【剑桥哲学指南】中世纪哲学 391页

\n\n\n\n\na.s.mCgradeIntroductionThestudyofmedievalphilosophyisflourishing,aswitnesstheselectivebibliographyforthisbook.Andyet,fromsomephilo-sophicalviewpoints–analytic,continental,orscience-oriented–thesubjectofthisvolumecanstillseemremote.Whereontologyrecapit-ulatesphilology,orDaseinreplacesbeingandessence,ornaturalismneedsnoarguing,theimmersionofmedievalthinkersinquestionsabouteternity,God,andtheimmaterialityofintellectcanseemin-comprehensible,ifoccasionallyintriguing.ThisCompanionseekstoenhancefascinationwhilediminishingincomprehension.Thecon-tributorshopetobringreadersintomedievaldiscussionsasdirectlyaspossible,enablingthemtoappreciateforthemselvesthephilo-sophicalmotivesinstigatingthesediscussionsandtheboldness,sub-tlety,andanalyticrigorwithwhichtheywerecarriedon.Theaimistoexhibitthevarietyandfreshnessofmedievalapproachestoproblemsratherthantoevaluatesolutions.Thisisnottodenythattimelesstruthcanbefoundinthematerialpresented.Manystudentsofmedievalmetaphysicswouldholdthatthedisciplinehadenteredon“thesurepathofascience,”inKant’sphrase,severalcenturiesbe-foreKantrestricteditsscopetolayingbaretheconditionsofpossibleexperience(andwouldattributeKant’sdismissalofearliereffortsas“randomgroping”totypicalEnlightenmentignoranceofmedievalthought).Weareconvinced,however,thattheinsightsofmedievalphilosophyappearmostclearlyinthemidstofthediscussionsinwhichthemedievalsthemselvessoughtthem.Medievaltreatmentsofphilosophicalproblemsarenotasaruleeasytogetthrough.Ifthatwereso,therewouldbenoneedforthisvolume.Wehopetodemonstratethatthemedievaldiscussionsarewellworthgettinginto.1CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n2a.s.mCgradeentrypointsThestrangenessofmedievalphilosophyshouldnotbeexaggerated.Agreatdealofwhatispresentedherecanreadilybeengagedwithbyreadersinaphilosophicallycurrentframeofmind.Thisisdueingoodmeasuretothefactthatrecentphilosophyhascaughtupwithsomecharacteristicmedievalinterests.Herearesomeexam-ples.Thehighesteemnowenjoyedbymedievallogicrestspartlyonthebrillianceofscholasticsemanticsintreatingparadoxesofself-referenceandtheproblemsposedbyintentionalcontexts,“modern”topicstouchedoninJenniferAshworth’schapteronmedievallan-guageandlogic.Increasedsophisticationinthedisciplinesofhistoryandphilosophyofscienceletsusappreciatethesophisticationtobefoundinmedievalnaturalphilosophy.Eventhephysicsofangels,asEdithSyllashows,haspointsofinterestforthephilosophicallyscientificmind.ThankslargelytotheworkofDavidArmstrong,themedievalproblemofuniversalsnolongerseems“merely”me-dieval.Indeed,asGyulaKlima’sdiscussioninthisvolumemakesclear,thephilosophicalandtheologicalstakesinthisproblemareveryhigh,involvingthepossibilityofscienceandtheintelligibilityofdiscourseaboutGod.Theriseofinterdisciplinaryprogramsincog-nitivescienceandrecentcritiquesoftheCartesianepistemologicaltraditionmakecertainaspectsofmedievalphilosophicalpsychologymoreaccessiblenowthanformerly.Ontheotherhand,Descartes’snewlyaffirmedrelationtoAugustinemeansthattherearemedievalsourcesforCartesianaswellasnon-Cartesianideasofmindandself.RobertPasnau’schapteronhumannaturetakesadvantageofbothofthesemedieval–modernconnections.Therearesimilarpointsforengagementinmoralphilosophy.Inthelastfiftyyearsphilosophershavedisplayedsubstantialinterestinmoralpsychologyandvirtueethics,centralconcernsinBonnieKent’schapteronthemorallife.Medievalpoliticalthoughthasbe-comebothmoreintelligibleandmorerelevanttocurrentconcernsforanumberofreasons.Recentscholarshiphasledtogreateraware-nessoftheroleofmedievalthinkersinprovidingfoundationsformodernpoliticalthought.Conversely,widespreadcurrentcriticismofmodernsecularismandarecognitionthattheassumptionsofmodernityarebynomeansinevitableareclarifiedbyreflectiononcontrastingassumptionsinmedievalthought.ItisnotonlymedievalCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nIntroduction3politicalthoughtproper,aspresentedherebyAnnabelBrett,thathasgainedsignificance.Ourdebatestodayabout“modern”or“western”valuesaregivensharperpointbytheclaimsnowurgedforIslamictraditionand,inacriticalpartofourworld,fortraditionalJudaism.ThetensionsbetweenphilosophyandreligiousfaithinmedievalIslamicandJewishculture,treatedamongothertopicsbyTher´ese`DruartandIditDobbs-WeinsteinintheirchaptersonphilosophyinIslamandJewishphilosophy,thusprovideadditionalwaysintomedievalthoughtfromwherewestandtoday.1othernessInspiteofsuchpromisingpointsofentryasthepreceding,muchofmedievalphilosophyisapttoseeminaccessible,evenforthosewhoarepreparedtoapproachitsympathetically.Initsotherworldlinessitmayseemtohavebeenwritteninanotherworld,andonemaysus-pectthateventhepartsthatseemassimilablearenotentirelywhattheyseem.Thereisadistinctivelymedievalconceptionofeternity,forexample,asJohnMarenbon’sdiscussioninchapter2makesclear,anditistakenveryseriously.Again,theideaofhierarchypresentedinthesamechapterbyD.E.Luscombeisubiquitousinmedievalthought,orderingsocialclasses,thepowersofthesoul,andthean-gelsofheaven.Indevotingachaptertothesetwoideas,weresistthetemptationtofoldwhatis“other”inmedievalthoughtintowhatappearsfamiliar.Eventheapparentlyfamiliarhasaspectsofotherness,however.Oncemore,someexamples.ThescholasticdevelopmentofAris-totelianandStoicvirtueethicsplacestheclassicalvirtuesinaschemecrownedbythe“theological”virtuesoffaith,hope,andChristianloveofGodandneighbor.Medievaldiscussionsoffriend-ship,civichappiness,andthephilosophicallife,aspresentedinJamesMcEvoy’schapteronultimategoods,areofgreatinterest,yettheul-timateinterestofmostoftheauthorsconsideredisinbeatitude–notearthlyhappinessbuteternalbliss.TheAristotelianinspirationformedievalmetaphysicsisclear,butinthemedievalperiodthereisahugeexpansionofoftenveryconfidentdiscussionofadivinerealitydealtwithbyAristotlebrieflyandtentatively.Accordingly,StephenMenn’schapteronmetaphysicsinthisvolumeispredomi-nantlyconcernedwiththebeingofGod.SimilarobservationsoftheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n4a.s.mCgradeunfamiliarinthemidstofthefamiliarcouldbemaderegardingeachofthetopicsmentionedinprecedingparagraphs.Howisthismixtureofsamenessanddifferencetobeunderstood?Historyhelps.StevenMarrone’spresentationofmedievalphilos-ophyincontext(chapter1)showswhenandhowthemoreremoteandthemoremodern-seemingstrandsofmedievalthoughtaroseandcametobewoventogether.Therewereimportantchangesinatti-tudestowardphilosophyandintheverycharacterofphilosophyinitsmillennialmedievalcareer.VirtuallyallmedievalthinkerscarriedwiththemsomethingoftheclassicalGreekandRomanconceptionofphilosophyasawayoflife,butthestylesofthephilosophicallifevariedmarkedlyovercenturiesandmilieux.(Thisopeninghistoricalnarrativeprovidesfoodforthought,incidentally,onthetopicofa–possible?imminent?–“deathofphilosophy.”Themoralsuggestedbythemedievalexperienceisthatphilosophyindeedcandie,butthatithasatendencytorisefromthedead.)Thefinalsectionofchapter1,onthesourcesandgenresofmedievalphilosophicalwrit-ing,providesfurtherreferencepoints.Inthissection,theplaceofauthorityinmedievalthoughtisbrieflydiscussed,theavailabilityofclassicalphilosophicaltextsindifferentplacesandtimesinthemedievalworldischarted,andanaccountisgivenoftheformsinwhichphilosophywaspublished,formsoftenunfamiliartothemod-ernreader:Sentencecommentaries,summas,quodlibeta,disputedquestions,sophismata,andthelike.whatismedievalphilosophy?Tospeakofhistoricalchangesinthecharacterofphilosophypromptssomenonhistoricalquestions,however.Givensuchchanges,wemaywellask:ismedievalphilosophyinanysensethesameasphiloso-phyasweknowit?Ifnot,whatisit,andshouldwereallycallitphilosophyatall?Ananswer(preliminarytotheonethisCompan-ionasawholeprovides)canbegivenbywayofanideajustreferredto,theclassicalideaofphilosophyasawayoflife.Ifvirtuallyallmedievalthinkerscarriedsomethingofthisideawiththem,fewregardedthemselvesas“philosophers”inwhatwemightthinkof,withoutdefiningitprecisely,astheclassicalormodernsenseoftheterm.ItwillbeusefultoelicitthedifferencebetweenmedievalphilosophicalwaysoflifeandphilosophyinthisothersensebyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nIntroduction5stages.Augustine,themostinfluentialthinkerintheWestinourperiodandacasestudyintensionsalsofeltinIslamicandJewishthought,willserveasaleadingexample.ThecourseofAugustine’slifewassetbyhisreadingofCicero’slostdialogueHortensius.Hesaysthatthistextinflamedhimwithadesirefor“wisdom.”WhathethoughthimselftobedoinginhisbettermomentsformorethantwentyyearsafterreadingCicerowaspursuingwisdom.Sofarsogood.Thequestforwisdominsomesenseidentifiesthephilosopherevennow,andthisquestmustshapethephilosopher’slifeinatleastsomerespects,ifonlyinthechoiceofconversationstojoin.Augustine’squestcarriedhimthroughanumberofintellectualpositions,includingManichaeandualism,skepticism,andNeoplatonism,towhathesometimescalled“ourphilosophy,”agenuine“understanding,”ashesawit,ofreality,truth,andthegood,ashareofthewisdomhehadbeenafterandwhichphilosophershadbeenseekingoverthecenturies.Again,sofarsogood.Ifwethinkofphilosophyasthequestforwisdom,aphilosopherassomeoneengagedinsuchaquest,andaphilosophyaswhatsuchaseekerarrivesat,Augustinemustberegardedasaphilosopher,andtheunderstandingheachievedmustberegardedasaphilosophy.Insettingout“ourphilosophy,”however,Augustinesometimescharacterizes“thephilosophers”asantagonistsor,atbest,neces-sarilyunsuccessfulaspirantstothewisdomhehadfound.ForwhatAugustinemeansby“ourphilosophy”isaspecificallyChristianun-derstandingofthings,anunderstandingpossibleonlythroughfaith.“Unlessyoubelieveyoushallnotunderstand”(Isaiah7:9)becamethemottoforawholetraditionof“faithseekingunderstanding”whichdefinedthequestforwisdomintheLatinWestfromAu-gustinethroughAnselmandbeyond.“Thephilosophers”Augustinecharacterizedasadversarieslackedfaith.Thus,forhim,philosophyasengagedinbyphilosopherswasnecessarilyabortiveandhencenotthebestexampleofwhatphilosophyoughttobe.2Hereiswherewerunupagainstamorefamiliarconceptionofphi-losophy.Farfromthinkingthatsuccessinphilosophyisimpossiblewithoutreligiousfaith,amodernreadermayassumethecontrary:thatphilosophyisdefinedbynotproceedingonthebasisoffaith.Philosophy,itiscommonlythought,proceedswithinthelimits,oronthebasis,orbythelight,of“reasonalone.”ThisdoesnotCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n6a.s.mCgradeprecludethesameperson’shavingfaithanddoingphilosophy,butitdoesentailthatphilosophizingandbelievingaredistinctactivi-ties.Fromthispointofview,thefactthatAugustinemakesnosuchdistinctionrendershimasuspiciouscharacter.Heisapttoseemrhetoricallyproselytizingwhereatruephilosopheroughttobedis-interestedlyrational.Thedifficultyshouldnotbeexaggerated.OnecanalwaysgatherfromthinkersinAugustine’straditionanythingthatseemsinterest-ingfromadifferentperspective.Augustine’sconceptionofthemindasatrinityofmemory,understanding,andwill,eachinitsownway“comprehending”theothers,mightstimulateusefulthoughtquiteapartfromAugustine’sownuseofthisanalysistogainunderstandingofChristianbeliefinGodastriune.Thesamecouldbesaidofothertrinitiesinmedievalthought.Likewise,Augustine’stheoryoflan-guageasinvolvinganinner,mentalwordwasforhimawaytotietheunderstandingofspokenandwrittensignstodivineillumination.EvenintheMiddleAges,however,thistheorywasdevelopedinwaysfreeofspecifictheologicalimport.ItshouldalsoberememberedthatAugustine’sprojectwasfaithseekingunderstanding.Thismeansthattheresultsofhisquestforwisdomcanoftenbeformulatedinsystematicallyrelatedpropositionsthatcanbeexaminedforthevirtueofconsistencyandmighthaveother“purelyphilosophical”virtuesaswell.Accommodationofmedievalphilosophytoa“reasonalone”viewofthedisciplineisstilleasierforthelatterpartofourperiod.Thisisbecausethepurelyreasonableviewisnotinfactdistinctivelyclassicalormodern.Itisactuallyamedievalconception,enshrinedmostfamouslyinthefirstquaestioofThomasAquinas’sSummatheologiae.ThereThomasseekstodeterminetherelationofthe-ology(sacradoctrina)to“thephilosophicaldisciplines.”Thelineofdemarcationheproposesissetpreciselyatwhatcanbediscov-eredby“reason”(“humanreason”or“naturalreason”).Thisisphi-losophy(includingthenaturalsciences).Sacreddoctrinemayusethemethodsandresultsofphilosophy,butitsownfoundationsaretruthsdisclosedbyGodin“supernatural”revelation.ForAquinas,then,andforthemajorityoflatemedievalthinkersintheLatinWest,thereisacleardistinctionbetweenphilosophyandtheol-ogythatusuallyallowsustomarkoffphilosophicalideasfromtherestoftheirthoughtonabasistheythemselveshaveprovided,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nIntroduction7onethatseemstosquare,furthermore,withmodernviewsofthesubject.InthisCompanionwewilltakeadvantageofbothpathsofaccom-modationjustsketched.Thatis,wewilloftenattempttoextractmaterialofindependentphilosophicalinterestfromAugustinianfaith-basedthought,andinpresentingtheideasofthinkerswhodis-tinguishedbetweenphilosophyasreasonandtheologyasrevelationwewillfocusprimarilyonwhattheauthorswouldthemselvestaketobephilosophical.Itwould,however,beadisservicetophiloso-phyinanysenseofthetermtofollowsuchpoliciestoorigidly.Therelationshipofphilosophytobiblicalorqur’anicreligionistooper-vasiveathemeinmedievalthoughtandtoofruitfulastimulustoself-awarenessinitscontrastwithtypicalmodernassumptionstobemutedintheinterestofquickaccessfromthedirectionofcur-rentphilosophy.Accordingly,insteadofattemptingtodealwiththeinteractionsofreligionandphilosophyinasinglechapter(“FaithandReason,”say),wewillconsiderthemindifferentchaptersastheyoccurindifferentcontexts.Forexample,medievalunderstand-ingofGod’screationoftheuniverseexnihilowillbediscussedalongwithmedievalunderstandingofnaturalprocesses.Centralconceptsinmoralphilosophy,suchasvirtueandvice,willbediscussedalongwithrelatedtheologicalconcepts,suchasmeritandsin.Moregener-ally,whenweextractelementsofindependentphilosophicalinterestfromtextsinspiredbyfaithseekingunderstanding(orbyaninterestinusingphilosophytoprovide“preamblestofaith,”asinAquinas),wedosowithoutprejudicetothereligiousprojectsinwhichtheme-dievalauthorsofourtextswereengaged.Inthisvolume,Augustinecountsasaphilosophernotonlyforwhathesaysthatmayseemrea-sonableapartfromfaith,butalsoforhispursuitofintelligibilityinChristianbelieving.ThesameinclusiveprincipleappliestoIslamicandJewishthinkersaswellastoAugustine’swesternsuccessors.goingfurtherIhavebeenarguingthatmedievalphilosophyisworthstudyingbothforwhatisorseemsfamiliarinitandforwhatthereisinitoraboutitthatdiffersfromphilosophyasusuallypracticedtoday.Ifthesucceedingchaptersconfirmthisdoubleclaim,readerswillwishtopursuethesubjectfurther.TheconcludingpartsofthevolumewillCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n8a.s.mCgradehelpthemdoso.Forpurposesoforientation,P.J.FitzPatrickandJohnHaldaneshowinchapter13,onthepresenceofmedievalphilosophyinlaterthought,howmedievalphilosophyitselfhasgonefurther,indicatingsomeofthemedievalelementsinRenaissanceandearlymodernphilosophyandsketchingthepresentstateofscholarlyin-terestinoursubject.ThomasWilliamsthendiscussestheproblemsoftransmissionandtranslationthatmustbetakenintoaccountinanyongoingengagementwiththeepochofphilosophyintroducedhere.Afurtheraidtogoingfurtheristhebibliography.Referencestomajortextsandstudiesinthebodyofthevolumeandinthesectionofbriefbiographiesofmajorthinkersarekeyedtoworkslistedinthebibliography,whichalsoincludesotherresources.afinalimage:medievalphilosophyandfreedomPerhapsthebestsinglerepresentationofmedievalphilosophyasawholeisBoethius’simageofphilosophyasabeautifulwomanof-feringfreedomofintellectandspiritineventhemostmiserableofcircumstances.Thepictureisdrawn,infivebooksofsuperbproseandpoetry,inTheConsolationofPhilosophy.Imprisonedintheearlysixthcenturyonchargesoftreasonagainstakinginwhosead-ministrationhehadheldthehighestposts,Boethiuswassickwithgrief,when,ashetellsus,philosophyappearedtohim,chidedhimforplacinghishappinessinthingssubjecttothevicissitudesoffor-tune,andshowedhimthattruehappinessistobefoundinGod,thesupremeGoodandprovidentialruleroftheuniverse.Thereli-giousvisionanimatingthisandmuchothermedievalphilosophydidnotpreclude–insomecasesitevendemanded–rigorouslyseculartreatmentofsecularsubjects.Furthermore,therewasnotuniversalagreementonthecapacityofphilosophytoproducetheliberatingresultswefindinBoethius,andthereareevenmedievalmaterialsforthecritiqueofreligionasmythandtherejectionofreligiousinsti-tutionsascorrupt.TheseriousconsiderationofmorehopefulviewsintheMiddleAgeswasitselfakindofliberation,however,andthismindsetarguablyheightenedthequalityofthoughtineveryareaofphilosophy.Thisframeworkforthemedievalpursuitofwisdomisoneimportantreasonamongotherswhymedievalphilosophycanbepresentedinthisvolumeasapotentiallyliberatingresourceforthereader’sownpursuitofwisdom,whereverthatpursuitmaylead.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nIntroduction9notes1.AfewchapterselsewhereinthevolumeareconcernedexclusivelywiththeLatinWest,butreferencestoMuslimandJewishphilosophyinotherchapters,especiallyinchapter6,givesomeimpressionoftheintercul-turalscopeofmedievalphilosophy.Furthercomparativeworkisneeded.2.ForamorenuancedaccountoffaithseekingunderstandingasAugustine’scharterforChristianphilosophythanIhavegiven,seeN.Kretzmann[71].AlsoseeE.Gilson[68]25–111andC.N.Cochrane[398]399–455.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nstevenp.marrone1MedievalphilosophyincontextWhatwasitliketodophilosophyintheMiddleAges?InthischapterIwilltrytoanswerthatquestionbylookingatrelevantsociopoliticalandeconomiccircumstances,specificinstitutionalsettingsforprac-ticingphilosophy,andseveralcompetingorcooperatingintellectualcurrents.Attheendofthechapter,Iwillsaysomethingabouttheplaceofauthorityinmedievalthought,thephilosophicalsourcesavailabletomedievalthinkersatdifferentpointsintheperiod,andtheliterarygenresintowhichtheyputtheirownideas.Briefly,thestoryrunsasfollows.WhatweknowasmedievalphilosophyemergedinthelateRomanEmpirefromasurprisinglycompletemutualaccommodationofChristianbeliefandclassicalthought.ItthenpassedthroughcenturiesofdormancyintheWest,whileatthesametimeitbeganafreshintheIslamicworld.IntheeleventhandtwelfthcenturiesphilosophyreemergedinanewEurope,inalteredformandagainstresistance.Then,bothaugmentedandchallengedbytheworkofIslamicandJewishthinkers,itenjoyedinthethirteenthcenturyagoldenageofsystematicanalysisandspeculationcorrespondingtoanewdegreeofrationalizationinpoli-ticsandsociety.Andfinally?Thesignificanceoffourteenth-centurythoughtremainscontested,despitesubstantialrecentscholarshipdemonstratingitsbrilliance.Asmynarrativeends,therefore,readerswillneedtomovefromcontexttocontent,acquaintingthemselvesinsucceedingchapterswiththeideasandargumentsonwhichtheirownassessmentofmedievalphilosophy,notjustthefourteenthcen-tury,mustdepend.Beforebeginning,weshouldnoticeanobviousbutimportantfact.Medievalthinkersdidnotknowthattheyweremedieval.Theex-pression“MiddleAge”(Latinmediumaevum;thencemedievalis,10CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext11“medieval”)wasfirstusedtodesignatetheperiodbetweenthe“ancient”and“modern”worldsintheseventeenthcentury.InlaterhistoricalwritingandpopularconsciousnessaradicaloppositionisoftenpositedbetweentheMiddleAges(or“DarkAges”)andtheini-tialphaseofthemoderneracalled,sincethenineteenthcentury,theRenaissance.Asweshallsee,eventheleastphilosophicalofmedievalcenturieswerenotwhollybenighted,andtherelationsbetweenmedievalandRenaissancethoughtareagooddealmorecomplexthanissuggestedbydepictionsofthelatterasarevolution-aryenlightenment.emergenceofmedievalphilosophyinthelateromanempireTheemergenceofmedievalphilosophylookssurprisingnotonlyfroma“reasonalone”viewofphilosophybutalsoinlightofapolemicofoppositionbetweenChristianityandphilosophydat-ingbacktoSt.Paul’sdisparagementof“thewisdomoftheworld”(specifically,thewisdomsoughtbyGreeks)andhiswarningagainst“philosophyandemptydeceit”(1Corinthians1:20–24,Colossians2:8).ItwasanincompatibilitythattheearlynorthAfricanapologistTertullian(c.160–c.230)celebratedasabsolute.Histauntingques-tion“WhathasAthenstodowithJerusalem?”wasachallengetothecognitivecommitmentsofhisphilosophicallymindedcontem-poraries(OnPrescriptionAgainstHeretics7[428]8–10).Iftodaywethinkofphilosophyasrequiringcompleteinsulationfromtheengagementsofreligiousbelief,wecanimagineourselvesasdis-playingthesameattitudeinreverse.Buthistoricallyspeaking,Tertullian’sconceptionofadividinglinebetweenreligionandphilosophywasoddmanout.Indeed,whenPaulhimselfwasactuallyconfrontedwithphilosophersatthehilloftheAreopagusinAthens,hetookaconciliatoryline,notingagreementbetweenhisownpreachingandtheversesofaStoicpoet(Acts17:28).IntheancientMediterraneanworld,philosophydidnotconsistofar-canereflectiononthenatureofwhatcanbeknownorthevalueofwhatmustbedone,abstractedfromtheday-to-daybusinessoflivinginsociety.Itcalledinsteadfortheengagementofthewholepersoninstrivingtoknowtruthandtodogood.Forphilosophersthemselvesitamountedtoanall-absorbingwayoflife.1Indeed,bythesecondCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n12stevenp.marroneandthirdcenturiesce,philosophy,aspracticedbyStoics,Platonists,andEpicureans,andChristianity,asprofessedamongeducatedGreekandRomanconverts,werebeginningtolookverymuchalike.Philosophyhadcome,inE.R.Dodds’swords,“increasinglytomeanthequestforGod.”2Insuchaworld,itwaseasyforapersonlikeJustin(d.163/67),searchingamongthephilosophersforananswertotheriddleoflife,toendupaChristian,andultimatelyamar-tyr.Asanapologistforhisfaithhecontinuedtowearthephiloso-pher’sdistinctivegarbandadvertisedChristianityasphilosophyinthefullestsenseoftheword(DialoguewithTrypho8[411]198b).Therewas,tobesure,aliteratureofcontroversypittingChristianagainstpaganthinker,butthesometimesbittertoneofthiswrit-ingwaspartlyduetothefactthattheantagonistswerefightingovercommonintellectualground.Thethird-centuryChristianwrit-ersandteachersClementofAlexandriaandhispupil,Origen,andtheirpagancounterpartsPlotinusandhisdisciple,Porphyry,spokethesamephilosophicallanguage,drewfromthesingleconceptualreservoirofemergentNeoplatonism,andeventraveledinthesamecircles.3Medievalphilosophywasborninpreciselythisintellectualset-ting.Notbycoincidence,thesewerealsothecircumstancesunderwhichChristianitycametobetheofficialreligionoftheRomanEmpire.ItisindeedonlyaslightexaggerationtocharacterizethelegalconversioninitiatedintheearlyfourthcenturybytheemperorConstantineasanepiphenomenonarisingoutofthismoregeneralculturalmilieu.ThewayhadalreadybeenpreparedbythespreadofJewishcommunitiesandtheirreligionthroughouttheMediter-ranean,withacorrespondingHellenizationofJewishthoughtfromacquaintancewithGreekphilosophicalideas.Bythethirdcenturyacommoncurrencyoflearneddiscourseflourishedamongtheelite–pagan,Jewish,andChristian.Constantine’scontributionwassimplytomaketheChristianvariantofthisdiscoursethedominantone,eventuallyoppressivelyso,fromthefourthcenturyon.Butthecon-ceptualapparatus,intellectualinclinations,andinterpretativetoolsthatwereusedinthecourseofthisprocesswereneitherspecificallyChristiannorverynew.Inotherwords,theconversionsimplyen-suredthatthephilosophizingofChristianthinkingpreviouslyunder-wayshouldcontinueapaceandcometotypifythecultureoflearninginlateRome.Itlikewiseinauguratedthefirstofthreephasesinthecareerofmedievalphilosophy.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext13ThestyleofthinkingcharacteristicofthisphaseisexemplifiedinAugustine,theLatinrhetoricianturnedChristianphilosopherandlaterbishopofHippoinnorthAfricauntilhisdeathin430.Persuaded,ashelaterexplainedinhisConfessions,byCicero’s“exhortationtophilosophy”thathemustforsakehislifeofvanityandpromiscuityanddevotehimselftotheinternalquestdemandedbytheloveofwisdom,hesetoutonapathleadingbywayofknowl-edge“upwards[away]fromearthlydelights”toGod(ConfessionsIII4[59]).Here,acrucialdirection-settingrolefellto“somebooksofthePlatoniststranslatedfromGreekintoLatin,”almostcertainlyworksoftheNeoplatonistsPlotinusandpossiblyPorphyry.ThesewritingsledAugustinetotheconvictionthattheuniverseemergedfromandinevitablytendedbacktowardauniqueprincipleofgoodthatisitselfGod,arealityshiningabove,yetstillwithin,eachofusastheeternallightoftruth(VII9–10).4InAugustine’seyes,thefurtherstepfromNeoplatonismtoChristianitywasnatural,almostinevitable.“NowthatIhadreadthebooksofthePlatonistsandhadbeensetbythemtowardthesearchforatruththatisincorporeal...IseizedgreedilyupontheadorablewritingofYourSpirit,andespe-ciallyupontheapostlePaul”(VII20–21).Fromthispointofview,Paul’swordstotheAtheniansattheAreopaguswereplainlyanex-hortationtocontinueintheirchosenwayoflifetotheperfectionoftruthandrightbehaviorlaidbareinChristianity(VII9,referringtoActs17:28).Thephilosopher’spursuitofwisdomwasthereforenotjustcompatiblewithChristianteaching.Itwasreceived,raisedsublime,andrenderedfullyrealizablethroughGod’srevelationandgraceinChrist.ChristianintellectualsofAugustine’sdaythushadnodoubtthattheywerefollowingthephilosopher’sway.Accordingly,theyincor-poratedasmuchastheycouldoftheclassicalphilosophicalheritage,bothhabitsofmindandconceptualcontent,intotheirpatternsofdiscourseandwayoflife.StoicismandNeoplatonism,theAntiqueschoolsthatappearedmostsupportiveofpreviousChristianintel-lectualandpracticalcommitments,weretakenovervirtuallyintactintoChristianspeculativeandmoralschemes.Forexample,Augus-tine’smentor,thelearnedandsociallyeminentbishopAmbroseofMilan,followedCicero’sOnDutiesinwritinghisguidetothecon-siderablesecularaswellasreligiousdutiesofabishop.AugustinehimselfexploredthepsychologicalandtheologicalimplicationsofNeoplatonictheoriesofemanationinhistreatiseTheTrinity.AndCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n14stevenp.marroneinoneofthemostprominentindicatorsofChristianaspirationtoinheritthemantleofGraeco-Romanhigherstudies,helaboredduringthelastfifteenyearsofhislifetoproduceinhismasterpiece,TheCityofGod,proofthatChristianitycouldcompeteonequaltermswiththebestthatpaganeruditionhadtooffer.5TheimmediatestimulusforAugustine’shistoricalandtranshis-toricalaccountofthehumanconditioninTheCityofGodwastheaccusationthatabandonmentoftheoldgodsofpaganismwasrespon-sibleforthesackofRomebytheVisigothsin410.WhenAugustinedied,theVandalswereatthegatesofHippo.Fromtheearlyfifthcenturythewesternpartsoftheempire–modernItalyandLibyatotheAtlantic–wereincreasinglybroughtundermilitarycontrolofbarbarian,largelyGermanic,armies,thosegroupsofsoldiersandtheirfamiliesreferredtointextbooksastribes.SuchTeutonicin-terlopersestablishedtheirpoliticalpreeminenceinwhatRomanstaughtthemtocallkingdoms.Theiroverlordshipdidnot,however,drasticallyreducetheinfluenceofRomanelitesordiminishtheim-portanceofLatincultureandLatinlearningamongtherulingclasses.Intheearlysixth-centuryOstrogothickingdomofItaly,forexample,LatinhighcultureshoneasbrilliantlyasatanypointsinceCicero.Inthissetting,officialpatronageofphilosophicalstudiesledtoanemphasisonthepurelyspeculativeortheoreticalthatwentbeyondAugustineandAmbrose.TheprominentsenatorBoethius,RomanconsulandadvisertotheOstrogothickingTheodoric,undertookacompletetranslationofandcommentaryontheworksofPlatoandAristotle,inthehopeofbringingLatinphilosophicaldiscoursetoalevelofsophisticationhithertofoundonlyinGreek.Hisexecutionin525onchargesoftreasonpreventedhimfromadvancingbeyondthelogicalworksmakingupAristotle’sOrganon.Besidestheseexeget-icalwritings,however,BoethiusalsoleftbehindabrilliantepitomeofGreekwisdom,TheConsolationofPhilosophy,andafewshorttreatisesinwhichheappliedphilosophicalanalysistoquestionsoftheology.ThisbodyofworkestablishedalexiconofLatinequiva-lentsforGreektermsandconceptsuponwhichmedievalphilosophywoulddrawforanotherthousandyears.Cassiodorus,aRomanofevenhighersocialstandingandsimilarlyadviserattheOstrogothiccourt,managedalesstechnicallyprodigiousbutperhapsequallyin-fluentialfeat.HisInstitutesofDivineandSecularLettersoffersasyllabusforChristianeducationinwhichthecanonofrhetoricalandphilosophicalclassicscontinuedtoplayamajorrole.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext15IntheGreek-speakingorbitoftheeasternRomanEmpire,itwastheotherworldlycharacteroflateAntiquephilosophywhichcametotheforeinthelatefifthandsixthcenturies.TheElementsofThe-ology,writtenbytheNeoplatonistProclus,headoftheAcademyfoundedbyPlatoinAthens,isanimportantexample.AmongChristians,thesamemysticaltendency,perhapsintensifiedbycon-tactwiththeangelologyofHellenizedJewishliteratureoncontem-platingthedivine,appearsinaseriesofshorttreatisesonsubjectssuchasthedivinenamesandthecelestialhierarchywritteninSyriaorPalestine.AuthoredbysomeoneplainlybeguiledbyProclus’sideas,theseworkscirculatedunderthenameofDionysius,men-tionedinActs17:34asoneofthoseancientpagansPaulconfrontedattheAreopaguswhowasconvertedbytheapostle’swords.Undersoaugustanimprimatur,theworksofPseudo-DionysiusrosetoapositionofgreatprominenceinsubsequentChristiantraditionsofNeoplatonizingmysticaltheoryandpractice.6TheearlycenturiesfollowingtheconversionoftheRomanEmpirethuswitnessedthematurationofacurrentofChristianspecula-tioningreatpartcontinuouswithlateAntiquepatternsofthoughtthateitherprecededtheconversionorwereevidentafteritoutsideChristiancircles.Consequently,thisfirstphaseofmedievalphilos-ophyrespondedtosomeoftheconcernsofphilosophyaspracticedtoday.Wecanplotitalongahistoricaltrajectoryconnectingthephi-losophyofclassicalGreecewiththatofthemodernworld.Thesituationchangeddramaticallyfromthelatesixthcenturyon.AfterBoethiusandCassiodorus,educateddiscourseinthewest-ernpartoftheempirebecamelesshospitabletothekindofreflec-tioninvolvedinAugustine’svisionofChristianlifeasthesuccessfulcompletionofthephilosopher’squestforwisdom.GlimpsesoftheearliertraditionarefoundinSpain,politicallysubjectatthetimetokingdomsoftheGermanicVisigoths.WorkcontinuedthereintheLatinencyclopedictradition,intowhichmuchofGreekspecu-lationhadbeenpouredinthecenturiesofRome’sgreatness.MostrenownedinourperiodaretheEtymologiesofIsidore,bishopofSeville.ElsewhereintheWest,attentionwasdevotedincreasinglyonlytonarrative,affective,andpracticalends.Evenwritingonsolelyreligioussubjectsbecamelesstheological,inthesenseofbeinglessengagedinthesystematicexaminationandexplorationofdoctrines,andmoredevotionalandinspirational.Intheeasternpartoftheem-pire,theEmperorJustinianiscommonlyassumedtohaveclosedtheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n16stevenp.marroneschoolsofphilosophyinAthensin529.Ifthereactuallywassuchaclosure(theargumenthasbeenmadethatpaganphilosopherscon-tinuedtoattractstudentsinAthensafterJustinian),itshouldnotbethoughtofasdeliveringthedeathblowtoGraeco-Romanphilo-sophicalthought.7Alreadyhere,too,“philosophy”eveninChristianform,aspromotedfromJustintoBoethius,washardlyatthecenteroflearnedattentionanylonger.monasticdisciplineandscholarshipThisbringsustothesecondpartofourstory,whichrunstothemid-dleoftheeleventhcenturyandfocusesontheWest.FromtheendofthesixthcenturythewesternhalfoftheMediterraneanworldsuf-feredaseriesofprofoundeconomicanddemographicshocks,whichdrewitfurtherandfurtheraway,commercially,politicallyand,fi-nally,culturally,fromthestillvitalcentersofRomanempireandeconomyintheGreek-speakingEast.8WhatfollowedwasnottheextinctionoftheclassicalLatinlearningthathadnourishedthefirstphaseofmedievalphilosophy,butanarrowingoffocusandaredi-rectingofinterest.AlreadysincethefifthcenturyinGaul,thesixthinItaly,publicschoolsofLatinityandliteraturehaddisappeared.ProminentRomans,andGermanswhoaspiredtoeminence,learnedtheirlettersinthehome,perhapswithaprivatetutor.Theseweretheindividualswhocarriedonwhatwastoremainofliteratedis-course,asthepoliticsandeconomyofempirewitheredaway.ItwasamongChristianbishopsandinthehouseholdsorfamiliaeofdepen-dentsandadvisersgatheredaroundthemwheresuchlearningocca-sionallyroseaboveanelementarylevel.Increasingly,however,thetoolsdidnotincludewhatpreviousgenerationshadcalledphiloso-phy,noreven,amongthethreefundamentallinguisticartsknownasthetrivium,logicordialectica.Whatwaslearnedathomewassim-plygrammar,whichincludedfamiliaritywiththeclassicsofLatinproseandpoetry,andtherudimentsofrhetoricorstyle.Theproductscomposedintheepiscopalfoyersofhigherculturewereprimarilysermons,accountsofmiracles,andhistory.9ThusbeganwhatIhavecalledaperiodofdormancyformedievalphilosophy.Withonestartlingexception,thereislittleinthesecen-turieswetodaywouldidentifyas“philosophical,”andperhapsmoreimportantly,notmuchthatAugustineorBoethiuswouldhavecalledCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext17philosophyeither.Instead,theinspirationandvehicleforlearningandliteracylaywithanewcultureofLatinmonasticism.Whenabstractspeculativeandanalyticthoughtemergedagaininthelateeleventhcentury,however,itemergedinthemonasticmilieu,whichthereforedeservesourattention.Bytradition,theoriginsofChristianmonasticismaretracedtotheheroicfoundersAntonyandPachomiusinearlyfourth-centuryEgypt.SomeofthedesertcommunitiesofasceticsthatsprangupfromthesebeginningsinteractedsignificantlywiththecenterofHellenisticlearninginAlexandria.GuidedbytheidealofChristianphilosophyepitomizedbyOrigen,theysituatedthemonk’squestforholinessalongthepathofthephilosopher’spursuitofwisdom.10Butthosecurrentsmostinfluentialforearlywesterndevelopmentsfollowedanothercourse.HereAntony’ssearchforinnerpeaceandin-differencetotheworldthroughpassionatecombatwiththedemonsoftemptationanddespairprovidedthemodelforasceticdiscipline.Itwasamissionatoncemorepracticalthanspeculativeandmoreroutinizingthandevelopmental.IntheearlyfifthcenturythiswayoflifewasintroducedintothewesternMediterraneanontheislandsofLerins,offwhatisnow´southernFrance,andinMarseilles.Theseareasrapidlybecametrain-inggroundsformonasticdisciplineintheLatinateWest,schoolsofmonasticpracticeandspringboardsforproselytismintoRomanter-ritorytothenorthandwest.Theywerenot,however,schoolsforletters.AswiththecontemporaryepiscopalcentersoflateAntiqueerudition,entryintothesecommunitiesrequiredaminimalfounda-tioningrammarandrhetoric,butthegoalherewasnottoadvanceChristianscholarshiporshapelearnedChristiansensibilities.TheirprogramthusmirroredevenlessAugustine’sideaofthesearchforwisdom.Theaimwastoacquirethehabitsofthemonasticheroesandbeatdownthedesiresoftheflesh.BesidestheBible,thelitera-turemostrelevanttothemonasticcurriculumconsistedofsaints’livesandhomelyaccountsofmonasticvirtue,themostfamousofwhichwerecirculatedinvariouscollectionsastheApophthegmatapatrumorSayingsoftheDesertFathers.11ItisinthislightthatwemustviewtheinvocationofPsalm34:12intheRuleofBenedict,writteninmid-sixth-centuryItalyandnormativewithinwesternmonasticismfromtheninthcenturyon.ThereGodcallsouttohishumanhandiwork:“WhoisthemanthatCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n18stevenp.marronewillhavelife,anddesirestoseegooddays?”Theexpectedresponseisto“[lay]aside[one’s]ownwill[soasto]takeuptheall-powerfulandrighteousarmsofobediencetofightunderthetrueKing,theLordJesusChrist”([362]43).Thequestforgoodness,alreadyforseveralcenturiesdefinedastheChristianequivalentofthephilosopher’swayoflife,isnowinterpretedtomeanwithdrawalbehindclaustralwallsinassumptionofadisciplineofcommunalprayerandpersonalsubmissiontoone’sabbot.Forthosewillingtofollowadirectiveofthissort,classicalfigureslikeSocratesandPlato,or,stillclosertohome,AugustineandBoethius,nolongerprovideappropriateexem-plars.Ruder,moreheroicmodelsstepforth,greatestofallthefourth-centuryGallo-Romanhermit,MartinofTours.Tellingly,hislessonsforlivingweretransmittednotbymeansofdialogue,confession,ormeditation,butratherinthelifeofasaint.12NotthattheLatinmonasticmilieuwasentirelyhostiletomorespeculativesortsoflearning.Atraditionofactivescholarshiporig-inatedinIreland,whichhadbeenconvertedtoChristianityinthefifthcentury,justasRomanmilitaryauthoritywasbeingdisplacedintherestofwesternEuropebyGermanicwarbands.Here,wheretheGraeco-Romansocialorderhadnevertakenroot,therearoseaChristianlearningthatdependedonthegrammaticalandrhetoricalminimumoftheAntiquesyllabusbutwhich,unlikeontheconti-nent,whereletterssurvivedinthehomesoftheelite,wasgeneratedentirelywithinthemonasticmilieuinwhichitwasapplied.Bythemid-seventhcenturythisLatin-Irishhybridofpersonalmortifica-tionandthedisciplineofRomanlettershadbeentransplantedviamissionaryactivitytonorthernEngland.ThereaclusterofmonasticfoundationsnurturedanefflorescenceofliteracyinwhichsomeofAugustine’sintellectualvisionreappears.ThedoublemonasteryofWearmouthandJarrowyieldedthefinestfruitofthiscultureintheprolificwriterandvirtualtypeofcentralmedievalmonasticscholar,Bede(d.735).Besidescomposingbiblicalcommentaries,Bedewas,sotospeak,anexpertontime:hewrotebothahistoryoftheEnglishchurchandatreatiseontheesotericcalculationsinvolvedindeterminingthedateofEaster.Onthebasisofeighth-centuryEnglishmonasticlearning,alongwithalikelyinfusionfromtheapparentlystilluninterruptedcultiva-tionoflateLatinhigherstudiesinnorthernSpain,aremarkableifrel-ativelybriefculturalphenomenonaroseontheEuropeancontinentCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext19intheprotectiveshadowofadynastyofexpansionistFrankishkings,Charlemagneandhisimmediatesuccessors.13InthewritingsofCarolingianscholarsduringthelateeighthandfirstthree-quartersoftheninthcenturytherebreakstothesurfaceatasteforspeculationandinquiry,andanapplicationofthenearlyforgottenartoflogic.ForthefirsttimeintheWestsincethefifthcentury,theologicalcontroversyaboutspecificdoctrinesengagedthecuriosityofintel-lectualseagertoreasonabouttheirfaith.Thephilosophicalgiantamongthem,andasometimesalarmingfigureforlaterthinkerstodealwith,wasJohnScottusEriugena(d.c.877).BorninIreland(hence“Eriugena”),heknewGreekandreadandtranslatedPseudo-Dionysius.John’saccesstothePlatonizingmysticaltraditionpro-videdsomeoftheelementsforhisPeriphyseon,adaringspeculativevisionof“natures”comingfromandreturningtoGod.YettheexceptionaleruditionoftheCarolingianperiodwasjustthat,anexception–inEriugena’scaseastunningone.WesternmonasticcultureofthecentralMiddleAgesfosteredalearningin-clinedtowardascesis,capableofproducingmarvelouschoreogra-phiesofchant,prayer,andliturgybuthardlyworksofspeculativeimport.14Wemustwaitanothertwocenturiesforsignificantphilos-ophizingintheWest.Elsewherethesituationwasverydifferent.islamIn622theArabprophetMuhammedfledfromhisnativecityofMeccatothemorewelcomingMedina,wherehebeganinearnesthisultimatelysuccessfulmissionofbringingtothewholeoftheArabianpeninsulawhathepresentedasGod’sfinalrevelationtohumankind.Here,attheoppositeextremityoftheRomanworldfromIreland,soimportantaboutthesametimeforthemedievalWest,therearoseinawhirlwindamovement,bothreligiousandprofoundlysocial,thatwithinacenturywouldsweepupmuchofwhatremainedofthepoliticallyintegratedpartsoftheRomanEmpire,alongwithitsevenmoreancientimperialrival,Persia.Bythe720sthemilitaryandpoliticaldomainofIslamstretchedfromSpaininthewestthroughnorthernAfrica,Palestine,Syria,andArabia,totheTigrisandEuphratesvalley,Persia,andthefrontiersofIndiaintheeast.AcoreoftheeasternRomanEmpirewaspreservedinGreece,theBalkans,andAsiaMinor.ThiswaswhatnowadaysiscalledtheByzantineCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n20stevenp.marroneEmpire,centeredonConstantinople.However,thebulkofthelandsinwhichtheChristianversionofHellenizedlearningstillretainedsomevitalityfellunderanewdispensation.Itisimportanttonotethatdespiteitsexpansionismanditsinsis-tenceonabsolutesubmissionamongbelieverstothenewruleoffaithembodiedintheQur’an,theconqueringMuslimpoliticalelitewasnotintolerantofeitherthepeoplesortheculturesoverwhichites-tablishedhegemony.InSyria,forexample,lateAntiquephilosophy,asexemplifiedintheHellenizedJewsofAlexandria,Origen,Por-phyry,andeventhemoremysticalProclusandPseudo-Dionysius,continuedtobepromotedamongalearnedstratumatthetopofthedominatedsociety.Bythelateninthcenturythistypeofliter-atediscoursehadestablishedabeachheadwithinArabicintellectualcircles.Al-Kindi,asometimeresidentofthecityofthecaliphsatBaghdad,iscommonlyveneratedasthefatherofArabphilosophy,bothforhisownwritingsandfortheworkheencouragedinothers.Forthenexttwohundredyears,thecentralperiodofmonasticismintheWest,itwaspreeminentlyintheIslamicworldthatthein-tellectualquestforwisdompersistedandadvanced.Herewemayplaceabeginningofthethirdmajorphaseinthehistoryofmedievalphilosophy.Already,withal-Kindi,MusliminterestinGreekphilosophydis-playedaparticularfascinationwiththeworksofAristotle.InthisitparalleledadirectionBoethiushadtakenthreecenturiesbefore,whichundoubtedlyfacilitatedthereceptionofArabicthoughtintheWestwhenBoethius’sworkitselfwasrevivedaroundtheendoftheeleventhcentury.ButtherapiditywithwhichtheIslamicworldde-velopedamasteryofthewholeGreekheritageandbegantochartapathofitsownisastounding.ThegreatPersianpolymathIbnSina(Avicenna,d.1037)producedthemostimpressivespeculativesyn-thesissincetheearlyNeoplatonists.Initsinfluenceoncriticsanddefendersalike,bothinIslamandintheWest,IbnSina’sthoughteasilybearscomparisonwiththatofKantorHegelinmoderntimes.InSpain,siteofanemirateopposedtoBaghdadsincethemid-eighthcenturyandthenhomeofthecaliphateofCordobafrom´929,aseparatefloweringofthesameextraordinaryculturebeganonlyslightlylater.HerethedynamismofJewishcommunitiesensuredthatlearnedJewswouldplayaprominentrole.ThestronglyNeopla-tonizingFountainofLife,writteninArabicbytheeleventh-centuryCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext21JewishpoetSolomonIbnGabirol(Avicebron),wasinfluentialamongMuslimsandalso,inLatintranslation,inlaterChristiancirclestothenorth.BythetwelfthcenturythefocushadnarrowedevenmoresharplyonAristotlethanbefore,andtheinterpretativesophistica-tionappliedtohisworksbySpanishintellectualshadtakenaquali-tativestepbeyondallearliertreatments.MosesMaimonides,aJewbornandeducatedinCordobabutactiveformanyyearsasaphysi-´cianinCairo,pointedthewaywithhisGuideforthePerplexed,written,likeGabirol’swork,inArabic.InIbnRushd(Averroes),acontemporaryCordovanphysicianandlawyerwhoendedhisdaysin´Marrakeshin1198,Muslimscholarshipproducedamonumentalse-riesofcommentariesonAristotle’swritingsthatprovidedafocusforsomeofthemostimportantphilosophicaldebatesofthefollowingcenturies.LaterChristianthinkers,forexample,wouldfindenunci-atedinAverroesthechallengingidealofapurelyphilosophicalwayoflifesuperiortothewayofreligiousfaith.Takeninitsentirety,theevolutionofspeculativethoughtintheMuslimworldmarkedaconsiderableenrichmentofthephilo-sophicalheritageoflateAntiquity.AndArabicachievementsinmathematicsandnaturalphilosophy,especiallyastronomy,laidthefoundationsforlatermedievalscienceintheWestandultimatelysetthestagefortheScientificRevolutionoftheseventeenthcentury.theriseofthewestandthereemergenceofphilosophyBytheyear1050thewesternEuropeanterritoriesoftheoldLatinworldhadabsorbed,Christianized,andpoliticallyacculturatedGermaniclandsallthewaytoScandinavia,aswellasSlavicregionsincentralEurope.TheWestnowprojectedamoreformidablepres-enceontheglobalstage.Here,inthehomelandofthemonasticlearningofBedeandthemagnificentBenedictineabbeysofthecen-tralMiddleAges,philosophyreawakened.ThefirststirringswereindependentofdevelopmentsinIslam.Wemaythusspeakoftwoseparatebeginningsofthethirdphaseofourstory,oneinIslamwithal-Kindiandhissuccessors,anotherinEuropewithAnselmandAbelard.Inthesometimesturbulentconfluenceofthesetwocurrentsofthoughtweshallfindsomeofthemajorachievementsofhigh-medievalphilosophy.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n22stevenp.marroneTherootsofthewesternsocialtransformationreachbackatleasttothetenthcenturyinwhatwouldbecomeaneconomicrevolu-tionacrossmedievalEurope.Byacombinationoftechnologicalin-novations(includingthewheeledplough,horseshoes,andthehorsecollar)andareconfiguringofthesocialstructurethatwastiedtothespreadoffeudalismandtheincreasedpoweroffeudallordships,northeasternEuropeevolvedbetween900and1100fromasparselypopulatedrurallandscapeofvirtuallysubsistenceagriculturetoamorecomplextopographyofsurplusproduction,rapidlyrisingpop-ulation,emergenttowns(orevensmallcities),andthebeginningsofsignificantmarketsandcommerce.15Itwasthisfundamentaltransformation,fromabackwardtoady-namicsociety,thatexplainstheriseoftheWestinlatemedievalandearlymoderntimes.InternalsignsofthenewordercanbeseeninthereinvigorationofroyalmonarchiesinFranceandEngland,theappearanceofself-governingurbancommunesinItaly,andre-formintheecclesiasticalhierarchyofthechurch,evidencedinapushtowardclericalcelibacyandgreaterindependencefromsecularcontrol.Externally,thechangeannounceditselfinamoreaggres-siveposturetowardLatinEurope’sneighbors.TheReconquista–themilitaryexpansionofnorthernChristianprincipalitiesintothecentralandeventuallysouthernheartlandsofMuslimSpain–waswellunderwaybymid-eleventhcentury.In1054anincreasinglyself-assuredanduncompromisingpapacyinRomeexcommunicatedthepatriarchofConstantinople.TheschismwithEasternOrthodoxyremainstothisday.Mostfamously,in1095therebeganthefirstofthosemassive,andfortwohundredyearsperiodic,invasionsofwest-ernsoldiersoffortuneandsalvationintotheMediterraneaneast,theCrusades.TheimportanceofallthisforEuropean,indeedforworldhistory,canscarcelybeexaggerated.Hereliestheoriginofwhatisseentodayaswesternglobalhegemony,thedesirability,inevitability,durabil-ity,orevenrealityofwhichishotlydebatedbutwhichneverthelessseemstohauntthecollectiveconsciousnessasasortofpan-ethnicnightmareordream-come-true.Withregardtophilosophy,theseeventsmeantthebirthofaso-cietyinwhichthelearnedwerefreetoturntheireffortstoanalysisandspeculationfortheirownsake,andeventuallytothatuseofpurereasononwhichphilosophypridesitselftoday.SymptomsofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext23thenewhabitsofmind,andofatypeofliteratecultureentirelydifferentfromanyofthosedescribedbefore,firstappearedwithintheveryinstitutionsofscholarlyactivityandliteraryproductionmostcharacteristicofwesternEuropeinthecentralMiddleAges:themonasteries.Thesehadnotonlybeenatthevanguardofthepreaching,religiousdevotions,andhistoricalwritingofoursecondmedievalperiod,buthadalsoprovidedthepedagogicalfoundationforit.Asindicatedabove,thatfoundationincludedgrammarandrhetoricbutgenerallynottheotherlinguisticartofAntiquity,logic.Beginningintheeleventhcentury,someofthemostlearnedmonksstartedtosearchamongthelogicaltextsofAristotleandBoethius,whichwereconservedintheirlibraries,forsomethingtheyfeltwasmissingfromtheireducation.Apowerfulvoicepromotingthefascinationwithlogicwasheardatoneofthecentersforecclesiasticalandspiritualreform,theabbeyofBecintheduchyofNormandy.TheretheItalianpriorLanfranc,whohadpreviouslycomposedacommentaryontheepistlesofSt.Paulinwhichheanalyzedtheirlogicalaswellasrhetoricalandgrammaticalstructure,16tookupthechallengetoapplythetoolsofdialectictomattersofreligiousdoctrinecurrentlyindispute.InthecontroversyandexchangeoftreatisesbetweenLanfrancandBerengarofToursoverthenatureoftheEucharist,theartoflogicassumedaplaceofprominenceinthediscourseoftheliterateeliteforthefirsttimeinLatinwesternEuropesincetheCarolingianperiod.Bytheendoftheeleventhcenturyevenmorepersuasiveadvocateshadbeguntobeheard,suchastheembattledearlynominalist,Roscelin,andAnselmofAosta,whowasLanfranc’ssuccessorasprioratBecandeventuallyalsoasthesecondNormanarchbishopofCanterbury.MedievalspeculationachievedanewclarityandrigorinAnselm’swritings.Themostfamousoftheseamongphilosophers,theProslo-gion,setsforthwhatcanbereadasareason-basedproofofGod.Itprovidedthehistoricalfoundationforwhatlaterbecameknownasthe“ontologicalargument.”TheProslogionwasoriginallyentitled“FaithSeekingUnderstanding.”Here,inameditationfullygroundedintheBenedictinemonastictradition,reappearthelineamentsofAugustine’sidealofaChristianintellectualquestforwisdom.De-scribinghimselfas“onewhostrivestoraisehismindtothecontem-plationofGodandseekstounderstandwhathebelieves,”Anselminsisted,notonlythattheuseofreasondidnotunderminefaith,butCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n24stevenp.marronethatitwasinfactfullyappropriatetoit.“Iamnot,”hesaid,“trying,OLord,topenetratethyloftiness...butIdesireinsomemeasuretounderstandthytruth.”Hiscelebratedcharacterizationoftheprojecthewasengagedinisthis:“Idonotseektounderstandinordertobelieve,butIbelieveinordertounderstand”(Proslogion,prefaceandch.1).17Thisnewmodelforintellectualendeavorrevivedaformofdis-courselongabsentfromtheWest.Italsoalteredthecharacterofthatdiscourse.Withitsexceptionalemphasisonlogic,itinfusedtheeruditionofthehighMiddleAgeswithadeeplyanalytichue.Inhisdialoguesonsuchsubjectsastruth,freewill,andthefalloftheDevil,eventhedevoutcontemplativeAnselmcansoundmorelikealatethirteenth-centuryuniversitymasterthanliketherhetoricallymoldedAugustine.Thebentforlogictookholdinthelateeleventh-andearlytwelfth-centuryWestatabreathtakingpace.By1100ithadfoundachampionatParisinthepersonofPeterAbelard,whosebrillianceoutshoneallcontemporariesandpointedtowardthefirstsignificantadvancesinlogicaltheorysincethelateAntiqueStoics.Twelfth-centurythinkerswereindeedsomuchawareofwhattheywereaddingtotheheritageofAristotleandBoethius,especiallyinpropositionallogicandthetheoryofterms,thattheycoinedaphraseforthedialecticoftheirownday,thelogicamodernorumor“logicofthemoderns.”18Suchadesiretoapplythetoolsofreason,honedbydialectic,ex-tendedtoeveryareaoflearning.ThefirstsignsofthenewhabitsofthoughtinBerengarandLanfranchadappearedindiscussionofanimportantbutlimitedtheologicalsubject,thesacramentoftheEucharist.WithAbelardintheearlytwelfthcenturythemethodicalstudyofreligiousbelieftookflight.NowthefullpanoplyofrationalspeculationandlogicalanalysiswasturnedtowardunderstandingthewholerangeofChristianfaithandpractice.Theresultwasavirtualreinventionoftheologyassystematicandinplaceshighlyabstractdiscourse,amarkeddeparturefromthememorativeandas-sociativemeditativehabitsofthemonasticpast.Abelardspokeforanewsensibilitywhenhedefendedhispathbreakingeffortsintheol-ogy.Heexplainedthathewasrespondingto“studentswhowereask-ingforhumanandlogicalreasonsonthissubject,anddemand[ing]somethingintelligibleratherthan[the]merewords”theywerefedinCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext25thetraditionalsacredlearningoftheirday(Abelard,Historiacalami-tatum[152]78).Thesamethirstforreasonedunderstandingwasfeltwithregardtohumanconductandtheexternalworld.Abelard’sEthicspresentsanintentions-basedexplicationofmoralaccountabilitythatcommandsrespecttothisdayonitsphilosophicalmerits.Andwhereprevi-ouslyaminimalnaturalphilosophycenteredonastronomyandthecalendarhadsufficed,alongwiththerichsymbolicinterpretationsofbiblicalandliteraryexegesis,learnedmindsofthetwelfthcen-turybegantodemandcausalexplanationsofprocessesandcarefulcategorizingofthepropertiesandtypesofthings.EchoingAbelardonreligiousthought,AdelardofBath,anEnglishmanwholedthedrivetowardnewmethodsofinquiryaboutexternalities,insistedthatGodhadendowedhumankindwithreasonjustsothatwecouldferretouttherulesunderwhichthecreatedworldoperated.FarfromunderminingafundamentalconfidencethatGodwasultimatelyresponsibleforallthatwasandallthathappened,suchanunder-standingrevealedtheextraordinaryprovidenceofaDivinitywhochosetoworkthroughregularbutmediatingcausation.19Indeed,thegrowingtendencyamongtwelfth-centurythinkerstoviewthecosmosasarationallyorderedstructure,amenabletoinvestigationandanalysisbytherationalmind,haspromptedsomehistorianstodescribethisperiodasatimeofthe“DiscoveryofNature.”20Therecanbenodoubtthat“natura”anditsGreekequivalent,“physis,”wereincreasinglyusedbyLatinscholarsbothtodescribetheexter-nalworldandtoindicatetheregularitiesuponwhichitsworkingsdepended.AconvenientwaytoconceptualizethisorderedharmonywasreadilyavailableinNeoplatoniccosmologicaltextspreservedinmonasticlibraries.Indeed,theprototypeitselfcouldbeused:thesingleworkofPlatothathadbeentranslatedintoLatininthelateEmpire,hisTimaeus.ThepopularityinFranceoftreatisesinnaturalphilosophybuiltuponaPlatonizingmetaphysicsandvisionoftheuniversehasencouragedhistorianstoproposethattherewasaspe-cificSchoolofChartres,anepiscopallysupervisedcenteroflearningwherekeywritersofsuchworksweretohavestudiedandtaughtandfromwhichtheirviewsweredisseminatedthroughouttheLatinWest.ThoughitisnolongerfashionabletothinkofChartresastheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n26stevenp.marronephysicallocationofaschoolofthissort,aPlatonicworldviewdidshapemostapproachestonatureinwesternEuropeinthetwelfthcentury.21AsimilarinclinationalsomadeLatinintellectualsreceptivetothevigoroustraditionsinnaturalphilosophyandmathematicsinIslamicterritoriestothesouthandeast:Spain,southernItaly,andSicily.ThecultivatedmedicalandphilosophicalcirclesofToledo,Cordoba,Valencia,andSeville,whereHebrew,Arabic,andLatin´metinatrulymultivalentscholarlyenvironment,drewindividualslikeAdelardfromEnglandandGerardofCremonafromItaly,whosteepedthemselvesinJewishandMuslimlearningandbegantotranslatetextsintoLatin:firstlythespeculativerichesfromthispartoftheworldandeventuallyworksfromtheclassicalGreekandHellenisticeasternMediterranean.SouthernItalywasalsoalocusofintenseactivity,particularlyatthecentersofmedicallearninginandaroundSalerno,wheretextswerecomposedthattransmittedmuchofGreekandIslamicnaturalphilosophytotheWest.Soradicalashiftineducatedattitudesandinterests,andsomas-siveaninfusionoflearningfromforeignsources,couldhardlyavoidprovokingopposition.Atstakewasnothinglessthanthefateoftwodivergentifnotnecessarilyopposingculturalforms.Ontheonehandstoodtheoldliturgical,devotional,andmeditativeroutineofthemonasteries;ontheother,thenewthirstforspeculationandanalysisappliedtoeverythinginmindandtheworld.ForsomeofthosecommittedinspirittotheolderrhythmsofLatinmonasticcul-ture,therelationofAbelard’sstyleoftheologytogenuineChristianfaithwasmuchliketherelationofAthenstoJerusalemintheeyesofTertullian.Prominentamongsuchculturalconservativeswastheinfluentialreligiousreformerandpreacher,BernardofClairvaux.Spurredonbytraditionalteachersofsacredstudies,hemanagedthecondemnationofsomeofAbelard’sdoctrinesin1140attheeccle-siasticalCouncilofSens,thesecondtobecalledagainstthegreatlogicianbecometheologian.InalettertoPopeInnocentII,composedfortheoccasion,Bernardpilloriedthepedagogicalmethodsofsuchamanwho,hesaid,would“[put]forwardphilosopherswithgreatpraiseandso[affront]theteachersoftheChurch,and[prefer]theirimaginationsandnoveltiestothedoctrineandfaithoftheCatholicFathers.”MakingclearthatitwasAbelard’smethodasmuchasthesubstanceofwhathesaidthatbroughtoffense,BernardalludedtoCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext27Abelard’sownjustification,surethathisantagonist’swordswouldstandastheirowncondemnation:“Ithoughtitunfittingthatthegroundsofthefaithshouldbehandedovertohumanreasoningsfordiscussion,when,asisagreed,itrestsonsuchasureandfirmfoundation”(Letter189[23]89;emphasisadded).YetforallBernard’sprominenceasaninstitutionalreformerandspokespersonforanewlytriumphantecclesiasticalhierarchy,hiscallforaunitedstandagainstthenovellearningwasdoomedtofailure.22Theenthusiasmforspeculativewisdomandananalyticalapproachtointerpretationwastoopowerfultobesuppressed.Al-ready,beforeBernard,institutionsweredevelopingwhichnurturedanddisseminatedthenewwaysamonganever-wideningcohortoflogiciansandspeculativethinkers–indeed,philosophersinboththelateAntiqueandmodernsensesoftheword.Bytheendoftheeleventhcenturycirclesoferuditionagaingatheredaroundpromi-nentbishops,asinthelattercenturiesofthewesternRomanEmpire,butinanoriginalform.Wenowfindwhatcanlegitimatelybecalledcathedralschools,withmasterspaidbythebishopandstudentsdrawnfrombeyondtheresidentclergy.AscatteringoftheseschoolsacrossFranceandEnglandbecameknownforintellectualspecialties:religiousteachingatLaon,grammaranddialecticatParis,rhetoricatOrleans,ArabicandGreeknaturalphilosophyatHereford.ItwastosucheducationalhotspotsthatbrightmindslikeAbelardweredrawn,and,asinhiscase,itwasinsuchplacesthattheyoftenbegantheirownteachingcareers.AttimesanindividualwithareputationlikeAbelard’swouldevenofferinstructionwithoutseekingformalecclesiasticalsanction,takingonstudentswhopaidfortheirlessonsinasortofprivateschool.Incentersofhighereducationlikethese,fromcathedralschoolstomonasticandadhocprivategatheringsofstudents,thewholeAntiquecurriculumwasrevived,notjustgrammarandrhetoric,butalsoofcourselogic,thirdoftheartsofthetrivium,andnowthefourmathematicalartsorquadriviumaswell:arithmetic,geometry,astronomy,andmusic.Giventheburgeoninginterestinnaturalphilosophy,indeedinphilosophyofanysort,broadlyconceived,itcomesasnosurprisethattheeducationalprogramatafewoftheselocalesexpandedbeyondanythingofferedinlateRome.Webegintoseeplaceswhereinquiryintonearlyeveryareaofthoughtorpracticewasformallypromoted.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n28stevenp.marroneAttheheartofitallstoodlogic,nowtheparadigmforinvestigationandsummaryinallfields.Startingwiththereadingandliteralexpo-sitionintheclassroomofthefundamentaltextsinasubject,aformalsystemofquestionandanswerarose,wherebystudentscouldbothexercisetheirlogicalskillsindebateandputthewordsoftheauthori-tiesunderthelensofcriticalanalysis,advancingtowardgreatercom-prehensiveness,increasingconsistencyofexposition,andenhancedclarityofunderstanding.Thisclassroommethodofanalysis,debate,andresolutionquicklybecamestandardthroughouttheemergingschools.Themajordisciplinesofhighmedievallearningstartedtotakeshape,crystallizingaroundtheseedofnewlycomposedandsoonuniversallyadoptedtextbooksthatwerestructuredascollectionsofdebatingpointstouchingonallsignificantaspectsofthesubjectfield.23IntheologytherewastheParisianPeterLombard’sSentencesofthemid-twelfthcentury,incanonlawthescarcelyearlierDecretumofMasterGratianofBologna,andinlogicthenumer-ouscommentaries,summaries,andcollectionsofquestionsassoci-atedwithvariousacademicfactions,particularlyatthemetropolisoflearninginParis.rationalizationinsociety:politics,religion,andeducationalinstitutionsFromabroaderperspective,theexplosiveadvancementofreason-ing–thatis,theexplicitapplicationoflogicasbothanalyticandsynthetictool–intothemethodofchoiceforlearneddiscoursewaslinkedtoamoregeneralphenomenonoftherationalizationofsoci-etyitself.Rationalizationismeanthereinthesenseofadifferentia-tionofsocialfunctionsandregularizationofthepracticesbywhichtheywerecarriedout,allaccompaniednecessarilybyincreasedcomplexityofinstitutions–whatwewouldassociatetodaywith“bureaucracy.”Thetwosortsofrationalization,intellectualandso-cial,wenthandinhand,foreachencouragedandwasdependentontheprogressoftheother.ImentionedabovethatroyalmonarchieshadrisenbythelateeleventhcenturytoapositionofeminenceasinstrumentsofpoliticalorderintheincreasinglyprosperousandpopulouslandsofwesternEurope.Thetwelfthcenturysawconsol-idationoftheseachievements,tothepointwhereafewkingdomsbecamebyfarthedominantpoliticalstructures,foundationsfortheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext29nation-statesthatwouldemergeinearlymoderntimes.Evidenceofthenewpoliticalrealitycanbeseenintheeffectiveimplementa-tionofa“royalpeace”overbroadswathsofEngland,France,north-ernSpain,andsouthernItaly.Inthiscase,“peace”meantnotjustamutingofthehostilitiesthathadcharacterizedthecompetitionamongfeudallordshipsduringthecentralMiddleAges,butalsothedynamicexpansionofroyalpowertoenforcecompliancewithkinglyexpectationsofacceptablebehavior.Thestateoftheecclesiasticalorderwasalsochanging.Controver-siesoverthecustomaryrightsoflayrulerstocontroltheappoint-mentofbishopsintheirdomainswereincreasinglyresolvedinfavorofthechurch’sindependence.AsarchbishopofCanterbury,Anselmhadplayedapartinthisintheearlytwelfthcentury.Acenturylater,thefirstarticleofMagnaCartadeclaredthatthekingshouldleavein-violate“therightsandlibertiesoftheEnglishchurch.”Bythistime,thepapacyhadbecomearecognizedandeffectivemonarchyinitsownright,claiminguniqueandcomprehensiveauthorityasheirtotheprinceoftheapostles,St.Peter.Papaldominionwasexercisedprimarilyoverofficersoftheinstitutionalchurch,firstandforemostbishopsandabbots,butinthethirteenthcenturytherewerealsoim-plicitclaimstoanauthorityinsecularaffairsvyingwithorperhapsevensupersedingthatofkingsandemperors.Forlayandecclesiasticalgovernmentinthisperiod,themostcon-creteachievementwastheelaborationofadualsystemofroyalandpapalcourts.Thesereachedoutintolocalitiesthathadhith-ertoknownonlythecustomaryjusticeoffeudallaw.Theybroughtthepossibilityofappealtomonarchical,andthusfromalocalpointofviewlesslordlyandpartisan,adjudicationwithinreachofpeoplefartherdownonthesocialscalethaneverbefore.Suchagencyandin-terventionrequiredfunding.Taxationbybothlayandecclesiasticalauthoritiesdevelopedrapidlyoverthecourseofthetwelfthandthir-teenthcenturies,withsomeofthemostingeniousinnovationsbeingmadebythepopes.Taxesbroughtwiththemtheneedforadminis-trationofcollectionandexpenditure,andsothefirstrealtreasuriesarose.ThemostfamousofthesewastheEnglishExchequer,withwrittenaccountingproceduresandpermanentpersonnel:inshort,aprimitivebureaucracy.Transformationwasnotlimitedtoofficialdomandtheupperreachesofsociety.Therewasfermentatthepopularlevel,too.FromCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n30stevenp.marronethelateeleventhcenturythistookshapemostnoticeablyinagita-tionforincreasedlayparticipationinreligionandthedevelopmentofnoveldevotionalforms.Therewasalsowidespreadcriticismofthewayoflifeandmoralstandardsprevalentamongtheclergy.Thepredictablestrainbetweensuchgrass-rootsactivismandofficialef-fortsatorganizationandcontroleruptedinaccusationsofheresy,marksofthefirstinstancesofanythingthatcouldbecharacter-izedaspopularorbroadlysocialheresyinwesternEuropesincelateRome.24BythelastdecadesofthetwelfthcenturypartsofsouthernFrance,northernItaly,andtheRhinelandcountedatleasttwowell-developednetworksofpopularreligiouscommunities,theCatharsandtheWaldensians,eachopposedtothedominanceandchallengingtheauthenticityoftheestablishedecclesiasticalhierarchy,andeachlabeledhereticalbymostsecularandclericalofficials.Theresponsefromthehigherauthoritieswastoerectinstitutionalbulwarksagainstdispersionofpower,eithermaterialorideological.Ontheideologicalside,thepopesbeganinthetwelfthcenturytocallthefirstuniversalor“ecumenical”churchcouncilssincetheeighthcentury,thefirsteverinwesternEurope.Suchgatherings,whichdidnotofcourseincluderepresentativesoftheOrthodoxeast-ernchurches,lentsupporttopapalclaimstoleadachurchinwhichlinesofauthoritycoalescedatthetop.Theyalsodefinedacceptable–thatis,orthodox–doctrineandconstructedanapparatusofdisci-pline.In1215attheFourthLateranCouncilinRome,forinstance,PopeInnocentIIIpresidedoveranassemblyofofficialsfromalloverLatinChristendom.TheresultwasanauthorizedstatementofthefaiththatallChristianswererequiredtoaccept,andacallforper-sonalconfessiontoapriestandreceptionoftheEucharistatleastonceeachyearbyallbelievers.Aftercenturiesofrelativeindiffer-ence,thesemeasuresshowedaseriousintenttobringthelaityintothechurchesandintouchatminimumwiththerudimentsofbelief.Butthecouncilalsoissuedanunmistakablethreatofretributionfordissent.Thisbecameexplicitintheformalreaffirmationofaninjunctiondeliveredbyanearlierpopein1184,whichcommandedbishopstoinvestigatetheirdiocesesannuallyforevidenceofnon-conformity.HerelietheoriginsofthemedievalandearlymodernInquisition.25Measureslikethese,andtheoftenmorebrutalstepstakenbylaygovernmentstosuppressdissentandmanufactureatleasttheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext31appearanceofacquiescenceanduniformity,havebroughthistorianR.I.Mooretowriteofthe“formationofapersecutingsociety”inwesternEuropeinthetwelfthandthirteenthcenturies,aviewin-creasinglyadoptedinrecentscholarshiponthelatemedievalandearlymodernperiods.26Inthislight,oneofthesalientinstitutionalaccomplishmentsofecclesiasticalorganizationintheearlythir-teenthcentury,thefoundingofthefirsttwoordersofmendicantorbeggingfriars,theFranciscansandtheDominicans,assumesapro-foundlyambiguouscharacter.Wanderingamongthepopulaceasirre-proachablyunworldlyandimpoverishedpreachersoforthodoxy,themendicantsquicklybecameassimilatedintoofficialmechanismsofeducationandecclesiasticaldiscipline.Ontheeducationalside,thefriars’preachingandteachingwasgreatlyinformedbyinstructionintheirownhousesofstudyandatthedevelopingcentersofhigherlearning.Onthedisciplinaryside,Dominicans,followedsoonbytheFranciscans,assumedaconspicuousroleinacentralizingpapalin-quisition,whichwassetupduringthethirteenthcenturytocircum-ventthebishops’yearlyinquisitorialforays.Thiswasthebroadersocialcontextofhighmedievalphilosophy,onefraughtwithstrate-giesforcontrolandeffortstoimposeorderinadisorderlyandprotest-ingworld.Theimmediateinstitutionalcontextinwhichthenewlearningtookplacewasitselfalsorationalized.Therewereanumberofmod-els:Italiancommunes,thenewmonasticorders,andparticularlythegrowthofmerchantandartisanguildsincommercialcenters.Withtheseasexamples,hithertounregimentedclustersofschoolsatsomeofthemostprominentsitesofeducationalactivitybegantoconsol-idateandorganizethemselvesalongcorporateinstitutionallines.Theimpetusforsuchmovesarosefromthecommunityofmasters(orstudents!)ateachsite.ThelegalbasiswasthenewlyrevivedRomanlawconceptofacorporation,agroupofindividualsactingatlawasoneperson.ThoughstepsinthisdirectionmusthavebeentakenatplaceslikeParisandBolognabymid-twelfthcentury,itisinthethirteenthcenturythatthefirstdocumentsappearattest-ingtotheexistenceofthesepedagogicalmonopolies.BythenParis,Bologna,andOxfordwereuniversallyacceptedproducersofhigherlearning,andatleastfivemoresuchcenterswerefoundedbycen-tury’send:Cambridge,Padua,Naples,Toulouse,andMontpellier.Bythefourteenthcenturytheseinstitutionswerehabituallynamedbyoneofthesynonymsforcorporations,“universities.”CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n32stevenp.marroneItwasintheuniversitiesthattheapparatusofadvancededucationassociatedwiththeEuropeanhighMiddleAgestookshape.Withineachuniversity,thegroupsofmastersandscholarsworkingintheemergentdisciplinesorganizedthemselvesintofaculties,withtheirownsenseofsubcorporateidentityandtheirownofficialsealstoratifydocuments.Foundationalforallotherhigherstudieswerethearts,developedoutofthetraditionaltriviumandquadriviumbutincludingamorevariedselectionfromwhatwouldbethoughtoftodayasphilosophyandnaturalscience,andgivinggreatestatten-tiontologic.TheFacultyofArtsthuscametogetheratthenucleusofeachuniversityandwasthefacultyfromwhichthemajorityofmatriculatingstudentswouldreceiveinstruction.Amongmoread-vancedstudies,forwhichcertificationasaBachelorinArtswouldordinarilybeexpectedasprecondition,aclassictriosoonestablisheditself:Law,dividedintothetwomajorsubdisciplinesofcivilandec-clesiasticalorcanonlaw;Medicine;andbythemid-thirteenthcen-turythequeenoffacultiesandmostprestigious,Theology.Atthesametimeeachfacultybegantoformalizeitscurriculum,withre-quiredtextsandcourses,examinations,teachingapprenticeshipsorbachelorhoods,timelimits,andceremonialcertificationofaccom-plishment,thebasesformodernacademicdegrees.Thusgrewupanelaboratesystemforobtainingcredentialsinfieldstailoredtocom-plexsocietaldemands.Itwas,ofcourse,asocietyswiftlyadvanc-ingininstitutionalspecializationandhencerequiringincreasinglytechnicalanddifferentiatedskillsofwritingandreasoningingov-ernment,religion,and,inareasofcommercialwealth,evenserviceslikemedicine.WeseeheretheearlystagesofprofessionalizationforagrowingnumberofthelearnedeliteinwesternEurope.Thiswholecomplexunderlaythehighandlatemedieval“scholas-ticism”thatconstitutesthediscursiveformforlearningandspecula-tioninthewesternheydayofourthirdphaseofmedievalphilosophy.aristotleandthirteenth-centuryscholasticismPerhapsthemostsignificantsingleeventassociatedwiththeripen-ingofthisculture,andsurelytheoneattractingmostattentioninhistoriesofmedievalthought,wastheassimilationofnearlythecompletecorpusofAristotle’ssurvivingwritings.OnthematerialCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext33side,thisamountedtotheintegrationintothecurriculum,primarilyfortheFacultyofArtsbutalsotoaconsiderabledegreeforTheology,ofAristotle’sworksbeyondthefirstbooksoftheOrganon.Drivenbyanassiduousprogramoftranslations,firstfromArabicversionsbutincreasinglyfromtheoriginalGreekandfrequentlysubsidizedbyec-clesiasticalorsecularofficials,latetwelfth-andthirteenth-centuryacademicsfamiliarizedthemselvesintimatelywiththerestoftheOrganonandthenwithAristotle’scontributionstothenaturalsci-ences,followedbyhismetaphysicsalmostsimultaneouslywithhisethics,andlastlyhispolitics.Ontheformalside,thestoryhastodowithanewparadigmforknowledge.MostcriticalhereweretheunpackingandostensibleadoptionofAristotle’sprescriptionsforcognitionofthehighestsort:“epistem`e`”inGreek,“scientia”inLatin.Foreachfieldofinvestiga-tionthegoalbecametheidentificationofbasicprinciplesdefining“evidently”theessentialnatureofthesubjectandthentherigor-ousdeduction,fromsuchprinciples,ofasystematicbodyoftruthsconcerningthesubject’sproperties.Thekeytothisschemaofwhathighmedievalthinkersregularlyacceptedastheidealtowardwhich“science”shouldaspirelayburiedinAristotle’sPosteriorAnalyt-ics.JohnofSalisbury,aparagonoftwelfth-centuryerudition,hadpointedtothistreatisearound1160ascrucialforcomprehending“theartofdemonstration,whichisthemostdemandingofallformsofreasoning.”JohncomplainedthatthematerialofthePosteriorAnalyticswas“extremelysubtle,”confessingthatinhisday“butfewmentalities[could]makemuchheadway”init(MetalogiconIV6[157]212).Onlytowardthesecondquarterofthethirteenthcen-turydidthetextreceivewrittencommentaryandinterpretationbyRobertGrosseteste,eventualmasteroftheologyatOxfordandsub-sequentlybishopofLincoln.27StartingwithGrosseteste,scholarsinalldisciplinessoughttoconstruetheirworkasscientific.Eventheologywasacandidate,atleastuntilthemid-fourteenthcentury,despitetheirksomeproblemthatitsfirstprincipleswouldseemtohavebeenreceivedfromGodbyfaithratherthangraspedasevidentinthemselvesinthepresentlife.“Science”inscholasticeyesthusembracedmuchmorethanthenaturalandmathematicalsciencesrecognizedtoday.Tobesure,muchofthisAristoteliancontentandformwasre-ceivedintoasetofbroaderintellectualcommitmentsthatcanonlyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n34stevenp.marronebedescribedasNeoplatonic,includingahierarchicalnotionofbeingandasenseofthesubordinationofmaterialthingsto,andeven-tualsublimationinto,theimmaterialandspiritual.Furthermore,therewereablemindscriticalofmanyaspectsofAristotleevenattheheightofhisinfluence,suchasBonaventureandPeterJohnOlivi.Whatiscalled“Aristotelianism”thustookmanyformsinthescholasticworld,noneofthempure.Withallthesequalifications,however,itwaslargelyunderAristotle’stutelagethatextraordinaryeffortsweremadeduringthethirteenthcentury,evenintheologyfac-ulties,toestablishabodyofknowledgetowhichallrationalminds,Christianornot,couldbeexpectedtoassent.Oneresultwasthatagreatdealofwhatwouldnowbeconsideredphilosophywasdonebytheologians.Thefinestandcertainlythemostcelebratedexamplesoftheologi-calspeculationinwhichextensivephilosophizingtookplacepresentthemselvesinthewritingsofanumberoflatterthirteenth-centurytheologians,allofwhomtaughtforatleastpartoftheircareerattheUniversityofParis,thejewelinthehighmedievaltheologicalcrown.TheyrangefromtheDominicanfriarsAlberttheGreatandThomasAquinas,throughtheFranciscansBonaventureandJohnDunsSco-tus,tothe“secular”–thatis,stillclericalbutneithermendicantnormonastic–mastersHenryofGhentandGodfreyofFontaines.Pro-fessionalreligiousthinkerslikethese,alltrainedextensivelyinartsfacultiesandexpertinlogic,regardedwhatthey,too,calledphiloso-phy–reasoningappliedtoevidencenaturallyobtained–asdistinc-tivelydifferentfromunderstandingbasedontruthssupernaturallyrevealedbyGod.Yettheyconsideredtheformersortofthinkingtobeanimportantconcomitantofthelatter.Ifreligionwastoattainitsfullintellectualdignity,theologianshadtobeconversantwithallthatthemindcouldknow,nomatterwhatthesource.Theyshouldneverbypassanaturalorlogicalargumentwhenonewasavailable,evenfortruthsthatwerevouchsafedbyrevelation.Forsuchintellec-tuals,philosophypossessedvalueevenwithintheirecclesiasticallysanctioneddisciplinejustbecauseitwastheology’shandmaiden,ancillatheologiae.Andsincetheassistancephilosophyprovidedwasmoreeffectivethemorefullyitsintegritywaspreservedinallitsnatural,nontheologicalautonomy,thespeculationandanalysisinwhichtheyengagedinthenameofphilosophycanbereadandappreciatedbyeventhemostnonreligiousrationalistoftoday.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext35Therewereinfactsomescholastics,mostlyinartsfacultiesandespeciallyatParis,whoheldthatphilosophybyitselfcouldleadtotheheightsoftruthwhichthemastersoftheologyconsideredattain-ableonlyintheirprofessionallyprivilegeddiscourseguidedbyfaithandtheteachingsofthechurch.Amongsuchthinkers,mostnotablytheartsmastersSigerofBrabantandBoethiusofDacia,theidealofaphilosophicalwayoflifecarriedonindependentlyofreligiousinsti-tutionsreappearedintheWestforthefirsttimesincethedayswhenpaganphilosopherscompetedwith“philosophized”Christians.Ac-cordingtosomehistorians,thesephilosopherswereconvincedthattheuseof“naturalreason”byitselfwouldbringtheseekeraftertruthtothewisdomwhichOrigenorAugustinehadsoughtbysub-limatingthePlatonicquestintoastrivingforChristiancontem-plation.UnlikeOrigenorAugustine,theythoughtthattakingintoaccounttheunreasoneddictatesoffaithorthedoctrinalprescrip-tionsoforthodoxywouldgetintheway.28Herethehighmedievalscholastics’distinctionbetweenphilosophicalandreligiousthoughtsubordinatedthelattertotheformer,perhapseveneradicatingitaltogether.Notsurprisingly,therewasareactiontothisoften-calledAver-roismevenintheenlightenedprecinctsofthe“scientifically”ori-enteduniversities.Alreadyin1210and1215ecclesiasticsatParishadbannedpubliclecturesonAristotle’sbooksofnaturalphilos-ophyandwell-knownArabicworks,probablyIbnSina’saboveall.TheserestrictionsfellawaywiththevirtualabsorptionofAristotleintotheacademiccurriculumbythe1240s.Buttheradicalassocia-tionof“wisdom”with“purereason”byartsmastersatParisinthelate1260sandearly1270s,andeventherespectsuchtheologiansasAlbertandThomaspaidtophilosophyasself-containedsourceoftruth,ledtorenewedfears.In1270,andagainmoreextensivelyin1277,thebishopofParisofficiallycondemnedtheteachingofahostofpropositions,mostofwhichwewouldconsiderpurelyphilo-sophical,thatconservativemastersoftheologyviewedasdetrimen-taltoChristianfaithbutcirculatingfreelyintheParisianschools.Aquinas’swritingsthemselveswereatleastindirectlyimplicatedinthedenunciations,asituationbroughtnearertothesurfaceinlike-mindedcondemnationsbyarchbishopsofCanterburyin1277,1284,and1286.29Scholarsnowdebateeventheshort-termeffective-nessoftheseprohibitions,andbythemid-fourteenthcenturymanyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n36stevenp.marronemastersinartsandtheologyfeltfreetodebatewithoutregardtoanyofthelistsofproscribedteachings.Itwasclear,however,thathigherstudiesinreligionandphilosophycouldnotcoexistwithouttheriskofconflict.Bytheendofthethirteenthcenturyasimilarbutmoreominoustug-of-warhadstartedtoemergeincircleslesssequesteredbehindthewallsofacademe,moreopentothelaityatlarge.Anumberoftheologianswhomaintainedclosetieswithdevotionalcommu-nitiesofliterateandsemiliteratelaityintheRhinelandsawthecalltopursuewisdomthroughreason,notasaninjunctiontosep-aratephilosophyfromtheology,butasaninvitationtoseehow,byfollowingreasonintothedepthsofthesoul,onecouldcometodiscoverthetruthofrevelationwithoutrecoursetoecclesiasticalsupervision.TheDominicanfriarsUlrichofStrassburg,DietrichofFreiberg,andmostfamouslyMeisterEckhart(1260–1327)reachedbacktotheNeoplatonictraditionsofPseudo-Dionysiusandthepa-gansProclusandPlotinustoreinstituteaprogramofpersonalmentalenlightenmentasthewaytoanear-beatificencounterwithGod.Thefactthattheyall,againespeciallyEckhart,weredeeplyinvolvedinministrytothenonclericalpopulacelenttheirspeculativeeffortsaresonancemarkedlydifferentfromthatofearlierartsmasters,suchasSigerofBrabantandBoethiusofDacia.AmongthesefirstoftheRhinelandmystics,webegintoseeastartlingcross-pollinationoflearnedandpopulardiscourseandthetakingrootofwhatcanonlybecalledaphilosophizingattitudeamongtheranksofthecommonpeople.30Mostintriguingly,itwascommunitiesoflaywomen,pop-ularlyknownsincetheearlythirteenthcenturyas“beguines,”thatprovedmostreceptivetothiskindofthinkingandprovidedinspira-tionformuchofthemysticalphilosophyoflatemedievalandearlymodernEurope.thecontestedfourteenthcenturyInsomehistories,theculminationofmedievalphilosophy,orin-deed,ofallphilosophy,isinthethirteenthcentury.Overthelastfiftyyears,however,scholarsattunedtocontemporarylogicandan-alyticphilosophyhavealsofoundmuchtoadmireinfourteenth-centurythought.ThescholasticsofthisperiodtookastheirpointofdeparturethepropositionalandterministlogicthathadbeguntobeCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext37developedinthetimeofAbelard,andinthespiritofAbelardtheyputtheirresultsinlogictoworkinotherfields.Thenewapproach,the“viamoderna,”flourishedintheuniversitiesthroughoutthelatefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies.TheinceptionoftheviamodernaissometimescreditedtothebrilliantOxfordFranciscan,WilliamofOckham(d.1347/48).Ockhamisalsocelebrated–orattacked–forhisnominalism,thatis,forholdingthatuniversals,suchasmanandred,arenames(nomina),notthings(res).Ithasbeenarguedthat“conceptualism”wouldbeabetterlabelforOckham’sview,butinanycase,neitherOckhamnorhispositionontheproblemofuniversalsshouldberegardedasthewholeoftheviamoderna.Whatisclear,however,isthatfourteenth-centuryuniversitiesdevotedenormousintellec-tualenergytotheinvestigationoflogicalpuzzles–puzzlesinvolv-ingself-reference,forexample–andtogamescalled“obligations,”wheretheaimwastocatchanopponentincontradictionasaresultofacceptingapparentlyquiteconsistentpremises.Suchactivitiesbespeakapreoccupationwiththephilosophyoflanguageandissuesoflogicalformthatmakesscholasticdiscourseoftheperiodseemcuriouslyathomeintheworldoftwentieth-centuryanalyticphilos-ophy.Atthesametime,therewasabentinthefourteenthcenturyforintenseanalysisofthenatureofquantityandforexperimentationwithmodesofquantitativereasoninginthemostdisparateacademicdisciplines,fromphysicstotheology.LeadersherewereagroupatOxfordcalledintheirowndaythe“calculatores.”IntheirworkandinthatofsuchthinkersastheParisianmastersJohnBuridanandNicoleOresme,somescholarshavediscernedfoundationsfortheScientificRevolution.31Thelogicalacutenessthatcametoruletheuniversitiesinthefirstpartofthefourteenthcenturygaverisetocriticalattitudesinmetaphysicsandtheology,adegreeofskepticismaboutthesolid-ityofsystemsofthoughtsuchasthoseofthepreviouscentury.Insomecases,ithasbeenargued,psychologicalanalysisofhowwethinkandactreplacedmetaphysicalinsightintotheintelligiblere-alityofwhatthereistothinkaboutoractfor.32Bethatasitmay,thestatusofacademictheologyasscienceorwisdomcameintoques-tion.FaithservedasthebasisforreligionwithoutasmuchinthewayofphilosophicalpreambleasaThomasAquinashadthoughttoprovide.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n38stevenp.marroneThefourteenthcenturyalsosawthebitterfruition,bothinactionandintheory,ofpoliticalconflictsinherentinlatemedievalChris-tendom.Aswasmentionedabove,bytheendofthetwelfthcenturythepapacyhadachievedmonarchicalauthorityovertheecclesiasti-calhierarchy.Thepopeswerealsoinapositiontoexertconsiderableinfluenceinsecularaffairs.InnocentIII,conveneroftheFourthLat-eranCouncil,interveneddecisivelyinsuchmattersonanumberofoccasions,skillfullymanagingcontestsbetweenkingandking,aswithFranceagainstEngland,orbetweenemperorsandimperialelec-tors,asinGermany.Inthe1240s,inaremarkableclashbetweenPopeInnocentIVandtheGermankingandHolyRomanEmperorFrederickIIofHohenstaufen,thepopecalledonallCatholicmonarchstojoininacrusadeagainsttheemperorhimself.Thisinitiativeprovedunsuccessful,butpapaldiplomacymanagednonethelesstocheckFrederick’shopesforeffectiveruleoverallofItalyandlaythebasisforthecollapseoftheHohenstaufendynastyintheearly1250s.Bycentury’send,however,somekingshadamassedaneffectivepowertoenforcecompliancewiththeircommandsthatdwarfedthepopes’powertowithstandthem.IttooktwoconfrontationsbetweenPopeBonifaceVIIIandthekingofFrance,PhilipIV,oneinvolvingtaxesandtheotherroyaljurisdictionoverhighecclesiasticaloffi-cials,tomakethepracticalstateofaffairsplainforalltosee.ButafterBoniface’sarrestandhumiliationatthehandsofFrenchmer-cenariesin1303andhissubsequentspeedydisappearancefromthescene,nooneinEuropecoulddoubtthatwhatiscommonlythoughtofas“real”powerbelongedtothelayruler.Fornearlyseventy-fiveyears,infact,thecourtofthepopeswasplantedjustoutsidetheFrenchkingdom,onthebanksoftheRhoneinAvignon,whereitˆwaswidelysuspectedthattheFrenchmadeallthecriticaldecisionsinaperioddescribedbyascandalizedcontemporaryasthe“Babylo-niancaptivityofthechurch.”Onthesideofpoliticaltheory,papalandlaypowerseachhadtheirdefenders.Therewerealsothinkerswhoattemptedtomaintainamoreorlessbalanceddualism.Aroundthecloseofthethirteenthcentury,theParisiantheologiansGilesofRomeandJamesofViterbocomposedtreatisesespousingaviewofclericalauthoritythroughoutsocietythathasbeendubbed“hierocratic,”becauseofthegovern-mentalpoweritascribestothepriesthood,transcendentlytothepope.IntheearlyfourteenthcenturyamorerealisticprescriptionfortheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext39separationofpowersbetweensecularandecclesiasticalmonarchssurfacedintheworksofwitnessestotherecentpoliticalevents,suchasthetheologianJohnofParis.AradicallyantihierocraticlinewastakeninMarsiliusofPadua’sDefenderofPeace,completedin1324,whichdepictedpapalclaimsto“fullnessofpower”(plenitudopotestatis)intemporalaswellasspiritualmattersasanoverwhelm-ingthreattotranquillityandorder.Afinalmedievalcontributiononthepapalistsidecamein1326,withtheSummaonEcclesias-ticalPowerofAugustineofAncona(calledAugustinusTriumphusfromthesixteenthcentury).However,thelargestbodyofmedieval“political”writingwasproducedbythesameWilliamofOckhamwhoistraditionallygivensomuchcreditorblamefornominalismandtheviamoderna.OckhambelievedthattheAvignonesepopeJohnXXIIhadfallenintoheresybyofficiallycondemningassertionsoftheabsolutepovertyofChristandtheapostlesthatmostFran-ciscansregardedasacceptedChristiantruth.Heaccordinglywroteamassivedialogueonheresy,“especiallyofthepope.”Inlaterworksmorebroadlyaddressedtoquestionsofecclesiasticalandlaypower,Ockhamdefendedthenormalindependenceofeachfromtheotherwhileallowingthatdeparturesfromthenorm–ineitherdirection–weresometimesnecessary.Itiseasytoexaggeratetheradicalismofantihierocraticoranti-authoritarianthemesinthethoughtofaMarsiliusoranOckham.Legaltheoryandmoralphilosophyintheprecedingcenturiescon-tainmuchthatissupportiveofindividualconscienceandnaturalrights,includingtherightsofsecularandreligiouscommunitiestotakeactionagainsttheirrulersinextremecases.StudentsofThomasAquinasdrewfromhisthoughtandfromAristotle’sPoliticsastronginterestina“mixed”constitutionasthebestformofgovernment,onecombiningelementsofmonarchy,aristocracy,anddemocracy.33However,whenalloftheseideasarecombinedwiththoseofMar-siliusandOckham,andwiththetheoriesofsovereigntyelaboratedbythehierocrats,wehavethetumultuousbeginningsofmodernEuropeanpoliticalthought.Beforetheturnofthecenturytheattentiveearmightalsodiscernothersignsofchange.Afterdecadesofterministlogicandnominalistmetaphysics,JohnWyclif,masteroftheologyatOxford,broughtthecounterclaimsofrealism,neverentirelyextinguishedatanypointintheMiddleAges,resoundinglybacktocenterstage.Forhim,theCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n40stevenp.marronecommonanduniversal,farfrombeingamatterofmerenames,wasahigherrealitythantheindividualandparticular.Inpolitics,Wyclifdrewupontraditionalattacksonecclesiasticalwealthandworld-linesstoadvocatethevirtualdisendowmentofthechurch.Thisgainedhimamomentaryhearinginroyalcirclesofthe1370sinEngland.ThePeasants’Revoltof1381souredaristocraticpatronsonWyclif’sideas,butmoreseedsforareorderingofsocietyhadbeensown.Meanwhile,scholasticismitself,oratleasttheunquestioneddominanceofthedialecticalanddisputatiousmethodsofthehighmedievaluniversities,begantoshowsignsofretreat.InEngland,ithasbeenargued,lawreplacedtheologyastheparamountfieldofstudy.Menofaffairsthusoustedinhabitantsoftheivorytowerasleadersintheliterarycultureofthesocialandrulingelite.34Bythen,anewairhadbeenstirringforsometimeinItaly,aself-consciouslyantischolastichumanism,convincedthatlearningandthinkinghadtobetotallyreformedforanythingofvaluetoemerge.Yetwhatdidtheleaderofthismovement,FrancescoPetrarca,thinkfittingtocarrywithhimonhisascentofMountVentoux,aventurefrequentlytakenasemblematicofthebeginningoftheRenaissance?NothingotherthantheConfessionsofSt.Augustine,thephilosophicalandspiritualautobiographyofthethinkerwithwhomournarrativeofmedievalphilosophybegan.ContrarytotheimageoftheRenaissanceasanti-Christian,AugustineandotherchurchfatherscontinuedtoexertgreatinfluenceonPetrarca’sfollowers.35Scholasticismitselfsurvived–thescholasticsberatedbyRenaissanceluminariesweremoreoftentheirowncontempo-rariesthanthefigurestouchedoninthischapter–andthetraditionofAquinasinparticularhadarebirthinthesixteenthcenturyatParisandintheSpanishschoolofSalamanca.Theseandstilllaterdevelopmentsaretouchedoninchapter13ofthisCompanion,onthepresenceofmedievalphilosophyinlaterthought.Betweenthischapterandthatone,mycolleagueswillpresenttheideasforwhichIhaveattemptedtoprovideasetting,theinsidestory,sotospeak,ofthephilosophycreatedinthecontextsdescribedthusfar.theplaceofauthorityinmedievalthoughtMostmedievalphilosophizingwasdoneinaframeworkofreli-giousbeliefsprimarilygroundedinacceptanceofparticulartextsasdivinelyinspired.Jewish,Christian,andMuslimthinkersofferedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext41argumentsforacceptingtheBibleorQur’anasdivinerevelation,36but,oncethusaccepted,thesacredtextacquiredanauthoritytran-scendinghumanreason.Astheutterlyreliablesourceoftruth,espe-ciallytruthaboutGod’snatureandpurposes,Scripturehenceforthservedasdataorpretheoreticalcommitmentforfurtherreasoning,not,asinmuchmodernthought,asanobjectofcritical–perhapsskeptical–scrutiny.Thedifferencebetweenmedievalandtypicalmodernattitudesto-wardtheauthorityofScripture(andtowardotherauthorityaswell)isrealandcannothelpbutaffectourreadingofmedievalphilosophy.Itisalsoadifferencethatshouldnotbeexaggerated.Twopointsmaybemadetogainasensibleperspective.Thefirstisthatauthority,orsomethinglikeit,playsaroleinthinkingatanytime.Nothinker,notevenaDescartes,reallystartsfromscratchor,ineventhemostscien-tificfields,attemptstoprovideproofforeverythingclaimedastrue.Inourownday,relianceonexpertsissouniversalastobeinvisible.Andtheassumptionthatpoliticalorinstitutionalsanction,wheninvoked,restsupontransparentcriteriaforconsentismoreoftenunexamined,maybeevenunjustified,thannot.Theself-consciousmedievalacquiescenceinanauthoritativevoiceisthereforenotsoblindlycredulousincomparisonwithmodernhabitsofthoughtasmightbesupposed.ThesecondpointisthatmedievalrelianceonScripture(orrespectforinstitutionsclaimingscripturalauthorization)provokedthoughtaswellaslimitingit.AsthewordofGod,Scripturecouldnotbefalse,andanythingcontrarytoScripturecouldnotbetrue.Thatsaid,however,itwasnoeasymattertodecideinparticularcasespreciselywhatconstitutedthetruth.BothBibleandQur’ancommonlyspokeonseveralsidesofanissue,requiringreconciliationtoestablishadefinitiveposition.Didthegospel,forinstance,requireChristianstobepacifists(thecommonearlyview)orcountenancejustwars(asAugustineandothersafterhimargued)?Moreimportantly,most,ifnotall,ofScripturewassubjecttointerpretation.Theformulationbythird-andfourth-centurychurchcouncilsofsuchfundamentaldog-masofmedievalChristianorthodoxyastheTrinityandIncarnationwastheoutcomeofintensedebateabouttheimportofkeyscripturalpassages(adebate,incidentally,inwhichGreekphilosophicalideasmadeasignificantcontribution).InatraditionwithrootsinclassicalGreekandRomanstrategiesforreadingthecanonictextsofmythandepic,ChristianexegetesbyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n42stevenp.marronethecentralMiddleAgesrecognizedfourinterpretativelevels.Therewastheliteralmeaningofthewords(whichcoulditselfbemetaphor-ical,aswhenphysicalqualitieswereascribedtoGod),thefiguralsignificationwheretheHebrewBibleforeshadowedtheChristianNewTestament,themorallessonembeddedintheletter,andfi-nallytheanagogicalmeaning,presagingwonderstocomeattheendoftime.37SuchahermeneuticsmadeforextraordinaryflexibilityintheemploymentofScriptureasastandardoftruth.AconsiderablestepdownfromtheBibleandtheQur’an,butstillofeminentauthority,werethewritingsofauthorstowhomtraditionhadgrantedspecialprestige.AnumberofChristianthinkerscametobeespeciallyrespectedas“doctors”orteachersofthechurch:intheEast,Athanasius,GregoryofNazianzus,Basil,andJohnChrysostom;intheWest,thefourlateRomanwritersAmbrose,Jerome,Augus-tine,andGregorytheGreat.Withtherisefromtheeleventhcenturyofinstitutionsofeccle-siasticaldisciplineinwesternEurope,andtheaccompanyingeffortstoenforcedogmaticorthodoxy–aphenomenonanticipatedbysev-eralcenturiesinEastRomeandvariouspowercentersofIslam–itbecamecommontocitepronouncementsofthechurchhierarchyasevidencefortruthandfalsehoodandperiloustogainsaythem.Therewasuniquerespectforpapalauthority,especiallyasexercisedinandwithchurchcouncilsbutalsoasexpressedinotherdeclarationsandmandates.Tobesure,noprecisetheoryofpapal,episcopal,orcon-ciliarauthoritygaineduniversalacceptanceinourperiod,evenintheWest.AsdedicatedahierocratasAugustineofAnconaacknowl-edgedthepossibilityofpapalheresy,apossibilitywhich,aswehaveseen,OckhamregardedasactualizedinJohnXXII.Nevertheless,aboutthetimethetwelfth-centuryschoolsstarttocoalesce,ecclesi-asticaloversightcomestoassumeasignificantpresenceeveninde-batesofcompletelysecularimportconcerning,forexample,naturalphilosophy.Bythetimeofthefullydevelopeduniversitysystemofthelatethirteenthcentury,afewrenowned“modern”theologiansarealsoaccordedalmostauthoritativestatus,especiallywithintheirownre-ligiousorders.Despitedisputesoverwhocountedasaveritabledoc-tor,thepresumptionoftruthincreasinglyclungtothestatementsofsuchthinkersasThomasAquinas,forDominicans,andBonaven-ture,forFranciscans.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext43philosophicalsourcesInthelateAntiquephilosophicalschools,thetextsoftheirfounderswereregardedwithprofoundrespect.Thisusuallyremainedtrueinthefaceofsubsequentdevelopmentsinquitedifferentdirections.EarlyChristianthinkersinheritedthissenseofreverence,thoughnotwithoutatouchofthecountervailingsuspicionofpaganthoughtex-pressedbyTertullian.AugustinenotsurprisinglythoughtofPlatoasdivinelyinspired,evenifnotilluminedwiththefullnessofChristiantruth.WhenthesephilosophicaltraditionswereresurrectedintheWestinthelateeleventhcentury,oldattitudesreemerged.Plato,oranyteachingattributabletohim,waspracticallyunassailableformostofthetwelfthcentury.Inthethirteenth,thesecularguidetotruthparexcellencewasAristotle,“thePhilosopher.”Again,interpretationinsuredflexibility.Tounderstandtheuseofclassicalphilosophybymedievalthinkers(ortheuseofIslamicandJewishthoughtbyLatinscholas-tics),itisvitaltoknowwhenearliertextsbecameavailabletolaterreaders.FortheavailabilityofclassicaltextsinIslam,seechapter4below.AsummaryofdatesofaccessibilityinLatinforselectedtextsisprovidedintable1.38genresFewmedievalthinkersfitthemodernimageofprofessionalphiloso-phers.Accordingly,thephilosophicallysignificantideasoftheperiodaretobefoundinliterarygenresunlikethejournalarticlesorsys-tematictreatisesoftoday.Majorformsincludemeditativeworks,theologicaltreatises,commentaries,compendiumsorsummaries,andvarioustypesof“questions”(whichareinsomerespectsratherlikejournalarticles!).Iwillsaysomethingabouteachoftheseandafewothers.MeditativeordevotionalworksaboundintheMiddleAges.Someareofconsiderablephilosophicalinterest.AmongtheearliestisAugustine’sConfessions,oneofthegreatestmonumentstospec-ulationofalltime.Boethius’sConsolationofPhilosophyprovidesaclassicexamplefromthesixthcentury.WiththereturnofinterestinphilosophicalthinkingintheWestintheeleventhcentury,theCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTable1EarliesttranslationsofGreek,Hebrew,andArabicworksintoLatinAuthorWorkTranslatorDatePlatoTimaeusCalcidiusc.400AristotleCategoriesBoethiusc.510–22DeinterpretationeBoethiusc.510–22PriorAnalyticsBoethiusc.510–22PosteriorAnalyticsJamesofVenice?1125–50TopicsBoethiusc.510–22SophisticalBoethiusc.510–22RefutationsPhysicsJamesofVenice?1125–50DeanimaJamesofVenice?1125–50Metaphysics(nearlyMichaelScotc.1220–24complete)NicomacheanEthicsRobertGrosseteste?1246–47(complete)PoliticsWilliamof?1260MoerbekePorphyryIntroduction(Isagoge)Boethiusc.510–22ProclusElementsofTheologyWilliamof1268MoerbekeAnonymousLiberdecausis(drawnGerardofCremonabefore1187fromProclus)Ps.-DionysiusMysticalTreatisesScottusEriugena862IbnSinaMetaphysics(BookofDominicusafter1150HealingIV)GundisalviDeanima(BookofIbnDaoudandafter1152HealingIII.6)DominicusGundisalviIbnGabirolFountainofLifeIohannesHispanusafter1152andDominicusGundisalviMaimonidesGuidefortheAnonymousc.1230PerplexedIbnRushdGreatCommentaryonMichaelScotc.1220–35Aristotle’sPhysicsGreatCommentaryonMichaelScotc.1220–24Aristotle’sDeanimaGreatCommentaryonMichaelScotc.1220–24Aristotle’sMetaphysicsMiddleCommentaryHermanthe?1240onAristotle’sGermanNicomacheanEthicsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext45moderevives,Anselm’sProslogionandMonologionleadingthewayandBonaventure’sMind’sRoadtoGodcontinuingthetraditionforhighscholasticismofthethirteenthcentury.Theologicaltreatisesinvestigatingreligiousdoctrineorcombat-ingperceivederrorwerealsonumerous.Theytendedtorelyheavilyonscripturalorotherreligiousauthority,butthedesiretounderstandwhatwasbelievedortoexpressitclearlyoftenyieldedphilosophicalinsights.Again,AugustineestablishedthepatternwithhisTheTrin-ity,andBoethiuscontributedwithaclusterofshortworkshighlyinfluentialinshapingtheterminologyofLatinphilosophyforthelater,scholasticperiod.TheCarolingiansproducedwritingsofthissort,spectacularlyinthecaseofScottusEriugena,asdidscatteredfiguresinIslamandJudaism.Maimonides’GuideforthePerplexed,forexample,retainsitsprominenceuptothepresent.Theuniver-sitiesofthehighmedievalWestprovedespeciallyfertilegroundforthiskindofcomposition,examplesrangingfromGrosseteste’sthirteenth-centuryHexaemeron¨,amany-sidedexplorationofthesixdaysofCreation,totheEnglishmanThomasBradwardine’sOnGod’sCause,AgainstPelagiusinthefourteenthcentury.Despitetheirim-mediatefocusondogmatics,alltheseworksturnconstantlytophi-losophyforargumentandelucidation.Theancienttraditionofcommentaries,particularlyontheclassicsofthephilosophicallegacy,wascontinuedandfurtherdevelopedintheMiddleAges.39BoethiusmadeaconspicuousstartwithhisintentionofcommentingonallofPlatoandAristotle.Thecommentarieshedidachieve,onmuchofAristotle’sOrganonandonotherlogicaltexts,suchasPorphyry’sIntroduction,likehisthe-ologicaltreatisessetthestage,aftercenturiesofincubation,forthespeculativerenaissanceoftheeleventhandtwelfthcenturies.Com-mentariesonclassicalphilosophicalworks,andnotjustinlogic,proliferatedinwesternEuropeinthetwelfthcentury.Moreimpor-tantinthelongrunweretheeffortsofMuslimscholars.IbnSina’sBookofHealingcanbeconsideredavastcommentaryonallofAris-totle.IbnRushdtookthecommentaryformtoitsheight.Althoughhedidnotescapecriticism(Aquinas,withrarebitterness,calledhim“theDepraver”ofAristotle,not“theCommentator”),hisglossesontheAristoteliancorpusdominatedthefieldforhundredsofyears,intheLatinWestmostofall.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n46stevenp.marroneFromthesemodelssprangavirtualindustryofcommentaryonthephilosophicalclassicsamonguniversityscholars,notonlyartsmas-terslikeJohnBuridan,whocommentedonAristotle’snaturalscienceandethicsinthefourteenthcentury,butalsotheologians.AlberttheGreatintroducedtheWesttothewholerangeofthePhilosopher’sthought,andhisstudentThomasAquinasatthesummitofhisca-reerasteacherofsacreddoctrineproduceddetailedexpositionsofmajorAristoteliantreatisesinlogic,metaphysics,andnaturalandmoralphilosophy.Somescholasticcommentaries,includingmostofAquinas’s,were“literal”:phrase-by-phraseexplicationsofthetext.Otherswereinquestionform,posingandresolvingobjectionstoAristotle’sdoctrineandsometimestakingtheopportunitytoputforwardthecommentator’sownideasatsomelength.40Byfarthegreatestnumberofmedievalcompositionswithsignif-icantphilosophicalcontentwerepeculiartotheschoolsofwesternEuropeinthehighMiddleAges,firstcathedralcentersandthenuniversities.AlreadyinthetwelfthcenturytextbooksdesignedforclassroomusewerebeingproducedinItaly,France,andEngland.Aprominenttypewasthecompendium(summaorsummula)onlogic.Theall-timeclassicinthislinewastheSummulaelogicalesofthethirteenth-centuryDominican,PeterofSpain.Thefourteenthcenturysawmanymore,fromWilliamofOckham’sSummatotiuslogicaetoPaulofVenice’snumeroushandbooks.Thequestion(quaestio),thegenremostcloselyidentifiedwithhighmedievalscholasticism,arosefromtheclassroomexercisesthattypifiedpedagogyintheWestfromthetwelfthcenturyon:debateordisputation.41Pittingstudentagainststudent,sometimesmasteragainstmaster,thesedebatesnotonlyhonedskillsinlogicbutalsoservedastheprincipalvehicleforinvestigatingtheissues.Abelard’sSicetnon,aclassroomtextfortheology,openedthewaytothelit-eraryappropriationofthisinitiallyoraltechnique,andbythethir-teenthcenturyalldisciplines,fromartstothehigherprofessionalstudies,includingtheology,hadacceptedthedisputationalformasstandardforthewrittendisseminationofideas.Collectionsofques-tions,sometimesdrawnfromtheschoolroom,sometimesfromfor-maldebatesbetweenmasters,sometimescomposedprivatelyintheauthor’sstudy,dominatedtheLatinscholarlyworld.Atypicalquestionbeganwithastatementofaproblemorthesis,followedbyalistofargumentsononesideoftheissueandanotherCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext47listinopposition.Thecoreconsistedinthedetermination(deter-minatio).Herethemasterlaidouthisconsideredresponse.Attheendusuallycameaseriesofshorteranswerstoargumentsfromtheinitiallistingsthatremainedunresolved.Fromthelaterthirteenthcenturyonward,morecomplexlystructuredquestionsarenotun-common:theinitialsetsofargumentsmayincludeobjectionsandresponses(thoughnotthefinalresponses),andtheremaybeanaddi-tionalroundofargumentsattheend(dubitationesadditae),aftertheinitialor“principal”argumentshavebeendispatched.Greatcareissometimesneededtotracktheauthor’sposition.Gatheringsofquestionsdrawnfromamaster’sclassroomdispu-tationsonaparticulartopic,intheologymostofteninconjunctionwiththerequiredcourseonLombard’sSentences,werepublished–offeredforpublicdisseminationbyuniversitybooksellers–as“ordi-naryquestions”(quaestionesordinariae).42Scotus’sandOckham’scoursesontheSentencesaremajorsourcesfortheirphilosophicalaswellastheologicalideas.Thepolishedrevisionsofspecialmagis-terialdebateswherequestionswereposedfromtheaudienceabout“anythingatall”(quaestionesquodlibetales)areourchiefsourcefortheideasofsuchimportantthinkersasGodfreyofFontainesandJamesofViterboandarecrucialalsoforourunderstandingofHenryofGhent.Inthethirteenthcenturymasterswouldoccasionallydesigntheirowncompilationsforawholefield,evenonesovastastheology.Theycomedowntousassummas,themostcelebratedofwhichisAquinas’sSummatheologiae.Thefourteenthcenturywit-nessedtheevolutionofseveralkindsofdisputationofexceptionalformalrigor,forexamplethoseassociatedwiththelogicalpuzzlesandthe“obligations”mentionedabove.Eachproducedaliterarysubgenreofaspecifictype.Inallcases,forquestionsdebatedinanactualcourseoracademicexercise,whatcirculatedwasnotalwaysarevisionoverseenbythemasterbutsometimesareport(reportatio)assembledfromthenotesofsomeoneintheaudience.Onthisandrelatedmatters,seechapter14inthisvolume.Thereremainthreegenresaboutwhichafewwordsarerequired.TheLatinandGreektraditionsfromearlyon,andeventuallytheArabaswell,yieldedworksdevotedsimplytonaturalphilosophy.Theymightbecompendia,asIsidore’sEtymologies,ordialogues,asAdelard’sNaturalQuestions.ArabscholarsexcelledinastronomyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n48stevenp.marroneandoptics,andtheirworksinthesefieldsprofoundlyinfluencedscienceandphilosophyofthelatemedievalandearlymodernWest.Collectedlettersandsermons,theChristianandJewishequivalenttotheorationsoftheclassicalgoldenage,canbeminedfornuggetsofphilosophicalspeculationfrompracticallyanycenturyinourpe-riod.Finally,wemustnotforgetpolemics,especiallythoseinspiredbypoliticalstrife.43TheevolutionofgovernmentinthehighandlatemedievalWeststimulatedexceptionaldemandforsuchworks,manyofwhichimplicatemattersofmoralandpoliticaltheorystillresonantinthemodernworld.notes1.SeethecompellingrecentstatementofthecasebyP.Hadot[406].ThereisalsohisPhilosophyasaWayofLife[407].2.E.R.Dodds[402]92.3.Seeibid.105–8andP.Brown[66]90–93.4.SeeP.Brown[66]94–95onthesePlatonistsandhowtheyinfluencedAugustine.5.Seeibid.299–307.6.Proclus,ElementsofTheology[381].Pseudo-Dionysius,TheCompleteWorks[78].7.SeeA.Cameron[395]andH.J.Blumenthal[393].8.SeerecentworkoncultureinW.A.Goffart[404]andP.Amory[392],andoneconomybywayofarchaeology,inR.HodgesandD.Whitehouse[409].9.Stillthebestintroductiontothiscultureoflate-Roman,earlymedievalEuropeisP.Riche[´421]139–210and266–90.10.Onthis,seeO.Chadwick[397].11.Onthiscultureofearlywesternmonasticism,seeagainP.Riche[´421]100–22and290–303.12.SeetheperennialfavoriteamongmedievalChristianreaders,TheLifeofSt.MartinbythelearnedRomanstylist,SulpiciusSeverus[427].OnMartinasparadigmforatypeofChristianprominence,seeP.Brown[394]106–27.13.W.Levison[414].14.AsR.W.Southernhasobserved,bytheeleventhcenturytherealityoftheBenedictinelifeformonksatthemostprestigiousofmonasticcommunities,Cluny,wasalmostentirelyabsorbedintheroutineofcommoncelebrationofservicesinthechoir([425]160–64).StillthebestdescriptionoftheintellectualandspiritualinclinationsofthismonasticCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyincontext49cultureisbyJ.Leclercq[413].Foramorerecenttakeonthesamesubject,seeM.Carruthers[396].SeealsoJ.Coleman[399].Allofthelatter,however,drawheavilyondevelopmentsafter1100.15.Foranintroduction,seeL.WhiteJr.’sclassicMedievalTechnologyandSocialChange[431].16.R.W.Southern[146]33–35,40–41.17.ForAnselm’sdefenseoftheemploymentofreasonintheologicalmat-tersasawayofachievingan“understanding”thatis“midwaybetweenfaithanddirectvision,”seehislettertoPopeUrbanIIat[138]I(II)39–41,translatedinpartbyG.Schufreider[144]240–41.18.Seeforastart,L.M.deRijk[471]andG.Nuchelmans[468].19.AdelardofBath,Quaestionesnaturales1and4;trans.R.C.Dales[401]39–40.20.M.-D.Chenu[507]4–18.21.SeeR.W.Southern’sdefinitivecontributiontothedebatein[426]61–85.22.Despitehisoppositiontothenewrationalism,Bernard’sownwrit-ingsrepresentaconsiderablereorientationofmonasticthoughtto-wardAugustinianaspirationstowisdom.Thepresenceofthesemore“philosophical”rhythmsinLatinmonasticspeculationfromthetwelfthcenturyoniswhatmakesmodernstudiesofwesternmonasticlearning–forexample,thethreementionedaboveattheendofnote14–typicallymorereliableguidestohighthantocentralmedievalmonasticsensibilities.23.SeeB.Lawn[412]10–13.24.SeeR.I.Moore[420].25.SeeselectionsfromthecanonsofthecouncilinE.Peters[23]173–78.26.R.I.Moore[419].27.SeeS.P.Marrone[200].28.A.deLibera[415].29.Forastartontheenormousliteratureonthecondemnations,beginwithR.Hissette[408].30.SeeA.deLibera[416]aswellasK.Ruh[423],R.Imbach[410],andinEnglish,B.McGinn[364].31.ThehistoriographicalstorygoesbacktoP.Duhem[510].Foranintro-duction,seeJ.Murdoch[528].32.E.Gilson[403].33.Onrights,seeB.Tierney[589]andA.S.Brett[572].Onthemixedcon-stitution,seeJ.M.Blythe[571].34.SeeW.Courtenay[400]365–68.35.C.Trinkaus[429].36.See,forexample,Augustine,TheAdvantageofBelieving[55];Aquinas,ScGI,cc.3–6;STIIaIIae,q.2,a.9,ad3.Therelationshipofnatural,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n50stevenp.marronephilosophicalreasoningtorevealedtruthisamajorthemeinphilosophyinIslamandinmedievalJewishphilosophy,asdiscussedinchapters4and5below.37.SeeH.deLubac[417]andB.Smalley[424].38.ThistabledrawsheavilyuponthecompendiuminCHLMP74–79.At-tributionsanddatesforthetranslationsofIbnSinaandIbnGabirolrelyonA.Rucquoi[422].Thecomplexandoftenuncertainhistoryoftrans-lationsofGreekphilosophyintheIslamicworldresiststabulation.SeeD.Gutas[490],C.d’AnconaCosta[476],G.EndressandJ.A.Aertsen[168],F.Rosenthal[496],andJ.Krayeetal.[18]forguidance.39.SeeE.Jeauneauin[36]117–31.40.Forexamplesofbothliteralcommentaryandcommentaryinquestionform,seeCTII.41.SeeC.Violain[36]11–30.42.Onthevarioustypesofscholasticquaestio,consultthechaptersbyB.C.Bazan,J.-G.Bougerol,J.F.Wippel,andJ.E.Murdochin[´36]31–100;B.C.Bazan´etal.[37];andO.Weijers[430].43.Foronesubtype,seeJ.Miethkein[36]193–211.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\njohnmarenbonandd.e.luscombe2Twomedievalideas:eternityandhierarchyBothoftheideaspresentedinthischapterhaverootsinlateAntiqueNeoplatonism,buttheirdevelopmentisdistinctivelyme-dieval.Boethiusframedafreshdefinitionofeternity,andifPseudo-DionysiustheAreopagitedidnotinventthetermhierarchy,heputastamponthetermthatwastocarryitthroughmanycenturiesinmanycontexts.Eternityandhierarchycanberegardedassomethinglikethetemporalandontologicalcoordinatesofmedievalthought,witheternityembracingalltimeandhierarchyverticallygradingallbeings.Thetwoideasareatanyratebothpresuppositionsandproblemsformuchofwhatfollowsinthisvolume.eternity(johnmarenbon)WhatdidmedievalthinkersmeanwhentheycalledGod“eternal”?Wenowgivetwomainsensesto“eternity”:perpetuity(“P-eternity”)–whensomethinglacks(Pi)abeginningor(Pii)endor(Piii)both;or(“O-eternity”)beingaltogetheroutsideandunmeasur-ablebytime.PhilosophersusuallyexplainO-eternityas“timeless-ness.”Somethingistimeless,theysay,whenitiswithouteitherextensionorpositionintime,andsonosentencesthatcontaintimereferencesofanysortaretrueofit.Onthisaccount,nothingcanbebothP-eternalandO-eternal,sinceaP-eternalthingexistsatmanytimes(alltimesinthecaseofPiii),whereasanO-eternalthingexistsatnotime.Medievalphilosophersandtheologiansalsotalkedabouteternity,sometimesinthesenseofP-eternityandsometimesinthesenseofO-eternity.ButanumberofthemthoughtthatGodiseternalinbothsenses:indeed,someevenconsideredthatheisO-eternal51CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n52johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombebecauseheisP-eternal.Clearly,then,manymedievalphilosophersdidnotunderstandO-eternityastimelessness–althoughmostoftheirmoderninterpretersinsistthattheydid.Andthereareatleasttwoothersurprisingelementsinthemedievaldiscussionthatwillbaffleunlesstheyareclearlyrecognized.First,therewasanasymmetrybetweenattitudestowardbegin-ninglessnessandthosetowardendlessness.Angels,humansouls,and,indeed,thepunishmentofthedamnedwereallthoughttohavebeginningsbutnoends.Manythinkers,however,tookaquitediffer-entviewaboutbeginninglessness.TheywerenotcontentmerelytoacceptonauthoritythatallofGod’screaturesinfacthaveabegin-ning:theyarguedthatitwasincompatiblewithbeingacreaturetolack,notjustanend,butalsoabeginning.1Theviewwasspelledoutbythetwelfth-centurythinkerRichardofSt.Victorandfrequentlycitedinthethirteenthcentury;2attheendofthecentury,HenryofGhentproposedasophisticatedargumentforit.3Fromthispointofview,then,Piii-eternityisawayofbeingmetaphysicallydifferentfromthatofotherthings,andpeculiartoGod.Second,timewasgenerallyconsideredtohavebeencreated.Tomedievalthinkers,then,ifsomethingbeganwithtime,itdidnotmeanthatthethingiswithoutabeginning.Ofcourse,itdidnothaveabeginningintime.Butthereisaverystrongtendencyinthemedievaldiscussions–sometimesmadeexplicit–tothinkoftimeasjustonespeciesofduration;otherspeciesofduration,suchaseter-nityandalsoaeviternity(thespecialendlessdurationofangels),wereapparentlyconsideredbysomeasstretchingoutbeyondtime,andbyotherstostandindifferentandmorecomplicatedrelationshipstotime.4BoethiusThetreatmentofGod’seternitybyBoethius,aChristianthoroughlyfamiliarwithGreekpaganNeoplatonism,wasthestartingpointformostmedievaldiscussions.Atfirstsight,Boethius’sanalysisseemstoshownoneofthepuzzlingfeaturesmentionedabove.BothinOntheTrinity(§4)andintheConsolationofPhilosophy(V,pr.6.2–12),5heclearlydifferentiatesthewayinwhichtheworld,ac-cordingtothephilosophers,hasnobeginningorendingand“neverbeginsnorceasestobe,anditslifeisextendedalongwiththeinfin-ityoftime,”fromGod’seternity,which,inadefinitionthatbecameCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy53classic,is“thewhole,perfectandsimultaneouspossessionofun-endinglife.”TherecanbenodoubtthatBoethiusismakingacleardistinctionbetweenP-eternityandtheO-eternitythatcharacterizesGod’slife.ButwhatexactlydoesBoethiusunderstandbyO-eternity?Almostallmoderncommentatorsconsiderthatheregardsitastime-lesseternity,6althoughsomeacknowledgethatitisaricherideathanthatofmerelackoftemporalextensionandposition,becauseitinvolveslife,andevengrantthat,althoughtimeless,itinvolvesduration.7Timelessduration,however,isadifficultconcept;somewouldsayanincoherentone.8Boethius’sdiscussionofO-eternitycanbeinterpretedinalessproblematicway.BoethiusdiscusseseternityinordertoexplainGod’swayofknowing.HisdescriptionofdivineeternityneedbetakenasnomorethananaccountofhowGodliveshislifeandcar-riesouthislifeactivityofknowing.Tosayheiseternalmeansthathehasallhislifeatonce.Thereis,therefore,nomovementorchangeinhislife.IthasbeenarguedthatBoethiusmusthaveconsidereddivineeter-nityastimeless,becausethetopologyofsimultaneoustemporaleter-nityisself-contradictory:itrequiresearlierandlatertemporalpartstobesimultaneous.9ButBoethius,onthereadingproposedhere,isdescribing,notthetopologyofaspecialsortofduration,eternity,butGod’swayofliving.Onepassagedoesseematfirstsighttobecomparingthestructuresoftimeandeternity:Boethiussaysthatthenever-endingmotionoftemporalthingsismadeupofmomentsthatareeachimitations,failedattemptsto“fulfillandexpress”the“ever-presentstateofunchanginglife”whichiseternity.But,asthisphrasingindicates,Boethiusisnottalkinghereabouttimebutaboutthechangingexistenceoftemporalthings.SoBoethiusmaybeclaimingnomorethanthateverythingwhichhappensinGod’slifehappenstogether,ratherthaninsuccession:God’slife,then,isasingle,indivisible,unchangingact,withoutendorbeginning.Onthisreading,whenBoethiuscontrastsGod’seter-nitywiththeworld’sunendingduration,heisnotdenyingthatdi-vineeternityitselfenduresunendingly,butispointingoutthatithasaspecialcharacteristic–thatofbeingalifelivedwhollysimul-taneously–whichisnotsharedbyanyothereverlastinglyenduringthing.ManysentencesaboutGodthataretemporallyqualifiedortensedwillbetrue,althoughtheywillbemisleadingifthetemporallanguageistakentomeanthatGodcanchangeinanyway.10CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n54johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombeAnselmInhisMonologion(1076),AnselmsetsouttheproblemofGod’seternityfarmoreexplicitlythanBoethius.11First(§18),heestab-lishesthatGodhasnobeginningorend:sinceitwasalwaystruethatsomethingwillexist,andwillalwaysbetruethatsomethingexisted,truthiswithoutbeginningorend,andGodistruth.ThenAnselmgoesontodrawoutaparadox.Ontheonehand,hesays(§20),Godexistsateverytime,becauseeverything,includingtime,dependsonhiminordertoexistatall.Yet,fromthisposition,itscontrarycanbeshowntofollow(§21).Godhasnoparts,andsoifheexistsatalltimes,hemustexistasawholeatalltimes.Itwillnotbeenoughforhimtoexist,ashumansdo,inacertainsenseasawholebut“separatelyanddistinctly”atdifferenttimes,forinthatcasehewouldbebrokenupintotemporalparts–animpossibilityforsomethingabsolutelysimple.Buthowcanheexistproperlyasawholeatalltimes,whentimesthemselvesareconsecutive,notsimultaneous(Anselm’sversionofthetopologicalobjectiontosi-multaneoustemporaleternitymentionedabove)?TheonlywaytopreservedivinesimplicityistosaythatGodexistsatnotime.Anselmresolvesthecontradictionbyarguing(§22)thatGodisabletoexistproperlyasawholeatalltimes,becauseitisonlythosethingsboundedandmeasuredbytimethattimebreaksupintoparts.Goddoesindeedexistateverytime,butitisbettertosaythatheexists“withtime,”ratherthan“intime,”becausewhenthephrase“intime”isusedofotherthings,itmeansthattimecontainsthem,whereasinGod’scaseheisnotcontainedbytime,butispresentateverytime.Anselmbelieves,then,thatGod’sPiii-eternityhelpstoexplainhow,thoughnottimeless,hecanbeO-eternal.WhydoesAnselmthinkthat,bylackingtemporalbeginningandend,Godisabletobeeternalinthisspecial,simultaneousway,especiallysincehehasnoticedthetopologicalobjectiontosuchsi-multaneitywithouttimelessness?12TosaythatGodisnotboundedbytimemeansatleastthatnomomentoftimeisGod’sfirstorlastmoment.Anselmconsidersthattimemeasuresthingsbybound-ingthem.Itcannotbound,andsocannotmeasure,somethingthathasnofirstorlastmoment.Time’sfailuretoactasametricforeternityseems,inAnselm’sview,tohavetopologicalconsequences:divineeternity,heconsiders,willlackthetopologicalstructureofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy55successivemomentssharedbyallthingsthattimebounds.God,then,issufficientlydifferentfromtemporalthingstobeabletolivehislifesimultaneously,butwithoutbeingtimeless.13TheearlythirteenthcenturyTwoofthefullestdiscussionsofeternityfromtheearlythirteenth-centuryUniversityofParisarethoseintheSummaFratrisAlexandri(SFA),compiledin1236–45bytheFranciscanpupilsofAlexanderofHales,14andintheSummadebonoofPhiliptheChancellor(d.1236).15SFAborrowsagreatdealfromAnselm’sMonologion,butitaddstheidea(mem.1,cap.1,a.2;§57)thatthereisaseriesofdifferentsortsofdurations,rangingfrometernitytotime.God’seternityhasneitherbeginningnorend,norisitchangeable;theaeviternityoftheangelshasabeginningbutnoend,anditisnotchangeable;timehasabeginning,ithasnoendfromitselfbutitwillbeendedbyanother(God),anditischangeable.Thisseriescanbeusedtoestablishade-greeofcommonmeaningbetween“eternal”usedofGodandusedof,forinstance,thepunishmentsofhell.Clearly,then,althoughSFAconsidersthatthereismoretoGod’seternitythanjustlackingbe-ginningandend,itisworkingfromtheideaofitbeingsomesortofP-eternitywithextraconditions,inparticularunchangingness.LikeAnselm,SFAisbothunwillingtogiveupGod’somnitemporality(mem.4,q.unic.,§71),andyetdoesnotthinkthatomnitemporal-itytellsthefull,oreventhemostimportant,story.16Atmoments,SFAmovestowarddefiningeternityasadurationofadifferentsortfromtime:lackinginsuccession(mem.1,cap.3,ad.4;§59)anddis-tinguishablefromtime,evenweretimeinfiniteinbothdirections,becauseitisanunmovingstateofever-presentness.Philip’sratherbriefertreatmentismoredefiniteinbringingouttheideaofeternityasduration,liketime,butofaquitedifferentsort(yetnottimeless).Philipconsidersthatthetwodurations,timeandeternity,aretogether(simul),althoughoneiscontainedbytheother.Butonthisview,timeseemstobeequaltoapartofeternity,andso,byusingtimeasameasuremany–perhapsinfinitelymany–times,willitnotbepossibletomeasureouteternity?And,sincestretchesoftimemakeupnothingotherthantime,timewillbeequalto(thewholeof)eternity.Philipofferstwodifferentresponses.Onthefirst,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n56johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombewhichhassimilaritieswithAnselm’sapproach,hearguesthateveniftimewerestretchedoutinfinitely(presumablybymultiplyingit),itwouldextendwithoutlimitonlyintothefuture,whereaseternityhasnobeginning.Onthesecond,Philipallowsthattimemightbeinfiniteinbothdirectionsandsoitmightbeequaltoeternity,butitwouldstillnotbethesameaseternity.Timeisasuccessionandisdividedintoparts,whereaseternityiswithoutpartsandsuccession.Philipoffersafurtherexplanationofhowthetwosortsofdurationarerelated.Thenowofthepresentmoment,consideredinitself,withouttheprecedingandfollowingnows,is“apartofeternityoreternity”:“remaininginitself”itproduceseternity,butwithitsprecedingandfollowingnowsitmakestime.Overall,Philipseemstoviewtimeandeternityastwoconcurrentdurations,differentintheirtopology.AlthoughGodexistsineternity,nottime,Philip’sviewallowstemporalstatementstobetrueofGod,solongastheydonotimplyanychangeinhim.Dosuchviewsmakesense?Theideathattherearedifferentsortsofdurationisnotfardistant(vocabularyapart)fromthenotionofdis-unifiedtimeentertainedbysomemodernphilosophers.17Buttherearefurtherproblems.Themultipletimestreamsofmodernphiloso-phersarealltimelikeintheirtopology,bycontrastwiththirteenth-centurythinkers’eternity.AnditishardtoseehowtheirconceptofeternitydoesnotentailthatGodistimeless,althoughtheyclearlydonotthinkheis.AquinasandAlberttheGreatInAquinas’streatmentofeternity–broughtmostfullytogetherinq.10ofthefirstpartofhisSummatheologiae–thetensionisevengreaterthanintheearlythirteenth-centuryaccounts.Bychangesinemphasisfromtheseearlieraccounts,hepresentsthetopologyofeternityinsuchawaythateternitymightwellbeconsideredtime-lessduration;18yetsomepassagesindicatethathedoesnotconsiderittimeless.LikeSFAandPhilip,Aquinas(a.4)acceptsthatonedifferencebe-tweentimeandeternityisthattimehasabeginningandend,whereaseternityhasneither,buthegoesontoexplainthatthisdifferenceisaccidental.Hisviewsontheeternityoftheworldrequiredhimtomakesuchaqualification.Bythetimeofhismaturity,AquinasCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy57heldthatGodcouldhavecreatedaworldthatlackedtemporalbe-ginning(andthathecouldhavecreatedthingsthatlackedbeginningandend–cf.a.5).Hecouldnot,therefore,makelackofbeginningandendthedistinctivefeatureofdivineeternity.Rather,helookstotheothercharacteristicbroughtforwardbyPhilip,thelackofsuc-cession,todistinguishGod’seternityfromanysortoftime,eveneverlasting.Eternityis(asBoethiussaid)“allatonce”(totasimul);thereis(a.1;a.5)noorderingofearliertolaterinit.AlthoughtherearepassageswhereAquinas,liketheearlierwriters,envisageseter-nityasstretchingoutbeyondtime,heplacesmoreemphasisontheideathateternityis“allentirelyatonce.”Thesuggestionseemstobethateternityisunextended,anditisreinforcedbythefamouspas-sageintheSummacontraGentiles(I66),whereAquinascompareseternitytoapointatthecenterofacircle,andtimetothecircle’scircumference.Itwouldbetempting,therefore,toconcludethatAquinasthoughtofeternityastimeless.Buttherearepartsofthisdiscussionthatmakeithardtodrawthisconclusion.Consider,forexample,howheexplainswhytheBiblereferstoGodusingtemporallanguage.“WordsreferringtovariousdifferenttimesareattributedtoGod,”heexplains(a.2,ad4),“insofarashiseternityincludesalltimes,notbecausehehimselfvariesaccordingtopast,presentandfuture.”ThefirstpartofthisreplyseemstomakeGodexistatalltimes(notatnone),andthesecondshowswhyhethinkstemporallanguagemisleadsaboutGod:notbecauseheistimeless,butbecauseheisimmutableandsuchlanguagesuggeststhathechangesfromonetimetoanother.19InhislateSummatheologiae(c.1270),20Aquinas’sformerteacher,AlberttheGreat,comesnearertoproposingdivineeternityastimeless.Consideredinitself,eternityisjustGod’snever-beginningandnever-endingexistence.Thereisindeedanotheraspectofit:infiniteextensionintothepastandthefuture.ButthisaspectismerelyinthemindofthosewhothinkaboutGod’seternity.AsAlbertputsit:Eternityiscalledadurationandaspannotbecausethesubstanceandthewhatofeternityisextended,butbecauseoftheextensionofthesoul,whichextendsitselfunfailinglyandexcellinglyabovealldurationthatisbeneathit.Andsoeternityisnotdividedaccordingtosubstanceandpartsthatareineternityitself,butaccordingtothesubstanceandpartsthatareinthethingsbeneathitthathaveduration.(cap.1,a.1,ad1)CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n58johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombeAlbertthusstripsdivineeternityitselfofanytemporalorquasitem-poralcharacteristics,whileprovidingthroughhispsychologicalaccountthelinkstotheworldoftimethateverymedievalauthorseemstohavefoundnecessary.21TimelessnessandtheProblemofPrescienceMedievaldiscussionofGod’seternitywasoftenlinkedtothe“Prob-lemofPrescience.”Godisomniscient,andsohemustknowfutureeventsaswellaspastandpresentones.Butthisknowledgeseemstodeterminethefuture,sothattherearenofuturecontingentevents.IfGodknowsalreadynowthatIshallgototheoperatomorrow,thenitseemsthatIwillhavenochoicetomorrowoverwhetherIdoordonotgo:forhowcouldI,byspendingtheeveningathome,makeGod’sknowledgeintoafalsebelief?Themostobviouswayofformulatingthisideamorestrictlyistosaythat,sinceasamatterofdefinitionwhatisknownistrue,then(1)IfGodknowsewillhappen,thenewillhappennecessarily.(1),however,isalogicalblunder.Allthatweareentitledtoassertis(2)Necessarily:ifGodknowsewillhappen,thenewillhappen.(2),however,isperfectlyconsistentwiththerebeingcontingentfu-tureevents.So,istheProblemofPresciencemerelytheresultofalogicalconfusion?No:theintuitiononwhichitisbasedissound,butthelogicalforminwhichitisexpressedneedstocapturethepointthatGod’sknowledgecomesbeforetheeventknown.Suppose(2)isadjustedtoread:(3)Necessarily:ifGodknewewillhappen,thenewillhappen.Notonlyistheantecedentof(3)(“Godknewewillhappen”)trueforanyevente,butsinceitisaboutapastevent,itisnecessarilytrue,inthesense(called“accidentalnecessity”)thatwhathashappenedcannotbealtered.Wecan,then,assert(4)Necessarily,Godknewewillhappen.Mostmodallogicsholdthat,from“Necessarily,ifpthenq,”and“Necessarilyp,”therefollows“Necessarilyq.”Andso(3)and(4)doseemtoentailCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy59(5)ewillhappennecessarily.Theargument(3–5),the“accidentalnecessityargument,”isthemostcogentwayofpresentingtheProblemofPrescience.God’stimelessnessprovidesaneatwaytoavoidit.IfGodistimeless(inthestrictsense,accordingtowhichnotemporalortensedsen-tenceistrueofGod),thenGod’sknowingthatewillhappenisnotapasteventandsoitisnotaccidentallynecessary:(4)isfalseandsotheaccidentalnecessityargumentfails.Modernphilosophersofre-ligionusuallycallthiswayoftacklingtheProblemofPresciencethe“Boethiansolution,”andtheyregardAquinasasoneofitsfollowers.IfBoethiusandAquinasreallydidtackletheaccidentalnecessityargumentinthisway,then–despitewhatwasarguedabove–theymusthaveconsideredGod’seternitytobetimeless.Infact,althoughboththinkersusetheirviewofdivineeternitytoresolvetheproblemofprescience,neitherofthemappealstoGod’stimelessness.Boethius’sownformulationoftheProblemofPrescienceisalongthelinesof(1)and,althoughhehasanintuitiveideathatthereisadeeperdifficulty,arguablyhenevernoticesthelogicalerrorin(1).22WhenBoethiuslookstotheideaofdivineeternity,heisnotan-sweringtheaccidentalnecessityargument.Rather,heistryingtoexplainhowfutureeventscanhavethenecessityneededinordertobeknownandyetbeopeninsuchawaythathumanagentscanfreelywilltoperformonecourseofactionoranother.Ourknowledgeofpresentevents,heargues,isnecessaryinpreciselythisway.OntheAristotelianviewofnecessity,whatishappeningisnecessarywhenitishappening,andsoknowledgeofthepresenthasnecessaryeventsforitsobject.Butnoonebelievesthatthisknowledgeconstrainstheeventsorlimitstheiragents’freedom.Boethiusthenpointsoutthat,becauseGod’swayofknowingallevents,inhiseternalpresent,islikeourwayofknowingpresentevents,hisknowledgeofeventsthat,tous,arefuturewillhavethecharacteristicsofourknowledgeofpresentevents:theeventswillbenecessaryinrelationtoGodastheirknower,butnotinawaythatconstrainstheiroutcomeandremoveshumanfreedom.Aquinas,bycontrast,knewtheaccidentalnecessityargumentandanswereditexplicitly.23HadheheldthatGodistimeless,hewouldhavehadaneasywayofrespondingtoit.Infact,hechoosestoanswerCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n60johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombeitinquiteadifferentway,farclosertoBoethius’s.Ratherthanre-jecting(4),Aquinasconcedes(5)IfGodknewthatewillhappen,ewillhappennecessarily.Butthenheclaimsthatwhere“somethingaboutcognitionissigni-fiedintheantecedent,itisnecessarythattheconsequentistakenaccordingtohowtheknoweris,notaccordingtohowthethingknownis.”Bythisprinciple,hesays,thenecessityofeisjustthetypeofnonconstrainingnecessityBoethiushadinmind.Aquinas’sargumentfortheprincipleisaconvolutedandratherunconvincingone.ItwouldhavebeenextraordinaryforAquinas,hadheheldGodtobetimeless,tohaveappealedtothisuncertainreasoning,whenasimplewayofrebuttingtheaccidentalnecessityargumentwasopentohim.Aquinas’streatmentoftheProblemofPrescienceis,there-fore,anotherstrongpieceofevidencethathedidnotconsiderdivineeternitytimeless.hierarchy(d.e.luscombe)Theideaofhierarchysupportedmedievalvisionsoforderintheuni-versebyassuringsomeoreveneveryformofbeing–transcendent,intelligible,andmaterial–aparticularpositionandanappropriatefunction.Althoughitwasoftenusedtosupportabroaderconcep-tion,thatof“thegreatchainofbeing,”hierarchyisadistinctideawithitsownparticularrangeofreferences.24Itsnichewasdeter-minedbyitsprincipalsourceandauthority,Pseudo-DionysiustheAreopagite(Denisthepseudo-Areopagite).Hierarchyofferedamodelderivedfromtheorderingofthecelestialworldwherepurelyspiri-tualbeingswerearrangedinorders.Itsignifiedthegraduatedman-ifestationofGodtotheuniverseofspiritsandtheirassimilationtoGod.Denis,writingaroundtheyear500andusingapseudonymtolinkhimwithSt.PaulatAthens(Acts17:34),definedtheterminCelestialHierarchyIII1:“Hierarchy,tome,issacredorder,knowl-edge,andactivityassimilatingitself,asfarasitcan,tothelikenessofGod,andraisingitselftoitsutmost,bymeansoftheilluminationsgrantedbyGod,totheimitationofGod.”25Hethensetforthtwohierarchies,onethatiscelestialorangelicandwhichprovidestheexemplarfortheother,whichisecclesiasticalandhuman.26CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy61Denisportrayedtheharmoniousangelichierarchyasamagnifi-cent,verticalarrangementofnineordersdividedintothreesuper-imposedtriadsaccordingtotheirlevelsofknowledgeandpurityandofparticipationinGod’ssecretsandgoodness.Eachtriadandwithiniteachordermediatespurification,illumination,andperfectionbe-tweentheorderaboveandtheorderbelow.Theprocessisbothadescendingandanascendingone,agoingoutandacomingback,asspiritsarebroughtclosertoGodthroughtheirpurification,illu-mination,andperfectingbythehigherorders.ThemeasureoftheresemblanceofspiritstoGod–theirdeiformity–istheordertheyoccupyinthehierarchy.Forthedivisionoftheangelsintogroupsofthree,DenisclaimedtheauthorityofacertainHierotheus(oth-erwiseunknown),27butProclus(d.c.485)hadalreadyassimilatedthepagangodsintotriadscommunicatinglightandknowledgetoeachother;Denisadaptedthisineffectandpresentedthreetriadsofordersofangels.Healsopresentedtwotriadsofordersofhumanbe-ings,withbishopsoccupyingthehighestgradeandcommunicatingdirectlywiththelowestorderofangelsabove:Thecelestialhierarchy28SeraphimCherubimThronesDominationsVirtuesPowersPrincipalitiesArchangelsAngelsTheecclesiasticalhierarchy29BishopsPriestsMinistersMonksHolypeoplePurifiedordersCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n62johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombeEachordercommunicatesdirectlywiththeorderaboveandwiththeorderbelow.AlltheordersspringfromGoddirectly;higherordersdonotproducesubordinateorders.Butwithineachtriad,theactivityofpurifying,illuminating,andperfectingisthetask,respectively,ofthelowest,middleandhighestorder.All,savethelowestorderoftheecclesiasticalhierarchy,worktoconverttoGodtheordersbelowbyhelpingthemtoconformasfullyaspossibletotheorderabove,whichismoredeiform.Hierarchicactivityisaprocessofmediation.Everydivineinterventioninhistory–suchasthegiftoftheLawtoMoses,thepurifyingofthelipsofIsaiah,andtheAnnunciationofthebirthofChrist–wasmediatedtopeopleonearththroughtheangelichierarchy.KnowledgeofThearchy(theruleofGod)islike-wisemediatedthroughtheorders,thefunctionofhierarchybeingtobringGodoutofhissilenceandtorevealwhatisobscure,thusleadingthelowerorderstounionwithGod.Angelsreceiveillumi-nationinstantlyandintuitively.Theecclesiasticalhierarchysharesintheirintellectualcontemplationsbutgraspsdivineknowledgeinfragmentsandinstages,withtheassistanceofmaterial,sacramentalthings.TheecclesiasticalhierarchywasconstructedbyDenisinthelightofthehistoricalrealityofthechurchinthefourthandfifthcenturies.Thefirsttriadincludestheinitiators:thebishop,whoispurified,illuminated,andperfectedbyangelsandtransmitspurifi-cation,illumination,andperfectiontotheorderofpriests,whointurncommunicatethesetoministers(porters,lectors,acolytes,ex-orcists).Hencetheycometothesecondtriadoftheinitiates:firsttomonks,thentotheholypeople,andfinallytothepurifiedorders(penitents,energumens,andcatechumens).FromGregorytheGreattoWilliamofAuvergnePopeGregorytheGreat(d.604)presentedtheninecelestialchoirsofangelsinhisMoraliaonJob,andinBookIIofhisthirty-fourthHomilyontheGospelshemakesreferencetoDenistheAreopagite.UnlikeDenis,GregoryislucidanduncomplicatedindescribingthemissionofangelstoGod,theuniverse,andthehumanrace.Thehumanrace,hewroteinfluentially,whenitisraisedtoheaveninthenextlife,willformatenthchoirandtherebywillremedythelossesthatfollowedtherevoltandfallofthoseangelswhodefectedtoLucifer.Denis’swritingscirculatedamongtheclergyandtheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy63religiousinByzantium,30andtranslationsweremadeintoSyriac,Armenian,andArabic.AlthoughhisworksweretranslatedintoLatinby835,31theywerecitedintheWestonlyrarelybeforethetwelfthcentury.GregorytheGreat’steachingonangelsdomi-nated.Anexception,however,isprovidedbyHincmar,archbishopofRheimsfrom845.DrawingupontheCelestialHierarchytoemphasizehissuperioritytoabishop,Hincmarproducedoneofthemostpowerfulofallmedievalstatementsaboutauthorityandsubjection.Heportrayedthechurchasasingle,divineinstitutionconsistingofbothangelsandhumanbeingswhoaredividedintodifferentordersor,ashealsocalledthem,paternities.Inequalityisasnecessaryafactoflifeforhumanbeingsasitisforangels.Angelsandhumanbeingsareeachequalbynaturebuttheyarenotequalinpowerororder.Justasinheavenangelsbothministerandassist,onearthtootheecclesiasticalhierarchyactsinlikemanner:arch-bishopsministertobishopsandbishopsassistarchbishops.HincmarhasadjustedtheschemeoftheecclesiasticalhierarchysetforthbyDenis,buthisargumentgainsinimportancethroughbeingplacedwithinauniversalframebecause,asGregorytheGreathadwritten,“Theuniversecouldnotsubsistbyanyotherreasonthanbecauseagreatorderofdifferenceconservesit.”32ThisparticularwayofreasoningreappearedbutinfrequentlyuntiltherevivalofinterestinthethoughtofEriugenaevidentinthewrit-ingsofHonoriusAugustodunensis(earlytwelfthcentury)33andofsubsequentauthors,includingHughofSt.Victor(d.1142),whowroteaninfluentialcommentaryontheCelestialHierarchy.34BookIofthiscommentarysetsforthHugh’sunderstandingofthediffer-encebetweennaturalanddivinetheology.CreatednatureprovidesknowledgeofGodbutbymeansofsigns;gracealone,mediatedtocreaturesbytheangels,givesdivineilluminationsortheophanies,andthehierarchiesleadhumanbeingsbacktoGod:“Bythesehierar-chiesorsacredpowersthewholeworldisgoverned.”35Theophany,asChenuobserved,36isamarkofLatinAreopagitisminthetwelfthcentury;themysteriousmanifestationsinthisworldoftheunknow-able,hiddenGodareachievedbythehierarchies.Asmallcollec-tionofdefinitionscirculatinginthelatetwelfthcenturyhelpedtodisseminatethenotion,distinguishingthreehierarchies–superce-lestial,celestial,andsubcelestial–andthreeangelictheophanies–epiphany,hyperphany,andhypophany.37CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n64johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombeInthewritingsofAlanofLilleandofWilliamofAuvergnede-tailed,luxuriousdescriptionsofthehierarchiesblossomed.Alan(d.1203),inaworkcalledHierarchia,commentedonthecollectionofdefinitionsmentionedabove.Hedefinedhierarchyaslordship(dominium).FollowingGregorytheGreat,Alanwrotethathuman-kindhadbeencreatedtofillthegapleftbythefallfromheavenofthebadangels.AlanwatereddowntheelevatedideasofDenisbyusingimagerythatwasmorepopularandmorereadilyunderstood.Hedescribedthespecificfunctionsofangelsinrelationtothedif-ferenttypesofhumanbeingswhowill,afterreceivingappropriateangelictuition,jointheangelicorderthatmostsuitablycorrespondstotheircondition.Toeachofthenineordersofangelstherecorre-spondsanorderofmenandanantiorderofdemons,nineineach.Theordersofthehumanhierarchyare:(1)contemplatives,(2)studentsofScripture,(3)judges,(4)and(5)rulers,(6)defendersagainstdiabolictemptations,(7)miracleworkers,(8)majorpreachers,and(9)lesserpreachersandteachers.Thesomewhatvagueimageryistakenfromthecontemporaryworld.38WithWilliamofAuvergne,theuniversitymasterwhobecamebishopofParisin1228,theideaofhierarchybecamepoliticized.WilliamwroteavastencyclopediaembracingknowledgeoftheTrinity,theuniverseofspiritsandofhumankind,ofplanets,stars,andtheelements,aswellasoftherealmsoffaith,law,sacraments,virtues,andvices.Williamwasanenthusiastandanoptimist.Helovedthebeautyandmagnificenceoftheuniverse.Inthesecondoftheseventreatisesofwhichhisencyclopedia–Magisteriumdiv-inalesivesapientiale–iscomposed(Deuniverso)hedescribedthe“universeofcreatures.”Hewroteofheavenasakingdomthaten-joyspeaceandwhichhasmanyandvariedordersofministerswhopresideoverthenationsonearth.Williamtellsusthatwhenhewasyounghehadtheideaofcomparingtheranksofangelswiththoseofawell-orderedearthlykingdom.Hewasapparentlymuchinflu-encedbyAlan’sschemeofnineordersinheaven,nineonearth,andnineinhell.Buthewentfurther.Williamcomparedthenineordersofangelsnotonlywiththeclerus,theecclesiasticalhierarchy,butalsowiththeofficesfoundinasecularkingdom.Heportrayedthechurch,too,asawell-orderedkingdomfollowingthemodelofasecu-larmonarchyaswellasofacelestialmonarchy.Remarkably,Williamdoesnotpresenttheearthly,secularhierarchyasareflectionoftheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy65ecclesiasticalhierarchyandsubordinatetoit.Theholdersofsecularofficedirectlyreflectthetasksoftheheavenlycourtandkingdom.Williamprivilegesthestate:itsofficesaremodeledupontheor-dersinthecityoftheangels.Inaddition,WilliamreportsthatsomephilosophershavesoughttoassimilatetheAvicenniandoctrineoftheIntelligences–eightofthemmovingtheheavens,theninthbeingtheagentintellect–intoChristianangelology;thedivineideasortheintelligiblereasonsofcreaturesaretransmittedthroughtheangelictheophanies.39ThelaterMiddleAges:criticismandchange40Thewaywasnowopentoconstructecclesiasticalandsecularhi-erarchiestoexpresspersonalviewsofhowearthlyhierarchiesdoorshouldreflectthecelestialexemplar.William,forexample,excludedfriarsfromtheecclesiasticalhierarchy;friarsretaliatedvigorouslyonclericswhodeniedthemadueplaceandroleintheecclesiasti-calhierarchy.Vigorousquarrelsoccurredduringthe1250s(and,in-deed,forcenturiestocome).41OnegreatchampionofthefriarswasBonaventure,from1257minister-generaloftheFranciscans.LikeWilliamofAuvergne,Bonaventureappliedtheconceptionofhierar-chytothewholeuniverse–tothedivineTrinity,theplanets,theindividualhumansoul,andmuchelse,and,likeWilliam,hean-alyzedinfinedetailthecorrespondencesbetweeneachandeveryhierarchy.42BonaventuregraspedtheideathatthedivineTrinity–itselfahierarchybutofthreeequalpersonsinoneGod43–impressesitstriunecharacterupontheangelichierarchysoastoassimilateitandtomakeitresembleGod.Likewise,theangelicordersim-presstheirhierarchicfeaturesuponthechurchmilitant,thatis,thechurchinthisworld.Thisistheprocession(processus)ordescentfromtheTrinitythroughtheangelstotheworldofhumanity.Inre-turnthereiswhathecallsa“reduction”oranascentofcreaturestoGod.Humanbeingsarepurified,enlightened,andperfectedbytheecclesiasticalhierarchyledbytheprelatesofthechurch.ButwithinthechurchBonaventuredistinguishedbetweenanactive,prelaticalhierarchyandahigher,contemplativeone–anouterandaninnerhierarchy.Healsoseeshierarchyasevolvingorunfoldinginthecourseofhistory.44Abovetheprelatesarethosewhohavearrivedatahigherstateofcontemplation.ThesearethemembersoftheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n66johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombereligiousorders:CistercianmonksandPremonstratensiancanons,thenabovethemFranciscanandDominicanfriars,andfinallyper-fectcontemplativessuchasSt.FrancisofAssisihimself.Ultimately,thepopecouldusethemembersofthiscontemplativehierarchytooverridetheactivehierarchyledbybishops.OneofthemostcontesteddocumentsintheentirehistoryoftheideologicalrelationshipbetweenclericalandlaypowerwasthepapalbullofBonifaceVIIIin1302–thebullknownfromitsopeningwordsinLatinasUnamsanctam.Bonifacedeclaredthateveryhu-manbeingissubjecttothepopeasthechiefintermediarywithGod.Theroleofintermediarieswasofparamountimportance:“ForaccordingtoSaintDenisthelawofdivinityistoleadthelowestthroughtheintermediatetothehighestthings.Accordingtothelawoftheuniverse,therefore,allthingsarereducedtoorder,notequallyandimmediately,butthelowestthroughtheintermediate,thein-termediatethroughthehigher.”45ThisreflectstheviewsofGilesofRomewho,inhisDeecclesiasticapotestate(1300–2),wroteabouthierarchyandtripartitedivisionasbeingthelawoftheuniverse.46BythetimethatGileswrote,however,thefashionformodelingtheecclesiasticaluponthecelestialhierarchyhadreceivedasevereknockfromThomasAquinas.Thomasacceptedthattheuniverseconsistsofordersofunequalbeings,thehighestlevelofbeinginalowergenusbeingtheparticipantinthelowestlevelofbeingintheimmediatelyhighergenus.47Andheacceptedthathierarchywasauniversalfact:nomultitudeofbeingswillbewellarrangedifitisnotdividedintoorderspossessingdifferentfunctions,norwillitbewellarrangedunlesshigherbeingsuseintermediatebeingstobringlowerbeingstounionwithGod.48Lowerthantheangelsashumanbeingsare,Aquinasemphasizedsomeessentialdifferencesbetweenthem:thelatterarenotsimplyminiature,incarnateversionsoftheformer,eachpossessingthesoulofanangelandthebodyofananimal.Theordersofangelsdiffernotonlyinthedivinegracethattheyreceive,butalsoinnature.Humanbeings,ontheotherhand,althoughtheytoodifferinthedivinegracethattheyreceive,areallequalbynature.Noangel-likehierarchyamonghumanbeingscanbeconstructedonthebasisofhumannature(becauseofthefundamentalequalityofhumannature)oruponthebasisofdivinegrace(becausetohumanbeingssuchgraceisinvisibleinitsreception).Inpracticethehierar-chyofthechurchmilitantisconstitutednotbylevelsofgraceorofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy67personalholiness(whichareinvisible)butbylevelsofpublicpower,juridicalaswellassacramental.Humanhierarchycannotimitatecelestialhierarchyinallthings.49Asforasupercelestialhierarchy–thatofthedivineTrinity–Aquinasrejectedit:nodivinepersonpossessesrule(principatus)overanother,norwasthisthedoctrineofDenis.50Moreover,AquinaschallengedtheDionysianideathatan-gelsareessentialintermediariesbetweenhumankindandGod.Godcanenlightenanycreatedintellectdirectly.TheprincipalmediatorisChristhimself.Withinangelicsocietyangelscanenlightenlowergradesonlybypassingthisenlightenmentfromoneordertoanotheraccordingtoastricthierarchy;butwithinhumansocietyanyen-lightenedpersonmaytransmithisenlightenmenttoanyoneelse.51Aquinas’sdoubtsmadeagreatimpressionuponsomelaterwrit-ers,whofocusedupontheirimplicationsfortheroleofspiritualauthorityastheintermediarybetweenlaypowerandGodandwhodeniedthattheecclesiasticalhierarchypossessedtemporalauthor-ity,thatsecularsocietyismodeleduponacelestialexemplar,andthatlaymenandkingsaresubjecttothepopeevenintemporalmatters.Insofarasmendoresembleangels,thecelestialhierarchyistheirmodel,butangelsarenotphysicalbeings,nordotheyliveintime,sotheorganizationoftheirsocietydoesnotprovideamodelfortheorganizationofhumansocietyinphysicalspaceandtime.JohnofParisisanotableexponentoftheselinesofcriticism:Johnsawlaypeopleoccupyingthelowestorderinthechurchbut,guidedbyAristotle’sPolitics,healsowrotethatthenaturalandcivilorderthattheyalsocreateisseparatefromthespiritualorderprovidedintheecclesiasticalhierarchyandisnot,incivilmatters,subjecttoit.52Henceforth,thereweregrowingdisagreementsabouttheimplica-tionsoftheconceptionofhierarchy.Ingeneral,popesinsistedupontheroleofmediators–betheypriestsorangels–intheworkofbringingpeoplebacktoGodandinbringingGodtopeople.Buttherealsodevelopedwhatonemaycallthe“Luciferproblem”andwhichwasputbyJohnWyclif.Wyclifbroadlyacceptedtraditionaltheoriesofhierarchy.ButinhisbookonTheChurch(Deecclesia,1378)hewrestledwiththeproblemofcorruptionwithinthepriestlyhierar-chy.Hedidnotbelievethatthemembersofahierarchyareuncon-ditionallyentitledtoremainmembersoftheirorder.LuciferandthebadangelshadconflictedwithMichaelandthegoodangelsandhadCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n68johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombeasaresultbeencastoutfromtheangelichierarchy,therebylosingtheirpowertopurifyandenlightenothers.Surely,therefore,clergy,iftheylosethepowertopurifyandtoenlightenothers,shouldbecastoutfromtheecclesiasticalhierarchyandbecomesubjecttolaymen.WyclifwasheretakingfurtheranargumentinsupportofresistanceinthenameofhierarchythathadfirstbeenpresentedbyRobertGrossetestein1253ontheoccasionwhenherefusedtoadmitthenephewofPopeInnocentIVtoacanonryatLincolncathedral:“NofaithfulsubjectoftheHolySee,”wroteGrosseteste,“cansubmittomandates,precepts,oranyotherdemonstrationsofthiskind,no,noteveniftheauthorwerethemosthighbodyofangels.”53ItwouldbeeasytomultiplyexamplesofdebatesinthelaterMid-dleAgesinwhichhierarchicalschemeswereadjustedtosuittheobjectivesoftheirsupporters.Mostnotably,inthequarrelsbetweenthemendicantfriarsandthesecularclergyandbetweenthesupport-ersofconciliarismandthoseofpapalmonarchy,therewererepeated,frequentappealstoDenis’streatisesonhierarchy–butinoppos-ingdirections,dependingonwhichideologywasbeingcanvassedorcriticized.54Inthefifteenthandsixteenthcenturieshostilitytosuchdiscoursewasexpressed.Around1455LorenzoVallaexpressedreservationsconcerningtheclaimofDenistobeacontemporaryanddiscipleofSt.Paul;thesegainedthesupportofErasmusandothersinthefollowingcentury.ThedoubterswereheavilyoutnumberedboththenandincenturiestocomebythebelieversinDenis’sclaims.RenaissancePlatonistssuchasBessarion,MarsilioFicino,andPicodellaMirandolashowedenthusiasmforDenis’sPlatonism,andJohnColetexploredhistwotreatisesonhierarchy.ButMartinLutherob-jectedtothedreamlikecuriositiesthathefound:“ToaccordsomuchcredittothisDionysius,whoeverhewas,altogetherdispleasesme,forthereisvirtuallynosoundlearninginhim.”55LutherthoughtthathecouldconstructabetterschemeofecclesiasticalhierarchythanDenishaddonesimplybyputtinginthepope,thecardinals,andthearchbishopsabovethebishopswhooccupiedthetoppositioninDenis’swork.Thisisexactlywhatsupportersofpapalmonarchyhaddoneveryfrequently,andperhapsLutherhadhistongueinhischeekashewrote.CalvinalsodismissedtheCelestialHierarchyas“forthemostpartnothingbuttalk”anddeniedthattherewasanybasis“tophilosophizesubtlyoveracomparisonoftheheavenlyandearthlyhierarchies.”56CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy69Onbalance,inspiteofallcontroversies,hierarchyenrichedme-dievalvisionsofastable,permanent,dynamic,articulatedstructureinthechurchandinsocietyatlarge,visionsthatreflectedandmir-roredtheeternalstructureoftheangelicsocietyandoftheangelicordersinHeaven.Theconceptionofhierarchystrictosensu,thatis,asitisfoundinthetreatisesofDenisthepseudo-Areopagite,waswidelyandincreasinglyregardedasanecessarypointofreferencefromthetwelfthcentury.Ithadtobeaccommodatedandbroughtroundtothepointwhereitsupportedavisionofwhystructuresexistandofwhatstructuresshouldexist.Thetrouble,ofcourse,wasdisagreementsaboutthelatter.Sotheconceptionofhierarchywastuggedinconflictingdirectionsingeniously,polemically,andflexiblyinwritingsonevangelicalpoverty,onpapalprovisionstoecclesiasticalbenefices,ontheexemptionofmonasteriesfromepis-copaljurisdiction,onAngevinruleinthekingdomofSicily,onthedisputebetweenKingPhiliptheFairandPopeBonifaceVIII,ontheGreatSchismofthepapacyinthefourteenthcentury,onLollardy,andontheHussitemovementinBohemia.Argumentsbasedonthecelestialexemplarwerefoundand,indeed,hadtobefoundinthecourseofalmostalldebateamongphilosophersaswellastheolo-giansaboutthelatermedievalchurch.notesThefirstpartofthischapter,oneternity,isbyJohnMarenbon.Thesecondpart,onhierarchy,isbyD.E.Luscombe.1.Thedisputecenteredonwhetherornottheworldcouldhavebeencre-atedbyGodwithoutabeginning.Forathoroughsurvey,seeR.Dales[433];andforananalysisofthearguments,seeR.Sorabji[438]193–252.Mostthinkersbelievedthattherecouldbenothingthatlacksabegin-ningbuthasanend.2.See,e.g.,SummaFratrisAlexandriI,Inq.1,tract.2,q.4,mem.1,cap.4[358]89(§60),quotingfromRichardofSt.Victor,DeTrinitate6,8,11;PL196,894ff.3.Nocreatureexiststhroughitself.Ifsomethingalwaysexists,then(onanAristotelianviewofmodality)itexistsnecessarily,andsoexistsofitself:HenryofGhent,QuodlibetI[219]V,especially39.4–42.67.4.ThisimportantpointiswellmadebyR.Fox[434].5.DeTrinitate,in[84]175.231–176.248,155.5–156.51.ThequotationsthatfollowarefromthepassageintheConsolation.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n70johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombe6.SeeR.Sorabji[438]115–16and119–20foragooddefenseofthestandardview.7.E.StumpandN.Kretzmann[439];andseetheirlater[440].Theirviewsaredefended(withmodifications)inB.Leftow[435]112–46.8.Butseebelow,onnontemporaldurationinthethirteenthcentury.9.B.Leftow[435]115.10.SeeJ.Marenbon[88]172–73.11.Chapters18–24.IomitinmyaccountAnselm’streatmentofGodandplace,whichisalongsidethediscussionofGodandtime.12.InthefullestandbestinvestigationyetofAnselm’sconceptofeternity,B.Leftow([435]183–216,especially203–09)answersthisquestionbyappealingtoAnselm’sviewthatGodisbetterdescribedas“justice”than“just,”“truth”than“true,”andsoon.ButthisanswerisnotAnselm’s,thoughitmaywellbeAnselmian.13.AnselmalsodiscussesGod’seternityinhisProslogion(chs.18–22)andhisOntheHarmonybetweenGod’sforeknowledge,predestinationandgracewithfreewill(I5).AlthoughintheseaccountsheemphasizesthesensesinwhichGodisnotintime,theydonotshowafundamentallydifferentpositionfromthatintheMonologion.14.I,Inq.1,Tract.2,q.4[358]84–111(§§56–71).15.SummadebonoI,q.4[379]52–54.16.WritingalittlelaterthantheSFA,probablyinthe1250s,RobertKilwardbyshowsanevengreaterrelianceontheMonologionandawishtostressGod’somnitemporality:see[372]§§133–43.17.AsR.Fox[434]pointsout;agoodintroductiontothemoderndebateisgiveninW.Newton-Smith[436]79–95andM.MacBeath[437].18.MostmoderncommentatorssaythatAquinasthoughteternitytimeless(see,e.g.,W.L.Craig[432],M.M.Adams[318],andC.Hughes[242]).StumpandKretzmannapplytheirideaoftimelessdurationtoAquinasaswellasBoethius,anditdoeshelptoexplainmuch,thoughnotall,inAquinas’sconception.19.R.Fox[434]isoneoftheveryfewauthorstoarguethroughthecasethatforAquinasdivineeternityisnottimeless.HepointsespeciallytoAquinas’sneedofGod’spresencetotimeinordertosustainallthings,andtoaffirmtheanalogousrelationshipbetweentimeandeternity.20.Tract.5,q.23[203].21.SpacedoesnotpermitdiscussionofeternityandtimelessnessinthelaterMiddleAges.Thestandardscholarlyviewisthatideasabouttime-lesseternitybecamelessimportantandwidelyaccepted,perhapsfromthetimeofDunsScotus(butseeR.Cross[292])andcertainlyfromthetimeofOckham:seeW.L.Craig[432]129–33andM.M.Adams[318]CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nEternityandhierarchy711137–38.But,iftheviewproposedhereiscorrect,thenthefourteenth-centurythinkerswillbeexhibitingmorecontinuitywiththeirprede-cessorsthanhasbeenbelieved.22.SeeJ.Marenbon[88]162–64and[87].23.ISent.,d.38,q.1,a.5,ad4;STI,q.14,a.13,ad2;OnTruth,q.2,a.12,ad7.24.A.O.Lovejoy,inhisclassicworkonthebroaderidea[447]hasverylittletosayaboutmedievalnotionsofhierarchy;seeE.P.Mahoney[451].OnlevelsofbeinginNeoplatonismseeD.J.O’Meara[453].ForthedevelopmentbymedievalChristianthinkersoftheideathattheclosercreaturesaretothelikenessofGodthehigheristheirbeing,seeespeciallyE.P.Mahoney[452,451,80].OndegreesofbeinginAquinas’s“thirdway”ofdemonstratingtheexistenceofGod,seechapter6below.25.CelestialHierarchy[79]87;PG3,164D.26.IntheNewTestamentangelsandwickedspiritsfigureprominentlyasmanifestationsofGodoroftheDevil;differentnameswereusedoftheformer.SeeColossians1:16andEphesians1:21;9(thrones,dominations,principalities,powers,virtues).AlsoIsaiah6:2(Seraphim)andEzekiel1:14–24;10:4–22(Cherubim).DeniswasalsodeeplyinfluencedbylateAntiqueNeoplatonistssuchasProclusandhisprecursors,Plotinus,Por-phyry,andIamblichus–althoughmostofDenis’smedievalreaderswereunawareofthesesources.Duringthefourthcentury,Christianangelol-ogyandNeoplatonicphilosophyhaddrawnclosertogether.MariusVic-torinussituatedfourclassesofangelsintheintelligible,supercelestialworld(archangels,angels,thrones,andglories)andalsosituatedangelsinthematerialworld,alongwithgodsanddemons(P.Hadot[446]).Gre-goryofNyssaidentifiedtheintelligibleworldasthecityoftheangelstowhichhumansouls,throughcontemplatingsupernaturalgoodness,maybeadmitted(J.Danielou[´444],part2,ch.2,“Lacitedesanges”).´27.CelestialHierarchy[79]104;PG3,200D.28.CelestialHierarchy7–9.29.EcclesiasticalHierarchy5–6.30.SeeA.Wenger[83]formodificationsbyNicetasStethatosintheeleventhcentury.31.ByHilduintheabbotofSaint-Denis.HisversionwastwicerevisedbyScottusEriugena.G.Thery[´82].ThemedievalLatintranslationsofDenis’sworksarecollectedinDionysiaca[77].Forthecompleteedi-tionofEriugena’scommentaryontheCelestialHierarchyseeJ.Barbet,ed.,IohannisScotiEriugenaeExpositionesinIerarchiamCoelestem(Turnhout,1975).32.OpusculumLVcapitulorum,PL126,282–494,especiallychs.11–15.Cf.W.Ullmann[454]114–16.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n72johnmarenbonandd.e.luscombe33.M.-T.D’Alverny[441]andJ.A.Endres[445]64–69,140–45.34.PL175,923–1154.Cf.D.E.Luscombe[155].35.I,5,PL175,931CD;I,2,PL175,927C–930B.36.M.-D.Chenu,LaTheologieaudouzi´emesi`ecle`(Paris,1957),304–05;seealsoChenu[507]80–85.37.H.F.Dondaine,RTAM17(1950),303–11.M.-T.D’Alverny[357]94–99cautiouslyattributedthesedefinitionstoAlanofLille.38.Hierarchia[357]223–35;Expositioprosaedeangelis,206–10;SermoindiesanctiMichaelis,249–51.39.Deuniverso,II,ii,ch.112[391]908.Cf.H.Corbin[122]101–17.40.Cf.D.E.Luscombe[448].41.TheclassicstudyofthesefightsisY.M.-J.Congar[443].42.CollationesinHexaemeron¨,in[211]V327–454,[212].Cf.J.G.Bougerol[216].43.CollationesinHexaemeron¨[212]VisioIV,coll.II(spokenversion);[211]V431–37(enlargedreportedversion).44.Apologiapauperum,XII10[211]VIII319.45.Fortheearlydevelopmentofthemaximlexdivinitatisestinferiorapermedia,etmediapersuperiorareducereinthewritingsofBonaventureseeJ.G.Bougerol[217]70.AlsoD.E.Luscombe[449].46.OnEcclesiasticalPower,especiallyII13[270].47.ScGII68.48.STI,q.108,a.2;q.106,a.3;ContraimpugnantesDeicultumetreli-gionem4[224]XLIA.49.IISent.,d.9,q.1,a.7.50.IISent.,d.9,q.1,a.1.51.STI,q.117,a.2.Cf.D.E.Luscombe[248].52.OnRoyalandPapalPower,writtenin1302/03.53.Grosseteste,Epist.128[194]432–37.OnWyclif,seeD.E.Luscombe[353].54.Thedebatesbetweensupportersofconciliarismandofpapalmonar-chyduringthefourteenthandfifteenthcenturiesoftenrevolvedaroundinterpretationsofhierarchy.SeeespeciallyA.Black[569].ImportantcontributionsincludetheCatholicConcordanceofNicholasofCusa[613].55.MartinLuther,TheBabylonianCaptivityoftheChurch,1520.Ordina-tion[450]109–10.56.JohnCalvin,InstitutesoftheChristianReligionI14,IV6[442]I164–65,II1111.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\ne.j.ashworth3LanguageandlogicItisimpossibletooverestimatetheimportanceofthestudyoflan-guageandlogicfortheunderstandingofmedievalphilosophersandtheologians.Manyofthesubjectsdiscussedbygrammariansandlo-giciansareofinterestinthemselvesandhaveanobviousrelevancetotheologicalandscientificproblems,butatadeeperlevel,allthewritingandthinkingoftheperiodispermeatedbyatechnicalvocab-ulary,techniquesofanalysis,andinferentialstrategiesdrawnfromthebasictrainingintheliberalartsthateverymedievalstudentre-ceived.Thenatureofthistrainingrevealstwoimportantfeaturesofmedievaleducation.Ontheonehand,thinkersfocusedonauthorita-tivetexts–theBible,theworksofAristotleandAugustine,Priscian’sInstitutionesgrammaticae,PeterLombard’sSentences–andtheat-tempttoreconcileandreinterprettheseauthoritiesliesbehindmanydevelopments.Ontheotherhand,themethodofteachingwaslargelyoral,andthisinfluencedwrittenexpressioninmanyways,fromthephilosophicaldialoguesofAugustineandAnselmtothehighlystruc-tureddisputationalpresentationofAquinas’sSummatheologiae.Onecannotcapturetherichnessandcomplexityofmedievalthe-oriesoflanguageandlogicinashortchapter.1InwhatfollowsIshallfirstgiveabriefoverviewandthenfocusonafewprincipalthemes.sourcesanddevelopmentsTheshapeofthebasicartsfacultycurriculumwasgivenbythesevenliberalarts:thethreelinguisticartsofgrammar,logic,andrhetoric,andthefourquadrivialartsofarithmetic,geometry,astronomy,andmusic.ThisstructurehadfirstbeenfullysetoutbyAugustineinhisDeordine,wheretheliberalartsarepresentedaspreparingthesoul73CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n74e.j.ashworthforitsorderlyjourneyupwardtothecontemplationofintelligiblethings.ThestructurewastakenupandhandedontolateragesbyMartianusCapella,inwhosepoemonthemarriageofMercuryandPhilologyMercurysymbolizedthedoublesenseoftheLogosaswordanddivinereasonandPhilology,theloverofLogos,personifiedthesevenliberalarts.2Thechieftextingrammar,Priscian’sInstitutionesgrammaticae,waswritteninConstantinopleduringthefirstquarterofthesixthcentury.Itwasalengthysystematictreatiseparticularlynotewor-thyforitssemanticapproach.Thatis,partsofspeechweredefinedintermsoftheirmeaningratherthanbytheirfunctioninasen-tence.Anotherimportanttextwasthefourth-centuryArsmaiorofDonatus,whosethirdbook,theBarbarismus,wasespeciallyusedfortraininginfiguresofspeech,atopicignoredbyPriscian.OncePriscian’sworkhadenteredtheCarolingiancurriculum,itbecamethesubjectofcommentary,andinthetwelfthcenturyPeterHeliaswrotehisinfluentialSummasuperPriscianum,thefirstfullsummaonanysubject.Helias’sworksignaledachangeintheapproachtogrammar,sinceheclassifiedpartsofspeechnotsomuchintermsoftheirsignificationasintermsofthelinguisticpropertiesthatconstitutetheirmodisignificandiormodesofsignification.Atthesametime,logicianstookovertheproblemsofreferenceandofdifferenttypesofsignificationfromthegrammarians,andthetrainingingrammarbecamelessphilosophicalandmoreatrainingingenerallinguistics.TheuniversitycurriculatendedtopaymostattentiontoPriscianusminor,thelasttwobooksoftheInstitutiones,whichdealtwithsyntax,andDonatuswasreplacedbysuchnewerteachinggrammarsinverseformasAlexanderdeVillaDei’sDoctrinale(c.1199)andtheGraecismusofEvrarddeBethune´(c.1210),bothpopularatEuropeanuniversitiesuntiltheendoftheMiddleAges.3Thesecondhalfofthethirteenthcenturysawapartialreturntophilosophicalthemesingrammarwiththeappearanceofthespecu-lativegrammariansorModistae.4TheytriedtopresentgrammaronthemodelofanAristotelianscience,whichmeantthatithadtodealwithwhatiscommontoalllanguages.Theyfoundthiscommonalityinthepostulatedparallelismbetweenthemodesofbeingofthings(modiessendi),themodesofunderstandinginthemind(modiintel-ligendi),andthemodesofsignifyingofwords(modisignificandi).CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic75Theywerenot,however,committedtotheviewthatlanguagemirrorstheworld,becauseoncetheintellecthasformedmodesofsignifying,itcanmakevariousattributions.Chimeraisafictionalterm,butitisasubstanceword;movementsignifieschangeandim-permanence,butthewordhasthemodesofsignifyingofanynoun,namely,stabilityorpermanence.Boththeinsistenceonuniversalityandthefocusonmodesofunderstandingledtoacleardisassocia-tionofspeculativegrammarfromspokenlanguageinthefourteenthcentury.Logicisthelinguisticartthatunderwentthemostdramaticchanges.Intheearlyperiodthetextsavailablewerelimitedinnum-ber.TheyincludeMariusVictorinusondefinitions,theCategoriaedecem,aworkwronglyattributedtoAugustine,whichwasthemostintenselystudiedlogicalworkintheninthandtenthcenturies,andAugustine’sownDedialectica,aswellasdiscussionsinsuchen-cyclopedistsasIsidoreofSeville.TheworksofBoethiusarethemostimportant.HeseemstohavebeenresponsiblefortranslatingAristotle’ssixworksonlogicintoLatin,andallbutthePosteriorAnalyticssurvive.HealsotranslatedPorphyry’sIsagoge,anintro-ductiontoAristotle’sCategories.HewrotecommentariesonsomeofAristotle’slogic,onPorphyry,andontheTopicsofCicero.Inad-ditionhecomposedmonographsofhisownonDivision,oncategor-icalsyllogisms,onTopics,andonhypotheticalsyllogisms,thatis,onconditionalpropositionsandargumentsbuiltupfromthem.TheworkonDivisionwasparticularlyinfluential.5BytheendofthetenthcenturyGerbertofAurillacwasteachingPorphyry’sIsagoge,Aristotle’sCategoriesandOnInterpretation,Cicero’sTopics,andagooddealofBoethiusinthecathedralschoolatRheims.Twelfth-centurymastersusedthesamebasiccurriculum,which,withthead-ditionoftheLibersexprincipiorumattributedtoGilbertofPoitiers,wassoontobeknownasthelogicavetusorOldLogic.From1150enormouschangestookplace.TherestofAristotle’slogicalworks,alongwithothertexts,wererecovered;andthinkersbegantodevelopnewareasoflogic.Aristotle’sTopicsandSophisticalRefutationswereknownbythe1130s,andtheentirelogicanovaorNewLogic,includingthePriorandPosteriorAnalytics,wasknownby1159,whenJohnofSalisburyreferredtoallfourworksinhisMetalogicon.InthesecondhalfofthetwelfthcenturypeoplebegantotranslateArabiclogic,includingwritingsbyAvicenna.IntheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n76e.j.ashworth1230sseverallogiccommentariesbyAverroesweretranslated,thoughtheywerelesssuccessfulthantheArabicworkstranslatedearlier.SomeGreekcommentatorswerealsotranslated.Thesetexts,giventheirnumberandadvancedcontent,providedafulllogiccur-riculumforanorganizedinstitution.WhilethewritingsofAristotlewerealwayscentraltothelogiccurriculumandwerethesubjectofnumerouscommentaries,thereweremattersthathedidnotdiscuss.Thisleftroomforaconsid-erablenumberofnewdevelopments,allofwhichhavetheirrootsinthesecondhalfofthetwelfthcentury.Themostprominentisterministlogic,whichincludessuppositiontheoryanditsramifi-cations.Treatisesonsuppositiontheorydealwiththereferenceofsubjectandpredicatetermsinpropositions,andtheyhaveasacorol-larythetreatisesonsyncategoremata,whichdealwithalltheothertermsinpropositions,includingevery,not,and,except,andsoon.Threeotherimportantdevelopmentsarefoundintreatisesoninsol-ublesorsemanticparadoxes,onobligationsortherulesoneisobligedtofollowinacertainkindofdisputation,andonconsequencesorvalidinferences.Anothernewformofwritingisthecomprehensivetextbook.Atleastsixsurvivefromthethirteenthcentury,includingthosebyWilliamofSherwood,PeterofSpain,andRogerBacon.InthefourteenthcenturywefindthosebyWilliamofOckham,JohnBuridan,andAlbertofSaxony.Someuniversities,especiallyOxfordandCambridge,preferredtouseloosecollectionsofbrieftreatisesonvarioustopics;agoodexampleofsuchacollectionistheLogicaparvaofPaulofVenice,whostudiedatOxford.Allthenewdevelopmentshadramificationsbeyondthetreatisesparticularlydevotedtothem,butthenewtechniqueinvolvingtheanalysisandsolutionofsophismatawasparticularlypervasiveinmedievalgrammarandlogic.6Asophismasentenceisapuzzlein-tendedtointroduceorillustrateadifficulty,aconcept,orageneralproblem.Examplesinlogicinclude“Everyphoenixexists,”giventhatonlyonephoenixcanexistatatime,and“SocratesiswhiterthanPlatobeginstobewhite.”Examplesingrammarinclude“Loveisaverb”andvarioussentencesbeginningwith“prochdolor”(Othepain!).Heretheproblemconcernsthemixtureofaninterjectionandanordinarynoun,theoneexpressingpaininanaturalway,theotherreferringtoitinaconventionallanguage.BytheendofthetwelfthcenturythesophismawasestablishedindifferentgenresoflogicalCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic77andgrammaticalwriting,whichincludedspecialtreatisesdevotedtosophismata.Typically,thesetreatiseswouldstartwithasophisma,and,usingdisputationaltechniques,showthattheverysamereason-ingwhichsupportedaplausiblethesiscouldalsoestablishsomethingimplausible.Theproblemwouldtheneitherbesolvedbyappealingtogrammaticalorlogicaldistinctions,ordissolvedbyshowingthatdifferenttruth-valueswerepossibleaccordingtodifferentsensesofthesophismasentence.Thesedisputationaltechniqueswereem-ployedintheoraltrainingofstudents.Othernewdevelopmentswereneverthesubjectofspecialtrea-tises.Inordertounderstandmedievalreflectiononthenatureandfunctionoflanguageandlogicingeneral,andonthedifferencesbe-tweenspokenlanguageandthelanguageofthought,wehavetolookatavarietyofphilosophicalandtheologicalsources.Ishalltakeupthesegeneraltopicsinthenexttwosections,beforeturningtosomemorespecializedtopics.thepurposeandnatureoflanguageandlogicBothlanguageandlogicwereseenashavingaprimarilycognitiveorientation,languagehavingbeenformedtostatethetruthandlogictoleadusfromonetruthtoanother.ThisorientationgaverisetoanumberoftensionsthatareparticularlyobviousinbothAugustineandAquinas.Augustinewasskepticalaboutthehumanabilitytoconveytruthsthroughspeech.Asaprofessionalrhetorician,hehadakeenappreciationofthemultifarioususesoflanguage,aswellasitsdangers;7buthealsoarguedinTheTeacherthatwemustturnawayfromordinaryspeechaltogetherinordertolearnfromChrist,whoisatoncetheInnerTeacherandtheDivineWord.Aquinaswasmoresanguineabouttheroleofspeech.Henotedthattheproperfunctionoflanguageistomakeknownthetruthbymeansofmakingknownourconcepts(STIIaIIae,q.110,a.1).8Speechisneededtofulfilltheendsofsociallife,tocommunicatenotionsofwhatisharmfulanduseful,justandunjust,andsocietyisfoundedontruth-telling.Hisprimarynotionoflanguage,likethatofthelaterModistae,seemstohavebeenofarational,rule-governedsystemthatcouldbestudiedinisolationfromcontextandspeakerintentionandwhichconcentratesonpropositionsaslinguisticunitsthatcon-veytheinformationnecessaryfororganizedknowledge(scientia).CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n78e.j.ashworthThisviewimpliesthatsignificantutterancerequiressentencesthatareneithersyntacticallynorsemanticallydeviant,whosecompo-nentsareneatlylinedupwiththespeaker’sconcepts,andwhoseendisthestatementoftruth.Otherusesoflanguage,suchasinvok-ingorsummoning,questioning,ordering,andrequestingorbegging,shouldbelefttorhetoricandpoetry.Nonetheless,Aquinaspaidsomeattentiontotheexpressivefunctionofspeech.Forinstance,wepraiseamannotmerelytolethimknowourgoodopinionofhimbutalsotoprovokehimtobetterthingsandtoinduceotherstohaveagoodopinionofhim,toreverenceandimitatehim(STIIaIIae,q.91,a.1).Inhisdiscussionofthesacraments,healsorecognizedthefactiveorperformativenatureofspeech(“Ibaptizeyou,”“Ipronounceyoumanandwife”).Mostimportantofall,hepaidcloseattentiontotheroleofhumanintentionsincompensatingforslipsofthetongueandotherlinguisticerrors.Sofaraslogicisconcerned,thinkersagreedthatlogichastodowithtruth.AsAugustineremarked(Dedialectica[60]102),“thebusinessofdialecticistodiscernthetruth,”andlaterAvicennain-sistedthatthefunctionoflogicistoleadusfromtheknowntotheunknown.Therewasneveranysuggestionthatthestudyoflogicisthestudyofformalsystems,andeventhoughlatermedievallogiciansusedasemitechnicallanguageinordertobringoutdis-tinctions,itwasinordertobringoutdistinctionsofmeaning.Thishadaneffectonthenotionofformalinference.Sincetherearenosystems,nosystem-relativedefinitionofformalityispossible,andsoaformalinferenceisonethatcanbejustifiedonlyasobviouslytruth-preserving.AsAugustineremarked,thetruthofvalidinference(ueritasconexionum)isnotinventedbymenbutis“permanentlyanddivinelyinstitutedinthereasonableorderofthings[inrerumratione]”(DedoctrinaChristianaII32).Ofcourse,thisattitudewascompatiblewithsomedisagreementaboutwhichinferenceswereacceptable,andalsowiththebeliefthatsomeinferencescouldbejustifiedbyreferencetoothers.Moreover,itwasrecognizedboththateventhebestinferenceisonlyusefulifitspremisesaretrue,andthatmistakesarefrequentlymadeininferenceasaresultofcon-fusingandambiguouspremises.Thestudyoffallaciesandhowtoavoidthemwasthefocusofmuchlogicaldiscussion.ItisrelevanttonoteatthispointthatthereisasenseinwhichlogiccanaimatthetruthwithoutusingthemethodofformalCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic79discursiveinferenceatall.WhiletheStoicandAristotelianapproachtologiccertainlyfocusesonformalinference,Neoplatonicdialecticwasmorealeadingofthesoulupwardstotheplacewhereitcanseeintelligiblerealitydirectly.Thisdialecticalprocessisclearlyex-emplifiedbyAugustine’sprooffortheexistenceofGodinOnFreeChoiceoftheWillII.ThesameprocessisalsofoundinAnselm,whoseso-calledontologicalargument(whichismoreaboutgreatnessthanbeing)seemstoaimatputtingthesoulinapositionwhereitcangobeyondwordstograspintelligiblerealityitself.However,Anselm’sargument,unlikethoseofAugustine,isformalizableasavalidargument,inthiscaseaclassicreductioadabsurdumargument.Similarly,hisproofsintheMonologionarepresentedasfully-fledgedargumentswithpremisesandconclusions.AnselmwasacarefullogicianaswellasanAugustinian.LeavingNeoplatonicdialecticaside,thereisstillmuchtobesaidaboutusesofthetermdialectica.Inthebroadsense,dialecticjustislogic,andthisnamewasmostprevalentuntilthethirteenthcentury,whenlogicagainedtheupperhand.Thewordalsohasthreenarrowersenses:dialecticastheartofdebate;dialecticastheartoffindingmaterialforarguments;anddialecticasakindofreasoningthatfallsbetweendemonstrativeandsophisticalreasoning.ThefirstsenseisfoundinCicero,whocallsdialecticthecorrectmethodofdiscussion(disserendidiligensratio)andinAugustine,whowrote(DeDialec-tica[60]82):“Dialecticisthescienceofdisputingwell.”ThesecondsenseisassociatedwiththediscussionofTopics,theheadingsunderwhichthematerialforargumentscanbesorted.9BecausethestudyofTopicsalsoincludedmaxims,orself-evidentlytruegeneralizationsthatcouldprovidethewarrantfordifferenttypesofargument,thereisacloselinkbetweenTopicsandargumentation.Hence,thethirdandmostusualsenseofdialectichadtodowithtopicalordialecticalsyllogismsasasubpartoflogic.MedievallogicianstreatedAristotle’sdistinctionbetweendialecticalanddemonstrativesyllogismsasanepistemologicaloneconcerningthestatusoftheirpremises,sothatwhiledialecticalsyllogismshadthesameformallyvalidstructureasdemonstrativesyllogisms,theirconclusionslackedcertainty.Justasthereweredifferentsensesoftheworddialectic,sothereweredifferentsensesoflogic.IsidoreofSevillenotedthatlogicacomesfromtheGreekwordlogos,whichcanmeansermo(word)orratio(reason).AsaresultlogiccouldbecalledeitherascientiaCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n80e.j.ashworthsermocinalis(linguisticscience)orascientiarationalis(rationalsci-ence).Therewereconsiderationssupportingbothtitles.Ontheonehand,theStoicshaddividedphilosophyintonatural,moral,andra-tional,andthelastwasequatedwithlogic,whichcouldthen,asBoethiuspointedout,beseenasbothaninstrumentandapartofphilosophy.Ontheotherhand,logicwasoneoftheliberalartsandbelongedtothetrivium,alongwithrhetoricandgrammar,whichmadeitseemalinguisticscience.ThisemphasiswasintensifiedbythediscoveryofArablogicianswhoincludedAristotle’sRhetoricandPoeticsinhislogicalworks,aclassificationacceptedbyAlberttheGreatandAquinas,amongothers.Somelogicians,suchasWilliamofSherwood,preferredtocalllogicjustalinguisticscience,butmanyothersinthethirteenthcentury,includingRobertKilwardbyandBonaventure,calleditbothlinguisticandrational.Inthelatethirteenthandfourteenthcenturiesthenotionoflogicaspurelyarationalsciencebecamepredominant.ThismovewaspartlyassociatedwiththerediscoveryofthePosteriorAnalyticsandthenewemphasisondemonstrativescience,anditraisedcertainproblemsaboutthenatureoflogic.Ifascienceconsistsofuniver-salnecessarypropositions,ifitproceedsbydemonstration,andifitdealswithbeing(ens),howcanthestudyoffallaciesorofindivid-ualargumentscountasscience?Similarproblemswereraisedaboutgrammar,andaswesawabove,theModistaeprovidedasolutionintermsofuniversalprinciplesunderlyingspokenlanguages.Similarprincipleswereadoptedbylogicianswhoarguedthatlogicdidcountasscience,bothbecauseitdealtwiththeuniversal,necessaryprinci-plesgoverninglogicalphenomena,includingtheapparentlydeviantphenomenaoffallaciousarguments,andbecausethenotionofbeingincludednotonlyrealbeingsbutalsobeingsofreason,whichowetheirexistencetothemind’sactivity.Beingsofreasonincludedfictionalandimpossibleobjects,suchaschimerasandgoldenmountains,butheretheycanbeidentifiedwithsecondintentions,thosehigherlevelconceptsweusetoclassifyourconceptsofthingsintheworld,andtheyincludesuchnotionsasgenus,species,subject,predicate,andsyllogism.Nominalistsandrealistsdisagreedoverwhethersecondintentionspickoutspecialcommonobjects,includingbothuniversalsandlogicalstructures,orwhethertheyjustarementalconstructsreachedthroughreflectiononindividualthingsandonactualpiecesofdiscourseorwriting,butCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic81thisdidnotpreventsuchnominalistsasOckhamfromfollowingAvicennainsayingthatlogicdealswithsecondintentionsandthatthesyllogismthelogicianconsidersisneitherathingintheworldnorapieceofwritingorspeaking.Somepeoplepreferredtosaythatlogicwasaboutthingsintheworldastheyfallundersecondintentions.Otherspreferredtopickoutsomespecialsecondintention,suchasargumentationorthesyllogism,asthesubjectoflogic,buttherewasstillastrongconsensusthattheobjectsoflogicarerationalobjects.signification,conventionalandmentallanguageSignificationThecentralsemanticnotionwasthatofsignification.However,wemustnotconfusesignificationas“apsychologico-causalpropertyofterms”10withmeaning.Themeaningofatermisnotanentitytowhichthetermisrelatedinsomeway,butonecansaythatanutterancesignifiesormakesknownanentity,whetherconceptualorreal,universalorparticular.Moreover,meaningisnottransitive,butsignificationis.LambertofAuxerre(orLagny)wrote:“Anutterancethatisasignofasign–i.e.,ofaconcept–willbeasignofthethingsignified–i.e.,ofthething;itis,however,asignoftheconceptdirectlybutasignofthethingindirectly.”11Thisisnottodenythatmedievalthinkershadanotionofmeaning.Theydidtalkaboutsense(sensus),aboutthoughtormeaning(sententia),andabouttheforceofaword(visverbi).Moreover,theyoftenusedsignificatioitselfalongwithitscognatesquitewidely.Thereweretwonotentirelycompatibleapproachestosignifica-tion,eachbasedonasentencefromAristotle.Accordingtothefirstapproach,basedonOnInterpretation16b9–21,tosignifyistogen-erateorestablishanunderstanding.Thisdefinitionplacesemphasisnotonthespeakerbutonthehearer.Giventhisemphasis,itispos-sibletoregardgroansandperhapsalsoanimalsoundsassignificant.Solongasthehearercanacquiresomeunderstandingthroughhear-ing,theutteranceissignificantevenifthespeakerisincapableofrational,abstractthought,andevenifthespeakerhasnointentionofconveyingamessage.ThesecondapproachtiedthesignificativeCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n82e.j.ashworthpowerofanutterancetoitsmakingknownaconcept.ThecrucialtexthereisOnInterpretation16a3–4,readassaying“Spokenwordsaresignsofconcepts.”Thissupportstheviewthatitisthespeaker’sintellectualcapacityandintentionsthatarecrucialtosignificantut-terance.Animalnoisesandgroansrevealspecificpassionsandsen-sorystates,suchasfearandpain,buttheyarenotlinkedtoconceptsandarenotproperlypartoflanguage.Aristotle,asinterpretedbymedievalcommentators,hadgoneontosaythatconceptsweresimilitudesorsignsofthings,andthisraisedthequestionofwhatismeantby“thing.”Inotherwords,whatisitthatweunderstandwhenanutterancesuchas“man”or“animal”establishesanunderstanding?WhiletheusualassumptionfromBoethiusatleastuntiltheendofthethirteenthcenturywasthattheunderstandingisofsomekindofuniversal,anessenceorcommonnature,wemustbearinmindtheimpactofdifferentepis-temologies.ForAugustineandAnselm,whoacceptedthedoctrineofanin-tellectualacquaintancewitheternalideasandtruthsthroughdivineillumination,thedistinctionbetweenknowingwordsandknowingthethingsthemselveswasall-important(e.g.,TheTeacher1.2).InMonologion10Anselmdrawsadistinctionbetweenspeakingwords,thinkingthewordsspoken,andthinkingthething,theuniversalessence“rationalmortalanimal.”Heemploysmuchthesamedis-tinctioninProslogion4whenexplaininghowthefoolsaidinhisheartwhatcannotbethought,namely,“Goddoesnotexist.”Tograsptheessence“beinggreaterthanwhichnonecanbeconceived”istograsparealintelligible,andingraspingitonecannotfailtoseethatitexistsnecessarily.TheissueisquiteotherforAquinasandthosewhoacceptedanAristotelianepistemologywhichmadecon-ceptformationdependentuponsenseexperience,andknowledgeofintelligiblerealitiessubsequenttoknowledgeofsensiblerealities.Forthemtherewasnosimple(albeitdivinelyaided)waytomovefromthinkingthewordstothinkingthethingsthemselves.Theinterpositionofconceptsbetweenwordsandintelligiblethingsliesbehindthelatethirteenth-centurydebateoverwhetherwordssignifyconceptsorthings.ForLambertofAuxerre(orLagny)inthe1260s,theintelligiblespecieswastheprimarysignifi-cateofwords,andtheessenceorcommonnaturethesecondarysignificate,12butAquinas’sdevelopmentofadistinctionbetweenCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic83theintelligiblespecies,asanessentialingredientintheintellectiveprocessbutnottheintellect’sobject,andtheinnerwordorconcept,thethingasthoughtabout,alteredthetermsofthedebate.Doesawordsignifyfirsttheintelligiblespecies,notasamereaccidentofthemindbutasarepresentationoftheexternalthing,ordoesawordsignifyfirsttheinnerword?Ifthelatteristhecase,thenwhatisthestatusoftheinnerword?Isthethingasthoughtaboutapurelymind-dependentconstruction?Ifso,conceptsareprimarilysignified.Oristhethingasthoughtabouttobeidentifiedwiththeexternalobjecttakenasrelatedtothemindinacertainway?Ifso,thethingasthoughtaboutisthesameastheexternalessence,anditisthingsthatareprimarilysignified.ThiswasthepositiontakenbySigerofBrabantanddiscussedbyDunsScotus.13Thetermsofthedebateweretochangecompletelyinthefour-teenthcenturywiththeriseofnominalism,thedoctrinethatallthatexistsareindividualthings,andthatonlyconceptscanbecommon.Thequestionnowbecameoneofpriority:doesawordsignifyanindividualthingintheworlddirectly,ordoesitsignifyfirstthegen-eralconceptwhichisanecessaryconditionforsignification?BuridanandOckhamdifferedonthisissue.Buridanheldthatwordsfirstsig-nifyconcepts,becauseonlythencanweexplainwhytermssuchasbeingandonewhichhavethesameextensionnonethelessdifferinsignification.Ockhampreferredtosaythatwordssignifiedindivid-ualthingswhilebeingsubordinatedtoconcepts.Boththinkersarealsonoteworthyfortheirnewinsistencethattheconceptitselfwasarepresentativesign.14ConventionalandnaturallanguageTherewassomediscussionofwhetherlanguagewasconventional,asAristotleandBoethiushadclearlyheld,orinsomesensenatu-ral.TheissuearoseinrelationtoAdam’snamingoftheanimalsinGenesis2:19:“WhatsoeverAdamcalledeverylivingcreature,thatwasthenamethereof.”WasthelanguageinstitutedbyAdam,orbyGodthroughAdam,anaturallanguageinthesenseofonethatenableduserstograspessencesbyvirtueofanaturalrelationshipbetweenspokenwordsandthethingsnamed?Herewefindaten-sionbetweenbiblicalexegesis,whichemphasizedanaturalrelation-shipwhilerecognizingthatitcouldnotinvolveonomatopoeia,andCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n84e.j.ashworthAristotelianlogic,whichemphasizedconventionality.15InthetwelfthcenturyThierryofChartreshadputforwardthetheorythatthewordsGodspokewhencreatinggaveessencetothings,andthatthroughtheinspirationoftheHolySpiritAdamusedthesesamewordstonamecreatedthings.Heclearlybelievedthatthisdoc-trinewascompatiblewithBoethius’sbeliefintheconventionalityofspokenlanguage.Laterauthors,includingPseudo-KilwardbyandAquinas,insistedthatimposition(theoriginalendowmentofwordswithconventionalsignification)shouldbearationaldeliberateac-tivity,butAquinassuggestedthatthiswasbyvirtueoftheinnerword,whichcapturedtheessenceofthethingnamedratherthananycorrespondencebetweenarbitrarysoundandessence.MentallanguageThecorollaryofconventionallysignificantspokenlanguageisthenaturalinnerlanguage.16Bythesecondcenturybcethenotionofinnerdiscourse(logosendiathetos)hadbecomecommontoGreekschoolsofphilosophy,andthedatasuggestthatthenotionwasnotthatofasilentconventionallanguagebutratherthatofagenuineinnerdiscourse,albeitnotyetoneendowedwithacompositionalstructure.Innerdiscourseplayedaparticularlyimportantroleindiscussionsofhowhumanbeingsdifferfromotheranimals,includ-ingthose(suchasparrots)capableofutteringwords.IntheearlyChristianera,thereisabifurcation.Ontheonehand,thenotionofinnerdiscourseisusedinNeoplatoniccommentariesonAristotleand,throughBoethius,ispassedontoLatinlogiciansandprofes-sionalphilosophers.Ontheotherhand,Christiantheologians,mostnotablyAugustine,usethenotionofaninnerwordintheirattemptstomakeintelligibletheassimilationofthedivineLogostothein-carnateChrist.Augustinepresentedanarticulatedpsychologyoftheinnermanasamodelofspiritualproduction,anditwastheactivenatureoftheinnerword,ratherthanitslinguisticanalogies,thatmatteredtohim.Thesetwoverydifferenttraditionsencoun-teredeachotherinthethirteenth-centuryLatin-speakinguniversi-ties,andAquinasplayedanimportantroleintheirassimilationandreshaping.Bytheendofthethirteenthcenturyandthebeginningofthefourteenthcenturywefindlengthy,sophisticateddiscussionsofthenatureofconceptualrepresentation,ofthequestionwhetherCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic85thementalwordisanactofmind,aspecialintentionalobject,orathingintheworldasthoughtabout,andofthedistinction,alreadypresentinAugustine,betweeninnerreflectiononspokenwordsandaninnerdiscourseindependentofspokenlanguages.Arich,sophisticatedversionofthelanguageofthoughthypothesiswasdevelopedinthefourteenthcenturybyWilliamofOckham.17Ockhamdrewasharpcontrastbetweenthetermsofconventionallysignificantspokenlanguagesandtheconceptsormentaltermstowhichtheyweresubordinated.Theseconceptswererepresentativesigns,significantbytheirverynature,andtheywerethesameforall,or,atleast,forallwithsimilarsenseexperiences.Justasthetermsofspokenlanguageenterintophrases,propositions,andargumentswithagrammaticalstructure,somentaltermsenterintogrammat-icallystructuredcompositions,althoughmentallanguagedoesnotdisplayallthegrammaticalfeaturesofspokenlanguagesbutonlythoseessentialforsemanticfeatures.Mentalnounsneedtobesingu-larorplural,forinstance,buttheydonotneedtobegendered.Atthesemanticlevel,thetruth-valuesofmentalpropositionsareafunc-tionofthereferenceofthesubjectandpredicateconcepts,togetherwiththesyntacticfeaturesoftheproposition.Ockham’stheoryofthelanguageofthoughtwasinfluentialintothefirstdecadesofthesixteenthcentury.18paronymyandanalogySofarthediscussionofsignificationhasfocusedonconcretesub-stantialterms,thatis,termssuchasmanandanimalwhichconsti-tuteanunderstandingofthingswithinthecategoryofsubstance.Nomatterwhatpositionwastakenoncommonnaturesoruniversals,thinkersagreedthatsuchtermsdidsucceedinpickingouttypesofthingwithintheactualworldandthatsuchtermscouldbegivenanessentialdefinitionintermsofgenusanddifference(e.g.,“Manisarationalanimal”).However,notallsignificanttermsareofthissort.Oneofthemainachievementsoflatermedievalthoughtwasthesophisticatedanalysisofdifferenttypesofterm.Ishallfocusontwocases:concreteaccidentaltermsandanalogicalterms.ConcreteaccidentaltermsareroughlyequivalenttoAristotle’sparonyms,alsocalleddenominatives.19Theyinclude“literate”(grammaticus)and“white”(album).TheproblemwithsuchtermsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n86e.j.ashworthisthattheydonotfallwithinanAristoteliancategory.Theyseemtohaveadoublerelation,ontheonehandtosubstantialthings,foronlysubstancescanbeliterateorwhite,andontheotherhandtothequal-itiesofliteracyorwhiteness.Moreover,unliketheEnglishadjective,theycanbeusedasthesubjectofaLatinsentence.Theissuewasfur-thercomplicatedbythecompetingauthoritiesofPriscian,whosaidthatanomen(nameornoun)signifiessubstancewithquality,andAristotle,whosaidthatthetwocategoriesaredistinctandthatwhitesignifiesonlyaquality.Anselm’sDegrammaticoisthefirstimpor-tantdiscussionoftheseproblems,thoughhisworkisinmanyre-spectsclosetothatofananonymouscommentatoronPriscianfromthesameperiod.Anselmsolvedtheproblembydrawingadistinc-tionbetweensignificationandnaming(appellation),andsayingthatAristotlewasonlyconcernedwithsignification.Whereasthewordmanprincipallysignifiesandnamesasubstancewhichisqualifiedinacertainway,grammaticus(literate)signifiesaqualitydirectly(perse)andnamesaman,thesubjectofthequality,indi-rectly(peraliud).SubsequentdiscussionsofthesameproblemwereheavilyinfluencedbytherivalviewsofAvicennaandAverroes,oncethesebecameknown,andculminateinOckham’stheoryofconnota-tiveterms,whichinvolvesacompletereversalofAnselm’sposition.ForOckham,albumprimarilysignifiesathing,anditconnotestheformwhitenesswhichqualifiesthething.Thequestionsconcerningconcreteaccidentaltermsarelinkedwiththequestionconcerningthesemanticunityofwordswiththesameroot.Hereanappealwasmadetothedistinctionbetweenthethingsignifiedandthegrammarian’smodesofsignifying,whichal-lowedonetodistinguishbetweenabstractandconcrete,orbetweennouns,verbs,andadjectives(thesebeingessentialfeatures),orbe-tweenvariousgendersandcases(thesebeingaccidentalfeatures).AnearlyexampleisfoundinWilliamofConches,whoremarkedthatwhiteandwhitenessdifferednotinthethingsignified(ressignificata),namely,whiteness,butinmodesofsignifying.Thisdis-tinctionwasveryimportantinthediscussionofreligiouslanguage.Aquinasarguedthatsuchwordsaswiseandgoodsignifypureperfec-tionsbuthavecreaturelymodesofsignifying.Thatis,theysuggesttheinherenceofaseparablequality.Theirabstractcounterparts,wisdomandgoodness,alsohavethewrongmodesofsignifying,sincetheyarenotnormallysaidofsubstances.TospeakaboutGod,weCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic87needtocanceloutthecreaturelymodesofbothconcreteandab-stractnouns.20However,thecentralproblemofreligiouslanguageremains,sincethethingsignified,thepureperfection,willstillnotbeattributedtoGodinjustthesensethatitisattributedtohumanbeings.Thereasonforthisdifferenceofattributionisfoundinthedoc-trinesofGod’ssimplicityandtranscendence,especiallyasstatedbyAugustineandBoethiusintheirworksontheTrinity.TheyinsistedthatGodtranscendsAristotle’scategoriesandthatGodisabsolutelysimple,sothatnodistinctionscanbemadebetweenGod’sessenceandhisexistenceorbetweenoneperfection,suchasgoodness,andanother,suchaswisdom,ormoregenerally,betweenGodandhisproperties.AsBoethiuswrote(TheTrinity[86]19),“Whenwesayofhim,‘Heisjust,’wedoindeedmentionaquality,butnotanacci-dentalquality–rathersuchasissubstantialand,infact,supersub-stantial.ForGodisnotonethingbecauseheis,andanotherthingbecauseheisjust;withhimtobejustandtobeGodareoneandthesame.”Twelfth-centurytheologianssuchasGilbertofPoitiersandAlanofLille,partlyundertheinfluenceofPseudo-DionysiusandScottusEriugena,tooktheissuefurtherbyemployingnegativetheology.WecannotaffirmanythingpositiveaboutGod,becausenoaffirmationcanbeappropriatetoatranscendentbeing.ItisbettertodenypropertiesofGod,sayingforinstancethatheisnotgood(i.e.,inthehumansense),andstillbettertosaythatGodisnotexistentbutsuperexistent,notsubstancebutsupersubstantial,notgoodbutsupergood.ThesetheologicaldoctrinesraisedthegeneralproblemofhowwecanspeakmeaningfullyofGodatall,buttheyalsoraisedanumberofparticularproblems,especiallytheproblemofhowwecansaythatGodisjustandthatPeterisjustaswell.Bythemid-thirteenthcenturytheologiansattemptedtosolvethisproblembyappealingtoanalogy.Thediscussionofanalogicaltermswasfittedintotheframeworkofthedoctrineofequivocaltermsfoundinlogictexts.21Theorigi-nalfocusofdiscussionwasprovidedbyAristotle’sCategories,whichopenswithabriefcharacterizationoftermsusedequivocally,suchasanimalusedofrealhumanbeingsandpicturedhumanbeings,termsusedunivocally,suchasanimalusedofhumanbeingsandoxen,andtermsusedparonymously,suchasstrongandliterate(theconcreteaccidentaltermsweexaminedabove).Inthefirstcase,theCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n88e.j.ashworthspokentermisthesamebuttherearetwodistinctsignificatesorintellectualconceptions;inthesecondcase,principallythatofcon-cretesubstantialterms,boththespokentermandthesignificatearethesame.TheCategorieswassupplementedbytheSophisticalRefu-tations,inwhichAristotlediscussesthreetypesofequivocationandhowthesecontributetofallaciesinlogic.Anotherinspirationfordoctrinesofanalogywasmetaphysics.OnecrucialtextisfoundinAristotle’sMetaphysicsIV2(1003a33–35):“Therearemanysenses[multismodis]inwhichbeing[ens]canbesaid,buttheyarerelatedtoonecentralpoint[adunum],onedefi-nitekindofthing,andarenotequivocal.Everythingwhichishealthyisrelatedtohealth...andeverythingwhichismedicaltomedicine.”Inthistext,Aristotleraisesthegeneralproblemofthewordbeinganditsdifferentsenses,andhealsointroduceswhatisknownasproshenequivocationorfocalmeaning,theideathatdifferentsensesmaybeunifiedthrougharelationshiptoonecentralsense.Anotherfoun-dationaltextisfromAvicenna’sMetaphysics,wherehewritesthatbeing(ens)isneitheragenusnorapredicatepredicatedequallyofallitssubordinatesbutisratheranotion(intentio)inwhichtheyagreeaccordingtothepriorandtheposterior.Asweshallsee,thisreferencetothepriorandtheposteriorisparticularlyimportant.Weshouldalsonotethatensisoneoftheso-calledtranscendentalterms,ortermswhichgobeyondAristotle’scategories,inthattheycanbeattributedtothingsofanycategory.Theothercentraltranscenden-talswereone(unum),good(bonum),andtrue(verum),sothatthediscussionoftranscendentalsiscloselyrelatedbothtothediscussionofpureperfectionsandtothegeneralproblemofconcreteaccidentalterms.22Forthirteenth-centuryauthorstherewerethreemaintypesofanalogy.IntheoriginalGreeksense,analogyinvolvedacompari-sonoftwoproportionsorrelations.Thusprinciplewassaidtobeananalogicaltermwhensaidofapointandaspringofwaterbecauseapointisrelatedtoalineasaspringisrelatedtoariver.Thistypeofanalogycametobecalledtheanalogyofproportionality,andwasbrieflyprivilegedbyAquinasinTruth.Inthesecondsense,analogyinvolvedarelationbetweentwothings,ofwhichoneisprimaryandtheothersecondary.Thushealthywassaidtobeananalogicaltermwhensaidofadoganditsfoodbecausewhilethedoghashealthintheprimarysense,itsfoodishealthyonlysecondarilyascontributingCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic89toorcausingthehealthofthedog.Thissecondtypeofanalogybe-cameknownastheanalogyofattribution,anditsspecialmarkwasbeingsaidinapriorandaposteriorsense(perpriusetposterius).Athirdtypeofanalogy,sometimesappealedtobytheologians,in-cludingAquinasinhisSentencescommentary,involvedarelationoflikenessbetweenGodandcreatures.Creaturesarecalledgoodorjustbecausetheirgoodnessorjusticeimitatesorreflectsthegood-nessorjusticeofGod.Thistypeofanalogywascalledtheanalogyofimitationorparticipation.23Ofthethreetypes,itistheanalogyofattributionthatiscentraltomedievaldiscussions.Fromthefourteenthcenturyon,discussionsofanalogyfocusednotsomuchonlinguisticusagesasonthenatureoftheconceptsthatcorrespondedtothewordsused.Istherejustoneconceptthatcorrespondstoananalogicalterm,oristhereasequenceofcon-cepts?Ifthelatter,howarethemembersofthesequenceorderedandrelatedtoeachother?Moreover,howfarshouldwedistinguishbetweenso-calledformalconcepts(oractsofmind)andobjectiveconcepts(whateveritisthatistheobjectoftheactofunderstand-ing)?Therewerealsothose,suchasDunsScotus,whorejectedanalogy.24Otherexplorationsofambiguitywerelessdirectlyrelatedtothe-ologyandhadtodonotwithindividualtermsbutwithwholepropo-sitions.Oneofthebasictoolsofpropositionalanalysiswasthedis-tinctionbetweencompoundedanddividedsenses,whichisgenerallyassociatedwithmodallogicbutoriginatedinAristotle’sdiscussionofthefallacyofcompositionanddivision.Thebasicpointconcernstwowaysofreadingthesentence“Aseatedmancanwalk.”Inter-pretedaccordingtoitscompoundedsense,thispropositionisdedicto(aboutadictumor“that”clause)andmeans“That-a-seated-man-walk(i.e.,whileseated)ispossible.”Interpretedaccordingtoitsdi-videdsense,thepropositionisdere(aboutaresorthing)andmeans“Aseatedmanhasthepowerorabilitytowalk.”Thepropositionisfalseinthefirstsensebuttrueinthesecond.Itbecamestandardwhenconsideringmodalinferences,includingmodalsyllogisms,todistinguishbetweenthecompoundedanddividedsensesofpremisesandconclusionandtoworkoutthelogicalresultsofthesedifferentreadings.WilliamHeytesbury’streatiseonthesubject25showsthevarietyofproblemstowhichthedistinctionwasappliedinthefour-teenthcentury.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n90e.j.ashworthreference:suppositiontheoryThemostnotablenewtheorythattookshapeinthetwelfthcenturywassuppositiontheory.Likethetheoryofanalogicalterms,ithadcloselinkswiththeologicalproblems,particularlythoseassociatedwiththedoctrineoftheTrinity,threePersonsinoneGod.Thewordsuppositumhadadualuse.Ingrammar,itmeantsubject,some-timessyntactic,thatis,thenounagreeingwiththeverb,butmoreusuallysemantic,thatis,thebeareroftheformpredicated;inthe-ology,itmeantPerson,thesubjectqualifiedbythedivineessence.Thesesensesandthoseassociatedwiththewordsuppositio(puttingassubject)andtheverbsupponere(toputassubject)fedintothenewnotionofsuppositioproorstandingfor.ThusthewordGodwassaidtosuppositforapersonwhenitstoodforaPersonoftheTrinity,andtosuppositforanessencewhenitstoodforthedivineessence(Aquinas,STI,q.39,a.4).Initsdevelopedform,thetheoryofsupposition,alongwithitsramifications,particularlyampliationandrestriction,exploredthedifferenttypesofreferencethatasub-jectorpredicatetermcouldhaveinvariouscontexts.26Thethreemaintypesofsuppositionwerematerial,simple,andpersonal.Atermwassaidtohavematerialsuppositionwhenitstoodforitselforforotheroccurrencesofthesameterm,asin“Manisanoun.”Thusmaterialsuppositionstoodinforquotationdevices.Atermwassaidtohavesimplesuppositionwhenitstoodforauniversal,asin“Manisaspecies.”Bothmaterialsuppositionandsimplesupposi-tiongaverisetocontroversy,butespeciallythelatter,becauseoftheobviousproblemoftheontologicalstatusofuniversalsorcommonnatures.Finally,atermhaspersonalsuppositionwhenitistakenforitsnormalreferents,aswhenmanistakenforSocrates,Plato,andsoon.Somelogiciansdistinguishedaccidentalpersonalsuppositionfromnaturalsupposition,whichallowedatermtohaveprepropo-sitionalreferencetoallitsreferents,past,presentandfuture,whileothersinsistedthatsuppositionmustbepurelypropositionalandcontextual.Thisdebatewaslinkedwiththequestionofhowtode-finesupposition:isitatypeofsignificationbelongingespeciallytothesubjectofaproposition,orisitnotatypeofsignificationatallbuttheacceptanceofatermasstandingforitsreferents?27Italsoaffectsthedoctrinesofampliation,wherebythereferenceofatermCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic91canbeextended,andrestriction(theoppositeofampliation).Parisianlogicians,suchasJeanlePage,writingcirca1235,tendedtoacceptnaturalsuppositionandtosay(likeBuridaninthefourteenthcen-tury)thattermshadnaturalsuppositioninscientificpropositions,thatis,universalnecessarytruths,sothatnoampliationwasnec-essary.Asacorollary,innonscientificpropositionsthesuppositionoftermswasrestrictedinvariousways.ForEnglishlogiciansinthethirteenthcentury,allsuppositionwascontextual,andthenotionofampliationhadtobeusedwhenthesubjectofapropositionwastoextendbeyondpresentexistentthings.Thenotionofampliationwasparticularlyimportantintheanal-ysisofpropositionscontainingtensedverbs,modalterms,andepistemictermssuchasimagine.Logiciansgenerallyheldthataffirmativepropositionswithnonreferringtermsarefalse,yetmanyofthepropositionswewishtotakeastruehavetermsthatrefertonothingcurrentlyexistent.Thedoctrineofampliationallowedref-erencetoextendoverpast,future,andpossibleobjects.InthelaterfourteenthcenturyMarsiliusofInghenarguedthatoneshouldalsoallowreferencetoimaginableobjectswhichwereimpossible.Byal-lowingthiskindofampliationtooccurwhensuchtermsasimaginewereused,hecouldsavethetruthof“Iimagineachimera,”whilestillholdingthat“Achimeraisananimal”wasfalse.28Thethreetypesofpersonalsuppositionmostoftenappealedtoaredeterminate,purelyconfused(confusetantum),andconfusedanddistributive.Thesetypeswerenormallyillustratedbymeansofthedescenttosingulars.Forinstance,tosaythatthesubjectofaparticularaffirmativeproposition,“SomeAisB,”hasdeterminatesuppositionistosaythatonecaninferthedisjunctionofsingularpropositions,“ThisAisB,orthatAisB,ortheotherAisB,andsoon.”Tosaythatthepredicateofauniversalaffirmativeproposition,“EveryAisB,”haspurelyconfusedsuppositionistosaythatonecaninferapropositionwithadisjointpredicate,“EveryAisthisBorthatBortheotherB,andsoon.”Tosaythatthesubjectofauniversalaffirmativepropositionhasconfusedanddistributivesuppositionistosaythatonecaninferaconjunctionofpropositions,“ThisAisB,andthatAisB,andtheotherAisB,andsoon.”Somepeopledistinguishedbetweenmobileandimmobilecases.Forinstance,nodescentispossiblefrom“OnlyeveryAisB,”andsoAhasimmobilesupposition.Afourthtypeofsuppositioniscollectivesupposition,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n92e.j.ashworthasin“Everymanishaulingaboat,”giventhattheyaredoingitto-gether.Hereanydescentwillinvolveaconjointsubject,asin“Thismanandthatmanandtheothermanareallhaulingaboat.”Thetheoryofpersonalsuppositionwasusedtosolveavarietyofproblems.Onestandardproblemhadtodowithpromising(or“owing”insomeauthors).IfIpromiseyouahorse,istheresomehorsethatIpromiseyou,andifnot,howistheoriginalsentencetobeconstrued?Awidevarietyofanswerswasproposed.WalterBurleysuggestedthathorsehassimplesupposition;Heytesburytookitthathorsehadpurelyconfusedsuppositionandthatitdidnotimply“ThereissomehorsethatIpromiseyou,”becausethenewpositionofhorsebeforetheverbgaveitdeterminatesupposition.Ockhampreferredtoreplacethesentencebyamorecomplexsentence,“Youwillhaveonehorsebymeansofmygift.”29truthandparadoxLanguageandlogicareconcernedwithtruth,butwhatistruth?ThequestionwascomplicatedbytheinterplaybetweenAristotle’sclaimthat“itisbecausetheactualthingexistsordoesnotexistthatthestatementissaidtobetrueorfalse”(Categories4b8–10),thedoctrineoftranscendentalsaccordingtowhichone,good,being,andtruearenotonlyidenticalbutcomeindegrees,andChrist’sclaiminJohn’sGospel14:6,“Iamtheway,thetruthandthelife.”InOnFreeChoiceoftheWillII12Augustineusedpropositionaltruthasastepping-stonetotheconclusionthatGodisTruth.Sincepropositionaltruthsexist,bythePlatonicone-over-manyprincipletheremustbeatruthinwhichtheyparticipate,andthisTruthcanonlybeGod.Inotherplaces,Augustineappealedtoaparadox,formulatedbyBonaventure(DisputedQuestions[213]113)inthesewords:“Ifthereisnotruth,thenitistruetosay:‘Thereisnotruth.’Butifthisistrue,thensomethingistrue.Andifsomethingistrue,thereisafirsttruth.”AnselmmadeasimilarmoveinMonologion18.InhisDeVeritatehetookuptheissueofdifferentsensesofthewordtruthandfoundasolutionwhichallowedhimtoreconciletheconflictingauthorities.Truthisfundamentallyrectitude,andthisnotionappliesfirsttoGod,butwecanalsospeakofthetruthofobjects,insofarastheyrightlyreflectdivineIdeas,andofthetruthofstatements,insofarastheyrightlyreflectthetruthofobjects.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic93UnsurprisinglyAquinasrejectedthePlatonicmoveswhichal-lowedaprogressionfromseeingthetruthofpropositionstoseeingthedivineTruth(STI,q.2,a.1,ad1);andhisdiscussionofdiffer-entsensesoftruthbegannotwithGodbutwiththeworldaroundhim.HetooktheclaimattributedtoIsaacIsraeli,accordingtowhichtruthis“thecommensuratenessofunderstandingandthing”(adae-quatiointellectusetrei),andarguedthatthereweretwosortsofconformity,thatbetweenmindandobjectandthatbetweenobjectandmind.Whenwespeakofconformitybetweenobjectandmindwearespeakingoftranscendentaltruth,byvirtueofwhichobjectsarereflectionsofdivineideas;whenwespeakofmindandobject,wespeakofthehumanmind’sconformitytotheobjectsarounditwherebyjudgmentsaretrue(STI,q.16,a.1;q.21,a.2).ThesetwosensesarethenusedtoexplainthatGodcanbecalledTruthbecauseinhimthereisadoubleconformity,giventhathisbeing(esse)andunderstanding(intelligere)arethesame.Oneofthemostnotoriousproblemsoftruthisassociatedwithinsolublesorsemanticparadoxes.30ThesimplestversionistheLiarParadox,“WhatIamsayingisfalse,”giventhecasusorinitialsituationthatthisisallthatissaid,butcomplexversionswithhypotheticalpropositions(“Godexists,andsomeconjunctivepropo-sitionisfalse.”)orsequencesofmutuallyreferringpropositions(“SupposethatSocratessays‘Platosayssomethingfalse,’andPlatosays‘Socratessayssomethingtrue.’”)werealsodiscussed.31Inthetwentiethcenturysuchparadoxeshavebeenusedtocastdoubtontheveryfoundationsofsemantictheoryandhaveledtoelaboratedistinctionsbetweenlevelsoflanguageandmetalanguage.Medievallogicians,however,shownosignsofsuchacrisismentality,andwhiletheydidemploycertainrestrictionsonself-referenceandmakecertaindistinctionsbetweenlanguageandmetalanguage,thesetech-niquesweregenerallylimitedtotheprobleminhand.inferenceandparadoxThenotionofinference,orconsequentia,wasattheheartoflogic.Theenormousamountofwritingdevotedtoproblemsofsignifica-tionandreferencewasintendedtohelpthereasoneravoidfallaciousinference.Similarlythemanytreatisesonobligations(therulestobefollowedinacertaintypeofdisputation)wereintendedtogiveCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n94e.j.ashworththestudentpracticeinfollowingthroughthelogicalimplicationsofthepropositionshehadaccepted.32Therewasconsiderabledebateaboutthedefinitionofvalidity.Theclaimthataconsequenceisvalidifandonlyifitisimpossiblefortheconsequenttobefalsewhentheantecedentistruewasques-tionedfortworeasons.Inthefirstplace,thepropositionsinvolvedweretakentobeoccurrentitems,whetherwritten,spoken,ormen-tal.Theycouldfailtoexist,inwhichcasethereisnothingtocarryatruth-value.Alternatively,theirmeaningcouldbeatoddswiththeiractualexpression,asin“Everypropositionisaffirmative,thereforenopropositionisnegative.”Suchproblemswerediscussedatlength,forexample,byBuridan,whosolvedthembysubstitutingadefini-tionintermsofsignification,thatis,thataconsequenceisvalidifandonlyifitisimpossibleforittobeassignifiedbytheantecedentwithoutitsbeingassignifiedbytheconsequent.Thepresenceof“ifandonlyif”raisesthesecondproblem.Thetruthdefinition(orBuridan’ssubstitute)mayprovideanecessaryconditionforvalidity,butisitsufficient?Ifitissufficient,thenwemustaccepttheparadoxesofstrictimplication,thatis,thatanythingfollowsfromanimpossibleproposition,andanecessarypropositionfollowsfromanything.Thedebateabouttheseparadoxesbeganinthetwelfthcentury,andtherewasaseriesofattemptstoprovideasecondconditionwhich,withthefirst,wouldbesufficientforvalidity.Abelardhadacontainmentprinciplebywhichthedictumoftheantecedentshouldcontainthedictumoftheconsequent,andRobertKilwardbyinthenextcentury,likeStrodeinmid-fourteenth-centuryOxford,saidthattheconsequenthadtobeunderstoodintheantecedent.Somepeopleinthethirteenthcenturyfocusedonreality,andarguedthataconsequencemustcaptureacausalrelationandthatasaresulttheantecedentmustbeaboutastateofaffairsthatcanatleastbesupposedtobepossible.Noneofthesepeoplecouldaccepttheparadoxesasformallyvalid.Ontheotherhand,theParvipontaniorAdamites(followersofAdamofBalsham)inthetwelfthcenturyandBuridaninthefourteenthwerehappytoacceptthe“ifandonlyif”formulationasofferingbothnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforvalidity,withallthatthatimpliedfortheacceptanceoftheparadoxes.Therearemanyplacesotherthanthosementionedaboveinwhichlogicalandphilosophicalortheologicalissuesoverlap,includingCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nLanguageandlogic95discussionsofthenatureofpropositionsandofmodallogic.33Anumberofthesediscussions,likethosementionedabove,seemtopresentlogicasastudyofinferenceratherthanasasearchfortruth,butasAugustineremarked,“itisonethingtoknowtherulesofinference,anothertoknowthetruthofpropositions”(OnChristianDoctrineII34).Hewentontosay“Knowledgeofinference,defini-tion,anddivisionisagreathelptotheunderstanding[intellectorem],solongasonedoesnotmakethemistakeofthinkingthathavinglearnedthemisthesameashavinglearnedthetruthoftheblessedlife”(ibid.II37).Forthemedievalthinker,logicwasapreliminarystudy,notanendinitself.notes1.ForfullerintroductionstologicseeI.Hadot[405]andJ.Marenbon[465]fortheearliestperiod,P.DronkeCH12forthetwelfthcentury,andCHLMPforthelaterMiddleAges.Forlanguage,seethearticlesinS.Ebbesen[460].Forfullbibliographies,seeE.J.Ashworth[456]andF.Pironet[470].Fortexts,seeN.KretzmannandE.StumpCTI.Subse-quentnotespointtofurtherreading.2.SeeI.Hadot[405].3.Forgrammar,seeC.H.Kneepkens[463].4.SeeM.A.Covington[458],C.Marmo[466],andI.Rosier[472]and[473].5.SeetranslationinCTI12–38.6.SeeS.Read[47].7.SeeespeciallyOnChristianDoctrine,TheTeacher,andDedialectica.8.SeeE.J.Ashworth[236]andI.Rosier[258].9.SeeN.J.Green-Pedersen[461].10.P.V.Spade,CHLMP188.11.CTI105.12.CTI104–05.ThetranslationmasksLambert’suseofthetermspecies.13.SeeG.Pini[298].14.SeeJ.Biard[457].15.SeeG.Dahan[459].16.SeeC.Panaccio[469].17.SeeC.Panaccio[322].18.SeeE.J.Ashworth[455].19.SeeN.Kretzmann[41].20.SeeE.J.Ashworth[237]andI.Rosier[474].21.SeeE.J.Ashworth[235]andchapter6inthisvolume.22.SeeJ.A.Aertsen[504]andchapter4inthisvolume.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n96e.j.ashworth23.SeeB.Montagnes[467].24.Fordiscussion,seechapter6inthisvolume.25.CTI413–34.26.Foraricharrayofnontheologicaltexts,seeL.M.deRijk[471].27.SeeLambertinCTI106–07.28.SeeE.J.Ashworth[455]forthisandotherproblemsofreference.29.Seeibid.30.SeeP.V.Spade[475].31.AlbertofSaxonyinCTI357,349.32.SeeK.Jacobi[462]andM.Yrjonsuuri[¨51]fordiscussionsofconse-quencesandobligations.33.Forpropositions,seeG.Nuchelmans[468];formodallogic,seeS.Knuuttila[464].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nth´er`ese-annedruart4PhilosophyinIslamWhy“PhilosophyinIslam”?Whynot“IslamicPhilosophy”or“ArabicPhilosophy”?Thesimpleanswerstothesequestionsandthefarfromsimpleconsequencesofthoseanswersprovideanentryintotherichworldofideasbrieflyexploredinthischapter.Thesim-pleanswertothequestion“Whynot‘IslamicPhilosophy’?”isthatnotallphilosophersinlandsunderIslamicruleintheMiddleAgeswereMuslim.ItiseasytoforgethowdiversetheempireofIslamwasand,inparticular,thatitincludednumerouslivelyreligiousminorities.1Amongphilosopherstherewere:
Muslims,suchasal-Farabi,Avicenna(IbnSina),andAverroes(IbnRushd),someofwhomwereSunni,othersShiitesorIsmaili,astheBrethrenofPurity
Christians,forinstanceYahyaIbn’Ady,aleadingdiscipleofal-Farabiandawell-knownJacobitetheologian
Sabians,suchasthephysicianThabitibnQurra,atranslator
MazdaeansorZoroastrians,suchasManial-Majusi
Pagans,suchasAbuBakral-Razi,thefamousRhazes,whodeniedtheverypossibilityofrevelationorprophecy,onthegroundthatitwouldfavoraparticularpeopleandwouldthereforebeincompatiblewithGod’sjustice
Jews,suchasIbnSuwar,Halevy,Maimonides,etc.ThegreatnumberandimportanceofJewishphilosophers,includingthoseworkingintheLatinWestaftertheReconquista,callforafullchapterdevotedtotheirthought(thechapterfollowingthisone),butthey,aswellastheothernon-Muslimslistedabove,mustbeconsid-eredasparticipantsinasinglephilosophicalconversationcarriedonfromtheninththroughthethirteenthcenturyandbeyond.97CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n98th´er`ese-annedruartScholarshavesometimespreferredtospeakof“Arabicphiloso-phy,”toavoidsuggestingthatthereisan“Islamic”wayofphilos-ophizingcomparabletotheconceptionof“Christianphilosophy”advocated,controversially,byGilsonasawaytocapturethespiritofmedievalphilosophyintheLatinWest.2Butthereareproblemswith“Arabicphilosophy,”too.LeavingasidethecaseofJudeo-Arabic(ArabicwritteninHebrewcharacters),weneedtorecog-nizethatnotallphilosophicaltextswerewritteninArabic,sinceAvicenna,amongothers,pennedsomeimportanttreatisesinPersian.Besides,thewordArabicmaybeconstruedasreferringnotonlytothelanguageusedbythephilosophersbutalsototheirethnicbackground,andwiththeexceptionofal-KindiandAverroes,fewphilosopherswereArab.Avicennaandal-Ghazali,forexample,werePersian.Inclusionofthelast-namedthinkerinmycensusofphilosopherspointstoyetanothercomplication,foral-Ghazali’schiefcontribu-tiontophilosophywasapowerfulcriticalwork,theIncoherenceofthePhilosophers.Thisraisesthequestion,whatismeantbyphi-losophy?Often,onerestrictsittofalsafa,anArabicwordwhichsimplytransliteratestheGreekphilosophiaandimmediatelypointstothediscipline’sforeignorigin.Mostofthefalasifa,thatis,Hell-enizedphilosophers,claimedmembershipinaschoolderivingfromAristotle,andAverroesbitterlycriticizedAvicennafordistancinghimselftoomuchfrom“thefirstteacher.”Others,however,suchasal-Razi,criticizedAristotleandinvokedPlatoorSocrates.More-over,Islamictheology(Kalam)hadalreadyelaboratedsomephilo-sophicalconceptsandanontology–ithaddevelopedphilosophicalreflections,evenifitspractitionersdidnotwanttobeequatedwiththefalasifa.Ghazaliobjectsvigorouslytothefalasifa’sexaggeratedclaimstohavingapodeicticdemonstrationsoftheexistenceorna-tureofGod,buthisobjectionswerethemselvessophilosophicallyacutethatAverroesfeltcalledtorefuteasmanyofthemashecould(whileconcedingthevalidityofothers).IthasbeenwellarguedthatthereismuchgenuineandoriginalphilosophyinKalamandthatAvicennahadmoreinfluenceonGhazalithanhaspreviouslybeenthought.3“PhilosophyinIslam”thusincludestheideasofnon-Muslims,non-Arabs,andmanythinkerswhodidnotwishtobeknownasphilosophers–anditisnonethepoorer,philosophically,forallthat.ItdeservesfurtheremphasisherethateventhosewhocalledCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam99themselvesfalasifawerenotgroundedexclusivelyinAristotleandNeoplatonism(orinNeoplatonictextsfalselyattributedtoAristotle,suchastheProcleanLiberdecausisandthePlotinianAristotle’sTheology4).TherewereotherGreeksources,includingChristianones,suchasPhiloponus’sargumentsagainsttheeternityoftheworld.LittleisknownabouthowStoicismcametoinfluencethefalasifa,butitclearlydid.Thesamegoesforthephilosopher-physicianGalen,whoinfluencedmanyfalasifawhowerealsophysi-cians,suchasal-Razi,Avicenna,IbnTufayl,andAverroes.AndSyriacandPersiansourcesarenottobeignored,althoughthegreattrans-lationmovementatthetimeoftheearlyAbbasidscertainlycon-centratedonGreektexts.5Withregardtothese,however,itmustbenoted,thereisstillconsiderableuncertaintyastowhatphilo-sophicalthinkersinIslamactuallyhadbeforethem.Itisnotalwaysclearwhetherwearedealingwithtranslationsofafullworkorsim-plyofsomekindofsummary.WehaveanArabicversionofGalen’sSummaryofPlato’s“Timaeus”butdonotknowofafulltransla-tionoftheTimaeusitself.ItisuncertainwhetherthereexistedafulltranslationofPlato’sLaws.6ThereisalongstandingdisputeastowhetherAristotle’sPoliticswastranslatedintoArabic,andeven,asinthecaseofAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics,ifafulltranslationexisted,wedonotknowhowmuchandwhenitcirculated(al-Kindi’sreferencestotheworkarerathervague,forexample).7Afinalremarktoconcludethisexplicationof“philosophyinIslam”:althoughthescopeofthischapterwillbelimitedarbitrar-ilyalmostentirelytophilosophersuptoandincludingAverroes(d.1198),itmustbeunderstoodthatthesupposeddeathofphilos-ophyinIslamiclandsafterAverroesisamyth.AnAvicenniantra-dition,thePhilosophyofIllumination,introducedbySuhrawardi(1154–91),hasbeenmaintaineduptothepresent,particularlyinIran,withphilosopherssuchasal-Tusi(1201–74),MirDamad(1543–1631),andMullaSadra(1571/2–1641).8Recently,scholarshaveeditedpostmedievalphilosophicaltextsfromotherareasoftheIslamicworld,suchastheOttomanEmpire,inwhich,forin-stance,severalscholarswroteTahafut,thatis,IncoherenceofthePhilosopherstreatisesalongthesamelinesasGhazali’s.The1533IncoherenceofKemalPasazade(alsoknownasIbnKemal)takesintoaccounttheargumentsofGhazali,Averroes(contrarytotheclaimthatAverroeshadnoimpactonphilosophersinIslam),andofapreviousOttomanscholar,Hocazade.9Formedievalists,ofcourse,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n100th´er`ese-annedruartphilosophyinIslamintheMiddleAgesisbyitselfsufficientlyen-grossingtorewardstudybyfurthergenerationsofscholars,butthephilosophical-criticalconversationwithwhichweareconcernedinthischaptercontinuedbeyondourperiodintothepresent.philosophy,religion,andcultureItiscommonlythoughtthattherewasintheMiddleAges(andper-hapsstillis)afundamentalconflictbetweenphilosophyandthereligionofIslam.Itisclearfromwhatwehavealreadyseenofthepresenceofphilosophicalthoughteveninthecriticsoffalsafathattheideaofasimpleoppositionisamisconception.Itwouldbeequallyamisconception,however,toimaginethattherewasasingledominantpositiveideaofwhatphilosophyandreligionhavetodowithoneanother.Rather,wefindavarietyofthoughtfulandimagi-nativeexplorationsoftherelationship.Thefactthatnoneofthedis-cussionsweshallconsiderwasstrictlyhomologouswithanythingintheLatinWestmakesthesediscussionsmore,notless,fruitfulforcross-culturalunderstanding.Theimportanceofculturalcontextcanhardlybeexaggerated.WhereChristianitycameasanewreligionintoaGraeco-Latinciv-ilizationinwhichtheclassicalphilosophicalschoolswerewellrep-resented,thesituationwasjusttheoppositeinIslam.Therephilos-ophycameonthesceneintheninthcenturyasanalienimport,withthetaskofmakingaplaceforitselfinacivilizationformedatitsdeepestlevels,bothpoliticallyandculturally,bytheQur’anandthelawbasedonit.OneofthefirstdebatesinvolvingfalsafacenteredonwhetherlogicitselfwastrulyuniversalorsimplyarosefromGreekgrammar.TranslatorsandmostofthefirstdefendersoffalsafawerenotArabicspeakers.TheirbrokenArabicandtheirstrangecoinagestorenderGreektechnicaltermspuzzledtheirMusliminterlocutors,soproudoftheirlanguageanditsimportanceasthelanguageoftherevelationtoMuhammad.ManyregardedtheQur’anitselfasuncreated,aclaimgroundedinitsinimitability,theimpossibilityofcomposingversesofsuchliteraryartistry.Thede-batewascomplicatedbythefactthatthefalasifaadoptedtheviewoftheAlexandrianSchoolthatAristotle’sRhetoricandPoeticsareinte-gralpartsoflogic,ratherthanofpracticalphilosophy.TheyequatedtheargumentsofthespecialistsinKalamwithdialecticandthoseofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam101theQur’anwithrhetoricandpoeticalarguments.10OncethefalasifabegantouseamorepalatablekindofArabicandtobringstylisticimprovementstothetranslations,someofthemisunderstandingsdissipated,andlogic,oftencomparedtomathematics,wasclearlydistinguishedfromGreekgrammar,acknowledgedasuniversallyvalid,andlateronfoundahomeinthecurriculumoftheschoolsoflaw.Thedebateraisesvividlythequestionofwhatisuniversallyvalidinphilosophyandwhatisculturallydetermined.IflogiccouldberegardedforawhileaspeculiarlyGreek,weshouldnotwonderattheproblematicstatusofmetaphysicsforsomeofthethinkersweshallbeconsidering.Asconcernsthebroaderissuesintherelationofphilosophywithreligion,wewilldowelltobeginattheendofourperiod,withAver-roes(1126–98),foranincompletegraspofhispositionisaprimesourceofthebeliefinasimpleandbasicphilosophico-religiouscon-flict.Afullerunderstandingofhisviewswillhelpustoplaceanum-berofearlierdiscussionsincontext.JudgeAverroesThereisanimageofAverroesasadefenderofimplicitlyantireligiousFreeThinkingandasaforerunneroftheEnlightenment11thatisbasedlargelyonapartialreadingofhisDecisiveTreatise,Determin-ingtheNatureandConnectionbetweenPhilosophyandReligion.12InthisworkAverroesdoesindeedpraisephilosophicalinsightasthehighestformofknowledge.Theliberalimageisseverelycracked,however,ifnotentirelyshattered,whenonereads,inAverroes’refu-tationofal-Ghazali’sIncoherenceofthePhilosophers,that“hereticsaretobekilled.”13Isthereaninconsistency?Notatall.Averroeswasnotsimplyaphilosopherphysicianbutalsoajudgeand,therefore,anexpertonIslamiclaw.Thetreatiseispresentedasanofficialfatwaorjuridicaldecisiondeterminingthecanonicalstatusofphilosophy.“Thepurposeofthistreatise,”hedeclaresattheoutset,“istoex-aminefromthestandpointofthestudyofthelaw[shari’a],whetherthestudyofphilosophy[falsafa]andlogicisallowedbythelaw,orprohibitedorcommandedeitherbywayofrecommendationorasobligatory.”Averroes’judgmentisthatthestudiesinquestionareobligatoryforanintellectualelitebutmustbeforbiddentoordinarybelievers.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n102th´er`ese-annedruartThefatwapresentationandnofewerthanninereferencestoal-Ghazali(1058–1111)showclearlythatthelatter’sIncoherenceofthePhilosophershadhadaseriousimpactthroughouttheIslamicworld.Beforeprovidingalengthyanddetailedrefutationofal-Ghazali’sar-gumentsinhisownIncoherenceoftheIncoherence,Averroeshereoffersamorepopulardefenseoflogicandphilosophy,butitisade-fensecouchedintermsofIslamiclaw.Heastutelybeginswithlogic,foral-Ghazalihimselfhaddefendedlogicandclaimedinhisintel-lectualautobiographythatthelogicofthefalasifawassuperiortothereasoningofthespecialistsinIslamiclaw,andheissaidtohaveconvincedtheschoolsoflawtoincludelogicinthecurriculum.ButAverroescarriesthejustificationoflogicfurther.Hearguesforitsusefulnessasaninstrumentforfalsafa,whichhedefinesas“noth-ingmorethanthestudyofexistingbeingsandreflectionsonthemasindicationsoftheArtisan,”thatis,God,astheCreator.Falsafathusbecomestheodicy,aimingtoprovetheexistenceofthecreatorandtoprovideabetterunderstandingofGod.Averroestherebyseekstocounteral-Ghazali’schargethatthefalasifadonotreallyprovethattheworldhasanArtisan,sincetheyhavereducedthatwordtoametaphor(Incoherence,secondandthirddiscussions).AcrucialstepinAverroes’acculturationofphilosophytotherequirementsofIslamrestsonashiftinterminologyinthewordstranslatedinEnglishasphilosophy.ElaboratingaparallelbetweenaspectsofIslamiclawandphilosophy,Averroessubstitutes“wisdom”(hikmat)forfalsafa.IntheQur’anoneofthebeautifulnamesofGodis“TheWise,”and,therefore,“wisdom”hasaqur’anicringtoit,whereasfalsafaconnotessomethingalien.Averroesthencalls“philosophy”(stillhikmat)theartofarts.Heconcludesthefirstsectionofthetrea-tisebyclaimingthatforeveryMuslimthereisawaytotruthsuit-abletohisnature,firstquotingQur’anXVI125:“Summon[them]tothewayofyourLordbywisdomandbygoodpreaching,andde-batewiththeminthemosteffectivemanner.”Therootofthewordfor“debate,”jadal,isusedtorefertoAristotle’sTopics,aworkconcernedwithdialecticalargumentsbasedongenerallyreceivedopinions.Averroeswillequatethis“debate”withKalam,orIslamictheology.Heisthenabletopresentphilosophyasonewayoffulfill-ingthequr’anicinjunction–awaythatisappropriate,andindeedobligatory,forcertainindividuals:CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam103ThuspeopleinrelationtoScripturefallintothreeclasses.Oneclassisthosewhoarenotpeopleofinterpretationatall:thesearetherhetoricalclass.Theyaretheoverwhelmingmass,fornomanofsoundintellectisexemptedfromthiskindofassent.Anotherclassisthepeopleofdialecticalinterpre-tation:thesearethedialecticians,eitherbynaturealoneorbynatureandhabit.Anotherclassisthepeopleofcertaininterpretation:thesearethedemonstrativeclass,bynatureandtraining,i.e.,intheartofphilosophy[hikmat].Thisinterpretationoughtnottobeexpressedtothedialecticalclass,letalonethemasses.([161]65)Bythusellidingsomeofthedistinctionsbetweenqur’aniclanguageandtechnicalGreekphilosophicalwordsandconcepts,AverroesisabletoclaimattheendoftheTreatisethat“philosophy[hikmatbutnowintendedassynonymouswithfalsafa]isthefriendandmilk-sisterof...law[shari’a].”Toomanyinterpreters,unawareoftheseshiftsinterminologyandofculturaldifferences,haveassumedthatAverroesraisedquestionsabouttherelationbetweenphilosophyandreligiousfaithsimilartothoseposedbytheso-called“Averroists”inthirteenth-centuryParis.Averroesdoesnotinfactrefertoreligionbutrathertotheshari’aorIslamiclaw,andtherelationheassertsbetweenphilosophyandthislawisoneofaccord,butonlyforasmallelite.Prophecyinterpretsphilosophy(culturally):al-FarabiAl-Farabi,the“secondteacher”(afterAristotle)andanimportantparticipantintheearlydebateaboutthestatusoflogic,14payslipservicetoGreekterminologyinspeakingofthe“IdealorVirtuousCity,”butindicatesthatcitymaymeanauniversalempirewithgreatethnic,linguistic,andreligiousdiversity.HeisfullyawarethatIslamicruleaimsatbeinguniversalandthatacity-statedoesnotfitthecurrentpoliticalandeconomicsituation.15Theabsolutelyperfecthumansocietiesaredividedintonations.Anationisdifferentiatedfromanotherbytwonaturalthings–naturalmake-upandnaturalcharacter–andbysomethingthatiscomposite(itisconventionalbuthasabasisinnaturalthings),whichislanguage–Imeantheidiomthroughwhichmenexpressthemselves.Asaresultsomenationsarelargeandothersaresmall.(ThePoliticalRegime[97]32)CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n104th´er`ese-annedruartAl-Farabiisaradical:falsafa,whichforhimreacheditspeakwithAristotle,isabsolutelyanduniversallytrue,butaccessibleonlytoasmallintellectualelite.Themassesthereforeneedsomethingtheycanrelateto,thatis,religion,whichmustbeadaptedtoparticu-larcultures.Althoughthereisonlyonephilosophicaltruth–andintheAlexandriantraditionheclaimsthatPlatoandAristotlearebasicallyinagreement–theremustbeapluralityoftruereligions,varyingfromculturetoculture,eachofthemconveyingphilosoph-icalconceptsbymeansofappropriatesymbols.Heexplains,forinstance,thatdarknessorchaosinreligioustextsrepresentsnonbe-ingorprimematter,theAgentIntellectisrepresentedbytheangelGabriel,andsoforth.Philosophyaloneusesapodeicticdemonstra-tions,Kalamusesdialecticalarguments,andreligionusesrhetoricandpoetry.16Hence,intheBookofLettersandinTheAttainmentofHappinesshewritesthatfalsafaispriorintime(sic)toreligion[“din,”closertoourconceptionofreligionthanAverroes’shari’a].17ReligionsareculturallydeterminedimitationsoftrueAristotelianphilosophy.Prophecyissimplyanoverflowofintelligiblesontheimaginationand,therefore,subordinatedtophilosophy.Aperfectrulerwillbenotonlyaphilosopherbutalsoalawgiverandaprophetorwillworkinconnectionwithaprophet,totranslatephilosoph-icalideasintoamoreaccessiblelanguageforthevariouscultures.Whetheral-Farabiactuallyheldtheseviewsorusedthemtoflatterandattractprospectivefalasifamaybedebated,buthewasmuchrespectedanddiedofoldage,inspiteofhisnotsohiddenassertionsoftheprimacyofphilosophy.18Thefalasifa’soveremphasison“apodeicticdemonstration”andtheirclaimthattheyalonepracticeditexplainswhyal-Ghazalide-lightedinshowingthatmostoftheirargumentswerenotapodeicticatall,particularlyinmetaphysics,butonthecontrarymanifestedanuncriticalacceptanceofGreekphilosophicstances.Hisforceful-nessmatchesthatofal-Farabi’sbitterattacksagainsthisintellectualrivals,thespecialistsinKalam,whomheridiculed.Philosophyculminatesinprophecy:AvicennaAl-Farabi’srationalismandhissubordinationofreligiontotheroleoflocalinterpreterofGreekphilosophystronglyinfluencedAver-roes,butitputfalsafaonthemarginsofIslamicculture.AvicennaCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam105(980–1037),asaPersianwritinginbothArabicandPersian,engagedpositivelywiththecultureofIslam.HewaseveninvolvedattimesinpracticalpoliticsasvizierofShamsal-Dawla.AvicennaknewAristotle’sMetaphysicsbyheart,buthecouldnotunderstandit,hetellsus,untilalittletreatisebyal-Farabirevealedtohimthatmetaphysicswasnotfocusedontheology,ashehadbe-lieved,butratheronbeingquabeing.19ButthenhisownprofoundthinkingledhimtomodifyorabandonsomeofAristotle’steachings.Avicenna“completed”Aristotle’sunderstandingofphysicalcausesascausesofmotionprecedingtheireffectswithanunderstand-ingoftrueormetaphysicalcauses,whicharesimultaneouswiththeireffectsbutoperatenecessarilyandbyemanation.20TheAgentIntellect,thetenthseparateintelligence,isnotonlyasourceofin-tellectualilluminationbutalsoliterallya“giverofforms”forsub-lunarybeingsandgroundsthiscausalsimultaneity.Inotherwords,AvicennaacceptedthechallengetorethinksomeoftheinheritedGreek“orthodoxy.”ThoughstillphilosophizinginthespiritofAristotle,21hetookintoaccountNeoplatonicideas,aswellascon-ceptselaboratedinKalam,andhepaidmoreattentiontothecircum-stancesofhisownplaceandtime.ThismayexplainwhyhistextshaveremainedinfluentialinIslamiccultureuntiltoday,especiallyinIran.Avicenna’sbest-knownmetaphysicaltext,theMetaphysicsoftheShifa’,endsinBookX,chapters2–5,withreflectionsonpoliticalphilosophy.22Herehepresentsprophecyastheculminationofin-tellectualdevelopment,agraspofintelligibles,whichnolongerre-quiresdiscursivereasoning.Inchapter2hearguesforthenecessityofprophecy.Humanbeingsneedtoformassociations,whichrequireaLawgiverwhomustconvincethemasses,andmustthereforebeahumanbeing(aninvidiouscontrastisintendedwiththeChristianconceptionofChristasSonofGod).TheLawgivermustbeaprophet:Aprophet,therefore,mustexistandhemustbeahuman.Hemustalsopos-sesscharacteristicsnotpresentinotherssothatmencouldrecognizeinhimsomethingtheydonothaveandwhichdifferentiateshimfromthem.There-forehewillperformthemiracles...Whenthisman’sexistencecomesabout,hemustlaydownlawsaboutmen’saffairs...ThefirstprinciplegoverninghislegislationistoletmenknowthattheyhaveaMaker,OneandOmnipo-tent...thatHehaspreparedforthosewhoobeyHimanafterlifeofbliss,butforthosewhodisobeyHimanafterlifeofmisery.ThiswillinducetheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n106th´er`ese-annedruartmultitudetoobeythedecreesputintheprophet’smouthbyGodandtheangels.ButheoughtnottoinvolvethemwithdoctrinespertainingtotheknowledgeofGod,theExalted,beyondthefactthatHeisone,thetruth,andhasnonelikeHimself.Togobeyondthis...istoasktoomuch.Thiswillsimplyconfusethereligiontheyhave.([114]100)Yet,toincitepromisingyouthtopursuephilosophy,theprophetmayinsertsymbolsandsignsthatmightstimulateatruephilosophicalawakening,asisthecaseintheQur’an.Chapter3givesaratherrationalisticjustificationofIslamicpre-scriptionsaboutworship,suchasritualpurificationfortheoffi-cialprayers,andthepilgrimage.Chapter4rationallyjustifiesotherIslamicpractices,suchasalmsgiving,careforthepoor,thehandi-cappedandthesick,aswellasjustificationsofmarriagecustomsandthedependencyofwomenonmen,sincewomen“arelessin-clinedtoobeyreason.”(ItisinterestingtonotethatonsuchdetailsAvicennadistanceshimselffromal-Farabi,whofollowedcloselyPlato’sRepublicinaffirmingaquasi-equalityofwomenandalsoincommandingthatthechronicallyillandthehandicappednotbetakencareof.Averroeswillfollowal-Farabiinhisneglectofthosewhoarenot“useful”tothecity,aswellasinaffirmingthat“thewomansharesincommonwiththemanalltheworkoftheciti-zens,”evenifinhisownsociety“theyfrequentlyresembleplants,”asisthecaseinbadcities.Theirbeingaburdenuponthemenisoneofthecausesofurbanpoverty.23)TheconcludingchapterofAvicenna’sworkconcernstheCaliphandpoliticalorganization.AvicennaobviouslyconsidersMuham-madthegreatestprophet–notsimplyoneamongmany,ashewasforal-Farabi–andhegivesrationaljustificationhereforthemostba-sicprinciplesofshari’a.Avicenna’saccountofpoliticalphilosophyandreligionismuchmoreIslamicizedthanal-Farabi’s.Hispositionisstillfairlyrationalist,however,asasmalltreatiseonprayer24andtheProofofProphecies25clearlyattest.Agenuinelymysticalinter-pretationofhisthoughtisdoubtful.ExileAl-Farabi,Avicenna,andal-GhazaliworkedintheEast,butfalsafabegantospreadtotheWestoftheIslamiclands,to“Andalu-sia”inparticular,wherethepoliticalsituationwasbothconfusedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam107andfragmented.Inal-AndalusthefalasifarenouncedtheIslami-cizedPlatonicidealofthephilosopher-ruler-lawgiver-prophetandadvocated“exile”fromthe“city,”perhapsbecauseofthepoliticalinstability.IbnBajjah,orAvempace(d.1138),anotherphysician-philosopher,wroteTheGovernanceoftheSolitary.26Abandoningal-Farabi’sdreamofthevirtuousorperfectstate,hefocusesontheplaceofthephilosopherinanimperfectcity.Itisclearfromthesituationofthesolitarythathemustnotassociatewiththosewhoseendiscorporealnorwiththosewhoseendisthespiritualitythatisadulteratedwithcorporeality.Rather,hemustassociatewiththosewhopursuethesciences.Nowsincethosewhopursuethesciencesarefewinsomewaysoflifeandmanyinothers,thereevenbeingwaysoflifeinwhichtheydonotexistatall,itfollowsthatinsomeofthewaysoflifethesolitarymustkeepawayfrommencompletelysofarashecan,andnotdealwiththemexceptinindispensablemattersandtotheextenttowhichitisindispensableforhimtodoso;oremigratetothewaysoflifeinwhichthesciencesarepursued–ifsucharetobefound.Thisdoesnotcontradictwhatwasstatedinpoliticalscienceandwhatwasexplainedinnaturalscience.Itwasexplainedthere[thatis,innaturalscience]thatmanispoliticalbynature,anditwasexplainedinpoliticalsciencethatallisolationisevil.Butitisonlyevilassuch;accidentally,itmaybegood,whichhappenswithreferencetomanythingspertainingtonature.(TheGovernanceoftheSolitary[361]132)SeparateislandsIbnTufayl(c.1116–85)wroteafamousphilosophicalnovelprecededbyatechnicalintroduction,HayyibnYaqzan,orTheLiving,SonoftheWakeful(“Wakeful”heremayrefertotheAgentIntellect).InthischarmingtaleHayy(theLiving),havingcomesomehowtoadesertedislandasanewborn,israisedbyadoe.Withoutcontactwithotherhumanbeings,hediscoversbyhimselfnotonlyhowtosurvivebut,later,alltheprinciplesoffalsafa.Hededucestheexis-tenceofGodandthen,atfirst,triestoimitatethecelestialbodies.Heemulatestheirprovisionoflightandwarmthbytakingcareoftheanimals;theirbrightnessbycleanliness,perfumes,anddazzlingclothes;theircircularmovementsbyspinninghimselfuntilhelosesconsciousness,asthe“whirling”dervishesorSufido,andrunningaroundhisownhouse,inatranspositionofthepilgrimageritualCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n108th´er`ese-annedruartaroundAbraham’shouseatMecca;andtheircontemplationbycon-centratinghisthoughtsonthenecessarybeing,orGod.Bitbybit,however,herealizesthathisenvironmentalconcernsandhisinter-estincleanlinessaredistractinghimfromthecontemplationofGodandhisownessence,andsoheabandonsthemandreachesastatethatcannotbeexpressed.Onaneighboringisland,amannamedAsal,abelieverinoneofthetruereligions,decidestobecomeaher-mitandmovestoHayy’sisland,whichheassumestobedeserted.AfterHayyencountershimandquicklylearnstospeak,Asaldis-coversthatHayyhasreachedamuchhigherlevelofcontemplationthanhehashimself.Ontheotherhand,HayycannotunderstandwhyAsal’sreligionoffersonlyimagesandparablesofphilosophicaltruths.Inordertoenlightenthepeopleoftheotherisland,HayyandAsaltravelthere,butthemoreHayytriestoteachthemtruephilos-ophy,themorerestlesstheybecome.Finally,Hayyunderstandsthattheyarenotgiftedforphilosophyandshouldfortheirowngoodbeleftinpeaceintheirreligion.HereturnstohisowndesertedislandwithAsal,who,despitehisbestefforts,neverreachesHayy’slevelofcontemplation.27Thisremarkabletaleimpliesthatreasoncandiscovereverythingonitsown,whilereligionsaresociallyusefulforordinarypeoplebutareonlypaleimitationsoffalsafa.28IbnTufayl’sviewsaresurprising,sincehewascourtphysicianandvizieroftheAlmohadrulerAbuYa‘qub,towhomheintroducedAverroes.FindingAristotle’stextsdifficult,AbuYa‘qubrequestedthatAverroeswritecommentariesonthem,arequestwithwhichAverroescompliedmonumentallyandseminally.Thequestionofphilosophy’srelationtoreligionisfarfromcen-tralinthephilosophicaltextsproducedinmedievalIslam.Whatwaswrittenonthisquestionisneverthelessofconsiderableinterest,es-peciallyifweavoidthemisconceptionthattherewasasingleviewofthematter–orasinglepairofviolentlyopposedpositions,onephilosophicalandpurelyrational,theotherreligiousandunsystem-aticallydogmatic.psychologyandmetaphysicsAl-Farabidevelopedapsychologytofithisviewsonreligionandprophecy.Forhim,thereisonlyoneAgentIntellectforthewholeCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam109ofhumankind,thetenthemanatedintelligence,whichheequateswiththeangelGabriel,whotransmittedtheQur’antoMuhammad.TheintelligiblesemanatefromtheAgentIntellecttoallhumanbeings,butmostoftheintelligiblescanbeacquiredonlybythefewpeoplewhoarebestpreparedtoreceivethem,thefalasifa,ofcourse.Thosearethefirstintelligibleswhicharecommontoallmen,as,forexam-ple,thatthewholeisgreaterthanthepart,andthatthingsequalinsizetooneandthesamethingareallequaltooneanother.Thecommonfirstintel-ligiblesareofthreekinds:(1)theprinciplesoftheproductiveskills,(2)theprinciplesbywhichonebecomesawareofgoodandevilinman’sactions,(3)theprincipleswhichareusedforknowingtheexistentswhicharenottheobjectsofman’sactions,andtheirprimaryprinciplesandranks:suchastheheavensandthefirstcause.(OnthePerfectState[95]203,205)Theintelligiblesthencanoverflowontheimaginationintheguiseofsymbolsandparablesappropriatetothevariousculturesandlan-guages.Al-Farabi’ssubordinationofprophecytophilosophyexplainshisclaimsthatnotonlythefirstintelligiblesformetaphysicsbutalsothoseforethicsandthevariousdisciplinescomebyemanationfromtheAgentIntellect,whereasal-Ghazali,whohaslessconfidenceintheintellectthanal-Farabi,attributesthediscoveryofeventheba-sicprinciplesofastronomyandmedicinetoprophecy.(Interestinglyal-Farabitellsusthathisteacher,theChristianIbnal-Haylan,andhisfellowChristianswereforbiddentoreadAristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics,knowninArabicasTheBookofDemonstration.)EmanationofthefirstintelligiblesfromtheAgentIntellectensuresthevalidityoftheputativelyapodeicticdemonstrationscharacteris-ticofthefalasifa.NeoplatonismgroundsAristotelianism.AvicennaconsidereditnecessarytoabandonsomeofAristotle’stenets,notonlytodevelophisaccountofprophecy,butalsotogroundhisconceptionofapurelyspiritualafterlifeandtoprovideamoresophisticatedhumanandanimalpsychologyforthepresentlife.InhisfamousDeanimaoftheShifa’(BookI,chs.1–3)hearguesthattherationalsoulisnottheformofthebodybutafullsubstanceonitsown.Hethenconstructsathoughtexperiment–“theflyingman”–toprovethatself-consciousnessisimmediateandnotare-sultofreflection.Thetextremindsus,retrospectively,ofDescartes’sCogito.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n110th´er`ese-annedruartTheoneamongusmustimaginehimselfasthoughheiscreatedallatonceandcreatedperfect,butthathissighthasbeenveiledfromobservingexternalthings,andthatheiscreatedfallingintheairorthevoidinamannerwherehewouldnotencounterairresistance,requiringhimtofeel,andthathislimbsareseparatedfromeachothersothattheyneithermeetnortouch.Hemustthenreflectastowhetherhewillaffirmtheexistenceofhisself.Hewillnotdoubthisaffirminghisselfexisting,butwiththishewillnotaffirmanylimbfromamonghisorgans,nointernalorgan,whetherheartorbrain,andnoexternalthing.Rather,hewouldbeaffirminghisselfwithoutaffirmingforitlength,breadthanddepth.Andifinthisstatehewereabletoimagineahandorsomeotherorgan,hewouldnotimagineitaspartofhisselforaconditionforitsexistence.([129]387)AvicennagivesamuchmoredetailedaccountthanAristotleoftheinnersenses.29MoregermanetothethemesofthepresentchapterarehisconceptionoftheAgentIntellectandhisdistinctionoffour“intellects”withinthehumansoul.WithmostGreekAristoteliancommentators,heholdsthatthereisonlyoneAgentIntellectforthewholeofhumankindandfollowsal-FarabiinclaimingthatitisthetenthIntelligence,whichrulesthesublunaryworld.ButwithinthesoulAvicennaposits:(1)apurelypotentialintellect;(2)anactualintellect,whichhasreceivedtheprimaryintelligibles(suchastheprincipleofnoncontradictionandthenotionthatawholeisgreaterthananyofitsparts)fromtheAgentIntellect;(3)anhabitualin-tellect,whichconservessecondaryintelligiblesandcanusethematwill;and(4)theacquiredintellect,whenitisactuallythinkingtheintelligiblesandknowsthatitisdoingso.SincethesoulisaspiritualsubstanceforAvicenna,andnot,asAristotleheld,aformimpressedinmatter,itsurvivesthebodyafterdeath.Theafterlifeispurelyspiritual,butpeoplewhohavenotreachedfullandimmediateself-consciousness,notbeingabletoconceiveofthemselveswithoutthebody,willrecreateforthemselvesanimaginarybody,inwhichtheywillexperiencethe“physical”rewardsorpunishmentsoftheafterlife,astheyaredescribedintheQur’an.30SinceAvicenna,contrarytoal-Farabi,doesnotsubordinateprophecytophilosophy,heindicatesthatsomeindividualshaveaverypowerfulpotentialintellectandcanthereforegetintouchwiththeAgentIntellecteasilyanddonotneedmuchinstructionorrea-soningtoacquirenewknowledge.Somedonotneedanydiscursiveprocessatall,butonlyintuition,andtheirhabitualintellectbecomesCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam111adivineorholyintellect,whichimmediatelygraspsallintelligiblesatthesametime.Syllogismsarenolongernecessary.Inthatcasetheseintelligiblesoverflowintotheimagination,whichtranslatesthemintosymbols,parables,andsoforth.Suchanintellectualfac-ultyisthehighesthumanfacultyandtheprophet’sprivilege.31ItisclearthatAvicennaistryingtodomorethanaccommodateGreekphilosophytohispoliticalandreligiouscircumstances.Hefindsfoodforhisowndistinctivethoughtwhereverhecan.HeisfamousforarguingintheMetaphysicsoftheShifa’I5thatbeingis“thefirstconcept.”Inthatchapterheholdsthattheotherprimaryconceptsare“thing”(knowninLatinasthetranscendentalres),and“necessary.”32Aristotlehadspokenofsomenotionsaspertainingtoallbeingassuch(forexample,“one,”“true,”and“good”).Avicennaderivedtheneedfor“thing”asaprimaryconceptfromtheKalam’sontologicalcommitments.Hearguedthattheconceptwasrequiredtogroundthedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistence,aswellasthedistinctionbetweenthecontingentandthenecessary-through-itself.33SinceIhavereliedmostlyontheShifa’,atextclearlyintheAristoteliantradition,forallitsoriginality,ImustpointtothreeproblemsofAvicennianinterpretation.First,theLatinversionsofAvicenna’sworksdonotalwaysmatchtheArabic.ThisledRahmantowonderwhetherAvicennareallyclaimedthatexistenceisacciden-taltoessence,asThomasAquinasunderstoodhimtohavedone.34SincetheLatinmanuscriptsareoftenolderthanthosewehaveinArabic,theLatintextmaysometimesbemorecorrectthantheAra-bic.Besides,recentstudiesshowthatAvicenna’spsychologicalandepistemologicalconceptionsevolvedandthathedoesnotalwaystakethesamepositionineverytext.35Second,Avicennasometimesspeaksofan“Oriental”philosophy,whichsomeholdtobehisownphilosophyandquitedifferentfromhis“Aristotelian”texts,whileothersdenythis.36ThethirddifficultystemsfromthefactthatatsomestageinAvicenna’scareerheandotherfalasifabegantoadoptthelanguageofthemysticsorSufi,perhapstoprovidesomedisguisefortheirunconventionalrationalistviews.SeveralsmalltextswerepublishedacenturyagoasAvicenna’sMysticalTreatises,amongthemtheratherrationalistapproachtoIslamicprayerswereferredtoearlier.37HislastinginfluenceonLatinscholasticism,greaterthanthatofAverroes,certainlycomesfromhisrationalism,butitisaCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n112th´er`ese-annedruartrationalismthatmodifiedsomeAristoteliantenetsbyintegratingaspectsofNeoplatonismwiththemandthatdevelopedtheologicallyfruitfuldistinctionsbetweenessenceandexistenceandbetweencon-tingencyandnecessity.38Avicenna’sdistinctionbetweenmetaphys-icalandphysicalcausesisattheheartofDunsScotus’sdistinctionbetweenessentiallyandincidentallyorderedcauses,centraltohisfamousprooffortheexistenceofGod.Al-Ghazali,debunkingthefalasifa’sclaimstoapodeicticdemon-strations,focusedhisattackonal-FarabiandAvicennaandtheircon-ceptionofcausation.Hisintellectualautobiographyshowsthathewasfullyawarethatthiswasthecoreissueinhiscondemnationoftwooftheircentralpositions:eternalcreationandthedenialofGod’sknowledgeofparticulars.39Emanation,whichheattacksbril-liantly,makescreationaneternalnecessityforGod.Al-Ghazaliin-siststhatonlyGodisatrueAgentandthatagencyrequirestheabilitytodistinguishbetweentwoindiscernibletemporalinstants.Itthere-forerequiresknowledgeofparticulars,aswellaschoice.Whetheral-Ghazali,underAvicenna’sinfluence,allowssomeefficacytosec-ondarycausesremainsadisputedquestion.40Strikingly,al-Ghazalispendslittletimeonthefalasifa’sviewsontheintellect,whereasthoseviewsweretocausemuchcommo-tioninthirteenth-centuryParis.Al-Ghazalisimplyindicatesthatthefalasifafailintheirattempttoprovethatthehumansoulisasub-stancecapableofsubsistingafterdeath.OnthisissuehemayhavebeenhappierwithAristotle’sconceptionofthehumansoulastheformofthebody,sinceinIslamresurrectioniscompleterecreation,andthereisnoconceptionofasoulsurvivingthebody’sdeath.Al-Ghazalisimplydeploresthefalsafa’sdenialoftheresurrectionofthebodyand,therefore,therealityofphysicalrewardsandpunishmentsattheresurrection.AverroesclaimsthatthereisnotonlyasingleAgentIntellectforthewholeofhumankind,butalsoonlyone“material”orpassivein-tellect.Theso-called“MaterialIntellect”isinfactimmaterial,butinintellectionitplaysarolesimilartothatofmatterinhylomorphiccomposition.Hispositionseemstodeprivehumanbeingsoftheirowncapacitytothinkandtoactfreely,sincetheythemselvesdonotreallythink,butthecommonMaterialandAgentIntellectsthinkinthemandfeedthemintelligibles.SuchviewscausedanuproarattheUniversityofParis,wheresomemembersoftheartsfacultyadoptedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam113themwithenthusiasm.Inlate1270ThomasAquinasfelttheneedtowritehisOntheUnityoftheIntellectAgainsttheAverroiststore-futesuchviewsandtocriticizeAverroes’interpretationofAristotleasabetrayal.Ithasrecentlybeenargued,however,thatsomeofAquinas’scriticismsaremisguidedandthatAverroescaninfactgiveacoherentaccountofourawarenessofouractsofunderstandingasbeingourownacts.41TheargumentdependsonthecorrectreadingofAverroes’LongCommentaryontheDeanima,whichisknownonlythroughamedievalLatintranslation,althoughafewfragmentsoftheArabichaverecentlysurfaced.ItisnoteasytodetermineexactlywhatAverroes’positionisontheMaterialIntellect.42NotonlyisthetextoftheLongCommentaryverydifficult,butscholarsworkingontheoriginalArabictextofAverroes’EpitomeoftheDeanimahaveshownthatinthattexthedoesnotclaimthatthereisonlyoneMaterialIntellectforthewholeofhumankind.TheythereforearguethatsuchastrangepositionmustcomefromerrorsintheLatintranslation.Infact,therearetwoversionsoftheEpitome,andmorerecentresearchhasshownthatAverroesrevisedhistextatalaterdate.Itis,therefore,truethatAverroesdidnotatalldefendthispositioninhisfirstversionoftheEpitome,but,lateron,hefelttheneedtodevelopit.HeindicatesinhisprefacetotherevisedEpitomethathisearlierexpositionrestedmoreonthecommentatorsthanonthetextofAristotle.OncehereallyfocusedonAristotle’sowntext,hisviewschanged.43EvenifwelimitourselvestothecommentariesontheDeanimaanddonottouchonthevariouspositionsdefendedinothertexts,44therearestillsomethornyissues.First,ithasonlyslowlybeenrecognizedthatAverroeschangedhismindonvariousphilosophicalissuesandwentbacktocorrectsomemanuscriptsofhisownpreviousworks.Second,whethertheMiddleCommentary,whichisaparaphraseofAristotle’stextbutincludesalongexcursusontheMaterialIntellect,precedestheLongCommentaryisdisputed.45ThesituationmaybecomeclearerwhenR.C.TaylorpublisheshisEnglishtranslationoftheLongCommentary.46ethicsLittlescholarlyattentionhasbeenpaidtophilosophicalethicsinIslam.47ThefocusonfalsafaasmainlyAristotelianhascontributedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n114th´er`ese-annedruarttothisneglect,foralthoughtheNicomacheanEthicsandasummaryofitknownastheSummaAlexandrinorumweretranslatedintoArabic,theydidnotcirculatewidelyorquickly.FewethicaltextsintheAristoteliantraditionhavesurvived,includingsomeknowntohavebeenwritten,suchasal-Farabi’sCommentaryontheNico-macheanEthics.Averroes’MiddleCommentaryontheEthicsstillawaitsacompletecriticaledition.Thereexist,however,anumberofinterestingtextsfromaHellenistic,morepopulartraditionofspiri-tualmedicine.ThefalsafatraditionwasmuchinfluencedbytheAlexandrianSchool,whichdevelopedacurriculumrequiringthatstudentsfirstacquirethehabitsofcharacternecessaryforseriousphilosophicalstudies.Thefalasifadistinguish,therefore,betweena“reformationofcharacter”or“spiritualmedicine,”asprerequisitetothestudyoflogicandphilosophy,anda“scientificethics”groundedinmeta-physics(aswesawinourreflectionsonAvicenna’sMetaphysicsoftheShifa’X).ScholarsinHellenisticphilosophyhaveshownthatStoics,Skep-tics,andEpicureanswrote“therapiesofthesoul”intendedtocurestudents’passions,oratleastcurbthem,inordertoliberatethesoulforthestudyofphilosophy.Emotions,passions,ordesiresarecon-sideredtobeeitherfalsebeliefsortheeffectsofsuchbeliefs,andtheycanthereforebecuredorcurbedbysubstitutingmoreappropriatebe-liefs.Literaryartistrymakestheargumentsmoreappealingforbud-dingphilosophers,and,generally,thereisaprogressionfromrhetor-icaltodialecticalandtrulyphilosophicalarguments,sincestagesinthehealingprocessallowforgreaterandgreaterphilosophicalsophistication.48Oneofthelongesttreatisesofal-Kindi(c.801–66)isTheArtofDispellingSorrows,inwhichhemovesfrom“gentleremedies,”thatis,Stoicarguments,to“strongerremedies,”thatis,metaphysicalNeoplatonicarguments.TherearestrikingsimilaritiestoBoethius’sConsolationofPhilosophy,sincebotharedeeplyrootedinthesameHellenistictradition.49Al-Razi,thenondenominationalPersianphilosopher-physician(c.864–925or932),wroteacharmingSpiritualMedicine,muchgroundedinGalen,whichincitesthereadertoreformhischarac-terandbeginstudyinglogicandphilosophy.50AcriticofAristotle,al-RazitookPlato’sviewsontransmigrationliterallyandelaboratedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam115averyoriginalconceptionofthesoul,inwhichanimalsareendowedwithsomesortofreasonandchoice.Thisallowsal-Razitoelabo-rateapurelyrationalnormativeethics,basedonaconsiderationofGod’sbasicattributesofintelligence,justice,andcompassion.Ade-tailedenvironmentalethicsisincluded,aswellasacasestudyofthetype,“Whoshouldbesavedfirst?”51SinceGodismercifulandtriestodiminishpain,al-Raziattackstheasceticpracticesofvariousreligions:Thejudgmentofintellectandjusticebeingthatmanisnottocausepaintoothers,itfollowsthatheisnottocausepaintohimselfeither.Manymattersforbiddenbythejudgmentofintellectalsocomeunderthismaxim,suchaswhattheHindusdoinapproachingGodbyburningtheirbodiesandthrowingthemuponsharppiecesofironandsuchastheManichaeanscuttingofftheirtesticleswhentheydesiresexualintercourse,emaciatingthemselvesthroughhungerandthirst,andsoilingthemselvesbyabstainingfromwaterorusingurineinplaceofit.Alsoenteringintothisclassifica-tion,thoughfarinferior,iswhatChristiansdoinpursuingmonasticlifeandwithdrawingtohermitagesaswellasmanyMuslimsstayingpermanentlyinmosques,renouncingearnings,andrestrictingthemselvestoamodicumofrepugnantfoodandtoirritatingandcoarseclothing.Indeed,allofthatisaniniquitytowardsthemselvesandcausesthempainthatdoesnotpushawayapreponderantpain.([383]232)Al-RazialsoacceptstheAlexandriandistinctionbetweenaprephilo-sophic“reformationofcharacter”andascientificethicsbasedonmetaphysics.Sinceal-Farabi’sCommentaryontheNicomacheanEthicsislost,weturntohispopularReminderoftheWaytoHappiness(nottobeconfusedwithTheAttainmentofHappiness),whichadvo-catescharacterreformationandinvitesitsreaderstothestudyoflogic(carefullydistinguishedfromgrammar).Foral-Farabithereareethicalfirstintelligibles,suchastheexistenceofhumanfreedom,emanatingfromtheAgentIntellect.InhisLongCommentaryonAristotle’sDeInterpretatione,hemountsascathingcritiqueofspe-cialistsinKalamwho,accordingtohim,holdthatthereisnohumanfreedom.52Hereagain,a“scientificethics”restsonpsychologyandmetaphysics.Al-Farabi’sChristiandisciple,Yahyaibn’Ady(893–974)alsowroteaReformationofCharacter,whichincludesbarbedattacksagainstclericswhoabusetheirflock.53TryingtodefendChristianmonksCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n116th´er`ese-annedruartfromtheattacksofal-RaziandMuslimthinkerswhoconsideredcelibacyexcessivelyasceticanddetachedfromcommunitylife,hearguesthatitallowsthemonkstopreparebetterapodeicticsyl-logisms.Thissurprisingviewhelpsusbettertounderstandhowmuchthephilosophersemphasizedtheirmonopolyondemonstra-tivereasoning.AmongMuslims,thistraditioncontinuesinIbnMiskawayh(d.1030).HisReformationofCharacterreversesthetraditionalor-derandbeginswithasystematicpresentationofethics,muchinflu-encedbytheNicomacheanEthics,butendsbyprescribingmedicineforthesoul.Itsfirstpartlaysdownafoundation,withastudyofthefacultiesofthesoulandreflectionsonthegoodandhappinessandonvirtuesandvices.Afterdiscussingcharacterandhumanperfec-tionanditsmeans,Miskawayhsurveysinmoredetailthegoodandhappiness.Hefocusesthefourthpartofhistreatiseonjusticeandinthefifthdealswithloveandfriendship.Finally,medicineforthesoulisprovided,withreferencestoGalenandal-Kindi.Miskawayhhereanalyzesdifferentdiseasesofthesoul,suchasanger,fearofdeath,andsadness;determinestheircauses;andsuggestsappropri-atetreatment.HisTreatiseonHappinessreliesheavilyonal-Farabi’sReminderandbelongsentirelytothe“medicineofthesoul”genre.Thistraditionimbuesal-Tusi’s(d.1274)NasireanEthics,writ-teninPersian.54Noreligiouscommunitywasimmunefromthegenre:theMuslimreligiouswriter,IbnHazmofCordoba(´994–1064),wroteaBookonCharacterandBehavior,andtheJewishwriterIbnPaqudah(c.1050–80)pennedaGuidetotheDutiesoftheHeartin-spiredbythistradition.Avicenna,thoughsubscribingtotheAlexandriantraditionofadoubleethics,thatis,aprephilosophiconeandascientificone,wrotelittleonethicsbut,aswehaveseen,concludeshisMetaphysicsoftheShifa’witharationaljustificationofthebasicprescriptionsoftheshari’a.55ThisbriefandvastlyincompletepresentationofphilosophyinIslamshowsthatthereismuchpioneeringworkyettobedone.Since1950muchhashappenedinthefield.Excitingdiscoverieshavebeenmade.Englishtranslationsofkeytexts,suchasAvicenna’sMeta-physicsoftheShifa’byM.E.MarmuraandAverroes’LongCommen-taryonthe“Deanima”byR.C.Taylorareeagerlyawaited.Criticaleditionsofotherimportanttextsarestillneeded,however,aswellCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam117asanalysesofargumentsandworksofinterpretation.Itwouldbewrongtoexaggeratethecontributiontocurrentcontroversiesabout“western”and“Islamic”valuesthatmightbemadebyscholarlyre-searchinthematerialpresentedinthischapter,butitcanatleastbesaidthatadeeperunderstandingofphilosophyinmedievalIslam,includingamorenuancedawarenessoftheissuesdebatedconcern-ingtheveryexistenceoffalsafainIslamicculture,canonlyimproveourinsightintothenatureandrole(andperhapsthelimitations)ofphilosophyingeneral.notes1.J.L.Kraemer,forinstance,hasadmirablyshowntheculturalinter-changesinBaghdadattheendofthetenthcenturyandthefirsthalfoftheeleventhcenturybetweenpeopleofvariousreligiousandethnicbackgrounds[492].2.E.Gilson,“WhatisChristianPhilosophy?,”in[635]177–91,andE.Gilson[628].F.VanSteenberghendefendedtheautonomyofphilosophyandarguedthatstrictlyspeakingtherecanbenospecificallyChristianphilosophyin[637].3.SeeR.M.Frank[487–89].4.SeeC.D’AnconaCosta[477]andJ.Krayeetal.[18].5.SeeD.Gutas[490].Gutasshowshow,thenasnow,politicalideologiessometimesdictatedthechoiceofthetextsthatweretranslated.6.D.Gutas[102]andT.-A.Druart[100]doubtit,butJ.Parens[105]affirmsit.7.H.A.Davidsonin[483]showsadmirablytheGreekoriginsofargumentsonthosetopics,aswellastheKalamsources,andtheirtransformationandintegrationatthehandsofphilosophersinlandsunderIslamicrule.8.SeethesecondpartofH.Corbin[10],called“FromtheDeathofAverroestothePresentDay.”CorbinalsohighlightedthatphilosophypersistedamongSunniandShiite,aswellasIsmaili.9.M.Aydin[478].10.SeeD.Black[480],inparticularthechapterontheimaginativeandpoeticsyllogism,pp.209–41.11.E.Renan[172].12.AlsoknownasTheHarmonyBetweenPhilosophyandReligion.MytranslationisbasedonthatofG.F.Hourani[161].MostofthetextsIshallrefertointhissectionwerenottranslatedintoLatinduringtheMiddleAgesand,therefore,hadlittleimpactonthescholastics,eveniftheygainedpopularitywiththeEnlightenment(seeG.A.RussellCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n118th´er`ese-annedruart[497])andinourowntime,particularlyamongthedisciplesofLeoStrauss.13.IncoherenceoftheIncoherence,discussion17,that“hereticsbekilled”[165]I322.14.Al-FarabiwasfamousforhisLongCommentaryonAristotle’sDein-terpretationeandhisepitomesofAristotle’sOrganon,includingthePoetics.Hecarefullydistinguishedlogicfromgrammar,andthoughheisarationalist,hislanguageandvocabularyareinfluencedbyreligiousterminology.15.SeeR.Walzer’stranslation[95].16.M.Galston[101]andJ.Lameer[103]highlightthelinkbetweenlogicandpoliticalphilosophyinal-Farabi.17.SeeTheAttainmentofHappinessinAlfarabi’sPhilosophyofPlatoandAristotle[96].18.M.Mahdiinparticularhashighlightedal-Farabi’srationalismin[104],andC.E.ButterworthhasrecentlypublishedtranslationsoftheSe-lectedAphorisms,TheBookofReligion,andTheHarmonizationoftheOpinionsoftheTwoSages:PlatotheDivineandAristotlein[98].19.TheLifeofIbnSina[117]30–35.20.Shifa’sMetaphysicsVI1and2.MedievalLatintranslation[116]II291–306.Englishtranslation[113].21.SeeD.Gutas[124].22.Trans.[114].23.AverroesonPlato’s“Republic”[164]101and59.24.InAvicennaonTheology[120].25.Trans.[22]112–21.Curiously,RogerBacon(c.1210–92)adaptedtheendofAvicenna’sBookXtoChristendominhisOpusmaius,PartVII.26.VerypartialEnglishtranslationin[22]123–33.27.PartialexcellentEnglishtranslation[22]134–62;fulltranslation[368].28.IntheMiddleAgesIbnTufayl’snovelwastranslatedintoHebrew(withaHebrewcommentarybyMosesNarboni).ItwastranslatedintoLatinonlyin1671,byPocok,andintoEnglishin1708underthetitleTheImprovementofHumanReasonExhibitedintheLifeofHaiEbnYokdhan,Inwhichisdemonstrated,bywhatmethodsonemay,bythemeerlightofnature,attaintheknowledgofthingsnaturalandsupernatural;moreparticularlyknowledgofGod,andtheaffairsofanotherlife.TheEnglishtextisillustratedandprovidedwithanap-pendix,intendedtoprotectthefaithofChristianreaders,“inwhichthepossibilityofMan’sattainingthetrueknowledgofGod,andthingsnecessarytosalvation,withoutinstruction,isbrieflyconsider’d”[367].TheLatinandEnglishtranslatorsbothreadthetaleasapurelyratio-nalistaccount,althoughsomehaveinterpreteditasamysticalallegory.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPhilosophyinIslam119Forinterpretationsofthetext,seeL.I.Conrad[369].Thereissomedis-putewhetherPocok’stranslationcouldhaveinfluencedtheauthorofRobinsonCrusoe,andsimplifiedformsofthetalearestillsometimestoldasafairytaletoMiddleEasternchildren.SeealsoH.Daiber[481].29.Onthisseechapter9inthepresentvolume.30.SeeJ.Michot,LaDestineedel’hommeselonAvicenne´(Louvain,1981).31.PartialEnglishtranslationinF.Rahman[119].32.Trans.[49]219–39.AlsoseeM.E.Marmura[131]andThomasAquinas,Truth,q.1,a.1.33.R.Wisnovsky[134].MarmurapointedearliertodifferencesbetweenAvicenna’sphilosophyandtheKalam[130].FortheimmenseinfluenceofthesedistinctionsinLatinphilosophy,seechapter6inthisvolume.34.F.Rahman[132].35.SeeD.Gutasin[133]1–38andD.N.Hassein[133]39–72.36.S.H.Nasrarguesforthe“originality”oftheOrientalPhilosophyin[11]247–51,whereasD.Gutasclaimsthereisnosuchthing[123].37.A.F.Mehren,Traitesmystiquesd’Avicenne´,4fascicles(Leiden,1889–94).H.Corbin,too,highlighteda“mystical”aspectinAvicenna[10].Butifmysticismthereis,itisaveryrationalisticone.38.SeeJ.F.Wippel[261].39.Trans.[149].40.R.M.Franksaysyesin[487],andM.E.Marmuradeniesitin[151]and[150].41.SeeD.Black[166].42.H.A.DavidsonhasremarkablyretracedthegeneralhistoryofthisissueamongboththeGreekcommentatorsandthefalasifain[482].43.AverroesseemsfirsttohavefollowedAlexanderofAphrodisias,thentohaveadoptedthepositionofIbnBajjah(Avempace)[360],andfinally,afterrereadingThemistius,tohavedecidedthatthereshouldbeoneMaterialIntellectforallhumankind.IntheLongCommentaryhesome-whatrhetoricallyaccusesIbnBajjahofhavingledhimintoerror.44.SuchasTheEpistleonthePossibilityofConjunctionwiththeActiveIntellect[160].45.A.L.Ivry,whoeditedandtranslatedtheMiddleCommentary(Arabiceditionin1994andwithEnglishtranslationin2002),maintainsthatitisposteriortotheLongCommentary,whereasH.A.Davidsonconsidersthatitprecededit(Ivry[170],Davidson,withIvry’sresponse,in[167]).46.ThearticlesbyA.Hyman,A.L.Ivry,andR.C.Taylorin[168]offermuchusefulmaterialonthesedifficultquestions.47.ExceptforG.F.Hourani[491]andM.Fakhry[486].48.SeeM.C.Nussbaum[494]and[495].49.SeeT.-A.Druart[92]and[485].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n120th´er`ese-annedruart50.Trans.[384].51.SeehisautobiographyTheBookofthePhilosophicLife,trans.C.E.Butterworth[383],andT.-A.Druart[385]and[386].52.Trans.[94]76–84.SeealsoT.-A.Druart[99].53.Trans.[366].54.Trans.G.M.Wickens[390].55.Mehren(note37above)hadattributedtohimatreatiseontheFearofDeath,but,infact,thistextcomesfromtheconcludingsectionofMiskwayh’sReformationofCharacter.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\niditdobbs-weinstein5JewishphilosophyIfmedievalphilosophyisstrangetothemodernreader,medievalJewishphilosophyisevenstranger.Totheextentthatmedievalphi-losophyhasbeenrecognizedasphilosophyratherthandismissedastheology,itsboundarieshavebeenstrictlydrawn,geographicallyanddoctrinally,aroundChristianwesternEurope.ThisexcludesbothIslamicandJewishphilosophy,sothatevensignificantphilosophi-calactivityinsouthernFranceandIslamicSpainhasremainedin-visibletothemodernwesterntradition.Whenactivitybeyondtheprescribedboundarieshasbeenacknowledgedatall,ithasbeenbythefewhistoriansofmedievalphilosophyandthen,asarule,onlytotheextentthatitsinfluenceonmajorChristianthinkerscouldnotbeignored.Thesignificanceofworkbeyondtheboundarieshasthusbeendeterminedalmostexclusivelybyrelevancetotheinter-estsofChristianphilosophers.Exceptforafewspecialists,therefore,thegeneralviewofmedievalphilosophyremainsundulynarrow.WhetheronereadsHegel’slecturesonthehistoryofphilosophy,orHeidegger’s,orRussell’s,onecouldonlyconcludethattherewerenomedievalJewishphilosophers–andthisdespitethefactthattheperiodinquestionisesteemedbyscholarlyJewsasagoldenage.RatherthanattemptingtoremedythisneglectbyacomprehensivesurveyofmedievalJewishphilosophers,Iwillfocusonfourfigureswhoseimportanceforlaterphilosophy,JewishaswellasChristian,isespeciallygreat:SaadiahGaon,SolomonIbnGabirol(Avicebron),MosesMaimonides,andGersonides(LevibenGerson).Togivesomeunitytotheconsiderationofthediversestylesandconcernsofthesethinkers,Iwillgivemajorattentiontoasinglephilosophicalques-tion:istheuniverseeternalorcreated?Inordertosuggestthedis-tinctcontributionofJewishphilosophyandtosituateitinrelation121CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n122iditdobbs-weinsteintoothermedievalphilosophy,Iwilltakeaccountofthreesortsofinfluence:(1)thephilosophicalandotherliterarytraditionsthatin-formedeachphilosopher’sthought;(2)theinfluenceeachhaduponsubsequentJewishthought;and(3)theinfluenceeachhaduponsub-sequentChristianphilosophy.Foroneofourfourselectedthinkers,strangely,influenceofthesecondkindisnil,whileinfluenceofthethirdkindisquiteextensive.therootsofknowledge–saadiahgaon(882–942)AlthoughwehavenodirectevidenceregardingSaadiah’seducation,hiswritingsreflectextensiveknowledgeofGreekphilosophyandscience,theinfluenceofIslamictheology(Kalam),andafamiliar-itywithChristiandoctrineandvariousformsofeasternphiloso-phy.WhileSaadiah’sworkwasunknowntotheChristianWest,itsinfluenceonJewishphilosophywas(andis)extensive.SaadiahwasthefirstJewishphilosopher,asdistinctfromaphilosopherwhohappenedtobeJewish,hisforemostconcernbeingtherelationbe-tweenphilosophyandtheHebrewBibleandtradition.Asaresult,subsequentJewishphilosophershadtorespondtohiswork,evenifcritically.Saadiah’swritingswereofthreekinds,allofthem,however,withthesingleaimofeducatingtheJewishcommunityatatimewhenHebrewliteracywasindeclineandwhen,amongtheliterate,con-fusionanderrorwererampant:polemics;1pedagogicalworkscon-cernedwiththepreservationofknowledgeoftheBibleandJewishtradition;andtwopredominantlyphilosophicalworks,TheBookofCreationandTheBookofDoctrinesandBeliefs.2SinceTheBookofCreationhashadlittleinfluenceonsubsequentJewishthought,whileTheBookofDoctrinesandBeliefsisstillstudiedasamajorworkinJewishreligiousphilosophy,Iwilldiscussonlythelatter.InTheBookofDoctrinesandBeliefsSaadiahsoughttodemon-strateafundamentalharmonybetweenphilosophyandbiblicalrevelation.Asabasisforexhibitingthisharmonywithregardtopar-ticulardisputedquestions(andafteroutlininghindrancestoknowl-edgeandcautioningatlengthabouttheproperorderofinquiry),hearguedforthesoundnessoffourrootsofhumanknowledge.Fromtheoutset,SaadiahrepeatedlyarguedthattheserootsmustbecultivatedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy123insuccessivestages.Inoneofhismostinterestingargumentshepre-sentedthisviewofknowledgeasappropriatelyprogressive,ratherthanperfectfromthebeginning,inresponsetoanobjectiontotheexistenceofaperfectcreator:suchacreator,theobjectionran,wouldhavebeenabletocreateaperfectworldwithperfectlyrationalcrea-tures.Saadiah,followingAristotle,insiststhattheperfectionofonerootisanecessaryconditionfordevelopmentofthenext.Differentlystated,andinamannerthatanticipatessubsequentAristotelianphi-losophy,heformulatedthedifferencebetweentypesofself-evidenceasadifferencebetweenwhatismostevidenttous(sensibleknowl-edge)andwhatismostevidentinitself(firstprinciples).Thefirstthreerootsarephilosophical,thefourth,traditional.TogethertheserootssustainSaadiah’stheoryofbiblicalinterpretationaswellasthemorestrictlyphilosophicalsideofhisharmonizingproject.Thefourrootsareasfollows.(1)Senseperception(literally:sensiblescience).Providedthesenseorganishealthyandtheindividualisnotdeluded,beliefderivedfromsensationissoundandisthebasisforallsubsequentknowledge.Saadiahpointsoutthatonlyaveryfewradicalskepticsrejectthisrootandclaimsthatinsodoingtheyalsorejectthesecondandthirdroots,sincethefurtherknowledgeisfromsensation,themoreitissubjecttodoubt.“Thereasonforthisunequaldistributionofviewsliesinthefactthatthesecondtypeofknowledgeismorehiddenthanthefirstandlikewisethethirdmorehiddenthanthesecond.Naturally,oneismorereadilyinclinedtodenywhatishiddenthanwhatisobvious”([106]37).(2)Reason.Saadiahholdsthatsometruthsareintrinsically(nec-essarily)evidentorknowableperse.Hisdescriptionofthissortofknowledgeshowshisunqualifiedconfidenceinthenaturalpowersofhumanreason,providedthatitisproperlytrained:“Astotheknowledgeofreason[literally:theintelligibles],weholdthateveryconceptionformedinourmindwhenitisfreefromdefectsisun-doubtedlytrueknowledge,providedweknowhowtoreason,com-pletetheactofreasoning,andguardagainstillusionsanddreams”([106]38).Headds,however,thatthosewhobelieveintherationalstatusofdreamsandillusionsdosoinordertosafeguardsensibleknowledge,confusing,asitwere,senseperceptionandimaginativerepresentation.Assumingthatdreamsderivedirectlyfromsenseper-ceptions,theybelievethattodenytherationalstatusofdreamsisCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n124iditdobbs-weinsteinsimultaneouslytodenythesensibleoriginsofhumanknowledge.Saadiah’sexplanationfortrustindreamsisbothnovelandstriking.Ontheonehand,heusesittobolsterhisownclaimforthecloserelationbetweensensationandreason.Ontheotherhand,heusesittosafeguardtherationalstatusofpropheticrevelationindreams,claimingthatthey“containaflashofinspirationfromaboveintheformofhintsandparables”([106]39,trans.modified).Thatis,pro-videdthatproperdistinctionsarerecognizedamongthedifferenttypesofrepresentation,sensible,imaginative,andrational(whichrequirespropertraining),thereisnofearofconfusingwakefulstateswithdreamstatesandnoneedtodoubttheveracityofsensepercep-tion.Saadiah’stwofoldaccountofdreamsisthusaboldargumentthatimplicitlypositsrevelationbothastheculminationofthenatu-ralprocessofhumancognitionandasadivineaidthatcircumventstheslowtemporalprocessofperfection,ensuringthatthosewhoareintellectuallyweakerwouldnotbebereftofreligiousfaith.(3)Inference,whenityieldspropositionsthatcannotbedeniedwithoutsimultaneouslydenyingpropositionsderivedeitherfromsenseperceptionorfromreason.Inferenceisnecessarywhennei-thersensorynorrationalevidenceissufficienttoaccountforaphe-nomenon,forexample,whenweperceivesmokewithoutperceivingfireor,mostsignificant,whenweperceivetheuniversebutnotacauseforit.Oragain:“Wearecompelledtoadmitthatmanpos-sessesasoul,althoughwedonotperceiveitbyoursenses,soasnottodenyitsobviousfunctions.Similarly,wearecompelledtoadmitthatthesoulisendowedwithreason,althoughwedonotperceiveitbyoursenses,soasnottodenyitsobviousfunction”([106]36).Saadiahoutlinessevenrulesforinferenceineitherphilosophyortheinterpretationofthebiblicaltradition.Theseagainconfirmtheauthorityofreason.Inferenceshouldnotcontradict(1)senseperception,(2)reason,or(3)someothertruth,and(4)itshouldnotbeself-contradictoryor(5)involvegreaterdifficultiesthanthoseweseektoresolve.Thesixthandseventhrulesenjoincaution,soastoavoidhastyconclusions.Providedtheinterpreterexercisespropercare,accordingtoSaadiah,thefirstfourrulesshouldbeappliedtoallbiblicalinterpretation.(4)Reliabletradition.Saadiahrefershereprimarily,butnotex-clusively,totherevealedtradition.Hearguesthatthisrootisinfactbaseduponbothsenseperceptionandreason.CertaintyconcerningCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy125thestatusofpropheticinstructionisderivedfromtheprophet’sper-formanceofmiraclesthatiswitnessedbyothersandcannotbeex-plainedotherwise.Thus,bothsenseperception,intheformofwit-ness,andinferencetoacauseofaneventthatcannotbeexplainedotherwiseservetoverifythestatusofprophecy.Saadiahofferstwojustificationsforaspeculativeapproachtoreli-gion,aninquiringapproachthatmakesuseofsenseperception,rea-son,andinferenceanddoesnotsimplytakethetraditionasgiven.First,speculativeinquiryturnsintoreal,intrinsicknowledgewhatGodhasrevealedasextrinsic,propheticinstruction.Second,takingadvantageofeverybasisforknowledgeenablesthebelievertore-futethosewhoderidereligiousbelief.MaimonideswastoquestionSaadiah’soverwhelmingconfidenceinthepowerofhumanreasonasamisguidedformofKalam.Accordingpriorityinbiblicalinterpretationtosenseperceptionandreasonovertraditionwouldnotbesurprisingwhenappliedtomanyquestions.ItisstrikingthatSaadiahmaintainsthispriorityevenwhendealingwiththequestionofcreation.Andsince,ashenotesatthebeginningofhisdiscussion,senseperceptionprovidesnodataonthisquestion(ifitdid,therewouldbenodisagreementaboutit),heinfactproceedsonthebasisofreasonandphilosophicalspeculation.MaimonideswillbeespeciallyvehementinhiscritiqueofSaadiahhere.Saadiahoffersfourproofsforthedivinecreationoftheuniverse.3Inamannerthatbecamestandardlater,theseproofsuseAristoteliancosmologicalornaturalprinciplesinordertoreachconclusionsthatareintendedtorefuteAristotle’sconclusionthattheworldiseter-nal.AndincontrasttoAristotle’sstatementintheTopics(I11,104b13–17)thattheoriginoftheworldcanonlybeinvestigateddi-alectically,Saadiahclaimsthatcreationisdemonstrable.Hisproofsproceedfromthefinitenatureoftheuniverse,thecompositenatureofbodies,thenatureofaccidentsinheringinbodies,andthenatureoftime.Inoutline,theyrunasfollows.(1)Sincetheheaven,earth,andallcelestialbodiesarefiniteinmagnitude,theforcethatpre-servesthemmustbefiniteaswell.Hence,theworldmusthavehadabeginningandwouldhaveanend.(2)Sincetheworldcompriseswell-fittingcompositebodies,theymustbe“theskillfulworkofaskillfulartisanandcreator”([106]54)–aversionoftheargumentfromdesign.(3)SincenaturalsubstancesandtheaccidentsinheringCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n126iditdobbs-weinsteininthemarefiniteandcontingent(thatis,donotexistnecessarily),theymusthavebeenbroughtintoexistencebyacreator.(4)Sincetheinfinitecannotbetraversedinthoughtorinreality,timemustbefinite.Weretimenotfinite,finitebeingscouldnothavebeengen-erated.Finally,havingconcludedthattheworldhadabeginningandthattimeisfinite,Saadiahclaimsthatwerecreationnotexnihilo,finitebeingswouldcreatethemselves,whichisimpossible.Conse-quently,allbeingsmusthavebeencreatedbyanexternal,eternal,all-powerfulbeing.ThereisacentralinconsistencyinSaadiah’sproofsforcreationthatwillbevehementlycriticizedbyMaimonides,namely,thatal-thoughhedeniesthatsenseperceptioncanprovidedataabouttheoriginoftheworld,hebaseshisproofsupontheperceivednatureofactuallyexistingfinitebeings.InviewofSaadiah’sunfailingbeliefinthepowerofhumanreason,thegreatestironyaboutMaimonides’criticismisthatheaccusesSaadiahoftheerrorforwhichSaadiahaccusedothers:pseudo-reason.universalhylomorphism–ibngabirol(avicebron)(c.1021–c.1058)Itwasdiscoveredonlyin1859thatthemanknowntotheJewishtraditionalmostexclusivelyasSolomonIbnGabirol,apoetwhocomposedhundredsofliturgicalandsecularpoems,wasthethinkerknowntotheChristiantraditionasAvicebron,thesupposedlyMuslimphilosopherwhocomposedtheFonsvitae,theFountainofLife.OfIbnGabirol’sphilosophicalworks,onlytwoareextant,theFonsvitae(Hebrew:MekorHayim)inatwelfth-centuryLatintranslationfromtheoriginalArabic,andTikkunMidotha-Nefesh(ImprovementoftheMoralQualities).Sincethelatterworkonprac-ticalethicsexertedlittleinfluenceonsubsequentphilosophy,JewishorChristian,IshallrestrictmydiscussiontoabriefoverviewoftheMekorHayim,inwhichthemoresignificantphilosophicalelementsoftheTikkunMidotha-Nefeshare,inanycase,repeated.MekorHayimreflectsitsauthor’seducationintherichJudeo-Arabicintellectualculture,philosophical,scientific,andliterary,ofIslamicSpainatitsheight.Theworkiswrittenintheformofadia-loguebetweenateacherandhisdisciple.Itisdividedintofivebooks,precededbyanintroductorysummaryofitsintentionandstructure.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy127Theintentionistoinquireintothenatureofuniversalmatteranduniversalformastheyaremanifestincompositecorporealsubstanceaswellassimplespiritualsubstance.Thestructureoftheworkisdescribedasfollows.Inthefirsttreatise,weshalltreatthosethingswhichoughttobepositedaboutuniversalmatteranduniversalforminordertoassignthematterandformincompositesubstances.Inthesecondweshalltreatthesubstancesus-tainingthecorporealityoftheworld.Inthethirdweshalltreattherealityofsimplesubstances.Inthefourthweshalltreatthescienceofunderstand-ingthematterandformofsimplesubstances.Inthefifthweshalltreatuniversalmatterandforminthemselves.([135]1;trans.mine)AlthoughIbnGabirol’saccountoftherelationsbetweenmatterandformisnotconsistent,4itisevidentthatby“simplesubstance”henevermeanssomethingindivisible,lackingallcomposition.Hismostoriginalandinfluentialcontribuitiontophilosophyisinfacthishylomorphism,accordingtowhichallsubstancesarecomposedofmatterandform,withmatterhierarchicallyorderedfromthehighestgeneralspiritualmattertothelowestprimematter.What-everhissources–Aristotle,theStoics,Proclus,IsaacIsraeli,andPseudo-Empedocleshaveallbeensuggested–IbnGabiroldevelopsanoriginalNeoplatonichierarchicalsystemofBeingthatisseam-lesslyunified,boundbythebeingofGodatitsapexandthatofprimematteratitsnadir.InIbn-Gabirol’stwoemanationistaccountsofit,creationisatem-poral.Inoneaccount,matteroriginatesintheessenceofGod,whereasformoriginatesinthedivinewill;intheother,bothmatterandformoriginateinthedivinewill.MekorHayimisauniqueworkinmedievalJewishphilosophy,inthatitlacksanyinternalevidencethatcouldidentifyitasaworkwrittenbyaJewishphilosopher;itcontainsnoreferencetotheHebrewBibleortoanyotherJewishsource,traditionalorphilo-sophical.Itisnotsurprising,therefore,that,incontrasttoitssignifi-cantpositiveaswellascritical5receptionbyChristianphilosophers,especiallyFranciscans,suchasBonaventureandDunsScotus,MekorHayimexertedlittleinfluenceonJewishphilosophy.Thisstrangedestinycanbestbeunderstoodinlightoftheharshcriticismlev-eledagainstIbnGabirolbythetwelfth-centuryJewishAristotelian,AbrahamIbnDaud,whoaccusedhimofaddressinghisworktoallCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n128iditdobbs-weinsteinnations,ratherthantotheJewishpeople;focusingattoogreatalengthonasinglesubject(matterandform);lackingascientificmethodandusingfalse(imaginative)premisestoreachfalsecon-clusions;andmisleadingtheJewishpeoplegreatly.thelimitsofreason–mosesmaimonides(1138–1204)MosesMaimonidesiswithoutdoubtboththebestknownandthemostcontroversialmedievalJewishphilosopher.Althoughthereisdisagreementabouthispreeminentmerit,nonewilldenythathisinfluenceonsubsequentphilosophy,bothChristianandJewish,hasbeenthemostextensiveandenduring.Likemanyofhisme-dievalcontemporaries,especiallyintheJewishandIslamictradi-tion,Maimonideswastrainedasaphysician,jurist,andphilosopher.OnthebasisofourknowledgeoftheeducationofotherprominentJewsofthistime,itisreasonabletoassumethathefirststudiedtheTorah,theTalmud,mathematics,andastronomywithhisfatherandsubsequentlywaseducatedbyArabmastersinthenaturalsciences,medicine,andphilosophy.FromhisowntestimonyinalettertoSamuelIbnTibbon,thetranslatorfromJudeo-ArabicintoHebrewofhismajorphilosophicalwork,Dalalatal-Ha’irin(GuideofthePer-plexed),weknowthat,inadditiontoAristotle,whomheheldinthehighestesteem,MaimonideswasinfluencedbyphilosophersintheIslamicworld,especiallyal-Farabi.Maimonides’prominenceasaspiritualauthorityisevidencedbyhisextensiveResponsatolegal,religious,andphilosophicalques-tionssenttohimbyJewishcommunitiesinbothIslamicandChris-tianlandsandbytheMishnehTorah,aworkwritteninHebrewinwhichhesoughttopresentaclearsystematicexpositionoftheOralLawinordertomakeitfullyaccessibletoallJews.Hisprominenceasaphysicianisattestedbyhismedicalwritingsandbyhisappoint-mentascourtphysiciantoal-Fadil,Salahal-Din’svizier.TheDalalatal-Ha’irin(henceforth,theGuide)hasasitsexplicitaimtheresolutionofperplexityattheapparenttensionbetweenphi-losophyandrevelation,aperplexityfeltmostacutelybythoseedu-catedinboththeTorahandphilosophy.ItistothisaudiencethattheGuideisaddressed.Maimonidesdiagnosesthesourceofhisreaders’perplexityas,ononehand,astrongintellectualdesire,leadingtoCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy129aninordinatehasteinthepursuitofknowledge,and,ontheotherhand,improperinstructionindivinemattersgivenbytheJewishMutakallimun,suchasSaadiah.SincetheperplexitywithwhichtheGuideisconcernedisoccasionedbyimproperinterpretationoftheBibleinrelationtophilosophy,Ishallbeginwiththeproblemofinterpretationandproceedtothethreetopicsmostsusceptibletoerror:divineunicity,creation,andprovidence.TheapparentcontradictionbetweentheTorahandphilosophyarises,accordingtoMaimonides,fromthemisguidedinterpretationofbiblicalspeechbyapplyingtoitthecriteriaandmethodspropertothenaturalsciences.TheBibledoesnotproceeddemonstrativelyorinalinearfashion,andneitherwilltheGuide.Maimonidesholdsthathismethod,whichdeliberatelyintertwinesdialecticsandin-dicativehints,ispedagogicallymostexpedient,becauseitfollowsbothbiblicalprudence,whichcounselsgreatcautionindisclosingdivinematters,andphilosophicalprudence,whichteachesbyde-velopingthestudent’scapacityforsimilarindependentpursuit.Heinstructshisreader:IfyouwishtograspthetotalityofwhatthisTreatisecontains...youmustconnectitschaptersonewithanother;andwhenreadingagivenchapter,yourintentionmustbenotonlytounderstandthetotalityofthesubjectofthatchapter,butalsotograspeachwordthatoccursinit...evenifthatworddoesnotbelongtotheintentionofthatchapter.ForthedictionofthisTreatisehasnotbeenchosenathaphazard,butwithgreatexactnessandexceedingprecisionandwithcaretoavoidfailingtoexplainanyobscurepoint.Andnothinghasbeenmentionedoutofitsplace,savewithaviewtoexplainingsomematterinitsproperplace.(GuideI,introduction[178]15;emphasismine)AfteroutliningotherdifficultiespertainingtothephilosophicalinterpretationoftheTorah,Maimonidespresentsthemostfunda-mentalone,namely,thenaturallimitationsofhumanreasonforapprehendingdivinescience.Bydivinescience,MaimonidesmeanstheintellectualinstructioncontainedintheTorah,asdistinctfromitsmoralteachings.Heimmediatelyreassuresthereader,however,thatdivineandnaturalsciencearecomplementary,andthattrueknowledgeofthelatterisnecessaryfortrueknowledgeofthefor-mer.Foralthoughrevelationmaygivebelieverstrueopinionsaboutdivinesubjects,theycanunderstandthesesubjectsonlywhentheyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n130iditdobbs-weinsteinhavegainedaknowledgeofnaturalscience.Thatiswhy,accord-ingtoMaimonides,theBiblecommenceswiththe“AccountoftheBeginning”andphilosopherscommencetheirstudywithphysics.Initially,thereisnodifferenceinunderstandingbetweenthevul-garandtheelite.NeithergroupcanseetheapparentcontradictionswithintheBibleortheapparentcontradictionsbetweenphilosophyandrevelationthatareoccasionedbytheBible’sparabolicformofspeech.Thevulgar,however,arecontentwiththeletterofthebib-licaltext,whereasthepotentiallywisearepromptedbytheBibletopursueadditionalknowledge.Butafterstudyofthenaturalsciences,theeliteexperienceperplexityandmustseekgenuineunderstand-ingofthemysteriesofdivinescience,thatis,trueunderstandingoftheTorah.Suchunderstandingwillsometimesamounttounder-standingclearlythatfullinsightandphilosophicaldemonstrationarebeyondus.“Youshouldnotthinkthatthesegreatsecretsarefullyandcompletelyknowntoanyoneamongus.Theyarenot.Butsometimestruthflashesouttoussothatwethinkthatitisday,andthenmatterandhabitintheirvariousformsconcealitsothatwefindourselvesagaininanobscurenight,almostaswewereatfirst”(GuideI,introduction[178]7).ThemajorprincipleofinterpretationderivablefromMaimonides’introductoryremarksandrepeatedthroughouttheGuideisAris-totelian.FollowingAristotle’sdictumintheNicomacheanEthics(I2;1094b24–27),that“itisthemarkofaneducatedmantolookforprecisionineachclassofthingsjustsofarasthenatureofthesubjectadmits,”Maimonidesdoesnotseekdemonstrativeproofswheretheseareinappropriate,namely,indivinescienceandinsub-jectswhichderivetheirprinciplesfromit.Thelessasubjectadmitsofdemonstration,thegreaterthedisagreementitengenders.Thus,accordingtoMaimonides,thegreatestdisagreementsareencoun-teredinmetaphysics,lesseronesinnaturalscience,andnoneinmathematics.Sincetheexpresspurposeofhisworkistheresolutionofper-plexityoccasionedbyerrors,Maimonidesfocusesprimarilyonques-tionswherebiblicalinterpretationorphilosophicalargumentismostlikelytogoastray.Hence,hedevotesthebulkofeachinquirytorefutationandonlysubsequentlyarticulateshisownposition.TheGuideisthusdialectical(preciselyinthesenseofBookIofAristotle’sTopics)anddoesnotshyawayfromcriticismofotherJewishCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy131thinkers.Maimonidesoftenproposestheteachingsofthephiloso-phers,especiallyAristotle,assuperiortothoseofhiscoreligion-ists.Forattaininghumanperfection,theeliminationoferrorismostcriticalwithrespecttothefollowing:(1)divineincorporeality,(2)creation,(3)providence,(4)divinelaw,and(5)humanperfection.Concerningthefirst,fundamentalsubject,thephilosophicalandre-vealedteachingsareincompleteagreement.ApparentdisagreementaboutGod’sincorporealityistheresultofvulgarmisunderstandingofrevelation.Withrespecttotheothersubjects,somedisagreementsbetweenthetwotraditionsareapparent,othersreal.Whenthedis-agreementsbetweenphilosophicalandrevealedteachingsmanifestrealconflicts,Maimonides’positionisalwaysanadaptationoftherevealedtraditionthatisphilosophicallyreasonable,thoughoftenindemonstrable.TheproperunderstandingofGod’sincorporealityandunicity,ac-cordingtoMaimonides,istheprimarypurposeoftheentireTorah,sincetruehumanperfectionisimpossiblewithoutsuchanunder-standing.Hence,despitethegreatdifficultyinattainingitandde-spitetheesotericnatureofthesubject,allJewsmustattainsomeunderstandingofGod’sincorporealityandmustrejectthecontraryconception.Onthisissue,Maimonidestakesaradical,uncompro-misingposition,onewhicheventuatesinastrictnegativetheology.ThemostadequateknowledgeofGodaccessibletohumanreasonistheunderstandingofwhatGodisnot,oftheradicaldistinctionbetweenGodandcreatures.ThusAristotle,“princeofthephiloso-phers,”coulddemonstratethatGodexistsbutnomore;hedeniedthepossibilityofhumanknowledgeoftheessenceorwhatnessofthesupralunarrealmandespeciallyoftheprimemover.Maimonidesentirelyagrees:KnowthatthedescriptionofGod,mayHebecherishedandexalted,bymeansofnegationisthecorrectdescription...IshallmakeitcleartoyouthatwehavenowayofdescribingHimunlessitisthroughnegationsandnototherwise...IthasalreadybeendemonstratedthatGod,mayHebehonoredandmagnified,isexistentofnecessityandthatthereisnotcompositioninHim...andthatweareonlyabletoapprehendthefactthatHeisandcannotapprehendHisquiddity.(GuideI58[178]134–35)Consequently,MaimonidesinsistsonafigurativeinterpretationoftheletteroftheTorahandthetraditionineveryinstancewhereCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n132iditdobbs-weinsteincorporealitymaybesuggested.Insodoing,hechallengesthebe-liefsofmostJewsandtheteachingsofsomeofhispredecessors,no-tablyYehudahha-Levi.UnlikemanypreviousJewishthinkers,whoconsideredanthropomorphiclanguagenecessaryforthereligiousin-structionofthemajorityevenwhiledenyingtheultimateveracityofsuchattributions,Maimonidesholdsthatallanthropomorphismsareconduciveonlytoidolatry.Accordingly,hediscussesdivinein-corporealitynotonlyinthephilosophicallyframedGuidebutalsoinhisCommentaryontheMishnahandintheMishnehTorah.Hebasesfiveofthethirteenbeliefsheconsidersnecessaryforgainingaccesstothe“worldtocome”(i.e.,toimmortality)ontheaffirmationofdivineunicityandincorporeality.Conversely,heinsiststhatbeliefindivinecorporeality,andthusinaliteralunderstandingofbiblicalversesimplyingit,entailsexclusionfromthecommunityofIsraelandfromtheworldtocome.Consequently,mostofBookIoftheGuideisdevotedtoanexplanationofanthropomorphicbiblicaltermsthatleadstoMaimonides’celebrated(ornotorious)denialofmeaningtopositivedivineattributionsandhisdenialofanypositiveknowledgeofGodbyanalogy,howeverremote.Attributesofaction,thatis,characterizationsofGodfromeffectsinthecreatedworld,arepermissible,buteventheseare,strictlyspeaking,untrue.Theyareacceptablebecausetheyarethebestexemplarsforhumanactionstoimitate,buttheydonotarticulateanythingtrueaboutGod.FollowingAristotleandtheIslamicphilosophicaltradition,MaimonidesprovidesfourdemonstrativeproofsfortheexistenceofGod.Allofthemarecausal,beginningfromobservedphysicalphenomenaandconcludingthat,sinceinfiniteregressofcausesisimpossible,theremustbeanuncausedfirstcauseorprimemoveroftheentirechainofcausality.FollowingAvicenna,MaimonidesidentifiesAristotle’sprimemoverwiththesingularnecessarybeingwhoseexistenceisidenticalwithhisessence,unlikeeveryotherbe-ing,inallofwhichexistenceisdistinctfromessenceandispossibleratherthannecessary.MaimonidesdepartsfromAvicenna,however,regardingcreation.WhereAvicennaheldthatotherbeingscomefromGodbyanecessaryemanation,Maimonidesdeniesthatcausalne-cessityextendstoGod.Godisthecauseofnecessityintheuniverseratherthanbeingboundbyit.PreciselybecauseAristotlerecognizedthelimitationsofnaturalhumanreason,MaimonidescansubstituterevealedteachingsforCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy133someofthePhilosopher’sspeculationsonsubjectsinaccessibletodemonstration.Thus,onsubjectswhichMaimonidesconsidersfun-damentalintheTorah,suchascreationandprovidence,subjectsonwhichAristotleandtheBibledisagree,Maimonidesseekstoestablishthegreaterprobabilityofrevealedteachingoverthephilo-sophical.Concerningbothcreationandprovidence,Maimonidesfirstexposestheweaknessesofthephilosophicalpositionandthenattemptstoshowthatrevealedteachingsaremoreplausible,eitherbybeingmorecongruentwiththerequirementsoflogicorbetterasexplanationsofsensibleexperience.Donotcriticizemeforhavingsetoutdoubtsthatattachtohis[Aristotle’s]opinion...However,weshalltreatthisphilosopherashisfollowershaveenjoinedustotreathim.ForAlexander[ofAphrodisias]hasexplainedthatineverycaseinwhichnodemonstrationispossible,thetwocontraryopin-ionswithregardtothematterinquestionshouldbepositedashypothe-ses,anditshouldbeseenwhatdoubtsattachtoeachofthem:theonetowhichfewerdoubtsattachshouldbebelieved.AlexandersaysthatthingsarethuswithrespecttoalltheopinionsregardingthedivinethatAristotlesetsforthandregardingwhichnodemonstrationispossible.(GuideII22[178]320)Ininvestigatingthequestionofcreation,Maimonidesoutlinesthreemainpositionsthatseemtenable:thatoftheTorah,thatofPlato,andthatofAristotle.ThefirstaffirmscreationexnihilobyanactofGod’swill;thesecondaffirmsanactofcreationoutofaprimemattercoeternalwithGod;thethirdaffirmsaprimemoverofaworldcoeternalwithitself,aswellaswithtimeandmotion.Havingout-linedthethreepositions,MaimonidesarguesthatalthoughPlato’spositiondoesnotunderminethefoundationoftheTorah,whileAristotle’sdestroysit,bothphilosophicalpositionscanberefutedasiftheywereone–andheinfactproceedstotreatthemassuch.TheconflationofthesedistinctphilosophicalpositionsandMaimonides’admissionthatneitherthephilosophicnortherevealedpositionisdemonstrablehaveledscholarstospeculatethatinup-holdingthepositionoftheTorahMaimonidesishidinghistrueopin-ion,whichiscontrarytotheTorah,namely,beliefintheeternityoftheworld.Itis,however,possibletoexplainMaimonides’positioninawaythatnotonlyhonorshisstatedopinionbutisalsomorecogentphilosophicallythansuchspeculationallows.TheproposedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n134iditdobbs-weinsteinexplanationisasfollows.AlthoughthePlatonicpositiondoesnotdestroythefoundationsoftheTorahforunphilosophicalbelievers,itstillrestrictsdivinepowerinamannerthatcompromisesthere-vealednotionofGod.Thisisbecausethecoeternalexistenceofany-thingpriortocreation(e.g.,primematter),withthenecessityofsuchmatterfortheveryactofcreation,restrictsthecreativeact,insofarasitontologicallydeterminestosomeextent(howeversmall)whatGodcanorcannotdo.Consequently,thatcoeternalmatterisalsoacodeterminingprincipleinthecreatedworld.Simplebelieverscan-notrecognizethedifferencebetweencreationexnihiloandcreationoutofcoeternalprimematter,andhence,forthem,thePlatonicpositionisconsistentwiththeTorah’saffirmationofcreation.Buttheperplexedphilosophers,theaudienceoftheGuide,canseethedifference.Moreover,totheperplexedbutbelievingphilosophersthePlatonicpositionisattractive,sinceitallowsthemsimultane-ouslytoaffirmcreationandexplainit,whereastheTorah’spositionplacescreationbeyondexplanation.ByadoptingthePlatonicposi-tion,however,thesethinkersmustadmitaprincipleofchangeanddecayindependentofthedivinewill,anadmissionwithgravecon-sequencesforthepossibilityofhumanperfection,letalonedivinejustice.Thecentralquestionisthuswhetherornottheoriginoftheworldisdemonstrable.SinceAristotleattemptedtoresolvetheques-tionphilosophically,whilePlatoproposedhisviewasonlya“likelystory,”itisAristotle’sargumentsthatposearealthreattotheTorahandhencerequirecarefulinvestigation.Iftheyareshowntobebasedonconjectureratherthanondemonstrativeprinciples,thenthepo-sitionoftheTorahcanbeproposedas,attheveryleast,equallyplau-sible.MaimonidesthereforetakesgreatpainstoshowthatwhereasAristotle’steachingsaretruewithrespecttosublunarphysics,withrespecttocelestialphysics,letalonemetaphysics,theyarenotonlyuncertainandcontrarytoPtolemy’sphysics,butalsoviolatesomeofAristotle’sownlogicalprecepts.Moreover,hepointsoutonnu-merousoccasionsthatAristotlehimselfconcludedthatthequestionoftheworld’soriginisbeyonddemonstrationandthatitisonlythelaterAristotelians,forexample,Saadiah,whobelievedananswertobedemonstrable.6Tounderscorethisconclusion,Maimonidesarguesfortheindemonstrabilitynotonlyofunobserved,unique,ex-tranaturalevents,butofallunobservedphenomena:CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy135Noinferencecanbedrawninanyrespectfromthenatureofathingafterithasbeengenerated,hasattaineditsfinalstate,andhasachievedstabilityinitsmostperfectstate,tothestateofthatthingwhileitmovedtowardbeinggenerated.Norcananinferencebedrawnfromthestateofthethingwhenitmovestowardbeinggeneratedtoitsstatebeforeitbegantomovethus.Wheneveryouerrinthisanddrawaninferencefromthenatureofathingthathasachievedactualitytoitsnaturewhenitwasonlyinpotentia,gravedoubtsarearousedinyou.Moreoverthingsthatmustexistbecomeimpossibleinyouropinion,andontheotherhandthingsthatareimpossiblebecomenecessaryinyouropinion.(GuideII17[178]295;emphasesmine)Maimonidesprovideshereacounterfactualexampletoshowtheimpossibilityofdeducingthenecessaryconditionsforexistencefromexistenceitself.Heimaginestheincredulityofamanwho,havinggrownupwithoutanyassociationwithfemales,humanoranimal,cannotbelievethathumanbirthoccursasitdoes.OncethephilosophicalpositionontheoriginoftheworldprovesdoubtfulandthepositionoftheTorahonthisquestionisacceptedasequallyvalid,alltheteachingsoftheTorah,includingmiraclesandprophecy,canbeshowntobephilosophicallyreasonable.Nonethe-less,itisimportanttoemphasizethat,accordingtoMaimonides,ifthereweretobeademonstrationconcerningtheoriginoftheuni-verse,itsconclusionwouldhavetobeacceptedevenifitcontradictedtheletteroftheTorah.Maimonides’argumentfortheindemonstrabilityoftheoriginoftheworld,whichdeniestheextensionofcausalnecessitytoGod,pertainsonlytodivineacts.Itisnotarejectionofnatural,necessaryteleologybutonlylimitsittotheactuallyexistinguniverseinitsformedstate,thoughwithoutexcludingthepossibilityoffree,un-determineddivineinterventioninit.Thispossibility,accordingtoMaimonides,ismadeimmanentinnatureinvirtueofthecreativeact.Thus,amiraculouseventdoesnotconstituteadisruptionofthenaturalorder.Rather,miraclesarevirtual,unactualizedpossibilitiesinnatureandareaconstitutivepartoftheoriginalplanofcreation.Likewise,itispreciselybecauseofthecognitiveandvoluntaryna-tureofthecreativeact,preciselyinsofarasitisnotnecessitated,thatGodcanbesaidtobeprovidentandomniscient,ratherthanthedivinitydescribedbyAristotleasindifferenttothesublunarworld.God’sknowledgeoftheworldofgenerationanddecayisgeneral,whereashisknowledgeofpotentiallyimmortalthings–ofhumanCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n136iditdobbs-weinsteinbeingsinsofarastheyareintellectsandthusmadeintheimageofthedivineintellect–isparticular.Thesublunarextensionofpartic-ularprovidencesolelytohumanbeingsisnotmerelyaconcessiontotheTorah,norisittheresultofexcessiveintellectualism(twoopposedaccusationsbroughtagainstMaimonides).Rather,insofarasitmakesnoclaimstoindividualimmortality,7thispositionistheonlyonethatcanbeheldconsistently,oncebothfreevoluntarycreationandnaturalcausalityareaffirmed.Thosebeingsthataresubjecttothelawsofnecessarycausalityareknownonlyasspecies,assubjecttotheuniversallawsoriginatinginGod,sinceitisonlyasspeciesthattheypossesspermanenceandthuscanbetrulyknown.Ontheotherhand,intellectualbeings,whodonotactnecessarilybutcanchoosetoactorrefrainfromaction(whereactionproperisunderstoodtobeconsequentuponintellect),tothatextentactualizetheirproperperfection,attaintheirpermanence,andcanbeknownasdistinctindividualsratherthanasessentiallyidenticalmembersofaspecies.ItisbeyondthescopeofthischaptertoinquirewhetherMai-monidesthoughtGodcouldbesaidtoknowindividualhumanbeingswhodonotactualizetheirintellects.Itismorelikelythathewouldhavedeniedit.WhatisimportanttorecognizeforMaimonidesisthat(1)quahuman,allindividualspossessafreedomtoactwhichstrictlynaturalbeingsdonot,and(2)humanbeingsweregiventheLaw,bymeansofwhichtheycanactaccordingtointellect(thedivineaswellastheirown)andwhichtheycanchoose,orrefrainfromchoosing,tomaketheirown.Whereasirrationalcreaturesattaintheirproperperfectionaccordingtothenecessaryuniversallawsoftheirnature,humanbeingsarefreetoattaintheirperfectionthroughthe“in-tellectual”revealedlaw.Failuretodosoisawilledcorruptionofhumannaturalperfectionandtherebyreducestheindividualtoarankofbeinglowerthantherational.“Knowthatthissinglesoul,whosepowersorpartsaredescribedabove,islikematter,andtheintellectisitsform.Ifitdoesnotattainitsform,theexistenceofitscapacitytoattainthisformisfornoughtandis,asitwere,futile”(EightChapters1[177]64).Ontheotherhand,byobservingdivinelawandseekingtounderstandit,allhumanbeingsarecapableofattaining“aportionintheworldtocome.”Maimonides’influenceonsubsequentphilosophy,bothJewishandChristian,canscarcelybeoveremphasized.HisinfluenceonCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy137ChristianphilosophyismostevidentinThomasAquinas,whosefrequentreferencestotheviewsof“RabbiMoyses”arehighlyre-spectful,evenwhenhedisagreeswiththeRabbi.8apureraristotelianism–gersonides(levibengershom)(1288–1344)GersonideswasborninProvence,isbelievedtohaveresidedinOrangemostofhislife,andclearlyspentaconsiderableamountoftimeinAvignon.ItisgenerallyagreedthathisknowledgeofGreekphilosophyandsciencewasobtainedthroughHebrewtranslationsofGreekandArabictexts,butthereisdisagreementastowhetherhecouldreadLatin.Inanycase,hisworksexhibitfamiliaritywithboththesubstanceandstyleofscholasticphilosophy,9andthereisdirectevidenceofhisinteractionwithChristianthinkersandwiththepapalcourt,wherehewashighlyregardedasamathematicianandastronomer.AlthoughMaimonides’fameandinfluenceasaJewishAris-totelianfarexceedsthatofGersonides,itisGersonideswhoisthemorethoroughandconsistentAristotelian.Inthislight,itisironic–thoughnotsurprisinggiventheturbulentethosofthetimes–thatGersonides’philosophicalworkshaveremainedunknowntotheChristianphilosophicaltradition,10whileintheJewishtra-ditiontheyhavebeenmalignedorpointedlyignored.Hismagnumopus,TheWarsoftheLord(Milhamotha-Shem),wasindeedvilifiedas“WarsagainsttheLord,”whilehisnumerouscommentariesonAverroes’commentariesonAristotlewereignored.Withtheexcep-tionofanEnglishtranslationofhisSupercommentaryonthePriorAnalyticsandanunpublishedpartialtranslationofhisSupercom-mentaryontheEpitomeontheDeAnima,theystillremainhiddeninmanuscriptform.Since,despitetheirintrinsicinterest,thesu-percommentariesexertednoinfluenceonsubsequentphilosophy,JewishorChristian,IwillfocusstrictlyupontheWars.11IntheintroductiontotheWars,Gersonideslistssixgreatprob-lemsthatmustbeaddressedinordertoachievehumanperfection,bothintellectualandpolitical.Eachofthesixaporiaeisthesubjectofaseparatebook:(1)whetherthesoulisimmortal;(2)thenatureofdreams,divinations,andprophecy;(3)whetherornotGodknowsin-dividualexistents;(4)thenatureofdivineprovidence;(5)thenatureCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n138iditdobbs-weinsteinandmotionofheavenlybodies(astronomy);and(6)whethertheuni-verseiseternalorcreated.Althoughthefinalquestionislastinorderofinvestigation,Gersonidesexplicitlystatesthatitisfirstinorderofimportance.Itisthefundamentalprincipleanddifficultyfromwhichallothersfollow.Healsoassertsattheoutsetthattheonlypossibleproofconcerningtheoriginoftheuniverseisanaposteriorioneandthatnoproofcanbederivedfrom“theessenceofthefirstcause”(animplicitcritiqueofSaadiah’sposition):Itisimportanttorealizethatonthisquestionwecannotderiveproofsfromthatwhichispriortotheworld,e.g.,fromtheFirstCause;forourknowledgeoftheessenceoftheFirstCauseisveryslight.Hence,wecannotmakeitapremisefromwhichwecanconstructproofforthisquestion.Indeed,thekindofproofavailabletousinthisinquiryistheaposterioriproof,whichisbasedonphenomenaposteriortothisgeneratedentity[theuniverse],ifitisthecasethattheworldisgenerated.(Wars,introductoryremarks[323]92)Insofarasthedifficultiesofaquestionarephilosophical,Gersonidessayshewillproceedthroughanexaminationofthestrengthsandweaknessesinthedifferentopinionsonitinordertoderiveprin-ciplesfromthemaswellastodistinguishthetruefromthefalseanderadicatedoubt.InamannerthatismorechallengingthanMai-monides’,Gersonidesannouncesthathisconcernistohelp“themanofinquiry,”notthosewhoattempttoprohibitinquiry,forphilosoph-icalinquiryisan“imitationofGod,”and“theTorahisnotanomos[law/custom/tradition]thatforcesustobelievefalsehoodsbutratherdirectsustowardtheattainmentoftruthtotheextentpossible”(WarsI,introductoryremarks[323]I98;translationmodified).Maimonides,aswehaveseen,endorsesthepositionoftheTorahonsomesubjectsafterclaimingthattheyexceedrationaldemon-stration.Insharpcontrast,Gersonidesarguesthatthenaturaldesireforknowledgeofthesesubjectsthatisevidentfromthephilosophi-calinvestigationsthathavebeendevotedtothem(includingthoseofMaimonides)indicatessuchknowledgeisnaturallyattainable.Fore-mostamongthesesubjectsaretheoriginoftheuniverseandGod’sknowledgeofindividualexistents,thetopicsonwhichIwillfocusinwhatfollows.Onbothmatters,Gersonides’conclusionschallengeMaimonides’claimsanddosoonphilosophicalgrounds.Inhisinvestigationoftheoriginoftheuniverse,GersonidesfirstoutlinesthediversewaysinwhichtwobasiccontradictorypositionsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy139onthequestionhavebeenunderstoodanddefended.Creationcanbeinterpretedeitherasthesuccessivegenerationofmanyworldsorasthecreationofasingleone,andeachoftheseinterpretationsadmitsoftwopossibilities,namely,creationexnihiloandcreationoutofprimordialmatter.Likewise,eternitycanbeinterpretedeitherastheeternalexistenceoftheworldorasGod’seternalemanationoftheworld.Fromhispreliminaryanalysis,Gersonidesconcludesthatonlythreeofthevariousopinionsmeritfurtherinvestigation:Aris-totle’sargumentsforeternity,Maimonides’argumentsforcreationexnihilo,andPlato’sargumentsforcreationoutofprimordialmat-ter.Hefurtherclaimsthatalloftheargumentsadvancedthusfarinfavorofthesepositionsareinadequate.Hefinallydefendsaver-sionofthePlatonicposition,butdoessoonthebasisofessentiallyAristotelianscientificconsiderations.WhatismoststrikingaboutGersonides’positionisnotsimplythathearguesforatemporalcreationoutofaprimordialabsolutelyformlessmatter,accordingtothelawsofphysics,butthathisrea-sonsforholdingthispositiononthequestionoforiginsalsogroundhisconvictionthattheworldisindestructibleandeverlasting.HefurtherclaimsthathispositionisfullyconsistentwiththeTorah,includingitsteachingsonmiracles,formiraclesalwaysinvolveachangeinalreadyexistingmatter.InGersonides’view,creationoutofabsolutelyformlessmatter(thevoidandprimevalwaterinGenesis1)innowaycircumscribesthedivinewill,becauseform-lessmatterhasnopotentialitywhateverformotionorchangeuntilitisendowedwithform,whichispreciselywhatconstitutescreation.Likehisaccountoftheworld’screation,Gersonides’argumentsfortheworld’sindestructibilityarebasedonthelawsofphysics,es-peciallyonwhatisnaturallynecessary,possible,andimpossible.Hisinvestigationofthisquestionbeginswithanexaminationofthecausesofdestruction.Theseareeithernaturalorvoluntary.Natu-raldestructionispossibleonlybyvirtueofmatterratherthanofform,for“formiswhatstrivestopreservethedeterminate[thatis,formed]existentinexistencetotheextentpossible”(WarsVI;trans-lationmine).12Althoughitispossiblethatanindividualexistentconsideredinitselfcanbedestroyedifitisacteduponbypowersthatarenaturallycontrarytoandgreaterthanitspowersofaction,thiscontrarietydoesnotpertaintoheavenlybodies,whoseformisperfect.Moreover,insofarastheperfectformoftheheavenlybodiesCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n140iditdobbs-weinsteiniswhatendowssublunaryexistentswithformandperfectsthem,itisnotpossiblethattheforms(species)ofchangeableexistentswillceasetoexist.Hence,Gersonidesconcludes,thereisnonaturalcauseoftheworld’sdestruction.Istheworlddestructible,then,byanactofwill,purposefully?Gersonidesdismissesthisasabsurd.Foriftheformsofexistingthingsstrivetopreserveandperfectthem,allthemoresodoesGod.TosupposethatGodhasthepower,letalonethewill,todestroytheworldamountstoascribingtoGodacapac-ityforperformingbaseanddeplorableacts.Onthesamegroundsonwhichhehasrejectedvariousalternativescenariosforcreation(thecreationofsuccessiveworlds,ofpossibleotherworlds,andcreationexnihilo),Gersonideshasnowdefendedtheeternityapartepostoftheoneworldcreatedoutofprimevalmatter.13ThesameconsistentphilosophicalnaturalismanimatesGerson-ides’discussionofGod’sknowledgeofindividuals.Theproblem,onceagain,istoreconcilephilosophyandreligion.Thephilosophers,whoarenotconcernedwithdivinejusticeperse,whichrequiresknowledgeofindividualsasindividual,denydivineknowledgeofindividualsinordertoascribetoGodonlysuchknowledgeasgen-uinelydeservesthename,thatis,anintellectualgraspoftheuniver-salandnecessary.Thetheologians,however,whoseforemostcon-cernisdivinejusticeandprovidence,insistonGod’sknowledgeofindividual,contingentbeingsandactions.Bothpositions,however,seemtocompromisehumanfreedom–thefirst,byleavingindivid-ualhumanactsandeventstochanceandhence,futile;thesecond,byregardingallindividualhumanactionsassubjecttoastrictdeter-minism.Judgingthedifferentformulationsofbothviews(includingMaimonides’attempttoreconcilethem)asphilosophicallyinade-quate,GersonidesholdsthatGoddoesnothaveknowledgeofindi-vidualsasindividual.Nonetheless,ratherthansimplyendorsingthephilosophers’viewandrejectingthatofthetheologians,Gersonidesreformulatesbothviewsinanoncontradictorymanner.Followingthephilosophers,hearguesthat,properlyspeaking,knowledge(sci-ence)assuchisoftheuniversalandnecessary,whereas“knowl-edge”ofindividualsisnotknowledgebutsensation.Goddoesnotknowindividualsasindividualspreciselybecausetheyaresensibleandassuchcannotbeknown.Nonetheless,Godknowsindivid-ualsinanotherrespect,namely,insofarastheyareorderedbyanintellect.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy141ForwehaveclaimedthatGod’sknowledgeofparticularsasorderedisbasedontheintelligibleorderpertainingtothemwhichiseternallyinherentinHisintellectandisnotbaseduponthesecontingentthings.ForGoddoesnotacquireHisknowledgefromthem;rathertheyacquiretheirexistencefromHisknowledgeofthem,sincetheirexistenceisaneffectoftheintelligibleorderpertainingtotheminherentinthedivineintellect.(WarsIII5[323]133)Preciselybecausethiskindofknowledgereflects(orevengrounds)theunderstandingofnecessarynaturallaws,italsoentailsanunder-standingofwhatisreallyornaturallypossible,includingthekindsofeventsandactionstowhichchoiceandfreedompertain.Thus,althoughGodknowsthatcertainsortsofeventsandactionswillal-waysoccur,Goddoesnot(cannot)knowthatthisorthatindividualwillactinthisorthatwayatthisdeterminatetime.“God’sknowl-edgeoffutureeventsdoesnotimplythattheeventsforeknownwillnecessarilyoccur;ratheritsoppositeisstillpossible...Theyremaincontingentbyvirtueofthefactorofchoice”(WarsIII5[323]133).ThemostradicalaspectofGersonides’philosophicalwritings,andtheonethatbestexplainstheirexclusionfromtheJewishandChris-tianphilosophicalcanons,isalsotheonethatmakesmanifesthiskinshipwithSpinoza.ForGersonides,ourscientificknowledgeoftheuniversalandnecessary(incontrastwithsenseperceptionoftheindividualandcontingent)isnotdifferentinkind,butonlyindegree,fromGod’sknowledge.Hence,themoreindividualhumanbeingsunderstandthenatural,necessaryorderofthings,themorethey“share”adimensionofGod’sknowledgeandthefreertheyare.jewish–christianinteractionsThreetypesofinteraction,differinginbothformandcontent,charac-terizemedievalJewish–Christianintellectualrelations:(1)polemicaldisputations,writtenandoral;(2)unilateralscholarlyconsultationonbiblicalinterpretations;and(3)mutualphilosophicalexchangesorinfluences.Consideringthephilosophicalfocusofthischapterandinlightoftheforcedconditionsunderwhichthefirsttwokindsofinteractionoccurred,Iwillsaylittleaboutthesetypesbeyondnotingsomeimportantdifferenceswithinandbetweenthem.AlthoughthepoliticalcontextofeverydisputationwasoneinwhichtheJewswereapersecutedminority,theearlypolemicsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n142iditdobbs-weinstein(roughlyuptothethirteenthcentury)generallytooktheformofwrittendialogueswhich,despitetheirstraw-man’spresentationofanantagonist’sviews,exhibitfamiliaritywiththeothertradition’ssourcesandarenotcoerced.Conversely,thelaterdisputations(in-cludingthosethatweresubsequentlyrecordedinwrittenform)werepubliceventsinitiatedbytheecclesiasticalauthorities,inwhichJews“participated”underthreatofforcedconversionordeath.Inneithercase,however,isthereevidenceofgenuineinfluence,letaloneareciprocalone.14Jewish–Christianinteractionandinfluencewithrespecttobib-licalinterpretationoccupiesamiddlegroundbetweenpolemicandphilosophy.Ononehand,Christianexegetesandphilosopherssoughttheexpertise(grammatical,philological,andphilosophical)ofJewishinterpreters.Ontheotherhand,theseexchangeswerenotonlyone-sided,butoftenthesameChristianthinkerswhosoughtsuchJewishexpertise,advocatedtoleration,andsecuredtheprotec-tionofJewsfromexpulsionandotherformsofviolentpersecutiondidsoforreasonsthatjustifiedviolentandoppressivepolicies,albeitshortofelimination(e.g.,RobertGrosseteste,AlexanderofHales,RogerBacon,ThomasAquinas,JohnDunsScotus,andothers).15Incontrasttotheprecedingtwoformsofinteraction,therewere,fromthethirteenthcenturyon,reciprocalphilosophicalinteractionsbetweenJewsandChristiansthatarerelatively(thoughfarfromen-tirely)independentofrepressiveecclesiastico-politicalconcernsandattimesimplicitlyopposedtothem.Amongthefactorsresponsi-bleforthischangeinthenatureofJewish–Christianinteractions,themostimportantforourpurposeare(1)theLatintranslationsofGreek,Arabic,andJudeo-ArabicscientificandphilosophicaltextsinToledoduringthelatterhalfofthetwelfthcentury;(2)thetrans-lationofGreek,ArabicandJudeo-Arabicscientificandphilosophi-caltextsintoHebrewandthefoundationofscholarlycommunitieswhoseprimaryphilosophicallanguageswereHebrew(ratherthanJudeo-Arabic)andatleastoneoftheRomancelanguagesandmanyofwhosememberswerealsoversedinLatin;(3)thevibrantcommu-nityofJewishandChristianscholarsandtranslatorsestablishedinNaplesbytheEmperorFrederickIIinthefirsthalfofthethirteenthcentury,acommunitywhosediscoursewasindependentofecclesi-asticalcensure;and(4)theLatintranslationofMaimonides’Guide,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy143whichgaverisetoextensivescholarlycooperationbetweenJewishandChristianscholarsinItaly.AnearlyandexemplaryinteractionattheimperialcourtwasthatbetweenJacobAnatoli,theemperior’sphysician,whotrans-latedphilosophicalandscientificworksfromArabicandLatinintoHebrewandmostlikelyassistedintranslationsofHebrewandArabictextsintoLatin,andMichaelScott,arenownedtranslatorofArabicworksintoLatin.Anatoli’stestimonytothenatureoftheirrelationisremarkableinatleasttworespects.First,hebestowsthehighestpossiblepraiseonaChristianthinkerintheintroductiontohismajorwork,Malmadha-Talmidim(TheGoadofStudents),atextdevotedtosermonsontheTorah.Second,heattributestoMichaelScottasuperiorabilityasabiblicalexegete.Inaddition,inamannerthatisstrikinglysimilartoMaimonides’exhortationtothereaderofhisIntroductiontoAvot(TheEightChapters)to“hearthetruthfromwhoeversaysit,”AnatolienjoinsthetraditionalJewishreaderofMalmadha-Talmidimtoappreciatetruth,irrespectiveofthereli-giousaffiliationofitsproponent.Thetranslationsandcooperationbegunintheimperialcourtcre-atedacommonphilosophicalcorpusthatmadepossible,forthefirsttime,genuineJewishandChristiandialogueandmutualinfluences,especiallyinItaly.Thus,complementarytoMaimonides’extensiveinfluenceonChristianphilosophy,thereisclearevidenceofinflu-encesofscholasticandNeoplatonicChristianphilosophyonJewishphilosophy.TheseinfluencesareevidentinbothMaimonideanandanti-MaimonideanJewishphilosophers.Thus,forexample,inhiscommentaryontheGuideaswellasothertexts,MosesofSalerno(d.1279)employedscholasticterminologyandmethod,whileHillelofVeronaandImmanuelofRomewereheavilyinfluencedbyDante.IncontrasttotherelativeindependencefromdoctrinalconcernsandecclesiasticaloversightofthephilosophicalexchangesinItalyinitiatedbytheimperialcourt,reciprocalinfluenceswerenotopenlyacknowledgedinSpainandProvence.Onthecontrary,althoughthewritingsofJewishphilosophersclearlyexhibitfamiliaritywithChristianphilosophy,especiallywiththeworksofThomasAquinas,DunsScotus,WilliamofOckham,PeterAureol,NicoleOresme,andthelike,littleresearchhasthusfarbeendevotedtothenatureCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n144iditdobbs-weinsteinandextentofsuchinfluences.TheexceptionisShlomoPines’sem-inalessay,“ScholasticismafterThomasAquinasandtheTeachingofHasdaiCrescasandHisPredecessors”[256].Despitetheastound-ingparallelsbetweentheworksofJewishandChristianphiloso-phersnotedinthischapter,anddespitetheintrinsicunlikelihoodofthetextsinquestionbeingindependentofoneanother,Pinescouldonlyofferhisevidenceandconclusionsregardinginfluencestentatively.16TheprecariousnatureofJewish-Christianphilosophicalinter-actions,especiallythosethatareexplicitlyacknowledged,ispoignantlyevidentintheRenaissance.Thisfragilityalsomakesev-identtheextenttowhichJewish-Christianphilosophicalinterac-tionsareaspecialcaseofthetenuousstatusofphilosophyinrela-tiontoecclesiastico-politicalpower.ElijahdelMedigo(1460–96)isavividexample.BorninCreteunderVenetianrule,delMedigowasanAverroistAristotelian,fluentinHebrew,Arabic,Greek,Latin,andItalian,whowastheheadofthePaduaYeshiva,wherehelec-turedonphilosophy.AmonghisnumerousChristianadmirersandpatronswasPicodellaMirandola,whoviewedhimashismentorinphilosophyandJewishmysticism.When,attheinvitationoftheVenetiangovernment,delMedigowasaskedtoserveasanarbiterinaheatedphilosophicalconflict,hisdeterminationinfavorofoneschoolofthoughtsparkedtheanimosityoftheother.Forsimilarreasons,stemmingfromhisAverroism,hecameintoconflictwiththeJewishRavofPadua.Consequently,afterPico’sdeathin1494,havinglosthispowerfulChristianpatron,delMedigowascompelledtoreturntoCrete,where,ironically,heremainedhighlyesteemedbybothJewsandChristians.notes1.Saadiah’smajorpolemicwasagainsttheKaraitesectwhichhadasig-nificantfollowingintheIslamicworldtowardtheendofthetenthcentury.TheKaraitesrejectedTalmudicJudaismandsoughttoestab-lishaJudaismbasedstrictlyontheHebrewBiblewithoutitslegalandinterpretativetradition.2.OfSaadiah’sworksonlytwoareavailableinEnglishtranslation,TheBookofDoctrinesandBeliefs[106]andhisBookofTheodicy[107].3.Saadiahaddsthatthereareotherproofsaswell.SincethefourproofshepresentsarebasedonthestandardKalamproofsforcreation,ofwhichCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nJewishphilosophy145Maimonidespresentsseven,Saadiah’sreferencemustbeunderstoodtoincludeatleastthese.4.Attimeshepresentsmatterandformasundifferentiated,atothers,asopposed.Likewise,attimes,hedrawsadistinctionbetweentheoriginsofmatterandformrespectivelyinthedivineessenceanddivinewill,atothers,heclaimsthatbothoriginatesimultaneouslyinthedivinewill.TheinconsistencyaboutthestatusofmattercanbetracedbacktoPlotinus.5.E.g.,ThomasAquinas’scriticism(Desubstantiisseparatis5–8)ofIbnGabirol’spositingofspiritualmatter.6.Seeabove,p.125andnote3.7.Itshouldbenotedthat,forMaimonides,sublunarindividuationcanoccuronlythroughmatter.God’sknowledgeofhumanbeingsquain-tellectsisknowledgeoftheagentintellectinwhichdifferentindividualsparticipateinproportiontotheirunderstanding.8.See,forexample,Quaestionesdeanima,q.3,obj.6andad6;q.8,obj.19andad19.AquinasoftenfollowsMaimonides.See,forexample,Ex-positiosuperlibrumBoetiiDeTrinitate,q.3,a.1;STIaIIae,qq.101–02,passim;Quaestionesdisputataedepotentia,q.3,passim.OnAquinasandMaimonidesingeneralseeJ.I.Dienstag[190],D.Burrell[121,189,and500],I.Dobbs-Weinstein[191],andW.Dunphy[183]and[192].9.SeeTheWarsoftheLordI1,lastparagraph,whichreflectsAquinas’sposition.10.TheexceptionisBookVofTheWarsoftheLord,whichwastranslatedintoLatinasanindependentworkonastronomy.11.Itmustbenotedthat,eventhoughignoringthesupercommentariesmakesourtasksimpler,italsotherebyoverlooksthewaysinwhichthediscussionofthesamequestionsinthemmaymodifyandenrichourunderstandingofGersonides’philosophicalpositions.ThisisespeciallyimportantinlightofthefactthatinthesupercommentariesGersonidesisnotconstrainedbytheneedtoharmonizephilosophyandbiblicalteachings.12.Theterminologicaldifferencesnotwithstanding,Gersonides’argu-mentsarestrikinglysimilartoSpinoza’s,includingthelanguageofstriv-ing(hishtadlut).13.ItshouldbenotedthatMaimonidestooarguedthattheworldiseternalapartepost.SeeGuideIII25[178]502–06.14.SeeS.W.Baron[499],especially55–134.15.RobertGrosseteste,Letters5and7[194]andDecessassioneLegalium(1232),discussedinL.M.Friedman[198]21–23;AlexanderofHales,SummaFratrisAlexandriIIii.8,1[358];RogerBacon,CompendiistudiiPhilosophiae,inBacon,Operaquaedamhactenusinedita,ed.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n146iditdobbs-weinsteinJ.S.Brewer(London,1859),p.472;ThomasAquinas,STIaIIae,q.10(cf.Cajetan’sCommentaryintheLeonineedition),aswellasOpusculumadDucissamBrabantiae;JohnDunsScotus,QuaestionesinlibrumquartumSententiarum,d.4,q.9.16.W.Kluxen,apioneerintheresearchofmedievalJewish–Christianphilo-sophicalinfluences,isevenmorecautious.See[193].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nstephenp.menn6Metaphysics:GodandbeingAncientGreekphilosophershavemuchtosayaboutGodorthegods;someofthemalsohavemuchtosayaboutbeing(whetherbeingaspredicationoridentity,expressedby“XisY,”orbeingasexistence,expressedbyabare“Xis”or“thereisanX”).Theydonotsystemati-callyconnectthetwotopics,however,andneitherdomanymodernphilosophers.Butmanymedievalphilosophersdid.CanthinkingaboutbeinghelpusunderstandGod?CanthinkingaboutGodhelpusunderstandbeing?Iwillexploresomeconnectionsthatmedievalphilosopherssawbetweenthetwotopics,andalsosomedifficul-tiesthattheyencountered.Iwillfocusnotsomuchonparticularphilosophersasoncentralideasthatmanydifferentphilosopherstookup,illustratingtheseideasfromtheworkofphilosopherswhosetthemoutinespeciallyinterestingoraccessibleways,andnotingchallengesthatdifferentphilosophersansweredindifferentways.ManyoftheseideasandchallengesbeginwithMuslimauthorsandarethentakenupbyChristianauthorsfromthethirteenthcenturyon.IwillgobackandforthbetweenMuslimandChristiansources.physicalandmetaphysicalproofsofgodTheproofsoftheexistenceofGodareanobviousplacetobegin.ThomasAquinas,inSummatheologiaeI,q.2,a.3,saysthatGod’sexistencecanbeprovedinfiveways.Thomas’sfirstway,arguingfromcausesofmotion,andhissecond,fromefficientcauses,arephysicalarguments,takenfromAristotle;hisfifthway,fromteleol-ogy,isequallyphysical,derivedultimatelyfromtheStoics.Butthethirdandfourthwaysseemtobeontologicalarguments,bywhichImeannotthattheyresembleAnselm’sfamousargument,which147CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n148stephenp.mennThomasrejects(STI,q.2,a.1,ad2),butsimplythattheystartfromthefactofbeing(inthesenseofexistence),andnotfromcontingentfactsaboutthephysicalworld.Thefourthwayturnsonthe“degrees”accordingtowhichthingsaresaidtobemoreXorlessX:Moreandlessaresaidofdifferentthingsastheyaredifferentlyclosetosomethingwhichismost:thussomethingishotterwhichisclosertowhatismosthot.Thereisthereforesomethingwhichistruest,andbest,andnoblest,andconsequentlymostbeing[ormostreal]:forthethingswhicharemosttruearemostreal,as[Aristotle]saysinMetaphysicsII.Butwhatissaidtobemostthus-and-such,inanygenus,isthecauseofallthingsinthatgenus,asfire,whichismosthot,isthecauseofallhotthings,as[Aristotle]saysinthesamebook.Thereforethereissomethingwhichisthecauseofbeing,andgoodness,andanyotherperfection,toallbeings;andthiswecallGod.(STI,q.2,a.3)Thomasisclaimingthatasfire,whichismosthot,isthecausetootherhotthingsofthefactthattheyarehotintheirlesserdegrees,soGod,whoismostbeing,isthecausetootherbeingsofthefactthattheyare,intheirlesserdegrees.ThereareobviousobjectionstoThomas’sproofasaproof;butsupposingThomasisright,howarewetounderstandthesituationheisdescribing?Inwhatsensearetheredegreesofbeing?Is“being”saiddifferentlyofGodandofcreatures–aretheysomehowofdifferentlogicaltypes?AsThomasiswellaware,Aristotlesaysthat“being”isnotsaidunivocallyofsubstancesandofaccidents:anaccident“exists”inaderivativeanddiminishedsense,sinceforwhitenesstoexistisjustforsomesub-stancetoexistandbewhite.IsthereasimilardifferencebetweentheexistenceofGodandofcreatedsubstances?Evenifso,howdoesGodcommunicatealowerdegreeofexistencetootherbeings?Pre-sumablynotthewaythatasubstancecommunicatesexistencetoanaccident,bybeingthesubstratumofthataccident;northewayfirecommunicatesheattoiron,bybeingmixedinwiththeiron.ButisthereanothermodelforthismetaphysicalconnectionbetweenGodandtheworld?Theadvantageofa“metaphysical”proofofGod’sexistence,ifitcouldbemadetowork,isthatitwouldleadus,bythinkingthroughthequestionsaboutGodandbeingthatitraises,toadeepercon-ceptionofGod,andofGod’scausalconnectiontootherthings,thansimplyconceivinghim(say)asthefirstcauseofmotion.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing149AtleastsinceAvicenna,therehasbeenasharpdebateoverwhetherthisstrategycouldwork.JohnDunsScotus–himselfade-fenderofAvicenna–putsitasfollows.ThereisacontroversybetweenAvicennaandAverroes.AvicennaclaimedthatnotGod,butsomethingelse,suchasbeing,isthesubjectofmeta-physics.Fornoscienceprovestheexistenceofitsownsubject,yetthemetaphysicianprovesthatGodandtheseparate[i.e.,immaterial]substancesexist.InhisfinalcommentonBookIofthePhysics,AverroescriticizesAvicenna:assumingAvicenna’smajorpremise(commontothemboth),thatnoscienceprovestheexistenceofitssubject,heinfersthatGodisthesub-jectofmetaphysicsandthatGod’sexistenceisprovednotinmetaphysicsbutinphysics,sincenokindofseparatesubstancecanbeprovedtoexistexceptthroughmotion,whichpertainstophysics.(Reportatioparisiensis,prologue,q.3,a.1;Latinwithtranslation(modifiedhere)inScotus[286]9–10)Thisisnotsimplyadisciplinaryboundarydisputeoverwhatmeta-physicsshouldstudyoroverwhichsciencehastheprivilegeofprov-ingtheexistenceofGod.AvicennaandAverroesareenvisagingquitedifferentkindsofproofs,yieldingquitedifferent(thoughnotneces-sarilyincompatible)waysofthinkingaboutGodandGod’srela-tiontotheworld.AverroesisdefendingthetraditionalAristotelianprocedureofarguingfromsublunarthingstotheeternallyconstantmotionsoftheheavenlyspheresastheirgovernors,andthenfromthesemotionstotheirmovers,thefirstofwhichisGod.Avicenna,bycontrast,wantstogiveaproofoftheexistenceofGodthatdoesnotdependonfactsaboutthephysicalworld,butarguesfrombeingtoGodasthefirstcauseofbeing.AvicennaisheretryingtomakegoodwhatheseesasadisappointmentinAristotle’sMetaphysics.WhileAverroesthinksthatmetaphysicsispurelyascienceofim-materialthings,Godandtheothermoversoftheheavenlyspheres,Avicenna,followingFarabi,thinksthatAristotelianmetaphysicsisalsoaboutbeingingeneralanditsuniversalattributes(whichare“immaterial”inthesensethattheydonotdependonmatterandap-plytoimmaterialaswellastomaterialbeings).AvicennasometimessaysthatmetaphysicshasbeingasitssubjectandGodasitsobject–thatis,startingbyinvestigatingbeing,itendsbyestablishingGodasthefirstcauseofbeing.1ButAristotle’sMetaphysicsisdisappointingasanexecutionofthisproject,sinceitestablishesGodonlyasthecauseoftherotationoftheoutermostsphere–andthisprocedureCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n150stephenp.mennshowssolittleaboutGodthatitisnotevenclearhowGodissu-periortothe“intelligences”or“angels”movingtheotherspheres.AvicennawantstomakegoodthepromiseoftheMetaphysicsbyes-tablishingGodasthefirstcauseofbeingtoallbeings,bothmaterialandimmaterial.Todothis,however,heneedsmoreofanargumentthanThomas’s“fourthway,”whichsimplyassumestherewillbeasinglemostbeing,whichwillbeacauseofbeingtoallbeings.Wemightwonderwhytherecannotbeaninfiniteregresstoeverhighercausesofbeing.Or,evenifaninfiniteregressisimpossiblehere,whyshouldn’ttherebeseveralindependent“first”beings,eachofwhichneedsnocauseofbeingbeyonditself?Theanswercannotbethateverybeingrequiresapriorcauseofbeing,sinceGodhimselfdoesnot.IfabeingXhasnotalwaysexistedbutcame-to-beintime,wecanseewhyitwouldrequiresomethingpriortocauseitsexistence:ifweusethispremise,however,wearebeginningnotfromthefactofbeingbutfromthefactofcoming-to-beormotion.Andwhycouldn’ttherebeseveralindependenteternalbeings?Thesedifficultiesareamongthereasonsmanyphilosophers,includingAverroes,concludethatAvicenna’smetaphysicalwayofprovingGod’sexistencedoesnotworkandthatwemustarguefromphysicsinstead.avicenna’sargumentandsomechallengestoitOnewayAvicennapresentshisargumentbeginsfrommodality.IfXexists,thenitsexistenceiseithernecessaryorcontingent.2Moreprecisely,eitherX’sexistenceisnecessarythroughXitself(disre-gardingthecausalityofanyotherobjects)oritiscontingentasfarasXitselfgoes.IfXexists,thentheremustbeasufficientreasonforX’sexisting.IfXisnecessarilyexistentthroughitself(wajibal-wujudbi-dhatihi),thenXitselfcontainsthesufficientreasonforitsownexistence.ButifXiscontingentlyexistentthroughitself(mumkinal-wujudbi-dhatihi),andifXinfactexists,thenitrequiressomefurthercause.IfYcontainsasufficientreasonforX’sexis-tence,thenX’sexistenceisnolongercontingent:soAvicennasaysthat,althoughXiscontingentlyexistentthroughitself,itisneces-sarilyexistentthroughsomethingelse(wajibal-wujudbi-ghayrihi).Avicenna’sfirsttaskinprovingtheexistenceofGodistoprovethereissomethingthatisnecessarilyexistentthroughitself.PerhapsthisCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing151isallthereistoprovingtheexistenceofGod;orperhapsitisnotaproofofGod’sexistenceuntilwehaveshownthatthereisonlyonesuchbeingandthatithasatleastsomeofthetraditionalattributesofGod.Inanycase,toaccomplishthisfirsttask,takeanyactuallyexist-ingthingX(say,yourself).IfXisnecessarilyexistentthroughitself,thetaskiscompleted.IfXiscontingentlyexistentthroughitself,itisnecessarilyexistentthroughsomethingelse,sayY.Yiseithernecessarilyexistentthroughitselfornecessarilyexistentthroughsomethingelse;andsoon.Butwhyshouldtherenotbeaninfiniteregress?Avicennadoesnotdenythepossibility(asanAristotelian,hebelievestheworldandallbiologicalspeciesinitareeternal,soyouhaveaninfiniteseriesofpastancestors).ButevenifthereisaninfiniteseriesofcausesofX,“eachoneofthecausesiseithercon-tingentinitselfornecessaryinitself.Ifitisnecessary,itwouldnotneedacause,andifitiscontingent,thenthewhole[composedofallthecausesintheseries]ischaracterizedbycontingency.Andeverycontingentthingrequiresacausebeyonditself;sothewhole[series]requiresacauseoutsideitself”(asstatedinGhazali,TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers[148]82,translationmodified;citedinAverroes’Tahafutal-Tahafut[165]I163).Toputitanotherway,ifwetakethecomplete(perhapsinfinite)seriesofcausesofX,bydefinitionthisseriescannothaveacauseexternaltoitself;sothewholeseriesisnotcontingentinitself;soitcannotbecomposedentirelyofthingsthatarecontingentinthemselves;soitmustcontainsometermthatisnecessaryinitself;sincethiscannothaveacause,itmustbethefirstuncausedcausewithintheseries.Avicennaisperhapsingreatertroublewithhisargumentfortheuniquenessofabeingnecessarilyexistentthroughitself.Buthisar-gumentfortheexistenceofsuchabeingwasalreadycontroversial.Ghazali,inhisIncoherenceofthePhilosophers,rejectstheargu-ment.Moresurprisingly,whenAverroescomestothedefenseofphilosophyinhisIncoherenceoftheIncoherence,he“defends”thisargumentonlywithseriousqualification.Infact,hismodifiedver-sionoftheargument,althoughverballyitsoundssimilar,worksonlybyturningAvicenna’smetaphysicalargumentbackintotheAristotelianphysicalargumentthatAvicennawastryingtoescape.GhazalicriticizesAvicenna’sinferencefrom“eachtermintheseriesofcausesiscontingentinitself”to“thewholeseriesofcausesCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n152stephenp.menniscontingentinitself.”Ghazali’scritiqueisparticularlyinteresting,becauseitturnsonacriticalexaminationofAvicenna’snotionofcontingency.Ghazalisays:Theexpressions“contingent”and“necessary”areobscureexpressions,un-lessby“necessary”ismeantwhathasnocauseforitsexistence,andby“contingent”whathasacauseforitsexistence.Ifthisiswhatismeant,letusgobacktothisexpressionandsay“each[causeintheseries]iscontin-gent,inthesensethatithasacausebeyonditself,butthewhole[series]isnotcontingent,inthesensethatitdoesnothaveacausebeyonditselfandoutsideitself.”Ifby“contingent”ismeantsomethingotherthanwhatwemean,wedonotunderstandit.(IncoherenceofthePhilosophers[148]82,trans.modified;Averroes,Tahafutal-Tahafut[165]I164)Avicennawillreplythatitisimpossibleforanecessarywholetobecomposedofcontingentparts,andthisseemsplausibleifnecessaryandcontingentbeingsbelongtotwodifferentlogicalorontologi-caltypes.ButGhazalisaysthatiftherearesuchontologicalcon-cepts,Avicennahasnotmadethemcleartohim;Ghazalisuspectsthat“contingent”and“necessary”arejusthigh-flownphrasesfor“caused”and“uncaused”(whichareextrinsic,relationalconcepts,notsomethingintrinsictoathing’smodeofbeing),inwhichcasehisparaphraseexposesthefallacyintheargument.GhazaliconcludesthatAvicenna’sattempttoavoidinfiniteregressargumentsfails,andthattheonlywaytoestablishtheexistenceofGodistoassumethatnoinfinitecausalregressesarepossible;which,hethinks,ispossibleonlyifwegiveuptheAristotelianthesisoftheeternityoftheworld(andofspecieswithinit),andhold,withthemutakallimun,thattheworldwascreatedintime.3Averroes,inhisresponsetoGhazali,triestoreconstructadefensi-bleversionofAvicenna’sargument,andthustoargueforGodwith-outgivinguptheeternityoftheworld.HiswayofdoingthisturnsonadistinctiveresponsetoGhazali’schallengeaboutthemeaningof“contingent”and“necessary.”Averroes’versiongoes:Contingentbeingsmusthavecauseswhichprecedethem,andifthesecausesagainarecontingentitfollowsthattheyhavecausesandthatthereisaninfiniteregress,andifthereisaninfiniteregressthereisnocause,andthecontingentwillexistwithoutacause,andthisisimpossible.Thereforetheseriesmustendinanecessarycause,andthisnecessarycausemustbenecessaryeitherthroughacauseorwithoutacause,andifthroughacause,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing153thiscausemusthaveacauseandsoadinfinitum;andifwehaveaninfiniteregresshere,itfollowsthatwhatwasassumedtohaveacausehasnocause,andthisisimpossible.Thereforetheseriesmustendinacausewhichisnecessarywithoutacause,i.e.,necessarybyitself,andthismustbethenecessarybeing.(Tahafutal-Tahafut[165]I165,trans.modified)Thisisthusatwo-stageargument,firstfromcontingentbeingstoanecessarybeing,andthenfromanecessarybeingtoacauselessnecessarybeing,orbeing“necessarythroughitself.”Averroes,likeGhazali,thinksthatAvicennausestheworld“contingent”toobroadly,tomean“whathasacause”(Tahafutal-Tahafut[165]I164):Averroesthinksthat,fortheargumenttobedemonstrative,wemustbeginfromwhatiscontingentinastrictersense,or,asAverroessays,“trulycontingent.”WhatAverroesmeansby“trulycontingent”becomesclearfromThomas’s“thirdway,”whichcloselyparallelsAverroes’argument:Wefindsomethingsthatarecapable[possibilia]bothofexistingandofnotexisting,sincesomethingsarefoundtobegeneratedandcorrupted,andthereforetobecapablebothofexistingandofnotexisting.Butitisimpossibleforeverythingofthiskindtoexistalways,sincewhatiscapableofnotexisting,atsometimedoesnotexist.Therefore,ifallthingsarecapableofnotexisting,atsometimenothingexisted.Butifthisistrue,evennownothingwouldexist,sincewhatdoesnotexistdoesnotbegintoexistexceptthroughsomething[else]whichexists;sothatifnobeingexisted,itwouldbeimpossibleforanythingtobegintoexist,andthusnothingwouldnowexist,whichisplainlyfalse.Therefore,notallbeingsarecontingent[possibilia];theremustexistsomethingwhichisnecessary.Buteverynecessary[being]eitherhasacauseofitsnecessityfromelsewhere,oritdoesnot.Butitisnotpossibletoproceedadinfinituminnecessary[beings]whichhaveacauseoftheirnecessity,justas[thiswasnotpossible]inefficientcauses,aswasproved[inThomas’ssecondway].Therefore,itisnecessarytopositsomethingwhichisnecessarythroughitself,nothavingthecauseofitsnecessityfromelsewhere,butisthecauseofnecessitytootherthings;whichiswhateveryonecallsGod.(STI,q.2,a.3)4ThekeypointisthatforAverroesandThomas,ifXiscontingent,thenatsometimeXhasnotexisted,whereasAvicennathinksthateverythingotherthanGodisintrinsicallycontingent,eventheheav-enlybodiesandtheirmovers,whichasagoodAristotelianhetakestobeeternal.ForAverroes,theonly“trulycontingent”thingsarethosethatdonotalwaysexist,thatis,sublunarthings:heanswersCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n154stephenp.mennGhazali’schallengetospelloutanintrinsicsenseof“contingent”bysayingthatsomethingiscontingentifitismaterialandthereforeca-pableofgenerationandcorruption.Likewise,a“necessary”beingissomethingthatalwaysexists,becauseithasnomatterandthereforeisnotcapableofgenerationandcorruption(theheavens,forAver-roes,arenotcomposedofmatterandform,althoughtheirsubstancecanbroadlybecalleda“matter,”capableofchangingplacebutnotofgenerationandcorruption).So,althoughAverroes’argumentsoundsalotlikeAvicenna’s,itmeanssomethingquitedifferent.WhenAver-roesarguesfromsomethingcontingenttosomethingnecessary,heisarguingfromgenerableandcorruptiblematerialthingstosomethingeternal,whichcouldperfectlywellbetheheavenlybodies.ToturnthisintoaproofoftheexistenceofGod,Averroesaddsasecondstage,arguingfroma“necessary”–thatis,eternal–beingtoanuncausednecessarybeing;andsincetheheavensaremoved,andsoneedsomecausetomovethem,thisgetsustosomecausebeyondtheheav-ens.Thecrucialpointhereisthat,intryingtosalvageaversionofAvicenna’sargumentfromcontingencyagainstGhazali’scriticisms,AverroeshasessentiallyturneditbackintoanAristotelianphysicalargument.Asaresult,allthereasonsonemighthaveforbeingdissat-isfiedwithAristotle’soriginalargumentwillapplyequallyagainstAverroes.CanAvicenna’sontologicalalternativebesaved?5essenceandexistenceContingencyissupposedtobeanintrinsicpropertythatexplainswhycontingentthingsneedcausesinordertoexist;if,asGhazalisuspects,itismerelyasynonymfor“caused,”thenaninfiniteseriesofcontingentcausesneednotbecontingent,andAvicenna’sproofforGodbreaksdown.Infact,Avicennahasananswertothischallenge.ItturnsonthedistinctionbetweenathingXanditsbeingorexistence(wujud),thatis,thatthroughwhichXisexistent(mawjud).Onewaythisdistinctionarisesisthroughtheanalysisofcreation,asdistinguishedfromotherkindsofchange.Aristotlerecognizesfourbasickindsofchange:alteration(changeinquality),augmentationanddiminution(changeinquantity),locomotion(changeofplace),andgenerationandcorruption.Inthefirstthreekindsofchange,thereisapersistingsubstancethatlosesoneaccidentandacquiresanother.Ingenerationorcorruption,thereisnotproperlyasubstanceCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing155thatpersists,butonlythematter,whichlosesonesubstantialformandacquiresanother;insuchacase,Aristotlesaysthatthesubstance(thematter–formcomposite)“comes-to-beabsolutely”(ratherthanXmerelycoming-to-beY),butitdoesnotcome-to-beoutofnoth-ing,andAristotledoesnotbelievethatcoming-to-beoutofnothingispossible.However,medievalwritersthinkthatGodcreatedtheworld,insomewayotherthanbygeneratingitoutofapreexist-ingmatter.ThemutakallimuninIslam,andmostChristianwriters,thinkthatGodcreatedthingsoutofnothingatthebeginningoftime,whenbeforethatmomentonlyGodexisted.Eventhefalasifa,whodonotbelieveinabeginningoftime,thinktheworldiscausallydependentonGodinadeeperwaythansimplybyhavingbeengen-eratedbyhimoutofsomepreexistingmatterinthepast:rather,theworldisalwaysbeingcreatedbyGod.Thelanguageofessenceandexistencegivesawaytoexplainwhatcreationis.WhenGodcre-atessomething,nopartofitpreviouslyexisted:Godisnottakingapreexistingmatterandgivingitaform,butgivingexistencetosome-thingthatdidnotpreviouslyexist.AstheQur’anputsit,“whenGodwishestocreateathing,hesaystoit‘be!’anditis”(Qur’anXVI42).Butwhatstatusdothesethingshavepriortotheirexistence?SincetheresultsaredifferentwhenGodtellsahorse“be!”andwhenhetellsanostrich“be!,”theremustbesomedifferencebetweenahorseandanostrichevenbeforetheyexist.Beforeanindividualhorseex-ists,theessenceofhorse–whatahorseis,orwhatitistobeahorse–alreadygroundspropositionssuchas“thehorseisaquadruped.”ForAvicenna,itisthisessencetowhichGodaddsexistence.Thisanalysisofcreationdoesnotdependoncreationhappeningintime.EvenifGodcreatesastaroranangelfrometernity,heisstilladdingexistencetoanessence.Eveniftheessenceneverlacksexistence,itdoesnotcontainexistenceofitself,butneedsitsupplied,byGodorbysomeproximatecause.Onewaytothinkaboutessenceandexistenceisgivenbymedievalrealistsemantics.Accordingtomedievalrealists,inthesentence“Socratesiswhite,”thesubjecttermsignifiesSocratesandthepredicatetermsignifieswhiteness,andthesentenceistruewhenwhitenessisinSocrates:whitenessisthe(formal)cause,toSocrates,ofhisbeingwhite.Thus,atleastinnormalcases,asentenceistrueifthereisaninherencestructureintheworldcorrespondingtothepredicationstructureofthesentence.(Thereareabnormalcases:in“SocratesisSocrates”thesubjectandCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n156stephenp.mennthepredicatesignifythesamething;in“[the]white[one]isSocrates”thesignificatumofthesubjectinheresinthesignificatumofthepredicateratherthanviceversa;in“[the]white[one]ismusical”thesignificataofthesubjectandofthepredicatebothinhereinathirdthing.)Likewise,“Socratesishuman”istruewhenhumanityinheresinSocrates,and“Socratesexists”or“Socratesisexistent[mawjud/ens]”istruewhenexistenceorbeing(wujud/esse)inheresinSocrates.TosaythatXiscontingentlyexistentthroughitselfisjusttosaythattheessenceofXdoesnotincludeexistence:whatmakesXX,orwhatitisforXtobeX,doesnotincludewhatmakesXexistent,orwhatitisforXtoexist.IfsuchanXdoesexist,itisbecausesomeothercause,externaltoX,givesexistencetoX.Bycontrast,tosaythatXisnecessarilyexistentthroughitselfistosaythattheessenceofXdoesincludeexistence:forXtobeXisalreadyforXtoexist,andnofurthercauseisneededforitsexistence.Theessence–existencedistinctionthusallowsAvicennatodiscernanintrinsicdifference,indeedadifferenceoflogicaltype,betweenthingsthatneedcausesfortheirexistenceandthingsthatdonot.ItalsoallowshimtoanswerGhazali’schallengethatanin-finiteseriesofcontingentcausesmightcollectivelybenecessary:aninfinitenumberofessences,noneofthemintrinsicallypossess-ingexistence,stilldonotpossessexistence,unlesssomethingfromoutsidegivesittothem.Theultimatesufficientreasonfortheexis-tenceofthosethingsthatdoexistcanonlybesomebeing(orbeings)whoseessenceincludesexistence.So,ifAvicennacansustainhismetaphysicsofessenceandexistence,hecandefendhisproofofsomethingnecessarilyexistentthroughitself–whetherornotwearewillingtocallthisaproofoftheexistenceofGod.NotethatthisAvicennianproofisnotan“ontological”argu-mentoftheform:theconceptoressenceofGodinvolvesexistence,thereforeGodexists.Avicenna’sargumentiscausal,arguingfromeffects,contingentbeings,totheconclusionthattheyhavesomecausewhoseessenceinvolvesexistence.AsThomasAquinassays,Thisproposition,“Godexists,”is,initself,self-evident,becausethepred-icateisthesameasthesubject,sinceGodishisexistence...butbecausewedonotknowwhatGodis,itisnotself-evidenttous,butneedstobedemonstratedthroughthingswhicharemoreevidenttousbutlessevidentbynature,namely,by[God’s]effects.(STI,q.2,a.1)CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing157Thomas’sdenialthatwehaveknowledgeofGod’sessencewascon-troversial(Scotus,forone,thinkswedohavesuchknowledge),butheisrighttowarnthattheconcept“essencewhichinvolvesexistence”isnotbyitselfaconceptofsomedeterminateessenceX,suchthatXinvolvesexistence:itismerelytheconceptofapropertywhichmightturnouttobesatisfiedbymanyessencesorbynone.onlyonenecessarybeing?BothAvicennaandThomasargue,notonlythattheremustbeatleastonebeingthatisnecessarilyexistentthroughitself,butalsothattherecanbeonlyone.TheirargumentsstartfromanargumentofFarabi’s.FarabibeginshisPrinciplesoftheOpinionsofthePeo-pleofthePerfectCitybyproclaiming:“thefirstbeing[mawjud/ens]isthefirstcauseofbeing[wujud/esse]toallotherbeings[mawjudat/entia]”([95]56).Farabitakesforgrantedthathedoesnothavetoworryaboutinfinitecausalregresses,sohedoesnotwastetimeprovingthatthereissuchafirstbeing.Rather,heisconcernedtoestablishitsattributes.Hisargumentisgenerallyoftheform,“thefirstbeingmustbeF,becauseifitwerenon-F,therewouldbesomeotherbeingcausallypriortoit.”Inparticular,Farabiarguesthatthefirstbeingmustbeentirelysimple,thatis,lackinganykindofcom-position,becauseifitwerecomposite,itscomponents(andthecausebringingthemtogether)wouldbecausallypriortoit.Farabithenin-fersfromthesimplicityofthefirstcause(itisinternallyone)toitsunicity(thereisonlyoneofit):thereasonisthattwosimplebeingscannothaveanythingtodifferentiatethem.Ifthereweretwo“first”things,theywouldhavesomethingincommon,andeachwouldalsohavesomedistinguishingdifferentia,sothatwecouldanalyzeAasX+YandBasX+Z.OrperhapsBcontainssomedifferentia,be-yondthesharedelement,todistinguishitfromA,sothatwecouldanalyzeBasX+Z,withAbeingdistinguishedfromBonlybynothavingZ,notbyanypositivedifferentia.Eitherway,atleastoneoftheassumed“first”beingswouldbecomposite,andsocouldnotbefirst:therewouldhavetobesomethingcausallypriortoit.Farabimakesthisargumentwithouthavingthenotionofessence–existencecompositionortheAvicenniandistinctionbe-tweennecessaryandcontingentbeings.Avicenna,usingtheseno-tions,developsamoreelaborateargumentfortheunicityofthefirstCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n158stephenp.mennbeing(Shifa’,MetaphysicsI7).HereIwillsketchThomas’slesscom-plicatedtreatment(therearealsogooddiscussionsbyGhazaliandAverroesatTahafutal-Tahafut[165]I170–81).ImmediatelyafterthequaestioontheexistenceofGod,ThomasgivesalongquaestioonGod’ssimplicity(STI,q.3),arguingthatGodisnotcomposedinanyway:heisnotcomposedofquantitativeparts(asabodyis),orofmat-terandform,substanceandaccident,genusanddifferentia,essenceandsuppositum,oressenceandexistence.Thomassupportstheseconclusionsbothbyarguingthatanycompositehassomethingpriortoit(forFarabi’sreasons,soespeciallyq.3,a.7)andbyarguingthatanyofthesekindsofcompositioninvolvepotentiality,whereasthefirstbeingmustbepureactuality(followingtheAristotelianprinci-pleofthepriorityofactualitytopotentiality,MetaphysicsIX8,citedinSTI,q.3,a.1).Inthecaseofessence–existencecomposition,ifGodwerenothisownesse,thenhisessencewouldbeofitselfinpoten-tialitytoexistence,andsoGodcouldnotbethefirstbeing(q.3,a.4);again,ifGodwerenothisownessebutmerelyhadesse,hewouldbeabeingonlybyparticipationandsocouldnotbethefirstbeing(q.3,a.4).Godisthusan“essewithoutaddition”(q.3,a.4,ad1)or“subsistentesse,”notanesseinheringinsomeessenceotherthanesse.Thomasthenarguesthattherecouldnotbetwosuchesses,because,beingsimpleand“withoutaddition,”theycouldnothaveanythingtoindividuatethem.“Therecanbeonlyonesubsistentesse,justas,if[a]whitenessweresubsistent[ratherthaninheringinasubstratum],therecouldonlybeone,sincewhitenessesaremulti-pliedaccordingtotheirrecipients”(q.44,a.1).ThismodificationofFarabi’sargumentfortheunicityofthefirstbeingallowsThomastoavoidanobjectiontoFarabi,namely,thatthetwosupposed“first”beingsneednothaveacommonelementandadistinguishingele-ment,sincetheymayhavenothingincommonexceptbeing“first”and“simple”(i.e.,uncausedanduncomposed),whicharemerenega-tions.Thomas,bycontrast,canspecifyacommonnaturethatthetwobeingswouldhavetoshare–esseitself.challengestoessence–existencecompositionThomas’sargumentbreaksdown,however,ifyoudenyAvicenna’stheoryofessence–existencecomposition.AvicennaandThomasthinkthat,ifXisintrinsicallycontingent,“Xexists”or“Xisexistent[mawjud/ens]”issayingsomethingaboutXthatisnotCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing159containedin“XisX,”andtheyconcludethattheexistence(wujud/esse)ofXissomethingpresentinX,beyondtheessenceofX.Butsomemedievalthinkersrejectthisanalysis.Theydenythat“existent[mawjud/ens]”isparonymous(ordenominative)from“ex-istence,”as“white”isparonymousfrom“whiteness”:6heresome-thingisnamedparonymouslyfromZifitisnotcalled“Z,”butiscalledbysomenamegrammaticallyderivedfrom“Z”(Aristotle,Categories,ch.1).Itseemsdubioustosaythat“white”isgrammat-icallyderivedfrom“whiteness”ratherthanviceversa(thisismoreplausibleinGreekandArabicthaninLatinorEnglish),butthedeeperissueislogicalorcausal:somethingiscalled“white”becausethereisawhitenessinit.Ockham,despitehisattackonrealistsemantics,concedesthepointinthecaseof“white.”Asheputsit,“white”isaconnotativeterm,connotingwhiteness:“white”doesnotalwayssignifythesamethings,butsignifiessomethingonlyonthecondi-tionthatthereisawhitenessinit.But(saysOckham)“being”or“animal”alwayssignifythesamethings,andthereisnoreasontothinktheyconnoteafurtherbeingnessoranimalness:sothereisnoreasontothinkthateithertheexistenceortheessenceoftheanimalBucephalusisanythingotherthanBucephalus.Ockhamgrantsthat“Bucephalusexists”(or“theessenceofBu-cephalusexists”)isnotanecessarytruth.But,hesays,“BucephalusisBucephalus”(or“theessenceofBucephalusistheessenceofBucephalus”)isalsonotanecessarytruth:anyofthesesentencesistrueonlywhenBucephalusexists.So“thereisnomorereasontoimaginethatessenceisindifferenttobeing[esse]ornotbeingthanthatitisindifferenttobeinganessenceornotbeinganessence”:sometimesBucephalusexistsandsometimeshedoesnot,butthisisnotbecausethereisanessencelyingaroundfrometernityandwait-ingtoreceiveexistence.Ockhamgrantsthat,because“Bucephalusexists”iscontingent,thereissomethingbeyondBucephalusthroughwhichBucephalusexists,butthisisjustBucephalus’sexternalcauses,notanesseinheringinBucephalus.And“Godexists”isnec-essary,notbecauseGod’sessenceisorincludesesse,butbecauseGodexistswithoutacause.7Butifthisanalysisisright,thewholeFarabian-AvicennianwayofprovingtheunicityofGodbreaksdown.Ifthereweretwogods,therewouldbenoreasonwhytheyhadtobeeitherpureesseoresseplusadistinguishingdifferentia.Eachmightbeasinglesimplenature,withnocommoncomponentatall.WecouldstillgiveanCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n160stephenp.mennaposterioriphysicalargumentthatthereisonlyoneGod(theworldistooorderedandintegratedtobetheworkofseveralseparatefirstcauses;thisisthethirdofthreeargumentsThomasgivesatSTI,q.11,a.3).Butthisargumentisatbestplausible,notdemonstra-tive,andOckhamconcludesthatwecannotdemonstratetheunicityofGod.PerhapsthismeanswecannotdemonstratetheexistenceofGodeither.Wecandemonstratethatthereisafirst(i.e.,uncaused)cause,butnotthatthereisonlyonesuchcause,andsonotthatthereissomeonecauseofallthings.DependingonhowstrongasenseyouattachtothewordGod,thismaymeanwecannotdemonstratethatthereisaGod.Ockhamleavesthelinguisticdecisionuptoyou.8FewChristianthinkerswilladmittobelievinginessenceswaitingtoreceiveexistence.Ifsuchanessenceisnotitselfcreated,wearedenyingthateverythingbutGodiscreatedbyGod.IfGodcreatedit,didhedosobygivingexistencetosomeprioressence,andsobackadinfinitum?Butifanessencecanbecreatedwithoutaprioressence,whynotsupposethatBucephalusiscreatedwithoutaprioressence?Wemightmaintain(asThomasdoes)thatGodcreatestheessenceofXjustwhenhegivesitexistence(i.e.,whenhecreatesX)andthattherearenoprioressences.Thisavoidsthedifficultiesmen-tioned,butitundercutsmuchoftheoriginalreasonfordrawingtheessence–existencedistinction.AnditleadsmanyChristianthinkerstoconcludethatessenceandexistencecannotbereallydistinct,asonething(res)isdistinctfromanother,sincewhenevertherearetworesotherthanGod,Godshouldbeabletocreateeitherofthemwithouttheother.9challengesaboutgodandesseTheessence–existencedistinctionmustalsoconfrontanotherin-finiteregresschallenge.WheneverXisacontingentbeing,XexiststhroughtheexistenceofX,whichissomethingotherthanX.ButtheexistenceofXalsoexists.Doesitexistthroughafurtherexistence,andsoadinfinitum(asAverroesasksinTahafutal-Tahafut[165]I180–81)?10Butifitexiststhroughitself–thatis,ifitsessencein-cludesexistence–thenonAvicenna’sanalysisitisanintrinsicallynecessarybeing,andAvicennaclaimstohaveprovedthatthereisonlyonesuchbeing,namelyGod.Thomastriesfendingthisoffbydenyingthatexistenceitselfex-ists.11ButsomemedievalthinkerstakethebullbythehornsandCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing161acceptthat,foranyX,theesseofXisGod,sothatjustas“running[currens]”or“runs”in“Socratesisrunning”or“Socratesruns”sig-nifiesrunning(currere),so“existing[ens]”or“exists”in“Socratesisexisting”or“Socratesexists”signifiesGod.ThisviewistakenbymanyMuslimwriterswhocombineAvicennianphilosophywithSufism.InChristendomitistakenmostfamouslybyEckhartinhisProloguestotheOpustripartitum,whosekeyformulais“esseestDeus.”Butearlier,independentlyofAvicenna,itwasoftenthoughttobetheviewofBoethius,anditseemsalsotobeAnselm’sview.BehindallthesefiguresstandsProclus,whoidentifies(hissecond)GodwithaPlatonicFormofbeing,inwhichallthingsmustpartic-ipateinordertobe.12ThomasiswellawareofthisPlatonizingview.Heoftencomesclosetoitsterminology.Hesaysthat,sinceGodistheonlysubsist-ingesse,“allthingsotherthanGodarenottheiresse,butparticipateinesse,”andheinfers“thatallthingswhicharediversifiedaccord-ingtotheirparticipatingdiverselyinesse,sothattheyaremoreorlessperfectly,arecausedbyonefirstbeingwhichismostperfectly.HencePlatosaidthatitisnecessarytopositaunitypriortoeverymultiplicity”(STI,q.44,a.1).Anythingthatisbyparticipationneedssomecauseinordertobe,andthiscausemustbeabeingnot-by-participation,andthusmustbeGod.ThomasalmostalwaysavoidssayingthatcreaturesparticipateinGod;butGodis“justesse[essetantum]”or“essewithoutaddition”(q.3,a.4,ad1),andGodisthecauseofotherthings’participatinginesse,“asfire,whichismosthot,isthecauseofallhotthings”(q.2,a.3;“fourthway,”citedabove).Nonetheless,ThomashotlydeniesthattheesseofcreaturesisGod.Godisnotesse-in-general(essecommune):heis“justesse,”butnotallesseisGod.BothGodandesse-in-generalare“essewithoutaddition,”butdifferently(q.3,a.4,ad1):esse-in-generalisneutralwithrespecttodifferentadditions,likeanimal-in-general,whichisneutraltorationality,whereasGodisanessethatexcludesanyad-dition,likeirrational-animal.God’squasi-differentia,correspondingto“irrational,”istonotbetheesseofanyessence.13InSummacontraGentilesI26ThomasgivesanextendedpolemicagainsttheviewthatGodisthe“formalesseofthings,”thatis,“thatthroughwhich,formally,theyare,”asSocratesiswhitefor-mallythroughhiswhiteness.(CertainlythingsarethroughGod,butonlyastheirefficientcause,notastheirformalcause,notaswhatCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n162stephenp.mennissignifiedbythepredicate“are.”)Thomas’sargumentsoftenseemtoassumethathisopponentsthinkGodinheresinthings,andisthereforedependentonthem,likeanaccidentinasubstanceoraforminmatter.Thismakeshisopponentslooklikepantheistec-centrics,wheninfacttheywerequitemainstream.Theythought,notthatGodisaforminheringinthings,butthatheisanextrinsicformalcauseofthefactthattheyare,likeaPlatonicForm.(So,whenXperishes,X’sessedoesnotperish–itjustceasestobeX’sesse.)Or,toformulateitwithinanAristoteliancontext,thingsotherthanGodaredenominatedbeings(entia)byextrinsicdenomination,thatis,bydenomination/paronymyfromaformoutsidethem,notfromoneinheringinthem.(Ananimaliscalled“healthy”byintrinsicdenomination,butadietorurineiscalled“healthy”byextrinsicde-nomination,asbeingacauseorasignofhealthinananimal;Socratesiscalled“known”byextrinsicdenomination,notfromknowledgeinhimbutfromknowledgeinsomeonewhoknowshim.)Thomas,andprobablymostscholasticsafterhistime,takeitasabsurdforsomethingtobebyextrinsicdenomination.Whatcouldbemoreintrinsictoathingthanitsverybeing?Tosaythatsomethingexistsonlybyextrinsicdenominationseemsclosetosayingthatitdoesnotgenuinelyexist.14AndindeedEckhartinfersthat“Godaloneproperlyspeakingexists.”15Itmayhelpheretoconsiderthephrasewahdatal-wujud,“unityofexistence,”usedintheArabicdiscussions.Thisphrasecouldbetakentomeaneithertheclaimthat“thereisonlyoneexistence[wujud]”ortheclaimthat“thereisonlyoneexistent[mawjud].”IftheexistenceofeachexistentXisGod–astheinfiniteregressargumentseemstoshow–thenthisimplieswahdatal-wujudinthefirstsense.Butitmayalsobehardtoavoidwahdatal-wujudinthesecondsense.Certainly,ifwesaythatSocratesexists,wemustmeanitinadifferentsensethanwhenwesaythatGodexists.TosaythatSocratesexistsisonlytosaythathehasacertainrelationtoGod,whoaloneexistsinthefullsense.univocity,equivocity,analogyEckhartisperhapstheonlymajorscholasticafterThomas’stimetoholdthattheesseofcreaturesisGod.ButakindredviewcanbefoundinHenryofGhent.Aswehavejustseen,iftheesseofcreaturesisGod,thentosaythatSocratesexistsistosaythatheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing163hasacertainrelationtoGod.Thissuggeststhatweshouldsay,notthattheesseofSocratesisGod,butthatitissomerelationhehastoGod;thisrelationwouldbeintrinsictoSocratesandsowouldavoidtheobjectionsagainstmakingthebeingofathingextrinsictoit.Theobviousrelationwouldbe“passivecreation,”thatis,Socrates’being-created-by-God.Henry’sviewaddsacomplication.InsteadofdistinguishingbetweenSocrates’essenceandhisexistenceastwothings(res),HenrydistinguishesbetweenesseessentiaeandesseexistentiaeastwomodesofbeingthatSocratesenjoys.Socrates’esseexistentiaeishisactualexistence,whichishisbeing-created-by-God,orhisrelationtoGodasefficientcause.Hisesseessentiaeisthatbywhichheiseternallysaidtobeahuman,ananimal,andsoforth,whetherheactuallyexistsornot.This,Henrysays,isSocrates’relationtoGodasformalorexemplarcause,whichishisdistinctivewayofimitatingthedivineperfections.16OnHenry’sview,asonEckhart’s,existencemeanssomethingquitedifferentwhensaidofcreaturesthanwhensaidofGod,justasitmeanssomethingdifferentofaccidentsthanofsubstances(theesseofwhitenessisitsbeingsomehowrelatedtoasubstance,namely,itsinheringinthesubstance,thatis,thesubstance’sbeingwhite).ButHenry’sviewinvolvesthedifficultythatwecannotwithoutcir-cularityexplain“creatingSocrates”as“causingessetoSocrates,”sinceesse,assaidofSocrates,justmeansbeing-created.Perhapsweshouldjustaccept“creating”asanundefinedprimitive;butthereisadeeperdifficulty.Thediminished,parasiticesseofcreaturescon-sistsintheirbeingsomehowrelatedtoGod;but,likewise,thedi-minished,parasiticesseofafictivebeing,sayagoatstag,consistsinitsbeingsomehowrelatedtocreatures(toagoatandastag,ortothemindthatimaginesit).WhatisremarkableaboutGod,though,isthathecangiverealessetotheobjectshecreates,whereahumanmindgivesonlyfictiveessetotheobjectsitimagines.OnHenry’saccount,orEckhart’s,thereseemsnowaytoexplainthedifference,andsoagainitishardtoavoidtheconsequencethatnothingbutGodreallyexists.ThisisonereasonforScotus’sinsistence,againstHenry,thatbe-ingmustbesaidunivocallyofGodandcreatures(alsoofsubstancesandaccidents,sinceaccidentsalsoreallyexist).ItissometimessaidthatScotusoverreactedagainstHenry’sextremeview,thatbeingissaidequivocallyofGodandcreatures,andthatifhehadbeenawareCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n164stephenp.mennofThomas’smoderateview,thatbeingissaidanalogicallyofGodandcreatures,hewouldnothavehadtorushtotheoppositeextreme,univocity.ButHenrytoosaysthatbeingissaidanalogicallyofGodandcreatures,andthemerewordanalogicallydoesnotsolvetheproblem.Beingisalsosaidanalogicallyofcreaturesandfictions,andwewanttoexplainwhycreatures,unlikefictions,existproperlyandnotjustmetaphorically.17Whatisneedediswhatlaterscholasticscallasingle“objectiveconcept”orratioofbeing,suchthatGodfirstpossessesthisratiohimselfandthencommunicatesthesameratiotootherthings.(The“formalconcept”ofhorseisthementalactorhabitofthinking“horse.”The“objectiveconcept”iswhatthefor-malconceptisaconceptof,theratioornatureofhorsenesssharedbythedifferentindividualhorses.)WhilemanylaterscholasticsdefendagainstScotusthetraditionalviewthatbeingissaidanalogicallyofGodandcreatures(andofsubstancesandaccidents),theyarecon-cernedtoshowwhycreaturesproperlyexist,andoftentheydefendtheunityoftheobjectiveconceptofbeing.MedievalwritersoftensaythatthenamebeingappliesprimarilytoGodandsecondarilytocreatures.AminimalistreadingofthisclaimisthatGodexistspriortootherthings,isaperfectorinfinitebeing,andisthecauseofbeingtofinitebeings.Butpriority,causaldependence,anddifferentdegreesofperfectionarecompatiblewithunivocity.Thusalthoughtrianglesarepriortootherpolygons,whichcannotexistwithoutthemandareprovedtohavemanyoftheirgeo-metricalpropertiesbecauseoftheirconstituenttriangles,nonethe-lesstheyareallcalled“polygons”univocally,because“theyareequalwithregardtotheratioofthisname,althoughonecanbepriororposteriortoanotherinactualexistence”(Aquinas,Truth,q.2,a.11).18For“being”tobesaidanalogically,weneedthat“beingit-self,howeverabstractlyandconfusedlyitisconceived,ofitsownforce[=meaning]requiresthisorder,sothatitshouldbelongpri-marilyandperseandas-it-werecompletelytoGod,andthatthroughthisitshoulddescendtootherthings,inwhichitisnotpresentex-ceptwitharelation[habitudo]anddependenceonGod,”whereas“aunivocalisofitselfindifferent,insuchawaythatitdescendstoitsinferiors[thespeciesorindividualsthatfallunderit]equallyandwithoutanyorderorrelationofonetoanother”(Suarez[´619]Disp.28,§3,para.17).Fortheretobeasingleobjectiveconceptofbeing,thesenseof“being”thatappliestocreaturesmustalsoapplytoGod,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing165soitcannotjustmean“dependentonGod.”But,Suarezissaying,´dependenceonGodisnotjustafurtherfactaboutcreatures,inad-ditiontothefactthattheyexist.ThewaythatthecommonconceptofbeingappliestotheminvolvesarelationofessentialdependenceonthepriorwaythatitappliestoGod.Canthismiddlepositionbeexplainedanddefended?Differentwriters,oftenfollowingdifferentsuggestionsinThomas,trytoexplaintheinferiorityoftheesseofcreaturesindifferentways.CajetanandsomeotherThomistssaythatbeingissaidofdifferentthingsbyananalogyofproportionality.XexiststhroughX’sesse,YexiststhroughY’sesse,andbotharesaidanalogicallytoexist,be-causeX’sesseistoX’sessenceasY’sesseistoY’sessence.Eachesseistheactualityoftheessence,andtherewillbedifferentdegreesofesseastherearedifferentpotentialitiestoactualize;thehighestessewillbeGod,anactualitynotlimitedbyanypotentialitytoreceiveit.Suarez,however,whileagreeingthatthereissuchaproportion-´ality,saysitdoesnotimplythatbeingissaidanalogically.Indeed,heholdsthatproportionalityisconsistentwithunivocity(surelybeingissaidunivocallyofcatsanddogs,despitethisproportionality).Suarez’sconditionsforthedifferentkindsofanalogycanbeput´schematicallyasfollows.IfSandTbothhavethepredicateP,andifSisPthroughaformFexistinginS,andTisPthroughaformGexistinginT,insuchawaythatGdoesnotdenominateTasPthroughwhatGisinitself,butonlybecauseGistoTasFistoS,thenTiscalledPthroughananalogyofproportionalitytoS.(IfGwouldstilldenominateTasP,disregardinganyrelationtoSandF,thenthereisaproportionalitybutnotananalogy,forSandTmaybothbecalledPunivocally.)IfSisPthroughaformFexistinginS,andTisPthroughtheformFexistinginS(TisthusnotdenominatedPintrinsically,butextrinsically,throughaforminsomethingelsetowhichTissomehowrelated)thenTiscalledPthroughananalogyofextrinsicattributiontoS:thisisthewaydietorurineiscalledhealthybyattributiontotheanimal.WherePissaidbyanalogyofextrinsicattribution,thereisnotasingleobjectiveconceptofPthatappliesbothtoSandtoT,andSuarezsays,thisiswhatledScotus´todenythatbeingissaidbyanalogyofattribution.ButSuareztries´toshowhowbeingcanbesaidbyanalogyofattribution,whilepre-servingasingleobjectiveconcept,bydistinguishingintrinsicfromextrinsicattribution.IfSisPthroughaformFexistinginS,andTCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n166stephenp.mennisPthroughaformGexistinginT,insuchawaythatGinvolvesarelationofessentialdependenceontheformFexistinginS,thenTiscalledPthroughananalogyofintrinsicattributiontoS.Per-hapsthemostconvincingexampleisthewaythathealthissaidofanorganofthebody.Theheart,unlikeurine,ishealthythroughanintrinsicform,namelytheproperfunctioningofthatkindofnaturalthing,justasananimalishealthythroughtheproperfunctioningofthatkindofnaturalthing.Butthehealthoftheorganinvolvesanessentialdependenceonthehealthofthewholeanimal:forthehearttofunctionproperlyisjustforittocontributeintheappropri-atewaytotheproperfunctioningofthewholeanimal.Suarezthinks´that,ifbeingweresaidofcreaturesbyananalogyofproportionalityorextrinsicattributiontoGod,thencreatureswouldnotreallyandintrinsicallyexist.HeoffersintrinsicattributionasawaytosaveboththerealityofcreaturesandtheiressentialdependenceonGodintheirexistence.HisdifficultywillbetoexplainwhyitisnotjustafurtherfactthatcreaturesexistbecauseGodcreatesthem,butisconstitutiveoftheiresse.Perhapstheexampleofthehealthoftheheartoffersamodel.19Wearebroughtaroundagaintothequestionsraisedatthebegin-ning,comingoutofThomas’sfourthwayforprovingGod’sexistence.ThomassaysthatGodismostbeing,asfireismosthot,andthatGodisacausetootherthingsoftheirdiminisheddegreesofbeing,asfireisthecausetootherthingsoftheirdiminisheddegreesofbeinghot.Thomasdoesnotmakeitclearenough(certainlynotinthistext)howthedegreesofbeing,orthecausingofbeing,aretobeunder-stood.Avicenna’sessence–existencedistinction,andtheanalysisofcreationasgivingexistencetoanessence,giveahopeofclarifyingtheseconcepts,butinvolvefurtherdifficulties.SodotheconceptionofGodasaPlatonicFormofbeing;orastheonlythingthatisinthefullsense,sothatforotherthingsto“be”isjusttobesomehowrelatedtoGod;orasanessenotlimitedbybeingtheesseofanyessence.Thelatescholasticdiscussionsoftheanalogyofbeing,liketheearlierandsometimeswilderpositionsonGodandesse,areacontinuousstrugglewiththeproblemsposedbyconnectingtheol-ogyandontology,asAvicennaandThomashadproposedtodo.Eachpositionoffersitsdifficultiesandleadstofurtherdiscussions.Ihavenottriedheretosolvethedifficulties,butrathertosetthemoutastheypresentedthemselvestomedievalthinkers.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing167notes1.ForAvicennaontheobjectofmetaphysics,seetheMetaphysicsofhisShifa’I1–4[111].AvicennaspeaksinhisAutobiography([124]28)ofhisfrustrationwithAristotle’sMetaphysics,hisinabilitytodiscovertheprimary“aim”or“object”ofthistreatiseandthisscience,andhisdiscoveryofthesolutiononreadingal-Farabi’sOntheAimsoftheMetaphysics[93].2.Thewordmumkinisoftentranslatedas“possible”inEnglishtrans-lationsofArabicphilosophicaltexts,followingLatintranslatorswhorenderitbypossibile.Butthecorrecttranslationis“contingent,”sinceitisopposedto“necessary”(wajib)justasmuchasto“impossible.”3.OnKalamandfalsafa,seep.98inthisvolume.4.Thomas’smainimmediatesourceforhis“thirdway”isinMosesMai-monides,GuideofthePerplexedII1[178]247–48.ButonsomepointsThomasisclosertoAverroes’argument,andheseemstobedirectlyin-fluencedbyAverroes’textsaswell(notbytheTahafut,whichhadnotyetbeentranslatedintoLatin,butbyrelateddiscussionsinthePhysicsandMetaphysicscommentaries).EitherMaimonidesisfollowingAverroes,ortheyarebothofferingthesameradicalreconstructionofAvicenna’sargumentandbringingitbackmuchclosertoAristotle’sphysicalargument.BothMaimonidesandAverroesinterpret“neces-sary”as“eternal,”and“contingent”as“generableandcorruptible,”whereasforAvicennaeverythingthatactuallyexistsisnecessary,al-thougheverythingbutGodiscontingentinitself.Foranextendeddis-cussionofAvicenna’sproofandal-Ghazali’sreactionstoit,seeH.A.Davidson[483](Maimonides,andThomas’sthirdway,at378–85).OnThomas’sproofsoftheexistenceofGodandtheircontextinhisthought,seenowJ.F.Wippel[262](controversiesaboutthesourcesandinterpre-tationofthethirdwayat462–69).Obviouslythestep“ifallthingsarecapableofnotexisting,atsometimenothingexisted”isproblematic.5.Averroes’argumentrequireshimtodistinguishbetweenpermissibleandimpermissiblecausalregresses.Heclaimsthattherecannotbeaninfinityofthingsexistingsimultaneously,butonlyofthingsexistingsuccessively.Sinceallnecessarybeingsexisteternally,thismeansthattherecannotbeinfinitelymanynecessarybeings;andsinceeverycauseofanecessarybeingisnecessary,nonecessarybeingcanhaveaninfiniteseriesofcauses.Ontheotherhand,acontingentbeing,forexample,ananimal,cananddoeshaveaninfiniteseriesofcontingentcauses,namelyitsancestors,whodonotallexistsimultaneously.Sowhymustitalsohaveanecessarycause?Averroessaysthatyourfatherisnotthepersecauseofyou,thatis,notthecauseofyourbeing,becauseCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n168stephenp.mennifhewere,hewouldhavetobecontinuallypresenttosupplybeingtoyou:thismeansthatateachmomentthatyouarealive,yourfatherwouldhavetobealive,andsowouldyourgrandfather,andsoon,andtherewouldbeanimpermissiblesimultaneousinfinity.Soaninfiniteregressispossibleonlyinperaccidenscauses,notinpersecauses;andAverroesthinksthatthewholeseriesofanimalsinthespecies,beingcontingentandperishable,mustalsobesustainedinbeingbyapersecause–immediatelybythesun,whoseperiodicmotionsregulatethelifecyclesofsublunarspecies,andultimatelybytheunmovedmoversproducingthesun’sconstantmotion.Averroes’responsetoAvicennaandGhazaliledtointerestingargu-mentsaboutwhatkindsofinfiniteregressarepermissibleandaboutperseandperaccidenscauses.Itisdisconcertingtobetoldthatthatthesunisapersecauseofyouandyourparentsarenot;Averroessaysthatyourparentsareinstrumentsthatthesunusestomakeyou,asacarpentermightuseanaxeinmakinganotheraxe,thenthrowthefirstoneawayorrecycleitspartsforlateruse;thesunwouldbelikeanimmortalcar-penterwhohasbeenrecyclinghissublunartoolsfromalleternity.JohnDunsScotusinhisDeprimoprincipio,themostthoroughmedievaldiscussionofdifferentkindsofcausalseries,givesareconstructionofAverroes’argumentthatavoidstheseimplications.ForAverroes’argu-mentandhisconfrontationwithAvicennaandGhazali,seeTahafutal-Tahafut[165]I156–70.ForScotus,seeA.B.Wolter’seditionandtranslationofDeprimoprincipio[287].6.SoalreadyFarabi,Kitabal-Huruf(Alfarabi’sBookofLetters),ed.M.Mahdi(Beirut,1990)110–17,takenupbyAverroesagainstAvicenna,Tahafutal-Tahafut[165]I235–41.7.Ockham’sdiscussionofessenceandexistenceatSummalogicaeIII,tract.2,ch.27,isgivenwithtranslationinOckham[311]92–95;quotedpassageat94(translationmodified).Forhistheoryofconnotationingeneral,seeOckham[316],especiallychs.5–10andthechaptersonindividualcategories;Ockham[315]ch.11;andinthisvolumepp.86and205.8.ForOckhamonwhetherGod’sexistencecanbeproved,seethetextscollectedin[311]115–26;forOckham’sclaimthatGod’sunicityisun-provable,andthequestionwhetherthisimpliesthatGod’sexistenceisalsounprovable,seeespeciallypp.125–26.9.Agoodandaccessiblediscussionisthethirty-firstofSuarez’s´Metaphys-icalDisputations[trans.in618].Suarezdisposesoftheideaofessences´priortoexistenceinsection2.Foranopposingscholasticapproachtoessenceandexistence,seeD.Banez[238].10.Thesamepoint(alongwithsomeoftheotherdifficultiesabouttheessence–existencedistinction)isnotedbySuhrawardi[388]45–47.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMetaphysics:Godandbeing16911.InhiscommentaryonBoethius’sQuomodosubstantiaein[229]II396,citedanddiscussedbyJ.F.Wippel[263]122.12.ForEckhartseehisParisianQuestionsandPrologues[363].Note,how-ever,thattheParisianQuestionstakeaverydifferentapproachtothequestionofGodandbeingthantheProloguestotheOpustripartitum(seeA.Maurer’sdiscussioninhisintroduction);notealsothatwehavenoOpustripartitumapartfromitsPrologues,althoughwehavevariousotherworksofEckhart’sthatwereundoubtedlysupposedtobeincor-poratedintoit.AmongMuslimwriters,Ibnal-‘Arabiisoftencreditedwithworkingoutthetheoryaccordingtowhich“exists”alwayssigni-fiesGod;thisaccountisworkedoutmorefullybylaterwriters,mostfamouslyMullaSadra(Sadral-dinShirazi).Themostaccessiblepresen-tationinEnglishisashorttreatisebyal-Jami[370].ForBoethiussee“HowSubstancesareGoodinVirtueoftheirExistencewithoutbeingSubstantialGoods”in[86].ForAnselmseehisMonologion1–3.ForPro-clusseehisElementsofTheology[381].Proclus’sdistinctionbetweentheFormofbeingandthehighestGod(theFormofunityorgoodness)iscollapsedbyhisChristianandMuslimfollowers,suchasthe(Muslim)Liberdecausis(BookofCauses)[373]andthe(Christian)Pseudo-DionysiustheAreopagite.ThomasinScGI26saysthatsomepeoplejustifythisviewofGodandessebycitingPseudo-Dionysius’sCelestialHierarchy4,“theesseofallthingsisthesupersubstantialdivinity.”13.Thomas’sphrase“justesse”(essetantum)correspondstoAvicenna’sphrasewujudmutlaq,whoseinterpretationisdisputedbyMuslimphilosophersinthesameway.Thomasdoesonoccasionspeakofcrea-turesasparticipatinginGod:thetextsarecollectedanddiscussedinJ.F.Wippel[263]142–48.WhileforAvicennaitisapparentlysufficientforGodtobetheultimatecauseofanycontingentbeing’sexisting,ThomasinsiststhatGodisalwaysanimmediatecauseofexistence;seeSTI,q.45,a.5.ThomasisherefollowingtheLiberdecausisagainstAvicenna.14.SoexplicitlySuarez,´Disputationesmetaphysicae,Disp.28,§3,para.15andDisp.32,§2,para.14[619].15.MeisterEckhart,ParisianQuestionsandPrologues[363]79.ThePro-loguesandtheappendixgiveninthisvolumegiveagoodpresentationofthiswholewayofthought,andshowhowdeeplyrootedEckhartisbothinAvicennaandinthepre-thirteenth-centurywesternmetaphysi-cal,logical,andgrammaticaltraditions.However,notethatthisvolumepersistentlymistranslatestheexpression(e.g.)essealbumas“whiteex-istence,”whenitshouldbe“being-white.”16.ForthisviewseeHenryofGhent,QuodlibetI9[219],especiallyV53–55,andQuodlibetX7–8[219],especiallyXIV151–75.InsomepassagesHenrysoundsclosetoEckhart.Perhapssurprisingly,OckhamCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n170stephenp.mennciteswithapprovalasimilarviewoftheexistenceofcreatures(thoughonewithfewermetaphysicalcommitments)fromRobertGrosseteste(Ockham[311]94).17.ForScotusonbeingasunivocal,see[286]4–8and19–22.ForThomasonbeingasanalogicalsee,e.g.,Truth,q.2,a.11;STI,q.13,a.5;ScGI32–34.ForbeingassaidanalogicallyofGodandcreatures,ofsubstanceandaccident,andofrealandfictivebeings,seeHenryofGhent,QuodlibetVII1–2[219]XI26–30.EvenScotus’ssummaryofHenry’spositionat[286]17–19admitsthatHenrythinksbeing(andsoon)arepredicatedanalogically,notpurelyequivocally,ofGodandcreatures.18.Thomas’sexampleisinfact“number,”whichIfindlessclear.Both“number”and“polygon”areAristotelianexamplesofthingsthataresaid,notequivocallyoranalogically,butofsomethingsfirstandofothersafterwards.19.ForSuarezontheanalogyofbeingsee[´619]Disp.28,§3andDisp.32,§2(also,ontheformalandobjectiveconceptsofbeing,seeDisp.2,§§1–3).Foranopposinglatescholasticview,seeTommasodeVioCajetan[596]andJohnofSt.Thomas[608].Scholasticterminologyonthekindsofanalogyisconfusing.Sometimesthescholasticscountanalogoustermsasaspecialkindofequivocals,sometimesasmidwaybetweenequiv-ocalsandunivocals;sometimesitislinguisticitemsandsometimestheirsignificatathatareequivocalorunivocaloranalogous;sometimesonlythingsthatareanalogousbyproportionality,ratherthanthingsthatareanalogousbyattribution,arecalledanalogous.Worse,thetypesofanalogythatI(followingSuarez)havecontrastedasanalogyofattri-´butionversusanalogyofproportionalityaresometimescontrastedasanalogyofproportionversusanalogyofproportionality,andsometimesasanalogyofattributionversusanalogyofproportion(thusthephrase“analogyofproportion”canstandindifferentwritersforbothsidesofthecontrast;Ihaveavoidedthetermaltogether).Theexampleoftheheartismine,butIthinkSuarezwouldacceptit.´CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nedithdudleysylla7CreationandnatureNaturalphilosophywas“themostwidelytaughtdisciplineatthemedievaluniversity.”1Wemaygetanideaoftheextentofthesubjectinwhathasbeencalleditsclassicalcentury,1277–1377,2bylookingatthecontentsofJohnDumbleton’smid-fourteenth-centurySummaofLogicandNaturalPhilosophy.Afterafirstpartonlogic,themajorheadingsare3ii.Firstprinciples,matterandform;opinionsaboutsubstantialforms;howqualitiesareintendedandremitted.iii.Onmotioninthecategoriesofplace,quality,andquan-tity.Onthecausesofmotion.Howvelocityisproducedandcaused.Howalterationandaugmentationaremeasured.Thedefinitionsofmotionandtime.iv.Onthenatureoftheelementsandtheirqualities.Ifeachelementhastwoqualitiesinthehighestdegree.Theactionandreactionofelementsoneachother.Therelationsofel-ementalandqualitativeforms.Densityandrarityandtheirvariation.Howthepowersofnaturalbodiesdependontheirmagnitudes.Therelativeweightsofpureandmixedbodies.v.Onspiritualactionandlight.Whetherlightbelongspar-ticularlytosomeelementorcompound.Onthenatureofthemediumreceivingspiritualaction,suchaslight.Onthevariationofspiritualactioninamedium.Whetherspiritualagentsactinstantaneouslyorintime.vi.Onthelimitsofactiveandpassivepowers.Onthedifficultyofaction.Onthelimitsofthepowersofnaturalbodiesbytheirnaturalplaces.Dothepowersofelementalformsseekrestaswellasmotion?Onthemotionoftheheavensand171CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n172edithdudleysyllatheirmovers.Onthelimitsofsizeofnaturalbodies.Howsomebodiesaremovedbyanintrinsicmover[exse]andsomearenot.vii.Onthecauseofindividualsandspeciesofgenerableandcor-ruptiblethingswithregardtotheirnumbersandthepoten-ciesofmatterandagent.WhetherthePrimeMoverisofinfinitepowerandwhetherithasbeenprovedbyaphysicalargumentthattheworldandmotionhadnobeginning.viii.Onthegenerationofsubstancesbylikesubstancesandan-imalsbycompleteanimalsandbyputrifaction.Onthenu-mericalunityofthesoulwithrespecttothesensitiveandintelligibleandontheoperationsofthenutritivesoul.ix.OnmaterialrelatedtoOntheSoul,BookII,concerningthefivesenses.x.Onuniversalswhicharecalled“Ideas”bythePlatonistsandonthepassiveintellect.Onthesimpleandcomplexopera-tionsofthehumanintellect.[Thispartmayneverhavebeencompleted.]ThusthecurriculumofnaturalphilosophyinDumbleton’sSummarangesfromphysicsthroughastudyoftheelementsandtheirinter-actions,optics,biology,andpsychology.PartsVIIIandIX,onbiologyandpsychology,takeupalmost40percentoftheentirework.ThebasicframeworkisAristotelian,butintheemphasisonlightandinthemissingPartXtherearePlatonicelements.Tothisbasicframe-work,DumbletonaddedinstructioninthebasictoolsofnaturalphilosophythatJohnMurdochhascalled“analyticallanguages”–inquiriesintotheintensionandremissionofforms,maximaandminima,proportionsofvelocitiesinmotion,andsoforth.4ElementsofthefundamentallogicalapproachofmedievalnaturalphilosophyareexplainedinPartIoftheSumma.EvenacursoryaccountofallofDumbleton’stopicsisoutofthequestioninashortchapter.Inwhatfollows,afterabrieflookatwhathappenedbeforethethirteenthcentury,Iwillconsidertherelationsbetweennaturalphilosophyandastronomyandthendevel-opmentsinlatermedievalnaturalphilosophy,boththosethatorigi-natedmainlywithinartsfacultiesandthosethatseemtohavearisenoutofitsinteractionswiththeology.Butfirstsomethingshouldbesaidaboutapresuppositionofessentiallyallofmedievalnaturalphi-losophy,namely,thattheworldisGod’screation.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature173creationAnimportantbackgroundassumptionforthesubjectofthischapteristhebeliefthatthenaturalworldandweourselvesarecreatures–notself-madeorself-subsistentbeings,butproductsofatranscen-dentmindorreason.SoBoethiuswroteinhisConsolationofPhilosophy(III9):OhThou,thatdosttheworldinlastingorderguide,Fatherofheavenandearth,Whomakesttimeswiftlyslide,And,standingstillThyself,yetfram’stallmovinglaws,WhotoThyworkwertmovedbynoexternalcause:Butbyasweetdesire,whereenvyhathnoplace,ThygoodnessmovingTheetogiveeachthinghisgrace,Thoudostallcreatures’formsfromhighestpatternstake,FromThyfairmindtheworldfairlikeThyselfdothmake.ThusThouperfectthewholeperfecteachpartdostframe.Themetaphysicsofcreationprovidedmedievalthinkerswithmanytopicsforreflection,someofwhicharediscussedelsewhereinthisvolume.5Forpresentpurposes,itisimportanttobearinmindthatnotonlytheheavensandearth,physicalelements,an-imalspecies,souls,andangels,butalsotimeandspace,weretypi-callyregardedascreated.Therewasthusnotime“before”creation.Augustine’streatmentofthisthemeinConfessionsXIisaclassictextfortheearlyMiddleAges.Later,medievalAristotelians,fol-lowingAristotle’sdefinitionoftimeasthenumberofmotionwithrespecttobeforeandafter(Physics,IV,10–14),arguedthattimebe-ganwiththecreationofthecosmos–withoutthecosmostherearenomovingbodiesandnomindscapableofnumberingtheirmotionsindaysoryears,andsoforth,andhencebeforethecosmosexistedtherewasnotime.Analogously,inatypicalmedievalview,thereisnospaceoutsidethelastsphereofthefinitecosmos,becausetherearenobodiestherewhoseextensionsmightbemeasured.ButjustasGodexistseternally“before”thecreationofthecosmos,soGodisubiquitous“outside”thecosmos,existingwhollyateverypoint.Fourteenth-centurydiscussionsofGod’subiquityoutsidethecos-mosbythelikesofThomasBradwardineandNicoleOresmehavebeenshowntohaveconnectionswithIsaacNewton’sconceptofabsolutespace.6TheaccountofcreationinGenesiswasauthoritativeforme-dievalJewsandChristians,butthisdidnotleadthemtorejectsuchCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n174edithdudleysyllaunderstandingoftheworldascouldbegatheredfromobservationandlogicalorrationalanalysis.InhisLettertotheGrandDuchessChristinaintheearlyseventeenthcentury,Galileofamouslyde-fendedhisownapproachtoreconcilingtheBibleandsciencebyquotingAugustine’sTheLiteralMeaningofGenesis.Indoingso,GalileowasnotmisrepresentingAugustine’sposition.NearlyeverysentenceofthecreationstoryinGenesiswasdifficulttointerpret,andexegetessuggestedawiderangeofinterpretationsthatmightshedlightonthesacredtextwhilenotconflictingwithestablishedknowledgeofnature.Augustineinparticularreturnsrepeatedlytothequestionofhowoneshouldusescienceornaturalphilosophyinbiblicalhermeneutics.Fromtheverybeginningofhiscommentaryhesuggestsmanyalternativeinterpretations(I1[61]I19–20),andhewarnsagainstdogmaticadoptionofreadingsthatmaybecontra-dictedbyexperienceandreason:ThatwouldbetobattlenotfortheteachingofHolyScripturebutforourown,wishingitsteachingtoconformtoours,whereasweoughttowishourstoconformtothatofSacredScripture...Usually,evenanon-Christianknowssomethingabouttheearth,theheavens,andtheotherelementsofthisworld,aboutthemotionandorbitofthestarsandeventheirsizeandrelativepositions,aboutthepredictableeclipsesofthesunandmoon,thecyclesoftheyearsandtheseasons,aboutthekindsofanimals,shrubs,stones,andsoforth,andthisknowledgeheholdstoasbeingcertainfromreasonandexperience.Now,itisadisgracefulanddangerousthingforaninfideltohearaChristian,presumablygivingthemeaningofHolyScripture,talkingnonsenseonthesetopics;andweshouldtakeallmeanstopreventsuchanembarrassingsituation,inwhichpeopleshowupvastignoranceinaChristianandlaughittoscorn...IftheyfindaChristianmistakeninafieldwhichtheythemselvesknowwellandhearhimmaintaininghisfoolishopinionsaboutourbooks,howaretheygoingtobelievethosebooksinmattersconcerningtheresurrectionofthedead,thehopeofeternallife,andthekingdomofheaven,whentheythinktheirpagesarefulloffalsehoodsonfactswhichtheythemselveshavelearntfromexperienceandthelightofreason?(I18–19[61]I41–43)7natureasepiphany:naturalphilosophythroughthetwelfthcenturyForknowledgeofthenaturalworld,theearlymedievalWestwaslargelydependentonsuchtextsasPlinytheElder’sNaturalHistoryCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature175andSeneca’sNaturalQuestions.DerivativefromtheseandotherRomanwritingsweresuchmedievalencyclopedicworksasIsidoreofSeville’sOntheNatureofThingsandEtymologiesandtheVenerableBede’sOntheNatureofThings.NeoplatonicworkssuchasMacrobius’sCommentaryonCicero’sDreamofScipioandMartianusCapella’sMarriageofPhilologyandMercurymustalsobementioned.Workssuchasthesesuppliedempiricalfactsaboutnaturethatmightbeinvestigatedphilosophically,buttheywerenotalwaysinthemselvesaccurateorrationallystructured.Withthedis-appearancefromviewofAristotle’sworks,themostsignificanttextinnaturalphilosophyavailableinLatinbeforethetwelfthcenturywasdoubtlessCalcidius’stranslationofandcommentaryonPlato’sTimaeus,sections17A–53B.8Equallyinfluential,althoughnotasthoroughlynatural,wasBoethius’sTheConsolationofPhilosophy.InmathematicsthereweresometextstranslatedbyBoethiusfromGreekandlatercalendricalworks(computus).InScottusEriugena’sPeriphyseon,Godissointimatelypresentinnatureastoraisethechargeofpantheism,althoughforallhisemphasisontheophaniesEriugenapresentslittlebywayofphysicaldetail.9Inthetwelfth-centurycathedralschools,naturalphilosophyintheformofideastakenfromPlato’sTimaeushadanefflorescenceinin-terpretingGenesisonthesixdaysofcreation(thehexaemeron¨).Suchtwelfth-centuryworkshavebeensaidtoinvolve“thediscoveryofnature.”10AssimilatingwhatGenesissaidaboutthefirstdayofcre-ationtoPlato’sstatementintheTimaeusthatinthebeginningtherewaschaosorunformedmatter,ThierryofChartres,inhisTreatiseontheWorksoftheSixDays,supposesthattheworldsouloftheTimaeusisthesameastheHolySpiritandisreferredtowhereGenesissays,“andthespiritofGodhoveredoverthewaters[SpiritusDeisuperferebaturaquas].”11TheonenessofthecosmosprecedesitandcomesfromGod,whoiseverywhere.Fromthenumberone,Thierrygoesontoexamineothermathematicalratherthanphysicalaspectsofthecosmos.Othertwelfth-centuryauthorssuchasWilliamofConches,BernardSylvester,AdelardofBath,andHermannofCarinthiaarealsoworthyofnatural-philosophicalattention.12TheyhavemuchmoretosayaboutdetailsofthenaturalworldthancanbefoundinEriugena’sPeriphyseon.AdelardofBath’sQuestionsonNaturalScience,forinstance,beginswiththetopics,“ThereasonwhyplantsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n176edithdudleysyllagrowwithoutaseedbeingsownbeforehand”and“Inwhatwaysomeplantsaretobecalledhot,whentheyareallmoreearthythanfiery”([355]85).LikeThierry,Adelardthinksthattheheavenlybodiesareanimate([355]219).Indeed,itishisopinionthat“Whoeverthinkstheyareinanimate,ishimselfratherwithoutasoul.”Hearguesener-geticallyforhisownviewofthestarsandplanets,“partlyfromtheirposition,partlyfromtheircomposition,andpartly,too,fromtheiraction.”Itwouldbetheheightoffolly,hethinks,tosupposethatthebrightandunpollutedcelestialrealmdoesnotparticipateinthemovementofsoulandtheexcellenceofmind.Again,“Iftheiractionisthecauseofthedeathandlifeofloweranimals,whatshouldbethoughtaboutthesestars?...Tobelievethatwhatprovidestheef-fectoflifeforothersisitselfwithoutlife,canonlybethebeliefofafrivolousjester.”Ascomparedtolatermedievalnaturalphilosophy,twelfth-centurynaturalphilosophyismoreliteraryordescriptiveandlessan-alytic.CosmologicalworkshaveaheavyinfusionofPlato’sTimaeus,ofthebookofGenesis,ofCicero’sOntheNatureoftheGods,andsoforth.ThereismuchmoresaidthatcouldbeassimilatedtothePlatonicIdeas(albeitinterpretedastheWordofGod)andmuchmoreattentiontospiritualorintellectualcreaturesthanwouldbethecaselater.Importantly,allofthesetwelfth-centuryworksassumethatnatureexhibitsregularity,startingwithGodandthentheheavens,whicharemostregular,and,throughtheinfluenceoftheheavens,tothediversityofthesublunarrealm.SoHermannofCarinthiareferstothe“lawofacertainuniversalcondition”asinvolvedintheverydefinitionofnatureandto“thenaturesofthings”asthebasisfortheirspecificproperties:Allmovementsofsecondarygenerationareadministeredbyacertainrela-tionshipofnature(bythedecision,ofcourse,oftheAuthorofallthings)...andsinceeveryorderofthingswhicharelivingisperpetuatedbyalawofacertainuniversalconditionwhichincommonspeechiscalled“nature,”fromnatureitselfitseemsmostappropriatetobegin...Itiscustomaryfortheterm“nature”tobeusedfortwoconcepts...(i)[as]Seneca...says:“WhatisnatureotherthanGodanddivinereasoninsertedintothewholeuniverseanditsparts?”...(ii)ButtheotheristhatbywhichPlatocomposesthesouloftheuniverse...Bytakingupthis“nature”naturalscientistsevenattempttodescribeindividuallythenaturesofallbodies–bothoftheheav-ensandofthelowerworld...What,then,appearstometobethemostCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature177accuratedescriptionpossibleisthis:natureisacertainperpetualpropertyofuniversalgenitura[generatedthings]ofpropagatingandconservingitself,asfarasthisisinherent[quantuminipsumest]...ThisisclosetothelastofthedefinitionswhichBoethiussupports–i.e.,thatthenaturesofthingsare,themselves,thethings’properspecies,sincethepropertyofeverygenituradependsonitsspecies.(Deessentiis[365]151–55)astronomyandastrologyMostmedievalthinkersassumedthatthemotionsoftheheavenlybodiesaffectthecourseofnatureinthesublunarrealm.Untilthetwelfthcentury,LatinknowledgeoftheheavenscamelargelyfromthelateRomanworksmentionedearlier,allofwhichwerenotonlynonmathematicalbutofteninconsistentoratleasthighlyfanciful.13When,however,ArabastronomybegantobeknowninEurope,bring-ingwithitaknowledgeofGreekmathematicalastronomy,thesitua-tionchangeddramatically.Inmanymedievalcosmologies,Godusesthecelestialrealmastheinstrumentorintermediatecauseofallterrestrialeffects(HermannofCarinthia’sDeessentiisisstructuredonthisassumption).Diversityofdayandnight,theseasons,theweather,growthofplantsandanimals,andsoforthareexplained,first,bytheobliquityoftheeclipticorapparentpathofthesun,moon,andplanetsrelativetotheapparentrotationofthesphereofthefixedstars,andthenbytheindividualmotionsofthesun,moon,andplanetsthroughthezodiac.Insofarasthesesupposedlyimportantcausalcircumstancescouldbereliablyknown,physiciansattemptedtotakeaccountoftheminexplaininghumanillnessesandindeterminingtheappropriatetimingofmedicalprocedures.Alchemyalsoassumedtheeffectofheavenlyemanationsonthedevelopmentofmetals.Suchtheoriesarelessevidentinlateruni-versityworks,perhapsbecausetheywerethoughttocallfreedomofthewilldangerouslyintoquestion,butevensoeminentathinkerasAlberttheGreattooktheprincipleofcelestialcausationquiteseriously.14Howwasonetothinkofthesciencebuiltonthisviewoftheheavens?InIslam,Avicennahadinitiatedatendencytocategorizeastrologyasnaturalphilosophyandastronomyasmathematics,15amovethatraisedsignificantquestionsabouttherelationsofthetwodisciplinestooneanother.AstrologybecamethedisciplinethatCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n178edithdudleysyllaaddressedthephysicsoftheheavens,aswellasapplyingthisphysicsofheavenlyinfluencesonearth.ItwasthusthroughthetranslationofAbuMashar’sIntroductoriummaiusinastronomiam,anastro-logicalwork,thattheLatinWestwasfirstintroducedtoAristotelianphysics.16Ontheotherhand,astronomybuiltmathematicalmodelstotrackthepositionsoftheplanets(henceprovidingtheforecastsoflunar,solar,planetary,andstellarpositionsneededforappliedastrol-ogy),butitoftenbuiltthesemodelsunconstrainedbyconsiderationsofphysicalplausibility.FromthetimeofPlato,mostnaturalphilosopherswereagreedthatasphericalheaven(withconcentricshellsratherlikeanonion)surroundsasphericalearth,althoughtheydifferedaboutthedetails.Aristotlehadpositedasetofsuchspheres,eachwithitsownuniformmotionbuteachalsocarriedwiththemovementofthespheressur-roundingit,meanttoaccountfortheobservedpositionsoftheplan-etsthroughtheyear.FromthetimeofHipparchusandApollonius,however,manymathematicalastronomerslosthopeofaccurately“savingthephenomena”ofplanetarymotionsusingmodelscon-tainingonlyconcentricuniformlyrotatingspheres.Theythereforeproposedmodelsinwhichspheresrotatedaroundcentersthatwerenotthecenterofthecosmos(epicycles,eccentrics)orevenchangedtheirratesofrotation(equants).Thisledtoadivisionoflaboroverthecenturiesbetweennaturalphilosophersseekingphysicallyrealistictheoriesoftheheavensandmathematicalastronomersproposingtheoriesthataccuratelypredictedplanetarypositions,Thisbreakbetweenmathematicalastronomyandnaturalphilos-ophyledtomanymethodologicalorepistemologicaldiscussions,aswellastomanyefforts,overtheyears,toreintegratethescienceoftheheavens.Didmathematicalastronomytakeitspremisesfromnaturalphilosophyatleastinassumingthatallheavenlymotionsarecircularbecausetheyarethemotionsofspheresmadeupofaetherforwhichsuchmotionisnatural?Orcouldmathematicalastronomybeanautonomoussciencethatdidnotneedtolooktonaturalphi-losophy,butcouldsimplybuildmathematicaltheoriestofitobser-vations?J.RagephasarguedthatinIslamastronomywassometimestreatedaspurelymathematicalinordertoassurethatitdidnotchal-lengetheologicaldoctrine.17Nasiral-Dinal-Tusi(1201–74)“madeclearintheTadhkirathatanastronomershouldprovemostcosmo-logicalmattersusing‘proofsofthefact’(thatsimplyestablishtheirCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature179existenceusingobservationsandmathematics)ratherthan‘proofsofthereasonedfact’(that‘conveythenecessityofthatexistence’usingphysicaland/ormetaphysicalprinciples).”18ThedifficultywithTusi’sproposal,however,wasthatastro-nomershadknownsincethetimeofHipparchusthatthesameplanetarymotionscanbeaccountedforequallywellindifferentways:amodelwithaneccentricmaygivethesamepredictionsasamodelwithadeferentandepicycle.Inmathematicsproper,suchasarithmeticorgeometry,thefoundationsareaxiomsthatarebet-terknowntothemathematicianthanthetheoremsprovedonthebasisofthesefoundations.Butinastronomythatisnotnecessarilythecase.Alial-Qushji(fifteenthcentury),whowroteacommen-taryonTusi’s“EpitomeofBelief,”“admittedthatasfarassavingthephenomenaofastronomywereconcernedtherewasnowaytodifferentiatebetweenamodelinwhichtheearthrotatesandoneinwhicheverythingelserotatesaroundanunmovingearth.”19Nevertheless,astronomywasnotdependentonnaturalphilosophy,al-Qushjiclaimed,becauseitspremisesareonlyreasonablesupposi-tions,notclaimedtobeabsolutelytrue.20ItisworthponderingthatthewholeofAristoteliannaturalphi-losophywasbuiltontheobservationor“empiricalfact”thattheheavensrotateonceaday,carryingaroundthestarsandplanets.Itwasbyinferencefromthisuniversallyobserved“fact”thatAristotleandAristotelians,followingareasonableandempiricalscientificmethod,concludedthattheheavensmustbecomposedofafifthelement,aether,movedineternalrotationbyimmaterialunmovedmovers.Theongoingexistenceofsystemsofmathematicalastron-omyinwhichitwasapparentthattheprocessofreasoningfromobservationstohigherlevelgeneraltheorycouldnotguaranteethatthehigherleveltheorywasuniquelytrue,evenifitspredictionswereaccurate,nodoubtservedtoinjectadegreeofongoingcau-tionintonaturalphilosophy’sepistemologicalclaims.Atthesametimeitmeantthatmedievalnaturalphilosophyneverbecameatrulymathematicalscience,asphysicsafterNewtonwouldbe.scholasticnaturalphilosophyMedievalnaturalphilosophyunderwentsignificantchangeswhenAristotle’sscientificworksweretranslatedintoLatinandeventuallyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n180edithdudleysyllabecamethestandardtextbooksofuniversityartsfaculties.Withoutabandoningthepresuppositionofdivinecreationoftheuniverse,naturalphilosophynowfocusedmoreonthenaturesthingshadinthemselves–onthespecific“innerprinciplesofmotionorrest”ofPhysicsII1–thanoncreaturesassignsoftheirmaker.AccordingtoAristotle,thegoalofnaturalphilosophyistodevelopadeduc-tivescience(modeledontheaxiomaticformatofGreekgeometry),whichexplainsobservedphysicalphenomenathroughtheiressentialcauses,proximateandremote.Startingfromtheobservationthatallthingsmove,physicistswereexpectedtoworkanalytically(orquia,byproofsofthefact)todiscovertheprinciplesofnature(analogoustothedefinitions,axioms,andpostulatesofgeometry).Theywouldthenexplainnaturalprocessesusingtheseprinciplesasthebasisfordemonstrationspropterquid,orofthereasonedorcausedfact.ThusAristotelianscienceisempirical–itbeginsfromexperience,but–andthisisessential–themethodofgettingfromexperiencetotheoryisnottocollectmoredata,butrathertothinkanalyticallyaboutsomesmallbodyofexperienceinordertogaininsightintoit.So,forinstance,onemightreasonthatwhereverthereismotiontheremustbeamover,andtheninquirewhatthemovermightbe.Thepreeminenttoolsofscholasticnaturalphilosophyarenotexperi-mentalormathematical,butlogical.AscommentatorsontheworksofAristotle,medievalnaturalphilosopherssometimesassumedthatAristotlehadproducedafinishedscientificsystem,buttheycouldnothelpbutnoticethatintheworkstheywerecommentingon,Aristotledidnotlayoutasyntheticdeductivesystem,butratherworkeddialecticallytodiscovertheprinciplesofsuchasystem.Intheirowncontributionstonaturalphilosophy,then,scholasticnatu-ralphilosopherswerenotthedogmatistsofthelaterstereotype,butquiteoftenopentonewideasandargumentsandmightcharacterizetheirownsolutionstoproblemsas“probable”ratherthancertain.Intheirlecturesintheartsfacultiesofuniversities,naturalphilosophersexpoundedandexplainedAristotle’stextschapterbychapterandlinebyline,suggestingimprovementstoAristotleasseemednecessary.21Complementinglecturesontextsascoreactiv-itiesofmedievaluniversitiesweredisputations,inwhichmastersandstudentsmighttakepart.InwrittencommentariesonAristotleincludingquaestiones(questionsfollowedbyargumentsonoppos-ingsidesanddeterminationsorsolutions),somequestionsarethosethatamasterteachingstudentsaboutAristotle’stextmightwantCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature181tobringup.Forinstance,itmightbeaskedwhetheritistrue,asAristotleargued,thatplaceistheinnermostunmovingboundaryofthesurroundingbody(PhysicsIV1–5,definitionat212a20–21).OtherquestionsappearinginAristoteliancommentariesconcernedissuesaboutwhichtherewassignificantcontemporarydifferenceofopinion.Suchquestionsonnaturalphilosophycouldalsohavebeenpart,notofdisputationslinkedtooneortheotherofAristotle’sworks,butofdisputationsonsophismata,problems,oranythingatall(quodlibetaldisputations).22Thewrittenworksbythirteenth-centurynaturalphilosophers–forinstance,theworkofRogerBacon,AlberttheGreat,andThomasAquinas–aremoreoftenexpositoryorsynthetic(muchofAquinas’sworkwassimplyexpositionofAristoteliantexts),whilethefourteenth-centuryapproachwasmoreoftenanalyticandintheformofquaestiones–forexample,theworkofOckham,theOxfordCalculators,JohnBuridan,andNicoleOresme.Onefactorthatdiffer-entiatedscholasticswhoaimedfora(single)syntheticAristotelian-Christiansciencefromthosescholarswhotookamoreanalyticapproachwastheirviewonthestatusoftheprinciplesofonescience,sayphysics,relativetotheprinciplesandconclusionsofanother,saymetaphysics.Forthosewhotookasyntheticview,theprin-ciplesofnaturalphilosophyorphysicsmightideallybeprovedbydeductionfromthehigherscienceofmetaphysics(orthelowersci-encewouldsimplyaddsomenewprinciplestotheprinciplesofthehigherscience).Ultimately,onthisview,allsciencemightbede-ducedfromself-evidentprinciples,andthelowerscienceswouldbeintegratedwiththehigherones.Ontheotherhand,therewerethose,likeBoethiusofDacia,whoclaimedautonomyfornaturalphiloso-phyorphysics,arguingthattheprinciplesofphysicswereneitherself-evidentnorprovedbymetaphysics,butestablishedaposteriori,fromtheanalysisofexperience23–andthatphysicsanditsprinciplesneednotbesynthesizedwithsuchChristianbeliefsasthecreationoftheworldintime.24ScholasticnaturalphilosophersfollowedAristotleinassumingthatnaturaleffectshavenotonlyanefficientcause,butalsomate-rial,formal,andfinalcauses(Aristotle,PhysicsII3;MetaphysicsI3–10).Onthisconception,naturalphilosophyexplainsonlythoseeffectsthathaveallfourofthesecauses.Besideseffectsthatfollowtheircausesregularlyandforapurpose,thereareeffectsthatoccurrarelyoraccidentallythroughtheconcurrenceofcauses,butnaturalCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n182edithdudleysyllaphilosophersdidnotexpecttobeabletoexplainsuchirregularorchanceevents,whichhavenofinalcause.Somescholasticnaturalphilosophers,forinstanceNicoleOresme,attemptedtoenlargetherangeofphenomenaforwhichnaturalphilosophycoulddiscoverthecausestoincludewhatwasconsideredmarvelousormagical.25Others,forinstanceJohnBuridan,concludedthatexceptformiraclesandhumanfreewill,everythingintheuniverseissubjecttonaturallaws.26Theassumptionthattheworldhasafinalcauseorpurposein-tendedbyGodledsomenaturalphilosopherstoassumethattheymightbeabletoreasonouthowtheworldmustbebecauseitisrightorgoodthatitbeso.Boethius’spictureoftheworldasinsomesensea“perfectwhole”didindeedpersistthroughtheMiddleAges.ButtherewasalsoconcerntorespectGod’sfreedom.Fourteenth-century“voluntarists”wereespeciallyinsistentthatGodwasnotcompelledtocreatetheworldinwhathumansmightconsiderthebestorevenagoodway.Hecouldhavedoneordoanythingthatdoesnotinvolvealogicalcontradiction.AccordingtoH.Oberman,thisviewreinforcedargumentsforempiricism:sinceGodwasfreetocreatetheworldindifferentways,wemustuseobservationtodeterminewhatisinfactthecase.27Thustheconceptionoftheworldlyingbehindmuchlatemedievalnaturalphilosophyallowedthatitcontainedmorecontingency–thoughthismightnotbetheaspectofnaturethatcouldbecomeapartofscience–thanissometimessupposedindiscussionsofme-dievaltheoriesofscience.28Andifthereiscontingencyinthecos-mos,thenthingscouldbeotherthantheyare.PierreDuhem,oneofthegreatpioneerhistoriansofmedievalnaturalphilosophyintheearlytwentiethcentury,famouslyarguedthattheCondemnationatParisin1277of219hereticalpropositionsledmedievalnaturalphilosopherstoconsideralternativestoAristoteliannaturalphilos-ophybyrequiringthemtoacceptthepropositionthatGodcandoanythingthatdoesnotinvolvealogicalcontradiction.Bystimulat-ingnaturalphilosophytogoinnewandfruitfuldirections,Duhemwrote,theCondemnationof1277broughtaboutthebirthofmodernscience.29IfDuhemwasright,thentheologyimpactednaturalphilosophy(perhapsforthebest)throughtheCondemnationof1277,butitisarguablethatbefore1277naturalphilosophershadalreadybeenCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature183movinginthedirectionofconcludingthatthecosmosiscontin-gent,andthatmanystatesofaffairsarepossiblethatarenotinfactthecase.Moreover,acommonscholasticphilosophicalmovethathadasimilarimpactonnatural-philosophicalreasoning–onethatisnotnecessarilytiedtotheCondemnationof1277–wasthehabitofreasoningsecundumimaginationem,thatis,ofposingcounterfac-tualsituationsandaskingwhatwouldhappeninsuchacase.Inthedisputationsdeobligationibusanddesophismatibusthatplayedsoprominentaroleinmedievalartseducation,thestudentwastrained,aboveall,toreasonlogicallyfromanarbitraryhypothesistowhat-everfollowedconsistentlyfromit.Thiswasaperfectpreparationforreasoningsecundumimaginationem.Topursuehisprogramofontologicalminimalism,WilliamofOckhamfrequentlyaskedwhetheritmightbepossiblethatonethingexistwithoutanother.If,forinstance,quantityisthoughttobesomethingrealanddistinctfromsubstanceandquality,whatwouldhappenifonesupposedthatGodremovedthequantityfromasubstancewhileleavingthesubstanceunmoved–wouldn’titstillfillthesamevolume?InthiswayOckhamarguedthatsubstancesandqualitiesalone,withoutanythingindependentcorrespondingtowordsfallingunderthecategoriesofquantityormotion(actionandpassion),couldexplainwhateverneededtobeexplained.30Bythusarguingsecundumimaginationem,Ockhamadoptedaminimalistontology.Butsuchargumentscouldworkinmorethanoneway.JohnBuridan,forinstance,argued,contraOckham,thatlocalmo-tionmustbesomesortofinherentquality.Whatwouldhappen,Buridansaid,ifGodrotatedthewholecosmosandeverybodyinit?Wouldthatsituationbeanydifferentfromwhatisnowthoughttobethecase?Itmustbedifferent,hebelieved(hisintuitionthusbe-ingtheoppositeofErnstMach’slater).Itfollowedthatlocalmotionmustcorrespondtoaninherentquality,eveniftherearenofixedreferencepointsbywhichtojudgeit.Thuslatemedievalnaturalphilosophersfrequentlyreasonedsecundumimaginationemorsup-posedthatGodmightdosomethingnotfoundinthenormalcourseofnature,but,evenaftertheydidso,therewasconsiderableleewayforcomingtodifferingconclusions.Historiansofsciencehavebeenparticularlyinterestedinsee-inghowthirteenth-andfourteenth-centurynaturalphilosophersintroducedmathematicsintonaturalphilosophy.31TheinfluenceCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n184edithdudleysyllaofRobertGrossetestewasespeciallyimportanthere.32Moreperva-sive,however,wastheintroductionofanarmamentariumofanalytictools,partlyfrommathematicsbutmostlyfromlogic,forunravel-inganygivenproblem.Inparticular,Ockhamandhisfollowersde-finedscienceaspropositionalknowledgeabouttheworldandthenusedsuppositiontheorytoanalyzethewaysinwhichtheproposi-tionsofsciencemappedontothethingsoftheworld.33Indispu-tationsonsophismata,universitystudents,particularlyatOxford,weretrainedincriticalthinking,withsophismatasentencesandtherelatedcasesoftencomingfromnaturalphilosophy.Howthishap-penedcanbeseeninWilliamHeytesbury’sSophismataandRulesforSolvingSophismata,inRichardSwineshead’sBookofCalculations,inmanyworksontheintensionandremissionofforms,onmaximaandminima,onfirstandlastinstants,oncontinuityandinfinity,andsoforth.34J.Murdochhasargued,indeed,thattheseanalyti-callanguagescreatedamethodologicalunitybetweenlatemedievalphilosophyandtheology,bymeansofwhichtheologybecamemuchmorephilosophicalthanwasthecaseatothertimes.35Itshouldperhapsbenotedhere,inlightofthecommunalityofmethods,thatinthelaterMiddleAgestheboundarybetweennatu-ralphilosophyandtheology(ormetaphysics)wasnotassharpasonemightexpect,giventheAristotelianconceptionofsciencesasself-containeddeductivesystems,becausetheologianshaddevelopedatheoryofnaturaltheologyaccordingtowhichnaturaltheology,likenaturalphilosophy,beginsfromexperience.36Onthistheory,theknowledgethathumanbeingsderivefromsenseexperienceofnatu-ralthingsisthebasisforhumanknowledgeofthebeingofGod–byaposterioridemonstrationsquia,notaprioridemonstrationspropterquid.ThepossibilityofavacuumAccordingtoJohnBuridan,thequestionofthepossibilityofavac-uuminsidethecosmosisaquestionclearlyrelevantbothtonaturalphilosophyandtotheology.37Medievalnaturalphilosophersgener-allyagreedthattheentireuniverseorcosmosisasphericalplenum,withnothingoutsideit,notevenemptyspace,andnoemptyspaceswithinit.Aristotlehadworkedveryhardtoshowthattheancientatomists’conceptionofanemptythree-dimensionalspacewasCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature185incoherent;instead,aswehaveseen,hehaddefined“place”astheinnermostunmovingsurfaceofthesurroundingbody.ByAristotle’sdefinitionavacuum,ifitexisted,wouldbeanextensioncapableofreceivingabody,butinwhichnobodywaspresent.Aristotlehadargued,bycontrast,thatextensionisalwaystobemeasuredonorbyabodyonwhich,sotospeak,differentreferencepointscanbeestablished.Iftherewereemptyspace,therewouldbenoreferencepointswithinitbywhichalongerorashorterextensioncouldbemeasured.InthewayofthinkingaboutGod’sabsolutepowersupportedbytheCondemnationof1277,itshouldnotbedeniedthatGodcouldcreateavacuumunlesstodosowouldinvolvealogicalcontradic-tion.Isthere,then,alogicalcontradictioninsupposingthatGoddepotentiaDeiabsolutacouldannihilateeverythinginsidethesphereofthemoon?Mostpeoplethoughtnot,buttheyhaddifferentwaysofconstruingthesituationthatwouldresult.Forsome,theresultwouldbeineffecttocutasphereoutofthecosmos,sothatnobodycouldoccupyaplaceinsidetheemptiedsphereofthemoon,justastherewasnospacethere,andlikewisenobodycouldbeinplaceout-sidethecosmosasawhole.AccordingtoBuridan,ifGodannihilatedeverythinginsidethesphereofthemoon,thentherewouldbenode-terminatedimensionthere–abodyplacedinsidethespherecouldmoveatahighvelocityinastraightlineforalongtimeandnevergetanyclosertoorfartherfromanyparticularpartofthesphereofthemoon.38Ontheotherhand,accordingtoBuridan,GodcoulddepotentiaDeiabsolutacreatemeasurableextensioninthreedimen-sionsseparatefromanybody(whatwemightcallEuclideanspace)insidethesphereofthemoon.ForAristotle,extensionwithoutanextendedbodywasimpossible.Here,however,thedevelopmentofscholastictheologyhadbroughtsuchimpossibilityintoquestion.Aquinashadheld,forinstance,thataftertransubstantiationtheex-tensionoftheformerbreadnowfilledtheroleofsubstanceassubjectofthequalitiesformerlyinheringinthebread(thisisdiscussedfur-therbelow).ForBuridan,then,ifGoddepotentiaDeiabsolutaannihilatedeverythinginsidethesphereofthemoon,therewasnothinglogicallycontradictoryinsupposingthatGodalsocreatedwithinthesphereofthemoonquantitativeextensionnotinheringinanybody:thiswassomethingknowntobepossible–albeitmiraculously–becauseitCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n186edithdudleysyllawasthecaseinthetransubstantiatedEucharist.Thenifabodywereplacedwithintheincorporealdimensionsinsidethesphereofthemoon,itcouldmoveawayfromonepartofthesphereofthemoonandtowardanotherpart.Insuchasituation,thekinematicswouldbenodifferentfromthekinematicsofordinarynaturalmotion.Itwouldbenecessary,however,toreconceptualizedynamics.InAristoteliandynamics,velocitywassupposedtodependontheforcescausingmotionandtheresistancestheyencountered.Onthisview,agreaterweightfallinginthesamemediumwouldfallfasterthanalesserweight,whilethesameweightfallinginalessresistantmediumwouldfallfasterthanitwouldfallinamoreresistantmedium.Ifabodyweremovinginavacuum,firstofallitwouldbeneces-sarytodetermineifthemotionwasnatural(likethefallofaheavybody)orviolent(likethemotionofaprojectile).Onecouldsupposethatinavacuumtherewouldbeno“up”or“down,”sothatbodiesinavacuumwouldnotmovetotheirnaturalplaces,oronecouldassumethatsomehowpositionsinavacuumwouldcontinuetobeidentifiedbythenaturalplacesoffire,air,water,orearthformerlythere.Ineithercasetherewouldbenomediumresistingthemotion.Thenitfollowed,accordingtonormalAristoteliandynamics,thatthevelocityofabodymovedbyanyforcewhatsoeverwouldexceedallfinitevelocities.But,accordingtotheusuallineofreasoning,anactuallyinfinitevelocityisalogicalcontradiction,sincethebodywouldarriveattheendofitsmotionimmediately,anditwouldnotreachthemidpointofagivenpathbeforeitreachedtheend.Aristotlehad,infact,usedthelogicalcontradictionofanactuallyinfiniteve-locityasoneofhisargumentsforthenonexistenceofanyvacuainthecosmos.ButifproperregardtotheomnipotenceofGodrequiredthatGodcoulddepotentiaDeiabsolutacreateavacuum,andifGodcouldputabodyinmotioninthatvacuum,thenitfollowedthataninfinite,self-contradictoryvelocitycouldnotresultfromthelackofexternalresistance.Afinitevelocitymustresult.Howcanthisbeunderstood?Onemightarguethatdistancealone,withoutresistance,issufficienttoexplainwhymotiontakestime.Dynam-icsmightbechangedtoarguethatanygivenforcewillcauseonlysomefinitemaximumvelocity,whichisdecreasedbytheresistanceofanymedium.MathematicallyonemightsupposethatvelocitiesareproportionaltoF–Rorto(F–R)/R,whereFisforceandRre-sistance.Or,thirdly,onemightsupposethataballthrowninsuchaCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature187vacuumwouldbemovedbyits“impetus”(normallythoughttobeproportionaltoitsmassandvelocityorMV)insuchawaythatimpe-tusisnotaforceinthenormalsense.Byreasoninglikethis,medievalnaturalphilosopherslikeJohnBuridanconcludedthatprojectilesingeneral,andnotjustthoseinunnaturalsituationssupposedtoresultfromtheabsolutepowerofGod,weremovedbyimpetus,consideredtobeaqualityinheringintheprojectile.39MedievalnaturalphilosophershadlittlenaturalphilosophicalmotivationforinvestigatingthepossibilityofavacuuminsidetheuniverseotherthanthefactthatAristotlearguedagainstit,makingitanissuethateverymasterteachingBookIVofthePhysicswouldrehearseinexpositoryquestions.Theylikewisehadlittlereasontocareaboutthemotionofprojectiles,exceptthatAristotle’stheoryofthecauseofprojectilemotionwasstrainedandunconvincing.Scholastictheologyalsohadlittlereasontocareaboutthepossibil-ityofvacuaoraboutthecauseofprojectilemotion.Thisisacase,then,inwhichthetechniqueofreasoningsecundumimaginationemorofcallingupontheabsolutepowerofGodinordertodistinguishbetweennaturalandlogicalimpossibilitiesservedtomovenatural-philosophicalthinking.InsofarastheresultwasmovementawayfromAristotle’sideasandtowardthoseofGalileoorNewton,ithasbeenconsideredprogressive.Whileothersmayblamemedievalnat-uralphilosophersforbeingexcessivelyrational(spinningwebslikespiders)andforhavingdevotedtoolittletimetomakingnewobser-vations,wemightratherpraisethemfortherationalconstructionofAristoteliannaturalphilosophyasanempiricalanddemonstrativenaturalscience.interactionsofnaturalphilosophyandtheologyInherinvestigationsoflatermedievalnaturalphilosophy,AnnelieseMaierstudiedtheologicalaswellasnatural-philosophicalworks,butwhensheusedsuchtextssheusuallysetasidethetheologicalcontextofadiscussioninordertoconcentrateontopicsofinter-estinrelationtothelaterhistoryofscience.Tounderstandthedynamicsofintellectualchangeinlatermedievalnaturalphiloso-phyitisessential,however,notonlytoretrievesuchdiscussionsbutalsotolookatthetheologicalproblemsthatgaverisetothem.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n188edithdudleysyllaItissometimesdebatedwhethermedievalnaturalphilosophywasinherentlytheological(becauseitwasessentiallyGod-oriented)or,ontheotherhand,whetheritwascompletelydissociatedfromthe-ologicalconcerns.40Itwouldseem,however,thatthesituationwasmorecomplicatedthaneitherofthesepositionsinitspureformwouldallow.Theologydidhaveasignificantinfluenceonmedievalnaturalphilosophy,butthisdidnotpreventnaturalphilosophyfrombeingscientificorfrombeinggoodphilosophy.Insomecasesthein-fluencewasscientificallybeneficial.Andsometimesinfluenceranintheotherdirection.Mastersteachingintheologyfacultiesfre-quentlycalleduponnaturalphilosophytohelpresolvetheologicalissues.Therewerethus“theologian-naturalphilosophers,”41whoknewasmuchasanyoneelseaboutnaturalphilosophyaswellastheology.ProblemswiththerelativedatingofthephilosophicalandtheologicalworkofsuchthinkersasAquinas,Scotus,andOckhammakeitdifficulttoprovewhichcontextwasthecontrollingone.Nevertheless,itwouldappearthatthemotivationforinnovationof-tencamefromaparticulartheologicalproblem,suchasthatofgivingwhatmightbecalledaphysicallyaccurateaccountofthetransub-stantiationofbreadandwineintothebodyandbloodofChrist,whichwasbelievedtooccur,byGod’saction,intheEucharist.42TransubstantiationandontologyAfterGodmiraculouslytransubstantiatedthebreadoftheEucharistintothebodyofChrist,itwasheldthattheappearances(species)ofbreadcontinuedtobepresent,althoughtheydidnotinhereinanybody.Theconflictingdescriptionsofthissituationgivenbyvari-oustheologian-naturalphilosophersbroughtdifferencesofontologywiththemthathadimplicationsfornaturalphilosophyitself.ForThomasAquinas,intheEucharistthequantityorextensionoftheformerbreadnowtooktheplaceofitssubstance,withthequalitiesthathadformerlybelongedtothebreadnowinheringinthisexten-sion.ForWilliamofOckham,ontheotherhand,thequalitiesoftheformerbreadbythemselvesoccupyanextendedplace,withinwhichisthebodyofChristtowhichtheyarenotinanywayrelated.43Toex-plainhowChristcouldbe“really”intheEucharist,theologiansusedAristotelianconceptsasfaraspossible.Butwhenthetheolog-icaldoctrineseemedtorequireamodificationofAristotelianconclusions–toallow,forinstance,thatintheEucharistaquantityCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature189orqualitymightexistwithoutinheringinasubstance–theysug-gestedandfrequentlyadoptedmodificationstotheAristotelianview.Some,likeAquinas,developedaspecial“sublimated”naturalphi-losophytoexplaintheexistenceofthequantitativeandqualitative“accidents”ofbreadandwineintheEucharistwithoutanybreadorwine.Ontheotherhand,thetendencyofaphilosopherlikeWilliamofOckhamwastoavoidsuchsublimatedphysicsandinsteadtosayeitherthatthesituationwastotallymiraculousor,alternatively,tomodifyordinarynaturalphilosophyitselfinlightofthetheologicalspecialcase.ThusOckhamdidnottrytogiveanaturalexplana-tionofhowthetransubstantiatedEucharistcouldmoveoractandbeactedon(since,forexample,ithasnosubstantialformitwouldseemtohavenonaturalplaceandlikewisenonaturalresistancetoviolentmotion),butinsteadsuggestedthatGodmaycauseamira-cleateveryinstantoftheEucharist’smotion.Ontheotherhand,whenOckhamdeniedtheseparateexistenceofquantityinconnec-tionwiththemodeofChrist’spresenceintheEucharist,heconse-quentlydeniedtheseparateexistenceofquantitythroughoutallofnaturalphilosophy.Itseemsthatincaseslikethis,Aristoteliannaturalphilosophyhadagreaterimpactontheologythanthereverse.Butafterthetheologian-naturalphilosophershadfinishedtryingtodescribetran-substantiationusingthetoolsofnaturalphilosophy,theirresultsalsohadanimpactwithinnaturalphilosophyproper.Thusmanyfourteenth-centurynaturalphilosophersacceptedtheconclusionthataquantityorqualitycanexistwithoutinheringinasubstance(ithappensintheEucharist)andthatquantityisnotsomethingseparatefromsubstanceandquality(itisnotseparateinChristasheexistsintheEucharist).Theseweretheoriesthatphilosophicaltheologygavebacktonaturalphilosophy.Suchtheorieswereoftenreasonableandconsistentinthemselves.Indeed,historianshavesometimespraisedthenewtheoriesasrepresentingprogresswithinnaturalphilosophy,payingnoattentiontotheevidencethattheywerede-velopedtosolvetheologicalproblems.44ThephysicsofangelsTheinteractionsoftheologicaldiscussionsoftheplaceandmotionofangelsincommentariesontheSentenceswithdiscussionsofthenat-uralmotionsoftheelementsincommentariesonthePhysicsprovideCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n190edithdudleysyllaanothertellingexampleofthewaystheologyandnaturalphilosophycross-fertilizedinthefourteenthcentury.Justastwelfth-centurynat-uralphilosophershadidentifiedtheHolySpiritwithPlato’sworldsoul,sonaturalphilosophersaftertherecoveryofAristotle’sscien-tificworksassumedthatAristotle’sprimemoversweretobeiden-tifiedwithangels,bothsupposedtobeimmaterialsubstances.ThisidentificationmayexplainwhyinthelaterMiddleAgesangelswerethoughttobeintrinsicallyimmaterialandwithoutbodies,whileinearlierNeoplatonictheoriestheywereoftenassumedtohaveethe-realoraerialbodiesorvehicles,nottomentiononeormoresetsofwings.45Inthetypicallatermedievalconception,angelsareapartofcre-ation,perhapsreferredtoas“heavens”intheGenesisstatementthatonthefirstdayGodcreated“theheavensandtheearth.”Naturalphilosopherswantedtounderstandhowtheprimemoversorangelsmovetheheavenlyspheres(obviouslypartofnaturalphilosophy),buttheyalsowantedtoexplainhowthesameorverysimilarsortsofentities(immaterialsubstances)couldbesentbyGodtoearthasmessengers.Withregardtothe“place”ofangels,ThomasAquinasarguedthatangelsareonlyinplacebytheiractions,andthattheymayoccupyalargerorsmallerfinitevolumedependingupontheactiontheyexert.Interestingly,oneofthepropositionscondemnedin1277wastheproposition“thatwithoutanoperationasubstanceisnotinplace.”Mentioningthiscondemnation(OrdinatioII,d.2,qq.1–2,para.200[281]VII244),Scotusarguedthatangelsareinplacebytheirsubstanceandnotonlybytheiraction.ThedifferencesbetweenAquinasandScotusherehadconsequencesforaquestioncommonlyaskedinSentencescommentaries:cananangelmovefrompointAtopointBwithouttraversingthedistanceinbetween?Itwasassumedthatangelsarenormallyintheempyreanheavenattheoutsideofthecosmos.Whentheyaresenttoearth,then,musttheytraversealltheetherspheresbeforearrivinghere?Notneces-sarily,accordingtoAquinas’stheory.Ifanangeldidnotactalongthepathfromheaventoearth,thenitcouldleavepointAandappearatpointBwithouteverbeingintheextensioninbetweenthetwopoints.Indeed,ifangelscouldonlybepresentwheretheyintendedtoactandiftheywere,inthemselves,indivisible,thenitseemedtofollowthattheirmotionwouldnecessarilybediscontinuous–sometheologians,includingHenryofGhent,thereforearguedthatangelsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature191areinasortofatomicorquantumtime(seeScotus,OrdinatioII,d.2,part2,q.7,para.497).InDunsScotus’sview,ifangelsaresentasmessengerswithinthenaturalworld,whileheretheyprobablyactnaturally:Itisnotunreasonabletosupposethatanangel,insofarasitparticipatesinthecorporealcondition(thatisinsofarasthereissomethingofthesamenature[ratione]initandinabody),thatitalsoparticipateinsomewayinthemeasureofbody.Butinsofarasitismovedlocally,itparticipatesinplace[ubi],whichisacorporealpassioninsomeway,ofthesamenatureinitandinabody.Thereforeitcanalsobemeasuredbythemeasureofthemotionofthefirstbody[i.e.,themotionoftheheavens,whichistheprimarymeasureoftime].(OrdinatioII,dist.2,part2,q.7.Utrumangeluspossitmoveriininstanti,para.501[281]VII380)Tothenextquestion,whetheranangelcanmovefromextremetoextremewithouttraversingwhatisinbetween,Scotusanswered:Itseemsprobablethattheangelcannot,becausetheorderpreestablishedbythesuperioragentseemstobenecessarytoanyinferioragentthatactswithregardtosuchordered[ordinata]things.Forexample:theorderofnaturalformssucceedingeachotherinnaturalgenerationisdeterminedbythees-tablisherofnature[instituentenaturam].Andthereforewithrespecttoanynaturalagentitisnecessary,justasnonaturalagentcanmakevinegarim-mediatelyunlessfromwine.Therefore,sincetheorderoftheprincipalpartsoftheuniversecomesfromGod,foranycreatedagentandcreatedpowerthisorderseemstobenecessarywhenitissupposedtoactonthosethingswhichhavethisorder.Thereforeanangel,whenitmovesitselfthroughbodieswhichhavethisorder,cannot,withoutanyorder,makeitselftobeimmediatelyinonegivenplacefromanyothergivenplace,forthennodis-tancewouldseemtoimpedeitsaction.(OrdinatioII,dist.2,part2,q.8,para.515[281]VII386–87)ThusScotussupposedthatangelssenttoearth,althoughtheymaybeindivisible,becomepartofthenaturalorder.InthePhysics,Aristotlehadarguedthatindivisiblescannotmove.Thiswasonestepinhisargumentthattheonlyeternalmotioninthecosmosistherotationoftheheavenlyspheres,allothermotionsnecessarilybeinginterruptedbymomentsorperiodsofrest.Thear-gumentagainstthemotionofanindivisiblebodywaspartofthischainofarguments.But,asanylatemedievaltheologian-naturalphilosopherwouldsay,weknowfromtheBiblethatangelsmove.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n192edithdudleysyllaOnlythinkofGabriel’sannunciationtoMary.ItfollowsthatAristotlemustbewronginarguingthatanindivisiblecannotbemoved.WhatshouldacommentatoronthissectionofAristotle’sPhysicsdo?Bytheearlyfourteenthcentury,Christiannaturalphilosophershadanumberofthingstothinkaboutincomment-ingonAristotleandanumberofpossiblyinconsistentmotivations.First,insofarasThomasAquinasandothersusedAristotle’sproofoftheexistenceofaprimemoverasallbutthelaststepofacosmolog-icalargumentfortheexistenceofGod,acommentatorwouldpre-sumablynotwanttoundermineAristotle’sproofofaprimemover.Ontheotherhand,Aristotle’sproofoftheprimemoverwashighlyinterwovenwithhissupposedproofthattheworldiseternal.SoaChristiancommentatoronAristotlemightwanttopreservetheproofoftheexistenceofaprimemover,whilecallingintoquestiontheproofofaneternalworld.TheargumentthatindivisiblescannotmovewasonestepinAristotle’slargerargument.EnteringfurtherintoAristotle’sargumentsofBooksVIIandVIIIofthePhysics,then,thecommentatorwouldcometoAristotle’sargumentthateverythingthatismovedmustbemovedbysome-thingelse(withallmotionultimatelytraceablebacktooneormoreunmovedprimemovers).Inattemptingtodemonstratethiscasebycase,Aristotledeniedthatevenanimalsandhumanbeingsmovethemselves.AChristianwantingtoprotecthumanfreewillwouldbeinclinedtobalkattheargumentthathumansarenotrespon-siblefortheirownactionsormotions.Buildinguptothecaseofanimalsandhumans,moreover,Aristotlearguedthateventheele-mentsinnaturalmotiondonotmovethemselves.Thisapparentlycontradictedhisearlieraccountof“natural”motionasahavingasourceinternaltothethinginmotion(asagainst“violent”motion,wherethesourceofchangeisexternal),butitwasnecessarytohisargument.Facedwiththeseproblems,AquinasquiteingeniouslysavedAristotle’sargumentinBookVIIIofthePhysicsbysayingthatwhatcausesthenaturalmotionofelementalbodiesisthegeneratorofthebodyandtheremoveroftheimpedimenttoitsmotion.Thuselementshaveonlyapassivepotentialitytobemovedinnaturalmotionnotanactivepotentiality.FromDunsScotuson,thisargu-mentwasrejectedontheveryplausiblegroundsthatwheneveraneffectisproducedtheremustbeacausethatispresentandacting.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature193Whileaheavybodyisfalling,itsgeneratorandtheremoveroftheimpedimentstoitsmotionmayhaveceasedtoexist.SoScotus,andfollowinghimJohnofJandun,Buridan,andmanyothersconcludedthatinthenaturalmotionofelementsthecauseisaforminheringinthebody,eitheritssubstantialformoritsweightactingastheinstrumentofthesubstantialform.WhatmotivatedScotus’sconclusionthatanelementcanmoveitselfinnaturalmotion?Thereare,indeed,strongargumentsinfa-vorofthisconclusion,butitcannotbedeniedthatitsubvertsthemainchainofargumentofBooksVIIandVIIIofthePhysics.Mostlikely,Scotusfirstworkedoutthepatternofreasoningleadingtothisconclusioninordertoexplainthemotionofangels.AlthoughthechronologyofScotus’sworksisnotknownwithcertainty,theeditorsofhiscommentaryontheMetaphysicsarguethatthebooksinwhichhedealswiththemotionofangelswerewrittenafterhiscommentariesonPeterLombard’sSentences.AndintheOrdinatiointheBalicedition,betweentheintroductionofthequestionofthe´motionofangelsandtheconclusion,thereisalargesection(twenty-twopages)devotedtothenaturalmotionoftheelements.Thus,thenewtheoryofthemotionoftheelementslikelycameintoexistenceasanaidtoexplainingthemotionofangels.Insum,itisprobablethatlatemedievaldiscussionsofangelshadasignificantimpactonnaturalphilosophy.Butiftheorizingaboutangelsaffectedmedievalnaturalphilosophy,itshouldalsoberecog-nizedthatmostofthebasicprinciplesusedinthattheorizinghadcomeoriginallyfromnaturalphilosophy–aswehaveseen,Scotusassumesthatangelssentasmessengersfallunderthenormallawsofnature.Inthediscussionofangels,then,wecanseeindetailtheeffectsofthedecisionwithinmedievaluniversitiesthattheologian-naturalphilosophersshoulddevelopaChristian-Aristoteliannaturalphilosophynolessrigorousanddetailedinitswaythanwhatmath-ematicalsciencewouldbecomeintheearlymodernera.notes1.E.Grant[514]148.2.A.Maier[521]V382.3.Cf.E.Sylla[378]133–34forPartsIIandIII.4.J.Murdoch[524],280–87.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n194edithdudleysylla5.Inthisvolume,ontherelationofGod’seternitytotime,seechapter1;oncreationasamajortopicinJewishphilosophy,seechapter5;ontheontologicaldependenceofcreaturesonGod(whetherornottheworldisthoughttohaveafinitepast),seechapter6.6.SeeE.Grant[516]173–75.7.SeeW.P.Carvin[506]44–45forThomasAquinas’sverysimilarpointofview.8.SeeT.GregoryinCH1254.9.ScottusEriugena[90];J.Marenbon[3].10.M.-D.Chenu[507],ch.1;T.GregoryinCH1263–64;B.Stock[533].11.[89]564–65.12.SeeCH12.13.SeeB.Eastwood[511].14.SeeJ.Hackett[204]114–15;P.Zambelli[202].15.J.Ragep[531]52.ThesameassumptionappearsinHermannofCarinthia’sDeessentiis;seeC.Burnett[365]6–10.16.R.Lemay[519];C.Burnett[365]8–9.17.J.Ragep[531]50,53–63.18.Ibid.59.19.Ibid.62.20.Ibid.62,70.21.SeeC.Leijenhorstetal.[42]foreightreasonswhyscholasticAristoteliannaturalphilosopherswentbeyondmereinterpretationofAristotle’stexts.22.SeeE.Grant[517]199–210forlistsofquestionsonAristotle’snaturalworks,andE.Grant[516]681–741forquestionsoncosmologyfromawiderrangeofworksincludingcommentariesontheSentences.23.E.Sylla[534].24.OnBoethiusofDaciaseechapter11inthisvolumeandE.Grant[516]53–55.Onthe“LatinAverroism”ofBoethiusandothersasimplyinga“doubletruth,”seeA.Maier[521]iv,partI.25.SeeB.Hansen[350].26.SeeA.Maier[521]iv,partV.Onthemetaphysicsoffreedom,seechap-ter9inthisvolume;onmoralfreedom,seechapter10.27.SeeH.Oberman[530]408–11.28.E.SereneCHLMP496–517;C.Schabel[307]onGod’sforeknowledge.29.SeeJ.Murdoch[527,528,and523]forsummariesoftheargumentfirstmadebyP.Duheminvol.ii(1909)of[509]412andvol.iii,viii.ForashortstatementseeE.GrantCHLMP537–39.30.Seechapter8inthisvolume.31.J.Murdoch[525].32.SeeA.C.Crombie[197].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nCreationandnature19533.Seechapter3inthisvolume.34.E.SyllaCHLMP540–63and[377].SeeA.Maier[521]ii;E.Sylla[536];R.Sorabji[532]forintensionandremissionofforms;J.Longeway[348]andC.Wilson[349]onmaximaandminima;N.Kretzmann[518]andJ.Murdoch[529]forfirstandlastinstants;J.MurdochinCHLMP564–91andE.Sylla[340]oninfinityandcontinuity.35.J.Murdoch[524].36.S.Marrone[522],ch.15.37.SeeE.Grant[517]50–51.38.E.Sylla[343].39.SeeA.Maier[521]iii,chs.4–5.40.SeeA.Cunningham[508]andE.Grant[513]forarecentroundinthisdebate.41.E.Grant[512]174–75.42.Thedoctrineoftransubstantiationwaspromulgatedincanon1oftheFourthLateranCouncilin1215.SeeH.Denzinger[24]260,no.802.43.E.Sylla[535].44.SeeA.Maier[521]iv,PartIII,andE.Sylla[535]364.45.Cf.http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01485a.htmCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\ngyulaklima8Natures:theproblemofuniversalsAristotelianscienceseekstodefinetheessentialnatureofathingandthentodemonstratethefeaturesthethingmusthavebecauseofthatnature.AphilosophicallyinevitablequestionthusarisesforAristotelians:whatisanature?Isitarealityoverandabove(orper-haps“in”)thethingswhosenatureitis?Isitamentalconstruction,existingonlyinourunderstandingofthings;ifso,onwhatbasisisitconstructed?Thisisthemedievalproblemofuniversals,oratleastonewayofthinkingabouttheproblem.Inaclassicformu-lation,Boethiusstatestheproblemintermsoftherealityofgeneraandspecies,twomaintypesofuniversalsinvolvedinanAristoteliandefinitionofessentialnature(asin“ahumanbeingisareasoning/speakinganimal,”whichplacesusinthegenusofanimalsandmarksoffourspeciesbyreferencetoour“difference”fromotheranimalsinreasoningorusinglanguage):“Platothinksthatgeneraandspeciesandtherestarenotonlyunderstoodasuniversals,butalsoexistandsubsistapartfrombodies.Aristotle,however,thinksthattheyareunderstoodasincorporealanduniversal,butsubsistinsensibles.”1Arigoroustraditionof,mainlyAristotelian,discussionoriginatesfromBoethius’stentativeexplorationoftheproblemthusstated.ButamorePlatonicsolutionhadbeenputintoplayaboutacen-turybeforeBoethiusbyAugustine,andthis,too,wouldhavearichdevelopment.exemplaristrealism:universalsasdivinereasonsAugustinedidnotregarduniversalnaturesasmind-independenten-tities,inthewayPlatoconceivedofForms,butasexistinginthe196CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nNatures:theproblemofuniversals197divinemind.Accordingly,thesenaturesstillserveasmodelsfortheirsingulars,insofarastheyaretheuniversalexemplarsofcre-ation.Inapassageoftenreferredtobymedievalauthors,Augustineintroduceshispositioninthefollowingmanner:InLatinwecancalltheIdeas“forms”or“species,”inordertoappeartotranslatewordforword.Butifwecallthem“reasons,”wedeparttobesurefromapropertranslation–forreasonsarecalled“logoi”inGreek,notIdeas–butnevertheless,whoeverwantstousethiswordwillnotbeinconflictwiththefact.ForIdeasarecertainprincipal,stable,andimmutableformsorreasonsofthings.Theyarenotthemselvesformed,andhencetheyareeternalandalwaysstandinthesamerelations,andtheyarecontainedinthedivineunderstanding.2AugustinecouldinfactclaimtobereconcilingPlatoandAristotle,for,intermsofBoethius’sformulation,heheldthatuniversalityresidedinanunderstanding,thedivineunderstanding.Nevertheless,thisconceptioncanstilldojusticetothePlatonicintuitionthatwhataccountsforthenecessary,intelligiblefeaturesoftheephemeralpar-ticularsofthevisibleworldisthepresenceofsomeuniversalexem-plarsinthesourceoftheirbeing;for,existinginthedivinemind,theideasserveasarchetypesofcreation,bywhichGodpreconceiveshiscreationineternity.Indeed,thisalsopointsthewayforustoamorecertainkindofknowledgethananywecangainfromsensoryexperience.AsAugustinecontinues:Andalthoughtheyneitherarisenorperish,neverthelesseverythingthatisabletoariseandperish,andeverythingthatdoesariseandperish,issaidtobeformedinaccordancewiththem.Nowitisdeniedthatthesoulcanlookuponthem,unlessitisarationalone...noteachandeveryrationalsoul...but[only]theonethatisholyandpure...Whatdevoutmanimbuedwithtruereligion,eventhoughheisnotyetabletoseethesethings,neverthelessdarestodeny,orforthatmatterfailstoprofess,thatallthingsthatexist,thatis,whateverthingsarecontainedintheirowngenuswithacertainnatureoftheirown,sothattheymightexist,arebegottenbyGodtheirauthor,andthatbythatsameauthoreverythingthatlivesisalive,andthattheentiresafepreservationandtheveryorderofthings,bywhichchangingthingsrepeattheirtemporalcoursesaccordingtoafixedregimen,areheldtogetherandgovernedbythelawsofasupremeGod?...Allthingsaresetupbyreason,andamannotbythesamereasonasahorse–forthatisabsurdtosuppose.Therefore,singlethingsarecreatedwiththeirownreasons.Butwherearewetothinkthesereasonsexist,ifnotinthemindofthecreator?...WhateverCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n198gyulaklimaexistscomestoexist,howeveritexists,byparticipationinthem.ButamongthethingssetupbyGod,therationalsoulsurpassesall[others],andisclosesttoGodwhenitispure.AndtotheextentthatitclingstoGodincharity,tothatextent,drenchedinacertainwayandlitupbythatintelligiblelight,itdiscernsthesereasons...Bythisvisionitbecomesmostblessed.Thesereasons,aswassaid,whetheritisrighttocallthemIdeasorformsorspeciesorreasons,manyarepermittedtocall[them]whatevertheywant,but[only]toaveryfew[isitpermitted]toseewhatistrue.3AmajormetaphysicalproblemgeneratedbyAugustine’spositionwasthatofreconcilingthemultiplicityofdivineideas(“allthingsaresetupbyreason,andamannotbythesamereasonasahorse”)withthesimplicityofGod’snature.4Anotherissue,morepertinenttoourpresentdiscussion,wastheaccessibilityandroleofdivineideasinhumancognition.Aswecanseefromthepassagejustquoted,Augustinemakesrecognitionoftruthdependentondivineillumi-nation,asortofirradiationoftheintelligiblelightofdivineideas,whichisaccessibleonlytothefewwhoare“holyandpure.”ButthisseemstogoagainsttheexperiencethatthereareknowledgeablenonbelieversorpagansandalsoagainsttheAristotelianthesisthatwecanacquirethefirstprinciplesneededforscientificdemonstra-tionsfromexperiencebyapurelynaturalprocess.LaterAugustiniansthereforearguedforalessmorallychargedviewofilluminationandalessexclusivelyilluminationistaccountofknowledge.Forexample,MatthewofAquasparta(c.1238–1302),recapitulatingBonaventure,writesthatitisamistaketoholdthat“theentireessenceofcogni-tioncomesforthfromthearchetypalorintelligibleworldandfromtheidealreasons,”for“ifthatlightweretheentireandsolereasonforcognition,thenthecognitionofthingsinthe[divine]Wordwouldnotdifferfromtheircognitionintheirproperkind,neitherwouldthecognitionofreasondifferfromthecognitionofrevelation.”Ontheotherhand,theviewthat“theentireessenceofcognitioniscausedandcomesfrombelow,throughthesenses,memory,andexperience,[workingtogether]withthenaturallightofouractiveintellect,”isalsodefective,forit“destroysthewayofwisdom.”5Whatisthecontributionoftheexemplarsoridealreasonsonthissortofview?HenryofGhentprovidesaninterestinganswertothisquestion.Hefirstdistinguishescognitionofatruethingfromthecognitionofthetruthofthething.Sinceanyreallyexistingthingistrulywhatitis(evenifitmayonoccasionappearsomethingCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nNatures:theproblemofuniversals199else),anycognitionofanyreallyexistingthingisthecognitionofatruething.Butcognitionofatruethingmayoccurwithoutthecognitionofitstruth,sincethelatteristhecognitionthatthethingadequatelycorrespondstoitsexemplarinthehumanordivinemind.Bytheexemplarinthehumanmind,Henrymeanstheconceptofathingwecanacquireforourselvesthroughexperience.“But,”heinsists,“bythissortofacquiredexemplarinuswedonothavetheentirelycertainandinfalliblecognitionoftruth.”Thisisimpossibleforthreereasons,takenrespectivelyfromthethingfromwhichthisexemplarisabstracted;thesoul,inwhichthisexemplarisreceived;andtheexemplaritselfthatisreceivedinthesoulaboutthething:Thefirstreasonisthatthisexemplar,sinceitisabstractedfromchange-ablethings,hastoshareinthenatureofchangeability...AndthisiswhyAugustine...saysthatfromthebodilysensesoneshouldnotexpectthepuretruth[synceraveritas]...Thesecondreasonisthatthehumansoul,sinceitischangeableandsusceptibletoerror,cannotberectifiedtosaveitfromswervingintoerrorbyanythingthatisjustaschangeableasitself,orevenmore;therefore,anyexemplarthatitreceivesfromnaturalthingsisnecessarilyjustaschangeableasitself,orevenmore,sinceitisofaninferiornature,whenceitcannotrectifythesoulsothatitwouldpersistinthein-fallibletruth...Thethirdreasonisthatthissortofexemplar,sinceitistheintentionandspeciesofthesensiblethingabstractedfromthephantasm,issimilartothefalseaswellastothetrue[thing],sothatonitsaccountthesecannotbedistinguished.Foritisbymeansofthesameimagesofsensiblethingsthatindreamsandmadnesswejudgetheseimagestobethethings,andinsaneawarenesswejudgethethingsthemselves.Butthepuretruthcanonlybeperceivedbydiscerningitfromfalsehood.Therefore,bymeansofsuchanexemplaritisimpossibletohavecertainknowledgeandcertaincognitionofthetruth.Andsoifwearetohavecertainknowl-edgeofthetruth,thenwehavetoturnourmindawayfromthesensesandsensiblethings,andfromeveryintention,nomatterhowuniversalandab-stractedfromsensiblethings,totheunchangeabletruthexistingabovethemind.6Henryholdsthatdirectintuitionofthedivineideasishadonlybyangelsandthesoulsoftheblessedinbeatificvision;itisgrantedinthislifeonlyinrare,miraculouscases,inraptureorpropheticvision.Inmoretypicalcasesofgenuineinsight,itisonlynecessary“thattheunchangeabletruthimpressitselfintoourconcept,andthatittransformourconcepttoitsowncharacter,andthatinthisCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n200gyulaklimawayitinformourmindwiththeexpressedtruthofthethingbythesamesimilitudethatthethingitselfhasinthefirsttruth”(Summaquaestionumordinarium,a.1,q.2[222]fol.7I).Henry’spointcanbeputthisway.Sincetheexternalthingitselfisjusta(moreorlessdefective)copyofthedivineexemplar,thestillmoredefectivecopyofthiscopythatweobtainfromexperience(thehumanexemplar)canonlybeimprovedbymeansoftheoriginalexemplar,justasacopyofapoorreproductionofsomeoriginalpic-turecanonlybeimprovedbyretouchingthecopy,notonthebasisofthepoorreproduction,butonthebasisoftheoriginal.Sincetheexternalthingisfashionedafteritsdivineidea,the“retouching”ofourempiricalconceptbytheimpressionofthatideayieldsabetterrepresentationofthetruthofthething–somuchbetter,indeed,thatthe“retouched”conceptenablesustojudgejusthowwellthethingrealizesitskind.Forexample,theroughideaofacircleIac-quirefromexperienceinlearningtousethetermcirclemayservefortellingcircularshapesapartfromnoncircularones,butwhenIcometounderstandthatacircleisalineeverypointofwhichisequidis-tantfromagivenpoint,IwillseeclearlywhatitwasthatIoriginallyconceivedinavagueandconfusedmannerinmyoriginalconcept.The“flash”ofunderstanding,whenIrealizethatitisnecessaryforanythingthattrulymatchestheconceptofacircletobesuchasthedefinitiondescribes,wouldbeaninstanceofreceivingilluminationwithoutanyparticular,miraculousrevelation.Evengranting,however,thattheconceptsinitiallyacquiredfromsensibleobjectsneedtobefurtherworkedoninordertoprovideuswithaclearunderstandingofthenaturesofthings,wemaywon-derwhetherthisfurtherworkcouldperhapsbedonebythenaturalfacultiesofourmind,assumingonlythegeneralinfluenceofGodinsustainingthemind’snaturaloperations,butwithoutperforminganydirectandspecific“retouching”ofourconcepts“fromabove.”Usingourpreviousanalogyoftheacquiredconceptasthefaultycopyofapoorreproductionofanoriginal,wemaysaythatifwehaveanumberofdifferentpoor,fuzzyreproductionsthataredefectiveinanumberofdifferentways,thenthroughalongandcomplexprocessofcollatingthem,wemightstillbeablediscerntheunderlyingpat-ternoftheoriginalandthusproduceacopythatisactuallyclosertotheoriginalthananyofthedirectreproductions,withouteverbeingallowedaglimpseoftheoriginal.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nNatures:theproblemofuniversals201ThiswastheAristotelianapproach,whichincreasinglydominatedmedievaldiscussionsofuniversalsfromthetimeofAbelardintheearlytwelfthcentury.7Inthisapproach,divineilluminationwouldconsistofcreatingahumanmindcapableofilluminatingexperienceonitsown.AsAquinasputit,Godhascreateduswith“acertainlike-nessoftheuncreatedlight,obtainedthroughparticipation,”namely,theagentintellect(STI,q.84,a.5),apowercapableofabstractingfromexperienceuniversalsthatwerequiteadequateforascienceofnaturesandtheirproperties.commonnatures,singularexistents,activemindsTheAristotelianprojectofexplaininguniversalityinhumancog-nitionwithoutilluminationfromatranscendentsourcegeneratedquestionsofitsown.Forinthisapproachitisnaturaltoaskexactlywhattheabstracteduniversalsinthemindare,whatitisforthemtoexistinthemind,howtheyarerelatedtotheirparticulars,whattheirrealfoundationinthoseparticularsis,whattheirroleisintheconstitutionofouruniversalknowledge,andhowtheycontributetotheencodingandcommunicationofthisknowledgeinthevarioushumanlanguages.Thesequestionsgiveanewaspecttotheproblemofuniversals,namely,asemanticaspect.ThemostimportantinfluenceonLatindiscussionsinthethir-teenthcenturyandlaterwasAvicenna’sdistinctionoftheabsoluteconsiderationofauniversalnaturefromwhatappliestothesamenatureinthesubjectsinwhichitexists.Thedistinctionisneatlysummarizedinthefollowingpassage:Horsehood,tobesure,hasadefinitionthatdoesnotdemanduniversality.Ratheritisthattowhichuniversalityhappens.Hencehorsehooditselfisnothingbuthorsehoodonly.Forinitselfitisneithermanynorone,neitherisitexistentinthesesensiblesnorinthesoul,neitherisitanyofthesethingspotentiallyoractuallyinsuchawaythatthisiscontainedunderthedefinitionofhorsehood.Rather[initselfitconsists]ofwhatishorsehoodonly.8InhislittletreatiseOnBeingandEssence,Aquinasexplainsthedistinctioningreaterdetail:CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n202gyulaklimaAnature,however,oressence...canbeconsideredintwoways.First,wecanconsideritaccordingtoitspropernotion,andthisisitsabsolutecon-sideration;andinthiswaynothingistrueofitexceptwhatpertainstoitassuch;whenceifanythingelseisattributedtoit,thatwillyieldafalseattri-bution...Intheotherway[anessence]isconsideredasitexistsinthisorthat[individual];andinthiswaysomethingispredicatedofitperaccidens[nonessentially],onaccountofthatinwhichitexists,aswhenwesaythatamaniswhitebecauseSocratesiswhite,althoughthisdoesnotpertaintomanassuch.Anatureconsideredinthisway,however,hastwosortsofexistence.Itexistsinsingularsontheonehand,andinthesoulontheother,andfromeachofthese[sortsofexistence]itacquiresaccidents.Inthesingu-lars,furthermore,theessencehasseveral[actsof]existenceaccordingtothemultiplicityofsingulars.Nevertheless,ifweconsidertheessenceinthefirst,orabsolute,sense,noneofthesepertaintoit.Foritisfalsetosaythattheessenceofman,consideredabsolutely,hasexistenceinthissingular,becauseifexistenceinthissingularpertainedtomaninsofarasheisman,manwouldneverexist,exceptasthissingular.Similarly,ifitpertainedtomaninsofarasheismannottoexistinthissingular,thentheessencewouldneverexistinthesingular.Butitistruetosaythatman,butnotinsofarasheisman,maybeinthissingularorinthatone,orelseinthesoul.There-fore,thenatureofmanconsideredabsolutelyabstractsfromeveryexistence,thoughitdoesnotexcludeany.Andthenaturethusconsiderediswhatispredicatedofeachindividual.9WhatismoststrikinginthispassageisthewayAquinastalksaboutthesamenatureexistingindifferentthings,aswellasbeing“consid-erable”apartfromexistinginanything.Itisclearthatthesamenessinquestioncannotbethenumericalunityofasingleexistent,sinceitispreciselyexistencethatisabstractedfromintheabsoluteconsid-erationofanature.10Thescholasticsoftenreferredtothesamenessofthesamenatureinthispassageasa“less-than-numericalunity.”Wemightsaythatitistheunityofsomethingthatisnotstrictlythesamebutrecognizablythesameinmultipleinstances,asthesamenessofabookexistinginmultiplecopies,oringeneral,thesamenessofsomecommoninformationcontentcarriedbyseveralcopies,possiblyinvariousmedia.Itisthisnotionofsamenessthatisoperativeincountingitemsasdistinctonlywhentheyaredis-tinctinkind(which,ofcourse,isonlytosaythatitisthesamenessofauniversal–butauniversalthat“subsists,”touseBoethius’slanguage,inparticularexistingthingsandisauniversalonlyasitisCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nNatures:theproblemofuniversals203“understood”).Forexample,thenumberofpublicationsofanauthoristhenumberofhisdifferentpublishedwritings,andnotthenum-berofthedifferentcopiesofoneandthesamework.Thesameworkisjustoneworkonthelist,butthisoneworkmayexistinmultiplecopies,indeed,indifferenteditions,encodedindifferentmedia(say,paper,CD-Rom,e-book,orInternetwebsite),andmayhaveradicallydifferentaccidentalattributesinthosedifferent“incarnations.”Yetthisdoesnotmeanthatthereexistssomeone“universalbook”overandaboveitssingularrealizationsinthesedifferentmedia.Onthecontrary,wecantalkaboutthisonebookasoneandthesameworkonlybyabstractingfromitsdifferentrealizations,indifferentformsofexistenceinthosevariousmedia.Thisaccountgivesrisetoafurtherquestion,however.Aquinassaidthattheabsoluteconsiderationofanatureabstractsbothfromitsbeinginextramentalsingularsandfromitsbeinginthemind.But,apparently,preciselyaccordingtothisconsiderationithastobeinthemind,foritcanberecognizedascommononlywhenthemindconsidersitinabstractionfromitsindividuatingconditionsinthesingulars.Sohowcanwesaythatitisabstractedfrombeinginthemind,whenitcanbeabstract,andhenceauniversal,onlyifitisinthemind?Whatisrequiredhereiscareindistinguishingbetweenwhatwecansayaboutthesamenatureassuchandwhatwecansayaboutthesamenatureonaccountofitsconditionsasitexistsinthisorthatsubject.Suchcareisobviouslyrequiredinrecognizingthatthesamebookcanhavequitedifferentaccidentalfeaturesinitsprintededition(whereitmayhave200pages,forexample)andinitselectronicedition(whereitmayhavenopaginationatall).Similarcareisrequiredinrecognizingthatthesamenatureisauniversalinsofarasitisinthisorthatmindandthatitisonlyasbeinginamindthatitisproperlycalledauniversal.AsAquinasremarks:Whenwespeakaboutanabstractuniversal,weimplytwothings,namely,thenatureofthethingitself,andabstractionoruniversality.Sothenatureitselftowhichitisaccidentalthatitisthoughtof,orthatitisabstracted,orthattheintentionofuniversalityappliestoit,existsonlyinthesingulars,butthenature’sbeingabstracted,oritsbeingthoughtof,ortheintentionofuniversalityisintheintellect.Andwecanseethisbythesimilarsituationinperception.Forsightseesthecolorofanapplewithoutitssmell.Thus,ifitisasked:Whereisthecolorthatisseenwithoutthesmell?...itisobviousCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n204gyulaklimathatitisnowhereelsebutintheapple.Butthatitisperceivedwithoutthesmellhappenstoapplytoit[acciditei]onaccountofsight,insofarasinsightthereisasimilitudeofcolorbutnotofsmell.Similarly,humanitythatisthoughtofexistsonlyinthisorinthatman;butthathumanityisapprehendedwithoutitsindividuatingconditions(whichisnothingbutforittobeabstracted,whichconfersonittheattributeofuniversality)isanaccidentalfeatureofhumanity[accidithumanitati]invirtueofitsbeingperceivedbytheintellect,inwhichthereisasimilitudeofthenatureofthespeciesbutnotoftheindividuatingprinciples.11So,althoughtheuniversalnature,namely,thatwhichispredica-bleofseveralsingulars,isnothingbutthecommonnatureassuch,consideredabsolutely,still,thatitispredicableofseveralsingularspertainstothesamenature,notaccordingtoitsabsoluteconsider-ation,butonlyonaccountofitsbeingconceivedbytheabstractiveintellect,thatis,insofarasitisaconceptofthemind.Evenifsucharesponseistenable,itshowswhatsortofproblemsthisconceptualframeworkisboundtogenerate.Speakingaboutthesamenaturepossiblyreceivingcontraryattributesinitsseveralin-stancesanddifferentmodesofbeingconstantlyrisksinconsistency,unlesswekeeptrackofwhatcanbesaidofwhataccordingtowhatactualcriteriaofidentityanddistinctness.Accordingly,itisnowon-derthatauthorsworkinginthisframework,whichcametobere-ferredtoastheviaantiqua,elaboratedfurtherdistinctionsregardingthepropertiesaccruingtonaturesintheirbeinginminds12andthepropertiesaccruingtothemintheirbeingintheworld.13commonterms,singularnaturesAnyonewhowantedtoescapethemetaphysicalcomplexitiesoftheviaantiquahadtogototheirroots,whichlayinthesemanticframe-workwithinwhichtheyarose.ThiswasthetacktakenbyWilliamofOckham,thepioneerofaradicallynewconceptualframework,theviamoderna.AccordingtoOckham,theviaantiquaconceptionwouldentailthatacolumnistotherightbyto-the-rightness,Godiscreatingbycreation,isgoodbygoodness,justbyjustice,mightybymight,anaccidentinheresbyinherence,asubjectissubjectedbysubjection,theaptisaptbyaptitude,achimeraisnothingbynothingness,someoneblindisblindbyblindness,abodyismobilebymobility,andsoonforother,innumerablecases.14CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nNatures:theproblemofuniversals205Butthisstemspreciselyfromtherootofallerrors,namely,“multi-plyingbeingsaccordingtothemultiplicityofterms...which,how-ever,iserroneousandleadsfarawayfromthetruth.”15Whetherintentionallyornot,Ockhamnodoubtexaggeratedthelogicallydrivenontologicalextravaganceoftheviaantiqua.Hisaim,however,wasnotjusttogetridoftherealorperhapsmerelyapparentunwantedontologicalcommitmentsofhisopponents,butrathertosimplifytheentireconceptualapparatus,togetherwithitsavailableyetrathercomplicatedwaysofgettingridofsuchcommitments.Accordingly,Ockhambasedhisprogramonaradicalreinterpretationofthefundamentalsemanticrelationships.Asintheviaantiqua,Ockham’suniversalsexistonlyinthemind(orinutterancesorwrittenexpressions),andextramentalexistentsareallsingular.ButforOckham,thatisallthereistoit.Therearenocommonnaturesoressences“in”eitherthemindortheworld.Atonestroke,therefore,asifbymagic,allquestionsoftheform“Howdoesthisorthatessencesubsistinthisorthatparticular?”vanish.Therearenoessencescapableofbeingconsidered“absolutely”andaccruingdifferentaccidentsintheirexistenceinthemindorout-sideit.16Furthermore,thenumberoffundamentallydifferentsortsofrealthingsisreducedbyOckhamtojusttwo:substancesandqualities.Ifweprovidetheappropriateanalysesofcomplexconceptsintheothercategoriesintermsofthesimpleconceptsofthecategoriesofsubstanceandquality,allthatwewanttosayabouttheworldintermsofquantities,relations,andtheotherAristoteliancate-goriescanbesaidwithoutpositinganydistinctfurtherrealitiesinthethingsthemselves.17MuchoftheweightofOckham’sprogramthereforerestsontheprocessbywhichweformoursimpleuniversalconcepts,forthesearetheconceptsthatanchorourentireconceptualedificeinreal-ity.Thisprocessyieldsthekeytermsinamentallanguagewhichissomehowthesameforallhumanbeingsandtowhichspokenorwrittentermsareconventionallysubordinate.TheuniversalsinOckham’smentallanguagearenatural,furthermore,inmeaning.Thementaltermhumannaturallyanddirectlysignifies,“indiffer-ently,”allandonlyhumanbeings,past,present,future,andmerelypossible–andthisinspiteofthefacts(1)thatthetermisformedfromexperienceofaminusculesampleoftheindividualsitsignifies,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n206gyulaklimaand(2)thatthereisnosinglehumannatureallthesethingshaveincommonwhichcouldbedirectlyrepresentedbytheterm.Notsurprisingly,Ockham’sclaimtohavingalanguageadequateforsci-entificpurposes,whenhehas,ineffect,bypassedthequestionofwhatthereisaboutthingsthatcauses(i.e.,insomewayjustifies)ourgroupingthemthewaywedo,didnotmeetwithuniversalac-ceptance.TheviaantiquainitsThomistandScotistformscontin-uedtoattractadherentsinthelaterMiddleAges,andevenfollowersoftheviamodernasometimeshaddifficultystayingonOckham’sstraightandnarrowpath.Buridan,forexample,whenarguingagainstcontemporaryskepticsaboutourabilitytoacquiresimpleconceptsofsubstances,resortsinhisepistemologytosomeoldwaysofthink-ingaboutabstractionthathecouldnotquiteconsistentlyaffordinhissemantics.18Thenominalists’semanticinnovations,whiletheyavoidedtherealists’ontologicalproblems,leddirectlytoanumberofnewepistemologicalproblems.Theviamodernathushelpedpushtheinterestsofphilosophersinadirectionwhichbecametheirmajorpreoccupationinthemodernperiod.19notes1.CommentaryontheIsagogeofPorphyry(itselfanintroductiontoAris-totle’sCategories)inP.V.Spade[20]25.2.OnEighty-ThreeDifferentQuestions,q.46,2inP.V.Spade[6]383.3.Ibid.AlsoseeOnFreeChoiceoftheWillII,whereAugustinearguesthatwecanrecognizetheimperfectionsofobjectsofacertainkindinourexperience(forexample,objectsthatarenotperfectlyequal,orobjectsthatarenotabsolutelyone,sincetheyaremanyintheirparts),onlyifwealreadyknowwhatitwouldbelikeforobjectstobeperfectlyequalorperfectlyone.Butsincetheseperfectinstancesarenotgiveninexperience,itseemstofollowthatwecanonlyhavetheseconceptsfromasourceotherthansenseexperience,fromaTruthwithinbutabovethemind.4.IbrieflydiscussAquinas’ssolutiontotheproblemin“TheMedievalProblemofUniversals”[543].Cf.Aquinas,STI,q.15,a.2;ISent.,d.36,q.2,aa.1–3;HenryofGhent,Summaquaestionumordinariarum,2,a.65,q.5[222];JohnDunsScotus,OrdinatioI,d.35,q.un.[281];ThomasofSutton,Quodlibeta,IV,q.5[389].Foramoderndiscussion,lesssophisticatedthanthepreceding,seeC.Hughes[242].5.Bonaventureetal.[215]94–96.6.HenryofGhent,Summaquaestionumordinariarum,a.1,q.2[222]fol.5F.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nNatures:theproblemofuniversals2077.ButexemplaristrealismmakesanimpressivecomebackinJohnWyclif’sOnUniversals,ch.2[352],especiallypp.14–15.8.Avicenna,MetaphysicaV1[116]II228;trans.[6]461.9.OnBeingandEssence2.10.FormoreonAquinas’sconceptionoftherelationshipbetweenthenotionsofunityandbeing,seeG.Klima[244].11.STI,q.85,a.2,ad2.12.Forexample,thedistinctionsbetweenimpressedandexpressedspeciesandbetweenformalandobjectiveconcepts.Theimpressedspeciesistheintelligiblecontentabstractedbytheagentintellectfromsensoryrepresentationsofsingulars,thephantasms.Thisintelligiblespecies,impressedbytheagentintellectuponthepotentialintellect,servesastheprincipleoftheactofconceptformationofthelatter,calledforma-tio.Theresultofthisactistheexpressedspecies,whichisnothingbuttheformalconcept,theuniversalconceptasexistinginthissingularmind.SeeCajetan[594]163andJ.Poinsot[380]170,255–68.Theobjec-tiveconceptistherepresentationalcontentoftheformalconcept,thecommonnatureofsingularsinsofarasitexistsinthemindasitsim-mediate,abstract,universalobject.SeeSuarez[´619]360–61andCajetan[594]67–71,121–24.13.Themetaphysicalproblemsmostcloselyconnectedwithdiscussionsofuniversalswere(1)theproblemofindividuationand(2)thedistinctionbetween(or“compositionof”)essenceandexistence.Thefirstcalledforananswertothequestion:whatisitinthisorthatcowthatmakesit“this”or“that”cow,ratherthanacongeriesofuniversals?Onthis,seeJ.Gracia[541–42].Onessenceandexistence,seechapter6inthisvolume.Differingaccountsofuniversalswerealsoinvolved,moreorlessclosely,indebatesabouttheunityorpluralityofsubstantialformsandtheontologicalstatusofAristoteliancategoriesotherthansubstance.Onsubstantialform,seechapter9inthisvolume.Ontheothercategories,seechapter3inthisvolume.14.Ockham,SummalogicaeI51[308]OPhI169.15.Ibid.171.16.SeeP.V.Spade[20]114–231andOckham’sTheoryofTerms[316]77–88.Forasympatheticbutultimatelyinconclusiveexposition,seeM.M.Adams[318]3–141.AlsoseemyarticleandthosebySpadeandKargerinCCOck.17.Ockham’sTheoryofTerms[316]126–88;M.M.Adams[318]143–313.18.SeeJ.M.M.H.Thijssen[544]andG.Klima[342].19.Forafullertreatmentofsomeofthemattersdiscussedhere,seeG.Klima[543].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nrobertpasnau9HumannatureNothinginmedievalphilosophywasmorefiercelycontestedthanthetopicofhumannature.Amongthemanyquestionsdiscussedwerethenatureofthesoul,therelationshipbetweenthesoulandthemind,theworkingsofsenseandintellect,theroleofthepas-sions,thelimitstohumanfreedom,andtheextentofourdepen-denceondivinegraceandillumination.Yetthesedisputes,thoughwide-ranging,werefoughtinthecontextofgeneralagreementonanumberofbasicissues.Therewasgeneralagreementthathumanbeingshaveasoulbutarenotmerelysouls–thattheyarecom-positesofsoulandbody.TherewasalsoagreementthatthehumansoulisimmaterialandcreatedbyGod;itdoesnotcomeintoexis-tencenaturally,asthesoulsofotheranimalsdo.Likewise,almostallagreedthatthesouldoesnotpreexistthebody,1thatGodbringsitintoexistenceoncethefetushassufficientlydeveloped,andthat,oncecreated,thesoulwillexistforever–thatitisincorruptible.Thestoryofmedievalthinkingonhumannatureconcernshowthisgen-eralframeworkwasdevelopedinvariousandconflictingwaysandhowthesevariousthesescouldbeprovedphilosophically–ifindeedtheycouldbeprovedatall.mindandbodyandsoulItishardtoimagineamoreimpressivestarttomedievalthinkingabouthumannaturethanthewritingsofAugustine.“Refusetogooutside,”headvised.“Returntoyourself.Truthdwellswithin”(OfTrueReligion39.72).Remarksliketheseannouncedamajorshiftinphilosophicalthought.Ratherthanlookingtothephysicalworld208CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature209forfundamentaltruths,ortoanabstractrealmofForms,Augustineproposedafirst-personmethod.Lookwithin.ThetruthAugustinesoughtwasnotonlytruthaboutourselves.Bylookingwithin,hethought,wecouldgainsomeunderstandingofthenatureofGodasthiswasprofessedintheChristiandoctrineoftheTrinity.Thedistinctnessofmemory,understanding,andwill,combinedwiththeirmutualinclusionofoneanother,madethemindanimage,albeitadistantone,ofthethreePersonsthatareGod(TrinityX–XV).Instrivingtowardthisheight,however,Augustineestablishedfundamentalconclusionsaboutourownnature.Whatisabody?Somethingthatoccupiesspaceinsuchawaythatapartofitoccupieslessspacethanthewhole(X7.9).2Whatisthemind?Thosefixatedonthesensesandimagesofthephysicalworldsupposethatthemindissomekindofbody,orperhapsaharmoniousstateofthebody.Forourmindtosupposethisisforittoconfusesensoryimageswithitsveryself,toaddsomethingphysicaltowhatitknowsitselftobe.“Letitsetasidewhatitthinksitselftobe,anddiscernwhatitknows”(X10.13).Whatthemindknows–whateverymindknows–isthatitisathingthatthinks:Whowoulddoubtthathelives,remembers,understands,wills,thinks,knows,andjudges?Forifhedoubts,helives;ifhedoubts,herememberswhyhedoubts;ifhedoubts,heunderstandsthathedoubts;ifhedoubts,hewantstobecertain;ifhedoubts,hethinks;ifhedoubts,heknowsthathedoesnotknow;ifhedoubts,hejudgesthatheshouldnotrashlyconsent.(X10.14)3Inknowingallthisaboutitself,themindknowsitsveryself.Whereasotherssupposethatwillingandunderstandingarequalitiesinheringinsomefurthersubstance,Augustineinsiststhatthemindgraspsitsownnaturewithcertainty:“athingisnotsaidtobeknowninanywaywhenitssubstanceisunknown”(X10.16).Henceweknowwhatthemindis,simplybylookingwithinourselves:ourmindjustisourownthinking,willing,andunderstanding.Thisinward-directedmethoddominatedwesternthoughtforcenturies.In1077AnselmbeganhisfamousprooffortheexistenceofGodwiththeinjunctionto“enterintothechamberofyourmind;excludeeverythingbutGodandwhathelpsyoutosearchforhim,andthensearchforhim,withthedoorclosed”(Proslogion1).ForBonaventurein1259theCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n210robertpasnaumind’sjourneytoGodbeginswiththeexternalworldandthenleadsus“toreenterourselves–thatis,intoourmind,inwhichthedivineimageshines”(ItinerariummentisinDeum3.1).DespiteBonaven-ture’sbestefforts,however,philosophychangedcoursedramati-callyinthethirteenthcentury,asitabsorbednewinfluencesfromAristotleandIslamicthought.AlthoughauthorssuchasThomasAquinasandJohnDunsScotuslaboredmightilytomeldAugustineandAristotle,thetwoapproachestohumannaturecouldhardlyhavebeenmoredifferent.InplaceofAugustine’sintrospectivemethod,whichtendedtoleavethebodybehindinfocusingonthemind,theAristoteliansmadeanessentiallybiologicalnotionofsoulthemodelfortheirunderstandingofournatureaswellasthatofotheranimals.Insteadoftreatingthoughtastheessenceofmind,theytreateditasmerelyitsactivity,andtookmindtobeafacultyofthehumansoul.Asforthesoulitself,itsnaturewassaidtobeunknown,oratleastunavailabletointrospection.AsThomasAquinasputit,“Thehu-manintellectneitherisitsunderstanding,norhasitsownessenceasthefirstobjectofitsunderstanding.Instead,somethingexternal,thenatureofamaterialthing,isitsfirstobject”(STI,q.87,a.3).ThisisnottosaythatscholasticAristoteliansregardedthesoulasacompletemystery.Itwasaxiomaticforthemthatthesoulisthefirstprincipleoflife–thatis,themostbasicinternalexplanationforwhyplantsandanimalsarealive(seeAristotle,DeanimaII1).Tobealive,onthisaccount,justistoengageintheoperationsthatcharacterizeallorsomelivingthings:takingnourishment,grow-ing,reproducing,moving,perceiving,desiring,andthinking.Hencethesoulwasconceivedofashavingassortedpowersforproducingthesevariousfunctionsandwasdividedintofunctionalparts:five,accordingtoAristotle,orthreeinAvicenna’smorestandardaccount:vegetative(=nutritive),sensory,andrational.(Aristotleaddedap-petitiveandlocomotive.4)Thesoulactualizesthebody,whichistosaythatsoulandbodyarerelatedtooneanotherasformtomat-ter.EncouragedbyAristotle’sremarkthat“Itisnotnecessarytoaskwhetherthesoulanditsbodyareone,justaswedonotaskaboutwaxanditsshape”(DeanimaII1,412b6–7),scholasticauthorssup-posedthatthiskindofhylomorphic(thatis,matter–form)frameworkcouldsolvetheperennialproblemofunifyingsoulandbody.Thediversityofplansfordoingthissuggeststhatthesolutionwasnotself-evident.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature211Scholasticaccountsofthesoul–bodyrelationshipfallintotwobroadclasses.First,therewerethosethattreatedhumanbeingsascompositesofmatterandaseriesofforms,sothattheinitialun-formedmatter(primematteror,moreliterally,“firstmatter”)isshapedbyacorporealform,andthisform–mattercompositeisatthesametimeshapedbyafurtherform,allthewayuptotheultimateform,therationalsoul.Amongearlyscholasticauthors,itwasstan-dardtofollowtheeleventh-centuryJewishphilosopherIbnGabirol(Avicebron)insupposingthathumanbeingsarecomposedofmanysuchessentialorsubstantialforms:corporeal,nutritive,sensory,ra-tional,andperhapsstillmore(FonsvitaeIV3).ForlaterauthorslikeHenryofGhentandDunsScotus,ahumanbeingiscomposedofjusttwosubstantialforms:acorporealformforthebody,plustherationalsoul.5Asecondclassoftheoriesheldthattherationalsoulistheonlysubstantialformofahumanbeing,thatitbothshapesthebodyandgivesrisetoallthecapacitiesassociatedwithlife.ThisunitarianaccountwasfirstarticulatedbyThomasAquinas.Itwasperhapshismostoriginalandmostdivisivecontributiontophilos-ophy.Onecritic,PeterJohnOlivi,referredtoitasa“brutalerror,”anditwascondemnedbysuccessivearchbishopsofCanterbury.6Therewereseveralreasonswhytheissuewassocontroversial.First,thesubstantialformwasthoughttofixtheidentityconditionsofwhateveritinforms.Thatis,abodyremainsthesamebodyonlyaslongasitretainsthesameform.Butifahumanbeinghasonlyonesubstantialform,thenthebodygoesoutofexistenceatthemomentofdeath,whensoulandbodyseparate.Aquinaswhollyendorsedthisresult,remarkingthat“Justasonedoesnotspeakofananimalandahumanbeingoncethesoulhasleft–unlessequivocally,inthewaywespeakofapaintedorsculptedanimal–sotooforthehandandeye,orfleshandbones”(STI,q.76,a.8;cf.Aristotle,DeanimaII1,412b19–22).Inadditiontoraisingvarioustheologicalproblems,7thisresultstruckmanyasabsurd.Ockham,forinstance(QuodlibetII11),wonderedwhatcouldpossiblyexplainwhysomethingnew(acorpse)comesintoexistenceatdeathwithall(orvirtuallyall)ofthephysicalqualitiespossessedbythelivingbody.Surelyitismucheasiertosupposethatthesamebodyenduresthroughdeath.Butthiscanbesoonlyifithasitsownsubstantialform,apartfromthesoul.UnderlyingthisdebatewasafurtherandmoregeneralworryaboutthecogencyofAquinas’saccount.Asnotedalready,allsidesagreedCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n212robertpasnauthattherationalsoulisimmaterial.Buthowcanitbeimmaterialandatthesametimetheformofthebody?Thiswasanissuethatallscholasticshadtoconfront,especiallyafter1312whentheCouncilofViennedeclaredithereticaltoholdthat“therationalorintellec-tivesoulisnotperseandessentiallytheformofthehumanbody.”8ButtheproblemwasespeciallypressingforAquinasandhisfollow-ers,becausetheyneededtherationalsoultogiveshapetothebody,togiverisetothebody’snutritiveoperations,tobetheinnerprinci-plebehindsensation,andatthesametimetobeimmaterial.Howcanthesouldoallofthosethingsandyetbeimmaterial?Aquinas’ssolution(STI,q.77)restsonadistinctionbetweenthesoul’sessenceanditspowers.Initsownright,thesoulisasubstantialform,whoseessenceisunknownoratleasthidden.Whatwecanknowofthesouliswhatwecanobserveofitsoperations,whichleadsustoinferthatthesoulhascertainpowers.Thesepowers“flow”fromthesoul’sessence,buttheyarenotthatessence.Hencethehumansoulgivesrisetoourabilitytodigestfood,whichisasphysicalaprocessasanythinginnature.Butthehumansoulalsogivesrisetoourcapacityforthought,whichallagreedisnotaphysicalpro-cess.SinceAquinasdistinguishedthesoulanditspowers,hesawnodifficultyinreconcilingtheseroles.Hisopponents,adheringmorecloselytoAugustine’sconceptionofmind,refusedtodistinguishthesoul’sessenceanditspowers,astancemadeeasierbytheirpluralismregardingsubstantialform.Byidentifyingtherationalsoulasahumanbeing’sonlysubstan-tialform,Aquinasmadeconsiderabletroubleforhimselfandhisfollowers.Butheclaimedonenotableadvantageforhisaccount:itscontributiontosolvingthesoul–bodyproblem.Whatexactlywasthisproblem?Incontrastwithearlymodernthinkers,medievalphilosophersdidnotregardthesoul–bodyproblemasaproblemaboutcausality.Thenotionofanimmaterialbeingactingonmatterwasconsideredunproblematic,andalthoughcausationintheotherdirectionwasgenerallynotallowed,causalityinonedirectionwasenoughtoexplaininteraction.Forthebodytoactonthesoul’sim-materialpowers–intellectandwill–bodilyinformationwassimplytransformedbytheintellectintoanimmaterialstate.9Themedievalversionofthesoul–bodyproblemwasinsteadtheproblemofhowtoreplytoPlatonicdualism.AlthoughalmostnoneofPlato’swritingswereknownatfirsthand,authorslikethefourth-centuryNemesiusCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature213ofEmesahaddescribedhowPlato“didnotholdthatananimalismadeupofsoulandbody,butthatitisthesoulusingthebodyand(asitwere)wearingthebody.”AsNemesiusobserved,“Thisclaimraisesaproblem:Howcanthesoulbeonewithwhatitwears?Forashirtisnotonewiththepersonwearingit”(Denaturahominis3[375]51–52).Augustinehadinsistedthatahumanbeingissoulandbody(CityofGodXIX3),buthehadlittletosayabouthowthetwopartsofthesoul–bodypairwereboundtogether.Aristotelianhylo-morphismsawthesoulasactualizingapotentiallylivingbody,butthisdidnotbyitselfsolvetheproblemoftheunityoftheindividualhumanbeing.Scotus,whopursuedmetaphysicalquestionsfartheranddeeperthananyoneelseintheMiddleAges,simplygrantedthat“thereisnocauseforwhythisactualityandthatpotentialitymakeonethingperse...exceptthatthisispotentialitywithrespecttothat,andthatisactuality”(OrdinatioIV.11.3.53[282]VIII652–53).Nothingmorecanbesaid.Aquinascouldsaysomethingmore.Asnotedearlier,thesubstan-tialformsuppliestheidentityconditionsforabodyandeachofitsparts.Eachpartexistsjustaslongasitisactualizedbytheformofthewholeofwhichitisapart.Moreover,thesubstantialformwasunderstoodtoplayacausalroleinsustainingalltheintrinsicpropertiesofasubstance.Substanceshavetheenduringcharacter-isticstheydobecauseoftheirdistinctiveunderlyingform.10Thisconceptionofformyieldsanexceptionallyclearaccountofsubstan-tialunity:sinceitsformiswhatindividuatesandcausallysustainsallthepartsofasubstance,noneofthemcanexistorendureapartfromit.Therefore,ifthehumansoulistheonesubstantialformofthehumanbeing,bodyturnsouttobeindivisiblefromsoulinthestrongestsense.Unsurprisingly,givenitsexplanatoryforce(andthewayitstillleavesroomforthesoultoexistapartfromthebody),Aquinas’sunitarianaccountwouldbecomethedominantviewbytheendoftheera.11cognitionAmongthevariousancientschoolsofphilosophy,noneposedamoreseriouschallengetoChristianitythanskepticism.OnemightbeaChristianandaPlatonist,likeAugustine,oraChristianandanAristotelian,likeAquinas,orconceivablyevenaChristianandaCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n214robertpasnauStoic.ButitishardtoseehowthebeliefsofaChristiancouldbereconciledwithaskeptic’ssuspensionofallbelief.12Augustinede-scribedintheConfessionshowhefellundertheswayofskepticismforatime,becomingsomeonewhohad“lostallhopeofdiscoveringthetruth”(VI1)and“believeditimpossibletofindthewayoflife”(VI2).Hequicklycametorejectthisstance,diagnosingtheskepticassomeonewhomistakenlyholdsoutforthewrongstandardofcer-tainty:“IwantedtobecomeascertainaboutthingsIcouldnotseeasIwascertainthatsevenandthreeareten...Idesiredotherthingstobejustlikethis”(VI4).Thosewholimittheirbeliefstowhatmeetsthistestwillbedoomedtowithholdassentinalmostallcases.Butwhyshouldthisbethestandardforadequatejustification?Whyisthatkindofcertaintytheonlyacceptablekind?WehavealreadyseenAugustineappealtoself-knowledgeforonekindofcertainty.Inothercaseshedefendsamorerelaxedstandardofjustification,onethatleavesaprominentplacefortheevidenceofthesensesand,crucially,theauthorityofothers:IconsideredtheinnumerablethingsIbelievedthatIhadnotseen,eventsthatoccurredwhenIwasnotpresent...manyfactsconcerningplacesandcitiesthatIhadneverseen,manythingsacceptedonthewordoffriends,manyfromphysicians,manyfromotherpeople.Unlesswebelievedwhatweweretold,wewoulddonothingatallinthislife.(VI5)Ifthisholdstrueineverydaylife,itholdsallthemoretruewherereligiousbeliefisconcerned.Inthisway,Augustineturnsthechal-lengeofskepticismtotheadvantageofChristianity,arguingthatthelackofcertaintythatthreatenstheisticbeliefinfactthreatensallourbeliefs.Ifwehavegoodreasonsforrejectingglobalskepticism,thenweshouldconsiderwhetherthesemightalsobegoodreasonsforrejectingreligiousskepticism.13LaterthinkersseemtohaveregardedAugustine’streatmentoftheseissuesasdecisive.SkepticismsimplyceasedtobeaprominenttopicofdiscussionuntiltheendoftheMiddleAges.Instead,atten-tionwasfocusedonhowknowledgeisacquired.Heretheissuewasnothowtodefineknowledge–thequestionthatPlatooriginallyposedandthatdominatedlatertwentieth-centuryepistemology–buthowtounderstandthecognitiveoperationsthatgenerateit.Thecomplexandsophisticatedtheoriesofcognitiondevelopedinthethirteenthandfourteenthcenturieshadvariousroots.MostCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature215obviously,therewereAristotle’sbriefremarksontheintellectandhismoredetaileddiscussionofsensation.EquallyimportantwereAugustine’sextensiveobservationsonmindandperception,intheTrinityandelsewhere.AthirdmajorsourcewastheIslamictradition,particularlyAlhazen’sinfluentialtreatiseonopticsandAvicenna’sbrilliantandoriginaldevelopmentofAristotle’sthought.Allmedievalworkoncognitiontakesasitsbasisafundamentaldistinctionbetweensenseandintellect.Thesensorypowerswereindeedregardedaspowersofthesoul,buttheyweretakentobepowersthatrequirephysicalorgans,andthatwesharewithnonra-tionalanimals.Writingahalf-centurybeforeDescartes’sdepictionofloweranimalsasnonsentientmachines,FranciscoSuareznoteda´similartendencyinsomeofhiscontemporaries.“Thisviewisintol-erableandenormouslyparadoxical,”hewrote(DeanimaI5),giventhatwehavethesamesensoryorgansinsideandout,thesamekindsofbehaviorinresponsetostimulus,andthesameabilitytostorememoriesofparticularimpressions.Inall,Suarezargued,wehave´asmuchevidenceforsensationinanimalsaswedoininfantsandtheseverelyretarded.Humanbeingsarespecialamongtheanimals,formedievalthinkers,becausewehaveamind,acognitivepowerthatisnotpartofthebrainorinanywayphysical.Suchimmaterialitywastakentoexplainhowthemindcouldengageinabstract,conceptualthought.Whereasthephysicalsenseswerelimitedtotheapprehensionofpar-ticularimagesandobjects,theintellectwasregardedasunlimitedinitsrepresentationalscope,abletograspnotjustaparticularqualitybuttheverynatureofthequality,anaturethatwasthesameinallindividualspossessingthequality.14Hencethemarkofthementalwasnotintentionalitybutconceptualization,andthedividebetweenthephysicalandthenonphysicalwaslocatednotattheboundaryofconsciousnessbutattheboundaryofabstractthought.Medievalphilosophersdevotedprimaryattentiontothemind,butthesenseswerenotignored.Avicennaproposedadistinctionthatbecamefundamentalbetweentwokindsofsensoryobjects,formsandintentions(LiberdeanimaI5[115]86).Ingeneral,aformisthekindofsenseobjectthatthefiveexternalsensesaresuitedtograsp:color,size,shape,sound,andsoforth.Anintentionisacharacteristicoftheobjectthatgetsconveyedbytheobject’sformbutthatcannotbedetectedbythefivesensesthemselves.ThisterminologyallowsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n216robertpasnauAvicennatodistinguishtwolevelsofsensoryprocessing,whichhedescribesastheexternalandtheinternallevel.Theexternalsensesarethefamiliarfivesenses,whichhaveparticularsensoryqualitiesastheirobjects.Therearelikewisefiveinternalsenses(LiberdeanimaI5,II2,andIVI[115]I87–90and117–19,II1–11;NajatII6§3[119]30–31):
commonsense(alsocalledphantasia),whichcollectsimpres-sionsfromallfiveoftheexternalsenses
imagination(alsocalledtheformativepower),whichretainstheimagescollectedinthecommonsense
theimaginativepower(inhumanbeings:thecogitativepower),whichcomposesanddividessensoryimages
theestimativepower,whichmakesjudgmentsthatgobe-yondexternalappearances(thesheeprecognizesitshouldfleethewolf)
thepowerformemory(inhumanbeings:recollection),whichretainsimpressionsformedbytheestimativepowerThisterminologyisdrawnlargelyfromAristotle,augmentedbyacomplexearlierIslamictradition.15ButAvicennagoeswellbeyondAristotle’suncertainsuggestionsbycollectingthesedisparatefac-ultiesundertheheadingofinternalsensesandgivingthemspe-cificlocationsinthebrainanddefinitefunctions.Latermedievalauthors–notablyAverroes(LiberdemedicinaII20),AlberttheGreat(Dehomine,qq.35–41),andAquinas(STI,q.78,a.4)–woulddeveloptheirownaccountsoftheinternalsenses,buildingonAvicenna’ssuggestionsandmodifyingtheterminologyincomplexways.Atheoryofsensationrequiressomeaccountofsensoryrepre-sentation.Withintheinternalsensestheperceptiblepropertiesofbodiesweresaidtoberepresentedbyphantasms.Moregenerally,informationfromtheexternalworldwassaidtobepassedtothesensesandintotheintellectthroughaseriesofformsor“species.”Augustinehadspokenoffoursuchspecies:intheobject,inthesense,inmemory,andinthemind(TrinityXI9.16).Themostimportantmedievalworkinthisareacamefromaneleventh-centuryIslamicauthor,Alhazen(Ibnal-Haytham),whoseOpticshastocountasthemostimpressivepremodernaccountofperception.Incarefuldetail,Alhazenstudiedthephysicalandpsychologicalunderpinningsofvi-sion,tracingthepropagationofvisualformsthroughthemediumCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature217andintotheeyeandexploringthewaysinwhichwetherebyacquireinformationaboutthevarioussensiblepropertiesoftheobject,suchasitscolor,distance,shape,size,motion,andsoforth.Latinauthors,ledbyRogerBacon,studiedthisworkinthethirteenthcentury,anditquicklybecamestandardtoconceiveofcognitionastheproductofamultiplicationofformsorspeciesthroughtheair,intothesensoryorgans,andultimatelyintointellect.16Therewasgeneralagreementthatallsuchspecies,eventheab-stract“intelligible”species,representobjectsinvirtueofsomehowbeinglikenessesofthem.Beyondthis,however,therewasconsider-abledisagreementabouthowspeciesplaytheirrepresentationalrole.Amongthirteenth-centuryauthors,forexample,RobertKilwardbyfollowedsomeremarksofAugustine’sinholdingthatsensiblequal-itiesmakeaphysicalimpressiononthesensoryorgans,producingaspeciesthere,andthatsensationoccurswhentheimmaterialsen-sorysoulthenperceivesthoseimpressions(OnImagination,ch.3).17Aquinas,incontrast,tookamoreAristotelianline,holdingthatthesensoryorgan’sreceptionofaspeciesjustisthesensation.18Onthiskindofview,sensationisaphysicalevent,apassiveinformingofthesenseorganfromoutside.LaterinthethirteenthcenturyOliviattackedviewsofthissecondsortfortheirpassivityandattackedviewsofthefirstsortformakingtheinternalimpressiontheobjectofperception.OnOlivi’sownview,perceptionoccursinvirtueofthemind’s“virtualattention”outwardtotheobjectsthemselves.19Themechanismsofthisaccountareobscure,butitisclearthatOliviwantedtoeliminatebothsensibleandintelligiblespeciesinfavorofadirectgraspoftheobjectitself.AlthoughAquinasinsistedthatthespeciesisnotthethingperceived,butthatbywhichexternalthingsareperceived(see,e.g.,STI,q.85,a.2),Oliviclaimedthataspeciesmustinevitably“veiltheexternalthingandimpedeitsbeingattendedtoinitselfasifpresent”(IISent.,q.58,ad14[271]II469).ThisdebatewentonthroughtheMiddleAgesandbeganagainwithLockeandhiscritics,thistimeovertheroleofideas.Someissuesregardingthesenseshadparallelsforintellect.Thosewhorejectedsensiblespecies,suchasOliviandlaterOckham,alsorejectedintelligiblespecies.20Aquinas’saccountofsensorypassivityalsoheldattheintellectuallevel:“Ourintellect’soperationconsistsinbeingactedoninacertainway”(STI,q.79,a.2)–itconsists,inotherwords,inreceivingintelligiblespecies.TherewerealsoCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n218robertpasnauenormousdifferencesbetweenthesensoryandintellectuallevels.Mostsignificantly,philosophersintheAristoteliantraditiondistin-guishedbetweentwointellectualpowers,theagentintellectandthepossibleintellect(or,moreaptly,theactiveandreceptiveintel-lects).Thepossibleintellectstartsoutasatabularasa,buildingupconceptualknowledgethroughsensoryinput.Theagentintellectisresponsiblefortransformingthatsensorydataintosomethingintel-ligible.Thisistosaythattheagentintellect,throughtheprocessofabstraction,takesinformationthatismaterialandparticularandmakesitintosomethingimmaterialandabstract.Inthisway,theperceptionofablackcatcangiverisetotheconceptblackortheconceptcat.Everythingabouttheagentintellectwasobscureandcontrover-sial.Itwassupposedtoperformitstransformativeoperationbyab-straction,butthereseemstohavebeenlittleunderstandingofhowthatwouldwork.21Onepossiblereasonfortheneglectofthisissueisthatmedievalenergieswerefocusedonamorebasicquestion:istheagentintellectevenapartofthehumansoul?Aristotle’sremarksonthistopic(DeanimaIII5)werecryptic,andlatermedievalauthorswereconfrontedwithaconfusingjumbleofphilosophicalauthori-ties.Avicenna,whoseviewswereparticularlyinfluential,conceivedoftheagentintellectasaseparatesubstance,relatedtothehumansoulasthesunisrelatedtooureyes(LiberdeanimaV5[115]II127).ThisviewwasendorsedbyprominentChristians,includingRogerBacon(Opustertium,ch.23;Opera...inedita,ed.J.S.Brewer[London,1859])andHenryofGhent(QuodlibetIX15).Justasinflu-ential,andmuchmorecontroversial,wasAverroes,whosometimesseemstohavethoughtthatboththeagentintellectandthepossi-bleintellectareseparatesubstances(e.g.,CommentariummagnumdeanimaIII5).Thispeculiarsoundingdoctrineofmonopsychism,accordingtowhichoneintellectissharedbyallhumanbeings,wasembracedbysomeartsmastersinthethirteenthcentury–inpartic-ular,SigerofBrabant(seehisQuestionsonDeanimaIII)–butwasfiercelyrejectedbytheologianssuchasBonaventureandAquinas.Bonaventure,writingintheearly1250s,heldthat“howeveronedressesup[coloret]thisview,itisbadandheretical:foritgoesagainsttheChristianreligion...againstrightreason...andagainstsensoryexperience”(IISent.18.2.1).22Howcouldanyonebelievethatallhumanbeingsshareasingleintellect?ThetheorysoundslessoddwhenconsideredinitsbroaderCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature219context.First,Aristotle’sbriefremarksontheintellecthavestruckmanyasinvitingsuchaconclusion.23ForChristians,moreover,thisseparateintellectcouldbeidentifiedwithGod,alineofthoughtthatmightseemtomeshwiththeAugustinianconceptionofdivineillu-mination.AugustinehadfamouslyarguedthatatleastsomehumanknowledgeisattainableonlyifweareilluminatedbyGod:Whenwedealwiththingsthatweperceivebythemind,namelybythein-tellectandreason,wearespeakingofthingsthatwelookuponimmediatelyintheinnerlightofTruth,invirtueofwhichtheso-calledinnermanisilluminatedandrejoices...WhenI’mstatingtruths,Idon’teventeachthepersonwhoislookinguponthesetruths.HeistaughtnotbymywordsbutbythethingsthemselvesmademanifestwithinwhenGoddisclosesthem.(TheTeacher12.40)AlthoughAugustineneversupposedthathumanbeingslacktheirownintellects,hesostressedourdependenceonalightoftruthabovethemindastomaketheminditselfseemincomplete.Divineilluminationheldacentralplaceinmedievalepistemol-ogyuntilthethirteenthcentury,whenitwasgraduallydisplacedbyAristotelianempiricism.Bonaventurestaunchlyremarkedthat“thelightofacreatedintellectdoesnotsufficeforacertaincompre-hensionofanythingwithoutthelightoftheeternalWord”(Christouroneteacher,n.10,CTIII84).Hewaswellaware,however,thatAristotle’sinfluencehadtobeacknowledged,andsohesoughtacompromise:Althoughthesoulis,accordingtoAugustine,tiedtotheeternallaws,be-causeitsomehowattainsthatlightthroughagentintellect’shighestfocusandthroughthehigherpartofreason,neverthelessitisundoubtedlytrue,inkeepingwithwhatthePhilosophersays,thatcognitionisgeneratedinusthroughthesenses,memory,andexperience,fromwhichtheuniversalisassembledinus,whichisthesourceofartandknowledge.(Christouroneteacher,n.18,CTIII88)ThisisstrikingnotonlybecauseBonaventureleavesroomfortheempiricismofPosteriorAnalyticsII19,butalsobecauseeventheAugustinianlanguageofthefirstfewlineshasbeeninfectedwiththeAristotelianagentintellect.BytheendofthethirteenthcenturythenextgreatFranciscanmaster,DunsScotus,haddispensedwithilluminationentirely.Whenitcomestoknowledgeof“infallibletruth,withoutdoubtanddeception,”ScotusinsistedthathumanCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n220robertpasnaubeings“canachievethis,bypurelynaturalmeans”(OrdinatioI,d.3.1,q.4,n.258).Goddoesinasenseilluminatethemind,buthedoessobymakingtheworldintelligible,givingitastructureandcoherencesuchthatourminds,ontheirown,cangrasptruthsinscience,mathematics,andphilosophy.24Thetwilightofilluminationistepistemologycoincidedwithre-newedinterestinskepticism.HenryofGhent,stilldefendingthetheoryofilluminationinthe1270s,beganhisinfluentialtheologi-calSummawithaseriesofarticlesonskepticismandillumination.Thefirstarticleconsidersancientskepticismatlength,arguingtothecontrarythathumanbeingscanapprehendathing“asitis,with-outanymistakeordeception”(Summaquaestionumordinariarum,art.1,q.1,CTIII97).Ifthisiswhatitmeanstoknowathing,thenGhentconcludesthathumanbeingscanhaveknowledge.Buthegoesonintheverynextquestiontoqualifythisclaimdramatically,remarkingthatifwelimitourselvestonaturalmeansthen“itisal-togetherimpossibleforustohaveanaltogethercertainandinfalliblecognitionoftruth”(q.2,CTIII119).Inthisway,Henrycontinuestofindaplacefordivineillumination.Bythefourteenthcenturyilluminationwasnolongeratopicofseriousinvestigation.Disputesoverskepticismandthelimitsofhumanknowledgenowoccurredmostofteninthecontextofadis-tinctionbetweentwotypesofcognition:abstractiveandintuitive.Scotusintroducedthisterminologyasadistinctionbetweencogni-tionthat“abstractsfromallexistence”andcognitionthat“canbeofathinginsofarasitispresentinitsexistence”(LecturaII,d.3.2,q.2,n.285).Imagination,then,countsasabstractive,whereasper-ceptionisordinarilyintuitive.Innocuousasthisdistinctionseems,itbecameenormouslyinfluentialandcontroversial.Therewere,inparticular,disputesoverhowtodefinethetwokindsofcognitionanddisputesoverwhethertherecouldbeintuitivecognitionofnonex-istentobjects.Thisinturnledphilosophersandtheologianstotakemoreseriouslythepossibilityofsensoryillusionandintellectualerror,issuesthathadnotbeenseriouslypursuedsinceAugustine’sera.25Thehigh-watermarkofmedievalskepticismcamewithNicholasofAutrecourt.WritingtotheFranciscanBernardofArezzointhe1330s,AutrecourtbeginswithBernard’sdefinitionofanintuitivecognitionasthat“throughwhichwejudgethatathingexists,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature221whetherornotitdoesexist.”Autrecourtarguesthatitfollowsfromthisdefinitionthatonecanneverbecertainthataperceptionisveridical.Consequently,contrarytoAristotle’sclaimthat“sensa-tionsarealwaystrue”(DeanimaIII3,428a11),Autrecourtcon-cludesthat“youarenotcertainoftheexistenceoftheobjectsofthefivesenses”(firstletter,n.11).Moreover,“youarenotcertainwhetheranythingappearstoyouatall”(n.12),andindeed“youdonotknowwhetheryourownintellectexists”(n.15).Inasec-ondletterAutrecourtgoesevenfarther,arguingthattheprincipleofnoncontradictionistheonlyfirmfootingforcertainknowledge.Butsincevirtuallynothingofwhatpassesforphilosophicalknowledgecanbederivedfromthatprinciple,“Aristotleinhisentirenaturalandtheoreticalphilosophypossessedsuchcertaintyofscarcelytwoconclusions,andperhapsnotevenofone”(secondletter,n.23).will,passion,andactionItissometimessaidthatthewillisamedievaldiscoveryandthatancienttheoriesofhumannatureweredevelopedinthecompleteabsenceofanysuchfaculty.Thisiscontroversial,26butwhatseemsclearisthatAugustinewasthefirstmajorphilosophertogiveadetailedaccountofthewillinsomethinglikeitsmodernsense.Fittingly,givenAugustine’smethodology,hefirstdidsothroughre-flectiononhisowncase,intheConfessions,analyzinghistorturedpathtowardreligiousconversion.Theopeningchaptersofthatau-tobiographytracehisintellectualjourneyfromcarelessadolescencethroughManichaeism,skepticism,andNeoplatonism,andfinallytocompleteacceptanceofChristianity.Buttherealdramabeginsonlyatthepointwhere“alldoubtleftme”(VII10).This,hehadsup-posed,wouldbetheendofthestory.Buthecametodiscoverthat–contrarytoSocratesintheProtagoras–knowingwhatisrightisnotsufficientfordoingwhatisright.Whatwastheproblem?Iwasheldfastnotbytheironofanotherbutbymyironwill.Theenemyhadagriponmywillandfromtheremadeachainformeandboundme.Fromadistortedwillcomeslust,andservitudetolustbecomeshabit.Whenthereisnoresistancetohabit,necessityfollows.Bytheselinks,asitwere,connectedtooneanother(hencemytermachain),aharshservitudeheldmeunderconstraint.(VIII5)CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n222robertpasnauAlthoughAugustinewasintellectuallyreadytochangehislife,hiswillwasnotwilling.Howcouldthisbe?Allthatwasnecessaryatthispointwasanactofwill:“Notjustthegoingbutalsothearrivingtherewouldhaverequirednothingotherthanthewillingtogo”(VIII8).Whatcouldpreventhimfromwillingthatwhichhewanted?Theproblemwasthathiswillwassplitintwo.Whatwasnecessarywas“willingstronglyandwholly,nottheturningandtwistingonewayandanotherofawillhalf-wounded,strugglingwithonepartrisingupwhiletheotherpartfallsdown”(VIII19).Latermedievalauthorsdebatedatlengththerelationshipsbe-tweenwillandintellectandbetweenwillandthepassions.Whatisperhapsmostsignificantinthesediscussionsistheconceptionofwillasafacultysubjecttocomplexdispositions.Justaswecom-monlythinkofthemindasacquiringbeliefsandmemoriesovertime,Augustineconceivesofthewillasshapedbyhabitualde-cisions.IntheNicomacheanEthics,Aristotlehaddescribedhowacquiringtherightsortofhabitfromanearlyage“isveryimportant,indeedall-important”(II1,1103b25).AugustinewasnostudentofAristotle,buthedevelopsmuchthesamepointandsituatesitwithinhistheoryofthewill.Thiswouldbecrucialtolatermedievalethics,accordingtowhichtheall-importantvirtuesofcharityandjusticearedispositionsofthewill.27Moreover,itwasthisconceptionofthewillthatshapedAugustine’stheoryofgrace.Justasgenuineunder-standingrequiresthattheintellectbeilluminatedbyGod,somoralgoodnessrequiresthatthewillbeinfusedwithvirtue.Awillthathasbeenbadlyhabituatedfromayoungage–likehisown–canfinditselfintheirongripofnecessity.SuchnecessitymadeitliterallyimpossibleforAugustinetoconvertonhisown.“Thelaborisbe-yondmeuntilyouopentheway”(ConfessionsXI22).Ashegrewolder,Augustinecametoputevermorestressontheroleofgrace,arguingthateventhefreeacceptanceofgracerequiresgrace.Intheend,hesucceededinhavingthecontraryviewofhiscontemporaryPelagiusregardedasaheresy.Thesequestionsweredestinedtore-mainattheforefrontofmedievalthought.InthefourteenthcenturyThomasBradwardinewassodisturbedbysomemodernviewsthathecomposedanextensivetreatiseOnGod’sCauseagainstPelagius,arguingthat“nophilosophicalormoralvirtueisatruevirtue,abso-lutelyrightorjust,withoutcharityandgraceperfectingit.”Withoutthese,“everysuchactionisinsomewayasin”([339]327C).CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature223Overshadowedbythesenotoriousdebatesovergracewassomeverysubtlelatemedievalworkinactiontheory.Aquinas’stheoryofaction–totakethemoststudiedinstance–isstandardlysaidtoinvolvetwelvediscretestepsonthewaytoavoluntaryact.28Amongthemostpressingquestionsinthisareawastherelationshipbetweenreasonandthepassions.St.Paulhadfamouslydescribedhow“Thefleshlustsagainstthespiritandthespiritagainsttheflesh.Theyareinconflictwithoneanother,andsoyoudonotdothethingsyouwant”(Galatians5:17).Augustinesawhisownearlyyearsasanillustrationofsuchremarks(cf.ConfessionsVIII5).Hecametoanalyzethephenomenonasafailureofwill–notsomuchweaknessofwill,aswenowcallit,butaflaweddispositionofwill,makingitimpossibletowill“stronglyandwholly”inawaythatwouldbeefficacious.AlthoughthePaulinetextsuggeststhatspiritandflesharematchedinanevenfight,medievalauthorstendedtoviewtherelationshipbetweenthewillandthepassionsasasymmetrical,inasmuchasonlythewill(voluntas)couldgiverisetovoluntaryactions.29IfthepassionswereliterallytoconquerthewillinthewayPaulsuggests,theresultingactionwouldbeaninvoluntaryone,forwhichtheagentwouldnotbedirectlyresponsible.(Suchcaseswouldbeexceedinglyrare.Eventhen,onemightbeindirectlyre-sponsibleforbeingdisposedtohavesuchoverwhelmingpassions.)Moreover,mostlatermedievalauthorsidentifiedthewillas“ratio-nalappetite,”meaningthatitchooseswhattheintellecthasjudgedtobegood.Thismakestheconflictbetweenwillandpassionstillmorepuzzling,sincethepassionsnowseemineligibletoinfluencethewill.Yet,ofcourse,wedoallsuffertemptation.Indeed,AdamandEve’soriginalsinwasthoughttohavemadesuchtemptationaninescapablepartofthislife.ThusnotevenSt.Paulcouldkeephisfleshfromlustingagainsthisspirit.Tomakesenseofthisinfluence,thefleshwasviewedasdoingitsworkindirectly,byshapinghowthemindconceivesofasituation.30Thedescriptionofwillasrationalappetitedidnotgounchal-lenged.OneofthemostinterestingcritiqueswasthatofScotus,whoproposedtwokindsofinclinationswithinthewill.DevelopingasuggestionmadebyAnselm(OntheFalloftheDevilch.14;TheHarmonyoftheForeknowledge,thePredestination,andtheGraceofGodwithFreeChoicech.19),ScotusdistinguishedbetweenanCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n224robertpasnauinclinationforone’sownadvantage(affectiocommodi)andanin-clinationforjustice(affectiojustitiae).Thefirstexplainsourincli-nationtowardwhatisgoodforourselves;thisistheaspectofourwillthatScotusthinksiscapturedbythephraserationalappetite,invirtueofwhichwepursuethatwhichmostcontributestoourownhappiness.Wearealsoinclined,however,todowhatisgoodregardlessofwhetherithasanyconnectiontoourselves.Thisincli-nationforjusticeexplainsourfreedomtoresistpureself-interest.InScotus’sview,itgroundsourcrucialcapacitytoloveGodforhisownsakeratherthanforourownreward.31freedomandimmortalityDifferingconceptionsofhumannatureleaddirectlytodisagree-mentsinethicsandpoliticaltheory,thefocusofthenextthreechaptersinthisvolume.Twoconvictionswereoffundamentalimportancetomedievalauthorsinthisregard:thathumanbeingsarefree,andhenceworthysubjectsofpraiseandblame;andthathu-manbeingsareimmortal,andhencesubjecttoeternalhappinessorsuffering.Thoughphilosophersdifferedinhowtheyanalyzedandar-guedforthesepropositions,therewasalmostuniversalbeliefintheirtruth.EvenBradwardine,forallhisanti-Pelagianism,acknowledgedthat“Allthetheologians,allthelogicians,allthemoralphiloso-phers,andalmostallthenaturalphilosophersunanimouslytestifythatfreedecision32mustbeposited”(OnGod’sCause[339]443D).Therewascontroversy,nevertheless,astohowfreedomofwillcouldbereconciledwithdivineprovidence,grace,andforeknowledge,ononehand,andwiththedetermininginfluenceofintellect,ontheother.Inthelatterconnection,itiscommontospeakofatheorybe-ingmoreorlessintellectualistorvoluntarist,dependingonwhetheritgivesagreaterorlesserroletointellectorwill.Thisis,however,notaveryusefulwaytounderstandthedebate,becauseallagreedthatthewilliscrucialforfreedecision.Thecentralquestionwashowthewillperformsitscrucialtask.Specifically,howandtowhatextentisitdeterminedbyintellectandotherforces?Philosopherstodaydistinguishbetweencompatibilists,whobelievethatthewillcanbefreeevenifdeterminedbyoutsidefactors,andlibertarians,whoarguethatthewillcanmoveitselfspontaneously.MuchthesameissueswereinplayduringtheMiddleAges,whenthekindofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature225determinisminquestionwastypicallyGod’sgraceandprovidenceortheintellect’sjudgmentregardingwhatisbest.Augustineonceagainwasinfluential,butalthoughhisremarksonfreewillwereextensive(see,e.g,OnFreeChoiceoftheWillIIIandCityofGodV10),hisviewsonthecrucialissuesareoftenhardtodetermine.33Anselm’sviewsarelikewisedifficulttointerpret,butheseemstocomeclosertosomethinglikecompatibilism.Heexplicitlydeniesthatfreewillrequiresthedualability,atasinglemoment,tochooseornotchooseathing,arguingthatsomeonesouprightastobeun-abletosinismorefreethansomeonewhoisabletoeithersinornotsin(OnFreedomofChoice,ch.1).Elsewhereheconsidersthecaseofanangelcreatedinstages,whohasbeencreateduptothepointofbeing“readytowillbutnotyetwillinganything”(OntheFalloftheDevil,ch.12).Thisangelcouldnotmoveitselftothatfirstactofwilling,Anselmclaims,because“whatevermovesitselftowilling,firstwillsitselfsotomove.”Sincetheangel,exhypothesi,doesnotwillanything,itcannotmoveitselftowill,andsoitneedssome-thingelsetomoveit.Anselmthusseemstodenythatthewillhasthepowertomoveitselfspontaneously.34Scholasticphilosophersdebatedthisissuevigorously.Aquinasdidnotclearlydefendeitherside(atanyrate,scholarsdisagreeonthepoint),35butthenextgenerationofphilosopherstookclearposi-tions.HenryofGhent,Olivi,andScotusdefendedalibertarian-styleaccount.GodfreyofFontainesandlaterJohnBuridanwereinef-fectcompatibilists.36Godfrey,writingin1289,proposedthatindis-cussingfreewill“Weshouldnotdenywhatisfirstandmostcertainbecauseofignoranceanddoubtaboutwhatissecondary.”Onesuchcertainprincipleisthatnothingcanmoveitself.Thereforeifitseemstosomeonethat,onthesuppositionthatthewilldoesnotmoveitself,itisdifficulttopreservethefreedomthatonhisviewhewantstopositinthewill,inthewayhelikes,heshouldnotonthebasisofthissecondaryclaimproceedtodenypriorandmorecertainclaims.Rather,onaccountofthecertaintyofthepriorclaimsthathehastosuppose,heshouldstudyhowtomakethesecompatiblewiththesecondaryclaims.(QuodlibetVI7[275]170)Inotherwords,ratherthanabandonabasicprincipleofmeta-physics–thatnothingcanmoveitself–weshouldreconsiderourassumptionsaboutwhatfreedomrequires.OtherswouldquestionCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n226robertpasnauthisallegedprincipleofmetaphysics.Scotus,themostinfluentialdefenderofthewill’sspontaneity,distinguishedbetweentwowaysinwhichathingmightbeindeterminate:eitherbecauseitisinsuf-ficientlyactualized,orbecauseithasa“superabundantsufficiency”thatallowsittomoveitselfinanyoneofvariousways(QuaestionessuperlibrosMetaphysicorumIX15.31–32[285]152–55;[284]610).Thewillisspecialbecauseitisindeterminateinthissecondway.So,givenitsexceptionalnature,“itseemstrulystupidtoapplyuni-versalpropositionsaboutactiveprinciplestothewill”(QuaestionesIX15.44[285]158–59;[284]614).Asforwhythewillhasthisca-pacity,Scotusremarked–muchashehadregardingtheunityofbodyandsoul(seeabove)–thatthereisnofurtherexplanationtobehad.“Thereisnoothercausetobegivenforwhyitchoosesinthiswayexceptthatitissuchacause...Thereisnoothercauseexceptthatitisthewill”(QuaestionesIX15.24,29[285]150–53;[284]608,610).37Still,despitesuchdisagreements,medievalauthorswereinbroadagreementontheimportanceofthewillandtherealityofhumanfreedom.Thereasontheycouldagreeonthispointwasthattheyagreedontheconnectionbetweenfreedomandmoralresponsibility.Aquinaswasmerelystatingatruismwhenheremarkedthat“With-outfreedecisiontherecouldbenomeritordemeritandnojustpunishmentorreward”(Truth,q.24,a.1).Medievalviewsaboutjustpunishmentandrewardwere,however,typicallyprojectedbeyondthepresentlife.InasermonontheApostles’Creed,Aquinasre-markedthatwithoutthehopeofabetterlifetocome,“deathwouldwithoutdoubtbedreadedintensely,andahumanbeingwoulddoanythingbadbeforesufferingdeath”(Insymbolumapostolorum11.1001).Sowhilefreewillmademoralresponsibilitypossible,per-sonalimmortalitygavesuchresponsibilityitsforce,byopeninguptheprospectofeternalsalvationordamnation.Therewaslittledisagreementaboutthefactofhumanimmortal-ity,butextensivedebateoverwhetheritcouldbeproved.Aquinasbelieveditcouldbe.Hiscentralargumentdependedonshowingthatthehumansoulhasafunction–thought–thatitexerciseswith-outanybodilyorgan.Hethenreasonedthatifthesoulhassuchafunction,itcanexistwithoutabody,andthatthebody’scorrup-tionwouldthereforenotbringaboutthesoul’scorruption(see,e.g.,STI,q.75,a.6).ThisdoesnotyieldtheconclusionthathumanCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature227beingsareimmortal.Fullhumanimmortalitywouldrequiretheresurrectionofthebody,somethingthatwasnotgenerallyconsid-eredprovable.Eventhedemonstrabilityofthesoul’simmortalitywasrejectedbymanylaterauthors,includingScotus(OpusOxonienseIV43.2[286]149),Ockham(QuodlibetI10),andevenCajetan,Aquinas’sgreatRenaissancecommentator(IndeanimaIII2).38Scotusarguedasfollows.Eveniftheintellectfunctionswithoutanybodilyorgan,thisdoesnotshowthattheintellect’sfunctioncouldendurewithoutabody,becausetheremightbeotherwaysinwhichtheintellect’sfunctiondependsonthebody.Infact,AquinasandScotuswereinagreementthatourintellectdoesneedthebodyforitsnormalop-eration.Bothheldthattheintellectmustconstantlyturntowardsensoryimages(phantasms)inthecourseofthinkingabstractly.So,evenforameaningfulimmortalityofthesoul,Aquinasneededtoestablishsomethingfurther.Heneededtoestablishthatthesoulwouldtakeupanewmodeofcognitiononceapartfromthebody.39Hewasinfactpreparedtoarguejustthat.Hethoughtthatoursoul,onceseparatedfromthebody,wouldthinkliketheangels,albeitinaninferiorway(Quaestionesdisputataedeanima,qq.15–21;STI,q.89).Notsurprisingly,therewasdoubtaboutwhetherthiscouldbeproved.Asscholasticphilosophybecameincreasinglyrigorousinitsmethods,suchdebatesoverprovabilitybecameincreasinglycommon.notes1.SomeearlyChristians,suchasOrigen,heldthatsoulswerecreatedbeforetheirbodieswerecreated.Augustineleftopenthisquestion(see,e.g.,ConfessionsI6).BythetimeofAquinas,however,preexistencewasnolongertreatedasaseriousoption,andtherewasanalmostuniversalconsensusthatthesoulisinfusedwellafterthepointofconception.Forasurveyofthirteenth-centuryviews,seeR.Dales[545].2.ThiscarefuldefinitionallowsAugustinetosaythatthemind,althoughnotabody,isextendedthroughoutthebodyinaspecialway:“itisawholeinthewholebody,andawholeineachpartofthebody”(TrinityVI6.8).3.SeealsoTrinityXV12.21,OnFreeChoiceoftheWillII3,andCityofGodXI26.ForfurtherdiscussionofAugustine’sfirst-personmethod,seeG.Matthews[73],chs.3–4andchapter12inthisvolume.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n228robertpasnau4.SeeAvicenna,LiberdeanimaI5[115]I79–80;Aristotle,DeanimaII3,414a31–32.Foranearlyscholasticdescriptionofthesoul’spowers,seeCTIII9–34,ananonymousworkdatingfromaround1225.5.Fortheearlythirteenthcentury,see,forexample,PhiliptheChancellor,SummadebonoIV8[379]284.ThemostnotablelaterpluralistsareHenryofGhent(QuodlibetIV13),JohnDunsScotus(OrdinatioIV,d.11,q.3[282]VIII604–56),andWilliamofOckham(QuodlibetII10–11),allthreeofwhomdisagreeamongthemselvesinvariousways(seeM.M.Adams[318]647–69).Foradetailedsurveyofviewsinthisarea,seeR.Zavalloni,RicharddeMediavillaetlaControversesurlaPluralitedesFormes´(Louvain,1951).6.Aquinasarticulateshisviewinvariousplaces:foraconcisestatement,seeSTI,q.76,arts.3–4.ForOlivi,seeIISent.,q.71[271]II637.OntheOxfordcondemnations,promulgatedfirstbyRobertKilwardbyin1277andthenbyJohnPechamin1284,seeD.A.Callus[239]andJ.-P.Torrell[260]304–05.7.DiscussionfocusedontherealpresenceofChristintheEucharistandtheenduranceofChrist’sbodyinthetomb.Forabriefaccount,seeM.M.Adams[318]650–52.8.SeeH.Denzinger[24]no.902.ThetargetofthiscondemnationwastheaforementionedOlivi,whotooktherationalsoultoinformacertainspiritualmatterthatwasdistinctfromthecorporealmatterwecallthebody(seeIISent.,q.51,andR.Pasnau[274]).ThisdecreewouldbereaffirmedbytheLateranCouncilof1513,makingtroubleforawholenewgenerationofCatholicphilosophersintheearlymodernera.9.Forscholasticauthors,thistransformingrolewasstandardlyplayedbyagentintellect(see,e.g.,Aquinas,STI,q.79,a.3;q.84,a.6).Augustineseemstohavethoughtthatevensensationrequiredthissortofspiritualtransformation(TheLiteralMeaningofGenesisXII16).Ockham,attheotherextreme,wasidiosyncraticinbelievingthatthematerialcouldactontheimmaterial.See,e.g.,ReportatioII12–13[308]OThV275.10.See,e.g.,Aquinas:“everynaturalbodyhassomedeterminatesubstantialform.Thereforesincetheaccidentsfollowfromthesubstantialform,itisnecessarythatdeterminateaccidentsfollowfromadeterminateform”(STI,q.7,a.3).11.SeethediscussioninD.DesChene[546]ch.4.Foralatescholasticexceptiontothisconsensus,seeJacobZabarella,asixteenth-centuryPaduanphilosopher,[622]395.12.Forinformationonancientskepticism,seeM.Burnyeat[38].13.ForfurtherdiscussionofAugustine’smethodology,seeN.Kretzmann[71].Augustinereturnstotheseissuesinmanyplaces,includingAgainstCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nHumannature229theAcademicians,TheAdvantageofBelieving,TrinityXV,andCityofGodXI.14.See,e.g.,Aquinas,STI,q.14,a.1;q.84,a.2.15.SeeH.A.Wolfson[553];D.L.Black[479].16.OntheroleofBaconindevelopingearlierIslamictheories,seeK.Tachau[552]ch.1.17.Augustinesuggeststhisaccountinvariousplaces,e.g.,OnMusicVI5,trans.R.C.Taliaferro(NewYork,1947);TheMagnitudeoftheSoul,trans.J.J.McMahon(NewYork,1947)23–24;TheLiteralMeaningofGenesisXII.FordiscussionseeG.O’Daly[75].18.See,e.g.,STI,q.85,a.2,ad3:“Therearetwooperationsinthesen-sorypart.Oneoccurssolelyinvirtueofanimpression;inthiswaytheoperationofasenseiscompletedbyitsreceivinganimpressionfromsomethingsensible.Theotheroperationistheforminginvirtueofwhichtheimaginarypowerformsforitselfanimageofanabsentthing,orevenofsomethingneverseen.”Cf.Aristotle,DeanimaII11,423b32:“Tosenseistobeaffectedinacertainway.”19.SeeIISent.,q.23;q.58,ad14;q.72,q.74,andR.Pasnau[551]chs.4–5.20.Suchclaimsalsoextendedtothementalword(seechapter3inthisvol-ume),whichOliviidentifiedastheactofthought(seeCTIII136–51).ForOckham,seeE.StumpinCCOck168–203,aswellasthetexttranslatedinA.HymanandJ.J.Walsh[17]670–79.21.SeeP.King[549]fordiscussionofthispoint.22.Foranotherfiercereplytothetheory,seeAquinas’sshorttreatiseDeunitateintellectus.ForananonymousdefenseofmonopsychismbyanartsmasterattheUniversityofParis,seeCTIII35–78.23.MostfamousisDeanimaIII5,speakingofagentintellect:“Thisintel-lectisseparate,unaffected,andunmixed,beinginessenceactivity...Itisnotthecasethatitsometimesthinksandatothertimesnot.Inseparationitisjustwhatitis,andthisaloneisimmortalandeternal”(430a17–23).24.Fortextandtranslationofthekeyquestion,seeJohnDunsScotus[286]96–132.Forfurtherdiscussionofdivineillumination,seeR.Pasnau[550].25.ParticularlyimportantweretheviewsofPeterAureolandWilliamofOckham.ForAureolseeCTIII178–218.Ockham’sviewhasbeenthesubjectofextensivediscussionanddisagreementinmoderntimes.See,mostrecently,E.KargerinCCOck204–26.Forastrikinginstanceofskepticism’sinfluenceintheearly1330s,seetheselectionfromWilliamCrathornatCTIII245–301.ForScotusonintuitiveandabstractivecognition,seeR.PasnauinCCScot285–311.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n230robertpasnau26.A.Dihle[547]stressestheimportanceofAugustine.T.Irwin[548]arguesforwillinAristotle;C.H.Kahn[69]givesagoodsenseofthecomplexityofthewholeissue.27.SeeB.Kent[558]andchapter10inthisvolume.28.SeeA.DonaganinCHLMP642–54.29.See,e.g.,Anselm,OnFreedomofChoice,chs.5–7;Aquinas,STIaIIae,q.77,a.1.30.ForAquinas’sviewsinthisarea,seeP.King[243]andN.Kretzmann[247].31.SeeScotus[288]179–81and469–73;fordiscussion,seeA.Wolter[301].Howarethesetwoinclinationstobeweighed?ThatitisrationalforustoloveGodmorethanourselveswasdefendedbyAquinas(IIISent.,d.29,q.un.,a.3),GodfreyofFontaines(CTII271–84,301–06),and,itwouldseem,byOckham(CCOck273–301).32.“Freedecision”translatesliberumarbitrium,whichwasthestandardmedievalphraseforwhatwecallfreewill,fromAugustinethroughAnselmandintothescholastics.Itwasnotcustomaryamongmedievalauthorstospeakofthewillasbeingfree,althoughmanyauthorscon-cludedintheendthatfreedecisionisacapacitybelongingtothewill.Still,themedievalterminologyisusefulbecauseitleavesopentheques-tionofwhetherourcapacityforfreedecisionreallyistheproductofourfacultyofwill.33.SeeC.Kirwan[70]andE.StumpinCCAug35–78.34.SeeS.VisserandT.Williams[147],whoreadAnselmasakindofliber-tarian.35.Forthreeverydifferentaccounts,seeE.Stump[259],S.MacDonald[249]andR.Pasnau[255].36.SeetheselectionsinHenryofGhent[221]andthediscussionofOliviinR.Pasnau[273].ForBuridan,seeJ.Zupko[345]andBuridaninCTII498–586.In[21]I,O.Lottinpresentsmanyinterestingtexts,inLatin,fromthroughoutthethirteenthcentury.37.Fordiscussion,seeP.King[296]andT.Williams[299].38.Seechapter13inthisvolumefordiscussionofthedisputeamongRe-naissancescholastics.39.OntheturntowardphantasmsinAquinas,seeSTI,q.84,art.7andR.Pasnau[255]ch.9.ForScotus,seeLecturaII,d.3.2,q.1,n.255;LecturaI,d.3.3,q.1,n.300;OrdinatioI,d.3.3,q.1,n.392;OrdinatioI,d.3.1,q.3,n.187.OnAquinas’sdifficultiesinestablishingthesoul’simmortality,seeJ.Owens[254].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nbonniekent10ThemorallifeFromthedawnoftheMiddleAgestotheirend,moraltheoristsstrug-gledtoexplainwhatmakesapersongoodbyhumanstandards,whatittakestomerithappinessintheafterlife,andwhat,ifanything,thetwohavetodowitheachother.Someinveighedagainsttheworldlyethicsofancientphilosophers;otherspraisedtheancientsforimportantmoralinsights.Yeteveryleadingmedievalthinkerworkedtodevelopanaccountofthemorallifefarmorecomprehen-sivethanmostprofessorsofphilosophicalethicsormoraltheologytodaywouldattempt.Theideathataserioustheologiancoulddis-missclassicalethicsasunworthyofstudyanddebatewasnomoreacceptablethantheideathataseriousphilosophercoulddismissquestionsabouttheimmortalityofthesoulandthenatureofGodasirrelevanttomorallifeinhumansociety.IshallbeginbysketchingAugustine’spioneeringworkinethics,alongwithsomeofthepuzzlesitcreates.AfteralookatrespectfulbutsignificantrevisionsofAugustinebyAnselmofCanterbury,Iturntothebravenewworldofuniversities,wherethepaganAristotlesoonemergedasanauthoritytobereckonedwith.Beginninginthemid-thirteenthcentury,effortstoweavetogetherhisinsightswithAugustine’sbecameatoncehighlycomplexandtheoccasionforpassionateacademicdispute.Lessthanacenturyold,universi-tieswerealreadyembroiledintheirfirststormyexperimentwith“multiculturalism.”Whatkindoffreedomdoesmoralagencyrequire?Dowealwaysactinpursuitofhappiness,alwaysseeingourownactionsasinsomewaygood?Isitpossibletochooseanactweknowfullwelltobewrong?WhatdoesitmeantoloveGodaboveall,andwhoisabletodoso?Reflectinguponanddebatingsuchquestions,Thomas231CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n232bonniekentAquinas,DunsScotus,WilliamofOckham,andothersjoinedinpro-ducingafine-grainedanalysisofhumanmotivationsthatmaystillbeunequaled.InlaboringtoworkoutwhatitmeanstoloveGod,medievalmoraltheoriststhoughtlongandhardaboutwhatitmeanstoloveanyone.augustineandclassicalethicsAugustineshareswithancientphilosopherstheconceptionofethicsasaninquiryintothesupremegood:thatwhichweseekforitsownsake,neverforthesakeofsomefurtherend,andwhichmakesushappy.1Healsosharestheconvictionthatallhumanbeingsbynaturewanttobehappy,agreeingthathappinessisaconditionofobjectivewell-being,notmerelythepleasureapersonmightgainfromsatisfyingwhateverdesiresshehappenstohave,howeverde-ludedorself-destructive.Beginningwithinthissharedframework,Augustine’sthinkingleadshimfarafieldfromclassicalethics.Hearguesthathappinessispossibleonlyintheafterlife,inthecom-panyofGodandthesaints.Wecannotmakeourselveshappy;wecanatmosthopetomerittherewardofhappinessintheafterlife.AshappinessisagiftofGod’sgrace,so,too,isvirtueafreegift,notonewecanearnbyourownnaturalresourcesorindependentmer-its.Finally,AugustinecontendsthatalltruevirtuesarerootedinGod-givencharity,thekindofloveextolledbySt.PaulinICorinthi-ans13(Latin:caritas;Greek:agape).Becausepaganslackcharity,alloftheirapparentvirtuesarevices,andalloftheiractionsaresins.2Ofcourse,paganscanpromotethegoodofotherindividuals,eventhegoodoftheircommunity,therebyacquiringwhatAugustinecalls“civic”virtues.Butfarfromacceptingsuchvirtuesasgenuinebutsecond-rate,hepronouncesthemvices.Thisdisparagingviewplainlyrequiressomeexplanation.SupposethataChristianwithcharity,awakenedat4a.m.bythecriesofherinfantson,choosestocomforthim,insteadofignoringthechildandgoingbacktosleep.Supposethatapaganmotherbehavesinpreciselythesameway.AugustinewouldpraisetheChristianbecausesherecognizesGodasthehighestgood,theonlygoodtobelovedstrictlyforhisownsakeandaboveallelse.Sheknowsthatthevaluepeoplehave,justbecausetheyarehuman,mustneverCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife233beconsideredindependentofGodasthecreatorofhumannature.Sheknows,too,thatwhatevervirtuesheherselfhasisGod’sgift,hencetobeexercisedwithappropriatehumility.Whenshecom-fortsherson,sheactsforthesakeofeternalhappiness,fromaloveofthechildasbelongingtoGod,andwithgratitudeforGod’sgrace.Augustinewouldfaultthepaganmotherforaimingatonlysomeearthlyendandactingfrombadmotivations.Ifsheactsfromloveofthechildjustbecausehebelongstoher,shefavorshimassomethingakintoprivateproperty.(Whyconsiderthisvirtuouswhenevenan-imalsdemonstratetenderconcernfortheirownoffspring?)Ifshesimplyenjoystakingcareofbabies,sheactsfromadesireforherownpleasureorsatisfaction.ThepaganmotherwillfarebetterinAugustine’sjudgmentifshehappenstobeaStoicsage;soletussup-posethatsheis.LikeAugustine,shebelievesthatvirtuesliewhollyinthemind,butthatanyonewhodoeshaveavirtuousmindwillperform,oratleasttrytoperform,awiderangeofphysicalactions.Sayshebelieves,too,thatavirtuouspersonwouldriseat4a.m.tocomfortacryingchildevenifhebelongedtoatotalstranger.AsaStoic,however,shealsobelievesthathappinesscomesexclusivelyfromavirtuousmind,sothatvirtueandhappinessbothliewhollywithintheindividual’scontrol.Augustineretorts:Avirtuousmindissomethingverypraiseworthy...Agreatthing,anad-mirablething;admireit,Stoic,asmuchasyoucan.Buttellme:Fromwheredoesitcome?Itisnotpreciselyyourvirtuousmindthatmakesyouhappy,buttheonewhohasgivenyouthevirtue,whohasinspiredyoutodesireit,andgrantedyouthecapacityforit...Itisagoodthingthatitpleasesyou.Iknowyouarethirstyforit;butyoucannotpouryourselfadrinkofvirtue.(Sermon150,§9)3Howevermuchtheiractionsmightbenefitothers,evensocietyasawhole,Stoicsgrosslyoverestimatehowmuchlieswithinhumancontrol–andnot,inAugustine’sview,owingtosomesimplefactualmistake.Theyexaggeratehumanpowerandself-sufficiencybecausetheywantcreditformakingthemselvesbothvirtuousandhappy.ThisanalysisofmotivationsreflectsAugustine’sviewofhu-mannature’spresentcondition,damagedbyoriginalsin.AfterAdam’sfall,allhumanbeingsarebornwiththeinordinateself-loveAugustinecalls“pride.”OnlythroughGod’sgiftofcharitycanweCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n234bonniekentloveGod,others,andevenourselvesasweshould:accordingtotheirintrinsicvalue,neithermorenorlessthandeserved.WithoutGod’sliberatinggrace,ourmotivationsandvaluejudgmentsremainincur-ablyself-centered(CityofGodXII8,XIV28,XV22).Augustine’stheocentricmoraltheorycarriesforwardSt.Paul’sattackontheelitismandintellectualismofclassicalethics.InPaul’sandAugustine’sview,virtuesarenolongermoraldisposi-tionsachievedbyonlyaselectfew,throughmanyyearsoflearningandpracticebeginninginchildhood.Nomatterhowbadone’sup-bringingandeducation,nomatterhowundistinguishedone’snativeintelligence,nobodyeverstandsbeyondhopeoflife-changingmoralimprovement.WithGod’sgrace,thegreatestsinnermightbecon-vertedtovirtue.Asnobodyinthislifeiseverbeyondhope,neitherisanyonebeyonddangerofdegeneration.Eventhesaintsamongusmustcontinuestrugglingtoresisttemptation.Emphasizingalwaysourshared,flawedhumanity,Augustine’smoraldoctrineenvisionswhatisaptlydescribedas“alifelongpro-cessofconvalescence.”4Theprocesscannotevenbeginuntilwead-mitthatweareimpotenttocontrolourownlivesandplaceourfaithinapowergreaterthanourselves.Iimagine,then,thatAugustinewouldawardhighmarkstoAlcoholicsAnonymousandprogramsmodeledonit,onlyexpressingregretthatrecoveringaddictsareamongthefewmembersofoursocietyhumbleenoughtorecog-nizewhathebelievedweretruthsapplicabletoeveryoneandtothewholeofmorallife.InreplacingwisdomwithcharityorloveasthefoundationalvirtueAugustineshiftswesternethicsawayfromthestandardclassicalfo-cusonreasonorintellect.Virtuecomestorequireaboveallagoodwill.Note,too,thatwearenolongerassuredthatvirtuouschar-acterwillprotectusfrommisery,letalonemakeushappy,amidstthepervasiveevilsandinjusticesofhumansociety.Dismissingasgrandioseliestheclassicaltreatmentsofvirtueasconstitutiveofthehappylife,Augustinerecastsvirtueasthatbywhichonemeritshap-pinessafterdeath:“Bymeansofthesedivinelybestowedvirtues,wenowliveagoodlifeandafterwardaregranteditsreward,thehappylife,whichmustbeeternal.Herethesesamevirtuesareinaction,thereineffect;heretheyareworking,theretheyarepaid;heretheirfunction,theretheirend”(Letter155,§16).CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife235OpenquestionsAugustine’sworksraisedmanyquestionsinthemindsoflaterphilosophersandtheologians:abouthowhisaccountofthemorallifewentindetail,whetheritneededrevisionstobecoherent,andwhetherhewassimplywrongoncertainpoints.5Consider,forin-stance,thethesisthatallhumanbeingsnaturallywanttobehappy.InitselfthisposesnoproblemforChristianmoralthought.Itdoes,however,poseproblemswhencombinedwithwhatIshalldub“theeudaimonistprinciple”:thateverythingwewill,wewillforthesakeofhappiness.Ifoureveryactionismotivatedbythedesireforhappi-ness,itwouldseemimpossibleforsomeonetochooseanactmainly,letaloneexclusively,becauseshebelievesittherightthingtodo.Istheeudaimonistprincipleevencompatiblewithlove?Whenweacttopromotethewell-beingoffriendsandfamilyevenathighexpensetoourindividualwell-being,arewestillpursuingourownhappi-ness,albeitinanexpanded,enlightenedway,orcanwesometimessetasideconcernforourownhappinessandactmainlyfromloveforsomeoneelse?6Furtherpuzzlesarisefromthenotionofvirtueasthatbywhichwemerithappiness.IsGodsomehowboundtorewardvirtuewithhap-piness?Wouldhebeunjustifhedidnot?Howdoesthemerit/rewardschemasquarewiththeconceptionofbothhappinessandvirtueasgiftsofgrace?Towardtheendofhislife,asAugustinebecameem-broiledindisputeswithPelagians,referencestohumanmeritvirtu-allydisappearedfromhiswritings.ThemeritsheemphasizedwerethemeritsofChrist.Atthisstagehesoughtchieflytoestablishthatvirtueitselfisa“freegift”ofgrace,whichGodisnotboundtorewardwithhappiness.IfGodinanywayowedushappiness,gracewouldnotbegrace.Indeed,ifhappinessweregiveninaccordwithhumanmerit,gracewouldnotbegrace(AnswertoJulianIV15;AnswertotheTwoLettersofthePelagiansII3;IV19).happinessandmoralityAnselmofCanterburyagreedthatfallenhumanity,withoutgrace,cannothelpbutsin.HedivergedfromAugustinechieflyinhisanal-ysisofrationalnatureasGodcreatedit.Inhisview,acreatureCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n236bonniekentnaturallyabletowillnothingbuthappinesscouldnotbeeithermorallygoodorevil,justorunjust.InattackingtheeudaimonistprincipleAnselminitiatedacontroversyinwesternethicsthatcon-tinuesinvariousformstothisday.EvenwithinAnglo-Americancir-cles,philosophersaresodividedthatsomebelievetheeudaimonistprinciplebeyondreasonabledoubt,whereasothersbelieveitbothfalseandathreattomorality.Asweshallsee,themedievaldebatehaslittletodowiththephysicalactionshumanbeingsareabletoperform.Itcentersinsteadonthekindsofmotivationswehaveindoingwhateverwedo.JusticeforitsownsakeAnselmbreaksnewgroundindistinguishingsharplybetweentwobasicinclinations(affectiones)ofthewill:oneforjusticeorrightness,theotherforhappinessorwhatisadvantageous.(Thedistinctionhereisbetweentwokindsofgoods,notbetweenthegoodinclinationforjusticeandsomewickedpenchantforselfishnessorinjustice.)Any-onewhowillsjustice,Anselmargues,mustwilljusticeforitsownsake.Someonewhowillsanactforthesakeofhappiness,suchasgivingmoneytotheSalvationArmyforthesakeofataxdeduction,willsnothingotherthanhappiness.Soifhappinessis,byacreature’sGod-givennature,thesoleendithasthecapacitytowill,thecrea-tureremainsattheamorallevelofananimal–abletocareaboutothers,asadogcaresaboutitspuppiesoritsmaster,butonlyfromanaturalinclinationtoincludethewelfareofothersinone’sownpursuitofhappinessorself-realization.Ontheotherhand,acreaturewhosenaturelackedtheinclinationtohappinessbutincludedtheinclinationtojustice,sothatitcouldnotwillanythingotherthanjustice,wouldagainremainattheamorallevel.Giventhathumanbeingsandangelsarebynaturecapableofsinning,asevidencedbyGod’spunishmentofAdamandSatan,AnselmconcludesthatGodcreatedrationalnaturewithbothinclinationsofthewill.Thewillforjusticewasintendedtotemperthewillforhappiness,sothattheindividualwouldbeabletokeepitwithinlimitsbutlikewiseabletotransgress(TheFalloftheDevil,chs.13–14).Atpresent,however,humannaturesuffersfromthedamagedonebyAdam’sfall.Retainingthecapacityforfreechoice(liberumarbitrium)thatmakesusmoralagents,wehavelosttheinclinationCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife237tojusticenecessaryforusingthiscapacityandcannowrecoveritonlythroughGod’sgrace.7Withouttheinclinationtojustice,aper-sonbecomespsychologicallyakintoanaddict.Deeplyunhappy,yetenslavedtohisowndesireforhappiness,hecannotwillanythingelse:“Havingabandonedjustice,[thewill]remainsasregardsitsownpoweraservantofinjusticeandunjustbynecessity.Foritisunablebyitselftoreturntojustice;andwithoutjusticethewillisneverfree,becausewithoutjustice,thenaturalfreedomofchoiceisuseless”(TheHarmonyoftheForeknowledge,thePredestination,andtheGraceofGodwithFreeChoiceIII13).WillingundertheaspectofthegoodFromthemid-thirteenthcenturyonward,Aristotle’sworksdidmuchtoshapescholasticdebateaboutthewill,happiness,andmorality.Someauthorscametoregardthewillasan“intellectualappetite,”determinedtoactforthesakeofhappinessandderivingitsfree-domfromtheintellect’sfreedomtointerpretandjudgehappinessinonewayoranother.8HoweveralientoAugustine’sthoughtthisnewconceptionofthewillwas,itatleastagreedwithhisapparentendorsementoftheeudaimonistprinciple.Asecondcontroversialprinciple,oftenattributedtoAristotle,declaredthatwhateverwewill,wewill“undertheaspectofthegood”(subrationeboni).OneneedlooknofartherthanthewritingsofAquinastofindbothprin-ciplesstaunchlydefended.9AquinasopensthesecondpartofhisSummatheologiaebyar-guingthatallhumanactionsareforthesakeofanultimateend,andthereisonlyonesuchend,whichweseekundertheaspectofthegood.Thissingleultimateendishappiness(STIaIIae,q.1,aa.6–8;q.8,a.1).Evenwhenwebehaveself-destructively,weareseekingfulfillment–seeingourbehaviorassomehowgoodforus,ifonlyinsatisfyingsometwistedappetiteforpleasure.Inclaimingthatwenecessarilywillhappinessandthateverythingwewill,wewillforthesakeofhappiness,Aquinasdoesnotmeantodenythatpeoplehaveverydifferentconceptionsofhappiness.Nordoeshemeantosuggest,asAristotlebelievedpossible,thatsomeonecanreachapointofnoreturninmoraldevelopment,sothatfromthenon,sheisdeterminedtopursuethesameconceptionofhappinessthatshehasinthepast.OnlyifofferedtheperfecthappinessoftheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n238bonniekentbeatificvision,saysAquinas,arewemovedofnecessitytowillit.Offeredanythingelse,wecanconsideritsgoodaspectsandwillit,butequallyconsiderthewaysinwhichitlacksperfectgoodnessandrefuseit(q.10,a.2).IncontrasttoAugustine,Aquinasrecognizestwokindsofhap-piness:theimperfecthappinessofearthlylife,attainablethroughourownnaturalresources,andtheperfect,supernaturalhappinessoftheafterlife,attainableonlywithGod’sgrace.ThedisagreementwithAugustineshouldnotbedismissedaspurelyverbal.Neither,however,shoulditbeoverstated.WhatAquinascallsimperfecthap-pinessdiffersinkind,notmerelyindegree,fromtheperfecthappi-nesspossiblewithGod.Thomisticmoraltheoryleavesnodoubtthatthesoleultimateend,theonlyhappinessthatcanentirelysatisfyus,liesintheafterlife(STIaIIae,q.1,a.7;q.5,a.5).HowdoesAquinasreconciletheeudaimonistprinciplewiththecommandtoloveGodmorethanoneself,one’sneighbors,orany-thingelseintheuniverse?Twodistinctionsareworthnoting:First,betweenthe“thing”wedesiretoattain,thatis,thatwhichmakesushappy–God,theabsolutelyperfectgood–andhappiness,thatis,our“use,orattainment,orpossession”ofthatthing(STIaIIae,q.2,a.7).Second,betweenseekingone’sowngoodstrictlyasanindividualandseekingtheshared,“common”good,whichbynatureisgreaterthananyindividual’sgood.“Fromcharity,”Aquinaswrites,“apersonoughttoloveGod,whoisthecommongoodofall,morethanhim-self,becausehappinessisinGodasinthecommonwell-springforallwhoareabletosharethishappiness”(STIII,q.26,a.3).HavingchosenAquinasasmyrepresentative“intellectualist,”Ishouldaddthathewasactuallyquitemoderatebycontemporarystandardsinhisembraceoftheideaofchoiceasalwaysdeterminedbytheapprehensionofsomegood.OthersatParisworkedmuchhardertopresentanddefendwhattheyconsideredtheunexpurgatedAristotle.Evenlatethirteenth-centurytheologians,notablyGodfreyofFontaines,sometimesfaultedAquinasforstrayingfromAristotle’steachingsinawardingthewilltoolargearoleinourmorallives.Atthesametime,othertheologiansworriedthatuncriticaldevotiontoAristotle’steachingsposedaseriousdangertomorals.Ifeverythingwewilliswilledforthesakeofhappiness,andwearedeterminedtochooseinaccordancewithwhatwejudge,inanygivensituation,willpromoteourhappiness,allwrongdoingappearstoresultfromCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife239someintellectualmistakeinjudgingthecourseofactionthatwouldinfactpromoteourhappiness.Theprinciplethateverythingwewill,wewillundertheaspectofthegood,triggeredespeciallybittercontroversy.Ifallthismeansisthatwecannotchooseanactunlesswejudgeitinsomewaydesir-able,theprinciplemightbetakenastruebuthardlyworthmention-ing.EvenPeterOlivi,perhapsthemostanti-Aristotelianthinkerofthelatethirteenthcentury,waspreparedtoaccepttheprinciplesoconstrued.Butwhatdifferencecoulditconceivablymaketomorals?Thesameact,Olivireasons–suchasfornicatingrightnow,intheseparticularcircumstances–canberegardedasdesirableinonerespectandundesirableinanother.Correctlyregardingtheactasimmoral(inhonestus),theagentwouldbeunabletochooseit;correctlyre-gardingitaspleasurabletothesenses,hesurelycouldchooseit.Hecouldevenseetheactinbothwaysatthesamemoment,forthereisnothingcontradictoryinjudginganactbothpleasurableandim-moral.Theindividualseesitinonewayortheotherandchoosesaccordinglybecausehewillstodoso,notbecauseheisignorantorbecausehismindmustsomehowhavelostsightofthesalientmoralfacts(IISent.,q.57,ad15).InalienablefreedomAsworriedasOlivibyintellectualisttrends,DunsScotussawfittoreviveAnselm’stheoryofthewill’sdualinclinations,albeitwithacrucialdifference.WheretheAnselmianinclinationtojusticeislostthroughoriginalsinandrecoverableonlythroughGod’sgrace,itbecomesinScotus’sethicstherootofthewill’sinnate,inalien-ablefreedom.Allhumanbeings,justbecausewehavewills,havebothinclinations:thenaturalinclinationtodesireone’sownfulfill-mentandseekwhatisgoodforoneself,aswellastheinclinationtolovegoodsfortheirintrinsicworthandfortheirownsake.Thereisnothingreprehensibleabouttheinclinationtoseekhappinessorself-realization.NotonlyisitpartofourGod-givennature,itformsthepsychologicalbasisforthevirtueofhope.Ontheotherhand,theinclinationtojusticeformsthepsychologicalbasisforcharity,agreatervirtuethanhope(OrdinatioIII,supplementd.26;trans.[288]178–80).Throughthisinclinationweareliberatedfromournaturaldrivetoseekself-realizationaboveall.WeareabletoloveGodandCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n240bonniekentotherhumanbeingsprimarilyfortheirownsake,insteadofprimar-ilybecausetheyreturnourlove,makeushappy,orinsomeotherwayproveadvantageous.Attackingthenotionofwillasintellectualappetite,Scotusarguesthatacreaturecanbehighlyintelligentinjudgingwhatpromotesitshappiness,choosingandactingaccordingly;butifitissocon-structedthatthequestforhappinessisitssolemotivation,itdoesnothavethefreedomnecessaryformoralresponsibility.Itlackswhatisproperlycalledawill,forabeingwithawillcanactagainstthenaturaldesireforitsownwell-being(OrdinatioIII,d.17;II,d.6,q.2;[288]180–82,464–70).Scotusbelievesweknowintrospectively,fromexperience,thatwearenever,infact,determinedtochoosethecourseofactionweregardasbestpromotingourhappiness.Actingalwaysforthesakeofhappinessfurthersuggeststhat,inchoosinganact,wemustalwaysbeweighingtheexpectedconsequencesforourownhappiness(QuaestionesinMetaphysicamIX,q.15;OrdinatioIV,supplementd.49,qq.9–10;[288]152,194).Ifthisistrue,thecommonassumptionthattheveryactionsmostrevelatoryofanindividual’scharacterareoftenspontaneousactsofkindness–or,ontheoppositeside,spontaneousactsofmeanness–wouldappearmistaken.Inthefinalanalysis,though,Scotusdoesnotrejecttheeu-daimonistprinciplebecausehebelievesitdisprovedbypurelydescriptive,empiricalpsychology.Herejectsitbecauseheconsid-ersitruinoustomorals,henceintolerableasaprincipleofmoralpsychology.10Amoralagentmustperforcehaveaninclinationforjusticeinordertocontrolthenaturalappetiteforwhathebelievesmostadvantageoustohimself:Thisinclinationforjustice,whichistheprimarymoderatoroftheinclina-tionfortheadvantageous–inasmuchasitisnotnecessarythatthewillactuallyseekthattowhichtheinclinationfortheadvantageoustends,andinasmuchasitisnotnecessarythatthewillseekthisaboveallelse(namely,totheextenttheinclinationfortheadvantageousdisposesit)–thisincli-nationforjustice,Isay,isthefreedominnatetothewill,becauseitistheprimarymoderatoroftheinclinationfortheadvantageous.(OrdinatioII,d.6,q.2;[288]468)Convincedthatifweareeverdeterminedtochoosetheactwedobyournaturaldesireforhappiness,ourstatusasmoralagentsstandsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife241onshakygrounds,Scotusarguesthatwecouldbepresentedwiththeperfect,eternalhappinessofthebeatificvisionandyetnotwillit.Granted,wearesodeterminedtowillinghappinessthatwewouldbeunabletorefuse(nolle);but–contrarytoAquinasandhisfollowers–wecouldsimplynotwill(nonvelle)thehappinessoffered(OrdinatioIV,supplementd.49,qq.9–10;[288]192–94).DoesScotusaimtobanishthenaturaldesireforhappinessfromthemorallife,asifthereweresomethingmorallyreprehensibleabouttryingtobehappy?Notatall.Healwaysdescribestheinclina-tionforjusticeaschecking,moderating,orkeepingwithinappropri-atelimitstheinclinationforhappiness,notaseradicatingit.11ThisbecomesespeciallyclearinScotus’saccountofhowthegoodangelsdifferedfromSatan.Thegoodangelswereneitherabletorefusehap-pinessnordidtheywantto,buttheywilledGod’swell-beingevenmorethantheirown.Satansinned,notinwillinghisownhappi-ness,butinwillingitimmoderately.Becausehehadaninclinationforjustice,hewasableandobligatedtokeephisdesireforhappinesswithinbounds,insteadofseekinghappinessaboveallelse,orwillingtohaveitonlyforhimself,orwillingtohaveittoosoon,orwillingtohaveitwithoutworkingtomeritit(OrdinatioII,d.6,q.2;[288]468–74).LoveandpleasureOckhamgoesevenfartherthanScotusinspurningtheeudaimonistprinciple.Nomatterhowgreatthehappinessoffered,heargues,thewillcanoutrightrefuseit.Ourfreedomtorefusehappinessextendseventotheperfecthappinessofthebeatificvision.Whatreason,onewonders,couldapersonconceivablyhaveforrefusing?OckhamsuggeststhatonemightregardGodasdisadvantageousandrefuseonthosegrounds.Ofcourse,onewouldbemistakeninsuchajudgment;butaslongassuchajudgmentispossible,thewillcouldactinaccordancewithit.ThephysicalsufferingexperiencedbyChristisofferedasevidencethatGodcouldbeseenandrejectedundertheaspectofthedisadvantageous,evenbysomeonewithaclearvisionofhisessence(Ordinatio,d.1,q.6[308]OThI503–06).Examiningthethesisthatwhateverwewill,wewillundertheas-pectofthegood,Ockhamseesaneedforclarification.Ifallonemeansby“good”isthatwhichisdesiredordesirable,ofcourseCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n242bonniekentwealwayswillundertheaspectofthegood.Thusinterpreted,theThomisticpositionbecomestruebuttrivial.Ontheotherhand,ifonemeansby“good,”eithermoral(honestum),useful,orpleasur-able,thethesismustberejectedasfalse.Apersoncanwillanactsheregardsasgoodinnoneoftheseways,evenonethatsheherselfcor-rectlyjudgestobeevil,suchasworshipingfalsegods(Quaestionesvariae8[308]OThVIII442–44).Manyphilosopherswouldgrantthatsomeonecanwillanacthedoesnotregardasmorallygood,useful,orpleasurabletothesenses,yetinsistthathemustregarditaspleasurableinsomeotherway,elsehewouldhavenomotivewhatsoeverinacting.Ockhamtakesaverydifferentview:thatthepleasureweexperienceinwillingXisaneffect,notacause,ofwillingX.Weexperiencepleasureinlov-ingsomeonepreciselybecausewelove.Althoughloveandpleasureusuallycomecombined,theyareinrealityseparable(Ordinatio,d.1,qq.3and6;QuodlibetII,q.17;[308]OThI403–28,486–507;IX186–88).12Farfromneedingthemotivationofpleasuretolovesome-one,wecanloveandcontinuelovingwithoutfeelingpleasure.OnceagainSatanservesasausefulexample.Thisfallenangelsinnedbylovinghimselftoexcess,andhecontinuestolovehimself.Thehellinwhichhelivesforeverisonewhereevenself-loveproducesnopleasure(Ordinatio,d.1,q.3;[308]OThI411).Ockhamarguesthatthethesis,whateverwewill,wewillundertheaspectofthegood,mustalsoberejectedbecauseitunderminesadistinctionendorsedbyalltheologians,thedistinctionbetweensinsdonefromignoranceandsinsdonefromevil(malitia).Somemightdescribeanignorantsinasonedonefromignoranceofamoralprinciple;othersmightdescribeitasonedonefromignoranceofhowtheprincipleappliestotheparticularsituationinwhichtheagentfindshimself.Butifwecannotsinwithknowledgeofboththerelevantprincipleanditspresentapplication,howisitpossibletosinfromevil(Quaestionesvariae,q.7,a.3[308]OThVIII365–66)?13InhisownaccountofsinsfromevilOckhammovesintomuch-contestedterritory.By1285theParistheologicalfacultyhadoffi-ciallyapprovedtheproposition:“Thereisnomalitiainthewillunlessthereiserrororsomelackofknowledgeinreason.”14Despiteofficialapproval,thepropositioncontinuedtotriggerheateddebateevenatParis.Perhapssomebriefremarksaboutscholasticmoralvocabularycanhelptoshedlightontheconflict.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife243evil,badness,vice,andsinIntranslatingtheNicomacheanEthicsRobertGrossetestedidhisbesttopreservetherangeofmeaningofAristotle’sGreek.Thewordshamartiaandhamartemaareacaseinpoint.Theysignify“missingthemark,”fallingshortofagoal,ornotmeasuringupaccordingtosomenorm.Thedeparturefromthenormmightbedeliberateanddeservingofmoralreproach.Thenagain,itmightbeatechnicalmis-step,suchasanarcher’sfailuretohitthetarget–evidencethathefallsshortofexcellenceasanarcher,butinnowayevidencethathefallsshortasahumanbeing.Grosseteste’schoiceofpeccatumasatranslationwasreasonablebecausetheLatinword,too,cansig-nifyanonmoraldeviationfromthenorm.Usingtheterminthisway,Aquinascalledevenamusician’smistakeinperformanceapeccatum.Hetreatedasmorallybadactsonlythesubsetofpeccatathroughwhichtheagentincursguilt(culpa).15Othertheologians,suchasOckham,whousedpeccatuminamorerestricted,specifi-callymoralsense,stillappliedittoawiderangeofactions.Allwouldagree(say)thatsomeonewhotakesballpointpensfromtheofficeforherprivateuseathome,sincerelybutmistakenlybelievingthatsheisnotstealing,hascommittedapeccatum,ifonlyfromignorance.Someonewithdisorderedappetiteswhosuccumbstothetempta-tiontoeatmorethanhejudgesappropriatewouldlikewisebeseenascommittingapeccatum,ifonlyfromweaknessorpassion.Mostoftoday’sEnglish-speakerseitheravoidthewordsinentirelyortheyreserveitfordeliberate,heinousmoraloffenses,typicallyin-volvinginjurytoothers.Theconventionaltranslationofpeccatumas“sin”thereforetendstomislead,eveninitsstrictlyreligiousmean-ing.RecognizingthatCicerohadwrittenmuchaboutwhatisandisnotapeccatum–evenbeforeGrosseteste’sAristotleenteredthepicture–medievalauthorssawthemselvesascontinuingandextend-ingamoraldialoguebeguninantiquity,notaschangingthetopictoonethatonlyChristians,Jews,andMuslimscouldunderstandandbelieveworthdebating.Scholasticsclassifiedsinsinmanydifferentways.Theydistin-guishedbetweentheoriginalsinallhumansinheritedfromAdamandtheactualsinsonecommitsstrictlyasanindividual.Theydividedsinsaccordingtoseriousnessandrelatedpunishment,dis-tinguishingvenial(“pardonable”)sinsfromthemortalsinsthatCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n244bonniekentrepresentadecisiveturningawayfromGod,breaktherelationshipwithhim,andresultindamnationunlessGodchoosestorenewtherelationship.Theydistinguishedbetweenignorance,passion,andmalitia–inincreasingorderofgravity–asinternal,psychologicalsourcesofsin.Finally,theydistinguishedbetweensinsandvices,treatingthefirstasactionsandthesecondasthesettleddisposi-tionsthatinclineapersontosuchactions.IntranslatingtheGreekkakia,anabstractnounderivedfromtheadjectivebad(kakos),Grossetesteagainsoughttopreservethenon-moralsenseoftheword.HeoptedfortheLatinmalitia,anabstractnounderivedfromtheadjectivebad(malus),probablyintendingittobereadas“badness”orperhapsas“evil”inthewidestsenseoftheword.16Hisreadershadnotroublerecognizingnaturalbadness(orevil,asintheevilsofsicknessornaturaldisasters),aswellasthebadnessofmoralcharacter.Theydividedsharply,however,onAristotle’saccountofsinningfrommalitia.Somesupportedthethe-sisthateveryonewhosinsfrommalitiaissomehowignorantofwhatheoughttodo.Othersbelievedthiswassomuchintellectual-izingneopaganism.Thedenialthatwecandowrongknowinglywasjudgedtantamounttothedenialwecansinfromevil.Towillevilwithouttheurgingofpassionoranyerrorwhatsoeverbythemindwas,inScotus’swords,“thefullestmeaningofsin”(OpusOxonienseII,d.43,q.2;[288]478).ThesevendeadlysinsIntheformbest-knowntoday,thelistofsevendeadlysinsruns:“pride,covetousness,lust,anger,gluttony,envy,andsloth.”Presumedtobearosterofsinsleadingtodamnation,itmightap-peartoprovethatpeopleintheMiddleAgeshadbizarrevalues.Whyaregluttonyandslothincludedwhenfarbettercandidates,suchastreacheryandinjustice,arenot?Whythisparticularorder,wherelustranksafteronlyprideandcovetousnessfordeadliness?17Eventhirteenth-centuryprofessorsfoundthelistperplexing,al-thoughtheyhadthegoodfortunetoreceiveanolder,morecoher-entversionofit.Theversionmostfamiliartothem,developedbyGregorytheGreatandincludedinPeterLombard’sSentences,namesprincipalorcapitalvices,notdeadlysins,andrunsfrom“spiritual”vices,consideredthemostserious,tovicessomehowrelatedtotheflesh.18Pride,envy,andangercomefirst,covetousness,gluttony,andCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife245lustattheend,withtheviceofacedia(alias“sloth”)inthemiddle.Dante’sPurgatoryfollowsexactlythesameorder.Theexpression“deadlysins”mostoftenappearsinmedievalpop-ularliterature,sermons,andguidesforconfessors.After1215,whenthechurchrequiredlaypeopletomakeanannualconfession,theyneededinstructioninidentifyingandrememberingtheirsins.Theschemeofseven,originallydevelopedformonasticeducation,wasadaptedforthiswiderpracticalpurposeandenjoyedalong,success-fulcareer–exceptinuniversities,whereitwasfoundsohardtora-tionalizethatbytheearlyfourteenthcenturytheeffortwasmostlyabandoned.ObjectionsalreadysuggestedbyBonaventure’scommentaryontheSentences(1250–52)becamefairlystandardinthelatethirteenthcentury.Thesevencapitalvicescannotbemodeledon“capital”crimes,forifthesewerethevicesmostdeservingofpunishment,faithlessnesswouldbeamongthem.Thelistofseven,however,in-cludesnoviceopposedtothevirtueoffaith,justasitincludesnoneopposedtothevirtueofhope.Consideringvicesasextremesofex-cessanddeficiency,pairsopposedtosomevirtuous“mean,”thelistofsevencapitalvicesstillmakesnosense.Whydoesitincludecov-etousness(orgreed:avaritia)butnotprodigality?Whysevenvicesinsteadoffourteen(IISent.,q.42,dubium3)?Tryingtorationalizetheschemeofseven,Bonaventuresuggeststhataviceiscalled“capital”becauseitgivesrisepsychologicallytoagreatmanysins,likeaprolificheadoffamily.Heproceedswithanaccountofhoweachofthesevenviceswarpsthesoul’sresponsetosomeperceivedgood.Aquinas,too,appealstopsycho-logicalfecundity,offeringhisownaccountofdistortions(STIaIIae,q.84,a.4).Alas,neitherthesenorotherproposedrationalescouldresolvethegreatestproblemwiththeschemeofseven.Atatimewhenmoraltheorizingwasvirtue-centered,thelistofsevenvicessimplydidnotcorrespondwithanylistofsevenvirtuesagreedtohavespecialimportance.Thelistreflectedanolderapproach:iden-tifyingtroublesomevices,thenpresentingvirtuesasremediesforthem.Despiteitscontinuedpopularitywithpreachers,theideaofvirtuesascorrectivesforviceshadlostfavorintheologicalcircles.Floatingfreeofthevirtue-centeredframeworkandpinnedonlytodu-biousclaimsaboutpsychologicalcausality,thesevencapitalvicesdidnotsurvivemuchlongerasatopicofevenperfunctoryacademicinterest.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n246bonniekentvirtues,theologicalandotherAugustine’sviewofalltruevirtuesasgiftsofgraceitselffellfromgraceinthetwelfthcentury.PeterAbelardwasapparentlythefirsttochallengeit.InfluencedbyCicero’swritingsandBoethius’scom-mentaryonAristotle’sCategories,Abelardrevivedclassicaltalkofvirtuesasdispositions(habitus):qualitiesthathumanbeingsdevelopgradually,frompracticeinexercisingournaturalpowers,sothattheybecome“secondnature”andverydifficulttochange(Abelard,EthicsII).Isayclassical“talk”becausebothAbelardandlatertwelfth-centurytheologiansextendedtheconceptofadispositiontoin-cludevirtuesgivenbyGod,eventoinfantsthroughthesacramentalgraceofbaptism.19Bythelatethirteenthcentury,whenGrosseteste’stranslationofAristotlewasrequiredreadingintheuniversities,pro-fessorsroutinelyclassifiedallvirtuesasdispositions–notonlythevirtuesthatevenpaganscanacquirethroughmanyyearsofpractice,butalsovirtueslikecharity,divinely“infused”inChristiansasgiftsofgrace.20Thispeculiarconceptofadisposition,alientoclassicalphilosophy,becameentrenchedinscholasticmoraltheory.AlthoughthelistofacquiredvirtuescametoincludevirtuallyallofthosediscussedbyAristotle,theologiansoftenfollowedtheStoicsandthechurchfathersinawardingspecialstatustothe“car-dinal”virtuesofprudence,justice,temperance,andfortitude.Ac-ceptingAristotle’sdivisionofvirtuesintothe“intellectual”andthe“moral,”scholasticstreatedprudenceasthesoleintellectualvirtueamongthecardinals.Thethreeinfusedvirtuesmostdiscussedwerefaith,hope,andcharity,allcalled“theological”virtuesbecauseoftheirdirectiontoGodandthehappinessoftheafterlife.21Aquinasandhisfollowerspositedinfusedprudenceandmoralvirtuesinaddi-tiontotheinfusedtheologicalvirtues.Scotus,Ockham,andothers,whilefaultingThomistsforpositingvirtuesbeyondnecessity,them-selvesventuredtopositnaturallyacquiredfaithandcharity.Whysomanykindsofvirtues?Latermedievaltheologianssoughttoexplainwhatmakessomeonemorallygoodinthepresentlifeaswellaswhatittakesto“merit”thecompletehappinesspossibleonlywithGodintheafterlife.Allagreedthatnobodymeritseternalhap-pinessinthewaythatagood,hardworkerwouldmerithiswages.AllagreedthatGod’sgrace,inoneformoranother,constitutestheindispensablefoundationformerit.Therenonethelessremainedam-pleroomfordebateaboutdifferentformsofgraceandrelatedformsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife247ofmerit.ThegroundsfordebatewereallthewiderbecauseeventhosewithseriousreservationsaboutAristotle’steachingsusuallyincorporatedsomeofhisinsightsintotheirownwork.22AttemptstodevelopasynthesisofancientandChristianmoralthoughtbecamethenorm,withmuchcontroversyabouthowthetheoryshouldgobutrelativelylittleaboutwhethertheeffortwasworthwhile.Farfromtryingtoendthesyntheticproject,theepiscopalcon-demnationatParisin1277leftacademictheoristsfreetocontinueworkingonit.Thebishop’swrathwasdirectedmainlyatyoungphi-losophyprofessorswhohighlightedconflictsbetweenancientandChristianethics,givingtheimpressionthatChristianteachingswereeithererroneousortobeacceptedpurelyonfaith.Thuswefindamongthe219propositionscondemned:“Thathappinessishadinthislifeandnotinanother”;and“ThathappinesscannotbecauseddirectlybyGod.”Thefirstleavesopenthepossibilitythathappinessishadbothinthislifeandinanother,asthesecondleavesopenthepossibilitythathappinessisdirectlycausedbothbyGodandbythehumanagent.23Augustinewouldhaveworriedthatthecondemnationswerefartooweak,leavingtheuniversityopentothesirensongofpaganethics.Hewouldhavehadgroundsforworry.ThemedievalchurchneveradoptedwholesalethemoraldoctrinesofAugustine’santi-Pelagianwritings.NotuntilthelatesixteenthcenturydidRomeclarifyitsofficialpositiononpaganvirtues.BythatpointthesharpdichotomybetweenChristiansundergraceandeveryoneelsehadbecomestronglyassociatedwiththeProtestantreformers,MartinLutherandJohnCalvin,andtheirgrowingranksofdisciples.Themedievaltradition,shapedbyAquinasandScotus,distinguishedbe-tweenthemoralgoodnessevenpagansmighthaveandthemeri-toriousgoodnessdependentstrictlyuponGod’sgrace.PopePiusVaccordinglycondemnedaCatholictheologyprofessorforteaching,“Allthedeedsofunbelieversaresins,andallthevirtuesofphiloso-phersarevices.”24EvenwhentheyagreedthatwecandeveloptruevirtueswithoutGod’ssavinggrace,scholasticsoftendisagreedabouttheplaceofthesenaturallyacquiredvirtuesinafullaccountofthemorallife.AbriefsketchofthedifferentpositionstakenbyAquinasandScotusmayserveasanintroductiontosomeoftheissuesthataroseintheefforttoexplainwhat,ifanything,goodmoralcharacterhastodowithattaininghappinessinthecompanyofGod.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n248bonniekentAquinas:God-givenmoralvirtuesLikevirtuallyallprofessorsoftheperiod,Aquinasconsideredorigi-nalsinlessmorallydebilitatingthanAugustinehad.AquinasneverdoubtsthathumanbeingscandeveloptruevirtueswithoutGod’sgiftofcharity.Ontheotherhand,aclosereadingoftheSummatheologiaerevealsthatthesenaturallyacquiredvirtuesplayafarmoremodestrolethanonemightexpect.Consider,forexample,Aquinas’streatmentofastandardtextbookdefinitionofvirtue:“Virtueisagoodqualityofthemind,bywhichweliverightly,ofwhichnoonemakesbaduse,whichGodworksinus,withoutus.”25Aquinassupportsthedefinition,butwithtwosuggestedre-visions:that“disposition”besubstitutedfor“quality,”andthatthelastphrasebeomitted,tomakethedefinitioncoverallvirtues,bothacquiredandinfused(STIaIIae,q.55,a.4).Bothrevisions,especiallycomingafteratreatiseondispositionsheavilyindebtedtoAristo-tle’swork,mightleadreaderstoassumethatacquiredvirtuesfigureprominentlyinAquinas’sownmoraltheory.OnlylaterinthePrimasecundaedowelearnthatAquinasregardstheinfusedvirtueofchar-ityasthe“form”ofallthevirtuesandthathepositsanentiresetofmoralvirtuesinfusedbyGodtogetherwithcharity.God-givenmoralvirtuesarevirtueswithoutqualification.Naturallyacquiredmoralvirtuesareinherentlyimperfect(orincomplete:imperfectus),virtuesinmerelyarelative,analogoussense.TheydifferinkindfromGod-givenmoralvirtues(q.63,aa.3–4;q.65,aa.2–3).Itwouldbedifficulttoexaggeratethedifferencebetweenthesetwokindsofmoralvirtues.Acquiredmoralvirtuesaredirectedtotheimperfecthappinessofearthlysocietyandmakeonemorallygoodinhumanterms.Infusedmoralvirtuesaredirectedto,andmakeitpossibletomerit,theperfecthappinessoftheafterlife.Acquiredmoralvirtuesmeasuredesiresandactionsaccordingtotheruleofhumanreason,observingameandeterminedbyprudence.Infusedmoralvirtuesmeasureaccordingtodivinerule,observinga“mean”appointedbyGod.(Forexample,wherehumanreasondictatesthatweeatinsuchawayastoavoidharmingourbodiesorimpairingourabilitytoreason,Goddecreesthatwemortifythefleshbyabsti-nence.)Acquiredmoralvirtuesmakerelatedactionseasier;infusedmoralvirtuesdonot.Acquiredmoralvirtuesarelostonlythroughaseriesofbadactions;infusedmoralvirtuescanbedestroyedbyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife249asingleact.Asacquiredmoralvirtuesaredevelopednaturally,sotheycanbeincreasednaturally,throughourownefforts.Infusedmoralvirtues,supernaturallycausedbyGod,canbeincreasedonlybyGod.Nobodycanacquireasinglemoralvirtuewithoutprudence,norcanoneacquireprudencewithoutallofthemoralvirtues.Theonlyunqualifiedmoralvirtues,however,aregiftsofgracerootedincharity,notprudence.AChristianmighthavealloftheseinfusedvirtueswithoutacquiringanymoralvirtuesthroughherownnatu-ralresources(STIaIIae,q.63,a.4;q.65,aa.2–3;IIaIIae,q.23,aa.7–8;Devirtutibusincommuni,q.10,ad14).Aquinasconsiderscharityessentialforunqualifiedmoralvirtueonteleologicalgrounds.Apersonlackingcharitycanneverattaintheultimateendofperfecthappiness.Atthesametime,AquinasfollowsAugustineinrelatingtheneedforcharitytotheself-centerednessoffallenhumanity.Originalsinhassocorruptedhumannaturethat,withoutgrace,weinevitablyfavorourprivategoods.Evenwhenweperformvirtuousacts,weperformthemfrominferiormotives,notfromthekindoflovepossibleforhumannatureinitsoriginalcondition.Withoutcharity,then,noonecankeepthecommandmenttoloveGodaboveallelse(STIaIIae,q.109,aa.3–4).Believingthatweneedcharitytotransformourmoralcharacters,AquinasarguesthatthisvirtuemustbeaGod-givendisposition,notsimplytheHolySpiritworkinginus.Iftherewerenochangeintheagent’sdisposition,hereasons,humanactsofcharitywouldbein-voluntary,withGodasthesoleefficientcauseandthehumanbeingasmerelyaninstrumentofGod’swill.ActsofcharitywouldthenbeGod’sactsandinnowaythehumanindividual’sown.Bythesametoken,itwouldbeimpossibleforsomeonetoperformcharita-bleactswitheaseandpleasure.Anindividualcanexperienceeaseandpleasureonlywhenactingassheisinternallydisposedtoact,whentheactionsare“secondnature,”evenifthesecondnaturewasitselfsupernaturallycaused(STIIaIIae,q.23,a.2).26Scotus:perfectlymoralpagansAswehaveseen,Scotusbelievesthattheabilitytoloveothersac-cordingtotheirintrinsicworthbelongstotheinalienablefreedomofthehumanwill.Hebelieves,too,that“ought”implies“can.”BecausefallenhumanbeingswithoutgracearestillobligatedtoloveCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n250bonniekentourneighborsasourselvesandGodaboveall,wemustbeabletodoso,evenifwecannotdosoasperfectlyassomeonecanintheafterlife.Scotusoffersasevidenceforhispositionthewillingnessofpaganstodieinbattleforthegoodoftheircountries.Someoneact-ingaccordingtonaturalreasoncancorrectlyjudgethepublicgoodtobeagreatergoodthanhisownlife,cansimplyloveitmoreandwillmoretopreserveitthanhisownlife.InthesamewaysuchapersoncouldjudgeGodthegreatestgoodandloveGodaboveallelse(OrdinatioIII,supplementd.27;[288]434–40).27True,naturallyacquiredmoralvirtuesareimperfectintheab-senceofinfusedcharityinthesensethattheydonotleadtotheendofperfecthappiness.Ontheotherhand,Scotusargues,theycanstillbeperfectasmoralvirtues.OnedoesnotneedGod-givencharitytobecomeaperfectlymoralhumanbeing,onlytobecomeaperfectlyhappyone.Howevergoodwemakeourselves,eternalhap-pinessremains,asAugustinetaught,afreegiftofGod(OrdinatioIII,supplementd.36;[288]414–16).WhydoesmoraltheoryevenneedtopositvirtuousdispositionsinfusedbyGod?AsScotusseesnoreasonwhyoneshouldneedsuchadispositiontoperformacharitableact,soheseesnoreasonwhyoneshouldneedittoperformacharitableactwithpromptness,ease,andpleasure.Noristhereanythinginourexperiencetoprovetheex-istenceofsomeGod-givencharity,forthesameactionsandmotivesmightbeexplainedbythenaturallyacquiredvirtueoffriendship.IftheaimistoexplainwhyGodgrantssomepersonsratherthanoth-erseternalhappiness,thecorrectanswer,toScotus’smind,isjustthatGodchosetodoso.InfusedvirtuescannotexplainwhyGodchosethesepersons,becausethevirtuesthemselvesarefreegiftsofgrace.IfGodhasinfactordainedthatinfusedvirtuesarenecessarytomeritsalvation,hecouldhave,byhisabsolutepower,dispensedwiththem.Thereisnothingaboutsuchvirtuesthatmakesthemin-trinsicallynecessaryforsalvation.TheyhavethestatusofsecondarycausesthroughwhichGodhaschosentooperate,sothattheircausalrolearisesstrictlyfromthecovenanthefreelychosetomakewithhumankind.28ShouldoneprotestthatGodhas,onthisaccount,chosenamoreelaborateschemeofsalvationthanhehadtochoose,Scotuswouldgladlyagree:Godoftenactsmoregenerouslythanfrugally.OckhamrepeatedandexpandedScotus’sargumentsagainstthetheoreticalCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife251necessityofpositingvirtuousdispositionsinfusedbyGod.He,too,declareditpossibletoloveGodaboveallthroughone’sownnaturalresources.He,too,laboredtoshowthatnoinfusedvirtuousdispo-sitionisintrinsicallyorontologicallynecessary.God-givencharityisnecessaryonlybecauseofthecovenantGodchosetomake,butcouldhave,byhisabsolutepower,refrainedfrommaking(IIISent.q.9[308]OThVI279–82).Again,theaimwastoemphasizeGod’sgenerosityinmakingacovenantthathecanbereliedupontokeep–notbecausehewouldbeunjusttoviolateit,asifhe“owed”ittous,butbecauseGodisconsistentlygenerous,sothathe“owesittohimself”tokeepthepromiseshehasmade.29MartinLuther,trainedinthetheologicaltraditionassociatedwithOckham,wouldlaterconcludethatinfusedvirtuesarenotevendefactonecessaryforsalvation.Hewoulddismissthewholetheoret-icalapparatusofGod-givendispositionsassomuchmoreevidenceofthedisastrousinfluenceofAristotle,thatspawnofSatan,onthewholeofscholastictheology.ScotusandOckhamhaveaccordinglycometobecastaspavingthewayforLutheranism,notwithstandingsuchobviousdifferencesfromLutherasthatbothscholasticsdevel-opedtheoriesheavilyshapedbytheirbeliefintheinalienablehumanfreedomtomakeourselvesmorallygood(albeitnothappy),whichLutherwentsofarindenyingthatevenAquinasendsuplooking,bycomparison,likeaquasi-Pelagiandefenderofthe“virtuouspagan.”notes1.Seechapter11inthisvolume.2.CityofGodV19–20,XV22,XIX1–4,25;AnswertoJulianIV19–23[57].MysummaryrestsmainlyuponAugustine’slaterwritings.P.Brown’sbiography[66]remainsthebestaccountofhowAugustine’sthinkingdevelopedoverthecourseofhislong,tumultuouslife.3.PL38,808–14.Alltranslationsinthischapteraremyown.Forthissermon,cf.Augustine,Sermons,trans.E.Hill(NewRochelle,1992),30–39.4.R.Markus[418]54.5.B.KentCCAug205–33providesamoredetailedtreatmentofAugus-tine’smoralthought.SeeJ.Rist[76]foragoodsurveyofhisviewsonissuesbeyondthosedirectlyrelatedtomorals.6.W.O’Connor[74]offersinsightfulanalysisofAugustine’sperspectiveonthesequestions.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n252bonniekent7.Anselm’sargumentthatthecapacitytosinornottosinessentiallyrequiresthefreedomtochooseeitherhappinessorjusticeshouldnotbemisreadasclaimingthatthefreedomtochooseeitherhappinessorjusticeessentiallyrequires,letaloneis,thecapacitytosinornottosin.BelievingthatGodisbothfreeandunabletosin,Anselmfirmlyrejectsthesecondthesis.HowevermuchScotusandKantdifferfromhim(andeachother),bothfollowAnselmindefendingthefirstthesiswhilerejectingthesecond.8.Seechapter9inthisvolume.9.SeeS.MacDonald[250].10.SeeJ.Boler[290].11.SeeM.Ingham[295].12.Cf.A.S.McGrade[319].13.SeealsoOckham[317]124–27,242–43.14.DrawnfromtheworksofGilesofRome,thepropositionwasregardedasonethatAquinashadalsodefended.SeeGilesofRome[269]110–17and179–224foranaccountofrelatedcontroversiesatParis.15.STIaIIae,q.21,a.1;Demaloq.2,a.2.D.Gallagher[241]givesaclearexplanationofbothAquinas’sterminologyandrelevantconceptualdis-tinctions.16.EnglishtranslationsoftheNicomacheanEthicsaremoremisleadinginthisrespect.EvenwhentheypresenttheGreekareteas“excellence,”insteadof“virtue,”theyroutinelypresentkakiaandrelatedwordsas“vice.”Thismysteriousfondnessfortheword“vice”tendstoobscurethecontinuitybetweenAristotle’steachingsonnatureandhisteachingsonethics,acontinuityevidenttoscholasticreadersofGrosseteste’stranslation.17.Scholarlyliteratureonthesevendeadlysinshaslatelygrowntobequiteextensive.“Classic”studiesincludeM.Bloomfield[554]andS.Wenzel[563–64].Wenzel’sworkisespeciallyhelpfulintracingthedevelopmentofwhatcametobecalled,intheEnglishoftheKingJamesBible,thefailingof“sloth.”18.SeeGregory’sMoraliainIob,XXXI,ch.45,PL76,620–23andPeterLombard,IISent.d.42,ch.6.19.SeeO.Lottin[21]III,section2,part1;C.Nederman[560];andM.Colish[555].20.ThechiefscripturalbasisforinfusedvirtueswasRomans5:5.Indis-cussinghowweare“justified”byfaith,Paulsaysthat“God’slovehasbeenpoured[diffusus]intoourheartsthroughtheHolySpiritwhichhasbeengiventous.”Althoughscholasticsadoptedinfususasthestandardadjective,thewateryimagerywasthesame.HenceAquinas’sdescrip-tionofGodasthe“commonwell-spring”ofhappinessquotedabove.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nThemorallife25321.SeePaul’smovingdescriptionin1Corinthians13,ending:“Sofaith,hope,love[caritas]abide,thesethree;butthegreatestoftheseislove.”22.ForexplanationoflatermedievaldebatesaboutmoralgoodnessandmeritIrecommendtheworkofD.Janz[556]andA.McGrath[559]i12–16,40–50,100–19.McGrathisexceptionallygoodatexplainingconceptualchangesandtensions,especiallybetweenAristotle’snotionofjusticeandChristian-theologicalaccountsof“justification.”23.SeeB.Kent[558]68–79forreferencestoprimarysourcesandfurtherdiscussionofcondemnedpropositionsrelatedtoethics,includingthoseconcerningthefreedomofthewill.24.ThecondemnationofMichaelduBay,reportedinH.Denzinger[24]427–37(seeespeciallyno.1925),makesforinterestingreading.AgoodmanyofhiserrorscanbefoundnotonlyinAugustine’sworksbutalsoinPaul’sEpistles.DuBaycouldhardlyhavechosenalessauspiciousjuncturetodisdainthescholasticsandcallforareturntotheteachingsofPaulandtheFathers.25.Thedefinition,includedinPeterLombard’sSentences(II,d.27,c.5),ispiecedtogetherfromvariousremarksbyAugustine.26.SecondaryliteratureonAquinas’smoralthoughtoftenleavesmuchtobedesiredinbothaccuracyandinterest.R.McInerny’sbook[252]andtheessaysinS.MacDonaldandE.Stump[251]seemtomeamongthemostphilosophicallyengagingofrecentcontributions.S.Pope[257]pro-videshelpfulguidanceinreadingSummatheologiaeII.Thisanthologyincludesanexplanationofstructureandmethod,aswellasaseriesofexpositoryessaysonthislong,difficulttext.27.LatermedievaldisputesaboutthenaturalabilitytoloveGodoftenin-cludefascinatingdiscussionsofself-love,self-sacrifice,andotherknottytopicsinmoralpsychology.Foragoodexampleseetheexchangebe-tweenGodfreyofFontainesandJamesofViterboinCTII271–306.28.OrdinatioI,d.17,part1,qq.1–2[281]I,especially200–03,215;Quodli-betalQuestions17.30–34[283]397–98.29.Thereisnowawealthofscholarlyliteratureonthelatermedievalback-groundforLuther’stheology.WorksbyP.Vignaux[562]andH.Oberman[561]areclassicsinthefield.A.McGrath[559]figuresamongmorere-centcontributionsofsubstance.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\njamesmCevoy11Ultimategoods:happiness,friendship,andblissReflectionuponhumanhappinesswaspursuedbyanumberofthegreatestthinkersoftheMiddleAges,workingsometimesastheo-logians,primarilyatleast,andsometimesasphilosophers,thoughinmorethanonesenseoftheword.Themostnotabletheoriesofwhathappinessisandhowhumanbeingsmayobtainitwereformu-latedbythreeverygreatminds:AugustineofHippo,Boethius,andThomasAquinas.IwillexploretheideasofeachoftheseandwillalsoexamineashorttreatiseonhappinessandthephilosophicallifebyBoethiusofDacia(fl.1270),sinceitstrikesanoteofcontrastwithitsmostnotablepredecessors.Othersignificantwritersandthematicdevelopmentswillalsobetouchedon.Friendshipbelongsintimatelytohappiness.Allancientschoolsofphilosophywouldhavemaintainedthis,eventhougheachoneplacedtheemphasesjustasseemedappropriateinviewofitsowncharacter-isticapproachtophilosophy.Thinkersofthemedievalperiodwouldnothavedisagreedaboutthecloseconnectionbetweenfriendshipandhappiness.Sometimesthatrelationshipwasmadeexplicit(inparticularbyAugustineandAelredofRievaulx),butsometimesitwasleftunthematized.Theaccountgivenherewillbeledbythetexts.IwilldiscusshappinessandfriendshiptogetherinexaminingthethoughtofAugustine,whointerrelatesthetwothemesonmorethanonenotableoccasion.InconsideringBoethiusandAquinas,Iwillforthemostparttreateachtopicseparately.Boththemescametomedievalthinkersfromtwodifferentsources,ancientphilosophyandChristianity,andtherewasnose-cretaboutthat.Totakeanexample:Augustinewasfullyalivetothedifferencebetweenthebiblicalnotionsofhappinessdeveloped254CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss255inPsalmsorintheBeatitudes(Matthew5),ontheonehand,andthetreatisesonthehighestgood/happinessandthehighestevilwrit-tenbyVarroorCicero,ontheother.Forhispurposes(e.g.,pastoralautobiographyinConfessionsorChristianapologeticinTheCityofGod)hefeltfreetodevelophisthoughtinrelianceuponbothkindsofsource.IfAugustinethusfelttheinfluenceofeach–theancientpre-Christianwisdomsearchandbiblical,especiallyNewTestament,faith–itshouldnotbeassumedeitherthatheintendedtomakeasyncretistichybridoutofhissourcereading,orthathewoundupdoingso.Thenotionofcriticaldiscernmentfitsbettertheoutcomeofhisreflection.augustineandtheuniversaldesireforhappinessHappinessisoneofAugustine’slifelongthemes.Thetopicrecursinmostofhiswritings,indifferentliterarygenres,withnewas-pectsandperspectives,orwithretouchesmadetoalreadyfamiliarthoughts.Histwomostinsistentlyrecurringideasarethatallhumanbeingswithoutexceptiondesiretobehappy,whatevertheircircum-stances,choices,orcommitments,andthateverythingeachonedoesispromptedbythisdeepestofdesiresandexpressesitinsomeway.Hissecondoverridingconvictionisthatnothingandnopersoncanfulfillone’sdesireforhappiness;noexperience,noobjectofdesire,evenwhenattained,canmakeonecompletely,reliablyhappy–noteventhehighestidealopentohumankind,suchasthesearchforwisdomandtheloveofit.Hisearliestreflectionsonbeatitudoaretobefoundinadialoguewrittenin386,OntheHappyLife(Debeatavita).Thethemeturnsupinthreeofthefourgreatworksofhisma-turity:Confessions,CommentaryonthePsalms,andTheCityofGod.IwillfocusuponhisdiscussionsofhappinessandfriendshipinConfessionsandTheCityofGod.HappinessandtruthasaprioriideasConfessions,BookXisasearchforGod,whoisbothbeyondandwithinthecreation.TheactionthatconnectsthetransitionswhichAugustinemakesisexpressedrepeatedlybytheverbtransibo:“IwillCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n256jamesmCevoygobeyond”–inordertosearchforGod,theabsolutegoaloflove.Thecreatedworldinitsbeautycriesout:“Hemadeus!”(X6).Thesoul,however,issuperiorinitsnaturetotheworld,sinceitisthesourceoflifeforthebody(X7).Transibo:abovethelife-givingpowerofthesoul,andbeyondthecapacitytoperceivewhichitconfersonthebody(acapacitywhichissharedwiththesoulsofanimals),thereisthemind,ortheself(X7).Inthememoryarestockedimagesofallkinds,whichhavebeenbroughtinbysenseperception.ThereImeetmyself“andrecallwhatIam,whatIhavedone,andhowIwasaffectedwhenIdidit”(X8).Memoryisapowerthatcontainsmorethantheimagesofsenseperception.Ideas,mathematicalobjects,affectiveexperience,andevenforgetfulnessareallsomehowpresentinit(X16).“Greatisthepowerofmemory...apowerofprofoundandinfinitemultiplicity.Andthisismymind,thisisImyself!”(X17).Buttransibo!“AsIriseabovememorywhereamItofindYou?”Whatisitthatliesattheverybottomofmentalandaffectivelife,atthedeepestpreconsciouslevel?Whataprioriformsorideasshapeallthatonedoes?Augustinebelievesthattwoquasi-ideas,happinessandtruth,givecoherencetoourentirementalandaffectivelife,inwaysofwhichwearenotfullyconsciousandwhichitdoesnotlieinourpowertoalter.Everythingwethink,desire,ordoisstructuredbythesetwoprimalinstinctsandisexpressiveofthem.Whentheycometogether,whenwefind“joyinthetruth”(gaudiumdeveri-tate),thepresenceoftheabsent,transcendentGodbecomestangible(X23).Thisisthenonlocative“place”(locusnonlocus!)whichGodoccupieswithineverymind,hewhois“immutablyaboveallthings”(X25).OnceGodisrevealedbyhisownpoweras“theBeautyeverancientandevernew,”heisrecognizedbythememoryasthetrans-cendentpresencethatcomestofillthespacecreatedwithinthemindandmemoryby“joycomingfromthetruth”(X27).Augustine’smeditationonmemoryisaspiritualexercisethroughwhichheseekstomountwithinthecontentsofconsciousness,fromleveltolevel,inordertoidentifythepresenceofGodwithinthesoulbymeansofself-knowledge.Thebetterheknowshimself,themoreheappreciatesGod’stranscendenceofhiscreature.YetGodhasleftatthedeepestpointofhumanself-consciousnessadistinctivemarkofpresencethatcorrespondstohistranscendence,namelythatjoyinthetruthwhichiscompletelyineradicable(Augustinebelieves)fromthehumanmindandmemory.1CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss257FriendshipandhappinessThethemesoffriendshipandhappinessareconjugatedbyAugus-tineintwowritings,theConfessionsandTheCityofGod.Friend-shipisdepictedasasourceofintensehappiness,andatthesametimethespaceofmiseryandgriefwhenafrienddies,orofanxi-etyforthelivingwhoarevulnerabletoallkindsofinsecurityandpreytomanyevilsandsufferings.Augustinebringsoutthepositivevalueoftheclassicalidealandpracticeoffriendship(heevenusesCicero’sdefinitionofamicitiaas“agreementinallthings,divineandhuman,togetherwithgoodwillandaffection”),buthebelievesthattheChristianvaluesoftrustinGod,beliefinprovidence,accep-tanceoftheinevitabilityofdeath,concernforthegoodofpeoplewhoarenotparticularlyvirtuousorstrong,readinesstoforgive,andfirmhopeintruehappinessintheheavenlyvisionofGodrevealahigherway.Hethereforeproposesapracticeoffriendshipthatwouldbefreefromillusionregardingmoralvulnerabilityandphysicaldeath,exemptfromanyidolizationofthepersonswelove,realisticabouttragedy,andreadytoshowgoodwillinsomewaytoall,outofasenseofhumilityandofcommonvulnerability.Inthesewaysheatonceacknowledgestheclassicalfriendshipideal,whichhehadlivedoutinhisearlyyears,andatthesametimedevelopsaChristiantheoryoffriendshipandloveinwhichfaith,hope,andcharityareaccordedtheirfullestvalue.Friendship,happiness,anddeathareinterwoveninthenarrativeofAugustine’slifeandlossataroundage20,whenheexperiencedthedeathofaclosefriendofthesameage.Lookingbackasautobio-grapher,twenty-fiveorsoyearslater,heconcludedthattheterriblemiseryofgriefheunderwent,hisdepressionandhisnihilisticsensethatdeathdestroysallhumanvalue,wereduetohis“havinglovedamortalasthoughhewouldneverdie”(ConfessionsIV6).Happinessshould,hethought,lieinlovingfriendswithasenseofmortalitythataloneallowsthepreciousvalueofeachpresentmomenttobesavored.Suchhappiness,heconsidered,cannotbehadwithoutfaithinGod’sprovidentialloveandineternallife.Hecomposedaper-sonalbeatitudeoutofphrasesofScripture.“Blessedisthepersonwholovesyou,andhisfriendinyou,andhisenemybecauseofyou”(IV9).Friendship,happinessandmisery,andmortalityareagainin-terrelatedatConfessionsVI16.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n258jamesmCevoyBookXIXofTheCityofGodconsidersthedifferentandcon-trastingwaysinwhichthefinalendofhumanlifewasdelineatedbytheancientphilosophers(whoseviewsonthematterAugustineknewthroughVarroandCicero)andbyChristianity.Isthehighestgoalofhumanaccomplishmentandstrivingtobefoundinpleasure,orvirtue,orsomecombinationofthetwo;inanactivelifeoroneofcontemplation,oragainamixtureofthetwo?Varrosetout,inall,298variationsonthesenotionsofhappiness.Augustine,ontheotherhand,insistedonthevulnerableandcontingentnatureoflifeandhappiness.Howmanyillsandmisfortunesthereare,suchasin-justice,war,personalmiseriesandmistakes,sicknessandinsanity,thatinfiltrateinsecurityintothecenterofhumanexperience!The“unfeignedloyaltyandmutualloveoftruefriends”(XIX8)isthebestsourceofhappinessthatthislifeoffers,yetevenhere,happinessandmiserymixandmingleinthemostambiguousway.Noutopiaofpeaceandcontentmentisavailablethissideofself-deceptionandillusion.Themorefriendswehavethemoreconcernweexperienceregardingtheillsthatmayafflictthem,orthatmaycauseushurtandheartbreakthroughthem.Atthedeathofeachofthemsolaceanddelightturntosadnessandgrief.ThelessonAugustinewantstoteachis,nottobecomeunfeelingtowardfriendsandliveinacastleofself-protection,butrathertoaffirmallreality,inbothjoyandpain,astheexpressionofanonlypartiallyvisibleprovidentialorder,withinwhichthecityofGod,atpresentwayfaringonearth,isbeingpreparedforeverlastingpeace.Ifweacceptthatwearepil-grimsonawayoffaithandhope,thenwecanbereasonablyhappydespiteallthatmaybefallus,partlybecauselifehassomanygoodthingstooffer,butmostlybecausewehavethehopeofunshakeable,unconditionalblessednesstolookforwardto(XIX20).ReadersofTheCityofGodthroughouttheMiddleAgesandtheearlyRenaissance(Erasmus,ThomasMore)absorbeditsmessageabouthappiness,friendship,andthelifeoftheblessed.Thehap-pinessofheavenmaybethoughtofasthefullnessoffriendship,theCistercianmonkAelredofRievaulx(d.1167)suggested(Spiri-tualFriendshipIII79),whilefriendshipinthepresentlife,despiteitslimitations,offersanexperientialforetasteofthejoysofheaven.HedevelopedhereanauthenticallyAugustinianidea.Hiscontempo-rary,AnselmofCanterbury,thoughtalongthesamelines(Proslogion25).Aelredreferredtothejoysofheavenusingfelicitasandbeati-tudosynonymously.InthelaterMiddleAgestheformertermwouldCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss259tendtobeemployedsomewhatmorefrequentlyinphilosophicaldis-cussionasthegeneraltermforhappiness,undertheinfluenceoftheLatinversionofAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics,whilebeatitudotendedtobeusedmorespecificallyfortheultimateblessednessofeternallife.ThestrengthofAugustine’sthoughtlayinhiscapacitytobetruetoexperience,especiallyinitsaffectiveheightsanddepths.Hetriedtoremoveallthebracketsthathadbeenplacedaroundportionsofexperience(inparticular,ofhisown)andtoacknowledgetheam-bivalenceofchoicewithregardtogoodandevil.Whenwritingaboutfriendshipandlovehethoughtalsoaboutmisery,obsession,andil-lusion.Hisreadingofthehumanconditionisclear-sightedregardingthefragmentedandwoundedstateoftheheart,buthopeissustainedbytheconvictionthatcreationisgoodandthatsufferingcanhavearedemptivemeaning.boethius:philosophyhasitsconsolations“AugustinewasanAfrican,apsychologistandasaint;BoethiuswasaRomanandascholar.”2ManliusSeverinusBoethius(d.524)wasimprisonedduringthelastyearofhislifebytheGermanicrulerofItalyonafalseaccusationofhightreason.HisConsolationofPhi-losophyisoneofthegreatestexamplesofprisonliterature.Boethiusspenthisimprisonmentunderthethreatofdeathandwaseventuallybrutallyexecuted.Hesought,throughwriting,toobtain“consola-tion”(consolatiowasagenrewhichtraditionallyofferedsolacetothefriendsofthedead).InthisconnectionheappealedtothememoryofSocratesandofcertainRomanStoics,whomheregardedasinno-centfellow-victimsoftyranny.ThomasMorewouldinturnrecalltheConsolationwhensufferingsimilartribulation.Theworkisasustainedmeditationupontheunjustsufferingoftheinnocent.Howisitpossible,ifindeeditispossible,tobehappywhileimprisonedandawaitingdeath?Boethiussoughtcomfortinphilosophy,“whosehouseIhadfromyouthfrequented”(I3).Hemadeanextensiveandveryartisticsurveyofallthatwasbestandnoblestinancientphilosophy:artistic,becauseconceivedinalter-natingpassagesofproseandmeter.TheworktakestheformofadialoguebetweenPhilosophy,whoappearstohimintheformofamajesticwoman,andBoethius’sownmind.Philosophyisatfirstobligedtoreacquaintthesuffering,complainingprisonerwiththeCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n260jamesmCevoymessageshehasforgotten–throughforgetfulnessofhisrealself(I2).Truefreedomcannotbeabolishedbymanacles,foritisinternal.Therealblessingsoflife(familyandfriends)arenottobeforgotteninadversitybutareasourceofhappymemories.Happinessdoesnotlieoutsidethepersoninthegoodsoffortune,butwithinafreemindthatisincommandofitselfandthatinturncannotbeoverpoweredbyanyoutsideforce.InBookIIthequestionoftruehappiness(felicitas)iscentrallyad-dressed.Philosophyarguesthathappinessis“thegoodwhichonceamanobtainsitleavesroomfornofurtherdesires”(III2),sinceallgoodsaregatheredtogetherinit.Thegoodisoftenthoughttolieinwealth,honor,power,glory,orpleasure(orelseinsomead-mixtureofthesefivesourcesofsatisfaction).Philosophychallengeseachoneofthese.Thepossessionofwealthdoesnotexcludeanx-iety.Honorandadvancementarenotinstillersofvirtue(buthowcantherebehappinesswithoutvirtue?).Power,asBoethiushimselfneedsnoreminding(III5),andeventhepowerofkings,isinsecure,anditattractsonlyfair-weatherfriends.Gloryisdeceptive:itdoesnotleadtowisdomorself-knowledge.Pleasureissharedbymanwiththebeasts.Thereisnohappinessinthesevainpromises.Ontheotherhand,fullhappinesswillcombineallthesefiveimperfectgoodsbyincludingthem(III9,prose).Butwhereissuchhappinesstobesought?Notwithinthisuniverseorworld.BoethiuspraysforGod’shelpinthesearch,asPlatofrequentlydidinhisdialogues.InthepoemconcludingIII9,themostbeautifulpassageinBoethius’swritings,themessageoftheTimaeusissetout.Cosmosandsoularebothexpressionsofthetranscendent,divineGood.HappinesswillconsistinparticipatingintheGood,whichisGod:Grant,Father,tomymindtorisetoyourmajesticseat,Grantmetowanderbythesourceofgood,grantlighttosee,Tofixtheclearsightofmymindonyou.DispersethecloudingheavinessofthisearthlymassAndflashforthinyourbrightness.For,totheblessed,youAreclearserenityandquietrest:toseeyouistheirgoal,You,atoncebeginning,driver,leader,pathway,end.TherestofthebookisoccupiedbyalengthyargumenttoshowthattheuniverseisruledbyGodandthatGodcandonoevil.BookIVexaminestheapparenttriumphofviceovervirtue,andpoweroverCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss261goodness,butshowsthatthiscannotbethefinaltruth.BoethiustakesuptheargumentofPlato’sGorgias(507C).Hebecomesrecon-ciled,throughtheuseofreasonindialoguewithPhilosophy,totheconclusionthatprovidencerulesthewholeuniverseandextendstotheindividual.BookVisdevotedtothediscussionofthehighestquestionsaboutprovidenceandhumanfreedom.WecanseehereamovementfromStoictoPlatonicthemesanddialectic.BookIIIformsthehinge.Thereisaparallelmovementfromvirtuetocontemplation(“seeing”)asthecentralelementinhappiness.BoethiusknewthetextsofPlatoandAristotleatfirsthand,andhewaswellreadinlaterGreekNeoplatonism.HisCon-solationdrawsuponallthesesourcesandseekstoproduceaunifiedthoughtthatwouldtakeinallthehighestethicalandmetaphysicaldevelopmentsofAntiquity.ButwhydidthatbelievingChristian,whenexaminingtheprob-lemposedbyinnocentsuffering,ofpatience,providence,andful-fillment,notconsiderinthefirstplaceJob,orJesusChrist?WhyistherenoexplicitlyChristianelementintheConsolation?VariousconsiderationssuggestthathewasworkingaccordingtoaprogramandfollowingouthisownearlytraininginphilosophyatAthens.SomewordsusedintheConsolationdoseemtoresonatewiththeLatinversionsoftheBible,eventhoughnoquotationismadefromthatsource.Theworkamountstoanapologyforprovidenceandthedivinegovernmentoftheuniverseandhumanaffairs,butonethattakesplaceneverthelessentirelywithintheambitofancientphilosophy.ItwasintheagesoffaiththattheConsolationwasmostdeeplyandconstantlyappreciated.Thefavorablereceptionofthisworkofpurephilosophythroughoutthemedievalperiodhadtheeffectofsug-gestingthatthereisasingle,trueaccountofmanandtheuniverseunderaprovidentGod,thevalidityofwhichrestsinallessentialsuponprinciplesofreasondevelopedbytheancientphilosophers.InthisregardBoethiushadahugeimpactonthefaith–reasonproblem-aticofthemedievalschools.thomasaquinasAquinasdiscussedhappiness,togetherwiththeothergreatquestionsofphilosophyandtheology,inseveraldifferentworks,includinghisCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n262jamesmCevoySentencescommentaryandtheSummacontraGentiles.HisideasonthesubjectaresetforthintheirmostmatureforminSummatheologiaeIaIIae,qq.1–5,writteninhislastyears.Thissetoffivequestionsconcernsthegeneralnatureoflife’sultimatepurpose(q.1)andtheparticularconceptionofcompletehappiness(beatitudo,blessedness,bliss)whichAquinasproposesasmeetingtherequire-mentsforsuchapurpose(qq.2–5).Wehaveherearelativelyself-containedtreatisethatisarguablythemostcoherentaccountofitssubjectproducedinmedievaltimesorpossiblyinanypastage.InitAquinasmaderigoroususeofphilosophicalmethodincontinu-itywiththebesttraditionsoftheancientGreekandLatinphiloso-phers.Thesettingofthetreatiseis,however,theological.Beatitudo,orthelastend,isheldtobethebeatificvisionofGod.LikeAugus-tinewritinginTheCityofGod,Aquinasthusproducedaremark-ablepieceofChristianapologeticsusingtoolsfashionedbyancientphilosophy.ItisbeingincreasinglyrecognizedthatvirtueethicsiscentraltoAquinas’smoralthoughtandtohisconsiderationofthecharacter-isticcapacitiesandachievementsofhumannature.HisstudyandappreciationofthevirtueslinkshimfirmlytoAristotle.Thomasendeavorstorelatehappinesstothemoralandspeculativevirtues,arguingthatbeatitudodoesnotlieinbodilyormaterialgoodssuchaspleasureorwealth,butratherthatthehighesthappinessattainablebyhumanbeingsliesinthecontemplationoftruth.EachofthequestionsinSTIaIIae1–5containseightarticles,sothatinrealityfortyquestionsinallareaskedandanswered,togetherwiththeusualobjectionsandrepliesthatmakeupthedialecticalcharacterofAquinas’sthought.Hesoughttomakeclearerthereas-onablenessofthepositionsheadoptedandtoenrichhisowngraspoftruthbythedeliberateinclusionofwhatevertruthwaspresentintheobjectionsputtohim,orchosenbyhim.Question1dealswiththepresuppositionofallthatfollows,theassumptionthattheremustinfactbeafinalend(goal,point)ofhumanexistence.Aquinasdiscussesherethedistinctivelyhumanintentionalandpurposiveactivityinwhichourfreeattemptstoiden-tifyandobtainthegoodunfold.Hearguesthateverythinghumanswilliswilledforthesakeofthegood.Nothingcanbedesiredorwilledforbeingbad,butonlyforbeinganapparent(orsubjectivelyregistered)good.Atthemostgenerallevel,then,wenecessarilyseekCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss263anultimategood.Inthefollowingquestionshetakesupthean-cientPlatonicandAristotelianinquiryintothetruenatureofthatgood.Intheeightarticlesofquestion2heasks:doeshappinesslie(1)inriches,(2)inhonors,(3)infameandglory,(4)inpower,(5)inbodilyendowment,(6)inpleasure,(7)inanyendowmentofsoul,or(8)inanycreatedgood?Inarticles1,3,4,and6itisfromBoethiusthattheauthoritativeview(sedcontra)isdrawn.Happinesscannotconsistinriches,becausemoneyismadeforus,notweformoney,Aquinasargues.Itcannotlieinhonorsbecause(withAristotle)honorisexternaltothepersonreceivingit.Norcanhappinessbeidentifiedwithglory,whichissomethingextrinsictotherealworthoftheperson.Powerdoesnotdefineiteither,beingmorallyambivalentanddependentuponvirtueforitsgooduse.Thehumanbodyexistsforthesakeofthesoulanditsspecificallyhumanactivities,andsoitcannotinitselfbethefocusofhappinessanymorethansensorypleasurecanbe.Happinesscannotberealizedinanycreatedgood,sincebydefinitionthelattercannotincludeeverythingthehumanbeingcandesire.Itis,notsurprisingly,toAugustinethatAquinashasresorttoexpresstheconvictionthatonlyGod,thecompletegood,cansatisfytheinnatedesireforbeatitudo.ForAquinas,however,theessentialrespectinwhichGodcon-stitutesourblessednessisinadirectvisionofthedivinenature,asupremecognitiveactivity,andherehemustdealwithanobjectionfromthestandpointoftraditionalChristianPlatonism.Theobjec-tionisthatbeatitudomustconsist,notinanactofintellectbutinanactofthewill,thatis,inlove.Inarticle4,Aquinasbringsforwardfiveargumentsforthisposition,twoofthemnamingAugustineandoneofthesequotinghisclaimthat“Happyishewhohaswhat-everhedesires,anddesiresnothingamiss.”Asabasisforreplyingtothesearguments,Aquinasdevelopshisownpositionasfollows(withacharacteristicreappropriationofAugustineforhisownviewattheend):Asstatedabovetwothingsareneededforhappiness:one,whichistheessenceofhappiness:theother,thatis,asitwere,itsproperaccident,i.e.,thedelightconnectedwithit.Isay,then,thatastotheveryessenceofhap-piness,itisimpossibleforittoconsistinanactofwill.Foritisevidentfromwhathasbeensaidthathappinessistheattainmentofthelastend.Buttheattainmentoftheenddoesnotconsistintheveryactofthewill.ForCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n264jamesmCevoythewillisdirectedtotheend,bothabsent,whenitdesiresit;andpresent,whenitisdelightedbyrestingtherein.Nowitisevidentthatthedesireitselfoftheendisnottheattainmentoftheend,butisamovementtowardtheend:whiledelightcomestothewillfromtheendbeingpresent,andnotconversely–athingisnotmadepresentbythefactthatthewilldelightsinit.Therefore,thattheendbepresenttohimwhodesiresit,mustbeduetosomethingelsethananactofthewill.Thisisevidentlythecaseinregardtoendsperceptiblebythesenses.Foriftheacquisitionofmoneywerethroughanactofthewill,thecovetousmanwouldhaveitfromtheverymomentthathewishedforit.Butatthatmomentitisfarfromhim;andheattainsitbygraspingitinhishand,orinsomelikemanner;andthenhedelightsinthemoneygot.Andsoitiswithanintelligibleend.Foratfirstwedesiretoattainanintelligibleend;weattainit,throughitsbeingmadepresenttousbyanactoftheintellect;andthenthedelightedwillrestsintheendwhenattained.So,therefore,theessenceofhappinessconsistsinanactoftheintellect:butthedelightthatresultsfromhappinesspertainstothewill.InthissenseAugustinesaysthathappinessisjoyintruth,because,towit,joyitselfistheconsummationofhappiness.(STIaIIae,q.3,a.4)Thevalueoffriendshipentersthediscussionattheendofquestion4.“Doeshappinesscallforthecompanionshipoffriends?”(a.8).Aquinasrespectscommonsenseinsuchmatters.Hemaintainsthatfortheconditionalsortofhappinessonecanhopeforduringearthlylife(wherehealthofbodyandsoulandsomedegreeofpos-sessionsarerelevantconditions)friendsareindeednecessary,sinceweneedtolove.Ifontheotherhandwearethinkingofperfect,heavenlybeatitudo,inthatstatetheloveoftheinfinite,divinegoodrequiresnosupplement.Friendshipwillnotbeinanysenseacondi-tionofperfectbeatitudebutitsaccompaniment.ItwasfromWilliamofAuxerrethatAquinasandothersofhistimeinheritedthedistinctionbetween“perfectbeatitude,whichthesaintswillhaveinthefuturestate,andtheimperfectbeatitudeofthepresentlife.”3Aquinascouldhaveemphasizedthemiseryandunhappinessofearthlylife,asmanyhaddonebeforehim,buthechosetovalueandrecommendthoseexperiencesandachievementsinitwhicharerelatedinapositivewaytoperfecthappiness.Hewiselyregardedthehappinessattainableinthislifeasbeingimper-fectatbest,butclearlyheldthatitishappinessinananalogical,notmerelyanequivocal,sense.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss265Ishappinessintellectualordoesitcomefromthewill?TheintellectualistaccountofbeatitudeputforwardbyAquinasmetwithcriticismonthepartofJohnDunsScotus,andtheirrespectivefollowersremaineddividedduringthelaterMiddleAgesbywhatisknownastheintellectualist-voluntaristcontroversy.Scotuslocatedhumandignityatitsheightnotsomuchintheformulationofcon-ceptsortheactofintellectualvisionbutratherinthefreemovementofthewill,inthatactoflovingwhichembraceswithenjoyment(fruitio)someobjecttrulyworthyofloveforitsownsake,andnotsimplyasameanstobeused(uti).Althoughthecontroversywasatheologicaloneabouthowperfectbeatitudo,theunlimitedhappi-nessofheaven,isenjoyed(isitthroughtheintellect’sapprehendingGodandthusopeningtothewillsomeaccesstothedivinereal-ity?orisitbythewill’sfreelygivingitslove,knowledgebeingonlyaconditionsinequanonofenjoyment?),itinvolvedphilosophicaldifferencesofsomemagnitude.AquinasadoptedandrefinedAristotle’smoralepistemology.Thewill,heheld,isdeterminedbygoodandonlybygoodbutisblindastowhatisgood.Itfallsexclusivelytotheintellecttoidentifyobjectsofaffectionandpossibleaction,andtoinformthewillofthem.Withinthelightthusofferedit,thewilldeliberatesandmakesachoice.Evenanobjectivelybadchoicestillrevealsthebasicdeterminationofthewill,whichcanonlychoosesomethingasgood(butcanofcoursegetproportionswrongbypreferringalessergoodtoagreater,oramerelyapparentgoodtoarealone).Scotus,ontheotherhand,admiredtheAugustinianemphasisonthewillasself-caused(“voluntasestvoluntas,”heremarkedcon-cerningGod).HemovedtowardethicalindeterminisminhisviewthatwhatGodcommandsorforbidsisrightorwrongsimplybecauseGodcommandsorforbidsit.ScotusagreedwithThomasthatdesireordelightcannotmakeupthecenterofhappiness,sincedesirere-vealstheabsenceofthelatterwhereasdelightsupposesitalreadypresent.Heaccordedpriorimportancenottotherespectiveorderinwhichactscomeabout–fortheactoftheintellectiscertainlypriortothatofthewill–buttotheorderofintrinsicworth,wherethefreeactofthewillbringingforthloveisofunequaledandun-rivaledvalue,bearingasitdoeswithinittheentireessenceoffreecommitment.4CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n266jamesmCevoyhappinessintheintellectuallifeWerethereintellectualsintheMiddleAges?Ifwemeanbythattermsomeonewhosehighestrewardanddeepestsatisfactionlies,beyondpleasure,intherealmofpurethought,thenwecanfindmanymed-ievalthinkerswhoindisputablywereintellectuals.Morethanthat,wecanfindauthorswhogaveforcefulexpressiontothisdimensionoftheirexperienceandaspirations.Twocontrastingexamplesoftheintellectualwillbegivenhere.EriugenaJohnScottusEriugenainhismasterpiece,Periphyseon,onlyonceusesthefirstpersoninthepresenceofhisreader:TherewardofthosewholaborinSacredScriptureispureandperfectun-derstanding.OLordJesus,nootherreward,nootherhappiness,nootherjoydoIaskofyouexcepttounderstandyourwords,whichwereinspiredbytheHolyGhost,purelyandwithouterrorduetofalsespeculation.Forthisismysupremefelicity.Itisthegoalofperfectcontemplation,becauseeventhepurestsoulwillnotdiscoveranythingbeyondthis–forthereisnothingbeyondit.(PeriphyseonV38)Eriugenaclaimedthat“Noonecanenterheavenexceptbyphilos-ophy”andthat“philosophyorthepursuitofwisdomisnotsome-thingotherthanreligion,”since“truephilosophyistruereligion,andconversely,truereligionistruephilosophy.”HeunderstoodthepursuitofwisdomastherationalworshipofGodandtheuniquewaytothehappinesswhichliesinthesearchfortruthandthegraspofit,andalsoasananticipationofthedelightsofheaven.Hedidnotdifferentiatebetweenphilosophyandtheology,regardingthequestoftheintellectualandthesatisfactionderivingfromitasbeingbasedonallthesourcesoftruthavailabletohim,includingtheBibleandearlyChristianliterature.BoethiusofDenmarkOursecondexampleofamedievalintellectualisathirteenth-centuryDanewho,asayoungMasterofArts,composedanessayentitledOntheHighestGoodortheLifeofthePhilosopher.TheviewsofBoethiusofDaciaweretooccasionsomeupsettocertainofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss267theParistheologians,whoconsideredthemcontroversialchallengestotheChristiandoctrineofhappiness.ThenameofBoethiusislinkedwiththatofSigerofBrabantintheradicalmovementofartsmasterswhichledtotheCondemnationof1277.Hisunreservedpraiseforthephilosophicallifehasledsomeinterpreterstoregardhimasaproponentofnaturalismorrationalism.YetBoethiuswasnotopposedtoChristianityorthechurch:thereissomereasontobe-lievethathejoinedtheDominicanOrder,presumablyyearsafterthecompositionofhisbookletonthephilosophicallife(around1270).Boethiusquotedanancientphilosopher(whomhewronglytooktobeAristotle,“thePhilosopher”)saying,“Woetoyoumenwhoarenumberedamongbeastsandwhodonotattendtothatwhichisdivinewithinyou!”Now,heargues,ifthereisanythingdivineinmanitistheintellect.Itfollowsthatthesupremegoodshouldlieintheuseofthemind,inboththespeculativeandpracticalorders(i.e.,inknowledgeoftruthandenjoymentofitandindoingwhatisrightandgood).ThegreatesthappinessofallbelongstoGod,accordingtoAristotle(MetaphysicsXII7,1072b24),sincehighestintellectualcapacityandsupremeintelligibilityarematchedandunitedinthedivineself-knowledge.Thegoodofthehumanintellectistruthuni-versally,whichaffordsdelight,whilethegoodofthepracticalintel-lectliesinmoralvirtue.Inshort,“toknowthetrue,todothegood,andtodelightinboth”isthehighestgoodthatisopentous.Thecul-tivationofthemoralandintellectualvirtues,inotherwords,isthetruesthappinesswecanhaveinthislife.AtthispointBoethiusreferstoanotherstateofhappiness:ontheauthorityoffaithwebelieveinhappinessinthelifetocome.Whatweenjoyinthislifepreparesusforthathigherblissbydrawingusclosertoit.Hegoesontouncoverthemoralnormforjudgingintentionandactionuniversally.Justasonewouldexpect,itturnsouttobeanintellectualistoneofthekindthatPlotinusorEriugenamighthaveproposed.Everythoughtandeveryactionwhichconducestothesupremegoodisrightandproperandisinaccordancewithnature–therationalnaturewhichisfulfilledpreciselybythemoralandintellectualvirtues.Inotherwords,Thehappymanneverdoesanythingexceptworksofhappiness,orworksbymeansofwhichhebecomesstrongerandbetterfittedforworksofhappiness.Therefore,whetherthehappymansleepsorisawakeoriseating,helivesinhappinesssolongashedoesthosethingsinordertoberenderedstrongerCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n268jamesmCevoyfortheworksofhappiness.Therefore,allactsofmanwhicharenotdirectedtothissupremegoodofmanwhichhasbeendescribed,whethertheyareopposedtoitorwhethertheyareindifferent,allsuchactsconstitutesininmantoagreaterorlesserdegree.([265]30)Boethiusacceptsthattheintellectualistethicheproposesiseli-tist,sincefewgivethemselvestothepursuitofwisdom,whereasmanyarelazy,orpursuerichesorpleasure,andthusmissthesupremehumangood.Butthephilosopherhastastedintellectualdelightandcannothavetoomuchofit(therebeingnoexcessintheorderofsupremegoods,Boethiusremindshisreader,encourag-ingly).Hisdesiretoknowwillneverbesatisfiedshortoftheabso-lute.Boethiusinvokes“theCommentator”(IbnRushd),whoarguesthatknowledgeandtruthgiverisetodelight,butthemovementofwonderandlovewhichtheyinspireinuscannotbesatisfiedwithanythinglessthanthephilosophicalgraspofthefirstcause,whoisthebeginning,middle,andendofallfinitethings.Boethius’sessaycouldbedescribedasasystematic,condensedpresentationoftheteachingconcerninghappiness,virtue,andcon-templationdevelopedbyAristotleinEthicsIandXandMetaphysicsXII.Thetreatiseendswithanacknowledgmentthatthefirstprinci-plepositedbythephilosopher,andthegloriousandmosthighGod“whoisblessedforever,Amen”areoneandthesame.SigerofBrabant,Boethius’scolleagueintheartsfaculty,alsowroteabookonhappiness,Liberdefelicitate.Ithasbeenlost,butsome-thingofitscontentsisknownthroughareportofitbyAgostinoNifo(1472–1538).5Sigerrejectedthedistinctionbetweenphilosoph-icalandtheologicalconceptionsofhappiness.LikeBoethius,hedidnotemphasizethepracticalaspectofhappiness.Felicitasconsists,hethought,inthecontemplationoftheessenceofGod.Oneofthepropositionscondemnedin1277seemstohavebeendirectedagainsthisbook:“ThatwecanunderstandGodinhisessenceinthismortallife”(Proposition38).ButcouldaChristianrevert,intellectuallyspeaking,toAris-totelianismandtolivingthephilosophicalidealofthehappylife,withoutchallengingthechurchandputtinghisownfaithatrisk?ThiswasthequitenewquestionwithwhichtheradicalpartyintheParisianartsfacultyconfrontedthetheologiansatthesameuni-versityduringapproximatelythetenyearsleadinguptothefatefulCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss269year1277.TheprecedingdecadeshadwitnessedtherediscoveryandLatinizationofthePhysics,Metaphysics,Ethics,andPoliticsofAris-totle.Theuniversitymilieufounditselfconfrontedbythesebooks,whichputforwardanswerstoallthegreatquestionsinethicsandpolitics,naturalphilosophy,andeven,inaway,religion(wehaveseenBoethiusrefertotheMetaphysicsregardingthedivinenature).Theclaimtototalityofoutlookandcompletenessofexplanationattractedsome,butitchallengedmanytheologiansbytheradicaltermsinwhichitwasputandbytheconvertsitmadeinthosetwoableyoungphilosophyteachers,SigerandBoethius.ThechallengewassharpenedbythechoicebothmenmadeofIbnRushdasthebestinterpreterofAristotle,andhisinfluenceuponSigerandBoethiushasleddistinguishedhistoriansoftheperiodtodescribethemasLatinAverroists.6Itwas,however,Aristotlewhowastheirideal,oreventheiridol;andtheyclungtohimfirstandlast,asbeingbeyondcomparisonaboveallothers.Theirroot-and-branchAristotelianismgavethemintellectualstrengthandasenseoftheautonomyoftheirownfaculty,evenasitsappedtheirindependencebymakingtheminmanywaysthesubjectsoftheirownsubject.AsenseoftheautonomyofphilosophywithregardtofaithandtheologycanbegatheredfromthereadingofBoethius’sessayonthesupremegood.Hisargumentthatthephilosophicallifebothinac-tionandincontemplationisthehighestidealwecanhave,andthatthehappinessitoffersiswithoutrivalsofarasthislifeisconcerned,isnotmitigatedbyreferencetoanyreligiousconcernorvocation,ortotheBeatitudesoftheSermonontheMount(Matthew5:5–12).Istherealayspiritatworkhere?Boethiusseemstohavebeenmoti-vatedmorebymethodologythanbyideology.Perhapshewouldhaverespondedthathewasspeakingonlyasaphilosopher,andonlyasahumbleinterpreterofthePhilosopher,whohadsaiditall(neitherhenorSigerlaidanyclaimtooriginality,indeedtheyrepudiatedanysuchnotionevenasanideal);thatcomparisonwithfaithwasnothistaskasaprofessorofliberalartsandphilosophy;thathehimselfsin-cerelybelievedintheafterlifeandheaven;thattruthsofphilosophyhavearationalcharacter,whilefaithisbasedonauthority,miracles,andtrust.Buttheseconsiderationscouldnotneutralizetheshockwavessentoutfromthejuniorfacultytotheseniorone.Thetheo-logicalcommissionthatwassetuptoinquireintothenew,strangeteachings,wasparticularlystruckbyBoethius’sessayandtookCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n270jamesmCevoyexceptiontohisconfidentcontentionthatthegreatesthappinessonearthisthatofthephilosopherandthatthephilosopherbuildsuphismoralcharacterandhisspeculativelifepurelyoutofhisownresources.Amongthe219propositionsthatthecommissionidentifiedasun-acceptableteachingsinaChristiancontext,andwhichthebishopofPariscondemnedonitsrecommendation(March7,1277),arethefol-lowing,whichmirrortheteachingofBoethius’sessay:“Thatthereisnomoreexcellentstatethantostudyphilosophy”(Proposition40)and“Thattheonlywisemenintheworldarethephilosophers”(Proposition154).Thepreambletothecondemnationspointedtotheconfusedattitudesthatcameaboutthroughtheclaimsoftheradicals,whobehaved“asthoughthereweretwocontrarytruths.”Whilenoonewasofficiallynamedinthedocument,andneitherBoethiusnorSigermaintainedadouble-truththeory,themethod-ologicalissuetheybroughtupwasoffundamentalimportance:phi-losophyandtheologydifferinwheretheycomefrom,reasonintheformercase,faithandtraditioninthelatter.Buttheintellectualdif-ficultyexperiencedbythetwomenwascompoundedinadoubleway:bytheirbeingforbiddentoteachanytheologyinthefacultyofarts(“leavethattothetheologians,”theywereinstructed),andbytheirevidentconvictionthatnoonecouldsurpassAristotleasaphilosopherbutthatonemustinsteadrestcontentwithfindingoutwhathemeantandteachingjustthat,withoutputtingitintoques-tionorgoingbeyondit.BoethiusandSigerhavebeenhailedasthefirstmodernphilosophersbyhistorianswhoforvariousreasons(e.g.,Marxistorliberal)regardmentalautonomy(orfreedomfromreli-giousauthorityandconviction)asthefirstconditionofthought.Inrealitytheirinstitutionalsettingandtheirintellectualpositionpre-cludedtheseradicalAristoteliansfromthinkingouttherelationshipofreasonandfaithinanyadequateway.Theessaywehavelookedatherehasaninnocenceaboutitthatmakesitseemlikeareversiontothefourthcenturybce.Itsauthorsimplyjumpsbackoverthecenturies,bracketingChristianity,bypassingtherichAugustinianexplorationsofexperience,andputtingAristotle’smessageintosyl-logisticshapeandLatinwords.PartoftheshockanddismaythatradicalAristotelianismoccasionedwasnodoubtduetothenaive,unhistoricalandatemporalrevivalthatwasitscenterpieceanditsintention.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss271theoriesoffriendshipMedievalideasaboutfriendshipallexhibitsomedegreeofconti-nuitywiththethoughtoftheancients.TheschoolsofPythagoras,Plato,Aristotle,theStoa,andEpicurusallcontributedsomethingtoarichheritageofideasuponwhichtheChristianauthorsofme-dievalandRenaissancetimesdrewliberally.7ThemostwidespreadoftheseideasderivedfromPythagoras:“Friendshaveallthingsincommon.”Itmaysafelybesaidthatnomedievalauthor,whethermonk,scholar,ormaster,wroteaboutfriendshipwithoutevokingthisnotionofcommunity.Augustine,forinstance,recordedthatagroupoffriends,ofwhomhewasone,“hopedtomakeonecommonhouseholdforallofus,sothatinthecleartrustoffriendshipthingsshouldnotbelongtothisorthatindividual,butonethingshouldbemadeofallourpossessions,andbelongwhollytoeachoneofus,andeverybodyowneverything”(ConfessionsVI14).Thatprojectfailed,butAugustinelaterrescueditbyfoundingamonasteryandbywrit-inginacommunitarianvein.HealsopresentedtheearlyChristiancommunityofJerusalem(Acts2:42–47;4:32–35)inacommunalistlight.Similarly,AelredofRievaulxdevelopedtheviewthatinthemonasticcommunity“whatbelongstoeachonepersonallybelongstoall,andallthingsbelongtoeachone,”addingthatinheaven,wherethesupremegoodwillbeheldincommon,thehappinessofeachwillbelongtoall,andtheentiretyofhappinesstoeachindividual.8CiceroandSenecaconveyedtotheirreadersmanyStoicideas.Thelatterthoughtofpersonalfriendshiplargelyintermsofthespir-itualdirectiongivenbyamaturephilosophertoanapprentice,ashisMoralLetterstoLuciliusamplyillustrate.ThetheoryandpracticeofspiritualfriendshipintheChristianagehadasimilarorigin.BothwereformsofeducativeloveandthereforehadaSocraticcharacter,beingbaseduponthedevelopmentofself-knowledge.CicerowasbynomeansastrueaStoicasSeneca,buthisworksweretheleadingsourceofStoicideasintheMiddleAges.Heinsistedthattheoriginoffriendshipistobesoughtnotinneedordesirebutinnatureitself;friendshipderivesfromthenaturalsociabilityofhumankindandfromvirtue,or“livinginaccordancewithnature.”Aquinaswouldmaintain,inasimilarvein,that“Everymanisbynatureafriendtoeveryotherman,byvirtueofasortofuniversallove,”whichistobeexercisedasfriendshipevenwithregardtothestranger(STIIaIIae,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n272jamesmCevoyq.114,a.1).Christianity,ofcourse,broughtwithititsownspecifickindofuniversalitythroughitsdoctrineoflove,evenloveoftheenemy,andofforgiveness;nevertheless,thesentimentsjustquotedseemtoberedolentoftheancientStoa.Aristotleformulatedthemostcomprehensiveancientdoctrineoffriendshipandrelatedthemes(suchascivictrustandfamilyaffec-tion).Hearguedthattheselfisanequivocalentity.Baseself-loverulesoneoutfromfriendship,whichisgenerous.Butifwelovethebetterpartofourselvesthenwearecapableoflovinganotherinthesamedegreeasweloveourselves,andthechosenfriendwillbecome“anotherself.”Werequirefriendsifwearetoprogressinself-knowledgeandingenerosity,andthisneedisnotaweaknessinus–althoughitwouldbesoinagod.Friendshipwithwisdom(philo-sophia)createsthehighestintellectualcommunionthathumanscanexperience.Aristotle’smessagebegantomakeanimpactfollowingthetransla-tionofthefulltextoftheNicomacheanEthicsintoLatinbyRobertGrosseteste.AquinasappearstohavebeenforciblystruckbytheverbalparallelbetweenAristotle’s“thefriendisanotherself”andtheGospelinjunctionto“loveyourneighborasyourself”(Mark12:31).Heperceivedinthenotionofdisinterestedfriendship(lovecharacterizedbybenevolence;loveoftheotherpersonforthatper-son’sownsake,i.e.,asanend,notameans)thevitalcluetothemoralattitudeofrespect,notforfriendsalonebutforevery“otherself”(STIaIIaeq.26,a.4;q.28,a.3).HenryofGhent,alsoinfluencedbyAristotle,taughtthatdueandproperself-loveisrequiredifwearetolovesomeoneelseasmuchasweloveourselves.9HowmightthespecificallyChristiandimensionofmedievalfriendshiptheorybecharacterized?Afewindicationsmaybeofferedhereonthebasisofrecentresearch.10Thewritersofpatristicandmedievaltimesconsciouslyreflecteduponthebiblicalreferencestofriendship,notablythestoryofDavidandJonathan,versesfromthebookofProverbs,andtherelevantNewTestamentpassages,suchasJohn15:15.ThebasisofspiritualfriendshipwasidentifiedinthepersonofJesusChrist.11Prayerforfriends,thereadinesstoforgiveandtoacceptforgivenessforoffensescommitted,thebearingofoneanother’sburdens,12andtheextensionofpardontotheenemy,whentakentogetherclearlyreducedtheclassicalemphasisontheequalityoffriendsandtherequirementregardingsimilarityinvirtue.TwoCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss273scholarlywriters,RichardofSt.VictorandHenryofGhent,evensoughttolayaTrinitarianfoundationforfriendship:thefriendshipofthethreedivinepersonsistheexemplarofallnonpossessive,self-givingamicitia,whereforefriendshipisthenaturalvirtuethatdrawsclosesttosupernaturalcharity.13Thelastofthesenovelties(bycomparisonwithancienttheories)wasalsoperhapsthemostdefiningone.Itlayintheinherentlinkforgedbetweenfriendshipandthehappinessofthecourtsofheaven.Thejoysoffriendshipwerewidelyregardedasanexperientialmu-tualencouragementonthesharedpilgrimageoflife,theforetasteofheavenitself,“whenthisfriendship,towhichonearthweadmitbutfew,willbeextendedtoall,andbyallwillbeextendedtoGod,sinceGodwillbeallinall”(Aelred,SpiritualFriendshipIII134).happinessandpeaceattheendofhistory:joachimoffioreAllmedievalthinkerswhowroteonthesubjectconceivedofhap-pinessinbothindividualandsocialterms.Theconvictionthatthehumanbeingisnaturallysociablewasunchallengeable:bothreligionandphilosophytaughtit.Ontheotherhand,therewasnoseriousmedievalsocial(orsocialist)utopiantheoryofhappiness,noranylit-eraryimitationofthePlatonicRepublic,noranyanticipationoftheUtopiaofThomasMore.Therewas,however,aninterpretationofChristianeschatology,aformofapocalypticthought,which(takingupRevelation20:1–3)lookedforwardtoamillenniumofmes-sianicpeaceandjusticeunderthepersonalruleofChrist.JoachimofFiore(c.1135–1200),aCalabrianmonasticreformer,developedthesethemesinhiscommentariesonRevelation,echoinginsomerespectstheearlyChristianheresyofMontanismorchiliasm.14Thisamountedtotheexpectationofatemporalstateofhappinessattheendofhistory.Attemptswereevenmadeinthethirteenthcenturytopredict(onthebasisofsymbolicnumbersintheapocalypticbooksofDanielandRevelation)themomentwhentheexpectedend-timeofpeacewouldbreakintohistory,andwhatshapelifemightthentake:theunificationofthereligions(Christian,Judaic,andIslamic)inonechurch;thewaningofinstitutionsandthespiritualizationofhuman-ity;theabolitionofwar;thepresenceoftheHolySpiritbringingatrulyspiritualage(orthirdstageofhumanity,inTrinitarianterms);CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n274jamesmCevoytheadventofaworldemperor,oranangelicpope.Althoughthesecurrentsofthoughtwereinfluential,andevenprovedtroublesomeforthechurchattimes,theydidnotmanagetorallymorethanaminority.TheinterpretationofRevelationbySt.Augustine,whichruledoutmillennialismandleftthetimeoftheSecondComingun-knowntothechurch,provedtoostrongtobeoverturned.Ithasbeenargued,however,thatsecularizedformsofthedoctrineofinevitablehistoricalprogresstowardunity,justice,peace,andhappiness(intheEnlightenment,GermanIdealism,andMarxism)owetheirshape,atleastinageneralway,toJoachimism.15Medievalphilosophersbe-lievedintheunderlyingdignityandfreedomofhumannatureandthegoodnessofthecreatedorder,buttheyalsorecognizedthedeeplyflawedcharacterofhumanactioninhistory.Asthefollowingchap-terwilldemonstrate,thepoliticalideaselaboratedinthelightoftheseassumptionshadaconsiderablemeasureofmoralidealismandinsomecasesprojectedpeace,justice,andcommunalwell-beingasgenuinepossibilitiesforthislife.Butregardingrealizationoftheultimatehumangoodofbeatitude,medievalthoughtcouldforthemostpartbedescribedasrealisticallyotherworldlyandtheocentricincharacter.notes1.Augustinearguesfortheconnectionbetweenhappiness,joyinthetruth,andGodinOnFreeChoiceoftheWillII.SeeespeciallyII13:“Man’sEnjoymentoftheTruth.”AlsoseearticlesonFreedom,Happiness,andTruth,aswellasthosedevotedtoindividualwritingsofAugustineinA.Fitzgerald[67].2.D.Knowles[8]55.3.G.Wieland,CHLMP679n.4.ScotusdiscussesthepositionofAquinas,withoutnaminghim,andop-posesitatOrdinatioIVd.49,q.4.Ockham,too,arguedthatenjoyment(fruitio)isnotacognitiveactbutavolitionalone.HemaintainedthatthewillitselfistheimmediatecauseofthepleasureinvolvedandthatloveofGod,ratherthanloveofthevisionofGod,istheessenceofenjoyment.SeeOckhamCTII349–417.5.G.Wieland,CHLMP682.6.Forexample,E.Gilson[9]387–402.7.J.McEvoy[565].8.AelredofRievaulx,OnSpiritualFriendshipIII79–80[356]111.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nUltimategoods:happiness,friendship,andbliss2759.ForHenry’sideasonfriendship,seeJ.McEvoy[223].ThewaysinwhichAristotle’sethicalthoughtwasreceivedbytheuniversityprofessorsbetweencirca1300and1450havenotforthemostpartbeenstudiedconsistentlyorindetail,sincemostoftheircommentariesarestillinmanuscript,andanumberofthemleaveoffatthecloseofBookV.10.J.McEvoy[565]34–36.11.CfMatthew18:20.12.Cf.Galatians6:2.13.RichardofSt.Victor,OntheTrinityIII12–15[387].ForHenryseeJ.McEvoy[223].14.M.Reeves[566].15.Ibid.166–75.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nannabels.brett12PoliticalphilosophyTheveryexistenceofmedievalpoliticalphilosophyissometimesquestioned.Theactivitiesandproblemsthatwethinkofasformingadistinctivelypoliticaldimensionofhumanlifecannot,itissug-gested,beisolatedinthemedievalperiodfromotherdimensionsofhumanactivity:centrally,thatofreligion.Theregnum,thesphereofworldlyadministration,wasonlyonehalf–andthelesserhalfatthat–oftheentiregovernanceofhumankind;theotherbeingthesacerdotium,thepriesthood,whichistodirectusinourcapacitytotranscendthisearthlyexistence.Whileworldlygovernmentwasinthehandsofthemultifariouskingdoms,principalities,city-states,andfeudaldomainsofmedievalEurope,spiritualgovernmentwasinthehandsofthechurchanditshead,thepope.Inotherwords,whatwecallpoliticswasthenonlyasubordinatebranchofreligion:theologywasthemaster-scienceofhumanlifeonearth,justasthechurchwasitsmaster-government–intheoryatleast.1Idisagreewiththiswayofthinkingaboutthemedievalattitudetothepolitical.AsIshallseektoshow,medievalthinkerswerequitecapableof(and,moreover,deeplyinterestedin)addressingtheac-tivitiesandproblemsofhumanbeingsrelatingtoeachotherwithinacommonpublicspaceasadistinctivesphereofhumanlife.ThiswasinpartbecausetheywereheirstoanAntiquediscourseofthepoliticalwhichdidjustthat.Medievaltheologianscertainlydidnotconsidertherationaleofpoliticsinthissenseseparatelyfromques-tionsoftheoverallrationaleofhumanlife,whichinvolvedthemimmediatelyinquestionsofreligionandthechurch.Butthisdoesnotdepoliticizetheirdiscussionsorreducethemtoalocalizedhis-toricalphenomenon.Onthecontrary,itisthesourceoftheirabid-inginterestandrelevance.Fortheimportantthingaboutmedieval276CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy277politicalphilosophyisthatthequestionofwhatispoliticscannotbeseparatedfromthequestionofhowtovalueit.Inotherwords,estab-lishingthatthereissuchadistinctiveareaofhumanactivity,whichmightaptlybetermedpolitics,involvesestablishingwhatgooditprovidesus.TheideaofaconnectionbetweenpoliticsandthehumangoodwasakeystoneofthepoliticaldiscourseofAntiquitywithinwhichanduponwhichmedievalphilosophersworked.Ancientpoliticalphilosophymeantnomorethanreasoningconcerningthepolis,the“city.”Aristotle,perhapsitsmostfamousancientGreekexponent,openedhisPoliticsasfollows:Everycityisacommunityofsomekind,andeverycommunityisestablishedwithaviewtosomegood...But,ifallcommunitiesaimatsomegood,thecityorpoliticalcommunity,whichisthehighestofall,andwhichembracesalltherest,aimsatgoodinagreaterdegreethananyother,andatthehighestgood.2Bytheterm“politicalcommunity”(emphasismine),Aristotlemeanttodistinguishthecityfromanyotherformofcommunityinwhichhumanbeings–asnaturallycommunicativeanimals–engage.Hesawthisformofengagement,beyondthelimitsofthehouseholdoreventheextendedkingroupthatmakesupthevillage,asvitaltohumanfulfillment:thelifeofmoralandtheoreticalreasonwhichishumanexcellenceorvirtue.Thisisthehumangood,withoutrefer-encetowhichthecitycannotbeunderstood,justasweourselvescannotbeunderstood.3Thecityisthereforenaturaltousinthesensethatitallowsandcompletesournature.Aristotle’sidentificationofandcommitmenttothecityunder-stoodinthisway,asvitallyimplicatedinhumanteleology,wasde-pendentonthepoliticalorganizationofancientGreece,inwhichthepoliswasboththecenterofgovernmentandthecenterofculturedoreducatedlife.Thisformofcity-basedculturewassharedbythemostfamouscity-stateofallAntiquity,Rome.Romeexpandedtoavastempire,butwithinitsterritoriesthesamecivicorganizationandcivicculture,centeredonthecityorcivitas,survived.Closelyassociatedwiththeideaofrespublicaor“commonwealth,”civitasmeantnotjustthecitybutcivilization,humanityasopposedtobarbarity,virtue–humanexcellence–asopposedtothebestialityofanimals.FortheRomanphilosopherCicero,asmuchasforAristotle,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n278annabels.brettthecityanditsliferepresentedthefulfillmentofhumanity’spossi-bilitiesinthelifeofreasonandreasonedspeech,dominantoverthemoreanimaldrivesofappetiteandsensuality.4Theideathathumanbeingsbynaturebelonginacitydidnotimply,foreitherAristotleorCicero,thatcitiesnaturallycoalesceinsomeorganic,nonnegotiatedwayfromtheirconstituentindividualsorlessercommunities.Bothphilosophersunderstoodthatdifferentindividualsandgroupshaveinterestsandappetitesthatmaynotalwaysharmonizepeaceablywiththoseofothers.Asaresult,theyarguedthatnocommunitycanholdtogetherwithoutthevirtueofjustice,thevirtuethatgivestootherswhatisrightfullytheirown.5Justiceisthatwhichenableshumanbeingsnotjusttolookoutforthemselvesbutalsototakeintoaccounttheinterestsofothers,anditisthereforethatwhichenablesthemmutuallytocreatea“publicthing,”arespublica.Justiceisthusthefoundationofanypoliticalsociety,andthejusticeoftherulerorthelawistorespectandtofosterthegoodofthispublicthing:the“commongood,”akeytermofpoliticalphilosophybothinAntiquityandthroughouttheMiddleAgesandbeyond.IfAristotleandCicerosharedabroadidealofpoliticsandthepo-litical,ofwhatitcandoforhumanity,theyconsequentlyalsosharedasenseofhowmuchstandstobelostifsomethinggoespoliticallywrong:ourverysoulisatstakeinthecity.Politicalwrongorpo-liticalviceisunderstoodasinjustice,theoppositeofthevirtuethatholdsthecitytogether.Ifjusticegivestoeachandalltheirown,injusticedeprivesthemoftheirown–ofownership–andsubordi-natesthemtotheownershipofanother.Thisisdomination,slavery,ortyranny:andthepossibilityofthecorruptionofthecityintoaformofdominationwasacentralproblemofancientpoliticalphi-losophy,fromPlato’sRepublicforward.ButitwasherethatthefirstgreatphilosopherofLatinChristianity,Augustine,offeredaradicalcritiqueoftheentireancientpoliticaldiscourse.theonetruecityAccordingtoAugustine,nohumancitycanavoidthecorruptionofdomination,becausebyhisownsin,manhasmadehisownsoulfundamentallycorrupt.6Thisisadifferenceofthemostprofoundna-ture.ButwhileAugustinewasthefirstphilosopherofthemedievalCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy279LatinWest,hewasalsooneofthelastancientRomanphilosophers,heirandinmanywayscommittedtotheancientunderstandingofcivility,thecity,andallthatitbroughtwithit.Thetitleofhisgreatworkonhumanlife,TheCityofGod,bearsthisout.Itissometimessaidthatthisisaworkoftheology,notpoliticaltheory,butthisisafalsedichotomy.Augustinesharedwithclassicalpoliticaltheorythecentralunderstandingthatourfulfillmentwillcomeonlyinatruecity,incommunicationwithothersinfreedomandinjustice.Thequestionwasrather,whatisthattruecity,andhowdoesonegaincitizenshipinit?ItisherethatAugustine’sChristianvisiondivergedsosignificantlyfromthatofhispredecessors.Forhisan-swerwasthatwecanonlybefullyhumaninthecityofGod,nottheearthlycity,thecityofman;andthatcitizenshipofGod’scitycomesthroughgracealone.Augustinethusexploitedtheconnectedpolesofclassicalpoliti-caltheory–thegood,nature,reason,andjustice–butheputthemtoverydifferentuse.ForAugustine,Godcreatedhumannatureandcreateditgood.ManwasendowedwithreasonorunderstandingbywhichhelivedintheknowledgeofGod.Hewasalsocreatedjust.ButhereAugustinemadeafundamentalinnovationintheancientvocab-ularyofthepolitical.DrawingonPlatobutdeployingtheterminol-ogyofRomanlaw,heanalyzedjusticeitselfintermsofdominance:rightfuldominanceordominionofthesuperiorovertheinferior.ThesuperiorwhowasrightfullydominantoverallthingswasGod,andthereforethejusticeofGod’screature(andhenceinferior),man,mustbeginwithanacknowledgmentofGodasrightfulmaster.Manwascreatedinthisjusticebut,attheFall,turnedawayfromhismaster,God,withdrawingfromsubordinationandhencefallingintoinjus-tice,apresumptionofabsoluteautonomyorwrongfuldominance(domination).Asaresult,thesphereofrelationsbetweenhumanbeingsapartfromGod–theancientsphereofthepolitical,theantithesisofdom-ination–isforAugustinenecessarilyasphereofdomination,injus-tice,orcorruption.TheonlystateoftruejusticeisthecityofGod:“truejusticeisfoundonlyinthatcommonwealthwhosefounderandrulerisChrist.”7Consequently,thegoalofhumanpoliticscannotbetheestablishmentofajustcity.Instead,itisakindofpeace.Throughitscoercivestructureoflaws,officers,andarmiestheearthlycitycancontaintheworsteffectsofourhumanlustfordomination(libidoCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n280annabels.brettdominandi).ThispeaceisnotthepeaceofGod,theonlytruepeace,“aperfectlyorderedandperfectlyharmoniousfellowship[societas]intheenjoymentofGod,andofoneanotherinGod.”8ButeventhepeaceoftheearthlycitypreservestheintegrityofnatureinsomewayandthereforebearssomerelationtothegoodnessofGod.9Itmay,andmust,beusedandupheldbythosewhoarejust,eventhoughitisnotultimatelyvaluedbythem.Augustinedidnot,then,de-valuehumanpoliticsentirely,buthesawthehumangoodaslyingoutsidethehumancity,inmembershipofthecityofGodonpilgrim-agethroughthisworld(whichAugustinetendstoequatewiththechurch,whilerecognizingthattherearereprobateaswellaselectwithinitsranks10),andinthehouseholdsofjustmen.Itisnotinthehumancitythatthegoodofoursoulsisatstake.Augustine’smedievalsuccessorsinheritedhisvisionoftheonetruecityasthedominantparadigmforthinkingaboutthepoliticsofthislife.Buttheybrokeoutofthisparadigminsomewayswhileremodelingitinothers.AtthecenterofthesedevelopmentswasthereopeningofthequestionofthevalueofthepoliticalwithinanexpresslyChristianreligiousframework.reason,nature,andthehumangoodInwhatfollowsIshallbetaking“medievalpoliticalphilosophy”nar-rowly,primarilyasapartofscholasticism,theformalizedlearningofthemedievaluniversities.ThisisnottosaythatpoliticaldiscoursewaslimitedtotheuniversitiesintheMiddleAges.Aflourishingliteratureexisted,bothcourtlyandpopular,onthe“artofruling,”thenatureofgoodgovernment,andthevirtuesoftheidealprince.Therearesometimesdirectconnectionsbetweenthisdiscourseandtheacademic,asforexamplebetweentherepublicanrhetoricofthenorthernItaliancitiesandthewritingsofMarsiliusofPadua.Again,straddlingtheuniversitiesandthepracticalforaofgovernment,lawyers–bothcivilandcanon–wereacriticallyimportantforceinconceptualizinganddefiningpoliticalagents,bodies,powers,andrelations.Nonetheless,Ishallbeconcernedherechieflywithself-consciouslytheoreticalandreflectivetreatmentsofthesubject,mostlybyuniversitytheologians.Ishallusetheworkofseveralofthemostimportantofthesetoillustratesomemajorthemesofme-dievalmeditationonthepolitical.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy281Thethirteenth-centuryrecoveryofAristotle’smoralandpoliticalthoughtintheLatinWestisoftenconsideredthekeymomentinmedievalreevaluationofthesphereofhumangovernment.Itisbynomeansthecase,however,thatpoliticalargumentsfromhumannatureandthegoodwerepreviouslyunknown.11Firstly,Cicero’sun-derstandingofthecivitasandofourdutieswithintheciviccontexthadremainedfamiliarafterthedemiseoftheclassicalworld,mainlythroughhisOnDuties,butalsothroughothertreatisesandinfrag-mentsofhiswritingshandedonanddiscussedbytheLatinfathers.AlthoughAugustinehadexplicitlyrepudiatedtheCiceronianunder-standingofthehumancommonwealthasasocietyheldtogetherbythebondofjustice,hehadallowed(aswehaveseen)thatChristianshavedutieswithinthiscommonwealth,suchasitis.Thewaywasopen,therefore,toapositivereassessmentofciviclifeintermsofvirtueandthusofthehumangood.JohnofSalisbury’sPolicraticusexemplifiesthistrend.12ThroughCicero,too,theancientargumentthatthecityisnaturaltouswasavailable.Ithasbeensuggestedthat,sinceCicero’sargumentfromnaturedoesnotassumeaneces-saryandnonviolentdevelopmentofthecity,butratherrecountsapassagefromanoriginalstateofwildnessbymeansofvirtueandde-liberateintervention,itcouldbeaccommodatedtotheAugustiniandimensionsofhistoryandhumansinfulness.13Thus,someoftheancientheritagethatconnectednature,thegood,andthehumancitywasavailableandbeingactivelydeployedpriortotherecoveryofAristotle’stexts.14ContributingtothiswayofthinkingwasthatotherhugeintellectualheritageofAntiquity,thecorpusoftheRomancivillaw,rediscoveredinthelibrariesoftheItalianpeninsulaandbothstudiedandappliedattheuniversitiestherefromtheearlytwelfthcentury.15Romanlegaltextssuggestedtheexistenceofanaturallawgoverninghumanbeingsintheirsocialrelations–amorallawratherthanalawbackedbycoer-civesanctions.16Thecoercivelegalframeworkofthecitywasseenascomingtoexistsubsequenttothisoriginalnormativeframe-work,againsuggestinganevolvingdynamicinhumanrelationsthatcouldbeconnectedwiththehistoricalperspectiveofAugustinianChristianity.Canonlaw,too,offeredsuggestionsinthisdirection.Canonistsusedtheirtextstodeveloptheideaofanaturaliusinhumanbeings–anaturalright,rectitude,orlaw–bywhichtheycoulddiscernrightfromwrongnaturally.17Finally,thewidespreadCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n282annabels.brettorganicanalogyofthecommonwealth,the“bodypolitic,”withthehumanbody,the“bodynatural,”wasagainakeylocusforargumentsfromnatureandthegood.Inaseriesofways,then,theargumentfromnaturewasbeingdeployedwithinaspecificallyChristianframeworkpriortothere-coveryofAristotelianmoralandpoliticaltextsinthemid-thirteenthcentury.Itisfairtosay,however,thatthesetextsputtheargumentinadifferentandchallengingform.Thedominantpositiontheirre-coveryhasenjoyedinthehistoryofmedievalpoliticalphilosophyistothatextentjustified,asistheparallelpositionofThomasAquinas,thetheologianandphilosopherwhomadetheirinterpretationacentralpartofhisintellectualendeavor.InhistreatiseOnKingshipaddressedtothekingofCyprus,tra-ditionallydatedaround1266,AquinasagreedwithAristotlethatwearenotjustanimalsbutrationalanimals,withanexcellencetobeachievedthroughlivingourlivesinareasonedmanner.18Suchalifeismadepossiblefortheindividualthroughcommunicationwithotherreasoningbeings:“foritisforthisthatmengathertogetherwitheachother,thattheymaylivethegoodlifetogether,whicheachofthemcouldnotachievebylivingindividually.”19Itwasnotimmediatelyobvious,however,thatthiscommunicationwasthepoliticalcommunityinsisteduponbyAristotle.Itsbenefitsseemedtospringsimplyfromhumansociety,apparentlymakingussocialbutnotnecessarilypoliticalanimals.Here,however,AquinasfilledouttheAristoteliantextinhisownway.Weprimarilyneedsoci-ety.Butsociety,beingmadeupofindividualsallpursuingtheirowngood,willfallapartunlessthereissomecommonforcedirectingthatsocietytoitscommongood.Thisforceanditsdirectives,andthecommunalorderthatitcreates,properlyconstitutethepoliti-caldomain.HenceAquinasmadeAristotlehisownbysayingthat“manisbynatureasocialandpoliticalanimal”20–socialinthefirstinstance,politicalasadirectconsequence.WhetherthisisthefirstsketchofAquinas’spoliticaltheoryorwhetheritinfactconstituteshisfinalreflectionsonthesubject,21weseethatthepoliticalhereisofcriticalimportancetothedistinctivelyhumangoodbutnotconstitutiveofit.ThisancillaryroleofthepoliticaldomainwasfurtherunderlinedbyadistinctionAquinasmadewithinthehumangood.Aswehaveseen,Aquinasacceptedthatpartofthisgoodcouldberealizedwithinthehumancommunity.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy283Thiswasthemoralorethicalgood,thelifeofnaturalhumanvirtue.ButasaChristian,Aquinasdidnotacceptthatthatwastheendofhumanlifeandhumanpossibility.ForAquinasasforAugustine,theultimategoodisGod,andallcreatedgoodisreferredtoGod.Therefore,althoughthelifethatwecanachievebyourownnaturalabilitiesdoeshavetheratio–therationalcharacter–ofanendandthusofagood,thelifemadepossiblethroughthesupernaturalgiftofgraceandtheattendanttheologicalvirtuesistheonlyonethathasthecharacterofanultimateendandfinalgood.Equallyevidently,Aquinasargued,thepolitical,whichisaconditionforachievingthenaturalend,mustalsoservethehigherend;otherwiseitisdetachedfromtheratio–theoverallrationalstructure–ofthegood.Asaresult,AquinasdidnothesitatetosaythatChristiankingsmustobeythespiritualgovernor,thepope,astheywouldthelordJesusChristhimself.22AlthoughAquinasisoftencelebratedforrevivingtheideaofanaturalmorallife,ofwhichpoliticsisapart,ithastoberealizedthatforhimthemoralautonomyofthehumanpoliticaldomainisnotunqualified.InhismagisterialSummatheologiae,Aquinassetthequestionofthepoliticalwithintheframeworkofoneofhisgreatestachieve-ments,acomprehensiveelaborationoftheconceptoflaw.TheDeregnoshowsAquinasusingthenotionofreasontobindtogetherAris-toteliannaturalteleologywithChristianeschatology.Itisbecausewearerationalcreaturesthatwebothliveinthehumancommu-nity,achievingthegoodthatitbrings,andcanalsomovebeyondittowardtheeternalcontemplationofGod.IntheSumma,Aquinasarguesthatreason,directingacommunitytoanendorgood,hastherationalcharacteroflawprovidedthatthereasoninquestionissovereignoverthatcommunity:lawisdefinedas“anordinanceofreasonforthecommongood,promulgatedbyhimwhohasthecareofthecommunity”(STIaIIae,q.90,a.4).23TheprimarylawistheeternallawofGod,thesovereignorlordofallthings,andthislawisnothingotherthanGod’sreasoninitsaspectasdirectingallthingstotheirappointedendorgood.Individualhumanbeings,asmadeintheimageofGod,arenaturallysovereignoverthemselves,inthesensethattheyareabletodirecttheirownactsinvirtueofhavingreasonandchoice(prologuetoST2).This“participation”inGod’srationaldirectionoftheuniverseisthelawwhichisnaturallyinthem,ornaturallaw:CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n284annabels.brettAmongotheranimalstherationalcreatureissubjecttodivineprovidenceinamoreexcellentway,inasmuchasittooparticipatesinprovidence,providingforitselfandothers.Whenceittoosharesineternalreason,throughwhichithasanaturalinclinationtoitsdueactandend,andthisparticipationoftheeternallawinarationalcreatureiscalled“naturallaw.”24Everythingindividualhumanbeingsdoshouldbeinaccordancewiththislaw.Butnaturallawitselfdirectsustomovebeyondindividual-ityintocommunitywithothersifwearetoattainthegoodweseek:“Thirdly,thereisinmananinclinationtothegoodofhisnatureasrational,whichispropertohim:asmanhasanaturalinclinationtoknowthetruthaboutGodandtoliveinsociety;andaccordinglyallthosethingswhichhaverespecttothisinclinationbelongtonaturallaw.”25Thepoliticalcommunityisthusaconsequenceofthepreceptsofnaturallaw,andaccordinglyAquinasarguesthathumanlaw–thelawpromulgatedbythepoliticalsovereignforthecommongoodofthepoliticalcommunity–mustbeinaccordancewithnaturallaworfailtohavethetruecharacteroflaw.Thelawofthepoliticalsovereigncoversallaspectsofourlifetogether,includingissuesofcommonmorality.Itisthereforenolongersimplyancillarytoso-ciety,asitisinOnKingship.Butbecauseitisnotthefinallaw,becauseitdoesnotdirecttothefinalgoodbutonlytothenaturalhumangoodinsofarasthisisrealizedincommon,itisnotitselfulti-matelysovereignoveruseveninourcommonlife.Afourthlaw,theredemptivelawofChrist,issupreme.Hence,thecommongoodatwhichthelawsofthepoliticalcommunityshouldaimisthe“goodregulatedaccordingtodivinejustice.”26Ifthelawsdothis,thenmembershipofapoliticalcommunitywillitselfcontributetotheindividual’sgood.Ifnot,thelawsmaymakeoneagoodcitizenbutnotagoodhumanbeing.ItmightbeobjectedthatAquinasdoesnotseemtohaveleftmuchroomforthepoliticalanditslaw,sandwichedasitisbetweenthedemandsofnaturallawontheonehandandofdivinelawontheother.ItistruethatAquinaswillneverallowpoliticalsovereignstobealawuntothemselves.ButitiscentraltoAquinas’stheologythatsovereignty,dominance,orfreedomisneversomethingthatislimitedorfrustratedby(true)law,whetherwearetalkingofthesovereigntyofGod,oftheindividualundernaturallaw,oroftheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy285politicalsovereign.Directingoneselfrationallyandfollowingratio-naldirectivesaretwosidesofthesamecoin.electionandconsentAquinasprovidedanaccountofhowhumanlawcanbelegitimateandwhyweshouldobeyitthatisframedalmostentirelyintermsoftheauthorityofreasonoverrationalhumanbeings.Heisnotcen-trallyconcernedwiththespecificauthorityofthisorthatpoliticalsovereignoverthisorthatspecificbodyofpeople,norwiththeroleofthepeopleinestablishingtheauthorityoftheirsovereign.27Oneau-thorwhotackledthesequestionsdirectlywastheEnglishFranciscanJohnDunsScotus.Inordertounderstandhispositionandhiscon-cerns,weneedtoknowalittleabouttheordertowhichhebelonged.TheFranciscanOrderprofessedadoctrineofmeritoriouspoverty.28Povertymeanttherenunciationofanyabilitytocommand,thatis,therenunciationofanykindofrightoverorpropertyinanything(oranyone)else.Inrelinquishingthesetwokindsofdominion,theFranciscanssawthemselvesasimitatingthehumanlifeofChrist,who,insofarashewasman,supposedlyhadnothingofhisown.ThisconceptionofthelifeofChristcarriedwithitanimplicitcom-mitmenttoanAugustinianunderstandingofthetemporalsphereasaworldofdomination:aproductofthehistoryoffallenman,anadventitiousorderofhumanjusticeinwhichtheonetrulyjustman,Christ,hadnopart,althoughhedidnotcondemnoroverturniteither.ScotusworkedwithinthisframeworkinhiscommentaryonPeterLombard’sSentences,whenheexplainedthenatureoftheftandthereforeofpropertythroughanaccountofthegenesisofthehumancity.29Scotus’sexplanationwashistorical:anaccountofhumanrelationsbeforeandaftertheFall.Inthebeginning,inthestateofinnocence,nothingbelongedtoonepersonratherthananother.Theearthwaspossessedincommon:“Letthisbeourfirstconclusion,thatbynaturalordivinelawtherearenodistinctpropertiesofthingsfortheperiodofthestateofinnocence.”30AftertheFall,however,humanviciousnessmeantthatthiscommunityofpropertywasim-possibletomaintain,andtherefore,Scotussays,thepreceptofnatu-rallawconcerningcommunityofpropertywasrevoked,generatingalicenseforindividualstoappropriatethingsforthemselves.ButthisCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n286annabels.brettbyitselfdidnotlegitimatethenewsituationofprivateproperty:“Thirdconclusion:Thatwhenoncethispreceptofthenaturallawconcerninghavingallthingsincommonhadbeenrevoked,andinconsequencealicensehadbeengrantedofappropriatinganddividingallthesecommonthings,theactualdivisiondidnottakeplacebymeansofnaturallawordivinelaw.”31Anewandspecificallyhumanlawwasneededtolegitimatetheneworder.Butthepromulgationofahumanlawrequiredinitsturntheauthoritytodoso.Howcouldthatauthoritybeacquired?Thefifthconclusionfollows,whichisthatrulershiporauthorityistwofold,thatis,paternalandpolitical;andpoliticalauthorityisitselftwofold,thatis,eitherinonepersonorinacommunity.Thefirstauthority,paternal,isjustbythelawofnaturebywhichallchildrenareboundtoobeytheirparents...Whereaspoliticalauthority,whichisoverstrangers,canbejust(whetheritresidesinonepersonorthecommunity)bycommonconsentandtheelectionofthatcommunityitself.32Thuspoliticalauthority,unliketheauthorityofafatheroverhischildren,doesnotspringupnaturallybuthastobecededbyagroupofpeopletoaparticularindividualorindividuals.TwothingsmaybenotedaboutScotus’sargument.Firstly,politicsonhisconceptionisaboutthecreationofanewhumanorderofjusticeandpeace.Itisnotfundamentallyaboutachievingthegoodofhumanbeingsbutaboutsecuringtheirpropertyandrights.Inparallel,althoughScotusdoesnotdenytheroleofreasoninthepoliticalsphere–indeed,herequiresalawtoberational,theproductofpracticalreasoning–itisnotfundamentallyreasonthatmakespoliticalsovereigns.Theirauthoritydoesnotcomefromthemselves,howevercapableofrulingtheymaybe,butfromthepeoplewhooriginallygaveittothem.Asaconsequence,Scotuscanofferaveryclearaccountnotjustofpoliticalauthorityingeneral,butofwhyoneindividualorgroupshouldhavesuchauthorityoveraparticularcommunity.Thesourceofpoliticalpowerliesinhumanhistoryasmuchasinhumannature.Locatingthesourceofauthorityinanactoftransmissionwascen-tralinanother,verydifferentworkofthelatethirteenthcentury,OnRoyalandPapalPowerbyJohnofParis.JohnwasaDominican,ofthesameorderasAquinas,andhispoliticaltheoryhassometimesbeenseenasspecificallyDominican.33ItistruethatJohnbeganwithCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy287theThomist-Aristotelianaccountoftheformationofthepoliticalcommunitythroughnature,andinsomepassageshedefendedthenaturalhumancityasprovidingalifeofnaturalmoralvirtue:“Itspurposeisthecommongoodofthecitizens;notanygoodindetermi-nately,butthatgoodwhichistoliveaccordingtovirtue.”34John’smainconcern,however,wasnotsimplytounderstandthenatureofthepoliticalcommunitybuttounderstanditsrelationtothespiri-tualcommunityofthechurch–andparticularlytherelationsoftheirrespectivepowers.WehaveseenthisasatacitissueinAquinas,whoarguedthatthenatureofthepoliticalcommunityrequiresittobesubjecttothedirectivesofthechurchanditshead,thepope.WhenJohnwrote,agenerationafterAquinas,theincreasinglystri-dentclaimsofbothkingsandpopetooverridingjurisdictioninthetemporalrealmdemandedthatthisquestionofrespectivepowersbehandledmoreovertly.Johnbeganthisargumentbydistinguishingthenatureofthecom-munityofthefaithfulfromthenatureofpoliticalcommunities.Whilethereis“onechurchofallthefaithfulformingoneChristianpeople,”governedbytheunitaryheadshipofthepopeasthesucces-sorofPeter,“itdoesnotfollowthattheordinaryfaithfularecom-mandedbydivinelawtobesubjectintemporalitiestoanysinglesuprememonarch.”35Thisissaidtobeanonsequiturforavari-etyofreasons,themostimportantbeing,firstly,thathumansoulsareuniversallyalikewhereashumanbodiesarediverseaccordingtodifferentlocalities;secondly,thatthefaithfulshare“oneuniversalfaith,withoutwhichthereisnosalvation,”whereaswhatispoliti-callysalutarydiffersfromplacetoplaceandthereforecannotuniteallthefaithfulpoliticallyspeaking.Spiritualandtemporalaretwoverydifferentcommunities,then,servingdifferentends,whichJohndoesnotlinkinthewaythatAquinasdoes.Indeed,defendingtheautonomyofthetemporalcommunity,hedeployedthemoreScotistnotionoftherulerasanarbiterofpropertydisputes,hisjurisdictionbeingcededbythepeopleherules:“Forthereasonthatsometimesthepeaceofeverybodyisdisturbedbecauseofthesepossessions...arulerhasbeenestablishedbythepeopletotakechargeofsuchsituations.”36This,Johnimplies,isthesourceofauthorityinthetemporalsphere,andforthatreasonthepopehasnotemporalau-thorityexceptwherethesafetyofthechurchisthreatened.Butwhataboutpapalauthoritywithinthespiritualcommunity?OntheoneCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n288annabels.bretthand,Johnisclearthatheadshipofthechurchdoesnotcomefromanybodyofpeoplebut“fromtheverymouthoftheLordhimself.”37Ontheotherhand,hewillnotallowthatthebodyofthechurchthereforehasnopowerwhateverifthepopeabuseshisauthority.Insuchasituation,thepopecanbedeposedorremovedfromauthority,“becausethatisinacertainwaynatural.”38Ifwearespeakingintermsofnature,therefore,authorityisvestedinthebodyofacommunity(whetheritbethepoliticalorthespiri-tualcommunity)andiscededupwardforthegoodofthecommunity,whichnotonlyhasaninterestasabodybutcanalsoactasabody.Inthiscriticallyimportantpoint,JohnwasdrawingontheheritageofRomanlawanditstheoryofcorporations,inwhichtheindividualsinagroupcanbeunderstoodnotsimplyasadisconnectedaggregatebutratheras“incorporated”intoonebody.39Thisbodyisabletoactasonethroughtheappointmentofaproctororrepresentative,whoisanswerabletothebodyasawholeonmatterstouchingitsinter-est.Usingcorporationtheorytounderstandboththechurch(inthemovementknownas“conciliarism”)andthepoliticalcommunityallowedmedievalpoliticalthinkerstoattributeagencytothebodyofthecommunity,andthisultimatelyopenedthewaytotheoriesofacontractualrelationshipbetweenthepoliticalcommunityanditsruler.40hierarchyandgraceInarticulatingthehumanoriginsofjurisdictionoverotherhumanbeings,ScotusandJohnofPariswerediametricallyopposedtoathe-sisthatwasbeingdeployedataroundthesametimetosupportpapalclaimstouniversaltemporaljurisdiction.InhisworkOnEcclesias-ticalPowerofaround1302,theAugustinianGilesofRomeusedthetwinprinciplesofhierarchyandgracetoarguethatallrightfulhumanrelationsofcommand–whetheroverotherhumanbeings(ju-risdictionorgovernment)oroverthings(property)–dependontheirsubordinationtothecommandofthepope.DrawingonthewritingsofDionysiusthePseudo-Areopagite,41Gilesunderstoodhierarchyasapluralityreducedtounitybythemediatedsubjectionofthelow-esttothehighest.Theultimateunityor“one”was,ofcourse,God,onwhomtheentirehierarchyofcreation,fromthehighestangelsdowntothelowestinanimatebeings,depended.GilesusedthesameCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy289principletoarguethatthehierarchyofhumanbeingsoverhumanbeingsandoverpropertydependedsimilarlyonthe“one”whowasthefountofthejusticeofthoserelations:thepopeasthevicarofChristonearth:Justasthereisonefountinthegovernmentofthewholeworld–thereisoneGod,inWhomthereiseverypower,fromWhomallotherpowersarederived,andtoWhomallpowersarereduced–soalso,inthegovernmentofmenandinthewholeChurchMilitant,itmustbethatthereisonefount,thatthereisoneheadinwhichisfullnessofpower:inwhichthereisalmosteverypowerasovertheMysticalBodyorovertheChurchherself,andinwhichtherearebothswords[thatis,theswordsofgoverningbothspiritualandtemporalrealms].42Usingasthekeyhierarchicalrelationtheorderingofthematerialtothecommandofthespiritual,Gilesarguedthatonlyinsubmissiontothe“spiritualman”couldthelegalinstitutions(jurisdictionandproperty)ofthetemporalormaterialdomainhaveanylegitimacy.Thisargumentdependedonafurtherposition:thatthetemporalisnotasourceofrightfulnessorlegitimacyinitself.AgainstAquinas’sposition,Gilesheldthat“nature”aftertheFallhasnointrinsicgood-nessintermsofwhichhumanpropertyandjurisdiction–dominioningeneral–couldbeunderstoodasnaturallyormorallylegitimate.Outsideofgrace,dominionissimplyunjustdomination,thesphereofdefactomightasopposedtoright.ThethesisthatjustdominiondependsupongracewasrevivedtowardtheendofthefourteenthcenturybytheEnglishmanJohnWyclif,probablyviatheworkofRichardFitzRalph.Wyclif’smo-tivesarenotentirelyclear,buttheprimacyofgraceallowedhimtocriticizethecurrentstateoftheEnglishchurchandtoexposeasun-foundeditsclaimstopropertyandjurisdiction,therebylegitimating(amongotherthings)royaltaxationoftheclergy.43Wyclif’steach-ingwasvigorouslycombatedby,amongothers,theParisiantheolo-gianJeanGerson,whodevelopedhisargumentforakindofnaturalrightineverynaturalbeingpartlyinresponsetoWyclif’sextremeAugustinianism.44Wyclif’steachingwascondemnedashereticalattheCouncilofConstancein1414andwasopposedanewinthere-naissanceofThomisminthesixteenthcentury.FranciscodeVitoriacitedpreciselythedecreesofConstanceinrejectingtheargu-mentthattheAmericanIndiansdidnothavetruedominion(andCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n290annabels.brettcouldthereforerightfullybedispossessed)becausetheyweresinnersandunbelievers.45history,autonomy,andrightsInthisfinalsectionIwanttolookattwothinkerswhoinverydiffer-entwaysusedacombinationofargumentsfromAristotelianismandAugustinianism.ThefirstisoneofthemostrevolutionarypoliticalwritersoftheMiddleAges,MarsiliusofPadua.Abitofcontextisnecessaryinordertounderstandtheachievementofhisastonish-ingmajorwork,TheDefenderofthePeace.46MarsiliuscamefromrepublicancirclesinPadua,acity-stateofnorthernItaly,aregioninwhichtheformer,communalsystemofgovernmentwasincreas-inglybeinglosttotheruleofsignorioroverlords.Atthesametime,theregionwasthemajorbattlegroundbetweenthepapacyandtheHolyRomanEmpire,bothtryingtogaincontrolorinfluenceoverthewealthyandstrategicallyimportantcities.WhenMarsiliuswroteTheDefenderofthePeace,theemperor,whoseelectionwasconsid-eredinvalidbythepope,wassettingaboutreestablishinghisjuris-dictionincitiesthatheclaimedrightfullybelongedtotheempire.Asaresult,hehadbeenexcommunicatedbythepope,andabitterpartywarhadbrokenout,withtheemperorclaiminginreturnthatitwasthepopewhoshouldbedeposedforhereticallydenyingthepovertyofChrist.AnuneasyallianceofFranciscansandimperialistshadde-velopedinconsequence,anditwaswiththispartythatMarsiliusalignedhimself.Hiscontinuingallegiancetoadistinctivelyrepub-licanunderstandingofthecity,however,meantthathewasabletotranscendthelimitsofthedisputeandtocreateacompletelynewunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenhumannature,politics,andreligion.Asarepublican,Marsiliuswascommittedtotheideaofcivicau-tonomy,thatis,theideathatthecityissufficienttoitselfbothforthenecessitiesoflifeandintermsoflaw.Hethereforehadtorepu-diateThomistpoliticaltheory,inwhichtheAristotelianaccountofpoliticswassandwichedbetweennaturallawononehandanddi-vinelawontheother,withthepoliticallegislatoranswerablebothways.Nonetheless,MarsiliuswantedtousetheAristotelianargu-mentfromnaturetoargueforthelifeofthecityaspartofnaturalhumanactivity.HethereforeneededanunderstandingofnaturethatCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy291didnotintroducenaturallawasanextracivicandprecivicstandardofthepolitical.Hefoundthisunderstandinginabiologicalnotionofnatureasregularity:whatallhumansinfactdo,whennotimpededbydiseaseorextraneouscauses,isnaturalandgood.Withthis,hewasabletoarguethatallhumanbeingsnaturallyseekcommunica-tionandcommunitywithothersinordertobecomesufficientandtoachievethegoodlife,thatis,thecultivatedlifeofexcellencethatisunavailabletosolitarydwellers:“Letusthereforelaythisdownastheprincipleofallthethingswhicharetobedemonstratedhere,aprinciplenaturallyheld,believed,andfreelygrantedbyall:thatallmennotdeformedorotherwiseimpedednaturallydesireasufficientlife,andavoidandfleewhatisharmfulthereto.”47Self-sufficiencyandcultivationreachtheirpinnacleinthecity,andthereforethepo-liticalcommunityisnaturaltous.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatapoliticalcommunityhastohaveexistedina“stateofnature”ortheoriginalhumancondition.Marsiliusisclearthatifmanhadnotfallenintosin,therewouldhavebeennopoliticalcommunities,be-causetherewouldhavebeennoneedtocreateasufficientlife.Itwasalreadyavailable.48Mandeprivedhimselfofthatoriginalgood,andhumanhistoryrecordshisattemptstoremedyhisowndeficiency.Inthisway,Augustinianideasofsin,history,andthecreationofahumanorderarefusedwiththeAristotelianconceptsofnatureandthegood.Thenaturalhumangoodinourpresentstateistolivethesufficientorgoodlifetogetherinacity,theconditionofwhichistranquillityorpeace.49Thislifeisthreatenedbystrifeanddivision,andMarsilius’sbookisinlargepartaprescriptionforavoidingtheseevilsof“intranquillity.”Aswehaveseen,forMarsiliusthereisnonaturallawintheThomistsense.Butlawandjustice–thedefinitionandtherectifica-tionofinjury–arerequiredforthesufficientlife,forotherwisethecommunitywilldissolveintoquarrelsandfighting.Humanitymustthereforecreatelawforitselfandcreateaforcetoexecutejusticeinaccordancewiththatlaw.AccordingtoMarsilius,thishumanlawisthelawcreatedbyhumanbeingsinsofarastheyarecollectedintodif-ferentcommunitiesforthesakeoflivingwell.Thesourceofhumanlegislation–the“humanlegislator”–iseachhumancommunityitselfor(asMarsiliusadds)“theweightierpartthereof”:“thelegisla-tor,ortheprimaryandproperefficientcauseofthelaw,isthepeopleorwholebodyofcitizens,ortheweightierpartthereof,throughitsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n292annabels.brettelectionorwillexpressedbywordsinthegeneralassemblyofthecitizens.”50Nothingandnooneelsecanbeahumanlegislatororclaimtolegislateforhumanbeingsintheircommunallifetogether,becausenothingandnooneelseiscompetenttodeterminethecom-mongoodofthehumancommunity.Toexecuteitslaws,thatis,toexercisejurisdiction,theMarsiliancommunityappointsa“rulingpart.”Thispartisliketheheartofananimal,thepartthatkeepsthewholeanimalgoing.Nonetheless,therulingpartisnotalawuntoitselfbutmustfollowthelawofthecommunity,whichisalsoitslaw.Marsilius’saccountthereforeoffersadefinitionofthepolitical.Itisthebasicessentialstructurethatacommunitymusthaveinordertocountasapoliticalcommunity,despitehistoricalandge-ographicalvariations.Themalfunctioningorcorruptionofthepo-liticaldomaincomeswhenthisorganicstructuredevelopsafaultinsomewayandthereforestartstofallapart.Theprimarycauseofsuchdivisioncomeswhentwoentitieseachclaimtobetheruling“part.”InMarsilius’sdayinnorthernItaly,thismeanttheemperorandthepope.Marsilius’ssolutiontotheproblemofconflictingtem-poralandspiritualauthoritywasradical.Heargued,appealingtothemodelofChristhimself,thattheresimplyisnospiritualauthority–inthesenseofcoercivejurisdiction–overhumanbeingsonearth.Therefore,papalclaimstosuchauthority,anditsextensionintothetemporaldomain,werenotsimplyillegitimatebuttyrannous;quitetothecontraryoftheclaimsofthepapacyandofpapalistssuchasGilesofRome,Marsiliusarguedthatthespiritualshouldbesubjecttothetemporal:NotonlydidChristhimselfrefuserulershiporcoercivejurisdictioninthisworld,wherebyhefurnishedanexampleforhisapostlesanddisciplesandsuccessorstodolikewise,buthealsotaughtbywordsandshowedbyexam-plethatallmen,bothpriestsandnon-priests,shouldbesubjectinpropertyandinpersontothecoercivejudgmentoftherulersofthisworld.51Marsiliusheldthatatruespiritualjurisdictiondoesexist.ItisthatofChrist.Butforthepurposesofthislife,thespiritualdomainisoneofteachingordoctrineandisthusapartofthecity,notsomethingsetoverandaboveit.Totheextentthatthechurch’sdoctrineisenforced,thatenforcementbelongstothecivilauthority.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy293OnewaytoreadMarsiliusisasofferingasecular,republicanthe-oryofpoliticsasawayofexcludingthepopefromanypartinit.ButasIhavealreadysuggested,Marsiliusdoesnotdiscountthepossi-bilitythattherulingpartofthehumancitymayenforcereligiousteaching,andhethinksitmatterswhatreligiousteachingtheciti-zensreceive.Marsiliusofferedanaccountnotsimplyofhumanpol-iticsbutofChristianpolitics,andheaccordinglygavethefaithfulhumanlegislatoranactiveroleincallingchurchcouncilsandenforc-ingtheirdecisions.52ForMarsilius,thecorrectfunctioningofboththepoliticalandthespiritualspheredependedequallyontheunim-pededjurisdictionofthefaithfulhumanlegislator,theHolyRomanEmperor,overallChristians.53Marsilius’stheorywasthusnotjustatheoryofthehumancitybutoftheChristiancity,thatcityinwhichthedemandsbothofhumanityandoftheChristianreligioncouldbesatisfied.WemaycontrastMarsilius’svisionwiththatofthefinalthinkerIwanttodiscuss,theEnglishFranciscanWilliamofOckham.OckhamtoospentthelastyearsofhislifeexcommunicateinMunichunderimperialprotection.HetoodefendedtherightsoftheRomanEmpireandopposedtheclaimstotemporaljurisdictionofthecurrentpapacy(residentatthetimeinAvignon).Buthedidnotdenythosepapalclaimsonthegroundthatthepopehadnoin-dependentjurisdictionwhateveroverhumanbeingsinthislife.ForOckham,itwasclearthathedid:butitwasaspiritualjurisdictionorprincipate,notatemporalone.ThewholethrustofOckham’sen-terprise,therefore,wastodeterminewhatwasspiritualasopposedtotemporaljurisdiction.Ingivinganaccountoftemporaljurisdiction,Ockhamappealed,ashadAquinasandMarsiliusbeforehim,tohumannature.Andyethisaccountofnaturewasdifferentfromboth.Insteadofinterpretingtherequirementsofnatureintermsofnaturallaworofbiologicalregularity,Ockhambuiltonafoundationofnaturalrights.54Arightheconceivedingeneralasajuridicalabilityorlicitpower:thus,the“rightofusing”is“alicitpowerofusingsomeexternalobject,ofwhichsomeoneshouldnotbedeprivedagainsthiswillwithoutfaultonhispartandwithoutreasonablecause:andifheshouldbedeprivedofit,hecancallthepersonwhodepriveshimintocourt.”55However,“therightofusingistwofold.Forthereisanaturalrightofusing;andthereisapositiverightofusing.ThenaturalrightofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n294annabels.brettusingiscommontoallmen,becauseitisheldfromnatureandnotfromanysubsequentestablishment.”56ThisconceptionofhumanbeingsasequippedwiththenaturalrightofusingthethingsoftheearthisdistinctfromthenonjuridicalnaturewithwhichMarsiliusbegan,butalsodistinctfromAquinas’sframeworkofnaturallaw.ThenaturalrightswithwhichOckhamcreditedindividualswerenotopposedtonaturallawasthedictateofrightreason,sanctionedbyGod,butwereneverthelesssubjectiveinthesensethattheindividualactingbyorwithnaturalrighthadhisactionsjustifiedintermsofhimselfandnot(atleastimmediately)intermsofahigherorder.ForOckham,rightsserveandjustifythedynamicaspectofhumanlifeonearth.Ockhampositedthatwearenaturallyequippedwithatleastthebasicrighttoself-sustenance.However,hefollowedScotusinsee-ingtwofurtherstepsnecessaryforaviablehumanlifeonearthaftertheFall:theestablishmentofpropertyandjurisdiction.ButinsteadoftheexplanationthatScotushadofferedintermsoflicenseandfact,Ockhamsawusasnaturallypossessedwiththerighttoacquirepropertyandtherighttocreatejurisdictions.Theserightsareatoncetheexplanationandthejustificationforthestructuresofthecitiesinwhichhumanslive.AlthoughtheyareGod-given,onOckham’sreadingoftheBible,theyareentirelyindependentofanyreligion,includingtheChristianreligion:“Thistwofoldpower,toappropri-atetemporalthingsandtoestablishrulerswithjurisdiction,Godgavewithoutintermediarynotonlytobelieversbutalsotounbe-lievers,insuchawaythatitfallsunderpreceptandisreckonedamongpurelymoralmatters.Itthereforeobligeseveryone,believerandunbelieveralike.”57OckhamappealsespeciallytoChrist’stacitacknowledgmentofRomanimperialjurisdictiontoinsistagainandagainthatlegitimatecivicstructures,especiallythatoftheempire,predateChristianityandthattheirsecularnaturesurvivesintacttothepresent.Theseculardomainisthusnaturaltousinthatwecreateitfromournaturaljuridicalabilities.Thisdoesnotimply,however,thatpoliticalrelationshipsexistedinthestateofinnocence.AsIhavealreadysuggested,politicsisforOckhamasphereofhumancreativ-itywithinhistoryaftertheFall.Itislegitimateandjustified,butitisnonethelessmarkedbytheurgetodominatewhich,inanAugus-tinianperspective,marksfallenhumanity.OckhamisambivalentCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy295astowhetheranysecularhumancitycanavoidthecorruptionofdominationortyranny.Onethingheisclearabout.Whateverthecaseforthehumancityortemporaljurisdiction,thechurchorspir-itualjurisdictionnotonlycanbutmustavoiddominationinordertocountasaspiritualjurisdictionatall:ForitcanbeclearlygatheredfromthewordsofChristhimself,thatpapalprincipatewasinstitutedbyhimforthegoodofitssubjects,notforitsownhonororadvantage,andshould,therefore,becallednota“despotic”principate,orone“oflordship,”butaprincipate“ofservice”:insuchawaythat,insofarasitisordainedofChrist,itextendsonlytothosethingswhicharenecessarytothesalvationofsoulsandfortheruleandgovernmentofthefaithful,respectingalwaystherightsandlibertiesofothers.58Thereisauthorityinthechurch,butsincethegospelisa“lawofliberty,”thatauthorityisexercisedoverfreepersons(freeasChristians,evenifinservitudetemporally).Accordingly,author-itarianencroachmentupontherightfullibertiesofthefaithfulistyranny.Paradoxically,thespiritualcommunityistherefore–asOckhamexplicitlypointsout–theonlycommunitythattrulyful-fillsthedemandsoftheclassicalcityforfreedomandjustice.Thesinofthepresent“Avignonesechurch”is,inanentirelytransformedcontext,thatfundamentalfaultidentifiedbytheancients,thatofturningacityintoadomination.conclusionReturningtoourstartingpoint,wecanseethatinonesenseme-dievalpoliticaltheorywasdominatedbythehistoricallyspecificcircumstancesofmedievalEuropeandthemedievalchurch,withitsclaimstotemporaljurisdiction.Workingoutthecorrectrelation-shipbetweentemporalandspiritualdomainspreoccupiedmedievaltheorists.Andyet,aswehavealsoseen,thiswasnotsimplybecauseofthepressingissuesofpracticalpolitics.Therelationshipwasim-portantbecausethebasicquestionwasnotaboutthepowerofpopes,emperors,andkingsbutaboutcorrecthumangovernanceasawhole:thejustificationorestablishmentofstructuresofrulewhichwouldbothpermitasufficientlifeinthisworldandrespondtotheChristianassumptionthathumanbeingsaremorethannaturalcreaturesandhavespiritualaswellastemporaldemands.InworkingthroughtheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n296annabels.brettproblemsofthepoliticalfromthisperspective,medievalthinkerscreatedordevelopedanumberofconceptsthat,withallduehis-toricalmutationsandpermutations,haveshapeddiscussionofourcommonhumanlifeeversince:theideaofnaturalrights;ofthehumancapacityforself-direction;ofcivicself-government;ofthecapacityofpeopletoactasabody,notjustasindividuals;offree-domandtyranny.Aboveall,however,andwiththemostabidingrelevance,theyposedandpursuedthemostfundamentalquestionaboutpolitics.Whatisit?Whatgoodisit?notes1.Therearemanygoodintroductorytreatmentsofmedievalspiritual–temporaldualismanditspoliticalcontext:seethearticlesbyJ.P.CanningandJ.A.WattinJ.H.Burns[13]orCanning’sexcellentintroductioninJ.P.Canning[14].2.Aristotle,PoliticsI1,ed.S.Everson(Cambridge,1996)11,translationaltered.AhelpfulrecentintroductiontoAristotle’smoralandpoliticalthoughtcanbefoundinC.RoweandM.Schofield,eds.,TheCambridgeHistoryofGreekandRomanPoliticalThought(Cambridge,2000),chs.15–19.3.Cf.PoliticsI1,1252b28–1253b1,Everson13–14.4.Cf.Cicero,OnInventionI2,trans.H.M.Hubbell(Cambridge,MA/London,1949)5–7.5.Aristotle,NicomacheanEthicsV1,trans.J.A.K.ThomsonandH.Tredennick(London,1976)173–74;Cicero,OnDutiesI20–23,ed.M.T.GriffinandE.M.Atkins(Cambridge,1991)9–10.ForagoodgeneralanalysisofCicero’sthoughtinitscontext,seeE.M.AtkinsinRoweandSchofield(n.2),477–516.6.AugustineofHippo,TheCityofGodagainstthePagansXIII12–14[58]522–23.7.Ibid.II21[58]75,criticizingtheCiceroniandefinitionofthecommon-wealthas“thewealofthecommunity,”acommunitybeing“anassoci-ationunitedbyacommonsenseofjusticeandacommunityofinterest.”8.Ibid.XIX17[58]878.9.Ibid.XIX11–17[58]865–78.10.Cf.ibid.,e.g.,atXX11[58]920.TherelationshipbetweenthecityofGodandthechurchisdiscussedinR.A.Markus[72]117–25.11.AnoutlineoftheseargumentscanbefoundinG.Post[585];seealsoD.Luscombe[579].12.JohnofSalisbury,Policraticus[158].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy29713.C.J.Nederman[582].14.Oneshouldbeaware,moreover,thatbeforetherecoveryofAristotle’sactualtexts–principallytheNicomacheanEthicsandthePolitics–certainkeytermsofAristotle’sframeworkwerealreadyavailablefromvarioussources:seeC.Flueler[¨576]I1–15andG.R.Evans[574]15–16.15.Forageneraltreatmentoftheapplicationoflawtoquestionsofpoliticalthoughtinthisperiod,seeK.Pennington[584].16.EspeciallythetextsoftheopeningtitleoftheDigest,“Onjusticeandright”[577].17.ThislanguagehasbeenanalyzedbyB.Tierney[589]ch.2.18.Thistreatise(whichusedtobeknownasOntheGovernmentofPrincesorDeregimineprincipum)hasbeenmostrecentlyeditedandtranslatedintoEnglishbyJ.M.BlytheaspartofthelargerworkofPtolemyofLucca,OntheGovernmentofPrinces[382],whichrepresentsacon-tinuationofthetreatiseOnKingshipgenerallyattributedtoAquinas.Blythe’sintroductionprovidesagoodoverviewoftheproblemsofdat-ingandauthorship;seealsoC.Flueler[¨576]I27–29.TheLatintextfromwhichIhavetranslatediseditedasDeregno,adregemCypribyH.F.Dondaine[224]XLII449–71.19.II3,p.466.20.Ibid.I1,p.449.21.AsarguedongroundsofcitationbyC.Flueler[¨576];seealsothediscus-sioninJ.Miethke[581]25–45,whoacceptsFlueler’sdating,makingthe¨DeregnothematurestatementofAquinas’spoliticalphilosophy.22.II3,p.466.23.Aquinas’streatmentoflawisgivenintheSummatheologiaeIaIIae,qq.90–97[233]vol.28;qq.90,“thenatureoflaw,”and91,“thevarietiesoflaw.”24.STIaIIae,q.91,a.2.25.STIaIIae,q.94,a.2.ThereisanenormousamountwrittenonAquinas’sideaofnaturallaw.AnintroductiontotheconceptisprovidedbyD.E.LuscombeinCHLMP705–19;seealsoD.J.O’Connor[253].Morerecently,J.FinnisincludesadiscussionofnaturallawinhisAquinas[240]79–94;pp.219–74coverAquinas’spoliticalthought.26.STIaIIae,q.92,a.1.27.Iamnotconvincedbythedescriptionofthe“mixedconstitution”atSTIaIIae,q.105,a.1.Aquinasmakesitcleartherethattheroleofthepeopleisasecond-bestarrangement,owingtothedefectsofhumanity;especiallythesupposedavariceoftheJews,whoselawisinquestionhere.Foradifferentview,seeJ.M.Blythe[571]47–56.ThisisnottodenythatAquinasseeshumancorruptionasaveryrealproblemandpartoftheproperdomainofthepolitical.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n298annabels.brett28.Forageneralintroductiontotheideaofpovertyandthejuridicaldif-ficultiesitimmediatelygenerated,seeJ.Coleman[573];mostrecentlyandfullyR.Lambertini[578].29.DunsScotus,IVSent.,d.15,q.2,Operaomnia,26vols.(Paris,1891–95)XVIII256–71.Ihavediscussedthesethemesinmoredetailintheintro-ductionto[312]14–17.30.Scotus,256.31.Ibid.265.32.Ibid.266.33.J.Coleman[280].InwhatfollowsIshallusethename“JohnofParis,”asishabitual,torefertotheauthorofthetract,althoughrecognizingthatthequestionofauthorshipiscontested.34.JohnofParis,OnRoyalandPapalPower,ch.1throughoutandch.17[279]182.35.Ibid.,ch.3,84–85.36.Ibid.,ch.7,103.37.Ibid.,ch.3,84.38.Ibid.,ch.25,252.39.SeeB.Tierney[588],especially132–78.40.Thereisalargesecondaryliteratureonconciliarismanditsrelationtosecularpoliticaltheory.TherearegoodtreatmentsofconciliarismanditsdevelopmentinC.Fasolt[575]andtwoearlierstudiesbyA.Black[568–69].ItsconsequencesfortheunderstandingofsecularpoliticsarehandledintheinfluentialessaysofF.Oakleycollectedin[583].J.Quilletgivesanoutlineofthemoreseculardimensionsofthiswayofthinkingin[586].41.Seeabove,p.66.42.GilesofRome,OnEcclesiasticalPowerIII2[270]147.Forthecontext,seeW.Ullmann[590];morerecently,J.Miethke[581]45–56.43.SeeM.J.Wilks[354];seealsotheremarksinA.Black[570]79–82.44.SeeB.Tierney[589]ch.9andA.S.Brett[572]ch.2.45.FranciscodeVitoria,“RelectionOntheAmericanIndians”1.2[621]240–43.46.Forafulleraccountofthiscontext,seeQ.Skinner[587]i12–22.47.MarsiliusofPadua,TheDefenderofthePeace,DiscourseI4.2[303]12.48.Ibid.,ch.6.49.Aslaidoutinthefirstchapterofthefirstdiscourse([303]3).50.Ibid.,ch.12.3[303]45.Marsiliusspellsoutwhathemeansbythe“weightierpart”inthesamechapter,at§§4and5:itisdeterminedeitherby“thehonorablecustomofpolities”orinaccordancewithAristotle’sprinciples(amixtureofquantitativeandqualitativeconsiderations),anditissaidto“represent”thecitizensintheirentiretysothatthecommonCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nPoliticalphilosophy299goodshouldnotbeimpededbythe“deformednature”ofsomemen.Criticshavedifferedoverwhatexactlyisthemeaningofthisforpopu-larsovereigntyintheMarsiliancity.51.Ibid.,DiscourseII4.9[303]119.Seealso,especially,DiscourseII9and25.52.Ibid.,ch.21.53.ThisequationoftheemperorandthefaithfulhumanlegislatorisveryclearinDiscourseII21,whichdiscussestheauthoritytocallageneralcouncil.Marsilius’sdefinitionofthelegislatorinDiscourseI12.3ex-plicitlyallowsforthe“primarylegislator”toentrustitsfunctiontoapersonorpersons;aprocessoftransferenceoflegislativeauthorityfromRomanpeopletoRomanemperorisclearlyassumedintheDefensorMinor,ch.12[304].Nonetheless,theendresultisthattheemperorap-pearstobeboththesupremerulingpartandthesupremelegislatorfortheentireChristianpeople,whichsomescholarshaveseenasincon-sistentwithsomeofthemorerepublicanformulationsofDiscourseI.Foran“imperial”interpretationoftheDefensorpacis,seeinparticularJ.Quillet[305];fora“republican”interpretation,N.Rubinstein[306].54.TheconceptionofnaturalrightshadacomplexdevelopmentevenbeforeOckhamcametousethenotion:seeB.Tierney[589]andA.S.Brett[572]ch.1;mostrecently,V.P.Makinen[¨580].ForOckham’sdevelopmentofhisideasinthecontextofthereneweddebateoverFranciscanpoverty,seeJ.Miethke[321].55.WilliamofOckham,TheWorkofNinetyDays,ch.2[310]24.56.Ibid.,ch.61[309]II559.57.WilliamofOckham,AShortDiscourseonTyrannicalGovernmentIII8[314].TheentirerangeofOckham’spoliticalthoughtisdiscussedindetailinA.S.McGrade[320]andsurveyedbyJ.KilculleninCCOck302–35.58.WilliamofOckham,OnthePowerofEmperorsandPopes,ch.7[312]90.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\np.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldane13MedievalphilosophyinlaterthoughtHistoriesofmedievalphilosophyoftenconcludewithchaptersonthedisintegrationofthescholasticsynthesisorthedefeatandne-glectofscholasticism.Fromthestandpointofthepresentvolume,wherescholasticismandmedievalphilosophyarenotseenasidenti-calandwheresynthesisisnotregardedasincontestablythesupremephilosophicideal,thesituationismorecomplicated.Anadequatehistoryofthepresenceofmedievalphilosophyinlaterthoughtwouldrequireavolumeinitself.Inwhatfollowssomemajorpointsaretouchedon,includingthosebearingondefeatandneglect,butthestoryconcludeswithanaccountoftherevivalofinterestinmedievalphilosophyofwhichthisCompanionisitselfaneffectandwhichithopestoaugment.therenaissanceandseventeenthcentury(p.j.fitzpatrick)InChaucer’sCanterburyTalestheOxfordscholarwouldsoonerhavevolumesof“Aristotleandhisphilosophy”thanworldlyattractions.ForBaconin1597,philosophersofthattraditionwerecyminisec-tores–“hair-splitters,”say–whosewritingscanhelpustodrawdis-tinctions.AndforMolierein`1673,theywerepeoplewhoexplainedhowopiuminducessleepbysayingthatithasa“dormitivevirtue.”Whichgivesusthreetopics:theplaceofAristotle;theeffectofdis-tinctions;andmedievalphilosophyinthefaceofnewdiscoveries.TheplaceofAristotleWhatmadenoteworthythecontributionofThomasAquinastothescholasticassimilationofAristotlewaslesshisacceptanceofso300CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought301muchinAristotlethanhiscapacitytointerpretapparentlyrecalci-tranttextsthereinawaythatmadethemconcordantwithChristianbelief.InwhatwecalltheRenaissance,thesheervarietyintheliteratureandphilosophyoftheancientworldcouldnowbeseen,andthesheerdistancewhichseparatedthatworldfromChristianEurope.ToeffectasynthesisofancientthoughtwithChristianbeliefwasnolongerwhatseemedurgent:firstandforemost,thethoughtofGreeceandRomehadtobeinvestigatedforitsownsakeandonitsownterms.PhilosophyintheancientworldhadbeenlargelyinGreek.TheMiddleAgeshadhadtouseLatintranslations–insomecases,translationsoftranslations.Thatwouldnolongerdo.TommasodeVioGaetano,commonlyknownasCajetan,wasano-tablefigureinhistime.Hewrotewhatbecameastandardcommen-taryontheSummatheologiaeofAquinas;hebecamemaster-generaloftheDominicansandeventuallyacardinal;hewasconsultedbytheEmperorMaximilianaboutaproposedcrusadeandbyClementVIIaboutHenryVIII’sproposeddivorce;andLeoXsenthimasalegatetomeetLuther.Itisnotsurprising,then,thatatthetimeofhisdeath,in1534,hewasbeingtalkedaboutasafuturepope.ButCajetandidsomethingelse,whichconcernsushere.HewasoneofonlytwomembersoftheFifthLateranCouncil(1512–21)tovoteagainstameasureorderingteachersofphilosophytoendeavortovin-dicateChristianbeliefintheimmortalityofthesoul.ThisdissentembodiesoneofthechangesthatwerecomingoverphilosophyastheMiddleAgescametoanend.InhiscommentaryonSummatheologiaeIin1507,asinanAd-ventsermonpreachedatRomein1503,Cajetanhadofferedstandardargumentsfortheimmortalityofthesoul:theindependenceofintel-lectualactivityfromthebody,andtheuniversaldesireforalifethatiseverlasting.Inhissermonhementionsthedifficultiesfeltbymanythinkersonthepointbutofferswhathesaysasasolutiontothem(Laurent[593]XXIII).Justso,inhiscommentaryontheSumma,heexpressesnodissentfromtheargumentsofferedbyAquinasatSTI,q.75.Butin1510hepublishedacommentaryontheDeanima,theworkinwhichAristotleconsiders,amongotherthings,thestatusofthesoulanditsrelationtothebody:thesourceofCajetan’sdissentattheLateranin1513appearsinthiscommentary.1TheopeningchapteroftheDeanimacontainstwotextstowhichCajetanrepeatedlyreturns.Someactivities,Aristotlewrites,seemCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n302p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldanetoinvolvethebodyintheirverynotion–beingangryisoneexample.Headds:“Understandingismostlikesomethingproper[tothesoul].Butifthistooisphantasiaornotwithoutphantasia,understandingitselfwillnotexistwithoutthebody”(403a).PhantasiainAristotlecanhavemorethanonemeaning,butforCajetanitamountstosensoryactivity,andheemploysthewordphantasma(pluralphan-tasmata)interchangeablywithit.HetakesAristotleasseeingthisindispensabilityofphantasiaforthoughtasanobstacletoregardingintellectualactivityasbeing“propertothesoul”–thatis,asbeinganactivitythatdoesnotessentiallyinvolvethebody.Itcanindeedbedistinguishedfrombodilyactivity,butthedistinctiondoesnotamounttorealseparability.Rather,thedistinctionislikethedis-tinctionwedrawaboutgeometricalfigures.AsAristotlewroteinthesamechapter:“astraightlinehas,invirtueofitsstraightness,manyattributes,suchastouchingabrazensphereatonepointonly;butthestraightline,ifseparated,wouldnotsotouchthesphere”(403a12).Cajetandwellsonthesetexts(ISummary;31;40;47)andstatesAristotle’sconclusion:thatwehaveherenomorethana“formalseparation”–adistinctionlikethatbetweenageometricalfigureanditsphysicalembodiment.Thedistinctiondoesnotallowustoinferthatthefigurecouldexistwithoutanyembodimentatall.Cajetankeepsthesetextsbeforehimwhencommentingonpas-sages,inBookIIIoftheDeanima,whichconsiderthepossiblesep-arabilityofthesoulfromthebody.Itisonlyifunderstandingcanbedeemedanoperationpropertothesoulthatthesoulcanbedeemedseparable.Cajetanthenstatesthattherearetwokindsofindepen-dencefromthebodythatsuchanoperationcandemand.Oneofthemwouldexcludetherebeinganyorganoftheintellect–andthisposi-tionwasadoptedbyAquinasandotherphilosophers.Buttheother,strongerindependencewouldexcludeanykindofbodilydependencewhatever,andforCajetanthiswasthepositionadoptedbyAristotle(III106–08[592]).WritersintheMiddleAgeshaddevelopedAristo-tle’sdistinctionbetweenthepotentialintellect(bywhichwethink)andtheactiveintellect(bywhichwebestowintelligibilityonthephantasmatafromthesenses).CajetanheldthatforAristotleitwastheactiveintellectalonethathadthestrongerindependence.Alltheoperationsofthepotentialintellectaremixedwithphantasia,mixedwiththesenses.ItistheactiveintellectalonethatthinksbyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought303itsownsubstanceandnotintermittently;itistheactiveintellectalonethatcanbereallyseparate(separatusinessendo);thepoten-tialintellectcanbeonly“formallyseparate”(Cajetancitesagaintheanalogywiththegeometricalfigure);itistheactiveintellectalonethatisseparableandimmortal;thepotentialintellectiscorruptible(III93–95).AndallthisissaidbyCajetantobeofapiecewithothertextsofAristotlewhichclaimthatourcapacityforhappinessislim-itedandtemporary,becauseoursoulisintellectualonlybysharinginthelightoftheactiveintellect(III115;CajetanreferstotheNico-macheanEthics).MorethanonceCajetaninsiststhatheisconcernedonlywithexpoundingAristotle:heisnottobetakenassharinginAristotle’sattacksordefenses(IIIi).And,laterinBookIII,hedeniesthathehasbeentryingtoprovethepotentialintellecttobecorruptible“accordingtophilosophicalprinciples.”Histextmakesnoappealtothetheoryoftwoseparateordersoftruth.Faithshowsthefalsityofthepropositionthatthesouliscorruptible,andafalsepropositioncannotbeimpliedbywhatistrue(i.e.,byphilosophicalprinciples).Hegoeson:“IhavebeensimplyconcernedtoexpoundtheviewofthatGreek[istiusgraeci],andIwilltrytodemonstrateitsfalsityonphilosophicalgrounds”(III102)–whichindeedhethengoesontoattempt(III103ff.).Butbeforeseeingsomethingofwhathedoesoffer,wemustseewhyhisaccountofAristotle’sopinionraisedtheoppositionitdid.AquinashadproposedaviewofthesoulwhichofferedasynthesisofwhathedeemedtobeAristotelianthoughtwithinheritedChris-tianbelief.HeacceptedAristotle’saccountofhumanknowledgeasstartingfromthesensesandfromthephantasmatatheyprovide.ButthisdidnotexcludeforAquinasthesurvivalofthesoul.Itsdepen-denceonphantasmataisadependenceonthemonlyasobjects.Theintellecthasnodependenceonthebodyasanorgan(inthewaythatsightdependsupontheeye).Whenitisseparatedfromthebody,theabsenceofphantasmataasobjectscanbesuppliedbydivinepower(see,e.g.,STI,q.89,art.1).Aristotlewasthustobeseenasprovidingaphilosophicalschemewhichwascompatiblewith,andsupportiveof,Christianbelief.Butnowaneminenttheologian,aDominicanandacardinal,waspresentinganAristotlewhoresistedsuchasynthesis.Cajetan’schal-lengewastakenupbytwootherDominicans,SpinaandCatherinus.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n304p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneTheirattacksonCajetanwereangryandabusive:Aristotlehasbeenincorporatedintothereceivedwisdomoftheologiansandphiloso-phers;insettinghimapartfromthattradition,Cajetanwasmisusinghistalentsandcausingalarmanddespondency.2TheannoyanceofCajetan’sadversarieswasnotlessenedbyhisundertakingtoshow,onphilosophicalgrounds,thatAristotlewaswrong(III102),orevenbyhisclaimthataproofofimmortalitycanbebasedonAristotelianprinciples(III103).HeinvokestheargumentusedbyAquinas(DeAnimaIII,n.680),thattheintellecthasnobod-ilyorgan;soitsdependenceonthebody,whichforAristotlewasunqualified,isinfactnomorethanaccidental(peraccidens).AndsoiscircumventedAristotle’spointthatdependenceonphantas-matapreventedunderstandingfrombeinganoperation“propertothesoul”(III120).Buttocallthesoul’sdependenceonthebody“accidental”doesnotgoeasilywiththeclaimofAquinasthattheintellectualsoulistheformofthebody(STI,q.76,a.1).Again,thedistinctionAquinasdrawsbetweendependenceasonanorgananddependenceasonanobjectisnotconsidered–asitcouldhardlybe,givenCajetan’sinsistencethatAristotleclaimedaradicalde-pendenceofintellectualactivityuponthebody.Mostannoyingofall,perhaps,wasthefactthathefillsouttheproofhehasofferedwithafurtherargument,foundindeedinAquinas(ScGII68)butNeoplatonicinorigin,thattheharmonyoftheuniversecallsfortheexistence–abovematerialformsbutbelowthespiritualformsofangels–ofaformthatinitswaysharesinbothorders(III122–23).Thusalone,headds,isthestatusofthesoulpreserved.3WehavecomealongwayfromAristotle.WecannowseemoreclearlythesignificanceofCajetan’sdissentattheLateranCouncil.HewasfacedwithatraditionofreligiousspeculationforwhichAristotlewascentral,andwithacentralitygiventhroughthesynthesisachievedbyAquinas.Hewasalsofacedwithattemptsmadeinhisowntimetoseizethethoughtoftheancientworldonitsownterms.Thetwothingssimplydidnotgotogether.Cajetanneverconsidereddenyingtheimmortalityofthesoul,buthewasimpressedbyAristotle’sclaimforaradicaldepen-denceofintellectuponthebody,andhisattemptstocountertheclaimdidnotfitineasilywithwhatAquinashadwritten.Thefig-ureofAristotlestillexerciseditspower,thoughinadirectionothersfoundunwelcome.InhislatercommentaryontheEpistletotheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought305Romans,Cajetanclassestheimmortalityofthesoulwiththerid-dlesraisedbypredestination–theyarematterforfaith,notargu-ment.SynthesisandharmonizingwerefortheMiddleAges;whatCajetanwroteshowedthatthoseageswereover.TheeffectofdistinctionsCatslearntorecognizecatdoors;butittakeshumanstoreachtheconceptofarectangle.AccordingtoAquinas(seeabove,p.218),con-ceptualizingisaprocessinwhichtheactiveintellectraisesthedataprovidedbyoursenses,theindividualphantasmsexistinginthesenseorgans,toanewandgeneralizedmodeofexistence,producinginthepotentialintellectarepresentationofthecommonnaturethatisinthephantasm,butwithoutthematerialandindividuatingcon-ditionsthere.Thatishowwecanseethecatdoorandalso“see”itsshapeassharingpropertieswiththeshapeofthepageofabook,andcancalleachofthemarectangle.Thisaccounttriestodealwithaperennialproblem,andadisagreementbetweentwowritersofthetimecanencouragethoughtaboutsomethingelseassociatedwithmedievalphilosophy–itsmakingofdistinctions.Oneofthetwowehavealreadymet–Cajetan;hereweshallbereferringtohiscommentaryonAquinas’sSummatheologiae(itisincludedintheLeonineeditionoftheSumma).Theother,acenturylater,istheSpanishJesuitFranciscoSuarez(´1548–1617).BothwereconcernedwithtextsinwhichAquinashaddiscussedthematter;bothwereinsympathywithhisreasonsforholdingtheactiveintel-lecttobenecessary;bothwentontoaskfurtherquestionsaboutthenatureofwhatitdid.Cajetan(commentingonSTI,q.79,a.3)statesamedievalobjec-tiontoanycooperationbetweentheactiveintellectandthephan-tasm.Ifthephantasmismaterial,itcannotactupontheintellect,whichbelongstoahigherorder;andthisinabilityremains,evenwhenthepoweroftheactiveintellectisinvoked–thephantasmismaterial,andwhatismaterialcannotaffectwhatisspiritual.Cajetanrepliesthatindeedwecannottreatthephantasmasifitcontainedtheconceptwhichtheactiveintellecttheneducesfromit;thephan-tasmisandremainsofthematerialorder.Theeffectoftheactiveintellectisratherthatthephantasm,previouslyexistingindepen-dently,isnowattheserviceofsomethingelse;itcannowdomoreCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n306p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldanethanitcould;andtheactiveintellectisabletoeducetheconceptfromthepotentialintellectitself(paragraphs4and5).Hegoesontoconsider,amongotherthings,theabstractionbywhichthephantasmisraisedtothegeneralizedintelligibleorder.Forthis,hemakesadistinctiontodowiththeeffectoflight.Theformaleffectistoilluminatethemedium,thediaphanum,asthemedievalscalledit;theobjectiveeffectistoilluminatebodies.Thephantasmisilluminatedobjectivelybythelightoftheactiveintellect,insuchawaythatthereshinesout,noteverythinginit,butthenaturetherewithoutitssingularity.Theconceptformedinthepotentialintellectistheformaleffectoftheactiveintellect’sforce,andisofitsverynatureabstractandspiritual.Theobjectivelyilluminatedphantasmisabstractandspiritualonlyaccordingtotheilluminationgivenit(paragraphs9and10).SuarezconsidersthesametopicinBookIVofhis´Deanima.Headmitsthatbothphantasmandactiveintellectareneeded,butaskshowwearetounderstandtheilluminativefunctionofthelatter(IV2.4[616]).HowcanwhatCajetansaysbeaccepted?Thewholeactionoftheactiveintellectisspiritual;howcanitaffectthephantasm,whichismaterial?Butifthephantasminitselfisunchanged,inwhatsensecanitbesaidtobeilluminated(IV2.5)?Some,hegoeson,havesuggestedthatthephantasmisaninstrumentoftheactiveintellect,thatthereisacertainvirtualcontactbetweenthem.Theseareonlywords:howcananinstrumentofalowerorderaffectwhatisofahigherorder?DonottheologiansalreadyhaveproblemsenoughinexplaininghowGodcanusefiretopunishdemons(IV2.7)?Theclosestunionwecanimaginebetweenactiveintellectandphantasmisthatbotharerootedinthesamesoul.Butthatinitselfisnotenoughtoexplaintheinstrumentality–youmightaswellarguethat,sincethephantasmisrootedinaspiritualsoul,itneedsnoactiveintellectinthefirstplace(IV2.8).Itseemsbesttosay,heconcludes,thatthephantasm’sroleisoneofmaterial,notefficientcausality(IV2.10).Thisdoesnotmeanthattheconcept,whichisspiritual,iseducedfromthephantasm,whichismaterial.But,becauseoftheunionofactiveintellectandphan-tasminthesamesoul,thephantasmdoesoffertheactiveintellectwhatisinasensematerialforittoworkon,asitwereasample(exemplar).Becauseofthisunion,theyhaveacertainwondrousor-derandharmony(consonantia):bytheveryfactthattheintellectCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought307operates,sodoesthephantasm–Suarezusesheretheword´imagi-natio(IV2.12).4Cyminisectores–thisdisagreementcanthrowlightonthemedievalmakingofdistinctions.Distinctionsarenotdissections:distinguishingthecolorofanapplefromitsshapeisnotthesameaspeelingtheapple.Butdissec-tion,takingapart,isthemostvividandmosteasilygraspedwayofshowingthatonethingisnotanother.Totreatallwordsonthemodelofnameshasbeenatemptationthatphilosophershavenotalwaysresisted.Justso,Isuggest,theelaborationofdistinctionsisliabletomakethembetakenasdissections–butdissectionsconductedinanorderbothelusiveandintangible.FornotethedifferencebetweenwhatAquinaswritesonthistopic,andwhatwehaveseeninCajetanandSuarez.At´SummatheologiaeI,q.67,a.1,Aquinasaskswhether“light”canbeusedofspiritualthings.Herepliesthatwemustdistinguishtheoriginalapplication(primaimpositio)ofanamefromthename’semployment(ususno-minis).Justasseeisusedoriginallyofsight,butextendedtoothersenses,solightisusedoriginallyofwhatmakesthingsvisiblyman-ifest,butisthenextendedtowhatmakesmanifestinanykindofknowledge.Wehavealreadyseenhowwordstodowithlightareextendedtotheroleoftheactiveintellect,butAquinasstatesanobjectiontothisusageatSTI,q.79,a.3,obj.2:forvision,lightisneededtoilluminatethemedium;butthereisnomediumfortheintellect;sonoilluminationofthephantasmisneeded.Herepliesthattherearetwoopinionsovertheroleoflight:(1)itworksdirectlyonobjects;(2)itworksonthemedium.Forbothofthese,theactiveintellectresembleslight,sincetheformerisnecessaryforknowledgejustasthelatterisnecessaryforvision.Butfor(1),theresemblancegoesfurther–aslightmakescolorsvisible,sotheactiveintellectformsconcepts.For(2),theresemblanceissimplythegeneralneces-sitythatexistsforlightinoneorderandfortheactiveintellectintheother:themediumplaysnopartinthecomparison.ForAquinas,inotherwords,theextensionofvisualimagerytotheintellectualorderdoesnotcommitustoclaimsaboutthemech-anismofconceptualization.Allthatmattersisthatwecanpassfromthedataprovidedbyoursensestotheconceptsweemploy.Thereisa“makingmanifest,”andsowecanapplytoittheterminologyoflight.5CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n308p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneButapplyingtheterminologyinthiswayisinasenseanendinitself.Wearesimplysayingthat,justascolorsofthemselvesdonotamounttovision,soconceptualizationismorethanperception.Wemayfindtheanalogysatisfying;orwemaythinkitshouldbecom-plementedbyothers;buttheanalogyassuchgivesusnoinformationastohowconceptualizationtakesplace.Or,indeed,whetherittakesplaceatallorisonlyconfusion–wecannotusetheanalogywithlighttodistinguishEuclid’srectanglefromthephrenologist’s“bumpofbenevolence.”Wemayindeedthinkthat“conceptualization”istoogenericanotiontobeuseful.Butwhateverwethink,wecannotgototheanalogywithlightforananswer,asifacloserscrutinywouldrevealjustwhatprocedureisgoingon.YetinmyopinionthatisjustwhatCajetanandSuarezaredoing.Forexample,toaskhow´thespiritualoperationoftheactiveintellectcanaffectthematerialphantasmistomissthepointofthecomparisonwithlight.Thecomparisonsaysineffect:ascolorsneedlightfortheretobevision,sothephantasmneedstoberaisedtoahigherandgeneralizedorderfortheretobeunderstanding.Wecannotgoontotreatthiscom-parisonasasuggestedmechanism,andthendisagreeastotheexactnatureofthemechanism.WehavethoughtaboutthedisagreementbetweenCajetanandSuarez.Wecanendthissectionbythinkingaboutwhattheyhave´incommon.ForAquinas,wecallthepowerthatenablesustogen-eralizethe“activeintellect,”andweextendtoittheterminologyoflight.ForCajetanandSuarez,theimageoflightisitselfthestart-´ingpointofanotherproblem:forCajetan,thephantasmcannotactupontheintellect;forSuarez,theintellectcannotaffectthephan-´tasm.Ihavedisagreedwiththeirwholeapproach,butthatapproachshowssomethingtheyhaveincommon.Inthecontextofconcep-tualizing,bothseparatetheordersof“material”and“spiritual”inawaythatAquinasdidnot.Wearemovingtowardaworldinwhichextensionandthoughtaretobeputasunder.Andtotheworldoftheseventeenthcenturywenowturn.Traditionandinnovation“Ishalldetect[atoms]withthespectaclesofmyunderstanding,andwiththemicroscopeofmyreason”:sowrotein1674theauthorofaworkon“Peripateticatoms”–anattempttocombineatomismwithCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought309thescholastictradition.6Thenoveltyofhislanguagecanintroducethissection,becauseintheseventeenthcenturysomanynewthingswerehappening:Gilbertandmagnetism;Napierandlogarithms;Keplerandtheplanetaryorbits;Galileoandthetelescopeturnedtotheheavens;vonGuerickeandthevacuumpump;Boyle’saware-nessoftheneedforanewstartininvestigatingthecompositionofbodies...Somanynewthings,somanynewquestions.Thosenewthingsweshouldnowadayscountasscience,butphilosophywasjustasfullofdisconcertingnovelties.Baconin1621,atthestartofhisNovumorganon,hadexplicitlysethimselfapartfromwhathadgonebefore;in1651HobbesinhisLeviathan(I8)hadgivenapassagefromSuarezasasampleof“Insignificantspeech”;andthelanguageand´style,letalonethecontent,ofDescartes’sDiscourse(1637)seemedtoproclaimanewbeginning.HadthetraditioninheritedfromtheMiddleAgesanythingtosetbesideallthis?Someminorfiguresneedtobeconsideredinthissection,becausetheirwritingscanshowtheordinarypreoccupationsofthosewho,trainedinthescholasticway,eitherdefendeditagainstthein-novators,orthemselvesfoundfaultwithit.AndIhopethattheinvestigationwillshowhowdistinctionsdrawninmedievalphilos-ophyweretouchedbythenewsettinginwhichitwasnowhavingtobepracticed.7AstandardchargeagainsttheAristoteliantraditionwasthatitwasuninformative.WehavealreadymetMoliere’sjestthat“adormitive`virtue”explainswhyopiuminducessleep.Thatwasinacomedy;butitwasofapiecewithwhatwassaidelsewhere.LeGrand,towhomisattributedtheintroductionofDescartes’sphilosophyintoEngland,askswhatwouldbetheuseofappealingtoascholastic“form”toexplainthephasesofthemoonorofVenus([610]BookIiv.7.6).SoitisinterestingtonoticethatthecounterattackmadeagainstCartesianismbyPardieswasofmorethanonekind.HeaskshowmuchmoreinformativeDescartesisinexplainingthenourishmentofplantsby“acertainshape(figure)”thanthescholasticswiththeir“intussusception”([614]§§59–60)–sosettinghimselfapartfromthemathematicalandquantitativeapproachthatwastoplaysuchapartinexplanation.Hethenmakesatheoreticalpointthatshowshowfarapartoldandnewwere.DonotCartesiansstopatthesurfaceofthings,whilethetraditionalphilosophy,withitstalkofforms,pointsonwardtothereasonforthem?ThenewphilosophersmayCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n310p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldanewellsaytheyarepreparingtoinvestigatenature;weprefertoopenthemind(esprit),andwithaneyetotheology([614]§85).Andtotheseobjectionsheaddsasocialconsideration.IsnotthespiritoftheCartesiansunsuitableforpolitesociety(leshonnetesgensˆ)?Thus,tosaythatakeycanopenadoorbecauseithas“anaperientvirtue”issurelymoresuitablethantogiveadetailedaccountofitswardsandmechanism–thatwouldbeturningphilosophyintoalocksmith’sworkshop([614]§§76–81).8AnothercounterchargemadebyPardies–thatDescartes’smatteristoouniformtoaccountforallthevarietyintheworld–leadsnaturallytoanotherthemethatpreoccupiedbothsidesofthedebate.TheultimatelyAristoteliandistinctionbetweenmatterandformseemed(likesomeotherthingsinthattradition)mostpersuasivewhenappliedtowhatwasliving.There,theunityandthecontinuityovertimeoftheobjectcouldbeeasilydistinguishedfromitsphysicalcomposition,whichvariedastimepassed.Butintheseventeenthcenturymuchattentionwasbeingpaidtoinanimatenature–themovementandcollisionofbodies,thelawsofplanetarymotion,thecompoundingandseparationofthestuffsthatmakeuptheworldaroundus.Whatwastobemadeoftheolderdistinctioninsuchnovelcontexts?ForGoudin,mixtureswereeitherimperfect(wherethecompo-nentsretaintheirownnature)orperfect(wheretheydonot).Inper-fectmixtures,hecontends,theformofthemixtureismorethanamingling(contemperatio)oftheelements,itissomethingdistinctandsubstantial([606]BookII,ch.2).Werethecompoundnomorethanamingling,theresultwouldbesimplylikeagarmentmadeofdifferentmaterials([606]II2).Butanotherdefenderoftheolderway,LaGrange,complainsthathehasneverencounteredatradi-tionalphilosopherwhohasgivenasatisfactoryproofofsubstan-tialforms,especiallythoseofinanimatebodies([600],preface45).Hisownexamplesofaccidentalformsconcernthehumansoul–knowledgeandvirtuearerealanddistinctfromit(IV1–3;III2).Thereisnoneedtopostulateanynewentitytoexplainwhyabentstickisbentonewayratherthananother:thereisaneed,ifwearetosaywhythejustmanisinclinedtowardwhatisgood(III8).Hedoesgiveoneexamplefrominanimatenatureofwherescholasticsmakechangetobesubstantial–thisisburning,wherefireisconvertedintosmokeandsmokeintowater.HerewehavemorethanachangeofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought311shape,oramovementofparts(astherewouldbeincarvingastatueoutofacolumn);rather,oneentityislostandanotherproduced.Thematterofthefirelosestheformofthefireandacquiresthatofair(I3).Goudinwritesinasimilarwayaboutburning.Theinfluenceofthefireproducesanaccidentalchangeinthewood,andtheneventuallydestroysitbyinducingtheformoffireintothewood’smatter([606]I1).Andinperfectmixturestherearepropertiesmorenoblethanthepropertiesofwhatcomposesthem.Ofthese,plantsandtheirstructureprovideoneexample.Anotherisprovidedbythewondrouspowersofminerals(metalla):themagnet,themixingofgoldandmercury(wheretheamalgamisdenserthanthemeanofthetwometals),andthecapacitiesofjadetoeasepainandofjaspertostaunchblood(II2.2).But,havingsaidallthat,headdsthequalificationthattheargumentforformsworks“atleastforanimals”(II2.2).SoascholasticphilosopherappealstoexperiencetovindicateAristotle;butthenseemstodoubtwhethertheappealisdecisiveornot.Wemightwellwonderwhatcouldcounthereasdecisive.Wehaveseensofarsomedifferencesofopinionaboutthetermi-nologyofmedievalphilosophy–itsallegedlackofinformativeness,therangeofitsapplicability,andtheadducingofexperimentalevi-dencetosupportAristoteliandistinctions.Wenowturntoadeeperdissent–thechargethatbothitsterminology,andthedistinctionsembodiedtherein,aremisleadingandincomprehensible.Letusstartwithasimpleexampletoseewhy.IfIheatavesselofcoldwater,thewaterbecomeshot,butwhatisinthevesselallthetimeiswater.IfIendwiththestuffwithwhichIstarted,thechangewouldbecalledoneofqualityoraccidental.Butifavesselofwineturnsintovinegar,Icannotaskwhatwasinthevesselallthetime,becauseIendwithadifferentkindofstuff;thechangeisnotaccidentalbutsubstantial.Butthedistinctiondrawnintheformerisnowappliedtothelatter.Justasthewaterwasfirstofallcoldandthenhot,sothematterofthewineisinformed,firstbytheformofwineandthenbythatofvinegar.Thewaterispotentiallycoldorhot;thematterispotentiallywineorvinegar.Therearetwoobservationstomakeaboutthis:oneconcernsmat-ter,theotherconcernsform.Firstforthatconcerningmatter.Ifwehavetwodifferentexamplesofsubstantialchange(say,winetovine-garandwoodtoash),wecannotinferthatwehavethesamematterinCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n312p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneeachcase.Thatwouldbetopassfrom“ineverysubstantialchange,thereismatterwhichisinformedfirstonewayandthenanother”to“thereismatterwhich,ineverysubstantialchange,isinformedfirstonewayandthenanother.”Apartfromcommittingalogicalfallacy,weshouldherebecommittingourselvestoholdingthatany-thingcanchangeintoanything,forweshouldbeholdingthattheonematterunderlieswine,vinegar,wood,andashalike.Andsuchaclaimneedsproof.Butmatter–materiaprima,asitwascalled–wascommonlyseeninthiswayintheMiddleAgesandalsobythosewhocameafter.ValerianoMagni,whengivinganexpositionofthetraditionalview,saysthatalllivingthingspassawayintowhatisinanimate;inanimatesinturnpassawayintotheelements;andtheelementscanbetransformedintoeachother;primematteristheultimatesubjectofallthesechanges;itcanbecomeallthings([620]BookI,ch.7).ForDuHamel,thatisthetrouble:whatisthisinde-terminatematterthatremainsunderallchanges?Allappealtoit,noneexplainit.Bettertotreattheelementsasmatter;theydonotpassawayintoeachother.Theyhaveeachadefinitecharacter–howcouldanythingasvagueandindeterminateasmateriaprimaexist([602]DeconsensuII11;ValerianoMagnimakesthesamepointin[620]BookII,ch.6)?Nowforthesecondobservation,concerningform.Wemustnottreatmatterandformasiftheywerethings.AsAristotlehimselfputit,ifwedosoweshallhavetoapplytothemalsothedistinctionbetweenmatterandform,andaretherebylaunchedintoaninfiniteregress(MetaphysicsVII8).Thetemptationtodosoisstrongestwithsubstantialchangebecause,whenwineturnsintovinegar,wecannotaskwhatwasinthevesselthewholetime.Thatisbecausethequestionmakesnosense–butitiseasytogiveitanappearanceofsensebymakingsomethingindeterminatebeinthevesselthewholetime,whichisdeterminedfirstbytheformofwine,thenbytheformofvinegar.Andsowearefacedwiththefurtherquestion,orratherconundrumofourownmaking–wheredotheseformscomefromandgoto?Suchcomplaintsaboutformsarenumerousintheauthorswehaveseenobjectingtothetraditionaldistinctions.ForLeGrand,scholasticsmustadmitthattherearemanysubstantialchangeseachday–therewillhavetobejustasmanyactsofcreationandannihilationofforms.Bywhatforce?Andwhatevidenceisthereforsuchacts(Iiv.7.2–3[610])?ForDuHamel,aformisarealityCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought313(entitas):ifitdidnotpreviouslyexist,itmusthavebeencreated;ifitis“educedfromthepotentialityofthematter,”asthescholasticssay,howcanmatterprovidesomanyformswithoutbeingdepleted(II2.7[602])?ValerianoMagnialsoreferstothescholasticphrase,andalsofindsitunintelligible.Whatpotentialityisthisthatmatterhas?Formissupposedtogivematteritsdetermination–howcanitbe“educed”fromit(II6[620])?Lookingbackonthecontroversy,wemayfeelthatthosewhothuscomplainedhadonlythemselvestoblameformisunderstand-ingthepointofphilosophicaldistinctions.Talkofsubstantialformsismeanttodojusticetotheunity,activity,andspecificcharacterofthings.Leibnizpraisedthescholastictraditionforthis,andforin-sistingonsomethinghethoughtDescarteshadneglected(DiscourseonMetaphysics§§10–12).Indeed,inoneworkof1670heconcludeswithaletterdevotedtothereconciliationofAristotelianismwithrecentthought.Butinthesameletterheblamesthescholasticsfornotacceptingthatspecificexplanationsofphenomenamustbegivenintermsofsize,shape,andmotion([611])andaccusessomeAristoteliansofhisowndayoftendingtotreatsubstantialformsasiftheywere“mini-gods”(deunculi).Thechargethatphilosophywasbeingconfusedwithwhatwewouldcallnaturalsciencecanbeillustratedbyanexamplethatwaspopularatthetime:itcanbefoundinGoudin(I3.1[606]),whodefendsitscoherence,andinValerianoMagni,whothinksitbewil-dering(II6).Takeasoldier,withhiswhiskersandhisscars;supposeheiskilledbyaswordthrustandliesdeadbeforeus.Whatdowesee?Notwhatwesawwhenhewasalive:hissoul,theformofhisbody,hasgone,andsowhatwesawhasbeeninstantlycorruptedtoprimematter;butthenjustasinstantlyinformedbythe“cadavericform.”Andifwethinkweareseeingwhatwepreviouslysaw,wearebeingdeceivedbysimilarity,aswemightbeovertwoeggs(GoudinI3.1[606]).Inonesense,ofcourse,Goudinisright:acorpseisnotalivingbody.AsAquinasputsit,aneyeinacorpseisaneyeonlyequivo-cally(STIII50.5;obj.1and2withresponses).Butthepointhereisoneofphilosophy–oflogic,ifwewill.Itisnotaclaimforsomepieceofphysicallegerdemain,inwhichinstantaneouschangessuc-ceedeachother.Tosaythat–andGoudin’stalkofeggssuggeststhathewassayingit–istofallintojusttheconfusionIhaveclaimedtodetectinCajetanandinSuarez:itistomisreadphilosophyastalkof´CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n314p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneintangiblemechanisms.There,wesawsuchtalkabouttheworkoftheactiveintellect;here,wemaysay,wehaveitinanindeterminatematterwithitscomplementofdeunculi.Isuggestthatonereasonwhyscholasticswerethentemptedtotalkinthiswaywastheachievementofsomanyrecentinnovations.Bysuchthings,claimswerebeingmadeabout“howthingsworked”–andmadewithincreasingsuccess.Thesuccesswasduetothepursuitofexplanationsintermsof,verygenerally,size,shape,andmotion.Tradition,Isuggest,wasencouragedbywhatelsewasgoingontotreatitsinheriteddistinctionsasifthey,too,wereakindofmech-anism.Conversely,innovationsawitselfasarivaltotradition:justasDuHamelwantedtoreplacemateriaprimabyelements,sohewantedanappropriateblendingofelementstoreplaceform.Isaidatthestartofthissectionthatweshouldcountmanyinnovationsoftheseventeenthcenturyasscience,andhavegoneontocomplementthemwithexamplesofinnovationinphilosophy.Theseventeenthcenturysawthedistinctionbetweenthetwodisciplinesbeingmade,albeitnotwithoutpainandlabor.Butthedebatepointedtoyetanotherdisagreementbetweenoldandnew.WhenLeGrandrejectedasidlethescholastics’talkofforms,hisattitudeherewascharacteristicofthewholeCartesiantradition.ItisinstructivetoseetheresponseoftheJesuitThomasComptonCarleton(“Comptonus”),whohasbeendescribedasthefirsttodefendsubstantialformsagainstsuchrejection(P.DiVona[601]).Carleton’sgeneraltacticresembleswhatwehaveseeninLeibniz:thevarietyinthingsandtheconstancyoftheirbehaviorcallforsomeprincipleofunity([597]Physica,disputation11).Buthehasfarlesstosayaboutsubstantialformsthanabouttheneedforrealaccidentalforms(disputation12).And,ashemakesclear,hisreasonistheological:suchaccidentsaredemandedbyeucharistictheology.Ashewriteselsewhereinthesamework:“Topursuephi-losophyasoneshould,itisimportanttobewellversedintheology”(Deanima,disputation7).Thedoctrineoftransubstantiationcalledforthesurvivalwith-outtheirsubstanceoftheaccidentsofthebreadandwine.Itwasnotofcourseclaimedthatphilosophycouldprovethedoctrine;buttheAristoteliandistinctionhadatleasttobedeemedcoherent,andspeculationsaboutthenatureofqualitieshadtotakeaccountofthis.TheCouncilofTrenthaddeclaredin1551that“transubstantiation”CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought315wasused“mostfittingly”oftheEucharist.Inotherwords,thelanguageinheritedfromtheMiddleAgeshadbeen,itwascontended,inacertainmeasureconsecratedbythistheologicaluse(LaGrange,preface).NorwasitenoughtosaythatDescarteswasconcernedonlywithnaturaltopics–notenough,thatis,unlesswearetoacceptthedoctrineoftwounconnectedordersoftruth(Pardies[614]§§6–7).Theoldertraditionwasclaimingtobedividedfromthenewertheo-logicallyaswellasphilosophically.Butifsubstantialformsclaimedlessattentionthanaccidentalforms,stilllessattention–infactnone,asfarasIcansee–wasbestowedonwhatweshouldnowregardasthegreatestnoveltyinDescartes:hismethodicdoubt,hissettinghismindapartfromallelse,hisinvocationofGodandselfaswhatultimatelyresistsat-temptstodoubt.Suchastartingpointis,toputthingsmildly,alientowhatisfoundinathinkerlikeAquinas;yetitwasneglectedinthepolemicofthosedefendingthemedievaltradition.ArecentworkbyStephenMenn[612]propoundsanexplanation–thatDescartescanbeseenasbuildingonthetraditionassociatedwithSt.Augustine,forwhomGodandthesoularethefoundationforallelse.Hishav-inglongprecededthelatermedievaldebatesgavehimtheadvantageofneutralityoverwhathadfollowed;andtheseventeenthcentury,whichsawthetraditionassociatedwithAristotleundersuchpres-sure,sawtheprestigeofAugustineevergreater,asbothsidesinthetheologicaldebatesappealedtohim.ItwouldbewrongsimplytoidentifythethoughtandinterestsofDescarteswiththoseofAu-gustine,andthelinkbetweenthemdidnotpreservetheCartesiansfromattacksoneucharisticgrounds;butDescartes’sapparentlynewbeginningwasnotasnovelasitappearstous.Better,thebeginningitselfwasnotsonovel,butnovelindeedwastherangeofideasandsystemsaslaterphilosophywentitsownlux-uriantlyvariegatedway.Leibniz(and,derivatively,Wolff)explicitlypreservedelementsoftheAristoteliantradition,andanyphilosopherwasliabletoencounterproblemsthat,unknowntohim,medievalphilosophershadalreadyfaced.Butthemedievaltraditionitselfcon-tractedtosettingsthatstoodapartfromdevelopment.9Itlivedonafterafashioninseminaries,wheretheologicalterminologycalledforsomeacquaintancewiththeolderinheritance.Yetitisworthpointingoutthat,despitetheattentionpaidbywriterssuchasCar-letontotheproblemsraisedbytheEucharistforDescartes,CartesianCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n316p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneaccountsofitweretaughtinseminariesuntilwellintothenineteenthcentury.10Othersurvivalswerepicturesqueratherthansignificant.ThedegreeofBachelorofArtswasstillconferredinnineteenth-centuryunreformedOxfordbygranting(quitevacuously)thelicensetolecture“uponanybookofthelogicofAristotle.”AndtherelingeredonuntilmyowndaythecustomatUshawCollege,Durham,ofreferringtoarationofextrasleepinthemorningas“anAristote.”ThelanguagewasFrench,butAristotlehimselfwashereaccordedadormitivevirtue.currentengagements(johnhaldane)ReadersofthisCompanionwillbynowbeabletodetectthepresenceofmedievalphilosophyinagreatdealofmodernthought.DescarteswasnoAugustine(andAugustinehadnoneofDescartes’sinterestinfindingsureandcertainfoundationsforthenaturalsciences),butthefirst-personstartingpointsharedbythetwothinkersde-terminesotherpointsofagreement,andAugustine’sConfessionshasneverlackedforreaderswiththeologicalorliteraryinterests.Linkstomedievalphilosophyhavebeennotedearlierfortheothertwogreatcontinentalrationalists,SpinozaandLeibniz.RenaissancescholarsturnedawayfromAquinas’sinterpretationofAristotle,andseventeenth-centuryscientistssupposedlyrejectedtheentireAristotelianworldview,butscholasticAristotelianism(ProtestantaswellasCatholic)underlaymanyofthepositionstakenbythosewhoweremostoutspokeninrejectingit(including,again,Descartes,asweshallsee).Evenwheredirectacquaintancewithmedievaltextsisdifficulttoestablish,illuminating,ifrisky,comparisonscanstillbemade(ofLockewithAbelardonrealandnominalessences,forexample,orHumewithOckhamonimpressionsandideas).Thoughwidelypresent,however,significantrelationshipsofme-dievaltolaterphilosophywerenotgenerallyacknowledgedfromtheseventeenththroughmuchofthenineteenthcentury.11Thepresentlivelyinterestinthesubjectofthisvolumeisthusacomparativelyrecentphenomenon.InwhatfollowsIwilltracebrieflysomeoftherootsofthisrenewalofhistoricalawarenessandphilosophicalengagementandindicatesomeofitsmajormanifestationsonthecurrentscene.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought317RootsofrenewalBythemiddleofthenineteenthcenturyabroadinterestinmedievalthoughtwasoccasionedbygeneralculturalmovementssuchastheGothicrevivalinart,architecture,andliteratureandthedevelop-mentofmedievalhistory.EvenincountriessuchasBritainwheretheProtestantReformationhadbeenvictorious,andinFrancewherethetidesofsecularismhadrisenhighest,theculturalrediscoveryoftheMiddleAgesbythelikesoftheeclecticVictorCousin(whoseinfluencerangedasfarastheAmericantranscendentalists)andthemultitalentedhistorianJean-BarthelemyHaureaufavoredtherevivalofmedievalphilosophy.Thecourseofmodernphilosophyitselfhadrunfarenoughinvariousdirectionstojustifyinterestinmedievalthinkersasprovidingfreshalternatives.ResourcesforthestudyofthelargeportionofmedievalphilosophytobefoundintheologicaltextswereincreaseddramaticallybythepublicationofPatrologiagraeca(162volumes)andPatrologialatina(221volumes)between1844and1866undertheeditorshipoftheabbeJ.P.Migne.Other´publicationsofmedievalsourcesfollowed,generallywithimprovedcriticaltexts.ApowerfulimpetustothestudyofThomasAquinasinparticularwasgivenbyPopeLeoXIII’sencyclicalletterAeternipatris(1878),whichcommendsAquinasas“thechiefandmaster”ofthescholas-tics,toweringabovealltheothers:Philosophyhasnopartwhichhedidnottouchfinelyatonceandthoroughly;onthelawsofreasoning,onGodandincorporealsubstances,onmanandothersensiblethings,onhumanactionsandtheirprinciples,hereasonedinsuchamannerthatinhimthereiswantingneitherafullarrayofquestions,noranaptdisposalofthevariousparts,northebestmethodofproceed-ing,norsoundnessofprinciplesorstrengthofargument,norclearnessandeleganceofstyle,norafacilityforexplainingwhatisabstruse.12SuchhighpraisecouldnotgounheededinCatholiccircles.WithintwodecadestherehadbeenestablishedtheLeonineCommission,chargedwiththetaskofproducingscholarlyeditionsofallofAquinas’swritings(aprojectstillfarfromcompletion),andtheAcademyofSt.ThomasinRomeandtheInstituteSuperieurde´PhilosophieattheUniversityofLouvain,inbothofwhichhisthoughtmightbestudied.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n318p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneOftheseandotherproductsofthenineteenth-centuryrevival,byfarthemostimportantinshapingthecourseofEuropeanand,ulti-mately,NorthAmericanstudyofmedievalphilosophygenerally(notjustofAquinasandnotjustbyCatholics)wastheLouvaininstitute.TheimportanceofLouvainliesinthreeareas.First,itengagedinse-riousandsystematicscholarlyresearchofasortthatraisedthestudyofmedievalfigurestothebeststandardsexistinginotherareasofhistoryofphilosophy.Second,itbecameincreasinglyself-consciousaboutitsmethodologicalandhistoriographicalpresuppositions,rais-ingquestionsabouttheintellectualunityofmedievalthought,thediversityofitssources,therangeofitsliteraryforms,thevarietyofitspurposes,andsuchlike.Third,itsoughttoengagemedievaltraditionsinanintellectualexchangewithcontemporaryphiloso-phyandscience,inthehopebothofupdatingtheoldertraditionsinlightofmoderntheoriesandconceptsandofshowingthecontinuingrelevanceofasystemsuchasAquinas’stotheunderstandingofthemetaphysicalstructureofreality.ThepreeminenceaccordedtoAquinasinAeternipatrisas,inef-fect,“greatestofthegreatandtruestofthetrue”producedadegreeofpressuretoharmonizeinterpretationsofotherfigureswiththatofAquinasinanassumeddoctrinalunityamongthechurchfathersandtheoriginalscholastics.Thenewscholarshiphad,however,revealeddifferencesamongmedievalthinkers,theextentanddepthofwhichhasgrownincreasinglyevidentwithsubsequentstudy.MauricedeWulfembarkedonthetaskofproducingasystematicandcompre-hensivehistoryofphilosophyinthemedievalChristianWest.DeWulf’sHistoirewasimportantinestablishing,throughsuccessiveeditions,aseriesofpossiblebasesuponwhichtheproclaimedsyn-theticunityofmedievalphilosophymightbeseentobefounded.13Itwouldbefairtosaythatsubsequentscholarshiphastendedtoelim-inatetheseassolefoundations,encouragingthepresentpluralisticassessmentofthosecenturiesasonesofquiteconsiderablediversity,includingatoneendofaspectrumworkthatisessentiallyreligious,attheotherendthatwhichisentirelyindependentoftheologicalcontent,andinbetweenthebulkwhichexhibitsvaryingformsanddegreesofconnectionwithreligiousideas.Ironically,ifonethinksoftherecentrelationshipbetweenthedominantFrenchandAnglo-Saxonphilosophicalmodes,itwasinParisthatthemostimportantdevelopmentsforthestudyofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought319medievalphilosophyintheEnglish-speakingworldoccurred.JacquesMaritain(1882–1973)andEtienneGilson(1884–1978)wereThomists,eachinhisownway,buttheirapproachestoAquinaswerealsoapplicabletoothermedievalthinkers.ForMaritain,aboldlyre-statedThomismprovidedaphilosophythatspokeoftheuniverse,totheworld,andaboutthemeaningofhumanlife.Morethananyotherauthorinthemiddlethirdofthetwentiethcentury,Maritainthrewamedievalsystemofthoughtintothegeneralphilosophicalmixasaworthyintellectualalternative.14ForGilsontheroutetoAquinaswasviahisstudyofDescartesandaninvestigationoftheintellectualbackgroundofCartesianism,which,ashediscoveredtohissurprise,wasmarkedlyscholastic.IntracingthethreadsofscholasticthoughtGilsonwasledbacktotheideasofAquinas,whichstruckhimasbe-ingbetterthanthoseofthefigurehehadoriginallychosentostudy.Stimulatedbythisdiscovery,hebeganasystematicexplorationofthethoughtofthemedievals,readingextensivelythroughprimarysources(Greek,Jewish,andIslamic,aswellaswestern)anddevelop-ingabroadmetahistoricalunderstandingoftheperiod.Asaresult,althoughheremainedaThomist,GilsonwasabletogivegenerouslypositiveaccountsoffiguresquitedifferentfromAquinas:Augustine,Bonaventure,Scotus,andeven,atonestage,Ockham.15WarinEuropegaveMaritainandGilsonreasonandopportunitytovisitNorthAmerica,andtheybothbecameregularpresencesthere.GilsonfoundedthePontificalInstituteofMedievalStudies(PIMS)attheUniversityofToronto,whichsoonbecametheleadingcenterinNorthAmericaforthestudyofmedievalthought.PIMSproducedseveralgenerationsofscholarswhospreadthemedievalrevivalthroughoutNorthAmerica,itsproductsgenerallyholdingtotheGilsoniancontextualisthistoriography.ThestudyofmedievalphilosophyintheUnitedStatesalsoowesagreatdealtoscholarssuchasPhilotheusBoehner,anearlyassociateofGilsonwhoinspiredtheseriousstudyandeditingofOckhamwiththefoundingoftheFranciscanInstituteinSt.Bonaventure,NewYork;ErnestMoody,whoseownworkonfourteenth-centurylogicandempiricismcomplementedBoehner’s;HarryWolfson,whoprovidedamajorimpetusforthestudyofmedievalJewish,16andbyextensionIslamic,17philosophyinhismanyyearsatHarvard;andNormanKretzmann.Apartfromhisownimpressivescholar-ship,KretzmanncoeditedwithAnthonyKennyandJanPinborgtheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n320p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneinfluentialCambridgeHistoryofLaterMedievalPhilosophy(CHLMP)andwasoneoftheeditorsoftheYaleLibraryofMedievalPhilosophy.AtCornellfrom1966hehelpedformseveralgenerationsofscholarsandphilosopherswhoengagewith,andmaketheoreticaluseofinsightsfrom,medievalphilosophy,withoutthemselvesbeingneoscholastics.Anencouragingresultoftheworkoftheseandotherscholarsistheextenttowhichthevariousstrandsofmedievalphilosophy–Christian,Jewish,andIslamic;speculativeandanalytic;earlyandlate–havecometobeconsideredtogether,bothinpublicationsandatscholarlyconferences,forexample,inthesessionsoftheSocietyforMedievalandRenaissancePhilosophyintheUnitedStatesandintheinternationalcongressesandcolloquiaorganizedbytheSociet´e´Internationalepourl’EtudedelaPhilosophieMedi´evale.´Anotherencouragingdevelopmentistheentryofmedievalthoughtintothephilosophicalmainstream.Forexample,throughoutthetwentiethcenturyaninterestinAquinas’sphilosophicalthoughthasasoftenbeenassociatedwithaconcernformoralphilosophyasforphilosophyofreligion.Untilthe1960s,Thomistethicswaspur-suedlargelyinisolationfromthedominantAnglo-Americantradi-tion,butimportantworkbythelateElizabethAnscombeandbyherhusbandPeterGeachrevealedtoananalyticalreadershiptheinter-estandpowerofAristotelian-Thomisticideas.Thesameistrueinthefieldoflogic.BothI.M.BochenskiinhisHistoryofFormalLogicandWilliamandMarthaKnealeinTheDevelopmentofLogicnotedtheprejudiceofearlierwritersinassumingthatlittleofinterestwasproducedaftertheStoicspriortothemodernperiod,andtheybegantocorrectthisbyidentifyingareasoflogicandsemanticsinwhichthescholasticshadbeenactive.Astheseworksandthoseofspe-cialistmedievalistslikeMoodycametoberead,andasscholarlyeditionsandtranslationswereproduced,sologiciansstartedtotakeaninterest,includingsomewhowereprominentinphilosophicallogic,suchasArthurPriorandPeterGeach.18ThecurrentsceneInitsorigins,thephenomenological-hermeneutictraditioninmod-ernphilosophyhassignificantrelationswithmedievalphilosophy.19Morerecently,authorswritinginthistraditionorinoneoranotherofitspostmoderntransformationshaveexploredpointsofanalogyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought321betweenthethoughtofAquinasandHeidegger,orAugustineandDerrida,andsoon.20Relatedtotheseexplorations,butmoredirectlymotivatedbytheologicalinterests,istheworkoftheself-styled“radicalorthodoxy”group.21Twopointsareworthnotingincon-nectionwiththecurrentengagementswithpremodernthoughtonthepartof“continental”thinkersandtheradicallyorthodox.First,incontrastwithanalyticalphilosophy,thesemovementsshowlittleinterestinlogicandthestructuralmetaphysicsofsubstances,prop-ertiesandrelations,identity,causality,supervenience,andsoforth.Second,theirattentiontendstobedirectedtowardeitherthepre-andearlymedievaleraorthelatermedievalperiod,ratherthanuponsuch“goldenage”figuresasAquinas,Scotus,andOckham.Thesepointsareconnectedandrelatedtothegeneralandmuchdiscusseddifferencebetweencontemporarycontinentalandanalyticalthoughtasthesearepracticedindependentlyofanyhistoricalinterest.Theexplanation,Ibelieve,isthatthereisaparallelbetweenthe“scientific”characterofanalyticalphilosophyandthescholas-ticAristotelianismofthelikesofAquinas;andanotherandquitedifferentparallelbetweenthe“literary”natureofcontemporaryhermeneuticalinquiryandtheexperiential,imaginativewritingsofAugustine,Eckhart,andRenaissanceNeoplatonists.Moreover,thefeltdissatisfactionofmanywiththedominationofanalyticalphilos-ophybyhighlytechnicaldiscussionscloselyparallelsthecomplaintsofRenaissancewritersaboutthe“logic-chopping”and“sophisticalentanglements”ofthescholastics.Itwillbeinterestingtoobserve,therefore,whetherincomingdecadesanalyticalphilosophywillbeeclipsedaswasitsmedievalcounterpartbyaquitedifferentsetofinterestsandmodesofthought.Beyondthedevelopmentofpost-phenomenologicalapproaches,therearethreeothersignificantformsofcontemporaryengagementthatareoftencombinedtoagreaterorlesserdegree.First,thereisthatmotivatedprincipallybyadesiretounderstandthemedievalthinkers,justasonemightfiguresandideasfromotherperiodsofthehistoryofphilosophy.Second,thereisthatwhichseekstoex-ploreparallelsbetweenmedievalandcontemporarytheoriesinthefieldsoflogic,language,andthesciences(“naturalphilosophy”inmedievalparlance)inthehopeofilluminatingbothsidesofthecom-parison.Third,thereisthatconcernedtocarryonphilosophizinginthegeneraltraditionofthescholastics,buttodosoaidedbythetechniquesandinsightsofcontemporaryanalyticthought.LetmeCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n322p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldanetermthesethreethe“historical,”the“comparative,”andthe“prac-ticing”approaches,respectively,repeatingthepointthattheseareoftencombined,andaddingthattheyareinanycasebroadtenden-ciesratherthanself-containedapproaches.22Sofarasthehistoricalisconcerned,thisispracticedbyscholarsofquitedifferentbackgroundsandinterests,someofwhomfocusonindividuals,othersonperiods,othersonbroadareassuchasmeta-physicsorethics,andothersonnarrowerfieldsexploringthewaystheseweretreatedbydifferentwritersorindifferentstylesofwork,suchascommentaries,occasionalquestions,andextendedsystem-aticpresentations.Itisparticularlyimportantforthisapproachtohavereliablecriticaleditionsoftextsandpreciseyetinformativetranslationssupportedbycriticalapparatusthatcomplicateswherecomplicationisnecessarybutdoesnotpreventaviewofthewoodsaswellasofthetrees.Someofthesetextsareproducedinthecontextofschemesinvolvingpublicationoftheentiretyofamedievalfig-ure’swork–completeeditionsofAlberttheGreat,Aquinas,HenryofGhent,Scotus,andOckhamarecurrentlyinprocess,aswellasthefirstEnglishtranslationofallofAugustine–but,increasingly,independenteditionsandtranslationsareappearingreflectingtheinterestsofindividualscholarsinsuchdiversefiguresasAbelard,Bradwardine,Grosseteste,RufusofCornwall,andRobertHolkot.AfeatureofthistrendisthatitisleadingtoagreaterstudyoffiguresandperiodsbothearlierandlaterthanAquinas,Scotus,andOckham,whoseworkhaslongdominatedthestudyofmedievalphilosophy.Apartfromitsintrinsicvalue,thisscholarshipgreatlyassistspur-suantsofthesecondapproach,forinordertoexploreparallelsbe-tweenmedievalandcontemporarythoughtoneneedstohaveagoodideaofwhatexactlytheformerinvolves.Attimesinthepast,com-parativeworkrestedonsuperficialreadingsofmedievalfiguresandsweepinggeneralizationsaboutwhat“themedievals”thoughtoraboutthecharacteroftheirwork.Asthesereadingshavebeencor-rectedbyhistoricalandtextualscholars,sothetaskofcomparingandcontrastinghasbecomemoreprecisewithhithertounnotedfeaturesbecomingmoreprominent.Examplesofthisincludetheincreasedappreciationofthecomplexitiesintheunderstandingofmind,causality,andexistenceinsomeonesuchasAquinas,23andthevarietiesanddegreesofmodalityidentifiedbyscholasticwriters.24CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought323Arichareaofcomparativestudyisthebroadfieldoflogicandlanguage.Fromthe1970sonwardstherehasbeenasteadyflowofpublications,somemonographsbutmanysingleandmultiauthoredcollections,coveringsuchtopicsastruth,entailment,paradoxes,sophisms,reference,modality,andvariousappliedandnonstandardlogicssuchasdeontic,epistemic,temporal,andrelevancelogic.25Intandemwiththis,authorssuchasE.J.AshworthandGabrielNuchelmanshaveproducedinvaluableworkonthephilosophyoflanguageinthemedievalandlaterscholasticperiods.26Anotherfruitfulfieldofcomparativeresearch,whichalsoleadsintothethirdcategory,theactualpracticeofphilosophyincon-tinuitywithmedievalthinkers,isphilosophicaltheology.Afteralongperiodoftryingtoaccommodatereligiousideastothedomi-nantstylesofEnglishlinguisticanalysisbeforeandaftertheSecondWorldWar,speculativethinkersinterestedintraditionalChristiandogmasbegantowonderwhetherthelimitationslaylesswiththe-ologicalthoughtperse,thanwiththeempiricistassumptionsofprevailingphilosophicalorthodoxies.ThusthinkerssuchasAlvinPlantingaandRichardSwinburnebegantoexplorealternativepos-sibilitiesatjustthesametimeasotheranalyticalphilosopherssuchasSaulKripkeandHilaryPutnamwererediscoveringtraditionalmetaphysics,andyetothers,suchasAnthonyKennyandNormanKretzmann,whosetrainingequippedthemtostudythemedievalsbutwhowerealsowellversedinanalyticalthought,sawthepos-sibilitiesofdrawingthesesourcestogether.Sodevelopedabroadmovement,oneexpressionofwhichwastheSocietyofChristianPhilosophers,whosejournalFaithandPhilosophyhasprovidedaforumforinquiriesthatareaslikelytodrawonAquinasorScotusasuponWilliamAlstonorSwinburne.AsIindicatedearlier,NormanKretzmann’sstudentsatCornellhavetypicallyengagedwithmedievalphilosophyonitsmeritsandthusqualifyaspractitionersinmysenseoftheterm.IhaveinmindhereespeciallyMarilynMcCordAdamsandEleonoreStump.Kretz-mannlaidoutaprogramof“faithseekingunderstanding”formodernphilosophicaltheologyinanessayusingAugustineasthepointofdeparture.27TowardtheendofhislifehepursuedthisprogramincriticaldialoguewithAquinas,28afocuslargelysharedbyStump,29whileAdams,nowaprofessoroftheology,findsinsightsinthinkersasdiverseasAnselmandOckham.30CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n324p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldanePractitionerscomingtoengagementwithmedievalthoughtfromotherdirectionsincludeAlasdairMacIntyreandJohnFinnis.MacIntyre’sAfterVirtuewasthefirstofaseriesofbooksinwhichhehasdevelopedacritiqueofmodernethicalthought,andinpro-vidinganalternativehehasdrawnevermoredeeplyuponAquinas(moreprecisely,onAugustineascorrectedbyAquinas).31Finnis,firstworkinginthecontextofEnglishanalyticaljurisprudence,hascometopresentAquinasasasourceofimportantideasaboutlawandsocialmorality,andthisisbeginningtofindapplicationincon-temporaryissues,bothinhisownworkandinthatofhisformerstudentRobertGeorge.32Asinotherareas,historicalandcomparativestudiesofmedievalthinkersaresettoenrichpresentphilosophicalpractice.Quitehowandhowfarthisenrichmentmayoccurdependsinlargepartonthereceptivityofphilosopherswhohavenoantecedentinterestinme-dievalphilosophy,aswellasonthosewhopracticeincontemporaryvariantsofmedievaltraditions,suchas“analyticalThomists.”33Astrikingfeatureofcurrentengagementswithmedievalphiloso-phyishowtheydiffer,notsomuchalongthedimensionmarkedout“historical,”“comparative,”and“practicing,”asalongthatmarked“analytical”and“radicalhermeneutical.”Certainlytherearediffer-encesinwhateachchoosestofocusuponinmedievalphilosophy,butitishardtoresistthethoughtthatwhatisnowcalledforisaphaseofsynthesisanalogoustothatachievedbythemedievalsthemselves.Isuggestthatthismightbestbeachievedbyconsider-ingthewaysinwhichtheycombinedmoreeffectivelythanlaterthinkers,ourowngenerationincluded,thescientificandsapientialdimensionsofphilosophy.Bethatasitmay,whatiscertainisthatmedievalthoughtisnowasmuchapartofthehistoryofphilosophyasisthatofancientGreeceandRome.Thisalonerepresentsamajorandwelcomeadvanceandonewhichisnowsetfairtobecarriedfurtherforward.notesThefirstpartofthischapter,ontheRenaissanceandSeventeenthCentury,isbyP.J.Fitzpatrick.Thesecondpart,onCurrentEngagements,isbyJohnHaldane.1.IciteCajetan’scommentarybybookandparagraphintheeditionofG.PicardandG.Pelland[592].ReferencestoLaurentaretohisintro-ductiontoI.Coquelle’searliereditionofthefirsttwobooks[593].InCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought325[605]E.Gilson,developingandextendingwhatLaurentwrote,givesaluminoussurveyofthecontroversiesinItalyatthattimeconcerningtheimmortalityofthesoul.IciteAquinas’scommentaryontheDeanimabylectio(lesson)andparagraph[225].2.Spina’sindignationcanbeseenfromthepassagesgivenbyE.Gilson[605].3.MatterswouldnothavebeenhelpedbyremarksandinterjectionsinCajetan’stext.NearthestartofBookIII,heremindsthereaderthatAristotlehasnotjustifiedtheanalogyhedrawsbetweenintellectandsensation;addingthataproofwillbeofferedlaterinthebook–“andwhenyouexamineityouwillseehowgreatisourignorance”([592]7).ThecircumventionofAristotle’sdemandfordependenceonphantas-mataisfollowedbytheinsistencethatAristotlebelievedthedepen-dencetobeunqualified([592]111).The“Neoplatonic”proofissaidtobetheonlywayofsafeguardingthestatusofthesoulasaformandsospiritualandimmortal–“althoughsomeobscuritiesmayremain”([592]122–23).Andobjectionstothepositionadoptedareanswered“forthecomfortofnovices,lesttheybedeceived”([592]124).PeoplelikeSpina–andtheLateranCouncil,presumably–wantedsomethingmorethanthat.4.SomehaveseenhereananticipationofLeibniz’s“preestablishedhar-mony”(E.Kessler[609]516).LeibnizissaidtohavereadSuarez’s´Dis-putationesmetaphysicaelikeanovel(E.J.Aiton[591]13).AsurveyofreferencesbyhimtoSuarezisinA.Robinet[´615],buttherefer-encesgiventhereinthecontextofpreestablishedharmonyallrefertoprayerandgrace,nottotheintellectandimaginatio.TheDisputationesmetaphysicaehadalonglifeasatextbookinmanyuniversities,andSchopenhauer–nottheeasiestpersontoplease–commendsit(ParergaandParalipomenaI,SketchofaHistoryoftheIdealandtheReal,§6).5.CajetanatoneplaceinhiscommentaryontheDeanimaalsoseemstoprescindfromdetailsintheanalogywithlight([592]78).Butthatdoesnotinhibithissubsequentspeculations([592]80–81).6.CasimirofToulouse,Atomiperipateticae[598]II55.7.Ihavechosenthreeauthorstodefendthescholastictradition,andthreetoexpressdifficultiesraisedbysomeinsidethatsametradition.ThosefavoringitareA.Goudin(d.1695),aDominican[606];I.Pardies(d.1683),aJesuit[614];andJ.B.DelaGrange,amemberoftheOratory[600].ThereservationsareexpressedbyJ.B.DuHamel(d.1706),chancellorofthedioceseofBayeux,whoseprofessedeclecticismisweightedagainstthescholastics[602];A.LeGrand(d.c.1700),aFranciscanmissionerinEngland[610];andValerianoMagni(d.1661),apicaresqueCapuchinreferredtoinPascal’sProvincialLetters[620].Editionsoftheseauthorsvary,andpaginationcanbeerratic.ButtheirsuccessivesubdivisionsCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n326p.j.fitzpatrickandjohnhaldaneareclear,andIhavegivenreferencesbythese.ThereisausefullistofauthorsinCasimir[598]preface.Thereisaverygoodrecenttreatmentofthetopic–moresympatheticthanmine–inD.DesChene[599].8.ThemathematicalandmechanicalskillsofPardies,theCartesiantoneofotherwritingsofhis(and,Ishouldwanttoadd,theelegantsnobberyofwhathewritesaboutkeys)havemadesomedoubttheseri-ousnessofhisattack,whichfirstappearedanonymously.Butitseems(fromtheNouvellebibliographiegen´erale´)thatheonlyprepareditforpublication,andwasnottheauthor.9.Therewere,ofcourse,changesinsomeoftheinstitutionsclaimingtocontinuethetraditionofmedievalphilosophy,andtheinfluenceofWolffshoweditself.J.E.Gurr[607]hasexploredthistopicandprovidesmuchinformationandguidance.10.BriefdetailsinP.J.FitzPatrick[603].11.Theneoscholasticismofthelateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcen-turiesisasignificantexception,onwhichseeP.J.FitzPatrickinCHLMP838–52.Themajorsourcesforcurrentengagementswithmedievalphi-losophydonotlieinthismovement,however.12.FortextofAeternipatris,seeV.B.Brezik[623]173–97,quotedpassagep.187.SeealsoJ.Haldane,“Thomism,”inTheRoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.13.ThefirsteditionofdeWulf’sHistoireappearedin1905.AtranslationofthesixthFrencheditionwaspublishedin1952.14.See,forexample,J.Maritain[633].15.ForE.Gilson,besides[9],[68],and[218],see[403]andnote27below.16.TherehasbeenacontinuousawarenessamongJewishphilosophersoftheimportanceoftheirmedievalpredecessors.Seechapter5inthisvolumefortherangeofreactions,andseeO.LeamanandD.Frank[12].17.ThemodernstudyofmedievalIslamicthoughtisamorerecentandspecializedfieldthanthestudyofLatinmedievaltraditions.SeeT.-A.Druart[626]andchapter4inthisvolume,andS.H.NasrandO.Leaman[11].18.See,especially,P.T.Geach[627].19.SeveralofthefoundersofthistraditionwerefamiliarwithscholasticismandwereorhadbeenCatholics.FranzBrentanoandAntonMartyhadbeenpriests.MartinHeideggerbeganataJesuitnovitiatebutquicklywithdrewfromit.20.SeeJ.Caputo[625]onHeideggerandAquinas;G.Schufreider[144]ineffectonAnselmandHeidegger;P.Rosemann[636]onFoucault;and,moregenerally,M.S.Brownleeetal.[624].21.SeeJ.MilbankandC.Pickstock[634].22.Foradifferentandfiner-grainedtaxonomyseeJ.Marenbon[465].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nMedievalphilosophyinlaterthought32723.See,forexample,A.Kenny[631]andJ.F.Wippel[262].24.SeeS.Knuttilla[464].25.SeeS.Read[47],P.V.Spade[475],andM.Yrjonsuuri[¨51].26.Seechapter3inthisvolumeandG.Nuchelmans[468].27.SeeN.Kretzmann[71].ForGilson’searlierpromotionoftheideaofaChristianphilosophy,seeE.GilsoninA.Pegis[635]177–91andE.Gilson[628–29].SeeF.vanSteenberghen[637]forcriticismofGilson’sproject.28.SeeN.Kretzmann[245–46].29.See,forexample,S.MacDonaldandE.Stump[251]andE.Stump[259].30.BesidesM.M.Adams[318]seeM.M.Adams[142]andher“ScotusandOckhamontheConnectionoftheVirtues”inL.Honnefelderetal.,eds.,JohnDunsScotus:MetaphysicsandEthics(Leiden,1996),pp.499–522.31.SeeA.MacIntyre[632].32.SeeJ.Finnis[240].33.SeeJ.Haldane[630].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nthomaswilliams14TransmissionandtranslationAsIwritethesewords,Icanseeonmyshelvesanattractivelyboundsetofsixteenvolumes,eachbearingonitsspinethewords“J.DunsScotusOperaOmnia.”OnewouldbetemptedtoassumethattheseareTheCompleteWorksofJohnDunsScotus.Unfortunately,inmedievalphilosophythingsarerarelysosimple.SomeoftheworksincludedinthissetarenotbyScotusatall,butwereonceattributedtohim.SomeofScotus’sgenuineworks,includinghisearlyLecturaontheSentencesofPeterLombard,arenotincluded.AndwhatthissetpresentsasBookIofScotus’slate(andveryimportant)ReportatioisactuallynottheReportatioatall,butanotherworkwhoseauthen-ticityandauthorityarevigorouslydisputed.Andtherearefurtherproblems.Theattractivemodernbindingbeliestheageoftheeditionitself.Openupanyofthebooks,andwhatyouwillseeisaphotographicreprintofaneditionfirstpublishedin1639.Thatedition(knownastheWaddingedition,afteritseditor)isnotacriticaledition,madebyweighingallthemanuscriptevidenceaccordingtoestablishedprinciplesoftextualscholarshipinordertodetermine,withasmuchprecisionandcertaintyaspossible,exactlywhatScotussaidorwrote.Inmanycasestheeditorsimplylookedattheoneortwomanuscriptshehadhandyandtranscribedwhathefoundthere,sometimeswithoutmuchattentiontowhethertheresultingtextevenmadegoodsense.Sadly,formuchofScotus’sworkthisfaultyeditionisthebestonewehave.Soonehastouseit:butonehastouseitwithgreatcare.ThepitfallsoftheWaddingeditionillustrateageneralfeatureofthestudyofmedievalphilosophy:thegapthatseparatestheauthen-ticwordsofthemedievalthinkeronewishestostudyfromtheLatin328CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation329wordsoneseesonthepagesofaprintededition–andfurtherstillfromtheEnglishwordsoneseesinatranslation.Theaimofthischapteristomakeclearboththenatureandthesizeofthatgap,notinordertodismayprospectivestudentsofmedievalphilosophy,butinordertoexplainthehazardsinsuchawaythatstudentscanequipthemselvesproperlytomeetthem.Iwillbeginbydiscussinginageneralwaythechannelsoftransmissionbywhichmedievalphilos-ophyhasmadeitswaydowntous.IthenturntothreespecificcasesbywhichIillustratesomeofthosegeneralpointsastheyapplytotextsofdifferentsortsandfromdifferentperiods.AlongthewayIdrawattentiontothekindsoferrorsthatareliabletobeintroducedatthevariousstagesoftransmissionbetweenamedievallecturer’sspokenwordsandthetextofamoderncriticaledition,andIoutlinethetoolsandtechniquesthatthecarefulhistorianofmedievalphi-losophywilluseinordertominimizesucherrors,especiallywherenocriticaleditionisavailable.InthesecondhalfofthechapterIturntoproblemsoftranslation.IprovideanexamplethatshowshowareadercansometimesdetecterrorsinatranslationevenwithoutcheckingtheLatintext,andan-othertoillustratehowtranslationssometimesreflectcontroversialviewsabouthowatextistobeinterpreted.Ithenconcludewithalookatthetranslationofparticularterms,discussinganumberofstandardtranslationsthatareapttobemisleadingandgivingsomeideaoftherangeoftranslationofcertainkeyterms.channelsoftransmissionIntheidealcasewewouldhaveacarefullyconstructedandeasilylegibleautograph(thatis,atextintheauthor’sownhandwriting).Suchidealcasesareexceedinglyrare.Eveninthefewinstancesinwhichwedohaveautographs,thetextcanposeproblems.Anauthorcanbecarelessaboutcheckinghiswork,orhishandwritingcanbedreadful.Aquinas,forexample,isnotoriousforabsent-mindedlyset-tingdownwrongwordsorphrases,andhishandwritingissodifficulttoreadthatonlyahandfulofspecialistscandecipherit.1Indefaultofautographs(whetherreliableandlegibleornot),wemustrelyontextsthatareconveyedtousbysomenumberofin-termediaries.Theserangefrom(atoneextreme)copiesthatwereCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n330thomaswilliamsauthenticatedbytheauthorhimselfto(attheother)distantdescen-dantsoflecturenotesfirstrecordedbyascribewhomaynotevenhavecompletelyfollowedthediscussionhewasrecording.Partic-ularlyinthedayswhenphilosophywaslargelycarriedonorally,throughlecturesandformalpublicdisputations,2thenumberofin-termediariesbetweenanauthorandourtext,andhencetheocca-sionsonwhicherrorsandcorruptionscouldbeintroduced,mightbeworrisomelygreat.3Forexample,anygivenlecture(orseriesoflectures)mightexistintwoversionsfromtheverybeginning:onedictatedbythemas-terhimselfandanothertakendownbythestudentswhoattended.AstatuteoftheUniversityofParisdatedDecember10,1355re-quiresthatmastersofphilosophy“uttertheirwordsrapidlysothatthemindofthehearercantaketheminbutthehandcannotkeepupwiththem,”thattheyinfactspeak“asifnooneweretakingnotesbeforethem.”4Wherethiswasthepractice,studentreports,calledreportationes,wereespeciallylikelytocontainomis-sions,mistranscriptions,andmisunderstandings.Otherstudentscouldmakecopiesofsuchreportationes,therebyincreasingthenumberofcompetingversionsofoneandthesamelectureordis-putation.Disputationswereespeciallylikelytogeneratediscrepantreportationes,sincenotonlyweretheymorecomplex(andlessorderly)thanlectures,buttheycouldalsobereportedeitherwithorwithoutthemaster’sdeterminationofthequestion.Amasterwhowishedtoestablishamoredefinitiveversionofhistext,anordinatio,wouldreviseandpolisheitherhisownnotesorastudentreportatioandpresentittotheuniversity’sofficialbook-sellers,orstationarii,fordistribution.(Whenhistoriansspeakof“publishing”aworkofscholasticphilosophy,itisthisofficialsub-missiontothestationariithattheyhaveinmind.)Inmakinganordinatiothemastermightreformulatecertainargumentsoraddnewmaterial.Someerrorsintheoriginaltextmightbecorrected,butnewonescouldeasilybeintroduced,especiallyifsubstantivere-visionswerenotcarriedoutconsistentlythroughoutthetext.Oftenseveralyearspassedbetweentheoriginallecturesandtheordinatio;amastermightchoosetoupdatehisworktoaccommodatedevelop-mentsinhisviewsinthemeantime,buthemightinsteadtreattheearlierlecturesashavingaliteraryintegrityoftheirownandrefrainfromsubstantialrevisions.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation331Theordinatiowouldthencirculate,notasawhole,butinunitscalledpeciae,unboundsetsof(usually)sixteenpageseach.AsJanPinborgexplains:Sincethestationariusnormallyhasatleasttwosetsofpeciaeofagiventext,moreorlessidentical,andsincethepeciaearehiredonebyone,anycopyistmaybecombiningpeciaefromtwodifferentsourcesintohiscopy,thusmakingdifferentpartsofhistextofdifferentcriticalvalue.Moreover,thepeciainitselfisnotastableentity;itwillsufferwearandtear,sothatwordsorevenwholesentencesmayhavebecomedifficulttoread,correctionsandmarginalremarks(oftentotallyirrelevanttothetext)mayhavebeenaddedbylessconscientiousborrowers,etc....Weevenhaveindicationsthatsometextswerechangedsoastooffermoreacceptabledoctrines.5Furthererrorsandchangescouldeasilybeintroducedbycopyistswhowerenotphilosophicallysophisticatedenoughtounderstandthetextwell,otherswhowerebeingpaidpieceworkfortheircopyingandhadthereforeagreaterincentiveforspeedthanforaccuracy,andstillotherswhowerenotinterestedinthetextforitsownsakebutmerelywantedtomakecopiesofthebitstheyfounduseful.Somecopyistssimplybecametired.AndAnnelieseMaierquotesadisgruntledcopyistwhorefusedtocopy“awholepageoftotallyuselessmaterial”fromWalterBurley.6Error-pronethoughtheyundoubtedlyare,thesemanuscriptsareinsomecasesouronlysourcesforatext,andinotherstheyareanindis-pensableresourceforcorrectingnoncriticaleditions.Apresent-dayuserofmanuscriptsneedsthespecializedskillstaughtunderthreegeneralheadings:paleography,textediting,andcodicology.Paleog-raphyissimplythestudyofwriting.Oneneedssomeacquaintancewiththevarietyofhandwritingtobefoundinmanuscripts,butwhatisespeciallyimportantisfamiliaritywiththecomplexsystemofab-breviationsthatscribesemployedinordertosavetimeandecono-mizeonwritingmaterials(seefigure1).Fortunately,amodestcom-petenceinthisfield–enoughtobeofgreathelptoamedievalistinphilosophywhodoesnotwishtobeprimarilyatextualist–issurprisinglyeasytoacquire.Onecangetagoodstartbytakingaone-semestercourseinmedievalpaleographyorevenbyworkingthroughapaleographicalmanualonone’sown.7Codicology,strictlyspeaking,issimplythestudyofcodices(manuscriptbooks).ItsvalueforhistoriansofmedievalphilosophyisthatitcansometimeshelpCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n332thomaswilliamsFigure1TextofapassagefromScotus.Vienna,OsterreichischeNational-¨bibliothek,cod.1453,fol.122va,lines22–29,usedwithpermission.Transcription,translation,andcommentarybelow.omniscon[diti]oquaese[quit]urna[tura]m,ut[a]eq[u]alitasethuiusmodi.¶Ada[liu]d|d[ic]oquod“q[u]icquidrectarationet[ib]imeliusoccurrerit,hocsciasDe|umfecisse”:ver[u]mestquodnihilestmeliussimpl[icite]rrectaratione|quaminquantumvolitumaD[e]o.Etideoa[li]aquae,sifierent,essent|meliora,nonsuntmodomelioraentibus.Undeauc[tori]tas|nihilplusvultdicerenisi“q[u]icquidDeusfecit,hocsciascumrectarationefe-cisse;omniaenimquaecumquevoluitfecit,”in|Ps[alm]o–cuiusvo[lun]tassitbenedicta.[Translation]everyfeaturethatfollowsfromthenature,forexample,equal-ityandsuchlike.¶Totheother[argument]Isaythat“whateverbetterthingoccurstoyoubyrightreason,knowthatGodhasmadeit”:thetruthisthatnothingisunqualifiedlybetteraccordingtorightreasonexceptinsofarasitiswilledbyGod.Andsothoseotherthingsthat,iftheyweremade,wouldbebetter,arenotinfactbetterthanexistingthings.Hence,theauthori-tativepassagemeansnothingmorethanthis:“WhateverGodmade,youmustknowthathemadeitwithrightreason;forallthingswhateverthathewilled,hemade,”[asiswritten]inthePsalm–blessedbehiswill.ManuscriptdatesfromthefourteenthcenturyandiswritteninanEnglishsemicursivehand.Theheavilyabbreviatedstyleischaracteristicofthepe-riod.Lettersrepresentedinthemanuscriptbystandardsymbolsareunder-linedinthetranscription;lettersleftoutofwordsaltogetherareenclosedwithinsquarebrackets.Thus,inthefirstlineofthemanuscript,“ois”withalineoveritistranscribedas“omnis,”sinceahorizontallineisareg-ularsignthatan“m”or“n”hasbeenomitted.ThenextcombinationisCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation333transcribedas“con[diti]o,”sincethefirstfigureisastandardsymbolfor“con”or“cum,”thefinal“o”iswrittenoutabovetheline,andthemiddlelettersaresimplydropped.Linebreaksareindicatedwithaslash.Usingtheseconventions,apatientreaderwillbeabletopiecetogetherhowonegetsfromthecharactersinthemanuscripttothetranscription.Ascanbeseen,thepunctuationinthetranscriptionislargelyeditorial.ThetextisfromtherepliestotheobjectionsattheendofJohnDunsScotus’sReportatioexaminatad.44,q.2.Foradiscussionofthesignificanceofthesecondreply,seeWilliams[300]195–98.inretracingtheprocessoftransmission.Texteditingisthestudyoftheprinciplesandtechniquesbywhichwedeterminethereliabilityandrelativepriorityofparticularmanuscripts,identifyfamiliesofrelatedmanuscripts,and(ideally)reversetheincrementalchangesintroducedbysuccessivecopyistssoastoproduceatextascloseaspossibletotheoriginal.8Thenextstepintheprocessbywhichmedievalphilosophicaltextshavebeentransmittedtothepresentdayistheearlyprintededition.Aswillbecomeclearinthecasestudiesbelow,theseearlyeditionsarenotespeciallyscholarly.Nonetheless,theyareouronlyprintedsourceforsomemedievaltexts,andincaseswherethemanuscriptsfromwhichtheywerederivedarenolongerextant,theyprovideanindependentwitnesstothetextthatcanbetakenintoac-countinacriticalreconstruction.Moderncriticaleditionsarethefinalstep.Moderneditorstakeintoaccountallthemanuscriptev-idence(andthatofearlyeditionswherethesegiveanindependentwitness),formhypothesesaboutthedevelopmentofthemanuscripttraditionandtherelativecriticalweightofvariousmanuscripts,andreconstructtheoriginaltextaccordingtoestablishedprinciplesoftextualscholarship.Butitisimportanttorealizethatevencriticaleditionsarenotinfallible.Someeditorialdecisions,forexample,de-penduponaneditor’sjudgmentaboutwhichreadinggivesthebestphilosophicalsenseincontext;andthatjudgmentmaybedisputableonphilosophicalgrounds.Fortunately,criticaleditionsprovideanapparatusofvariantreadings,sothatskepticalreadershaveattheirdisposaltheinformationtheyneedwhenapassageseemssuspect.Moreover,thepunctuationofatext–includingsentenceandpara-graphdivisions–isalmostwhollyeditorial,sincethemanuscriptsgenerallyemploywhatmightbecalledtherandom-dotmethodofCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n334thomaswilliamspunctuation,whichisofalmostnovalueasaguidetothesenseofthetext.Nowitisnotuncommontofindmisleadingoroutrightmistakenpunctuationevenincriticaleditions,andsuchmistakescandrasticallyalterthesenseofapassage.Thebestadviceissimplytoignoreeditorialpunctuationaltogether.threecasestudiesOnecangetabettersenseofthevariedfatesofmedievalphilo-sophicaltextsbyexaminingtheworksofspecificthinkers.HereIofferthreecasestudies,briefnarrativesofthechannelsbywhichtheworksofAnselmofCanterbury(1033–1109),JohnDunsScotus(1265/6–1308),andRobertHolcot(d.1349)havecomedowntous.Thecasestudieshavetwoaims.First,theyaremeanttogivethereaderageneralideaaboutwhattowatchoutforwhenstudyingmedievalphilosophy.Thegenerallessonisthatitishighlyadvis-able,beforeundertakingseriousworkonamedievalphilosopher,toacquaintoneselfwiththestateofthemanuscriptsandeditionsofhiswork.Morespecificcautionswill,Itrust,becomeevidentalongtheway.Second,thecasestudiesarealsomeanttoshowhowmuchtextualandeditorialworkisyettobedoneinmedievalphilosophy.Sinceitseemsimpossibletomakeanyinformativegeneralstate-mentsabouthowmuchinterestingworkremainstobedonealongtheselines,Ihavechosenthreethinkersforwhoseworkswehavetextsofquitedifferentlevelsofreliability.Anselm9ManyofthecomplexitiesintheprocessoftransmissionfortunatelydonotapplytoAnselm’sworks,sincetheybeganlifeaswrittenworksandnotaslectures.Moreover,wehaveatleastonemanuscript(Bodleian271)whosescribewecanidentifywithreasonablecertaintyasamonkofCanterburyCathedralknowntohavebeenincorrespon-dencewithAnselmhimselfaboutthecorrectreadingofapassageinDeconceptuvirginali.10Anselmhimselfseemstohavebeenes-peciallyconscientiousaboutrevisingandperfectinghisworksbe-foreallowingthemtobecopied,althoughhedoescomplaininoneplacethat“certainover-hastypersons”havecopiedhisdialoguesinthewrongorder,11andhedoessometimesgobackandmakeminorCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation335revisionsandimprovements.Forexample,theProslogionoriginallyhadadifferenttitleandnochapterdivisions.Inthisconnectionitisworthnotingthatchapterheadingsinmedievaltextsareoftenaddi-tionsbylaterscribes,apointoccasionallylostoninterpreterswhoseektomakeexegeticalhayoutofsuchinauthentictexts.Thechap-tertitlesinAnselm’sworks,however,originatedwiththeauthorhimself.Itistheirplacementinmoderneditionsandtranslationsthatisinauthentic:Anselmputthewholelistofchaptertitlesatthebeginningofaworkanddidnotrepeatthemwithinthetextitself.12TheearlyprintededitionsofAnselmareofalmostnocriticalvalue.Thefirstsuchedition,publishedinNuremburgin1491,waseditedbyanotherwiseobscurescholarnamedPetrusDanhauser.F.S.Schmittcomments:Itisnotknownwhichmanuscriptormanuscriptsheusedasthebasisfortheedition.Tojudgefromthewaytheeditionturnedout,bothonthewholeandindetails,theymusthavebeenexclusivelylatemanuscriptsthatwereeasilyaccessible.Moreover,wecannotescapetheimpressionthateverynowandthentheyounghumanistlaidanimprovinghandonthetextthathadcomedowntohim.13Sincemostlatereditionsfollowedhistextmoreorlessuncritically,theyareequallyunreliable.Indeed,someeditionsactuallymademat-tersworsebyaddingtothenumberofinauthenticworksDanhauserhadincludedunderAnselm’sname.NotuntiltheeditionofGabrielGerberonin1675dowefindanattempttocorrectthereceivedtextonthebasisofalargenumberofmanuscripts,alongwithsomethingapproachinganapparatusofvariantreadings;buteventhen,theold-estandbestmanuscriptswerenotused.ThecriticaleditionofF.S.Schmitt,publishedin1968,wasthereforeinessenceawhollynewundertaking.Schmitt’seditionisunusualinthatitcontainsalltheauthenticcompletedworksofamedievalphilosopheraseditedbyasinglehandandpublishedinasingleseries,14makingthepresentstateofAnselm’stextsenviablyunproblematic.OnlyrarelyhaveIfoundreasontoquestionSchmitt’seditorialdecisionsaboutwhichofanumberofvariantreadingstoaccept;eventheparagraphingshowsgreatsensitivitytoAnselm’stext.SothestudentofAnselm’sworkscan,toaremarkabledegree,simplyassumethereliabilityoftheLatintext.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n336thomaswilliamsJohnDunsScotusAsIhavealreadysuggestedinmyintroduction,Scotus’sworkshavecomedowntousinaparticularlyconfusingstate.Eventhebriefestattempttotellthestoryofallhisworkswouldrequirefartoomuchspace,15sohereIwillillustratethedifficultiesbydiscussingSco-tus’sOrdinatio,therevisionofthelectureshegaveasabacheloratOxfordinthelate1290s.Thebasisfortherevisionwashisoriginallecturenotes,theLectura.Wecanclearlydiscernatleasttwolayersofrevision.Theinitialrevisionwasbeguninthesummerof1300andleftincompletewhenScotusdepartedforParisin1302;itprobablydidnotgetmuchpastBookII.FurtherrevisionsweremadeinParis;weknowthatScotuswasstilldictatingquestionsforBookIVaslateas1304,aswellasupdatingthepartshehadalreadyrevisedwhilestillatOxford.TheseupdateswereusuallyintheformofmarginaladditionsorinterpolatedtextsthatreflectedwhatScotustaughtinParis.Ourpictureofthenatureandextentofthesecondlayerofre-visionsis,however,stillmurky,inpartbecausetheVaticaneditionoftheOrdinatiohasreachedonlytotheendofBookII,andnocriti-caleditionoftheParisReportatioisavailableatall.16MuchfurtherstudyisneededinordertounderstandjusthowmuchtheOrdinatiorepresentstheviewsScotusheldatOxfordandhowmuchherevisedittoreflectdevelopmentsinhisviewsinParis.Atpresent,however,themostplausibleviewwouldseemtobethatofAllanB.Wolter,whowrotethatitisaseriousandinexcusablemistakeforscholarswritingonScotustodaytoregardhisOrdinatioasaseamlessgarmentratherthanaworkbeguninOxfordandleftunfinishedwhenheleftParisforCologne.ItisparticularlyunwisetoconsiderthebasictextoftheelevenvolumesoftheVaticaneditionsofarprintedasnecessarilyrepresentativeofhisfinalviewssimplybecausepartswereupdatedwithaviewtowhathetaughtlaterinParis.17AndWolterarguespersuasivelythatBookIoftheOrdinatio“issimplyamorematureexpressionofhisearlyviews,andneedstobesupplementedbythelaterpositionsheheldwhichcanbefoundinthereportsofhislecturesatCambridgeandParis”18–reportsthatforthemostparthaveneverbeenedited.19Thepaleographicalskillsneededtoreadthemanuscriptsofthesereportationes,aswellasCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation337thoseofthepartsoftheOrdinatiothathavenotyetbeencriticallyedited,arethereforehighlydesirableforaseriousstudentofScotus.TheVaticaneditorshavealreadydeterminedwhichmanuscriptsoftheOrdinatioaremostreliable,butmodestskillsintexteditingareneededinordertoweighthemeritsofvariantreadingsinthosemanuscriptsandinthefewavailablemanuscriptsoftheReporta-tiones.20RobertHolcotTheOxfordDominicanRobertHolcotisoneofthemanyimpor-tantmedievalphilosopherswhohavebeenseriouslyunderappreci-atedandunderstudied.AlthoughmoderninterestinHolcothasbeensomewhatsporadic,hisinfluenceinthelateMiddleAgeswasgreat,asisevidencedbythegreatnumberoffourteenth-andfifteenth-centurymanuscriptsofhiswork.21Thereareforty-eightmanuscriptsofhisquestionsontheSentences(comparethistothethirty-sixmanuscriptsofOckham’sSentencescommentary)andanastonish-ing175manuscriptsofhiscommentaryonthebookofWisdom,aworkthatinfluencedChaucer’s“Nun’sPriest’sTale.”22Hemadeimportantcontributionstosemantics,thedebateoverGod’sknowl-edgeoffuturecontingents,discussionsofpredestination,grace,andmerit,andphilosophicaltheologymoregenerally.HereIwilldiscussonlythefateofhisquestionsontheSentences.KatherineTachaucommentsthat“forHolcot’sSentencesques-tions...theevidenceisstrongthatthepeciasystemwasthebasisfortheirdissemination.”23Manymanuscriptsbearthetracesofthissystem,asinascribe’s“crowdingthemarginswithtextforwhichhehadnotleftsufficientroomwhencopyingpeciaeoutoforder,astheybecameavailable.”24Insomecasessubstantialportionsofthetextclearlydroppedoutinthecourseoftransmission.Thus,intwoearlymanuscripts,onecounterargumenttoanearlierobjectioninBookII,q.2,breaksoffafterjusttwosentences,andthecoun-terargumentstothenextthreeobjectionsaremissingaltogether.Afterwardscomethecounterargumentstofourmoreobjections.Insomewhatlatermanuscripts,thoselastfourcounterargumentshavealsodroppedout,“almostcertainlybythelossofafoliofromanunboundquire.”25CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n338thomaswilliamsAtextofHolcot’squestionsontheSentenceswasprintedatLyonin1497.InacoverlettertothiseditionJodocusBadiusnotesthatthescholarentrustedwithreviewingthemanuscriptshadfoundthetextinadisorderlystateandthatthemanuscriptsavailabledidnotallowhimtoestablishareliabletext.Unfortunately,thiseditionistheonlyprintedversionoftheSentencesavailabletoday.26NocompletecollationofthemanuscriptsofHolcot’sSentencesquestionshasyetbeenmade,andasfarasIknow,nocriticaleditionisinpreparation.Accordingly,Holcotisanoutstandingexampleofamedievalthinkerwhoseworksofferaripefieldforbothtextualandphilosophicalstudy.translatingmedievalphilosophyWecanthinkofEnglishtranslationsasthelast,andinevitablythemostproblematic,stepinthetransmissionofmedievalphilosophicaltexts.Itis,ofcourse,averynecessarystep,notonlyforthewiderdisseminationofmedievalphilosophytothosewhoareinterestedinthesubjectbutdonotwishtobecomespecialists,butalsofortheformationofspecialists.Forexample,thereisnotellinghowmanypeoplehavebeenbroughttoaseriousstudyofJohnDunsScotusthroughthetranslationsofAllanB.Wolter.Moregenerally,itissurelynoaccidentthatthemostwidelytranslatedmedievalthinkersarealsothemostwidelystudied,fortranslationsencouragestudyandstudiesencouragetranslation.Giventheaimsofthischapter,Iwishtoconcentratehereonmat-tersthatreadersofEnglishtranslationsneedtobeawareofinordertomakethemosteffectiveusepossibleofthosetranslations.IshouldnotefirstofallthatevenamodestamountofLatincanbeveryusefulinworkingwithanEnglishtranslationandLatintextsidebyside,especiallyforthirteenth-andfourteenth-centurytexts,withtheirgenerallysimplesyntaxandlimited,largelytechnicalvocab-ulary.(Onerarelyhastheluxury,socommonwithclassicaltexts,ofworkingwithmultipletranslationsofthesametext,whichcanbeenormouslyhelpful.)Howevergoodatranslationis,certainpas-sageswillbeopentomisunderstandingsthatthetranslatorcouldneverhaveforeseen,andareaderwithabitofLatincanputherselfbackontherighttrackimmediately.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation339Somefaultytranslationscanbedetected,ifperhapsnotalsoreme-died,withoutanyknowledgeofLatinatall.ConsiderthefollowingpassagefromawidelyusedtranslationofAnselm’sProslogion:Manywordsareusedimproperly,as,forexample,whenweuse“tobe”for“nottobe,”and“todo”for“nottodo”orfor“todonothing.”Thusweoftensaytosomeonewhodeniesthatsomethingexists:“Itisasyousayitis,”althoughitwouldseemmuchmorepropertosay,“Itisnotasyousayitisnot.”Again,wesay“Thismanissitting,”justaswesay“Thatmanisdoing[something],”orwesay“Thismanisresting,”justaswesay“Thatmanisdoing[something].”But“tosit”isnottodosomething,and“torest”istodonothing.Thepenultimatesentencehastobemistaken,sinceasthistransla-torhasrenderedit,itdoesnotoffertheexamplethatAnselmhaspromised:thatis,anexampleof“todo”beingusedfor“nottodo”or“todonothing.”Moreover,thesentenceisnotproperlyparal-leltotheprecedingone,asthe“Again”leadsustoexpectitwillbe.Sosimplybypayingphilosophicalattentiontothecontentoftheargument,wecanknowthatthereissomethingwrongwiththetranslation.AlookattheLatinenablesustocorrectittoreadasfollows:Again,wesay“Thismanissittingjustasthatmanisdoing”or“Thismanisrestingjustasthatmanisdoing,”eventhough“tosit”isnottodosomethingand“torest”istodonothing.NowthepassagegivesthekindofexampleAnselmhadledustoexpect.ItshouldbenotedthatthetranslationIquotedfirstisgrammaticallypossible,giventheLatintext;itjustmakesnophilosophicalsense.Similarmistranslationsoccurwhentranslatorsattachmodifiers,especiallyadverbialphrases,tothewrongelement.Onceagain,philosophicalattentionisallthatisneededtorecognizethemistake,althoughrecoursetotheLatintextmaybeneededtocorrectit.Inothercases,atranslationmightmakeenoughsenseincontextthatonecannotrecognizeitaserroneouswithoutcomparingittotheLatinoriginal.ComparethesetwoalternativetranslationsofapassagefromScotus,27bothofwhichmakeperfectlygoodsenseincontext:CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n340thomaswilliamsAIsaythatGodisnodebtorinanyBIsaythatGodisadebtor,inanunqualifiedsensesavewithrespectunqualifiedsense,onlytohisowntohisowngoodness,namely,thatgoodness,thatheloveit.Toheloveit.Butwherecreaturesarecreatures,however,heisadebtorinconcernedheisdebtorrathertohisvirtueofhisgenerosity,thathegenerosity,inthesensethathecommunicatetothemwhattheirgivescreatureswhattheirnaturenaturerequires.Thisrequirementisdemands,whichexigencyinthemsetdownassomethingjustinthem,issetdownassomethingjust,aasasecondaryobjectofGod’skindofsecondaryobjectofthisjustice.Butintruthnothingjustice,asitwere.ButintruthexternaltoGodisjustexceptinanothingoutsideofGodcanbesaidcertainrespect,viz.,withthetobejustwithoutthisaddedqualification“sofarasitisonthequalification.Inanunqualifiedpartofacreature.”Thesensewhereacreatureisunqualifiedlyjustisonlythatconcerned,Godisjustonlyinwhichisrelatedtothefirstjustice,relationtohisfirstjustice,namely,i.e.,becauseitisactuallywilledbybecausesuchacreaturehasbeenthedivinewill.actuallywilledbythedivinewill.NotefirstthattranslatorAsaysthatGodisadebtortohisgen-erosity,whereastranslatorBsaysthatGodisadebtorinvirtueofhisgenerosity.Thisdiscrepancyisinstructivebecauseitrevealstheextenttowhichtranslationsareatthesametimephilosophicallymotivated(andthereforepossiblytendentious)interpretationsofthetextbeingtranslated.Inanumberofinfluentialarticlesandbooks,translatorAhasarguedthataccordingtoScotus,Godowesittohim-selftomakehiscreaturesgood,sothatGod’sgenerositytocreaturesisitselfamatterofjustice:justicetohimself,not(strictlyspeaking)justicetocreatures.Theexpression“debtortohisgenerosity”wouldsupportthatinterpretation.TranslatorB,bycontrast,haswrittenanumberofarticlesarguingthataccordingtoScotus,God’sjusticetohimselfimposesnoconstraintsonhowhemusttreatindividualcreaturesorthecreateduniverseasawhole.Thewords“adebtorinvirtueofhisgenerosity”aremeanttosuggestthatitissolelyamatterofgenerosityforGodtogivehiscreaturestheircharacteristicperfections.28Thetranslationsoftheendofthepassagealsorevealaninterpre-tiveagendaatwork.ScotushasidentifiedGod’s“firstjustice”ashisjusticewithrespecttohimself.WhentranslatorAsaysthat“Godisjustonlyinrelationtohisfirstjustice”whenhe“givescreaturesCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation341whattheirnaturedemands,”heconveyshisviewthatinconferringperfectionsoncreaturesScotus’sGodisbeingjust,notreallytohiscreatures,buttohimself.Bycontrast,translatorB’srenderingofthesentencesupportshisreadingofScotusasanextremevoluntarist:whatisunqualifiedlyjustissimplywhateverGodwills.Incaseslikethese,wherefaultytranslationscannotbedetectedsimplybyphilosophicalvigilance,theuseroftranslationsneedstobeabletoformajudgmentastothegeneralreliabilityofatranslator.Consultingmoreseniormedievalistsaboutatranslator’sreputationcanbehelpful,butcareisneededhere,especiallywhentheme-dievalistsoneconsultsaretranslatorsthemselves,sincetranslatorsseemtobetemperamentallydisposedtoexaggeratetheshortcom-ingsoftheworksofothers.29Abetterapproachistoformone’sownjudgmentaboutthetranslator’sphilosophicalacuitybyreadingarepresentativeselectionofherarticles.Asloppyphilosopherwillbeasloppytranslator;anunreliableinterpreterwillbeanunreliabletranslator.Indeed,toalimitedextent,thetranslator’sprosestyleisagoodguidetothequalityofhertranslations.Atranslatorwhoha-bituallywriteshazyEnglishwillproducehazytranslations,butonewhowriteswithprecisionwilltranslatewithprecision.Itisproba-blyalsotruethatsomeonewhowriteselegantEnglishwillproduceeleganttranslations,butelegance,thoughgratifyingtothereader,isseldomofphilosophicalsignificance,andthedesireforeleganceisastandingtemptationtostrayfromstrictfidelitytothetext.pairsandsnaresStrictfidelitytothetextofcourserequiressoundjudgmentinthechoiceoftranslationsforindividualwords,andsuchjudgmentde-pendsasmuchonphilosophicalsensitivityandanappreciationofEnglishidiomasitdoesonone’scommandofLatin.InthissectionIwishtoillustratethedifficultiesthatfacetranslatorsbydiscussingwordsthatarecommonlymistranslatedandwordsthatdefyexacttranslation.Ialsonotetherangeoftranslationofsomekeyphilo-sophicalterms.Mostcommonmistranslationsresultfromalazypreferenceforcognates.Malitiaisoftentranslatedas“malice”andofficiosumas“officious,”totakejusttwoexamples.Nowmalitiacanmean“malice”(adesiretoinflictinjury),butmoreoftenitmeanssimplyCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n342thomaswilliams“badness.”Itistheoppositeof“goodness,”notof“benevolence.”Officiosumismostcommonlyseeninthethreefoldclassificationofliesasperniciosum,officiosum,andiocosum.Totranslatetheseas“pernicious,”“officious,”and“jocose”issheerlaziness.“Offi-cious”means“meddlesome”or“offensivelyforwardinofferinghelporadvice.”Amendaciumofficiosum,however,isnotameddlesomeliebutaserviceableand(assuch)inoffensiveone.(Themeaning“obliging”forEnglish“officious”haslongbeenobsolete.)WithbothmalitiaandofficiosumthecorrecttranslationissuggestednotbytheEnglishcognatebutbytheLatinwordformation:malitiaistheabstractnounfrom“malum,”meaning“bad”–hence“badness”;officiosumistheadjectivefrom“officium,”meaning“function”or“service”–hence“functional”or“serviceable.”Attentiontostan-dardpatternsofwordformationwhenlearningLatinisoneofthebestsafeguardsagainstthiskindofmistake.WithmalitiaandofficiosumperfectlygoodEnglishequivalentsareavailablebutcarelesslyoverlooked.FormanyotherwordsthereisnoexactEnglishequivalent,andonemustmakedowithanap-proximation.Thereis,forexample,nosingleEnglishwordthatcor-respondsexactlytoappetitusinitsAristotelianuse:“tendency,”“inclination,”“desire,”“directedness,”andsimilartermsconveytherightmeaninginsomecontextsbutnotinothers.Thesen-sibleconventionistouse“appetite”astheinvariabletransla-tionofappetitus,ontheunderstandingthatreaderswillrecognize“appetite”asatermofart.Similarconventionsjustifythetransla-tionofpotentiaas“potency”or“potentiality,”actus(inoneofitssenses)as“act”or“actuality,”andaccidensas“accident.”Howeverinexactsuchstandardtranslationsmaybe,theycanhardlybecalledmisleading,sinceanymodestlywell-trainedreaderofmedievaltextswillrecognizethemforthetechnicaltermstheyare.30Indeed,thereissomeadvantagetousingwordslike“potentiality”thathavenoordinarynontechnicaluse.Sometimes,however,itisnotclearwhetherawordisatechnicaltermornot,orevenwhetheritisbeingusedwithexactlythesamemeaningthroughoutatext.Doeshonestum,forexample,describeitemsallofwhichexemplifysomesinglepropertyinagiventhinker’smoralontology(say,intrinsicvalue),orisitamoregeneraltermofcommendationwhoseexactmeaninginitsdifferentoccurrencesde-pendsoncontext?Ifthefirstalternativeisthecase,aconsistentCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation343translationofhonestumisprobablyadvisable,althoughwhatthatconsistenttranslationshouldbeislikelytobeacontentiousmat-terofinterpretation;ifthesecondalternativeisthecase,aconsis-tenttranslationofhonestumwouldbedownrightmisleading.Andofcoursethesetwoalternativesdonotexhaustthepossibilities.Nordoesthefactthatacertainwordisatechnicalterminoneauthorimplythatitisatechnicalterminanyotherauthor.Forthatmatter,oneandthesameauthormayusethesametermbothasatechnicaltermandasanontechnicaltermevenwithinasinglework.Simi-larproblemsbedevilthetranslatorfacedwithsuchproteantermsasprincipium(“beginning,”“origin,”“premise,”“principle,”“startingpoint”)andratio(“argument,”“basis,”“concept,”“definition,”“es-sentialnature,”“feature,”“ground,”“intelligiblenature,”“mean-ing,”“model,”“reason,”“theoreticalaccount”).Asissooftenthecase,itisnotfacilityinLatinbutexegeticalandphilosophicalacuitythatallowsthetranslatortodeterminehowawordisbeingusedand,accordingly,howitoughttobetranslated.awordofencouragementIhavefocusedhereontheobstaclesthatconfrontthestudentofme-dievalphilosophy.Thereadershouldnotsuppose,however,thattheworkneededtoovercometheseobstaclesismeredrudgery:farfromit.AsmycolleagueKatherineTachauisfondofobserving,doingpa-leographicalworkislikebeingpaidtodocrosswordpuzzles.Anyonewhoenjoysdetectivestoriesshouldenjoycodicologicalresearchandtheeditingoftexts,whichemployexactlythesameskillsofpick-ingupcluesanddrawinginferences.Andanyonewhotakespleasureinfindingjusttherightwordstoexpressadifficultphilosophicalthoughtshouldfinddeepsatisfactioninthechallengeoftranslation.Aboveallelse,however,theefforttorecovertheauthenticwordsofmedievalphilosophersisworthwhilesimplybecausethosewordsaresophilosophicallyinteresting.Evenafterafewdecadesofre-newedattentiontomedievalthought,thereremainsanastonishingamountoffirst-ratephilosophy–technicallyproficient,inventiveinargument,andattentivetoquestionsofperennialinterest–thathasyettobeexamined.Theeffortrequiredtomakethesetextsavailableforstudyisamplyrepaidbytheopportunitytoreclaimthetreasuresofarichphilosophicalinheritance.CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n344thomaswilliamsnotes1.Foranexample,seehttp://www.handwriting.org/images/samples/aquinas2.htm2.Seeabove,pp.28and46–47.3.ThebestsummaryaccountremainsthatofA.KennyandJ.PinborgCHLMP34–42,onwhichIrelyheavilyinwhatfollows.MoredetailedtreatmentsofthechannelsoftransmissionmaybefoundinJ.Destrez[642],A.Dondaine[643],andG.Fink-Errera[644–45].4.ChartulariumuniversitatisParisiensisIII39–40,translatedinL.Thorndike[650]237–38.Thepracticeofreadingatsuchapaceispre-sentedasalreadycommon;thedecreesimplyforbidsthealternativepracticeofdictatingslowly.Thedecreeisexplicitlyappliedtobothlec-turesanddisputations.Studentresentmentwasapparentlyexpected,sincethedecreeprovidesforstiffpenaltiesfor“listenerswhoopposetheexecutionofthisourstatutebyclamor,hissing,noise,[or]throwingstonesbythemselvesorbytheirservantsandaccomplices.”5.CHLMP37–38.SeealsoG.Pollard[648],andfordetailedinformationonbookproductioninthelatemedievaluniversity,seeL.J.Bataillonetal.[638].6.QuotedinCHLMP41.7.ForthispurposeIrecommendB.Bischoff[640].ThestandardmanualsofabbreviationsareA.Capelli[641]andA.Pelzer[647].TheUniversityofBochumhasproducedanabbreviationsCD-ROM[651].Knowledgeofabbreviationsisusefulnotonlyforreadingthemanuscriptsbutalsofordetectingerrors,sincemistakesincopiesareoftenattributabletomisreadingofabbreviations:seeB.Bergh[639].InvolumeVIIIoftheVaticanScotusedition,theeditorsofferaninstructivetableofvari-antreadingsfromtheScotusmanuscriptsthat“arosefrommistakeninterpretationofabbreviations”([281]VIII69∗).Theresultscanrangefromthemerelypuzzling(aswhen“satispatere,”“tobesufficientlyevident,”iscopiedas“satisfacere,”“tosatisfy”)tothewhollymis-leading(aswhen“diaboli,”“theDevil’s,”iscopiedas“Domini,”“theLord’s”).8.Coursesinpaleographyoftenincludeinstructionincodicologyandtextediting,whicharebestlearnedthroughinstructionandapprenticeship.Texteditinginparticularisdifficulttoencapsulateinageneralhand-book,sincedifferentkindsoftextscallfordifferenteditorialtechniques.Anon-linepaleographycoursehasbeenproducedbytheUniversityofMelbourne[652].OtherresourcesincludetheNotreDameSum-merMedievalInstitute[646]andtheTorontoSummerLatinCourse[653].CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nTransmissionandtranslation3459.AthoroughdiscussionbyF.S.SchmittofthetransmissionofAnselm’sworkscanbefoundin[138]I(I)1∗–239∗,fromwhichmyremarksarederived.10.Ibid.226∗–39∗.R.W.Southern[145]238narguesagainstSchmitt’sattribution.11.Seethetranslator’sprefacetoOnTruth,OnFreedomofChoice,andOntheFalloftheDevil[141].12.F.S.Schmitt[138]I(I)37∗.13.Ibid.10∗(mytranslation).14.Admittedly,itwasoriginallypublishedinseparatevolumesbydifferentpublishers,butitwasreissuedasasingleset,withadditions,correc-tions,andalongcriticalpreface,byFriedrichFromannVerlagin1968.15.SeemysummaryaccountinCCScot1–14.16.ComplicatingmattersevenmoreisthefactthattherearerivalRepor-tationesofScotus’sParislectures:fouronBookI(includingaversionexaminedbyScotushimselfandthereforeknownastheReportatioex-aminata),twoonBookII,fouronBookIII,andtwoonBookIV.17.A.B.Wolter[302]39–40.18.Ibid.50.19.TheexceptionforBookIistheversionidentifiedbytheVaticaneditorsasReportatio1BoftheParislectures,whichdoesexistinaneditionpublishedinParisin1517.Butaswehaveseen,earlyprintededitionsmustbeusedwithcaution,andinanyeventReportatio1BisoffarlessvaluethanthehithertouneditedReportatioexaminata(Reportatio1A).20.T.B.Noone[297]containsaneditionofReportatio1A,d.36,withadiscussionofthemanuscriptsonpp.392–94.AlltheknownmanuscriptsofScotus’sworkarelistedintheProlegomenatothefirstvolumeoftheVaticanedition[281]I144∗–54∗.21.SeeP.StrevelerandK.Tachau[337]2–3,36–38.KatherineTachau’sin-troductiontothisvolumeisaveryinformativesourcefordetailsaboutHolcot’scareerandthetransmissionofhisworks;mydiscussionofthetransmissionoftheSentencesquestionsisbasedonpp.35–46.22.R.A.Pratt[649].23.P.StrevelerandK.Tachau[337]41.24.Ibid.25.Ibid.45.26.P.StrevelerandK.Tachau[337]containsapartialeditionofBookII,q.2.Holcot’sQuodlibetalQuestionsaresimilarlyneglected:fourquestionsareeditedinStrevelerandTachauandthreeinH.G.Gelber[335],butotherwisetheLyoneditionistheonlyprintedsource.27.OrdinatioIV,d.46,q.1,n.12:“dicoquodnonsimpliciterestdebitornisibonitatisuae,utdiligateam;creaturisautemestdebitorexliberalitateCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n346thomaswilliamssua,utcommuniceteisquodnaturasuaexigit,quaeexigentiaineisponiturquoddamiustum,quasisecundariumobiectumilliusiustitiae;tamensecundumveritatemnihilestdeterminateiustumetextraDeumnisisecundumquid,scilicetcumhacmodificatione,quantumestexpartecreaturae,sedsimpliciteriustumtantummodoestrelatumadpri-mamiustitiam,quiascilicetactualitervolitumadivinavoluntate.”28.AsR.Crossputsit,“theclaimisnotthatGodisessentiallygenerous,butthattheterm‘debtor’isbeingusedmetaphorically”([293]63).29.IonceheardascholardismissanentiretranslationoftheProslogionbecausehedisapprovedoftherenderingofonewordinchapter2,eventhoughIcouldseenophilosophicaldifferenceatallbetweentheal-ternativetranslations,onlyatriflingdisagreementaboutwhatwasthemoreidiomaticEnglish.30.Analogously,thestandardrenderingofeudaimoniaas“happiness”isasinaccurateasitisinevitable,butanyonewhohasheardevenonelectureonAristotle’sEthicsknowsexactlywhatiswrongwithitandcaneffortlesslysubstitutetheconceptofeudaimonia,whichnoEnglishwordcallsup,fortheconceptusuallycalledupbytheword“happiness.”CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nbiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersThebiographiesthatfollowareinchronologicalorder,asinthechartonpp.347–48.Thebracketednumberattheendofeachlifeindicatestheentrypointforfindingworksbyorabouttheindividualinthebibliography.Forshortbiographiesofalargernumberofmedievalphilosophers,seeCHLMP855–92.AUGUSTINE(354–430)wasbornatTagaste,inpresent-dayAlgeria.HestudiedatCarthageandtaughtrhetoricinRomeandMilan.Hisquestforwisdom,inspiredbyCicero’slostHortensius,ledhimthroughManichaeism,skepticism,andNeoplatonismbeforehisconversiontoChristianityin386/87.HereturnedtoTagastein388andwasbishopofthenearbycoastalcityofHippoRegiusfromabout396,exercisinggreatinfluenceamongthenorthAfricanchurchesandbeyonduntilhisdeathduringthesiegeofHippobyVandals.Augustine’simmeasurableinfluenceonlaterwesternthoughtdependsespeciallyonhismanysurvivingcommentariesandsermonsonbiblicaltextsandonthreemasterpieces:theConfessions,anautobiographyaddressedtoGod,withreflectionsonmemory,creation,andtime;Trinity,inwhichthetriunenatureofGod(givenitsmajorofficialformulationinAugustine’slifetime)andthestructuresofmindandperceptionprovideil-luminationforoneanother;andOntheCityofGodagainstthePagans,undertakentorefutethechargethatabandonmentoftraditionalgodsinfa-vorofChristianitywasresponsibleforthesackofRomebyVisigothsin410butextendedbeyondthistargettoprovideanaccountofhumanoriginsanddestiny,fromParadiseandtheFall,throughthehistoryof“earthly”and“heavenly”citiesinthislife,toalastjudgmentandeverlastingpunish-mentorbliss.HiswritingsagainsttheDonatistsplinterchurchandagainstPelagiusweresources,respectively,forlegislationagainstheresyanddebatesaboutgraceandfreewill.OtherworksofparticularinterestforphilosophyareAgainsttheAcademicians(withTrinitythechiefsourceforAugustine’sinfluenceonDescartes),OnFreeChoiceoftheWill,andTheTeacher(amore350CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers351subtleaccountoflanguagethanthebehaviorismoftheConfessionscriti-cizedbyWittgensteinatthebeginningofPhilosophicalInvestigations).[55]PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS(fl.c.500)wasaChristianNeoplatonistwhopresentedhimselfas(andwasregardedduringthelaterMiddleAgesandRenaissanceasbeing)anAthenianconvertofSt.Paul(Acts17:34),aniden-titywhichgavehiswritingsgreatauthorityintheWest,evenduringtheperiodofAristotle’sgreatestinfluenceinthethirteenthandfourteenthcenturies.[77]AniciusManliusSeverinusBOETHIUS(c.480–525/26),bornintoapa-tricianfamilyinRome,combinedscholarshipwithpublicserviceatatimewhenItalywasruledbyGothsandknowledgeofGreekwasbecomingrareintheWest.HeintendedtotranslateallofPlatoandAristotleintoLatinbutgotnofurtherthanAristotle’slogicaltreatises.HewrotetheConsolationofPhilosophyinprison,whileawaitingexecutiononchargesoftreason.[84]JohannesSCOTTUSERIUGENA(c.800–c.877)combinedPseudo-Dionysius(whosewritingshetranslatedintoLatin),othersourcesinGreek,andAugustineinaChristianNeoplatonismcenteredonafourfoldideaofnatureascreatingandnotcreated,createdandcreating,createdbutnotcreating,andneithercreatednorcreating.[90]AbuYusufYa‘QubIbnIshaqal-KINDI(d.c.866–73),“thephilosopheroftheArabs,”activeinBaghdad,encouragedtranslationintoArabicofGreekphilosophers,especiallyAristotle,andutilizedthesesourcesinhisownthought.Anotherimportantearlycontributiontotheintegrationofphi-losophywithqur’anicorbiblicalmonotheismwastheanonymousLiberdecausis,aNeoplatonictreatiseprobablywritteninBaghdadintheninthcentury.ItwasinfluentialintheWestfromthetwelfthcentury.[91]AbuNasral-FARABI(c.870–950),“theSecondMaster”(afterAristotle),hasalsobeencalled“theFatherofIslamicNeoplatonism,”anindicationofthebreadthofhisphilosophicvision.Hedidimportantworkinpoliticalphilosophy,metaphysics,andlogic.[93]SAADIAHGAON(892–942),thefirstJewishphilosopherinthepropersenseoftheterm,wasborninFayyum,UpperEgypt.In928hebecamehead(Gaon)oftheSuraAcademyinpresent-dayIraq.Hismajorphilosophicalwork,theKitabal-mukhtarfi’l-amanatwa-’l-’i‘tiqadat(BookofDoctrinesandBeliefs),demonstrateshisknowledgeofPlatonic,Aristotelian,andStoicideas,aswellastheinfluenceoftheIslamicMu‘tazilites.Saadiah’sdefenseCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n352Biographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersoftheharmonyofreasonandrevelation,unequaledinmedievalJewishthought,wasthelocusclassicusforMaimonides’critique.[106]Abu‘Alial-HusaynIBNSINA(AVICENNA)(980–1037)wasbornnearBukharainpresent-dayUzbekistan.HewasahighlysystematicandcreativethinkerandgreatlyinfluencedlaterLatinaswellasIslamicphilosophy.Hismostseminalcontributiontometaphysicswasthedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistence,universallyapplicableexcepttoGod,inwhomtheyareidentical.Inphilosophicalpsychology,heheldthatthesoulwasincor-poreal,immortal,andanagentwithchoicebetweengoodandevil.[111]SolomonIBNGABIROL(AVICEBRON)(1021/22–1057/58),aJewishphilosopherandpoet,livedinMuslimSpainandwroteinbothHebrewandArabic.HisemphasisonthewillofacreatorGodallowedhimtopropoundaNeoplatonicvisionofrealitywithoutthedeterminismcommonlyfoundinthattradition.HisMekorHayyim(FountainofLife,Fonsvitae)hadnoinfluenceonJewishphilosophy,butitshighlyoriginalhylomorphismre-ceivedseriousattentionfromtheLatinscholastics,especiallyAquinasandDunsScotus.[135]ANSELMOFCANTERBURY(1033–1109)wasborninAostainpresent-dayItaly.AsamonkatBecinNormandy,hebroughthisextraor-dinarilyacuteanalyticalmindtobearonsuchtopicsastruth,freedomofthewill,andthefalloftheDevil.InhisProslogionAnselmformulatedthemostfamousargumentinthehistoryofphilosophy,theso-calledontologi-calargumentfortheexistenceofGod.In1093AnselmbecamethesecondNormanarchbishopofCanterbury,wherehecontendedvigorouslyfortheautonomyofthechurchwhileproducingsignificantfurtherworkinphilo-sophicaltheology,includingattemptstodemonstratethenecessityofGod’sincarnationasahumanbeing(CurDeushomo)andtheharmonyofdivineforeknowledge,predestination,andgracewithhumanfreechoice.[138]AbuHamidal-GHAZALI(1058–1111),borninnorthernIran,wasoneofthegreatestIslamicjuristsandthemostacutecriticoftheHellenizingphilo-sophicaltraditionwithinIslam,atraditionthatreacheditspeakinIbnSina.ConvincedintheTahafutal-falasifa(TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers)thatphilosophycouldnotprovideabasisforacceptingrevealedtruth,GhazaliturnedtoSufimysticism,intermsofwhichhereinterpretedtradi-tionalreligioustexts.[148]PeterABELARD(1079–1142)renouncedhisbirthrightaseldestsonofaBretonknightforthearmsofdialectic.Hewasarenownedteacher,apoet,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers353andthetutor,lover,and(againstherwishes)husbandofHeloıse,theniece¨ofaParisianecclesiasticinwhosehouseAbelardlodged.InthecourseofsuchcalamitouseventsascastrationbyorderofHeloıse’suncle,threatsof¨murderbytheunrulymonksofamonasteryhehadsetouttoreform,andrepeatedattacksonhisorthodoxybyBernardofClairvaux,Abelardbecameafoundingfigureofmedievalscholasticism.Hehascommonlybeenregardedasabrilliantbutcriticalandunsystematicthinker.Recentresearchmakesastrongcasefortheconstructiveandsystematiccharacterofhisworkinbothlogicandtheology,especiallymoraltheology.[152]HUGHOFST.VICTOR(d.1141)inauguratedacourseofstudyattheParisianabbeyofSt.VictorthatintegratedphilosophyintoamonasticethoscenteredontheChristiansacramentsandmeditativereadingoftheBible.[155]PETERLOMBARD(1095/1100–60)collectedanddiscussedthejudg-ments(sententiae)ofawiderangeofearlierauthorsinhisSententiaeinIVlibrisdistinctae(FourBooksofSentences),whichbecamethemajortext-bookintheologyfromthethirteenththroughfifteenthcenturiesandhencethepointofdepartureforphilosophicallysignificantthoughtbyAquinas,DunsScotus,Ockham,andothers.LombardwascriticalofNeoplatonismandhospitabletoAristotelianideas.[156]JOHNOFSALISBURY(c.1120–80)championedtheunionofwisdomwitheloquencetocombatvanityinroyalcourtsandworldlinessinthechurch.John’smorallyenergeticChristianhumanismdrewonRomanmodelsnotonlyfortheimportanceofgrammarandrhetoricbutalsoforadefenseoftyrannicide.[157]Abu’lWalidMuhammadIBNRUSHD(AVERROES)(1126–98)wroteinIslamicSpain.Hecametobeknownas“theCommentator”forhismassiveexplicationofAristotle’sworks.HedefendedphilosophyagainstchargesthatitwascontrarytoIslamandheldthatthestudyofphilosophywasobligatoryforanintellectualelite,butshouldbeforbiddentoordinarybelivers.TheJewishandLatinAverroisttraditionsmaintainedhisidealofthephilosophiclifeasthewaytothehighestpossiblehappiness.[160]MosesMAIMONIDES(c.1138–1204)wasthemajorJewishphilosopheroftheMiddleAges,andhisinfluencelaststothepresent.HewasborninCordobainMuslimSpain,whencehisfamilywasforcedtofleein´1148,aftertheAlmohadsconqueredAndalusia.HesettledinAl-Fustat(Cairo)before1168,wherehealsopracticedandwroteasaphysician.MaimonideswastheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n354BiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersleaderoftheJewishcommunityofhisdayandcomposedforitanauthorita-tivecodeofrabbiniclaw.InhisDalalatal-Ha’irin(GuideforthePerplexed),writteninArabic,heconfrontedtheapparentcontradictionsbetweenbib-licalandphilosophical(mainlyAristotelian)ideas.Maimonides’intellec-tualismintheGuidemakespropheticrevelationanaccommodationtothelower,materialsideofournature,butamutuallyfruitful(thoughchalleng-ing)relationbetweenphilosophyandreligionissuggestedbyhisinsistenceontheneedformoralpurity,hisdefenseofthephilosophicaltenabilityofmajorarticlesoftraditionalbelief,andhisemphasisonthelimitsofphilo-sophicalknowledgeofGod(thislastanimportantinfluenceonAquinas).[176]RobertGROSSETESTE(c.1170–1253)taughtatOxford,wherehewasanearlysupporteroftheFranciscans,includingRogerBacon,whoregardedhimastheforemostthinkeroftheage.AsbishopofLincoln(hencethesobriquet“theLincolnian”),Grossetestecontinuedanambitiousprogramoftransla-tionandcommentaryonArabicandGreektextsnotpreviouslyavailableorfullyavailableintheLatinWest,includingespeciallyAristotle’sEthicsandearliercommentariesthereon.NotwithstandinghismajorroleinthereintroductionofAristotle,GrossetestehimselfwasmostdeeplyanAugus-tinianandNeoplatonist,affinitiesexhibitednotonlyinhisphilosophybutalsoinhisactivityasapreacherandaspastorofoneofthelargestdiocesesinEngland.[194]ALBERTTHEGREAT(ALBERTUSMAGNUS)(1200–80)wasthefirstinterpreterintheLatinWestofAristotle’sworkinitsentirety.Indistinguishingsharplybetweenphilosophyandtheologyandinsistingthatphilosophicalproblemsbesolvedphilosophically,whileatthesametimeintegratingNeoplatonicthemesintohisinterpretation,AlbertpresentedanAristotelianismthatwasmorecongenialtolaterdefendersofapurelyphilo-sophicalwayoflifethanthatofhispupil,ThomasAquinas.AlbertwasthefirstGermantobecomeamasterattheUniversityofParis.[201]PETEROFSPAIN(c.1205–77)wasaSpanishDominicanwhowrotetheleadinglogictextofhighscholasticism.HeisnolongeridentifiedwiththePortugueseauthorofmedicalworksandacommentaryonAristotle’sDeanimawholaterbecamePopeJohnXXI.[206]ROGERBACON(c.1214–92/4),anirascibleEnglishFranciscanactiveatbothOxfordandParis,setforthinhisOpusmaiusadetailedplanofcurricularreformemphasizingmathematics,experimentalscience,moralphilosophy,andthestudyoflanguages.BacondisparagedrelianceontheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers355authorityofpastthinkersbutwasanunashamedadmirerofnon-Christianachievementsinphilosophyandscience,whichheattributedtodivineillu-mination,thesourceofallknowledge.[208]BONAVENTURE(JohnofFidanza)(c.1217–74)taughttheologyatParisfrom1243untilhiselectionasminister-generaloftheFranciscansin1257.HedefendedtheimportanceofuniversitystudiesforhisorderbutaimedatasynthesisoftheintellectualandtheaffectiveinsuchworksasTheMind’sJourneytoGod.ThoughantagonistictothecontemporaryrageforAristotle,hewasexpertindeploying“thePhilosopher’s”ideastoestablishhisown.AscontemporariesatParis,BonaventureandAquinaswereopposedtooneanotherintheirattitudestowardAristotleandonotherissuesinwaysthatwereechoedinthesubsequentteachingsoftheirorders,theFranciscansandDominicans.IntheDivineComedyDantehaseachpraisethefounderoftheother’sorder(ParadiseXI–XII).[211]HENRYOFGHENT(c.1217–93),amasteroftheologyatParisby1276,defendedtraditionalNeoplatonicandAugustinianpositions(hewasamemberofthecommissionwhichprepared219mainlyArab-AristotelianpropositionsinphilosophyandtheologyforcondemnationbythebishopofParisin1277),butinthecourseofalongintellectualevolutionintegratedmuchofAristotleintohisowncomplex,markedly“essentialist”views.HewasoftencitedbyFranciscanthinkers,albeitoftenasafoilfortheirownviews.[219]THOMASAQUINAS(c.1225–74)wasbornatRoccasecca,betweenNaplesandRome,atacastlebelongingtohisfamily,abranchoftheAquinoclan.AfterstudyingliberalartsandphilosophyattheUniversityofNaples,hejoinedtheDominicanorder,overstrongobjectionsfromhisfamily.HestudiedphilosophyandtheologyunderAlberttheGreatatParisandCologneandthenbeganacareerofteachingtheologyattheUniversityofParis(1251/52–59and1268–72),andinNaples,Orvieto,andRome.ThomaswroteinfluentialcommentariesonbiblicaltextsandonmajorworksofAristotle,includingthePosteriorAnalytics,Physics,Deanima,Metaphysics(throughBookXII),NicomacheanEthics,andPolitics(to1280a6).Hisownphilosophyisprimarilyfoundembeddedinhistheologicalworks.Theseincludethreesystematictreatises:(1)hisearlyParislecturesontheSentencesofPeterLombard;(2)theSummacontraGentiles(ASummaryagainstthePagans),alsoknownasLiberdeveritatedecatholicaefidei(TreatiseontheTruthoftheCatholicFaith)(1259–65);and(3)theSummatheologiae(ASummaryofTheology)(1265–73,unfinished).AlsoimportantforphilosophyareOnBeingandEssence,OntheEternityoftheWorld,andtreatisesinquestionCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n356Biographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersformonsuchtopicsastruth,evil,andthesoul.Aquinas’sthoughtisAris-totelianinframeworkbuttakesinmuchofPlatonismaswellasdistinctivelyChristiansources.[224]BOETHIUSOFDACIA(activec.1275)taughtintheartsfacultyatParisanddefendedthepossibilityofachievinghappinessthroughphilosophy.Hetreatedtheologyandphilosophy,includingnaturalphiloso-phy,asmutuallyindependentsystemsofthought.[265]SIGEROFBRABANT(c.1240–c.1284),likeBoethiusofDacia,taughtintheartsfacultyatParis.HeexpoundedandattimesdefendedAristotelianpositionsincludedinthecondemnationof1277.DantehasThomasAquinasintroducehiminParadise(X.136–38)asonewho“syllogizedinvidiousverities.”[266]GILESOFROME(AegidiusRomanus,EgidiusColonna)(c.1243/47–1316)studiedtheologyatParisduringAquinas’ssecondperiodofteachingthereandtookaprovocativelyAristotelianlinehimself,furnishinginhisSentencescommentarymanyofthepropositionscondemnedin1277.GileswithdrewfromParisandsettoworkcommentingonAristotle.HereturnedtoParisin1285asthefirstregentmasterofhisorder,theAugustinians.Hiswritingsweremadetheofficialteachingoftheorderin1287,andhewaselectedgeneralin1292.Hecontributedinfluentiallytothediscussionofthedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistenceandwrotetwosignificantpoliticaltreatises:Deregimineprincipum(OntheRuleofPrinces),amanualonrulershipwrittenforthefuturePhilipIV(theFair)ofFrance;andDeec-clesiasticapotestate(OnEcclesiasticalPower),asweepingdefenseofpapalauthorityinsupportofPhilip’seventualadversary,PopeBonifaceVIII.[269]PeterJohnOLIVI(1247/48–98)wasaFranciscan,controversialforhisapoc-alypticismandadvocacyofa“poor”lifestyletomaintainSt.Francis’sidealofimitatingChristandtheapostles.Olivialsoparticipatedinthemainphilosophicaldiscussionsoftheday,showinglittlerespectforAristotleandtakingoriginalpositionsofhisown.[271]GODFREYOFFONTAINES(c.1250–c.1306/09)studiedliberalartsatParisunderSigerofBrabantduringAquinas’ssecondregencyintheology,thentheologyunderHenryofGhent.GodfreytaughttheologyatParisfrom1285,stoutlycriticizedthe1277condemnation,defendedmanyofAquinas’sviews,andcarriedonanoftenoppositionaldialoguewithHenry.Hedividedbeingintocognitivebeingandrealbeingandheldthatevenincreaturesessenceandexistencewereneitherreallynor“intentionally”distinct.[275]CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers357JAMESOFVITERBO(c.1255–1308)studiedandtaughttheologyatParis,succeedingGilesofRomeintheAugustinianchairin1293.HeisbestknownforhisdefenseofpapalauthorityinDeregimineChristiano(OnChristianGovernment),butalsowroteonmetaphysicalissues.[277]JOHNOFPARIS(JohnQuidort)(c.1260–1306)wasanearlyDominicandefenderofAquinas’spositionsonthecompositionofessenceandexistenceincreatures,onmatterasprincipleofindividuation,andonotherissues.Hearguedforthemutualindependenceofecclesiasticalandlayauthority.[278]JohnDUNSSCOTUS(c.1265/66–1308),aFranciscan,studiedandtaughtatbothOxfordandParis.Knownas“theSubtleDoctor,”Scotuswasoneofthegreatestmedievalthinkers.HismajorworksincludeatleastthreesetsoflecturesontheLombard’sSentences,questionsonAristotle’sMetaphysics,andasubstantialbodyofquodlibetalquestions.MajorfeaturesofScotus’sthoughtincludeaunivocalconceptofbeing,adistinctivedemonstrationoftheexistenceofGod,the“formal”distinctionamongathing’s“really”iden-ticalcharacteristics(includingitshaecceitasor“thisness”),thegroundingofknowledgeinintuitivecognitionratherthandivineillumination,andatheoryofthewillasfreeattheveryinstantofchoosing.[281]MARSILIUSOFPADUA(1275/80–1342/43)wasastudentofmedicineandnaturalphilosophy,probablyfirstattheUniversityofPadua.HewasrectoroftheUniversityofParisbrieflyin1313.In1324hewrotethemostrevolutionarypoliticaltreatiseofthelaterMiddleAges,theDefensorpacis(DefenderofPeace),whichpropoundedasubstantiallycompletetheoryofacommunity’scompetencetocontrolitsownaffairsandattackedpapalandpriestlyclaimstopoliticalpowerasamajorthreattocivictranquillity.[303]PETERAUREOL(c.1280–1322),aFranciscan,taughtatParis.Hismaincontributiontocontemporarydebatesaboutrepresentationalismwastheconceptof“apparentbeing”(esseapparens),whichprovokedcriticismfromOckham.[307]WILLIAMOFOCKHAM(c.1287–1347/48),anEnglishFranciscan,studiedatOxfordandtaughtthereandatFranciscanhousesofstudywhilewritingextensivelyonlogic,Aristotelianphysics,andtheology.TheseworksarethebasisforOckham’ssometimesexaggeratedreputationasthenomi-nalistinauguratorofaviamodernainphilosophyandtheology.Inthemid-1320shewasrequiredtodefendhisteachingsongrace,freewill,andothertopicsatthepapalcourtinAvignon.WhiletherehecametobelievethatPopeJohnXXIIwasahereticindenyingthecompletelegalpovertyofChristandCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n358Biographiesofmajormedievalphilosophershisapostles,adoctrinemostFranciscansofthetimeconsideredessentialtoChristianbelief.Ockhamfledthecuriain1328withtheminister-generalofhisorderandafewconfreres,takingrefugewithLudwigofBavaria,whowasatoddswiththepapacyoverthelegitimacyofhistitleasRomanemperor.OckhamthenwroteagainstJohnXXII’steachings,composedamassivedi-alogueonheresy,anddiscussedatsomelengththebasisandfunctionsofsecularandreligiousgovernments.HediedinMunich,possiblyduringanoutbreakofplague.[308]GERSONIDES(LevibenGershom)(1288–1344)wasaJewishphilosopher,astronomer,andmathematicianwholivedinsouthernFrance.Anabbre-viatedtranslationofhisastronomicalworkswascommissionedbyPopeClementVIandquotedbyKepler.InhisMilhamotha-Shem(TheWarsoftheLord),GersonidesshowedhimselfamoreconsistentAristotelianthanMaimonides,tothedetrimentofhisreputationinlaterJewishcircles.Hetookoriginalpositionsonsuchcentralpointsofmedievalphilosophicalthe-ologyascreationexnihilo(denied),divineomniscience(rejectedregardingfuturecontingents),andpersonalimmortality(restrictedtotherationalpartofthesoul).[323]ROBERTHOLCOT(c.1290–1349)wasanEnglishDominicanwhoques-tionedtheextentoftheologicalandnaturalknowledgebuthasbeencon-sideredsemi-Pelagianinaffirmingthenaturalpowerofthewilltoachievefaith.[335]ADAMWODEHAM(c.1298–1358),anEnglishFranciscantheologian,studiedunderOckhamanddefendedmanyofhisviews.Wodehamwasalsoanoriginalthinker,emphasizingthedependenceofcreationandsalvationonGod.IncontrastwithOckham,heheldthattheobjectsofscientificknowledgewerenotpropositionsbutstatesofaffairs.[338]ThomasBRADWARDINE(c.1300–49)appliedlogicandmathematicsinnaturalphilosophyinanumberoforiginalandinfluentialworks.Intheology,hedefendedastrongviewofdivineomniscienceandtheprimacyofgraceineverygoodhumanact.HewasconfirmedasarchbishopofCan-terburyshortlybeforehisdeath.[339]JohnBURIDAN(c.1300–after1358)wasanartsmasteratPariswhowroteonlogic,especiallysemantics,andcommentedonmanytextsofAristotle.Humanfreedom,heargued,existedtoallowustoliveasreasondictates,andwecanknowenoughoftheworldforreasontoleadustowardtheknowledgeandloveofGodwhichconstitutesourultimatehappiness.[341]CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers359NICHOLASOFAUTRECOURT(c.1300–69)vigorouslyappliedtheprincipleofnoncontradictiontoAristotelianknowledgeclaims,withhighlyskepticalresults.[346]WilliamHEYTESBURY(before1313–72),oneofthe“OxfordCalculators”(withBradwardine,RichardSwineshead,RichardKilvington,andJohnDum-bleton),developedthemathematicsofuniformaccelerationandthemathe-maticaltreatmentofphysicalqualitiessuchasheat.Hisinfluentialtreatiseonsophismatadealtcomprehensivelywithparadoxesofself-referenceandtheproblemsarisingfromintentionalcontexts.[348]NicoleORESME(c.1325–82)followedtheleadoftheOxfordCalculatorsinapplyingmathematicaltechniquesinnaturalphilosophy,developingasophisticatedanalysisoftheintensitiesofspeedsandqualities.Healsowroteoneconomicsand,underthepatronageofCharlesVofFrance,translatedAristotle’sNicomacheanEthicsandPolitics,withcommentarybearingoncurrentcircumstances.[350]JohnWYCLIF(c.1330–84)wasanOxfordsecularmasterinartsandlaterintheology.Recentscholarshiphasincreasedrespectforhismetaphysics,especiallywithregardtotheproblemofuniversals,onwhichheopposedthenominalismfashionableinhisday.Heremainsmostwellknownforhisrad-icaloppositiontochurchwealthandforhisdoctrineofpredestination,bothofwhichsuggestedagulfbetweentrueChristianityandtheinstitutionalchurchofhisday.[351]CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nbiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersThebiographiesthatfollowareinchronologicalorder,asinthechartonpp.347–48.Thebracketednumberattheendofeachlifeindicatestheentrypointforfindingworksbyorabouttheindividualinthebibliography.Forshortbiographiesofalargernumberofmedievalphilosophers,seeCHLMP855–92.AUGUSTINE(354–430)wasbornatTagaste,inpresent-dayAlgeria.HestudiedatCarthageandtaughtrhetoricinRomeandMilan.Hisquestforwisdom,inspiredbyCicero’slostHortensius,ledhimthroughManichaeism,skepticism,andNeoplatonismbeforehisconversiontoChristianityin386/87.HereturnedtoTagastein388andwasbishopofthenearbycoastalcityofHippoRegiusfromabout396,exercisinggreatinfluenceamongthenorthAfricanchurchesandbeyonduntilhisdeathduringthesiegeofHippobyVandals.Augustine’simmeasurableinfluenceonlaterwesternthoughtdependsespeciallyonhismanysurvivingcommentariesandsermonsonbiblicaltextsandonthreemasterpieces:theConfessions,anautobiographyaddressedtoGod,withreflectionsonmemory,creation,andtime;Trinity,inwhichthetriunenatureofGod(givenitsmajorofficialformulationinAugustine’slifetime)andthestructuresofmindandperceptionprovideil-luminationforoneanother;andOntheCityofGodagainstthePagans,undertakentorefutethechargethatabandonmentoftraditionalgodsinfa-vorofChristianitywasresponsibleforthesackofRomebyVisigothsin410butextendedbeyondthistargettoprovideanaccountofhumanoriginsanddestiny,fromParadiseandtheFall,throughthehistoryof“earthly”and“heavenly”citiesinthislife,toalastjudgmentandeverlastingpunish-mentorbliss.HiswritingsagainsttheDonatistsplinterchurchandagainstPelagiusweresources,respectively,forlegislationagainstheresyanddebatesaboutgraceandfreewill.OtherworksofparticularinterestforphilosophyareAgainsttheAcademicians(withTrinitythechiefsourceforAugustine’sinfluenceonDescartes),OnFreeChoiceoftheWill,andTheTeacher(amore350CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers351subtleaccountoflanguagethanthebehaviorismoftheConfessionscriti-cizedbyWittgensteinatthebeginningofPhilosophicalInvestigations).[55]PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS(fl.c.500)wasaChristianNeoplatonistwhopresentedhimselfas(andwasregardedduringthelaterMiddleAgesandRenaissanceasbeing)anAthenianconvertofSt.Paul(Acts17:34),aniden-titywhichgavehiswritingsgreatauthorityintheWest,evenduringtheperiodofAristotle’sgreatestinfluenceinthethirteenthandfourteenthcenturies.[77]AniciusManliusSeverinusBOETHIUS(c.480–525/26),bornintoapa-tricianfamilyinRome,combinedscholarshipwithpublicserviceatatimewhenItalywasruledbyGothsandknowledgeofGreekwasbecomingrareintheWest.HeintendedtotranslateallofPlatoandAristotleintoLatinbutgotnofurtherthanAristotle’slogicaltreatises.HewrotetheConsolationofPhilosophyinprison,whileawaitingexecutiononchargesoftreason.[84]JohannesSCOTTUSERIUGENA(c.800–c.877)combinedPseudo-Dionysius(whosewritingshetranslatedintoLatin),othersourcesinGreek,andAugustineinaChristianNeoplatonismcenteredonafourfoldideaofnatureascreatingandnotcreated,createdandcreating,createdbutnotcreating,andneithercreatednorcreating.[90]AbuYusufYa‘QubIbnIshaqal-KINDI(d.c.866–73),“thephilosopheroftheArabs,”activeinBaghdad,encouragedtranslationintoArabicofGreekphilosophers,especiallyAristotle,andutilizedthesesourcesinhisownthought.Anotherimportantearlycontributiontotheintegrationofphi-losophywithqur’anicorbiblicalmonotheismwastheanonymousLiberdecausis,aNeoplatonictreatiseprobablywritteninBaghdadintheninthcentury.ItwasinfluentialintheWestfromthetwelfthcentury.[91]AbuNasral-FARABI(c.870–950),“theSecondMaster”(afterAristotle),hasalsobeencalled“theFatherofIslamicNeoplatonism,”anindicationofthebreadthofhisphilosophicvision.Hedidimportantworkinpoliticalphilosophy,metaphysics,andlogic.[93]SAADIAHGAON(892–942),thefirstJewishphilosopherinthepropersenseoftheterm,wasborninFayyum,UpperEgypt.In928hebecamehead(Gaon)oftheSuraAcademyinpresent-dayIraq.Hismajorphilosophicalwork,theKitabal-mukhtarfi’l-amanatwa-’l-’i‘tiqadat(BookofDoctrinesandBeliefs),demonstrateshisknowledgeofPlatonic,Aristotelian,andStoicideas,aswellastheinfluenceoftheIslamicMu‘tazilites.Saadiah’sdefenseCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n352Biographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersoftheharmonyofreasonandrevelation,unequaledinmedievalJewishthought,wasthelocusclassicusforMaimonides’critique.[106]Abu‘Alial-HusaynIBNSINA(AVICENNA)(980–1037)wasbornnearBukharainpresent-dayUzbekistan.HewasahighlysystematicandcreativethinkerandgreatlyinfluencedlaterLatinaswellasIslamicphilosophy.Hismostseminalcontributiontometaphysicswasthedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistence,universallyapplicableexcepttoGod,inwhomtheyareidentical.Inphilosophicalpsychology,heheldthatthesoulwasincor-poreal,immortal,andanagentwithchoicebetweengoodandevil.[111]SolomonIBNGABIROL(AVICEBRON)(1021/22–1057/58),aJewishphilosopherandpoet,livedinMuslimSpainandwroteinbothHebrewandArabic.HisemphasisonthewillofacreatorGodallowedhimtopropoundaNeoplatonicvisionofrealitywithoutthedeterminismcommonlyfoundinthattradition.HisMekorHayyim(FountainofLife,Fonsvitae)hadnoinfluenceonJewishphilosophy,butitshighlyoriginalhylomorphismre-ceivedseriousattentionfromtheLatinscholastics,especiallyAquinasandDunsScotus.[135]ANSELMOFCANTERBURY(1033–1109)wasborninAostainpresent-dayItaly.AsamonkatBecinNormandy,hebroughthisextraor-dinarilyacuteanalyticalmindtobearonsuchtopicsastruth,freedomofthewill,andthefalloftheDevil.InhisProslogionAnselmformulatedthemostfamousargumentinthehistoryofphilosophy,theso-calledontologi-calargumentfortheexistenceofGod.In1093AnselmbecamethesecondNormanarchbishopofCanterbury,wherehecontendedvigorouslyfortheautonomyofthechurchwhileproducingsignificantfurtherworkinphilo-sophicaltheology,includingattemptstodemonstratethenecessityofGod’sincarnationasahumanbeing(CurDeushomo)andtheharmonyofdivineforeknowledge,predestination,andgracewithhumanfreechoice.[138]AbuHamidal-GHAZALI(1058–1111),borninnorthernIran,wasoneofthegreatestIslamicjuristsandthemostacutecriticoftheHellenizingphilo-sophicaltraditionwithinIslam,atraditionthatreacheditspeakinIbnSina.ConvincedintheTahafutal-falasifa(TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers)thatphilosophycouldnotprovideabasisforacceptingrevealedtruth,GhazaliturnedtoSufimysticism,intermsofwhichhereinterpretedtradi-tionalreligioustexts.[148]PeterABELARD(1079–1142)renouncedhisbirthrightaseldestsonofaBretonknightforthearmsofdialectic.Hewasarenownedteacher,apoet,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers353andthetutor,lover,and(againstherwishes)husbandofHeloıse,theniece¨ofaParisianecclesiasticinwhosehouseAbelardlodged.InthecourseofsuchcalamitouseventsascastrationbyorderofHeloıse’suncle,threatsof¨murderbytheunrulymonksofamonasteryhehadsetouttoreform,andrepeatedattacksonhisorthodoxybyBernardofClairvaux,Abelardbecameafoundingfigureofmedievalscholasticism.Hehascommonlybeenregardedasabrilliantbutcriticalandunsystematicthinker.Recentresearchmakesastrongcasefortheconstructiveandsystematiccharacterofhisworkinbothlogicandtheology,especiallymoraltheology.[152]HUGHOFST.VICTOR(d.1141)inauguratedacourseofstudyattheParisianabbeyofSt.VictorthatintegratedphilosophyintoamonasticethoscenteredontheChristiansacramentsandmeditativereadingoftheBible.[155]PETERLOMBARD(1095/1100–60)collectedanddiscussedthejudg-ments(sententiae)ofawiderangeofearlierauthorsinhisSententiaeinIVlibrisdistinctae(FourBooksofSentences),whichbecamethemajortext-bookintheologyfromthethirteenththroughfifteenthcenturiesandhencethepointofdepartureforphilosophicallysignificantthoughtbyAquinas,DunsScotus,Ockham,andothers.LombardwascriticalofNeoplatonismandhospitabletoAristotelianideas.[156]JOHNOFSALISBURY(c.1120–80)championedtheunionofwisdomwitheloquencetocombatvanityinroyalcourtsandworldlinessinthechurch.John’smorallyenergeticChristianhumanismdrewonRomanmodelsnotonlyfortheimportanceofgrammarandrhetoricbutalsoforadefenseoftyrannicide.[157]Abu’lWalidMuhammadIBNRUSHD(AVERROES)(1126–98)wroteinIslamicSpain.Hecametobeknownas“theCommentator”forhismassiveexplicationofAristotle’sworks.HedefendedphilosophyagainstchargesthatitwascontrarytoIslamandheldthatthestudyofphilosophywasobligatoryforanintellectualelite,butshouldbeforbiddentoordinarybelivers.TheJewishandLatinAverroisttraditionsmaintainedhisidealofthephilosophiclifeasthewaytothehighestpossiblehappiness.[160]MosesMAIMONIDES(c.1138–1204)wasthemajorJewishphilosopheroftheMiddleAges,andhisinfluencelaststothepresent.HewasborninCordobainMuslimSpain,whencehisfamilywasforcedtofleein´1148,aftertheAlmohadsconqueredAndalusia.HesettledinAl-Fustat(Cairo)before1168,wherehealsopracticedandwroteasaphysician.MaimonideswastheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n354BiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersleaderoftheJewishcommunityofhisdayandcomposedforitanauthorita-tivecodeofrabbiniclaw.InhisDalalatal-Ha’irin(GuideforthePerplexed),writteninArabic,heconfrontedtheapparentcontradictionsbetweenbib-licalandphilosophical(mainlyAristotelian)ideas.Maimonides’intellec-tualismintheGuidemakespropheticrevelationanaccommodationtothelower,materialsideofournature,butamutuallyfruitful(thoughchalleng-ing)relationbetweenphilosophyandreligionissuggestedbyhisinsistenceontheneedformoralpurity,hisdefenseofthephilosophicaltenabilityofmajorarticlesoftraditionalbelief,andhisemphasisonthelimitsofphilo-sophicalknowledgeofGod(thislastanimportantinfluenceonAquinas).[176]RobertGROSSETESTE(c.1170–1253)taughtatOxford,wherehewasanearlysupporteroftheFranciscans,includingRogerBacon,whoregardedhimastheforemostthinkeroftheage.AsbishopofLincoln(hencethesobriquet“theLincolnian”),Grossetestecontinuedanambitiousprogramoftransla-tionandcommentaryonArabicandGreektextsnotpreviouslyavailableorfullyavailableintheLatinWest,includingespeciallyAristotle’sEthicsandearliercommentariesthereon.NotwithstandinghismajorroleinthereintroductionofAristotle,GrossetestehimselfwasmostdeeplyanAugus-tinianandNeoplatonist,affinitiesexhibitednotonlyinhisphilosophybutalsoinhisactivityasapreacherandaspastorofoneofthelargestdiocesesinEngland.[194]ALBERTTHEGREAT(ALBERTUSMAGNUS)(1200–80)wasthefirstinterpreterintheLatinWestofAristotle’sworkinitsentirety.Indistinguishingsharplybetweenphilosophyandtheologyandinsistingthatphilosophicalproblemsbesolvedphilosophically,whileatthesametimeintegratingNeoplatonicthemesintohisinterpretation,AlbertpresentedanAristotelianismthatwasmorecongenialtolaterdefendersofapurelyphilo-sophicalwayoflifethanthatofhispupil,ThomasAquinas.AlbertwasthefirstGermantobecomeamasterattheUniversityofParis.[201]PETEROFSPAIN(c.1205–77)wasaSpanishDominicanwhowrotetheleadinglogictextofhighscholasticism.HeisnolongeridentifiedwiththePortugueseauthorofmedicalworksandacommentaryonAristotle’sDeanimawholaterbecamePopeJohnXXI.[206]ROGERBACON(c.1214–92/4),anirascibleEnglishFranciscanactiveatbothOxfordandParis,setforthinhisOpusmaiusadetailedplanofcurricularreformemphasizingmathematics,experimentalscience,moralphilosophy,andthestudyoflanguages.BacondisparagedrelianceontheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers355authorityofpastthinkersbutwasanunashamedadmirerofnon-Christianachievementsinphilosophyandscience,whichheattributedtodivineillu-mination,thesourceofallknowledge.[208]BONAVENTURE(JohnofFidanza)(c.1217–74)taughttheologyatParisfrom1243untilhiselectionasminister-generaloftheFranciscansin1257.HedefendedtheimportanceofuniversitystudiesforhisorderbutaimedatasynthesisoftheintellectualandtheaffectiveinsuchworksasTheMind’sJourneytoGod.ThoughantagonistictothecontemporaryrageforAristotle,hewasexpertindeploying“thePhilosopher’s”ideastoestablishhisown.AscontemporariesatParis,BonaventureandAquinaswereopposedtooneanotherintheirattitudestowardAristotleandonotherissuesinwaysthatwereechoedinthesubsequentteachingsoftheirorders,theFranciscansandDominicans.IntheDivineComedyDantehaseachpraisethefounderoftheother’sorder(ParadiseXI–XII).[211]HENRYOFGHENT(c.1217–93),amasteroftheologyatParisby1276,defendedtraditionalNeoplatonicandAugustinianpositions(hewasamemberofthecommissionwhichprepared219mainlyArab-AristotelianpropositionsinphilosophyandtheologyforcondemnationbythebishopofParisin1277),butinthecourseofalongintellectualevolutionintegratedmuchofAristotleintohisowncomplex,markedly“essentialist”views.HewasoftencitedbyFranciscanthinkers,albeitoftenasafoilfortheirownviews.[219]THOMASAQUINAS(c.1225–74)wasbornatRoccasecca,betweenNaplesandRome,atacastlebelongingtohisfamily,abranchoftheAquinoclan.AfterstudyingliberalartsandphilosophyattheUniversityofNaples,hejoinedtheDominicanorder,overstrongobjectionsfromhisfamily.HestudiedphilosophyandtheologyunderAlberttheGreatatParisandCologneandthenbeganacareerofteachingtheologyattheUniversityofParis(1251/52–59and1268–72),andinNaples,Orvieto,andRome.ThomaswroteinfluentialcommentariesonbiblicaltextsandonmajorworksofAristotle,includingthePosteriorAnalytics,Physics,Deanima,Metaphysics(throughBookXII),NicomacheanEthics,andPolitics(to1280a6).Hisownphilosophyisprimarilyfoundembeddedinhistheologicalworks.Theseincludethreesystematictreatises:(1)hisearlyParislecturesontheSentencesofPeterLombard;(2)theSummacontraGentiles(ASummaryagainstthePagans),alsoknownasLiberdeveritatedecatholicaefidei(TreatiseontheTruthoftheCatholicFaith)(1259–65);and(3)theSummatheologiae(ASummaryofTheology)(1265–73,unfinished).AlsoimportantforphilosophyareOnBeingandEssence,OntheEternityoftheWorld,andtreatisesinquestionCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n356Biographiesofmajormedievalphilosophersformonsuchtopicsastruth,evil,andthesoul.Aquinas’sthoughtisAris-totelianinframeworkbuttakesinmuchofPlatonismaswellasdistinctivelyChristiansources.[224]BOETHIUSOFDACIA(activec.1275)taughtintheartsfacultyatParisanddefendedthepossibilityofachievinghappinessthroughphilosophy.Hetreatedtheologyandphilosophy,includingnaturalphiloso-phy,asmutuallyindependentsystemsofthought.[265]SIGEROFBRABANT(c.1240–c.1284),likeBoethiusofDacia,taughtintheartsfacultyatParis.HeexpoundedandattimesdefendedAristotelianpositionsincludedinthecondemnationof1277.DantehasThomasAquinasintroducehiminParadise(X.136–38)asonewho“syllogizedinvidiousverities.”[266]GILESOFROME(AegidiusRomanus,EgidiusColonna)(c.1243/47–1316)studiedtheologyatParisduringAquinas’ssecondperiodofteachingthereandtookaprovocativelyAristotelianlinehimself,furnishinginhisSentencescommentarymanyofthepropositionscondemnedin1277.GileswithdrewfromParisandsettoworkcommentingonAristotle.HereturnedtoParisin1285asthefirstregentmasterofhisorder,theAugustinians.Hiswritingsweremadetheofficialteachingoftheorderin1287,andhewaselectedgeneralin1292.Hecontributedinfluentiallytothediscussionofthedistinctionbetweenessenceandexistenceandwrotetwosignificantpoliticaltreatises:Deregimineprincipum(OntheRuleofPrinces),amanualonrulershipwrittenforthefuturePhilipIV(theFair)ofFrance;andDeec-clesiasticapotestate(OnEcclesiasticalPower),asweepingdefenseofpapalauthorityinsupportofPhilip’seventualadversary,PopeBonifaceVIII.[269]PeterJohnOLIVI(1247/48–98)wasaFranciscan,controversialforhisapoc-alypticismandadvocacyofa“poor”lifestyletomaintainSt.Francis’sidealofimitatingChristandtheapostles.Olivialsoparticipatedinthemainphilosophicaldiscussionsoftheday,showinglittlerespectforAristotleandtakingoriginalpositionsofhisown.[271]GODFREYOFFONTAINES(c.1250–c.1306/09)studiedliberalartsatParisunderSigerofBrabantduringAquinas’ssecondregencyintheology,thentheologyunderHenryofGhent.GodfreytaughttheologyatParisfrom1285,stoutlycriticizedthe1277condemnation,defendedmanyofAquinas’sviews,andcarriedonanoftenoppositionaldialoguewithHenry.Hedividedbeingintocognitivebeingandrealbeingandheldthatevenincreaturesessenceandexistencewereneitherreallynor“intentionally”distinct.[275]CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers357JAMESOFVITERBO(c.1255–1308)studiedandtaughttheologyatParis,succeedingGilesofRomeintheAugustinianchairin1293.HeisbestknownforhisdefenseofpapalauthorityinDeregimineChristiano(OnChristianGovernment),butalsowroteonmetaphysicalissues.[277]JOHNOFPARIS(JohnQuidort)(c.1260–1306)wasanearlyDominicandefenderofAquinas’spositionsonthecompositionofessenceandexistenceincreatures,onmatterasprincipleofindividuation,andonotherissues.Hearguedforthemutualindependenceofecclesiasticalandlayauthority.[278]JohnDUNSSCOTUS(c.1265/66–1308),aFranciscan,studiedandtaughtatbothOxfordandParis.Knownas“theSubtleDoctor,”Scotuswasoneofthegreatestmedievalthinkers.HismajorworksincludeatleastthreesetsoflecturesontheLombard’sSentences,questionsonAristotle’sMetaphysics,andasubstantialbodyofquodlibetalquestions.MajorfeaturesofScotus’sthoughtincludeaunivocalconceptofbeing,adistinctivedemonstrationoftheexistenceofGod,the“formal”distinctionamongathing’s“really”iden-ticalcharacteristics(includingitshaecceitasor“thisness”),thegroundingofknowledgeinintuitivecognitionratherthandivineillumination,andatheoryofthewillasfreeattheveryinstantofchoosing.[281]MARSILIUSOFPADUA(1275/80–1342/43)wasastudentofmedicineandnaturalphilosophy,probablyfirstattheUniversityofPadua.HewasrectoroftheUniversityofParisbrieflyin1313.In1324hewrotethemostrevolutionarypoliticaltreatiseofthelaterMiddleAges,theDefensorpacis(DefenderofPeace),whichpropoundedasubstantiallycompletetheoryofacommunity’scompetencetocontrolitsownaffairsandattackedpapalandpriestlyclaimstopoliticalpowerasamajorthreattocivictranquillity.[303]PETERAUREOL(c.1280–1322),aFranciscan,taughtatParis.Hismaincontributiontocontemporarydebatesaboutrepresentationalismwastheconceptof“apparentbeing”(esseapparens),whichprovokedcriticismfromOckham.[307]WILLIAMOFOCKHAM(c.1287–1347/48),anEnglishFranciscan,studiedatOxfordandtaughtthereandatFranciscanhousesofstudywhilewritingextensivelyonlogic,Aristotelianphysics,andtheology.TheseworksarethebasisforOckham’ssometimesexaggeratedreputationasthenomi-nalistinauguratorofaviamodernainphilosophyandtheology.Inthemid-1320shewasrequiredtodefendhisteachingsongrace,freewill,andothertopicsatthepapalcourtinAvignon.WhiletherehecametobelievethatPopeJohnXXIIwasahereticindenyingthecompletelegalpovertyofChristandCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\n358Biographiesofmajormedievalphilosophershisapostles,adoctrinemostFranciscansofthetimeconsideredessentialtoChristianbelief.Ockhamfledthecuriain1328withtheminister-generalofhisorderandafewconfreres,takingrefugewithLudwigofBavaria,whowasatoddswiththepapacyoverthelegitimacyofhistitleasRomanemperor.OckhamthenwroteagainstJohnXXII’steachings,composedamassivedi-alogueonheresy,anddiscussedatsomelengththebasisandfunctionsofsecularandreligiousgovernments.HediedinMunich,possiblyduringanoutbreakofplague.[308]GERSONIDES(LevibenGershom)(1288–1344)wasaJewishphilosopher,astronomer,andmathematicianwholivedinsouthernFrance.Anabbre-viatedtranslationofhisastronomicalworkswascommissionedbyPopeClementVIandquotedbyKepler.InhisMilhamotha-Shem(TheWarsoftheLord),GersonidesshowedhimselfamoreconsistentAristotelianthanMaimonides,tothedetrimentofhisreputationinlaterJewishcircles.Hetookoriginalpositionsonsuchcentralpointsofmedievalphilosophicalthe-ologyascreationexnihilo(denied),divineomniscience(rejectedregardingfuturecontingents),andpersonalimmortality(restrictedtotherationalpartofthesoul).[323]ROBERTHOLCOT(c.1290–1349)wasanEnglishDominicanwhoques-tionedtheextentoftheologicalandnaturalknowledgebuthasbeencon-sideredsemi-Pelagianinaffirmingthenaturalpowerofthewilltoachievefaith.[335]ADAMWODEHAM(c.1298–1358),anEnglishFranciscantheologian,studiedunderOckhamanddefendedmanyofhisviews.Wodehamwasalsoanoriginalthinker,emphasizingthedependenceofcreationandsalvationonGod.IncontrastwithOckham,heheldthattheobjectsofscientificknowledgewerenotpropositionsbutstatesofaffairs.[338]ThomasBRADWARDINE(c.1300–49)appliedlogicandmathematicsinnaturalphilosophyinanumberoforiginalandinfluentialworks.Intheology,hedefendedastrongviewofdivineomniscienceandtheprimacyofgraceineverygoodhumanact.HewasconfirmedasarchbishopofCan-terburyshortlybeforehisdeath.[339]JohnBURIDAN(c.1300–after1358)wasanartsmasteratPariswhowroteonlogic,especiallysemantics,andcommentedonmanytextsofAristotle.Humanfreedom,heargued,existedtoallowustoliveasreasondictates,andwecanknowenoughoftheworldforreasontoleadustowardtheknowledgeandloveofGodwhichconstitutesourultimatehappiness.[341]CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nBiographiesofmajormedievalphilosophers359NICHOLASOFAUTRECOURT(c.1300–69)vigorouslyappliedtheprincipleofnoncontradictiontoAristotelianknowledgeclaims,withhighlyskepticalresults.[346]WilliamHEYTESBURY(before1313–72),oneofthe“OxfordCalculators”(withBradwardine,RichardSwineshead,RichardKilvington,andJohnDum-bleton),developedthemathematicsofuniformaccelerationandthemathe-maticaltreatmentofphysicalqualitiessuchasheat.Hisinfluentialtreatiseonsophismatadealtcomprehensivelywithparadoxesofself-referenceandtheproblemsarisingfromintentionalcontexts.[348]NicoleORESME(c.1325–82)followedtheleadoftheOxfordCalculatorsinapplyingmathematicaltechniquesinnaturalphilosophy,developingasophisticatedanalysisoftheintensitiesofspeedsandqualities.Healsowroteoneconomicsand,underthepatronageofCharlesVofFrance,translatedAristotle’sNicomacheanEthicsandPolitics,withcommentarybearingoncurrentcircumstances.[350]JohnWYCLIF(c.1330–84)wasanOxfordsecularmasterinartsandlaterintheology.Recentscholarshiphasincreasedrespectforhismetaphysics,especiallywithregardtotheproblemofuniversals,onwhichheopposedthenominalismfashionableinhisday.Heremainsmostwellknownforhisrad-icaloppositiontochurchwealthandforhisdoctrineofpredestination,bothofwhichsuggestedagulfbetweentrueChristianityandtheinstitutionalchurchofhisday.[351]CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmindexAbelard,Peter24–25,26–27,94,246,316AbuMashar178AbuYa‘qub108actiontheory223“actus”342AdamofBalsham94AdelardofBath25,175–76AelredofRievaulx258,271,273aeviternity52AgentIntellect104,105,107–09,110,112,115agent/activeintellect201,218,305–08AgostinoNifo268AlanofLille64,87AlbertofSaxony76AlberttheGreat34,57–58,80,177AlexanderdeVillaDei74AlexanderofAphrodisias119,133AlexanderofHales55,142Alhazen215,216Alial-Qushji179AmbroseofMilan13ampliation91analogy86–89,132,162–66analyticallanguages184angels(seealsohierarchy)61,65,189–93AnselmofCanterbury23–24,29,82,209,239,258beingofGod161eternity54–55ethics223,235–37freedom225ontologicalargument79paronymy86398onreasonintheology49stateoftexts334–35truth92AntonyofEgypt17“appetitus”342Aquinas,Thomas34,80,84,111,113,142,145,160,164–65,210,307,313angelsandplace190condemnations35,211eternity56–57,59–60ethics237–38,248–49freedom225,226friendship271–72happiness261–65hierarchy66–67immortality226–27,303languageandlogic77–78,82:analogy88–89;naming84;paronymy86;suppositiontheoryandtheTrinity90;truth93;universals201–02,203–04loveofGodmorethanself230,238metaphysics(seealsoesse):“Godexists”self-evidentinitselfbutnottous156;GodtheCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(1of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmimmediatecauseofanycontingentbeing’sexisting169;proofsofGod147–48,153;unicityofGod158philosophyandtheology6physicsoftheeucharist188–89politicalthought282–85revivalsofinterestin40,317–18soulandbody211,213soulanditspowers211–12species82–83,217Aristotle20,21,79,87–88,92,99ontheheavens178,190influenceon:Averroes98;Avicenna105,112;al-Farabi104,109;Gersonides137;IbnGabirol127;Maimonides128,132–33;philosophyinIslam98;scholasticpoliticalthought277,281,282integrationofhiswritingsintouniversitycurriculum32–34,35,179–81interpretedbyCajetanasdenyingindividualimmortality300–05logic:dialecticalanddemonstrativesyllogisms79;paronymy86;RhetoricandPoeticsconsideredpartsoflogic80,100;transmissionoftexts75Aristotle’sTheology(Plotinian)99astrology,physicsoftheheavens177astronomy,mathematical177–79passimAugustineofAncona39,42AugustineofHippo13–14,18,263,294andclassicalethics232–34freedom225friendship257,271grace222,234happiness255–59illumination219liberalarts73–74language77:divinesimplicityandlanguageaboutGod87;innerword84;knowingwordsandknowingthings82logic75,78:dialectic79;rulesofinferenceandtruthofpropositions95politicalthought278–80intheRenaissanceandseventeenthcentury40,315Scriptureandnaturalphilosophy174self-consciousness208–09againstskepticism214truth,Godas92universals196–98will221–22,223Aureol,Peter229authority(seealsohierarchy)andgrace289papal29,283,287–89,292,293itsplaceinmedievalthought40–42political286:basedonconsent286;ofcityoveritself288,291–92;ofcommunity290spiritualandtemporal287,292,295AverroesseeIbnRushdAverroism,Latin35–36,194,268–69AvicennaseeIbnSinaBacon,F.300,309Bacon,Roger76,118,142,217,218Banez,D.168beatitude(seealsohappiness;friendship)258,264,265Bede,theVenerable18,175being(seealsoesse;essence,existence)beingsofreason80degreesof148BenedictofNursia17–18BerengarCambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(2of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmofTours23BernardofClairvaux26–27BernardSylvester175body209Boethius8,14,114,175,177creation173eternity52–53,59God87,161happiness259–61logicalworksandtranslations75universals82,196BoethiusofDacia(Denmark)35,181,266–70Bonaventure34,80,127deadlysins245hierarchy65–66illumination219self-consciousness209–10truth92BonifaceVIII38,66Bradwardine,Thomas173,222Buridan,John37,182,183,193logic76,83,91,94possibilityofavacuum185–87universals206Burley,Walter92Cajetan,TomassodeVio165,301–06Calvin,J.68,247Carleton,T.C.314,315Cassiodorus14categoriesreducedbyOckham183,205transcendedbyGod87causation112,168,181–82celestial177metaphysicalandphysical112regresses167–68Calcidius175change,kindsof154–55charity249andothervirtues232,248andperfecthappiness249,250andself-love233–34Charlemagne19Chartres,Schoolof?25–26Chaucer,G.300Cicero5,13,176friendship257,271logic75,79politicalthought277–78,281ClementofAlexandria12ClementVII301cognition(seealsoillumination;intellect;self-consciousness)intuitiveandabstractive220roleofspeciesin83,216–17sensory123,215–17:internal216Colet,J.68commentaries45–46compoundanddividedsenses89conciliarism288condemnations26,35,182–83,211,247,268,270Constantine12contingency151–53,182–83Cousin,V.317Crathorn,William229creation112,125–26,127,133–35,138–40,155,173–74andexemplars197–98Dante143,245Descartes,Rene´109–10,309,310–16CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(3of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmpassimDerrida,J.321DeWulf,M.318dialectic79DietrichofFreiberg36“doctors”ofthechurch42Donatus74dreams123–24Dumbleton,John171–72DunsScotus,John34,83,127,142causation112,168cognition157,219–20eternity70freedom226,239–41happiness265physicsofangels190,191politicalthought285–86self-motionofelements192–93stateoftexts336–37unityofsoulandbody213virtue249–50willasrationalappetite(opposed)223–24DuHamel,J.B.312–14duration,modesof55–56Eckhart,Meister36,161,162educationalinstitutionsbishops’households16cathedralschools27methodsofinstructionandcurriculum28,171–72,180–81,330monasteries17,18,23universities31–32ElijahdelMedigo144Epicureans12,114Erasmus,D.68,258esse(“tobe,”“being”)andGod160–62“esseestDeus”(Eckhart)161Godis“justesse”(Aquinas)161Godnottheformalesseofthings(Aquinas)161–62subsistingesseandparticipationinesse161essence163,202andexistence111,154–56:distinctionrejected159–60;identicalinGod132,156–57eternity(seealsocreation)51–60andGod’slife53andtheproblemofprescience58–60definition51,52–53oftheworld(beginninglessness)57ethicsinquiryintothesupremegood232scientificortherapeutic114,115,116eudaimonistprinciple235,236–37,238,240–41EvrarddeB´CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(4of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmethune74existence(seealsoesse;essence)ofexistenceitself160asparticipationinGod’sbeing160–62faith(seealsovirtue)5–6,23–24,246Al-Farabi103–04,106,108–09,115,128,157FitzRalph,Richard289FrederickII38,142freedom115,136,140–41,182,224–26,241,295compatibilistsandlibertarians224–26andhappiness260andjustice236–37,239–40andphilosophy8friendshipandbeatitude258,264,273andcommunityofpossessions271andhappiness257,264andself-love272spiritual271,272–73andtheTrinity273Galen99,114Galileo174genresofmedievalphilosophy43–48GerardofCremona26GerbertofAurillac75Gerson,Jean289Gersonides137–41creation138–39God’sknowledgeofindividuals140–41Al-Ghazali98,102,109,112creationandsoul112criticismofAvicenna’sproofofGod151–52GilbertofPoitiers75,87GilesofRome38,66,252,288–89Gilson,E.319God(seealsocreation;essence;eternity;love)incorporealityof131–32knowledgeofparticularsby106,112,135–36,140–41proofsofexistenceof23,79,132,147–48,150–51,152–53simplicityof87,198unicityof131–32,157–58,159–60GodfreyofFontaines34,225,230,253Goudin,A.310–13Grosseteste,Robert33,68,142,170,184,243,244GratianofBologna28GregoryofNyssa71GregoryI,theGreat62–63,244happiness(seealsobeatitude;inclinations;eudaimonistprinciple)232,255,256,260attheendofhistory273–74contemplationcentralin261andGod260,263–64intheintellectuallife266–70perfectandimperfect238,257–58Haureau,J.-B.317Heidegger,M.321HenryofGhent34angelsandtime190eternity52friendship272,273Godandbeing162–63illumination220intellect218universals198–200heresy30–31,39,42,101HermannofCarinthia175,176–77Heytesbury,William89,92,184hierarchy60–69activeandcontemplative65–66angelic61definition60,64ecclesiastical61,63,66functions61–62,68–69human/secular64–65,69objectionsto66–68andTrinity65HillelofVerona143HincmarofRheims63Hobbes,T.309Holcot,Robert337–38“honestum”342–43HonoriusAugustodunensis63HughofSt.Victor63Hume,D.316hylomorphism127Iamblichus71Ibn‘Ady,Yahya115–16Ibnal-‘Arabi169IbnBajjah107,119IbnDaud,Abraham127Ibnal-Haylan109IbnGabirol20–21,126–28creation127education126CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(5of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmhylomorphism127influence127–28onpluralityofsubstantialforms211IbnHazm116IbnMiskawayh116IbnPaqudah116IbnRushd(Averroes)21,98commentariesonAristotle108intellect112–13,218logic76,86metaphysics149–50,151–54quasi-equalityofwomen106religionandphilosophy101–03IbnSina(Avicenna)20,35,98,167–68,201astrologyandastronomy177:intelligencesandChristianangelology65logic75,78,81,86,88metaphysics149–50:argumentforexistenceofGod150–51;essenceandexistence154–56;Godasultimatecause169;unicityofGod157–58psychology109–12:intellect110,218;senseperception215–16religionandphilosophy104–06IbnTufayl107illumination197–200,201,219–20andhierarchy62,63imagination216ImmanuelofRome143immortality110,112,136,226–27,301–05impetus186–87inclinationsforjustice/rightnessandadvantage/happiness223–24,236–37,239–41individuation207inference93–94,124innerdiscourse/word83,84–85InnocentIII30,38InnocentIV38intellect(seealsoAgentIntellect;agent/activeintellect;mind)215andbody301–05fourinsoul110andimagination110–11material112–13IsaacIsraeli93,127IsidoreofSeville15,75,79,175Islam19–21JacobAnatoli143JamesofViterbo38,253Al-Jami169JeanlePage91Jewish–Christianinteractions141–44JoachimofFiore273–74JohnofJandun193JohnofParis39,67,286–88JohnofSalisbury33,281JohnofSt.Thomas170JohnXXII39,42justice(seealsoinclinations)278,279JustinMartyr12JustinianI15Kalam98,100,102,104,105attackedbyal-Farabifordenyinghumanfreedom115influenceonSaadiahGaon122sourceforconceptof“thing”inAvicenna111Kant,I.1,252KemalPasazade99Kilwardby,Robert70,80,94,217Al-Kindi20,114LaGrange,J.B.de310,315LambertofAuxerre81,82LanfrancofBec23language74–75,77–78conventionalornatural?83–84mental84–85,205–06lawofChrist284civilandcanon280,281defined283eternal283human284,286,291–92Islamic,andphilosophy101,103natural281,283–84,285–86LeGrand,A.309–14Leibniz,G.W.F.313,314,315LeoX301LeoXIII317Liberdecausis99,169liberalarts69,73–74Locke,J.217,316logic(seealsoampliation;analogy;CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(6of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmcompoundanddividedsenses;inference;dialectic;language;paradoxes;paronymy;signification;sophismata;suppositiontheory;truth)75–76,78linguisticorrational?79–80universaloronlyGreekgrammar?100–01love(seealsocharity;friendship)ofGod224,239–40,249–50,251,256ofothers239–40ofself233–34,242Luther,M.68,247,251,301Mach,E.183Macrobius175“malitia”244,341–42Manial-Majusi97Maritain,J.319MariusVictorinus71,75MarsiliusofInghen91MarsiliusofPadua39,290–93MartianusCapella74,175MartinofTours18mathematics183–84MatthewofAquasparta198Maximilian,emperor301meaningseesignificationmerit235,246–47MichaelduBay253MichaelScott143mind(seealsointellect)asfacultyofthesoul210asimageoftheTrinity209MirDamad99miracles135,139,182,199Modistae74–75,80Moli`ere300monasticism17–19andlearning18–19,23–24monopsychism218–19More,T.258,259MosesMaimonides21,128–37educationandinfluence128,136–37GuideofthePerplexed128–36creation133–35negativetheology131–32unicityandincorporealityofGod131–32MosesNarboni118MosesofSalerno143motionoftheheavens178ofindivisibles191–92self-192–93MullaSadra99,169mysticism36,111CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(7of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmnature176–77andregularity176–77,290–91natures180,196–202,206negativetheology87,131–32NemesiusofEmesa212–13Neoplatonismandearlymedievalphilosophy12,13,15,71logicandlanguage79,84andnaturalphilosophy25,175andphilosophyinIslam99,105,109,112,114neoscholasticism326Newton,I.173NicholasofAutrecourt220–21nominalism37,83OckhamseeWilliamofOckhamOlivi,PeterJohn34,211,217,239Oresme,Nicole37,173,182Origen12,17,20Oxfordcalculators37PachomiusofEgypt17Pardies,I.309–15paradoxesofstrictimplication94paronymy85–86,162PaulofVenice76peace279–80,291“peccatum”243Pelagius222PeterHelias74PeterLombard28PeterofSpain76Petrarca,Francesco40PhilipIV38PhiliptheChancellor55–56,228Philoponus,John99PiusV247Plato,Platonism161,196creation133andearlymedievalphilosophy12,13,261andphilosophyinIslam98,104quasi-equalityofwomen106Timaeusandtwelfth-centurynaturalphilosophy25–26,175,176PlinytheElder174Plotinus12,13,36,71politics(seealsoauthority;peace;justice)andthehumangood277–78,282–83,291andproperty285–86Porphyry12,13,20,71,75“potentia”342poverty,Franciscan285“principium”343Priscian74,86Proclus15,20,36,61,71,127,161,169Pseudo-Dionysius15,20,36,60–62,169,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(8of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm288Pseudo-Empedocles127Pseudo-Kilwardby84Ptolemy134quaestio,the46–47“ratio”343rationalizationofsociety28–31Al-Razi,AbuBakr98,114–15realism39reason6,22–26,123–24andlaw283–84limits129–30andthepassions223anduniversals(divinereasons)196–200reasoningsecundumimaginationem183,187religionandphilosophy,relationsbetweeninIslam100–06,107–08inJewishphilosophy122–26,128–29,138inlatermedievalphilosophy24–27,34–35,266:interactionsofnaturalphilosophyandtheology173–74,187–93inRomanEmpire11–14representationseecognition,roleofspeciesinRichardofSt.Victor52,273right/s,natural281,293–94Roscelin23SaadiahGaon122–26,129creation125–26educationandinfluence122harmonybetweenphilosophyandbiblicalrevelation122–25statusofdreams123–24schoolsofphilosophyclosed?15–16science,asidealofknowledge33–34ScottusEriugena19,175,266ScotusseeDunsScotus,Johnself-consciousness109–10,209–10,256Seneca175,176SigerofBrabant35,83,218,267–70signification81–83asgeneratinganunderstanding81asmakingknownaconception81–82andmeaning81andnaming(appellation)86ofconceptsorthings?82–83sin(seealso“peccatum”;“malitia”)andgrace233–34politicalconsequencesof278,279,CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(9of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm285,291types243–45skepticism213–14,220–21Skeptics114Socrates98,259sophismata76–77soul(seealsosubstantialform)109,110,115,208,210–13andbody210–13principleoflife210space,created173Spinoza141Stoicism127,147andearlymedievalphilosophy12,13,259,261:criticizedbyAugustine233andphilosophyinIslam99,114logic79,80Strode,Ralph94Su´arez,Francisco165–66,215,306–07substantialform310–14oneormanyinhumans?211–13al-Suhrawardi99,168suppositiontheory90–92Swineshead,Richard184Tertullian11,26ThabitibnQurra97Themistius119ThierryofChartres84,175time,created52,173tradition26–27,124–25,308–16transcendentals88,111transubstantiation185–86,188–89,314–15truth92–93as“commensurationofunderstandingandthing”93andeternity54andGod54,92,256asrectitude/rightness92andsemanticparadoxes93al-Tusi,Nasiral-Din99,116,178UlrichofStrassburg36universitiesseeeducationalinstitutionsUrbanII49vacuum,possibilityof184–87ValerianoMagni312–13validity94Valla,L.68Varro258CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(10of11)19/12/200516:12:02\nfile:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htmviamoderna37,204virtue232,246–48,249infused,needfor250–51kinds246,248–49StoicandChristian233Vitoria,Franciscode289will221–22andgrace222asintellectual/rationalappetite223–24,237,240andpassions223andpleasure242tobelieve221–22undertheaspectofthegood237–38,239,241–42WilliamofAuvergne64–65WilliamofAuxerre264WilliamofConches86,175WilliamofOckham37,39,184,211,316eternity70ethics:enjoyment274;freedom,love,andpleasure241–42;loveofGodmorethanself230;virtues250–51intuitiveandabstractivecognition229logic76:languageofthought85;paronymy86;secondintentions81;signification83;supposition92metaphysics:God’sunicityindemonstrable159–60;ontologicalminimalism183,205,206;rejectsessence–existencedistinction159physicsoftheEucharist188–89politicalthought293–95universals204–06WilliamofSherwood76,80Wolff,C.315women106Wyclif,John39–40,67–68,207,289Yehudahha-Levi132CambridgeCompanionsOnline©CambridgeUniversityPress,2006file:///C|/wip/CUP/CCOL/ForUpload/0521806038/0521806038ind_p398-405_W.htm(11of11)19/12/200516:12:02\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n