【布莱克威尔哲学指南】社会与政治哲学 333页

TheBlackwellGuidetoSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy\nBlackwellPhilosophyGuidesSeriesEditor:StevenM.Cahn,CityUniversityofNewYorkGraduateSchoolWrittenbyaninternationalassemblyofdistinguishedphilosophers,theBlackwellPhilosophyGuidescreateagroundbreakingstudentresource–acompletecriticalsurveyofthecentralthemesandissuesofphilosophytoday.Focusingandadvanc-ingkeyargumentsthroughout,eachessayincorporatesessentialbackgroundmaterialservingtoclarifythehistoryandlogicoftherelevanttopic.Accordingly,thesevolumeswillbeavaluableresourceforabroadrangeofstudentsandreaders,includingprofessionalphilosophers.1TheBlackwellGuidetoEpistemologyEditedbyJohnGrecoandErnestSosa2TheBlackwellGuidetoEthicalTheoryEditedbyHughLaFollette3TheBlackwellGuidetotheModernPhilosophersEditedbyStevenM.Emmanuel4TheBlackwellGuidetoPhilosophicalLogicEditedbyLouGoble5TheBlackwellGuidetoSocialandPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyRobertL.Simon6TheBlackwellGuidetoBusinessEthicsEditedbyNormanE.Bowie7TheBlackwellGuidetothePhilosophyofScienceEditedbyPeterMachamerandMichaelSilberstein8TheBlackwellGuidetoMetaphysicsEditedbyRichardM.Gale\nTheBlackwellGuidetoSocialandPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyRobertL.Simon\nCopyright©BlackwellPublishersLtd2002Firstpublished200224681097531BlackwellPublishersInc.350MainStreetMalden,Massachusetts02148USABlackwellPublishersLtd108CowleyRoadOxfordOX41JFUKAllrightsreserved.Exceptforthequotationofshortpassagesforthepurposesofcriticismandreview,nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwise,withoutthepriorpermissionofthepublisher.ExceptintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,thisbookissoldsubjecttotheconditionthatitshallnot,bywayoftradeorotherwise,belent,resold,hiredout,orotherwisecirculatedwithoutthepublisher’spriorconsentinanyformofbindingorcoverotherthanthatinwhichitispublishedandwithoutasimilarconditionincludingthisconditionbeingimposedonthesubsequentpurchaser.LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDatahasbeenappliedfor.ISBN0-631-22126-3(hardback);0-631-22127-1(paperback)BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataACIPcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.Typesetin10on13ptGalliardbyBest-setTypesetterLtd.,HongKongPrintedinGreatBritainbyT.J.International,Padstow,CornwallThisbookisprintedonacid-freepaper.\nToJoy,foralwaysbeingthere\nContentsNotesonContributorsixIntroduction:SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy–SortingOuttheIssues1RobertL.SimonPartICorePrinciplesandtheLiberalDemocraticState1PoliticalObligationandAuthority17A.JohnSimmons2Liberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheState38AlanWertheimer3Justice60ChristopherHeathWellman4Equality85RichardJ.Arneson5Preference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheory106AnnE.CuddPartIILiberalism,ItsCritics,andAlternativeApproaches6Marx’sLegacy131RichardW.Miller7FeminismandPoliticalTheory154VirginiaHeld8LiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianism177JamesP.Sterbavii\nContents9LiberalTheoriesandtheirCritics197WilliamNelsonPartIIIPluralism,Diversity,andDeliberation10DeliberativeDemocracy221JamesS.Fishkin11CitizenshipandPluralism239DanielM.Weinstock12TheNewEnlightenment:CriticalReflectionsonthePoliticalSignificanceofRace271A.ToddFranklin13ReligionandLiberalDemocracy292ChristopherJ.EberleSelectBibliography319Index321viii\nNotesonContributorsRichardJ.ArnesonisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,wherehewasdepartmentchairfrom1992to1996.Hisresearchcentersoncontemporarytheoriesofjustice.Since1990hehas46essaysinethicsandpoliticalphilosophypublishedandforthcoming.Infall,1996hewasvisitingpro-fessorofpoliticalscienceatYaleUniversityandinspring,1999hewasvisitingfellowatAustralianNationalUniversity.AnnE.CuddisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofKansas.ShereceivedherMAinEconomicsandherPh.D.inPhilosophyfromtheUniversityofPitts-burghin1988.Herresearchisintheareasofsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,fem-inisttheory,gametheory,andphilosophyofeconomics.Sheiscurrentlyworkingonabookonoppression,andfutureplansincludefurtherworkonliberal-democraticremediesofoppression.ChristopherJ.EberleisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatConcordiaUniversity-RiverForestandworksinthefieldsofpoliticalphilosophyandthephi-losophyofreligion.Amonghispublicationsare“WhatRespectRequires–AndWhatItDoesNot”(WakeForestLawReview),“LiberalismandMysticism”(JournalofLawandReligion),“WhyRestraintisReligiouslyUnacceptable”(Reli-giousStudies),and“TheAutonomyandExplanationofMysticalPerception”(ReligiousStudies).JamesS.FishkinholdsthePatterson-BanisterChairattheUniversityofTexasatAustinwhereheisProfessorofGovernment,LawandPhilosophy.HeistheauthorofseveralworksondemocratictheoryandthetheoryofjusticeincludingDemoc-racyandDeliberation(Yale,1991),TheDialogueofJustice(Yale,1994),andTheVoiceofthePeople(Yale,1997).A.ToddFranklinisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatHamiltonCollege,whereheteachescoursesinnineteenth-centurycontinentalphilosophy,Existentialism,ix\nNotesonContributorsandCulturalStudies.HeearnedhisPh.D.fromStanfordUniversityandiscur-rentlyeditingacollectionofessaysthatfocusonthecriticalaffinitiesbetweenFriedrichNietzscheandAfrican-AmericanThought.VirginiaHeldisDistinguishedProfessorofPhilosophyattheCityUniversityofNewYork,GraduateSchoolandHunterCollege.AmongherbooksareThePublicInterestandIndividualInterests(1970);RightsandGoods:JustifyingSocialAction(1984);FeministMorality:TransformingCulture,Society,andPolitics(1993);andtheeditedcollectionsProperty,Profits,andEconomicJustice(1980);andJusticeandCare:EssentialReadingsinFeministEthics(1995).ShehasalsotaughtatYale,Dartmouth,UCLA,andHamilton.Sheiscurrentlyworkingonanumberofessaysontheethicofcareandthechallengethiskindoftheorypresentstostandardmoraltheories.RichardW.MillerisProfessorofPhilosophyatCornellUniversity.Hiswritings,insocialandpoliticalphilosophy,ethics,epistemology,thephilosophyofscience,andaesthetics,includeAnalyzingMarx(1984),FactandMethod(1987),andMoralDifferences(1992).WilliamNelsonisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofHouston.HeistheauthorofOnJustifyingDemocracy(1980)andMorality,What’sInItforMe:AnHistoricalIntroductiontoEthics(1991).Hiscurrentinterestsincludeliberalpoliticaltheoryandjustificationsformoralrights.A.JohnSimmonsisCommonwealthProfessorofPhilosophyandProfessorofLawattheUniversityofVirginia,wherehehastaughtsince1976.HereceivedhisBAinPhilosophyfromPrincetonUniversityandhisMAandPh.D.inPhi-losophyfromCornellUniversity.HeistheauthorofMoralPrinciplesandPoliti-calObligations(Princeton,1979),TheLockeanTheoryofRights(Princeton,1992),OntheEdgeofAnarchy(Princeton,1993),andJustificationandLegiti-macy(Cambridge,2001).RobertL.SimonisProfessorofPhilosophyatHamiltonCollege.HeistheauthorofnumerousarticlesinsocialandpoliticalphilosophyaswellasFairPlay(1991),NeutralityandtheAcademicEthic(1994),and(withNormanE.Bowie)TheIndividualandthePoliticalOrder(3rdedn.,1998).Hecurrentlyisworkingonissuesinethicsandathletics,andisapastpresidentoftheInternationalAsso-ciationofthePhilosophyofSport.JamesP.SterbaisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNotreDame.Hehaswrittenmorethan150articlesandpublished21books,includingHowtoMakePeopleJust(1998),EarthEthics(2ndedn.,1994),FeministPhilosophies(2ndedn.,1998),andMoralityinPractice(6thedn.,1991).HisbookJusticeforHereandNowpublishedwithCambridgeUniversityPresswasawardedthe1998Bookx\nNotesonContributorsoftheYearAwardoftheNorthAmericanSocietyforSocialPhilosophy.Hismostrecentbook,ThreeChallengestoEthics:Environmentalism,FeminismandMulti-culturalism,waspublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress.DanielM.WeinstockisanAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversitédeMontréal.Hehaspublishedwidelyonissuesrelatingtomulticulturalismandpluralismandtheirimpactontheoriesofjusticeandcitizenship.Heispresentlyworkingonaprojectdealingwiththenormativetheoryofinstitutionaldesignformultinationstates.ChristopherHeathWellmandirectstheJeanBeerBlumenfeldCenterforEthicsandteachesintheDepartmentofPhilosophyatGeorgiaStateUniversity.Heworksinethics,specializinginpoliticalandlegalphilosophy.AlanWertheimerisJohnG.McCulloughProfessorofPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofVermont.HeistheauthorofCoercion(PrincetonUniversityPress,1987)andExploitation(PrincetonUniversityPress,1996)andnumerousarticles.Heiscurrentlyworkingonabookonconsenttosexualrelations.xi\nIntroduction:SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy–SortingOuttheIssuesRobertL.SimonHumanbeingsnormallydonotliveinisolationbutinteractwithinavarietyofsocialandpoliticalpracticesandinstitutions.Manydifferentkindsofissuescanberaisedaboutthesepracticesandinstitutionswhichincludehowtheorganizationsorpracticesactuallywork,whattheyare,howtheyaffectpeople,andhowtheycompareacrossnationalandculturalboundaries.However,othersarenormativeandconcerndisputesoversuchmattersaswhethertheinstitutionsandtheprin-ciplesunderlyingthemaregoodorbad,fairorunfair,justorunjust.Moreover,wecanaskjusthow“fairness,”“justice,”andothercriteriausedtoevaluatethesocialandthepoliticalorderareunderstoodthemselves.Thepurposeofthiscollectionofessaysistoprovideacomprehensiveguidetothemajorquestionsthatarisewithinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy.Eachcontri-butionaddressesamajorissueorsetofissueswithinthefieldandprovidesacon-ceptualorhistoricalguidetothecentralargumentsandpositionsthatbearonthetopic.Inaddition,eachessayoffersadefenseofaparticularapproachorconclu-sionconcerningtheproblemsaddressed.Thus,eachessayprovidesaguidetothemajorpositionsthathavebeendevelopedinresponsetotheissuesitaddresses,andthenattemptstomovethediscussionforwardfromthere.Thatis,notonlyiseachcontributionaguidetoanareaofsocialandpoliticalphilosophybutitalsocontributestotheongoingdiscussionoftheissuesitconsiders.Thiscollection,then,isaguideintwosenses.Notonlydoesitattempttoofferextensiveback-groundontheissuesdiscussed,butitalsoisacontributiontowardresolvingthem,oratleastadvancingourunderstandingofthem,aswell.Inthefirstsectionofthisintroduction,Iwillattempttoplacethemajorissuesdiscussedwithinthecontextofsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,andinthesecondsection,Iwillreviewthemajorargumentsofeachcontributionand,insomecases,suggestconnectionsbetweenandamongarticles.1\nRobertL.SimonMajorIssuesofSocialandPoliticalPhilosophyPoliticalandsocialphilosophyisconcernedwiththemoralevaluationofpoliticalandsocialinstitutions,andthedevelopment,clarification,andassessmentofpro-posedprinciplesforevaluationofthepoliticalandsocialorder.Differentphiloso-pherswoulddrawthelinebetweenthepoliticalandthesocialindifferentplaces,and,inanycase,thatlinemostprobablyisblurredandshifting.Asfeministphilosophersamongothershaveremindedusintheirdiscussionsoftheprivatevs.thepublic,thisisatbestaroughcharacterizationthatsometimescanbemis-leading.Thus,althoughwemaythinkofissuesconcerningtheproperroleofthenationalgovernmentaspolitical,andissuesofchildrearingassocialratherthanpolitical,clearlynationalpolicies,orfailuretomakepolicy,canhavesignificanteffectsuponthenatureandqualityofchildcare.Althoughsomedistinctionbetweenthesocialandpoliticalprobablycanbemaintained,itmaybebestnottoassigntoomuchweighttoit,andtorememberthathoweveronedrawstheboundary,manyissuesalmostsurelywillcutacrossit.Perhapsthemostdominantpoliticalinstitutionthroughoutmuchofhumanhistoryhasbeenthestate.Itisnotsurprising,then,thatphilosophersconcernedwiththepoliticalorderfromPlatoandAristotleinancientGreeceuntilourowndayhavedevotedmajorattentiontothisinstitution.Atthemostbasiclevel,stateshaveclaimedtherighttopasslawsthatlimitthefreedomofcitizensandhavemaintainedthatcitizenshavethedutytoobey.Thatis,statesclaimtohavenotjustpowerovertheircitizensbutmoralauthorityaswell,andclaimthatthoseunderthatauthorityhaveamoraldutytocomply.Onesetofissuesconcernswhetherandunderwhatconditionssuchclaimscanbemadegood.Asecondsetofissuesconcernstheproperextentandlimitofthestate’sauthor-ityorlegitimateexerciseofpower.Aretheresomeareasthataretheproperdomainofindividuallibertythatmaynotberegulatedbythestate?Forexample,almosteveryonewouldagreethatthestateactslegitimatelywhenitsetsspeedlimitsonpublichighways.However,doesthestateactlegitimatelywhenitrequiresmotor-cyclistsusingthosehighwaystowearhelmets?What,ifanything,distinguishestheareathatgovernmentmayregulatefromthatwhereindividualsshouldbefreeofsuchregulation?Thefamousnineteenth-centuryphilosopherJohnStuartMillmaintainedthatthestatemaylegitimatelyinterferewiththelibertyofindividualsonlytopreventharmtoothers,buthowis“harm”tobeunderstood?Mayweneverinterferewithlibertyeventopreventdisplaysofbehaviorhighlyoffensivetoalmosteveryone,forexample?Soifonesetofissuesconcernsthebasis,ifany,ofclaimsbythestatetoexercisepowerlegitimately,oratleastwithjustification,asecondsetconcernsthescopeandlimitsofthatauthority,orofthedefensibleuseofpoliticalpoweroverindividuals.Evenifpoliticalinstitutionsactwithinjustifiableboundariesorconstraints,whatcriteriashouldbeusedtoevaluatetheirbehavior?Amongthemajorstandardsthathavebeenappliedtothepoliticalorderarejustice,equality,and2\nIntroductiondemocraticchoice.Buthowarethesestandardsbestunderstood?Whatisjustice?Whatkindofequality,ifany,shouldpoliticalinstitutionsfoster?Wesurelydonotwantequalityinthesenseofabsoluteuniformity,forsomedifferencesarenotonlylegitimate,butalsovaluable,whileothersmayarisefromtheproperexerciseofindividualliberty.Ifso,withwhatformofequalityshouldpoliticalandsocialinsti-tutionsbeconcerned?Moreover,wemayalsobelievethatpoliticalinstitutionsshouldbedemocratic,governedultimatelybythewillofthepeople.Butdemoc-racyitselfraisesmanyquestions.Howisdemocracytobeunderstood?Whatareproperlimitsofthepowerofthemajority?Canamajorityvote,forexample,legit-imizerestrictionsonthelibertyofthosewhoholdunpopularorevenobnoxiousviews?Oneofthemajorundertakingsofsocialandpoliticalphilosophers,then,istodevelopandevaluateconceptionsofnotionssuchasjustice,fairness,equality,anddemocracythatareusedasstandardsforassessingpoliticalandsocialinstitu-tionsalike.Thebodyofpoliticalandsocialphilosophywhichendorseslimitsonthepowerofthestatesetaccordingtothevalueputontheindividual,andwhichempha-sizestheimportanceofsuchvaluesasliberty,justice,equality,individualrights,anddemocraticchoice,isknownasliberaltheory.Theliberal-democratictradi-tionhashadprofoundinfluence,notonlyonthosestatesintheWestwhich,howeverimperfectly,trytoembodyitsstandards,butonothersattemptingtodevelopliberal-democraticinstitutions,aswell.Moreover,opponentsoftyrannyelsewherelooktoliberal-democratictheoryasprovidingthosestandardstowhichallstatesareobligatedtoconform.Canfreeanddemocraticinstitutionswhichvalueindividuallibertyandsocialjusticebedefendedagainstotherformsofpoliticalandsocialorganization?AmongthemorebasicapproachestomoraltheorywhichphilosophershaveemployedinevaluatingthepoliticalorderareutilitarianandwhatmightbecalledKantianapproachestojustification.Utilitarianism,whichcantakemanydifferentforms,lookstotheconsequencesofpoliticalacts,rules,orpracticesforallthoseaffected.Sophisticatedutilitarians,perhapsfollowingtheleadofJohnStuartMill,needappealnottothedirectresultsofeachact,whichmanyfearmightleadtoatyrannyofthemajority,buttoindirectresultsofbroadrulesorpractices.Forexample,individualrightsrestrictingthepowerofthemajoritymightbedefendedonutil-itariangrounds,asconstitutingasystemofprotectionsfortheindividualwhich,whilesometimesproducingbadconsequencesinindividualcases,worksystemati-callytopromoteutilityinthelongrun.Philosophersmoreinthetraditionoftheeighteenth-centuryphilosopherImmanuelKant,however,appealnottotheconsequencesofapracticebuttosuchfactorsaswhetheritisrationallyacceptabletoimpartial,autonomousagents.Forexample,inhiswidelyacclaimedworkATheoryofJustice(1971),JohnRawlssug-gestedthatthebasicstructureofsocietyisjustonlyifitconformstoprinciplesacceptabletorationalandimpartialpersonsignorantoftheplaceinsocietyandthepersonalqualities,suchasrace,gender,religion,andcharacter,ofthesociety’smembers.AlthoughRawls’sownviewshavechangedashistheoryofjusticedevel-3\nRobertL.Simonoped,histheorystillconstitutesamajoralternativetotheconsequentialismoftheutilitarianapproach.Itremainsamajordefenseofliberal-democraticinstitutions,whichpoliticalphilosophersmustengage,whetherornottheyendupacceptingorrejectingitsprincipalconclusions,ortheargumentsadvancedinsupportofthem.But,evenif,asitsphilosophiccriticsgenerallyconcede,liberaldemocracyisasignificantmoraladvanceoversuchformsofpoliticalorganizationasmonarchyordictatorshipsofvariouskinds,theliberal-democraticstate,andthetheoreticalapproachunderlyingit,mayhavedeepproblemsofitsown.Manyoftheseissuesconcernhowjustice,equality,democracy,andotherconceptscentraltotheidealofliberaldemocracyarebestunderstood.Forexample,onlibertarianconceptionsofjustice,thejuststateistheminimalstate,whichactslegitimatelyonlywhenitactstoprotectthenegativerightsofitscitizenstobefreefromcoercion.Ontheotherhand,manyliberals,suchasRawls,believethatsocialjusticerequiressomeredistributivemechanisms,insomecasesquiteextensiveones,topromoteeco-nomicandotherformsofequality,oratleastkeepinequalitywithinfairandreasonablelimits.Moreover,foravarietyofreasons,manyliberalsbelievethatthestateshouldbeneutralinconsideringvariousconceptionsofthegoodlife.Onthisview,thestate’sroleistoprovideafairframeworkinwhichthefundamentalrightsofindi-vidualsaretobeprotected,butsolongastherightsarenotviolatedandfairprin-ciplesareinplace,individualsshouldbeleftfreetochooseforthemselveshowtolive.Thestateshouldnotfavor,forexample,thereligiouslifeoverthenon-religiouslife,or,say,alifedevotedtocontemplationofartisticandintellectualworksoveroneofhedonisticindulgenceinphysicalpleasures.Thebasicideaisthatpeopleshouldbeleftfreetochooseforthemselveshowtolive,solongastheydonotviolatetheprinciplesofjusticeandrightsthatprotectallthecitizensofthedemocraticstate.Althoughliberalshavedonemuchtoclarifywhattheymeanbyneutrality,andtodevelopsophisticatedaccountsofjustice,equality,andliberty,liberalpoliticaltheoryhasbeenexposedtoseriousphilosophicalchallenge.Thus,yetanothersetofmajorissuesconcernswhetherliberaltheory,includingtheworkofRawlsandothercontemporaryliberalthinkers,isacceptableorwhetherliberaltheoryitselfmustberejectedorsignificantlymodified.Communitarians,somefeminists,aswellaspluralistsinfluencedsometimesbypostmodernthoughtandthe“politicsofidentity,”alongwithhumanisticallyori-entedMarxists,recommendmodification,alteration,orrejectionofsomekeyele-mentsofliberalpoliticalthought.Forexample,communitariansquestionwhethertheliberalidealoftheautonomousself,freetostepbackandevaluateitscom-mitments,ignorestheextenttowhichactualselvesarealreadyembeddedinandsoconstitutedbyvarioussocialidentities,suchasthoseofculture,race,gender,religion,andclass.Communitariansalsorejectthedoctrinetheyattributetolib-eralsofthepriorityoftherightoverthegood;basicallytheideathatthejobofthestateistoprovideafairandjustframeworkwithinwhichindividualspursue4\nIntroductiontheirownconceptionofthegood,ratherthantoendorseandsupportanoverridingconceptionofthegooditself.Culturalpluralists,ontheotherhand,questionwhetherliberalism,anditsemphasisonindividualrights,needstobemodifiedtomakeroomfortheclaimsofcultural,religious,racial,andethnicgroups.Moreover,somefeministsquestionwhethertheframeworkofindividualrightsandimpartialjusticeisthebestoneforpursuingmanyofthecomplexissuesofpoliticalandsocialthought.Thecontributorstothisvolumeaddressmanyoftheissuesraisedabove,aswellasrelatedquestionsandcontroversies,fromavarietyofperspectives.Inthenextsectionofthisintroduction,Iwillprovideaguidetoeachcontribution,indicatehowthecontributionsbearonthekindsofissuesspecifiedabove,andcommentbrieflyonsomeofthegeneralthemesrunningthroughthecollection.SummaryofEssaysFollowingtheorganizationofthebook,thissectionisdividedintothreeparts:PartI,CorePrinciplesandtheLiberalDemocraticState;PartII,Liberalism,ItsCritics,andAlternativeApproaches;andPartIII,Pluralism,Diversity,andDelib-eration.Whilethetopicstreatedineachsectionclearlybearonthetopicsinothersections,thisdivisiondoesfocusonthemainemphasisofthecontributionsineachdivision.CorePrinciplesandtheLiberalDemocraticStateInthefirstessayofthecollection,A.JohnSimmonsaddressestheissueofwhetherandunderwhatconditionsstates,especiallymorallydecentstates,haveauthorityovertheircitizensandwhethercitizenshaveobligationstoobey.Putanotherway,dostateseverhavethemoralrighttoruleandcitizensthemoraldutytoobey?Simmons’squestionisnotwhethercitizenscaneverhavegoodreasontocomplywiththelaw.Forexample,weallmayhavegoodreasontoobeythelawpro-hibitingdrivinganautomobilewhileintoxicated,becausepeoplemaybeseriouslyharmedifthelawisbroken.But,asstatedsofar,thereasonforobeyingistoavoidharmtoindividuals,notsimplythatthestatehaspassedalaw.Thequestionofwhetherstatescanclaimlegitimateauthorityisnotidenticalwiththequestionofwhetherthereareevergoodreasons,evengoodmoralreasons,toobeythestate’scommands.Rather,itismoreakintothequestionofwhetherthefactthatthestatehascommandedorprohibitedcertainbehaviorsisinitselfamoralreasontoobey,andwhetherfailuretoobeyisatleastaprimafaciemoralwrongorviolationofduty.Simmonsconsidersapproachestojustifyingclaimstopoliticalauthority.ThreeargumentsfromPlato’sCritoaregivenspecialattention,inboththeirclassicaland5\nRobertL.Simonmoremodernformulations.Afterexaminingvariousformulationsoftheseargu-ments,includingcontemporaryapproaches,Simmonsfindsthatnoneisstrongenoughtogroundclaimstopoliticalauthoritybyactualorexistingstates,althoughheallowsthatsomeconceivablestates(ideallyfreeandjustcontractualdemocra-cies)couldrightlyclaimauthorityovertheircitizens.Heconcludesthatintheactualworld,weshouldnotpresumethatwehaveanobligationtoobeythecom-mandsorlawsofevendecentstates,butjudgethemonacasebycasebasis.(Notethatthisanalysisrestsnotonlyonaphilosophicalexaminationofvarioustheoriesofauthorityandobligationbutalsoonanevaluationofwhetherandtowhatdegreeactualstatesmustordomeasureuptothecriteriathesetheorieslaydown.)Onhisview,nogeneralpresumptioninfavorofarighttoruleorageneraldutytoobeyexists,sincenoactualstatesatisfiesthemoralcriteriathatwouldgener-atesuchobligationsinthefirstplace.Inthesecondessay,AlanWertheimerdiscussestherelatedissueofwhatgroundsmightjustifythestateininterferingwiththelibertyofitscitizens.Wertheimerassumes,atleastforthesakeofargument,thatdemocraticstatesarelegitimateandasksunderwhatconditionstheyactproperlyinrestrictingindividualliberty.However,thosereaderswho,alongwithSimmons,areskepticalabouttheclaimsofstatestoexerciselegitimateauthority,canviewtheessayasaskingwhenlegalrestrictionsonindividuallibertyarejustified,orsupportedbyreasonsofsufficientmerittosupporttherestriction.InOnLiberty(1859),JohnStuartMilladvancedwhatheclaimedtobe“oneverysimpleprinciple”totheeffectthatsocietyisjustifiedinlimitingthelibertyofindividualsonlytopreventthemfromharmingothers.Wertheimerbringsout,however,thecomplexityoftheissueheconsiders.Inadditiontodiscussingsuchfamiliargroundsforlimitinglibertyaspaternalism,prohibitionofoffensivebehav-ior,andtheenforcementofmorality,healsoconsiderssuchgroundsforlimitinglibertyaspromotionofsocialjustice,protectionofcollectivegoods,orfulfillmentofthebasicneedsofcitizens.Onthebasisofconsideringamultitudeofdifferentcasesthatcannotallbeeasilysubsumedunderoneprinciple,WertheimerconcludesfirstthatMill’sHarmPrincipleisnotsosimpleitself,andsecondlyandofperhapsgreaterimportance,thatapluralityofprinciplesthatmightjustifyrestrictinglibertyneedtobeweighedandbalancedincomplexcases.Sinceitisnotclearthereisonlyoneweighingoftheseprinciplesthataloneisreasonable,disagreementoverhardcasesisatbestextremelydifficulttoavoid.Noeasyphilosophicalresolutionisimmediatelyavailable.TheconclusionsadvancedbySimmonsandWertheimerarenotdissimilar.Bothseemtoendupwithaviewthatmightbecalledjustificatorypluralism.Thatis,theyseemtosuggestthatwhenweighingwhetherthelawsofastateoughttobeobeyed(Simmons),orwhetherlegalrestrictionsonthefreedomofindividualsarejustified(Wertheimer),thereareapluralityoffactorsthatneedtobeassessed.Each,indifferentways,questionswhetheranysimpleprincipleorlineofargu-mentexistsforresolvingtheissuestheydiscuss.6\nIntroductionPerhapsthen,politicalphilosophersshouldfocusonfairandjustwaysforreconcilingconflictingclaims.Whatwewantarecriteriaforajustpoliticalorder,andajustresolutiontodisputeswithinit.ThetopicofsocialjusticeisaddressedbyChristopherWellmaninchapter3.Wellmansurveysanumberofapproachestojusticethathavebeendefendedbycontemporaryphilosophers,anddiscussesmajorcriticismsofeachone.Hefirstconsidersutilitarianviewsofjustice.Perhapsthemostattractiveandplausibleutil-itarianapproachtojusticeistoseeprinciplesofjusticeasinjunctionswhich,ifgenerallyoruniversallyfollowed,tendtomaximizeaggregateutility,ortheratioofbenefitstoharmsforallaffected.However,asWellmanpointsout,defendersofthisversionofutilitarianismhavenotpersuadedcriticsthattheirviewgivesadequateweighttomoralrightsorgivespeoplewhattheyaredue,ratherthantreatingpeopleasiftheyhadrightssimplybecauseitisusefultodoso.Theprincipalalternativetoutilitarianviewsofjusticeistheextremelyinfluen-tialviewofjusticedevelopedbyJohnRawls,particularlyasexpressedinhismon-umentalworkATheoryofJustice.AlthoughRawls’sworkhasbeenextensivelydiscussed,andcriticizedbymanycommentators,itssignificanceissuchthatanyonehopingtocontributeinthisareamustbefamiliarwithandtakeaccountoftheRawlsianapproach.Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatRawls’sworkisdiscussedbymanyofthecontributorstothiscollection.Inhisessay,WellmanacknowledgesthatRawls’stheoryhasmanyvirtues.However,hequestionswhetheritprovidesauniquelyacceptableapproachtoissuesofsocialjustice.AfterexaminingseveralcriticismsoftheRawlsianaccount,heconsidersalternativeapproachestojustice,includingthoseemphasizingcommunalaccountsofjusticerelativizedtodifferentspheresofhumaninterest(Walzer),equalityandfreedomfromoppression(Anderson),andoppressionandthepoliticsofrecognitionandgroupdifference(Young).WhilehefindsYoung’sapproachpromisingforreasonsprovidedinhisessay,healsoexpressesdoubtaboutwhetheranyonetheoryorapproachbyitselfwillbesatisfactory.HetoosuggeststhatweconsiderakindofwhatIhavecalledjustificatorypluralisminwhichwecombinethebestelementsofeachapproachtoresolveissuesofinjustice,perhapsinapiecemealfashionratherthaninanoverarchingorcomprehensiveway.Equalitymightseemlikeasimpleconcept,referringinsomewaytoidentityoftreatmentordistribution,butasRichardJ.Arnesonsuggests,itactuallyisquitecomplex.Arnesondistinguishesbetweendifferentconceptionsofequality,andoffersanassessmentofeachone.Forexample,heconsiderswhetherweshouldbeconcernedwithequalityofrights,equalityofthedistributionofsomeresource,orwhetheritisactualequalityofwelfare(sincethesamepackageofresourcesmightleadtodifferentlevelsofwelfarefordifferentindividuals)thatoughttobeofconcern.Hisdiscussionbringsoutthevastvarietyofconsiderationsthatapplytodiscussionsofequality,andwhymanyissuesconcerningthenature,scope,andweighttobeassignedtoequalityremaincontroversial.Differencesofopinionandevenoffundamentalvalues,aswellasdisagreementsabouthowtoresolveconflictsamongvalues,suggestthatweneedamorallysound7\nRobertL.Simonprocedureforresolvingsuchdifferences.Democracyisoftenthoughttobesuchaprocedure.Inheressay,AnnE.Cuddexaminesdifferentconceptionsofdemoc-racy,andconsiderswhetherdemocracyisbestthoughtofasameansofaggre-gatingthepreferencesofindividualsinordertoreachacollectivedecision.But,assheasks,overwhatmattersmayindividualpreferencesdetermineoutcomes,andhowarethepreferencesofdiverseindividualstobeaggregatedtoarriveatacollectivedecision?Cuddexplorestheoreticalcomplexitieswiththenotionofaggregatingpreferencesandalsoconsidersdifferentversionsofdemocratictheory,suchastheideathatindividualsshouldvotefortheirconceptionofthecommonorgroupgoodratherthantheirownindividualpreferences.Although,liketheotherauthorsinthissection,sheacknowledgesthatdemocracysometimesneedstobebalancedagainstothervalueswithwhichitcanconflict,shesuggeststhatasuitablyconstrainedformofpreference-baseddemocracycanbejustified.Takenasagroup,theessaysinthissectionclarifyandexaminesomeofthebasicconceptsofpoliticalphilosophy.Manyofthesevaluesarecentraltowhatwasbrieflydescribedaboveasliberaltheory(althoughsomeauthorsmaynothavethemselvesendorsedtypicallyliberalconclusionsaboutthevaluestheyexplored).Forexample,thequestionofatwhatpointindividuallibertyshouldbeprotectedfromthestateisamajorconcernofliberals.Theessaysinthenextsectioncon-siderviewswhichdepartfromliberaltheoryinsomefundamentalrespect,andsoprovideafullerevaluationoftheliberal-democraticapproachtopoliticalandsocialtheory.Liberalism,ItsCritics,andAlternativeApproachesMarxismhasbeenoneofthemostinfluentialpoliticalphilosophiesofthetwen-tiethcentury.Althoughmanyidentifyitwiththeruleofrepressivecommunistregimes,manyscholarshavefoundintheworkofthenineteenth-centurythinkerKarlMarxahumanisticandnon-repressiveapproachtocriticismnotonlyofcapitalisteconomicstructuresbutalsoofmuchofliberal-democraticthoughtaswell.Inhisessay,RichardW.MilleraskswhatisworthretrievingfromMarx’sthoughtandhowitappliestoevaluationofthecontemporarypoliticalandsocialorder.Forexample,MillersuggeststhatacarefulanalysisofwhatMarxistsmightmeanbyexploitationcancastdoubtontoonarrowconceptionsoffreedompresupposedbyliberalphilosophers,onliberalconceptionsofneutralitytowardconceptionsofthegoodlife,andonliberalconceptionsofequality.Marxistsmightalsochallengetheliberalfaithindemocraticprocedures,sinceifMarxistanalysesofexploitationandalienationhaveevensomeforce,thoseproceduresmaycontainaninherentbiasinfavoroftheinterestsofsomegroupsorclassesandagainsttheinterestsofothers.MilleralsoexploresMarx’scomplexviewsaboutmorality.HeconsiderswhatcanberetrievedfromMarx’sapparentscornfulrejectionofbasicmoralnotions,althoughliberalsmayquestionwhetherwhatcanbesavedofmorality8\nIntroductionwithinMarxismissufficientlyrobustastomakeanymoralcritique,letaloneamoralcritiqueofliberal-democraticideology,evenpossible.Bethatasitmay,asMillerargues,Marxismcastsmanyassumptionsofliberal-democraticpoliticaltheoryintoquestion,andprovidesalessindividualisticalternativethanliberalismforunderstandingandevaluatingthepoliticalandsocialorder.Feminismprimarilyisamovementcommittedtotheequalityofwomen.Insocialandpoliticaltheory,feministshaveconsideredsuchissuesasthenatureofequalityforwomen,howitmaybeachieved,theexistenceandextentofmalebiasesintraditionalpoliticaltheory,andthedevelopmentofmoraltheorieswhichreflecttheexperiencesofwomenandgivevoicetoawidervarietyofperspectivesthanthatoftraditionalapproaches.AsVirginiaHeldindicatesinhercontribution,feministtheoristsdifferamongthemselvesonmanyissues,sofeminismshouldnotbethoughtofasamonolithicapproachtosocialandpoliticalthought.Forexample,Heldpointsoutthatmanyfeministtheoristsworkwithinbasicliberalparadigmsandarguethatafullerappli-cationofliberalprinciplestosuchareasasjusticewithinthefamily,childcare,harassment,andeconomicjustice,iswhatisneededtopromoteequalityforwomen.Thus,fullapplicationofarobustprincipleofequalopportunitymightsupporttheprinciplesofmoreequitabledistributionofburdensbetweenmalesandfemaleswithinthefamily,non-discriminationandperhapsaffirmativeactionintheworkplace,andmoreegalitarianeconomicpolicies(perhapssuchascom-parablepayforworkofcomparableworth)aswell.However,asHeldalsopointsout,manyotherfeministseitherrejectormodifyliberalpolicies,regardingthemastooindividualistic,andtoofirmlygroundedonnotionssuchascontractualism,whichtendtoignoretheimportantroleofrelationshipsandpersonalcommit-mentsinhumanlife.Inherdiscussion,Heldexplorestherolerightsshouldplayinachievingjustice,andcontrastsarights-basedapproachwithalessindividualisticethicsofcaregroundedinconcretehumanrelationships.Theethicsofcareexploresthemoralroleourpersonaltieswithoneanothershouldplaywithinsuchinstitutionsasthefamily,wheretheapproachofimpartialconsiderationofbenefitsandburdensrec-ommendedbymanyliberaltheoristsoftenseemsinappropriate.Heldalsocon-sidersextendingtheethicsofcaretothepoliticalandeveninternationalarena.Andwhilesheexpressessomesuspicionofpostmodernistattemptstodismisssuchnotionsasobjectivity,impartiality,andrationalityasinevitablybiasedanddis-torted,shesuggeststhatamoreconcreteconceptionofrationaldiscourse,whichmightinvolvesuchtraitsaslistening,empathy,andcareforcommoninterests,mightleadtoanimprovedconceptionofreasonablediscussionandinquiry.Whethersuchaconceptionofdiscoursecanbestbecarriedoutwithoutthepro-tectiveframeworkoffamiliarliberalrights,andsotowhatextentsomeonewhoholdsHeld’sviewshouldremaincommittedtosomeconceptionofindividualrights,isopentofurtherdiscussion.Communitarianphilosophers,likeMarxistsandnon-liberalfeminists,aretrou-bledbywhattheyregardastheexcessiveindividualismofliberalism.Communi-9\nRobertL.Simontarianshaveraisedquestionsaboutwhattheyseeasexcessiveattachmentbylib-eralstotheselfasanautonomouschooserabletostepbackfromanyofitssocialrolesinordertoassessexistingsocialarrangements.Instead,theyviewtheselfasatleastinpartconstitutedbyitscommitmentsinconcretecommunities.Com-munitariansalsohavesharplyquestionedtheliberalideaofstateneutralitytowardthegood,arguinginsteadthatonlygivenaconceptionofthegoodlifecanacommunityavoidarbitrarinessinmoraldecision-making,andprovidethekindofcommunalcontextinwhichhumansflourish.Communitariansregardliberalsasinsufficientlysensitivetotheimportanceofcommunities,which,theysuggest,atleastpartiallyshapeouridentitiesandcommitments,andwhichprovidethesocialframeworkwithoutwhichmoraljudgmentisunintelligible.Sinceneithercommunitarianismnorliberalismaremonolithicphilosophies,itisdifficulttosayjustwhichconcretepoliciescommunitarianswouldfavorandliberalsoppose.However,tocitesomeplausibleexamplesofpossibledifferences,communitariansmightbemoreinclinedthanliberalstolimitobscenityaswellasbrutalandmis-ogynistlanguageinpopularmusiconthegroundsthatotherwisethecommunitywouldbedegradedandcoarsened.Liberalswouldtendtoprotectindividuallibertytochoose,absentconcreteevidenceofharmtoothers.(ButseeWertheimer’sessayonthecomplexityofthisissue.)Inshort,whilecommunitar-iansemphasizethevalueofasharedsocialandpoliticallifebasedonconceptionsofthegood,liberalswonderifcommunitiescantooeasilybecomerepressivewithouttheprotectionsfortheindividualprovidedbyliberalism.Manycommunitariansclaimthatinspiteofprotestationsofneutrality,liberal-ismitselfrestsonaconceptionofthegood,onethatcommunitariansregardasunacknowledgedandarbitrary.JamesP.Sterba,inthecourseofexaminingthisclaim,doesconcedethatcontrarytothoseliberalswhoclaimtobasetheirviewsonprinciplesneutralwithrespecttothegood,liberalismdoesrestonathintheoryofthegoodafterall.FollowingasuggestionmadebyRawls,Sterbamaintainsthatliberalismrejectscomprehensiveorrobustconceptionsofthegood,suchasthosebasedsolelyontheclaimsofparticularreligions,whichcanbereasonablyrejectedbysomecitizensofthedemocraticstate.Rather,hesuggestsliberalismrestsonlyonapartialorthintheoryofthegood.Sterbaarguesthatthispartialconceptioncanbejustifiedbypremisesthatneitherlibertariansnorcommunitarianscanrea-sonablyreject,andwhichleadtoademanding(socialist)conceptionofequality,ratherthanthemorelimitedwelfarestatefavoredbymanyliberals.Readers,ofcourse,willhavetojudgeforthemselveswhetherthiskindofargumentissuccessful.ItmaybehelpfultocompareSterba’sapproachwithMiller’sattempttoretrieveelementsofMarxismandwithWeinstock’sconsiderationinPartIIIofparticularisticmoralobligationsthatarguablymaylimittheglobalscopeofSterba’sprinciples.In“LiberalTheoriesandtheirCritics,”WilliamNelsonpointsoutthatthereisnoonecanonicalversionofliberalism,andthatliberaltheoristsdisagreeonawidevarietyofquestionsabouttheformulationandjustificationofliberaltheory.HisaccountofdifferentformsofliberalismdistinguishesnotonlybetweenRawls’s10\nIntroductionviewsinATheoryofJusticeandhislatershifttowhathehascalled“politicalliberalism,”butalsobetweenversionsofliberalismoftenidentifiedwithsomeversionsofneutralismandapproaches,suchasthoseofRazandSher,committedtoakindofmoderateperfectionismwhichsanctionslimitedpursuitofsomecon-ceptionsofthehumangood.Nelsonconsiderswhethersomelinesofagreementmaybefoundamongthesepositions,andpointsoutsomedistinctionsthatmaypromoteaccommodation.Forexample,hepointstothedifference,suggestedbysomeliberaltheorists,betweenneutralityatthelevelofconstitutionalprincipleandneutralityinthepursuitofdemocraticallyenactedlegislativepolicy.Bymakingroomforawiderpursuitofvaluesatthelatterlevel,liberalismmaybeabletoaccommodatesomeoftheconcernsofitscritics,whilepreservinganinsistencethatthebasicprinciplesofsocietymustbethosecitizenscouldnotreasonablyreject.WhileNelsondoesnotdirectlyaddressallofthecriticismsofliberalismmadeinotheressaysinthissection,readersmaywanttoasktowhatextentsomeofthosecriticismsarebasedonthekindofcomprehensive(inthesenseexplainedbyNelson)doctrinesthatmanyliberalsdenywouldbefreelyagreedtobyallrea-sonablecitizensinthedemocraticstate.Ofcourse,theimportanceofthecrite-rionofreasonableagreement,aswellastheformitshouldtake,areamongthepointsthatliberalsthemselves,aswellassomeoftheircritics,disagreeupon.Pluralism,Diversity,andDeliberationLiberal-democraticpoliticaltheoristshavetendedtofocusupontheindividualastheprimaryunitofmoralconcern.Theindividualistobeprotectedfromthepowerofthestate,orthetyrannyofthemajority.Itistheindividualwhohasrights,whoexercisesliberty,andwhosepreferencesareexpressedinthedemoc-raticprocess.Ofcourse,anumberofliberal-democratictheoristshavebeensen-sitivetotheroleofgroupsandassociations,suchasRawlswhoattimesspeaksofthestateasasocialunionofsocialunions.Infact,theprimarymotivationforRawls’sdefenseofpoliticalliberalismishisviewthatitcanprovideamutuallyacceptableframeworkfordiversegroupsthatdisagreeamongthemselvesonfundamentalissuesandvalues.Ifsocietyconsistsofdiverseindividualsandgroupswithconflictingviewsonmanyfundamentalissues,howaretheytorelatetooneanotherwithinthepolit-icalarena?Anumberofcontributorstothisvolume(andthisPart)refer,oftensympathetically,totheideaofdeliberationamongcitizensofthepolis(oramongpluralisticgroups),asanalternativetoabstractderivationofprinciplesfromcon-ceptionsofimpartialrationalchoice.JamesS.Fishkinexplorestheideaofdelib-erativedemocracyindepth.DrawingonhistoricalexamplesfromancientAthensandfromAmericanConstitutionaldevelopment,heconsiderswhetheranempha-sisondeliberationiscompatiblewithotherdemocraticvalues,suchasequalityandavoidanceoftyranny.Isthoughtfuldeliberationcompatible,forexample,with11\nRobertL.Simonmassparticipation?Fishkinconcludeswithsomesuggestions(butcomparewithCudd’scommentsondeliberativedemocracy)foratleastpartialreconciliationofwhatmayseemtobecompetingvalueswithindemocracyitself.Recently,anumberofcontemporaryphilosophershaveraisedquestionsaboutwhetherliberalism,eveninformssensitivetogroupconcernsandtofundamen-taldisagreementamongcitizensonmanyissues,haspaidsufficientattentiontotheroleandimportanceofcultural,ethnic,religious,andotherformsofplural-ismwithinthepolity.Inhisessay,DanielWeinstockexaminestheseconcerns.Heconsiderswhetherthereisacaseforgrouprightswithinmulticulturaldemocraticsocieties,andthemeaningofcitizenshipinsuchcontexts.Forexample,doesemphasisongroupsandwhathasbeencalledthepoliticsofdifferenceunderminetheunityneededforliberaldemocraticsocietiestosurvive?Dopluralismandmul-ticulturalismunderminethebeliefinaneutralconceptionofpublicreason?Ifnot,canconceptionsofactualdeliberationamonggroupsreplacetheliberalconcep-tionofpublicreason,ordoconceptionsofdeliberativedemocracythemselvespre-supposesomekindofuniversalproceduralnorms?Inconsideringquestionssuchasthese,Weinstockassessesmodificationsinliberalconceptionsofcitizenshipandtriestoarticulatehowcitizenshipmightbestbeunderstoodinpluralisticandmulticulturaldemocraticsocieties.A.ToddFranklincontinuesWeinstock’sexaminationoftheimplicationsofpluralismanddiversitybyassessingthesignificanceofraceforpoliticalandsocialtheory.Afterconsideringthehistoricalrootsofliberaltreatmentofrace,Franklinexplorescontemporaryliberalism’streatmentofit.Heendorsestheviewofsomecriticsofliberalismthatliberalrelianceonuniversalprinciplesthatreasonablepeoplecannotrejectinfactfunctionstoimposethenormsofdominantgroupsundertheguiseofneutrality.Moreover,hemaintainsthatliberaltheoryfailstogivedueweighttothesocialrealityofraceasaconstitutiveelementofindividualidentity.Hesuggeststhataliberalismtransformedbyelementsofwhathasbeencalledthepoliticsofdifference,asdevelopedbysuchwritersasIrisYoung(dis-cussedearlierinthecollectionbyWellman,Held,Nelson,andWeinstock),constitutesamoreacceptableresponsetoissuesofracethaneventhepoliticalliberalismoftheRawlsians.Liberaltheoristsmightquestion,however,whethertheneedtofindfundamentalprinciplesthatreasonablecitizensfromdifferentgroupscanallreasonablyacceptcanbesoeasilyavoided.Withoutfundamentalgroundrulesapplyingtodiscourseamonggroups,moretraditionalliberalsmightretort,itisunclearhowonecouldavoidonegroup’svaluesdominatingtheconflictingcommitmentsofothergroups.Thus,Franklin’sconcernthatappealtouniversalandpresumablyimpartialframeworksreinforcesthepowerofthealreadydominantraisesaparticularlyfundamentalquestionthatwillcontinuetobedebatedbothbypoliticaltheoristsandinthelargerpublicarenaaswell.Inthefinalcontribution,ChristoperJ.Eberleexaminestheimplicationsoftheideaofpublicreason,asdefendedbyliberalphilosopherssuchasRawls,anditsimplicationsfortheroleofreligiousbeliefinthepoliticalrealm.Inparticular,Eberleconsidersthequestionofwhetheritisappropriateforsomecitizensto12\nIntroductionsupportalawonthebasisoftheirreligiousconvictions,evenifthelawwouldcoerceothercitizenswhodonotsharetheirreligiousbeliefs.Accordingtomanyliberaltheorists,acitizenshouldappealtopublicreason,andnotsupportcoer-civelawssolelyonreligiousgrounds.Eberleconcludesthattheliberalispartlyrightinthatcitizensshouldcertainlytrytofindanon-religiousrationalefortheirviews,andtheyfailtorespecttheirfellowcitizensiftheydonotmakesuchanattempt.However,hequestionswhethercitizenswhohaveconscientiouslytriedtofindapubliclyaccessiblenon-religiousjustificationfortheirviewsbuthavefailedtodoso,shouldavoidsupportinglawsforreligiousreasonsalone.Hence,Eberleconcludesthatreligiouslygroundedreasonsdohaveaproperplaceinpublicdebate.Theessaysinthiscollectionhaveprovidedanintroductiontomajordebatesinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,andalsoconstituteasawholeanexaminationofmanyofthemajorprinciplesofliberal-democraticthought.Althoughnocollec-tionthissizecancoverallmajorissuesinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,thebib-liographiesattheendofeacharticlesuggestfurtherreadingsanddiscussions.Manyoftheessayshaveraisedquestionsaboutvariousaspectsofliberalism,includingitsemphasisonindividualrights,anditsunderstandingofsuchvaluesasjustice,equality,anddemocracy.Whilefew,ifany,ofthewritersrepresentedheretotallyrejectliberalthought,manyquestionaspectsofitorsuggestrevisionsinourunderstandingofitscoreprinciplesoritsapplicationstoconcreteissues.Inlightoftheseconflictingviews,itmayprovehelpfultokeeptwopointsinmind.Oneistheconcernthatifwetotallyrejecttheveryideasofrationality,suchastheobjectiveandimpartialconsiderationofevidence,ourownpoliticalcritiquescannotthemselvesclaimtherationalallegianceofthosewhoarecommittedtotheconsiderationofissuesobjectivelyandimpartially.Thismakesitalltooeasytodismiss,forexample,theclaimsofvictimsofinjusticeasthemselvesarguingfromabiasedandsubjectiveperspective.Whilesuchachargemaysometimesbetrueofallofus,anall-encompassingskepticismthatdeniestheverypossibilityofratio-nalobjectiveargumentriskscuttingouttheverygroundsonwhichititselftriestostand.Currentdoubtsaboutwhetherauniversalandneutralconceptionofrationaljustificationispossibleinlightofthevariousformsofpluralisminoursocietymayavoidsuchaself-defeatingskepticism,perhapsthroughacommitmenttoreasonabledeliberation.Whetherliberalargumentsthatourmostfundamentalprinciples,perhapsincludingthoseregulatingdeliberationitself,mustberationallyacceptabletoallarejustifiedwillremainpartofthedebatebetweenliberaltheoristsandtheircritics.Thesecondpointisthattheessaysinthiscollectionarepartofacontinuingdebate,andaimnotonlyatclarifyingthemainlinesofargumentthathavebeendevelopedthatarerelevanttotheissuesconsidered,butalsoatadvancingthediscussionandpointingtoaresolution.Perhapsthiscontinuingcommitmenttoopen,fair,andrationalinquiryisthegreatestlegacyofpoliticalandsocialphilosophy.13\nPartICorePrinciplesandtheLiberalDemocraticState\nChapter1PoliticalObligationandAuthorityA.JohnSimmonsTheBasicConceptsWeknow,ofcourse,thatmuchobediencetolawandsupportforestablishedgov-ernmentsismotivatedbyfearoflegalsanctions,byhabit,andbyvariousnon-rationalattachmentstocommunity,nation,orstate.Weknowaswell,however,thatbothphilosophersandlaypersonsfrequentlyciteasreasonsforobedienceandallegiancethelegitimateauthorityoftheirgovernments(andthelawstheyissue)orthegeneralobligationsthatcitizensarethoughttobeundertocomplywithandsupportlegitimategovernment.Itiscommontosuppose,inshort,that(some)governmentspossessmorethanmerelythepowertothreatenpunishmentandcoercecompliance;theypossessaswellgenuineauthorityovertheirsubjects,amoral“righttorule”inthewaystheydo.Similarly,itiscommontosupposethatcitizensindecentstateshavemorethanmereprudentialreasonsandnonra-tionalmotivationstoobeyandsupporttheirgovernments;thereareinadditionrationalmoralgroundsfordemandingfromthemobediencetoandsupportforgovernment.Thephilosophicalproblemofpoliticalobligationandauthorityistheproblemofunderstandingwhen(ifatall)andforwhatreasonswearemorallyrequiredtobe“goodcitizens”intheseways,andwhen(ifatall)andforwhatreasonsstatesand/ortheirgovernmentspossessamoralrighttorule.Politicalobligations,then,asthesearecommonlyunderstood,aregeneralmoralrequirementstoobeythelawsandsupportthepoliticalinstitutionsofourownstatesorgovernments.Therequirementsaremoralinthesensethattheirnor-mativeforceissupposedtoderivefromindependentmoralprinciples,aforcebeyondanyconventionalorinstitutional“force”thatmightbethoughttoflowfromthesimplefactsofinstitutionalrequirement(accordingtoexistingrules)orgeneralsocialexpectationsforconduct.Ourquestioniswhy(orwhether)oneoughtmorallytodowhattherulesrequireorwhatsocietyexpects.Politicalobli-gationsarenormallytakentobegeneralrequirementsinthefollowingtwosenses:17\nA.JohnSimmonsfirst,theyaremoralrequirementstoobeythelaw(ortosupportgovernment)becauseitisvalidlaw(orlegitimategovernment)–orbecauseofwhatitsbeingvalidlaw(orlegitimategovernment)implies–andnotbecauseofanyfurthercon-tingentpropertiesparticularlaws(orgovernments)mightpossess.(Beingobli-gatedtoanauthority,itisoftenclaimed,involvesacertainkindof“surrenderofjudgment,”withtheobligationsdisplaying“content-independence”;itisthesourceofanauthoritativecommand,notitsindependentmerits,thatbindsthosesubjecttotheauthority.)So,forinstance,amoraldutytorefrainfromlegallypro-hibitedmurdersbecauseofmurder’sindependentmoralwrongnesswouldnotconstituteapoliticalobligation(sincevalidlawcanprohibitactswhicharenotindependentlywrong),norwouldamoralobligationtorefrainfromlegallypro-hibitedtheftbecauseofapromisemadetoone’smothertosorefrain.Second,politicalobligationsaregeneralrequirementsinthesensethattheirjustificationsarethoughttoapplytoallormosttypicalcitizensofdecentstates.Mostwhohaveaddressedtheproblemofpoliticalobligationwouldregardtheiraccountsasunsuccessfuliftheobligationstheyidentifiedboundonlyasmallminorityofthecitizensofdecentstates.Thereisfarlessagreementabouthowweshouldunderstanddejurepoliticalauthorityorlegitimacy,butmuchofthisdisagreementisinfactduetotheoristsconfusingquestionsaboutthenatureorcontentoflegitimateauthority(onwhichwefocushere)withfarmorecontentiousquestionsaboutthegroundsorjustifi-cationofauthority(whichwewilladdresslater).Confusionanddisagreementisalsogeneratedbydifferencesbetweenaccountsfocusingontheauthorityorlegit-imacyofstates(orpoliticalsocieties)andthosefocusingontheauthorityorlegit-imacyofgovernments(orregimes).Thequestionsherearedistinctbutnotindependent,sincegovernmentscanbeillegitimatewherethestatestheygovernarenot,butillegitimatestatescannothavelegitimategovernments(exceptinapurelyprocedural,nonmoralsenseof“legitimate”).WhileIwilldiscussherebothgovernmentsandstates,myargumentsshouldbeunderstoodasconcerninginthefirstinstancetheauthorityorlegitimacyofstates,notgovernments.Governments,inmyview,obtainwhateverauthoritytheypossessonlyfromtheauthoritythattheirstatespossesstoempowerparticulargovernments.Themostcommonunderstandingofpoliticalauthorityorlegitimacyseesitasastate’smoralrighttoactinthewayscentraltotheconductofactualdecentstates,andparticularlyarighttoperformtheprincipallegislativeandexecutivefunctionsofsuchstates.Stateswithlegitimateauthoritypossessthe“righttorule”:therighttomakelaw(withintolerablemorallimits)forthoseintheirjurisdic-tionsandtocoercecompliancewiththatlawbythreateningand(ifnecessary)applyinglegalsanctions.Thedominantphilosophicalviewofpoliticalauthoritytakestherightsinwhichitconsiststobestillmoreextensive.Legitimatestateshavenotonlytherighttocommandandcoerce;theyhavetherighttocommandandbeobeyed.Alegitimatestatehasnotonlyaclaimtodischargeitslegislativeandexecutivepoliticalfunctions,butalsoaclaimtoobedienceandsupportfromitssubjects.Understoodinthisway,therightsinwhichpoliticalauthoritycon-18\nPoliticalObligationandAuthoritysistsaretakentobejustthelogicalcorrelatesofsubjects’politicalobligations(i.e.,oftheirgeneralmoralrequirementstosupportandcomplywithvalidlawsandpoliticalinstitutions).Thejustificationsforpoliticalauthorityandforpoliticalobligationareonsuchaccountsatleastinpartidentical.Thisunderstandingofpoliticalauthorityorlegitimacyhasnotgoneunchal-lenged.Somephilosophersarguethatpoliticalauthorityandpoliticalobligationshouldnotbeseenascorrelative(e.g.,LadensoninRaz,1990;SartoriusandGreenawaltinEdmundson,1999).Therightsinwhichauthorityconsistsaresaideithertobeonlymoralliberties(orprivileges),whichcorrelatewithnoobliga-tionsatall,ortheyareclaimrights(i.e.,rightsthatdocorrelatewithothers’obli-gations)thatcorrelatewithobligationsotherthanpoliticalobligations.Thefirstsuggestion–thatpoliticalauthorityrightsaremereliberties–isimplausible,sincestateswhicharethoughttoenjoylegitimateauthoritysurelyarethoughttopossessatleasttherighttoexcluderivalprovisionoflegislativeandexecutiveservices(by,e.g.,internalvigilantesorrivalstates),andsotopossessrightsthatdocorrelatewithothers’obligationstorefrainfrom“competitivegoverning.”Butthesecondsuggestion–thatpoliticalauthorityconsistsinclaimrightsnotcorrelatingwithpoliticalobligation–isimplausibleaswell,forwetakeactualstatestohaveclaimsonsubjects’obedience,notmerelyrightstousecoerciontocontrolpeople(aswemightthinkzookeepershadrightstousecoerciontocontrolthezoo’sanimals).Thetraditionalclaimofstatesistotheirsubjects’obedienceandsupport(andeventotheirloyaltyandallegiance),notmerelytothemeansofcontrollingthem.Soany“justificationofpoliticalauthority”thatfailstojustifythesefurtherclaimswillfailinitsconservativeambitions(seebelow),failingtojustifythecentralprac-ticesofactualdecentstates.Iwill,asaconsequence,concentratehereonaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthoritythattreattheseas(atleastinpart)moralcorrelates.Actualstatesclaimingauthorityorlegitimacyinfacttypicallymakethreekindsofrightsclaims,allofwhichrightscorrelatewithmoralrequirements,includingthepoliticalobli-gationsoftheirsubjects.Statesclaimrightsovertheirsubjects(i.e.,overthosewithintheirclaimedlegaljurisdictions),rightsagainstaliens(i.e.,againstthosewithouttheirjurisdictions),andrightsofcontroloveraparticulargeographicalterritory.Theclaimedrightsagainstalienscorrelatewiththeobligationsofaliensnottointerferewithorusurpthestate’srighttoexerciseitslegislativeandexec-utivefunctions,whiletheclaimedrightsoverterritorycorrelatewithobligationsonallothersnottoopposeorcompetewiththestate’sterritorialcontrol.Finally,theclaimedrightsoflegitimatestatesoversubjectscorrelatewith(amongotherthings)citizens’politicalobligationsofobedienceandsupport(includingtheirobligationsnottoattemptrivalprovisionofcentralstateservicesandnottoresistlawfulstatecoercion).19\nA.JohnSimmonsThePhilosophicalProblemThetraditionalphilosophicalexaminationoftheproblemsofpoliticalobligationandauthorityhasbeenconservativeinnature.Thatis,theprojecthasbeentoshowhowwecanjustifytheintuitiveconviction(ofmany)thatdecentstatesinfactpossesslegitimatepoliticalauthorityandthatcitizensofdecentstatesinfactowethosestatesgeneralobligationsofsupportandcompliance(asthesenotionsofauthorityandobligationhavebeenspecifiedabove).Itmay,ofcourse,bethecasethatfamiliarstateshavefarmorelimitedrightsthantheyclaimandenforce.Itmaybethattypicalcitizensofthesestateshavefarnarrowerobligationsthantheyortheirgovernmentssupposeorthatfullpoliticalobligationsapplyfarlessgenerallythanisnormallysupposed.Oritmaybe,asanarchistshaveinsisted,thatall(possibleoractual)statesinfactlackallcomponentsoftherighttoruleandthatall(possibleoractual)citizenslackevenlimitedpoliticalobligations.Thesepossibilitieshavebeendefended(untilveryrecently)byonlyaveryfewseriousphilosophers;butitiscertainlyunclearwhyanotherwiseacceptableaccountofpoliticalobligationandauthorityshouldbedeemedafailuresimplybecauseitsconclusionsfailtoconformtoourpretheoreticalbeliefsonthesubject.Wewill,accordingly,examineattemptstoprovideapositivephilosophicalcaseforacon-servativeconclusionaboutpoliticalobligationandauthority,butwewillalsoleaveopenthepossibilitythatalessconservativeresultmightstillbeacceptable.Becauseanswerstoquestionsaboutpoliticalobligationandauthority(orlegit-imacy)appeartohavequiteimmediatepracticalimplicationsforourpoliticallives,theyseemtobethepointatwhichsocialandpoliticalphilosophymakesitsmostsalientcontactwiththeconcernsofordinarymenandwomen.Politicalphiloso-phy,ofcourse,triestoanswernotonlyquestionsabouthowweasindividualsoughttoactquapoliticalpersonsorquacitizensofparticularkindsofstates,butalsoquestionsaboutthekindsofpoliticalsocietieswecollectivelyoughttocreate–andsoquestionsaboutsocialjusticeandthedivisionofproperty,aboutformsofgovernmentandinstitutionalmeansforresolvingpoliticaldifferences,abouttheproperextentofindividuallibertyandtheproperinfluenceofculturalidenti-ties,etc.Fewofus,however,areeverinaposition(exceptinfortuitousconcertwithmanyothers)toinfluencedecisionsabouttheselatterconcerns.Wemaycaredeeplyaboutjusticeorliberty,butrarelyareweable,individuallyorinsmallgroups,tomakemuchofadifferencetohow(orwhether)oursocietiespursuethesevalues.Bycontrast,weallface,individuallyandfrequently,questionsaboutwhetherornottoobeythelaw,supportourgovernment,ortreatgovernmentaldictaasauthoritative:whethertoexceedthespeedlimitordrivewhileintoxicated,tocheatonourtaxesoruseillegalrecreationalsubstances,toevadejurydutyorregisteringforthemilitarydraft,toengageincivildisobedienceorevenrevolu-tionaryactivity.Thesearequestionsthatareimmediatelyaddressed(evenifnot,perhaps,fullyresolved)bysolutionstotheproblemsofpoliticalobligationandauthority,ina20\nPoliticalObligationandAuthoritywaythatday-to-dayquestionsaboutconductareroutinelynotaddressedbysolu-tionstoproblemsaboutthemostjustinstitutionalstructureorotheraspectsof“ideal”politicalphilosophy.Showingthatapoliticalstructureorformofgovern-mentisjustoridealoftenhasfarfromimmediatepracticalconsequences,sincebothourindividualdutiestopromotethegoodandourindividualabilitiestobringaboutsuchpoliticalendsareseverelylimited.Questionsaboutpoliticalobligation(andaboutauthoritynarrowlyconceivedasitscorrelate),however,arequestionswe,perhapsunwittingly,grapplewithregularly.Isitreallywrongtobreakthislaw,evenifIcaneasilygetawaywithitandevenifnobodyelsewillbeobviouslyharmedbymydisobedience?Whatportionsoftheconductprescribedbypoliticalconventionaremorallycompulsory,andwhatpartsaremorallyoptional?Theanswerstosuchquestionsmattertomostofus,sincemostofustakeourmoralobligationsatleastreasonablyseriously.BriefHistoryLikemostenduringphilosophicalproblems,theproblemsof(whatwetodaycall)politicalobligationandpoliticalauthority(orlegitimacy)havegoneinandoutoffashionduringthecourseofthehistoryofphilosophy.Someaspectsoftheprob-lems,ofcourse,wereaddressedveryearlyinthathistory,asPlato’sCritoattests,whileothersweretouchedonbyaveryfewamongtheothergreatpre-modernphilosophers(suchasAquinas).Butpre-moderntheorists,thoughkeenlyinter-estedinthelegitimacyofparticularrulersorpoliticalinstitutions,tendedtoacceptasinherentlylegitimatethegeneralsocialandpoliticalorder(whichwasthoughttobeinstitutedbyGod,nature,orinviolabletradition),andsotendednottoraisequestionsaboutthelegitimacyoftheirstates.Similarly,theworriesaboutindi-viduallibertythatpromptquestionsaboutourpoliticalobligationstendednottobecentralinpre-modernthought.Onlywiththebreakdownoffeudalhierarchiesandtraditionsdidconcernsaboutthegenerallegitimacyofthesocialorderbecomeprominentenoughtosharplyfocustheoreticalattentiononindividuals’politicalobligationsandtheauthorityofthestate.Asaresult,concernsaboutpoliticalobligationandauthoritydidnotcometohavetheirplacenearthecenterofpolit-icalphilosophyuntilthegreatearly-modernpoliticaltreatisesandthemultifarioustraditionofsocial-contractthoughtthatflowedfromthem–atraditionthatincludestheclassicworksofHobbes,Locke,Rousseau,andKant.Inthoseworkswefindthetwinchallengesofobligationandauthorityclearlyposedandener-geticallyaccepted.Tocallthese“twin”challengesisperhapsmisleading,formostofthecontracttheoriststreatedthetwoproblemsasoneproblem,withauthorityandobligationviewedascorrelatesjustifiedbythesamearguments.Citizenshavepoliticalobli-gationsonlyif(andforthesamereasonsthat)theirpoliticalsocieties(orgovern-ments)haveauthorityoverorarelegitimatewithrespecttothem.Theverysame21\nA.JohnSimmonssocialcontract–sometimesseenasactual,sometimeshypothetical–bothautho-rizedorrenderedlegitimatepoliticalsociety(orgovernment),andobligatedcit-izenstodotheirpartsinmaintainingthatsociety.Theutilitarianandpositivistcritiquesofsocial-contracttheory–bestknownfromtheworksofHume,Bentham,andMill–succeededindrivingtheproblemsofpoliticalobligationandauthoritytothefringesofpoliticalphilosophy.Indeed,theysucceededsocompletelythat,withafewnoteworthyexceptions(suchastheworkofT.H.Green[Green,1882]),littleseriousattentionwaspaidtotheseproblemsagainuntilthemid-twentiethcentury.Hume,whoinspiredmostofthesecritiques,famouslyargued(Hume,1742)thatsocialnecessity(orutility)couldbyitselfexplainourpoliticalobligationsandgovernments’authority,withoutanyneedtoresorttotheartificial(andlargelyfictional)deviceofabindingcontractorgeneralconsent.OurpoliticalobligationsweresimplyplacedbyHumeonthesamefootingasallofourotherobligations.Therewasnolongeranyspecialproblemofpoliticalobligation,tobeaddressed(asthecontracttheoristsaddressedit)afterourmorebasic,nonpoliticalobligations(suchastheobligationtokeepapromiseorhonoracontract)hadbeenestablished.Instead,weweretotreatourpoliticalobligationsaswetreatalloftheothermoralobligationswehavethatdependfortheirforceonbeneficialsetsofsocialconventions.Norwastheproblemofpoliticalobligationandauthorityanespeciallyhardproblemtosolve,inHume’sview.Forviewedasasimplequestionofsocialnecessity,thereappearstobeaneasycasetomakeonbehalfofatleastmostgovernments’authority(hencelegit-imacy)andmostcitizens’obligatoryobedience(orallegiance).NearlyacenturyafterHumewrote,wecanfindJ.S.MillstilltakingthesuccessofHume’scritiqueforgranted.Atthestartofchapter4ofOnLiberty,forinstance,Mill’scasualassertionsmakeitplainthathetakesitassimplyobviousboththatnocontractisnecessarytoexplain(whathecalls)our“socialobligations”andthatallthoseprotectedbysocietyowetoittheirsharesoftheburdensofmaintainingthesociety.Thesocial-contracttheorist’sversionoftheproblemsofpoliticalobli-gationandauthorityhadlargelydisappearedfromthephilosophicallandscapebythetimeMillwrote.Anditwasnotreallyuntilthe1950sthatitreappeared,theproblemsrevived(asweresomanyotherlongneglectedproblemsintheirareas)bythemostinfluentiallegalandpoliticalphilosophersoftheirgeneration,H.L.A.HartandJohnRawls.TheAmericancivilrightsmovementandtheVietnamwarbothprovidedpracticalcontextsinwhichdoubtsaboutpoliticalobligationandauthoritywerefrequentlyraised,furtherstimulatingtherevivalofinterestinthetheoreticalproblems,whichhascontinuedtothisday.SocratesandtheThreeStrategiesProbablymostofuslivinginreasonablyjustsocietiesbelieveinageneralobliga-tiontosupportourgovernmentsandcomplywithourlaws,oratleastwouldsay22\nPoliticalObligationandAuthoritythatwebelieveinsuchanobligation(seeGreeninEdmundson[1999]).Butevenifmostpeoplefeelobligatedintheseways,weshouldnotregardsuchfeelingsasjustified,orasaccuratelytrackingtrueobligations,unlesswecansupportthembyreferencetosomeintelligiblelineofmoralreasoning.Afterall,manypeoplefeelobligatedtoactinwaysthatwecannotcomfortablysayreflecttheirtrueobliga-tions:thehousewifewhostillfeelsobligatedtowaithandandfootonherhusband,tofashionnoreallifeofherown;theblackmanwhostillfeelsobligatedtodefertowhitesinbothtrivialandimportantmatters;thebrainwashedpoliticalprisonerwhofinallyfeelsobligatedinjustthewayshistormentorshavesolongandsoforcefullyinsisted.Whererelationsofdominationandsubjectionareatissue,astheycertainlyareinallpoliticalcommunities,weshouldbeextremelywaryoftryingtodefendjudg-mentsaboutmoralobligationsimplybyappealingtothe“feelingsofobligation”ofthesubjects–feelingsthatmaybesimpleelementsof“falseconsciousness”orvaguesentimentsofmisplacedloyaltytotheonlyauthoritiesoneknows.Resolv-ingtheproblemofpoliticalobligationmustinvolvebypassingquestionableappealstofeltobligationandlookinginsteadstraighttotherecognizablemoralargumentsthatmightyieldconclusionsaboutourpoliticalobligations.Similarly,defensesof“attitudinal”accountsofpoliticallegitimacyorauthority,whicharedominantinsocial-scientificliterature(seetheessaysinConnolly,1984),constituteanunpromisingpathtojustifyingjudgmentsoflegitimacy.Onsuchaccounts,legitimateauthorityisascribedtostatesorregimeswhosesubjectsfeeltowardthemloyalty,allegiance,orotherkindsofapproval,ortostatesorregimeswiththecapacitiestogeneratesuchfeelings.Butthiskindofaccountimplies,ofcourse,thatstatescanacquireorenhancetheirlegitimateauthoritybymisleadingorbyindoctrinatingtheirsubjects,oronthestrengthofsubjects’extraordinarystupidity,immorality,orimprudence.Anyplausibleargumentthatastate(orkindofstate)enjoystherightsinwhichlegitimateauthorityconsistswillappealnottothefactofsubjects’positiveattitudes(orstates’capacitiestoproducethoseatti-tudes),butrathertomoreobviouslymorallysignificantfeaturesofthestate’shistory,character,orrelationswithitssubjects.Wecanbegin,then,byidentifyingthesemoreplausibleargumentativestrate-giesforaddressingtheproblemsofpoliticalobligationandauthority.OnenaturalplacetostartiswithabriefexaminationofPlato’sdialoguetheCrito(inWoozley,1979),theearliestrecordedtreatmentofthesephilosophicalproblems(nownearly2,400yearsold).ForinthatdialoguewecanfindhintsofeachofthethreebasicstrategiesforsolvingtheproblemsofpoliticalobligationandauthoritythatIwillidentify.TheCrito,ofcourse,isPlato’s(probablynonfictional)recountingofSocrates’reasonsforrefusingtofleeAthensafterhistrialanddeathsentence.Triedforcriminalmeddling,corruptingtheyoung,andbelievinginfalsegods,SocratesrefusestheofferofhisfriendCritotoassisthiminescapingintoexile;andintheprocess,Socratespresentsacomplexargumenttotheconclusionthatjustice(orright)requireshimtoremainandaccepttheunjustsentenceoftheAtheniancourt,outlinedinSocrates’imaginedconversationwiththeLawsofAthens.23\nA.JohnSimmonsHow,then,doesSocratesidentifythegroundorjustificationofhisobligationstoobeythestate’scommands?Threearguments,atleast,seemtobeclearlyartic-ulatedbytheLaws.Thefirstisthatthestate(theLaws)islikeafatherandmastertoSocrates,having“begotten,nurtured,andeducated”him.ThisstatusrequiresSocratesto“eitherpersuadeitordowhatitcommands”(50d–51e).Thesecondisthatthestate,inbringinghimup,hasgivenSocratesa“shareofallthefinethings”thatitcould(51d).Andthethirdargumentisthatbyremaininginthestatewithoutprotest,raisingchildreninthestate(andsoon),evenafter“seeingthewayinwhich[theLaws]decide[their]casesincourtandtheotherwaysinwhich[they]manage[their]city,”Socrateshas,“byhisactofstaying,agreedwith[theLaws]todowhat[they]demandofhim”(51d–52d).ThefirstargumentpointstowhoSocratesis,tohisidentity,bynotingaroleorstatusheoccupies.Justasachildissaidtooweitsparentshonorandobedi-ence,simplybyvirtueofthenonvoluntaryrole(“child”or“offspring”)itoccu-pies,soSocrates,havingbeen“begotten”bythestate,owesthestatehonorandobedience.Thus,Socrates’obligationstothestate,onthismodel,are“roleobli-gations,”“obligationsofstatus,”or“associativeobligations.”Iwillhereafterrefertoaccountsofpoliticalobligationthatexplaintheobligationinthiswayas“asso-ciativeaccounts”ofpoliticalobligation.ThesecondargumentpointstowhatSocrateshasreceived:Athenshasprovidedhim,asitprovidesallitscitizens,withnumeroussignificantbenefits;andtherecip-ientsofimportantbenefitsowetheirbenefactorsafairreturnforthem.ThethirdargumentpointstowhatSocrateshasdone:hehasfreely,ifonlyimplicitly,con-sentedoragreedtoabidebytheverdictsofAthens’courts(and,presumably,agreedaswelltogoalongwiththeotherbasicwaysinwhichthecityismanaged).ThesecondandthirdargumentsemployedbySocrates(throughtheLaws)appealnottowhoSocratesis,ortowhatroleheoccupies,butrathertothenatureofhismorallysignificantinteractionsortransactionswiththestate.Ithasbene-fitedhim.Hehaspromisedoragreedtoobey.Whilethesecondofthesetrans-actions(theagreement)isnecessarilyvoluntary(ifitistobebinding),andthefirst(thebenefaction)neednotbe,bothargumentsconcernwhathasbeendonebyorforSocrates.Iwillcallaccountsofpoliticalobligationthatappealtosuchjustifications“transactionalaccounts.”ThethreeargumentsspecificallyindividuatedbytheLawsintheCritoallappealtoeitherassociativeortransactionalobligationstothestate,obligationswhichbindnotonlySocratesbut(presumably)manyorallofhisfellowcitizensaswell.ButSocrates(throughtheLaws)doesalsoapparentlyadvanceinthedialogueotherkindsofconsiderationsthatseemtobearonhisobligationstothestate.Forinstance,theveryfirstresponsemadebytheLawsagainstCrito’sproposalforescapeisthis:“Doyouintendtodoanythingelsebythisexploit...thantodestroybothourselvesthelawsandtheentirecity–atleastasfarasyoucan?”(50a–b).Ifprivateindividualsinthecitydisregardtheircourts’lawfulverdicts,forinstance,thecitycannotlongsurvive;anditisthisdestructionatwhichSocrates’proposedescapemustbetakentoaim.24\nPoliticalObligationandAuthorityThereisavarietyofwaysinwhichthisargumentmightbeunderstood.Socratessurelydoesnotwanttoarguethat(aimingat)thedestructionofanycity,inanycircumstances,iswrongorunjust.Thedestructionof(e.g.)deeplyunjustcities,ofcitiesinvolvedingenocide,ofcitieswithwhichoneis(legitimately)atwar,andsoon,maybeagoodthingtotrytoaccomplish,notawrong.SoitmaybethatSocratesinsteadintendsfortheLawstoargueonlythatitiswrongto(tryto)destroyacitytowhichoneantecedentlyowesindefeasibleobligationsofhonorandobedience–suchasthosewhichSocratesowestoAthens,butwhichhedoesnotowetoSparta,andwouldnot(perhaps)owetoanimaginary,genocidalAthens.Thatwouldmakethe“argumentfromdestructiveness”asimplesupple-menttothethreeargumentswehavealreadydiscussed.Butthereareotherpossiblewaysofreadingthe“argumentfromdestructive-ness”whichseeitasadvancinganapproachtotheproblemwhichisbothfree-standingandquitedifferentfromtheassociativeandtransactionalapproaches.TwoobviouspossibilitiesaretoreadSocrates’argumenteitherasadirectconse-quentialistargumentorasaconsequentialistgeneralization(a“Whatifeveryonedidthat?”)argumentagainstdisobedience.Onthedirectconsequentialistreading,theclaimwouldbethatSocrates’escapewouldbewrongbecauseitwouldhaveworseconsequencesthanwouldhisremainingtofacehislawfulpunishment.Theescapewouldcontributeincrementallytoaquiteawfulpossibleresult(destruc-tionoftheLaws)andmightwellencourageotherstodothesame.Onthecon-sequentialistgeneralizationreadingoftheargument,Socrateswouldbeclaimingthatescapingwouldbewrongbecauseifothers,similarlysituated,didthesame,theconsequenceswouldbefarworsethanifothers,similarlysituated,remainedtofacetheirpunishments.Noappealtotheactual,expectableresultsofSocrates’escaping(asonthedirectconsequentialistline)isnecessaryhere;thehypotheti-calconsequencesofgeneralizedescapeinsimilarcircumstancesissupposedtobesufficientbyitselftoestablishthewrongnessofescape.Neitherofthesereadingsofthetextmakestheargumentconvincing,butbothreadingsanticipatelater(18th–20thcentury)attemptstodefendutilitarianaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthority.DirectconsequentialistargumentsforobediencefailinourdayforthesamereasontheydidinSocrates’day:itsimplyseemsempiricallyfalsethatSocrates’escapewouldeitherhavemadeaninterest-ingincrementalcontributiontoabadendorhaveencouragedenoughotherstodisobeythatAthenianlawwouldhavebeenweakened.Moregenerally,whiledis-obediencemayoftenhaveworsedirectconsequencesthanobedience,thereisnoguaranteethatthiswillbethecase,andweareallfamiliarwithcommonplaceinstancesinwhichitquiteplainlyisnotthecase.Similarly,so-calledargumentsfrom“necessity”forauthorityandpoliticalobligation–whichmaintainthatauthoritytoactisjustifiedforthosewhoperform“necessary”tasks,suchasimpos-ingtheruleoflawonasociety(e.g.,AnscombeinRaz,1990)–seemutterlyunabletoexplainwhyauthorityshouldextendasfarasthosefrequentinstancesinwhichcompliancewithauthoritativecommandssimplyisnotessentialtotheaccomplishmentofthestate’snecessarytasks.25\nA.JohnSimmonsTheactuallanguageusedbytheLaws,ofcourse,looksmorelikeanappealtoconsequentialistgeneralization,buttheargumentfaresnobetterifwereaditthatway.Forconsequentialistgeneralizationargumentsareeitherthoroughlyimplau-sibleorsimplyextensionallyequivalenttodirectconsequentialistarguments.Ifeveryoneatelunchatnoon,theconsequencesforsocietywouldbefarworsethanifpeopleatetheirlunchesatdifferenttimes.Butfromthisitsurelydoesnotfollowthatitwouldbewrongformetoeatlunchatnoon.Ifweadjusttheexamplesothattheargumentyieldsthedesiredconclusion–bygeneralizingovermorespe-cificacts,suchaseatinglunchatnoonwhendoingsowouldhavebaddirectcon-sequences–wesimplyrendertheargumentequivalenttoadirectconsequentialistargument.Consequentialist(includingutilitarian)theoriesofobligationandauthoritycan,ofcourse,beadvancedinmoresophisticated“rule-consequentialist”formsinwhichtheyarenotequivalenttodirectconsequentialistarguments.Butsuchapproachesfacetheequallydauntingproblemofexplainingwhytheydonotcountasendorsingrule-followingincircumstanceswhereitissimplyirrational(fromaconsequentialistviewpoint)toconformone’sconducttotherule.Theseobsta-cles,alongwiththedifficultiessuchtheoriesfaceontheissueofparticularity(seebelow),seemtomesufficienttorenderunconvincingallconsequentialist(and“necessity”)accountsofpoliticalobligationandauthority,regardlessofform.Thereis,however,atleastoneother,nonconsequentialistreadingofthe“argu-mentfromdestructiveness”thatwemightconsiderhere.Asalreadysuggested,itseemsunlikelythatSocratesintendstocategoricallyopposethedestructionofanystateonanyoccasion.Whichcities,then,ishesayingthatwemustnot(tryto)destroy?PerhapsSocrates’ideaisnotthatitiswrongforhimto(tryto)destroyAthensperse,orthatitiswrongforcitizensgenerallyto(tryto)destroythestatesthathavebegottenandnurturedthem,orthestateswithwhichtheyhavemadeagreements,butinsteadthatitiswrongforanyoneto(tryto)destroyanyjustorgoodstate.TheLaws’speechmakesitclearthatSocrateshasnocomplaintwithAthenianlawandgovernment.PerhapshedoesnotregardAthensasamodelcity,butheatleastseemstoregarditasacceptablyjustorgood.TheLaws,remem-ber,remindSocratesthat“asthingsstand,youwillleavehere,ifyoudo,wrongednotbyusthelawsbutbymen”(54c).Onthisreadingoftheargument,then,becauseSocrateshasanobligationnevertodoaninjustice,andbecauseitisunjustto(attemptto)subvertajustcity,Socrateshasanobligationnotto(tryto)subverthisownjustcity.Thejusticeorgoodnessofcitiesbindsustorespectorsupportthem.Theappropriatereplytosuchanargumentwillhavetoawaitourconsidera-tionoftheparticularityproblem.Here,however,weshouldnoticethat,liketheconsequentialistreadingsofthe“argumentfromdestructiveness,”thereadingofitasanargumentfromjusticetakesthewrongnessofSocrates’disobediencetobeexplainedbyneithertransactionalnorassociative“facts”aboutSocratesandAthens.ItisnotwhoSocratesis,whotheLawsareinrelationtohim,what26\nPoliticalObligationandAuthoritySocrateshasdoneorwhathasbeengiventohimbyAthensthat(onthisstrat-egy)explainshisobligationnotto(tryto)destroyAthens.Itisratherthemoralqualityofthestateandtheimpartialmoralvaluesthathisobediencetothestatewillpromote–valuessuchassocialhappinessorsocialjustice.Ourgeneraldutiestoadvanceorrespectsuchvalues,by(inthiscase)upholdingtheinstitutionsthatembodyandpromotethem,iswhatexplainsthewrongnessofSocrates’proposedescape,onallofthethreereadingsofthe“argumentfromdestructiveness.”Iwillrefertoaccountsofpoliticalobligationthatappealinthiswaytogeneraldutiestopromoteutility,justice,orotherimpartialmoralvaluesas“naturaldutyaccounts.”Iwantnowtosuggestthatalloftheaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthor-ityfamiliartousfromWesternpoliticalphilosophycanbeclassifiedasbelongingtooneofthethreegeneraltypes(orstrategies)thatwehavediscoveredin(orreadinto)theargumentoftheCrito.Naturaldutyaccounts,aswehaveseen,havebeenadvancedbyboththeclassicalandcontemporaryutilitarians.Butthe“justice”variantofthenaturaldutyapproachisalsomuchinevidence,intheworkofKantandthemanycontemporaryKantians(includingRawls,1971;WaldroninEdmundson,1999).Associativeaccountsofpoliticalobligation(andofcorrel-ativepoliticalauthority)arefamiliartousfromtheworkofcontemporarycom-munitarians,whothemselvesareroutinelyinspiredbytheworkofAristotle,Burke,Hegel,orWittgenstein.Andtransactionalaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthorityarethemostfamiliarofall,giventhecentrality,inwritingsonthosetop-ics,oftheconsentandcontracttraditionsofthought.Consenttheory,ofcourse,wasgivenitsfirstclearformulationbyLockeandisappealedtointhefoun-dationalpoliticaldocumentsofmanymodernnations(includingtheAmericanDeclarationofIndependence).Butreciprocationtheories–whichfindouroblig-ations(andcorrelativeauthority)inourresponsibilitiestoreciprocatefortheben-efitswereceivefromourstatesorgovernments–areequallytransactionalinnature;andtheybothcapturemuchcommonsensethinkingaboutpoliticalobli-gationandauthorityandhavebeenamplyrepresentedinthewritingsofcontem-porarypoliticalphilosophy.Thedetailsandvariantsof,alongwiththeproblemsfacedby,thethreestrategiesidentifiedherewillbemorepreciselyspecifiedbelow.ParticularityandNaturalDutyAccountsInordertobecleareraboutmyproposedclassificationoftheoriesofpoliticalobligation–andinordertobecleareraboutthekindofmoralrequirementweshouldbepreparedtocountasa“politicalobligation”–itisnecessarytomakesomerelativelyelementaryobservationsaboutthenatureofmoralrequirements.Letussayfirst,thatallmoralrequirementsareeithergeneralorspecialrequire-ments,andsecond,thatallmoralrequirementsareeithervoluntaryornonvolun-27\nA.JohnSimmonstary.Moralrequirementsaregeneralwhentheybindpersonsirrespectiveoftheirspecialroles,relationships,orperformances.Thus,dutiesnottomurder,assault,orstealcountasgeneralrequirements,asdodutiestopromoteimpartialvalueslikejusticeorhappiness.Suchdutiesarecommonlysaidtobeowedtohumanityortopersonsgenerally–ornotowedtoanyoneatall.Specialrequirements,bycontrast,arisefrom(orwith)specialrelationshipswehave(orcreate)withpar-ticularothersorgroups;andthesespecialrequirementsareowedspecificallytothoseothersorgroups.Sopromissoryorcontractualobligations,obligationstocooperatewithincollectiveenterprisesorgroups,andobligationstofriends,neigh-bors,orfamilymemberswillallbespecialmoralrequirements.Evenmorefamil-iaristhe(related,butnotidentical)divisionofmoralrequirementsintothosewehavebecauseofsomevoluntaryperformanceofourown–suchasapromise,thefreeacceptanceofbenefits,injuringanother,orfreelybringingachildintotheworld–andthosethatfallonusnonvoluntarily,simplybecausewearepersonsorbecauseweoccupysomenonvoluntaryroleorstatus.Thesetwoexhaustivedichotomiesmightatfirstappeartogiveusfourgeneralclassesofmoralrequirements:general,voluntary;general,nonvoluntary;special,voluntary;andspecial,nonvoluntary.Butthefirstofthesesuggestedclassesofmoralrequirement–thegeneral,voluntary–seemsclearlytobeempty,indeedself-contradictory.Voluntaryactscannotbothgroundmoralrequirementsanddosoirrespectiveofourspecialrelationshipsorperformances;morallysignificantvol-untaryactsaremorallysignificantpreciselybyvirtueofcreatingorconstitutingsuchspecialrelationshipsorperformances.SoIwillsaythatallmoralrequirementsbelongtooneofthreeclasses:general,nonvoluntary;special,voluntary;orspecial,nonvoluntary.Itisimportanttosee,Ithink,thatthethreestrategiesforsolvingtheproblemofpoliticalobligation–theassociative,thetransactional,andthenaturalduty–utilizeintheiraccountsquitedifferentkindsofmoralrequirements.Naturaldutyapproaches,focusingastheydoontherequirementtopromoteimpartialvalues,plainlycharacterizeourpoliticalobligationsaswhatIhavecalledgeneral,non-voluntarymoralrequirements.Associativeapproaches,withtheiremphasisonnonvoluntaryroles,clearlyidentifyourpoliticalobligationsasspecial,nonvolun-tarymoralrequirements.Finally,transactionalapproachesmayeitherutilizespecial,nonvoluntaryrequirements–aswhenSocratespointstothedebtheowesforbenefitshereceivednonvoluntarily(thatis,“nonvoluntarily”inthesensethathehadnooptionofrefusingthem)–orutilizespecial,voluntaryrequirements,suchastheobligationSocratesclaimsheowesAthensbyvirtueoftheimplicitagreementhefreelymadewiththestate.Fromthesesimpleobservationsaboutthethreestrategies,animportantpointfollows.Theassociativeandthetransactionalstrategieshaveaclearadvantageoverthenaturaldutyapproach,bydefendingaccountsofpoliticalobligationthatseemtosquarebetterwithourordinaryconceptionofthatobligation.Boththeasso-ciativeandthetransactionalstrategiesinvolveclaimingthatourpoliticalobliga-tionsarespecialmoralrequirements.Thatmeans,aswehaveseen,thatpolitical28\nPoliticalObligationandAuthorityobligations(ontheseapproaches)willbebasedinourspecialtransactions,rela-tionshipsorroles,andwillbeowedtoparticularothersorgroups.Thenaturaldutyapproaches,however,understandourpoliticalobligationsasgeneralrequire-ments,whichbindusirrespectiveofthesespecialfeaturesofourlivesandwhichareowedtopersonsgenerallyortonobodyatall.Nowitis,aswehavealsoseen,commontounderstandourpoliticalobliga-tionsasmoralrequirementsthatbindusspeciallytoourowncountries(commu-nities,governments,states,constitutions)aboveallothers,andthatarebasedinthespecialrelationshipsordealingswehavewithourowncountriesorfellowcit-izens.Politicalobligations,wetypicallysuppose,areowedtoourparticularstates,governments,orfellowcitizens.Anditseemsclearthattheassociativeandtrans-actionalstrategies,byappealingtospecialmoralrequirementsintheiraccounts,caneasilyexplainthesefeaturesofordinarythoughtaboutpoliticalobligationinawaythatnaturaldutystrategiescannot.Thisistheproblemofparticularity.Politicalobligations,properlyunderstood,mustbindustooneparticularpoliticalcommunityorgovernmentinawaythatisspecial;ifanobligationordutyisnot“particularized”inthisway,itcannotbewhatweordinarilythinkofasapoliticalobligation.Aswehaveseen,politicalobligationsareassociatedwithbondsofobedience,allegiance,loyalty,andgoodcitizenship.Butwedonotnormallysupposethatitispossibletofullysatisfysuchrequirementswithrespecttomanypoliticalcommunitiesatthesametime;indeed,itmaybeincoherenttosupposethis.Ifpoliticalobligationsarespecialrequire-ments,thisparticularityrequirementseemstobestraightforwardlysatisfied.Socrateswastheoffspringofonlyonepoliticalcommunity,wasgiventhegoodsofcitizenshipbyonlyonecommunity,andonlypromisedto“persuadeorobey”onestate’slaws.Indeed,evenifsomemorecosmopolitanSocrateshadsubse-quentlymadepromisesto(orreceivedgoodsfrom)otherstates,hecouldacquireobligationstosecond(andsubsequent)statesonlyinsofarastheseobligationswereconsistentwithhispriorobligationstoAthens.Andwemaysuppose,Ithink,thatthismeansthathisobligationstootherstates,howeverreal,wouldhavetobeincertainways–andperhapsinmanyimportantways–lesscompletethanorsecondarytohisobligationstoAthens.Thus,(ourcounterfactual)Socrates’trueorprimaryobligationswouldstillallbespeciallyowedtooneparticularstate,astheparticularityrequirementdemands.Onecan,ofcourse,consistentlysatisfythelegaldemandsofmorethanonestateatonce,asholdersofmultiplecitizenshiproutinelydo.Onecanpayrequiredtaxestomorethanonestate,obeythelawsinmorethanonestate,evenserveinthemilitaryofmorethanonestate,andsoon.Whatislesscleariswhetheronecansatisfyallofthepossibledemandsofobedienceandsupporttomorethanonestatesimultaneously,orevenfulfillone’sbasiclegaldutieswherethesearesimplymorerestrictivethanwemightlikethemtobe.Wecannotconsistentlybeoblig-atedto“serve(inthemilitary,onajury)whencalled”inmorethanonestate.Wecannothonestlyacceptanobligationtodefendmorethanonestate“againstallenemies,foreignordomestic.”Norcanwebothobeylegalcommandsfrom29\nA.JohnSimmonsourgovernmenttorefrainfromdealingswith,say,Iraq,andstillsatisfypoliticalobligationswemightsupposeweowetoIraq.Politicalobligation,asthisiscom-monlyunderstood,requiresakindofexclusivityinmanyofourdealingswithpoliticalcommunities.Itisonlygoodfortunethatallowsholdersofdualcitizen-shiptosatisfyallofthepoliticalobligationsthatwenormallysupposecitizenslieunder.Butitmaywellbethatinthefinalanalysis,ifwereallybelievethatallcitizensowetheirstatespoliticalobligations,wemustbelieveaswellthattheposi-tionofdual(ormultiple)citizenshipissimplymorallyuntenable.Andthatwouldseemtoimplythattransactionalandassociativeaccountsofpoliticalobligationonlycanjustifyorexplainobligationsspeciallyowedtooneparticularstate,aboveallothers,astheparticularityrequirementdemands.Naturaldutyaccountsofpoliticalobligation,asI’vecharacterizedthemabove,portrayourpoliticalobligationsinsteadasbelongingtotheclassofgeneralmoralduties.Thesedutiesbindthosewhohavethemnotbecauseofanythingthosepersonshavedone,orbecauseofthespecialpositionsthosepersonsoccupy,butbecauseofthemoralcharacteroftherequiredacts.Justicemustbedoneandpro-motedbecauseofthemoralvalueorimportanceofjustice,period.Happinessmustbepromotedbecausehappinessisgood.Murdermustberefrainedfrombecauseofthemoralsignificanceofmurder.Thismeansthatmygeneralmoraldutieswillholdasstronglywithrespecttostatesthatarenotmyownandpersonswhoarenotmyfellowcitizensastheydowithrespecttothosethatare.MurderingRussiansisaswrongasmurderingAmericans.ThehappinessofIsraelisisasvalu-ableasthehappinessofmyneighbors.JustSwedishpoliticalinstitutionsmeritsupportasmuchas,andforthesamereasonasdo,justpoliticalinstitutionsintheUnitedStates.Becauseallthisistrue,itisdifficulttoseehowageneralmoralduty,ofthesortemployedinnaturaldutyaccountsofpoliticalobligation,couldeverbindcitizensspeciallytotheirownparticularcountries,communities,orgov-ernments.ItiseasytoseewhySocratesshouldsupportandpromotejustice,bysupportingjuststatesorlaws.ItismuchhardertoseewhySocratesshouldspe-ciallysupporthisownjuststateorlawsoverallothers,ifitisthevalueorimpor-tanceofjusticethatgroundshisdutyinthefirstplace.Agovernment’sorstate’sbeingours,ofcourse,usuallyhasconsequencesthatmightwellseemtotieusspeciallytoit.Buttheseconsequences–suchastheben-efitswereceivefromitalone,ortherelianceitaloneplacesonus–allinvolvetransactionalorassociativefeaturesofthecitizen–staterelationship,featuresforwhichanaturaldutyapproachcannot,itseems,independentlyaccount.Nowageneraldutytopromotejustice(orhappiness)couldobviouslygiveusamoralreasontosupportourownjust(orhappiness-producing)state,amongothers,iftheseimpartialvalues(ofjusticeorhappiness)wouldbewellservedbydoingso.Butamoralreasonforsupportingotherstatesasfullyaswesupportourowncouldnotbeapoliticalobligation.Equallyobviously,suchgeneralmoraldutiescouldeven,quitecontingently,giveusmoralreasonstosupportonlyourownstate,ifonlyourownstatewerejustorifonlysupportingourownstatewould30\nPoliticalObligationandAuthoritybest(orsatisfactorily)promotehappiness.Butwedonotnormallytakeourpolit-icalobligationstodependonsuchcontingentfactorsaswhetheranotherjuststatehascomeintoorgoneoutofexistence.Thepointhereisonlytoobservethatthenaturaldutystrategyforexplainingourpoliticalobligationsfacesanimmedi-ateandconsiderablehurdlethattheothertwostrategiesI’veidentifieddonot.Itmustexplainhowgeneraldutiescanbindusspeciallyandnon-contingentlytoourownparticularpoliticalcommunities,withoutovertlyorcovertlyutilizinginitsexplanationassociativeortransactionalfeaturesofourrelationshipswiththosecommunities.Oritmustexplainwhynon-particularizedmoraldutiesshouldnonethelessbethoughtofas“politicalobligations”insomerecognizablesense.Itisnotatallclearthatanynaturaldutyaccountofpoliticalobligationcanclearthishurdle.Whencombinedwiththefurtherdifficultiesforsuchtheoriesnotedabove,naturaldutyaccountsmustberegardedasunpromising.Weshallturn,then,totheprospectsfortheothertwostrategies.AssociativeAccountsAssociativeaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthority,aswehaveseen,trytojustifytherelevantrequirementsandrightsbyappealtobasicfactsaboutpersons’identitiesorfactsaboutthesocialandpoliticalrolestheyoccupy.Usuallysuchaccountsformpartofabroadlycommunitarianapproachtothecentralissuesofpoliticalphilosophy,thoughassociativeaccountshavealsobeendefendedbysomeprominentliberals(e.g.,DworkininRaz,1990).Insomeversionsofthisapproach,theclaimsmadeareespeciallystrong:itisallegedtobeanalyticortobeaconceptualtruththatcitizensaresubjecttothedejureauthorityoftheirstatesandowethempoliticalobligations.Buttheseusesoftheassociativestrat-egyareeitherwildlyimplausibleorsimplyirrelevant.Nobodybelievesthatjustanyonewhooccupiesthelegalpositionof“citizen”inanykindofstateismorallyboundtogiveitsupportandobedience.Statescanbemonstrouslyunjustandoppressive(andsoillegitimate),andtheycannamewhomevertheypleaseastheir“citizens.”Butifwemodifytheargumenttoclaimthatonlycitizensoflegitimatestatesaresubjecttodejurepoliticalauthorityandboundaccordingly,wehaveclaimedsomethingtrue(indeed,somethinganalytic)atthecostofclaimingsome-thingutterlyuninteresting;forwehavesaidnothingatallaboutwhatitisthatgroundspoliticalobligationorauthority,whichisthequestionourargumentativestrategiesaresupposedtoaddress.Moreconvincingassociativeaccountshavefallenintothreemaincamps,whichwecancallnonvoluntaristcontracttheories,identitytheories,andnormativeinde-pendencetheories(Simmons,2001).Accordingtononvoluntaristcontracttheo-ries,citizensofdecentpoliticalsocietiessimplycometofindthemselvesinvolvedinnetworksofexpectationandcommitmentthatjointlydefineakindofnonvol-31\nA.JohnSimmonsuntary,butnonethelessbinding,contractwithoneanothertoactasgoodcitizensofthatsociety(by,e.g.,obeyingthelawandacceptingtheauthorityofthestate).Butwhilesuchtheoriesmayseemwellequippedtoaddresstheobligationsthatfriendsandneighborsmightoweoneanother,theyappearquiteincapableofexplaininghowmembersofalarge-scale,pluralisticpoliticalcommunitycouldbetakentooweobligationstoalloftheirfellowcitizens(ortotheirstategenerally);fortheinteractionsoftypicalmembers,hencetheiropportunitiesforcommitmentandforraisingexpectations,areroutinelyquitelocal,notnational.Identitytheories(e.g.,Horton,1992)attempttobaseourobligationsinthepracticalincoherenceofdenyingcertainaspectsofouridentities,suchasourrolesasobligatedmembersofsomepoliticalcommunity(whichrolesaretakenbysometobecentraltotheirsenseofwhotheyare).Butitisunclearwhyweshouldthinksuchmereidentificationwithasocialrolesufficienttogroundgenuinemoralobligations.Themerefactthat,forinstance,one’sroleascitizenoftheThirdReichiscentraltoone’spracticalidentitysurelydoesnotshowthatonehasamoralobligationtodischargeallofthedutiesassociatedwiththatrole(suchasrevealingthehidingplacesofJews).Only,itseems,whenoursocialandpoliticalrolesarethemselvesmorallydefensible(andnon-refusablebythoseunwillingtooccupythem)couldthedutiesassociatedwiththembetakentobemorallybinding;butthatsimplyreturnsustotheindependentquestionoftheappropri-ateargumentstousefordemonstratingthemoralauthorityofcertainkindsofpoliticalarrangements.Thelastassociativeapproaches–normativeindependencetheories–simplyaffirmwhattheargumentsaboveimplicitlyreject:namely,thenormativeauthor-ityoflocalpractices.Ifthesourceof(someofour)genuinemoralobligationsissimplytheirassignmenttoindividualsbylocalsocialandpoliticalpractices,thenthereiseveryreasontosupposethatwidespreadpoliticalobligationsmightbeamongthesegenuineobligations,giventhewidespreadlocalsocialexpectationsofcompliancewithandsupportforthelegalandpoliticalinstitutionsofourstatesofresidence.Buttoacceptthisstyleofargumentistoacceptthatthemeresocialinstantiationofapractice,independentofanyexternallyjustifyingpointorvirtues,issufficienttoallowthatpractice’srulestodefinegenuinemoralobligationsforthosesubjecttotherules.Andacceptingthat,Ithink,istoreducetherelevantideaofamoraljustificationforobligationclaimstoafarce;somethingcannotcountasajustificationofXifitdoesnotclaimforXsomespecialpointoradvan-tage.If,however,associativistsallowthatonlyexternallyjustifiedpracticescandefinegenuinemoralobligations,thentheyoweusanexplanationofwhyweshouldregardthepractice,ratherthanthevaluesthatcertifyit,asthesourceoftherelevantobligations.Forthisreason(alongwiththosenotedabove),associa-tiveaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthority,thoughenjoyingtheadvantageofareadyexplanationfortheparticularityofpoliticalobligations,havefailedtosatisfyreasonablestandardsforargumentativeplausibility.32\nPoliticalObligationandAuthorityTransactionalAccountsTransactionalaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthorityhavetypicallyutilizedeitherconsenttheories(asinPlato’sCrito;Locke,1689;andBeran,1987)orre-ciprocationtheories(asinKlosko,1992).Accordingtoconsenttheories,ourpolit-icalobligations(andthepoliticalauthoritywithwhichthesecorrelate)arisefromthoseofourdeliberateactsthatconstitutevoluntaryundertakingsofpoliticalobligations,suchasourpromisesorcontractstosupportandobeyorourconsenttobesobound.Reciprocationtheoriesportrayourpoliticalobligationsasrequiredreciprocationforthereceiptoracceptanceofbenefitsprovidedbyourstates,governments,orfellowcitizens.Bothkindsoftransactionalaccountshavebeendefendedinmanyvarieties,butallvarietiesfaceby-now-familiarobstacles.Consenttheoriesdifferprincipallyinthekindsofconsenttowhichtheyappealintheirjustifications.Locke(Locke,1689)famouslyappealedtotheactualconsentofpersonstojustifytheirobligations,distinguishingbetweenactualex-pressconsent(i.e.,consentexplicitlygivenin,e.g.,anovertpromise,contract,oroath)andactualtacitconsent(i.e.,consentgiveninexplicitlybykindsofactswhoseconventionalpointisnotsolelythatofgivingconsent).Bothkindsofconsentbindusfully,Lockethought,thoughexpressconsentbindsmoreper-manently.Otherphilosophers,however,haveappealedtokindsofnon-actualconsentintheiraccountsofpoliticalobligation.Dispositionalaccountsholdthatweareboundnotonlytothatconducttowhichwehaveactuallyconsented,butalsotothattowhichwewouldhavefreelyconsentedhadtheoccasionforgivingconsentarisen.Andhypotheticalconsent/contracttheoriesderiveourobligationsfromtheconsentthatwouldbegivenbysomeidealizedversionofourselves,rangingfromversionsofourselvesthataremerelypurgedofobviousdefectstoperfectlyrational(andmotivationallysimplified)versionsofourselves(Rawls,1971).Dispositionalaccounts,however,seemstraightforwardlyimplausible;fromthefact,forinstance,thatIwouldfreelyhaveagreedtopurchaseyourpropertylastyearhadIknownitwasavailable,itsurelydoesnotfollowthatInowhaveanobligationtopayforit.Andhypotheticalconsenttheoriesarereallybetterunderstoodasakindofnaturaldutyaccountthanasakindoftransactionalaccount,despitetheirbeingclothedinthelanguageofconsent.Forthepointofappealingtotheconsentofidealizedpersons(ratherthanthatofactualpersons)ispreciselytostressthatourobligationsflownotfromouractualtransactionswithourstates,butratherfromthevirtuesorqualitiesofthosestatesthatwouldelicittheconsentofidealpersons(whorightlyperceiveandappreciatetruevirtueorquality,whichactualpersonsmaynotdo).Actualconsenttheories,then,seemtobetheonlypromisingformoftransactionalconsenttheory.Butactualconsenttheoriesfacesomecleardifficultiesoftheirown.Themostobviousaredifficultiesintermsofrealismandvoluntariness.Consenttheoriesrelyonthemodelofthefreepromisefortheirintuitiveforce,foreveryoneseemstoacceptthatfreepromisesyieldgenuinemoralobligations.Butrealcitizensinreal33\nA.JohnSimmonspoliticalcommunitiesseldomdoanythingthatlooksmuchlikeeitherapromiseoranyotherkindoffreelymadecommitmenttosupportandcomplywiththeirlawsandpoliticalinstitutions.Theoccasionsformakingexplicitoathsofallegianceseldomariseexceptinsituationstaintedwiththreatsofstatecoercion;andevenfreeactssuchasvotingindemocraticelectionsaretypicallyperformedagainstaconventionalbackgroundassumptionthatsuchactsarenottobetakentobethesourceofourpoliticalobligations(sincethoseobligationsaretakenbothtoprecedeone’sactsofvotingandtobeinnowaylimitedbyone’sdecliningtovote).Similarly,itisdifficulttolocateanykindofactperformedbymostcitizensindecentstatesthatcouldbeplausiblyunderstoodasanactoftacitconsenttostateauthority.Merecontinuedresidence(Locke’ssuggestion)ornon-resistance,forinstance,whilewidelypracticed,areparticularlyfeeblecandidates.Formanypersonstherearefewviablealternativestoremainingintheirstates,andformost,resistancetothestateisimpossible(whileforallofustherearenorealalterna-tiveoptionstolivinginsomestatethatmakesstatelikedemandsonus);andthesefactsraiseseriousdoubtsaboutthevoluntariness(hence,bindingness)oftheallegedconsensualacts(Hume,1742).Transactionalreciprocationtheoriesfallintotwomaingroups:thosethatappealtotherequirementsoffairnessandthosethatappealtodebtsofgratitude(orsimplemandatoryreturnforbenefitsconferred).Fairnesstheoriesmaintainthatpersonswhobenefitfromthegood-faithsacrificesofothers,madeinsupportofamutuallybeneficialcooperativescheme,haveobligationstodotheirownfairshareswithinthoseschemes.Totakebenefitsinacooperativecontextwithoutdoingone’spartwouldbetounfairlyridefreeonthesacrificesofothers.Grati-tudetheoriesmaintainmoresimplythatweareobligatedtomakeanappropriatereturnforservicesrenderedbyothers.Sincepoliticallifeindecentstatesseemstoinvolvebothelaboratemutuallybeneficialschemesandtheprovisionofimpor-tantservicesbythestate,bothstylesofreciprocationtheoryseemprimafaciepromising.Butgratitudetheoriesofpoliticalobligationandauthority(suchasthatinPlato’sCrito)collapseunderevenquitecharitableanalysesofmoraldebtsofgrat-itude.Evenifitistruethatweoweothersareturnforunsolicitedbenefitstheyprovideforus,whatweoweotherscannotbecharacterizedinanywaythatmakesitplausibletothinkofpoliticalobligationassuchadebt.Whatisowedforabenefitreceivedisatmostsomekindoffittingreturn;andifanythingonthesubjectisclear,itisthatourbenefactorsarenotspeciallyentitledtothemselvesspecifywhatshallconstituteafittingreturnfortheirbenefaction.Imaynotconferbenefitsuponyouandsimplynamemyreward.Itis,however,crucialtotheideasofpoliticalobligationandauthoritythatourstates(our“benefactors”inthiscase)arespeciallyentitled,atleastwithinlimits,tospecifythecontentofourobliga-tions,byspecifyingwhatshallbevalidlawwithinthestate.Fairnesstheorieshaveinthetwentiethcenturybeenthemorepopularoptionforreciprocationtheorists,largelyduetotheinfluenceofHartandRawls(in,e.g.,34\nPoliticalObligationandAuthorityRawlsinEdmundson,1999).ButevenRawlseventuallyrejectedfairnesstheory(inRawls,1971),arguingthatpersonsinactualpoliticalsocietiesseldomfreelyaccept(routinelyonlyreceiving)thebenefitstheirsocietiesprovideandsocannotreasonablybethoughttobetreatingothersunfairlyiftheydeclinetoreciprocate.Thosewhohaveattemptedtoavoidthisobjectionbymaintainingthatevenben-efitswehavenotfreelyacceptedobligateus,providedthosebenefitsaresubstan-tialenough(e.g.,Klosko,1992),threatentherebytocollapsethefairnesstheoryeitherintoasimple(inadequate)gratitudetheoryorintoanaturaldutyaccount,focusedontheindependentmoralimportanceofprovidingthebenefitsinques-tion(ratherthanongenuineissuesoffairness).Finally,itseemsappropriatetoquestionwhetherthemodelofthesmall-scalecooperativeventure,onwhichfair-nesstheoriesrelyinmotivatingtheirobligationclaims,canevenberealisticallyappliedtothekindsoflarge-scale,pluralistic,looselyassociatedpolitieswithinwhichpoliticalobligationsandauthorityhavetobedemonstrated;forinsmall-scaleventures,muchofoursensethatparticipantsareboundtodotheirpartsderivesfromtheirsharedpersonalinteractionsandsubsequentrelianceononeanother,featuresmissinginlarge-scalegroupsmarkedbysocial,regional,eco-nomic,orracialdivisions(Simmons,1979).PluralistandAnarchistResponsesAlloftheaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthoritydiscussedabove–naturalduty,associative,andtransactional–canbedefendedinlessconservativeformsthanisstandardinpoliticalphilosophy.Thatis,suchaccountscanbedefendedascorrectaccountsoftheobligationsandauthorityactuallypossessedbypersonsandtheirstates,butwiththeadmissionthatfewactualpersonsorstatessatisfytherequirementsoftheaccount.Thus,actualconsentmightbedefendedasthesolegroundofpoliticalobligationandauthority,butwiththeadmissionthatfewpersonsinfactgivebindingpoliticalconsentandthatfewstatesenjoyextensiveauthority;orassociativetiescouldbedefendedasthetrueground,butwiththeadmissionthatfewactualpoliticalsocietiesqualifyasthekindwithinwhichgenuineassociativepoliticalobligationscouldarise.Inlightofthedifficultiesfacingalloftheargumentativestrategiesdiscussedabove,thislessconservativeapproachtotheproblemappearsespeciallyattractive.Thosewhoacknowledgethesedifficultieshavetendedtooptforoneoftworesponsestothem.Eithertheyhaveretainedconservativeambitionsandtriedtocobbletogetherapluralistaccountofpoliticalobligationandauthority(e.g.,Gans,1992),ortheyhaveabandonedthoseambitionsandembracedanarchistconclusions.Theformerresponseacknowledgestheinabilityofthevariousaccountstoseparatelyjustifysufficientlygeneralobligationsandauthority,butmaintainsthatthevariousaccountscancollectivelyaccomplishthisend.Thelatterresponseinvolvesaccept-35\nA.JohnSimmonsingtheapparentlycounterintuitiveresultthatfew(ifany)citizensofexisting(orpossible)stateshavepoliticalobligationsandthatfew(ifany)existing(orpos-sible)stateshavedejureorlegitimatepoliticalauthority.Pluralisttheoristshavenotyetbeenabletoshowthatthetraditionalaccountsofpoliticalobligationandauthorityexplaintheobligationsofenoughrealpersonsinmodernpoliticalsocietiesthattheycanevencollectivelyprovideasuitablygeneralresult.Instead,pluralistsseemtooffernotmuchmorethanlistsofsome-timesapplicablereasonsforobeyingthelawandsupportingourpoliticalinstitu-tions.Butthisfallsfarshortofanadequategeneralaccountofpoliticalobligation,andinfactseemstoyieldthefieldtotheanarchists,whodenysuchgeneralobli-gations(withouteverhavingdeniedtheexistenceofsometimesapplicablereasonsforcomplyingwithlegalrequirements).Anarchistsdenygeneralstateauthorityandgeneralpoliticalobligations,buttheydifferonboththestrengthandtheconsequencesofthisdenial.Someanarchistshavearguedonapriorigroundsthatalegitimate,authoritativestateisconceptuallyimpossible(e.g.,Wolff,1970),whileothershaveargued(onlyaposteriori)thatallexistingstatesfailtoliveuptostandardsforlegitimacy(e.g.,Simmons,1979).Anarchistsarealsodividedbetweenthose(the“politicalanar-chists”)whotaketheanarchistdenialofstatelegitimacytoimplythatallstatesmustbeopposedandifpossibledestroyed,andthose(the“philosophicalanar-chists,”e.g.,Wolff,1970;Simmons,1979)whotaketheanarchistdenialtoimplyonlythatpersonsmustmakenopresumptioninfavorofobedience,butinsteaddecideonacase-by-casebasiswhatresponsetothestateisbest.Whileallanar-chisttheoriesmustembraceapparentlycounterintuitiveconclusionsaboutpoliti-calobligation,aposterioriphilosophicalanarchismseemstobelesscounterintuitivethanitsrivalsintheanarchistcamp;foritcanacknowledgeboththepossibilityoflegitimateauthorityandpoliticalobligation(e.g.,inanideallyfreeandjustcon-tractualdemocracy)andthewrongnessofactinginwaysthatunderminetheusefulfunctioningofdecentstates.Aposterioriphilosophicalanarchismmayprovetobeonbalancethemostdefensiblepositionontheproblemofpoliticalobligationandauthority.BibliographyBeran,H.(1987).TheConsentTheoryofPoliticalObligation.London:CroomHelm.Connolly,W.(ed.)(1984).LegitimacyandtheState.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.Edmundson,W.A.(ed.)(1999).TheDutytoObeytheLaw.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.Gans,C.(1992).PhilosophicalAnarchismandPoliticalDisobedience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Green,L.(1990).TheAuthorityoftheState.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Green,T.H.(1882).LecturesonthePrinciplesofPoliticalObligation.AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress,1967.36\nPoliticalObligationandAuthorityHorton,J.(1992).PoliticalObligation.AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress.Hume,D.(1742).“Oftheoriginalcontract.”InD.Hume,EssaysMoral,PoliticalandLiterary.Indianapolis:LibertyClassics,1985.Klosko,G.(1992).ThePrincipleofFairnessandPoliticalObligation.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.Locke,J.(1689).SecondTreatiseofGovernment.InLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1980.Pateman,C.(1979).TheProblemofPoliticalObligation.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Rawls,J.(1971).ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Raz,J.(ed.)(1990).Authority.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.Simmons,A.J.(1979).MoralPrinciplesandPoliticalObligations.Princeton,NJ:Prince-tonUniversityPress.——(2001).“Associativepoliticalobligations.”InA.J.Simmons,JustificationandLegit-imacy:EssaysonRightsandObligations(pp.65–92).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Wolff,R.P.(1970).InDefenseofAnarchism.NewYork:Harper&Row.Woozley,A.D.(1979).LawandObedience.London:Duckworth.37\nChapter2Liberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateAlanWertheimerThesubjectofthischapterisadistinctlymodernquestion.Classicalpoliticalphi-losophy,asexemplifiedbytheworksofPlatoandAristotle,wasprimarilycon-cernedwiththenatureofagoodlifeandagoodstate.Itsimplyassumedthataprimarytaskofanystateistogetitsmemberstolivemorallives.Earlymodernpoliticalphilosophy,suchaswefindinthesocialcontracttraditionofHobbes,Locke,andRousseau,wasprimarilyconcernedwiththequestionofpoliticallegitimacy:Whyandwhenisanyoneentitledtoexercisepoliticalpoweroverotherpeople?Modernpoliticalphilosophyshiftsthefocusofconcern.Weassumethatthestateislegitimate,atleastifitisdemocratic.Andthequestionbecomes,toputitsimply:Whatsortsofpublicpoliciesshouldthestateadopt?Thischapterconsidersonedimensionofthatquestion.Atthemostbasiclevel,theproblemisthis.Webelievethattheindividualistheprimarylocusofmoralvalueandthatindividualfreedomisoftheutmostimportance.Atthesametime,wethinkthatthestateisjustifiedinusingitscoer-civepowerstolimitindividuallibertyifitdoessofortherightreasons.Unfortu-nately,wedisagreeastowhatthosereasonsare.InhisessayOnLiberty,thelocusclassicusonthetopic,JohnStuartMillobservesthat“Thereis,infact,norecog-nizedprinciplebywhichtheproprietyorimproprietyofgovernmentinterferenceiscustomarilytested”(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.I).Millthoughtthathecouldprovidethatprinciple.Ineffect,ourtaskistodeterminewhetherMillhasdoneso.Ratherthanlaunchdirectlyintoadiscussionoftheoreticalprinciples,Ibelieveitisbesttobeginwithexamplesofthesortsofpublicpolicyissuesatstake.Thefollowinglistisquitelongbecausetheissuesarediverseandcomplex.Murder.Thestatemakesitacrimetokillanotherperson.Abortion.Thestatemakesitacrimetoperformanabortion.SeatBelts.Thestatemakesitillegaltorideinacarwithoutwearingaseatbelt.38\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateHelmets.Thestatemakesitillegaltorideonamotorcyclewithoutahelmet.Prescription.Thestateallowsonetopurchasecertaindrugsonlywithapre-scriptionfromaphysician.Converters.Thestatemakesitillegaltoselloruseautomobilesthatdonothavecatalyticconverters.TaxEvasion.Thestatemakesitacrimenottopayone’staxes.Voting.Thestaterequirespeopletovoteinelections,andfinesthemiftheydonot.Conscription.Thestaterequirescitizenstoserveinthemilitarywhenneeded.VoluntaryEuthanasia.Thestatemakesitacrimeforaphysiciantoterminateapatient’slifeevenwiththepatient’sconsent.Surrogacy.Thestatemakesitillegalforawomantoacceptpaymentforbecom-ingimpregnatedwithaman’sspermonconditionthatsherelinquishcustodyrightstothechildafterbirth.Laetrile.Laetrile,asubstancederivedfromapricotpits,hasbeentoutedasacureforcancer.TheFoodandDrugAdministrationdoesnotpermitLaetriletobesold.Cocaine.Thestatemakesitacrimetosellorbuycocaine.Blackmail.Thestatemakesitacrimetodemandpaymentinreturnforthewith-holdingofembarrassinginformationaboutaperson.Extortion.Thestatemakesitacrimetothreatentoinjureanotherpersonorhisorherpropertytoachieveafinancialgain.DwarfTossing.Thestatemakesitacrimetothrowhelmeteddwarfsatapaddedwall.Cockfights.Thestatemakesitacrimetoenteraroosterinacontestinwhichtworoosterstrytokilleachother.Monogamy.Thestateallowsonetobemarriedtoonlyonememberoftheoppositesex.Deduction.Thestatepromoteshomeownershipbyallowinghomeownerstodeductinterestpaidonmortgagesfromtheirtaxableincome.Thosewhopayrentarenotentitledtothededuction.Noise.Thestatemakesitillegaltohavenoisypartiesafter10:00p.m.incloseproximitytoanotherdwelling.Lewdness.Thestatemakesitillegaltoexposeone’sgenitalsinpublic.Assault.Thestatemakesitacrimetoinflictphysicalinjuryonanotherperson,ortothreatentodoso.39\nAlanWertheimerHomosexualActs.Thestatemakesitillegaltoengageinsexualrelationswithapersonofthesamesex.HeterosexualMarriage.Thestatedoesnotpermitonetomarryapersonofthesamesex.ChristianScience.Thestaterequiresallparentstogetmedicalcarefortheirchildrenevenifthisisforbiddenbytheirreligion.Non-discrimination.Thestaterequirestheownerofarestauranttoservecustomersregardlessofrace.Voyeurism.Thestatemakesitillegaltoobserveanotherpersoninhisorherdwellingwithoutthatperson’spermission.TicketScalping.Thestatemakesitillegaltosellatickettoanentertainmenteventformorethan$10overitsfacevalue.Psychotherapy.Thestatemakesitillegalforapsychotherapisttohavesexualrelationswithapatient.MinimumWage.Thestatemakesitillegaltohireapersonforlessthan$7.00perhour.Adultery.Underastate’slaws,adulteryistheonlygroundsfordivorce.Medicaid.Personsonalowincomemayreceivefreeobstetricalcare,butthestatewillnotpayforabortions.IntoxicatedConsent.Thestatemakesitacrimetohavesexualrelationswithsomeonewhogivesconsentwhileseverelyintoxicated.DWI.Thestatemakesitacrimetodriveacarwhenone’sbloodalcohollevelisover0.08percent.Habitability.Thestatedoesnotpermitlandlordstorentapartmentsthatdonotmeetminimalstandardsofhabitability.BadSamaritan.Thestatepassesalawthatmakesitacrimenottorenderaidtosomeoneinneedifonecandosowithminimalinconvenience.Witness.Awitnesstoacrimemayberequiredtotestifyincourtonpainofjailforcontemptofcourtifheorsherefuses.PublicSchools.Thestateimposespropertyandincometaxonallcitizenstopayforpublicschools.Welfare.Thestateusesfundsderivedfromincometaxestoprovideforthoseinneed.Organs.Thestatemakesitillegaltobuyorsellakidney(mostpeoplehavetwohealthykidneysbutcandowellwithone).40\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateBathHouses.Thestatemakesitillegaltooperatea“bathhouse”atwhichpeopleengageinanonymoussexualrelations.Custody.Thestatepasseslegislationthatrequiresthatjudgesnotawardcustodyofachildtoaparentwhoishomosexual.GunControl.Thestatepasseslegislationthatprohibitstheownershipofguns.Cigarettes.Thestatetaxescigarettesattherateof$3.00perpack.Hate.Thestatepasseslegislationthatprohibitstheadvocationofviewsthatexpresscontemptforothersongroundsofrace,religion,ethnicity,orsexualorientation.Blood.Thestatepasseslegislationrequiringallable-bodiedcitizenstogiveatleastonepintofwholebloodperyear.Art.Congressallocatesfundstosubsidizeorchestras,museums,andaspiringartists.Barriers.Thestatedoesnotrequirethatarchitecturalbarrierstothehandi-cappedberemovedfromneworrenovatedstructures.LibertyandCoercionLetusaskthreequestionsabouteachofthesecases:(1)Doesthepolicyconsti-tuteaninterferencewithliberty?(2)Doesthepolicyinvolvetheuseofstatecoer-cion?(3)Isthepolicyjustified?Thissectionconsidersthefirsttwoquestions.Ithengoontoconsiderthethird.LetussaythatAcoercesBtodoXwhenAproposestomakeBworseoffifBdoesnotdoX.LetusalsoagreethatAlimitsB’sfreedomofactionifAcoercesBtodoX.Theparadigmaticcaseofstateinterferencewithindividuallibertyinvolvestheuseofthecriminallawtoforbidusfrombehavingincertainways(Murder,Abortion,Lewdness,TicketScalping,Organs)ortorequireustobehaveincertainways(SeatBelts,Voting,BadSamaritan,Blood).Wemaythinkthatsomeofthesepoliciesarejustifiedandothersnot,buttheyallinvolveinterferingwithpeople’slibertytoactastheyplease.Othercasesaretrickier.ItmaybearguedthatMonogamy,Adultery,Het-erosexualMarriage,andCustodyneithercoercenorlimitfreedom,butsimplylimitthetermsonwhichthestateextendsthebenefitsofdivorce,marriage,andcustody.ConsiderDeductionsandMedicaid.Asageneralrule,Adoesnotinter-ferewithB’sfreedomwhenAuseincentivestomotivateB.AcoercesBwhenAthreatenstobreakB’sarmifBdoesnotmowA’slawn,butAneithercoercesBnorlimitsB’sfreedomifAoffersB$25tomowA’slawn.Onthisview,thestatedoesnotlimitthelibertyofpeopletorentorbuytheirhomes,althoughitmay41\nAlanWertheimerencouragebuyingoverrenting;andthestatedoesnotlimitthelibertyofpeopletoabort(assumingabortionislegal),althoughitmayencouragepoorwomennottodoso.ConsiderPublicSchools,Welfare,andArt.Thesepoliciesdonotforbid,require,discourage,orevenencouragepeopletodoanything.Thestatesimplytaxesone’sresourcesandusesthefundsforonepurposeoranother.Dotheabove-mentionedpoliciesinvolveinterferencewithliberty?Ibelieveitisamistaketoputtoomuchweightonthedistinctionbetweencoerciveandnon-coercivepoliciesandbetweenthosethatdirectlylimitourlibertyandthosethatdonot.Ifthestatedoesnotpermitonetoenterintoagreements(MinimumWage,Habitability)ordissolvemarriages(Adultery),orbuyproducts(Laetrile),orlimitsthetermsonwhichonecanbuythem(Prescription),thestateislimit-ingone’sfreedomofaction.Thoselimitationsmaybejustifiable,butweshouldnotdenythattheyarelimitations.Idonotdenythatthereisadifferencebetweenprohibitingonefromengaginginsame-sexsexualrelationships(HomosexualActs)andnotallowingsame-sexmarriage(HeterosexualMarriage),orthatthereisadifferencebetweenprohibitingabortion(Abortion)andnotsubsidizingit(Medicaid),orthatthereisadifferencebetweennotallowingonetobuyaproduct(Laetrile,Cocaine)andapolicythatmakesitmoreexpensive(Ciga-rettes)orrequiressomeoneelse’spermission(Prescription).Atthesametime,thatdistinctiongoesonlysofar.Afterall,peoplewanttobeabletoattaincertainbenefits,suchastohavetheirrelationshipofficiallyacknowledgedbysocietyortohavecustodyofchildren,ortogetabortions,ortoconsumeproducts.Andastatethatmakesitimpossibleormorecostlyforpeopletogainthesebenefitsmakesitmoredifficultforpeopletolivetheirlivesastheychoose.Sowhetherornotapolicyinvolvestheuseofdirectcoercionoraninterferencewithliberty,wecanalwaysaskwhetherthestateshouldfavorsomeactionsoverothers.Forthereasonsthatmighttellagainstinterferingwithlibertymayalsotellagainsta“favoring”policy.IfHomosexualActsisunjustified,inpart,becausethestatehasnobusi-nesspreferringheterosexualrelationstohomosexualrelations,thenHetero-sexualMarriagemaybeunjustifiedforthesamereasons.IfLaetrileisunjustifiedbecausethestatehasnobusinesstellingpeoplewhattheycanputintheirbodies,thenitisarguablethatthestatehasnobusinessmakingitmorecostlyformetosmokethantodrinksoda(Cigarettes).Somepoliticalphilosophershavearguedthatthestateshouldremainneutralbetweenviewsofthegoodlife.Iftheyareright,thenalargerangeofpublicpoliciesmaybeunjustifiable.WhataboutPublicSchools,Welfare,andArt?Itmaybearguedthattheserepresentexpenditurepolicies,butdonotinvolveinterferencewithfreedom.Afterall,theydonotrequireustodoanything.Butthatclaimcanbedenied.WeareinclinedtothinkthatBloodconstitutesadeprivationofourfreedombecauseitrequiresustogivea(renewable)bodilyresourcetothestateonpainofpunish-ment.Similarly,itcanbearguedthattorequireustogiveupour(nonrenewable)moneyonpainofpunishmentistointerferewithourlibertytouseourfinancialresourcesaswewish.ItmayturnoutthatPublicSchoolsandWelfarearejusti-fiedwhereasBloodandArtarenot,butnotonthegroundsthatBloodandArt42\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateconstituteaninterferencewithlibertywhereasPublicSchoolsandWelfaredonot.Rather,itwillbebecausetherearereasonsthatjustifyapolicyoftakingothers’resourcesinsomecasesbutnotinothers.Solibertariansmayberighttoregardtaxationasalimitationofliberty,althoughtheymaybewrongaboutthereasonsthatjustifysuchlimitations.Liberty-LimitingPrinciplesLetusnowconsiderthecentralquestionofthisessay:Forwhatreasonsisthestatejustifiedinlimitingindividualliberty?Inhismagisterialfour-volumetreatiseonthemorallimitsofthecriminallaw,JoelFeinbergsuggeststhatweshouldstartfromthepresumptionthatindividualsshouldbefreetodowhattheywishunlesswecanjustifyalimitationoftheirliberty(J.Feinberg,1984,1985,1986,1988).Giventhatpresumption,Feinbergdiscussesfourprinciplesthatmightbethoughttojustifystatepoliciesthatlimitindividualliberty:TheHarmPrinciple,TheOffensePrinciple,LegalPaternalism,andLegalMoralism.Heproposesthatweaskifsuchprinciplesjustifylimitationsofliberty.AlthoughIcometosomewhatdifferentconclusions,Icannotthinkofabetterwaytoproceed,soweshallconsidertheseprinciplesalongwiththreeprinciplesthatFeinbergdoesnotdiscuss:TheCollec-tiveBenefitsPrinciple,TheJusticePrinciple,andTheNeedPrinciple.Toprovidearoadmap,letussummarizetheseprinciples.TheHarmPrinciplesaysthatthestateisjustifiedinlimitingA’sliberty,topreventAfromharmingothers.TheOffensePrinciplesaysthatthestateisjustifiedinlimitingA’sliberty,topreventAfromoffendingothers,evenifAisn’tharmingthem.LegalPaternalismstatesthatthestateisjustifiedinlimitingA’sliberty,topreventAfromharminghimself.LegalMoralismsaysthatthestateisjustifiedinlimitingA’sliberty,topreventAfromengaginginbehaviorthatisorisregardedasimmoral,evenifAisn’tharmingotherswithouttheirconsent.TheCollectiveBenefitsPrinciplestatesthatthestateisjustifiedinlimitinglibertyinordertoprovidepublicbenefitsthatcannotbeprovidedwithoutsuchlimitations.TheJusticePrinciplestatesthatwearejusti-fiedinlimitinglibertyongroundsofjustice.TheNeedPrinciplestatesthatwearejustifiedinlimitingA’slibertytoprovideforotherpeople’sneeds.Beforeconsideringthevariousprinciples,weneedtomakefourgeneralpointsaboutthem.First,togivealistofliberty-limitingprinciplesisnottodefendthem.AlthoughFeinbergdiscussesfourmajorprinciples,hedoesnotclaimthattheyactuallydojustifylimitationsofliberty.Tothecontrary.HearguesthattheHarmPrincipleandtheOffensePrinciplearetheonlyreasonsthatsurvivetheoreticalscrutinyandthatjustifythelimitationofindividualliberty.Iamlesssure.Second,avalidlibertyprincipleprovidesajustificationforaliberty-limitingpolicy.Itdoesnotprovidepositivereasonsforapolicybecausetheremaybemoralorpracticalreasonsthat“outweigh”thereasonsforsuchapolicy.Forexample,ifweacceptLegalPaternalism,andifwebelievethattheconsumptionofcocaineis43\nAlanWertheimerbadforpeople,thenthereisareasoninfavorofCocaine.Atthesametime,thesocialandeconomiccostsofenforcingCocainemaybesogreatthatweshouldrejectthepolicy,allthingsconsidered.Third,aliberty-limitingpolicymaybesupportedbymorethanoneliberty-limitingprinciple.Forexample,wemaythinkthatSurrogacyissupportedbytheHarmPrinciple,onthegroundsthatitisharmfultothechildren,andbyLegalPaternalism,becauseitpreventswomenfrommakingcontractstheyarelikelytoregret,andbyLegalMoralism,onthegroundsthatitiswrongtocommodifyprocreationallabor.WemaythinkthatCocaineissupportedbyboththeHarmPrinciple,onthegroundsthatthedrugmakespeoplemoreviolent,andbyLegalPaternalism,onthegroundsthatitisbadforthosewhouseit.Wemustexaminewhethereachprincipleprovidesagoodreasonforapolicy,butweshouldnotthinkthatapolicyisnecessarilyjustifiedbyonlyonereason.Fourth,andasFeinbergnotes,wemustdistinguishthequestionofconstitu-tionalityfromthequestionofmoraljustifiability.Laetrilemaybequiteconstitu-tional,andyetitmightbeanunjustifiablelimitationofindividualliberty.GunControlmaybeajustifiablepolicyandyetunconstitutional(althoughthatisquitedebatable).Afterall,iftheSecondAmendmentweretoberepealed,thusremov-inganyquestionaboutitsconstitutionality,wewouldstillhavetoresolvewhetherGunControlisajustifiablelimitationofindividualliberty.Forourpurposes,then,weshallsetconstitutionalityaside.TheHarmPrincipleInOnLiberty,Millboldlyarguesthatwecanuseoneandonlyone“verysimpleprinciple”todeterminewhenitislegitimateforthestatetolimitindividualliberty.Thatprincipleisthat...theonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilizedcommunity,againsthiswill,istopreventharmtoothers.Hisowngood,eitherphysicalormoral,isnotasufficientwarrant....Overhimself,overhisownbodyandmind,theindi-vidualissovereign.(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.I,emphasisadded)Asnumerouscommentatorshavenoted,Mill’sownanalysisrevealsthattheHarmPrincipleishardlysimple.Moreover,itmaynotbetheonlydefensiblereasontolimittheindividual’sliberty.Afterall,onsome(strict)readingsofthatprinciple,wemustconcludethatallbutafewofmyexamplesareillegitimate,aconclusionthatmany(includingMill)wouldfindimplausible.Nonetheless,evenifwedonotacceptMill’sclaimthatharmtoothersistheonlygoodreasontolimitliberty,wehavetoseewhattheHarmPrincipledoesanddoesnotentail.Whatisharmtoothers?Preciselywhatsortsofbeingsisonenotpermittedtoharm?If“others”referstopersonsandifthefetusisaperson,thentheHarmPrin-ciplesupportsAbortion.Ifthefetusisnotaperson,thenitdoesnot.Theremight,44\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateofcourse,beareasontoallowpeopletoharmotherpersons,asinself-defense.Butifthefetusisaperson,thereisaprimafaciecaseforthinkingthatAbortionisajustifiablelimitationofliberty.Bycontrast,if“others”refersonlytohomosapiens,thenwecannotlimitbehavioronthegroundsthatitisharmfultoanimals(Cockfights).Surrogacyraisesadifferentanddifficultquestionaboutexistence.Supposethatthechildrenofcommercialsurrogatestendtohavemorepsycho-logicalproblemsthanotherchildren(thismaybeuntrue).Isthepracticeofcommercialsurrogacyharmfultothosechildren?Arguablynot.Afterall,theseparticularchildrenwouldnotexistiftheyhadnotbeenconceivedviacommercialsurrogacy.Iftheyarenotworseoffthantheywouldotherwisebe(thatis,non-existent),itisarguablethattheyhavenotbeenharmed.Whatisharmtoothers?Herethereareseveralissues.First,ifwesetasidetheparadigmaticcasesofdeath,physicalinjury,andtheftofordamagetoanother’sproperty,whatshouldwesayabouttheinflictionofmentaldistress?Ononehand,wedonotwanttosaythatallaversiveorunpleasantexperiencesconstituteharms.AmayoffendBifheuseshiscellphoneduringamovie,butAdoesnotharmB.Ontheotherhand,itwouldbeoddtosaythatAdoesnotharmBifAputsBinfearbythreateningphysicalinjury(Assault).Ifmentaldistresscanconstituteharm,asAssaultsuggests,doLewdness,Noise,andHatealsoinvolveharm?Iftheydonot,thenthesepoliciescannotbejustifiedundertheHarmPrincipleandwemustconcludethattheyareunjustifiedorthatharmtoothersisnottheonlylegitimatereasonforlimitingliberty.Inanycase,ifsomebutnotallmentaldis-tresscountsasharmful,weneedatheoryastowhatmentaldistresscountsasharm.Ifunpleasantexperiencesarenotnecessarilyharmful,doesharmalwaysinvolveanunpleasantexperience?Canonebeharmedbywhatonedoesn’tknoworfeel?Althoughitmayseemnaturaltothinkthatonecan’tbeharmedbywhatonedoesn’texperience,ifweacceptthisview,thenVoyeurismcannotbejustifiedundertheHarmPrinciple.Afterall,apeepingTom’stargetmaybeentirelyunawareofhisactivities.Ontheotherhand,ifwesaythatvoyeurismisharmfulbecauseAharmsBwhenAviolatesB’srightsevenifBdoesnotexperiencetheviolation,thenwecannotresolvewhatconstitutesaharmwithoutfirstdetermin-ingwhatrightspeoplehave.Athirdissueconcernsthedistinctionbetweenharmingandnotbenefiting.DoestheHarmPrinciplesupportBadSamaritan,Witness,andBarrier?IsAharmingBifAfailstothrowaliferingtoadrowningB,orrefusestoappearasawitnessorrefusestoremovearchitecturalbarrierstothehandicappedinhisbuilding?AccordingtoMill:Thereare...manypositiveactsforthebenefitofotherswhichhemayrightfullybecompelledtoperform,suchastogiveevidenceinacourtofjustice...andtoperformcertainactsofindividualbeneficence...thingswhichwheneveritisobvi-ouslyaman’sdutytodohemayrightfullybemaderesponsibletosocietyfornotdoing.(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.I)45\nAlanWertheimerTheproblemisthis.Ifwesaythatinactionsneverconstituteharm,thenwecannotsaythattheparentharmsthechildifsherefusestogetmedicalcare(ChristianScience).If,followingMill,wesaythat“apersonmaycauseeviltoothersnotonlybyhisactionsbutbyhisinaction,”howdowedeterminewheninactioncausesharmandwhenitdoesnot?DoesAharmapanhandlerifherefusestogivehimanything?Millsaysthataninactionconstitutesaharmonlywhenitis“obvi-ouslyaman’sduty”toact.Ifso,thenthedecisionastowhatcountsasaharmisbasedonapriorviewastowhatdutieswehave.Onceagain,whenwemovebeyondparadigmaticcases,itbecomesclearthatwhatconstitutesharmisnotself-explanatory.LetusassumethatA’sactionconstitutesaharmtoB.Itdoesnotfollowthatthestateisjustifiedinlimitingone’slibertytoharm.AsMillnotes,theHarmPrincipleappliesonlytotheinflictionof“lossordamagenotjustifiedby[one’s]ownrights”(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.IV).Considerbusinesscompetition.IfBordersopensabookstoreinmytown(itdid)andthisdrivesalocalmerchantoutofbusi-ness(itdid),itsactionswereharmfultothelocalmerchant.Buttheyhavearighttoopentheirbookstore.Similarly,AmayharmBifApublishestruthfulinfor-mationthatisdamagingtoB’sreputation,butwethinkthatthestateshouldnotlimitA’slibertytodoso.Othercasesaremoredifficult.ConsiderBlackmail.SupposethatAhastakenapictureofBwithhismistressatarestaurant.AtellsBthathewillgivethispicturetoB’swifeunlessBpaysA$1,000.IfAhasarighttogivethepicturetoB’swife(it’shardtoseewhyhedoesn’t),andifAhastherighttosellthepicturetoB(it’shardtoseewhyhedoesn’t),thenAisnotpropos-ingtodoanythingthathedoesn’thavearighttodo.SounlikeExtortion,whereAthreatenstodosomethinghehasnorighttodo,itisnotclearwhethertheHarmPrincipleallowsthestatetoprohibitblackmail.Fourth,theHarmPrincipledoesnotjustifylimitingA’slibertytoharmBifBconsents–volentinonfitinjuria(toonewhoconsents,no[legallyrecognizable]injuryisdone).AsMillputsit,societyhasnobusinessinterferingwithconductthataffectsothers“withtheirfree,voluntary,andundeceivedconsentandpartic-ipation.”Onthisprinciple,itisarguablethatthestateexceedsitsauthorityinVoluntaryEuthanasia,Surrogacy,Laetrile,Cocaine,DwarfTossing,TicketScalping,Psychotherapy,IntoxicatedConsent,MinimumWage,Habitabil-ity,andOrganSales.IfBwantsherphysiciantoterminateherlife,sobeit.IfAwantstopurchaseuseofB’swomb,orsellanineffectivedrug,orsellcocaine,ortossdwarfsagainstapaddedwall,orsellticketsforanexorbitantprice,orengageinsexualrelationswithhispatient,orhiresomeonefor$3.00perhour,orhavesexualrelationswithawomanwhoisseverelyintoxicated,orrentarat-infestedunheatedapartment,orbuyanother’skidney,theHarmPrincipledoesnotjustifyinterferencebythestatesolongasBconsents,aswellshemightforonereasonoranother.Ofcourse,theconsentmustbe“free,voluntary,andundeceived,”andques-tionsariseastowhenthatisso.Thevictimofextortionmay“consent”topaytheextortioner,buthedoessounderduress.Othercasesaremorecontroversial.46\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateAdyingpatientmaynotwanttoexhaustherfamily’sresources(VoluntaryEuthanasia),apatientmayhavebecomeinfatuatedwithherpsychotherapist(Psy-chotherapy),awomanmaynotanticipatewhatitwillbeliketogiveupherchild(Surrogacy),apoorpersonmayfeelshehasnochoicebuttorentanuninhabit-ableapartment(Habitability),andsoforth.Isconsentvoluntaryinnone,some,orallofthesecases?WecannotsaywhethertheHarmPrinciplejustifiesthesepoli-cieswithoutatheoryastowhenconsentis(sufficiently)voluntary.AfifthissueaboutharmisraisedbyGunControl,BathHouse,andDWI.ItmightbearguedthattheHarmPrincipleonlyjustifiesprohibitingbehaviorthatactuallycausesharmascontrastedwithbehaviorthat(merely?)increasestheriskofharm,andsoitcannotjustifyanyofthesepolicies.Ontheotherhand,Millhimselfsuggeststhatwhenever“thereisadefinitedamage,oradefiniteriskofdamage...thecaseistakenoutoftheprovinceofliberty”(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.IV).Thisisasensibleapproach,butitopensuparangeofbehaviorstotheprovinceofsocialcontrol.Asixthissueconcernsthedistinctionbetweendirectharmandcollectiveorpublicharm.Inthestandardcasesofharm,oneindividualimposesdirectpalpa-bleharm(orriskofharm)onanother.ButTaxEvasionexemplifiesawiderangeofcasesinwhichA’sactisnot(very)harmfultoanyotherindividual,butwouldbeharmfulifperformedbyalargenumberofpersons.Inhisfamousessay“TheEnforcementofMorals,”LordPatrickDevlinmakesthefollowingobservation:Youmayarguethatifaman’ssinsaffectonlyhimselfitcannotbetheconcernofsociety.Ifhechoosestogetdrunkeverynightintheprivacyofhisownhome,isanyoneexcepthimselftheworseforit?Butsupposeaquarterorahalfofthepopula-tiongotdrunkeverynight,whatsortofsocietywoulditbe?(P.Devlin,1968,p.14)Devlinisprobablyrightaboutdrunkenness.Widespreadandcontinualdrunken-nesswouldhaveserioussocialandeconomiceffects.Butsettingasidethepartic-ularcontentofDevlin’sclaim,thestructureofDevlin’spointisabsolutelycorrect.Ifoneindividualdoesnotpayhistaxes,itcauseslittleharmtoanyone;iflargenumbersofpersonsdonotpaytheirtaxes,wehaveaserioussocialproblem.Ifonepersonremoveshiscatalyticconverter,itdoesnoharm;iflargenumbersofpersonsdoso,itmayseriouslypollutetheair.Ifwethinkthatenvironmentalpoli-ciessuchasConverterarejustified,wemustextendtheHarmPrinciplesoastocovercollectiveharmorsupplementtheHarmPrinciplewithanadditionalprin-ciple.ThequestionthenarisesastowhethertheCollectiveHarmPrinciplemightjustifytoomuch.ConsiderHomosexualActsandCompulsoryVoting.Iffewpeopleengageinexclusivehomosexualbehaviorordonotvote,theremaybelittleharmtosociety.Butifmostpeopleeschewedheterosexualrelationsordidnotvote,thentherewouldbeagenuinepublicharm.Societycouldnotreproduceitself,anddemocracywouldwither.DoesitfollowthatHomosexualActsandCompulsory47\nAlanWertheimerVotingarejustifiedinordertopreventacollectiveharm?Itdoesnot.UnlikeTaxEvasion,wherewemighthavereasontothinkthatmanypeoplewillevadetheirtaxesunlesstheyareprohibitedfromdoingso,wehavenoreasontothinkthatmanypeoplewillchooseexclusivehomosexualityorrefusetovoteunlesstheyareprohibitedfromdoingso.SowhileDevlinisrighttothinkthatthephenomenonofcollectiveharmshowsthatsomeprivatebehaviorshouldbeamenabletosocialcontrol,itisanotherquestionaltogetherastowhentheprincipleactuallyjustifieslimitingliberty.TheproblemofcollectiveharmisstructurallyidenticaltowhatIcalltheCol-lectiveBenefitPrinciple.Therearesomebenefitsthatsocietycanprovideforitsmembersifbutonlyifallarerequiredtobehaveinsomeway.Toexemplify,con-sidertheuseofanabolicsteroidsbyprofessionalfootballplayers.Assumethatusingsteroidsenhancesone’sstrengthbutisharmfultoone’shealth.Ifplayersareallowedtodoastheyplease,eachplayermayfeelcompelledtousesteroidsinorderthatotherplayerswillnotgainacompetitiveadvantage.Althougheachplayerwouldpreferthatallplayersnotusesteroidsthanthatallusesteroids,theycannotattainthisresultbythemselves.Theyneedanenforceablerulethatpro-hibitsthemfromdoingso.WecanunderstandConscriptionandMinimumWageintheseterms.Allmembersofasocietymaybenefitfromitsmilitarycapacity,butfewmayvolunteertoserve,andsoitmaybenecessarytorequire(enough)peopletoserve.Ifweallowpeopletoworkforapittance,then(inaneraofsignificantunemployment)manyindividualworkersmaybewillingtodosoandwilldrivethewagesdown.Itispossiblethatmostworkerswillbenefitifnooneispermit-tedtoworkatasub-minimumwage.Onepointshouldnowbeclear.DespiteMill’saspirationtoprovidea“verysimpleprinciple”bywhichtodeterminewhenthestatecanlegitimatelyinterferewithindividualliberty,theHarmPrincipleishardlysimple.Considerabletheo-reticalworkisrequiredjusttosaywhetheranactisharmfultoothersintherelevantway.Thequestionremainsastowhetherthestatecanjustifiablylimitindividuallibertywhenbehaviorisclearlynotharmfultoothers.Itistothatques-tionthatwenowturn.TheOffensePrincipleTheOffensePrincipleclaimsthatthestatecanlegitimatelylimitA’slibertyinordertopreventAfromoffendingothers,evenifA’sactiondoesnotharmothers.Nowevengrantingthatsomementaldistresscountsasaharm(Assault),thereisanintuitivedistinctionbetweenbehaviorsthatareoffensiveandthosethatareharmful.BmaybeoffendedbyA’sobscenebumperstickerorbodyodor,butBisnotharmedinthesecases.Ibelievethatnormaladultsarealsonotharmedbythosewhoexposetheirgenitalsinpublic(Lewdness).Othercasesarelessclear.Itisarguablethatoneisharmedandnotmerelybotheredbyone’sneighbor’s48\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateloudpartywhenoneistryingtogotosleep.Butthisdependsuponourviewofharm.Theinterestingquestionisnotwhetherthereisadistinctionbetweenharmandoffense,butwhetherthestateisjustifiedininterferingwithoffensivebutadmit-tedlyharmlessbehavior.Tosay,“ButXisn’tharmful”isnotananswertothatquestion.Onecan’tsimplyassert,“IhavearighttoengageinoffensivebehaviorsolongasI’mnotharmingyou,”becausethequestionatissueispreciselywhetheronehassucharight.Somewhatsurprisingly,MillhimselfissympathetictotheOffensePrinciple:“therearemanyactswhich...ifdonepublicly,areaviolationofgoodmannersand,comingthuswithinthecategoryofoffensesagainstothers,mayrightlybeprohibited”(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.V).Andwhynot?Ifoffensivebehaviorproducesunpleasantexperiences,thereisatleastsomepositivevalueinpreventingsuchbehaviors.Inaddition,thereisvaluetothecommunityinpreservingasenseofcivility,asensethatpublicspaceiswel-coming,afeelingthatone’ssensibilitiesarenotjarredwhenoneventuresoutintotheworld.Ontheotherhand,andasMillsoeloquentlyargued,thereisalsovaluetoallowingindividualstoactaccordingtotheirownlights,toencouragingspon-taneityanddiversity,evenwhensuchbehaviorisoffensive.Ifthereisnoabsoluterighttoengageinoffensivepublicbehavior,howcanwedecidewhenitislegit-imateforsocietytointervene?Thereisnosimpleformulatobehad,butwecanidentifyseveralcriteriathatsocietymightuse.1Avoidability.Theeasieritisforpeopletoavoidbeingoffended,themoredifficultitistojustifyprohibitingoffensivebehavior.Ifonedoesn’twanttoseenudity,thendon’tgotothenudebeach.2Pervasiveness.Themorewidespreadthetendencytobeoffended,theeasieritistojustifyinterference.Weshouldnotrestrictbehaviorthataminorityorevenabaremajorityfindoffensive.3Magnitude.Themoreintenseanddurabletheoffense,theeasieritistojustifyintervention.Weshouldnotrestrictbehaviorthatgivesrisetoonlymildorshort-liveddistress.4Legitimacy.Themorelegitimatethestateofbeingoffended,theeasieritistojustifyintervention.Althoughthiscriterionpresentsitsowntheoreticaldif-ficulties,itseemsmorelegitimatetobeoffendedbytheflasherthan,say,bythesightofahomosexualcoupleembracing.5SocialValue.Someoffensivebehaviorsareofatypethathavegreatersocialvaluethanothers.Millarguedthattheexpressionoffalseandoffensiveideashasvalue:“theclearerperceptionandlivelierimpressionoftruthproducedbyitscollisionwitherror.”Bycontrast,thereislittlevaluetoindecentexposure.6IndividualIntegrity.Doesprohibitingoffensivebehaviorrepresentathreattoanindividual’sintegrity?Toasksomeonenottoexposehimselformakenoisedoesnot(Ithink)askAtostopbeingwhoheis.Toasksomeonenottoexpresshisideasortoweardifferentclothingrepresentsagreaterthreattoindividualintegrity.49\nAlanWertheimerNeedlesstosay,theinterpretationandapplicationofthesesortsofcriteriaareadifficultmatter.Nonetheless,itisatleastplausibletosupposethatthestateissometimesjustifiedinseekingtopreventoffensivebehavior.Thedifficultques-tionistodeterminewhenitisreasonableforthestatetodoso.LegalPaternalismPeopledomanystupidthings,althoughwemaydisagreeastowhattheyare.Peopledrinktoomuch,ridemotorcycleswithouthelmets,rideincarswithoutseatbelts,takeuselessmedicines,usemind-alteringdrugs,haveunprotectedsexwhiledrunk,signcontractstheylaterregret,smokecigarettes,andclimbMountEverest.Isthestatejustifiedinprotectingpeoplefromtheirownfollies?Aswehaveseen,itappearsthatMillrejectsLegalPaternalisminthestrongestpossibleterms:“Overhimself,overhisownbodyandmind,theindividualissov-ereign”(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.I).Suchseeminglyabsolutestatementstothecon-trarynotwithstanding,Mill’sviewsonpaternalismareactuallymuchmoresubtle.NosoonerdoesMillmakethepreviousstatementthanhesaysthattheHarmPrinciple“ismeanttoapplyonlytohumanbeingsinthematurityoftheirfacul-ties”(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.I).ItisonethingforaChristianScienceadulttorefusemedicaltreatmentforhimself,butchildrenareanothermatter.Similarly,MillmightdefendtheNewHampshire(the“LiveFreeorDie”state)lawthatrequiresthatchildrenwearseatbelts,butdoesnotrequirethisofadults.Suchexceptionsaside,isthestateeverjustifiedinlimitingthelibertyofcom-petentadultsfortheirowngood?Ifweadoptautilitarianorconsequentialistpointofview,thereisnoseriousprobleminthewayofjustifyingLegalPaternalism.Millseemedtobelievethatpaternalisticpoliciesalwayspromotelessutilityinthe(very)longrun,but,asanempiricalproposition,itishardtobelievethisisso.IfthequestionissolelywhetherpoliciessuchasSeatBeltsorHelmetspromotemoreutility,itseemslikelythattheydo.ItismoredifficulttojustifyLegalPater-nalismifweregardindividualautonomyasanindependentvalue.Evenifitwouldbebetterforpeopleiftheywererequiredtowearseatbeltsorhelmets,wemaythinkthatthereareweightymoralreasonstorespectanindividual’sdecisionsaboutherownlife.Supposewetakethelatterperspective.DoesitfollowthatLegalPaternalismisalwaysunjustified?Itseemsnot.First,weshoulddistinguishbetweenwhatisoftencalledhardpaternalismandsoftpaternalism.Hardpaternalisminvolvesrestrict-ingthelibertyofadultswhenwehavenoreasontoquestiontheircompetence,freedom,information,orrationality.Softpaternalisminvolvesrestrictingthelibertyofadultswhentheirdecision-makingcapacityiscompromisedbycognitiveoremotionaldeficiencies.ToprohibitpeoplefromclimbingMountEverestwouldbeacaseofhardpaternalism(unlesswebelievethatonewouldhavetobeirra-tionaltoattempttheclimb).Millpresentsacaseofsoftpaternalism.50\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateIf[one]sawapersonattemptingtocrossabridgewhichhadbeenascertainedtobeunsafe,andtherewerenotimetowarnhimofhisdanger,theymightseizehim...withoutanyrealinfringementofhisliberty;forlibertyconsistsindoingwhatonedesires,andhedoesnotdesiretofallintotheriver.(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.V)Mill’sthoughtisthatwedonotreallycompromiseaperson’sautonomyifwelimitherlibertyonlywhenshelacksthecapacityforautonomousaction,asisprobablytrueinthebridgecase.Theproblemistodeterminewhenthisisso.Toseetheproblemmoreclearly,considertwoadditionalversionsofMill’sbridgestory:1Thepersonknowsthatthebridgeisunsafeandisattemptingtocommitsuicidebecauseheisseverelydepressed.2Thepersonknowsthatthebridgeisunsafe,buthasahobbyofcrossingricketybridges.Wouldwebejustifiedininterferingineitherofthesecases?Ifwebelievethatseveredepressioncompromisesone’srationalcapacities,thenversion1wouldrep-resentacaseofsoftpaternalism.Suchapersonisnot,asMillputit,inthe“matu-rityoftheirfaculties.”Thisdoesnotmeanthatitisalwaysirrationaltowanttoendone’slife,asinsomecasesofvoluntaryeuthanasia.Butanattemptedsuicideby,say,anotherwisehealthytwenty-four-year-oldwomanis,Ibelieve,averydif-ferentmatter,andwemaybejustifiedinpreventingsuchactions.Bycontrast,version2seemstobeacaseofhardpaternalism.Imightthinkthatthishobbyiscrazy,butunlesswewanttoregardalldangerousactivities(mountainclimbing,hanggliding)asirrational,wemustprobablybitethebulletandrespectthischoice.Toputthepreviouspointslightlydifferently,itiseasiertojustifypoliciesonpater-nalisticgroundswhenwehavereasontoquestiontheactor’sunderstandingofthefactsthanwhenwequestionhervalues.Itisonethingtopreventapersonfromcrossingthebridgebecausesheisunawarethatthebridgeisunsafe,butquiteanotherbecausewedonotthinkthatcrossingricketybridgesisaworthwhileendeavor.Weaknessofwillpresentsaparticularlydifficultproblemforthesoftpaternal-iststrategy.Putroughly,letussaythatAexperiencesweaknessofwillwhenhemakesachoicethatrunscountertohissettledlong-termorhigher-orderprefer-ences.IexperienceweaknessofwillwhenIeatfatteningfoods,failtoexerciseenough,ordonotwearmyseatbelt.Idonotsufferfromanycognitivedefectabouttherelationshipbetweenmybehaviorandmyhealthorsafety,andIdonotwanttodie.IjustfindithardtomotivatemyselftodowhatIknowIshoulddoandwanttodo.Ifweincludeweaknessofwillamongtheconditionsthatcom-promisethevoluntarinessofourchoices,thenwecanofferasoftpaternalisticjus-tificationforsomeliberty-limitingpoliciesalongtheselines.Giventhepreviousdiscussion,whatshouldwesayaboutSeatBelts,Helmets,VoluntaryEuthanasia,Prescription,Laetrile,Cocaine,Surrogacy,Dwarf51\nAlanWertheimerTossing,Psychotherapy,MinimumWage,IntoxicatedConsent,andOrgans?Idonotthinkwecansayanythingwithanyassurance,inpartbecauseweneedmoreempiricaldataabouttheeffectsofthesedecisionsonthedecision-makers.Thatsaid,IthinkthatSeatBeltsisagoodcaseforjustifiablesoftpaternalism,particularlyifmostpeoplefailtobuckleupbecauseofweaknessofwill(laziness)ratherthanbecausetheygenuinelyprefertoincuragreaterriskofdeathorinjuryinexchangeforfeelingunencumbered.Inmyview,Helmetsisacaseofhardpaternalismbecausesomecyclistsknowinglyandintentionallyprefertoincuragreaterriskofinjuryasthepriceforwhattheytaketobeamoreenjoyableexperience.VoluntaryEuthanasiaisadifficultcase,inpartbecausewecanneverknowwhetherpeopleregrettheirdecisions.Surelymanypatientswhochoosevoluntaryeuthanasiadosufferfromcognitiveandemotionalimpairmentsproducedbyage,disease,medication,andstress.Atthesametime,suchdecisionsarenotobviouslyirrational,andnottoallowpatientstomakesuchdecisionsistorequirethemtogoonliving.So,giventhealternatives,wemaythinkthat,onbalance,wedonothavesufficientpaternalisticreasontointerfere(althoughtheremaybeotherreasonstodoso).Ifprescriptionswerenotrequiredformanydrugs,itispossiblethatmanypeoplewouldusedrugsinaharmfulwaybecausetheywereinsufficientlyinformedornotabletounderstandtheinformation.GiventhatPrescriptionrepresentsaminimal(butnottrivial)limitationofindividualliberty,itmaynotbedifficulttojustify.IfcancerpatientsaskforLaetrilebecausetheirdecision-makingcapacitiesareimpaired,andifitdetersthemfromchoosingsuperiortreatments,thenLaetrilemaybejustifiable.IfmostpeoplechooseLaetrileonlyasalastresort,thereismuchlessreasontointervene.Idonotthinkthatmostusersofcocainesufferfromacognitiveoremotionalimpairmentor,forthatmatter,thattheyregrettheirdecisions,oreventhatusingthedrugdoesnotenhancetheirutility.Some,certainlyyes.Most?Thatisques-tionable.TheremaybeotherreasonstosupportCocainebutitisnotclearthatwecandosoonsoftpaternalisticgrounds.ManypeoplehavedefendedSurrogacyonsoftpaternalisticgrounds.Theyarguethatwomenmustchooseinthefaceofanintrinsiccognitivedefect,becausetheyareunabletoanticipatethetraumaofrelinquishingcustodyofthechild(A.Wertheimer,1996,ch.4).Thereissomethingtothisclaim,butweshouldnotexaggeratetheimportanceofexceptionalcases.Ifmostsurrogatemothersdonotregrettheirdecisions,thenwehavelittlecauseforinterferingonpaternalisticgrounds.WecouldsaysimilarthingsaboutDwarfTossing,MinimumWage,andOrgans.Itisbynomeansclearthatthesechoicesarebadforthepeoplewhomakethemorthatthosewhomakesuchchoicessufferfromanycognitiveoremo-tionalimpairment,orthattheyregrettheirdecisions.Bycontrast,IthinkPsychotherapyisdifferent.Thereisconsiderableevidencethatpatientswhoconsenttosexualrelationswiththeirtherapiststypicallysuffer52\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStatefromcognitiveandemotionalimpairmentsandthatsuchchoicestypicallydonotworkoutwellforthem,andsoitseemseminentlyjustifiabletoprohibitallsuchrelations(A.Wertheimer,1996,ch.6).FewstateshaveenactedanythinglikeIntoxicatedConsent,butmanyuniver-sitieshavedoneso.Onecanofferasoftpaternalistargumentthatonewhoisseverelyintoxicatedcannotgivecompetentconsent,andthuswehavenodiffi-cultysupportingsuchapolicyifB’sintoxicationisitselfinvoluntary(aswhenAspikesB’sdrink).ItpresentsamoredifficultproblemifBisvoluntarilyintoxi-cated,forwemightthinkthatthevoluntarinessofherintoxicationflowsthroughtothevoluntarinessofherconsent.Inadditiontosoftpaternalisticarguments,thereisanotherwaytothinkaboutthejustificationofLegalPaternalism.ThomasSchellinghasobservedthatweoftenactasifwehave“twoselves.”Inwhatwemightregardasself-imposedpaternal-ism,our“rational”selfwillsometimesinterferewiththelibertyofour“irrational”self(T.Schelling,1984,ch.4).One’srationalselfmayplacethealarmclockontheothersideoftheroomtoforceone’sirrationalselftogetupinthemorning,or,asinthemostfamoussuchcase,Odysseustoldhiscrewtotiehimtothemastsohecouldhearthesiren’scallwithoutendangeringtheship(J.Elster,1979).Iassumethatthereisnothingmorallyproblematicaboutself-imposedpaternalism.IfIwanttolimitmyownlibertyformyowngood,thenIshouldordinarilybeabletodoso.Lessobviously,IbelievethatwecanunderstandsomecasesofLegalPaternalisminjustthisway.Totheextentthatweregardademocraticlegislatureasrepresentingthewishesofthecitizenry,thenwecanunderstandpoliciessuchasSeatBeltsandPrescriptionasgenuinecasesofself-imposedpaternalism.Itisnotthatsomepeoplearelimitingthelibertyofothersfortheirowngood.Rather,citizensare(throughtheirrepresentatives)limitingtheirownlibertyfortheirowngood.Helmetsisdifferent.InSeatBeltsandPrescription,amajorityiscoerc-ingitselfforitsowngood,becausemostpeoplerideincarsanduseprescriptiondrugs.Bycontrast,inHelmets,amajorityiscoercingaminorityforitsgood,andthatismoredifficulttojustify.Inanycase,totheextentthatwecanlegitimatelyunderstandapolicyasacaseofsoftpaternalismorself-imposedpaternalism,suchpoliciesarecompatiblewithacommitmenttotakingautonomyseriously.LegalMoralismThisprincipleholdsthatthestateisjustifiedinlimitingone’slibertytopreventonefromengaginginimmoralbehavior,evenifitcouldnotjustifiablylimitone’sbehaviorundertheHarmPrincipleortheOffensePrinciple.The“evenif”clauseiscrucial.Murderisimmoralandharmful,andimmoralbecauseharmful.Lewdbehaviormaybeimmoralandoffensive,andimmoralbecauseoffensive.ButwecanjustifyMurderandLewdnessundertheHarmPrincipleortheOffensePrinciple.WedonotneedLegalMoralism.Bycontrast,someonemightdefend53\nAlanWertheimerMonogamyandHomosexualActsonthegroundsthatpolygamyandhomo-sexualityarewrongevenifconsensual.SomeonemightdefendDwarfTossingandCockfightsonthegroundsthatitiswrongordegradingforpeopletoenter-tainthemselvesinthisway.SomeonemightdefendSurrogacyandOrgansonthegroundsthatthesepracticeswrongfullytreataperson’sbodyasacommodity.AndsomeonemightdefendCocaineandArtonthegroundsthatsubstance-inducedpleasureisnotaworthyexperiencebutthatartisticexperienceisgoodforthesoul.Dosuchargumentswork?WemustfirstnotethatLegalMoralismcomesinseveraldifferentvarieties.Theclassicalversionmaintainsthatthestatecanjustifi-ablyprohibitthosebehaviorsthatare“objectively”immoral.Peoplemaydisagree,ofcourse,astowhatbehaviorsareimmoral.Onepersonmayclaimthatconsen-sualhomosexualrelationshipsareimmoral,whereasthereisnothingwrongwithsellingone’skidneys,whileanothermightclaimjusttheopposite.Butbothmightagreethatitislegitimateforthestatetoprohibitanactivityifitisimmoral.AsecondversionofLegalMoralismappealstoaformofmoralpaternalism.Thisviewconsistsoftwoclaims.First,itmaintainsthatitisbadforpeopletoperformimmoralacts.Thisisnotatautology,anditmaywellbefalse.Onemightthinkthatitisbadtostealwithoutbelievingthatstealingisbadforthethief,ifhedoesnotgetcaught.ButtheversionofLegalMoralismIamnowconsideringacceptsRobertGeorge’sclaimthat“Everyimmoralchoice...[damages]thataspectofthechooser’sownwell-beingwhichconsistsinestablishingandmain-taininganuprightmoralcharacter”(R.George,1993,p.168).Second,theargu-mentmaintainsthatthestatehasaresponsibilitytoprotecttheactorfromcorruptinghimselfjustasitmayhavearesponsibilitytoprotectcitizensfrominjur-ingthemselves.IbelievethatGovernorMarioCuomoinvokedaformofmoralpaternalismwhenhejustifiedhisdecisiontosignlegislationthatbanneddwarftossinginNewYorkbarsbysayingthat“Anyactivitywhichdehumanizesandhumiliatesthesepeopleisdegradingtousall.”Cuomodoesnotclaimthatthelegislationisdesignedtohelpthedwarfs,whomaybewellcompensatedforbeingtossed.Rather,itisdesignedtosaveNewYorkersfromdegradingthemselvesbytossingthe(consenting)dwarfs.Athird–socialcohesion–versionofLegalMoralismmakesanempiricalclaimthatacommonmoralityisanimportantbasisofsocialcohesion,andthenamoralclaim,thatitislegitimateforasocietytopreserveitselfbyprohibitingthosebehav-iorsthatitregardsasimmoral–whetherornotthoseactsare“objectively”immoral.AsLordPatrickDevlinputsit,“Whatmakesasocietyofanysortiscom-munityofideas...societyisnotsomethingthatiskepttogetherphysically;itisheldbytheinvisiblebondsofcommonthought(P.Devlin,1968,p.9).Devlinrecognizesthatasociety’scommonmoralitymayrequirepeoplenottodothingsthattheythemselvesdonotregardasimmoralandwhich,forallthat,maynotevenbeimmoral.But,heargues,thebondageofacommonmorality“ispartofthepriceofsociety;andmankind,whichneedssociety,mustpayitsprice”(P.Devlin,1968,p.10).Devlin’sversionofLegalMoralismdoesnotarguethat54\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStatesocietyshouldprohibiteveryactivitythatitregardsasimmoral.Thosedecisionswilldependonhowintenselysocietyfeelsaboutatypeofaction,aboutthevalueofprivacy,andavarietyofpracticalconsiderations,suchasenforceability.ButDevlinwouldcertainlythinkthatifalargeproportionofsocietyregardedhomo-sexualactivityasanabomination,thenHomosexualActswouldbejustifiedinthatsociety,justasanIslamicsocietymightjustifiablyprohibitthesaleofpork.Afourth–socialization–versionofLegalMoralismisa(distant?)cousintotheHarmPrinciple.Thisargumentmaintainsthatgettingpeopletoavoidimmoralbutharmlessbehaviorsisonewaytoinculcatenormsofself-restraintandrespectforothersthatmakeitlesslikelythatpeoplewillharmothers.Iftheconsump-tionofpornographysocializesmentoregardwomenassexualobjects,increasingtheriskthatmenwillcommitviolenceagainstwomen,thensocietycouldlegiti-matelyrestrictpornographyonthegroundsthatrestrictingitleadstolessharm.Similarly,wemighttrytojustifyCockfightingandDwarfTossingonthegroundsthatthewayasocietyentertainsitselfcouldhaveeffectsonthewaythatpeopletreateachother,althoughIdonotknowthatthereisevidencethatwouldsupporttheapplicationofthesepolicies.ShouldweacceptanyoftheargumentsforLegalMoralism?Anyonecommit-tedtotheimportanceofindividualautonomyshouldbereluctanttoacceptmostversionsofLegalMoralism,althoughitispossiblethatsomeargumentswillgothrough.Herearetworeasonsforcaution.First,despitetheconvictionwithwhichmanymoralclaimsareadvanced,thereisoftenverylittlereasoningbehindthem.ConsiderHomosexualActsandSurrogacy.Iaminclinedtothinkthatwhenanactivityisimmoralthisisbecauseitisbadforpeople,becauseitsetsbackpeople’swell-beingorfailstopromoteit.Biblicalclaimsaside,whyshouldanyonethinkthatthereisanythingimmoralabouthomosexualactivity?Afterall,ifmoralityhastodowiththewaywetreateachother,itisarguablethatquestionsastowhatpersonsofwhatgenderputwhatorgansinwhatplacesarenotamatterofgreatmoralmoment.Theremaybesomethingunseemlyaboutcommercialsurrogacy,butweshouldnotletourintuitivesenseofseemlinesstakeustoofartooquickly.If,forexample,commercialsurrogacycreateschildrenwithgoodlives,ifittypi-callyworksoutwellforthesurrogatemothersandtheadoptiveparents,weshouldbeloathtointervenejustbecausewehavethesensethatthereis,afterall,“some-thing”immoralaboutit.Second,itisarguablethatone’schoicesmayhavemoralvalueonlyiftheyaremadeautonomously,andsoifwewantpeople’slivestohavepositivemoralvalue,weneedtoprovidethespaceforthemtomakechoicesforthemselves,evenbadchoices.Thisargumentdoesnotclaimthatallautonomouschoicesareofequalmoralvalue,thatbeingentertainedbytheChicagoSymphonyisnomorevaluablethanbeingentertainedbydwarftossing.Itistosaythatachoicehasmoralvalueonlyifitismadeautonomously.IfIamright,thereisanimportantdistinctionbetweentheclaimthatanactivityisimmoralandtheclaimthatitoughttoberestrictedbythestate.Therearegoodreasons,goodmoralreasonsforthestatenottointerferewithindividualchoicesjustbecausethosechoicesare,insomeway,immoral.55\nAlanWertheimerJusticeTheJusticePrinciplesaysthatthestateisjustifiedininterferingwithindividuallibertyongroundsofjustice.PreciselywhattheJusticePrincipleactuallyjustifieswill,ofcourse,dependuponwhatacommitmenttojusticerequires,andpeopledisagreeaboutthat.Withouttakingapositiononthatissue,letusconsiderseveralwaysinwhichtheJusticePrinciplemightjustifyinterferingwithpeople’sfreedom.First,wemightthinkthatthestateisjustifiedininterferingwithpeople’sfreedomtodiscriminateongroundsofrace,religion,ethnicity,and(mostrecently)sexualorientation,asinNon-discrimination.OnemightsaythatwecanjustifyNon-discriminationviatheHarmPrinciple,butIdonotthinkthatwillwork.Weareandshouldbefreetomakemanydecisionsthathaveadverseeffectsonothers.Anemployercanrefusetohirethoseshethinksareunqualifiedorobnox-iousorugly.Alandlordcanrefusetorenttoasmoker,orsomeonewithpets,ortoundergraduatestudents,becausewethinkjusticeprohibitstreatingpeopledif-ferentlyonthebasisofsomecriteria,butnotonthebasisofothercriteria.Inaddition,wemaythinkthatpeopleshouldbefreetodiscriminateonthebasisofarguablyirrelevantcriteriainavarietyofprivatecontexts.Wearefreetochooseourfriendsandmatesonthebasisofraceorreligion,evenifitisnotadmirablethatwedoso.Wearefreetojoinprivateassociationsthatexcludepeopleonthebasisof,say,sexorreligion.Somecasesaremoredifficult.WemaythinkthattheJayceesortheRotaryshouldnotbeabletoexcludeblacksandwomen,becausemembershipinsuchquasi-privateorganizationsisimportanttopeople’sbusinessopportunities.Butthatispreciselythepoint.Wemustdecidewhenjusticerequiresprohibitingdiscriminationandwhenitdoesnot.Byitself,thenotionofharmcannotdothat.Second,justicemayrequireequalityofopportunity.Ifequalityofopportunityrequiresthatchildrenbeprovidedwithaneducation,thenwemaysupportPublicSchools.Wemightgofurther.Ifjusticerequiresthatallchildrenreceiveroughlyequaleducationalopportunities,thenthestatemightbejustifiedinprohibitingcommunitiesfromspendingmorethanothercommunitiesontheirchildren’sedu-cation,arestrictionthatsomewouldexperienceasaseriousinterferencewiththeirliberty(justifiedornot).Topushthisonestepfurther,wemightthinkthatequal-ityofopportunityrequiresthatnopeoplestarttheraceoflifewithgrosslyunequalresourcesandsowemightthinkthatsocietyshouldabolishorseverelytaxinher-itance(seeD.W.Haslett,1986).Ishallnotpursueherethequestionastowhatequalityofopportunityactuallyrequires.Itis,forexample,notobviousthattheJusticePrinciplesupportsPublicSchools.Onecouldargue,afterall,thatitisunjustforpeoplewhohavechildrentoexternalizethecostoftheirdecisionsontoothers.Thepresentpointisthatifequalityofopportunitydoesrequirethatpeoplebeprovidedwithcertainresourcesorthatthedistributionofcertainresourcesbeequalized,thenwemaythinkthatthestateisjustifiedininterferingwithpeople’slibertyinordertoattainthatgoal.56\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateThird,wemightthinkthattheJusticePrincipleshouldregulateeconomictrans-actions.OnemightdefendMinimumWageonthegroundsthatitisunjusttopaypeoplelessthana“fairwage,”althoughthatrequiresatheoryastowhatcon-stitutesafairwage.OnemightdefendTicketScalpingonthegroundsthatcertainpricesaresoexorbitantastobeunjust.OnemightdefendOrgansonthegroundsthatitiswrongtoexploitaperson’sbackgroundsituationeveniftheexploitedpartygainsfromthetransaction.Iamskepticalthatthislineofargumentwillgen-erallywork,preciselybecauseitpreventstheexploitedpersonfromadvancingherowninterests,butifitdoeswork,thenwehaveanotherjustificationforinter-feringwithconsensualtransactions.Finally,wemightthinkthatjusticerequiresthateachpersondoeshisfairshareinprovidingsomepublicbenefit,evenifthepublicbenefitwouldbeprovidedifcitizenswereableto“freeride”onthecontributionsofothers.Millhimselfarguesthatonemayberightfullycompelled“tobearhisfairshareinthecommondefenseorinanyotherjointworknecessarytotheinterestofsociety”(J.S.Mill,1859,ch.I).Onemightmaintainthatto“freeride”onthecontributionsofothersistoharmthem,butIthinkitmoreaccuratetosaythatitisunjust.ConsiderCom-pulsoryVoting,Conscription,andBlood.Itcouldbearguedthatweallhaveanobligationtodoourpartinsustainingourelectoraldemocracybyvoting,andthatnon-votersarefreeridingonthe(admittedlysmall)sacrificesincurredbyvoters,thatweallbenefitfromdefenseandthatthosewhodonotserveinthemilitaryarefreeridingonthesacrificesmadebythosewhovolunteer,andthatwebenefitfromlivinginasocietyinwhichpeopledonateblood,andthatthenon-donorsarefreeridingonthesacrificesofthosewhogiveblood.Unlikethecollectiveharmandcollectivebenefitcases(Converter,TaxEvasion),wherewelimitlibertytoensurethatabenefitwillactuallybeprovided,heretheJusticePrincipleisridingalone,forthebenefitisprovidedwithoutcompulsion.WhetherconsiderationsofjusticearesufficienttojustifyinterventionisaquestionIcannotresolvehere.NeedTheNeedPrincipleisstraightforward.Theprinciplestatesthatwearejustifiedininterferingwithindividuallibertytoprovideforpeople’sneeds.Itdoesnotstatethatweshouldalwaysdowhatisnecessarytoprovideforpeople’sneeds.IfBwilldieunlessshereceivesA’skidney,itdoesnotfollowthatweshouldcoercivelyextractA’skidney.ButtheNeedPrinciplestatesthatB’sneedsprovideareasontolimitA’sliberty.AlthoughlibertariansrejecttheNeedPrinciple,weareaccus-tomedtothinkingthattheNeedPrinciplejustifiestaxationofpeople’sresourcesinordertoprovideforothers’needformedicalcare,food,clothing,andeduca-tion,asinWelfare.Ifthisisright,IseenoreasontothinkthattheNeedPrinci-plemightnotalsojustifyBloodandBadSamaritan.Supposethatweneedmuch57\nAlanWertheimermorebloodthanwecanobtainthroughvoluntarydonationsorforpay(say,becausethequalityofcommercialbloodmaybetoolow),thatpeoplewilldiebecausethereisinsufficientbloodavailable.Ifwecanrequirepeopletoprovidemoneybecauseotherpeopleneedgoodsinordertolive,Idonotseewhywecannotrequirepeopletoprovidearenewableresourcesuchasblood.Ifwecanrequirepeopletoserveaswitnessesoronjuries,Idonotseewhywecannotrequirepeopletomakeeasyrescues.ItmightbesaidthattheNeedPrincipleissuperfluous,thatitspointcanbeputintermsofjusticeorharm.IdonotdoubtthatthepointoftheNeedPrinciplecanoftenbehandledinotherways,butthereisreasontopreferamorestraightforwardapproach.AndifweaccepttheNeedPrinciple,thereareawiderangeofcircumstancesinwhichthestatemaybejustifiedinusingcoercion,tolimitpeople’sliberty,thatgoesbeyondtheinter-ventionjustifiedbyotherprinciples.ConclusionAswehaveseen,JohnStuartMillthoughtthatwecouldresolvethequestionasto“thedealingsofsocietywiththeindividualinthewayofcompulsionandcontrol”byinvoking“oneverysimpleprinciple,”namelythatsocietyisjustifiedinlimitingindividuallibertyonlytopreventpeoplefromharmingothers.IfIamright,Millwaswrong.First,IhavetriedtoshowthattheHarmPrincipleitselfisnotsosimple.Second,Ihavearguedthatitisatleastplausibletosupposethatthereareseveralprinciplesthatcanbeusedtojustifytheuseofstatecoercionorrestrictpeople’sliberty.Ineffect,Ihavearguedforapluralismofprinciplesthatrequiresweighingandbalancingarangeofconsiderations.Moreover,aswiththeHarmPrinciple,theseprinciplescannotbeappliedmechanically.Itmightbeobjected,ifweacceptthissortofwideopenpluralismaboutlimitingindividualliberty,thatwewillendupjustifyingtoomuch,thattherewillnotbeenoughlibertyleftattheendoftheday.Thatisareasonablefear,butIdonotthinkthereisaneasywayout.Inthefinalanalysis,thereisnowaytoavoidbalancingthereasonsthatfavorlimitingpeople’slibertywiththereasonsthatfavorleavingpeoplealone.Ifwearelucky,wewillgetthebalancemoreorlessright.Finally,itisafactofpoliticallifethatwhateverthebestviewaboutthereasonsthatjustifylimitingindividualliberty,wewilldisagreeaboutthematter.Wewilldisagreeastowhatprinciplesweshouldacceptandwewilldisagreeastohowtheyshouldbeapplied.Indeed,evenifweweretoacceptMill’sviewthattheHarmPrincipleistheonlyjustificationforlimitingindividualliberty,wewilldis-agreeastohowtointerepretandapplythatprinciple.Itisnotenoughtodeveloptheoriesastowhenthestateisjustifiedinlimitingindividualliberty.Weneedatheoryastohowweshouldproceedgiventhatwewilldisagreeaboutthatques-tion.Butthatisthetopicofotheressaysinthisvolume.58\nLiberty,Coercion,andtheLimitsoftheStateBibliographyDevlin,P.(1968).TheEnforcementofMorals.London:OxfordUniversityPress.Dworkin,G.(1972).“Paternalism.”Monist,56:64–84.——(1983).“Paternalism:SomeSecondThoughts.”InRolfSartorius(ed.),Paternalism(pp.105–11).Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.Elster,Jon(1979).UlyssesandtheSirens.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Feinberg,J.(1984).HarmtoOthers.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.——(1985).OffensetoOthers.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.——(1986).HarmtoSelf.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.——(1988).HarmlessWrongdoing.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.George,R.(1993).MakingMenMoral.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Hart,H.L.A.(1963).Law,Liberty,andMorality.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.Haslett,D.W.(1986).“IsInheritanceJustified?”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,15:122–55.Mill,J.S.(1859).OnLiberty(citedfromHackettedition,1978).Olson,Jr,M.(1965).TheLogicofCollectiveAction.NewYork:SchockenBooks.Schelling,T.(1984).ChoiceandConsequence.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Sher,G.(1997).BeyondNeutrality.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Wertheimer,A.(1996).Exploitation.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.59\nChapter3JusticeChristopherHeathWellmanThisessaysurveyssomeofthemostprominentpositions,issues,andquestionswithincontemporarydiscussionsofjustice.Itaddressesmanykeytopics,butreadersshouldbearinmindthatthisreviewwaswrittenexplicitlyforthisvolumeandthusomitsmuchofimportancewhichwillbecoveredintheotheressaysinthisbook,especiallythosefocusingondemocracy,equality,feminism,liberalism,andMarxism.UtilitarianismOneofthemostpowerful,systematic,andpopulartheoriesofjusticeisutilitari-anism,theviewthatactions,policies,andinstitutionsaretobejudgedintermsoftheextenttowhichtheymaximizeoverallhappinessorwell-being.Utilitarianscomeinvariousshapesandsizes,butvirtuallyallembraceconsequentialism,impartiality,andmaximization.Utilitariansareconsequentialistsinsofarastheyassessactionsandpoliciessolelyintermsoftheconsequencestheygenerate.So-called“backward-looking”considerations(suchaswhatpeopledeserveinlightoftheirpastbehavior)areirrelevantonthisview;allthatmattersisthefutureeffects.Utilitariansareimpartialistsbecausethewell-beingofeveryperson(where“person”sometimesincludesnotjusthumansbutallsentientbeings)mattersequally.Nospecialdeferenceispaidtotheinterestsoftheagentorhercloserela-tions;consequencesforeveryonearetobecounted,andnoone’swell-beingisgivenmoreweightthantheothers.Finally,utilitariansaremaximizersbecause,amongallthepossibleoptions,theysingleoutthatwhichresultsinthegreatestoverallwell-beingastheuniquelycorrectchoice.Thereisconsiderabledebateamongutilitariansastowhatgoodshouldbemaximized(happinessisonlyoneprominentanswer),butallagreethattherightactionisthatwhichmaximizesthegood.60\nJusticeEventhisquicksketchisenoughtoindicatewhyutilitarianismisprofoundlyrevisionary.Indeed,JeremyBentham,JohnStuartMill,anditsotherearlyadher-entswereradicalreformerswhoworkedtooverhaulnineteenth-centuryEngland.Intheirview,theexistinglawsandcustomsweremorallyatrociousbecausetheyprevented,ratherthanpromoted,overallhappiness.Indefianceofthestatusquo,utilitariansproposednewarrangementsinspiredbytheimportanceofconsideringequallythewelfareofeachindividual.Amongotherreforms,theysoughttobringdownpropertylawswhichunjustifiablyprivilegedtheupperclasses.Thisleaningtowardequaldistributionstemsfromthetwinassumptionsof(1)impartiality,and(2)diminishingmarginalreturns.Impartiality,ofcourse,ismerelytheabove-mentionedmoralstancethatnooneperson’swell-beingisofgreaterintrinsicvaluethananother’s,anddiminishingmarginalreturnsistheeconomicprinciplethatpeoplederiveasmalleramountofsatisfactionfromeachadditionalincrementofwealth(orothergood)theyobtain.Toappreciatethisprinciple,considerhowmuchthehappinessyougainbyacquiringanadditionalpairofpantsisaffectedbythenumberofpantsyoualreadyown.Ifyouhavenopantsandsomeonegivesyouapair,forinstance,itmakesahugedifferencebecauseyoucannowclotheyourlegs.Andifsomeonethengivesyouasecondpair,thesepantswilllikelyhaveasubstantialeffectonyourhappiness(sinceyoucannowwearonepairwhileyouwashtheother)butwillnotmakesuchahugedifferenceasthefirstpair.Simi-larly,youmightbequitehappytoreceivethethirdpairofpants(becauseoftheadditionalvarietyitintroducesintoyourwardrobe),buttheimportanceofaddingthisthirdpairpalesincomparisonwiththesignificanceofgainingyoursecondpair.Finally,considertheadditionalsatisfactionyouderivefromacquiringafif-teenthpairofpants.Youmightbepleasedtogetthisadditionalpair,butitsacqui-sitionwillbenowherenearasimportanttoyouasthefirst,second,orthirdwas.Presumably,allofthisisintuitivelyplausible.Butnowconsiderhowtheseobser-vationsmightleadyou(andtheutilitarian)todistributepantsamongacommu-nityofpeople.Imagine,forinstance,thattherearetenpeopleandtwentypairsofpants.Wouldyouarrangethingssothatonepersonhadalltwentypairsandtheremainingninehadnone,sothatfourpeoplehadfivepairseach,orsothateachpersonhadtwopairsofpants?Ifyoubelievedthattheoneofthefourpeopledeservedspecialconsideration(becausetheywerepartofahigher,morallysupe-riorclass,forinstance)youmightrecommendthefirstorsecondoption.Butifyoubelievethateachperson’swelfareisequallyimportant–astheutilitariansdo–thenyouarelikelytorecommendthelastoption,whereineachpersongetstwopairsofpants.Itisthistypeofreasoningwhichledearlyutilitarianstolobbyforsweepinglegislativechangesdesignedtoredistributewealthmoreequally,anditisalsothislogicwhichinspiressomecontemporaryutilitarianstoarguethatweshoulddedicatemuchmoretointernationalaid.Afterall,whereisthejusticeinusingmoneytobuyfancynewpairsofpantsforourselveswhenourclosetsarealreadyfilledandthereareimpoverishedforeignerswhoselegsarebare?Unlesswethinkthereissomereasonwhyourhappinessismoreimportantthantheirs,itseemsdifficulttojustifybuyingluxurieswhichwillhaveminimaleffectonour61\nChristopherHeathWellmanhappinesswhenthemoneyspentontheseamenitiescouldhavealife-alteringeffectonthosewhohavesomuchless(Singer).Althoughthisstoryisplausible,notallutilitariansembraceitsconclusion.Fewdoubtthelogicofdiminishingmarginalreturns,butmanyeschewegalitariandistributionsbecauseoftheincentivestructurestheycreate.Someutilitariansacknowledgethat,ifweassumeagivennumberofpants,happinessisgenerallymaximizedbydistributingthemequally.Itiswrongtoassumeafixednumberofpants,however,becausetherearedifferentarrangementsthataremore,orless,conducivetotheproductionofpants(andothergoods).Inparticular,theamountproduceddependscruciallyontheincentivespeoplehavetoengageinproduc-tion.Toseetheimportanceofthis,reconsiderthecommunityoftenpeoplemen-tionedabove.Giventhelawofdiminishingmarginalreturns,itmakessensetodistributethetwentypairsofpantsequally,givingtwopairstoeachperson.Thedrawbacktosuchegalitariandistributions,however,isthattheyreducetheincen-tivestowork,byexternalizingthecostsofleisure.Inotherwords,ifeachpersonknowsthatshewillgetonlyone-tenthofwhateversheproduces(sincethetotalproducedwillbesplitintotenequalparts),thennoonehasmuchincentivetoproduce.Suppose,forinstance,thatiftheyworkedhard,eachcouldproducetenpairsofpants.Ifso,therewouldbe100pairs,which,distributedequally,wouldgiveeachpersonten.Butnoticethatifonepersondecidedtoplayratherthanwork,therewouldbeonly90pairsofpants,orninepairseach.Giventhisarrange-ment,wewouldexpectthispersontoplayratherthanwork.Thekeyisthatbecauseproducedgoodsaredistributedequally,thepersonwhoelectsnottoworkenjoys100%ofthebenefitsofherleisurebutincursonly10%ofthecosts(theother90%isincurred–inequalparts–bytheotherninewithwhomthefruitsofproductionareshared).Thus,onehasinsufficientincentivetowork;itisratio-naltochooseleisurewhenonepaysforonlyone-tenthofitscost.Theproblemisthatthislogicdoesnotapplytoonlyoneperson;itappliestoeveryoneunderthisdistributivearrangement,soweshouldexpecteveryonetochooseleisureoverproduction.Inotherwords,ifallpantsweredistributedequally,noonewouldvoluntarilyproducepants,nonewouldbeproduced,andthustherewouldbenonetodistribute(SchmidtzandGoodin).Thisreasoningleadssomeutilitarianstoeschewegalitariandistributivepolicies.Thebetterlong-termstrategy,theysuggest,istoharnesseveryone’sself-interestbyarrangingthingssothateachpersonisassuredofkeepingvirtuallyallthatsheproduces.Thepointisnotthatthebestlifeinvolvesaccumulatingproducedgoodsratherthanenjoyingleisure.Theimportantinsightisinsteadthat,wheneachpersonfullyinternalizesthecostsandbenefitsofworkandleisure,shechoosesaproductionschedulewhichisbestforherwithoutdisplacingthecostsofherleisureontoothers.Inthisway,allowingeachindividualtodecidewhichtypeoflifebestsuitsher,maximizesoverallhappiness.Asthisdiscussionillustrates,manyfactorsmustbeconsideredwhendesigningadistributivearrangementwhichmaximizeshappiness,anditshouldcomeasnosurprisethatnotallutilitariansendorsethesamepolicies.Butwhilethereis62\nJusticesomedisagreementamongutilitarians,thereismuchmorecontroversyovertheapproachasawhole.Theobjectionstoutilitarianismaremany,butperhapsthemostconsistentworryisthat,insofarasutilitarianismconcernsitselfexclusivelywithconsequences,itcannotbesquaredwithjustice.Criticscontendthatbecausejusticeinvolvesgivingpeopletheirdue,andbecausesomeone’sduedependsprin-cipallyuponherpreviousactions,anethicaloutlookwhichlookssolelytothefuturecannotofferanaccountofjustice.Perhapsthemostpopularwaytoexpressthisconcernisthatutilitarianismcannotaccommodatemoralrights.Forinstance,ifhappinesswouldbemaximizedbykillingawealthyfarmeranddistributingherabundantcropamongthestarvingmasses,thenutilitarianismwouldapparentlyrecommendthatwedoso.Theutilitarianresponsestothischargearediverseandsophisticated,butthemostfrequentinvolveeither(1)denyingthedivergencebetweenutilitarianismandjustice,(2)bitingthebulletinfavorofutilitarianism,or(3)distinguishingbetweenrightactionandthebestmotivation.Considereachoftheseresponses.Someutilitariansinsistthat,intherealworldatleast,thereisnosignificantdivergencebetweenwhatutilitarianismrecommendsandourordinarymoralthinkingaboutjustice.Utilitariansprotestthattheircriticsconcoctradicallycoun-terfactualthoughtexperimentswhichpurporttohighlightthedivergencebetweenjusticeandutility.Accordingtodefendersofutilitarianism,thistendencytowardotherworldlyexamplesisnocoincidence;itismadenecessarybythegreatcon-cordancebetweenmaximizingutilityandcommonconvictionswhichoccursinreal-worldcircumstances.(Killingwealthyfarmersandredistributingtheirassetsamongtheneedywouldneverinrealitymaximizehappiness,forinstance,becauseonecouldnotcovertlyimplementsuchaplan,andpublicawarenessofthistypeofredistributivepolicywouldthreateneveryone’ssenseofsecurityandundermineourincentivetoworkandaccumulategoods.)Whatismore,inthoseextremelyraresituationsinwhichutilitarianismwouldclearlyrecommendsomethingdiffer-entthanwhatjusticeputativelydemands(say,whenonemusttortureaninnocentbabyinordertosavetheentirehumanrace),wetendtosidewithutilitarianism–or,attheveryleast,ourconvictionthatjusticemusttrumpconcernsofutilityisgreatlydiminished.Anotherresponse–thatofbitingthebullet–occurswhenstaunchutilitariansacknowledgetheincompatibilityofutilitarianismandourconvictionsaboutjustice,andthenopenlyjettisonjustice.Oftenthethinkinghereisthat,justaswewouldnotabandonanelegant,powerfulscientifictheorythefirsttimewecameacrossoutlyingempiricaldata,weshouldnotdiscardutilitarianismmerelybecauseitconflictswithafewmiscellaneousmoralintuitions.Giventhatutilitarianismissuchasimpleandpowerfultheorywhichsoconsistentlygeneratescorrectanswersinawidevarietyofcontexts,itseemswrong-headedtodiscarditmerelybecauseitfailstosquarewitharandomassortmentofputativeintuitions(SmartandWilliams).Whilebothoftheaboveresponsesarecommon,themostcelebratedutilitar-ianmoveistodistinguishbetweenrightactionandrightmotivation.Hereutili-63\nChristopherHeathWellmantarianscontestthat,justbecauseutilitarianismdefinestherightactionasthatwhichmaximizeshappiness,itdoesnotfollowthatautilitarianmustrecommendthatweconsciouslytrytomaximizehappinesseachtimeweact(Mill).Utilitariansnotethatweoftendoabetterjobofactuallymaximizinghappinesswhenwedonotexplicitlyaimto.Becauseoftheerrorswecommonlymakeincalculatingutility,andbecauseitisoftenaninefficientuseoftimetostopandcomputetheexpectedconsequences,itisbesttoactfromhabitsorrules.Perhapstheparamountreasonweoughtnottoconsiderequallythehappinessofallthosepotentiallyaffectedbeforeweact,though,isbecauseweknowandcarethemostaboutourselves.Andsinceeveryoneisbestpositionedtotakecareoftheirownhappiness,utili-tarianscanwithoutcontradictionurgeustoworryprincipallyaboutourownself-regardingaffairswhilesimultaneouslydenyingthatanagenthasanyreasontotreatherownhappinessasofanygreaterintrinsicimportancethanthatofthenextperson.Utilizingreasoninglikethis,manyutilitariansarguethatoverallhappinesswouldinfactbemaximizedifeachofusactedasifthemoralrightsfalselypositedbycommonsensemoralityweregenuine.Inshort,sophisticatedutilitarianscon-tendthatoverthelonghaul,rightactionsaremoreoftenperformedwhenwearenotexplicitlymotivatedbyutilitarianconcerns(Hardin;Hare).Ofcourse,noneofthesethreeutilitarianresponsesquietsallcritics.Thosesym-pathetictomoralrightsobjectthatitisnotenoughthatutilitarianismonlyrarelyconflictswithjusticeintherealworldoreventhatitplainlydivergesfromjusticeonlyinradicallycounterfactualcircumstances.Detractorsinsistthatevenonehypotheticalconflictbetweenjusticeandutilitydemonstratesthatutilitarianismmustberejected.Moreover,manyarenotsatisfiedthatutilitarianismcanapproveofouractingasifwehavemoralrights;theyinsistthatnotheoryisadequateunlessitcanaffirmtheserightsthemselves.Thecrucialpointisthatwedeservecertaintypesoftreatment,and,atbest,utilitarianismcanonlysaythatweshouldtypicallyactasifpeopledeservethistreatment.Utilitariansstandardlyarguethat,whenoneappreciatesthelimitsofhumanreasoning,oneseeshowhappinessismaximizedbynonconsequentialmotivations.Formany,thisaccountinvolves“onethoughttoomany”(Williams,p.18).RawlsForquitesometime,theonlyalternativetoutilitarianismseemedtobeamiscel-lanyofretributiveintuitions.InhisTheoryofJustice,JohnRawlssetouttoremedythissituationbydevisingaretributivetheoryofjusticewhichcouldrivalutilitar-ianism’sinternalcoherenceandsystematiccomprehensiveness.Inparticular,hesoughttodevelopanapproachthatwaselegantandpowerfullikeutilitarianismbutwhichstillaccommodatedretributivenotionslikefairness.Inbuildinghisaccountof“JusticeasFairness,”hedrewinspirationfromasimple,paradigmati-callyfairdistributivemethod.Specifically,imaginethatJillandJackhadtoshare64\nJusticeapie;whatwouldbethefairestwaytodivideit?Onemethod,towhichnoonecouldobject,wouldbetoletJillcutitintotwopiecesandthenletJackchoosehispiecefirst.Theirpiecesmightnotbeexactlythesamesize,butneithercouldquestionthefairnessofthedistributionsinceJillhadtheopportunitytocutthepieintoequallydesirableportions,andJackcouldhavechosenJill’spieceifhehadsodesired.InRawls’sview,thekeytodevelopinganadequatetheoryofdis-tributivejusticeistodeviseananalogousmethodwhichcouldbeappliedtothemuchmorecomplicateddivisionofthecostsandbenefitsofsocialcooperation.Toseehowheattemptedthis,letusreturntoourimaginarycommunityoften.Tobegin,supposethattenpeopleneedafairwaytosplittheirpie.Clearly,thebeststrategywouldbeforonepersontodividethepieintotenpieceswiththeunderstandingthatshewillgetthelastpiece.Naturally,thepie-cutterwilldoherbesttodividethepieintotenequalpiecessinceanyinequalitieswillresultinthebiggestpiecesbeingtakenfirstand,ultimately,thesmallestpiecebeingleftforher.Theonlyproblemwiththisanalogyisthat,aswesawinthediscussionofutilitarianism,wecannotassumethatthesizeofthepieisconstant.Takingthepieasanalogoustothecostsandbenefitsofsocialcooperation,weneedtorec-ognizethatthesizeofthepiedependsonhowsociety’sbasicinstitutionsareorganized.Moreover,wehavealreadyseenhowdistributingproductsequallycaninhibittheincentivetoproduce,andthusweseethatdividingthecommunalpieintotenequalsliceswillleadtoasmalleroverallpie.Andfinally,sincethepie-cutterwouldinsistuponequal-sizedslicesattheexpenseoftheabsolutesizeofherownsliceonlyifshewereexceptionallyenvious,thecutterwouldhappilyallowanyinequalitieswhichwouldresultinthelastpieceofpiebeingbiggerthanitwouldbeotherwise.Afterall,thepersonwhoarrangesthedistributionofthetenpieceschooseslast,andshecanreasonablyexpectthatherninecompanionswillleavethesmallestpieceforher.Thus,oncewetransposethepie-cuttingmodeltoalargergroupandthenaddtheobservationthatourmethodofdistributionhasaneffectonthesizeofthepieasawhole,weendupwiththefollowingrecom-mendation:thecostsandbenefitsofsocialcooperationaretobearrangedsothattheworst-offpersonhasthebestpossibleshare.NowthatwehaveasenseofRawls’soverarchingaim,letuslookathowheexplicatesanddefendshismodelofjusticeasfairness.Rawlswritesofhistheoryinvolvingtwoprinciples,buthissecondprincipleistwo-pronged,sohisaccountmaybeunderstoodintermsofthreedistinctprinciples:thePrincipleofGreatestEqualLiberty,thePrincipleofFairEqualityofOpportunity,andtheDifferencePrinciple.ThePrincipleofGreatestEqualLiberty,whichenjoyspriorityovertheothertwo,specifiesthat“eachpersonistohaveanequalrighttothemostexten-sivebasiclibertycompatiblewithasimilarlibertyforothers”(Rawls,1971,p.60).Thisprincipleproposesthateachpersonistohaveanequalrighttosuchliber-tiesasthefreedomofconscience,freedomofspeech,freedomofpoliticalpartic-ipation,therighttoprivateproperty,etc.asiscompatiblewitheveryoneelseequallyenjoyingthesefreedoms.ThePrincipleofFairEqualityofOpportunityrequiresthatofficesandpositionsbegenuinelyopentoallunderconditionsof65\nChristopherHeathWellmanfairequalityofopportunity.Theideahereissimplythateachpersonshouldbeabletocompeteonanevenplayingfield,sothatthosewiththesametalentsandmotivationenjoyequalopportunitiestoassumepositionsofpowerandprestige.Andfinally,theDifferencePrincipleassertsthatsocialinequalitiesaretobear-rangedsothattheyareofthegreatestbenefittotheleastadvantaged.Inotherwords,deviatingfromequalityispermissibleonlywhenitistothemaximaladvan-tageoftheworst-off.Itshouldbeapparenthowtheseprinciplesderivetheirinspirationfromthepie-cuttingscenario,butnoticethatRawlsalsoseekstosupporthistheorywiththesamereasonswhichinspireourconfidenceinthefairnessofthepie-cuttingpro-cedure.Toappreciatethis,itisimportanttorememberthatJillandJackwillnotnecessarilygetpreciselyequalpiecesofpie.Thus,themethodofdivisionisnotjustifiedexclusivelybythesizeoftheportions;thedistributionisalsojustifiedbecauseitistheresultofaproceduretowhichneithercouldreasonablyobject.Putsimply,JillandJackbothrationallyagreetothismethodofdivision.Similarly,Rawlsseekstodefendhisprinciplesbyshowingthattheytoowouldbeagreedtobyrationalbargainersinasuitable-choicesituation.Therehasbeenanenormousamountwrittenaboutwhatconstitutesarationalbargainerandwhattypeofchoicesituationismostappropriate,butthebasicideaistoconstructathoughtexperi-mentwhichdemonstratesthat–likeJillandJackwiththeirrespectivepiecesofpie–noonelivinginasocietywhosebasicinstitutionsareinaccordwiththeprin-ciplesofjusticeasfairnesscouldreasonablycontestherlot.(AsRawlspointsout,inasocietywhosebasicinstitutionsaregovernedbyhisprinciples,eventhoseworst-offcannotrighteouslyobjectsincethingscouldnothavebeenorderedsoastoimprovetheirlotwithoutreducingotherstoapositionbelowthatofthecurrentlyworst-off.)Thus,thedescriptionoftherational-choicesituation(whichRawlslabelsthe“originalposition”)isextremelyimportantbecauseRawlsseekstojustifyhistheory,notonlyonthegroundsthatitsquareswithourconsideredjudgmentsofsocialjustice,butalsobecauseitwouldbeagreedtobyrationalbar-gainersincircumstanceswhichweallagreearefair.Thefirstthingtonoticeabouttherationalbargainersisthatwecannotuseactualpeoplewhoareawareoftheircircumstancesbecausewhite,maleChristiansareliabletolobbyforruleswhichfavorwhite,maleChristians,andblack,femaleMuslimsmightseekrulesprivilegingblack,femaleMuslimsandsoon.Moreover,becausethewealthyandpowerfulhavegreaterbargainingpower,theprincipleslikelytoemergefromanynegotiationsamongactualcontractorswouldreflectthesepowerdifferentials.Suchprincipleswouldnotnecessarilybefair,ofcourse,sincetheystemmedfromamorallyarbitrarysource.Toderiveprinciplestowhichnoonecouldreasonablyobject,then,wemuststripeachcontractorofanymorallyarbitraryadvantagesinbargainingpower,andthebestwaytodothis,Rawlssug-gests,istoputthecontractorsbehinda“veilofignorance”wheretheylackallknowledgeoftheirpersonalcharacteristicsandstationinsociety.Ifeachcontrac-torhasnoideawhethersheisblackorwhite,richorpoor,femaleormale,MuslimorChristian,forinstance,thenshewillnotbeconcernedmerelytoprotectpeople66\nJusticeofherowndescription.Thus,becausewehavereasontovalueprinciplesuponwhichrationalcontractorswouldagreeonlyifthesecontractorswereunawareoftheirpersonalcharacteristics,Rawlswantstoshowthatthosebehindtheveilofignorancewouldchoosetheprincipleswhichcomprisejusticeasfairness.Rawlsproposesthatthebargainerswouldreasonasfollows.Firstandforemost,theywouldinsistonthePrincipleofGreatestEqualLibertybecause,aboveall,eachwouldwanttoensureherfreedomtoliveaccordingtoherownconscience.IfacontractorknewthatonewasaMuslim,forinstance,shemightwantastatewhichfavorsMuslims,butsincethecontractorisignorantofherreligiouscon-victionsandofwhichreligionisdominant,herfirstprioritywillbetosecureanarrangementwhereineachpersonisatlibertytoworship(ornot)assheseesfit.Similarly,eachrationalbargainerwouldhopethatallpublicofficesandotherposi-tionsofauthorityareeffectivelyopentoall.Again,unlessoneknewthatonewasamemberoftheprivilegedcasteorclass,onewouldwanttomakesurethatevery-onehasanequalshotatallawardsandpostsofconsequence.Finally,whenitcomestodistributingthebasicgoodsofsociety,thebestwaytoensurethatonehassufficientmeanstolivearewardinglifeistoarrangethingssothatone’sworst-casescenarioisasgoodaspossible.Inotherwords,onewoulddistributewhatRawlscalls“primarygoods”(goodssuchasrights,liberties,wealth,powerandopportunities,whichvirtuallyeveryoneneedstopursuetheirgoalsandprojects)equallyunlessdepartingfromequalitywouldimprovethesmallestportion.Giventherationalityofthisreasoning,Rawlsconcludesthatthecontractorswouldoptforhisprinciplesofjustice.Andbecausetherationalpreferencesofbargainersbehindtheveilofignorancelendsupporttowhicheverarrangementtheyendorse,Rawlsseesthisthoughtexperimentascompellingsupportforhisconceptionofjusticeasfairness.ThecriticalresponsetoRawls’sgroundbreakingargumenthasbeenextraordi-naryinbothitsvolumeanditsinterdisciplinarity.HereIwillbrieflymentionjusttwoconcerns:(1)notonlydomanyquestionthemoralsignificanceofRawls’sthoughtexperiment;butalso(2)somesuggestthatitwouldnotgeneratetheprincipleshesupposes.Regardingthefirstobjection,detractorshaveprotestedthatitishardtoseehowthesupposedpreferencesofhypotheticalreasonerscouldhaveanymoralimplicationsforthoseofuslivingintherealworld.AsRonaldDworkinsays,ahypotheticalcontract“isnotsimplyapaleformofacontract,itisnocontractatall”(Dworkin,1975:18).Ofcourse,Rawlsinsiststhatitisimportanttodeterminewhichprincipleswouldbechosenbehindtheveilofignorancebecause,insofarashehasspecificallydesignedtheoriginalpositiontobeafair-choicesituation,whicheverprinciplesemergeshouldbeconsideredfair.EvenifoneagreeswithRawlsonthispoint,however,itmaynotbeenoughtosavehispreferredtheorybecausemanyques-tionwhethertherationalbargainerswouldreallyfavorRawls’sprinciples.MostcommentatorsconcedethePrincipleofGreatestEqualLiberty,andeventhePrin-cipleofFairEqualityofOpportunityhasnotbeentoocontroversial,buttherehasbeenenormousdissatisfactionwiththeDifferencePrinciple.Inparticular,many67\nChristopherHeathWellmanwonderwhyRawlsthinksrationalityrequiresthecontractorstobesorisk-aversethattheywouldsacrificepotentiallygreatgainsinefficiencyforincreasedsecurity.Putanotherway,whyconcentratesointentlyontheworst-offpositiontothedetrimentoftheoverallaggregateofcostsandbenefits?Itmakessenseforthepie-cuttertofocusexclusivelyonthesizeofthesmallestpieceofpiebecausesheknowsthatshewillchooselast,butthisisnottrueofthosebehindtheveilofignorance.Rawls’srationalbargainersdonotknowwhattheirrelativepositionwillbe,buttheirignoranceisverydifferentfromknowingthattheywillbetheworst-off.Giventheirignorance,itseemsasthoughtheyshouldassumethattheyareaslikelytoberelativelywealthyastoberelativelypoor.Ifso,thebargainersshouldpreferwhicheverdistributionofgoodsismostefficientsincethatismostlikelytoincreasetheaverageshare.Insum,manycriticscontendthat,oncethePrincipleofGreatestEqualLibertyandthePrincipleofFairEqualityofOppor-tunityaresafelyinplace,itwouldbeirrationaltoworryexclusivelyaboutmakingtheworst-offpositionasgoodaspossible.Themorerationalstrategywouldbetopreferwhicheverdistributivepolicywouldmakethepieasawholethebiggestsincethiswillimprovethesizeoftheaverageslice.Rawlsacknowledgesthatthepolicyofmaximizingone’sminimum,worst-casescenario(knownasthe“maximin”strategy)isnotalwayspreferabletomaximiz-ingone’sexpectedoutcome,butheinsiststhatthebargainersbehindtheveilofignorancehavespecialreasonstoweightsecurityoverefficiency.Inparticular,Rawlsinvokesthe“strainsofcommitment”whichweighonthecontractors.Theargumenthereisthatthebargainers’specialconcernwithimprovingthecondi-tionoftheworst-offiswarrantedbecause,inagreeingtoasetofprinciplestogovernthebasicinstitutionsofsociety,theyareirrevocablycommittingthemselvestotheresultingdistributionnomatterwheretheymayenduponthesocialhier-archy.Whatismore,thecontractorswouldbeirrationaltogamblewiththehighstakesofsuchanoutcomebecausethesocialconditionsnecessaryforself-respectareontheline.Finally,Rawlsemphasizesthatthecontractorsunderstandthattheymustnotonlybeabletoenduretheireventualstationsinsociety;theymustbeabletoembracethemasactive,energeticcitizensinademocraticcommunity.Thus,Rawlsconcludesthatthehighlydistinctivecircumstancesbehindtheveilofignorancerequirethemaximinstrategy,whichinturnleadstotheDifferencePrin-ciple.Insum,Rawlsarguesthathisconceptionofjusticeasfairnessisconfirmednotonlybyourconsideredjudgmentsaboutsocialjusticebutalsobecauseitwouldbeselectedbyrationalbargainersplacedinafair-choicesituation.BeforeclosingourdiscussionofRawls,itisworthpausingtonotethatheplacesmuchgreateremphasisonstabilityandlegitimacyinhismorerecentwork.InPoliticalLiberalism,Rawlstakesitasaninevitablefactthatapluralityofcompre-hensivemoral,religious,andphilosophicaldoctrineswillexistunlessuniformityisforciblyimposedbyanoppressiveregime.Assumingboththatapoliticalregimewillenjoystabilityonlyifthegreatmajorityofitsconstituentsfreelysupportit,andthatastatecannotbelegitimateifitimposesruleswhichitsconstituentscanreasonablyreject,thefundamentalquestionarisesastohowastatecanlegitimately68\nJusticecoerceallofitscitizenswhentheysubscribetoapluralityofreasonablecompre-hensiveviews.AsRawlsputsit:“Howisitpossiblethatdeeplyopposedthoughreasonablecomprehensivedoctrinesmaylivetogetherandallaffirmthepoliticalconceptionofaconstitutionalregime?”(Rawls,1993,p.xviii).Thesolution,Rawlsbelieves,liesin“publicreason,”anoverlappingconsensusoffundamentalpoliticalidealswhichexistwithinthepublicpoliticalcultureofenduringliberaldemocracies.Thus,astatecanbelegitimateandstabledespitetheideologicaldiversityofitscitizensaslongasitcangrounditslawsinthisoverlappingcon-sensusofpublicreason,asopposedtoappealingtoaparticularcomprehensivedoctrinewhichisnotsharedbyall.ItisimportanttorecognizethatRawlsdoesnotseektoeliminatethepluralityofreasonablecomprehensivedoctrines;heacknowledgesthattheymightberelevantforvariousassociationsorinstitutionswithinastate(whendecidingmatterswithinone’schurch,forinstance).Butwhenitcomestopoliticaldecisionsconcerningthebasicstructureofsociety,Rawlsinsiststhatitisillegitimatetoinvokeanythingotherthanpublicreason.Thus,incontrasttohisearlierwork,Rawlsnowemphasizesthathisprinciplesconstituteapoliticalconceptionofjustice;hearguesnotthathistheoryistruebutonlythatitisconsistentwithanoverlappingconsensusofpoliticalviewswhichexistamongthepluralityofreasonablecomprehensivedoctrinesofanylongstandingdemo-craticregime.LibertarianismManyembracelibertarianpoliciesforconsequentialreasons;asexplainedabove,thereisgoodreasontothinkthatsocialsystemswhichcelebrateindividualfreedomandresponsibilitymakeeveryonebetter-off.Themorepopularlibertar-ianstance,however,stemsfromarespectfortheinviolabilityofmoralrights.SuchlibertariansofferanaccountofjusticeverydifferentfromthoseofutilitarianismorRawls,andperhapsthebestwaytointroducetheirviewistoexplainwhytheyrejectthetwopreviousaccountsofjustice.Rights-basedlibertarians(hereaftersimply“libertarians”)likeJohnLockeand,morerecently,RobertNozickunderstandthetemptationtoslicepiesordistrib-utepantssoastomaximizeoverallhappinessorimprovetheconditionoftheworst-off,buttheynonethelessinsistthatsuchredistributionistypicallyunjust.Theprincipalconcernisthatpies,pants,andotherproductsdonotmerelyfallfromtheheavens;theyhavetobeproducedandnormallyarethepropertyoftheirproducer.Reconsiderourcommunityoftenasanexample.Ifoneoftheten,Antonio,bakesapie,thenwemightdivideitinanynumberofways,dependingonwhatgoalsweseektoadvance.Nomatterwhatgoodconsequenceswouldarisefromthesevariousdivisions,however,itwouldbeunjustfromtheperspec-tiveoflibertarianismtotakeeventhetiniestsliveronbehalfofthehungriestpersonwithoutAntonio’spermission.Astherightfulownerofthepie,Antoniostandsin69\nChristopherHeathWellmanaprivilegedpositionofmoraldominionoverit.Ofcourse,Antoniomaysharethepiewiththeothersifhewouldlike,buthemayalsoeattheentirepiehimselforevenletitgotowasteifhewouldprefer.Lettingthepiespoilwhenothersarehungrywouldadmittedlybeinefficient,wasteful,andperhapsevenmean-spirited,butitneednotbeunjust.AssumingthatAntoniohasapropertyrighttothepie,justicerequiresthathebeallowedtouse–orwaste–itinanymannerheseesfit.Efficiency,charity,andthemaximizationofhappinessareworthwhilegoals,butlibertarianjusticeinsiststhatnonetakespriorityovermoralrights.Nomatterhownobleourintentions,therangeofourpermissibleactionsisalwaysconstrainedbytherightsofothers.Giventhisemphasisonrights,libertarianslikeNozickinsistthatonecannotknowwhetheraparticulardistributionisjust–nomatterwhatitspattern–unlessoneknowshowitarose.AdistributionwhereinAntonioiswealthyandtheotherninearerelativelypoorcouldbeperfectlyjustaslongaseachofthetenisenti-tledtopreciselywhatshehas;andconversely,ascenarioinwhichalltenhaveequalportionsmightbeunjustifsomehaveacquiredtheirpossessionsviaillegitimatemeans.Anydistributionwillbejustaslongaseachpossessionwasacquiredeitherthroughaproperinitialacquisition(aswhenonegrowsacroponone’sownlandorbakesapiewithone’sowningredients)orthroughajusttransfer(aswhenoneeitherbuys,tradesfor,orisgivensomethingfromitsrightfulowner).Itisthehistoryofeachparticularinitialacquisitionandtransferratherthantheresultingoverallpatternofdistributionwhichdeterminesthejustnessofaparticulardis-tribution(Nozick).Forcemaypermissiblybeusedtotakesomethingbackfromsomeonewhohasacquireditviaillegitimatemeans(throughfraudortheft,forinstance),butitisalwaysunjusttocoercesomeonetosurrendersomethingtowhichsheisentitled.Theremaybeloadsofreasonstowishthatpropertyweredistributedmoreequallyorinconformitywithsomeotherpattern(andoftenthesereasonswillinspirepeopletoactcharitably),butaslongastheexistingdistribu-tionistheresultofjustinitialacquisitionsandtransfersonly,itwouldbestrictlyimpermissibletoforceanyonetosurrenderherproperty.Giventhisaccountofjustice,itisnotsurprisingthatlibertarianstendtofollowNozickinrejectingthewelfarestateinfavorof(atmost)aminimal,“nightwatcher”state.Theideahereisthat,justasitwouldbeunjustforanindividualtotakeAntonio’sproperty,itwouldequallybewrongofallninetobandtogetherandcommandeeraportionofhispie.Antonio’spropertyrightisapositionofmoraldominionwhichholdsagainstallothers,whethertheyactasindividualsorhavebeenincorporatedintheformofastate.Understoodfromthisperspec-tive,Nozickarguesthatthereisasenseinwhichlivinginawelfarestateismorallyakintosomethinglikeslavery.Imagine,forinstance,thatthestate“redistributes”one-tenthofAntonio’sincometoothers;supposeittakesoneofthetenpiesAntoniobakesdaily.Inasense,Antonioisone-tenthenslavedsinceheisforcedtoworkforothersforaportionofeveryday.Thus,whilelibertarianshavenoprincipledoppositiontovoluntarycharity,theyinsistthatcoercedwelfareredistributionisunjustregardlessofwhetheritisperpetratedbyanindividual,by70\nJusticeRobinHoodandhismerrymen,orbyasophisticatedmodernstate.Giventhisstance,libertarianstypicallyargueforaminimalstate,onewhichmerelysecuresthepeace,enforcescontracts,andperhapsprotectsagainstaggressiveforeignstates.Onthisview,thestateisneededto–andmaypermissiblydonomorethan–ensurethatnooneinterfereswiththemoralrightsofitscitizens.Becauselib-ertarianspositonlyminimalrightsagainstinterference,theydislikeallstateswhich,inattemptingtodomorethanprotectthesefewrights,regularlytramplealloverthem.Libertarianismisattractivebothbecauseofthesimplicityandintuitiveplausi-bilityofitsemphasisonrightsandbecauseofitscelebrationofindividualfreedomandresponsibility.Likeallaccounts,however,ithascritics.Twoprominentobjec-tionsarethat(1)thereisnoadequatefoundationforlibertarianrights,and(2)iflibertarianswerecorrectaboutourmoralrights,wecouldnotjustifyevenaminimalstate.Considereachoftheseworriesinturn.First,manyconcedethatallforcedwelfareredistributionwouldbeunjustifmoralrights–especiallypropertyrights–tooktheformlibertarianspresume,buttheycontendthatthereisinsufficientreasontobelieveinrightsofthisdescrip-tion.Mostcontemporarystudentsofjusticebelieveinmoralrights,buttheyunderstandthemdifferentlythanlibertarianswouldlike.Accordingtolibertari-anism,therecanbeno“positive”rightstoassistancebecausetheyareruledoutbyour“negative”rightstobefreefrominterferenceaslongaswedonotharmothers.(Veryroughly,negativerightsprotectonefrombeingharmed,andposi-tiverightsentitleonetobebenefited.)Theobviousquestionemerges,however,astowhywemustagreethatournegativerightsleavenospaceforpositiverights.Negativerightswoulddosoiftheywereentirelygeneralandunfailinglyabsolute,butthisrenderingill-fitsourconsideredmoraljudgments.(Toofferjustoneexampleofanexceptiontoourrighttoliberty,mostthinkthereisaperfectdutytoperformSamaritanrescueslikesavingadrowningbabyfromaswimmingpoolwhensucharescuerequiresoneonlytoreachdownandpullthechildfromthewater.)Whatismore,weshouldrevisethesesubstantivemoraljudgmentsonlyiftherearecompellingconceptualreasonsforinsistingthatallrightsareabsoluteandgeneral.Theproblemforlibertariansisthatnoonehasbeenabletosupplythesereasons.(Moralrightsmightbeperfectlygeneralandabsoluteiftheywerederiveddirectlyfromafewnaturallaws,forexample,butmosthaveabandonedtheconceptionofmoralrulesuponwhichsuchanaccountdepends.)Inshort,intheabsenceofatheoreticalexplanationofwhyrightsmustbegeneralandabsolute,wecannotconcludethatournegativerightsruleoutthepossibilityofpositiverights.And,givenourconsideredbeliefinpositiverights,itseemswrongtoinsistthatallforcedredistributionofwealthmustbeunjust.Asecondproblememergeseveniflibertarianscangenerateaconvincingexpla-nationforwhyournegativerightsleavenoroomforpositiverights,because,whilelibertariansstressthattheiraccountofjusticeisincompatiblewithforcedredis-tribution,italsoappearstoconflictwiththeminimal,“nightwatcher”state.Theproblemisthatjustasawelfarestatecannotredistributefundswithoutfirstforcing71\nChristopherHeathWellmancitizenstorelinquishsomeoftheirwealth,aminimalstatecouldnotsecurepeace,enforcecontracts,andprovidemilitaryprotectionunlessitcoercedthosewithinitsterritorialboundariestobothfollowasinglesetofrulesandcontributetotheinstitutionsrequiredtodraft,promulgateandenforcetheserules.Albeittoalesserextentandforfewerpurposes,aminimalstateisguiltyofthesamecrime–non-consensualcoercionandinvasionofpropertyrights–withwhichlibertarianschargethewelfarestate.Ifso,libertariansmustescheweventheminimalstateinfavorofanarchy.Ofcourse,anarcho-libertariansurgeustoembracejustsuchaconclusion,butmostconsideranarchyanunpalatableconclusion.Facedwitheitherendorsinganarchismorabandoninglibertarianism,manywouldoptforthelatter.Post-RawlsianEgalitarianismSincetheemergenceofRawls’stheoryofjustice,anumberofegalitarianshavedefendedvariousinterpretationsoftheidealofequality.InthissectionIwillbrieflyreviewthreeegalitarianapproaches:(1)so-called“luck”egalitarians,(2)MichaelWalzer’scomplexequality,and(3)ElizabethAnderson’srelationaltheoryofequality.Althoughegalitariansoftendisagreeabouthowtheidealofequalityshouldberealized,theyareunitedinrejectingthelibertariancritiqueofwelfareredistribu-tion.Intheirview,theproblemwithallowingindividualsunlimitedlibertytoaccu-mulateandtransferjustlyacquiredpropertyisthatthecumulativeresultofmanyseeminglybenigntransactionscanresultinperniciousinequalities(Cohen).Itisquitepossible,forinstance,thatBert’sparents–throughacombinationofambi-tion,preferences,andluck–amassafortunewhileErnie’sbecomequitepoor.Thisdisparityismorallyproblematicbecauseitmeansthat,throughnofaultofhisown,ErniehasamuchworsechancethanBertoflivingarewardinglife.ThereisnothingnecessarilywrongwithBertworkinghardandaccumulatingmorepos-sessionsbecausehevaluespossessionsmoreandleisurelessthanErnie,butitseemsunjustthatBertshouldenjoybothmorepossessionsandmoreleisurethanErniemerelybecauseBertwasluckyenoughtohavebeenborntowealthierparents.Justasweobjecttotheinjusticeofwhiteshavingbetterlifeprospectsthanblacksormenhavingbetterlifeprospectsthanwomen,weshouldobjecttothedispar-itybetweenthelifeprospectsofBertandErniewhenthisdivergencehasnothingtodowithdifferencesintheircharacterorbehavior.Toavoidthisformofinjustice,somerecommendthatweshoulddivideresourcesequally.Theproblemwiththis“equalityofresources”approach,how-ever,isthatsomepeoplemightneedmoreresourcestoliveanequallyrewardinglife(Dworkin,1981b).Imagine,forinstance,thatIamparalyzedandcannotgetaroundwithoutaspeciallivingenvironmentandamotorizedwheelchair.Ifeveryoneweresimplygivenanequalshareofresources,myspecialexpenseswould72\nJusticeleavemewithconsiderablylessfortheusualgoodsoflife.Tocorrectforthisproblem,someembrace“EqualityofWelfare,”theviewthatresourcesaretobedistributedinwhateverfashionensuresthatallareequallyhappy.Thisapproachisalsoproblematic,though,becauseitmightbethatIhaveunreasonablyexpen-sivetastes(Dworkin,1981a).IfIcanonlybepleasedwithchampagneandcaviarwhenmostareperfectlycontentwithchickenanddumplings,thentheequalityofwelfareseemstorequirethatIbegivenenoughfundstocompensateformymoreexpensivetastes.Thisconclusionisawkward,however,sinceitseemsasthoughsocietyatlargeshouldnothavetopickupthetabformypeculiarcravings.Amorepromisingapproachwouldseemtobeonewhichsplitthedif-ferencebetweenequalityofresourcesandequalityofwelfare,onewhichcom-pensatedpeopleforexpensesbeyondtheircontrolbutgavenoextraresourcestothosewithcontrollable,expensivetastes.Infact,however,eventhosewhoconcurthatweshouldeliminatetheelementofluckhavefounditextremelydif-ficulttoagreeonjusthowthisidealofequalityrequiresthattheburdensandben-efitsofsocialcooperationbedistributed.Distinguishinghimselffromthosewhounderstandequalityintermsofasingleideal,MichaelWalzerdevelopsanaccounthecalls“complex”equality,whichisdramaticallypluralisticintwoimportantsenses.First,ratherthansearchforafun-damental,universalconceptofjusticewhichcanbeuniformlyappliedinallcon-texts,Walzerregardsjusticeassomethingwhichmustbecreatedbyeachparticularcommunity.Second,eachdistincttypeofsocialgoodcomprisesitsown“sphereofjustice”withitsowndistinctcriterionofdistribution.Thecriterionwhichgov-ernsthedistributionofpoliticalpower,forexample,maybedifferentfromthecriterionwhichgovernsthedistributionofmedicalcare.Whatismore,thereisnoreasontoassumethatanyparticularcriterionismorebasicthantheothersorthatthereissomeoverarchingprincipletorankthevariouscriteriaofdistribution.Rather,complexequalityrequiresmerelythatnoonebeabletodominateoverothers,wheredominationisunderstoodintermsofconvertingtheadvantagesofonesphereofdistributionintoadvantagesinanother.Thus,thereisnoproblemwithyourhavingmorepoliticalpowerthanIaslongas(1)yougainedthisgreaterpowerinaccordancewithourcommunity’scriterionforwhoshouldhavepoliti-calpower,and(2)youarenotabletouseyourpoliticalpowertogetgoodsinothersphereslikemedicalcare.Indeed,itisnotevenclearhowWalzercouldobjecttoyourenjoyingagreateramountofeverygoodthanI,aslongaseachparticularadvantagewasgainedinaccordancewithitsowncriterionofdistribu-tionandnotbecauseofthedominanceof,say,wealthorpower.(However,giventhegreatvarietyofgoodsandthecorrespondingdiversityofindividualcriteria,itwouldinpracticebevirtuallyimpossibletoachievesuchuniformadvantagewithoutviolatingcomplexequality.)Thus,WalzerneednotobjecttoanygiveninequalitywhichexistswithrespecttoaparticulargoodbecauseWalzerianjusticecancoincidewithvariousinequalitiesaslongas(1)nooneisabletodominatetherest,and(2)theinequalitiesarecreatedinaccordancewithoursocialunder-standingsofthesegoods.73\nChristopherHeathWellmanWhileWalzer’scomplexequalityhasgarneredagreatdealofsupport,criticshaveexpressedconcernabouthiscontentionthatparticularconceptionsofjusticemustbecreatedbyeachcommunity.Ifheweremerelyemphasizingthatthereareoftenmorallyrelevantdetailswhichmayvaryfromculturetoculture,fewwouldobject.ButWalzerdoesnotsimplymeantopointoutthattherulesofdistribu-tivejusticeshouldnotbeconstruedinoverlygeneralterms;heembracesabrandofculturalrelativismbyallegingthateachsphereofjusticedependsuponthesocialunderstandingsofthecommunityinwhichitexists.Mostcommentatorsshyawayfromthisrelativism,though,becauseitapparentlyleavesusunabletocriticizeobjectionabledistributivearrangements.Ifacommunityreservestheprivilegedreligiousorpoliticalpostsexclusivelyformen,forinstance,itisunclearhowforce-fullysomeonewhofollowsWalzerineschewinguniversalconceptsofjusticecouldcriticizesuchanarrangement.Sincemostofusregardaninherentlysexistdis-tributivepolicyasunjustirrespectiveofitsculturalpedigree,fewareentirelycom-fortablewithallelementsofWalzer’spluralism.Inreactiontothe“luck”egalitarians,ElizabethAndersonoffersa“relational”theoryofequality.Inherview,thekeytodevelopinganaccuratetheoryofequal-ityisunderstandingthepointofequality.Luckegalitariansmissthemark,shesug-gests,becausetheymistakenlybelievetheirchiefconcerntobeeliminatingtheelementoflucksothateachpersoncangetpreciselythegoodsshedeserves.Therealreasontovalueequality,Andersoncontends,isbecauseinequalityfacilitatessociallyoppressiverelationships.Thus,ifwewanttoknowwhatequalityrequires,wemustthinkaboutwhatpeopleneedtoavoidbeingoppressedbyothers.Adoptingthisviewinvolvesbroadeningone’sfocusfrommerelythedistributionofgoodsthemselvestoaconsiderationoftherelationshipswithinwhichthesegoodsaredistributed.Andersonisparticularlyconcernedwiththerelationshipamongfellow-citizens,andthusshedevelopsatheoryof“democraticequality.”Regardingcompatriots,shewrites:“Negatively,peopleareentitledtowhatevercapabilitiesarenecessarytoenablethemtoavoidorescapeentanglementinoppressiverelationships.Positively,theyareentitledtothecapabilitiesnecessaryforfunctioningasanequalcitizeninademocraticstate.”Thus,AndersonwouldinsistthatrealizingtheidealofequalityrequiresneitherthatBerthavenomorethanErnienoreventhatErniecouldhavejustasmuchasBertifhewereastal-entedandaswillingtowork.AslongasBert’sprivilegedpositiondoesnotplaceErnieinanoppressiverelationship,themoralidealofequalitygivesusnocausetoeliminatethedisparityinwealthbetweenthetwo.Ofcourse,noteveryoneispreparedtojoinAndersoninrejectingthemoretra-ditionalaccountsofequality.LuckegalitariansmightagreewithAndersonthatweshouldcondemnoppressiverelationshipsbutarguethatthereismoretoequalitythantheabsenceofoppression.RegardingBertandErnie,aluckegalitarianisliabletoprotestthatsurelyitremainsproblematicthatErnie’sprospectsforarewardinglifeare–throughnofaultofhisown–somuchlesspromisingthanBert’seveniftheseprospectswillneverleadtoErnie’sbeingoppressed.Ifso,thenrestrictingourattentionsolelytooppressiverelationshipsmightcauseustoover-74\nJusticelookworrisomeformsofinequality.Moreover,onemightquestionhowmuchAnderson’sfocusonoppressionreallyadvancesthediscussionsince(a)“oppres-sion”maynotbeasufficientlyclearnotiontoresolveconflicts,and(b)totheextentthatitisclear,itmaybeparasiticonnotionslikerightswhichmoretradi-tionalegalitariansendorse.TheBoundsofJusticeAssumingthatjusticeconsistsofmoralrequirementswhereascharityismorallygoodbutnotrequired,itisimportanttoknowwherejusticeendsandcharitybegins.Exploringthisissueisnotonlyworthwhileinitsownright,itisanimpor-tantbasisonwhichtoevaluatetheoriesofjustice.AsIwillexplainbelow,dissat-isfactionwiththetraditionaltheories’accountsoftheboundsofjusticemightleadsometoadoptotherapproaches.Anotoriousdifficultyforthestandardtheoriesistheirdivergencefromordinarymoralthinkingregardingthespecialdutieswehavetowardthosewithwhomwesharespecialrelationships.Inparticular,itiscommonlypresumedthatwhilewehave,atmost,minimalSamaritandutiestostrangers,wehavemuchmorerobustobligationstofriends,familymembers,neighbors,colleagues,andcompatriots.Toappreciatewhymanyaredissatisfiedwiththisaspectoftraditionaltheories,considerthespecialobligationsthoughttoexistamongcompatriotsandthedifficultyRawlsians,utilitarians,andlibertarianshaveaccountingforthem.Mostpeoplebelievethat,whilewemighthaveminimaldutiestohelpforeignersduringtimesofcrisis,wehavemuchmoredemandingresponsibilitiestoassistcompatriots.Wemayhaveadutytosupporthumanitarianreliefprojectswhenothercountriesarestruckwithnaturaldisasters,forinstance,butwedonotoweforeignersthesameextensivewelfareredistributionandsocialsafetynetwhichweprovidetofellowcitizens.Surprisingly,neitherRawls’stheory,utilitarianism,norlibertarianismappearsabletoexplainthesespecialduties.Althoughsomepoliti-caltheoristshavetriedtoapplyRawls’smethodologytointernationaljustice,hisownaccountseemsill-equippedtoshedlightonredistributionbetweenpoliticalcommunitiesbecauseRawls’s“strainsofcommitment”argumentrequiresthatthebargainersintheoriginalpositionassumetheyaredesigningprinciplestogovernaself-containedcommunitywhichwillexistinperpetuity.Inotherwords,becauseRawlswantstoensurethattherationalbargainerswillnotadopttooriskyastrat-egy,heemphasizesthattheyareirrevocablycommittingthemselvestowhicheverprinciplestheyadopt.Tomakethispoint,herequiresthatthebargainersunder-standthatthereisonlyoneunitofsocialcooperation(i.e.,theywillnotbeabletodefectlater)andthattheprinciplesadoptedcannotsubsequentlybeamendediftheydonotliketheirpositioninsociety.And,ifRawls’smodelrequiresthebar-gainerstopresumethattherewillbenootherpoliticalstates,ittherebyappears75\nChristopherHeathWellmanincapableofexplainingwhattypeofdutiesmightexistbetweenthesestates.Thisutilitarianismisatoddswithextendingcompatriotspreferentialtreatmentbecause,insofarasitregardseachperson’sinterestsasofequalintrinsicvalue,itimploresustodojustasmuchforforeignersasforcompatriots.(Indeed,becauseutilitar-iansdenyeventhattheagent’sinterestsaremoreimportantthanthoseofdistantstrangers,theyofteninsistthatweowemoretoeveryone–irrespectiveofnation-ality–thanwecurrentlyacknowledgeisdueeventospecialrelationslikecompa-triots.)Autilitarianmightcounterthathertheorycanaccommodatethesespecialobligationsbecauseconsiderationsofefficiencyentailthateveryonewouldbebetteroffifeachattendedprincipallytocompatriots,butefficiencywouldseemtojustifyatmostattendingtofellow-citizensfirst;itcouldnotjustifyaddressingtheconsiderablylessdireneedsofcompatriotswhileforeignersremainindra-maticallyworseshape.Libertarianismsuffersfromtheoppositeproblembecause,whileutilitarianismseemstoexaggeratethevalidclaimsofforeigners,libertarian-ismappearstounderappreciatetheconnectionsamongcompatriots.Accordingtolibertarianism,eachpersonisatlibertytokeepherpropertyunlessshefreelyagreestogive,trade,orsellittosomeoneelse.Thus,unlessonehasagreedtotransferfundstoaforeigner,oneowesnothingtononcitizens.However,becausemostofushavenotagreedtoshareourwealthwithourfellow-citizens(indeed,thisiswhylibertariansobjectsovehementlytothewelfarestate),libertarianscannotaccountforthespecialresponsibilitiesthoughttobeowedtocompatriots.Thisreviewofthetraditionaltheories’capacitiestoexplainthespecialobliga-tionsamongcompatriotshasbeenquick,buthopefullyitrevealswhyRawls’sapproachisdismissedasinapplicable,utilitarianismstandsaccusedofdemandingtoomuch,andlibertarianismisthoughttorequiretoolittle.Letusnowturnto“associativism”and“justiceasmutualadvantage,”twodistinctiveaccountsofjusticewhichsometoutasbetterabletoexplainthemoralimportanceofspecialrelations.Associativists(sometimescalled“particularists”)urgeustorecognizethatrela-tionalfactshaveabasicmoralsignificance;ontheirview,IhavespecialobligationstomysisterLesley,andweneedlooknofurtherthanthefactthatsheismysistertoexplaintheseextraduties.Weneednottellsophisticatedstoriesaboutthequasi-contractualnatureofsiblingrelationships,forexample,toexplainwhyourcon-nectionismorallysignificantbecauseanyrelationshipwhereinthepartiesidentifywithoneanothergeneratesspecialmoralobligations(Miller;Tamir).Thisviewaccordsnicelywithourconvictionthattherearespecialobligationsamongfamily,friends,colleagues,co-nationalsandcompatriotsbecausewetypicallyidentifywiththeseassociates.Inotherwords,wefeelconnectedtotheseassociatesinsuchawaythat,amongotherthings,werootforthemtoflourishandfeelproudwhentheysucceedorashamedwhentheyfail.Associativistscanciteatleastthreereasonstoregardrelationshipsbetweenthosewhoidentifywithoneanotherasmorallybasic.Firstandmostobviously,thisapproachdoesabetterjobthanthestandardaccountsofmatchingourcom-76\nJusticemonsenseconvictionthatweowemoretoourspecialrelations.Second,associa-tivismoffersadirectconnectionbetweenourmotivationsandmoralrequirements:givenourpersonalinvestmentinthosewithwhomweidentify,wehaveextramoti-vationtosacrificeonbehalfofourassociates,soassociativismhasabuilt-inmech-anismlinkingourobligationstoourmotivations.Finally,associativistssuggestthattreatingrelationalfactsasmorallybasicaccordswithourmoralphenomenologybecauseitseemsasthoughthemerefactthatLesleyismysisteriswhatismorallysignificant.Thatis,evenifwecouldtellaplausiblestoryabouthowoverallhap-pinessismaximizedwhenpeopleattendprincipallytotheirsiblingsorabouthowthereisasenseinwhichsiblingscanbesaidtohavecontractedwithoneanotherforspecialtreatment,theseaccountsseembesidethemoralpoint.Tomostofus,itissimplythefactthatLesleyismysister,andnottheseelaboratestories,whichmattersmorally(Williams).Althoughassociativismaccordswellwithoursentimentsregardingtheboundsofjustice,ithasotherfeatureswhicharemoreproblematic.Forstarters,whileitisplausiblethatthosewhoidentifywithoneanotherwillbemorelikelytosacri-ficeoneachother’sbehalf,itisnotclearwhyitfollowsfromthisthattheyarespeciallyobligatedtodoso.Untilsomeoneexplainswhytheformer,psychologi-calclaimshouldleadustoacceptthelatter,ethicalassertion,skepticismseemswarranted.Additionalproblemsemergebecauseawkwardimplicationscanbederivedfromtheprinciplethattherelationshipswithwhichweidentifygeneratespecialmoralduties.Considertwoexamples.First,manysportsfansferventlyiden-tifywithagiventeam(justasmostcitizensidentifywiththeircountryandcom-patriots),butwewouldhesitatetoconcludethatsportsfanshavespecialdutiestosupporttheirteam.(Wemightcriticizea“fairweatherfan”forcapriciouslyturningherbackon“her”teamassoonasitloses,buthereweindictherchar-acterratherthanchargeherwithdisrespectingadutyofjustice.)Asecond,lessbenignexampleistheracistorsexistpersonwhoidentifieswithotherwhitesorwithmen.Giventhatwewouldbeloathtosaythatawhitesupremacisthasextradutiestowardotherwhitesorthatamisogynisthasspecialobligationstoothermen,weoughtnottoembracetheviewthatallpersonalidentificationscreateduties.Thus,whileassociativismconvenientlymatchesourunderstandingoftheboundsofjustice,manyfinditunacceptableforotherreasons(Wellman).Asecondapproachwithpromiseonthisscoreis“justiceasmutualadvantage,”theviewthatjusticeisthesetofthoseruleswewouldrationallyfollowforourownmutualadvantage.Onthisview,thereasonthatjusticeincludesprohibitionsagainstlying,stealing,andkilling,forexample,isbecauseeachofusisbetteroffspeakingtruthfully,respectingothers’propertyrights,andrefrainingfromkillingothersaslongaseveryoneelsefollowsthesesamerules.Theprincipalattractionofthisapproachisitsapparentabilitytoanswerthequestion:“Whybejust?”Mosttheoriesstrugglemightilytoexplaintherationalityofactingjustly,butmutual-advantagetheoristscitethebenefitsofreciprocityasthestraightforwardanswer(Hobbes;Gauthier).Obeyingtherulesofjusticeadmittedlyinvolvesopportunity77\nChristopherHeathWellmancosts,butthesearemorethanoutweighedbythebenefitseachpersonreceivesfromothersrespectingthesamerules.Inotherwords,whiletherearedisadvan-tagestonotlying,stealing,andkilling,theydonotcomparetothegreatadvan-tagesoflivinginacommunitywhereinothersalsodonotlie,steal,orkill.Whilemanychampionthisapproachforitsabilitytoexplaintherationalityofjustice,itmightalsobeapplaudedforitscompatibilitywiththespecialdutiesthoughttoexistamongspecialrelations.Acoretenetofjusticeasmutualadvan-tageisthateachperson’sfairshareofthebenefitsofjusticedependsonhercon-tributingtotheproductionofthesebenefitsviaherowncooperation.Giventhisemphasisonreciprocity,itisnotdifficulttoseehowjusticeasmutualadvantageiswellpositionedtoexplaintheextradutiesweowetoourspecialrelations.Weowemoretocompatriotsthantoforeigners,forinstance,becauseourcompatri-otssacrificereciprocallyforus,andwemightoweourcolleaguesspecialconsid-erationonlybecausetheyextendusthesameextraconcern.Indeed,justiceasmutualadvantageseemsideallysuitedtoexplaintheextradutiesamongspecialrelationsbecause,theclosertheassociation,thegreatertheconsiderationgener-allyreciprocated.Althoughmutual-advantagetheoryisingoodshaperegardingspecialrelations,manyobjectthatitdoesnotreallydemonstratetherationalityofbeingjust;rather,itcanshowonlywhyitisrationaltoappearjust(sinceothersaremorelikelytotreatyoujustlyaslongastheybelievethatyouarereciprocating).Moreover,justiceasmutualadvantagedoesconsiderablylesswellmatchingourconvictionsregard-ingotherboundariesofjustice.Mostproblematically,itappearstoleavethosewhocannotreciprocateentirelybeyondthescopeofprotection.Someonebothunabletocontributetothesocialsurplusandincapableofthreateningothers,forinstance,wouldnotbeprotectedbyjusticebecauseitistonoone’sadvantagetocontractwithher.Similarconclusionsapplytononhumananimalsandpersonsmentallyincapableofcommittingtorules.Theseimplicationsunderminejusticeasmutualadvantagebecausetheygowellbeyondsuggestingthatthesepeopledeservenospecialtreatment;thistheoryimpliesthat,becausethesepartiescannotrecipro-cate,itisnotpossibletotreatthemunjustly.Thus,evenifthepowerfulwantedtodosomethinghorrificliketorturethesepeoplemerelyforthesakeofamuse-ment,justiceasmutualadvantageappearsincapableofexplainingtheinjusticeofdoingso.Giventhatthetraditionaltheoriesconflictwithourcommonconvictionsabouttheboundsofjusticeandthatneitherassociativismnorjusticeasmutualadvan-tageoffersafullysatisfactoryalternative,itisnotclearhowtoproceed.Sometheoristssuggestthatwemustreviseourpretheoreticbeliefsaboutthespecialobligationsthoughttoexistamongourassociates,butmostareunwillingtoabandonthesejudgments.Thosewhoclingtoourcommonsenseconvictionshavemuchworktodo,butperhapsElizabethAnderson’sinsightspointtoafruitfulstrategy.RecallthatAndersondevelopsarelationaltheoryofequalityinspiredbyherconvictionthatthechiefevilofinequalityisitsroleincreatingsociallyoppres-siverelationships.IfAndersonisontrack,itmayhelpexplainwhyweowemore78\nJusticetothosewithwhomwesharespecialrelationships.Specifically,giventhatthemoralsignificanceofaninequalitywilldependonthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenthehavesandhave-nots,theremightbegreatercauseforconcernaboutthesameinequalitieswhentheyexistamongcompatriotsratherthanforeignersoriftheyobtainbetweenspousesasopposedtostrangers.Clearlymuchofthisstoryremainstobetold,butitoffershopetothoseinclinedtodefendthecommonsensecon-victionthatjusticerequireswedomoreforourassociates.Ihavecitedthespecialobligationsamongcompatriotsinthissectiontoillus-tratethedifficultiesvarioustheorieshaveaccommodatingourordinarymoralthinkingabouttheboundsofjustice,butitisworthpausingtonotethatthisexampleisalsoemblematicofourlimitedunderstandingofinternationaljusticeingeneral.Politicaltheoristsareincreasinglyfocusingtheirattentiononthissubject,butthereturnstothispointhavebeenmodestbecausesomanyofourtheoreticalmodelsaredesignedexplicitlytospeaktojusticewithinagivenpolit-icalunit.Notonlyhastherebeentoolittlesystematicthinkingabouttherespon-sibilitiesamongstates,politicaltheoristsarejustbeginningtofaceuptothefactthatsomeofourmostimportantinternationalobligationsaretonon-sovereignentitiessuchasoppressedminorities,andevenimperiledindividualswhoareeitherneglectedoractivelypersecutedbytheirownstates.Onceonequestionsthesanc-tityofeachstate’ssovereigntyoveritsterritory–asinternationallawyersarebegin-ningtodo–onerecognizesthatouroldmoralroad-mapsmaynotbereliable.Mattersarefurthercomplicatedbytheemergenceofnon-governmentalorgani-zationsandinternationalallianceslikeNATOandtheUnitedNations,whichnowcompetewithstatesfortheleadrolesintheinternationaldrama.Finally,whenoneconsiderstheextenttowhichincreasedeconomicandculturalinteractionhaserodedthesignificanceofpoliticalsovereignty,itbecomesclearhowill-equippedthetraditionalpoliticalmodelsarefornegotiatingcontemporaryinternationalpol-itics.Ofcourse,thesesameconditionsmakeitanexhilaratingtimetobeastudentofglobaljustice,butitisnotforthoseuncomfortableworkingoutsidethetradi-tionalparadigms.BeyondJusticeasDistributionThusfarIhaveinterpretedjusticesolelyintermsofthedistributionofsocialben-efitsandburdens.Althoughthisinterpretationisnotuncommon,itisimportanttorecognizethatsomecontestthedistributiveparadigm.InthisfinalsectionIwillfirstlookbrieflyatthecontroversyoverminorityculturalgrouprightsanditsimplicationsforunderstandingjustice,andwillthenreviewtheworkofIrisMarionYoung,aprominentcriticofthedistributiveparadigm.Inlightoftheincreasinglyemphaticdemandsofminoritygroups,politicalthe-oristshaverecentlyturnedtheirattentiontotheissueofculturalgrouprights.FollowingtheleadofauthorslikeWillKymlickaandAllenBuchanan,manynow79\nChristopherHeathWellmanbelievethatthebestconceptionsofjusticeprovideroomforsomegroupstohavespecialcollectiverightsdesignedtohelpstrengthenandpreservetheircultures.Thebasicideahereisthat,becausetheoristslikeRawlsinsistthatjusticerequiresthateachpersonhaveanequalopportunitytoleadalifeofself-respect,andbecauseone’sself-respectdependscruciallyuponthehealthoftheculturewithwhichoneidentifies,noadequatetheoryofjusticecanignorethehealthofminor-itycultures.Drawingonthistypeofreasoning,theoristsincreasinglyallegethatvariousgroupsshouldbeextendedspecialcollectivelanguageandpropertyrights,forinstance,whichgivethemdominionovertheofficiallanguagestobeusedinschoolsandmunicipalbuildingsoroverwhomayownpropertywithinaspecifiedterritory.Whetherornotoneissympathetictothesetypesofgrouprights,itisinterestingtonotethatthedemandsbeingmadebyculturalminorities(andthespecialrightsbeingproposedassolutions)donotontheirfacefitneatlywithinthedistributivemodel.Tofullyappreciatethispoint,considertheworkofIrisYoung.Youngbeginsheranalysiswiththegrievancesofvictimsofinjusticeandthenconcludesthatthesedemandscannotbeadequatelyaddressedbysimplyredis-tributingthebenefitsandburdensamongindividualsinasociety.Reviewingtheclaimsofvarioussocial-justicemovementsleadsYoungtoconceiveofinjusticeintermsofoppressionanddomination,whereoppressionisunderstoodtohavethefivefacesofexploitation,marginalization,powerlessness,culturalimperialism,andviolence.Especiallykeyishercontentionthatpeopleareoppressednotasindi-vidualsbutasmembersofgroups.Young’sanalysisofviolencenicelyillustratesherpoint.Shewrites:Whatmakesviolenceafaceofoppressionislesstheparticularactsthemselves,thoughtheseareoftenutterlyhorrible,thanthesocialcontextsurroundingthem,whichmakesthempossibleandevenacceptable....Violenceissystemicbecauseitisdirectedatmembersofagroupsimplybecausetheyaremembersofthatgroup.Anywoman,forexample,hasareasontofearrape.RegardlessofwhataBlackmanhasdonetoescapetheoppressionofmarginalityorpowerlessness,helivesknowingheissubjecttoattackorharassment.Theoppressionofviolenceconsistsnotonlyindirectvictimization,butinthedailyknowledgesharedbyallmembersofoppressedgroupsthattheyareliabletoviolation,solelyonaccountoftheirgroupidentity.Justlivingundersuchathreatofattackononeselforfamilyorfriendsdeprivestheoppressedoffreedomanddignity,andneedlesslyexpendstheirenergy.(Young,pp.61–2)Youngurgesustoreformthosepervasivesocialinstitutionswhichpermitorevenencourageviolenceagainstspecificgroups,andsheemphasizesthatthenec-essarychangeswouldinvolvemuchmorethanmerelyredistributinggoodsbetweenvariousindividualsinsociety.Amongotherthings,theywouldrequiremeasuressuchasreformingthosemedialiketelevision,moviesandpornographywhichplaysuchaprominentroleinproducingthestereotypesandimagesthatshapehowweunderstandourselvesandeachother.80\nJusticeIntheend,Young’smaindissatisfactionwiththedistributiveparadigmistwofold.First,byfocusingsonarrowlyonmaterialgoods,thedistributivepara-digmneglectsimportantmattersconcerningpowerrelationswithinthesocialcontext,whichoftendeterminetheultimatepatternsofdistribution.Second,whentheoriststrytoexpandthedistributiveparadigmbeyondmaterialthingstoothercrucialgoods,theytendtomisrepresentthesenonmaterialsocialgoodsasthoughtheywerestatic,materialthingswhichcouldbedistributedinamannerakintothewaywedivvyupincome.Young’sattackonthedistributiveparadigmhasbeeninfluential,butcriticscontendthat,evenifportionsofhercritiquearerightontarget,itdoesnotfollowthattheentiredistributivemodelmustbejettisoned.Forinstance,twoofYoung’sstrongestpointsarethat:(1)justiceinvolvesmuchmorethanmaterialgoods,and(2)individualsareoftenoppressedasmembersofgroups.Butadvocatesofthedistributivemodelcouldseeminglyacceptbothoftheseclaimswithoutabandon-ingtheiroverallapproach.OnemightarguethatYoung’spointsdemonstrateonlythatwemustbeawareofthedistributionofnonmaterialgoodslikeculturalinflu-enceandpoliticalpowerandthatweneedtobevigilantastohowtheseandothergoodsaredistributedamonggroups.Ofcourse,Youngbelievesthatweneces-sarilymisrepresentthesenonmaterialgoodswhenwetrytodistributethemlikeincome,butdefendersofthedistributiveparadigmobjectthatthereisnothingabouttheirmodelwhichrequiresonetotreatallgoodsasakintoincomeorothermaterialgoods.Thus,whilemanyjoinYounginrejectingthedistributivepara-digm,othersclaimthatthereisampleroomtoincorporateYoung’smostim-portantinsightsintomoresophisticateddistributivemodels,whichattendtononmaterialgoodsandtheirdistributionamonggroups.ConclusionReadersmaybedisappointedthatIhavenottoutedonetheoryofjusticeasuniquelycorrect.AsmuchasIwouldliketosingleoutoneaccountasfullyade-quate,ImustconfessthatIfindmanyofthestandardobjectionscompelling.Allofthetraditionalapproacheshaveattractiveelements(indeed,theywouldnothavegarneredsuchbroadsupportunlesstheyhadcapturedimportantinsights),buteachwronglysupposesthatitskerneloftruthcantellthewholestory.Asastaunchdefenderoftheimportanceofindividualself-determinationandindividualrespon-sibility,Iamdrawntolibertarianism,butitstrikesmethatthereisinsufficientreasontoconcludethatourrightsmusttrumpallclaimswhichdonotalsostemfromthecorevalueofliberty;conversely,whileutilitarianismissurelyrightthatthewelfareofotherscreatesmoralreasonsforustoact,itjustseemswrong-headedtoconcludethatfuturewelfareisallthatmattersmorally.Assumingthatnoexist-ingtheoryisbeyondcriticism,wheredowegofromhere?81\nChristopherHeathWellmanIsuspectthattherearenosimpleanswerstothisquestion,but,forseveralreasons,IthinkwewoulddowelltofollowtheleadofElizabethAnderson,MichaelWalzer,andIrisYoung.First,justasAndersonwasabletoadvancethediscussionofequalitybyrefocusingonwhyweworryaboutinequality,itstrikesmethatthebestwaytobetterunderstandjusticeistobecomemoreclearaboutwhywecareaboutinjustice,andthebestwaytodothisistocomeoutofouracademiclibrariesandlistencarefullytowhatactualvictimsofinjusticearesaying.Inthisregard,Young’sworkstandsasashiningexampleofhowthebesttheoriesofjusticecanbecraftedonlyifweremainsensitivetotheactualfrustrationsofthosewholongforjustice.AnotherreasontotakeourcuefromYoung’sworkisthat,likeWalzer,shedoesnotgiveexcessiveprioritytotheoreticalsimplicity.Giventhatjusticerearsitsheadinmanyforms,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatYoungconcludesthatoppressionhasmultiplefaces.Itisstriking,however,that–justasWalzereschewsasimpleapproachinfavorofhispluralisticaccount–Youngdoesnotassumethatallthefacesmustbelongtoasingle,many-headedbeast.Inotherwords,Youngdoesnotinsistthatonefaceisbasicandtheothersarederivative,nordoesshepresumethatallmustbeexplainedintermsofthesamevalue.Whiletheappealofbuildingeleganttheorieswhichexplainallofinjusticeintermsofasolitaryvalueisunderstandable,Youngiscontenttostaywithamessy,multi-prongedapproach.Asaconsequence,Young’saccountisneitheraselegantnorascleanasmanywouldlike,butithasthemuchmoreimportantadvantageofbeingtruertotheregrettablefactsofinjustice.Andifso,hertheorystandsabetterchanceofshowingthewaytowardanaccuratetheoryofjusticeand,mostimpor-tantly,towardthepromotionofjusticeintherealworld.UltimatelyIremainhopefulthatsubstantialprogresscanbemadeontheques-tionofjustice,butitstrikesmethatwemustreturntothetraditionalapproacheswithanewattitude.Ratherthanselectingapetvalueandignoringallothers,weneedtoappreciatetherealinsightswhichattractpeopletoeachofthesestandardtheoriesandthenremainopentocombiningthesevariousinsightsintoanewwhole.Aboveall,weshouldresistthetemptationtoassembletheminanover-simplifiedfashion.Injusticeisnotonlylamentablypervasive,itistheoreticallymessy,soperhapsourbestchanceofexplainingjusticewillcomeonlywhenwecanbecontentwithasimilarlyuntidy,pluralisticaccountofjustice.Seventyyearsago,W.D.Rosswrotethefollowingindefenseofhispositingmultiple,non-derivativesourcesofprimafacieduties:“Loyaltytothefactsisworthmorethanasymmetricalarchitectonicorahastilyreachedsimplicity”(Ross,p.23).Thepre-cedingsurveyofcontemporarytheoriesofjusticeconvincesmethatstudentsofjusticewoulddowelltoembracehissentiment.AcknowledgmentsIamgratefultoBradChampion,PeterLindsay,TimRenick,EricRovie,RobertSimon,andAndrewVallsforhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthisessay.82\nJusticeReferencesAnderson,ElizabethS.(1999).“WhatisthePointofEquality?”Ethics,109:287–338.Bentham,Jeremy(1988).ThePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation.Amherst,NY:PrometheusBooks.Buchanan,Allen(1988).Ethics,Efficiency,andtheMarket.Totowa,NJ:RowanandLittlefield.——(1991).Secession:TheMoralityofPoliticalDivorcefromFortSumtertoLithuaniaandQuebec.Boulder:WestviewPress.Cohen,G.A.(1978).“RobertNozickandWiltChamberlain:HowPatternsPreserveLiberty.”InJusticeandEconomicDistribution,ed.J.ArthurandW.H.Shaw.Engle-woodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall.Dworkin,Ronald(c.1975).“TheOriginalPosition.”InReadingRawls,ed.NormanDaniels.NewYork:BasicBooks.——(1981a).“WhatisEquality?Part1:EqualityofWelfare.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,10:185–246.——(1981b).“WhatisEquality?Part2:EqualityofResources.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,10:283–345.Gauthier,David(1986).MoralsByAgreement.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Hardin,Russell(1988).MoralityWithintheLimitsofReason.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Hare,R.M.(1981).MoralThinking.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Hobbes,T.(1990).Leviathan(1651),ed.RichardTuck.Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sityPress.Kymlicka,Will(1989).Liberalism,Community,andCulture.Oxford:ClarendonPress.——(1995).MulticulturalCitizenship:ALiberalTheoryofMinorityRights.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Locke,John(1988).TwoTreatisesofGovernment,ed.PeterLaslett.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Mill,JohnStuart(1979).Utilitarianism,ed.GeorgeSher.Indianapolis:Hackett.Miller,David(1995).OnNationality.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Nozick,Robert(1974).Anarchy,StateandUtopia.NewYork:BasicBooks.Rawls,John(1971).ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge,MA:BelknapPress.——(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Ross,W.D.(1988).TheRightandtheGood.Indianapolis:Hackett.Schmidtz,DavidandRobertE.Goodin(1998).SocialWelfareandIndividualResponsi-bility.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Singer,Peter(1972).“Famine,Affluence,andMorality.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,1:229–43.Smart,J.J.C.andBernardWilliams(1963).Utilitarianism:ForandAgainst.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Tamir,Yael(1993).LiberalNationalism.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Walzer,Michael(1983).SpheresofJustice:ADefenseofPluralismandEquality.NewYork:BasicBooks.83\nChristopherHeathWellmanWellman,ChristopherHeath(2000).“RelationalFactsinLiberalPoliticalTheory:IsThereMagicinthePronoun‘My’?”Ethics,110:537–62.Williams,Bernard(1981).MoralLuck.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Young,IrisMarion(1990).JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.84\nChapter4EqualityRichardJ.ArnesonTheidealofequalityrequiresthateveryonehavethesame,orbetreatedthesame.Theidealtakesmanydifferentformscorrespondingtothedifferentwaysinwhichitmightbethoughtimportanttotreatpeopleequallyorrenderthemequal.Anysuchidealofequalityexpressesanunderlyingconceptionoftheequalbasicworthanddignityofhumanpersons.Atthislevelegalitarianismopposeselitist,aristo-cratic,racist,andotherviewsthatassertthatsomepersonsareinherentlysuperiortoothers.Thevariousidealsofequalityalsotosomeextentopposeoneanother,sincerenderingpeoplethesameortreatingthemthesameinonerespectcaninduceinequalityinotherrespects.EqualityofLockeanRightsWritingin1690,JohnLockeassertsthatinordertounderstandtheconditionsunderwhichclaimstopoliticalauthorityarejustified,weshouldthinkaboutaprepoliticalsituation,the“stateallmenarenaturallyin.”Thisprepoliticalsitua-tionisastatealsoofequality,whereinallthepowerandjurisdictionisreciprocal,noonehavingmorethananother:therebeingnothingmoreevidentthanthatcreaturesofthesamespeciesandrank,promiscuouslyborntoallthesameadvantagesofnature,andtheuseofthesamefaculties,shouldalsobeequaloneamongstanotherwithout1subordinationorsubjection.Godmightlegitimatelyorderanendtothisnaturalmoralequality,Lockeacknowl-edges.ButheaddsthatGoddoesnotinfactdothis,sothepresumptionofmoralequalitystands.Lockeisarguingforlimitedgovernmentandagainsttheclaimsofkingstounlimitedlegitimateauthorityovertheirsubjects.Everyindividualhasrights85\nRichardJ.Arnesonwhichevenkingsmustrespect.AccordingtoLocke,weareallnormativelyequalinthatwepossessthesamerights,whichshouldequallyalwaysberespected.Lockealsogesturesvaguelyataclaimthatthebasisofthismoralequalityisthathumanindividualsareroughlyequalintheirnaturalpowersandtalents.Lockewasnotaloneinassertingthatallindividualshavenaturalmoralrights,butheisoneofthefirstexponentsofthisidea,whichhascontinuingvitalityincontemporarypoliticalthought.Naturalmoralrightsarerightsonehasindependentlyofsocialarrangementsorhumanconventions.Tosayonehasarightistosaythatpeopleoughttobehaveinwaysthatrespecttheright.Inthissenseonecanhavearighttoone’spropertyeveniftheking’sagentsseizeitanddosobyauthorityoflaw,andonecanhavearightnottobejailedforone’sreligiousbeliefsevenifpublicopinionandentrenchedsocialpracticesuniteinfavoroftheInquisition(andevenifthepersonbeingjailedthinksnowrongisbeingdonetoher).Amoralrightisaclaim,per-tainingtoanindividual,thatsociety(otherpeople)oughttohonor.Rightsmightbeinterpretedaswaivableornonwaivable,forfeitableornonfor-feitable,alienableorinalienable.Onealienatesarightbytransferringittoanotherperson.Oneforfeitsarightbydoingsomethingmorallywrongthatentirelyorpartiallynullifiesarightonewouldotherwisehave.Onewaivesarightbyper-mittingapersontodowhattherightwouldforbid,absentone’sconsent.IntheLockeantraditionnaturalrightsarethoughttobeforfeitable.Whetherornottheyarealienableorwaivabletendstobecontroversial.(CanIlegitimatelyconsenttobecomingtheslaveofanother?)TheLockeantraditionisassociatedwithaviewthatassignsacertaincontenttonaturalrights.Veryroughly,one’sbasicnaturalrightsare(1)toactinwhat-everwayonechooseswithwhateveronelegitimatelyownssolongasonedoesnottherebyharmothersincertainways,and(2)nottobeharmedbyothersinthosecertainways.TheLockeanviewassertsasafurtherbasicpremisethateachpersonistherightfulfullownerofherself,anditisthoughtthatonecanderivestrongpermanentrightsofprivatepropertyinlandandmoveablegoodsfromthesebasicpremises.Incontemporarypoliticalthought,advocatesofaviewofnaturalrightsakintoLocke’saresometimesreferredtoaslibertariansorclassical2liberals.Animportantambiguityshouldbenoted.TheLockeanpositionholdsthatallhumanpersonshavethesamebasicnaturalmoralrights,butdoesnottherebyplaceavalueonbringingabouttheconditioninwhicheveryone’srightsareful-filledtothesameextent.FortheLockean,rightsareviewedasconstraintsonthesetofactionsamongwhichoneismorallyfreetochoose,andnotasgoalstobe3promotedinwhateverwayismosteffective.ThismeansthatevenifIcanbringitaboutthatseveralpeople’srightnottobemurderedorunjustlyimprisonedcanbesafeguardedifImurderorunjustlyimprisononeperson,accordingtotheLockean,moralityforbidsmetoviolateanyone’srights,eventobringitaboutthattheoutcomeisgreaterrightsfulfillmentoramoreequaloverallrightsful-fillmentonthewhole.86\nEqualityDemocraticEqualityTheidealofademocraticpoliticalordercontainsanidealofequalcitizenship.Inademocracy,eachcitizenhastheequalrighttovoteandtostandforpublicofficeinfreeelections.Afreeelectionisoneheldagainstabackgroundoffreedomofexpression.Allvotescountequallyandthewinnergainsamajority(orplurality)ofvotes.Inademocracy,powertonamepublicofficialsiscontrolleddirectlyorindirectlybymajorityruleofthepeople,andlawsthatareenforcedonthepopulacearechoseneitherdirectlyorindirectlybyamajority-ruleprocess.Inanindirectlydemocraticlawmakingprocess,citizenselectlawmakers,whothenchooselaws.Theidealofequaldemocraticcitizenshipisopposedtotheviewthatakingoraristocracyorcommunisteliteisentitledtoexercisepoliticalrule.Itisalsoopposedtodenialoffullcitizenshiprightstoanyadultresidentofasocietyinvirtueoftheindividual’ssex,skincolor,supposedrace,ethnicity,religiousaffiliation,andsoon.EqualityofOpportunityInWilliamShakespeare’splayKingLear,Edmundcomplains,...WhereforeshouldIStandintheplagueofcustom,andpermitThecuriosityofnationstodepriveme,ForthatIamsometwelveorfourteenmoonshinesLagofabrother?Whybastard?Whereforebase?Whenmydimensionsareaswellcompact,Mymindasgenerous,andmyshapeastrue,Ashonestmadam’sissue?(I.2.2–9)Edmundisavillain,buthehasapoint.Anaccidentofbirthquitebeyondthechild’scapacitytocontroldetermineswhetherheislegitimateorabastard.Whyshouldascribedstatusofthiskindpreventapersonfromrisingintheworld,orfalling,accordingtohispersonaltraitsastheyareassessedbyothers,andbytheirexpressioninhisactionsthatbeargoodfruitorbad?Theprincipletowhichtheresentfulillegitimatesonappealspointsbeyondfeudalhierarchytomodernsociety,fromstatustocontracttomeritocracy.Shakespeareherealludestoasignificantidealofequality,thoughitisnotonetowhichtheplaywrighthimselfsubscribes.Theidealisformalequalityofopportunity,alsoknownascareersopentotalents.Formalequalityofopportunity(FEO)holdsthatjobsinprivatefirmsandingovernmentservice,andopportunitiestoborrowcapitalfromlendinginstitutions,87\nRichardJ.Arnesonshouldbeopentoallapplicants,andapplicationsshouldbeassessedontheirmeritsandthepositionoropportunityofferedtothemostqualified.Theprinciplecanalsobeappliedtoeducation:placesforstudentsineducationalinstitutionsshouldbeopentoallapplicants,applicationsshouldbeassessedontheirmerits,andtheplacesshouldbeofferedtothemostqualified(whoseenrollmentmaybemadecontingentonpaymentoffees).Therelevantqualificationsforapostaretraitsinapplicantsthatrenderitthecasethattheirperformanceinthatpostwouldbetterpromotethemorallyinnocentgoalsofthefirmoragencythanwouldtheperfor-manceofotherapplicants.Forfirmsoperatinginamarketeconomy,thenormalgoaltobepromotedisthemaximizationofthefirm’sprofits,andsimilarlythebestapplicantforaloanistheonetowhomgrantingtheloanwouldmaximizetheexpectedprofitsofthelender.TheimportanceofrequiringthatloansofcapitalbemadetothemostqualifiedapplicantsistoensurethatnotonlyemploymentbutalsotheopportunitytostartandoperateaprivatebusinessisregulatedbyFEO.FEOisanantifeudal,anticasteprinciple.Itforbidsthereservationofofficeandpositionsorprivilegetomembersofahereditaryelitegroup,beitanaristocracy,asuperiorcaste,ahierarchybasedonskincolor,orthelike.Itequallyforbidsthereservationofofficeandprivilegetomembersofareligionorculturalgroupthatanyoneisfreetojoin,asforexampleinaregimethatdiscriminatesinfavorofChristiansandagainstJews.Thespiritoftheidealofcareersopentotalentscallsforasocietyinwhichracial,religious,ethnic,sexual,andsimilarformsofprejudiceandbigotrydonothamperanyone’spursuitandattainmentofdesirablepositionsintheeconomyandgov-ernment.Evidentlytheprincipleneedssometinkeringifitsletteristocorrespondtothisspirit.ImagineasocietylikethesegregatedUSSouthoftheJimCroweraexceptthatthepatternofsegregationismaintainedbyculturalnormsratherthanbylegalenactments.Ifconsumersarebigoted,andprefernottopurchasemer-chandiseandservicesunlesstheskilledhigh-paidlaborembodiedinthesegoodsisdoneentirelybywhitemales,evenifgoodsproducedbytheskilledlaborofblacksandwomenwouldbecheaperandbetter,thenprofit-maximizingfirmsinacompetitivemarketsettingwillfindthathiringwhitemalesonly,fornecessaryskilledjobsyieldshigherprofits.Whitemaleapplicantswillthenbemorehighlyqualifiedthanotherapplicantsfortheseskilledjobs,sincetheirperformanceinthesejobswouldboostsalesandprofits.ButthespiritofFEOorcareersopentotalentsisevidentlyviolatedinthisimaginedscenario.Somerefinementoftheideaofbeingqualifiedforapositionisevidentlyneeded.Theprincipleofcareersopentotalentsconflictswiththeprerogativesofprivateownershipofpropertyasusuallyunderstood.IfIownsomething,IcandowhatIlikewithit,solongasIdonottherebyharmnonconsentingothersincertainways,e.g.,byassaultingthem.SoifIownafactory,Iamfreetohiremyunqual-ifiedbrother-in-lawifIchoose,ortohireonlymyfriends,orfellowmembersofmyreligiouscongregation,ortohireonsomewhimsicalbasis.Allowingcareers88\nEqualityopentotalentslimitstherightofpropertyownerstodowhatevertheypleasewithitifthepropertyprovidesemploymentopportunitiesorisloanedbyabank.Theanticasteimplicationsofcareersopentotalentsextendjustsofar.FEOrequiresthatanyonemayapplyforapostoropportunityandthatthemostqual-ifiedischosen,butitimposesnoconstraintsontheprocessesbywhichpeoplebecomequalified.Itcouldturnoutthatfornodesirablejobinasocietycananyonebecomequalifiedexceptbymeansofexpensivesocializationandeducationandthatonlyasmallsegmentofsocietycanaffordthenecessarysocializationandedu-cation.Inthisstateofaffairsthereisequalopportunityfortheequallyqualified,asrequiredbycareersopentotalents,butopportunitiestobecomequalifiedareveryunequallydistributed.Noticethatapublicschoolsystemfundedbygeneraltaxationandavailabletoallchildreninasocietyatnocostreflectsamoveinthedirectionofensur-ingthateachchildhassomeopportunitytodevelophernativetalentsandbecomequalifiedfordesirableposts.Stateenforcementofminimallyadequatestandardsofchildrearingbyparentsandlegalguardiansalsomovesinthissamedirection.Asocietymightgofurtherinthedirectionofequalizingtheopportunitytobecomequalifiedaccordingtoone’snativetalentthanoperatingpublicschoolsforallchildren.Itmightprovideextraeducationalresourcestargetedtowardthosewhoseparentsareeitherlessableorlesswillingthantheaverageparenttoprovideanurturingandstimulatinghomeenvironmentfortheirchildren.JohnRawlshasproposedaprincipleofequalityoffairopportunitythatineffectrequirespubliceducationandstate-providededucationalresourcestargetedattheeducationallydeprivedtobeextendedtothepointatwhichtheyfullycompen-4sateforanydeficitsinparentalupbringingefforts.Equalityoffairopportunityissatisfiedinasocietyjustincaseanytwoadultswhohavethesamenativetalentandabilitiesandthesameambitionwillhavethesameprospectofsuccessincom-petitionsforpositionsthatconferadvantagesinthesociety.Thisnormrequiresthatifachildborntoimpoverishedparentshasthesametalentandambitiontobeahighlypaidlawyerasachildborntowealthyandsociallywellconnectedparents,eachindividualwillfacethesameprospectofbecomingahighlypaidlawyer.InthesocietythatsatisfiesthisRawlsianideal,theadvantagesofwealthandclassandsocialconnectionsareentirelynullified,sothatparentsexertnonetimpactontheirchildren’sprospectsofcompetitivesuccessexceptviathemecha-nismofgeneticinheritance.Sinceparentsandotherfamilymembersarestronglyinclinedtousewhateversuperioradvantagestheypossesstogivefamilychildrengreaterthanaverageaccesstofavorableeducationalandsocializingexperiencesandhencebetterprospectstoobtaincompetitivesuccessthanotherchildren,itisdifficulttoenvisageasocietyinwhichRawls’sequalityoffairopportunityisfulfilledorevencloselyapproximated.89\nRichardJ.ArnesonEqualityofConditionSomemodernmarketeconomiesmaycometolerablyclosetoachievingtheidealofcareersopentotalents,thoughnonecomesremotelyclosetotheRawlsianclasslessidealofequalityoffairopportunity.Inthoughtonecantranscendtheselimits,andimagineasocietythatperfectlyfulfillsbothformalandRawlsianequal-ityofopportunity.Thisutopiaofequalopportunitywouldstillberegardedasobjectionablefromthestandpointofanotherrangeofidealsofequality.TheideaofaperfectRawlsianmeritocracybyitselfsetsnolimitsonthesuperioradvan-tagesandprivilegesthataccruetothosewhowinthefaircompetitionsandcon-testsandareeitherchosenforthepositionsthatyieldtheseadvantagesorsucceedinentrepreneurialventures.Writingaboutcareersopentotalents,R.H.Tawneyraisesdoubtsandworriesthatwouldapplyeveninaperfectmeritocracy:Sothedoctrinewhichthrowsallitsemphasisontheimportanceofopeningavenuestoindividualadvancementispartialandone-sided.Itisrightininsistingontheneces-sityofopeningafreecareertoaspiringtalent;itiswronginsuggestingthatoppor-tunitiestorise,whichcan,oftheirverynature,beseizedonlybythefew,areasubstituteforageneraldiffusionofthemeansofcivilization,whichareneededbyallmen,whethertheyriseornot,andwhichthosewhocannotclimbtheeconomicladder,andwhosometimes,indeed,donotaspiretoclimbit,mayturntoasgood5accountasthosewhocan.Alongwithadvocatingaradicalextensionoftheidealofequalityofopportu-nity,Rawlsalsosuggeststhatsocialjusticeincludesaprinciplethatregulatesthegeneraldiffusionofthemeansofcivilization.Whenthereisageneraldiffusionofthemeansofcivilization,thosewhofor-merlyhadlessthananaverageshareofthesemeanswillgetmoreofthem.Thisdoesnotnecessarilyimplymovementtowardequalholdingsofthesemeans.Witheconomicgrowth,thepoorcanbecomericherwhilethericharebecomingevenricheratafasterrate.Withconstantordecliningmeans,theirgreaterdiffusiondoesimplyatrendtowardequalityofcondition.Equalityofconditionadmitsofdifferentinterpretations.Recentdiscussionsinthetheoryofjusticeworktoclarifythevarietiesofequalconditionandtoexplorewhichvariety,ifany,ismorallyattractive.Thisisthe“equalityofwhat?”issue.The“equalityofwhat?”issuethatisthefocusofthissectionshouldbedistin-guishedfromanotherissue,oneaboutmeasurement.Supposewehavedecidedthatpeopleshouldbemadeequalinsomeparticularaspectoftheircondition.Thenextquestionis,foranysuchaccountoftherelevantaspect,howcanonemeasurepeople’sconditioninthisrespect,soastodeterminewhenadistributionisequalandwhenitisunequal?Evenifitisassumedthatthechosenequalizan-dumadmitsofcardinalinterpersonalcomparison,sothatinprincipleonecansaywhohasmoreandwhohaslessandbywhatextentthepersonwithmoreexceeds90\nEqualitythescoreofthepersonwithless,allofthisstillleavesopenthequestionofhowfaragivendistributionthatisunequaldepartsfromtheidealofequality.Supposeforsimplicitythatitisdeemedthatpeopleshouldideallybeequalinbankaccountwealth,sothatdetermininghowmuchsuchwealtheachpersonhasposesnodif-ficultyinprinciple.Thereareevidentlydifferentwaysofmeasuringhowfaragivendistributionthatisunequaldepartsfromequality.Whichtochoose?Thediscussiontofollowbypassesthisissuebyassumingimplicitlythatitispos-sibletodeterminenotonlywhetheragivendistributionofgoodsamongagivensetofpersonsisequalornotbutalsothedegreetowhichitdeviatesfromstrictequalityifitisunequal.Yetitisnotobvioushowtomeasuredegreesofinequal-ity.Economistsandothershaveproposedvariouswaysofmeasuringinequality,butitisnotclearthattheordinaryideaofpeoplehavingthesameorequalshares6includesadeterminatenotionofdegreesofinequality.Onemightthinkthatequalityisequality,andthat’sthat.Whenpeoplehaveequalholdings,theirholdingsarethesame,oridentical.Whatisthefussabout?Butwhetherornotadistributionisequalisrelativetoadescriptionofit.IfastockoflargetrousersisdistributedtostoutSmithandthinJones,andtheyreceivethesamenumberoftrousers,thedistributionisequalinthatrespect.ButSmithhasreceivedfourpairsofpantsthatfit,andJonesgotnone,sointhatrespectthedistributionisunequal.Togetaclearpositiononthetablefordebate,theadvo-cateofequalityneedstospecifyaconceptionofequality.Thediscussionintheremainderofthissectionpresupposesthatnativetalentitselfisunequallydistributedandthatsomeunfortunateindividualswillhaveverylittleofit.Thetaskforjusticeisthentocompensatethegivenindividualforlackoftalentinsomewaydeemedappropriate.Wemightjustmentionthatfurtherthoughtisneededtotheextentthatdevelopingmedicaltechnologybringsitaboutthatthegeneticinheritanceoftalentsandtraitscanitselfbealteredbyalteration7ofthespermandeggmaterialthatunitestoformanewindividual.Inthissce-narioonemightextendthescopeofjusticesoitspecifiesnotonlyrequiredcompensationforgivenindividualswiththeirnativetalentsbutalsoobligationsconcerningwhatsortsofindividualswithwhatsortsofnativetalentsmaybebroughtintoexistence.EconomicequalityConsiderthentheproposalthatotherthingsbeingequal,itismorallygoodthatpeoplehaveequalamountsofmoney(purchasingpowerovertradeablegoods)orequivalentlythattradeablegoodsaredividedintoidenticallots,oneforeachperson,whichtherecipientisthenfreetotrade.Inthisexercisegoodsaredis-tinguisheduntileachoneishomogeneousinquality,anditisassumedeachsuchgoodcanbedividedasfinelyasonechooses.Ofthissortofeconomicegalitarianism,MichaelWalzerhasobservedthatitis8anideal“ripeforbetrayal.”Whathehasinmindisthatitwouldnotbestable91\nRichardJ.Arnesonovertime.Ifequalityisestablishedononeday,individualswillchoosetodovariousthingswiththeirresourceshares,sothatsoonthecumulativeimpactofpeople’schoicestotradeanddeal,consumeandsave,willyieldeconomicinequality,whichtheensembleofindividuals’choiceswillhavenotendencytorestore.Onecouldclamprestraintsonindividualchoiceinordertopreventinequalityfromemerg-ingfrominitialequality,butanyseriousattempttosustainequalitywouldrequireamassivelycoercivestateapparatusandwouldinstitute,accordingtoWalzer,anotherandworseformofinequality.Thiswouldbeinequalityofpoliticalpowerbetweenthosewhocontroltheenforcingstatethatclampsrestraintsandtheindi-vidualsonwhomrestraintsareclamped.RobertNozickmakesasimilarobjectionagainsttheidealofeconomicequality.Hestressesthatmaintenanceofequality(oranyotherdistributivepatternforthatmatter)wouldrequirewhatinhisviewwouldbecontinuouswrongfulviolationofpeople’sLockeanrights.Theseobjectionsareresistible.IntheabsenceofacompellingargumentthatLockeanrightshavepriorityovercompetingmoralvalues,theconflictbetweenequalityandLockeanrightsisnotfataltotheclaimthatequalityshouldprevail.Moreover,onemightfavorequalityofconditionamongothervalues,andholdthatonbalancesomeeconomicinequalityisacceptablebutextremeinequalityisnot.Theloosertherequirementsofequalitythatonefavors,thelesstightneedbetheconstraintsonindividualsneededtosustainit.Also,social-scientificinge-nuitymightdiscoverwaystoavoidextremeinequalitythatdonotinvolveexces-sivelyinvasiveinterferencewithindividualliberty.Forasimpleexample,onemightcombineprogressiveincometaxationwithanestatetaxthatbreaksuplargefor-tunesatthedeathofthewealthyperson.Finally,theextenttowhichpeopleexpe-riencelimitsontheirfreedomasonerousdependstoaconsiderableextentonthedegreetowhichtheyseetheconstraintsasefficientlyadvancinggoalstheysupport.Forexample,trafficlawsinvolveextensiveandcontinuousinterferencewiththelibertyofcardrivers,butastheserulesefficientlyhelptosustaintheflowoftraffic,fewexperiencethemasoppressive.Ifpeopleregardedeconomicequalityasveryvaluable,andsawthatcertainlimitsonlibertywereneededtosustainequality,andworththeircost,theywouldnotbalkattherestrictions.Ifonepicturesegal-itarianlawsasbearingdownonpeoplewhocarenothingforequality,ofcoursethelawswillseemtyrannical.Theissuetheniswhethereconomicequalityisorisnotpersesignificantlymorallydesirable.Areasonfordoubtingthateconomicequalityisdesirableinandofitselfemergesonceonereflectsonthewaythatindividualswithverydifferenttraits,abilities,andsusceptibilitieswouldfindthemselveshavingveryunequalrealfreedominaregimeofequalityofincomeandwealth.ConsiderSmithandJones,whohaveequalinitialallotmentsofmoney.Smithisunintelligent,blind,legless,andlacksnaturalcharm.Jonesisintelligent,andhasnormaleyesight,soundlegs,andlotsofnaturalcharm.Withequalmoneythetwoindividualswillfaceveryunequallifeprospects,veryunequalopportunitytoleadwhateversortoflifetheymightwanttolead.Inlightofthisexample,onemightdoubtthateconomic92\nEqualityequalityisimportant,exceptperhapssometimesasameanstosomefurthergoalthatdoesmatterforitsownsake.Peoplewantmoneyandmaterialgoodsforwhatthegoodscandotohelpsatisfytheiraimsanddesires.Thesegoodsaregenerallynotvaluedfortheirownsake,sowhyregardequalityinpeople’sholdingsofthesegoodsasinherentlydesirable?EqualityoffunctioningcapabilitiesPursuingthislineofthought,AmartyaSenproposesthatweshouldcareaboutwhatindividualsareenabledtobeanddowiththeresourcestheypossess,giventheirothercircumstances.ThesebeingsanddoingsSencalls“functionings,”andwhatmattersisthefreedomorcapabilitythatpeoplehavetogainfunctionings9thataresignificant,thattheyhavereasontovalue.Ifwecareaboutequalityofcondition,theequalitythatismorallyattractiveisequalityinpeople’scapabilitytofunctioninsignificantways.Totakeasimpleexample,ifthefunctioningofconcernisbeingadequatelynourished,differentamountsofresourceswouldhavetobemadeavailabletoathinman,astoutman,anindividualdoingdailyhardphysicallabor,alactatingwoman,andsoon.Havingthecapabilitytofunctioninacertainwayishavingrealasopposedtoformalfreedomtogainthatfunctioning.IamformallyfreetogotoParisifnolawpreventsmefromgoingandnoonewouldinterferewithanattemptImightmaketogothere.HavingformalfreedomsoconstruediscompatiblewithmynotactuallybeingabletogotoParis,becauseIlackthemoneytopayforaplaneticketandthestrengthtoswimtheAtlantic.IfIhavetherealfreedomorcapa-bilitytogotoParis,thenifIchoosetogothere,Icangetthere.Thecapabilityinterpretationofequalityraisesseveralissues.Onequestioniswhythenormofequalityshouldbedeemedtobesatisfiedifpeoplehavethefreedomtofunctioninacertainwayratherthanifpeoplereachtherelevantfunc-tioning.Whyfocusoncapabilityratherthanfunctioning?Supposethatagroupofpeopleisenabledtoattainamultitudeofenormouslyvaluablefunctionings,achievingsomeofwhichwouldconstituteawonderfullife.However,itturnsoutthateveryonefrittersawaytheircapabilities,ordeliberatelyturnstheirbackonthem.Intheend,thoughpeoplehaveahighlevelofcapability,theyhaveazeroleveloffunctioning.Onemighttakethepositionthatjustasonedoesnotgen-erallycareforresourcesfortheirownsake,butforwhatonecandowiththem,soonegenerallycaresforfreedomnotforitsownsakebutforthegoodoutcomestowhichtheexerciseoffreedomisexpectedtobeinstrumental.IfIamgiventhefreedomtoorderwhatIlikefromavariedmenu,IammorelikelytogetamealIenjoythanifonesetofdishesissimplyimposedonme.Butifonecaresforfreedomforthisreason,one’scareshouldevaporateincaseswherehavingfreedomdoesnotpromotegettingtodesiredoutcomes.Iffocusoneconomicresourcesas93\nRichardJ.Arnesonthoughtheywereintrinsicallyvaluableisfetishistic,perhapsfocusingonrealfreedomasthoughitwereintrinsicallyvaluableisalsofetishistic.Oneresponsetothisdoubtabouttheimportanceofcapabilityistonotethatmanypeopledoindeedcareabouthavingwideindividualfreedom,manyoptionsavailabletochoosefrom,foritsownsake,andnotmerelyforthegoodsthattheexerciseoffreedomcanbring.Asecondresponseistoholdthatthetheoryofjusticeassignslimitedresponsibilitytosociety–allofusregardedtogether–forthewell-beingandlifeoutcomesthatanyadultmemberofsocietyreaches.Atmost,societyisresponsibleforplacingpeoplesothattheycanliveavaluableandworthylifeiftheychoosetodosoandactontheirchoice.Givenadequaterealfreedomorcapabilitytofunction,theindividualherselfisresponsibleforthechoicesshemakesandthequalityofthelifeshecomestolead.Regardingthissecondresponse,onemightworrythattheideaofalimitedresponsibilityorobligationofsocietytoprovideindividualsagoodqualityoflifeisnotadequatelycapturedinthecapabilityapproach,atleastasstatedsofar.Con-sideranindividualinanaffluentandorderedsocietywhoreceivesalongwithallothermembersofsocietyanequalcapabilitytofunctioninavarietyofsignificantways.Nowsupposetheindividualnegligentlysquandersorfrittersawaytheresourcesandopportunitiesthatprovidedherthisequalcapability.Shethennolongerhasanequalcapability.Ifjusticeorfundamentalmoralprinciplesrequirethateachpersoninsocietybesustainedinequalityofcapabilitytofunction,thenjusticerequiresthechannelingoffurtherresourcestothisnegligentindividual,torestorehertoapositionofcapabilityequaltothatenjoyedbyothers.Butwecanimaginethisprocessbeingrepeatedoverandover.Surelyatsomepointtheresponsibilityofsocietygivesoutanditismorallyacceptabletosaytothepersonwhonowlacksequalityofcapability,“Youhadyourchance.Societybearsnofurtherresponsibilitytosustainyouinequalityofcapabilityonaparwiththosewhohavemadesensibleuseoftheiropportunities.”Ofcourse,onecouldharnessanaccountofpersonalresponsibility–anaccountoftheproperdivisionofobligationandresponsibilitybetweenindividualandsociety–tothecapabilityapproach.Insuchanaccounttheobligationtosustainequalcapabilityforallwouldbelimitedsomehowbyconsiderationsofpersonalresponsibility.Buttheaccountofpersonalresponsibilitymightjustaswellbehar-nessedtoanoutcome-orientedaccountofwhategalitarianjusticerequires,astoacapability-orientedaccount.Thequestionresurfaces,whyfocusoncapability?AsoutlinedbySen,thecapabilityapproachisnoncommittalastothecompar-ativeassessmentofthefunctioningcapabilitiesthatmightbeprovidedtoaperson.Butforanygivenindividualatanytime,whateverhercircumstances,anindefi-nitelylargeagglomerationofcapabilitieswillbeavailabletoher.Mostwillbeutterlytrivial,ortrivialvariantsonsomenontrivialcapability.Exceptforcasesinwhichonesetofcapabilitiesdominatesorcontainsanotherset,onewillnotbeabletocomparedifferentindividuals’capabilitiesandjudgethatonepersonhasmorecapabilitiesoverallthananotherunlesswehavesomewayofassessingdiversecapabilitiesonacommonscale.94\nEqualityEqualityofresourcesSeveraltheoristsofdistributiveequalityrejectthesuggestionthatwhatweowetooneanotherbywayofjusticeobligationsisdeterminedbyassessingthevalueofpeople’sopportunitiesandresourcesonanycommonscale.Onebasisforthisrejectionisthethoughtthatinamodernsocietywithfreedomofexpressionanddiverseculturepeopledisagree–and,moreover,disagreereasonably–aboutwhatisultimatelyvaluableandworthseekinginhumanlife.Acloselyrelatedthoughtisthateachindividualhasaresponsibilitytoherselftothinkthroughforherselfaconceptionofwhatisworthwhileandtodevelopaplanoflifeaimedatmakingsomethingworthwhileandvaluableoutofthislife.Society,alongwiththegov-ernmentasagencyofsociety,owesittoeachindividualtoleavefreeroomforallindividualstoexercisetheirevaluativeautonomy.Whatweowetoeachotherbywayofjusticeobligationsincludesthisdutyofrespect,andthedutiesofconcernforthewell-beingofindividualsmustbeunderstoodinawaythatdoesnotviolatethisdutyofrespect.Thisstanceofrespectforeachindividual’sevaluativeauton-omyrequiresthestatetobeneutralonthequestionofthegoodlife,orofwhatisworthwhileinhumanlife.RonaldDworkinadvocatesneutralityonthegoodasjustdescribed.He10alsoadvocatesaversionofdistributiveequality.Itmightseemthatneutralityonthegoodprecludesholdingthatjusticerequiresequalityinthedistributionofgoods,foranidealofequalityrequiressomemeasureofhowwellofforbadlyoffindividualsare,andanysuchmeasure,itwouldseem,mustviolateneutrality.Dworkinhasaningeniousresponsetothispuzzleembeddedinacomplexaccountofequalitythatweldstogethertheidealofequalitywithanidealofper-sonalresponsibility.AccordingtoDworkin,thedutiesofequalityinitsvariousmanifestationsareowedbythestate–byallcitizensactingthroughthestate–toitsindividualcit-izens.Equalityisowedinthepublicsphere,nottheprivatesphere.Aprivateindi-vidualmaypermissiblyfavorfriendsorfamilyoverothers.Thestate,actinginthenameofallcitizensandcoercivelyenforcingitsrules,hasaspecialdutytotreatallitscitizenswithequalconcernandrespect.Thenormofdistributiveequalityfollowsfromthismoregeneraldutyofequalconcernandrespect,inthestoryofjusticeasDworkintellsit.Dworkindividesproposednormsofdistributiveequalityintotwofamilies:equalityofwelfareandequalityofresources.Hedevelopsanddefendsaversionofthelatter.Equalityofwelfaresaysthatresourcesshouldbedistributedsothateachperson’swelfareorwell-beingisthesame.ThefundamentalflawinequalityofwelfareaccordingtoDworkinisthatanyimplementationofitwouldentanglethestateindeterminingwhatisgoodforeachindividualandhowtolive.Thatviolatesthedutyofrespectthestateowestoallcitizens.Aresponsiblecitizenassignstoherselfthetaskofdecidingwhatisworthwhileandhowtoliveherlife95\nRichardJ.Arnesonanddoesnotacquiesceintheassumptionbythestateofthisfundamentalindi-vidualresponsibility.Accordingtoequalityofresources,peopleshouldbemadeequalintheirresourceholdingssofarastheirholdingsaretheconsequenceofunchosen,bruteluckratherthanchosen,optionluck.Themeasureofthevalueofanyone’shold-ingsisthesubjectiveevaluationofthemarket.Thevalueofaresourceassignedtoonepersoniswhatotherswouldbewillingtopayforitinasituationinwhicheveryone’sinitialbrute-luck-determinedpurchasingpowerisequal.Dworkinexplainsthedistinctionbetweenoptionluckandbruteluckasfollows:“Optionluckisamatterofhowdeliberateandcalculatedgamblesturnout–whethersomeonegainsorlosesthroughacceptinganisolatedriskheorsheshouldhave11anticipatedandmighthavedeclined.”Socharacterized,thedistinctionappearsamatterofdegreealongthreedimen-12sions.Consideralotteryorgamblewithvariousprobabilitiesofvariouspayoffs.Asalimitcase,alotterymightcontainjustonepayoff,thatwillaccruewithcer-taintytoanyonewhohasgambledinaparticularway.(1)Thelotterymaybemoreorlessavoidablebytheagent.(Theremaybemoreorfeweractionstheindividualcantake,thatwouldavoidhistakingpartinthelottery.)(2)Thelotterymaybemoreorlessreasonablyavoidable,wherethemoreitisthecasethatanindividualhasoptionsthatitmakessenseforhimtoadopt,thatwouldavoidhistakingpartinthelottery,themoreavoidableitis.(3)Andthefactthatthelotterylooms(thathewilltakepartinitunlesshetakessomeactiontoavoidit)mightbemoreorlessforeseeablebytheagent.Inthecasewhereanindividualfacesarisk,buthecanalterthepayoffsorprobabilitiesthathefacesbyanactionhecouldchoose,regardtheindividualassubstitutingonelotteryforanother.Todecideinagivencaseinwhichanindividualincursariskofbenefitandlosswhethertheriskshouldcountasoptionluckorbruteluckandtowhatdegree,onemustweighthethreefactorsandpooltheirresultstoyieldanoverallbruteluck/optionluckscore.Asimplifiedpictureofaregimeofequalityofresourceswillcapturetheflavoroftheproposal.Supposealltradeablegoodsareauctionedoffinitiallytothemembersofsociety,allofwhomhaveequalpurchasingpower,andfromthenontheylivetheirlivesinteractingonacompetitivemarket,inwhichalloutcomesareoptionlucknotbruteluckintheircharacter.Thenequalityofresourcesisfulfilledfortheseindividuals.Thepictureissimplifiedinsupposingthatindividualsintheiradultlivesdonotfacebruteluckoccurrences.ButagreatersimplificationarisesfromthefactthatanimportantwrinkleinDworkin’saccountofequalityofresourceshasnotbeenmentionedsofar.Recalltheworrythatequalityofmoneyor(equivalently)equalityoftradeablegoodsisinadequateinsofarasitfailstoaddressinequalitiesinthenativetraitsandabilitiesandsusceptibilitiesgeneratedforeachindividualbythegeneticlottery.(ForconvenienceIusethetermtalentsforallthreeoftraits,abilities,andsus-ceptibilities.)Dworkinmeetsthisworrystraightforwardly.Heproposesthatweconsideranindividual’stalentstoberesourcesthathelpherachieveheraimsand96\nEqualityambitions.Buttheseresourcesarenotlikeothers.OnecannottransferSmith’smusicaltalenttoJonesorJones’swizardryatcomputerstoJohnson.Onecancompensateanindividualforpoortalents,however.Dworkinamendsthestoryofthehypotheticalequalauctionfortradeablegoodstoincludetwohypotheticalinsurancemarkets,oneformarketabletalentandoneforhandicapsornegativetalent.Thedetailsneednotconcernushere,butthebasicideaisthatwedeter-minewhatinsuranceanindividualwouldhavepurchasedagainstthepossibilityofhavinglowtalentifweimaginehimwithhispresentdesiresbutnotknowingeitherwhathandicapshemightincurorwhatthemarketdemandforhismar-ketableabilitieswouldbe.Theinsuranceanindividualwouldhavepurchasedinthishypotheticalscenariofixeswhatcompensationheisowedsothatallthingsconsidered,initialresourcesareequallydistributed.Dworkin’soppositiontoequalityofwelfarecannowberestatedinawaythatregistershisaccountofpersonalresponsibilityasitisintegratedintohisidealofequalityofresources.Inprinciple,equalityofwelfarecoulddictatecompensationtoanindividual,inthenameofequality,foratasteshehasthatisexpensivetosatisfy.Iftradeablegoodsareequallydistributedtoallindividualsandtheydifferonlyinthatoneofthemlikesexpensivechampagneandtherestlikecheapbeer,sothatwiththesameresources,thechampagneloverhaslesswelfarethanthebeerlovers,thenequalityofwelfaredictatesaresourcetransferfromthosewithatasteforbeertothosewithatasteforchampagne.Dworkinregardstheresultasasuresignthattheidealofequalityofwelfareisdeeplymorallyunattractive.ForDworkin,ifanindividualfindshimselfwithacravinghedoesnotidentifywithandregardsasjustanobstacletothesatisfactionofdesiresandaimshedoesiden-tifywith,thenthatunwantedcravingcountsasahandicapthatinprinciplecouldlegitimatelytriggercompensationtothepersonafflictedwiththecravingaccord-ingtothehypotheticalinsurancemarketmechanism.Butifoneisgladtohaveapreferenceorambition,thenitdoesnotcountasaresource,butasapartofoneselfforwhichonemusttakeresponsibility.Onecannotlegitimatelyclaimthatinthenameofdistributiveequalityoneshouldbecompensatedforhavingpref-erencesandaimsthatoneidentifieswithasconstitutingpartofone’sconceptionofwhatisgoodandadmirable.Rawls,whotakesasimilarpositionthattheprinciplesofjusticeshouldnotrenderitthecasethatwhatoneisowedinthenameofjusticevarieswithone’saimsandambitions,forwhichonemusttakeresponsibility,referstothisnormas13“responsibilityforourends.”Theindividualandnotsocietytakesresponsibilityforthatveryindividual’sends,providedthatsocialjusticeisbeingimplemented,whichincludesaprovisionoffaireducationforeachindividual.Dworkinianequalityofresourcestiestogetherattractiveideasaboutwhatshouldbethoughttoconstituteequalityofcondition.Doesthissynthesisholdtogetherorunravel?TherearetwolinesofthoughtconcerningindividualresponsibilitycombinedinDworkin’sconceptionofequality.Itisfarfromclearthattheyarecompatible.Oneideaisthatindividualsshouldbeheldresponsibleforoptionluckbutnot97\nRichardJ.Arnesonforbruteluck,forchosenbutnotunchosenrisks.Theotherideaisthatindivid-ualsshouldbeheldresponsiblefortheiraimsandambitions,forthepreferencesthattheyaregladtohave,andforthechoicestheymaketoachievethem,butnotfortheirnativetalentsandinitialresourceendowments.Inthiscontextanoutcomethatoneisheldresponsibleforisonethatshouldnottriggercompensationfortheagentonwhomtheoutcomefallsifitsqualityisdeficient.Myresponsibilityinthissensefortheoutcomesofmyactioncorrespondstotheabsenceofoblig-ationonthepartofotherpeopletocompensatemeforitscoststhatfallonme(andalsototheobligationonmyparttocompensateotherpeoplewhoareharmedwrongfullybymyaction,buttosimplifydiscussionthisfurtheraspectisignored).Theproblemisthatamongone’snativetalents,forwhichoneisnottobeheldresponsible,arevalue-forming,preference-forming,choice-making,andchoice-executingtalents.Thesethenhavealargeinfluenceonthevaluesandpreferencesonecomestohaveandthechoicesandactionsonemakes.IfMariahastopqualitytalentsintheseareas,andIhavelowgradetalents,andasaresultshemakesgoodchoicesthatyieldherafinequalityoflifeandImakebadchoicesthatyieldmeagrimandsqualidqualityoflife,IdonotseehowitmakessensetoholdmefullyresponsibleasDworkin’sequalityethicdoesformybadvaluesandchoicesthatflowfrommylowgradetalents.IfIshouldbecompensatedforwhatdoesnotliewithinmypowertocontrol,formybrutelucknotmyoptionluck,thenmyvaluesandchoicesherearelessamatterofoptionluckandmoreamatterofbruteluckandshouldbetosomedegreeeligibleforcompensationaccordingtoanequalityethic.Whatthenbecomesofthedutyofrespectthatthestateowesallitscitizens,whichaccordingtoDworkinincludesthedutytorespecttheevaluativeautonomyofeachindividual,andwhichoughttoshapeourunderstandingofdistributiveequalityandleadustoembraceequalityofresourcesnotequalityofwelfare?Weshouldperhapsexaminethisideawithskepticism.Dworkinpointsoutthatonecannotsensiblyinone’sownvoiceclaimthatapreferencethatoneisgladtohaveisanafflictionandasktobecompensatedforthelossesitcausesinone’slife.Butfromathird-personperspectivethejudgmentthatapreferenceisanafflictioncanbemade.SupposeIamaheroinaddict,andforthesakeoftheargumentjustassumethatheroinaddictionisinitselfunde-sirable.Imaybegladtobeanaddict;Iamarighteousdopefiend.Still,theaddic-tionmayconstitutedegradation.IfIamnotreasonablyheldresponsiblefordevelopingthepro-heroinpreference,perhapsIshouldbecompensated.Fromamoralperspectivethatinsiststhatpeopleshouldnotbeheldfullyresponsibleforchoicestheyareledtomakebypoorresourceendowments,responsibilityforends,withitsassociatednormofindividualautonomy,isnotamoraltrumpcard,butissometimesitselftrumpedbycompetingvalues.98\nEqualityWelfaristequalityNoticethatthepositionthatdistributiveequalityshouldmeasureeachindivid-ual’sconditionintermsofthewelfareorwell-beingthatherresourcesincon-junctionwithherothercircumstancesenablehertogaincanbeadjustedto14integrateaconceptionofpersonalresponsibility.Infacttheformulationintheprevioussentencegivesanexampleofhowthismightbedone:responsibility-cateringwelfaristequalityofconditionholdsthatitismorallydesirablethatallpersonsbemadeequalnotinthelevelofwelfaretheyactuallygetbutratherintheleveltheyareenabledtoattain.Inotherwords:equalityofconditionrequiresthatpeople’sinitialresourceallotmentsandcircumstancesbesetsothateachpersoncanattainthesamelevelofwelfareifshebehavesprudentlythroughoutherlifeaftertheinitialmoment.Callthisviewequalopportunityforwelfare.Analternativespecificationwouldrequirethatindividuals’opportunitiesareequalwheneachwouldhavethesameexpectedwelfare,thesameprospectofwelfare,ifshebehavedprudentlythroughoutherlife.Ontheseequal-opportunitycon-ceptions,egalitarianjusticerequiresthatsocietyprovideeachindividualapathinlifeandaguaranteethatiftheindividualtakesthispathshewillhavethesamewelfarethatanyoneelsewhobehavesprudentlycanreach(oralternativelythesameexpectationofwelfare).Thecontentofan“equalopportunityforwelfare”viewvariesdependingonhowoneinterpretstheideaofindividualwelfareorwell-being.Theideawearetryingtoconstrueisthegoodnessordesirabilityofalifeforthepersonwholivesit.Welfareiswhatapersonwhoisactingprudentlyseeksforitsownsake.Themostplausibleandethicallyattractiveaccountofequalopportunityforwelfarewouldbeyokedtothephilosophicallymostdefensibleaccountofwelfare.Someobjectionstotheideathatwelfareorwell-beingistheaspectofpeople’sconditionthatisrelevanttoegalitarianjusticeappeartogaintheirplausibilitybyinvokinganinadequateconceptionofwell-beingandthenqueryingwhetherequalityofthatisanadequateconceptionofegalitarianjustice.Buttheappropri-ateresponsetoanysuchobjectionistoseekamoreadequateconceptionofwell-being,nottorejecttheideathatwell-beingmattersforjustice.Skepticismaboutthisprojectmighttaketheformofassertingthat,givenplu-ralismofbeliefinmodernsociety,individualswilltendreasonablytoembracemanydiverseandopposedviewsofhumangood,sonoaccountofthegoodcanbetheobjectofrationalconsensusamongmembersofsocietyandserveasapublicstan-dardofequaljustice.Ifthisskepticismiscorrect,egalitarianwelfarismisdoomed.Evenifthewelfarecomponentofwelfare-orientedconceptionsofdistributiveequalityisnotmistaken,thewayinwhichthe“equalopportunityforwelfare”normintegratesequality,welfare,andpersonalresponsibilityisproblematic.Itistoodemandingtoformulateanequal-opportunityaccountsothatthewelfarelevelone’sresourcesenableonetoattainiscountedasthewelfarelevelonewouldgainifonewereperfectlyprudentthroughoutone’slife.Perfectpru-99\nRichardJ.Arnesondencemaybeimpossibleforsome,giventheirchoice-makingandchoice-executingtalentdeficits.Evenifaprudentandreasonablechoicecanbemadebytwoindividuals,doingsomaybeeasyforoneanddifficultfortheother,andpleasantfortheoneandintenselypainfulfortheother.Onemightaccommodatethisconcernbyreformulatingequalopportunityforwelfarebythestipulationthattheopportunityforwelfareaperson’sresourcesandcircumstancesaccordheristhewelfarelevelshewouldreachifshebehavedfromthenonasprudentlyasitwouldbereasonabletoexpect,giventhedifficultyandpainrequiredforthatpersontoconductherselfprudently.Butevenasreformulated,an“equaloppor-tunityforwelfare”conceptionmightseemtoounforgiving,foranindividualgivenequalopportunitymightdeviateveryslightlyfromitssoftresponsibilityrequire-ment,butexperienceverybadluck,andsufferextrememisfortune.Currentphilosophicaldiscussionssuggestavarietyofwaysofbalancingcon-cernsaboutpersonalresponsibilityinanegalitarianframework.Noconsensusiscurrentlyinsight.Thedifficultiesencounteredbythevariousstrategiesforcater-ingtoresponsibilityraisequestionmarksaboutwelfaristequalitybutalsoabouttheadequacyofanyofitsrivalscurrentlyonoffer.EqualityAmongWhom?Theidealofequalityofconditionisnotrenderedfullydeterminatebysettlingwhataspectofpeople’sconditionshouldbemadethesameforall.Oneneedstospecifythegroupofpeoplewhoseconditionshouldberenderedequalintherel-evantrespect.Inthisspecificationseveralquestionsarise.Onemightholdthattheidealofequalityofconditionshouldbeappliedtoeachseparatecommunityorpoliticalcommunityinisolation.OnthisviewitmightbeheldmorallyundesirableifsomeSwedesareworseoffthanothers,andunde-sirableifsomeNigeriansareworseoffthanothers,butnotundesirableifNigeriansontheaverageareworseoffthanSwedesontheaverage.Ifequalityshouldobtainacrosscommunitylines,onemightlimititsscopetothegloballevel,orextenditacrosstheuniverse.Framingtheissueforconsiderationas“Amongwhichpeopleshouldequalityofconditionobtain?”makesanassumptionsomeegalitarianswouldreject.Someholdthatequalityofconditionshouldholdacrossallsentientbeings,includingnonhumananimalsalongwithhumans.Arivalviewwouldholdthatequalityshouldobtain,atmost,onlyamongpersons.Justassumethattheequality-of-conditionidealistoholdonlyforpersons.Theegalitarianmightbeopposedonlytoequalityofconditionamongcontemporariesornear-contemporaries(thosewhoselivesoverlapintime)orholdratherthatitismorallybadifsomepeoplelivingatanytimeareworseoffthanotherpeoplelivingatthattimeoranyothertime.100\nEqualityWhenoneholdsthatpeople’sconditionshouldbeequal,onemightmeanthatpeople’soveralladvantagelevelmeasuredoverthelifetimeofeachpersonshouldbethesameforallpersons.Onemightalternativelyholdthatateachmomentoftime,allpeoplealiveatthatmomentshouldhaveequaladvantagelevels–allshouldbeequallywelloffateachmoment.Anotherpossiblechoiceofunitofequalityisthelifestage.Divideeachperson’slifeintostages–saychildhood,adulthood,andoldage.Overtime,themorallypertinent“equalityofconditionaccordingtolifestage”egalitarianismissustainedtothedegreethatpeopleinthesamestageareatthesameadvantagelevel.Thesedifferentversionsoftheidealofequalityofconditionwouldhavedifferentimplicationsforpublicpolicychoicethatdifferentiallybenefitstheoldandtheyoung.EqualityofCondition:ObjectionsandAlternativesIsequalityofconditionmorallydesirableforitsownsake?Equalityinagivensettingmightpromotecommunitysolidarityorothervalues.Ifso,equalityistothatextentinstrumentallyvaluable.Butisequalitymorallydesirableasanend?Thisquestionishardtoanswer,becauseitiseasilyconfoundedwithothers.Wecanimagineasituationinwhichafewindividualspossessthegreatbulkoflandandmoveablegoodsandthevastmajorityofthepopulationconfrontsacrushingpovertythatimposesgrimandsqualidconditionsoflife.Respondingtothisexamplebyurgingthatthereshouldbeatransferofeconomicresourcesfromthewealthyfewtotheimpoverishedmanydoesnotnecessarilyreflectendorse-mentofequalityofconditionasvaluableasanend.Manymoralprincipleswouldtendtojustifytransferofeconomicresourcesinthedirectionofequaldistribu-tioninthissetting.Thedoctrineofutilitarianismholdsthat,ofthoseavailable,oneshouldalwayschoosetheactthatmaximizesthesumtotalofhumanutility(humangood)inthelongrun.Whenegalitarianeconomicresourcetransferswouldbethemosteffectiveavailablemeanstopromoteutility,utilitarianismimpliesthatoneoughttocarryouttheseegalitariantransfers.Butthisunderstandingofwhyequalityofasortshouldsometimesbepromoteddoesnotsupportthejudgmentthatequal-ityofanysortismorallydesirableforitsownsake.Concerningthedistributionofeconomicresources,onemightholdthatitismorallyimportantthateachpersonshouldhave“enough,”andthatwhatismorallyobjectionableaboutthelopsidedlyunequalwealth-distributionexampleisnotthateveryonedoesnothavethesamebutratherthatsomedonothave15enough.Onthisview,themoraltaskistodeterminethethresholdlevelofresourcesatwhichanindividualhasenoughtosustainagoodenoughqualityoflife,andtobringitaboutthateachindividualhasthissufficientlevel,sofarasthisisfeasible.Sufficientarianismisthedoctrinethatjusticerequiresthatasmanyas101\nRichardJ.Arnesonpossibleofthosewhoshalleverlivebesustainedatalevelofresourcesthatpro-16videsagoodenoughqualityoflife.Acloserelativeofthisviewholdsthatjusticerequiresthatwegiveprioritytogettingbenefitstothosewhoarebelowthethresh-oldofagoodenoughqualityoflife.Neithersufficientarianismnoritsrelativevaluesequalityforitsownsake,thoughbothfavortransferstowardeconomicequalityincertainsituations.Considerthenormthatoneshouldbringitaboutthattheconditionofthe17veryworstoffismadeasadvantageousaspossible.Thismaximinview(socalledbecauseitinstructsustomaximizetheadvantagelevelofthepersonwiththeminimumlevelofadvantage)isattheextremeofacontinuumofnormsthataffirmtovaryingdegreesthatitismorallymoreimportanttoachieveabenefitoravoidalossforaperson,theworseoffshewouldbe,comparedwithothers,intheabsenceofthisbenefitoravoidanceofloss.Acloserelativeoftheseviewsisthepriorityview,whichassertsthatthemoralvalueofachievingagainofagivensizeforanindividualisgreater,theworseoffinabsolutetermstheindividualwould18beintheabsenceofthisbenefit.Principlessuchasmaximinandthefamilyofnormsassociatedwiththeprior-ityviewwillinawiderangeofcircumstancesrecommendtransfersofresourcesfromwealthytopoorinawaythatcanmimicwhatanadherentofequalityforitsownsakewouldfavor.Tobeassuredthatequalityofconditionismorallyvaluableasanend,onemustbeassuredthatachievingorapproximatingequalityofconditionisvaluableincircumstancesinwhichtheseotherviews,thatvalueequalityonlyasameanstoothervalues,wouldnotfavormovementtowardequality.Anothermoralviewthatwillrecommendmovesinthedirectionofequalityofconditionwithoutregardingequalityofconditionasmorethaninstrumentallyvaluableistheprinciplethatone’sgoodfortuneshouldbeproportionaltoone’sdeservingness.Whenthoseontheshortendofaninequalityarenolessdeserv-ingthanthosewhoarebetteroff,proportionaldesertwillfavormovementtoward19equality.Byitself,thenormthateveryoneshouldenjoythesamelevelofadvantagewillfavorachangethatrenderseveryonemoreequalbutworseoff.Theadvocateofequalitymightnotfavorsuchachangeallthingsconsidered,ifshealsoaffirmsotherprinciplesthatmilitateagainstsuchlevellingdown.Butthedoctrinethatequalityofconditionisintrinsicallydesirablemustholdthateveniflevellingdownissometimesorevenalwaysundesirableallthingsconsidered,thesituationthatresultsfromlevellingdownisinonerespectimproved,sinceequalityofconditionistherebyfulfilledtoagreaterextent.Againsttheviewthatequalityofconditionisintrinsicallyvaluabletheobjectionhasbeenraisedthatlevellingdownisnotdesirableinanyrespect.Butasstated,thisobjectionjustdenieswhatthedoctrineofequalityofconditionasserts.Nonetheless,reflectiononcasesoflevellingdownpersuadessomethattheydonotvalueequalityofconditionofanysortforitsownsake.Theyrathervaluesomenonegalitarianprincipleorprinciplesthatmimictheimplicationsofequalityinsomecircumstances.102\nEqualityWhatRendersAllHumanPersonsMorallyEqual?Ifindividualsareentitledtosomeformofequality–ofrights,orstatus,orcon-dition,ortreatment–anaccountisneededofthebasisofequality.Abroadrangeofviewsinsistsonsomeformoffundamentalequalmoralstatusforallhumanpersons.Invirtueofwhatfeaturesofhumanpersonsisthisfundamentalequalstatusjustified?Thisquestionmightseemtoinviteaneasyandobviousanswer.Beingamemberofthehumanspeciesentitlesonetoafundamentalequalmoralstatusanddignity,thesameforallhumans.Ideologiesandcreedsthatdenythefundamentalequal-ityofhumanityareguiltyofprejudiceandbigotry.Theyarebeyondthemoralpale.Forexample,sexistviewsthatclaimmentobesuperiortowomen,racistviewsthatholdthatsomehumangroupsdefinedbyskincolororlineagearesupe-riortoothers,andaristocraticdoctrinesthatdividehumanityintothosenaturallyfitbyqualityofbirthformembershipinaprivilegedcasteorclassandthosefitforthelowerrungsoffixedhierarchies,donotmeritseriousconsiderationbyreflectiveminds.Racist,sexist,andaristocraticcasteideologiesareindeedunfounded,butthepuzzleofthemoralbasisofequalityisnotsoeasilysolved.Meremembershipinthehumanspeciesdoesnotnecessarilypickoutallandonlythosewhomeritfun-damentalequalstatus.Nonhumanbeingsinregionsoftheuniversebeyondearthmightforallweknowexhibitintelligenceandsociabilitythatshouldentitlethemtothestatusofpersonseventhoughtheyarenothumanpersons.Amoretrou-blesomeworryisthatnotallmembersofthehumanspeciessharethetraitsthatarestandardlycitedtodistinguishthemoralstatusofhumansfromthatofotheranimals.Inheritedgeneticanomaly,accident,anddiseasecausesomemembersofthehumanspeciestoloseatsomephaseoftheirlives,andothersnevertogain,thetraitsthatareplausiblecandidatesforbeingregardedasnecessaryandsuffi-cientforpersonhoodstatus.Wemightsayitisnotmerelybeinghumanbutbeingapersonthatcounts,whereonejuststipulatesthatapersonisabeingthatpossessesthetraits,what-evertheymightbe,thatconferfullmoralstatus.Butthequestionstillremains:Whyshouldwethinkthereisanequalbasicmoralstatusthatallnormalhumanspossess?Ingeneraltermsthereisprobablywideagreementthathumansaredis-tinguishedfromnonhumananimalsonearthbytheirpossessionofgreatercog-nitivepowers.Humanshaverationalagencycapacitywhichotheranimalslack.Invirtueofthiscapacitytoperceivethetrueandthegood,toadoptgoalsandchooseactionstoattainthem,andtoregulateactionbysomeconceptionofwhatisowedmorallytoothers,humansaresuperiortootheranimalsandareentitledtosupe-riormoralstatus.Nodoubtmoreneedstobedonetocharacterizethetraitsthatrenderabeingaperson.Asidefromthis,thereisthefurtherworrythatthecog-nitivecapacitiesthatformrational-agencycapacityallvarybydegree.Theques-tionthenarises,ifIclaimtohavegreatermoralrightsandmoralstandingthan103\nRichardJ.Arneson(forexample)agorilla,onthegroundthatIammuchsmarter,whydoesnotthissameargumentestablishthat(forexample)AlbertEinstein,whoismuchsmarterthanI,hasgreatermoralrightsandmoralstandingthanthattowhichIamenti-tled?Whyhumanequality?Onemightsaythatifonepossessesrational-agencycapacityatorabovesomethresholdlevel,onehasenoughtoqualifyfortheequalstatusaccordedtoallpersons,andabovethethreshold,inequalitiesincognitivecapacitydonotmatter.Butwhynot?Therearefurtherquestionsinthisregiontobeexplored.Notes1SeeLocke(1980),p.8.2ThelibertarianconceptionofLockeanrightsiselaboratedanddefendedinNozick(1974).3SeeNozick(1974),ch.3;alsoSen(1982);Scheffler(1994),ch.4.4Rawls(1999a),pp.73–8.5Tawney(1964),pp.109–10.6SeeTemkin(1993),esp.ch.2;alsoSen(1997).7SeeBuchanan,Brock,Daniels,andWikler(1999).8Walzer(1983),p.xi.9Sendevelopshisviewsinseveralpublications.Forasummary,seeSen(1992).10SeeDworkin(2000);alsoRakowski(1991).11Dworkin(2000),p.73.12OnthispointIamindebtedtoPeterVallentyne.13Rawls(1999b),p.369.14Onthispoint,seeCohen(1989),Arneson(1989),andRoemer(1996).15Forthisargument,seeFrankfurt(1987).16AccordingtoWalzer(1983),justicerequiresroughlythateveryoneshouldhaveenoughtobeafullyparticipatingmemberofademocraticsociety.Anderson(1999)furtherdevelopsthisview.SeealsoNussbaum(1999).17Rawls’stheoryofjusticeincorporatesthedifferenceprinciple,whichrequiresmax-iminningofsocialandeconomicbenefits.SeeRawls(1999a).18Parfit(1997).19Kagan(1999)providesasubtlediscussionofhowjudgmentsaboutdeservingnessmightbetteraccountforjudgmentsthatontheirfacelookedtobebasedontheviewthatequalityofconditionisintrinsicallymorallyvaluable.BibliographyAnderson,Elizabeth(1999).“Whatisthepointofequality?”Ethics,109:287–337.Arneson,Richard(1989).“EqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfare.”PhilosophicalStudies56:77–93.104\nEquality——(1997).“Equalityandequalopportunityforwelfare.”InLouisP.PojmanandRobertWestmoreland(eds.),Equality:SelectedReadings(pp.229–41).Oxford:OxfordUni-versityPress.Buchanan,Allen,DanW.Brock,NormanDaniels,andDanielWikler(2000).FromChancetoChoice:GeneticsandJustice.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Cohen,G.A.(1989).“Onthecurrencyofegalitarianjustice.”Ethics,99:906–44.Dworkin,Ronald(2000).SovereignVirtue:TheTheoryandPracticeofEquality.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Frankfurt,Harry(1987).“Equalityasamoralideal.”Ethics,98:21–43.Kagan,Shelly(1999).“Equalityanddesert.”InOwenMcLeodandLouisP.Pojman(eds.),WhatDoWeDeserve?(pp.298–314).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Locke,John(1980).SecondTreatiseofGovernment.Indianapolis:Hackett(originallypub-lished1690).McKerlie,Dennis(1989).“EqualityandTime.”Ethics,99:475–91.Nagel,Thomas(1991).EqualityandPartiality.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Nozick,Robert(1974).Anarchy,State,andUtopia.NewYork:BasicBooks.Nussbaum,Martha(1999).“Womenandculturaluniversals.”InMarthaNussbaum,SexandJustice(pp.29–54).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Parfit,Derek(1997).“Equalityandpriority.”Ratio(newseries),10:202–20.Rakowski,Eric(1991).EqualJustice.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Rawls,John(1999a).ATheoryofJustice(revisededn).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniver-sityPress.——(1999b).“Socialunityandprimarygoods.”InSamuelFreeman(ed.),JohnRawls:CollectedPapers(pp.359–87).Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Roemer,John(1996).TheoriesofDistributiveJustice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Scanlon,T.M.(2000).“Thediversityofobjectionstoinequality.”InMatthewClaytonandAndrewWilliams(eds.),TheIdealofEquality(pp.41–59).NewYork:St.Martin’sPress.Scheffler,Samuel(1994).TheRejectionofConsequentialism(revisededn).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Sen,Amartya(1982).“RightsandAgency.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs11:3–39.——(1992).InequalityReexamined.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.——(1997).OnEconomicInequality(expandededn).Oxford:ClarendonPress.Shakespeare,William(1980).KingLear.InTheCompleteWorksofWilliamShakespeare(theCambridgeTextestablishedbyJohnDoverWilson)(pp.921–54).London:OctopusBooks(originallypublished1605).Tawney,R.H.(1964).Equality.London:AllenandUnwin.(Firstpublished1931.)Temkin,Larry(1993).Inequality.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Walzer,Michael(1983).SpheresofJustice:ADefenseofPluralismandEquality.NewYork:BasicBooks.105\nChapter5Preference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheoryAnnE.CuddIntroductionThisessaywilladdressthequestion:Whatoughttobetheroleofindividuals’preferencesinademocracy?By“preference”Iamreferringtotheconceptofanorderingofaperson’sbestjudgmentsaboutwhichstatesofaffairstheindividualdesires.Preferencesnormallyresultinactionsthatindividualsthinkwillbringaboutthemostpreferredstatewithintheindividual’spowertoenact.Inthecaseofvoting,then,onenormallyvotesforthatcandidateoroptionthatonemostprefers.Atfirstblush,itseemsthattheanswertothequestionshouldbeobvious:individuals’preferencesshouldcollectivelydeterminesocialdecisionsinademoc-racy–thatis,afterall,definitiveofdemocracy.Butasisoftenthecasewithfirstblushes,thisonepalesunderthelightofscrutiny.First,votesorexpressionsofpreference,notpreferencesthemselves,determineoutcomes,atbest,anditisnotclearthatindividuals’preferencesdeterminetheirvotes.Second,tosaythatindi-vidualpreferencesdeterminesocialdecisionsisjustnottosayenoughabouthowtheaggregationofindividualpreferencesistobeaccomplished.Fortheanalogybetweenindividualandsocialdecision-makingbreaksdownpreciselywhenoneconsidershowsocialpreferencesaretobedeterminedwhentheindividualpref-erencesconflict.Third,itisnotclearthateveryindividualshouldhaveavoteoneveryissueinademocracy.Preferencesmaybeperverted,misinformed,ormisdi-rectedinmanyways–asthisessaywilldiscuss–andsomayberationallyormorallyunacceptableasthedeterminantsofcollectivedecisions.Democracyisasocialdecision-makingprocedureformaking“coercively1enforceablecollectivedecisions.”Literally“democracy”meansruleofthepeoplebythepeople.Butoverwhatmattersmaytheymakecoercivelyenforceabledeci-sions,andhowarethemanyvoicesofthepeopletobecombinedtomakeasingle,coherentsound?Ifwearegoingtoanswerthequestionofwhatroleindividualpreferenceshouldplayinademocracy,andatthesametimedefenddemocracyas106\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheorythebestformofgovernment,itwillbeimportanttolookfirsttothejustificationofdemocraticrule.Therearethreesourcesofjustificationofadecision-makingprocedure:arulemaybejustifiedbyshowingthatitisrationallyorthatitismorally2required,orbyshowingthatitleadstothebest(insomesenseofbest)outcomes.Thislatterstandard,theconsequentialistorperfectioniststandard,eithercoincideswiththerationalitystandardoritisnotaformofdemocracy–rulebythepeople–atall.Ifitdoesnotcoincidewiththerationalityjustification,thenitmustarguethatdemocracysomehowbringsaboutthebestoutcomedirectly,butnotasaresultofthevoters’deliberationsonwhichtheybasetheirvotes.Inademocracyitisnotenoughthatpeoplegetwhattheywant;theymustintendtheircollectiveaction,whichtheyexpectwillbringabouttheircollectiveintention.Thus,Ishallnotconsidertheconsequentialiststandardfurtherinthisessay.Tosaythatadecision-makingprocedureisrationalispossiblytosayanumberofdifferentthings.First,onemightmeaninstrumentalrationality,asassumedinrational-choicearguments.Tosaythatadecisionprocedureisinstrumentallyratio-nalistosaythatitmaximizesthesatisfactionofanindividual’sself-interest,whereself-interestisdeterminedbytheindividualandmaybeselfishoraltruistic,solong3asitisnon-tuistic.Onthisviewofjustification,asocial-decisionprocedurewouldbejustifiedifitwereinstrumentallyrationalfortheindividualsinthesociety,andindividualsmightbeself-interestedin,amongotherthings,astablepolity,oppor-tunitiesforcooperationwiththeirfellows,andavoidingpredationbyuntrust-worthies.Second,onemightmeanby“rational”theachievementof(Kantian)autonomy.Tosaythatasocial-decisionruleisrationalinthissensewouldbetosaythatitsupportsorpromotestheautonomy,orself-governingabilities,oftheindividualsinthesociety.Rationaldecision-makinginthissensemeansadherencetonormsforbehaviorthatareuniversalizeableamongsomegroupofpersonswith4whomoneidentifies.Whilethesesensesofrationalitymaybeinconflict,theymayalsohappilycometogetherinthepoliticalchoiceofastable,relativelyrespon-sivegovernment.Theotherstandardofjustificationhastodowithmoralidealsorconceptionsofhowasocietyideallyistobeorganized.Democracymaybejustifiedbysomeappealstomoralidealssuchasequality–thateachpersonistocountforone–andthepreservationofhumandignity–thatnooneistobesubjectedtoarulewhichshehadnopartinchoosing.Anadditionalmoraldemandthathasbeen5morerecentlyrecognizedisthatdiversitybenotonlytoleratedbutvalued.By“diversity”ImeantorefernotonlytothedifferencesofopinionthatarisefromwhatRawls(1993)termed“theburdensofjudgment,”butalsotothewidedif-ferencesinculturalpracticesthatareexemplifiedbythepopulationsofcontem-porarymulticulturaldemocracies.Ideally,then,democracypromotesrationality,autonomy,equality,dignity,anddiversity,andisjustifiedtotheextentthatitisthebestmeanstodoso.Thesecanbecompetingcriteria;indeed,somemightarguethatinthecontextofdemoc-racythecompetitionamongthesecriteriaisinevitable.Personsmayseetheirinter-estsbestfurtheredbythedenialtoothersofautonomyorequality.Somemay107\nAnnE.Cuddrejectclaimsthatothersmakethattheirwayoflifeisvaluablediversity,andinsteadfinditathreattodignityorrationalself-interest.Tosomeextent,theformorproceduresofaparticulardemocraticregimecanaddresstheseissues,buttodefenddemocracyasaviablemeanstogovernourselves,wewillhavetoarguethathumannaturecantoleratesomereasonablecompromiseamongthejustifica-toryideals.Ibeginwiththeassumptionthatdemocracy,astheruleofthepeople,where6eachcitizencountsforone,meansthateachgetsasingle,equally-weighted,voteoneveryissue,andtheoptionwiththemostvotesisenactedbythegroup.Itakethistobethedecisionprocedureofsimplemajorityrule.Eachofthestandardsofjustificationprovidesacriticalstandpointfromwhichtorefineourconceptionofdemocracy.InthisessayIwillsurveyanumberofcriticismsthathavebeenraisedintheliteraturesonpreference,rationalchoice,anddemocracy,fromtheperspectivesofbothrationalityandmorality,tothisconceptionofdemocracy.Weshallseethatthissimpleconceptioncannotworkformanyreasons.Somereasonshavetodowiththestructuralinstabilityofthedecisionprocedureofmajorityrule,andsomewiththeperversitiesofindividualpreference.Intakingaccountofthesecriticismsofsimplemajorityrule,weshallhavetoalterthesocial-decisionprocedure,andyetdosoinawaythatarguablyretainstheessenceofdemocraticrule.NextIwillexaminetheclaimsofsometheoriststhatindividualpreferenceisirrelevanttodemocraticrule,thatindividualsinfactoughtnotvotetheirpref-erences.FinallyIwillsuggestanoutlineforliberaldemocracythattakesindivid-ualpreferencetobeanimportantbutnotalwaysdeterminativeelementofsocialdecision-making,avoidsthesurveyedcriticisms,andcanbejustifiedmorallyandrationally.StructuralProblemswithDemocracyasMechanismofSocialChoiceMajorityrulehasforalongtimebeenknowntohavecertainstructuralproblemsassociatedwithit.By“structuralproblems”Irefertoparadoxes,internalincon-sistencies,andconflictswiththejustificatorycriteriathatareindependentoftheparticularcontentsoftheissuesvotedonorthepreferencesexpressedinthevotes.Someofthesearisewithmajorityruleinparticular,otherswithanyvotingmech-anism,whereavotingmechanismisasocial-decisionprocedurethattakesvotesastheonlyinputstosocialdecisions.InthissectionIsurveyfoursuchstructuralproblems.108\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheory1VotingparadoxesTheoriginalvotingparadoxafflictingmajorityruleistheCondorcetparadox,whichreferstotheproblemthatwithatleastthreevotersandthreechoices,itisalwayspossibletofindasetofpossiblepreferenceorderingsthatyieldacyclicalorintransitivesocialpreference.Forexample,supposethatthepossiblechoicesarex,y,andz.SupposeAprefersxtoyandytoz,Bprefersytozandztox,Cprefersztoxandxtoy.Nowifweaskwhetherthereisasocialpreferencebetweenxandy,weseethatxbeatsy,similarly,withxandz,zbeatsx,andwithyandz,ybeatsz.Butthatmeansthatsocially,xispreferredtoy,ytozandztox,whichisintransitive.TheprobabilityofaCondorcetparadoxonlygetsworsewithgreaternumbersofoutcomesandgreaternumbersofvoters,andthusitseemstobeageneralproblemwithmajorityrule.Althoughanygivenoccasionofvotingmayresultinawinner,itwillbethearbitrary(orworse,manipulated)resultoftheorderinwhichtheissueswerevotedon.Whatthismeansisthatwecannotalwaysderiveanon-arbitrary,trulyrepresentativesocial-preferencefunctionfrommajor-ityrule.AsPeterOrdeshookputsit,“wecannotunderestimatetheimportanceof[theCondorcetparadox]becauseitunderminesfundamentallyanyapproachthat7treatsinstitutionsandcollectivitiesasthoughtheyarepeople.”However,itisalsoimportanttonotethatthegeneralityoftheparadoxrestsontheassumptionthatallpossiblepreferenceorderingsareequallylikely.Inacommunityinwhichmuchisagreeduponandmanyofthepossibleorderingsareruledoutbyeachofthevoters,thelikelihoodofanintransitivityarisingfallsconsiderably.Thus,ifmajor-ityruleistobearational,non-arbitrarywayofmakingsocialdecisions,itwillhavetobeconfinedtoissuesoverwhichthereisalreadyacertainamountofcom-munityagreement.2Arrow’sImpossibilityTheoremEvenmorethantheCondorcetparadox,Arrow’sImpossibilityTheoremthreat-enstheverycoherenceofcollectivedecision-makingbymeansofindividualpreferences.Accordingtothetheorem,thereisnowaygenerallytoconstructacompleteandtransitivecollective-preferenceorderingthatisdeterminedbythepreferenceorderingsofthemembersofthecollective,thatmeetsfourseeminglysimplerationaland/ordemocraticcriteria.Thesefourareasfollows:(1)anyindividualpreferenceorderings(thatarecompleteandtransitive)areallowable(UnrestrictedDomain);(2)ifeveryoneprefersoneoptiontoanother,thenthesocialorderingranksthetwooptionsthatway(ParetoPrinciple);(3)thecollec-tivepreferencebetweenxandydependsonlyonhowalltheindividualsinthecollectiverankorderxandy(IndependenceofIrrelevantAlternatives);and(4)noonepersonisdecisiveforeverypairofoptions(Non-dictatorship).Theproofproceedsbyshowingthatwhenalloftheotherconditionsaremet,theonlyway109\nAnnE.Cuddtoguaranteeatransitiveorderingistohaveadictator.Theupshotisthatwecannotguaranteethatmajorityrulewillbedemocraticandrationalforeverypossiblesetofpreferenceorderingsthatthecitizensmayhave.KurtBaier(1967)arguedthatArrow’sTheoremdoesnotprofoundlyaffecttheargumentfordemocracy.Therearemanyreasonsfordemocraticandliberallaw-makerstooverrideindividualpreferences,heclaims,suchastheproblemswithpreferencesthatIwillexploreinthenextsection.Therefore,Arrow’stheoremmakesamuchlesssignificantcritiquethanitwouldifindividualpreferencecouldbecountedontobesettled,rational,moralandliberal.Butwemustnotaccept8thisevasionofArrowtooquickly.Ifwedecidethatwewillrelyonanyaggrega-tionofindividualpreferences,itwillbeimportanttoseewhethertherestrictions9placedonindividualpreferencesruleoutdictatorshipandallowatransitivesocialorderingwhentheyaretobereliedon.Thatis,justbecausetheconditions–theantecedentsoftheconditional–areviolateddoesnotguaranteethattheoutcome–theconsequent–willalwaysbeavoided.EvenifArrow’sTheoremdoesnotstrictlyapply,thespecterofintransitivityanddictatorshipwillhauntdecisionsmadeonthebasisofaggregatedindividualpreferences.Furthermore,weshouldnotethatBaier’sdefenseamountstosayingthat,sinceademocracywillhavesomeundemocraticfeatures,Arrow’sTheoremwillhavelessbite.Butthiscanhardlybecomfortingtothestrictadherenttomajorityrule.3Irrationalvoting;rationalignoranceAnotherstructuralproblemwithvotingisthatinelectionswithlargenumbersofvoters,whereeachvoterisunlikelytobetheonetocastthedecidingvote,itisnotinstrumentallyrationaltovotebecausetheexpectedbenefitofvotingislowerthanthecostofvoting.Yet,weseethatintherealworldpeoplevote,evenwhentheyarenotlegallycompelledtodoso.Clearlytheyaregettingsomeextravaluefromvotingoverandabovetheireffectontheoutcomeofthevote,perhapsfromthefactthattheyareparticipatinginacommunityendeavorthatisgreaterthantheinstrumentalvalueoftheirvotes.Iftherearelargenumbersofcitizenswhodonotvote,thenthesocial-decisionschemethatresultsfrommajorityrulevio-latesthemoralcriteriaofequalityanddignity.Yet,ithardlyseemsappropriatetorespectthesemoralcriteriabycoercingpeopletovote.Thisproblemwithvotingsuggeststhatajustifiableformofdemocracywillhavetoprovideadditionalincen-tivestoconvincepeoplevoluntarilytovote.Associatedwiththeproblemoftheinstrumentalirrationalityofvotingiswhatisknownastheproblemof“rationalignorance.”Ifitisirrationalforindividualstovote,thenitisrationalforeachvotertoinvestonlysmallamountsofeffort,ifany,intounderstandingtheissues.Buttheconsequenceofthismaybeanigno-rantcitizenry,hardlytheidealofautonomy,equalityordignitythatdemocratswouldliketosuppose.Liketheproblemwiththeirrationalityofvoting,though,wecanseethatmanypeoplefindanadditionalvalue,beyondtheinstrumental110\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheoryexpectedvalueoftheirwell-informedvote,tobecomingwell-informedaboutpoliticalissues.HowelsecouldoneaccountforthepopularityoftheC-SPANnetworkwhichpresentspoliticalspeechesandconferences?Still,thisproblemsug-geststhatademocraticsocietymustfindwaystoencouragepeopletobecomeinformedaboutpoliticalissues.Shouldwebecontenttosayjustthis,thatdemocracyshouldencourageinformedvoting,oraretheseparadoxessomewhatdeeper,suggestingthatpeoplewouldbesimplydeludingthemselvesthattheirvotesmakeadifferenceiftheyinformthemselvesandvote?Myresponsetotheirrationality-of-votingproblem,whichgeneratestherational-ignoranceproblem,istodistinguishbetweenvotinginindividualinstancesandhavingapolicyofvoting,andtopointoutthatvotingisapublicactwithconsequencesforeachperson’sreputation.Nowtheirra-10tionality-of-votingproblemhassomethinglikea“prisoner’sdilemma”structure:eachisbetteroffnotvotingiftheothersvote,butallareworseoffifnonevotethantheywouldbeifallofthemvoted.Forifpeopleweretosimplyabdicatetheirpowerenmasse,astherationalityargumentssuggest,thenthechancethatadic-tatorordemagoguewouldmovethesocietyfromdemocracytototalitarianismislikely.Sinceitisclearthatatotalitarianstatemeetsnoneofthecriteriaofjustifi-cation,thisoutcomeisunacceptable.Iwanttosuggestthatthepolicyofvotingcanbedefendedasarationalstrategyforavoidingtyranny,ifindividualsaremadetosuffersomebadreputationeffectbynotvoting.Theprocedurethatastateputsinplaceforvotingmakesitmoreorlessapublicact.One’sneighborsandfellowcitizenscanseewhenonedoesordoesnotgotothepolls.Itcanbemademoreorlessamatterofpublicdiscussion.Apolicyofvotingisaruleforactionthatconcernsnotjusteachsingleactofvotinginanelection,butrathervotinginelec-tionsasageneralrule.Ifitisadvantageousforonetohavethereputationofbeingavoter,thenthebenefittohavingapolicyofvotingcanbeenoughtochangethepayoffstructureofvotingfromaprisoner’sdilemmaintoanassurancegame,whereeachdoesbestbyvotingsolongastheothersvotetoo.Incontrasttotheprisoner’sdilemma,inanassurancegameoneequilibriumforsuchagamewouldbewherethecitizensallhavethepolicyofvoting.Ifthereputationeffectwereenoughtocompletelyoverwhelmthecostofvoting,thenthegamewouldbeone11withauniqueequilibriumwhereeveryonevotes.Hence,itisinstrumentallyrationaltovoteafterall,providedthatothersdoaswell.Mypointhereisthatitispossibletomakevotingbothsociallyandindividuallyrational,andthespecterofthetotalitarianmenaceprovidesjustificationfordemocraciestoputpoliciesinplacetodoso.4ManipulabilityThevotingparadoxesshowedthatitisnotgenerallypossibletogenerateadefin-itivesocialpreferencefromtheindividualpreferencesalone.Buttheremaybeamoresinisterproblemherethanarbitrariness.AllanGibbard(1973)showedwith111\nAnnE.CuddhisGeneralManipulabilityTheoremthatasavvyvotercan,conceivably,biasanoutcomeinherdirection.A“votingscheme”isanyschemewhichmakesacom-munity’schoicedependentirelyonindividuals’professedpreferences,andanindi-vidual“manipulates”avotingschemeifshesecuresanoutcomesheprefersbymisrepresentingherpreferences.Suppose,forexample,therearethreecandidates,A,B,andC,foraposition,andtheonewiththemajorityoffirst-placevoteswillwintheposition.Supposethatonastraightforward,honestrepresentationofpref-erences,Awouldhave6first-placevotes,Bwouldhave7first-placevotes,andCwouldhave2.IfthevoterswhopreferCknowthattheircandidatehasnochance,andiftheybothpreferAtoB,thenbyvotingfortheirsecondfavoritecandidate,theycanmanipulatethevotesothatAcomesoutthewinner.Gibbard’stheoremprovesthat“anynon-dictatorialvotingschemewithatleastthreepossibleout-12comesissubjecttoindividualmanipulation.”Nowthisinitiallysoundslikeamoreseriousproblemthanitactuallyis.Gibbardadmitsthatjustbecauseitispos-sibletomanipulateavotingschemethisdoesnotmeanthatanyoneintheactualworldwouldbeinapositiontodoso.However,thereasonsthatonewouldnotbeinapositiontodosoareignorance,stupidity,orintegrity.Still,the“igno-rance”and“stupidity”requiredherearejusttheordinaryconditionsofhumanexistence.Theinformationthatwouldberequiredsuccessfullytomanipulatethe13voteisknowledgeoftheothers’votes.AtmostwecanconcludewithGibbardthat“nostraightforwardappealtoinformedself-interestcanmaketheoutcomea14non-trivialfunctionofpreferencesregardlessofwhatthosepreferencesare.”Thematterismuchmorecomplicated,andone’sbestbetforachievingthesocialoutcomeonedesiresmaynotrecommendvotingone’struepreferences,buttheconditionsunderwhichonecanknowhowtopreciselymanipulateanelectionareextremelyrareinasocietyofmanyindividuals.Tosummarizethissection,then,IhavearguedthatthevotingparadoxesandArrow’sTheoremaretroubling,butnotdecisive,objectionstomajorityrule,iftherearelimitingconditionsonwhenindividualpreferencescanbedeterminativeofsocialdecisions.Wherethereisagreatdealofcommunityagreementalreadyitisunlikelythattherewillbeintransitivecycles.Arrow’sTheoremwillnotdirectlyapplyinmanyinstancesbecausethescopeofindividualpreferenceiscircum-scribed.However,itwillbeimportantforademocracytoconsiderwhetherthereisanintransitivityinitscollectivepreferences,andwherethereis,adictatorwillhavetobenamedtodecidenon-arbitrarilywhatthecollectiveactionoughttobe.Iwilloffersuggestionsintheconclusionforhowthiscanbejustifiablyaccom-plished.Ihavearguedthatitispossibleandjustifiableforademocracytopursuemethodstoencourageinformedvoterparticipation.Finally,itseemsthatalthoughmanipulabilityisatheoreticalpossibilityinademocracy,practicallyspeakingtheinformationrequirementsaretoohighforittoposeaseriousthreat.Nowwewillmoveontootherobjectionstoindividualpreferences.112\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheoryReasonstoOverrideIndividualPreferencesInadditiontothestructuralproblemswithmajorityruleasasocial-choicemech-anism,therearemanyreasonsforobjectingtotheparticularcontentsofindivid-ualpreference,andthusoverridingindividualpreferenceinsocialdecision-making.Recallthatthegoalistopromoterationality,autonomy,equality,dignity,anddiversity,andwesaidthatdemocracyisjustifiedtotheextentthatitisthebestmeanstodoso.Nowwehavetoaskwhetherdemocracyisbestservedbyallow-ingvotersunlimitedrightstodecidehowtheyasindividualswillvote.Manyreasonscanbegivenforrestrainingpersonsfromvotingtheir“mere”preferencesinademocraticsociety.Hereisalistofthem.1SomepreferencesareirrationaloruninformedIntherational-choiceliterature,preferencescanonlybeaninputtoarationaldecisioniftheyareconsistent(onedoesnotpreferxtoyandytox)andiftheydonotformanintransitivecycle.Otherwise,itwouldbeincoherenttoclaimthatthepersonhasagoalthatshewishestopursueinaneffectiveway.Likewise,unset-tledpreferences,orpreferencesthatshiftrapidlyovertime,makepursuitofagoalimpossible,asthegoalshiftsfromonemomenttothenext.Inthiscategory,Iwouldargue,wecanalsotreatincontinentpreferences,orfirst-orderpreferencesthatconflictwithlonger-standingsecond-orderdesires.Therealproblemwiththesefirst-orderpreferencesiseitherthattheyshiftbackandforth(Iwantthecig-arette;Idon’twantthecigarette),orthattheysimplycauseaninconsistencywhencombinedwiththesecond-orderones(Iwantthecigarette;Idon’twanttowantcigarettes;thisisacaseofwantingcigarettes;thereforeIdon’twantwhatIwant).Hence,theyviolateinstrumentalrationalityinthesamewayasinconsistentpreferences.Uninformedpreferences,i.e.,preferencesbasedonfalsebeliefsoronincom-pleteinformationaboutoptions,riskviolatingboththeinstrumental-rationalityandautonomycriteria.However,thematterisnotsimplehere,sincehavingfalsebeliefsandincompleteinformationisaninevitablepartofthehumanepistemiccondition.Tosaythatthesepreferencesareunacceptableforrationalorauton-omousdecisions,theyhavetobefalseoruninformedinspiteofreadily(relativetotheagent)availableinformation.Otherwisethebaristoohighforratio-nalityandautonomy.Thesolutiontotheproblemofuninformedpreferencesisclearlytomakeinformationaboutmattersonwhichvoteswillbetakenreadilyavailable,andthentogiveincentives,asIdiscussedabove,tocitizenstoinformthemselves.113\nAnnE.Cudd2Somepreferencesarenon-autonomouslyformedThisistheproblem,raisedbyseveralpreferencetheoristsandfurtherrefinedbyseveralfeministtheorists,knownasadaptivepreferenceformationordeformed15preferences.JonElster(1983)definesanadaptivepreferenceasapreferencethathasbeenformedwithoutone’scontrolorawareness,byacausalmechanismthatisn’tofone’sownchoosing.Adaptivepreferenceshaveatypical“foxandgrapes”structure,thatis,ifthegrapesareoutoftheagent’sreach,theagent’sprefer-ences,iftheyarelikethefox’s,willturnagainstthegrapes,theagentdeclaringthemsouranyway.The“sourgrapes”phenomenonisfamiliartousall:afterIfoundoutthateatingscallopswouldmakemeviolentlyill,IfoundthatIhadnotasteforthem;followingmydiscoverythattherewasnoorganizedfootballleaguethatadmittedmembersofmygender(nottomentionshort,small,andslowpersons),Idesiredtowatchthegameless.Notalladaptivepreferencesarebadfortheagentherself,sincesomemayallowtheagenttogetmorewelfarefromherfeasiblesetofoptions.Therearelessinnocentexamplesofthisphenomenon,though.Thoseadaptationsthatareforcedonpersonsbysocialdeprivationandinjusticeoughtnottobeautomaticallyrespectedbyademocracy.Ifone’sprefer-encesadapttothecircumstancesinthisway,thenthepreferencesofagentsunderconditionsofdeprivationwillturnawayfromgoodsandevenneedsthat,absent16thoseconditions,theywouldwant.Oppressedpersonswillcometoseetheirconditionsofoppressionasthelimitswithinwhichtheywanttolive.Asocial-decisionprocedurethattakessuchpreferencesasthefixedinputsviolatesthejustificatorycriteriaofautonomy,equality,anddignity.Acloselyrelatedformofadaptivepreferenceformationisthehabituationof17preference.Notonlydopersonstendtobecomecontentwithwhatevertheyseeastheirlotinlife,theyalsobecomeaccustomedtogreatprivilegeandaregreatlyaffectedfortheworseshouldtheybedeprivedofthisprivilege,howeverunfairit18mightbe.Inanoppressivesituationinwhichsomesuffergreatdeprivationandothersenjoygreatprivilege,statesofaffairsinwhichthingsaremorefairlydis-tributedwillnotbepreferredbytheoppressedandwillbegreatlydispreferredbytheprivileged.Girlsandwomenareencouragedbymultiplesourcestothinkofthekindofworkthatoppressesthemastheworkthattheyought,bynature,bysentiment,andevenbyGod,todo.Allofthesesourceshavepowerfuleffectsonemotions,makingitlikelythatwomen’spreferenceswillfavortheiroppressivecondition.It’snotthattheywillpreferoppressiontojustice,orsubordinationtoequality,rathertheywillpreferthekindsofsocialrolesthattendtosubordinatethem,makethemlessabletochoose,orgivethemfewerchoicestomake.Thesesourcesalsosuggesttowomen,andtomen,thatitisnotsocialoppressionatwork,butrathernature(orthesupernatural)thatputswomenintheirplace.AsJohnStuartMillnotedinTheSubjectionofWomen,theoppressionofwomenistheonekindofoppressionthatismaintainedinpartbytheaffectionsoftheoppressedfortheprivilegedclass.Manyreligions,atleastthepastandcurrent114\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheoryinterpretationsofthem,insistthatwomen’splaceisinthedomesticsphere,and19mostprohibitthemfrombecomingreligiousleaders.Religionalsopowerfullyengagestheemotions,andsoaffectspreferences.Butsocialdecisionsmadefromsuchhabituatedpreferenceswillcompromiseautonomy,equality,dignity,anddiversity.Thus,asdemocrats,weshouldbewaryofindividualpreferencesthat20reinforcetheoppressionofwomen.Othernon-autonomouspreference-formationprocessesshouldalsogivethedemocratsomereasontopause,atleast.Peer-pressure,addictions,andtheeffectof(possiblyunjust,immoral,orirrational)socialnormsonpersonscancausethemtoprefer,ortoexpressthemselvesasiftheyprefer,optionsthatabsentthosecon-straintstheywouldnotprefer.Again,ifthesocialdecision-makingprocedurereflectsthesepreferences,autonomywillbecompromised.AnotherfeministcriticismofthenotionofpreferencewasraisedbyEvaFederKittay(1999).Thereshenotesthatthenotionofpreferenceassumesanindependenceofpersonsthatisnotcompatiblewiththeinterdependenceofseriouslydependentpersonsandtheircaretakers,whomKittayterms“dependencyworkers.”Onthestandardaccount,preferencesaretakentobelongtoasingleperson,andtobe,ifnotself-regarding,atleastnon-tuistic.Eachpersonistobeconsidereda“self-originatingsourceofclaims.”Butseriouslydependentpersons(infantsandsmallchildren,theseverelydisabled,theveryill,thefrailelderly)oftencannotmakeclaimsforthemselves;theymaybeunabletoexpresstheirneedsanddesires,oreventoframetheconceptofneedsanddesiresadequately.Thus,depen-dencyworkersareforcedtomakeclaimsonbehalfoftheircharges,andsotheirpreferencesmusttosomedegreereflectthepreferencesoftwopersons.Thesenseinwhichtheyare“forced”todosois,ofcourse,notanoutrightdenialoftheirautonomy,fortheyareforcedbythedemandsofmorality,andperhapsloveorcommitment,tocarefortheircharge.However,caretakingisasocialneed,andsomeonehastodoit.Thosewhodonotfulfillthesocialneedarefree-ridingonthosewhodo.Asocial-choicerulethatdoesnothaveamechanismforregister-ingbothpersons’preferences,then,willviolatetheequalitycriterion.3Somepreferencesareself-defeatingMillarguedthatforaliberalstatetorespectthepreferenceofanindividualtosellhimselforherselfintoslaverywouldbeself-defeating,inthatitprecludesthepos-sibilityoffuturechoice-makingforthatindividual.Ademocracymustbesimilarlyconcernedwithsuchpreferences,sinceself-defeatingpreferencesviolatetheidealsofequality,autonomy,anddignity.AlthoughIendorsethisgeneralprohibitionontrulyself-defeatingpreferences,decidingwhichpreferencesareself-defeatingisamoredifficultmatter.Thereareemploymentcontractsthatapproximateslavery,eitherbytemporarilytakingawayautonomyfromtheworkerorbycom-pensatingworkerssopoorlyastocoercethemintoworkingmuchlongerandharderthanwouldbeconsideredreasonable,forexample.Shouldpersonsbe115\nAnnE.Cuddallowedtomakesuchcontractsonthegroundsthattheyprefersuchworktotheirotherfeasiblealternatives?Onemightsimilarlyquestionwhetheranindividual’s21choiceofvoluntaryeuthanasiaisself-defeating.InbothcasesIaminclinedtosayno,thatthesearenotself-defeatingpreferences.Butmyinclinationshereaside,thesequestionsshowthatdemocracymustbeconcernedaboutself-defeatingpref-erencesandmustmakethegeneralissueofwhatconstitutesaself-defeatingpref-erenceamatterofpublicdecision-making.Whilethiswillnotguaranteethatallandonlyself-defeatingpreferenceswillbequestioned,bymakingthegeneralissueofwhatconstitutesaself-defeatingpreference(ratherthanparticularpreferencesastheyarise)amatterofdeliberation,areasonablejudgmentaboutthematterismorelikelytocomeabout.4SomepreferencesareimmoralSomepeoplehavepreferencesfordiscriminationanddomination.Theypreferthattheirsocialgroupberegardedasbetterthanothers,thattheirsocialgrouphaveunfairadvantagesinthecompetitionforsocialresources.Theymightarguethattheirsocialgroupisworthyordeservingofadvantages.Becausetheyaresoclearlyself-interested,suchclaimsmustbeconsideredseriouslybiased.TheRawlsiandif-ferenceprinciple,whichallowsinequalitiesonlywhentheyaretotheadvantageoftheleastwelloff,maybetheappropriatetestforsuchclaims.Ingeneral,though,respectingpreferencesfordiscriminationanddominationviolatesthecriteriaofequality,dignity,anddiversity.5SomepreferencesareilliberalFinallytherearepreferencesthatoughtnottoberespectedbecausetheyinterfereunnecessarilyorunjustlywithotherpersons’liberty.Illiberalormeddlingprefer-ences,whicharepreferencesaboutsomeoneelse’stastesandlifestyle,deriveeitherfromanaestheticorethicaldisagreement,orfromdifferingmetaphysicalorreli-giousconceptionsofthegood.Meddlingpreferencesdenyotherstherighttolivetheirlivesastheyseefit,asfarasthosemattersthataffectprimarilythemselvesareconcerned.Whenforceduponpersonswhodisagree,suchpreferencesviolatethecriteriaofrationality,equality,anddiversity.Evenmoreseriousarethoseprefer-encesthatareformedonthebasisofsomemetaphysicalorreligiousbeliefthatisnotcommonlysharedinthesociety.Forexample,consideranindividual’spref-erencethatnoonehaveaccesstoabortionbecausehebelievesthatthefetusisapersonfromthemomentofconception.Inordertoreceivesupport,suchabeliefhastobebasedoneitherametaphysicalorareligiousviewofpersonhoodthatiseithersharedcommonlyorderivablefromcommonlysharedpremises.Rawlsarguesthatonlypreferencesbasedonpublicreasons,bywhichhemeansreasonsthat“eachcouldreasonablyexpectthatothersmightendorseasconsistentwith116\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheory22theirfreedomandequality,”oughttobeusedforvotinginaliberaldemocracy.Ultimatelythereasonforsolimitingtheappealtopreferenceorto“thewholetruth,”astheadherentsofthecomprehensivedoctrinesseeit,isthatnotdoingsowillviolatetheidealsofautonomyandequalityfromwhichdemocracyderives23itslegitimacy.Asocialdecision-makingprocedurethattakesthesepreferencesasinputsviolatesthecriteriaofequality,autonomy,dignity,anddiversity.Canwehaveademocraticdecisionprocedurethattakesasitsinputsindividuals’preferences,butscreensouttheproblematicpreferencestothedegreenecessarytoupholdwhatIhavebeencallingthejustificatorycriteriaofdemocracy?BeforeItrytoanswerthisquestion,weshouldexamineargumentsthatattempttopre-emptthisquestion,suggestingthatdemocracydoesnotoroughtnotuseindi-vidualpreferencesasthedeterminantsofsocialdecisions,atall.ShouldIndividualPreferenceDetermineSocialDecisions?DavidEstlund(1990)claimsthatdemocraticvotingisnotproperlyconceivedasanexpressionof(self-)interestbutratherasanexpressionofcommoninterest.SinceIamgoingtoarguethatindividualpreferencedoesindeedplayacrucialroleindeterminingdemocraticdecisions,itisimportanttocriticallyevaluatethisargument.Hisargumentproceedsasfollows.Hesetsoutthreeconditionsondemocraticvoting:aggregability–democraticsocialchoicesmustbedetermined24bythecumulativeimpactofmultipleimpacts;advocacy–democraticinputsmustbefororagainstcertainchoices,asdistinctfrombeingjustopinionsthatsome-2526thingisthecase;activity–democraticinputsmustbeacts.Hethenarguesthatpreference,whetherunderstoodastheexpressionofdesires,interest,ordisposi-tionstoact,cannotmeetallthreeconditions.First,preferencesmustbereportsofpreferencesinordertobeacts.Butiftheyarereportsof“myinterests(desires/dispositions)”thentheyarenotaggregablebecauseofwhathecallsthe“indexicalproblem.”Inreportingmydesire(“Ipreferxtoy”=Aprefersxtoy)Iamreportingonsomethingdifferentfromwhatyouarereportingonwhenyouvote(“Ipreferytox”=Bprefersytox).But,Estlundargues,eachvoteisaboutsomethingdifferent,andinparticularnotaboutwhatsocietyprefers.Thispointiseitherobtuseorquestion-begging,however.Ifwetake“society”asmajorityruledoes,tobethesumoftheindividuals,thenmajorityrulesaystakethesumofthevotesovertheindividualsbytakingeachindividual’spreferenceasacom-ponentofthatpreference.Soinasocietyofthreemembers,A,B,andC,wemighthave:AprefersxtoyandBprefersytoxandCprefersxtoymeans(bytheruleofmajorityrule)AandBandCpreferxtoy(byavoteof2to1).Thatistosay,majorityrulejustistheaggregationruleforturningindividualvotesintosocialpreferences.Thefactthateachindividualisreportingonadifferentfactisjustwhatisrequiredonthisconceptionofmajorityrule.117\nAnnE.CuddEstlundnextarguesthatunderstandingvotingasanexpressionofcommoninterestmeetsallthreeconditions.Thisclaimisinsufficienttoshowthatvotingoughttobeforthecommoninterestwhenthatconflictswithindividualprefer-ence.By“statementsofcommoninterest”Estlundmeansastatementthatsome-thingisorisnotintheinterestofthegroupthatincludesthespeaker.Nowwecanunderstandmajorityruleeitherasconstitutiveofcommoninterest,orasthemethodbywhichthecommoninterestisdiscovered.Theformerinterpretationseemsparticularlyill-suitedtoEstlund’sproject,andbettersuitedtomyinter-pretationofmajorityruleasaggregationrule.Thelatterinterpretationiseitherirrationalorincoherent,Isuggest,ifindividualsarenotvotingfortheirprefer-ences.Thereseemtobetwoalternativesforgeneralizingthecharacterofthecommoninterestthattheyareexpressing:eithertheaggregationofindividualpref-erences(whichEstlundhasrejectedforformalreasonsthatIeschewedabove),orsomeopinionofthecommoninterestthatisdifferentfrom“mere”individualpreference.Supposethattheyarevotingforwhattheythinkotherswant,thentheyarevotingothers’preferences.Butthereisnoreasoningeneralforthemtothinkthatothers’preferencesarerationallyormorallymorerelevantthantheirown,soitisirrational.Supposethenthattheyarevotingforwhattheythinkotherswillthinkisthecommoninterest,theniftheyarenotvotingothers’interestsandarenotsupposingthatothersarevotingothers’interests,thentheyarevotingforwhattheythinkwillarisewheneveryonevotesforwhat?Thereseemsnogeneraldescriptionofthecontentthattheyarevotingfor,ifnottheirownorothers’pref-erences.So,ifEstlundistomakeouthisargumentinfavorofvotingasanex-pressionofcommoninterest,hewillhavetoofferageneralcharacterizationofcommoninterest.Letmediscusstwopossiblewaysofgeneratingageneralaccountofcommoninterestthatarenotimmediatelyequivalenttotheaggregationofindividualpref-erences.Thecommoninterestmightcomefromacommitmenttoasharedgoalamongmembersofasocialgroup,orfrombeliefsaboutwhatsocietyoughttodo,relativetosomeobjectiveaccountofwhatoughttobedone.AmartyaSen(1977)arguedagainstwhathetooktobetheblinduseoftheconceptofprefer-encebyeconomists.Heclaimsthatindividualpreferenceneglectsotherim-portantmotivationstoactionthatcannotbereducedtomerepreference.Forexample,moral,political,religious,orpersonalcommitmentsmightmotivatesomeonetoactagainstherinterest,andhenceherpreferences,withtheresultthatherindividualwelfarewillnotbefurtheredbyheraction.Amothermightprefertoseehersonacquittedofmurdercharges,butfeelcompelledbyhercommit-menttojusticetotestifyagainsthim.Senwrites:“commitmentdoesinvolve,in27averyrealsense,counterpreferentialchoice,”andhegoeson,“itdrivesawedge28betweenpersonalchoiceandpersonalwelfare.”Senarguessimplythatonemightchoosetoactcontrarytoone’spreferences,becauseofsomecommitmentonehastosomethingorsomeoneelse.ElizabethAnderson(forthcoming)usesSen’scon-ceptionofcommitmenttoderiveanotionofrationalitybasedoncommitmenttoasharedgoal.Onthisconception,personsfindthemselvessharinggoals(whether118\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheoryforashort-termoralong-termproject)withothers,andcometoseethemselvesasjointlycommittedtoactingtogether.Actingtogetherasasingleagentrequiresthemtopursueajointstrategyaimedatreachingthatgoal.Theadoptionofajointstrategythenallowsthemtomaximizetheoverallwell-beingofthegroup.However,Andersonarguesthatpersonsneednotsetoutwithasharedgoalinmind.Rather,shearguesthatitispartofthelogicofpersonalidentityformationtoidentifywithagroup,andthatidentifyingwithagroupmeanscommittingour-selvestoactingonajointstrategy.Tobeaperson,onthisview,istoseekoutgroupmembershipandtherebyfindoneselfwithcommitmentstosharedgoals.Informulatingtheirjointstrategy,Andersonsupposesthatgroupmemberswillaskthemselves,“Whatreasonsdowehavetoact?”andtheoutcomewillbeapolicythatisuniversalizeable,atleastintheuniverseofthegroup.Onthisviewvotingisrationalbecauseitispartofbeingamemberofademoc-racytovote,thatis,partofthejointstrategyofthedemos.Thecontentofindi-viduals’voteswillbedeterminedbytheirsharedcommitmentswiththegroupsbywhichtheyidentifythemselves.Thereisnogeneralwayofpredictingwhatgroupswillformorwhatgoalsthegroupswilldevelop.Noristhereageneralwayofpredictingwhichgroupmembershipwillgovernanindividual’svote.Sincesomegroupswithwhichindividualsidentifyareanti-democraticormorallyorsociallysuspect,therationalityofthejointstrategyitselfdoesnottestifyinitsfavor.Ifindthisviewofrationalityattractive,butitisopentocriticismasanalter-nativetotheaggregated-individual-preferencetheoryofdemocracy.Itreliesonaclaimabouthumanpsychology:thatpersonsnotonlyseekoutgroupmember-ship,butputasideself-interestoncetheyidentifywithagroup.Althoughtheclaimdoesnotringentirelyfalse,itisclearlyoftenfalse.Eveniftheyderivevaluefromtheirgroupmembership,suchpersonsopenthemselvestobeingtakenadvantageof,andthusitisnotinstrumentallyrationaltowhollyidentifywiththegroup.Andersonmightrespondthatpersonsdonotandshouldnotentirelylosethem-selvesinthegroupforjustthisreason.Butkeepingthegroupatarm’slengthbynotwhollyidentifyingwithitsuggeststhatwhenitisintheperson’sself-interesttodefectfromthegroup,shecanandwilldoso.Inthatcase,thewholeargu-menttakesonaninstrumental-rationalitycast.Thenitcanbearguedthatinfactitisamatterofself-interestedpreferencethatleadsonetoidentifywiththegroupandplayone’spartinthejointstrategy.Commoninterest,onthisaccount,wouldturnouttobegroundedinindividualpreferenceafterall.ThesecondpossibilityforfillingouttheaccountofcommoninterestisSusanHurley’s(1989)“cognitivetheory”ofdemocracy,inwhichcitizensvoteaccord-ingtotheirbeliefsaboutwhatshouldbedoneallthingsconsidered,ratherthantheirpreferences.Thecognitivetheorydeniesboththatcitizensvotefortheirpref-erencesratherthantheirbeliefsaboutwhatshouldbedoneallthingsconsidered,andtheviewsofpoliticalliberalismthatpoliticaldecisionsoughttobeindepen-dentofparticularconceptionsofthegood.Instead,Hurleyclaimsthatthegoalofgovernmentistodeliberatetofindthetruthaboutwhatshouldbedone,not119\nAnnE.Cuddmerelytosatisfythepreferencesofthemajority.Thecognitivetheorythusdemandsthatthoseinauthorityshouldbedividedinawaythatwillpreventthemfromrelyingon“debunked”beliefs,i.e.,beliefsthatareformedthroughsomenon-rationalprocesssuchasself-deceptionorbribery.Furthermore,thecognitivetheorydemandsthattheproceduresandinstitutionsfosterthecapacityfordelib-erationandformationofundebunkedbeliefssothatthetruthismorelikelytobeplaintothevoters.Relyingonvoterstovoteaccordingtotheirbeliefsaboutwhatoughttobedoneratherthanwhattheywanttobedonerunsintotheproblemofincentivecompatibility,theproblemthatindividuals’self-interestwillconflictwithwhattheyoughttodo,atleastaccordingtothistheory.Whatwouldmotivatethevoterstovotethisway,andwhatpreventssomefromcheating?Hurleydefersthisproblemtothedesignofinstitutionsandagenda-setting.Theideaisthatthesocialinsti-tutions,includingthevotingprocedureitself,aretobesodesignedthatthereisapositivemotivationtovoteaccordingtoone’sbeliefs,comingfromthedesiretoparticipateinthecollectiveactionofsocialself-determination.However,thequestionofwhetheritisrationaltovoteaccordingtoone’sbeliefsaboutwhatthestateoughttodoratherthanwhatoneprefersthestatetodoisnoteasilysepa-ratedfromthequestionoftheformthattheseinstitutionswillultimatelytake.Forifitwereirrationaltovoteaccordingtoone’sbeliefs,thenitmaywellbeirra-tionaltoagreetotheinstitutionsthatmotivateonetovoteaccordingtoone’sbeliefs.Whymightitbeirrationaltoagreetosuchinstitutions?Preciselybecausetheywouldrecommendtopeopletovoteinwaysthatviolateone’sinterests.Andtoagreetothatonewouldhavetothinkthatothers’interestsaremorallyorratio-nallymorerelevantthanone’sown.Butwhyshouldoneassenttothatinademoc-racywhereeveryone,notjustsomerecognizableexperts,isgoingtohaveasay?ForthesamereasonsthatIrejectedEstlund’sappealtocommoninterest,Iwouldrejectthisappealtobeliefsaboutwhatoughttobedone,insofarasthatiscon-struedassomethingdifferentfromone’spreferences.OnefinalargumentagainsttheappealtoindividualpreferencethatIwillcon-siderisJoshuaCohen’s(1989)argumentthatthepointofdemocracyistomakeadecisionthroughthedeliberationofmembers,notjustadecisionviaindividualpreferences.Whatmakesdemocracystableandmorallyjustifiable,heargues,isnotitsappealtoindividualpreferencesbutratherthatitpromotestheidealofrational,informeddeliberationamongitsmembers.Thedeliberative-democracyinterpretationhasbecomequiteinfluential,andamongitsadherentsIwouldincludeRawls(especiallytheRawlsofPoliticalLiberalism),Habermas,CarolPateman,MarthaNussbaum,CassSunstein,andPhilipPettit,amongothers.Elster(1997)distinguishesusefullybetweentwotypesofdeliberativedemocracy.Oneisthe“Habermasian”(equally,theRawlsian)theory,wherethegoalofpol-iticsisrationalagreement,ratherthanpoliticalcompromise,andthedecisivepolit-icalactisengaginginpublicdebatewiththegoalofconsensus.TheotheriswhatElstercalls“participatorydemocracy,”wherethegoalistransformationandedu-cationofparticipants,andheassociatesitwithMillandPateman(andIwould120\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheoryaddNussbaum).Thesethreetheoristsarefeminists,oneofwhosemainconcernsistoprotectindividualsagainsttheinfluenceoftheirownandothers’sexistadap-tivepreferences.Elsterarguesagainstthistheoryonthegroundsthatitisinher-entlyself-defeating,however.Hispointisthattheapparentgoalofparticipationinademocracyistopursueone’sintereststhroughdeliberationanddecision.Ifthatismerelyapparent,andthepointactuallyistotransformtheparticipants,theniftheybecomeinformedofthatgoaltheymaynolongerhaveanexante29incentivetoparticipate.Manypeoplewouldfinditpatronizing,afterall,tolearnthattheyareincludedinaprocesssothattheywillbechanged.ThatleavestheHabermasian(Rawlsian)theoryasthemaincompetitortoliberaldemocracy,whereliberaldemocracyhasasitsmainaimtopursuethewillofthepeoplethroughtheirexpressionsofindividualpreference,takingthosepreferencesasgiven.Mymainconcernwiththispoliticalliberalversionofdemocracyisthatindemandingconsensus,itdemandstoomuchfromadiversepopulation.Whenthereareirreconcilabledifferences,thatcomefromdeeplyheldmoralprinciples,suchasisthecaseintheabortionquestion,consensuscannotbehad.Todemanditwillinevitablybetoforgeafraudulentandunstablesimulationofconsensus.Better,inmyview,tosearchforwhatRawlstermsa“modusoperandi,”whereeachsideisrespectedforitsrighttoaposition,butnooneispressuredtogiveintothedemandforconsensusonpainofcompletepoliticalbreakdown.InthefinalsectionofthisessayIwillpresentaversionoftheliberaltheorythatIthinkwillnotfallpreytothedangerswehavediscussedinthetwoprevioussections,butwillalsoallowgreaterflexibilityandindividuallibertyinthefaceofirrecon-cilablediversity.ConclusionRecallthequestionsIaskedbeforetheprecedingsection:Canwehaveademo-craticdecisionprocedurethattakesasitsinputsindividuals’preferences,butscreensouttheproblematicpreferencestothedegreenecessarytoupholdwhatIhavebeencallingthejustificatorycriteriaofdemocracy?InthetraditionofAmericandemocracy,Iwillarguethatthereisalargelyproceduralsolution,thoughitwillhavetobeenhancedbysomesubstantialconstraintsontheinflu-enceofindividualpreference.ConsidertheargumentofJamesMadisoninhisfamousFederalistPaper#10,inwhichheaddressestheproblemoffactionsindemocracies.Madisonstatestheprobleminhispejorativedefinitionof“faction”:“anumberofcitizenswhetheramountingtoamajorityorminorityofthewholewhoareunitedandactuatedbysomecommonimpulseorpassion,orofinterest,adversetotherightsofother30citizens,ortothepermanentandaggregateinterestofthecommunity.”Theproblemisthatcitizenscanformcoalitions,orsub-groups,thathavecommonintereststhattheycan,byworkingtogether,furtherattheexpenseofinterestsof121\nAnnE.Cuddsomeoftherestofthepeopleorofthewholecommunity.Forexample,drugmanufacturerscan,usingtheirimmensemarketpowerduetotheinelasticdemandfordrugs,furthertheirownnarroweconomicinterestsattheexpenseofthehealthandwell-beingofthewholecommunity.AccordingtoMadison,therearetwopossiblewaystosolvetheproblemsoffactions.First,wecouldtrytoremovethecausesoffactions.Butthereareonlytwowaystodothis,andbothareunac-ceptable.Eitherbydisallowingthefreedomofassociationnecessarytoformcoali-tions,apossibilityhediscardsimmediatelyasabolishingthe“libertywhichis31essentialtopoliticallife,”orbymakingsureeveryonehasthesameopinion,butthisisimpossible–itisinthe“natureofman”forpeopletohavedifferentopin-ions.Theonlyotherpossibilityistocontroltheeffectsoffactions.ThisisthepurposeofthegovernmentconstructedbytheConstitution:tocreateademoc-racythatisasimmuneaspossibletothedamagesoffactions.Analogously,therearetwopossibilitiesforsolvingtheproblemsofindividualpreferences.Wecouldtrytoremovethecausesoftheproblemsofindividualpref-erences,orwecouldcontroltheireffects.Inthiscase,weneedtoemploybothstrategiesinalimitedway.Weneedtotrytoremovetheproblemsofindividualpreferences,whenthatcanbedonewithoutviolatingthelibertyessentialtopolit-icallife,andtocontroltheireffects,whentheyareproblematicbutcannotbelegitimatelyavoided.Letmebrieflyaddressthemeansbywhichthesethingscanbeaccomplishedwithinaliberaldemocraticframework.SomeofMadison’ssolutionstotheproblemoffactionsapplyhereaswell.Thedemocracyshouldbelimitedintwoways.First,itshouldbearepresentativegov-ernment,wherethepeopleelecttherepresentatives,whothenmakelegislativeandexecutivedecisions.ThisformofgovernmentwillhelptorespondbothtotheproblemsofvotingparadoxesandArrow’sTheorem,andtotheproblemofuninformedpreferences.Second,thereshouldbeasystemofliberalrightstoprotectagainstnon-autonomous,self-defeating,immoral(discriminatoryanddominating),andilliberalpreferences.Ofcourse,suchprotectionwillnotbecom-plete,butwillonlyextendtothosemattersofmostintimateconcerntotheindi-vidual.Butabalancemustbestruckbetweendemocracyandliberty,betweentheabilityofthepeopletorulethemselves(andsonotberuledbyothers),andthetyrannyofthemajorityoverminorities.Wherethatbalanceisstruckdependson32howmuchindividuallibertyistobeprotectedbythesystemofrights.Themostpervasiveandtrenchantproblemwiththecontentsofindividualpref-erencesistheproblemofadaptiveandhabituatedpreferences,specificallythattheytendtoreinforceoppression.Liberalrights,then,shouldbefashionedwithaneyetolimitingtheoppressiveeffectsofadaptiveandhabituatedpreferencesonothers.TheproperprincipleforfashioningliberalrightsmightbesomethinglikethisMill-inspiredprinciple:Theonlyjustificationthestatehasfordirectlycoercingindividualstoactcontrarytotheirpreferencesistopreventoppression.Rightscanonlyprotectpersonssofar,however.Inaliberaldemocracywherecitizensvotetheirpreferences,thereareboundtobeadditionaleffectsfromoppressivepreferences.Forexample,ifindividualsvoteonthebasisofadaptive122\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheorypreferencesforencouragingwomentomaintaintraditionalroles,women’soppres-sionwillbefurtherreinforced,eveniftheirrightsarenotviolated.Butthisproblemseemstomenottobeuniquetoliberaldemocracy,buttobecommontoallformsofdemocracy.ItistheMadisonianproblemoffactions,withtheparticulartwistthatthefactionsareformedbypersonswithsimilaroppressive,adaptivepreferences.Inadditiontoliberalrights,then,therewillneedtobemech-anismstoencouragecitizenstoenvisionlifebeyondtheoppressivesocialstruc-turesinwhichtheirpreferenceshavebeenmolded.Education,freedomofconscience,publicsupportformind-expandingexperiencessuchasart,music,andleisureactivities,andpublicdeliberationamongadiverseandactivecitizenryaretheonlyhopefordemocracytoavoidtyranny.Andthealternativetodemocracyisalmostcertaintyranny.Notes1Coleman(1989),p.194.2ComparewithJulesColeman’s(1989)strategyforjustification.3Iamusingthisterm“non-tuism”inthesensethatGauthier(1986,p.87)usedit,thatis,tosaythatapreferenceorderingisnon-tuisticistosaythatitdoesnottakeaninterestintheinterestsofthosewithwhomoneisengagedinexchange.So,exceptforwhereoneisindirectcompetitionwithanother,onecantakeothers’intereststobepartofone’sown.4Anderson(forthcoming).5Ferejohn(1993);Rawls(1993);Nussbaum(2000)6Iwillignoreforthepurposesofthisessaythequestionofwhocountsasacitizen,though,asDahl(1979)pointsout,thequestionofinclusioniscloselytiedtothejus-tificationofademocraticdecisionprocedure.7Ordeshook(1986),p.56.8Others,suchasHurley(1989),havereliedonsimilarevasionsofArrowtowhichmycaveatalsowillapply.9Ofcourse,oversomedecisions,aliberalwouldargue,dictatorshipisjustwhatismorallyrequired;namely,overtheprivatedecisionsthatasystemofliberalrightsisdesignedtoguarantee.10Isay“somethinglike”because,first,therearemorethantwoplayersinvolvedhere,althoughwemightrepresentthemasonevs.alltheothers,andso,asiftherearetwoplayers.Butthiswillnotpreciselycapturethecharacterofthesituation,asJeanHampton(1987)argued,becauseofthe“stepgood”structureofvoting,asIchar-acterizeit.Thatis,thereissomegreaterbenefittoallfromhalfthepeoplevotingratherthannone,butgreaterstillfromallthepeoplevotingratherthanjusthalf–itisneithercontinuouslydependentonthenumberofvoters,norwhatHamptoncallsapurestepgood,whereeitherallornoneofthebenefitofvotingisreapedwithanygivennumberofvoters.11Iamimaginingherethefollowingthreepayoffmatrices.Firstthematrixfortheprisoner’s-dilemma-likesituationthatariseswhenonlytheindividual’scostsandben-efitsfromdecidingtheissuewithhervoteareconsidered:123\nAnnE.CuddOthersvotedon’tvote2,24,1medon’t1,43,3Second,theassurance-gamepayoffmatrixwhenreputationeffectsareintroduced,butdonotcompletelyoverwhelmtheindividual’scostsandbenefitsfromdecidingtheissuewithhervote:Othersvotedon’tvote1,13,2medon’t2,32,2Third,thepayoffmatrixwhenthereputationeffectsoverride:Othersvotedon’tvote1,12,3medon’t3,22,212Gibbard(1973),p.358.13Knowingthepreferencesoftheotherswouldnotbeenough,forthatwouldleaveopenthepossibilitythatotherswhoarealsotryingtomanipulatethevote,orwhoaresimplymakingamistakeinthevotingbooth,couldcausetheefforttomanipu-latethevotetofail.14Gibbard(1973),p.366.15Elster(1983);Sen(1995);Agarwal(1997).16IarguedinCudd(1994)thatwomenoftenfaceincentivesthroughthesocialstruc-turetochoosewaysoflifethatwillfurthertheiroppression.TheexamplethatIusedtoillustratethiswasacoupledecidingonhowtoallocateunpaidandpaidlaborbetweenthem,andIarguedthatthegenderwagegap(oranyofanumberofotherstructuralincentives)wouldmakeitrational,fromatotalhouseholdperspectiveatleast,forthewifetodotheunpaiddomesticlaborandthehusbandtodothepaidmarketlabor.But,giventheexitoptionsthatthischoicewouldgiveeachofthespouses,thewoman’spowertocontrolresourcesandoutcomesinthemarriageandinbargainingovergoodswouldbeseriouslyreduced.Hence,theoppressivecondi-tionsthatgiverisetothechoiceswouldthentendtobereinforcedbythosechoices.Yet,tomakeanoppositechoicemightrequireadegreeofpowerinthemarriagethatwasalreadyprecludedbytherelativebargainingpositionsofmenandwomen.Womenpreferhouseworkagainstthisbackgroundofoppression.17Sen(1995);Sunstein(1993).18Branscombe(1998).19Idonotmeantosuggestherethatdemocracyrequiresreligiousintolerancewheneverareligiondiscriminatesinvidiouslyagainstwomen(orethnicminorities).Atthispoint,124\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheoryIamsimplyillustratingthekindsofundemocraticpreferencedeformationsthatcanoccurundertheinfluenceofreligion.IntheendIthinkthattheonlywaytohaveajustifiabledemocraticsystemistoguaranteeasetofpersonalrightsthatwillsome-timesconflictwithdemocraticoutcomes.Althoughfreedomofreligionwillbeanimportantrighttoprotect,ademocraticsocietyoughttoexcludereligionfromthepublicsphere.Thiswillbeadelicatebalance.Thedetailsofthebalancingprocesswilldependonmanylocalandhistoricalconditions,andarebeyondthescopeofthisessay.20Weberman(1997).21IamgratefultoRobertSimonforthisexample,andforforcingmetoexamineMill’sprohibitiononself-defeatingpreferences.22Rawls(1993),p.218.23SimilarargumentsforthevirtuesofcivilityandpublicparticipationaregivenbyPettit(1998).24Estlund(1990),p.395.25Ibid.,p.396.26Ibid.,p.397.27Sen(1977),p.96.28Ibid.,p.97.29Personsfromdominatedsocialgroupsmightfinditevenworsethanpatronizing,butrathercolonizingandcoercivetobeincludedinsuchaprocess.30Madison(1961),p.78.31Ibid.,p.78.32Thequestionofwheresuchabalanceshouldbestruckis,ofcourse,anenormousissuethatIcannottakeuphere.BibliographyAgarwal,Bina(1997).“‘Bargaining’andgenderrelations:Withinandbeyondthehouse-hold.”FeministEconomics,3:1–51.Anderson,Elizabeth(forthcoming).“Unstrappingthestraitjacketof‘preference’:CommentonAmartyaSen’scontributionstoPhilosophyandEconomics.”EconomicsandPhilosophy.Aranson,Peter(1989).“Thedemocraticorderandpublicchoice.”InGeoffreyBrennanandLorenE.Lomasky(eds.),PoliticsandProcess(pp.97–148).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Baier,Kurt(1967).“Welfareandpreference.”InSidneyHook(ed.),HumanValuesandEconomicPolicy(pp.120–35).NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.Branscombe,Nyla(1998).“Thinkingaboutone’sgendergroup’sprivilegesordisadvan-tages:Consequencesforwell-beinginwomenandmen.”BritishJournalofSocialPsy-chology,37:167–84.Broome,John(1989).“Shouldsocialpreferencesbeconsistent?”EconomicsandPhiloso-phy,5:7–17.Christiano,Thomas(1993).“Socialchoiceanddemocracy.”InDavidCopp,JeanHampton,andJohnE.Roemer(eds.),TheIdeaofDemocracy(pp.173–95).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.——(1996).TheRuleoftheMany.Boulder:WestviewPress.125\nAnnE.CuddCohen,Joshua(1989).“Deliberationanddemocraticlegitimacy.”InAlanHamlinandPhilipPettit(eds.),TheGoodPolity(pp.17–34).Oxford:BlackwellPublishers.Coleman,Jules(1989).“Rationalityandthejustificationofdemocracy.”InGeoffreyBrennanandLorenE.Lomasky(eds.),PoliticsandProcess(pp.194–220).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Cudd,AnnE.(1994).“OppressionbyChoice.”JournalofSocialPhilosophy,25:22–4.——(1998).“Psychologicalexplanationsofoppression.”InCynthiaWillett(ed.),Theo-rizingMulticulturalism(pp.187–215).Malden,MA:BlackwellPublishers.Dahl,RobertA.(1979).“Proceduraldemocracy.”InP.LaslettandJ.S.Fishkin(eds.),Philosophy,PoliticsandSociety,5thSeries(pp.79–133).Oxford:BlackwellPublishers.——(1956).APrefacetoDemocraticTheory.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Elster,Jon(1997).“Themarketandtheforum:Threevarietiesofpoliticaltheory.”InRobertE.GoodinandPhilipPettit(eds.),ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(pp.128–42).Oxford:BlackwellPublishers.——(1983).SourGrapes:StudiesintheSubversionofRationality.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Estlund,David(1990).“Democracywithoutpreference.”PhilosophicalReview,99:397–423.Ferejohn,John(1993).“Mustpreferencesberespectedinademocracy?”InDavidCopp,JeanHampton,andJohnE.Roemer(eds.),TheIdeaofDemocracy(pp.231–41).NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Gauthier,David(1986).MoralsByAgreement.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Gibbard,Allan(1973).“Manipulationofvotingschemes:Ageneralresult.”Econometrica,41:587–94.Goodin,RobertE.(1993).“Democracy,preferences,andpaternalism.”PolicySciences,26:229–47.Hampton,Jean(1987).“Freeriderproblemsintheproductionofcollectivegoods.”Eco-nomicsandPhilosophy,3:245–73.Hardin,Russell(1990).“Publicchoiceversusdemocracy.”InJohnChapmanandAlanWertheimer(eds.),MinoritiesandMajorities:NomosXXXII(pp.184–203).NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.Held,David(1996).ModelsofDemocracy,2ndedn.PaloAlto:StanfordUniversityPress.Hurley,Susan(1989).NaturalReasons.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Kittay,EvaFeder(1999).Love’sLabor.NewYork:Routledge.Madison,James(1961).TheFederalistPapers.NewYork:NALPenguinInc.Nussbaum,Martha(2000).WomenandHumanDevelopment.NewYork:CambridgeUni-versityPress.Ordeshook,PeterC.(1986).GameTheoryandPoliticalTheory.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Pettit,Philip(1998).“ReworkingSandel’srepublicanism.”JournalofPhilosophy,95:73–96.Rae,DouglasW.(1969).“Decision-rulesandindividualvaluesinconstitutionalchoice.”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,63:40–56.Rawls,John(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Sen,AmartyaK.(1995).“Genderinequalityandtheoriesofjustice.”InM.NussbaumandJonathanGlover(eds.),Women,Culture,andDevelopment(pp.259–73).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.126\nPreference,Rationality,andDemocraticTheory——(1982).“Theimpossibilityofaparetianliberal.”InChoice,WelfareandMeasurement(pp.285–90).Oxford:BasilBlackwell.——(1977).“Rationalfools:Acritiqueofthebehaviouralfoundationsofeconomictheory.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,6:317–44.Sunstein,CassR.(1991).“Preferencesandpolitics.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,20:3–34.——(1993).ThePartialConstitution.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Weberman,David(1997).“Liberaldemocracy,autonomy,andideologycritique.”SocialTheoryandPractice,23:205–33.Wollheim,Richard(1962).“Aparadoxinthetheoryofdemocracy.”InP.LaslettandW.G.Runciman(eds.),Philosophy,Politics,andSociety,2ndSeries(pp.383–92).Oxford:BasilBlackwell.127\nPartIILiberalism,ItsCritics,andAlternativeApproaches\nChapter6Marx’sLegacyRichardW.MillerAttheclimaxofVolumeOneofCapital,Marxconcludeshundredsofpagesoftheoryandnarrativebydescribing“thehistoricaltendencyofcapitalistaccumu-lation”:“themassofmisery,oppression,slavery,degradationandexploitationgrows;butwiththistherealsogrowstherevoltoftheworkingclass,aclassconstantlyincreasinginnumbers,andtrained,united,andorganizedbytheverymechanismofthecapitalistprocessofproduction....Theknellofcapitalistprivatepropertysounds.Theexpropriatorsareexpropriated”([1867],p.929).Fewpeoplenowbelievethatmodernsocialdevelopmenthasthistrajectory.Andyet,Marx’sdescriptionsofmechanismsofdominationandresistanceincapitalistsocieties,fromwhichhederivedthisapocalypticvision,remainofenduringinter-esttomanywhorejectthevisionitself.ForwhatisstillplausibleinMarx’saccountofcapitalismcastsadistinctivelightonthenatureofwage-labor,freedom,democ-racy,politicallegitimacyandcommunity,andevenontheauthorityofthemoralpointofview.ThisessaywilldescribecurrentlypromisingusesofMarx’slegacytochallengeorexpandmainstreamsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,andwillsketchsomeoftheleadingcontroversiesamongthoseengagedinthisprojectofretrieval.Marx’sCapitalismSincethisprojectattemptstoextractpiecesofcurrentwisdomfromMarx’swholetheoryofcapitalistsociety,itishelpfultobeginwithasketchofthissource.InMarx’sview,societiesaremostfundamentallydistinguishedbydominantsocialrelationsofcontrolintheproductionofmaterialgoods.Thedominantformofproductionincapitalistsocietiesiswage-laborinwhichthose–theproletariat–whocontrolnosignificantmeansofproductionselltheuseoftheirlaborpowertothose–thebourgeoisie–whocontrolthemeansofproductionthattheywork1andtheproceedsfromthesaleofwhattheyproduce.131\nRichardW.MillerForreasonsthatpartlyderivefromAdamSmith’sdiscussionofwage-determination,Marxbelievesthatproletariansineverycapitalistsocietybargainataseveredisadvantagewhenthey“selltheirlivespiecemeal”inthelabormarket.Typically,whenaproletarianseeksemploymentfromacapitalistfirm,thefirmhassubstantialfundsinreservewhiletheapplicanthasnosubstantialsavings,andthefirmhaslessofaninterestinhiringthisparticularapplicantthanthejob-seekerhasinlandingajobnow.Sothefirmisunderlesspressuretomakeadeal.Becausefirmsinatypicallocallabormarketarebothunderlesspressureandvastlylessnumerousthantheirpotentialemployees,theyareinabetterpositiontocollab-orate(usuallytacitly)inresistingincreasedwagesthanproletariansareinresistingdecreases.Becauseofthedifferentrelationshipsofemploymentchangeandinvest-mentchangetopersonallife,“Ifyoudon’tlikeithere,trytogetajobelsewhere”threatensinawaythat“Ifyoudon’tlikeourtermsforworking,investelsewhere”doesnot.Thebourgeoisiecanrespondtolowunemploymentwithlabor-savingdevices,whileproletarianscannotusetechnologytoreducetheirneedforemploy-ment.Fortheseandotherreasons,ifpeopleadvancethemselvessolelythroughcapitalisteconomictransactions,Marxthinksthatthetypicaloutcomeofthelabormarketwouldbeawagenohigherthanwhatcapitalistsrequire–awagethatkeepsworkersalive,coverscostsoftraining,andmakesitpossibleforworkerstoraisechildrentoserveasfuturegristforthecapitalistmill.AccordingtoonecaricatureofMarx,hethoughtanironlawofreductiontothisphysicalminimumwasirresistible,overthelongrun,unlesscapitalismwasoverthrown.Infact,atleastinhispost-1848writings,Marxstatesthatworkerscanoftenresistthis“tendencyofthings”([1865],p.228)andmaintainthevalueoftheirlabor-powerthroughnonrevolutionarycollectiveactiontranscend-ingmarketactivity,forexample,byresortingtotrades-unionmilitancyandengag-inginpoliticalactivityleadingtoeconomicreforms.AccordingtoMarx’slabortheoryofvalue,thevalueofthelabor-powerusedinaworkingdayisthelabortime,usingcurrentlytypicaltechniques,neededtoproducethecommoditiesboughtwithaday’swagethatsustainsthecurrentproletarianstandardofliving.Soconstancyinvalueandincreasingproductivityentailanincreaseinthecom-moditiesthatproletariansstandardlyconsume.Nonetheless,workers’wageswillnot,overthelongrun,exceedworkers’needs,becauseneedsgrowaspeopleperceivegrowthinwhattheirsocietycanprovide.“[L]etapalacearisebesidethelittlehouse,anditshrinksfromalittlehousetoahut”([1847],p.84).Becauseoftheenduringadvantagesofthebourgeoisie,Marxdoesnotthinkthatproletarianswillbeabletoreducetheeconomy-wideratioofsurplus-value,i.e.,thelaborvalueofcapitalists’consumption-goodsandmeansofeconomicexpansion,tothevalueoflabor-power.Atbest,theywillmaintaintheirproportionateshareoftechnologicalimprovements,barelykeepingpacewiththegrowthoftheirneeds,determinedby“comparisonwiththestateofdevelopmentofsocietyingeneral”(ibid.,p.85).InMarx’sview,theconflictbetweenthebourgeoisieandtheproletariatshapespoliticalandculturalinstitutions,aswellastheeconomy:themostsociallyimpor-132\nMarx’sLegacytantfeaturesofrespectablepoliticalandculturalinstitutionsareduetotheirroleinadvancingtheinterestsofthebourgeoisie,despitethefrequentconflictofthoseinterestswiththoseofthevastmajority.Inthissense,thebourgeoisieis“therulingclass”politicallyandintherealmofideas.YetMarxevadesothercaricaturesbyavoidingspeculationsaboutvastconspiraciesinfavorofappealstosuchbanalsourcesofbourgeoisinfluenceasgovernments’needtofinancethenationaldebt.Oneaspectoftheprojectofretrieval,then,istoshowhowMarx’ssoberspecificdescriptionsofthemechanismsofbourgeoisinfluencecouldsupporttheflam-boyantgeneralmetaphorsofclassrule.If,undercapitalism,nonrevolutionaryactivitycanpreservethevalueoflabor-power,whilethestateandideologicalinstitutionsareinstrumentsofclassrule,won’tcapitalismlastforever?Marx,ofcourse,thinksnot:theprocessesconsti-tutinganycapitalistsocietyinevitablygiverisetoitsdestruction,throughtheincreasingmiseryandincreasingunitydescribedintheapocalypticpassagefromCapital.Capitalistfirmsplanproductiononaneverlargerscale,mobilizeincreas-inglycapital-intensivetechnology,andfindlessandlesspre-capitalistterritorytoexploit,copingwithconsequentobstaclestosuccessfulexpansionintheabsenceofacentralplanandinthefaceofanincreasinglyknowledgeableandcoordinatedworkers’movement.Asaresult,workersarevictimizedbyincreasingandincreas-inglyviolentinstability–deepeningindustrialdepressions,warsofmountingsever-ity,andtheabandonmentofparliamentarydemocracyforunconstrainedandbrutalrepression.Meanwhile,theadvancesineducationandcommunicationthatcapitalistproductionrequires,andcollectiveresistancethattheburdensofcapi-talistlaborpromote,createaproletariatthatisawareofcommonclassinterests,preparedbyagrowinghistoryofreciprocalaidtomaketheindividualsacrificesrequiredforsuccessfulrevolution,andcapableofefficientdemocraticcontrolofamoderneconomy.Inoneoranothercrisis,capitalismisreplacedbyworkers’controlofproduction:atfirst,throughaworkers’state,mobilizingindividualeco-nomicincentives,then,whenthepsychologicalresiduesofcapitalistlifehavedwin-dledand“allthespringsofcooperativewealthflowmoreabundantly”([1875],p.325),throughanoncoercivecoordinativeapparatusimplementingageneralwillingnesstoworkaccordingtoabilityandprovideaccordingtoneed.Injustifyingthisvision,Marxoftenshowsawarenessofcapitalistrealitiestowhichmostofhislearnedcontemporarieswereblind.Buttheevidenceyieldedbythetwentiethcenturymadethisahighlyimplausibleconceptionofthetrajectoryofmodernsociety.ShouldMarx,then,betreatedasashrewdobserverofhistime,withsomeattitudesandobservationsthatarestillofinterest–anineteenth-centurysocialobserverofthelimitedstatureofRuskinandCarlyle,whodi-sastrouslysucceeded,wheretheyfortunatelyfailed,ininspiringsuccessfulrevolutions?Orisheasocialtheoristwhosefalsehoodsaremixedwithgeneralinsightsofenduringsystematicimportance–allthemoreimportantnow,becausetheyshedlightonwhatcapitalisttriumphalismobscures?133\nRichardW.MillerExploitationOnesourceofhopethatMarx’slegacymighthavethislargerimportanceishisinsistencethatcapitalistwage-laborisaburdenforreasonsthatareindependentofthesufferingdescribedinhisgrimmestindictments.Forexample,inhislastmajorwork,acritiqueofthe1875GothaPrograminauguratingtheSocialistWorkers’PartyofGermany,Marxcondemnsas“trulyoutrageous”itsappealtoanironlawthatwagesundercapitalismtendtodeclinetotheminimumcom-patiblewithphysicalsurvival:“thesystemofwagelaborisasystemofslavery...whethertheworkerreceivesbetterorworsepayment”([1875],p.329).Becausewearestillinaneraofproductionbywage-labor,thoughnotinaneraofmountingproletarianmisery,suchpassageshaveexcitedmuchinterest.“Exploitation,”awordthatMarxappliestocapitalistwage-laborassuch,hasbecomethestandardtermforposingthecentralquestioninthisprojectofretrieval,“Whatisitaboutcapitalistwage-laborthatmakesitaformofexploita-tion?”AfterexaminingresponsesthatdonotappealtoMarx’sothercelebratedindictmentofcapitalistwage-labor,asalienated,Iwillconsiderthevirtuesofinte-gratingthesetwopartsofMarx’slegacy.Atacertainabstractyetsuperficiallevel,itisclearenoughwhyMarxtookcap-italistwage-labortobeexploitive.Hethoughtthatcapitaliststookadvantageoftheinferiorbargainingpowerofproletariansinawaythatisobjectionable.ButausefullegacyofMarx’sdiscussionwillconsistofaspecificandplausibledescrip-tionofthenatureoftheobjection.EventhoughMarxthinksthatcapitalistwage-laborsometimes,initially,hasa“historicaljustification”byreasonofitsexpansionofproductivepowers,cooperativetendenciesandindividualprerogatives,hethinksthatotherreasonsforobjectingtothecapitalistwage-laborsystem,justi-fyingthelabel“exploitation,”arealwayspartofthesystem.Whatcouldtheseinherentreasonsbe?Suchtermsas“subjugation,”“force,”and“slavery”pervadeMarx’sdescrip-tionsofthewage-laborsystem,andeveryoneagreesthattheyindicateanecessaryelementinitsindictmentasexploitive.Ifsomeonewhoisdelightedtoplaybas-ketballtwiceaweekfornothingdecidestoexpandhispurchasesofluxuriesbyacceptingalocalpromoter’soffertoplayforsomuchpergame,thetransactionhardlyseemsexploitive.Itistoounforced.ButMarx’sproletariansarenotliter-allyslaves.Nothingforcesthemtoworkforonecapitalistratherthananother,andnopersonforcesthemtoworkatall.Whyistheirengagementinwage-laborforced?Inhisdiscussionsoftheforcedcharacterofthesystemoffreelycontractedlabor,Marxsaysthataproletarianisforcedtoworkforthecapitalistclass,i.e.,foronecapitalistorother,thoughnotforanyparticularcapitalist.Sheisforcedtodosobyhercircumstancesinthecapitalistlabormarket,eventhoughnopersonorgroupforceshertoengageinwage-labor.Admittedly,iftheconstrainingcircum-stancesentirelyderivedfromunluckydealingswithnature,theymightgenerate134\nMarx’sLegacynoobjectiontothesocialorder.Buttheabsenceofcontrolovermeansofpro-ductiononthepartofthevastmajoritywascreatedandissustainedbycoerciveacts.Inblazingnarratives,Marxdescribestheroleofviolentdispossession,impe-rialconquestandrepressioninthehistoricalprocesswhichultimatelymadesuchcircumstancesthetypicalworker’sfate.Moreimportantly,healsoinsiststhatnon-violentcapitalistcompetition,startingwithasituationofequalpossession,wouldproduceanalogouscircumstancesovertime,throughtheclass-differentiationofwinnersandlosersandtheirdescendants.Theforcedcharacterofcapitalistwage-laboressentiallydependsonthecurrent,politicallyenforcedrulesofself-advancementandthelimitedalternativestowage-laborthattheyyield.Ifproletarians’onlyalternativetowage-laborwerestarvation,fewwoulddenythatproletariansareforcedbytheircircumstancestoselltheuseoftheirlabor-power.Butthiscircumstanceisnotessentialtocapitalistexploitation.Despitehisflamboyantresortto“workorstarve”scenarios,MarxmusthavebeenawarethattheruralfolkflockingtothenewfactoriesofthePrussianRhineland,inhisyouth,wereoftenescapingaphysicallytenablebututterlydrearyexistenceaspoorpeasants.Ontheotherhand,itwouldhardlydotocharacterizethechoiceofwage-laborasforcedjustbecauseitisrationallypreferabletothealternatives(cf.thebasket-ballplayer).Theotheralternatives,inaforcedchoiceofwage-labor,mustbe,notjustrationallydispreferred,butsufficientlybad,posingachoicethatonewouldprefernottocontemplate,eventhoughonemighthaveto,inordertoavoidafatethatisevenworse.Unlikethebasketballplayer,typicalproletarians,inMarx’sview,havenorealchoicebecauseofthebadnessofthealternativestowage-labor.Liketheprospectofsloggingthroughdeepmudthatforcesahikertotaketheotherforkintheroad,thisbadnesscanfallfarshortofphysicalextinction.Onceforceisassociatedwiththeunacceptabilityofalternativestowage-labor,thosewhoseekacurrentlyproductivelegacyinMarxneedtoaskwhetherthealternativesreallyaresocircumscribed.Forexample,proudownersofthrivingsmallbusinessessometimesstartedoutasproletarians,gettingwheretheyarebyworkinglonghoursforlittleinitialrewardinthefaceoflargerisksoffailure.Areworkersforcedintowage-laborifthisescapeisavailable?Cohen(1983)arguesthatevenifeachindividualproletarianisfreeforthisreason,proletariansasaclassareunfree:nolargeproportioncouldactuallyescapebythisroute,sincethecon-sequentunderminingofcapitalistproductionwouldunderminesmallproprietors,whodependonitsflourishing.Othershaveinsistedthattherisksandburdensoftheescaperoutesavailabletoanyindividualproletarianwhosesituationisatalltypicalmakethemfitforamenuofalternativesconstitutingforcedchoice.Also,some(forexample,Reiman,1987)takethetimerequiredforexittobecompatiblewithanascriptionofforcedchoiceinthemeantime.Anyofthesespecificationsoftheforcednatureofwage-laborcould,inprinci-ple,bepartofacelebrationofwage-labor,illuminatingitsvirtuesbycontrastwiththebadalternatives.Sootheringredientsofthe“exploitation”chargemustbe135\nRichardW.Millercharacterizationsofwhatproletariansactuallychoose.Ofcourse,itisimportantthatcapitalistsbenefitfromthecircumstancesforcingproletarianstosellthemtheuseoftheirlabor-power.Exploitationinvolvesderivingabenefitfromsomeoneonaccountofaweakness(asWood,1995,emphasizes).Butanotheringredientseemstoberequired.Afterall,dentistsbenefitfromothers’beingforcedbytoothachestoseektheiraid.Yetwedonottakethem,onthisground,toexploittheirpatientsortheirpatients’suffering(cf.ibid.,p.136).Thenatureofthismissingingredient,theobjectionablefeatureofthewayinwhichbargainingweak-nessforcesproletarianstoworkontermsthatbenefitcapitalists,isthecentralcon-troversyoverMarxianexploitation(acontroversymuchinvigoratedbyRoemer’sthesis(e.g.,inRoemer,1985)thatexploitationdoesnotinfactmeritnormativeinterestfromMarxists).“Unpaid”laborAccordingtosome,theneededingredient,inadditiontocapitalistbenefitfromworkers’bargainingweakness,isprovidedbyMarx’scharacterizationofthebenefititself.Acapitalistfirmwillnotlastforlongunlessthewagepaidforaworkingdayisworthlessthanwhataworkeraddstooutputinaworkingday.Marxoftencharacterizestheworkingdayremainingaftertheworkerproducestheequivalentofherwageas“unpaid”(thoughhealsooftenconcedesthatthisusageisnotlit-erallycorrect).PerhapsMarxthoughtthatcapitalismwasexploitivebecause“itssocialstructureisorganizedsothatunpaidlaborissystematicallyforcedoutofoneclassandputintothedisposalofanother”(Reiman,1987,p.3;seealsoHolmstrom,1977).Butisthissurplus-extractionsufficient,byitself,tomakeasocialprocessexploitive?AtthestartoftheCommunistManifesto,withoutatraceofirony,Marxcelebratesaheroicerainwhichcapitalismovercomestechnologicalstagnation,geographicisolation,stultifyingconformitytotradition,andabjectfeudaldefer-ence.Thesebenefitsdependontheextractionof“unpaid”labor,whichprovidesincentivesandresourcesforcapitalistimprovementofproductivepowers.Inprin-ciple,ifnotinMarx’sviewofactualhistory,thebenefitscouldmakecapitalismthebestfeasiblesystem,onbalance,forworkersinacertainphaseofacertainsociety.Marx’squipaboutwell-paidslavesimpliesthatcapitalistwage-laborwouldstillcountasexploitation.Butunlessmoreissaidabouttheprocessofsurplus-extraction,thechargeofexploitationseemsfarfetched.Granted,ifacapitalistandaproletarianemployeearetypicaloccupantsoftheirsocialroles,theirincomeswillbequiteoutofproportiontothetimethattheyinvestineconomicactivity.But,asArneson(1981,pp.206f)andothershavenoted,suchdisproportionneednotbeabasisforcondemningarelationshipasexploitive.Ifhealthyworkersaretaxedtohelpthosewhoarephysicallyunabletowork,thefrailwillbenefitoutofproportiontotheirlabor,butthisdoesnotseemtoconstituteexploitation.Indeed,suchtransfersarecharacteristicofthepost-136\nMarx’sLegacycapitalistsocietiesthatMarxregardsasovercomingexploitation(see[1875],pp.322f,325).UnfairnessIftheproletariandisadvantagefromwhichcapitalistsbenefitisanunfaircircum-stance,thenthechargeofexploitationisapt.Andsome,forexample,Arneson(1981),havetakenthechargethattheunderlyingdifferencesincontrolofmeansofproductionareunfairtobeimplicitinMarx’scritiqueofcapitalistwage-labor.TheyarewellawarethatMarxstrenuouslyavoidstalkofunfairnessinhisindict-ments,evenmockspraiseofthesuperiorfairnessofsocialistdistributionintheGothaProgramas“ideologicalnonsense”([1875],p.325),buttheytakethesefeaturesofhiswritingstoreflectlimited,tacticalaims,ortorepresentafalseanddispensablepartofhislegacy.Evenso,Marx’savoidanceoffairness-talkinhisindictmentswouldbesignifi-cantfortheprojectofretrieval.Hethoughthecoulddescribewhatmakeswage-laborexploitivewithoutapplyingthelabel“unfair.”Thosewhothinkthatunfairnessispartofavalidchargeshouldconcedethatthismorespecificdescrip-tionwouldbehiscentralachievement.Forthem,itisadescriptionofwhatmakesthecapitalistlabormarketunfair.InequalityThedisadvantagesofproletariansareduetounequalcontrolovermeansofpro-duction.Isthiswhatmakeswage-laborexploitive,perhapsbecauseitmakesthecapitalistlabormarketunfair?Mereunequalcontroldoesnotseemsufficient.Ifarulethatthefirsttofarmaplotgetstoownitweretobenefitall,becauseoftheincentivesitprovidesforirrigationandfertilization,theresultingadvantages,duetounequalcontrol,offirst-farmersovernewcomersneednotbeexploitive.Suppose,then,thatexploitationisrestrictedtosituationsofunequalcontrolinwhichsomewouldbebetteroffinasituationofequality.Thenwelackanaccountofwhyprogressivecapitalismcanconstituteexploitationevenifequalcontrolwouldbesoinefficientthateveryoneloses.AlienatedlaborThesedifficultiesmaydictateamorethoroughappropriationofMarx’slegacy,includingthediscussionsofalienationwhichoccurthroughouthislife,eventhoughtheyaremostprominentearlyon.Marxtakesthedominationofeconomiclifebycapitalismtoalienatepeoplefromoneanotherandfromthemselves.Peoplearealienatedfromoneanother137\nRichardW.Milleraboveallbecausetheother’sneediness,whichcouldbeanobjectofpositiveconcerninavaluedrelationship,isinsteadusedasasourceoftacticaladvantage(“themeanswherebyIacquirepoweroveryou,”[1844a],p.275)orconfrontedasasourceofresistancetoone’sownaspirations.Theprimeexampleofthisestrangementisthecapitalistlabormarket,inwhichcapitalists,iftheyaretostayinbusiness,mustdowhattheycantotakeadvantageofneedsdrivingpeopletoseekemployment(theword“exploit”comesverynaturally,here),andtofindtheresponsetoworkers’demandsthatmostenhancestheirownprofits.Becausetheother’sneedsarenotthemselvesasourceofconcernyetexpressheraspirationstohumandignity,MarxcharacterizesrelationshipsthatarewhollydeterminedbytheimperativesofthemarketinaKantianway,asrelationshipsinwhichoneperson“makesuseoftheother...ashismeans”([1857–8],p.243),andthecapitalisttreats“therealproducerasameansofproduction,materialwealthasanendinitself”([1866],p.1037).Itisnaturaltocharacterizesomeoneasexploitinganother’sneedswhenshebenefitsfromthemandisonlysensitivetothemasusefulinformationinherpro-motionofherindependentinterests.Adentistwhochargesasmuchashecanfromthosedrivenbypaintoseekhisservicesandwhoavoidspreventiveadvicethatwillmakeapatientlesslucrativedoesexploithispatients’suffering.Butsome-thingmore,somethingmoreencompassing,isgoingoninthecapitalist–proletarianrelationship,whichconstitutesexploitationoftheproletarian,notjustexploitationofhisneediness.Theoutcomeisthealienationoftheworkerfromhimself.Eveniftheoutcomeoftheproletarian’sbargainingweaknessisnotalifescarcelybetterthandeathbystarvation,Marxthinksitis(alwaysoralmostalways)awork-lifethatisenduredasasacrifice,“notthesatisfactionofaneed,butameremeanstosatisfyneedsoutsideitself”([1844],p.326).Suchanexistenceisanoptionthattheworker,ifself-respecting,couldnotembraceasanexpressionofwhoheis,as“anactivationofhisownnature”([1844],p.326).Rather,hemustbedisposedtoresistitasnot“worthyandappropriatefor...[his]humannature”([1894],p.959).Inpart,Marxregardsthisneednottoidentifywithone’swork-lifeastheworker’salienationfromherself,becausework-lifeundercapitalismtakesupsomanyofaproletarian’swakinghours.Butthethesisofself-alienationalsoreflectsanassessmentofthevalueofproduction.(IfMarxthoughtthatonlyleisurewasworthyofenjoyment,hewouldhaveregardedallworkasalienated.)LikeAristotle(seeMiller,1981),Marxthinksthatthemoldingofone’senvironmentaccordingtoone’simaginativelyformulatedplans,guidedbyone’saspirations,isfundamentaltoaworthwhilehumanlife.Circumstancesthatmakesomeone’spro-ductiveactivityunworthyofherenjoymentmakeitimpossibleforherlifeasawholetobeanadequateexpressionofherhumanity.Thisverdictdoesnotdependontheproletarian’senduringthemind-numbingdrudgerydescribedinthemostheartrendingreportageinCapital.Butitdoesdependonthefeaturesofwork-lifeundercapitalismthatMarxsometimescallsthe“realsubsumptionoflaborundercapital”([1866],pp.1034f),which138\nMarx’sLegacyinevitablyresultsfromits“formalsubsumption,”thecontrolofthelabor-processbythebourgeoisie.Inpursuitofdiscipline,coordinationandefficientuseoftech-nology,capitalistfirmswillsostructureproletarianworkthatproletariansareorderedaroundinactivitiesthatdonotmeritmuchinterest,permitmuchinitia-tiveormobilizeabroadrangeofhumancapacities.Supposethatincapitalistproductionthosewithsignificantcontroloverthemeansofproductionbenefitfrombargainingdisadvantagesthatothersareforcedtoendure,towhichtheyareresponsiveastacticaladvantagestobeusedorsourcesofdiscontentwhosecostistobeminimized.Thatarelationshipischaracterizedbythisalienatedresponsetoothers’imposedweaknessdoesseemareason(whichisnottosayaconclusivereason)toobjecttoit,anddoesseemabasisforregard-ingtherelationshipasexploitive.Suppose,inaddition,thattheoutcomefortheweakerpartyisforcedacceptanceofcertaintermsforlivingthatarenotfullyworthyofahumanbeing,andthatthestrongerpartybenefitsfromtheimposi-tionoftheseterms.Thenonemightnaturallysaythatthestrongerpartyexploitstheweakerparty.SoperhapsMarx’stheoryofexploitationandhistheoryofalien-ationarecontinuous.Capitalistwage-laborisaformofexploitationbecausecap-italistsbenefit,inanalienatedway,fromsociallyimposedweaknessesinothers,benefitingfromthecapacitytoimposework-livesonthemthatalienatethose2othersfromthemselves.Many,probablymostwage-earnersinanymoderncapitalisteconomycouldseethemselvesastheexploiteesinthisportrait.Butthevastmajorityofthemthinkthatfurthergainsfromthisformofproduction,includinggainsderivedfromaddedefficiency,makesomeformofcapitalismbetterforworkingpeoplethananynon-capitalistalternative.Supposethattheyareright.Doestheviewthatcap-italistwage-laborexploitsworkersstillhaveabearingonmodernpoliticalchoice?Itdoesifonetakesseriouslytheforcedandalienatedcharacterofcapitalistexploitation.Accordingtoonefamiliarperspectiveonpoliticalchoice,governmentinter-ferencewithindividuals’effortstoretainthefullbenefitsofcapitalistself-advancementisatroublinginterferencewithfreedom,justifiable,ifatall,bytheneedtotakeaccountofothervalues,suchaseconomicequality.Butifacom-plaintofexploitationisacomplaintofbeingforcedtohaveawork-lifewithwhichonecannotself-respectfullyidentifybecauseitdoesnotenjoyablyexercisearea-sonablywiderangeofvaluablehumancapacities,thenitisacomplaintofunfree-dom.Iftaxationorrestrictionsoffreedomofcontractarefeasiblewaysofmitigatingorcompensatinginresponsetoexploitation,thenthesemeasureswilloftenexpressapropervaluingoffreedom.ToadaptanexampleofRaz’s(1986,p.374):awomanwhomustspendeighthoursadaydevotingherenergiestoevadingatigerissignificantlyunfree.IftheIslandCouncilcanhelpherbyrequir-ingsomeonetocagehispet,theyneednotbetroubledbythethoughtthatfreedomhasbeenreducedtopromoteanothergood.Inadditiontoitschallengetorestrictedunderstandingsoffreedomcharacter-isticoflibertarianpoliticalphilosophy,theMarxisttheoryofexploitationalsocasts139\nRichardW.Millerdoubtonformsofliberalegalitarianisminwhichtheultimateperspectiveofequal-ityavoidsrelianceonarankingofwaysoflife.Liberalscountequalfreedomasaspeciallyimportantaspectofequality,and,forreasonsjustnoted,thisseemstomakecomplaintsofexploitationserious,themoreseriousthegreaterthedegreeofexploitation.Thesedegreescorrespondtodifferencesinalienationduetothe“realsubsumptionoflabor”anddifferencesinthedifficultyofescaperoutesonthemenuofalternatives,aswellastodifferencesintheratioof“unpaid”to“paid”labor.Yetmitigationofthedistinctiveburdensofthosewhoseexploitationisrelativelyintensemayproduceareductionintheirnetincome,the“allpurposeresource”favoredbyliberalneutralistsintheirjudgmentsofeconomicjustice.Forexample,thistrade-offisposedbycostlyrestrictionsonprerogativestofireemployeesandbypublicfundingofaccesstoculturalresourcesthatfacilitatetheenjoymentofabroadrangeofcapacitiesbutdonotaddtoincome.Atsuchjunc-tures,itishardtoseehowneutralityamongwaysoflifecanbeobservedifcom-plaintsofexploitationaregivenappropriateweight.Butitisalsohardtoseehowthedismissalofthesecomplaintsinthenameofneutralitycouldbereconciledwiththeliberalvaluationoffreedom.Finally,iftheMarxistcritiqueofexploitationisvalid,theemphasisonequalityoflife-chancesincurrentliberalpoliticsaswellasliberal–egalitarianpoliticalphi-losophyisone-sided.Thefundamentalprojectofeconomicjusticeisoftenenvis-agedastheeliminationofunjustifieddisadvantagesin“startingplaces”atbirth(Rawls,1971,p.7).Certainly,thosewhoaresympathetictoMarxwillsharetheconcernwiththelowerprospectsofeconomicsuccessofthosewhoseparentsorcommunitieshavenotfaredwellincapitalistcompetition.Butsensitivitytoharmsofexploitationcansupportstrongcriticismofthestructureofeconomicsuccessandfailure,whichisindependentofinequalityinlife-chances.Suppose(probablyperimpossibile)thatareasonablyefficientcapitalistsocietycouldsoarrangeedu-cationandinitialeconomicresourcesthateveryonehasanequalinitialchanceofwindingupontop.If,nonetheless,some,inevitably,spendsignificantpartsoftheirlivesbeingseverelyexploited,thosesympathetictoMarxwilldiscernanobjectionableformofinequality.Asusual,theyextendroutinedemocraticatti-tudestowardpoliticsintotheeconomicrealm:anenduringregimeoftyrannyisnotmuchimprovedifalotterysystemgiveseveryoneanequalinitialchancetobeatyrant.TheStateandCapitalismThosewhohavelosthopeinMarx’svisionofpost-capitalistsocietywhilesympa-thizingwithhisaccountsofharmsgeneratedbycapitalismwilllooktogovern-mentactiontoreducethoseharms.SotheyneedtoassessMarx’sfurtherviewthatthebourgeoisieisthepoliticalrulingclassundercapitalism.140\nMarx’sLegacy“[T]hebourgeoisiehas...conqueredforitself,inthemodernrepresentativeState,exclusivepoliticalsway.Theexecutiveofthemodernstateisbutacom-mitteeformanagingthecommonaffairsofthebourgeoisie”([1848],p.37).“[T]heStatepowerwhichnascentmiddle-classsocietyhadcommencedtoelab-orateasameansoftheirownemancipationfromfeudalism...full-grownbour-geoissocietyhadfinallytransformedintoameansfortheenslavementoflabourbycapital”([1871],p.290).WhatcanMarxhavemeantbytheseclaims?Theyseemtoannouncefar-flungconspiraciesunitingtheleadersofpoliticsandcom-merce,yetMarxengagesinnosuchspeculation,and,indeed,makesthesecondclaimrightafternotingtheblithedisengagementofbusinesspeoplefrompoliticalactivityunderLouis-Napoleon.Threegeneralclaimsarejointlysummedupintheblazingmetaphorsofclassrule:1Governmentactionsservethelong-terminterestsofthebourgeoisieasawhole,evenifthoseinterestsconflictwiththoseoftherestofsociety.Thisisnottodenythatshiftsingovernmentpolicymaysatisfyorforestallproletariandemandswhoseexis-tenceisnotintheinterestofthebourgeoisie.Sincethebourgeoisiehaveanimpor-tant(thoughnotanall-important)interestinacquiescenceandstability,suchaccommodationmaybeessentialtotheirlong-terminterestsasawhole.Still,atleastinamaturecapitalistsociety,Marxthinksthatallshiftsinpolicythat,takeninisolation,imposesignificantcostsonthebourgeoisiefunctionasprudenttac-ticalretreatsfromdisruptionorthethreatofdisruption–prudent,thatis,fromthestandpointofthebourgeoisie.2Thisbiasininterestsservedissustainedbymechanismsthatarepartofthesocialcontextofpoliticalchoice,sufficientmechanismswhichwillexist,inoneformorother,solongascapitalismendures.Inparticular,indescribingtiesbetweengovernmentactionandbourgeoisinterestsinstableparliamentarydemocracies,Marxascribesthepatternofchoiceonthepartofsuccessfulelectedofficialstounderlyingrelationsofeconomicpowerratherthanbriberyorconspiracy.Theapprovalofbourgeois-controlledmediaisacentrallyimportantresourceforelec-toralsuccess.Electedofficialsrelyonthebourgeoisietofinancethenationaldebt.Thoseatthetopofpoliticalhierarchiesareisolatedfromthelivesandproblemsofmostpeople,anddrawnintotheculturalmilieuandinterpersonalnetworksofthoseatthetopofeconomichierarchies.(Forthisreason,MarxcelebratestheParisCommune’srestrictionofofficials’salariestonomorethanaskilledworker’swageaspartofwhatmadeit“thepoliticalformatlastdiscoveredunderwhichtoworkouttheeconomicemancipationoflabour”([1871],p.294).)Manypeopleoutsideofthebourgeoisiefalselyidentifytheirowninterestsbecauseofbourgeoiscontrolofmediaandother“meansofintellectualproduction”orbecausetheirsocialsituationspontaneouslygivesrisetofalsehopesanddistortedbeliefs,suchasthehopesleadingsmallfarmerstoalignthemselveswithbusinessintereststhatwillultimatelydestroythem,ortheretreatoftheoppressedintofaithinheavenlyredemption.141\nRichardW.Miller3Ifasocialmovementthreatenstoendthebiastowardbourgeoisinterests,theoldconnectionbetweenclassandgovernmentwillbedefendedthroughviolencewhichmobilizesresidualbourgeoispoliticalresources,violencewhichcanonlybedefeatedbyorganizedcounter-violence,rooted,inpart,innon-electoralactivity.Evenwithintheboundsofaptmetaphor,thestatewouldnotbeameansfortheenslavementoflaborifbourgeoisdominanceofsocietycouldbeendedbylegallyprotectedelectoralactivity.Marxthoughtthatabourgeoisieconfrontedwiththisprospectwouldeithersuccessfullypromotearegimeofdirectandviolentrepression,suchasLouis-Napoleon’s,or,ataminimum,supporta“pro-slaveryrebellion”againstanelectedworking-classgovernment(seeEngels’PrefacetotheEnglisheditionofCapital,volume1(Marx,[1867],p.113)).Ifthelatterregimecouldbedefended,thiswouldbebecauseofresistanceledbyproletarians,takingadvan-tageofextensiveexperienceofnon-electoralconflictsinwhichworkershadcon-3frontedcapitalistfirmsandprior,pro-capitalistregimes.Itis,toputitmildly,hardtotellwhetherreformsbenefitingworkersatdirectcosttocapitalistsarebestexplainedastheresultofsocialmechanismsmakinggovernmentactionsensitivetolong-termbourgeoisinterestsincludinginterestsinacquiescence,orastheresultoftheindependentpoweroftheexer-ciseofdemocraticrights,aprocessthatiscapableofproducingdeparturesfromthelong-terminterestsofthebourgeoisie.Intheabsenceofacompellingargumentthatthebourgeoisie(aliasbigbusiness)ismorethananexceptionallyinfluentialinterestgroup,whatcouldbethevalueofthispartofMarx’slegacy?OnecurrentlyquiteplausiblefeatureofMarx’stheoryofthecapitaliststateishisviewthattheexistenceofmechanismsinsuringthatstateactionwillbeimportantlybiasedtowardtheinterestsofthebourgeoisieisaninevitablefeatureofcapitalism.Supposethatprivatecampaigncontributionsareillegalandeveryonehasthemeanstoformpoliticalopinionsthroughintelligent,suffi-cientlyleisuredreadingofthemostinformativenonspecializedmedia.Still,managersandprofessionalsatthetopofthecapitalisteconomicdivisionoflabor,whotend,forobviousreasons,toover-identifytheinterestsofthebour-geoisiewiththeinterestsofsocietyasawhole,willhaveknowledge,skillsandnetworksofacquaintancethatmakethemespeciallylikelytoberecruitedtoposi-tionsofpoliticalpowerortoofferinfluentialadvice.Resourceallocationwillstillbedominatedbyastockmarketdrivenbythelustforreturnsofself-interestedinvestors,sothatpoliticalleadersmusttakecaretoavoidcreatinganxietyamonginvestorsabouttheirreturns.Marxandhiscriticsagreethatsuchunderlyingsourcesofbiastowardthebourgeoisiecouldnotbeeliminatedwithoutdestroyingrequirementsofreasonableefficiencyincapitalistproduction.More-over,capitalistownershipofmediagivesrisetodisproportionateinfluenceoverpublicopinion,which(evenapartfromthedangersofstultifyingdomination)per-vasivestateownershipwouldhardlyremove,givenbourgeoisinfluenceonthestate.142\nMarx’sLegacyAcommonandplausibleviewofcapitalism,whichIwillsometimescall“thepost-Marxistsynthesis,”combinesthiscoreofMarx’stheoryofthecapitaliststatewithtwootherelements.First,eveniftheconflictbetweentheinterestsofthebourgeoisieandtheinterestsofmostworkingpeopleisnotassevereasMarxsup-posed,thereareoftenseriousconflictsbetweentheinterestsofthebourgeoisieandmeasuresreducingburdensoflifeundercapitalismindesirableways,throughfeasiblereductionsinthedegreeofexploitation,unemployment,inferiorityineco-nomicopportunity,andinequalitiesthatpushminoritiestothemarginsofciviclife.Becausesuchmeasuresaddtocostsofproduction,makeworkdisciplinehardertoachieve,ormakeitharderforthoseinoralliedwiththebourgeoisietomaintaintheirpersonalwealthandstatusandpassthemontotheirchildren,thestructuralpoliticalpowerofthebourgeoisiewillseriouslylimitresponsivenesstodisadvantage.Theotherelementinthepost-Marxistsynthesisisthequitenon-Marxistviewthatsomeformofcapitalismisbetter,forall,thananyformofnon-capitalism.Thismixturehasanimportantbearingonviewsoflegitimacyandloyaltyinthemainstreamofpoliticalthought.LikethepositionsthatMarxcriticizedfromhismoreradicalperspective,theseviews(ifthepost-Marxistsynthesisisright)exag-geratetheimportanceofpurelypoliticalprocessesthroughneglectofinequalitiesofeconomicpower.Ironically,thesecriticismsaremorepowerfulbecauseoftheconcessionthatsomeformofcapitalismisbest.Tobeginwith,thepost-Marxistsynthesisisachallengetopoliticalliberalism,themostimportantexplicitaffirmation,incurrentpoliticalphilosophy,oftheprimacyofthepurelypolitical(seeRawls,1993).Accordingtopoliticalliberal-ism,citizensofademocracyshouldstrivetoresolvequestionsofbasicjustice,includingbasiceconomicjustice,throughprincipled,mutuallyattentivedelibera-tionsestablishingabroadconsensusconcerningtheproperinterpretationofpurelypoliticalliberalvalues,suchascivillibertyandequalcitizenship.Thisrestrictiontoconsensusbasedonliberalpoliticalvaluesassessedintheforumofpublicreasonisnotarbitrary,politicalliberalssay,becauseitisrequiredtoreconciletheinevitablecoercivenessofpoliticalchoicewiththemutualrespectthatcitizensowetooneanother.However,ifthepost-Marxistsynthesisisright,politicalchoiceconstrainedbypoliticalliberalismwill,inimportantcases,beincompatiblewithrespectforfellow-citizens.Supposethatthosewhoareexploitedhaveaseriouscomplaintagainstthelawsandpoliciesthatmakeexploitationsuchastheirsinevitable,themoreseriousthehigherthedegreeofexploitation.(Virtuallyallpoliticalliberalsacceptthis,astheyshould,giventheimplicationsoftheirattitudetowardcoercion.)Onecancombinerespectfortheexploitedwithinsistencethatapoliticalresponsetotheircomplaintstakeplacethroughcertainchannels,onlyifthispoliticalprocessisnotbiasedagainstthem.But,accordingtotheresidueofMarx’sruling-classthesis,theprocessofconsensusformationthroughprincipleddiscussionisbiasedagainsttheexploitedinanycapitalistsociety.If,inresponse,thepoliticalliberalproteststhattheintendedforumofpublicreasonexcludessuchsystematicdis-143\nRichardW.Millertortion,thenthethesisofthesuperiorityofsomeformofcapitalismcomesintoplay:theconstraintrestrictedtounbiasedprocessesappliestonosocietywhichoughttobepromoted.Thosewhorejectpoliticalliberalismonthesegroundscanstillinsistthatcoer-cionofthosewhoprotestoutofconscientiousadherencetoprinciplesisalwaysaseriouscost,especiallyiftheprotestisgroundedonaninterpretationofliberalvalues.Buttheywilltakesuchcoststobejustifiableinsystematicallyimportantcases.Becauseoftheirviewofthedynamicsofsocialchange,theywillbeespe-ciallyconcernedtoallowthatnon-officialsinaconstitutionaldemocracymaysometimesadvancetheirpoliticalprogramsbycoercivemeansevenasreasonablediscoursecontinues.Thesitdownstrikersofthe1930sintheUnitedStates,Canada,Swedenandelsewheredidnotwaitforaconsensusonthemeaningofequalcitizenshipandcivilandpoliticallibertiestodevelopandtosustaintheiraspirationsbyappropriatelegislation.Iftheyhadwaited,thisconsensusmightneverhaveemerged.Politicalliberalismisonespecialwayoffurtherdevelopinganassumptionaboutpoliticallegitimacythatismuchmorewidelyshared:anymorallyresponsiblecitizenshouldhelptoachieveapolitywhoselegislationoughttobeupheld,byeachcitizen,evenifsheregardsitasunwiseorunjust,becauseofthepoliticalprocessthatproduceditandtheoveralldivisionofbenefitsandburdensthatthisprocesssustains;thissupportforeachoutcomeofthewholeprocessmay,ofcourse,includeeffortstochangethelaw,buteachcitizenshouldhavegroundsforregardingitaseveryone’sdutytohelpimplementthelawuntilitischanged.Whetherornottheyarepoliticalliberals,manypoliticaltheoristsregardthisasafeasiblegoal,sothatitisatleastanopenquestionwhethercurrentsocietieshaveattainedit.Eveniftheytaketheanswertobe“no,”manyareinclinedtosupposethatcurrentdemocracieshavecomecloseenoughthatthedisobedientshould,attheveryleast,honorthepoliticalprocessasawholebydisobeyingsymbolicallyandpublicly,andwillinglysubmittingtopunishment.Buttheidealisutopianfromthestandpointofthepost-Marxistsynthesis.Theactualconsentofallwillnotbeforthcomingasabasisforthegeneraldutyofpoliticalcommitment.Inanycase,consentcanbeirrelevantbecauseofthepres-suresthatcreateit.Fortheseandotherreasons,themostlikelybasisforthedutyofpoliticalcommitmentisaconditionwhich,apartfromconsent,makesitwrongforsomeonenottoupholdtheoutcomesofacollectiveprocess.Plausibledescrip-tionsofsuchcircumstancesincorporaterequirementsoffairtreatment,asintheclaimthatitiswrongtodisobeyrulesgoverningacollectiveprocessifonehasbenefitedfromgeneralconformityandifthebenefitsandburdensoftheprocessarefairlyshared.Butatleastifthecollectiveprocessdominatesone’swholelife,astheprocessofgovernmentdoes,itisessentialthatthisfairsharinginvolveade-quateequalityinresponsivenesstoone’sneeds,interestsanddesiresascomparedtoothers’.Giventhethreatofdestructivechaos,IvantheTerrible’sautocracymayhavebeenbyfarthebestfeasibleregimefromthestandpointoftheserfs,buttheyhadnodutytoobeyallthemandatesresultingfromaprocessinwhichthey144\nMarx’sLegacycountedforsomuchlessthanothers.Similarlyforsomecitizensofanymodernstate,accordingtothepost-Marxistsynthesis:anyfeasibleanddesirablepoliticalarrangementistoosystematicallybiasedinfavorofothers’interestsforthesecit-izenstohaveacomprehensive,overridingdutytoupholditsoutcomesbecauseofthekindofpolityitis.Theymightstillconformonhumanitariangrounds,becauseofharmfulconsequencesofnonconformity,butnotbecausethenatureofthepoliticalprocessmakesdisobediencewrong.Inadditiontothesedoubtsaboutpoliticallegitimacy,Marx’slegacyyieldsacosmopolitanreassessmentofpatrioticloyalties.Marxhimselfscornfullyrejectssuchloyalties.“Theworkingmenhavenocountry.Wecannottakefromthemwhattheyhavenotgot”([1848],p.51).Initsfullextent,thisradicalcos-mopolitanismdependsonviewsofthedestructivenessofrulebythelocalbour-geoisieandoftheinternationalproletarianinterestinworldrevolutionthatnowseemoutmoded.Thepost-Marxistsynthesisdoesleavesomeroomfordutiesofspecialconcernforcompatriotsthatbindproletarians.Inamoderndemocracy–mostpost-Marxistswouldaccept–everyonebenefitsfromthegeneralpreferenceforprincipledpersuasionandsupportfordemocraticrightsandcivilliberties.Apropervaluingofthiscivicrespectcanrequirespecialloyaltytoitssource,one’sfellow-citizens,analogoustothespecialloyaltiesoffriendship.Also,ongoingactivepoliticalparticipationincapitalistdemocracyisaduty,inthepost-Marxistsyn-thesis,andthereisaspecialobligationtomitigateburdensofdisadvantagecreatedbyaprocessofpoliticalcoercioninwhichoneactivelyparticipates.Still,Marx’slegacyaddsconsiderableweighttocosmopolitanconsiderations,extendingthemfarbeyondordinaryhumanitarianconcerns,onaccountofcurrentinternationaleconomicrelations.Thecritiqueofexploitationcannotstopattheborders:becausepeopleincountrieswithhighper-capitaincomebenefitfromtheespeciallyintenseinternationalexploitationofpeopleinpoorcountries,theyhaveaspecialobligationtohelpthem.Apropervaluingofnonalienatedrelationships,inwhichothers’needsareasourceofpositiveconcern,entailsacommitmenttochangeaworldeconomyinwhichtheneedsofthoseinpoorcountriesareexploited(and,sometimes,created)assourcesoftacticaladvantageinaprocessthatisfacilitatedbyinternationalinstitutions.Finally,if(aspost-Marxiststhink)inequalitiesofbargainingpowerbasedonthemobilityofcapitalandthecapacityofcapitalistfirmstoshiftproductivetaskselsewherestilldominateworkers’lives,thegrowthofinternationaltiesamongworkersandtheiralliesisacentralmeansofreducingexploitation.MoralityandSocialInterestsInadditiontomanydiscussionsofcapitalismthathavenormativeimplications,Marxoccasionallydirectlyconfrontsgeneralmoralperspectives.Hisargumentsagainsttheseparticularperspectivesmayalsoshedlightonbrief,shocking,unar-guedgibesinwhichMarxseemstocriticizemoralityassuch.145\nRichardW.MillerEqualrightsMarx’scriticismsoflargenormativeperspectivesaretypicallyargumentsthatthisorthatconsiderationofequalityisnotdecisive.Certainly,hehasonlyscornorpityforthosewhowouldmakemereequalityofwell-beingtheoverridingsocialstandard,sothatlevelingdownwardwouldbeanadvance.Whatismoresurpris-ingistheferociousattackonappealstoequalrightsthathelaunchesinresponsetotheGothaProgram’scallfor“afairdistributionoftheproceedsoflabour,”endinginhiscondemnationofthispassageforpervertingtherealisticoutlookwhichGermansocialistworkershadgainedwith“ideologicalnonsenseaboutrightsandothertrashsocommonamongthedemocratsandFrenchsocialists”([1875],p.325).ForMarx’sownstrategicgoalsarenaturallycharacterizedintermsofrights.Forexample,inhiscritiqueoftheGothaProgram,heproposesthatthefirststageofsocialismwouldimplementanequalrightofallable-bodiedadultstogainfulemploymentandtorewardinproportiontolabortimeandskill.Atahigherstage,incommunistsociety,eachhasarighttobeprovidedforaccord-ingtohisorherneed,fromthesocialoutputtowhichallhaveadutytocon-tributeaccordingtoability.Still,Marxinsiststhateveryright“isarightofinequality”(ibid.,p.324).Heseemstohaveinmindthateveryrightdefiniteenoughtoregulatesocialcooper-ationwillfavorsomepeople’sinterestsorgoalsoverothers’inwaysthatviolatearivalprincipleofrightthatalsomeritsconsideration;nosuper-principleofequalrightisbroadandpowerfulenoughtoprovideasatisfactoryrights-basedadjudi-cationofallsuchconflictsamongsocialrights.Hisprimeexampleistheneglectoftheneedsofrelativelyfrailworkersorthosewithmanydependantsatthefirststageofsocialism,incomparisonwiththelaterstandardofprovisionaccordingtoneed.Butanalogouscomparisonsofcapitalistrightswithsocialistrightsarealsoapt(ifoutoftunewithasocialistmanifestosuchastheGothaProgram).ThefirststageofsocialismthatMarxdescribespreventsself-denyingentrepreneurialstriversfromestablishingcapitalistenterprises,andthisviolationoftherighttopeacefulself-advancementthroughvoluntaryagreementmeritsanon-question-begging4justification–onewhich(Marximplies)cannotrestonanappealtorights.UtilitarianimpartialityIndenyingthatallpoliticallyimportantconflictsamongrightscanbeadequately5adjudicatedbyappealtoafurther,deeperright,Marxagreeswithutilitarianism.YetMarx’sdiscussionsofutilitarianismdripwithcontemptforwhatheseesascrassneglectofthediversityofhumanexperiencesandrelationships.JeremyBenthamismockedas“ageniusinthewayofbourgeoisstupidity,”whotakeswhatisusefultothemodernEnglishshopkeepertobeabsolutelyuseful([1867],p.759).Reflectingthesubordinationofallrelationshipsto“theoneabstractmon-146\nMarx’sLegacyetary–commercialsystem”inmodernbourgeoissociety,utilitarianismissaidtocommitthemanifest“stupidityofmergingallthemanifoldrelationshipsofpeopleintheonerelationshipofusefulness”([1845–6],p.409).Intheseaciddiscussions(especiallyibid.,pp.409–19),Marxseemstocriticizeutilitarianismforafailuretocopewiththediversityofcompetingformsofhap-piness,whichparallelsthefailureofrights-basedmoralitytocopewithconflictsamongstandardsofequalright.Ifutilitarianismmeasuresoverallwell-beingsolelybytheextentandintensityofpleasurablefeelings,then,despiteitsclaimtoimpar-tiality,itisarbitrarilybiasedagainstmostpeople’slife-goals,whicharenotcrudelyhedonistic,andisfatedtoraterelationshipssolelybytheirpleasurablepayoffs,sothat,forexample,arelationshipgroundedonsuccessfulmutualshamelessflatteryisworthnolessthanarelationshipofmutualrespectandconcern.Ontheotherhand,aMillianproposaltoemploytherankingsofkindsofexperiencestowhichallwouldagreeiftheyhadtherelevantexperiencesmustconfrontrelationshipsbetweenformsofenjoymentandsocialsituationsthatMarxrepeatedlyempha-sizes.Differentsocialexperiencesgiverisetodifferentrankingsofcompetingformsofenjoyment,suchasthezestofcompetitionversusthewarmthofmutualsupport,pleasuresofmaterialconsumptionversuspleasuresofmateriallymodestleisure,enjoymentofthepursuitofenormousincome,withsomeprospectofsuccess,versusenjoymentofthesecurityofaguaranteedmodestminimumwithoutthepossibilityofenormousincome.Inaclass-dividedsociety,thediffer-encesindispositionstoenjoyaresufficientlyrigidthatfurtherexperienceofalter-nativewaysoflifewouldnotproduceaunanimousranking,uniting,forexample,industrialworkers,maids,investmentbankers,commoditybrokers,farmersandshopkeepers.Admittedly,ifMarxwererightabouttheconsequencesofmoderncapitalismandthesocialistalternative,thejointverdictsonkindsofenjoymentwouldbedeterminateenoughtodictatethechoiceofsocialismonutilitariangrounds,sincecapitalismwouldexposemanymorepeopletoformsofsufferingandprematuredeathwhicharedirefatesinanyranking.Still,aclass-neutralstandardwouldbeaninadequateguidetoevaluationswhichmightbecrucialatotherjunctures,suchaspolicy-choiceinthefirststageofsocialism,andwhichwouldsometimesbecrucialinapost-Marxistviewofcurrentsocialfacts.FormsandlimitsofmoralityIntheManifesto,respondingtoanimaginedprotestthat“Communismabolishes...allmorality,insteadofconstituting[it]...onanewbasis,”Marxblithelynotesthat“itisnowonder”thatsucharadicalrevolution“involvesthemostradicalrupturewithtraditionalideas”([1848],p.52).InTheGermanIdeology,hiscrit-icismsofutilitarianismendwiththebroadlyanti-moraldeclarationthatcommu-nism“hasshatteredthebasisofallmorality,whetherthemoralityofasceticismorofenjoyment”([1845–6],p.419).TowhatextentdidMarxreallyintendtoreject147\nRichardW.Millerrelianceonmorality?Theremaybenowaytoresolvethismuch-discussedexegeticquestion.Forexample,whatseemtobebroadattacksonmoralitycouldbehyper-bolicindictmentsofallspecific,respectableconceptionsoffairness,justiceandmoralityinhistime,whichhetooktobeobstaclestotheworkers’movement.Still,asthebrief,tantalizingbitsofapparentanti-moralismindicate,Marx’sexplicitdiscussionsofthefailuresofrights-basedmoralityandutilitarianismtocopewithsocialconflictsuggestmoregenerallimitstorelianceonmorality.WhetherMarxprovidesabasisforcriticizingrelianceonmoralityinsocialchoicewill,ofcourse,dependonhow“morality”isunderstood.Ononecon-strual,someoneiscommittedtoamoralityifhethinksthatchoicesofhisandothersthatadheretocertainnormsarerationalinlightoftheircircumstances,evenwhentheyinvolvesacrificesofthechooser’spersonalinterestsandtheinter-estsofbelovedintimates,andhetakessuchchoicestobeworthyofpraisewhiletakinginsufficientlymitigatedfailuresotochoosetobeworthyofcondemnation.Onthisconstrual,Marxwasasternandeloquentpartisanofmorality.Hetakesadherencetothegoalsandstrategiesofrevolutionarysocialismtoberationalinlightofburdensthatcapitalismengendersandopportunitiesforremovingthemundersocialism.Atthesametime,hethinksthatsuchcommitmentwill,atcrucialjunctures,requireconsiderableself-sacrifice,whichheeventuallyepitomizedandcelebratedinhismovingeulogycommemoratingthe“heroicself-sacrifice”oftheParisCommunards,attheendofTheCivilWarinFrance.Marx’semphasisontheessentialroleofclassinterestdoesentailthatsufficientlystrongandpervasivemotivationforsocialistrevolutiondependsonthemotiva-tionalpowerofthethoughtthatsuccesswillbenefitthoseinone’sproletariansit-uation(includingoneselfifonesurvives),endingthesocialdominationfromwhichonehassuffered.ButMarx’stheoryofthestatemakesengagementinrev-olutionaryactivityriskybusiness,whilethesuccessoftheworkers’movementwouldbeapublicgood,availabletoproletarianswhotooknosuchrisks.Soclassloyalty,basedonself-respect,notthemeremaximizationofexpectedpersonalbenefit,isessentialtoMarx’srevolutionaryhopes,whichendorseademanding6moralityonthefirstconstrual.Still,evenifMarxwascommittedtoapracticeofreasonedself-sacrificeinpursuitoflargesocialgoals,hecouldhaverejectedmoralityinanothersenseasaninadequatebasisforpoliticalchoice.Themoralpointofviewisoftenunder-stoodasanimpartialstandpointforchoice,theauthoritativeperspectiveinwhichonechooseswithequalconcernorrespectforall.Thus,eachofthespecificmoralstandpointsthatMarxcriticizesistypicallyofferedasafavoredinterpretationofthedemandsofmoralimpartiality.Perhapstheanti-moralremarksrejectultimaterelianceonanimpartialperspective.Certainly,Marxregardedimpartialconcernandrespectasinsufficienttomoti-vatethesuccessfulpursuitofthesocialgoalsheadvocated.Howeversinceretheirprofessionsofimpartialconcernorrespect,theinterestsofthebourgeoisieandtheirallieswouldleadthemtoreconcilethesemoralcommitmentswiththedefenseofthestatusquo,andproletarianloyaltybasedonclasssolidaritywould148\nMarx’sLegacybenecessarytomotivateitsoverthrow.Inaddition,Marxmayhavethoughtthattherewereimportantlimitstothecapacityofmorality,inthesecond,impartial-istsense,tojustifypoliticalchoicesthatreflectthereasonedcommitmentsconsti-tutinghismoralityinthefirst,broadsense.Thesedoubtsmighthavebeenbasedonextrapolationfrominadequacieshediscernedinalloftheimpartialmoralitiesofhistime.However,theymayalsoindicateafurtherlegacytobederivedfromMarx’ssocialtheories,aconcernfortheepistemicconsequencesofsocialdivision.Thedeepproblemsofutilitarianism(ofwhichMarx’sobjectionsareonlyasample)suggestthatthestandpointofimpartialmoralityis,mostfundamentally,astandpointofequalrespectforpersons.Butnotoriously,peopleinanymodernsocietyaredividedintheirconscientiousinterpretationsofthedemandsofequalrespect.Howcanpoliticalchoicesexpressingthedictatesofequalrespectleadsometoforceinstitutionsonothers,whichtheseothersregardasincompatiblewithequalrespect?Whenimportantlife-longinterestsareatstake,anappealtomajorityruleisnotsufficient–otherwiseitcouldbetooeasytojustify,say,theimpositionofastatechurchonareligiousminority.But(aspoliticalliberalsemphasizeinourtime),thedogmaticstipulationofaparticularinterpretationofequalrespectforpersonsisnotsufficienteither.Forexample,someonecouldacceptthatextensiveinterferencewithmarket-generatedinequalitiesisrequiredbythestandardsthathewouldchoosebehindRawls’s“veilofignorance,”whileprotestingthattheRawlsianinterpretationofrespectforfellow-membersofone’ssocietyleadstodisrespectfultakingofpeople’sbenefitsgainedfromtheirusesoftheiractualtalentsandassetsinhonest,peacefulself-advancement.Ifonesimplydismisseshisconstrualofrespectforpersonsandforceshimtoconform,onecanhardlyclaimtoactasrespectforpersonsrequires.Becauseofthepluralityofcompetinginterpretations,theprojectofbasingpoliticalchoiceonthedictatesofequalrespectforallrequiresanappropriatelyimpartialbasisforinterpretingthesedictates.WhenIamawarethatothersaredrawntodifferentinterpretations,Iam,nonetheless,justifiedinrelyingonmyconstrualofthedictatesofequalrespectifIamjustifiedinbelievingthattheotherswouldshareitifweallrationallyreflectedonrelevantfactsandputtoonesideourspecialinterestsandothermorallyirrelevantbiases.Sopoliticscanbebasedonimpartialmoralityifpartisanscanbewarrantedintakingtheirchoicestoberelevantlyuntainted.Marx’sinsistenceontherobustconnectionbetweenpeople’ssocialpositionsandtheirevaluativestancessuggeststhatthisinterpretiveprojectmaybeepis-temicallyutopian.Theremaybeimportantareasofsocialchoiceinwhichthepursuitofuntaintedinterpretationsisneitherfeasiblenordesirable.Itisnoteasytobesurethatone’sfavoredcontroversialspecificationofanabstractmoralprincipledoesnotessentiallydependonone’sownspecialinter-ests,thespecialinterestsofasocialgroupwithwhichoneidentifiesorsomecastoftemperamentthatlacksmoralauthority.Insomecases,actualagreementamongpeopleofdiverseinterests,backgroundsandtemperamentsortheactualtrendofincreasingagreementinresponsetosharedinformationofferadequateassurance149\nRichardW.Millerthatpartialitydoesnotintrude.Butthereisoftennosuchevidenceoftheinno-cenceofone’sresponsetoacontroversialprincipleofsocialchoice.Ifone’sdis-tinctivemoralinclinationscorrespondtotheinterestsofthoseinone’ssocialsituation(atendencyfromwhichintellectualsarehardlyexempt),theremaybenoadequateassurancethatthoseinclinationsdonotessentiallydependonthosepartialinterests.Evenwheninclinationsdepartfromsocialbackground,asinMarx’scase,theymaysimplyreflecttheforcesthatgiveatemperamentitsdis-tinctivecast(inMarx’scase,acastofdefiance).Itmightseemthatequalrespectwouldstillrequirestrivingtofreeoneselffrompartialinterests,eventhoughone’sbesteffortmayverywellbeinadequate.ButMarx’stheoryofideologysuggeststhatthiseffortisnotameansofmovingclosertoadeterminateperspectiveofequalrespect,formostpeoplewhentheyreflectonfundamentalquestionsofsocialchoice.Whatdoesdeterminechoiceifonehasbrokentheholdofone’sspecialinterestsandinclinations?Presumably,themoralmilieuinwhichonehasgrownup.Butwheresocialchoiceisconcerned(Marxargues),thismilieureflectsaprocessofreconcilingsocialstabilitywiththedom-inanceofaneconomicelite.Ifthisistruetoasignificantextent,thendetachmentfromtheirspecialinterestsbythoseoutsideoftheelitewillnotbearoutetoequalrespect,eventhoughattachmenttothoseinterestsposesitsownthreatsofcal-7lousness,intoleranceandenvy.GivenMarx’sempiricalbeliefs,thisindeterminacymightnotaffectthechoiceofsocialismovercapitalism,becauseofthedifferencesbetweenthesealternativesonalldimensionsofconcerntothosewhoarestriving,howeverdiversely,toshowequalrespectforall.Still,giventhedangers,uncertainprospectsandspeculativegoalsofanyparticularsocialistrevolutionaryinitiative,orthodoxMarxistswon-deringwhethertocallworkerstothebarricadesmaywellhavefounditimpos-sibletoresolvethequestiononthebasisofimpartialistmorality.Inanycase,nowadays,intheabsenceofoldempiricalconvictions,thediversityofspecifica-tionsofrespect,justiceandwell-beingmaymakethesphereofindeterminacyquiteextensiveinthechoiceofwhetherandhowtointervenetochangemarket-basedeconomicfates.Supposethattherearespheresofpoliticalchoice,toofundamentaltobegroundedontherule:“Whateverthemajorityfavorsis,bythattoken,therightchoice,”inwhichnopartisanisinapositiontoclaimthatherchoiceisadictateofequalrespectforall.Doesitfollowthatpartisansmustgiveuptheprojectofreconcilingtheiractivitywithequalrespectforall,regardingitasaconstraintonlyappropriatetoafuture,moreharmonioussociety?No,forwhatimpartialmoral-itydoesnotrequire,impartialmoralitymay(ormaynot)permit.WhenIdonothaveawarrantforregardingmyconstrualofequalrespectasuniquelycompelling,Imaystillbewarrantedinsupposingthatmyreasonsforseekingtoimposemyalternativearesufficientlyserioustomakemypoliticalactivityrespectfulofevery-one’sinterests,inlightofthecostsimposedbyothers’alternatives.Thereduc-tionofexploitation,povertyandmarginalizationcouldbesufficientlyseriousreasons.SoanheirofMarx’slegacyinmoralepistemologycanbeconcernedto150\nMarx’sLegacyreconcileherpoliticalcommitmentswithimpartialmorality,evenifshedoesnotregardallthesecommitmentsasdictatesofimpartialmorality.Moralityinthefirst,8broadsensefillsthegapsleftbymoralityinthesecond,impartialistsense.Ofcourse,whatcountsasasufficientlyseriousjustificationdependsonempir-icalscrutinyoflikelygainsandlosses.Andhere,thepost-Marxistsocialdemo-cratoftenfacesapeacefulanalogueoftheMarxistrevolutionary’squandary.Inmanycases,shelacksreasonsforconfidencethatacostlyinitiativeinhelpingthepoororexploitedormarginalizedwillbeeffective.Giventhosecosts(aswellaspossibleharmstotheintendedbeneficiaries),itwouldbeself-indulgenttoappealtoherfinegoals.ButperhapsoldtimeMarxismhassomethingtocontribute.Marxistswhochosemilitanceorrevolutioninthenameofsocialismwereawarethatharmwascertainandsuccesswasnotonthecurrentoccasion.Buttheyalsothoughtthattheirultimategoalofhumanliberationcouldnotbeattainedunlesspeopleincircumstancesofuncertainsuccesstookinitiativesthatimpartialmoral-itydidnotrequire.Similarly,apost-Marxistwhoisuncertainwhetheraparticu-larattempttoreduceburdensofcapitalismwouldsucceedmayhaveadequatereasontobelievethatthelong-termprojectofreducingtheseburdensisdoomedintheabsenceofapoliticalmovementthatproducessuchattemptsandlearnsfromtheirfailuresaswellastheirsuccesses.Despiteitsnowall-too-evidentdangers,perhapstheoldtalkofhistoricalmissionstillhasauseinjustifyingengagementinpoliticalmovementsthatimposerisksandcostsanddonotmerelyimplementrequirementsofimpartialmorality.Notes1Marxalsouseslesspretentioustermsforthekeygroups,suchas“theworkers”fortheproletariat,whenthereferenceisclear,andsowillI.Furtherspecificationofthisgeneralconceptionofcapitalistrelationsofproductionwouldclarifythecrucialascriptionsofcontrol,distinguishdifferentsourcesofpowerorvulnerabilitywithinthetwoclasses,andcharacterizeotherclassesincapitalistsocieties.Wright(1997)presentsaninfluen-tialefforttodevelopspecificationsthatprovideaframeworkforexplainingcurrentsocialphenomena.2Earlierformsofsurplus-extraction,suchasslaveryandserfdom,alsohavethesefea-tures,andareformsofexploitation–though,here,thedirectcoercionthroughwhichthestrongerforcetheweakertoworkforthemisprobablyenoughtojustifythelabel.3Avineri(1970),Moore(1975)andotherseitherhavedeniedthatorganizedpoliticalviolencewaseveressentialtotheestablishmentofsocialisminMarx’svieworhavetakenhimtohavedepartedfromthisjudgmentafterthefailureoftherevolutionsof1848.Thisishardtoreconcilewithhisenduringemphasisontheactivelypro-capitalistroleofthestateundercapitalismandwithsuchlatetextsasTheCivilWarinFrance.4Brenkert(1983)arguesthatMarxreliedonamoralityoffreedom,butsuchamoral-itysimilarlyconfrontsconflictsamongdifferentpeople’sfreedomsanddifferentkindsoffreedom.151\nRichardW.Miller5Indeed,Allen(1973)andothershavearguedthatMarximplicitlyreliedonsomeformofutilitarianism.However,Marx’sexplicitcriticismsofutilitarianismturnouttocutdeep.6Olson(1965),whofirstnotedthepublic-goodsproblem,tookittoundermineMarx’saccountofrevolutionarymotivation.Buchanan(1979)arguesthatOlson’schallengehasnotyetbeenanswered.MysketchofananswerisalongthelinesofHolmstrom(1983)andofMiller(1984);whichalsofurtherdevelopstheMarxistcritiquesofmoral-itiesandmoralityinthisessayandtheanalysisofMarx’stheoryofthestate).7Brudney(1998)discussesMarx’sconcernwithsocialbarrierstomoraljustification,inthe1840s.8Arguably,specifickindsofmoraljudgments,suchasjudgmentsofjustice,might,nonetheless,beexcluded,whereimpartialityisunavailable,becausetheyintrinsicallyappealtodictatesofmoralimpartiality.ThecaseofjusticehasbeenspeciallysignificantincontroversiesoverMarxandmoralitybecauseofthestimulusofWood’sargument(1972)thatMarxregardedjusticeasanon-normativeproperty,involvingconformitytostabilizingsocialrules.BibliographyAllen,D.(1973).“TheUtilitarianismofMarxandEngels.”TheAmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly10:189–99.Arneson,R.(1981).“What’swrongwithexploitation?”Ethics,91:202–27.Avineri,S.(1970).TheSocialandPoliticalThoughtofKarlMarx.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Brenkert,G.(1983).Marx’sEthicsofFreedom.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.Brudney,D.(1998).Marx’sAttempttoLeavePhilosophy.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Buchanan,A.(1979).“Revolutionarymotivationandmorality.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,9:59–82.(AlsoinCohen,NagelandScanlon(1980).)——(1982).MarxismandJustice:TheRadicalCritiqueofLiberalism.Totowa,NJ:Rowman&Littlefield.Chapman,J.andJ.Pennock(eds.)(1983).NomosXXVI,Marxism.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.Cohen,G.A.(1978).KarlMarx’sTheoryofHistory:ADefense.Princeton:PrincetonUni-versityPress.——(1983).“Thestructureofproletarianunfreedom.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,12:3–34.(AlsoinCohen(1988),Cohen,NagelandScanlon(1980),NielsenandWare(1997).)——(1988).History,LabourandFreedom:ThemesfromMarx.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Cohen,M.,T.Nagel,andT.Scanlon(eds.)(1980).Marx,JusticeandHistory.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Elster,J.(1985).MakingSenseofMarx.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Gilbert,A.(1981).Marx’sPolitics.NewBrunswick,NJ:RutgersUniversityPress.Holmstrom,N.(1977).“Exploitation.”CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,7:353–69.(AlsoinNielsenandWare(1997).)152\nMarx’sLegacy——(1983).“Rationalityandrevolution.”CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,13:305–25.Marx,K.(1844).EconomicandPhilosophicalManuscripts.(CitedfromK.Marx(1975).)——(1844a).ExcerptsfromJamesMill’s“ElementsofPoliticalEconomy”.(CitedfromK.Marx(1975).)——([1845–6]1976).TheGermanIdeology,writtenwithF.Engels.InK.MarxandF.Engels,CollectedWorks(vol.5),pp.15–539.——(1847).WageLabourandCapital.(CitedfromK.MarxandF.Engels(1968).)——(1848).ManifestooftheCommunistParty,writtenwithF.Engels.(CitedfromK.MarxandF.Engels(1968).)——([1857–8]1973).Grundrisse(trans.M.Nicolaus).NewYork:VintageBooks.——(1865).Wages,PriceandProfit.(CitedfromK.MarxandF.Engels(1968).)——(1866).ResultsoftheImmediateProcessofProduction.InK.Marx([1867]1976).——([1867]1976).Capital(vol.1)(trans.B.Fowkes).NewYork:Penguin.——(1871).TheCivilWarinFrance.(CitedfromK.Mar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embeddednessofpersonsinsocialandhistoricalcontextshelpsustoseethatweshouldnotmerelysupplementthetraditionalconceptofanabstract,rational,liberalindividual,historicallythoughtofasmale,withaconceptofanabstractessentialwoman,assomefeministsatfirsttendedtodo.Weareneversimplywomen-as-such,butalsoalwayswhiteorblackorLatina,priv-ilegedorpoor,heterosexualorlesbian,andsoon.TheperspectivesoffeministsofcolorandofnonWesternfeministshavecontributedgreatlytoreconceptual-izationsofidentity,personhood,theself,andthusofpoliticsandsociety(Collins,1990;Hoagland,1989;Spelman,1988;Williams,1991).Muchfeministthoughtalsodiffersfromliberalindividualisminattendingespe-ciallytoparticularothersandrelationsbetweenparticularpersonsratherthanonlytoeitherindividualsoruniversalmoralnorms(Benhabib,1992;Held,1993).Themoraltheorybuiltonliberalindividualismrecognizestheindividualselforegoontheonehand,andtheuniversalalloreveryoneontheother.Theindividual’spursuitofhisinterestsaretoberestrainedbytheuniversalnormstowhichallotherhumanbeingscouldagree,forinstance.Butbetweentheindividualselfandtheuniversalallothers,traditionalliberalmoraltheoryisvirtuallysilent.Ithaslittletosayaboutthemoralissuesofsuchintermediateregionsasfamilyrelations,155\nVirginiaHeldfriendship,orgroupidentity.Feminists,incontrast,payparticularattentiontothemoralclaimsofparticularothersenmeshedwiththeselfinparticularrelations,andtoselvesmovedbyempathy,attachments,andhumanconcern(Jaggar,1994).TraditionalMarxistsandcommunitarianshavealsoseenthepersonassocialratherthanastheabstractindividualoftheliberaltradition.Liketheirliberalcon-freres,theysometimesdisputethatthereisanythingdistinctiveinthefeministcri-tique.ButfeministsrespondthatalthoughtheymayhavebeeninfluencedbyMarxistorcommunitarianarguments,theircritiqueofliberalindividualismisoftendifferentfromnon-feministones(Ferguson,1989;Jaggar,1983;MackenzieandStoljar,2000;Sargent,1981).Itcentersonanappreciationofwomen’sexperi-encesinrelationsbetweenactualpersons.Itseesthegenderstructureascentraltotheserelations,andseespersonsasrelationalinadifferentwaythanastheoutcomeoftherelationsofeconomicproductionemphasizedbyMarxorofthecommunalrelations,traditionallypatriarchal,emphasizedbycommunitarians.Andmanyfeministsbelievetheirviewofthepersonasrelationalisnotlikelytobelost.JeanKellerwritesthat“theinsightthatthemoralagentisan‘encumberedself,’whoisalwaysembeddedinrelationswithfleshandbloodothersandispartlycon-stitutedbytheserelations,isheretostay”(Keller,1997,p.152).Women’sexperienceshavebeenneglectedbynon-feministtheorists,fromlib-eralstoMarxiststocommunitarians.Feministthought,incontrast,takeswomen’sexperienceasworthyoftrustandcentraltoitsproject.Manyfeministsbelievethatwhatwomendoandfeelandthinkincontextsofresponsibilityforandinterde-pendencewithothers,suchasindealingwiththemoralissuesinvolvedincaringforchildrenandotherswhoarenotindependentandself-sufficient,isespeciallyrelevantformoralandpoliticalthought(Held,1993;Kittay,1999;Ruddick,1989;Tronto,1993).Theyrejectasbiasedideologythelongstandinganddom-inanttraditionalviewthattheexperienceofwomeninthehouseholdisoflittlerelevancetomoralitybecauseitisdeterminedby“nature”orbiologywhilethelifeofmaninthepolistranscendsthese.BrianBarryhascharacterizedliberalismas“thevisionofsocietyasmadeupofindependent,autonomousunitswhoco-operateonlywhenthetermsofco-operationaresuchastomakeitfurthertheendsofeachoftheparties”(Barry,1973,p.166).ThismodelwasputforwardmoststarklybyHobbes,butithascontinuedinmodifiedformthroughthepresent.AnotherformofliberalismismoreKantianandlessegoistic,butnolessindividualistic.Itseesuscooperatingonthebasisofrationalprinciplestowhichwecouldagreeasfreeandequalbutmutuallydisinterestedindividuals.Society,inthevariousformsoftheliberalview,shouldrestonasocialcontract,andappropriatemoralrelationsbetweenpersonsarecontractual.Fromtheperspectiveofmanywomen’sexperiences,thismodelofpersonsandsocietiesisunsatisfactory,normativelyaswellasdescriptively.Itimaginesaninde-pendentrationalagentwhoonlyinteractswithotherstofurtherhisowninterestsoronthebasisofavoluntarychoicetodoso,yetpersonsareembeddedinsocialrelationsthatareofteninvoluntarythroughouttheirlives.Noneofuscanchoose156\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryourparents,forinstance.Andwerecognizemanysourcesofmoralresponsibilityotherthanourowninterests,voluntarilypursued,orthanabstractrationalprin-ciples.Societyisdeeplynoncontractual.Weneedviewsofthepoliticalthatreflecttheseunderstandings,whichthismodel,deeplyentrenchedinliberalpoliticalthought,doesnotdo.Onthebasisofafeministunderstandingofhumanexperience,liberalpoliticalthoughtisimplicatedbythismodelbecauseofitsartificialityandimplausibilityforallbutaverynarrowrangeofchoices,suchasthoseofaconsumerinthemar-ketplacewithadequatefundstospend,oranabstractrationallegislatordevisinganidealconstitution.AsMarxistshaveargued,the“choice”ofmostworkerstoselltheirlabortooneoppressiveemployerratherthananother,canhardlybebestunderstoodasafreechoice.Andasfeministshaveemphasized,awomandeniedaccesstoanyothermeansofeconomicsupportthanbeingdependentonamanishardlymakingafreechoiceindecidingtomarryadomineeringhusbandtoescapeadomineeringfather.Yetallthesesituationsarepoliticalinthesensethatstructuresofpowerkeeptheminplace.Andmoralquestionsofresponsibilityforandidentificationwiththosewithwhomwehavesocialties,oftenunchosenandbetweenunequals,arecontinuallypresent.Theeconomicsystemthatpoliticalpowerallowsorsupportsisapoliticalandmoralissue.Andasfeministshavemadeclear,thegenderstructureofeverysocietythatrenderswomensubordinateinsuchawiderangeofwaysisfundamentallyapoliticalandmoralissue.Forunderstandingsuchissues,themodeloftheliberalindividual,withitsassumptionsofindependenceandfreechoicetoenterintosocialrelationsornot,isinadequate.Somedefendersofliberalindividualism,includingfeministdefenders,criticizethefeministcritiqueasrestingontheempiricalclaimthat,forinstance,workersandwomenarenotinfactself-sufficient,whereastheliberalargumentisnorma-tive(Hampton,1993).Theyinterpretthesocial-contracttraditionofpoliticaltheoryasasking:ifwewouldbefreeandequalandindependent,whatpoliticalarrangementswouldwefreelyagreeto?Theliberalargumentisthatitsprincipleswouldbejustifiedbecausetheywouldbebasedonanormativelypersuasivepro-cedureforarrivingatthem.Butthisargumentagainstthefeministcritiquemisseswhatisatleastasimportanttoitasitsclaimsthattheliberalmodelisdistortinglyunrealistic.Thefeministcritiqueisalsoanormativecritiqueofindividualismasamoralideal.Manyfeministsdonotthinkofrelationswithothersasmereencum-brancestobefreefrominordertoarriveatwhathasnormativevalue,norasmerepreferencestobepursuedornotastheliberalindividualwishes.Thesefeministsvalueinterdependenceaswellasrecognizehowlimitedindependenceis.Theyvalueautonomy,butasrelational(Clement,1996;MackenzieandStoljar,2000).Theyholdthatrelationsbetweenpeople–relationsofcaring,trust,friendship,andthelike–havevalue,andcanbeevaluatedmorally,notjustdescribedempir-ically(Held,1993).Likecommunitarians,theymayarguethatuntilthereisacertainkindofattachmentbetweenpersons,therewillnotbeasocietywithinwhichtobringabouttherespectforrightswhichbothliberalsandfeministsvalue.157\nVirginiaHeldMoreover,feministsmayarguethatmakingtheassumptionsinherenttoliberalindividualismtendstoundermineinterdependenceandtopromoteasanempiri-calrealitytheveryassumptionthatisassertedasbeingmerelyproceduralandnor-mative.“Liberalmorality,”AnnetteBaierwrites,“mayunfitpeopletobeanythingotherthanwhatitsjustifyingtheoriessupposethemtobe,oneswhohavenointer-estineachothers’interests”(Baier,1994,p.29).Interestingempiricalsupportisbeingfoundforthisclaim.Anumberofstudiesshowthatstudyingeconomics,withits“repeatedandintensiveexposuretoamodelwhoseunequivocalprediction”isthatpeoplewillmaketheirdecisionsonthebasisofself-interest,causeseconomicsstudentstobelesscooperativeandmoreinclinedtofree-ridethanothers(Franketal.,1998,p.61).Itisplausibletosuppose,then,asfeministsoftendo,thatasocietyguidedbyliberalindividualism,withitsassumptionsthatindividualsonlydo,orshould,engagewithotherswhenitisintheirinteresttodoso,oronacontractualbasis,willitselfpromoteasocietyofatomisticindividualswhotakenointerestineachothers’well-beingfortheseothers’sakes.Aslongasthepainsordeprivationsoftheseothersposenothreattotheindividualinquestion,orpresentnoneedforcontractualagreements,theliberalindividualhasnomotive–ofempathyorcaring–toconcernhimselfwiththeseothers.Suchasocietywillbeadisintegratingsociety,lackingthetrustneededforasocietytoflourish.Itwilllosethesolidar-itythatholdsasocietytogether,anditwillcertainlyfailtodevelopadequateappre-ciationsofhowbesttobringupitschildren,dealwithitssocialproblems,orsafeguarditsenvironmentortheglobeforthesakeoffuturegenerations.ThePublicandthePrivateDefendersofliberalindividualismandoftherationalchoicetheorythatgeneral-izesanddeploysitsassumptionsarguethatitisatheoryforrelationsbetweenstrangers,notforthepersonalrelationsbetweenloversorspousesorparentsandchildren,whereemotionisdominant.Butthisleadstoquestionsthathavebeenfundamentaltofeministtheorizing:whatispoliticalandhowshouldthedistinc-tionbetweenthepublicandpoliticalontheonehand,andtheprivateandper-sonalontheother,bedrawn?(Elshtain,1981;Landes,1998).Anearlysloganofthewomen’smovementthatbeganintheUSinthelate1960swas“thepersonalispolitical.”Itexpressedtheinsightthatthegreaterpowerofmen–politically,economically,andsocially–affectedthewaysinwhichwomensuffereddominationinwhathadbeenimaginedtobethepersonalandprivateandnon-politicaldomainofthehousehold,andthewaysinturnthatthiseffectofmen’spoweronwomen’spersonalliveslimitedwomen’scapacitiesandunderminedtheirdevelopmentintheworkplaceandinthepublicdomain.Feministshavebeenre-examiningandrethinkingthepublic/privatedistinctioneversince.Thereiswidespreadagreementthatthetraditionalconceptionisunsat-158\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryisfactory.Attheveryleast,womenandchildrenneedpublicprotectionfromdomesticviolence.Thetraditionalviewthatthehomewasaman’scastleintowhichthelawshouldnotintrudeleftwomenandchildrenvulnerableto“private”tyranny.Inmanypartsoftheworld,womenarestillsubjecttodomesticviolenceonamassivescalebecausethepublicrealmoflawfailstoprotectthem.Ontheotherhand,lawofteninterfereswithwomen’sprivatedecisionscon-cerningreproduction,andwiththeprivatesexualbehaviorofbothwomenandmen,andlawordersmarriageandthefamilyinallsortsofways(Callahan,1995;Petchesky,1985).Butevenwhenthepublicsphereoflawisconsistentinleavingthehouseholdalone,thegreaterpublicpowerofmenrenderswomenunequalathome.Hence,publicprinciplesofjusticerequiringanequaldistributionofben-efitsandburdensorapersuasivejustificationforadeparturefromthis,shouldbeappliedtothefamilyaswellastogovernmentaldecisions.Thetasksofhouseholdmaintenanceandchildrearingshouldbeequitablyshared,ordeparturesshouldbefreelyandmutuallyagreedupon(Held,1984;Okin,1989).Womenhavetraditionallyhadverylittleprivacy,evenathome.Feministsseekreconceptualizationsofprivacy,not,assometimescharged,theabolitionoftheprivate(AnitaAllen,1988).Womendonotwanttosacrificetheidealsofaffilia-tionandcaringtoself-centereddemandstobeleftalone,butthesubordinateandcaretakingrolesimposedonthemhavelargelydeprivedthemoftheexperienceofprivacy.Tobeconfinedtothe“privatesphere”isnottoenjoyprivacy;andthemanywomennowinthelaborforcearestillburdenedbyhouseholdresponsibil-itiesthatleavethemunfairlylimitedopportunitiestotakeadvantageofprivacy(ibid.).Anumberoffeministtheoristswhocanbecharacterizedasradicalfeministsbelievethatsexualityandthewayitissociallyconstructedisthedeepestcauseofwomen’ssecondarystatus.Malesexuality,onthisview,hasbeendevelopedinsuchawaythatthedominationofwomenisinherenttoit,andviolence,oftenagainstwomen,hasbeensexualized.Tomanyradicalfeminists,thepornographythatfeedsthisconstructionandtheviolenceagainstwomenthatindicatesitarestrongcontributorstomaledominationandfemaledisempowerment.Accordingtothesefeminists,thesexualitythatisoftenthoughtofasmostprivateisactuallythemostimportantfactorinthegenderstructurethatpervadesallsocietiesandgivesmenthepowertodominatewomeninmostareasoflife,publicaswellasprivate.AsCatharineMacKinnonputsit,“Womenandmenaredividedbygender,madeintothesexesasweknowthem,bytherequirementsofitsdominantform,hetero-sexuality,whichinstitutionalizesmalesexualdominanceandfemalesexualsub-mission.Ifthisistrue,sexualityisthelinchpinofgenderinequality”(MacKinnon,1989,p.179).Manyfeministsdofarmorethancriticizethewaythetraditionallinesbetweenpublicandprivatehavebeendrawn.Thisisconnectedwiththefeministrevalua-tionofthemoralvaluesofthepersonalrealm,andtherethinkingofmoraltheoryinvolved.Then,withatransformedviewofmoraltheory,andofpersons,values,andsocialrelations,theviewof“thepolitical”istransformed.159\nVirginiaHeldLiberalismandRightsThefeministcritiqueofliberalpoliticaltheoryshouldnotbeunderstoodasarejec-tionofwhathasbeenachievedbytheliberaltraditionofindividualrightsanddemocraticgovernment.Comparedwiththeconservatism–whetherlibertarianorcommunitarian–thatseekstokeeppatriarchyinplace,itisofcourseprogress.Thereisappreciationoftheprogressiveaspectsofliberalismandeventhosefem-inistsmostcriticalofliberalindividualismusuallyseek,atthelevelofinstitutionsandpolicies,toimproveonliberalismnotdestroyit.Thewaytheseissueshavedevelopedcanperhapsbestbeseeninfeministdiscussionsofrights.Historically,feministshavefocusedtheirdemandsonequalrightsforwomen.Intheeighteenthcentury,MaryWollstonecraftargued,againstRousseau,thatthesamerightsandfreedomsbasedonrationalprinciplesthatwerebeingsoughtformenshouldbeaccordedtowomenalso(Wollstonecraft,1967).JohnStuartMillandHarrietTaylorcalledinthenineteenthcentury,inoppositiontoprevailingviewsatthetime,foranextensiontowomenofequalrightsandopportunitiesandforanendtothesubjectionofwomen.Theyarguedthatwomenshouldhavethesamerightsasmentoreceiveeducation,toownproperty,tovote,andtoenteranyprofession(MillandMill,1970).Women’smovementsinthetwentiethcenturyoftenconcentratedtheireffortsonwinningforwomentherighttovote;thiswasachievedintheUnitedStatesin1920,inFrancein1946,inSwitzerlandnotuntil1971.Thesecondwaveofthewomen’smovementthatgatheredstrengthintheUnitedStatesinthe1970s,afteralapseofalmostfourdecades,placedgreatimportanceonaddinganEqualRightsAmendmenttotheUSConstitution.Thoughtheamendmentfailedtoberatifiedbytherequirednumberofstates,effortstoenddiscrimina-tionagainstwomeninallitsformscontinued(Rhode,1989).Thesewereattemptstohavetherightsofwomentoequalprotectionbythelawsrecognized.Manyalsoargued,onliberalaswellasothergrounds,forwelfarerights.Theseareespe-ciallyimportantforwomen:personscannotenjoyequalrightsiftheyhavenoassuranceofthemeanstostayaliveandfeedtheirchildren.Eitheremploymentandaffordablechildcaremustbeavailable,orpersonsmusthaveaccessbyrighttothebasicnecessitiesoflifeforthemselvesandtheirchildren.Thenegativefreedomfrominterferenceoftheliberaltraditionisinsufficient;personsmustalsohavepositiveenablementstobefreeandequalagents(Gould,1998;Held,1984;Sterba,1989).Weshouldthinkofrightsaseitherlegalormoral,orboth.Manyofthelegalrightsrecognizedinandprotectedbyanactuallegalsystemarebasedonmoralrightsseenasjustifiablemoralclaims(Held,1984).Examplesaresuchrightsastonotbemurderedorrapedorassaulted.Butsomeofthelegalrightsthatactualpoliticalandlegalsystemshaveprotected,suchastherightsofhusbandstodototheirwiveswhatwouldotherwiseberape,arenotmorallyjustifiableandoughtnottobelegalrights.160\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryArgumentsfortheequalrightsofwomenareespeciallyprominentforfeministswhenwomenaredeniedsuchfundamentalrightsastoownpropertyortovote,whentheyaresubjecttowidespreadlegallypermitteddomesticviolence,andwhentheysufferblatantdiscriminationineducationandemployment.Thesearestilltheconditionsofmanywomenaroundtheworld(French,1992).Butfeminismhasalsomovedfarbeyonddemandsthatrightsarticulatedformen,suchastherighttovote,beextendedequallytowomen.Forinstance,forwomentohavegen-uinelyequalopportunitiesinemployment,theymayneedrightstopregnancyleave,andchildcarefortheirchildren.Feminismhasalsocontributedbynowfun-damentalcritiquesofthelanguageandconceptsofrights.Overcomingtheper-vasivepatriarchyoftraditionalandexistingsocietiesisthoughtbysometorequireashiftoffocusawayfromrights,aswellasreconceptualizationsofwhatequalrightsforwomenreallyrequire.Someofthecritiqueofrightsisbasedondevelopingthoughtintheareaofethics,andmoraltheoryandpractice.Somefeministsaredeeplycriticaloftheten-dencyintraditionalethicstointerpretalloralmostallmoralproblemsintermsofrightsandjustice.Anethicofcare,incontrast,valuesconnectionsbetweenpersonsandthetrustandcaringthatcancharacterizehumanrelationships,ratherthanfocusingontheassertionofindividualrightsagainstothers.Feministsdevel-opinganethicofcarearguefortheimportanceformoralityofempathy,sensitiv-ity,andattentiontotheparticularaspectsofpersonsandtheirneeds,incontrasttothefocusofrightsontherationalrecognitionofhowallpersonsarethesame,andinterchangeable.Someadvocatesofcareethicsseethemoralityofrightsandjusticeasinher-entlymasculineandhostiletotheunderstandingofmoralproblemsaswomentendtointerpretthem.CarolGilliganpointsoutthat“amoralityofrightsandnoninterferencemayappearfrightening...initspotentialjustificationofindif-ferenceandunconcern”(Gilligan,1982,p.22).NelNoddingsnotesthatincon-textsofcaringforothers,weshouldbewaryofrulesandprinciples,andthustherightsthatreflectthem,becausetheyoftenplaya“destructiverole.”Shesuggeststhatalthoughrelyingonrulescanbeusefulattimeswhenwecannotrespondtoeachparticularsituationaswouldbebest,ifwe“cometorelyalmostcompletelyonexternalrules[we]becomedetachedfromtheveryheartofmorality:‘thesen-sibilitythatcallsforthcaring’”(Noddings,1986,p.47).Otherfeministspointtothesuspecthistoryofthedevelopmentofrightsascentraltomoralandpoliticaltheory(Pateman,1988).AnnetteBaierwritesthat“themoraltraditionwhichdevelopedtheconceptofrights,autonomy,andjusticeisthesametraditionthatprovided‘justifications’oftheoppressionofthosewhomtheprimaryrights-holdersdependedontodothesortofworktheythemselvespreferrednottodo.Thedomesticworkwaslefttowomenandslaves,”andtheofficialmoralityignoredtheircontribution.InBaier’sview,“rightshaveusuallybeenfortheprivileged,”andthe“justiceperspective”andthelegalsensethatgoeswithit“areshadowedbytheirpatriarchalpast”(Baier,1994,pp.25–6).EvaFederKittayarguesthattheliberaltraditionofindividualrightsconstructedanequality161\nVirginiaHeldforheadsofhouseholdsandcountedthatheadasanindependentandself-sufficientindividual(Kittay,1999).Withothers,shearguesthatthisimagefostersaharmfulillusion.Itsuggeststhatdependenciesdonotexist,andthatsocietyneednotdealwiththembecauseitiscomposedofindependent,freeandequalindi-vidualswhomeettheirownneedsandcometogethervoluntarilytoformassoci-ations.Infact,whatindependencesomepersonshaverestsonsocialcooperationasapriorcondition.Aschildrenwearealldependent,mostofusaresometimesillorfrail,andevenmenwhoimaginethemselvesmostindependentmustrelyonavastnetworkofsocialbondsprovidingtheconditionswithinwhichtheyenjoythe“fruitsoftheirlabor.”Moreover,themeaningsof“dependency”and“citi-zenship”andofhowtheyareconnectedneedtobereconceptualizedsothatallwhoparticipateinasociety’slifecanattaindignity(ShanleyandNarayan,1997).Feministtheoristswhofocusprimarilyonlawarealsocriticaloftheconcep-tionsofrightssocentraltotraditionallegal,political,andmoraltheory.Feministanalyseshaveshownhowthelawisapatriarchalinstitutionandhowitsschemeofrightssupportsthesubordinationofwomen.CarolSmartseeslawandmascu-linecultureascongruent;sheexamineshowlaw“disqualifieswomen’sexperience”andwomen’sknowledgeandsheurgesfeministstoresistfocusingonrights(Smart,1989,p.2).CatharineMacKinnonarguesthat“Intheliberalstate,theruleoflaw–neutral,abstract,elevated,pervasive–bothinstitutionalizesthepowerofmenoverwomenandinstitutionalizespowerinitsmaleform....Maleformsofpoweroverwomenareaffirmativelyembodiedasindividualrightsinlaw....Abstractrightsauthorizethemaleexperienceoftheworld”(MacKinnon,1989,pp.238–48).Further,evenwherethewrittenlawappearsgender-neutral,themechanismsoflaw–police,prosecutors,andjudges–oftenapplyitinbiasedways.Thestatehaspermittedmuchdomesticviolenceandhasbeenreluctanttochallengepatriarchalpowerinthefamily(Smith,1993).Ithasbeenespeciallydefi-cientinprotectingtherightsofwomenofcolor(Crenshaw,1993).Andlegaltheoryasdistinctfromthelawitselfhasbeennolesssupportiveofmaledomi-nance.RobinWestseesthewholeofmodernlegaltheoryas“essentiallyandirre-trievablymasculine”initsacceptanceofthethesis“thatweareindividuals‘first,’and...thatwhatseparatesusisepistemologicallyandmorallypriortowhatcon-nectsus”(West,1988,p.2).Tosomefeminists,then,rightsareseenasinherentlyabstractandbiasedtowardamalepointofview.Somearguethatusingthediscourseofrightsleadssocialmovementstoundulytailortheiraimstowhatcanbeclaimedasrightswithinexistinglegalsystems,andthatthisweakenssuchmovements(Schneider,1986).Manyfeministsinfluencedbypostmodernismandthecriticallegalstudiesap-proacharedeeplyskepticalofanyclaimstothetruthorobjectivityofanyasser-tionsaboutrights;theyseelawasanexpressionofpowerratherthanofmorality(Schneider,1986;Smart,1989;Smith,1993).Eventheseveryfundamentalcritiques,however,donotamounttoarejectionofrightsbymostfeminists.Theyleadinsteadtodemandsforreformulationsof162\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryexistingschemesofrights,tosuggestedreconstructionsoftheconceptofrights,andtorecommendationsforlimitingthereachoflawtoanappropriatesphereratherthanthinkingofrightsasthemodelforallmoralandpoliticalthinking.Feministjurisprudencehascontributedmanydetailedanalysesofwhatequalrightsforwomenwouldrequire(BartlettandKennedy,1991;Cornell,1998).Itisexam-iningwhendifferencesbetweenmenandwomen,anddifferencesbetweensomewomenandothers,needtobetakenintoaccount.Anditisquestioningtheprac-ticeoftakingmalecharacteristicsasthenormaccordingtowhichwomen’schar-acteristics,suchasthecapacitytobecomepregnant,areseenasdifferentandhencepresentaproblem.Men,itisnoted,areasdifferentfromwomenaswomenarefrommen.ChristineLittletonarguesthatwhatisoftenrequiredbytheequal-protectionclauseoftheUSConstitutionisnotsamenessoftreatmentbutequalityofdis-advantagebroughtaboutbythetreatment.Thus,ifapensionschemethatexcludespart-timeworkersandappearstobegender-neutralactuallyaffectswomenmuchmoreadverselythanmen,itisdiscriminatory.Littleton’sargumentisthatdiffer-enceshouldnotleadtodisadvantagebutshouldinsteadbecostless(Littleton,1987).Asimilarargumentcanbeusedwithrespecttoracialdisadvantages.Achiev-ingequalitymaywellrequirepositiveaction,includinggovernmentalaction,ratherthanmerelyignoringdifferences.Argumentsforpregnancyleave,childcarepro-vision,andaffirmativeactionprogramsallcombinearecognitionofequalityanddifference,anddenythatwemustchoosebetweenthese.Legalrightsoftenhelpbringaboutaspectsofthesocialchangeneeded.Theareaofsexualharassmentshowswellthepotentialoflegalrightstoimprovethelivesofwomen.Theinjuriesthatwomenhadlongexperiencedwereturnedbyfeministjurisprudenceintoaformofdiscriminationfromwhichlegalprotectioncouldbesought.CatharineMacKinnonherselfwritesthatthelawagainstsexualharassmentisatestofthe“possibilitiesforsocialchangeforwomenthroughlaw.”Womensubjecttoharmfulanddemeaningsexualpressureintheworkplace“havebeengivenaforum,legitimacytospeak,authoritytomakeclaims,andanavenueofpossiblerelief....Thelegalclaimforsexualharassmentmadetheeventsofsexualharassmentillegitimatesocially,aswellaslegallyforthefirsttime”(MacKinnon,1987,pp.103–4).Therearemanyexamplesoftheusesofrightstoreducethesubordinationofwomen,butthereareoftendisadvantagesintheseuses.Acknowledgingdiffer-encesbetweenwomenandmen,forinstanceinprotectinggirlsthroughstatutoryrapelaws,oftenstigmatizeswomenandperpetuatessexiststereotypes(Olsen,1984).Thebacklashagainstaffirmativeactionhasmadeitmoredifficultpoliti-callytoargueforpositiveeffortstoovercomegenderandracialdisadvantages.Butthereisastrongdeterminationonthepartoffeministstomaintaintherightsachieved.Itisgenerallyarguedthatreproductiverightsareapreconditionformostotherrightsforwomen,yettheyarecontinuallythreatened.ToPatriciaSmith,“itisinconceivablethatanyissuethatcomparablyaffectedthebasicindividual163\nVirginiaHeldfreedomofanymanwouldnotbeunderhiscontrolinafreesociety”(Smith,1993,p.14).Variousstrongvoiceshavealsoremindedfeministsofthecentralityofrightsargumentstomovementsforsocialjustice.Takingissuewiththecriticallegal-studiescritiqueofrights,PatriciaWilliamswritesthat“althoughrightsmaynotbeendsinthemselves,rightsrhetorichasbeenandcontinuestobeaneffectiveformofdiscourseforblacks”(Williams,1991,p.149).Subordinategroupscandescribetheirneedsatlength,butdoingsohasoftennotbeenpoliticallyeffec-tive,asithasnotbeenforAfricanAmericans.Williamsassertsthatwhatmustbefoundis“apoliticalmechanismthatcanconfrontthedenialofneed,”andrightshavethecapacitytodothis(p.152).UmaNarayanalsowarnsagainstaweakeningoffeministcommitmentstorights.Shedescribesthecolonialistprojectofdenyingrightstothecolonizedongroundsofapaternalisticconcernfortheirwelfare.Resistingthis,theuseofrightsdiscoursebythecolonizedtoasserttheirownclaimscontributedsignificantlytotheiremancipation.Andtheninturn,assertingtheirrightswasimportantforwomeninopposingthetraditionalpatriarchalviewsoftenprevalentamongthepreviouslycolonized(Narayan,1995).Itiswidelyunderstoodamongfeministcriticsofrightsthatrightsarenottime-lessorfixed,butcontestedanddeveloping.Rightsreflectsocialrealityandhavethecapacitytodecreaseactualoppression.Achievingrespectforbasicrightsisoftenagoalaroundwhichpoliticalstrugglescanbeorganized,andmanyofthemostsubstantialgainsmadebydisadvantagedgroupsarebasedonastrivingforjusticeandequalrights.Feministsdonotsuggestthatthesegainsandgoalsbeabandoned.Ontheotherhand,rightsargumentsmaynotservewellforthefullrangeofmoralandpoliticalconcernsthatfeministshave,andthelegalframeworkofrightsandjusticeshouldperhapsnotbethecentraldiscourseofmoralityandpolitics.Rightsareoneconcernamongothers,notthekeytoovercomingthesub-ordinationofwomen.Fromtheperspectiveofmanyfeminists,thepersonseenasaholderofindividualrightsinthetraditionofliberalpoliticaltheoryisanartifi-cialandmisleadingabstraction.Acceptingthisabstractionforsomelegalandpolit-icalpurposesmaybeuseful(FrazerandLacey,1993).Butweshouldnotsupposethatitisadequateformoralityorpoliticaltheoryingeneral(Held,1993).Somelegaltheoristshavearguedthatrightsneedtobefundamentallyrecon-ceptualized.MarthaMinowcriticizesrightsrhetoricforignoringrelationships,andarguesthatweshouldneverlosesightofthesocialrelationsofpowerandprivi-legewithinwhichindividualrightsareconstructed.Sheadvocatesaconceptionof“rightsinrelationships”thatcanbeusedagainstoppressiveformsofbothpublicandprivatepower.Weneed,shewrites,“ashiftintheparadigmweusetocon-ceiveofdifference,ashiftfromafocusonthedistinctionsbetweenpeopletoafocusontherelationshipswithinwhichwenoticeanddrawdistinctions”(Minow,1990,p.15).Shewants,however,to“rescue”rights,notabandonthem,seeingthatthereissomething“toovaluableintheaspirationofrights”forustodispensewiththediscourseofrights(p.307).164\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryMuchofthecriticismofrightscanperhapsbestbeseenasresistancetotheideathattheapproachesandconceptsoflawandrightsshouldbegeneralizedtothewholeofmoralityandpoliticalthinking.Itisnotsomuchanattempttodis-pensewithrightsinthedomainoflawastolimitlegalisticinterpretationstothedomainoflawratherthanseethemextendedtoallmoralandpoliticalissues.Oncewethinkoftheframeworkoflawandrightsasonetobelimitedtoasomewhatnarrowrangeofhumanconcernsratherthanastheappropriateonewithinwhichtointerpretallmoralandpoliticalproblems,othermoralapproachescanbecomesalientandsocialandpoliticalorganizationcanbebasedonothergoalsandcon-cernsaswellasonthoseofrights.TheEthicsofCareIfmoralityshouldnotbedominatedbythemodeloftheliberalindividualwithhisrightsandeconomicinterestsandlegalprotections,whataretheimplicationsforpoliticaltheory?Theethicsofcarewasinitiallydevelopedwithanemphasisontheexperienceofwomeninactivitiessuchascaringforchildren,ortakingcareoftheillortheelderly,orcultivatingtiesoffriendshipandpersonalaffection.Itwasrealizedthatmoralissuesaboundinthesedomains,aboutwhichstandardmoraltheoryhadalmostnothingtosay(Gilligan,1982;Noddings,1984;Ruddick,1989).Careethicshasbynowdevelopedfarbeyonditsoriginalformulations,andthereisanextensiveanddiverseliteratureonthisalternativemoralapproach(Card,1991,1999;Held,1995;Tong,1993).DominantmoraltheoriessuchasKantianethicsandutilitarianismareuniver-salisticandrationalistic.Althoughmuchhasbeenwrittenaboutthedifferencesbetweenthem,fromafeministperspectivetheirsimilaritiesaremorepronouncedthanwhatdividesthem.Bothrelyonasingle,ultimateuniversalprinciple–theCategoricalImperativeorthePrincipleofUtility.Botharerationalisticintheirmoralepistemologiesandbothemployaconceptionofthepersonasarational,independent,liberalindividual.InMargaretWalker’sestimation,theseare“theoretical-juridical”accountsofmoralitywhichrepeatedlyinvoketheimageof“afraternityofindependentpeersinvokinglawstodeliververdictswithauthority”(Walker,1998,p.1).InFionaRobinson’sevaluation,dominantmoraltheoriesgiveprimacytovaluessuchasautonomy,independence,non-interference,self-determination,fairness,andrights,andinvolvea“systematicdevaluingofnotionsofinterdependence,relat-edness,andpositiveinvolvement”inthelivesofothers(Robinson,1999,p.10).Thesedominantmoraltheoriesthathavebothsupportedandreflectedliberalpoliticaltheoryhaveeitherignoredaltogethertheexperiencesofwomenincaringactivitiesortheyhavedismissedthemasirrelevant.Caringforchildrenhasbeenseenas“natural”orinstinctivebehaviornot“governed”bymorality,orfamilylifehasbeenthoughtofasapersonalpreferenceindividualsmaychoosetopursueor165\nVirginiaHeldnot.Walkershowshowthetheoretical-juridicalaccountsofmoralityareputforwardasappropriatefor“the”moralagent,orasrecommendationsforhow“we”oughttoact.Butthesecanonicalformsofmoraljudgmentarethejudg-mentsofsomeoneresembling“ajudge,manager,bureaucrat,orgamesman”(Walker,1998,p.21).Theyrepresentinabstractandidealizedformsthejudgmentsofdominantpersonsinanestablishedsocialorder,notthemoralexperiencesofwomencaringforchildrenoragedparents,ofill-paidminorityservice-workersinahospital,orofthemembersofcolonizedgroupsrelyingoncommunaltiesfortheirsurvival.Tofeminists,theexperienceofwomenisoftheutmostrelevance,tomoralityandpoliticaltheoryaswellastootherendeavors.Women’sexperiencedoesnotcountmerelywhenwomenenterthe“public”realmssymbolicallyifnotnowexclusivelydesignatedasmale.Andtheexperienceofmarginalizedandsubordi-nategroupsisasrelevantasisthatofthosewhooccupypositionsofprivilege.Perhapsitismorerelevant,sinceprivilegecansoeasilydistortone’sviewsofsocietyandmorality.Women’sexperiencesofcaretakingandofcultivatingsocialtiesarebeingtakenbyfeministtheoristsashighlyimportantforunderstandingthemoralitynotonlyoffamilylife,butofpubliclifeaswell.Theethicsofcaregivesexpressiontowomen’sexperienceofempathy,ofmutualtrust,andoftheemotionshelpfultomorality.Thisexperienceispartofandcanbemoreofmen’sexperiencealso,butithasnotbeenreflectedindominantmoraltheories.Theethicsofcareappreciatesthetieswehavewithparticularothersandtheactualrelationshipsthatpartlyconstituteouridentity.Althoughweoftenseektoreshapetheseties,todistanceourselvesfromsomepersonsandgroupsandtodevelopnewtieswithothers,theautonomyweseekisacapacitytoreshapeourrelationships,nottobetheunencumberedabstractindividualselfofliberalpolit-icalandmoraltheory(Clement,1996;MackenzieandStoljar,2000;Meyers,1997).Thosewhosincerelycareforothersactforparticularothersandfortheactualrelationshipbetweenthem,notfortheirownindividualinterestsandnotoutofdutytoauniversallawforallrationalbeings,orforthegreatestbenefitofthegreatestnumber.Universalrulesofimpartialityoftenseeminapplicableorinappropriateincon-textsoffamilyandfriendship(Friedman,1993).Certainly,however,weneedmoraltheorytoevaluaterelationsbetweenpersonsandtheactionsofrelationalpersonsinwhathavebeenthoughtofaspersonalcontexts.Virtuetheoryhasoftenbeenthoughttooffermorepromisingapproachesforthesecontexts;AristotleandHumearefrequentlyinvoked.Butvirtuetheory,likeliberalmorality,maybetaintedbyitspatriarchalandindividualisticpast.TheManofVirtueconcernedforhisdispositions,likeTheManofReasondissectedbyfeministcritiques(Lloyd,1984),maystillbearlittleresemblancetothewomanorservice-workerengagedinaffectionatecare.Theethicsofcarethatdoesspeakforpersonsinrelationsshouldthennotbethoughtofasvaluingamerepreferenceorextrathatimpar-tialrulescanpermitwhileretainingpriority,butasachallengetouniversalisticmoralityitself.166\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryThedominantmoraltheoriesclaimtooffermoralguidanceforallmoralprob-lems;iftheirrulesdonotapplytocertainkindsofissues,theseareoverlookedorseenasnotmoralissues.However,asSusanMenduswrites,toapplymoralrulestoloveandfriendshipistousea“deformedmodel”forthesecontexts(Mendus,1996).Weshouldnot,though,concludethatthesecontextsare“beyond”or“outside”morality.Weshouldfindmoralitythatilluminatesandgivesguidanceforthem,astheethicsofcaretriestodo.Incontrasttotherationalistepiste-mologiesofdominantmoraltheories,theethicsofcarevaluestheemotions,notonlyincarryingoutthedictatesofreasonbutinhelpingusunderstandwhatweoughttodo.Empathy,sensitivity,andopennesstonarrativenuancemaybebetterguidestowhatmoralityrequiresinspecificactualcircumstancesthanarerationalprinciplesorcalculations.Theethicsofcareisneededmostclearlyinsuchcontextsasthoseoffamilyandfriendship.Butitshouldnotbethoughtofaslimitedtothese.Somefeministswouldliketoseeitdisplaceentirelythedominantethicsofjusticeandrights,oruniversalrules.Mostothersseekanappropriateintegrationofjusticeandcare,liberalrightsandempatheticconcern.Noadvocateoftheethicsofcareseemswillingtoseeitasamoraloutlooklessvaluablethanthedominantones(Clement,1996).Toimaginetheconcernsofcareethicistsasonesthatcanmerelybeaddedontothedominanttheoriesisunsatisfactory.Toconfinetheethicsofcaretotheprivatespherewhileholdingitunsuitableforpubliclifeisnolesstoberejected.Buthowtheethicsofcareandliberalpoliticaltheoryaretobemeshedremainstobeseen.Mostwhodefendtheethicsofcarerecognizethatcarealonecannotadequatelyhandlemanyquestionsofjusticeandrights.Forinstance,membersofaprivilegedgroupmayfeelcompassiontowardsandevencareformembersofagrouptheyconsiderunfortunate,butfailtorecognizethatthelatterdeserverespectfortheirrights–includingrightstosuchbasicnecessitiesasfood,shelter,andhealthcare–notpaternalisticcharity.Yetcaremaybethewiderframeworkwithinwhichweshoulddevelopcivilsocietyandschemesofrights.Withoutsomedegreeofcaring,personswillbeindifferenttothefatesofothers,includingtoviolationsoftheirrights.Andintheprocessofrespectingpersons’rights,suchastobasicnecessi-ties,policiesthatexpressthecaringofthecommunityforallitsmemberswillbesuperiortothosethatgrudginglyissueanallotmenttotheunfit.Manyfeministsarguefortherelevanceofcareforthepoliticaldomain(Held,1993,1995;Kittay,1999;Ruddick,1989;Tronto,1993,1996).Elevatingcaretoaconcernasimportantasthetraditionalconcernsofliberalindividualsmightrequireadeeprestructuringofsociety.Arrangementsfortheupbringingandhealth,educationanddevelopmentofchildrenwouldmovetothecenterofpublicattention,notbelefttothevagariesofthemarketortheinadequaciesofarbitrarylocalorcharitablesupport.Caringfortheelderlywouldbeseenasapublicconcern,notaburdenforindividualadultchildren,usuallywomen(Harrington,1999).Considerationsofhowculturecouldenlightenandenrichhumanlifewouldreplacethecurrentabandonmentofculturetothedictatesofeconomic167\nVirginiaHeldgainthatnowdeterminehowcultureisproducedanddistributed(Schiller,1989).Economicactivitywouldbesociallysupportedtoservehumanwell-beingratherthanmerelytheincreasedeconomicpoweroftheeconomicallypowerful.JoanTrontoarguesthatweshouldthinkofcareasapoliticalconcept,andsheattributesthefailuretodosotogenderedassumptionsthatunderliestandardpoliticalviews.Caringactivities,largelylefttowomenandill-paidminorityworkers,havebeenseenaseither“below”politics,toonarrowandnaturaltobeofconcerntopolitics,ortheyhavebeenseenascharityandthus“above”politics.Shearguesthatsuchviewsignore“thatcareisacomplexprocessthatultimatelyreflectsstructuresofpower,economicorder...andournotionsofautonomyandequality.”Theactivitiesthatconstitutecareare“crucialforhumanlife,”andseeingcareasapoliticalconceptwouldenableustorealizethat“asocietyflourisheswhenitscitizensarewellcaredfor”(Tronto,1996,pp.142–4).Rec-ognizingcareaspoliticalgivesusrecommendationsforemploymentpolicies,schoolexpenditures,accesstohealthcare,andovercomingdiscrimination.Careisnotonlyrelevanttopolitics,butalsotointernationalaffairs.FionaRobinsondevelopsa“criticalethicofcare”capableofmovingbeyondthepersonalnotonlytothepubliclifeofagivensociety,buttodealingwithissuesofglobalconflict,poverty,anddevelopment(Robinson,1999).Shecites,forinstance,manyexamplesshowingthatinmitigatingglobalpoverty,itisvitaltobuildstrongrelationshipsbetweenlocalcommunitiesintheSouthandorganiza-tionsintheNorth,andtodevelopabilitiestobeattentivetoothers.Careshouldnotbethoughtofassentimentalorpaternalistic;itcanbeeffectiveandresponsi-ble.Manyfeministshavebeenconcernedwiththeadverseeffectsofglobalizationanddevelopmentonwomen,andseekfeministapproachestodealingwiththesetrends.Theethicsofcarebuildstrustandmutualresponsivenesstoneedonboththepersonalandwidersociallevel.Withinsocialrelationsinwhichwecareenoughabouteachothertorespecteachother’srights,wemayagreeforlimitedpurposestoimagineeachotherasliberalindividuals,andtoadoptliberalpoliciestomax-imizeindividualbenefits.Butweshouldnotlosesightoftherestrictedandarti-ficialaspectsofsuchconceptions.Theethicsofcareoffersaviewofboththemoreimmediateandthemoredistanthumanrelationsonwhichasatisfactorypoliticscanbebuilt.Andwiththenewmoralinsightsmadeavailablebytheethicsofcare,wecanbegintoseehowpoliticallifewillneedtobetransformed.PostmodernismandFeminismManyfeministpoliticaltheoristshavebeeninfluencedbypostmodernism(BenhabibandCornell,1987;Nicholson,1990).Critiques,bysuchwritersasFoucault,Derrida,RichardRorty,andLyotard,ofEnlightenmentclaimstoratio-nalanduniversaltruthshavehelpedmanyfeministsdismantlegenderedconcepts168\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryandassumptionstakenascertainties.Inplaceofbiasedclaimstouniversalandtimelessrationalunderstanding,postmodernismandmanyfeministsoffersocialcriticism,frommanydifferentculturalandracialperspectives,thatisfrac-tured,contextual,pluralistic,andadhoc.Glimpses,images,andcollagesofobser-vationsareoftenthoughttoprovidemoreinsightthanmisleadingtotalizingabstractions.Intheprojectofreconstruction,however,manyfeministshavefoundapost-modernstancelesshelpful.Attemptstodelineateasocialordermorehospitabletowomenandotherdisadvantagedgroupsfallpreytothesameweaponsofironyanddeconstructionusedontheordertheyaimtodisplace.Toanumberoffeminists,postmodernapproachesareseenashostiletothepoliticalgoalsoffeminism.Thesetheoristsfearthatpostmoderncelebrationsofdisunityunder-minepoliticaleffortstoresistthehegemonyofcorporatecapitalismandtoachieveprogress.Whatfeministsneed,NancyHartsockargues,isnotawholesaleandone-sidedrejectionofmodernity,butatransformationofpowerrelations,andforthis“weneedtoengageinthehistorical,political,andtheoreticalprocessofconstitutingourselvesassubjects”engagedinmakingadifferentworld.Sheacknowledgesthatsomewilldismissherviewas“callingfortheconstructionofanothertotalizingandfalselyuniversaldiscourse,”butsherejectstheviewthatEnlightenmentthoughtandpostmoderndisassemblingsaretheonlyalternatives.Membersofmarginalizedandoppressedgroupsarenot“likelytomistakethemselvesfortheuniversal‘man’,”buttheycanstillnameanddescribetheirexperiencesandworktotransformthepoliticalprocess(Hartsock,1996,p.42).Manyotherfeministsappreciatepostmoderncontributionsbutaresimilarlyawareoftheirpoliticalweaknesses.FeminismandPowerWemustnotlosesightofpowerastheveryrealcapacitytoopposewhatmoral-ity,evenifpersuasive,recommends,norofthepowerofthestructuresthatkeepoppressioninplace.Thisbringssomefeministsbacktopoliticaltheoryinthemoretraditionalsense,seeingpoliticsasinherentlyaboutpowerandfocusingonit.AsChristineDiStefanosays,“power,alongwithitsassociatedconcept,thepolitical,isthesubjectmatteroffeministpoliticalphilosophy”(DiStefano,2000,p.96).Butpowerisitselfoneoftheconceptsundergoingfeministreconceptualizations.Inanearlytreatment,NancyHartsockanalyzedwhatshetooktobeafeministalternativetothestandardconceptionofpowerasthecapacitytodominate,ofpoweroverothers.Shefoundanumberofwomentheoristswritingofpowerasenergyandcompetence,or“powerto”ratherthan“powerover,”andshedevel-opedthisalternativeidea(Hartsock,1983).Feministshavealsoexploredthepower,forinstanceofmothers,toempowerothers.169\nVirginiaHeldMorerecently,AmyAllenexaminesthreeconceptionsofpowerthatfeministshavebeenworkingwith.Theyrecognizepowerasresource,powerasdomination,andpowerasempowerment.Shefindsthefirstinadequatebecauseitsuggeststhatpowercanbe“possessed,distributed,andredistributed,andthesecondandthirdareunsatisfactorybecauseeachoftheseconceptionsemphasizesonlyoneaspectofthemultifacetedpowerrelationsthatfeministsaretryingtounderstand”(AmyAllen,1999,p.3).ShediscussestheworkofFoucault,JudithButler,andHannahArendt,anddevelopsherownconceptionthatconstruespoweras“arelationratherthanasapossession,”butavoidsthetendency“tomistakeoneaspectofpower,”suchasdominationorempowerment,forthewholeofit(p.3).Feministcriticsoftheprojectofbringingthevaluesofcareandconcern,trustandrelatednesstopublicandpoliticallifeworrythatdoingsomayleadustolosesightofthepower,especiallyinthesenseofpowertodominate,thatmaybearrayedagainstprogress(DiStefano,2000).Thereisnodoubtthatabacklashagainstwomen’sadvanceshasoccurredinmanyformsalongwiththegainswomenhavemadeinrecentdecades.Butadvocatingthatpoliticallifeoughttobeguidedmuchmorethanatpresentbythevaluesofcareandtrustinnowayentailssoft-headednessabouttheobstaclesfeministsmustexpectintransformingsociety.Therearemanyconflictsofaneconomic,religious,andethnickindwrackingtheglobe,thatnon-feministandsomefeministcriticsseeapoliticsofcareasunsuitableforaddressing.Butanethicofcareisquitecapableofexaminingthesocialstructuresofpowerwithinwhichtheactivitiesofcaringtakeplace(Tronto,1993).Andthereisnothingsoft-headedaboutcare.AsSaraRuddickemphasizes,familylifeandbringingupchildrenarerifewithconflict.Sometimesrulesmustbeestablishedandenforced,andpunishmentsmetedout.Butthoseadeptintheskillsofmothering,ofdefusingconflictsbeforetheybecomeviolent,ofsettlingdisputesamongthosewhocannotjustleavebutmustlearntogetalongwithoneanother,havemuchtoteachpeacemakersandpeacekeepersinotherdomains(Ruddick,1989).Asinternationalmechanismsevolvefordealingwithconflictandforpersuadingtheuninvolvedtocontributethefundsandpersonnelneededtocontrolviolenceandbuildtolerance,theywilldependheavilyoncitizenscaringaboutpotentialvictims,wantingtopreventtheirsuffering,andunderstandingwhatneedstobedone(Robinson,1999).Andthisfactorofrelatednesstootherhumanbeingsmaybemoreimportantthanamererationalrecognitionofabstractliberalrights,thoughprogressinunderstandingandrespectinghumanrightsissurelyimportantalso.Furthermore,incounteringthecorporatepowerthatthreatenstooverwhelmpoliticsaswellasallotheraspectsofgloballifewithitsideologyofSocialDar-winism,liberalindividualismoffersweakdefenses(Kuttner,1996;Schiller,1989).Corporatepowerisoftenexercisedthroughenticementratherthancoercion.Itcanincreaseitsreachandtheinfluenceofitsvaluesinmanywayswithoutviolat-ingliberalrights.Whatisneededtorestrainitsimperialisticexpansionisanasser-tionofalternativevalues,suchascareandtrustandhumansolidarity.170\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryFeminismandPoliticalChangeFeminismseekstooverturnthegenderhierarchythathasinvariousformsmain-taineditspowerandpermeatedalmostallaspectsofeveryknownsocietythrough-outhumanhistory,andtoreplaceitwithequalitybetweenmenandwomen.Thiswillrequirethetransformationofwhatisthoughtofasknowledge,ofthewayspeoplethinkandbehaveatalmostalllevels,ofalmostallinstitutions,ofculture,ofsociety.Doingthisiscertainlyrevolutionaryandcannotbeimaginedtobeahistoricalchangetobeaccomplishedrapidly.Feministsdonotseektosimplyreplacemenwithacomparablenumberofwomenintheexistingpositionsofpowerdetermininghowsocietywilldevelop,theyseektochangethewaythesepositionsarethoughtaboutandstructured.Mostfeministswhorejectpostmodernwarningsaboutpositinganyalternativestothefailedonesofmodernismsuggestsuchimaginablethoughdistantgoalsasanendofdomination,exploitation,andhierarchyasinherentfeaturesofsociety.Theyseekanorderingofsocietyalongcooperativelinesthatfostermutualtrustandcaring.Asanideal,ademocraticpoliticalsystemmayseektotreatcitizensequally,butitmaypresumeconflictinginterestsbetweenthem,andmayallowaneconomicsystemthatpromotesconflictandself-interestfarmorethancoopera-tion.Astheeconomicsystemdominatesmoreandmoreofthesociety,asincapitalistsocietiesatpresent,cooperationismoreandmoremarginalized.Thefeministidealofdemocracyisoftendifferent.ThedominantwayofthinkingaboutdemocracysincetheseventeenthcenturyhasseenitaswhatJaneMansbridgecalls“adversarydemocracy,”inwhichcon-flictinginterestscompete,limitedonlybycontractualrestraints,andthestrongestwin(Mansbridge,1983).Shenotesthatinpractice,citizensinactualdemocraticsystemshaveoftensoughttopersuaderatherthanmerelyoverpowertheiroppo-nents.Buttheleadingviewsofthepastseveraldecadescontinuetoseedemoc-racyasadversarial,andpoliticalpracticesseemincreasinglytoaccordwithsuchviews.Mansbridgewouldliketoseethiskindofdemocracyreplacedbyone“wheremutualpersuasionhelpsrealizesharedgoalsandinterests”(Mansbridge,1996,p.123).Shethinksthatfeministunderstandingsofmaternalandotherformsofcon-nectednesscanhelpusbringaboutthemoreconsultativeandparticipatoryprocessesthatmanytheoristsadvocate(Cunningham,1987;Gould,1988)andthatsheseesas“unitarydemocracy.”Manyleadingtheoristsofdemocracythinkofdeliberationaslimitedtowhatis“reasoned”andimpartial,butfeministsexaminehowactivatingfeelingsofempathyandresponsibilityisalsoneededtoreachsharedobjectives.Ofcourse,someemotionsaredangerous,butothersoughttobeincludedinourunderstandingofwhatdemocracyrequiresandshouldbewelcomedintodemocraticdiscourse(Phillips,1995;Taylor,1995;Young,1990).Mansbridgenotesthatconcernforongoingrelationships,listening,empathy,evencommoninterests,havebeencodedasfemaleandtherefore171\nVirginiaHelddevaluedbypoliticaltheoristseagertobeseenastough-minded.Feministtheo-ristsareshowing,incontrast,howtheseconsiderationsareessentialforacceptableusesofpower,includingdemocraticpower.Theyunderstandatthesametimethatpowerispervasiveinhumanlifeandcannotbeignored.Butitcanbedevelopedandusedinmorallyappropriateways(Jones,1993).Theextenttowhichtheworldisstillwrackedbyethnicandracialdivisionsthathavenotyieldedtoliberaluniversalismmustbeacknowledged.Thefeministunderstandingofhowbothequalityanddifferencecanberespectedcanbeusefulinshowinghowpoliticscandealwithgroupconflict.Aswehavecometoseecon-cerningwomen,membersofgroupscanbebothequalto,butdifferentfrom,dominantgroups.Toberespectedasanequalshouldnotmeanbeingreducedtosameness,whichpurportedsamenesshashistoricallyreflectedthecharacteristicsofthedominantgroup(Mendus,1992;Young,1990).Inasocietyincreasinglyinfluencedbyfeminismandthevaluesofcareandconcern,theneedforlawandcoercionwouldnotdisappear,buttheirusemightbecomeprogressivelymorelimitedassocietywouldlearntobringupitschildrensothatfewerandfewerwouldsinktoviolenceorinsistonpursuingtheirownindividualinterestsattheexpenseofothersorwithoutreasonablerestraints.Eveninthemostcooperativesocieties,politicswouldstillbeneededtomakeappro-priatedecisionsandtodeterminesuitablepolicies.Butthetermsofthecontestsmightbepoliticalinthesensethatthebestargumentswouldbepersuasive.Theywouldnotneedtobepoliticalinthesenseofthepowertocoerce,throughpolit-icalpositionorlegalsanctionoreconomicpowerorsheernumbersofvotes,deter-miningtheoutcome.Economicpowerwouldbelimitedsothatitwouldnotcontrolpoliticalandculturaldiscourse.Andwecouldforeseethatmuchmorepublicdebatewouldbeconductedinthedomainofaculturefreedfromeco-nomicdomination(Held,1993).Suchaculturecouldapproachthefreediscourseonwhichdemocraticdecisionsoughttobebased,alongwiththeprotectionsofbasicrights.Theoutcomesmightthenmuchmorenearlyapproachconsensusthanpoliticalcoercion.Whileusingpoliticalpowertocoerceisprogressoverusingvio-lenceormilitaryforcetodoso,freelygivenaccordisbetterstill.Andthedis-courseinfluencedbyfeministvalueswouldnotbelimitedtotherationalprinciplesoftraditionalpublicandpoliticalphilosophy.Imagesandnarrativesappealingtothemoralemotionsofempathyandcaringwouldalsocontribute(Held,1993;Landes,1998).Feministethicalviewswouldbeonaparwithtraditionalonesaspersonswoulddefuseconflictwithconversationandseekcooperativelytoprovideforchildrenandcarefortheirglobalenvironment.ReferencesAllen,Amy(1999).ThePowerofFeministTheory:Domination,Resistance,Solidarity.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.172\nFeminismandPoliticalTheoryAllen,Anita(1988).UneasyAccess:PrivacyforWomeninaFreeSociety.Totowa,NJ:RowmanandLittlefield.Baier,AnnetteC.(1994).MoralPrejudices:EssaysonEthics.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUni-versityPress.Barry,Brian(1973).TheLiberalTheoryofJustice.London:OxfordUniversityPress.Bartlett,KatherineT.andRosanneKennedy(eds.)(1991).FeministLegalTheory:Read-ingsinLawandGender.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.Benhabib,Seyla(1992).SituatingtheSelf:Gender,Community,andPostmodernisminCon-temporaryEthics.NewYork:Routledge.——andDrucillaCornell(eds.)(1987).FeminismasCritique:OnthePoliticsofGender.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.Callahan,Joan(ed.)(1995).Reproduction,Ethics,andtheLaw:FeministPerspectives.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.Card,Claudia(ed.)(1991).FeministEthics.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas.——(ed.)(1999).OnFeministEthicsandPolitics.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas.Clarke,LorenneandLyndaLange(eds.)(1979).TheSexismofSocialandPoliticalThought.Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress.Clement,Grace(1996).Care,Autonomy,andJustice.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.Collins,PatriciaHill(1990).BlackFeministThought:Knowledge,Consciousness,andthePoliticsofEmpowerment.Boston:UnwinHyman.Cornell,Drucilla(1998).AttheHeartofFreedom:Feminism,Sex,andEquality.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Crenshaw,Kimberle(1993).“MappingtheMargins:Intersectionality,IdentityPoliticsandViolenceAgainstWomenofColor.”StanfordLawReview,43:6.Cunningham,Frank(1987).DemocraticTheoryandSocialism.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.DiStefano,Christine(1991).ConfigurationsofMasculinity:AFeministPerspectiveonModernPoliticalTheory.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.——(2000).“FeministPoliticalPhilosophy.”InAPANewsletteronFeminismandPhilos-ophy,Spring:196–200.Els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ly,hereIproposetosimplyeliminatetheconfusingterminologyandrecasttheunder-lyingdefense.Ofcourse,thedefenseofliberalismthatIproposetoprovide,likeanydefense,10isembeddedinatraditionwithitspresuppositions.Nevertheless,thebasicpre-suppositionofthisdefense,namely,thatviewsthatcanbesupportedwithnon-question-beggingargumentsarerationallypreferable,ishardlyopentochallenge.IAMoralConceptionoftheGoodThereislittledoubtthatprovidingliberalswithanon-question-beggingdefenseoftheircommitmenttoamoralratherthanaself-interestedconceptionofthegoodisthemostdifficultpartofdefendingliberalism.Buttoseehowsuchadefenseispossible,letusbeginbyimaginingthatweare,asmembersofasociety,deliberatingoverwhatsortofprinciplesgoverningactionweoughttoaccept.Letusassumethateachofusiscapableofentertainingandactinguponbothself-interestedandmoralreasonsandthatthequestionweareseekingtoansweris11whatsortofprinciplesgoverningactionitwouldberationalforustoaccept.Thisquestionisnotaboutwhatsortofprinciplesweshouldpubliclyaffirmsincepeoplewillsometimespubliclyaffirmprinciplesthatarequitedifferentfromthosetheyarepreparedtoactupon,butratheritisaquestionofwhatprinciplesitwouldberationalforustoacceptatthedeepestlevel–inourheartofhearts.Therearepeoplewhoareincapableofactinguponmoralreasons,ofcourse.Forsuchpeople,thereisnoquestionabouttheirbeingrequiredtoactmorallyoraltruistically.Yettheinterestingphilosophicalquestionisnotaboutsuchpeoplebutaboutpeople,likeourselves,whoarecapableofactingmorallyaswellasself-interestedlyandareseekingarationaljustificationforfollowingaparticularcourseofaction.178\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismIntryingtodeterminehowweshouldact,letusassumethatwewouldliketobeabletoconstructagoodargumentfavoringmoralityoveregoism,andgiventhatgoodargumentsarenon-question-begging,weaccordinglywouldliketocon-structanargumentthat,asfaraspossible,doesnotbegthequestion.Theques-tionatissuehereiswhatreasonseachofusshouldtakeassupreme,andthisquestionwouldbebeggedagainstegoismifweproposedtoansweritsimplybyassumingfromthestartthatmoralreasonsarethereasonsthateachofusshouldtakeassupreme.Butthequestionwouldbebeggedagainstmoralityaswellifweproposedtoanswerthequestionsimplybyassumingfromthestartthatself-interestedreasonsarethereasonsthateachofusshouldtakeassupreme.Thismeans,ofcourse,thatwecannotanswerthequestionofwhatreasonsweshouldtakeassupremesimplybyassumingthegeneralprincipleofegoism:Eachpersonoughttodowhatbestserveshisorheroverallself-interest.Wecannomoreargueforegoismsimplybydenyingtherelevanceofmoralreasonstorationalchoicethanwecanargueforpurealtruismsimplybydenyingtherelevanceofself-interestedreasonstorationalchoiceandassumingthefollowinggeneralprincipleofpurealtruism:12Eachpersonoughttodowhatbestservestheoverallinterestofothers.Consequently,inordernottobegthequestion,wehavenootheralternativebuttogranttheprimafacierelevanceofbothself-interestedandmoralreasonstorationalchoiceandthentrytodeterminewhichreasonswewouldberationallyrequiredtoactupon,allthingsconsidered.Noticethatinordernottobegthequestion,itisnecessarytobackofffromboththegeneralprincipleofegoismandthegeneralprincipleofpurealtruism,thusgrantingtheprimafacierelevanceofbothself-interestedandmoralreasonstorationalchoice.Fromthisstandpoint,itisstillanopenquestion,whethereitheregoismorpurealtruismwillberationallypreferable,allthingsconsidered.Inthisregard,therearetwokindsofcasesthatmustbeconsidered:casesinwhichthereisaconflictbetweentherelevantself-interestedandmoralreasons,andcasesinwhichthereisnosuchconflict.Itseemsobviousthatwherethereisnoconflictandbothreasonsareconclu-sivereasonsoftheirkind,bothreasonsshouldbeactedupon.Insuchcontexts,weshoulddowhatisfavoredbothbymoralityandbyself-interest.Ofcourse,defendersofegoismcannotbutbedisconcertedwiththisresultsinceitshowsthatactionsinaccordwithegoismarecontrarytoreasonatleastwhentherearetwoequallygoodwaysofpursuingone’sself-interest,onlyoneofwhichdoesnotcon-flictwiththebasicrequirementsofmorality.Noticealsothatincaseswheretherearetwoequallygoodwaysoffulfillingthebasicrequirementsofmorality,onlyoneofwhichdoesnotconflictwithwhatisinaperson’soverallself-interest,itis179\nJamesP.Sterbanotatalldisconcertingfordefendersofmoralitytoadmitthatwearerationallyrequiredtochoosethewaythatdoesnotconflictwithwhatisinouroverallself-interest.Nevertheless,exposingthisdefectinegoismforcaseswheremoralreasonsandself-interestedreasonsdonotconflictwouldbebutasmallvictoryfordefend-ersofmoralityifitwerenotalsopossibletoshowthatincaseswheresuchreasonsdoconflict,moralreasonswouldhavepriorityoverself-interestedreasons.Nowwhenwerationallyassesstherelevantreasonsinconflictcases,itisbesttocasttheconflictnotasaconflictbetweenself-interestedreasonsandmoralreasonsbutinsteadasaconflictbetweenself-interestedreasonsandaltruistic13reasons.Viewedinthisway,threesolutionsarepossible.First,wecouldsaythatself-interestedreasonsalwayshavepriorityoverconflictingaltruisticreasons.Second,wecouldsayjusttheopposite,thataltruisticreasonsalwayshaveprior-ityoverconflictingself-interestedreasons.Third,wecouldsaythatsomekindofcompromiseisrationallyrequired.Inthiscompromise,sometimesself-interestedreasonswouldhavepriorityoveraltruisticreasons,andsometimesaltruisticreasonswouldhavepriorityoverself-interestedreasons.Oncetheconflictisdescribedinthismanner,thethirdsolutioncanbeseentobetheonethatisrationallyrequired.Thisisbecausethefirstandsecondsolu-tionsgiveexclusiveprioritytooneclassofrelevantreasonsovertheother,andonlyacompletelyquestion-beggingjustificationcanbegivenforsuchanexclu-sivepriority.Onlybyemployingthethirdsolution,andsometimesgivingprior-itytoself-interestedreasons,andsometimesgivingprioritytoaltruisticreasons,canweavoidacompletelyquestion-beggingresolution.Noticealsothatthisstandardofrationalitywillnotsupportjustanycompro-misebetweentherelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasons.Thecompromisemustbeanonarbitraryone,forotherwiseitwouldbegthequestionwithrespect14totheopposingegoisticandaltruisticperspectives.Suchacompromisewouldhavetorespecttherankingsofself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsimposedbytheegoisticandaltruisticperspectives,respectively.Sinceforeachindividualthereisaseparaterankingofthatindividual’srelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasons(whichwillvary,ofcourse,dependingontheindividual’scapabilitiesandcircumstances),wecanrepresenttheserankingsfromthemostimportantreasonstotheleastimportantreasonsasfollows:IndividualAIndividualBSelf-InterestedAltruisticSelf-InterestedAltruisticReasonsReasonsReasonsReasons111122223333............NNNN180\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismAccordingly,anynonarbitrarycompromiseamongsuchreasonsinseekingnottobegthequestionagainsteitheregoismorpurealtruismwillhavetogiveprioritytothosereasonsthatrankhighestineachcategory.Failuretogiveprioritytothehighest-rankingaltruisticorself-interestedreasonswould,otherthingsbeingequal,becontrarytoreason.Ofcourse,therewillbecasesinwhichtheonlywaytoavoidbeingrequiredtodowhatiscontrarytoyourhighest-rankingreasonsisbyrequiringsomeoneelsetodowhatiscontrarytoherhighest-rankingreasons.Someofthesecaseswillbe“lifeboatcases,”as,forexample,whereyouandtwoothersarestrandedonalifeboatthathasonlyenoughresourcesfortwoofyoutosurvivebeforeyouwillberescued.Butalthoughsuchcasesaresurelydifficulttoresolve(maybeonlyachancemechanism,likeflippingacoin,canofferareasonableresolution),theysurelydonotreflectthetypicalconflictbetweentherelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsthatweareorwereabletoacquire.Typically,oneortheotheroftheconflictingreasonswillranksignificantlyhigheronitsrespectivescale,thuspermittingaclearresolution.Nowwecanseehowmoralitycanbeviewedasjustsuchanonarbitrarycom-promisebetweenself-interestedandaltruisticreasons.First,acertainamountofself-regardismorallyrequiredoratleastmorallyacceptable.Wherethisisthecase,high-rankingself-interestedreasonshavepriorityoverlow-rankingaltruisticreasons.Second,moralityobviouslyplaceslimitsontheextenttowhichpeopleshouldpursuetheirownself-interest.Wherethisisthecase,high-rankingaltru-isticreasonshavepriorityoverlow-rankingself-interestedreasons.Inthisway,moralitycanbeseentobeanonarbitrarycompromisebetweenself-interestedandaltruisticreasons,andthe“moralreasons”thatconstitutethatcompromisecanbeseenashavinganabsolutepriorityovertheself-interestedoraltruisticreasons15thatconflictwiththem.Itisalsoimportanttoseehowthiscompromiseviewhasbeensupportedbyatwo-stepargumentthatisnotquestion-beggingatall.Inthefirststep,ourgoalwastodeterminewhatsortofreasonsforactionitwouldberationalforustoacceptonthebasisofagoodargument,andthisrequiredanon-question-beggingstartingpoint.Notingthatbothegoism,whichfavoredexclusivelyself-interestedreasons,andpurealtruism,whichfavoredexclusivelyaltruisticreasons,offeredonlyquestion-beggingstartingpoints,wetookasournon-question-beggingstart-ingpointtheprimafacierelevanceofbothself-interestedandaltruisticreasonstorationalchoice.Thelogicalinferencehereisanalogoustotheinferenceofequalprobabilitysanctionedindecisiontheorywhenwehavenoevidencethatonealter-16nativeismorelikelythananother.Herewehadnonon-question-beggingjusti-ficationforexcludingeitherself-interestedoraltruisticreasonsasrelevanttorationalchoice,soweacceptedbothkindsofreasonsasprimafacierelevanttorationalchoice.Theconclusionofthisfirststepoftheargumentforthecompro-miseviewdoesnotbegthequestionagainstegoismorpurealtruismbecauseifdefendersofeitherviewhadanyhopeofprovidingagood,andhence,non-question-beggingargumentfortheirviews,theytoowouldhavetograntthisvery181\nJamesP.Sterbaconclusionasnecessaryforanon-question-beggingdefenseofeitheregoism,purealtruism,orthecompromiseview.Inacceptingit,therefore,thecompromiseviewdoesnotbegthequestionagainstapossiblenon-question-beggingdefenseoftheseothertwoperspectives,andthatisallthatshouldconcernus.Nowoncebothself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsarerecognizedasprimafacierelevanttorationalchoice,thesecondstepoftheargumentforthecom-promiseviewoffersanonarbitraryorderingofthosereasonsonthebasisofrank-ingsofself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsimposedbytheegoisticandaltruisticperspectivesrespectively.Accordingtothatordering,high-rankingself-interestedreasonshavepriorityoverlow-rankingaltruisticreasonsandhigh-rankingaltruis-ticreasonshavepriorityoverlow-rankingself-interestedreasons.Thereisnootherplausiblenonarbitraryorderingofthesereasons.Hence,itcertainlydoesnotbegthequestionagainsteithertheegoisticoraltruisticperspective,onceweimaginethoseperspectives(ortheirdefenders)tobesuitablyreformedsothattheytooarecommittedtoastandardofnon-question-beggingness.Intheend,ifoneiscommittedtoastandardofnon-question-beggingness,onehastobeconcernedonlywithhowone’sclaimsandargumentsstakeupagainstthoseofotherswhoarealsocommittedtosuchastandard.Ifyouyourselfarecommittedtothestan-dardofnon-question-beggingness,youdon’tbegthequestionbysimplycomingintoconflictwiththerequirementsofotherperspectives,unlessthoseotherper-spectives(ortheirdefenders)arealsocommittedtothesamestandardofnon-question-beggingness.Inarguingforone’sview,whenonecomesintoconflictwithbigots,onedoesnotbegthequestionagainstthemunlessoneisabigotoneself.Nowitmightbeobjectedthatevenifmoralityisrequiredbyastandardofnon-question-beggingness,thatdoesnotprovideuswiththerightkindofreasontobemoral.Itmightbearguedthatavoidingnon-question-beggingnessistoo17formalareasontobemoralandthatweneedamoresubstantivereason.Happily,theneedforasubstantivereasontobemoralcanbemetbecauseinthiscasetheformalreasontobemoral–namely,avoidingnon-question-beggingness–itselfentailsasubstantivereasontobemoral–namely,togivehigh-rankingaltruisticreasonspriorityoverconflictinglower-rankingself-interestedreasonsandhigh-rankingself-interestedreasonspriorityoverconflictinglower-rankingaltruisticreasons,or,toputthereasonmoresubstantivelystill,toavoidinflictingbasicharmforthesakeofnonbasicbenefit.So,asitturnsout,moralityascompromisecanbeshowntoprovidebothformalandsubstantivereasonstobemoral.Inthisway,therefore,liberalscanprovideanon-question-beggingdefenseoftheircommit-menttoamoralratherthanaself-interestedconceptionofthegood.182\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismIIAConceptionoftheGoodwithPositiveRightsAssumingthenthatwehaveanon-question-beggingdefenseforendorsingamoralratherthanaself-interestedconceptionofthegood,thenextstepinthedefenseofliberalismistoprovideanon-question-beggingdefenseofamoralconceptionofthegoodthatincorporatespositiveaswellasnegativerights.Specifically,weneedtoaddresstheviewoflibertarianswhocontendthatonlyaconceptionofthegoodthatincorporatesnegativerightsisrequired.Tocounterthelibertarianview,weneedtofocusonatypicalconflictsituationbetweentherichandthepoor.Inthisconflictsituation,therichhavemorethanenoughresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.Bycontrast,thepoorlacktheresourcestomeettheirmostbasicneedseventhoughtheyhavetriedallthemeansavailabletothemthatlibertar-iansregardaslegitimateforacquiringsuchresources.Undercircumstanceslikethese,libertariansusuallymaintainthattherichshouldhavethelibertytousetheirresourcestosatisfytheirluxuryneedsiftheysowish.Libertariansrecognizethatthislibertymightwellbeenjoyedattheexpenseofthesatisfactionofthemostbasicneedsofthepoor;theyjustthinkthatlibertyalwayshaspriorityoverotherpoliticalideals,andsincetheyassumethatthelibertyofthepoorisnotatstakeinsuchconflictsituations,itiseasyforthemtoconcludethattherichshouldnotberequiredtosacrificetheirlibertysothatthebasicneedsofthepoormaybemet.Ofcourse,libertarianswouldallowthatitwouldbeniceoftherichtosharetheirsurplusresourceswiththepoor.Nevertheless,accordingtolibertarians,suchactsofcharityarenotrequiredbecausethelibertyofthepoorisnotthoughttobeatstakeinsuchconflictsituations.Infact,however,thelibertyofthepoorisatstakeinsuchconflictsituations.Whatisatstakeisthelibertyofthepoortotakefromthesurpluspossessionsoftherichwhatisnecessarytosatisfytheirbasicneeds.Whenlibertariansarebroughttoseethatthisisthecase,theyaregenuinelysurprised,onemightevensayrudelyawakened,fortheyhadnotpreviouslyseentheconflictbetweentherichandthepoorasaconflictofliberties.Nowwhentheconflictbetweentherichandthepoorisviewedasaconflictofliberties,eitherwecansaythattherichshouldhavethelibertytousetheirsurplusresourcesforluxurypurposes,orwecansaythatthepoorshouldhavethelibertytotakefromtherichwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneeds.Ifwechooseoneliberty,wemustrejecttheother.Whatneedstobedetermined,therefore,iswhichlibertyismorallypreferable:thelibertyoftherichorthelibertyofthepoor.Isubmitthatthelibertyofthepoor,whichisthelibertytotakefromthesurplusresourcesofotherswhatisrequiredtomeetone’sbasicneeds,ismorallyprefer-abletothelibertyoftherich,whichisthelibertytouseone’ssurplusresourcesforluxurypurposes.Toseethatthisisthecase,weneedonlyappealtooneofthemostfundamentalprinciplesofmorality,onethatiscommontoallmoralcon-ceptionsofthegood,namely,the“ought”implies“can”principle.Accordingto183\nJamesP.Sterbathisprinciple,peoplearenotmorallyrequiredtodowhattheylackthepowertodoorwhatwouldinvolvesogreatasacrificethatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskthemtoperformsuchanaction,and/orinthecaseofsevereconflictsofinterest,18unreasonabletorequirethemtoperformsuchanaction.Forexample,supposeIhavepromisedtoattendadepartmentalmeetingonFriday,butonThursdayIaminvolvedinaseriouscaraccidentwhichputsmeintoacoma.SurelyitisnolongerthecasethatIoughttoattendthemeetingnowthatIlackthepowertodoso.OrsupposeinsteadthatonThursdayIdevelopaseverecaseofpneumoniaforwhichIamhospitalized.SurelyIcouldlegitimatelyclaimthatInolongeroughttoattendthemeetingonthegroundsthattherisktomyhealthinvolvedinattendingisasacrificethatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskmetobear.Orsupposetherisktomyhealthfromhavingpneumoniaisnotsoseriousthatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskmetoattendthemeeting(asupererogatoryrequest),itmightstillbeseriousenoughtobeunreasonabletorequiremyattendanceatthemeeting(ademandthatisbackedupbyblameorcoercion).Whatisdistinctiveabouttheformulationofthe“ought”implies“can”prin-cipleisthatitclaimsthattherequirementsofmoralitycannot,allthingscon-sidered,beunreasonabletoask,and/orincasesofsevereconflictofinterest,unreasonabletorequirepeopletoabideby.Theprincipleclaimsthatreasonandmoralitymustbelinkedinanappropriateway,especiallyifwearegoingtobeabletojustifiablyuseblameorcoerciontogetpeopletoabidebytherequirementsofmorality.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatwhilemajorfiguresinthehistoryofphilosophy,andmostphilosopherstoday,includingvirtuallyalllibertarianphiloso-phers,acceptthislinkagebetweenreasonandmorality,thislinkageisnotusuallyconceivedtobepartofthe“ought”implies“can”principle.Nevertheless,Iclaimthattherearegoodreasonsforassociatingthislinkagebetweenreasonandmoral-itywiththe“ought”implies“can”principle,namely,ouruseoftheword“can”(Ican’tcometothemeeting)asintheexamplesjustgiven,andthenaturalpro-gressionfromlogical,physicalandpsychologicalpossibilityfoundinthetraditional“ought”implies“can”principletothenotionofmoralpossibilityfoundinthisformulationofthe“ought”implies“can”principle.Inanycase,theacceptabilityofthisformulationofthe“ought”implies“can”principleisdeterminedbythevirtuallyuniversalacceptanceofitscomponentsandnotbythemannerinwhichIhaveproposedtojointhosecomponentstogether.Nowapplyingthe“ought”implies“can”principletothecaseathand,itseemsclearthatthepoorhaveitwithintheirpowerwillinglytorelinquishsuchanimpor-tantlibertyasthelibertytotakefromtherichwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneeds.Nevertheless,itwouldbeunreasonabletoaskorrequirethemtomakesogreatasacrifice.Intheextremecase,itwouldinvolveaskingorrequiringthepoortositbackandstarvetodeath.Ofcourse,thepoormayhavenorealalter-nativetorelinquishingthisliberty.Todoanythingelsemayinvolveworseconse-quencesforthemselvesandtheirlovedonesandmayinviteapainfuldeath.Accordingly,wemayexpectthatthepoorwouldacquiesce,albeitunwillingly,to184\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismapoliticalsystemthatdeniedthemtherighttowelfaresupportedbysuchaliberty,atthesametimethatwerecognizethatsuchasystemimposesanunreasonablesacrificeuponthepoor–asacrificethatwecouldnotmorallyblamethepoorfortryingtoevade.Analogously,wemightexpectthatawomanwhoselifewasthreat-enedwouldsubmittoarapist’sdemands,atthesametimethatwerecognizetheutterunreasonablenessofthosedemands.Bycontrast,itwouldnotbeunreasonabletoaskandrequiretherichtosacri-ficethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedssothatthepoorcanhavethe19libertytomeettheirbasicneeds.Naturally,wemightexpectthattherich,forreasonsofself-interestandpastcontribution,mightbedisinclinedtomakesuchasacrifice.Wemightevensupposethatthepastcontributionoftherichprovidesagoodreasonfornotsacrificingtheirlibertytousetheirsurplusforluxurypur-poses.Yet,unlikethepoor,therichcouldnotclaimthatrelinquishingsuchalibertyinvolvedsogreatasacrificethatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskandrequirethemtomakeit;unlikethepoor,therichcouldbemorallyblameworthyforfailingtomakesuchasacrifice.Consequently,ifweassumethat,howeverelsewespecifyamoralconceptionofthegood,itcannotviolatethe“ought”implies“can”principle,itfollowsthat,despitewhatlibertariansclaim,therighttolibertyendorsedbythemactuallyfavorsthelibertyofthepooroverthelibertyoftherich.Yetcouldn’tlibertariansobjecttothisconclusion,claimingthatitwouldbeunreasonabletorequiretherichtosacrificethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedssothatthepoorcouldhavethelibertytomeettheirbasicneeds?AsIhavepointedout,libertariansdon’tusuallyseethesituationasaconflictofliberties,butsupposetheydid.Howplausiblewouldsuchanobjectionbe?Notveryplau-sibleatall,Ithink.Forconsider:whatarelibertariansgoingtosayaboutthepoor?Isn’titclearlyunreasonabletorequirethepoortosacrificethelibertytomeettheirbasicneedssothattherichcanhavethelibertytomeettheirluxuryneeds?Isn’titclearlyunreasonabletorequirethepoortositbackandstarvetodeath?Ifitis,then,thereisnoresolutionofthisconflictthatitwouldbereasonabletorequireboththerichandthepoortoaccept.Butthatwouldmeanthatthelibertarianidealoflibertycannotbeamoralconceptionofthegood,foramoralconceptionofthegoodresolvesconflictsofinterestinwaysthatitwouldbereasonabletorequireeveryoneaffectedtoaccept.Therefore,aslongaslibertariansthinkofthemselvesasputtingforthamoralconceptionofthegood,theycannotallowthatitwouldbeunreasonablebothtorequiretherichtosacrificethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedsinordertobenefitthepoorandtorequirethepoortosacri-ficethelibertytomeettheirbasicneedsinordertobenefittherich.ButIsubmitthatifoneoftheserequirementsistobejudgedreasonable,then,byanyneutralassessment,itmustbetherequirementthattherichsacrificethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedssothatthepoorcanhavethelibertytomeettheirbasicneeds;thereisnootherplausibleresolution,iflibertariansintendtobeputtingforthamoralconceptionofthegood.185\nJamesP.SterbaNowitmightbeobjectedthattherightsthatthisargumentestablishesagainstthelibertarianarenotthesameastherightsendorsedbymostliberals.Thisiscorrect.Wecouldmarkthisdifferencebyreferringtotherightsthatthisargu-mentestablishesagainstthelibertarianas“negativewelfarerights”andbyrefer-ringtotherightsendorsedbymostliberalsas“positivewelfarerights.”Thesignificanceofthisdifferenceisthataperson’snegativewelfarerightscanbevio-latedonlywhenotherpeoplethroughactsofcommissioninterferewiththeexer-ciseofthoserights,whereasaperson’spositivewelfarerightscanbeviolatedbysuchactsofcommissionaswellasbyactsofomission.Nonetheless,thisdiffer-encewillhavelittlepracticalimport,foroncelibertarianscometorecognizethelegitimacyofthenegativewelfarerightsI’vedefended,theninordernottobesubjecttothediscretionofrightholdersinchoosingwhenandhowtoexercisetheserights,libertarianswilltendtofavortheonlymorallylegitimatewayofpre-ventingtheexerciseofsuchrights:theywillinstituteadequatepositivewelfarerightsthatwillthentakeprecedenceovertheexerciseofnegativewelfarerights.Accordingly,iflibertariansadoptthismorallylegitimatewayofpreventingtheexerciseofsuchrights,theywillendupendorsingthesamesortofwelfareinsti-tutionsfavoredbymostliberals.Inbrief,Ihavearguedthatalibertarianconceptionofthegoodcanbeseentosupportarighttowelfarethroughanapplicationofthe“ought”implies“can”principletoconflictsbetweentherichandthepoor.IntheinterpretationthatIhaveused,the“ought”implies“can”principlesupportssuchrightsbyfavoringthelibertyofthepooroverthelibertyoftherich.Inanotherinterpretation(devel-opedelsewhere),theprinciplesupportssuchrightsbyfavoringaconditionalright20topropertyoveranunconditionalrighttoproperty.Ineitherinterpretation,whatiscrucialtothederivationoftheserightsistheclaimthatitwouldbeun-reasonabletorequirethepoortodenytheirbasicneedsandacceptanythinglessthantheserightsastheconditionfortheirwillingcooperation.IIIAConceptionoftheGoodRequiringSocialistEqualityAssumingthenthatwehaveanon-question-beggingdefenseofamoralconcep-tionofthegoodthatincorporatespositiveaswellasnegativerights,thenextstepinthedefenseofliberalismistoprovideanon-question-beggingargumentspec-ifyingtheeconomicinstitutionsrequiredbythisconception.Inparticular,wouldtheconceptionallowtheinequalitythatischaracteristicofcapitalismorrequiretheequalitythatischaracteristicofsocialism?WhatIproposetoshowisthatitistheequalitythatischaracteristicofsocialismthatisrequired.Tokeepmyargu-mentnon-question-begging,Iwillcontinuetoarguefrompremisesthatareacceptabletolibertarians.Inviewoftheargumentoftheprevioussection,libertarianswouldhavetoacceptarighttowelfarebuttheywouldstillwanttodenythatthiswouldleadto186\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismanythingliketheequalityofasocialiststate.Atmost,libertarianswouldconcedethattheargumentoftheprevioussectionshowsthatanon-question-beggingmoralconceptionofthegoodsupportsawelfarestatebutnotasocialiststate.Theywouldclaimthatthisisbecause,atleastinanaffluentsociety,arighttowelfarecouldbefullysecuredwhileinequalitiesofwealthandprivilegeincom-patiblewiththesocialistidealofequalityremain.Inowhopetoshowwhythisisnotthecase.Tobeginwith,itshouldbeclearthat,aslibertariansseeit,thefundamentalrightsrecognizedbythemareuniver-salrights,thatistheyarerightsthatarepossessedbyallpeople,notjustthosewholiveincertainplacesoratcertaintimes.Toclaimthattheserightsareuni-versalrightsdoesnotmeanthattheyareuniversallyrecognized.Obviously,thefundamentalrightsthatflowfromalibertarianconceptionofthegoodhavenotbeenuniversallyrecognized.Rather,toclaimthattheyareuniversalrights,despitetheirspottyrecognition,impliesonlythattheyoughttoberecognizedbecausepeopleatalltimesandplaceshaveorcouldhavehadgoodreasonstorecognizetheserights,notthattheyactuallydidordoso.Norneedtheseuniversalrightsbeunconditional.Thisisparticularlytrueinthecaseoftherighttowelfare,which,IarguedinSectionII,flowsfromaliber-tarianconceptionofthegood.Forthisrightisconditionaluponpeopledoingallthattheylegitimatelycandotoprovideforthemselvesandconditionalupontherebeingsufficientresourcesavailablesothateveryone’swelfareneedscanbemet.Wherepeopledonotdoallthattheycantoprovideforthemselvesorwheretherearenotsufficientresourcesavailable,peoplesimplydonothavearighttowelfare.Yeteventhoughlibertarianshaveclaimedthattherightstheydefendareuni-versalrightsinthemannerIhavejustexplained,itmaybethattheyaresimplymistakeninthisregard.Evenwhenuniversalrightsarestrippedofanyclaimtobeinguniversallyrecognizedorunconditional,stillitmightbearguedthattherearenosuchrights,thatis,thattherearenorightsthatallpeopleoughttorecognize.Buthowwouldoneargueforsuchaview?Onecouldn’targuefromthefailureofpeopletorecognizesuchrightsbecausewehavealreadysaidthatsuchrecog-nitionisnotnecessary.Norcouldonearguethatnoteveryoneoughttorecog-nizesuchrightsbecausesomelackthecapacityoropportunitytodoso.Thisisbecause“ought”implies“can”here,sothattheobligationtorecognizecertainrightsonlyappliestothosewhoactuallyhaveorhavehadatsomepointthecapac-ityandopportunitytodoso.Thus,theexistenceofuniversalrightsisnotruledoutbytheexistenceofindividualswhohaveneverhadthecapacityandoppor-tunitytorecognizesuchrights.However,itwouldberuledoutbytheexistenceofindividualswhocouldrecognizetheserightsbutforwhomitwouldbecorrecttosaythattheyought,allthingsconsidered,nottodoso.Butwehavejustseenthatevenaminimallibertarianconceptionofthegoodsupportsauniversalrighttowelfare.And,asIhavearguedinSectionI,when“ought”isunderstoodself-interestedlyratherthanmorallyanon-question-beggingconceptionofrationalityfavorsamoralconceptionofthegoodoveraself-interestedconception.Sofor187\nJamesP.Sterbathosecapableofrecognizinguniversalrights,itsimplyisnotpossibletoarguethatthey,allthingsconsidered,oughtnottodoso.Still,itmightbegrantedthatthereareuniversalrights,evenarighttowelfare,thatcanbesupportedbyalibertarianconceptionofthegood,butstilldeniedthatsuchrightsleadtoasocialistratherthanawelfarestate.Buttoseewhythisisnotthecase,considerwhatwouldberequiredtorecognizeauniversalrighttowelfare.Atpresentthereisprobablyasufficientworldwidesupplyofgoodsandresourcestomeetthenormalcostsofsatisfyingthebasicnutritionalneedsofallexistingpersons.AccordingtotheformerUSSecretaryofAgriculture,BobBergland:Forthepast20years,iftheavailableworldfoodsupplyhadbeenevenlydividedand21distributed,eachpersonwouldhavereceivedmorethantheminimumofcalories.Otherauthoritieshavemadesimilarassessmentsoftheavailableworldfoodsupply.Needlesstosay,theadoptionofapolicyofsupportingarighttowelfareforallexistingpersonswouldnecessitatesignificantchanges,especiallyindevelopedcountries.Forexample,thelargepercentageoftheUSpopulationwhosefoodconsumptionclearlyexceedsevenanadequatelyadjustedpovertyindexmighthavetoaltertheireatinghabitssubstantially.Inparticular,theymighthavetoreducetheirconsumptionofbeefandporkinordertomakemoregrainavailablefordirecthumanconsumption.(Currently,37%ofworldwideproductionofgrainand2270%ofUSproductionisfedtoanimals.)Thus,thesatisfactionofatleastsomeofthenonbasicneedsofthemoreadvantagedindevelopedcountrieswillhavetobeforgoneifthebasicnutritionalneedsofallthoseindevelopingandunder-developedcountriesaretobemet.Ofcourse,meetingthelong-termbasicnutri-tionalneedsofthesesocietieswillrequireotherkindsofaid,includingappropriatetechnologyandtrainingandtheremovaloftradebarriersfavoringdeveloped23societies.Inaddition,raisingthestandardoflivingindevelopingandunder-developedcountrieswillrequireasubstantialincreaseintheconsumptionofenergyandotherresources.Butsuchanincreasewillhavetobematchedbyasubstantialdecreaseintheconsumptionofthesegoodsindevelopedcountries;otherwise,globalecologicaldisasterwillresultfromincreasedglobalwarming,24ozonedepletion,andacidrain,loweringvirtuallyeveryone’sstandardofliving.Forexample,sometypeofmutuallybeneficialarrangementneedstobenegoti-atedwithChina,which,with50%oftheworld’scoalresources,planstodoubleitsuseofcoalwithinthenexttwodecadesyetiscurrentlyburning85%ofitscoal25withoutanypollutioncontrolswhatsoever.Furthermore,oncethebasicnutri-tionalneedsoffuturegenerationsarealsotakenintoaccount,thesatisfactionofthenonbasicneedsofthemoreadvantagedindevelopedcountrieswouldhavetobefurtherrestrictedinordertopreservethefertilityofcroplandandotherfood-relatednaturalresourcesfortheuseoffuturegenerations.Obviously,theonly188\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismassuredwaytoguaranteetheenergyandresourcesnecessaryforthesatisfactionofthebasicneedsoffuturegenerationsistosetasideresourcesthatwouldotherwisebeusedtosatisfythenonbasicneedsofexistinggenerations.Whenbasicneedsotherthannutritionalonesaretakenintoaccountaswell,stillfurtherrestrictionswillberequired.Forexample,ithasbeenestimatedthatpresentlyaNorthAmericanusesaboutfiftytimesmoregoodsandresourcesthanapersonlivinginIndia.ThismeansthatintermsofresourceconsumptiontheNorthAmericancontinent’spopulationaloneconsumesasmuchas12.5billion26peoplelivinginIndiawouldconsume.So,unlessweassumethatbasicgoodsandresources,suchasarableland,iron,coal,oil,andsoforthareinunlimitedsupply,thisunequalconsumptionwouldhavetoberadicallyalteredinorderfor27thebasicneedsofdistantpeoplesandfuturegenerationstobemet.Ineffect,recognizingauniversalrighttowelfareapplicablebothtodistantpeoplesandtofuturegenerationswouldleadtoanequalsharingofresourcesoverplaceandtime.Inshort,socialistequalityistheconsequenceofrecognizingauniversallibertar-28ianrighttowelfare.Itmightbeobjectedthatthisargumentfallsvictimtoitsownsuccess.Ifauni-versalrighttowelfarerequiresanequalsharingofresources,wouldn’ttalentedpeoplesimplylacktheincentivetoproduceaccordingtotheirabilitywhensucharightisenforced?Butwhatsortofincentiveisneeded?Surelytherewouldbemoralincentiveforthetalentedtomakethenecessarysacrificesifevenaliber-29tarianconceptionofthegoodrequiresarighttowelfare.Yet,exceptforthosewhocloselyidentifywithsuchmoralincentives,therewouldnotbesufficientself-interestedincentivetoaccepttheequalityofresourcesrequiredbyauniversalrighttowelfare.Evenso,inlightoftheargumentofSectionIthatamoralcon-ceptionofthegoodhaspriorityoveraself-interestedconception,thereisnoques-tionofwhatoughttobedone.IVAPartialRatherthanaCompleteConceptionoftheGoodAssumingthenthatwehaveanon-question-beggingdefenseofamoralconcep-tionofthegoodthatincorporatespositiverightsandtheequalityofresourcesthatischaracteristicofasocialiststate,thenextstepinthedefenseofliberalismistoprovideanon-question-beggingargumentforenforcingapartialratherthanacompleteconceptionofthegood.Nowitisimportanttonotethatthisisnothowthecontrastbetweenliberalsandtheircommunitariancriticsisusuallyformulated.Instead,liberalsareusuallysaidtodefendtheviewthatsocietyshouldbeneutralwithrespecttoconceptionsofthegood,whilecommunitariansareusuallysaidtodefendtheviewthatsocietyshouldenforceaparticularconceptionofthegood.Forexample,accordingtoRonaldDworkin:189\nJamesP.Sterba[L]iberalismtakes,asitsconstitutivepoliticalmorality,thattheoryofequality[whichholdsthat]politicaldecisionsmustbe,sofaraspossible,independentofanypar-30ticularconceptionofthegoodlife,orofwhatgivesvaluetolife.Bycontrast,MacIntyrecontendsthat:Anypoliticalsociety...whichpossessesasharedstockofadequatelydeterminateandrationallydefensiblemoralrules,publiclyrecognizedtobetherulestowhichchar-acteristicallyandgenerallyunproblematicappealsmaybemade,willtherefore,implic-itlyorexplicitly,becommittedtoanadequatelydeterminateandrationallyjustifiable31conceptionofthehumangood.Butthiswayofputtingthecontrast–liberalsfavoringneutralitywithrespecttoconceptionsofthegood,andcommunitariansfavoringcommitmenttoapar-ticularconceptionofthegood–hasbredonlyconfusion.Whatitsuggestsisthatliberalsareattemptingtobevalue-neutralwhentheyclearlyarenot.Liberals,liketheircommunitariancritics,arecommittedtoasubstantiveconceptionofthegood.Forexample,thepoliticalconceptionofthegoodthatRawlsendorsesrulesoutanycompleteorcomprehensiveconceptionofthegoodthatconflictswith32it.Italsorulesout,withoutmuchargument,alibertarianconceptionofthe33good.Soclearly,inthisrespect,Rawlsmakesnoclaimtobeingneutralwithrespecttoconceptionsofthegood.Rawlsfurthercontendsthathispoliticalconceptionofthegoodmarksthelimitsofenforceability.Toenforceanythingmore,Rawlsclaims,wouldrequire“the34oppressiveuseofstatepower.”SoforRawls,asforliberalsgenerally,onlyapartialconceptionofthegoodcanbejustifiablyenforced.Thisstillwouldpermittheadoptionofanycompleteorcomprehensiveconceptionofthegoodwhichiscom-patiblewiththesubstantive,yetpartial,conceptionofthegoodliberalswantto35enforce.Anditisonlyinthislimitedrespectthatliberalscanbesaidtobeneutralwithrespecttoconceptionsofthegood,thatis,theyareneutralinthesensethattheyarenotcommittedtoenforcinganycompleteorcomprehensiveconceptionofthegood,butonlytoenforcingapartialconceptionofthegood.Accordingly,itseemsfarbettertoavoidtheterminologyofneutralityaltogetherandsimplydescribetheliberalviewasrequiringtheenforcementofapartialratherthana36completeconceptionofthegood.Butisthereanynon-question-beggingdefenseofthisliberalcommitmenttoenforcingapartialratherthanacompleteconceptionofthegood?Ithinkthatthereisoncewerecognizethattheconceptionofthegoodwearelookingforshouldbeabletoprovidesufficientreasons,accessibletoallthosetowhomitapplies,forabidingbyitsrequirements.Soitmustbeaconceptionofthegoodthatiscapableofjustifyingtheuseofpowertoenforceitsbasicrequirements.Todothat,itmustbepossibletojustifiablymorallyblamethosewhoarecoercedforfailingtoabidebyitsrequirements.Ifthatwerenotthecase,peoplecouldjusti-fiablyresistsuchusesofpoweronthegroundthattheywouldlackmorallegiti-190\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianism37macy.Peoplecannotbemorallyrequiredtodosomethingiftheycannotcometoknow,andsocometojustifiablybelieve,thattheyarerequiredtodoso.Soifaconceptionofthegoodistobeabletojustifytheuseofpowertoenforceitsbasicrequirements,theremustbesufficientreasonsaccessibletoallthosetowhomitappliesforabidingbythoserequirements.Whatthismeansisthattheconcep-tionofthegoodweareseekingmustbepartialratherthancompletebecausenocompleteconceptionofthegoodwouldbeaccessibletoallthosetowhomitapplies.Inaddition,thepartialconceptionweareseekingmustbesecularratherthanreligiousincharacterbecauseonlyasecularconceptionwouldbeaccessibletoeveryone;religiousconceptionsareprimarilyaccessibleonlytothemembersoftheparticularreligiousgroupswhoholdthem,andassuchtheycannotprovidethejustificationthatisneededtosupporttheuseofpowertoenforcethebasicrequirementsofmorality.Nowitmightbeobjectedthatatleastsomereligiousconceptionsareacces-sibletovirtuallyeveryonewhohasbeenexposedtothem.Ofcourse,manypeopletodayhavenotevenbeenexposedtotheteachingsofthefourdominantreligions,Christianity,Islam,BuddhismandHinduism,andevenforthosewhohave,mereexposure,byitself,isnotenoughtoguaranteethekindofaccessibilitythatwouldjustifytheuseofpoweragainstthosewhofailtoabidebytheirteachings.Forthattobethecase,exposuremustnecessarilyleadtotheideathatitwouldbeunrea-sonabletorejectthoseteachingsassuch.InthecaseofChristianmoralteachings,thiswouldmeanthatitwouldbeunreasonabletorejecttheseteachingsaspartofauniqueChristiansalvationhistory,whichhasaskeyeventsanIncarnation,aRedemptiveDeath,andaResurrection.Ofcourse,thisisnottodenythatsomereligiousteachingscanbegivenajus-tificationthatisindependentoftheirreligiousorigin(e.g.,thestoryoftheGood38Samaritan)–ajustificationthatisaccessibletovirtuallyeveryoneexposedtotheseteachingsonthegroundsthatvirtuallyeveryonesoexposedwouldunder-standthatitwouldbeunreasonabletorejectthemsojustified.Buttheobjectionweareconsideringdoesnotaddressthepossibilityofjustifyingreligiousmoralteachingsinthisway.Rather,itclaimsthatreligiousmoralteachingsarejustifiedbecauseassuchtheyareaccessibletovirtuallyeveryoneexposedtothem,withtheconsequencethatitwouldbeunreasonableforvirtuallyanyonesoexposedtorejectthem.Butisthisthecase?SurelymanyChristianmoralteachings,forexample,areunderstandabletobothChristiansandnon-Christiansalike,butthesenseof“accessible”wehavebeenusingimpliesmorethanthis.Itimpliesthatpersonscanbemorallyblamedforfailingtoabidebyaccessiblerequirementsbecausetheycancometounderstandthattheserequirementsapplytothemandthatitwouldbeunreasonableforthemtofailtoabidebythem.Sounderstood,itwouldseemthat,forexample,Christianmoralteachingsassucharenotaccessibletoeveryoneexposedtothem.Toomanynon-Christians,whoseemotherwisemoral,donotrecognizetheauthorityofChristianmoralteachingsassuch,eventhoughtheymaygrantthatsomeoftheseteachingshaveanindependentjustification.191\nJamesP.SterbaAccordingly,weneedtorestrictourselvestoaconceptionofthegoodthatispartialandsecularincharacterandthusonethatcanprovidesufficientreasonsaccessibletoallthosetowhomitappliesforabidingbyitsrequirements.Onlysuchaconceptionwouldbecapableofjustifyingtheuseofpowertoenforceitsbasicrequirements.Noristhereanythingintheaboveargumentthatbegsthequestionagainstthecommunitarianviewbecausethereisnoreasonwhycommunitariansshouldbecommittedtoenforcingacompleteconceptionofthegood.Infact,Ihavejustbeenarguingthatnoone,communitariansincluded,isjustifiedinenforcingacompleteconceptionofthegood.Yetevenifoneacceptstheviewthatsocietyshouldenforceapartialratherthanacompleteconceptionofthegood,thisstillleavesopenthequestionofwhatsortofpartialconceptionshouldbeenforced,andhereobviouslyliberalsandcom-munitariansmightstilldisagree.Nevertheless,iftheargumentsofsectionsI,IIandIIIofthisessayarecorrect,andliberalismcanbeprovidedwithanon-question-beggingdefenseofamoralratherthanaself-interestedconceptionofthegood,aconceptionthatincorporatespositiverightsandtheequalityofresourcesthatischaracteristicofasocialiststate,thenthedomainoverwhichreasonabledebatecanstilltakeplaceisconsiderablynarrowerinscopethanmostphilosopherstodayhaveyettorealize.AcknowledgmentIwishtothankAlasdairMacIntyreforhiscommentsonanearlierversionofthisessay.Notes1ReviewofPolitics(Summer,1990).2SeeCarlosNino,“TheCommunitarianChallengetoLiberalRights,”LawandPhi-losophy(1989):37–52;AllanBuchanan,“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritiqueofLiberalism,”Ethics(1989):852–83;GeraldDoppelt,“IsRawls’sKantianLiberalismCoherentandDefensible?”Ethics(1989):815–51;andmyownworkHowToMakePeopleJust(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1988),especiallypp.58–9;“RecentWorkinLiberalJustice,”PhilosophyandLawNewsletter(1984):3–11.3JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),LectureV.4Ofcourse,thereare(Aristotelian)waystounderstandself-interestsothatitincludesthemoral.Insuchviews,thecontrastIamreferringtoreappearsasacontrastbetweentheprioritiesgivendifferent(possible)interestsoftheself.5Rawls,forexample,simplyassumesegoismaway.SeeJohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(1971),pp.132–6.OtherliberalslikeKurtBaier,AlanGewirthandStephenDarwallhaveattemptedadefenseofthissort,butthereareweaknessesintheirdefensesthat192\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismneedtobeovercome.Forasurveyofsuchattempts,seemy“JustifyingMorality:TheRightandtheWrongWays,”inJamesP.Sterba,ContemporaryEthics(1989),pp.138–54.6AlasdairMacIntyre,“ThePrivatizationoftheGood,”ReviewofPolitics,vol.52(1990),pp.344–61;andAfterVirtue(1981),especiallychs.2,4–5,17,andthePost-scripttothesecondeditionofAfterVirtue(1984).7AsIdidin“Neo-Libertarianism,”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly(1978),butseeitsexpandedversioninmyJustice:AlternativePoliticalPerspectives(WadsworthPub-lishingCo.,1979).Forasimilarmistake,seeAllanBuchanan,“DerivingWelfareRightsfromLibertarianRights,”inIncomeSupport:ConceptualandPolicyIssues,editedbyPeterBrown,ConradJohnsonandPaulVenier(RowmanandLittlefield,1981).8See,forexample,RonaldDworkin,“Liberalism,”inPublicandPrivateMorality,editedbyStuartHampshire(1978),pp.113–43.9JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),LectureIV;andRonaldDworkin,“Liberalism”.TheclassicaldefenseofliberalismonthispointisJohnStuartMill,OnLiberty(1859).10ItakethistobeoneofthecentralpointsofMacIntyre’sWhoseJustice,WhichRatio-nality?(1988),butwhatMacIntyrehasnotyetacknowledgedinthisbookorelse-where,andIhopetoestablish,isthatthereexistssufficient“commonground”amongthepresuppositionsofvarioustraditionstoprovideadefenseofliberalism.11“Ought”presupposes“can”here.Unlessthemembersofthesocietyhavethecapac-itytoentertainandfollowbothself-interestedandmoralreasonsforacting,itdoesnotmakeanysenseaskingwhethertheyoughtoroughtnottodoso.12Iunderstandthepurealtruisttobethemirrorimageofthepureegoist.Whereasthepureegoistthinksthattheinterestsofotherscountforthembutnotforherselfexceptinstrumentally,thepurealtruistthinksthatherowninterestscountforothersbutnotforherselfexceptinstrumentally.13Thisisbecause,asIshallargue,moralityitselfalreadyrepresentsacompromisebetweenegoismandaltruism.Sotoaskthatmoralreasonsbeweighedagainstself-interestedreasonsis,ineffect,tocountself-interestedreasonstwice–onceinthecom-promisebetweenegoismandaltruismandthenagainwhenmoralreasonsareweighedagainstself-interestedreasons.Buttocountself-interestedreasonstwiceisclearlyobjectionable.14Noticethatby“egoisticperspective”hereImeantheviewthatgrantstheprimafacierelevanceofbothegoisticandaltruisticreasonstorationalchoiceandthentriestoargueforthesuperiorityofegoisticreasons.Similarlyby“altruisticperspective”Imeantheviewthatgrantstheprimafacierelevanceofbothegoisticandaltruisticreasonstorationalchoiceandthentriestoargueforthesuperiorityofaltruisticreasons.15Forfurtherdiscussion,seemyJusticeforHereandNow(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),ch.2.16SeeR.DuncanLuceandHowardRaiffa,GamesandDecisions(NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,1967),ch.13.17ThomasScanlondiscussesthisprobleminWhatWeOwetoOthers(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),ch.3.18Ifirstappealedtothisinterpretationofthe“ought”implies“can”principletobringlibertariansaroundtothepracticalrequirementsofwelfareliberalism,inanexpanded193\nJamesP.Sterbaversionofanarticleentitled“Neo-Libertarianism,”whichappearedinthefallof1979.In1982,T.M.Scanlonin“ContractualismandUtilitarianism”appealedtomuchthesamestandardtoarbitratethedebatebetweencontractariansandutilitarians.Inmyjudgment,however,thisstandardembeddedinthe“ought”implies“can”principlecanbemoreeffectivelyusedinthedebatewithlibertariansthaninthedebatewithutilitarians,becausesacrificeslibertariansstandardlyseektoimposeonthelessadvan-tagedaremoreoutrageousand,hence,moreeasilyshowntobecontrarytoreason.19BythelibertyoftherichtomeettheirluxuryneedsIcontinuetomeanthelibertyoftherichnottobeinterferedwithwhenusingtheirsurpluspossessionsforluxurypur-poses.Similarly,bythelibertyofthepoortomeettheirbasicneedsIcontinuetomeanthelibertyofthepoornottobeinterferedwithwhentakingwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneedsfromthesurpluspossessionsoftherich.20SeeJusticeforHereandNow,ch.3.21BobBergland,“AttackingtheProblemofWorldHunger,”TheNationalForum,vol.69,no.2(1979),p.4.22LesterBrown,ChristopherFlavin,andHalKane,VitalSigns1996(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1996),pp.34–5;JeremyRifkin,BeyondBeef(NewYork:Penguin,1992),p.1.23HenryShue,BasicRights(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1980),ch.7.24Foradiscussionofthesecausalconnections,seeCherylSilver.OneEarth,OneFuture(Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress,1990);BillMcKibben,TheEndofNature(NewYork:AnchorBooks,1989);JeremyLeggett(ed.),GlobalWarming(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990);andLesterBrown(ed.),TheWorldWatchReader(NewYork:Nelson,1991).25CharlesPark,Jr(ed.),EarthResources(Washington,DC:VoiceofAmerica,1980),ch.13;LesterBrown.StateoftheWorld1995(NewYork:Norton,1992),ch.7;LesterBrown(ed.),TheWorldWatchReader,p.268.ChinacurrentlyusesmorecoalthantheUS.SeeLesterBrown,StateoftheWorld(NewYork,1997),p.9.26G.TylerMiller,Jr,LivingwiththeEnvironment(Belmont:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1990),p.20.SeealsoJanetBeseckerandPhilElder,“LifeboatEthics:AReplytoHardin,”inReadingsinEcology,EnergyandHumanSociety,editedbyWilliamBurch(NewYork:HarperandRow,1977),p.229.ForhigherandlowerestimatesoftheimpactofNorthAmericans,seeHolmesRolstonIII,“FeedingPeopleversusSavingNature?”inWorldHungerandMorality,2ndedn(EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall,1996),pp.259–60;PaulEhrlich,AnneEhrlich,andGretchenDaily,TheStorkandthePlow(NewYork:Grosset/Putnam,1995),p.26.27Successesinmeetingthemostbasicneedsofthepoorinparticularregionsofdevel-opingcountries(e.g.,theIndianstateofKerala)shouldnotblindustothegrowingnumbersofpeoplelivinginconditionsofabsolutepoverty(1.2billionbyarecentestimate)andhowdifficultitwillbetomeetthebasicneedsofallthesepeopleinasustainablewaythatwillallowfuturegenerationstohavetheirbasicneedsmetaswell,especiallywhenwereflectonthefactthatthewayweinthedevelopedworldarelivingisnotsustainableatall!28Ofcourse,asocietycharacterizedbysocialistequalitymaynothaveallthelegaltrap-pingsofasocialiststate.Forexample,itmaynothavefullcommunalownershipofthebasicmeansofproduction.However,inordertoguaranteesocialistequality,theprivateownershipofthebasicmeansofproductionwouldbesoseverelyrestrictedby194\nLiberalismandtheChallengeofCommunitarianismdemocraticcontrolsthattherewouldbelittlepracticaldifferencebetweenasocietywithsocialistequalityandasocietywithfullcommunalownershipofthebasicmeansofproduction.29Onemightthinkthattheobjectionfromincentiveisthatitwouldproveimpossibletomotivatepeopletoworkforothers.Butpeopleworkforothersoncetheysupportanykindofawelfaresystem,andatleastindevelopedsocieties,theexistenceofwelfaresystemsarenowherethreatened.Nor,itseemstome,dotherecenteventsinEasternEuropeandtheSovietUnionsignalarejectionofwelfareorevensocialistequality.FivemonthsoftravelingandlecturingintheSovietUnionandEasternEuropein1989andvisitstotheSovietUnionin1990and1991haveconvincedmethatwhathasbeenrejectedinEasternEuropeandisbeingrejectedintheSovietUnioniswide-spreadcorruptionandauthoritariancontrolovereverythingbylocalbureaucratsandultimatelybyMoscow.30Dworkin,“Liberalism,”p.127.31MacIntyre,“ThePrivatizationoftheGood.”32JohnRawls,“ThePriorityofRightandIdeasoftheGood,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs17(1988),pp.251–76.33ThereissomeargumentfortherejectionoflibertarianisminJohnRawls,“TheBasicStructureasSubject,”inValuesandMorals,editedbyA.GoldmanandJ.Kim(1978),pp.47–71,butwhattheargumentignoresisthatonthelibertarianviewfairnesscannotbeinterpretedaschoicefrombehindanimaginaryviewofignorance.34JohnRawls,“TheIdeaofanOverlappingConsensus,”p.4,OxfordJournalofLegalStudies,vol.7(1987),pp.1–25.35Thedifferencebetweenacompleteorcomprehensiveconceptionofthegoodandapartialconceptionofthegoodisthattheformerencompassesallofmoralitywhilethelatteronlycertainbasicrequirementsofmorality.36NordoIthinkthatthemostdefensibleformofliberalismisappropriatelycharacter-izedasaviewinwhich“therightispriortothegood”becausewhenthisclaimiscorrectlyunpacked,itonlyassertsthatacertainpartialconceptionofthegoodhaspriorityoveranycompleteconceptionofthegoodthatconflictswithit.However,whattheclaimincorrectlysuggestsisthattherighthasprimacyandindependenceoverbothpartialandcompleteconceptionsofthegood.Onthispoint,seealsoWillKymlicka,Liberalism,Community,andCulture(1989),ch.3.37Thewillofthemajorityifitistobemorallylegitimatemustbebackedupwithmorethanpower.Theminoritymusthaveamoraldutytoaccepttheimpositionofthemajority,butthatcouldonlybethecaseiftheminoritywouldbemorallyblame-worthyforfailingtoacceptthatimposition.38GospelAccordingtoSt.Luke,10:25–37.BibliographyBarry,Brian(1995).JusticeasImpartiality.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Bell,Daniel(1993).CommunitarianismandItsCritics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Daly,Markate(1994).Communitarianism.Belmont:Wadsworth.Horton,JohnandSusanMendus(eds.)(1994).AfterMacIntyre.NotreDame,IN:UniversityofNotreDamePress.195\nJamesP.SterbaKekes,John(1997).AgainstLiberalism.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Kymlicka,W.(1989).Liberalism,CommunityandCulture.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.MacIntyre,Alasdair(1981).AfterVirtue.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress.Mulhall,StephenandAdamSwift(1992).LiberalsandCommunitarians.Oxford:Blackwell.Rawls,John(1971).ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.——(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Raz,J.(1986).TheMoralityofFreedom.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Sandel,Michael(1996).Democracy’sDiscontent.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Sterba,JamesP.(1998).JusticeforHereandNow.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.196\nChapter9LiberalTheoriesandtheirCriticsWilliamNelsonIspeakof“liberaltheories,”insteadof“liberalism,”partlybecauseitisamatterofdisputewhatliberalism“really”is.Someliberalscharacterizeitintermsofaspecificmethodology,othersintermsofitshistoricalrole.Somebelieveinnaturalrights,somearecontractualists,andsomeconsequentialists.Asaroughgeneral-ization,liberalsareconcernedtoprotectindividualfreedomagainstthepowerofthestateandthepowerofotherindividualsorinstitutions.Theyadvocatetoler-ationofdifferentbeliefsandvalues.Theyvaluelegalandpoliticalequality,seektoensureopportunitiesandtoprotectindividuals’economicwelfareandinde-pendence.Still,liberalsdifferastojustwhatthislistshouldcontain,howkeycomponentsshouldbeunderstood,andwhichitemsshouldberegardedasfundamental,whichderivative.Therearemanyliberaltheories,andliberalsarethemselvesoftentheliveliestcriticsofotherliberals.ManyofthecriticsIdiscusswillbeliberalscriticizingthetheoriesofotherliberals.Liberaltheoriesarenormativetheories.Anysuchfullyrealizedtheoryoughttoincludeareasonablyprecisestatementofitssubstantiveprinciples,arationalefortheseprinciples,andanaccountoftheinstitutionsbymeansofwhichtheprinci-plescanberealized.Beyondthat,itoughttoincludeademonstrationofthecapac-ityofsuchinstitutionstofunctionasintendedandtosustainthemselves.Thecharacteristicsofliberaltheorieslistedabovecomprisemainlysubstantiveaims.Theoriesthatinclude(roughly)thesamesubstantiveprincipleswilloftendifferintheirrationalesfortheseprinciples.Anddifferentrationaleswilloftenleadtodif-ferentspecificinterpretationsoftheprinciples.Differentrationaleswillalsoexposetheoriestodifferentobjections–andanobjectiondirectedatonerationalemayfailtoapplyatalltoatheorybasedonanother.Consideranexample:JohnKekes,inAgainstLiberalism(1997),criticizeslib-eralismforitsinabilitytodealadequatelywiththeproblemposedby“thepreva-lenceofevil(23f).”Thisisaproblembecause“thetruecoreofliberalism,”Kekessays,isacommitmenttoautonomy(15).“[I]tisthefosteringoftheautonomousfunctioningofallcitizensthatistheultimatepurposeandjustificationofliberal-197\nWilliamNelsonism(21).”However,Kekesgoeson,moreoftenthanwemightlike,menandwomenfreelychoosetodoevil.Thus,asocietythatleavespeoplefreeandevenencouragesthisfreedomisboundtoencourageevilintheprocess.Liberalismcandealwiththisproblemonlybyretreatingfromitsmostfundamentalcommitment.Therearemanypossiblerepliestothisobjection,andIwillmentionitlaterinadifferentcontext.OnereplyistorejectKekes’sclaimthathehascorrectlyiden-tifiedthefundamentalcommitmentofliberaltheory.Butwhatarethealternatives?Toillustratethepossibilities,Iwillsketcha(somewhatselective)historyofliberalthoughtsincethemiddleofthetwentiethcentury.Ibegin,inSectionI,withJohnRawls’searlywork,someoftheresponsestoit,andalternativesproposedbyvarioustheoriststhroughthe1980s.Ithenturn,inSectionII,to“politicallib-eralism”asithasdevelopedsincethelate1980s.Iwillofferaninterpretationofsomeofitsmorecontroversialideas,and,inlightofthisinterpretation,Iwilldefenditagainstsomerecentcriticisms.Throughout,Imeantofocusmainlyonliberals’justificationsfortheirprinciplesand,moregenerally,ontheirideasaboutwhatconstitutesanadequatejustification.ITheoriesofJusticeRawls’stheoryofjusticeJohnRawls’spublicationofATheoryofJustice,in1971,issurelyakeymomentintwentieth-centurypoliticalthoughtgenerally,andinliberalthoughtinpartic-ular.Bythetimeofthebook’spublication,though,Rawls’sideaswerealreadywellknownandinfluential.ThebookculminatedaprojectthatbeganwithRawls’spaper“JusticeasFairness”(1958).Beginningwiththispaper,Rawlssetouttoestablishwhathecallsprinciplesofjusticefortheevaluationofthe“basicstruc-tureofsociety”–itsmajorsocial,political,legalandeconomicinstitutions.Theideaisthatinstitutionsaretobeassessedholistically,forRawlsassumesthatprin-ciplesareconcernedwiththeinterestsandprospectsofindividualsandthatinsti-tutionsworktogethertodeterminetheseprospects.Rawls’sparticularprinciplesrequirethatinstitutionsestablishthegreatestpossiblesystemofequalbasicliber-ties,asystemoffairequalityofopportunity,andaneconomicsysteminwhichtypicalmembersoftheworstoffeconomicclassareeconomicallyaswell-offaspossible.Economicinequalitiesarepermissible,butonlysubjecttotheconditionthattheeconomicadvantagesofthosebetteroffdonotcomeattheexpenseofthoseworstoff.ThisiswhatRawlscallsthe“differenceprinciple.”Istatetheseprinciplesinformally.Theirdetailedexpositionisadifficulttask,mademoredifficultbythefactthatRawlsdoesnotalwaysstatethemconsistentlyevenwithinthescopeofhisbook.Still,thetheorydescribedfallsclearlywithintheroughcharacterizationofliberalismofferedearlier:itgivesahighpriorityto198\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsindividuallibertyandopportunity,anditalsoinsistsonsecuringadecentminimumincome.Itisperhapsworthnoting,though,thatRawlsdoesnotspeakofliberty,perse,anddoesnotvieweveryexerciseofcoercivestatepowerasevenaprimafacieviolationofthe“equalliberties”principle.Instead,whatheseemstohaveinmindisasystemofspecificrights,immunities,andpowersofthekindfoundintheBillofRightsoftheUSConstitution.Hemeansthemtoincludefreedomofexpression,freedomofreligion,rightstoacquirepersonalpropertyandtoitssecurepossession,protectionsagainstarbitraryarrest,andrightstotakepartindemocraticself-governance.Indeed,wecangeneralizehere.Theideaoffreedom,asitfunctionsinliberalthought,ishighlyambiguous.Whilewriters,especiallythoseassociatedwiththe“libertarian”tradition,sometimesobjecttoanycoercionorrestraint,itisperhapsmorecommontoemphasizeparticularrights(e.g.,propertyrightsorrightstofreespeech).Iffreedominamoregeneralsenseisthoughtimportant,thatisbecauseitisthoughttounderlieorexplaintheim-1portanceofthespecificrights.Rawls,however,doesnottakefreedomorautonomyashisstartingpoint.Hethinkshecanofferaunifiedaccountoftheseeminglydisparateelementsinhistheory,andhebeginsnotwithlibertybutwithanabstractconceptionofthesocialcontract.Hearguesthatpersonsinwhathecalls“theoriginalposition”wouldchoosetheprinciplesIhavesketched–equalliberties,fairequalityofopportu-nityandthedifferenceprinciple.Thesepersonsarepresumedtoknowcertaingeneralfactsofsocialtheory,buttheyareotherwisebehindaveilofignorance.Theydonotknowsalientfactsaboutthemselves(theirrace,religion,sex,socialstatus,orpositioninthenaturallotteryoftalents).Nordotheyknowtheirdis-tinctiveaimsandvalues.Theychooseprinciplesonlyonthebasisofaninterestinprimarygoods–liberties,opportunities,incomeandwealth.Theyassumetheywantmoreoftheseratherthanless,withintherangethattheirsocietycanproduceforeveryone,buttheyalsoassumethat,atsomelevel,theirinterestinmoretendstodiminish(Rawls,1971,secs.24,26).Itshouldnotbesurprising,giventheseassumptions,thatRawls’sprincipleswouldbechosen.Theassumptionsabouttheoriginalpositionaredesignedtoproducethischoice.Theidea,Ibelieve,istobringoutclearlyasetofassump-tionsthataresufficienttogiveushisresults.Thisgivesusaproofoftheprinci-ples.Whetheritisalsoajustificationisanothermatter.Justification,Rawlssays,proceedsbetweenpersons.Itsucceedswhenitispossibletoshowthatthecon-clusioncanbesupportednotjustbysomeassumptions,butbyassumptionsthattheotherpersonaccepts(ibid.,sec.87).AsIreadRawls,hehas,fromearlyon,beeninterestedinjustificationaswellasproof.Hehasspecificallyaimedtofindprinciplesandargumentsforthemthatcanbeacceptabletothosewhomustliveunderthemandtojustifythisaspirationitselfaswell.Thus,hehasaimedforinstitutionsthatwouldgeneratetheirownsupportandsupportfortheprinciplesonwhichtheyarebased;hehasbeencon-cernedtosolvetheproblemofstability,understoodasinvolvinganenduringcom-199\nWilliamNelsonmitmenttoprinciples.Hehasaimedatestablishingastable,well-orderedsociety:asocietyinwhichpersonsacceptthesameprinciples,institutionsmeettherequire-mentssetbythoseprinciples,andinwhichitiscommonknowledgethattheseconditionsaremet.Insuchasociety,clearly,theinstitutionscouldbejustifiedtoeachintermsofprincipleseachaccepts.Inshort,Rawlsassumessomethinglikeanidealofconsentofthegoverned,anidealthatfiguresinsomeotherliberalthe-2ories,includingsomeoftheworkofJeremyWaldron.IfRawlsisright,princi-plesderivedashisarecanachieveconsent.ResponsestoRawls’stheoryRawls’smainaim,ofcourse,wastoshowthathisprinciplesaretherightonesforevaluatinginstitutions.Amorespecificaimwastoprovideanalternativetoutili-tarianismandtherebyundermineitspositionastheonlynormativeperspectiveforevaluatinginstitutions.Aswehavelatercometoappreciate(Scheffler,1994),util-itarianismembodiestwodistinct,controversialdoctrines.Thefirst,whichRawlstargetsdirectly,istheideathatoutcomesaretobeevaluatedintermsofaggre-gatewell-being,independentofdistribution.Thesecondistheideathatnotypeofactionismorallyruledoutindependentofitsconsequences–thatthereareno“deontologicalconstraints.”InAnarchy,StateandUtopia(1974),RobertNozickarguedthatthereasonsforrejectingtheaggregativestandardforevaluatingconsequences(itsallegedrefusaltorecognize“theseparatenessofpersons”)shouldleadusalsotoacceptindividualrights(constraints)againstthestate.But,oncewedothis,heclaimed,wewillthenseethattheliberalstateingeneral,andRawls’sversioninparticular,mustberejected.NozickadoptedwhathesawasaLockeanconceptionofindi-vidualrights–especiallyrightstoproperty,butotherindividualrightsaswell;andheclaimedthatanystateactionencroachingontheserightsisunjust.HeholdsthiswhethertheaimistopromoteaggregateutilityortoachieveeconomicjusticeasconceivedbyRawls,andbymanyotherliberaltheorists.Totheobjectionthatthismeanscondoninginjustice,NozickrepliesthatRawls-ianliberalshaveamistakenconceptionofjustice.Ajuststateofaffairs,ajustsociety,heholds,isnottobecharacterizedbyapatternedprinciple,likeequalityorthedifferenceprinciple.Instead,astateofaffairsisjustifandonlyifitresultsfromthefreeexerciseofindividualrightsconsistentwithrespectfortherightsofothers.Nozick’stheoryisahistorical,entitlementtheory.Now,insofarasNozick’stheoryembodiesastrongsuspicionofstateactionandaconcernforindividualrightsandliberty,itcoincideswithamajorpartofliber-alismasunderstoodhere.However,thoughhebelievesthatprotectingindividualeconomicrightstendstobenefiteveryone,Nozickdoesnotmakethisclaimapre-conditionofacceptinghistheory.Thus,herejectsanotherfoundationalcom-mitmentofmuchtwentieth-centuryliberalism,namely,thecommitmenttopromotingindividualwelfareandopportunity.Inthis,hejoined–fromwithin200\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsphilosophy–atraditionofcriticismheretoforefoundmainlywithineconomics.EconomistslikeHayek(1960),andlaterJamesBuchanan(1975),werepro-foundlysuspiciousofstateinterventiontoredistributeincomeorwealth.Theythoughtinterventiontobeinefficientandalsotorequireastateapparatusthatendangeredliberty.ThoughNozick’ssuspicionofthestateandhisdoubtsaboutaggregativerea-soningfoundasympathetichearingamongmanyinthebroadlyliberaltradition,hisspecificlistofrightsdidnot.OneoftheearliestrepliestoNozick’sbookwasThomasNagel’s“LibertarianismwithoutFoundations”(1975).NagelcomplainedspecificallyaboutNozick’sfailuretogiveanadequateargumentforhissystemofpersonalandpropertyrights.And,indeed,thoughNozickoffersaningeniousandoftenfascinatingaccountofwhatstatesandcitizenswouldbecommittedtoiftheyacceptedatheoryofrightsliketheoneheadopts,heagreesthathisargu-mentsinsupportofthoserightsarelessthanconclusive.Inretrospect,IthinkNozick’sbookcanactuallymakeonemoresympathetictoRawls’sproject.Twopointsareworthmentioning.First,insofarasRawls’stheoryaddressesthequestionofthejusticeofparticularholdingsofparticularpersons,histheoryisactuallysimilartoNozick’s.Bothholdthatthereoughttoberulesofpropertyandcontract,thattheseoughttoberespected,andthatanyparticularperson’sentitlementsaredeterminedbythefreeoperationofthat3system.Thequestionisjustwhichrules,whichsystemofrights,weoughttoadhereto.Buthere,secondly,Rawlsoffersageneralanswer,whileNozickdoesnot.ForRawls,asystemofrightsiscorrectonlyifitispartofthebasicstructureofasocietywherethatstructure,inturn,satisfiesgeneralprinciplesofjusticewhichwouldbechosenintheoriginalposition.Rawls’stheorypurportstoofferawaytoachievecriticaldistancefrompartic-ularinstitutions,systemsofrights,andbeliefsaboutliberty,opportunity,andthedistributionofwealth.Itspecifiesanabstractprocedureforadjudicatingamongthesedifferentbeliefsorsystemsanddeterminingwhichcanbejustified.And,ifRawlsisright,itispossibletoproduceacoherentliberaltheoryspecifyingtheappropriaterelationsbetweenliberty,equalityandwelfare.Inthis,Rawls’stheory–butnotonlyhis–isconsonantwithoneofthehistoricallycentralideasofmodernpoliticaltheory:theidea,centraltoenlightenmentthought,thatsocial,politicalandlegalarrangementsaretobeseennotasfixedbutasproperlysubjecttoalterationinlightofhumanpurposes(cf.Waldron,1993,pp.43–5).Whilemuchliberalthought–and,aswewillseebelow,notjustthatofRawls–seekstojustifyitspoliciesbyadoptinganabstract,criticalperspectiveonpar-ticularinstitutions,bothfeministandcommunitariancriticshavecriticizedliber-alismforexactlythisabstraction.Feminists,inparticular,arguethattheabstractconceptionofcitizensfoundinRawlsianorutilitarianthoughtblindsustotheparticularneedsandinterestsofparticulargroups,includingwomenandracialor4culturalminorities.201\nWilliamNelsonAlternativeliberaltheoriesRawls’scontractualisttheoryisnottheonlyonethatoffersthiskindofcriticalperspectiveonfirst-orderliberalbeliefs.Sincetheeighteenthcentury,utilitarian-ismhassoughttodothesame.ForBentham,andlaterforMillandSidgwick,theideaofthegreatesthappinessofferedarationalstandardforthecriticalassessmentofchoicesofallkinds,frompersonaldecisionstodecisionsaboutconstitutionaldesign.Benthamthoughtmanyofthelawsandinstitutionsofhisowndayirra-tionalbythisstandard.Anumberofutilitariantheoristsinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,partlyinresponsetotheRawlsianchallenge,havedevelopedsophisticatedargumentstoshowthattheutilitarianstandardactuallyrequiresmanyofthetypicalinstitutionsofthecontemporaryliberalstate(Bailey,1997;Hardin,1986;Hardin,1988;Sartorius,1975).Theargumentsturnonconsider-ationsofseveralkinds.Oneexample:Utilitarianism,itmightseem,shouldinsistthateachperson,ineachsituationoughttotrytomaximizeutility.Butitdoesnotfollowthat,ifoneweredesigningaconstitution,oneoughttocreatepositionsofauthoritywhoseoccupantsareauthorizedtopursuetheprojectofutilitymaximizationwithoutrestriction.Itdoesnotfollow,inparticular,thatgovernmentofficialsshouldhavetheauthoritytocensoractsofexpressionsimplyonthegroundthatutilityrequiresit.Nordoesitfollowthatthepoliceshouldalwayshavetheauthoritytoconductsearchesortoengageinformsofsurveillance,eveniftheythinktheconsequenceswillbegood.Utilitarianscandefendlimitsonauthority,evenontheauthoritytoactonutil-itarianconsiderations,byarguingthattheauthorityitself,oncegranted,maysooftenbemisusedastohavebadconsequences.Onereasonisthatgovernmentoffices,oncecreated,maynotbeoccupiedbyconscientiousutilitarians.Amoreinterestingreasonisthatevengoodutilitarians,likeeveryoneelse,seldomhaveanythinglikethekindoffullinformationtheywouldneedtocalculateconse-quencesaccurately.Avarietyofwriters,includingRussellHardin,andFriedrichHayek(1948),haveemphasizedthispoint.NotonlydoesitprovideagooddefenseofthelimitsonofficialauthorityfoundinworkslikeMill’sOnLiberty(restrictionsoncensorshipandpaternalism,forexample),italsoprovidesanargu-mentforindividualrightsofpropertyandcontract:wemayhavelimitedknowl-edgeofwhatisgoodforothers,orforsocietyatlarge,butwearemorelikelytoknowwhatweourselvesneed(and,asHayekemphasizes,howtoconductourownbusinesses).Ofcourse,liberalismusuallyinvolvesmorethanjustacommitmenttolimitedgovernment,specificfreedomslikefreedomofspeech,andabeliefinindividualrights.Manyliberalsfavorsomerestrictionsonfreedomofcontract,suchastherestrictionsimplicitinminimum-wagelawsorclosed-shoplaborcontracts.Manyalsofavorlimitstopropertyrightsiftheseareneededtosecurepublicgoodslike202\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticscleanairandwater.Bututilitarianarguments,supplementedbyanunderstandingofthestrategicfeaturesofinteractions,cansupporttheseconclusionstoo.ThoughRawls’searlyworkonjusticeaimedespeciallytoprovideanalterna-tivetoutilitarianism,laterworkbyutilitariansshowedthattheirtheorycaninfactsupportmanyofthesameconclusionsRawlsdefends.Moreover,justasRawls’scontractualismpromisestoofferacriticalperspectiveonthenaturalrightspostu-latedbylibertarianslikeNozick,soalsodoesutilitarianism.However,whilebothofferargumentsinsupportofindividualrightstopropertyandcontract,neithersupportsunqualifiedrightsofthesekinds.Boththeoreticalapproaches,indeed,canmakeuseofsomeofthesameconcernsaboutthestrategicnatureofinter-actiontosupportqualificationsonlibertarianrights.Contractualismandutilitarianismarenottheonlytheoriesofferingacriticalperspectiveonparticularaccountsofindividualrightsandauthority.AnotherisJosephRaz’s.Razsaysheaimsto“rehabilitate”the“traditionalistaffirmationofthevalueoffreedom,”andtodefenda“doctrineofpoliticalauthority”basedona“perfectionistpoliticaldefenseandpromotionoflibertyandautonomy.”Autonomy,indeed,ishiscentralconcept,andhethinksthevalueofpersonalautonomyiswhatunderliesthedefenseofpoliticalfreedom(Raz,1986,pp.17,19,400f).Theargumentislongandcomplex,withmanydifferentstrands.Itisbroadlyconsequentialist,buttheaimistopromoteautonomy,notutility.Razisespeciallyconcernedtoshowthat,startingwiththeideaofautonomy,weendupinadifferentplacefromthatofmanyothertheoristsinthebroadlyliberaltradition.Herejects,foronething,theattempttoreducetheideaoflibertyorautonomytotheideaofanyparticularsystemofrights.HespecificallydeniesthatautonomyisbestrealizedinasystemprotectingonlyindividualrightsofthekindNozickadvocates.Instead,Razarguesthatthevalueofautonomycanbeachievedonlyincontextsinwhichsocietyprotectscollectivebenefits,especially“socialforms”constitutingvaluablewaysoflife.Forautonomouschoosersmustchooseforreasons,andthatmeanschoosingamongavailable,valuable,alternatives.Sinceprotectingsocialformsmayrequirestateaction,theliberalstateshouldnotbeequatedwiththeminimalstate.Andsinceprotectingautonomyitself,aswellasprotectingparticularsocialformsandpractices,requireslegislatingonthebasisofvalues,Raz’sliberalstateisalsonotrequiredtorefrainfrompromot-ingideals.ItisperhapsworthrecallinghereKekes’scritiqueofliberalism,mentionedattheoutset,forKekesobjectedtotheallegedliberalpreoccupationwithautonomy.NeitherRawls,asIreadhim,norutilitarians,actuallybasetheirtheoriesonanidealofautonomy,butRazdoes.AndKekesobjectedthat,whenweguaranteepeopleautonomy,wealsomakeitlikelythattheywillmisusetheirautonomybychoosingevilovergood.DoesthisobjectionapplytoRaz?WhileitistruethatRazchampionsautonomy,thishastobeunderstoodinthecontextofhisclaimthathisisa“‘moralistic’doctrineofpoliticalfreedom”(1986,203\nWilliamNelsonp.367).Theidealofpersonalautonomy,hesays,istheidealofpersons“con-trolling...theirowndestiny...throughouttheirlives”(369).However,whileRazthinksgoodlivesmustbeautonomousinthisway,hedoesnotthinkthatanyautonomouslifeisgood.Autonomyis,asitwere,anecessary,notasufficientcon-dition.Goodlivesarelivesautonomouslychosenforgoodreasons.“[T]henon-availabilityofmorallyrepugnantoptions”isnotabadthing,onthisview.“Autonomyisvaluableonlyifexercisedinpursuitofthegood”(381).Conse-quently,forRaz,thepromotionofvaluable,autonomouslivesisperfectlycom-patiblewithgovernmentalactiontomakevaluableoptionsavailableandtodiscourageoreliminateoptionsthatarebad.Respectfor(worthwhile)autonomydoesnotmeanweshouldturnpeopleloosetochooseevilorrepugnantwaysoflife.Asaresult,Raz’stheoryisnotsubjecttoKekes’scriticism.Inthisbriefsurveyofliberalthoughtthroughthe1980s,Ihavefocusedespeciallyondifferentideasabouthowliberalinstitutionsandprinciplescanbejustified,andonwhatkindofjustificationisappropriate.ThetheoristsIemphasizeallargueforbasicpoliticalfreedoms,toleration,equalopportunity,andtheeconomicandsocialconditionsthatmakepossiblethepursuitofgoodandmeaningfullives.Allofthemrejectextantinstitutionsandbeliefsthatstandinthewayofourrealizingtheseconditions.Liberalinstitutions,thesetheoristsargue,canbegivenafirmandconvincingjustification,whileopposingideasandinstitutionscannot.But,thefactis,evenliberalsdisagreeamongthemselvesastowhichjustificationsareadequate;andnon-liberalsdonotaccepttheargumentsofferedbyanyliberals.Acknowledgingthesedisagreements,someliberalshavecometothinkabouttheissueofjustifyingliberalisminanewway.Theyseekawayofthinkingaboutliberalideasthatcouldmakeliberalismmorewidely–evenuniquely–justifiable.IIPoliticalLiberalismanditsCriticsPoliticalliberalismInthissection,Iattemptanexplicationand(partial)defenseoftheideasitsdefendersrefertoas“politicalliberalism.”Despitetheconsiderableingenuitydevotedtodevelopingandrefiningthevarioustheoriesdescribedabove,eachremainscontroversial.Indeed,inbothacademicandnonacademiccircles,oppos-ingideashavereassertedthemselveswithgreatvigor.Whilethestrongestacade-miccriticsofliberalisminthe1960swerefromtheMarxistleft,thenextwaveofacademiccriticismcamefromthelibertarianright,andmanysubsequentcriticswerepartisansoftraditionalandreligiouscommunities.Itbecameeasytoseethejustificatoryideasinliberalthoughtasjustvariousarbitrarystartingpoints.Anyonewhomighthavehopedthatcarefulattentiontofoundationalbeliefsandtotheconstructionofwell-groundedtheorieswouldleadtoaconvergence204\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsofideas,asharedconceptionofthetruth,wouldhavebeendisappointed.Someliberaltheoristsinthelasttwodecades,therefore,havecometofocusevenmoreself-consciouslyontheprospectsandlimitsofjustification.Callingtheirview“politicalliberalism,”JohnRawls,inhislaterwork(1993),andCharlesLarmore(1987,1996)seektostrengthenthecaseforliberalismandtobroadenitsappealpartlybylimitingthescopeofliberalprinciples(theyapplyonlytocertainpolit-icalquestions)andpartlybytryingtoshowthatliberalism,astheyconstrueit,istheuniquelybestanswertothosequestions,givenapracticalproblemtheythinkunavoidableinallmodern,democraticsocieties.Theproblemarisesfromwhattheyseeastheinevitablediversityofmoral,philosophicalandreligiousideas,evenamong“reasonable”persons.Thatpoliticalliberalismcansolvethisproblem,theyclaim,justifiesit(foranyonewhoseesitasaproblem).Andthatotherpoliticalviewsdonotsolveit,orevenexacerbateit,showsthat(atleastinthisrespect)theycannotbesimilarlyjustified.Takingthisapproach,however,leadsRawlsandLarmoretopositionsthatputthematoddsnotonlywithvariousnon-liberalthe-oristsbutalsowithutilitarianliberalsand“perfectionist”liberalslikeRaz.RawlsandLarmorearenotaloneinseeingdisagreementanddiversityasa5problem.Butwhyitshouldbeaspecialproblemrequirescomment.Thatpeopledisagreeaboutrightandwrong,goodandbad,afterall,ishardlynews.Itisespe-ciallynotnewstomoralphilosophers;andtheyhaverespondedinvariousways.Oneissomeformofskepticism,thedenialthatwecanknowthetruthinthesemattersor,even,thatthereisanytruthtobehad.Others,Isuspectthemajorityamongcontemporaryphilosophers,takethefactofdisagreementsimplytoshowthatsomepeoplemustbewrongandthatthetaskofphilosophyistodiscoverwhattherightviewis.Rawlsseemstosay,intheintroductiontohisPoliticalLiberalism(1993),thatheoriginallysawtheprojectofATheoryofJusticeasanattempttodojustthis:Itaimedtoshowthatthehypotheticalcontractwasthecorrectstartingpointformoralphilosophy,andso,thattheprinciplesderivedtherewerethemorallycorrectprinciplesforassessingsocialandpoliticalarrangements.Heconstruedpoliticalphilosophy,atthattime,astheapplicationofacorrect,comprehensivemoralviewtotheparticularcaseofpoliticalchoice(1993,p.xv).Rawlsnowconceiveshisprojectdifferently.Butthereasonhenolongerseekstofindtheuniquelycorrectmoraltheorytosupplantthealternativesisthatheretainsoneoftheoriginal,motivatingideasbehindhistheory,namely,theideathatinstitutions,tobelegitimate,mustbejustifiabletoeach(reasonable)personsubjecttothem.Yet,healsothinksitinevitablethattherewillnever,inademo-craticsociety,beagreementonfoundational,moralandphilosophicalideas.Therewillneverbeagreementonwhathecalls“comprehensivedoctrines.”Thatleavesuswith“theproblemofpoliticalliberalism”:“Howisitpossiblethattheremayexistovertimeastableandjustsocietyoffreeandequalcitizens,profoundlydividedbyreasonablethoughincompatiblereligious,philosophicalandmoraldoctrines?”(1993,p.xviii,cf.xix,4;seealsoLarmore,1996,pp.121–2).Thisisessentiallytheproblemofcreatingawell-orderedsociety–asocietywhosesta-205\nWilliamNelsonbilityrestsonaprincipledconsensus,whereeveryoneacceptsthesamestandardsas“areasonablepublicbasisofjustificationonfundamentalpoliticalquestions”(1993,p.xix).WhatisnewinthewayRawlsnowseesthisproblemishisaccep-tancethatwhateveragreementwemayreachwillbelimitedincrucialways.Itwillbeanagreementoncertainprinciplesforcertainpurposesagainstabackgroundofdisagreementonmanyothermatters,including,perhaps,theultimatereasonswhyweshouldseeksuchanagreement.Howisawell-orderedsocietypossibleatall,giventhefactofpluralism?Rawls’sanswer–orconjecture–isthatphilosophicalandreligiousdoctrines,oftenradicallydifferentintheirfoundationalbeliefsandinmanyoftheirconse-quentjudgments,canstillcoincideinendorsingtheidealofthereasonable.Par-tisansofotherwisedifferentviewscanallbereasonableinthesensethat(1)theyarepreparedtoseekandtooffer,ingoodfaith,mutuallyacceptabletermsofcoop-erationwithothers(andtocomplywiththesewheninforce),and(2)theyarepreparedtoaccepttheburdensofjudgment–toacceptthatdeeperagreementonfundamentalmatterssimplycannotbeachieved,onawidespreadbasis,underconditionsoffreedomanddemocracy(1993,pp.48–58).Reasonablepersons,asdefined,sharetheaimoffindingmutuallyacceptableprinciplesfortheassessmentofsharedinstitutions.And,totheextentthatpersonsarereasonableinthissense,thereisabasisforseekingagreementamongthem–despiteotherdifferences.Totheextentthatpersonsarereasonableinthesensedefined–andtotheextentthattheaimofpoliticaltheoryisconstruednotasjustificationtoeveryone,butasjustificationtothereasonable–itlooksasiftheproblemofjustificationmightbetractable.Anditis,ofcourse,notaparticularlysurprisingideathatprin-ciplesguaranteeingreligiousliberty,freeexpression,andsomedegreeofpersonalprivacy,wouldformpartofaconsensusamongreasonablepersonswhootherwisedisagreesharplywithoneanother.Inshort,itisfarfromimplausiblethatcentralliberalideascan,infact,solvethepracticalproblemofpoliticalliberalismunderconditionsofreasonablepluralism.Defendersofpoliticalliberalismsometimesgoontosayitisaconsequenceoftheirapproachthatthestatemustingeneralbeneutralamongthereasonablecomprehensivedoctrinesofthesortthatcanbeexpectedtopersistinmodern6democracies.Or,asThomasNagelputsitinhisratherdifferentidiom,wemustfindprinciplesrepresentinga“highestorderofimpartiality”:“highestorder”because,asNagelnotes,theconflictingmoralviewsprevalentinsocietyalreadyrepresenttotheiradherentsanachievementofimpartiality.Theyaremoralviews.Anysystemthatcanexpectconsentmustachieveimpartialityamongtheseother-wisealreadyimpartialperspectives.Andsoalso,toputthepointnegatively,thefactthatparticularmoralviewsrepresentanachievementofimpartialityisnotenoughtojustifyimposingthem(Nagel,1987).Now,thesubstantiveprinciplesRawlsseekstodefend–andheistheonewhoofferssubstantiveprinciples–havenotsignificantlychangedsinceATheoryofJustice,thoughheislessinclinedtotreatthemasuniquelycorrect.ButIdonotintendtofocushereonthesesubstantiveprinciples.Instead,Iwanttolookatthe206\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsideasinpoliticalliberalismabouttheconstraintsonjustification–theideasaboutmorality,truth,neutralityandimpartialitytowhichRawlsandotherdefendersofpoliticalliberalismtakethemselvestobecommitted.Thesehavethemselvesbecomemattersofcontroversyintherecentliterature.Howdotheycomeintoplay?Giventhefactofreasonablepluralism,RawlsandLarmorebothclaim,asystemofprincipleswillbeabletoserveas“apublicbasisofjustificationonfundamen-talpoliticalquestions”onlyifitconstitutes,inRawls’sphrase,an“overlappingconsensus”amongthediverse,reasonabledoctrinesinsociety.Thisdoesnotassumethattheseprinciplesarealreadyfound,inadevelopedform,ineachdoc-trine.Itassumesmerelythattheycanbedevelopedoutofminimalsharedassump-tionsinsuchawaythatall“canreasonablybeexpected,”atleastinthelongrun,toendorsethem(Rawls,1993,p.137).Buttheycannotbebasedoncertaincon-troversial,fundamentalideas.Forexample,theycannotbebasedonthemoralideaofpluralism–theideathatthedifferentconceptionsofthevalueandmeaningoflifeprevalentinsocietyareallviableandgoodwaysoflife(Larmore,1999,p.122).Thisisjustwhatmanyreject.Similarly,LarmoreandRawlsjoinindenyingthatweshouldbegin,asdoesRaz,byaffirmingthevalueofautonomy.Thevalueofautonomyisamatterofcontroversy.Tosummarize,RawlsandLarmorebothclaimthatpoliticalprinciplesmustbeacceptabletothediversepersonsandgroupsinsociety;andbothclaimthatthisrequiresneutralityamongdifferentconceptionsofthegoodlife,amongdifferentcomprehensivemoral,religiousandphilosophicalideas.Moreover,Rawlsevenclaimsthatliberalismmustrefrainfromassertingthetruthofitsideasandprinciples.Criticsobjectstronglytobothideas.Notonlysomeconservatives,butalsoper-fectionistliberalslikeRazandSherclaimitisthestate’sjobtopromotewhatisgenuinelygood.Politicalphilosophyshoulddiscovertruthsaboutwhatisgoodandargueforpublicpoliciesbasedonthosetruths.Theyconsequentlycriticizethecommitmenttobothneutralityand“epistemicabstinence.”Thereissomeironyinthisturnofevents.ThomasNagel(1973)andAdinaSchwartz(1973),amongtheveryearlycriticsofATheoryofJustice,criticizedRawls’sprinciplesforfailingtobeneutralamongcompetingconceptionsofthegood:Whileitistruethatpoliticalliberties,economicopportunitiesandadequateincomeandwealthareusefulinthepursuitofmanygoals,theyareespeciallyusefulinthepursuitofthemoreindividualisticgoalswidelyfavoredinmodern,market-orientedsocieties.Thustheemphasisonthesegoodsmayactuallyencouragepeopleinthedevelopmentofindividualisticgoals.Itmaymakeitlesslikelythatthosewithmorecommunitarianvalueswillbeabletorealizethosevaluesandlive7thekindoflifetheyfindbest.Rawlsreplied,in“FairnesstoGoodness”(1975),thatnopoliticaltheorycanbegenuinelyneutralinitseffects.Anysetofinstitutionalarrangementswill,infact,makesomewaysoflivingmoreeligiblethanothers.Moreover,incaseswherethewaysoflifemadedifficultorimpossibleareunjust(becausetheyrestonracist207\nWilliamNelsonideologies,forexample)weshouldnotregrettheirpassing.Butevensomeotherwiseacceptablewaysoflifearebound,inanysystem,tobemoredifficulttopursuethantheymightbeotherwise;and,inthatcase,allweneeddoisassureourselvesthatwhatevertheobstacles,theyarecompatiblewithjusticeandcannotberemovedwithoutcausinggreaterinjustice.WhatRawlsassertedatthattimewasthatprinciplesandinstitutionswerenotrequiredtobeneutralintheireffects.And,alongwithLarmore,DworkinandWaldron,hestillacceptsthatview.ButwhilebothRawlsandLarmorenowexpresssomedissatisfactionwiththeterminology,theyalsoinsist,asIhavesaid,onsomeversionofneutralityofintentionorpurpose.Therearethentwocontroversialideasassociatedwithpoliticalliberalism:thatliberalismmustrefrainfromassertingthetruthofitsideasandprinciples,andthatthestatemustremainneutralamongvariousothermoralandphilosophicalviews.Iwillsaymoreabouteachinturn.ThemoraltruthItisRawls,primarily,whoseemstoadvocatethatliberalismabstainfromclaim-ingthetruthofitsprinciples.Whatdoesthisclaimamountto,anddoeshehaveagoodreasontoadheretoit?Toanswer,weneedtosayalittleaboutthetheory.Likeanypoliticaltheory,liberaltheorywillincludedirectivesconcerningmattersofconstitutionaldesign,especiallyspecificationsofthescopeandlimitsoflegalandpoliticalauthority,butalsomattersofbasiceconomicandsocialpolicy.Itwillalsoembodyajustificationforthesedirectives.InRawls’stheory,thisjustificationrestsonvariousideas–ideasaboutcitizens,andtheircapacities,togetherwiththeideaofchoicebehindaveilofignorance–wheretheseideasandresultingprin-ciplesaresupposedtoformastable“overlappingconsensus”amongpersonswithdiversebutreasonablecomprehensivedoctrines.Theprinciples,Rawlsassumes,willnotbefoundalreadyextantinthevariousprevailingdoctrines.Rather,theywillhavetobeconstructedsoastobesuitablefortheirpurpose.Theprocedureofconstructionischoiceintheoriginalposition.Thisprocedure,andthevariousconditionswhichdefineit,isproposedasaninterpretationofthevaluesofconsentandofsocialcooperationformutualadvantage.Thesevalues,inturn,includeapartialspecificationofthesharedideasofthereasonableandtherational(Rawls,1993,pp.90–6).Theargumentforthewholesystemis,ultimately,thatitworks.Moreexactly,theargumentisthatreasonableadherentsofdifferentcomprehen-sivedoctrinescouldcome,intime,tosharetheseideasastheideasthatshouldgoverntheircommonpoliticalaffairs.Theywillbeseenasreasons.Whencitizensrespectlimitsonauthorityandmodifytheirowndemandsonthebasisoftheseprinciples,theytreatothersinawaythatcanbejustifiedtothoseothers.And,whenothersmakeexcessivedemands,itwillbepossibletoexplaintothem,intermstheycanaccept,whytheyareexcessive.208\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsThathispoliticalliberalismworks,thatitcanbeacceptedinthisway,Rawlsthinks,doesnotmeanthatitistrue(1993,pp.xx,125f,216f).More,theasser-tionofitstruthcanbenopartoftheargumentforitsacceptance.Why?ItisJosephRaz,especially,whohasrecentlypressedthisquestion.In“FacingDiver-sity:TheCaseofEpistemicAbstinence”(1990),heobjectstoseveralofRawls’sstrategiesfortryingtoavoidrelianceoncontroversialtheoriesorideas.Heobserves,correctly,thatRawlsnowviewshistaskasthatofsolvingakindofprac-ticalproblem.But,heobjects,evenifthisishistask,thatisnoreasontodenythathistheoryistrue(15–16).Ifitsolvestheproblem,thenitistruethatitsolvestheproblem.Supposewehadanengineeringproblem,andweconcludedthatitssolutionrequiredtheuseofacertaintypeofvalve.Inthatcase,itistrue(giventhecontext)thatweshouldusethattypeofvalve.Howcanweassertthatweshouldusethisvalveandnotassertthatitistruethatweshould?Thatweshouldisatruismabouttruth.Byanalogy,ifourproblemistofindaconstitutionthatcanmeetcertainpracticalconstraints,andifthatrequiresaguaranteeofreligiousliberty,thenitissimplytrue(giventhecontext)thatweshouldguaranteereli-giousliberty.WhenRawlsinitiallydeniesthathisprinciplesaretrue,hesaysthattoclaimtheirtruthwouldbetoassessthem“fromthepointofviewofourcomprehen-sivedoctrine”(1993,p.126).Now,thisclaimcanbeunderstoodinmorethan8oneway.Buteitherway,itdeniesthattherecanbetruthrelativetoalessthancomprehensiveaimorconcern.Idonotseewhyweshouldacceptthislimitationontheuseoftheterm“true”.Hence,IdonotseewhyRawlsmustrefusetosaythattheprinciplesofjustice,supposingtheydothejobtheyaresupposedtodo,aretrue.Ialsodonotthinkthiswouldbeaseriousconcessiononhispart.Granted,ifanargumentforpoliticalliberalismistosucceed,itmustnotcon-tradictessentialfeaturesofreasonable,comprehensivemoralorreligiousdoctrines.Ifitdidthat,thenitcouldnotbejustifiedtoreasonableadherentsofanyofthedoctrinesitcontradicts.But,aslongasassertingthetruthofprinciplesdoesnotinvolvedenyinganyessentialfeatureofsuchdoctrines,doingsodoesnotcom-promisetheproject.Iftheirtruthconsistsmerelyoftheirbeingpartofasolutiontoapracticalproblem,thenthereisnoreasonnottoasserttheirtruth.Shouldwegoontosaythattheprinciplesrepresent(partof)themoraltruth?Rawlsinsiststhatpoliticalliberalismisa“freestanding”politicalconception(1993,p.12).Itsprinciplesarenotpresentedastheoremsofsomeparticularcom-prehensiveview,but,rather,asprinciplesforregulatingpoliticallife,justifiableintermsoftheideaofthereasonable.CharlesLarmorehasrecentlyargued,though,thattosaythisisnotnecessarilytodenythattheymaketruemoralclaimsonus(1999).Rather,theypresupposeacertainmoralideal(cf.Raz,1990,p.14).ShouldRawlsagreewiththis?Rawlsclaimsthatliberalprinciplesarereasonable.Theymeettheneedreason-ablepersonshaveforprinciplesthattheyandotherreasonablepersonscanallaccept.Reasonableness,Rawlsthinks,willbyitselfbeenoughtoleadpersonsto209\nWilliamNelsonacceptliberalprinciples.(Ifheisright,itwillleadpersonstoaccepthisprinciples.)Buttheaimofbeingreasonable,Larmoreclaims,isitselfamoralaim.Itamountstooneconceptionofthemoralidealofrespectforpersons.Andso,heargues,weshouldnotshyawayfromassertingthatreasonableprinciplesrepresentmoraltruths.IbelieveRawlshasgoodreasontorefrainfromassertingthisasanypartofthejustificationforliberalprinciples.Toclaimtheyaremoraltruthsistomakeanassertionthatadherentsofsomereasonable,comprehensiveviewsmustreject.Itiscertainlytruethattheterm“moral”canbe,andhasbeen,usedbothbroadlyandnarrowly.WemightsometimeswanttoreserveitforarathernarrowrangeofparticulardutiescorrespondingroughlytoRawls’srequirementsofreasonablebehavior,but,onotheroccasions,wemighttakeittoincludeidealsandconcep-9tionsofexcellencethatgofarbeyondtheminimaldutiesweowetooneanother.Thus,someonecanspeakofarequirementasamoralone,intheformer(narrow)sense,withouttakingastandonitsrelationtoavarietyoffurtherideals–muchlessonwhetheritderivesfromthesamesourceasthoseideals.ItakethistobewhatLarmoreproposes.However,amongthosewhoarepreparedtoaffirmthedutiesofthereasonable,theremaybesomewhorejectthe“pluralistic”concep-tionofthemeaningof“moral.”Forthem,tocommitoneselftoamoralclaimistocommitoneselftoanelaboratemetaphysicalidea,andtheymayrejectthatidea.Forexample,theymayholdthatmoralityconsistsofGod’slawsandyetrejecttheism.Whiletheymaybecommittedtoreasonableprinciples,theyhavereasontodenythatthesearemoralprinciples.Toinsistthattheyaretruemoralprin-ciplesisgratuitouslytorejectassumptionstheymayholddear.IconcludethatRawlsiswrongtowithholdtheterm“true”fromhisprinci-ples,butjustifiedinrefusingtosaythattheyaremoraltruths.Moreexactly,whilehe,orLarmore,maythemselvesbepreparedtobelievethatthesearemoraltruths,heisjustifiedininsistingthatliberalprinciplesbecapableofbeingjustifiedbyreferencemerelytotheideaofthereasonable,andwithoutafurtherclaimthatthis10constitutesamoralrequirement.NeutralityAmoredifficultissueaboutpoliticalliberalismiswhether,ortowhatextent,itiscommittedtoanidealofstateneutralityamongcompetingviews–andifitiscommittedtoneutrality,whetherthisisnotanobjectionablecommitment.Iwillfocusparticularlyonneutralityinpoliticalliberalism.Thisisimportantbecausevariousliberal(andlibertarian)conceptionshaveadvocatedanidealofneutralityforvariousreasons.Andso,differentcriticsofneutralityfocusonunderminingdifferentargumentsofferedtosupportit.Iwillarguethatthefundamentalcommitmentofpoliticalliberalismisnottoneutralityperse,buttotheideaofjustificationtoallreasonablepersons.Thisrequires,atmost,thatbasicprinciplesbeneutraljustwithrespecttocomprehen-210\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticssivedoctrinesonwhichthereisdisagreement.Moreover,whileprinciplesmaysometimesdenypoliticalauthoritytopromotecertainendsorvalues,morecom-monlyitwillsimplyregulatethewayinwhichtheycanbepromoted,perhapsbyrequiringthatcertainlegislativeproceduresbefollowed.Thiscanstillallowthatlegislationitselfmaynotbeneutral.AndIwillalsoarguethatthereisgoodreasonwhysomesuchlegislationshouldbeallowed.Still,startingwiththeideathatbasicprinciplesmustbejustifiabletoeach,LarmoreandRawlsconcludethatthisrequiresprinciplestobeneutralamong11competing,reasonablecomprehensiveviews.Ontheotherhand,bothempha-sizethatthisrequirementappliesonlytobasicconstitutionalquestions,andRawlsgoesontosaythatcitizensshouldbefreetovoteaccordingtotheircomprehen-siveviews“whenconstitutionalessentialsandbasicjusticearenotatstake”(1993,p.235).Giventheirunderlyingaim,onecanseetheappealofneutrality.Amongpersonswhohaveverydifferentideasaboutwhatmakeslifegoodforaperson,aboutwhatkindsoflifeoractivityaretobeadmired,andaboutwhatmightmakesuchideasrightinthefirstplace,onewaytoachieveagreementissimplytorefrainfrompro-nouncingonsuchthings–toremainneutral.Asagainstallthis,however,thereisaverydifferentideaabouttheproperaimsofthestate.InBeyondNeutrality(1997),Shersetsouttodefendtheviewthatthestate“maylegitimatelypromotethegood.”(1)Herejectstheviewthatthestate“overstepsitsbounds”ifit“triestomakecitizensmorevirtuous,toraisetheirlevelofcultureorcivility,ortopreventthemfromlivingdegradinglives.”(2)Whilepoliticalliberalismdeniesthatthestatecanbaseatleastitsfundamentalprinciplesontheaimofpromot-ingthegood,Sherinsiststhat“noreasonsareinadmissibleinpolitics”(4,cf.248).Hedefendsthe“traditional”viewthat“knowledge,excellenceandvirtuemakepeople’slivesbetter”andthat“politicalagentsoftenhaveamplereasontopromotesuchlives”(245).Todosoispartoftheproperfunctionofthestate.PerfectionistslikeSherorRazwilldifferfromdefendersofpoliticalliberalisminthekindofargumenttheywillacceptforlawsandinstitutions.Inmattersofsubstantivepolicy,however,itishardtosayhowmuchperfectionistswoulddifferfromRawlsorLarmore.Foronething,differentperfectionistswillhavedifferentideasastowhichlivesarebest.Moreover,although,atthelevelofconstitutionaldesign,perfectionistliberalswillbelessconcernedtofindrulesacceptabletoall,andmoreconcernedtocreateastatethatwillpromotethegood,theymay,fortheirownreasons,endorsethingslikefreedomofexpressionandfreedomofreli-gion.(Evenifonethinksitjustifiabletorestrictoffensiveexpression,say,onemayfearauthorizingthestatetodosoonthegroundthatotherswilllikelymisusethepower.)Still,perfectioniststendtopreferanarrowerconstructionofFirstAmend-mentrightsandtofavorsomerestrictionsonartisticexpressionwhenitmightencouragedegradingwaysoflife.Theywillcertainlyfavorstate-sponsoredcul-turalorartisticactivitywhenitencouragespeopletodevelop,orenablesthemtoexercise,theirtalents.Andtheyoftenfavorrelativelystrictacademicstandards,12alongwithmoraleducation,inschoolcurricula.211\nWilliamNelsonPoliticalliberalismwouldrespondbyreassertingthatdisagreementonfunda-mentalissuesofvalue,religionandphilosophyisinevitableinmoderndemocra-cies.Attheleast,werewetoadopt,astheveryfoundationofourpoliticalrelationswithothers,theideaofpromotingsomeparticular,idealwayoflife,wewouldbeunabletojustifyoursocialandpoliticalarrangementstootherswhorejectthatideal.Wewouldfailtosolvetheproblemofpoliticallegitimacyaspoliticalliberalismunderstandsit.Iftheaimofourassociationweretopromoteanidealincompatiblewiththebasicaimsofsomereasonablecitizens,howcouldwejustifyourinstitutionstothem?ItisnotirrelevanttothisreplythatSherbeginshisbookbyacknowledgingan“ambivalence”towardcontemporaryliberalism,asserting“aconfidenceinthepowerofreasontoresolveourdisagreements”(ix).ThisissurelyoneoftherootsofhisdisagreementwiththeliberalismofRawlsandLarmore.Evenifweacceptthedemandsofthereasonable,Shermightsay,wehavenoneedtobeneutralamongconflictinggroupsifwecanwintheagreementofallbyreasoning.Ifheisright,ofcourse,thatcertainlyunderminesthecaseforneutrality.Butisheright?Thisisnotasimplequestion,foransweringitrequiressortingouttwodiffer-entissues.First,thereisthequestionwhetheractual,smart,educatedpersonswillcontinuetodisagreeinfactaboutphilosophical,religiousandmoralissues.Theanswer,surely,isyes.But,second,thereisthequestionofwhatsortofagreementweneed.Shouldwebesatisfiedifweareconvinced,onthebasisofsober,reasonedinvestigation,thatourinstitutionsaresupportablebyprinciplesthateveryoneelseoughttoagreeto–ifonlytheyusedtheirheads?Ormustweseeksomethingclosertoactualassentofallormostpersons?Wehavetoadmitthatwewillnotgetactual,universal,assenttoanything.ButIsuspectthetheoristsofpoliticalliberalismmightbeinterpretedasacceptinganintermediaterequirement:principlesareadequateonlyiftheyshouldbeacceptedbyallreasonablepersonsonthebasisofbeliefsandvaluestheyalreadyhold.Perhapspoliticalliberalsthinktheydiscern,inthemodernhistoryofdemoc-raticsocieties,atrendtowarddisagreementonmattersofreligionandphilosophy,conjoinedwithatrendtowardagreementonpoliticalidealsliketoleration.Idonotknow.ButIdosuspectthat,asRawlsunderstandstheideaofthereasonable,itrequiresthatweseeksomethingclosertoactualagreementthanSherwouldrequire–perhapssomethingalongthelinesjustsuggested.Andthisinturnsug-geststhatthedisagreementbetweenhimandSherisanormativedisagreementastohowweshouldbehavetowardotherswithwhomwedisagree.Ifthisisright,itisnotsurprisingthatSher,followingRaz,questionsRawls’sconsistencybyobservingthatRawls’sowntheoryis“basedonacontroversialmoral...doctrine,”namely,the“valueofuncoercedstability”(85,92).Now,IbelieveitisrightthatonedifferencebetweenpoliticalliberalismandSher’sperfectionismisthattheformeriscommittedtoanidealofpoliticalsta-bilitygroundedonprinciplesthatareacceptabletoallreasonablepersons,despiteenduringphilosophicalandreligiousdifferences.Andthisideamaycommitlib-eralstosomethinglikeneutralityonmattersindisputeamongreasonablepersons.212\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsButIdonotseeanyinconsistencyhere.Politicalliberalism,likeanyview,isnotwithoutpremises.Thereisnothingwrongwithadoptingaparticularnormativeperspectiveandthen,ifthatperspectiverequiresneutralityelsewhere,pursuingitthere.Andcertainlytheideaofjustificationtoallisnotcontroversialamongthereasonable.However,IdonotbelievethatRawls’stheory(andheistheonewhooffersthemoresubstantiveprinciples)achievesathoroughgoingneutrality.Instead,theimpatienceheexpressedwiththeideaofneutrality,atthetimeof“FairnesstoGoodness,”ismoreinlinewithhiscurrenttheory;andthatmayhelptoexplainthediscomfortwiththeterm“neutral”thatbothheandLarmorenowexpress(Rawls,1993,p.194;Larmore,1996,pp.125–6).Isupposeoneideaofwhatneutralitymightinvolveistheideaofaminimalstate–astatethatdoesalmostnothingbeyondenforcinganuncontroversialgoaloforderandindividualsecurity.PerhapsthisisonewayofarrivingatsomethinglikeNozick’sposition.ButRawlsandLarmorehopetofindarationaleforamorerobust,activistliberalism,andtheyseekideasandprinciplesthatcanserveasthe“publiccharter”intermsofwhichcitizenscanunderstandanddiscusstheirsharedinstitutions,principlestowhichtheycanappealinresolving,oratleastclarifying,theirdisagreements.Toachievetheaimsofpoliticalliberalism,theseideaswillhavetobeaccept-abletodiversepersonswhootherwisedisagreesharply.Rawls’slanguage(e.g.,theideaofan“overlappingconsensus”)sometimessuggeststhathewillachievethisbydrawinghisprinciplesfromthesharedstockofideasalreadypresentindemo-craticculture,andbothSherandRaztakenoteofthispoint.SheralsoportraysRawlsastaking“conceptionsofthegood”“outofplay”withthedeviceoftheveilofignorance(79).ButIthinkneitherideareallycaptureswhatRawlsdoes.Thefirstignorestheextenttowhich,asnotedabove,Rawls’stheoryrepresentsaconstructionoutofavarietyofideasthataremerespecificationsofsharedvalues;andthesecondignoresthefactthatRawls’sargumentfromtheoriginalpositionbeginswithalistofgoodseveryoneissaidtowant:liberties,opportunities,income13andwealth.Now,tostartwiththeseideasisnottoadoptastanceofneutralityamongallideasofthegood.Norcanitbesaidthatthelistofgoodsiscompletelyuncon-14troversial.Buttherealaimofpoliticalliberalismisnotneutralityperse.Itisrathertoformulateapoliticalconceptionthatcanbejustifiedtoreasonablepersonsholdingavarietyofincompatible,comprehensivedoctrines.ThequestioniswhetherconstitutionalprinciplesguaranteeingRawlsianprimarygoodscanbesojustified.Itiscertainlyplausiblethatprinciplesguaranteeingequalliberties,especiallyfreedomofreligionandfreedomofexpression,mightfigureinareasonableaccommodationamongthosewhoholdconflictingdoctrines.Whileleavingsup-portersofdifferentideasfreetoadvocatetheirviews,theyspecificallyrefrainfromsidingwithanyoneinparticular.UnderstoodastheyareintheUSBillofRights,theyremovefromthepoliticalagendathequestionofwhichreligionorwhichmoralorphilosophicaldoctrinesoughttobeofficiallycertifiedastrue.Theother213\nWilliamNelsonRawlsianguarantees–thedifferenceprincipleandtherequirementoffairoppor-tunity–however,maybelesseasytojustify.Ithinktherequirementoffairoppor-tunityespeciallyproblematic.Rawlssaysremarkablylittle,inhisvariouswritings,aboutjusthowthisrequirementistobeunderstood.Isitprimarilyconcerned,forexample,withthecompetitionforeconomicallyadvantageouspositions,orforpositionsofpowerorprestige?Orisitinsteadconcernedwithopportunitiestoflourishandlivewellmoregenerally?Thelattermightseemmoreeasilyjustifiable(especiallyifthereisseriousdis-15agreementastothevalueofeconomicsuccessitself).Buteventhenitlooksasifthejustificationwillnotbeasstraightforwardasthejustificationforsomeoftheotherlibertiesmentioned.Whilefreedomofreligion,forexample,removescertainissuesfromtheagenda,fairopportunitymerelypostponesthem.Ifitwereunder-stood,say,astheopportunitytoacquireandexercisecertainpurelysecularcapac-itiesandhabitsofskepticalinquiry,oralternativelyastheopportunitytobecomeamodelsocialistcitizen,thentherearemanytowhomitcouldnotbejustifiableasarequirementofbasicjusticeatall.Thesamewouldbetrueifitwereunder-stoodmerelyastheopportunitytoleadanexemplaryreligiouslifeandpursueareligiousvocation.Ontheotherhand,iftheideaofagoodlifeisleftlargelyopen,therequirementcouldbejustifiedasabasicrequirement,butonlybecauseitpost-ponescontroversyoverparticularattemptstoimplementit.Controversyoverschoolcurriculaandtextbooksisanobviousexample.Securingopportunitywillrequirelegislation,andalegislatureempoweredtoenforcerequirements.Disputesabouttheserequirementswillinescapablytaketheformofdisputesaboutwhatisactuallygoodforpeople,whatisactuallytrue,andsoon.Theywillrequiredecisionsabouthowtopromotewhatisgoodbothforindividualsandforsociety.Eventhedecisionnottorequirecertainthingsofevery-one,giventheassumptionthatwemustprovidefairopportunity,isadecisionaboutwhatapersonneedsinordertoflourish.So,votersandofficialswillbeunable,intheformulationofactualpolicy,toactneutrally.IfIamnotmistaken,then,Rawlsshouldactuallyendupwiththekindof“quasi”perfectionistviewSherproposes:aview“thatdoesnotseektogroundthestateinanyparticularconceptionofthegood,butneverthelessholdsthatagovernmentmaylegitimately16promotethegood”(1).AndthisviewisalsoconsistentwithwhatRawlshimselfsays,whenhesuggeststhatneutralityisrequiredindealingwithconstitutionalquestionsandquestionsofbasicjustice,butthatpeoplearefreetovoteaccord-ingtotheircomprehensiveviewsinlegislativematters.Indeed,bothLarmoreandNagelsayverymuchthesamething.Ithelpsmakesenseofthistosee–asRawlsmakesexplicit–thatpoliticallib-eralismisconcernedwithmorethanmerelyfindingagreement.Thisisonecon-straintonamoregeneralpoliticalproject,anotheraimofwhichistoconstitutea“fairsystemofcooperation,”wherethisidea,inturn,requires“anideaofeachparticipant’srationaladvantage”(1993,pp.15–16).Politicalsocietyaimstomakepossibleandtofacilitateourgainingtheseadvantages.Theproblemistoachieve214\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsthispurposeinalegitimateway,wherelegitimacyrequires,touseWaldron’sterm,someanalogueofconsent.Promotingtheachievementofindividualgoodisinsometensionwiththelegit-imacyconstraint–giventhebackgroundofreasonablepluralism.Reasonableness(inRawls’ssense)makessomeagreementpossible.Anditisarguablethatthisagreementcanincludethekindofsubstantiverequirements,supplementedbyarelativelyunconstrained,democraticpoliticalprocess,whichRawlsproposes.ButthisdoesnotachievethekindofthoroughgoingneutralityagainstwhichSherargues.Legislativedebateswillinvokesubstantivevalues,andlegislationitselfwillincorporatesomeofthesevalues.Forthose,includingsomefeministwriters,whoobjecttowhattheyseeasexcessiveabstractnessandwhoendorsearobust,demo-craticpolitics,thisshouldbewelcome(Young,1990,ch.5;Benhabib,1987).Politicalliberalismoffersanaccount–anexplanation–ofawiderangeofliberalideas.Raz’stheory,likesophisticatedformsofutilitarianism,canalsomakesenseofmanyoftheseideas.Thelattertwo,however,arguablyfailtomeetthelegiti-macyconstraint–therequirementthatatleastthebasicprinciplesofatheorymustbejustifiabletoallreasonablepersons.Doesthatmeantheyarenotjusti-fied,whileatheorylikeRawls’sis?Thatdependsonwhetheroneacceptsthisrequirement,andjusthowoneinterpretsit.Whetherweshouldacceptit,Ithink,dependsonwhetheritcanbeinterpretedinsuchawaythat,ontheonehand,itcanbemet,butontheotherhand,thefactthatatheorymeetsitismorally17significant.Theideaoffocusingonreasonablepersonsandonwhatcanbejustifiedtothem,isanattempttodothis.Inanycase,Ithinkacceptanceorrejec-tionofthisrequirementmarksafundamentaldivideinpoliticalphilosophy–and18perhapsinmoralphilosophyaswell.Notes1J.S.Mill’sOnLiberty(1978),amoresweepingdefenseofliberty,evenagainstdemocraticencroachments,isaclassicofliberalthought.IsaiahBerlin,in“TwoConceptsofLiberty”(1969),defendsaMillian“negative”libertyagainst“positive”liberty.2SeeWaldron(1993),pp.50f,and58whereheemphasizesjustificationtosubjects.Notethatthisidealitselfmaybequestioned.3InRawls’sterms,thisisamatterof“pureproceduraljustice,”whateverresultsfromajustsystemisjust.Fordiscussion,seeNelson(1980).4Young(1990),Benhabib(1987),but,seealsoOkin(1989).Forfurtherdiscussion,seearticlesinthisvolumebyHeldandSterba.5Nagel(1987),Berlin(1969),Hampshire(1989).6Onneutrality,seealsoDworkin(1985),pp.191f;Waldron(1993),ch.7.7SeediscussioninWaldron(1993),“LegislationandMoralNeutrality,”esp.pp.165f.SeealsoDworkin(1985).8Itmightimplyarelativisticview,thattherearedifferenttruths,buteachpresupposesoneoranothercomprehensiveview;oritmightbetheviewthatajudgmentistrue215\nWilliamNelsononlywhenbasedonthecorrectcomprehensivedoctrine–thoughwedisagreeastowhichthisis.9ThisphraseisfromScanlon(1998).Heinsistsonthepluralityofconceptionsofthemoralandrepliestosomecriticismsofhisaccountofourdutiestooneanotherthattheystemfrommoralidealsinabroaderuseoftheterm.10ThisisanargumentinsupportofRawls’srefusaltoaccepthistheoryasamoraltruth.Butananalogyofthisargumentcouldalsobeusedtodefendhisrefusaleventosaythatitistrue;forsomemayevenrefusetoacceptthe“relativized”conceptionoftruthwhichIrefertoasatruism.IthankDavePhillipsforthisobservation.11Larmore(1987),pp.50f,67f(1996),pp.125–6;Rawls(1993),p.194.12Whilesomedefendersofneutrality(perhaps,e.g.,Dworkin)willrejectsuchpolicies,politicalliberals,asIarguebelow,canatleastpermitsomeofthem.Theyreject,asabasisforpoliticalassociation,anyspecificconceptionofthegood,buttheyrecognizetheneed,inpractice,toprovideconditionsinwhichgoodlivesofvariouskindscanflourish.Theyalsohavetofaceuptothehardchoicesthatarisewhentheconditionsforonegoodkindoflifeareincompatiblewiththeconditionsforanother.13IthasbeenarguedbyScanlon(1975),andnotedbyNagel(1987),thatweneedatleastsometheoryofthegoodifwearetomakejudgmentsaboutdistributivejustice–forthesewillrequirejudgmentsastowhoisbetterorworseoff.14Thoughitisrelativelyso–as,bytheway,elementsoftheconceptionofvalueSherdefendsinhisbookarerelativelyuncontroversial.IthinkalotofwhatShersays,muchofitinspiredbyAristotelianideas,couldbeacceptedbytheoristslikeRawls.AmongthosewhomightfindRawls’slistcontroversialarefeministslikeYoungandBenhabib,eachofwhomsuggeststhatabstractgeneralizationsaboutwhatpersonsneedriskleavingouttheneedsofunder-representedpersonsorgroups.15Nelson(1984),andSen(1992).16Attheendofhisbook,Sherseemstogofurther,arguingthatitisactuallylegitimatetogroundastateonaconceptionofthegood.Butthenhedoesnotseemtoacceptthepoliticalliberal’sconstraintonlegitimacy.17Raz,inthelastparagraphof“FacingDiversity...”(1990),doubtsthatbothcondi-tionscanbemet.ThisessaywaswrittenbeforeRawls’sPoliticalLiberalism.Whethertheideasthere–inparticular,theconceptionofthereasonable–help,seemstomeaninterestingquestion.18MythankstoGregBrown,DavePhillipsandGeorgeSherfordiscussingtheseideaswithmeandforcommentsonanearlierdraft.BibliographyBailey,J.W.(1997).Utilitarianism,InstitutionsandJustice.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Benhabib,S.(1987).“Thegeneralizedandtheconcreteother.”InS.BenhabibandD.Cornell(eds.),FeminismasCritique(pp.77–95).Cambridge,Eng.:PolityPress.Berlin,I.(1969).FourEssaysonLiberty.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Buchanan,J.M.(1975).TheLimitsofLiberty.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Dworkin,R.(1985).“Liberalism.”InAMatterofPrinciple.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.216\nLiberalTheoriesandTheirCriticsHampshire,S.(1989).InnocenceandExperience.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Hardin,G.(1988).MoralitywithintheLimitsofReason.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Hardin,R.(1986).“Theutilitarianlogicofliberalism.”Ethics,97:47–74.Hayek,F.(1948).“Theuseofknowledgeinsociety.”InIndividualismandtheEconomicOrder.London:Routledge.–––(1960).TheConstitutionofLiberty.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Kekes,J.(1997).AgainstLiberalism.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Larmore,C.(1999).“Themoralbasisofpoliticalliberalism.”JournalofPhilosophy,XCVI:599–625.–––(1996).TheMoralsofModernity.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.–––(1987).PatternsofMoralComplexity.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Mill,J.S.(1978).OnLiberty.Indianapolis:Hackett.Nagel,T.(1973).“Rawlsonjustice.”PhilosophicalReview,LXXXII:220–34.–––(1975).“Libertarianismwithoutfoundations.”YaleLawJournal,85:136–49.–––(1987).“Moralconflictandpoliticallegitimacy.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,16:215–40.Nelson,W.(1984).“Equalopportunity.”SocialTheoryandPractice,10:157–84.–––(1980).“Theveryideaofpureproceduraljustice.”Ethics,90:502–11.Nozick,R.(1974).Anarchy,StateandUtopia.NewYork:BasicBooks.Okin,S.M.(1989).Justice,GenderandtheFamily.NewYork:BasicBooks.Rawls,J.(1958).“Justiceasfairness.”ThePhilosophicalReview,LXVII:164–94.–––(1971).ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.–––(1975).“FairnesstoGoodness.”ThePhilosophicalReview,89:536–54.–––(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Raz,J.(1986).TheMoralityofFreedom.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.–––(1990).“Facingdiversity:Thecaseofepistemicabstinence.”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,19:3–46.Sartorius,R.E.(1975).IndividualConductandSocialNorms.EncinoandBelmont,CA:Dickenson.Scanlon,T.(1975).“Preferenceandurgency.”JournalofPhilosophy,LXXII:655–68.Scanlon,T.M.(1998).WhatWeOwetoEachOther.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Scheffler,S.(1994).TheRejectionofConsequentialism(Revisededn).NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Schwartz,A.(1973).“Moralneutralityandprimarygoods.”Ethics,83:294–307.Sen,A.K.(1992).InequalityReexamined.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Sher,G.(1997).BeyondNeutrality.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Waldron,J.(1993).LiberalRights,CollectedPapers,1981–1991.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Young,I.M.(1990).JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.217\nPartIIIPluralism,Diversity,andDeliberation\nChapter10DeliberativeDemocracyJamesS.Fishkin“Deliberativedemocracy”referstoefforts,inboththeoryandpractice,torecon-cilethevalueofdeliberationwithothercoredemocraticprinciples,suchaspolit-icalequalityandtheavoidanceof“tyrannyofthemajority.”Theseeffortsengagenormativeconcernsaboutwhetherdeliberationisworthachieving,andatwhatcost,intermsofother,apparentlyconflictingvalues.Deliberativedemocracyalsoengagesempiricalissuesaboutwhethermoredeliberationwouldmakemuchdif-ferenceandaboutthekindsofinstitutionsthatmightbetterrealizedeliberativedemocracy.Themoderndebateaboutdeliberativedemocracycanbethoughtofasanexplorationintothecompatibilityofthreeprinciples–deliberation,politicalequal-ityandnon-tyranny(ortheefforttoavoidtyrannyofthemajority).Eachoftheseprincipleshasbeenconnectedtoadistinctimageofthedemocraticprocess:thefilter(fordeliberation),themirror(forpoliticalequality)andthemob(forwhattheprincipleofnon-tyrannyattemptstoavoid).Thesethreeimages,bequeathedtousbylongstandingdebatesaboutdemocracy,aredifficulttoreconcileinacoherentpicture;moreimportantly,theprinciplestheybringtomindseemtoclashinwaysthatbedevileffortsatdemocraticreform.Therearelongstandingarguments,inotherwords,forbelievingthattheseprinciplesformanincompat-ibletriad.However,wewillseethattherearealsowaysofcombiningthemthatrenderthemcompatible.Institutionsthatembodydeliberation,politicalequalityandnon-tyranny(theavoidanceoftyrannyofthemajority)are,infact,possibleundersomerealisticconditions.Beforeturningtothemoderndebate,however,itisworthnotingthattheseissuesgobacktotheearliestknowndemocraticefforts.221\nJamesS.FishkinTheAthenianSolutionOnecangobacktothebeginningsofdemocracyinancientAthensandfindinsti-tutionsembodyingaformofdeliberativedemocracy.TheAtheniansemployeddeliberativemicrocosmsofthecitizenrychosenbylotformanykeyfunctions.TheCouncilof500choseninthatwaysettheagendafortheAssembly.The“grapheparanomon”wasakindofcourtprocedurebeforeajuryof500ormorechosenbylotthatwouldhearappealsaboutanyproposalintheAssemblythatwasallegedtobeillegal.Andbyfourth-centuryAthens,legislativecommissionschosenbylotweremakingthefinaldecisionsaboutlegislation.Theseinstitutionsallowedforamicrocosmofthecitizenryonamanageablescale(500orso)thatcouldmakedeliberationpossible.Butsincethememberswerechosenbylot,therewasarec-ognizableformofpoliticalequality(atleastamongcitizens)realizedaswell.Everycitizenhad,intheory,anequalchanceofbeingchosentobepartoftheprocess.Thiskindofinstitution,thedeliberativemicrocosmofthecitizenrychosenbylot,providedasolutiontoabasicproblemthathaslongbedeviledattemptstorealizedeliberativedemocracyinpoliticalsystemsofanysignificantsize.Ataminimum,deliberativedemocracymightbethoughttorequirebothadelibera-tiveandademocraticelement.Thedeliberativeelementconsists,attheveryleast,inabalanceddiscussionofcompetingargumentsand,hopefully,reasonablyaccu-rateinformationinsupportofthosearguments.IntheAtheniansolution,thedemocraticelementwasembodiedbyaformofpoliticalequality–theequalchanceofferedbylottoeverycitizentoparticipateandthencastavote.AkeyaspectoftheAtheniansolutionisthatitmaintainedaclaimtopoliticalequalityregardlessofthenumberofcitizensinthesociety.CommentatorslongtreatedancientAthensandtheotherGreekcity-statesasplaceswheretheentirecitizenrycouldgathertogetherandpracticedirectdemocracy.Infact,modernresearchshowsthatthePnyx,thehillwheretheAssemblymetinAthens,couldonlyholdabout6,000citizenswhiletherewereabout60,000citizensinfifth-centuryAthens.TheAtheniansfacedthesamefundamentalproblemasmoremoderndemocraticefforts:theycouldnotgatherallrelevantcitizenstogetherinthesameplace.Theirsolutionwastorelyincreasinglyondeliberativemicrocosmschosenbylotsoastokeeptheparticipantstoamanageablenumberwhilealso1realizingaformofequality.WhentheAmericanfoundersdebatedhowtorealizesomeformofpopularcontrolinanation-state,theconventionalwisdomwasthatdemocracywasreservedforsmallcity-states,whereeveryonecouldgathertogether.JamesMadisonevenavoidedtheterm“democracy,”reservingitfordirectdemocraticgovernance,andtermedthefounders’plana“republic.”Madisonprizeddeliber-ativedemocracy,emphasizingthedeliberativeportionwhile,atthesametime,modulatingthedemocraticelements.ThemoderndebateaboutdeliberativedemocracywaseffectivelylaunchedbythedebateovertheAmericanfounding,222\nDeliberativeDemocracyfocusedoncompetingconceptionsofdemocracy,emphasizedbyFederalists(pro-ponentsoftheproposedconstitution)andAnti-Federalists.Thecompetitionbetweenthosecompetingvisionsofdemocracycontinuestothisday.TheFilterAsMadisonreportedonhisownpositioninhisnotesontheConstitutionalCon-vention,hewas“anadvocateforthepolicyofrefiningthepopularappointments2bysuccessivefiltrations.”Famously,hearguedinFederalist,no.10,thattheeffectofrepresentationwas“torefineandenlargethepublicviewsbypassingthemthroughthemediumofachosenbodyofcitizens...undersucharegulationitmaywellhappenthatthepublicvoice,pronouncedbytherepresentativesofthepeople,willbemoreconsonanttothepublicgoodthanifpronouncedbythepeoplethemselves,ifconvenedforthepurpose.”RunningthroughoutMadison’sthinkingisthedistinctionbetween“refined”publicopinion,theconsideredjudg-mentsthatcanresultfromthedeliberationsofasmallrepresentativebody,ontheonehand,andthe“temporaryerrorsanddelusions”ofpublicopinionthatmaybefoundoutsidethisdeliberativeprocess,ontheother.Itisonlythroughthedeliberationsofasmallface-to-facerepresentativebodythatonecanarriveat“thecoolanddeliberatesenseofthecommunity”(Federalist,no.63).ThiswasaprincipalmotivationfortheSenate,whichwasintendedtoresistthepassionsandintereststhatmightdivertthepublicintomajoritytyranny.TheFoundersweresensitivetothesocialconditionsthatwouldmakedeliber-ationpossible.Forexample,largemeetingsofcitizenswerethoughttobedan-gerousbecausetheyweretoolargetobedeliberative,nomatterhowthoughtfulorvirtuousthecitizenrymightbe.AsMadisonsaidinFederalist,no.55,“hadeveryAtheniancitizenbeenaSocrates,everyAthenianassemblywouldstillhavebeenamob.”AkeydesideratumintheFounders’projectofconstitutionaldesignwasthecreationofconditionswheretheformulationandexpressionofdelibera-tivepublicopinionwouldbepossible.Thefiltercanbethoughtofastheprocessofdeliberationthroughwhichrep-resentatives,inface-to-facediscussion,maycometoconsideredjudgmentsaboutpublicissues.Forourpurposes,wecanspecifyaworking(andminimal)notionofdeliberation:face-to-facediscussionbywhichparticipantsconscientiouslyraiseandrespondtocompetingargumentssoastoarriveatconsideredjudgmentsaboutthesolutionstopublicproblems.Thedangeristhatifthesocialcontextinvolvestoomanypeople,orifthemotivationsoftheparticipantsaredistractedbythekindsofpassionsorintereststhatwouldmotivatefactions,thendelibera-tivedemocracywillnotbepossible.ItisclearthatfromtheFounders’perspec-tive,thesocialconditionswearefamiliarwithinmodernmassdemocracywouldbefarfromappropriatefordeliberation.223\nJamesS.FishkinTheMirrorWhiletheFederalistsemphasizeddeliberationthroughsomekindof“filtering”processforthepublic’sviews,theopponentsoftheConstitutionemphasizedadifferentpictureofthefunctionofrepresentatives–themirror.Arepresentative3assemblyshouldbeaportraitorpictureinminiatureofthepeople.InthehandsoftheAnti-Federalists,thisnotionbecameabasisforobjectingtotheapparentelitismofthefilteringmetaphor(onlytheeducatedupperclasseswereexpectedtodotherefining,insmalleliteassemblies).Themirrornotionofrepresentationwasanexpressionoffairnessandequality.AsoneofthekeyAnti-Federalists,the“FederalFarmer,”putit:“Afairandequalrepresentationisthatinwhichtheinterests,feelings,opinionsandviewsofthepeoplearecollected,insuchmanner4astheywouldbewerethepeopleallassembled.”Inlinewiththemirrortheoryofrepresentation,Anti-Federalistssoughtfrequentelections,termlimits,andanymeasuresthatwouldincreasetheclosenessofresemblancebetweenrepresenta-tivesandthosetheyrepresented.Themirrorimagesuggestsanapproximationtowhatthepeopleallassembledwoulddecideiftheycouldsomehowallgathertogetherandhavetheirvotescountedequally.Thedifficulty,fromthestandpointofdeliberativedemocracy,isthatthepeopleinanation-statecannotallgathertogether,atleastforpurposesofdeliberation.Whiletheycanallvote,orhavetheirvotescountedequally,asinareferendum,itisfarmoredifficultforlargenumberstoachievemeaningfulface-to-facediscussion.“Thepeopleallassembled”isexactlythekindofgatheringtheFederalistsbelievedwouldgiveonlyaninferiorrenderingofthepublicgood.RecallMadison’sclaimthatasmallrepresentativegroupwouldgiveabetteraccountofthepublicgoodthanwouldthe“peoplethemselvesifconvenedforthepurpose”(Federalist,no.10).Themirrorisapictureofpublicopinionasitis;thedeliber-ativefilterprovidesacounterfactualpictureofpublicopinionasitwouldbe,wereit“refinedandenlarged.”The“Mob”Thereisathirdimage,andindeedathirdprinciple,tointroduceintothisdis-cussion.Inthiscase,itisanimagetobefeared,ratherthanonetobeprized.TheFounderswereclearlyhauntedbythepossibilitythatfactionsarousedbypassionsorinterestsadversetotherightsofothers,coulddoverybadthings.TheimagetheyfearedseemstobesomecombinationoftheAthenianmobandShays’srebel-lion.Partofthecasefordeliberativepublicopinionisthatthe“coolanddelib-eratesenseofthecommunity”(Federalist,no.63)wouldbeinsulatedfromthepassionsandintereststhatmightmotivatefactions.TheFoundersbelievedthatpublicopinion,whenfilteredbydeliberativeprocesses,wouldmorelikelyserve224\nDeliberativeDemocracythepublicgoodandavoidmob-likebehaviorofthekindthatthreatenstyrannyofthemajority.HencetheFounders’emphasisondeliberationwaspartlymoti-vatedbytheefforttoavoidtyrannyofthemajority.Buttheirstrategyforachiev-ingdeliberationcameatacostinpoliticalequality.Theyfeareddirectconsultationofthepeople.Thedeliberativebodiestheyemphasizedwererepresentativebodies,sometimeschoseninturnbyrepresentativebodies–Madison’sstrategyof“suc-cessivefiltrations.”RecallthattheinitialplanfortheSenatewasthatitwaschosenbytheStatelegislatures(asystemthatremainedinplaceuntilthepassageofthe17thAmendmentin1913).Similarly,theinitialnotionoftheElectoralCollegewasthatitwastoconstituteadeliberativebody,meetingonastate-by-statebasis.Insteadofthepeoplevotingdirectlyforpresident,Statelegislaturesselectedelec-torswhodeliberated,inturn,toselectthemostqualifiedcandidateforpresident.Astimewenton,theElectoralCollegebecameacrudedeviceforaggregatingvotesandthoseelectorswhodeliberatedriskedbeingbranded“faithless”iftheyeverdepartedfromthevotingexpressedearlierbythepublic.Theresultingchangescanbeviewedasanimprovementinpoliticalequalityamongcitizens,butastheeffectiveeliminationofyetonemoreinstitutionthatwasintendedtoembodydeliberation.TheApparentConundrumThereisstrongnormativeappealtoanyvisionofdemocracythatwouldsomehowachieveallthreeprinciples–deliberation,politicalequalityandnon-tyranny.First,thereareobviousreasonsforpreferringthatcitizenshavedeliberativeratherthannon-deliberativepreferences.Democracyismoremeaningfulifcitizensarebetterinformedandmoreattentivetotheissuestheyarevotingon.Second,thereareobviousreasonsforpreferringthatallvotesbecountedequally.Ifthevotesofsomecitizensarenotcounted,orifothersarecountedmore,thenthepictureofthepublicvoicethatresultshasbeendistorted.Third,thereareobviousreasonsforpreferringtoavoidtyrannyofthemajority.Ifdemocracyproducesgraveinjus-ticestosomeminority,thenitsnormativeclaimisundermined.Thisconditioncanbeviewedasarequirementofdemocratictheoryitselfor,alternatively,asarequirementforconditionsofjusticethatneedtobesatisfied,ifdemocratictheoryistohaveacompellingnormativeclaim.However,muchofthedebatesincetheAmericanfoundingillustratesjusthoweasyitisforconflictsamongthesethreeprinciplestoarise.Ontheonehand,polit-icalequalityseemstosystematicallyunderminedeliberationandontheotherhand,politicalequalityseemstoplacenon-tyrannyatrisk(inthatthepursuitofpoliticalequalitymaybringabouttyrannyofthemajority).Ifthesepatternsofincompatibilitycannotbeavoided,thenaspirationsforatheoryofdeliberativedemocracyrealizingallthreearedoomed.225\nJamesS.FishkinModernmassdemocracyattemptstorealizepoliticalequalitythroughmasspar-ticipation–throughdirectconsultationoftheentirepublic(or,viapublicopinionpolls,throughamirroring,inminiature,oftheentirepublic).Thisstrategy,unliketheAtheniansolutionmentionedearlier,leavesmassopinionunaffected.Peoplehavelittlereasontopayattentionortobecomeinformed.Equally,thisstrategycontrastswiththesmalldeliberativebodiesidealizedbyMadisoninhisvisionoftheSenate,ortheConstitutionalConventionsortheElectoralCollege.Madison’sclaimwasthatsmalldeliberativebodies,suchastheUSSenateoraConstitutionalConvention,allowrepresentativestocometoabetterdeterminationofthepublicgoodthanonewouldgetjustbybringingthepeopletogetherandaskingthem.Thereisadifference,inotherwords,betweenthedeliberativeorthoughtfulpublicopiniononecanfindinrepresentativeinstitutions,atleastattheirbest,andtheuninformedandunreflectivepreferencescommonlyfoundinthemasspublic.Acentralproblemindemocratictheoryishowtoreconciletheaspirationforthoughtfulandinformedpreferences–anaspirationexpressedbythevalueofdeliberation–withprincipleslikepoliticalequalitythatsupportmasspubliccon-sultation.Deliberativebodiesmayrepresenthighlyinformedandcompetentpref-erences,butthosepreferencesareoftensharedonlybyanelite.Directconsultationofmasspreferenceswilltypicallyinvolvecountinguninformedpreferences,thosesimplyreflectingthepublic’simpressionsofheadlinesor,inamoderncontext,soundbites.Hencethehardchoicebetweenpoliticallyequalbutunreflectivemasspreferencesandpoliticallyunequalbutrelativelymorereflectiveeliteviews.Beforewesearchforwaysoutofthisconundrum,letuspausetogetatleastaworkingdefinitionofpoliticalequality:apracticesatisfiespoliticalequalitywhenitgivesequalconsiderationtoeveryone’sviews.Forthemoment,weneednotconcernourselveswithwhoisincludedintheterm“everyone.”Obviously,therehavebeenenormouschangesinsuffrage,orinthedefinitionoftherelevantdemos,5duringtheperiodcoveredbythisdiscussion.Therearealsovariouswaystoprovidefor“equalconsideration.”Forourpurposesherewecanspecifyarootnotion–anequalchanceofbeingthedecisivevoter(assumingthatweknownothingaboutthepreferencesoftheothervoters).Thisnotionistheintuition6behindindicesforequalvotingpowersuchastheBanzhafindex.Itisalsoworthnotingthatpoliticalequalitycanbeappliedtoformalpoliticalprocessessuchasvotinginelectionsorprimariesorreferenda.Itcanequallybeappliedtounofficialprocessessuchaspublicopinionpolls,andtomanyotherinformalprocesseswhereitisfarlesssuccessfullyrealized:strawpolls,townmeet-7ingsandotherinformalgatheringswhereopinionislooselyassessed.OnekeyissuethatIhavealsoleftintentionallyunderspecifiedinthisdefinitionistheques-tionofwhat“views”aretobeconsideredequally.Politicalequalitycanbeappliedtogiveequalconsiderationtoinformedviews,asinadeliberativemicrocosm,orequalconsiderationtotheuninformedviewscommonlyfoundinthemasspublicwhenithaslittlereasontopayattentiontothedetailsofpublicpolicy.Wehavealreadyseenhowinstitutingpoliticalequalitythroughdirectconsul-tationcanunderminedeliberation.TheFounderspresentedaplausiblecasethat226\nDeliberativeDemocracytheappropriatevenuefordeliberationwasasmallrepresentativebodythatcouldcarefullyandconscientiouslyconsiderthecompetingargumentsaboutanygivenproposal.TheyhadinmindtheConstitutionalConventions,theSenate,theElec-toralCollege.TheyfeltthateventheAthenianAssemblymusthavebeentoolargeforrealdeliberation.Appealstomassdemocracyweredangerousasthepublicwaslikelytobeinattentiveandillinformedandwaslikelytobearousedonlybypas-sionsorintereststhatmightbedangerous.WhentheFounderstalkedof“tyrannyofthemajority,”itwasonlylooselyspec-ified.Theywereclearlyfearfulofsubstantialandavoidabledeprivationscommit-tedagainstlife,libertyorproperty.Whilethesenotionsaresuggestive,weneedaworkingdefinitionhereofthosegovernmentdecisionsthatwouldbesounac-ceptablethattherewouldbeoverridingnormativeclaimsagainstthemevenwhentheywereotherwisesupportedbydemocraticprinciples.Forourpurposes,wecansaythattyranny(whetherofthemajorityorminor-ity)isthechoiceofapolicythatimposesseveredeprivationsofessentialinterestswhenanalternativepolicycouldhavebeenchosenthatwouldnothaveimposedcomparableseveredeprivationsonanyone.Bynon-tyrannyIsimplymeantheavoidanceof“tyranny”inthissense.Thereare,ofcourse,interestingquestionsaboutthedefinitionof“essentialinterests”andthesenseinwhichpoliciesare8alternatives,onetoanother.However,thebasicnotiondoesnotturnonanyspe-cificaccountofthesenotions.Forourpurposeshere,thebasicideawillserve:thatitisobjectionablewhenpeoplechoosetodoverybadthingstosomeoftheir9number,whensuchachoicecouldhavebeenavoidedentirely.ReferendumDemocracyversusDeliberationTheproblemisthatpursuitofpoliticalequalitywouldseemtounderminebothdeliberationandnon-tyranny.FromthestandpointoftheFounders,theproblemwassoondramatizedbytheRhodeIslandreferendum,theonlyefforttoconsultthepeopledirectlyabouttheratificationoftheConstitution.RhodeIslandwasahotbedofpapermoneyand,fromtheFederaliststandpoint,irresponsiblegov-ernmentandfiscalmismanagement.AnAnti-Federaliststronghold,itliveduptotheFounders’imageofaplacewherethepassionsofthepublicmightunderminebothdeliberationandnon-tyranny.ItisworthpausingforamomenttoconsiderthedebateovertheRhodeIslandreferendum,sincetheconflictovercompetingconceptionsofdemocracythatwasclearlyarticulatedthenhasresonatedinsimilarwayseversince.TheAnti-Federalistssparkedathoroughgoingdebateoverthepropermethodofconsultingthepeople.Referendumadvocatesheldthat“submittingittoeveryIndividualFreeholderofthestatewastheonlyModeinwhichthetrueSentiments10ofthepeoplecouldbecollected”(emphasisinoriginal).However,theFederal-istsobjectedthatareferendumwouldnotprovideadiscussionoftheissuesin227\nJamesS.Fishkinwhichtheargumentscouldbejoined.Byholdingthereferendumintownmeet-ingsscatteredthroughoutthestate,differentargumentswouldbeofferedineachplace,andtheargumentsofferedwouldnotgetanswered.“Thesea-porttownscannothearandexaminetheargumentsoftheirbrethreninthecountryonthissubject,norcantheyinreturnbepossessedofourviewstheoreof...eachsepa-rateinterestwillactunderanimpressionofprivateandlocalmotivesonly,unin-formedofthosereasonsandargumentswhichmightleadtomeasuresofcommon11utilityandpublicgood.”FederalistsheldthatonlyinaConventioncouldrep-resentativesoftheentirestatemeettogether,voicetheirconcernsandhavethemansweredbythosewithdifferentviewssoastoarriveatsomecollectivesolutionforthecommongood.Theveryideaoftheconventionasabasisforratification12wasanimportantinnovationmotivatedbytheneedfordeliberation.Directcon-sultationofthemasspublic,realizingpoliticalequality,wouldsacrificedelibera-tivediscussion.Federalistsalsonotedanotherdefect–lackofinformation:“everyindividualFreemanoughttoinvestigatethesegreatquestionstosomegooddegreeinordertodecideonthisConstitution:thetimethereforetobespentinthisbusinesswouldproveagreattaxonthefreementobeassembledinTown-meetings,whichmustbekeptopennotonlythreedaysbutthreemonthsormore,inpreparationasthepeopleatlargehavemoreorlessinformation.”Whilerepresentativeschosenforaconventionmightacquiretheappropriateinformationinareasonabletime,itwouldtakeanextraordinaryamountoftimetosimilarlypreparethe“peopleatlarge.”Ofcourse,whathappenedintheend,isthatthereferendumwasheld;itwasboycottedbytheFederalists;andtheConstitutionwasvoteddown.RhodeIsland,underthreatofembargoandevenofdismemberment(ConnecticutthreateningtoinvadefromonesideandMassachusettsfromtheother),capitulatedandheldtherequiredstateconventiontoeventuallyapprovetheConstitution.Theefforttorealizepoliticalequalitybydirectlyconsultingeveryvoterunder-mineddeliberationand,giventhepassionsinvolvedinthereferendumcampaign,posedrisksofviolatingnon-tyrannyaswell.ThisincidentwasanearlyAmericansalvoinalongwarofcompetingconceptionsofdemocracy.Inthelongrun,theFederalistemphasisondeliberationanddiscussionmaywellhavelostouttoaformofdemocracy,embodiedinreferend,andinotherformsofmoredirectcon-sultationthatachievepoliticalequality–regardlessofwhetherornotitisalsoaccompaniedbydeliberation.Inthemorethantwocenturiessincethefounding,manychanges,bothformalandinformal,intheAmericanpoliticalsystemhaveservedtofurtherrealizepolit-icalequalitythroughmoredirectpublicconsultation,butatthecostofdelibera-tion.ConsiderwhathashappenedtotheElectoralCollege,theelectionofSenators,thepresidentialselectionsystem,thedevelopmentandtransformationofthenationalpartyconventions,theriseofreferenda(particularlyintheWesternstates),andthedevelopmentofpublicopinionpolling.Peoplevotedirectlyandtheirvotesarecountedequally(except,ofcourse,invotingfortheSenate,ifwe228\nDeliberativeDemocracycompareacrossstateswithdifferentpopulations).ManyaspectsofMadisonian“fil-tration”havedisappearedinasystemthathastakenonincreasingelementsofwhatmightbecalled“plebiscitary”democracy(embodiedinreferenda,primariesandtheinfluenceofpolls).Primariesandreferendabringtothepeopledecisionsthatwerepreviouslymadebypoliticalelites–partyleadersinthecaseofnominations,andlegislatorsinthecaseoflaws.Publicopinionpollsbringsubstantiveissuesdirectlytothepublic(inrepresentativesamples)withoutanyeffectiveopportunityfor“filtering”ordeliberation.Thismovementtomoredirectconsultationhascomeatacost–alossintheinstitutionalstructuresthatmightprovideincentivesfordeliberation.Muchsocialsciencehasestablishedthatordinarycitizenshavealowlevelofpoliticalknowl-edge.IntermsmadefamousbyAnthonyDowns,theycanbethoughtofassuf-13feringfrom“rationalignorance.”Eachindividualvoterorcitizencanseethathisorherindividualvoteoropinionwillnotmakemuchdifferencetopolicyout-comes,sothereislittlereasontomaketheefforttobecomemoreinformed.Theresultisaconsistentlylowlevelofknowledgeinthemasspublicaboutpoliticsandpolicy(aproblemtheAmericanelectorateshareswithcomparableelectorates14aroundtheworld).Theclaim,tobesure,isnotthatthepubliclackscapacity,onlythatundermostconditions,itlacksinterestoreffectiveincentivetobecomeinformed.Laterwewillturntoevidencethatwheneffectivelymotivated,thepubliciscertainlycapableofdeliberatingaboutcomplexpolicyquestions.Butwithoutaneffectivemotivation,thepursuitofpoliticalequalitythroughincreas-inglydirectmethodsofpublicconsultationhasbroughtthelocusofmanyimpor-tantdecisionstoamasspublicwhosemembers,ordinarily,havelittlereasontopayattention.Theresulthasbeenalossininformedchoiceanddeliberation.Theapparenttrilemmahastwoessentialclaims:pursuitofpoliticalequalityunderminesdeliberationandpursuitofpoliticalequalityunderminesnon-tyranny.TheFederalistclaimthatdeliberationcouldonlytakeplaceinsmallrepresenta-tivebodies,suchasratifyingconventionsortheproposedSenate,andnotthroughdirectconsultationsuchastheRhodeIslandreferendum,showshowthepursuitofpoliticalequalitythroughmoredirectconsultationwould,ontheirview,under-minedeliberation.Fromamoremodernperspective,themassincentivesfor“rationalignorance,”forcitizensinthelarge-scalenation-stateacquiringinfor-mation,orevenpayingattentionbeyondasoundbite,rendertheprospectsfordeliberativedemocracyonaconsistentandcontinuingbasisamongthemasspublic15ratherdubious.Thesecondclaimthatformsthebasisfortheapparenttrilemmaisthatthepursuitofpoliticalequalitythroughmoredirectconsultationunderminesnon-tyranny.Aswehavealreadyseen,thiswasclearlyamainworryoftheFounders.Madison,forexample,believedthatwithoutthefilterofaSenate,thedirectdemocracyoftheancientshadnobarrierstopassionsorintereststhatmightmoti-vatefactionsadversetotherightsofsomeminority.WhileagreatdealoftheAmericanexperiencewithinjusticeandmajoritytyrannycannotbepinnedonthe229\nJamesS.Fishkinspreadofpoliticalequality(indeed,itisarguablethatthespreadofthefranchisehas,onbalance,hadasalutaryeffect),itisneverthelessthecasethatagreatdealofpoliticalexperiencearoundtheworldsinceMadison’stimesupportstheviewthatdirectdemocraticconsultationholdsdangers,atleastonoccasion,ofmajor-itytyranny.ThereferendumwasusedbyNapoleontoprovidetheappearanceofpopularlegitimacy.ItwaslaterusedbyNazisandotherfascistsforthesame16purpose.Clearly,agreatdealofcaremustbetakenwiththesocialcontextofreferenda:howtheyareproposedandwithwhatmotives,andwhatopportunitiesareofferedforseriouspubliceducationoncompetingsidesoftheissue.SomeoftheAmericanexperienceintheWesternstateswherereferendaarecommonalsoraisesissuesof“faction”arousedbypassionsapparentlyadversetotherightsofothers.AgoodexamplemightbeProposition187inCalifornia,whichwasintended,in1994,todenyaccessofillegalalienstoschoolsandmedicalcare.Theconundrumseemstoturnonthefactthatmassdemocracybringswithitthelimitationsofthemasspublic.Individualcitizensinthelarge-scalenation-statearetypicallyinattentiveanduninformedduetotheincentivesforrationaligno-rance.Candidatesandpolicyadvocateswhowouldpersuadethem,oftenfinditadvantageoustotreatthemasconsumerswhomightbeswayedbyadvertisingratherthanascitizenswhomightdeliberate.AndtheyhaveallthevulnerabilitiesthatworriedtheFoundersaboutbeingarousedbypassionsorintereststhatmightbeadversetotherightsofothers.Onecaveatisworthnotingtothisdispiritingpicture.Theremayberarehis-toricaloccasionswhenallthreeofourprinciplesare,infact,realizedsimultane-ouslyinthelarge-scalenation-state.BruceAckerman’stheoryoftheAmericanConstitutionoffersacompellingpictureof“constitutionalmoments.”Attimesofgreatnationalcrisisitispossiblefortheentirecountrytobearousedinseriousdeliberativediscussion.AckermanclaimsthatthishashappenedatleastthreetimesinAmericanhistory–thefounding,ReconstructionandtheNewDeal.Onthoseoccasions,thereissomethingapproachingakindof“deliberativeplebiscite.”Thesubstanceoftheissuesisjoinedinagreatnationaldebate,inwhichvariousinsti-tutionsplayaroleinraisingargumentsandcounter-arguments,untilanewcon-17sensusonconstitutionalprinciplesisreachedandtheninstitutionalized.ModernDeliberativeMicrocosmsButtheexceptionalcharacterofAckerman’sconstitutionalmomentsonlyhelpsreinforcethepointthatundermostcircumstancesmostofthetime,wecanexpectthatmassconsultationwillfailtoyieldanythinglikemassdeliberation.Indeed,Ackermanusestheterm“normalpolitics”fortheconjunctionofmassinattentionandelite-dominatedinterest-grouppoliticsthatprovidestherule–towhichthegreatoccasionofa“constitutionalmoment,”onceinmanygenerations,providestheexception.230\nDeliberativeDemocracyThedifficulty,inotherwords,isthatmostofthetime,undernormalcondi-tions,thethreeprincipleswehavespecifiedposefundamentalconflicts.Ifwetrytoimplementpoliticalequalitythroughmassconsultation,wewillencounterthelimitingconditionsofrationalignoranceandthedangerthatthepublicwillonlybearousedbypassionsorinterestsofthesorttheFoundersfearedwhentheyconstructedtheiroriginal“indirect”system–asystemwehaveprogressivelyabandonedovertheyearsaswehavemadeourinstitutionsincreasinglydirect,increasinglysensitivetothe“mirror”ratherthanthe“filter.”Furthermore,Amer-icandemocracyisnot,ofcourse,aloneinthismovetoincreasinglydirectcon-sultation.Referenda,opinionpollsandotherformsofmassconsultationhavebecomecommonineverydemocracyaroundtheworld.Andeliteseverywherehavefoundthemselvesforcedbypublicpressuretodefertomassopinion,onceitismeasuredandpublicizedbythemedia.Fromthestandpointofpoliticalequal-ity,thismaywellbeagoodthing,butfromthestandpointofdeliberation,itisclearlyaproblem.Thequestforrealizingbothvaluesatthesametime(withoutalsoimpingingonthenon-tyrannycondition)remains.Largelylostinthedustofhistory,theAtheniansolutionremainsasaviablealternative.Ifastatisticalmicrocosmofthecitizenryisgatheredtogether,itcandosounderconditionswhererealdeliberationispossible,whereitsmembersareeffectivelymotivatedtoovercomerationalignoranceandbehavemorelikeidealcitizens.Bothdeliberation,forthismicrocosm,andpoliticalequalitycanbeachieved.TheAtheniansolutionwastoselecttheparticipantsbylot–givingeachcitizenanequalrandomchanceofbeingdecisive.Suchasolutioncomportswiththerootnotionofpoliticalequalitymentionedearlier.Modernsocialscienceexperimentshavedemonstratedtheviabilityofthisidea,atleastasaninstitutionthatmightserveanadvisoryfunctionforpublicpolicy.Invariousefforts,givendifferentnamesindifferentcountries,representativemicrocosmsofthecitizenryhavebeengatheredtodeliberateaboutimportantpublicissues.Someoftheseexperimentshavegonesofarastousescientificrandomsampling,themodernextensionoftheancientAthenianlot,toselecttheparticipants.Themostambitiousefforts,combiningscientificrandomsamplingofentirenation-stateswithdeliberationslastingseveraldays,fallundertheheadingof“DeliberativePolling.”IwillconfinetheseremarkstoDeliberativePolling,butthesamepointsapply,tovaryingdegrees,toeffortstermed“citizensjuries”(inBritainandtheUS),to“consensusconferences”(onscientificissuesinDenmark18andBritain),to“planningcells”(inGermanyandSwitzerland).DeliberativePollingbeginswithaconcernaboutthedefectslikelytobefoundinordinarypublicopinion:theincentivesforrationalignoranceapplyingtothemasspublicandthetendencyforsamplesurveystoturnupso-called“non-attitudes”ornon-existentopinions(aswellasverymuch“topofthehead”opin-ionsthatapproachbeingnon-attitudes)onmanypublicquestions.Thepublicdoesnotliketoadmitthatitdoesnotknowandmaywellmakeupanswerson19thespotinresponsetosurveyquestions.TheseworriesarenotdifferentinspiritfromtheFounders’concernsaboutmasspublicopinion,atleastascontrastedto231\nJamesS.Fishkinthekindsofconsideredjudgmentsthatmightresultfromthefilteringprocessofdeliberation.Atbest,ordinarypollsofferonlyasnapshotofpublicopinionasitis,evenwhenthepublichaslittleinformation,attentionorinterestintheissue.Suchpollsare,ofcourse,themodernembodimentofthemirrortheoryofrepresentation,perfectedtoadegreenevercontemplatedbytheAnti-Federalists.ButDelibera-tivePollingisanexplicitattempttocombinethemirrorwiththefilter.Theparticipantsturnedupbyrandomsampling,whobeginasastatisticalmirrorofthepopulation,aresubjectedtothefilterofadeliberativeexperience.Everyaspectoftheprocessisdesignedtofacilitateinformedandbalanceddis-cussionand,eventually,aconsideredjudgmentoftheissueinquestion.Aftertakinganinitialsurvey,participantsareinvitedforaweekendofface-to-facedelib-eration;theyaregivencarefullybalancedandvettedbriefingmaterialstoprovideaninitialbasisfordialogue.Theyarerandomlyassignedtosmallgroupsfordis-cussionswithtrainedmoderators,andencouragedtoaskquestionsarisingfromthesmallgroupdiscussionstocompetingexpertsandpoliticiansinlargerplenarysessions.Themoderatorsattempttoestablishanatmospherewhereparticipantslistentoeachotherandnooneispermittedtodominatethediscussion.Attheendoftheweekend,participantstakethesameconfidentialquestionnaireasonfirstcontactandtheresultingjudgmentsinthefinalquestionnaireareusuallybroadcastalongwitheditedproceedingsofthediscussionsthroughoutthe20weekend.Ineverycasethusfar,theweekendmicrocosmhasbeenhighlyrepre-sentative,bothattitudinallyanddemographically,ascomparedwiththeentirebaselinesurveyandwithcensusdataaboutthepopulation.Ineverycasethusfar,therehavealsobeenanumberoflargeandstatisticallysignificantchangesofopinionovertheweekend.Consideredjudgmentsareoftendifferentfromthe“topofthehead”attitudessolicitedbyconventionalpolls.Theevidenceoftheseexperimentsisthatdeliberationdoesindeedmakeadifference.Informedandengagedpublicopinionwouldbedifferentinitsconclusionsfromwhatwenor-mallyfindinthemasspublic.Butwhatdotheresultsrepresent?Therespondentsareabletoovercometheincentivesforrationalignorancenormallyapplyingtothemasspublic.Insteadofonevoteinmillions,theyhave,ineffect,onevoteinafewhundredintheweekendsample,andonevoiceinfifteenorsointhesmallgroupdiscussions.Theexper-imentisorganizedsoastomakecredibletheclaimthattheopinionsofeachpar-ticipantmatter.Theyovercomeapathy,disconnection,inattentionandinitiallackofinformation.Participantsfromallsociallocationschangetheiropinionsinthedeliberation.Fromknowingthatsomeoneiseducatedornot,economicallyadvan-tagedornot,onecannotpredictchangeinthedeliberations.Wedoknow,however,fromknowledgequestions,thatbecominginformedontheissuespre-dictschangeonthepolicyattitudes.Inthatsense,deliberativepublicopinionisbothinformedandrepresentative.Asaresult,itisalso,almostinevitably,counter-factual.Thepublicwillrarely,ifever,bemotivatedtobecomeasinformedandengagedastheseweekendmicrocosms.232\nDeliberativeDemocracyTheideaisthatifacounter-factualsituationismorallyrelevant,whynotdoaserioussocialscienceexperiment–ratherthanmerelyengageininformalinfer-enceorarmchairempiricism–todeterminewhattheappropriatecounter-factualmightactuallylooklike?Andifthatcounterfactualsituationisbothdiscoverableandnormativelyrelevant,whynotthenlettherestoftheworldknowaboutit?JustasJohnRawls’soriginalpositioncanbethoughtofashavingakindofrec-ommendingforce,thecounterfactualrepresentationofmorethoughtfulandinformedpublicopinionidentifiedbytheDeliberativePollalsorecommendstotherestofthepopulationsomeconclusionsthattheyoughttotakeseriously.Theyoughttotaketheconclusionsseriouslybecausetheprocessrepresentseveryoneunderconditionswheretheparticipantscouldthink.DeliberativePollingismeanttouncoverrepresentativeanddeliberativeconclusions–consideredjudgmentsthatembodydeliberation,politicalequalityand,presumably,non-tyranny.TheDeliberativePollappearstofunctionaswhatJohnStuartMillcalleda“schoolforpublicspirit,”asocialcontextwhereordinarycitizenscancometoconsiderthepublicinterestonitsmerits.Millthoughtthejurysystemfunctionedinthatwayandhehadthesamehopeforpublicvoting(forvotinginwhichonepubliclyaffirmedone’schoice).Millthoughtthatwhentheprivatecitizenpar-ticipatesinpublicfunctions,“Heiscalledupon,whilesoengaged,toweighinter-estsnothisown;tobeguidedincaseofconflictingclaims,byanotherrulethanhisprivatepartialities;toapply,ateveryturn,principlesandmaximswhichhavefortheirreasonofexistencethegeneralgood....Heismadetofeelhimselfone21ofthepublicandwhateverisintheirinteresttobehisinterest.”ThiskindofincreasedsensitivitytothepublicinterestcanbeseeninDeliber-ativePollsonenvironmentalmatters,inwhichtherespondentswererepeatedlywillingtomakemodestsacrificesofself-interestforthepublicgoodbyagreeingtobechargedmoreontheirmonthlyutilitybillstopromoteacleanenvironment(throughinvestmentsinenergyconservation,andrenewableenergyasopposed22tofossilfuels).TheDeliberativePollingexperimentsarefilledwithotherexam-plesaswellinwhichparticipantsfindcommongroundoncontentiousissuessuchascrimeorwelfarereformandwhere,afterdeliberation,theyevinceaclearwill-ingnesstomodulatetheirpursuitofself-interestforsomecollectivebenefitfortheentirecommunity.Inaway,theveryprocessofdeliberatingpublicproblemstogetherhelpscreateasocialcontextforsharedconcerns,apublicspaceforpublicopinioninwhichwhatMadisoncalled“thecoolanddeliberatesenseofthecom-munity”(Federalist,no.63)canbediscovered.Undertheseconditionspartici-pantsareinterestedinsolvingpublicproblemstogetherratherthanintakingawaytherightsofsomeforthebenefitofothers.Whilemoreempiricalworkisneeded,therecordthusfarsupportsthenotionthatstatisticalmicrocosmsofthepeoplecanbebroughttogethertorealizeallthreeprinciples:deliberation,politicalequal-ity,andtheavoidanceoftyrannyofthemajority.233\nJamesS.FishkinTheRoleofRepresentativesEffortstorevivetheAtheniansolution,atleastinanadvisoryform,suggesthowthethreeprinciplescanbeembodiedexplicitlyinnewkindsofdemocraticinstitutions.Butevenwithoutnewinstitutions,deliberativepublicopinionmayinfluencepoliticsandpolicyprovidedthatrepresentativesandcitizensregarditasmorallyrelevant.WhenMadisonclaimedthatrepresentativesshould“refineandenlargethepublic’sviews”itisarguablethathewasclaimingtheyshouldcon-siderwhattheirconstituentswouldthinkaboutanissueiftheywerebetter23informedandcoulddeliberateabouttheissue.ThisglossonMadisonsuggestsamiddlegroundinthecommonaccountofthedilemmaoftenfacingrepresen-24tatives.Shouldrepresentativesfollowthepolls?Orshouldtheyvotetheirownviewsofwhatisbestforthecountry(ortheirstateordistrict)?ThissimpledichotomydominatesthediscussionabouthowmembersofCongressandotherlegislatorsshouldapproachtheirtask,yeteachofthesetwobasicpossibilitieshasdifficulties.IfmembersofCongressfollowthepolls,thentheycanbedismissedasleaderlessweathervanesfortheshiftingwindsofpublicopinion.Givenhowill-informedthepublictendstobeonmostpolicyissues,theblindwouldliterallybedoingtheleading.Ontheotherhand,iftheyfollowtheirviewsofthesubstantivemeritswhentheirconstituentsdisagree,thentheycanbecriticizedforimposingtheirpersonalvaluejudgmentsonanelectoratethatthinksotherwise.Themiddleposition,betweenfollowingpublicopinionasitis,andfollowingone’spersonalviewsonthemerits,issoobviousthatithardlyrequiresexplicitstatement.Itiseasilyoverlookedandonlyoccasionallyarticulated.Representativescantakeaccountofwhattheythinktheirconstituentswouldthinkaboutanissue,oncetheywerewellinformedandgotthefactsandheardtheargumentsoneithersideandhadareasonablechancetopondertheissues.Thisviewofarepresenta-tive’sroleprovidesgroundsforresistingthepressureofpollsonissuesthattherepresentativeknowsthepublicknowslittleabout.Ontheotherhand,thisposi-tionisnotthesameasjusttherepresentative’sownviewsontheissueinques-tion.Therepresentativemayknowthathisorhervaluesdifferfromthoseofconstituentsonagivenquestionorthatconstituentswouldneveracceptapar-ticularpolicy,evenwithagreatdealmoreinformationanddiscussion.Therep-resentativemayalsoknowhisorherconstituentswellenoughtohavesomeideaofwhattheywouldaccept,ifonlytheyhadtheinformation.Thisdeferencetothecounterfactualdeliberatingpublicprovidesawayofthinkingabouttherep-resentative’srolethatavoidsthedifficultyoffollowingthepublic’suninformedviews,ontheonehand,andoffollowingtherepresentative’smoreinformedbut(perhaps)merelypersonalviews,ontheother.Whilethispointmayseemonlycommonsense,ithaslargeimplications.Onceitisgrantedthatcounterfactualbutdeliberativepublicopinionissomethingthatrepresentativesshouldpayattention234\nDeliberativeDemocracyto,itbecomespossibletoimplementatleastsomemodestelementsofdelib-erativedemocracywithoutrequiringawholesaletransformationofcurrentrepre-sentativeinstitutions.Deliberativedemocracyisnotamerelyutopianideal;itisalsosomethingwecanmovetowardsinmodestways.Otherreformsthatmightencouragethemediatotreatvotersascitizensratherthanasconsumersofadver-tisingandthatmightencouragebetterciviceducationmightalsobeconsidered25topromotemovementstowarddeliberativedemocracy.Experimentationwithnewinstitutions,suchasrevivalsoftheAtheniansolutionforcertainpolicycontexts,shouldbecontinuedaswell.Comparedwithotherformsofdemocracy,deliberativedemocracygivesaprimeroleforthepublic’sconsideredjudgments–foropinionsthatpeoplearriveataftertheyhavehadachancetoconsidercompetingargumentsandopposingpointsofview.Ifdemocracyistomeananything,itishardnottopreferdeliberativeformsofdemocracytothoseinwhichthepublicisinattentive,ill-informed,ormanip-ulated.Ifpreferencesaremoremeaningfuloncetheyhavehadthebenefitofdelib-eration,thensoshouldthecollectivedecisionprocessesthatemploythem.However,sincemostcitizensmostofthetimeundermostcircumstancesdonotdeliberate,manyofthekeyquestionsaboutdeliberativedemocracyfocusonitsreconciliationwithpoliticalequality(sincethisprinciplewouldrequirecountingeveryone’spreferencesequally,eventhepreferencesofthosewhoarenotdelib-erating)andnon-tyranny(sincethisprinciplewouldrequirethatunjustoutcomesbeavoided,eveniftheyseemtoresultfromprocedurallycorrectdemocraticprocesses).Wehaveseenthattheseprinciplescan,infact,bereconciledandthatdeliberativedemocracyisanidealthatcanactuallyberealized,atleasttosomedegree.However,thisidealprovidesforanovelagendaofchangeandexperi-mentation,anagendathathasonlyrecentlybecomeprominentagain,despitethefactthatthequestionsatthecoreofdeliberativedemocratictheoryareasoldasdemocracyitself.Notes1FormoreonAtheniandemocraticpractices,seetheexcellentaccountofferedbyMogensHermanHansen,TheAthenianDemocracyintheAgeofDemosthenes(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1991).2JamesMadison,NotesofDebatesintheFederalConventionof1787ReportedbyJamesMadison,withanIntroductionbyAdrienneKoch(NewYork:Norton,1987),p.40.3JackN.Rakove,“TheMirrorofRepresentation,”inOriginalMeanings:PoliticsandIdeasintheMakingoftheConstitution(NewYork:VintageBooks,1997),p.203.4HerbertStoring(ed.),TheCompleteAnti-Federalist(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1981),vol.II,p.265.5AsRogersSmithnotes:“whenrestrictionsonvotingrights,naturalization,andimmi-grationaretakenintoaccount,itturnsoutthatforover80percentofU.S.history,235\nJamesS.FishkinAmericanlawsdeclaredmostpeopleintheworldlegallyineligibletobecomefullU.S.citizenssolelybecauseoftheirrace,originalnationalityorgender.Foratleasttwo-thirdsofAmericanhistory,themajorityofthedomesticadultpopulationwasalsoineligibleforfullcitizenshipforthesamereasons.”RogersSmith,CivicIdeals(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1997).6SeeJonathanStill,“EqualityandElectionSystems,”Ethics(April1981),foranoverviewofthisliteraturethatisstillveryuseful.“Equalprobabilities”ismoredemandingthanacloselyrelatedcriterionsuchasequalsharesandlessdemandingthananonymityormajorityrule.7SeeJohnG.Geer,FromTeaLeavestoOpinionPolls(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),foranexcellentaccountofhowpoliticshaschangedforpoliticalleadersastheyhavelearnedtoassesspublicopinionmoresystematically.8ThisaccounthasobviouslybeeninfluencedbyRobertDahl’sdiscussionofMadisonandtheproblemoftyrannyindemocratictheoryinhisAPrefacetoDemocraticTheory(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1956).Forafulleraccountofthisviewof“tyrannyofthemajority,”seemyTyrannyandLegitimacy:ACritiqueofPoliticalTheories(Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,1979).9Whendecisionmakersareinablind-alleysituationsuchthatnomatterwhichoptiontheychoose,terribleconsequenceswillresultforatleastsomepeople,ithardlyseemsappropriatetousesuchaseveretermas“tyranny.”Rather,theyareinasituationthatmightbetterbecharacterizedas“tragicchoice.”10“RhodeIsland’sAssemblyRefusestoCallaConventionandSubmitstheConstitu-tionDirectlytothePeople,”inBernardBailyn(ed.),TheDebateontheConstitution,PartII(NewYork:TheLibraryofAmerica,1993),p.271.11“TheFreemenofProvidenceSubmitEightReasonsforCallingaConvention,”inBailyn(ed.),TheDebate,p.280.12SeeRakove,OriginalMeanings,ch.V.13SeeAnthonyDowns,AnEconomicTheoryofDemocracy(NewYork:HarperandRow,1956).14SeeMichaelX.DelliCarpini,andScottKeeter,WhatAmericansKnowaboutPoliticsandWhyItMatters(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1996).Foranexcellentoverview,seeRobertC.Luskin,“FromDenialtoExtenuation:PoliticalSophistica-tionandCitizenPerformance,”inJamesH.Kuklinski(ed.),ThinkingaboutPoliticalPsychology(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming,2001).15Isay“onaconsistentandcontinuingbasis”soasnottoruleoutthepossibilitythat,episodically,theremaybeacrisisthatproduceswhatBruceAckermancallsa“consti-tutionalmoment.”Seebelow.16Foragoodoverview,particularlyofEuropeanexperience,seeVernonBogdonar,“WesternEurope,”inDavidButlerandAustinRanney,ReferendumsAroundtheWorld(Washington,DC:AEI,1994).17BruceA.Ackerman,WethePeople,vol.1:Foundations(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUni-versityPress,1991),forthebasicidea,andWethePeople,vol.2:Transformations(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),fordetailedevidence.The“delib-erativeplebiscite”claimismadeonp.83ofvolume2.18Whilealloftheseeffortssharearootidea,thecitizensjuriestypicallyinvolvetoosmallanumber(12or18,thesizeofamodernjury)tobestatisticallyrepresentative;theconsensusconferencesemployself-selectedsamplesrecruitedfromnewspaperadver-236\nDeliberativeDemocracytisements;theplanningcellsemployonlyaseriesoflocalrandomsamples.FormoreonthesedifferencesseeJamesS.FishkinandRobertC.Luskin,“TheQuestforDelib-erativeDemocracy,”TheGoodSociety,vol.9,no.1(1999),pp.1–9.19SeetheseminalessaybyPhilConverseandtheenormousliteratureitstimulated(whichIcannotreviewhere):PhilipConverse,“TheNatureofBeliefSystemsinMassPublics,”inDavidE.Apter(ed.),IdeologyandDiscontent(pp.206–61)(NewYork:FreePress,1964).ForamorerecenttakeonthisliteratureseeJohnZaller,TheNatureandOriginsofMassOpinion(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992).20Formoreonhowthisworks,seeJamesS.Fishkin,TheVoiceofthePeople:PublicOpinionandDemocracy(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1997).SeealsotheessayscollectedinMaxwellMcCombsandAmyReynolds(eds.),APollwithaHumanFace:TheNationalIssuesConventionExperimentinPoliticalCommunication(Mahwah,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates,1999).21J.S.Mill,ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,1991),p.79.22SeeJamesS.Fishkin,TheVoiceofthePeople:PublicOpinionandDemocracy(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1997),pp.200–3.23SeeJosephM.Bessette,TheMildVoiceofReason:DeliberativeDemocracyandAmer-icanNationalGovernment(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1994),pp.35–7,forthisinterpretationofMadison.24Foraclassicstatementofthedilemma,seeHannaPitkin,TheConceptofRepresenta-tion(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1967),ch.7.25SeeFishkin,TheVoiceofthePeople,ch.5,formoreonthesestrategies.BibliographyAckerman,B.A.(1991).WethePeople,vol.1:Foundations.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.——(1998).WethePeople,vol.2:Transformations.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Bessette,J.M.(1994).TheMildVoiceofReason:DeliberativeDemocracyandAmericanNationalGovernment.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.DelliCarpini,M.andS.Keeter(1996).WhatAmericansKnowaboutPoliticsandWhyItMatters.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.Elster,J.(ed.)(1998).DeliberativeDemocracy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Fishkin,J.S.(1991).DemocracyandDeliberation:NewDirectionsforDemocraticReform.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.——(1997).TheVoiceofthePeople:PublicOpinionandDemocracy.NewHaven:YaleUni-versityPress.——andR.C.Luskin(1999).“TheQuestforDeliberativeDemocracy.”TheGoodSociety,9:1–9.Madison,J.,A.Hamilton,andJ.Jay(1987).TheFederalistPapers.NewYork:PenguinBooks(originallypublished1788).Manin,B.(1997).ThePrinciplesofRepresentativeGovernment.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.237\nJamesS.FishkinMcCombs,M.andA.Reynolds(eds)(1999).ThePollwithaHumanFace.Mahwah,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssociates.Mill,J.S.(1991).ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment.NewYork:PrometheusBooks(originallypublished1861).Rakove,J.N.(1996).OriginalMeanings:PoliticsandIdeasintheMakingoftheConsti-tution.NewYork:VintageBooks.238\nChapter11CitizenshipandPluralismDanielM.WeinstockMyintentioninthisessayistocanvasssomeofthemajordevelopmentswhichhaveoccurredwithincontemporarypoliticalphilosophyasaresultofthegreaterattentionwhichwritershavedevotedtotheissueofsocialpluralism.Morespecif-ically,Iwillbefocusingonthevariouswaysinwhichourunderstandingofwhatitmeanstobeacitizenofaliberaldemocracyhasbeenalteredbythemyriadphenomenawhichfallundertherubricofpluralism.Theessaywillbedividedintofiveparts.First,Iwillattempttobringsomeordertoourunderstandingoftheprincipalconceptsinvolved,namelypluralismandcitizenship.Gettingclearontheseconceptswillgiveusaclearersenseoftherangeoftopicsthatneedtobeaddressed.Next,Iwilldiscussthequestionofwhetheragreaterappreciationoftheculturalpluralismofmostmodernsocietiesrequiresthatweextendtherangeofrightsassociatedwiththestatusofcitizen-shipbeyondthecoreofindividualrightsidentifiedmostfamouslybyT.H.Marshalltoincludevariouskindsofcollectiverights.Third,Iwilldiscusschangeswroughtbypluralisminourunderstandingofthecharacteristicpracticesofciti-zenship.Whatkindsofactivitiesarecharacteristicofaplausibleidealofcitizen-shipinapluralistsocialcontext,andwhatnormsshouldgoverntheseactivities?Reflectingonthesequestionswillleadmetoconsidertwodistinct,butultimatelyrelatedquestions:Whatnormsshouldweimposeuponcitizensinvolvedinthepracticeofdemocraticdeliberation?Andinafourthsection:Whatshouldbetherelationshipbetweenthenormsoftheliberaldemocraticstateandthoseofthefreeassociationswhichmakeupthesphereofcivilsociety?Finally,Iwilladdressthevexedquestionofhowtheroleofcitizenshouldideallyinformouridentities,therangeofouraffections,andthetraitsofcharacterwhichdeterminehowwecomportourselvesinthepublicarena.Shouldourpsycholog-icaleconomiesbesuchthattheroleofcitizenwhichwesharewithourconcitoyenshabituallytrumpsother,moreparticularisticaspectsofouridentities?Orisitappropriateinthecontextofapluralistsocietyforthoseaspectsofouridentitieswhichbindtoallofourfellowcitizenstojoustwithmoreparticularisticalle-239\nDanielM.Weinstockgiances?Andifthelatteristhecase,howcanmodernsocietiescometopossessthekindof“socialcement”requiredtosustainaminimalcommonalityofpurpose?ThesearethequestionstowhichIwillbeturningmyattentioninthenextfewpages.TwocaveatsareinorderbeforeIbegin:first,Iwillnottrytoprovideanobjectiveandexhaustivesurveyofallthathasbeenwrittenonthetopicofplu-ralisminthepasttwentyyearsorso.Rather,IwillengagecriticallywithwhatItaketobethemostimportantcontributionstothearea,andwillnotshyawayfromputtingforwardmyownpositions.Myhopeisthatthereaderwillbetterbeabletofindherfeetinthesedebatesbyencounteringa(necessarilyincomplete)episodeofthedebatesratherthanbybeingconfrontedwithahands-offdescrip-tionofthedebateswhichhavetakenplace.Second,theagendasetforthinthisintroduction,whilecopiousenough,doesnotaddressallofthenormativeques-tionsinvolvedinacompleteunderstandingofcitizenshipinthecontextofpluralistsocieties.Inparticular,Ihavehadtoomitadiscussionofthenormativeprinciplessurroundingtheacquisitionofcitizenship.Whatprinciplescanapolityjustifiablyinvoketodistinguishmembersandnon-members,andhowshouldtheseprinciplesrespondtothesocialandpoliticalprocesseswhichhavemademodernsocietiesaspluralisticastheyare?Thereismuchtosayabouttheproblemsofimmigration,naturalization,andthegrantingofrefugeestatus,butitwillhaveto1awaitanotheroccasion.IThetheoryandpracticeofliberaldemocracyhavebeenprofoundlyaffectedoverthecourseofthepastgenerationbythegreaterattentionwhichtheoristshavedevotedtothepluralismofmodernsocieties.Whilethisclaimhasbecomesome-thingofatruismforstudentsofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophy,thereisstillsomethingparadoxicalaboutit.Afterall,itcanbearguedthatliberaldemocratictheoryreceiveditsoriginalimpetusfromanappreciationofthegreatvarietyofinterestsandbeliefspresentinsociety,combinedwithagrowingdesiretomanagethisdiversityinapeacefulmanner.Manyliberaltheories,fromHobbestoRawlsandbeyond,haveforinstanceemployedthedeviceofthesocialcontractasawaytodramatizethepluralityofviewsandinterestspresentinsocieties,andtojustifythetermsofpoliticalassociationtoallcitizens,regardlessoftheirparticularsetsofbeliefsanddesires,providedonlythattheyarerational.OneoftheproblemswhichforexampleleadsHobbestotheconclusionthathumanbeingswillonlybeabletofindpeaceandsecuritybyalienatingtheirpersonalsovereigntytoaLeviathanhastodowiththefactthatinthestateofnature,coreevaluativetermssuchas“good”and“evil”aredefinedsubjectivelybyindividualsasafunctionoftheirvaryingdesires,appetites,hatesandaversions(Hobbes,1996,p.35).Andevenliberalswhowerenotdrawntothejustificatorydeviceofthecontract,suchasJohnStuartMill,viewedliberalinstitutionsasprimarilyjustifiedbyservingas240\nCitizenshipandPluralismabulwarkagainstconformityandallowingindividualitytoflourish(Mill,1982).Thus,itwouldseem,farfrombeingofrecentvintage,anappreciationofdiver-sityhasbeenattheheartofliberaldemocratictheoryfromitsveryinception.Inwhatsensethencanwereallyspeakofanewappreciationofpluralismamongliberaldemocratictheorists?Thisobservation,whichwillseembanaltoanyonefamiliarwiththeliberal-democraticphilosophicaltradition,forcesustosharpenourunderstandingofthespecificwaysinwhichpluralismhasbeenunderstoodbycontemporarythinkers.Twothingsseemrelativelynewaboutthepresentconcernwithpluralism.First,manycontemporarythinkershavecometoappreciatethattheculturaldiversityofmodernpolitiesposesproblemsfortheoriesofjusticeandcitizenshipwhichhavebeenunderstudiedbypreviousgenerationsofphilosophers.Thisculturaldiversityisaresultof(atleast)fourprocesses.First,immigration,primarily,butnotexclusively,tothesocietiesofthe“NewWorld,”hascreatedsocietiesofoftenquitestaggeringethnicdiversity.Second,colonialismhasplaceddescendantsofEuropeancolonistsincontactwithindigenoussocieties,bothonthecolonizedterritories,andincreasinglyasaresultofthedecolonizationprocessesofthetwentiethcentury,withintheerstwhilecolonialmetropolisesthemselves.Third,thevagariesofstateformationinthemodernerahavethrowndifferentnationalgroupstogetherinmultinationstates,either,asinthecaseoftheUnitedKingdom,asaresultofcomplexprocessesofconquestandtreaty,orasinthecaseofmanyAfricanstates,asaconsequenceofthedivisionofspoilsbycolonialpowers.Fourth,andperhapsmostcontroversially,thereisagrowingawareness,bothamongciti-zensandamongtheorists,thatculturesarenotnecessarilyethno-cultures.Identi-tiesformandcommunitiesorganizearoundquitedifferentaspectsofpeople’slives,todo(forexample)withsexualpreference,gender,andhandicap.Allfouroftheseprocessesarenow,moreover,rightlyperceivedasgivingrisetoconsiderableproblemsforourtraditionalunderstandingofjusticeandcitizen-ship.Goneistheassumptionthatimmigrantscanunproblematicallybesubjectedtoaprocessofassimilationandintegrationbasedsolelyupontheinterestsandculturalself-understandingsofthereceivingsociety.Philosophersandpoliticiansarenowattemptingtounderstandwhatcanasamatterofjusticebeexpectedofimmigrants;andtheyarealsospellingoutwaysinwhichthereceivingsocietyitselfmustadapttothefactofimmigration,mostimportantlybyputtingforwardacon-ceptionofsharedcitizenshipwhichdoesnotdependuponthekindsof“thick”sharedunderstandingswhicharecharacteristicofcommunitieswithdeephistori-calroots(see,e.g.,Bader,1997).Therelationshipofnativecommunitiestothesocietiesformedasaresultof(primarilyEuropean)colonialismandimmigrationisnowviewedasamatternot(solely)ofrawpowerbutofjustice.Thequestionoftherestitutionowedtonativecommunitiesforwrongscommittedinthepastisnowpartofthepoliticalagendaofmanycountries.Andperhapsmostsignifi-cantly,theassumptionthatnativeswouldintimesimplyassimilateintomainstreamsociety,whichinformssuchpolicydocumentsasCanada’sassimilationistWhitePaper,nolongerfindsmanyadvocates(GovernmentofCanada,1969).Inits241\nDanielM.Weinstockplace,wefindtheidea,stillfarfromrealized,thatthecontinuanceofsocietiesbornofEuropeanexpansioninplaceslikeCanada,NewZealand,andAustraliamustbecompatiblewithmeaningfulinstitutionsofself-governmentfornativepeoples,anideawhichhasfoundexpressionintheMabodecisioninAustralia,theNisga’atreatyinCanada,andtheWaitangitribunalinNewZealand.See,forexample,CookandLindau(2000),Sharpe(1997),andTully(1995).Andthesearchforprincipledgroundsuponwhichtobaserelationsbetweennationswithinmultinationstateshasoflatetakenonparticularurgency,bothbecausegeopolit-icalrealitiesmakeforthefullrealizationofthe“nationalistprinciple,”accordingtowhicheachnationshouldideallybeabletoformitsownstate,andbecausethereisagrowingrecognitionofthefactthatfederalarrangementsbetweenpar-tiallyself-governingpoliticalcommunitiesrepresentsaplausiblepoliticalresponsetotheincreasinglycontinentalandglobaleconomicandinformationalprocesses,onethatavoidsthedystopiaofaworld-state.JohnStuartMill’sassertioninCon-siderationsonRepresentativeGovernmentthatasharednationalcultureisrequiredasaconditionoftheviabilityofinstitutionsofdemocraticrepresentationtodayseemscompletelyoutoftunewiththeresolutelymulticulturalnatureofmany(most?)modernsocieties(Mill,1991).Finally,somecitizenswhoseidentitiesareboundupwiththeirmembershipinnon-ethno-culturalgroupshavecometobelievethatifimmigrationandmultinationalitywarrantthathighlyunifiedaccountsofcitizenshipbemodifiedtoreflectrecognitionofethno-culturaldif-ference,thanitshouldalsobealteredsoastoreflect,asitwere,differentformsofdifference(IsinandWood,1999;Young,1990).Arecognitionoftherelevanceofculturalpluralismtonormativetheorizingaboutcitizenshipandjusticehasthuscontributedsignificantlytorenewingpolit-icalphilosophy’sagenda.Asecondimportantchangeonthelandscapeofpoliti-calphilosophyhashadtodowithvaluepluralism.Therehasbeenanincreasedappreciationofthefactthatthereareanumberofincommensurablevaluesandcorrespondingwaysoflifewhicharealllegitimateobjectsofhumanaspiration,andthatdifferentcitizenscanmakedifferent,butequallylegitimatechoiceswithinthatset.Individualachievementvs.loyaltytocommunity,spiritualityvs.materi-alism,politicalinvolvementvs.theprivatesphere,alloftheserivalpairspresentvalueswhichareonlycompossibletoalimiteddegree,andyetReasondoesnotunivocallyinclineforoneortheothersidesofthesedualities.Itis,moreover,asignalachievementoftheinstitutionsoffreedomwhichliberaldemocracieshavecreatedthatcitizensfeelincreasinglyempoweredtocomeupwiththeirownspecificwaysoforderingtherangeofincompatiblevalueswhichpresentsitselftothem–toengagefreelyinwhatJohnStuartMillcalled“experimentsinliving.”Whyshouldanappreciationofvaluepluralismalterthetaskofpoliticalphilos-ophy?Afterall,itatfirstglanceresemblesthekindofproblemalreadynoticedbyHobbes,andwhichonhisestimationcalledfortheestablishmentoftheLeviathan,namelythatwealldefinegoodandevilaccordingtoourownpersonalidiosyn-242\nCitizenshipandPluralismcrasies,butthatpeacefulandsecurecommunalexistencerequiresthatwearriveatasharedenforceableconceptionoftheseterms.Thedifference,toputmattersbluntly,isthattheoristsnowdoubtwhathadbeenanassumptionofsocialcontractarians,namelythatthereisasharedcon-ceptionofreasonwhichcanberepairedtoinordertosetthetermsofpoliticallife,andwhichcutsacrosscitizens’quitedifferentconceptionsoftheirownindi-vidualgood(Rawls,1993;D’Agostino,1996;Gray,2000).Atitsdeepestlevel,valuepluralismtellsagainsttheassumptionthatconceptionsofrationalityareevercompletelyvalue-free.SupposedlyneutralconceptionsofrationalitywhichoneencountersinthecontractarianconstructionsoftheoristsfromHobbestoRawlsactuallyinclinetowardsome–andawayfromother–conceptionsofthegoodlife.Solegitimatingdiscourse–thekindofargumentwhichissupposedtoreconcileallcitizens,throughreason,totheprinciplesandinstitutionsofliberaldemocracy–cannotbethoughtofashadpreviouslybeendone.Ifliberaldemoc-raciesaretobepresentedaslegitimatefromthepointofviewofallreasonableconceptionsofthegood,itwillhavetobebyreferencetosomethingotherthanasupposedlyneutralconceptionofhumanrationality.Themostimportanttheo-reticaltasktowhichvaluepluralismgivesriseisthustofindawayoflegitimatingaliberal-democraticpoliticalordertoindividualsandgroupswhoseconceptionsofthegoodarebasedupondefensibleorderingsofthevariousvaluesinfunctionofwhichhumanbeingstypicallyorienttheirlives,onesthatnonethelessinclinethemawayfromliberaldemocracy.Insum,politicalphilosophershavedeepenedtheirconstrualofsocialpluralisminatleasttwoways.First,theyhaverecognizedthatculturalpluralismisaper-manentfeatureofmostmodernliberaldemocracies,andthatitrenderssuspectconceptionsofcitizenshipandofjusticepremiseduponan(oftenunspoken)assumptionofculturalhomogeneity.Second,manypoliticalphilosophershavecometorealizethatvaluepluralismposesadeeperproblemforthelegitimacyandjustificationofliberal-democraticnormsthanhadpreviouslybeenappreciated,inthatitforcesustoreconsiderwhetherthereexistsasharedconceptionofrationalitywithwhichwemightneutrallybrokertheconflictsanddifferencestowhichthedifferingconceptionsofthegoodlifepresentinsocietygiverise.Howdothesechangesinourphilosophicalunderstandingofpluralismaffectourconceptionofcitizenship?Beforewecananswerthatquestion,wemustgetaclearersenseofcitizenship’ssemanticfield:justwhatdoesthetermtraditionallydenote?Fewconceptsinpoliticsareasvulnerabletotheriskofconceptualoverloadasthatofcitizenship(KymlickaandNorman,1994,2000).Assomecontemporarycommentatorshavenoted,thetermhascometomeanallthingstoallpeople.Aperusalofsomerecentwritingoncitizenshipmakesanemotivistanalysisoftheconcepttempting:inthesamewaysasA.J.Ayeroncearguedthatdescribinganactionoranagentasgoodissimplyawayofexpressingour(non-rational)approvalofit,somecontemporaryauthors,inclaimingthatsuchandsuchapolicyorprac-ticeisvitalforcitizenship,simplyseemtomeanthattheythinkwellofit.Useof243\nDanielM.Weinstockthetermsometimesseemstohavenootherpurposethantoaddnormativeweighttoapolicy,institutionorpracticethatcouldjustasaptlybedescribedwithoutreferencetocitizenship.Theconceptofcitizenshipthereforeneedstobedisciplined.Iproposetodoso,firstofall,byidentifyingfivesemanticfieldswithwhichtheconceptofcitizenshipseemstobeinextricablytied.First,andperhapsmostfundamentally,citizenshipdenotesastatus.Tobeacitizenistobeamemberofapoliticalcom-munity.Thereis,ifnottoday,atleastatthehistoricalinceptionoftheconcept,acontrastivedimensiontothenotionofcitizenship.Mystatusascitizenconfersuponmeadignityandstandingwhichnon-citizensdonotpossess.Inthemodernera,thisstatushasbeenidentifiedmostcloselywithaseconddimensionofcitizenship:thosebundlesofrightswhichcitizensenjoyasmembersofaparti-cularpoliticalcommunity.Oneoftheprincipalresponsibilitiesoftheliberal-democraticstateis,onthemodernunderstanding,toprotectitsmembersintheirenjoymentoftheserights.InT.H.Marshall’scanonicalformulation,theserightsareofthreekinds:civilrights,whichprotectcitizensagainstthepotentiallytyrannicaluseofstateauthority;politicalrights,throughwhichallmembersofthecommunityareallowedtoparticipateindemocraticself-government;andsocio-economicrights,whichguaranteeaminimallevelofwelfareforallcitizens,andintheabsenceofwhichthegrantingoftheaforementionedcivilandpoliticalrightswouldbeempty.Whiletheyare,inthemodernunderstanding,connectedtothesecureposses-sionofrights,thedignityandstandingwhichattachtocitizenshiphavehistori-callyalsobeenconnectedtoathirddimensiontowhichtheconceptofcitizenshipisconceptuallyconnected:thatofself-government.Citizensarepoliticalactors,ratherthanmerelypassivesubjectsofpoliticalauthorities.Anypoliticalcommu-nitycanconfermembership,andcanthusdistinguishbetweeninsidersandout-siders.Butonlyfree,self-governingpolitiescanmakecitizensofsubjects,foronlytheycangivemembersashareinself-government.Thus,theideaofcitizenshipseemstobeconceptuallyconnectedtothatofdemocracy.Thisaspectofcitizenship’ssemanticfieldistiedintoafourth.Citizens,asopposedtosubjects,areactiveinthedefinitionandadministrationofacommongood.Andso,theremustbearangeofpracticescharacteristicofcitizenshipthroughwhichmembersmanifesttheiractivestatus.Membersarecitizensnotonlythroughwhattheyare,butthroughwhattheydo.Fifth,andfinally,citizenshipdenotesanidentity.Tobeacitizenmeanstohaveasetofpsychologicaldispositionswhichbindsonetoone’sfellowcitizens,andanensembleofpsychologicaldispositionsor“virtues”whichfacilitateone’sdailyinteractionswiththem.Tobeacitizenistoidentifytoatleastsomedegreewiththepoliticalcommunitytowhichonebelongs,andtobedisposedtobehavetowardone’sfellowcitizensinwayswhichpromotethestabilityandunityofthecommunity.Idonotpretendthatthislistisexhaustive.Butitdoesprovideuswithasenseofthedensityoftheconceptofcitizenship.Itdenotes(atleast)anindividual’s244\nCitizenshipandPluralismstatusasamemberofaself-governingpoliticalcommunity,onewhichprotectstheindividualinherenjoymentofrights.Italsopointstocharacteristicpracticesofcitizenship,andtodispositionsandtraitsofcharacterwhichareinplayinthesepractices.Finally,itreferstoanimportantaspectofindividualidentity.Asecondpreliminaryclarification:thoughrootedininstitutionalandpoliticalreality,theconceptofcitizenshippossessesaninescapablynormativedimension.True,wecanaskourselveswhatconceptionofcitizenshipisatworkinthelaws,institutions,andpracticesofdifferentsocieties.Therightsofcitizens,andtheconditionswhichindividualsmustsatisfyinordertocountascitizensofagivensociety,aregiveninthepositivelawofthesocietiesinquestion.Moreover,onecanfruitfullyinquireempiricallyintotheextenttowhichcitizenshipinformstheidentitiesofindividualsindifferentsocieties(forexample,seeJohnstonConover,1995),andintothewaysinwhichcitizensofaparticularsocietyengageinprac-ticesthroughwhichtheyevincetheirpracticalcommitmenttothecommongood(forexample,seeWuthnow,1998).What’smore,purelynormativetheorizingaboutcitizenshiprisksirrelevanceifitisnotgroundedininstitutionalreality.Morethanotherpoliticalideals,suchasequalityandfreedom(though,Iwouldargue,forthoseaswell),citizenshipisrealizedinandthroughconcreteinstitutions,ratherthanbeingadisembodiedidealfloatingabovetheseinstitutions.Sonor-mativereflectionaboutcitizenshipmustbecontinuouswithamorepragmatic,institution-basedformofreasoning(Bauböck,1994;Carens,2000).Nonetheless,citizenshipalsofunctionsinourconceptualrepertoireasanideal,asagoaltowardwhichbothdemocraciesandindividualsmustaspire.Thus,wecanalsoaskwhatrightsademocraticcommunityoughttograntitscitizens,orhowitoughttograntmembership(e.g.,tonon-memberresidents),ifitistorealizethevaluesintrinsictotheidealofdemocracy.Andwecanalsoaskourselveswhatvirtuesanddispo-sitionsofcharacteroughttobedisplayedbycitizenswhentheyinteractwithoneanotherinthepublicsphere,orwhatpracticestheyoughttoengagein,inordertosatisfythenormsofthe“role-morality”ofcitizenship.Thoughthepresentessaywillbefocusedpredominantlyonsuchnormativequestions,Iwillattemptnottolosesightoftheinstitutionalquestionswhichalsonecessarilyariseinanydiscus-sionofcitizenship.Thisoverviewprovidesuswithaclearerviewoftherangeofquestionswhichshouldbeaddressedinordertogetafixontheimpactwhichpluralismhashadonourunderstandingofcitizenship.Ourinquiryshouldideallytouchonthewaysinwhichbothculturalandvaluepluralismhaveimpactedbothontheinstitutionalrealityandontheidealconceptionsrelatedtothemultipledimensionsofciti-zenship,includingtherightsandpracticeswhichcitizenshipinvolves,thevirtuesofcharactertowhichitrefers,andthesharewhichcitizensshouldhaveinself-government.Thisessayonlyscratchesthesurfaceofthevastagendatowhichthisbriefstatementpoints,butIhopethatitwillprovidethereaderwithafairideaoftheworkwhichliesahead.245\nDanielM.WeinstockIILiberalpoliticalphilosophershavetraditionallythoughtofrightsasattachingtoindividualagents,andasjustifiedbyreferencetothefundamentalinterestsofindividualagents.AccordingtoRonaldDworkin’sinfluentialformulation,rightsfunctionas“trumps”againstactionsofagovernmentwhich,whiletheymightbejustifiedfromaconsequentialiststandpointwhichconsidersonlyhowlawsandpoliciesaffectacollectionofindividualsconsideredasanaggregate,areincom-patiblewiththefundamentalinterestsofsomemembersofsociety(Dworkin,1977).Accordingtothisview,rightsprotectindividualsagainsttheriskofthe“tyrannyofthemajority”(Mill,1982).Inrecentyears,thisquasi-orthodoxyhasbeenshakenbyanargumentwhichwasfirstformulatedbyJosephRaz,butwhichfindsitsmostcompleteexpressionandsystematizationintheworkofWillKymlicka(Raz,1986;RazandMargalit,1990;Kymlicka,1987,1995).Theargumentholdsthatsomefundamentalindi-vidualinterestscanonlyberealizedifindividualshavesecuremembershipingroups,andholdsfurtherthatthissecurityofmembershipcanonlybeensuredifthegroupsinquestionaregrantedsignificantself-governmentrights.Thefunda-mentalinterestatstakeisonetowhichliberalpoliticalphilosophershavetradi-tionallyattachedsignalimportance.Indeed,theargumentclaimsthatwehaveafundamentalinterestinbeingautonomousrationalchoosers,capableofarrivingatarationallife-plan,andofrevisingitifneedbe,butthatthisinterestcanonlybesatisfiedthroughmembershipinasecure,viable“societalculture,”onewhichprovidestheindividualwitharangeofoptionsacrossthefullrangeoffieldsofhumanendeavor,andwithanevaluativegridonthebasisofwhichtoascertainthevalueoftheseoptions.Now,formostpeople,theseculturalconditionsfortheexerciseofthecapaci-tiesinvolvedinautonomouschoiceareeasilysatisfied.Membersofthemajoritynationalcultureofmostmodernstatesautomaticallygainaccesstotherequisiteculturalresourcesoftheirsocietalculture.Butthisisnotthecaseformembersofminoritycultures.Theyfacetheassimilationistpressureswhichbeingpartofaminoritygroupinalargersocialwholealmostinevitablyinvolves.What’smore,theattitudeofmembersofthemajorityculturetowardthemistypicallyoneof(atbest)benignneglect,and(atworst)overthostility.Fairnessthusrequiresthatmembersofsuchculturesbeabletoadoptspecialmeasurestoallowtheirmemberstoavailthemselvesoftheculturalresourcesrequiredtorealizetheirpotentialasautonomouschoosersjustasmembersofthemajorityculturecan.But,theargu-mentruns,suchmeasurescannotbecashedoutsimplyintermsofindividualrights.Individualsactingalonecannotensuretheviabilityoftheinstitutionalinfra-structurerequiredtokeepasocietalculturealive.Thus,theargument,ifsuccess-ful,showsthatmembersofminoritysocietalculturesrequireforthesatisfactionoftheirfundamentalinterestinbeingabletoactasautonomouschoosersthatthegroupstowhichtheybelongbegrantedcollectiverights.Anditdoessoinaway246\nCitizenshipandPluralismwhichshouldseemunobjectionabletoliberals,thatis,byidentifyinganindivid-ualinteresttakentobesufficientlyfundamentaltowarrantitssatisfactionbeingimmunizedfromtheimpactofmajoritarianpoliticalproceduresandothersocio-logicalforceswhichmightgenerateassimilationistpressures.Kymlicka’sworkhasbeensubjectedtoagreatdealofcriticalscrutiny,whichI2donotwanttorehearseinthecontextofthisessay.IwantinsteadtoshowthatargumentssuchasKymlicka’sarepercheduncomfortablybetweentwoquitedif-ferentpositions,bothofwhichleaveanumberofquestionstodowiththeformwhichcitizenshipshouldtakeinpluralistdemocraciesunanswered.Note,tobeginwith,thatanargumentlinkinggrouprightstoindividualinter-estsinautonomouschoosingviathenotionofsocietalculture,ifsuccessful,wouldinvolveattributingsuchrightstoafairlynarrowrangeofgroups.Indeed,onlysocietalcultures,thatisculturesthatalreadyfunctiontoasignificantdegreeasself-standingsocieties,withanadequaterangeofeconomicandpoliticalinstitu-tions,qualify.What’smore,onlysocietalculturesthatpromoteautonomymeetthejustificatorytestwhichKymlicka’stheorysetsforth.Presumably,minorityculturalgroupswhichpassedthe“societalculture”hurdle,butwhich(forexample)setsig-nificantobstaclesinthepathofwomenwhoaspiretonon-traditionallives,wouldlackthenormativejustificationwhichtheargumentimposesuponaspirantstogrouprights.Ineffect,therefore,itjustifiesgrantingself-governmentrightstofullyformednationalminoritiessuchasthosewhichonefindsinQuebec,Catalonia,andCorsica,andtoahandfulofotherminoritynationalculturesthatfindthem-selvesassociatedtoother,largernationalgroupswithinmultinationstates.Therearereasonstoopposelimitingtheargumenttosocietalculturesasmorallyarbitrary.Manydifferentkindsofgroupshaveplayedquitesignificantrolesinprovidingtheirmemberswiththewherewithalrequiredforautonomouschoice.Forexample,itisplausibletoclaimthattheexistenceofgayassociationsofvariouskindshavemadeagaylifestylemorereadily“choosable,”andhave(amongotherthings)shelteredgaysfromtheself-loathingandself-doubtthatcomesfromtakingontheevaluationswhichthebroadersocietyimposes.Kymlickaseemstorestricttherangeofgroupstowhichgrouprightscanbeattributedbecauseoftwoun-warrantedelisions:first,theassumptionthatgrouprightsarenecessarilyself-governmentrights,whichonlygroupspossessedofsignificantinstitutionalinfra-structurecaninfactexercise.Infact,thereareafullrangeofgrouprightswhichdonotrequiresuchpowers,including,forexample,exemptionfromspecificlawsinthebroadersociety(Levy,1997).Andsecond,theassumptionthatbecauseonlysocietalculturesinfactwanttoexerciseself-governmentrights,onlytheyoughttobeableto(Carens,2000).WhatIwanttofocusonhowever,isthestrongperfectionistbasisoftheargu-ment.Groupsarevaluable,andmeritprotection,ifandonlyiftheyarestructuredinawaythatpromotesautonomy.Thismeansthatgroupswhich,innon-coerciveways,encouragetheirmemberstoadopt(say)traditionalwaysandnottovaluethefullrangeofoptionsavailableinthebroadersocietyandthecapacitiesinvolvedinbeingabletochooseamongthem,shouldinprinciplenotbeabletoclaim247\nDanielM.Weinstockgrouprights.Indeed,theperfectionistbasisoftheargumentcouldbemadetosupportastrongerargument,totheeffectthatabroader,autonomy-promotingculturecouldbewarrantedintakingstepstoeliminatesuchwaysoflifefromtherepertoirefromwhichcitizenscandraw.Someperfectionistsarewillingtobitethisperfectionistbullet(Raz,1986;Hurka,1994).Itsitsuncomfortably,however,withKymlicka’sownprofessedespousaloftheimportanceofstateneutrality(Kymlicka,1989).Andmoregen-erally,itisincompatiblewithacommitmenttowordsvaluepluralism.Iftherearereallyanumberofdifferent,equallyacceptablewaysoforderingthevalueswhichlegitimatelylayclaimtoindividuals’allegiances,thenorganizingtheaffairsofthestateinamannerwhichprivilegesonesuchorderingisproblematic.Thus,itwouldseemthatanargumentdesignedtoaccommodateculturalpluralismfallsfoulofthestrictureswhichvaluepluralismseemsatfirstglancetoimpose.Ifweareunwillingtofollowtheperfectionistroute,oneoptionthatisopentousistobroadenourunderstandingofthevalueofgroupmembership.Groupsmattertoindividualsbecausetheyallowthemtorealizeanumberofdifferentfundamentalinterests.Anargumentofthiskindcanbefoundinthewritingsofvariousauthorswhohavedefendedsomeformofwhathascometobecalled“identitypolitics.”IwillfocusmyremarksonIrisMarionYoung’simportantbook,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(thoughseealsoMinow,1990).Youngclaimsthatgroupidentityisconstitutiveofhumanindividuality.Whetherweacknowledgeitornot,weare(toemployaHeideggerianphrase)“thrown”intoroles,implicitmeaningsandevaluationswhichourgroupmembershipfoistsuponus.Groupidentityposesaproblemforajustsocietybecause,whenitisunacknowledged,dominantgroupswillimposewhatareintheendonegroup’svaluesuponsocietyasawhole,andwilltendtoviewthesevaluesnotaspartialandperspective-bound,butas“impartial”and“universal,”andthusasappropri-atetothepublicsphere,andwillrelegatethevaluesandself-understandingofothergroupstothe“private”sphere.Ascribingrightstogroupsisawayofright-ingthissystematicbiaswhichwouldotherwiseinfectthebodypolitic.Ifgroupmembershipineliminablyshapesouridentitiesandourvalues,thenaconcernforequalityandfairnesswouldallowallgroupstoinfluencethepublicsphere.ForYoung,thiswouldmean,amongotherthings,grouprepresentationinlegislativeassembliesandgroupvetoes(Young,1990:184).WhatinterestsmeinthepresentcontextisthatYoung’sconceptionofsocialgroupsisfluidandexpansive.Sheimposesnosubstantiveconstraintonwhichgroups“count”fromthepointofviewofatheoryofjustice.Sherecognizesthatgroupformationinagivensocietywilldependinlargemeasureuponthevagariesofsocialinteractionwithinthatsociety.Andshearguesthatgroupmem-bershipisafunctionnotofobjectivecriteriabutofamutualsenseofaffinityandofsubjectiveidentification(ibid.:172).Thus,onthefaceofit,herconceptionofgrouprightsallowsustoreconcilethedemandsofculturalpluralismaswellasthoseofvaluepluralism.Ifitisthecasethatgroupmembershipisoffundamen-talimportancetohumanbeings,tothepointthattheyoughttobeprotectedin248\nCitizenshipandPluralismtheirmembershipthroughtheattributionofgrouprights,thenweoughtnot,absentaconvincingargumenttothecontrary,imposeapriorilimitationsonthekindsofgroupstowhichrightscanlegitimatelybeattributed.Whatshouldwemakeofthisargument?Letmemakethreeobservationsaboutit.First,thereisanincompatibilitybetweentwoclaimswhichpartisansofidentitypoliticssuchasYoungarewonttomake(Miller,2000a).Ontheonehand,theyclaimthatindividualidentitiesinconditionsofpluralismarefluidandcomplex.Membersofmodernsocietiesbelongtoanumberofdifferentgroups,andtheiridentitiesreflectthemultiplicityoftheirattachments.What’smore,theyarenotirredeemablyweddedtoanyonegroup.Conditionsofsocialpluralismtendtoencouragethemtomovebetweengroups.Citizensofmodernpluralisticsocietiesare,onaviewsuchasYoung’s,defactowhatargumentslikeRaz’sandKymlicka’swouldhavethembedejure,thatis,autonomous,unrootedchoosers.Butlegalandpoliticalinstrumentssuchasrightspresupposelessfluidity.Rightsmustbeattributedtoidentifiablebodies(representingwomen,gays,singleparents,racialminorities,etc.).Andbytheirverynature,suchbodieswillbemuchlessfluidandcomplexthanthememberstheywillthenclaimtorepresent.Thealternativeseemstobethefollowing:eitherlimittheattributionofrightstoindi-viduals,asliberalshavetraditionallyinsisted,andallowindividualsfreelytoconcocttheiridentitiesoutofthevariousculturalmaterialsattheirdisposalincivilsociety,orelseattributerightstogroups,whichwillbemuchmoremonolithicthanindi-vidualidentitiestendtobe,andthereforejustasunrepresentativeoftherealcom-plexityofindividuallifeasthe“impartialpublicsphere”decriedbypartisansofidentitypoliticshadsupposedlybeen.Second,andrelatedly,theacknowledgmentthatgroupmembershipisafundamentalinterestofindividuals,onethatwarrantstheattributionofgrouprights,doesnotimplythatjustanygrouprightwillbejustifiedonthebasisoftheargumentfromanindividual’sinterest.Iftheforegoingargumentshavemerit,itfollowsthatindividualshaveaninterestbothinbeingabletobelongtogroups,andinbeingabletoexitgroupsastheyseefit.Rightswhichwouldsecuretheformer,butnotthelatterinterest,wouldthusnotbebasedonacompleteunder-standingofthefullrangeofinterestswhichindividualshavewithrespecttogroups.Now,rightscanappropriatelybetermedgrouprightsforavarietyofdif-ferentreasons:first,individualscanclaimandexerciseweaklycollectiverightsasmembersofgroups;secondly,collectiveagentsmandatedbythemembersofagroupcanclaimmoderatelycollectiverightswhicharethentobeexercisedbyindividualmembersofthegroup;thirdly,collectiveagentscanbothclaimandexercisefullycollectiverightsonbehalfoftheirmembers(Bauböck,1994).Theproblemwhichstemsfromthegapbetweenthefluidityandcomplexityofindi-vidualidentitiesandthecomparativelygreaterfixityandhomogeneityofgroupscanbeatleastinpartcircumventedbylimitingthelegitimaterangeofgrouprightstothosedrawnfromthefirsttwocategoriesjustsketched,foronlytheyreliablypreservetheoptionalcharacterofgroupmembership,which,Ihaveclaimed,alsoreflectsafundamentalinterestofindividuals.249\nDanielM.WeinstockThird,ithasbeenclaimedthattherecognitionbythestateofgrouprightsrisksfragmentingthepublicsphereandunderminingtheviabilityofdemocraticinsti-tutions.ThefearoffactionhasbeenaconcernofdemocratictheoristsatleastsinceRousseau.Theclaimisthatifwearemembersofparticulargroupsfirst,andcitizenssecond(ifatall),thenthecommonalityofpurposewhichshouldbindcitizensofademocraticpolitybecomesimpossible.Thefunctioningofdemoc-raticinstitutionsonthisviewrequiresthatdisputedquestionsberesolvedfromthepointofviewofthecommongood,ratherthanfromtheperspectiveofthisorthatsectionalinterest(Miller,2000b).Formanycontemporarytheorists,thisimpliesthat,aboveandbeyondtheirparticularallegiances,citizensofapoliticalcommunityshouldshareanationalidentity(Miller,1995;Tamir,1993).Attentiontothefullrangeofconceivablegrouprightsallowsustoallytheseconcernsatleasttosomedegree.Rightswhichgrantgroupssignificantdegreesofautonomyandself-governmentwithrespecttothebroadersocietymighthavethiseffect.Thatis,theymayencouragegroupstowithdrawfromtheaffairsofthebroadersocietytocreatemoreorlessautarkicenclaves.ThisismostlikelytooccurthroughthegrantingofwhatIhaveabovetermedfullycollectiverights,astheyaremostlikelytoprovidecollectiveagentswiththeinstitutionalwherewithaltocreatepocketsofsovereigntywithinthebroadersociety.Yetmanygrouprightswhich,ontheirface,exemptmembersofgroupsfromnormswhichapplyinthebroadersociety,mighthavetheoppositeeffect,namely,offosteringafeelingofgreaterinclusionandstakeholding.ToinvokeaCanadiancase,exemptingSikhsfromthenormswhichgoverntheheadgearofmembersoftheRoyalCanadianMountedPolicefacilitatesandpromotesagreatersenseofinclusiononthepartofminoritygroups.Itconveysthemessagethattheyarewelcomeintothepublicinstitutionsofthebroadersociety,andthattheyneednotabandontheirparticularidentitiesinordertobeconsideredfullcitizens.Similarly,andasIwillarguemorefullybelow,allowingmembersofreligiousgroupstomakeargumentsinthepublicarenabasedontheir“comprehensiveconceptionsofthegood”islikelytolessentheirsenseofalienationfromthebroadersociety.Ingeneral,allowingparticularitiestomanifestthemselvesinthepublicarenaneednotgiverisetosocialfragmentation.Onthecontrary,itcanencourageasenseofbelonging.Thisisnottosaythatitisneverjustifiedtograntfullycollectiverightstosomegroups.Manypoliticalcommunitiesincorporateapluralityof“politicalculturesofself-determination”toborrowAnnaMoltchanova’shelpfulphrase(Moltchanova,2001),thatis,cultureswhosemembersthinkofthemselvesascon-stitutinganautonomousandself-standingpoliticalentity.Thoughfateandpolit-icalcircumstancemayhavethrowntheminwithothersuchcultureswithintheconfinesofthesamestate,themembersofsuchculturesthinkoftheirpoliticalidentitiesasdefinedinthefirstinstancebytheirpoliticalculture.Theirallegiancetothebroaderstateisprimarilyinstrumental:theyidentifywithittothede-greethatitprovidesacongenialpoliticalcontextwithinwhichtoexerciseself-determination.Insuchcases,concernsaboutthefragmentingeffectstowhich250\nCitizenshipandPluralismfullycollectiverightsgiveriseareoutofplace:themembersofsuchgroupsalreadythinkofthemselvesasseparate.Thechallengeforstatesthatencompassthemisnottomakethemabandontheirpoliticalidentitiesinfavorofanidentityfocusedonthebroaderstate.Historyshowsthat“nation-building”ofthiskindcanonlybecarriedoutbyflagrantlyilliberalmeans,involving,forexample,theprohibitionofschoolinginlocallanguages,andthatitsachievementsarealwaysfragile,ashasdramaticallybeendemonstratedinrecentyearsbynationaliststirringsinsomeregionsofFrance,acountrywhichistraditionallythoughtofasamongthemostunitaryintheworld.Rather,thechallengeistostrengthentheinstrumentaltiewhichbindssuchculturestothestate,bycreatinganinstitutionalsettingandapoliticalculturewhichislikelytofosterthesensethatmembersofsuchgroupswillbemorelikelytoexercisemeaningfulpoliticalself-determinationwithinthebroaderstatethanoutsideofit.Thisisanotherwayofsayingthatfederalismisasolutionwell-suitedtomultinationstateswantingtostemthecentrifugalforceofnationalismwithoutresortingtotheilliberalpolicieswhichhavetraditionallybeen3usedbynation-builders.Theattributionoffullycollectiverightsposesgreaterproblemswithrespecttogroupsof(inJeffSpinner’susefulphrase)“partialcitizens”(Spinner,1994).Suchgroupsdonotseektoestablishcompletesystemsoflawparalleltothoseofthebroadersociety.Rather,theyseeksovereigntyoverselectedaspectsofcommunitylife,eithertoshelterthemselvesfromlawsandinstitutionsofthebroadersocietythatoffendagainstfundamentalbeliefs(forexample,someultra-orthodoxJewishcommunitieshaveaskedfortherighttohavetheirownpara-medicalteamsrespondtomedicalemergencieswithintheirowncommunities,soastoensurethatthecareofbodieswillconformtoJewishnorms),ortoresistassimilationistpressuresexercisedbythebroadersociety(asinthefamousYodercaseinwhichanOldAmishfamilyrequestedthattheirchildrenbeexemptfromlawsgovern-inglengthofschoolattendanceobtainingelsewhereintheUnitedStates).Nosingleprincipleexiststhatwouldallowliberal-democraticsocietiestoadjudicatesuchcases.Decisionsastowhetherornottorecognizesuch“semi-sovereignties”mustbetakenwithinthecontextofapluralityofrelevantbutcon-flictingnormswhichdonotalwayshavethesameweightacrossallcases.Ontheonehand,ifliberaldemocraciesreallywanttocreateacontextconducivetoavarietyofdifferent“experimentsinliving”andresponsivetothetruth(ifitisone)ofvaluepluralism,thentheywillhavetoprovidecommunitiesorganizedaroundconceptionsofthegoodwhichstandinsometensiontothevaluestradi-tionallyassociatedwithliberaldemocracywiththerequisiteinstitutionalmeans.Acommitmenttopluralismisemptylip-serviceifitisnotaccompaniedbyawill-ingnesstoallowgroupstosettheirownrulesonquestionswhichtheydeemcentraltotheirsurvival(Spinner,1994).Ontheotherhand,liberaldemocracieshavearesponsibilitytowardalltheircitizenstoupholdtheirfundamentalrights.Somegroupnormsstandintension,andinsomecasesflatlycontradict,suchnorms.Therighttobodilyintegrityissucharight,andsopracticessuchasfemalecircumcisionmustbeopposed,eveniftheyaredeemedcentraltogroupidentity251\nDanielM.Weinstockbysome.Butmanycasescannotbedealtwithinsuchablackandwhiteway.Thefamilyandpropertylawswhichobtaininsomecommunitiesarenotinlinewithliberal-democraticnormsofsexualequality.Shouldtheybesystematicallyover-riddenbythelawsofthebroadersociety,orshouldjudgesaffirmcommunitylaw(Réaume,2000a,2000b;Levy,2000)?Isthereathresholdinthespectrumofrightsbeyondwhichgroupnormsmustbeoverridden?Andifso,howdowesetouttodefineit?Isan“unforcedconsensusonhumanrights”(inCharlesTaylor’shelpfulphrase)possible?Anotherrelevantnormativeparameterhastodowithfairnessacrossthewholesociety.Itisfeltbysomewritersthattheexemptionsandpowerswhichsomegroupsclaimasaconditionoftheviabilityoftheirwaysoflifecannotbejustifiedfromapointofviewwhichwouldconsidertheinterestsofallcitizensequally.JeremyWaldronhasargued,forexample,thatthelandclaimsmadebyaboriginalgroupsasawayofcorrectingpastinjusticesstandintensionwithnormsofdis-tributivejustice.Theresourcesofthepoliticalcommunityasawholeshouldinhisviewbedistributedinawaywhichbenefitsallmembersofsociety(Waldron,1992).Andtherehasbeengrowingresentmentinrecentyearsagainstultra-orthodoxJewsbeingexemptedfrommilitaryserviceinIsrael.Militarysecurity,itisfelt,isapreciouspublicgood,onewhichtheultra-orthodoxbenefitfrom,4buttowhichtheydonotcontribute.Insum,thedecisiontograntgrouprightsto“quasi-citizens”raisescomplexquestionswhichcannotberesolvedbyinvokingasingle“masterprinciple.”Con-siderationsofpluralism,basicrightandfairnesswillalwaysbearonsuchcases,buttheweightwhichshouldbeattributedtooneoranotheroftheseconsiderationswillvaryfromcasetocase.Normativediscussionofgrouprightsinsuchcaseswillthusnecessarilybedeeplycontextual(Carens,2000).Letmesummarizethemainthemesthathaveemergedfromthissomewhatmean-deringdiscussion.Thequestionwhichhasguidedmyinquiryinthissectionhasbeenthefollowing:Shouldaconsiderationofsocialpluralismleadustorecon-siderthecanonicalMarshalliantrinityofcivil,politicalandsocialrightstoincludegrouprights?AconsiderationofWillKymlicka’sinfluentialworkledtothecon-clusionthatifwedoconsidergroupmembershipasrepresentinganindividualinterestsufficientlyfundamentaltowarranttheattributionofgrouprights,wemustdosoinawaywhichdoesnotprivilegeautonomy-promotinggroups.AdiscussionofIrisYoung’smoreexpansiveconceptionofgroupmembershipledustorefineourviewofthecomplexinterestswhichindividualshavewithrespecttogroups.Theyhaveaninterestinbelonging,tobesure,buttheyalsohaveaninterestinbeingabletoviewtheirbelongingasoptional.Reconcilingtheseinter-estswouldinvolvelimitingtheextensionoffullycollectiverightswhichempowercollectiveagentstotakedecisionsfortheirmembers,andattemptingtosecurethegoodsofcommunitythroughwhatItermed“weakly”and“moderatelycollec-tive”rights.Finally,weconsideredcasesinwhichtheextensionoffullycollectiverightsofself-governmentseemslegitimate:first,andmostobviously,theyarejus-252\nCitizenshipandPluralismtifiedbothmorallyandprudentiallyinthecaseofmultinationstates.Andsecond(andmoreproblematically),morelimitedfullycollectiverightscoveringsomeaspectsofcommunitylifecanincertaincontextsbeappropriateinthecaseofcommunitiesof“quasi-citizens.”Someofthethemeswhichwillbeatthecenterofourattentioninthefollow-ingsectionsofthisessayhavealreadybeenbroached.First,thequestionofthedegreeofunityrequiredtosustaindemocraticinstitutionshasbeenraisedviatheconcern,voicedinteraliabyDavidMiller,thatthegrantingofgrouprightsrisksfragmentingthepublicspheretoanunacceptabledegree.WewilltakeupinSectionVthequestionofwhether“liberalnationalists”suchasMillerhavebeenrighttoinsistuponahighdegreeofnationalunityasaconditionoftheviabilityofliberal-democraticinstitutions.Second,wehavealsobroachedtheissueofwhetherornotitisappropriateforcitizensengagedindemocraticdeliberationinapluralistsocietytodosointhetermsoftheircomprehensiveconceptionsofthegood.SectionIVwillthusleadustoaconsiderationoftheargumentsofpresent-day“deliberativedemocrats.”Beforethat,however,Iwanttoconsidertheques-tionofwhatthecharacteristicpracticesofcitizenshipmightbeinconditionsofsocialpluralism.Inparticular,Iwanttoexaminetheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofanactiveconceptionofcitizenshipfocusedonparticipationintheinstitutionsofdeliberativedemocracy.IIIWhatarethedistinctivepracticeswhichcanbeassociatedwithaconceptionofcitizenshipappropriatetomodernpluralisticmasssocieties?Traditionally,theyhavebeenoftwokinds.Theroleof“citizen”involvesdeliberatingwithfellowcitizensaboutthelawsandpolicieswhichwillgoverntheircommonaffairs,andactingsoastopromoteacommongood.Theparadigmaticactivitiesofcitizenshipcanobviouslynotsimplymimictheideal(oridealized)viewofcitizenshipwhichcomesdowntousfromthethinkersoftheancientGreekpolisandfromthewritersoftheItalianRenaissance.Theirsweresmall-scalepoliticalcommunities,whosefull-fledgedmembersprobablyonlynumberedasmallfractionoftheoverallpopulation.Women,slavesandservants,metics,peasantsandotherswereexcludedfromtheprerogativesandresponsibilitiesofcitizenship.TheremainingmalenotableswhomadeupthebulkofthecitizenryofGreekpoleiandRenaissancecity-stateswerebesetbyneitheroftheprincipalobstaclestoeffectiveactivecitizenshipwhichcharacterizemostmodernsocieties.Theyhadtodealneitherwiththechallengeofnumber,norwiththatofpluralism.Thesizeofcity-states,coupledwiththesubstantialrestrictionsoncitizenshipwhichtheytendedtoimpose,meantthattheaffairsofthecitycouldbedealtwithonaface-to-facebasis.Anditisplausibletosupposethat,despitetheircompetitionandrivalries,citizensofsuchcity-stateswere253\nDanielM.Weinstocknotasdeeplydividedonquestionsofthegoodlifeascitizensofmodernsocietiesare.Howiseffectivecitizenshippossibleinmodern,pluralisticmasssocieties?Howcancitizensparticipateeffectivelyintheadministrationofacommongooddespitetheanonymitywhichappearstobeanunavoidablecorrelateofsize?Andhowcantheydeliberateaboutthelawsandpolicieswhicharetoregulatetheiraffairswhentheirperspectivesonkeyissuesareinformedbysuchdifferentworldviews?Manytheoristshaveinrecentyearsbeentemptedbyananswertothefirstques-tionwhichaccordsgreatimportancetotheroleplayedinmodernmassdemoc-raciesbytheinstitutionsofcivilsociety.Asunderstoodbythesewriters,civilsocietyismadeupbythevastarrayof“intermediatebodies,”lyingasitwere“between”thestateandtheindividual,inwhichcitizensfreelyassociatearoundanissueofcommonconcern,andactpoliticallyinordertorealizeasharedinterest.Theseassociationsincludetradeunions,neighborhoodassociations,environmentalgroups,philanthropicassociationssuchastheShrinersortheElks,andawidevarietyofothers.ThoughrepublicanthinkerssuchasRousseauhaveviewedthemwithsuspicionasencouragingfaction,thethinkersofliberaldemocracyhaveingeneralviewedthemasperformingessentialfunctionsforthehealthofsociety.AlexisdeTocquevillepraisedthethrivingcivilsocietywhichhesawblossominginearlynineteenth-centuryAmerica,forinhisviewtheorganizationsofcivilsocietyare“schoolsfordemocracy”(deTocqueville,1981).Amongmorerecentauthors,HannahArendt(1950)arguedthatfreeassociationslyingasitwere“between”thestateandtheindividualareavitalbulwarkagainsttotalitarianism.Whenindi-vidualsbecomeatomizedandwithdrawnintotheprivatesphere,theyareonher5vieweasypreyfortheseductiverhetoricoftotalitarianleaders.Simplifyingandsystematizingsomewhat,letmepointoutanumberofdistinctfunctionswhichcivilsocietyistakentoperforminthecontextofmoderndemoc-racies,aswellassomedangersanddrawbacksthathavealsobeenassociatedwithit.First,andmostobviously,theassociationsofcivilsocietyrepresentforthevastmajorityofcitizenstheonlypossiblefocusforactive,effectivecitizenship.Onlythroughtheirparticipationinsmaller-scaleassociationswillcitizensbeabletoactconcretelyinassociationwiththeirfellowsinthepursuitofacommongood.What’smore,athrivingcivilsocietyrifewithassociationsorganizedaroundaplu-ralityofdifferentgoodsgivesconcreteexpressiontothegoodofpluralism:ifwethinkitimportantthatindividualsbeabletochoosebetweenawiderangeoflifeoptions,itisessentialthattheybeabletoavailthemselvesofawealthofassocia-tionsbringingtogetherlike-mindedindividuals.Throughassociations,optionsgainconcreteness.Thus,totheextentthattherearegoodswhichindividualscanonlyachievethroughparticipationofthiskind,civilsocietyperformsacrucialroleasameanstoindividuals’good.Second,theorganizationsofcivilsocietycanperformanumberoffunctionscrucialtothefunctioningofthebroadersociety.DeTocquevillethoughtthatparticipationintheassociationsofcivilsocietywouldwrenchindividualsfrom254\nCitizenshipandPluralismprivatism,andinstillvirtuesofpublic-spiritednessandcooperationcrucialtotheviabilityofdemocraticsocietiesasawhole.Hehasbeenfollowedbyanumberofrecentwriters(seee.g.,Macedo,1996)instressingtheeducativefunctionofcivilsociety.Third,somehavearguedthatcivilsocietyiscrucialtothesuccessfuldesignandimplementationofpublicpolicy(Habermas,1996;CohenandRogers,1995).Whenpreviouslyvoicelessindividualsassociate,theycangiveexpressiontoneedswhichwouldotherwisehavegoneundetectedbyevenwell-intentionedpublicpolicydesigners.Theycanalsoperformanimportantfunctioninthesuccessfulimplementationofpublicpolicy.Indeed,asweknowfrombitterexperience,publicpolicymotivatedbythemostmorallyadmirablemotivescanrunagroundforlackofappropriatecontext-sensitivity(Scott,1998).Partnershipsbetweenthestateandcivilsocietycanhelptoalleviatethisunfortunatetendencyofpublic-policyimplementation.Fourth,asNancyRosenblum(1998)hasrecentlyargued,evenorganizationsofcivilsocietywhosemembersjointogetherinthenameofvaluesandbeliefsthatruncountertoliberal-democraticnorms–thatmightindeedbeviewedasthreats–mayendupcontributingtotheoverallhealthofliberaldemocracies.Indeed,suchorganizationscanincertaincaseschanneldestructive,anti-liberalenergiesinrelativelybenignways.Thus,civilsocietycanprovideindividualswiththegoodsofassociation,andcanprovidethemwithconcreteoptionsembodyingdifferentvalues,interestsandwaysoflife.Itcancontributetoeffectivepublic-policydesignandimplementa-tionbyarticulatingneedsandallowingforcontext-sensitiveapplication.Anditcanchannelpotentiallydestructivepassionssoastominimizetheriskthattheywillmanifestthemselvesindeleteriousways.Ontheotherhand,therearerisksattachedtoathrivingcivilsocietyfromthepointofviewoftheoverallhealthofsociety.DeTocqueville’soptimismaboutcivilsociety,thatthevirtuesofcooperationandpublic-spiritednessacquiredbyassociatingwithothersinsmall-scaleassociationwilltransfersmoothlytothelargersociety,isbaseduponanassumptionwhichdoesnotseementirelyjustified,namely,thattheincreasedabilitytocooperatewithotherswillbematchedbyanincreasingwillingnesstodoso.Yetthereistheriskthat,asone’sidentityandinter-estsbecomeincreasinglywrappedupwithaparticulargroupincivilsociety,onewillcometoseepolicyissueswhichbearontheinterestsofallone’sfellowciti-zensthroughthenarrowerprismconstitutedbyone’sgroupidentity.Publicpolicyneedstobeassessedfromapointofviewthatencompasses–andadjudicatesbetween–allrelevantsocialinterests,andthereisnoguaranteethatparticipationincivilsocietywillencouragethedevelopmentofthevirtuesofcharacterthatwouldinclineonetotakeupthispointofview.Onthecontrary,therearerisksthattoodividedandfracturedacivilsocietywillforanypolicyproposalgiverisetoquitepartisanresponses(Young,2000).What’smore,asKymlickaandNormanhavenoted,manycivil-societyassocia-tionswilltendtogiverisetotraitsofcharacteranddispositionswhichareincon-255\nDanielM.Weinstocksiderabletensionwiththevaluesofliberaldemocracy.Whereasliberaldemocratstendtoencourageequalityandfreedomofindividualconscience,manyassocia-tionsarebuiltaroundsubservienceandauthority.Soonthefaceofit,itwouldseemthatatleastsomesegmentsofcivilsocietypromotevirtueswhicharedirectly6antitheticaltothosewhichliberaldemocracyrequires.Finally(andherewetouchuponasetofquestionswhichwerealreadybroachedinSectionII),someorganizationsincivilsocietyembodyilliberalnorms,bothbyrestrictingmembershipinwayswhichseemunacceptablefromthestandpointofliberalvalues(themuch-discussedcaseoftheUSJaycees’banonfemalemem-bershipcomestomindinthiscontext),andbyimposingunjustnormsamongmembers(thinkofthebarwhichmanyorganizedreligiousgroupsplaceupontherightofwomentooccupyvariouspositions,orthatwhichtheBoyScoutsintheUnitedStatesimposeupontheabilityofGaystoserveasScoutleaders).Especiallygiventhetendencywhichsomegroupsincivilsocietyhaveofoffend-ingagainstcoreliberal-democraticvaluessuchasequalityandautonomy,shouldtheliberal-democraticstatebeinthebusinessofregulatingcivilsociety,mostnotablybyadoptingvariousmoreorlesscoercivemeasuresdesignedtopromoteliberal-democraticvalueswithingroups?Ashadbeenthecasewiththequestionofwhetherornotthestateoughttoextendgrouprightsornot,thisquestiondoesnotadmitofasimpleanswer.Variousnormativeconsiderationsseemrele-vant,andtheydonotweighinexactlythesamewayfromcasetocase.Obviously,theliberal-democraticstate’scommitmenttovaluessuchasequalityandauton-omyringshollowifitisnotattimeswillingtostandupforthemincasesofegre-giousviolation.What’smore,theinvocationwhichsomemightbeinclinedtomakeofthepublic/privatedistinctioninordertojustifystateinaction(ontheviewthatthestateshouldonlyupholdliberal-democraticvaluesinthepublicsphere,whereascivil-societyassociationsarebetterclassedasbelongingtotheprivatesphere)wouldnotbearmuchcriticalscrutiny.Wenowrecognizethatrightscanbeviolatedintheprivatearenainwayswhichwarrantstateinter-vention(itisnownolongerconsideredcontradictorytoclaimthatamancanrapehiswife),andcivil-societyassociationsdonotcleanlyfiteithersideofthepublic/privatedichotomyinanycase.MembershipinorganizationsliketheJayceeshasanimpactonthedistributionofopportunities,andsoproperlyfallsunderthepurviewofatheoryofjustice.AfinalargumentfortheregulationofcivilsocietybythestatehasbeenprovidedbyCohenandRogers:ifwevaluecivilsocietybecauseitpermitsthearticulationofneedsthatwouldotherwisegounheeded,thestateshouldpositivelyencouragethecreationofgroupsinpar-ticularlydisenfranchisedandvoicelesssegmentsofsociety(CohenandRogers,1995).Ontheotherhand,freedomofassociation,surelyacornerstoneofliberal-democraticsocieties,musttosomedegreeimplythefreedomofassociationstodefinetermsofmembership,andtherighttosomelatitudeintheorganizationofinternalaffairs.Andtotheextentthatliberalsvaluepluralism,andtheability256\nCitizenshipandPluralismtochooseamongawidearrayofoptions,theymustacceptthatnotallassocia-tionswillbemicrocosmsofliberal-democraticsocietyasawhole.Perhaps,asJeffSpinner(1994)hasargued,liberaldemocratsshouldviewvaluessuchasfreedomandequalityassufficientlyprotectedbytheimportantplacetheyoccupyinthebroadersociety,bythefactthattheyinformthebackdropforalltheassociationsofaliberal-democraticpublicsphere,andbytheassuranceofasubstantialrightofexitforallmembersofgroupswithincivilsociety.Thenaturalconclusionoftheforegoingremarksisthatthestateshouldstepintoregulatecivilsocietyincasesofegregiousviolationofliberal-democraticnorms,butshouldrefrainfromdoingsootherwise.Justwherethethresholdofegregiousnessislocatedis,however,avexedquestionwhich,thankfully,liesbeyondthescopeofthisessay.IVRegardlessofthepreciseplacewherethislinegetsdrawn,itremainsthecasethat,inthecontextofmasssocietiescharacterizedbyapluralityofdifferentviewsofthegoodlife,theobstaclestocitizenshipwhichpluralismandnumberrepresentcanonlybeovercomebyparticipationinthefreeassociationsofcivilsociety.Surely,though,thisparticipationdoesnotexhaustwhatitmeanstobeacitizen.Oneofthecentraldimensionsofcitizenshiphastraditionallyhadtodonotwithactionbutwithtalk.Beingacitizenmeanstakinganinterestinpublicaffairs,anddeliberatinguponissuesofcommonconcernwithone’sfellowcitizensinapublic-spiritedmanner.TheGreekagoraandtheNewEnglandtownhallarepriv-ilegedsitesofthepracticeofcitizenship,foritisinforasuchasthesethatcitizensattempttoovercometheirdifferencesinordertoarriveatcommonlawsandpolicies.Therehas,moreover,probablyneverbeenasmuchphilosophicalattentiondevotedtothenormswhichshouldgovernthepracticesofdeliberationastherehasbeeninrecentyears.Thisisduetotheimpactthatvaluepluralismhashadupononeoftheprincipaltheoreticalaspirationsofliberalphilosophers.FromLockeandKantonwards,liberalpoliticalphilosophershaveattemptedtoshowthatthepoliticalandlegalprinciplesunderpinningaliberalordercouldattracttherationalconsentofallthosewhofallwithinitsambit.Valuepluralism,takenseri-ously,wouldappeartoputpaidtothishope.Fortheliberalprojectdependsupontherebeingarangeofinterestsandvalueswhichrationalagentscanbetakentoshare,regardlessoftheparticular“conceptionofthegood”towhichtheygivetheirallegiance.Inrecentyears,JohnRawls(1971)hasmostfamouslymadeanargumentofthiskind:inhisviewthereexistsarangeof“primarysocialgoods”whichallpeoplecanbetakentoneed,regardlessofwhattheywant,andthereexistsauniquely257\nDanielM.Weinstockrationalwayofrankingthesegoods.Thesetwoassumptions,takentogether,allowhimtoshowthattheprinciplesofwhathecalls“justiceasfairness”couldbeshowntobejustifiedfromthepointofviewofallrationalindividuals.Rawlshasfamouslycometorejecttheseassumptions,arguingthatthe“factofpluralism”shouldnowbeseenasa“permanentfeature”ofmodernliberaldemocracies.Itisunclear,however,thathehastakenthefullmeasureoftheplu-ralismhenowrecognizes.Aliberaldoctrinecanstillinhisviewbeshowntobejustified,butnownotbecausereasonunivocallyinclinestowardit,butbecauseitcanbeinferredfromtheintellectualandinstitutionaltraditionsofactuallyexist-ingliberaldemocracies.AsIhavearguedelsewhere(Weinstock,1994),however,thisdoesnotsomuchconfrontassidesteptheproblemofvaluepluralism:itisunclearthatthetraditionsofanyliberaldemocracycanbereadinasunivocalamannerasRawlssuggests;what’smore,ifthe“factofpluralism”isasdeepandpervasiveaproblemasRawlsclaims,thenitisentirelylikelythattherewillbecitizenswhoonanynon-circularaccountshouldbeclassedas“reasonable”whosepoliticalviewswillnotspontaneouslyinclinethemtowardthepoliticalethicofliberalism.Thisbringsusbacktodeliberation:theintuitionsharedbythemanyauthorswhotodaydefendaversionof“deliberativedemocracy”isthat,intheabsenceofanysharedconceptionofpracticalreason,orofwhatultimatelymattersinlife,thejustificationofaliberalpoliticalordercannotbeachievedbyaphilosophicaljus-tificationlogicallylinkingthesesharedvalueswithpoliticalprinciples.Rather,cit-izensandtheirrepresentativesindeliberationmust,inthewordsofarecentbookonthetopic,“makeitupastheygoalong,”thatis,theymusttalktooneanotheracrosstheirdoctrinaldifferencesandachieveconsensusinthismanner.Theassumptionisthatvaluepluralismdoesnotmakeconsensusimpossible;itsimplymakesitimpossibletoachieveintheusualmanner.Monologicalreflectionis,giventhefactofpluralism,insufficient,butdialogue,itishoped,canbeeffectiveinforgingprinciplesofpoliticalagreement.Ofcourse,nooneexpectsthatagreementonprincipleswillemergefromjustanyprocessofpoliticaldiscussion.Thelog-rollingandpork-barrelingwhichgoesoninmanylegislatures,andtheheated,alcohol-fueledargumentswhichoccurincafésandstudentdormscannotbeexpectedtoyieldjustifiedoutcomes.Rather,justifiedpoliticalconsensusdependsuponthedeliberationofcitizens.Delibera-tivedemocratsdistinguishdeliberationfromthethreats,blackmail,rhetoricandnakedemotionalappealsthatoftencharacterizethepublicspheresofliberaldemocraciesbyemphasizingtheimportancefortheachievementofjustifiedpolit-icalagreementsoftheexchangeofreasons.Whencitizensandtheirrepresentativesenterthepoliticalarenawiththeirinterestsandpoliticalpreferencespre-formed,andsimplydobattleonbehalfoftheseinterestswithwhateverpoliticalmeansareattheirdisposal,outcomesmightreflectthebalanceofforcesandthedistributionofpoliticalsavvy,buttheywillnotbejustifiedongroundsofprinciples.However,whentheyallowtheexchangeofreasonswiththeirfellowcitizenspartiallytoinformanddefinetheirinterestsandpreferences,andwhentheyapproachthepro-258\nCitizenshipandPluralismceduresofreason-exchangeinapublic-spiritedmanner,thentheycanlegitimatelyaspiretojustifiedoutcomes.Onthedeliberativedemocraticview,thetalkwhichcitizensengageindemocraticforamustthereforebedisciplinedandconstrainedbyappropriatenorms.Butwhatshouldthosenormsbe?Twobroadfamiliesofanswershavebeenprovidedtothisquestion.Weakdeliberativists,asIshallbecallingthem,arguethatdeliberatorsoughttorestrictthemselvesindebatetotheexchangeofreasons,thatis,ofutterancesbearingcognitivecontent(ratherthan,say,merelyexpress-inganindividualorgrouppreference)fromwhichinferencescanbedrawn,whichpossesstherequisitelevelofgenerality,etc.What’smore,theymustobserveproceduralconstraintswhichwillmakeitaslikelyaspossiblethattheoutcomeofdeliberationwillreflecttheweightofthebetterargument(ratherthan,forexample,certainparticipants’greaterrhetoricalskillorsocialpower).Thus,they7willinsistuponrulesensuringfairnessinagenda-setting,turn-taking,andthelike.Buttheywillimposenoconstraintsuponthecontentofparticipants’utterances.Aslongastheyputforwardreasonsandrespecttherelevantproceduralnorms,citizenscanlegitimatelymakereferencetotheirparticularconceptionsofthegood,evenwhentheyknowthattheseconceptionsarenotsharedbytheirfellowcitizens.Strongdeliberativistsgoonestepfurtherbyimposingsubstantiveconstraintsuponthereasonswhichcanproperlybeputforwardindeliberation.Theyarguethatcitizensmustrestrictthemselvestoreasonswhichmightconceivablybesharedbytheirfellowcitizens.Thismeans,negatively,thattheymustabstainfrommakingreferencetotheirownpartisanconceptionsofthegood,andpositively,thattheymustrestrictthemselvesindeliberationtotheconceptualresourcesof“public8reason.”(Asafirstapproximation,publicreasonmakesreferencetotheobliga-tionsandrightswhichcharacterizealiberalpoliticalorder,andavoidsaretaicandteleologicaltalk.Publicreasonreferstotheright,nottothegood.)Shouldcitizendeliberatorsbeweakorstrongdeliberators?Beforewecananswerthisquestion,letmethrowapairofvariablesintothemix.First,deliber-ationcanhaveavarietyofdifferentgoals.Mostimportantly,itcanaimatcon-sensusorcompromise.Whenconsensusoccursindeliberation,thereisagreementinprinciple.Thepartiestotheconsensusbecomeconvincedthattheviewswithwhichtheyhadstartedoffweremistaken,orratheronlyembodiedapartialviewoftheissuesathand.Whencompromiseisreached,however,thepartiesremainconvincedthattheiroriginalpositionwas,abstractlyconsidered,thebest,buttheyrecognizethatwhathasbeenagreedtorepresentsthebestthatcanplausiblybeachievedinacontextinwhichotherscontinuetodisagree.Partiestoacompro-miseagreeto“splitthedifference”inthenameofsocialpeaceandcontinuedcooperation(Benjamin,1990).Second,deliberationcanoccuratdifferentlevelsinthedecision-makingprocess.Mostobviously,deliberationoccurs,orshouldoccur,inlegislativebodiesandcourts.Here,officialsaremandatedexplicitlytodeliberateforthecommongood.But,onecanimagineapoliticalcultureinwhichdeliberationis,asitwere,259\nDanielM.Weinstockpervasive,thatis,wherethedeliberationthatgoesonincourtsandlegislaturesiscontinuouswiththatwhichgoesoninthemedia,inparliamentarycommissionsandtaskforces,andinpublicsquaresandcafés.Onthisview,thenormswhichgoverndeliberationinofficialarenasmusttherefore,tosomedegree,pertaintocitizensaswell.Ifthe“factofpluralism”isasdeepandpervasiveasRawlsandothersclaimitis,thencompromiseisamoreappropriategoalfordeliberationthanconsensusis.Thisissoforprincipledreasonsaswellasforpragmaticones.Asfarasprincipleisconcerned,public-policydebatesonhotlycontestedissueswillbethosearoundwhichthedifferentlegitimaterankingswhichcitizenswillascribetothevalueswhichbearonthedecisionwillbecomemostsalient.Pragmatically,theinsistenceonconsensustendstobecounter-productive:settingconsensusasagoaltendstodiscreditanddevaluecompromises.Whereconsensusistheaim,compromisecancometoappeartoparticipantsasanundesirablesecond-best.Thethirstforcon-sensusmakesthelegitimacyanddignityofcompromisedifficulttoascertain(vanGunsteren,1998).Moreover,ifourvisionofthegoodsocietyisoneinwhichcitizensfulfilltherolesandtakepartintheparadigmaticpracticesofcitizenship,ratherthanbeingmereprivateconsumersprotectedfromoneanotherandfromthestatebyabarrierofrights,thentheresponsibilityofdeliberationbelongstocitizensratherthanmerelytolegislatorsandjudges.Soanormativelyattractiveconceptionofcitizenshipappropriatetoconditionsofpluralismwillincludeaconceptionofdeliberativedemocracythataimsatcompromise,andthatpervadessociety,ratherthanbeingrestrictedtopoliticiansandjudges.Shouldsuchaviewofdeliberativedemocracybe,inthetermsdefinedabove,weakorstrong?Itseemsclearthat,thoughitisappropriatetoinsistthatcitizensengagedindeliberationexchangereasons,andthattheyrespectproce-duralnormsensuringfairness,therequirementsofstrongdeliberationareexces-sive(Weinstock,2001).Letmebrieflyprovidethreegroundsforthinkingthatdeliberationoughttobegovernedbyweaknormsonly.First,therequirementthatcitizensdeliberateinawaythatabstractsfromtheirdeepestconvictionsispsychologicallyimplausible.Theseconvictionswillcontinuetoinformpeople’spositionsandpoliticalpreferences,andtheiruseofpublicreasonwillonlysuper-ficiallyoccludethisfact.Theresourcesofpublicreasonaresufficientlyplastictoallowexpressionofmostpolicypreferences.Forexample,thosewhofavorthepublicfundingofreligiousschoolscanalwaysspeakofaparent’s“righttochoose.”True,the“publicreason”requirementwillprecludetheexpressionoftrulyegre-giouspositions.Evenwhencitizensareinsincereintheiruseofpublicreason,theconstraintwhichtheyimposeonthemselvesbyspeakinginitstermswillinformwhattheycansay.JonElsterhaswritteninthiscontextofthe“civilizingforceofhypocrisy”(Elster,1995).Ontheotherhand,aconceptionofdemocracywhichpreservesthecausalroleofpeople’sdeepestconvictionsinshapingtheirpoliticalinterventionswhileshieldingtheseconvictionsfromviewmakesitlesslikelythattheseconvictionswillthemselvesbeshapedandalteredbydiscussionwithothers.260\nCitizenshipandPluralismAndsurely,whatwewantisnotmerelythatpeoplenotbeabletoexpressthemoreilliberalorintolerantaspectsoftheirconceptionsofthegood,butrathermoredeeply,thattheirbeliefsbechallengedbydiscussion.Second,theexpressionbycitizensoftheirdeepestconvictionsindeliberativecontextswhentheseconvictionsinformtheirpoliticalpositionshasepistemicvalue.Politicalpositionswhichmighthaveseemedirrational,unreasonableorunintelli-gibletootherswhenexpressedinabstractionoftheirrootsinsuchconvictionscanberevealedaslegitimate(thoughnotnecessarilyasshareable)whentheyareconsideredasofapiecewithconvictionsaboutthegood.Forexample,certainexemptionsclaimedonreligiousgroundsmightseembizarretotheuninitiatedwerethosereligiousgroundsnotmadeclear.Third,itmustnotbeforgottenthattheroleswhichdemocraticdeliberationperformsinahealthydemocracycannotbereducedtoitsdecision-makingfunc-tion.Peopledeliberatenotonlytoreachdecisionsthatreconcilethevariousvaluesandinterestsinplay.Theprocessofdeliberationisimportanttothehealthofdemocracy,evenwhenconsideredindependentlyoftheresultsofdeliberation.Thatcitizensconversewithoneanotheraboutmatterstodowiththecommongoodmatters.Normsofdeliberationwillthereforeamongotherthingshavetoensurethattheconversationwillcontinue.Theyshouldthereforepromotecivicfriendship(Blattberg,2000).Now,thoughthisisanempiricalpoint,itseemstomethatthisfunctionofdeliberationwillbetterbeachievedifcitizensareallowedtodiscusstheircon-ceptionsofthegoodindeliberativefora.Citizensaremorelikelytowanttoengageinconversationwiththeirfellowswhentheyfeelthat,thoughtheymayberequiredtomakecompromiseswhendecisionsneedtobearrivedat,theydonothavetocompromisethemselvesintheprocess.What’smore,conversationinapluralistsocietyprobablyalsodependsuponcitizensnotremainingcompletelyopaquetooneanother.Thoughcitizensofadiversesocietyshouldnot,aswehaveseen,aspiretoconsensusandsameness,theyshouldasaconditionoftheviabilityoftheirdeliberationsaimforunderstanding.Anditseemsplainthatwecannotunderstandthatwhichsystematicallyshieldsitselffromview.Forthesereasonsandothers,Iarguethatdeliberationinpluralistsocietiesoughttobeconstrainedbynormsofweakdeliberation.Somewouldargue,however,thatevenweakdeliberativenormsareexcessive.Conversationamongcitizensshouldintheirviewnotberestrictedtotheexchangeofreasons,wherereasonsareunderstoodnarrowlyaspropositionsputtingforwardreasonsfororagainstspecificpolicyproposals.Languageisalsoexpressive,throughitcitizensoughttobeabletoexpresswhotheyareratherthansimplywhattheywant(Blattberg,2000).What’smore,therearemodesofexpression,suchasstory-telling,whichservecrucialexpressivefunctions,especiallyforsomeculturalgroups,butwhichdonotassuchputforwardreasons.Atrueappreciationofplu-ralism,whichwouldincludeapluralismofmodesofexpression,wouldinvitethesemodesofexpressionintodemocraticdeliberation(Young,2000).Thus,onthisview,evenweakdeliberativistsimposeexcessivelyrigidnorms.261\nDanielM.WeinstockIhavealreadyconcededsomeofthisobjectioninmycriticismofstrongdelib-erativists.Inputtingforwardtheirpolicypreferencesaswellasthedeepestgroundsunderlyingtheseconvictions,citizensmakeplain–express–toeachothertheessentialaspectsoftheiridentities.Butwemustbekeenlysensitivetothecondi-tionswhichmakepossibleasustainedconversationamongcitizensofradicallydif-ferentethnic,religiousandculturalperspectives.Modesofexpressionwhichhavenootherfunctionthanself-expressionriskfunctioningasconversation-stoppersratherthanasinvitationstopursuediscussion.Narrativeswhichdonotprovideradicallydifferentcitizenswithsomethingtolatchontoinconversationmayrunthisrisk.Wemustbewaryofexcessivelyunanimistorconsensus-orientedcon-ceptionsofdeliberation,especiallyincontextsofpluralism.Butwemustalsorememberthatconversationhasitsconditions,andamongthesemightbethecommitmentbyallparticipantstofosterthegive-and-takewhichcharacterizesdiscussion.Acommitmenttoreason-givingseemswell-suitedtothisrole.VIwantinclosingthisoverviewofthedebatestowhicharenewedattentiontopluralismhasgivenrisetoconsideraproblemwhichhasthusfarbeenheldinabeyance,butwhichhasinasensehoveredabovethediscussionfromtheoutset.Ithasbeenanunspokenassumptionofthisessaythatpluralismposesaproblemfortraditionaltheoriesofcitizenship,onetowhichtheoristsofcitizenshipshouldrespondbyadoptinglessunitaryconceptionsofcitizenship.Amongotherthings,aswehaveseen,weoughtperhapstobemorewillingtoacceptthatdifferentgroupsofcitizensmightbegranteddifferentsetsofrights,someofthemexer-cisedbythegroupunderstoodasacorporatebodyratherthanmerelybyindi-vidualmembersofthegroup,dependingontheparticularneeds,values,beliefs,etc.,ofthegroupinquestion.Weshouldbemoreopenthansomerepublicantheorists(Rousseauistheparadigmaticexamplehere)havebeentotheassocia-tionsofcivilsocietyasappropriatelociofactive,participatorycitizenship.Andweshouldacceptthatwhencitizenstakepartindebatesovermattersofcommonconcern,theywilldosoasbearersof“thick”identities,ratherthanascitizenssharingacommonidentity.Butperhapstheproblemisnotsomuchwithcitizenshipaswithpluralism.Ratherthaninflectingourconceptionofcitizenshipsoastoaccommodatetheclaimsofpluralism,perhapsweoughttoquestionthenormativeimportanceaccordedtopluralism.Ahealthydemocracyrequirespatriotismonthepartofcitizens,asenseofallegiancetoatrulycommongood(Taylor,1989).Yetgivinguptoomuchgroundtopluralismerodestherequisitesenseofcommonpurpose.Ratherthanmodifyingourconceptionofcitizenshipsoastoincorporateplural-ism,perhapsliberaldemocraciesoughttotakemeasurestoinstillasenseofpatri-otismandbelonging.Theymightdothisforexamplethroughtheeducational262\nCitizenshipandPluralismsystem:creatingcitizens,andpatrioticonesatthat,oughtperhapstobeagoalof9ourschools.Inrecentyears,theconcernthatcitizensbeanimatedbyasenseofcommonpurposehastakentheformofarenewalofinterestinnationalism.Manyauthorsnowfeelthat,inthemodernworldcharacterizedbythecontinuedpre-eminenceofthenation-state,achastened,liberalnationalismcanprovidethe“socialcement”requiredtooffsetthecentrifugalforceswhichourdiverseidentitiessetinmotion.Therehasbeenaveritableexplosionofscholarlywritingonthequestionofwhether,despitethehorrorswhichhavebeencommittedinitsnameinthetwen-tiethcentury,adulyconstrainednationalismmightstillbewarrantedtopreventtheerosionofpoliticalcommunitiesbesetbytheincreasinglycomplex,con-10flictingclaimsofculture,religion,race,sexualorientation,andthelike.Iwill,however,focusprimarilyonargumentswhichhaveinrecentyearsbeenputforwardbyDavidMiller.Miller’srehabilitationofnationalismisgroundeduponwhatmightbetermedan“immanentcritique”ofthekindofpurelyprocedural,somewhatdisembodiedliberal-democratictheorywhichhasbecomeprevalentinAnglo-Americanwriting.ThereisinMiller’sviewatensioninmanyliberalviews,onethatcanonlyberesolvedifthenationalismtacitlypresupposedbyliberalsisfullyacknowledged.LiberalswritinginaRawlsianveinhavetendedtobeethicaluniversalists.Theirargumentspurporttoaddresstheinterestsofhumanagentsassuch,ratherthancitizensofthisorthatconcretepolity.Famously,JohnRawlshadarguedthatweoughttoreflectuponthetermsofjustpoliticalassociationfromaperspectivethathecallsthe“originalposition,”inwhichweabstractfromtheparticularitieswhichhappentocharacterizeus,butwhichshouldbeviewedasarbitraryfromthe“moralpointofview.”Yettheyalsosupposethatcitizenshaveobligationsinthefirstinstancetowardtheirfellowcitizens,ratherthantowardhumanityatlarge.Buthowdoweaccountfortheseparticularisticobligationsfromauniversalisticmoralperspective?Miller’sargumentisthatwecannot.Wemusteschewuniversalismandacknowledgemorefullythatnations,farfrombeingarbitraryfromthemoralpointofview,representsignificantmoralcontoursintheethicallandscape.Morethanthis,wemustrecognizethatthefactthatthebetter-offareinclinedtorec-ognizedistributiveobligationstowardthelesswell-offreflectsnotsomuchtheirespousalofauniversalisticethic,butratherasenseofsolidaritybornofsharednationality.Liberaldemocratsthereforeattacknationalismattheirperil,fortheyriskundercuttingtheculturalconditionsrequiredtoaccountfortheveryredis-11tributiveobligationsforwhichtheirtheoriesargue.Soratherthanattemptingtohidethenationalistunderpinningsofliberal-democraticcommitmentsfromview,liberaldemocratsshouldfindwaystopromoteanationalidentity,lesttheyundercuttheveryconditionswhichmakecitizensinclinedtofulfilltheobligationswhichaliberal-democraticethoswouldimposeuponthem.Butwhatarethecomponentsofnationalidentity?AccordingtoMillerandTamir,itincorporatesbothobjectiveandsubjectiveconditions.263\nDanielM.WeinstockMembersofanationmust,subjectively,believethattheyformanation,andthatthedistinctiveobjectivetraitstheysharehavesomekindofethicalimport.Theseobjectivetraits,inturn,includesuchthingsasasharedsenseofhistory,asenseofplace,andanationalcharacter,which,onMiller’saccount,includessuchthingsaspoliticalbeliefs,sharedmoresgoverningeverydaytransactionsanddealingssuchasqueuing,and,perhaps,religiousandculturalcommitments(e.g.,tothepreser-vationofalanguage).Inordertopromoteanationalidentity,therefore,aliberaldemocracymustontheliberalnationalistviewpromoteasenseofbelongingamongitscitizens,aswellasasenseofsharinginanhistoricalnarrative,andbeingrootedinaspecificplace,anditmustalsofostertheconditionsfortheemergenceandmaintenanceofanationalcharacter.Variousleversareatthedisposalofstateswishingtodoso,themostobviousofwhichistheeducationalsystem.ItisimportanttoemphasizethatliberalnationalistssuchasMillerandTamirareliberalnationalists.Theyseektowalkafinelinebetweenthekindofculturalneutralityanddisembodimenttheyperceiveinmuchcontemporarypoliticalphilosophy,andthekindofexclusiveandxenophobicviewofpoliticsthathasmarrednationalism’shistory,especiallyinthetwentiethcentury.Andso,itisimportantthattheobjectivetraitstheyseeaslyingattheheartofachastenednationalidentitybeshareable.Itmustbepsychologicallyplausibleforallmembersofsocietytoadheretothemwithoutunduehardship.Tosimplifymatterssomewhat,therefore,liberalnationalistsmountatwo-prongedargumentagainstculturalneutralists,andafortiori,againstthoseplur-alistsandmulticulturalistswhowouldrespondpositivelytothedemandsfordifferentiatedcitizenshipputforwardbygroupswithinsociety.First,theyarguethatthepositionisself-defeating,becausethedemandsofmulticulturalistsareonlyintelligiblegivenanassumptionthatnationalidentitymatterseventothem(whywouldtheycareabouttherecognitionorlackthereofoftheirfellowcitizensiftheydidnotalsoviewthemascompatriots?),andbecauseliberaldemocracyitself,totheextentthatitexpectscitizenstoobserveredistributiveobligationstowardtheirlessfortunatefellows,isunderpinnedbythekindofsolidaritythatonlynationalismcanensure.Iwillrefertothisastheempiricalargument.Andsec-ondly,theyarguethatthestateshould,whileavoidingexclusivistexcesses,promoteanationalidentity.Iwillrefertothisasthenormativeargument.12Whatarewetomakeofthesetwoarguments?Ibelievethattheybothfaceinsuperableobstacles.Theempiricalargumentignoresamuchsimpleranswertothequestionofwhypeopleseembothtobemoredisposedtohelptheirfellowcitizens,andtocaremoreabouttheirrecognition.Thisanswerisaninstitutionalone:asithappens,peoplearethrowntogether,whethertheywanttobeornot,intotheambitoftheinstitutionsofthestate.Theseinstitutionsmakemoresalienttheneedoffellowcitizens,andmostobviously,throughthetaxesthattheylevy,theymakeitmoredifficulttoavoid.Also,sincethewelfareofthosepeoplejoinedtogetherincommonisgreatlyinterdependent,theycaremoreaboutwhetherthosewithwhomtheyareassembledundercommonstateinstitutionswillbewell-264\nCitizenshipandPluralismdisposedtowardtheir(sometimesgroup-specific)interests,becausetheyareinapositiongreatlytoaffectthoseinterests.Thuswedonotneedtoassumesomemysteriousnationalbondinordertoaccountforthepuzzlesliberalnationalistsraise.Institutionalreasoningsolvesthemaswell,anddoesitmuchmoreeconomically.Institutionshaveanimpactontheobligationspeoplerecognize.Ratherthanassumingthatinstitutionsalsofixtheobligationsthattheyoughttorecognize,Iwouldarguethatthislatterquestionneedstobesettledindependently,andinsti-tutionsshouldbedesignedwhichwillinclinepeopletorecognizetheobligations13theyought.Whatofthenormativeargument?Ilackthespacetodealeveninpassingwitheachoftheelementswhich,accordingtoMillerandTamir,makeupnationaliden-tity.Butletmebrieflydiscussone,whichhastodowiththesharedsenseofhistoricalcontinuity.Inmulticulturalsocieties,especiallythosethatreceivegreatnumbersofimmigrants,and/orthatincorporatedistinctnations,theargumentthathistoryshouldbetaughtinawaythatfostersattachmentiscaughtinabind.Brieflystatedtheproblemisthis:ifhistoryistoservetocementanationaliden-tity,thenitwillhavetobesanitizedandmoralized.AccordingtoMiller,historywillserveitssocializingfunctionbyreassuringusastothehistoricalrealityofournation,andbyprovidingmodelsof“thevirtuesofourancestors”whichweshouldstrivetoemulate(Miller,1995:36).Let’sfocusonthefirstofthesefunctions.Teachingahistoryattemptingtoservethefirstfunctionwillnecessarilybeuntruetoimmigrantsandtheirchildren,whothoughtheymightverywelllearnaboutthehistoryoftheplacetowhichtheyhaveimmigrated,willnothaveanidentitystakeinthishistory.ItisimplausibletoexpectthatayoungVietnameseimmi-granttoQuébeclearningabouttheBattleofthePlainsofAbrahamwillfeelthatitishercommunitythatwasalreadyinasensethereatthetime.Insistingthatsheshouldriskshavinganalienatingeffect,ratherthanfosteringbelonging.Thealternativeistoteachhistoryrealistically,andtomakecleartheconflicts,fracturesanddiscontinuitieswhicharethelotofallreal-worldsocieties.Butthen,theteachingofhistorywillnothavethedesiredeffectasregardsthebuildingofacohesivenationalidentity.Doesthismeanthatwecannotdoanythingtoresistthefragmentationwhichmulticulturalismandpluralismriskcausingifunchecked?Thefirstthingtonote14isthatnationalistsexaggeratethedangerstowhichthesocialfabricisprey.Whatisneededisnotsomuchthatpeoplebeboundtoeachotherinsuchawaythat,hadtheyhappenednottofindthemselvesunderconstitutions,theywouldhavechosentodosoanyway;whatisrequiredinsteadtooffsetfragmentationisthatpeoplelackgoodreasontoputintoquestionthepoliticalunionsinwhichtheyalreadyfindthemselvesthrown.Inotherwork(Weinstock,1999b),IattemptedtodefineakindofrelationshipbetweencitizenswhichItermed“trust.”Thisrela-tionshipobtainswhencitizensrightlyfeelthattheirfellowcitizensarenotill-disposedtowardthesatisfactionoftheirinterests,includingtheirgroup-specificinterests.Ialsoattemptedtoindicatewaysinwhichinstitutionscanfostertrust265\nDanielM.Weinstockamongcitizens.Icannotgointothedetailofthatdiscussionnow;sufficeittosaythatcitizensthattrustoneanotherdespitetheirdifferencesareunlikelytofallawayfromoneanotherinthemannersuggestedbythenationalistargument.Onthecontrary,theyaremorelikelytostaytogetheriftheyviewthepoliticalassociationtheyareinascongenialtotheirinterestsasholdersofdiversebeliefsandasbearersofdifferentidentities,thantheyareiftheyaresubjectedtonation-buildingprojects.ConclusionThepluralismofvalueandculturewhichhasbecome(andperhapshasalwaysbeen)constitutiveofmasssocietiesrightlyinflectsandinformsourconceptionsofjusticeandofcitizenship.Thediversityofviewsandofwaysoflifecannotsimplyberelegatedtotheprivatesphereinthenameofaculturallyhomogenizedandsanitizedpublicsphere.Thisisbecausecitizens’valuesinformthepositionsthattheytakeonissuesofcommoninterest,andbecausetheirverydiversewaysoflifeinpartdeterminetheinterestswhichtheyhave.Thechallengeforpoliticalphiloso-phersistocontinuetoimaginewaysinwhichthevaluesandvirtuesintrinsictotheconceptionofcitizenshipwehaveinheritedfromourpoliticalculturecanbeadaptedtochangingcircumstancesbothinternaltoexistingpolities,andincreas-ingly,intherelationsbetweencitizensofdifferentpolities.Wemustthereforearticulatethepractices,virtues,rightsandinstitutionsbothofadifferentiatedcit-izenshipandofacosmopolitancitizenship.Ihopetohavecontributedmodestlytothefirstofthesetasks.Notes1See,interalia,Carens(1987),Brubaker(1989),Bauböck(1994),Schwartz(1995),andCastlesandDavidson(2000).2IhavediscussedKymlicka’sworkingreaterdetailinWeinstock(1998).3IhavediscussedthefederalistoptioninmoredetailinWeinstock(forthcoming).Forskepticalconsiderationsconcerningfederalism’scapacitytohaltthesecessionistlogicwhichthegrantingoffullycollectiverightsofself-governmentsetsinmotion,seeKymlicka(1998).4ForafascinatingdiscussionofmulticulturalismintheIsraelicontext,seeGavison(1999).5Forrecentoverviewsofdebatesaroundcivilsociety,seeCohenandArato(1992),Ehrenberg(1999),Keane(1998)andSeligman(1992).6ThoughoneshouldkeepinmindanotherobservationofdeTocqueville’sconcerningAmericansociety,namelythatthedisciplineandself-abnegationwhich(mostnotably)religiousorganizationspromoteactasasalutarycounterweighttothelicensewhichthedemocraticwayoflifemightitselfpromote.266\nCitizenshipandPluralism7Thoughtheydifferonpointsofdetail,weakdeliberativistsincludeHabermas(1996),Bohman(1996)andChambers(1996).8TheparadigmaticworkhereisthatofGutmannandThompson(1996,1998).SeealsoJohnRawls(1998).9Fordifferentviewsonthisquestion,seeFullinwider(1996),Brighouse(1998).10Seeinteralia,Miller(1995),Tamir(1993),Canovan(1996),McKimandMcMahan(1997),Coutureetal.(eds.),Moore(1998).11Miller(2000a)mountsasimilarimmanentcritiqueofthedifferentialistclaimsmadeinthenameof“identitypolitics.”InMiller’sview,thefactthatpartisansofidentitypoliticsdemandrecognitionoftheiridentitiesfromtheirfellowcitizensmeansthattherecognitionoftheirfellowcitizensmatterstothemmorethanthatofpeoplewithwhomtheydonotsharenationalbonds.Andso,“thepoliticsofrecognition”inasensepresupposesthetacitbeliefbypartisansofidentitypoliticsinwhatMillerterms“theprincipleofnationality.”12IhavediscussedtheseissuesatgreaterlengthinWeinstock(1996)andWeinstock(1999a).13ThoughIlackthespacetogointothisinanydetail,thisargumentdisposesofanargumentmadebyMilleragainstcosmopolitancitizenship.Heargues(Miller,1999,andMiller,2000)thatcosmopolitancitizenshipisimpossiblebecausetherearenocosmopolitaninstitutionstoactasafocusforaccountabilitytorivalthosewhichthenation-stateprovides.Ifmyargumentisontherighttrack,weneedtofigureoutwhetherwehavecosmopolitanobligations,andthenimaginewhatinstitutionsmightbedesignedtorealizethem.14ForaninterestingargumenttothiseffectinthecaseoftheUS,seeHallandLindholm(1999).BibliographyArendt,Hannah(1950).TheOriginsofTotalitarianism.NewYork:Harcourt,BraceandCo.Bader,Veit(1997).“TheCulturalConditionsofTransnationalCitizenship.”PoliticalTheory,vol.25,no.6:pp.771–813.Bauböck,Rainer(1994).TransnationalCitizenship:MembershipandRightsinInter-nationalMigration.Aldershot:EdwardElgar.Benjamin,Martin(1990).SplittingtheDifference:CompromiseandIntegrityinEthicsandPolitics.Lawrence:UniversityofKansasPress.Blattberg,Charles(2000).FromPluralismtoPatrioticPolitics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Bohman,James(1996).PublicDeliberation.Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress.Brighouse,Harry(1998).“CivicEducationandLiberalLegitimacy.”Ethics,108:719–45.Brubaker,Rogers(ed.)(1989).ImmigrationandthePoliticsofCitizenshipinEuropeandNorthAmerica.Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica.Callan,Eamonn(1998).CreatingCitizens.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Canovan,Margaret(1996).NationhoodandPoliticalTheory.Cheltenham:EdwardElgar.Carens,JosephH.(1987).“AliensandCitizens:TheCaseforOpenBorders.”ReviewofPolitics,vol.49,no.2:251–73.267\nDanielM.Weinstock——(2000).Culture,Citizenship,andCommunity:AContextualExplorationofJusticeasEvenhandedness.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Castles,StephenandAlastairDavidson(2000).CitizenshipandMigration:GlobalizationandthePoliticsofBelonging.London:Routledge.Chambers,Simone(1996).ReasonableDemocracy.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Cohen,JeanandAndrewArato(1992).CivilSocietyandPoliticalTheory.Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress.Cohen,JoshandJoelRogers(1995).AssociationsandDemocracy.London:Verso.Cook,CurtisandJuanD.Lindau(2000).AboriginalRightsandSelf-Government.Montreal:McGill-Queens’Press.Couture,Jocelyne,KaiNielson,andMichaelSeymour(eds.).RethinkingNationalism(CanadianJournalofPhilosophySupplementaryVolume22).D’Agostino,Fred(1996).FreePublicReason:MakingItUpasWeGo.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.deTocqueville,Alexis(1981).DeladémocratieenAmérique.Paris:Garnier-Flammarion.Dworkin,Ronald(1977).TakingRightsSeriously.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Ehrenberg,John(1999).CivilSociety:TheCriticalHistoryofanIdea.NewYork:TheNYUPress.Elster,Jon(1995).“StrategicUsesofArgument.”InK.Arrowetal.(eds.),BarrierstotheNegotiatedResolutionofConflict.NewYork:Norton,pp.236–57.Fullinwider,Robert(1996).“PatrioticHistory.”InR.Fullinwider(ed.),PublicEducationinaMulticulturalSociety.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Gavison,Ruth(1999).“CanIsraelbeJewishandDemocratic?”IsraelStudies,5:44–77.GovernmentofCanada(1969).StatementoftheGovernmentofCanadaonIndianPolicy.Ottawa:DepartmentofIndianAffairsandNorthernDevelopment.Gray,John(2000).TwoFacesofLiberalism.NewYork:TheNewPress.Gutmann,AmyandDennisThompson(1996).DemocracyandDisagreement.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.——(1998).“WhyDeliberativeDemocracyisDifferent.”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy,17:161–80.Habermas,Jürgen(1996).BetweenFactsandNorms:ContributionstoaDiscourseTheoryofLawandDemocracy.Cambrdige,MA:TheMITPress.Hall,JohnA.andCharlesLindholm(1999).IsAmericaBreakingApart.Princeton:Prince-tonUniversityPress.Hobbes,Thomas(1996).Leviathan(ed.J.C.A.Gaskin).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Hurka,Thomas(1994).“IndirectPerfectionism:KymlickaonLiberalNeutrality.”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy,vol.2,no.3.Isin,EnginandPatriciaK.Wood(1999).CitizenshipandIdentity.London:Sage.JohnstonConover,Pamela(1995).“CitizenIdentitiesandConceptionsoftheSelf.”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy,vol.3,no.2(June1995):133–65.Keane,John(1998).CivilSociety.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.Kymlicka,Will(1987).Liberalism,CommunityandCulture.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——(1989).“LiberalIndividualismandLiberalNeutrality.”Ethics,vol.99:883–905.——(1995).MulticulturalCitizenship.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.268\nCitizenshipandPluralism——(1998).“IsFederalismaViableAlternativetoSecession.”InPercyLehning(ed.),TheoriesofSecession.London:Routledge.Kymlicka,WillandWayneNorman(1994).“TheReturnoftheCitizen:ASurveyofRecentWorkonCitizenshipTheory.”Ethics,vol.104,no.2:354–81.——(2000).“CitizenshipinCulturallyDiverseSocieties:Issues,Contexts,Concepts.”InKymlickaandNorman,CitizenshipinDiverseSocieties.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Levy,Jacob(1997).“ClassifyingGroupRights.”InIanShapiroandWillKymlicka(eds.),EthnicityandGroupRights.NewYork:TheNYUPress.——(2000).TheMulticulturalismofFear.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Macedo,Stephen(1996).“Community,DiversityandCivicEducation:TowardaLiberalPoliticalScienceofGroupLife.”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy,vol.13,no.1:240–68.McKim,RobertandJeffMcMahan(eds.)(1997).TheMoralityofNationalism.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Mill,JohnStuart(1982).OnLiberty.Harmondsworth:Penguin.——(1991).ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment.Albany,NY:PrometheusBooks.Miller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dtothembylanguageand1rhetoric.”Althoughthesepeoplearesteepedinerror,theyaresohabituatedtotheirso-called“reality,”thattheyareextremelyreluctanttoforsakeit,forasPlatodescribesit,todosowouldbeaspainfulandbewilderingassuddenlyemergingfromdarknessandbeingtemporarilyblindedbythebrightnessandglareofthe2light.However,ifoneoftheprisonersdoessomehowbreakfreeandgrowaccus-tomedtothelight,hewillseethatthosethingsthatwereonceconsideredreali-tiesaremerelycoarsedistortions.Initsbroadestsense,theallegoryofthecaveexemplifiesPlato’sepistemology.Morespecifically,however,itservesthepracticalpurposeofillustratingaprocessofenlightenmentthatthepoliticalleadersoftheStatemustundergoiftheyaregoingtodevelopacriticalknowledgeandunderstandingofthevalues,principles,andsocialrealitiesthatwillallowthemtosuccessfullyserveandpromotethegoodoftheState.Focusedonfreeingthemselvesfromtheprejudicesandsophistrythat271\nA.ToddFranklinholdswayintheproverbialcave,Plato’sidealpoliticalleadersarethosewhocommitthemselvestocriticallyassessingreceivedviewsinanefforttograspthingsinatruelight.Moreprecisely,theseenlightenedleadersarethosewhoactivelyendeavortorecognizeandovercometheperversesocialandpoliticaleffectsofdistortedconceptionsofself,personalorself-interestedpassionsandprejudices,andsharedpassionsandprejudicesthatarereifiedbylanguageandrhetoric.Fol-lowinginthespiritofthisPlatonicideal,thisessayconstitutesanattempttohastenthedawnofanewEnlightenmentthatbreaksfreeofthegrossdistortionsthathamperaclearunderstandingofthepoliticalsignificanceofrace.Focusingmorespecificallyontherelationshipbetweenraceandthedominantpoliticaltheoryofliberalism,Iexplorethewaysinwhichliberaltheoryfailstoadequatelygraspthesocialrealityofrace,andIgoontoarguethatatrueappre-ciationofthepoliticalsignificanceofracechallengestheoriststoreconceptualizesocialjusticeinaccordancewithamoreenlightenedviewofraceasaconstitutiveelementofindividualpoliticalidentity.Proceedinginthemodeofcriticaltheory,thegoalofthisessayistodevelopareflectiveanalysisofracethatclarifiesitsmeaning,history,anddeploymentwithinthecontextofliberalism.Broadlycon-strued,criticaltheorydenotesaphilosophicalenterpriseaimedatcombatingtheideologicalinculcationofsystemicformsofdominationandoppressionbyiden-tifyingwaysinwhichthepoliticalsignificanceoftheconcretespecificityofhumansubjectivityandahostofothercontextualdeterminantsofsocialrelationsandpoliticalstructuresareroutinelyunrecognized,unacknowledged,andunappreci-ated.Thus,thecommittedgoalofthisessayistofosteragreatercriticalaware-nessofandsensitivitytothefactthatconsiderationsofracearecrucialtothedevelopmentofpoliticaltheoriesandprinciplesthatarticulateandservetheinterestsofsocialjustice.Inkeepingwiththisaim,IbeginwithanaccountofthehistoricalemergenceofthepoliticaltheoryofliberalismthatfocusesonitsconnectiontoWesternEuropeanEnlightenment.Highlightingliberalism’sfaithintheefficacyofreason,thefirstsectiondetailsthenatureofliberalismasapoliticalidealthatemergesinconcertwiththedevelopmentofWesternEuropeanEnlightenment.InthesecondsectionIgoontodevelopabriefgenealogyoftheconceptofracethatcon-textualizesitshistoricaltransformationandsubsequentintersectionswithearlyexpressionsofliberalism.Drawinguponthegenealogyoftheprevioussectionasapointofentry,thethirdsectionoffersacriticalassessmentofliberalism’sfailuretoacknowledgethepoliticalsignificanceofraceandspotlightsitssubsequentcom-plicityintheperpetuationofracialoppressionanddomination.Inthefourthandfinalsection,Iconcludebysketchingthefeaturesofanenlightenedliberalisminfusedwithaheightenedracialconsciousnessandtherewithamorecomprehen-sivepoliticalconscience.272\nTheNewEnlightenmentFromModernitytoEnlightenment:TheHistoricalEmergenceofLiberalismInordertofullyunderstandthecharacterofliberalismit’sbesttobeginbyacquaintingoneselfwiththeintellectualcurrentsthatledtoitsgenesis.Emergingintheeighteenthcentury,liberalismisinessencethepoliticalexpressionoftheideology,ideas,andprinciplesthatdefinewhatislooselydescribedastheWesternEuropeanEnlightenment.Giventheintellectualconvergenceofthesetwotradi-tions,thefirsttaskistoexaminethehistoricalemergenceofthebroadertraditionofWesternEuropeanEnlightenmentandthesecondistodetailthewayinwhichliberalismconstitutesitspoliticalembodiment.HighlightingthemainfactorsandfeaturesthatprefiguretheEnlightenment,andtherewithliberalism,thefollowingbeginsbydrawingattentiontotheriseofmodernism.ModernismemergesintheseventeenthcenturyasaprofoundshiftinthenatureandfocusofEuropeanthought.Upuntiltheseventeenthcentury,Europeanintel-lectualismwaslargelythepurviewofChristiantheologians,manyofwhomservedasuniversityprofessors.Althoughanumberofthesetheologiansmadenotewor-thycontributionstospeculativemetaphysics(e.g.,Aquinas,Scotus,Ockham),themajorityofpre-modern,ormedieval,philosophersweredevotedtothedevelop-mentoftheologicallyrefractedcommentariesonthecanonicalworkstaughtintheuniversitiesandthedevelopmentofscholastictreatisesaimedatelucidatingreceivedtruths.Thusunderstood,pre-modernphilosophyisdistinguishedbyadevotiontocanonicaltraditionandasubserviencetotheologythatmanifestsitselfasapersistenttendencytointerpreteverythingindirectrelationtoGod.Incon-trast,modernismismarkedbytheemergenceoforiginalandindependentthinkerswhorejectthetheocentrismofthemedievalperiodandpursuephilosophyasapurelyautonomousbranchofstudy.Ingeneral,theshifttomodernismoccursduringaperiodofreligiousdisillu-sionmentandintellectualfrustration.Plaguedbythereligiousstrifeexemplifiedbythevariousreformationsanddismayedbytheepistemicdeficienciesofscholas-ticism,theshifttomodernismismarkedbyashifttoamorenaturalisticfocusandthedevelopmentofnewmethodologiesthataremoreconducivetotheattain-mentofcertainty.Byandlarge,thephilosophersofthemodernperiodweretheproductsofaburgeoningeducatedandculturedsecularclass.OperatingoutsideofboththeChurchandtheUniversity,modernphilosophersenjoyedamaterialandsocialindependencethatfacilitatedaneruptionoforiginalandcreativephi-losophyunbeknownsttoEuropesincethetimeoftheGreeks.NotableamongtheearlymodernphilosopherswerepeoplelikeSirFrancisBacon(1561–1626)andRenéDescartes(1596–1650).Frustratedbythemethodologicalshortcomingsofmediaevalthought,BaconandDescartescontributedtothedevelopmentofthemodernmethodologiesofempiricismandrationalismrespectively.Althoughdistinctinsofarasempiricismfocusesonsensoryobservationandinductionwhilerationalismfocusesonmathematicalformsofdeduction,bothmethodologiesare273\nA.ToddFranklinpremisedonaboldnewconfidenceinthehumanmind’sabilitytodevelopaclearandcertainunderstandingofnaturalphenomenawithoutrecoursetocanonicalordivineauthority.Broadlyconstrued,seventeenth-centurymodernismcanbecharacterizedasanintellectualmovementthatproducesthreeprofoundshifts.Thefirstisashiftinintellectualautonomy.Transformedintoasecularenterprise,thestudyofphi-losophyemancipatesitselffromthetutelageoftheologyanddistinguishesitselfasanindependentdiscipline.Intheprocess,itforsakesappealstocanonicalanddivineauthorityandbecomesself-validating.Thesecondisashiftinfocusfromtheologicalissuestonaturalisticphenomena.Andthethirdisashiftfromascholasticismthatfocusesontheclarificationofreceivedtruthtothespeculativemethodologiesofempiricismandrationalism.Incontrasttotheprofoundintellectualshiftswitnessedintheseventeenthcentury,theeighteenthcenturyisarelativelystableperiodinthehistoryofWesternEuropeanthought.WidelyreferredtoastheperiodofEuropeanEnlight-enment,theeighteenthcenturyrepresentsacontinuationoftheintellectualcur-rentsofmodernism.Inparticular,itisaperiodthatmaintainsthefocusonnaturalphenomenaandcontinuestoemployunencumberedempiricalandrationalisticmethodologiesinthepursuitofknowledgeandtruth.Furthermore,giventheapparentsuccessofthespeculativenaturalsciences,theEuropeanAgeofEnlight-enmentalsomarksagrowingoptimismconcerningtheefficacyofcorrespondingspeculativeapplicationsofreasontothescienceofhumanity.Punctuatingthesuccessofmodernism’sapproachtonaturalscience,SirIsaacNewton(1642–1727)combinedtheuseofspeculativereasonwithmathematicstoproduceatheoryofgravitythatwouldserveasoneoftherudimentsofphysicsformorethantwocenturies.Newton’stheory,setforthinhismagnumopusPrin-cipiaMathematica(TheMathematicalPrinciplesofNaturalPhilosophy),reasonedthatallbodies,bothcelestialandterrestrial,movethroughmutualattraction.Demonstratingthisrelationshipmathematically,thetheorydefinedtheforceofgravityasproportionaltotheinversesquareofthedistancebetweentwobodies,andindoingso,laidthegroundworkforahostofscientificandtechnologicalachievements.SteeledbythesuccessofNewton’sprogramofrationalandunbiasedinvesti-gationasappliedtothephysicalworld,enthusiasticexponentsoftheenlighten-mentprojectfeltthatitwasonlyamatteroftimebeforetheywoulddevelopanequallyclearunderstandingofthenatureofhumanity,andderivatively,aclearunderstandingoftheidealordersofthemoral,social,andpoliticalspheresoflife.Althoughtheeighteenthcenturywouldgoontogiverisetoavarietyofdiffer-entphilosophicalaccountsofthenatureofhumanity,nonewouldachievethecer-taintyandstabilityofNewtonianphysics.Nevertheless,aconstantthemeunitingalloftheenlightenmenttheoriesfocusingonthehumanconditionwastheabidingconvictionthathumanrationalitywouldeventuallysuccessfullyserveasthefountofself-understandingandnormativeobjectivity.274\nTheNewEnlightenmentInhisfamousessay“WhatisEnlightenment?”ImmanuelKant(1724–1804)givesfurthervoicetotheEnlightenment’senthusiasmforreason.Criticalofwhatheperceivesasapervasivedocilityandsubserviencetoexternalauthorityregard-ingallfacetsoflife,KantdescribestheEnlightenmentasanintellectualmovementcommittedtorationalself-determination:Enlightenmentisman’sleavinghisself-causedimmaturity.Immaturityistheinca-pacitytouseone’sintelligencewithouttheguidanceofanother.Suchimmaturityisself-causedifitisnotcausedbyalackofintelligence,butalackofdeterminationandcourage....SapereAude!Havethecouragetouseyourownintelligence!Is3thereforethemottooftheenlightenment.AlthoughKantclaimsthatcourageisthekeytoenlightenment,heconcludesthatpracticallyspeaking:Allthatisrequiredforthisenlightenmentisfreedom;andparticularlytheleastharmfulofallthatmaybecalledfreedom,namely,thefreedomformantomakepublicuse4ofhisreasoninallmatters.Moreover,Kantarguesthattheopportunitytoexerciseone’sreasoninthedevelopmentoffreethoughtfostersgreaterintellectualmaturity.Inaddition,hegoesontoclosetheessaybyclaimingthateventually,theupsurgeinrationalfreethoughtwouldalsofosterthedevelopmentofapoliticallyenlightenedstate.Exemplifyingthespiritofsuchenlightenedreflection,liberalismemergesasaphilosophicaltraditionthatcentersaroundacommitmenttorationallyderivedpoliticalprinciplesthatrespectandpromotefreethoughtandself-determination.Thusunderstood,liberalismdenotesapoliticalcommitmenttoformaljustice,i.e.,acommitmentthatistypicallyreferredtoasacommitmentto“thepriorityoftherightoverthegood.”Moreover,asMichaelSandelaptlydescribesit,liberalismexemplifiestheviewthat:society,beingcomposedofapluralityofpersons,eachwithhisownaims,interests,andconceptionsofthegood,isbestarrangedwhenitisgovernedbyprinciplesthatdonotthemselvespresupposeanyparticularconceptionofthegood;whatjustifiestheseregulativeprinciplesaboveallisnotthattheymaximizethesocialwelfareorotherwisepromotethegood,butratherthattheyconformtotheconceptofright5[i.e.,justice],amoralcategorygivenpriortothegoodandindependentofit.AlthoughprefiguredinthepoliticalphilosophyofJohnLockeandcodifiedinthepoliticaldeclarationsofeighteenth-centuryliberal-democraticregimes,thebeliefintheabsolutepriorityoftheright,i.e.,formaljustice,enjoyedthestatusofaconviction,butlackedthecertaintyguaranteedbyindependentjustification.Rec-ognizingthisshortcoming,Kantsetsouttoestablishtheabsolutepriorityoftherightasanobjectiveanduniversallawofreason.275\nA.ToddFranklinTothisend,hedrawsadistinctionbetweenpracticalprinciplesthatreflectpar-ticularconceptionsofthegoodandprinciplesofjusticethatareindependentlyderived.Incontrasttopracticalprinciplesthataresubjectivewithrespecttopar-ticularconceptionsofthegood,andtherewith,potentiallycoerciveoroppressivewhenappliedtoall,principlesofjusticearecompletelyundeterminedanduncon-ditionedbyconceptionsofthegoodandarethusregardedasconsistentwithhumanfreedom.However,havingcharacterizedprinciplesofjusticeasstemminginnowayfromconceptionsofthegood,onwhatelsecansuchprinciplesbebased?Kant’sresponse:thebasisforprinciplesofjusticeliesnotinsomeparticularendorobjectofthewill,i.e.,insomenotionofthegood,butratherintheautonomouswillthatconstitutesourabilitytorationallyreflectuponandchoosebetweenends6independentlyofourphenomenalparticularity.Shiftingthejustificatoryfocusfromtheidealityofpoliticalendstotheidealityofrationalautonomy,Kantintro-ducesanewapproachtothespeculativeprojectofarticulatingandgroundingtheprinciplesofsocialjustice.Anapproach,moreover,thatcontinuestoserveasoneofthecentralparadigmsofcontemporaryliberalpoliticalthought.AGenealogyofRaceanditsIntersectionswithEarlyExpressionsofLiberalismNegro,Homopellinigra,anamegiventoavarietyofthehumanspecies,whoareentirelyblack,andarefoundinthetorridzone,especiallyinthatpartofAfricawhichlieswithinthetropics.Inthecomplexionofnegroeswemeetwithvariousshades;buttheylikewisedifferfarfromothermeninallthefeaturesoftheirface.Roundcheeks,highcheek-bones,aforeheadsomewhatelevated,ashort,broad,flatnose,thicklips,smallears,uglinessandirregularityofshape,characterizetheirexternalappearance.Thenegrowomenhavetheloinsgreatlydepressed,andverylargebut-tocks,whichgivethebacktheshapeofasaddle.Vicesthemostnotoriousseemtobetheportionofthisunhappyrace:idleness,treachery,revenge,cruelty,impudence,stealing,lying,profanity,debauchery,nastinessandintemperance,aresaidtohaveextinguishedtheprinciplesofnaturallaw,andtohavesilencedthereproofsofconscience.Theyarestrangerstoeverysentimentofcompassion,andareanawfulexampleofthecorruptionofmanwhenlefttohimself.Theforegoingexcerptfromthe1798AmericaneditionoftheEncyclopediaBri-tannicaexemplifiesthehistoricaltendencytolinkvarioushumanqualitiestothebiologicalnotionofrace.Moreover,inthiscase,theviewisthattheNegroraceismarkedbycertainphysicalfeaturessuchasblackskin,flatnoses,andthicklipsthatinadditiontouglinessandphysicalirregularity,connotemoralcorruptionandintellectualdeficiencyaswell.AlthoughlongregardedasanAeternaVeritas,thebiologicalconceptofracehasacuriousorigin.Onewayofunderstandingthisoriginistothinkintermsof276\nTheNewEnlightenmenttheNietzscheannotionofaprocessofinterpretiveimposition.Inaphorism58ofTheGayScience,Nietzschewrites:Thishasgivenmethegreatesttroubleandstilldoes:torealizethatwhatthingsarecalledisincomparablymoreimportantthanwhattheyare.Thereputation,name,andappearance,theusualmeasureandweightofathing,whatitcountsfor–originallyalmostalwayswrongandarbitrary,thrownoverthingslikeadressandaltogetherforeigntotheirnatureandeventotheirskin–allthisgrowsfromgenerationuntogeneration,merelybecausepeoplebelieveinit,untilitgraduallygrowstobeapartofthethingandturnsintoitsverybody.Atbase,Nietzsche’sparadigmconnotesatemporalprocessoftransformation.Drawinganinitialdistinctionbetweensomething’soriginalcharacterandprevail-ingnotionsof“whatitcountsfor,”Nietzschehighlightsthefactthatovertime,rhetoricandrationalizationscanoverpowerandtransformreality.Inthecaseofrace,theinterpretivetransformationsprimarilyresponsibleforitseventualemergenceasabiologicalconceptconnotegrossdistortionsofpre-modernpolitical,religious,andscientificschemesofclassification.Widelyregardedastheprogenitorsofmoderndemocraticthought,theGreekssubscribedtoaschemeofclassificationthatdrewhierarchicaldistinctionsbetweenindividualsonthebasisofapoliticalconceptionofhumantelosorpurpose.FortheGreeks,lifewasconsideredaprecariousstruggleagainsttheforcesoftimeandcircumstance.Subjecttoboththecapriceofnatureandtheeminenceoftheirownmortality,theGreeksviewedpoliticsastheidealmeansofraisingoneselfabovethetemporalorderofnaturalnecessity.Moreover,theybelievedthatthroughpol-itics,onecouldestablishone’simmortalsignificanceandworthasanactivecon-tributortothecreationofaflourishingandwell-orderedsociety.Drawinguponthisview,Aristotledevisesahierarchicalschemeofclassificationthatroughlydivideshumanbeingsintothosewhoarecivilized,i.e.,thosewhoactivelypar-ticipateinandaregovernedbyarationallyorderedstate,andthosewhoarebarbarians,i.e.,thosewholiveaccordingtoeithernaturalinstincts,orpassivelyacceptedtraditions,customs,andhabits.Notably,however,thedistinctionbetweenthecivilizedpersonandthebarbarianisbasedstrictlyonthepossessionorlackofcapacitiesanddispositionsthatarepeculiartoindividualsasopposedto7distincthereditarygroups.Incontrast,thedistinctionbetweencivilizedandbarbariantakesonadecid-edlybiologicalcharacterwhenitislaterinvokedinthesixteenthcentury.Precip-itatedbythesuccessoftheEuropeanvoyagesofdiscovery,andtheresultingincreaseincontactwithpeopleswhoappearedstrikinglydifferentbothinformandincustom,thedistinctionbetweencivilizedandbarbarianbecomesinterpre-tivelytransformedintoadistinctionbetweenpeoples,orraces.Arguingthatasapeople,NativeAmericanswerebynaturewild,savageandservile,therenownedAristotelianscholarGinesdeSepulvedaappealedtoAristotle’sclaimthatcivilizedpeoplewerejustifiedinenslavingnaturalbarbarians,whowereincapableof277\nA.ToddFranklincontrollingandgoverningthemselves.NeglectfulofthefactthatAristotlerejectstheideathatnaturalbarbarismishereditary,Sepulveda’sargumentprovestobewoefullyunfaithful.Nevertheless,itsarticulationcontributestothepopularityofthenotionofanessentialracialcharacter.CorrespondingtotheshiftfromadominantGreco-Romanpoliticalordertoanewtheocentricorder,thepre-modernreligiousschemeofclassificationoriginatesasasimpledichotomybetweenthosewhowererecognizedasbelongingtoGod(theHebrews)andthosewhowereestrangedfromGod(theGentiles).Incon-trasttotheGreeks,whodistinguishedpeopleonthebasisofthedegreetowhichtheypossessedandemployedacapacityforrationalself-governance,theHebrewdistinctionwasbasedonone’sbeliefinanddevotiontothepatriarchaldivinityofYahweh.ItisagainstthisbackgroundthattheJewishhistorianFlaviusJosephus(37–95CE)appealstothebiblicalstoryofHamtoexplainthehistoricaldisper-sionoftheworld’spopulation.AccordingtoJosephus’account,afterthegreatflood,thepopulationoftheworldwasdividedintothreeparts:thefirstweretheinhabitantsofEurope,whowerethedescendantsofNoah’seldestsonJaphet,thesecondweretheinhabi-tantsoftheMiddleEast,whowerethedescendantsofhissecondsonShem,andthethirdweretheinhabitantsofAfrica,whowerethedescendantsofhisyoungestsonHam.AlthoughalllinesofdescentcouldbetracedbacktoNoah,thelineofHamwasmarkedbyacursethatstemmedfromanactofimpiety.AsJosephuswrites:[Noah]offeredsacrifice,andfeasted,andbeingdrunk,hefellasleepandlaynakedinanunseemlymanner.Whenhisyoungestsonsawthis,hecamelaughing,andshowedhimtohisbrethren;buttheycoveredtheirfather’snakedness.AndwhenNoahwasmadesensibleofwhathadbeendone,heprayedforprosperitytohisothersons,buttoHam,hedidnotcursehim,byreasonofhisnearnessinblood,butcursedhisposterity.Andwhentherestofthemescapedthatcurse,heinflictedit8uponthechildrenofCanaan.OnJosephus’account,thecursevisiteduponHam’sposterityisthecurseofestrangement.InresponsetotheprayerofhisfaithfulsonNoah,GoddisownsthechildrenofHam.However,insofarasHameffectivelyestrangedhimselffromhisfatherbyactingimpiously,thecursethatisvisiteduponhischildrenmerelyreciprocatestheconsequenceofHam’sinitialactions.Althoughinitiallyunderstoodasthestoryofahorrificcursethatdivideshuman-ityintothosewhoenjoyarelationshipwithGodandthosewhoareestrangedfromHim,thestoryofHamprominentlyre-emergesinthesixteenthcenturyasanexplanationofracialdifference,ormoreprecisely,anexplanationofblackness.InhisTrueDiscourseoftheThreeVoyagesofDiscoverie(1578),theEnglishmanGeorgeBestrejectstheviewthatblacknessisaproductofheatexposureandclaimsinsteadthatitisaproductofanaturalinfectionthatproceedsbylinealdescent.278\nTheNewEnlightenmentInvokingthestoryofHam,BestmaintainsthattheinfectionwasoriginallyaproductoftheHamiticcurse.Moreover,asIvanHannafordpointsout,Best’saccountgoesontodescribetheaccurseddescendantsofHamas“markedwithablackbadgetosymbolizeloathsomenessandbanishedtothecursedanddegen-eratevoidsofAfrica,wheretheylivedasidolators,witches,drunkards,sodomites,9andenchanters.”Despiteitsmisguidedfocusonphysicalanddispositionalinher-itances,biologicalreadingsofthestoryofHamproliferatedandenjoyedpopularacceptancewellintothenineteenthcentury.Finally,athirdmajorlocusofinterpretivetransformationcentersaroundthescientificconceptofbiologicalclassification.Widelyhailedasthefatherofbio-logicalclassification,Aristotlesetouttoclassifylivingthingsinaccordancewiththeirnatureandindependentlyofsuperficialresemblancesorvariations.Examin-ingavarietyofdifferentspecimensofnumerousorganisms,hecreatedascalanaturaethatorderedlivingthingsonacontinuousscaleofcreaturesincreasingincomplexityandperfectionfromplantstoman.Relyingmainlyonembryologicalcriteria,Aristotleclassifiedcreaturesintogenusesaccordingtotheirembryonicformandorderedthemaccordingtothelevelofdevelopmentalmaturityexhib-itedatbirth.Thusamongthebloodedanimals,i.e.,thevertebrates,thosewholaideggsthatchangedinsize,shapeorformonceoutsideofthefemaleweregroupedtogetherinthegenusofreptilesandamphibianswhilethosewholaidfullyformedeggsweregroupedtogetherinthehighergenusofbirds.Lastly,thosewhogavebirthtoliveyoungweregroupedtogetherinthepenultimategenusofmammals.Withineachgenus,Aristotlealsodrewfurtherhierarchicaldistinctionsintermsofspecies.Thuswithinthegenusofmammals,cowsandapeswereconsidereddistinctspecies,thatwereeachlowerthanthespeciesofhumansonthescaleofnature.Ultimately,however,itishereatthelevelofspeciesthatAristotle’sschemeofdifferentiatedsubordinationends,foralthoughherecognizeddiffer-encesbetweenmembersofthesamespecies,hebelievedthatsuchdifferences10failedtowarrantfurtherdifferentiationonthescalanaturae.AlthoughAristotle’sphilosophydifferentiatesbetweenhumanbeingsinavarietyofdifferentcontexts,hisbiologicalsystemofclassificationde-emphasizesmorphologicaldifferencesinsofarasitregardsallhumansasmembersofthesamespecies.Incontrast,however,thenaturalhistoriansoftheeighteenthcenturyconsideredmorphologyacrucialdeterminantofhumandifferentiationonthegreatscaleofbeing.Linkingdifferencesinskincolor,hair,andfacialfeaturestodifferencesincharacteranddisposition,thefamousnaturalistCarolusLinnaeus(1707–78)transformedsuperficialmorphologicaldifferencesintoasubstantivebasisforsubdividingthehumanspeciesintofourdistinctraces:HomoEuropeaus,HomoAsiaticus,HomoAmericanus,andHomoAfer.Atthetopofthehierarchy,HomoEuropaeus:European.White,Sanguine,Brawny.Hairabundantlyflowing.Eyesblue,Gentle,acute,inventive.Coveredwithclosevestments.Governedbycustoms.279\nA.ToddFranklinAtthebottomofthehierarchy,HomoAfer:African.Black,Phlegmatic,Relaxed.Hairblack,frizzled.Skinsilky.Noseflat.Lipstumid.Women’sbosomamatterofmodesty.Breastsgivemilkabundantly.Crafty,11indolent.Negligent.Anointshimselfwithgrease.Governedbycaprice.Althoughlatereighteenth-centurytheoristswouldgoontodevelopdifferentaccountsofdefinitiveracialcharacteristicsandtheircauses,allwouldregardraceasacorrelatetocharacter,andtherewith,abasisfordrawinghierarchicaldistinc-tionsbetweenhumans.Withthescienceofnaturalhistorynowaddingitsvoicetoachorusledbypolit-icalandreligiousschematizationsthatproclaimtherealityandsignificanceofhumandifferenceintermsofrace,thecreationandreificationofthemodernbio-logicalconceptofraceiseffectivelycomplete.Giventhepre-eminenceofthisconceptduringtheageofWesternEuropeanEnlightenment,itshouldcomeasnosurprisetoseeearlyexpressionsofliberalismintimatelyinvolvedintheintel-lectualdynamicthatdefinedthesocio-politicalsignificanceofrace.Longregardedasprogenitorsofliberalism,JohnLockeandImmanuelKantdevelopphilosophiesthatheraldtheenlightenmentcommitmenttohumanlibertyandequality.InhisfamousSecondTreatiseonGovernment,Lockedeclaresthatallmenarenaturallyin:astateofperfectfreedomtoordertheiractions,anddisposeoftheirpossessionsandpersons,astheythinkfit,withintheboundsofthelawofnature[i.e.,reason],withoutaskingleave,ordependingonthewillofanyotherman.Astatealsoofequality,whereinallthepowerandjurisdictionisreciprocal,noonehavingmorethananother;therebeingnothingmoreevidentthanthatcreaturesofthesamespeciesandrank,promiscuouslyborntoallthesameadvantagesofnature,andtheuseofthesamefaculties,shouldalsobeequaloneamongstanotherwithoutsubordinationorsubjection.(SectionII,par.4)Similarly,Kantformulatesasupremeprincipleofmoralitythataimstoguaranteeuniversalrespectfortheintrinsicautonomyandequalworthofall:“Actsoastotreatman,inyourownpersonaswellasinthatofanyoneelse,asanend,never12merelyasameans.”Fromtheforegoing,itwouldappearthatbothmenarephilosophicallycommittedtoanideaofhumanequalitythattranscendsrace.Unfortunatelythisprovesnottobethecase.Inordertoclearlyunderstandtherelationinwhicheachoftheirphilosophiesstandstothenotionofrace,youhavetoresistthetemptationtoreadthemanachronistically.Ifsuccessful,thecarefulreaderwillfindthatbothphilosophiesarestructuredsoastoaccommodatesubordinatingracialdiscriminations.Bothphilosophiesrelyonwhatseemtobenon-racial,ormorebroadly,non-discriminatoryphilosophicalanthropologies.InLocke’scase,however,notice280\nTheNewEnlightenmentthefactthatalthoughhisphilosophyclearlypostulatesequalityandprohibits“sub-ordinationorsubjection,”itdoessoonlyfor“creaturesofthesamespeciesand13rank,”whichforLockemeansthosewhoare“industriousandrational.”Anal-ogously,despiteKant’sinsistencethatallmenberegardedasendsinthemselves,theactualconcernisformanqua“rationalbeing”asopposedtohumansintoto.Insum,eachphilosophyemploysanotionofhumanitythatisdefinedintermsofspecificthresholdconditions,conditionsthatwarrantracialexclusions.Thefactofsuchwarrantprovesundeniablewheneachphilosopher’sspecificviewsofracialdifferenceareproperlytakenintoaccount.AsDavidGoldbergpointsout,Locke’sparticularviewofracialdifferencereflects“widelyheldEuropeanpresuppositionsaboutthenatureofracialothers,”andislargelya14consequenceofhisnominalisticconceptionofhumanidentity.Incontrasttometaphysicalviewsthatconsiderparticularpropertiesessentialtotheconstitutionofanobject,Lockecontendsthatobjectsarebestunderstoodintermsof“nom-inallyessentialproperties,”i.e.,thecontingentpropertiesofanobjectthatthespeakersofalanguageconventionallydesignateasessential.Thusconstrued,essenceisafunctionofcollectiveperception.Andinthecaseofrace,Lockehimselfpointsoutthatcolorservesasanominallyessentialpropertyofhumansinsofarasempiricalobservationsgiverisetotheconsensusthatcoloriscorrelatedtoratio-nalcapacity.Giventhisconsensus,heconcludesthatconceptionsofhumanitycouldrationallyfailtoincluderacialothersamong“creaturesofthesamespeciesandrank.”LikeLocke,Kantalsoacceptstheconsensusviewthatracialdifferencescorre-latetodifferencesinrationalcapacity.NotingDavidHume’sremarksabouttheinferiorityoftheNegro,Kantwrites:Mr.Humechallengesanyonetociteasimpleexampleinwhichanegrohasshowntalents,andassertsthatamongthehundredsofthousandsofblackswhoaretrans-portedelsewherefromtheircountries,althoughmanyofthemhavebeensetfree,stillnotasingleonewaseverfoundwhopresentedanythinggreatinartorscienceoranyotherpraiseworthyquality,eventhoughamongthewhitessomecontinuallyrisealoftfromthelowestrabble,andthroughsuperiorgiftsearnrespectintheworld.Sofundamentalisthedifferencebetweenthetworacesofman,anditappearstobe15asgreatinregardtomentalcapacitiesasincolor.Moreover,asCornelWestpointsout,Kant’scommitmenttotheviewthatracialdifferencesareindicativeofdifferencesinrationalcapacityisfurtherevidencedwhenhedisparagesablackman’sadvicetoaFatherLabat,bynotingthatalthoughtheman’sadvicemaycontainsomeelementsworthyofconsideration,thefactthat“thisfellowwasquiteblackfromheadtofoot”servedas“aclearproof”that,byandlarge,whathehadtosaywasstupid.Anditmightbethattherewassomethinginthiswhichperhapsdeservedtobecon-sidered;butinshort,thisfellowwasquiteblackfromheadtofoot,aclearproofthat16whathesaidwasstupid.281\nA.ToddFranklinInlinewiththeiroutlooks,bothphilosophersacceptedslaveryasanacceptableconsequenceofracialdifference.Asaninvestorintheslavetradeandacontribu-tortothedraftingoftheCarolinacolony’sslaveconstitution,Lockewasanactivesupporteroftheinstitutionofslavery.AlthoughLocke’sacceptanceofslaveryismostoftencouchedintermsofhisnotionofajustwar,healsowarrantsslaveryonthebasisofracialinferiority.NoticeoncemorethatforLocke,respectoffreedomandequalityarethenaturalrightsof“creaturesofthesamespeciesandrank.”However,insofarascertainraces,suchasNativeAmericans,areclearlyinfe-riorintermsof“industriousnessandrationality,”theylacktherequisiterankandtherebyfailtocountascreaturesworthyofequalrespect.Similarly,Kantcondonesslaveryformuchthesamereasons.DismissingNativeAmericansascompletelyunredeemable(andbyimplication,worthyofgenocidaleradication),hegoesontoofferthefollowingcommentsaboutNegroes:TheraceoftheNegroes,onecouldsay,iscompletelytheoppositeoftheAmericans;theyarefullofaffectandpassion,verylively,talkative,andvain.Theycanbeedu-17catedbutonlyasservants(slaves),thatistheyallowthemselvestobetrained.HighlightingKant’sideologicalcomplicityintheinstitutionofslavery,ChristianNeurgebauerpointsoutthatKantalsocounselsthosewhoengageinthe“train-ing”ofAfricanservantsorslavestobeatthemintosubmissionusinga“splitbamboocaneinsteadofawhip”soastoinflictthegreatestdegreeofpainand18sufferingpossiblewithoutcausingdeath.AlthoughLocke’sandKant’sphilosophiesarecontinuallycelebratedasclassicandparadigmaticexpressionsofliberalism,rarelyaretheyviewedmorebroadlyintermsoftheobviouswaysinwhichtheirunderlyingphilosophicalanthropologiesintersectwiththebiologicalconceptofrace.However,onceappreciated,theseintersectionsclearlyrevealthatinitsearliestforms,liberalismsanctionedracialexclusionsandoppressionsandhencereifiedtheconceptofraceaspoliticallysignificant.ContemporaryEgalitarianLiberalismandtheMarginalizationofRaceIncontrasttoclassicexpressionsofliberalismthatconsiderraceconstitutiveofidentity,andtherewith,animportantpoliticalconsideration,contemporaryexpres-sionsofliberalismdismissraceasessentiallyirrelevant.Unlikeclassicalexpressionsofliberalism,whichsanctionedandperpetuatedvariousformsofhumansubjuga-tionandsubordinationbyrelyinguponadubiousphilosophicalanthropologythatreifiedbiologicalnotionsofsubstantivehumandifference,contemporarytheoriesvigilantlyregardeachandeveryhumanindividualasequalirrespectiveofthespe-cificcharacteristicsthatareconstitutiveofhisorheridentity.Inhislandmarkwork,ATheoryofJustice,JohnRawlsregardsraceasnothingmorethananaccidental282\nTheNewEnlightenmentfeatureofhumanidentitythathasnobearingonone’sessentialcharacter.Focus-ingexclusivelyonauniversalhumancapacityforreason,heviewsconsiderationsofhumanparticularity,e.g.,gender,age,religion,class,aswellasrace,antitheti-caltothecreationofprinciplesofjusticededicatedtoequalregardforall.Initslessextremeforms,egalitarianliberalismmarginalizesracebyturningablindeyetoitsnormativesocialsignificanceandfocusinginsteadonproceduralconstraintsaimedatcreatingequitabledistributionsofsocialgoodsandpositions.Inbothcases,theimpetusforthemarginalizationofracestemsinlargepartfromawell-meaningcommitmenttosocialjustice.Ingeneral,egalitarianliberalismconsidersuniversalityandimpartialityfunda-mentaltothepoliticalprojectofestablishingandpreservingsocialjustice.Facedwiththedifficulttaskofreconcilingandbalancingthedivergingandsometimescompetinginterestsmanifestwithinasocietycomprisedofadiversepluralityofpersons,contemporarytheoristsembraceuniversalityandimpartialityasconstitu-tivecharacteristicsofanyidealtheoryofjustice.Inparticular,theyconsideruniversalitythehallmarkofatheorythatbothencompassesandappliestoallandimpartialityaneffectiveguaranteethatitsprinciplesanddictateswillaffordeveryoneanequalmeasureofconsiderationandrespect.FollowinginthetraditionoftheEuropeanEnlightenment,egalitarianliberal-ismconsidersreason,ormoreprecisely,acapacityforreason,centraltobothuni-versalityandimpartiality.However,incontrasttoearlyexpressionsofliberalism,contemporaryversionsrejecttheideathatdifferencesinracecorrespondtodif-ferencesinrationalcapacityandunequivocallyextendthenotionofhumanequal-itytoall.Inparticular,egalitarianliberalismstrivestoestablishuniversalrespectandimpartialpoliticalregardforeveryonebydesigningprinciplesofjusticethatfairlydistributerights,duties,benefits,andburdensamongallmembersofthesociety.Inanefforttoderivetheseprinciplesinaccordancewithafundamentalrespectforhumanautonomy,JohnRawlscreatesahypotheticaloriginalpositionthatallowstherationalmembersofasocietytoengageinimpartialdeliberationsaimedatproducingfairprinciplesofjustice.InRawls’soriginalposition,thepartiesengagedindeliberationsconcerningtheprinciplesofjusticearesequesteredbehinda“veilofignorance,”thatdeprivesthemofknowledgeoftheirparticularrace,sex,socialposition,talents,abilities,convictions,desires,andoverallgoals.Althoughtheyknowthattheydohavespecificinterestsandaimsinlife,theveilofignoranceforcesthemtodeterminetheprinciplesofjusticeindependentlyofthem.Thussituated,theindividualsbehindtheveilareeffectivelyreducedtonondescriptrationalagents.Strippedofallknowledgeoftheirownparticularneeds,interests,andaims,allpartiescon-sideritprudenttoselectprinciplesofjusticethatpromotecommoninterestsandtreatpeopleequallyandfairlyregardlessoftheiractualconstitutionandcircumstance.Despiteitsobviousadvantagesoverearlyexpressionsofliberalismintermsofitsgenuinecommitmenttohumanequality,Rawlsianliberalism’santiseptic283\nA.ToddFranklinnotionsofuniversalityandimpartialityprovetobedangerouslyunrealisticandinsensitivetotheconstitutiveimportanceofrace.Initszealtotheoreticallyprovideandsafeguarduniversalrespectandregardforallmembersofsociety,Rawlsianliberalismreducesthehumanindividualtoanemaciatedself.AccordingtoRawls,onlythecapacityforreasonisessentialtohumanidentity;everythingelsethatcommonlyattachestopersonhoodisaccidentalandascriptive.Moreover,follow-ingKant,Rawlsconsiders“moralpersonality,”i.e.,ournatureasfreeandequal19humanbeings,“thefundamentalaspectoftheself.”Giventhisview,humanequalitybecomesmanifestasaself-evidenttruth.Unfortunately,however,suchconceptionsoftheselfsecureauniversalregardandrespectforallhumanbeingsattheexpenseofeverythingconstitutiveofindividuality.Criticsofthisphilosophicalanthropologychargethatitbelittlesallofthesub-stantivefeaturesofcharacterandindividualitythatareconstitutiveofouridentityaspersons.Emphasizingthispointwithrespecttorace,LuciusOutlawwrites:Forme,racialityandethnicity(andgender)areconstitutiveofthepersonalandsocialbeingofpersons,thusarenotsecondary,unessentialmatters:theymakeupthehistoricallymediatedstructuralfeaturesofhumanlife-worldsandinformlivedexperience.Further,theyhavebothabsolute(i.e.,inthemselves)andrelative(i.e.,inrelationtootherracial,ethnic,gendergroups)valuetotheextentthat,andforaslongas,personstakethemtobeconstitutiveofwhotheyare.Itisherethatthephilo-sophicalanthropologyoftheEnlightenment[andofRawlsianliberalism]comesupshort.Atheoryofsocietythatsetsitselfthetaskofunderstanding,scripting,andproducingrevolutionarysocialtransformationwhiledisregardingthesebasic“social20facts”is,inmyjudgment,seriouslydeficient.Atbase,criticssuchasOutlawandothersaretroubledbythefactthatanarrowandpresumptuouscharacterizationofhumanbeingsasrationalcreaturescapableofsubstantiveself-reflectionandself-determinationindependentofcharacterandcircumstancedemeanstheconcreteconcatenationoffacts,features,andfacetsthatareintrinsictowhoweare.Distinguishedintermsofvaryingendowmentsoftalentsandabilitiesthatcontributetotheirsenseofself-worth;unitedbytheaffec-tions,affiliations,andsharedexperiencesthatdefinethemasmembersofvariouscollectivities;intertwinedwithinahistoricallymediatednexusofsocial,politicalandeconomicrelationsthatcontextualizetheirinteractions;andemboldenedbytheaimsandattachmentsreflectivelyinformedbytheirparticularsituationsandperspectives,humanbeingsareundoubtedlycreatureswhoseindividualidentitiesareinextricablyrichandcomplex.Byandlarge,currentexpressionsofegalitarianliberalismrejectthepresumptivepracticeofmakingreductivemetaphysicalclaimsabouthumanidentity.Infact,Rawlshimselflaterqualifieshisownviewinanefforttodisavowanyearlierinvo-21cationsoftheKantiannoumenalself.Nevertheless,despiteitsrecognitionoftheconstitutiveimportanceofparticularitywithrespecttohumanidentity,egalitarianliberalismremainscomplicitinthemarginalizationofrace.Inparticular,egalitar-284\nTheNewEnlightenmentianliberalismfailstoadequatelyappreciateandaddresstheconstitutiveimpor-tanceofracewithrespecttosocialnorms.Committedtotheviewthatraceshouldplaynoroleinthedeterminationandrealizationofanindividual’sprospectsforlife,egalitarianexpressionsofliberalismdeviseavarietyofinstitutionaldictatesandinitiativesaimedatcreatingasocietythatextendsrightsandopportunitiesequallytoallofitscitizensregardlessofrace.Unfortunately,however,thesedictatesandinitiativesareinsufficienttostemthetideofracialdiscrimination.Sensitivetothisfact,egalitarianliberalismendorsesadditionalcorrectivemea-suressuchasaffirmativeaction.Althoughmanypeopleviewaffirmativeactionasaprogramwhosespecialconcernforcertaingroupsandracesisantitheticaltoacommitmenttodisregardingrace,egalitariantheoristsarguethataffirmativeactionmeasuresareactuallyconsistentwiththisstancewhenviewedintermsofthebroaderscopeoftheirmission.Recognizingthesocialvirtuesofaffirmativeaction,RonaldDworkinarguesthatrace-basedpreferential-treatmentprogramsaimedatincreasingthenumbersofunderrepresentedgroupsinsociallystrategicpositionsandprofessionsarejustifiedinvirtueoftheirviabilityasmeansofreducingthe22degreetowhichasocietyisraciallyconscious.Thusconstrued,thegoalofaffir-mativeactionistoneutralizeraceandtherebyrenderitsociallyandpoliticallyinsignificant.Unfortunately,thisnormativecommitmenttothemarginalizationofracefailstoappreciateitspervasivesignificancewithinthesocialorder.Focusinginparticularontheabsenceofcertainracialgroups(andwomen)fromvariouspositionsofprivilegeanddistinction,affirmativeactioncallsoninstitutionstocurbsocialinjusticebyadoptingformalproceduresthatprovidemembersofthesegroupsgreateraccesstoopportunitiesandpositionsthatinflu-23enceanindividual’srangeoflife-plansandprospectsforsuccess.Unfortunately,however,theproceduralfocusongreateraccessinnowayaddressestheunder-lyingsocialconditionsthatbearheavilyonaperson’schancesforsuccess.Givenapre-establishedandrigidlyentrenchedcorporate,professional,orinstitutional“culture,”aperson’ssuccessdependsnotonwhetherornottheygainaccess,butonwhetherornottheycanadapttothe“culture”andwinacceptancebylivinguptoitsnorms.HighlightingthissituationinrelationtoAfricanAmericans,DavidCochranwrites:EqualityofopportunityintegratessomeAfricanAmericansintowhiteinstitutions,butitdoeslittletochangetheinformalsourcesofpower,rootedinaninstitution’sculturallystructurednormsandpractices,thatstillprivilegewhitemembers.Itmay24shufflesocialpositions,butitdoeslittletoaddressunderlyingsocialrelations.Morebroadly,egalitarianliberalism’stheoreticalfocusonequalityofopportunityreliesonthebeliefthatracialdiscriminationisaberrantandthatoncetheformalimpedimentstoopportunityareremoved,individualswillbemeasuredonlyintermsofimpartialnormsandstandards.Unfortunately,however,normsandstandardsareneverimpartial,forasIrisYoungwrites:285\nA.ToddFranklinWheregroupdifferencesincapacities,values,andbehavioralorcognitivestylesexist,equaltreatmentintheallocationofrewardaccordingtorulesofmeritcompetitionwillreinforceandperpetuatedisadvantage.Equaltreatmentrequireseveryonetobemeasuredaccordingtothesamenorms,butinfactthereareno“neutral”normsofbehaviorandperformance.Wheresomegroupsareprivilegedandothersoppressed,theformulationoflaw,policy,andtherulesofprivateinstitutionstendtobebiasedinfavoroftheprivilegedgroups,becausetheirparticularexperienceimplicitlysets25thenorm.Insum,Younghighlightsthetroublingfactthategalitarianliberalism’sfailuretofullyacknowledgeandaddressthefundamentalsignificanceofraceactuallyresultsintheunintendedperpetuationandexacerbationofsocialinjustice.TheNewEnlightenment:RaceConsciousnessintheServiceofSocialJusticeCommentingonwhathewoulddoifhehadanopportunitytoteachchildrenvictimizedbythesystemicsocialandeconomiceffectsofracialdiscrimination,JamesBaldwinwrites:Iwouldtrytoteachthem–Iwouldtrytomakethemknow–thatthosestreets,thosehouses,thosedangers,thoseagoniesbywhichtheyaresurroundedarecrimi-nal.Iwouldtrytomakeeachchildknowthatthesethingsaretheresultsofacriminalconspiracytodestroyhim.Iwouldteachhimthatifheintendstogettobeaman,hemustatoncedecidethatheisstrongerthanthisconspiracyandthathemustnevermakepeacewithit.Andthatoneofhisweaponsforrefusingtomakehispeacewithitandfordestroyingitdependsonwhathedecidesheisworth.Iwouldteachhimthattherearecurrentlyveryfewstandardsinthiscountrywhichareworthaman’srespect.Thatitisuptohimtobegintochangethesestandards26forthesakeofthelifeandhealthofthecountry.EmbeddedwithinBaldwin’spoignantaccountofhisownpedagogicalaimsisanaptdescriptionofthedifficultiesandchallengeswroughtbyinvidiousinstitutionalformsofracism.ThefirstthingthatBaldwinnotesisanarrayofdesperatemate-rialandsocialconditionsthatdisproportionatelybefallpeopleofcolor.Charac-terizingthefailuretoaddresstheseconditionsas“criminal,”heattributesthecreationandreproductionofidentifiablepatternsofracialdiscriminationtowhatisbestdescribedasaconspiracyofunjustinstitutionalstructures,processes,andpractices.Inthefaceofthisconspiracy,hechallengesitsvictimstodedicatethem-selvestocreatingahealthysocietybyaffirmingtheirownselfworthandchang-ingtheperniciousstandardsandnormsthatdisparageit.EchoingBaldwin’scharge,manycriticsbelievethatinsofarasegalitarianliberalismisdedicatedtothecreationofahealthy,andtherewithequitable,society,itmustalsorecognizethe286\nTheNewEnlightenmentincumbentneedtofacilitatethetransformationofinstitutionalstandardsandnormsinthenameofsocialjustice(Mills1998;Outlaw;West;Young).More-over,theconsensusamongthesescholarsisthategalitarianliberalismmustmovebeyondthefocusonequitablepatternsofdistributionandbroadenitsmissiontoincludethegoalofequitableinstitutionalstructures,i.e.,proceduralandorgani-zationalconstraints,thatareresponsivetotheunderlyingconditionsthatproduceandreproduceracialdiscrimination.Standingoutasoneofthemostobviousandefficaciousmeansofrealizingthisgoalisashiftfromasweepingphilosophicalcommitmenttouniversalityandimpartialitythatmarginalizesraceaswellasotherformsofhumanspecificitytoamoreenlightenedcommitmenttopluralityanddeferencethatembodiesagreatersensitivitytothepoliticalsignificanceofgroup-specificdifferences.Popularlyknownasthepoliticsofdifference,theideaistobreakthesocialcyclesofdomi-nationandoppressionbydiversifyingtheinstitutionalpowerstructuresthatdeter-minethenorms,standards,andpoliciesofthesocio-politicalorder.Inconcertwiththisnewapproach,enlightenedliberalismreconceptualizesaffir-mativeactionasmorethanjustameansofpromotingequalaccesstosociallysignificantpositionsandprofessions.Recognizingthebiasesinherentinthenorms,policiesandproceduresthatstructuresocialinstitutions,enlightenedliberalismendorsesaffirmativeactionasameansofpromotingtheinternaltransformationoftheseinstitutionsinwaysthatbetteraccommodatediversity.Thusdeployed,thegoalofaffirmativeactionistoensurenotonlythatmarginalizedsocialgroupsarerepresentedwithinvarioussocialinstitutions,butthattheyareeffectivelyrep-resentedatalllevelsofthoseinstitutionsandwithinthedecision-makingbodiesthatgovernthemaswell.Thusconceived,however,affirmativeactionaloneisinsufficienttoachieveenlightenedliberalism’sbroaderend.Forexample,considerapublicuniversity’slargeallwhitedepartmentofliteraturethataddstwoorthreefacultyofcolorincompliancewiththeschool’sstate-mandatedpolicyofaffirmativeaction.Devoidofanyrealcommitmenttoracialandethnicdiversity,theprevailingattitudeoftheexistingmembersofthedepartmentisthatitscurriculum,standards,andprac-ticesarefineastheyareandthatit’sOKif“these”peoplecomeinandteach“their”coursessolongastheydon’tdisruptthecurrentintellectualorder.Givensuchasituation,itseemshighlyunlikelythatthefacultyofcolorwillbeabletoworkwithinthesystemtosuccessfullydiversifythedepartmentinsubstantiveandmeaningfulways.Recognizingthisdifficulty,enlightenedliberalismincludesadditionalproce-duralcomponentsthatcompelinstitutionstosubstantivelyrecognizesocial-groupdifferences.DrawinguponYoung’snotionofanidealdemocraticpublic,enlight-enedliberalismcallsforstructuralchangesthatcreatemechanismsthatguaranteethat“thedistinctivevoicesandperspectives”ofthosewhoareoppressedordis-27advantagedareaffordeddueconsideration.Moreover,itdemandsthatthesocietyasawholecommititself:(1)tosupportingthedevelopmentofgroup-specificorganizationsthatallowmarginalizedsocialgroupstodiscussanddefine287\nA.ToddFranklintheircollectiveneedsandinterests;and(2)tothedevelopmentofinstitution-specificpoliciesthatrequiredecision-makingbodiestodemonstratethattheir28deliberations“havetakengroupperspectivesintoconsideration.”Thus,inthecaseofpublicpolicy,enlightenedliberalismdemandsthatissuesthatdirectly,andsometimesuniquely,pertaintomarginalizedgroupsareincludedonthelocal,state,andnationalagendasthatframepublicdiscourse.Inthecaseofnon-politicalinstitutions,enlightenedliberalismdemandsthatthevoicesandperspec-tivesoftheoppressedfactorintothepolicies,procedures,anddecisionsthatdeterminethewaysinwhichtheyoperate.Oneoftheprincipalbenefitsoftheseproceduralconstraintsisthewayinwhichtheyencouragethedevelopmentofanenlightenedself-consciousness.Hereagain,Young’saccountofanidealdemocraticpublicprovesinstructive.Highlightingthevirtuesofguaranteeingpoliticalrecognitionofthevoicesofdifference,Youngstressesthefactthatapolitythatisstructurallyrespectfulofdifference“assertsthatoppressedgroupshavedistinctcultures,experiences,andperspectiveson29sociallifewithhumanlypositivemeaning.”Furthermore,shepointsoutthatinmakingsuchassertions,apolitynotonlyvalidatestheidentityoftheoppressedintheeyesofothers,italsoencouragesmembersoftheoppressedtorecognizethepositiveaspectsoftheirparticulargroupidentityandbreakfreeoftheself-denigratingforcesofassimilation.Additionally,Youngalsonotesthatthepublicrecognitionofoppressedgroupsforcesdominantgroupstobecomeconsciousoftheirownspecificity.Andthatmoreimportantly,itunderminesthepretensethattheirperspectivesandvaluesareobjectiveandhenceunbiased.Couplingtheproceduralconstraintsofpoliticalrecognitiontogetherwithpro-gramsofaffirmativeaction,enlightenedliberalismcreatesapowerfuldynamicforinstitutionalchange.Atthestructurallevel,theproceduralconstraintsofpoliticalrecognitioneffectivelyensurethattheneeds,concerns,andperspectivesofmar-ginalizedgroupsfactorintoinstitutionaldecision-makingprocesses.Againstthisbackdrop,themembersofformerlyexcludedsocialgroupswhooccupypositionswithininstitutionalpowerstructures–positionsthatweremademoreaccessiblebyaffirmativeaction–enjoyconditionsthatenhancetheirabilitytoserveaseffec-tiveagentsforchange.Consideronceagaintheexampleoftherecently“integrated”literaturedepart-ment.Withtheadditionofproceduralconstraintsthatforcethedepartmenttorecognizeandconsideravarietyofdifferentracialandethnicvoicesandperspec-tives,monochromaticdiscussionsofthecharacter,content,andaimsofthedepart-ment’scurriculumbecomeinfusedwithcolor.Furthermore,insofarasthewhiteprotectorateisnowfacedwithhavingtojustifythestatusquotoraciallyandeth-nicallydistinctothers,thecontrivancesandcontingenciesthatgiverisetothestan-dards,styles,andobjectivesthatittakesforgrantedasnormsaremorelikelytobeunmaskedandthrusttothefore.Workingwithinthisenvironment,thefacultyofcolorserveasanever-presentcheckagainstfailurestoadheretotheproceduraldemandsofsocialjustice.Inaddition,thefacultyofcolorareguaranteedaformalopportunitytomakeacaseforvariousformsofinstitutionalchange.Andinsofar288\nTheNewEnlightenmentasthesedemandsservetheinterestsofsocialjustice,theycantakesolaceinthefactthattheycannolongerbedeniedwithoutreasonsthatbothreflectthedueconsiderationofdiverseperspectives,andareinkeepingwithasocio-politicalcommitmenttoequalrespectandregardforall.Intheend,itisaliberalisminformedbythepoliticsofdifferencethatservesasthebestresponsetothedemandsofsocialjustice.Sensitivetotheexistentialandpoliticalsignificanceofrace,aswellasotherformsofsocial-groupspecificity,suchenlightenedformsofliberalismtranscendthelimitsofamantraofuniver-salityandimpartialitywhichperpetuatestheinstitutionalformsofdiscriminationthatleavemanypeoplesociallyandpsychologicallytrappedwithininvidiouscyclesofdominationandoppression.Cognizantofthesocialandpoliticalrealitiesoftheseperniciouscycles,anenlightenedliberalismactivelypromotestherecogni-tionofhumanspecificityasameansofcombatingthehegemonyofoppressivemonolithicdeterminationsofnormativity.Notes1Nettleship,LecturesontheRepublicofPlato,p.260.2Plato,Republic,515c.3Kant,“WhatisEnlightenment?”translatedbyCarlJ.Friedrich.InFriedrich(1949).4Kantgoesontodescribethepublicuseofone’sreasonastheexerciseofone’sreasonoutsideofone’sfunctioninaccordancewiththedemandsofone’scivicpostoroffice.5Sandel,LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice,p.1.6KantdevelopsthisargumentintheGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals.ThepresentsummaryisindebtedtothelucidrecapitulationdevelopedbyMichaelSandelinhisLiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice.7Aristotle,Politics,1254band1255b.Sadly,however,theGreeksconsideredwomennaturallylackinginthecapacitiesanddispositionsrequisiteofactivepoliticallife.8QuotedinHannaford,Race:TheHistoryofanIdeaintheWest,p.91.9Ibid.,pp.166–7.10Ibid.,p.52.11QuotedinWest,“AGenealogyofModernRacism,”p.56.12Kant,ThePhilosophyofKant,editedbyCarlJ.Friedrich,p.178.13Locke,SecondTreatiseonGovernment,SectionV,par.34.14Goldberg,RacistCulture,p.27.15QuotedinWest,“AGenealogyofModernRacism,”pp.62–3.16Quotedinibid.,p.63.17QuotedinEze,“TheColorofReason,”inRaceandEnlightenment,p.215.18Ibid.19Rawls(1971),p.563.20Outlaw,OnRaceandPhilosophy,p.174.21SeeRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,LectureI,§4and§5.22SeeDworkin(1977),“WhyBakkeHasNoCase.”23ForausefulsummaryofthehistoricalaccountofaffirmativeactionseeJohnD.Skrentny’sTheIroniesofAffirmativeAction.289\nA.ToddFranklin24Cochran,TheColorofFreedom,p.62.25Quotedinibid.,p.62.26Baldwin,“ATalktoTeachers,”p.685.JamesBaldwin(1998)CollectedEssays.27Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,p.221.28Ibid.29Ibid.,p.204.BibliographyAppiah,K.A.(1992).InMyFather’sHouse:AfricainthePhilosophyofCulture.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.——andGutmann,A.(1996).ColorConscious:ThePoliticalMoralityofRace.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Baldwin,James(1998).JamesBaldwinCollectedEssays,NewYork:TheLibraryofAmerica.Banton,M.P.andJ.Harwood(1975).TheRaceConcept.NewYork:Praeger.Barker,E.(1948).ThePoliticsofAristotle.London,England:OxfordUniversityPress.Boxhill,B.R.(1984).BlacksandSocialJustice.Totowa,NJ:Rowman&Allanheld.Cochran,D.C.(1999).TheColorofFreedom:RaceandContemporaryAmericanLiberal-ism.Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Dworkin,Ronald(1977).“WhyBakkeHasNoCase.”TheNewYorkReviewofBooks,November10,1977.InJohnArthur(ed.)(1981).MoralityandMoralControversies.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHallInc.Eze,E.C.(ed.)(1997).RaceandtheEnlightenment:AReader.Cambridge,MA:Blackwell.Feagin,J.R.andC.B.Feagin(1978).DiscriminationAmericanStyle.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall.Friedrich,C.J.(ed.)(1949).ThePhilosophyofKant:ImmanuelKant’sMoralandPoliti-calWritings.NewYork:TheModernLibrary.Goldberg,D.T.(1993).RacistCulture:PhilosophyandthePoliticsofDifference.Cambridge,MA:Blackwell.Gray,J.(1986).Liberalism.Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.Hamilton,E.andC.Huntington(eds.)(1961).Plato:TheCollectedDialogues.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Hannaford,I.(1996).Race:TheHistoryofanIdeaintheWest.Baltimore,MD:TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Kymlicka,W.(1990).ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy:AnIntroduction.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Macpherson,C.B.(ed.)(1980).SecondTreatiseonGovernment.Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishingCo.Mills,C.W.(1997).TheRacialContract.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.——(1998).BlacknessVisible:EssaysonPhilosophyandRace.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniver-sityPress.Nettleship,R.L.(1955).LecturesontheRepublicofPlato,2ndedn.London,England:Macmillan.Outlaw,L.T.(1996).OnRaceandPhilosophy.NewYork:Routledge.Rawls,J.(1971).ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.290\nTheNewEnlightenment——(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Sandel,M.J.(1989).LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice.NewYork:CambridgeUniver-sityPress.Skrentny,J.D.(1996).TheIroniesofAffirmativeAction:Politics,Culture,andJusticeinAmerica.Chicago,IL:TheUniversityofChicagoPress.Snowden,F.M.(1983).BeforeColorPrejudice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.West,C.(1982).“AGenealogyofModernRacism.”InC.West,ProphesyDeliverance!AnAfrican-AmericanRevolutionaryChristianity.Philadelphia,PA:TheWestminsterPress.Young,I.M.(1990).JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.291\nChapter13ReligionandLiberalDemocracyChristopherJ.EberleIn1992,BillMcCartney,thenheadcoachoftheUniversityofColoradofootballteamandsubsequentfounderof“Promise-Keepers,”heldanewsconferenceinwhichheassertedthathomosexuallifestylesarean“abominationofalmightyGod”andonthatbasisurgedhisfellowColoradanstoamendtheirstate’scon-stitution.“Amendment2”wouldhaverepealedexistinglawsinColoradothatprohibitwork-andhousing-relateddiscriminationagainsthomosexualcitizensandwouldhaveforbiddenthepassageofanycomparablelawelsewhereinthatstate.McCartney’spublicadvocacyofAmendment2turnedouttobecriticallyimpor-tant,asitenergizedanotherwisemoribundpetitiondrivetoputAmendment2onstatewideballot.Ultimately,however,McCartney’sextremelycontroversialcrusadecametonaught.Althoughpassedwithaslightmajority,Amendment2wasstruckdownbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtongroundsthatitviolatestheEqualProtectionClause.McCartney’sadvocacyofAmendment2raisesanumberofimportantques-tions.NottheleastofthosequestionshastodowiththemoralmeritsofAmend-ment2,e.g.,isitmorallyappropriateforthestatetoforcealandlordwhobelievesthathomosexualityisanabominationtoletanapartmenttohomosexualappli-cants?Thereareanumberofdistinct,butnolessimportant,questionsthatMcCartney’sadvocacyofAmendment2raises–questionsthathavetodo,notwiththemoralmeritsofAmendment2,butwiththemannerinwhichacitizenoughttoevaluatethemeritsofAmendment2.Specifically,thefollowingquestionhasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromliberaltheorists:Isitappropriatefora1citizentosupportalawonthebasisofherreligiousconvictions?Wasitappro-priateforMcCartneytourgehisfellowColoradanstoamendtheirstate’sconsti-tutionbyappealingtotheclaimthathomosexualrelationsareanabominationtoGod?GiventhatthecitizensofColoradoadheretowidelydivergentmoral,meta-physicalandreligiouscommitments,wasitmorallyproperforMcCartneytoadvo-cateforAmendment2onsosectarianabasis?292\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyNotethatthisquestionisnotalegalone:noliberaltheoristdisputestheclaimthateachcitizenhasalegalrighttosupportalawonreligiousgrounds.Indeed,thequestionathandisnotreallyamatterofmoralrights:presumablyeachcitizenhasamoralrighttosupportherfavoredlawsonprettymuchwhateverbasisshepleases.Butacitizencanexercisehermoralandlegalrightsinanirresponsiblemanner.(Eveniftherichhavealegalandmoralrightnottogiveoftheirexcesstothestarving,theirfailuretodosomightverywellbereprehensible.)Theques-tionthathasexercisedmanyliberaltheoristsiswhetheracitizenismorallycriti-cizableforexercisinghermoralandlegalrightsinacertainway,viz.,bysupportingherfavoredlawsonreligiousgrounds.Notethattherearetwoimportantlydifferentwaystoformulatethisquestion.First,isitmorallyappropriateforacitizensuchasMcCartneytosupporthisfavoredlawsonthebasisofhisreligiousconvictions?Second,isitmorallyappro-priateforMcCartneytosupporthisfavoredlawsonthebasisofhisreligiousconvictionsalone?ItisonethingforMcCartneytosupportAmendment2onnon-religiousgrounds,therebyaddressinghisnon-religiouscompatriots,yetalsotosupportAmendment2oncorroboratoryreligiousgrounds.Itisquiteanothermatter–amuchmoretroublingmatter,givenitssectarianovertones–forMcCart-neytosupportAmendment2fornoreasonotherthanareligiousreason.Givenitsparticularlytroublingnature,recentdiscussionsamongliberaltheoristshavetendedtofocusonthelatterkindofreligioussupport,asshallI.So,then,hereisthefocalpointofthisessay:mayacitizensupportalawsolelyonreligiousgroundsor,tothecontrary,oughtsheinsurethatsheenjoysarationalethatincludes(evenifitisnotlimitedto)anon-religiousrationale?JustificatoryLiberalismManyprominentliberaltheoristsarecommittedtosomeblendofjustificatorylib-eralism:inspiteofsignificantdisagreements,liberaltheoristsasdiverselycom-mittedasJohnRawls,AmyGutmann,CharlesLarmore,GeraldGaus,andRobert2Audihavedefendedthatpositionorsomeclosecousinthereof.AnditisinvirtueoftheircommitmenttojustificatoryliberalismthatRawls,etal.,affirmthefol-lowingposition:thateachcitizenshouldinsurethatshehasasuitablenon-religiousrationaleforherfavoredcoercivelaws,suchthatacitizenwhosupportsacoercivelawsolelyonreligiousgroundsismorallycriticizableforsodoing.(Thepertinentdiscussionstypicallyfocusoncoercivelaws–andIwillnarrowmyfocus3accordingly.)Whatisjustificatoryliberalism?First,justificatoryliberalsarecommittedtoasuitableselectionofparticularpoliciesandpractices.Mostcentrally,theybelievethateachcitizenshouldenjoyanadequateschemeofrights:tofreespeech,tofreeassociation,toreligiousfreedom,tovote,todueprocess,etc.Adherencetosuchsubstantivecommitments,givenwidelatitudeforalternativespecifications,isa293\nChristopherJ.Eberlenecessaryconditionofadherencetojustificatoryliberalism–itiswhatmakesthejustificatoryliberalaliberal.Butadherencetosuchsubstantivecommitmentsisnowherenearlysufficientforadherencetojustificatoryliberalism;onecanbefullycommittedtosuchpoliciesandneverthelessrejectjustificatoryliberalism.Asecond,furthercommitmentdistinguishesjustificatoryliberalismfromotherspeciesofliberalism,viz.,thenormofpublicjustification:thatacitizenoughttoprovideapublicjustificationforherfavoredcoercivelaws.Theclarioncallofjus-tificatoryliberalismisthateachcitizenoughttosupportonlythosecoercivelawsthatshesincerelytakestobejustifiabletoeachmemberofthepublic.Thenormofpublicjustificationwillbeacentralfocusofattentioninthisessay,justasithasbeenafocalpointofrecentliberalpoliticaltheorygenerally,andjustasithasbeenafocalpointofrecentdiscussionsofthemorespecificissueoftheproperroleofreligioninliberalpolitics.Butwhat,exactly,isapublicjustification?Proposalsvarywidely;theconceptof“publicjustification”isexceptionallyslip-peryandhasbeenarticulatedinadizzyingvarietyofalternativeandoftencon-flictingways.Nevertheless,givenevenitsdiversespecifications,thebasicnotionisfairlystraightforward.Apublicjustificationisanother-directedrationale:acitizen’srationalemustbeconvincingnotonlytoher,givenherdistinctivepointofview,buttoothercitizensaswellgiventheirrespectivepointsofview.Apublicjustificationisn’tjustarationalethatitsproponentsregardasplausible,butisalsoonethatitsproponentsexpectthattheircompatriotswill,oratleastcan,taketobeplausible.Theclaimthatacitizenshouldprovideapublicjustificationforherfavoredcoercivelawshasanimmediatebearingontheproperroleofreligiousconvictionsinliberalpolitics.Howso?Areligiousrationaleisparadigmaticallynon-public.GiventhehighlypluralisticnatureofacontemporaryliberaldemocracysuchastheUnitedStates,anyreligiousrationalewillbeutterlyunconvincingtomanycitizens:McCartney’srationaleforAmendment2isacaseinpoint.AndeventhoughahighproportionofUnitedStatescitizensaretheists,millionsarenotandsowillrejectMcCartney’srationaleforAmendment2.Consequently,McCart-ney’srationaledoesnotcountasapublicjustification.SincethereisnothingspecialaboutthekindofreligiousrationaleMcCartneyofferedforAmendment2,wemaygeneralize:noreligiousrationalebyitselfsufficesforapublicjustifica-tion.Consequently,accordingtothejustificatoryliberal,acitizenwhoenjoysonlyareligiousrationaleforafavoredcoercivelawoughttowithholdhersupportfromthatcoercivelaw.Theposition,then,thatacitizenoughttorefrainfromsup-portingcoercivelawssolelyonreligiousgroundsisadirectimplicationofthenormofpublicjustificationandis,therefore,anon-negotiablefeatureofjustifi-catoryliberalism.294\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyJustificatoryvs.MereLiberalismTheheartofjustificatoryliberalism,thecommitmentthatdistinguishesitfromotherspeciesofliberalism,isaclaimaboutthekindsofreasonsacitizenmayemployasabasisforcoercivelaws.Sincewhatdistinguishesthejustificatoryliberalfromotherspeciesofliberalisamatterofthesortofjustificationrequiredforcoercivelaws,ratherthanamatterofthespecificlawsthejustificatoryliberalaffirms,itispossibletorejectjustificatoryliberalismwithouttherebyrejectinganyofthesubstantivecommitmentscharacteristicallyassociatedwithaliberalpolity.Itispossible,inshort,torejectjustificatoryliberalismandneverthelesstoaffirmmereliberalism,whereanecessaryandsufficientconditionofcommitmenttomereliberalismiscommitmenttocharacteristicliberalpolicies.Thus,forexample,Elijahcanaffirmtherighttoreligiousfreedom,hecanaffirmthatrightsolelyonreli-giousgrounds,yethecandenythatheshouldrefrainfromsupportingthatright,absentapublicjustification.Inthatcase,Elijahadherestoafundamentalliberalcommitment–toreligiousfreedom–buteschewsthenormofpublicjustifica-tion.Heis,wemayassume,amere,butnotajustificatory,liberal.Thisdistinctionbetweenjustificatoryliberalismandmereliberalismenablesustoclarifythreeimportantpoints.First,asindicatedbythefactthatElijahcancoherentlyaffirmtherighttoreligiousfreedomsolelyonreligiousgrounds,com-mitmenttoreligiousfreedomisdistinctfromcommitmenttothenormofpublicjustification.Thesetwocommitmentsariseatdifferentlevelsofdiscourse:therighttoreligiousfreedomisasubstantivepolicyforwhichacitizenmighthaveallmannerofreasonswhereasthenormofpublicjustificationisaconstraintonthesortofreasonsacitizenoughttohaveforherfavoredpolicies.Second,itispossibletorejectjustificatoryliberalismandneverthelessberatio-nallyjustifiedinacceptingcharacteristicliberalcommitments(suchastoreligiousfreedom).Thispossibilityisafunctionofconstitutivedifferencesbetweenratio-nalandpublicjustification.Putcrudelyanddogmatically,rationalityofbeliefformationisafunctionofthemannerinwhichacitizenemployshiscognitivecapacitiesinreflectingonthereasonsavailableinhisepistemicenvironmentinreachingconclusionsthatmakesensefromhisperspective,whereasapublicjusti-ficationisafunctionofacitizen’sbeingabletoarticulatearationalethatothersdo,orcan,regardasconvincing.Givenappropriatelydifferentepistemicenviron-ments,rationaljustificationandpublicjustificationcandiverge.Forexample,wemayassumethat,giventheevidenceavailableinhisepistemicenvironment,Socratesrationallybelievedthatthesunrevolvesaroundtheearth;that,giventheevidenceavailableinourepistemicenvironment,wemodernsrationallydenythatthesunrevolvesaroundtheearth;andthat,giventherelevantdifferencesbetweenourrespectiveepistemicenvironments,Socrateswouldhavebeenunabletoartic-ulatearationaleforhisgeocentricconvictionsthatwemodernsregardasevenremotelyconvincing.Inthathypotheticalcase,Socrateswouldenjoyarational,butnotapublic,justificationforhisgeocentricconvictions.And,ofcourse,this295\nChristopherJ.Eberletruthaboutmattersastronomicalisequallytrueformatterspolitical:Elijahcanberationallyjustifiedinaffirmingtherighttoreligiousfreedomgiventheevidenceavailableinhisepistemicenvironmentbutbeunabletoarticulatearationaleforthatrightthatwill,orevencan,beconvincingtothoseensconcedinsufficientlydifferentepistemicenvironments.Rationaljustificationisonething,publicjusti-ficationquiteanother.Third,itispossibletorejectthespecificconstraintonreasonsthatjustificatoryliberalsadvocateandneverthelesstoendorseanynumberofalternativeconstraints.Forexample,itisplausibletosupposethatacitizenoughttosupportonlythosecoercivelawsthatsherationallytakestobemorallydefensible.Butgiventhatratio-nalandpublicjustificationcandiverge,onecanacceptthatfairlyburdensomecon-straintandneverthelessrejectthenormofpublicjustification.Inshort,torejectthenormofpublicjustificationdoesnotcommitonetotheclaimthatanythinggoesbywayofthemannerinwhichacitizenmaysupportherfavoredcoercivelaws.Wearenowinapositiontofocusnarrowlyonthemostcontentiousaspectofjustificatoryliberalism.Thereisnothingparticularlycontentiousaboutthejusti-ficatoryliberal’sadvocacyofreligiousfreedom:boththejustificatoryliberalandhercriticsarefreetoagreethateachcitizenenjoysthatright.Thereisnothingpar-ticularlycontentiousabouttheclaimthatacitizenshouldhavegoodreasonforherfavoredcoercivelaws:boththejustificatoryliberalandhercriticsarefreetoconcurthatacitizenmaysupportonlythosecoercivelawssherationallytakestobemorallydefensible.Andthereisnothingparticularlycontentiousabouttheclaimthatacitizenshouldobeyrestrictionsonthereasonssheemploysasabasisforherfavoredcoercivelaws:boththejustificatoryliberalandhercriticscanagreethateachcitizenshouldabidebysomesuchrestrictions,e.g.,thateachcitizenshouldwithholdsupportfromcoercivelaws,absentrationaljustification.Rather,themainpointofcontentionhastodowiththespecificrestrictionsonreasonsthejusti-ficatoryliberalendorses:sheclaimsthateachcitizenshouldenjoyapublicjustifi-cationforherfavoredcoercivelawsandthusshouldnotsupportcoercivelawssolelyonreligiousgrounds,whereasmanycriticshavefoundthatrestrictionindefensible.WhyPublicJustification?Whyrejectthenormofpublicjustificationanditscorrelativestricturesonreli-giousgrounds?Surelyoneofacitizen’smostimportantobligationsistotreathercompatriotsinaccordwiththedictatesofconscience.Acitizenactsinaccordwithherconscienceonlyifshetreatshercompatriotsinwaysthatshesincerelybelievestobemorallyappropriate.Sooneofacitizen’smostimportantmoralobligationsistotreathercompatriotsinwaysthataccordwithwhatshesincerelytakestobemorallyappropriate.Butthenormofpublicjustificationrequiresofeachcitizen296\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyawillingnesstoviolatethisfundamentallyimportantobligation.Consequently,weshouldrejectthenormofpublicjustification.Thecrucialpremisehereistheclaimthatthenormofpublicjustificationrequiresofeachcitizenawillingnesstorefrainfromtreatinghercompatriotsinaccordwiththedictatesofconscience.Andwhybelievethatpremise?Aswehaveseen,thenormofpublicjustificationisarestrictiononthereasonsacitizenisper-mittedtoemploytosupportacoercivelaw.Anditispossiblethatacitizenwhoabidesbythatrestrictionconcludesthatthebalanceofpermissiblereasonspro-videsinsufficientsupportforacoercivelawthatsheregardsasmorallyobligatorywhenjudgedfromthepointofviewofbothpermissibleandimpermissiblereasons.ConsiderRachel,whosereligiousconvictionsprovideessentialsupportfortheclaimthatafetusisaperson,andthusthatabortingafetusismorallyreprehen-sible,andthusthatthestateoughttocriminalizeabortion.Rachelbelievesthatabortingafetusismorallyreprehensiblebutwouldnotdosowereitnotforherreligiouscommitments.Inthatcase,thenormofpublicjustificationcounselsRacheltorefrainfromsupportinganylawthatcriminalizesabortionandthusforbidshertosupportacoercivelawthatshesincerelybelievestobemandatedbymoraltruthsofobviousimportance.AndalthoughRachelneednoteverfindherselfsounfortunatelycircumstanced,sheshouldrecognizethatshemightfindherselfsocircumstancedandthat,ifsheis,obediencetothenormofpublicjus-tificationrequireshertoexerciserestraint.Soacitizenwhocommitstothenormofpublicjustificationmustbewillingtoviolatethedictatesofconscienceevenifsheneednoteverdoso.Giventheimportanceofacitizen’sobligationtotreathercompatriotsinaccordwiththedictatesofconscience,itwouldseemthateachcitizenhaspowerfulmoralreasontorejectthenormofpublicjustification.Moreover,giventhepeculiarnatureofreligiouscommitment,itseemsthatreligiouscitizenshaveevenfurtherreasontorejectthenormofpublicjustification.ForreligiouscitizenstypicallyregardtheirobligationtoobeyGodasoverriding–astheirmostimportantandweightyobligation.Andtheyoftentakeadherencetotheirreligiouspracticesasessentialtotheiridentityaspersonsandthustoameaningfulexistence.Giventhesefactsaboutreligiouscommitment,thestricturesimposedonreligiousciti-zensbythenormofpublicjustificationareextremelyburdensome.Andsoitseemsthatreligiouscitizenshaveparticularlypowerfulreasontorejectthenormofpublicjustification.TheArgumentfromRespectThisargumentisfarfromconclusive.Afterall,therearesomecontextsinwhichacitizenoughttoabidebyrestrictionsthataresimilarinstructuretothenormofpublicjustification.Forexample,acitizenonajuryoughttorefrainfromcon-sideringreliablebutinadmissibleevidenceinherdeliberations.Buttherearepow-297\nChristopherJ.Eberleerfulreasonswhythemembersofajuryoughttoabidebysuchrestrictions.Andtheburdenonthejustificatoryliberalistoprovideconsiderationsthatoverridewhatseemsapowerfulpresumptionagainstthekindofrestrictionconstitutiveofthenormofpublicjustification.Theargumentfromrespectisbyfarthemostcommonargumentforthenormofpublicjustification,ofwhichCharlesLarmore’sisperhapstheclearestandmostcompelling.Larmore’sargumentbeginswithaclaimabouthumanpersonhood.Apersonhasherownperspectiveontheworld:shehasasetofcaresandcon-cernsinvirtueofwhichthingsmattertoher.Apersonalsohasthecapacitytoreflectonthosecaresandconcerns,toemployherreflectivecapacitytochangeherperspectiveontheworldandthereforetoalterwhatmatterstoher.Inthatessentialrespect,personsdifferfromnon-persons–fromrocks,trees,andpiecesoflint.Suchnon-personshavenocaresandconcerns,andsonothingmatterstothem,andsotheyhavenoperspectiveontheworldthatcanbealteredbyreflection.Thesefactsaboutpersonhoodhaveanimportantbearingonhowacitizenoughttotreathercompatriots:becausepersonscareaboutwhathappenstothemand,inparticular,aretypicallydeeplyaversetobeingtreatedastheobjectofanother’swhim,acitizenoughtnotmerelymanipulatehercompatriots,asshemaypiecesoflintandothernon-persons.Moregenerally,acitizenoughtnottreathercompatriotsmerelyasmeanstoherends,assheispermittedtotreatnon-persons.Rather,sheoughttotreatpersonsasendsinthemselves–notjustasendsinthemselves,butalsoasendsinthemselves.Thisgeneralprinciplehasanimportantimplicationforourtopic.Ifacitizenoughtnottreathercompatriotssolelyasmeanstoherends,thensheoughttorefrainfromgettinghercompatriotstosubmittoherdemandsonlybycoercingthem.Larmorewrites:Nowforcingpeopletocomplywithprinciplesofconductistotreatthemasmeans:theircomplianceisseenasconducivetopublicorderorperhapstotheirownrefor-mation.Initselftheuseorthreatofforcecannotbewrong,forotherwisepoliticalassociationwouldbeimpossible.Whatisprohibitedbythenormofrespectisrestingcomplianceonlyonforce.Forthedistinctivefeatureofpersonsisthattheyarebeingscapableofthinkingandactingonthebasisofreasons.Ifwetrytobringaboutcon-formitytosomepoliticalprinciplesimplybythreat,wewillbetreatingpeoplesolelyasmeans,asobjectsofcoercion.Wewillnotbetreatingthemasends,engaging4directlytheirdistinctivecapacityaspersons.Ifacitizenoughtnotcountenancetheemploymentonlyofforcetoinsurecom-pliancetosomelaw,thenhowoughtshetoinsurecompliance?Byaddressinghercompatriotsonthebasisoftheircapacitytoreflectonwhatmatterstothem.Herobligationtorespecthercompatriotsrequiresacitizentocommitherselftobringaboutconformitytoherfavoredcoercivelawsbymeansofrationaldiscourse:shewilltrytoconvincehercompatriotsthatherfavoredcoercivelawsaremorally298\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyappropriatebyaddressingthemwithreasonsratherthandependingsolelyonthethreatofpunishment.Acitizencommittedtobringingaboutconformitytoherfavoredcoercivelawsbymeansofrationaldiscoursewillabidebythecanonsofrationaldiscourse.Andthecanonsofrationaldiscourseobligeacitizentoarticulateargumentsthathercompatriots,giventheirdistinctiveperspectivesontheworld,canaccept.IfJillrejectsJack’srationaleforcoercivelawL,andifJackiscommittedtoarationalresolutionoftheirdisputeoverL,thenhewillnotsimplyinsistonrepeating,inmantra-likefashion,hisrationaleforL.Rather,hewillretreattoneutral,common,orpublicground.Indiscussinghowtoresolvesomeproblem(forexample,whatprinciplesofpoliti-calassociationtheyshouldadopt),peopleshouldrespondtopointsofdisagreementbyretreatingtoneutralground,tothebeliefstheystillshareinordereitherto(a)resolvethedisagreementandvindicateoneofthedisputedpositionsbymeansofargumentsthatproceedfromthiscommonground,or(b)bypassthedisagreement5andseekasolutionoftheproblemonthebasissimplyofthiscommonground.Inorderrationallytoresolveagivendisagreement,theinterestedpartiesmustrelyoncommonground,premisescontainedineachoftheirrespectiveevidentialsets.Andtheirretreattocommongroundenablesthemtoresolvetherelevantdisagreementineitheroftwoways.First,theycanrelyoncommongroundtoresolvetheirdisagreementinfavorofoneparty,e.g.,theycanresolveadisputeoverthemoralityofabortionbyemployingwhatevercommongroundtheyenjoytovindicateaparticularpositiononabortion.Thisstrategyisunlikelytosucceedinmostcasesandsothepartiesengagedinrationaldiscourseoverdisputedlawsmustfindsomeotherwaytoresolvetheirdisagreement.Andthereisasecondway:theycanagreetodisagreeonthespecificissueathandbutthenemploytheremainingclaimstheysharetodeterminewhatoughttobedoneinspiteofthatdisagreement,e.g.,theycanagreetobypasstheirdisputeoverthemoralityofabortionbyagreeingtoabidebytheresultsofpopularreferendaonabortion-relatedpolicies.Ofcourse,whethercitizensresolvetheirdisputesinoneortheotherofthesewaysisnotasimportanttoLarmoreasishisproposedconstraintonthemannerinwhichcitizensoughttoresolvetheirdisputes.Giventhatacitizen’sobligationtorespecthercompatriotsforbidshertotreathercompatriotsmerelyasmeanstoherends,andgiventhatacitizen’sobligationtorefrainfromtreatinghercom-patriotsmerelyasmeanstoherendsimpliesthatsheoughttoretreattocommonground,itseemsthateachcitizenshouldcommittoresolvepoliticaldisagree-mentsonthebasisofcommonground–bysupportingonlypubliclyjustifiableresolutionsofdisagreements.Andofcoursethisconclusionhasdirectimplicationsforourtopic:sinceacitizenwhoenjoysonlyareligiousrationaleforcoercivelawLtherebydoesnotenjoythedesiredpublicjustificationforL,sheoughtnottosupportL.299\nChristopherJ.EberleEvaluationofLarmore’sArgumentfromRespectLarmore’sversionoftheargumentfromrespectis,Ithink,unsound.Inordertoseewhy,weneedtodistinguishbetweentheclaimthatacitizenoughttoexercise6restraintandtheclaimthatsheoughttopursuepublicjustification.Theclaimthatacitizenoughttoexerciserestraint,orasIshallsay,thedoctrineofrestraint,istheclaimthatacitizenoughttowithholdhersupportfromanycoercivelawforwhichshelacksapublicjustification.Thedoctrineofrestraintlaysdownacon-straintonthepoliciesacitizenispermittedtosupport:acitizenispermittedtosupportacoercivelawLonlyifsheenjoysapublicjustificationforL.The“onlyif”implicitinthedoctrineofrestraintprovidesthatdoctrinewithitscriticaledge:acitizenwholackspublicjustificationforLshouldnotsupportL.Bycontrast,theclaimthatacitizenoughttopursuepublicjustification,orasIshallsay,theprin-cipleofpursuit,istheclaimthatsheoughttodowhatshecantoinsurethathercompatriotshavewhateachregardsasadequatereasontosupportL.Sotheprin-cipleofpursuitisaclaimaboutwhatacitizenshouldaspiretoachieve.Althoughdistinct,boththeprincipleofpursuitandthedoctrineofrestraintareembeddedinthenormofpublicjustification:thatacitizenshouldprovideapublicjustificationforcoercivelawL,asthenormofpublicjustificationrequires,isambiguousasbetweentheclaimthatsheshouldtrytoprovideapublicjustifi-cationforLandtheclaimthat,ifshefailsinherattempt,sheshouldwithholdhersupportfromL.Thatthedoctrineofrestraintandprincipleofpursuitaredis-tinctisindicatedbythefactthattheformercomesintoplayonlyafteracitizenhasfailedinherpursuitofpublicjustification.Acitizencandoeverythingthatcanreasonablybeexpectedbywayofattemptingtodiscernapublicjustification,andthushavesatisfiedherobligationtopursuepublicjustification,withoutbeingsuccessfulintheattempt.Wetrybutdonotinvariablysucceed;westrivebutalltoooftenfailtoachieveouraspirations.Thatacitizenoughttopursuepublicjus-tificationforLprovidesherwithnoguidanceatallastowhatsheshoulddoinacasewhereshefailsinthataspiration:thatsheoughttopursuepublicjustifica-tion,prettyobviously,providesnoguidanceinansweringthequestion,“WhatshouldIdointheeventthat,havingdischargedmyobligationtopursuepublicjus-tification,Ineverthelessfindmyselfwithoutthedesiredjustification?”Perhapssheshouldceaseanddesistfromsupportingthatpolicy.Thatisasitmaybe,butweneedadifferentargumentforthatclaimthanfortheclaimthatsheoughttopursuepublicjustification.IttomeseemsthatLarmore’sversionoftheargumentfromrespectvindicatestheprincipleofpursuit:inLarmore’sidiolect,respectrequirestheaspirationtodecidepoliticalmattersbyretreatingtocommonground.Andthatisnomeanachievement:thatacitizenoughttoobeytheprincipleofpursuitforbidshertoconductherpoliticaldeliberationsandadvocacyentirelywithintheambitofherparochialconvictions.Rather,sheoughttoexitherperspectiveontheworldandentertherespectivemindsetsofhercompatriots,inordertoarticulatesomeratio-300\nReligionandLiberalDemocracynaleforherfavoredcoercivelawsthathercompatriotsfindconvincing.And,ofcourse,theprincipleofpursuithasdirectimplicationsforreligiouscitizens:acitizenmustexitherreligiousperspectiveontheworldandattempttoarticulatesomerationaleforherfavoredcoercivelawsthathercompatriotsmightfindconvincing.Althoughhisisaveryimportantconclusion,Larmoreintendstovindicatenotjusttheprincipleofpursuitbutalsothedoctrineofrestraint.Aswithjustificatoryliberalsgenerally,Larmorewantsreligiouscitizenstorefrainfromengagingincertainactivities:hewantsMcCartneytorefrainfromsupportingAmendment2ifMcCartneyenjoysonlyareligiousrationaleforAmendment2.Infact,thisrestrictiveaimseemsmuchmorecentraltothejustificatoryliberal’sprojectthandoestheprincipleofpursuit.ButLarmoredoesnotsucceedinvindicatinghisrestrictiveaim.Why?IfLarmoreiscorrect,eachcitizenhasanobligationtoresolvedisagreementsoversomecoercivelawLbyretreatingtocommon,neutral,orpublicground.ButitisacontingentmatterwhetherthereactuallyiscommongroundtowhichthepartieswhodisagreeoverLcanretreat.Foranygivendispute,itispossiblethatthepartiestothatdisputelackcommongroundthatissufficientlyrichastoenablethemeithertoresolvethatdisputedirectlyortodeterminewhattodogiventheirinabilitytoresolvetheirdispute.Thecaseofabortionseemstofitthischaracter-ization:wefindourselvesatloggerheadsnotjustoverthemoralproprietyofabor-tionbutalsooverwhattodogivenourinterminabledisagreementoverthatissue,e.g.,whetherweshouldallowtheissuetobesettledbypopularreferendumorbythedictaoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Giventhattheremightbenocommongroundtowhichwecanrepairinordertoreachapubliclyjustifiableresolutionofourcontinuingdisagreementovercoer-civelawL,itisquitemisleadingtoclaimthatweoughttoretreattocommonground.Thatclaimassumesthattherewillbecommongroundtowhichwecanretreat.Since,however,theremightnotbeanysuchground,itwouldseemmoreaccuratetoclaimthatwehaveanobligationtoretreattocommongroundsolongascommongroundisavailable.Afterall,wecannotbeobligedtodotheimpos-sible,viz.,toretreattoaplacethatdoesnotexist.Suppose,then,thateachcitizen,outofrespectforhercompatriotsaspersons,oughttoretreattosuchcommongroundasexists.Thisconclusionimmediatelyraisesthequestion:Whatoughtacitizentodoifshehasdoneallthatshefeasi-blycantodiscoverorforgethedesiredcommongroundbutcannotdiscernthatcommonground?Grantedthatshehasdoneherlevelbesttoretreattocommonground,whatdoesrespectforhercompatriotsrequirehertodowhenthegroundsheshareswithhercompatriotsisinsufficienttoresolvetheirdisagreement?ItseemstomethatLarmore’sargumentprovidesnoguidancewhatsoeverastohowweoughttoanswerthatquestion.Fromtheclaimthatacitizenoughttotrytoresolveherdisagreementswithhercompatriotsonthebasisofcommonground,nothingfollowsregardingwhatsheoughttodoif,havingpursuedcommonground,herpursuitendsinfailure.301\nChristopherJ.EberleThus,forexample,supposethatBillMcCartneyhadsincerelyattemptedtodiscernawidelyconvincingrationaleforhisconvictionthathomosexualrelationsaremorallywrong,butfailedinhisattempt.ThecentralquestionforMcCartneyis:WhatshouldMcCartneydoifhefindshimselfsocircumstanced?GrantedthathehasattemptedtovindicateAmendment2byretreatingtocommonground,andgrantedthathehasfailedinhisattempt,mayhepersistinhissupportforAmendment2?Larmorewantstoclaimthathemaynot–McCartneyshouldceaseanddesistfromsupportingAmendment2.ButoncewedistinguishbetweentheclaimthatMcCartneyshouldpursuepublicjustificationandtheclaimthatheshouldexerciserestraint,itseemsclearthatLarmore’sargumentestablishesnosuchconclusion.ItmightstillseemthatLarmore’sargumenthassomelifeinit.Afterall,itmightseemthatacitizenwhopersistsinsupportingacoercivelawabsentapublicjustificationfailstotreathercompatriotsasendsinthemselves.Afterall,shedoesindeedcoercehercompatriotsagainsttheirrespectivewills,regardlessofwhethershehasdonewhatshecantoavoidthatcondition.Thisresponseisinadequate,andthedistinctionbetweenpursuingpublicjusti-ficationandexercisingrestraintenablesustoseewhy.ThemoralheartofLarmore’sargumentisthatacitizenwhorespectshercompatriotsoughtnottotreathercompatriotsasmeansonly,butsheisnotforbiddenfromtreatingthemasmeansatall.Butacitizenwhopursuespublicjustificationforherfavoredlawsdoesnottreathercompatriotsonlyasameans:sheattemptstoaddresshercom-patriotsonthebasisoftheirrespectivecapacitiestoformtheirrespectivepointsofviewregardingheractions.Sheattemptstoreasonwithhercompatriots,toconvincethemthatherfavoredpoliciesareappropriate.Thatshedoesnotmeetwithsuccess,andthusregardsherselfasconscienceboundtosupportcoercivelawsabsentapublicjustification,doesnotobviatethefactthatsheaccordssig-nificantweighttothefactthathercompatriotsarepersonsandallowsthatfacttoconstrainthemannerinwhichshesupportsherfavoredlaws.Prettyclearly,acitizenwhoiscommittedtopursuingpublicjustificationbutwhorefusestoexer-ciserestrainttreatshercompatriotsbothasmeansandasendsinthemselves.AGeneralProblemfortheArgumentfromRespectThedoctrineofrestraintisbothcentralto,andyetthemostcontentiousaspectof,thejustificatoryliberal’sproject:althoughfewreligiouscitizenswillobjecttotheprincipleofpursuit,manywillfindthedoctrineofrestraintintolerablybur-densome.AndasIseethematter,noappealtorespectforpersonssufficestovin-dicatethedoctrineofrestraint.Infact,solongasreligiouscitizensaffirmtheprincipleofpursuit,theytaketheargumentativewindoutoftherhetoricalsailsoftheargumentfromrespect.Howso?Theargumentfromrespecttargetsciti-zens(e.g.,BillMcCartney)whointendtocoercetheircompatriotssolelyonthe302\nReligionandLiberalDemocracybasisoftheirparochialconvictionswithoutconcerningthemselvesatallwiththefactthattheircompatriotslackreasontoaffirmtheirfavoredcoercivelaws.Thatkindofcallousindifferencetothefateoftheircompatriotsissupposedtoindi-catethatcitizenswhorefusetoexerciserestrainttherebydisrespecttheircom-patriots.Butacitizenwhopersistsincoercinghercompatriotsabsentapublicjustificationneednotbecallouslyindifferenttotheirfate.Consequently,itseemsimplausibletosupposethatacitizenwhoinsistsonsupportingherfavoredlawsabsentapublicjustification,andevensolelyonreligiousgrounds,therebyfailstorespecthercompatriots.Thispointisbestmadebyconsideringaconcretecase.SupposethatElijahsurveyswhathesincerelyandrationallytakestobeallofthereliableevidencerel-evanttocoercivelawL.Heabidesbytherelevantnormsofrationaljustificationandso,forexample,heiswillingtoanalyzecriticallythevariousconsiderationsforandagainstL,toevaluatealternativesandamendmentstoL,tosubjecthispreliminaryconvictionsaboutLtothecriticalanalysisofhispeers,etc.Hecon-cludes,afterall,thatthecaseforLiscompelling.Moreover,thecaseforLthathetakestobecompellingisreligiousinnature.Herealizes,ofcourse,thatthatrationalewillbeunconvincingtomanyofhiscompatriots.Sooutofadeepaver-siontocoercinghiscompatriotsagainsttheirbetterjudgment,ElijahattemptstoarticulatearationaleforLthatwillbeconvincingtohiscompatriotsandthat,therefore,doesnotdependonhisreligiousconvictions.Buthelearnsasaconse-quenceofmanyhoursofvigorousargumentthathecannotdoso:hispursuitofapublicjustificationforLendsinfailure.GiventhatheisrationallyconvincedthatthecaseforLiscompelling,ElijahpersistsinsupportingL.Herefusestoexercisethekindofrestraintthejustificatoryliberaladvocates,notoutofagleefulexerciseofpoweroverhiscompatriots,butwithasenseoftragedy:heiscon-scienceboundtoimposeLonhiscompatriotseventhoughhiscompatriotshave,astheyseethematter,noreasonatalltosupportL.DoesElijahfailtomanifestrespectforhiscompatriots?Ican’tseethathedoes.Infact,Ithinkthatitisobviousthathedoesnotdisrespecthiscompatriots.Respectforpersonsrequiresacitizen,nottowithholdhersupportfromcoercivelawsabsentapublicjustification,buttodowhatiswithinherpowertoavoidputtingherselfintheunfortunateconditionthatshelacksapublicjustification.AcitizenwhorationallybelievesthatcoercivelawLismorallyappropriate,whoisthereforeconscienceboundtosupportL,andwhoassiduouslypursuesapublicjustificationforL,doesjustthatandtherebymanifeststheappropriaterespectforhercompatriots.So,itseems,acitizenwhorefrainsfromsupportingcoercivelawsabsentarationaljustificationandwhopursuespublicjustification,therebyrespectshercompatriotsirrespectiveofherwillingnesstoexerciserestraint.Andthiscon-clusionhasadirectbearingonourtopic:sinceacitizenwhosupportsLsolelyonreligiousgroundscanfullycommitbothtowithholdhersupportfromcoercivelawsabsentarationaljustificationandtopursuepublicjustification,itfollowsthatacitizenwhosupportsherfavoredcoercivelawssolelyonreligiousgroundsneednotdisrespecthercompatriots.303\nChristopherJ.EberleTheArgumentfromReligiousWarfareTheargumentfromrespecttorestrainthasadecidedlydeontologicaltone:althoughthejustificatoryliberalexpectsobediencetothedoctrineofrestrainttohaveallmannerofsalutaryeffects,theargumentfromrespectdoesnotdependforitssoundnessonanysuchclaimaboutconsequences.Giventhedemiseoftheargumentfromrespect,perhapsaconsequentialistrationaleforthedoctrineofrestrainthasabetterchanceofcarryingtheday.Andjustificatoryliberalshavenotbeenloathtoavailthemselvesofconsequentialistconsiderations.Considerinthisregardtheargumentfromreligiouswarfare.Religiouswarshaveplayedadefiningroleinthehistoryofliberaldemocracy:theliberalcommitmenttofreedomofreligionwasformulatedanddefendedindirectreactiontoanappallingseriesofevents:acenturyandahalfofwarsfoughtto“resolve”religiousdisagreements.Giventhedefining,ifdubious,rolethatreligiouswarfarehasplayedinthehistoryofliberaldemocracy,thespecterofreligiouswarfarelingersonintheself-understandingofmanyliberaltheorists:thebleakhistoryofreligiouswarfaremotivatesanextremewarinessregardingtheintrusionofreligioninpolitics.And,insomecases,thatwarinessmotivatesthejustificatoryliberaltoendorsethedoctrineofrestraint.Butwhydoesthespecterofreligiouswarfaremandatecitizenstoobeythedoctrineofrestraint?Hereisonewaytoformulatetheargument.Religiouswarsaremorallyabhor-rent:militaryconflictsguidedbyreligiousaimsarepurelydestructive,extraordi-narilyviciousandutterlywithoutredeemingvalue.Awidespreadrepudiationofrestrainthasarealisticprospectofengenderingreligiouswarfare:ifreligiousciti-zensrelysolelyontheirreligiousconvictionstodirectstatecoercion,suchciti-zensmightattempttoenlistthepowerofthestatetoforceconversionandpersecuteheretics,anattemptthatwouldlikelybemetwithdeterminedresistance.Giventhatawidespreadrepudiationofrestrainthasarealisticprospectofgener-atingreligiousconflict,eachcitizenshouldobeythedoctrineofrestraint.Inshort,adherencetothedoctrineofrestraintisacrucialbulwarkprotectingusfromcon-fessionalconflict.Althoughverypopular,thisargumentfailstovindicatethedoctrineofrestraint.Why?Theargumentisdystopian:itrecommendsthatweshouldtakeseriouslyinourpracticaldeliberationsapossibilitythathasnorealisticprospectofactualiza-tionundercurrentorforeseeableconditions.Althoughitisnodoubtlogicallypossiblethatawidespreadrepudiationofrestraintwillresultinreligiouswarfare,conditionsinacontemporaryliberaldemocracysuchastheUnitedStatesrenderthatpossibilitytooremotetovindicatethedoctrineofrestraint.Butwhyistheprospectofreligiouswarfaresoremote?Whatisitabouttheearlytwenty-first-centuryUnitedStatesinvirtueofwhichwecansafelydismisstheprospectthatwewillbeengulfedbyareligiouslygeneratedwarlikethatwhichafflicted,say,mid-seventeenth-centuryEngland?Whathaschangedinthemeantime?Simplyput,wenowhaveinplacemeasuresthateffectivelyprotectusfromreligious304\nReligionandLiberalDemocracywarfare,measuresthatareeffectiveirrespectiveofobediencetothedoctrineofrestraint.Letmeexplain.Liberalslearnedtwocruciallyimportantlessonsfromthereligiouswarsthatwrackedsixteenth-andseventeenth-centuryEurope.First,theylearnedalessonabouttheconditionsinwhichreligionplaysaroleincausingwarfare:religionplaysaroleingeneratingwarfarewhensomeagency(thestateinparticular)employscoerciontocompelcitizenstoworshipinaccordwithareligiouscreedtheyreject,punishescitizensforheterodoxreligiouspractices–inshort,whenthestateemployscoercioninordertoachievereligiousends.Thatuseofthestate’scoer-civepowernaturallyresultsinresistance:coercedreligiouscommunitiesmightverywelldefendthemselves–byforceofarmsifnecessary.Thus,JohnLocke:“itisnotthediversityofOpinions(whichcannotbeavoided)buttherefusalofToler-ationtothosethatareofdifferentOpinions(whichmighthavebeengranted)thathasproducedalltheBustlesandWars,thathavebeenintheChristianWorld,upon7accountofReligion.”AccordingtoLocke,itistheforciblecompulsiontoassenttoorthodoxy,theuseofcoerciontoachievereligiousuniformity,thatcausesreli-giouswar.Again:Nobody,therefore,infine,neithersinglePersons,norChurches,nay,norevenCom-monwealths,haveanyjustTitletoinvadetheCivilRightsandWorldlyGoodsofeachother,uponpretenceofReligion.ThosethatareofanotherOpinion,woulddowelltoconsiderwiththemselveshowperniciousaSeedofDiscordandWar,howpowerfulaprovocationtoendlessHatreds,Rapines,andSlaughters,theytherebyfurnishuntoMankind.NoPeaceandSecurity,nonotsomuchasCommonFriend-ship,canevenbeestablished,solongasthisOpinionprevails,ThatDominionis8foundedinGrace,andthatReligionistobepropagatedbyforceofArms.Second,liberalslearnedthatthestatemustleavewhateverreligiousconvictionsacitizenacceptsandwhateverreligiouspracticeshepursuesentirely“totheCon-9scienceofeveryparticularman.”Thestateoughttoaccordeachcitizenarighttoworshipasheseesfitwithoutbeingsubjecttopunishmentforthewayheexer-cisesthatright.Insodoing,thestatedoesallthatisnecessarytoinsurethatreli-giousdisagreementdoesnotescalateintoreligiouswarfare.Thus,JohnNoonan:“thatreligionhascausedmanyactsofviolenceandperpetuatedmanyhatredsisadatumofhistory....Fortheevils,atleastformostoftheevilsthatreligion10brings,asovereignremedyexists–freeexercise.”ReligiouswarfareisnotarealisticprospectinthecontemporaryUnitedStates,then,becausewehavelearnedhowtoinsurethatitdoesnotoccurandhavetakentheappropriatemeasures:theproperprophylacticforreligiouslygeneratedstrifeisalegalandconstitutionalone,viz.,effectiveprotectionofreligiousfreedom.Weneednothingmore,andnothingless,toinsurethatreligiousdisagreementdoesnotescalateintointer-religiousconflict.Soweneednotworrythatarepudiationofrestraintrisksreligiouswarfare.Itiscommitmenttoreligiousfreedomthatreallymatters:solongascitizensarefirmlycommittedtoreligiousfreedom,theirwill-305\nChristopherJ.Eberleingnesstosupportcoercivelawssolelyonreligiousgroundshasnorealisticprospectofengenderingreligiouswarfare.Ofcourse,itislogicallypossiblethatcitizensintheUnitedStateswillflagonamassivescaleintheircommitmenttoreligiousfreedom.Butthat’sbesidethepoint.Thequestioniswhetherthereisaplausiblestorythattakesusfromourcurrentstatetosomeconditioninwhichlargenumbersofcitizensareintentonemployingstatepowertocompeltheircompatriotstoadheretosomereligiouscreedortoparticipateinsomereligiouspractice.Andthereisnosuchstory;atleast,I’veneverheardittold.Perhapsinpartbecauseoftheeffectivenessofreli-giousfreedominprecludingreligiouswarfare,thevastmajorityofcitizensintheUnitedStatesarefullyandfirmlycommittedtotherightoftheircompatriotstoworshipfreely,ifatall.Thereis,nodoubt,quiteabitofdisagreement–oftenacrimonious–astotheproperapplicationoftherighttoreligiousfreedominspe-cificcases.Nevertheless,onlysmallnumbersofcitizens,locatedattheextremefringesofthepoliticalspectrum,arewillingtodenytheircompatriotstherighttoreligiousfreedom.Notonlyistherenoreasontobelievethatwefacearealisticprospectofreli-giouswarfare,thereareatleasttworeasonstodenythat,eveniftherewereareal-isticprospectofreligiouswarfare,awidespreadrepudiationofrestraintholdsoutthatprospect.Thisisparticularlyimportantforthefollowingreason.Weareinter-estedintheargumentfromreligiouswarfareonlyinsofarasitprovidessupportforthedoctrineofrestraint.Asaconsequence,onlyifarepudiationofrestraintregardingreligiousconvictionshasarealisticprospectofgeneratingconflictdocitizenshavereasontoexerciserestraint.Bycontrast,evenifreligiondoeshavearealisticprospectofgeneratingconflict,solongaswehavenoreasontobelievethatarepudiationofrestraintholdsoutthatrealisticprospect,thencitizenshavenoreasontoobeythedoctrineofrestraint.Sowhydenythatarepudiationofrestraintregardingreligiousconvictionshasarealisticprospectofengenderingreli-giouswarfare?First,recallthat,sincetherighttoreligiousfreedomanddoctrineofrestrainthavetodowithdistinctlevelsofdiscourse,affirmationofreligiousfreedomisentirelyconsistentwithrejectionofthedoctrineofrestraint.Thedoctrineofrestraintconstrainsthereasonsacitizenemploysasabasisforherpoliticalcom-mitments.Therighttoreligiousfreedomisasubstantivepoliticalcommitmentforwhichacitizenmighthaveallmannerofreasons.Giventhatthedoctrineofrestraintconstrainsthereasonsacitizenemploysasabasisforherpoliticalcom-mitments,butissilentregardingthepoliticalcommitmentssheoughttosupport,itisentirelypossibleforacitizentorejectthedoctrineofrestraintbuttoaffirmtherighttoreligiousfreedom.Infact,itispossible–indeedlikelyformembersofthedominantfaithtraditionsintheUnitedStates–thatcitizenswillaffirmreli-giousfreedomforreligiousreasons.Second,citizenswhorejectthedoctrineofrestrainthavespecialreasontoaffirmreligiousfreedom.Why?Effectiveprotectionofreligiousfreedommakesforapoliticalframeworkinwhichreligiouscitizenscan“crusade”totransform306\nReligionandLiberalDemocracythelawsthatgoverntheUnitedStateswithouttherebyinitiatingthesortofreli-giousstrifethatbedeviledthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.Publicaffir-mationoftherighttoreligiousfreedom,and,moreimportantly,zealousdefenseofthatright,exhibitsacommitmenttorefrainfrompursuinganagendathathasprovedterriblydestructiveinthepast:theforcibleimpositionoforthodoxy.ThiscommitmenttoreligiousfreedomallowscitizenswhorejectthedoctrineofrestrainttoemploythemoralresourcesoftheirrespectivereligioustraditionstomoldandshapethelawsthatgoverntheUnitedStatesfreefromthestigmathatrightlyattachestothosewhowouldattempttoemploythepowerofthestatetopunishheretics,imposereligiousorthodoxy,etc.Commitmenttoreligiousfreedomfreesthecitizenwhorepudiatesrestrainttoengageinthedemocraticprocessonequalfootingwithhercompatriots:bysupportingherfavoredcoer-civepoliciesasherconsciencedictates.Inshort,wehavereasontobelieveneitherthatwefacearealisticprospectofreligiouswarfarenorthat,evenifwedid,repudiationofrestraintwouldholdoutthatprospect.Themovefromthedeontologicalargumentfromrespecttotheconsequentialistargumentfromreligiouswarfaredoesnotforwardthejustifica-toryliberal’scase.TheArgumentfromDivisivenessButnotsofast.Thecentralproblemwiththeargumentfromreligiouswarfareisthattheconsequencesitassociateswitharepudiationofrestrainthavenorealis-ticprospectofactualization.Buttherearemanyotherpossibleconsequencesofawidespreadrejectionofrestraint.Inparticular,manycitizensexpressconsider-ableconcern,frustrationandevenalienationattheintrusionofreligiousconsid-erationsintopolitics.Acursoryperusalofrecenthistoryindicatesthat,eveniftheintrusionofreligionintopoliticsdoesnotengenderreligiouswarfare,suchintru-sionisdivisive:McCartney’sadvocacyofAmendment2isarepresentativecaseinpoint.Giventhattheintrusionofreligionintopoliticspolarizesalreadycon-tentiouspoliticaldisputes,conscientiouscitizenswill,itseems,obeythedoctrineofrestraint.Thisargumentfromdivisivenessisfairlystraightforward:frustration,alienation,marginalization,inshort,divisiveness,aremorallyundesirablestatesofaffairs;awidespreadrefusaltoobeythedoctrineofrestraintisdivisive;conse-quently,citizensoughttoobeythedoctrineofrestraint.Whatshouldwemakeofthisargument?Inordertoevaluateitproperly,weneedtoclarifythemoralstatusof“divisiveness.”Acitizenwhoengagesindivi-sivebehaviordoesnotnecessarilyactinamorallyinappropriatemanner:acitizenwhoengagedintheCivilRightsmovement–theFreedomRides,forexample–actedinwaysshehadtoknowwouldbedivisiveandyetisrightlycommendedforheractions.Again,acitizenwhoperformsextremelydivisiveactionsdoesnotnec-essarilybehaveinamorallyinappropriateway:sometimesextremelydivisiveactions307\nChristopherJ.Eberlearenecessarytoachievegoalsofutmostmoralimportance.Clearly,thejustifica-toryliberalmustshowmorethanthatarefusaltoexerciserestraintisdivisiveorthatitisextremelydivisive.Butwhatmustsheshow?Somethinglikethefollow-ing:ifwetakeintoconsiderationallofthemorallyrelevantconsequencesbothofobediencetothedoctrineofrestraintandofrejectionofthatdoctrine,wearebetteroff,morallyspeaking,whencitizensobeythedoctrineofrestraintthanwhentheydonot.Thatis,thejustificatoryliberalmustengageinthatcomplex“weighingprocess”characteristicofconsequentialistargumentsofthesortunderdiscussion:shemustidentifythemorallydesirableandmorallyundesirableconsequencesthatwouldresultwereeitherofthetwoalternativestomaterialize,“add”upthemorallydesirableconsequencesofbothalternatives,“subtract”fromeachsumthemorallyundesirableconsequencesofeachalternative,andthendeter-mineonthebasisofthosecalculationswhichofthetwoalternativesismorallypreferable“onbalance.”Inspiteoftheconsiderabledivisiongeneratedbythereligiousadvocacyforcoercivelaws,itseemsdoubtfulthatthatdivisionissufficientlyweightyastovin-dicatethedoctrineofrestraint.Threereasonsinparticularunderminethemovefromdivisivenesstorestraint.First,althoughtherecanbenodoubtthatreligiousadvocacyforcoercivelawsisverydivisive,muchofthedivisiongeneratedbyreligiousadvocacydoesnotcountinfavorofthedoctrineofrestraint.Why?Hereitiscrucialthatwerecallwhatthedoctrineofrestraintforbidsandwhatitdoesnotforbid.Thedoctrineofrestraintdoesnotforbidacitizentosupportcoercivelawsonreligiousgrounds;rather,itforbidshertosupportcoercivelawsonreligiousgroundsalone.Butthenonlythedivisiongeneratedbyacitizen’ssupportingacoercivelawsolelyonreli-giousgroundscountsinfavorofthedoctrineofrestraint:sincethejustificatoryliberalhasnoobjectiontoreligioussupportforcoercivelaws,thedivisiongener-atedbyreligioussupportforcoercivelawscanhardlycountinfavorofthedoc-trineofrestraint.Nowitseemsthat,asamatteroffact,veryfewcitizenshaveageneralpracticeofsupportingcoercivelawssolelyonreligiousgrounds.Why?Simply,acitizenwhosupportsherfavoredcoercivelawsonreligiousandnon-religiousgroundsstandsamuchbetterchanceofgaininghercompatriots’support,andthereforeofachievingherpoliticalaims,thandoesacitizenwhoreliessolelyonreligiousgrounds.Sothedivisiongeneratedbymuch,ifnotmost,religiousadvocacywillnotcountinfavorofthedoctrineofrestraint.Second,asIhavearguedabove,eachcitizenoughttopursuepublicjustifica-tionforherfavoredcoercivelawsoutofrespectforhercompatriotsaspersons.Nowitseemsthatawidespreadrefusaltopursuepublicjustificationforcoercivelawswouldgenerateconsiderablefrustration,alienationanddivision:citizenswhorefusetopursuepublicjustificationtherebydisrespecttheircompatriots,whichinturnwarrantslegitimateresentmentonthepartofthedisrespectedcitizens.Butgiventhedistinctionbetweentheprincipleofpursuitanddoctrineofrestraint,noneofthedivision,alienationandexclusionthatresultsfromarefusaltopursuepublicjustificationmaybeadducedinfavorofthedoctrineofrestraint.Rather,308\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyonlythedivisiongeneratedbycitizenswhohaveassiduouslypursuedpublicjus-tification,whohavefailedintheirpursuit,andwhopersistinsupportingtheirfavoredcoercivelaws,countsinfavoroftheclaimthatacitizenoughttowith-holdsupportfromcoercivelawsabsentapublicjustification.Aswiththepriorpoint,thisdramaticallyreducestheamountofdivisivenessthatthejustificatoryliberalmayadduceinfavorofthedoctrineofrestraint.Indeed,itseemstomethataproperappreciationofthedistinctionbetweentheprincipleofpursuitanddoctrineofrestraintconsiderablyweakenstheargu-mentfromdivisiveness.Solongaswefailtobearthatdistinctioninmind,wearelikelytooverestimateconsiderablythemorallyundesirableconsequencesofawide-spreadrepudiationofrestraint(bycountingthedivisivenessgeneratedbyarefusaltopursuepublicjustificationinfavorofthedoctrineofrestraint).Butkeepingthatdistinctioninminddramaticallyreducestheamountofdivisiontowhichthejustificatoryliberalmayappealinherattempttoshowthatarefusaltoexerciserestraintmakesusworseoff,morallyspeaking,thandoesexercisingrestraint.Thisisimportantsincetheargumentfromdivisiveness,inaccordwithitsconsequen-tialistnature,unavoidablyinvolvesusinanumbersgame:giventhatthecentralquestionraisedbythatargumentiswhetherrefusingtoexerciserestraintputsusfurtherinthe“moralblack”thanthealternative,anythingthatdramaticallyreducesthe“debit”sideoftheledgerisobviouslyofcrucialimportance.Ofcourse,nothingI’vesaidindicatesthatrepudiationofrestraintgeneratesnodivision:undeniably,somecitizenstakeconsiderableumbrageattheircom-patriots’refusaltoexerciserestraint.Asaconsequence,itisimportanttoidentifymorallyundesirableconsequencesofobediencetothedoctrineofrestraintofsuchmagnitudethattheycan“outweigh”thedivisiongeneratedbyrepudiationofthedoctrineofrestraint.Anditisnotdifficulttoidentifytheillconsequencesthatmightresultfromtheeffectiveenforcement,bymeansofsocialstigma,oftheexpectationthatcitizensexerciserestraintregardingtheirreligiousconvictions.Religiouscitizenswillverylikelytakeconsiderableumbrageattheexpectationthattheyobeythedoctrineofrestraint.(Itishelpfultofocusontheisticcitizens,sincethevastmajorityofcitizensintheUnitedStatesaretheistsofonesortoranother.)Theistsdonottypicallyregardtheirreligiousconvictionsasasetofpref-erencesontheorderofadesiretovacationinexoticlocations.Rather,theytakethemselvestobeobligedtoobeyGod.AsIarguedearlier,thedoctrineofrestraintrequiresthattheisticcitizensbewillingtodisobeywhattheyhavegoodreasontobelieveareGod’sdemands.Giventhenatureoftheisticcommitment,manytheistswillregardthatexpectationasextremelyalienating.Andwemustfactorthatresentmentandalienationintoourconsequentialistcalculation.Onefurtherpointisessential.AsIhavenoted,theargumentfromdivisivenessisaconsequentialistargumentandthereforedependsontheexactquantitiesofmorallygoodandmorallybadconsequenceslikelytobegeneratedbytherele-vantalternatives.Successfulprosecutionoftheargumentfromdivisivenessdependsonanumbersgame:Howmuchalienationislikelytobegeneratedbytherepudiationofrestraint?Howmanycitizenswillfindrestraintoffensive?Etc.But309\nChristopherJ.EberlethevastmajorityofcitizensintheUnitedStatesaretheists.Andmanywillregardthekindofrestraintthejustificatoryliberaladvocatesasquiteburdensome.Giventhelargequantityoftheisticcitizens,andgiventheirlikelyaversiontothedoctrineofrestraint,itseemsverydoubtfulthatwewillfindourselvesfurtherinthemoralblackbyimposingoncitizenstheexpectationthattheyexerciserestraintthanbyimposingonthemamuchweakerandcommensuratelylessobjec-tionablesetofconstraints,viz.,thattheygenuinelyandsincerelypursuepublicjustificationfortheirfavoredcoercivelawsbutthattheyneednotrestrainthem-selvesfromsupportingtheirfavoredcoercivelawswhentheirpursuitofpublicjus-tificationendsinfailure.Theargumentfromdivisiveness,aswiththeargumentfromrespect,counselscitizenstoobeytheprincipleofpursuitbutnotthedoc-trineofrestraint.WhatIsPublicJustification?Uptothispoint,ourdiscussionhasfocusedalmostexclusivelyonthequestion:Whyoughtacitizentorefrainfromsupportingherfavoredcoercivelawsabsentapublicjustification?Thatquestionraisesanother:What,exactly,isapublicjus-tification?Tobesure,areligiousrationaleisnotapublicjustification:justificatoryliberalsunanimouslyagreeonthatpoint.Evenso,thejustificatoryliberalmustprovidesomeprincipledjustificationforthisevaluationofreligiousgrounds:shecan’tjustprovideuswithalaundrylistofnon-publicgrounds,onwhichreligiousgroundsareprominentlydisplayed,andexpectustotakeherwordonthematter.Failuretoprovidesomeprincipleddemarcationbetweenpublicandnon-publicgroundsopensthejustificatoryliberaltoa(commonlyexpressed)chargeofarbi-trariness:sheadvocatesrestraintregardingreligiousgroundswithoutadvocatingrestraintregardingallmannerofconsiderationsthatseemsimilartoreligiousgroundsinrelevantrespects.Inshort,thejustificatoryliberalmustarticulateaconceptionofpublicjustificationthat,inaprincipledmanner,getstherightresultsregardingreligiousgrounds.Moreover,shemustarticulateaconceptionofpublicjustificationthatissatis-factoryinotheressentialrespects.Mostparticularly,thatconceptionmustnotbesodemandingthatcitizensareunabletoarticulateapublicjustificationforcentralliberalcommitments:althoughherfavoredconceptionofpublicjustificationmustbestrongenoughtoforbidacitizentorelysolelyonreligiousgrounds,itmustbeweakenoughforcitizenstobeabletoprovideapublicjustificationforchar-acteristicliberalpolicies.Otherwise,justificatoryliberalismisdeeplyincoherent:itsjustificatorycomponentwouldunderminecommitmenttocharacteristicliberalpolicies,inwhichcasewenolongerhavejustificatoryliberalism.Sothejustifica-toryliberalseemsobligedtoperformachallengingbalancingact:shemustartic-ulateaconceptionofpublicjustificationthatisdemandingenoughtogettherightresultsregardingreligiousgrounds,butrelaxedenoughtoallowcitizenstorely310\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyonanarrayofconsiderationssufficienttoarticulateasuccessfulpublicjustifica-tionforcharacteristicliberalpolicies.I’llbrieflyreviewsomeofthejustificatoryliberal’soptionswithaneyetowardidentifyingaverysignificantobstacleshemustovercomeinarticulatingadefen-sibleconceptionofpublicjustification.Andanaturalplacetobeginistonotetheconstraintsthejustificatoryliberal’srationaleforthedoctrineofrestraintimposesontheavailableconceptionsofpublicjustification.Briefly:sincethecentralratio-naleforthedoctrineofrestraintisanappealtorespectforpersons,andsinceacitizen’sobligationtorespecthercompatriotsisanobligationtorespectthemastheyareratherthanasshewishesthemtobeorastheywouldbeunderradicallyalteredconditions,thenitseemsmostnaturalforthejustificatoryliberaltoadoptapopulistconceptionofpublicjustification.Thatis,itismostnaturalforhertoadoptaconceptionaccordingtowhichapublicjustificationisafunctionofwhattheactualcitizensinagivenliberaldemocracyactuallyfindconvincing.Thusitseemsnaturalforthejustificatoryliberaltodefend:(1)rationaleRcountsasapublicjustificationforcoercivelawLonlyifeachcitizenaffectedbyLactuallyacceptsRasabasisforL.(1)hasanumberofattractivefeatures.First,(1)providesaprincipledbasisfordeterminingwhethersomerationalecountsasapublicjustification:whatmakesforapublicratherthananon-publicjustificationisafunctionofthepositionthemembersofthepublictaketowardthatrationale–whethertheyacceptitorrejectit.Second,(1)getsthedesiredresultregardingreligiousgrounds:manycitizenswillrejectanyparticularreligiousrationale,andsonoreligiousrationale,accord-ingto(1),countsasapublicjustification.Inspiteoftheseattractivefeatures,however,(1)isutterlyimplausible.Regrettablybutundoubtedly,somecitizensinanygivenliberaldemocracyarecognitivelyineptandsoareunabletoacceptevenminimallycomplexarguments.Andsince(1)requiresapublicjustificationtoenjoytheactualimprimaturofallaffectedcitizens,thennominimallycomplicatedratio-nalewillcountasapublicjustification.Butthisisdisastrousforjustificatorylib-eralism.Forinthatcase,evenbasicliberalcommitmentswillnotbeamenableofpublicjustification:evensohighlyregardedaliberalcommitmentastherighttoreligiousfreedomwillrequireaslightlycomplexrationaleforitsjustification.(1)iseasilymodifiedtoavoidthisproblem.Allthejustificatoryliberalneedstodoistorestrictmembershipinthepublictocognitivelyadeptcitizens.Sosupposesheproposes:(2)rationaleRcountsasapublicjustificationforcoercivelawLonlyifeachcognitivelyadeptcitizenaffectedbyLacceptsRasasufficientbasisforL.(2),quitereasonably,doesnotrequireapublicjustificationtobeacceptedbychil-dren,theinsaneandothercognitivelyineptcitizens.Giventhisminormodifica-tion,does(2)constituteadefensibleconceptionofpublicjustification?No,(2)is311\nChristopherJ.Eberlestillfartoorestrictive.Giventhemillionsofcitizensinalarge-scaleliberaldemoc-racysuchastheUnitedStates,andgiventheirfreedomtodecideforthemselveswhattobelieveaboutthecoercivelawstowhichtheyaresubject,itbeggarscredulitytosupposethatweareabletoarticulatesomerationaleforcharacteris-ticliberalcommitments,suchastherighttoreligiousfreedom,thatwillbecon-vincingtoeachofourcognitivelyadeptcompatriots.Althoughanaturalcandidateforthejustificatoryliberal,(2)foundersontheundeniablerealitytherewillinevitablybesomecognitivelyadeptcitizenswhoobjecttoalmostanyrationaleforpoliticalcommitmentsofmoment.Aswithitspredecessor,(2)iseasilymodified.Considerthefollowingconception:(3)rationaleRcountsasapublicjustificationforcoercivelawLonlyifeachcognitivelyadeptcitizenaffectedbyLcanacceptRasasufficientbasisforL.(3)weakens(2)ratherdramatically:(3)requiresonlythepossibilitythatRisacceptedbythemembersofthepublicratherthan,aswith(2),thatRisactuallyacceptedbythemembersofthepublic.ButinwhatsensemustitbepossibleforthemembersofthepublictoacceptR?Surelynotinthesenseoflogicalpossi-bility:werewetointerpretthemodalterm“can”in(3)asrequiringonlylogicalpossibility,(3)wouldnotgettherightresultregardingreligiousconvictions,sinceitislogicallypossibleforeventhemosthard-bittenatheisttoassent,forexample,toMcCartney’srationaleforAmendment2.Aretheremorepromisingcandidates?Undoubtedly.Withoutcyclingthroughatiresomemenuofoptions,considerthefollowing:Acitizencanacceptsomerationaleintherelevantsenseonlyifacceptingthatrationalewouldnotrequireherdrasticallytoalterherfundamentalconvictions.Thus,BillMcCartney’sratio-naleforAmendment2isnotacceptableintherelevantsensejustbecause,ifhisatheisticcompatriotsweretoaccepthisclaimthathomosexualityisanabomina-tiontoGod,theywouldhavetoconverttotheismandsowouldberationallycompelledtoaltertheirmetaphysicalcommitments,presumably,inquiteathor-oughgoingmanner.Sofaras(3)goes,McCartney’satheisticcompatriotscannotaccepthisrationaleforAmendment2.Eventhough(3)weakens(2)considerably,itisstilltoodemanding.Howso?SomecitizensintheUnitedStatesnotonlyrejecttheliberalcommitmenttoreli-giousfreedom,buttheyfindthatcommitmentsoalienthatitsacceptancewouldobligethemtoaltertheircorecommitmentsinfundamentalrespects.Thus,forexample,somecitizensintheUnitedStatesareChristianReconstructionistsandsobelievethattheUnitedStatesoughttobegovernedbythelawsencodedintheOldTestament.AndgiventheircommitmenttotheabidingauthorityofOldTestamentlaw,ChristianReconstructionistsadvocatethatwerevokethecivilrightsofnon-Christians,thatwestoneadulterers,etc.Surely,acceptanceoftheliberalcommitmenttoreligiousfreedomwouldrequirearatherthoroughrework-ingoftheChristianReconstructionist’screed.Butinthatcase,thereisnoprospect312\nReligionandLiberalDemocracythatweareinanypositiontoarticulatearationalefortherighttoreligiousfreedomthatsatisfies(3).Consequently,(3)istoostrongforthejustificatoryliberal’spurposes.ThehighlypluralisticnatureofamodernliberaldemocracysuchastheUnitedStates–whichmakeslikelytheexistenceoffringegroupslikeChris-tianReconstructionism–renders(3)utterlyutopianundercurrentandforesee-ableconditions.Atthispoint,justificatoryliberalshavebeeninclinedtomakethesamebasicmovewithChristianReconstructionistsastheymakewithregardtothecogni-tivelyinept:thatweadoptconstraintsonmembershipinthepublicthatobviatethenecessityofarticulatingarationalethatis,orcanbe,convincingtosuch“fanat-ics.”Perhapsthemostpopularproposalofthissort,associatedwithJohnRawls,hasbeentorestrictmembershipinthepublictoreasonablecitizens.Thus,wemightmodify(3)asfollows:(4)rationaleRcountsasapublicjustificationforcoercivelawLonlyifeachcognitivelyadeptandreasonablecitizenaffectedbyLcanacceptRasasuffi-cientbasisforL.Whatmakesforareasonablecitizen?ForRawls,the“reasonable”isamoral,ratherthananepistemicconcept:themarkofreasonablenessisawillingnesstoseek,proposeandobeyfairprinciplesofsocialcooperation.“Reasonablepersons...desireforitsownsakeasocialworldinwhichthey,asfreeandequal,cancoop-11eratewithothersontermsallcanaccept.”Thephrase“ontermsallcanaccept”iscrucial:theonlycitizenstowhomaprospectivepublicjustificationmustbeacceptablearethosecommittedtotheprojectofproposingandobeyingcoercivelawsacceptabletoall.ItseemsobviousthatChristianReconstructionistsareunreasonableintheirinsistencethattheUnitedStatesoughttobegovernedbyOldTestamentlaw:theycanexpectlittleelsebutthatnon-Christiancitizenswillfindtheirtheocraticprojectshockinglyrepugnant.Giventhattheyareunreasonable,(4)permitsustoignoretheirprotestationsindeterminingwhetherweenjoyapublicjustificationfortherighttoreligiousfreedom.Havewearrivedatadefensibleconceptionofpublicjustification?No:therestrictiontoreasonablecitizensistooweaktoexcludeChristianReconstruc-tionistsfrommembershipinthepublic,inwhichcase(4)isstilltoodemanding.Brieflyput,theChristianReconstructionist’srepudiationofreligiousfreedomneedhavenothingtodowithanunwillingnesstoseek,proposeandobeysocialtermsthatallcanacceptandhaveeverythingtodowithadherencetoordinaryempiricalclaimsabouttheconsequencesofreligiousfreedom.Thus,forexample,supposetheChristianReconstructionistassentstothevenerableclaimthatsocialorderdependsonagreementregardingfundamentals,andinparticular,onagree-mentregardingreligiousmatters.Accordingtothisstapleofpre-modernpoli-ticalwisdom,inordertoavoidsocialanarchy,citizensmustagreeonreligiousmatters,andinordertoapproximatereligiousuniformity,thestatemustemploy313\nChristopherJ.Eberleitscoerciveforcetocompelreligiousuniformity.Nowimaginethejustificatoryliberalproposingthatthestateaccordeachcitizenarighttoreligiousfreedom:whatshepurportstoproposeasapolicyallcanaccept,theChristianRecon-structionistregardsasarecipeforsocialdisaster!Prettyclearly,theliberal’sadvo-cacyofreligiousfreedomisjustasobjectionabletotheChristianReconstructionistastheChristianReconstructionist’sdenialofreligiousfreedomistotheliberal.AndtheChristianReconstructionist’srejectionofreligiousfreedomneedhavenothingtodowithherunwillingnesstoseek,proposeandacceptfairterms;rather,itwilldependonher,quiteunderstandable,rejectionofanyproposalthatensuesinsocialchaos.ThedisagreementbetweentheliberalandtheChristianRe-constructionistresultsnotfromadeficitofreasonablenessonthelatter’spartbutfromadisagreementaboutfact:aboutthelikelyconsequencesofreligiousfreedom.ButsinceChristianReconstructionistsneednotbeunreasonable,theexclusionarymoveembodiedin(4)willdonothingtoobviatetheproblemChris-tianReconstructionistsposefor(4):therewillremainreasonablecitizensforwhomanyrationaleforreligiousfreedomissimplyunacceptable,inwhichcasewewillbestymiedinourattempttoarticulatearationaleforreligiousfreedomthatsat-isfies(4).Hereagain,thejustificatoryliberalisnotwithoutoptions.Theobviousdiffi-cultyofarticulatingasatisfactorypopulistconceptionofpublicjustificationunderconditionsofmanifoldpluralismmotivatesmanyjustificatoryliberalstoarticulateanepistemicconceptionofpublicjustification.Incontrasttopopulistconceptions,whichrequirethatarationalebeactuallyacceptableinsomerobustsensetothemembersofthepublic,epistemicconceptionsrequirethatarationaleenjoysomeepistemicpropertyinvirtueofwhichthatrationalemeritsacceptanceinspiteofthefactthatmembersofthepublicrejectthatrationale.Therearemanyepistemicconceptionsonoffer;infactevenacursoryfamiliaritywiththeliteratureontheproperroleofreligiousconvictionsinpoliticswillacquaintthereaderwithahealthydoseofreferencesto“criticalrationality,”“intelligibility,”“commonhumanreason,”“criticizability,”“accessibility,”“replicability,”andthelike.I’lldiscussonlyoneepistemicconception.Considerthat,althoughChristianReconstructionistsneedbeneithercogni-tivelyineptnorunreasonable,theyaremostcertainlymisinformed.Howso?Thelastseveralcenturieshaveprovidedampleempiricalrefutationofthepre-moderncommonplaceundergirdingtheChristianReconstructionist’srejectionofreligiousfreedom:itjustisn’ttruethatsocialorderdependsonagreementonfundamen-tals,whetherreligiousornot.TheChristianReconstructionistmightbelieveoth-erwise,butshe’sjustwrongaboutthat.EveniftheChristianReconstructionistisrationallyjustifiedinbelievingthatsocialorderrequiresagreementonfundamentals,thejustificatoryliberalproposesthatwetakeintoconsiderationthefactthatthatclaimisfalseindeterminingwhethertherighttoreligiousfreedomisamenableofpublicjustification.Afterall,itseemsundulyconstrainingtosupposethat,inorderforsomerationaletocountasapublicjustification,thatrationalemustbeconvincingtothemembers314\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyofthepublic,irrespectiveofhowignorantorbenightedtheyare.Surely,asuccessfulpublicjustificationneedbeconvincingonlytoadequatelyinformedcitizens.Thus,somejustificatoryliberalshaveendorsed:(5)rationaleRcountsasapublicjustificationforcoercivelawLonlyifeachcognitivelyadept,reasonableandadequatelyinformedcitizenaffectedbyLcanacceptRasasufficientbasisforL.(5)isafflictedwithanumberofveryseriousproblems.Iwillfocusontwo.First,considerMcCartney’srationaleforAmendment2.McCartney’srationaleforAmendment2assumesthatGodhasauthoredtheBible,suchthattheBibleisarepositoryofreliableinformationabout,amongotherthings,God’sexpresscon-victionsaboutallmannerofmoralclaims.(McCartney’sclaimthathomosexual-ityisan“abominationofalmightyGod”isanallusiontoLeviticus18:22,viz.,“Youshallnotliewithamaleasonelieswithafemale;itisanabomination.”)SinceMcCartneybelievesthattheBibleisareliablesourceofinformationaboutGod’smoralconvictions,itisentirelynaturalforhimtoconcludethatanade-quatelyinformedcitizenwillbeawareofthatfact.Afterall,howcouldMcCart-ney’scompatriotsbeadequatelyinformedabouthomosexualityiftheyareignorantofoneofthemostimportantfactsabouthomosexuality,viz.,thatanomniscientmoralauthorityhasexpresslycondemnedhomosexualrelations?McCartneywill,nodoubt,claimthatnon-believersthinkotherwisebecausetheyareinadequatelyinformed:tobeunawareofanomniscientbeing’sexpressmoraljudgmentsistobedesperatelyignorant.Itseems,then,that(5)istooweaktogetthedesiredresultsregardingreligiousconvictions:evenifMcCartneyaccepts(5),hehasnoreasontowithholdsupportfromAmendment2solelyonthebasisofhisreligiousrationaleforAmendment2.Ofcourse,thejustificatoryliberalisfreetoproposeconstraintsonwhatcountsasadequateinformationsoastodisallowMcCartneyfromconcludingthatade-quatelyinformedcitizenswouldbeawarethathistheologicalcommitmentsaretrue.Butitisentirelyunclearonwhatprincipledbasisthejustificatoryliberalcanprovideforsucharestrictionand,ofcourse,providingsomesuchprincipledbasisisessentialtothejustificatoryliberal’scase.Moreover,Iamunawareofanyextantattempttodoso.Second,(5)seemsdisjointwiththejustificatoryliberal’srationaleforthedoc-trineofrestraint.Considertheargumentfromrespect(althoughthesamepointholdsforboththeargumentfromreligiouswarfareandtheargumentfromdivi-siveness).AsIhavenoted,theargumentfromrespectarticulatesmostnaturallywithapopulistconceptionofpublicjustification:sinceeachcitizenhasanoblig-ationtorespecthercompatriotsastheyare,ratherthanasshewishesthemtobeorastheyoughttobe,andifrespectrequiressomethingbywayofpublicjusti-fication,thenitseemsmostnaturalforthejustificatoryliberaltoclaimthatacitizenoughttoprovidearationaleforherfavoredcoercivelawsthatisaccept-abletohercompatriotsmoreorlessastheyare.Bycontrast,itstrikesmeasutterly315\nChristopherJ.Eberleunnaturalforthejustificatoryliberaltoclaimthatrespectrequiresacitizentoarticulateapublicjustificationthatsatisfies(5).Infact,itseemsutterlymystify-ingwhyacitizenwhoobeys(5)exhibitsrespectforhercompatriots.Afterall,acitizen’srationaleforsomecoercivelawcansatisfy(5)eventhoughitisthor-oughlyrepugnanttotheactualcitizenssubjecttothatlaw.Thattheircounter-factualcounterpartsinsome–perhapsverydistant–possibleworldwouldfindagivenrationaleacceptableiscoldcomforttotheflesh-and-bloodcitizenswhoarenotsofavorablycircumstancedwithrespecttothatrationaleandthuswhofindthatcoercivelawhighlyobjectionable.Thedemiseof(5)bynomeansclosesthebooksonthejustificatoryliberal’ssearchforadefensibleconceptionofpublicjustification.Moregenerally,thisshortdiscussionbynomeansestablishesthatjustificatoryliberalsareunabletoarticu-lateadefensibleconceptionofpublicjustification.Butitdoesillustrateaseriousproblemforthejustificatoryliberal,viz.,toarticulateaconceptionofpublicjus-tificationthatisstrongenoughtomandaterestraintregardingreligiousconvic-tions,butweakenoughtoenablecitizenstoarticulateapublicjustificationforcharacteristicliberalcommitments.Myjudgmentisthatjustificatoryliberalshavenotsuccessfullyperformedthisbalancingact,althoughnoneofthesegeneralcom-mentsestablishthatconclusion.Inordertodothat,wewouldneedtoengagein12adetailedanalysisofthemanyproposedepistemicconceptions.Butatleastwecanspywherethetroublelies.ConclusionAccordingtosomeliberaltheorists,religionshouldbeexcludedinitsentiretyfromliberalpolitics.Thus,forexample,RichardRortyadvocatesathoroughgo-ingprivatizationofreligion:“contemporaryliberalphilosophersthinkthatweshallnotbeabletokeepademocraticpoliticalcommunitygoingunlessthereligious13believersremainwillingtotradeprivatizationforaguaranteeofreligiousliberty.”Rorty’sconcernfortheveryexistenceofliberaldemocracymotivateshissugges-tionthatweaspiretomake“itseembadtastetobringreligionintodiscussions14ofpublicpolicy.”Butthismuch-discussedandoft-criticizedpolicyofprivatiz-ingreligionisextremeandextremelyimplausible.Therearemoreplausiblepositionsinthegeneralarea.Justificatoryliberalshaveadvocatedamuchmoreplausibleposition:ratherthanexcludingreligionentirelyfromliberalpolitics,religiouscitizensarefreetosupporttheirfavoredcoercivelawsonreligiousgroundssolongastheycomplementtheirreligiousgroundswithapublicjustification.Buteventhisconciliatorypositionfacesquiteformidableobstacles.Ihaveidentifiedtwo.First,itisnotclearthatacitizenoughttorefrainfromsupportingcoercivelawsabsentapublicjustification.Tobesure,eachcitizenshouldpursuepublicjustifi-cationforherfavoredcoercivelaws–respectforhercompatriotsaspersons316\nReligionandLiberalDemocracyrequiresatleastthat.Butitisnotclearthat,ifacitizenpursuespublicjustifica-tionforagivencoercivelawandfailsinthatattempt,sheshouldalsowithholdhersupportfromthatlaw–particularlyifsheisrationallyjustifiedinbelievingthatthatlawismorallyappropriate.SofarasIcantell,nojustificatoryliberalhasshownthatsheshouldexerciserestraintunderthoseconditions.Second,evenifacitizenoughttorefrainfromsupportingcoercivelawsabsentapublicjustification,justificatoryliberalshaveprovidednocompellingreasontoconcludethatacitizenwhoenjoysareligiousrationaletherebylacksapublicjus-tification.Indeed,theclaimthatacitizenshouldexerciserestraintregardingherreligiousconvictionssmacksofarbitrariness:thejustificatoryliberaladvocatesrestraintregardingreligiousconvictionswhilsthelpingherselftoconsiderationsthatarenolesscontroversialandnomoreepistemicallyrespectablethanarereli-giousgrounds.Thisarbitrarinesscaststhedoctrineofrestraintevenfurtherintodoubt.Itseemsthateventheconciliatoryapproachdefendedbyjustificatoryliberalsistoostrong.Anevenweakerpositionseemsappropriate:thatacitizenshouldattempttoarticulateawidelyconvincingrationaleforherfavoredcoercivelaws,butneednotwithholdhersupportfromcoercivelawsforwhichshelacksawidelyconvincingrationale.SoreligiouscitizensshouldbewillingtoattempttomeettheircompatriotsonwhatLarmorecallscommongroundandthereforeshouldbewillingtodowhattheycantoarticulatereasonsfortheirfavoredcoercivelawsthatdonotdependessentiallyontheirreligiousconvictions.Respectforpersonscounselseachcitizentorefrainfromanintransigentparochialism;religiousciti-zensshouldn’tconducttheirpoliticaldeliberationsentirelywithintheambitoftheirtheologicalcommitments.Butacitizenwhosereligiousconvictionscounselhertosupportsomecoercivelaw,andwhocannotprovidearationaleforthatlawthathercompatriotsfindconvincing,isnottherebymorallycriticizableforper-sistinginhersupportforthatlaw.Infact,herwillingnesstopersistmightverywellbemorallyadmirablesuchthatweshouldcommendherfordoingso.Notes1Forsimplicity’ssake,Iunderstandareligiousgroundtobeareasonthathastheisticcontent,e.g.,theclaimthattheBibleisinspiredbyGod,thatsomereligiousauthor-ityhasbeenappointedtospeakforGod,andthelike.2IhavetakenthistermfromGeraldGaus,whocoineditinhisJustificatoryLiberalism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),althoughmyuseofthetermisquiteabitbroaderthanGaus’s.3Sometheorists,e.g.,JohnRawlsandCharlesLarmore,focustheirattentionevenmorenarrowly–toconstitutionalmattersandmattersofbasicjustice.ButasIseethematter,nothingessentialhangsonthatdifference.4CharlesLarmore,“PoliticalLiberalism,”inTheMoralsofModernity(Cambridge:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress,1996),p.137.5Ibid.,pp.134–5.317\nChristopherJ.Eberle6Formoreonthisdistinction,seeChristopherJ.Eberle,“WhyRestraintisReligiouslyUnacceptable,”ReligiousStudies,35/3(September1999):247–76.7JohnLocke,ALetterConcerningToleration,ed.JamesTully(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett,1983),p.55.8Ibid.,p.33.9Ibid.,p.55.10JohnNoonan,TheLustreofOurCountry:TheAmericanExperienceofReligiousFreedom(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1998),p.2.11JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),p.50.12Ihaveevaluatedalargenumberofepistemicconceptionsin“LiberalismandMysti-cism,”JournalofLawandReligion,13/1(1996–98):189–238.13RichardRorty,“ReligionasaConversation-Stopper,”CommonKnowledge,3/1(1994):3.14Ibid.,p.2.BibliographyAudi,Robert(2000).ReligiousCommitmentandSecularReason.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.——andNicholasWolterstorff(1997).ReligioninthePublicSquare:ThePlaceofReligiousConvictionsinPoliticalDebate.Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield.Carter,Stephen(1993).TheCultureofDisbelief.NewYork:BasicBooks.Greenawalt,Kent(1988).ReligiousConvictionsandPoliticalChoice.Oxford:OxfordUni-versityPress.——(1995).PrivateConsciencesandPublicReasons.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Perry,Michael(1991).LoveandPower:TheRoleofReligionandMoralityinAmericanPol-itics.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——(1997).ReligioninPolitics:ConstitutionalandMoralPerspectives.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Rawls,John(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Weithman,Paul(ed.)(1997).ReligionandContemporaryLiberalism.NotreDame,IN:UniversityofNotreDamePress.318\nSelectBibliographyTheselectbibliographyincludesrecentandcontemporarytitlesthatmaybeofspecialinter-esttoreadersofthiscollection.Thisbibliographymakesnoclaimtobeexhaustive.However,intheeditor’sjudgmentthetitlesselectednotonlyprovidebackgroundordevel-opmentofthemes,positions,orargumentsthathavebeenespeciallyinfluentialtothedevel-opmentofrecentsocialandpoliticalphilosophybutalsoarerelevanttotheargumentofmorethanoneoftheessaysinthecollection.Whilemostoftheentrieslistedalsoappearinthebibliographiesfollowingeachessay,severaldonot.Theseadditionalentriesprovidecomprehensivetreatmentsoftopicsrelevanttothematerialcoveredinthisvolumeintheirownright.Theselectbibliographydoesnotincludebooksandarticlesbythecontributorstothisvolumesincetheircurrentviewsaredevelopedintheiressays.However,relevantbooksandarticlesbythecontributorstothisBlackwellGuidearelistedinthebibliogra-phiesfollowingeachchapter.IGeneralSurveysandAnalysesBowie,NormanE.andSimon,RobertL.(1998).TheIndividualandthePoliticalOrder.Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield.Hampton,Jean(1997).PoliticalPhilosophy.Boulder:Westview.Kymlicka,W.(1990).ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy:AnIntroduction.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.IISpecializedStudiesofSelectedTopicsAppiah,K.A.andAmyGutmann(1996).ColorConscious:ThePoliticalMoralityofRace.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Audi,Robert(2000).ReligiousCommitmentandSecularReason.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.319\nSelectBibliographyBarry,Brian(1995).JusticeasImpartiality.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.——(2001).CultureandEquality.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Buchanan,A.(1982)MarxismandJustice:TheRadicalCritiqueofLiberalism.Totowa,NJ:RowmanandLittlefield.Cohen,G.A.(1978).KarlMarx’sTheoryofHistory:ADefense.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Dworkin,Ronald(1977).TakingRightsSeriously.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Feinberg,Joel(1984).HarmtoOthers.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Gauthier,David(1986).MoralsByAgreement.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Gutmann,AmyandDennisThompson(1996).DemocracyandDisagreement.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Hart,H.L.A.(1963).Law,Liberty,andMorality.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.Jaggar,Alison(1983).FeministPoliticsandHumanNature.Totowa,NJ:RowmanandLittlefield.Kittay,EvaFeder(1999).Love’sLabor:EssaysonWomen,Equality,andDependency.NewYork:Routledge.Kymlicka,Will(1995).MulticulturalCitizenship.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Nozick,Robert(1974).Anarchy,State,andUtopia.NewYork:BasicBooks.Nussbaum,MarthaC.(1999).SexandSocialJustice.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Okin,SusanMoller(1989).Justice,Gender,andtheFamily.NewYork:BasicBooks.Outlaw,L.T.(1996).OnRaceandPhilosophy.NewYork:Routledge.Pateman,C.(1979).TheProblemofPoliticalObligation.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Rawls,J.(1971).ATheoryofJustice.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.——(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Raz,J.(1986).TheMoralityofFreedom.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.——(ed.).(1990).Authority.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.Sandel,Michael(1982).LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Scanlon,T.M.(1998).WhatWeOweToEachOther.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Walzer,Michael(1983).SpheresofJustice.NewYork:BasicBooks.Young,IrisMarion(1990).JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.320\nIndexPagenumbersinboldtypeindicateamainordetailedreference.abortion,38,41,42,44–5,297,301associativeaccounts,24,27,28,29,30,Ackerman,Bruce,230,236n.1531–2,35actualconsenttheories,33–4,35naturaldutyaccounts,27,28,30–1,35adaptivepreferences,114,122–3pluralistview,35,36adversarydemocracy,171Socratesand,23–7,28AfricanAmericans,285transactionalaccounts,24,27,33–5alienation,137–40seealsolegitimacyAllen,Amy,170autonomy,157,197–8,203–4,207,247Allen,Anita,159Avineri,S.,151n.3altruism,179–82,193nn.12–14Ayer,A.J.,243America,seeUnitedStatesanarchism,20,35–6,72Bacon,SirFrancis,273Anderson,Elizabeth,7,72,74–5,78,82,Bader,Veit,241104n.16,118–19Baier,Annette,158,161Anscombe,E.,25Baier,Kurt,110,192n.5Anti-Federalists,223,224,227,232Bailey,J.W.,202Arendt,Hannah,254Baldwin,James,286Aristotle,138,277–8,279Barry,Brian,156Arneson,RichardJ.,7,136,137Bartlett,KatherineT.,163Arrow’sImpossibilityTheorem,109–10,Bauböck,Rainer,245,249112,122,123n.8Benhabib,Seyla,155,168,215,216n.14associativeaccountsofpoliticalobligation,Benjamin,Martin,25924,27,28,29,30,31–2,35Bentham,Jeremy,61,146,202associativism,76–7,78Beran,H.,33Athens,222,223,227,231,234,235Bergland,Bob,188Socratesand,23–7,28Berlin,Isaiah,215n.1Audi,Robert,293Best,George,278–9authority,2,5–6,17,18–22,85,202biologicalclassification,279–80anarchistview,20,35–6Blattberg,Charles,261321\nIndexBohman,James,267n.7communitarianism,4–5,9–10,189,190,bourgeoisie,131,132,133,140–2,143,192148complexequality,73–4,82Brenkert,G.,151n.4Condorcetparadox,109Brudney,D.,152n.7Connolly,W.,23bruteluck,96,97–8consensusconferences,231,236–7n.18Buchanan,Allen,79,152n.6consenttheories,27,33–4Buchanan,James,201consequentialism,25–6,60,197,308,309Callahan,Joan,159constitutionalmoments,230,236n.15capability,93–4Cook,Curtis,242capitalism,131–40,169,186Cornell,Drucilla,163,168stateand,140–5corporatepower,170Card,Claudia,165Crenshaw,Kimberle,162careethics,9,165–8,170Cudd,AnnE.,8,124n.16careersopentotalentsprinciple,87–9,90Cunningham,Frank,171Carens,JosephH.,245,247,252Cuomo,Mario,54Chambers,Simone,267n.7China,188D’Agostino,Fred,243ChristianReconstructionists,312–14Dahl,RobertA.,123n.6Christianity,191,273Darwall,Stephen,192n.2citizensjuries,231,236n.18deliberativedemocracy,11–12,120–1,citizenship,87,123n.6,162,208,213,221,230–5,253235–6n.5,239–40,243–5American,222–30deliberationand,143,239,243,Athenian,222,223,227,231,234,257–62235groupidentityand,12,201,246–53pluralismand,257–62nationalidentityand,241–2,253,DeliberativePolling,231–3262–6,267n.13democracy,3,104n.16,106–8,124–5practicesof,239,244,245,253–7n.19,143,144,145rightsand,12,87,239,244,245,citizenshipand,87,244,245,261,246–53262–3civilsociety,11,254–7,262commoninterestand,117–21Clarke,Lorenne,154factions,121–3Clement,Grace,157,166,167feministview,114–15,120–1,171–2Cochran,David,285preferences,8,106,108,113–17,121,coercion,41–3,172122onreligiousgroundsseejustificatoryreligionand,114–15,124–5n.19,266liberalism;publicjustificationn.6,316cognitivetheoryofdemocracy,119–20structuralproblems,108–12Cohen,G.A.,72,135seealsodeliberativedemocracy;liberalismCohen,Joshua,120,255,256Descartes,René,273CollectiveBenefitsPrinciple,43,48deservingness,102,104n.19collectiveharm,47–8destructiveness,argumentfrom,24–7Collins,PatriciaHill,155Devlin,LordPatrick,47,48,54–5colonialism,241–2DiStefano,Christine,169,170commoninterest,117–21dictatorship,109–10,123n.9322\nIndexdifferenceprinciple,65,66,67–8,104euthanasia,39,46,47,52n.17,198,199,214exploitationoflabor,134–40,151n.2dispositionalconsenttheories,33divisiveness,argumentfrom,307–10factions,121–2,123Downs,Anthony,229FairEqualityofOpportunityPrinciple,druguse,39,42,44,4665–6,67,68,214Dworkin,Ronald,31,67,246,285fairnessreciprocationtheories,34–5onequality,72,73,95–8“FederalFarmer,”224onneutrality,95,189–90,208,216federalism,251,266n.3n.12Federalists,223,224,227–8Feinberg,Joel,43Eberle,ChristopherJ.,12–13feminism,5,9,121,154,201,215,216economicequality,91–3n.14Edmundson,W.A.,19,23,27,35careethics,165–8education,40,42–3,56,133,211,251liberalismand,4,5,154–8,160–5,equalityand,89170nationalidentityand,262–3,264,265politicalchangeand,171–2egalitarianism,72–5postmodernismand,168–9raceand,282–7powerand,169–70seealsoequality;Rawls,Johnpreferencesand,114–15egoism,179–82,192n.5,193nn.12–14public/privatedistinctionand,2,158–9Elshtain,JeanBethke,158rightsand,160–5Elster,Jon,53,114,120–1,260Ferguson,Ann,156EncyclopediaBritannica,276filterprocess,221,223,225,229,232Engels,F.,142Fishkin,JamesS.,11–12Enlightenment,272,273,274–6,280,foodresources,188–9283,284formalequalityofopportunity(FEO),equality,2–3,10,137,14087–9,90complex,73–4France,160,251ofcondition,90–102,104n.19Frank,RobertA.,158economic,91–3Franklin,A.Todd,12educationand,87,107Fraser,Nancy,155offunctioningcapabilities,93–4Frazer,Elizabeth,155,164liberalismand,4,197,256,257freedomseelibertymoralityand,102,103–4,280–1French,Marilyn,161ofopportunity,65–6,67,68,87–90,Friedman,Marilyn,166285–6functioningcapabilities,93–4political,87,107,221,222,225–30,231Gans,C.,35relationaltheory,74–5,78–9,82Gaus,Gerald,293,317n.2ofresources,7,72–3,93–4,95–8Gauthier,David,77,123n.3ofrespect,149–50GeneralManipulabilityTheorem,111–12ofrights,7,65,85–6George,Robert,54socialist,186–9,194–5n.28Gewirth,Alan,192n.5ofwelfare,7,72,73,95–6,97,99–100Gibbard,Allan,111–12forwomen,9,154–5,172Gilligan,Carol,161,165Estlund,David,117–18,120Goldberg,David,281323\nIndexgood,the,11,177,216n.13,250,275–6Hoagland,SarahLucia,155equalityand,178,186–9Hobbes,Thomas,77,156,240,242moralconceptionof,177,178–82Holmstrom,N.,136,152n.6neutralityand,4,10,95,189–90,213,homosexuality,40,42,47–8,54,55243McCartneyand,292–3,302,315partialconceptionof,10,178,189–92,Horton,J.,32195nn.35–6Hume,David,22,34,281rightsand,4–5,177–8,183–6,187–8Hurka,Thomas,248stateand,4–5,207,211,214,216n.16Hurley,Susan,119–20,123n.8Goodin,RobertE.,62hypotheticalconsenttheories,33GothaProgram,134,137,146Gould,CarolC.,160,171identity,31,32,244grapheparanomon,222group,248–9,251–2,288gratitudereciprocationtheories,34,35national,250–1,263–6Gray,John,243immigration,241,242,265GreatestEqualLibertyPrinciple,65,67,impartialityseeneutrality68ImpossibilityTheorem,109–10,112,Greeks,222,253,277,278,289n.7122,123n.8Green,T.H.,22individualism,154–8,170Greenawalt,K.,19internationalaffairs,168,170grouprights,79–80,246,247–8,Isin,Engin,242249–53,256,287–8Kymlickaon,246–7,248,249,252Jaggar,Alison,154,156Youngon,80–1,248,249,287,288JohnstonConover,Pamela,245Gutmann,Amy,293Jones,KathleenB.,172Josephus,Flavius,278Habermas,Jürgen,255,267n.7justice,2–3,97,101–2,104n.16,152habituatedpreferences,114–15,122n.8,216n.13Hampton,Jean,123n.10,157associativistviews,76–7,78–9Hannaford,Ivan,279egalitarianviews,72–5,78–9,81,82,hardpaternalism,50,5194Hardin,G.,202feministview,5,9,154–5,159,164,Hardin,Russell,64,202167Hare,R.M.,64liberalview,4,140,143,155,214,HarmPrinciple,2,6,43,44–8,53,55,275–6,28358libertarianviews,4,69–72,75,76,81Harrington,Mona,167minoritygroupsand,79–81,82Hart,H.L.A.,22,34asmutualadvantage,76,77–8Hartsock,Nancy,169raceand,272,283,286–9Haslett,D.W.,56Rawls’stheoryof,3–4,7,64–9,75–6,Hayek,Friedrich,201,202104n.17,198–201,205,207–8,215Hebrews,278n.3,257–8,282–3Held,Virginia,9,154,155,156,157,utilitariantheories,7,60–4,75,76,81159,172JusticePrinciple,43,56–7oncareethics,9,165,167justificatoryliberalism,293–6seealsoonrights,9,160,164publicjustification324\nIndexKagan,Shelly,104n.19preferencesand,122–3Kant,Immanuel,27,275–6,280,281,raceand,272,276–89282,284,289n.4,n.6Razon,203–4Kekes,John,197–8,203,204religionand,12–13,191,292–3Keller,Jean,156rightsand,160–5,170,177–8,183–6,Kennedy,Rosanne,163200,201,202–3Kittay,EvaFeder,115,156,161–2,167utilitarianismand,3,202–3Klosko,G.,33,35seealsojustificatoryliberalism;politicalKuttner,Robert,170liberalismKymlicka,Will,79,195n.36,243,246–7,libertarianism,86,139,199,210248,249,252,255justiceand,4,69–72,75,76,81liberalismand,178,183–6,190,193–4Lacey,Nicola,155,164n.18,195n.33,204Ladenson,R.,19Nozickon,69,70,104n.2,200–1,Landes,JoanB.,158,172203Lange,Lynda,154liberty,2,6,21,38–43,198–9,201,215Larmore,Charles,205,209,210,293,n.1317n.3CollectiveBenefitsPrinciple,43,48argumentfromrespect,298–303HarmPrinciple,2,6,43,44–8,53,55,onneutrality,207,208,211,21358LegalMoralism,43,44,53–5JusticePrinciple,43,56–7LegalPaternalism,43–4,50–3LegalMoralism,43,44,53–5legitimacy,2,4,6,17–19,23,38,230LegalPaternalism,43–4,50–3anarchistview,20,35–6,72NeedPrinciple,43,57–8liberalview,689,144,190–1,195OffensePrinciple,43,48–50n.37,212,216n.16povertyand,183–6,194n.19post-Marxistview,143,144–5Lindau,Juan,D.,242seealsoauthorityLinnaeus,Carolus,279–80Levy,Jacob,247,252Littleton,Christine,163liberalism,3,10–11,197–8,204Lloyd,Genevieve,166civilsocietyand,11,254–7Locke,John,27,33,34,69,275,280,communitarianismand,4–5,177,281,282,305189–90onrights,85–6equalityand,178,186–9luckegalitarianism,72–3,74feminismand,4,5,154–8,160–5,170historyof,273–82McCartney,Bill,292–3,294,301,302,justiceand,4,140,143,155,214,307,312,315275–6,283Macedo,Stephen,255libertarianismand,178,183–6,190,MacIntyre,Alasdair,177,190,193n.10193–4n.18,195n.33,204Mackenzie,Catriona,156,157,166Marxismand,3,8–9,140MacKinnon,CatharineA.,159,162,163moralityand,177,178–82,184,Madison,James,121,122,222,223,224,189–92,193n.13,195nn.35–7225,226,229,233,234nationalismand,262–6manipulabilityofvoting,111–12,124pluralismand,4,5,12,240–1,242,n.13258Mansbridge,Jane,171325\nIndexMargalit,Avishai,246rightsand,86,160,183–5Marshall,T.H.,239,244mutual-advantagetheory,77–8Marx,Karl,8,131–3,151n.1onexploitation,134–40Nagel,Thomas,201,206,207,216n.13onmorality,8–9,145–50,151–2Napoleon,230nn.4–8Narayan,Uma,154,162,164onstate,140–5,148,151n.3nationalism,251,263–6onutilitarianism,146–7,148,149,152naturaldutyaccountsofpoliticaln.5obligation,27,28,30–1,35Marxism,4,8,156,157,204necessity,argumentsfrom,25maximinstrategy,68,102,104n.17NeedPrinciple,43,57–8meddlingpreferences,116negativerights,4,71,177–8,186Mendus,Susan,167,172Nelson,William,10–11Meyers,DianaTietjens,166Neurgebauer,Christian,282Mill,HarrietTaylor,160neutrality,4,10,11,206,210–15,243,Mill,JohnStuart,22,61,64,115,122,216n.12202,233,240–1,242,246Dworkinon,95,189–90,208,216onHarmPrinciple,2,6,44,45–6,47,n.1248,58Larmoreon,207,208,211,213onliberty,38,49,50–1,57,215n.1Rawlson,207–8,213,214onwomen’srights,114,160Newton,SirIsaac,274Miller,David,76,249,250,253,263,Nicholson,Linda,168264,265,267n.11,n.13Nietzsche,Friedrich,277Miller,RichardW.,8–9,10,138,152n.6Noddings,Nel,161,165Mills,C.W.,287non-tuism,107,123n.3minoritygroups,79–81,122,125n.29,nonvoluntaristcontracttheories,31–2143,201,246–53,287–8Noonan,John,305Minow,Martha,164,248Norman,Wayne,243,255mirrortheoryofrepresentation,224,231,normativeindependencetheories,31,32232Nozick,Robert,69,70,92,104n.2,mob,221,224–5200–1,203,213modernism,273–4Nussbaum,MarthaC.,104n.16,120,Moltchanova,Anna,250121,155Moore,S.,151n.3moralpaternalism,54obligation,5,6,17–18,19,20–2morality,155–6,157,158,161,190–1,anarchistview,20,35–6193n.13,203–4,280,296–7associativeaccounts,24,27,28,29,30,careethics,165–831–2,35ofcitizenship,245naturaldutyaccounts,27,28,30–1,35equalityand,102,103–4pluralistview,35–6liberalismand,177,178–82,189–92,Socratesand,23–7,28195n.37,205,208–10,216nn.9–transactionalaccounts,24,27,33–510OffensePrinciple,43,48–50,53Marxon,145–50,151n.4,152n.8Okin,SusanMoller,154,155,159obligationand,17–18,27–31Olsen,Frances,163preferencesand,116Olson,M.,152n.6religious,191,292–3,308,309opinionpolls,226,228,231326\nIndexoptionluck,96,97–8316–17Ordeshook,Peter,109argumentfromdivisiveness,307–10originalposition,66–8,78,199,201,argumentfromreligiouswarfare,304–7233,263,283argumentfromrespect,297–303,“ought”implies“can”principle,183–5,315–16186,187,193n.11,n.18natureof,310–16Outlaw,Lucius,284,287publicopinion,223,224–5,226,231–3,234–5,236n.7ParisCommune,141,148public/privatedistinction,2,158–9,248,participatorydemocracy,120–1256particularity,29Pateman,Carole,161race,12,88,103,272,282–6paternalism,43–4,50–3historicalviews,276–82perfectionism,11,211,247–8socialjusticeand,88,286–9Petchesky,Rosalind,P.,159rationalagencycapacity,103–4Phillips,Anne,171rationalignorance,110–11,229planningcells,231,237n.18Rawls,John,10–11,80,107,121,140,Plato143,192n.5,203caveallegory,271–2onauthority/obligation,22,27,33,Crito,5–6,21,23–7,33,3434–5pluralism,5,6,12,35–6,206,207,210differenceprinciple,65,66,67–8,116,citizenshipand,239–45,262–6198,199,214deliberationand,253–62onequality,89–90,283–4justiceand,7,73–4,82onthegood,10,177,190,207–8,243rightsand,246–53justificatoryliberalismand,293,313,politicalliberalism,11,121,68–9,204–8317n.3moraltruthand,208–10,216n.10originalposition,66–8,78,199,201,neutralityand,210–15,206,207–8,233,263,283216n.12onpluralism,207,258,260post-Marxismand,143–5politicalliberalismand,11,68–9,120,positiverights,71,177–8,183–6205–10,211,212,213,214–15,positivism,22216n.10,n.14post-Marxistsynthesis,143–5,147,151theoryofjustice,3–4,7,64–8,75–6,postmodernism,9,162,168–9,171104n.17,198–201,205,207–8,215power,169–70,172,190–1n.3,257–8,282–3preferences,8,106,108,109–10,111,veilofignorance,3,66–8,149,195112,226n.33,199,208,283commoninterestand,117–21Raz,Joseph,11,19,25,31,139,216reasonsforoverriding,113–17n.17priorityviewofwelfare,102onautonomy,203–4,207prisoner’sdilemma,111,123–4n.11ongroupmembership,246,248,249privacy,159Rawlsand,205,207,209,211,212,proletariat,131–3,148,151n.1213,215exploitationof,134–40,151n.2Réaume,Denise,252propertyrights,69–70,71,86,88–9,200,reciprocationtheories,27,33,34–5201,202–3referenda,226,227–30,231publicjustification,294,295,296–7,Reiman,J.,135,136327\nIndexrelationaltheoryofequality,74–5,78–9,Sartorius,R.E.,19,20282Scanlon,T.M.,194n.18,216n.9,religion,114–15,116,124–5n.19,191,n.13213–14,251,266n.6,273Scheffler,S.,200justificatoryliberalismand,293,294,Schelling,Thomas,53295,296Schiller,HerbertI.,168,170lawand,12–13,292–3seealsopublicSchmidtz,David,62justificationSchneider,ElizabethM.,162politicalliberalismand,204,205,206,Schwartz,Adina,207209,212science,274raceand,278–9Scott,James,255religiouswarfare,304–7self-defeatingpreferences,115–16representatives’role,234–5self-imposedpaternalism,53resources,188–9,194n.26Sen,Amartya,93,94,118equalityof,93–4,95–8Sepulveda,JuanGinesde,277–8respect,argumentfrom,297–303,sexism,103315–16sexualharassment,163responsibility,individual,97–8sexuality,159restraint,doctrineof,296,297,311,Shakespeare,William,87316–17Shanley,MaryLyndon,154,162argumentfromdivisiveness,307–10Sharpe,Andrew,242argumentfromreligiouswarfare,304–7Sher,George,207,211,212,213,214,argumentfromrespect,297–303,215,216n.14,n.16315–16Simmons,A.J.,31,35,36Rhode,DeborahL.,155,160Singer,Peter,62RhodeIslandreferendum,227–8slavery,282rights,4,69–70,71,88–9,122–3,239,Smart,Carol,162293Smart,J.J.C.,63ofcitizenship,244,245Smith,Adam,132feministview,9,155,160–5Smith,Patricia,162,163–4liberalismand,177–8,183–6,200,Smith,Rogers,235–6n.5201,202–3socialcohesion,54–5Lockean,85–6,92,200socialcontracttheory,21–2,38Marxon,146socialism,10,186–9,194–5n.28minoritygroups,79–81,246–53,256,socialization,55287–8Socrates,23–7,28Robinson,Fiona,165,168,170softpaternalism,50–3Roemer,J.,136Spelman,ElizabethV.,155Rogers,Joel,255,256Spinner,Jeff,251Rorty,Richard,316state,2,8,98,190,203Rosenblum,Nancy,255capitalismand,140–5Ross,W.D.,82civilsocietyand,239,255,256,257Rousseau,Jean-Jacques,254,262individualandseelibertyRuddick,Sara,156,165,167,170justiceand,56–7,70–1,71–2,79neutralityand,4,10,206,207,211,Sandel,Michael,275,289n.6213,214,216n.16Sargent,Lydia,156Nozick’sview,200–1328\nIndexpluralismand,241–2,248,250–1,virtuetheory,166253–4voting,106,108,123–4nn.10–11,n.13,religionand,305,313–14225,226,228–9,233rightsofseeauthority;legitimacycommoninterestand,117–21welfareand,10,70–1,72,186–7compulsory,39,47–8,57Sterba,James,10,160structuralproblems,108–12Stoljar,Natalie,156,157,166womenand,160,161strongdeliberativism,259,260,262sufficientarianism,101–2Waldron,Jeremy,27,200,201,208,215,surrogacy,39,45,46,47,52,54,55252Switzerland,160Walker,Margaret,165,166Walzer,Michael,7,72,73–4,82,91–2,Tamir,Yael,76,250,263,264,265104n.16Tawney,R.H.,90war,religious,304–7Taylor,Charles,171,252,262weakdeliberativism,259,260–1,267Taylor,Harriet,160n.7theism,309–10,317n.1Weinstock,DanielM.,10,12,258,260,Tocqueville,Alexisde,254,255,266n.6265Tong,Rosemarie,165welfare,40,42,57,195n.29,200,244transactionalaccountsofpoliticalequalityof,7,73,95–6,97,99–100obligation,24,27,33–5rightto,160,186,187,188–9Tronto,JoanC.,156,167,168,170welfarestate,10,70–1,72,186–7Tully,James,242well-orderedsociety,200,205–6tyrannyofmajority,221,225,227,236Wellman,ChristopherHeath,7,77nn.8–9,246Wertheimer,Alan,52,53West,Cornel,281,287unitarydemocracy,171West,Robin,162UnitedStates(US),235–6n.5,254,266Williams,Bernard,63,64,77n.6Williams,PatriciaJ.,155,164Constitutionaldevelopment,222–30Wolff,R.P.,36religion,213,251,292–3,294,304,Wollstonecraft,Mary,160305–7,309–10,312–13women,9,114–15,123,124n.16,201,resourceconsumption,188,189,194251,289n.7n.26votingrights,160,161women’srights,160,163seealsofeminismunpaidlabor,136,140Wood,A.,136,152n.8utilitarianism,3,81,101,165Wood,PatriciaK.,242authority/obligationand,22,25,26,Woozley,A.D.,2327,202,203Wright,E.O.,151n.1justiceand,60–4,75,76Wuthnow,Robert,245Marxon,146–7,148,149,152n.5Yodercase,251valuepluralism,242–3,248,251,257Young,IrisMarion,155,171,215,261vanGunsteren,HermanR.,260onequality,172,285–6veilofignorance,3,66–8,149,195n.33,onjustice,7,79,80–1,82,287199,208,283onminoritygroups,12,216n.14,242,violence,80,151n.3,155,159,170,172248–9,252,255,288329