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\nTHECAMBRIDGECOMPANIONTOEARLYMODERNPHILOSOPHYTheCambridgeCompaniontoEarlyModernPhilosophyisacomprehensiveintroductiontothecentraltopicsandchangingshapeofphilosophicalinquiryintheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies.Itexploresoneofthemostin-novativeperiodsinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy,extendingfromMontaigne,Bacon,andDescartesthroughHumeandKant.Duringthisperiod,philosophersinitiatedandrespondedtomajorintellectualdevelopmentsinnaturalscience,religion,andpolitics,transformingintheprocessconceptsanddoctrinesinheritedfromancientandmedievalphilosophy.InthisCompanion,leadingspecialistsexamineearlymoderntreatmentsofthemethodologicalandconcep-tualfoundationsofnaturalscience,metaphysics,philoso-phyofmind,logicandlanguage,moralandpoliticalphilosophy,andtheology.AfinalchapterlooksforwardtothephilosophyoftheEnlightenment.Thiswillbeanin-valuableguideforallwhoareinterestedinthephilosophicalthoughtoftheearlymodernperiod.DONALDRUTHERFORDisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUni-versityofCalifornia,SanDiego.HeistheauthorofLeibnizandtheRationalOrderofNature(1995),editor(withJ.A.Cover)ofLeibniz:NatureandFreedom(2005),andeditorandtranslator(withBrandonLook)ofTheLeibniz–DesBossesCorrespondence(2007).CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nOTHERVOLUMESINTHESERIESOFCAMBRIDGECOMPANIONSABELARDEditedbyJEFFREYE.BROWERandKEVINGUILFOYADORNOEditedbyTHOMASHUHNANSELMEditedbyBRIANDAVIESandBRIANLEFTOWAQUINASEditedbyNORMANKRETZMANNandELEONORESTUMPARABICPHILOSOPHYEditedbyPETERADAMSONandRICHARDC.TAYLORHANNAHARENDTEditedbyDANAVILLAARISTOTLEEditedbyJONATHANBARNESAUGUSTINEEditedbyELEONORESTUMPandNORMANKRETZMANNBACONEditedbyMARKKUPELTONENSIMONEDEBEAUVOIREditedbyCLAUDIACARDBERKELEYEditedbyKENNETHP.WINKLERBRENTANOEditedbyDALEJACQUETTECRITICALTHEORYEditedbyFREDRUSHDARWINEditedbyJONATHANHODGEandGREGORYRADICKDESCARTESEditedbyJOHNCOTTINGHAMDUNSSCOTUSEditedbyTHOMASWILLIAMSEARLYGREEKPHILOSOPHYEditedbyA.A.LONGFEMINISMINPHILOSOPHYEditedbyMIRANDAFRICKERandJENNIFERHORNSBYFOUCAULTEditedbyGARYGUTTINGFREUDEditedbyJEROMENEUGADAMEREditedbyROBERTJ.DOSTALGALILEOEditedbyPETERMACHAMERGERMANIDEALISMEditedbyKARLAMERIKSGREEKANDROMANPHILOSOPHYEditedbyDAVIDSEDLEYHABERMASEditedbySTEPHENK.WHITEHEGELEditedbyFREDERICKBEISERHEIDEGGEREditedbyCHARLESGUIGNONHOBBESEditedbyTOMSORELLHUMEEditedbyDAVIDFATENORTONHUSSERLEditedbyBARRYSMITHandDAVIDWOODRUFFSMITHWILLIAMJAMESEditedbyRUTHANNAPUTNAMCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKANTEditedbyPAULGUYERKANTANDMODERNPHILOSOPHYEditedbyPAULGUYERKEYNESEditedbyROGERBACKHOUSEandBRADLEYBATEMANKIERKEGAARDEditedbyALASTAIRHANNAYandGORDONMARINOLEIBNIZEditedbyNICHOLASJOLLEYLEVINASEditedbySIMONCRITCHLEYandROBERTBERNASCONILOCKEEditedbyVERECHAPPELLMAIMONIDESEditedbyKENNETHSEESKINMALEBRANCHEEditedbySTEVENNADLERMARXEditedbyTERRELLCARVERMEDIEVALJEWISHPHILOSOPHYEditedbyDANIELH.FRANKandOLIVERLEAMANMEDIEVALPHILOSOPHYEditedbyA.S.MCGRADEMERLEAU-PONTYEditedbyTAYLORCARMANandMARKHANSENMILLEditedbyJOHNSKORUPSKIMONTAIGNEEditedbyULLRICHLANGERNEWTONEditedbyI.BERNARDCOHENandGEORGEE.SMITHNIETZSCHEEditedbyBERNDMAGNUSandKATHLEENHIGGINSOCKHAMEditedbyPAULVINCENTSPADEPASCALEditedbyNICHOLASHAMMONDPEIRCEEditedbyCHERYLMISAKPLATOEditedbyRICHARDKRAUTPLOTINUSEditedbyLLOYDP.GERSONQUINEEditedbyROGERF.GIBSONRAWLSEditedbySAMUELFREEMANTHOMASREIDEditedbyTERENCECUNEOandRENEVANWOUDENBERGROUSSEAUEditedbyPATRICKRILEYBERTRANDRUSSELLEditedbyNICHOLASGRIFFINSARTREEditedbyCHRISTINAHOWELLSSCHOPENHAUEREditedbyCHRISTOPHERJANAWAYTHESCOTTISHENLIGHTENMENTEditedbyALEXANDERBROADIECambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nADAMSMITHEditedbyKNUDHAAKONSSENSPINOZAEditedbyDONGARRETTTHESTOICSEditedbyBRADINWOODTOCQUEVILLEEditedbyCHERYLB.WELCHWITTGENSTEINEditedbyHANSSLUGAandDAVIDSTERNCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheCambridgeCompaniontoEARLYMODERNPHILOSOPHYEditedbyDonaldRutherfordUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiegoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\ncambridgeuniversitypressCambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,Sa˜oPaulocambridgeuniversitypressTheEdinburghBuilding,Cambridgecb22ru,UKPublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversityPress,NewYorkwww.cambridge.orgInformationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9780521529624©CambridgeUniversityPress2006Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.Firstpublished2006PrintedintheUnitedKingdomattheUniversityPress,CambridgeAcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibraryisbn-13978-0-521-82242-8hardbackisbn-100-521-82242-4hardbackisbn-13978-0-521-52962-4paperbackisbn-100-521-52962-xpaperbackCambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyofURLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication,anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,accurateorappropriate.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nCONTENTS423582pageListoffiguresixNotesoncontributorsxPrefacexiiiListofabbreviationsxivIntroductionDONALDRUTHERFORD11InnovationandorthodoxyinearlymodernphilosophyDONALDRUTHERFORD112Knowledge,evidence,andmethodSTEPHENGAUKROGER393FromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscienceDENNISDESCHENE674MetaphysicsNICHOLASJOLLEY955ThescienceofmindTADSCHMALTZ1366LanguageandlogicMICHAELLOSONSKY1707ThepassionsandthegoodlifeSUSANJAMES198viiCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nviiiContents8Thefoundationsofmorality:virtue,law,andobligationSTEPHENDARWALL2219TheoriesofthestateA.JOHNSIMMONS25010TheologyandtheGodofthephilosophersTHOMASM.LENNON27411ScholasticschoolsandearlymodernphilosophyM.W.F.STONE29912Towardenlightenment:KantandthesourcesofdarknessJ.B.SCHNEEWIND328Shortbiographiesofmajorearlymodernphilosophers353Bibliography365Index401CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFIGURESpage1Classificationofthesciences,Hobbes,Leviathan,ch.9132Representationofaddition,Descartes,Rules,18613Modeloftherainbow,Descartes,Me´te´ores62ixCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nNOTESONCONTRIBUTORSSTEPHENDARWALLisJohnDeweyCollegiateProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofMichigan.Hehaswrittenwidelyinmoralphilosophyandthehistoryofethics,andistheauthorofImpartialReason(1983),TheBritishMoralistsandtheInternal“Ought”:1640–1740(1995),PhilosophicalEthics(1998),WelfareandRa-tionalCare(2002),andTheSecond-PersonStandpoint(2006).DENNISDESCHENEisProfessorofPhilosophyatWashingtonUniver-sityinSt.Louis.HeistheauthorofPhysiologia:NaturalPhiloso-phyinLateAristotelianandCartesianThought(1996),Life’sForm:LateAristotelianConceptionsoftheSoul(2000),andSpiritsandClocks:MachineandOrganisminDescartes(2001).STEPHENGAUKROGERisProfessorofHistoryofPhilosophyandHis-toryofScienceandARCProfessorialFellowattheUniversityofSydney.HeisauthorofExplanatoryStructures(1978),CartesianLogic(1985),Descartes:AnIntellectualBiography(1995),FrancisBaconandtheTransformationofEarly-ModernPhilosophy(2001),Descartes’SystemofNaturalPhilosophy(2002),andTheEmer-genceofaScientificCultureintheWest,1210–1685:ScienceandtheMakingofModernity,volumeI(forthcoming).SUSANJAMESisProfessorofPhilosophyattheBirkbeckSchoolofPhilosophy,UniversityofLondon.SheisauthorofTheContentofSocialExplanation(1984)andPassionandAction:TheEmotionsinSeventeenth-CenturyPhilosophy(1997),andeditor(withGiselaBock)ofBeyondEqualityandDifference(1992).xCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nNotesoncontributorsxiNICHOLASJOLLEYisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCalifornia,Irvine.HeistheauthorofLeibnizandLocke:AStudyoftheNewEssaysonHumanUnderstanding(1984),TheLightoftheSoul:TheoriesofIdeasinLeibniz,Malebranche,andDescartes(1990),Locke:HisPhilosophicalThought(1999),andLeibniz(2005).HeistheeditorofTheCambridgeCompaniontoLeibniz(1995)andco-editorofNicolasMalebranche’sDialoguesonMetaphysicsandonReligion(1997).THOMASM.LENNONisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofWesternOntario.HeistheauthorofTheBattleofGodsandGiants:TheLegaciesofDescartesandGassendi,1655–1715(1993),ReadingBayle(1999),and(withPatriciaEaston)TheCartesianEmpiri-cismofFranc¸oisBayle(1992),editorandtranslatorofAgainstCar-tesianPhilosophy:Pierre-DanielHuet’sCensuraPhilosophiaeCartesianae(2003),and(withP.J.Olscamp)NicolasMalebranche,TheSearchafterTruthandElucidationsoftheSearchafterTruth(1997),andeditorofCartesianViews:EssaysPresentedtoRichardA.Watson(2003).MICHAELLOSONSKYisProfessorofPhilosophyatColoradoStateUniversity.HeisauthorofLinguisticTurnsinModernPhilosophy(2005)andEnlightenmentandActionfromDescartestoKant:Pas-sionateThought(2001),andeditorofWilhelmvonHumboldt’sOnLanguage(1999).Heisco-author(withHeimirGeirsson)ofBegin-ningMetaphysics(1998)andco-editor(withGeirsson)ofReadingsinLanguageandMind(1996).DONALDRUTHERFORDisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego.HeistheauthorofLeibnizandtheRationalOrderofNature(1995),editor(withJ.A.Cover)ofLeibniz:NatureandFreedom(2005),andeditorandtranslator(withBrandonLook)ofTheLeibniz–DesBossesCorrespondence(2007).TADSCHMALTZisProfessorofPhilosophyatDukeUniversity.HeistheauthorofMalebranche’sTheoryoftheSoul(1996)andRadicalCartesianism(2002),andhaseditedReceptionsofDescartes(2005).HecurrentlyiseditoroftheJournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nxiiNotesoncontributorsJ.B.SCHNEEWIND,ProfessorEmeritusofPhilosophy,JohnsHopkinsUniversity,istheauthorofSidgwick’sEthicsandVictorianMoralPhilosophy(1977)andTheInventionofAutonomy(1998).Hehasalsoeditedananthology,MoralPhilosophyfromMontaignetoKant(1990),andwrittennumerousarticlesonthehistoryofethics.A.JOHNSIMMONSisCommonwealthProfessorofPhilosophyandProfessorofLawattheUniversityofVirginia.HehasbeenaneditorofthejournalPhilosophy&PublicAffairssince1982.HeistheauthorofMoralPrinciplesandPoliticalObligations(1979),TheLockeanTheoryofRights(1992),OntheEdgeofAnarchy(1993),JustificationandLegitimacy(2000),IsThereADutytoObeytheLaw?ForandAgainst(withC.H.Wellman)(2005),andmanyarticlesinpolitical,moral,andlegaltheory.HehasalsoeditedInternationalEthics(1985)andPunishment(1995).M.W.F.STONEisProfessorofPhilosophyattheHigherInstituteofPhilosophy,CatholicUniversity,Leuven,Belgium.Heistheauthorofmanyarticlesonlatemedievalandearlymodernscholasticism,andaforthcomingtwo-volumehistoryofcasuistry,TheSubtleArtsofCasuistry:AnEssayinHistoryofMoralPhilosophy.Hispresentresearchisonideasofgraceandnatureinearlymodernphilosophy.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nPREFACEThisCambridgeCompanionaimstoserveasanintroductionandguidetowhathascometobeknownas“earlymodernphilosophy”–roughly,philosophyspanningtheperiodbetweentheendofthesixteenthcenturyandtheendoftheeighteenthcentury,or,intermsoffigures,MontaignethroughKant.Itsintendedaudienceincludesbothstudentsofphilosophyandthosewithageneralinterestintheperiodwhowishtoknowmoreabouthowphilosophyrelatestocontemporarydevelopmentsinscience,religion,andpolitics.Atthesametime,itishopedthatthechaptersareframedinsuchawaythatevenspecialistswillbeofferedafreshlookatthephilosophicalthoughtofearlymodernEurope.ManypeoplehavecontributedtotheproductionofthisCompan-ion.Besidestheindividualauthors,towhomIoweaspecialdebt,IwouldliketothankseveralanonymousreviewersforthePress,whoprovidedusefulsuggestionsaboutthecontentsofthevolume.Inearlyworkonit,IwasaidedbyMatthewKisner;valuableassist-ancewasprovidedlaterbyKristenIrwin,whoalsocollaboratedontheshortbiographiesthatareincludedasanappendix.HelpfuladvicewasofferedalongthewaybyRichardArneson,DavidBrink,DanielGarber,StevenNadler,andAlisonSimmons.Throughouttheeditorialprocess,HilaryGaskinhasbeenasourceofencourage-mentandgoodcounsel,forwhichIamgrateful.Mygreatestthanksarereserved,asalways,forMadeleinePicciotto,whocreatedspace,time,andotherconditionsforthepossibilityofthisbook.xiiiCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nABBREVIATIONSFullreferencesappearinthebibliographyunderPrimarySources.BACONNewOrg.NewOrganon(Bacon2000)BOYLEOriginTheOriginofFormsandQualitiesAccordingtotheCorpuscularHypothesis(inBoyle1991)DESCARTESATŒuvresdeDescartes,AdamandTannery(Descartes1974–86)CSMThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,Cottinghametal.(Descartes1984–91)PassionsThePassionsoftheSoul(inATXIandinCSMI)Princ.PrinciplesofPhilosophy(inATVIIIA[Latin]andIXB[French]andinCSMI)HOBBESLev.Leviathan(Hobbes1994)HUMETreatiseATreatiseonHumanNature(Hume2000)EnquiryEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding(inHume1975)xivCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nAbbreviationsxvKANTGes.Schr.GesammelteSchriften,Ko¨niglichpreussischen(later:Berlin)AkademiederWissenschaften(Kant1910–).LEIBNIZAGPhilosophicalEssays,AriewandGarber(Leibniz1989)GPDiephilosophischenSchriften,Gerhardt(Leibniz1875–90)LPhilosophicalPapersandLetters,Loemker(Leibniz1969)MTheLeibniz–ArnauldCorrespondence,Mason(Leibniz1967)DiscourseDiscourseonMetaphysics(inAGandL)NewEss.NewEssaysonHumanUnderstanding(Leibniz1981)Theod.Theodicy:EssaysontheGoodnessofGod,theFreedomofManandtheOriginofEvil(Leibniz1952)LOCKEEssayAnEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding(Locke1975)MALEBRANCHEOCŒuvrescomple`tes,Robinet(Malebranche1958–84)Dial.DialoguesonMetaphysicsandonReligion(Malebranche1997a)SearchTheSearchafterTruth(Malebranche1997b)TNGTreatiseonNatureandGrace(Malebranche1992)SPINOZAEthicsEthicsDemonstratedinGeometricalOrder(inSpinoza1985)TTPTheological-PoliticalTreatise(Spinoza1998)SUA´REZDisp.met.Disputationesmetaphysicae(inSua´rez1856–78,XXV–XXVI)CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nDONALDRUTHERFORDIntroductionTheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturieshavelongbeenrecog-nizedasanespeciallyfruitfulperiodinthehistoryofWesternphilosophy.Mostoftenthishasbeenassociatedwiththeachieve-mentsofahandfulofgreatthinkers:theso-called“rationalists”(Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz)and“empiricists”(Locke,Berkeley,1Hume),whoseinquiriesculminateinKant’s“Criticalphilosophy.”Thesecanonicalfigureshavebeencelebratedforthedepthandrigoroftheirtreatmentsofperennialphilosophicalquestions,concern-ing,forexample,existence,modality,causality,knowledge,obliga-tion,andsovereignty,aswellasfortheireffortstopushphilosophyinnewdirections,challengingmanyoftheassumptionsofancientandmedievalphilosophy.Inthisconnection,ithasbeenarguedthatepistemologyassumesanewsignificanceintheearlymodernperiodasphilosophersstrivetodefinetheconditionsandlimitsofhumanknowledge.Yetearlymodernphilosophersmakemajorcon-tributionsinalmosteveryareaofphilosophy,andinmanycasestheirconclusionscontinuetoserveasstartingpointsforpresent-daydebates.ThechaptersinthisCompanionaredesignedtoacquaintthereaderwiththemostimportantdevelopmentsinearlymodernphilosophyandtopointthewaytowardmoreadvancedstudiesinthefield.THENEWHISTORYOFEARLYMODERNPHILOSOPHYFewwouldchallengethenotionthattheearlymodernperiodisarichandevenrevolutionaryerainthehistoryofphilosophy.Never-theless,scholarshippublishedduringthelastthirtyyearshasledtoarevisioninourconceptionofthescopeandsignificanceofearly1CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n2DONALDRUTHERFORDmodernphilosophy.Fourdevelopmentsarenoteworthy,allofthemassociatedwithanincreasedemphasisonacontexualizedunder-standingofthepracticeofphilosophyandoftheknowledgeitproduces.First,historianshavechallengedtheassumptionthatearlymodernphilosophycanbeadequatelycomprehendedintermsofthemajorpublishedworksofitsmostfamousfigures.Itisnowacommonplacethattounderstandaphilosopher’sviews–expressedinthewell-honedsentencesofabooksuchasDescartes’sMedita-tionsorKant’sCritiqueofPureReason–requiresunderstandingtheminrelationtotheentirecorpusofthephilosopher’swritings,publishedandunpublished.Correspondences,preliminarydrafts,andsubsequentrevisionsofpublishedtextsareallseenasimportantsourcesofevidence.Inaddition,itisincreasinglyacknowledgedthatourunderstandingofacanonicaltextcanbedeepenedbyreadingitinconjunctionwiththeworksofaphilosopher’simmedi-atepredecessorsandcontemporaries–worksthatoftensupplyan2illuminatingbackgroundforitsinterpretation.Inshort,evenifapublishedtreatisecarriesanimprimaturastheauthoritativeexpres-sionofaphilosopher’spositiononagiventopic,understandingthatpositionoftenisfacilitated,andsometimesisonlypossible,byrelatingittootherpiecesoftextualevidence.Asecondandmoreprofoundchallengehastargetedtheprivilegedstatusaccordedtothephilosophersmakingupthetraditionalcanonofearlymodernphilosophy.Inrecentyears,thecastofleadingcharactershasexpandedtoincludeanarrayoffigureswhoaresignificantthinkersintheirownrightandwhosethoughtintersectsatvitalpointswiththatofthecanonicalseven.Thesefiguresin-cludeMicheldeMontaigne,FranciscoSua´rez,HugoGrotius,FrancisBacon,PierreGassendi,ThomasHobbes,HenryMore,RalphCudworth,AnneConway,AntoineArnauld,NicolasMalebranche,BlaisePascal,PierreBayle,SamuelPufendorf,FrancisHutcheson,ThomasReid,AdamSmith,Jean-JacquesRousseau,andChristianWolff–tomentiononlysomeoftheauthorswhosewritingshavebeensubjecttointensiveanalysisinthesecondaryliterature.Byattendingtotheirworks,historianshavearrivedatfullerandmorenuancedaccountsofphilosophy’sdevelopmentintheearlymodernperiod.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nIntroduction3Oneresultoftheseeffortstomapmoreaccuratelythelandscapeofearlymodernphilosophyhasbeenagrowingskepticismconcern-ingtraditionalinterpretativecategories(e.g.“rationalist”versus“empiricist”).Suchdichotomieshavebeencriticizedasinadequateforunderstandingtherelationshipsamongtheviewsofearlymodernphilosophers.Moreover,theyhavetendedtoreflectabiasinthehistoryofphilosophytowardepistemologyandmetaphysicsandawayfromethics,politicalphilosophy,andtheology.Recentscholarshiphassoughttocounterthisbiasboththroughdetailedstudiesofthepracticalphilosophyoftheearlymodernperiod,andthroughstudiesthataimtodeliverasynopticpictureoftheviewsofparticularthinkers,emphasizingthecloseconnectionsbetween,for3example,metaphysicaltheoriesandethicaltheories.Finally,thedevelopmentofearlymodernphilosophyincreas-inglyhasbeenrecognizedtobeinseparablefrom,andinmanycasesdependentupon,alargersetofintellectualandculturalchanges,whichincludetheemergenceofmodernnaturalscience,theologicalconflictswithinandbetweentheCatholicandProtestantchurches,andthemovementtowardthemodernnation-state.Withintheearlymodernperiod,philosophyretainsadistinctidentityasadisciplinewhoseconcernsarecontinuouswiththoseofancientandmedievalphilosophy,ontheonehand,andlatermodernphilosophy,ontheother.Whatthenewhistoryofearlymodernphilosophyhasstressed,however,isthatabstractphilosophicalproblemsacquireadetermin-atecontentwithinaspecificintellectualcontext–onethatmustbeappreciatedinordertounderstandthetheoriesandargumentsofthephilosophersinquestion.Inmostcasesonefindsnosharplinedividingphilosophicaldebatesconcerning,forexample,thenatureofmatterorfreedomofthewill,andrelateddebatesinphysicsortheology.Thus,again,oneisforcedtotakeamoreexpansiveviewoftherelevanttextualevidencethanpreviouslywascommoninthehistoryofphilosophy.Thepresentvolumereflectstheseprioritiesofthenewhistoryofearlymodernphilosophy.Itsfocusisthechangingshapeofphilo-sophicalinquiryintheearlymodernperiod,withemphasisplacedonthetransformationofconceptsanddoctrinesinheritedfromancientandmedievalphilosophyandtheargumentsusedtojustifythesetransformations.UnlikeotherguidestothephilosophyoftheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n4DONALDRUTHERFORDperiod,thisCambridgeCompanionisnotorganizedbyindividualphilosophersbutratherbyareasofinquiry.Followinganopeningchapterthatlooksbroadlyatthecharacteranddefiningtensionsofearlymodernphilosophy(DonaldRutherford),thevolumeproceedssystematicallythroughchaptersdedicatedtothemethodologicalandconceptualfoundationsofnaturalscience(StephenGaukroger;DennisDesChene),metaphysics(NicholasJolley),philosophyofmind(TadSchmaltz),logicandlanguage(MichaelLosonksy),ethics(SusanJames;StephenDarwall),politicalphilosophy(A.JohnSimmons),theology(ThomasM.Lennon),andtheenduringvitalityofscholasticthought(M.W.F.Stone).AfinalchapterlooksaheadtotheendoftheearlymodernperiodthroughthelensoftheEnlightenmentphilosophyofKant(J.B.Schneewind).THEPHILOSOPHICALLIFE4Earlymodernphilosopherscomeinmanystripes.Somewereuni-versityteachers,somewerenot.Somewereclerics,somewerenot.Asonemightexpect,almostallweremen,butanumberofwomenarenowrecognizedasmakingnotablecontributionstothephiloso-5phyoftheearlymodernperiod.WiththeexceptionofSpinoza,allthemajorfiguresofseventeenth-andeighteenth-centuryphiloso-phywereprofessedChristians,thoughwhatexactlysuchaprofes-sionmeantwasapointofcontention,reflectingthecontinuedprominenceofreligiousdiscordandtheologicaldebateintheperiod.Althoughsomeearlymodernphilosopherschosetopursuecareersasuniversityteachers,manywerewaryoffollowingsuchapathforfearoftherestrictionsthatmightbeplacedontheirfree-domtophilosophize.SpinozafamouslyturneddowntheofferofaprofessorshipinHeidelbergforthisreason,choosingtosupporthimselfasalensgrinder.Inthemiddleoftheeighteenthcentury,ChristianWolffwasforcedtofleehispositionatHalle,becauserumorshadspreadtothekingofthedangerouspoliticalconse-quencesthatcouldbeinferredfromhisdoctrines.Forthemostpart,itwasthoughtthataphilosophicallifecouldbestbepursuedout-sidetheuniversity.Insomecases,thiswasmadepossiblebyaprivateincome(Descartes,Shaftesbury);inothersitdependeduponsecuringareligiousoffice(Gassendi,Malebranche,Berkeley)orCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nIntroduction5otheremployment(Bacon,Hobbes,Leibniz)thatleftonewithsuffi-cienttimeandfreedomtopursueone’sownreflections.Forthosephilosopherswhoeschewedauniversitycareer,phil-osophywasforthemostpartasolitaryendeavor.Fromthebegin-ningoftheseventeenthcentury,however,concertedattemptsweremadetoshareideasandintelligenceaboutthelatestdevelopmentsinnaturalphilosophy–apatternofcooperationthatculminatedintheestablishmentofthefirstscientificsocietiesinFlorence,Paris,andLondon.Priortothis,MarinMersennehadconvenedgatheringsthatbroughttogethermanyoftheleadingthinkersinParis,includ-6ingatdifferenttimesDescartes,Gassendi,Hobbes,andGrotius.Mersennealsocarriedonanextensivecorrespondencethatcon-nectedscholarsfromacrossEurope,anactivityinwhichhewasfollowedbyHenryOldenburg,secretaryoftheRoyalSocietyofLondonduringthe1660s,andbyLeibniz.Intheseways,philoso-pherswhowerenotuniversityteacherswerenonethelessdrawntogetherininformalintellectualcommunities.Theworldofearlymodernphilosophywasanintimateone.ThroughhisfriendNicolas-ClaudeFabridePeiresc,GassendiobtainedoneofGalileo’snewtelescopes,withwhichhemadeaseriesofimportantobservations.In1634,whiletravelingthroughItaly,HobbespaidapersonalvisittoGalileo,thenunderhousearrestnearFlorence.ThroughtheofficesofMersenne,Descartes’sMedita-tionswerepublishedin1641withobjectionsbyArnauld,Gassendi,andHobbes.WhenLeibnizarrivedinParisin1672,hemadetheacquaintanceofMalebrancheandArnauld.OndepartingParisfouryearslater,hespentaweekindiscussionwithSpinozainHolland.Inhisearlylife,hehadwrittentoathenelderlyHobbes;heengagedinimportantcorrespondenceswithArnauldandWolff;hewrotebooksrespondingtoworksbyBayleandLocke;andneartheendofhislifehewasdrawnintoabitterfeudwithNewtonovertheirrivalclaimstopriorityinthediscoveryofthecalculus.SuchpatternsofcontactcontinuedintheeighteenthcenturywithphilosopherssuchasHume,whocomposedmuchofhisTreatiseofHumanNatureinFranceatLaFle`che,whereDescarteshadstudiedoveracenturyearlier.HumewasafriendoftheScottishphilosophersFrancisHutchesonandAdamSmith,andlateinlifemadeanabortiveattempttoarrangerefugeforJean-JacquesRousseauinEngland.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n6DONALDRUTHERFORDDespitethelargelysolitarynatureoftheirownactivity,then,philosophersintheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturiesactivelystudied,disagreedwith,andrespondedtotheviewsoftheircontem-porariesandrecentpredecessors.Thismakestheperiodanespe-ciallyattractiveoneinwhichtostudythedevelopmentofphilosophicalideasthroughtheactiveengagementofthinkerswithoneanother.Suchanapproachhasservedasastartingpointformuchrecentresearch.Movingbeyondthequestionofwhetheragivenphilosophermayormaynothavereadtheworksofaninflu-entialprecursor,historiansofphilosophyhaveendeavoredtodisen-tangleandreconstructlinesofargumentthatlinktheviewsofsuccessivethinkers,illuminatinginthiswaythesourcesofphilo-sophicalcreativityandthestandardsofrationalitythatguidetheprogressofphilosophy.LOOKINGAHEADTheseventeenthcenturyisaperiodofsweepingintellectualchange.FromthegroundbreakingworksofBaconandGalileotothecrowningachievementofNewton’sPrincipia,thecenturyushersinaradicallynewconceptionofthenaturalworldandtheplaceofhumanbeingsinit.Equallydramaticarethesearchingreexaminationsofthefoundationsoflaw,liberty,andpoliticalsovereigntycarriedoutbysuchthinkersasGrotius,Hobbes,andLocke.Philosophyistransformedateverylevelbythesedevelop-ments.Well-entrenchedassumptionsaboutcausality,matter,mind,knowledge,language,law,andevenGodaresubjecttore-appraisalandinmanycasesrevision.Theresultisthebodyofphilosophicaltheorieswetodaythinkofasthefirstexamplesofearlymodernphilosophy,distinguishingtheminthiswayfromtheinheritedsynthesisofancientGreekphilosophyandChristianitythathadprevailedtothatpoint.ManyofthechaptersinthisCompanionbeginfromaviewofearlymodernphilosophyasdefinedbytheeffortsofearlyseventeenth-centurythinkerstothrowoffthe“yokeofAristotle.”Often,itwasnotthephilosophyofAristotlehimselfwhomthesethinkerswerereactingagainst,butaversionofscholasticAristote-lianism(or“scholasticism”)whichprevailedinuniversityteachingthroughtheseventeenthcentury,andinsomelocationswellintoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nIntroduction7theeighteenth.Fosteredbytheinnovatorsthemselves(e.g.Bacon,Hobbes,Descartes),thedominantnarrativeofthehistoryofearlymodernphilosophyremainsthatofarevolutionarymovementthataimstoilluminatethedarknessofasterileorthodoxywiththesharplightofanewcriticalreason.ThechaptersbyDonaldRutherford(“Innovationandorthodoxyinearlymodernphilosophy”)andM.W.F.Stone(“Scholasticschoolsandearlymodernphilosophy”)argueindifferentwaysfortheneedtoqualifythisnarrative.Rutherfordshowsthat,withafewexceptions,theleadinginnovatorsofearlymodernphilosophywerecommittedtomaintainingaharmonybetweentheconclusionsofphilosophicalreasonandthetenetsofChristianity.HoweverradicaltheirchallengestoAristoteliannaturalphilosophy,logic,andepis-temology,theysoughttopreservethecompatibilityoftheirviewswithChristianorthodoxy,muchastheirmedievalpredecessorshaddone.Fromtheotherdirection,Stonedetailshowearlymodernscholasticphilosophyisfarfromthemoribundtraditionthatitisoftendepictedasbeing.Thereisconsiderableinnovationandcrit-icalreflectionhereaswell,highlightedbythewidelyinfluentialworksoftheJesuitsLuisMolinaandFranciscoSua´rez.Thus,itisanoversimplificationtothinkofearlymodernphilosophyexclusivelyintermsofthereplacingoftheoldbythenew.Otherchaptersextendthispictureofthecomplexityoftheplayoftheoldversusthenewintheearlymodernperiod.IntheaptimageofferedbyNicholasJolleyinhischapter“Metaphysics,”earlymodernphiloso-phersoftencanbeseenasdeliveringnewwineinoldbottles–bottlesthatlaterarefoundtoholdwithdifficultythepotentvintagethathasbeenpouredintothem.Afurtherpointtokeepinmindisthatduringtheearlymodernperiod,‘philosophy’doesnotdesignateaunitaryenterprise.Bothdiachronicallyandsynchronically,itisaconstellationoflooselyrelatedinvestigationsoffundamentalquestionsaboutnature,hu-manity,andGod.Wecanhelpfullydistinguishthreestagesintheevolutionofearlymodernphilosophy,correspondingroughlytothethreecenturiesencompassedbytheperiod.ExtendingapatternthatbeginsintheItalianRenaissance,thesixteenthcenturywitnessesthereemergenceofahostofancientphilosophicalviews–Platonism,Pyrrhonianskepticism,Epicureanism,Stoicism–alongwithavarietyofattemptstosynthesizetheirinsightsandtorenderCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n8DONALDRUTHERFORDthemconsistentwithChristianity.Theresultsare,byancientlights,eclecticmixturesofideas,butsuchmixturesmakeforafertilesoilfromwhichgrowmanyoftheinnovationsofthenextcentury.Theseventeenthcenturyisbestknownforlandmarkadvancesintheunderstandingofnature,boththosethatwetakeasdefiningthebeginningsofmodernnaturalscienceandthosethatweseeascharacteristicallyphilosophicalreflectionsonthenatureofmindandbody,andtherelationofhumanbeingstoGod.Herethephil-osopherwhocaststhelongestshadowisDescartes,whoseviewsstimulatetheinquiriesofasuccessionoffollowers–Malebranche,Arnauld,Pascal,Spinoza,Leibniz–dedicatedtoextendingorcor-rectinghisideas.YetDescartesisbynomeanstheonlyseminalphilosophicalthinkeroftheseventeenthcentury.Duringhislife-time,hisgreatestrivalisGassendi,whoseeffortstodefendaChris-tianizedEpicureanismhelptomakerespectabletherevivalofancientatomism.EquallysignificantarethecontributionsofHobbes,afriendandallyofGassendi,whoalongwithSpinozaformulatesthemostseriouschallengeintheseventeenthcenturytoreceivedideasinmoralandpoliticalphilosophy,andLocke,whoisinstrumentalinmovingphilosophy’scenterofgravityawayfromspeculativemetaphysics.Wheretheadvancesofseventeenth-centuryphilosophyareoftententativeattemptstoreconceivethebroadestoutlinesofre-ality,theeighteenthcenturybuildsonthesecurefoundationsofNewton’sunifiedtheoryofthemathematicalstructureofnature.Foreighteenth-centuryphilosophers,consequently,thereiscom-parativelylittlemysteryabouttheoperationofnature.Withthisissuesettled,theweightofphilosophicalinterestshiftsfromtheor-eticalphilosophytopracticalphilosophy–aboveall,tothequestionofthegroundsofthemoralandpoliticalobligationsofhumanbeings.Underlyingmanyofthedebatesofthecenturyistheques-tionthatmightbeseenasthemostsignificantlegacyofearlymodernphilosophy:Canhumanlife,andwhateverwejudgetobeofvalueaboutit,bedefinedindependentlyofreferencetoGod,conceivedaccordingtobiblicalteachingashumanity’screator,lawgiver,andjudge?Thepreviouscenturieshadrevealedthedeepandbloodyriftsthatcouldopenbetweenmenwhodisagreedaboutreligion.Consequently,themotivationtoriseabovetheseCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nIntroduction9differencesandtounderstandhumanbeingsinpurelyseculartermswasstrong.Howpreciselytodothis,however,wasbynomeansobvious.Canhumanbeingsbeunderstoodmerelyasapartofnature,asSpinozahadsuggestedalreadyattheendoftheseven-teenthcentury?Isthereanontheologicalyetuniversalconceptionofreasonintermsofwhichwecandefinethecommonmoralidentityandvalueofhumanbeings?ThesearethequestionswithwhichtheleadingphilosophersoftheEnlightenmentstruggled,andtoalargeextenttheyremainquestionsforustoday.NOTES1Forarecentstudythatconformstothispattern,seeBennett2001.2SeethecontributionstotheCambridgePhilosophicalTextsinContextseries,beginningwithAriew,Cottingham,andSorell1998.3RenewedemphasisonthepracticalphilosophyoftheearlymodernperiodhasbeenassociatedespeciallywiththeworkofJ.B.Schneewind(1998,2003,2004).Forothercontributions,seeTuck1982,1993;Darwall1995;Haakonssen1996;KrasnoffandBrender2006.4Overthepastdecadeanumberofexcellentbiographiesandbiograph-icalstudiesofearlymodernphilosophershaveappearedinEnglish:Gaukroger1995;Martinich1999;Nadler1999;Kuehn2001;Malcolm2002.5SeetheneweditionsofworksbyAnneConway(1996)andMargaretCavendish(2001),aswellasthetextscollectedinAtherton1994.6Similarinformalintellectualcircles,whichservedasforerunnersoflaterscientificsocieties,existedinotherEuropeancountries.SeeLux1991;Feingold1991.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nDONALDRUTHERFORD1InnovationandorthodoxyinearlymodernphilosophyANEWBEGINNING?Whatweknowtodayasearlymodernphilosophywasforgedintheopeningyearsoftheseventeenthcentury,inthewritingsofsuchthinkersasFrancisBacon,ThomasHobbes,andRene´Descartes.Wethinkofthisperiodasthebeginningofmodernphilosophyinpartbecausethesephilosopherssawthemselvesasthevanguardofanintellectualrevolution,whosegoalwastobreakwiththephiloso-phyofthepast.HeretheyidentifiedtheirmostimportanttargetasAristotle,whoseteachingsinlogicandmetaphysicshaddominatededucatedopinioninEuropethroughmostofthepreviousmillen-nium.Almostallofthebest-knownphilosophersandscientistsoftheseventeenthcenturysawAristotle’sviewsasasignificantim-pedimenttotheadvanceofknowledge,andbelievedthatprogresscouldonlybeginoncetheedificeofAristotle’ssystemhadbeenrazedandphilosophycouldbegintorebuildonsolidfoundations.ThemetaphorofdemolishingtheoldtomakeroomforthenewisfamiliartostudentsofphilosophyfromDescartes’sFirstMedita-tion,buttheEnglishphilosopherFrancisBaconhademployeditsometwentyyearsbeforeDescartes.InhisNewOrganon(anotherallusiontoAristotle,whoselogicalworkswereknownastheorga-non,or“instrument”),Bacondeclares:“Itisfutiletoexpectagreatadvancementinthesciencesfromoverlayingandimplantingnewthingsontheold;anewbeginninghastobemadefromthelowestfoundations,unlessoneiscontenttogoroundincirclesforever,1withmeagre,almostnegligible,progress”(NewOrg.,I.31).Amongleadingthinkersoftheseventeenthcentury,thebelieftookrootthatprogresswasatlastpossibleinphilosophy,butthatit11CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n12DONALDRUTHERFORDrequiredathoroughsweepingoutofoldpatternsofthought.TheprogressthatBaconandothersenvisionediscloselyassociatedwiththeemergenceofmodernnaturalscience:empiricallysupportedknowledgeofthestructureandlawsofnature,andtechniquesformanipulatingnaturesoastoproducebeneficialeffectsforhumanbeings.Collectively,theseinnovationsmakeupwhathascometo2beknownas“theScientificRevolution.”Itisimportant,however,toavoidanachronisminouruseoftheterm“science.”Priortotheseventeenthcentury,therewasnocleardistinctionbetweenphil-osophyandscience.SciencetakesitsnamefromtheLatinwordscientia,whichsignifiesasystematicbodyofknowledgesuchaswastraditionallysoughtbyphilosophy.Whatweknowasnaturalsciencewasoriginallysimplyabranchofphilosophy:naturalphil-osophy.Thiswayofcharacterizingthedisciplinesurviveswellintotheseventeenthcentury,asillustratedbyHobbes,whofollowstheancientsindefining“philosophy”or“science”asdemonstrativeknowledgeconcerningthecausesofthings,andthendrawsadiv-isionwithinthishighestcategoryofknowledgebetween“naturalphilosophy”and“civilphilosophy”(seeFig.1).Acceptingthispointabouttheclassificationofknowledge,thefactremainsthatmanyofthemostimportantintellectualbreak-throughsoftheearlymodernperiodoccurintheareaofnaturalphilosophyandthatthesebreakthroughsareresponsibleforredefin-ingthedisciplineofphilosophy.Bytheendoftheseventeenthcentury,adistinctionhadbeguntoemergebetween,ontheonehand,naturalscience,characterizedbyexperimentation,measure-ment,andmathematicalrepresentationsofnaturalorder,and,ontheother,philosophy,conceivedmoreorlesstraditionallyasaspecula-tivediscipline.AlthoughNewton’smagnumopusisentitledMath-ematicalPrinciplesofNaturalPhilosophy,Newtonhimselfisoneofthepeoplemostresponsiblefordrawingamethodologicalboundarybetweennaturalscienceandspeculativephilosophy.Theboundaryismarkedbyhisfamousassertion“hypothesesnonfingo”(“Idonotfeignhypotheses”).ForNewton,thedomainofscience,or“experi-mentalphilosophy,”isconfinedtoexplanatorypropositionsthatcanbe“deducedfromthephenomena.”Whatcannotbededucedinthiswayismerelyahypothesis,and“hypotheses,whethermetaphysicalorphysical,orbasedonoccultqualities,ormechanical,havenoplace3inexperimentalphilosophy.”CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n,ch.9.Leviathan.Classificationofthesciences,Hobbes,1FigureCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n14DONALDRUTHERFORDThisbriefhistorygivesusonewayofapproachingwhatisinnova-tiveaboutearlymodernphilosophy.Whatisinnovative–perhapsrevolutionary–aboutthephilosophyoftheseventeenthcenturyisexplainedbyitsrelationtomodernnaturalscience:apowerfulnewwayofthinkingabout,andanewsetofmethodsforinvestigating,thenaturalworld.Onthisreckoning,thedevelopmentofphilosophyisdrivenbythehopes,promises,andconceptualproblemsofnaturalscience.Philosophylaysthegroundworkforthenewscience,propa-gandizingonitsbehalfandclarifyingitsfundamentalprinciples.ThefirstmodernphilosopherstookitastheirmissiontoturnbackthestultifyinginfluenceofAristotle,sothattheprogressofsciencecouldproceedunimpeded.Thereafter,philosophywaslefttocontendwiththeconceptualproblemsthatappearedinthewakeofscience’sredescriptionofthenaturalworld,adaptingitsinsightstoproblemsinmetaphysics,ethics,andpolitics.Toalargeextent,thispictureremainswithustoday.Whilethereismuchthatiscompellingaboutthisstory,intworespectsitfallsshortofanadequaterepresentationofearlymodernphilosophy.First,byemphasizingthelinkbetweenseventeenth-centuryphilosophyandtheemergenceofmodernscience,itencour-agesthebeliefthatproductiveinquirywasconfinedtothoseareasofphilosophy–metaphysicsandepistemology–whosesubjectmattermostcloselyoverlapswiththenewtheoriesofthephysicalworld.Increasingly,thishasbeenrecognizedasanunsupportedassump-tion.Howeversignificantthechangesinphilosophers’explanationsofthefundamentalstructureandoperationsofnature,equallyde-cisivedevelopmentsoccurintheareasofmoralandpoliticalphil-osophy,wheretraditionalaccountsofthenormativeauthorityofnaturallawandthefoundationsofpoliticalsovereigntymeetrepeatedchallenges.Insomecases,therearedeepconnectionsbe-tweendebatesinthesedifferentareasofphilosophy.Therevision-aryaccountsoflaw,obligation,andvirtueofferedbyHobbesandSpinoza,forexample,canbetracedinparttoassumptionstheymakeabouttheunderlyingformofnature,includingthenatureofhumanbeings.Yettoseeeveryinnovationinmoralandpoliticalphilosophyasaconsequenceofpriordevelopmentsinnaturalphil-osophywouldbeagrossoversimplification.Intheseventeenthcentury,philosophershaveavarietyofreasonsrootedincon-temporarytheologicalandpoliticalconflictsforquestioningtheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy15coherenceoftraditionalexplanationsofnormativeauthority.Inde-pendentofcontemporarydevelopmentsinthenaturalsciences,thesesupplyampleimpetusforphilosophy’smovementinnew4directions.Theaccountofearlymodernphilosophyasmakingaradicalbreakwithitspast–whetherasaresultofthenewscienceorforotherreasons–mustalsobequalified.Whilesomeofitsbest-knownfiguresdescribetheirprojectsinrevolutionaryterms,recentscholarshiphasdocumentedtheextenttowhicheventhesephil-osophersremaintiedtotheideasandargumentsoftheirprede-cessors.Philosophicaltheoriesarerarely,ifever,entirelynewcreations.Moreoften,theyarebuiltwithbricksandtimberscav-engedfromphilosophy’spast.Thus,whiletheinnovatorsdepictedthemselvesasrazingtheedificeofAristotle’ssysteminordertobeginanew,whattheybuiltinitsplacewasastructureassembledwithmaterialsborrowedfromotherancientschoolsandfromAristotlehimself.Innocasewasthereasimplerupturewiththepast–theoldreplacedwithanentirelynovelwayofthinking.Furthermore,therewasbynomeansuniversalsupportintheseventeenthcenturyfortheideathatphilosophyneededtomoveinaradicallynewdirection.Opposingthosephilosopherswhoarguedforasharpbreakwiththepastwereotherswhourgeda5continuitybetweenancientandmodernthought.Forthelatter,contemporarydevelopmentsinnaturalphilosophycould,andshould,beincorporatedintoatheoreticalframeworkthatupheldtraditionalteachings,particularlyintheareasoftheologyandmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.Forthesephilosophers,nothingwasmoredisturbingthanthepossibilitythatinnovationsinnaturalphiloso-phymightleadtotheunderminingoftheancientmodel,sharedbyalmostallWesternreligiousandphilosophicaltraditions,ofanorderlyuniverse,ruledbyanomnipotentandprovidentdeity.Suchconservativetendenciesplayacriticalroleinshapingphilo-sophicaldebateintheseventeenthcentury.Asweshallsee,itisaperiodinwhichmassiveeffortisdevotedtoholdingontothepastbyinterpretingtheconceptsandtheoriesofthenewscienceintermsoftraditionalmetaphysicalandtheologicalcategories.Inmanycasesthiseffortisexertedbytheverysameindividualswhocontributesignificantlytotheemergenceofmodernscience.ThelessonwemaytakefromthisisthatthedevelopmentofearlymodernphilosophyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n16DONALDRUTHERFORDcannotbeexplainedsolelyintermsofthenewpictureofnaturethatformsthebasisofseventeenth-centurynaturalscience.Mostphil-osophersoftheperiod,infact,weredeterminedtounderstandthenewscienceinawaythatwouldrenderitconsistentwithatraditional,biblicallybasedconceptionofhumanbeingsandtheirdependenceonGod.Theexceptionisahandfulofradicalthinkers–aboveall,Spinoza–who,workingthroughtheimplicationsoftheideasthatprecipitatedthenewscience,aswellasnovelconceptionsofmoralandpoliticalauthority,werepreparedtochallengetheinterpretativeframeworkofJudeo-Christiantheologyasastartingpointfortheunderstandingofnatureandhumansociety.THEMEDIEVALSYNTHESISTheinnovationsofearlymodernphilosophyoccuragainsttheback-dropofarichtraditionofmedievalthought,whosefoundationswerelaidinthethirteenthcenturyinthewritingsofThomasAquinas.Aquinasisbynomeanstheonlymedievalphilosopherwhoseviewsareconsequentialforthedevelopmentofearlymodernphilosophy;nevertheless,thescholasticAristotelianismagainstwhichearlymodernphilosophersreactismostclearlytraceabletoAquinas’scomprehensivesynthesisofAristotle’snaturalphiloso-phyandChristiantheology.Aquinas’ssingularachievementwastoshowhow,throughadivisionofintellectuallabor,thesetwoverydifferentsystemsofthoughtcouldbeseenassupportingonean-other.ThekeywastoacceptthatAristotlewasgenerallyrightaboutphilosophyandthedetailsofthenaturalworld,andtheCatholicchurchrightaboutmattersspiritualanddivine.ThreefeaturesofAristotle’snaturalphilosophyarerelevantforourpurposes.First,Aristotleconceivesofthecosmosasconsistingofaclosedsetofconcentricspheres,atthecenterofwhichistheearth.Asharpdistinctionisdrawnbetweenthepropertiesofthingsenclosedwithintheinnermostsphere,thesublunaryworld,andthoselocatedonouterspheres,celestialobjectssuchasplanetsandfixedstars.Celestialobjectsareeternalandunchanging;thosethatmove,movewithperfectcircularmotionsaroundtheearth.Bycontrast,objectsinthesublunaryworldaresubjecttogenerationandcorruption,andmovewithanaturalmotionthatisrectilinearandperpendiculartotheearth’ssurface.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy17Second,onAristotle’saccount,allnaturalsubstances(rocks,plants,animals,people)arehylomorphic,orcompositesofformandmatter.Matteristhestufffromwhicheverythingismade.Byitself,however,matterhasnospecificcharacteristics;itis“purepotentiality.”Ineachcase,asubstance’squalitiesaresuppliedbyform,whichmakesitthekindofthingthatitis.Formgivesasubstanceitscharacteristicshape,properties,andpowertoact.Aristotleidentifiesthelatterpowerwiththesubstance’snature,whichis“asortofsourceandcauseofchangeandremainingunchangedinthattowhichitbelongsprimarilyandofitself”(Physics192b20–22).Everykindofsubstancehasaspecificnature,whichisresponsibleforitsbeingabletodowhateveritcando,frompurelyphysicalmotiontosensationandrationalthought.Asub-stance’sformalsodeterminesthatitsnaturalmotionshaveanintrinsicendorgoal(telos).Rocksnaturallyfalldownwardtotheearth;firerisesupwardfromtheearth.Plantsnaturallygrowtowardthesunandreproducethemselvesthroughseed.Animalsnaturallymovetowardwhattheysenseasagreeabletotheirconstitutionandawayfromwhattheysenseasdisagreeabletoit,andlikeplants,theynaturallyseektoreproducethemselves.Third,accordingtoAristotle,humanbeingsarehylomorphicsubstancesthataredistinguishedfromotheranimalsbytheposses-sionofrationality.Becausewepossessthepowerofreason,weareabletoregulateouractionsbychoosingtoactornotactonthebasisofrationalconceptionsofourgood,andweareabletoknowandcontemplatetheorderoftheuniverse.Throughphilosophy,Aris-totlebelieves,wecancometounderstandreflectivelythatourhighestgood,orhappiness,isalifeofrationalactivity,thatis,alifespentexercisingtheoreticalandpracticalreason.ThedetailsofAristotle’sphilosophyareofconcerntousonlyinsofarastheyinformtheviewofthenaturalworldthatmodernphilosophyreactsagainst.ChristiantheologywasabletotakeonalmostallofAristotle’sphilosophy,withtheexceptionoftheeter-nalityofmatter(whichthedoctrineofcreationexnihiloexcludes)andthelimitationofthehumangoodtorationalactivity.OntheaccountdefendedbyAquinas,onlyGodcanbeidentifiedwiththehighestorunqualifiedgood;hencehumanhappinessmustcon-sistinunionwithGod,whichcanbeachievedonlyinanother,nontemporallife.Fortherest,AquinasandothermedievalthinkersCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n18DONALDRUTHERFORDsawAristotle’sphilosophyasfittingcoherentlywiththeChristianviewthathumanbeingsarecomposedofanimmaterialsoulandamaterialbody,andthatallthingshavebeencreatedbyGodtofulfillanaturalpurposewithinawell-organized,hierarchicalcosmos.Attheapexofthishierarchyarehumanbeings,whodominatetherestofcreationinamanneranalogoustothewayinwhichtheythem-selvesareruledbyGod.AuthorityforthisconceptionoftheplaceofhumanbeingsincreationisfoundinGenesis1:26,whichservesasatouchstoneforphilosophersthroughouttheearlymodernperiod:“AndGodsaid,Letusmakemaninourimage,afterourlikeness:andletthemhavedominionoverthefishofthesea,andoverthefowloftheair,andoverthecattle,andovertheearth,andoverevery6creepingthingthatcreepethupontheearth.”CHALLENGESTOTHESYNTHESISTheunionofAristotleandRomanCatholictheologywasextraor-dinarilysuccessfulinEurope,fosteringalongperiodoffruitfulinquiry.Bytheendofthefifteenthcentury,however,eventswereoccurringthatwouldeventuallyleadtoitsoverthrow:TheperiodweknowastheRenaissance(roughlythefour-teenththroughsixteenthcenturies)witnessedtherediscov-eryofawiderangeofclassicaltextsofferingalternativestoAristotle’sviewsinnaturalphilosophy,metaphysics,andethics.Theinventionandrapidspreadofmechanicalprintinginthelatefifteenthcenturyallowedforthedisseminationofthesenewtexts,containingavarietyofunorthodoxideas,toawiderpublic.TheReformation,initiatedbyMartinLuther(1517),issuedafundamentalchallengetotheauthorityoftheRomanCath-olicchurch,whichincludedaninsistenceontherightofindividualconscienceandpoliticalself-determination.Copernicus’sheliocentriccosmology(1543)removedtheearthfromthecenterofthecosmosandrejectedAristotle’spictureoftheworldasaclosedsetofconcentricspheres.ThesedevelopmentshadadecisiveimpactonthecourseofWesternphilosophy,culminatinginthegroundbreakingworksCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy19ofGalileo,Bacon,Hobbes,andDescartesatthebeginningoftheseventeenthcentury.Ateveryturn,however,effortsweremadetoisolatetheimpactofnewideas,soastopreservetheintegrityofChristianity.Presentedwithanarrayofnewtextscontainingcompet-ingclaimsofancientwisdom,philosopherswereforcedtoreexaminethesupportforAristotle’steachings.WherecriticismswereofferedofAristotle’sviews,theywereinvariablyaccompaniedbyattemptstodemonstratethecompatibilityofotherpaganphilosophies–Platonism,Stoicism,ancientskepticism,Epicureanism–withtherevealedtruthofChristianity.Giventhecontentoftheancientviews,somesynthesesweremoresuccessfulthanothers.Ashadhappenedinthepast,numerouseffortsweremadetouniteaspectsofPlatonismandStoicismwithChristiantheology.Whilesomerejectedoutrightsuchattemptsataccommodation–heretheinfluenceofAugustinewasstronglyfelt–manyfoundinPlatonismandStoicismproductiveavenuesforarticulatingmetaphysicalandethicaltheorieswhichtheybelievedtobeconsistentwiththetruthofChristianteachings.Atthesametime,specifictheses,e.g.theStoicconceptionoffateandtheidentificationofGodwiththeworldsoul,werealmostuniver-sallyjudgedtobeatoddswiththecoretenetsofChristianity;hencesomeattempthadtobemadetominimizetheirrolewithinany7alternative,anti-Aristoteliantheoryofnature.Sincethebeginningofthesixteenthcentury,therevivalofan-cientskepticismhadofferedapowerfultoolforlooseningthegripofAristotelianphilosophy.Intheeyesofsome,itpointedthewaytowardapurifiedChristianity,foundedonfaithalone,independentofphilosophicalreason.Forothers,however,theunrestrictedappli-cationofskepticalargumentscouldonlyresultinthefosteringofa8broadclimateofdoubt,andhencetheweakeningofChristianity.EvenmoreunsettlingfromthepointofviewofChristianorthodoxywasthegrowingattractionofEpicureanphilosophy,knownprin-cipallythroughLucretius’Dererumnatura.Innaturalphiloso-phy,EpicureanatomismrepresentedacompellingalternativetoAristotle’shylomorphism,butitbroughtwithitmetaphysicalcom-mitments(adenialofdivineprovidenceandteleology,thethesisofthepluralityofworlds)thatmanysawasantitheticaltoChristian-ity.Epicureanethics,foundedonthedoctrineofhedonism,i.e.thatpleasureistheonlynoninstrumentalgoodandpaintheonlynon-instrumentalevil,wasviewedbymostChristiansasacoverforCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n20DONALDRUTHERFORDmoralcorruption,despitethefactthatEpicurushimselfrecom-mendedalifeofvirtueasnecessaryfortheattainmentofthehighest9good:mentalcontentmentortranquility.TheefforttoturnbacktheperceivedperniciousinfluencesofEpicureanism,skepticism,andtoalesserextentStoicism,wasacentralpreoccupationofwritersinthelatesixteenthandearlyseventeenthcenturies.ThepublicationsofDescartes’sfriendMarinMersenneareprominentexamplesofsuchworks,whichhelptoestablishacontextwithinwhichCartesianismcanberepresentedastheonlydefensiblealternativetoAristoteliannaturalphiloso-10phy.RunningparalleltothisaretheeffortsofPierreGassenditorehabilitateEpicureanisminaformacceptabletoChristianity.Al-thoughCartesianismisgenerallyseenastriumphingin“thebattleofthegodsandgiants,”Gassendisucceededinremovingmuchoftheopprobriumfromthedoctrinesofatomismandhedonism,whichsubsequentlyacquireanewprominenceinthephilosophies11ofHobbesandLocke.Oneofthemostsignificantconsequencesofthisvigorousplayofideaswasaheighteningofphilosophy’sawarenessofissuesconcerninghumanknowledge.Broadly,thiscanbeposedasaprob-lemaboutthegroundsofepistemicauthority.Whatultimatelysupportstheclaimofagivenindividual,text,ormethodtobeanauthoritativesourceofknowledge?Whererivalauthoritiespresentthemselves,howarethecompetingclaimstobeadjudicated?Throughoutthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,suchconcernswereboundupwithlargermoralandpoliticalissues.Mostpoint-edly,theReformationraisedquestionsabouttheauthorityofreli-giousteaching.Whomisonetobelieveinmattersofscripturalinterpretation:theCatholicchurch,oneofthenewProtestantsects,orone’sownconscience–aninnertestimonythatanswerstonohumanauthority?Butfollowingcloselyonthiswasthequestionofthegroundsforacceptingreligiousfiguresasauthoritiesinmatters12ofgovernment,law,ormorality.Intheseventeenthcentury,thesameconcernextendstothechallengemountedbythenewsciencetothereceivedsynthesisofAristoteliannaturalphilosophyandChristiantheology.TheissueinitiallyarisesinthewakeofCopernicus’sheliocentrichypothesis,whichdisputesAristotle’sconceptionofthecosmos.Soon,how-ever,thequestionisappliedacrosstheboard:WhatcaseingeneralCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy21canbemadeforAristotelianphilosophyasagainstthearrayofnew(andold)ideasthatchallengeitssupremacy?Theattempttoaddressthisquestionisaprimarymotivationforthedevelopmentofearlymodernphilosophy:itseffortstoarticulatefoundationalconceptsofnature,methodsbywhichreliableknowledgecanbeobtained,andtheaptnessofthehumanmindforacquiringsuchknowledge.Nevertheless,inalloftheseinquiriestheanswersphilosophygivescontinuetobesubjecttothetestofreligiousorthodoxy–evenwhilethedemandsoforthodoxythemselvesareasfiercelydebatedasanyotherclaimstoauthority.RECONCILINGSCIENCEANDRELIGION:GALILEOANDBACONTheimperativetoaccommodatetheinnovationsofthenewsciencetoChristianityisfeltthroughoutseventeenth-centuryphilosophy.Yetitmanifestsitselfindifferentways,dependingupontheinter-estsandobjectivesofthephilosopherandthereligiouscontextinwhichhefindshimself.Thiscanbebrieflyillustratedbyconsider-ingtwoofthemostinfluentialproponentsofthenewscience,GalileoandBacon.ThequestionofauthorityliesattheheartofGalileo’sconfron-tationwiththeCatholicchurch.In1616,followingatrialcon-ductedbytheCongregationoftheHolyOffice,thechurchpubliclycensuredtwokeypropositionsofCopernicanism:Thesunisthecenteroftheworld,andiscompletelyimmo-bilebylocalmotion.Theearthisnotthecenteroftheworldandisnotimmobile,butmovesasawholeandalsowithadiurnalmotion.Thejudgmentonthefirstofthesepropositionswasparticularlyharsh.Itwasdeemed“formallyheretical,”becauseitcontradictedtheapproved(literal)meaninggiventocertainscripturalpassagesbythechurch.Inthebackgroundtothisverdictwasthedeclar-ationoftheCouncilofTrentin1546thatonlythechurchhadtheauthoritytointerpretthe“truesenseandmeaning”ofscripture.TheimmediatetargetsofthisassertionwereProtestantreformerswhoclaimedforthemselvestherighttointerpretscriptureastheysawfit,butthepointappliedequallytothosewho,inaffirmingtheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n22DONALDRUTHERFORDtruthoftheCopernicanhypothesis,therebyimpliedthattherele-vantpartsofscripturehadtobeunderstooddifferentlyfromhowthe13churchhaddeclaredthemtobeunderstood.Immediatelyfollowingthe1616condemnationofCopernican-ism,thechurchhadextractedfromGalileoapromisenotto“hold,teachordefendinanywaywhatsoever,verballyorinwriting”thecensuredpropositions.ThepretextforGalileo’ssubsequenttrialandconvictionbytheCongregationoftheHolyOfficein1633wasthat,withthepublicationofhisDialogueconcerningtheTwoChiefWorldSystemsinthepreviousyear,hehadopenlyfloutedthechurch’sauthoritybyviolatingthebanonthepublicdiscussionofCopernicanism.Seeninthislight,itwasnotsomuchhowGalileorepresentedtherespectivestrengthsandweaknessesoftheAristotelianandCopernicansystemsinhisDialogue(orthatthedefenderoftheformersystemiscalled“Simplicio”),butsimplythathehadchallengedthechurch’srighttodecidewhatcouldand14couldnotbediscussedpublicly.Inthebackgroundtotheseevents,however,wasamoreprofoundchallengeGalileohadearlierissuedtothechurch’sclaimtobethesolejudgeofthemeaningofscripture.Onthebasisofthisclaim,itinevitablyfollowedthatthechurchalsosetitselfupasajudgeofscientifictruth,sincewherehypothesesconcerningthenaturalworldwerefoundtocontradicttheapprovedmeaningofscripture,thechurchclaimedtherighttodeclaresuchhypothesesfalse.In1615,priortothecondemnationofCopernicanism,Galileocom-posedadetailedresponsetothechurch’sposition,hisLettertothe15GrandDuchessChristina.Therehearguedthatregardingtheoperationsofnature,reasonistheonlyauthoritativejudgeoftruth.IfreasonsupportsthetruthofCopernicus’shypothesis,thenitshouldbeaccepted,andaliteralreadingofthecontestedscriptural16passagesrejected.AlthoughGalileo’sstanceinevitablysethimonacollisioncoursewiththechurch,hisdefenseoftheauthorityofscientificreasonoccurswithinaframeworkthatupholdsboththefounda-tionaltruthofscriptureandtheorthodoxconceptionofhumanityasmadeinGod’simage.Inthis,hedoesnotmovefarbeyondtheparametersestablishedbyAquinas’ssynthesis.TheBibleistherevealedwordofGodexpressedinaformthatallcanunderstand,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy23notjustthoseadeptatscientificreasoning.Henceweshouldnotexpecttobeboundbyastrictliteralisminourinterpretationofscripture.Inmattersrelatingtofaithandsalvation,theCatholicchurchistheundisputedauthorityonwhatweshouldbelieve.Atthesametime,reasonisagiftofGod,andinfactamoreprizedgiftthanthesenses,sinceitisthewayinwhichwearemostclearlymadeinGod’simage.Thus,ifreasonleadsustounderstandnaturedifferentlyfromthewaythesensespresentittous(i.e.asCoperni-cansratherthanAristotelians),weshouldacceptreason’sverdictasauthoritative.AlthoughGalileoheredirectlychallengestheauthor-ityoftheCatholicchurch,hedoessoinawaythatreinforcestheharmonybetweentheclaimsofthenewscienceandthetenetsofChristianity.Histheologicaldefenseofreason’srighttojudgeofscientifictruthsupportstheconclusionthatalthoughthetheoriesandmethodsofnaturalphilosophyundergoafundamentalrevisioninhishands,thesechangescomeagainstthebackdropofastablesetofassumptionsabouttherelationofhumanbeingstoGod.AdifferentattempttoreconciletheclaimsofscienceandreligionisfoundinthewritingsofGalileo’scontemporaryFrancisBacon.BaconisanoutspokencriticofwhatheperceivesastheobfuscationandvainspeculationofscholasticAristotelianism.HearguesforarejectionofAristotle’sphilosophyanditsreplacementbyhisowninductivemethodandthenewscientifictheoriesthatwillbede-velopedthroughitsemployment.Yetdespitetherevolutionarytenorofhiswritings,Baconisconcernedtomakehisinnovationsfitwithinabiblicalunderstandingofhumanbeingsandtheirplaceincreation.ThismeansshowingaboveallhowtheadvancementofsciencecanbereconciledwithAdam’sFallandthelimitationsthishasplacedonhumannature.Bacon’smostimportantphilosophicalwork,TheNewOrganon(1620),isanextendedargumentonbehalfofthepossibilityofscientificprogress.Thebook’sfrontispieceisanimageofashipsailingforthfromthepillarsofHercules,belowwhichisquotedDaniel’sprophecyonthelastdaysoftheworld:“Manyshallpassthrough,andknowledgewillbeincreased”(12:4).BaconexpoundsonhischoiceofmottoinNewOrganon,I.93:it“signifiesenigmatically”thatitisprovidence,orGod’swill,“thatthecircumnavigationoftheworld...andtheincreaseoftheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n24DONALDRUTHERFORDsciencesshouldcometopassinthesameage.”Baconisawarethatfewofhisreadersseeinthefutureanever-expandinghorizonofhumanknowledge.Thatthe“increaseofthesciences”shouldleadtoanunprecedentedmasteryofnatureisformostanidledream,oranexpressionofsinfulpride.OnBacon’sanalysis,thispessimismisasignificantobstacletotheadvanceofscientificinquiry;progressinthesciencesisimpededbytheabsenceofhopefortheirfuturesuccess.Consequently,heseeshiscentraltaskasprovidingreasonsforhope,intheformofconcretesignsofanewage(voyagesofdiscovery,usefulinventions),amethodforthe“trueinterpretation”ofnature,anddiagnosesoferrorsthathavehinderedtheadvanceofknowledge.ReiteratinghisappealneartheendofthefirstbookoftheNewOrganon,Baconwrites:[E]venifthebreezeofhopeblewmuchmoreweaklyandfaintlyfromthisNewContinent,stillwebelievethattheattempthastobemade(unlesswewanttobeutterlydespicable).Forthedangerofnottryingandthedangerofnotsucceedingarenotequal,sincetheformerrisksthelossofagreatgood,thelatterofalittlehumaneffort.Butfromwhatwehavesaidandfromotherthingswhichwehavenotsaid,ithasseemedtousthatwehaveabundanceofhope,whetherwearemenwhopressforwardtomeetnewexperiences,orwhetherwearecarefulandslowtobelieve.(NewOrg.,I.114)Instressingthenecessityofanattitudeofhope,BacontransformsaChristiantheologicalvirtueintoascientificone.TheChristianhopeforbetterthingstocome,whichfromSt.Paulonwardsignifies17aconfidenceinaneternallifeafterdeath,becomesinBacon’shandsthehopeforasteadyexpansionofourabilitytomasternatureinthislife.Onthefaceofit,suchagoalappearsresolutelysecular,butBacon’sunderstandingofitis,infact,profoundlytheological.Themasteryofnatureistobeunderstoodastherestorationofhumanity’srightfulplaceincreation:thereorderingofaworldthathasbeendisorderedbyAdam’sFall.AsBaconwritesinanearlierwork,Valeriusterminus:[I]tisnotthepleasureofcuriosity,northequietofresolution,northeraisingofthespirit,norvictoryofwit,norfacultyofspeech,norlucreofprofession,norambitionofhonororfame,norinablementforbusiness,thatarethetrueendsofknowledge;someofthesebeingmoreworthythanother,thoughallinferiorordegenerate:butitisarestitutionandCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy25reinvesting(ingreatpart)ofmantothesovereigntyandpower(forwhenso-everheshallbeabletocallanimalsbytheirtruenamesheshallcommand18them)whichhehadinhisfirststateofcreation.Thereceivedexplanationofhumanity’slossofdominionovernatureisthedisorderthatresultsfromtheFall.ButifBaconpre-scribesthepursuitofscienceasameansofrectifyingthenaturalorder,ishealsosuggestingthatwecanthroughourowneffortsexpungeAdam’ssin?HereBaconmustwalkafineline.Noortho-doxChristian,ProtestantorCatholic,couldacceptthatoriginalsinmightbeerased,andhumanbeingsjustifiedintheeyesofGod,withouttheaidofdivinegrace.Accordingly,Baconcanmakeonlyalimitedclaimonbehalfoftheadvancementofknowledge.Inre-acquiringmasteryovernaturewedonottherebyremovetheguiltthatwasincurredbyAdam’sdisobedience;thatisaddressedonlybyfaithandreligion.BaconconcludestheNewOrganononthisnote,reassuringhisreadersthattheimprovementofthematerialcondi-tionsoflifethroughtheprogressofscienceisconsistentwiththeBible’srepresentationofhumanity’sdestiny:Weintendattheend(likehonestandfaithfulguardians)tohandmentheirfortuneswhentheirunderstandingisfreedfromtutelageandcomesofage,fromwhichanimprovementofthehumanconditionmustfollow,andgreaterpowerovernature.ForbytheFallmandeclinedfromthestateofinnocenceandfromhiskingdomoverthecreatures.Boththingscanberepairedeveninthislifetosomeextent,theformerbyreligionandfaith,thelatterbytheartsandsciences.FortheCursedidnotmakethecreationanutterandirrevocableoutlaw.Invirtueofthesentence“Inthesweatofthyfaceshaltthoueatbread”[Genesis3:19],man,bymanifoldlabors(andnotbydisputations,certainly,orbyuselessmagicalceremonies),compelsthecreation,intimeandinpart,toprovidehimwithbread,thatistoservethepurposesofhumanlife.(NewOrg.,II.52)ForBacon,thesignificanceofthenewscienceisthatitoffersthemeansofrepairingcreationandofreturninghumanbeingstotheirrightfuldominionovertherestofnature–thepositiontheylostasaresultoftheFall.AmodernreadermightsupposethatBaconisheresimplypayinglipservicetoconventionalideas:in1620thepres-surestoappearreligiouslyorthodoxinEnglandweresogreatthathecouldnotaffordnottoreassurehisreadersonthispoint.AmoreCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n26DONALDRUTHERFORDplausibleexplanationisthatBacon,likemostoftheleadingintel-lectualsoftheseventeenthcentury,doesnotthinktwiceaboutthetruthoftheChristianbiblicalnarrativeofcreation,fall,andredemp-tion.Fortheseearlymodernthinkers,whatsciencehastotellusabouttheworldfailstothreateninanyfundamentalwaytherealityofthedefiningeventsofChristianityortheirsignificancefor19humanbeings.DESCARTES’SREVOLUTIONMorethananyotherearlymodernthinker,Descarteshasbeenseenasrevolutionizingphilosophy–ofmakingit,ineffect,adifferentformofintellectualinquirythanitwasfortheancientsormedievals.Whilethereissometruthtosuchclaims,therearealsoclearlimitstohowfarDescartesispreparedtogointransformingphilosophy.TheselimitsaresetbyhisconcerntopreservetheconsistencyofhisphilosophywiththeChristianconceptionofGodandtheteachings20oftheRomanCatholicchurch.Intheend,Isuggest,whatismostconsequentialaboutDescartes’sphilosophyisthatitpreparesthewayforasetofmoreradicalconclusionsabouttherelationshipofGodtonature–conclusionsthatDescarteshimselfdoesnotdraw.BythetimeDescartesappearsontheintellectualsceneinthelate1620s,theoverhaulofAristotle’scosmologyhadlargelybeencom-pleted.NowcriticswerebeginningtofocusattentiononAristotle’stheoryofsubstance.RecallthatinAristotle’sphilosophy,formplaysacriticalroleinexplainingtheessentialpropertiesofathing:whatitiscapableofdoingasthekindofthingitis,includingthenaturalendorgoalofitsactivity.Proponentsofthenewscience–figuressuchasGalileo,Gassendi,andHobbes–rejectedtheexist-enceofsubstantialforms.Theyarguedthatitisabsurdtoattributeagoalorpurposetoinanimatethingslikerocks;thatformsdonoth-ingtoexplainwhynaturalchangesoccurinthewaytheydo;andthatinanycase,formsareunnecessaryinscience,sincethereisabetterwayofexplaining(andpredicting)naturalchangebymeansofmathematicallaws.InplaceofAristotle’stheory,thenewscientistsembracedthedoctrineofmechanism:theviewthatallnaturalchangescanbeexplainedintermsofchangesinthesizes,shapes,andmotionsofparticlesofmatteralone,inaccordancewithnecessarymathematicallaws.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy27Descarteswasastrongproponentofthedoctrineofmechanism.However,hewentbeyondmanymechanistsinformulatingalargermetaphysicaltheorythattookaccountoftheexistenceofhumanbeingsascreatureswhoseactionscannotbeexplainedsolelyinmechanisticterms.Descartesdefendsadualistmetaphysicswherebythecreatedworldismadeupoftwoentirelydifferentandindependenttypesofsubstance:matterandmind.Everysubstanceiseithermindormatter;nosubstanceisboth.Matter(orbody)isidentifiedwithreal,three-dimensionalEuclideanspace.Mindisdefinedintermsofthementalpowersofconsciousness,rationalthought,andfreedomofthewill.Whatisdistinctiveabouthumannature,accordingtoDescartes,isthatitconsistsoftheunionofthesetwoseparatesubstances.Furthermore,asidefromangels,theonlymindsintheworldarehumanones,whichhavethecapacitytochoosefreelyandtoguidetheactionsoftheirrespectivebodies.Everythingelse,includinganimals,isonlymatter,whichoperatesaccordingtonecessarylaws.Apartfromhumanminds,thenaturalworldisacomplexmachinedevoidofpurpose,thought,orfeeling.Inadditiontohisnewmetaphysicsofsubstancedualism,Des-cartesinitiatedanewapproachinepistemology,whichhesawascriticalfordefendingthesuperiorityofmechanisticscienceoveritsAristotelianrival.InDescartes’sview,themainsourceoftheerrorsofAristotle’sphilosophywasitswillingnesstotaketheevidenceofsenseexperienceatfacevalue.Whenwerelyonoursensesinthinkingabouttheworld,weinevitablydrawfalseconclusionsaboutit.Wesupposethatsuchthingsascolors,odors,andflavorsarerealpropertiesofbodies,andweattributehumanwants,needs,andpurposestoinanimateobjects.AccordingtoDescartes,thewaytoavoidsucherrorsistobeginoursearchforknowledgebyturninginwardtowardtheminditself.Ourmostcertainknowledgeisoftheexistenceofourownmind(“Ithink,thereforeIam”),ofthemind’sessence(itisa“thinkingthing”),andoftheinnateideascontainedinthemind.ThroughthelatterweacquireknowledgeofGodandoftheessenceofmatter.Thiseffectivelyreversestraditionalviewsabouttheorderofknowing.ForAristotle,formisapartofthenaturalworld,whichweknowthroughsenseexperience.ForDes-cartes,whatweknowfirstistheminditself;onthebasisofwhatwefindwithinus,weareabletoproceedtoknowledgeofotherthings.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n28DONALDRUTHERFORDAlthoughthesenseshavearoletoplayinscience(e.g.inselectingamongphysicalhypotheses),thefoundationsofphilosophymustbeestablishedindependentlyofsenseexperience.Ourmostcertainknowledgeofrealityisderivedthroughthemind’sown“naturallight,”i.e.reason.Inhismostfamouswork,MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy,Des-cartesdescribesalineofthoughtbywhichhehopeshisreaderswillbebroughttoacceptthisnewviewoftheworld.AshewritesinalettertoMersenne,“Imaytellyou,betweenourselves,thatthesesixMeditationscontainallthefoundationsofmyphysics.Butpleasedonottellpeople,forthatmightmakeitharderforsupport-ersofAristotletoapprovethem.Ihopethatreaderswillgraduallygetusedtomyprinciplesandrecognizetheirtruth,beforetheynoticethattheydestroytheprinciplesofAristotle”(CSMIII173).Atthelevelofnaturalphilosophy,thereisnodoubtthatDescartesregardshisprojectasrevolutionary:hisobjectiveisnothinglessthanthecompleteoverthrowofAristotle’sviews.ButDescartesisequallyforthrightinaffirminghissupportfortheteachingsoftheCatholicchurch.Indeed,onemayseehislargergoalasanewsynth-esis,inwhichhisownphilosophywouldreplacethatofAristotleasthesecularcounterparttoCatholictheology.Forthisreason,Des-cartesplacesstrictlimitsonthescopeofhisinquiry.Heinsiststhathisconcernsarerestrictedtonaturalphilosophyandmetaphys-ics,andhedisavowsanyclaimtohavearrivedatnewknowledgeabouttheologyorpolitics.Inthesemattershepromisescompleteorthodoxy.Descarteswasjustifiedinbelievingthatdeviationsfromortho-doxycarriedsignificantrisks:thephilosopherGiordanoBrunowasburnedatthestakeasahereticin1600,andin1633GalileowasforcedtorecanthissupportfortheCopernicanhypothesis.ThelattereventhadaprofoundimpactonDescartes,whodecidednottogoaheadwiththepublicationofhisbookTheWorld,andlivedmuchofhislaterlifeinmoreliberalHolland,althougheventhere21hisphilosophywascensuredbytheauthorities.Noneofthis,however,givesusanyreasontothinkthatDescartesmayhavebeendissimulatinginhisprofessionsofreligiousorthodoxy,orthatGod22isnotabsolutelycentraltohisphilosophy.Thelatterpointcanbesupportedinanumberofways.Iwillconsiderjustoneargument,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy29whichbearsdirectlyonDescartes’sdefenseofmechanism,themostinnovativepartofhisphilosophicalsystem.TheassumptionoftheexistenceandagencyofGodisindispens-abletoDescartes’sworldview.Thisconclusionfollowsdirectlyfromhisidentificationoftheessenceofmatterwithgeometricalextension.Descartestoutshisdefinitionofmatterasonethatmeetsthehigheststandardsof“clarityanddistinctness.”IncontrasttotheAristotelianaccountofmatteras“purepotentiality,”Descartes’sdefinitionisfullyintelligibletoreason.Furthermore,byidentifyingmatterwithextension,Descartesguaranteestheapplicabilityofmathematicstonature.Themathematicalrepresentationofthepropertiesofmatterwillbenomoredifficultthantherepresentationofthepropertiesofgeometricalfigures.YetoneimportantelementismissinginDescartes’saccountofmatter:anexplanationofthesourceofitsmotionandoftheprinciplesbywhichmotionistrans-ferredfromonebodytoanother.Withrespecttotheformer,Des-carteshasnochoicebuttoinvokeGod.Thereisnootherwayformotiontobeinmatter–anunchanging,homogeneousplenum–exceptthatGodhaschosentogiveoneregionofextensionamotionrelativetoanother.Furthermore,Godisresponsibleforsustainingthesamemotioninabody,unlessitisactedonbyanotherbody(aversionoftheprincipleofinertia),andforpreservingthesametotalquantityofmotionandrestintheuniverse(aversionofaconser-vationprinciple).AsDescarteswritesinhisPrinciplesofPhilosophy:Godimpartedvariousmotionstothepartsofmatterwhenhefirstcreatedthem,andhenowpreservesallthismatterinthesameway,andbythesameprocessbywhichheoriginallycreatedit;anditfollowsfromwhatwehavesaidthatthisfactalonemakesitreasonabletothinkthatGodlikewisealwayspreservesthesamequantityofmotioninmatter.(Princ.,II.36,CSMI240)OnDescartes’saccount,eitherthelawsofmotionareidenticalwithGod’sregularandimmutableactiononmatter,orthoselawsareimmediateeffectsofGod’sactionandserve“assecondaryandpar-ticularcausesofthevariousmotionsweseeinparticularbodies”(Princ.,II.37,CSMI240).Eitherway,therecanbenoCartesian23physicswithoutGodplayinganineliminablecausalroleinnature.ThislineofreasoningispushedtoitslogicalconclusionbyDescartes’smostprominentfollower,NicolasMalebranche.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n30DONALDRUTHERFORDAccordingtoMalebranche,God’sessentialroleasthecreatorandsustaineroffinitethingsentailsthatGodistheonlytruecauseofnaturalchange.Createdthings(mindsandbodies)thatappeartoactononeanotherandtochangeeachother’sstates,infact,areonly“occasionalcauses,”whichistosay,occasionsforGodactingontheworld,recreatingitinanewstateofexistence.InMalebranche’sphilosophy,whichheseesasaconsistentdevelopmentofDescar-tes’sposition,creatednatureiscausallyimpotent:natureitselfcandonothing,andnothingcanhappeninnature,unlessGoddoesit.Malebrancheregardsthisasanentirelyhappyresultthatcon-firmsafundamentaltruthofChristianity:thatweareutterlyde-pendentonGodforourexistenceandforeverythingthathappensintheworld.Indeed,Malebranchethinksthatanyothercausaltheorywhichaccordedamodicumofactivitytofinitethingswouldbetantamounttoakindofpaganism,inwhichweendupworshipingbodies–lovingandfearingthem–forthegoodandeviltheymaybringus.InafamouschapterofhisSearchafterTruthentitled“TheMostDangerousErrorofthePhilosophyoftheAncients,”Malebranchewrites:“Wethereforeadmitsomethingdivineinallthebodiesarounduswhenwepositforms,faculties,qualities,virtues,orrealbeingscapableofproducingcertaineffectsthroughtheforceoftheirnature;andthusweinsensiblyadopttheopinionsofthepagansbecauseofourrespectfortheirphilosophy”(Search,VI.ii.3).Likeanyconfirmedmechanist,MalebrancheisconvincedthattherearegoodphilosophicalreasonsforrejectingtheAristoteliantheoryofforms.However,hebelievesthatthereareevenbettertheologicalreasons,whichpointtotheconclusionthatcreatednatureisdevoidofallcausalpower,andthatconsequentlyeverythingthathappensinnaturemustbeascribedtoGod’saction.Thedebateoverthesourceoftheapparentcausalpowersofcreatedthingsisadefiningoneinseventeenth-centuryphiloso-24phy.Invariably,however,argumentsaboutwhichtheorycanbestaccountforthephenomenaaresubordinatedtoargumentsthatassesstheacceptabilityofdifferenttheoriesintermsoftheirtheo-logicalconsequences.DescartesandMalebranchebothinsistthattheGodoftheirphilosophiesisidenticaltotherevealedGodofChristianity.Malebranche,aCatholicpriest,developsthispointatlengthinhiswritings.Descartesislessexplicitaboutit,butthereisnoreasontothinkthatheseriouslyquestionsit.Nevertheless,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy31despitetheireffortstoupholdtheclaimsofreligion,thewritingsofDescartesandMalebranchefailedtowinwidespreadsupportwithintheCatholicchurch.Descartes’sworkswereplacedontheIndexofProhibitedBooksin1663,andthroughtheeffortsofArnauld,Mal-ebranche’swereaddedin1690(TreatiseonNatureandGrace)and251709(TheSearchafterTruth).ThefundamentalobjectioninbothcaseswasthatthephilosophershadelevatedtheauthorityofreasonabovetherevelationofscriptureandtheapostolicteachingsoftheCatholicchurch.PascalpinpointedwhatmanyfoundobjectionableaboutDescartes’sworldview:“IcannotforgiveDescartes:inhiswholephilosophyhewouldliketodowithoutGod;buthecouldnothelpallowinghimaflickofthefingerstosettheworldinmotion;26afterthathehadnomoreuseforGod.”Pascal’scomplaintidentifiesthecorecriticism,fromaChristianpointofview,ofCartesianattemptstoreconcilethedomainsofreligionandphilosophy.Ifreasonisthefinalarbiterofwhatoneshouldbelieve,andifreasonrequiresGodonlyasafoundationalprincipleofthecausalorderofnature,thensupportersoforthodoxyareforcedtoassumeadefensiveposition,makingthecasethatscriptureandtraditiondemandmorethanthis.ThedifficultyofmountingsuchadefensefromwithintheperspectiveofreasonwasapparenttothinkerssuchasPascalandPierreBayle.Conse-quently,theysawDescartes’sphilosophyascontainingtheseedsofthemostpotentthreattoreligionintheearlymodernperiod.THESPECTEROFNATURALISMPaintingwithabroadbrush,seventeenth-centuryphilosopherscanbedistinguishedaseithercompatibilistswithrespecttotherelationofreligionandphilosophy,orincompatibilists.Thevastmajorityofearlymodernthinkerswerecompatibilists.Theybe-lievedthatcontemporarydevelopmentsinthenaturalsciencesandinmoralandpoliticalphilosophycouldbereconciledwiththetraditionalbiblicalaccountofhumanbeingsandtheirplaceincreation.Aswehaveseen,Galileo,Bacon,Descartes,andMalebranchefallintothisgroup,asdoGassendi,Hobbes,Boyle,27More,Cudworth,Leibniz,Locke,andNewton.Oneconclusiontodrawfromthisisthatinnovationsinnaturalphilosophybythem-selveswerenotviewedbymostphilosophersasaseriousthreattoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n32DONALDRUTHERFORDtheintegrityofChristianity.MostassumedthatAquinas’sidealofasynthesisofsecularphilosophyandChristiantheologycouldbepreserved,providedthatasuitablesubstituteforAristotle’sphiloso-phycouldbefound.NowhereisthisclearerthaninthecaseofNewton,whointheGeneralScholiumtohisPrincipiaincludesafinaldiscussionofGodas“apartofnaturalphilosophy”:Thismostelegantsystemofthesun,planets,andcometscouldnothavearisenwithoutthedesignanddominionofanintelligentandpowerfulbeing...Herulesallthings,notastheworldsoulbutasthelordofall...AndfromtruelordshipitfollowsthatthetrueGodisliving,intelli-gent,andpowerful;fromtheotherperfections,thatheissupreme,orsupremelyperfect...Weknowhimonlybyhispropertiesandattributesandbythewisestandbestconstructionofthingsandtheirfinalcauses,andweadmirehimbecauseofhisperfections;butweveneratehimbecauseofhisdominion.Forweworshiphimasservants,andagodwithoutdominion,providence,andfinalcausesisnothingotherthanfateandnature.Novariationinthingsarisesfromblindmetaphysicalnecessity,whichmustbethesamealwaysandeverywhere.Allthediversityofcreatedthings,eachinitsplaceandtime,couldonlyhavearisenfromtheideasandthewillofa28necessarilyexistingbeing.Incompatibilistsarefarfewerinnumberamongearlymodernphilosophers,andtheyfallintotwodistinctgroups.InonearethoselikePascalandBaylewhodetectedinDescartes’sthoughtthebe-ginningsofadownwardspiralintoirreligion.Totheextentthatonemakesreasonthefinalarbiteroftruthconcerningreality–includingtheexistenceandactionsofGod–oneunderminesthefoundationsofChristianity.AsBayleframestheproblem:OnemustnecessarilychoosebetweenphilosophyandtheGospel.Ifyoudonotwanttobelieveanythingbutwhatisevidentandinconformitywiththecommonnotions,choosephilosophyandleaveChristianity.Ifyouarewillingtobelievetheincomprehensiblemysteriesofreligion,chooseChris-tianityandleavephilosophy.Fortohavetogetherself-evidenceandincom-prehensibilityissomethingthatcannotbe.Thecombinationofthesetwoitemsishardlymoreimpossiblethanthecombinationofthepropertiesofa29squareandacircle.Achoicemustnecessarilybemade.Forincompatibilistsofthiskind,theattempttogroundreligioninreason,ortoarguefortheequalauthorityofreligionandphiloso-phy,couldonlyspelldisasterforChristianityasareligionbasedonCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy33faithandrevelation.Consequently,theyurgedacurtailingoftheauthorityofphilosophy.Whileacceptingthatthenewscienceofferedinnovationsofpracticalvalue,theydeniedthatitwasthebasisofafundamentallynewunderstandingofreality.Asecondgroupofincompatibilistslikewiserecognizedtheim-possibilityofareconciliationofphilosophyandrevealedreligion,buttheydrewfromthisexactlytheoppositeconclusion.Forthesethinkers,thepaththatphilosophyhadembarkedonatthebegin-ningoftheseventeenthcenturycouldonlyterminateintherejec-tionofthetruthofrevealedreligion.Thismighttaketheformofadefenseofdeism,whichrecognizestheexistenceofanimpersonaltranscendentGod:abeingthatiscausallyresponsibleforthecre-ationoftheworldbutthereafterisuninvolvedinitsoperationorintheunfoldingofhumanhistory.Oritcouldgobeyondthis.Followedtoitslogicalconclusion,rationalinquirymightbeseentosupportthemetaphysicalstanceofnaturalism,accordingtowhichexistenceislimitedtothetotalityofnature,withnoappealmadetoatranscendentcreatorGod.AnaturalismofthissortmightincludetheideaofGodasanimmanentandeternalintelligence,orprincipleoforder,butsounderstood,Godwouldbeidenticaltonatureitself.Thedangerofopenlyespousingsuchapositionintheseventeenthcenturywasveryreal.TodenytheexistenceofGodasdefinedbyJewishandChristianscripturewastodenytheexistenceofGodaltogether.Consequently,deistsandnaturalists(ormaterialists)wereroutinelydenouncedasatheists.ThedoctrineofnaturalismfindsitsmostpotentexpressionintheseventeenthcenturyinthewritingsofBenedictdeSpinoza.Spinozaisuniqueamongthecentralfiguresofearlymodernphilosophy.HeistheonlymajormodernphilosopherwhosereligiousbackgroundisJewishratherthanChristian.AndheisoneofthefewphilosopherspriortothenineteenthcenturywhoopenlychallengesthecentralclaimofJudeo-Christiantheology:thattheworldhasbeenfreelycreatedbyatranscendentGod,whoisthelawgiverto,andjudgeof,humanbeings.Againstthisorthodoxy,SpinozaadvancesinhisEthicstheboldthesisthatGodissimplyaneternalandinfinitepower,fromwhichallthingsnecessarilyfollowandinwhichall30thingsexistasmodesoftheonedivinesubstance.Whatwecallthecreatedworldis,forSpinoza,nothingbutaninfinitelyvarieddeterminationofGod’spower.GoddoesnotchooseCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n34DONALDRUTHERFORDtocreate:Godsimplyis(andweare“in”God).Thisalternativetotheorthodoxdoctrineofcreationbringswithitothernovelclaims.IfeverythingfollowsnecessarilyfromGod,thenthereisnocontin-gencyintheworldandnofreedomofthewill.Everythingisthewayitisnecessarily,becauseofthewayGodnecessarilyis.Whateverpowerfinitethingspossess,theypossessbecausetheyaremodesoftheonesubstance.Thus,thereisnoproblemabouthowGod“gives”hispowertosomethingdifferentfromhimself.Finally,Spinoza’sphilosophyneatlyresolvestheCartesianproblemofmind–bodyinteraction.Onhisaccount,Godisbothathinkingsubstanceandanextendedsubstance(thesearetwooftheinfiniteattributesthroughwhichGod’spowerisexpressed).Consequently,anyfinitethingissimultaneouslyamindandabody.InSpinoza’sphilosophy,thereisnointeractionbetweenmindsandbodies,becausemindandbodyareidentical.Spinoza,itshouldbeclear,doesnoteliminateGodfromphiloso-phy.Onthecontrary,hemakesnaturenothinglessthananimme-diateexpressionofGod’sinfiniteandeternalpower.Inadvancingthisposition,however,hedrawsasharpcontrastbetweentheGodofphilosophyandtheGodofJewishandChristianscripture.InhisTheological-PoliticalTreatisehearguesthatthecoreofbiblicalreligionisnotasetoftruthsaboutGodbutanethicalinjunction:“toobeyGodwithallone’sheartbypractisingjusticeandcharity”(TTP,preface).Religionprescribesthismorallawasacommandthatmustbeobeyed.Obediencetodivineauthority,ascommuni-catedbyscripture,definesforSpinozatheprovinceofreligion.Religionthusregardshumanbeingsasessentiallyservile,subordin-atetothecommandofGod.IntheTTPandmorefullyintheEthics,Spinozaaimstotransformthisunderstandingofthegroundofmoralnorms,representingthemasdictatesofreason,asopposedtothecommandsofasovereignGod.Spinoza’sphilosophyis,then,inthebroadesttermsanEnlighten-mentproject,whosegoalisthereleaseofhumanbeingsfromintel-31lectualservitude.DistinctiveabouthisapproachisthatitdefinestheconditionsofEnlightenmentagainstthebackgroundofanun-compromisingmetaphysicalnaturalism.Describingthepositionofthosewithwhomhedisagrees,SpinozawritesintheprefacetoPartThreeoftheEthics:CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy35Mostofthosewhohavewrittenabouttheaffects,andmen’swaysofliving,seemtotreatnotofnaturalthings,whichfollowthecommonlawsofNature,butofthingswhichareoutsideNature.Indeedtheyseemtocon-ceivemaninNatureasadominionwithinadominion.Fortheybelievethatmandisturbs,ratherthanfollows,theorderofNature,thathehasabsolutepoweroverhisactions,andthatheisdeterminedonlybyhimself.Rejectingtheassumptionthathumanbeingspossessanabsolutepowerovertheiractions,Spinozainsiststhatweconceiveofthemasboundbythesame“commonlawsofnature”thatgoverntheoperationsofotherthings.Thereisbutasingle“orderofnature,”andhumanbeingsarenolessapartofthatorderthanplantsorotheranimals.CondemnationofSpinoza’sthoughtwasnearlyuniversalintheearlymodernperiod.Manydismisseditwiththeblanketchargeofatheism,butsomesuchasLeibniztreateditwithgreatseriousnessanddevotedthemselvestoaphilosophicalrefutationofitsprin-ciples.LikeNewton,withwhomheotherwisedisagreeddeeply,Leibniz’sprincipalreservationconcerningtheidentificationofGodandnaturewasitsconsequencethata“blindmetaphysicalnecessity”ruledallthings.Suchaconclusionwasunacceptableinhiseyes,chieflybecauseitentailedthattheuniversewaswithoutaninherentmoralorder:anormofjusticethatwouldservebothasastandardofrightactionandasanendtoberealizedthroughthecourseofhumanhistory.IfGodisnotawiseandjustcreatorinwhoseimagehumanbeingshavebeenmade,thenthereisnospecialplacereservedforhumanbeingsinnature,norcanwelooktoGod’s32exampleformoralprinciplesbywhichtoguideouractions.Theimplicationsofthispossibilityresonatethroughouttheeighteenthcentury,culminatingintheinfluentialnaturalistandnon-naturalistconceptionsofhumanitydefendedbyHumeandKant.Fromthisperspective,itisSpinozawhomostclearlypointstowardanewphilosophicalera.Althoughearlierthinkerspavedthewaywithanewpictureofnature,theyheldfasttotheassumptionthatthispicturemustbereconcilablewiththetruthofscriptureandwiththeideathathumanbeingsareinsomesignificantwayabove,orindependentof,nature.NotuntilSpinozaisacomprehensiveattemptmadetochallengethisassumption.ApplyingthesamecriticalreasonthatfosteredthenewsciencetobasicquestionsofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n36DONALDRUTHERFORDhumanexistence,Spinozareachestheconclusionthattheassump-tionmustbeabandoned.ThatSpinoza’srevolutionleavesmanyproblemsunresolved(consciousness,freedom,normativity)goeswithoutsaying,butthesearenowtheproblemsdistinctiveofmodernphilosophy.NOTES1NorisBaconthefirsttocallforanewbeginning,basedonabreakwiththeteachingsofscholasticAristotelianism.IntheprefacetohisDemagnete(1609),WalterGilbertstressestheneedfor“anewstyleofphilosophizing,”formen“wholookforknowledgenotinbooksonly,butinthingsthemselves”(quotedinHill1965,p.86).2Forabroad-rangingcritiqueoftheideaofa“ScientificRevolution,”seeShapin1996.3Newton’sremarksappearintheGeneralScholium,addedasaconclu-siontothesecond(1713)editionofthePrincipia.Foradiscussionofitssignificance,seeI.BernardCohen,“AGuidetoNewton’sPrincipia,”ch.9,inNewton1999.4SeeSchneewind1998,pp.6–9;andinthisvolume,thechaptersbyDarwallandSimmons.5Someclaimsforcontinuitywerebasedonadoptingadifferenthistor-icalantecedent,e.g.Epicurus(inthecaseofGassendi)orPlato(inthecaseofMoreandCudworth).OtherssuchasLeibnizarguedforanunderlyingagreementbetweentheclaimsofthenewscienceandtheprinciplesofAristotle’sphilosophy.6Foradevelopmentofthistheme,seeCraig1987.7AtypicalattempttoreconcileStoicfatewiththeChristiannotionofprovidenceisfoundinJustusLipsius’sDeconstantia(1584).Levi1964offersagoodaccountofhowearlymodernmoraliststendtowardeclectism,drawingatwillfromChristian,Platonic,andStoicsources,amongothers.TworecentcollectionsincludeanumberofstudiesontheinfluenceofStoicideasintheearlymodernperiod:MillerandInwood2003;StrangeandZupko2004.8Ontheinfluenceofancientskepticismintheearlymodernperiod,seePopkin2003.Foradetailedaccountofthereceptionofancientskep-ticaltexts,seeSchmitt1983b.9Wilson2003surveysthereceptionof,andreactionto,Epicureanismamongearlymodernphilosophers.10OnMersenne,seeLenoble1943;Dear1988.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nInnovationandorthodoxy3711ThecompetinglegaciesofDescartesandGassendiareexaminedinLennon1993.OnGassendi’srehabilitationofEpicureanism,seeJoy1987;Osler1993,2003;Sarasohn1996.12ThischallengeisraisedbyLutherinhis1520AppealtotheChristianNobilityoftheGermanNation.Thatreligiousfigureslackanylegit-imatepoliticalauthorityisoneoftheprincipalpointsarguedforbyHobbesinLeviathan.13Forafulldiscussion,seeBlackwell1991,ch.5andapp.I,whichreproducesthedecreeoftheCouncilofTrent.14SeeBlackwell1991,pp.125–34.ThisisnottosaythatleadingchurchfiguresdidnotalsofindthecontentsoftheDialogueobjectionable.Theyclearlydid,especiallypopeUrbanVIII,whosepublisheddeclar-ationthattheCopernicanhypothesisis“neithertruenorconclusive”andthat“itwouldbeexcessiveforanyonetolimitandrestrictthedivinepowerandwisdomtooneparticularfancyofhisown”isassignedtoSimplicio(Shea1986,pp.130–31).15ThisdocumentcirculatedwidelyinmanuscriptbeforeitseventualpublicationinStrasbourgin1636.ItistranslatedinGalileo1957,pp.157–216.16AtleasttwolinesofargumentrunthroughGalileo’sletter.Onedistin-guishesscienceandreligionintermsoftheirrespectivedomains:scienceisauthoritativeintheinvestigationofnature;scripture,asinterpretedbythechurch,isauthoritativeinmoralandspiritualmatters.Aweakerstancegrantsapresumptiveauthoritytoscriptureasinterpretedbythechurch,unlesscontradictedbydemonstratedscientifictruth.TotheextentthatGalileoacceptsthelatterpointofview,hispositionremainsvulnerable,sincethechurchdisputedwhethertheCopernicanhypothesishadbeendemonstrated,accordingtostandardsthatGalileohimselfaccepted.SeeShea1986,pp.126–27,andthedetailedanalysisofMcMullin1998.17Romans8:24–25;Aquinas,Summatheologiae,IIaIIae,q.17,a.5.18Bacon1857–74,vol.III,p.222(quotedinGaukroger2001,p.78).Foradevelopmentofthispoint,seeGaukroger2001,ch.3.19AsGaukrogernotes(2001,pp.74–75),Baconacceptsahistoryofphil-osophy,popularizedbyRenaissancethinkerssuchasGiovanniPicodellaMirandola,thattracesitsoriginstoasecretwisdomrevealedbyGodtoAdam,andsubsequentlytransmittedthroughasuccessionofhermeticfiguresbeforebeingdevelopedbyPythagoras,Democritus,andPlato.Onsuchanaccount,thehistoryofphilosophy,includingnaturalphilosophy,ispartoftheesoterichistoryofChristianity;hencethereisnodivisionbetweenthetwothatneedstobebridged.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n38DONALDRUTHERFORD20Seee.g.the“DedicatoryLettertotheSorbonne”thatprefacestheMeditations,andthelettertoFatherDinet,appendedtotheSeventhObjectionsandRepliesinthesecondeditionoftheMeditations:“Asfarastheologyisconcerned,sinceonetruthcanneverbeinconflictwithanother,itwouldbeimpioustofearthatanytruthsdiscoveredinphilosophycouldbeinconflictwiththetruthsoffaith.Indeed,Iinsistthatthereisnothingrelatingtoreligionwhichcannotbeequallywellorevenbetterexplainedbymeansofmyprinciplesthancanbedonebymeansofthose[Aristotelianprinciples]whicharecommonlyaccepted”(CSMII392).21SeeVerbeek1992.22Formoreonthispoint,seeLennon’schapterinthisvolume.23DesChene’schapterinthisvolumeprovidesafullerdiscussionofDescartes’sphysics.24TheproblemisactivelyengagedbyDescartes,Malebranche,More,Cudworth,Boyle,Locke,Leibniz,andNewton,tomentiononlysomeofthemostprominentcontributorstothedebate.25Nadler2000a,p.6.26From“SayingsAttributedtoPascal”(Pascal1966,p.355).27Thisisnottosaythatallthesefiguresheldtheologicalviewsthatreligiousauthoritieswouldhaveregardedasorthodox,butsimplythattheyweretheistswhoremainedcommittedtothetruthofChristianityasrevealedinscripture.TheinclusionofHobbeswithinthisgroupiscontroversial.Forcontrastinginterpretationsofhisattitudetowardreligion,seeMartinich1992andJesseph2002.28Newton1999,pp.940–42.SomeseeanimportantdistinctionbetweensuchpublicexpressionsofChristianpietyandNewton’sprivatespecu-lationsaboutreligion(Westfall1986,p.226).ThelattercenteronhisinterpretationofscripturalprophecyanddefenseofArianism,thefourth-centuryheresythatdeniesthefulldivinityofChristandhencethedoctrineoftheTrinity.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeManuel1973;ForceandPopkin1998;Mamiani2002.29Dictionary,ThirdClarification,IV,inBayle1991,pp.428–29.30ForanaccountofthedevelopmentofSpinoza’sviewsandthecircum-stancesofhisexpulsionfromtheAmsterdamJewishcommunity,seeNadler1999.31SeeIsrael2001;andSchneewind’schapterinthisvolume.32Forfurtherdiscussionandreferences,seetheeditors’introductiontoRutherfordandCover2005.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nSTEPHENGAUKROGER2Knowledge,evidence,andmethodTheunderstandingofwhatknowledgeconsistsin,howitistobesecured,themeansbywhichdiscoveriesaretobemade,andthemeansbywhichpurportedknowledgeistobelegitimatedorcon-firmedwereallquestionsthatweredisputedintenselyinthecourse1ofthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.Thesedisputeswerepartlytheoutcomeofdevelopmentsinnaturalphilosophy,butinsomecasestheylaypartlyatthesourceofthesedevelopments.Theybegan,intheearlysixteenthcentury,withreflectionon2Aristotle’sdoctrineofmethodandscientificexplanation,butsoonturnedintoincreasinglyradicalrevisionstothisdoctrine.Bythebeginningoftheseventeenthcentury,theytooktheformofasearchforawhollynewapproach,withseveraldifferent,novelmethodo-logicalmodelsbeingadvocated.Thesearchforasatisfactorymethodisnotawhollylineardevelopment,however,andtwosetsoffactorsservetooverdeterminewhatisalreadyquiteacomplexissue.Thefirstturnsonthefactthatquestionsofmethodnotonlyhavedirectconnectionstosubstantivedevelopmentsinnaturalphilosophyitself,butalsototherelationbetweennaturalphiloso-phyandtheotherdisciplines(mostnotablymetaphysicsandthe-ology),aswellastothequestionofwhatkindsofskillsandvirtuesthepractitionerofnaturalphilosophyrequires.Secondly,questionsabouttheappropriatemethodforscientificdisciplinesbecometranslatedintoquestionsaboutthelegitimationofthescientificenterpriseasawhole.Theseconcernscometogetheratcertaincrucialjunctures,shapingwhataretakentobethecoremethodologicalquestions.Itisimportantthatweareabletoatleastglimpsehowthisshapingtakesplace,forthecontextinwhichitoccursisdifferentfromthe39CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n40STEPHENGAUKROGERconcernsthatshapedquestionsofmethodintheworkofWhewellandMillandtheirnineteenth-andtwentieth-centurysuccessors.Theconcernsthatemergedfromthislatterdevelopmentputques-tionsofinductionandhypothetico-deductivismatthefore;andwhileinductiveandhypotheticalprocedureswerediscussedandcontrastedwithoneanotherintheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,theywerepursuedinaratherdifferentway.Aboveall,oneofthecrucialdifferenceswasthat,inthenineteenthandtwen-tiethcenturies,methodologicalquestionswereconcernedlargelywiththeattempttoreconstructhowsuccessfulscientificdevelop-mentshadoccurred,toidentifythemethodologicalconditionsforthesesuccessfuloutcomes,andtodrawgeneralmethodologicallessons.Bycontrast,inthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,thereweren’tanysuccessfulmodelsofthekindthatNewtonianmechanicsorNewtonianoptics,forexample,weretoprovide,andtheaimoftheexercisewastoexplorevariousmethodologicalstrat-egieswithaviewtodiscoveringwhethertheydidinfactyieldanythingofvalue.Itisfundamentaltoanunderstandingofearlymodernconcernswithmethodtograspthattheaimwastodiscoversomethingwhichwouldaidoneinpursuingnaturalphilosophy,forexample,nottorationalize,withhindsight,somescientificachieve-ment.Intheseventeenthcentury,aboveall,methodwasconsideredapractical,pressingquestionwhichenabledonetogetstartedonthescientificenterpriseinthefirstplace.Itwasnotsomethingonereconstructedinretrospect,andatseveralremovesfromtheenter-prisethatembodiedthatmethod,anditisimportantthatweavoidimportingconsiderationsappropriatetothiskindofenterpriseintooneinwhichmethodologicalconsiderationsareacorepartofthescientificenterpriseitself.THERENOVATIONOFARISTOTLEINTHERENAISSSANCEInhisearlierwritingssuchastheTopics,Aristotlehadelaboratedproceduresforthe“discoveryofknowledge.”Theseproceduresweredesignedtoguideoneinuncoveringtheappropriateevidence,discoveringthemostfruitfulquestionstoask,andsoon,andtheydidthisbyprovidingdevicesorstrategiesforclassifyingorcharac-terizingproblemssothattheycouldbeposedandsolvedusingsettechniques.InhislaterworkssuchasthePriorandPosteriorCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod41Analytics,however,thereisamarkedchangeofemphasis.Aristotlenowpursuesthequestionofthepresentationofresults,ashisinterestsshifttothevalidityofthereasoningusedtoestablishconclusionsonthebasisofacceptedpremises:syllogistic.Inotherwords,hisconcernsshiftedfromquestionsofdiscoverytoquestionsofdemonstration.Whathappensinthesixteenth-centurydevelop-mentoftheAristotelianaccountofmethodturnsinlargepartonabasicconfusionaboutthemethodofdiscovery,inthatAristotle’soriginalmethodofdiscovery,thetopics,becomeslost,atleastinthecontextofscientificdiscovery,andhismethodofdemonstration–syllogistic–comestobeconstruedasmethodperse,thatis,asa3methodofdiscoveryaswellasamethodofpresentation.Inthesixteenthcenturythisgaverisetotwoopposingtenden-cies.DefendersofAristotle,suchastheregressustheorists,triedtounderstandhowsyllogisticcouldbeconstruedsothatitcouldbeusedas,oratleastbepartof,amethodofdiscovery.CriticsofAristotle,bycontrast,arguedthatsyllogisticcouldnotpossiblybepartofamethodofdiscovery,thatmanyoftheproblemsinAristotle’saccountofawholerangeofphilosophicalmattersweretracedtohishavingattemptedtoemploythisuselessmethod.Thesecriticssoughtagenuinemethodofdiscoveryinrhetoric,whichwastheareainwhichthestudyofthetopicshadbeendevelopedafterthedeathofAristotle,principallybythoseRomanthinkerswhostoodatthefoundationsofearlymodernrhetoric,CiceroandQuintilian.Therewerebothconservativeandradicaladvocatesofthisapproach,theconservatives,suchasPeterRamus(1515–72),seeingamethodofdiscoveryasbeingaguidetothestorehouseofknowledgebuiltupsinceantiquity,andtheradicals,suchasBacon,seeingitasofferinganopportunitytoreplacetraditionallearningwithsomethingcompletelynew.AsanexampleofthedefendersofAristotle,wecantakethoseearlysixteenth-centuryPaduanAristotelianssuchasJacopoZabarella(1533–89)andAgostinoNifo(ca.1469–1538)whode-velopedanaccountofthedemonstrativesyllogismasamethodofdiscoveryknownasregressustheory.Thebasicissuetowhichregressustheorywasdirectedwastheinformativenessofthepro-cedureofbuildingupknowledgesyllogistically,and,althoughthiswasnotclearlyrecognizedatthetime,therewasineffectadoubleproblem.First,Aristotle’sprocedureseemedtorequirethatwestartCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n42STEPHENGAUKROGERfromsenseperception,abstractingmoreandmoregeneralprinciplesfromwhatweobserved,andthendeducingourobservationsfromthosebasicprinciples;andthisseemedcircularanduninformative.Second,therewasthequestionofhowapurelyformaldevicelikethesyllogismcouldyieldnewinformation,howitcouldgobeyondtheinformationcontainedinthepremises.Aristotlehadpresentedscientificdemonstrationssyllogistically,andhehadarguedthatsomeformsofdemonstrationprovideex-planationsorcauseswhereasothersdonot.Thismayoccurevenwherethesyllogismsareformallyidentical.Consider,forexample,thefollowingtwosyllogisms:TheplanetsdonottwinkleThatwhichdoesnottwinkleisnear__________________________________TheplanetsarenearTheplanetsarenearThatwhichisneardoesnottwinkle__________________________________TheplanetsdonottwinkleInAristotle’sdiscussionofthesesyllogismsinhisPosteriorAna-lytics(I.13),hearguesthatthefirstisonlyademonstration“offact,”whereasthesecondisademonstrationof“why,”orascientificexplanation.Inthelatter,weareprovidedwithareasonorcauseorexplanationoftheconclusion:thereasonwhytheplanetsdonottwinkleisthattheyarenear.Intheformer,wehaveavalidbutnotademonstrativeargument,sincetheplanets’nottwinklingisnotacauseorexplanationoftheirbeingnear.Sothefirstsyllogismisinsomewayuninformativecomparedtothesecond:thelatterproducesunderstanding,theformerdoesnot.Thisisthekeytounderstandinghowthesyllogismcanbein-formativefortheregressustheorists.Itistruethatwestartwithobservations,proceedtogeneralprinciples,andthendeduceobser-vations,butthegraspoftheobservationsthatwehaveattheendoftheprocessisverydifferentfromthatwhichwehaveatthebegin-ning.Westartbygraspingthatsomethinghappens,butattheendoftheprocesswegraspwhythatsamethinghappens.Onthisreading,thesyllogismisnotadiscoveryofnewfactssomuchasadiscoveryCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod43ofthereasonsunderlyingthefacts.However,whatitlookslikeisawayofarticulatingthefactsintermsoftheprinciplesunderlyingthem,ratherthanameansfordiscoveryofthefacts.ThiswasinfactAristotle’sownview.ForAristotle,theepistemicandtheconse-quentialrelationsindemonstrativesyllogismsruninoppositedir-ections.Thatistosay,itisknowingthepremisesfromwhichtheconclusionistobededucedthatistheimportantthingasfarasprovidingadeeperscientificunderstandingisconcerned,notdis-coveringwhatconclusionsfollowfromgivenpremises.Thedemon-strativesyllogismwassimplyameansofpresentationofresultsina4systematicway,onesuitableforconveyingthesetostudents.Theconclusionsofthesyllogismswereknowninadvance,andwhatthesyllogismprovidedwasameansofrelatingthoseconclusionstopremisesthatwouldexplainthem.Regressustheoryincorporatesthiskindofunderstandingintoalargertheoryofscientificdemonstration.Regressuscombinesanin-ferencefromanobservedeffecttoitsproximatecausewithaninferencefromaproximatecausetoanobservedeffect,anditisthispeculiarcombinationthatproducestheknowledgerequired.Themostusualschemeemployedisafourfoldone,althoughtherearea5numberofvariants.First,weobtain“accidental”knowledgeofaneffectthroughobservation;second,throughinductionanddemon-strationofthefact,weobtain“accidental”knowledgeofthecauseofthefact;third,viaaformofreflectionreferredtoasnegotiatio,wegraspthenecessaryconnectionbetweentheproximatecauseanditseffect;andfinally,fourth,wedemonstratethefactfromthecausethatnecessitatesit.Regressustheorywassubjecttoanumberofproblems.OneofthesederivesfromAristotle,namelythatofdistinguishingdemon-strativefromnondemonstrativesyllogisms.Thetwosyllogismsgivenabove,forexample,areformallyidentical:bothareinBarbaramode,whichmeansthatthewayinwhichtheconclusionisdeducedfromthepremisesisidentical.Thefactthatoneofthesyllogismsgivesusacauseoftheeffectisnotduetoaformaldiffer-ence,andinanycasethereareotherkindsofsyllogisminwhichcauseisrelatedtoeffect.Aristotlehimselfrefersustoaformofintellectualinsight(nous)bywhichwedistinguishthediffer-encebetweendemonstrativeandnondemonstrativesyllogisms,buthedoesnotgiveusanaccountofwhatdifferenceitisthatweCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n44STEPHENGAUKROGERaresupposedtorecognize.Nevertheless,whathewastryingtoachieveisclearenough.Hewasseekingsomewayofidentifyingthoseformsofdeductiveinferencethatresultedinepistemicad-vance,thatadvancedone’sunderstanding.Realizingthatnopurelylogicalcriterionwouldsuffice,heattemptedtoshowthatepistemicadvancedependedonsomenonlogicalbutneverthelessinternalorstructuralfeaturethatsomedeductiveinferencespossess.Buthewasunabletoprovideanyaccountofjustwhatgaverisetothisfeature.Theregressusaccounthasarelatedproblem.Inthecrucialthirdstageoftheregressus,wearesupposedtograspthenecessarycon-nectionbetweencauseandeffectthroughanegotiatio.IncontrasttoZabarellaandtohisownaccountinearlypublications,Nifo,inhislaterwritings,beginstoshowsomeskepticismaboutnegotiatio,suggestingthatthebestwecanhopeforinsomecasesisconjectural6knowledge.Andindeednegotiatiodoesremainamysteriouspro-cess,althoughtheideaofinspectingthecontentsofone’smentalstatesforguidanceastothetruthorcertaintyofapropositionissomethingweshallseereappearinDescartes,eventhoughitssourceisverydifferent.THEHUMANISTRESPONSEThosewhorejectedtheideathatthesyllogismcouldplayanyroleinscientificunderstandingtendedtoassume(alongwithmanysupportersofAristotle)that,forAristotle,thedemonstrativesyllo-gismwasamethodofdiscovery,ameansofdeducingnovelconclu-sionsfromacceptedpremises.Conceivedasatoolofdiscovery,thereissomejusticeintheclaimthatthedemonstrativesyllogismlookstrivial,but,asIhaveindicated,thiswasneveritspurposeforAristotle:discoverywassomethingtobeguidedbythe“topics,”whichwereproceduresforclassifyingorcharacterizingproblemssothattheycouldbesolvedusingsettechniques.Morespecifically,theyweredesignedtoprovidethedistinctionsneededifonewastobeabletoformulateproblemsproperly,aswellassupplyingdevicesenablingonetodeterminewhathastobeshowniftheconclusiononedesiresistobereached.Nowthetopicswerenotconfinedtoscientificinquiry,buthadanapplicationinethics,politicalargu-ment,rhetoric,andsoon,andindeedtheyweremeanttoapplytoanyareaofinquiry.Theproblemwasthat,duringthemiddleages,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod45thetopicscametobeassociatedverycloselyandexclusivelywithrhetoric,andtheirrelevancetoscientificdiscoverybecameatfirstobscuredandthencompletelylost.Theupshotofthiswasthat,forallintentsandpurposes,theresultsofAristoteliansciencelostallcontactwiththeproceduresofdiscoverywhichproducedthem.Whiletheseresultsremainedunchallenged,theproblemwasnotparticularlyapparent.Butwhentheycametobechallengedinaseriousandsystematicway,astheywerefromthesixteenthcenturyonward,theybegantotakeontheappearanceofmeredogmas,backedupbycircularreasoning.Itisthisstrongconnectionbe-tweenAristotle’ssupposedmethodofdiscoveryandtheunsatisfac-torinessnotonlyofhisscientificresultsbutalsoofhisoverallnaturalphilosophythatprovokedtheintenseconcernwithmethodintheseventeenthcentury.Thefirststageofthisrevisiontooktheformofwhatmightbetermedahumanistbacklash.IfthedefendersofAristotlehadignored(becausetheymisrecognized)hismethodofdiscovery,hu-manistssuchasRamusignoredhismethodofpresentation.ThetopicshadbeenpursuedwithvigorandrefinedinrhetoricandlawintheRenaissance,andservedthereasthemeansofdiscoveryorinvention.ThehumanistcriticsofAristotleheldupthetopicsasconstitutivenotjustofdiscoverybutofthewholeprocessofcognitiveunderstanding.Theregressustheoristshadbelievedthatwecannotsimplydem-onstrateaneffectthroughitsproximatecausesince,althoughcausesarebetterknown“innature,”effectsarebetterknown“inus,”becauseourknowledgealwaysstartsfromsensation.Thisdistinc-tionwascrucialtoorthodoxAristotelianism.Itdrawsasharplinebetweenwhatis“betterknowntous,”whichisafunctionofourlimitedexperience,andwhatis“betterknowninnature,”thatistosay,themostgeneralpreceptsunderlyingthedisciplineundercon-sideration,preceptswhichenableustograsptheuniversalprinciplesaroundwhichthedisciplineisstructured.ThisdistinctionmotivatesAristotelianaccountsofpedagogy,inventionordiscovery,andjudg-ment,theideabeingthatwemuststartfromwhatisbetterknowntousandworktoward,or–intheall-importantcaseofthepeda-gogicalcontext–beguidedtoward,whatisbetterknowninnature.Thisguidancetakestheformofthemethodsofresolution(analysisofaproblemintoitselements)andcomposition(constructionofaCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n46STEPHENGAUKROGERsolutionoutoftheseelements),allthisbeingdoneonthebasisofasyllogisticformulationofallknowledge.DisputesbetweenAristo-teliansandtheiropponentsonthequestionofscientificdemonstra-tioninthesixteenthcenturygenerallytookplaceinapedagogicalcontext.Ramusthinksofknowledgeinexclusivelypedagogicterms,transformingthetopicsintoasystemofpedagogicclassificationofknowledge:thepointoftheexerciseistoenableustoreferanyquestionbacktothestorehouseofancientwisdom,theroleofthe7topicsbeingtoprovideuswithpointsofentryintothisstorehouse.Ramus’sapproachhadnomonopolyonattemptstodealwiththisquestion,butitdidmanagetoengageaverybroadrangeofquestions–abouttherelativestandingofvariousdisciplines,theaimsofpeda-gogy,andthenatureofknowledge–whichhadbecomeproblematicinthecourseofthesixteenthcentury.AnimportantingredientintheRamistresponsetotheAristoteliansisanoutrightrejectionofthedistinctionbetween“betterknowntous”and“betterknowninnature”:onekindofknowledgecanbesaidtobepriortoanotheronlyiftheoneisneededtoexplaintheother,andsuchpriorityresidesresolutelywiththemostgeneralprecepts.Insteadoftryingtocombinethem,Ramistsprizedapartdiscoveryanddemonstration,maintainingthattheformerhadnothingtodowiththesyllogisticallymotivatedproceduresofresolutionandcompos-ition,butdependedsimplyonobservationandinferencesfromsuchobservation(induction).Demonstrationisirrelevanttohowknow-ledgeisacquired,onthisview:allthatmattersishowitisbestconveyed,andthiswillbethesameinallpedagogiccircumstances,foritwillalwaysconsistinthemovefromthemoregeneraltothelessgeneral.ANEWMETHODOFDISCOVERY:BACONTheideathatthereisnoindependentmethodofpresentationofresults,onlyamethodofdiscovery,encouragedtheideathattheonlyeffectivewayofdemonstratingsomethingwastoreproducehowitwasdiscovered.Thisprovedtobeaverypowerfulidea,andcombinedwithanattackonthesterilenatureofscholasticbook-learning,fosteredarenewedconcernwithmethodsofdiscovery,aconcernthatwastobeattheforefrontofphilosophyintheseventeenthcentury.8OneofthekeyfiguresinthisdevelopmentwasFrancisBacon.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod47Bacon’sconcernwasabovealltomakenaturalphilosophyapractical,productivediscipline,andheusedinsightsgainedfromthestudyofrhetoricanditsapplicationinlegalreasoningtothisend.FollowingtheRomanrhetoricaltradition,hethoughtofepiste-mologyinpsychologicalterms,andhismethodologicalprojecthastwomainparts:oneaimstoridthemindofpreconceptions,whiletheotheraimstoguidethemindinaproductivedirection.Thesecomponentsareinterconnected,foruntilweunderstandthenatureofthemind’spreconceptions,wedonotknowinwhatdirectionweneedtoleaditsthinking.Bacon’sradicalviewisthatvariousnaturalinclinationsofthemindmustbepurgedbeforethenewprocedurecanbesetinplace.Hisapproachhereisgenuinelydifferentfromthatofhispredeces-sors,asherealizes.Logicormethodinthemselvescannotsimplybeintroducedtoreplacebadhabitsofthought,whichBaconidentifies9as“idols,”becauseitisnotsimplyaquestionofreplacement.Thesimpleapplicationoflogictoone’smentalprocessesisinsufficient.Inhisdoctrineoftheidolsofthemind,Baconprovidesanaccountofthesystematicformsoferrortowhichthemindissubject,andherethequestionisraisedofwhatpsychologicalorcognitivestatewemustbeintobeabletopursuenaturalphilosophyinthefirstplace.BaconbelievesanunderstandingofnatureofakindthathadneverbeenachievedsincetheFallispossibleinhisowntime,becausethedistinctiveobstaclesthathaveheldupallpreviousattemptshavebeenidentifiedinwhatisinmanyrespectsanoveltheoryofwhatmighttraditionallyhavebeentreatedunderatheoryofthepassions,onedirectedspecificallyatnatural-philosophicalpractice.OneofthegreatvaluesofBacon’saccountoftheidolsisthatitallowshimtomakethecaseformethodinaparticularlycompellingway.Baconarguesthatthereareidentifiableobstaclestocognitionarisingfrominnatetendenciesofthemind(idolsofthetribe),frominheritedoridiosyncraticfeaturesofindividualminds(idolsofthecave),fromthenatureofthelanguagethatwemustusetocommu-nicateresults(idolsofthemarketplace),orfromtheeducationandupbringingwereceive(idolsofthetheater).Becauseofthese,wepursuenaturalphilosophywithseriouslydeficientnaturalfaculties,weoperatewithaseverelyinadequatemeansofcommunication,andwerelyonahopelesslycorruptphilosophicalculture.Inmanyrespects,thesearearesultoftheFallandarebeyondremedy.TheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n48STEPHENGAUKROGERpractitionersofnaturalphilosophycertainlyneedtoreformtheirbehavior,overcometheirnaturalinclinationsandpassions,etc.,butnotsothat,indoingthis,theymightaspiretoanatural,prelapsarianstateinwhichtheymightknowthingsastheyarewithanunmedi-atedknowledge.Thistheywillneverachieve.Rather,thereformofbehaviorisadisciplinetowhichtheymustsubjectthemselvesiftheyaretobeabletofollowaprocedurewhichisinmanyrespectsquitecontrarytotheirnaturalinclinations.Inthefirstinstance,then,whatisneededisapurgingofthosefeaturesofthemindthatleadusastray.Oncewehaveachievedthis,oratleasthavemadesomesignificantadvancesalongtheselines,wecanpursueBacon’smethodofdiscovery.WhatBaconisseekingfromamethodofdiscoveryissomethingthatmodernphil-osopherswoulddeemimpossiblystrong:thediscoveryofcauseswhicharebothnecessaryandsufficientfortheireffects.ShowinghisAristotelianheritage,whatBaconisseekingaretheultimateexplanationsofthings,anditisnaturaltoassumethatultimateex-planationsareunique.Bacon’smethodisdesignedtoprovidearoutetosuchexplanations,andtheroutetakesusthroughanumberofproposedcausalaccounts,whicharerefinedateachstage.Thepro-cedureheelaborates,eliminativeinduction,isoneinwhichvariouspossiblycontributoryfactorsareisolatedandexaminedinturn,toseewhethertheydoinfactmakeacontributiontotheeffect.Thosethatdonotarerejected,andtheresultisaconvergenceonthosefactorsthataretrulyrelevant.Thekindof“relevance”thatBaconisafteris,ineffect,necessaryconditions:theprocedureissupposedtoenableustoweedoutthosefactorsthatarenotnecessaryfortheproductionoftheeffect,sothatweareleftonlywiththosethatarenecessary.Heprovidesanexampleofhowthemethodworksinthecaseof10color.Wetake,asourstartingpoint,somecombinationofsub-stancesthatproduceswhiteness,i.e.westartwithwhatareineffectsufficientconditionsfortheproductionofwhiteness,andthenweremovefromtheseanythingnotnecessaryforthecolor.First,wenotethatifairandwateraremixedtogetherinsmallportions,theresultiswhite,asinsnoworwaves.Herewehavethesufficientconditionsforwhiteness,butnotthenecessaryconditions,sonextweincreasethescope,substitutinganytransparentuncoloredsub-stanceforwater,whencewefindthatglassorcrystal,onbeingCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod49ground,becomewhite,andalbumen,whichisinitiallyawaterytransparentsubstance,onhavingairbeatenintoit,becomeswhite.Third,wefurtherincreasethescope,andaskwhathappensinthecaseofcoloredsubstances.Amberandsapphirebecomewhiteonbeingground,andwineandbeerbecomewhitewhenbroughttoafroth.Thesubstancesconsidereduptothisstagehaveallbeen“moregrosslytransparentthanair.”Baconnextconsidersflame,whichislessgrosslytransparentthanair,andarguesthatthemix-tureofthefireandairmakestheflamewhiter.Theupshotofthisisthatwaterissufficientforwhiteness,butnotnecessaryforit.Hecontinuesinthesamevein,askingnextwhetherairisnecessaryforwhiteness.Henotesthatamixtureofwaterandoiliswhite,evenwhentheairhasbeenevaporatedfromit,soairisnotneces-saryforwhiteness,butisatransparentsubstancenecessary?Bacondoesnotcontinuewiththechainofquestionsafterthispoint,butsetsoutsomeconclusions,namelythatbodieswhosepartsareunequalbutinsimpleproportionarewhite,thosewhosepartsareinequalproportionsaretransparent,proportionatelyunequalcolored,andabsolutelyunequalblack.Inotherwords,thisistheconclusionthatonemightexpectthemethodofsiftingoutwhatisnecessaryforthephenomenonandwhatisnottoyield,althoughBaconhimselfdoesnotprovidetheroutetothisconclusionhere.Thisbeingthecase,onecanaskwhathisconfidenceinhisconclusionderivesfrom,ifhehasnotbeenabletocompletethe“induction”himself.Theansweristhatitderivesfromtheconse-quenceshecandrawfromhisaccount.Therearetwowaysinwhichthejustificationfortheconclusionscanbeassessed:bytheproced-ureofeliminativeinductionthathehasjustsetout,andbyhowwelltheconsequencesoftheconclusionssogeneratedmatchotherobservations.Inotherwords,thereisatwo-wayprocess,fromem-piricalphenomenatofirstprinciples(induction),andthenfromfirstprinciplestoempiricalphenomena.THEMETHODOLOGICALIMPLICATIONSOFANEWMATHEMATICALNATURALPHILOSOPHYRadicallyanti-Aristotelianthoughheis,BaconisinsomewaysstillverymuchwithintheAristoteliantradition.ExplanationforBaconstilltakestheformofthediscoveryofessentialnatures,andCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n50STEPHENGAUKROGERsuchexplanationisnotquantitative.Yetinthecourseoftheearlydecadesoftheseventeenthcentury,theprincipalsourceofdissatis-factionwithAristotlederivedfromtheresistanceofhisfollowerstotheuseofmathematicsinphysicalexplanation,andmanyofthekeyissuesinquestionsofmethodintheearlytomid-seventeenthcenturylayintheareaofhowquantitative,mathematicalexplan-ationsweretobesecuredinphysicaltheory.TheguidingprinciplebehindAristotle’sapproachtounder-standingnaturalprocessesliesinhisclassificationofthedifferenttypesofknowledgeinbookEoftheMetaphysics.Heoffersathree-foldclassificationofthe“sciences”intothepracticalsciences,whichconcernthemselveswiththosevariable,contingent,andrelativegoodsthatareinvolvedinlivingwell;theproductivesci-ences,whichenableustodoormakethings;andthetheoreticalsciences,whichareconcernedwithunderstandinghowthingsareandwhytheyareastheyare.Thedivisionofthetheoreticalsci-encesworksintermsoftwovariables:whetherthephenomenafallingunderthesciencearechangingorunchanging,andwhethertheirbeingor“existence”isdependentorindependent.Aristotledefinesmetaphysics,physics,andmathematicsintermsoftheirsubjectmatters.Metaphysicsisconcernedwithwhateverdoesnotchangeandhasanindependentexistence.Physicsisconcernedwiththosethingsthatchangeandhaveanindependentexistence,thatis,allnaturalphenomena.Finally,mathematicsdealswiththosethingsthatdonotchangeanddonothaveanindependentexistence,thatis,thosequantitativeabstractionswemake:numbers(discontinuousmagnitudes)andgeometricalshapes(continuousmagnitudes).Theaimofscientificinquiryonhisaccountistodeter-minewhatkindofthingthesubjectmatterisbyestablishingitsessentialproperties.Thekindsofprinciplesoneemploystoachievethisaredeterminedbythesubjectmatterofthescience.Toestablishtheessentialpropertiesofanaturalobject,oneneedstouseprinciplesconsonantwiththatsubjectmatter,i.e.principlesthataredesignedtocapturetheessenceofsomethingwhichisindependentandchanging.Thishasaverysignificantbearingupontheconnectionsbetweenthetheoreticalsciences,anditisparticularlymarkedinthecom-plexquestionoftherelationbetweenphysicsandmathematics,foritleadstotheideathatphysicalprinciplesmustbeusedinphysicalCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod51inquiry,andmathematicalprinciplesintheverydifferentkindofsubjectmatterthatconstitutesmathematics.Thetwocannotbemixed,forphysicalandmathematicalprinciplesareessentiallyconcernedwithdifferentkindsofsubjectmatter.AlthoughtherearemanyqualificationsweneedtomaketothisinexploringtheAristotelianaccountindetail,thegeneralthrustoftheAristotelianpositionisthatphysicalinquiryordemonstrationcannotbepur-suedmathematically,anymorethanmathematicalinquirycanbepursuedphysically.Thepointcanbemadeinadifferentwaybyaskingwhatonedoesinaphysicalexplanation,andinparticularbyaskingwhatitisthatmakesaphysicalexplanationinformative.Aristotle,andthewholeancientandmedievaltraditionafterhim,thoughtthatonehasexplainedaphysicalphenomenonwhenonehasgivenanaccountofwhythateventoccurredinthewayitdid,andthatthisultimatelycomesdowntoprovidinganaccountofwhybodiesbehaveastheydo.Inaccountingforthisbehavior,oneneedstodistinguishbetweenaccidentalfeaturesofabodyanditsessentialproperties,andanybehaviorwhichcanbesaidtobeduetothebodyitselfisduetotheessentialpropertiesithas.Theseessentialpropertiesexplainitsbehavior.Suchpropertiesarephysical,andAristotlearguedthattheycannotbecapturedbyemployingmath-ematicalorquantitativeconcepts.Aswellasnaturalphilosophy,therealsoexistedanotherdiscip-lineinantiquity,which,althoughitwasclassedunderpracticalmathematics,dealtwithphysicaldevices:thiswasmechanics,thescienceofmachines.Thedevicesthatmechanicsinvestigated–thelever,theinclinedplane,thepulley,thescrew,gears–wereprob-lematicfromtheAristotelianpointofviewintworespects.First,theywerenon-naturaldevices,thatis,theyaddedtonatureratherthanmakingmanifestanaturalprocess:assuch,theycameunderthecategoryof“violentmotions”ratherthan“naturalmotions”andwerenotproperlythesubjectofnaturalphilosophyatall.BaconhaddrawnattentiontothisfeatureofAristotelianism,notingthatusefuldeviceswereactuallyexcludedfromitsdomainofinves-tigation,whereasthesewere,inBacon’sview,exactlywhatin-vestigationshouldbedirectedtoward.Second,themechanicaldisciplineswereneitherwhollymathematicalnorwhollyphysical,andfellundertherubricofwhatAristotleandhisfollowerscalled“mixedmathematics.”Aphysicalaccountofsomething–suchasCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n52STEPHENGAUKROGERwhycelestialbodiesarespherical–isanexplanationthatworksintermsofthefundamentalprinciplesofthesubjectmatterofphysics,thatis,itcapturesthephenomenaintermsofwhatischangingandhasanindependentexistence,whereasamathematicalaccountofsomething–suchastherelationbetweenthesurfaceareaandthevolumeofasphere–requiresawhollydifferentkindofexplanation,onethatinvokesprinciplescommensuratewiththekindsofthings11thatmathematicalentitiesare.InOntheHeavens,forexample,12weareofferedaphysicalproofofthesphericityoftheearth,notamathematicalone,becausewearedealingwiththepropertiesofaphysicalobject.Inshort,distinctsubjectmattersrequiredistinctprinciples,andphysicsandmathematicsaredistinctsubjectmatters.However,Aristotlealsorecognizessubordinateormixedsciences,tellingusinthePosteriorAnalyticsthat“thetheoremsofonesciencecannotbedemonstratedbymeansofanotherscience,exceptwherethesetheoremsarerelatedassubordinatetosuperior:forexample,asopticaltheoremstogeometry,orharmonictheorems13toarithmetic.”Whereasphysicaloptics–theinvestigationofthenatureoflightanditsphysicalproperties–fallsstraightforwardlyunderphysics,forexample,geometricaloptics“investigatesmath-14ematicallines,butquaphysical,notquamathematical.”Thequestionoftherelationbetweenmixedmathematics,ontheonehand,andthe“superior”disciplinesofmathematicsandphysics,whichdidtherealexplanatoryworkonthisconception,remainedavexedonethroughoutthemiddleagesandtheRenaissance,butsolongastheformerremainedmarginaltotheenterpriseofnaturalphilosophytheproblemswerenotespeciallyevident.Bythebegin-ningoftheseventeenthcentury,however,thedisciplinesofwhatwereconceivedofasmixedmathematicswereattractingasignifi-cantamountofattention,aboveallonthequestionofwhethertheymighthaveanyexplanatoryforceintheirownright.Initsmostgeneralform,theproblemwashowtointegratemechanicsintomattertheory.Mechanicsdealswithphysicalpro-cessesintermsofthemotionsundergonebybodiesandthenatureoftheforcesresponsibleforthesemotions.Mattertheorydealswithhowthephysicalbehaviorofabodyisdeterminedbywhatitismadeof,andintheseventeenthcenturyittypicallyachievesthisinacorpuscularianfashion,byinvestigatinghowthenatureandar-rangementoftheconstituentpartsofabodydetermineitsbehavior.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod53Mechanicalandmatter-theoreticapproachestophysicaltheoryareverydifferent:theyengagefundamentallydifferentkindsofconsid-erations,andonthefaceofitofferexplanationsofdifferentphe-nomena.Wedon’texplainhowlevers,inclinedplanes,screws,andpulleysworkintermsofmattertheory.Correlatively,itisfarfromclearthattheappropriateformofexplanationofthephenomenaofburning,fermentation,anddifferencesbetweenfluidsandsolidsisintermsofmechanics.Traditionally,mattertheoryhadbeenconstitutiveofnaturalphilosophy,anditwasgenerallyassumedfromthePresocraticsuptotheseventeenthcenturythatthekeytounderstandingphysicalprocesseslayinunderstandingthenatureofmatteranditsbehavior,whetherthisunderstandingtooktheformofatheoryabouthowmatterisregulatedbyexternalimmaterialprinciples,byinternalimmaterialprinciples,orbythebehavioroftheinternalmaterialconstituentsofmacroscopicbodies.Thetraditionaldisciplinesofpracticalmathematicsincludedsuchareasasgeometricaloptics,positionalastronomy,harmonics,andstatics,thelatterbeingtheonlyareaofmechanicsthathadbeendevelopedinantiquity.Statics,alongwiththeotherdisciplines,wasconsideredverymuchasabranchofmathematics,whichmeant–ontheprevailingAristotelianconception–thatitdealtwithabstractionsandhypoth-esesratherthanwithphysicalreality.Inotherwords,itwasnotpartofnaturalphilosophy;itwasnotsomethingthatonewouldusetoexplorethenatureofthephysicalworld.Aroundthebeginningoftheseventeenthcentury,however,therewasanattempttodrawonthetraditionaldisciplinesofpracticalmathematicsandtoincorporatetheseintonaturalphilosophy.Inparticular,mathematicalastronomyhadtraditionallybeencon-sideredabletoprovidemathematicalmodelsofthecosmos,buthadnotbeenconsideredtobeinapositiontoestablishthephysicalrealityofanyofthem.ThereweresomeAristotelians,suchastheJesuitmathematicianChristopherClavius(1538–1612),whotriedtoaccommodateaquantitativeapproachintermsof“mixedmath-15ematics,”andanumberofnaturalphilosophers,suchasGalileoinhisearlywritings,hadattemptedtopursuethislineofinquiry,butitcametonothing,aboveallbecauseAristotle’snonquantitative,matter-theorydrivennaturalphilosophysimplycarriedtoomuch16baggage.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n54STEPHENGAUKROGERGalileohadpushedhardfortheincorporationofmathematicalastronomyintonaturalphilosophy,andhadsoughttoriditofthe17merelyhypotheticalstandingthatithadhaduptothatpoint.ThekindofaccountofcelestialmotionheofferedwasverydifferentfromthatwefindinAristotle,orinsixteenth-centuryscholasticwritersoncosmologyandastronomy.Galileoattemptedtodevelopamechanicaltheory,abovealladynamics,thatmadenatural-philo-sophicalsenseofCopernicanism,inthewaythatAristoteliannat-uralphilosophyhadbeenusedtogroundandmakephysicalsenseofthePtolemaicsystem.Thesinglegreatestobstaclefromthemeth-odologicalpointofviewwastheobjectionthatmechanicsdealtonlywithmathematicalidealizations,notwithreality,andthisobjectionhadtobeclearedoutofthewaybeforetheprojectforaquantitativenaturalphilosophycouldproceed.Thiswas,infact,thegreatestmethodologicalproblemofthefirsthalfoftheseventeenthcentury.GALILEOANDTHEPROBLEMOFIDEALIZATIONSInTwoNewSciences(1638),Galileoprovidesthefirstmodernfull-scalekinematicaltreatmentofmotion:inparticular,hepresentsandjustifieslawsconcerningfreefallandprojectilemotion.Thesehepresentsintheformofmathematicaldescriptionsofwhathappensinavoid.Nowthemotionofbodiesinavoidissomethingweneverexperienceandsomethingtowhichwehavenodirectaccess.Themotionsofbodiesinresistingmediaissomethingweregularlyexperience,yetthesemotionsdifferfromthemotionsthosesamebodieswouldundergoinavoid.Galileo’slawoffreefalltellsusthatallbodiesundergoauniformaccelerationinavoid,butthisisclearlynotthecaseinaresistingmedium.Atfirstsight,therefore,thelawappearstosufferfromtwodrawbacks:itappearstotellussomethingaboutasituationthatmayneveroccur,anditappearsnottotellusaboutsituationsthatdonormallyoccur.Hencethereseemtobeproblemsbothabouttherelevanceofthelawandaboutwhetheritcouldreceiveanyevidentialsupport.Galileo’ssolutionistosetouttherelationsthatholdbetweena18bodyfallinginavoidandthatbodyfallinginaresistingmedium.Hetakesthefallofbodiesinaresistingmediumashisstartingpointandthendescribesaseriesofexperiments,includingthoughtCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod55experiments,designedtodecidewhatfactorsareoperativeindeter-miningtherateoffallofabodyandhowthesefactorsoperate.HedealsfirstwiththetraditionalAristotelianviewthatrateoffallisdirectlyproportionaltoabsoluteweight.Hehastwoargu-mentsagainstthis.Thefirstisempirical:iftwobodiesmadeofthesamematerialbutofdifferentabsoluteweightsaredroppedsimultaneouslyfromthetopofatowertotheground,theyarriveatthegroundsimultaneously.Thesecondisathoughtexperiment.Ifwedrop,say,twoleadspheresofdifferentweights,thenontheAristotelianaccounttheheavierwillfallfaster.But,supposewetiethespherestogether.Thesloweronewouldthensurelyslowdownthefasterone,andthefasteronewouldspeeduptheslower,sothattheresultantspeedwouldbesomewherebetweenthetwooriginalspeeds.Buttheaggregateweightisgreaterthantheweightoftheheavierbody.Hence,rateoffallcannotbedirectlypropor-tionaltoabsoluteweight.Now,Aristotlehadalsoheldthattherateoffallisinverselyproportionaltothedensityofthemedium.Againstthisanotherthoughtexperimentisproposed.Ifweletthedensityratioofwatertoairben:1,wheren>1(sincethespecificweightofwaterisgreaterthanthatofair),andtakeabodythatfallsinairbutfloatsinwater(e.g.awoodensphere),andsaythatthishasarateoffallofoneunitinair,thenitwouldfollowthatithasarateoffallof1/nunitsinwater.But,wehavealreadysaidthatitfloats–i.e.wouldriseandnotfall–inwater.Sorateoffallcannotbeinverselyproportionaltothedensityofthemedium.Next,Galileomakesanimportantgeneralization.Insteadofthinkingsimplyintermsofrateoffalldeterminedwithrespecttoonebodyintwomediaorwithrespecttotwobodiesinonemedium,heconsidersthecaseofanybodyinanymedium.First,hedescribesanexperimentwhichshowsthattheratiobetweentheratesoffallofbodiesisnotthesameastheratiooftheirspecificweights.Goldandlead,whichfallatapproximatelythesamerateinair,behavequitedifferentlyinmercury,theformersinking,thelatterrisingtothesurface.Thisexperimentindicatesthatdifferencesinrateoffallofbodiesdiminishasthedensityofthemediumdecreases.Thispromptshimtoaskwhatwouldhappeninthelimitingcaseofavoid:heraisesthepossibilitythatinsuchacasetherateoffallofallbodieswouldbeequal.But,untilweknowthepreciseconnectionbetweenspeed,specificweight,andresistance,wewillnotbeableCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n56STEPHENGAUKROGERtoestablishthis.Galileothereforeproposesanexperimentinwhichthebuoyancyeffectofthemediumcanbedistinguished.Thebuoy-ancyeffectistheratiobetweenthespecificweightofthebodyandthatofthemedium.Theproblemistodeterminepreciselywhateffectthisratiohasonrateoffall.Hecomparesthebuoyancyeffectoftwomedia(airandwater)ontwobodies(ebonyandlead).Giventhespecificweightsofthesesubstances,thebuoyancyeffectcaneasilybecalculated.Itturnsoutthatthebuoyancyeffectvariesmuchmoreradicallythanthespecificweightofthebody:ifweletthespecificweightsofair,water,ebony,andlead,be1,800,1,000,and10,000respectively,thenitturnsoutthatwhereasthebuoy-ancyeffectofairhasanegligibleeffectonratesoffallofebonyandlead,thebuoyancyeffectofwateronebonyishuge(itlosesfour-fifthsofitseffectiveweight)whereasitseffectonleadisverysmall(lessthanone-tenth).Itisthespecificweightratiosthatdeterminerateoffall,notthespecificweightsthemselves.Sinceavoidhasnospecificweight,itcannotbeararatiorelationtothespecificweightofthefallingbody;i.e.thisratiowhichdeterminesdifferencesintherateoffallcannotbeoperativeinthecaseofavoid.Sowemustconcludethatallbodies–whatevertheirspecificweight–fallinavoidwiththesame“degreeofspeed”(i.e.asitturnsout,degreeofuniformlyacceleratedmotion).Thisconclusionisparticularlyim-portant,sinceonthebasisoftheequalityofratesoffallofallbodiesinavoidwecanproceed,atleastinprinciple,tocalculatethedifferencesinspeedsbetweenanytwobodiesinanymediabydeterminingtheamountbywhichthetheoreticalspeedinavoidwillbediminished;andwedothisbycomparingthespecificweightofbodieswiththatofthemedia.Tothisend,Galileotakesusthrough(largelyunsuccessful)experimentstomeasurethespecificweightofair.Thereremainsoneproblem.Bodiesfallinginmediadonotinfactaccelerateuniformly.Neitherspecificweightnorthebuoyancyeffectcanaccountforthis,sincetheyarebothconstant(thelatterbeingaconstantforanyparticularbodyandanyparticularmedium).ThisleadsGalileotoinvokeaformofresistancetofallwhichisdistinctfromthebuoyancyeffect:thefrictioneffect.Thefrictioneffectincreaseswiththeaccelerationofthebody,sincelargerandlargeramountsofresistingmediumhavetobetraversed,andequi-libriumisreachedwhenthebodyceasestoacceleratebecauseofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod57friction.Thisstateofequilibriumoccursmuchearlierinrarerbodies,notbecausethefrictioneffectbearsadirectrelationtospecificweight,butbecausethebuoyancyeffectismuchgreaterinbodiesoflowerdensity,andhencetheirmotionisalreadygreatlyretarded.Forthisconclusiontogothrough,however,twothingshavetobeshown:first,thatthefrictioneffectisgreaterforrarerbodies;second,thatitincreaseswithspeed.Inordertoshowthefirst,weneedtoisolatethefrictioneffectexperimentallyfromthebuoyancyeffect.Freefalldoesnotallowustodothis.Galileosuggestsrollingtwobodies,e.g.oneofcorkandoneoflead,downaplanewhichisgentlyinclinedsoastomakethemotionsasslowaspossibleandtherebytoreducethebuoyancyeffect.Thetroublehereisthatthemoregentletheincline,thegreaterthesurfacefriction,whichwouldinterferewithourisolatingthefrictioneffect(whichistotallydifferentfromsurfacefriction,sinceitisaneffectofthemedium).Heresolvesthesedifficultiesbyproposinganin-geniousexperimentinwhichacorkandaleadspherearesuspendedonthreadsofequallengthandsetinoscillation.Theperiodsofoscillationremainidenticalforbothspheres,butinthecaseofthecorksphere,theamplitudeofswingisconsiderablyreducedveryquickly.Thiscannotbeduetothegreaterspecificweightoftheleadcausingittomovefaster:wecanbegintheexperimentbyswingingthecorkthroughagreaterarcsothatitinitiallymovesfaster,butthesamethingwillhappen.Moreover,sincethebuoyancyeffectissimplythespecificweightratio,itcannotbeduetothis,either.Itmustthereforebeduetothefrictioneffect.Finally,allthatremainstobeshownisthatthefrictioneffectincreaseswithspeed.Again,nodirectexperimentonfreelyfallingbodiesispossiblebecauseofthegreatdistancesthatwouldbeinvolvedandthedifficultiesinmeasurementthatwouldensue.Hencetheconsequence,thatbodiesprojectedatartificiallyhighspeedswillberetardeduntiltheyreachtheirnaturalmaximumspeedforthatmedium,isofcrucialimportance,sinceanexperimentalsituationinwhichthiscanbetestedcanberealizedinarelativelyeasyandstraightforwardway.Wesimplyfireagunverticallydownwardfromagreatheightandmeasurethepenetrationofthebulletintotheground.Wethenfirethegunclosetothegroundandmeasurethatpenetration.Thefirstislessthanthesecond,whichmeansthatthebullethasbeenretarded.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n58STEPHENGAUKROGERInsum,Galileoshows,bymeansofaseriesofactualexperimentsandthoughtexperiments,thatrateoffallbearsacomplexrelationtospecificweight,buoyancyeffect,andfrictioneffect.Bydetermin-ingexactlyhowthesefactorsarerelatedtooneanother,heisabletodeterminewhathappenswhenthemediumisremovedentirely,andthisformsthecontentofhislawoffreefall.NowGalileankinemat-icsisthemodelformuchseventeenth-centurymechanics,provid-ingthemodelwhich,whendevelopedfurtherbyHuygensandothers,willbefleshedoutbyNewtonindynamicaltermsinthePrincipia.IfthereisanymethodbywhichthePrincipiaproceed,itisbuiltonGalileo’sprocedureintheTwoNewSciences.Butwhatisthemethod?Noneofthestandardmethodologiesofscienceseemtofitthebill.Sincewedonotexperiencebodiesfallinginavoid,forexample,wecannotarriveatGalileo’slawbycumulativeinduction,thatis,bycomparinginstancesoffallingbodiesandisolatingwhattheyhaveincommon.Ontheotherhand,since,ifthelawholds,itstruthiscontingent–bodiesmayjustaseasilyhavefallenatdiffer-entratesinavoid,ormayhavefallenwithanunacceleratedornonuniformlyacceleratedmotion–itisimpossiblethataprioriargumentswillleadustothelaw.Tomaintainthatthelawisahypothesisopentoempiricaltestsisofnorealhelp,either.First,theproblemsimplyreappearsatadifferentlevel.Thesituationde-scribedinthelawdoesnotnaturallyoccurandcannotbeexperi-mentallyinduced,soinwhatwayisitopentoempiricaltest?And,evenifthesituationcouldsomehowbeexperimentallyinduced,thatwouldstillleavetheproblemofhowthelawcouldbeatallrelevanttothecaseofbodiesfallinginresistingmedia.Second,thepresumptionbehindthehypotheticalconstrualisthatthetheoryitselfissomehowdevelopedatapurelyconceptuallevelandthentestedempiricallytodeterminewhetheritistrueornot.But,itisclearthathereexperimentisanintegralpartofscientificdiscovery,notanaddedextra.Thishasimportantconsequencesforourunder-standingofmethodologicalquestions,becauseitsuggeststhein-appropriatenessofanygeneraldistinctionbetweeninventionandpresentation(oritsmodernanalogue,contextofdiscoveryandcon-textofjustification).Rather,inthepresentcase(hardlyauniquecaseinthisrespect),thereseemstobeacontinuousintegrationofdiscoveryandjustification.TheremayindeedbecasesinwhichaCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod59separationofdiscoveryandjustificationispossible,butnogenerallessoncanbedrawnfromsuchcasesaboutbestmethodologicalpractice.DESCARTES:“UNIVERSALMETHOD”VERSUSHYPOTHESESThemostformativefiguresinseventeenth-centurydiscussionsofmethodareBaconandDescartes,andDescartes’scontribution19isbyfarthedeeperandmorecomplex.ThereareinfactanumberofdifferentstrandsinDescartes’sworkonmethod,anditwillbehelpfulheretodistinguishbetweenquestionsofdiscoveryandques-tionsofpresentation,asthiswasadistinctionbasictohisproject,although,asweshallsee,thereisablurringofthedistinctiononthecrucialquestionsofhypotheses.WemustdistinguishtwodistinctphasesinDescartes’sthinkingonquestionsofdiscovery.Duringthe1620s,Descartesbelievedhehadhituponageneralmethodofdiscoverythathaditsoriginsinmathematics;butthisencounteredproblemsaround1628,andduringthe1630s,headvocatedalessambitiousaccountofdiscov-eryinnaturalphilosophythatwasexperimental,andnotunlikethe20procedureinGalileowhichwehavejustlookedat.In1620,Descartesmadeanimportantmathematicaldiscovery.Fromthebeginningofthecentury,therehadbeenaninterestinanimplementcalledtheproportionalcompass,whichhadavarietyofuses.Galileowroteapamphletshowinghowtouseaproportionalcompasstocalculatecompoundinterest,andproportionalcom-passeswereusedtosolvegeometricalproblemsthatwerenotsolubleusingarulerandordinarycompass,suchasthedivisionofanglesintoasmanyequalpartsasonechooses.ForDescartes,thefactthattheproportionalcompasscouldbeusedtosolvebotharithmeticalandgeometricalproblemssuggestedthatthesewerenot,perhaps,fundamentaldisciplinesatall.Sincetheprinciplebehindthepropor-tionalcompasswascontinuedproportions,herealizedthattherewasamorefundamentaldiscipline,whichheinitiallyidentifiedwithatheoryofproportions,laterwithalgebra.Thismorefundamentaldisciplinehadtwofeatures.First,itunderlayarithmeticandgeom-etry,inthesensethat,alongwithvariousbranchesofpracticalmathematicssuchasastronomyandthetheoryofharmony,theseweresimplyparticularspeciesofit,andforthisreasonhetermeditCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n60STEPHENGAUKROGERmathesisuniversalis,“universalmathematics.”Itssecondfeaturewasthatthisuniversalmathematicswasaproblem-solvingdiscip-line:indeed,anexceptionallypowerfulproblem-solvingdisciplinewhoseresourceswentfarbeyondthoseoftraditionalgeometryandarithmetic.Descarteswasabletoshowthisinaspectacularwayingeometry,takingonproblems,suchasthePappuslocusproblem,whichhadbaffledgeometerssincelateantiquity,andhewasabletoshowhowhisnewproblem-solvingalgebraictechniquescouldcutthroughtheseeffortlessly.Ininvestigatingtheproblem-solvingcap-acityofhisuniversalmathematics,however,Descartessuspectedthattheremightbeanevenmorefundamentaldisciplineofwhichuniversalmathematicsitselfwassimplyaspecies,amasterproblem-solvingdisciplinethatunderlayeveryareaofinquiry,physicalandmathematical.ThismostfundamentaldisciplineDescartestermed“universalmethod,”anditissuchamethodthattheRulessoughtto21setoutandexplore.Thegeneralfeaturethatunderliesuniversalmathematics,whichDescarteshopedtoisolateandmakethesubjectofuniversalmethod,wastheclearanddistinctrepresentationofideas.Inthecaseofmathematics,forexample,Descarteswasledtorejectbothgeometricalandarithmeticalrepresentationsofproblems:theformerbecausegeometricalproofsoftenofferedonlyanindirectconnectionbetweenpremisesandconclusionsandlackedtranspar-encybecausetheyoftenhad,ofnecessity,toproceedthroughauxil-iaryconstructionsandthelike,andthelatterbecauserelationsbetweennumberswerenotapparentintheirusualarithmeticalrepresentation.Inthecaseofarithmeticaloperations,forexample,thetruthoftheproposition2þ3¼5isnotimmediatelyevidentinthisformofrepresentation,butitisevidentifwerepresenttheoperationofadditionasthejoiningtogetheroftwolinelengths(seeFig.2).Inthiscase,wecanseehowthequantitiescombinetoformtheirsum(andthisisjustasevidentinthecaseofverylargenumbersthenumericalvalueofwhosesumwecannotimmediatelycompute).Infact,theprojectcollapsedinthecaseofmathematics,becausetherewassimplynoline-lengthrepresentationofsomeofthemore22sophisticatedoperationsopenedupbyDescartes’salgebra.ButDescarteswasloathtoabandontheideathattherewerewaysofpresentingideasclearlyanddistinctlytoourselvesinsuchawayCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod61Figure2.Representationofaddition,Descartes,Rules,18(ATX464:CSMI73).thatwecouldimmediatelygraspthetruthorfalsityoftheircontent.Thenewparadigmforclearanddistinctgraspnowshiftsfrommathematicstoepistemology,anditisthecogitothatcomestostandinasthearchetypicalformofclearanddistinctidea:simplybyreflectingonthecontentoftheidea,wegraspthatitmustbetrue.Butwhilereflectiononclearanddistinctideasprovidesabasisforsettingouttruthsinasystematicway,itisnotpresentedbyDescartesasamethodofdiscovery.Ifanythinghasaclaimtobeinghisproposedmethodofdiscoveryinnaturalphilosophyitis,ashetellsAntoineVatierinaletterof2322February1638,tobefoundinhisaccountoftherainbow.Thisispresentedinbook8ofhisMe´te´ores,whichisdevotedtoexplain-ingtheangleatwhichthebowsoftherainbowappearinthesky.Hebeginsbynotingthatrainbowsarealsoinfountainsandshowersinthepresenceofsunlight,whichleadshimtoformulatethehypoth-esisthatthephenomenoniscausedbylightreactingondropsofwater.Totestthishypothesis,heconstructsaglassmodeloftheraindrop,comprisingalargeglassspherefilledwithwater,and,standingwithhisbacktothesun,heholdsupthesphereinthesun’slight,movingitupanddownsothatcolorsareproduced(seeFig.3).Then,ifweletthelightfromthesuncomefromthepartoftheskymarkedAFZ,andmyeyebeatpointE,thenwhenIputthisglobeattheplaceBCD,thepartofitatDseemstomewhollyredandincomparablymorebrilliantthantherest.AndwhetherImovetowarditorstepbackfromit,ormoveittotherightortotheleft,oreventurnitinacirclearoundmyhead,thenprovidedthelineDEalwaysmarksanangleofaround42withthelineEM,whichonemustimaginetoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n62STEPHENGAUKROGERFigure3.Modeloftherainbow,Descartes,Me´te´ores(ATVI326).extendfromthecenteroftheeyetothecenterofthesun,Dalwaysappearsequallyred.ButassoonasImadethisangleDEMtheslightestbitsmaller,itdidnotdisappearcompletelyintheonestroke,butfirstdividedasintotwolessbrilliantpartsinwhichcouldbeseenyellow,blue,andothercolors.Then,lookingtowardtheplacemarkedKontheglobe,Iperceivedthat,makingtheangleKEMaround52,Kalsoseemedtobecoloredred,butnotsobrilliant.(ATVI326–27)DescartesthendescribeshowhecoveredtheglobeatallpointsexceptBandD.Theraystillemerged,showingthattheprimaryandsecondarybowsarecausedbytworefractionsandoneortwoin-ternalreflectionsoftheincidentray.Henextdescribeshowthesameeffectcanbeproducedwithaprism,andthisindicatesthatneitheracurvedsurfacenorreflectionarenecessaryforcolordis-persion.Moreover,theprismexperimentshowsthattheeffectdoesnotdependontheangleofincidence,andthatonerefractionissufficientforitsproduction.Finally,Descartescalculatesfromtherefractiveindexofrainwaterwhatanobserverwouldseewhenlightstrikesadropofwateratvaryinganglesofincidence,andfindsthatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod63theoptimumdifferenceforvisibilitybetweenincidentandrefractedraysisfortheformertobeviewedatanangleof41to42andthelatteratanangleof51to52,whichisexactlywhatthehypothesispredicts(ATVI336).Hypothesesherefigureverymuchasamethodofdiscovery,butthereisalsoauseofhypothesesinDescarteswheretheyarepartofamethodofpresentation.BothTheWorldandtheTreatiseonMan,forexample,purporttodescribehypotheticalimaginaryworlds24ratherthanrealworlds,andinthePrinciplesofPhilosophyheprefaceshisaccountoftheformationoftheEarthwiththestate-mentthatheisdescribingawayinwhichtheEarthmighthavebeenformedbypurelynaturalprocesses,notthewayinwhichit25wasinfactformed,byanactofcreation,andagainheexplicitlycallshisaccountahypothesis.Ineachofthesecases,Descartesisintroducinganextremelycontentiousthesis–heliocentrism,thedoctrineofanimalmachines,andanaccountoftheformationoftheEarththateschewsanymentionofends–whichhewantstopresentinsuchawayastoobtainforitthegreatestpossiblehearing.Inthecaseofatleastthefirsttwo(andpossiblyallthree),hedoesnotgenuinelybelievethatwhatheisofferingismerelyhypothet-ical,butanaccountofwhatreallyhappens,andineachcaseitiscrucialtohisprojectthattheoutcomeofthe“hypothetical”pro-cessesheinvokesissomethingidenticaltowhatwefindintherealworld.Inthelateseventeenth-andearlyeighteenth-centurydisputesoverthemeritsofCartesianandNewtoniannaturalphilosophy,oneofthecentralissueswasthatoftheroleofhypothesis,New-tonianscontrastingthecertaintyoftheresultsachievedinNewton’sPrincipiawiththemerelyhypotheticalstandingofthose26ofDescartes.Thequestionsherearecomplex.WhilethosenaturalphilosopherswhoidentifiedthemselvesasCartesiansinthesecondhalfoftheseventeenthcenturywereinfactveryexperimentally27orientated,bytheeighteenthcentury,Cartesianismwasidentified28withananalytical/mathematicalapproachtomechanics.Butcon-finingourattentiontoDescarteshimself,itisclearthatagooddealofthepolemicagainsthimwouldhavebeenneutralizediftheroleofhypothesesindiscovery(eventhoughdiscoveryandjustificationareinsomerespectsindistinguishableinhisinvesti-gationoftherainbow,forexample,justastheywereinGalileo’sCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n64STEPHENGAUKROGERinvestigationoffreefall)hadbeendistinguishedfromthehypothet-icalmodeofpresentationofcontentioustheoriesandresults,formuchofthecriticismrestsontheviewthatevenDescartesadmitsthathismainresultsaremerelyhypothetical,whichisamisunder-standingoftheroleofhypothesesinthepresentationofresults.METHODMAKETHTHEMANConcernwithmethodisnotjustaquestionofhowonegoesaboutdoingnaturalphilosophyintheseventeenthcentury.BothBaconandDescartesurgedthatnaturalphilosophylayatthecoreofthephilosophicalenterprise,andbothofthemcombinedaconcernwithmethodwithaconcernforwhatkindofpersonisbestequippedtocarryoutthismethod.Moreover,bothofthembelievedthatthetraditionalphilosopher,andtraditionalphilosophicaltraining,werewoefullyinadequatetothetasktheyenvisaged.Ineffect,whatBaconandDescarteswereconcernedwithwasthetransformationofphilosophersintowhat,inthenineteenthcentury,wouldbecomeknownasscientists.ThisisarecurrentthemeinBacon’swork,and29DescartestouchesuponitprimarilyinhisSearchafterTruth.Theproblemwasnotonlythatatraditionalcoreareaofphilosophymightbepursuedinacompletelynovelway,butthatphilosophyitselfwasgoingtobeaverydifferentkindofenterpriseoncethiscoreareahadbeenremoved.Thenewnaturalphilosophyhadaclearpurpose,andwhatdistinguisheditaboveallwasthemethod(disputedasthiswas)bywhichitwastorealizethatpurpose.Bytheendoftheseventeenthcentury,therewaswidespreadconsensusthatthespeculativemethodsthatphilosophyhadtrad-itionallyemployedhadfaileditinnaturalphilosophy.Thenewnaturalphilosophyandtheothertraditionalphilosophicalconcernshadtoberealigned.Thisinevitablyraisedthequestionofwhatthepurposeofphilosophypersewas,withLockemaintaininginthe“EpistletotheReader”atthebeginningofAnEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding,that“everyonemustnothopetobeaBoyle,oraSydenham;andinanAgethatproducessuchMasters,astheGreatHuygenius,andtheIncomparableMr.Newton,withsomeotherofthatstrain;’tisAmbitionenoughtobeimploy’dasanUnder-LaborerinclearingGroundalittle,andremovingsomeof30theRubbishthatliesintheWaytoKnowledg.”TheviewoftheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nKnowledge,evidence,andmethod65reformednaturalphilosopher/scientistasthemasterbuilderandthephilosopherasunder-laborerwasnotuniversal.ThegreattraditionofGermansystematicmetaphysicsfromLeibniztoKantwasverymuchoneofscholasticphilosophyradicallyreformedandrenewed,forexample,oneinwhichmetaphysics,whichhaditsowndistinct-ivewayofproceeding,providedthefoundationswhich,amongotherthings,allowedonetomakesenseofthenaturalphilosophyandmechanicsthathaddevelopedtheirresultsbyquitedifferentmethods.NOTES1Althoughnowsomewhatdated,thebestgeneralcoverageofthesequestionsisGilbert1960.Therewasalsoanextensivelegalandmed-icalliteratureonquestionsofevidencethatbearonmethod,whichIdonotdiscusshere.Onthelegalliterature,seeFranklin1963andMaclean1992.Onthemedicalliteratureonthesequestions,seeMaclean2001.2OntheveryvariedimpactofAristotleinthesixteenthcentury,seeSchmitt1983aandDiLisciaetal.1997.3SeeGaukroger1989,ch.1.4SeeBarnes1975.5SeeJardine1988,pp.687ff.6SeethediscussioninJardine1976.7SeethediscussioninOng1983.8ForadetaileddiscussionofBacononthesequestions,seeGaukroger2001,Urbach1987,andAnderson1971.9ThechiefdiscussionofthedoctrineisinNewOrganon,whichistobefoundinvol.I(Latin)andvol.IV(Englishtrans.)ofBacon1857–74,andinBacon2000.10SeeBacon’sValeriusterminus(1857–74,vol.III,pp.235–41).11SeeAristotle,PosteriorAnalytics75a28–38:“Sinceitisjustthoseattributeswithineverygenuswhichareessentialandpossessedbytheirrespectivesubjectsassuchthatarenecessary,itisclearthatboththeconclusionsandthepremisesofdemonstrationswhichproducescientificknowledgeareessential...Itfollowsthatindemonstratingwecannotpassfromonegenustoanother.”Cf.76a23ff.andOntheHeavens306a9–12.12OntheHeavens,297a9ff.13PosteriorAnalytics75b14–16.14Physics194a10.15SeeDear1995.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n66STEPHENGAUKROGER16SeeGaukrogerandSchuster2002.17FordetailsseeBiagioli1993.18Galileo,TwoNewSciences(1974,pp.65–108).SeethediscussionsinGaukroger1978,ch.6;Clavelin1974,partsIIIandIV.19ThemostgeneraltreatmentisClarke1982.20FordetailsseeGaukroger1995.21SeeRule4ofRulesfortheDirectionoftheNativeIntelligence(ATX371–79:CSMI15–20).22SeeGaukroger1995,pp.172–81.23Descartes,ATI559–60:CSMIII85;seealsotheDiscourse(ATVI63–65:CSMI143–44),andMe´te´ores(ATVI325).24TheWorldatATXI31–32,36:CSMI90,92;andTreatiseonManatATXI120:CSMI99.25Principles,IV.1(ATIXB201:CSMI267).26SeeLaudan1981,ch.4.27SeeMcClaughlin2000;andmoregenerallyClarke1989.28SeeBlay1992.29OntheconstructionofanewscientificpersonainBacon,seeGaukro-ger2001.OntheconstructionofanewscientificpersonainDescartes,seeGaukroger2002.30Locke1722,vol.I,p.ix.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nDENNISDESCHENE3FromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscienceIn1619,afteroneofhisfirstencounterswithDescartes,IsaacBeeckman,pleasedtofindakindredspirit,notedthat“physico-1mathematici”are“paucissimi”–veryfew.Asidefromhimself,Descartes,andperhapsGalileo,Beeckmanknewofnoothers.Ahalf-centurylater,Leibniznotedthat“recentphilosophersall2wishtoexplainphysicalmattersmechanistically(mechanice).”Theperiodbetweenwitnessedatransformationintheconcepts,methods,andinstitutionsofnaturalphilosophy,soremarkablethatitistemptingsimplytograntthatBacon’spromised“newinstaur-ation”–inlaterlanguage,arevolution–wasaccomplished,andthephilosophyoftheschoolswhollysuperseded.Thattransformationwasunevenandincomplete.Eveninphys-ics,thoughtherewasundoubtedlyprofoundchangeinfundamentalconcepts,explanationsofparticularphenomenaweresometimesalmostrote“mechanizations”ofexplanationsalreadyfoundinscholasticworks.Attheoutset,manyofthephenomenathem-selveswerenotnew.Evenmoresodoesthisholdinchemistryandphysiology.Descartes’sTreatiseonMan,writtenintheearly1630s,thoughit“mechanizes”physiology,doessoalmostentirelyonthebasisoftheanatomyandphysiologyofhisnonmechanistpredecessors.TheprogramoftheTreatisecouldhaveproceededperfectlywellwithoutHarvey’sdiscoveryofthecirculationofthebloodandKepler’snewtheoryofvision.AdherentsofAristotelian-ism,moreover,werenotwithoutresourcestoaccommodatesome,ifnotall,ofthenoveltiesoftheirrivals.Honore´FabrirejectedbothCartesianismandGassendism.Neverthelesshewasan“experimen-talphilosopher,”andquitecapableofformulatingcorpuscularex-planationsofopticalandmechanicalphenomena.Notonlycould67CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n68DENNISDESCHENEnewconceptshappilycoexistwitholddata;buttheconceptsthem-selvesbynomeanscomposedanindissolublewhole.Thechanges,moreover,nowbundledundertheheadingofthe“ScientificRevolution,”were,thoughroughlycontemporary,onlylooselyrelated.Theusesofexperience–andespeciallythecreationofnewphenomenabyartificialmeans–changedevenastheconceptsemployedtoexplainthemdid.Butneitherwasdependentontheother.Thesameholdsforthenewinstitutionalarrangementsfortheproductionanddisseminationofscientificresultsestablishedinthesecondhalfofthecentury.Thethreestreams–conceptual,experimentalorpractical,andinstitutional–thoughoftenmingled,hadtheirowntempi,theirownterrains.Eveniftherewasakindofunityintheirprogression,talkofasingleemergingscientificworld-viewdoesnotdojusticeeithertotheheterogeneityofchangeortothemultiplicityofitscausalconditions.Inthischapter,Iconcentrateontheconceptual.Thestoryhastwoparts.Firstofall,scholasticmatterandformgivewaytoa“mechanical”matter,towhichonlyafewprimaryaccidentsareattributed.Scholasticform,foritspart,issupplantedbyfigure–theshapesattributedtoelementarypartsorcorpusclesofmatter–andtextureorconfiguration–thevariousmannersofcombinationofthoseelementaryparts.Itisbyreferencetothehypotheticalfiguresandconfigurationsofmatterthatthereductionofmaterialacci-dentsismadegood.So-called“secondary”qualities,includingnotonlythesensiblebutalsothedispositional–flexibilityandtrans-parencyaswellastasteandcolor–aretobeexplained,where“explanation”meansamoreorlessspeculativecausalaccountbywhichitisshownthatmatterthusconfiguredwouldhavetheeffectstobeexplained.This,the“mechanicalhypothesis”ofBoyle,thoughnotanentirelynewmodeofexplanation,becamethemeansbywhichtheimputedlyprofligateandobscurescholasticformsandqualitiesweredismissed.Thesecondpartofthestoryconcernslawsandends.BythetimeofNewton,theprimaryobjectofnaturalphilosophyisnolongerpowersandoperations,butthelawsofnature.Atfirst,thelawsinquestionareonlythefundamentallawsofmotion.Butgraduallythenotionoflawisextendedtocoveralmostanyuniversalgeneralization–Boyle’slaw,forexample,orHooke’s–until“science”and“know-ledgeoflaws”become,asinKant,virtuallyidentical.ItisbywayCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience69ofthenotionoflaw,whichisonlywithdifficultyextractablefromitstheisticorigins,thatthescholasticdistinctionbetweenchanceandendsissupplantedbyadistinctionbetweenchanceandcausallaws,which,conjoinedwithsuitablehypothesesaboutmaterialfiguresandconfigurations,yieldanefficient-causalaccountoforderinthenaturalworld.Thisconceptionofscience,impressedfirmlyuponphilosophicalreflectionbyKant,wouldhaveseemedquitealientoascholastic.Scholasticnaturalphilosophydoesgathergeneralizations.Butthesourceofnaturalorderisacommunityofnatures,definedintermsofactiveandpassivepowers,subordinatedtoahierarchyofends.Whatmediatesbetweentheoldandnewconceptionsistheascrip-tiontoGodofthoseends,whicharenot,asAristotlewouldhaveit,intrinsictothings;thenewphilosophygoesontodenytothethingsofnaturenotonlyendsbutactivepowers.ForceiseitherGodhimselforfromGod.Itisnotsurprising,then,thatoccasionalismshouldhaveexperiencedarevivalinseventeenth-centurythought;thatrevivalmakesevidentthedifficultyofretaining,inasciencebasedonpassivematteractuatedbythepowerofGodaccordingtolaws,anotionofefficientcausewithmoremeatonitsbonesthantheHumean.Whatfollowsisprimarilyacoarse-graineddescriptionofhistor-icalchange.Explanationsarehardertocomeby.ThoseIofferareforthemostpartintermsofmotivationsinternaltothedisciplinesIexamine.Itis,inmyview,notevidentwhytheschoolphilosophyshouldhavegivenwaysoquickly,oratall;norwhyexperiment,andespeciallythedeliberateproductionofnewphenomenabyart(bywhatwewouldcalltechnologicalmeans),shouldhavetakenontheimportanceitdid.Aninternaldynamicdevelopsinthesciencesbywhichhypothesesaremadetoyieldexperimentalsetupstherealizationofwhichwillputthosehypothesestothetest,andconverselybywhichnewdevicesandthephenomenaproducedbythemarethoughttodemandtheoreticalexplanation.Thatdynamicislargelyabsentfromtheschools.Itcutsacrossconceptualdisagree-ments,andisperhapsabetterdiagnosticofthenewnessofthenewphilosophythananyonetheoreticalormethodologicalinnovation.Butthatisonlytopushtheproblembackastep:itisagainnotevidentwhythatdynamicshouldhavetakenholdwhenitdid.Onecansee,perhaps,thatarationalagent,endowedwithcertainaims,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n70DENNISDESCHENEwouldpreferthenewwaytotheold,andforwhatreasons.Therealandtherational,however,donotcoincideasamatterofcourse.Evenifa“rationalreconstruction”couldbegivenaroleinexplain-ingthetriumphofthenewscience,thefactthatreasonwasinthisinstanceeffectivewoulditselfrequireexplanation.MATERIALSUBSTANCEAristotelianviews(1)Primeandproximatematter.MatterandformarefortheAristo-telianthebasiccomponentsofallmaterialsubstances.Primematteristhebasicstuffunderlyingallsuchsubstances;foreachkindofsubstance,thereisacorrespondingproximatematter,thequalitiesofwhicharethoserequiredtosupporttheoperationscharacteristicofthingshavingitsform.ThatmuchwascommontoallAristotelians,whetherScotistorThomistoreclectic.Indis-putedquestionsonmatter,whicharefoundinbothPhysicsandMetaphysicscommentaries,onefindsonalmosteveryotherpointsignificantdifferences.Theprincipalargumentfortheexistenceofprimematteristhatineverynaturalchangetheremustbesomethingthatpersiststhroughthechange.Otherwisewewouldhavenotchangebutannihilationandcreation.ItwasgenerallybelievedthatcreationistheprerogativeofGod,becausetobringsomethingoutofnothingrequiresinfinitepower.Naturalagentscannotcreate.Theycanonlyproducenewformsinapreexisting(andpersistent)matter.Butisthereonestuffthatunderliesallchange,andthatisthere-forecommontoallmaterialthings?Disputationsonthispointrecordtheopinionthatcelestialandterrestrialmatterdifferevenintheirunderlyingstuff,butthepredominantopinionisthatinallbodiesthereisunique“prime”orfirstmatterthatpersiststhrougheverynaturalchange.Inparticular,thetransmutationofelements,asofwaterintoairundertheactionoffire,seemstorequiresuchamatter,bereftofallqualitiesthoughperhapsnotofquantity.Intransmutation,nothingremainsoftheoldsubstantialformandtheelementalqualitiesassociatedwithit.Yetsincethisisanaturalchange,effectedbyanaturalagent,thenewelementisnotcreated.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience71Itsformisintroducedinto(or“educedfromthepotentiaof”–seebelow)amatterthatpersiststhroughthechange.(2)Primematterandquantity.Therelationofprimemattertoquantitywasavexedquestion.TheorthodoxThomistheldthatmatterispurapotentia,a“purepotency”totakeonanymaterialsubstantialform.Inparticular,matterisnotessentiallyendowedwithquantity,althoughnomaterialthingexistsnaturallywith-outquantity.Againstthosenominalistswhoheldthatmatterandquantityareone(onthegroundsthatmatterandquantityhave,naturally,thesameeffects),theThomistarguedthatintrans-substantiation,thequantityofthehostremainsevenafteritssubstance–itsmatteranditssubstantialform–isannihilated.Quantitycanthereforeexistwithoutmatter,andistherefore3distinctfromit.Nevertheless,matterseemstohaveanaturalaffinityforquantity.Divineinterventionisrequiredtodepriveitofquantityaltogether.Naturalchange–inparticular,thecorruptionofacomplexsub-stanceintoitselements–cannotdoso.Sua´rez,heredepartingfromtheThomistview(representedintheseventeenthcenturybyJohnofSt.ThomasandthevariousauthorsbasedatSalamanca:seeMartinStone’schapterinthisvolume),heldthatmatterisnotpurepotency–itisessentiallyinpotentiatoquantity,evenifbydivineactthatpotentiacanbepreventedfrombeingactualized.Thatpotentia,moreover,distinguishesitasmatter:spiritualsubstancesdonothaveapotentiatoquantity.(3)Matterandform.Thenewphilosophers,whentheytooknoteofprimematter,dismisseditasunintelligibleandotiose;butmostoftheircriticismsweredirectedagainstform.AnAristotelianmaterialindividualisa“completesubstance”withtwocompon-ents,eachofwhichisan“incompletesubstance.”Primematteranditscomplement,substantialform,are“substantial”insofaraseachisthesubjectofinherenceforcertainaccidents;theyare“incomplete”becauseneithercanexistnaturallywithouttheother.Amongtheaccidentsofmaterialsubstance,quantitywasbymostphilosophersheldtoinhereinmatter.Alsoinheringinmatter,accordingtosome,werethequalitiesthattogethermadethematterfittoreceiveaparticularform.Thesoulofahumanbeing,forexam-ple,requiresacertain“temperament”orcombinationofelementalCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n72DENNISDESCHENEqualitiesinthebodyjoinedwithit.Ratherthansaythatthesoulitselfishotorcoldorwetordry,itwasthoughtthatthosequalitiesinhereinthematterbyvirtueofthesouljoinedwithit.Inahumanbeing,warmthinheresinthebody.But,aschangesafterdeathprove,thepresenceofthatwarmthdependsonthesoul.Habits,desires,andvolitions,ontheotherhand,inhereinthesoul.Therememberingofatree,forexample,requirestheuseofabodilyorgan–aventricleinthebrainortheanimalspiritsresidingtherein–butisitselfaqualityofthesoul.Similarlythevariouspowersofthesoul,whichbelongtotheAristoteliancategoryofquality,inhereinthesoulalone,eveniftheirexerciserequirestheuseofbodilyorgans.Theresultingpictureisoneinwhichtheaccidentsofcomplexmaterialsubstancesaredividedintothosethatinhereimmediatelyinform,andthosethat,thoughproducedbyform,inhereimmedi-atelyinmatter.Theactivepowersofathinginhereinitsform,itspassivepowersandqualitiesinitsmatter,orinquantitywhichitselfinheresimmediatelyinmatter.Inacomplexsubstance,the“orderofproduction”isfromformtopowersandfrompowerstooperations(whicharetheactusoractualizationsofunderlyingpotentiaeorpowers).Substantialformisthustwiceremovedfromexperience:whataffectsoursensesisnotformbutaccidents.Substantialform,likeprimematter,isaninferredentity.Itwould,however,bemisleadingtotakematterorformtobeanalogoustothe“theoretical”entitiesreferredtoincurrentphilosophyofscience.Theoreticalentitieslikeatomsorgenes,thoughnotimmediatelyaccessibletotheunaidedsenses,aretypicallynotontologicallyseparatekindsinthewaythatsub-stance,matter,andformareontologicallyseparatefromqualityandquantity.Anatomisabody,averysmallbody;itisaconstituentofthosemacroscopicbodiesthatdoaffectthesenses,notacomponent.TheclosestcounterpartinmodernsciencetoAristotelianformisstructureorfunction.Likeform,thesearenotaccessibletothesensesexceptthroughconcreterealizations(inthecaseofstructure)oractualoperations(inthecaseoffunction).Theyenterintoexplan-ationsnotasefficientcausesorconstituentsofobservables,butaswaysofdescribingconcreteindividualsorcollectionsofindividuals,whicharenot,however,necessarilyreducibletoanyonesuchrealization.TheAristotelianswereinclinedtocreditformandCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience73matterwithdistinctexistence;theyadmittedamoregenerousontologythanmostrecentphilosophersarewillingtocountenance.Butthatdifferenceshouldnotobscurethelikenessofroleinexplan-ation.Itisnotmypurposeheretodefendtheuseofstructureorfunctioninscientificexplanation.Itsufficestopointoutthatiftheyhavealegitimateuse,thenananalogouscasecanbemadefortheinferredentitiesofAristoteliannaturalphilosophy.Theissuebe-tweentheschoolsandus,orbetweentheschoolsandthenewphilosophers,isnotsolelyoneofutilityinexplanation;itisaquestionofexistence.(4)Qualities.Substantialformwasoneofthetwomostfrequenttargetsofcriticismamongthenovatores(ormoderns).Qualitywastheother.TheAristotelianadmittedamongtheprimary,irre-duciblequalitiesofmaterialsubstancesthepropersensiblesofeachofourfivesenses,thefourelementalqualities(hot,cold,wet,dry),andvarious“occult”qualitieslikethosethoughttounderlietheattractionofirontolodestones.Figure,whichisanentirelypassivequality,hasnoroleinexplainingthequalitiesofhomogeneoussubstanceslikebloodandbone.Itcomesintoitsowninexplainingcertaindispositionalqualitiesliketransparencyandflexibility.Insuchexplanations,theAristotelianandthemechanicalphilosophertendtoconverge.Thenewphilosopherscriticizedtheirpredecessorsontwomainpoints.Thefirstwasthedoctrineof“realqualities.”Thoughrhet-oricallyprominent,ithasmorethecharacterofadebatingpointthanofagenuineissue.ToshowhowitispossiblethatthehostshouldcontinuetoaffectoursensesinthesamewayevenwhenitssubstanceisannihilatedandreplacedbythebodyofChrist,ThomasAquinashadsupposedthattheaccidentsofthehostcouldpersistevenwhenitssubstancewasannihilated.Notsurprisingly,philoso-pherslikeDescartesandBoylefoundthedoctrineofThomasunin-telligible.Accidentsaredefinedintermsofinherence:anaccidentdependsonsomethingelsetoexist,namelythesubstanceitinheresin.“Accidentwithoutsubstance”isacontradictioninterms.Aristoteliansintheirdefenseofthedoctrinedistinguishtheessenceofaccidents,definedaspotentialinherence,fromtheirexistence.Thewhitenessofthehostremainsinitsessenceanacci-dentevenif,bydivineintervention,ithappenstoexistwithoutinheringinanysubstance.Theissueisnot,asDescarteswouldCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n74DENNISDESCHENEhaveit,whetheranaccidentcanbeasubstance–itcan’t–butrathertheinvokingofthedistinctionbetweenpotentialandactual.ThedefendersofThomastreattheiraccountoftheessenceofaccidentsasanaturalextensionofthatdistinction;Descartesandtheothernewphilosopherstendtorejectit,notonlyherebuteverywhereinnaturalphilosophy.Thesecond,andmoreimportant,pointofcriticismwasthattheAristotelians’listofprimaryqualitieswastoobig.Ofthequal-itiesrecognizedinAristotelianphysics,onlyfigureisinfactre-quiredtoexplainwhatweexperienceinnature.Hot,cold,wet,dry,andthe“occult”qualitiescanbereducedtothefiguresandmotionsofthepartsofmatter.Thenewphilosopherdemanded,inotherwords,anexplanationofwhattheAristotelianunderstoodtobeinnoneedofexplanation,anditselfthestartingpointforex-plainingthelessfundamentalpropertiesofmixtures.Iwillreturntothispointinthediscussionofthemechanicalphilosophy.(5)Change.Aristotleappealstothedistinctionbetweenthepotentialandtheactualindefiningnaturalchange.Naturalchangeistheactuality(actus)ofwhatwasatfirstonlypotential(inpoten-tia):whenwaterspontaneouslycoolsafterbeingheated,itspotentialcoldnessbecomesactual.Itcoolsbecauseitisinthenatureofwatertohaveapotentiatowardcoldnessthatwill,ifnothindered,expressitselfinactuallybeingcold.Similarly,aseedisinpotentiathematureplantoranimalitwillbecome,anditwillbecomemature,giventhematerialsitneedstodosoandtheabsenceofanyhindrance.Changeinthissensecanoccurinsubstance,quantity,quality,andplace.Changeofsubstanceisgenerationorcorruption.Changeofquantityisgrowthordiminution.Changeofqualityisalteration,asinheatingorcoolingorchangingcolor.Changeofplaceislocalmotionorlocomotion.Thedistinctionbetweenpotentiaandactusappliestoplaceasitdoesintheothercases.Aheavybodywhichisnotatthecenteroftheworldisonlypotentiallyinitsnaturalplace.Wereittoreachthecenteritwouldhaveactualizedthatpotentia.Thereare,ofcourse,manycasesoflocalmotionthatdonotconsistinfallingorrising;thesemaybecontranaturalor“violent”fromthestandpointofabody’sheavinessorlightness,butfromthestand-pointoftheagentthatcausesthelocalmotiontheymaybenaturalchangesnecessarytoorconstitutiveof,say,growthorgeneration.InCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience75principle,everychangenotitselfnatural(orpurelymiraculous)canbesubsumedundersomechangewhichis,andsoallchangecanbefittedintoanoverallteleologyofthenaturalworld.CartesianbodiesDescartes’sphysicswasnotthefirstnewphysicsoftheseven-teenthcentury.AtomistslikeThomasHarriot,SebastianBasso,andDanielGorlaeusprecededhim;HobbesandGassendiweredevelopingtheirnaturalphilosophiesatroughlythesametime;andinItaly,BernardinoTelesio,FrancescoPatrizi,andTommasoCampanellahadalreadypresentednew,comprehensivealternativestotheschoolphilosophy;GalileohadarguedthatAristotelianqual-itiesandformsweretobereplacedbyasingle,mathematically4describablematter.NeverthelessDescartes’snaturalphilosophy,andthatofhisrivalGassendi,takingadvantageofdiscontentwithAristotelianism,cametodominatethefieldofalternativesby1660.Theirheyday,asitturnedout,wasshort;butitwasdecisive.(1)Resextensa.TheprinciplesofDescartes’sphysicsfallundertwoheadings:anewontologyofthenaturalworld,andanewmeansofexplainingchange.Thenewontology,whichItreathere,wasthatofresextensaandrescogitans:extendedstuffandthinkingstuffare,withGod,thethreesummageneraofDescartes’sworld.Thenewmeanswasthelawsofnature,thetopicofthenextsection.AlreadyinTheWorld,writtenintheearly1630sbutnotpublisheduntil1664,Descarteswritesofhisnewworldthatinittherearenoforms,noelementalqualities,nosensiblequalities,andnoprimematter.Instead,thematterofthisnewworldistobeconceived“asatruebody,perfectlysolid,whichfillsequallyallthelengths,widths,anddepthsofthisgreatspaceinthemiddleofwhichwehave,in5thought,cometorest.”InAristotelianphysics,mattercannotnaturallyexistwithoutquantity.Butmatterandquantityareheld,exceptbynominalists,tobedistinct.Quantityconsideredinitselfisentirelypassive;theactivepowersofmaterialthingsarequalities.Themodesofquantityaresizeandfigure,andlikequantityitself,theyareen-tirelyinert.WhenDescartesidentifiedmatterwithextension,andthequalitiesofmaterialthingswiththemodesofextension,hewaseffectivelyrulingoutanyappealtoactivepowersinphysicalCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n76DENNISDESCHENEexplanation.Hewasalsoeliminatinganysortofchangeotherthanlocalmotion–changeofplace.NotonlyischangeofplacetheonlyoneofthefoursortsofAristotelianchangeforwhichwehaveaclearanddistinctidea,itisalsotheonlyonewhich,intheschools,wascommonlystudiedinabstractionfromends.Alreadymedievalphilosophers,especiallytheso-calledcalculatores,hadtreateduniformandacceleratedlocalmotioninmathematicalterms,independentlyofconsiderationsaboutends.Descartes’searlyworkwithBeeckmancanbeseenasacontinuationofthattradition.(2)Againstformsandqualities.ThepositiveagendaofDescartes’sphysicswastoexplainallnaturalphenomenausingonlyextendedstuff,localmotion,andthelawsofnature–inshort,“mechanistic-ally.”Thenegativeagendawastoensurethatappealingtosubstan-tialformsorqualities(asidefromfigure)wouldnolongerbeaseriousalternative.Inaidofthatgoal,avarietyofargumentswerebroughtforward,togetherwithrejoinderstostandardscholasticargumentsonbehalfofformandqualities.ThebestknownofDescartes’santischolasticargumentsarenodoubttheepistemological.Cartesianmethodallowscertaintyonlytojudgmentsonobjectsperceivedclearlyanddistinctly.TheformsandqualitiesattributedtobodiesinAristotelianphysicsareobscureandconfused;certainknowledgeofthem,eveniftheyexisted,couldnotbeattained.Althoughclarityanddistinctnessaretakenupbylaterphilosophersandappliedtothesamepurposeofeliminatingunwantedentities,theepistemologicalargumentwasnotDescartes’sprimaryreasonforrejectingformsandqualities.Evensettingasidetheobviousissueofdefiningclarityanddistinctnesswithoutbeggingthequestion,sensiblequalitiesare,asDescarteshimselfadmits,clear;sotheonlyquestionisthatoftheirdistinct-ness.Ifmeasurabilityorgeometricalrepresentabilitywerethecriter-ion,thensome“intensivequalities”(heat,forexample)admittedofdegrees;NicoleOresmeandothershadalreadyusedgeometricfig-urestorepresenttemporalandspatialdistributionsofintensiveas6wellasextensivequantities.Itwouldseem,rather,thatacommitmenttoconsideringmatterasextensionalone(andthusfigureandsizeastheonlymodesofmatter)motivatedthesearchforargumentsagainstformsandqual-ities.AlreadyinthecollaborationwithBeeckman,DescarteshadCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience77decidedupona“mechanistic”ontology,inwhichbodiesarestrippedofallbutthosequalitiesthatadmitofanimmediategeometricrepresentation(thougheventhisrequiresthatonetreattherepre-sentationofintensivequantitiesbylinesandfiguresasindirectormetaphorical).Whatonemightcalla“physical”lineofargumentisfoundinDescartes’sPrinciplesandinBoyle’sOriginofFormsandQualities(1666).Itisthatevenif,say,colorsreallyexistedinbodies,theycouldhavenophysicaleffects;inparticular,theycouldnotaffectthesenses.Theargumentrestsonthesuppositionthatonebodycanactonanotheronlybylocalmotion;localmotioncanbringaboutonlychangeofsizeandfigure.Henceeithercolorsarejustmodesofextension(orthemorecomplicatedarrangementsBoylecalls“tex-tures”),inwhichcaseourideasofcolor,whichrepresentthemasqualitiesdistinctfromanymodeofextension,aresystematicallymisleading–hence“obscureandconfused”;orelsetherearenocolorsexceptinourthought.Thesuppositionthatonebodycanactonanotheronlybylocalmotionremainstobedefended.Herethepositiveagendacomesintoplay:ifindeedallnaturalphenomenacanbeexplainedmechanistic-ally,thenformsandqualities,whichforthepurposesofthisargu-mentaretakennottobeincludedamongthemechanisticpropertiesofmatter,areinert.Oncethemechanicalpropertiesofmatterhavebeensetapart,theproductionofformsandqualitiesbythem,ortheirbeingaffectedbysuchformsandqualities,becomesdifficultto7conceive.Theseargumentsserveonlytodislodgetheassumptionthatformsandqualitiesarerequiredinnaturalphilosophy;theydonotestablishtheirnonexistence.Itisworthconsideringingreaterdetailthecaseagainstsubstan-tialforms.InAristoteliantextsonphysics,theprimaryargumentsonbehalfofformarethese.First,theAristoteliandistinguishesbetween“substantial”change,inwhichanindividual,orratheritsmatter,ceasestobeofonekindandinsteadbecomesanother,and“accidental”change,inwhichtheindividualremainsofonekindthroughout.Deathisasubstantialchange,fevermerelyaccidental.Thebestwaytoac-countforthatdifferenceistodistinguishtwosortsofform:substan-tialform,whichdetermineswhatkindathingis,andaccidentalform,whichincludesallothersortsofproperty.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n78DENNISDESCHENESecond,onepervasivefeatureofthenaturalworldisthatthefeaturesofbodiescomeinbundles.Thesamecollocationsrecur:thecoolness,wetness,transparency,andodorlessnessofwater,forexample;orthecapacitiesandstructurespropertocats.Notonlyarethosefeaturesfoundtoexisttogetherinsingleindividualstimeandagain,buttheycometobeandpassawaysimultaneously.Burningpaperlosesnotonlyitscolorbutitsflexibilityanditsdurability.Thebestway(sotheAristotelianargues)toaccountforthebundlingoffeaturesistosupposethattheyhaveacommonprinciple,thatineachindividualasinglesubstantialformunderliesallthefeaturescharateristicofitskind.Finally,somesubstanceshavepreferredstatestowardwhichtheyspontaneouslytendifnotperturbed.Water,ifheated(butnottotheboilingpoint),coolsagainoncethesourceofheatisremoved.Asickanimalreturnstohealth.Variousargumentsweremarshaledtoshowthatthespontaneousreversiontoaparticularquality,say,couldnothaveanotherqualityasitscause,butonlytheform.Inmorecurrentterms:somechangesarereversible,andarereversedwhenathingislefttoitself,andsomeareirreversible,aswhenwaterchangestosteamunderintenseheat.If,asDescartesandBoylebelieve,matterisextendedstuff(Boyleaddsimpenetrabilitytothelistoffundamentalpropertiesofmatter),andtheonlyqualitativedifferencesamongbodiesaredifferencesofsizeandfigure,thentherecanbenodistinctionbetweensubstan-tialandaccidentalchange.Figurescanvaryindefinitely,continu-ously.Theneedle-likecorpusclesthatDescartessupposeswatertoconsistincouldbecontinuouslytransformedintothebranchedparticlesofoil.Boyle,whodevotesquiteafewpagesoftheOrigintorefutingscholasticargumentsonform,substitutesforthedistinctionbe-tweensubstantialandaccidentalchangeafunctionalanaloguecom-patiblewiththeCartesianor“mechanical”hypothesis:matterhasnoform,butitcanbeendowedwitha“convention”of“mechanicalaffections”whichwillexplaineverythingthatthescholasticshadexplainedbywayofform(Origin,40).Thatconventionistobeex-plainedbyreferenceeithertotheshapesofindividualcorpusclesortothe“textures”or“configurations”formedbycombiningthem(30).ThecollocationofobservablefeaturesinanindividualisthusaconsequenceofwhatBoylecallsits“essentialmodification”orCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience79“stamp.”Thosefeatureswillcomeandgotogetherwhenthestampischanged.Thepointofreplacingformwith“stamp”isontological:thestampofanindividualisnothingadditionaltoitsmechanicalproperties,butonlyasubsetofthosepropertiesthatexhibitsacertainstability.Asfortheargumentfrompreferredstates,Boylefirstnotesthat,sinceonhisviewnaturalchangeconsistsinalterationsoffigureandsizebroughtaboutbythecollisionofbodiesinlocalmotion,heis“notsofullyconvincedthatthereissuchathingasnature’sdesigningtokeepsuchaparcelofmatterinsuchastatethatisclothedwithjustsuchaccidents,ratherthanwithanyother”(Origin,61).WhattheAristoteliancallsthenaturalstateiseither“themostusualstate,orthatwhereinthatwhichproducesanota-blechangeinthemfindsthem,”aswhensilver,whichbeginsasflexible(i.e.asretainingwhatevershapeitisbentinto),afterham-meringbecomes“springy”(i.e.returnstoitsoriginalshapeafterbeingbent)(61–62).Therearenopreferredstates:waterkeptinthecellarwillbecool,waterkeptintheatticwillbewarm,notbecausetheoneortheotherisnatural,butowingtothetemperatureofthesurroundingair(60).Twopointsmeritemphasis.TheCartesianormechanicalcon-ceptionofmatterunderminesanyfundamentaldistinctionbetweenthenaturalkindofanindividual,whichisnecessarytoitsexist-ence,andmerelycontingentoraccidentalfeatureswhichthatindi-vidualcangainorlosewithoutceasingtobeofthesamekind.Nevertheless,Boyle(and,lessexplicitly,Descartes)notonlywantstosavesomesuchdistinction,butneedsittoshowwhyitshouldevenappearthattherearenaturalkinds.Evenso,Boyle’sargumentstendtosupportaviewaccordingtowhichkindsarearbitraryandrelativetous–wateris“naturally”coolbecauseitisusuallycoolintheenvironmentswelivein.Thesecondpointisthatthefateofformsistiedtothatofends.Werethingstohave,asAristotleseemstohavethought,intrinsicends,thenitisquitereasonabletoexpectthattheyshould“prefer”onestatetoanother.ChristianAristotelianstendedtosubstitutedivineendsforintrinsicends;nevertheless,mostofthemfoundthemselvesbound,fordoctrinalreasons,nottodenythatthereareactivepowersinthings.Butifathinghasanintrinsicpower,con-ceivedinAristotelianfashionasapotencyawaitingactualizationorCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n80DENNISDESCHENEperfection,thenitisasifitwereintrinsicallydirectedtowardactualizationorperfection.Thatintrinsicdirectednesstowardwhatisnotyet,asoftheseedtowardthestateofmaturity,runscontrarytowhatmightbecalledaprincipleofisolation.ConsiderBoyle’sargumentforthe“relativenatureofphysicalqualities”:Wemayconsider,then,thatwhenTubalCain,orwhoeverelsewerethesmiththatinventedlocksandkeys,hadmadehisfirstlock...,thatwasonlyapieceofironcontrivedintosuchashape;andwhenafterwardshemadeakeytothatlock,thatalsoinitselfconsideredwasnothingbutapieceofironofsuchadeterminatefigure.(Origin,23)Weareaskedtoconsiderthelockwithoutthekey,andthekeywithoutthelock:whatweseeisthatkeynessandlocknessarerelative(wewouldsay“relational”),andthat“beingakey”isnothingatallinadditiontohaving“suchashape.”Thatseparateexistence,actualorpossible(hence“isolation”),isthebasisoftheargumentisapparentwhenweturntothequestionofthestatusofsensiblequalities.(3)Sensiblequalities.Theterm‘secondaryqualities’intheperiodcouldbeusedtorefertoanypropertyofbodiesthatwasnotoneoftheprimarypropertiesofmatter:flexibility,forexample,ortranspar-ency.Ithassincecometoreferalmostexclusivelytothesubsetofsecondaryqualitiesthatarefirstperceivedbythesenses–the“propersensibles”ofAristotelianpsychology.Aristotle’sphysicsbeginswithsensiblequalities(inparticular,thetangiblequalitiesoftheelements)inkeepingwithhismaximofstartingwith“whatisbestknowntous(quoadnos).”Ittakesthosepropertiestobe,asBoyleputsit,realandphysical.Theyexistandarewhattheyareindepend-entlyofthemannerinwhichweconceivethem,andtheycanbecausesoreffectsofnaturalchange.Earlymodernnaturalphilosophers,whatevertheirdisagreementsabouttheprimarypropertiesofmatter,almostalldeniedthatsec-ondaryqualities,astheypresentthemselvestothemind,arereal.EchoingDescartes,Boylewrites:wehavebeenfromourinfancyapttoimaginethatthesesensiblequalitiesarerealbeingsintheobjectstheydenominate,andhavethefacultyorpowertoworksuchandsuchthings,asgravityhathapowertostopthemotionofabulletshotupwards...;whereasindeed...thereisinthebodyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience81towhichthesesensiblequalitiesareattributednothingofrealandphysicalbutthesize,shape,andmotionorrest,ofitscomponentparticles,togetherwiththattextureofthewholewhichresultsfromtheirbeingsocontrivedastheyare.(Origin,31)Theseremarksfollowuponathoughtexperimentinwhichwearetoconceive“thatalltherestoftheuniversewereannihilated,exceptanyoftheseentireandundividedcorpuscles”whoseexist-enceBoylehassupposed.Itwillthenbe“hardtosaywhatcouldbeattributedtoitbesidesmatter,motion(orrest),bulk,andshape”(Origin,30).Inparticular,ifallanimalsweretovanishfromtheworld,“thosebodiesthatarenowtheobjectsofoursenseswouldbebutdispositively,ifImaysospeak,endowedwithcolours,tastes,andthelike,andactuallybutonlywiththosemorecatholicaffec-tionsofbodies–figure,motion,texture,&c.”(34).The“dispos-ition”hereisthearrangementandorderofthecorpusclesinthosebodiesthataffectthesenses.Dispositioninthatsenseisrealandphysical,butsonameditisarelativequality,relativetothesensesasbeingalockistokeys.Coloraspresentedtousisaqualitywetaketobedistinctfromanymodeofmatter–fromfigure,motion,texture,andsoon.Inbodiestherearenosuchqualities;theyare“nothingrealorphysical.”Ontheotherhand,therearerealandphysicaldifferencesinbodiesthataccountforthedifferencesinoursensations.Thesearedifferencesinwhatthosebodiesare“dispositively,”thatis,inordersandar-rangementsthathavestable,determinateeffectsonthesenses.IntheMe´te´ores,Descartesproposesthatthosepartsofsubtlematterthat“tendtorotatewithmoreforcethan[theforcewithwhich]theymoveinastraightline”causethecolorsredoryellow;thosethatrotatewithlessforcecauseblueorgreen.Thatproposalispartofanexplanationofwhatweseewhenlightpassesthroughaprism,which8isinturnpartofanexplanationoftherainbow.ItshouldbeclearthatDescarteshasnoexplanationofwhyanyofthevariousratiosofangulartorectilinearforceshouldyieldthatsensiblequalitywhichtheyinfactproduceinthemind.ThatredcorrespondstoalargeratioandbluetoasmallonefollowsfromtheobservedorderofspectralcolorsinthespectrumproducedbyaprismandfromahypothesisabouttheeffectsofpassingthroughtheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n82DENNISDESCHENEprismontherotationofparticlesofsubtlematter.Buttherelationofthe“dispositive”qualityoflightthatgivesrisetosensationsofredtothequalitypresentedbythoseideastothemind–inDescartes’sview,aqualitywhichwetaketobedistinctfromanymodeofextension–isarbitrary.Hencetheargument,foundatthebeginningofTheWorldandinBoyle’sOrigin(31),thatoursensationsdonot“resemble”theirefficientcausesinnature.Theviolentmotionofparticlesthatcausesthesensationofheatdoesnotresemblethequalitypresentedinthatsensation;itonlycorrespondstoitbywhatDescartescalls,intheSixthMeditation,an“institution”ofGod,arelationestablishedtowardtheendofprovidingus,insensation,withaguidetobenefitandharmintheworldaroundus.LAWSANDTHEFORMALCONDITIONSOFWISDOMAstillprevalentconceptionofnaturalsciencewouldhaveitthattheprimaryobjectofnaturalscienceistodiscoverthelawsofnature.Thoselawsareuniversalandmodallydistinctfrommeregeneralizations(they“supportcounterfactuals,”forexample);theuniverseis“closed”underthoselawsinthesensethateveryeventcanbesubsumedunderoneoranotherlaw.Theyformasystemwhichissubjecttorequirementsofconsistency,simplicity,rich-nessofconsequence,andsoforth.Inexplanationtheyplaytheroleofaxioms,onthebasisofwhichlessfundamental(butstilllawlike)generalizations,likethelawoffallingbodies,arederived.Thatconception,crystallizedintheworkofKant,isacreationoftheseventeenthcentury.Itisabsentfromscholasticphilosophy.Scholasticphilosopherswerecertainlyinterestedindiscoveringandstatingregularitiesinnature;theymightevenspeakofnatureinthelargeasasystemor(incosmology)amachine.Itsrisecoincideswithgreatdifficultiesconcerningcausation.ActivepowersinbodieshadbeenruledoutbyDescartes;others,likeHenryMore,attemptedtoreinstatethem,butinthecontextofanotherwisemechanistphysics,thosepowers,likeNewtoniangravitation,wereuniversal-ized,nolongercapableofsupplyingthebasisforaclassificationofnaturalkinds.Necessaryconnection–thedeterminationofeffectsbytheinternalcharacteroftheircauses–likewisebecameproblem-atic.InMalebranche,forexample,theonlycausewhoseinternalCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience83characteryieldsaneccessaryconnectiontoitseffectsisthedivinewill.Everyothercausalrelationmustbemediatedbyalawofnature.Inwhatfollows,IfirstsketchaconceptionofefficientcausalityfoundinSua´rez,whichforthepurposesofthisdiscussionItaketoberepresentativeofAristotelianism.IthenexaminethetreatmentofcausalrelationsinDescartes,Malebranche,andLeibniz.Thisisnottheonlystrandonecouldfollowintheskeinofearlymodernthoughtoncausation.Butithashad–bywayofHumeandKant–thelargestroleindeterminingrecenttheoriesofcausation.CauseandintentioThetreatmentoftheefficientcauseinSua´rez,asinhisAristoteliancontemporaries,restsonatreatmentofcausesingeneral.Fromthatwetakethefollowingconclusions.Theremustbesomethinginthenatureofthecausebywhichitcausestheeffect;otherwisewehaveamereperaccidenscause.WhenIseeSocrates,forexample,whatactsperseonmyvisualorganishisvisiblequalities,hiswhiteness,forexample.Hisbeingcalled‘Socrates’isincidentaltomysenseofsightbeingaffectedbyhim:Iseeawhitethingperse,athingcalled‘Socrates’onlyperaccidens.Thatconditionimpliesintentionalityinthecausalrela-tion,thatis,inexhibitingthecauseofaparticulareffectwemustbeabletopointtosomethinginthenatureofthecausebywhichtheeffectisdetermined.Thecausalrelationitselfrestsonarealcon-9nection,whichSua´rezcalls“influx,”betweencauseandeffect;influxoccurswhenandonlywhenthecauseisactuallycausingitseffect.ThereisinSua´rez’swayofthinkingadistinctionbetweennecessaryconsecution(theeffect,giventhecause,mustfollow)andtherealconnectionhecalls“influx.”Necessaryconsecutionholdswhetherthecauseiscausingornot;onlywhenthereisarealconnectionisthecauseactuallyacause.TheAristotelians,liketheirsuccessors,tendtoinsistthatwherethereisarealcausalconnection,theremustbeademonstrativelynecessaryconnection.Thiscanbeseenindiscussionsofcausalityperseandperaccidens.OfthisdistinctionSua´rezwrites:Acauseperseisthatuponwhichtheeffectdirectlydependsaccordingtoitsownproperbeing,insofarasitisaneffect,asthestatue-makeristhecauseCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n84DENNISDESCHENEofthestatue...Acauseperaccidens,sinceitisnotatruecause,butiscalledsoonlybysomehabitudeorsimilitudeorconjunctionwiththe10cause,hasnosingledefinitionbutissaidinvariousways.Whenwesay“themusicianbuilds,”therelationisperaccidens.Themusicalityofthebuilderisincidentallyconjoinedwiththatwhichinthebuilderdeterminestheeffectsofhisactivityasbuilder.“Fireheats”isnotperaccidens,because“fireradicallyandbyitsownvirtueincludestheproperreasonofheating”;i.e.fireisthepersecauseofsomething’sbeingheated,becausefireisbyitsnaturehot.Similarlyperseare“theanimalmoves,”“themanreasons.”So-calledchanceevents,whicharebroughtaboutbytheinci-dentalconcurrenceofseveralcauses,aconcurrencehavingitselfno“certainanddefinitecause”(sothateclipsesarenotchanceevents),aresaidtobe“outsidetheintentionoftheagent.”WhenastonefallsonPeter,thateventisoutsidetheintentionPeterhadingoingwherehewasgoing,andalsooutsidetheintentionofthestoneoritsprogenitor(theobjectofthatintentionisthe11centeroftheuniverse).Moregenerally,inaperaccidensrela-tion,theeffect(beingvisible,say)liesoutsidetheintentionofthefeatureunderwhichthecauseisdescribed(beingcalled‘Socrates’).ThistalkofintentionscanbetracedbacktothebasicconceptionofnaturalchangeinAristoteliannaturalphilosophy.Naturalchangeisparadigmaticallydirected.Theactusofapotentiahasadefiniteterminusaquo,astartingpoint,andadefiniteterminusadquem,apointofcompletion.Theterminusadquemofapowerispartofitsdefinition.Everypower,exercisedornot,hasanobjecttowardwhichitisdirected–itsintentio.Thisholdsnotonlyforagentsthatcanrepresentgoalstothemselvesaswedo,buteven,say,inplantswheretheintentiocannotpossiblyberepresented.Inknowing,therefore,thenatureofathing–henceitsactiveandpassivepowers–weknowtheintentionesofitspowers.Weknow,forexample,ofahumanbeingthatitsgenerativepowersintendoffspring,thatitswillintendsthegood.Neithertheinfluxwhichisthebasisofactualcausation,northenecessaryconnectionbetweencauseandeffect,isbasedonlaws.Aristotelianphysicsisrepletewithregularities;theirbasisistheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience85sharednaturesofindividuals.Powerscomefirst,anddefinenatures;theinstantiationofnaturesincommonlyoccurringindividualsgivesrisetoregularities.Descartesonlaws“Rules”or“laws”ofmotionarepresentfromthebeginninginDes-cartes’sphysics.Beeckman’snotesfrom1619recordlawssimilartothosesetforthbyDescarteshimselfin1630andagaininthePrinciples12of1644.Myinteresthereisinthederivationofthoselaws.InthePrinciples,II.36,Descartesdividesthecausesofmotionintothe“universalandprimary”cause,God,andthe“secondaryandparticularcauses”–thelawsofmotionlaidoutinsubsequentsectionsofthePrinciples.Theoperationofthefirstcauseisgovernedbytheprincipleoftheconservationofthetotalquantityofmotionintheworld;thisissupposedtofollowfromtheimmut-abilityofGod’swill,henceofhisoperation.Theexistenceofanycreatedthingrequiresanactofconservation(or“continuedcre-ation”)onthepartofGod.Motioninparticular,eventhough“itisnothingotherinthemattermovedthanoneofitsmodes,”canbeconservedinquantity.Themeasureofthatquantityisvolumetimesspeed.Thatquantityofmotionwhich,aspartofthetotalactofcreation,GodgivestheworldatthebeginningisconservedbyGod,sofarasthisispossible.Sincethevolumeofmatterremainsconstant,whatGodconservesisspeed,whichisdistributedoverbodiesinsuchawaythatthetotalquantityremainsconstant.Theconservationprincipleisaconsequenceoftheimmutabilityofdivineoperations.Diversityintheworlddoesnotimplydiversityinitscreator;God’swillremainsconstant,butitseffectsmayvarywiththevaryinglocationsandspeedsofbodies.Thethreelawsofmotionwhicharesupposedtofollowfromtheprincipleofconser-vation“localize”thatprincipleinsuchawaythat,givenanyinter-actionamongbodies,onecanshowthatwithinsomefiniteregionthetotalquantityofmotionisconserved.Thefirstandsecondlawsapplytosinglebodies,thethirdtothecollisionoftwobodies.Onlyincollision,whereneitherbodycanmaintainitsstateofmotion,doesanyredistributionofspeedoccur;allchangeintheworldisaconsequenceofthethirdlaworofthefragmentationandfusionofbodies(aboutwhichthelawshavenothingtosaydirectly).CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n86DENNISDESCHENEThethreelawsaregivenintheLatinversionofthePrinciplesasfollows:[Firstlaw.]Eachthing,insofarasitissimpleandundivided,remains,insofarasitisinitself(quantuminseest),inthesamestatealways,norisiteverchangedexceptbyexternalcauses.(II.37,ATVIII.1,62)[Secondlaw.]Eachpartofmatter,consideredseparately,nevertendsinsuchawaythatitwouldcontinuetomoveaccordingtoanycurvedlines,butonlyaccordingtostraightlines,eventhoughmany[parts]areoftenmadetoturnasidethroughtheirencounterwithothers.(II.39,ATVIII.1,63)[Thirdlaw.]Whenabodythatmovesmeetsanother,ifithaslessforcetocontinueaccordingtoastraightlinethantheotherhastoresistit,thenitisdeflectedinsomeotherdirection,andwhileretainingitsmotiongivesuponlyitsdetermination[i.e.itstendencytomoveinaparticulardirection];butifithasmoreforce,thenitmovestheotherbodywithit,andhowevermuchitgivestheotherofitsownmotion,itlosesthesameamount.(II.40,ATVIII.1,65)Inthederivationofthefirstandsecondlaws,notonlythecon-stancybutthesimplicityofGod’sactisinvoked.Itisinvokedexplicitlyinthederivationofthesecond:abodyinmotion,unim-pededbyothers,willmoveinastraightlinebecause“ofallmove-ments,thestraightlineistheonlyonewhichisentirelysimpleand13whosenatureiscomprisedinaninstant.”Inthederivationofthefirst,Descartes,holdingthatmotioninabodyissomethingrealandthatchangeofmotionisagenuinechange,arguesthataspontan-eouschangeinthemotionofabody,withoutitsbeingacteduponbyothers,wouldentailamutationinthedivineoperationbywhichitisconserved.Thatsimplicityisinvokedheretoprovethatcon-stancyofoperationimpliesconstancyofmotioncanbeseenifoneconsidersthatGodcouldhavewilled,inwhatwouldseemlikeasingleandimmutablevolition,thatthespeedofabodylefttoitselfshouldalwaysincrease.That,however,wouldbelesssimplethantowillthatitsspeedremainthesame.Thelaws,then,areconsequencesofGod’swill(thatthelawsholdisofcourseaconsequencealsoofhispower).Thecharacterofthelawsisinferredfromnecessaryfeaturesofthedivinewill:immut-ability,simplicity.Thelawsresultfromasingledivineact–namely,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience87thatofcreatingthematerialworld;theyholduniversallyofthatworldifweconsideritapartfrommindsandfromGodhimself.Evenmore:sincetheyarederivedfromnecessaryfeaturesofthedivinewill,thelawsmustholdineveryworldGodcreates–ifGodcreatesbodiesandmotionatall.Itisworthcontrastingthreewaysinwhich,inDescartes’sworld,thetruthofauniversalpropositionaboutcreatedthingsmaybefixed.1.Itmaybefixedinthemanneroftheeternaltruthsofarith-meticandgeometry,byafreeactofGod.Wecannotcon-ceiveothertruthsthanthosecreatedbyGod;butthedoctrineoftheircreationimpliesthatothertruthscould14havebeencreated.2.Itmaybefixedinthemannerofthelawsofnature.Thebasisofthenecessityofthoselawsisthenecessityofthedivineattributes,andinparticularofGod’simmutability.3.Itmaybefixedinrelationtoadivineendwhich,beinganobjectofthedivinewill,weknowtobeuniversalandinvari-ant.IntheSixthMeditation,DescartesobservesthattherelationsinstitutedbyGodbetweenparticularmotionsinthebrainandparticularsensationsareorderedtotheendofhealth–thatis,tokeepingthebodyfittoserveintheunionofbodyandmind.Theresultinggeneralizations,Itakeit,aremorethanmereempiricalgeneralizations.Itdoesn’tjusthappentobethecasethateveryinstanceofMgivesrisetoaninstanceofS.Thereisareason,namely,thatthispro-motestheendofhealth,andthatGodwilledthatendinconstructingthemind–bodyunion.Itwouldbewrongtocallthesegeneralizations“laws”onaparwiththelawsofnature.Butneitheraretheyentirelycontingent.FortheAristotelian,orderinnatureisderivedfromthepresenceinmatterofformswhosepowers,activeandpassive,areorientedtoends.Thisismostevidentinlivingthings,wherethehighestendoforganismsis,bywayofreproduction,toconferupontheirspecificformakindofeternalexistence,andthustoassimilatethemselves15toGod.InCartesianphysics,weseethebeginningsofwhatwilleventu-allybecomethedevelopmentalorhistoricalapproachtoexplainingCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n88DENNISDESCHENEtheexistenceoforder.Descartes’shistoricalcosmologyandhistheoryoftheearth,presentedinthethirdandfourthpartsofthePrinciples,are,howeverimperfect,examplesoftheproductionofcomplexstructuresaccordingtothelawsofnature.Thoselawsthemselvesareindifferenttoorderortheabsenceoforder:thechaoticinitialstateadvertedtoinTheWorld(“themostconfusedandtangledchaosthatthePoetscoulddescribe”),andtheboringuniformdivisionoftheworldintolittlecubesassumedinthe16Principles,areequallyconsistentwiththelawsofnature.Thederivationofthelawsisfromdivineattributes.WewillseethatbothMalebrancheandLeibnizrestoretophysicstherelationtothegoodwhichisrejectedbyDescartes.ButalreadyinDescartesthederivationofthelawsadducesnotonlytheimmutabilityofthedivinewillbutalsothesimplicityofthedivineoperations.Sloganslikenaturanilfacitfrustra(“naturedoesnothinginvain”)had,ofcourse,beenpartofnaturalphilosophyforalongtime–theonejustquotedisfoundinAristotle(OntheHeavens,II.11).InCartesianphysics,whatwasattributedbyAristotletonatureisattributedinsteadtoGod;whichistosay,theoriginofsimplicityisoutofthisworld,transcendentifnottranscendental.MalebrancheonlawsCauses.Sua´rez,towhomMalebrancherefersintheelucidationonsecondcauses(Search,Eluc.15),recognizesfourviewsontheeffi-cacyofsecondcauses.1.ThatGodistheuniqueefficientcause(oneargumentforwhichisthatsinceGodhimselfcanbringabouteveryeffect,andsincenaturanilfacitfrustra,God“didnotconferany17operativevirtueoncreatures”).2.Thatspiritualcreaturesareefficientcauses,butcorporealcreaturesarenot.3.Thatcorporealcreaturescanbeefficientcausesofaccidentsbutnotofsubstances;andspiritualcreaturesofboththosesubstanceswhichareinferiortothemandofaccidents.4.That“createdagentstrulyandproperlybringaboutthose18effectsthatareconnaturalandproportionatetothem.”CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience89ThelastoftheseistheorthodoxviewamongAristotelians.TheviewIattributetoDescartesisthesecond.Resextensaisinert.Moreover,ifstones,say,reallyhadapowerthatdrewthemtowardthecenteroftheearth,theywouldhavetobecapableofcognizingthatend;butiftheycouldcognizethatendtheywouldhavetohave19minds.Thelatterargumentprecludesonly“directed”activepowers;itisthedefinitionofbodyasresextensathatprecludescorporealactivepowersingeneral.MalebrancheholdsthatGodistheuniqueefficientcause.TheargumentoftheSearchonthispointisthis.Theideaofbody,firstofall,precludesattributingefficacytobodies.Henceonlyspiritscanmovebodies.But“whenoneexaminestheideaonehasofallfinitespirits,oneseesnoconnectionbetweentheirwillandthemove-mentofanybodywhatever”(Search,VI.ii.3),becausethevolitionsoffinitespiritshavenonecessaryconnectiontotheirobjects.TheactivepowerorforceweattributetothewillinanimpulsiontowardthegoodproperlybelongstoGod,nottotheminditself.Whatremainsisinfinitespirit–God.“WhenonethinksoftheideaofGod...,onerecognizesthatthereisaconnectionbetweenhiswillandthemovementofallbodies,thatitisimpossibletoconceivethatheshouldwillthatabodybemovedandyetthisbodynotbemoved.”Malebranchelatercallsthatconnectiona“neces-sary”connection(Search,VI.ii.3).Itisnecessarybyvirtueofthedefinitionofomnipotence:theinferencefrom‘Godwillsthatp’to‘p’isvalid,giventhatGodisperfect.Malebrancheheretreatstherelationofcausetoeffect,inkeepingwiththescholastictradition,asintentional.Butheinsiststhattherelationofcausetoeffectbeoneofnecessity.AnydefeasibilityoftheconnectionbetweencauseandeffectentailsthatthecauseisonlywhatMalebranchecallsa“natural”or“occasional”cause–somethingthatdeterminestheparticulareffectofagenuinecause.Sincetheconnectionbetweenanyfinitecauseanditseffectisdefeasible(byGod,atleast),allfinitecausesare“natural.”Ends.Descartesdeniesthatdivineendshaveanyroleinnaturalphilosophy.ThelawsofnaturearederivednotfromGod’sgoodnessbutfromhisimmutability.Neitherinthelawsthemselvesnorintheirderivationisthereanyreferencetothegood.Onlywhenweconsidermindsdoends(andnormativenotionslikehealth)enterCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n90DENNISDESCHENEthepicture.Themoralandthephysicalorderoftheworldarethusquitedistinct.ForMalebranche,thecontraryistrue.God,inestablishingthenaturallaws,“hadtocombinethephysicalandthemoralinsuchawaythattheeffectsoftheselawswouldbethebestpossible”(Dial.,XIII.3).ThesourceofthisdisagreementisthatMalebranche,unlikeDescartes,holdsthatthedivinewisdomhaspriorityoverthedivinewill;themoralorderlikewisehaspriorityoverthephysical.Forexample,“ifman...hadnotsinned...,thensinceorderwouldnotpermithimtobepunished,thenaturallawsofthecommunicationofmovementswouldnothavebeencapableofrenderinghimun-happy.”Thelawoforderis“essentialtoGod,”andsothearbitrarylawofthecommunicationofmovements“mustnecessarilybesubmittedtoit”(TNG,I.i.20).Adambeforehesinnedhad,byvirtueofthelawoforder,thepowerofsuspendingthelawsofmotionsoastoavoiddistractionfromhisend.Fromthestandpointofphysics,Adamperformedmiracles;withrespecttoorder,hisfeatswerenot20miraculous,butratherthefulfillmentofGod’swisdom.Formalconditionsofwisdom.God’swisdomprecedeshiswill;thelawsofnaturearesubordinatetoorder.Orderitselfconsistslargelyinthepreponderanceofthe“formalconditionsofwisdom.”FromaportionoftheargumentoftheTreatiseonNatureandGrace(I.i.12–18),itwillbeseenthatthoseconditionsturnouttoincludejustwhatarenowsometimescalledthe“theoreticalvirtues,”thatis,theconditionsthoughttoberequiredofgoodscientifictheories.ThewisdomofGod,forMalebrancheasforLeibniz,encompassesallpossibledesignsandallmeansofexecution.ThedesignandmeansGodactuallychooseswillbethosethatbear“moststronglythecharacterofthedivineattributes.”ThatcharacterimposesuponGod’smeanstheformalconditionsofwisdom–simplicity,general-ity,uniformity,andproportionalityofmeanstoends.Icallthem“formal”because,takeninthemselves,theyyieldnospecificends,noparticulargoodstoberealizedincreation.Inthatrespecttheyresembleimmutability,accordingtowhichwhateverGodwills,hewillseternally.Thereisatradeoffbetweenmeansandends.ElsewhereMale-branchewritesthatsometimesthewisdomofGod“resistshisvolitions”(TNG,Eluc.3,arts.22–23):hewantsallmentobesaved,forexample,buttodosowouldrequirehim“toperformmiraclesatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience91allmoments”;thisheispreventedfromdoingbyhiswisdom.Ifweabstractfromthemeans,wecanseewaysinwhichtheworldcouldbemoreperfect.Butinsuchaworld,“therewouldnothavebeenthesameproportionbetweentheactionofGodandthissoperfectworldasbetweenthelawsofnatureandtheworldweinhabit”(TNG,I.i.14).OurworldisthebestinexpressingnotonlythesubstantivegoodnessofGod,butalsotheformalqualityofsimplicity.Malebranchedeniesthatthereisanynecessaryconnectionbe-tweenfinitecausesandtheirso-calledeffects.Hume,ofcourse,wouldtakeoverthatclaim(andMalebranche’sexampleofthecolli-sionoftwoballs)inhisargumentagainstnecessaryconnections,therebyraisingthequestionofwhetherlaws(theirtheisticbackinghavingbeenremoved)areatalldistinctfrommeregeneralizations,exceptinthedegreetowhichtheyareconfirmedinexperience.WhatIhavecalledthe“formalconditionsofwisdom”arepre-ponderantnotonlyovertheoutcomestheyentailinparticularcases(becausegeneralvolitionshavepriorityoverparticularinGod’swill),butalsoovertheperfectionoftheworldtakenabsolutely,inabstractionfrommeans.Giventhatwetakeotherlawstobe,logic-allyspeaking,possible,andthatwedonotknowattheoutsetwhichlawsGodhasestablished,itistotheformalconditionsthatwemustturnindiscoveringthelaws,firstofall,andtheninshowingwhytheyareastheyare.Theformalconditionsprovideaprincipleofselectionamonghypotheses,and(byvirtueoftheirrelationtothedivinewill)reasontobelievethatsuchaprincipleisaguidetotruth.LeibnizonlawsLikeMalebranche,andunlikeDescartes,Leibnizholdsthatthedivineunderstandingpreexiststheactofcreation.Eachpossibleworldisanentirelydeterminatecollectionofmutuallydefiningindividualconcepts.Whateverlawlikerelationsobtainamongindi-vidualsintheactualworldobtainalsoamongthecorrespondingindividualconceptsastheywereunderstoodallatoncebyGodpriortocreation(see,forexample,Theod.,}225).Thoughnot“geometric-allynecessary”–thecontraryofalawisnocontradiction–theyarenotarbitraryinrelationtothedivinenature.Theyare“bornfromtheprincipleofperfectionandorder;theyareaneffectofthechoiceandofthewisdomofGod”(Theod.,}349).RatherthanbeingCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n92DENNISDESCHENEindependentgeneralizations,theyaresubjecttowhatwewouldcallglobalconstraints;theyfittogetherintoaharmoniouswhole.Lawsandwisdom.Toactoutofwisdom,toactreasonably,istoactaccordingtoprinciplesorrules.Havingtheperfectionoftheentireuniverseinmind,Godprescribedlawstohimself,eventhoughtheinevitableconsequence(asweknowfromexperience)isthatsomeindividualssuffer,because“lawsandreasonmakeorderandbeauty;andbecauseactingwithoutruleswouldbeactingwithoutreason”(Theod.,}359).Theargumenthereisthatthecre-ationoftheworldwasarationalact,achoiceofmeanstoanend;toactrationallyistoactaccordingtorules,becausefromthem(it’snotclearwhetherLeibnizwouldsayfromthemalone)orderandbeautyarise;sinceorderandbeautyareincludedintheendtowardwhichGodactsincreation,itfollowsthatGodmustprescribelawstohimself,hencetotheoperationsofhiscreatures.Theprimacyofrulescanbeseeninthecaseofmiracles.InexplicitagreementwithMalebranche,LeibnizholdsthatGoddoesallaccordingtoorder.Miraclesmaylieoutsidethecustomaryorderofnature;theymayexceedthenaturalpowersofindividuals;buttheyarestillencompassedwithinthedesignthatGodjudgedbest.Leibniztakesthis,hesays,a“littlefurther”thanMalebranche.God,hesays,neveractsaccordingto“primitiveparticularvoli-tions,”noteveninproducingmiracles.Indeed,he“cannothaveaprimitiveparticularvolition,”independentfromlawsorgeneralvolitions;“itwouldbeunreasonable.”“Thewisemanactsalwaysbyprinciples;heactsalwaysbyrulesandneverbyexceptions”(Theod.,}337).Apparentexceptions,forexamplewhenrulesconflict,willhavebeengeneratedbyruleandwillbesettledbyrule–rulesofprecedenceamongrules,say,accordingtowhich“weaker”rulesgivewayto“stronger.”ThustheformalconditionsonwisdommustbeobservedbyGodifheistoactwiselyandwell.ThoseconditionsapplytotheoneadequateobjectofGod’sgoodintention–theentireworld.Itis,inotherwords,thewholesystemofuniversallawsthatissubjecttotheformalconditions.Inassessingthefulfillmentofthosecondi-tionsbyasinglelaworspecialtheory,wemustalwaysbearinmindthepossibilitythatanapparentviolationofthoseconditionsinonepartofscience(naturalandmoral)maybecompensatedbygreaterperfectionelsewhere.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nFromnaturalphilosophytonaturalscience93BywayofconclusionIntheviewofMalebrancheandLeibniz,Descartes’sGodisnotarationalagent.ForDescartes,God’sfreedomrestsontheabso-luteindifferencewithwhichheacts.Thatconditionsetsthedivinewillapartfromthehuman:ourfreedom,ascreatures,restsonthedeterminationofourwillbyreason.Descartes,however,comprom-iseshispositionsomewhatbyinvokingsimplicityinthederivationofthelawsofmotion.Thatwouldseemtorequireanantecedentunderstandingofwhatistobewilled,andreasonedchoiceamongalternatives.Malebranche’sGod,andevenmoreLeibniz’s,isarationalagent.God’swill,unlikeours,cannotfailtobeeffective;hehastheforesightnecessarytogoverntheworldbyparticularvolitions.Nevertheless,theformalconditionsofwisdomapplyequallytohimandtous.Thelawsofnature“areachoicemadebythemostperfectwisdom,”neitherabsolutely(thatis,logically)necessarynorentirelyarbitrary;theirnecessityis“amoralnecessity,whicharisesfromthefreechoiceofwisdominrelationtofinalcauses”(Theod.,}345).BecausethelawsofnaturearetheresultsofrationalactsofGod,thescientist,whoishimselforherselfarationalagent,canemployindiscoveringthelawsofnaturethesameformalconditionsofwisdomthatGodwasconstrainedbyincreatingtheworld.Thoseformalconditionsarejustifiedbyreferencetotherationalagencywhichaccountsfortheexistenceandcharacterofthenaturalworld.Theevidentquestion,then,is:whatbecomesofthoseformalconditions–and,moreimportantly,whatjustifiesinvokingthem–whenthetheisticbackingfallsbythewayside?OneanswerisKant’s.Theformalconditionsofwisdomaretheconditionsofthepossibilityofscientificknowledgeoftheworld;wederivethemnotfromtheologybutfromreflectiononrationalagencyitself–apossibilityalreadyhintedatinMalebrancheandLeibniz.Theother,whichwithsuitablequalificationsonecouldcallvoluntarist,ifnotCartesian,isthepragmaticanswer.Theformalconditionsofwisdomhavenofoundation–neitherinnature(byvirtueofitsbeingcreatedbyarationalagent)norinaprioriconditionsontherationalsearchfortruth.Theyare,asDescartes’spositionwouldimply,arbitrary;butsincethepragmatistdeniestoanyparticularconceptionstheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n94DENNISDESCHENEnormativeforceDescartesattributestoclearanddistinctideasandtothetruthsrevealedtousbythelightofnature,whatremainstojustifytheapplicationofthoseconditionsis,inthosecaseswhereexperienceisnotdecisive,onlyutilityoraestheticpreference.NOTES1Beeckman1939,vol.I,p.244;ATXI52.2Theoriamotusconcreti,art.58(GPIV210–11).3Fonseca,Commentarium...inlibrosmetaphysicorumAristotelis,bk.5,ch.13,q.1,}2(1615,vol.II,p.648A).4Galileo1952,p.13.SeeBiener2004.5TheWorld,ch.6,ATXI33:CSMI90–91.6Oresme,Tractatusdeconfigurationibus,bk.3,ch.5,inOresme1968.SeeMurdochandSylla1978,pp.231–41.7Descartes,Princ.,IV.198,ATVIIIA322:CSMI284–85.8Me´te´ores,disc.8(ATVI333–34).9Disp.met.,disp.12,}2,n.4(Sua´rez1856–78,vol.XXV,p.384).10Disp.met.,disp.17,}2,n.2(Sua´rez1856–78,vol.XXV,p.583).11Disp.met.,disp.19,}12,n.3(Sua´rez1856–78,vol.XXV,p.742).12TheWorld,ch.7,ATXI41–43:CSMI94–96;Princ.II.37–40,ATVIIIA62–65:CSMI240–43.13TheWorld,ch.7,ATXI45:CSMI96–97.14SeeDescartes’sletterstoMersenneof6Mayand27May1630,ATI149–50,152:CSMIII24–25.15Coimbra,Commentarii...inoctolibrosphysicorumAristotelis,bk.4,ch.9,q.1,a.3(1594,vol.II,p.62).SeeDesChene2000,p.174.16TheWorld,ch.6,ATXI34:CSMI91;Princ.,III.46–48,ATVIIIA100–104:CSMI256–58.17Disp.met.,disp.18,}1,n.2(Sua´rez1856–78,vol.XXV,p.593).18Ibid.n.5(p.594).19SeeGarber1992,pp.98–99.20Ibid.TheSearch(I.5)seemsnottohaverequiredthesuspensionofthelawsofmotion.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nNICHOLASJOLLEY4MetaphysicsAccordingtotheGospels,mendonotputnewwineinoldbottles.Metaphoricallyspeakingatleast,philosophersoftheearlymodernperiodtendtobeexceptionstothisrule.Descartesandhissucces-sorsinheritedarichmetaphysicalvocabularyandsetofcategoriesfromtheancientandmedievalworld;particularlyintheworkofAristotleandhisscholasticdisciples,thisconceptualframeworkhadbeendevisedtoarticulateametaphysicalpictureoftheuniverseverydifferentfromanywhichwaslikelytocommenditselftophilosophersintheageoftheScientificRevolution.Nonetheless,insteadofrejectingthisinheritedframeworkwholesale,philoso-phersoftheperiodtendtoretainitinlargemeasurewhileinfusingitwithradicallynewcontent.Suchcontentwasofcourseadaptedtothetaskofprovidingmetaphysicalfoundationsforthenewsci-entificworldpicture.Andinthecaseofmanyphilosophersitwasalsoadaptedtothegoalofprovidingnewbasesfordoctrinesoftraditionalnaturaltheologysuchastheimmortalityofthesoul.Thecontrastbetweenthenewwineandtheoldbottlesmayhelptothrowlightononedifficultyposedbymetaphysicsoftheearlymodernperiod.Readersapproachingthemetaphysicalsystemsforthefirsttimearestruckbythefactthatphilosophersoftenseemtobeannouncing“newsfromnowhere”;thegreatmetaphysicalsystemstendtobefullofstrangeandextravagantclaims,typifiedbySpinoza’sinsistencethatthereisonlyonesubstance,Male-branche’sinsistencethatthereisonlyonecause,andLeibniz’sinsistencethatnocreatedsubstancescausallyinteractwithoneanother.Thereisnodoubtthat,fortifiedbyconfidenceinthepowerofhumanreason,philosophersoftheperiodareoftenledtoadvancetheoriesofrealitythatareradicallyatvariancewiththedictatesof95CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n96NICHOLASJOLLEYcommonsenseandwhichcanretainanairofstrangenessevenafterprolongedfamiliarity.Itisofcourseimportanttorememberthatinmanycasestheydrawonatradition,atleastasoldasPlato,whichemphasizesthatthereisafundamentaldifferencebetweentheworldofappearancesorphenomenaandtheworldofultimatereality.Itisalsopossibletodispeltheairofmysterysurroundingsuchmetaphysicalclaimsbyseeingthattheirauthorsareoftenseekingtoarticulatenewphilosophicalinsightswithinatraditionalvocabularyandsetofconcepts.AstheGospelsremindus,thedangerofputtingnewwineintooldbottlesisthatitmaybursttheleatherskins.Attimes,asweshallsee,thenewinsightsofearlymodernphilosophersregardingsuchissuesassubstance,laws,andcausationseemsimilarlyindangerofexplodingthetraditionalmetaphysicalframework.Althoughtheleadingphilosophersoftheearlymodernperiodareoftencontenttopracticemetaphysicswithinatraditionalsetofcategories,itwouldbemisleadingtosuggestthattherewerenodissentientvoices.JohnLocke,forexample,isfamousforhisskepticismaboutwhethertheconceptofsubstancederivingfromAristotleretainsanypointorvalueonthenewscientificpictureoftheworld.AndevenMalebranche,thoughheclaimstoberejectingonlynaturalcausality,mightbereadasadvocatingthattheconceptofcausalityingeneralshouldbejettisonedaltogetherfromphiloso-phy.Moreover,somephilosophersoftheperiod,ofwhomLockeisagainaprimeexample,extendtheirskepticismbeyondparticu-larmetaphysicalconceptstothewholeenterpriseofmetaphysics;thatis,theycallintoquestionthepowerofthehumanmindtounderstandandarticulatethefundamentalnatureofreality.METAPHYSICS:ITSMETHODANDPROSPECTSOneofthemostfamousworksofearlymodernphilosophyisen-titledEthicsDemonstratedintheGeometricalManner.Evenasuperficialinspectionofthiswork,whichisasmuchacontributiontometaphysicsastomoraltheory,revealstheaccuracyofitsfulltitle.Spinoza’sEthicsemploysthroughouttheratherintimidatingapparatusofEuclid’sElements:thereaderisimmediatelycon-frontedwithanimpressivearrayofnumberedaxioms,definitions,postulates,andtheoremstobeproved.Spinoza’sEthicsmayseemCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics97merelytoembodyinanextremeanduncompromisingformacon-victionthatwasratherwidespreadamongearlymodernphiloso-phers,particularlyinthefirsthalfoftheperiod:philosophyshouldseektoemulatethepracticeofgeometry.Itisnotdifficulttounderstandwhygeometryexercisedsuchaholdovertheimagin-ationofphilosophersintheperiod.EversinceDescartesintheDiscourseontheMethodhadwrittenadmiringlyofthelongchainsofreasoningofthegeometers(CSMI120),philosophershadbeenimpressedbythepossibilityofachievingcertainanddemonstrativeknowledgeingeometry;suchcertaintyseemedtocontrastfavorablywiththeobscurity,sterility,andinconclusivenessofdebatesinscholasticphilosophy.Moreover,philosophersoftheperioddidnothavetolookbacktotheancientstofindimpressivecontribu-tionstomathematicalknowledge.Nearthebeginningoftheperiod,thediscoveryofcoordinategeometryrevolutionizedmathematicsbysynthesizinggeometryandalgebra;neartheendoftheperiod,LeibnizandNewtonindependentlyadvancedthesubjectwiththediscoveryofthedifferentialcalculus.Theholdthatgeometryinparticularexercisedovertheimagin-ationofsomeearlymodernphilosophersisfurtherillustratedbyacelebratedanecdoteaboutHobbes’sdiscoveryofthesubject:BeinginaGentleman’slibraryEuclid’sElementslayopen,and’twasthe47El.libr.1[i.e.thePythagoreantheorem].HereadtheProposition.ByG–,saydhe...thisisimpossible!SohereadstheDemonstrationofit,whichreferredhimbacktosuchaProposition,whichpropositionheread.Thatreferredhimbacktoanother,whichhealsoread.Etsicdeinceps[andsoon]thatatlasthewasdemonstrativelyconvincedofthattrueth.Thismade1himinlovewithGeometry.ObviouslyAubrey’sstoryabouttheoriginsofHobbes’sloveaffairwithgeometryshowsthatonereasonfortheattractionwastheprospectofachievingdemonstrativecertainty.ButtheanecdotealsobringsoutanotheraspectofHobbes’sattractiontogeometrywhichisnolessrevealing:itillustratesthepossibilityofderivinginitiallycounterintuitiveconclusionsfromprevioustheoremsandultim-2atelyfromaxiomsanddefinitionswhicharebeyonddispute.Thusitisnotaconclusiveobjectiontoageometricaltheoremthatitappearscounterintuitiveorsurprising:criticismmustfocusonthereasoningorthepremisesfromwhichitisderived.ClearlythisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n98NICHOLASJOLLEYmoraloftheanecdoteisrelevanttoHobbes’sownpoliticalphiloso-phy:Hobbesrecognizesthathismainconclusiontotheeffectthatnothinglessthanabsolutesovereigntyisaproperlyconstitutedstatewillappearshockinglycounterintuitivetomanyofhisreaders.Butitisnolessrelevanttothemetaphysicsoftheperiod.TheresultsofmetaphysicalsystemssuchasthoseofSpinozaandLeib-nizarehighlycounterintuitiveatfirstsight.Confrontedwithanobjectiontothiseffect,SpinozaandLeibnizcouldrespondinpartbyobservingthatoursenseofsurpriseandshockisafunctionofourbondagetopreconceivedopinionsandtheconfusedideasofcommonsense;oncewesucceedinattainingclearanddistinctoradequateideas,thisreactionwilldisappear.ButtheycouldalsorespondbydrawingthesamemoralfromEuclidthatHobbesclearlydid:thecounterintuitivenessofaconclusionisnotadecisiveobjec-tiontoapropositionvalidlyderivedfromincontestableaxiomsanddefinitions.TheEuclideanmethodmaythusseempeculiarlywelladaptedtothepresentationofmetaphysicalsystemsthatproposeseriousrevi-sionsofcommonsenseviews.ButitremainsthecasethatSpinoza’sEthicsistheonlymajorworkofearlymodernphilosophywhichadoptstheEuclideanmodelinapureandthoroughgoingway.Im-pressedbythisfact,somerecentwritershavetendedtoquestionwhethereventherationalistphilosopherswerereallycommittedtotheviewthatmetaphysicscouldachievethedemonstrativecer-taintyofgeometry.Indeed,ithasevenbeenclaimedinthecaseof3SpinozathattheEuclideanapparatusissomethingofasham.ItiscertainlytruethatneitherDescartesnorLeibnizmademorethanintermittentorperfunctoryuseoftheapparatusofEuclideangeom-etrywhenwritingmetaphysics.Butitwouldbeamistaketoinferfromthisthattheywerenotcommittedtotheidealofgeometricaldemonstration.InthecaseofDescartes,itshouldbeparticularlyeasytodeter-minehisposition,forhewaspressedonthepointbytheauthorsoftheSecondObjectionswhoinvitedhimto“setouttheentireargu-ment[oftheMeditations]inthegeometricalfashionstartingfromanumberofdefinitions,postulates,andaxioms”(CSMII92).Inreply,DescartesclaimsthatthereisasenseinwhichhehaswrittentheMeditationsinthegeometricalmanner.Foronething,theworkiswritteningeometricalorder,“whichconsistssimplyinthis”:CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics99Theitemswhichareputforwardfirstmustbeknownentirelywithouttheaidofwhatcomeslater;andtheremainingitemsmustbearrangedinsuchawaythattheirdemonstrationdependssolelyonwhathasgonebefore.IdotrytofollowthisorderverycarefullyinmyMeditations.(CSMII110)Itistrue,Descartesconcedes,thathehasnotemployedtheEuclid-eanapparatusintheMeditations(and,wemightadd,didnotdosoeveninthePrinciples),buthereDescartesjustifieshispracticebymeansofadistinctionbetweentwokindsofgeometricalmethod.ThemethodofEuclidinhisElementsisthemethodofsynthesis:withitsarrayofdefinitions,postulates,andaxiomsitbulliesthereaderintosubmission,asitwere:“ifanyonedeniesoneoftheconclusionsitcanbeshownatoncethatitiscontainedinwhathasgonebefore,andhencethereader,howeverargumentativeorstub-bornhemaybe,iscompelledtogivehisassent”(CSMII111).Butthereisalsothemethodofanalysis,whichshowsthetruewaybymeansofwhichthethinginquestionwasdiscovered.Themethodofanalysis,whichisthetruemethodofinstruction,ismoreappro-priatetometaphysicsthantheEuclideanorsyntheticmethod,andit4isforthisreasonthatDescartesadopteditintheMeditations.InonewayDescartes’sexplanationofwhythesyntheticmethodisnotappropriateinmetaphysicsissomewhatsurprising.Theex-planationturnsonanallegeddifferencebetweentheconceptsofgeometryandmetaphysics:intheformer,theconceptsatissueareacceptedbyeveryoneandaccordwiththeuseofoursenses;inthelatterfield,bycontrast,theyconflictwithsomanypreconceivedopinionsderivedfromthesensesthatitisdifficulttomakethemclearanddistinct;indeed,thisdifficultyistheprincipalobstacletodoingmetaphysics,andcanbeovercomeonlybythekindofsus-tainedreflectionpracticedbythesolitaryinquirerintheMedita-tions.OnemightsupposethatfromaCartesianperspectivetheconceptsofgeometryandmetaphysicswereepistemicallyonapar;ineachcasewhatisatissueisabodyofinnateideasthatcanbeaccessedonlybyturningawayfromthedataofthesensesandtheimagination.ButthereisastrandinDescartes’stheoryofmath-ematicswhichtendstoemphasizethepositiveroleoftheimagin-ation.EvenintheSixthMeditation,Descartesmaynotwishtodenysucharole:hemaysimplywishtoputusonourguardagainstCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n100NICHOLASJOLLEYsupposingthatgeometricalconceptsactuallyarementalimages.WhetherornotwethinkthatDescartes’spreferencefortheanalyticmethodissimplyadhocandself-serving,weshouldnotethathewasnotinsuperablyopposedtothemethodofsynthesisinmeta-physics;forDescartesatleastmakesaconcessiontotheauthorsoftheSecondObjectionsbycastingpartoftheargumentoftheMeditationsingeometrical(i.e.Euclideanorsynthetic)form.Leibniz,likeDescartes,seemstohaveheldthattheEuclideanorsyntheticmethodwaslessthanidealforthepresentationofmeta-physics.ButwhereasDescartesstressesfactsaboutthenatureofmetaphysicalconceptsasareasonforavoidingthismethod,Leibnizoffers,atleastofficially,amorestraightforwardexplanation:themathematicalstylerepelspeople.Itisthusinappropriateforaphil-osopherwhoseekstogainwidespreadagreementtohisprinciples.Yetsuchexplanationstendtobeaccompaniedbyuncompromisingstatementstotheeffectthathismetaphysicsachievesthedemon-strativecertaintyofmathematics.ThusinthesamebreathLeibniztellsacorrespondent:“IneverwriteanythinginphilosophythatIdonottreatbydefinitionsandaxioms”(GPIII302).Moreuncomprom-isingly,Leibnizearlierinformsanothercorrespondent:“Iruledde-cisivelyonthesegeneralphilosophicalmattersalongtimeago,ina5waythatIbelieveisdemonstrativeornotfarfromit”(GPIII474).Althoughtheissueiscontroversial,itispossiblethatthereisadeeperexplanationofLeibniz’savoidanceoftheEuclideanappar-atus.NoneofLeibniz’smajorexpositionsofhismetaphysicsiscastinEuclideanform,butarguablyintheDiscourseonMetaphys-ics(andsomerelatedtexts)LeibnizapproximatesthisformmorethaninlaterworkssuchastheNewSystem,theMonadology,andthePrinciplesofNatureandGrace.TheDiscourseonMetaphysicsiscertainlymuchricherindeductivephilosophicalargumentsthanthoselaterwritings;moreover,itisnottoodifficulttoseehowitsargumentscouldberecastintheformofaxioms,definitions,andtheoremstobeproved.YetthefoundationaldoctrinesintheDiscourseonMetaphysicsincludedLeibniz’sconcept-containmenttheoryoftruth,andweknowthatwhenLeibnizsubmittedasum-maryoftheworktoArnauld,thelatterbelievedthatthistheoryhadwhollyunacceptableconsequencesforhumananddivinefreedom.Itisstrikingthatinthelaterpresentationsofhismetaphysics,theCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics101theoryoftruthmakesnoappearance.ThuswecannotdiscountthepossibilitythatfearofbeingchargedwithunorthodoxylaybehindLeibniz’savoidanceoftheEuclideanmethod.AlthoughtheymaynotallembracetheEuclideanmethod,Des-cartes,Leibniz,andSpinozasharethesameconfidenceinthepossi-bilityofdemonstrativemetaphysics.Inthelastdecadeoftheseventeenthcentury,amajorchallengetotheclaimsofdogmaticmetaphysicswasmountedbyJohnLockeinhisgreatEssaycon-cerningHumanUnderstanding.Intheintroductiontothiswork,Lockediagnosestheapparentfailureofthemetaphysiciansintermsoftheiradoptionofthewrongmethod;theyhadsimplyassumedwithoutquestioningthatthehumanmindwasadequatetothetaskofdiscoveringtheultimatenatureandstructureofreality:ForIthoughtthatthefirstSteptowardssatisfyingseveralEnquiries,theMindofManwasveryapttoruninto,was,totakeaSurveyofourownUnderstandings,examineourownPowers,andseetowhatThingstheywereadapted.TillthatwasdoneIsuspectedwebeganatthewrongend,andinvainsoughtforSatisfactioninaquietandsecurepossessionofTruths,thatmostconcern’dus,whilstweletlooseourThoughtsintothevastOceanofBeing,asifallthatboundlessExtentwerethenatural,andun-doubtedPossessionofourUnderstandings,whereintherewasnothingexemptfromitsDecisions,orthatescapeditsComprehension.(Essay,I.i.7)InawaythatanticipatesKant,Lockethuscallsforareorientationofphilosophytowardacritiqueofthemind’spowers.Tosay,however,thatLockeisskepticalofthepossibilityofdemon-strativemetaphysicsisnottosaythatheisskepticalaboutthepossi-bilityofdemonstrativeknowledgeingeneral.Locke,nolessthanDescartesorLeibniz,believesthatwecanachievesuchknowledgeaprioriinthecaseofmathematics;heisfarfromsubscribingtoanextremeempiricismwhichregardsmathematicsasaninductivesci-ence.Indeed,ironically,LockeisinagreementwithSpinozathat“morality[is]capableofdemonstration”(Essay,IV.iii.18).Why,then,isLockepessimisticabouttheprospectsofdemonstrativecertaintyinmetaphysics?Lockeoffersaprincipledanswertothisquestionwhichstrikesdeeprootsinhistheoryofknowledge:itturnsonthenatureoftheobjectsofstudyinthedifferentdisciplines.AtthecostofsomeCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n102NICHOLASJOLLEYoversimplification,Locke’sansweristhis.Inthecaseofmathemat-icsandmoralityweareconcernedwithentitiessuchastrianglesandgratitudewhoserealessencesaretransparenttotheintellectbecausetheyarecreationsofthehumanmind.Inmetaphysics,bycontrast,asinnaturalscience,wearedealingwithentities,suchasmaterialsubstances,whoseessencesareopaquetous;theyareopaquetousbecausetheentitiesinquestionaretheproductsofnature,notthehumanmind.DespitehisadmirationfortheachievementsofBoyleandNewton,Lockethusclassifiesthenat-uralsciences,aswewouldcallthem,alongsidemetaphysicsasdisciplinesinwhichdemonstrativeknowledgeisforeverbeyondourreach(Essay,IV.iii.26).Locke’scallforareorientationofphilosophytowardacritiqueofthehumanunderstandingrepresentsonewayinwhichphiloso-pherscouldreactagainsttheenterpriseofspeculativemeta-physics.ItisthisformofreactionwhichHumedevelopsinhisInquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding,thetitleofwhichisaclearallusiontoLocke’sgreatwork;indeed,HumegoesmuchfurtherthanLockeinhisattempttoexposetheillusionsofspecu-lativemetaphysics(e.g.Enquiry,XII.3).ButthereisanothersidetoHume’sphilosophywhichturnsawayfrommetaphysicsandtheEuclideanparadigminadirectionwhichhasnorealprecedentinLocke.Hume’sTreatiseofHumanNature,hisearlymaster-piece,resemblestheworksofthemetaphysiciansinthesensethatitdrawsitsinspirationfromanonphilosophicalmodel;butthemodelinquestionisnotEuclideangeometrybuttheexperi-mentalmethodofthenewscience:theTreatiseis,asitssub-titlesays,anattempttointroducetheexperimentalmethodintomoralsubjects.Hume’sprofessedaimisthusthenaturalisticoneofseekingtodiscoverlawsofhumanpsychologybythesamemethodasNewtonandothershaddiscoveredlawsgoverningphysicalphenomena.ItistruethatinthecourseofexecutinghisprojectHumerevealsadeepfamiliaritywithseventeenth-centurymetaphysicaldebatesaboutsubstance,causality,andthelike.Officially,atleast,however,heisinterestednotinmakingadirectandnovelcontributiontosuchdebates,butratherinex-plainingwhyhumanbeingsholdthebeliefsabouttheworldthattheydo.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics103SUBSTANCEPerhapsnowhereisthetendencyofearlymodernphilosopherstopournewwineintooldbottlesmoreapparentthanintheirdoc-trinesofsubstance.TheconceptofsubstanceisundoubtedlythemostprominentconceptinthemetaphysicalsystemsofSpinozaandLeibniz:withsomequalifications,itplaysanimportantroleinDescartes’sphilosophy,too.Thefactthattheconceptissopromin-entinearlymodernmetaphysicsreflectsthelegacyofAristotleaboveall,forAristotleregardsmetaphysicsasthatsciencewhichisprincipallyconcernedwiththequestion:Whatissubstanceorbeing?Thatis,metaphysics,forAristotle,isaquesttodiscoverwhatisultimatelyreal.ButthoughearlymodernphilosophersareindebtedtoAristotlefortheterm‘substance,’theytypicallyemployittoarticulateaverydifferentmetaphysicalvisionoftheworldfromthatwhichisfoundinAristotleandhissuccessors.Moreover,evenwhentheyretainorechoAristoteliandefinitionsof‘sub-stance,’theytendtoinfusesuchdefinitionswithnewcontent.Asweshallsee,insomecasesthetraditionalconnotationsoftheterm‘substance’maysetuptensionswiththemetaphysicalpicturewhichtheywishtoarticulate.Oftheleadingphilosophersoftheearlymodernperiod,atleastbeforeLocke,itisperhapsDescarteswhoisleastenthusiasticabouttheterminologyof‘substance’;insomeofhismorepopularwritings,suchastheDiscourseontheMethod,Descartescomesclosetodispensingwiththetermaltogetherinfavorofthemore6familiar,everydayword‘thing.’Asweshallsee,Descartes’sdeci-siontoretaintheterminthemoreformalexpositionsofhissystemisasourceofdifficultyforunderstandinghisphilosophy.Butitwouldbewrongtodwellonsuchproblemsattheoutset,foritisthestrengthsofDescartes’sontology,notitsdifficulties,thataremostimmediatelyapparentandthatobviouslyimpressedmanyofhisearliestreaders.TheattractionsofthenewCartesianontologyarenotunlikethoseoftheCopernicansysteminastronomy,incomparisonwithitsrivals:Descartes’sontologyisstrikingbyvirtueofitssimplicityandelegance.InplaceofthecomplexAristotelianpictureofaworldofsubstanceswhichareallcompoundsofmatterandform,Descartessubstitutesaverydifferentaccount:thecreatedCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n104NICHOLASJOLLEYuniverseconsistsoftwokindsofthingorsubstance,eachofwhichhasaprincipalattributethatconstitutesitsnature.Thenatureofbodyormatterisconstitutedbytheprincipalattributeofextension,thatis,bythepropertyofbeingspreadoutinthreedimensions.Thenatureofmindisconstitutedbytheprincipalattributeofthoughtorconsciousness.Thefurther,morespecificpropertiesofbodyandmindaresimplymodes,thatis,waysofbeing,oftherespectiveprincipalattributes:themodesofextensionaresuchpropertiesasbeingsquareortriangular;themodesofthoughtaresuchpropertiesaswilling,doubting,andsensing.Itistruethat,forallitssimplicityandelegance,Descartes’sontologyisfarremovednotonlyfromtheAristotelian–scholasticpictureoftheworld,butalsofromun-tutoredcommonsensewhichthatpicturewasableinparttoac-commodate;accordingtoDescartes,forexample,strictlyspeakingbodieshavenosensiblequalitiessuchascolor,taste,odor,andsound.Butinthisrespect,too,theparallelwiththeCopernicanrevolutioninastronomyholds:theCopernicanhypothesisthattheearthrotatesdailyonitsaxisandrevolvesannuallyaroundthesunwassimilarlylessintunewithcommonsensethanthesystemitreplaced.ButDescartes,likeCopernicusofcourse,hasargumentstopersuadethereaderthatthedeparturefromcommonsenseisnotaweaknessofhissystem,forcommonsenseistherepositoryofpreconceivedopinionsandprejudices.TheattractionsoftheCartesianontologyareobvious:itsproblemsappearonlywhenwestarttoprobebeneaththesurface.Themostfamousproblemperhapsisthatofgivingacoherentaccountofthestatusofhumanbeingswithinthissystem,butthereisalsoamoregeneraldifficulty:Descartesseemscuriouslyundecidedontheissuewhetherhisdualisticsystemissymmetricalinrespectofthenumberofsubstances.ThereisnoquestionthatDescartessubscribestothethesisthatthereisapluralityofmindsorthinkingsubstances:suchathesisisofcourserequiredbyChristianorthodoxy,anditisalsoonedatumofcommonsensewhichDescartesneverappearstochallenge.Buttothequestionwhetherthereissimilarlyapluralityofextendedsubstances,Descarteshasoftenseemedtoreturnanambiguousanswer.Commonsensewouldsuggestthatthereareindeedmanyextendedsubstances,andDescartessometimeswritesasifparticularbodies,suchasthelumpofwaxdescribedintheSecondMeditation,doindeedqualifyassuchsubstances.ButtherearepressuresinhisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics105philosophytomaintainthatthedualismisasymmetricalwithrespecttothisissue:whetherthismeansthatthereisonlyoneextendedsubstanceremainstobeseen.Descartes’sdifficultieswithregardtothisissuemayspringinpartfromhisdecisiontocasthissysteminthetraditionalterminologyof‘substance’;theyarearguablycompoundedbythefactthatDescartesoffersnotone,buttwodefinitionsof‘substance’whichseemclearlynonequivalent.Inthe“ArgumentsinGeomet-ricalFashion”appendedtotheSecondReplies,Descartesdefines‘substance’inawaywhich,despitetheratherconvolutedlanguage,isclearlytraditional:Substance.Thistermappliestoeverythinginwhichwhateverweperceiveimmediatelyresides,asinasubject,ortoeverythingbymeansofwhichwhateverweperceiveexists.By‘whateverweperceive’ismeantanyproperty,qualityorattributeofwhichwehavearealidea.Theonlyideawehaveofasubstanceitself,inthestrictsense,isthatitisthethinginwhichwhateverweperceive...exists,eitherformallyoreminently.Forweknowbythenaturallightthatarealattributecannotbelongtonothing.(CSMII114)SuchadefinitionisarecognizabledescendantofAristotle’sconcep-tionofsubstanceasanultimatesubjectofpredication:thatis,asubstanceisabearerofpropertiesbutisnotitselfapropertyofsomethingelse(incontrast,say,toyellownessorhonesty).Intermsofsuchadefinitionitmayseemobviousthatparticular,finitebodies,suchasthelumpofwaxintheSecondMeditation,forexample,areextendedsubstances.AsDescartesnotes,thepieceofwaxisextended,flexible,andchangeable;itthusseemsclearlytobeabearerofpropertieswhichisnotitselfpredicableofanythingelse.InthePrinciplesofPhilosophy,however,Descartesoffersadef-initionof‘substance’whichseemstohavedifferentimplicationsforthestatusofbodies.Inthisworkhedefines‘substance’intermsofindependence,andthoughhedoesnotexplicitlyaddthequalifica-tion,theindependenceinquestionseemstobecausal:“Bysub-stancewecanunderstandnothingotherthanathingwhichexistsinsuchawayastodependonnootherthingforitsexistence”(Princ.,I.51,CSMI210).Descartesimmediatelyproceedstorecog-nizethat,takenstrictly,thisdefinitionrulesoutallcreatedsub-stances,andafortioriallextendedsubstances;strictly,onlyGodCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n106NICHOLASJOLLEYsatisfiesthedefinition,forallotherthingsexistonlywiththehelpofdivineconcurrence.ButDescartesthensaysthat,takeninaweakersense,thedefinitiondoesleaveroomforcreatedsubstances:“asforcorporealsubstanceandmind(orcreatedthinkingsub-stance),thosecanbeunderstoodtofallunderthiscommonconcept:thingsthatneedonlytheconcurrenceofGodinordertoexist”(Princ.,I.52,CSMI210).Butifcorporealsubstanceissaidtodependonlyondivineconcurrenceforitsexistence,itseemsclearthatnofinitebody–whethermacroscopicormicroscopic–canbeacorpor-ealsubstancebythisdefinition.Thepieceofwax,forexample,obviouslydependsforitsexistenceonotherfinitebodiessuchasthebodyofthebee.Bycontrast,theentirephysicaluniversewouldseemtosatisfytheconditionsforsubstantialityintheweakersense.AlthoughDescartesdoesnotdrawtheconsequenceexplicitlyinthePrinciples,heseemscommittedbyhisdefinitiontodenyingthatthereisapluralityofcorporealsubstances.ItistemptingtoconcludethatDescartes’srealviewisthatthereisonlyoneextendedorcorporealsubstance–theentire,indefinitely7extendedphysicaluniverse.SuchathesishasindeedoftenbeenattributedtoDescartes,buttheattributionmayrestonamiscon-ception.ForitispossiblethatforDescartes,‘corporealsubstance,’like‘matter,’isintechnicaljargonamassnounratherthanacount8noun.Justaswecannotmeaningfullyaskhowmanygoldsorwatersthereare,sowecannotmeaningfullyaskhowmanyextendedorcorporealsubstancesthereare:thereisjustindefinitelyextendedorcorporealsubstance.Thusonthisreading,theterm‘substance’ismoreakinto‘stuff’thanitisto‘thing.’Wecanstillofcoursesaythattherearefinite,particularbodies,suchasthepenonmytable,butitisnotsuchcountableitemswhicharecandidatesforextendedorcorporealsubstance:suchitemswouldratherbepartsofextendedorcorporealsubstance(inthewaythatwaterdropsarepartsofwater).ThatthisisDescartes’sviewissuggestedbyapassagefromtheSynopsistotheMeditationswherehecontrastsbody,inthegeneralsense,withthehumanbodyinrelationtotheissueoftheincorruptibilityofsubstance:Secondly,weneedtorecognizethatbody,takeninthegeneralsense,isasubstance,sothatittooneverperishes.Butthehumanbody,insofarasitdiffersfromotherbodies,issimplymadeupofacertainconfigurationofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics107limbsandotheraccidentsofthissort:whereasthehumanmindisnotmadeupofanyaccidentsinthisway,butisapuresubstance.(CSMII10)IfDescartesdoesimplicitlytreat‘extendedsubstance’asamassnoun,wecanseeagainhowthenewwineofhismetaphysicsisindangerofburstingtheoldAristotelianbottle.ForintheAristoteliantradition,theterm‘substance’wassurelyacountnoun:individualsubstances,forAristotle,areparadigmaticallythesortofthingsthatcanbecounted.Therearepowerfulpressuresinhisphilosophy,then,whichpushDescartesinthedirectionofrecognizingthatthereisanasymmetryattheheartofhisdualism.Aswehaveseen,thisasymmetrymaytakeoneoftwoforms:Descartesmayholdthattheasymmetryissimplywithrespecttonumber–whereasthereisonlyoneextendedsubstance,therearemanythinkingsubstances.Moreinterestinglyandmoreradically,Descartesmayholdthattheasymmetryisamatteroflogicalgrammarcapturedinthedistinctionbetweencountnounsandmassnouns:whereasthereisextendedsubstance(orstuff),therearemanythinkingsubstances(orthings).WhetherDes-cartesconsistentlyrecognizesthepresenceofeitherasymmetryinhisdualismmaybedisputed,buttheideaofsomesuchasymmetryisstillhighlyinstructiveforanunderstandingofDescartes’sleadingrationalistsuccessors:itistemptingtosaythatSpinozaandLeibnizdevelopthedifferentsidesofthedualismand,withduequalifica-tions,presentitasthewholetruthabouttheuniverse.WhereasSpinozadevelopsthefirstside,Leibnizdevelopsthesecondside.ItisLeibnizwhomakesoneofthemostilluminatingremarksaboutSpinoza’sphilosophicalrelationshiptoDescartes:Spinoza,saysLeibniz,merelycultivatedcertainseedsinDescartes’sphiloso-phy(GPII563).PartofwhatLeibnizhasinmindhereinvolvesanissuethatwillcomeupinthenextsection:SpinozagoesfurtherthanDescartesinhisrejectionofteleologicalexplanation,thatis,explanationintermsofpurposes.ButthemostobviousillustrationofLeibniz’spointinvolvesthedoctrineofsubstance.InthePrin-ciplesofPhilosophy,Descartes,aswehaveseen,defines‘substance’intermsofcausalindependence,andinfersfromthisthat,strictlyspeaking,thereisonlyonesubstance,God.ButDescartesimmedi-atelytakesthepointbackagain,asitwere,byallowingthatthereisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n108NICHOLASJOLLEYaweakersenseinwhichtherecanbecreatedsubstances.Spinoza,bycontrast,willtoleratenoneofDescartes’squalifications:SpinozaisunequivocalthatthereisnoothersubstancethanGod.ThereisnodoubtthatatsomelevelLeibnizmustberightthatSpinoza’spantheisticmetaphysicsgrowsoutofaseedthatDes-carteshimselfsowsinthePrinciples.ThedifficultyistoknowwhetherSpinozareachesthisdoctrinebyastrictlyCartesianroute.Theissueishighlycontroversial,butitdoesnotseemthatSpinoza,likeDescartesinthePrinciples,seekstodefine‘substance’intermsofcausalindependence:rather,intheearlypropositionsoftheEthics,Spinozaappearstoregardcausalindependenceorself-sufficiencyasaderivativetruthaboutsubstancewhichneedstobe9establishedbyphilosophicalargument.ItistruethatSpinoza’sdefinitionof‘substance’doesnotwearitsmeaningonitsface,butitseemscorrecttosaythatithasAristotelianroots:bydefining‘substance’as“thatwhichisinitselfandconceivedthroughitself”(Ethics,I,def.3),Spinozaseemstomean,inpartatleast,thatsubstanceisabearerofpropertiesoranultimatesubjectofpredica-tion.Asmanywritershavenoticed,itispossibletoexpressthisideaintheterminologyof‘independence,’buttheindependenceinques-tionisnotcausal,butlogical:propertiesarelogicallydependentonsubstance,butsubstanceisnotdependenton,butpriorto,itspro-pertiesormodes.Spinoza’sstrategyintheearlypropositionsoftheEthicsseemstobetoshowthatthatwhichisagenuinebearerofpropertiesoranultimatesubjectofpredicationmustalsobecausallyindependentorself-sufficient.ThusSpinozacanagreewithDescartesaboutthislastpoint,butnotbecausehesubscribestoDescartes’sdefinitionof‘substance’inthePrinciples.IfSpinozafindsitnecessarytoargueforthecausalindependenceofsubstance,healsofindsitnecessarytoarguefurtherforthethesisthatthereisnoothersubstancethanGod;forSpinoza,unlikeDescartes,thethesisisnotatrivialconsequenceoftheinitialdefinitionof‘substance.’Spinoza’sstrategyhastwoparts.First,bymeansofaversionoftheontologicalargument,heseekstoshowthatGod,orabsolutelyinfinitesubstance,necessarilyexists(Ethics,I,prop.11);fortodenytheexistenceofaGodwhoseessencein-volvesexistenceisabsurd.Further,Spinozathenarguesthatnoothersubstancecanexist.ForsinceGodhasinfinitelymany–thatis,allpossible–attributes,iftherewereanothersubstance,itwouldCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics109havetoshareanattributewithGod,andSpinozahasearlierclaimedtohaveestablishedthattherecannotbetwosubstanceswithasharedattribute.TheproofofthispropositionreliesonaprincipleacceptedalsobyLeibniz:therecannotbetwosubstanceswithalltheirpropertiesincommon.SpinozaisthusledtoargueforthethesisthatthereisnoothersubstancethanGod.Butisthisamonisticdoctrine?Spinoza’smetaphysicalsystemhasbeentraditionallydescribedintheseterms,andthereiscleartextualsupportforthetraditionaldescrip-tion;inthecorollarytoEthics,I,prop.14,Spinozasays:“itfollowsquiteclearlythatGodisone;thatis,intheuniversethereisonlyonesubstance.”ButourearlierdiscussionofDescartesmayleadustowonderwhetherthereisnotahintinSpinozaofadifferentdoctrine;inplacesSpinoza,likeDescartes,mayimplicitlytreat‘substance’asamassnounratherthanacountnoun.JustasDes-cartesmaybesayingnotthatthereisjustoneextendedsubstance,butratherthatthereisextendedstufforsubstance,Spinozamaybesayingnotthatthereisonesubstance,butthatthereissubstancewhichisbothextendedandthinking.AsinthecaseofDescartes,Spinoza’smetaphysicsofsubstancemaybeindangerofburstingitsAristotelianbottle.Although,especiallyinhislaterphilosophy,LeibnizseemstomovefarawayfromAristotle’smetaphysics,heismuchmoreconcernedthanDescartesorSpinozatomaintainessentialcontinu-itywiththeAristoteliantradition.UnlikeDescartesorSpinoza,forinstance,LeibnizneverabandonstheAristotelianthesisthattheworldconsistsultimatelyofindividualsubstances:substances,forLeibniz,asforAristotle,areitemsthatcaninprinciplebecounted.Moreover,LeibnizseekstoaccommodateAristotelianassumptionsconcerningsubstances,suchasthattheyarecompoundsofmatterandform.ItisoneofLeibniz’sconstantcomplaintsagainsttheCartesiansandtheirfellowmodernsthattheyhadneedlesslyabandonedthevaluablemetaphysicalinsightsintheAristotelian–scholastictradition.AmainaimofLeibniz’sphilosophyistoshowhowametaphysicsofessentiallyAristotelianinspirationcanalsoprovideapropergroundingforthenewmechanisticphysics.Leibniz’smetaphysicsisperhapsmostfamousforitsinsistencethatanindividualsubstanceisagenuineunityorunumperse.AttimesLeibnizmaybetemptedtodefine‘substance’intheseterms,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n110NICHOLASJOLLEYbutitisimportanttoseethatheisnotthrowingoverthetraditionaldefinitionof‘substance’asanultimatesubjectofpredication.Leib-nizshowshisrespectfortheAristoteliandefinitioninDiscourseonMetaphysics,}8,whenheremarksthat“whenseveralpredicatesareattributedtoasinglesubject,andthissubjectisattributedtonoother,itiscalledanindividualsubstance”(AG40–41).WhenArnauldchargedLeibnizwithsimplyintroducingastipulativedefinitionof‘substance’as‘thatwhichhastrueunity,’Leibnizprotestedthathewasbeingunfair:theconceptionofsubstanceasatrueunityisequivalenttotheAristoteliandefinitionof‘substance’asabearerofpropertiesorultimatesubjectofpredication.AsLeib-nizexplains,“Tobebrief,Iholdasaxiomatictheidenticalpropos-itionwhichvariesonlyinemphasis:thatwhichisnottrulyoneentityisnottrulyoneentityeither.Ithasalwaysbeenthoughtthat‘one’and‘entity’areinterchangeable”(M121).Onthebasisofthisconception,Leibnizinsiststhatnomereaggregatecanbeasub-stance,andinhismiddleperiodheseemsattachedtotheideathatall,andperhapsonly,organismsaresubstancessince,unlikeinani-matebodies,theyaregenuineunitiesbyvirtueofbeinginformedbyasoulorsubstantialform.Suchathesisdrewinspirationfromtheinventionofthemicroscopeandthediscoveriesthatitmadepos-sible:itisalsotruetotheteachingsofAristotleinhisMetaphysics.AlthoughLeibniztreatstheAristotelianconceptionofsubstancewithrespect,healsoinsiststhatitdoesnotgodeepenough.InDiscourseonMetaphysics,}8,Leibnizarguesthatwecangainmoreinsightintothenatureofindividualsubstancesbyseeingthattheyhavecompleteconceptswhichcontaineverythingthatcanbetrulypredicatedofthem;thusitispartofthecompleteconceptofJuliusCaesar(locatedinthemindofGod)thathecrossedtheRubiconandwasassassinatedintheCapitol.Althoughtheissueiscontro-versial,itseemsthatfromthisthesisLeibnizseekstoderivesomeofthemaindoctrinesofhismetaphysics:individualsubstancesdonotcausallyinteract;rather,eachisthecausalsourceofallitsstateswhichevolveinaharmonywithoneanotherthathasbeenpreestablishedbyGod.Leibniz’sobsessionwiththeideathatsubstancesaregenuineunitiesfindsitsmostmatureexpressioninthetheoryofmonads.(Theterm‘monad’derivesfromthePlatonictermforunity.)Per-hapsthemostimportantpointtomakeaboutthisdifficultandCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics111counterintuitivetheoryisthatitisaformofatomism;asLeibniz10says,monadsarethetrueatomsofnature.ButmonadsareofcoursenotphysicalatomsforLeibniz,forinhisviewnothingpurelymater-ialcanbeagenuineunity:rather,theyarespiritualatomsorsoul-likeentitiesendowedwithperceptionandappetition.ManyofthedoctrineswhichLeibnizhadearlierformulatedinconnectionwithcorporealsubstancereappearinanewforminthetheoryofmonads.Eveninthetheoryofmonads,LeibnizseekstoaccommodateAristoteliandoctrines;sometimesthisaccommodationseemsratherstrained,asinLeibniz’sinsistencethatevenmonadsareinasensecompoundsofmatterandform.ButLeibniz’sfinalmeta-physicsdrawsitsinspirationfarmorefromthePlatonicandneo-PlatonictraditionthanfromtheAristotelianone.Thetheoryofmonads,forinstance,isastrikingillustrationoftheancientPla-tonicthesisthatthereisafundamentalcontrastbetweentheworldofappearanceandreality.Thebodieswhichweseearoundusbelongtotherealmofphenomena:onlymonadsareultimatelyreal.None-theless,thereisanimportantconnectionbetweenthetworealms:bodiesaregroundedinmonadsinaquitespecificsense.Theforcesofbodieswhicharetheobjectofinvestigationbyphysicistsderivefromtheprimitiveforcesatthelevelofmonads(L529–30).“[Spinoza]wouldberightiftherewerenomonads”(GPIII575).DespitehisprofessedhostilitytoSpinoza’s“atheism,”LeibnizinthisfamousremarkatleastpaysSpinozathecomplimentofregardinghissystemastheonlyalternativetohisown.Suchajudgmentisperhapsnotsurprising,forthetwosystemsrepresenttwoverydiffer-entwaysofdevelopingDescartes’slegacy.Butitwouldbeamistaketonoticeonlythecontrastsbetweenthetwosystems,whichareindeedsufficientlystriking.Infact,itismorefruitfultoseeLeibnizandSpinozaasengagedinadialogueonthebasisofsomeimportantsharedcommitments.Leibniz,likeSpinoza,acceptstheprincipleoftheIdentityofIndiscernibles,butbelievesthatitdoesnothavetheconsequencesSpinozaclaimsforit.ForSpinoza,theprincipleex-cludesthepossibilityofapluralityofsubstancesofthesamenature;forLeibniz,itdoesnothavethisconsequence,forsubstancescansharethesameabstractnaturewhilebeingindividuatedintermsoftheirpointsofview.Leibniz,likeSpinoza,acceptsthatasubstanceisessentiallycausallyself-sufficient,butwhereasSpinozadrawstheconsequencethattherecanbenoothersubstancethanGod,Leibniz,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n112NICHOLASJOLLEYlikeDescartes,acceptsasomewhatweakerversionofthisprinciplewhichallowsforcreatedsubstances:suchsubstancesareascausallyself-sufficientasisconsistentwiththeirstatusascreatures.Foralltheirdifferences,thephilosopherswehavediscussedagreeinaccordingtheconceptofsubstanceaprominentroleintheirphilosophy,eveniftheyadaptittoaccommodatenewmetaphysicalinsights.YettherewereotherphilosopherssuchasGassendiandLockeinparticularwhoopenlyquestionwhetherthereisaplaceforthecategoryofsubstanceonthenewscientificpictureoftheworld.Locke’scontemporarieshad,afterall,brokenentirelywiththeAristotelianconceptionofaworldofindividualsubstancesrangedintonaturalkindsaccordingtoformsoressences.Inplaceofsuchaworldpicture,Locketentativelyacceptedthecorpuscularianhy-pothesisaccordingtowhichthephysicalworldwasultimatelymadeupoftinycorpusclesorparticlesendowedwiththeprimaryqualitiesofsize,shape,solidity,andmotion.IntheeyesofLockeandothers,itwasbynomeansobviousthataconceptofsubstancederivingfromAristotleretaineditsphilosophicalvalueanduseful-ness.Asweshallseehereandinthefinalsection,itisnotonlytheAristotelianswhoarethetargetsofLocke’spolemics.Locke’scritiqueoftheconceptofsubstanceisdirectedagainstalineofthinkingthatcanbetracedbacktoapassageinAristotle’sMetaphysics.Aswehaveseen,substances,forAristotle,areultim-atesubjectsofpredication,andsuchsubjectsarenormallytakentobesuchitemsasindividualhumanbeingsandhorses.Butinonepassage,Aristotlesuggeststhattheultimatesubjectofpredicationisnottheindividualhorse,forexample,butrathertheultimate11substratumwhichisopposedtoallpropertieswhatever.ItisthisconceptofsubstanceassubstratumofallpropertiesthatisthetargetofLocke’sfamouspolemic.Fromthebeginning,Locke’scritiqueoftheconceptofsubstanceassubstratumhasintriguedandpuzzledhisreaders.Foronething,Locke’scritiqueismarkedbyacertainsystematicambivalence:Lockemaintainsthattheideaofasubstratumisnaturalandeven12indispensabletous,whilealsodeploringitsuselessness.More-over,thecritiqueseemstoincludetwocomponentswhicharenotobviouslyconsistentwithoneanother.Ontheonehand,Lockecomplainsthattheideaofasubstratumwhichisthebearerofpropertiesbutitselfpropertylessisemptyofcontent;forthisreason,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics113itcanplaynousefulroleinphilosophy.Ontheotherhand,Lockecomplainsthattheideaofsubstance,farfrombeingclearanddistinctastheCartesianssuppose,isobscureandconfused:itistheideaofsomethingweknownotwhat.Inthesameveinhecomplainsthatsubstanceingeneralhasanaturewhichis“secretandabstract”(Essay,II.xxiii.6).Itisnaturaltoobject,asLeibnizdid,thatLockeishereneedlesslymakingdifficultiesforhimself.“Ifyoudistinguishtwothingsinasubstance–theattributesorpredicatesandtheircommonsubject–itisnowonderthatyoucannotconceiveanythingspecificinthissubject.Thisisinevitable,becauseyouhavealreadysetasidealltheattributesthroughwhichdetailscouldbeconceived”(NewEss.,II.xxiii).Inotherwords,itisperversetocomplainthattheideaofsuchasubstratumisobscureandconfused,fortodososuggeststhatthereismoretobeknown.Butiftheideaofasubstra-tumistheideaofabareparticularopposedtoallpropertieswhatever,thenthereisnothingthatcouldinprinciplebeknown.ThisapparenttensioninLocke’steachingsaboutsubstancecanberesolved,Ithink,byseeingthatheisworkingwithanimplicitcontrastbetweenthedivineandhumanlevelsofknowledge.Ourideaofsubstanceisindeedemptyofcontent:itistheideaofapropertylesssubstratum.Godhastheideaofsubstanceinthesensethatheknowswhatitistobeagenuinething;itisrelativetothisperfectdivineideathatourownideaofsubstanceisobscureandconfused.ThemostobvioustargetofLocke’spolemicmayseemtobetheAristotelians,andthereisnodoubtthattheyareoneofLocke’stargets.ButthereisalsonodoubtthatLocke,followingGassendi,hastheCartesiansinhissights:LockethinksthathecanexploitthepovertyofourconceptofsubstanceinordertounderminethedogmaticsubstancedualismofDescartesandhisdisciples.ThusLockeappealstotheobscurityofourideaofsubstanceinordertoarguethat,thoughitmaybenaturalforustothinkindualisticterms,wecannotruleoutthepossibilitythatoneandthesamesub-stratumsupportsbothmentalandphysicalproperties.Butthereisalsoahint,perhaps,ofamoreradicalcritique.Drawingontheemp-tinessoftheconceptofsubstratum,Lockesuggeststhatthedebatebetweensubstantialdualistsandtheiropponentshasnorealcon-tenttoit,atleastatthelevelofourideas.Whetherwesaythatoneandthesamesubstratumsupportsmentalandphysicalproperties,orthatdifferentsubstrataplaythisrole,isamatterofconventionCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n114NICHOLASJOLLEYandcustomonly:intermsofourimperfectideas,thereisnofactofthemattertobediscovered.Locke’steachingsaboutsubstancearesorichandambivalentthattheylentthemselvestobeingdevelopedindifferentphilosoph-icaldirections.ItistraditionaltoportrayBerkeleyasonephiloso-pherwhodevelopedthenegative,criticalsideofLocke’steachingsforhisown,verydistinctivepurposes.Inonewaythisiscorrect:BerkeleysawhowthissideofLockecouldbeexploitedintheinterestsofattackingthedoctrineofmaterialsubstance–thatis,thatthereisarealmofmind-independentphysicalobjectscon-ceivedalongcorpuscularianlines.Inaveinthatisobviouslyinflu-encedbyLocke,Berkeleyinsistsontheunhelpfulnessandindeedincoherenceofsayingthatextensionissupportedbyasubstratum.Iftheclaimistakenliterally,itleadstoaninfiniteregressofsuchsubstrata,forthesubstratum,beingitselfextended,willneedtobesupportedbyafurthersubstratum,andsoon;ifitistakenmeta-13phorically,itisunintelligible.Berkeley’sdebttoLockeisbeyondquestion,butitwouldbewhollymisleadingtoportrayBerkeleysimplyasacriticofthecon-ceptofsubstance.Famously,althoughBerkeleyinsiststhatthecon-ceptofmaterialsubstanceisincoherent,healsoinsiststhatnosuchdifficultiesplaguetheconceptofspiritualormentalsubstance.OneofBerkeley’sreasonsforthisasymmetryturnsonthenotionofsupportorsubstratum.Inthecaseofmaterialsubstance,thereisnowayofcashingoutthemetaphorofasupportorsubstratumofproperties.Inthecaseofspiritualsubstance,however,thisisfarfrombeingso:spiritualsubstancessupporttheirproperties–ideas–by14perceivingthem.Berkeleyisthusledtoaformofidealismaccordingtowhichthecreateduniverseconsistsentirelyofspiritualsubstances.Thus,althoughBerkeleyisabletomakeuseofLocke’scritique,heisnomoreledtodispensewiththeconceptofsubstancealtogetherthanisLeibnizinhisownsomewhatsimilarmetaphysics.Berkeleyisatleastpreparedtoretainsomeoftheoldbottlesforthenewwineofhisuncompromisinglyidealisticmetaphysics.CAUSALITYModernphilosophicaldiscussionofthenatureofcausalityhastraditionallybeentracedbacktoHume,anditiscertainlytruethatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics115Humegaveanewdirectiontophilosophicalthoughtaboutthetopic.ButitisnowrealizedthatHumehimselfwasbuildingontheworkofhispredecessors:philosophicaltheories,suchasocca-sionalism,whichwereformerlydismissedasextravagant,adhocsolutionstoparticularproblemsarenowseenasgeneraltheoriesofgreatinterestwhichplayedapivotalroleinthedevelopmentof15thoughtaboutcausalitybetweenDescartesandHume.Onthewhole,thephilosopherswhomadethemostimportantcontribu-tionstothedebateaboutcausalityseemtohavebelievedthatDescartes’sownthinkingonthistopicremainedtooconservative.Despitehisboastthathewasbeginningphilosophyagainonnewfoundations,inthisareaofhisthoughtDescartesseemedtoacceptscholasticassumptionsaboutcausalitywhichhadnoplaceinhisownverydifferentpictureofthephysicalworld.Foranumberofphilosophers,thetaskbeforethemwastocompletetheCartesianrevolutioninthisarea;theysoughttodrawouttheimplicationsofthenewtheoryofmatterandtoshowthattraditionalclaimsaboutnaturalcausalitycouldnolongerbeupheld.Insomecases,suchastheoccasionalists,theycameclosetosuggestingthattheconceptofcausalityingeneralshouldbejettisonedfromphilosophy.IntheAristoteliantradition,theterm‘cause’(oritsGreekandLatinequivalentsaitiaandcausa)wasusedinamuchbroadersensethaniscurrenttoday.Ingeneral,acausewaswhateveransweredaWhy?question,anditisintermsofthisfactthatwemustunderstandwhytheAristoteliantraditionrecognizesfourkindsofcauses:theefficient,formal,material,andfinalcausesaresupposedtocorres-16pondtofourdifferentkindsofWhy?question.Thustoanswerthequestion:Whyisthestatuesoheavy?bycitingthefactthatitismadeofbronze,istoappealtothematerialcause.Toanswerthequestion:WhyistheangleA,inscribedinasemicircle,arightangle?bycitingthefactthatitisequaltoanangleBwhichishalfofastraightangle,istoappealtotheformalcause.Ingeneral,withthepossibleexcep-tionofLeibniz,earlymoderndiscussionsofcausalitytendedtofocusonthenotionofefficientcause,thatis,thekindofcausethatbringsaboutachangeofstateinanotherthing;itistheefficientcausethatisatissuewhenwesay,forexample,thatthestonecausedthewindowtobreak.Butasweshallseetowardtheendofthissection,therewasalsoalivelydebateabouttheplaceoffinalcauses,thatis,causesthatappealtogoalsorpurposes,inthenewmechanisticCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n116NICHOLASJOLLEYpictureofthephysicalworld.First,wemustturntothedebateoverefficientcausality.“Nowitismanifestbythenaturallightthattheremustbeatleastasmuchrealityintheefficientandtotalcauseasintheeffectofthatcause”(CSMII28).InthesetermsDescartesstateshismostexplicitprincipleconcerningthenatureofefficientcausationinthecourseofprovingtheexistenceofGodintheThirdMeditation.(AlthoughDescartesproceedstoapplythisprincipletoideas,itisclearthatitisintendedtobeofwhollygeneralapplication.)DespiteDescartes’sclaimthatitisself-evident,theprinciplehasseemedfarfromintuitiveandvulnerabletocounterexamples.Someinsightintotheprinciplecanbegainedbyseeingthatitisassociatedwith,andindeedfollowsfrom,whathasbeencalledanheirloommodelofefficientcausation:incausaltransactions,theeffectinheritsaprop-erty,orstrictlyapropertyinstance,fromthecause(CSMII192).Itisperhapsmorenaturaltothinkofthismodelofefficientcausationintermsofadifferentmetaphor:causationispicturedasaprocessofcontagion.Thuswhenthelightedgascausesthewaterinthekettletobecomehot,itdoessobyinfectingthewaterwithitsownpropertyofheat.TheheirloomorcontagionmodelofcausationhasoftenseemedlikearelicofthescholastictraditionwhichremainsunassimilatedinDescartes’sphilosophy.Whetherthismodelofcausationwas17actuallyembracedbythescholasticshasrecentlybeendisputed.Nonetheless,itwascertainlysoregardedbyLeibniz,whoattacksthedoctrineofinflux,ashetermsit,vigorouslythroughouthiscareer:forLeibniz,thedoctrineisparticularlyassociatedwithSua´rez.AccordingtoLeibniz,itisutterlyunintelligibletosupposethatpropertiesorindividualaccidentscouldpassoverfromonesubstancetoanother.“Strictly,itcanbesaidthatnosubstanceexercisesonanotherametaphysicalactionorinflux...[I]tisimpossibletoexplainhowanythingpassesfromonethingintothe18substanceofanother.”Leibnizisthusledtothedenialofcausalinteractionbetweencreatedsubstances.Itisstrikingthatinattack-ingthedoctrineofinfluxhere,Leibnizdoesnotcallforanewunderstandingofefficientcausationwhichwouldallowustopre-servetheintuitionthatsubstancescausallyinteract;rather,heseemstoholdthatinfluxistheonlyavailablemodelofcausalinter-action.Yetinhisearlierwritings,LeibnizhadhintedatadifferentCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics117strategy;hehadcriticizedthescholasticSua´rezforbadlydefining‘cause’intermsofinflux(GPIV148).ButifSua´rez’sdefinitionof‘cause’isabadone,itseemsreasonabletosupposethatabetterdefinitionmightopenthewaytoadefenseofcausalinteractionortranseuntcausation.Leibniz’sdenialofinfluxmaythrowlightonavexedissuecon-cerningthescopeofhisdenialofcausalinteraction.Thedoctrineismostfamousasathesisconcerningrelationsbetweensubstances,anditisinthesetermsthatitisgenerallyintroducedinLeibniz’smainexpositionsofhismetaphysics:indeed,someofhisargumentsdependexplicitlyonassumptionsaboutthenatureofindividualsubstances.Thedenialofinteractionthusappliestomonadsandperhapsalsoorganisms.ButLeibnizcanalsobefoundinsistingthatthedoctrineisathesisinphysicswhichappliestoallbodies,whetheranimateorinanimate:“noimpetusistransferredfromonebodytoanother,buteachbodyismovedbyitsinnateforcewhichisdeterminedonlyontheoccasion,i.e.inrespectofanother.Foreminentmenhavealreadyrecognizedthatthecauseoftheimpulseonebodyreceivesfromanotheristhebody’selasticity19itself,bywhichitrecoilsfromanother.”Yetifitemssuchasbilliardballsareatissue,thesearenotstrictlysubstancesbutaggregatesofsubstancesforLeibniz.Leibnizseemstobesuggestingthatcausalinteractionbetweensuchbodiesincollisionwouldinvolveanobjectionableformofinflux,andisthusimpossible.Theheirloomprinciple,orthedoctrineofinflux,asLeibniztermsit,thusseemstobeapointonwhichDescartesandLeibnizaresharplydivided.Thereislessdisagreementoverthestatusofaweaker,butrelatedprinciple–theCausalLikenessPrinciple–totheeffectthattheremustbealikenessbetweencauseandeffect.AlthoughDescartesnevermakesthisprincipleacornerstoneofhisphilosophy,heiscertainlycapableofappealingtoitimplicitly;asweshallseeinthenextsection,heinvokesitinconnectionwiththeissueofthecausationofsensoryideas.However,theforminwhichDescartesacceptedtheprincipleisunclearandhasbeenasubjectofdebate.InthecaseofSpinoza,bycontrast,thereislittleambiguity.HisacceptanceisprominentlyproclaimedearlyonintheEthics(I,prop.3):“Thingswhichhavenothingincommoncannotbethecauseofoneanother.”ForSpinoza,theCausalLike-nessPrincipleservesasthebasisforexcludingtheproductionofoneCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n118NICHOLASJOLLEYsubstancebyanotherofadifferentattribute:itthusexcludesthecreationofmatterbyGodasenvisagedbyDescartesandindeedmanyChristianphilosophers.Asweshallsee,theprinciplealsoservesasthebasisforexcludingcausationacrossattributesoftheonesubstance,GodorNature.PerhapstheprincipleconcerningcausalitywhichhadthemostfruitfulresultswastobestatedbyMalebrancheinhisSearchafterTruth:“Atruecause,”accordingtoMalebranche,“isonesuchthatthemindperceivesanecessaryconnectionbetweenitanditseffect”(VI.ii.3).(AlthoughMalebranchedoesnotsaysoexplicitly,itisclearthatheunderstands‘necessaryconnection’hereinastronglogicalsense.)InthehandsofMalebranche,thisprincipleisakeypremiseinhismostinterestingandpowerfulargumentforoccasionalism.TheprincipleservestoestablishthepositivethesisthatGodisindeedatruecause,fortheminddoesperceiveanecessaryconnectionbetweenthewillofaninfinitebeinganditsupshots.ItisanecessarytruththatifGodwillsalogicallypossiblestateofaffairs,thatstateofaffairsobtains.Theprinciplealsoservestoestablishthestrikingnegativethesisthatisattheheartofoccasionalism:nocreatureisagenuinecause,fortheminddoesnotperceiveaneces-saryconnectionbetweenanysuchbeinganditsallegedupshots.Itislogicallypossible,forinstance,thatonebilliardballshouldcollidewithanotheratrest,andthatthestationaryballshouldfailtomovefollowingthecollision.ItisalsologicallypossiblethatIshouldwilltoraisemyarmandthatitshouldfailtomove.Particulareventsinthecreatedworld,suchasthecollisionofbilliardballs,arethussimplytheoccasionsonwhichGod’sgenuinecausalityisexercised;itisinthiswaythatthedoctrinegetsitsname.Theinsistenceonnecessaryconnectionasanessentialcompon-entofgenuinecausalitywastobetakenupanddevelopedindiffer-entdirectionsbytwoofMalebranche’ssuccessors.BerkeleyemployedMalebranche’sprincipleinordertoargueforaformofsemioccasionalism.BerkeleyagreeswithMalebranchethattheminddoesnotperceiveanecessaryconnectioninthecaseofbodies,construed,ashisimmaterialismrequires,intermsofcollectionsofideas:thatfoodnourishesandfireburnsisknownnotapriori,by20meansofanecessaryconnection,butbyobservingregularities.Butatleastinhispublishedwritings,BerkeleycannotagreewithMalebranchethatfinitemindsorspiritsareonaparwithbodies.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics119AccordingtoBerkeley,itseemsthatwedoknowapriori,byper-ceivinganecessaryconnection,thatourarmwillgoupwhenwedecidetoraiseit.Berkeley’sinsistenceonthisasymmetryneedstobeunderstoodintermsofhistheologicalcommitments.Ifthehumanmindintheexerciseofitswillwerenotagenuinecause,itcouldhardlybesaidtobemadeintheimageofGod.Berkeleyseemstohavebelievedthat,foralltheirpiety,theoccasionalistswerepreparedtosacrificetheteachingsofGenesis.LikeBerkeley,Humeagreeswiththeoccasionaliststhatneces-saryconnectionisanessentialcomponentofcausality;butunlikeBerkeley,heagreeswithMalebranche’soccasionalisminhisinsist-enceonthesymmetryofthementalandphysicalcases.IntheInquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding,Humeisexplicitthatwearenomoreabletoperceivealogicallynecessaryconnectioninthecaseofvoluntaryphysicalmovementthaninthecaseofthecollisionoftwobilliardballs(Inquiry,VII.1).Indeed,withintheframeworkofhisownverydifferent,empiricisttheoryofideas,HumeadoptsandrefinesthenegativeMalebranchianarguments.Butdespitehisacknowledgeddebttothedoctrine,Humeofcourseisnooccasionalist.HumepartsphilosophicalcompanywithMale-branchebyinsistingthatthenecessaryconnectionwhichisanessentialcomponentofourconceptofcausalitymustbeconstruedinpsychological,notlogical,terms.TosaythateventsoftypeAcauseeventsoftypeBistosaynotonlythattheyareconstantlyconjoinedinourexperience;itistosayalsothat,aftersufficientexposuretosuchregularities,thehumanmindfeelscompelledtoexpectaneventoftypeBontheoccasionofaneventoftypeA.AsHumesays,uponthewhole,necessityexistsinthemind,notinobjects(Treatise,I.iii.14).InsofarasHumewritesasametaphysicianratherthananaturalist,hethusmakeshismostdistinctivecontri-butiontothedebateovercausalitybyofferingareductionistordeflationaryaccountofcausalitywhichallowsustopreservetheintuitionthattherearecausalconnectionsinnature.TheappealtonecessaryconnectionthusnotonlyprovidedthebasisforMalebranche’smostpowerfulandintriguingargumentforoccasionalism;italsoprovedasourceofinspirationtosuccessorssuchasBerkeleyandHume.Butthoughtheargumentfromneces-saryconnectionisMalebranche’smostpowerfulargumentforocca-sionalism,itisbynomeanstheonlyone.MalebrancheofferstwoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n120NICHOLASJOLLEYotherimportantargumentsforthedoctrinewhichshowhimtobeengagedinadialoguewithDescartes;intheirdifferentways,bothargumentsseektodeveloptheimplicationsofCartesianthesesmorefullyandconsistentlythanDescarteshaddone.Onesuchargumentforoccasionalismistheological:itturnsonDescartes’sdoctrinethatGodconservestheworldbycontinuouslycreatingit.AccordingtoMalebranche,whenproperlyunderstoodthisdoctrineleavesnoroomforgenuinecausalpowersonthepartofcreatures.Inrecreatingbodies,Goddoesnotsimplywillthatabilliardball,forinstance,besomewhereorother;hisvolitionsarefullyspecificordeterminatewithregardtosuchvariablesaslocationandvelocity(Dial.,VII.11).ThusthereisnoneedforGodtoendowcreatedsubstances,whethermindsorbodies,withgenuinecausalpowersoftheirown;andsinceGodalwaysactsinthesimplestway,wecanbesurethathehasnotdoneso.Althoughmostnaturallyillustratedwithreferencetobodies,thisargumentisofwhollygeneralapplica-tion;itappliestocreatedmindsaswellasbodies.Anotherargumentismoremodestinscopeinasmuchasithasnoimplicationsforthestatusofminds:itturnsonthenewCartesianconceptionofmatter.MalebrancherightlyobservesthatontheCartesianaccount,matter,beingdefinedingeometricalterms,ispurelypassiveanddevoidofactiveforce;itissubject,forinstance,tothelawofinertia.Sounderstood,matterisincapableofbeingagenuinecause(Dial.,VII.5;cf.OCX47).Itisinthisargument,perhaps,thattheconnectionbetweenmetaphysicsandthenewphysicsistightest.FinalcausesWhetherDescarteswasentitledtosaythatbodiesaregenuineeffi-cientcausesmaybedisputed,butthereisnodoubtthathesoughttobanishallcausesbutefficientcausesfromthenewphysics.Inparticular,Descartessoughttoarguethatappealstofinalcauseshavenoplaceonthenewmechanicalconceptionofthephysicalworld.Descartes,inotherwords,seekstobanishfromphysicsanyexplanationswhichappealtodivineorcosmicpurposes:forexample,itiswhollyinappropriatetosaythattherainfellinorder21thatthecropsmightgrow.IntheMeditations,Descartesjustifiestheexclusionoffinalcausesfromphysicsontheologicalgrounds:CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics121SinceInowknowthatmyownnatureisveryweakandlimited,whereasthenatureofGodisimmense,incomprehensibleandinfinite,Ialsoknowwithoutmoreadothatheiscapableofcountlessthingswhosecausesarebeyondmyknowledge.AndforthisreasonaloneIconsiderthecustomarysearchforfinalcausestobetotallyuselessinphysics;thereisconsiderablerashnessinthinkingmyselfcapableofinvestigatingtheimpenetrablepur-posesofGod.(CSMII39)ItistemptingtosaythatDescartesissomewhatdisingenuoushere.Hisrealreasonsforbanishingfinalcausesfromphysicsturnonthesufficiencyofmechanicalexplanationsofphenomenaandonthefactthat,unliketeleologicalexplanations,theyappealonlytoclearanddistinctideas.ButDescartesisnotaboveseekingtolegitimatehisrevolutionaryredirectionofphysicsbyappealingtoconsiderationsofpiety.WesawinanearliersectionthataccordingtoLeibniz,SpinozamerelycultivatedcertainseedsinDescartes’sphilosophy.Withthepossibleexceptionofhisteachingsconcerningsubstance,noneofSpinoza’sdoctrinesillustratesthetruthofLeibniz’sdictumbetterthanhisstanceonfinalcauses.ItisimportanttonoticethatDes-cartesdoesnotgosofarastodenythatGodhaspurposes;hesimplysaysthattheyareimpenetrable,andthatitisforthisreasonthattheyshouldnotbeinvokedinphysics.Spinoza,bycontrast,con-vertsDescartes’snegativeepistemologicalclaimintoanontologicalone:Godhasnopurposes(Ethics,I,appendix).Suchathesisiscon-sistentwithhisconceptionofGodasanimpersonalbeingdevoidofwillandintellect;indeed,itfollowsfromthatdoctrineinconjunc-tionwiththefurtherassumptionthatonlypersonscanhavepur-poses.Spinoza’sstrongthesis,ofcourse,likeDescartes’sweakerone,hasimplicationsforphysics,forifGod(orNature)hasnopur-posesatall,thenittriviallyfollowsthatitismisguidedtoseektoexplainphysicalphenomenaintermsofdivineornaturalpurposes.SomereadershavesupposedthatSpinozatakestheevenstronger22positionthatteleologicalexplanationismisguidedinprinciple.Aself-consciouslyrearguardactionindefenseoffinalcauseswasmountedbyLeibniz,whocharacteristicallyholdsthatteleologicalexplanationisnotincompetitionwithexplanationintermsofefficientcauses.Leibnizinsists,likeMalebranche,thatGodactsfromfinalcauses,forGodisabenevolentpersonwhosegoalinCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n122NICHOLASJOLLEYcreationistomaximizethegood.InoppositiontoDescartes,Leib-nizfurtherinsiststhatthereisaplaceforteleologicalexplanationevenonthenewanti-Aristotelianphysics.Leibniz’sunderlyingideahereseemstobethatintheconductofscientificresearch,itisoftenhelpfultoadoptthedivineperspectiveatleastasaheuristicdevice;thatis,scientificdiscoverywillbeaidedbyreflectiononthefactthatGodaimsalwaystoproducehiseffects“bytheeasiestandmostdeterminateways”(Discourse,}21,AG54).LeibnizisfondofcitingSnellasaprominentmodernexampleofascientistwhofollowedthemethodoffinalcauses,forSnellsoughttheeasiestormostdeterminatepathbywhichraysoflightmightpassfromagivenpointinamediumtoagivenpointinanother(Discourse,}22,AG55).Leibniz’srehabilitationoffinalcausesistypicallyin-genious,butitmaybedoubtedhowfarhisownconceptionof23teleologicalexplanationagreeswiththeAristotelianone.SUBSTANCE,CAUSALITY,ANDTHEMIND–BODYPROBLEMThetendencyofearlymodernphilosopherstoputnewwineintooldbottlesisstrikinglyillustratedbyDescartes’sattempttoexplaintheunityofahumanbeingintermsofhisdualisticmetaphysics.OneofthestrengthsoftheoldAristotelian–scholastictraditionwasitsabilitytogiveaconvincingaccountofsuchunity;thesoulwasregardedasasubstantialformwhichunifiesandorganizesthematterofthehumanbody.Descartes,ofcourse,brokewiththistraditionwithhisrevolutionaryinsistencethatthemindisapurelythinkingsubstancewhichisreallydistinctfromitsbody;thebody,ifnotasubstanceinitsownright,isatleastpartofasubstancewhichiswhollydifferentinnaturefrommind.OnDescartes’saccount,then,ahumanbeingseemstobeamysteriouscompoundoftwoutterlyheterogeneousentities.YetDescartesinsistsintheMeditationsthatinfactonhismetaphysicsthemindanditsbodyformaverytightunion(CSMII56).IncorrespondencewithhiswaywarddiscipleRegius,Descartesevengoessofarastoinstructhimtosaythatthehumanbeingisa“trueensperse,andnotanensperaccidens”(CSMIII206).Indeed,Descarteshasseemedtosomereaderstobesuggestingthatthemind–bodyunionisagenu-inethirdsubstancewhichisthetruesubjectofproperties,suchassensationandimagination,whichcannotbeproperlyattributedtoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics12324eitherthemindorthebodyalone.AttheveryleastDescartesclaimstobelievethathisnewdualisticmetaphysicscandojusticetotheoldAristotelian–scholasticdoctrinethatahumanbeingisanensperse,orgenuineunity.Ingeneral,Descartes’ssuccessorsdidnotsharehisconfidencethathehadsolvedtheproblemofunityortherelatedproblemofmind–bodyinteraction.OfDescartes’smajorsuccessors,itisLeibnizwhoismostsym-pathetictotheAristotelian–scholasticapproachtotheproblemofunity.Aswehaveseen,Leibnizisattractedbythethesis,derivingfromAristotle,thattheparadigmsubstancesareorganisms,andintermsofthisthesisLeibniziscapableofarticulatingastan-dardAristotelian–scholastictheoryofthestatusofthesoul.InsomenotesrespondingtoFardella,LeibnizwritesinapurelyAristotelian–scholasticveinthat“thesoul,properlyandaccuratelyspeaking,isnotasubstancebutasubstantialform,ortheprimitiveformexistinginsubstances,thefirstact,thefirstactivefaculty”(AG105).YetitisuncharacteristicofLeibniztotakesuchapurelyscholasticposition.Moretypically,evenduringtheperiodinwhichherecognizestheexistenceofcorporealsubstances,Leibnizmodi-fiesAristotelian–scholasticteachingsinordertoaccommodatePla-tonicandCartesianintuitions.AlivingorganismsuchasAlexandertheGreatisindeedasubstance,andhissoulplaystheunifyingrolewhichitplaysforAristotleandhisscholasticdisciples,butLeibnizalsowantstoinsistthatthesoulisasubstanceinitsownright.Moreover,towardtheendofhiscareer,LeibnizmovesevenfurtherawayfromAristotelian–scholasticteaching.Accordingtothedoc-trineofmonads,notonlyisthehumansoul(ormind)asubstanceinitsownright,butthehumanbodyisitselfanaggregateofsuchsubstances(i.e.monads)whosestatesevolveinapreestablishedharmonywiththoseofthesoul.ItistruethatLeibnizstillwishestosaythatitisthepresenceofthesoulthatconfersunityonthehumanbeing,butheisnowdriventoexplainsuchunitybysayingthatthesoulisthedominantmonadwithrespecttotheaggregateofsubordinatemonadswhichconstitutethehumanbody.Theclaimthatthehumansoulisthedominantmonadisunpackedintermsofrelationsofclarityanddistinctnessamongperceptualstates.SpinozawasnolessdissatisfiedthanLeibnizbyDescartes’sac-countoftheunityofahumanbeing;indeed,heisevenmoreunspar-inginhisridiculeofDescartes’sposition.But,asweshouldexpect,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n124NICHOLASJOLLEYhisownproposedsolutiontotheproblemoweslittleornothingtotheAristotelian–scholastictradition.Inoutline,Spinoza’ssolutiontotheproblemisremarkablysimple:mindandbodyareoneandthesamething.Thisthingisnotofcourseasubstance,butafinitemodeoftheonesubstance,GodorNature.Statedthusbaldly,Spinoza’sthesisthatmindandbodyareidenticalmayseemindis-tinguishablefromtheoutrightmaterialismofHobbes,butitwouldbemisleadingtoassimilatetheirpositionstooclosely.ItistruethatHobbesandSpinozaarealikeinrejectingtheviewthatthehumanmindisanimmaterialsubstance;theyaretherebyabletocircum-ventalltheproblemsthatDescarteshadfoundinexplaininghowsuchasubstanceisunitedtoitsbody.ButthedifferencebetweenHobbesandSpinozaissuggestedbythewayinwhichtheformerqualifieshisbaldstatementofidentity:mindandbodyareoneandthesamething,conceivednowundertheattributeofthought,nowundertheattributeofextension(Ethics,III,prop.2schol.).Spinozaregardsthementalandthephysicalasirreduciblydifferent–indeed,reallydistinct–aspectsunderwhichahumanbeingmaybecon-ceived;theattributesofthoughtandextensionrunthroughthewholeofnature,andneitherattributehasprimacyovertheother.Hobbes,bycontrast,isareductivematerialist:thementalissimplyasubdomainofthephysical,anditisthephysicalwhichisontologicallybasic.AthirdsolutiontotheproblemoftheunityofahumanbeingmayhaveitsrootsinDescartes’sownteachings.Descarteshassome-timesbeenreadassayingthattheunityofahumanbeingisconsti-tutedsimplybythefactofinteractionbetweenbodyandmind.IntheDialoguesonMetaphysicsandelsewhere,Malebranchede-velopsthisthesisinanoccasionalistdirection.Asanoccasionalist,Malebranchecannotholdthatthereisanygenuinecausalinter-actionbetweenmindandbody,buthecananddoessaythatmentalandphysicaleventsareoccasionalcauses.Moreover,Malebranchealsoexpressesthisideaintermsoftheexistenceof“lawsoftheunionofmindandbody,”oraswemightsay,psychophysicallaws:Thusitisclearthatintheunionofthesoulandthebodythereisnootherconnectionthantheefficacyofthedivinedecrees:decreeswhichareim-mutable,andefficacywhichisneverdeprivedofitseffect.Godhasthereforewilled,andhewillsunceasingly,thatthevariousdisturbancesofthebrainCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics125arealwaysfollowedbyvariousthoughtsofthemindunitedtoit.AnditistheconstantandefficaciouswilloftheCreatorwhich,properlyspeaking,effectstheunionofthesetwosubstances.Forthereisnoothernature,thatis,therearenoothernaturallawsexcepttheefficaciousvolitionsoftheAlmighty.(Dial.,IV.11)Malebranchethusinvokestheideaofdivinelydecreedlawstoofferadeflationaryaccountoftheunionofmindandbody.TheproblemofinteractionWhetherornotDescartestriestocashouttheunionofmindandbodyintermsofinteractionmaybedisputed,butitwaswidelyagreedbyDescartes’ssuccessorsthathefacedaninsuperableprob-leminexplaininghowsuchinteractionispossibleonhisonto-logicalprinciples.IntheNewSystem,forexample,Leibnizwritesthat“howthebodymakesanythinghappeninthesoul,orviceversa...Descarteshadgivenupthegameatthispoint,asfaraswecandeterminefromhiswritings”(AG142–43;cf.Spinoza,Ethics,V,pref.).Indeed,itissometimesthoughtthatthegreatmetaphysicalsystemssuchasMalebranche’soccasionalismandLeibniz’sdoctrineofpreestablishedharmonyweredevisedasadhocsolutionstothisoneproblem.Butitshouldbeclearbynowthatthisviewismisleading.Aswehaveseen,suchsystemsaddressmorebasicandgeneralproblemsaboutwhetherthereisaplacefornaturalcaus-alityonthenewmechanisticscientificworldpicture,andifso,howitcanbeaccommodated.ThechallengewhichMalebranche,Spinoza,andLeibnizfacedwastodeviseprincipledsolutionstotheproblemofinteractiononthebasisoftheirgeneralcommitmentsconcerningthenatureofsubstancesandofefficientcausality.Descartes’ssuccessorsmayhavefoundproblemsinhisapparentcommitmenttotheinteractionofmindandbody,butwasDes-carteshimselfawareofaproblem?Here,aselsewhere,Descartesseemstospeakwithanambiguousvoice.Sometimes,asincorres-pondencewithArnauld,Descarteswritesinsuchawayastosug-gestnotonlythatmindandbodydointeract,butthatsuchinteractionisunproblematic:“Thatthemind,whichisincorporeal,cansetthebodyinmotionissomethingwhichisshowntousnotbyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n126NICHOLASJOLLEYanyreasoningorcomparisonwithothermatters,butbythesurestandplainesteverydayexperience”(CSMIII358;cf.CSMII275).TherehasbeenatendencyamongcommentatorstosupposethatDescartesisnotentitledtosuchconfidence.Butinfactitisbynomeansobviousthatmind–bodyinteractionisinconsistentwith25Descartes’sownofficialpronouncementsconcerningcausality.Aswehaveseen,hismostexplicitprincipleconcerningcausalitymaintainsthattheremustbeatleastasmuchrealityinthetotalefficientcauseasintheeffect.Descartesisnotwithoutresourcesforreconcilingthisprinciplewithtwo-wayinteractionofmindandbody.OnDescartes’sscaleofreality,substancesrankhigherthanmodes.If,then,intheinteractionofmindandbody,sub-stancesarecausesofthemodesinanothersubstance,therewillbenoviolationofthisadmittedlyratherobscureprincipleregardingefficientcausality.Atothertimes,however,Descartesseemsmorewillingtocon-cedethattheinteractionofmindandbodyisproblematiconhisprinciples.ToPrincessElisabeth,forinstance,hewritesthatthequestionofhowthesoulcanmovethebodyis“theonethatcanbemostproperlyputtomeinviewofmypublishedwritings”(CSMIII217).Onoccasion,indeed,Descartesseemspreparedtoabandoninparthiscommitmenttosuchinteractiononthegroundsthatitwouldconflictwithacceptedcausalprinciples.IntheCommentsonaCertainBroadsheet,forinstance,Descartesarguesagainsttheexistenceofstrictlyadventitiousideas(thatis,ideasthatarecausedbyexternalphysicalobjects)byappealingtothefactthatthereisnolikenessbetweensensoryideasandcorporealmotions;thereis,forinstance,strictlynocolorintheexternalphysicalworld(CSMI304).Here,then,DescartesispreparedtoappealimplicitlytoaCausalLikenessPrincipleinordertoruleoutatleasttheactionofbodyonmind.ItisthissideofDescartesthatisdevelopedbyhisleadingsucces-sorswhoadvancedpositivemetaphysicalsystemsoftheirown.Malebranche,Spinoza,andLeibnizalldenythatthereis,strictly26speaking,anycausalinteractionbetweenmindandbody.Suchanapproachtotheproblemofmind–bodyinteractionmayseemini-tiallysurprising,butfurtherreflectionsuggeststhatitshouldnotbe.Inthefirstplace,suchphilosophersseektoderivetheirdenialofmind–bodyinteractionfromtheirgeneralcommitmentsconcerningCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics127efficientcausality.Moreover,inthecaseofSpinozaandLeibniz,afurthermotivationfortheirapproachtotheproblemofinteractionwastheirdesiretoupholdtheprincipleofthecausalclosureofthephysicalworld;thatis,everyphysicaleventhasexclusivelyphysicalcauses.Clearly,thisprinciplecannotbeconsistentlycom-binedwithboththerecognitionofinteractionandthedualisticthesisthatthementalandthephysicalaredifferentinnature.Since,incontrasttoHobbes,theircommitmenttothislastthesisisnonnegotiable,theyavoidaninconsistenttriadofpropositionsbydenyingmind–bodyinteraction.IntheeyesofLeibniz,inpar-ticular,acceptanceoftheprincipleofcausalclosureisessentialtoanysatisfactoryphysics.Indeed,LeibnizcomplainsthatevenMalebranche’soccasionalistadjustmentofDescartes’sontologythreatenstointroduceatroublesome“disturbance”ofthelawsofphysics(Theod.,}61).Leibniz’sworryhereisthattohold,asMalebranchedoes,thatmentaleventsmaybeevenoccasionalcausesofphysicaleventsisinconsistentwiththeprincipleoftheconservationofmomentum.OfthethreesolutionstotheproblemofinteractionproposedbyMalebranche,Leibniz,andSpinoza,itisperhapsSpinoza’spositionthatismostpuzzling.ThesourceoftheproblemliesinSpinoza’sinsistencethatmindandbodyareoneandthesamethingconceivedunderdifferentattributes–theattributesofthoughtandextension.Theattempttocombinethisthesiswiththefurtherthesisthatthementalandphysicalrealmsarealikecausallyclosed,appearstoleadtoparadox.ForitseemsintuitivethatifAisthecauseofB,andBisidenticalwithC,thenAisthecauseofC.Thus,forexample,ifthestingingactionofthebeecausesastateofthebrainandthisstateofthebrainisidenticalwithpain,thenthebee’sstingcausespain.ButSpinozacannotacceptthiscausalprinciple,forinconjunctionwithhisidentitythesisitentailsaconclusionwhichisinconsistentwithhisdenialthatthereisanycausalflowbetweenthemental27andphysicalrealms.ThesolutiontothisparadoxseemstolieinaproperunderstandingofSpinoza’sconceptionofcause,whichisalientothepost-Humeanmind.ForSpinoza,thelinkbetweencauseandeffectisonethatisperspicuoustotheintellect;tosaythatAisthecauseofBistosayatleastthatAexplainsBinanilluminatingway.Whencausationisunderstoodintheseterms,thegeneralprinciplethatSpinoza’sphilosophyseemstoviolatenoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n128NICHOLASJOLLEYlongerappearsintuitive.Intechnicaljargon,forSpinoza,causal28contextsarenotreferentiallytransparentbutopaque.IncommonwithDescartes’sothermajorsuccessors,Lockead-dressesnotonlytheissueoftheontologicalstatusofthemind,butthefurtherquestionofwhetheritinteractswiththebody;likethem,heseestheseissuesasrelatedininterestingways.Butinotherrespects,hereaselsewhere,Lockestandsapart,forinhiscasethedirectionoftheargumentisquitedifferent.Thephilosopherswehaveexaminedsofartendtoarguefromtheheterogeneityofmindandbodytotheimpossibilityofcausalinteractionbetweenthem.Locke,bycontrast,likeDescarteshimselfonoccasion,acceptstheinteractionofmindandbodyasafactofexperiencewhichcannotbesensiblydenied,andexploitsthisfactasabasisforundermininganimmaterialisttheoryofmind.Lockecanagreewithothersthatitisdifficulttoconceiveofinteractionbetweenheterogeneoussub-stances,butforhimthisservesasareasonfordoubtingthatmindandbodyaresuchsubstances.“WhatcertaintyofKnowledgecananyonehavethatsomeperceptions,asv.g.pleasureandpain,shouldnotbeinsomebodiesthemselves,afteracertainmannermodifiedandmoved,aswellasthattheyshouldbeinanimmaterialsub-stance,upontheMotionofthepartsofBody:Bodyasfaraswecanconceivebeingableonlytostrikeandaffectbody,andMotion,accordingtotheutmostreachofourIdeas,beingabletoproducenothingbutMotion”(Essay,IV.iii.6).ItistruethatLockeneverentertainsthepossibilityofreductivematerialism;thatis,heneverentertainsthehypothesisthatmentalstatesaresimplyidenticalwithbrainstates.Butwhileheiscommittedtopropertydualism,hedoesexploitthefactofmind–bodyinteractioninordertoquestionthetruthofsubstantialdualism.Here,assoofteninhisphilosophy,LockeappealstothedeliverancesofcommonsenseintheserviceofarathersubtleandsystematicattackonCartesiandogmatismabouttheessencesofmindandmatter.SPACEANDTIMEForobviousreasons,philosophersuptothetimeofKanttendedtodebatethenatureofspaceandtimeintandem.Yetitisalsonotice-ablethattheytendedtofocusmoresharplyonthecaseofspace;philosophicaltheoriesthatseemprimarilytailoredtospaceareCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics129oftensaidtoapplymutatismutandistothecaseoftime.Thistendencytofocusonspaceattheexpenseoftimeisparticularlyprominentintheearlymodernperiod.Accordingly,inthissectionweshalldevotemoreattentiontospacethantotime.Philosophicaldebateaboutspacecenteredonaclusterofissueswhichwerenotalwayssharplydistinguished.Onesuchissuecon-cernstheplaceofspacewithinthesystemofontologicalcategoriesfavoredbyearlymodernphilosophers:isspaceasubstance,anattri-bute,orarelation?Asweshallsee,eachoftheseoptionscouldboastdistinguishedadvocates.Arelatedissueconcernedtheactualityandeventhepossibilityofemptyspaceorthevoid.Philosopherswhowereunitedintheirrejectionofscholasticphysicsandtheiradher-encetothenewmechanicalphilosophycouldbesharplydividedoverwhetherthephysicaluniversewasaplenum.Althoughtheywouldhavedeploreditsanthropomorphicphrasing,somephilosopherscon-tinuedtoagreewithAristotle’sdictumthatnatureabhorsavacuum,whileotherssoughttorevivetheEpicureantheoryofatomsinavoid.Afinalissueconcerningtheinfinityorfinitudeofspacewasparticu-larlysensitivefortheologicalreasons,fortraditionallyonlyGodwassupposedtobestrictlyinfinite.Thusphilosopherswhocaredabouttheologicalorthodoxyhadtotreadcarefullyaroundthisissue.ThefirsttwoissuesconcerningspacearetightlyrelatedinthecaseofDescartesandSpinoza.InhisPrinciplesofPhilosophy,Descartesexplainsthatthereisonlyarationaldistinctionbetweenspaceandcorporealsubstance:Thereisnorealdistinctionbetweenspace,orinternalplace,andthecor-porealsubstancecontainedinit:theonlydifferenceliesinthewayinwhichweareaccustomedtoconceiveofthem.Forinrealitytheextensioninlength,breadthanddepthwhichconstitutesaspaceisexactlythesameasthatwhichconstitutesabody.(Princ.,II.10,CSMI227)Descartesthusanswersthepurelyontologicalquestionbysayingthatspaceisineffectasubstancewhichdiffersfrommatteronlyinourwayofconceivingit.Andfromtheontologicalthesis,Descartesproceedstoderiveananswertotherelatedquestionaboutthevacuum:sincespaceandcorporealsubstanceareoneandthesameundertwodescrip-tions(merelyrationallydistinct),avacuumoremptyspaceisstrictlyimpossible.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n130NICHOLASJOLLEYTheimpossibilityofavacuum,inthephilosophicalsenseofthatinwhichthereisnosubstancewhatsoever,isclearfromthefactthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheextensionofaspace,orinternalplace,andtheextensionofabody.(Princ.,II.16,CSMI229–30)AlthoughDescartes’scommitmenttotheimpossibilityofavacuumisuncompromising,acomplicatingfactorisintroducedbyhisex-tremedoctrineofdivineomnipotence.IncorrespondencewithArnauld,DescartesexplainsthathewouldnotdaretosaythatGodcouldnotbringabouttheexistenceofwhollyemptyspace(CSMIII358–59).Butatthesametimehemakesitcrystalclearthatavacuuminvolvesa“contradictioninmyconception.”ForDes-cartes,itisnolessimpossiblethatthereshouldbeavacuumthanthattwoplusoneshouldnotbeequaltothree.Spinoza’sthinkingaboutspaceinvolvesacharacteristicattempttoaccommodateCartesianthemeswithinapantheisticmetaphys-ics.LikeDescartes,Spinozaholdsthatspaceisonlyconceptuallydistinctfromextendedorcorporealsubstance;likeDescartes,too,forthisreasonheiscommittedtotheimpossibilityofavacuum(withnoCartesianqualificationsstemmingfromreflectionondivineomnipotence).ButSpinoza’sabandonmentofthetranscendentGodoforthodoxtheologyallowsandeveninsomecasesdictatesade-parturefromCartesianprinciples.Forreasonsoftheologicalcaution,Descarteshadbeenreluctanttodeifyspace,asitwere,byproclaim-ingittobeinfinite;instead,Descarteshadpreferredtosaythatitwasboundlessorindefinite(Princ.,I.27,CSMI202).Spinoza,ofcourse,hasnosuchscruplesaboutsayingthatspaceasextendedsubstanceisinfinite;indeed,amajorinspirationofhiswholepantheisticmeta-physicswastheinsightthatspace,onthenewscience,wastakingonanattributewhichhadtraditionallybeenascribedtoGodalone.Spinoza’sreadinesstodeifyextendedsubstanceliesbehindafurtherdeparturefromtheCartesianframework:Spinozaholdsthatthissubstanceisindivisible.ThephilosophicalpointbehindthisattempttoaccommodateatraditionalpropertyofGodwithinhissystemseemstobethatspaceislogicallypriortoitsregions:suchregionscanonlybeidentifiedasregionsofspace.Thusspaceisnotbuiltup29ofregionsinthewaythatawholeisbuiltupofparts.Thesametendencytotakeupadogmaticstandontheonto-logicalstatusofspaceisvisibleintheworkofNewton’sprominentCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics131philosophicalspokesman,SamuelClarke.Newtonhimselftendedtobeaversetophilosophicalspeculation,whichhebelievedhadcorruptedChristiantheology,butClarkehadnosuchscruples;incorrespondencewithLeibnizandelsewhere,Clarkewaspreparedtoexplorethemetaphysicalandeventheologicalunderpinnings,ashesawthem,oftheNewtoniantheoryofabsolutespaceandtime.Accordingtothistheory,whichismotivatedbycomplexscientificarguments,absolutespaceandtimearelikegiant,indeedinfinite,containersforbodiesandeventsrespectively:spaceislogicallyprior30tobodies,andtimeislogicallypriortoeventsorprocesses.Tosaythatabsolutespaceandtimearecontainersmightsuggestthatinontologicaltermstheyaresubstances,butthisisnotinfactClarke’sview.AccordingtoClarke,spaceandtimearenotsub-31stancesbutattributes;indeed,theyareattributesofGodhimself.Infinitespaceisthedivineattributeofimmensity;infinitetimeisthedivineattributeofeternity.Clarke’sinsistencethatspaceandtimeareattributesmayseemphilosophicallyunmotivated,butitnodoubtreflectshisreligiousconcerns.Clarke,likeSpinoza,wishestoexploitthetheologicalassociationsofinfinity,butunlikeSpinoza,hedoesnotwishtostrayfarfromChristiantheologicalorthodoxy.ClearlyClarkecouldnothaveidentifiedabsolutespaceandtimewiththeverysubstanceofGodwithoutfallingintoheresy.TheNewtoniantheoryofabsolutespaceandtimehassomeim-plicationsfortheothermainissuedebatedbyphilosophersintheperiod.Aswehaveseen,forNewton,spacedoesnotdependlogic-allyonmatterforitsexistence;forthisreasonemptyspaceisatleastalogicalpossibility.ButtheNewtoniantheoryofemptyspacedoesnotofitselfimplythatthereactuallyissuchemptyspace;asfarasthetheoryisconcerned,itisconceivablethatabsoluteinfinitespaceiseverywherefullofmatter.ButNewtonandhisdiscipleinfactagreewiththeEpicureantraditioninrecognizingtheexistenceofatomsandthevoid.Intheirdifferentways,Descartes,Spinoza,andClarkeallaccordafundamentalplacetospaceintheirontologies;SpinozaandClarkeevenagreeinlinkingspacewithGod.ItisobviousthatLeibniz,especiallyinhismaturemetaphysics,isnotinapositiontodothesame,foraccordingtothedoctrineofmonadstheonlytruesub-stancesareimmaterialsoulswhosebasicpropertiesorattributesareperceptionandappetition.Indeed,LeibnizcannotfindanyplaceCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n132NICHOLASJOLLEYforeitherspaceortimeatthegroundfloorofhismetaphysics.Hereitishelpfultorecallthat,moreclearlythanDescartesorSpinoza,Leibnizoperateswithasharpdistinctionbetweenappearanceandreality.Spaceandtime,forLeibniz,arepurelyphenomenal;theybelongtotherealmofappearances,andnottherealmofwhatistrulyreal,namelymonads.Tosaythatspaceandtimeareappearances,however,doesnotsettlethequestionoftheirontologicalstatus.InthecorrespondencewithClarke,LeibnizprovidesaclearanswertothisquestionwhichcontrastssharplywiththeNewtonianandCartesianviews:spaceandtime,forLeibniz,areneithersubstancesnorattributes,butrelations.“Iholdspacetobesomethingmerelyrelativeastimeis...Iholdittobeanorderofcoexistences,astimeisanorderofsuccessions”(ThirdLetter,}4,AG324).ThusforLeibniz,spaceandtimedependlogicallyontheexistenceofbodiesandeventsrespect-ively.Iftherewerenobodiestherewouldbenospace;iftherewerenoeventstherewouldbenotime.IncorrespondencewithClarke,Leibnizdefendsafurtheronto-logicalthesis:spaceandtimearenotmerelyrelationalbutideal.ThethesisthatspaceandtimeareidealfollowsfromtherelationaltheoryinconjunctionwithLeibniz’sdoctrinethatonlysubstancesarefullyreal,everythingelse,includingrelations,beinganensrationisormentalconstruct.Thereferencetomentalconstructsservestoshowthattheidealityofspaceandtimeistobesharplydistinguishedfromtheidealismofthetheoryofmonads.Tosaythatspaceandtimeareidealistosaythat,asrelations,theyarecontrib-utedbytheperceivingmind;tosaythatthetheoryofmonadsisaformofidealismistosaythatthebasicsubstancesarementalorquasi-mentalinnature.Moreover,theclaimthatspaceandtimeareidealhasnotendencytoimplythatrealityisconstitutedbysuchquasi-mentalsubstances.Evenif,asinhismiddleperiod,Leibnizacceptedtheexistenceofcorporealsubstances,hewouldstillbecommittedtotheidealityofspace.PhilosopherssuchasLeibnizandClarkeweredivided,then,onthemeritsoftherelationalandnonrelationaltheoriesofspace.Althoughhewaswritingbeforethefamouscorrespondence,inhisEssayLockerevealshisawarenessnotonlyoftheissuesinthisdebatebutalsoofitstheologicaldimensions.Characteristically,Lockerefusestoarbitratebetweenthesetwomainpositions:“ButCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics133whetheranyonewilltakeSpacetobeonlyarelationresultingfromtheExistenceofotherBeingsatadistance;orwhethertheywillthinktheWordsofthemostknowingKingSolomon,TheHeavenandtheHeavenofHeavens,cannotcontainThee;orthosemoreemphaticalonesoftheinspiredPhilosopherSt.Paul,InHimwelive,move,andhaveourBeing,aretobeunderstoodinaliteralsenceIleaveeveryonetoconsider”(Essay,II.xiii.26).AlthoughLockehimselfpreferstoremainagnostic,somereadershavesup-posedthattherewasadevelopmentinhisthoughtontheissue;undertheinfluenceofNewtonhemayhavemovedawayfromthe32relationaltheorytothedoctrineofabsolutespaceandtime.Lockemayhavecometofavortheabsolutetheory,butthereisnoreasontosupposethathefelthimselftherebycommittedtoeitherasubstantiveorattributivetheory.Locke’stendencytoquestionthevalueoftraditionalontologicalcategoriesisevidentinhisdiscus-sionoftheoneissueconcerningspaceandtimeonwhichhewasconcernedtodefendapositivestance,namelythetheoreticalpossi-bilityofavacuum.Locke’sdefenseofthispositionisofcourseintegraltohiswholepolemicagainstCartesiandogmatismwhich,onthisissue,recognizesonlyarationaldistinctionbetweenmatterandspaceandconcludesthatavacuumisabsolutelyimpossible.LockeattackstheCartesiandogmainvariousways:heappealstoconceptualconsiderationsabouttheevidentdistinctnessofourideasofbodyandspace,andherehearsessometraditionalargu-ments,whichgobacktotheEpicureans,toestablishthetheoreticalpossibilityofemptyspace(Essay,II.xiii.21).ButhismostdistinctivemethodofattackontheCartesiandogmaemergesinresponsetoonefamiliarontologicalobjection:“Ifitbedemanded(asusuallyitis)whetherthisSpacevoidofmatter,beSubstanceorAccidentIshallreadilyanswer,Iknownot,norshallbeashamedtoownmyIgnorance,tilltheythatask,shewmeacleardistinctIdeaofsubstance”(Essay,II.xiii.17).ThusLockeseekstoremovethestingofthestandardobjectionstothepossibilityofavacuum(spacevoidofmatter)byquestioningthevalueofthecategoriesoftraditionalorthodoxy.Lockeisskepticalnotonlyaboutthevalueoftraditionalonto-logicalcategoriessuchasthatofsubstance;heisskepticalalsoaboutthewholeenterpriseofdemonstrativemetaphysics.Here,asinotherareasofhisphilosophy,LockeanticipatesandnodoubtCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n134NICHOLASJOLLEYhelpstoshapethespiritofthesucceedingage.Theeighteenthcenturywastowitnessareactionagainsttheconstructionofmeta-physicalsystemssuchasthoseofDescartes,Leibniz,andSpinoza.Nodoubtthemultiplicationofverydifferentsystems,allmakingthesameclaimstodemonstrativecertainty,helpedtobringtheenterpriseintodiscredit.Moreover,thedivergenceofthemetaphys-icianscontrastedunfavorablywiththesuccessoftheexperimentalscientists;thescientistsmayhavehadtheirdisagreementsaboutthetheoreticalfoundationsoftheirwork,buttheywereablenone-thelesstoboastsolidachievements.Inanycase,Locke’sinsistencethatphilosophersshouldbeginbytakingasurveyoftheirunder-standingswasnottogounheededinthefollowingcentury;itwasto33betheguidingspiritoftheCriticalphilosophyofKant.NOTES1Aubrey1972,p.230.2ThepointiswellmadebyWatkins1973,p.13.3SeeBennett1984,pp.16–20.BennettarguesthatSpinoza’smethodishypothetico-deductiveratherthandemonstrative(pp.20–23).4ForfurtherdiscussionofDescartes’sdistinctionbetweentheanalyticandthesyntheticmethod,seeCurley1986.5ForLeibniz’sviewsonmetaphysicsasademonstrativescience,seeRutherford1995a,pp.73–79.6Cf.Cottingham1993,p.159.7See,forinstance,Williams1978,p.253.8Cf.Woolhouse1993,pp.45–50.9TheviewthatSpinozadefines‘substance’intermsofcausalindepend-enceisdefendedbyCurley1969.ForcriticismsofCurley’sthesis,seeBennett1984,pp.92–96.10Monadology,}3(AG213).11Metaphysics,1028b.ThisAristoteliananticipationofLocke’saccountisnotedbyWoolhouse1993,p.7.12Locke’sambivalencetowardtheideaofsubstanceingeneralhasbeennotedbymanycommentators;see,forexample,Bennett1987.InrecentyearsLocke’steachingsconcerningsubstancehavebeenthesubjectofgreatcontroversy.ForaverydifferentaccountofLocke’spositionthantheonedefendedhere,seeAyers1991,vol.II,pp.15–128.13ThreeDialogues,I,inBerkeley1948–57,vol.II,pp.197–99.14ThreeDialogues,III,inBerkeley1948–57,vol.II,pp.233–34.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMetaphysics13515CommentatorswhohavecontributedtothisreassessmentofcausalityintheperiodincludeLoeb1981,McCracken1983,Clatterbaugh1999,andNadler2000b.16ForahelpfulaccountofAristotle’sdoctrineofthefourcausesinrela-tiontoearlymodernphilosophy,seeMates1986,pp.158–60.17SeeO’Neill1993.18PrimaryTruths,inLeibniz1973,p.90.19ASpecimenofDiscoveries,inLeibniz1973,p.79(translationmodi-fied).20ATreatiseconcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge,}31,inBerkeley1948–57,vol.II,p.54.21ThisexamplecomesfromBennett1984,p.213.22SeeBennett1983.Foranopposingview,seeCurley1990andGarrett1999.23ThedifferencesbetweenAristotle’sandLeibniz’sconceptionsoftele-ologyarenotedinGarrett1999.24Thethesisthatthemind–bodyunionformsathirdsubstanceisdefendedinHoffman1986.Cf.Cottingham1986.25SeeLoeb1981,ch.3;Richardson1982;Radner1985.26Forfurtherdiscussionoftheirpositions,seeSchmaltz’schapterinthisvolume.27TheissueisdiscussedinDelahunty1985,p.97.28SeeDellaRocca1996,ch.8.29Cf.Bennett1984,p.86.30Foranilluminatingdiscussionoftheissues,seeBroad1981.31ADemonstrationoftheBeingandAttributesofGod(1705),props.V–VI,inClarke1738,vol.II,pp.539–41.32SeeLennon1993,secs.18,276–88.33IamverygratefultoDonaldRutherfordandSeanGreenbergfortheirhelpfulcommentsonearlierdrafts.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTADSCHMALTZ5ThescienceofmindInPhilosophyandtheMirrorofNature,RichardRortyattributestoRene´Descartestheinventionofadistinctivelymodernnotionofthemind.AccordingtoRorty,Descartesdeviatedfrompreviousthinkers,bothAristotelianandPlatonic,intakingtherealmofthe“mental”toincludeboththe“sensorygraspofparticulars”and1theintellectualgraspofuniversals.Whatmakestheseapparentlyheterogeneouskindsbothcountasmentalisthefactthatwehaveindubitableaccesstothevariousstates.Thus,Descartesmadeindubitabilitythenewmarkofthemental.Rortyclaimsthatthisnewmarkwasconnectedtoanewconceptionofthemindas“aninnerarenawithitsinnerobserver.”Thisnewconceptioninturnrenderedknowledgeofwhatexistsoutsideoftheinnerarenaprob-lematic,andthusmadeitpossible“toposetheproblemoftheveilofideas,theproblemwhichmadeepistemologycentralto2philosophy.”TherecanbenodoubtthatDescartesdeviatedinsomesignifi-cantwaysfromthepsychologyofAristotleandthelaterscholas-tics.However,thedeviationsarelinkedlesstoepistemologicalpreoccupationswithexternalworldskepticismthantoaconcerntoarticulateanewmetaphysicalconceptionofthemindandits3relationtothematerialworld.ThefirstofthethreesectionsinthischapterconsiderstheAristotelianandscholasticaccountsofthesoulthatserveasthefoilforDescartes’sdiscussions,andthentakesupDescartes’sviewofthemindanditsinfluenceonhisearlymodernsuccessors.Aprominentissueherewillbethevariousreactionsamongthesethinkerstotheso-called“mind–bodyprob-lem.”InlightofRorty’sremarks,itissignificantthatthisproblem4ismoremetaphysicalthanepistemological.Thesecondsection136CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind137beginswithareactiontoscholastictheoriesofcognitioninDes-cartesthatinvolvesthepositingof“ideas”inthemindthatservetorepresentobjects.Hereagain,itturnsoutthatearlymoderndiscus-sionsofthisreactionemphasizelesstheproblemofexternalworldskepticismthanthequestionofwhatmetaphysicalviewofthemindanditsfacultiesisrequiredforanadequateaccountofcogni-tion.Inthethirdsection,Iexaminetheroleattributedtothementalfacultyofthewillincognition.ThestartingpointhereisanaccountofthisroleinDescartesthatdifferssignificantlyfromwhatisfoundinhisscholasticopponents.AfurthersignificantfeatureofDescar-tes’sposition,whichismorecloselyconnectedtoearlierscholasticdiscussions,ishisinsistenceonthefreedomofactsofourwill.Withonenotableexception,theearlymodernthinkerssurveyedhereagreedwithDescartesthatsuchactsarefree.However,theyofferedfundamentallydifferentaccountsofthenatureofthatfreedom.SOUL,BODYANDMINDFromtheAristoteliansoultotheCartesianmindInDeanima,Aristotle’saccountofthesoul(psukheoranima)startsfromahylomorphictheoryonwhichalivingorganismisacompos-iteofindeterminatematterandadeterminingform.Thesoulisthendefinedastheformof“aphysicalbodyhavinglifepotentially”andasthegroundorprincipleofthevariouspowersofthelivingbody.Thesoulisthesourcenotonlyofintellectualpowersofhumanbeings,butalsoofthevegetativepowersofnutrition,growth,andreproduc-tioncommontoalllivingthings,aswellasofthesensitivepowersofexternalandinternalsensation,appetition,andself-motion5commontohumansandotheranimals.Aristotelianismdidnotprovidetheonlyperspectiveonthesoulandthenatureoflifeatthebeginningoftheseventeenthcentury.Therewerealternativesthattookintoaccountcompeting6Platonic/Augustinian,Epicurean,orGalenicviews.However,atthistimethestudyofthesoulwasdominatedbythecommentariesonAristotle’stextsthatissuedfromvariousreligiousordersanduniversities.LatescholasticssuchasFranciscoSua´rez,theCoimbrans,andEustachiusaSanctoPaulo(1573–1640)invariablyreadAristotleinlightofthe“Christianized”versionofhispositionCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n138TADSCHMALTZinthethirteenth-centurycommentariesofThomasAquinas.Inparticular,therewasbroadsympathyamongthelatescholasticsfortheThomisticattempttotempertheAristotelianemphasisontheessentialconnectionbetweensoulandbodywiththeChristiandoctrinethathumansoulscanexistapartfrombody.Therewasaconsensusthatallsoulsare“substantiallyunited”tothebodiestheyvivifybutthathumansoulsarealsoimmaterialandincorrupt-iblesincetheyhaveintellectualpowersthat–unlikethepowersofvegetationandsensation–donotrequirebodilyorgansfortheir7operation.IntheletterdedicatinghisMeditationstotheParisTheologyFaculty,Descartesemphasizedhisattemptinthistexttofollowthe1513injunctionoftheLateranCouncilthatChristianphiloso-phersrefutebynaturalreasontheclaimofthetwelfth-centuryAristoteliancommentatorAverroesthattheindividualhumansoulisnotimmortal.ButthoughDescartesagreedwiththemajorityofhisAristoteliancontemporariesthatreasonsupportstheconclusionthatthehumansoulisnaturallyincorruptible,hedifferedradicallyfromtheminhisunderstandingofwhatthesoulis.Thus,inre-sponsetothecomplaintofhisFrenchcriticPierreGassendithatthesoulisresponsibleforvegetativeandsensoryfunctionsinusaswellasforourthought,Descartesinsistedthattheprincipleresponsibleforthesebodilyfunctionsisdistinctinkindfromtheprincipleinvirtueofwhichwethink.HisproposalhereisthattheAristoteliansoul,theprincipleresponsibleforallofthefunctionsoflivingbeings,bereplacedbythemind(mensoresprit),thethinkingthingrevealedbyourreflectionontheself.ThedualistconclusionintheMeditationsisthatthismindisasubstancethatisreallydistinctfromandcanexistapartfrombody,thenatureofwhichconsistsinextensionalone.ItisDescartes’sidentificationofmatterwithextensionthatprovidestheprimarybasisforhisrejectionofanAristotelianac-countoflife.ForDescartes,explanationsinphysicsaretobeframedsolelyintermsofthesizes,shapes,andmotionsofthepartsofmatter.Likewise,heinsistedonaphysiologythatdoesawaywithscholasticsoulsandtheirvegetativeandsensitivepowers.Heofferedatheoryonwhichtheoperationsofplantsandanimalswouldnotdifferinkindfromthemechanisticoperationsofinani-matematter.OnlyinthecaseofthoughtdidhefinditnecessarytoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind139positanonmechanisticprinciplethatisdistinctfromextensionanditsmodifications.InhisDiscourseontheMethod,Descartesheldthatthefactthathumanbeingscanuselanguageappropriatelyinanindefinitenumberofcasesshowsthattheyhavethe“universalinstrument”ofreason,theoperationsofwhichcannotbeexplainedintermsofmechanisticbodilydispositions.Incontrast,theoper-ationsofanimalsthatlackreasoncanbeexplainedentirelyintermsofthosedispositions(CSMI139–41).Theimplicationherethatsuchanimalsaremere“beastmachines”devoidofanysortofsensationorfeelingprovidedaconsiderablesourceofoppositiontoCartesianismbothduringDescartes’slifeandafterhisdeath.ForDescartes,however,theinclinationwehavetoattributesensorythoughtstononrationalanimalsisakintoourinclinationtoattri-butetobodiessomethingsimilartooursensationsofcolorsandtastes.Bothinclinationsaretobeeliminatedbymeansofreflectiononourclearanddistinctideaofbody.Ononepoint,however,Descartesdidmakeaconcessiontothescholastics.IntheSixthMeditation,heclaimedthatthepres-enceinusofthesensationsofpain,hunger,andthirstrevealthatourmindisnotmerelypresentinthebodyasasailorisinaship,butis“mostcloselyjoined”and“asifintermixed”withit(CSMII56).ThecomparisonofthesoultothesailorinashipisfromPlato,andmostlatescholasticsfollowedAristotleinprotestingthatoursouldoesnotmerelyusethebodyasitsinstrument.Descartesevenappropriatedscholasticlanguageatonepointinclaimingthatoursoulissubstantiallyunitedwithourbodytoformanensperse,thusindicatingthatthesoul–bodyunionconstitutesasinglebeing(ens)thatexists“throughitself”(perse)(CSMIII206).Whenhissympatheticcritic,AntoineArnauld,objectedthathisaccountofmindrevertstothePlatonicviewofthesoul,Descartesprotestedthathisargumentsforthesubstantialunionare“asstrongasanyIcanrememberhavingread”(CSMII160).Soonafterhewrotethis,however,Descartesconcededin1643correspondencewithPrincessElisabeththathehadsaidlittleabouttheprecisemannerinwhichthehumansoulisunitedwithitsbody,sincehismainconcernwastoshowthatthissoulisathink-ingthingthatisreallydistinctfrombody(CSMIII217–18).Whendiscussingtheunion,hefocusedonconfusedsensorystatesthatrevealmostclearlytheconnectionofoursoultothebody.WhenCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n140TADSCHMALTZdiscussingtherealdistinction,however,hetendedtoempha-sizethepurelyintellectualfacultythathetooktooperateapartfromthebody.Inholdingthatitisourintellectualpowersthatrevealtheimmaterialityofoursoul,Descarteswasinagreementwiththescholastics.Whatissomewhatobscuredbyhisreferencetotheunion,however,isadisagreementwiththescholasticpositionconnectedtohisclaimthatsensationsaremodesofthought.Whereasforthescholastics,sensationsarepowersmanifestedinthebodilysenseorgansofhumansandotheranimals,forDescartes,theyaremodesofthoughtthatcanexistonlyinathinkingthing,albeitathinkingthingunitedtoabody.Themind–bodyproblem:Malebranche,Leibniz,SpinozaAmongDescartes’sfollowers,therewasastressonthedistinctivelymentalnatureofsensoryconsciousness.Descarteshadintroducedtheviewthatthoughtinvolvesconsciousness(conscientiaorconscience),thoughheappealedtothisnotionrelativelyinfre-quently.ItwastheFrenchphysicianLouisdelaForge(1632–66)who,inhisTreatiseontheHumanMind(1666),insistedthatconsciousnessorinnersensation(inte´rieursentiment)isanessen-tialfeatureofallthought.NodoubtinfluencedbyLaForge,NicolasMalebrancheclaimedinhisSearchafterTruthandsubsequentwritingsthatweknowoursoulthrougha“consciousnessorinnersensation”(conscienceouinte´rieursentiment)ofitsstates.Inthe“Elucidations”(1678),asetofcommentsonhisviewsintheSearch,MalebranchefurtherofferedaCartesianargumentformind–bodydistinctnessfromthefactthatthesensiblequalitiesweperceivehavenorelationtothestatesthatweclearlyconceiveinbody.Thisargumentisreminiscentofrecentclaimsabouttheirreducibilityofsensoryqualiatobodilystates.However,itdifferssignificantlyfromDescartes’ssuggestiontoElisabeththatwecanbestapprehendtheimmaterialityofthemindbydisregardingthesensoryaspectsof8theunionandfocusingonourpurelyintellectualthoughts.WiththeemphasisintheworkofthelaterCartesiansonthesensoryaspectsofmindcomesanewunderstandingofthe“mind–bodyproblem.”IntheworkofscholasticssuchasSua´rez,therewastheproblemofhowthesensorypowersofthehumansoul,whichrequireaunionwiththebody,couldinfluenceitsmore“noble”CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind141intellectualpowers,whichdonotrequiresuchaunion.Incontrast,theproblemforDescartes’ssuccessorsconcernedthenatureoftheunionbetweensoulandbodyrevealedinsensoryexperience.Descarteshimselfassumedthatsuchexperienceshowsthatmotionsinourbodycausesensoryperceptionsinourmindandthatvolitionsinourmindcausemotionsinourbody.However,this“fact”aboutinteractionwasproblematicforMalebranche.Heofferedthe“occasionalist”positionthatourexperiencerevealsonlycertaincorrelationsamongmentalandbodilystates,andthatthetruecauseofthesevariousstatesisthewillofGod.ForMalebranche,thepresenceofcertainmotionsinourbodymerelyprovidestheoccasionforGodtoproducecertainperceptionsinoursoul,whereasthepresenceofcertainvolitionsinoursoulprovidestheoccasionforhimtoproducecertainmotionsinourbody.InhisNewSystemoftheNatureandCommunicationofSub-stances,LeibnizaccusedMalebrancheofinvokingadeusexmachinainordertoexplainthecorrelationsamongmentalandbodilystates(AG143).ThisaccusationisnodoubtasourceofthetextbookviewthatMalebrancheofferedoccasionalismasanadhocsolutiontodiffi-cultiesinternaltotheCartesiansystemconcerningtherelationbetweenmindandbody.However,MalebranchehimselfpresentedhisoccasionalismasanextensionofDescartes’scritiqueoftheAristotelianaccountofnature.HefollowedDescartesinrejectingthescholasticviewthatbodieshavevarious“substantialforms”and“realqualities”thatgobeyondtheirquantitativefeatures.ButMalebranchesawmoreclearlythanDescartesthatthereductionofbodytopassiveextensionrenderedproblematicourpurportedexperi-encebothoftheactionofbodiesoneachotherandoftheactionofbodyonourmind.Moreover,Malebrancheinsistedthattheremustbeanecessaryconnectionbetweenaneffectandits“truecause,”andthattherecanbesuchaconnectiononlyinthecaseoftheproductionofeffectsbythevolitionofanomnipotentbeing.Thus,inthecaseofourownvolitionalactiononthebody,orevenofourvolitionalpro-ductionofourownmentalstates,itmustbeGodwhobringsabouttherelevanteffects.Malebrancheofferedthisoccasionalistviewasanalternativetothetraditionalscholasticposition,whichDescarteshimselfsometimessuggested,thatGodmerely“concurs”withtheactionofcreaturesinbringingaboutnaturaleffects.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n142TADSCHMALTZAnotherobjectionthatLeibnizofferedintheNewSystemisthatMalebranchepositedaseriesof“perpetualmiracles”bymeansofwhichGodbringsaboutparticulareffects.Arnauld,in1687correspondencewithLeibniz,andPierreBayle,inanoteontheNewSysteminhisHistoricalandCriticalDictionary,respondedwiththelegitimatepointthatthislineofobjectionoverlooksMalebranche’sclaimthatGodproducesnaturaleffectsbymeansofasmallsetof“generalvolitions”orgenerallaws.Itisonlyinthecaseofgenuinedeviationsfromnaturallawsthatherequired“particularvolitions”inGodtobringaboutparticulareffects.InMalebranche’sview,then,variouschangesinsoulandbodyarenaturalratherthanmiraculousinsofarastheyderivefromthegenerallawsgoverningthesoul–bodyunionthataretobeidentifiedinturnwithgeneralvolitionsinGod.Evenso,Leibniz’sinsistenceintheNewSystemthatcreatedsubstancemusthaveitsownpowerindicatesafundamentaldis-agreementwithMalebranche.LeibnizgrantedMalebranchethatnopowerinacreatedsubstancecanexertacausalinfluenceonanothercreatedsubstance.However,heclaimedthatacreatedsubstancecanhavethepowertobringaboutchangesinitsownstates.ThefactthatthesechangescorrespondwithchangesinothersubstancescanbeexplainedbythefactthatGodcreatedthesubstanceswithcausalpowersthatactindependentlyof,andyet“harmonize”with,eachother.ThisisLeibniz’s“hypothesisofagreements,”ashecalleditintheNewSystem(AG144),betterknownbyhislaterlabelforit,the“preestablishedharmony”(seee.g.AG148).Leibnizoftenproposedthepreestablishedharmonyasasolutiontotheproblemofthesoul–bodyunion.InadefenseoftheNewSystem,forinstance,hecontrastedtheinteractionistviewthatsoulandbodycausechangesineachotherandtheoccasionalistviewthatGodcausesallsuchchangeswithhisownviewthatthesoulandbodycausechangesinthemselvesthatcorrespondtochangesintheother.Heillustratedthedifferencesbycomparingthethreeviewstothreeexplanationsofthesynchronousoperationoftwowatches.Theinteractionistviewcorrespondstotheclaimthatthisoperationistobeexplainedbythefactthatthewatcheshaveaninexplicable“naturalinfluence”oneachother.Theoccasionalistviewofthesoul–bodyrelationisakintotheclaimthatthewatchesrunintandemsincethereisacraftsmanwhoconstantlyadjustsCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind143them.Finally,thepreestablishedharmonyiscomparedtothesim-plestandmostintelligibleexplanationoftheoperationofthewatches,namely,onethatappealstothefactthatthecraftsmanhasconstructedthewatchessoperfectlythattheyrunontheirownbutinconformitytoeachother(AG147–48).Thereisonerespect,however,inwhichthischaracterizationofpreestablishedharmonyismisleading.Thesuggestionisthatthesoulandbody,likethetwowatches,areself-containedentitiesthathavethesamestatus.YetLeibnizindicatedintheNewSystemthatbodyisnotasubstancebutsomethingcomposedofsimple,unextendedsubstances,whichhelatercalled“monads.”Theoper-ationsofthesesimplesubstancesaretobemodeledontheoperationsofourownsouls;allhave“somethinganalogoustosen-sationandappetite,”eventhoughmanylacktheabilitiesforra-tionalreflectionandevenconsciousnessthatoursoulspossess(AG139).Giventhisformofidealism,then,thepreestablishedharmonymustultimatelyexplainthecorrespondencenotofthestatesofmentalandbodilysubstances,butratheroftheperceptionsofsimplesubstancesormonads.Thebodyisinvolvedinsofarasthesubstancesperceivethemselvestohavebodiesrelatedinasystem-aticmannertootherbodies.Becauseofpreestablishedharmony,thesevariousperceptionssupportascientificstorythatexplainsbodilyoperationsentirelyintermsofthemechanisticinteractionofpartsofmatter.However,theharmonyultimatelyrelatesonlyperceptualchangesinsimplesubstancesthatareproducedinateleologicalmannerbytheirownappetitesorstrivingsforthegood.TheseaspectsofLeibniz’scomplexpositionservetoexplainhisclaimintheNewSystemthatwhereasheholds,contrarytoboththescholasticsandtheCartesians,thattheoperationsofhumanaswellasanimalbodiescanbeexplainedentirelyinmechanisticterms,healsoclaims,withthescholasticsbutagainsttheCartesians,thatanimalaswellashumanbodiesareanimatedby9soul-likesubstances(AG139,141–42).IntheTheodicy,Leibnizprotestedthatbydeprivingcreaturesofanycausalpower,andthusofsubstantiality,Malebranchefalls“intoSpinozism,whichisanexaggeratedCartesianism”(}393).Nevertheless,theaccountofthemind–bodyrelationintheworkofSpinozaprovidesaclearalternativebothtoMalebranche’soccasionalismandtoLeibniz’spreestablishedharmony.ThisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n144TADSCHMALTZaccountisgroundedinthedistinctiveclaimofSpinoza’smaster-work,theEthics,thatGodistheonlysubstance,ofwhichallotherfinitethingsare“modes”or“affections.”Spinozaheldthatthissubstancehasaninfinityofattributesthat“theintellectperceivesasconstitutingtheessenceofsubstance”(Ethics,I,def.4),ofwhichweknowonlytwo,namely,thoughtandextension.ThereisaremnantofDescartes’sviewofmindhere,insofarasSpinozaclaimedthatneitherthoughtnorextensioncanbeconceivedintermsoftheother.However,heexplicitlyrejectedDescartes’ssub-stancedualismwhenheinsistedintheEthicsthattheattributesofthoughtandextensionyieldconceptuallydistinctwaysofconceivingoneandthesamesubstance.Inadditiontobeingconceptuallydistinct,thoughtandextensionarecausallyisolated.ForSpinoza,thiscausalisolationfollowsfromtheaxiomthatknowledgeofaneffectinvolvesknowledgeofitscause(Ethics,I,ax.4;II,prop.6).Ifamodeofextensionweretheeffectofamodeofthought,thentheunderstandingofextensionwouldrequireaconceptionofthought,thusviolatingtheconcep-tualdistinctionbetweenthetwoattributes.InSpinoza’sview,onlymodesofextensioncanbeunderstoodtocausechangesinothermodesofextension,andonlymodesofthoughtcanbeunderstoodtocausechangesinothermodesofthought.YetjustasLeibnizpositedapreestablishedharmonyamongcausallyisolatedstatesofdistinctsubstances,soSpinozapositedaparallelismamongcausallyisolatedmodesofdistinctattributes.Spinoza’sparallelismbeginswiththeclaimthattheattributeofthoughtmustcontainideasthatrepresentallmodesinotherattri-butes.Thus,foreachmodeofextension,thereisacorrespondingideaofthatmodeinthought.Givenhisdoctrineofthecausalisola-tionoftheattributes,Spinozacouldnotexplainthecorrespondenceofthesemodestotheirideasbyappealingtoacausalrelationbetweenthem.Instead,heclaimedthattheideasarelinkedtotheirobjectsinvirtueofthefactthattheformerhavethesame“orderandconnection”amongthemselvesthatthelatterdo.Onthebasisofthisparallelismofthetwomodalchains,aswellashisclaimthattheattributesofthoughtandextensionexpresstheessenceofthesamesubstance,Spinozaconcludedthatamodeofextensionanditsideaare“oneandthesamething,butexpressedintwoways”(Ethics,II,prop.7schol.).ThisidentificationofthementalandtheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind145physicaldiffersfromLeibnizianidealisminrefrainingfromgivingprioritytothementalrealm.Evenso,SpinozaagreedwithLeibnizinrejectingcertainfeaturesofamoreorthodoxCartesianaccountofthemind.Leibniz’spre-establishedharmonyrequiresthatourperceptions“express”every-thingthatoccursinourbody.InfluencedbytheCartesianviewthatmentalstatesarebynatureaccessibletoconsciousness,Arnauldprotestedagainsttheimplicationherethathissoulperceives“aninfinitenumberof...thingsoccurringinmybody,ofwhichitisneverthelessignorant,asforinstanceallthefunctionsofdigestionandnutrition”(M105).ButLeibnizrespondedthatoursouldoesnothave“aperfectapperceptionofwhatisgoingoninthepartsofitsbody,”andthat“toomanythingsoccurinourbodyforthemtobeseparatelyperceived”(M113).Thisresponseisconnectedtohisclaimthatwehavepetitesperceptionsthatexpressstatesofourbodyandalsomotivateaction,butthatfallbelowthelevelofconsciousness.Spinoza’sparallelismalsorequiresthat“nothingcanhappenin[thehuman]bodywithoutitsbeingperceivedbythe[human]mind”(Ethics,II,prop.12).WithLeibniz,however,Spinozainsistedthatourideasofourbodilychangesforthemostpartyieldonlyaveryconfusedandinadequateknowledge.AndwithLeibnizagain,hedidnotrequirethatideasofthesechangesbeaccessibletoconsciousness.Moreover,SpinozaandLeibnizbothinsistedagainstDescartesthatthementalrealmincludesnotonlyhumanpercep-tion,butalsothewhollyconfusedperceptionofmindsorsoulsthatpossessnothingsimilartoourownconsciousness.However,SpinozarejectedoneaspectofLeibniz’spositionthatderivesfromtheCartesiantraditioninthephilosophyofmind.LeibnizfollowedbothDescartesandMalebrancheinemphasizingthesimplicityandthusindivisibilityoftheimmaterialthinkingthing.AfterLeibniz,itbecameastandardtaskin“rationalpsych-ology”toarguethatoursoulhastheseproperties.ThoughSpinozaagreedthatmindcanbeconceivedapartfromextension,hisparal-lelismledhimtoconcludethatourmindhasacomplexitythatmatchesthecomplexityofourbody.Indeed,inSpinoza’sviewourmindissimplythecollectionofideasthatareidenticaltothevariouspartsthatmakeupourbody.Whenthisbodyisdestroyed,sotooisthemindthatisidentifiedwithit.Spinozaadmittedlyspokesomewhatobscurelyofthe“eternityofthemind,”butheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n146TADSCHMALTZindicatedclearlyenoughthattherecanbenopersonalimmortalitythatinvolvesthecontinuedexistenceofourindividualconscious-10nessafterthedeathofourbody.HobbesianmaterialismandLockeanskepticismBesidesSpinoza,theotherprominentearlymoderncriticofthedoctrineoftheimmortalityoftheimmaterialsoulwasHobbes.UnlikeSpinoza,however,Hobbesbasedthisrejectiononthepossi-bilityofreducingmindtomatter.Hewentsofarastoclaimthattheverynotionofanimmaterialsubstanceisincoherent.TheargumentinhisLeviathanisthatsinceourideaofsubstanceisdrawnentirelyfromoursensoryexperienceofbodies,“substanceandbodysignifythesamething;andtherefore,substanceincorporealarewordswhich,whentheyarejoinedtogether,destroyoneanother,asifamanshouldsay,anincorporealbody”(ch.34,par.2).Towardthestartofthissametext,Hobbesnotedthatthesensoryexperiencecausedinusbymotionisitself“butdiversmotions(formotionproducethnothingbutmotion)”(ch.1,par.4).HobbeswroteasetofobjectionstoDescartes’sMeditations,towhichDescarteshimselfrespondedinadismissivemanner.Thisresponseisnottoosurprisinggiventhefundamentaldifferencesintheirrespectivetheoriesofmind,amongotherissues.ButthoughHobbesisaloneamongthemajorearlymodernphilosophersinendorsinganuncompromisingformofmaterialism,hisviewsaresimilarincertainrespectstothoseofLeibnizandSpinoza.Allthreethinkersheldthatwecangiveanaccountofthematerialworld(oratleastofnonmiraculouseventsinthisworld)thatisentirelymechanisticandinvolvesnospecialinterventiononthepartofnonextendedthings,eveninthecaseoftheoperationsofthehumanbody.Ofcourse,therearestillsignificantdifferenceshere.Afterall,Leibnizheldthatthemechanisticaccountmustbegroundedinanaccountofperceptualchangesinsimpleimmaterialsubstances,andSpinozaheldthatthemechanisticaccountparallelsanaccountoftherelationamongunextendedideas.Nevertheless,theircommoninsistenceonauniversalmechanisminthematerialworldplacestheminoppositionbothtoDescartes,whoallowedforthenonme-chanisticactionofmindonbody,andtoMalebranche,whoallowedthatGodproduceseffectsinthematerialworldthatderivenotonlyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind147fromlawsofmotionbutalsofromlawsgoverningtherelationofimmaterialsubstancestobodies.LockeofferedaskepticalalternativebothtoHobbes’sstrongformofmaterialismandtothedogmaticinsistenceintheworkoftheCartesiansonthedemonstrabilityofdualism.InhisEssayconcern-ingHumanUnderstanding,LockeprovidedanimplicitcriticismofHobbes’srejectionofincorporealsubstancewhenhenotedthatourideaofcorporealsubstanceisnoclearerthanourideaofspiritualsubstance,sincewetakebothideastosignifytheunknown“sub-stratum”thatwesupposetounderliespiritualorcorporealqualitiesoroperations.Lockeconcludedthatwecannomoreinfertothenonexistenceofspiritfromthelackofaclearideaofanimmaterialsubstratumthanwecaninfertothenonexistenceofmatterfromthelackofaclearideaofamaterialsubstratum(II.xxiii.4).Lockewasnotaloneinrejectingtheclaimthatwehaveclearknowledgeofthesubstratumthatunderliesourmentaloperations.InrespondingtoDescartes’sthesisintheSecondMeditationthat“thenatureofmindisbetterknownthanbody,”Gassendiempha-sizedthatwhatscientificstudyhasrevealedaboutthenatureofbodyisfarsuperiortoanythingthatDescarteshasrevealedaboutthemysterious“innersubstance”responsibleforthought(CSMII192–93).EvenMalebranche,whowassympathetictoCartesiandualism,rejectedDescartes’sthesisonthegroundsthattheknow-ledgeofthenatureofmindthatwegainthroughconsciousnessorinnersensationisinferiorinkindtotheknowledgeofbodythatderivesfromtheclearideaofextension.Locke’sskepticalargumentagainstHobbesianmaterialismdepends,however,ontheclaimthatourknowledgeofmaterialsub-stanceisasdeficientasourknowledgeofimmaterialsubstance.ThisskepticalargumentalsoundercutstheargumentinMalebrancheandotherCartesiansthataclearideaofbodyrevealsthatbodiescanpossessonlymodesofextension,andsocannotbethinkingthings.InafamouspassagefromtheEssay,Lockeclaimedthatourideasofmatterandspiritdonotallowustodeterminewhether“GODcan,ifhepleases,superaddtoMatteraFacultyofThinking,thanthatheshouldsuperaddtoitanotherSubstancewithaFacultyofThinking”(IV.iii.6).LockedidinsistelsewherethatitisprobablethatGodhassuperaddedanimmaterialsubstancewiththisfacultyinourcase.Nonetheless,Locke’sEnglishcritic,thebishopofWorcester,EdwardStillingfleetCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n148TADSCHMALTZ(1635–99),protestedthatLockeconfoundedmatterandthinkinginclaimingthatGodcansuperaddtobodysomethingthatconflictswiththeessenceofmatter.InthecourseofhisextendedpublicdebatewithStillingfleet,LockedefendedhimselfbyassertingthatthoughGodcannotsuperaddtobodyqualitiesthatcontradicttheessenceofmatter,hecananddoessuperaddqualitiessuchasmotion,beauty,andsensethatgobeyondwhatiscontainedinthatessence.Lockefurthernoted,correctly,thathesaidintheEssaynotthatGodactuallydidsuperaddthoughttomatter,butonlythatwecannotseeacontra-dictionintheclaimthathecan.However,theimplicationinhiswritingsthatpurelymaterialanimalshavesensorythoughtsdoesseemtorequireastrongercommitmenttothesuperadditionof11thoughttoamaterialsystemthanhisofficialpositionindicates.ThediscussionofsuperadditionintheLocke–Stillingfleetcorres-pondencepromptedafurtherdebatebetweenSamuelClarkeand12AnthonyCollins(1676–1729).Collinsstartedthedebatebytakingissue,inalettertoHenryDodwell(1641–1711),withClarke’sclaiminhis1705Boylelecturesthatconsciousnessisdistinctinkindfromotherbodilyproperties,andsocannotbelongtoamaterialsystem.Forhispart,Clarkearguedthatsinceunitaryconsciousnessisnotcomposedinanyintelligiblewayfrompowersthatinhereinthepartsofamaterialsystem,consciousnessitselfcannotinhereinthatsystem.Collinsrespondedthatconsciousnesscanbeattributedtothewholematerialsystemwithoutbeingattributedtoeachpart.Inthisdisputeweseeananticipationoftheemphasisinrecentdiscussionsofthephilosophyofmindnotonlyonthenatureofconsciousness,butalsoonthequestionofwhetherthementalcan“supervene”onthephysical.IDEAS,INNATENESS,ANDCOGNITIONFromscholasticspeciestoCartesianideasOnewayofunderstandingmedievalandRenaissancetheoriesofcognitionisintermsofthedistinctionbetweenPlatonicandAristoteliantraditions.ThePlatonictraditionemphasizedthatin-tellectualknowledgedoesnotdependonthesenses.InPlatonistssuchasMarsilioFicino(1433–99),therewastheviewthatsuchknowledgederivesfromelementsinnatetointellect.AnotherstrainCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind149ofPlatonism,whichisfoundintheworkofAugustineandlaterAugustinians,involvedtheclaimthattheintellectrequirestheassistanceofdivine“illumination”inordertoattaincertainknow-ledgeofnecessarytruths.SomepassagesinAugustine’swritingsevensuggestedthatthebodymerelystimulatesthesoultoformsensationsinitself.LaterAugustiniansdrewonsuchpassages,aswellasontheAugustinianprinciplethatsomethingcannotactonwhatismorenoblethanit,inarguingthatsensationsareproducednotbytheactionofthebodyonthesoul,butratherbytheactivityofan“agentsense.”Incontrast,therewasanemphasisintheAristoteliantraditiononthedependenceofthehumanintellectonpassivesensoryexperi-ence.ThistraditionisreflectedintheviewinThomasAquinasthatallofourknowledgestartswiththereceptionintheexternalsenseorgansof“sensiblespecies”transmittedfromsensiblequalitiesinexternalobjects.Hereitisonlythe“form”ofthequalitythatistransmitted,notitsmatter.Thus,thematerialsenseorgandoesnotbecomeliterallycoloredorodorous,say,butmerelyreceivessome-thingthatallowsittocognizecolorsorodors.Thespeciesisthenstoredasa“phantasm”intheinternalsenses,whereitprovidesmaterialforfurthersensoryjudgmentsconcerningtherelevantsensiblequality.Finally,thepresenceofthephantasmleadstheintellecttoabstractawayallofitsaccidentalmaterialconditions,therebyproducingan“intelligiblespecies”thatrevealstheessenceornatureofthesensiblething.Thomasarguedthatsuchspeciesprovideallthatisrequiredforournaturalintellectualknowledge,andthusthatthereisnoneedforeitherthesortofdivineillu-minationpositedbytheAugustiniansortheinnateintellectual13equipmentpositedbyotherPlatonists.Amongthelaterscholastics,thereweredisputesoverthedetailsoftheThomisticaccountofcognition.Ockhamandhisfollowersallowedforthesensiblequalitytoactatadistanceontheexternalsenseorgans,andthusrejectedtheneedforthetransmissionofaspeciesfromtheexternalobject.Also,somelaterscholasticswor-riedthatthepositingofsensibleandintelligiblespeciesmightcompromiseadirectrealismthatallowsforimmediatesensoryorintellectualcontactwithexternalqualities.Finally,Ihaveindicatedthattherewereworriesabouttheclaimthatthelessnoblematerial14phantasmcantriggertheactionofthehumanintellect.DespiteCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n150TADSCHMALTZthesecomplications,therewasabroadagreementamongthelaterscholasticswithThomas’sinsistenceonthesensorybasisofhumanknowledge,somuchsothatscholasticismcametobeassociatedwiththemaximthat“nothingisintheintellectthatwasnotfirstinthesenses”(nihilestinintellectuquinpriusfueritinsensu).DescartesridiculedscholasticviewsconcerningthereceptionofspecieswhenhereferredintheDiscourseto“allthoselittleimagesflittingthroughtheair,calledintentionalspecies,whichsoexercisetheimaginationofthephilosophers”(CSMI153–54).AlreadyinThomas,however,therewasaconcerntodistinguishthespeciesinvolvedinsensationfromtheimagisticeidolaoftheatomists.ThedeepestobjectioninDescarteswasnotthatthescholasticspositflyingimages,butthattheyappealtosomethingotherthanmodesofextension,suchasshapeandmotion,inexplainingthebodilyalterationsinvolvedinsensation.ForDescartes,our“clearanddistinct”understandingthatthenatureofbodyconsistsinextensionprecludesanysuchappeal.Inpre-1640writings,butalsooccasionallyinlaterworks,Descartesofferedareplacementforscholasticsensiblespecieswhenheidentified“ideas”withcertainfigurescomposedofmotionsinthebrainthatderivefromexternalobjects.YetintheDioptrics,anessayappendedtothe1637Discourse,heassertedthat“itisthesoulthatsenses,notthebody”(CSMI164).Moreover,inpost-1640writingshetendedtorestricttheterm‘idea’tofeaturesofthemind.Thus,ina1641responsetoHobbes,Descartesnotedthathetookideastobe“whateverisimmediatelyperceivedbythemind,”andthatheusedthistermbecause“itwasthestandardphilosophicaltermusedtorefertotheformsofperceptioninthedivinemind,eventhoughwerecognizethatGoddoesnotpossessanycorporealimagination”(CSMII127).Wehavetheshiftherefromthescholas-ticviewthatcognitionstartswiththereceptionofspeciesinthematerialsenseorganstotheCartesianviewthatitstartswiththeperceptionofideasintheimmaterialmind.TheScottishphilosopherThomasReidtookthisshifttohaveperniciouseffects.ThoughhepraisedDescartesforrejectingthe“sophistry”ofthescholastics,Reidcriticizedhimforofferingan“idealsystem”thatunderminesthecommonsensebeliefintheexternalworldinsofarasitinterposesideasbetweenourmindandexternalreality.ForReid,theultimateresultoftheintroductionofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind151theidealsystemwastheexternalworldskepticismofBerkeleyandHume.Reid’shistoriographyprovidesasourcefortheviewinRorty,citedattheoutsetofthischapter,thatDescartes’s“inventionofthemind”placedtheepistemologicalproblemof“veil-of-ideas”skepti-cismatthecenterofphilosophicaldiscourse.AsIhavenoted,oneproblemforthisviewisthatDescartesandhissuccessorspositedideasaspartofempiricallybasedaccountsofsensoryandintellec-tualcognition.Therearenodoubtepistemologicalissuesraisedbytheirdiscussionsofideas,butthesediscussionsalsoaddressissuesthatarenotsofarremovedfromthosethatnowfallwithinthepurviewofthescienceofpsychology.Ideas,objectivereality,andrepresentationThoughofferedasanalternativetoscholasticism,Descartes’saccountofideasreliesinimportantwaysontheviewsofhisscho-lasticpredecessors.ThisrelianceisclearintheMeditationsandrelatedtexts,inwhichDescartesdrewonterminologysimilartothatfoundinlatescholasticwritingsindistinguishingbetweenthe“formalreality”ofanideaasamodeofmindandthe“objectivereality”ofthatideaasarepresentationofitsobject.Descartes’sclaimthatthisobjectiverealityrequiresacauseiscentraltohisargumentintheThirdMeditationthatGodmustexistasthecauseoftheobjectiverealityofhisideaofinfinitesubstance.Whenascholasticcritic,JohandeCater,objectedthatobjectiverealitydoesnotneedacausesinceitisnotdistinctfromtheactofcognitionitself(CSMII67–68),Descartesrespondedthatthisrealityisagenuinefeatureoftheideathatservestolinkthatideatoarealorpossibleexternalobject(CSMII75).Descartes’sclaimthatideashaveobjectiverealityinadditiontohavingformalrealityasamodeofmindraisesthequestionofthepreciserelationbetweenthesetwokindsofreality.Indeed,therewasafamousdisputeamonghisfollowersoverhowpreciselytocharacterizethisrelation.Malebrancheproposedthattheobjectiverealitybeidentifiedwith“theimmediateobject,ortheobjectclosesttothemind,whenitperceivessomething”(Search,III.ii.1).Healsoinsistedthatthisobjectissomethingthatisindependentofourperception.Thoughhearguedforthissortofdistinctionindifferentwaysatdifferenttimes,MalebranchewasmotivatedtoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n152TADSCHMALTZacceptitprimarilybyhisAugustinianviewthatwedependforourknowledgeofobjectsonideasinGodthatserveasthe“exemplars”or“archetypes”forthecreationofthoseobjects.Evenso,Malebranche’sviewthattheobjectsofperceptionaredistinctfromtheperceptionitselfcanbeseenasadevelopmentofDescartes’sclaimthathehasperceptionsof“trueandimmutablenatures”thatare“notinventedbymeordependentonmymind”(CSMII45).Malebranche’sCartesiancriticArnauldrespondedthat“repre-sentativebeings”distinctfromourperceptionsarenotrequiredforourknowledgeofobjects,sincetheperceptionsthemselvessufficetoexplainsuchknowledge.Arnaulddidallowthattheideaasaperceptualmodificationofmindisconceptuallydistinctfromtheideaasarepresentationwithaparticularamountofobjectivereal-ity.However,heinsistedthatgivenDescartes’sowndefinitionofanideaas“theformofanygiventhought”(CSMII113),thereisnoreal15distinctionbetweentheideaandthethoughtitinforms.Descartesbequeathedtohissuccessorsnotonlythegeneralprob-lemofthenatureofideasasrepresentativebeings,butalsothespe-cificquestionofwhetheroursensationsservetorepresentobjects.Descartesdidnotprovideaclearanswertothisquestion,claimingatcertaintimesthatoursensations“representnothingresidingoutsideourthought”(CSMI219),butatothertimesthattheyallowfora“confusedandobscure”graspofbodies(e.g.atCSMII55).Malebranchesidedwiththeviewthatoursensationsdonotrepre-sentextra-mentalobjects.Incontrast,Leibnizarguedthatoursens-oryperceptionscan“express”orrepresentbodilystates,sincetheyhaveacomplexitythatmatchesthesestates.HewasparticularlyconcernedtoopposeDescartes’ssuggestiontowardtheendoftheMeditationsthatsuchperceptionsaremerelyextrinsicallylinkedtothesestatesbymeansofanarbitrary“divineinstitution”(CSMII60–61).ForLeibniz,sensationscanrepresentpreciselybecausetheydonotbearthissortofarbitraryrelationtothebodilystatesthatserveastheirobjects.Thus,forinstance,oursensationofcolorisacomplexofperceptionsoftheindividualmotionsthatthissensationrepresents.ForCartesianssuchasMalebrancheandArnauld,phenomeno-logicalconsiderationssufficetoestablishthesimplicityofthequali-tativefeaturesofsuchasensation.However,Leibnizprotestedthatthesimplicityisanillusion,andthatweinfact“confuse”theCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind153variousperceptionsofindividualmotions.WhereasMalebrancheheldthatourintellectualperceptionofbodiesthroughideasisdistinctinkindfromoursensationsofthem,Leibnizclaimedthatthedifferenceisonlyoneofdegreeofdistinctnessintheperception.ThisdisputepreparesthewayforthelaterpositionofKantthatthefacultiesofsensibilityandunderstandingareindependentsourcesforourrepresentationoftheworld.Kant’sclaimthattheunder-standingmakesacontributiontothissortofrepresentationthatgoesbeyondwhatisgiveninsensoryintuitionisfurtherconnectedtodiscussionsintheearlymodernperiodconcerningtheroleof16judgmentinsenseexperience.SensoryjudgmentandtheMolyneuxquestionAsindicatedabove,thescholasticsheldthatmaterial“phantasms”ofsensiblequalitiesplayaroleinjudgmentsconcerningthosequalities.Descartesagreedthatjudgmentplaysasignificantroleinsensorycognition,butnottoosurprisinglyhisaccountofthisrolediffersfundamentallyfromastandardscholasticaccount.Descartes’sviewofsensoryjudgmentisexplicatedmostclearlyinhisSixthRepliespublishedwiththeMeditations,inwhichhedistinguishedthree“grades”orstagesofsensation(CSMII294–96).Thefirstandpurelyphysicalstageinvolvesonlythemechanicaleffectsofexternalobjectsonthesenseorgansandbrain.Inthecaseofthevisionofthestick,forinstance,thisstageinvolvesnotthereceptionofsensiblespecies,asthescholasticsheld,butonly“themotionoftheparticlesoftheorgans,andthechangeofshapeandpositionresultingfromthismotion.”Inanimals,thisistheonlystageofsensation.Inhumans,however,thereisasecondpsy-chophysicalstageofsensationthatincludes“allthatimmediatelyresultsinthemindowingtothefactthatitisunitedtoacorporealorgansoaffected[bymotion].”Examplesofsucheffectswouldbe“perceptionsofpain,pleasure,thirst,hunger,colors,sound,taste,heat,cold,andthelike.”Inthecaseofthestick,thisstageinvolves“themereperceptionofthecolorandlightreflectedfromthestick.”Somecommentatorshavetakenthisstagetoberestrictedtosensa-tionsof“secondaryqualities”suchasthoseofcolor.However,Descartes’sclaiminthistextthatwealsoperceive“theextensionofthecoloranditsboundaries”indicatesthatthisstageinvolvesasCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n154TADSCHMALTZwellthesensationof“primaryqualities”suchasshape.Finally,thereisinusathirdstageofsensationthatincludes“allthosejudgmentswhich,occasionedbythemotionofthecorporealorgans,wehavebeenaccustomedtomakefromourearliestyears.”HereDescartesdrewonhisearlierclaimintheDioptricsthatthecalcu-lationofsizeanddistanceinvolves“akindofreasoning”thatproceeds“asifbynaturalgeometry”(CSMI170).Thoughourawarenessofthesize,shape,anddistanceofthestickappearstobeimmediate,itrequiresthesupplementationofstagetwosensa-tionswithvariousjudgments.Descartesnotedthatsincethejudg-mentsareconfusedwiththesensations,peoplefailtorealizethat17theyareproperlyattributedonlytotheintellect.Thereissomequestion,however,concerningtheintellectualnatureofthestagethreejudgments.Descartes’sownremarksmaysuggestthatsuchjudgmentsderivefrompureintellect.However,intheDioptricshehadcharacterizedthemasderivingfrom“asimpleactofimagination”(CSMI170).Afurtherdifficultyisthatthesejudgmentsaresupposedtoincludenotonlyclearanddistinctdeter-minationsofsizeanddistance,butalsotheconfusedjudgmentthatexternalobjectsresembleoursensationsofthem.ForDescartes,pureintellectisnotthesourceofsuchjudgments,butratherthefacultythatservestocorrectthem.Finally,onDescartes’sofficialview(consideredbelow),judgmentinvolvesnotonlyperceptionbutalsoanactofwill.Malebranchetookthisviewintoaccountwhenheheldthatourperceptionofsizeanddistanceinvolvesinferencesderivingfromthecomparisonofvarioussensationstowhichweassentbymeansof“naturaljudgments.”MalebranchewentbeyondDescartes,however,inholdingthatsuchjudgmentsdependonfea-turesofourwillthatGodcausesinus“independentlyofus,andeveninspiteofus”(Search,I.9),andthatthereforearedistinctfrom“freejudgments”inusthatissuefromthefreeexerciseofourwill.TheviewinDescartesandMalebranchethattheperceptionofthethree-dimensionalworldincludesjudgmentsthatgobeyondbasicsensoryexperienceisrelevanttoafamousearlymoderndebatepromptedbythequestion,ina1693lettertoLockefromhisIrishfriendWilliamMolyneux(1656–98),whetheranewlysightedpersonwhopreviouslydistinguishedaglobeandcubeofsimilarsizesbytouchwouldbeabletodosoatfirstbysightalone.InhisEssay,LockeacceptedMolyneux’sownnegativeanswertothisquestionCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind155onthegroundsthatthoughthenewlysightedperson“hasobtain’dtheexperienceof,howaGlobe,howaCubeaffectshistouch,”suchaperson“hasnotyetattainedtheExperience,thatwhataffectshistouchsoorso,mustaffecthissightsoorso”(II.ix.8).Lockeconnectedthisanswertohisownviewthatthesensationoflightandcoloristransformedinto“thefardifferentIdeasofSpace,Figure,andMotion”bymeansofahabitualjudgmentthat“isperformedsoconstantly,andsoquick,”thatwedonotseparateitfromtheinitialsensations(Essay,II.ix.9).Apparently,then,whatthepreviouslyblindpersonlacksisthesortofjudgmentthatwouldallowhimtoderivetheperceptionofathree-dimensionalglobeandcubefromhissensationoftwo-dimensionalboundedpatchesofcolor.InhisconsiderationintheNewEssaysofthisdiscussioninLocke,Leibnizagreedthatittakessomeskilltodiscernthree-dimensionalobjectsonthebasisofperceptionoftwo-dimensionalimages.Evenso,heinsistedthatitmustbepossibleatleastinprincipleforMolyneux’snewlysightedpersontodiscernthediffer-encebetweentheglobeandcube“byapplyingrationalprinciplestothesensoryknowledgewhichhehasalreadyacquiredbytouch”(NewEss.,II.ix.8).Eventhoughthesensoryimagesofthesefiguresproducedbysightandtouchdiffer,thereisasinglemathematicalideathatcapturestheirtruenature.ThoughLockerejectedthesuggestioninLeibnizthatmathematicalideashaveapurelyintel-lectualcontent,thepointthatthereissomethingcommontoourvariousperceptionsofthespatialfeaturesofobjectshassomeforceagainsthim,givenhisownclaimthattheideasofspace,figure,andmotionare“simpleideasofdiverssenses”thatwereceive“bothbyseeingandfeeling”(Essay,II.v).Incontrast,BerkeleytookLocke’sacceptanceofMolyneux’spositiontoconfirmhisownviewthatthereisnothingcommontovisualandtactileideas.InhisNewTheoryofVision,hearguedthatifthereweresomecontentcommontotheseideas,theMolyneuxmanshouldbeabletodiscernthedifferencebetweenthecubeand18globebysightalone.Berkeleytakesthefactthathecannottorevealthatvisualandtactileideasofthesefiguresarerelatednotbymeansoftheircontent,butratherthroughanassociationthatrendersvisualideassignsofthetactileideas.WhattheMolyneux19manismissingistheexperiencerequiredforsuchanassociation.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n156TADSCHMALTZPureintellectandinnatismIntheSecondMeditation,Descartesaddressedthecommonscho-lasticpositionthatourknowledgestartswithoursensorygraspofparticularbodiesbyconsideringthecaseofourunderstandingofthenatureofapieceofwax.Hearguedthatourunderstandingthatthewaxisessentiallyanextended,flexible,andmutablethingdoesnotderivedirectlyfromoursensoryexperienceofthechangingqualitiesofthewax.Suchanunderstandingalsocannotderivefromtheimagination,sinceweknowthatthewaxcantakeonmoreshapesthanwecanimagine.Thus,theunderstandingmustderivefroma“purementalscrutiny,”thatis,fromanexaminationbyanonsensoryfacultyofpureintellect(CSMII20–21).Inoppositiontothescholastic“abstractionist”modelofintellec-tualknowledge,Descartesinsistedthatourknowledgeofthewaxisinformedbyaninnateideaofthe“trueandimmutablenature”ofextension.IntheMeditations,Descartesdistinguishedthisinnateideafrom“adventitious”ideasreceiveddirectlyfromthesensesand“factitious”ideasfreelyconstructedbythemind.Hecomplicatedmatterssomewhatwhenheclaimedinalaterwork,CommentsonaCertainBroadsheet(1647),thatevenoursensoryideasmustbeinnate,sincetheideasweformdonotexactlyresemblethe20bodilymotionsthatprompttheirformation(CSMI304).Eveninthistext,however,Descartesdistinguishedbetweeninnatesens-oryideasthataredirectlytiedtobodilymotionsandinnateintel-lectualideasthatareonlyindirectlytiedtosuchmotions.Moreover,itisclearthathetooktheinnateintellectualideastobedistinguishedfromsensoryideasbythefactthattheformerarerootedinthenatureofamentalfacultythatyieldsparticular“clearanddistinct”perceptionsofthenaturesofobjects.Descartes’saccountofinnateintellectualideasbearssomerela-tiontotheappealtoinnatementalelementsintheworkofPlaton-istssuchasFicino.However,MalebranchesawhimselfasadheringtoadifferentformofPlatonism.HeacceptedthebasicPlatonicpointinDescartesthatintellectualideasaredistinctfromsensa-tions.Indeed,hisdiscussionofideasintheSearchisincludedinasectiondevotedto“theunderstanding,orpuremind,”definedas“themind’sfacultyofknowingexternalobjectswithoutformingcorporealimagesoftheminthebraintorepresentthem”(III.i.1).AsCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind157wehaveseen,however,Malebrancheconcludedtherethattheideasthatrepresenttheseobjectsarenotinnatefeaturesofourminds,butratherarchetypesinthedivinemind.AsherepeatedlystressedtoArnauld,hisprimarysourceforthisaccountofideasistheviewofdivineilluminationinthewritingsofAugustine.Despitetheirdifferences,DescartesandMalebrancheagreedinfavoringsomeformofPlatonismoverAristotelianempiricism.Notallearlymoderncriticsofscholasticismfollowedthem.IntheirpublishedcommentsontheMeditations,bothHobbesandGassendirepeatedlycriticizedthesuggestioninDescartesthatwehavepurelyintellectualideasthatdonotderivefromsensationorimagination.Moreover,HobbesandGassendialikeacceptedthebasicscholasticpositionthatsensationandimaginationaremerelyoperationsofbodilysenseorgans.InHobbes,morethanGassendi,theattackoninnateideaswaspartofacampaignagainstthedoc-trineoftheimmaterialityofmind.However,Lockelatercombinedanattackoninnatismwithhisownskepticismconcerningourknowledgeoftheultimatenatureofmind.InthefirstbookofhisEssay,hereliedontheprinciplethatonlyactuallyperceivedideascanbepresentinourmindtocounterthepossibilitythattherecanbeanyunperceivedinnateideasortruths.Lockerespondedtothefurthersuggestionthatsuchideasortruthscouldbepresentmerelypotentiallybyclaimingthatittrivializesthedoctrine.Sinceourmindmusthavethecapacitytoperceivealltheideasortruthsitcanperceive,thissuggestionrendersallsuchmentalitemsinnate(Essay,I.ii.5).Lockeofferedasanalternativetheviewthatsensationandreflectionfillthe“emptyCabinet”ofthemindwithparticularideas,fromwhichthemindabstractsthemoregeneralideasthatservetoexplainitsknowledgeofgeneraltruths(Essay,I.ii.15).InhisNewEssays,LeibnizrespondedtoLocke’schargeoftrivi-alitybyclaimingthatinnatetruthsarenotpresentin“abarefaculty,consistinginamerepossibilityofunderstandingthesetruths;itisratheradisposition,anaptitude,apreformation,whichdeterminesoursoulandbringsitaboutthattheyarederivablefromit”(I.i.11).ThereisanobvioussimilarityheretoDescartes’sclaimintheCommentsthatintellectualideasareinnateinthesamewaythatcertaindiseasesareinnateinchildrenwhohaveatendencytocontractthem(CSMI303–4).ForbothDescartesandLeibniz,tosaythatwehaveinnateknowledgeofatriangle,forinstance,istoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n158TADSCHMALTZsaythatourintellecthasatendencyordispositionthatleadsittoclearlyanddistinctlyperceivethatthetrianglehasaparticular21nature.JustasDescartesindicatedintheCommentsthatevenoursens-oryideasareinnateinacertainsense,soLeibniz’sdoctrineofpreestablishedharmonyledhimtoclaimthatallourideasarisefromourownsoul.YetLeibnizfollowedDescartesindistinguishingsensoryideasfromthosethatareinnatetointellect.InLeibniz,thedistinctionisbetweensensationsthatconfusedifferentpetitesper-ceptionsofmotions,andintellectualperceptionsthataredistinctinthesensethattheyindicatethe“marks”oressentialcharacteristicsoftheirobjectsthatsufficetodistinguishsuchobjectsfromothers.Therecognitionofthesemarksistiedinturntotheinborndispos-itionsthatLeibniz,aswellasDescartes,tooktobeessentialtointellectualinnateness.Evenso,Leibniz’sviewthatthereisarigorouscorrespondenceofthementalandbodilyrealmsseemstocompromisethePlatonistsuggestioninbothDescartesandMalebranchethatpureintellectcanoperateindependentlyofbody.Inasimilarway,suchasugges-tionseemstobeincompatiblewithSpinoza’sinsistenceontheparallelismbetweenmentalandbodilymodes.However,Spinozaallowedthatourmindis“disposedinternally”tohave“adequate”ideasthatcanbeunderstoodintermsofitsnatureastheideaofourbody.Suchideasaretobecontrastedwithinadequateideasthatourmindis“determinedexternally”tohavethroughfortuitoussensoryencounterswithexternalobjects(Ethics,II,prop.29schol.).ThoughneitherLeibniznorSpinozawasabletoacceptafull-bodiedPlaton-ism,bothnonethelessretainedsomesemblanceofthePlatonistviewinDescartes(notfoundinMalebranche)thatadequateordistinctknowledgederivesfromtheintellect’sownnature.WILL,FREEDOM,ANDDETERMINATIONWillandjudgmentinthescholasticsandDescartesIhavenotedtheThomisticpositionthattheintellect“abstracts”intelligiblespeciesfromthesensiblespeciesreceivedthroughsens-orycontactwithexternalobjects.ScholasticswhoacceptedsuchapositionheldthatintelligiblespeciesprovidethematerialforthreeCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind159kindsoffurtherintellectualoperations.Thefirstinvolvesthesimpleapprehensionofspecies,thesecondajudgmentthataffirmsordeniesalinkbetweensubjectandpredicate,andthethirdaprocessofdiscursivereasoningthatinvolvesthederivationofcon-sequences.Thus,thereisthesimpleapprehensionofthehumanityofSocrates,thejudgmentthatSocratesishuman,andthediscursivereasoningreflectedinthesyllogismthatsinceSocratesishumanandallhumansaremortal,Socratesismortal.Forthescholastics,thesethreeoperationswereactsoftheintel-lectratherthanofthewill.TheyfollowedThomasinacceptingtheAristoteliandefinitionofthewillasrationalappetite.Asrational,thewillisguidedbytheresultsofthethreeintellectualoperations,butasappetite,itisdirectedprimarilytowardthegoodandnot,asinthecaseoftheintellect,towardthetrue.Itwasamatterofcontroversy,however,whetherorhowactsofwill(voluntas)in-volveafreechoiceamongalternatives(liberumarbitrium).Therewereofcoursedifficulttheologicalissuesconcerningthecompati-bilityoffreehumanchoicewithdivinepreordinationandthework-ingsofgraceinsalvation.Butevenapartfromsuchissues,therewasasplitbetweenintellectualistswhofollowedAristotleinemphasiz-ingtheroleofrationaldeterminationinfreechoiceandvoluntaristswhofollowedScotusandOckhamininsistingthatfreechoice22requiresthatthewillnotbeconstrainedbytheintellect.IntheFourthMeditation,Descartesclaimedthatjudgmentin-volvescontributionsfromtwofaculties,namely,“thefacultyofknowledge,”whichcontributesperceptionsofideas,and“thefac-ultyofchoiceorthefreedomofthewill,”whichcontributestheaffirmationordenialoftheideasperceived(CSMII39).Heappealedtothisaccountofjudgmenttoexplainhowwecanfallintoerror.InDescartes’sview,errorcannotarisesimplyfromtheperceptionofideas,sincestrictlyspeakingsuchaperceptioncarrieswithitnotruthorfalsity.Errorrequiresinadditionavolitionalaffirmationthatrelatestheseideastoreality.Thus,theperceptionofrednesscannotitselfbefalse;whatisfalseisrathertheaffirmationthatrednessresemblessomerealqualityexternaltomind.Descartes’smainthesisinthissectionoftheMeditationsisthatweareresponsibleforourerrorssincewearefreetorefrainfromaffirmingwhateverwedonotclearlyanddistinctlyperceive.Indeed,heheldinthePrinciplesthatourexperienceofthepowerCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n160TADSCHMALTZofourwilltorefrainfromjudgmentinthesecasesissoself-evidentthat“itmustbecountedamongthefirstandmostcommonnotionsthatareinnateinus”(Princ.,I.39,CSMI205–6).ItisthissortofpowerthatexplainsourabilitytouseDescartes’s“methodofdoubt”tooverturnbeliefsthatrestonperceptionsthatarelessthanclearanddistinct.ThatthisaccountofthewillmarksadeparturefromscholasticorthodoxyisindicatedbythefactthatwhentheJesuitscondemnedalistofCartesianpropositionsin1706,theyincludedthethesesthatperceptionis“apurelypassivefaculty”andthat“judgmentandreasoningareactsofthewill,nottheintellect.”Evenso,acloserconsiderationofDescartes’saccountofourfreedomofchoicerevealscertaindifficultiesconcerningtherelationbetweenwillandintellectthatarefamiliarfromearlierscholasticdisputesamongintellectualistsandvoluntarists.Suchdifficultiesareim-portantforthevariousdiscussionsofthefreedomofthewillin23theworkofDescartes’searlymodernsuccessors.Libertarianfreedom:DescartesandMalebrancheIntheFourthMeditation,Descartesheldthatwillconsistsinthefactthatwhentheintellectputssomethingforwardforaffirmationordenial,pursuitoravoidance,“wesensethatwearedeterminedbynoexternalforcetoit.”Heallowedforcaseswheretherealsoisalackofinternaldeterminationduetothefactthattheintellectdoesnotleadthewillinonedirectionratherthananother.Insuchcases,thereisabalanceofreasonsthatleavesthewill“indifferent.”However,Descartesinsistedthatthissortofindifferenceismerely“thelowestgradeoffreedom,”andthatthemorehiswillisdeter-minedbyhisperceptions,“thefreerismychoice.”Henotedthatwhenhehadclearanddistinctperceptions,“agreatlightoftheintellectwasfollowedbyagreatpropensityinthewill,andthusthespontaneityandfreedomofthatbeliefwereallthegreaterinproportiontomylackofindifference”(CSMII40–41).Itwouldseem,then,thatinthiscasefreedomiscompatiblewithinternaldeterminationbytheintellect.Incontrast,DescartesassertedinthePrinciplesthat“wearesoconsciousofthefreedomandindifferencewhichiswithinus,thatthereisnothingwecomprehendmoreevidentlyandmoreCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind161perfectly”(I.41,CSMI206).WhereasDescarteshadsuggestedearlierthatperfectfreedomexcludesindifference,herehepracticallyequatedfreedomwithindifference.However,Descartes’sunder-standingofindifferenceshiftedovertime.Thisshiftisindicatedinhiscorrespondenceinthemid-1640swithaJesuitfriend,mostlikelyDenisMesland.DescartesbeganbyrepeatingtheviewintheMeditationsthatindifferenceinvolvesabalanceofreasonsthatconstitutesthelowestgradeoffreedom.However,healsograntedhiscorrespondentthatindifferencecouldbeidentifiedratherwith“arealandpositivepowertodetermineoneself,”andthatsuchindifferenceisinfactessentialtofreedom(CSMIII233).Hefurtherheldthatthough“morallyspeaking”thewillmustfollowtheclearanddistinctperceptionsoftheintellect,“absolutelyspeaking”itcanalwaysdotheoppositeofwhattheintellectcommandsittodo(CSMIII245).Thisaccountoffreedomismoreclearly“libertarian”thantheoneofferedintheFourthMeditationinsofarasitrejectseventheinternalintellectualdeterminationoffreeacts.Malebranchelaterinsistedthatalibertarianaccountofourfree-domisrequiredby“alltheprinciplesofreligionandmorality,”sinceitisonlyinvirtueofpossessingthissortoffreedomthatwe,ratherthanGod,canbesaidtobethesourceofsin(Search,Eluc.1).IntheSearchafterTruth,heheldthatwehavea“freedomofindifference”withrespecttothewill,sincewehave“thepowerofwillingornotwilling,orevenofwillingthecontraryofthattowardwhichournaturalinclinationscarryus”(I.1).Malebrancheconcludedthatweareresponsibleforoursinfulloveofparticulargoods,sincewearefreeto“suspendconsent”toloveofthatwhichwedonotdistinctlyperceivetobeworthyofit.ThelineofargumenthereobviouslyisdrawnfromDescartes’sclaimintheFourthMeditationthatweareresponsibleforourerrors,sincewearefreetosuspendjudgmentonwhateverwedonotclearlyanddistinctlyperceivetobetrue.ButthelinktoDescartesisrevealedevenmoreclearlybythefactthatMalebranchesidedwithDescartes,againstthestandardscholasticview,inclaimingthatassenttoaproposition,nolessthanconsenttoagood,involvesanactofwill.AndagainwithDescartes,Malebrancheinsistedthatourassenttoapropositionnotclearlyanddistinctlyperceivedtobetrueisindifferentinthesensethatwehavethepowertorefrainfromjudgment.ThusheconcludedintheSearch,intheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n162TADSCHMALTZspiritofDescartes’sviewinthePrinciples,thatweshouldmakeuseofourfreedomofindifferenceinorder“nevertoconsenttoanythinguntilweareforcedtodoso,asitwere,bytheinwardreproachesofourreason”(I.2).SinceMalebranchewasmorefirmlycommittedthanDescartestotheoccasionalistthesisthatGodistheonlytruecause,however,theassertionoflibertarianfreedomismoreproblematicforhim.IntheSearch,Malebrancheattemptedtoaddressthedifficultiesbyofferingasenseinwhichourcausallyinefficaciouswillcanbesaidtobeactive.Hebeganbycomparingthewilltothefacultythatmatterhasofreceivingmotion.Inclinationsareconceivedasatypeof“mentalmotion”thatisalwaysdirectedtoward“thegoodingeneral,”sincewearealwaysinclinedtowardhappiness.WhereasGodalonecanbethecauseofthe“quantity”ofthismentalmotion,thewillisfreeinthesensethatithasthepowerto“turn”itsinclinationstowardparticularobjectsthatarepleasing(I.1).OneproblemforthisaccountofourfreewillisthatMalebranchehadindicatedintheSearchthatourinclinationsareinitiallydirectedtopleasingobjectsbynature,thatistosay,byGod.SuchanindicationisalsoconnectedtoMalebranche’sclaim,mentionedabove,thatour“naturaljudgments”concerningsensoryobjectsderivefromGod.Giventhisview,therewouldseemtobenoroomforanysortof“turning”ofinclinationsbyourwill.ThisproblemmayexplainwhyMalebrancheemphasizedinalaterElucidationofhisSearchthatourfreeconsenttotheinclinationtowardaparticu-largoodisamere“repose,”aninactivitythatpreservesaninclin-ationalreadypresentinus(Eluc.1).However,healsoindicatedthatfreedominvolvesnotonlythepowertoconsent,butalsothepowerto“suspend”thatconsentbysearchingforotherobjectstolove.Thissuspensionissupposedtobeaninactivitythatcausesnothingreal.Thequestionishowthisoneinactivitycanbeopposedtotheinactivityofconsent.Inhisfinalwork,ReflectionsonPhysicalPremotion(1715),MalebranchewentsomewaytowardaddressingthesedifficultieswhenhedistinguishedbetweenthenaturallovethatGoddeter-minesandthefreelovethatisunderthecontrolofourwill(OCXVI17–18).Hesuggestedthatsincesuspensionleavesthemotioncorrespondingtoourfreeloveinanindeterminatestate,itcontrastswithaconsentinusthatdeterminesthatmotiontowardaCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind163particularobject.Eventhoughthereisanoppositionhere,itremainsthecasethatneithersuspensionnorconsentiscausallyefficaciousinthesenseofproducingnewperceptionsoralteringthequantityofthementalmotiondirectedtowardthegood.Necessitationandnominalism:HobbesandSpinozaWhereasDescartesandMalebrancheembracedalibertarianfree-domofindifference,inLeviathanHobbesendorsedthecompatibi-listpositionthat“Libertyandnecessityareconsistent.”Hearguedtherethatfreeactionsaresimplyvoluntaryactions,thatis,actionsnecessitatedbythewill.Sincethewillinturn“proceedethfromsomecause,andthatfromanothercauseinacontinualchain(whosefirstlinkisinthehandofGodthefirstofallcauses),theyproceedfromnecessity”(ch.21,par.4).Hobbes’snominalismisreflectedinhisviewthatthewillitselfisnotsomegeneralfacultyorpower,butratherthelastappetitederivingnecessarilyfromaprocessofdeliberationthatitselfnecessitatesthefreeandvoluntaryaction(ch.6,par.53).Hobbes’saccountoflibertyandnecessitypromptedanimpas-sionedrebuttalfromtheBishopofDerry,JohnBramhall(1594–1663).AsafolloweroftheDutchdissidentCalvinistJacobArminius(1560–1609),Bramhallacceptedalibertarianviewthatprecludesanysortofnecessitationordeterminationinthecaseoffreeacts.ButBramhallalsodefendedamoretraditionalviewofthewillasapoweragainstHobbes’snominalisticcounterproposal.InhisDefenseoftheTrueLibertyofHumanActionsfromAntece-dentandExtrinsicallNecessity(1655),Bramhallurgedthatthewillisaspecialpowerorfacultyofthemindthathastheabilitytodetermineitselfwithoutbeingfurtherdeterminedbyanythingexternaltoit.Thoughheadmittedthatintellectualconsiderationscaninducethewilltoactinacertainmanner,healsoinsistedthatthis“moral”necessitationdiffersfromanysortof“absolute”24necessitationinvolvingnaturaldetermination.HobbesobjectedtoBramhall’sviewontwocounts.First,heheldthatthenotionofanysortofnecessityotherthanabsolutenecessityisunintelligible.Necessityissimply“thatwhichisimpossibletobeotherwise,”andsincetheclaimthatvoluntaryactionsareneces-sitatedsaysonlythatitisimpossiblethattheynotoccurgiventheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n164TADSCHMALTZpresenceofthelastappetiteindeliberationthatproducesit,this25sortofnecessityisperfectlyconsistentwithfreedom.Second,Hobbesclaimedthat“toconfoundthefacultyofthewillwiththewillweretoconfoundawillwithnowill;forthefacultyofthewillisnowill.”Thewillisratheraparticularvolition,andtosaythatwearefreetowillissimplytosaythatwearefreetodowhatwewill,thatis,whatourlastappetiteindeliberation26determinesustodo.IncontrasttoHobbes,Spinozarejectedthepositionthatafreeactcanbenecessitatedbyexternalcauses.IntheEthics,hedefinedfreedomasthat“whichexistsfromthenecessityofitsnaturealone,andisdeterminedtoactbyitselfalone.”Freedomhereiscontrastedwith“necessarycompulsion,”definedasthat“whichisdeterminedbyanothertoexistandtoproduceaneffectinacertainmanner”(I,def.7).Spinozaalsoarguedthatastheonlybeingthatis“initselfandconceivedthroughitself,”Godalonecanbesaidtobeperfectlyfree.AllotherfinitethingsaremodesthatmustbeconceivedthroughGod,andassuchareeffectsdeterminedbysomethingexternaltothemtoexistandtoproducetheireffects.Intheappen-dixtopartIoftheEthics,Spinozafurtherdismissedthebeliefinhumanfreedomasafictionderivingfromignoranceoftheexternalcausesthatdetermineouraction.Somewhatparadoxically,SpinozaspoketowardtheendofpartIVoftheEthicsofthevariousqualitiesofa“freeman”(props.66–73),andhedevotedpartVofthistexttoaconsiderationof“humanfreedom.”However,hemadeclearthatthe“freeman,”oranindi-vidualwho“isledbyreason”or“onewholivesaccordingtothedictateofreasonalone,”isanidealization.Actualhumanbeingscannotbeinternallydeterminedbyreasonalone,sincetheyinevit-ablyareaffectedbypassionsderivingfromexternalcauses.Evenso,humanscanapproachthemodelofthefreemaninsofarastheyareabletocontroltheirpassionsandtofollowreason.Spinoza’sadmissionthatdeterminedhumanactionscanbesaidtohaveatleastsomedegreeoffreedomshowsthathedidnotrejectentirelythesortofcompatibilismthatonefindsinHobbes.However,SpinozawasmoreclearlysympathetictothenominalistaspectsofHobbes’saccountofthewill.Thus,heurgedintheEthicsthatthewill,understoodasapowerorfacultydistinctfromspecificvolitions,fallsintotheclassof“completefictions”CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind165thatare“nothingbutMetaphysicalbeings,oruniversals,whichweareusedtoformingfromparticulars”(II,prop.48schol.).Indeed,SpinozawentbeyondHobbesindenyingthatthereisanysortofdistinctionbetweenwillandintellect.HerehistargetwastheviewinDescartesthattheperceptionofideasisdistinctfromthevol-itionalactofaffirmingordenyingthem.Spinoza’sargumentisthatsinceaparticularvolitionalaffirmationofanideacannotbecon-ceivedapartfromthatidea,andsincetheperceptionofthetruthofanideaissimplytheaffirmationoftheidea,thevolitionandtheideaareoneandthesame(II,prop.49).ThereistheobjectionfromDescartesthatthefactthatonehasthepowertosuspendjudgmentconcerningaparticularideashowsthattheideacannotbeidentifiedwithavolitionaljudgment.However,Spinozarespondedthatsus-penseofjudgmentdoesnotarisefromapower,muchlessafreepower,butissimplyasecond-orderperceptionthattheideaisnotadequatelyperceived(II,prop.49cor.schol.).Determinedfreedom:LockeandLeibnizLocke’smainaccountoffreedomisfoundinthechapterofhisEssayontheideaofpower.Thislongchapterwasextensivelyrevisedforthesecond(1694)edition,andincludeslateradditionsinthefourth(1700)andfifth(1706)editions.IncontrasttoHobbesandSpinoza,Lockeconsistentlyclaimedinthistextthatthewillisacertainsortoffacultyorpower,inparticular,an“activepower”thatenablestheagenttoactinaccordwithconsciouschoice.Theremayseemtobeanevengreaterdifference,giventhatLockeexplicitlydeniedthatactionsderivingfromthewillcanbenecessary.Yetthedifferencehereislargelyverbal,sinceLockedefinednecessaryactionssimplyasthosethatdonotderivefromwillorvolition.Moreover,hecon-sistentlyallowedthatthewillisitselfdeterminedbysomethingexternaltoit.InlinewithHobbes,butnotwithSpinoza,heheldthatsuchexternaldeterminationinnowayprecludesfreedomofaction.Lockeinitiallydefinedfreedomas“thepoweraManhastodoorforbearanyparticularAction,accordingasitsdoingorforbearancehastheactualpreferenceoftheMind”(Essay,II.xxi.15).Heempha-sizedthatsincefreedomandwillarebothpowers,freedomisnotproperlyattributedtothewill.Instead,freedomissimplythepowerofarationalagenttoexercisethepowerofwillinacertainmanner.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n166TADSCHMALTZLockealsoinsisted,againstHobbes,thatfreeactsmustbedistin-guishedfromvoluntaryacts.Thoughitisnecessarythatafreeactbevoluntary,thatis,derivefromthewill,itisfurthernecessarythatotherchoicesbeopentotheagent.Thus,Lockenotedthatapris-onerwhoremainsinalockedroombecausehepreferstodosoactsvoluntarilybutnotwithfreedom,sincetobefreeitmustbeopentohimtoleavetheroomifhesoprefers.ThisprecisionisreflectedinHume’sfamousdefinitionoflibertyintheEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding,accordingtowhich“ifwechoosetoremainatrest,wemay;ifwechoosetomove,wealsomay”(VIII.1).InthesecondeditionoftheEssay,Lockeintroducedanewelem-entintohisaccountoffreedomwhenhenotedthat“thehingeonwhichturnsthelibertyofintellectualBeings”consistsinthefactthatsuchbeings“cansuspendthisprosecution[oftruefelicity]inparticularcases,tilltheyhavelookedbeforethem,andinformedthemselves,whetherthatparticularthing,whichisthenproposed,ordesired,lieinthewaytotheirmainend,andmakearealpartofthatwhichistheirgreatestgood”(II.xxi.52).ThereisanobviousresemblancetotheviewinMalebranchethatourfreedomrequiresthatweareabletosuspendconsenttoloveofanobjectthatwedonotclearlyunderstandtobeworthyofit.Evenso,LockedidnotacceptMalebranche’slibertarianclaimthatourconsenttoloveofaparticulargoodisundetermined.Thisisclearfromhis1701corres-pondencewiththeDutchArminian,PhilippvanLimborch(1633–1712).Limborchinsistedthatfreeactsrequirean“Indifferency”onwhich“whenalltherequisitesforactingarepresent,itcanactor27notact.”Herehewasrepeatingthedefinitionoflibertarianfree-domintheworkoftheSpanishJesuit,LuisMolina.Inresponse,Lockerejectedthis“antecedentindifferency”onthegroundsthatoncealloftherequisitesforactionarepresent,thewill“isdeter-minedbythepreferenceoftheprecedingjudgmentoftheunder-28standingforeitherthatactionorforbearancefromit.”InanadditiontothefiftheditionoftheEssaythatnodoubtderivesfromtheLimborchcorrespondence,Lockedidconcedethatbeforebeingdeterminedtheagentwasfreetosuspendchoice.Inhisownview,however,thisfreedomconsistsonlyinthefactthattheagenthad29theabilitytosuspendchoicehadhesodesired.InhiscommentsonLocke’saccountoffreedomintheNewEssays,Leibniznotedthat“theunderstandingcandetermineCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind167thewill,inaccordancewithwhichperceptionsandreasonsprevail,inamannerwhich,althoughitiscertainandinfallible,inclineswithoutnecessitating”(NewEss.,II.xxi.8).Heheldthatfreeagentsaredeterminedtochoosewhatappearstobebest,butthatthis“inclining”determinationisdistinctfroma“geometricalormeta-physical”necessitationthatprecludesanychoice.IntheprefacetohisTheodicy,LeibnizcitedHobbesandSpinozaasthetwothinkerswhohave“extendedfurthestthedoctrineofthenecessityofthings.”JustasHobbesadvocated“absolutenecessity”againstBramhall,henotes,soSpinozaposited“ablindandgeometricne-cessity,withcompleteabsenceofcapacityforchoice,forgoodnessandforunderstandingin[the]firstcauseofthings.”AlthoughHobbesdifferedfromLeibnizinsuggestingthatdeter-minedfreeactionsarelogicallynecessitated,henonethelessallowedasmuchasLeibnizthatwearedeterminedtochoosewhatappearstoustobebest.AndwhereasLeibnizdifferedfromSpinozainholdingthat“thefirstcauseofthings”selectsthebestamonginfinitepossibleworlds,thereisasenseinwhichheacceptedSpinoza’sclaimthatfreedomprecludesexternaldetermination.Thus,Leibnizfrequentlyemphasizedthathissystemofpreestab-lishedharmonyprovidesroomforfreedominsofarasitrequiresthatallstatesofasubstancearisespontaneouslyfromthatsubstanceitself.Allthatisfurtherrequiredforaspontaneousacttobefree,accordingtoLeibniz,isthatitderivefromadeliberatechoiceofthatwhichappearstobebest.Atonepoint,Leibnizallowedthatfreechoiceinvolvesasortof“indifference.”However,heheldthatsuchindifferencerequiresonlythatthechoicebeindifferentinthesensethat“neitherInoranyothermoreenlightenedmindcoulddemonstratethattheop-positeofthistruthimpliesacontradiction”(AG194).Incontrast,herejectedthestrongerMolinistclaimthatthefreeagentisindiffer-entinthesensethatalltherequisitesforactionbeinggiven,theagentisabletoactornottoact.Leibnizinsistedthattherecanbeno“absoluteindifference,”since“choicealwaysfollowsthegreatestinclination,”andthusthefreeagentisdeterminedtochoosewhatappearstobebest.Evenwhenwechooseagainstwhatreasontellsusisbest,thischoicemustbedeterminedbypassionsorevenby“smallimpressions”tooindistinctforustorecognize(AG193–96).Here,then,LeibnizstandswithHobbesandLocke,andagainstCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n168TADSCHMALTZDescartesandMalebranche,inholdingthatwehaveadeterminedfreedomthatprecludesanycontracausalindifference.NOTES1Rorty1979,p.54.2Ibid.,p.51.Rortynotesthatheissimplyrelayingthe“usualstory”aboutthe“emergenceofepistemologicalskepticismoutofatheoryofrepresentativeperceptioncreatedbyDescartesandLocke”foundintheworkofEtienneGilsonandJ.H.Randall(p.49,n.19).3ForacritiqueofRorty’snarrativethatemphasizesthislineofargu-ment,seeWilson1999b.4SeveralrecentworkshaveemphasizedtheconnectionsofDescartes’stheoryofmindtohisviewsinmetaphysicsandnaturalphilosophy.See,forinstance,Rozemond1998,Alanen2003,andClarke2003.5SeethematerialonAristotle’sviewofthelifesciencesinGotthelf1985.6ThereisahelpfuldiscussionofthevariouscompetingcurrentsofearlymodernthoughtinMenn1998.7ForaconsiderationoftheviewsonthesemattersinthetextsoftheearlymodernJesuitscholastics,seeDesChene2000.8IprovideamoredetailedtreatmentofthedifferencesbetweenDescartesandMalebrancheonthispointinSchmaltz1996,esp.chs.2and4.9ForadiscussionoftherelationofLeibniz’saccountofpreestablishedharmonytohismonisticmetaphysics,seeRutherford1995a,ch.8.10OnSpinoza’sviewsconcerningimmortalityandtheeternityofthemind,seeNadler2001,esp.chs.5–6.11ThereisanimportantexchangeoverLocke’sunderstandingofthepossibilityofthesuperadditionofthoughttomatterinWilson1999c,Ayers1981,andWilson1999d.12SeeClarke1738,vol.III,pp.719–913.13ForadiscussionofThomas’sviewthatsetsitinitsmedievalcontext,seeMahoney1982.14Foradiscussionofthesemedievaldebates,seePasnau1997.15Moreau1999isarecenttreatmentoftheArnauld–Malebranchedebate.16ForacomparisonofthedifferentaccountsofideasinDescartes,Malebranche,andLeibniz,seeJolley1990.17Wolf-Devine1993providesatreatmentofDescartes’svariousdiscus-sionsofvisualperception.18FormoreonBerkeley’sviewsintheNewTheoryofVision,seeAther-ton1990.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThescienceofmind16919Berkeley1975,pp.49–50.20Schmaltz1997focusesonthisargumentinDescartesforsensoryin-nateness.21OnthedebatebetweenLockeandLeibnizonthisissue,seeJolley1984,ch.9.22Kent1995considersdebatesinthelatermedievalperiodoverthenatureofthehumanwillandfreedom.23Ontheissuesaddressedinthefollowingsections,seeSleigh,Chappell,andDellaRocca1998.Notice,however,thatincontrasttothelibertar-ianreadingofDescartesthatIofferpresently,theviewin}IIofthatarticle(assignedtoChappell)isthathewasacompatibilistwhoheldthat“everythingapartfromGodiscausedbyfactorsotherthanitself”(p.1,206).24HobbesandBramhall1999,p.52.25Ibid.,pp.72–73.26Ibid.,pp.73,82.27Locke1976–92,vol.VII,p.367.28Ibid.,p.408.29FormoreonthecomplexitiesofLocke’saccountofthewillandfree-dom,seeYaffe2000.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nMICHAELLOSONSKY6LanguageandlogicIntheirmonumentalwork,TheDevelopmentofLogic,MarthaKnealeandWilliamKnealemaintainthatduringtheseventeenth1centurylogicwas“indeclineasabranchofphilosophy.”ButanerathatincludedLeibniz,whoaccordingtotheKneales“deservestobe2rankedamongthegreatestofalllogicians,”aswellasLocke,whodismissesformallogicas“learnedIgnorance”whilewriting“thefirstmoderntreatisedevotedspecificallytophilosophyoflan-3guage,”suggestsdramaandexcitement,notdecline.Whiletrad-itionallogicwasindeedindecline,logicitselfwasbeingtransformedintomodernmathematicallogic.Moreover,theturnawayfromformallogicwasalsoadramaticturntonaturallanguageforinsightandsolutionstotheproblemsofphilosophy.Thesetwoturns,themathematicalandlinguisticturnsofearlymodernphilosophy,aredefiningfeaturesofseventeenth-centuryEuropeanphilosophy.EARLYMODERNLOGICIn1626,theDutchlogicianFrancoBurgesdijkmaintainedthattherewerethreekindsoflogicians:Aristotelians,Ramists,andSemi-Ramists.WhileAristotelianscontinuedtodevelopAristotle’slogicofcategoricalsyllogismsandimmediateinferences,RamistssoughtalternativelogicsthatcapturedreasoningthattraditionalAristotelianlogicignored.Semi-Ramists,alsocalled“Philippo-Ramists”afterLuther’scollaboratorPhilippMelanchthon,soughtasynthesisoftraditionalandalternativelogics,whichincludedthe4searchforformalmethodstocapturenonsyllogisticreasoning.ItisusefultofollowBurgesdijkanddivideearlymodernlogicintotrad-itionallogic,alternativelogics,andattemptstosynthesizethetwo.170CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic171Traditionallogic:AristoteliansBythethirteenthcentury,Aristotelianlogicconsistedoftwoparts:oldandnewlogic.Oldlogic(logicavetus)consistedofAristotle’sCategoriesandOnInterpretation,supplementedwithPorphyry’sIsagogeasageneralintroductiontotheCategories.TheremainingfourtextsofAristotle’sOrganonwereknownasthenewlogic(logicanova):PriorAnalytics,PosteriorAnalytics,Topics,andOnSophisticalRefutations.ThesefourtextswerepreservedintheoriginalGreekinSicilyandsouthernItaly,andwerealsobroughttoMuslimSpainintheeleventhandtwelfthcenturiesinGreekandinArabictranslations.ThePriorAnalyticsandOnSophisticalRefutationswereparticularlyinfluential.Theformerexpandedonthemeagerdiscus-sionofsyllogismsinthelogicavetusandthelatterfocusedonfallaciesandparadoxes,whichweremostlynewtopics.Thesefalla-ciesandparadoxesbasedonsyntacticandsemanticambiguitiesofordinarylanguagewerediscussedundertheheadingsSophismataandInsolubilia,andmotivatedsyntacticandsemanticstudiesthatinthethirteenthcenturycametobeknownas“modernlogic(logicamoderna)”inordertodistinguishitfrom“ancientlogic(logicaantiqua),”whichhewedmorecloselytothetraditionaltopicsofterms,propositions,immediateinferences,andsyllogisms.Themostimportant“modernlogic”textforthreehundredyearswasPeterofSpain’sSummulaelogicales,writtenabout1245.Itwasstillbeingusedintheseventeenthcentury,bywhichtimeithad5enjoyednolessthan166printededitions.AllthebooksofAristotle’sOrganonwerecoretextsoftheEuro-peanuniversitycurriculumduringthefourteenthandfifteenthcen-6turiesexcepttheTopics.TheTopicsdiscussedpracticalproblemsofreasoning,specifically,howtofindthematerials“outofwhichargumentsareconstructed”(Topics,105a20),and“howwearetobecomewellsuppliedwiththese”materials(101b13–14).Whatchar-acterizesthepost-medievalperiodandinformsseventeenth-centuryphilosophyisthatthepracticalandepistemologicalperspectiveoftheTopicsmovestocenterstage.Butthemedievallogician’spreoccupationwithevaluatingde-ductiveargumentsconstructedfromcategoricalpropositionsstillthrivedintheearlymodernperiod,particularlyinRomanCatholicCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n172MICHAELLOSONSKYcountries.Asjustmentioned,PeterofSpain’stextbookwasstillbeingreprintedintheseventeenthcentury.Outstandingcontempor-arycontributionstotraditionallogicincludethoseofthePortugueseJesuitPedroFonseca(1528–99),whoseInstitutionumdialecticarumlibrioctowaspublishedinfifty-threeeditionsbetween1564and1625,thePolishJesuitMartinSmiglecki(1563–1618),whosemonu-mental1,600-pageLogica(1618)wasreprintedthreetimesinOxford,andtheItalianJesuitGirolamoSaccheri(1667–1733),whose7Logicademonstrativawaspublishedin1697.ThomasWilson(1524–81)introducedscholasticterminology,includingtheterm‘proposition,’intoEnglish,inhisRulesofReason(1551),butmajortraditionallogictextscontinuedtobewritteninLatin,particularlyJohnWallis’s(1616–1703)Institutiologicae(1687)andHenryAldrich’s(1647–1710)Artislogicaecompendium(1691).Alternativelogics:informallogic,induction,andscientificmethodTraditionallogictextsmentionedinductivereasoning,butgenerallyhadverylittletosayaboutit.Logiciansintheearlymodernperiodsawthisasaseriousdefectandsoughtalternativelogicsthatwouldcapturenondeductiveargumentation.Thissearchforalternativesduringtheperiodhasbeendismissedasnotpartofthedevelopmentoflogicinthesenseofthestudyofdeductivevalidity,butpartofthe8“newstudyofheuristicmethodology.”Ifweareguidedbyearlymodernconceptionsoflogic,however,itisamistaketoignorethenewstudyofmethodologyinahistoryoftheperiod.RUDOLPHAGRICOLA(1444–1485).Agricola’sDeinventionedialec-ticalibritres,writtenby1480andpublishedin1515,becameawidelyusedtextbookinthesixteenthcentury.Thissuccessmarks9thedeclineoftraditionallogic.Thetitlealreadycapturesimportantcharacteristicsofthealternativelogicmovement.Traditionally,theterm‘dialectic’wasusednarrowlyforthestudyofprobablereasoning,notdemonstrativereasoning.Moreover,theartofjudg-ment,whichistheevaluationofdeductiveinferences,wasthecenterpieceoflogic,asopposedtotheartofinvention,whichfocusesontheinventionorconstructionofarguments.Agricola’stitleupsetsthesepriorities.DialecticnowisusedtocoverallformsCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic173ofargumentation,andinventionbecomesthecenterpieceofdia-lectic,whichAgricolacharacterizesas“theartofspeakingwithprobability(probabiliter)onanyquestionwhatsoever,insofaras10thenatureofthesubjectiscapableofinfusingconviction.”Thisalsoincludesdeductivearguments,whichhetreatsaslimitingcasesofprobablereasoning,intentionallyblurringthelinebetween11inductionanddeduction(242).ForAgricola,inventionis“thinkingoutthemiddletermorargu-ment”(16).Guidedbythetraditionaltheoryofsyllogisms,Agricolaseesthefirststepinargumentconstructionasthesearchfortruepropositionsthatinvolveoneofthetermsoftheconclusionandanewterm.Agricola’sprojectistodesignamethodforfindingsuchpropositionsforagivenconclusion.Oncealistofpropositionsisgenerated,thearguerthentriesvariouspairsofpropositionsuntilasyllogismfortheconclusionisfound.Thetoolforlocatingpropositionsisalistoftopicsorlocithatapplytoallthings.AccordingtoAgricola,eachtopicisa“commonmark(nota)ofathing,throughwhichitispossibletodiscoverwhatcanbeshown,whichisalsowhatisprobable,withregardtoanyparticularthing.”Eachtopicis“arefugeandtreasurechest”wherein“alltoolsforfixingbelief(faciendaefidei)arestored”(20).Agricola’slistconsistsoftwenty-fourtopicsorderedhierarchic-allyinordertomakeiteasierforthearguertoworksystematicallythroughthem.Toillustratehismethod,Agricolaconsidersthecaseofsomeonearguingfortheproposition“Aphilosopherneedsawife”(414).Agricolarunsthroughhistwenty-fourtopicscollectingvariouspropertiesofphilosophers,includingthatphilosophersarepaleandthin,butintheendsettlesonthepropertyaimingtolivevirtuously.Hethendoesthesameforwife,focusingonvariousvirtuesofwives,includingthattheydesireandcanbearchildren.Thissuggestsvariouspropositionsthattogetherwiththepropositionthatphiloso-phersseektolivevirtuouslycanbeputtogetherinasyllogismwiththeconclusionthatphilosophersneedwives(414–22).Agricolarecognizesthatthisisnotanautomaticprocedureforfindingpremises.“Thevalueoftheseexercises,”hewrites,“ispri-marilythis:thedescription(descriptio)”thatcanbebuiltbygoingthroughthetopicsandthatwillbestructuredbythetopicsforeasyoverview(422).ThearguerneedstobuilduparichdescriptionCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n174MICHAELLOSONSKYinvolvingthetermsoftheconclusion,andthenthearguerwillhaveafundofinformation,“linedupforbattle”(424).InthismannerAgricolashiftsthefocusoflogictomethodsforgeneratingdescriptionsofobjects.Agricolaincludesabriefdiscussionofinductionbysimpleenu-meration,buthedistinguishesbetweenacompleteinductionorenumerationofallinstances,inwhichtheconclusionmustbetrueifallthepremisesaretrue,andanincompleteinduction,wheretheconclusionneednotbetrueevenifthepremisesaretrue(322–28).Therearegoodandbadincompleteinductions,andhesuggeststhatthedifferencebetweenagoodincompleteandacompleteinductionisamatterofdegree(318).Withtheexceptionofincludingsyllogismsinvolvingsingularpropositions,whichhadbeenignoredbytraditionalAristotelianlogic,Agricolamakesnocontributiontothetheoryofdeduction.Butaswehaveseen,Agricola’ssignificancelieselsewhere.Byattendingtoinformalreasoningandtheproblemsofargumentcon-struction,Agricolacanlegitimatelybeseenasaprecursorofthefieldofinformallogic.Moreover,byturningtonondeductivereasoningandmethodsfordiscoveringtruthsaboutanobject,includingem-piricaltruths,Agricolatillsthesoilforthecultivationofinductivelogicandthelogicofscientificreasoning.PETERRAMUS(1515–1572).Agricola’slogicwastaughtattheUni-versityofParisbyJohannSturm(1507–89),anditislikelythatoneofSturm’sstudentswasPierredelaRame´e,betterknownasRamus.Legendhasitthatthetitleofhismaster’sthesiswas“WhateverAristotleStatedIsFalse(Commentitia),”indicatingRamus’srepu-tationasaradicalcriticofAristotlewhichlastedwellintothe12seventeenthcentury.HisDialectique(1555),thefirstpublishedlogicbookinFrench,andtheLatinversionDialecticaelibriduopublishedayearlater,wereverypopulartexts(nearly250editionswerepublished)thattookbroadswipesatAristotelianlogic.How-ever,itneedstobepointedoutthatRamusfollowstraditioninimportantrespects,moresothanAgricola.Forinstance,hisdiscus-sionofargumentationsharplydistinguishesdeductiveandinduct-ivearguments,andwhendiscussingargumentation,hefocusesalmostexclusivelyondeduction.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic175ButtherearegoodreasonsforRamus’sreputation.WhilehebeginshislogicingoodAristotelianfashionwithadiscussionofcategoriesandclassification,hislistofninebasiccategories(cause,effect,subject,adjunct,opposite,comparative,name,division,definition)departssignificantlyfromAristotle’stencategories(substance,quantity,quality,relation,place,time,action,passion,situation,state).Theinclusionofcauseandeffectasmaincategoriesratherthanasubdivision,asisthecaseinAristotle’sCategories,andtheelevationofefficientcauseoverAristotle’sotherthreecauses,marktheincreasingimportanceofscientificreasoning.Also,Ramus’slistincludeslinguisticcategoriessuchasnameanddefinition,sig-nalingthecominglinguisticturnofearlymodernphilosophytobediscussedbelow.RamusfollowsAgricolainconfiningrhetorictomattersofstyle,notargumentation,andplacingallargumentationwithinthedomainoflogic.“Dialecticistheartofgooddisputation,”hewrites,addingthattheterm‘dialectic’hasthe“samesenseasthenameLogic”becausetheyareabout“nothingelsebutdisputationor13reasoning.”Healsofocusesontheartofinvention,devotingfortypagesoftheDialectiquetotheartofinvention,whereasthediscus-sionofthestructureofpropositionsandsyllogismsreceivesonlytwenty-ninepages.LikeAgricola,Ramusallowsforsyllogismswithsingularpropositions,buthegoesfurtherbyalsoclassifyingthem.Healsoaddsconditionalsanddisjunctionstohisdiscussionofnoncategoricalpropositions,whichreceivedlittleattentionfromhispredecessors(134–41).AninnovationofRamus’sdiscussionofthetheoryofjudgmentistheadditionofasectiononmethod.Traditionally,methodwastreatedasapartofrhetoric,butRamus,alongwithSturmandMelanchthon,wasamongthefirstlogicianstolocateadiscussion14ofmethodundertherubricoflogic.Duringthemedievalperiod,method(methodus)wasprimarilyapedagogicalconceptthatin-cludedprovidingstudentswithoverviews,syllabi,andotheraids15orshortcutsthatwouldmakecomplexmaterialmoreaccessible.Ramuselevatesmethodtothesystematicorganizationorarrange-ment(disposition)ofallknowledge,andexplicitlydistinguisheshismethodfrompedagogicalshortcuts.Hewrites,“thisname[method]signifiesthewholesubject...althoughcommonlyitistakenfor...ashortcut”(144–45).CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n176MICHAELLOSONSKYRamus’sarrangementanticipatesimportantfeaturesofDescartes’sconceptofmethod.Hedividesmethodintothemethodsofnatureandprudence,andthemethodofnaturerequiresthatallknownpropositionsbearrangedsothatthefirstpropositionsarethosethatarethemostevidentorclear(e´vident)(145).Thefirstpropositionsshouldalsobethemostgeneralanduniversalpropositions,assum-ingthatgeneralpropositionsarethemostevident.Moreover,thepro-positionsaretobearrangedsyllogisticallysothatthelessgeneralpropositionsarederivablefromthemoregeneralones.Themethodofprudenceorderspropositionsrelativetoaudiencesthatarebeinginstructedandarenotreadyforscientificknowledge(150).Hereprop-ositionsarenotarrangeddeductively,butaccordingtoprobabilityandinduction.Ramusnotonlyelevatesmethodtoabranchoflogic,butalsogivesitasymbolicapparatus.Ramuswaslookingforasimpletech-niqueforarrangingpropositionssothattheywouldbevisuallyattractiveinaclassroomtextbook.Tothatendheadaptedthe16branchingtablesthatwerewidelyusedinmedicaltextbooks.Thesearetree-likediagramsthatbeginwithonemainconcept,typicallyontheleft,followedbybracketsthatterminateinadd-itionalconcepts.Eachoftheseconceptsalsobranchesintootherconcepts.Ramusatfirstdoesnotlimitthebranchesofhistablestodichotomies,buttheRamisttraditionpreferredbinarytrees,anditisthesedichotomoustablesthatbecamethehallmarksofRamistlogicandpedagogy.Whatwasattractiveaboutthesetableswasthattheysuggestedamechanicalprocedurefororderinginformation.Ramus’ssearchformechanicalproceduresislikelytiedtohisinterestinmathemat-ics.WhenRamuswasforbiddentoteachphilosophy,heturnedtoteachingandpublishingtextbooksingeometryandarithmetic.Ramusmaintainedthatmathematicsisthefoundationofnaturalphilosophyandanessentialpracticaltoolinastronomyandmech-17anics.AsMahoneyhasobserved,“byemphasizingthecentralimportanceofmathematicsandbyinsistingontheapplicationofscientifictheorytopracticalproblemsolving,Ramushelpedtoformulatethequestforoperationalknowledgeofnaturethatmarks1819theScientificRevolution.”Indeedthe“starktriviality”ofRamisttablesispreciselythesourceoftheirhistoricallysignificantroleinthemathematizationoflogic.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic177FRANCISBACON(1561–1626).Baconisevenmoreradicalinhis20responsetotraditionallogicthanAgricolaorRamus.ForBacon,logicsimplyisinductionandscientificmethodandhisboldnessandambitioniscapturedinthetitleofhisbookonlogic,TheNewOrganon,orTrueDirectionsfortheInterpretationofNature(1620).“Werejectproofbysyllogism,”hewrites,“becauseitoperatesinconfusionandletsnatureslipoutofourhands.”Instead,Baconfocusesontheprocessofarrivingatjudgmentsusefultoscientificinquiry,andthishecalls“induction”:“Forweregardinductionastheformofdemonstrationwhichrespectsthesenses,stayscloseto21nature,fostersresultsandisalmostinvolvedinthemitself.”Inductionwillbethemethodforestablishing“degreesofcertainty”onthebasisofsensationandconstructing“anewandcertainroad22forthemindfromtheactualperceptionofthesenses.”Baconalsodistanceshimselffromhishumanistpredecessorsbysharplydistinguishingthedeliveryofknowledge,sayinclassroominstruction,fromthediscoveryofnewknowledge.Undertheheadingofinventio,RamusandAgricolarantogetherdeliveryanddiscoveryand,moreimportantly,focusedprimarilyondelivery.Forthisreason,Bacondidnotseehisworkasacontributiontotheartofinvention.Inductionaimstotiereasoningtotheobservationofnature,23ratherthantowhatisappropriatetosocialinteraction.Accord-ingly,thefirststepistopreparethegroundforinductionbycompil-ing“agood,adequatenaturalandexperimentalhistory,”muchasAgricolarequiredagooddescriptio.Bacon,however,designsamethodforcompilingadescription,becausewithoutamethoditwillbesorichthatit“confoundsandconfusestheunderstanding.”Therefore“tablesmustbedrawnup,”andthismustbedone“insuchawayandwithsuchorganizationthatthemindmaybeabletoactuponthem”(NewOrg.,II.10).Thesetablesarenotsimplya24matterof“convenience,”butarenecessaryifthemindistolearnsomethingfromnature.Thegroundispreparedbyconstructingthreetablesundertheheading“Presentationsofinstancestotheintellect”(II.15).First,“thetableofexistenceandpresence”collectsallthe“knownin-stanceswhichmeetinthesamenature”thatisbeinginvestigated,or,inBacon’swords,interpreted(II.11).Thesecond,the“tableofdivergences,”presentsnegativeinstances.Thethird“tableofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n178MICHAELLOSONSKYdegreesorcomparison”collectsinstancesinwhichtheobjectunderinvestigationisfoundindegrees(II.12–13).Oncethedataiscollectedinthesecomparativetables,“induc-tionitselfhastobeputtowork”(II.15).Thefirstinductivestepis“rejectionorexclusion,”whichissupposedtoleavetheinterpreterofnaturewithasetofaffirmativeinstances,whichBaconcallsthe“firstharvest”(II.16,20).ContrarytowidespreadcharacterizationsofBacon’sinduction,thisisnottheendoftheinductiveprocess.Thefirstharvestisonlyapreliminaryconclusionthatneedstoberefinedandconfirmedwith“otheraidstotheintellectintheinter-pretationofnatureandintrueandcompleteinduction.”Onesuchaidistosearchfor“privilegedinstances”(II.21).Thisconsistsinisolatinginstanceswherethephenomenonunderinvestigationstandsoutorisparticularlyrevealingorclear,forexample,aheatedthermometer,whichisa“revealinginstanceofthemotionofexpansion”(II.24).Bacon’sownestimationthathedevelopsaconceptofinductionthatissuperiortosimpleenumerationisaccurate.HeformulatesprinciplesofeliminativeinductionandanticipatesMill’sJointMethodofAgreementandDifferenceandtheMethodofConcomitant25Variations.Moreover,Bacon’sclaimthatrejectionorexclusionisonlythefirststepofinduction,followedbyeightstepsofrefinement,includingfindingprivilegedorrevealinginstances,showsthatelim-26inativeinductiondoesnotexhausthisconceptofinduction.ItiswithjustificationthatBaconhasbeendescribedas“theFatherofInductivePhilosophy”whoseaccountofinductiveargumentsbroke27“newground.”Synthesis:GottfriedWilhelmLeibnizAsnotedabove,Philippo-Ramismsoughtasynthesisoftraditionalandalternativelogics,andalthoughLeibniz’sworkonlogictran-28scendsthistrend,italsohasitsrootsinit.AnimportantinfluenceonLeibnizistheSemi-RamistJoachimJunge(1597–1657),whoseLogicahamburgensia(1638)Leibnizconsideredtobeoneofthegreatestlogictexts.ThistextbookpresentedtraditionalAristotelianlogic,butalsoincludedanextensivediscussionofvaliddeductive29inferencesthattraditionallogicdidnotcapture.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic179Leibniz’sowninterestsinlogicwereeclectic.Hedescribeshowas“aladofthirteenyears”hewasfascinatedbythevariouslogicsofclassificationandhowhehimselfcompiled“tabulationsofknow-ledge”andsopracticedtheartofdivisionandsubdivision,“drawingheavily”onthetopicallogicsofboththeRamistsandSemi-Ramists(L463–64).Hebelievedthesemethodswerenotonlyusefulformemorizingandrecallinginformation,butalsohelpedgeneratedescriptionsandexplanationsandthuscouldguidediscovery.Thelogicsthat“servediscovery,”Leibnizwrites,alsoinclude“theartofinquiryintonatureitself,”which“VerulamBaconbegansoably”(L465).Buttraditionallogicisalsovaluable.Determiningthenumberofvalidfiguresandmodesofsyllogismsis“nolessworthyofourconsiderationthanthenumberofregularbodies”(L465).ForLeibniz,syllogisticlogicis“oneofthefinest,andindeedoneofthemostimportantinventionstohavebeenmadebythehumanmind”(NewEss.,IV.xvii.4).Aristotle’sachievement,Leibnizmain-tains,wastobe“thefirstactuallytowritemathematicallyout-sideofmathematics”(L465).WhatstandsoutforLeibnizinAristotle’slogicisthat“itisakindofuniversalmathematicswhoseimportanceistoolittleknown”(NewEss.,IV.xvii.4).However,Leibnizsawdefectsinboththelogicofdiscoveryandjudgment.Forexample,“Aristotle’sworkisindeedbutabeginning,virtuallytheABCs”ofdeductivereasoningbecausetherearevaliddeductiveinferencesthatarenotcapturedbytraditionallogic(L465).Leibnizhasinmindconditionalanddisjunctiveargumentsaswellasinferencesinvolvingpropositionsaboutrelations,suchas“IfDavidisthefatherofSolomon,thencertainlySolomonisthesonofDavid,”or“IfJesusChristisGod,thenthemotherofJesusChrististhemotherofGod”(NewEss.,IV.xvii.4).Leibniz’sremedyfortheproblemsoflogicwasaunifiedlogicalcalculusthatwouldcaptureallvalidinferencesandserveboththeartsofinventionandjudgment.Hisfirstattempt,DissertationontheArtofCombinations,waspublishedin1666.Itisguidedbytwomainideas.First,therearesimpleandindefinableconcepts,or“firstterms,”andallotherconcepts,propositions,andchainsofpropos-itionsthatconstituteinferencesarevariouscombinationsorstruc-turesofconcepts,andsecond,thesestructuresofconceptscanberepresentedmathematically.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n180MICHAELLOSONSKYThroughouthislife,Leibnizproposedvariouswaystorepresentlogicalrelationsmathematically.In1666,heassignednumberstothesimpleconceptsandrepresentedthecombinationofconceptsas30theproductofthevaluesofitssimplercomponents.In1679,Leibnizworkedonacalculusofideasinwhicheverytrueuniversalaffirmativepropositionisoneinwhichthenumberassignedtothesubjectcanbedividedexactlywithoutanyremainderbythenumberassignedtothepredicate.Ifthesubjectcannotbedivided31bythepredicatewithoutremainder,thepropositionisfalse.Hislastproposalin1690attemptedtocapturelogicaloperationsin32termsofadditionandsubtraction.Theunderlyingthemeinalltheseproposalsisthatdeductiverelationsofpropositionscanbecalculatedorcomputedmechanicallyjustaswecalculateinarith-meticoralgebra.Thecentraloperationinalldeductiveproofsisthesubstitutionofequivalents.Therepresentationofthisconceptualstructurewithwrittensignswouldbea“universalwriting,”“universalpolygraphy,”orwhathe33latercalls“universalsymbolistic”and“generalcharacteristic.”Thisuniversalcharacteristicwouldbeasymbolsystemthatpre-34ciselyrepresentsthestructureofallpossibleconceptualcontent.ThisiswhyGottlobFrege,whowithGeorgeBoolefoundedmodernmathematicallogic,payshomagetoLeibniz,characterizinghisownBegriffsschrift,orConceptualNotation,asarevivalofLeibniz’sprojectofauniversalcharacteristic.ButasFregenotes,hisownprojectismuchmoremodest.WhileLeibnizhopedtodesignalan-guagethatwouldexpressallpossiblecontent,Fregelimitshimselftologicalform,thatis,thecontentthatisrelevantfordeductive35validity.InpracticeLeibnizalsohadtorestricthisproject.Whilehenevergaveuphisfaiththatwithenoughtime,effort,andsupporthecouldmakesomeheadwayinisolatingthesetofsimplecon-ceptsandtherulesforcombiningtheseintocomplexconceptsandpropositions,hisintereststeadilyshiftedtodesigninga“logicalcalculus”fordeductiverelationsonly,thatis,alogicalcalculusthatabstractsfromspecificcontentandisthuscapableofdiverse36interpretations.ItmustbenotedthatthesuggestionthatdeductiverelationscanbeexpressedmathematicallyisnotoriginaltoLeibniz.Heappropri-atelycreditsThomasHobbes,whoinpartIofDecorpore,titledCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic181“ComputationorLogic,”declaresthattoreasonistocompute,and“tocompute,iseithertocollectthesumofmanythingsthatareaddedtogether,ortoknowwhatremainswhenonethingistakenoutofanother,”andheconcludesthat“Ratiocination,therefore,is37thesamewithadditionandsubstraction”(I.i.2).Hobbes,how-ever,takesonlyafewverysmallstepsinworkingoutthedetailsofthisdeclaration,anditfallstoLeibniztoactuallymakeprogressinthereductionoflogicalrelationstoarithmeticaloperationsandthedevelopmentoftheideaofacalculusthatrepresentsmathemat-icallytheformalstructureofallvalidinferences,irrespectiveofinterpretation.TheimportanceofLeibniz’slogicliesnotonlyintheclarityofhisvisionofthemathematizationoflogic,butalsoinitsbreadthanddepth.AsFregewrites,“Leibnizinhiswritingsstrewssuchanabundanceofseedsofideasthatinthisrespecthardlyanyothercan38measureuptohim.”Forexample,Leibnizrecognizestheimport-anceoftheconceptsofnecessityandidentityforunderstandingdeductivevalidity.Hisclaimsthattheactualworldisoneofaninfinityofpossibleworlds,andthatcontingenttruthsarepropos-itionsthatareactuallytruebutfalseinotherpossibleworldswhilenecessarytruthsareones“whoseoppositeisnotpossible,”are39foundationalideasofcontemporarymodallogic.Similarly,Leibniz’sprincipleofidentity,“Thosearethesameofwhichonecanbesubstitutedfortheotherwithtruthpreserved(Eademsunt,quorumunumalterisubstituipotestsalvaveritate),”persistsin40twoformsincontemporaryphilosophy.Itappearsasaprinciplefortheidentityofobjects,oftenlabeled“Leibniz’sLaw,”namely,thatiftwothingsareidentical,thenanythingtrueoftheoneisalso41trueoftheother:x¼y!Fx$Fy.Italsoappearsasaprincipleforidentifyingcontentorsynonymy,namelythattwoexpressionshavethesamecontentiftheycanbesubstitutedforeachotherina42sentencewithoutchangingitstruthvalue.Finally,Leibniz’sunifiedconceptionoflogicincludednon-deductiveinferences,aninterestthatdatesbacktohisearlyworkonlegalreasoning.Hebelievedthatacompletelogicalcalculuswouldincludealogicofprobability.“Whenwelacksufficientdatatoarriveatcertainty,”Leibnizwrites,“theuniversalsymbolisticwouldalsoservetoestimatedegreesofprobability”(L654).Thelogicofprobabilitywould“establishthedegreesoflikelihoodontheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n182MICHAELLOSONSKYevidence,”thatis,theprobabilityofapropositionisafunctionoftheoverallweightoftheavailableevidence(NewEss.,IV.ii.14).Buttheprobabilityofapropositionrelativetotheevidence,accordingtoLeibniz,“mustbedemonstratedthroughinferencesbelongingtothelogicofnecessarypropositions”(NewEss.,IV.xvii.6).Thustheprobabilityofapropositionrelativetotheavailableevidenceisitselfanecessarytruthsubjecttodeductivedemonstration,which43anticipatesmodernlogicaltheoriesofprobability.Leibniz’sworkinlogicdidnotoccurinanintellectualvacuumanditwasnotsimplyaproductofhisgenius.Leibniz,aprolificcorrespondent,wasalsorespondingto,drawingon,andmirroringtheintellectualfermentofhistime.Hisachievementsinlogic,particularlyhiscontributionstothemathematizationoflogic,arecompellingevidencethatthefieldoflogicwasnotindeclineduringtheearlymodernperiod.EARLYMODERNLINGUISTICTURNSWhileforLeibniz,traditionallogicis“oneofthefinest”achieve-mentsofthehumanmind,forJohnLocke,itis“averyuselessskill,”“acuriousandunexplicableWebofperplexedWords”usedto“cover...ignorance,”an“endlessLabyrinth,”and“learnedIgnor-ance.”Worstofall,itdestroys“theInstrumentandMeansofDis-course,Conversation,Instruction,andSociety”(Essay,III.x.8–10).Locke’sanimusisnotjustdirectedatsyllogisticlogic,butatthetwinideasthatsymbolsandformalrulesguidehumanreasoning(IV.vii.11).Lockebelievedinsteadthatnaturallanguageis“theIn-strumentandMeansofDiscourse,Conversation,Instruction,andSociety.”LanguagegetsastarringroleintheEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding,andLockeconcludestheEssaywiththesuggestionthat“anothersortofLogick”shouldreplaceformallogic,namelyonethatstudiesnaturallanguage(IV.xxi.4).TheturntonaturallanguagebeginswithRenaissancehuman-ism,whereinterestinlanguageissodeepthatithasbeenclaimedthat“Renaissancephilosophersoflanguage”sharesomeofthe“cen-tralphilosophicalconcerns...ofrecentAnglo-Americanphiloso-phy,”particularly“turningtolanguageasthemainoronlyobjectofanalysis”andexamininglanguagenotsimplyforitsownsake,but44forthelightitshedsonphilosophicalproblems.RenaissanceCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic183criticsrejectedscholasticlogicbecausetheybelieveditclashedwithcustomaryspeech(ususloquendi).Forexample,LorenzoValla(1407–57)exhortsthereader:“Letusconductourselvesmoresimplyandmoreinaccordancewithnaturalsenseandcommonusage.Philosophyanddialectic...oughtnottodepartfromthecustomary45mannerofspeaking.”TheSpanishhumanistJuanLuisVives(1492–1540)likewisecriticizesthelogician’suseofvariablesand46therulesthatare“againsteverycustomofspeech.”Humanismseveredthetiebetweenthestudyoflogicandlan-guage.Relyingonthegapbetweentheapparentgrammaticalstruc-tureofnaturallanguageandformallogic,Renaissancehumanistsridiculedtheideathatlogichadanythingtodowithnaturallanguage.Moreover,sincehumanbeingstypicallyusenaturallan-guagetoexpresstheirthoughts,formallogicseveredfromlanguageseemedirrelevanttohumanthinking.Withformallogicinretreat,manyearlymodernphilosophersturnedtheirattentiontonaturallanguagetounderstandthehumanunderstanding.FrancisBaconandThomasHobbesTheincreasingimportanceofnaturallanguageinearlymodernphilosophyisevidentinthephilosophiesofBaconandHobbes.Whilecritiquingtraditionallogic,BaconaffirmstheAristotelianviewthatwordsare“countersandsignsofnotions”andthatthe“notionsofthemind...arelikethesoulofwords,andthebasisofeverysuchstructureandfabric.”Soifthesenotionsaredefective,then“everythingfallstopieces,”andhencealogicisneededthatconsiderstheformationofthenotionsthatarethesouloflan-47guage.Thefirstconcernofsuchalogicistolocateandcorrect48thesourcesoferror.WhenBaconturnstothesourcesoferror,however,herattlesthetraditionalrelationshipbetweenmindandlanguage.TheseerrorsareBacon’sfamousidolsorillusionsofthemind,andoneoftheseinvolveslanguage:theidolsofthemarketplace(idolafori),ormoreaccurately,theidolsoftheforum,commonortownsquare.Linguis-ticillusionsare“thebiggestnuisanceofall,”Baconwrites,“be-causetheyhavestolenintotheunderstanding.”Humanbeingsbelievethattheirreasonruleswords,“butitisalsotruethatwordsretortandturntheirforcebackupontheunderstanding,andthishasCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n184MICHAELLOSONSKYrenderedphilosophyandthesciencessophisticandunproductive”(NewOrg.,I.59).InTheAdvancementofLearning,Baconmakesthispointevenmoredramatically:“althoughwethinkwegovernourwords...yetcertainitisthatwords,asaTartar’sbow,doshootbackupontheunderstandingofthewisest,andmightilyentangle49andpervertthejudgment.”Baconhasnexttonothingtosayabouttheprocessbywhichlanguageinteractswiththehumanunderstanding.Moreover,hisresponsetolinguisticillusionsistofindwaysofstrengtheningthemind’sindependencefromlanguage.Hisremedyistotightenthemind’sbondstotheobservationofnatureandtopryitawayfromnaturallanguageinfectedbyhumanintercourse.Baconnevercon-sidersthatlanguagemaybeessentialtoscientificreasoningandthatthemindcannotbeshieldedfromlinguisticillusions.WhileBaconisunclearaboutthemind’sabilitytofreeitselffromlanguage,Hobbesexplicitlyaffirmsthatreasoningcannotbepriedapartfromlanguage.Withoutwordsorsomeothersensiblemarksforourthoughts,“whatsoeveramanhasputtogetherinhismindbyratiocination...willpresentlyslipfromhim,andnotberevocable50butbybeginninghisratiocinationanew.”Moreover,withouttheuseofwordswecanreasononlyaboutparticularthingsandparticu-larcauses(Lev.,ch.5).Thusanyreasoningaboutgeneralcausalrelationships,whichisessentialtoscience,willrequiresomesens-iblemarks,andthatiswhyHobbesbelievesthatsciencebeginswiththedefiningofwords(ibid.).Infact,inLeviathanHobbesseemstogosofarastodeclarelanguagetobeconstitutiveofall51reasoning.Hewritesthattrainsofthoughtarecasesofreasoningwhentheyareregulatedbyanacquiredandartificialmethod,namelyreason.Reasonisacquiredthrough“studyandindustry”anditdependsonthe“inventionofWords,andSpeech”(ch.3).AsforBaconbeforehim,forHobbeslanguageisalsoasourceoftrouble,aboveallmeaninglesswords.ItisonaccountofthisthatHobbesadmonishesthat“wordsarewisemenscounters,theydobutreckonbythem:buttheyarethemonyoffooles”(Lev.,ch.4).Unfortunately,thisadvicedoesnotaddressacentraldifficulty.Humanbeingsneedlanguagetoreason,Hobbesargues,becausewithoutlanguageourthoughts“slipaway.”Butifourthoughtsareunstableandwordsaremeaningfulbecausetheyaretiedtomentalconceptions,weneedanaccountofhowlanguage,ontheonehand,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic185iscapableofprovidingstabilitytothemindand,ontheotherhand,acquiresitsownstabilityfromthemind’sunstableconceptions.DescartesandtheCartesiansDescartesavoidsthisdifficultybydenyingthatthemindwithoutlanguagesuffersfrominstabilitythatinhibitsreason.Thisisevi-dentinhisreplytoHobbes’sFourthObjectiontotheMeditations.InresponsetoDescartes’sclaimthattheimaginationdoesnotplayaroleintheintellectualconceptionofapieceofwax,Hobbesarguesthatif“reasoningissimplythejoiningtogetherandlinkingofnamesorlabelsbymeansoftheverb‘is’,”then“reasoningwilldependonnames,nameswilldependontheimagination,andim-aginationwilldepend(asIbelieveitdoes)merelyonthemotionsofourbodilyorgans.”Thus,Hobbesconcludes,“themindwillbenothingmorethanmotionoccurringinvariouspartsofanorganicbody”(CSMII125–26).DescartesrejectsHobbes’ssuggestionthatwereasonwithlan-guage.Reasoning“isnotalinkingofnamesbutofthethingsthataresignifiedbythenames,andIamsurprisedthattheoppositeviewshouldoccurtoanyone”(CSMII126).Hisopeningdefenseistodistinguishimaginationfrom“apurelymentalconception.”ThisisarecurringthemeinDescartes’srepliestoHobbes,mostnotablyinhisresponsetoHobbes’sclaimthat“wehavenoideaorimagecorrespondingtothesacrednameofGod.”Imagesarepartofthe“corporealimagination,”Descarteswrites,butideasare“formsofperception”thatevenadivinemindwithoutabodyhas(CSMII127).Thisundercutstheneedforlanguage,becausetheinstabilityHobbesperceivesistheinstabilityofourmentalimages,notoftheideasofreason.Hobbes’sviewisnotonlyunmotivated,butithaswhatDescartesbelievesaretwoabsurdconsequences.First,itwouldmeanthatpeoplespeakingdifferentlanguagescouldnotreasonaboutthesamething,but“aFrenchmanandaGermancanreasonaboutthesamethings,despitethefactthatthewordstheythinkofarecompletelydifferent.”Second,andmoreimportantly,ifHobbesisright,then“whenheconcludesthatthemindisamotionhemightjustaswellconcludethattheearthisthesky,oranythingelsehelikes”(CSMII126).Ifthemeaningoflanguageisafunctionof“arbitraryCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n186MICHAELLOSONSKYconventions,”Descartesargues,thenifwereasonwithwords,truthisarbitraryaswell.Accordingly,Descarteshaslittletosayaboutnaturallanguage.ThereareonlytwoothermajorpassageswhereDescartesdiscusseslanguage.ThebestknownishisbriefargumentinDiscourseontheMethodthatahumanbeing,unlikeanonhumananimal,isableto“producedifferentarrangementsofwordssoastogiveanappropri-atelymeaningfulanswertowhateverissaidinitspresence,asthedullestofmencando”(CSMI140).TheotherisDescartes’slettertoMersennein1629assessingthefeasibilityofauniversallanguage.Descartesarguesthatauniversalcharacteristicwouldrequirea“truephilosophy”thatbreaksdownallconceptsintotheirsimplestparts,butitisnotlikelythathumanbeingswillachievethis,eventhoughitispossible(CSMIII13).AlthoughDescarteshaslittletosayaboutlanguage,hiswritingsinspiredimportantworkonlanguage.Descartes’sfundamentalas-sumptionthatthemindiswhollyindependentoflanguageispre-servedanddevelopedinthePort-RoyalGrammar(1660)andLogic(1662).AccordingtotheGrammar,languageissimplytheuseofphysicalsignstoexpressthoughtsand“whatoccursinourminds52isnecessaryforunderstandingthefoundationsofgrammar.”TheprimaryconcernoftheGrammaristoshowhowgrammaticaldistinctionscommontodiverselanguagesareanecessaryconse-quenceofthebasicoperationsofthemind:conceiving,judging,andreasoning.Thenatureofthesethreeoperations,plusafourth,orderingormethod,isthesubjectofthePort-RoyalLogic,whichisevenmoreexplicitthantheGrammarinitsCartesiansubmis-sionoflanguagetothought.Ifwedidnothavetocommunicatewithotherpeople,“itwouldbeenoughtoexaminethoughtsin53themselves,unclothedinwordsorothersigns.”TheauthorsoftheLogicalsoendorseDescartes’ssharpdividebetweenimaginationandpureintellection,andconcludethat“wecanexpressnothingbyourwordswhenweunderstandwhatwearesayingunless,bythesametoken,itwerecertainthatwehad54inustheideaofthethingweweresignifyingbyourwords.”ThisconclusionisusedagainstHobbes’sviewthat“reasoningwilldependonwords.”Hobbesappealstotheconventionalityofnames,butiftherearenoideasofthingsindependentofthenamesof55things,conventionsareimpossible.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic187JohnLockeLocke’sthinkingaboutthehumanunderstandingbeginsinaCarte-sianfashion,payinglittleattentiontolanguage,buthisEssayar-rivesatHobbes’spositionthatthemindreliesonlanguage.Lockeexpresslyconnectedsemanticinquirywithepistemology,andthishascorrectlybeenassessedasnewanduniqueaboutLocke’sdis-56cussionoflanguage.ThestatureofLocke’sEssayasaworkinepistemologyisundeniable:itisrecognizedasaphilosophicalmas-terpiecethat“inauguratesan‘epistemologicalturn’whichwasto57launchphilosophyontheroadtoKant.”Itisnotanexaggerationtosaythat“LockeintendedhisepistemologyasasolutiontothecrisisofthefracturingofthemoralandreligioustraditionofEurope58atthebeginningsofmodernity,”andwecanaddthatLockefearedthatsciencewasnotimmunefromsuchfracturing.WhattheseassessmentsignoreisthatLocke’sepistemiccon-cernsdonotleadhimstraightawaytoaccountsofjustification,belief,andknowledge.ItisonlyinthelastbookoftheEssay,bookIV,thatLocketurnstothetheoryofknowledge.Hefirstdis-cussespsychologyinbookII,called“OfIdeas,”andLocke’soriginalplanwasthatthenextbookbedevotedtohumanknowledge.ButLockechangedhisplans,andthereasonforthisisthat“thereissocloseaconnexionbetweenIdeasandWords;andourabstractIdeas,andgeneralWords,havesoconstantarelationonetoanother,thatitisimpossibletospeakclearlyanddistinctlyofourKnowledge,whichallconsistsinverbalPropositions,withoutconsidering,first,theNature,Use,andSignificationofLanguage;whichthere-foremustbethebusinessofthenextBook,”namelybookIII,“OfWords”(Essay,II.xxxiii.19;alsoIII.ix.21).Lockethenpostponesthediscussionofthenature,extent,anddegreeofhumanknowledgetobookIV.OnereasonLockebelievesthatallhumanknowledge“consistsinverbalPropositions”isthathumanbeings“intheirThinkingandReasoningswithinthemselves,makeuseofWordsinsteadofIdeas”(Essay,IV.v.4).Thisoccursprimarilywhenpeoplehavethoughtsinvolvingcomplexideas,whichunlikesimpleideasarenotreceivedpassively,butinsteadareproductsoftheworkmanshipoftheunder-59standing(Essay,II.xii.1).Inacomplexidea,varioussimpleideasaretiedtogethertoformanewidea.ForLocke,allideasofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n188MICHAELLOSONSKYsubstancesarecomplexideas,asareideasofspace,duration,number,power,andcausality.Unfortunately,complexideasareunstable(Essay,IV.v.4).Theircompositionvariesovertimeforindividualsanditvariesevenmoresoacrossdifferentindividuals.LikeHobbesbeforehim,Lockereliesonlanguagetomakeupforthisinstability,althoughLocketurns60Hobbes’ssuggestionintoatheory.Becauseoftheinstabilityofideas,humanbeings“usuallyputtheNamefortheIdea”and“reflectontheNamesthemselvesbecausetheyaremoreclear,certain,anddistinct,andreadiertooccurtoourThoughts,thanthepureIdeas:andsowemakeuseoftheseWordsinsteadoftheIdeasthemselves,evenwhenwewouldmeditateandreasonwithinourselves,andmaketacitmentalPropositions”(IV.v.4).Accord-ingly,words“interposethemselvessomuchbetweenourUnder-standings,andtheTruth,”andtheyarelikea“MediumthroughwhichvisibleObjectspass”and“imposeuponourUnderstandings”(III.ix.21).Whenwethinkwithlanguage,werelyonideasofwords61ratherthanideasofobjects.Sinceitiscomplexideasthatrequirethesupportoflanguage,thearenawherelanguageplaysakeyroleincognitionisclassifica-62tion.AgainsttraditionalAristotelianaccountsofspeciesandnat-uralkinds,Lockemaintainsthat“thiswholemysteryofGeneraandSpecies,whichmakesuchanoiseintheSchools...isnothingelsebutabstractIdeas,moreorlesscomprehensive,withnames63annexedtothem”(Essay,III.iii.9).Locke’sepistemologicalturn,then,leadshimtopsychology,whichtakeshimtolanguage,whichbecomessoimportantinLocke’smindthathenotonlydevotesthethirdbookoftheEssaytolinguistictopics,butintheconcludingparagraphsoftheEssay,wherehegiveshisoverall“DivisionoftheSciences,”Lockerecom-mendsthatoneofthethreebranchesofscienceis“sZmeiotikZ´,ortheDoctrineofSigns,themostusualwhereofbeingWords”(Essay,IV.xxi.4).Needlesstosay,forLocke,asforBaconandHobbes,languageisalsoasourceofproblems.Whilesomeofthesearesimplydueto“wilfulFaultsandNeglects,whichMenareguiltyof,”othersarecausedby“theImperfectionthatisnaturallyinLanguage”(Essay,III.x.1).“TheverynatureofWords,”Lockewrites,“makesitalmostunavoidable,formanyofthemtobedoubtfulanduncertainintheirCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic189signification”(III.ix.1).Thereasonsforthisuncertaintyare,first,that“SoundshavenonaturalconnexionwithourIdeas,buthavealltheirsignificationfromthearbitraryimpositionofMen,”and,second,theinherentdiversityofideasthatwordscansignify(III.ix.4).Withwordsbeingtiedtoideasonlybyhumanconventionandtheideasthemselvesvariableandunstable,themeaningoflanguageitselfisasourceofinstability.Thisistruenotonlyinthecaseofmorality,whereLockebelieveshumanideasarethemostunstable,butalsointhenaturalsciences.Thescienceshavetheadvantagethat,unlikeinmorality,ideasofsubstancesarebasedonastandard,namelyrepeatingpatternsofcoexistingsimpleideas.Butthesesimpleideasthatcoexistinapatternare“verynumerous”(even“almostinfinite”)andallofthemhavean“equalrighttogointothecomplexspecifickIdea”thathumanbeingsconstructonthebasisofthispatternor“archetype.”Accordingly,“thecomplexIdeasofSubstances,inMenusingthesameNameforthem,willbeveryvarious;andsothesignificationsofthosenames,veryuncertain”(Essay,III.ix.13;alsoIII.vi.44–47).Payingattentiontotheimperfectionsoflanguagewillnotonlyhelpsolvemanyphilosophical,scientific,legal,moral,andtheo-logicaldisputes,butitwillalsoimprovehumanity,Lockebelieves(Essay,III.ix.21).ButLocke’sadmonitiontopayattentiontotheimperfectionsoflanguagedoesnotconfrontthedeepcriticismDescartesraisesagainstHobbes.Iflanguageisconventional,andreasoningreliesonlanguage,doesitnotfollow,inDescartes’swords,thattheearthisthesky,oranythingelseyouwish?LeibnizAsinlogic,Leibnizsynthesizesthecompetingtrendsinseventeenth-centuryphilosophyoflanguage.Leibnizreintroducesthelogicalper-spectiveonhumanlanguageandreunitesthephilosophicalstudyoflogic,language,andmind.Theroleoflogic,aswewillseebelow,istodealwithpreciselytheproblemDescartesraisedagainsttheroleofconventionallanguageinhumanreasoning.Butthiscomesatacost:languageisconventional,butnotthoroughlyso.LeibnizprefacestheNewEssayswiththeremarkthathisandLocke’s“systemsareverydifferent”becauseLocke’s“iscloser64toAristotleandminetoPlato.”OneexpressionofthisisthatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n190MICHAELLOSONSKYLeibnizrejectsLocke’sviewthathumanlanguageiswhollycon-65ventionalandarbitrary.Hedisagreeswith“theScholasticsandeveryoneelse”whohold“thatthesignificationsofwordsarearbi-trary,”addingthat“perhapstherearesomeartificiallanguageswhicharewhollychosenandcompletelyarbitrary,”but“knownlanguagesinvolveamixtureofchosenfeaturesandnaturalandchancefeatures”(NewEss.,III.ii.1).Hementionswithsomeapprovalthepopularseventeenth-cen-turydoctrinethatthereisaprimitiveorAdamiclanguageofnaturethatisattherootofalllanguages.HespecificallycitesJakobBo¨hme(1575–1624),thebestknownproponentofthisdoctrine,andwritesthathiswritings“actuallydohavesomethingfineandgrandabout66them”(NewEss.,IV.xix.16).Bo¨hmeheldthatallobjectshaveinneressencesthatareexpressedbyuniquesoundsthatmakeupthe“languageofnature,withwhicheverythingspeaksaccordingtoits67properties,andrevealsitself.”LeibnizrejectsthesuggestionthatanycurrentnaturallanguageistheAdamiclanguageofnature,buthedoesbelievethatcurrentspokenlanguages“consideredinthemselveshavesomethingprimitiveaboutthem”(III.ii.1).Leibnizgoesontodescribesoundsymbolismortheonomato-poeicfeaturesofnaturallanguages,whichheillustrateswiththeLatincoaxareandtheGermanquakenforthesoundoffrogs68(NewEss.,III.ii.1).ButLeibnizalsohasamoresubtleandmoredurableideainmind,namelythatnaturallanguages,whenproperlyanalyzed,expressa“naturalorderofideas”thatis“commontoangelsandmenandtointelligencesingeneral”(NewEss.,III.i.5).ThisnaturalorderofideasisacombinatorialstructureinwhichcomplexideasarebuiltoutofasetofsimpleideasthatLeibnizcalls“akindofalphabetofhumanthought”(L222).Moreover,thisorderisnot“institutedorvoluntary”anditisnotsubjecttohumancontrol:“itisnotwithinourdiscretiontoputourideastogetherasweseefit”(NewEss.,II.xxviii.3;III.iii.15).Althoughinordinarythinkingandspeaking,humanbeingsdepartfromthisstruc-turebecausetheymustfollowtheircontingentinterests,properreflectionandanalysiscanuncoverit.Accordingly,LeibnizconcurswithLocke“thatlanguagesarethebestmirrorofthehumanmind,andthatapreciseanalysisofthesignificationofwordswouldtellusmorethananythingelse69abouttheoperationsoftheunderstanding”(NewEss.,III.vii.6).ButCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic191LockeandLeibnizarelookingatverydifferentimagesinthismirror.WhereasLockelooksforthepsychologicalclueslanguageoffers,Leibnizseesthestructureofnaturallanguagesasasourceofinformationaboutthedeductivestructureofthemind’sideas.ForLeibniz,eventhoughnaturallanguagesdepartfromthenaturalorderofideas,theyremaintiedinsignificantwaystothemind’suniversalunderlyinglogicalstructure.Eventheargumentationofanoratorwithallitsornamentationhasa“logicalform(formelogique),”namely,contentthatisrelevanttovalidityandthatcanbeexhibitedwiththeprinciplesoflogic(IV.xvii.4).Leibniziscarefultodistinguishthenaturalandlogicalstructureofhumanideasfromthecontingentpsychologicalprocessesofthehumanunderstanding.Leibnizcapturesthisdifferencebydis-tinguishingthoughtsfromideas.ManyofLocke’sclaimsaboutideas,forexample,thatsomeideasarearbitrarywhileothersarenot,holdtrue,Leibnizargues,onlyof“actualthoughts”or“notice-ablethoughts.”Ifweturntoideasas“theveryformorpossibilityofthosethoughts”orasthe“objectsofthoughts,”Leibnizcontinues,thenLocke’saccountofthelimitsofthehumanunderstandingiswrong.Therealmofideasistherealmof“possibilitiesandneces-sities,”andwhatispossibleandnecessaryis“independentofourthinking”(NewEss.,III.v.3;III.iii.14).ThisdistinctionplaysaroleinLeibniz’sdiscussionofthenatureofpropositions.ForLocke,“thejoiningorseparatingofsigns...iswhatbyanothername,wecallProposition”(Essay,IV.v.2),andthesesignsareoccurrentpsychologicalentities:eitheroccurrentthoughtsordeclarationsmadebyapersononaparticularoccasion.Consequently,forLocke,truthisapropertyofmentalorverbalentities.ForLeibniz,however,apropositionisastructureofideasandtruthisapropertyofsuchstructures,which“wehaveincommonwithGodandtheangels.”AdialogueLeibnizwritesinParisaboutHobbes’sconventionalismexpressesthesamepoint:atruthofgeometry“istrueevenifyouwerenevertothinkofit”and“evenbeforethegeometricianshadproveditormenob-servedit.”Leibnizgoesontomaintainthattruthisapropertyofpropositions,butnot“allpropositionsarebeingthought”andconsequentlypropositionsare“possiblethoughts”(L182–83).Leibniznowstandsface-to-facewiththedifficultyDescartesraisedagainstHobbes.Ontheonehand,LeibnizarguesthatideasCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n192MICHAELLOSONSKYarenotconventional,andthetruthofpropositionsisindependentofactualhumanthought.Ontheotherhand,heagreeswithHobbesthatsomehumanthinkingis“blind”or“symbolic”inthatitrelies70onconventionalsymbols.Reasoninginarithmeticandgeometry“presupposessomesignsorcharacters”(L183),andintheNewEssaysLeibnizstatesbaldlythatallabstractthoughtsrequire“somethingsensible”andthathumanbeings“cannotreasonwith-outsymbols”(I.i.5;II.xxii.73).Butifhumanbeingscanthinkabout,say,arithmeticonlywiththehelpofsymbols,andsymbolsareconventional,doesitnotfollowthat“truthsdependonthehumanwill?”(L183).Theconventionalityoflanguage,therelianceofreasoningonlanguage,andtheobjectivityorunconventionalityoftruthappeartobeinseriousconflict.ThesolutionLeibnizoffersiscrucialtounderstandinghiscontri-butiontothephilosophyoflanguage.Leibnizclaimsthatalthoughdifferentlanguagesandartificialsymbolsystemscanbeusedtoreason,“thereisinthemakindofcomplexmutualrelationororderwhichfitsthethings...intheircombinationandinflection”(L184).Headds:Thoughitvaries,thisordersomehowcorrespondsinalllanguages.Thisfactgivesmehopeofescapingthedifficulty.Foralthoughcharactersarearbi-trary,theiruseandconnectionhavesomethingwhichisnotarbitrary,namelyadefiniteanalogybetweencharactersandthings,andtherelationswhichdifferentcharactersexpressingthesamethinghavetoeachother.Thisanalogyorrelationisthebasisoftruth.Fortheresultisthatwhetherweapplyonesetofcharactersoranother,theproductswillbethesameorequivalentorcorrespondanalogously.(L184)Leibnizillustratesthispointwiththefactthatboththedecimalandthebinarysystemsofarithmeticpreservetruthsaboutthenaturalnumbers.ForLeibniz,conventionalsymbolsystemscanhaveastructurethatisnotconventional,andthisstructurecanbethesameacrossdifferentsystemsofsigns.Moreover,thesimilarityofstructureneednotbeexplicitintheapparentstructure,e.g.thesurfacegram-marofalanguage.Allthatisneededisthattherebeanequivalenceorcorrespondence.Twostructuresthatappeartobedistinctcaninfactcorrespondtoeachotherbecausethereisapreciseone-to-oneCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic193mappingbetweenthem.Forexample,asLeibnizpointsout,thereisacorrespondencebetweenacircleandanellipsebecause“anypointwhateverontheellipsecorrespondstosomepointonthecircleaccordingtoadefinitelaw,”anditisonaccountofthisthatthe71ellipsecanrepresentacircle(L208).Inthesamemanner,lan-guagescancorrespondtoeachotherand,moreimportantly,tothenaturalorderofideas.Forexample,asentenceinanaturallanguagecancorrespondtoasentenceoftheuniversalcharacteristic,oranyotherlogicalcalculus,becausethereisaprecisemappingbetweenthetwosentences.Forthisreason,Leibnizdevotessomeefforttoshowinghowthediversegrammaticalformsofnaturallanguagescancorrespondto72theformsofamorerationalsymbolsystem.Theformthissortofgrammaticalanalysistakesisthesubstitutionofcertaincharacters73forothersthatareequivalentinusetotheformer.Leibniz’sideaisthatbyanorderlysequenceofwell-definedsubstitutions,asentenceofnaturallanguagecanbetransformedintoasentenceofamoreprecisecharacteristicorcalculusthatrevealsthelogicalformofthesentenceofnaturallanguage.Thenagain,usingsuccessivesubsti-tutionswithinthecharacteristicorlogicalcalculus,thesentencecanbesubjectedtovariouslogicaloperationsandusedinlogicaldemonstrations.InthismannerLeibnizreintroducesthelogicalperspectiveonhumanlanguagethatwaslostduringtheRenaissance.Aswesaw,amajorreasonforthislosswasthewidegapbetweentheapparentgrammaticalstructureofnaturallanguagesasusedinordinarydiscourseandthelanguagesoftraditionalformallogic.Leibnizaimedtobridgethisgapbyrejectingtheassumptionthatnaturallanguage’slogicalformisidenticaltoitscontingentsurface74grammaticalstructure.SowhileLockefoundlittleornoroomforlogicinhisaccountofmindandlanguage,Leibnizlocateslogicalorderintheabstractstructurecommontomindandlanguage.OnemightsaythatwhatLockemissedbytakingintoaccountonlyactualhumanthoughtandspeech,Leibnizrecognizedbytryingtocaptureallthatcouldbesaidandthought.Bylookingforanaccountofallpossiblejudg-ments,LeibnizaddedlogictotheunionLockehadalreadyforgedbetweenphilosophy,psychology,andthestudyoflanguage.Leibniz’svisionovercomesthedisparitiesbetweenformallogicCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n194MICHAELLOSONSKYandordinarylanguageandpreservesthedemandsofbothtruthandtheconventionalityofhumanlanguageandthought.Thisreconcili-ationofthestrictdemandsoftruthandlogicwithcommonplaceandconventionalhumanpracticebearswitnesstothegrandeurandoptimismofseventeenth-centuryphilosophy.NOTES1KnealeandKneale1962,p.345;alsop.298.2Ibid.,p.320.3Kretzmann1967,p.379;alsoKretzmann1968.4Ashworth1974,pp.16–17;Freedman1984,pp.86–87;Risse1964,vol.II,pp.516–17;Nuchelmans1998,p.104.5KnealeandKneale1962,p.234;PeterofSpain1972;Ashworth1974,p.2.6Ashworth1988,p.143.7Ashworth1974,pp.19–20and1988,p.163;Nuchelmans1998,p.103.8KnealeandKneale1962,p.310.9Ashworth1988,pp.152–53;Jardine1988,p.181;Mundt1994,pp.108–17.10Agricola1992,p.212,alsop.228.Subsequentparentheticalnumeralsrefertopagesinthistext.11SeeOng1983,p.102.12Italsoearnedhimaroyaldecreein1544forbiddinghimtoteach.Thedecreewascanceledin1547,buthewasmurderedduringtheSt.Bartholomew’sDayMassacreof1572,duringwhich3,000Protest-antswerekilledinParis.13Ramus1964,p.61.Subsequentparentheticalnumeralsrefertopagesinthistext.14Ong1983,pp.232–39;Ashworth1974,p.14.15Ong1983,pp.227–28;CopenhaverandSchmitt1992,p.235.16CopenhaverandSchmitt1992,p.238.17RamusalsoestablishedandfundedachairinmathematicsattheColle`geRoyaldeFrance.18Mahoney1975,p.289.19CopenhaverandSchmitt1992,p.236.20ThereissomecontroversyabouthowmuchinfluenceRamushadonBacon,whocommentsbothfavorablyandunfavorablyonRamus.SeeRossi1960;Jardine1974;Ong1983,pp.302–4;Pe´rez-Ramos1988,p.107;Zagorin1998,pp.54–57;Walton1999,p.294;Gaukroger2001,p.43.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic19521Bacon2000,p.16.22Ibid.,p.28.23GaukrogerarguesthatBaconaimsto“transformtheepistemologicalactivityofthephilosopherfromsomethingessentiallyindividualtosomethingessentiallycommunal”(2001,p.5).ThisisanimportantcorrectivetoourunderstandingofBaconandhelpsexplainhisinterestinlanguage,butitisalsotruethatforBacon,socialinteractionisasourceoferrors,andthathumanbeingsneedformsofreasoningthatadheretonature,notconvention.24Urbach1987,p.172.25Broad1926,p.57.26Gaukroger2001,p.153.27Broad1926,pp.1,64;alsoUrbach1987,p.185.28L471,n.2.29Couturat1901,pp.73–74,n.4;alsoAshworth1974,pp.17–18;Krolzik1990–92;Mates1986,pp.211–12.30Leibniz1966,pp.4–5.31Ibid.,p.26.32Ibid.,pp.122–44.33Ibid.,p.11;L654,221.34Theseventeenthcenturywasrifewithprojectsfordevelopingunam-biguousuniversalcharactersorlanguageswhosesyntacticstructurecloselytrackedsemanticcontent.AparadigmexampleisJohnWilkins’sEssaytowardsaRealCharacter,andaPhilosophicalLan-guage(1668),inwhichhebuildshislanguageoutoffortybasiccategor-ies,eachassignedtoauniquepairofconsonantsandvowelsforspeechandauniqueinscriptionforwriting.Otherswhocontributedorpro-moteduniversallanguageprojectsincludeCaveBeck(1623–1706?),GeorgeDalgarno(1626?–87),JanAmosKomensky(1592–1670),FrancisLodwick(1619–94),andMarinMersenne(1588–1648).SeeRossi1960;Knowlson1975;Slaughter1982;Poole2003;Maat2004.35Frege1879,pp.v–vi.36SeeRutherford1995b,p.231.37Hobbes1839,vol.I,p.3.38Frege1980,p.9.39Leibniz1973,pp.97–98;L661;AG71,193;Discourse,}13(AG46);NewEss.,III.v.3.AlsoLewis1918;Carnap1956,p.10;Mates1972and1986,pp.69–73;Adams1994,pp.46–50.40Leibniz1903,pp.259;1966,p.122;also1966,pp.34,53.41ThetheoremappearsinbothFrege’sBegriffsschriftandWhiteheadandRussell’sPrincipiaMathematica(1997,p.23).CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n196MICHAELLOSONSKY42Frege1960,p.64;Quine1980,p.27.SeeIshiguro1990,pp.17–43,whoarguesthatforLeibnizthiswasaprincipledefiningtheidentityofconcepts,notthesynonymyofexpressions.43SeeCouturat1901;Keynes1921;Carnap1950;Hacking1975;Daston1988.44CopenhaverandSchmitt1992,p.351.45Valla1962,vol.I,p.679.46Vives1782–90,vol.III,pp.41,53.47Bacon2000,p.16.48Ibid.,pp.17–18.49Bacon1973,p.134.50Decorpore,I.ii.1(1839,vol.I,p.13)51ThisappearstobeadeparturefromHobbes’searlierpositioninDecorpore,accordingtowhichthereclearlyissuchathingasreasoning“inoursilentthoughts,withouttheuseofwords”(I.i.3)(Hobbes1839,vol.I,p.3).OnthistensioninHobbes,seeLosonsky1993a.52ArnauldandLancelot1975,pp.41,65–68.53ArnauldandNicole1996,p.23.ArnauldandNicolegoontoclaimthatbecauseincommunicationwemustassociateideasandwords,“thishabitissostrongthatevenwhenwethinktoourselves,thingsarepresentedtothemindonlyinthewordsinwhichweusuallyclothetheminspeakingtoothers”(pp.23–24).This,however,istreatedonlyasahabit,andtheconclusiontheydrawisthattheyneedtoexaminehowideasandwordsarejoined,andnothowwordsarepresentedtothemindandplayaroleinreasoning.54Ibid.,p.26.55Ibid.,p.28.AnotherCartesianworkthatisdevotedprimarilytolan-guageisGe´rauddeCordemoy’sDiscoursphysiquedelaparole(APhilosophicalDiscourseconcerningSpeech)(1668).Cordemoyaimstoexaminespeechmorecloselyinordertobetterunderstandwhichaspectsoflanguageusecanbeattributedtothebodyaloneandwhichrequirearationalsoul.56Kretzmann1968,p.379.57Jolley1999,p.14.58Wolterstorff1996,p.227.59SeeLosonsky1989.60OntherelationbetweenLockeandHobbes,seeRogers1988.61Losonsky2007.62CompareJolley1999,whowrites:“Locke’smajorthesesconcerningthemetaphysicsandepistemologyofclassificationcanbeunderstoodindependentlyofhisteachingsaboutlanguage”(p.162;alsoseep.144).63SeeGuyer1994,p.116.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nLanguageandlogic19764Leibniz1981,p.47.65Aarsleff1982,p.42.66OnLeibnizandBo¨hme,seeAarsleff1982,pp.42–83;Losonsky1992and1993b.67Bo¨hme1956,vol.VI,p.4;also1963,vol.I,pp.58–59,208.InAcade-miarumExamen,ortheExaminationoftheAcademies(1653),the‘Behemist’JohnWebster(1610–82)suggeststhatthelanguageofnatureistheuniversalcharacteristicthatWilkinsandothersweretryingtoconstruct.WilkinsandthemathematicianSethWard(1617–89)respondedinVindiciaeacademiarum(1654),arguingagainstthepossi-bilityofalanguageofnatureanddefendingartificialuniversallan-guageprojects.SeeDebus1970;Aarsleff1982,p.262;Losonsky2001,pp.105–10.68AlsoseeLeibniz1903,pp.151–52.69ThemirrormetaphoralsoopensLeibniz’sposthumouslypublishedworkUnvorgreiflicheGedanken,betreffenddieAushebungundVerbesserungderteutschenSprache(“UnassumingThoughtsconcern-ingthePracticeandImprovementoftheGermanLanguage”):“Itisknownthatlanguageisthemirroroftheunderstanding,”andwhenunderstandingflourishes,sodoestheuseoflanguage(Leibniz1838–40,p.449).70L292;NewEss.,III.i.2.OntheconstitutiveroleofsymbolsinreasoninginLeibniz’sphilosophy,seeDascal1987;Losonsky2001,pp.160–63,171–73.71ForLeibniz,“thatissaidtoexpressathinginwhichtherearerelationswhichcorrespondtotherelationsofthethingexpressed”(L207).AlsoseeTheod.,}357andNewEss.,II.viii.13.72Rutherford1995b,pp.249–50.73Leibniz1903,p.351.74OnthedistinctionbetweensurfaceandunderlyingforminLeibniz,seeBrekle1971andDascal1987,pp.125–44.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nSUSANJAMES7ThepassionsandthegoodlifeIntroducinghisEssayontheNatureandConductofthePassionsandAffections,whichwaspublishedin1728,FrancisHutchesonremarkedthattheconclusionshewasabouttodefendwerenonetheworseforhavingbeen“taughtandpropagatedbythebestmenof1allages.”AmongtheviewsthatwriterssuchasHutchesonin-heritedwerevariousimagesofthegoodlife,somehandeddown2fromRomanantiquity,somederivedfromChristianity,andsome,3suchasMachiavelli’saccountofprincelyvirtu`,forgedincompara-tivelyrecenttimes.Whilethemostgeneraloftheseinterpretationsofferapictureofthegoodlifeforhumanity,ablueprintofthepatternsoffeelingandactiontowhichallmen(andinsomecasesarguablyallwomen)shouldaspire,othersareexplicitlyadjustedtopersonsofaparticulargender,class,orprofession,andtoindividualswhooccupyseveralrolesatonce.HandbookssuchasCicero’sDeofficiisnotonlyspecifywhatisinvolvedinbeingagoodfather,son,husband,ormagistrate,butalsoindicatehowthedemands4imposedbytheserelationshipscanbereconciled.Livingvirtuouslyisthereforepartlyamatterofexperiencingpassionsthatareheldtobeappropriatetoone’sstationanditsduties,andideallyconsistsinpossessingthemtojusttherightdegree.Furthermore,becauseanyoneroleisdefinedinrelationtoothers(thatofarulerinrelationtothatofacitizen,orthatofaservantinrelationtoamaster),thedemandsofaparticularofficeareimplicitlybothsocialandpolit-ical.Withfewexceptions,goodlivesareconceivedascontributingtoacooperativeexistencewithinanorganizedcommunity,andvirtuousindividualsarethereforeexpectedtobeemotionallycapableofengaginginarangeofcommonprojects.198CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife199Althoughitwasgenerallyacceptedthatparticularpatternsoffeelinghelptodefinespecificformsofthegoodlife,theexactnatureofthesepatternswasamuchmorecontentiousissue,andauthoritytopronounceonitwassharedbetweenanumberoftraditions,eachwithitsowninternaldisputesandcomplexities.Fromclassicaltimes,medicalspecialistshadbeenregardedasexpertsonthecausesandcontroloftheaffects,andtheyretainedthisrolethrough-outtheearlymodernera.Whilenovelaccountsofhumanphysi-ologyandpsychologyemergedwithinthisperiod,manyoftheseinnovationsdrewonlong-establishedorganizingprinciplessuchasthetheoryofthefourhumors,sothatlearneddoctorsretainedmuchoftheirestablishedpowertoexplicatethebodilycharacterofthe5passionsandspecifywhicharehealthy,andwhicharepathological.Atthesametime,Christiantheologiansofvariousdenomin-ationswereauthorizedtodeterminewhataffectivedispositionscharacterizeatrulyreligiousexistence.Inthisarena,theseventeenthcenturyinheritedadisputebequeathedbytheReformationbetweenRomanCatholictheologianswhodistinguishedthereligiousofficesofordinarypeoplefromthoseofindividualswhohaddedicatedthemselvestoreligion,andsomeProtestantswhoarguedthatevery-oneshouldaspiretothemoretaxingstandardsformerlyappliedsolelytopriestsandmembersofreligiousorders.Thequestionofhowfaragoodlifemustbedominatedbyaffectssuchashumilityandpiety,andthemannerinwhichtheseaffectsshouldbeexpressed,exercisedbothreligiousandpoliticalcommunities,andinsomecasesgenerateddisagreementsthatcontributedtowar.Finally,itwastakentobepartoftheofficeofthephilosophertoexplainwhatpartthepassionscouldplayinthequestforvirtueandwisdom.Theideathatvirtuedependsonself-knowledge,whichinturnincludesanunderstandingofone’spassions,hadanancientlineage.Buttheprecisenatureoftheknowledgeinvolvedwashotlydisputed,aswasthekindoflifeitvindicated.Onedimensionofthisdisagreement,whichbecameincreasinglyprominentinthecourseoftheseventeenthcentury,concernedtherelationshipbetweenethicalquestionsaboutvirtueandnaturalphilosophy.Foraphilosopher-scientistsuchasDescartes,itwasimportanttoshowhowacorrectgraspofphysicscouldyieldinsightsintotheoperationandcontrolofthepassions,andcouldthusrevealhowphysics6wasrelevanttoanunderstandingofthegoodlife.However,someCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n200SUSANJAMESofhisnearcontemporaries,amongwhomLockeisagoodexample,7remainedunconvincedbythisapproach.Wearefartooignorant,theyclaimed,abouttheworkingsofourownbodiesandgeneralphysicalprinciplestoseehowthesebearontheprojectoflivingvirtuously,butweareneverthelesscapableofarrivingatknowledgeofourselvesandthegoodlifebyreflectivemeans.Althoughtheethicaldimensionofthepassionscontinuedtobeexploredindistinctwayswithineachofthesetraditions–medical,theological,andphilosophical–theyneverthelessdrewonasharedbundleofclassicalandmedievaltheories,whichgaverisetoacom-monsenseoftheproblemstobeaddressed.Foremostamongthesewasthequestionofwhetherthepassionsaremorallygoodorbad,andthustheextenttowhichvirtuouspeopleneedtotranscendorcontrolthem.Whiletherewasnogenerallyagreedanswer,itwaswidelyacceptedthatthepassionsatleastsometimesneedtobemodifiedorredirected,andthisconvictiongaverisetoasecondproblem:howisthiscontroltobeachieved?Herevariousresponseswereoffered.Perhapsthemostinfluentialwastheviewthatthepassionscanbecontrolledbyreason,butthisanswerinturnledpeopletoaskhowfarreasoniscapableofmodifyingtheaffects.Ifitspowerisrelativelylimited,asmanytheoristsmaintained,perhapsitismorefruitfultouseonepassiontomodifyanother.Theoppositionbetweenreasonandpassionaroundwhichthisdebatewasorganizeddominateddiscussionthroughouttheearlymodernperiod,butinthecourseoftheseventeenthcenturyitbegantobecomprehen-sivelyreexamined.Asaresult,thenotionofapassionwasprogres-sivelyreconfigured,andaccountsofthepsychologicalconditionsonwhichvirtuedependedacquiredanevengreatercomplexity.Statesthatwenowdescribeasemotions,suchaslove,hatred,grief,orjoy,wereusuallyclassifiedbyseventeenth-centurywritersaspassions(inLatinpassionesorperturbationes)orasaffects(inLatin8affectiones),termsthatwereoftentreatedasinterchangeable.Inusingtheword‘passion,’authorsalludedtoadistinctionbetweenpassionandactionthathadplayedacentralpartinGreekandRomanphilosophyandcontinuedtobedebated.Forexample,Hobbes,Descartes,andMalebrancheareamongalargegroupofthinkerswhoengagedwithAristotle’sviewthat,whenonebodybringsaboutachangeinasecond,aswhenastovewarmssomeone’sCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife201hand,thefirstisactiveandthesecondpassive.Thestoveissaidtoactwhenitwarmsthehand,whilethehandhassomethingdoneto9itwhenitiswarmed.Toundergoapassionisthereforetobechangedbyanexternalobjectorstateofaffairs,andforearlymodernwritersthisremainedadefiningfeatureofapassionoraffect.Wheneverweexperiencejoy,grief,orhopeweareactedonbysomethingexternal,andareinthissensepassive.Asaresult,pas-sionswereunderstood,bothetymologicallyandmetaphysically,asresponsestothewaythatthingsimpingeuponusfromoutside,andthisideawastakenupinastringofmetaphorsthatrepresentusas10blownabout,moved,weigheddown,orsweptawaybypassion.Thecapacitytoexperienceaffectsisthereforeacapacitytore-spondtotheworld,aboveallthosefeaturesofitthatwecansee,hear,smell,touch,ortaste.Itistrue,asLockeinparticularpointedout,thatsomepassionsdonotseemtofallintothesecategories;forexample,onemightbedisgustedorattractedbysomethingabstract,11suchasaparticularconceptionofthegoodlife.Nevertheless,itwasgenerallyagreedthatthemostpowerfulaffectsareresponsestosensoryexperiences,andthattheseareusuallystrongerthanthosecausedbyrecollectionsofsuchexperiences,orfantasiesaboutthem.AsMalebrancheremarks,“thesoulismoreoccupiedbyasimplepinprickthanbyloftyspeculations,andthepleasuresandillsofthisworldmakefarmoreofanimpressiononitthanthe12dreadfulpainsorinfinitepleasuresofeternity.”Thisorientationtothesensibleworldenablesthepassionstofulfilltheirfunction,whichistohelpussurvive.Bypromptingustoavoidsituationsthatstrikeusasharmful,aswhenfearmovesustoflee,andtoseekoutsituationsthatweviewasbeneficial,aswhenhopeencouragesustoputupwithhardship,theaffectsmakeusalivetothedangersandbenefitsthattheworldpresents.Evenbeforeweareborn,manyearlymoderntheoristsbelieved,wearecapableofexperiencingcertainprimitivepassionswhichmayshapeoursubsequentdevel-13opment;andthesemostbasicformsofresponsearerapidlyextendedandmodifiedbyourpostnatalexperience,aswenotonlylearnwhattoloveandwhattobeafraidof,butalsodeveloptheabilitytoexperienceawiderrepertoireofaffects.Adults,unlikeneonatesorverysmallchildren,arecapableoffeelingthedifferencebetweenbenevolenceandcompassion,orshameandguilt,andwilloftenexperiencecomplexblendsofpassionsastheyrespondtoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n202SUSANJAMESmultifacetedsituations.Moreover,becauseanindividual’saffectsareshapedbyarangeoffactorssuchastheirbodilyconstitution,history,andeducation,eachpersondevelopsapassionatecharacteroftheirownwhichisinaconstantprocessofchange.Althoughtwoindividualswhohavegrownupinthesamecultureorfamilymayhavemorepassionatedispositionsincommonthanapairofstrangers,andalthoughearlymodernwritersnevertireofcontrast-ingthepassionatetempersofpeopleofdifferentnationalities,theyneverthelessinsistthateachindividualrespondsaffectivelytotheworldintheirownparticularway.Byenablingustoapprehendstatesofaffairsasbroadlybeneficialorharmful,orasamixtureofboth,ouraffectsgivenormativecolortooursensoryexperienceandprovidethebasisofourcapacitytomakeevaluativedistinctions.Thisbeingso,shouldwenotviewthemwithadmirationandgratitude?Someseventeenth-centurywritersdoindeedpraisethemonthesegrounds,admiringtheirusefulnessandwonderingataGodwhohasdevisedsuchintricate14survivalmechanisms;butmostauthorsregardthemwithdeepsuspicionandambivalence.Whiletheyacknowledgethatwecouldnotmanagewithoutaffectsorsomecomparableformofresponsive-ness,theyneverthelessemphasizethattheyprovideonlyacrudemoralcompasswhichoftenleadsusastray.Theinaccuracyandunreliabilityoftheevaluationscontainedinourpassionsissaidtostemfromthreelooselyconnectedaspectsofthewaytheyfocusonthehereandnow.First,aswehavealreadyseen,theyfixonthesensiblepropertiesoftheworldattheexpenseofitsotherfeatures;forexample,thefactthatamanlooksfrighten-ingtomeislikelytobeenoughtomakemefearhim,evenifheinfactposesnothreat.Atthesametime,passionsareheldtobeintrinsicallyforcefulandimpetuous,sothatthereissomethingcommandingaboutmyfearthatpreventsmefromquestioningit.Finally,ourpassionstendtobedirectedtowardourpresentexperiences,ratherthantothepastorfuture,sothatthepleasuresofthemomentcanobliterateprudentfearsaboutthemorrow,just15asapresentsadnesscandriveoutthememoryofpastjoys.Com-mandingandinconstantastheyare,ouraffectspromptustoactinwaysthatarefarfromjudiciousorvirtuous,andourinabilitytocontrolthemplacesusatthemercyofapartofourselvesthatisbothmorallyandmetaphysicallydoubtful.Inextremecases,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife203peoplewhoactontheirpassionsareself-destructiveanddangeroustoothers,andevenindividualswhoseaffectsarecomparativelymoderatewillgenerallybepreytocertainpassionateimpulsesthatthreatentheirvirtueanddisrupttheharmonyoftheirsocialrelationships.Pessimismabouttheethicalvalueofthepassionspervadesmanygenresofearlymodernwriting,andgainsparticularlystrongsupportfromPlatonistandStoictraditions,aswellasfromtheChristiandoctrineoftheFall.Malebranche,forinstance,reiteratestheAugustinianviewthat,beforeAdamandEvewereexpelledfromtheGardenofEden,theirpassionswereforcefulenoughtoprotectthemfromharmbutnotsostrongastodistractthemfromtheone16truegood,namelyGod.Itispartofhumanity’spunishmentfororiginalsinthatourpassionsarenowmuchstrongerandmorecompellingthantheywere,sothatanyattempttoleadagoodlifeisanunremittingstruggle,andthetaskofovercomingorcounter-actingouraffectsisacentralaspectofanygoodlife.Underlyingthisviewistheassumptionthatthecapacitytolivewellrestsonanabilitytoconformtocertainnorms,whichinturnrequiresacon-siderabledegreeofself-discipline.Theinconstancyofthepassions,combinedwiththeirforcefulnessandimpetuousness,thereforemakesthemanobstacletovirtuebyunderminingthesteadfastnessthatisoneofitsessentialcharacteristics.Moreover,theabilitytolivevirtuouslyis,ideallyspeaking,theabilityconsistentlytodotherightthing,notjustforoneselfbutforeveryoneconcerned.Indecidinghowtoact,avirtuouspersonmustthereforetakeaccountofarangeofinterests,claims,andcircumstances,andwherethesearecomplicated,mustbecapableofadjudicatingbetweenthem.Onceagain,thepassionsareheldtostandinthewayofthisprocessbygivingusapartialandmisleadingconceptionofthestatesofaffairsweencounter.Becauseone’saffectiveresponsesanswertoone’sowncharacterandexperience,theyembodyanindividualviewpoint;andalthoughthisneednotbenarrowlyself-interested,itlacksthedistancethatisoftentakentocharacterizevirtuousjudgments.Mypassionstellme,forexample,whatIfindlovableoradmirableinaparticularsituation,ratherthanassessingitfromtheimpersonalpositionthatAdamSmithwouldlaterdescribeas17thatoftheimpartialspectator.Theythuslackanessentialkindofinsightonwhichagoodlifedepends.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n204SUSANJAMESIfthepassionsareethicallywanting,asthisaccountsuggests,theyneedtobecontrolledormanipulated.Buthowcanthisbedone?Whattherapeutictechniquescanbeusedtomodifyourpas-18sionatenaturesandbringtheminlinewithvirtue?Takingupanotherclassicalcommonplace,manywritersbasedtheiranswers,aswehaveseen,ontheassumptionthatthemostpowerfulmeansofmodifyingouraffectsistomakeuseofourcapacitytoreason.Theythenwentontoexploretheoperationsthatpurportedlyen-abledreasontokeepthepassionsincheck.Conceivingofitasakindofforceopposedto,andpotentiallystrongerthan,thepassions,theytendedtointerpretreason’spowerassimultaneouslyphysical,epistemological,andpsychological.Descartes’sPassionsoftheSoulcontainsaninfluentialversionofthefirstoftheseapproaches.Reasoning,Descartesargues,givesrisetovolitions,whichhavephysicaleffectsthataresometimescapableofcounteringthebodilymotionsthatconstitutepassions.Whenonewillsoneselftoactinaparticularway,onecreatesaflowofanimalspiritswithinthebody,andwhentheseareforcefulenoughtorepulseacontrary,passionate19flow,thepassioninquestiongiveswaytothevolition.Althoughpassionscanbetoostrongforthewilltocontrol,sothatthetech-niqueisnotalwayssuccessful,volitionsgroundedonrationaleth-icaljudgmentscancontaintheaffectsandplayapartinenablingustolivevirtuously.Ifthismechanismistowork,rationaljudgmentsmustproducestrongvolitions,andinexplaininghowtheydosoDescartesreliesonthefurtherandpopularassumptionthatthereissomethinguni-quelyepistemologicallycompellingaboutthefruitsofreasoning.Inhisversionofthisargument,thestep-by-steppatternsofinfer-enceonwhichclearanddistinctideasaregroundedendowthemwithcertainty,andourgraspoftheirepistemologicalstatusinturnenablesthemtofunctionasacounterweighttothejudgmentsembodiedinpassions.Whenonepossessesaclearanddistinctidea,itisdifficulttoignoreitorfailtotakeitintoaccount,andthesequalitiesareoftenreflectedinthestrengthofthevolitionstowhichitgivesrise.Onceagain,theprocessisnotfoolproof,andonecanlosesuchrationalinsightsasonehasgained.Butapersonwhoseethicaljudgmentsarerationallygroundedisneverthelessrelativelywellequippedtocontroltheirdeviantpassions.Furthermore,accordingtoawidespreadpsychologicalview,theywillbeassistedCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife20520bythefactthatreasoninginitselfisexceptionallypleasurable.Justasourperceptionsofsensibleobjectsareboundupwithpas-sion,sotheprocessesofrationalthoughtgiverisetoakindofnonpassionatejoycapableofoffsettingandcounteractingit.Reasonisthusendowedwithvariouskindsofforcethathelptoexplainhowitcanimposeorderontheunrulyaffects,eitherbyopposingunvir-tuousfeelingsandtheactionstheyengender,orbyendorsingandencouragingpassionsthatareintunewiththegoodlife.Thisconceptionofthehumansoulasdividedbetweenreasonandpassion,thefirstindicativeofthetrueselfandthesecondofexter-nalinvasion,continuedtodominatemuchseventeenth-centuryphilosophy.However,itwasalwaysembeddedinadebateabouthowfarsuchsubjectionwasethicallydesirable.Atoneendofthespectrum,writersindebtedtoStoicismviewedthepassionsaserro-neousjudgments,andarguedthatreasonoughtinprincipletotran-scendthemcompletely.Peoplewhoprogressivelyovercometheirpassionsbycultivatingarationalandcorrectunderstandingoftheworldaregraduallyreleasedfromtheemotionalupsanddownsofapassionatelife,andcometoexperienceastateofjoyfultranquilityorataraxia.Atasteofthiskindofjoycreatesadesiretosustainitbyextendingone’sunderstandingstillfurther,andurgedonbythesetwointellectualemotions,joyanddesire,theindividualgraduallyachievesaperspectivefromwhichthedelightsandsorrowsoftheirpreviousexistenceappearinsignificant.Virtuethusconsistsinun-derstanding,andmoralperfectionliesinakindofindifferenceorinsensibilitytoeventsthatmightnormallybeexpectedtoprovoke21suchpassionsasgrief,hope,orsadness.Eventhemostrigorousearlymodernneo-Stoicstreatedthiseth-icalviewasanidealtobeaspiredtoratherthanaconditionthatcanfullybeachieved,andonlyclaimedthatweshouldtrytotranscendthepassionsasfaraspossible.Nevertheless,manyoftheiroppon-entsvehementlyrepudiatedthisposition,onthegroundsthatapersonwhofailstofeelsorrow,anger,orfearinthefaceofcatas-tropheisamonsterratherthanasage,ablockratherthanahuman22being.Thispowerfulcriticismwaswidelyaccepted;butanumberofauthorscontinuedtobeattractedbytheStoicviewthatreasoninggeneratesadistinctformofemotionalengagementwhichcanmodifyandsometimesextinguishpassion.WriterssuchasDes-cartesandSpinoza,whoindifferentwaysregardthepassionsasCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n206SUSANJAMESbodilyphenomenathatareanineradicableandmorallynecessary23partofhumanlife,writepositivelyabouttheemotionalsatisfac-tionandcontrolthatreasoninggenerates.TherearethereforetracesofStoicismintheCartesiancontentionthatthepleasurewederivefromunderstandingencouragesustoformrationaljudgmentsthatrevealthetheoreticalandpracticallimitationsofourpassions.AndthesameistrueoftheSpinozisticclaimthat,althoughthepassionsarealwayswithus,aphilosophicalunderstandingofourselvesandtheworldbothtranscendsthemandprovideswaysofcontrollingpassions,sothatreasoningreducestheirpowertomonopolizeour24feelingsanddetermineouractions.UnconvincedofthebenefitsofthedrastictherapyrecommendedbytheStoics,manyphilosophersadheredtothebroadlyAristotelianviewthatthepassionsformanintegralpartofagoodlife.Avirtuouspersonwillexperiencethewholerangeofpassions,positiveandnegative,buttheobjectsandintensityoftheirfeelingswillalwaysbeappropriate;theirangerwillalwaysberighteous,theiradmir-ationwillnevershadeoverintoadulation,theirgenerositywillbeatjusttherightpitch.Reasoningcanhelpustoattainthiscondi-tionbyteachinguswhatvirtueconsistsinandwhatweshouldbeaimingfor,andcanalsogiveussomecriticaldistanceonourpassions.Aswelearnwhattheworldisreallylike,wecometoappreciatetheshortsightednessandpartialityinherentintheaffects,andthisitselfcanchangeus.Totakeasimplecase,onceIknowthatthespeciesofspiderthatterrifiesmeisinfactharmless,Imayfeellessafraid.Sinceourpassionsaremoldedbyourunderstand-ingofgeneraltruths,aswellasbyourindividual,embodiedexperi-ence,rationallygroundedknowledgemayalterouraspirationssothatgoalswhichusedtoattractusceasetodoso,andfeelingsbywhichweusedtosetgreatstoreceasetobesatisfying.Partoftheattractionofthisapproachisthatitrepresentsgoodlivesascontinuouswithlessgoodones,andmakesvirtuecorrespondinglyeasiertoimagine.Moralimprovementisheldtoconsistinrefiningandredirectingtheaffectswithwhichordinarypeoplearealreadyacquainted,ratherthaninacquiringunfamiliarintellectualemo-tions,andthisalsopreservesadiverseemotionallandscapeofsorrowsaswellasjoys.Thisanalysisconsequentlyclaimedawiderangeofadherents,whocontinuedtoexploreitindetailthroughoutCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife207theseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies,anddefendeditagainstavarietyofcriticisms.Someofthemoststraightforwardobjectionstotheirstanceem-phasizedthesheerdifficultyofgettingindividualsandcommunitiestobringtheiraffectsunderrationalcontrol,andintroducedanoteofpessimismabouttheextenttowhichreasoncaninfactsubduethepassions.Inthefirstplace,assomeskepticalwriterspointedout,itisuselesstopretendthatreasoningisespeciallypleasurableandcontainsitsownaffectivesourceofmotivation.Thetruthisthatitisexceptionallyarduous,andalsogratesontheimagination,sothatmostpeoplearerepelledbywhatPhilipSidneydescribesas25its“thornyarguments”and“baserule.”Itisthereforeamistaketothinkthattheartofdemonstrationcanprovideapracticalcoun-terweighttoantisocialpassions,andcaninducepeopleofordinarytalentstocultivatethekindofunderstandingthatpromotesvirtue.Onemightfeel,asmanyearlymodernphilosophersdid,thatthisaccountexaggeratesthedifficultyoflearningtoberational.Butevenifreasoningisnotasunattractiveasitsuggests,theobjectionpointstoafurtherissueabouttheextenttowhichthecapacitytocontrolthepassionsdependsoneducation,andcanthereforeonlybeattainedbyasmallandpredominantlymaleelite.Inthefaceofageneralconsensusthatuneducatedpeoplearepronetoantisocialpassions(manifested,forexample,insomeofSpinoza’sremarks26aboutthevulgusorcrowd)andthatpartofthepointofeducationistocorrectarangeofnaturalflaws(asexplained,forinstance,by27FrancisBaconinhisanalysisoftheidols),itmadesensetocon-siderhowfarreasoningisinpracticecapableofpreventingpeople’saffectsfromdisruptingsocialandpoliticallife.Confrontedbytheclaimthatappealstoreasonarelargelyuse-less,evenauthorswhoheldadarkviewofthepassionssometimesprotestedthateveryonepossessessomeabilitytothinkcriticallyabouttheiraffects.Hobbes,forexample,takeshumanstoberaven-28ousforthekindsofpowerthatwillguaranteetheirsecurity,butneverthelessarguesinDecivethateveryonehascalmermomentsinwhichtheprocessofusingrationaljudgmenttomodifythepassionscanatleastgetstarted.Asheemphasizes,theabilitytograspthelawsortheoremsthatspecifythenatureofthegoodlife“teachesgoodmannersorvirtues”byalteringourdesiresand29theaffectsassociatedwiththem.Toagreatextent,thistypeofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n208SUSANJAMESviewdominatedseventeenth-centurydebatesabouttheefficacyofreasoningandmarginalizedthedoubtsofthosewhosuspectedthatitspracticalimpactwouldnormallybenegligible.However,itexistedalongsidetheologicallygroundedformsofskepticism,whichviewedreasonasinefficacious,andrecommendedtheuseofsomeextra-rationalsourceofknowledgeasthesolemeansofarrivingatatrueunderstandingofthegood.Anenormouslyinfluen-tialversionofthisstancehadbeenarticulatedbyLuther,whoarguedthat,sincereasoncannotenlightenusastohowGodwishesustoact,theonlywaytoattainvirtueistocultivateapassivefaithinthedeity,whomaythengraceindividualswithakindofunmer-itedrighteousness.Righteousnessthereforereplacesvirtueastheidealtobestrivenfor,andaconceptionofthegoodlifeasthefruitofanactiveprocessoflearningandself-disciplinegiveswaytotheideathatonemustpracticeanunreasoningfaithinthehopethatGod30willinstillinusthegracethatenablesustobesaved.ThisdenigrationofreasonremainedacentralthemeofearlymodernProtestantism,andalsotookholdamongagroupofFrench31CatholicwritersinfluencedbytheworkofCorneliusJansen.AccordingtothegreatestoftheJansenists,BlaisePascal,theFallhaslefthumanbeingsinaflawedcondition.Ontheonehand,wearecapableofreasoningandcancomprehendtheadvantagesofthecertaintyitpromisestosupply.Ontheotherhand,itisadelu-siontobelievethatreasoningcanyieldknowledgeofthegood.Wethereforefindourselvestornbetweenayearningforaknowledgeofvirtue,andarecognitionthatitisbeyondus.“Weperceiveanimageofthetruthandpossessnothingbutfalsehood,beingequallyincap-ableofabsoluteignoranceandcertainknowledge;soobviousisitthatweonceenjoyedadegreeofperfectionfromwhichwehave32unhappilyfallen.”Theonlymeansofescapingfromthisdilemmaistosubmittofaith,recognizingthatGodwillhelpindividualswhosetthemselvestobelievethecentraltruthsoftheChristianreligionbygivingthemanoverwhelmingdesiretolovehimandleadapiouslife,andthatthisinturnwillenablethemtoconformtothelawsofChristianmoralitythatconstitutethetruegood.Pascalacknow-ledgesthatthepassionsaredestructiveofbothreasonandpiety,butheinterpretstheconvictionthatwecanusereasontoquashthemasoneaspectofanundueprideandarrogancethatisitselfaconse-quenceoforiginalsin.OurbusyattemptstoreasonourwaytoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife209ethicaltruthsandamoralwayoflifeareself-defeating,becausetheydivertusfromthecentralityoffaith,andensurethatoureffortsto33conformtothegoodarefrustrated.Reason,then,doesnothelpustocontrolthepassionsandlivewell;insteaditdistractsusfromcultivatingthepietyandsubmissivenessthataretheonlymeanstovirtue.Pascal’ssuggestionthathumanscanmoveinthedirectionofvirtuebyfosteringaparticularsetofaffectsdrawsonafurtherdeeplyentrenchedview:thatthebestwaytodealwiththepassionsistouseonetocontrolanother.Theveryfactthatweexperiencesucharangeofaffectsis,sosomewriterssuggest,evidenceofGod’sbenevolentintentiontohelpustowardvirtue.AsJean-Franc¸oisSenaultexplains,“Thouemployestfeartotakeoffacovetousmanfromthoseperishablericheswhichpossesshim;thoumakestaholyuseofdespairtowithdrawfromtheworldacourtier,whoseyouthhasbeenmisemployedintheserviceofsomeprince;thoumakestanadmirableuseofdisdaintoextinguishtherewithalover’sflames,34whoisenslavedbyaproudbeauty.”Whetherornottheywerepersuadedbythisinterpretationofouraffectiveconstitutions,earlymodernauthorsworkinginawiderangeofgenresexploredthetechniquesandprinciplesthatcouldbeusedtomodifymorallydeviantpassions.WeseethisatatheoreticallevelinaworksuchasSpinoza’sEthics,whichsetsoutthecentralpsychologicalprin-ciplesaroundwhichthepassionsarepurportedlyorganized,andchartstherelationsbetweentheoperationsofsympathy(aswhenexposuretosomeoneelse’ssadnessmakesmesad),ofanimosity(aswhenIcompetewithyouforsomeoneelse’slove),andofassoci-ation(aswhenyourresemblancetosomeoneIlovemakesmefeel35loveforyouaswell).Anunderstandingofthesecausalrelation-shipscanhelpustomanipulateourownandother’saffects,andenableustodeveloptechniquesforrestrainingormodifyingthem,36forinstancebyformulatingandappealingtomaxims.Descartescomparesthisapproachwithtrainingdogs,thusremindinghisreadersthatmodifyingapassionisamatterofcreatingabodily37change,andgoesontodescribesomeoftheindirectwaysinwhichsoldiers,forexample,canlearntosuppressfearandreplaceitwithdeterminationandhope.Whileonecannotwilloneselftofeelbrave,hepointsout,onecandiscoverthroughexperiencethatcertainactionshavetheeffectofbolsteringone’scourage,andcantrainCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n210SUSANJAMES38oneselftoperformthembeforeabattle.Thisexample,interpol-atedinatheoreticaltreatise,focusesononeofalargenumberoftypesofdisciplinarypracticethatmadeupthefabricofordinarylife,someofwhichwereformalizedinmanualsofreligiousmedita-3940tion,inrulesforgivingsermons,inbooksofadvicetocourtiers4142andgentlemen,ininstructionsforeducatingchildren,andsoon.Inallthesegenreswefindmoreorlessexplicitanalysisofbodilyandpsychologicalproceduresbywhichthepassionscanbemolded,andindividualswiththevirtuousdispositionsrequiredbyspecific43officescreated.Fewcommentatorsdeniedthatthisapproachtotheproblemofcontrollingthepassionswascapableofbringingaboutmoralim-provement,andwassometimessufficienttoinducepeopletoactwell.Forinstance,althoughthesoldiersofDescartes’sexamplemightfailtomakethemselvesutterlyproofagainstfearandcow-ardice,theymightneverthelessgenerateenoughcouragetofightvaliantlyinallthebattlestheyencountered.Butinordertousedisciplinarytechniquesintheserviceofvirtue,oneobviouslyhadtoknowwhatpassionatedispositionsagoodliferequires,andheremanytheoristscontinuedtoappealtoreason.Onlyreasoning,theybelieved,couldtellonewhattoaimfor,thoughoncethisgoalhadbeenspecified,practicalexperimentandtrainingofthepassionscouldhelponetoachieveit.Thishybridviewremainedextremelycommon,butinthecourseoftheseventeenthcenturythefunda-mentaloppositionbetweenreasonandpassiononwhichitrestswassubjectedtoaprofoundchallenge,whichbegantoalterthetermsofphilosophicaldebateandtoopenupaseriesoffreshquestionsabouttherelationbetweenvirtueandtheaffects.TheinitialstepsinthisinnovativelineofargumentcanbetracedtotheworkofThomasHobbes,andparticularlytoLeviathanwhere,ratherthanconcedingintraditionalstylethattherearetwosourcesofhumanmotivation,passionandreason,Hobbesarguesthatthereisonlyone.Thepassions,heclaims,alonemotivateustoact,sinceourabilitytoreasondependsonthestrengthofourpassio-natedesireforvariousformsofpower,suchaswealth,knowledge,orhonor.Astrongandsteadydesireforpowermotivatesustoinvestourenergyinworkingouthowtogetitbymakingdistinctions,formulatingdefinitions,andcarefullyconsideringwhatfollowsfromthem.Takentogether,thesecapacitiesproducewhatHobbesCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife211callsjudgment,sothataperson’scapacityforjudgmentrestsultim-44atelyontheirpassionatetemperament.Thisargumentcontainstwocrucialclaims.First,theonlyforcethatmovesustoreasonisdesire,andthereisnothingspecialaboutthedefinitionsandinfer-encesofwhichreasoningconsiststhatenablesthemtoholdourattention.Secondly,sincetheprocessofreasoningdoesnotinduceadistinctkindoffeeling,suchastheintellectualpleasuretowhichsomephilosophersappealed,ourinterestinitvarieswithourpas-sions.Ournaturalinclinationtopreserveourselvesbymaintainingorincreasingourpowerincludesadispositiontofindoutaboutcausesandeffects,whichmanifestsitselfinthepassionofcuriosity,45andthiscanbeexercisedwithmoreorlesssophistication.WhileeveryoneisatleastalittlecuriousandpossessesadegreeofwhatHobbescallsprudence,ortheabilitytolearnaboutcausesandeffectsfromexperience,certainindividualshaveaparticularlystrongdesireforpowerwhichpromptsthemtodevelopamoreextensiveandreliablegraspofcausalrelations.Reasoningisthusanenhancedversionofauniversalinclinationtocultivateprudence,andisrootedinthesamepassionatedesireforpower.Ratherthanstandingoveragainstthepassions,itdependsonthem;andwhentheendswedesiretoachieveareaggressiveandantisocial,asHobbesbelievestheyoftenare,reasondoesnotstruggleagainstthem,butfights,sotospeak,ontheirside.Ifreasonisinert,inthesensethatrationalinferencesdonotthemselvesmotivateus,itcannotbethemostactiveandgodlikeofourcapacities,ortheultimatemeansbywhichweacquireandexercisecontroloverourselvesandtheworld.Butbydispensingwiththesetraditionalviews,Hobbesplaceshimselfinapositionthatmanyofhiscontemporariesfounddeeplytroubling,aboveallbecauseofitsethicalimplications.Ifreasoningonlyservesourpassions,andifourpassionsareoftentumultuousandmisguided,howarewetolivewell?Hobbes’sownansweragainharksbacktotheaffectiveelementsinhumannature.Thestrongestofhumandesires,heclaims,isthedesiretoliveinaconditionwhereoneisnotplaguedbyfearsofinsecurity,andtheforceofthispassionregularlypromptsustoreasonourwaytotheconclusionthatthebestwaytogainsafetyistotrytolivepeacefullywithothers.Sincethisisinfactthegreatestgoodforhumanbeings,agoodlifemustbeonedevotedtoacooperativequestforpeace,andourpassion-ledCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n212SUSANJAMESinferencesarelikelytoleadustothisconclusion.Unfortunately,thisargumentseemedtomanyofHobbes’sreaderstocontainaloophole.Ifourstrongestpassionsleadustopursueourownsecur-ity,theyobjected,andifthewaytoattainsecurityis(atleastinsomecircumstances)toattackothers,whatstandsinthewayoftheconclusionthatunprovokedaggressionmaybeanelementofa46goodlife?TheproblemsposedbyHobbes’sworkgavefreshimpetustoinquiriesintotherelationbetweenthepassionsandvirtue.Hisclaimthatouraffectsleadustobehaveinwaysthatarecompetitiveandantisocial,andthatreasonhasnoindependentpowertopreventthisoutcome,weresubjectedtoavarietyofcriticisms.Onewaytodealwiththefirstofthesecontentionswastodenythepremiseandinsistthathumansarenotsobadafterall.AccordingtotheEarlofShaftesbury,forinstance,thereisnoneedtoassumethatpassionatedispositionswhichemergeindesperatecircumstances–“undermonstrousvisagesofdragons,leviathans,andIknownotwhatdevouringentities”–arealwaysdominant,andthusthathuman47beingsareinvariablydrivenbyaggressivedesires.Oneshouldalsoacknowledgetheroleofsuchaffectsasloveandbenevolence,whichmoveustotakepleasureinthehappinessofothers,andtobehavein48thebroadlycooperativefashionusuallyheldtobevirtuous.Thislineofresponsehelpedtosparkoffalivelyeighteenth-centurydebateastowhetherornothumansarenaturallysociable,inthecourseofwhichShaftesbury’sviewwassubjectedtoanumberofrefinementsandcriticisms.AmongitsmostenthusiasticopponentswasBernardMandeville,whoregardedself-interestasthedriving49forcebehindallhumanaction.AndamongitsmostenthusiasticsupporterswasFrancisHutcheson,whodevelopedanelaborateaccountofthementalcapacitiesthatinclineandencourageustolivevirtuously.Tounderstandhumannatureadequately,Hutchesonproposed,weneedtorecognizethat,inadditiontothefeelingsofpleasureandpainproducedbythefiveexternalsenses,humansalsoexperienceseveralfurtherkindsofsensation.Theytakeaspecificformofplea-sureinobjectsthatcombinevarietyanduniformityinsuchawayastobebeautiful;andtheyderivethreeadditionaltypesofpleasurefromhumancharactersandactions.Apublicsensecausesustogainsatisfactionfromotherpeople’spleasure,andtofeeldissatisfactionCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife213attheirdistress;amoralsensepromptsustotakepleasureinstatesofmindintendedtopromotehappinessordiminishpain;andasenseofhonorinclinesustofeelpleasedwhenotherpeopleexpress50theirgratitudeforourmorallygoodactions.Together,thesethreesensesgiverisetoourconceptionofthegood,andcauseustoexperiencedesiresandaversionsfortheobjectstowhichtheyaredirected.Hutchesonfurtherarguesthatbenevolence,theinclin-ationtoincreasethehappinessofothersthatconstitutesourmoral51sense,isaninstinct“antecedenttoallreasonfrominterest.”Sinceitunderpinsarangeofsociableaffections,humansarenaturallydisposedtobeconcernedforoneanother’shappiness,andtogainpleasurefromsatisfyingeachother’sdesires.AlthoughHutchesondoesnotdenythatpeoplearesubjecttoselfishorantisocialimpulses,hisremappingofthemindincorpor-atestwofeaturesdesignedtominimizetheirimpact.First,hesep-aratestheaffectionsarousedbythevarioussensesfrompassions,which,onhisaccount,areaccompaniedbyviolentbodilymotions52thatobstructreflection.ThisredefinitionmakesthepassionsintrinsicallyinimicaltovirtueasHutchesonconceivesit,andcom-parativelymarginaltoeverydaylife.Themainthingpeoplehavetodoinordertoactwellisthereforetocontroltheweaker,selfishaffections,andheretheycanrelyonbothreasonandhabituation,aswellasonthepromptingsofmoralandpublicsense.Secondly,Hutchesonabandonsthewidelyheldviewthatdesireandaversionarespeciesofpassion;thesetwo,heremarks,“leaddirectlyto53actionandarewhollydistinctfromallsortofsensation.”Thissteppreparesthewayforthefurtherclaimthathumansareequippedwithcalmdesires,devoidofpleasantorunpleasantsensa-tions,whichenablethemtorespondtothebenevolentpromptings54ofmoralsense.Onceagain,thecausesofwaywardandpotentiallydisruptiveformsofbehavioraredistinguishedfromthoseofsociableactions,andpriorityisgiventopsychologicalresourcesthatinclineustovirtue.Thetaskofcombatingexcessiveorinappropriatepas-sionsisnolongerconceivedasbelongingprincipallytoreason,topassion,ortoacombinationofthetwo,butissupportedbyafurtherpairofnaturalcapacities,themoralsenseandcalmdesire.Humanspossessresourcesthatpurporttoberelativelyfreefromtheinaccur-acyandinstabilitythathadbeenassociatedwiththepassionssinceancienttimes,andwhichattunethemtosociability.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n214SUSANJAMESThestrategiesunderlyingHutcheson’sreconfigurationofthemindweretakenupinaseriesofeighteenth-centuryattemptstoexploretheplaceofthepassionsinbothself-interestedandbenevo-lentbehavior.AmongthemostinfluentialofthesewastheworkofDavidHume,whoincorporatedsomeofHutcheson’sinsightsintoanovel,andonthefaceofthingsmorethreatening,analysisofthespringsofaction.Inastrikingopeningmove,HumerevertstoHobbes’sanalysisoftheimpotenceofreasonand,reversingortho-doxywitharhetoricalflourishthatHobbeswouldhaveadmired,55pronouncesreasontobetheslaveofthepassions.Ratherthanbeingourmostactivecapacity,asgenerationsofphilosophershadclaimed,reasoningdoesnotmoveus,andisitselfactivatedbypassion;thus,ifaman’spassionsweretomakehimmoreaversetothescratchingofhisfingerthantothedestructionoftheworld,56reasonwouldbepowerlesstointervene.Asthismelodramaticexampleindicates,Humewasanxioustoemphasizethestartlingimplicationsoftheviewthatthereisagulfbetweenreasonandaction;butwhereasHobbeshadcombinedthisinsightwithableakanalysisofthepassionatedispositionsthatmotivateus,Hume’sgentlerpsychologyowesagooddealtoHutcheson.Althoughhedoesnotshrinkfromclassifyingphenomenasuchaspride,humil-ity,love,orhatredaspassions,hisaccountofthemannerinwhichtheyoperateallowsthattheycanjustaseasilymoveustovirtuousastoviciousbehavior.Hume’saccountoftheprincipalmechanismsgoverningthepas-sionsisdrawnfromtheworkofMalebranche.Malebranchehadofferedasystematicinterpretationoftheworkingofcomparison(ourdispositiontofeelsuchpassionsaspride,humility,esteem,orcontemptwhenwecompareourselvestoothers)andofsympathy(ourinclinationtorespondtothepassionsandsituationsofothers,aswhensomeoneelse’shappinessmakesusglad,ortheirexploit-57ationmakesusangry).Hisaccounthaddweltonthepotentiallycompetitiveanddestructiveconsequencesofcomparison,andal-thoughHumetakesovermuchofitsstructure,heisatpainstoarguethatthesenegativeeffectsarelimitedandconfinedbyourdis-positiontosympathizewiththejoyorsadnessofthosearoundus.Hethusportraysindividualswhosenaturaldispositionsarealreadymoderatelysociable,andwho,althoughtheyarenotimmunetopassionssuchascontemptorenvy,areneverthelessdisposedtoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife21558rejoiceinthewell-beingofothersandtosharetheirsuffering.Asaresult,amorallycommendablelifedoesnothavetobelivedagainstthegrainofhumannature.Byanalyzingthepsychologicalresourceswithwhichhumanbeingsareendowed,thephilosopherswehavebeenconsideringstrovetodefinethebasisonwhichourcapacityforvirtuousactionrests,andthelimitsabovewhichitcannotrise.However,alongsidethepossibilitieslicensedbynature,therewasapervasiveconcernintheearlymodernperiodwiththewaythatculturecanmoldthepassions,aconcernpartlyarousedbytheencounterswithdistantandunfamiliarsocietiesthatwerepartandparcelofimperialexpan-59sion.TheworksofwriterssuchasMicheldeMontaigneand60ThomasMoreattesttothewaythatreportsoftheunfamiliarpracticesandbeliefstobefoundinexoticculturesgaveanewedgetodebatesaboutthegoodlife,andpromptedpeopletowonderhowfartheimagesofvirtueassociatedwiththeofficesofEuropeancommunitiesweregroundedinhumannature,andhowfartheyrestedonpatternsoffeelinginculcatedthrougheducationandcon-vention.Furthermore,visionsofradicaldifferencewereencouragedbythethoughtexperimentsofnaturallawyersandsocialcontracttheorists,whosefantasiesconcentratedattentiononthehistoricalaswellasthegeographicaldiversityofculturalmores,andfedthesuspicionthatconceptionsofvirtuemightbeunderdeterminedbypsychology.Whileonecouldtosomeextentfendoffthispossi-bilitybynaturalizingarangeofvirtuousaffects,orbyexplicatingthecontentofamoralsense,anotherwaytodealwiththeproblemwastoacknowledgetheculturaloriginsofcertainmorallyvaluabletraits,togetherwiththepassionatedispositionsonwhichtheyrested.Theideathatthemembersofasocietycanonlyfullyrealizetheircapacitytolivevirtuouslyincertaincircumstances,andthatthesecircumstancesarethemselveshistoricallyvariable,cametobegen-erallyacceptedamongseventeenth-centuryphilosophers.TheideaisperhapsmostmemorablyelaboratedbySpinoza,whotouchesonthedifferencesbetweentheHebrews,whoseexperienceofslaverymadethemafraidoftakingdecisionsforthemselves,andtheinhabitantsoftheDutchrepublic,whohavedevelopedgreater61self-confidence.WhilethelattergroupsubscribetoimagesofvirtuethatrevolvetosomeextentaroundnotionsofindividualCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n216SUSANJAMESindependenceandcreativity,theformerwouldhavebeenquiteincapableofenactingthese,andperhapsalsoincapableofrecogniz-ingthemasvirtuous.Theprojectofdevisingimagesofvirtuethatpeoplecanlivebyisthereforeasocialandpsychologicalexperi-ment,amatteroffindingoutbothhowpeoplereactemotionallyindifferentconditions,andwhatformsofsocialorganizationanswertotheirexistingemotionalcapacities.AmongtheassumptionsimplicitinSpinoza’sdiscussionistheideathatthecapacitytolivevirtuouslydevelopsprogressively,athoughttakenupintheworksofanumberofhistorians,whotriedtogiveitempiricalsupportbyproducingstadialnarrativesofhumandevelopment.InfluencedbyMontesquieu’sSpiritofthe62Laws,anumberofScottishwriters,suchasAdamSmith,John6364Millar,andAdamFerguson,definedthehistoricalstepsbywhichbarbarismgavewaytocivilization,andchartedsomeofthepassionsthatpredominatedatdifferentstages.Aparallelphilo-sophicalprojectcanbefoundinHume’sclassificationofnaturalandartificialvirtues,whichdistinguishesbetweenthepleasurableandunpleasurablefeelingsthatareexperiencedbyallpeoples,re-gardlessoftheircircumstances,andthosethatdependoncultureandexpectation.Amongthepassionsinthelattercategoryare“apleasurefromtheviewofsuchactionsastendtothepeaceofsociety,andanuneasefromsuchasarecontrarytoit,”whichcanonlyariseinsocietieswhererulesdeterminingwhatisjustandun-65justhavebeenestablished.AsHumepresentsthematter,thepracticeofassessingthejusticeofstatesofaffairs,andthefeelingsofindignation,satisfaction,andsoonthatmakeitpossibletomain-tainsuchapractice,developtogetherandsustaineachother;andthevirtueofrespondingpositivelytojusticeisconsequentlyartifi-cialinthesensethatitpresupposestheexistenceofaparticularsetofsocialconventions.Onthewhole,eighteenth-centurywritersbelievedthathuman-ityhadprogressedthroughoutthecourseofhistory,andthatcivil-izedpeopleswereinvariouswayssuperiortotheirpredecessors.Therewere,however,someopponentsofthisview,oneofthemostoutspokenbeingJean-JacquesRousseau,whoarticulatedadeepbutnovelformofpessimismaboutthemoraldevelopmentofhuman-kind.RejectingtheChristianconceptionofhumanbeingsasinher-entlysinful,whilereworkingtheChristiandogmathattheyareCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife217morallywanting,heofferedapictureofhumanityasnaturally66peaceableandbenevolent,butascorruptedbysociety.Ratherthanimprovingus,thecompetitivemoresofsociallifedestroyvirtuebyinducingdestructivepassionsandhabituatingustoadistortedconceptionofthegood,sothattheonlywaytocultivatevirtueistowithdrawfromthesesocialpressures.Thesourceofmoraltrouble,therefore,isnotournature,whichiswelladaptedtoapresocialexistence,butculture,whichcreatesthedestructivetraitsthatphilosophershavemistakenlylaidatnature’sdoor.Thepervasivesuspicionofthepassionsthatrunsthroughearlymodernphilosophy,andtheperceiveddifficultyofsuccessfullydefusingit,isfundamentallylinkedtotheideathatself-controlisaconditionofvirtue.Unlessapersondevelopssomecapacitytocontroltheiraffectsandthebehaviortowhichtheylead,theywillremaininaninfantilecondition,subjecttoboutsofrage,love,andenvythatexceedthelimitsoftheiroffices.Buthowmuchself-controldoesavirtuouspersonneed?Musttheybeabsolutelyproofagainstpassion,inthemannerofaStoicsage,orneedtheyonlyremainwithinboundsthatlicenseitincertaincircumstances?Throughouttheearlymodernera,oneprominentstrandofthoughtcontinuedtoinvestenormousvalueinimagesofself-control.Atasocialandpoliticallevel,thisemphasisyieldedameanstocondemnthetantrumsofrulersorspousesandtheviolenceofmastersormistresses,andstoodfirmlyonthesideofestablishedorder.Atamorephilosophicallevel,itsustainedtheideathattheexerciseofreasonorotherresourcesenablesthepassionstobemanipulated.Byitself,itseems,controlmightormightnotbeagoodthing–onecanimagineavillainwhosuppresseshisfearandcompassioninordertocommithorriblecrimes.ButforwriterssuchasDescartesorSpinoza,reliablecontroloverone’spassionsisthefruitoftrueunderstanding,andisthereforeaccompaniedbyknowledgeofthenatureofvirtue.Theachievementoftheoneenhancestheachievementoftheother,andviciousbehaviorisconsequentlybestseenasamarkofignor-ance.Thisconceptionofindividualpoweriscentral,forexample,totheCartesiannotionofge´ne´rosite´,itselfthekeystoneofamorallygoodlife,aswellasSpinoza’sconceptionoffreedomastheabilitytomaintainone’spowerandjoyfulnessinthefaceofdifficulties.WecanseefromthecaseofHobbesthatthispreoccupationwithcontrolcanbeaforceforintellectualchange.HobbesisasanxiousCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n218SUSANJAMESasanyofhiscontemporariestounderstandhowsocietiescanpro-tectthemselvesfromthedestructiveeffectsofthepassionsbyfindingawaytocontrolthem,andthisconcernseemstobeoneofthefactorsthatpromptedhimtoreassesstheacceptedviewthatreasonandaffectaredistinct.Butamongearlymodernwriterswealsofindareactionagainsttheassumptionthatcontrolisthecentralissue.Aswehaveseen,theeighteenthcenturybroughtwithitanincreasingemphasisonthesociabilityofouremotionaldispos-itions,whichcometobeseenasmoreconducivetovirtuethanbefore.Atthesametime,thisshiftgaverisetoanewconceptionofgoodcharacter,nolongersofocusedonthecarefulcontrolofpas-sion,buthospitabletothespontaneousexpressionofsentiment.Divestedoftheirmoretroublesomefeatures,theaffectsmovedcenterstageintheanalysisofagoodlife.NOTES1Hutcheson2002,p.3.2SeeMillerandInwood2003;Kraye1988.3ThePrince,inMachiavelli1988.4SeeColeman2005.5Onthedebtof“new”physiologicaltheoriestolong-establishedmed-icaltraditions,seeSutton1998;Siraisi1990,pp.97–114.6Descartes,Passions.SeealsoClarke2003,pp.106–34;Talon-Hugon2002,pp.207–48.7Locke,Essay,II.xxiii.16andIV.iv.1–9.OntheviewthatthestudyofthepassionsfallswithinthedomainofmoralasopposedtonaturalphilosophyseeJames1997,p.3.8TheviewthattheseareinterchangeablecanbetracedtoAugustine,CityofGod,bk.9,ch.4.Onthetransitionfromtheuseoftheterms‘passion’and‘affection’tothatoftheterm‘emotion,’seeDixon2003;Rorty1982.9Aristotle,Metaphysics,bk.II,1046a27.SeealsoJames1997,chs.2and4.10SeeKovecses2000.11Locke,Essay,II.xxi.15.12Malebranche,Search,I.xviii.1.13See,forexample,Charleton1674,pp.75–76;Descartes,Passions,art.107;DastonandPark1992.14SeeforexampleSenault1649,sig.B2r–v;Malebranche,Search,V.7.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThepassionsandthegoodlife21915SeealsoJames1997,ch.7.16Malebranche,Search,V.3;Harrison1998.17TheTheoryofMoralSentiments,III.3.iii,inSmith1984.18Onthecontrolofthepassionsasatherapeuticexercise,seeNussbaum1994.19Descartes,Passions,arts.46–47.20Descartes,Passions,arts.49,147;Spinoza,Ethics,III,def.2;prop.1.SeeJames1997,ch.8.21SeeLong2003;Zanta1914;Saunders1955;Levi1964.22See,forexample,NicolasCoeffeteau,Tableaudespassionshumaines,1630,p.133;RichardBurton,TheAnatomyofMelancholy,inBurton1989–94,vol.I,p.249.23Lloyd1998.24Lloyd1996,chs.1and4;James1993;Long2003;Rutherford1999.25TheDefenseofPoesie,inSidney1962,vol.III,pp.13–14.SeeJames1997,pp.215–44.26See,forexample,Spinoza,Ethics,I,appendix.27TheAdvancementofLearning,ch.14,par.9,inBacon1973.28Lev.,ch.15.29OntheCitizen,ch.3,par.31,inHobbes1998.30“TwoKindsofRighteousness,”inLuther1957.SeeGerrish1962.31CorneliusJansenius,Augustinus(1640).32Pense´es,131,inPascal1958.ForfurtherdiscussionseeJames1998,pp.1384–91.33Moriarty2003.34Senault1649,sig.B2.35Spinoza,Ethics,III.36Spinoza,Ethics,V,prop.10.37Descartes,Passions,art.50.38Descartes,Passions,art.4739See,forexample,IgnatiusofLoyola,TheSpiritualExercises,inIgnatiusofLoyola1950.40Shuger1988.41Skinner1988,pp.423–34;Hunter2005.42See,forexample,JohnLocke,SomeThoughtsconcerningEducation,inLocke1989.43Elias1978;Schmitt1989;Foucault1977.44Lev.,chs.6and8.45OnthepassionofcuriosityseeKenny2004,pp.41–47;Daston1995.46Forexample,HenryMore,AnAccountofVirtue(1690).SeealsoJames1998.47“TheMoralists:APhilosophicalRhapsody,”II.5,inShaftesbury1999.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n220SUSANJAMES48“SensusCommunis:AnEssayontheFreedomofWitandHumor,”inShaftesbury1999.49TheFableoftheBees,inMandeville1988.50AnEssayontheNatureandConductofthePassionsandAffections,sec.1;seealsotheeditor’sintroductiontoHutcheson1999,pp.ix–xiv.51AnInquiryintotheOriginalofourIdeasofBeautyandVirtue,“TreatiseconcerningMoralGoodandEvil,”sec.2.10,inHutcheson1729.52Essay,sec.2,inHutcheson1999.53Ibid.,sec.3.54Ibid.,sec.2.55Treatise,II.iii.3.56Ibid.SeeBaier1991,ch.6;Penelhum1994;Jones1982.57Malebranche,Search,V.7.58James2005.59“OfCannibals,”inMontaigne1965,pp.150–59.60Utopia,inMore1989.61Theological-PoliticalTreatise,chs.17,20,inSpinoza1998.62LecturesonJurisprudence,inSmith1982.63TheOriginsoftheDistinctionofRanks,inLehmann1960.64AnEssayontheHistoryofCivilSociety,inFerguson1995.SeealsoPittock2003.65Treatise,III.ii.6.66DiscourseontheMoralEffectsoftheArtsandSciencesandDiscourseontheOriginsofInequality,inRousseau1997.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nSTEPHENDARWALL8Thefoundationsofmorality:virtue,law,andobligationHistorianscommonlydatethebeginningofearlymodernepistemol-ogyandmetaphysicsfromDescartes’sattemptintheMeditationstofindafoundationforknowledgethatisimmunetoskepticalchallengeforanindividualself-criticalmind.Thereisnocomparableconsensusaboutwhenearlymodernethicalphilosophybegins,but,asJ.B.Schneewindhasargued,itmakessensetolinkitsimilarlytoanengagementwithformsofethicalskepticisminthewritingsofMontaigneinthelatesixteenthcenturyandHugoGrotiusinthe1earlyseventeenth.Ifoneweretoseekaparallelcanonicalmoment,onemightdonobetterthanapassageinGrotius’sOntheLawofWarandPeace(1625),inwhichGrotiusputsintothemouthoftheancientskepticCarneadesthechallengethat“[T]hereisnolawofnature,becauseallcreatures...areimpelledbynaturetowardsendsadvantageoustothemselves...[C]onsequently,thereisnojustice,orifsuchtherebe,itissupremefolly,sinceonedoesviolencetohis2owninterestsifheconsultstheadvantageofothers.”Toappreciatetheforceofthischallenge,wemustknowwhatGrotiusandhiscontemporarieswouldhaveunderstoodbya“lawofnature.”Naturallaws(ofthenormativeorethicalsort)werethoughtofasuniversalnormsthatimposeobligationsonanyonewhoiscapableoffollowingthem,onallmoralagents,ratherthanoncitizensofamorespecificjurisdiction.And,differentlyfrompositivelaw,theywerethoughttorequirenopositing,legislativeact,atleastnohumanone.Hobbeswroteinthemid-seventeenthcenturythat“allwritersdoagree,thatthenaturallawisthesame3withthemoral.”Attheendoftheeighteenth,Kantalsowouldspeakofthe“morallaw,”butmostearlymodernthinkerssimplyusedtheterm‘morality’torefertothesameidea.221CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n222STEPHENDARWALLItisanimportantfeatureofthisperiodthattheideasreferredtobytermslike‘morality,’‘morallaw,’and‘moralagent’cametohaveadistinctiveshapethatwemightcallthe“modernconceptionofmorality.”Together,theycomprisedawayofthinkingaboutasigni-ficantpartofethics,atleast,thatstillhascurrencytoday.TheearlymodernnaturallawtraditionofGrotiusandhiscontemporaries,includingPufendorf,Hobbes,andLocke,playedanespeciallyim-portantroleindevelopinganddefendingtheseideas.Properlytounderstandtheircontribution,however,wemustseeitagainstthebackgroundoftheclassicalnaturallawtraditionofThomasAquinasandhisfollowers.TheideathattherearenormsorlawstowhichallrationalhumanbeingsaresubjectgoesbackasfarastheStoics.ButitwasnotuntilAquinasinthethirteenthcenturythatitwasdevelopedsystematic-ally.ForThomas,naturallawisaformulationof“eternallaw,”God’sidealorarchetypeforallofnature–“theexemplarofdivine4wisdom...movingallthingstotheirdueend.”ThisisThomas’sdistinctivesynthesisofAristotelianteleologyandtheChristianideaofdivinerule.Eternallawspecifiesthedistinctiveperfectionoridealstateofeverynaturalbeing,andso“rule[s]andmeasure[s]”them,butrationalbeingsaresubjecttothelawinadistinctiveway.Having“ashareoftheeternalreason,”theycanactinthelightoftheirawarenessofeternallaw.AndthisbindsthemtowhatAquinascalls“naturallaw”:eternallawmadeaccessibletoand5applicablebyrationalcreaturesinpractice.SinceThomas’stheoryofgoodwasperfectionist,thegoodofeachcreaturebeingitsperfection,itfollowedthatindividualhumanbeingsrealizetheirrespectivegoodsonlywithintheoverallscheme6specifiedbyeternallaw.Anygenuineconflictbetweenindividuals’interestsisthusruledout–harmonyisguaranteedbyperfectionist-7teleologicalmetaphysics.ForAquinas,naturallawandindividualbenefiteffectivelyprovidethesamenormativestandard.Intheclassicalview,teleologicalmetaphysicsiswhatgivesnaturallawitsnormativepurchase.Inherentineverybeing’snatureisanidealend:whatthatbeingshouldbe.Normativityis“builtinto”nature.TheThomistclassicalnaturallawtraditionwascarriedintotheseventeenthcenturybysuchinfluentialwritersasFranciscoSua´rez.However,likemostmodernformstocome,Sua´rez’sversiongavegreaterstresstoaconceptionofmoralobligationpremisedonGod’sCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality223authoritativecommand.Sua´rezneverthelessacceptedthemaintenetofAquinas’ssynthesisofChristianityandAristotlethatnat-urallawisfixedbyeternallaw.Goodandrightarecodeterminedinsuchawaythatdoingwhatisrightisthesamethingasactingforone’sowngood.Bytheseventeenthcentury,however,thispositionhadbeguntowearthininEuropeasabasisforpublicmoralandpoliticalorder.Antagonisticreligiousdivision,asinMontaigne’sFrance,under-minedconsensusonacommongoodorontheideaeventhatoneexists.Atthesametime,anemergingmodernscienceseemedlike-liertobemechanisticthanteleological.Andoncemetaphysicalteleologywasgivenup,itwasguaranteedneitherthathumaninter-estsarenecessarilyharmonizednorthathumannaturehasanyintrinsicnormativeimplications.WhenGrotiuscametowritehisfamoustreatiseoninternationallaw,therefore,heconfrontedwhatSchneewindcallsthe“Grotianproblematic.”Lackinghopeofagree-mentonacommongoodrootedinasharedreligiousoutlook,Grotiusattemptedtoarticulateaconceptionofmoralandpoliticalorderthatcouldbeconvincingtopeoplewithoutacommonvisionofthegoodlifeoranyreasontobelievethatoutcomesthatwouldbegoodforonemustbegoodforall.TheskepticalchallengethatGrotiusconsiders–thattheremightbenoreasontodowhatisrightandjustwhenthisconflictswiththeagent’sowngood–simplycouldnothavearisenontheclassicalview.Thepointisnotthattheclassicaltraditionassertedthatactingrightlypromotestheagent’sinterestalso.ThereisaformofthatdoctrineinmodernnaturallawyerslikeLockeandHobbesaswell.Itisratherthatitclaimedthatactingrightlyandactingforone’sgoodareoneandthesamething.WithGrotius,ontheotherhand,wegetthebeginningsofthemodernconceptionofmoralityasabodyofuniversalnormswhoseclaimonusisfundamentallyindependentofthatofourowngood,indeed,thatcanconflictwithourgoodandbindusevenso.Disagreementaboutacommongoodorconflictbetweenindivid-uals’goodsisthesourceofwhatwenowcall“collectiveaction”problems:situationsinwhichalldoworsebyactingfortheirindi-vidualbenefitthantheywouldifallweretofollowanalternativecollectivestrategy.Thisisthegenusofwhichthefamous“Prison-8er’sDilemma”isaspecies.AnditwasthemostfundamentalCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n224STEPHENDARWALLaspectoftheproblematicthatGrotiusandhiscontemporariesfaced,towhichtheyproposedthemodernconceptionofnaturallawassolution.Lackingconfidencethatasufficientlyrichconceptionofcommongoodcouldgainsufficientlywideacceptanceamongreasonablepersonsforunconstrainedprudencetogovernwithoutsignificantconflict,theysoughtaconceptionofmutuallyadvanta-geous,prudence-constrainingnorms(naturallawormorality)tosolvetheotherwiseinevitableproblemsofcollectiveaction.Thenuboftheproblemwasthat,althoughmutualadvantagecouldexplainwhyeveryoneshouldwantalltofollowsuchnorms(ingeneral),itcouldnotdirectlyunderwritethenormativityofthenormsthemselves,sincecollectiveactionproblemscanbesolvedonlybytheconstraintofself-interestedconduct.Asaconsequence,earlymodernmoralistsfacedthephilosophicalissueofdefendingandexplicatingthenormativityofwhatSidgwickcalleda“regula-tiveandgoverningfaculty”thatisindependentofself-interest:the9moralfacultyorconscience.AnimportantaspectofGrotius’ssolutionwasanoriginaldistinc-tionbetweenperfectrights(ofjustice),whichcreateenforceable10obligations,andimperfectrights(oflove),whichdonot.GrotiusarguedthatitwasinthecaseofjusticethatAristotle’stheoryofvirtuesbreaksdownmostseverely.Sincejusticeinvolvespubliclyauthorizabledemands,itmustbemediatedbypubliclyaccessibleandenforceablerulesratherthanbyaninsightpossessedonlybythevirtuous.TheGrotianproblematic,therefore,washowtoaccountforprudence-constraining,thoughmutuallyadvantageous,norms,alongwiththeauthoritytoenforceatleastsomeofthese.Thisdistinctionbetweenapartofmorality,justice,whichisessentiallyconcernedwithexactableconductandrequiresformula-tioninpubliclyacceptablerules,ontheonehand,andanotherhavingtodomorewithmotiveandcharacterthatneithercan,norneed,havethesamepubliclyavailableenforcement,ontheother,becameacentralelementofmuchofthemoralphilosophyofthisperiod.ItrunsthroughPufendorf,SamuelClarke,Humeonnaturalandartificialvirtues,andlater,AdamSmithand,ofcourse,Kantonperfectandimperfectobligations.Itisadistinctivelymoderndevelopment;sofarasweknow,Grotiusinventedthedistinction.Moreover,indoingso,heinitiated,asweshallsee,themodernCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality225preoccupationwiththerelationbetweenaccountablenormativeguidanceandfreedomofthewill.LAW,OBLIGATION,ANDFREEDOMDespitethis,responsibilityplayednofundamentalroleinGrotius’saccountofthenormativityofnaturallaw,whichhebasedona11hypothesized“impellingdesireforsociety.”Grotius’sfollowersdidnotfindthisstrategyespeciallyconvincing,however,andafterhim,mainstreammodernnaturallawdoctrinetookamorevolun-taristturn.ThenotionofauthoritativedemandbecameutterlycentraltotheaccountsofmoralobligationandnaturallawinthewritingsofPufendorf,Locke,andHobbes.AsImentioned,thisisprefiguredinSua´rez.Althoughmainlyaclassicalnaturallawyer,Sua´rezcriticizesAquinasforhisinability12toexplainnaturallaw’spowertoobligate.BythisSua´rezdoesnotmeanthatAquinascannotexplainwhythereisreasontodowhatisright;heandAquinasagreethatwealwaysbenefitbyactingrightly.Rather,Thomas’sdoctrineisimpotenttoexplainwhyanyone,evenGod,hastheauthoritytodemandthatwenotviolatenaturallaw,and,therefore,whyGodmaylegitimatelyholdusaccountableforwrongdoing.ThisleadsSua´reztowhatwillbethecentraltenetoftheologicalvoluntaristformsofmodernnaturallaw,namely,thatmorality’spowertoobligatefollowsfromnaturallaw’srelationtoGod’sauthoritytocommand.BeforeweconsiderhowthisideawasdevelopedbyPufendorfand13Locke,weshouldnotesomegeneralfeatures.First,itmakesaccountabilityandauthoritativedemandcentraltomoralityinaplausibleway.Millfamouslysaidthat“wedonotcallanythingwrong,unlesswemeantoimplythatapersonoughttobepunishedinsomewayorotherfordoingit;ifnotbylaw,bytheopinionofhisfellowcreatures;ifnotbyopinion,bythereproachesofhisown14conscience.”Theveryideasofmoralblameworthinessand15guiltinvolvethatofauthoritativedemand.Toblamesomeoneforwrongdoingistomakeademandofhim.Second,thisconnec-tiontomoralresponsibilitybringsalongwithitissuesaboutfree-dom.HoldingsomeoneresponsiblepresupposesthattheagenttowhomthedemandisaddressedcancomplywithitbyacceptingitsCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n226STEPHENDARWALLauthority.Thismeans,third,thatmorality(oratleastthatparthavingtodowithexactableobligations)essentiallyinvolvesarela-tionthatisonlypossiblebetweenrationalwills:theaddressingofademandfromonefreeandrationalwilltoanother.ItistruethataccordingtoearlymodernnaturallawyerslikePufendorfandLocke,moralobligationultimatelyinvolvesaformofsubjection.ItisbecauseweareGod’ssubjectsthatGodcancreatenaturallawbyhiscommand.ButPufendorfalsothoughtthatGodcandothisonlyifhe(andwe)presupposethatwecandetermineourconductthroughourfreeacceptanceofhisauthority.Pufendorfmakesafundamentaldistinctionbetweenphysicalandmoral“entities,”betweenhowthingsstandinnaturewithouttheaddressofacommandingwill,ontheonehand,andthe“super-added”moralchangesresultingfromthisformofaddress,onthe1617other.Godproducesmoralentitiesby“imposition.”WithouttheimpositionofGod’sauthoritativewillthroughcommand,allbeings(includinghumanbeings)stand“physicallycomplete,”theirrespectivephysicalnaturesfixing“theirabilitydirectlytoproduce18anyphysicalmotionorchangeinanything.”WithGod’scom-mand,however,“moralentities”aresuperaddedtothephysicalrealm–morallawandmoralreasonsarecreated.Andthisdivinecreationenablesustosolvecollectiveactionproblemsthatwouldotherwisebeirresolvable.“Moralentities”makepossiblethe“or-19derlinessanddecorumofcivilizedlife.”Withoutthemorallaw,20“menshouldspendtheirliveslikebeasts.”WhenGodaddresseshiswilltofreeandrationalbeings,hemakesus“moralcauses,”agentstowhomactionsandtheireffectscanbeimputedandforwhichwearethereforeaccountable.Theformalnatureofamoralaction“consistsofits‘imputativity’,”“whereby21theeffectofavoluntaryactioncanbeimputedtoanagent.”Thisisthe“primaryaxiominmorals”:“amancanbeaskedforareckoning”foranythinginhispower;“anyactioncontrollableaccordingtoamorallaw,theaccomplishmentoravoidanceofwhich22iswithinthepowerofaman,maybeimputedtohim.”AccordingtoPufendorf,then,whenGodaddresseshiswilltofreeandrationalbeings,hesimultaneouslycreatesthemorallawandmakesthem“moralcauses”whoareaccountableforcomplyingwithit.23WefindessentiallythesamepositioninLocke.IntheEssay,theproblemofcollectiveactionfollowsfromLocke’shedonisticCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality227theoryofindividualgood.Ifeachpursueshisownindividualpleas-ureindependentlyofdivinelyimposednaturallaw,theneveryoneisworseoff.LockehadearlierassertedhisbeliefintheunavoidabilityofrationalhumanconflictwithoutdivinelegislationinhisEssaysontheLawofNature.Andheheldtherethathumanbeingscaninferboththecontentandformofnaturallawfromempiricalobservations.Fromthemanifestdesignoftheuniverse,wecaninfer24theexistenceofasupremelywiseandpowerfulCreator.Andsinceweneedtolive“insocietywithothermen,”itisevidentlyGod’swillthatwedoso.Buthowcanwedosoiftherearecollectiveactionproblemsandif,asLockealsobelieves,self-interestisthe25onlyrationalmotive?Goddoesnotwillinvain,sosinceouronlyrationalmotiveisself-interest,hemusthavecreatedsupernaturalbenefitsforcomplianceandburdensfornoncompliance,beyondtheirnaturalconsequences,sufficienttomakeobedienceinvariablyineachagent’sinterest,and,moreover,givenusawaytodetermineourselvesbyourknowledgeofthisveryconclusion.ThiseffectivelygivesLockeadeductionoftheimmortalityofthesoul,theavail-abilityofself-determination,andthedoctrineofeternalsanctionsasnecessaryconditionsfortheverypossibilityofmoralityand26reasonablesocialunity.Pufendorf,however,believedthatfearofpunishmentisamotiveofthewrongkindformoralobligation.LockeandPufendorfagreedthatmoralaccountabilitypresupposesthatmoralagentscanfreelydeterminethemselvestoactastheyareobligated.ButLockebe-lievedthatself-determinationissimplytheabilitytodiscernthelikelihoodofsanctionsandvividlyconsidertheminawaythatinfluencescurrentdesire.Pufendorf,bycontrast,makesafunda-mentaldistinctionbetweenmotivationbysanctions,ontheonehand,andbeingmovedbyrespectforauthoritativedemands,ontheother.Obligation“affectsthewillmorally”;it“isforcedofitselftoweighitsownactions,andtojudgeitselfworthyofsomecensure,27unlessitconformstoaprescribedrule.”Obligationthus“differsinaspecialwayfromcoercion.”Although“bothultimatelypointoutsomeobjectofterror,thelatteronlyshakesthewillwithanexternalforce.”“Anobligation,”however,“forcesamantoac-knowledgeofhimselfthattheevil,whichhasbeenpointedouttothepersonwhodeviatesfromanannouncedrule,fallsuponhim28justly.”ThisisthedifferencebetweenthefearofcensureandCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n228STEPHENDARWALLinternallyacknowledgedblame.Pufendorf’sinsightispregnantwithphilosophicalpossibilitiesaboutthenatureanddeliberativeroleofrespect,dignity,orauthority,andreciprocalrecognition.However,hedidnotdevelopthese,andultimatelyofferednoalter-29nativemoralpsychologythatsuchadevelopmentwouldrequire.Althoughmorefamous(orinfamous)forhispoliticaltheory,ThomasHobbes’smoralphilosophyisalsowithinthemodernnat-urallawtradition.Amaterialist,Hobbesholdsthatjudgmentsofvalueareultimatelyprojectionsofthejudger’sdesiresinsomethinglikethewayGalileohadheldthattheascriptionofcolorinvolvesanobjectifyingprojectionofcolorexperience.Whenweseethatsome-thingisnecessarytoanendwedesire,likeself-preservation,wethereforethinkitissomethingweshoulddo.The“lawsofnature,”Hobbesconcludes,arereally“theoremsconcerningwhatconduceth30totheconservationanddefense”ofoneself.Theirnormativitycomesfrominstrumentalrationalityintheserviceofendsjudgedvaluable.Consideredonlysofar,however,theyare“butimprop-31erly”calledlaws.Tobelawproper,thesegeneralizationsmustbeconnectedtoobligationandauthoritativedemand.Thetheo-logicalvoluntaristsaccomplishedthisfromGod’sassumedauthor-itytocommand.Hobbes’salternativewastoarguethatagreementsandcontractsinvolveobligationaspartoftheirdefinitionandthatacknowledgingthevalidityandbindingnessofagreementsisnecessarytoavoidingtheevilsofastateofnaturewhereuncon-strainedpursuitofadvantageleadstoalifethatis“nasty,brutish,32andshort.”Reducingobligationtoinstrumentalrationalityandadvantageinthisway,however,seemstofounderonaversionofPufendorf’spointmentionedabove.Itseemstogiveareasonofthewrongkindtosupportthemoralbindingnessofagreements:areasonofself-interestforwantingtorecognizetheseobligationsisnotareasononthebasisofwhichwemightrecognizethemas33obligating.RATIONALISTREACTIONSManyaspectsofthemodernnaturallawtraditionelicitedcriticismandinspiredalternativeethicalconceptions.Modelingmoralityonlawseemedtosometooveremphasizeexternalconductatthecostofmotiveandcharacter,whichtheythoughtthecenterofthemoralCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality229life.AccordingtotheCambridgePlatonistRalphCudworth,itmademoralitya“deadLawofoutwardWorks,which...subjectsustoa34StateofBondage.”Voluntarismalsofacedadilemmathatitsproponentsneveradequatelyconfronted.WhatgivesGodtherighttoourobedience?Voluntaristshadtwopossibleresponses.TheycouldreduceGod’sauthorityto,say,hispowertosanctionortheycoulddefendthisauthorityasanirreduciblemoralproposition.TakingtheformertackconflatedPufendorf’sdistinctionbetweencoercionandmoralobligation.Andtakingthelatterrequiredatleastonemoralfact,indeed,apparentlyonemoralobligation,thatdoesnotderivefromGod’scommand.AsCudworthputit,“itwasneverheardofthatanyonefoundedallhisauthorityofcommand-ingothers...inalawofhisownmaking,thatmenshouldbe35required,obliged,orboundtoobeyhim.”LeibnizarguedsimilarlythatifGod’sgoodnessisareasontoobeyhim,thenthatmustbesoindependentlyofhiscommand.Andthenthequestionnaturallyarises,iftherearereasonsforGodtobenefitusthatareindependentofanyone’scommand,thenwhyaren’tthesereasonsgoodenough36forusalso?Finally,groundingmoralobligationsinGod’scom-37mandsmadethemseemarbitraryand“factitious.”Themostbasicmoraldutiesare“eternalandimmutable,”notthesortofthingthatwouldneedtobecreatedbyacommandorthatevencouldbe.Thelatterthought,especially,ledanumberofphilosophers–CambridgePlatonistslikeCudworth,theirfollowerShaftesbury,Leibniz,Spinoza,andMalebranche–todeveloprationalistethicalapproachesthatstressedthenecessityoffundamentalethicaltruthsandfocusedonmotiveandcharacter.WiththepossibleexceptionofGrotius,themodernnaturallawtraditionhadbeencharacterizedbyabroadlynaturalistmetaphysicsandempiricistepistemology.RationalistslikeCudworthargued,however,thatethicaltruthshaveakindofrationalnecessitythatcouldnotpossiblybegraspedempirically.Seventeenth-centuryethicalrationalismwaselaboratedinverydifferentwaysbydifferentphilosophers.Oneimportantdifferenceisbetweenthose,likeCudworthandlaterShaftesburyandLeibniz,whotooktheGrotianproblematicseriouslyandthose,likeMalebrancheandSpinoza,whosawethicsasprimarilycon-cerned,notwithhowweshouldconductourselvestowardoneanothergiventhepossibilityofpluralityandconflict,butwithourCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n230STEPHENDARWALLorientationtowardaunifiedorderofvalue.Againstthelatter,theformergroupagreedwiththemodernnaturallawyersthatmoralityisdistinctinitsnaturefromprudence(evenwhentheyalsothoughtthatthemorallifeisthemostbeneficialaswell).However,theyalsobelievedthatethicsisprimarilyaninternalmatterthatcannotbeexternallyimposed.Butalthoughtheirethicsfocusedprimarilyonvirtueratherthanduty,itwasnotintheAristoteliansenseoftheexcellentexerciseofnaturalpowersinwhichweflourish.Theirswasanethicsofmoralvirtueinthemodernsense.Knownfortheirliberaltheologyandethics,theCambridgePlatonistswereagroupofthinkersatCambridgeinthemid-seventeenthcenturywhostressedindependenceofjudgmentandalovingcharacterratherthananydoctrineorcreed,andwhohelpedshapesomeofthemajortrendsoflateseventeenth-centuryandeighteenth-centuryBritishethics,frommoralsentimentalism,inShaftesbury,Hutcheson,andHume,toformsofrationalintuition-ism,likeSamuelClarke’s,toBishopButler’sethicsofautonomousconscience.BenjaminWhichcotewasthespiritualleaderofthegroup,butthemostsophisticatedphilosopherbyfarwasRalphCudworth,whoseTreatiseconcerningEternalandImmutableMoralityappearedposthumouslyin1731.Cudworth’sideaswerenonethelesswellknowntohiscontemporaries,andhehadsubstantialinfluenceonShaftesburyand,throughhisworkonself-determination,onthethoughtofJohnLocke.IntheTreatise,Cudworthmountsasystematicattackonvoluntarismandempiricisminethics.Ultim-ately,heargues,whatethicalpropertiesathinghasdependonitsnature,notonanythingexternaltoit,likeacommand.Anditisonlythroughour“intellectualnature”orreasonthatmoralagentscanapprehendethicaltruths.ThissuggeststhesortofrationalintuitionismoflaterBritishintuitionistslikeSamuelClarkeorRichardPrice,accordingtowhichreasonapprehends“eternalandimmutable”ethicaltruthsthatareindependentofthemind.When,however,theTreatiseisreadinthelightofCudworth’sextensiveunpublishedwritings,adifferentpositionemerges,onethatanticipatesthesortofidealism38ofpracticalreasontobefoundinKant.Theeternalessencesthatdetermineethicaltruthsdonotexistinthe“individualswithoutus”;butneitherarethey“somewhereelseapart[from]theindivid-39ualsensibles,andwithoutthemind.”FormsareaspectsofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality231formingsubstance,thatis,ofmind.“[I]ntelligibleformsbywhichthingsareunderstoodorknown,”Cudworthwrites,“arenotstampsorimpressionspassivelyprinteduponthesoulfromwithout,but40ideasvitallyprotendedoractivelyexertedfromwithinitself.”Alluniversalnaturesoressences,includingmoralones,arethereforemodificationsofmindandhavereality,Cudworthbe-lieves,onlysolongasmind(specifically,God’sarchetypalmind)41exists.Thus,althoughheisnotheologicalvoluntarist,Cudworthisatheologicalmoralistnonetheless.WeretherenoGod,therewouldbenomorality.Butthen,weretherenoGod,therewouldbenothing.Nevertheless,ethicalessencesdifferfrommerelytheor-eticalor“intellectual”ideas,sincetheyareessentiallypractical.Themind’s“anticipationsofmorality”comefroma“moreinwardandvitalprinciple,inintellectualbeingsassuch,wherebytheyhaveanaturaldeterminationinthemtodosomethingsandto42avoidothers.”AsKantwilllater,Cudworthbelievesthatmoralityrequiresthepossibilityofpurepracticalreason.ButCudworthidentifiespurepracticalreasonwithlove,ratherthan,likeKant,afacultyofformalreasoning.God’sperfectloveisbothperfectvirtueandperfectmind.The“LawofLove”freesus“inamannerfromallLawwithoutus,becauseitmakethusbecomeaLawunto43ourselves.”AlthoughCudworth’sethicsfocusesfundamentallyonvirtueratherthanduty,heisnonethelessconcerned,likeLockeandPufendorf,withissuesoffreedomandaccountability.Cudworthleftmanyvolumesofunpublishedmanuscriptsthataredevotedtounderstandingthenatureofmoralblameanditspresup-positions,including“self-comprehensive”self-commandorauton-omy,whichCudworthbelievesconsistsinbeingabletoreflectonone’sowndesiresandformnewonesinlightofcriticallyformed44moraljudgments.OfspecialinteresthereisCudworth’sdistinctionbetween“animal”and“moral”formsof“obligation,”whichechoesPufen-dorf’sdistinctionbetweenmotivationbysanctionsandmotivesthataredistinctiveofmoralobligation.Theformerrequiresthesortofself-determinationLockedefendsinhisEssay–theabilitytostepbackandconsiderlong-runinterestinawaythatcanaffectthestrengthsofcurrentdesires.Butthisisnotyet,Cudworthinsists,an“obligationtrulymoral.”“Lawscouldnootherwiseoperateorseizeuponthemthanbytakingholdoftheiranimalselfishpassions...andthatwillCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n232STEPHENDARWALLallowofnoothermoralobligationthanthisutterlydestroysallmoral-45ity.”Themotivationtruemoralobligationmustdrawon,Cudworthbelieves,isthesameloveorpurepracticalreasonwefindinGod.The“candleoftheLord”withinisnotjustasourceofmoralknowledge,butamoralmotiveaswell.Thesethemes,thatmoralityandmoralobligationareinternaltothemoralagentandnotexternallyimposed,andthatsharinginthedivinecreativeintelligencemakesethicspossible,werecentralalsotothethoughtofShaftesburytwogenerationslater.ItwasprimarilythroughShaftesbury,indeed,thattheinfluenceofCambridgePla-tonismpassedontotheeighteenthcentury.AndShaftesburywasevenfartherfromthemodernnaturallawyers.Hewassothoroughlyavirtueethicistthathedidnotevenrecognizeevaluationsofactionsotherthanonthebasisofmotives.AndhisviewsaboutmoralmotivationdeveloptheCambridgePlatonistidentificationbetweenmoralvirtueandself-determination.ShaftesburydismissesthepictureofmoralmotivationhefindsinHobbesandLocke,whomheseesasgivingthemoralagentthe“tameandgentle46carriage”ofabeast,cowedby“fearofhiskeeper.”Virtuous(orasShaftesburyalsocallsthem,“natural”)motiveshave,unlikefear,animmediatebeautyoramiabilitywhenwecontemplatethem.Itistheirpleasingappearanceto“moralsense,”akindofcultivated47disinterestedtaste,infact,thatmakesthemvirtues.ShaftesburyalsodevelopsadistinctiveversionoftheCambridgePlatonistdoctrineofthedignityofrationalpersons,whichheholdstoderivefromthehumanabilitytoshapeand“author”lives.“Onlygoodfortuneor[atrainer’s]rightmanagement”cancontrola48savagebeast,butmoralagentscancontrolthemselves.Byself-reflection,wegaincriticaldistanceonourmotivesand,throughmoralsense,endorseorrejectthem,makingthemotivesonwhichwesubsequentlyactourownandnotcausestowhichwearesimplysubject.Shaftesburydescribesatsomelengthaprocessofself-criticaldeliberationor“self-converse”throughwhichapersoncan49becomeherownmaster.Thislast,proto-KantianthemecombinedinShaftesbury’sthoughtwithanotherthatanticipatedKant’sdoctrinethatmoralworthisrealizedonlybyactionsundertakenforself-consciouslymoralmotives.The“meregoodness”ofmotivessuchaspityorkindness,which“lieswithinthereachandcapacityofallsensibleCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality233creatures,”contrastswithgenuine“virtueormerit,”whichcanbeachievedonlybybeingswhocandeterminethemselvesthroughmoralsense.Talkofa“sense”ismisleadinghere,sinceShaftesbury’swholepointisthat,unlikethesensesforwhichwehaveorgans,moralsensedependsuponhowanagentcritically“frames”itsobjectinthought.Apersoncannotappropriatelybeheldresponsibleforvisualdefects,butshecan,hethinks,forfailure50adequatelytodetermineherselfthroughmoralsense.AlthoughShaftesburythought,likeCudworth,thatvoluntarismdestroysmorality,hedidnotthinkthatmoralpropertiesneedhavemetaphysicalrealitytosupportgenuinemoraldistinctions.“Iftherebenorealamiablenessordeformityinmoralacts,thereisatleastanimaginaryoneoffullforce.ThoughperhapsthethingitselfshouldnotbeallowedinNature,theimaginationorfancyofitmustbe51allowedtobefromNaturealone.”Moralproperties’“wayofbeing”isthroughmoralsense,andsolongasdisinterestedreflectionleadstoaconvergentresponse,thiswilladequatelyfoundjudgmentsofviceandvirtue.WhatassuresconvergenceinShaftesbury’sschemeisCambridgePlatonism’sconfidenceinrationalorder.Forhisempiri-cistfollowers,HutchesonandHume,however,convergenceinmoraljudgmentresultsfromcontingentuniversalaspectsofthehumancondition.MuchofShaftesbury’scritiqueofvoluntarismandhisethicsofvirtueisanticipatedinLeibniz.However,Leibnizturnedtheseideasinthedirectionofwhatwouldcometobecalledutilitarianism.Moreover,withinLeibniz’sdistinctivemetaphysics,hisvirtueethicslackedanythinglikeShaftesbury’sdoctrineofthemoralsense.Leibnizagreedwiththenaturallawyersthatobligationin-volves“moralnecessity,”buthethoughtthattherequisitecon-straintoperateswithinthewill,notbyexternalimposition.Evenwithoutrecognizingasuperior,apersoncanbeconstrainedbynecessity,since“theverynatureofthingsandcareforone’sown52happinessandsafety...havetheirownrequirements.”Moralnecessityisthusakindofnaturalnecessity:“thatwhichis‘natural’foragoodman,”where“agoodmanisonewholoveseverybody,in53sofarasreasonpermits.”Whatoneoughttodoiswhateveractwouldbedeterminedbygood(benevolent)nature–whatagoodpersonwoulddoorwhatonewoulddowereonegood.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n234STEPHENDARWALLLeibniz’spositionwasliketheclassicalnaturallawview,how-ever,inrequiringametaphysicalguaranteeofvariousharmoniesandcoincidences,bothwithinmoralityandbetweenmoralityandself-interest.(ThereisasenseinwhichLeibniz’sview,likeCudworth’s“lawoflove,”canbeconsideredakindofnaturallawview.)Withinmorality,Leibniz’sperfectionismledhimtoidentifyallofjustice,enlightenedbenevolence,wisdom,virtue,andhappi-ness.Justiceis“thecharityofthewise,”sowhateveraninformed54loveofallleadstoisjust.Andsinceeverybeing’sgoodisitsper-fection,wisdomandbenevolencecannotcomeapart:intellectualperfectionimpliesperfectionofthewill,andviceversa.Thegoodlifeispleasurable,butthatisdue,nottopleasure’sintrinsicgoodness,buttopleasure’sinvolving“aknowledgeor55feelingofperfection,notonlyinourselves,butalsoinothers.”Knowing(theprospectof)good(perfection)inanyonewillleadtoadesireforthatforitsownsake.Leibniz’sidentifyingmoralgoodnesswithuniversalbenevolenceledhimtoanearly,perhapstheearliest,formofthegreatesthappi-nessprinciple:“Toactinaccordancewithsupremereason,istoactinsuchamannerthatthegreatestquantityofgoodavailableisobtainedforthegreatestmultitudepossibleandthatasmuchfeli-56cityisdiffusedasthereasonofthingscanbear.”LaterutilitarianswouldrejectLeibniz’sperfectionistconceptionofhappiness,butfollowhimindrawingsimilarmaximizingconclusionsfroman57equalconcernforthegoodofall.TheformsofethicalrationalismputforwardbyMalebrancheandSpinozawereevenfartherfromtheGrotianproblematicthanLeibniz’s.Bothwerenotableforlocatingtheirethicalviewswithintheirdistinctivemetaphysics.Althoughcertainaspectsoftheirethics–forexample,theirrespectiveconceptionsoffreedom–wereinfluential,neitherprovidedacompetingconceptionofmoralitythatcouldbeconsideredalongsidethenaturallawview.Malebranche’sepistemologyandmetaphysicsarethoroughlytheocentric.PerceptionofexternalobjectsispossibleonlythroughideasinGod,andonlyGodhasgenuinecausalpower,everythingelsebeingbutanoccasionforhiscausation.AndMalebranche’sethicswasnolesstheologicallyfocused.Ethicsconcernsthecorrectorientingoflovetoformsofperfection,hencetoGod.LoveofGodisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality235thusthecentralethicalattitude,andethicalknowledgeconcernsan58orderofperfectionthatcanbefoundonlyinGod.Itisanexpressionofhisperfection,Malebrancheheld,thatGodrulestheuniversebyageneralwillratherthanbyparticularvoli-tions.Hadthelatterbeenthecase,itwouldhavebeenwrongforusevertoattempttoavoidnaturalevils.TheideathatGod’swillmustbegeneralwouldlaterinfluenceattempts,likethoseofBerkeleyandButler,tosquarerule-basedconceptionsofmoralitywithGod’sbenevolence,and,inpoliticalform,Rousseau’sideaofthegeneral59will.Perhapsmostsignificant,however,wasMalebranche’sideaoffreedom,whichalsoplayedaprominentroleinhistheodicy.Itisimpossibleforusnottolovegoodingeneral,butoursensesleadusastraywithdistortedseeminggoodsandevils.However,MalebranchearguedthatGodalsogivesustheabilityto“suspend”theseappearancesanddecidewhetherto“consent”tothemortothemoreperfectgoodswithwhichtheyconflict.Andthismakesusresponsibleforourchoices.ThisideawouldresonatewithLocke’saccountoffreedomintheEssay,and,later,withKant’sideathatactionalwaysinvolvestheimplicitendorsementofaprincipleor60“maxim.”Spinoza’sethicsandmoralpsychologyprovidedanespeciallyinterestingfoilfortheearlymodernnaturallawtraditionaswellasasourceofideasforthinkers,likeHumeand,muchlater,Nietzsche,whowouldseektoproblematizeconceptionsofmoralitythataretiedtoaccountabilityandautonomousagency.WecanseethegeneralthrustofSpinoza’sthoughtinthefinalpropositionofhisEthics:“Blessednessisnottherewardofvirtue,butvirtueitself;nordoweenjoyitbecausewerestrainourlusts;onthecontrary,becauseweenjoyit,weareabletorestrainthem”(V,prop.42).ThereareseveralmajorelementsofSpinoza’sethicalthoughthere:theblurringofasharpdistinctionbetweenthebeneficialandthemorallyright;aconceptionoffreedomthatconsists,notinanycapacitytotranscendappetitesbyautonomouschoicethatmightbenecessaryformoralaccountabilityanddesert,butinsomethingemergentwithinrightlyordereddesiresthemselves;and,finally,aviewofhappinessas,notwhatthemorallyvirtuousdeserve,butthatthroughwhichvirtueandself-restraintarerealized.AsEdwinCurleyhasobserved,Spinoza’sEthicsprovidea61“serene,butremorselessdissectionofhumannature,”oneCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n236STEPHENDARWALLthatisprofoundlynaturalistinthemodernsenseofeschewingAristotelianfinalcauses(whichSpinozaassociateswithself-congratulatoryanthropomorphizing)butthatmightnonethelessgroundanethicthat,likeancientGreek(andclassicalnaturallaw)views,canunifyvirtueandhappinessasfollowingnature.Spinozarejectsahostofdualisms–betweenmindandbody,Godandnature,freedomandnecessity,reasonandpassion,andmoralityandprudence–andarguesagainstethicalconceptionsthatdependuponthem.AreligiousthinkerforwhomloveofGodiscentraltothehighestgood,Spinozawasnonethelessseenasanatheistbecausehesteadfastlyrejectedasupernaturalistviewofthedivine.Godcon-sistsratherinthenecessaryorderofnature.Andhumanconductisnolessimmanentinthenecessarycausalorderthanthedivine.Freedominvolvesnoexceptiontoorinterventioninanecessarycausalorder,butitisratherself-determinationwithinit.SinceGodisthetotalityofnature’sself-determination,Heisnecessarilyfree.Butsoalsocanhumanfreedomcoincidewithnaturalnecessitywhenthecausesofhumanbehavioraresuitablyinternaltotheselfandrelatedtoself-understanding.ManyofSpinoza’scriticswhodisdainedhisideasasatheisticrejectedthemalsofortheirdenialofantinecessitarianfreedomor,assomesawit,theirfatalism.Andthinkerswhoheldthemoralrealmtoinvolveanaccountabilitythatrequiresdesire-transcendingrationalchoicefoundSpinoza’sconceptionoffreedomtoothintosupportmoralityastheyconceivedit.ThiswasCudworth’sreac-62tion,andsomethinglikeitwasBerkeley’salso.Butforphiloso-pherslikeHumeandNietzsche,Spinoza’smoralpsychologywasliberating,avisionofhumanfreedomwithoutfreedomofthewillandofpracticalthoughtthatdidn’tstarklyopposereasonandin-clination.AndthesethinkersfoundalsoinSpinozaawayofthink-ingaboutethicsthat,althoughthoroughlymodern(andlackingmetaphysicalteleology),didnotassumeatranscendentwill,humanordivine,ordistinguishsharplybetweenwhatismorallyrightorobligatory,ontheonehand,andwhatismostusefulandbeneficialtotheagent,ontheother.Spinozaheldthatouractionsbecomefreerandmoreproperlyourownastheyinvolvegreaterself-understanding.Unfreedomisnotdeterminationbydesire–everyactionresultsfromdesire–butbeinginthegripofpassionsthatinvolveconfusedideas.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality237“[A]passionceasestobeapassionassoonasweformaclearanddistinctideaofit”(Ethics,V,prop.3).Asweunderstandourplaceinthenaturalorder,moreover,wecometoaclearerconceptionalsooftheinterdependenceofhumangood.Thisisowing,nottometaphysicalteleology,aswithAristotleorAquinas,buttotheroleofself-understandinginhumanfreedomandgood.ForSpinoza,thesourcesofexternalconflictareinternal.Only“insofarasmenaretornbyaffectswhicharepassions”arethey“contrarytooneanother”(Ethics,IV,prop.34).Self-understandingthatharmonizestheselfalsoproducesexternalharmony.“Menmostagreeinnature,whentheyliveaccordingtotheguidanceofreason.”Andtheyare“mostusefultooneanother,wheneachonemostseekshisownadvantage”inacalm,free,self-understandingway(Ethics,IV,63prop.35andcor.2).EGOISTCRITIQUEAfarmoreradicalcritiqueofmainstreammoralizingwasposed64byBernardMandeville’sTheFableoftheBees(1714).Perhapsbestknownforitsunmasking,egoisticpsychology,theFable’ssubtitle,“PrivateVices,PublicBenefits,”indicatesitsmaintheme:theeffectsofwidespreadvirtueandvice,takenintheaggregate,canbethereverseofwhatagentsintend.Theactual,ifunin-tended,effectsofeveryone’stryingtohelpothersathisowncost,Mandevilleargued,canbesignificantpublicharm.ThecentralityofbenevolencewascommontotheethicsoftheCambridgePlatonists,Shaftesbury,andLeibniz,asitwouldbetoShaftesbury’sfollower,FrancisHutcheson.Butwhatifwidespreadaltruismisactuallysociallycostly?Mandeville’sFablesketchedastoryofhowitmightbe,andarguedthatitactuallywouldbeintheconditionsofeighteenth-centuryEuropeanlife.Ahiveofvain,self-servingcreatures,“endeavouringtosupplyeachother’slustandvanity,”createsgreatwealth,whichallenjoy.When,however,theygrumbleaboutthewickedavarice,dishonesty,andluxuryintheirmidst,Godmakesthemallhonest.Theresultsarecata-strophic.Withnodesireforluxuries,avarice,orvanity,theengineoftheirproductiveactivityisstilled,andallareleftinpoverty.ThesignificanceofMandeville’sthesisformoderneconomics,beginningwithAdamSmith’sWealthofNations(1776),isobvious.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n238STEPHENDARWALLButitalsohadapowerfulinfluenceonearliereighteenth-centurymoralphilosophy.Particularlysignificantwasitsroleinthedevel-opmentofutilitarianismafterHutcheson.Oncethepossibilitywastakenseriouslythattheeffectsofwidespreadbenevolencemightdivergefromthoseintendedbythebenevolent,thequestionoftherelativeimportanceformoralityofmotiveandconsequencewasforced.And,increasingly,thoseattractedbyutilitarianideaswouldrejectLeibniz’sandHutcheson’spositioninfavorofone,likeBentham’s,thatmadegoodconsequencesfundamental.Mandeville’smajorlastingcontributionwastomakevividhowsubtleandcomplextherelationsbetweenintendedandactualeffectscanbe.Itliesbehind,forexample,Butler’s,Berkeley’s,andHume’slaterinsistencethatrulesofjusticethatstrictlyregulatethepursuitofoverallgood,aswellasindividualgood,canleadtoagreatergoodthancouldbeachievedbyindividualseachtryingto65promotethegoodthemselves.REASONVERSUSSENTIMENTASTHEFOUNDATIONOFMORALSPerhapsthemostcentralissueofearlyeighteenth-centurymoralphilosophy,however,concernedtheveryfoundationofmoralsandwhetherthatcanbeprovidedbyreasonorsentiment.Therewereseveraldifferentissuesunderthisgeneralheading:(a)theepistemo-logicalquestionofwhetherwediscernmoralfeaturesthroughreasonorfeeling,(b)themoralpsychologicalissueoftherolesreasonandaffectplayinmoralmotivation,and(c)themetaphysical,metaethicalissueofwhetherrelationtoreasonorsentimentcanbewhat,say,anaction’sbeingmorallyrightorwrongconsistsin.AlthoughShaftesbury’sideaofmoralsensederivedfromakindofrationalism,hismajoreighteenth-centuryinfluencewasthroughphilosopherslikeFrancisHutchesonandDavidHumewhode-velopedhisideainadistinctlyempiricist,antirationalistway.ForHutcheson,moralsensefollowedfromtheLockeanthesisthatallideascomefromexperience,togetherwithHutcheson’sownclaimthatmoralapprobationanddisapprobationinvolvedistinctive,irre-ducibleideas,aclaimthatwouldbeexploitedbyintuitionistslikeRichardPricefortheirownrationalistpurposes.Hutcheson’sdoc-trineofmoralsensewasthecontingentpsychologicalthesisthatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality239contemplatingmotiveandcharactercausesthesedistinctiveideas.Hutchesonbelieved,moreover,thatmoralsensefollowsasimpleempiricallaw:weapprovecharactersandmotivesinproportiontothedegreeofbenevolencethatismanifestedinthem.LikeLeibniz,Hutchesondrewtheproto-utilitarianconclusionthattheaction“whichprocuresthegreatesthappinessforthegreatestnumbers”66isalwaysthemorallybestchoice.ButwhereasLeibnizthoughtthisfollowedonmetaphysicalgrounds,Hutchesonregardeditaspartofanempiricallyconfirmedtheoryof(contingent)humannature.This,togetherwithHutcheson’shedonism,broughthisformulationfarclosertotheformthegreatesthappinessprinciplewouldtakeintheutilitariantraditionofBenthamandhisfollowers.HutchesonalsodivergedfromShaftesburyinotherways.Despiteextollingbenevolence,Shaftesburyhadheldthatself-interestistheprimarysourceofrationalmotivation.Hutchesonargued,how-ever,thatuniversalbenevolenceisnolessrationalintheonlysensethat,byempiricistlights,amotivecanbe.Theoreticalreasoning,informingourselvesperfectlyinawaythatallowsustorespondequallytoallweknow,leadsnolesstobenevolencethanitdoesto67self-love.Thereis,then,anirresolvabledualismofrationalmotive,whichGodhappilyrendersotiosebyarrangingthecoinci-denceoftheinterestsofthebenevolentagentandtheinterests68ofall.Importantly,however,Hutchesonarguedthatreasonisnotitselfasourceofmotivation,astherationalistssupposed:thereisnosuchthingaspurepracticalreason.Reasonissimplythefacultythroughwhichwediscerntruthsand,whilethiscanmoveustobelief,69withoutotherpassionsor“affects”itcannotmoveustoaction.Indeed,Hutchesonarguedthatmoralsenseitselfcannotdirectlymotivate,sinceitisafeltresponsetoamotiveratherthanamotiveitself.SowhereasShaftesburyhadheldthattruevirtuemustin-volveself-consciousself-directionbymoralsense,Hutchesonarguedthatthisgivesnofurthermoralmotive;worse,itislikeliertobreedself-indulgentself-congratulation.DavidHume’scritiqueofethicalrationalismisfarbetterknownthesedaysthanHutcheson’s,butHumetookmanyoftheessentials70fromHutcheson.Still,itwasHumewhomostsharplyfocusedargumentsagainsttheclaimthat“moraldistinctions”derivefromreasonineithertheepistemologicalorthemetaphysicalsense.TheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n240STEPHENDARWALLHume/HutchesonclaimthatreasoncannotmotivateisacentralpremiseinHume’smainargumentfortheformer.Unlike“thecalmandindolentjudgmentsoftheunderstanding,”moraljudg-71mentsstandardlymoveusinsomeway.Sowemustmakemoraldistinctionsthroughsentimentratherthanreason.Butneithercananythingbecomemoralorimmoral–virtuousorvicious,rightorwrong–becauseofitsrelationtoreason.Strictlyspeaking,Humeargued,onlybeliefscanaccordorconflictwithreason.Actions,passions,andfeelingslackthe“representativequality”thatmakesbeliefsfitforreasoningandaptforrationalcriticism.Soactionsandpassionscan’tpossiblyhavemoralpropertiesinvirtueoftheirrationalproperties;strictly,theydon’tevenhavethelatter.HumealsofollowedHutchesoninhispositivethesisthatmoralpropertiesderivefromsentiment,buttherewereimportantdiffer-encesofdetail.WhereasHutchesonthoughtintermsofadedicated“moralsense,”Humeheldthatthemoralsentimentresultsfromtheworkingsofmorebasicpsychologicalprinciples:humansym-pathyandtheassociationofideas.Roughly,weapproveofwhatevermotivestendtoleadtohumanhappinessbecauseourcontempla-tionofthesemotivesisassociatedpsychicallywiththesenormallygoodconsequences,whichwethenvicariouslyexperiencethroughsympathy,leadingtoapositivemoralsentimenttowardthemotive.ThisdeparturefromHutcheson’spsychologywenttogetherwitharejectionofhisidentificationofvirtuewithbenevolence.HumetookseriouslythelessonofMandeville’sFable,andheagreedwithBishopButlerthatonreflectionweapproveavarietyofmotives,prominentlyincludingjustice,thatcannotbereducedtobenevo-72lence.Justicecanrequireustoreturnpropertytoa“seditiousbigot”evenwhenanalternativeuseofitwouldbemoreinthe73publicinterest.Evenso,Humeargued,“howeversingleactsofjusticemaybecontrary,eithertopublicorprivateinterest,itiscertainthatthewholeplanorschemeishighlyconducive,orindeedabsolutelyrequisite,bothtothesupportofsociety,andthewell-74beingofeveryindividual.”Wealldobetterifwetreatas“sacredandinviolable”certainartificialrulesstructuringproperty,con-tract,promise,andotherpracticesofjustice,andregulateourselvesbythem.Justiceisinthiswayan“artificialvirtue,”unlikenaturalvirtueslikebenevolence.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality241Withhistheoryofjusticeandoftheobligationtobejust,Humetookanimportantstepawayfromthekindofvirtueethics,foundedentirelyonlove,thathadbeenadvancedbyShaftesbury,Hutcheson,andLeibniz.Undertheusualconditionsofhumanlife,Humeargued,lovesimplycannotprovideanadequatebasisforsocialorder.Anotionofjusticethatisdistinctfromanyformofloveisrequired:governancebymutuallyadvantageousrules.Thisevi-dencedandhelpedstimulatearenewedinterestinwhathadearlierenergizedtheseventeenth-centurytraditionofnaturallaw–theideaofaregimeofnormsorlawsrelating(andobligating)individ-ualswhocannotexpecttobelovedbyothersaseachloveshimself,orevenaseachloveshisfamily,neighbors,orthosewithwhomhesharesthesameconfession.Anethicsofvirtue,whetherempiricistorrationalist,appearedillsuitedtostructureanacceptableconcep-tionofmoralorder,atleastunderthesocialandpoliticalconditionsoflifeineighteenth-centuryEurope.Notsurprisingly,therefore,eighteenth-centuryformsofethicalrationalismtendedtobeethicsofdutyratherthanvirtue.Moreover,therationaliststurnedagainstempiricistapproachesacriticismthatwasverysimilartooneearliervirtueethicistshadmadeagainstvoluntaristnaturallaw.Thevoluntarists,theseearliercriticscom-plained,mademoralityanexternalratherthananinternalmatter,somethinglikemagnetism,withhumanbeingsplayingironfilingstoGod’slodestone.Takeawaythemagnetandtherewouldbenomorality.Asimilarcriticismwasmadeofempiricistvirtueethicsbyanumberofwriterswhosoughttodefendarationalistethicsofdutyinthefirsthalfoftheeighteenthcentury:JohnBalguy,SamuelClarke,andWilliamWollaston,and,afterthem,RichardPriceandThomas75Reid.Thedoctrineofmoralsense,theyargued,groundedmoralityinacontingentandarbitrarysenseinsomethinglikethewaythatearliercriticsofearlymodernnaturallawclaimedthevoluntaristshadbasedmoralityonpositedwill.AndalthoughtheyapplaudedHutcheson’sthesisthatthereisamotivetomoralityotherthan“theprospectofprivatehappiness,”theyobjectedthatempiricistvirtuewas“ofanarbitraryandpositivenature...entirelydependingoninstincts,that76mightoriginallyhavebeenotherwise.”Therationaliststhoughtmoralitytobenecessaryinseveraldif-ferentsenses.Asagainstacontingentmoralsense,therationalistsCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n242STEPHENDARWALLarguedthatmoralityis,inCudworth’sphrase,“eternalandimmut-able.”HutchesonandHumewereagreedthatvirtueandvice“maybecompar’dtosounds,colours,heatandcold,which,accordingtomodernphilosophy,arenotqualitiesinobjects,butperceptionsin77themind.”Therationalistsobjectedthatfundamentalmoral78truthscouldnotdependinthiswayonhumansentiment.Theempiricistsheldalsothatanymotivationtobemoralislikewisecontingent.ButBalguyobjectedthat“moralgoodnessnomoredependsoriginallyonaffectionsanddispositions,thanitdoes79on[positive]laws.”Had“wefoundinourheartsnokindinstincttowardsourbenefactors,”wewouldnonethelessbeabletorecognizeanobligationtogratitudeand,inthatrecognition,haveanadequate80motivetodoso.Fortherationalists,itisnecessarilytruethatmoralagentscanbevirtuous;whatmakesussubjecttomoralityalsoensuresthecapacityformoralvirtue.Empiriciststhoughtalsothatnothingguaranteesthatmoralcon-siderationswillhaveconclusiveforceinpracticalreasoning,thatmoralconductissomethingwereallyshoulddo.Therationalists,ontheotherhand,defendedtheviewthattodowrongistoactcontrarytoreason.Therationalistsarguedthatalltheseaspectsoftheempiricistapproachresultedfromanimpoverishedconceptionofagencyandamistakenviewoftherelationbetweenpracticalreasonandthewill.Fortheempiricists,agencyemergesfromthecombinationofbeliefanddesire.Apersondesiresastateofaffairs,believessomethingwithinherpowerwillachievethat,andiscausedbythosetwointernalstatestoact.Reasonhasawhollytheoreticalroleinthispicture,informingagentsoffactsaboutmeanstosatisfyingdesiresand,perhaps,asHutchesonheld,of(nonethical)factsthatcancausemodificationsofdesiresaswell.Therationalists,however,distin-guishbetween“mere”intelligentgoal-seekingofthissortandgenu-ineagency.Distinctively,agentsactforreasons;theyundertakeconductonaccountofconsiderationstheyregardasjustifyingwhattheydo.Whileanintelligentgoal-seekerneedhavenoendinadd-itiontothevariousgoalsheseeks,anagenthasadefiningaim:doingwhateverthebestreasonsrecommend.AsBalguyputit:“Theendofrationalactions,andrationalagents,consider’dassuch,is81reasonandmoralgood.”BishopButler’sfamousthesisofthe“authorityofconscience”amountedtothesamething.WithoutaCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality243“principleofreflection”or“conscience”–inthiscontext,aconcep-tionofwhatoneshoulddo–abeingisnotanagentcapableof82havingreasonstoact.TherationalistsagreedwithShaftesbury’sproto-Kantianthesis(asagainstHutchesonand,toaconsiderableextent,Hume),thatgenuinevirtueisrealizedonlybymoralagentswhogovernthem-selvesbytheirownmoralconvictions.Onlyif“virtueconsistsinarationaldetermination,andnotinablindpursuitoftheinstinct,”Balguyinsisted,isitrightlyattributedtoapersonasopposedtosomethinginher.Althoughtheyoftentreatedthisissueasidenticaltothemetaphysicalproblemoffreewillanddeterminism,thecontrasttherationalistshadinmindisbetterseenasthatbetweenautonomyandheteronomy,betweenself-determinationanddeter-minationbysomethingotherthantheself.Amoralagent,Butlerargued,musthavethecapacitytogovernhimselfbynormativeconvictionsheaccepts,therebymakingthemoralagenta“lawto83himself.”Therationalintuitionistssharedthemodernnaturallawyers’contentionthatthereareuniversalnormsofconductthatobligateallrationalpersons.Theproblem,recall,wastoshowwhythesenormsincludeobligating,interest-constraining,moraldemands.ClarkeandBalguywereunited,however,inbelievingthatwenei-therneednorcanhaveanyargumenttoconvinceusofthemostfundamentalmoralnorms;theyare(andmustbe)self-evident.Noristhereanyuseforatheorythataimstosaywhatnormativityconsistsin;thatnotionisfundamentalandirreducible.Attemptslikethetheologicalvoluntarists’derivewhateverplausibilitytheymightbethoughttohavefromsimplyassumingafundamental,irreduciblemoralfactinthebackground.Otherwise,theyjust84changethesubjectfromethicstopsychologyortheology.Theintuitionists’preferredanalogywastoanotherareawheretruthsseemtoholdnecessarilyandself-evidently:mathematics.Clarkethoughtitisnolessevidentthatactsarerelatedtosituationsas“fitting”or“unfitting”as“thatonemagnitudeornumberis85greater,equalto,orsmallerthananother.”LikeGrotius,therationalistsmadeafundamentaldistinctionbetweenapartofmorality,rootedinloveorbenevolence,thatcannotbedemandedasourdue,andapart,justiceorequity,thatcanbe.Evenifwelackanyconcernforthegoodofothers,BalguyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n244STEPHENDARWALLwrote,wecanseethatitis“reasonable”todountothem“aswe86wouldbedoneunto.”Love,Clarkeadded,leadsus“topromotethewelfareandhappinessofallmen,”whileequityrequiresthatwe“dealwitheveryman,asinlikecircumstanceswecouldreasonably87expectheshoulddealwithus.”Whenwerecalltheproblematicofmodernnaturallaw,wecanseewhyequityorreciprocitymightappearamorepromisingsourceofthenormativityofmoralnormsthanself-loveorbenevolence.Butwhatobligatesanagenttoforgoeitherhisowngoodorthegoodofall,whenjusticecallsforthat?Ifthenormsaremutuallyadvan-tageous,wemightsaythatsincetheagentwouldwantotherstoconformintheirplace,withrolesreversed,itisreasonableforhertoconformhere.Sucharationaledoesnotrequirethattheagentbeabletocareaboutothersfortheirownsakes.Itdependsratheronanidealofreciprocalorreasonabletreatmentthatisindependentoffellowfeeling,andsomaybebettersuitedtogroundaconceptionofnormativeorderamongindividuals(andgroups)whocannotexpecteachother’slove.Aspromisingasthisideais,however,itstilllefttherationalistswithanumberofunsolvedproblems.Themostvexingfromtheircritics’perspectivewashowtofitmoralfactsastherationalintu-itionistsconceivedthemintoaplausiblemetaphysics.ButHume’schallengeremainedalso.TherationalistsgenerallyagreedwithHumethatmoralconvictionsnecessarilymotivate,butitwasun-clearhowontheiraccountthiscouldbe.Finally,aproblemthatremainedforbothempiricalsentimentalistandrationalintuitionistaccountsofmoralityisthat,unlikethenaturallawtradition,nei-therhadeventhebeginningsofanaccountoftheessentialconnec-tionbetweenmoralityandmoralresponsibility,ofwhyweareappropriatelyheldaccountableforviolatingmoralnorms.Without,however,someexplanationoftheauthoritytodemandcompliancewithmandatorymoralnorms,weapparentlyhavenosatisfyingexplanationofmoralobligation.NOTES1Schneewind1998.Thisisamonumentalworkthatshouldbeconsultedbyanyoneinterestedinthehistoryofmodernmoralphilosophy.Foradiscussionofthiswork,seeDarwall1999,fromwhichIheredraw.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality2452Grotius1925,pp.10–11.ForadiscussionofGrotiusasrespondingtotheskepticalchallengesposedbyMontaigneandCharron,see,inadditiontoSchneewind,Tuck1983and1987.TuckarguesthatGrotius’sresponseforeshadowsHobbes.ForadifferentviewseeShaver1996.ThereareobviousparallelsbetweenthispassageandHobbes’sfamousreplyto“theFoole”inch.15,par.4ofLeviathan.3PhilosophicalRudimentsconcerningGovernmentandSociety(theEnglishtranslationofDecive)(1651),ch.3,par.31,inHobbes1839,vol.II,p.47.4Summatheologiae,IaIIae,q.93,a.1,inAquinas1945.5Ibid.,q.91,a.2.6SummacontraGentiles,bk.III,ch.16,inAquinas1945.7Forthequestionofhumanlawandgovernance,Aquinasrecognizesthatimportantissuesofconflictarise.See,e.g.,Deregno,ch.1,inAquinas1945.Althoughthesecouldberaisedwellenoughintermsofconflictingbeliefsaboutthegood,consistentlywiththedoctrinesconcerningtherelationbetweeneternallawandgoodalreadycited,Aquinasdoesspeakhereaboutconflictinginterests.8ForadiscussionofthePrisoner’sDilemma,seeBarryandHardin1982,pp.11–12,24–25.TheclassicdiscussionofcollectiveactionproblemsisOlson1971.9Cf.Sidgwick’sperceptiveremarkthat“themostfundamentaldiffer-ence”betweenmodernandancientethicalthoughtisthat,whereastheancientsbelievedthatthereisonlyone“regulativeandgoverningfaculty”tobe“recognizedunderthenameofReason,”“inthemodernview,whenithasworkeditselfclear,therearefoundtobetwo–UniversalReasonandEgoisticReason,orConscienceandSelf-love”(Sidgwick1954,pp.197–98).Inthisrespect,althoughAquinas’sideaofnaturallawencodesaconceptionofmoralityandmoralobligationthatisfarfromanythinginAristotle,itisnonethelessfullywithintheancientframework,sinceitallowsonlyonefundamentalprinciple.Eternallaw’steleologicalarchetypesimultaneouslydeterminestheagent’sgoodandnaturallaw,sothatthesenecessarilyprescribethesameactions.Asbefitshissubjectinthatbook,SidgwickconfineshisremarkstomodernEnglishthought.Foradiscussionofthisclaim,seeFrankena1992.10SeeSchneewind’sexcellentdiscussionofGrotiusinSchneewind1998,esp.pp.78–81.11Grotius1925,p.11.12ATreatiseonLawsandGodtheLawgiver,I.i.1,inSua´rez1944.13ForanextendeddiscussionoftheseelementsinSua´rez,Pufendorf,andLocke,seeDarwall2004,fromwhichIdrawhere.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n246STEPHENDARWALL14JohnStuartMill,Utilitarianism,ch.5.15IargueforthisclaiminDarwall2006.16TheLawofNatureandNations,I.i.2–6,inPufendorf1934.17Ibid.,I.i.3.18Ibid.,I.i.4.19Ibid.,I.i.3.20Ibid.21Ibid.,I.v.3.22Ibid.,I.v.5.23LockesketchedthisfirstinhisEssaysontheLawofNature(Locke1954)andtheninAnEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding.ForanextendeddiscussionoftheseaspectsofLocke’sthought,seeDarwall1995,pp.33–52,fromwhichIdrawhere.24Locke1954,pp.151–55.25“Moralrectitude...consideredbarelyinitselfisnotgoodorevillnorinanywaymovesthewill”(entryinLocke’s1693CommonplaceBooktitled“Voluntas.”BodleianLibrary,Oxford,LovelaceMS.C28,fol.114).26ItisinterestingtocomparehereKant’sideaintheCritiqueofPracticalReasonthatimmortalityofthesoulandGod’sexistenceare“postu-latesofpurepracticalreason.”27TheLawofNatureandNations,I.vi.5.28Ibid.29InDarwall2006,IarguethatthethemeispickedupinideaswefindinKantonrespectandequaldignity,AdamSmithontheroleofempathyinmoraljudgmentand,especially,judgmentsofjusticeanddignity,andFichteontheroleofreciprocalrecognitioninbothrealiz-ingandrecognizingadistinctiveformoffreedomthatwepresupposeinsecond-personaladdress.30Lev.,ch.15,par.41.31Ibid.32Hobbeshimself,however,issometimesinterpretedasatheologicalvoluntarist.See,forexample,Martinich1992.33AnotherimportantnaturallawyerofthetimewhosoughttoprovideanempiricalnaturalistaccountofthenormativityoflawsofnaturewasRichardCumberland,whoseDelegibusnaturaedisquisitiophilo-sophica(London,1672),translatedasATreatiseoftheLawsofNature(1727),wasquiteinfluential.Althoughheismuchlesswellknownthesedays,hisideasactuallyanticipatemanyimportantstrainsofcontemporaryethicalnaturalism.Cumberlandsoughttoshowthatthe“wholeofmoralphilosophy”canbe“resolv’dintonaturalobser-vationsknownbytheexperienceofallmen”(1727,p.41),andtoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality247understandthenormativityoflawsofnatureintermsofinstrumentalrationality.Healsodefendedaversionofutilitarianismandargues,asSidgwickwillmuchlater,thatdeliberationsetsboththeagent’sowngoodandthegoodofallasrationalends.(Inthis,asinmanyotherways,FrancisHutchesonisastudentofCumberland’sthought.)ForadiscussionofCumberland,seeDarwall1995,ch.4.34“ASermonPreachedbeforetheHouseofCommons,”inCudworth1970,p.123.35ATreatiseconcerningEternalandImmutableMorality(hereafterTreatise),I.ii.3,inCudworth1996.36“OpiniononthePrinciplesofPufendorf,”inLeibniz1988,pp.64–75.LeibnizalsocriticizedPufendorfforfailingtoappreciatethatmotiveandcharacter,specificallybenevolence,matteredmuchmorethan“externalacts.”37Cudworth,Treatise,I.i.1.38AsIargueinDarwall1995,ch.5.39Cudworth,Treatise,IV.iv.4.40Ibid.,IV.i.1.41Seee.g.TheTrueIntellectualSystemoftheUniverse(1678)inCudworth1978,p.736.42Cudworth,Treatise,IV.vi.4(emphasisadded).43“Sermon,”inCudworth1970,p.124.ThelastphraseisareferencetoRomans2:1,whichwasfrequentlytakenduringtheperiodasreferringtoaformofautonomythatmoralitypresupposes.44BLAdd.MS.4980,p.239.45BLAdd.MS.4980,p.9.46“AnInquiryConcerningVirtueorMerit,”I.ii.2,inCharacteristicsofMen,Manners,Opinions,Times(Shaftesbury1999,originallypub-lished1711).47Ibid.,I.ii.3,I.iii.1.48Ibid.,I.ii.2.49“Soliloquy,orAdvicetoanAuthor,”inCharacteristics.SeealsotheselectionsfromShaftesbury’sStoicnotebookscontainedinShaftesbury1900.ForadiscussionofthisaswellasotheraspectsofShaftesbury’sethics,seeDarwall1995,ch.7.50“AnInquiryconcerningVirtueorMerit,”I.ii.3.51Ibid.,I.ii.4.52“OpiniononPufendorf,”inLeibniz1988,p.73.53“PrefacetoCodexJurisGentium,”inLeibniz1988,p.171.54Ibid.55“Felicity,”inLeibniz1988,p.83.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n248STEPHENDARWALL56ThiscomesfromareviewLeibnizpublishedanonymously,“Observa-tionesdeprincipiojuris,”publishedin1700inMonathlicherAuszugausallerhandneu-herausgegebenennu¨tzlichenundartigenBu¨chern(Hanover,1700),p.378.Itisquoted(andtranslated)inHruschka1991,p.166.Hruschkaarguesthatthisisthefirstformulationofthegreatesthappinessprinciple.57Leibniz’smajorfollower,however,wasChristianWolff,whoprovidedtheauthoritativeversionofrationalperfectionismforGermanphiloso-phyofthefirsthalfoftheeighteenthcentury.WhatmightbecalledtheLeibniz/WolffviewwasvirtualacademicorthodoxyinGermanyduringthisperiod.EchoingLeibniz,Wolffidentifiedobligationwith“whatevergivesamotive”(ReasonableThoughtsabouttheActionsofMen,I.i,inScheewind2003,p.335).And,likeLeibniz,heassumedaharmonyofgoods(perfections)tobemetaphysicallyguaranteedandconcludedthateachpersonisobligatedtopromotethegreatestperfec-tionofall.Insoacting,eachsimultaneouslypromoteshisowngreatestgood(perfection)and,somuchasitisinhispower,thatofeveryotherpersonaswell.58Traite´demorale(1684),inMalebranche1993.59Onthelatter,seeRiley1986.60SeeVienne1991.SeealsoYaffe2000.61Spinoza1985,p.402.62Cudworth,TrueIntellectualSystemoftheUniverse(1678);Berkeley,ThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous,SecondDialogue,inBerkeley1948–57,vol.II.63Foracurrentversionofaviewthatarguessimilarlythatthemotiveofself-understandingiscentraltofreeagencyandtohumancooperation,seeVelleman2000and“TheCenteredSelf,”inVelleman2006.64Mandeville1988.65Butler,FifteenSermonsPreachedattheRollsChapel(1726),sermon12,par.31,andDissertationupontheNatureofVirtue(1751),par.8,bothinButler1950;Berkeley,PassiveObedience(1712),p.21;Hume,Treatise,III.ii.66AnInquiryintotheOriginalofourIdeasofBeautyandVirtue,“Trea-tiseconcerningMoralGoodandEvil,”sec.3.8,inHutcheson1729.67AnEssayontheNatureandConductofthePassionsandAffections,sec.2,inHutcheson2002.68Sidgwickisthemostfamousexampleofaphilosopherwhoadvancesa“dualismofpracticalreason”(Sidgwick1967,pp.373–89,507–9).Sidg-wickclaimsButlerasthesourceofthisidea,butHutchesonisamuchbetterexample.AcasecouldbemadeforCumberlandasthefirstphilosopherimplicitlytosuggestit.Onthispoint,seeDarwall1995.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nThefoundationsofmorality24969ThisisthecentralthemeofIllustrationsontheMoralSense,inHutch-eson2002.70SeeDarwall1997.71Hume,Treatise,III.i.1.72See,especially,Butler’sDissertationupontheNatureofVirtue,inButler1950.73Hume,Treatise,III.ii.2.74Ibid.75Formostpurposes,BishopButlermightalsobeincludedwithinthisgroup.76Balguy,TheFoundationofMoralGoodness(1728),pp.5,8–9.77Hume,Treatise,III.iii.1;Hutcheson,IllustrationsontheMoralSense,sec.4,inHutcheson2002.78Careisrequiredhere,sinceHutchesonwouldalsohaveheldthatitisnoaccidentwehavethemoralsensewedo,sincethatcanbeexplainedbyGod’sbenevolence,anditisnoaccidentthatheisbenevolent.79TheFoundationofMoralGoodness(1728),p.11.80Ibid.,p.12.81Ibid.,p.48.82FifteenSermons,preface,pars.14–29,sermon1,par.8,sermon2,pars.4–17,sermon3,pars.1–5,inButler1950.83Ibid.,sermon2,par.8.84Clarke,ADemonstrationoftheBeingandAttributesofGod(1705),XII.85Clarke,ADiscourseconcerningtheUnchangeableObligationsofNat-uralReligion(1706),I.86TheFoundationofMoralGoodness(1728),p.12.87ADiscourseconcerningtheUnchangeableObligationsofNaturalReligion(1706),I.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nA.JOHNSIMMONS9TheoriesofthestateGreatchangesinthecharacterandinterrelationsofwesternpolit-icalsocietieswereinprogressduringthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.Earlymodernphilosopherseitherdirectlywitnessedthesechangesorwereabletoreflectuponthemfromnogreatdistance,ascrucialelementsoftheirrecentpoliticalhistory.Un-surprisingly,then,earlymodernpoliticalphilosophywasinimport-antrespectspreoccupiedwiththetheoreticalunderpinningsoftheemergingpoliticalorder,withitsnewinstitutionsandnewexpect-ationsofcitizensandpublicofficials.Thetheoriesadvancedbypoliticalphilosophersoftheperiodinturnplayedtheirownmodestrolesininfluencingthedevelopmentofthemodernpoliticalinsti-tutionswithwhichwearefamiliartoday.Theirquestionsandproblemswerethusimportantlyrelatedtoourown,whichallowsearlymodernpoliticalphilosophytospeaktomanyofusinawaythatisperhapsnotfullypossibleforthepoliticalphilosophiesofearlierperiods.Iwillstressheretwogreat“divides”ortransitionswithintheperiodthatcanhelpustounderstandsomeofthemostsalientfeaturesofearlymodernpoliticalphilosophy.Thefirstofthesedividesisthetheoreticaldividebetweenwhatwecancall“politicalnaturalism”and“politicalantinaturalism.”Thesecondisthehis-toricaltransition(mirroredbyacorrespondingtransitioninpoliticaltheories)frompoliticalsocietiesthatexistedascomplex,hierarch-icalstructuresofoverlappingreligiousandcontractualrelationships(suchasthosethatcharacterizedempireandthefeudalorder)topoliticalsocietiesthatbegantotaketheformofmodern,sovereign,territorialstates.Thesetwotransitionswere,ofcourse,relatedinimportantways.Politicalnaturalismwasunderstandablysuppressed250CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate251astheoristsbegantothinkofpoliticalsocietyinitsmodernform.Butbecausethereisnoprecisecorrespondencebetweenthetwo–therewere,forinstance,manynaturalisticdefensesofthesovereign(particularly,monarchical)state–Iwilltreatthetwotransitionsindependently.POLITICALNATURALISMANDITSOPPONENTSWecanthinkofpoliticalnaturalismastheviewthatitispartofthenaturalconditionofhumankindforpersonstobepoliticallyorgan-ized,forsometobesubjecttothepoliticalauthorityofothers.Governmentandsubjectionaresimplypartofthenaturalorderoftheworld.TheAristotelianviewthat“everystateexistsbynature”1andofmanas“bynatureapoliticalanimal”–ofhumannatureasessentiallysocialandpolitical,withsomepersonsnaturallysuitedtoruleandotherstoberuled–wasafamiliar(andenormouslyinfluential)ancientexampleofpoliticalnaturalism;andmodern“organictheories”ofthestatearesimilarlynaturalisticinorienta-tion.Buttheversionofpoliticalnaturalismthatdominatedthemiddleages,thatwasstillapowerfulplayerduringtheearlymodernperiod,andthatwasthe(statedorunderstood)adversaryformanyofthebest-knownearlymodernpoliticalphilosophies,wasarelated,religiousversionofnaturalism.Thepoliticalauthorityofsome(typically,monarchs,emperors,orpope)overothers,orofcommu-nitiesovertheirmembers,isnaturalbecausenaturallybestowedonthosepersonsorcommunitiesbyGod.MedievalpoliticaltheoristslikeAquinasandMarsilius,ofcourse,usedAristotle’ssecularnaturalismasthebasisfortheirownreligiouspoliticalnaturalism(thoughtheydifferedconcerningitsimplicationsonmanypoints).ReformationtheoristslikeLuther,despitetheirinnovations,stillgenerallytookittobeessentialtoviewpoliticalauthorityasinstitutedbyGod.Frequently,thejusti-ficationofferedforreligiouspoliticalnaturalismconsistedsimplyinanappealtothedoctrineofSt.Paul:“thereisnoauthorityexceptfromGod,andthosethatexisthavebeeninstitutedbyGod.There-forehewhoresiststheauthoritiesresistswhatGodhasappointed,2andthosewhoresistwillincurjudgment.”Lutherwas,infact,largelyresponsibleforpopularizingearlymodernappealstothistext(thoughothers,likeGeorgeBuchananandJohnMilton,laterCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n252A.JOHNSIMMONSchallengedthenaturalistreadingofthePaulinetext).Accordingtothecommonunderstandingofthedoctrine,notonlyispoliticspartoftheorderofnature,sinceitisordainedformanbyGod,buttheprecisestructureofcurrentlyexistingpowerrelationsisalsotakentobedivinelysanctioned.Establishedrulersweresome-timessaidtoruleby“divineright,”arightthatcorrelateswithsubjects’obligationsofpassiveobedience(obligationsultimatelyderivingfrompersons’obligationstorespecttheirCreator’schoicesinhisconferralsofauthorityonparticularhumans).Justaspapalpoliticalpower(ortheunifiedpoliticalpowerofChristendomunderemperorandpope)wastakentoderivefromGod’sauthorization,sosecularkingscouldbecharacterizedasbydivinewilllike“little3Gods,”touseJamesI’smemorablephrase.InJames’sview,mon-archy(notjustpoliticalsociety)isdivinelyordained,andkingsareaccountableonlytoGod.Thequalityofthegovernancethatissuesfromearthlyauthoritiesissimplyirrelevanttotheargument’sforce.Ifgovernmentisnaturalanddivinelyordained,theappropriateattitudetowarditisacceptance;torailagainstthenaturalorthedivineispresumptuousandpointless.Theprescribedremedyfor4badgovernmentisprayer.Manyofthemostfamiliardefensesofreligiouspoliticalnatural-ism,ofcourse,advancedmorecomplicatedargumentsthanhavebeensuggestedthusfar.Forinstance,amongthebest-knownver-sionsofearlymodernreligiousnaturalismisthe“patriarchalist”naturalismofRobertFilmer,knowntouschieflythroughLocke’sfamousattackonFilmer’sviewsinhisFirstTreatiseofGovernment(1689).ForFilmer,politicalauthorityisnatural,monarchical,and5absolute,andFilmeridentifiesitwithpaternalpower.HeattemptstoderivetheGod-givenauthorityoftheStuartmonarchsfromthenaturalauthorityoverhisoffspringandtheworldoriginallygrantedbyGodtoAdam.Filmer’sderivationproceedsthrough(pre-sumed)repeatedinstancesofinheritanceofthisauthority,descend-ingfrombiblicaltimesdownthroughtheagesto(amongotherplaces)StuartEngland.Thisisplainlyamorecomplicatedargumentthananysimple,directappealtodivinewill.ButthedivideinearlymodernpoliticalthoughttowhichIhavereferredwasnotmotiv-atedbyoppositiontoanyparticularversionofpoliticalnaturalism,orevenonlytoreligiousversionsofnaturalism(thoughtheoppos-itiontoreligiousnaturalismwasparticularlykeen,tiedasitwastoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate253importantchangesinmanyearlymodernphilosophers’moregen-eralconceptionoftherelationshipbetweenhumanityandGod).Theoppositioninquestionwasprincipledandfundamental,anoppositiontotheveryideaofpoliticsaspartofthenaturalorder.Politicalantinaturalismistheviewthatthenaturalconditionofhumankindisnonpolitical.Mostearlymodernpoliticalphiloso-phers(withthenotableexceptionofHobbes)believed,ofcourse,thathumansarenaturallysociable,perhapsevenbestunderstoodasnaturallymembersofnonpoliticalorprepoliticalsocialgroups(whichgroupsmightthemselves,asSua´rezmaintained,havediv-inelygrantedauthorityovertheirmembers);andmanyheldthatamongourmostbasicdutiesistherequirementthatweenterintosocietywithothers.(SamuelPufendorf,forinstance,arguedthatdevelopingandmaintainingapeacefulsocialitytowardothersis6thefundamentallawofnature.)Butwhilepersonsmaybesocialbynature,itisstillopentothephilosophertomaintainthatthespecificallypoliticalorderoftheworldisartificial(inHume’ssenseofrequiringhumanartifice),asistheparticularformthatapoliticalsocietymaytake,neitherbeingordainedbyGodnorotherwisenatural.Whileitmaybeperfectlynaturalforhumanstocreatepoliticalsocietiesandtofreelysubjectthemselvestopoliticalau-thority,personsarenaturallysubjecttonopoliticalauthority:theexistenceofpoliticalauthorityderivesfromactsofhumancreation.Existingpoliticalpowersreceivetheirauthority(ifany)neitherdirectlyfromGodnorfromthenaturalsuperiorityofrulersorgovernors.Onefamiliarwayofannouncingthisantinaturalismwastode-clarethatthenaturalconditionofhumankindisaconditionof7freedomandequality.Intheircommitmenttoantinaturalism,manyoftheearlymodernpoliticalphilosopherswearetaughttothinkofasrivals–forinstance,HobbesandLockeorHobbesandRousseau–areinfactstaunchallies.ForHobbes,man’snaturalconditionincludesthe“liberty...tousehisownpower,ashewill8himself,forthepreservationofhisownnature.”AndforLocke,thisconditionis“astateofperfectfreedomtoordertheiractions,anddisposeoftheirpossessionsandpersonsastheythinkfit,withintheboundsoftheLawofNature...Astatealsoofequality,wherein9allthepowerandjurisdictionisreciprocal.”Pufendorfmaintainedthat“man’snaturalstate...alsocomeswiththenameofnaturalCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n254A.JOHNSIMMONS10freedom”;andRousseau’scommitmenttoasimilarpositionisapparentintheopeningsentencesofhisSocialContract.AffirminginthiswaythatGodhasnotordainedanyparticularpoliticalorderforhumankinddoesnot,ofcourse,entailanydiminutionofGod’sroleascreatorandsupremelawgiveroroftheauthorityofhiswillor11commandstogroundhumanmorality.ItimpliesonlythatpoliticsisonepartofthebusinessofhumankindthatGodhaschosentoleavetohumans.Mostantinaturalistsduringthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturieswerecontractariansofonesortoranother,arguingthatlegitimatepoliticalorderarisesfromcontract,pact,orcovenant(eitherbetweenindividualsandrulersor,morecommonly,betweenantecedentlyunifiedpeoplesandrulers).Antinaturalistappealstoutility,notcontract,asthesourceofpoliticalobligationandauthoritybecamemorecommonlaterintheearlymodernperiod,particularlyafterHume’sexample;butmanyoftheearliercontractarians(mostnotably,perhaps,Pufendorf)alsostressedcen-trallytheutilityofpoliticalorder(andhaveasaresultoccasionallybeenreadbyinterpretersasproto-utilitarians).Politicalantinaturalismwasindicatedwithintheoriesoftheperiodinavarietyofways,mostprominentlybytheuseofstateofnaturestories,bydefensesofnaturalrights,andbytheinsistenceoncontractorconsentasthesourceoflegitimatepoliticalauthority.Theideaofa(orthe)stateofnature(orthenaturalconditionofmankind)wasusedinavarietyofwaysbyearlymodernpoliticalphilosophers.Ithadhistorical,descriptive,andnormativesenses,sometimesallwithinthesametheory.Manytheoristsuseditexclu-sivelyinitshistoricalsense,torefertotheperiodinhumanhistorypriortotheappearanceofcivillaw,institutionsofgovernment,kings,orpoliticalsociety.Souseditusuallyindicatedanantinatur-aliststance,sinceifhumankindoncelivedwithoutpolitiesorrulers,politicscouldhardlybenaturalformanorordainedformanbyGod.Filmer’sinsistencethatAdamwieldedpoliticalpowerwaspreciselyanaturalistdenialthathumankindeverexistedinanon-12politicalstateofnature.Mankind’snaturalconditionwaspolit-ical.Theideaofanonpoliticalstateofnaturewas,however,usedbyotherconservativewritersinawaybroadlyconsistentwithnatural-ism,whentheyusedittorefertothespecifichistoricalperiodbeforeman’sFall(orbeforetheFlood).ThenpoliticalsocietycouldstillbeportrayedasnaturaltoandordainedbyGodforfallenman.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate255ThemorefamiliardescriptiveandnormativesensesofthestateofnaturecorrespondtothoseemployedbyHobbesandLocke,re-spectively,andtheiruseswerealmostalwaysantinaturalistinin-tent.ForHobbes,thestateofnaturewasanyconditionofpersonslivingtogetherwithoutacommonpoweroverthem“tokeeptheminawe”(thatis,tocontrolbycrediblethreatofpunishmentaggres-siveconduct).Thestateofnaturewas,inessence,theabsenceofeffectivegovernment,anditnotonlycharacterizedhumanprehis-tory,butwasaconditionthatcouldreemergeatanytime(asHobbesbelievedhadhappenedduringtheCivilWarinEngland).Locke’snormativeideaofthestateofnaturewasthatofpersonswithoutacommonlegitimategovernmentoverthem,agovernmentlegitim-atedbytheirmutualconsent.People(orstates)areinthestateofnaturewithrespecttooneanother,accordingtoLocke,wheretheyhavenotfreelyagreedtoentercivilsocietytogether,bysurrender-ingtheindividualrightsnecessaryforeffectivegovernment(includ-ing,importantly,therighttoprivatelyenforcethelawofnature).Onthisaccount,allpersonsremaininthestateofnatureuntiltheyreachtheageofconsent,andmaturepersonscanbeinthestateofnatureevenwheretheylivetogetherundereffectivegovernment,ifthatgovernmentisillegitimate.OnboththeHobbesian(descrip-tive)accountandtheLockean(normative)account,then,thestateofnaturecanbeinstantiatedonthosehistoricaloccasions(includ-inghumanprehistory)thatsatisfytheconditionsoftheaccount;butitdoesnotoneitheraccount,asitdoesonthehistoricalaccount,referessentiallytoanyparticularperiodinhumanhistory.AndboththeHobbesianandLockeanusesofstateofnaturetheoriesplainlysignaltheirpoliticalantinaturalism,intheirconsiderationofpossible(andactual)nonpoliticalornoncivilconditionsofhu-mankind(including,inLocke’scase,nonpoliticalconditionsthatarerationallypreferabletoatleastsomefamiliarcasesoflifeunderaneffectiveruler).Thedefensesofnaturalrightsthataresofamiliarfromthelateseventeenthandeighteenthcenturiessimilarlywerenormallypartofanantinaturalistprograminpoliticalphilosophy.Hereitwascrucialthatwhatwasbeingdefendedwasnaturalrights,notmerelynaturaldutiestocomplywiththerequirementsofGod’s(natural)law.Theemergenceofnaturalrightstheoriesfromthelongtrad-itionofnaturallawmoraltheorywasaslowandconfusedprocess.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n256A.JOHNSIMMONSButinthehandsofphilosopherslikeGrotius,Hobbes,Pufendorf,andLocke,thesetheoriesbecameanimportantcomponentofthepoliticalantinaturalismthatwastodominatethelatermodernpoliticalmindset.Naturalrightsweregenerallyunderstoodasindi-vidualmoralprerogativesorasmoralprotectionsforcertainspheresofindividualchoiceorthepursuitofcertaininterests.Sometimes(asinHobbes)theserightsweretakentobemeremoralliberties–thatis,toentailonlythattheconductinquestionwasnotwrongful.Othertheorists(likeLocke)defendednaturalrightsasmorestronglyimplyingcorrelativedutiesonotherstopermitexerciseoftheright.Buteitherway,theassertionofnaturalrightsforpersonsdirectlyimpliesamoraljustificationforactingcontrarytothecommandsofpoliticalsuperiors.Ifwehaveanaturalliberty-righttopreserveourselves(asGrotiusandHobbesbelieved),thenwemaywithoutwrongdoingignorethecommandsofourpoliticalsuperiorswheretheydonotconducetoourpreservation.Wearenotnaturallysub-jecttothosesuperiorsinallthings.Ifwehavea(stronger)naturalrightto“orderouractions”aswechoose(asLockeargued),correlat-ingwithothers’naturaldutiestoallowustodoso,thenwecannotbelegitimatelysubjectedtothepoliticalpowerofothersexceptbyourchoice.Naturalsubjectionby(alleged)naturalinferiorityor13by(alleged)divinegrantisnotpossible.Naturalrightstalkwasthusalmostalwaysimplicitlyalsoantinaturalistdiscourse.Stillmoreobviouslyantinaturalistinitsimplicationswasthewidespreadearlymodernemploymentoftheideaofcontract,promise,orconsentasthehistoricalsourceofpoliticalpowerorasthesolegroundoflegitimatepoliticalauthority.Inonesense,aswehaveseen,contractarianismwearsitsantinaturalismonitsface,sinceifpoliticalauthorityrequireshumancreationthroughcon-tract,thatauthoritycanhardlybeportrayedasnaturalordivinelyordained.Ontheotherhand,anobservationofthatsortseemsincertainwayssimplisticorinsensitivetotheactualvarietyofcon-tractarianthoughtoftheperiod.Someearlyappealstocontractorconsentinexplainingpoliticalauthority(suchasthoseofHookerandSua´rez)werenotentirelyorunambiguouslyantinaturalistintone,stillrelyingastheydidontheideaofGod’sgrantastheultimatesourceofsuchauthority.And,moregenerally,appealstocontractwerecertainlynotroutinelyindicativeofarevolutionaryorevenanonconservativepoliticalspirit.Onthecontrary,useoftheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate257ideaofthecontractcamequitenaturallytophilosophersofmanyorientations.EvenAugustinehadreferredtoageneralcontractbyhumansocietiestoobeytheirkings.Feudalpoliticalorderhadlargelyconsistedinacomplexnetworkofoverlappingcontracts,exchangingprotectionforvariousservices,withbothlordandvassalconsequentlypossessingbothrightsandobligations.Sotherewasnothingparticularlyrevolutionaryaboutearlymodernusesoftheideaofcontracttoexplainpoliticalorder.Further,mostoftheearlyemploymentsoftheideaofcovenantorcontractasthefoundationofpoliticalsocietywerequitedistantfromthemorefamiliarandindividualistusesofthemintheworkofphilosopherslikeHobbes,Locke,orRousseau.Fornormallytheearlycontractariansreferredtopoliticalcontractsthatwereneitherindividualnorcontemporary–thatis,contractsthatwereneithermadebyindividual,freepersonsnormadebythepersonsallegedtobeboundbythecontracts(ortheircontemporaries).Instead,therelevantcontractsweregenerallysupposedtobebetweenalreadyconstitutedorincorporatedpeoplesandtheirrulers(orgovern-ments)andtohavetakenplaceatthehistoricalfoundingofeachpoliticalsociety.Contemporarypoliticallifewasnotitselfconsti-tutedbyconsentorcontract,butwasseenratherintermsofacontinuationoftheoriginal,foundingcontract(orcontracts:typic-allythefoundingwasconceivedofintermsofaseriesofcontracts).Thejustificationofahistoricalpeople’sauthoritytoactforitscontemporaryconstituentmembersandtheauthorityofahistor-icalpoliticalcontractwithrespecttosubsequentgenerationsofsubjectsinthatpoliticalsocietywereoftenleftsomewhatvague,withfrequent(andrelativelyuncompelling)recoursetohistoricaltradition,implicitacceptancethroughnonrebellion,andthelike.ThecontracttheoriesofBuchanan,Hooker,andAlthusiuswereofthissort,andthoseofGrotiusandPufendorfcertainlyleanedinthatdirection.Englishjustificationsofcontemporarypoliticalarrange-mentsbyreferencetothetermsoftheir“ancientconstitution”(ortoancientcustoms,ortotheMagnaCartaastheirconfirmation,ortotheunwrittenrulesofhistoricalcommonlaw)–whichwereespeciallyfrequentduringStuartrule–displayedasimilartheoret-icalbent.Appealstoancient,hazy,foundingcontractsofexistingsocieties,whilecertainlytechnicallyantinaturalist–sincepoliticalauthorityisstillahumanartifactandpeoplesretaintherighttoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n258A.JOHNSIMMONSresistviolationsofthecontract–nonethelessoftenmanagetohavemuchofthefeelofthepoliticalnaturalist’sappealtothedivinelyordained,time-honoredinevitabilityoftheexistingpoliticalorder.Forthetemporalandemotionaldistanceoffoundingcontractsfromthelivesandconcernsofcontemporarysubjectsremainspotentiallyenormous,andtheopportunitytointerpretancientcontractsasauthorizingtyrannyisomnipresent.Similarly,evennonhistoricalcontracttheoriesofpoliticalau-thorityseldomweretakenbytheirearlyproponentstohavetheliberal,antiabsolutist,anticonservative(andpossiblyrevolutionary)implicationsthatlatercontractariansattemptedtoderivefromtheirtheories.Theirunwillingnessonthesescoresgenerallyflowedfromoneormoreofthreesources:atheoryofpresumed,tacit,orimplicitconsent(togetherwithcertainfactualassumptions);atheoryoftheunlimitedalienabilityofrights;oranacceptanceofthebindingforceofcoercedconsent.Manyearlymoderncontractariansdeniedthatpoliticalresist-ance(asopposedtopassive,conscientiousrefusaltoobey)couldeverbejustified,oraffirmedthatsuchactiveresistancecouldbejustifiedonlywhenone’sownpreservationwasdirectlyputinjeo-pardy.Thestandardargumentwasthatitwasineveryfreeperson’sbestintereststoliveinanenduring,peacefulsocietyandthustogranttoarulerorgovernmentalltherightsonepossesseswhosetransfermightbenecessarytopreservingstabilityandpeace.Thesepowersinfactincludealltherightsonehas,perhapsexceptingtherighttodefendone’slifefromimmediatethreats.Sinceitisineachperson’sbestinterestto(virtually)absolutelyempowerasovereigninthisway,wecanpresumethateachpersonimplicitlyortacitlyconsentstosuchanarrangement.Further,theargumentproceeded,aserioustheoryofcontractsmustholdthatthecontractor’swillshoulddeterminethecontentoftheagreement.Contractorsmaytransfertoothers(virtually)anyrightsthattheywishtotransfer,meaningthatevenvoluntaryenslavementorpoliticalabsolutism(thecollective,politicalequivalentofslavery)isperfectlypossiblemorallyandaperfectlypossiblelegitimateconsequenceofcontract-ualrelationships.Thatcontractorsmadewhatinretrospectseemsabadbargainisneitherherenorthere;bargainsmustbekept.Thus,evenifweignorethepossiblebindingforceofanancient,original(founding)contract,acontractarianargumentwasavailablethatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate259appearedtodemonstratethatbywayofaperfectlycontemporary(ifpresumedorimplicit)contract,politicalsuperiorscanandroutinelydoenjoyabsoluteauthority,andpoliticalinferiorspossessnorighttoresistalawfulsovereign’srule.Eachinhisownway,Sua´rez,Grotius,JohnSelden,Hobbes,Spinoza,andPufendorfallemployedvariantsofthisargument.Inaddition,illiberalconclusionsseemedboundtoflowfrombeliefinthebindingforceofcontractsorpromisesproducedbyinti-midation,coercion,orradicallyunequalbargainingpower.And,again,manyoftheearlymoderncontractarianssubscribedtosuchaview.Itwasaviewthatcouldseemperfectlynaturalandplaus-ible,ofcourse,giventhatfamiliarfeudalcontractualrelationswereregularlytaintedbysuchdefects,aswerethecommonmilitaryanddiplomatictreatiesandagreementsofthatage(andeveryotherage).Butifcoercedagreementsaremorallybinding,thenconquestandintimidationcanbeperfectlylegitimatesourcesofpoliticalauthor-ity,againtendingtoconfirmconservativeandabsolutistconclu-sionsaboutthelegitimacyofexistingpoliticalpowerstructures.Hobbeswentsofarastoarguethatallpoliticalcovenantsareequallymadefromthemotiveoffear,sothatallsuchcovenants(includingthosemadewithconquerorsatswordpoint)mustbe14equallybinding.ThisHobbesianpositionhasoftenbeenequatedwiththeideathat“mightmakesright,”thoughitismoreaccur-atelytheviewthatthepowertodestroyreliablyproduceswillingsubmission,whichinturnmakestheactionsofthemightyrightful.UltimatelyitwaslefttolatercontractarianphilosopherslikeLocketoutilizetheideaofthepoliticalcontractinitspurestanti-naturalistform,makingpoliticalauthorityrestonindividual,con-temporaryconsent(or,dependingonone’sinterpretativeleaning,onwhatitwouldberationalforindividual,contemporarypersonstoconsentto)–thusrejectingtheideaofhistorical,foundingcontractsasbindingonsubsequentgenerations–anddrawingbroadlyliberalconclusionsfromthisantipoliticalnaturalism.Evenpurelyantina-turalistcontractarianthought,ofcourse,remainedperfectlycon-sistentwithconservativepoliticalviews(asHobbesshowed),justaspurelyantinaturalistutilitarianpoliticalthoughtdid(asHumedem-onstrated).Anditremainedconsistentwiththedefenseofpoliticalabsolutismaswell(aswehaveseen),untiltheLevellersandLockemadeprominenttheargumentsthattherearelimitsonthepowerofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n260A.JOHNSIMMONSevenafreeadulttocontractuallytransfertootherscertainpersonalindividualrightsandthatconsentproducedbycoercionorintimi-dationisnotbinding,failingasitdoestoexpressthewilloftheagent.Oncesuchlimitswereestablished,absolutegovernmentsimplycouldnotbealegitimateoutcomeofacontract–hence,itcouldnotbealegitimateformofpolityatall–andthepathwasclearforthedevelopmentofthemoreexplicit,eighteenth-centurydefensesofinalienablenaturalrightsandthenecessarylimitstopoliticalpowerthattheyestablish.Ofthesourcesofantinaturalist,contractarianilliberality,onlythetheoryoftacitconsentremainedinLocke’spoliticalphilosophy;anditisthattheoryoftacitcon-sentwhichismostoftenchallengedbyliberalphilosophicalcommentaryonLocke.Whilethedefenseoforoppositiontopoliticalnaturalismthuscharacterizesmuchofthesubstanceofearlymodernpoliticalphil-osophy,itmustbereemphasizedthatthecontrastbetweenthetwoviews,whileveryimportant,wasnotespeciallysharp.Forinstance,acommonpositionoftheperiodwasthatwhilepoliticallifewasadirectgiftfromGod,politicallifewasnotfullynaturalforman,sincethefirsthumanshadexistedinanonpoliticalcondition.Whetherornotthiscountedaspoliticalnaturalismseemsafinepoint.Similarly,itwasregularlymaintainedthatallpersonswerebornfreewithrespecttootherindividualpersons(butperhapsnotwithrespecttogroupswithquasi-politicalstatus),thatpoliticalsocietyisperfectlynaturalbutnotanyparticularrulerorformofgovernment,thatnonpolitical(butfullyincorporated)societiesarenaturaltoman,orthatGodcommandsthehumancreationofpolities.Allofthesepositions,allperfectlyfamiliarinearlymodernpoliticalphilosophy,lieclosetotheborderbetweennaturalismandantinaturalism.Soweshouldnotassumethatthedebateoverpolit-icalnaturalismwasoneinwhichphilosopherssimplylinedupononeoftwoclearlydefinedsides.Butwhydidtheycarewhichsidetheywereon,ortrysohardnottotakeasideatall?Heretheanswersareasvariedasthepositionsonthequestion,andweresometimesassimpleastheantinatural-ist’sdesiretomakethestudyofpoliticsmorescientificbyclearlydelineatingitfromthedisciplineoftheology(adesiremadeclearbytheoristslikeAlthusiusandBuchanan,forinstance).Buttwoverygeneralanswersfromamongthemanyseemthemostimportant.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate261First,earlymodernpoliticalphilosophershadclearlybeforethemavirtuallyunparalleleddisplayoftheoreticalandpracticalconflictoverthenatureofChristianreligionanditsrelationtopolitics,abloodyandunsettlingrecenthistoryofpassionatedebate,schism,andreligiouswar.TheywrotewhiletheFrenchHuguenotsweremassacred,duringthereligiouswarsthatconsumedFranceformostoftherestofthatcentury,whiletheThirtyYearsWarraged,andduringthePuritanrisingagainstroyalpowerinEngland.Ortheywrotewiththememoryofthesebloodyandunsettlingeventsclearlyfixedbeforetheirminds.Theavailablepositionsweremany,andpreciselywhereonestoodontheroleofGodandchurchinthepracticallifeofthepolityobviouslymattereddeeplyinthatcontext,stancessometimescostingphilosopherstheircareers,theirfree-dom,oreventheirlives(Grotius,forinstance,wrotehismostimportantworkwhileimprisonedandinexile,duetohisinvolve-mentinapoliticalcontroversythatultimatelyrestedondifferencesoverissuesofreligioustoleration).Second,theearlymodernperiodwitnessedthebirthofseveraltraditionsofthoughtcommittedtothepossibilityofjustifiedpolit-icalresistance,alongwithcountertraditionsdeterminedtounder-minethisconclusion.Thestandingofrulersorgovernments–asnaturallysuperiororasordainedbyGod,say–makesaplaindiffer-encetotheplausibilityofconclusionsaboutresistanceandrevolu-tion.Ifgovernmentismadebyhumanbeings,notbyGodornature,thenitisanartifactthatcanwithoutimproprietybealteredandimprovedbyhumanbeings.Itisnot,simplybyexisting,whatitoughttobe.Somegovernmentisbetter,someisworse,andmanyarecapableofobviousimprovement.Asahumancreation,madetoservehumanneeds,officialrefusalstopermitsuchimprovementsbegintolookthemselveslikerefusalstobeguidedbytheendorpointofpoliticalsociety.Theunjustandunresponsiverulerbreachesatrust,renegesonanimplicitagreement,ishimselfmoretherebelthanthosewhoopposeorattempttoremovehim(asLockefamouslyargued).Whiletherewas,ofcourse,someCatholicresist-ancetheoryintheperiod,itwasprincipallyCalvinisttheoristsinFrance,Scotland,andEnglandwhoadvancedthislineofargument.15IntheVindiciaecontratyrannos,inBuchananandinAlthusius,thedoctrineofpopularsovereigntyreceiveditsfirstinfluentialdefenses,pavingthewayfortheculminationofCalvinistresistanceCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n262A.JOHNSIMMONStheoryinLocke’sSecondTreatise.Noneofthisistosay,aswehaveseen,thatconservativephilosophersalllineduponthenaturalistsideofthisdivide;theperiodwasrifewithantinaturalistdefensesofdoctrinesofpassivesubmissionandnonresistance.Butitwastheriseofantinaturalisminearlymodernpoliticalphilosophythatmadejustifiedpoliticalresistanceseemapossibleconclusioninthedebate.Noissuesaremorecentraltopoliticalphilosophythanthedutiesofsubjects,thenatureandsourceofpoliticalauthority,andthelimitsonthepoliticalrelationship;anditwasthroughthedebateaboutpoliticalnaturalismthattheseissueswereapproachedinearlymodernpoliticalphilosophy.OLDANDNEWFORMSOFPOLITICALSOCIETYIturnnowtothesecondofthedividesortransitionsofearlymodernpoliticalphilosophytowhichIreferredabove:thetransitionfromearlierformsofpoliticallifetothemodernstate(alongwiththecorrespondingconceptualchangesthishistoricaltransitionfacili-tated).Muchofthemostinfluentialpoliticalphilosophyoftheperiodwaswrittenatthedawnofthemodernnation-state.Indeed,manyhistoriansdatethebeginningofthemodernstatesystemwellintotheearlymodernperiod,atthePeaceofWestphaliathatclosedtheThirtyYearsWarin1648.Priortothesixteenthcentury,theterm‘state’wasseldomevenusedtorefertoanindependentpolit-icalsociety.Machiavelli’swritingshelpedtochangethis(thoughMachiavellihimselfrarelyused‘state’inthemodernsense,hedidclearlyworkwiththeideaofindependent,territorialpolities).ButthepoliticalorderofEuropeonwhichMachiavellicouldlookbackwasverydifferentfromthatwhichexistedduringthelivesofHumeorRousseau;andtheconceptofthemodernstatethatdevelopedinearlymodernpoliticalphilosophydevelopedalongwiththeideasofterritorialexclusivityandpoliticalsovereignty,emergingfeaturesofthenewpoliticalorder.Thepoliticalorganizationofthemiddleageslackedseveralofthedistinctivefeaturesofmodernpoliticalsociety,themoststrikingofwhichweretheabsenceofclearterritorialjurisdictionsandtheabsenceofclearhierarchicalstructuresofauthority.Thefamiliarmoderntendencyofpoliticstoaidintheconvergenceofnationalandpoliticalidentitieswasalsolargelymissing.ChristendomwasCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate263structuredbyacomplicatedanddecentralizedsystemofpowerrelations,inwhichtheclaimstoobediencemadebylocalities(townsandcities),feudallordsandkings,churchleaders(popesandbishops),andquasi-religiousleaders(theHolyRomanemperors)cutacrossoneanotherandoverlapped,oftenwithoutclearpriority.Theclaimsinquestionwere(withtheexceptionofsomelocalities’claims)claimsoverpersons,notclaimsovergeographicalterritories(andoverpersonsonlyinsofarastheywereinthoseterritories).Feudalsocietywasanetworkofquasi-contractualrelationships,inwhichsomepromisedprotectionorsupporttoothersinexchangeforpromisesofvariousothergoodsorservices.One’srightsandobligationsdependedonthenatureoftheseagreements,notonone’sgeographicallocationintheworld,andparticularindividualswereregularlysubjecttoclaimsfromavarietyofsuperiors.Feudalbaronsmightholdfiefsfromdifferentkingsindifferentterritories,forinstance,andmilitarysupportmightbepromisedtodifferentkingsfordifferentkindsofoccasions.Whilethechurchclaimedamoreuniversalauthority,itsauthoritytoowasoverpersons–specifically,overbelievers–andnotoverterritory.Nor,ofcourse,wasitsauthorityclearlylocatedinanyuncontroversialhierarchyofauthority.TheHolyRomanemperorsclaimedauthorityoverpre-ciselythesamebodyofpersons(theinevitablerivalrybetweenchurchandempireeventuallyseriouslyweakenedboth);andtheyclaimedsuperiorityoverallotherrulers,aclaimwidelydeniedbyrivalkings.ButwhiletheemperorsruledoverspecificpartsofEurope,liketheearlierRomanemperors,theyclaimednoboundedterritoryastheirown.Theempirewasmeanteventuallytohaveuniversaljurisdiction,notterritoriallylimitedjurisdiction.Fromthismorassofinterrelatedpowerstructures,themodernstategraduallyemerged–morerapidlyinFrance,Spain,andEng-land,andmoreslowlyinareas(Germany,Italy)controlledbytheHolyRomanempire.Wherestatesgrewslowly,theywereprecededbyotheralternativestotheoldorder,suchascityleagues(e.g.theHanseaticLeague)andtheindependent,territorial(butinternallyfactional)citystatesofnorthernItaly,allofwhichthemselveswereeventuallyreplacedbymodernstates.Whythesechangesoccurredisamatterofsomecontroversyamonghistorians(thoughefficien-ciesofscaleandthechangingnatureofwarfareseemtobeatleastpartofthestory).MoreimportantforourpurposesisthatthesewereCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n264A.JOHNSIMMONSthepoliticalchangeswitnessedbyearlymodernpoliticalphiloso-phers,changesthathelpedtosetthephilosophicalagendafortheperiod.Theemergingorderofmodernstatesconsistedofmultipleinde-pendentpolities,eachclaimingjurisdictionoveradistinctportionoftheearth(andoverthepersonsinthatterritory),eachclaimingtherightofexternalsovereignty–thatis,autonomyorindepend-encefromtheauthorityofotherstates,persons,ororganizations–andeachdisplayinganinternalhierarchyofpoliticalandlegalauthority,withthesharedunderstandingthatsomeofficeorbodymustholdsupreme(orsovereign)authorityrelativetootherswithinthepolity.Inaddition,thenewordertendedtobringabouttheconvergenceofpolitiesandnations(thinkhereoftheaforemen-tionedtheoreticalconceptionofpolitiesasbasedinanoriginal,foundingcontractbetweenapreexistingpeopleandaruler).Churchandempirewerepoliticalorganizingsystemsthatreachedacrossmyriadnations,whilefeudalrelationshipscutfreelyacrossthelinesofnationality.Modernstates,bycontrast,tendedboth,ontheonehand,tocorrespondtopreexisting,historicalcommunitiescon-nectedtoparticularterritoriesand,ontheother,tofosternew,morepoliticalkindsofnationality,premisednotonlyonculturalandterritorialcontinuity,butonmutualsubjectiontoacommonsetof(relatively)fixedlawsandparticipationinacommonciviclife.Earlymodernpoliticalphilosophy,appropriately,concerneditselfprincipallywithunderstandingthenatureofthenewpoliticalen-titiesofthiskindandoftheclaimstheymade(e.g.tosovereigntyandterritory)–focusingonquestionsaboutthejustifications(orlackthereof)availablefortheseclaims,onquestionsaboutthespecificwaysinwhichstatesneededtobeorganizedorlimitedinorderfortheseclaimstobedefensible,andonquestionsaboutthebestformssuchstatescouldtake.SOVEREIGNTY,TERRITORY,GOVERNMENTInternalsovereigntyissupremacyofauthority(right,power)withintheterritoriesofthestate.Externalsovereigntyistheindependenceofthestatefromauthoritiesexternaltoit.Earlymodernpoliticalphilosophywaspreoccupiedwithbothideas,concernwiththeformeryieldingcompetingtheoriesofthenature,location,andCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate265groundofsovereigntywithinthestate,whileconcernwiththelatteryieldedcompetingtheoriesofinternationalrelationsandwarandpeace.Ibeginwithinternalsovereignty.JeanBodinfocusedattentionontheproblemofsovereignty,andtheaccounthegaveofthenotionwasasignificanteventinthedevelopmentofWesternpoliticalthought.Ineverystate,Bodinargued,theremustbeasinglepersonorgroupinwhichtheentireauthorityofthestateisconcentrated.Thisauthoritymustbesu-premeandfinal,thelastlegalandpoliticalwordinthestate;solawcansimplybeunderstoodasthecommandofthesovereign.With-outsuchfinality,thereisnotonestate,oneclearsourceoflaw.Fortheretobesuchfinalityandsupremacy,thisauthoritymustbecompletelyunlimited:bytemporallimits,bytheconstraintsofcivillaw,byothergoverningbodies(asinamixedconstitution),orbyanythingelse.Sovereigntymustbeperpetual,absolute,and16undivided.Hobbespresentedvirtuallyidenticalarguments.Mostearlymodernpoliticalphilosophersagreedthattheremustbeafinal,supreme,legalauthorityineverycivilsociety,properlyconceived(thoughnotallusedtheterm‘sovereign,’andtherewasdisagreementaboutwhetherfinalityoflegislativeorexecutiveau-thoritywasthemorebasicrequirement).Themostseriousdebatesaboutsovereigntyconcernednotitsnecessityforpoliticalsociety,butratheritsground,itslocation,andthepossibilityoflimitsonstatesovereignty.Disputesaboutthegroundofstatesovereigntywehavealreadyconsidered–whetheritisgroundedindivinewill,inthepowertocompelsubmission,orinconsentorcontract(histor-icalorpersonal);andconclusionsaboutthegroundofsovereigntyhadclearimplicationsfordebatesconcerningthelocationandextentofsovereignty.Disputesaboutthelocationofsovereigntytendedtobeoftwosorts.Thefirst,morephilosophical,disputeconcernedwhethersovereigntyrestedultimatelyandinalienablyinthepeopleasawhole,whomerelydelegateorentrust(ratherthantransfer)theirauthoritytogovernment(ase.g.Buchanan,17Althusius,theLevellers,andLockemaintained),orwhethersov-ereigntywaslocatedinagovernmentorrulerwhowastherightfulholderofthatsupremeauthority(ase.g.Bodin,Grotius,Hobbes,andPufendorfheld).Thesecond,oftenrelated(butusuallymorehistoricalandempirical)kindsofdebateaboutthelocationofsovereigntyconcernedthequestionofwheresovereigntylayinCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n266A.JOHNSIMMONSparticularstates–typicallythosewithmixedconstitutions,andmostprominentlyEngland.Byfarthemostinterestingaspectoftheearlymoderndiscussionofsovereignty,however,wasthedisagreementaboutthepossibilityoflimitsonsovereignty.Aswehaveseen,BodinandHobbesheldthatsovereigntywasnecessarilyunlimitedandabsolute;limitedsovereigntywassimplynotsovereignty,beinginferiortothatwhichlimitedit.Theopponentsofabsolutismrepliedwiththepowerfulargumentthat,ineffect,supremacywithinadomainandabsolute-nessaresimplydifferentnotions,notnecessarilyconnected.Anauthoritycanbethesupreme,finalauthoritywithinarealm–andsobesovereign–withoutnecessarilypossessingtheabsoluteau-thoritytodoanythingatwill.Agovernmentcanbethesole,final,legislativeandexecutiveauthorityinapolitywhileempoweredonlytomakeandenforcelawswithincertainlimits.Defendersofabsoluteness,inresponse,remainedsuspiciousthatproponentsoflimitedsovereigntywereinfactwithsuchclaimsonlydisguisingtheirtruebeliefinabsolute,butpopular,sovereigntyorinadividedsovereigntythatunintelligiblylackedanauthoritytospecifythetermsofthedivision.Butsinceproponentsofpopularsovereigntyalmostnevermaintainedthatthepeople’sauthoritytoactonbehalfofitsmemberswasabsolute,limitedasitwasbymorallaw,thefirstcharge,atleast,seemsunsustainable.Theapparentlogicalpossibilityoflimitedsovereigntyimmedi-atelyraisedthequestionofthewaysinwhichsovereigntyshouldbeunderstoodtobelimited.Thisquestionwastypicallyaddressedbyconsideringthepropertask,sphere,orendofcivilgovernment,anapproachwhichwasitselfrelatedtothequestionofwhatpowersrationalcontractorswouldinfactdelegatetogovernment.Assum-ingthatsuchcontractorswantgovernmentchieflytobringaboutandcontinuallysecurecivilpeaceandprosperity,wemustaskwhatauthoritygovernmentsneedtoaccomplishtheseends.Heretheproponentsoflimitedsovereigntyarguedonempiricalgroundsthatabsoluteauthorityissimplynotnecessarytothetask.Governmentsdonotneedtheauthoritytoinvadecertainbasicpersonalrights–toinnocentpersonalliberties,toproperty,toreligiousfreedom.Manyoftheserightswouldlatercometoberegardedasinprincipleinalienableandimprescriptible,thussettingnecessarylimitstosovereignauthority;andsome,suchasrightstoreligiousliberty,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate267cametoberegardedasbelonginginaspecialclassofrights.Butitwasatfirstsufficientfortheargumentthatsuchrightswerenotnecessarytogovernment’spropertask,sothatpersonscouldnotbesimplyassumedtohaveimplicitlysurrenderedtheserightsincre-atingasovereign.ThecourseofLocke’swritingsonreligioustoler-ationservesasanexcellentillustrationoftheargumentativetransitionfrom(inhisearlywritings)regardingthepowertolegis-lateinreligiousmattersasnecessarytothepreservationofcivilpeace,tohisfinalviewof“thecareofsouls”assimplynoneof“the18businessofcivilgovernment.”Handinhandwiththisdefenseoflimitedsovereigntygrewdoctrinesofjustifiedpoliticalresistanceagainstsovereignsthatactbeyondtheirlimitedauthority–expandingfromtheideaofjustifiedresistanceinthenameofGod(i.e.toupholdthetruefaith),throughtheideaofjustifiedresistancebyinferiormagistratesorrepresentativesofthepeople,tothemoreradicaldoctrineofjustifiedpopularresistance(eitherbythepeoplecollectively,orevenmoreradically,bywrongedindividuals).AbouttheearlymoderndiscussionofexternalsovereigntyIwillsaylittle(thoughmuchofmodernthoughtaboutthenatureandauthorityofstateswasinfactpromptedbypriorconcernsaboutinternationalmoralityandpolicy).Themedievalinternationalorderrestedprimarilyonoverarchingecclesiasticalandimperialauthor-ity.Themodernorderofindependentstates,equalinauthority(ifnotinpower),requiredaverydifferentmodelforpoliticalphiloso-phy.Theemergingpoliticalantinaturalism(discussedabove),withitsemphasisonthenaturalfreedomandequalityofpersons,pos-sessedjustthemodelrequiredforthejob.Inthesamewaythatindividualpersonscouldbeconceivedofasexistinginastateofnature,socouldthefreeandequal(i.e.sovereign)nationstatesoftheworldbethoughtofascorporateindividualsexistinginaninternationalstateofnature.Forthesinglemostsalientfeatureoftheneworderwastheabsenceofanyhigherauthoritywiththerighttomakelawfor,adjudicatedisputesbetween,orpunishthesover-eignstates.Andtheabsenceof(effectiveorlegitimate)higherau-thoritywithsuchrightswas,aswehaveseen,formostphilosophersthedefiningcharacteristicofthestateofnature.Understandinglegitimacyorrightandwrongintheinternationalsphere,then–including,forinstance,thelawsofwarandtherightsofvariousnationstoportionsoftheearthorsea–wassimplyamatterofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n268A.JOHNSIMMONSseeinghowthecharacteristicsofthestateofnatureappliedtonationsinthatstate.GrotiusandPufendorfproducedextensiveanddetailedtheoriesonthissubject.HobbesandLockeproducedequallyimportant,thoughfarlessdetailed,accounts.Theprimarydivisioninsuchtheoriesdependedonthemoralconditionthatwastakentocharacterizethestateofnature.Ontheonehand,thereweretheorieslikethatofHobbes,accordingtowhichthestateofnatureisessentiallyamoralvacuum,suchthat“thenotionsofrightandwrong,justiceandinjusticehavetherenoplace”;andpoliticalsocietiesinsuchacon-ditionare“inthestateandpostureofgladiators,”preparedatalltimestouseforcetopromotetheirrationaladvantageandutterly19unconstrainedmorallyfromdoingsowhenevertheyjudgeitbest.Ontheotherhand,moremoralizedconceptionsofthestateofnature(likeLocke’s),wherethatstatewasseenasgovernedbyalawofnaturethatbindspersons(and,byanalogy,states)evenwithoutacommonsuperiortokeepallinawe,permittedasaconclusioninthiscontextasignificantbodyofrulesforinternationalconduct(corres-pondingtothenaturallawrulesforindividualconduct),includingnonaggression,thekeepingofpacts,andsoon.Theclaimsofmodernstatestoenduringgeographicalterritories–claimstoterritorialexclusivityandsovereignty–wereissuesinthetheoriesofbothinternalandexternalsovereignty.Forjustastheclaimsofstatestohaveexclusivejurisdictionoverparticularterri-toriesneededtobejustifiedagainstrivalclaimantswithinthestate(e.g.individuallandownersorgroupsdesiringterritorialautonomy),theyneededtobejustifiedagainsttheclaimsofrivalstateswishingtocontrolorusethatsameterritory.Onthesubjectofterritorialsovereignty,however,earlymodernpoliticalphilosophers(liketheirsuccessors)hadsurprisinglylittletosay,seemingsimplytoacceptthatthedivisionoftheearthbyoccupationandconquestwaslegitimate.Insofarastheydisplayedinterestinjustifyingthisac-ceptance,theybyandlargeappearedtoassumethatiftheyhadexplainedtheauthorityorsovereigntyofthestateoverpersonswithinaparticularterritory,thentheyhadipsofactoexplainedtherightofthestatetocontroltheterritoryitself(bye.g.regulatingbordercrossings,preventingsecession,controllingresourceswithinit,etc.).Butthisassumption,ofcourse,isfalse.Itisnotenoughtoshowthatpersonswithinthestate’sdominioncanbeunderstoodCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate269tohavetacitlyorimplicitlyconsentedtoitsauthority(asmostofthecontractariansbelieved).Unlesstheindividualsrightlysub-jecttosovereignauthoritythemselveshaverightsovertherelevantportionsoftheearth,thenthoseterritoriesappearonlytobewithinthereachofthestate’spower(andoftennoteventhat),notwithinitssphereofrightfulauthority.GrotiusandLockeseemtohavebeenaloneamongtheearlymodernpoliticalphilosophersinappreciatingthisproblem.Grotius,largelyinpassing,suggeststhattheboundariesofstatesmustbethesamekindsofthingsastheboundariesofprivateestates.Locke,inconsiderablymoredetail,arguesthattheconsentthatmakesapersonamemberofanylegitimatepoliticalsocietymustbeunder-stoodasanagreementtojoinpermanentlytothatstateaswellthelandinwhichthatpersonhasprivateproperty.SinceLocke(followingGrotius)famouslyarguesaswellthatpersonscanbylabor(andsubsequentfreeexchange)enjoymorallybindingrightstopropertyeveninastateofnature,hecanpresentthepictureofastate’slegitimateterritoriesascobbledtogetherfromthepreexist-ingpropertyrightsofitsconstituentmembers.(Common,unownedlandsurroundedbytheprivatepropertyincorporatedintothestate,Lockesupposes,isregulatedbyinternationalconsenttolocalstate20control.)WhileLocke’stheoryfacesobviousproblems,italoneamongearlymoderntheoriesofthestateatleasthastheproperformtoexplaintheclaimsoverterritory(ratherthanoverpersons)madebymodernstates.Finally,evensupposingthatweunderstandthenatureof,limitson,andjustificationforpoliticalsocietiesexercisingthekindofterritorialsovereigntythatmodernstatesclaimedforthemselves,therestillremainstheancientquestionofthebestformofgovern-mentforsuchstatestoemploy.Inonerespect,mostearlymodernpoliticalphilosophersfollowedtheleadoftheancients(particularly,Aristotle)byconsideringthequestionintermsoftheoptionsofrulebyone(monarchy),rulebythefew(aristocracyoroligarchy),andrulebythemany(democracy).Thestandardlineofpoliticalantinaturalists(andevenmanynaturalists)wasthatbecauseGodhadordainednoparticularformofgovernment,thepeoplefoundingapoliticalsocietyweresimplyfreetochoosetheirpreferredform.Legitimateterritorialsovereigntycouldinprinciplebeexercisedbyanyoftheseformsofgovernment.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n270A.JOHNSIMMONSThereremainedthequestionofwhichformofgovernmentwasmostlikelytoachievethoseendsforwhichthepeopleerectedgovernmentoverthem.Onthisquestion,earlymodernpoliticalphilosophersseemtohaveintroducedrelativelyfewnovelorinter-estingargumentstotakethedebatebeyonditsancientandmedievalforms.Acceptanceofmonarchyasanappropriateformofgovern-mentwasverywidespread,despitethebitterdisagreementoverwhetherornotsuchmonarchs’sovereignauthorityshould(ormustofnecessity)beabsolute.Defendersofdemocracywerefew.Repub-licanauthorsoftheperiodclearlycaredmoreaboutthepeople’srighttochoosetheirgovernment(andaboutitsbeingnonabsolute)thantheydidaboutgovernment’sform.TheLevellers,Locke,andRousseau(tomentionlikelycandidates)werenotdefendersofdem-ocracy,thoughRousseaudidbelievethatdemocracymightbemostsuitableforcertainkindsofverysmallstates(andSpinozaalsohadkindwordsfordemocracy).AndwiththeexceptionofRousseau’s21casefor“naturalaristocracy”(i.e.rulebythewisest),evenrulebythefewreceivedrelativelylittleinthewayoforiginalsupport.Therearetwochiefqualificationstotheclaimsmadeabovethatmeritmentioninclosing:thefirstconcerningtheideaofmixedgovernment,thesecondconcerningrepresentation.Politicalphil-osophers,inlargenumbersbeginningduringtheseventeenthcen-tury,startedtomention“mixed”(“balanced,”or“federal”)formsofgovernmentaspreferablealternativestothethreepureforms,nodoubtusingastheirmodelstheactualgovernmentsofsomeexistingnationstates.Thismovewasopposedbyothers,notjustasamistakenclaimaboutthebestformofgovernment,butasaconfusedclaimaboutpossibleformsofgovernment.BodinandHobbes,aswehaveseen,thoughtthatpoliticalsovereigntywasnecessarilyindivisible.Andbothconcludedfromthisthatmixedgovernmentwasnotsomuchabadformofgovernmentasitwasnogovernmentatall.Thereisnosovereigntyexercisedbyamixedgovernment,henceasocietysogovernedisnotinapoliticalconditionatall.Givenourcontemporaryacceptanceofmixedconstitutionsanddividedsovereignty(whichwetaketobeexemplifiedwithparticu-larclarity,forexample,intheUnitedStates),therejectionofmixedgovernmentmayseemplainlyconfused(ascontemporaryphiloso-phersregularlyconclude).ButitisworthconsideringbrieflytheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate271actualformofHobbes’sargument(themoresophisticatedofthetwo),beforeweleaptothiscomfortingconclusion.Hobbes’sprinci-palpointwasthatwheresovereigntyisgenuinelydividedbetweentwogoverningbodies(orpersons),itwillalwaysbeimpossibletodeterminewhatthelawis(andhencetopredictthatforwhichonewillbepunished).Thereisalwaysthepossibilitythatatanymomentthetwobodieswilldisagreeintheirdeclarationsorinter-pretationsofthelaw.Iftheircompetenciesaregovernedbyawrit-tenconstitution,thenwhateverbodyhasauthoritytointerpretthatwrittendocumentisinfactsovereignoverallothers;andifnobodyhassuchauthority,thenthelawremainsuncertain.Asingle,un-dividedsovereignbody(bycontrast)isalwaystheindisputablesourceofthelaw.Theforceofthisargumentforpracticalpoliticsseemstobethatnonsovereignmixedgovernmentscanonlymakeclearlaw(andsogoverneffectively)wheresubjectsandgovernorsareinsteadyagreementaboutthedivisionofpowersspecifiedbytheconstitution;disagreement,withoutasingleindisputablesourceoflawtocorrectit,willproduceuncertainty,conflict,andpossiblecivilwar.Thereseemstobemuchtobesaidforthisempiricalpoliticalhypothesis.Thesecondqualificationisthis:Sometheoristsoftheperiod,particularlyamongsupportersofParliamentduringtheyearssur-roundingtheCivilWarinEngland,defendedtheviewthatinordertobelegitimate,governmentneededtoberepresentative.Representativegovernmentwasoftenpresentedbythemasthemiddlegroundbetweenunwieldy,chaotic,democraticgovernmentsandmonarchiesthattendedtotyranny.Notonlywasitthusthebestformofgovernment,avoidingtheillsofitscompetitors;butitwaslegitimateinawaythatmonarchycouldnotbe,sincemon-archscouldnotpretendtoberepresentingthediversepopulationofanation-stateinthewaythatamultiplicityofelectedofficialscould.Thiswasnotsimplyadefenseofrulebythefew.Itwasadefenseofrulebyaparticularfewwhomaintainedanongoingconnectionwiththewillofthepeople,longbeyondtheoriginal,foundingcontractthatauthorizedgovernmentofthatform.Defend-ersofmonarchy(likeHobbes)tendedtorespondthatmonarchscouldperfectlywellrepresenttheirsubjects,sinceinconsentingtotheirrulepeopleauthorizedthemtoactontheirbehalfs–inshort,torepresentthem;alllegitimategovernmentswererepresentativeCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n272A.JOHNSIMMONSintherelevantsense.Butastheideaofafoundingcontractbegantoberegardedmoreandmoreasamyth,thecontemporaryconsent(allegedly)givenbycitizensinelectingtheirrepresentativescamemoreandmoretoberegardedasanecessaryconditionforgovern-mentallegitimacy.Defensesofpuremonarchicalruleasaresultbecameincreasinglyinfrequent,andpoliticaldiscourseaboutlegit-imateformsofgovernmentbegantodisplaythefocusontheideaofrepresentationsofamiliarfromlatermodernpoliticalphilosophyandpractice.NOTES1Aristotle,Politics,I.2.2Romans13:1–2.Seealso1Peter2:13–14.3The“divinerightofkings”doctrineisbestunderstoodasaReforma-tiondoctrine(likeitsrival,thenaturalrightstheory),beingessentiallyaProtestantdefenseofdivinelyordainedsecularpoliticalauthority,mountedtorivaltheCatholicdefenseofdivinelyordainedpapalpolit-icalauthority.4Alternatively,forphilosopherslikeMontaigne,theappropriatere-sponseisstoicendurance,patience,andsubmission.5Seee.g.Patriarcha,I.3–4,inFilmer1991.6TheLawofNatureandNations,II.iii.15,inPufendorf1934.7Therewereprominentphilosopherswho,onthispoint,appearedtostraddlethenaturalistdivide.Sua´rez,forinstance,heldboththatpoliticsisnatural,thatpoliticalauthorityisnaturallybestowedonhumancommunitiesbyGod,andthatpersonsarenaturallyfree,withlegitim-atepoliticalrulerestingonconsent.TheappearanceofsimultaneousnaturalismandantinaturalismisexplainedbyuncertaintyastowhetherforSua´rezacommunityholdingpoliticalpower,butwithoutfamiliarpoliticalinstitutionsorrulers,countsasakindofpoliticalsocietyoronlyasanonpoliticalsocialorganization.RichardHookersimilarly(andslightlyearlier)heldthatpersonsarenaturallyfreeandequal,that(most)politicalauthorityderivesfromconsent,andthatpoliticalauthorityultimatelyderivesfromGod.ForHooker’speculiarconsenttheory,seeOftheLawsofEcclesiasticalPolity,I.x.4,8,inHooker1989.8Lev.,ch.14,par.1.9SecondTreatiseofGovernment,par.4,inLocke1993.10TheLawofNatureandNations,II.ii.3.11Grotius,notoriously,deniedthenecessityofGod’swilltothebindingforceofnaturallaw(OftheLawofWarandPeace,prolegomena}11,inCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheoriesofthestate273Grotius1925),asdidHobbes(lessexplicitly).PhilosopherslikePufen-dorfandLockewereemphaticinreaffirmingthisnecessity.12EvenantinaturalistslikePufendorfdenied,onthebasisoftheconditionofAdamandEve,thatmankindeverexistedallatonceinthestateofnature(TheLawofNatureandNations,II.ii.4).Locke’slatereffortstoclearlydistinguishconjugalandpaternalpower(ofthesortwieldedimmediatelybyAdam)fromproperlypoliticalpowerwerethuscrucialtotheefforttocharacterizemankind’snaturalconditionasgenuinelynonpolitical.13Antinaturalists,ofcourse,oftenhadtowalkafinelineonthispoint,acceptingthatdivinegrantsofpoliticalauthoritytosomecouldinprincipleproduceforotherslegitimatesubjection,butdenyingthatthereisanyreasontosupposethatsuchgrantshaveactuallytakenplace(orthatawiseGodwouldchoosetointerveneinsuchways).Thus,forexample,Lockefollowshisassertionofmankind’snaturalfreedomandequalitywiththecaveat,“unlesstheLordandMasterofthemallshouldbyanymanifestdeclarationofhiswillsetoneaboveanother”(SecondTreatiseofGovernment,par.4).Locke’sargumentthatourrighttofreedomisnaturaltomaturepersons,ofcourse,clearlyimpliesthatnosuchdivineacthasoccurred(orwilloccur).14Lev.,ch.20,pars.1–2.Hobbes,ofcourse,ignoresinthisargumenttheapparentlyquitesignificantdifferencebetweenactingfromfearofaharmthreatenedbyanotheragent(inordertoinducecompliancewithhiswill)andactingfromfearofconsequencesthatwillonlypredictablyflowfromthejointbehaviorofotherpersons,withoutdirectcoercivethreats.15TheVindiciaewasananonymousHuguenottractpublishedin1579,generallycreditedtoPhilippeDuplessisMornay,HerbertLanguet,orboth.ForamoderneditionseeVindiciaecontratyrannos1969.16Lessixlivresdelare´publique,I,8,par.1;I,10,inBodin1992.17Seee.g.Althusius,Politicamethodicedigesta,IX,18–19,inAlthusius1995.18ALetterconcerningToleration,pars.4–10,inLocke1993.SeealsoSimmons1993,pp.123–36.InhisTheological-PoliticalTreatise,Spi-nozaarguedthattolerationofdiversityofopinionandfreedomofspeechwereinfactnotjustconsistentwith,butnecessarytothepreservationofcivilstability(Spinoza1958).19Lev.,ch.13,pars.12–13.20SeeSecondTreatiseofGovernment,pars.120,45.21SocialContract,III.5,inRousseau1978.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTHOMASM.LENNON10TheologyandtheGodofthephilosophersTheGodthatphilosophersintheearlymodernperiodintendedtorefertowastheGodoftheJudeo-Christiantradition,whichistosay,thebeingwhocreatedtheworld,whospoketoMosesfromtheburningbush,andwho,throughJesusChrist,savedmankindfromtheconsequencesofsin.Butwhothatbeingis,andwhathemeansforhumanexistence,wasamatterofseriousandsometimesmortaldebate,even,andespecially,withinthistradition.ThiscontroversyisratherironicbecauseitwasagreedthatGodhadexplicitlyrevealedhimselfthroughthetextsthathadcometobeknownastheBible(“thebook”).Outsidethistradition,therewasnotmuchofrelevance.Islamwasregardedastheparadigmaticreligionoftheinfidel,andwassummar-ilydismissed,especiallyinsofarasitwasthoughttoembraceafatalismincompatiblewithhumanfreedomandresponsibility.Evenso,ithadafewimportant,ifunacknowledged,influences.Thereisaconnection,forexample,betweenDavidHume’sfamousanalysisofcausationintermsofconstantconjunction(viaNicolasMalebrancheandFranciscoSua´rez)andtheAraboccasionalistal-Farabi.Second,largelybecauseofJesuitmissionaries,therewasacertaininterestintheFarEastwhichatleastshapedsomephilo-sophicalthinking.WhenMalebrancheproducedthesinglebestshortexpositionofhissystem,heframeditasadialoguebe-tweenaChristianandaChinesephilosopher.BenedictdeSpinoza’srelationtoChinesethoughtalsohasbeentheobjectofstudy.Finally,Judaismitself,thetargetofperennialpersecution,wasnonethelessviewedasbeingofinterestinthreeways:astheur-religioncontain-ingtheoriginalanduncontaminatedrootsofChristianity,asthebearerstillofapurerevealedreligion(aviewheldtodaybysome274CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers275Christianfundamentalists),or,finally,asanexample(appliedtoChristianity,tacitlyorotherwise)ofreligionasapurelyhumaninventionbasedonfearandignorance(thisviewemergingsome-1timesfromwithinJudaism,asinthecaseofSpinoza).THEGODOFTHEPHILOSOPHERSThebookofGenesistellsusthatonthesixthdayofcreationGodsaid,“letusmakemaninourimage,afterourlikeness...SoGodmademaninhisownimage”(1:25–26).Intheeighteenthcentury,attheveryendoftheperiodcoveredhere,Voltairesaid,hardlylessfamously,“ifGoddidnotexist,itwouldbenecessarytoinvent2him.”ThisdramaticshifttomancreatingGod,presumablyinhisownimage,expressestwoimportantdevelopmentsinthinkingaboutGodintheearlymodernperiod.OneisthatindiscussingGod,philosophersoftheperiodseemtoreveallessaboutGodthanaboutthemselves,oratleastabouttheworldastheyseeit.TheyallprettymuchagreeonwhatattributesGodmusthave,butcertainoftheseattributescomeinforgreateremphasis,dependingonthephilosopher.ThusG.W.Leibniz,forexample,repeatedlyinsistsuponwisdomasanessentialattributeofGod,aswouldbefitthecreatorofthewell-regulatedworldthatheexperiences.PierreBayle,ontheotherhand,emphasizesdivinegoodness,withoutwhichtheworldwouldbenothingmorethantheirremediablenightmareofcrimeandsufferingthatheexperi-encesittobe.Rene´Descartes,aswillbeseenbelow,forreasonsofhisownemphasizesdivinepower,oromnipotence.Thisdevelopmentshouldcomeasnosurprise,becauseGodwasgenerallyinvokedinphilosophicalcontextstoexplaintheworld,typicallyasitscause.WhatattributesGodisthoughttohave,therefore,willdependonwhatattributestheworldisthoughttohave.EveninthecaseofDescartes,whichiscomplicatedbecausehisnotionofcauseiscomplicated,Godstillplaysacentraltheoret-icalrole.Inearlycorrespondence,Descartesannouncesthathehasdiscoveredthefoundationsofhisphysics,whichistosayhismeta-physics,intheology.Hedoesnotsayexplicitlywhathegotfromtheology,butheimmediatelyturns,withgreatexcitement,tohisbeliefthatalltruth,includingtheeternaltruthsofmathematics,dependsonGod.DescartesgoesontoexplainthatGodisthetotalCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n276THOMASM.LENNONandefficientcauseoftruth,thattheessenceofthingsnolessthantheirexistencedependsonhiswill,andthathadhewilledother-3wise,alltruthwouldhavebeenotherwise.Thisnotionofanut-terlyomnipotentGod,whoactswithanunconstrainedfreedomofindifference,latergeneratesandovercomesforDescartestheultimatedoubtofskepticism.Becausetruthdependsentirelyondivinepower,thebeingexercisingthatpowermustbeshowntobereliablebeforewecanacceptastruewhatappearstoustobetrue.Butoncethatreliabilityhasbeenestablished,theroadtocertainknowledgeisopenedtous.Tosomeextent,thisexplanatoryrelationbetweentheGodofthephilosophersandtheworldistobefoundearlier–considerAquinas’sfiveways,forexample–butintheearlymodernperiodtheexplanatoryroleofGodcametodominatebecauseofthedom-inanceofnaturaltheology.Wecandistinguishtwokindsofthe-ology:first,revealedtheology,whereinfaithprovidespremisesaboutGodandrelatedmatters,towhichreasonisapplied,andsecond,naturaltheology,whereinonlyreasonisemployedinunder-standingthesamematters.Thefirstadoptedthe“handmaidenview”ofphilosophy,foundasearlyasthefourthcenturywithAugustine,accordingtowhichreasonisthehelpmateoffaith,explaininganddefendingitasfarasispossible.Onthesecondview,theologyisjustapartofphilosophy.Intheseventeenthcen-tury,naturaltheologybecameincreasinglyimportant.Despitemanyeffortstopreserveaplaceforfaith,itwasdecidedlyonthewane,withreasonultimatelyusurpingitsplacealtogether.Thisreversalisrelatedtotheseconddevelopment,expressedbyVoltaire’squip.Intheearlymodernperiod,theworld,includingmanasapartofit,increasinglycametobeunderstoodasnolongerneedingGodasanexplanation.Thiswasdueprimarily,thoughnotexclusively,tothedevelopmentinphysicsofamechanicalaccountoftheworld.Theworldwasthoughttobeamachine,notunlikeaclock,thatcouldbeexplainedonthebasisofthemotionofmaterialpartsofmatterinfluencingeachotherbytheircontactaccordingtofixedlaws.Onsuchaview,theroleofGodwouldberestrictedtothatofacreatorandwinder-upoftheclock,whocouldthenretiregracefullyfromthescene.Thetwonotions,thatGodisanabsentclockmakerandthateverythingthatcanbeknownabouthisclockcanbeCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers277knownbyreasonunaidedbyfaith,arethetwotenetsofdeism,thecharacteristicdoctrinethatemergedattheturnoftheeighteenthcentury.Fromdeismtooutrightatheismwasbutashortstep,bothlogicallyandhistorically.Now,ifitwasnecessarytoinvokeGod,itwouldbenotaspartofatheoreticalinquiry,butasamoreorlesscynicalmeansofsocialandpoliticalcontrol.ThiscontrolisthereasonwhyGodwouldhavetobeinvented.Attheoutsetoftheearlymodernperiod,however,andeventhroughoutmuchofit,outrightatheismwasnotanoption,cer-tainlynotapublicoption.LucienFebvrehasarguedthatinthesixteenthcentury,atheismwasliterally“unthinkable”–notjustinthesensethatthatnoonecouldwithimpunityholdorexpressthethoughtthatGoddoesnotexist,butthatnoonecouldhaveheldthethoughtatall.Theargumentsandconceptsforsuchathoughtjustdidnotexist.Eventhescholarlylanguagewasinappro-priatetosucharevolutionaryview.AccordingtoFebvre,Latinwasatthatpointsuitableonlyforcodifyingandpreservingalready4extantviews.Itwasa“mediumofossification.”AlthoughFebvre’sthesishasbeenchallengedandmodified,itremainslargelyapplicable,notonlytothesixteenthcentury,buttotheseventeenthaswell.Tobesure,theterm‘atheist’istobefound,andfrequently,butitwasusedasatermofabuseforthosethoughttohaveaheterodoxconceptionofGod.Totalkaboutthedivinity,itwasthoughtnecessarytohaveanappropriatecon-ceptionofGod.Itwasnotenoughmerelytosay,“IbelieveinGod.”Someonewhotalkedabout“God,”butworshippedandsomehowthoughtofhimasanonion,forexample(asMalebranchereportstheancientEgyptianstohavedone),reallywasnottalkingaboutGod.Whateverhemightsay,suchapersonwouldbedescribedasanatheist.Evenlessobvious,barelydiscernibledeviationsfromtheperceivedorthodoxyweredescribedasatheistic.Bayleattheendoftheseventeenthcenturyreportsthreedegreesofatheismaccordingtowhatisbeingclaimed:first,thereisnoGod;second,theworldisnottheworkofGod;third,Godcreatedthe5worldbythenecessityofhisnature,notbyhisfreewill.Evenatthispoint,itisnotclearthatatheisminthefirstdegreeinvolvesanoutrightdenialoftheexistenceofGodratherthanamisrepresen-tationofGod.ItmightwellbethatthefirstatheistofthefirstCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n278THOMASM.LENNONdegreewasJeanMeslier,aFrenchcountrypriestwhowhenhediedin1729leftbehindaheterodoxtestamentthatmostnaturally6wouldleadhimtobeinterpretedassuch.PrevioustoMeslier,thefiguremostnotoriouslydespisedasanatheist,certainlytheonemostuniversallycondemnedassuch,wasSpinoza,whowasexpelledfromhisJewishcommunityinAmsterdam.HeheldthepantheisticviewthateverythingiseitherGodorsomeaspectofGod.Thisview,thatthereisbutonesubstancecomprisingtheentireuniverse,whichSpinozacalled“GodorNature,”wasdenouncedbyBayleas“thehideoushypothesis.”(Healsocalledit“extravagant,”“absurdandmonstrous.”)Buthow-evermuchSpinoza’sviewmighthavebeencontrarytoorthodoxviewsofGod,andhowevermuchhemighthavecontributedtotheoverthrowofthenotion(thosewhocriticizedhimwererightaboutthethreatheposed),Spinozawasnotafirst-degreeatheist.Hemighthavehada“horridnotion”ofGod,asBaylealsoputit,butitseemsstilltobeaconceptofGod.DISSIMULATIONHow,then,didMeslieremergewhenandwherehedid?HowtoaccountforMeslier’sapparentlypureveinofatheism?Heisnotknowninthehistoryofthoughtasagreatcreativegenius,capableofsuchamomentousredirectionofthecourseofintellectualhistory.TheAthenaofatheismcannothaveemergedfull-blownfromtheheadofsuchaZeus.Onealternativeexplanationisthatinfactatheismisalreadytobefoundinthepreviouscentury,evenintheworkofsomeofitsleadingfigures,who,becauseofthepoliticalandsocialunacceptabilityoftheirviews,dissimulated.Theyaresup-posedtohaveconveyedtheirrealviewsonlyindirectly,assugges-tionsorinferencestobeunderstoodonlybytheintelligent,whoweretheirrealaudience.Theirexplicitprofessionsofreligiousbeliefareexplainedasmereirony,asexpressionsmadewithawinktoindicatetheyarenottobetakenseriously,or,moreprecisely,notattheirfacevalue.Thissortofdissimulationwasallegedintheperiod,andcon-tinuestobeallegedtoday,although,withasingleexception,ithasneverbeenanythingmorethanaminorityposition.Inanycase,itdoesnotfullyanswerthequestionjustraisedaboutMeslier,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers279becauseonestillwantstoknowhowtheseseventeenth-centuryfiguresarrivedattheirviews.ThemostspectacularcaseisthatofDescartes,who,followingthepublicationoftheMeditations,almostimmediatelywasac-cusedbythetheologyfacultyattheUniversityofUtrechtofdis-seminatingtheveryskepticismthatheclaimedtoovercome.Morerecently,Descarteshasbeentakentohaverealizedthathisnewmechanical,andallegedlymaterialistic,worldviewdidnotrequiretheexistenceofGod.HisMeditations,withitsproofsoftheexist-enceofGodofvarioussorts,andoftheimmortalityofthesoulbasedonmind–bodydualism,areinfactpartofametaphysicalburlesque.Hisintentionwastoridiculeandparodytheveryargu-mentsandpositionsthathavebeenmisinterpretedashisrealview,whichis,rather,thatanysuchattempttoprovetheexistenceof7God,forexample,mustfail.Evidenceforthisinterpretation,presentedearlyinsuchcriticsasBishopPierre-DanielHuetandintherecentliterature,isthatDescartes’sargumentsaresotransparentlylackingincogencythathecouldnothaveintendedthemtobetakenseriously.DescarteswastoointelligentnottoseethathisproofsfortheexistenceofGod,whicharecentraltotheargumentoftheMeditations,fail.Indeed,itwaspointedouttohimbyArnauldthattheoverallargumentoftheworkitselfiscircular:Descartesovercomesskepti-cismonlyifheprovestheexistenceofGod,butthetruthofthepremisesheneedstodosoissecuredonlyifheknowsthatGodexists.Butthisinterpretationfacesadilemma.IfDescartes’sargumentissotransparentlybadastobeanexplanationofwhyhecouldnotreallyhavemeantit,thentheappealtoironyasaploytodisguisetheargumentmustfail;ontheotherhand,ifthereisnotransparency,thenthereal,hiddenargumentremainshidden,andDescartes’sploy8wouldbepointless.Moreover,asmorethanthreecenturiesofser-iousandsustaineddebateovertheirmeritssuggests,Descartes’sargumentsarenottransparentlybad.Finally,thereistheadditionalcomplicationthatDescarteshadmanyfollowers,farmorethananyotherfigureintheperiod.Althoughtheyweresometimesdisparagedbytheiropponentsasmeresectarians,manyofthemwereverybrightpeople.TheywouldhavebeentoointelligentnottohaveseenthroughDescartes’sruse;theythereforewouldhaveneededtobeCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n280THOMASM.LENNONpartytoit,thusmakingitssecrecyimpossibletokeep.Inanyevent,noonehaseverallegedsuchawidespreadconspiracy.AsecondmajorfigurechargedwithdissimulationwithrespecttotheexistenceofGodisHobbes.AlthoughthechargebothearlyandlatehasbeenmorewidespreadthaninthecaseofDescartes(onlySpinozawasmorevilifiedintheperiodasanatheist),itsplausibility9isquestionable.Onesortofevidenceforitismetaphysical.Hobbeswasamaterialist;“thatwhichisnotBody,”hesaid,“isnopartoftheUniverse.”Sinceantiquity,certainly,theviewthatallthatexistsisbodyormatterhasbeenseenasapremiseforatheism.Butnoteverymaterialisthadbeenanatheist,andwhatHobbesmeantbyhisclaimaboutbodyisnotaltogetherclear.Hemighthavemeanttoclaimonlythateverythingthatexistsisinspace(andtime),whichwasaviewsubscribedtobyotherEnglishphilosophersofthecenturywhosetheismismoreorlessbeyondreproach,suchasLocke,More,Cudworth,andNewton.Godwouldhavetobematerialinthissenseinordertobeanindividual,whichwouldbeanecessary,thoughnotsufficient,conditionforhisenteringintothesortofdialoguehehadwithMosesandotherprophets.Thedifferencebetweenhimandothersuchindividualswouldbethatheispresentinallspaceandalltime.EpistemologicalproblemshavealsobeenfoundinreadingHobbesasatheist.IfthereisasingleepithetforGod,accordingtoHobbes,itisdivineincomprehensibility.Now,therearetwowaystointerpretthisview.OneisthatGodisincomprehensibleinthewaythatasquarecircleisincomprehensible,orinconceiv-able,i.e.theredoesnotexistanythingtobecomprehended.OnHobbes’sontology,God’spresenceeverywherewouldbetheana-logueofthesquarecircle.Butanotherinterpretation,foundrepeat-edlyamongtheorthodox,issimplythatwecannotunderstandGod,whoseinscrutablewaysarebeyondcomprehension.Onthisreading10ofHobbes,allwecanknowofGodisthatheexists.Theinscrut-abilityofGodisemphasizedbyHobbes’sunwillingnesstoadmitthecredibilityofrevelation.TheremighthavebeenprophetswhotrulyreportedthewordrevealedtothembyGod,but,inawaythatanticipatedHume,Hobbesarguedthattherecanneverbeanyjusti-fiedreasontobelievethem.Tobesure,thisincipientdeismmightlaterhavegreasedtheskidsofatheism,butbyitselfitdoesnotdoesmakeHobbesadissimulator.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers281TheundeniablefactisthatHobbesproducedargumentsfortheexistenceofGod,mostnotablyasthecauseoftheworldasawhole.Somereaders,againbothearlyandlate,havereadhisargumentasanironicparody,buttodosotheargumentmustbeantecedentlyprob-lematic.Allotherthingsbeingequal,itwouldbehardtoreadsomeauthor’snarrationoftheproofofthePythagoreantheorem,forexample,asaparody.Hobbes’scosmologicalargumenthasbeenfoundproblematiconseveralgrounds.Foronething,hedoesnottakeittoshowthattheworldhasabeginningintime,oreventoshowthatGodexists,only“whatmencallGod.”ButconsiderAquinas,whomnoonehasaccusedofdissimulation.Healsoheld,withoutimpugningGod’sstatusascauseoftheworld,thatitsbegin-ningintimeisnotrationallydemonstrable,andhisviaprimacon-cludesbycommentingontheunmovedmoverjustdemonstrated,“andthiseveryoneunderstandstobeGod.”Athirdmajorfigurewhowasreadasdissimulatinginhisstate-mentsaboutGodisBayle.Inhiscase,ithasbeentheminorityviewtoacceptmoreorlessatfacevaluehisprofessionsofCalvinistreligiousbelief.Hecametobeknownasthe“ArsenaloftheEn-lightenment”forhisargumentsfavorabletotoleration,skepticism,and,itwouldseem,atheism.Recently,averystrongcasehasbeenmadethatthewholelogicofBayle’sverycomplicatedworkleadsto“Stratonianatheism”(socalledwithoutanyrealconnectiontotheancientfollowerofAristotle).AlthoughBaylemighthavecastigatedSpinoza’s“hideoushypothesis,”aclosereadingrevealsthatthecondemnationisnotwholesale,butisrestrictedtoSpinoza’sasser-tionofasinglesubstanceandofstrictnecessitarianism(nothingis11contingent).Theallegedatheismisnotcondemnedassuch.Themostcogent,andpoignant,iftheleastoriginal,featureofBayle’sthoughtthatinsinuatesatheismisfoundnotinmetaphys-ics,butinthemoraldomain.Mostnotableistheproblemofevil,whichEpicurushadintroducedinantiquityasanargumentforathe-ism:ifGodisgood,heiswillingtopreventevil;ifGodisalmighty,heisabletopreventevil;thereisevilintheworld;therefore,anybeingwetaketobeGod,whoisbothgoodandalmighty,isnotGod.Partlybecauseofthecircumstancesofhisownmiserablelife,Baylewasnearobsessedwiththisproblem.Hisviewisthattheproblemhasnorationalsolution.TheManicheansolutionintermsoftwoequalprinciplesofgoodandevilis,becausesimplest,thebestthatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n282THOMASM.LENNONreasoncanprovide,butnonethelessfails.Instead,theproblemremainsaparadox;foritsconclusion,whilefollowinglogically,isknowntobefalseonthebasisoffaith.AsinthecaseofHobbes,therearetwowaysofreadingtheclaimthatreligiousbeliefisirrational:eitheritshouldnotbeheldatall,oritshouldbeheldcontrarytoreason.ThosewhotakeBayletobeatheistregardhimasafideistofthemostextremesort,andtakeatfacevaluehisprofessionofbelief.Thosewhorejecthisprofessionasinsincere,ormisguided,orin-appropriate,ontheotherhand,readatfacevaluewhathesaysaboutthevirtueofatheists.ForBayle,thethreedomainsofreligion,mor-ality,andsalvationareconceptuallydistinct.Religionhastodowithceremony,moralitywithconscience,andsalvationwithgrace.Theoretically,then,anatheistiscapableofrightaction,andthisiswhattheHuguenotBaylesuggestsinathinlydisguisedpolemicalworkinwhichhearguesthatatheistsarenoworsethanidolaters,whichiswhathetakesCatholicstobeonaccountoftheirreverence12oftheEucharistastherealpresenceofChrist.Theargumentproceedsbywayofarefutationoftheobjectionthatatheistsareinfactworsethanidolaters.TheobjectionisbasedonthefactthatGodpermitsidolatryinorderthatfearoffalsegodsshouldatleastregulatepassionandmakesocietypossibleamongpagans.Baylerebutsthisonempiricalgrounds,whichamounttoacriticismofCatholicpersecutionoftheHuguenotsinFrance.Whilethiscriti-cismappearstobehismainpoint,thedefenseofamoralatheisticsocietyisthemoreobviouspoint.Asanargumentforatheism,however,thisreasoningfails,becauseofthetrinarydistinctiononwhichitisbased:theatheistmightbemoral,but,lackinggrace,doesnothavetruebelief(andafortioridoesnotparticipateinthetruereligion).Theatheistmightbecapableofmorality,butisstillmistakenabouttheexistenceofGod.Howeverweakthecasefordissimulation,thefactisthatatran-sitiontookplaceinthisperiod.Aviewlessextremethandissimu-lationwouldbethattheseearlymodernfiguresunwittinglylaidthegroundsforatheismbyprovidingtheconceptsandeventheprem-isesforargumentswhoseconclusionstheythemselveswereeitherunwillingorunabletodraw.AreportfromBayleisagainhelpful.“Accordingtotheopinionofmany,thesame[Cartesians]whohaveinourageremovedthedarknesswhichtheSchoolmenhadspreadCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers283overEurope,haveincreasedthenumberoffreethinkers,andmadewayforAtheism,orskepticism,orthedisbeliefofthegreatest13mysteriesofChristianity.”WhetherornotBaylesubscribesexactlytothisopinion,heclearlythinksthatphilosophy,“some-14timesserviceableagainsterror,issometimesprejudicialtotruth.”ThisisanexpressionofBayle’sfrequentlyexpressedviewthatreasonisbettersuitedfortearingdownthanforbuildingthingsup.Thefactisthat,howeversinceretheCartesians’intentionstoprovebyreasontheexistenceofGodandemphasizeitscentralityintheirexperienceoftheworld,theoppositewastheperhapsinevitableresult.Onemechanismfortheintroduction,oratleasttheexpression,ofatheismmighthavebeenarecastingofreductioadabsurdumarguments,whichseemtohaveenjoyedspecialprominenceintheperiod.Itrytoconvinceyouofsomepositiononthebasisthatitsdenialleadstosomeconsequencethatwebothknowtobefalse(strictlyspeaking,acontradiction).So,theargumentmightbethatifGoddidnotexist,thenmoralitywouldbeahumaninvention,ortheworldwouldbewithoutdesign,orwhatever.Butmoralityisnotahumaninvention,theworlddoeshavedesign,andsoforth;there-foreGodexists.Butattheturnoftheeighteenthcentury,morality,cosmicdesign,andotherrelevantconceptswereindependentlyquestionedinsuchawayastofalsifytherelevantpremisesofthereductioarguments,thusprovidinganargumentfortheoppositeconclusion.Norwasthereductiotheonlysortofargumenttobereversedinthisway.Huettriedtoarguethetruthoftheism,andofChristianityinparticular,onthebasisoftheargumentcalledconsensusgen-tium:whatallpeoplesassenttomustbetrue.HecarriedthisargumentsofarastoprovethevirginbirthofChristonthebasisofbeliefssuchasthebirthofAthenafromtheheadofZeus.Butthelatterisofcourseamyth,andsotheargumentwaseasilyreversedwhilepreservingthepremisethatthetwobeliefsareofthesame15status.THEFATHEROFMODERNPHILOSOPHYIntheconceptionofGod,asinsomuchofearlymodernphilosophy,Descartesistheseminalfigure.DescarteshasfourargumentsfortheexistenceofGod.Moreprecisely,hehasfourdifferentwaysofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n284THOMASM.LENNON“guidingthenaturallightinsuchawayastoenableustohavea16clearawareness”ofwhathetakestobeobvioustoanuncloudedmind,namelythatGodexists.(Hetakesthistobemoreobviousthananythingelse,evenhisownexistence.)Theseheuristicap-proachestotheexistenceofGodsuggestfourrelatedwaysofcon-ceivingofGod.Somehavethoughtthattheyarenotallcompatible,buttheyinfactconvergeonasingleconception,namelyomnipo-tence,whichisthebasisfortheotherthree.Descartesalsoholds,however,thatthedifferenceamongdivineattributesisnotarealone,butonlyadistinctionofreasonfromourlimitedperspective;sotheconceptionofGodasalmightyisonlythebestwaywehumanshaveofconceivingGod.Giventhenatureofitsobject,ourconceptionofGodmustbelessthanperfect.Ontheotherhand,Descartesalsoholdsthattobeawareofanythingatallwemustgraspitsessence.HeattemptstoreconciletheseapparentlyincompatiblepositionsbysayingthatwhilewedograsptheessenceofGod,wedonotcomprehenditbecauseofitsimmensity.Hethinksofitasratherlikecomingincontactwithamountainbytouchingit,butwithouttherebybeingabletogetourarmsarounditbecauseofitsliteralsize.ThefirstthreeargumentsarefoundintheThirdMeditation,wheretoshowthatwearenotbeingdeceivedinsomewayaboutthethingswetaketobemostobviouslytrue,DescartesattemptstoprovetheexistenceofaGodwhocreatesusinsuchawaythat,ifweexercisepropercaution,suchdeceptionisimpossible.AllthreeargumentsappealtothenotionofGodasacause,anddifferbyinvokingdifferentnotionsofcause.ThefirstargumentisthathecouldnotthinkofGodashedoes,thatis,havehisideaofGod,unlessanexistentGodcausedtheideaasitsobject.InDescartes’stechnicallanguage,thecauseofanyideamusthaveatleastasmuchformalreality,outsidethemind,asthethingthoughtabouthasobjectivereality,inthemind.Thekindofcausationinvolvedresultsintheideabeingofonething,inthiscaseGod,ratherthanofsomeotherthing,atree,let’ssay.DescartesthinksthathecouldgivehimselfallhisideasotherthantheideaofGod.(Whilehecoulddoso,heinfactdoesnot.HethinksthatthereareideasotherthantheideaofGodthatarenotmadebyhim,andthatdonotcomefromthesenses.)WhatisitabouttheideaofGodthatrequiresanobjectasacauseotherthanCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers285himself?Asopposedtotheideahehasofhimself,thisideaisuniquelyofsomethingthatis“immense,incomprehensibleandinfinite.”Onlysuchanexistentobjectcouldcausesuchanidea.Themeritsoftheargumentaside,itisworthnotingthatthespatialmetaphorattherootofallthreeofthesetermsispower.AlthoughGodmightbeubiquitous,i.e.insomesensepresenteverywhere,hisimmensityrefersnotliterallytosomesize,asinthecaseofamountain,buttohispower,whichhasnorestriction(CSMII79).Asecondargumentappealstothenotionofefficientcausation,whichrequiresarealdistinctionbetweencauseandeffect–i.e.causeandeffectaredifferentthings(CSMII167).ThisisthekindofdistinctionthoughttoholdbetweenGodandanythinghecreates–here,Descarteshimself.NotonlydoesGodbringDescartesintoexistence,Godsustainshiminexistencebythesamepowerbywhichhecreatedhim,andwithoutwhichDescarteswouldceasetoexist.ItisasifGodisconstantlyrecreatingDescartes–andwhateverelseexistsaslongasitexists.ThenotionofGodascauseisalsomobilizedbythethirdargu-ment,inthiscaseascauseofhimself.Amongmanypreviousphilosophers,Aquinasforexample,Godwasthoughttobetheuncausedcauseofeverythingelse.Indepartingfromthistradition,DescartesiscarefultoinsistthatGodisnottheefficientcauseofhimself,withtheimpossiblerequirementthatascausehebereallydifferentfromhimselfaseffect.Instead,Descartesoptsforamiddleway,whichhesaysisonly“analogoustoanefficientcause,”be-tweenefficientcauseandnocauseatall(CSMII167).Theissueiswhetheranexistentthinghasexistencein,by,orthroughitself,orelsein,through,orbysomethingelse.Thevariousprepositionsexpressarelationofdependence,sotosaythatGodistheonlyexistentinthefirstcategoryistoexpressthenegativethesisthatGod’sexistencedoesnotdependonanythingelse.IntakingGodtobecauseofhimself,Descartesdepartsfromthistraditionbycon-struingtheconceptinapositivesense.TheinexhaustiblepowerorimmensityofthedivineessenceistheformalcauseofGod’sexisting,aswellasthereasonwhy,unlikeeverythingelse,hedoesnotdependonanythingelseorneedtobepreservedbyanythingelse(CSMII78,165).InintroducingthisargumentintheThirdMeditation,andde-velopingitinhisRepliestoObjections,DescartesrepeatedlyrefersCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n286THOMASM.LENNONtotheessenceofGod,whichhetakestobetheunrestrictedpowerofexisting.ThispowerenablesGodtobethecauseofhimself,aswellasthecauseandpreserverinexistenceofeverythingelse,andassuchtobetheexplanationofourideaofGod,whichwouldotherwisebeinexplicable.Descartes’sfourthargument,whichisfoundintheFifthMedita-tion,iswidelytakentobeamererestatementofAnselm’sso-calledontologicalargument,thatGodnecessarilyexistsbecauseexistenceiscontainedintheideaofGodorinhisveryessence,suchthatanonexistentGodwouldbeacontradiction.Tobesure,muchofwhatDescartessayscanbereadinthisway,butinhiscorrespond-encethereisthesuggestionthathedidnotreadAnselmbeforepublishingtheMeditations.Descartes’ssincerityaboutthisclaimwaslaterquestionedbyhiscriticHuet,butthereisinanycaseawayofreadingtheargumentotherthanasarestatementofAnselm’sargument.Notincidentally,itmakesbettersenseofDes-cartes’sreturntoprovingtheexistenceofGodafterhavingalreadygiventhreeargumentstoestablishit.KeytothepreviousthreeargumentsistheappealtotheessenceofGodasunrestrictedpower.WhatiskeytotheargumentoftheFifthMeditationisthatGod’sexistencefollowsfromhisessenceastheequalityofitsinterioranglestoastraightanglefollowsfromtheessenceofatriangle.Descartesmighthaveintendedhislaterargu-mentasnothingmorethanasummaryofatleastwhatiskeytothepreviousthree,thetruthofwhoseconclusioncanbedefinitivelyacceptedonlyintheFifthMeditation,afterallimpedimenttoap-preciationofthetruthofGod’sexistencehasbeenremovedinthe17FourthMeditation.Thereis,inanycase,animportantdifferenceinwhatmotivatedtheargumentsofAnselmandDescartes.Attheturnofthetwelfthcentury,AnselmwasconcernedtorefutetheviewofPeterDamian,who,likeDescarteslater,thoughtGodtobeomnipotentwithoutrestriction.SopowerfulwasGod,inhisview,thatalltruthdependedonhim;Godcouldevenalterthepast,orputhimselfoutofexistence.SuchaGod,whocouldself-annihilate,wouldbelessthanomnipotent,accordingtoAnselm,ashisargumentattemptstoshow.Tobesure,DescartesagreeswiththisviewofAnselm,andthuswefindhimofferingaversionoftheontologicalargument;yethealsoacceptsPeterDamian’sviewthatalltruthdependsonGod.ButdoesthetruthofGod’sexistenceCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers287dependonGod’swill?Descarteswouldanswerintheaffirmativefortheveryreasonthatdistinguisheshisversionoftheontologicalargument,namely,thatGodisbyhisverynaturethecauseofhimselfandthusmustexist.Anythingthatcouldself-annihilatewouldnothavethisnatureandthuswouldnotbeGod.THEOLOGICALDEBATESTherewasadriftamongthefollowersofDescartes,andcertainlyamongthoserationalistsinfluencedbyhim,towardpantheism,theviewthattheworldjustisGod,orissomehowapartofGod.Themostobviouscaseofthisdriftwas,ofcourse,Spinoza,whoismostoftenassociatedwiththenotionofthe“Godofthephilosophers.”Heheldthatthereexistsbutonesubstance,whichhecalledDeussiveNatura(GodorNature).Inholdingthisview,hewasonlytakingliterally,andwithoutqualification,Descartes’sviewthatasubstanceisthatwhichneedsnothingotherthanitselfinordertoexist.Suchaviewwascertaintobefoundtheologicallyunaccept-able,andSpinozasufferedaccordingly,forheheld,orseemedtohold,thateverythingtrueoftheworldfollowedfromthedefinitionofGodwiththesamenecessitywherebythetheoremsofgeometryfollowedfromitsaxioms,postulates,anddefinitions.TheresultwasthedenialnotjustofanyrealdistinctionbetweenGodandtheworld,andthuscreationoutofnothing,butalsoofhumanfreedomandthusresponsibility.Suchapparentconsequencesofhisviewwereboundtocausehimproblems.Thechallengeforrationalistswastoshowhowtheirownprin-ciplesdidnotleadtojusttheseconsequences.Malebrancheat-temptedtodosobyinsistingthatwhileGod,ifhecreates,mustdosoaccordingtoarationalnecessity,theactualfactofhiscreatingdependsentirelyonhisutterlyfreeandindifferentwill.Leibnizdrewasimilardistinction,inhiscasebetweentwokindsofneces-sity,absoluteandhypothetical.Inhisview,alltruthhasasufficientreason,butnoteverythingisabsolutelynecessary(trueinallpos-sibleworlds).Sometruthsobtainonlyincertainworlds,anddependonthecreationofthoseworldsratherthanothers.HowwelleitheroftheserationalistsavoidedtheobjectionableresultsofSpinoza’ssystemwasdebatedintheperiodandcontinuestobedebated.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n288THOMASM.LENNONHere,thedetailsofSpinoza’smetaphysicsareoflessimportancethanthesupporthisepistemologygavetodeism,forthiswasanissuethattranscendedtheproblemsofrationalismandinvolvedthemajortheologicaldebatesoftheperiod.Inparticular,Spinoza’sapplicationofDescartes’sphilosophytothenewscienceofBiblecriticismgavedeismagreatboost.HefollowedtheleadoflsaacLaPeyre`re(1596–1676),whohadbeenledbyhisrationalistprinciplestodenytheMosaicauthorshipofthePentateuch(whereinthedeathofMoseshimselfisrecounted–inexplicablyifhewastheauthor),theauthenticityoftheexistingbiblicaltext(whichLaPeyre`retooktobea“heapofcopieuponcopie”),andtheBibleastheframeworkofhumanhistory(inhisview,itisthehistoryonlyoftheJewish18people).Indeed,itmightwellbethatacceptingsuchviewsfromLaPeyre`reled,atleastinpart,toSpinoza’sexpulsionfromtheJewishcommunity.Spinozawasquotedassayingthat“Godexists,but19onlyphilosophically,”whichsaysitall.Therewereanumberofresponsestothenew“historicalandcritical”methodofBiblecriticism,andtothedeismthatithelpedtofoster.Beyondoutrightcondemnationwithoutresponseoralter-native,whichofcourseoccurred,oneresponsewastoacceptthevalidityofthemethod,buttocontainitssignificancebyfindingaplaceforrevelationbasedonfaith.SuchwastheresponseofLocke,forexample,althoughhistorically,aswillbeseenbelow,itprovedtobeanuntenableposition.AnotherresponsewasamysticismthatavoidstheproblemaltogetherinfavorofadirectcommunicationwithGod.Onthefaceofit,thisalternativeseemstheexactoppositetoSpinoza’sapproach,asindeeditistomostofhisEthics.Butinitsfifthandlastpart,Spinoza,notunlikeothergreatmonistsincludingParmenideshimself,talksofintellectualperfectioninmysticalterms.Considerproposition36:“theintellectualLoveofGod[whicharisesfromthethirdandhighestformofknowledge(prop.33)]istheveryLoveofGodbywhichGodloveshimself.”Fromthisknowledge“thegreatestsatisfactionofMindtherecanbearises”(prop.27),and,sosatisfyingistheresultingloveofGod,thatwho-everlovesGodinthisway“cannotstrivethatGodshouldlovehiminreturn”(prop.19).Aswillbeseenbelow,thesepropositionsthatnegateindividualselvesandtheirinterestscouldwellhavebeenacceptedbythemostnotoriousmysticalmovementattheendoftheseventeenthcentury.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers289Beforeanyinvestigationofthesehistoricalalternatives,thecon-textforSpinoza’sdeismmustbeset.AgoodplacetobeginfortheperiodasawholeiswithSocinianism.TheeponymoussourceofthedoctrinewasFaustoSozzini,borninSienain1539.Largelybecauseofhisunorthodoxtheologicalviews,hehadacolorfulcareer,fleeingItalyforSwitzerlandandthenFrance,Transylvania,andfinallyPoland,wherehebecametheeffectiveleaderofthegroupknownasthePolishBrethren.HediedinPolandin1604(havingalmostdiedearlieratthehandsofangrystudents).Sozzinideniedoriginalsinascontrarytoreason,hisonlycriter-ionofreligiousfaith.(Inarrivingathiswholesalerevisionoftrad-itionaltheology,Sozzinireliedconstantlyonwhathetooktobeprinciplesofreason.)Withnooriginalsin,hereasoned,thereisnoneedtoregardChristasotherthanfigurativelydivine.TheroleofChristisnottoatoneforsin,buttosetanexampleofhowtobesaved.Hehasspecialknowledge,immortality,andpower,butnotomnipotence,whichbelongstoGodalone.Inaddition,theHolySpiritisnotapersonbutthepowerofGod,andthusSozzinideniedTrinitarianism(accordingtowhichtherearethreepersonsinoneGod:Father,Son,i.e.Christ,andHolySpirit),whichhetooktobeatoddswithmonotheism.Healsodenieddivineomniscience,in-cludingknowledgeoffuturecontingents,onrationalgrounds.IfGodknewthefutureevilscommittedbyhumankind,thenhewouldhavepreventedthem.InsteadofconcludinginEpicureanfashionthatGoddoesnotexist,hedeniedthatGodknewofsuchevils.SinceChristisnottheRedeemerasintraditionaltheology,divinegraceceasestobeofmuchsignificance,andfreewillemergesasparamount.Peoplesavethemselves.Thosewhoarenotsavedarenotdamned,butsimplyperish.Eternaldamnationoftherepro-batewouldbecontrarytoreason:Godwouldmakemortalmanimmortalonlytopunishhim.Throughouttheseventeenthcentury,Socinianismwastakentobeatermofabuse.Regardlessoftheviewsthatonemighthaveheld,nooneadmittedtobeingaSocinian.Rather,theresponsetobeingconsideredonewastofindsomerespectinwhichthelabeldidnotapply(andoftenthentoapplythelabeltotheaccuser).Itwasnotuntiltheeighteenthcenturythatthisspeciesofdeismbecamerespectable,andthenonlyunderthenameofUnitarianism.Still,thereweremanytowhomthelabelwasappliedwithacertainCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n290THOMASM.LENNONplausibilitybeforetheacceptanceoftheview,perhapsmostnotably,JohnLocke.InhisEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding(firstedition,1690),Locketriedtoplacerationallimitsonwhatcouldbeacceptedonthebasisoffaith.Ataminimum,nothingcontrarytoreasonwasacceptable.Butthewayinwhichhearticulatedsuchlimitssuggestedthatfaithisunnecessary.InhisReasonablenessofChris-tianity(1695),hesetoutviewsthatledinthefollowingyeartoanexplicitchargeofSocinianismfromJohnEdwards.Locke’sattempttoreplyinhisVindicationofthatworkonlyaggravatedthecharge,whichEdwardsrepeatedinSocinianismUnmask’dandotherworks.EvenasapracticingAnglican,LockehadclaimedthattheonlydogmaessentialtoChristianityisthatChrististheMessiah.Theclaimbyitselfwouldhavebeenenoughtoraiseorthodoxhackles,butevenworseperhapswaswhatLockemeantbytheMessiah.Forhe,likeSozzini,calledintoquestionthenotionofredemptionbydenyingthedoctrineofanimputedoriginalsinasincompatiblewiththenotionofGod.Healsodeniedeternaldam-nation;asontheSocinianview,heheldthatthereprobatesimplyperish.Moreover,althoughheneverexplicitlydeniedthedivinityofChrist,thereisevidenceinhisnotebooksshowingthathetookittobeunlikely.So,althoughLockecouldneverhaveagreedtohisdescriptionasSocinian,hisviewscertainlyapproximatedmuchofwhatwascondemnedassuch.AlthoughitdidnotemergespecificallyasanalternativetodeisticBiblecriticism,mysticismmightbeunderstoodinconnectionwiththesequestionsbecauseitobviatedtheproblemsassociatedwiththisnewapproachtotheBible.Mysticisminthewesthashadalonghistoryofacceptance,evenadulation,ontheonehand,andmistrust,evencondemnation,ontheother.Inthestrainofitmostrelevanttothesequestions,mysticism,despiteitspotentialasablockagainstdeism,wasreceivedinnegativefashion.Itseemsthatthefourteenth-centurymonksofMountAthosbecameconvincedthatdivinecommunicationwasbestfaci-litatedbytheabsolutereposeofmindandbody.Onetechniqueemployedbythese“hesychasts”(aftertheGreekwordforquiet)forachievingsuchreposewastokeeptheireyesfixedontheirownumbilicalregions,whencetheywerederidedbyacriticas“ompha-lopsychi”(navel-gazers).Intheseventeenth-centuryversionofthisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers291navel-gazing,thetechniquesofreposewereratherdifferent,thesceneshiftedfrommonasterytohighsociety,andthemovementwascalled,morepolitely,“Quietism.”Still,thephenomenoncametoberegardedasadangerousformofsalonshenanigans,anditwascondemnedbythechurch,thoughnotbeforesomeofthebiggestnamesinFrenchtheologyandphilosophywereinvolvedinthedisputeoverit.EarlymodernmysticismoriginatedwithMigueldeMolinos(1628–96),aSpanishclericwhoseworkswerecensured,andforwhichhediedinprison.Hisviewswerenonethelesstakenupbyotherswithclaimstoorthodoxy,mostnotablybyJeanneBouvie`redelaMotte,MadameGuyon(1648–1717),andherprotectorFran-c¸oisdeSalignacdelaMotheFe´nelon(1651–1715),aprominentliteraryfigurewhobecamearchbishopofCambrai.GuyonwasforvariousperiodsconfinedtoaconventandeventotheBastille.Fe´nelon,hisworkcensuredbytheSorbonne,appealedtoRome,butlosthiscasein1699.TheirimplacableopponentwasthemostimportantchurchmaninFrance,BishopJacques-BenigneBossuet(1627–1704).ThestoryhasitthatFe´nelonlearnedofthedecisionagainsthimashewasabouttoascendthepulpittopreach,where-uponheabandonedhispreparedtextandinsteaddramaticallyan-nouncedhissubmissionontheQuietismissue.Itisdifficulttodescribetheviews,orpreciselywhatitwasaboutthem,thatcausedsuchhostilities,especiallysinceviewssimilartothoseoftheQuietistsaretobefoundinsuchmysticsasTeresaofAvilaandJohnoftheCross,whohadbeencanonizedbythechurch.Ataminimum,theQuietistsrejectedpetitionaryprayer,whichasksGodforsomethinginwhattheytooktobeaviolationoftheabsolutedivinewill.Instead,theyadvocatedadisinterested,pureloveofGod.TheirprayerwasChrist’sown:notminebutthywillbedone.Theyadvocatedanacceptanceofdivinewillbeyondinteresteveninone’sownsalvation.Withsuchanattitude,considerationsofpersonalmoralitybegintoevaporateintheory,andinpracticeledtosuspicionsabouthowpuretheactualloveoftheQuietistswas.Guyon,knownforheroutspokenness,didnothelpthecauseinthisregard.“Don’tspeaktomeofhumility,”shesaid;“thevirtuesare20notforme.”Theyalsorejectedmeditation,especiallyofthesortinstitutedbySt.IgnatiusofLoyola,wherebyoneimaginedscenesofthepassionCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n292THOMASM.LENNONofChrist,forexample,inanefforttomorallyperfectoneself.In-stead,theyadvocatedcontemplation,asortofimagelessthoughtaboutGodalone,withoutreferencetooneself.Suchanactivityraisestheunresolvedproblemofthelegitimacyofecstasy,ofdistin-guishinggenuineinspirationfromlunacyorevendiabolicalposses-sion.Thisproblemgoesbacktothesecond-centuryMontanists,21wholiketheQuietistswerecondemned,andeventoSt.Paul.TheQuietistcontroversywasobservedwithinterestbyphiloso-phersofthetime,notablybyLeibniz,andofcourseBayle,butitwasMalebranchewhofoundhimselfimplicatedinitthroughtheun-welcomeeffortsofhisdisciple,Franc¸oisLamy(1636–1711).ThisBenedictinewasoneofthefirsttoteachCartesianismintheschools,andwasstronglyattachedtotheviewsofMalebranche,whomhedefendedagainstArnauldintheirdisputeoverthenatureofideas.WhilecomposingthethirdvolumeofhisDelaconnais-sancedesoi-meˆme(1694–98),LamybecameconvincedoftheQuietistposition,whichhedefendedbycitingpreviouslypublishedtextsfromMalebranche.ThatLamyshouldhavedeployedtheOratorian’sworkinthiswaywasfarfromimplausible.Afterall,Malebrancheveryobviouslytaughtthattruthisapprehendedbypurethought,intheabsenceofthecommotiongeneratedbythesensesandtheimagination;thatwhatwereallyknowinapparentlyknowingtheworldisanideainthemindofGod(atheoryhecalled“thevisionofallthingsinGod”);thatwecanbefreefromerrorbyrestrainingthewillsuchthatweacceptastrueonlythatwhosetruthforcesitselfuponus;thatthispassiveacceptanceofthetruthisineverycase,whetherwerealizeitornot,amatteroflisteningtothevoiceofChrist.AllofthisobviouslysmackedofQuietistmysticism.Nonetheless,Male-branchethoughthimselfillservedbyLamy,andwrotehisTraite´del’amourdeDieu(1697)inanefforttodistancehimselffromLamy.ThereensuedanexchangeofpublishedlettersthattypifiedthebewilderingexchangetakingplacearoundthembetweentheQuiet-istsandtheiropponents;asthegreatMalebrancheeditorAndre´Robinetputsit,theMalebranche–Lamydebatewaspartof“oneofthemostindecipherableimbrogliosinbibliographicalhistory”(OCXIVix).Forwhatitisworth,hereishowtheissueisexpressedintheforewordtoMalebranche’sTraite´:Malebranchebelieves“thatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers293thewill,insofarasitiscapableofloving,isbutthedesirefortheunshakablehappinessthatGodconstantlyimpressesuponusinordertolovehimasourend.TheBenedictineLamyclaims,tothecontrary,thatdisinterestedloveispossible,thatthewillisdifferentfromthedesiretobehappy”(OCXIV3).Thiswayofputtingtheissuemightinfactbeworthagreatdeal,foritmightshedlightonthephilosophicaldebate,reintroducedbyThomasHobbesandcon-tinuedbyJosephButler,overpsychologicalandethicalegoism,namely,whetherandinwhatsensewecanactcontrarytoperceivedself-interest.ThemajortheologicaldebateintheWesternchurchoccurredinthesixteenthcentury,duringtheReformation.Therewerethreeissuesofenduringimportance:thesignificanceofgraceforhumansalvation;therealpresenceofChristinthesacramentoftheEu-charist;and(mostimportantly,becauseonitdependedthereso-lutionoftheseandallotherdifferences)theproperauthorityfortheinterpretationofscripture.ThedifferencesthatdistinguishedCatholicandProtestantpositionsconstitutedoneofthegreatscan-dalsofChristianity:notjusttheenmitybetweensects,allofwhichacknowledgedthedutytoturntheothercheekandlovetheiren-emies,butthefactoftherebeingdifferentsectsatall.AseriousattemptwasmadetobeginthereunificationChristendomwhenLeibnizonbehalfoftheLutheransenteredintonegotiationswithBossuet;butthroughillwillandmisunderstanding,noproductiveoreveninterestingdiscussiontookplace.Duringtheseventeenthcentury,remnantsofthepreviouscon-troversiescontinuedtobedebated,intramurally,withinthevarioussects.Jansenism,forexample,wasacontinuationwithinCatholi-cismofthedebateovergrace.Themovementattractedsomeofthebestmindsoftheperiod,mostnotablyPascal,Arnauld,andNicole,andwassocalledbecauseitsviewongracewasderivedfromthebookAugustinus(1640)ofCorneliusJansen,bishopofYpres.BecausetheviewcametobecondemnedbyRomeandwasrepeatedlycondemned,withevergreaterseverity,itisimportanttobeclearonwhatthatviewwas.BecausetheJansenistsinsistedonremainingwithinthechurch,theycouldacceptonlythatthepopehadcondemnedsomething,andhaddonesoinfallibly,butthathehadnotcondemnedanythingthattheyheld.(ThistacticwasbasedontheirfamousdistinctionbetweenquestionsofrightandCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n294THOMASM.LENNONquestionsoffact.)Indeed,theyinsistedthroughoutthattherewasnosuchthingasJansenism.Everyoneelse,however,tooktheviewtobedefinedbythefivepropositionsatthecoreofthesuccessivecondemnations.Roughly,theyamounttotheviewthatgraceisnecessaryandsufficientforsalvation,thatGodsavesthoseandonlythosewhomhewillstosave.ToassignanyefficaciousroletothosesavedwouldsmackofthePelagianheresythatwasaperceivedfailingoftheirJesuitopponents(hilariouslysentupinPascal’sProvincialLetters,aclassicofFrenchliterature).Theso-calledJanseniststriedtodefendthemselvesbypointing,plausiblyenough,toSt.PaulandSt.Augustineasthesourceoftheirview.ButexactlyhowtheirarticulationofitdifferedfromthestrictpredestinationismofCalvinwasneverclear.ForitappearedthatGodnotonlysavedgratuitously,i.e.withoutanyjustificationonthepartofthesaved,butalsodamnedgratuitously,withoutanyguiltonthepartofthedamned.Moreover,thenumberofthelatterfarsurpassedtheformer,accordingtotheJansenists,sotheirpictureofGodwasofanaltogetherangryandvengefuldeity,representedbytheirtypicalcrucifix,withChrist’shandsclosetogetherabovehisheadtoindicatehowfewhehaddiedfor.Amidstallthisfireandbrimstone,boththeologicalandpolitical,onefindsagreatdealofsophisticatedthoughtthatisapplicabletothefreedom–determinismissuethenbeingindependentlyraisedinthecontextofthemechanicalpictureoftheworld.FIDEISMInhisclassicHistoryofSkepticism,RichardH.PopkinadvancedthethesisthatinthelateRenaissanceandearlymodernperiod,philosophicalskepticismwasoftentheallyofreligiousbelief.Inparticular,thelibertinse´ruditsarguedthatreasonwassufficientforknowledgeinnoneofthethreedomainsofphilosophy:notinlogic,norinphysics,norinethics.Theskeptics’argumentsweretakenbythemtobeinvincible,withtheresultthatonlyfaithcanovercomeuncertainty,thusconfirming1Corinthians1:“itisnecessarytobefoolishandignorantaccordingtotheworld,inordertobewiseandlearnedbeforeGod.”Inthehomelyanalogyofoneofthem,LaMotheleVayer(1588–1672),thehumanmindislikeafieldthatmustbestrippedofitsweeds,i.e.itspretencetocertainknowledge,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers295beforebeingsownwiththeseedsoffaith.Whether,contrarytoPopkin,suchfideismisonlyaveneerforheterodoxviews,expressedironicallywithtongueincheek,hasalwaysbeenamatterofdebate.Theviewitself,however,isclearenough:religionisindependentofnaturalreasonandperhapsevencontrarytoit.ManyhaveattributedsuchfideismtoBlaisePascal(1623–62).Certainly,therearemanystatementsinhisPense´es(“Thoughts,”aposthumouscollectionofratherbriefremarksonreligion)thatdenigratereasoninfavoroffaith:“humbleyourself,impotentreason;besilent,dull-wittednature,andlearnfromyourmaster22yourtrueconditionwhichyoudonotknow.ListentoGod.”Indeed,reason’sroleispreciselytoacknowledgeitsownlimitation:“Reason’slaststepistherecognitionthatthereareaninfinitenumberofthingsthatarebeyondit”(373).Themostreasonablethingwecandoistorejectreason:“Thereisnothingsomuchinconformitywithreasonastherejectionofreason”(367).Anditisfaiththatmakesupforthedeficiencyofreason.Oneofthemostfamousofallthepense´esreads:“Thehearthasitsreasonsthatreasonknowsnot”(224),whichcanbereadinjusttheseterms.Pascal’sfideismisnot,however,anexactinstanceofPopkin’sthesis.Thetotaleliminationofreason,exceptperhapsasaninstru-mentofitsowndemise,isnottobefoundinPascal,whowarnsagainst“twoformsofexcess:toexcludereason,andnottoadmitanythingbutreason”(368).Inanotherposthumouswork,Conver-sationwithSaci,PascalcomparestherelativevalueofEpictetus’sStoicismandMontaigne’sPyrrhonism.Bothhaveadvantagesanddisadvantages.StoicismleadsustofocusonGod,acceptingourlotwithoutcomplaint.ButitalsoleadsustothevainbeliefthatwecanknowandserveGodbyourowneffortalone.Skepticism,atleastasdeployedinMontaigne’sApologyforRaymondSebond,hasprovedtobethescourgeofheretics.Butittooleadstoanimpenetrabletangleofignoranceanderror,especiallyamongthosewithapen-chantforimpietyandvice.Thefailingsofbothphilosophiesaretracedtoignoranceoforiginalsin:Stoicismfailstoseeourpresentcorruption,skepticismourpreviousdignity.PascaltranscendsbothskepticismandStoicism.ItisheintheperiodwhomostexplicitlyidentifiesandrejectstheGodofthephilosophers,whofailstobeaGodofloveandconsolation.Indeed,eventheGodofAbraham,Isaac,andJacobfailsinthisrespect.“ItisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n296THOMASM.LENNONnotonlyimpossible,butuselesstoknowGodwithouttheinter-mediacyofJesusChrist”(382).ForPascal,Godislessanobjectoftheunderstandingthanofthewill.Withsuchaconception,PascalplaceshimselfinthemorerespectabletraditionofFrenchmysti-cismfromearlierinthecentury,beforetheappearanceofQuietism.Franc¸oisdeSales(1567–1622),forexample,hademphasizedtheincomprehensibletranscendenceofGodthatcanbeapproachedonlybythewill’sactoflove.Inthisvoluntarism,thereis,ironic-ally,somethingofarapprochementwithDescartes,whomPascalotherwisetakestobe“uselessandunreliable”(297).ThedoctrineoftheFourthMeditationisthatbycontrasttotheintellect,thehumanwillisessentiallyasgreatasthedivinewill,“somuchsothatitisaboveallinvirtueofthewillthatIunderstandmyselftobearinsomewaytheimageandlikenessofGod”(CSMII40).ThecleareststatementoffideismisfoundinBayle.HisHistor-icalandCriticalDictionary(1697)becamethephilosophicalbest-selleroftheperiod,whichonlyinsuredthattheaccusationsagainstitbyhisirasciblecoreligionist,PierreJurieu,wouldbeinvestigatedbytheHuguenotauthorities.Livinginexile,BaylewassummonedbytheConsistoryoftheWalloonchurchofRotterdam,andwasledtopublishwiththesecondeditionhisEclaircissements(eluci-dationsorexplanations)onfourtopics.ThethirddealtwiththeperceivedthreattoreligionposedbyBayle’sapparentlyfavorabletreatmentofskepticism.Hisresponsewastoemphasizethemes-sageofPaulinCorinthiansandelsewhere,thatthewisdomoftheworldisbutfoolishnessaccordingtotheGospel,andconversely,withtheresultthatfaithisimpervioustoskepticalargument.ThebasisforthisdismissalofskepticismishisconceptionofChristian-ityitself,which“isofasupernaturalorder,andcentersinthesupremeauthorityofGodproposingmysteriestous,notthatwemaycomprehendthem,butthatwemaybelievethemwithallthehumilitythatisduetotheinfinitebeing,whocanneither23deceivenorbedeceived.”Severaltimesinthistext,Baylesetsreasonandfaithatodds,tothepointthatfaithconcernsthingsnotonlybeyondreason,buteven“repugnant”toit.Indeed,themorefaithiscontradictedbyreason,themorevaluableitis,suchthatthecontradictionsofreasoncanevenbeaccordedaninstrumentalroleinbringingthephilosophicallyinnocenttoanappreciationofGod’sgoodnessinCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTheologyandtheGodofthephilosophers297providingthegraceoffaith.Lestreasonbepresumedvictoriousoverfaithforhavingprovidedunanswerableobjectionstoit,nosolutiontothemisforthcomingfromreason,either.Baylewouldseem,therefore,tobeacorroboratingcaseofPopkin’sthesis,wereitnotforhiscondemnationofthePyrrhonists,who,rejectingeverycer-tainsignoftruthandfalsehood,wouldbeunabletorecognizethetruthshouldtheyencounterit.Theyarethusleastworthyofallphilosophersof“beingallowedtodisputeconcerningthemysteries24ofChristianity.”AsforPascal,soforBayle,Godseemstobebeyondallphilosophy.NOTES1SeePopkin2001.2LettertoFrederickWilliam,PrinceofPrussia(1770),inBrinton1956,p.367.3ToMersenne,15April,27May1630(CSMIII22–23,25).4Febvre’sthesisisdiscussedbyKors1990,pp.6–9.5PierreBayle,Dictionary,art.Thales,rem.D.6Kors1990,pp.4–6.7Foraversionofthisinterpretation,seeCaton1971and1973.8LeoStrauss’s(implausible)explanationisthat“acarefulwriterofnormalintelligenceismoreintelligentthanthemostintelligentcensor,assuch.”Moreover,whatistrueofwritersistrueofreaders:“thoughtlessmenarecarelessreaders,andonlythoughtfulmenarecarefulreaders”(1988,pp.25–26).9ForthedissimulationreadingofHobbes,seeJesseph2002,pp.140–66.10Watkins1973,p.45.11SeeMori1999,whodoesnotchargeBaylewithdissimulation,butwhononethelessmakesoutthebestcaseforwhy,ifBayleknewwhathewasdoing,heoughttohavebeendissimulatingandlikelywas.ForthebestdefenseofBayleasatheist,albeitatepidone,seeLabrousse1964and1983,whichisalsoawonderfulintroductiontoBayle.12Pense´esdiversessurlacome`te(1683),translatedasMiscellaneousReflections,occasion’dbytheComet(Bayle1708).13Dictionary,art.Takiddin,rem.A.14Ibid.15Lennon(2006).16FourthsetofReplies(CSMII168).17IamgratefultoAlanNelsonfordiscussionofthispoint.18Popkin1982,pp.64–65.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n298THOMASM.LENNON19Popkin1982,p.66;andNadler1999,p.134.20Knox1950,p.279.21SeewhatJohnLockehastosayaboutthiscaseintheEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding(IV.xviii.3).AversionofthedifficultypersiststodayinPopeJohnPaulII’sconcernsaboutBuddhisttechniquesofdetachingoneselffromtheworld.“ForChristians,theworldisGod’screation,redeemedbyChrist.ItisintheworldthatmanmeetsGod.Thereforehedoesnotneedtoattainsuchanabsolutedetachmentinordertofindhimselfinthemysteryofhisdeepestself”(1994,p.89).NotunliketheQuietistrepose,theBuddhistnirvanaisapassivestate,whichthepopeseesasindifferencetotheworld,wherealoneGodistobefound(p.86).22Pense´es,246.ThisandsubsequentparentheticalreferencesaretonumberedpassagesintheLafumaedition(Pascal1958),astranslatedinPascal1962.23Bayle1991,p.421.24Ibid.,p.422.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nM.W.F.STONE11ScholasticschoolsandearlymodernphilosophyFewstudentsofphilosophyrecognizethatideasanddoctrinesad-vancedbyscholasticthinkersmadeadistinctivecontributiontophilosophicalinquiryintheseventeenthandeighteenthcentur-1ies.Formost,scholasticismisbelievedtohavebeeneclipsedandsubsequentlydisplacedbyself-styledmodernmovementsinphil-osophyandscienceassociatedwithGalileo,Bacon,Descartes,2Hobbes,Locke,Spinoza,Leibniz,andNewton.Duetotheenduringperceptionthatitispremodern,andthusbyassumptionillateasewithorelsehostiletothepredilectionsofmodernphilosophy,scholasticismisdismissedasreconditeorrebarbative,andviewed3aslargelyirrelevanttothestudyofearlymodernthought.Andyet,eventhoughtheideasofthescholasticschoolsundoubt-edlychallengethecontemporaryreaderinwaysthatsurpasstheactofengagingwiththethoughtofcanonicalthinkers,theirgeneralneglectbyhistoriansofphilosophyandabsencefromstandardtext-booksisperverse.Foronanyobjectiveassessment,theschoolsofearlymodernscholasticismconstitutedaverylargepartofthephi-losophicalactivityincontinentalEurope,aswellasinNorthandSouthAmerica,fromthesixteenthcenturyuptothetimeofIm-4manuelKant.Sincesomanyconfectionsofscholasticthoughtwerepresentinearlymodernuniversitiesandacademies,andtheworksofcertainauthorswereactivelydiscussedandwidelydissem-inated,itshouldbebeyonddoubtthatphilosophyinthisperiodembracednotjusttheestablishedfigureswhonowdominateouranalysisofseventeenth-andeighteenth-centurythought,butamuchwidergroupofthinkerswholookedtodifferentintellectualtraditionsandresourcesofargument.Evenifweleaveopenthequestionwhetherornotanyscholasticphilosophereverattained299CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n300M.W.F.STONEthedizzyingheightsoforiginalityachievedbyDescartes,Hobbes,Leibniz,orSpinoza,thefactremainsthatbydintoftheirpublica-tions,andbyvirtueoftheirprominenceininstitutionsofhighereducation,scholasticthinkerswereasignificantandconspicuouspresenceinthephilosophyoftheera.Suchconsiderations,however,haveyettobeembracedbyhistor-iansofearlymodernphilosophy,mostofwhomstillmaintainthatallthingsscholasticarecontrarytothespiritandpracticeof5modernphilosophy.Whyisthisso?Thisquestioninvitesnei-theraquicknorafacileresponsesinceittakesustotheheartofahostofdifficultissuesconnectedwiththehistoriographyofmodernphilosophy,andmanydeep-seatedassumptionsabouthowseventeenth-andeighteenth-centuryfigurescontinuetoshapephilosophicalinquirytothepresentday.Thatsaid,thequestioncanbepartiallyilluminatedbyhighlightingawidespreadproclivityamongphilosophers(hereEnglish-languagethinkersarenodifferentfromtheirFrench,German,orItaliancounterparts)toclassifythehistoryoftheirsubjectintermsofmutuallyexclusivechrono-logicaldivisions(e.g.ancient,medieval,Renaissance,andmodern),divisionsthatprecludeanyworthwhileinvestigationofthewaysinwhichseeminglydifferenterasofphilosophyinformandconditiononeanother.Thislastremarkhelpstoexplain,ifonlypartially,whyscholasticismhasbeendisenfranchisedfromthestoryofearlymodernphilosophy.Heldtobetheoffspringofadistantandalienmedievalcivilization,itissupposedtoexemplifytheinterestsofaformofthoughtatoddswithmodernity.Seenthus,scholasticismanditspractitionersareassumedtorepresentthedyingembersofaphilosophicalculturestillclingingtothelastremainsofitstawdrylifebymeansofarecalcitrantoppositionto6allthingsmodern.Slowlybutsurely,historiansofphilosophyarebeginningtorejecttheabovecaricatureandarenowmindedtoaccept,albeitwithcertainqualifications,thatthescholasticschoolsaredeservingofstudy.Inthelastthirtyyearsorso,greatertimeandconceptualgenerosity,aswellasamodicumofhistoricalsympathy,haveallbeenextendedtospecificauthorsbyscholarseagertoassessandclarifytheintellectualcontextinhabitedbythecanonicalauthorsof7modernthought.Assuch,thesemoreecumenicaleffortshavehelpedtobringaspectsofthephilosophyoftheschoolswithintheCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools301purviewofmainstreamresearch,andmuchhasbeenlearnedabouttherelationshipbetweentheinfluentialfiguresofseven-teenth-andeighteenth-centuryphilosophyandthescholasticideas8andpreoccupationsoftheirday.Despitethesewelcomedevelopments,thereisstillasenseinwhichtheschoolsarenotstudiedfortheirownsakebutareratherviewedinstrumentally:namely,tofacilitateavividdepictionofhowandwhycanonicalthinkersadvancedthepositionstheydid.Whileitwouldbesillyandungracioustodisparagetheeffortsofthosescholarswhohavepromotedtheimportanceofanalyzingcanonicalfiguresintheirappropriatesetting,itremainsthecasethatourexistinggraspoftheindustryandsophisticationoftheschoolsisenervatedbyaresistanceonthepartofthesesamescholarstoviewingscholasticthinkersasobjectsofintrinsicinter-est.Ourunderstandingoftheschoolswillbeamelioratedonlywhensufficientjusticeisdonetothemethodsthatindividualscholasticsusedtobroachthephilosophicalproblemstheydeemedtobesig-nificant.Thisrequiresthatweridourselvesofallantecedentjudg-mentsconcerningthemeritorrelevanceoftheirwork,andinsteadfocusuponthosequestionsthatwerebelievedtobesalient,andtheresourcesbywayofargumentandappealtotraditionthatwereusedintheirclarificationandresolution.Thescholasticschoolsareoneofthefewremainingsubjectsofearlymodernphilosophyyettobestudiedinextenso.Onemightconjecturethatthecontinuingpro-gressandfuturegoodorderofthedisciplineisdependentupontheirsystematicanalysis.Inwhatfollows,Ishallendeavortoprovideaprovisionalcartog-raphyofthemostprominentscholasticschoolsandthinkersoftheearlymodernperiod.Throughoutthissurvey,myaimwillbetoshowthatwhileindividualscholasticthinkerslookedtothelumi-nariesofthemedievalpastforinspiration,andwerefurtherguidedbyideasofauthorityandtradition,theirapproachtophilosophicalquestionswasfashionedbytheneedsandexigenciesoftheirown9times.Inmyassessmentofthecontributionmadebytheschools,Ishallhavecausetonotetwopointsofsignificance:first,thatearlymodernscholasticsmadeanimportantbequesttotheirownphilo-sophicaltraditions,andsecond,thattherelationshipbetweentheself-styledschoolmenandtheso-calledmodernswasoneofmutualinvolvementratherthananassociationcharacterizedbyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n302M.W.F.STONEcursoryinfluence,utterdependence,orirrevocablehostility.Gaugingtheprecisenatureofthisrelationshipataskwhichliesbeyondtheremitofthisessaywillhaveimportantimplicationsforourgeneralunderstandingofearlymodernphilosophy.SCHOLASTICSCHOOLSThescholasticschools(sectaescholasticae)thatenjoyedsomestandingintheyearsfromtheendoftheReformationtotheout-breakoftheFrenchRevolutionwerenumerous.Createdbythefragmentationoflatemedievalphilosophyintocompetingmove-10ments,andheavilyconditionedbyoverttheologicalallegiances,theschoolsexhibitedconsiderableflexibilityinphilosophicalorien-tationandwerecomposedofdisparateelements.TwoofthegreatestintermsofnumbersandinfluenceweretheThomistandScotistschools.Promotedbytwoprominentordersoffriars,theDominic-ansandFranciscansalthoughbynomeanstheirexclusivepreservebothtraditionsprovedthemselvesadeptatwithstandingtheintel-lectualpressuresoftheearlymodernperiod.OthermajorschoolswerealsosponsoredbyfriarssuchastheCarmelitesandtheAu-gustinians,aswellbynewreligiousorderssuchastheJesuits.Secularpriestsandlaymenalsocontributedtoscholasticphiloso-phy,asdidthinkersintraditionalmonasticorderssuchastheBenedictinesandCistercians.AcrossthenewlyinstitutedconfessionaldivideofEurope,scho-lasticmovementsgracedtheLutheran,Reformed,andAnglicandenominations.NeitherasrobustnorasenduringastheschoolsoftheRomanCatholicchurch,afactwitnessedbytheirslowde-clineinthelateseventeenthcentury,Protestantscholasticismmadeanimportantcontributiontothetheologyandphilosophyoftheperiod.Notonlydiditsmembershelptofashiontheinstitu-tionalconditionsinwhichfiguressuchasLeibniz,Locke,Berkeley,andeventheyoungKantwerefirstexposedtophilosophyanachievementnotwithoutconsequence,sincemanycanonicalfig-ureswouldcomplainaboutthedeficienciesoftheirscholasticeducationbuttheyproducedmanywell-knowntextbooksinlogic,metaphysics,andethicsthatbecamestaplefixturesofaphilo-sophicaleducationinNorthernEuropeandNorthAmericadownto11thelastdecadesoftheeighteenthcentury.IntheNetherlands,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools303Protestantscholasticswereamongtheveryfirsttoengagesystem-aticallywiththenewapproachtophilosophyandscienceof12Descartes,whileinGerman-speakingcountriesatraditionofscholasticmetaphysicsremainedinfluentialevenaslateasthelastdecadesoftheeighteenthcenturyandwascloselyassociatedwith13theworkofChristianWolff(16791754).Itisimportanttostressthattheschoolswereneithermonolithicnorclosedintellectualsystems.Whenonereviewsthecentralfea-turesofphilosophicalpracticeamongtheThomists,Scotists,orJesuits,orperusesthetheoriesofLutheran,Reformed,andAnglicanthinkers,oneisimmediatelystruckbytheabsenceofanystrictoroverbearingpartyline,andtheextenttowhichconsiderabledis-agreementonissuesinmetaphysics,ethics,andphilosophicalthe-ologywaspermittedineveryschool.Forthisreason,itishazardoustoarriveatgeneraldefinitionsofThomism,Scotism,JesuitScholasticism,andProtestantScholasticism,sinceatthistimeuniformityinmethodisnotalwaysinevidencewhenonecompareswritersofthesameschool,butresidentindifferentuniversitiesandnationalphilosophicalcultures.Suchflexibilityinoutlookcouldhavesurprisingresults.ThroughouttheperioditwasquitecommonforaThomistinonepartofEurope,readingtheverysametextsasacolleagueinanotherpartoftheContinent,toarriveatentirelydifferentviews.SimilardifferencesofopinioncanbefoundamongmembersoftheScotistschool,andarerecognizableintheranksofJesuitphilosophersonehasonlytorecallthebitterdisputesbetweenGabrielVa´zquez(15491604)andFranciscoSua´rezas14wellasamongLutherans,Calvinists,andAnglicans.Scholasticismintheearlymodernperiodexhibitedamaturetoleranceofincongruity(althoughthisdidadmitofdegrees),aswellasanappetiteforgenuinedebate.Giventhetextsandquestionsthatscholasticthinkersstruggledtounderstand,thesetraitsareunsurprising.Thebasesoftheirdetaileddiscussionswerethesem-inalbooksofAristotle,ThomasAquinas,JohnDunsScotus,andtheirRenaissancecommentatorstextswhichoccasionedmultiple15interpretationsandencourageddifferentpointsofview.Asmanyoftheimportantargumentsofthesesameworksgaverisetoequivo-calreadings,itbecameincumbentuponinterpreterstotrytofindcoherentexplanationsofdisputedpassages,evenwhenthesepassagesdidnotlendthemselvestosimpleorconclusiveCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n304M.W.F.STONErenderings.Hencetheexistenceofdisagreementamongthinkersofthesameschool,andextensivedisputesamongmembersof16differentschools.THOMISMThewritingsofThomasAquinas(122574)provedthemostendur-ingsourceofinspirationtoscholasticphilosophersinearlymoderntimes,andforthisreasonThomismisworthyofourgreatestatten-tion.BequeathedtotheperiodbyarenewedandsystematicinterestinThomasscorpuscoincidentwiththegreatsixteenth-centurycommentariesoftheDominicansSylvesterMazzolini(14561523),FrancescoSilvestrodiFerrara(ca.14741528),CardinalThomasdeVioCajetan(14681534),ConradKoellin(d.1536),andChrysostom17Javelli(14701538),itstriumphalmarchledtothecoronationofThomasAquinasasthePrinceofTheologianswhenhisSummatheologiaewaslaidbesidethesacredscripturesattheCouncilofTrent(154562).In1567,PopePiusVproclaimedhimaDoctoroftheUniversalChurch,andthepublicationofthefamousPianaeditionofhisworksin1570usheredinseveraleditionsofhisOperaomnia,agreatmanyofwhichgracedthelibrariesofthelearnedworld.MostaspectsofThomistthoughtwererefreshedandfurtherdeveloped,especiallyinthefieldsofmoralandpoliticalphilosophy,byleadingthinkersoftheso-calledschoolofSalamanca.OftheseFranciscodeVitoria(14861546),DominicSoto(14951560),MelehiorCano(150960),PeterSoto(14941563),Bartholome´deMedina(152880),andDomingoBanez(15281604)standoutas18capableexponentsofThomistphilosophyandtheology.ApartfromtheDominicanorder,thedecisionoftheJesuitstoadoptThomasastheofficialphilosopheroftheirorderprovided19additionalimpetusanddirectiontoThomistphilosophy,althoughasweshallsee,manyJesuitwritersarrivedatdoctrinesquiteatvariancewiththoseofmoreorthodoxDominicanexegetes.ThomismwasembracedandvalorizedbytheCarmelitetheologiansofSalamanca,theSalmanticenses,whosevoluminousCursustheo-20logicus(163172)waswidelycitedandrespected.Protestantthinkers,inturn,appropriatedThomisticideasandincountriessuchasEngland,Aquinassnaturaltheology,withitsemphasisontheimportanceofaposterioriproofsfortheexistenceofGod,provedCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools305anenduringresourceforsavantsasdiverseasRichardHooker(15541600),HenryMore(161487),andJohnNorrisofBemerton21(16571717).Amongthenoteworthyexamplesofseventeenth-centuryThomismwerethewritingsofJohannesWiggers(15711639)andFranc¸oisDuBois(15811649).Wiggers,acontemporaryofCorneliusJansen(15851638),wasatheologianofLouvainwhosemainwork,theposthumouslypublishedCommentariaintotamD.Thomaesum-mam(Louvain,1641),containedawealthofinterestingargumentsandsuggestionsontopicssuchasphilosophicaltheologyandthephilosophyofmind.Acuriousandagilethinker,Wiggersscommen-tarywasalivetothetensionsandambiguitiesinThomassgreat22work.TheDouai-basedtheologianFranc¸oisDuBoiswrotetheCommentariainsummamtheologiaeS.Thomae(Douai,162035,162248),whichalsomadeagenuinecontributiontotheThomistexegesisofhistime.LesssagaciousthanWiggers,DuBoisprovidedbalancedandthoroughcommentonmostaspectsoftheThomistic23system.Consideredtogether,thesecommentariesarerepresentativeofagenreofThomismpeculiartothosepartsoftheLowCountriesthathadremainedloyaltoRome.Intheselands,scholasticthoughthadcomeunderconcertedattacknotjustfromProtestantdivines,butalsofromCatholicthinkerswhowishedtoreplacetherationalismoftraditionalscholasticismwithabiblicallybasedtheologyaug-mentedbyPatristictradition.Thispositionemphasizedtheimport-anceofindividualfaithinGodoverademonstrationofhisexistence,andanaccountofhumannaturethatdrewsustenancefromtheantipelagianwritingsofAugustine.Supportersoftheseopinions,whorangedfromfiguresasdifferentasMichaelBaius(151389)andLibertusFromondus(15851653)ontoJanseniushimself,arguedthatanonscholasticformoftheologicaldiscoursewouldservemoreeffectivelytheveritiesoftheChristiantradition,24andhelptoaddressthegrievancesoftheProtestants.Fightingarearguardactioninthissituation,scholasticthinkerssoughttopromoteevenmorestringentlytheargumentsofThomas,sincetheyheldthemtobeindispensabletotheprojectofprovingdoctrinessuchastheimmortalityofthesoul,theexistenceofGod,andthegroundingofanaccountofhumanagencyuncompromisedbyfulsomedescriptionsofdivineprovidence.ThiscontextgaveCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n306M.W.F.STONEbirthtooneofthebetter-knownscholasticfiguresofearlymodernphilosophy,JohannesCaterus(15901655),whocomposedthefirstsetofObjectionstoDescartessMeditations.CaterushadbeenapupilofWiggersatLouvain,andmostcertainlycarriedforwardhisoldmasterscommitmenttoaversionofThomistnaturaltheology.HewasclearlyunimpressedbywhathebelievedtobeDescartess25disregardoftraditionalformsofscholasticargument.Beyondthesewriters,ahighlycapablequartetofFrenchDomin-icanfriarsbasedatconventsinToulouseandBordeauxtookupthechallengeofsettingdownanaccountofmoralityandhumanactioninspiredbytheteachingofThomas.ThefirstofthesewasVincentBaron(160474),whosepristinemoraltheologysoughttoflaythehideofthatdangerousinnovation,thisbeingthedoctrineof26probabilismthenchampionedbyJesuitcasuists.ThesecondwasPierreLabat(d.1670),whowroteaseven-volumeTheologiascho-lasticasecundumillibatamD.Thomaedoctrinamsivecursustheologicus(Toulouse,165861)whichfiredadualbroadsideat27JansenismandMolinism.Inadditiontotheseauthors,theTheo-logiamentisetcordisseuspeculationesuniversaesacrae(Lyons,166869)ofVincentContenson(164174),combinedasophisticatedblendofmetaphysics,biblicalexegesis,anddogmatictheology,whiletheClypeusthomisticacontranovoseiusimpugnatores(Bordeaux,165969)ofJean-BaptisteGonet(161581)tookupthe28taskofdefendingThomistmoralteachingagainsttheJesuits.ProminentDominicansbasedinParisstruggledtomatchthecontributionoftheirsoutherncolleagues.Oneofthebest-knownThomistsoftheFrenchcapitalwasNicolasYsambert(15691642).ProfessorofTheologyattheSorbonne,Ysambertheldthefirstchairincontroversy,aninstitutioncreatedinimitationofthehighlysuccessfulJesuitpracticeperfectedbythelikesofRobertBellarmine(15471621)andMartinBecanus(15631624),inwhichaprofessordiscussedtopicalarguments.From1616tojustbeforehisdeathin1642,theindefatigableDominicanlecturedontheSummatheolo-giaeofThomas,theresultsofwhichwereposthumouslypublishedasDisputationesfrom1643to1648.Anunoriginalmind,YsambertattemptedtocreateadoctrinalsynthesisoftheteachingofBona-venture,Aquinas,andScotus,andconvincedveryfewthataunionofthesemindswasinfactpossible.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools307OneofthemoreinterestingFrenchDominicanswasthehistor-ianandmoralistAlexanderNatalis(16391724).HepublishedintenoctavovolumesacommentaryontheCatechismusromanusen-titledTheologiadogmaticaetmoralis(Paris,1693),aworkwhichprovidesaclearstatementofThomistmoralthoughtagainsttheJesuitcasuistryoftheday.Aprominentfigureinintellectualcircles,Nataliswasnostrangertocontroversy,andhisheatedspatwiththeJesuitGabrielDaniel(16491728)onprobabilismandMolinistideasofgraceandpredestinationarousedsuchacrimonythatthepartieswereeventuallysilencedbyKingLouisXIV.LikeotherDominicans,Natalisspolemicalcasewasclear:therewasnobasisfortheseJesuittheoriesinthetextsofThomas.WhilewritinghismoralworkshealsopublishedseveralhistoricaldissertationsinwhichheattemptedtoprovethatThomaswastheauthoroftheentireSummatheologiae.Inadditiontothishistoricalmidwifery,hewroteanengagingshortdialoguebetweenaFranciscanandaDominicanonthesubjectoftheoriginalityofThomas.NatalissdoubleconclusionwasthatThomaswasnotadiscipleofAlexanderofHales(d.1245)amedievalFranciscanprofessoroftheologyandthattheSecundasecundaeoftheSummatheologiaewasnotborrowedfromthelatter,ashadbeenclaimedbyscurrilousFranciscans.Moraldebatesaside,otherThomistsweremovedtodefendthefollowingtheses.Firstwastheideathatangelsandhumansoulsarewithoutmatter,butthateverymaterialcompositebeing(compo-situm)hastwoparts,primematterandsubstantialform.Thethoughthereisthatinacompositebeingwhichhassubstantialunity,andisnotmerelyanaggregateofdistinctunits,therecanbebutonesubstantialform.ForThomists,thesubstantialformofmanishissoul(animarationalis),totheexclusionofanyothersoulandofanyothersubstantialform.Theprincipleofindividuation,formaterialcomposites,ismatterwithitsdimensions:withoutthistherecanbenomerelynumericalmultiplication;distinctionintheformmakesspecificdistinction,hencetherecannotbetwoangels29ofthesamespecies.AnotherdistinctivecommitmentoftheThomistswastheirdetaileddefenseoftheAngelicDoctorsmoralpsychology.AtSummatheologiae,Ia,qq.8286,andDemalo,q.6,ThomashadCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n308M.W.F.STONEarguedagainstthencontemporaryformsofvoluntarismwhichheldthatthewillmovestheintellectquoadexercitium,i.e.initsactualoperation;rather,theintellectmovesthewillquoadspecificatio-nem,i.e.bypresentingobjectstoit:nilvolitumnisipraecognitum.Intheearlymodernperiod,Thomistswereconcernedtocountermorerecentvoluntaristideasderivedeitherfromlatemedieval30philosophyorfromthetheologicaldebatesoftheReformation.Theoriginofallhumanaction,fortheThomists,residedintheapprehensionanddesireofgoodingeneral(bonumincommuni).Humanbeingsdesirehappinessnaturallyandnecessarily,notbyafreedeliberateact.Particulargoods(bonaparticularia)arechosenfreely.Thus,thewill(voluntas),thoughaproactiveforceinhumanaction,isnotthesuperiorpartnerinthecompositeknownaslib-erumarbitrium(freedomofdecision);asafacultyitalwaysfollows31thelastjudgmentofthepracticalintellect(ratiopractica).Anotherwidelysupportedthesiswasthatthesensesandtheintellectarepassive,i.e.recipient,faculties;theydonotcreate,32butreceive(i.e.perceive)theirobjects.Therewasalsoextensivediscussionofthetheorythatthedirectandprimaryobjectoftheintellectistheuniversal,whichispreparedandpresentedtothepassiveintellect(intellectuspossibilis)bytheactiveintellect(intellectusagens)whichilluminatesthephantasmata,ormentalimages,receivedthroughthesenses,anddiveststhemofallindi-viduatingconditions.FortheThomists,thiswascalledabstract-ingtheuniversalideafromthephantasmata,andtherewasalivelydebateamongthemastohowsuchabstractionwastobeunder-stood.Thegeneralconsensustheyformedwasthatabstractionisnotatransferringofsomethingfromoneplacetoanother;theilluminationcausesallmaterialandindividuatingconditionstodisappear,thentheuniversalaloneshinesoutandisperceivedbytheactionoftheintellect.Becausethisprocesswasbelievedtobevital,andelevatedfarabovematerialconditionsandmodesofaction,thenatureoftheactsandoftheobjectsapprehendedwasthoughttoshowthatthesoulwasimmaterialandspiritual.Thus,thesoulwasbyitsverynatureheldtobeimmortal.NotonlywasitthoughttobetruethatGodwillnotannihilatethesoul,butfromitsverynaturethesoulwasheldtocontinuetoexist,therebeinginitnoprincipleofdisintegration.ThislastthoughtformedthebasisofAquinassmuch-disputeddoctrineonesupportedbymostofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools309hisearlymodernenthusiaststhathumanreasoncanprovethe33incorruptibility(i.e.immortality)ofthesoul.Whileitisalwaysinvidioustoelevateoneindividualaboveallothers,acasecouldbemadethatthemostimportantThomistthinkeroftheseventeenthcenturywasJohnofSt.Thomas,thisbeingthereligiousnameofthePortugueseDominicanJoaoPoinsot(15891644).Hismajorphilosophicalworkswerecollectedandpub-lishedduringhislifetimeunderthetitleCursusphilosophicusthomisticus(MadridandRome,1637;Cologne,1638;andafterhisdeath,Lyons,1663).Thiscollectioniscomposedofdetailedtractsonlogicandnaturalphilosophy.Histheologicalwritings,namedtheCursustheologicus,wereoriginallypreparedintheformofacommentaryontheSummatheologiae,andpublishedatAlcala´,34Madrid,andLyonsfrom1637onwards.ThoughineverysenseadedicateddiscipleofThomas,Poinsotwasbynomeansanunthinkingfollowerofhismastersideas.InoneofthemoremethodologicallyreflectivepassageswrittenbyanearlymodernThomist(seeCursustheologicus,tractatusdeappro-bationeetauctoritatedoctrinaeD.Thomae,disp.II,a.5),Poinsotprovidesfivemarks(signa)whichhebelievesoughttoguidethereadingofThomas.Theseare:(i)whenthereisdoubtaboutwhatThomasmeansoneshoulddefertoauthoritativecommentators;(ii)thefaithfulreaderofThomasshouldaimtoenergeticallydefendandexplainThomassteachingratherthandisagreeingcap-tiously;(iii)thecommentatorshouldstressthegloryandbril-lianceofthemastersteachingratherthanparadehisowntalent;(iv)thecommentatorshouldendeavortoexplainThomassreasonsinhisownterms;and(v)thetestoffidelityistobeobservedinthe35agreementofthecommentatorwithearlierdisciplesofThomas.FaithfulnessmeanteverythingtoPoinsot;yethiswasacriticalfealtythataimedtoteaseoutambiguitiesandresolvetextualprob-lemsinordertomakethemindofThomastractableandappealing.AnoteworthybutrarelyexploredfeatureofThomisminthelateseventeenthcenturywasthemannerinwhichitbecamein-creasinglyfixatedwithhistoricaltreatmentsofitsownportfolioofarguments.SeveralDominicanworkswrittenatthistimesoughttorecreatethetimelessteachingofThomashimself,inordertojuxtaposetheveritiesofhisideaswiththoseofothercontemporaryThomistsusuallythehaplessJesuitswhoclaimedawarrantCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n310M.W.F.STONEfortheirviewsinthecorpusthomisticum.Powerfulexamplesofthistypeofworkweretomesofmoraltheologybytheaforemen-tionedAlexanderNatalis,aswellasbyDanielConcina(16871759),andthestudiesongraceandnaturebyJacquesHyacinthaSerry(d.1738),whopennedtheinfluentialHistoriacongregationisde36auxiliis(Louvain,1700).WhiletheadventofthismorebelligerentstyleofwritingdidnotsignalatotaldeclineinmorespeculativeThomistthoughtthetheoreticalwritingsofCharles-Rene´Billuart37(d.1757),especiallyhisvoluminousifaridSummaS.Thomaehodiernisacademiarummoribusaccommodata,sivecursustheo-logiae(Paris,174651),revealthataspecttobeinreasonableorderitdoesshowthatbytheendoftheeighteenthcenturymanyThom-istsweremuchlesscriticaloftheirtraditionthaninprecedingdecades,andmoreconcernedwiththeenterpriseofsketchingadefinitivepictureadmentemThomae.Thistendencywouldbecomecommonplaceintheso-calledneo-Thomistmovementofthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies,andtestifiestothefactthatseveralofthemoredecadentaspectsofearlymodernThomismhavebeenadopted,albeitwithoutacknowledgmentandreflection,38bymodern-dayThomistwriters.SCOTISM39ThenextgreatschoolofearlymodernscholasticismwasScotism.BasedontheteachingoftheDoctorSubtilis,JohnDunsScotus(ca.1265/661308),asthathadbeenpasseddownfromthemedievalperiod,itwasonlyatthebeginningofthesixteenthcenturythataScotistSchoolbecameanidentifiablepresenceinEuropeanphil-osophy.TheworksofScotuswerethencollected,publishedinmanyeditions,andsystematicallycommentatedupon.From1501wealsofindregulationsofgeneralchaptersoftheFranciscansrec-ommendingordirectlyprescribingScotismastheteachingoftheorder,althoughthewritingsofBonaventure(ca.121774)werealsopromotedinsomequarters.Scotismreacheditszenithinthefirsthalfoftheseventeenthcentury,withtheestablishmentsomeyearsbeforeofspecialistchairsattheuniversitiesofParis,Rome,Coimbra,Salamanca,Alcala´,Padua,andPavia.Oneobserver,theCistercianpolymathJuanCaramuelyLobkowitz(160682),wasmovedtoremark:theCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools311schoolofScotusismorenumerousthanalltheotherschoolstaken40together.Intheeighteenthcentury,themovementstillhadanimportantfollowing,butsubsequentlyfellintodecline,astateofaffairsexplicablebytherepeatedsuppressionsenduredbyFran-41ciscancommunitiesinmanycountries,andbytheincreasingtendencyofseveralpopesfromthelateeighteenthcenturyonwardtorecommendtheteachingofAquinasasnormativeforRomanCatholicintellectuals.Amongthemainpersonalitiesofsixteenth-centuryScotism,PaulScriptoris(d.1505),professorattheUniversityofTu¨bingen,provedaninfluentialfigureheadforthemovementinGerman-speakingcountries,whilethecommentariesofFrancisLichetus,GeneraloftheOrder(d.1520),weregreatlyadmired.AnthonyTrombetta(14361517),thePaduanopponentoftheDominicanCajetan,wrote42andeditedmanyableworksofScotistphilosophy,asdidJamesAlmainus(d.ca.1515),aParis-basedtheologianwhowasnotaFran-ciscan.Hislegacyinthetheologyfacultywouldhelptoestablishatraditionofscholasticthoughtwhich,thoughhighlyeclectic,drewonmanyaspectsofScotistmetaphysics.Inthefollowingcentury,thistrendwouldfindexpressioninthetextbooksofEustachiusaSanctoPaulo(15731640)andthewritingsofYvesofParis(ca.4315901678).Atthecloseofthesixteenthcentury,Jose´Angle´s(d.1588),acelebratedmoralist,wrotethemuchcitedFlorestheologi-cae,whileDamianGiner(fl.1605)producedaneditionoftheOpusoxonienseScotiwhichwastobecomeatemplateforthelater44criticaleditionofLukeWadding(15881657).Intheseventeenthcentury,Scotismcameintoitsown.Thecrowningachievementoftheschoolatthistimewasthepublica-tionbyWaddingandotherIrishFranciscansworkingattheCollegeofSt.IsidoreinRomeofthecompleteworksofScotus(12volumes,45Lyons,1639).TheworkincludeddetailedcommentariesbyPitigianusofArezzo(d.1616),JohnPounce(Poncius)(ca.1599or16031672/3),HughMacCaughwell(Cavellus)(d.1626),and46AnthonyHickey(15861641).TheverycleverBonaventuriBelluti(16001676)editedwithBartolomeoMastri(160273)themostwidelyregardedScotistmanualofthecentury,CursusintegerphilosophiaeadmentemScoti(Venice,1678,1688,andmanyother47editions),whileMastrihimselfwroteacelebratedDisputationestheologiae(manyeditions)andTheologiaadmentemScoti(1671),CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n312M.W.F.STONEaworkwhichprobablyrepresentsthehighwatermarkofScotist48thinkingintheperiod.MastriwasbynomeansthemostoriginaloftheScotistphiloso-phersofhisdaymaybeBellutideservesthatgarlandbuthewasamongthemostlearned.HisknowledgeofthemedievalandRe-naissancescholastictraditionwasprobablyunsurpassed,andhewasnicknamedDottoreUbertosobyhisbiographerFranchiniinvirtueoftheplethoraofauthorities(auctoritates)hecited.Mastrisdevelopmentofaphilosophicalopinionwasaremarkablefeatofsynthesisandconceptualengineering,wherebydifferentaspectsofmedievalScotismwouldbefused,compared,orevengainsaid49byopinionsdrawnfromcontemporarydebate.Thismethoden-abledMastritodemonstratethediversityofargumentsavailabletoScotistthinkers.Hisstudiesdisplayedthesubtletyandrigor50traditionallyassociatedwithDunsScotushimself.AfterMastri,Scotistphilosopherscontinuedtolabortosomepointandpurpose.TheCroatianMatthaeusFerchius(MateFrkic)51(15831666)wrotetheVitaetapologiaScoti,whiletheFrench-manJeanGabrielBoyvin(160581)wrotetheesteemedTheologiaScotiaprolixitateetsubtilitaseiusabobsuritateliberaetvindi-52cata(4volumes,Caen,166571).Anothervaluablework,theproductofaneclecticasopposedtoapurelyScotistmind,wastheCollationesbyaPortugueseprofessoratPadua,FranciscoaSantoAugustiniMacedo(15961681).ThisworksetitselftheunenviabletaskofassessingtherespectivemeritsandcompatibilityofThomistandScotistdoctrines,andassuchitthrowsagreatdealoflightonthedisputes(atleastatPadua)conductedbythesecompeting53schools.Aswemovetotheeighteenthcentury,Scotistphilosophycon-tinuedtoholditsowninsomepartsoftheCatholicworld,althoughelsewhereitwentintoaswiftdecline.ManyEnlightenmentwritersfounditsmetaphysicsanachronisticorprolix,whileCatholicthinkerslookedincreasinglytoThomas.Bytheendoftheeight-eenthcentury,individualScotistscanbesaidtomanifestanunwill-ingnesstoengagecriticallywiththeirpluriformtradition.Itisinstructivetocompare,inthisregard,theeruditionofMastriortheintelligenceofBellutiwithwriterssuchasDuRandus(d.1720).HispopularClypeusscotisticus(manyeditions)merelyaimedtoexpoundthekernelofScotistteachingwithoutmuchthoughttoitsCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools313truthorplausibility.Therewere,however,somegoodexamplesofScotistwritingintheperiod,ascanbeobservedintheprofoundandlucidworkofHieronymusaMontefortino(16321738),DunsScotisummatheologiaeexuniversisoperibusejusconcinnata,juxtaordinemetdispositionemsummaeAngeliciDoctoris(6volumes,172834),andtheTheologiaescholasticaemorali-polemicaeliberIVsententiarumiuxtaverumsensum,etmentemdoctorissubtilisJoannisDunsScoti(Augsburg,1732),oftheGermanmoralistMarin54Panger(d.1732).Theseaccomplishedtextsrepresenttheswansongofaoncevibranttraditionofphilosophy.THEJESUITSJustasitmadeanenduringcontributiontothearts,sciences,polit-ics,andreligiouslifeofitsday,sotheSocietyofJesus,ortheJesuits,55providedahometooriginalphilosophicalachievement.Deferen-tialthoughneverwhollycomplianttotheirauctoritatesmaiores56suchasAristotleandThomasAquinas,andhighlyrespectfulofauctoritatesminoressuchasScotusandotherRenaissancelumi-nariessuchasCajetan,Jesuitauthorsfromthefoundationofthesocietyin1540toitssuppressionin1773wereresponsibleforinnovationsinlogic,naturalphilosophy(includingpsychology),metaphysics,ethics(includingcasuistry),jurisprudence,politicalphilosophy,andphilosophicaltheology.Someofthebest-knownfiguresintheannalsofearlymodernscholasticismwereJesuits.FirstandforemostwasSua´rez,whosemagisterialDisputationesmetaphysicae(1597)andTractatusdelegibus,acDeolegislatore(Coimbra,1612)werereadthroughoutEuropebyCatholicsandProtestantsalike.FollowingSua´rezinintel-lectualstatureisLuisdeMolina(15361600),authoroftheConcor-dia(Lisbon,1588).Thisworkinstitutedoneofthemostenduringdebatesofearlymodernscholasticism,theDeauxiliisdispute,atheologicalquarrelconcerningthecompatibilityofhumanfreedomanddivineprovidence,whichcommandedtheattentionof(amongothers)Banez,Arnauld,Leibniz,andMalebranche.ThedebateeveninfluencedtheDutchCalvinistcensureofthethoughtofJacobArminius(15501609).Molinasothergreatwork,Deiustitiaetiure(Cuenca,15931600),provedtobeoneofthemostdurablebooksofphilosophiapracticaorpracticalphilosophyoftheperiod,makingCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n314M.W.F.STONEmanynovelcontributionstoethics,politics,andeconomics.Finally,theConimbricenses(15921606),acollectionofJesuitswritersbasedatCoimbra,rosetoeminence.Thisgroup,whichincludedEmmanueldeGoes(154297),CosmasdeMagalhaes(15511624),BalthasarAlvarez(156197),andSebastiandoCouto(15671639),wereresponsibleforahighlysuccessfulseriesofcommentariesonAristotlesPhysics,Decaelo,Meteorologica,Parvanaturalia,Ethics,Degenerationeetcorruptione,Deanima,andDialectica(commentariesonthelogicaltreatises).Combiningscholasticargu-mentwithahumanistattentiontophilology,theseworkshadbeenreprintedastaggering112timesby1633inCatholicterritoriessuchasPortugal,France,Italy,andRhinelandGermany.LesswellknowninourtimebuthighlyregardedintheirowndaywereanothergroupofJesuitphilosophers.Theseincludedtheafore-57mentionedGabrielVa´zquez,PedrodaFonseca(152899),Gregory5859deValencia(15501603),LeonardusLessius(15541623),Adam6061Tanner(15721632),AntonioPerez(15991648),JuanDeLugo6263(15831660),ThomasCarletonCompton(15911666),Pietro6465SforzaPallavicino(160767),andSebastia´nIzquierdo(160181).Thispooloftalentwassupplementedbywritersofimportanttext-66bookssuchasFranciscoToletus(153496),RodrigodeArriaga6768(15921667),andPedroHurtadodeMendoza(15781641),allofwhomadvancedthescopeandcauseofscholasticphilosophybymakingitsideastractable.TheJesuitsplayedafurtherpartinthedisseminationofscholasticthoughtthroughtheirelaboratenet-workofschoolsandcollegesinEuropeandtheNewWorld,ofwhichtheCollegioRomanowasthemostinfluential.Manyintellectualsoftheperiod,includingclericsandlaymenandnotablemindslikeDescartesandVoltaire,wereeducatedinJesuitschoolsand69universitycolleges.WhencomparedwiththefarfromhomogeneousschoolsofDominicanThomismandScotism,itissignificantthatJesuitscho-lasticswerelessmotivatedtoconstructabindingphilosophicalconsensus,especiallyinsubjectssuchasmetaphysicsandethics,eventhoughvariousgeneralsoftheorderhadendorsedtheteaching70ofThomas.Inthecaseofmetaphysics,nowhereisthismore71apparentthaninthegreatDisputationesmetaphysicaeofSua´rez.SuchistheoriginalityofthisworkabookwhoseargumentsareprosecutedbymeansofasustainedreflectiononthedebatesofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools315medievalthoughtthatSua´rezsfinalopinionwasneitherbeholdentoThomismnorScotism.WheneverhewasmindedtosidewitheitherThomasorScotus,hewasledtoendorsetheirrespectivepositionsbymeansofanimpartialscrutinyoftheclaimsatissue.Thisapproachledhimtomodifyaspectsoftheirteachingforhisownpurposes.Forexample,heacceptedthedoctrineofanalogicalpredication,sidingwithThomas,butthoughtthataconceptofbeing(esse)canbefoundwhichisstrictlyunitary,therebysupport-72ingthecommunisopiniodefendedbyScotusandhisdisciples.Conversely,heembracedtheScotistdoctrineofmattersexistingwithoutformbydivinepower,butsidedwithThomasontheissue73ofthepluralityofforms.TheextentofSua´rezsdistancefromclassicalThomismismostforcefullyparadedinhisdiscussionoftheso-calledrealdistinction,wherebytheessenceofthingsis74distinguishedfromtheirexistence.AgainstThomas,hearguedthatthereisathirddistinctionotherthantherealandrational.SkepticalofthetraditionalThomistdichotomybetweenessenceandexistence,Sua´rezpositedadistinctionofreasonwithabasis75inthings,andadistinctionbetweensubstanceandaccidents.Inmattersofphilosophicalcontroversy,theDoctorExigimuskepthisowncounsel.Inethics,manyJesuitsendeavoredtodefendversionsofanAristotelianThomistpracticalphilosophy,apluraltraditionwhichalsonourishedtheirdistinctiveapproachtoappliedethicsorcasu-76istry.HereagaintherewereprofounddifferencesofopinionamongJesuits,aswellasapropensityonthepartofindividualauthorstothinkbeyondthetextsofAristotleandThomasona77rangeofcontroversialissues.IfthereisacommontendencyamongJesuitwritersinpracticalphilosophy,itisbestillustratedbytheirpenchanttodefendanaccountofmoralitythatemphasizestheimportanceofhumanfreedom.JesuitwritersoftencitedtheaccountoffreedomsetdownbyMolinasConcordia(seeIV,esp.q.14,a.13,disp.2,}3),whosepracticalimplicationsweresubsequentlyworkedoutbythesameauthorinhislaterDeiure78etiustitia.ForMolina,whathelpstodefineahumanbeingasarationalcreatureisthepowertoactfreely.Thefacultyofliberumarbitrium,ortheabilitytomakereasonedchoices,distinguisheshumanbeingsfromotheranimalsandlivingthings.UnderthedoctrineofmiddleCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n316M.W.F.STONEknowledge(scientiamedia),theliberumarbitriumofhumanbeingsisnotaffectedbydivinecausalityorbyGodsforeknowledgeoffuturecontingentevents;freeactionsshapeandmoldthedirec-tionofanyhumanlifebecausetheyareundertakeninconditionsexemptfromallcoercionandconstraint.Itisagainsttheback-groundofthisaccountofhumanactionthatMolinaoutlinedhis79owndistinctiveviewofthenaturallaw.FewwoulddenytheinfluenceofThomasandhisSalamancaninterpretersonMolinasDeiureetiustitia,buthisstrongemphasisonthemutabilityoftheprinciplesofthenaturallaw,aflexibilityhedeemedtobeindispensablefortheirsubsequentapplicationtothevariedcontextsofhumanaction,isindicativeofadistinctiveJesuitperspective.Molinafirstbegantodiscussthisquestioninhis1570lecturesonSummatheologiae,IaIIae,qq.98108.There,headoptedapositionfamiliartoearlierthinkerssuchasVitoriaandSotothatwhiletheprinciplesoftheDecalogueandothervaliduniversalprinciplesdonotadmitofexceptions,judgmentisre-80quiredtodeterminehowandwhentheyapplytoaparticularcase.Molinadevelopedthisopinionastagefurther,however,byarguingthatcertainprinciples,especiallythosethatexpressgeneralmoralnorms,donotalwaysobligeinrecalcitrantcases.Thepointherewasnotthatsuchcasesconstituteexceptionstotheseprin-ciples,butratherthatnoappropriatespecificationofthegeneralprincipleswaspossible.Suchideas,sooftenmisunderstoodbyrig-oristiccriticssuchasBlaisePascalandPierreNicole,werean81importantcomponentofJesuitcasuistry.ItiscommonplaceamonghistorianstodeclarethatlaterJesuitwriters,betheymetaphysicians,moralists,orcontributorstode-batesinnaturalphilosophyandpsychology,didnotmaintainthehighintellectualstandardsoftheirlatesixteenth-centuryfore-82bears.Thisofcoursemaybetrue,sinceatfirstglancethedecadesfollowingthepublicationofPascalsLesprovincialesin1656appearbereftofthinkersofanygreatoriginality.Still,thisverdict,likesomanyothersimposeduponthestudyofearlymodernscholasticism,isatbestunfairandatworstderisory.Thefactofthematteristhatevenaftermanyyearsofhistoricalstudyofeighteenth-centuryphilosophy,vastquantitiesofscholasticworksandtextbooks,espe-ciallythosebyJesuitauthorsintheyearsuptotheirsuppressionin831773,areunreadandunstudied.ItisprematuretoassumethatCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools317thereareneitherinterestingtextsnorpalpableconceptualachieve-mentsinthetwilightyearsofthescholastictradition.Somethingoftheintellectualenergyofeighteenth-centuryJesuitscholasticscanbelearnedbyglancingatthosefigureswhowereactivelyinvolvedinthedebatesoftheday.ThewritingsofClaudeBuffier(16611737),especiallyhisTraite´despremie`resverite´zetdesourcedenosjugements(Paris,1724),areknowntohaveinfluencedThomasReid,andwerewidelydiscussedoutsidescholastic84circles.BertoldHauser(171362),aprofessorofmathematicsatDillingen,wrotetheElementaphilosophiaeadrationisetexperi-entiaeductumconscriptaatqueusibusscholasticisaccommodata(Augsburg,175558),whichdrewheavilyonthethoughtofChris-tianWolff.DespitedivergingfromWolffonquestionsregardingtruthandmindbodyunion,Hauserwasmotivatedtousehimasasuasiveauthorityonmanyquestions;hencetheoccurrenceof85phraseslikeWolfioipsofatenteetdocente.Manyofthepreoccu-pationsofWolffianmetaphysics,suchasadevelopedinterestintheprincipleofsufficientreason,wereadoptedbyotherJesuitauthors86workinginGerman-speakinglands.Thesewritersprovidesomemodestevidencethatscholasticswereapplyingthemselvestothetopicalconcernsoftheirday.PROTESTANTSCHOLASTICSANDOTHERSHitherto,ProtestantphilosophyandtheologybetweenthedeathsofthemagisterialreformersandtheadventoftheEnlightenmenthasbeenviewedasaperiodofintellectualdecline.Thisassessment,thecreationoftwentieth-centurytheologianswhohadlittleunder-standingorsympathyforscholasticism,suchasKarlBarth(18861968),isnolongertheacceptedwisdomamonghistoriansofthe87period.Inthelasttwodecades,severalsophisticatedstudieshavesettheconceptsandissuesconfrontedbyLutheranandReformedscholasticsincontext,withtheconsequencethatitisnowpossibletoappreciatetheirpalpablecontributiontothephilosophicaland88theologicaldebatesoftheirtime.OnreadingtheProtestantscholasticsoneisimmediatelystruckbytheextenttowhichtheyappropriatedandpreservedimportantvestigesofthemedievalphilosophicaltradition.Whileleading89reformerssuchasMartinLuther(14831546)andJohnCalvinCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n318M.W.F.STONE90(150964)kepttheirdistancefrommoreabstractphilosophicaltopics,theirimmediatefollowers,especiallyPhilipMelanchthon9192(14971560),AndreasHyperius(151164),andTheodoreBeza93(15191605),provedmorecongenialtothemethodsofscholasti-cism.AmongReformedthinkers,variousThomistthemesandalle-94giancesareondisplayinauthorssuchasGirolamoZanchi(151690)andPeterMartyrVermigli(15001562).VermiglialsoadoptedanAugustinianpositionongraceandpredestinationwhichisclosely95associatedwiththeworkofGregoryofRimini(d.1354).OtherProtestantscholasticswillinglythrewthemselvesintothedebatesofthetime,especiallyaftertheycametodominatethoseuniversitiesandacademiesinnorthernEuropeanlandsthathadpartedcompanyfromRome.TheacuteandencyclopedicmindofJohanAlsted(15881638),despiteitsmillenarianpreoccupations,madeanumberofimportantcontributionstometaphysicsand96naturalphilosophy.ThescientistandphilosopherRudolfGocle-nius(15471628),whowaswellknownforhisphilosophicaldic-tionary,Lexiconphilosophicum(Frankfurt,1613),presentedasynthesisofscholasticmetaphysicsinhisIsagogeinperipateti-corumetscholasticorumprimamphilosophiam(Frankfurt,1598).Thistomerevealssimilarontologicalpreoccupations,especiallyonthesubjectoftheensreale,tothencontemporaryCatholicwriters97suchasSua´rez.GiventheroleandinfluenceofGisbertusVoetius(15891676)attheSynodofDorts(161819)condemnationofArminius,onemightexpectthathe,likefellowmembersoftheNadereReforma-tie,ortheDutchSecondReformation,wouldhavelittleenthusiasmforscholasticism.Thisprovestobefarfromthecase,however,sinceVoetiusbelievedtheretobenotensionbetweenanaccountofreligiousfaithwhichstresseditsexperientialefficacyandaformofscholastictheology.Whileinsistingontheultimatesuper-iorityoffaithoverreason,heconsideredamorestreamlinedformofscholasticismtobeaprofitablemethodologywhichcouldbeemployedintheconceptualclarificationofboththeintellectual98andemotionalaspectsoffaith.VoetiusiswellknownforcrossingswordswithCartesianism,asystemhebelievedtohaveplacedreasononaparwiththeassumedveritiesofscripture.WhatwassoghastlyaboutDescartessthought,hebelieved,wasitsunwar-rantedelevationofhumanbeingsabovetheirnaturalstationasCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools319sinfulwretchestotheveryzenithofcreation.ForapiousCalvinistlikeVoetius,itwasabhorrentthathumanscouldfreethemselves99fromsubserviencetothedivinewillbytheuseofreason.AmongAnglicans,twoEnglishdivineswhobecameIrishbishops,JohnBramhall(15941663),archbishopofArmagh,andJeremyTaylor(161367),bishopofDownandConnor,provedastutecustodiansofcertainaspectsofscholasticthought.Bramhalltendstobedisparagedbymoderncriticsinvirtueofhistenaciousattempt100torefuteHobbessdiscussionofhumanfreedom.Thegoodbishop,however,doesmakeseveralsalientpointsatHobbessex-pense,andisparticularlyadroitatdrawingattentiontohisoppon-entssomewhatparsimoniousandhighlyreductivedescriptionofhumanpsychology.ForBramhall,anyrejectionofatraditionalscholasticaccountofliberumarbitriumwillhaverealconse-quencesforthestudyofethics.Ofcourse,manymoderninterpret-ers,likeHobbeshimself,aresimplyunimpressedwithBramhallsreiterationofscholasticteaching.Thisistoberegretted,sinceit101deniesthelattersargumenttheattentionitdeserves.JeremyTaylorwasatheologianwhobuiltuponnumerousscho-lasticdiscussions,usingthemtoeffectinhisnaturaltheology,ac-countoftheEucharist,andmoraltheology.Morejudicious,ifstillvehement,inhiscriticismoftheRomisherrorsofCatholiccasu-istry,hisDuctordubitantium(London,1660)wasoneofthefewEnglishworksoftheperiodtoadvanceamethodofmoralreasoningwhichboresomesimilaritytotheapproachofthecontinentalcasu-ists.AninveteratereaderoftheChristianpasthisknowledgeoftheFathersisjustasimpressiveashiscommandoftheteachingoftheschoolmenTaylorsworkbearstestimonytoasympathetic102engagementwithmedievalandmorerecentscholasticthought.Throughhisefforts,andthoseofotherdivinessuchasJamesUssher(15811656)andEdwardStillingfleet(163599),vestigesofscholasti-cismremainedalivepresenceinlateseventeenth-centuryEnglish103philosophyandtheology.LeavingtheProtestants,itisperhapsfittingtocompleteourfarfromconclusivesurveyofthescholasticschoolsbydrawingatten-tiontoanintellectualcolossus,afigurewhosereputationwouldsurelybesecuredifscholasticthoughtbecameamoretopicalsub-jectofscholarlyresearch.TheSpanishCistercian,JuanCaramuelyLobkowitz,leftanextensivebodyofwritingthatcontrivestosayCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n320M.W.F.STONEsomethingsensibleonjustabouteverytopicitconsidered,rangingfromlogic,mathematics,metaphysics,andnaturalsciencetothe-104ology,moralphilosophy,casuistry,andmusic.ItrevealsamyriadofinfluencesrangingfromPlatoandRamo´nLull(ca.12351315)tomoreestablishedscholasticsourcessuchasAristotle,Thomas,and105Scotus.Inatimeofconsiderablefermentinthearts,sciences,andpoliticsofCatholicEurope,Caramuelwasonhandtowitnesstheseintellectualshiftsbyvirtueofhisprolongedresidenciesin106Spain,Portugal,theLowCountries,Bohemia,andItaly.Hisphilosophicalwritingsfrom1660onwardareespeciallyimportantinthattheydisplayadetailedappreciationoftheworkofDescartes107andotherinnovatorsinthenaturalsciences.Willingtoacknow-ledgetheforceofagoodargument,Caramuelrevealshimselfopentotheclaimsofthenewlearningandtriestoappropriatemanyofitsinsightswithintheacceptedparametersofscholasticdiscourse.OfparticularinterestishisdiscussionoftheCartesianmethodof108hyperbolicdoubtandhisthoughtsonthenatureoflogic.AnyoneinterestedinphilosophywillgainsomethingfromreadingCara-muel,andthesameremarkcouldbemadeaboutotherfigures,especiallythosewhoseworkhasbeensurveyedabove.Itishightimeforthescholasticstobebroughtinfromthecold;theprospectofamoreinclusiveandhistoricallyreliableportraitofearlymodernphilosophymustsurelydependuponourassigningthemaplace109nearerthehearth.NOTES1ThisissodespitetheeffortsofsuccessivegenerationsofEuropeanscholarstodisplaythevitalityofearlymodernscholasticism,amove-mentthatfoundexpressioninseveralschoolseachofwhichclaimedameasureoffidelitytotheideasandintellectualmethodsofthemiddleages.Thereisnocompleteorauthoritativesurveyofearlymodernscholasticismpresentlyavailableinanylanguage,afactwhichisex-plicablemoreintermsoftheprofusionofsourcesratherthantheindolenceordisinterestofscholars.ThebestgeneralaccountcanbefoundinSchmutz2000a,whileanolderbutstillusefulstudyisavail-ableinGiacon194450.FulltreatmentsofearlymodernscholasticismasitimpingeduponnationalphilosophicalculturescanbefoundinLewalter1935,Wundt1939,andBlum1999forGerman-speakingcoun-tries;Brockliss1987forFrance;Poppi2001,Burgio1998and2000,andCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools321Forlivesi2002forItalyandSicily;Stegmu¨ller1959,BeldaPlans2000,andCalafate2001fortheIberianpeninsula;Krook1993andSouthgate1993forEnglish-speakingcountries;andKnuutilla2001andOgo-nowski2001forScandinaviaandEasternEurope.ForaninstructiveessayonthechangingattitudestoscholasticismseeQuinto2001.SeealsoTrentmann1982,Stone2002,andFitzpatrickandHaldane2003forEnglish-languagecommentaryonaspectsofscholasticism.Forthoseunfazedbynewtechnology,muchcanbelearnedfromtheexcellentwebsite,Scholasticon(http://www.ulb.ac.be/philo/scholasticon/),maintainedbyJacobSchmutzoftheSorbonne(Paris-IV).2SeeSorell1993,andGarberandAyers1998.3Forexamplesoftraditionaldisdainofscholasticismbywell-knownearlymodernwriters,seePierreBaylesentryonArriagaintheDic-tionnaire(1697).FormorerecentassessmentsthatconcurwithBaylesgeneraljudgment,seeWilliams1978,Cottingham1988,Scruton1994,andBennett2001.4Thisbecomesapparentinanysurveyofuniversityteachingatthistime.ForEngland,seeCostello1958andTyacke1997;forFrance,seeBrockliss1987;forGerman-speakinglands,seeBauer1928andBoehm1978;forCentralEurope,seeFreedman1997;andforthecoloniesofNorthandLatinAmerica,seeMiller1939andBeuchot1996.5Whilemanycontemporaryscholarsaremotivatedtoexploretherela-tionshipsthataresaidtoexistbetweenearlymodernthinkersandancienttraditionsofphilosophicalthought,e.g.Stoicism,Epicurean-ism,andskepticism(seetherecentcollectionbyMillerandInwood2003),fewaremovedtoinvestigatethedebtthatseventeenth-centuryphilosophymayormaynotowetomedievalthought.Forrecentat-temptstorestorethisimbalanceinsubjectssuchaslogic,metaphysics,psychology,ethics,andphilosophicaltheology,seethecollectionsbyBrown1998,LagerlundandYrjo¨nsuuri2002,Boulnoisetal.2002,BardoutandBoulnois2002,FriedmanandNielsen2003,PinkandStone2004,EbbesenandFriedman2004,andKrayeandSaarinen2004.6Itisrevealingthatinamajorrecentstudyofthecontributionmadebyseventeenth-centuryphilosophytothemakingofmodernity,thescholasticschoolsaretotallyignored;seeIsrael2001.7Forrecentexamples,seeGarberandAyers1998andthetrilogybyDesChene1996,2000,and2001.8Examplesofthisapproachcanbefoundinthewritingsof(amongothers):Grene1991,Garber1992,BiardandRashed1997,Rozemond1998,Ariew1999,andSecada2000onDescartes;Leijenhorst1998onHobbes;Brown1984andMercer2001onLeibniz;Milton1984onCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n322M.W.F.STONELocke;Coppens2003onSpinoza;andConnell1967andPyle2003onMalebranche.9Thislastpointcanalsobeobservedinthedecisionofearlymodernscholasticstowritephilosophyinadifferentway.Theyceasedtousetheoldermedievalpracticesofthequaestiodisputataandquaestioquodlibetilis,andnolongerwrotecommentariesontheSentencesofPeterLombard.Forfurtherdiscussionofthesedevelopments,seeLawn1993andQuinto2001.10Onlatemedievalschoolsofphilosophyandtheproblemsinherentintheirassessment,seethearticlesbyHoenen1997,1998,and2003.11Amongthebest-knownwritersofscholasticmanualsintheProtestanttraditionareBartolomeusKeckermann(15721609)andFrancoBurges-dijk(15901635).FordiscussionsofKeckermannsworkandcareer,seeFreedman1997andStone2000,whileBurgesdijkscontributioniscoveredbyBosandKrop1993andBlom1995,pp.67100.12SeeVerbeek1992andGoudriaan1999.13Ontheoriginsofthisschool,seeWundt1939andBeck1969.OnWolffandscholasticism,seeRuello1963andCarboncini1991.14OnthedisputesbetweenthetwoJesuitsastheypertainedtomorals,metaphysics,andtheology,seeVereecke1957,Castro1974,andSchmutz2002d.15ThispointisdiscussedbyGiacon1944andSchmutz2000a.16Twoofthemostheateddisputeswereonthesubjectsofgraceandnature,topicsconsideredintheDeauxiliiscontroversy,andthedis-cussionofmoralreasoningconcerningprobabilism.Ondivinefore-knowledgeasitwasdiscussedbyscholasticsandnonscholasticauthors,especiallyLeibnizandArnauld,seeSleigh1990and1996,Murray1995and2002,Knebel1991and1996b,Ramelow1997,andKremer1994.Onprobabilism,seeDeman1936andStone2004e.17OnthefiguresandissuesofRenaissanceThomism,seeKristeller1992,PinchardandRicci1993,andTavuzzi1997.18ForgeneraldiscussionoftheThomismoftheseauthors,seeBeldaPlans2000andStone2004c;andCarro1944,Brett1997,andStone2005bfordifferentassessmentsoftheirmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.19OntheadoptionofThomasbytheJesuits,seetheConstitutionsoftheSocietyofJesus,no.464,andthedefinitiveversionoftheirRatiostu-diorum(1599):Rulesforprofessorsofscholastictheology(Regulaeprofessorisscholasticaetheologiae);seeRule2:S.Thomassequendus.20SeeMerl1947,Corazo´n1955,andBorde2001.21SeeRyan1948forgeneraldiscussionofThomismamongtheEnglish.OnHooker,seeVoak2003;onMoreandtheCambridgePlatonists,seeDockrill1997;andforNorris,seeAcworth1979.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools32322OnWiggers,seeMarcus-Leus1995.23SeeAmann1939.24ForfurtherdiscussionoftheseissuesastheypertaintotheLowCoun-tries,seeLamberigts1994andStone2005b.ForcorrespondingdebatesastheywereconductedinCatholiccirclesinFrance,seeQuantin1999.25OnCaterusandhisformationinthisintellectualtradition,seeVerbeek1995andArmogathe1995.TheargumentsofThomistnaturaltheologywerealsousedbyProtestanttheologiansintheNetherlands,especiallyattheUniversityofLeiden.Onthesefigures,seePlatt1982.26OntheheateddebatesonprobabilismandJesuitcasuistry,seeSchu¨ßler2002andStone2004e.27SeeChenu1925.28OnGonet,seePeyrous1974.29Forafulldiscussionofalltheseissues,seeBeuchot1996,Schmutz2002b,andPasnau2004.30Forlatemedievalandearlymodernscholasticdiscussionofthefree-domofthewill,seeStone2004aandPink2004.Schneewind1998,pp.1736,95100,13840,15961,18489,and25060containsanexten-sivediscussionofthedebateaboutvoluntarisminearlymodernphil-osophy.31SeeLeahy1963fordiscussiononhowearlymodernThomistwritersdealtwiththeseissues.32ThomasAquinas,Summatheologiae,Ia,q.78,a.3;q.79,a.2.33Summatheologiae,Ia,q.84,a.4;andq.85,a.1,adlum,3um,4um.Forfurtherdiscussionofhowthesepassageswerediscussedbyearlymodernscholastics,seeDesChene2000,andFowler1999whoisinstructiveinchartingtherelationshipbetweenthisdiscussionandtheattemptsofDescartestodemonstratetheimmortalityofthesoul.34FortwoofthefewmoregeneralstudiesofPoinsot,seeDeely1985,pp.394514,andForlivesi1993.35SeeJohnofSt.Thomas,Cursustheologicus(193153),vol.I,pp.297301.36OnConcinaandSerry,seeCessario1998.37OnBiluart,seeCessario1998.38Forastudyofnineteenth-centuryThomism,seeMcCool1977,andformorerecentversions,seeShanley2002andKerr2002.39ThebestavailablesurveyisbySchmutz2002c;seealsoHoenen1998.ForadiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenCartesianismandScotism,seeAriew1999,pp.3957.40Caramuel,Theologiamoralisfundamentalis(Lyons,1657),bk.II,disp.10:Scotischolanumerosiorestomnibusaliissimulsumptis.Onthequotation,seethestudybyBak1956.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n324M.W.F.STONE41Duringtheearlymodernperiod,theFranciscansweredividedintothreemaincongregations:FriarsMajor,FriarsMinor,andtheCapu-chins,allofwhomstronglysupportedScotistphilosophy.42OnTrombettaandScotismatPadua,seePoppi1962and1966,andMahoney1976and1978.43OntheearlymodernParisiantheologicalfaculty,seeGarciaVilloslada1938,Brockliss1987,andAriew1999.44OnWadding,seeCleary1925andMooney1958.45OntheIrishFranciscans,seeMillet1964.46OnPoniusandhiscolleagues,seeGrajewski1946andSousedik1996.FurthercoverageisgivenbyCleary1925.47OnBelluti,seetheolderbutstillusefulstudybyScaramuzzi1927.48SeeSchmutz2002c,andForlivesi2002foraveryfullaccountofMastriusslifeandcareer.49Onthisaspectofhiswork,seePoppi1989andCoombs1993.50Forfurtherdiscussion,seeHoffmann2002,Forlivesi2002,pp.2024,andSchmutz2002c.51OntheCroatianfriar,seeRoscic1971andForlivesi2002.52SeeSmeets1942,}215and}545.53FordiscussionoftheCollationesandotheraspectsofMacedoswork,seeDeSousaRibeiro1951andCeyssens1956.54SeeDeArmellada1997.55OntheimpactoftheJesuitsonculture,society,andpolitics,seeOMalley1999andHo¨pfl2004.OnJesuitscience,seeFeingold2003aand2003b.ForamajortreatmentofJesuitphilosophers,seeKnebel2000.56ItisinterestingthatmanyearlyJesuitswantedtocreateasynthesisofscholasticteachingratherthanrelyupontheworkofThomas.Onthesedebates,seeOMalley1993,pp.24453.57ForcommentaryonFonsecaslogic,metaphysics,andAristoteliancommentaries,seePereira1967,Martins1994,andMenn1997.58SeevonHentrich1928andAsensio1998.59ForLessiussphilosophicaltheology,seeLeBachelet1931,andStoneandVanHoudt1999forhisethics.60SeeLurz1932.61SeeRamelow1997,Knebel1998and2000,pp.7986,13142,andSchmutz2003.62Onhispracticalphilosophy,seeBrinkman1957,andforhismetaphys-icsandtheology,seeOlivares1984.63OnCarletonComptonsinterestingmetaphysics,seeDoyle1988and1995,andKnebel2000,pp.1215,31016,421.64SeeKnebel1996aand2001.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools32565SeeDiVona1994,Knebel2000,pp.7984,12834,33143,andSchmutz2002e.66SeeHellin1940,Baldini1992,andDesChene1996and2000.67SeeThorndike1951,Leinsle1985,pp.31720,andSousedik1981and1998.68SeeCaruso1979andForlivesi2000.69SeeGarciaVilloslada1954ontheRomanCollege,andOMalley1993onJesuiteducation.70ForthediversityofmetaphysicalviewsamongearlymodernJesuits,seeLohr1988and1999,Schmutz2002dand2004,andAriew1999.Menn1997containssomeinterestingphilosophicalcommentary,al-thoughheexaggeratestheimportanceofwhathecallsliberalJesuitscholasticism,atermofhisowninventionratherthanonewithabasisinhistoricalfact.71RecentmonographsonSua´rezianmetaphysicsarebyCourtine1990andDarge2004.Sua´rezspsychologyhasalsobeenthesubjectofimportantarticlesbySouth2001and2002.AfulllistofpublicationsonSua´rezcanbefoundintheBibliographicasuarecianawhichisnowavailableonlineatScholasticon(http://www.ulb.ac.be/philo/scholasticon/).72FranciscoSua´rez,Disp.met.,disp.28,}3,nn.27;and}1,n.9.73Disp.met.,disp.34,}5,n.36;anddisp.15,}10,n.61.74OntherealdistinctioninThomasAquinas,seeWippel1984.75Disp.met.,disp.7,}1,n.16;anddisp.31,}1,n.3.76OnJesuitapproachestoethicsandcasuistryseeJonsenandToulmin1988,Courtine1999,Knebel2000,Ho¨pfl2004,andStone2004d.77Forexamples,seethedebateamongJesuitscholasticsontaxesde-scribedbyGo´mezCamacho1998aand1998b,andlyingdescribedbySomerville1988.78ApartfromtheConcordia,MolinaaddressesthethemeofhumanlibertyinhispolemicalwritingsagainsttheProtestants:seeSummahaeresiummaior,writtenagainsttheLutherans,Stegmu¨ller1935,pp.394438,andSummahaeresiumminor,writtenagainsttheCalvinists,Stegmu¨ller1935,pp.43950.CentraltoMolinascaseinthesetractsishisargumentthatbydiminishingthescopeofhumanlibertytheProtestantsmakeGodintoatyrant.79SeeDı´ez-Alegrı´a1951andStone2005b.80SeeVitoria,CommentariainsummamtheologiaeIIa–IIae,V,p.210,andSoto,Deiureetiustitia,I,2,q.3.81OnMolinasthoughtabouttheseissues,seeDı´ez-Alegrı´a1951.ForthecaseagainstJesuitcasuistryadvancedbyPascalsLesprovinciales(Paris,1656),seeBaudin194647,vol.III,pp.33254;andStone2004e.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n326M.W.F.STONE82SeeJansen1938.83Foranattempttoopenupsomeoftheunstudiedaspectsofeighteenth-centuryscholastics,seeNortheast1991.84In1780ananonymousauthorattackedReidandaccusedhimofpla-giarizingBuffierstreatmentofcommonsense.Forafulldiscussionofthegrounds,orotherwise,ofthischarge,seeMarcil-Lacoste1982.Reidsmoregeneralrelationshiptotheworkofthescholastictradition,intheformofAquinasandScotus,isassessedbyHaldane1989andBroadie2000.85OnHauserandhismilieu,seeGurr1959.86SeeBenedictStattler(172897),Philosophiamethodoscientiispropriaexplanata(Augsburg,176972);andSigsmundStorcheneau(173197/8),InstitutionummetaphysicarumlibriIV(Venice,1772).87SeeMuller2003forthetheologicalobstaclesthatthwartedamoreobjectiveandhistoricalstudyofProtestantscholasticism.88AmongthesearetheanthologiesbyTruemanandClark1999andVanAsseltandDekker2001,andthemagisterialstudybyMuller2003.89OnLutherandscholasticism,seeSteinmetz1995.90CalvinscomplicatedrelationshiptophilosophyisdiscussedbyHelm2004.91FordetaileddiscussionsofMelanchthonsuseoftheAristotelianandscholastictraditionsinphilosophyandscience,seeFrank1995andKusukawa1985.92SeeSinnema1999.93SeeMuller1999.94OnZanchi,seeDonnelly1976.95OnVermigli,seeJames1999and2001.96SeeHotson2000aand2000b.97SeeLeinsle1985.98OnVoetius,seeVanRuler1995andBeeke1999.SimilarviewstoVoetiuswerealsoabroadamongEnglishPuritanssuchasJohnOwen(161683).99SeeVerbeek1992.100ForBramhallsattackonHobbes,seeCastigationsofMr.Hobbes(London,1655)andTheCatchingofLeviathanortheGreatWhale(London,1658).101AclearandinterestinginterpretationofthedifferencesonmoralagencybetweenthescholastictraditionandHobbescanbefoundinPink2004.102OnTaylor,seeWood1952.103ForadiscussionofUsshersconsiderableerudition,seeKnox1950andTrevor-Roper1989,andCarroll1975forStillingfleet.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nScholasticschools327104ForsynopticcommentaryonCaramuel,seeSchmutz2000bandFrank-lin2001.105OnCaramuelseclecticbrandofscholasticism,seePastine1975.106Onhislifeandtimes,seeVelardeLombrana1989.107SeeCenal1953andFartosMartinez1997.108SeePastine1972.ForacompletelistofwritingsaboutCaramuelandhisworks,seetheBibliographiacaramuelianaatScholasticon(http://www.ulb.ac.be/philo/scholasticon/).109IamgratefultoJacobSchmutzandtoDonaldRutherfordfortheirassistancewiththisessay.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nJ.B.SCHNEEWIND12Towardenlightenment:KantandthesourcesofdarknessThetitlepageofChristianWolff’sVernu¨nftigeGedanckenvonGott,derWeltundderSeeledesMenschenof1720,theso-called“GermanMetaphysics,”showsabrilliantsunbeamingthroughdarkcloudsaboveapeacefulrurallandscape.ALatinphraseoverthesunexplainsthepicture:“lightrestoredafterclouds.”ManyotherphilosophybookspublishedinGermanyduringthefirstpartoftheeighteenthcenturycarriedsimilarpictures.Inatleasttwothe1wordDispellamisshownatthetop.EnlightenmentorAufkla¨rungwasthesundispellingtheclouds.Thesunwasreason;thecloudswereignoranceandfalsebelief.Thedarknesstheycausedwasfavorabletodespoticgovernment,overbearingpriests,misguidedreligiosity,abusivenobility,repressivelawsbackedbyferociouspunishments,unjusttaxation,andstultifyingeconomicpractices.Enlightenersopposedthesebytryingtoreformlegislation,govern-ment,andpenalsystems,toincreasereligioustolerationandthefreedomtothinkandpublish,tospreadscientificknowledge,toimproveeducation,andtorationalizeeconomicpolicies.Success,theythought,dependedonremovingthedarkcloudsinheritedfromthepast.Reasonwasthetoolforthejob.Andphilosophersweretakentobeamongthosebestequippedtoshowwhatreasoncoulddoandhowitcouldhelp.Kant’sessay“AnAnswertotheQuestion:WhatIsEnlighten-ment?”iswidelytakentobeaclassicstatementofenlightened2thinking,andhehimselftobeoneofitsgreatadvocates.Whilethisisbroadlyspeakingcorrect,Kant’sstancetowardAufkla¨rung,astowardalmosteverythingelse,isverymuchhisown.Onewayofseeinghowhediffersfromhisenlighteningpredecessorsistocom-parehisviewofthesourcesofdarknesswiththeirs.Ibeginwith328CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment329afewgeneralcommentsaboutEnlightenment.Inthesecondsection,Ireviewbrieflysomeofthethinkerswhoexpressviewsonthesourcesofdarkness–notallofthemdo.Inthelastpart,IlookatKant’scomplexposition.ENLIGHTENMENTSThereformingoutlooktowardwhichIgesturedabovewascon-sciouslysharedbymanythinkersandactivistswhomweclassifyasenlightened.Itis,however,amatterofscholarlydebatewhethertheyshouldallbethoughtofasparticipatinginasinglemovement3ofEnlightenment.Expressinganowcommonview,onescholararguesthatifenlightenerswerereformers,thenationaldifferencesintheinstitutionstobereformedmusthavemadeasignificantdifferencetotheideastheyusedtoquestionestablishedbeliefs.HeisdefendingtheclaimthattherewasauniquelyScottishEn-lightenment:“SincethereisdemonstrablysomethingdistinctivelyScottishaboutthelargeinstitutions...whichinformstheexperi-encethatsupportsandmotivatesthethinkers’reflections,therewillalsobesomethingdistinctivelyScottishaboutthosereflections4abouttheconcepts...andvalues”involvedintheinstitutions.Thereismuchtobesaidforthisview.Germanphilosophers,forinstance,livedunderawidevarietyofpoliticalregimes,withsev-eralreligionspermittedandsometimesbackedbythedifferent5governments.InFrance,bycontrast,acentralgovernmentimposedonereligion,whileinEnglandacentralgovernmentmoreorlesstoleratedanumberofthem.Nonetheless,therewerecommonal-itiesthatcrossedpoliticalboundaries.JonathanIsraelhasarguedpowerfullythatweshouldtakeEnlightenmenttobe“asinglehighlyintegratedintellectualandculturalmovement”occurringalloverEurope,comingatvarioustimesbutcenteredonthesame6problemsandoftenstimulatedbythesamebooks.IsraelalsoarguesthatwhathecallstheearlyradicalEnlighten-ment,whichdevelopedinthelatterpartoftheseventeenthcentury,wasdecisiveinshapingEuropeanandeventuallyworldthoughtthereafter.Nationality,forhim,isnotdeeplysignificant.Whatdoesmatteristhatsomegroupsofthinkersadvocatedfarmoresweepingchangesinthoughtandactionthanothers.Theradicalenlightenerswereatheistic,materialistic,andnaturalistic.TheyadvocatedCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n330J.B.SCHNEEWINDgovernmentsthatwouldbemuchmoreliberalanddemocraticthananyunderwhichtheylived.ForIsrael,theirmostinfluentialphil-osopherwasSpinoza.BecauseherejectedallthemainpointsofJewishandChristianconceptionsofGod,hewasseenasanatheist,eventhoughhecalledthebasicsubstanceoftheuniverse“GodorNature.”Hisviewswerespreadbyinnumerablepamphlets,books,letters,discussioncircles,andclandestinemanuscripts.MoremoderateenlightenerswereappalledbytheradicalSpinoz-isticprogram,seeingitasathreattothereligionmanyofthemstillacceptedaswellastomoralityandpublicorder.Butevenmoderatesfoundmuchdarknessinthepracticesofreligion.Theiraimwastobringlighttodriveawaywhattheysawasharmfulexcrescencesonmuch-neededbeliefratherthantoeliminateitaltogether.Kanthimselfwasneitheratheisticnormaterialisticnornaturalistic.Hedevotedmuchofhisworktoarguingthattheseviewswerenotsupportable.Hehasconsequentlybeenthoughtbysomescholars7nottobelongtotheAufkla¨rungatall.ButmetaphysicallybasedantireligiousclaimsarenottheonlymarkersofEnlightenment.Whetherradicalormoderate,enlightenersusedacommonvo-cabularytoidentifywhattheyrejected.Ignorancewasnottheonlyenemy.Itsimplyopenedthewayformistakenbeliefsthatweremoredirectlythecausesofthepracticestheenlightenersopposed.Inreligiousmatters,theytendedtothinkofthesebeliefsasfallingintotwomaincategories:superstitionandenthusiasm.By“supersti-tion,”theenlightenerssometimesmeantanyreligiousbelief,butoftentheymeantbeliefinthevalueoftheworshipofsaints,theuseofrelicsandimages,andthenecessityofpriestlyintercessiontoobtainsalvation–allofwhichtheytooktobedistinctivelyRomanCatholic.By“enthusiasm,”theymightmeananysortofreligiousfanaticism,butoftentheymeantthelargelyProtestantbeliefthatindividualscouldreceiveinspiration–andpoliticalinstruction–8directlyfromGod.Superstitionandenthusiasmweretiedtowhattheenlightenerscalled“prejudice.”Bythistheymeant,notnegativeandhostileattitudestoward“other”people,butinheritedbeliefsandpracticeswiththeauthorityoflongacceptancebehindthem.Thetermhadawideapplication.IntheEthics,publishedin1677,Spinozasaidthatthebeliefthateverythinginnatureactsforanend,ashumansdo,is9foremostamongtheprejudiceshewishestoremove.D’AlembertCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment331spokeofprejudicesinfavorofAristotleopeningthewaytobe-10nightedscholasticism.SomestudentsatJena,inspiredbytheFrenchRevolution,formedagroup“tosetReasononthelegislativethronethatshedeserves.”Theyproclaimedthat“Reasontolerates11noprejudices,whichmockher.Duelingissuchaprejudice.”IntheCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment,Kantidentifiedprejudicewiththepassivityandhencetheheteronomyofreason.Headded12that“thegreatestprejudiceofallis...superstition.”LaterIpresentmoreevidenceoftheimportanceoftheseEnlightenmentconceptsinKant’sthinking.THESOURCESOFDARKNESSWhydothereligiousprejudicesthatformthedarkcloudshavesuchastronghold?Afterall,mostofthesebeliefsimposesevereregi-mens,callforsacrifice,interferewithone’slife.Whydopeopleholdtothemwithsuchtenacity?WhyisthestruggleforEnlightenmentsodifficult?Doestheanswerlieinourpsychology?Kantsaysthatwhileitispermissibletorepresentthecorrupterofmankindasexternaltous,thatis,asadevil,theultimatesourceofcorruptioniswithin:afterall,“wewouldnotbetemptedby[thedevil]werewenotinsecretagreementwithhim”(RR,6.60).Whatattractsustosuperstitionandenthusiasm,andmakesusclingtoourprejudices?Whatarethesourcesofdarkness?SpinozaopenstheprefacetohisTheological-PoliticalTreatise(1670)withsomesuggestionsofananswer.Menwouldnotbeheldbysuperstition(superstitione),hesays,iftheycouldcontroltheirownlivesandhadrulesbywhichtogoverntheiractions.Buttheyoftenhavenoideaabouthowtocopewiththedifficultiesfortuneputsintheirway.Theyfluctuatebetweenhopeandfear,andgraspatanybeliefthatoffershelp.Theywonderatanythingunexpected,andtakeitasasignoraportentofthewillofthegodsrequiringsacrifice.Butifgreedandfeararethemainsourceandsustainerofsuperstition,theyareaidedbystatecraft.Itprofitsdespoticrulerstokeeptheirsubjectsinthrallbyreligion.Spinoza’saiminthebookistoshowthatonlyfreedomofthought,fosteredbyfreedominsoci-ety,canleadtotruepietyandtocivilpeaceandorder.Todosohe13mustconvincethemassesofthetruthoftheseviews.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n332J.B.SCHNEEWINDLater,heexplainswhythetaskissodifficult.Thebestwaytoconvincepeopleofthetruthofanythingistoproveit,deducingitrigorouslyfromself-evidentprinciples.Butmostpeoplefindargu-mentsofthiskindtoohardtofollow.Theyprefertotaketheirbeliefsfromexperience.Themainpointsoftruereligioncanbebroughttothemasses,whosemindscannotperceiveideasclearlyanddistinctly,onlybyembodyingtheideasinstories.Andwhilethemassesneedstoriesthatmovethemtoobedience,theycannotthemselvesjudgewhicharebestforthispurpose.Hencetheyalwaysneed“pastorsorministersofthechurch”astheirguides.Otherwisetheyattendtotrivialnarrativedetailsandnottothe14lessonstobelearned.Evenwithsuchguides,men’smindsareeasilyledastray.IntheTreatiseontheEmendationoftheIntellectandtheEthics,Spinozasaysthemasseshaveatbestperceptionsofkindsthatallowfor15error.IntheEthics,headdsthatfalsity“consistsintheprivationofknowledgewhichinadequate,ormutilatedandconfused,ideas16involve.”Confusedideasconstitutethepassionsanddesiresthatdrivemostpeople.ThemassesthinkGodmadeeverythingfortheirbenefit.TheydeveloptheirownwaysoftryingtoinfluenceGodtodirectallofnaturetosatisfytheirown“insatiablegreed.”Thustheprejudicethateverythinginnatureworksforanend“waschangedintosuperstition”andlodgedfirmlyinmen’sminds.Wewouldallhaveremainedinthissorrystatehadnotmathematics,whichisnot17concernedwithends,“shownmenanotherstandardoftruth.”Itwilltakeacleardeductivedemonstrationofthetruth,suchashisownEthics,tofreemenfromtheirsuperstitions;butthisisexactlythekindofthinkingmostpeoplecannotfollow.Lockediscussesthesourcesofdarknessinreligiousmattersin18manyplaces.HereIcanconsideronlyalittleofwhathesays.UnlikeSpinoza,hebelievesthatwehavebeengivenagenuinedivinerevelationandhedefendsaversionofChristianity.Thedomainoffaithbeginswherereasoncannotdeliverknowledge,butfaithcannotrequireustobelieveanythingthatgoesagainstclearreason.More-over,ouracceptanceofclaimsasdivinelyrevealedmustrestonourhavingreasonsforbelievingthattherevelationdoesindeedcomefromGod.Aproperunderstandingoftherelationsbetweenreasonandfaith,andduerelianceonreason,isessentialifwearetoavoid19superstition.ButfewmencaretoreasonortoseektruthforitsownCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment333sake.Theirpassionsandinterestsalltoooftendictatetheirbeliefs;andinreligiousmatters,thisleadstoenthusiasm.Havingdisre-gardedbothreasonandChristianrevelationinimposingbeliefsonthemselves,theyproceedtoimposethemonothers.Theysetupthe“ungroundedfancies”oftheirownbrainsas“aFoundationbothofopinionandConduct.”Becominganauthorityforotherswithoutgoingtoanytrouble“flattersmanyMen’sLaziness,Ignorance,andVanity”:hencethegreatappealofbeinganenthusiastandclaiming20immediatedivineinspiration.Lockethinksthatfailuretoreasonisingeneralamajorsourceoferror.Menholdmanybeliefswithoutgrounds,evenwhengroundsareavailable.Manypeopleareunabletothinkwellenoughtoassessevidenceandfollowarguments.Thereis“adifferenceofdegreesinMen’sUnderstandings...tosogreatalatitude...thatthereisagreaterdistancebetweensomeMen,andothers...thanbetweensomeMenandsomeBeasts.”Somejustrefusetoconsiderreasonsforandagainstvariousclaims.Andmanyarecontenttogiveuptheirownabilitytoreason.Theysimplyacceptthe“currentOpinions,21andlicensedGuides”oftheircountry.Manydonothavetimeandenergytothinkaftertheirexhaustingwork.ButthetruthsaboutGodandmoralityneededforrightlivingaresoeasilyaccessiblethatmostpeoplecouldthinktheirwaytothem.Andthosewhocannot–22farmhandsanddairymaids–canlearnthemfromthepreacher.ItisnotjustignoranceorconfusionthatisthesourceofdarknessforLocke.Itismainlytheinabilityorunwillingnesstothinkclearly.Inhiswritingsoneducationandtheconductoftheunder-standing,herepeatedlysaysthatmostpeoplecanreason,thatitislackofdesireorpracticethatleadsthemtofailtoseekgroundsfortheirbeliefs,andthatsoundeducationcandomuchtoremedythedefect.Spinozadoesnotseemtosharehisoptimismonthispoint.Nonetheless,bothheandLockearerejectingstrongCalvinistviewsabouttheinabilityofsinfulhumanstoreasonclearlyortoimprove23theirfaculties.NeitherattributesthedarknesstothedepravitythatCalviniststhoughtweinheritedfromAdam.Theyareofferingnotasupernaturalviewofthetendencytoacceptcorruptformsofreligion,butnaturalisticaccounts.Contingentfactsabouthumanenergyandability,notdivinelyimposedpunishment,explainthedarkness.Somethingcanbedoneaboutit.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n334J.B.SCHNEEWINDWhetherHumehimselfwasorwasnotwhollywithoutreligiousbelief–amuch-discussedquestion–heseemstohaveallowedthatthereissomereasontoacceptaminimalsingledeity,thefirstcauseoftheuniverse,butotherwisebarelydescribable.Therichvarietyofreligiousbeliefbeyondthisiscausedbyignorance,hope,andfear.Withalmostnoknowledgeofacausalorderinnature,surroundedonallsidesbythreatstolifeandhappiness,andwith“auniversal24tendency...toconceiveallthingslikethemselves,”humansfirstinventedavarietyofdeitieswhomtheycouldblameformisfortuneandsupplicateforaid.Monotheismemergedonlyslowly.And“whoeverthinksithasoweditssuccesstothe...reasons,onwhichitisundoubtedlyfounded,wouldshowhimselflittleacquaintedwiththeignoranceandstupidityofthepeople,andtheirincurable25prejudiceinfavoroftheirparticularsuperstitions.”Nordoir-rationalforcesceasetoworkoncemonotheismisreached.Religiousbeliefisunstable:ittends“torisefromidolatrytotheism,andto26sinkagainfromtheismintoidolatry.”Theconsequencesarenottrivial.Onthewhole,polytheistsaretolerantofotherreligions,andmonotheistsarenot.Humansacri-ficewaspracticedin“barbarousnations”butitnowhereequaledthehorrorsoftheInquisition.Andtheproclivityofmonotheiststoattributeinfinitesuperiorityofeverykindtotheirdeityleadsthemintoasubmissivenessandpassivitythattakesthemfarfromthevirtuesdisplayedbytheheroesofantiquity.Moreover,astheismismoreinaccordancewithsoundreasonthanpolytheismis,itmoreeasilycooptsphilosophy.Buttheologyinsistsonlimitingthescopeofreason.Religion–ortheclergy–musthave“Amazement...27Mystery...Darkness”inordertokeepthemassesinawe.Humedelightsinpointingoutabsurditiesinthebeliefsandpracticesofmonotheisticreligions,especiallyRomanCatholicism.Healsoarguesthateveryreligiontendstocorruptitsadherents.Votaries,hesays,“willstillseekthedivinefavor,notbyvirtueandgoodmorals,whichalonecanbeacceptabletoaperfectbeing,buteitherbyfrivolousobservances,...byrapturousextasies,orbythebelief28ofmysteriousandabsurdopinions.”WeretheretobesounlikelyathingasareligioninsistingthatonlypuremoralscanbepleasingtoGod,“thepeople’sprejudices”aresostrongthattheywouldfindwaystomakeevenattendanceatmoralinstructionintoa29superstitiousmeansofingratiatingthemselveswiththeirdeity.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment335Thereisnowaywecanescapereligiouscontroversiesexcepttoleavethedifferentsuperstitionstoquarrelamongthemselves,while30weturnto“thecalm,thoughobscure,regionsofphilosophy.”ButinfactonHume’sviewthereismoreroomforhopethanthisremarksuggests.Ignorance,combinedwithfearanddesire,createsreligion.IfNewtonianaccountsofnaturaleventsbecomewidelyknown,theywilldryupthesourcesofsuperstition.Whateverhisskepticaldoubtsintheobscureregionsofphilosophy,HumeholdstotheEnlightenmentbeliefthatscientificknowledgewilldispel31thedarkness.“ManisunhappyonlybecausehemistrustsNature,”declaimsBarond’HolbachattheopeningofhisSystemofNature(1770).“Hismindissopervadedwithprejudicesthatonemightbelievehimforevercondemnedtoerror...ItistimetoseekinNaturethe32remedyfortheillsthatenthusiasmhasmadeforus.”TheSystemisperhapsthefullestEnlightenmentaccountofthesourcesofdark-ness.InitHolbachmakesacomprehensiveeffort“toscatterthecloudsthatpreventmanfromwalkingwithasurefootonthepathoflife.”Hisundefendedstartingpointisempiricism.Allknowledgecomesfromsensoryexperience,Holbachholds,andsodoallideas.Weshouldstripthelanguageofwordswithnodeterminateideasattachedtothem.Ifwedo,wewillgetridofbeliefsinaminddistinctfromthebody,freewill,andpurelyspiritualbeings–allofthempropsforreligion.Holbachhasnointerestintracingtheexperientialpedigreesofideashetakestobesound.Hismaineffortistoshowhowwecametohavetheharmfulideasandbeliefsthatenableprincesandprieststotyrannizeoverus.Andhehasnodoubtaboutwherethetroublelies:“Itcannotbetoooftenrepeated,itisinerrorthatwefindthetruesourceoftheillsbywhichthehumanraceisafflicted...notNature;notanirritableGod;nothereditary33depravity;itisonlyerror.”Holbachvehementlydeniesthatreligiondoesanygood.Religionandtheology,“farfrombeingusefultomankind,arethetruesourcesoftheillsthatafflicttheearth,oftheerrorsthatblindit,the34prejudicesthatbenumbit.”Thereisnorationaleforreligiousbelief:HolbachexaminestheargumentsofClarke,Descartes,Newton,andMalebrancheandproclaimsthemworthless.Henceacausal,naturalisticaccountofreligiousbeliefisneeded.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n336J.B.SCHNEEWINDTheaccountHolbachgivesisclosetoHume’s.Mankindbeginswithalmosttotalignoranceofnature’sways.And“itissolelyignoranceofnaturalcausesandtheforcesofnaturethatgivesbirth35tothegods.”Oursufferings,ourfearsandneeds,andourtendencytomodeleverythingonourownfeelingsleadustoattributeextra-ordinarypowerstonaturalobjectsandeventsthatwedonotunder-stand.Religionis“alwaysasystemofconductinventedbyimaginationandignorancetowinfavorfromtheunknownpowerstowhichNatureissupposedtobesubmitted...[T]hesecrude36foundationssupportallreligioussystems.”Priesthoodoriginatedwhenoldmenstartedsupervisingofferingstothedeities.Eventu-allytheytoldstoriesaboutthegods,andthendevelopedelaboratetheoriestoexplaintheircontradictoryways.They“enveloped[thegods]inclouds...andbecamethemastersofexplainingasthey37pleasedtheenigmaticbeingtheymadetoadore.”Inallthistheywereaidedbytheregrettablefactthatmenlovemysteriesandmarvels,andsoarecomplicitinspreadingthesystemthatoppressesthem.Men“needmysterytomovetheirimaginations,”Holbachsays,andoncetheyhavethemysteriestheyspendtheirtime38praying,ratherthaninvestigatingnature.Toimprovematters,educationisclearlyneeded.Butwecannoteasilygetridoftheerrorandignorancethatarethesourcesoftheharmfulbeliefs.Theabstractargumentsthatwouldclarifyourthinkingcannotbeunderstoodbythemasses.“Itisnot...forthemultitudethataphilosophershouldproposetohimselfeithertowriteortomeditate;theprinciplesofatheismorthesystemofNaturearenotmade...foralargenumberofpeople.”Still,theadvanceofscience,exemplifiedespeciallybyNewton’swork,cangiveushope.Forsciencealwaysdrivesoutsuperstition:thusas-tronomyhasputthealchemistsoutofbusinessandsciencemoregenerallyhasdestroyedthecredibilityofmagicians.Awisesover-eignwillbeneededaswell,tospreadthelightanddriveawaytheclouds.Butadvancedideascometobeacceptedonlyslowly.Themostwecanhopefornowisthatpeoplewillloseinterestinreli-giousandtheologicalcontroversies.“Itisthisindifference,sojust,soreasonable,soadvantageoustostates,thathealthyphilosophy39canproposetointroducelittlebylittleonearth.”NearlyaquarterofacenturyafterHolbach’sSystemappeared,theMarquisdeCondorcetwroteaclassicEnlightenmentaccountofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment337theprogressofknowledgeanditseffectsindispellingthecloudsofprejudiceandsuperstition.Heholdsthatthehistoryoferrorisanimportantpartofthehistoryoftheprogressofknowledge.Andmuchmorethanhispredecessors,heattributesbothprogressandoppositiontoittostructuralfeaturesofsociallife,particularlytostrugglesforpower.Individualpsychologyplaysonlyasmallpartintheformationofthecloudsthatknowledgewilleventuallydriveaway.Therearetwopointsonwhichindividualpsychologymatters.Ourfacultiesdeveloponlyslowly,andsomeprejudicesservedausefulpurposeintheirtime.But“theyhaveextendedtheirseductions...beyondtheirseasonbecausemenretaintheprejudicesoftheirchild-hood,theircountryandtheirage”evenwhenenoughisknownto40rejectthem.TomentalinertiaCondorcetaddsafeatureofearlythoughtthathedoesnotexplain.Whensomemencametoknowenoughtobetheleadersandteachersofothers,twoclasseswereformed,onetryingtoplaceitselfabovereason,“theotherhumblyrenouncingitsownreasonandabasingitselftolessthanhuman41stature.”Thisself-abasementhelpedintheriseofthepriesthood.Sincethenthatclasshasclungtopower,terrifyingthemasseswithsuperstitiousfearsofpenaltiesinanafterlifefordisobedienceandfiercelyopposingtheprogressofknowledgethatwoulddisabusesubjectsoftheirbeliefinclericalsuperiority.Thepriestlyclasssometimessoughttoincreaseknowledge,but42itsaimwas“nottodispelignorancebuttodominatemen.”ThedeathofSocrates,Condorcetsays,“wasthefirstcrimethatmarkedthebeginningofthewarbetweenphilosophyandsuperstition,”a43warstillcontinuing.Aristotlediscoveredtheprincipleofempiri-cism,butdidnottakeitveryfar.UndertheRomanempire,theclaimsofreasonwereswampedbythetriumphofChristianity,“towhichthegreatmassofenthusiastsgraduallyattachedthem-selves.”Condorcetsaystheconvertsweretheslavesandthepoor,44butoffersnofurtheraccountofwhytheyadheredtothenewfaith.Tosustaintheirpower,themedievalpriestsexaltedreligiousvirtuesabovenaturalonesandkeptthepopulaceinignorance.Theironlyachievementwas“theologicaldaydreamingandsuperstitiousimposture.”TheArabrevivalofscienceofferedsomehope,butwasdefeatedby“tyrannyandsuperstition”:therewasnowaytodefenditfrom“theprejudicesofmenwhohadalreadybeendegradedbyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n338J.B.SCHNEEWIND45slavery.”Itwasonlywiththeinventionofprintingandtheconse-quentwidedisseminationoftheadvancesofthenewsciencethatknowledgebeganwhatCondorcetconsidersanowirreversiblead-vance.“Thereisnotareligioussystemnorasupernaturalextrava-gance,”hesays,“thatisnotfoundedonignoranceofthelawsof46nature.”Sciencewillendthereignofdarkness.KANTKantbeginstoofferaviewaboutthesourcesofdarknessintheopeningparagraphofhis“Enlightenment”essay.Tobeenlightenedistohavelefttheconditionhecallsself-incurredminorityortutelage(selbstverschuldeteUnmu¨ndigkeit).“Thisminorityisself-incurred,”hecontinues,“whenitscauseisnotinlackofunderstandingbutinlackofresolutionandcouragetouseitwith-outdirectionfromanother”(PracP,8.35).Theimperative,“Havethecouragetouseyourownreason!”isthemottoofAufkla¨rung.IfEnlightenmentisthinkingforoneself,thesourceofdarknesswouldbethe“lazinessandcowardice”whichhinderusfromdoingso.Atleast,thatwouldbethesourcewithinindividuals.Freedomtomakepublicuseofreasonseemstobewhatittakesforawholesocietytobeenlightened.Herethesourcesofdarknesswouldbeeffortsofrulersandclergytopreventopencriticaldiscussionoftheirpoliciesanddecisions.Kantdevotesmuchoftheessaytodistinguishingbetweenpublicandprivateusesofreason,andthecriticalliteraturehasaccordinglyexaminedthedistinctionindetail.ButtheopeningparagraphsraisequestionsabouttheinnersourceofdarknessthatKantdoesnotanswerintheessay,anditisthesethatIshallexplore.47Whenwethinkforourselves,whatarewetothinkabout?ReligiousbeliefsareKant’smainconcernintheessay.Buthedoesnotexplainwhyittakescouragetothinkaboutthemforoneself.ItisalsounclearwhatKantmeansbysayingthatourbeinginaconditionofminorityortutelageisself-incurred.Shortlyafterthe“Enlighten-ment”essaywaspublished,J.G.Hamannwrotealettercriticizing48itandespecially“thataccursedadjectiveself-incurred.”ThoughKantusestheadjectivetwomoretimesintheessay(atPracP,8.40and8.41)andplainlythinksitimportant,theessayitselfdoesnotCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment339offermuchhelpinunderstandingit.Irresolutionandcowardicemaykeepmostpeopleundertutelage,butaretheyalsoself-incurred?TheimperativeofEnlightenmentseemstobeaddressedtoindi-49viduals.YetKantalsosaysthat“itishardforanysingleindividualtoworkhimselfoutofthelifeundertutelage.”Whatisneededisasocietyinwhichcitizenshavethefreedomtomakepublicuseoftheirreason(PracP,8.36).IfIdonotliveinsuchasociety,ismytutelagestillself-incurred?DoIpersonallybeartheresponsibilityforit?Wedonotyetliveinanenlightenedage,Kantallows,but50onlyinonegoingthroughtheprocessofAufkla¨rung.Westilllackmuchthatwouldberequiredformentousetheirownreasoninreligiousmatters.Theobstaclestoescapefromself-incurredminor-ityarebeingremoved,butnotallatonce.Inwhatwaythenisourremainingintheconditionoftutelageself-incurred?Kantdoesnotheresay.Asimilarjuxtapositionofindividualandcommunityresponsi-bilityoccursinKant’s“ConjecturalBeginningofHumanHistory.”Hetheresketchesahistoryoftheawakeningandgradualdevelop-mentofmoralreasoning.Inthecourseofthisdevelopment,“man...hascausetoascribetohimselftheguilt(Schuld)foralltheevilthathesuffersandforthebadthatheperpetrates.”Yetthesufferingisunavoidable.Itispartofnature’swayofteachingthehumanracethemorallessonsitneedstolearn.Kantthinkswemust“admire51andpraise”it.Perhaps;butitisstillhardtoseehowtheindividualcanberesponsibleforalltheseevils.Anendnotetothefinalpageofthe“OrientationinThinking”essaygivesusvitalhelpwithKant’sviewin“Enlightenment.”Iquoteitinfullhere:Thinkingforoneselfmeansseekingthesupremetouchstoneoftruthinoneself(i.e.inone’sownreason);andthemaximofalwaysthinkingforoneselfisenlightenment.Nowthereislesstothisthanpeopleimaginewhentheyplaceenlightenmentintheacquisitionofinformation;foritisratheranegativeprinciplefortheuseofone’sfacultyofcognition,andoftenhewhoisrichestininformationistheleastenlightenedintheusehemakesofit.Tomakeuseofone’sownreasonmeansnomorethantoaskoneself,foreverythingthatoneshouldassume,whetheronecouldfinditfeasible[wohlthunlichfinde¼finditdoable]tomakethereasonwhyoneassumessomething,ortherulefromwhichtherefollowswhatoneas-sumes,intoauniversalprinciplefortheuseofone’sreason.ThistestisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n340J.B.SCHNEEWINDonethateveryonecanapplytohimself;andwiththisexaminationhewillseesuperstitionandenthusiasmdisappear,evenifhefallsfarshortofhavinginformationtorefutethemonobjectivegrounds.Forheisusingmerelythemaximofreason’sself-preservation.Thusitisquiteeasytogroundenlightenmentinindividualsubjectsthroughtheireducation;onemustonlybeginearlytoaccustomyoungmindstothisreflection;forthereareexternalobstacleswhichinpartforbidthismannerofeducationandinpartmakeitmoredifficult.52(RR,8.146n.)KantisheresayingthatEnlightenmentconsistsinorrequirestheadoptionofamaxim.Maxims,forKant,areourmostgeneralprac-ticalprinciples.Enlightenmentthusbelongswithinthedomainofpracticalratherthantheoreticalreason.Morespecifically,Enlight-enmentisnotamatterofgettingmoreinformation.Wedonotneeddetailedinformationtoacceptorrejectaproposedmaxim.AsKant’swholeethicaltheoryshows,thereisanaprioritestforsuchmaxims.ByidentifyingAufkla¨rungwithadoptingamaxim,Kantrejectsallviewsholdingthatthecloudsaredispelledsimplybytheremovaloffactualorscientificignorance.TheEnlightenmentmaximis“anegativeprincipleintheuseofone’sfacultyofcognition.”BythisKantmeansthattheEnlighten-mentmaximwillleadustorejectcertaincognitiveclaims–thosemadebytheadvocateofsuperstitionorenthusiasm.Themaximdirectsonetouseatestforwhateveroneisaskedtoassume(wasmanannehmensoll),andKantsaysthateveryonecanusethistest.Kant’sphrasingsuggestsapossibleprocedureforapplyingtheEnlight-enmentmaxim:formulateaprinciplethatwouldleadonetoassumewhateveritisthattheadvocateofsuperstitionorenthusiasmsaysoneshouldassume.Thenaskifonecouldwillthattheprinciplebeauniversalprincipleofone’sreason.Couldtheprincipleguideallofone’sthinking?Ifnot,rejectit;andsinceitisthisprinciplethatwouldleadtoacceptanceoftheadvocate’sclaim,rejecthisclaimaswell.Bywayofexample,Kantsaysonlythatifoneusesthetest,superstitionandenthusiasmwilldisappear.Hedoesnottelluswhatreasonsorruleswouldgroundone’sacceptanceoftheadvicetheiradvocatesgiveus.Hedoeshoweversaythatwedonotneedtobring“information”(dieKenntnisse¼piecesofknowledge)tobearinordertorejecttheclaimsoftheadvocateofsuperstitionorenthu-siasm.WerejecttheseclaimsnotbecausewecanprovethemfalseCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment341onempiricalgrounds,butbecausetheself-preservationofreasonrequirestheirrejection.Reasonwouldcontradictitselfinsomewaywerewetoaccepttheprinciplethatwouldleadustoacceptwhattheadvocateurgesuponus.Whatexactlythismeanswillbecomeclearlater,whenIidentifythesortofprinciplethattheEnlightenmentmaximtellsustoreject.Kantendsthenotewithadistinctionbetweenindividualenlight-enmentandtheenlightenmentofanage,indicatingthepossibilityofoneandthedifficultyoftheother–butnotinquitethesamewayhedoesinthe“Enlightenment”essayitself.AnequallypackedpassageinthethirdCritiquereinforcesthesepoints.Enlightenment,Kanttheresays,isthinkingforoneself,whichis“themaximofareasonthatisneverpassive.”Superstitiondemandspassivityofmindasanobligation.Henceitisthepreemi-nentcaseofprejudice,andliberationfromitisatthecoreofEnlightenment.Inthenotetothispassage,KantsaysthatEnlight-enmentisinonewayeasy,inanotherwayhard.“Alwaysbeinglegislative,”i.e.active,iseasyforsomeonewhodoesnotwanttogobeyondhisessentialendandseeksnoknowledgewhichisbeyondunderstanding.ForKant,ouressentialendisamoralend:thathappinessshouldbedistributedinaccordancewithvirtue.BeliefinGodandimmortalityhavenotheoreticalbasis,butwecanacceptthebeliefsonpracticalgrounds.Ifweaskforknowledgebeyondthat,therearemanywhowillpromiseit.Kantsaysthatwewillfindtheirpromisestempting.Hencewefindithardtostayenlight-ened,i.e.tomaintainthecriticalstance,towardwhattheyofferusforbelief.Andthiswillbeespeciallydifficultforawholepublic(CJ,5.294–95).InbothpassagesKanttreatsbeingenlightenedashavingadoptedamaxim,orasamatterofpracticalreason.Inbothhedistinguishesbetweenachievingenlightenmentasanindividualandachievingitasorforawholepublic.Inneitherdoeshehelpustounderstandjusthowourpersistentconditionofminorityortutelagecanbeself-incurred.Butnowthatweknowthatweareconsideringmatterswithinthedomainofpracticalreason,wecanseeaparallelbetweenthestruggleforEnlightenmentandthestruggleforvirtue.Virtueisstrengthofmaximsindoingourduty.Theoppositiontodoingsocomesfromwithinus,fromourinclinations;and,Kantadds,“itisthehumanbeinghimselfwhoputstheseobstaclesinthewayofhisCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n342J.B.SCHNEEWINDmaxims”(PracP,6.394).Moraldifficulties,liketheconditionoftutelage,areself-incurred.ButsofarwedonotseeKantexplainingwhyweputtheseinclinationsinthewayofvirtue,orwhywearetemptedbythethoughtofextra-moralknowledgeofGod,orwhyitissohardtoadopttheEnlightenmentmaxim.Thusinthesepassageshedoesnotfullyexplainthesourceofdarkness.TofindKant’saccountofitwemustlookathisReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason.Inpartone,Kantpresentshisviewoftheradicalevilthatdwellsineachofus.Thisresuscitationofwhatlookslikethedoctrineoforiginalsinshockedmanycontem-poraries.Kant,wroteGoetheinafrequentlyquotedpassage,“afterspendingalonglifecleansinghisphilosophicalmantleofvariousgrubbyprejudices,haswantonlybesmircheditwiththeinfamousstainofRadicalEvilsothatChristianstoocanafterallbeluredup53tokissitshem.”Evenhiscriticsshouldadmit,however,thatKant’sradicalevilisnotSt.Augustine’soriginalsin.Kantianevilleavesuswithourabilitytoseeourdutyandchooseit,whichstrongviewsofChristiandepravitydidnot.Kantsaysnothingofpredestin-ation,andherejectsprevenientgrace.Evenso,itisasurprisingviewforaphilosopherofAufkla¨rungtohold.ThatKantisnonethelessaphilosopherofAufkla¨rungis,how-ever,nowhereclearerthaninpartfouroftheReligion.Hetheregiveshisfullestaccountofwhyweshouldrejecttheaspectsofreligionthatenlightenersattacked.Indoingsoheputsthedoctrineofradicaleviltoasurprisinguse.MysuggestionisthatradicalevilisforKanttheultimatesourceofthesuperstition,enthusiasm,andpriestcraftwhichconstitutesolargeapartofthedarknesstobedispelledbyAufkla¨rung.InwhatfollowsItrytosupportthissuggestion.IgiveonlyabriefreminderofKant’sviewofradicalevil.Thatweareevilisnotastrictnecessityofournature,butacontingentfact,althoughitholdsofallofus(RR,6.32).Ourbeingevilisnotamatterofourhavingimpulsestopreserveandbenefitourselveswhichareoftenstrongerthantheimpulsederivedfromourawarenessofthemorallaw.Thisissimplyhumanfrailty.Theinclinationsthem-selvesarenotevil,butgood(RR,6.58).Norisourbeingevilconsti-tutedbyourcomplyingwiththerequirementsofthemorallawoutofincentivesotherthanthelawitself.Thisismerelyimpurity.Ourdepravityorcorruptionisrather“thepropensityofthepowerofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment343choicetomaximsthatsubordinatetheincentivesofthemorallawtoothers...itreversestheethicalorderasregardstheincentivesofafreepowerofchoice”(RR,6.29–30).Thegoodagentmakescom-pliancewithmoralitytheconditionforactionfromanonmoralincentive.Theevilagentmakescompliancewithanonmoralincen-54tivetheconditionfordoingwhatmoralityrequires(RR,6.36).WeneednotretracethequalificationsandexplanationswithwhichKantsurroundstheclaimthatweareallinherentlyevil.Itisimportant,however,tonotethatheisnottalkingofspecificindividualswhenhemakesthisclaim.Herulesoutthethoughtthatsomepeoplemightbeinherentlygood,andonlysomeevil.Heisspeakingof“thewholespecies”(RR,6.25).Andalthoughheholdsthatweallstartincorruption,healsoinsiststhat“[t]hehumanbeing(eventheworst)doesnotrepudiatethemorallaw...Thelawratherimposesitselfonhimirresistibly”(RR,6.36).Awarenessofthemorallawisboundupwithourfreedomand“throughnocauseintheworld”cananyonelosethatfreedom.Kantputsthepointquitestrongly:Howeverevilahumanbeinghasbeenrightuptothemomentofanimpendingfreeaction(evilevenhabitually,asasecondnature),hisdutytobetterhimselfwasnotjustinthepast:itstillishisdutynow;hemustthereforebecapableofit.(RR,6.41;cf.6.45)Thequestionoftheproperorderofmoralandothermaximsas55relatedtofaithrecursfrequentlyintherestofReligion.Kantre-peatedlycontrastsrationalreligionasapuremoralpositionwithstatutoryfaithswhichtrytoignoreorbypassordowngrademoralityinfavorofothermeansofappealingforthefavorofthedeity.Hedistinguishes“religionofrogation(ofmerecult)”from“moralreli-gion,i.e.thereligionofgoodlife-conduct”(RR,6.51);ecclesiasticalfaithfromthepurefaithofreligion(RR,6.109);andfaithascom-mandedfromreligionascompliancewithmoralityunderstoodasGod’scommands(RR,6.163–64).Kantiseagertoshowthathistoricalfaith,transmittedbylearnedscholars,canbeofassistancetomoralreligion.Heacceptstheclaimthatritualsandprayersinalimitedcommunitymayhelprealizethemoralreligionthatmustultimatelybecommontoall.ButwheneverwethinkwecanbecomewellpleasingtoGodbysomethingotherthanpuremorality–whenweCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n344J.B.SCHNEEWINDthinkthatlivingaccordingtoancientprescriptionstransmittedinabook,orcarryingoutritualsdemandedbyanecclesiasticalauthority,willreplacemoralityasameanstodivinefavor–wearegettingthingsinthewrongorder.Thelanguageisrevealing:“todeemthisstatutoryfaith...essentialtotheserviceofGodingeneral,andtomakeitthesupremeconditionofdivinegoodpleasuretowardhumans”isitselfwhatKantcalls“adelusionofreligion”(RR,6.168,myemphasis;cf.6.170–71).Itistherooterrorthatleadstothedarknessesofsuperstitionandenthusiasm,andopensthewaytopriestlytyranny.AnotedauthorityonKant’sreligiousthoughtsaysthat“Thegeneralsubjectivegroundofreligiousdelusionliesinthehuman56tendencytoanthropomorphism.”KantdoesindeedsaythatwetendtothinkthatGodcanbeswayedaswecanbyentreatiesandgifts.Andhisexplanationofthestrengthofthistendencyistiedtohisaccountsofsuperstition,enthusiasm,andpriestcraft.Allofthemdisplaythepatterncharacteristicofradicalevil.Goodlife-conduct,Kantremindsus,istheonlythingwellpleasingtoGod.Weknowthatinthislifewecannotbringourselvesintocompletecompliancewiththedemandsofmorality.Hencewehopeforsomesortofaidbeyondourselvesthatwillenableustomakeprogressinataskwecannotmorallyescape.Reasonshowsus,Kantsays,thatGodwillcountsincereeffortassufficienttoentitleustodivinegrace.Butbecausemoralityrequireshardworkandwearegreedyforassuranceofsalvation,welookforotherwaysofobtainingit.Weknowthatpeoplecanbeboughtoff.Sowethinkthatwemightobtaingracebysomelessarduousservicetothedivinity,andthatthenmoralvirtuewillbeaddedtoit.Wegrantthatgracemightcomeinamysteriousway.Weoffersacrificeswhich,howevercostly,arelessdemandingthanmorality.Andwepersuadeour-selvesthatwecantellthatwearefeelingtheeffectsofthegraceoursacrificesandprayershavewonus.“ThedelusionthatthroughactsofcultwecanachieveanythinginthewayofjustificationbeforeGodisreligioussuperstition,”Kantsays,“justasthedelusionofwantingtobringthisaboutbystrivingforasupposedcontactwithGodisreligiousenthusiasm”(RR,6.174).Superstitionisusingnaturalmeans,themselvesnottiedtomorality,tobringaboutnonnatural,moral,effects.Enthusiasmcallsonsomethingnotwithinhumanpowers–immediatecontactCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment345withthedivinity–toeffectnonnaturalgoals(RR,6.174–75).Super-stitionatleastoffersmanypeopletheabilitytotryforgrace,sinceitusesnaturalmeans.Enthusiasm,bycontrast,ismoreirrational:becauseitendsasanappealtoinnerfeeling(RR,6.114),itis“themoraldeathofreasonwithoutwhichtherecanbenoreligion”(RR,6.175).Priestssimplyformalizeandreinforcethedelusionsatworkinsuperstitionandenthusiasm.ThereisnodifferenceinprinciplebetweentherefinedpriestofEuropeandtheprimitiveshamanofAsia.Whattheybothwantis“tosteertotheiradvantagetheinvis-iblepowerwhichpresidesoverhumandestiny”(RR,6.176).AsInoted,Kantthinksthatmoralitycanbenefitfromchurches,rituals,andprayers.Butwhenthey,andtherevelationthatpre-scribesthem,aremadenecessarytotheinnerlifeandnottreatedasmeremeanstoenhancemorality,theresultiswhatKantcallsfetishism.Thepriesttakesjustthisstep.Heturnswhatshouldbemerelymeansintoanend,andthustellsustojoinmeansandtrueendinthewrongorder.Priestcraftistheconstitutionofachurchdevotedtofetishism.Insuchorganizationstheclergyrules,dispensingwithreasonandclaimingauthorityoverallthelaity,includingthesecularruler.Everyonemustpretendtoreceivebenefitsfromclericalrule,sounconditionalobediencetopriestsundermines“theverythinkingofthepeople.”Thehypocrisynecessaryundersucharegimeevenunderminestheloyaltyofsubjects.Insteadofbringingpeaceandorder,itbringsabouttheiropposite(RR,6.179–80).Ritualizedser-viceandmoraleffortmayindeedbejoined.Theyarebothgoodthings,but,Kantwarns,“[s]omuchdepends,whenwewishtojointwogoodthings,ontheorderinwhichwecombinethem!”“Itisinthisdistinction,”Kantsignificantlyadds,“thattrueAufkla¨rungconsists”(RR,6.179).WhereverKantnotesthetemptationtotreataspectsofreligionwhichareatbestmeanstomoralityasmoreimportantthanmoral-ity,inthehopeofcurryingdivinefavor,heindicatesthatthisisthewrongordering:itsubordinatesmoralitytodesireforone’sownhappiness.Everywherethepatternisthatofradicalevil.Then,attheendofthebook,Kantcharacterizesthedelusionsofreligionas“self-deceptions”(RR,6.200).Theself-incurredtutelageoftheessayonEnlightenmentmay,Isuggest,beunderstoodinthesameway.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n346J.B.SCHNEEWINDThefailureofcouragetouseourownreasonisamoralfailure.RadicalevilistheultimatesourceofthedarknessresultingfromthefailuresofarofalloureffortsatAufkla¨rung.Whatwilltheenlightenedagentthinkwhenconfrontedbyasuperstitiousorenthusiasticperson?TheenthusiastclaimstohavedirectdivineinspirationaboutanonmoralwaytobecomewellpleasingtoGod.ThesuperstitiouspersonclaimstoknowthatattentiontocertainritualsorrelicsorsaintswillenableonetobecomewellpleasingtoGod.Toacceptwhattheyurgeuponus,wemustaccepttheprinciplethatthereissomenonmoralwayofpleasingGod.Thisiswhatenlightenedagentsreject.Whenthink-ingforthemselves,theywillalwaysrejectanyclaimgroundedonthebeliefthattherearenonmoralmeanstoGod’sapproval.Inthisapplication,theEnlightenmentmaximhasanegativeoutcomefortheuseofourfacultyofcognition,asKantsaysithas:weconcludethatwedonotknowwhatthereligiousadvocatesclaimtoknow.Inthiswaythemaximleads,asKantalsosays,tothedeathofbothaberrantformsofdivineservice.CanthispointbebroadenedtotakeinotheraspectsofAufkla¨r-ung,asKantsuggestsinthe“Enlightenment“essay?Tomakethisout,wehavetothinkthatthebookorspiritualadviserthatdoesourthinkingforus,ortheruler,orthephysician(PracP,8.35),allurgeustocoursesofactionthatrequireplacingourowninterestaheadofmorality.Perhapsourpastordirectsustopersecutemembersofagrouphethinksungodlyanddespicable;perhapsourcommandingofficertellsustokillthewivesanddaughtersoftheenemyaswellastheirsoldiers;perhapsourphysicianurgesustobribethepharma-cisttogiveuspriorityforsomeimportantmedicineinveryshortsupply.Toseethattheyshouldrejectsuchdirectives,enlightenedagentsneednotquestionanyfactualorquasi-factualclaimsthatthepriestorrulerorphysicianmaymake.TheycanseethatthereasonsunderlyingadviceofthekindsIhaveimaginedalwaysinvolveplacingself-interest,orspecialgroupinterest,abovemoralprinciple.Matureagentscannotacceptthebasicreasonsgivenforthissortofadviceasrulesfortheirownpracticalreasoning.Sincepracticalreasongivesmoralityprecedenceoverotherkindsofdirective,todosowouldbetousepracticalreasontodestroyitself.Enlightenmentthusensurestheself-preservationofreason.Enlightenedagentscan,however,acceptchurchceremoniesorCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment347politicaldirectivesormedicaladviceaslongasthesedonotrequireoverrulingmorality.Theagentisfreetodecidebyusingprudentialreasonwhethertoacceptorrejectdirectionsfromanyauthority,insofarastheirdirectivesconcerntheuseofmeansthatliewithintheboundsofmorality.Andhecandecidesimplytotaketheauthority’sadvicewithouttryingtothinkforhimselfaboutitanyfurtherthantoseethatitismorallypermissible.ForKant,theultimatesourceofdarkness–ofourpersistenceintheunenlightenedconditionoftutelage–is,Ihaveargued,theradicalevilthatbesetsallhumanbeings.Emergencefromradicalevilisuptous.Ifwedecidetorejectit,wedosoinarealmbeyondexperience.Nothingcanbeknownofhowthechoiceismade.Thesameistrueifwedecidenottoemergefromradicalevil.OurignoranceherespreadstootheraspectsofKant’sphilosophy.Moralimprovementrequiressteadyrefusaltoplaceself-interestaheadofmorality.Aufkla¨rungrequiressteadyadherencetothemaximofthinkingforoneself,refusingtoobeyanyauthoritythatdirectsustoplacemoralityinsecondplace.BothmoralimprovementandEn-lightenmentmustessentiallybefreelychosen.Butifthechoiceoftherightcourseisfree,soisthechoiceofthewrong.Andinthatcase,arewenotalwaysintheconditionofthinkinginpractical57termsforourselves–ofbeingnotundertutelagebutenlightened?Notheoreticalanswertothesedifficultiesispossible,onKant’sview.Wecannothaveatheoreticalunderstandingofwhythecon-ditionoftutelageisself-imposed.Kantcanonlysaythatwearemorallyrequiredtothinkitis,becausewearemorallyrequiredtothinkthatimprovementisalwayspossible.ThecontrastbetweenKant’saccountofthesourceofdarknessandtheaccountsoftheotherenlightenerswhomIhavediscussedisstriking.Forthem,darknesscomesfromcognitivefailureofonesortoranother.Enlightenmentrequiresimprovementinourtheoreticalgraspoftheworld.Theythereforeofferclarificationofideas,orimprovementofreasoning,orincreaseofscientificknowledgeaswaystodispelthedarkness.Andeventhosewho,likeHolbach,ardentlydefendtherightsofman,preservetheideathatanintellec-tualeliteofsomesortmustleadtherestofustowardthelight.ForKant,thesourceofdarknessisamoralfailureofwill.Inmoralmattersweareallequallyfailures;butweallhaveessentiallythesameabilitytogetthingsright.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n348J.B.SCHNEEWINDKantadvocatesarepublicanformofgovernmentasbestsuitedtoexpressouressentialmoralfreedom.Hethinksweallhaveadutytoworktowardaworldfederationofrepublicsasmostlikelytopre-servepeace.ButhoweverenlightenedKant’sgoalsmaysound,henowheresuggestspracticalstepsanyonemighttaketowardreach-ingthem,exceptforimprovementofmoraleducation.Hethinksthatpoliticalrevolutionisnevermorallypermissible.HepraisesFredericktheGreatinthe“Enlightenment”essay,butsaysnothingtochallengetheruler’sauthoritarianregime.ItishisviewofthesourceofdarknessthatprovidestherationaleforthisquiteminimalprogramofAufkla¨rung.Whatisessentialisindividualmoralim-provement.Politicalactioncannotimprovematters.Kantcanofferonlythemorallynecessaryhopethatwearemovingourselves58throughhistorytowardEnlightenment.NOTES1Schneiders1990,Wolffonp.87,theothersonpp.84,85,frombooksbyGundling,1715,andThomasius,1726.2The“Enlightenment”essayisinGes.Schr.,8.33–42,translationinKant1996a,pp.17–22,citedhereafterasPracP.Withoneexception,referencestoKantaretovolumeandpagenumbersoftheAkademieeditionoftheGes.Schr.;theonereferencetotheCritiqueofPureReasonfollowsthestandardpracticeofusingAandBpagenumbersforfirstandsecondeditionreferences.AllenWoodsaysthatKantwas“perhapsthegreatestphilosophicalproponent”oftheEnlightenment(Kant1996a,p.xxiii).3Foramostilluminatinglookatthewholecategory,seeSchmidt2003.SchmidtshowsthattheGermanshadinAufkla¨rungawordthatlongprecededtheEnglishEnlightenmentasthenameofahistoricalperiod.4Broadie2003,pp.2–3.ForamorespecificcontrastbetweenEnlighten-mentsinScotlandandGermany,seeOz-Sulzberger2002.5ForanolderbutstillusefulviewofthepeculiaritiesofAufkla¨runginGermany,seeBeck1969,pp.244–47.Schneiders1990,pp.45–48,dis-tinguishesfourstagesintheAufkla¨rung:anearlystagefrom1690to1720,stimulatedlargelybyThomasius;highAufkla¨rung,centeredonWolff,from1720to1750;apopularizingAufkla¨rung,from1750to1780,inwhichideaswerespreadbylessrigorousthinkers;andlateAufkla¨rung,from1780to1800.HunterarguesfordifferentiationofEnlightenmentswithinGermany,distinguishingbetweenamovementaimingatmakingCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment349governmentwhollynonreligiousandindifferenttotheprivatebeliefsofitscitizens,andanothertryingtopreserveanolderviewinwhichthestatemustprotectreligionandconcernitselfwiththespiritualwelfareofitscitizens.HeseesPufendorfandThomasiusasthemainthinkersfavoringthecivilenlightenment,LeibnizandKantastheoristsofthemetaphysicalEnlightenment.SeeHunter2001.6Israel2001,p.v.7SeeKondylis2002,pp.639–42.8Inanearlywork,Kantdistinguishesfanaticismfromenthusiasm,re-servingthefirsttermforthefeelingofimmediatecontactwithahigherbeingandthesecondforanabnormallyhighdegreeofattachmenttoanyprinciplewhatsoever.HetiessuperstitionespeciallytoSpain,andthinksitmoreperniciousthanfanaticism(ObservationsontheFeelingoftheBeautifulandSublime,Ges.Schr.,2.250–51andn.).InReligionwithintheBoundariesofMereReason,Kanttiesenthusiasmto“sup-posedinnerexperience(effectsofgrace)”(Ges.Schr.,6.53;cf.6.174).IusethetranslationsofKant’swritingsonreligionbyAllenWoodandGeorgediGiovanniinKant1996b.FuturereferencestoReligionwithintheBoundarieswillbegiveninthetext,indicatedasRR.9TheremarkaboutprejudiceoccursatthebeginningoftheappendixtopartIoftheEthicsinSpinoza1985,p.439.10Alembert1963,p.71.11QuotedinBoyle2000,p.112.12CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment(Ges.Schr.,5.294),astranslatedinKant2000.CitedhereafterasCJ.13Spinoza1989,pp.5–11.14TTP,ch.5,inSpinoza1989,pp.179–85;alsoinSpinoza1958,pp.99–105.15Spinoza1985,pp.12–16;Ethics,II,prop.40,schol.2.16Ethics,II,prop.35.17Ethics,I,appendix(Spinoza1985,pp.440–41),andbk.IIIgenerally.18HediscussesthesemattersinhisConductoftheUnderstanding,inThoughtsconcerningEducation,andinTheReasonablenessofChris-tianity,aswellasintheEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding,whichIcitefromLocke1975.19Essay,IV.xviii.20Essay,IV.xix.3.21Essay,IV.xx.3–5.22TheReasonablenessofChristianity(1695),inLocke1958,p.66.23SeeSpellman1988,andMarshall1994,whosecriticismsofSpellmanIfollow.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n350J.B.SCHNEEWIND24TheNaturalHistoryofReligion,III,inHume1993,p.140.ReferredtohereafterasHume.25Hume,p.153.26Hume,pp.159–60.27Hume,p.166.28Hume,p.179.29Hume,p.180.30Hume,p.185.31SeeBuckle2001forstrongdevelopmentofthispoint.32Holbach1990,vol.I,pp.11–12;referredtohereafterasHolbach.TheEnglishtranslationbySamuelWilkerson,1820,isnotfullyreliable.33Holbach,vol.I,p.360;cf.vol.I,p.12.34Holbach,vol.II,p.280.35Holbach,vol.II,p.24.36Holbach,vol.II,p.21.37Holbach,vol.II,p.61.38Holbach,vol.II,pp.178–82.39Holbach,vol.II,pp.372–75.40Condorcet1955,p.11;referredtohereafterasCordorcet.41Cordorcet,pp.17–18.42Cordorcet,p.36.43Cordorcet,p.45.44Cordorcet,p.71.45Cordorcet,pp.77–87.46Condorcet,163.47Ru¨digerBittnerraisesimportantquestionsonthispointin“WhatisEnlightenment?”reprintedinSchmidt1996,pp.345–58.Bittner’scriti-cismsofKanthelpedmetoreachtheinterpretationofferedhere.48Theletter,dated18December1784,istranslatedwithannotationsbyGarrettGreeninSchmidt1996,pp.145–53.TheGermantextisre-printedandgivendetailedcommentaryinBayer1976.IamgratefultoJamesSchmidtforpointingoutthesignificanceofHamann’sletterandforotheradvice.BittnerhasasharpparagraphcriticizingKantonthispointinSchmidt1996,p.346.49Andissotakenbye.g.GordonMichalsoninhisvaluablestudyFallenFreedom(1990),p.15.50OnAufkla¨rungasprocessratherthanashistoricalperiod,seetheessaybySchmidtreferredtoinn.3above.51Ges.Schr.,8.116,inKant1983,p.54.52IhaveslightlymodifiedAllenWood’stranslation,inKant1996b,tomakeitconformmoreliterallytothetext.53QuotedinBoyle2000,vol.II,p.162;alsoinMichalson1990,p.17.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nTowardenlightenment35154InthefirstCritique,Kantsaysthat“themoraldisposition,asacondi-tion,firstmakespartakinginhappinesspossible,ratherthantheprospectofhappinessfirstmakingpossiblethemoraldisposition”(A813–14/B841–42,Guyer–Woodtranslation).55Seee.g.RR,6.118–19;6.174–75;6.185andn.56Bohatec1966,p.507.57Ru¨digerBittnerraisedthisquestionincorrespondence.58MythankstoEckartFo¨rster,SeanGreenberg,DonRutherford,andRu¨digerBittnerforhelpfulsuggestionsandcomments.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nSHORTBIOGRAPHIESOFMAJOREARLYMODERNPHILOSOPHERS472618Thebiographiesthatfollowarearrangedinchronologicalorder.Foramorecomprehensivesurveyofauthorsandworks,thereaderisencouragedtoconsultthebiobibliographicalappendixtotheCambridgeHistoryofSeventeenth-CenturyPhilosophy(GarberandAyers1998),andtheRoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(availableonlineathttp://www.rep.routledge.com).MICHELDEMONTAIGNE(1533–1592),Frenchessayist,wasborninMontaigne,nearBordeaux.HewaseducatedathomeinLatin(hisfirstlanguage)andlaterstudiedlawattheUniversityofBordeaux.HeservedasacounselortotheBordeauxparliamentandasaroyalcourt-ier,beforeretiringtohiscountryestatein1571.There,duringaperiodofintensereflectionstimulatedbyhisstudyofancientskepticism,hebegantorecordthethoughtsthatwouldbecomehisfamousEssays(firsttwovolumes,1580;thirdvolume,1588).HelaterservedasmayorofBordeaux(1581–85)andwasinstrumentalinmaintainingpeacebetweenCatholicsandProtestantsduringtheFrenchwarsofreligion.LUISMOLINA(1536–1600),Jesuitphilosopherandtheologian,wasborninCuenca,Spain.HestudiedatSalamancaandAlcala´,beforeenteringtheSocietyofJesusin1553.HeisbestknownforhisattempttoreconciletheaccountsofdivinegraceandfreewillinCatholictheology.HeoutlinedthissolutioninConcordialiberiarbitriicumgratiaedonis,divinapræscientia,providentia,prædes-tinationeetreprobatione(“TheHarmonyofFreeChoicewiththeGiftsofGrace,DivineForeknowledge,Providence,PredestinationandReprobation”)(1588).PIERRECHARRON(1541–1603),philosopher,lawyer,andpriest,wasborninParisandeducatedattheSorbonne.Hewasaclose353CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n354ShortbiographiesaquaintanceofMontaigne,whomadehimhisadoptedsonandheir.HismostimportantworksareLestroisve´ritez(“TheThreeTruths”)(1593)andDelasagesse(“OnWisdom”)(1601;2nded.1604),whichreflectthecombinedinfluenceonhimofChristianPyrrhonismandStoicism.JUSTUSLIPSIUS(1547–1606),humanistscholarandChristianneo-Stoic,wasborninmodern-dayBelgiumandeducatedatCologneandLouvain.HeisbestknownforhiseffortstorevivethephilosophyoftheancientStoicsandtoadaptittotheconditionsofhisday,whichhedidbeginningwithDeconstantia(“OnConstancy”)(1584)andPoliticorumsivecivilisdoctrinaelibrisex(“SixBooksofPoliticsorCivilDoctrine”)(1589).ThesewerefollowedbytwosummariesofStoicteachings,Manuductioadstoicamphilosophiam(“GuidetoStoicPhilosophy”)andPhysiologiastoicorum(“PhysicalTheoryoftheStoics”)(both1604),andaneditionofSeneca’sphilosophicalworks(1605).FRANCISCOSUA´REZ(1548–1617),Jesuittheologian,philosopher,andjurist,wasborninGranada,SpainandenteredtheSocietyofJesusin1564.HetaughtatanumberofSpanishuniversitiesaswellasattheJesuitCollegioRomano.HisDisputationesmetaphysicae(“MetaphysicalDisputations”)(1597)areoftenseenasthelastgreatfloweringofscholasticphilosophy.Healsomadeimportantcontri-butionstothedevelopmentofnaturallawtheoryinhisTractatusdelegibus,acDeolegislatore(“ATreatiseonLawsandGodtheLawgiver”)(1612).FRANCISBACON(1561–1626),Englishlawyer,politician,andphilosopher,wasborninLondonandeducatedatTrinityCollege,Cambridge.Heenteredparliamentin1584andheldaseriesofincreasinglypowerfulgovernmentpositions,culminatinginhisappointmentasLordChancellorin1618.Threeyearslaterhewasforcedfromofficefollowinghisconvictionforbribery.Inphiloso-phyhewasatirelessadvocatefortheadvanceofknowledgethroughempiricalresearchguidedbyanewscientificmethod.HisviewsarelaidoutmostfullyinNewOrganon(1620).OtherworksincludeEssays(1597;3rded.1625),TheAdvancementofLearning(1605),Desapientiaveterum(“OntheWisdomoftheAncients”)(1609),andNewAtlantis(1624).GALILEOGALILEI(1564–1642),theforemostscientistofthefirsthalfoftheseventeenthcentury,wasbornandeducatedinPisa,CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nShortbiographies355Italy.HetaughtmathematicsthereandatPaduabeforehisappoint-mentaschiefphilosopherandmathematiciantothecourtofTuscanyin1610.HistelescopicobservationswerethebasisofhisSideriusnuncius(“TheStarryMessenger”)(1610);otherworksincludeTheAssayer(1623),DialogueconcerningtheTwoChiefWorldSystems,PtolemaicandCopernican(1632),andDiscoursesandMathematicalDemonstrationsrelatingtoTwoNewSciences(1638).In1633hewascalledtoRomeandforcedtoretracthisviews,afterwhichhewasconfinedunderhousearrestfortherestofhislife.HUGOGROTIUS(1583–1645),usuallyrecognizedasthefounderofmodernnaturallawtheory,wasborninDelft,Holland.EducatedinLeidenandinFrance,hewasactiveasajurist,historian,theologian,anddiplomat.Hisfirstmajorwork,Mareliberum(“TheFreeSea”)(1609),defendedhiscountry’srightofmaritimefreetrade.Hewasinvolvedinrepublicanpolitics,narrowlyescapingasentenceoflifeimprisonmentin1621,andineffortstoreunitetheProtestantandCatholicchurches.HismostfamousworksareDeiurebelliacpacis(“OntheLawofWarandPeace”)(1625)andDeveritatereligionischristianae(“OntheTruthoftheChristianReligion”)(1627).THOMASHOBBES(1588–1679),Englishphilosopherandpoliticaltheorist,wasborninMalmesbury,WiltshireandeducatedatOxford.DuringtheEnglishCivilWarhelivedinPariswherehewasamemberofthecircleofMersenne,whocommissionedfromhimthethirdObjectionstoDescartes’sMeditations(1641).HismostinfluentialworkisLeviathan(1651),inwhichhearguesforanidealofundividedsovereigntyandthesubjectionofreligiontocivilauthority.HeattemptedtogiveacomprehensiveaccountofhisphilosophyinthebooksDecive(“OntheCitizen”)(1642),Decorpore(“OnBody”)(1655),andDehomine(“OnMan”)(1658).LateinlifehewasinvolvedinacrimoniousdisputeswithJohnBramhall(onfreewill)andJohnWallis(ongeometry).MARINMERSENNE(1588–1648),Frenchcleric,mathematician,andnaturalphilosopher,wasborninOize´,MaineandeducatedatLaFle`cheandtheSorbonne.ThroughhisPariscircleandextensivecorrespondence,heplayedacriticalroleinfacilitatingcommuni-cationamongphilosophersduringthefirsthalfoftheseventeenthcentury.HewasalsoinstrumentalinsecuringthepublicationofDescartes’sworks,andcontributedtotheObjectionsappendedtoCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n356Shortbiographiesthelatter’sMeditations.HismostimportantworksincludeL’im-e´desde´istes(“TheImpietyofDeists”)(1624),Lave´rite´dessciences(“TheTruthoftheSciences”)(1625),andHarmonieuniverselle(“UniversalHarmony”)(1636–37).PIERREGASSENDI(1592–1655),Frenchastronomer,philosopher,andhumanist,wasborninProvenceandeducatedatDigneandAix.HisfirstbookwasaskepticalattackonAristotelianphilosophy,ExercitationesparadoxicaeadversusAristoteleos(“ParadoxicalEx-ercisesagainstAristotle”)(1624).Soonthereafterheembarkedonhislife’sprojectofrehabilitatingEpicureanisminaformcompatiblewithChristianity.TheresultswerepublishedintheposthumousSyntagmaphilosophicum(“PhilosophicalSystem”)(1658).AmonghisotherwritingsaretheFifthObjectionstoDescartes’sMedita-tions(1641),whichwerelaterpublishedwithDescartes’srepliesandGasssendi’sfurthercriticismsinDisquisitiometaphysica(“MetaphysicalDisquisition”)(1644).RENE´DESCARTES(1596–1650),oneofthemostinfluentialphil-osophersoftheearlymodernperiod,wasborninLaHaye,FranceandeducatedatLaFle`cheandPoitier.FollowingaperiodoftravelinthearmyofPrinceMauriceofNassau,hesettledinPariswherehejoinedthecircleofMersenne.In1630hemovedtoHolland,whereheremaineduntil1649,whenhetraveledtoSwedenattheinvita-tionofQueenChristina.HisprincipalworksareDiscourseontheMethod(1637),MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy(1641),PrinciplesofPhilosophy(1644),andThePassionsoftheSoul(1649).ImportantpartsofhisphilosophywerealsodevelopedincorrespondenceswithMersenne,PrincessElisabethofBohemia,andHenryMore.ANTOINEARNAULD(1612–1694),CartesianphilosopherandaleaderoftheCatholicJansenistmovement,wasborninParisandreceivedhisdoctorateintheologyin1641,thesameyearthathisFourthObjectionstoDescartes’sMeditationswerepublished.HewaspersecutedbythechurchandtheFrenchgovernmentforhistheologicalviews,whichledtohisexpulsionfromtheSorbonnein1656andsubsequentexileintheLowCountries.Hisbest-knownworksare(withClaudeLancelot)Grammairege´ne´raleetraisonne´e(“GeneralandRationalGrammar”)(1660),(withPierreNicole)Lalogique,oul’artdepenser(“Logic,ortheArtofThinking”)(1662),andaseriesofcritiquesofMalebranche’sphilosophy,beginningwithDesvraiesetdesfausseside´es(“OnTrueandFalseIdeas”)CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nShortbiographies357(1683).HealsoexchangedanimportantsetofletterswithLeibnizonthelatter’sDiscourseonMetaphysics.HENRYMORE(1614–1687),Englishphilosopherandtheologian,wasborninGrantham,Lincolnshire,andeducatedatEtonandChrist’sCollege,Cambridge,wherehesucceededtoafellowshipin1641.HewasoneofthefoundersofthephilosophicalschoolknownasCambridgePlatonism,whichaimedtounitethetheoret-icalinsightsofthenewsciencewithPlatonistandneo-Platonistdoctrines.HisworksincludeDemocritusplatonissans(1646),AnAntidoteagainstAtheisme(1653),Conjecturacabbalistica(1653),TheImmortalityoftheSoul(1659),andEnchiridionmetaphysicum(1671).RALPHCUDWORTH(1617–1688),Englishphilosopher,theolo-gian,andclassicalscholar,wasborninSomersetandspenthisentireacademiccareeratCambridge.WithHenryMore,hewasoneoftheprincipalarchitectsofCambridgePlatonism.Hismaster-work,TheTrueIntellectualSystemoftheUniverse,whereinAlltheReasonandPhilosophyofAtheismareConfuted,appearedin1678.Twootherimportantworkswerepublishedposthumously:ATreatiseconcerningEternalandImmutableMorality(1731),andATreatiseofFreeWill(1838).ELISABETHOFBOHEMIA(1618–1680),eldestdaughteroftheElectorPalatineandKingofBohemia,FrederickV(“theWinterKing”)andElizabethStuart,daughterofJamesIofEngland,wasraisedinSilesiaandHolland,followingherfather’slossofhisthroneattheBattleofWhiteMountain(1620).Althoughshedidnotauthoraphilosophicalworkofherown,in1643shebegananextensivecorrespondencewithDescartesonarangeoftopics,andwasthestimulusforhiscompositionofThePassionsoftheSoulandthefullerdevelopmentofhisethicaldoctrines.Inlaterlife,asabbessoftheProtestantconventofHerfordinWestphalia,shewasvisitedbyProtestantreformerssuchasWilliamPennandex-changedletterswithMalebrancheandpossiblyLeibniz.Inherphilosophicalinterests,shewasfollowedbyhersisterSophieandhernieceSophieCharlotte,wifeanddaughterrespectivelyoftheElectorofHanover,ErnstAugust,bothofwhomcarriedonlongcorrespondenceswithLeibniz.BLAISEPASCAL(1623–1662),Frenchmathematician,naturalphil-osopher,andspiritualwriter,wasborninClermont-FerrandandCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n358Shortbiographieseducatedathome.Earlyinhiscareer,hemetDescartesandcom-posedseveralscientificworks,includingATreatiseontheVoid(1651).In1654,amysticalexperienceintensifiedhisfaith,leadinghimtoretiretotheJansenistcommunityofPort-Royalin1655.TherehecomposedhisfamousProvincialLetters(1656–57)andthePense´es,begunin1658butpublishedonlyafterhisdeath.MARGARETCAVENDISH(1623–1673),Englishphilosopherandliteraryfigure,wasborninEssextoaprominentRoyalistfamily.FollowinghermarriagetoWilliamCavendish,firstDukeofNewcastle,in1645,shemadetheacquaintanceofmanyoftheleadingintellectualfiguresoftheday,includingDescartes,Mersenne,Gassendi,andHobbes,whohimselfservedintheemployoftheCavendishfamily.Throughthesecontactsshewasledtoavarietyofcriticalreflectionsonthenewscience,whichshepublishedinPhilo-sophicalandPhysicalOpinions(1655),PhilosophicalLetters:Or,ModestReflectionsuponSomeOpinionsinNaturalPhilosophy(1664),ObservationsuponExperimentalPhilosophy(1666),andGroundsofNaturalPhilosophy(1668).ROBERTBOYLE(1627–1691),naturalphilosopherandtheologian,wasborninLismore,Ireland,andeducatedatEton.Heisbestknownforhisanti-Aristotelianmechanismandcorpuscularianism,andforhisskillasanexperimentalist.AfoundingmemberoftheRoyalSociety,hismostsignificantworksareNewExperimentsPhysico-Mechanicall,TouchingtheSpringoftheAir(1660),TheScepticalChymist(1661),OrigineofFormesandQualities(1666),andExperi-ments,Notes&c.abouttheMechanicalOrigineorProductionofDiversParticularQualities(1675).HiswritingsinnaturaltheologyincludeSomeConsiderationsabouttheReconcileablenessofReasonandReligion(1675)andTheChristianVirtuoso(1690).ANNECONWAY(1631–1679),Englishmetaphysician,wasanau-todidactinLatin,Greek,philosophy,andtheology.ShewasclosetomanyoftheCambridgePlatonists,especiallyHenryMore,whohadbeentutortoherhalf-brother,John.Shearticulatedametaphysicalsysteminseveralnotebooks,publishedposthumouslyasPrinciplesoftheMostAncientandModernPhilosophy,concerningGod,Christ,andtheCreatures,viz.ofSpiritandMatterinGeneral(1692),andherideaswerecitedapprovinglybyLeibniz,amongothers.JOHNLOCKE(1632–1704),theleadingEnglishphilosopherofthesecondhalfoftheseventeenthcentury,wasborninSomersetandCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nShortbiographies359educatedatWestminsterandChristChurch,Oxford,wherehestudiedmedicinewithThomasSydenham.Inphilosophyhewasaproponentofempiricism,religioustoleration,andrepresentativegovernment.Duringthe1670sand1680shebecameactiveinWhigpoliticsthroughhisassociationwithAnthonyAshleyCooper,thethirdEarlofShaftesbury.In1683heleftEnglandforexileinHol-land.ReturningaftertheGloriousRevolution,hepublishedinquicksuccessionin1690ALetterconcerningToleration,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,andhismasterpieceEssayconcerningHumanUnderstanding(2ndreviseded.1694).ThesewerefollowedbySomeThoughtsconcerningEducation(1693),andTheReason-ablenessofChristianity(1695).SAMUELPUFENDORF(1632–1694),philosopher,legalscholar,andhistorian,wasborninSaxonyandeducatedatLeipzigandJena,wherehestudiedwithErhardWeigel,whoalsotaughtLeibniz.Inphilosophy,heisbestknownasanoriginalexponentofnaturallawtheory.HisfirstworkonthistopicwasElementorumjurispruden-tiaeuniversalislibriduo(“TwoBooksontheElementsofUniversalJurisprudence”)(1660).HismagnumopusisDejurenaturaeetgentium(“OntheLawofNatureandNations”)(1672),ofwhichanabridgmentappearedasDeofficiohominisetcivisjuxtalegemnaturalem(“OntheDutyofManandCitizenaccordingtoNaturalLaw”)(1673).BENEDICTDESPINOZA(1632–1677),Dutchphilosopher,wasborninAmsterdam;hereceivedatraditionalJewisheducationbutlatersoughtoutsideinstructioninnaturalphilosophy,includingthephilosophyofDescartes.HewasexpelledbytheJewishcommunityin1656,andthereaftersupportedhimselfasalensgrinder,whilelivinginseveralDutchtowns,ultimatelysettlinginTheHague.HisfirstpublicationwasacommentaryonDescartes’sPrinciplesin1663.HisgroundbreakingTheological-PoliticalTreatiseappearedanonymouslyin1670;theEthics,PoliticalTreatise,andTreatiseontheEmendationoftheIntellectwerepublishedimmediatelyfollowinghisdeath.NICOLASMALEBRANCHE(1638–1715),Frenchphilosopherandpriest,wasborninParisandeducatedattheSorbonne.HeenteredtheCongregationoftheOratoryin1660andwasordainedin1664.HewasstronglyattractedbythephilosophiesofAugustineandDescartes,fromwhichhedevelopedhistheoryof“visioninGod”CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n360Shortbiographiesandhisinfluentialversionofthedoctrineofoccasionalism(thatGodistheonlytruecauseofchangeinthecreatedworld).Heengagedindebateswith,amongothers,SimonFoucher,Arnauld,Leibniz,andPierreRe´gis.HismostfamousbookisTheSearchafterTruth(1674–75,plusfivefurthereditionsexpandedbymany“Elucidations”through1712).OtherworksincludeTreatiseonNatureandGrace(1680),TreatiseonEthics(1683),andDialoguesonMetaphysicsandReligion(1688).ISAACNEWTON(1642–1727),theforemostmathematicianandnaturalphilosopheroftheearlymodernperiod,wasborninLincolnshireandeducatedatTrinityCollege,Cambridge,wherehewasappointedLucasianProfessorofMathematicsin1669.In1696hebecamewardenoftheRoyalMint.HewasactiveintheaffairsoftheRoyalSociety,throughwhichaspresidenthepros-ecutedhisprotractedquarrelwithLeibnizovertheirrespectiveclaimstopriorityintheinventionofthecalculus.HismostfamousworkisPhilosophiaenaturalisprincipiamathematica(“Mathemat-icalPrinciplesofNaturalPhilosophy”)(1687;2nded.1713);othernotableworksincludeOpticks(1704)andUniversalArithmetic(1707).Onhisdeathhealsoleftavoluminouscollectionofunpub-lishedmanuscriptsontheology,scripturalinterpretation,andalchemy.GOTTFRIEDWILHELMLEIBNIZ(1646–1716),renownedasaphil-osopher,mathematician,legalscholar,andhistorian,wasborninLeipzig,andstudiedlawandphilosophythereandatAltdorf.Duringafour-yearstayinParis(1672–75)hediscoveredtheprinciplesofthedifferentialandintegralcalculus,whichhepublishedin1684.Throughcorrespondenceandpersonalcontacts,hewasacquaintedwithalmostalltheleadingintellectualfiguresoftheperiod.Inphilosophy,heisbestknownforthehypothesisofpreestablishedharmony,themetaphysicsofmonads,andthedoctrineofdivinejusticehecalled‘theodicy,’whichincludedtheassertionthatthisisthebestofallpossibleworlds.HismajorworksincludeDiscourseonMetaphysics(1686;pub.1846),NewSystemoftheNatureandCommunicationofSubstances(1695),NewEssaysonHumanUnderstanding(1704;pub.1765),EssaysonTheodicy(1710),andMonadology(1714;pub.1721).PIERREBAYLE(1647–1706)wasborninLeCarla,France,andthoughaCalvinist,waseducatedataJesuitcollegeinToulouseCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nShortbiographies361until1670,duringwhichtimehebrieflyconvertedtoCatholicism.HetaughtinGeneva,Paris,andSedanbeforebecomingaprofessorattheEcoleIllustreinRotterdamin1681.HeisbestknownforhisapplicationofPyrrhonianskepticismandhisadvocacyofreligioustoleration.HismostfamousworkisthemassiveHistoricalandCriticalDictionary(1697;2nded.,1702);othernotableworksin-cludePense´esdiversessurlacome`te(“DiverseThoughtsontheComet”)(1683)andCommentairephilosophiquesurcesparolesdeJe´sus-Christ‘Contrains-lesd’entrer’(“APhilosophicalCommen-taryontheWordsofJesusChrist,‘Compelthemtocomein’”)(1686).DAMARISMASHAM(1658–1708),Englishmoralist,wasthedaugh-terofRalphCudworthandadiscipleofJohnLocke,whoresidedatherhomeinOates,Essexfrom1691untilhisdeathin1704.HerpublishedworksareDiscourseconcerningtheLoveofGod(1696)andOccasionalThoughtsinReferencetoaVertuousorChristianLife(1705).ShealsoconductedanextensivecorrespondencewithLeibnizonmetaphysicaltopics.SAMUELCLARKE(1675–1729),theologiananddivine,wasborninNorwich,EnglandandeducatedatCambridgeUniversity.HeisbestknownforhisadvocacyofNewton’snaturalphilosophy,whichhedefendedinhisfamousexchangewithLeibnizin1715–16(pub.1717).Healsowasinvolvedinvarioustheologicaldisputes(onewithAnthonyCollins),inwhichhecriticizeddeviationsfromorthodoxy.TwosetsofsermonsdeliveredastheBoylelecturesin1703–4werepublishedasADemonstrationoftheBeingandAttri-butesofGod(1705)andADiscourseconcerningtheUnchangeableObligationsofNaturalReligion,andtheTruthandCertaintyoftheChristianReligion(1706).CHRISTIANWOLFF(1679–1754),Germanphilosopherandprofes-sor,wasborninBreslauinmodern-dayPoland,andeducatedattheuniversitiesofBreslau,Jena,andLeipzig.Inhisphilosophicalout-lookhewasstronglyinfluencedbyLeibniz,whosethoughtheattemptedtosystematizeanddevelop.HisfirstappointmentatHalleinPrussiaendedwithhisbanishmentin1723astheresultofaconflictwithPietisttheologians.DuringthistimehepublishedtheVernu¨nftigeGedanken(“RationalThoughts”),aseriesoftrea-tisescoveringalmosteverymajorareaofphilosophy(1712–25).HelatertaughtatMarburg,wherehereframedhisphilosophyinasetofCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n362ShortbiographiesLatintexts,beforereturningin1741toHalle,whereheremaineduntilhisdeath.GEORGEBERKELEY(1685–1753),philosopheranddivine,wasborninKilkenny,IrelandandeducatedatTrinityCollegeDublinfrom1700to1707.HewasintroducedbyJonathanSwifttoLondonsociety,wherehemetsuchnotablesasJosephAddisonandAlexanderPope.During1729–31heresidedinNewport,RhodeIsland,whereheattemptedtoadvancetheprojectoffoundingacollegeinBermuda.Heisbestknownforthedoctrineofimmaterialism(thatmatterhasnomind-independentexistence),whichhedefendedinATreatiseconcerningthePrinciplesofHumanKnowledge(1710)andThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous(1713);othernotableworksincludeAnEssaytowardsaNewTheoryofVision(1709),Demotu(1721),Alciphron,ortheMinutePhilosopher(1732),andSiris(1744).JOSEPHBUTLER(1692–1752),Englishphilosopher,theologian,anddivine,waseducatedatOxfordandordainedintheChurchofEnglandin1718.HispublicationsincludeFifteenSermonsPreachedattheRollsChapel(1726)andTheAnalogyofReligion,NaturalandRevealed,totheConstitutionandCourseofNature(1736),whichattackeddeistinterpretationsofreligion.Tothelatterwasappendedatreatiseonmoralphilosophy,OftheNatureofVirtue,inwhichhedefendedtheroleofconscienceastheauthori-tativebasisofmoraljudgment.FRANCISHUTCHESON(1694–1746),knownforhiscontributionstoethicsandaesthetics,wasborninIrelandandeducatedatGlasgowUniversity,whereheheldthechairofmoralphilosophyfrom1730untilhisdeath.HewasaleadingfigureoftheScottishEnlight-enment,alongwithReid,Hume,andSmith.HismostimportantworksareAnInquiryintotheOriginalofourIdeasofBeautyandVirtue(1725)andEssayontheNatureandConductofthePassionswithIllustrationsontheMoralSense(1728),inwhichheexplainedmoralityintermsofbenevolence,oranaturalinclinationtopromotethehappinessofothers.AcompilationofhislecturesappearedposthumouslyasASystemofMoralPhilosophy(1755).THOMASREID(1710–1796),theleadingmemberoftheScottish“commonsense”schoolofphilosophy,waseducatedattheUniver-sityofAberdeenandbecameaprofessortherein1752.Heisbestknownforhisdefenses(againstDescartes,Locke,andBerkeley)ofperceptualrealism,and(againstHume)offreewillasacausalpowerCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nShortbiographies363propertohumanbeings.HismajorworksareAnInquiryintotheHumanMindonthePrinciplesofCommonSense(1764),EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan(1785),andEssaysontheActivePowersofMan(1788).DAVIDHUME(1711–1776),apreeminentphilosopheroftheeighteenthcentury,wasborninEdinburghandeducatedattheuni-versitythere.Althoughhetwiceappliedforprofessorships,atEdinburghandGlasgow,heneverheldanacademicposition,beingdoggedbyhisreputationasanatheistandaskeptic.During1734–37heresidedinFrance,wherehecomposedATreatiseofHumanNature(1739–40),whichhefamouslydescribedas“fallingdead-bornfromthepress.”HelaterrecasthisphilosophyinthemoresuccessfulEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding(1748)andEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals(1751);othernotableworksincludeEssays,MoralandPolitical(1741–42),ANaturalHistoryofReligion(1757),andDialoguesconcerningNaturalReligion(publishedposthumouslyin1779).JEAN-JACQUESROUSSEAU(1712–1778),aleadingfigureamongtheFrenchEnlightenmentphilosophes,wasborninGenevaandwaslargelyself-educated.HisfirstmajorworkswereDiscourseontheArtsandSciences(1751)andDiscourseonInequality(1755),inwhichhearguedforthecorruptionofhumannaturebysociety.InTheSocialContract(1762),hedefendedaninfluentialmodelofthestateinwhichlawsbindthroughthe“generalwill,”assentedtobyallcitizens.OtherimportantworksincludeEmile(1762)andReveriesoftheSolitaryWalker(1776–78).ADAMSMITH(1723–1790),Scottishpoliticaleconomistandmoralphilosopher,studiedatGlasgowunderHutchesonandlaterbrieflyatOxford.HewasaclosefriendofHumeandlaterinlifemetmanyoftheleadingfiguresoftheFrenchEnlightenment.In1751hewasappointedprofessoroflogicatGlasgow,obtainingthechairofmoralphilosophytherethefollowingyear.HislecturesbecamethebasisforhisinfluentialTheoryofMoralSentiments(1759),whicharguedfortheroleofimaginativesympathyinmoraljudgment.Heisbestknownforhislandmarkcontributiontoeconomictheory,AnInquiryintotheNatureandCausesoftheWealthofNations(1776).IMMANUELKANT(1724–1804),withHume,themostdis-tinguishedphilosopheroftheeighteenthcentury,wasborninKo¨nigsberg,Prussia,wherehespenthisentirelife.HewasstronglyCambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n364ShortbiographiesinfluencedbyLeibnizandNewton,andisbestknownforhisattemptstoascertaintheconditionsandlimitsofhumanknow-ledge,andtodemonstratethevalidityofauniversalmorallawdictatedbyreasonalone.HismostimportantworksareCritiqueofPureReason(1781;2nded.1787),CritiqueofPracticalReason(1788),andCritiqueofthePowerofJudgment(1790);othernotableworksincludeGroundworkofaMetaphysicsofMorals(1785),ReligionwithintheLimitsofReasonAlone(1793),andTowardsPerpetualPeace(1795).CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nBIBLIOGRAPHY423414PRIMARYSOURCESAgricola,Rudolph(1992).Deinventionedialecticalibritres,ed.LotharMundt.Tu¨bingen:Niemeyer.Alembert,JeanLeRondd(1963).PreliminaryDiscoursetotheEncyclo-pediaofDiderot,trans.RichardN.SchwabandWalterE.Rex.Indian-apolis:Bobbs-Merrill.Althusius,Johannes(1995).Politica,trans.FrederickS.Carney.Indianapo-lis:LibertyFund.Aquinas,Thomas(1945).BasicWritingsofSaintThomasAquinas,ed.AntonC.Pegis.NewYork:RandomHouse.Arnauld,Antoine,andLancelot,Claude(1975).GeneralandRationalGrammar:ThePort-RoyalGrammar,trans.JacquesRieuxandBernardE.Rollin.TheHague:Mouton.Arnauld,Antoine,andNicole,Pierre(1996).Logic,ortheArtofThinking,ed.andtrans.J.V.Buroker.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Aubrey,John(1972).AubreysBriefLives,ed.OliverLawsonDick.Harmondsworth:Penguin.Bacon,Francis(185774).TheWorksofFrancisBacon,ed.J.Spedding,R.L.Ellis,andD.D.Heath(14vols.).London:Longmans.(1973).TheAdvancementofLearning,ed.G.W.Kitchin.London:Dent.(2000).TheNewOrganon,ed.LisaJardineandMichaelSilverthorne.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Balguy,John(1728).TheFoundationofMoralGoodness.London.Bayle,Pierre(1708).MiscellaneousReflections,OccasiondbytheComet.London.(1738).DictionaryHistoricalandCritical,trans.PierreDesmaizeaux.London.Repr.NewYork:Garland,1984.(1991).HistoricalandCriticalDictionary:Selections,trans.RichardH.Popkin.Indianapolis:Hackett.365CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\n366BibliographyBeeckman,Isaac(1939).JournaltenuparIsaacBeeckmande1604a`1634,ed.CornelisdeWaard.TheHague:Nijhoff.Berkeley,George(1712).PassiveObedience.London.(194857).TheWorksofGeorgeBerkeley,BishopofCloyne,ed.A.A.LuceandT.E.Jessop(9vols.).London:Nelson.(1975).PhilosophicalWorks,ed.M.R.Ayers.London:Dent.Bodin,Jean(1992).OnSovereignty,trans.J.H.Franklin.Cambridge:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress.Bo¨hme,Jakob(1956).Sa¨mtlicheSchrifte,ed.Will-ErichPeuckert(11vols.).Stuttgart:Frommann.(1963).DieUrschriften,ed.WernerBuddecke(2vols.).Stuttgart:From-mann.Boyle,Robert(1991).SelectedPhilosophicalPapers,ed.M.A.Stewart.In-dianapolis:Hackett.Buchanan,George(1964).TheArtandScienceofGovernmentamongtheScots,trans.D.H.MacNeill.Glasgow:MacLellan.Burton,Robert(198994).TheAnatomyofMelancholy,ed.ThomasC.Faulkner,NicolasK.Kiessling,andRhondaL.Blair(6vols.).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Butler,Joseph(1950).FiveSermonsPreachedattheRollsChapelandADissertationupontheNatureofVirtue,ed.StuartM.Brown.Indian-apolis:LibraryofLivingArts.Cavendish,Margaret(2001).ObservationsuponExperimentalPhilosophy,ed.EileenONeill.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Charleton,Walter(1674).ANaturalHistoryofthePassions.London.Clarke,Samuel(1705).ADemonstrationoftheBeingandAttributesofGod.London.(1706).ADiscourseconcerningtheUnchangeableObligationsofNat-uralReligionandtheTruthandCertaintyoftheChristianRevelation.London.(1738).TheWorksofSamuelClarke(4vols.).London:Knapton.Repr.NewYork:Garland,1978.Coeffeteau,Nicolas(1630).Tableaudespassionshumaines.Paris.Coimbra[CollegiumConimbricensis](1594).Commentariicollegiiconim-bricensis...inoctolibrosphysicorumAristotelis(2vols.in1).Coim-bra.Repr.Hildesheim:Olms,1984.Condorcet,Jean-Antoine-NicolasdeCaritat,Marquisde(1955).SketchforaHistoricalPictureoftheProgressoftheHumanMind,trans.JuneBarraclough.London:WeidenfeldandNicolson.Conway,Anne(1996).ThePrinciplesoftheMostAncientandModernPhilosophy,ed.AllisonP.Coudert.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.CambridgeCollectionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2007\nBibliography367Cudworth,Ralph(1678).TheTrueIntellectualSystemoftheUniverse(2vols.).London.Repr.inCudworth1978.(1970).ASermonPreachedbeforetheHouseofCommons,inC.A.Patrides(ed.),TheCambridgePlatonists.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.(1978).TheCollectedWorksofRalphCudworth.NewYork:Garland.(1996).ATreatiseconcerningEternalandImmutableMorality,withATreatiseofFreedom,ed.SarahHutton.Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress.Cumberland,Richard(1727).ATreatiseoftheLawsofNature,trans.JohnMaxwell.London.Descartes,Rene´(197486).uvresdeDescartes,ed.CharlesAdamandPaulTannery(11vols.).2nded.Paris:Vrin.(198491).ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,trans.JohnCotting-ham,RobertStoothoff,DugaldMurdoch,andAnthonyKenny(3vols.).Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Fe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