【布莱克威尔当代哲学论争系列】政治哲学 470页

\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PageiContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PageiiContemporaryDebatesinPhilosophyInteachingandresearch,philosophymakesprogressthroughargumentationanddebate.ContemporaryDebatesinPhilosophyprovidesaforumforstudentsandtheirteacherstofollowandparticipateinthedebatesthatanimatephilosophytodayinthewesternworld.Eachvolumepresentspairsofopposingviewpointsoncontestedthemesandtopicsinthecentralsubfieldsofphilosophy.Eachvolumeiseditedandintroducedbyanexpertinthefield,andalsoincludesanindex,bibliography,andsuggestionsforfurtherreading.Theopposingessays,commissionedespeciallyforthevolumesintheseries,arethoroughbutaccessiblepresentationsofopposingpointsofview.1.ContemporaryDebatesinPhilosophyofReligioneditedbyMichaelL.PetersonandRaymondJ.Vanarragon2.ContemporaryDebatesinPhilosophyofScienceeditedbyChristopherHitchcock3.ContemporaryDebatesinEpistemologyeditedbyMatthiasSteupandErnestSosa4.ContemporaryDebatesinAppliedEthicseditedbyAndrewI.CohenandChristopherHeathWellman5.ContemporaryDebatesinAestheticsandthePhilosophyofArteditedbyMatthewKieran6.ContemporaryDebatesinMoralTheoryeditedbyJamesDreier7.ContemporaryDebatesinCognitiveScienceeditedbyRobertStainton8.ContemporaryDebatesinPhilosophyofMindeditedbyBrianMcLaughlinandJonathanCohen9.ContemporaryDebatesinSocialPhilosophyeditedbyLaurenceThomas10.ContemporaryDebatesinMetaphysicseditedbyTheodoreSider,JohnHawthorne,andDeanW.Zimmerman11.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyeditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristmanForthcomingContemporaryDebatesarein:PhilosophyofBiologyeditedbyFranciscoJ.AyalaandRobertArpPhilosophyofLanguageeditedbyErnieLepore\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PageiiiContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristmanAJohnWiley&Sons,Ltd.,Publication\nCDIA01.qxd2/5/0910:59PageivThiseditionfirstpublished2009©2009BlackwellPublishingLtdBlackwellPublishingwasacquiredbyJohnWiley&SonsinFebruary2007.Blackwell’spublishingprogramhasbeenmergedwithWiley’sglobalScientific,Technical,andMedicalbusinesstoformWiley-Blackwell.RegisteredOfficeJohnWiley&SonsLtd,TheAtrium,SouthernGate,Chichester,WestSussex,PO198SQ,UnitedKingdomEditorialOffices350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148-5020,USA9600GarsingtonRoad,Oxford,OX42DQ,UKTheAtrium,SouthernGate,Chichester,WestSussex,PO198SQ,UKFordetailsofourglobaleditorialoffices,forcustomerservices,andforinformationabouthowtoapplyforpermissiontoreusethecopyrightmaterialinthisbookpleaseseeourwebsiteatwww.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.TherightofThomasChristianoandJohnChristmantobeidentifiedastheauthoroftheeditorialmaterialinthisworkhasbeenassertedinaccordancewiththeCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise,exceptaspermittedbytheUKCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988,withoutthepriorpermissionofthepublisher.Wileyalsopublishesitsbooksinavarietyofelectronicformats.Somecontentthatappearsinprintmaynotbeavailableinelectronicbooks.Designationsusedbycompaniestodistinguishtheirproductsareoftenclaimedastrademarks.Allbrandnamesandproductnamesusedinthisbookaretradenames,servicemarks,trademarksorregisteredtrademarksoftheirrespectiveowners.Thepublisherisnotassociatedwithanyproductorvendormentionedinthisbook.Thispublicationisdesignedtoprovideaccurateandauthoritativeinformationinregardtothesubjectmattercovered.Itissoldontheunderstandingthatthepublisherisnotengagedinrenderingprofessionalservices.Ifprofessionaladviceorotherexpertassistanceisrequired,theservicesofacompetentprofessionalshouldbesought.LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataContemporarydebatesinpoliticalphilosophy/editedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman.p.cm.–(Contemporarydebatesinphilosophy)Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN978-1-4051-3321-0(hardback:alk.paper)–ISBN978-1-4051-3322-7(pbk.:alk.paper)1.Politicalscience–Philosophy.I.Christiano,Thomas.II.Christman,JohnPhilip.JA71.C57732009320.01–dc222008044641AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.Setin10on12.5ptRotisSerifbyGraphicraftLimited,HongKongPrintedinMalaysia12009\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PagevContentsAcknowledgmentsviiNotesonContributorsviii1IntroductionThomasChristianoandJohnChristman1QUESTIONSOFMETHOD212FactsandPrinciplesG.A.Cohen233Constructivism,Facts,andMoralJustificationSamuelFreeman414ReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizenStephenWhite61LIBERALISM79PoliticalNeutrality795TheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutralityGeraldF.Gaus816PerfectionisminPolitics:ADefenseStevenWall99LibertyandDistributiveJustice1197IndividualismandLibertarianRightsEricMack1218Left-LibertarianismandLibertyPeterVallentyne137Equality1539IlluminatingEgalitarianismLarryS.Temkin15510AReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianismJohnKekes179\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PageviDEMOCRACYANDITSLIMITS195TheValueofDemocracy19511TheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSayRichardJ.Arneson19712Democracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValueElizabethAnderson213DeliberativeDemocracy22913DeliberativeDemocracyRussellHardin23114ReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracyJoshuaCohen247Constitutionalism26515Constitutionalism–ASkepticalViewJeremyWaldron26716ConstitutionalismLarryAlexander283PERSONS,IDENTITYANDDIFFERENCE301IndividualismandCommunity30117IndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunityRichardDagger30318Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentityMargaretMoore322IdentityandthePoliticsofDifference34319RelationalLiberalismandDemandsforEquality,Recognition,andGroupRightsAnthonySimonLaden34520StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifferenceIrisM.Young362GLOBALJUSTICE385Cosmopolitanism38521CosmopolitanismandJusticeSimonCaney38722DistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroadJonMandle408HumanRights42323TheDarkSideofHumanRightsOnoraO’Neill42524ADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRightsJamesW.Nickel437Index457viContents\nCDIA01.qxd2/10/0910:26PageviiAcknowledgmentsAlongerversionofChapter2appearedasanarticlebyProf.Cohen,“FactsandPrinciples,”inPhilosophyandPublicAffairs31(3)(Summer2003):211–45.Chapter20isarevisedversionofapaperbyProf.YoungwhichappearedinMulticulturalismandPoliticalTheory,ed.AnthonyLadenandDavidOwen(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007).Chapter24isarevisedandexpandedversionofProf.Nickel’s“PovertyandRights,”ThePhilosophicalQuarterly55(2005).Chapter23isreprintedwithpermissionfromInternationalAffairs81(2)(2005):427–39.Allpreviouslypublishedmaterialusedbypermissionwiththegratitudeoftheeditors.Wewouldalsoliketothankourindexers,DanielM.SilvermintandJustinTosi.\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PageviiiNotesonContributorsLarryAlexanderisaWarrenDistinguishedProfessorofLawattheUniversityofSanDiegoSchoolofLaw.HeistheauthorofIsThereaRightofFreedomofExpression?(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005);(withEmilySherwin)TheRuleofRules:Morality,RulesandtheDilemmasofLaw(Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress,2001);Constitutionalism:PhilosophicalFoundations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998);(withPaulHorton)WhomDoestheConstitutionCommand?(NewYork:Green-woodPress,1988);severalanthologies;andmorethan160articles,bookchaptersandreviewessaysinjurisprudence,constitutionallaw,criminallaw,andnormativeethics.HehasbeenamemberofthefacultyattheUniversityofSanDiegoSchoolofLawsince1970.Heistheco-editorofthejournalLegalTheory,andheservesontheeditorialboardsofEthics,LawandPhilosophyandCriminalLawandPhilosophy.Heisco-executivedirectoroftheInstituteforLawandPhilosophyattheUniversityofSanDiegoandheispastpresidentofAMINTAPHIL.ElizabethAndersonisJohnRawlsCollegiateProfessorofPhilosophyandWomen’sStudiesattheUniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor.Herresearchhasfocusedondemocratictheory,egalitarianism,theethicallimitsofmarkets,theoriesofvalueandrationalchoice,thephilosophiesofJohnStuartMillandJohnDewey,andfeministepistemologyandphilosophyofscience.SheistheauthorofValueinEthicsandEconomics(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1993).Sheiscurrentlywritingabookontheidealofethno-racialintegrationindemocratictheory.RichardJ.ArnesonisprofessorofphilosophyattheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,wherehehasbeenemployedsince1973.HiscurrentrankthereisProfessor,AboveScale(DistinguishedProfessor).Inwinter,2006heheldavisitingappoint-mentattheCentreforPublicPhilosophyandAppliedEthicsatAustralianNationalUniversity.Hisworksmainlyconcernpoliticalandmoralphilosophy.Severalofhisrecentessaysexploreoneoftwotopics:(1)howbesttointegratesensibleaccounts\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41Pageixofindividualresponsibilityandhumanwell-beingintoanegalitariantheoryofsocialjustice;and(2)howbesttodefendactconsequentialisminthelightofthemostseriousrecentcriticismsthisdoctrinehasattracted.SimonCaneyisProfessorinPoliticalTheoryandTutorialFellowinPoliticsatMagdalenCollege,Oxford.Hehaspublishedarticlesonjustice,rights,perfectionism,andglobaljustice,inphilosophy,politicsandlawjournals.HeistheauthorofJusticeBeyondBorders(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005).HeisworkingonabookentitledOnCosmopolitanism(forOxfordUniversityPress)andabookentitledGlobalJusticeandClimateChange(co-authoredwithDrDerekBellandalsoforOxfordUniversityPress).Hecurrentlyholdsathree-yearESRCLeadershipFellowshiponClimateChange.ThomasChristianoisProfessorofPhilosophyandLawattheUniversityofArizona.Heisalsotheco-directoroftheRogersPrograminLawandSocietyintheCollegeofLaw.HehasbeenafellowattheNationalHumanitiesCenter,avisitingfellowofAllSoulsCollege,Oxford,andavisitingfellowintheResearchSchooloftheSocialSciencesattheAustralianNationalUniversity.HehaspublishedwidelyintheareasofmoralandpoliticalphilosophyandistheauthorofTheConstitutionofEquality:DemocraticAuthorityandItsLimits(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),TheRuleoftheMany:FundamentalIssuesinDemocraticTheory(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1996).Heiscurrentlyfinishingabookonthefoundationsofequality.JohnChristmanisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophy,PoliticalScienceandWomen’sStudiesatPennsylvaniaStateUniversity,wherehespecializesincontemporarysocialandpoliticalphilosophy.HeistheauthorofTheMythofProperty(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1994),SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy:AContemporaryIntroduction(London:Routledge,2002),andThePoliticsofPersons:IndividualAutonomyandSocio-historicalSelves(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009).G.A.CohenwaseducatedatMcGillandOxfordUniversitieswhereheobtained,respec-tively,thedegreesofB.A.inPhilosophyandPoliticsin1961andB.Phil.inPhilosophyin1963.Fortwenty-twoyearshewasaLecturerandthenaReaderinPhilosophyatUniversityCollege,London.In1985hebecameChicheleProfessorofSocialandPoliticalTheoryandaFellowofAllSoulsCollege,Oxford.ProfessorCohenistheauthorofKarlMarx’sTheoryofHistory:ADefence(1978;expandededn,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),History,Labour,andFreedom(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1988),Self-Ownership,Freedom,andEquality(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),IfYou’reanEgalitarian,HowComeYou’reSoRich?(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000)andRescuingJusticeandEquality(HarvardUniversityPress,2008).Cohenhasgivenlecturesallovertheworld,includingtheTannerLecturesatStanfordUniversityin1991andtheGiffordLecturesatEdinburghUniversityin1996.HewasmadeaFellowoftheBritishAcademyin1985.JoshuaCohenisprofessorofpoliticalscience,philosophy,andlawatStanfordUniversity,wherehedirectstheProgramonGlobalJustice.HehasbeeneditoroftheBostonReviewsince1991.AcollectionofhispapersonissuesofdemocratictheorywillbepublishedbyHarvardUniversityPressin2009.NotesonContributorsix\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PagexRichardDaggerisProfessorofPoliticalScienceatRhodesCollege,wherehealsodirectstheSearchforValuesProgram.HeistheauthorofCivicVirtues:Rights,Citizenship,andRepublicanLiberalism(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1997)andco-author,withTerenceBall,ofPoliticalIdeologiesandtheDemocraticIdeal(7thedn,NewYork:Longman,2008).Hisrecentessaysinpoliticalandlegalphilo-sophyinclude:“RepublicanPunishment:ConsequentialistorRetributivist?”inC.LaBordeandJ.Maynor,eds.,RepublicanismandPoliticalTheory(Malden,MA:Blackwell,2008);“PunishmentasFairPlay,”ResPublica(2009);and“RepublicanismandCrime,”inS.BessonandJ.-L.Marti,eds.,LegalRepublicanism(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2009).SamuelFreemanisProfessorofPhilosophyandLawattheUniversityofPennsylvania.HeistheauthorofJusticeandtheSocialContract(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2006)andRawls(NewYork:Routledge,2007),andhaseditedTheCambridgeCompaniontoRawls(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),aswellasJohnRawls’sCollectedPapers(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2001)andhisLecturesontheHistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2007).GeraldF.GausisJamesE.RogersProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofArizona.AmonghisbooksareOnPhilosophy,Politics,andEconomics(Belmont,CA:Wadsworth,2008),ContemporaryTheoriesofLiberalism:PublicReasonasaPost-EnlightenmentProject(NewYork:Sage,2003),JustificatoryLiberalism(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),andValueandJustification(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990).HeandChandranKukathaseditedtheHandbookofPoliticalTheory(NewYork:Sage,2004).AlongwithJonathanRiley,heisafoundingeditorofPolitics,PhilosophyandEconomics.HeiscurrentlycompletingabookonTheOrderofPublicReason(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress)and,withJulianLamont,iswritingabookonEconomicJustice(Malden,MA:Blackwell).RussellHardinisprofessorofPoliticsatNewYorkUniversity.Heistheauthorofmanybooks,includingHowDoYouKnow?(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,forthcoming),IndeterminacyandSociety(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2003),Trust(Cambridge:PolityPress,2006),andLiberalism,Constitutionalism,andDemocracy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).JohnKekeshasretiredaftermanyyears,firstasProfessorofPhilosophy,andthenasResearchProfessor,andnowworksasanindependentauthor.HismanybooksincludeAgainstLiberalism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1997),ACaseforConservatism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1998),andmostrecentlyEnjoyment(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2008).HeisatworkonTheHumanCondition:ASecularView.Hisemailaddressisjonkekes@nycap.rr.com.AnthonySimonLadenisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofIllinoisatChicago,wherehehastaughtsince1996.HeistheauthorofReasonablyRadical(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2001)andco-editor,withDavidOwen,ofMulticulturalismandPoliticalTheory(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007).HisresearchfocusesxNotesonContributors\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41Pagexionliberalism,democratictheory,feminismandthepoliticsofidentity,andthenatureofpracticalreasonandreasoning.EricMackisProfessorofPhilosophyandafacultymemberoftheMurphyInstituteofPoliticalEconomyatTulaneUniversity.Hespecializesinmoral,political,andlegalphilosophy.HehasbeenaVisitingFellowinPoliticalPhilosophyatHarvardUniversity,aVisitingResearchScholarattheSocialPhilosophyandPolicyCenteratBowlingGreenStateUniversityandaResidentScholaratLibertyFund,Inc.Hehaseditedtwobooks,AuberonHerbert’sTheRightandWrongofCompulsionbytheStateandOtherEssays(Indianapolis,IN:LibertyFund,1978)andHerbertSpencer’sManversustheStateandOtherEssays(Indianapolis,IN:LibertyFund,1982).Hehaspublishedmanyarticlesinscholarlyjournalsandanthologies–primarilyonsuchtopicsastheagentrelativityofvalue,thenatureandfoundationofmoralrights,propertyrights,economicjustice,Lockeanprovisos,rightsandpublicgoods,liberal-ismandpluralism,justifiedkilling,anarchism,andbadsamaritanism.Hisbook,JohnLocke,isforthcoming.JonMandleischairofthePhilosophyDepartmentattheUniversityatAlbany(SUNY).HeistheauthorofWhat’sLeftofLiberalism?(Lanham,MD:LexingtonBooks,2000),GlobalJustice(Cambridge:PolityPress,2006),andaforthcomingbookonJohnRawls’sATheoryofJustice.MargaretMooreisProfessorinthePoliticalStudiesdepartmentatQueen’sUniversity(Kingston,Canada).SincereceivingherPh.D.fromtheLondonSchoolofEconomicsin1989,shehaspublishedanumberofbooksandarticlesonissuesofdistributivejustice,nationalismandmulticulturalism.Mostnotableare:FoundationsofLiberalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993)andEthicsofNationalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).JamesNickelisProfessorofLawatArizonaStateUniversity.HeisanaffiliateprofessorintheDepartmentofPhilosophyandintheSchoolofGlobalStudies.During2008–9NickelisaVisitingProfessoratGeorgetownUniversityLawCenter.Nickelteachesandwritesinjurisprudence,constitutionallaw,politicalphilosophy,andhumanrightslawandtheory.From1982–2003NickelwasProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofColoradowhereheservedasDirectoroftheCenterforValuesandSocialPolicy(1982–8)andasChairofthePhilosophyDepartment(1992–6).NickelistheauthorofMakingSenseofHumanRights(2ndedn.,Malden,MA:Blackwell,2006).Otherrecentwritingsinclude:“WhoNeedsFreedomofReligion?”;“AreHumanRightsMainlyImplementedbyIntervention?”;and“RethinkingIndivisibility:TowardsaTheoryofSupportingRelationsbetweenHumanRights.”OnoraO’NeillisPrincipalofNewnhamCollege,Cambridge.HerbooksincludeFacesofHunger:AnEssayonPoverty,DevelopmentandJustice(GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1986),ConstructionsofReason:ExplorationofKant’sPracticalPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),TowardsJusticeandVirtue(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),BoundsofJustice(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),andAutonomyandTrustinBioethics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).SheisaformermemberandchairoftheNuffieldCouncilonBioethicsandtheNotesonContributorsxi\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PagexiiHumanGeneticsAdvisoryCommission,andchairstheNuffieldFoundation.Dr.O’NeillisaMemberoftheHouseofLords(BaronessO’NeillofBengarve),sitsasacrossbencherandwasamemberoftheSelectCommitteeonStemCellResearch.LarryS.TemkinisProfessorIIofPhilosophyatRutgersUniversity.HeistheauthorofInequality(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),aswellasmanyarticlesinethicsandpoliticalphilosophy.AformerDanforthFellow,hehasbeenaVisitingProfessor/FellowattheNationalHumanitiesCenter,PittsburghUniversity,Harvard’sSafraFoundationCenterforEthics,AllSoulsCollegeOxfordUniversity,theNationalInstitutesofHealth,andtheAustralianNationalUniversity.Heisalsotherecipientofeightmajorteachingawards.Temkiniscurrentlyworkingonabook,tentativelytitled“RethinkingtheGood,MoralIdeals,andtheNatureofPracticalReasoning.”PeterVallentyneisFlorenceG.KlineProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofMissouri-Columbia.Hewritesonissuesoflibertyandequality–andleft-libertarianisminparticular.Heisco-editorofEconomicsandPhilosophy.HeeditedEqualityandJustice(NewYork:Routledge,2003,6vols)andContractarianismandRationalChoice:EssaysonDavidGauthier’sMoralsbyAgreement(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),andheco-edited,withHillelSteiner,TheOriginsofLeftLibertarianism:AnAnthologyofHistoricalWritingsandLeftLibertarianismandItsCritics:TheContemporaryDebate(Basingstoke,Hants:PalgravePublishersLtd.,2000).HehasheldanAmericanCouncilofLearnedSocietiesfellowshipanddirectedaNationalEndowmentsfortheHumanitiesprojectonethicsacrossthecurriculum.HecanbecontactedatVallentynep@missouri.edu.JeremyWaldronisUniversityProfessorintheSchoolofLawatNewYorkUniversity.HehasalsoheldappointmentsatOxford,Edinburgh,Berkeley,Princeton,andColumbia.HehasdeliveredtheSeeleyLecturesatCambridge,theCarlyleLecturesatOxford,andtheStorrsLecturesatYaleLawSchool.ProfessorWaldron’sbooksincludeTheDignityofLegislation(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999);LawandDisagreement(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999);andGod,Locke,andEquality(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).Heistheauthorofmorethan100publishedarticlesinlegalandpoliticalphilosophy.Particularlywellknownishisworkoncosmopolitanism,homelessness,judicialreview,theruleoflaw,andtortureandsecurityissues.HewaselectedtotheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciencesin1998.StevenWallisassociateprofessorofphilosophyattheUniversityofConnecticut.HeistheauthorofLiberalism,PerfectionismandRestraint(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)andtheeditor(withGeorgeKlosko)ofPerfectionismandNeutrality:EssaysinLiberalTheory(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2003).StephenK.WhiteisJamesHartProfessorofPolitics,UniversityofVirginia.Formereditorofthejournal,PoliticalTheory.RecentbooksincludeSustainingAffirmation:TheStrengthsofWeakOntologyinPoliticalTheory(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000);EdmundBurke:Modernity,PoliticsandAesthetics(Rowman&Littlefield,2ndedn.,2002);WhatIsPoliticalTheory?(NewYork:Sage,2004),co-editedwithxiiNotesonContributors\nCDIA01.qxd2/4/0915:41PagexiiiJ.DonaldMoon;andTheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2009).IrisMarionYoung(beforeherdeathin2006)wasProfessorinPoliticalScienceattheUniversityofChicago.Shewastheauthorofnumerousworksinpoliticalphilosophy,feminism,socialjusticeandotherareas,including:IntersectingVoices:DilemmasofGender,PoliticalPhilosophyandPolicy(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1997);JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress1990);InclusionandDemocracy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2000);FemaleBodyExperience(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005);andGlobalChallenges:War,Self-Determination,andResponsibilityforJustice(Cambridge:PolityPress,2007).NotesonContributorsxiii\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page1CHAPTERONEIntroductionThomasChristianoandJohnChristman“Manwasbornfreeandheiseverywhereinchains....Howcanthisbemadelegitimate?”Jean-JacquesRousseau’sprofoundobservationandquestionexpressthefundamentalconcernsofpoliticalphilosophy.Accordingly,politicalphilosophyisprimarilyanormativeproject,onewhosemainfocusisontheprinciplesthatguidetheevaluationandreformofpoliticalandeconomicinstitutionsthathavepervasiveeffectsonourlives.Government,bureaucracy,law,police,property,markets,thewelfarestateandcourtshaveprofoundeffectsonallourlives.Andwhiletheseinsti-tutionsenhanceourfreedomandbenefitalmostallofusinagreatvarietyofways,theyalsoimposecostsandrestrictourfreedominmanywaysaswell.Theprotectionofthepropertyofapersonguaranteesthefreedomofthepropertyholder,forexample,butitalsorestrictsthefreedomofthosewhodonotholdthisproperty.Theeffortstoensureareasonabledistributionofwealthrequirethattaxesbeimposedonsometobenefitothers.Indeed,thewholeschemeofinstitutionsguaranteeingsecurityiscostlyandsorequireseachtomakeacontributiontoitsmaintenance.Thequestionforusasmembersofsocietiesiswhichofthesetypesofinstitutionsareethicallydefensible?Andhowshouldwereforminstitutionsiftheyareethicallydefective?Thisisasignificantpartofthestuffofpoliticaldebatesindemocraticsocieties.Butthisraisesthequestionaboutwhattheappropriatenormativestandardsarebywhichwemaketheseassessments.Theassessmentswemakeareatleastpartlybasedinmoregeneralprinciples,butwedisagreeoftenaboutthebasicprinciplesasmuchasaboutthepolicyquestions.Onedoespoliticalphilosophywhenonearticulatesandrationallydefendssomeoftheseprinciplesandcriticizesothers.Thereismuchdisagreementconcerningthelegitimacyofeachoneoftheactivit-iesmodernstatesengagein,raisingthesuspicionineachcasethattheyaremerelythemisguidedeffortsofsomeorthethieveryofothers.Manyargue,forexample,thatthereisnotenoughredistributionofwealthinsocietyorthereistoomuchinequalityandthatasaconsequencetheprotectionofprivatepropertyisineffecttheprotectionofaprivilegedclassofpersons.OthersarguethatthereistoomuchredistributionandContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page2thatthegovernmentthatcarriesouttheseactivitiesisengagedinsimplethieverynomatterhowfinesoundingitsrhetoricmaybe.Atheoryofdistributivejusticeattemptstoelaborateanddefendprinciplesbywhichwecanadjudicatetheseissuesbydeterminingthecorrectanswerstothegeneralquestionofwhatjusticerequiresregardingthedistributionofwealth.Furthermore,whenthereissuchpervasivedisagreementabouthowsocietyshouldbeorganized,wemustthenaskwhooughttodecidesuchcontentiousissues?Traditionallymanyarguedthatthewisestoughttodecide,butinthemodernworlditisgenerallyassumedthatpeopleoughttodecidetogetherasequalsinademocracy.Stillothersarguethatthereoughttobeseverelimitsonwhatdemocraciescandecide,leavingtheleftoverareasofsociallifetobedeterminedbyindividualsthemselves.Buthowextensiveshouldtheselimitsbe?Whooughttodecidethismatter?Theoriesofdemocracyandconstitutionalismattempttoanswerthesequestionsinrationallydefensibleways.Moreover,oneoftheprofoundquestionsofpoliticalphilosophyconcernshowtodealwiththecenturies-longinjusticesdonetominorities,womenandothers,especiallysincetheinjusticesofthepasthavehadatremendousimpactonthepresent(ifindeedtheyhaveendedatall).Theseinjusticesandtheircurrenteffectsoftenremainunac-knowledgedoratleastignoredbythelargersocietyandthuscreatefreshnewinjus-ticesinthepresent.Theexperiencesofminoritiesarebelittledandtheirplightsblamedonthem.Whatisthejustresponsetotheoverhangofgreatinjusticeofthissort?Again,theactivityofpoliticalphilosophyexpressesthehopethatthesequestionscanbegivengenerallydefensibleanswers.Finally,thefocusofpoliticalphilosophyhasexpandedinthelastthirtyyearsbeyonditsinitialfocusontheassessmentofthenation-statetoincludequestionsaboutthenatureofglobaljusticeandtheplaceofthenation-stateinthelargerglobalorder.Somehavearguedthattheprinciplesthatwerethoughttoapplytoindividualpolit-icalsocietiesinfactapplytotheworldasawhole.Why,thesethinkersask,shouldwefocusonissuesofpovertyonlyinourownsocieties?Whyshouldn’twebeevenmoreconcernedwithglobalpoverty,whichisoftenmuchmoreserious?Thesecosmopolitanviewsarecriticizedbythosewhothinkthatthereisstillanimportantplaceforthemodernstateinourmoralappraisalsofpoliticalpower.Theyarguethatcitizenshavespecialobligationstotheircompatriotsthattheydonothavetowardsothersandthattheseobligationsincludethoseofdistributivejustice.Butalltheoristsagreethattheassessmentofthemodernstateanditspoliciesmustnowbecarriedoutwithaneyetoitspositioninthelargerglobalorder.Manytheorists,then,areinterestedindevelopingconceptionsofhumanrightsthattakeintoaccounttheinterestsofallhumanbeingsandthatsetminimalstandardsfortheassess-mentoftheactivitiesofstatestowardspeopleinothercountries.Stillthereismuchdisagreementaboutthenatureandbasisofhumanrightsamongcontemporarytheorists.Formostphilosophers,politicaltheoryinvolvesacommitmenttotheideathatthequestionsabovehaveobjectivelyvalidanswersandthattheissuescanbeunder-stoodandprogresscanbemadeonthembymeansofrationalargumentandgoodjudgment.Manyofthepapersinthisvolumedisplaytheeffortsatrationaldiscussioncentraltotheprojectofpoliticalphilosophy.Theyapproachtheissueswithaneyetowardsclarifyingthecentralconceptsandproblems.Theyadvancealternative2ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page3systematictheoriesoftheprinciplesofjusticeandthecommongood.Andtheydefendtheoriesbymeansofrationalargumentsinfavorofthetheoryandagainstalterna-tives.Tobesure,eventhiscommitmentshouldbebroughtunderscrutinywhenwethinkasphilosophers,asthefourthessaydoes.Thebookasawholecanbethoughtofasaninvitationtoparticipateinrationaldebatesonthebasicstandardsbywhichweevaluatemodernpoliticalsocietiesandtheirplaceintheworld.~~Inthisvolumeweattempttocapturethemaincurrentsofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophyaspracticed,forthemostpart,intheso-calledanalyticstylebutwithdueattentiontoalternativeapproaches.Thisisperforceaselectiveenterprise,wheremanythemesareleftinthebackgrounddespitetheirimportanceandrelevance.Surveyingthepresentlandscape,though,suggestscertaindominantpreoccupationsaswellastrajectoriesinnewdirections.InthisIntroduction,then,wewilldiscusssomeofthemaintrendsandtopicareasthathavepreoccupiedpoliticalphilosophersinthecurrentlandscapeand,insodoing,provideabriefoverviewoftheexcellentpaperscontainedinthevolume.QuestionsofMethodHowshouldpoliticalphilosophyproceed?Whatmodeofthoughtshouldpredominateintheoreticalexchangesaboutsuchcomplexandtortuouscontroversiesasarethesubjectmatterofpolitics?ThelegacyoftheEuropeanEnlightenment,andthemodernistphilosophicalframeworkithelpedspawn,haslongsuggestedthat“reason”insomeformprovidethefundamentalbasisformoralprincipleandthus,byextension,thejustificationofpoliticalprinciples.However,muchnineteenth-andtwentieth-centurypoliticalandphilosophicalthoughtinsistedthatwereappraisetheroleofreasoninthejustificationofpoliticalpositionsespeciallygiventhepervasivehumantendencytobeirrational,movedbysubconsciousmotives,giventorationalizationsandsubterfuge,andsoon,nottomentionthefactthatvariousinjusticesthatweresupportedby“reason”inthoseEnlightenment(andlater)thinkersthemselves.StephenWhite,inChapter4,takesasastartingpointtheradicalchallengestothemodernistapproachtopoliticaljustification,challengeswhichpointedoutthesepatternsofsubterfugeanddominationunderthebannerofreason.Inhisexamina-tionoftheaftermathofthesechallenges,hesurveyswaysthatbeing“reasonable”mightnowsubstituteforatraditionalfoundationalunderstandingofthegroundingofprinciplesinuntethered“reason.”Heproceedstoexaminetheway“reasonableness”functionsinfourareasofpoliticaldiscussion:thejustificationofbasicsocialandpoliticalstructures;thefoundationsofethical-politicaljudgments;andthestruggleforrecognitionofidentity.Heconsidersthewaysthatseeingidealrationalityasapersonalandsocial(andphilosophical)idealhas,inthepast,ledtoallmannersofexclusionanddomination(specificallyofthose“others”whowerebyimplicationlabeled“non-rational”).Hetracestheideaof“reasonableness”asasubstituteforthetraditionalideaofreasonasthefoundationofpoliticalpowerinwaysthatismoresensitivetoourmanyanddeepdifferencesaswellasourmortalityandfinitude.Introduction3\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page4White’sessaydiffersfrommostoftheothersherebothinstyleandperspective;thisisduetohisfocusonwaysthatparadigmmethodologiesinpoliticalphilosophyhavebeenquestioned.Oneofthekeyissuesinpoliticalphilosophyistherelationshipbetweenethicaltheorizingandsocialscience.Thisissuepervadesmanyofthediscussionsinpoliticalphilosophy.ButitisnowheremoreinevidencethaninJohnRawls’spoliticalphilosophy.OnRawls’sviewmanyofthefundamentalprinciplesofjusticedependfortheirvalidityonfactsabouthumannatureandsociety.Forinstance,Rawlsassertsthatthevirtueofjusticeonlyarisesinthecontextofthecircumstancesofjusticeinwhichhumansareonlymoderatelyaltruisticandthereismoderatescarcityofthethingsthatpeoplewant.Furthermore,Rawlsarguesthattheprinciplesofjusticearethosethatwouldbechosenbyindividualsinasuitablesetofcircumstancesandassumingknowledgeofthegeneralfactsabouthumannatureandsociety.Moregenerally,manyhavearguedthatprinciplesofjusticemustbefeasibleinorderforthemtobevalid.Thus,factsaboutfeasibilityconstrainthechoiceofprinciples.Sothecompletecarryingoutoftheprojectofelaboratingandjustifyingfundamentalprinciplesofjusticerequiresagooddealofsocialscienceandpsychology.G.A.Cohenhasquestionedthisfrequentlycitedmethodologicalconstraint.InhiscontributioninChapter2,hearguesthatthefundamentalprinciplesofpoliticalphilosophymustbefactinsensitive.Bythishemeansthatthetruthorvalidityoffundamentalprinciplesofpoliticalphilosophymustholdregardlessofthefacts.Totheextentthatfactsplayaroleintheseprinciples,itisaconditionalone.Thatis,factsaffecttheconditionsunderwhichprinciplesaretobeapplied,theymayalsobepresentinprinciplesasconditionsforrequirements.Butanyfactthatappearstoplayafundamentalroledoesthisonlybecausethereisadeepergroundingprinciplethatexplainsthisrole.Ultimately,Cohenarguesthatthisgroundingrelationmustterminateinfactinsensitiveprinciples.SamuelFreemanrespondsinChapter3toCohen’schallengebydefendingtheRawlsianaccountoftherelationoffactstoprinciplesofjustice.Hisreplydependsonmakingadistinctionbetweenfundamentalprinciplesofconductsuchasprinciplesofjusticeandfundamentaljustificatoryprinciplessuchastheprincipleofimparti-ality,andthefreedomandequalityofpersons,whichdetermineforRawlstheneedforandthenatureoftheinitialpositioninwhichpersonsaretoagreeonprinciplesofjusticebutarenotthemselvesfundamentalprinciplesofconduct.Theideaisthatprinciplesofconductcanbefundamentalinthesensethattheyarenotgroundedinanyotherprinciplesofconducteventhoughtheyaregroundedinfactsandfun-damentaljustificatoryprinciples,whicharenotprinciplesofconductthoughtheyarenormativeprinciples.Thisexchangeraisesthebroaderquestionofwhatkindsoffactsmightberelevanttotheshapeandlegitimacyofnormativepoliticalprinciples.Factsaboutthehis-toricalandsociologicalconditionsofdemocraticsocieties,towhichsuchnormativeprinciplesaretoapply,mightinclude,forexample,arecordofpoverty,socialhier-archies,violence,anddivision.Actualconstitutionaldemocraciesthatevenpretendtobefullyinclusiveandegalitarian,afterall,areveryrecentphenomena.Thisspeakstoabroaderissueofwhetherpoliticalphilosophyshouldproceedinanidealfashion,wherepastandongoingpatternsofinjustice,domination,andviolenceareignoredorbracketedinordertospecifytheprecisenatureofnormativeprinciples.Arethe4ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page5principlesthatwouldbejustifiedunderrelativelyidealconditionsthesameaswouldberequiredinrealworldsettingswherecenturiesofinequalityandoppressionhavelefttheirmarks(andcontinueunabatedinmanysettings)?However,whenonedoesturntothespecificationandjustificationofnormativeprinciplesforasociety,oneparadigmhasdominatedthelandscapeinmanyways,atleastsincetheseventeenthcenturyinEuropeandcontinuingtothepresentday,andthatistheparadigmofliberalism.Therearemanyformsofliberalismandseveralfundamentalcomponentstoit,butthedominationofthisframeworkfornormativepoliticalprinciplesinrecentdecadesisnotableandindeediseventakenforgrantedbyliberalism’sseveralcritics.Itisfitting,then,thatthisparadigmberepresentedinfullforce,includingmanyofthecentralissuesraisedaboutandwithinitinrecentworkinpoliticalphilosophy.TheTroubledDominanceoftheLiberalParadigm“Liberalism”refersgenerallytothebroadapproachtothejustificationofsocialandpoliticalpowerthatseessuchpoweraslegitimateonlyifitisbasedonpopularsovereignty,theruleoflaw,andtheprotectionofbasicrightsandlibertiesofindividuals,whetherthesebasicrightsareseenasderivativefromuniversal(moral)principlesorsimplytherequiredpostulatesofapoliticalcompromisebasedonthefreedomandequalityofcitizens.Severalissuesinpoliticalphilosophyarisecon-cerningthecoreelementsofthisparadigm.Onesuchelementistheideathatinsofarasjustpoliticalinstitutionsmustmeetwiththepopularapprovalofthoselivingunderthem,theymustremainneutraltowardallofthevariousvalueframe-worksandmoralviewsthosecitizensfollow.Thisissupposedlyinoppositiontothemoreancientviewthatthepurposeofstateinstitutionsistoadvancethevirtueorgoodofthecitizenry,wherethoseconceptsaredefinedobjectivelyandapartfromcitizenconsent.Butthequestionofwhetherstateneutralityisfeasibleandwhatitsimplicationsareisaprominentoneinrecentphilosophicalwork.StateNeutralityInChapter5,GeraldGausdefendsastrongversionofliberalneutrality,whichhetracesfromaviewofmoralitygenerallyandconceptsoffreedomandequalityinparticular.Hearguesthatallcoercionofonepersonbyanotherperson(orstate)withoutsufficientjustificationisprimafaciemorallywrong,andthattojustifycoerciontoanothermoral(freeandequal)personwemustprovidesufficientjustificationfromher(rationalandreflective)pointofview.Suchaposition,then,implieswhathelabels“LiberalMoralNeutrality.”Thisprinciplestatesthatintreat-ingallothers(inwaysthatmayinvolvecoercingthem)wemustbeneutralbetweenourownandtheirevaluativestandards,theirmoralpointofview.Then,ifweassumethatstatesmustfollowmoraldictatesthatapplytopersons(andheclaimsweshould),thenaprincipleofLiberalPoliticalNeutralityfollows,namelythatstatepoliciesmustbeneutralbetween(justifiablefromthepointofviewof)allcitizens.Hisargumentsfortheseclaimsarepainstaking,andtheconclusionshedrawsaredramatic,namelythatveryfewstatepoliciesareinfactjustifiablebythesestandards,sinceveryfewIntroduction5\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page6ofthemcouldplausiblybejustifiedfromallreasonableandreflectiveevaluativestand-ardsgivenpeople’sdeepdifferencesinmoraloutlookandrankingofvalues.Neutralityistypicallypittedagainstperfectionism,whichisgenerallytheviewthatstatepolicies,ratherthanclaimingsomekindofneutralpositionvis-à-vismoralvalue,shouldactuallypromotethemostworthwhilevaluesandidealsfortheircitizens.StephenWalldefendssuchaviewinChapter6.HeclaimsthatliberalneutralistssuchasGaus(aswellaspoliticalliberalslikeRawlsandothers)cannotconsistentlyjustifytheirviewthatdisagreementaboutconceptionsofthegoodcangivewaytoconsensusabout(supposedlyneutral)proceduresfordeterminingtheright.Wallques-tionswhethertherewecaneverdeviseproceduresthatarejustifiablefromabroadspectrumofcitizenpointsofviewandthathavespecificcontentwithoutrelyingonperfectionistvaluesintheend.WallandGausmaynotbeasfarapartastheyfirstappear,asbothagreethatapurifiedconceptionofliberalneutralityleadstoverylittleinthewayofjustifiedstatepolicy.ButWallfavorsthealternativetoliberalneutrality,namelythatthestateshouldpromotelivesofitscitizensthatareinfact“worthwhile.”Somevalues,Wallclaims,arejustifiedonobjectivegrounds,evenifsomepeopledonotgraspthosegrounds.DistributiveJusticePrinciplesofdistributivejusticehavebeenattheheartofdebatesinpoliticalphilosophyinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturyandtheearlytwenty-firstcentury.Thebasicquestionsofdistributivejusticeconcernhowthegoodthingsofsociallifesuchaswealth,power,orhonorsoughttobedistributed.Inthemoderneramanyhaveaskedasomewhatmoreabstractquestionofdistributivejustice:howoughthappinessoropportunityorotherintrinsicallygoodthingsinhumanlifebedistributed?Andinmodernpoliticaldebates,manyhavearguedthatthegreatinequal-itiesofwealthoropportunitiesweseearemorallyindefensible.TheclassicaltraditionofpoliticalphilosophyinPlatoandAristotlearticulatedanddefendedprinciplesconcerningthejustdistributionofgoodsinsociety.Aristotlearguedthatwealthandpoliticalhonorsshouldbedistributedinaccordancewithmerit.Themorevirtuouspersonsinpoliticalsocietydeservedtohavemorepoliticalpowerthanthelessvirtuous.ThescholasticnaturallawtraditioncarriedonAristotle’straditionofdistributionaccordingtomeritbuttheoreticaldiscussionsofdistribu-tivejusticewanedintheseventeenthcentury.Hobbesthoughtthatconsiderationsofdistributivejusticewerenotoffundamentalimportance,andLockemakesnomentionofdistributivejustice,thoughthesatisfactionofneedsplaysacentralroleinhisthought.TheideabeginstomakeareappearanceintheoreticaldiscussionswithJohnStuartMillandKarlMarx,whoisresponsibleforarticulatingthedeeplyegalitarianprinciple:“Toeachaccordingtohisneedsandfromeachaccordingtohisability.”ThepersonmostresponsiblefortherevivalofinterestinthetheoreticalgroundingandelaborationofprinciplesofdistributivejusticeinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcenturyisJohnRawlsinhisATheoryofJustice.Rawlsthinksofthewholeofsocialjusticeasbeingconcernedwithquestionsofdistribution.Hearticulatestwocentralprinciplesofdistributivejustice.Thefirstprincipleisthateachpersonistohavethe6ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page7maximalamountofbasiclibertyconsistentwithanequalbasiclibertyforall.Thesecondassertsthateachistohavefairequalityofopportunityandthatinequalitiesofwealthandpowerarejustifiedonlyiftheyworktotheadvantageoftheworstoff.Rawls’sargumentsandprincipleshavebeentakenbymanyasreasonsforreduc-ingthelevelsofinequalityofwealthandpowerinsocietysubjecttotherestrictionthatwemustnotintrudeinthebasiclibertiesofpersons.Contemporarydebatesaboutdistributivejusticefocusontwosortsofquestions.Thefirstiswhetherdistributivejusticeisagenuinepartofjusticeatall.Libertarianshavefamouslyarguedthattherereallyisnosuchthingasdistributivejusticeasadistinctmoralsetofprinciples.RobertNozick(Anarchy,State,andUtopia),forexample,arguesthatthedistributionofgoodsisjusttotheextentthatitcomesaboutthroughaprocessofvoluntaryexchangeamongpersonswhohavepropertyrightstothethingstheyexchange.Anyconcerntoredistributegoodssothatthedistributionaccordsmorewithsomeprincipleofdistributivejustice,heclaimed,wouldinvolveadeepinterferenceinhumanfreedomtowhicheachhasafundamentalnaturalright.EricMack’scontributioninChapter7attemptstogiveaphilosophicalgroundingtoanaccountofdistributivejusticethatcontinuesintheNozickianlineofanalysis.MackfollowsNozickinseeingrightstoself-ownershipandcompanionrightstoprivatepropertyasthecornerstoneofdistributivejustice.Seeingpeopleas“separate,”onhisview,meanstakingseriouslytheindependentimportancethatanyperson’swellbeinghasforherascomparedtotheimportanceittypicallyhasforothers(thoughofcoursethiscanvary).Thenaturaland,forMack,leastcontroversialstartingpointfortheorizingaboutmoralityisanassumptionofthebasicrationalityofprudence,thatapersonhasaparticularinterestinhowherownlifegoes.Mackarguesthattakingseriouslythisspecialimportancewillbemeaningfulonlyifwecorrespond-inglyrecognize,atthesociallevel,specialrights-basedprotectionsagainstothersinterferingwithone’spursuitofone’sgood.Withoutthesesecondsortsofprotec-tions,thefirstsortofregard(fortheimportanceofpeople’spursuingtheirowngoodintheirownway)hasnorealweight.This,forhim,establishesthefundamentalrightofself-ownershipthatjusticemustalwaysrespect.ButMackproceedsfromthesebasicethicalconsiderationstospecificallylibertarianconclusions,namelythatprotectingpeople’srightstonon-interferenceandbyextensiontheirrighttofullprivatepropertyrights(asanextensionofthisbasicself-ownership)isthecentraltenetofdistributivejustice.Nofurtherattempttoequalizepeople’schancesatachievingwell-beingorinanyotherwaypromotingthe“publicgood”shouldproceedunlessthesebasicrightsarerespected.Thismeansthattheextensionofthesepersonalrightstonon-interferencesupportpropertyrightsto“extra-personal”objectsandmaterial.The“practiceofprivateproperty,”asheputsitwillprotectindividualsfromtheintrusionsbyothersthatbasicself-ownershipforbids.Thisattentiontobasicself-ownership–thatweallhavefundamentalmoralrightsagainstallotherstomoveanduseourbodies,developourtalents,andotherwisepursueourgoods,withintheboundsofothers’rightsofthesamesort–alsogroundsPeterVallentyneapproachtojustice(Chapter8).ButVallentynetakesaturnfromhere,inthathesuggeststhattheprotectionofself-ownershiprightsofthesortMacklaysoutisconsistentwithanumberofdifferentpositionsontheprinciplesgovern-ingtheoveralldistributionofgoods.The“right-libertarian”stanceofthesortMackalignshimselfwith,combinesindividualself-ownershipwithindividualcapitalistIntroduction7\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page8propertyrightsinthebasicprinciplesofdistributivejustice,resultinginaprominentroleoffreemarketsandminimalstateinterferenceincapitalisteconomicactivityinthesociety.ButVallentynerejectsthisposition,andpursuesinsteadthe“left-libertarian”strategyofclaimingthatjusticerequirestheprotectionofindividualrightstoself-ownershipalongwith“equalopportunityleft-libertarianism,”whichinsistsanyindividualclaimofpropertyownershipmustbeconsistentwithothershavinganopportunityforwell-beingthatisatleastasgoodastheopportunityforwellbeingthatthefirstpersonhasinacquiringtheproperty.ThisisastrictegalitarianapproachtothedistributionofresourcesbuiltuponthekindofmoralindividualismthattheoristssuchasMackemphasize.Vallentyne’spositionillustratesthewaythatinmanyaccountsofdistributivejustice,equalityplaysthecentralroleinconceptionsofjusticeinmodernpoliticalphilosophy.Historically,theprincipleofequaldistributionisassociatedwithdemo-cracy.CitizensinAthensandotherGreekcity-statesclaimedrightstoanequalamountofpoliticalpoweronthebasisofequalcitizenship.AndAristotlecitesthisprincipleofequalityasthefoundationofdemocracy.Hecriticizedtheideaofequalityonthegroundsthatthemorevirtuousdeservedgreaterpowerthanthelessvirtuous.Tobesure,nooneinancientGreecearguedforuniversalequality,womenandslavesweretobeexcludedfrompoliticalpowerbyboththedemocratsandbyAristotle.OnAristotle’sview,distributivejusticewastobeunderstoodasproportionateequality.Thatis,eachpersonwastoreceiveinproportiontohismeritsothattheproportionofbenefittomeritisthesame.Andthisconceptionofdistributivejusticewastobethedominantconceptionthroughthescholasticperiod.ThoughRawlsdidnotdefendanegalitarianprinciple,theprincipleshedoesdefendareclosetoegalitarianones.Thefirstprincipleisaprincipleofequallibertyandthesecondprincipleincludesaprincipleofequalopportunityandaprinciplethattakesequalityofwealthandpowertobethebaselinefromwhichdeparturesmustbejustified.AndRawlsisthemainsourceforoneoftheprincipalcontemporaryargumentsforequality.Rawlsarguesthatdifferencesinpeople’smeritoriousqualitiesshouldnotserveasthebasisfordifferencesinthedistributionofsocialgoods.Thereasonforthisisthatdifferentialmeritoriousqualitiesareprimarilytheresultoffactorsforwhichthepersonswhohavethemarenotresponsible.TothinkthatIcandeservegreaterrewardsforqualitiesforwhichIcannotbeheldresponsibleistothinkthatIcandeservemoregoodthingsthananothermerelyasaresultofmygreatergoodluck,whichseemsquitearbitrary.Indeed,alargepartofaperson’sabilitytonavigatesuccessfullyinthemodernworldisduetogoodfamilybackgroundandeducationandotherenvironmentalfactorsavailabletosomeandnottoothers.Thesearefactorsforwhichthepersoninquestionisnotresponsible.RawlstakesthisargumentonestepfurtherwhenhesaysthatthenaturaltalentsIambornwiththatmakeagreatdifferenceinhowwellmylifegoesarealsofeaturesthatIamnotresponsiblefor.Iambornwiththem.Thefinalstepinthisargumentistodenythatevendifferentialeffortsoughttobethebasisofdifferentialrewards.RawlsarguesthattheamountofeffortIamwillingtoputforthisitselfinsignificantpartafunctionofenvironmentalfactorsandnaturaltalent.Soevendifferencesineffortcouldoftenbeattributedtodifferencesinbackgroundconditionsforwhichpersonsdonothaveresponsibility.LarryTemkin’scontribution(Chapter9)defendingtheprincipleofequalityasacomparativeprincipleofdistributiontakesthiskindofRawlsianargumentasgiven.8ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page9Hetentativelyendorsestheformulationthatoneperson’slifeshouldnotgoworsethananother’slifethroughnofaultofhisown.Onlyqualitiesoractionsforwhichpeoplecanbeheldresponsiblearelegitimatebasesfordifferentialrewards.Temkingeneralizesthebasicideabysayingthatdeparturesfromequalitymustbefairandthatnooneoughttosufferunfairdisadvantagerelativetoothers.Thisisinordertocapturetheideathatitisnotunfairthatacriminalwhohasnotbeencaughtbythepolicesuffersdisadvantagethroughnofaultofhisown.Temkinthendiscussesthequestionofwhatequalityshouldbeequalityof.Thetraditionalaccountofequalityhasbeenofequalityofwealthorincome.Butmosthaverejectedthiskindofmetricofequalityonthegroundsthatsomepeoplearemuchneedierthanothersbecauseofhealthproblemsordisabilities(forwhichtheyarenotresponsible).Thenaturalconclusionseemstobethateachshouldhaveequal-ityofwell-being.Buttheworryhereisthatsomepersonsmayexploitaconcernforequalityofwell-beinganddevelophighlyexpensivetastes,whichrequiretheredistribu-tionofresourcestothem.Sothishasledsometopreferequalityofopportunityforwell-beingorequalityofresourcessothatpeoplehavetheopportunitiestoachievethesamelevelofwell-beingbuttheyalsohavetheopportunitiestopursuemoreexpensiveprojectswithoutbeingabletoimposethecostsonothers.Temkin’spositionistoendorseapluralismwithrespecttothesedifferentkindsofequality,apluralismthataccordswithamoregeneralmoralpluralismthathealsoendorses.Oneofthemain,indeedperhapsthemainobjectiontotheprincipleofequalityiswhatiscalledthelevelingdownobjection.Somehavethoughtthatacommitmenttoaprincipleofequaldistributionimpliesthatonemustalwayspreferanequaldistributionofgoodtoanunequaldistributionevenifeveryoneisbetteroffintheunequaldistribution.Notallegalitariansacceptthattheprincipleofequalityhasthisimplication.Temkindoesacceptit,though.hearguesthatitisnotanobjection,itonlyshowsthattheprincipleofequalityisnottheonlyprincipleofmorality.Heclaimsthatouraversiontolevelingdownisnotexplainedbyarejectionoftheprin-cipleofequality,itisexplainedbythefactthatinadditiontoaprincipleofequalitywealsothinkitismorallyimportanttoadvancewell-being.Andhesaystheprinciplethatenjoinsadvancingwell-beingoverridestheprincipleofequalityinthisinstance.JohnKekesarguesagainsttheprincipleofequalityinChapter10.Hisprincipalobjectionistotheideathatpersonsareowedequalconcernandrespect,sometimestakenasakeygroundoftheprincipleofequality.Onhisaccounttheideathatper-sonsaremoralequalsishighlyimplausible.Hecomplainsfirstthatnoonehasofferedanyjustificationforthisprincipleofequalmoralstatusandmostseemtothinkthatnoneisneeded.Thiscomplaintissharpenedbytheobservationthatwedonotthinkofpeopleasequalsinmanyimportantcircumstances.Parentsdonottreattheirchildrenastheequalsofotherchildren;citizensdonottreatforeignersastheequalsoffellowcitizens;andcriminalsarenottreatedasequalswithordinarylaw-abidingcitizens.Kekesconsidersanumberofpossiblewaysofbluntingtheforceofthiskindofobjectionandfindsthemallwanting.Healsoobjectstoegalitarianismonthegroundthatitseemstocriticizewhatisanecessityforthesocialorganizationofthevastmajorityofdevelopedsocieties:theexistenceofinequalitiesinprospectsamongpersonsinthosesocieties.Moreover,hearguesthattheonlygenuinesourceofappealforequalityisnotaconcernforequalitypersebutacompassionforthosewhoarebadlyoff.Introduction9\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page10Kekesdefendswhathecallsareasonablealternativetoegalitarianism.Itstartsfromtheobservationthatcertainconventionalrulesarenecessaryforthemaintenanceandflourishingofsocieties.Heenumeratesthreecentralkindsofrules(withoutclaimingthatthisisanexhaustivelist):thosepertainingtofamilyandspecialrelationships,thosepertainingtocompliancewithpromisesandcontractsandthoseprotectingthesecurityofpersons.Theseconventionalrulesaresuchthatthosewhoabidebythemdeservepraiseandthosewhoviolatethemdeservepunishment.Furthermoretheserulesalsosubvertequalitybycreatingspecialobligationstowardsfamilymembersandpersonstowhomonehaspromisedthingsormadecontractualrelationswith.Andtheseinequalitiesareessentialtothemaintenanceofsociety,soKekesarguesthategalitarianismsubvertssocietiesandisthereforedangerous.DemocracyTheidealofdemocracywasfirstexplicitlyarticulated,asfarasweknow,inancientGreekcity-statesaroundthesixthcenturybeforetheChristianera.Inthesesocietiesallfreemaleswereequalcitizens,andwomen,slavesandlaborerswereexcluded.Eventhismodestformofdemocracywasunderminedintheancientworldbythedevelopmentoflargeempiresandbytheworkofphilosopherswhoarguedthatpoweroughttobeinthehandsofthemostvirtuousorthemostknowledgeable.Theargu-mentsofPlatoandAristotlewereforthemostpartunansweredforover2,000years.Thisanswercame,though,withtheideathatthosegovernedbythepowerofasovereignoughttobetheultimatesourceofthatsovereign’slegitimacy.TheideaofpopularsovereigntywasdevelopedbyafewmedievalthinkersbuttheriseofdemocraticthinkingmustwaituntilJohnLocke,Jean-JacquesRousseauandJohnStuartMilltoreachitsfruition.Oneofthemajorissuestobedealtwithinthetheoreticaldevelopmentofdemocracyishowtoaccommodatethedemandsofequalcitizenshipwithalargenation-state.Rousseauthoughtthatequalcitizenshipwasonlypossibleinasmallcity-state.JamesMadisonagreedwithhimbutthoughtthatsomekindofcitizenparticipationwaspossibleinlargenation-statesandindeedhearguedthatinsomerespectsitcouldbemoresuccessfulthancity-staterepublics.JohnStuartMillishoweverthemostimportantthinkertotrytoshowhowthedemandsofactivecitizenshipcouldbemadecompatiblewithandindeedenhancedbythelargenation-state.Incontemporarytheorizingtherearetwomainsourcesofdebateconcerningthenormativeunderpinningsofdemocracy.Thefirstiswhetherdemocracyismerelyinstru-mentallyjustifiedorwhetherthereissomeintrinsicmerittodemocraticwaysofmakingdecisions.Somehavethoughtthatifdemocracyandindeedanypoliticalinstitutionsarejustifiedtheymustbejustifiedbyreferencetotheconsequencessuchpoliticalinstitutionshaveforthesocietyinwhichtheyrule.Hobbes,forexample,thoughtthatpoliticalinstitutionsweretobeevaluatedsolelyaccordingtotheirpropens-itytoestablishsocialpeaceinthesocietyandarguedthatmonarchywassuperiortodemocracyinthisrespect.Butonecouldevaluatedemocracyorpoliticalinstitutionsmoregenerallyintermsofthequalityoflegislationthatisproduced,thequalityoftherelationshipsthatariseinsuchsocietiesandthequalityofcharactertraitsthataregeneratedinsuchasociety.10ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page11RichardArnesonandRussellHardinbothargueforcefullyforanexclusivelyinstru-mentalistapproachtotheevaluationofdemocracy.Arneson’smasterargumentinChapter11isthatwheneverapersonexercisespoweroverothersthelegitimacyofthatexerciseofpowermustbeevaluatedintermsoftheconsequencesithasfortherightsandinterestsofthepersonsoverwhompowerisexercised.Arnesonalsoarguesagainsttheideathatdemocracyhasintrinsicvaluebydefendingtheideathatinequal-ityofpowerisanecessaryfeatureofanypoliticalsocietyinwhichadivisionoflaborisnecessaryandinwhichtheinputofanyparticularcitizenisextremelysmall.Thisisimportantbecausetheusualreasonsgivenforthinkingthatdemocracyisintrinsicallyvaluableisthatitrealizesakindofequalityamongcitizensinthemakingofcollectivedecisions.Arnesonalsothinksthatwedonotrequiredemo-craticdecision-makinginvoluntaryassociationsinsocietiesandseemperfectlyhappywiththehierarchieswelivewithincorporations,universitiesandchurches.Hearguesthatifwereallythoughtequalityintheprocessofcollectivedecision-makingwererequired,wewouldrequireitintheseassociations.InChapter12ElizabethAndersonargues,tothecontrary,thatdemocracyhasintrinsicvalue.Thatis,itisimportantnotonlythatwehaveourinterestsadvancedinourpoliticalsocietiesbutthatweadvancethemourselvesanddon’thavethemhandedonaplattertous.Ourparticipationisessential.Andersonmakesananalogywithshopping.Shethinksmostofusdon’tmerelywanttohaveourinterestsinhavingconsumergoodssatisfied,wewanttogoaboutgettingthethingsforourselves,withallthedeliberationandexperimentationthatthisinvolves.Anderson’sargumentisnotprimarilybasedonequalitybutratheronadeepinterestinparticipation.Sheplacesthedemocraticprocessnarrowlyconceivedwithinthecontextofalargerdemocraticsocietyinwhichpeopletreateachotherasequalsinongoingprocessesofcooperationandexperimentation.DeliberativeDemocracyTheotherissuethathasbeenparticularlyprominentinmoderndebatesaboutdemocracyhasbeenthequestionofdeliberativedemocracy.Bydeliberationwemeantheparticipationindiscussionanddebateofcitizensinsocietywithaneyetogivingreasonsfortheirpositionsandbeingopentothereasonsthatothersgivefortheirownpositions.Theidealofdeliberativedemocracyisthatcollectivedecisionsaremadeasmuchaspossibleonthebasisofthisgoodfaithexchangeofreasonsandideasamongcitizens.Contemporarydebatesfocusonthefeasibilityofdelibera-tionindemocracyaswellasitsdesirability.Thefirstquestionconcernswhetherdeliberationonalargescaleisfeasible.InChapter13RussellHardinarguesthatdeliberationonasocietywidescaleisneitherfeasiblenordesirable.Hisfunda-mentalconcernisgroundedintheminimalinfluenceordinarycitizenscanhaveonthepoliticalprocessofanymodernstate.Theideaisthatsincecitizenshavesolittleimpactontheoutcomeofelections,theyhavevirtuallynoincentivetoacquireanevenmodestabilitytoengageinthekindofsophisticateddeliberationenvisagedbydeliberativedemocrats.Hardinthinksthatmostpeopleareforthemostpartself-interestedsotheyaresimplynotgoingtodowhatisnecessaryforparticipatingindeliberation.Solarge-scaledeliberationisnotlikelytocomeabout.ButsuchdeliberationisnotdesirableeithersincehethinksthatgivenitslargescaleandIntroduction11\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page12lowlevelsofcitizens’informationthedeliberationwouldbeofquitelowquality.Furthermore,Hardinargues,itisbetterforcitizenstospendthelimitedtimetheyhavedevotingthemselvestotheproductivejobstheyhaveandtotheirprivateliveswheretheirknowledgecanmakeasignificantdifference.JoshuaCohenworriesaboutthefeasibilityofdeliberationinlarge-scaledemocraciesaswell(Chapter14).Hearguesthatdeliberationisanidealbecausehethinksthatitismostlikelytoproducejusticeunderstoodasthetermsofassociationfreeandequalpersonswouldagreeoniftheywerereasonableandrational.Deliberationalsohasbeneficialeffectsontheunderstandingandcharactersofcitizens.Andfinallydeliberationamongequalcitizensembodiesanidealofmutualrespect.However,Cohenisconcernedwithwhetherdeliberationinactualsocietiescanliveuptotheidealsofdeliberativedemocracy.Hediscussestheworrythatdeliberationmightinfactempowerthosewhoarewelltodoandwelleducatedoverothersandthusincreasetheinequalityofpowerinmodernpoliticalsocieties,buthemarshalsempiricalevidencethatthepoorinvariouscloselystudiedcaseswere,throughdeliberativeparticipation,abletoenhancetheirpoliticalpower.Heisalsoconcernedwithsomerecentargumentsthatdeliberationmaynotproducereasoneddiscussionbutrathergroup-thinkandnarrow-mindedness.Inhisview,thispossibilitycallsforgoodinstitutionaldesignasaremedy.Cohenisalsoconcernedwiththeproblemofscale.Thestudieshecitesinfavorofdeliberationtendtobestudiesofsmallgroups.Thebigquestioniswhetherthiscanbescaledup.CoheniscautiouslymoresanguinethanHardinonthisquestion,basedontheobservationsthatpeoplecanlearnhowtoparticipateasequalsinmorelocalcontextsandusetheseskillsinlargersettingsandthatcivicinstitutionssuchasinterestgroups,politicalparties,andthemediacanenhancedeliberativecapacities.ConstitutionalismAnissuementionedearlierwaswhetherliberaldemocraciesmusthaveinplacelegalstructuresthatdefineandprotectbasicrightsandlibertiespriortoandindependentoftheworkingsofdemocracies.Thisiswhatconstitutionsdo.Aconstitutionisasetoflawsthatenablesandstructurestheprocessofcollectivedecision-makingandsetslimitstowhatcollectivedecisionsmaybemade.Itsubjectstheprocessofmakinglawtotheruleoflaw.Thebigquestionsconcerningconstitutionalismhavebeenwhetherawrittenconstitutionisnecessary,whetherconstitutionsmustincludebothlawsenablingthemakingoflegislationandlimitingthepowerofthelegislature,andwhetherconstitutionsshouldbelegallyenforcedbyanindependentjudiciary.InChapters15and16JeremyWaldronandLarryAlexanderarticulatethedif-ferentpurposesforconstitutionalarrangementsandfocusontheissueofthelimitsconstitutionscanimposeondemocracy.Waldronarguesthatasidefromtheworkthatconstitutionsdoinenablingcollectivedecision-making,theircapacitiestolimitsubsequentdemocraticdecision-makingareproblematicparticularlywhensupplementedwithanindependentjudiciarywithpowerstolegallyenforcelimitsonthedecision-makingofdemocraticassemblies.Waldronworriesthatthisallowsearlierdecision-makerstoconstrainlatterdecision-makerseventhoughtheremaybegoodfaithdisagreementbetweenthem.Healsoseesthatitallowsanindependentandunelectedjudiciarytoconstrainademocraticlegislatureonissuesonwhichthereisalsogoodfaithandreasonabledisagreement.HereWaldronproceedsfromaconceptionofthe12ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page13intrinsicvalueofdemocraticdecision-makingincircumstanceswherethereisseri-ousgoodfaithdisagreementamongequalsandarguesthatitisunclearhowitcanbelegitimateinthesecircumstancestogivedecision-makingpowertounelectedjudges.Alexander’schaptergivesanaccountofthedifferentdimensionsofconstitutions.Hegivesanaccountofthedifferentstepsintheconstructionofconstitutionsandattemptsanaccountoftheirbasicnatureandfunctions.AlexandertakesissuewithWaldron’sthesisthatconstitutionallimitationsondemocraticlegislaturescoupledwithjudicialreviewisillegitimate.Ultimatelyhisargumentproceedsfromalargelyinstrumentalistaccountofthevalueofdemocracy.Sincedemocracyandallpoliticalinstitutionsaretobeevaluatedsolelyintermsoftheresultsofdemocraticinstitutions,Alexanderseesnofundamentalreasonwhyconstitutionallimitationsandjudicialreviewoughtnottobeimposedondemocraticlegislatures.Therelationbetweenconstitutionsanddemocraticactivitystrikeatthecenterofthephilosophicalexaminationofthepromiseandlimitationsoftheliberalproject,foritraisestheissueofwhetherprin-ciplesofjusticecanbejustifiedonphilosophicalgroundspriorto,andindependentof,contextualfactorsaboutsocieties,citizens,andinstitutions.Thiscontinuesthequestionoftheviabilityoftheliberalprojectparticularlyinraisingtheissueofwhethernormativepoliticalprinciplescanapplyuniversallyacrosspopulationsandindependentofspecificfactsaboutpeopleandsocieties.ThePoliticalPersonAllnormativepoliticaltheorizingpresupposeswhatMichaelSandelhascalleda“polit-icalanthropology”inthattheyrestuponamodelofthepersonorselforcitizenthatisunderstoodasthosewhoaresubjecttothoseprinciples.Howonemodelsthesesubjectswillaffectthecontentofthosenormativeprinciplesinatleasttwoways.First,suchmodelsreflectthebasicintereststhathumanbeings,asmembersofsocieties,shareandtowhichpoliticalstructuresshouldrespond.Second,themodelofthepersonrepresentstheperspectivefromwhichthelegit-imacyofpoliticalinstitutionsisestablished.Thatis,ifonefollowsinthewakeofthesocialcontracttraditioninseeingthatthebasicinstitutionsofpoliticalpowerarejustifiedonlyifthepersonslivingunderthem,insomesense,agreeto,accept,orendorsethem,thenthewayinwhichwemodelthosepersonswillaffectwhetherwethinkthiskindofendorsementispossibleorlikely.Traditionally,theliberalapproachtothesequestionsistoputforwardwhatwastakentobeageneric,neutralconceptionoftheperson(andherinterests)asthelinchpinofconceptionsofjustice.However,fromanumberofdirectionsthisassump-tionhasbeenchallenged,forexampleoverwhethersucha“generic”conceptionofthepersonisreallyadisguisedformofprivilegingsomekindsofpeopleoverothers.Forinstance,thechargeismadeindifferentwaysthattheliberalconceptionofthepersonisoverlyindividualisticinthatitassumesthatpersons’fundamentalinter-estsareconcernedonlywiththepursuitoftheirownindividuallyformulatedends.Suchamodelofthepersonrenderslesssignificanttheneedsandinterests(aswellastheself-conceptions)ofthosepeoplewhodefinethemselveswithfundamentalreferencetogroups,cultures,andcommunities.Suchpeopleandgroups,itisclaimed,arenotIntroduction13\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page14adequatelyrepresentedbythemodeloftheperson/citizeninstandardliberalcon-ceptionsofjustice.Beginninginthe1980s,thischallengearosefromtheso-called“communitarian”critiqueofliberalism,exemplifiedmostforcefullybywriterssuchasCharlesTaylor,MichaelSandel,MichaelWalzer,andAlasdairMacIntyre.RichardDaggerandMargaretMooreengagewiththisdebateintheirchaptershere,takingusfromtheoriginalformulationsofthecommunitarianchallengeandbringingthingsuptodate.DaggerinChapter17helpfullylaysoutthemainprongsofthischallengetoliber-alismaswellassomenowstandardliberalrejoinders.Forexample,totheclaimthatliberalismassumesaproblematicconceptionofthepersonassomehow“priorto”allherendsandvalues,liberalsreplythatthisisamisunderstanding.Conceptionsofthepersoninliberalprinciplesofjusticerequireonlythatnoparticularendorpurposeisimmunefromre-examination,notthatallendsandcommitmentscouldbesetapartfrommyself-understandingandacceptedorrejectedintoto.Thisisadebatethat,onthetermsinwhichitwasstaged,liberalismlargelywon:totheextenttowhichthevalueofcommunaltiestogroupsandtraditionswasmeanttotrumptheprotectionofbasic(liberal)rightsaffordedtoindividuals,noplausibleviewwouldinsistthatprotectionofthecommunityismorecrucial.Butthedebatedid,Daggerexplains,forceliberalsandothertheoriststolookmorecarefullyattherelationbetweenselfandcommunitythatprinciplesofjusticeassume.Forexample,Daggerlookscloselyattheideasof“individualism”and“community”tosuggestthatsomeconceptionsofthesetwopoliticalidealsmaywellfacechallengesfromtheotherdirection.Forexample,hefavorsaconceptionofcommunitywhichisnarrowenoughtocapturetheuniquenessandimportanceofcommunalrelationsformanypeoplebutleavesopentheultimatevalueofcommunities–somearegoodandworthprotectingpolitically,othersnotsomuch.Theupshot,however,isthatinsofarascommunalconnectionsdoorshouldtakeonapoliticaldimension,theresultingpoliticalviewamountstocivicrepublicanism–theviewthatone’sfreedomandwellbeingisdefined,protectedandpromotedbyone’sstatusasanequalcitizeninaself-governingdemocracy.Thisviewhasnowgainedprominenceamongvarioustheorists,someofthemlatter-day“communitarians.”MargaretMoore,inChapter18,picksupthisdiscussionbutsuggeststhat,contrarytothewaythisdebatewasfashionedinitsearlierform,thechallengetoliberalismwagedbybothcommunitarianandmulticulturaltheorists(aboutwhichmorebelow)cannotberesolvedabstractlybutwilldependonandvaryaccordingtothecontextsinwhichtheyplayout.Mooreseesthecommunitarianchallengetohavemorphednotintorepublicanismofthesortjustmentionedbutintoidentity-basedcritiquesoftheassumptionofthegenericindividualcitizencentraltoliberalism.Thischallenge,sheargues,hasmorebiteinthatitraisesseriousquestionsaboutwhethertheliberalcon-ceptionofthecitizencanaccommodatethedemandsof“difference”–thevariableandculturallygroundedmodesofidentitythatareincreasinglyfoundinmodernsocieties.Moorediscusseshowidentity-basedclaimsshouldhaveanimportancetowhich(liberal)theoriesofjusticemustrespondforanumberofreasons,forexamplethatsocialidentitiesandtheinterestsconnectedtothemareoftencentraltotheperson’ssenseofself,andthatitisthereforeinconsistentwithrespectforpeople’sintegritytoaskthemtopursuesocialgoalsthatdeviatesignificantlyfromthisself-conception.However,someclaimsofthissortcanbeaccommodatedunderneutralpolitical14ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page15principlesbyallowingexemptionsfromgeneralrules,suchasallowingSikhstowearturbansinsteadofmotorcyclehelmets.Suchexceptionscanbederivedfromthemoreabstractliberalcommitmenttoequality:treatingpeoplefairlyinvolvesaffordingdifferenttreatmenttopeoplewhoaredifferentinsignificantways,inthesamewaythatconscientiousobjectionexemptionsareallowedformilitaryservice.Butamoretrenchantchallengetoliberalneutrality,Moorepointsout,comesfromcasesinwhichmembersofidentitygroupsrequirepolicyresponsesthataffordpositiverecognitionofneedsratherthansimpletoleration,suchascallstoreformmarriagelawstoallowgayandlesbianmarriage.Classicalliberalversionsoftolerationsimplyrespondtosuchclaimsbyallowingactivities(withoutcriminalpenalty)assimplyaprivatematter.Butinthesecases,groupmemberscallforpositiveaffirmationofawayoflife,anaffirmationthatrequiresrestructuringpublicpoliciesinazero-summannerrelativetothetraditionalpractice.Theparticularresolutiontotheseproblems,sheargues,cannotbedeterminedintheabstractbutonlyinacontext-dependentmannerthatlookscarefullyatrealisticoptionsfortreatingallinterestsequally.Thisattentiontohistoricalcontextechoesconsiderationsmentionedearlierabouttherelationsbetweenabstractnormativepoliticalprinciplesandfactsaboutthepeopleandsocietytowhichthoseprinciplesaretoapply.Politicalcritiqueandevaluationrelatestoparticularkindsofsocietiessuchastheconstitutionaldemocraciesofthelatemodernage.Suchsocialsettingsare(assumedtobe)characterizedbysub-populationswithdifferingidentitiesandcontrastingcommitmentstovalues,religiousaffiliations,andsoon.ThisisallpartofwhatRawlscallsthefactof(reasonable)pluralism.Butinadditiontothesedifferencesinvalueframeworksandmoralcommitment,therearedifferencesinrelationtohistoricalexperience.Sub-populationsinmoderndemocracieshaveinfactexperiencedwhatanyplausibletheorywouldcallinjusticeandoppression,asintheexperienceofracialminorities,women,andindigenouspeoples.Allofthesehistorical(andongoing)patternsofoppressionaresaidbysometoberelevanttothenormativeprinciplesthatareintendedtoapplytothesegeo-politicallocales.InChapter19AnthonyLadenbeginswiththeobservationthatpoliticalphilo-sophygenerallydevelopsinreactiontosocialeventsandmovements.Inparticular,theriseofsocialmovementscharacterizedbyapoliticsofidentity–feminism,thecivilrightsandgayrightsmovements,callsforculturalrecognitionandgrouprights–putpressureonthestandardliberaldoctrinesofdifference-blindequality,wheretheassumptionwasthatabstractprinciplesoflibertyandequalitywouldapplytoallregardlessofparticularsofidentityorsocialsituation(exceptinsofarasthatwasrelevanttowhetherindividualswereequalorunequal).Theperceivedfailureofliberalpolicies,forexampleofenforcinganti-discriminationlawandguaranteesofequalityofopportunity–toachievemeaningfulequalityfortraditionallyoppressedgroupscausedare-thinkingofliberaltheory.AsMooresuggests,thereisacomplexdynamicbetweenpolicyconflictsinparticularcontexts,suchascallsforparticularrightsorexemptionsbyspecificsocialgroups,andrevisionsofabstractprinciple.Ladenagrees,ashetracesthedebatesbetweencriticswhoclaimthatliberalismisinsufficientforaccountingforthespecialinjusticessufferedbyidentitygroupsandliberaltheoristsattemptingaresponse.Theparticularformsofinjusticecontestedinthedemandsforfullequalitybywomenandminoritygroups,callsforrecognitionbyculturalgroups,andinargumentsforIntroduction15\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page16self-determinationrightsbynationalminorities,arenoteasilyaccountedforinthestandardliberalparadigm.Thatparadigmremainshamstrunginclassifyingthesekindsofinjusticeaseitherviolationsofbasicindividualrights,typesofdiscrimina-tion(denyingequalityofopportunity),oramal-distributionsofresources.Butthesesocialmovementscallforanendtokindsofoppressionandmarginalizationthatarenoteasilyclassifiedintheseways.Ladenhelpfullytracesthegiveandtakebetweenidentity-basedcritiquesofliberaljusticeandvariousattemptsbyliberalphilosopherstorespond.Intheend,however,hearguesthatamorefundamentalrevisionofliberaljusticemustbepressedtotakeaccountofthesechallenges.Inparticular,heclaimsthatjusticeshouldbeseennotintermsofindividualrightsandcon-ditionsbutratherinthekindsofsocialrelationsthatshouldbeenjoyedinalegitimatedemocracy.IrisYoungconfrontstheseissuesinChapter20withreferencetothe“politicsofdifference,”aphrasethatsheprefersstronglytothe“politicsofidentity.”Identitiesare,shethinks,alwayscontestableinthattheparticularcontoursofourgender,ethnic,orracialidentities,andtheparticularintereststhatattachtothem,arenotfixedquantitiesorsettledmatters.Inheressay,shecontraststwowaysofrespond-ingtostrugglesbysocialgroupsofthesortwearediscussing,whichshecallsthe“structuralinequalityapproach”andthe“societalcultureapproach.”ThelatterismostassociatedwiththoseliberalphilosopherssuchasWillKymlicka,JosephRaz,andseveralothers,whohaveattemptedtoexplaintheinjusticeofgroupoppressionwithoutforsakingthefundamentalsoftheliberalcommitmenttoindividualrightsbasedonautonomyandequality.Thecrucialstepinthistypeofargument,though,istheclaimthatthegroupsinquestion(uponwhosebehalfthecritiquesofliberaljusticearemade)formahomogeneousculturalunitthatitsmembersseeasgivingmeaningtotheirlifepursuits.ButYoungarguesthatsuchanapproach,whilevalu-ableinsomeways,cannotgiveaplausibleaccountoftheinjusticeexperienced,forexample,bywomen,racialminorities,andthedisabled.Thislastgroup,forinstance,isvictimizednotsimplybyalackofaresource,suchasaskill,butalackofaccom-modationorfitbetweentheirabilitiesandthephysicalenvironmentthatisconsid-erednormalfortherestofthepopulation.Inaddition,womensufferinequalitybecauseofagender-specificdivisionoflaborthatdoesmorethandenyopportunitiesbutdefinesacceptablesocialrolesthatrelegatewomenintoconstrainingandstereotypicalsocialcategories.Thestructuralinequalityapproach,ontheotherhand,documentshowgroupsinteractalongsocialaxesthatcanbecharacterizedbyhierarchyanddifferentialprivilegeinareasofthedivisionoflabor,socialdecision-makingpower,andtheestablishmentandmaintenanceofdominantnormsofbehavior,appearance,dress,andsoon.Thiswayofanalyzingtheinjusticeofgroup-basedsocialexperienceneednotrestonproblematicassumptionsofhomogeneityoressentialismaboutidentitygroups,somethingthesocietalculturesviewtripsover.Youngarguesfurtherthatcallsforarevisedconceptionofjusticetotakefullaccountofthepoliticsofdif-ferencehavebeenoftenmisunderstoodbecauseithasbeenassumedthatsuchcon-ceptionssharethetraditionalliberalviewthatquestionsofjusticeonlyapplytotheformal,coerciveinstitutionsofthestate.Sheclaimsthatmanyaspectsofcivilsoci-etythatunderlayoppressivesocialconditionsenforcedominantnormslessformally(thoughsometimesquitecoercively),andthesepatternsofbehaviorandrelationsmust16ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page17alsobethesubjectmatterofpoliticalcritiqueandphilosophy.Thismarksaprofounddeparturefromtraditional(liberal)politicalphilosophythatbeganwiththequestionofwhatjustifiedlegitimatestatepowerandrarelylookedbeyondtheoperationsofwhatRawlscallstheinstitutionsofthebasicstructure.InternationalIssuesCosmopolitanismContemporarypoliticalphilosophyuntilrecentlyhasfocusedlargelyonindividualpoliticalsocietiesandtheirevaluation.JohnRawlsexplicitlylimitedhistheoryofjusticetoconsiderationofthejusticeofanindividualpoliticalsocietyunderstoodasaclosedsystemwhichpeopleenterintobybirthandexitbydeathalone.ThisfocusontheindividualstateastheunitofconcernforideasofjusticeiscommontopoliticalphilosophysincePlatoandAristotle.Inpartithasbeensupportedbythetwomaintraditionsofthoughtoninternationalrelations:realismandnaturallawtheory.Realism,firstarticulated(thoughnotnecessarilyendorsed)byThucydidesinancientGreeceassertsthattheworldofstatesconstitutesakindofviolentanarchyinwhichmoralnormsdonotholdbetweenstatesevenwhiletheydoholdwithinstates.Theprinciplesofjusticeobtainonlyamongrelationsbetweenpersonswithinstates.ThesecondviewarticulatedmostclearlyinthescholasticandProtestantnaturallawtheoriesofFranciscodeVitoriaandHugoGrotiusassertsthattheinter-nationalsystemisasocietyofsocieties.Onthisviewthereareindependentpolit-icalsocietiesthatoweeachotherdutiesofnon-interference,dutiesflowingfromvoluntaryagreementsanddutiesofaidintimesofprofoundcrisissuchasattackbyotherstates.Theprinciplesofjustwarandofglobaljusticemoregenerallyaremodeledontheprinciplesthatapplytodomesticpoliticalsocieties.Thisviewgivesprideofplacetodomesticpoliticalsocietiesinthedevelopmentofinternationalnormsandtheorizesaboutinternationalsocietyonthebasisofanalogieswithdomesticpolit-icalsocieties.Still,cosmopolitanismisnotanentirelynewdoctrineinpoliticalphilosophy.Thestoicphilosophersinvokedtheideaofacitizenoftheworld.ButpoliticalreflectionindefenseoftheideaofworldgovernmentwasgivenanearlyarticulationbyDanteAlighieri.AnothermoremodestdefenseofglobalpoliticalinstitutionswasgivenbyImmanuelKant,thoughhedefendednotworldgovernmentbutafederationofthestatesoftheworld.AndmuchsocialistandMarxistthoughtconceivesofworkersaspartofaninternationalmovementfortheestablishmentsocialism.Themodernerahascalledtheprominenceofthestateinpoliticaltheoryintoquestionbecauseofthemyriadrelationsthatcitizensofonesocietyholdwiththoseofothersocieties.Themassiveexpansionofinternationaltrade,finance,communica-tions,transportationandmigrationofpeoplesandtheincreasingawarenessofpublicevilssuchaspollutionandglobalwarmingcoupledwiththeriseofinterna-tionalinstitutionsthathavesignificantpoliticalpowertiepersonsinallpartsoftheglobewitheachother.Thesefactsmakesalientquestionsofdistributivejusticeonaglobalscaleandquestionsaboutthelegitimacyofglobalpoliticalinstitutionsaswellasaboutmoralnormsofaglobalreachmoregenerally.Introduction17\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page18Onequestionofparticularinteresttocontemporarypoliticaltheoristsistheques-tionoftheproperscopeofprinciplesofdistributivejustice.CosmopolitanswithrespecttodistributivejusticesuchasSimonCaney(Chapter21)havearguedthattheproperscopeofprinciplesofdistributivejusticeisaglobalone.TheprinciplesofequalityofopportunityoughttoapplytoeveryoneintheworldsothatachildborninMalawioughttohavethesamevaluableopportunitiesasachildborninSweden.Thisisastrikingandambitiousclaimthatseemstoimplymoreorlessimmediatelythattheworldisprofoundlyunjust.Thefundamentalargumentforthisthesisisthatthepoliticalsocietyoneisbornintoissomethingforwhichonecannotbeheldrespons-ible.Sooneperson’slifeshouldnotgoworsethananother’sonthebasisofthefactthatonewasborninonepoliticalsocietyandanotherinadifferentpoliticalsociety.Thereaderwillseethesimilarityofstructureinthisargumenttothebasicargumentsforegalitarianism.Caneydefendsthisargumentagainstanumberofrecentobjectionsfromanumberofquarters.OnesuchrecentargumentisproposedbyJonMandleinChapter22.Mandlearguesfortheconclusionthatprinciplesofdistributivejusticeapplyparticularlywithinthecontextofapoliticalcommunityandnottotheworldasawhole,atleastaslongasitisnotaunifiedpoliticalcommunity.ThebasicargumentMandlegivesproceedsfromaconceptionofjusticethattiesittofreedominadistinctiveway.Mandlearguesthatthefoundationofjusticeistheprinciplethatonemaynotsubordinatethewillsofotherstoone’sown.Hearguesthatinthecaseofindividualsintheworld,notrelatedthroughpoliticalinstitutions,thisrequirementofnon-subordinationimpliesthatonemaynotviolatetheirbasichumanrights.IfIenslaveorkillanotherpersonorfailtohelpinprovidingthemfortheirbasichumanneedsinordertoadvancesomearbitraryaimofmyown,Iamsubordinatingthatperson’swilltomyown.Butbeyondthis,thereisnorequirementofdistributivejusticeforpeoplegenerallyForMandle,thepicturechangeswhenweliveundercommonpoliticalinstitutionsthatarecoerciveandexpectcompliance.Inthiscase,hesays,wedosubordinateanother’swilltoourownifweimposelawsorinstitutionsonhimthatcannotbejustifiedtohim.Onlyifthelawsandinstitutionsthatexpecthimtocomplycanbejustifiedtohimcanhebesaidnottobesubordinated.Mandlethinksthatitisinthecontextofthisrequirementofmutualjustificationoflawandinstitutionsthattherequirementsofdemocracyandthenofdistributivejusticeariseandnototherwise.Soitisonlywithindomesticpoliticalinstitutionsthatconsiderationsofdistributivejusticehaveapplication.Andsotheinternationalrealmoughttoberegulatedbyinstitutionsthatrespecthumanrightsbutnotdistributivejustice.HumanRightsThegreatmajorityofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophers,cosmopolitanandnon-cosmopolitanalike,agreeonthecentralimportanceofhumanrightsintheevalu-ationoftheinternationalorder.Everyoneowesrespectforthehumanrightsofeveryotherperson.Therehavebeenmanydisagreements,however,abouthowsuchrightsoughttobedefinedandhowtheyaregrounded.Aretheymerelyinstitutionalpro-tectionsofbasichumaninterestsconferredbyinternationalinstitutions,ordotheyhaveabasisinthenaturesofhumanbeings?Thelatteranswerismostclearlyassertedbythetraditionofnaturallawtheory.Butmanymoderntheoristshavechosenthe18ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page19formerreply.Inaddition,oneofthemosthotlydebatedquestionsamongcontem-porarypoliticalthinkersconcernsthecontentofthesehumanrights.Somehavearguedthatthereareonlynegativehumanrights,whichimpliesthathumanrightsimplyonlynegativedutiesofnon-interferenceonothers’parts.Othersthinkthatinadditiontonegativehumanrightstherearealsopositivehumanrights,orrightstothepositiveprovisionofgoodstopersonsbyothers.Theserightsimplypositivedutiestoaidothersortoprovidethemwithbasicneeds.Thiskindofapproachfindssomeofitsmostformidablesupportinthefactthatallthecentralhumanrightstreatiesanddeclarationsincludebothpositiveandnegativerights.TheideathatthereareonlynegativehumanrightsispartlysupportedbythecontributionofOnoraO’NeillinChapter23.Shearguesthatrightsmustbecorre-latedwithduties.Andshearguesthatnegativerightsarecorrelatedwithnegativedutiesthatareeasilyassignabletoallhumanbeings.Soeachpersoncanmakeaclaimagainsteveryotherpersonintheworldthatthatpersonnotinterfereorharmthem.But,shearguesthesituationofpositiverights,suchasarighttoeducation,isnotsoeasytounderstand.WhomustprovidetheeducationtothepersoninMalawi?Dowe(citizensoftheU.S.)haveadutytodothis?O’Neillappearstothinkthatthisisimplausible.PerhapsthestateofMalawihasthisduty.Butinthiscase,thethoughtis,weareassigningadutytoanentitythatisacontingentproductofinstitutionalarrangements.Inthecaseofnegativerightswehavethemagainstallpersonsandnoinstitutionalsettingisrequiredfordeterminingwhatdutiespeoplehave,butitappearsthatinthecaseofpositiverights,thedutiesmustbeassignedbyinstitutionsandthiswilldependonamyriadcontingenciesmakingthemspecialrightsandnothumanrights.Henceitisnotclearhowtherecanbepositivehumanrights.JamesNickeloffersanaccountofhumanrightsthatismeanttosupportthethesisthattherearepositivehumanrightstoeconomicandsocialgoods(Chapter24).Hisaccountofhumanrightsisgroundedintheideathatrespectforhumandignityimpliestheneedtoprotectthefundamentalinterestsofpersons.Thesefundamentalinterestsareinlife,agency,andinavoidingcruelanddegradingaswellasseverelyunfairtreatment.Thesegroundcertainfundamentalmoralclaimsonothers.Nickelargues,then,thattheprovisionofgoods,educationandhealthcarearenecessarytothesatisfactionofthesefundamentalclaims.Sincehumanrightsaregroundedinthefundamentalinterestsassociatedwithhumandignity,theycanbethoughtofasuniversalhumanrightswithoutthesuppositionthattheyentailuniversalandcleardutiesonthepartofallpersons.Indeed,Nickelclaimsthattheprimaryaddresseeofhumanrightsisthestateinwhichapersonlivesandfailingthattheotherstatesintheinternationalcommunity.Thisconcludesouroverviewofthedominantthemesofthevolumeand,wethink,of“mainstream”politicalphilosophyasitiscurrentlypracticedinacademicsettings.Muchhasbeenomitted,ofcourse,whichwouldbeofgreatinteresttothestudentofpoliticaltheory.Examplesincludethenatureofpoliticalauthority,thenatureandvalueofpoliticalfreedom,thejustificationofrevolution,andothersuchtopics.Inaddition,therearesomeofthemostpowerfulchallengestomainstream(especiallyliberal)politicalphilosophyfromtheoristsoutsideoftheanalytictradition,includ-ingcriticaltheory(andtheworkofJürgenHabermas),pragmatism(especiallyJohnDewey),andpost-moderntheory.Wemightalsomentionthatfeminism,criticalracetheory,andpost-colonialstudiesarenotspecificallyincluded,thoughwehopethatIntroduction19\nCDIC01.qxd2/4/0915:43Page20theissuesraisedbyattentiontoidentity,democracy,andinternationaljusticedis-cussedinthechaptersherewillpermeatethesespecifictrajectoriesofthought.Thoughwedon’tpretend,ofcourse,tohavecapturedtheseveralandmultifacetedaspectsofthoseapproaches.Onefinalnote:althoughthisseriesiscalled“Debatesin...,”wehavenotheldstrictlytoadebateformathere.Wethinkthatthetopicscovered,whicharethem-selvesaselectivesampleofabroadfield,donotadmiteasilyofa“for”and“against”formatofthesorttheword“debate”connotes.Wethinkofthesepiecesasoverviewswithdistinctpointofview,andwehavepairedtheessayssothatthepointsofviewtendtobeintension.Butalloftheseissuesadmitoffarmorethantwosides,andargumentslaidouthereshowcommongroundaswellasdisagreement.Thepurposehereistoprovideacross-sectionofsomeofthebestthinkingaboutparticulartopicsandtosuggestwheresomeofthemosttrenchantfaultlinesbetweencontrastingapproachestothosetopicscanbefound.20ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page21QUESTIONSOFMETHODContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page23CHAPTERTWO1FactsandPrinciplesGeraldA.Cohena.Inthispaper,Iargueforathesis,whichIstateinsectiond.below,abouttherelationshipbetweenfactsandnormativeprinciples(or,asIshallcallthem,forshort,“principles”).Anormativeprinciple,here,isageneraldirectivethattellsagentswhat(theyought,oroughtnot)todo,andafactis,orcorrespondsto,anytruth,otherthan(ifanyprinciplesaretruths)aprinciple,ofakindthatsomeonemightreasonablythinksupportsaprinciple.Notethat,undertheforegoingstipulations,itisnotexcludedthatnormativeprinciplesmightthemselvesbefactsinadifferentsenseof“fact”fromthatwhichisherestipulated.Principlesmight,thatis,befactsinthebroadersenseof“fact”inwhichalltruths,including,therefore,trueprinciples(ifthereareany),representfacts.Imyselfbelievethatthereexisttruenormativeprinciples,butthethesisaboutprinciplesandfactstobedefendedhereis,asIshallexplainatq.below,neutralwithrespecttowhetheranynormativeprinciplesaretruths.b.Theverylittle(almostnothing)thatIjustsaidaboutwhatconstitutesafactsufficesformydemonstrativepurposes.Iamhappyforfactstobewhatevermyopponentsinthisdebate,whosepositionIshalldescribeinc.,(reasonably)understandthemtobe:myargument,soIbelieve,isrobustacrosspermissiblevariationsinthemeaningof“fact,”anditisalsoneutralacrosscontrastingconceptionsoftherelationshipoffactandvalue.Nordoesmyviewaboutfactsandprinciples,orsoIargueatl.below,requiremetotakeapositiononthefamousquestionofwhetheran“ought”canfollowfroman“is.”Itbearsemphasisthatthequestionthatmythesisanswersisneutralwithrespecttocontroversiesabouttheobjectivityofprinciples,therelationshipbetweenfactsandvalues,andthe“is-ought”question,and,letmeadd,forgoodmeasure,therealism/anti-realism/quasi-realism/a-little-bit-of-realism-here-not-so-much-realism-therecontroversy.Thequestionpursuedhereisdistinctfromthosethatdominatethemeta-ethicalliterature,and,sofarasIknow,itishardlydiscussedinthatliterature.YouwillinevitablymisunderstandmeifyouassimilatethethesisIshallstatetoonewithinthosefamiliarcontroversies.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page24Theindependentstatusoftheissuecanvassedhereinrelationtolong-standingcontroversiesmakesthepresentdiscussionlessinterestingthanitotherwisemightbe,inthatithasalimitedeffectonthosepopularphilosophicalcontroversies,butalsoinonewaymoreinterestingthanitotherwisemightbe,inthatitaddressesarelativelynoveland,Ithink,consequentialissue,anissuewhichphilosophersdon’targueaboutmuch,butaboutwhichmostofthemspontaneously,or,whenappro-priatelyprovoked,displaystronglyopposedandunarguedviews,whicheachsidefindsobviouslytrue:thatcircumstancesuggeststhatthere’ssomethingofaphilosophicalproblemhere,aboutwhichmostphilosophersareatleastinpartmistaken(becauseaviewisunlikelytobeobviouslytrueifagoodlynumberofreflectivethinkersbelieveittobeobviouslyfalse).c.Thethesistobedefendedherecontradictswhatmanypeople(and,Ibelieve,mostmoralandpoliticalphilosophers)aredisposedtothink,towit,thatourbeliefsaboutmattersofnormativeprinciple,includingourbeliefsaboutthedeepestandmostgeneralmattersofprinciple,shouldreflect,orrespondto,truthsaboutmattersoffact:theyshould,thatis,–thisishowIamusing“reflect”and“respondto”–includemattersoffactamongthegroundsforaffirmingthem.So,forexample,manyfinditobviousthatourbeliefsaboutprinciplesshouldreflectfactsabouthumannature,suchasthefactthathumanbeingsareliabletopain,orthefactthattheyarecapableofsympathyforeachother,andtheyalsothinkthatourbeliefsaboutprinciplesshouldreflectfactsabouthumansocialorganization,suchasthetendencyforpeopletoencountercollectiveactionproblems,orforsocietiestobecomposedofindividualswhohavediverseinterests,andconflictingopinions.Thesepeoplebelievethatallsoundprinciplesare,asIshallsay,fact-sensitive,bywhich,onceagain,Imeanneithermorenorlessthanthatfactsformatleastpartofthegroundsforaffirming2them.Constructivistsaboutjusticebelievethat,anditwasmyinterestinthatcon-structivismthatledmetothinkabout,andtoaddress,theissueunderdiscussionhere.Iexplore,here,ingeneralterms,therelationshipbetweenprinciplesthataregroundedinfactsandthefactsthatgroundthem.Iapplywhatresultstoconstruc-tivisminthestudymentionedintheopeningfootnoteofthisarticle.(Abriefsketchofsomeofthatapplicationwillbefoundinsectionss.andt.below.)d.Theviewthatallprinciplesforgoverninghumanlifearesensitivetofactsabouthumanlifesoundsreasonable,anditseems,indeed,tomanypeopletobeobviouslycorrect,butIbelieveittobedemonstrablymistaken.Ibelievethatitcannotbetrueofallprinciplesthattheyaresensitivetofact,andthatitistrueofsomeprinciplesonlybecauseitisfalseofother,fact-insensitive,principles,whichexplainwhygivenfactsgroundfact-sensitiveprinciples.Inmyview–andthisismythesis–aprinciplecanreflectorrespondtoafactonlybecauseitisalsoaresponsetoaprinciplethatisnotaresponsetoafact.Toputthesamepointdifferently,principlesthatreflectfactsmust,inordertoreflectfacts,reflectprinciplesthatdon’treflectfacts.Mythesisdependsonwhatitisforaprincipletobeaprincipleand,moreparticularly,onwhatitisforafacttogroundaprinciple.Thethesisisnotrestrictedinscopetoprinciplesthatareinsomeorothersensecorrect.Thethesisappliestoanyone’sprinciples,betheycorrectornot,solongasshehasacleargraspbothof3whatherprinciplesareandofwhysheholdsthem(where“graspingwhysheholds24GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page25them”isshortfor“knowingwhatgroundsshebelievesshehasforholdingthem”ratherthanfor“whatcauseshertoholdthem”).Italsocharacterizes(underanappro-priatereformulation)whatever(ifanything)constitutesthecorrectsetofprinciples.e.Letmenowdeveloptheadvertisedthesis.First,Iproceedabstractly,butwhatIhopeisahelpfulillustrationfollowsshortly.SupposethatpropositionFstatesafactualclaim,andthat,inthelightof,onthebasisof,herbeliefthatF,apersonaffirmsprincipleP.WemaythenaskherwhyshetreatsFasareasonforaffirmingP.And,ifsheisabletoanswerthatquestion,thenheranswer,soIbelieve,willfeature,orimply,anaffirmationofamoreultimateprinciple(callitP1),aprinciplethatwouldsurvivedenialofPitself,aprinciple,more-over,whichholdswhetherornotFistrue,andwhichexplainswhyFisareasonforaffirmingP:itisalwaysafurtherprinciplethatconfersonafactitsprinciple-groundingpower.Thesaidprinciple,P1,isinsensitivetowhetherornotFholds,althoughP1maybe,asweshallsee,sensitivetootherfacts:Ihavenotyetarguedthattheoriginalprinciple,P,presupposesaprinciplethatisinsensitivetoallfacts,aprinciple,thatis,whichisinsensitivenotonlytoF,butwhichisaltogetherfact-insensitive.LetmeillustratewhatIamincourseofclaiming.IfIamright,whatIsayabouttheforthcomingexampleprovidesanargumentformythesis,sincewhatIsayaboutitis,Ibelieve,bothpatentlytrueandpatentlygeneralizable.Supposesomeoneaffirmstheprinciplethatweshouldkeepourpromises(callthatP)becauseonlywhenpromisesarekeptcanpromiseessuccessfullypursuetheirprojects(callthatF).(IamnotsayingthatthatistheonlybasisonwhichPmightbeaffirmed:thatitisoneplausiblebasissufficesformypurposes).ThenshewillsurelyagreethatshebelievesthatFsupportsPbecausesheaffirmsP1,whichsays,toputitroughly,thatweshouldhelppeopletopursuetheirprojects.ItisP1,here,whichmakesFmatter,whichmakesitsupportP,butthesubject’saffirmationofP1,asopposedtowhetherornotthataffirmationinduceshertoaffirmPitself,hasnoth-ingtodo,essentially,withwhetherornotshebelievesthatF.ShewouldaffirmP1whetherornotshebelievedthefactualstatementF:P1isnot,inherbeliefsystem,sensitivetowhetherornotFistrue.Ifshecametothinkthatfacingbrokenpromisesbuildscharacter,andthatFisthereforefalse,shewouldhavereasontoabandonPbutnoreasontoabandonP1.f.Althoughaprinciplethatmakesafactmatter,intheindicatedfashion,isinsensitivetowhetherornotthatfactobtains,itmayyetbesensitiveto(other)facts.Toseethis,returntothepromisingexample,inwhichP1saysthatweshouldhelppeopletopursuetheirprojects.What,wemaynowask,supportsP1?Apossibleanswerisafreshfactualclaim(callitF1),whichsaysthatpeoplecanachievehappinessonlyiftheyareabletopursuetheirownprojects.But,manifestly,F1thensupportsP1onlyinthelightofayetmoreultimateprinciple,P2,whichsaysthat,absent4otherconsiderations,people’shappinessshouldbepromoted,anditispossiblethattherewillbenofactonwhichthatprinciple,P2,isgrounded.Merely“possible,”though,ifonlybecausesomemightbaseP2onthe(supposed)factthatpromotingpeople’shappinessexpressesourrespectforthem.ButthentheymustholdprincipleP3,namely,thatweoughttoexpressourrespectforpeople,FactsandPrinciples25\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page26which,ifitselfbasedonfact,isbasedonthefactthatpeoplepossesswhatarethoughttoberespect-meritingcharacteristics.Therelevantbasicfact-freeprincipleP4,willthenbe:oneoughttorespectbeings,humanorotherwise,whohavetherelevantcharacteristics.NotethatP4isimmunetodenialsthathumanbeings,oranybeings,havetherelevantcharacteristics.Tobesure,P4isinapplicableifnobeingshavesuchcharacteristics,butthatcertainbeingsdohavesuchcharacteristicsisnever-thelessnogroundforaffirmingP4.Manywillthinkthattheconsideration(F)thatonlywhenpromisesarekeptcanpromiseessuccessfullypursuetheirprojectsisnottheright,oratanyratenottheonly,groundfortheprinciplethatweshouldkeepourpromises.Formany(forexample,I)thinkthatbreakingpromisesiswrongbecausedoingsoconstitutesaviolationoftrust.Nowthatgroundforthepromisingprinciplemightberegardedasotherthanafact,inwhichcaseIneedmakenocommentonithere:non-factualgroundingofprinciplesfallsoutsidethescopeofmythesis.Butifanyonedoeswanttopresenttheclaimthatpromisingviolatesatrustasafact,thenIwouldpointoutthatwhatmakesthat(putative)factagroundforthepromisingprincipleisthemoreultimateprinciplethatoneshouldnotviolateatrust.Andthatmoreultimateprin-cipleiseitheritselffact-insensitive,or,ifitisindeedfact-sensitive,youwillknowbynowhowIwouldpressbeyondittoafact-insensitiveone.g.Myargumenthasthreepremisses.ThefirstpremisssaysthatwheneverafactFconferssupportonaprincipleP,thereisanexplanationwhyFsupportsP,anexplanationofhow,thatis,FrepresentsareasontoendorseP.Thatfirstpremissrestsuponthemoregeneralclaimthatthereisalwaysanexplanationwhyanygroundgroundswhatitgrounds.Ihavenoargumentforthatmoregeneralclaim–itstrikesmeasself-evidentlytrue,underaproperlyunrestrictedunderstandingofwhatwouldqualifyassuchanexplanation.Notethatthisfirstpremissplacesnorestrictionontheformthattheanswertoaquestionaboutwhyagroundgroundswhatitgroundsmusttake.So,forexample,itisallowedheretobeanexplanationofwhyp(ifitindeeddoes)supportspthattheyarethesameproposition.Arestrictionoftheformthattheanswertotherelevantwhy-questiontakesinourspecificcase,thatoffactssupportingprinciples,isaffirmednotbythefirstbutbythesecondpremissofmyargument.Forthesecondpremisssaysthattheexplanationwhoseexistenceisaffirmedbythefirstpremissinvokesorimpliesamoreultimateprinciple,commitmenttowhichwouldsurvivedenialofF,amoreultimateprinciplethatexplainswhyFsupportsP,inthefashionillustratedabove.ForthissecondpremissmydefenceissimplytochallengeanyonewhodisagreestoprovideanexampleinwhichacredibleexplanationofwhysomeFsupportssomePinvokesorimpliesnosuchmoreultimateprinciple.(Notethatthesecondpremissdoesn’tsaythatthepertinentmoreultimateprincipleiseitherultimate(toutcourt)orfact-insensitive–asopposedtoinsensitivetotheparticularfactF.Thatstrongerclaimistheforthcomingconclusionoftheargument.Note,further,thatasIstatedthesecondpremiss,itpresupposesthetruthofthefirst.But,forthosewholikethepremissesofanargumenttobeindependentofoneanother,thepresuppositioncanbedropped,throughrestatementofthesecondpremissinconditionalform.ItthensaysthatifthereisanexplanationwhyfactFsupportsprincipleP,thenitinvokesamoreultimateprinciplethatisinsensitivetoF).26GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page27Armedwiththesepremisses,wemayaskanyonewhoaffirmsaprincipleonthebasisofafactwhatfurtherandmoreultimateprincipleexplainswhythatfactgroundsthatprincipleand,oncethatmoreultimateprinciplehasbeenstated,whetherit,inturn,isbasedonanyfact,andsoon,reiteratively,asmanytimesasmayberequired,untilshecomestorestwithaprinciplewhichreflectsnofact,unlessthesequenceofinterrogationproceedsindefinitely.Butthethirdpremissofmyargumentis,simply,adenialthatitwillsoproceed.Thecaseforthatpremissisthreefold.First,itisjustimplausiblethatacredibleinterrogationofthatformmightgoonindefinitely:ifyoudisagree,trytoconstructone,onethatgoesbeyondcitationof,say,fiveprin-ciples.Second,suchanindefinitelycontinuingsequencewouldrequiresomethinglikeaninfinitenestingofprinciples,andfewwillthinkthatthereexistarelevantlyinfinitenumberofprinciples.Finally,anunendingsequenceofjustificationswouldrunagainsttherequirement(laiddownind.above)thatshewhoaffirmsPhasacleargraspofwhatherprinciplesareandofwhysheholdsthem:forwecansurelysaythatapersonwhocannotcompletetheindicatedsequence,becauseshehastogoonforever,doesnotknowwhysheholdstheprinciplesshedoes.Tosumupthecaseforthethirdpremiss:thesequencecannotproceedwithoutendbecauseourresourcesofconvictionarefinite,and,eveniftheywerenot,proceedingwithoutendwouldviolatetheself-understandingstipulation.Itfollowsfromthestatedpremissesthat,asIclaimed,everyfact-sensitiveprin-ciplereflectsafact-insensitiveprinciple:thatistruebothwithinthestructureoftheprincipledbeliefsofagivenperson,aslongassheisclearaboutwhatshebelievesandwhyshebelievesit,and,byacertainparityofreasoningthatIshallnotlayouthere,withinthestructureoftheobjectivetruthaboutprinciples,ifthereisan5objectivetruthaboutprinciples.But,asIindicatedatb.above,mythesisaboutprincipledbeliefs,or“beliefs,”holdsevenifthereisnoobjectivetruthaboutprin-ciples,andevenifwhatwecall“beliefs”aboutprinciplesarereallyexpressionsofendorsement,oruniversalcommands,ornon-truth-bearingitemsofsomeotherkind:see,further,t.below.[Threesubsectionsfollowintheoriginalarticle,ineachofwhichoneofthethreepremissesoftheargumentisdefendedagainstobjections.Thereisroomtoreproduceonlythechallengetothefirstpremisshere].g(i).Thefirstpremissdoesnotsaythateverything,oreveryprinciple,hastohaveajustification:Iamneutralonthatclaim.Thepremissratherinsiststhatthereisalwaysanexplanationthatexplainswhyagroundgroundswhatitgrounds.Whatinitiatesthesequenceofprinciplesisnotaneedforjustification–that,wemaysup-pose,hasalreadybeenfulfilled,bythecitedfact–butaneedforexplanation(ofwhyastatedjustificationjustifies).Norisitavalidobjectionto,oratruthabout,mythesisthatitimpliesthat(beliefsabout)ultimateprinciplescannotthemselvesbejustified:myviewlacksthestatedimplication.Whatratherfollowsfromitisthatultimateprinciplescannotbejustifiedbyfacts.Myviewisneutralonwhethertheycanbejustifiedinsomeotherway.For6myargumentativepurposes,fact-freeprinciplesmightbeself-evidentlytrue,ortheymightforsomeotherreasonrequirenogroundsortheymightneedgroundsandhavegroundsofsomenon-factualsort(theymight,forexample,bejustifiedbysomeFactsandPrinciples27\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page28methodologicalprinciplewhichisnotitselfanormativeprinciplebutaprinciplethat7sayshowtogeneratenormativeprinciples),ortheymightneedgroundsbutlackthem,or,asweshallseeatq.,theymightbejudgedtobeoutsidethespaceofgroundsbecause,assomenon-cognitiviststhink,theymightnotbeobjectsofbeliefatall.Letmeamplifytheforegoingclarificationofmyfirstpremissbyexplainingwhy7thatpremissdoesnotsayanythinglikewhatLewisCarroll’stortoisesaidtoAchilles.Thatmisguidedtortoisesaidthataninferenceisvalidonlyiftheprinciplethatvalidatesitisstatedasafurtherpremissoftheinference.Anunmanageableinfiniteregressensues,andthetake-homelessonisthatprinciplesofinferentialvaliditydonotfunctionaspremissesintheargumentsthattheyvalidate.LewisCarroll’slessonisnochallengetomyfirstpremissbecausethatpremissconcernsnotinferencesandwhatmakesthemvalidbutjustifyinggroundsandwhatmakesthemjustify.WhatthetortoisesaystoAchillesisthat“q”doesn’tfollowfromtheconjunctionof“ifpthenq”and“p”alone:hesaystheinferencefailsunlessyouadd“If‘ifpthenq’and‘p’,then‘q’”asafurtherpremiss.Butinmyproceedingsnoinferenceiseversaidtobeinvalid,andthereforeneedfulofafurtherpremiss.Whensomeoneclaimsthatafactgroundsaprinciple,sheaffirmsagroundingrela-tion,notoneofdeductiveinference.AndIdonotsay:no,thatfactdoesn’tgroundthatprinciple,unlessweadd...Isimplyask,non-rhetorically,whythefactsupportstheprinciple,andIclaimthatasatisfactoryanswerwillalwaysfeatureafurtherprinciple,P1:thatis,precisely,a(correct!)claim,notamovedemandedbylogic.And,unlikethesequencegeneratedbythetortoise,thesequencethatmyclaimgeneratesisfinite:itcomestoanendwiththestatementofaprinciplethatisfact-insensitive,and,thereforeonetowhichmysequence-generatingquestion(“Whydoesthisfactsupportthisprinciple?”)doesn’tapply.i.Ishouldobservethattheclarityofmindrequirement(seep.6above)isbynomeansuniversallysatisfiedbyaffirmersofprinciples:peopledisplaycontrastingdegreesofcertaintywithrespecttowhytheyaffirmtheprinciplestheyaffirm.So,forexample,apersonmightsaywithassurancethatthereasonwhysheaffirmsthat,ifabeingisvulnerabletosuffering,then,absentotherconsiderations,itshouldbeprotectedagainstsuffering,is(quitesimply)thatbeingsshouldbeprotectedagainstsuffering:protectionagainstsufferingis,forher,therelevantultimatenorm.Butanotherpersonwhoaffirmsthestatedprinciplemayjustnotknowwhetherthatprincipleis,forher,asitisforthefirstperson,(entirely)fact-insensitive,orwhethersheaffirmsit(atleastalso),forexample,onthebasisofthefactthatsufferinginterfereswithprojects(including,interverymanyalia,theprojectofavoidingsufferingitself)togetherwiththeprinciplethat,absentotherconsiderations,people’sprojectsshouldbefacilitated.And,ifsheaffirmstheoriginalanti-sufferingprincipleforthatfurther,projects-centered,reason,thenshemaynotknowwhethershemeanstherebytoendorsehumanfreedomtopursueprojectsassuch,orwhethersheaffirmstheproject-respectingprincipleforthereasonthatnotfreedomassuchbutwelfareassuchistobepro-moted,andapersonis(usually)betterthanotherpeopleareatdiscerningthepaththatleadstoherwelfare.Anotherexample.Asamatteroffact,zygote/foetusesbecomeprogressivelymorebabylikeastheyproceedtowardsbirth.Butsupposethingsweredifferent.Suppose,forexample,thattheywereinitiallymorebabylike,andregressedtoalessandless28GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page29babylikeconditionuntilonedaybeforebirth,whentheyundergoaspectacularhuman-ization.Thenitwouldnotbeareasonfornotabortingadayortwobeforebirththatthefoetuswasalreadybabylike.Ithinkthatmightthrowusintonormativeturmoil.Ournormsareformedunderthefactualconstraintthatfoetus-agegoeswithfoetus-level-of-development,but,beingsoformed,wedon’tknowwhatweshouldthinktheultimatewarrantofournormsis.Itistruethatwedon’tneedtoknowwhatthatwarrantis,forpracticalpurposes,but(inmyview)philosophy’sroleisnottotelluswhatweneedtoknow(inthatsense),butwhatwewantorought(fornon-practicalreasons)toknow.Notallwillagree.Somemightattackmyphilosophicalpresuppositionsas“philosophist.”Inthatspirit,theymightacceptthethreepremissesofmyargumentbutdenytheproprietyoftheclarityofmindrequirement.j.Ihavearguedthataffirmationsoffact-insensitiveprinciplearelogicallypriortoaffirmationsofprinciplethataremadewhenfactualinformationisbroughttobear.Butthepriorityenjoyedbyfact-insensitiveprinciplesispurelylogical,andnottemporalorepistemic,or,atanyrate,notepistemicinatleastonesenseofthatterm.Thepriorityoffact-insensitiveprinciplesisamatterofwhatutterancesofprin-ciplecommitoneto,notofhowonecomestobelieveorknowwhatonesaysinutteringthem.ThatiswhyIdonotdeny(infact,Iwouldassert)thataskingwhatwethinkweshoulddo,giventheseorthosefactualcircumstances,isafruitfulwayofdeterminingwhatourprinciplesare;andsometimes,moreover,responsestoactualfactsrevealourprinciplesbetterthanourresponsestohypothesizedfactsdo,becausetheactualfactspresentthemselvesmorevividlytous,and,too,theyconcentratethemindbetter,sincetheycallforactualandnotmerelyhypotheticaldecisions.Butnoneofthoseconsiderationsbearonwhethercommitmenttofact-sensitiveprinciplescarrieswithitcommitmenttofact-insensitiveprinciples.k.Mythesisisconditional:itisthatifanyfactssupportanyprinciples,thentherearefact-insensitiveprincipleswhichaccountforthatrelationshipofsupport(and,bythesametoken,ifwehaveanyprinciplesatall,thenwehavefact-insensitiveprinciples).Ialsobelievetheconsequentsofthoseconditionals,ifonlybecauseIbelievetheirantecedents,andIthereforebelievethatthereexistfact-insensitiveprin-ciples,butIhavenotarguedfortheitalicizedunconditionalthesisassuch.Theconditionalcharacterofmythesisrendersitconsistentwiththeview(withwhich,independentlyoftheclaimsofthepresentpaper,Idisagree)thatthereexistcasesinwhichnogeneralprincipleisrequiredforafacttojustifyanaction.Thethesisisalsoconsistentwiththestrongerview,defendedbydifferentthinkersonvariousgrounds,thatreasonsforactionquitegenerallydonotpresupposeprinci-9ples.Thestatedconsistenciesobtainbecausemythesisconcernswhathappensifandwhenfactsgroundprinciples,notwhetheractionscanbejustifiedbyfactsonlythroughprinciples.Mostpeoplethink,asIindeeddo,thatfactsdogroundprinciples,andmythesisclaimsthattheyaretherebycommittedtoacknowledgingtheexistenceoffact–insensitiveprinciples.Butmythesisdoesn’tdependonpeoplebeingrightwhentheyclaimthatthereareprinciplesthatrespondtofacts,orthatfactsjustifyactionsonlythroughprinciples.Tobesure,mythesisislessinterestingifthoseclaimsarefalse,butitisnotforthatreasonlesstrue.FactsandPrinciples29\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page30l.Somepeoplethinkthatonecan,astheideaisoftenexpressed,“‘go’froman‘is’toan‘ought’,”that,forexample,thestatementthatHarryisinpainentailsthatHarryoughttobeassisted,orthatthestatementthatHarryisinnocententailsthatitwouldbeaninjusticetopunishHarry(where“pentailsq”saysthatitwouldbeacontradictiontoaffirmpanddenyq,becauseofwhat“p”and“q”mean).DavidHume(iswidelythoughttohave)rejectedthatview,and,onfirstacquaintancewithmythesisaboutfactsandprinciples,manyunderstandittobeareissueofHume’s10(whenHumeissounderstood:henceforthIdropthatqualification).Butthatunder-standingismistaken.Idonotsay,Hume-like,that,sinceonecannotgofroman“is”toan“ought,”apersonwhoaffirmsPonthebasisofFmustalsoaffirmthetruthofsomefact-independentnormativestatement.NosuchHumeanpremisswaspart11ofmyargument.NordoesmyconclusionsupportHume’sview.IbelievethatIhavedemonstratedmyconclusion,butIcannotclaimtheremarkableachievementofhavingprovedthatonecannotgofroman“is”toan“ought.”Toseethatmyargumentpresupposesnodenialthatonecangofroman“is”toan“ought,”observethat,farfromrejectingmythesis,someonewhothinksthatonecangofroman“is”toan“ought”neednotdenymythesis,andshemust,indeed,affirmit,if,thatis,andasIshallnowsuppose,shebelievesthatfactssupportprinciples12atall.Suppose,then,thatsomeonewhodoesbelievethatfactssupportprinciplesalsothinksthatyoucango,bysemanticallybasedentailment,froman“is”toan“ought.”Likemanyotherpeople,sheaffirmstheprinciplethatinjuredpeopleshouldbeassisted,and,whenaskedwhy,shedefendsthat,asotherpeopledo,byreferencetothefactthatinjuredpeoplesufferpainand/orotherdisability:forsimplicity,I’llsticktopain.Butthenshemustbelievethefurtherprinciplethatpeopleinpainshouldbeassisted,and,ifaskedwhyshebelievesthatprinciple,shewillsaysome-thinglikethis,whichdistinguishesherviewfromthatofotherpeople,includingDavidHume’s:thatitisaconceptualtruththatpeopleinpainshouldbeassisted,thatapersondoesn’tunderstandwhatthewords“pain”and/or“assist”and/or“shouldbe”(andsoon)meanifshedoesn’tthinkso.But,ifthisanti-Humeanisright,thenherprinciple,ifXisinpain,thenXoughttobeassisted,isinsensitivetofact,sinceitisanentailment,andentailments,beingapriori,areinsensitivetofact.Nochangeinherbeliefsaboutfactswouldcausehertodoubttheitalicizedprinciple.Myviewthatallfact-sensitiveprinciplespresupposefact-insensitiveprinciples,doesn’t,then,requirethatan“ought”can’tfollowfroman“is.”Mypositionisneutralwithrespecttothatdispute,and,asfarasitsdisputantsareconcerned,itisnottheHumeansbuttheanti-Humeans(thatis,the“‘is’to‘ought’”brigade)whomustagree13withme.m.Whateveranybodymaythinkabout“is”and“ought,”mostpeoplethinkthat“ought”implies“can,”andthatisnodoubttrueundersomeinterpretationsofthosewords.Soletmereplytothefollowingwould-beobjectiontomythesis:factsoftenmakeamootedultimateprincipleimpossibletofollow,and,since“ought”implies“can,”factstherebydisqualifythemootedprinciple.But,whetherornotthatisalltrue,itisnoobjectiontomythesis,whichisthatfactsgroundprinciplesonlyinvirtueoffurtherprinciplesthatarenotgroundedinfactsandthatexplainwhythegivenfactsgroundthegivenprinciples.Theobjectionlacksapplicationbecauseexclud-ingaprinciple(becauseitcan’tbecompliedwith)isn’tgroundinganyprinciple.30GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page31Someonemightsaythat,whiletheforegoingreplytothe“‘ought’implies‘can’”objectionsavestheletterofmythesis,italsorevealsarestrictiononitsscopethatwasnotinitiallymadeexplicit:thethesisappearstoallowthatfactscanrefute(sup-posed)ultimateprinciples.AnditistruethatIhavedefendednostrongerthesisherethatforbidswhatthatweakeroneallows:butInowproceedtodoso.Whenafactofthekindhereinquestion,thatis,afactabouthumanincapacity,excludesaprinciplebecauseitcan’tbeobeyed,thenwemayaskwhatweshouldsayabouttheexcludedprincipleonthecounterfactualhypothesisthatitcouldbeobeyed.Anditisonlywhenwethusclearthedecksoffactsaboutcapacity,andgettheanswertothatcounterfactualquestion,that,soIclaim,wereachthenormative14ultimate.Anyonewhorejects“oneoughttodoA”onthesolegroundthatitisimpossibletodoA,anyone,thatis,whowouldotherwiseaffirmthatprinciple,iscom-mittedtothisfact-insensitiveprinciple:“OneoughttodoAifitispossibletodoA.”IfIamright,thedictumthat“‘ought’implies‘can’”ismisusedwhenitisused,asitoftenis,inanattempttoshowthatfeasibilityconstrainsthecontentofultim-atenormativejudgment.Thefollowingargument,orsomethinglikeit,shouldbefamiliartoreaders:1.Normativejudgmentsare“ought”-statements.2.“Ought”implies“can.”∴3.If“OneoughttodoA”cannotbecompliedwith,“OneoughttodoA”isnotanormativejudgment.Consider,thestatement-formthatIintroducedacoupleofparagraphsback,thatis,“OneoughttodoAifitispossibletodoA.”Callit4.Noweither4isan“ought”-statementoritisnotone.Supposethat4isan“ought”-statement.Thenpremiss2isfalse,because4entailsnorelevant“can”-statement.Butsuppose,instead,andper-hapsmorenaturally,that4isnotan“ought”-statement.Thenpremiss1fails,becauseconditionalstatementsofformof4saysomethingessentialaboutthenormative.Theforegoingpointappliestothevirtueofjustice,withrespecttowhichtwoinquiriesmustbedistinguished.Ifweareinterestedinobeyinginjunctionsthatcarrytheauthorityofjustice,andwehaveanumberofinjunctionsbeforeus,then,incourseofsatisfyingthestatedpracticalinterest,wemaycrossoutanyinjunctionthatfailsthe“ought”-implies-“can”test.Buttheresultofthatproceduredoesnotprovideuswithacompletepictureofthenatureofjusticeitself.Ourpictureisincom-pleteunlesswecansayofrejectedinjunctionswhethertheyarerejectedsolelybecauseoftheirinfeasibility.Andwherethatisindeedtheonlyreasonforrejectingthem,then,onceagain,wefindfundamentaljusticewithinclaimsoftheform:ifitispossibletodoA,thenyououghttodoA.IfIamright,allfundamentalprinciplesofjustice,whetherornotwecallthem“ought”-statements,areofthatconditionalform.Wederiveunconditionalought-statementsfromthemwhenrealityispluggedin.Butreality,asitwere,affectsthe“possible”part,notthe“ought”part,ofthestatement.Whatgoesforjusticegoesforallvaluesthatgenerateinjunctions,andevenforthe“ought”ofpracticalrationality,ifthereissuchathing,andwhateverrelation-shiprationalitymaybeartojusticeandtoothervalues.ForIwouldclaimthattheultimatedeliverancesofrationalitytaketheform“IfitispossibletodoA,thenyouought(thatis,rationalityrequiresyou)todoA.”Wereadilysaythingslike,“EvenFactsandPrinciples31\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page32ifthatcoursewerepossible,itwouldbeirrational.”Thismeansthatwemakejudg-ments,howevermerelyimplicitly,oftheform“Ifthatcoursewerepossible,itwouldberational.”AndIclaimthat,whenourevaluationisfundamental,weevaluatepracticalrationality,asweevaluatejustice,andthenormativeingeneral,independ-entlyoffactualpossibility,andwethereforeatleastimplicitlyaffirmprinciplesoftheindicated“conditional-possible”form.q.Althoughmythesisisundoubtedlymeta-ethical,itisneutralwithrespecttowhatmayreasonablyberegardedasthecentralquestionofmeta-ethics.Mythesisismeta-ethical,becauseitisathesisaboutprinciplesthatissilentaboutwhichprinciplesshouldbeacceptedandwhichrejected:itisnotacontributiontowhatissometimescalledsubstantive,asopposedtometa-ethical,ethics.Butmythesisisneutralonthatcentralquestionofmeta-ethicswhichconcernstheobjectivityorsubjectivityofnormativeprinciples,andwhichasks“Whatisthestatusofnormativeprinciples?”inthesenseof“status”inwhichobjectivists,realists,cognitivists,subjectivists,imper-ativists,emotivists,expressivists,errortheorists,andsoon,providevariouslycon-trastingandoverlappinganswerstothatquestion.Myclaimisthatanyonewhoisentirelyclearaboutwhatherprinciplesareandwhysheholdsthemhasprinciplesthatareindependentofherbeliefsaboutfacts,whetherornotheraffirmations(or“affirmations”)offact-insensitiveprinciplesaretobeunderstoodasclaimsaboutatimelessnormativereality,orasexpressionsoftaste,orasemotionalcommitments,15orasuniversallyprescribedimperatives.Tobesure,mythesiswouldhavetoberephrasedtosuitcertainanswerstothecentralquestionofmeta-ethics.Underemotivism,forexample,itwouldhavetobestatedwitheschewalofsuchphrasesas“believesprinciplePtobetrue.”Underanemotivistconstrualofthe“affirmation”oftheprinciplethatoneoughttokeepone’spromises,thespeakerisreallysaying(oruttering,oremitting):“Bootobreakingpromises!”Nowthat“Boo!”nodoubtreflectsherfactualbeliefs,perhaps,forexample,thebeliefthatbreakingpromisesprejudicespeople’sprojects.Butthen,clearly,sheisdisposedtosay(orshout)“Bootoprejudicingpeople’sprojects!,”and,ifIamright,sheiscommittedtoanultimate“Boo!,”perhapsaratherlong“Boooooooo!,”thatdependsonnofactualbeliefs.(Somewouldsaythatemotivistsmustdenythatpeoplehavewhatare,strictlyspeaking,principles,and/orthatthefactsthatpeopleadducetoexplaintheir“affirmationsofprinciple”constitutegroundsforthem.Iftheyareright,thatisnothreattomythesis,forthatthesis,Iremindyou(seesectionk.above),istheconditionalonethat,iffactssupportprinciples,thenthereareprinciplesthatarenotsupportedbyanyfacts.If,ontheotherhand,emotivismdoescountenanceprinciplesandgrounds,thenthereadingofmythesiswithintheemotivistpositionisasgiveninthepre-parentheticalpartofthepresentparagraph).r.Iremarkedinsectionb.thatthemeta-ethicalliteraturesaysverylittleaboutthequestionpursuedinthepresentpaper.ButanotableexceptionistheworkofJohnRawls,whoarguedthatfundamentalprinciplesofjustice,and,indeed,“firstprinci-ples”ingeneral,arearesponsetothefactsofthehumancondition.(Thatiswhytheprinciple-choosingdenizensoftheoriginalpositionareprovidedwithextensivefactualinformation.)Rawlscallsthealternativetothatview“rationalintuitionism,”16andhedisparagesthatalternative.32GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page33“Thereis,”accordingtoRawls,“noobjectiontorestingthechoiceoffirstprinci-plesuponthegeneralfactsofeconomicsandpsychology.”Headds,inillustrationofhisclaim,thatthedifferenceprinciple“reliesontheideathatinacompetitiveeconomy(withorwithoutprivateownership)withanopenclasssystemexcessive17inequalitieswillnotbetherule.”Buttheillustrationthatisheresupposedtoshowtheinnocenceofthedepend-enceoffirstprinciplesonfactisunequaltoitstask.ForitfollowsfromwhatRawlssays(note“relies”)that,ifheappraisedthefactsdifferently,hewouldrejectthedifferenceprinciple,becauseitpermittedtoomuchinequality.Butitthenfurtherfollows,inlinewiththesecondpremissofmyargument(seethesecondparagraphofg.above),thatthereisanunarticulatedbackgroundprincipleofequality(some-thinglike:“Oneoughtnottocausetoomuchinequality”)thatexplainswhythestatedfactaboutacompetitiveeconomysupportsthedifferenceprinciple,and,forallthatRawlsshows,thatfurtherprincipleeitheritselfdoesnotdependonanyfacts,or18pointstoastillmoreultimateprinciplebehinditthatdoesnotdoso.RawlsneedstodenywhatIregardastheevidenttruth,affirmedinthesecondandpivotalpre-missofmyargument,thatafactsupportsaprincipleonlyinthelightofafurtherprinciple,yettheveryphrase,“excessiveinequalities,”thatheusesintheexampleathandconfirmsthatpremiss,sinceitfusesreferencetoafactwithreferencetoaprinciplethatrendersthatfactrelevant:excessqualifiesasexcessonlyinthelight19ofaprinciplewhichsayshowmuchistoomuch.ButIwanttomakeafurtherpointthatcriesouttobemadehereeventhoughitislessrelevanttotheimmediatedispute.AndthatisthattheofficialtwoprinciplesofjusticedonotreallyexhaustwhatRawlsthinksjusticeis.For,alongsidethem,andofequalstatustothem,thereis,hisillustrationshows,anindependentprinciplewhichforbidsmorethanacertainamountofinequalityandagainstwhichtheclaimsof(atanyrate)thedifferenceprinciplemustbetradedoff.InamoreperspicuouspresentationoftheRawlsianpositionboth“promoteequality”and“promotetheconditionoftheworstoff”wouldbefact-freeinjunctionswhoseclaimsaretobebalancedagainstoneanother.Despitethecuriouslymishandledillustrationofhisposition,Rawlssaysthatthose,likeme,whoaffirmtherivalpositionthatultimateprinciplesarefact-independent,makemoralphilosophythestudyoftheethicsofcreation:anexaminationofthereflectionsanomnipotentdeitymightentertainindeterminingwhichisthebestofallpossible20worlds.Eventhegeneralfactsofnaturearetobechosen.Butitisflatlyuntruethattheviewthatultimateprinciplesareindependentoffactcommitsthosewhoholdittolegislatingnotonlyprinciplesbutalsofacts.Thatwouldfollowonlyonanassumptionoppositetowhatweaffirm:that,contrarytowhatweaffirm,allprinciplesmustbechoseninthelightoffacts(sothat,havingdecidedtoignoretheactualfacts,weshouldhavetomakeupforthatbylegislat-ingfacts).Thesecondsentenceoftheabovepassagecanbestberegardedasaslip21thatshouldbeignored.Amoreaptapplicationofthefact-free-principles-are-only-for-deitiesmotifappearsinRawls’sargumentthat,intheabsenceoffactualinput,thepartiestotheoriginalpositionwillhavenoideawhattochoose:FactsandPrinciples33\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page34How...cantheypossiblymakeadecision?Aproblemofchoiceiswelldefinedonlyifthealternativesaresuitablyrestrictedbynaturallawsandotherconstraints,andthosedecidingalreadyhavecertaininclinationstochooseamongthem.Withoutadefinitestructureofthiskindthequestionposedisindeterminate.Forthisreasonweneedhavenohesitationinmakingthechoiceoftheprinciplesofjusticepresupposeacertaintheoryofsocialinstitutions.Indeed,onecannotavoidassumptionsaboutgeneralfacts....Iftheseassumptionsaretrueandsuitablygeneral,everythingisinorder,forwithoutthese22elementsthewholeschemewouldbepointlessandempty.Thisargumentfallsbeforethedistinctionbetweenlogicalandepistemicprioritythatwasmadeatsectionj.above.Howeverdifficultitmaybetodecideonprinciples,toknowwhatallyournormativebeliefsare,intheabsenceoffacts,decisionsofprinciplethatindeedreflectfactscarryacommitmenttofoundationalfact-independentprinciples,andthatisthepointatissuebetweenthosewhoaffirmandthosewho23rejectwhatRawlscalls“rationalintuitionism.”Becauseofaperfectlyordinarypoverty24ofimagination,thedenizensoftheoriginalposition,andweourselves,mayneedfactualinformationtoprovokeappropriatereflection,buttheresultofthatreflectiondoesnotreposeuponthatinformation.InthefullversionofthispaperIhaveoccasiontoremark(inthefinalparagraphofsectiong(ii),whichisomittedinthepresentabridgedversion)thatRawls’sthesisthatfirstprinciplesrestonfactsitsillwiththecircumstancethatseeminglynon-fact-basedprinciplesjustifytheuseoftheoriginalpositionmachine:itisjustifiedbythe“freeandequal”standingofmembersofsociety,butthatstandingreflectsfact-freeprinciplesaboutthepropertreatmentofbeingsofthesortthattheyare.So,itmightbeasked,“HowmuchdifferencewoulditmakeifRawlsdidnotcallhistwoprinciples‘firstprinciples’butreservedthatdesignationfortheprinciplesthatjustifytheoriginalpositionmachine?”Theanswerdependsontheparticularintel-lectualconcernthatisinplay.ToourassessmentofthedesirabilityoftheprinciplesthatATheoryofJusticetellsustofollowitmightmakenodifferenceatall.Butitwouldmanifestlymakeamassivedifferencetothethesisoffact-sensitivityandtheargumentsforitscoutedinthissection,sinceitwouldrepresenttheabandonmentofboth,anditisthatthesis,andnotitsimportancewithintheRawlsianenterprise,thatisimmediatelyatstakehere.Iftheargumentsscoutedinthepresentsectionweresound,thentheprinciplesthathelptoexplicate“freeandequal”standingcouldnotbefact-free,becausethestatedargumentsdenythatthereareanyfact-freeprinciples.s.Manyobjecttoutilitarianismthatitrecommendsslaveryforconditionsinwhichslaverywouldpromoteaggregatehappiness.Manyutilitariansreplythatsuchcon-ditionsdonot,infact,obtain.IclosemycriticismofRawls’sdefenceofhisthesisthatfirstprinciplesaregroundedinfactbyexamininghisendorsementofthatutilitarianrecoursetofact:Itisoftenobjected...thatutilitarianismmayallowforslaveryandserfdom,andforotherinfractionsofliberty.Whethertheseinstitutionsarejustifiedismadetodependuponwhetheractuarialcalculationsshowthattheyyieldahigherbalanceofhappiness.Tothistheutilitarianrepliesthatthenatureofsocietyissuchthatthesecalculations25arenormallyagainstsuchdenialsofliberty.34GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page35Contracttheory[and,therefore,Rawls]agrees...withutilitarianisminholdingthatthefundamentalprinciplesofjusticequiteproperlydependuponthenaturalfactsabout26menandsociety.Rawlshereendorsesneitherutilitarianismnoritsdefenders’factualclaimaboutslavery.Butheendorsestheprocedureofinvoking“naturalfactsaboutmenandsociety”todefendafundamentalprinciple,suchasthesupposednaturalfactthatslaveryisnotahappiness-maximizingarrangementforhumanbeings.Ihopethattheensuingdiscussionofthequotedpassagewillreinforcethecaseformyviewaboutfactsandprinciples,showthatRawls’scontraryviewisill-considered,explainwhyhemakesthemistakethathedoes,andexposetheimport-anceofthepresentdispute.ThebeginningofwisdominthismatteristomarkanambiguitywhichRawlsmissesintheslaveryobjectiontoutilitarianism.Thewordsofthefirsttwosentencesoftheexhibitedpassageformulatewhatareinfacttwoindependentslaveryobjectionstoutilitarianism,butRawlstreatsthetwoasvariantexpressionsofasingleobjection.ObjectorAandobjectorBbelowaredifferentlyanimated,butwhatAsaysisinlinewiththefirstsentenceoftheRawlspassageandwhatBsaysisinlinewithitssecond:A:Iopposeutilitarianismbecauseifweadoptutilitarianismthenwemightfacecircumstancesinwhich(becauseitmaximizeshappiness)weshouldhavetoinstituteslavery,andIamagainsteverinstitutingslavery.B:Iopposeutilitarianismbecauseitsaysthatifcircumstancesweresuchthatwecouldmaximizeutilityonlybyinstitutingslavery,thenweshoulddoso.ToseethatobjectorsAandBaredifferentlyanimated,observethatthestatedsinglereplytotheirtwoobjections(towit,“slaverywillneverinfactbehappiness-maximizing”)shouldsilenceAbutshouldleaveBunsatisfied.Awasworriedthatslaverymighthavetobeimposed,inobediencetotheutilitariancommand.Shelearnsthatthereisnosuchdanger,soherreasonforobjectingtoutilitarianismisovercome.ButthatslaveryisnotinfactoptimificshouldcutnoicewithB.B’sobjectionwasthatwhetherslaveryisjustifiedshouldnotbemadeto“dependupon”an“actuarialcalculation.”Sayingthattheresultofsuchacalculationwillalwaysbereassuringisnoreplytotheobjectionthatwhetherornotweinstituteslaveryshouldn’tdependuponsuchacalculation.(Notethat,whileBmay,likeA,opposeslaveryunderanycircumstances,herobjectioncommitshertonosuchstance.Shemightthinkslaveryajustpunishmentforterriblemisdeedsyetremainoutragedatthethoughtthatitwouldberighttoimposeitifitproducedenormoushappiness,atwhatevercostinunhappinesstoinnocentslaves).ObservethatIusedtheword“adopt”inthestatementofA’sobjectionbutnotinthestatementofB’s.Andthatisbecauseofthedifferenceofstatusthattheutilitarianprincipleenjoysinthedifferentopticsofthetwoobjections.Battacksutilitarianismnotasaruleforregulatingouraffairsthatwemightconsideradopting,butasaprin-ciplethatformulatesthemoraltruthor,tospeakwithmoremeta-ethicalneutrality(seesectionq.above),asaprinciplethatformulatesanultimateconvictionorcom-mitment.ButAattacksutilitarianismasaruleofregulation,thatis,asacertaintypeofsocialinstrument,tobelegislatedandimplemented,whetherbygovernmentFactsandPrinciples35\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page36itselforwithinsocialconsciousnessandpractice.Aprincipleofregulationis“adevice27forhavingcertaineffects,”whichweadoptornot,inthelightofanevaluation,precisely,ofitslikelyeffects,and,therefore,inthelightofanunderstandingofthefacts.Andweevaluatethoseeffects,andtherebydecidewhichfact-boundprinciplestoadopt,byreferencetoprinciplesthatarenotdevicesforachievingeffectsbutstatementsofourmoreultimateandfact-freeconvictions.Rawlsfailstodistinguishbetweenrulesofregulationthatwedecidewhetherornottoadoptand(hisexpression)“firstprinciples”thatarenotinthatwayoptional.Thatiswhyheisabletoendorsetheutilitarianreply-procedurewithoutqualificationandthatiswhyheiscorrespondinglyabletobelievethatevenfirstprinciplesarerootedinfact.ItisafundamentalerrorofATheoryofJusticethatitidentifiesthefirstprinciplesofjusticewiththeprinciplesthatweshouldadopttoregulatesociety.Rawlsrightlysaysthat“thecorrectregulativeprincipleforanythingdependsonthe28natureofthatthing”:factsareofcourseindispensabletothejustificationofrulesofregulation.Butrulesofregulationnecessarilylackultimacy:theycannottellushowtoevaluatetheeffectsbyreferencetowhichtheythemselvesaretobeevaluated.29Sociologytellsuswhattheeffectsofvariouscandidateruleswouldbe,butanorm-ativephilosophythatlackssociologicalinputisneededtoevaluatethoseeffectsandtherebytodetermine,jointlywithsociology,whatrulesweshouldadopt.IfA’sobjectionweretheonlyobjectiontoadoptingutilitarianism,andthefactualreplytoitwerecorrect,then,forallpracticalpurposes,theutilitarianprinciplewouldbefine.Butonlyforallpracticalpurposes,nototherwise,andnot,inparticular,forthepurposeofformulatingourultimateconvictions.Suchconvictionsincludeahostilitytoslaverythatisnotutilitarianlybased,ahostility,beitnoted,thatissharedbyanysoi-disantutilitarianwhothinksitnecessarytocitethefactstosilenceobjec-torA.Andthathostilitytoslaveryexpressesthefact-freeconvictionthatnobeingscharacterizedashumanbeingshappentobecharacterizedshouldbeinarelation-shipofslaverytoeachother(orsomemorequalifiedfact-freeconvictionsthatallowsslaveryunderspecialcircumstances:seenote25).Thequestion,Whatprinciplesshouldweadopt?isnotthequestion,Whatprin-ciplesformulateourfundamentalconvictions?Andananswertothefirstquestionpresupposesananswertothesecond:inthesenseof“adopt”thatgovernshere,weadopttheprinciplesthatweadoptinthelightofprinciplesthatwedon’tadopt.Thedistinctionistransparentlyimportant,butitisnotonlynotrecognizedbutexpresslyrejectedbyRawls,sinceheidentifiesthefundamentalprinciplesofjusticewiththeprinciplesthatspeciallydesignedchooserswouldadoptforthesakeofregulatingsociety.Whateverthemeritsmaybeofthatdesign,andwhetherornotitensuresasoundanswertothequestionastowhatprinciplesshouldbeadopted,thatthedenizensoftheoriginalpositionaskandanswerthatquestionensuresthattheoutputoftheoriginalpositionisnotasetoffirstprinciplesofjustice.ThedefenderofRawls’sviewmightrespondthus:“Fine.Iacceptyourdistinctionbetweenbasicprinciplesandprinciplesofregulation.ButwhyshouldIcareaboutbasicprinciples?Icareaboutwhatweshoulddo,andtheprinciplesofregulationthatweadoptinthelightofthefactsdeterminethat.”Theresponseisunsustain-ablebecausewenecessarilyhaverecoursetobasicprinciplestojustifytherulesofregulationthatweadopt:factscastnormativelightonlybyreflectingthelightthatfact-freefirstprinciplesshineonthem.36GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page37Thefactsdeterminewhatquestionswillarisefrom(butonlyfrom)apracticalpointofview.JoshuaCoheninfersthat“wedonotneedtohaveprinciplesofjusticethataddress”circumstancesthatwillnotinfactobtain.So,forexample,hecontinues,“weneednothaveanythingdefinitetosayaboutwhatwewoulddoif[contrarytofact-30basedexpectation]thesatisfactionofthedifferenceprincipleledto”greatinequality.Now,itisindeedtruethatinordertodecidewhattodoweneedsaynothingdefinite,and,infact,nothingatall,aboutthat.Butsupposethat,likeme,youthinkthatpoliticalphilosophyisabranchofphilosophy,whoseoutputisconsequentialforprac-tice,butnotlimitedinsignificancetoitsconsequencesforpractice.Thenyoumay,likeme,protestthatthequestionforpoliticalphilosophyisnotwhatweshoulddobutwhatweshouldthink,evenwhenwhatweshouldthinkmakesnopracticaldifference.t.Mythesis,thatprincipleswhichreflectfactsreflectprinciplesthatdon’treflectfacts,is,ifcorrect,ofinterestforseveralreasons.First,itisofinterestinitself,simplyasapieceofneglected,androutinelydenied,meta-ethicaltruth,one,moreover,whichanswersameta-ethicalquestionthatissur-prisinglydistinctfromthe“is”/“ought”question.Butmythesisisalsoofinterest,soIbelieve,becausethefact-freeprinciplesthatliebehindourfact-boundprinciplesarenotalwaysidentifiedincontextswheretheyshouldbeidentified,partlybecauseneglectofthemeta-ethicaltruththatIbelieveIhaveestablishedhasmeantthattherehasbeeninsufficientefforttoidentifythem.Andidentifyingour(one’s,their)fact-freeprincipleshasvaluebothforself-clarificationandforclarificationofwhatisatstakeincontroversy.Sometimes,tobesure,whenweexposetheunstatedfact-insensitiveprinciplethatundergirdsafact-sensitiveone,itwillprovokenosurprise.Sometimes,however,itwillbeunexpected.Anditwillalwaysbeworthwhiletoexposeittoview.Thethesisalsohasthemeritthat,aswesawinsections.,itgeneratesadistinctionbetweenultimatefact-freeprinciplesandadoptedrulesofregulation,adistinctionwhich,wealsosaw,refutesRawlsianconstructivismasameta-theoryofjustice.ForRawlsianconstructivism,fundamentalprinciplesofjustice,forallthattheyarefun-damental,whichistosay,notderivedfromstillmorefundamentalprinciples,reflectfacts.Rawlsbelievesthatbecausehemisidentifiesthequestion“Whatisjustice?”withthequestion“Whatprinciplesshouldweadopttoregulateouraffairs?”Forfactsundoubtedlyhelptodecidewhatrulesofregulationshouldbeadopted,thatis,legislatedandimplemented,ifonlybecausefactsconstrainpossibilitiesofimple-31mentationanddeterminedefensibletrade-offs(atthelevelofimplementation)amongcompetingprinciples.Buttheprincipleswhichexplain,withthefacts,whyagivensetofprinciplesistherightonetoadopt,don’treflectfacts,andnon-exposureofthosemoreultimateprinciplesmeansfailuretoexplainwhyweshouldadopttheprinciplesthatweshouldadopt.Thedistinctionbetweenrulesofregulationandtheprinciplesthatjustifythemhelpstoilluminatewhatisatstakeinnormativecontroversy.Suchcontroversyisbetterconductedwhenthestatusofthenormunderexamination–basicorregulative–isclearlyspecified.Forexample:Certainrecentcritiquesofthe“luckegalitarian”viewofjustice,whileundoubtedlycontainingsomegoodchallenges,aredisfiguredbyfailuretodistinguishbetweenrejectionoftheluckegalitarianviewasaproposedruleofregulationandrejectionofitatthefact-insensitivefundamentallevelatwhichFactsandPrinciples37\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page38theviewisproperlypitched.Thusmuch(notall)ofElizabethAnderson’sbroadside32againstthe“luck-egalitarian”viewofjusticehighlightstheeffectofstrivingtoimple-menttheluck-egalitarianprinciplewithoutcompromise,butdifficultiesofimplementa-tion,justassuch,donotdefeatluckegalitarianismasaconceptionofjustice,sinceitisnotaconstraintonasoundconceptionofjusticethatitshouldalwaysbe33sensibletostrivetoimplementit,whateverthefactualcircumstancesmaybe.Justiceisnottheonlyvaluethatcallsfor(appropriatelybalanced)implementation:otherprinciples,sometimescompetingwithjustice,mustalsobevariouslypursuedandhonoured.Andthefactshelptodecidethebalanceofduedeferencetocompetingprinciples:thefactsconstitutethefeasiblesetthatdeterminestheoptimalpoint(s)onasetoffact-independentindifferencecurveswhoseaxesdisplaypackagesofdifferentextentstowhichcompetingprinciplesareimplemented.(ThatiswhyIemphasized“atthelevelofimplementation”intheprecedingparagraph.Thetrade-offvalues,theratesatwhichwearewillingtoallowreducedimplementationofoneprincipleforthesakeofincreasedimplementationofanother,areapriori:thefactsdetermineonlywhichimplementationpackagesarefeasible).Notes1Thepresentpaperisanabridgedversionoftheoriginal,whichappearedinPhilosophyandPublicAffairsin2003.Wholesectionshavebeendeleted:hencethegapsintheletteringofthesections.Therearealsootherunrecordeddeletions,andafewparagraphshavebeenaddedtosectionm.(AsomewhatexpandedversionoftheoriginalarticleappearsasChapter6ofmyRescuingJusticeandEquality,HarvardUniversityPress,2008).2ThusRawlswrites:“Conceptionsofjusticemustbejustifiedbytheconditionsofourlifeasweknowitornotatall,”andhedoesnottherebymeantoleaveroomfortheaffirma-tionofprinciplesmoreultimatethanthoseofjusticewhichdonotdependonsuchcon-ditionsfortheirjustification(ATheoryofJustice,p.454/p.398:hereandthroughoutRawlsreferencesinthatstylecitepagesfrom,respectively,the1971and1999editionsofATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress)).3Theitalicizedrequirementconstrainswhatisheresaidaboutanindividual’sprinciples,butitalsoservesasaheuristicdeviceforhighlightingtruthsabouthownormativeprinciplesjustifyandarejustified,withinastructureofnormativeprinciples,andindependentlyofanybody’sbelief.Inspeakingofthestructureoftheprinciplesheldbysomeonewhoisfullyclearaboutherprincipledcommitment,Iamspeakingnotonly,precisely,ofthat,butalsoofthestructureofacoherentsetofprinciplesassuch,and,therefore,moreparticularly,ofthestructureoftheprinciplesthatconstitutetheobjectivenormativetruth,ifthereissuchathing.4“Absentotherconsiderations”isrequiredbecauseotherprinciplesmightoverridethestatedprinciplewhenitisstatedwithoutthatrider.Toreducethedangerofirritatingthereader,Iwon’tinwhatfollowsalwaysinsertthisphrasewhereitisplainlyrequired.5Cf.theheuristicroleassignedtothe“clarityofmind”stipulationatnote2above.6Assomeanti-Humeansthink:seesectionl.below.7Notethatthepossibilityacknowledgedwithintheseparenthesesdoesnotimplythatsuchamethodologicalprinciplemightexplain,intheabsenceofanyfurthernormativeprin-ciple,whyacertainfactsupportsacertainprinciple.Thatfurthersupposedpossibilitycontradictsmysecondpremiss:seesectiong(ii)oftheunabridgedversionofthisarticle.38GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC02.qxd2/4/0915:44Page398See“WhattheTortoiseSaidtoAchilles,”inLewisCarroll,SymbolicLogic,WilliamWarrenBartley,III(ed.)(Hassocks,WestSussex:Harvester,1977),pp.431–4.9See,e.g.,JonathanDancy,MoralReasons(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),Chapters4–6,andJohnMcDowell,“VirtueandReason,”inMind,Value,andReality(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),pp.57ff.10NothesisaboutwhatHumehimselfthoughtismaterialtomypurpose.Ifheisthoughttohavesaidsomethingdifferent,andmoreproblematicformypurposes,thenitwouldbethatdifferentthingthatmatters(andIwouldwelcomeitsbeingaired),butnotthatHumesaidit.11Howcouldit,therebeingnothingabout“is-to-ought”inthepremissesusedtoreachit?Onemightsay:ifyoudon’tincludeaprohibitionongoingfrom“is”to“ought”inthepremisses,youwon’tfindoneintheconclusion.12That“if”-clauseisenforcedbythepointabouttheconditionalityofmythesisthatwasmadeinsectionk.13IofcoursethinkthatHumeans,too,shouldadoptmyposition,butonlybecauseitisthecorrectposition,notbecauseitfollowsdistinctivelyfromtheHumeanposition.Mypositionfollowsdistinctivelyonlyfromtheanti-Humeanposition.14Comparethedistinctionbetweenultimateprinciplesandfact-boundprinciplesofregu-lationthatislaidoutinsections.below:factsaboutagentincapacityaretheendofthematterwithrespecttothelatterprinciplesbutnotwithrespecttotheformer.15Ipersonallybelieveinmoralobjectivitywithrespecttothesematters.Butnotethatitisonlyif(≠ifandonlyif)oneaddssomethinglikeathesisofmoralobjectivitytomydenialthatfactscontrolmoralsthatonecansupposethatmyargumenthasbeenaratio-nalistone,onethatsaysthatmoralnormscomeapriorifromreason.Apriori(thatis,non-a-posteriori)theycome,but,asfarasthepresentpaper’sclaimsareconcerned,notnecessarilyfromreason.16SeeATheoryofJustice,pp.158–61/pp.137–9;“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory,”inCollectedPapers(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),pp.343–6;and“ThemesinKant’sMoralPhilosophy,”inibid.,pp.510ff.17ATheoryofJustice,p.158/p.137,myemphases.18“ForallthatRawlsshows”putsthecasemildly:Ibelievethatnotmuchreflectionisrequiredtoseethat“Don’tcausetoomuchinequality”iseitheritselffact-insensitiveorimmediatelydependentonacloselyrelatedfact-insensitiveprinciple.Accordingly,Rawls’sillustrationofthesupposedunobjectionabilityoffact-dependent“firstprinciples”notonlyfailstoillustratethelatterbutalsoillustratestheveryoppositeofwhatRawlsseekstoillustrate.19See,further,ATheoryofJustice,p.536/p.470;JusticeasFairness:ARestatement(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress2001),p.67.20ATheoryofJustice,p.159/p.137.21InhisLecturesontheHistoryofMoralPhilosophy(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniverstiyPress,2000)RawlscharacterizesLeibniz’s“ethicsofcreation”asonethat“specifiesprin-ciplesthatlieinGod’sreasonandguideGodinselectingthebestofallpossibleworlds”(p.108,andcf.p.107).SoRawlsperhapsmeans,intheexhibitedcuriousTheorypas-sage,thatthefunctionoffact-independentprinciplesistodeterminewhatthegeneralfactsofnaturearetobe.Therightreplytowhich,here,is:theymighthavethatfunc-tionforGod,buttheyneednotthereforehavethatfunctionforus.22ATheoryofJustice,pp.159–60/p.138.Thereis,inmyopinion,atensionbetweenthequotedmethodologicalstatementandanelementinRawls’saccountofreflectiveequi-librium–seethereferenceto“allpossibledescriptions”atibid.,p.49/p.43–butIshallnotpursuethatclaimhere.FactsandPrinciples39\nCDIC02.qxd2/5/0911:00Page4023Iemphasize“calls”because“rationalintuitionism”istoospecificanameforthewidefamilyofpositionsaboutprincipleseachmemberofwhich,soIhaveargued(seesectionq.)isconsistentwithdenialthatfactsaffectultimateprinciples.24Seethepenultimateparagraphofsectiong(ii)aboveontherelationshipbetweenthemandus.25InmyforthcomingdiscussionofthispassageIshallprescindfromtheoccurrenceofthis(asIbelieveittobe)infelicitousmodifier.26ATheoryofJustice,pp.158–9/p.137,emphasisadded.27RobertNozick,TheNatureofRationality(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993),p.38.28ATheoryofJustice,p.29/p.25.29Includingarmchairsociology,whichissometimesenough,ornearlyenough,forthepurposestatedhere.30“TakingPeopleasTheyAre?”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs30(4)(2001),p.385.Cf.thediscussionofthedifferenceprincipleand“excessiveinequality”atp.33.31Foracommentonthisphrase,seep.38.32ElizabethS.Anderson“WhatIsthePointofEquality?,”Ethics109(1999);Cf.SamuelScheffler,“WhatIsEgalitarianism”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,Winter(2003).33RichardArnesonmakesarelatedpointinhisreplytoAndersonwhenhecontrasts“asetofprinciplesofjustice”with“aspecificationofjustinstitutionsorjustpractices”:seehis“LuckEgalitarianismandPrioritarianism,”Ethics110(2000):345.40GeraldA.Cohen\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page41CHAPTERTHREEConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustificationSamuelFreemanInjusticeasfairnessthefirstprinciplesofjusticedependuponthosegeneralbeliefsabouthumannatureandhowsocietyworks....Firstprinciplesarenot,inaconstructivistview,independentofsuchbeliefs,nor...trueofallpossibleworlds.Inparticular,theydependontheratherspecificfeaturesandlimitationsofhumanlifethatgiverisetothecircumstances1ofjustice.–(JohnRawls)Kantfamouslyadvocatesanethicsof“purereason”whichsaysthatthefundamentalprinciplesofmoralconductandtheirjustificationarenottocontainanyempiricalconcepts.Nomajortwentieth-centurymoralphilosopherwasinfluencedbyKantmorethanRawls.YetRawlsrejectsKant’sideathatfirstmoralprinciplesaretobefor-mulatedandjustifiedindependentofcontingentassumptions.Rawls’spositionmightbeexplainedongeneralphilosophicalgrounds:alongwithmanycontemporaries,herejectedthedualismsunderlyingKant’sandothertraditionalphilosophicalpositions,includingdistinctionsbetweenanalyticandsynthetic,purevs.empiricalreason,nec-2essaryvs.contingenttruths,andapriorivs.aposterioripropositions.ButgeneralphilosophicalreasonsofthekindthatQuine,Wittgenstein,DeweyandothersrelieduponarenotthereasonsRawlsgivesforinvokinggeneralfactstojustifyhisprin-ciplesofjustice.Hisreasonsarespecifictomoraltheory,asbefitshisclaimof“theindependenceofmoraltheory”frommetaphysicsandepistemology.AndthesereasonsrelatetotheonenotableexceptionamongKant’sdualismsthatRawlsretains:Kant’ssharpdistinctionbetweenthetheoreticalvs.thepracticalusesofreason.Myaimhereistodiscusssomereasonswhygeneralfactsshouldberelevanttoajustificationoffundamentalprinciplesofjustice.G.A.Cohenarguestheopposingposition.Headvocatestheapriorithesisthat,iffactsgroundprinciples,thenfact-freeprinciplesareatthefoundationofthestructureofthebeliefofanyonewhoisclearaboutwhattheybelieveandwhytheybelieveit,justasitisapriorithatanyonewhoisrationalmaximizes,or3satisfices,orwhatever.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page424Cohen’scriticismisdirectedagainstconstructivisminmoralphilosophy.Hesays,“Constructivistsaboutjustice...believethatallsoundprinciplesare,asIshallsay,fact-sensitive,bywhichImeanneithermorenorlessthanthatfactsformatleastpartofthegroundsforaffirmingthem.”Nowstrictlyspeaking,thisisnottrueofKant’sconstructivism,forwhomthereasonsfortheMoralLawareaprioriandbased5in“purereason”alone.NordoesRawlsregard“allsoundprinciples”as“fact-sensitive”(forexample,theveilofignoranceandformalconstraintsofrightarenot).ButRawlsdoescontendthathis“fundamentalprinciplesofjustice”arebasedincertaingeneralfactsaboutthehumancondition.SinceCohen’saccountofcon-structivismiscloselytiedtofeaturesofRawls’sconstructivism,Iwillfocusonthat.IleaveasideRawls’slaterpoliticalconstructivism,sinceitcantakenopositiononthemeta-ethicalissuesCohenraises.Onlyjusticeasfairnessregardedasa(partially)comprehensiveconstructivistpositionsetforthinATheoryofJusticeand“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory”isatissuehere.Idiscussthreereasonswhythefirstprinciplesofamoralconceptionofjusticeshouldbe“fact-sensitive”orpresupposegeneralfactsintheirjustification:(1)First,aconceptionofjusticeshouldbecompatiblewithourmoralandpsycho-logicalcapacities.Itshouldrespondtobasichumanneeds;moreover,giventheirnaturaltendencies,conscientiousmoralagentswhoaffirmtheconcep-tionshouldbecapableofdevelopingappropriateattitudesenablingthemtonormallyactuponitsdemands.(2)Second,aconceptionofjusticeshouldprovideprinciplesforpracticalreason-ingandfulfillasocialroleinsupplyingapublicbasisforjustificationamongpersonswithdifferentconceptionsoftheirgood.(3)Third,amoralconceptionshouldnotfrustrate,butshouldaffirmthepursuitofthehumangood.Inordertomeeteachofthesereasonableconditions,aconceptionofjusticemusttakeintoaccountfactsabouthumannatureandsocialcooperationinjustifyingfirstprinciplesofjustice.IargueforthisthesisinsectionsII–IV.Beforethat,IclarifywhatCohenandImeanby“fundamentalprinciplesofjustice”andwhatisatstakeinthisdispute.I:WhatAreFundamentalPrinciplesofJustice?Supposewewereconstructedbynaturesothatwehadequalconcernforeveryoneandcarednomoreforourownwell-beingthanthenextperson’s.Wemightthen,asHumesays,havenoneedforpropertyandothernormsofdistributivejustice,forthenwewouldbewillingtoproduceandsharegoodsandserviceswithoutself-concern.Similarly,supposenatureweresobountifulthatallourdesirescouldbesatisfiedwithoutanyone’slabororforbearance–theobjectsofourwantsappear“likemannafromheaven.”Againwewouldhavenoneedforpropertyordistributivejustice.Butcircumstancesaredifferent.Wearecharacterizedby“limitedaltruism”–wehaveattachmentstoparticularpersonsorgroupsandcaremoreforourownprojectsandcommitmentsthanforothers’.Alsothereis“moderatescarcity”ofgoods–enough42SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page43tomeeteveryone’sneeds,butneverenoughtosatisfyalltheirdesires;thushumansmustproduce,save,andinvesttheirproducttosatisfypresentaimsandfutureambitions.These“circumstancesofjustice”giverise,Humesays,tothe“cautious,jealousvirtueofjustice.”Weregeneralfactsabouthumankindentirelydifferentwemighthavenoneedforrulesofpropertyandprinciplesofdistributivejusticethatdeterminewhoshouldreceiveandcontrolincomeandwealthinexchangeforspecifiedcontributions.RawlsfollowsHumeinregardingjusticeasaparticularlyhumanvirtue.Itmightberepliedthatnoneofthisshowsthatthecontentofprinciplesofjustice,orwhattheyrequireofus,iseitherconditioneduponandorjustifiablebyappealtofactsabouthumannature.Whetherjusticerequiresthatwemaximizeaggregategoodness,ordistributegoodsequally,oraccordingtoneed,oreffort,orcontribution,ortomaximallybenefittheleastadvantaged,ortoredresstheeffectsofbruteluck,orwhateverthecriterion–it’sthisquestionthatisnotdependentuponfactsabouthumannaturebutratheruponmoralconsiderationsthatultimatelyare“fact-6insensitive.”Cohensays“Ultimateprinciplescannotbejustifiedbyfacts”(FP212,emphasisadded),notthattheycannotcontainanyallusionstofacts.YetRawlsexplicitlyappealstogeneralfactsabouthumannature(ourlimitedaltruismandpsychologicaltendenciesofreciprocity)andsocialphenomena(thechain-connectionandclose-knitnessofeconomicdistributions)toarguethatthedifferenceprincipleispreferabletotheprincipleofutilityorastricteregalitarianprinciple.AsIunderstandCohen,thisistheproblem,namelyconditioningthejustificationofprinciplesofjusticeupongeneralfactsabouthumanpropensities,economictendencies,andsocialinstitu-tions.Theproblemisthatwhenfactsareinvokedtojustifyprinciplesofjustice,theseprinciplesthencannotbefundamentalprinciplesbutrathermustbetheapplicationorextensionor“implementation”offundamentalprinciplestoparticularfactualcir-cumstances.Forthisreason,Rawls’sdifferenceprinciplecannotbethe“fundamental,”7“ultimate,”or“firstprinciple”ofdistributivejustice(allbeingtermsRawls’suses).InsupportofRawls’sposition,thefollowingfourlevelsofnormativeprinciplescanbedistinguished.TheyaretobefoundnotonlyinRawls,butalsoSidgwick,Mill,Kant,andothermajormoralphilosophers:(1)Substantivemoralprinciples,whichareamongthebasicprinciplesofcon-duct(forindividualsorinstitutions);examplesincludeRawls’stwoprinciplesofjustice,theprincipleofutility,Kant’sMoralLaw,W.D.Ross’ssevenprimafacieprinciplesofRight,Nozick’sentitlementprinciples.Icontendthattheseprinciplesofconductarefundamentalinthattheyaretheultimatestandardsthatdetermineifandwhenactions,laws,andinstitutionsarerightorjust.(2)Principlesofjustification,whichareamongtheultimatereasonsandconsid-erationswhichareusedtojustifythesubstantiveprinciplesofjusticementionedin(1).Thesejustifyingreasonshaveadifferentfunctionthanprovidingultimatestandardsforrightconductorjustdistributions;theyhaveprimarilyanepi-stemicrole.ExampleswouldbeRawls’sidealoffreeandequalmoralpersons,theformalconstraintsofright(universality,generality,publicity,etc.),andtheveilofignorance,allofwhicharepartoftheoriginalposition;orKant’sassumptionofpracticalfreedominhis“transcendentaldeduction”oftheMoralLaw;orSidgwick’sprinciplesofimpartialbenevolenceandofequity(treatsimilarcasessimilarly),usedtojustifytheprincipleofutility;orHarsanyi’sConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification43\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page44impartialityconditionandassumptionsregardingrationalchoiceandequiprob-abilityofoutcomes,usedtojustifyaprincipleofaverageutility;andperhaps(asheregardsit)Cohen’sluckegalitarianprinciple.Someaccountofpracticalrationalityandmoralreasoningandjustificationnormallyaccompanyprinciplesofjustificationandisutilizedinthejustificationoffundamentalprinciplesofconductforindividualsandinstitutions.(3)Principlesofapplication,whichareusedtodeterminewhat(1)substantiveprinciplesofjusticerequire;examplesinclude“equalconsiderationistobegiventoequalinterests”inapplyingtheprincipleofutility;orthefinalthreestagesofRawls’s“Four-stagesequence”forapplyingtheprinciplesofjus-tice;orKant’scategoricalimperativeprocedureforapplyingtheMoralLaw.(4)Secondaryprinciplesandrulesofconduct,whichresultfromtheapplicationoffirstprinciplesofjusticein(1);examplesarerightsoffreedomofspeechandexpressionthatliberalscontendarejustifiablebyaprincipleofliberty;therulesofaconstitutional,property-owningdemocracythatRawlscontendsarejustifiedbyapplyingtheprinciplesofjustice;ortherulesofacapitalistwelfarestatethatwelfareeconomistsjustifyongroundsoftheprincipleofutility;ordutiesoffidelity,veracity,andcharityjustifiedbymanymoralconceptions.Withinthisfour-partschema,epistemicprinciplesofjustification(atlevel2)donotthemselvesdeterminewhenactions,lawsandinstitutionsarerightorjust.Forexample,thereisnothingaboutRawls’sidealoffreeandequalmoralpersons,thefiveformalconstraintsofright,theveilofignorance,andtheaccountofrationalplansoflife,takenbythemselves,thatwoulddeterminewhetheronedistributionismorejustthananother,orwhethersocialism,property-owningdemocracy,welfare-statecapitalism,orlaissez-fairecapitalismarerequiredbyjustice.Instead,thesejustificatoryprinciplesareamongtherelevantreasonsthatmustbetakenintoaccountinarguingforandjustifyingsubstantiveprinciplesofdistributivejusticebywayoftheoriginalposition.Itisnottheroleoftheseprinciplesofjustificationtoprovidetheultimatestandardforjustdistributions.Toknowthestandardstousetodecidewhicheconomicinstitutionsordistributionsaremoreorlessjust,wehavetolookatthefundamentalsubstantiveprinciplesofjusticethemselves(thedifferenceprin-ciple,theprincipleofutility,libertarianentitlementprinciples,orsomeotheraccountofdistributivejustice).Cohenholdsthatsolongasaprinciplehasajustificationviaother“normative8principles,”itcannotbeafundamentalprinciple.Thisimpliesthatnothingcanbeafundamentalsubstantiveprincipleofconductunlessitisitselfself-evident,orfollowsfromnon-factualmethodologicalprinciples.Butthefactthatnormativejustificatoryprinciples(e.g.animpartialityconditionimplicitintheveilofignorance)areneededtoargueforultimatesubstantiveprinciplesofjusticeshouldnotdeprivethelatteroftheirstatusasfundamentalmoralprinciples.Whatmakesasubstantiveprincipleofconductfundamentalisnotthatitisself-evidentorotherwisewithoutnormativejustification,butthatitistheultimatestandardfordeterminingconductandtherearenomorebasicprinciplesofwhichitisanapplication.Thus,forRawlsdistributionsofincome,wealth,andpowersandpositionsofofficearejustwhentheyresultfromaneconomydesignedtoimplementfairequalityofopportunityand44SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page45thedifferenceprinciple.Thereisnomorefundamentalprincipletowhichwecanappealtodeterminejustdistributions;thesecondprincipleisthelimit.Cohenhimselfdistinguishesbetween“justifyingprinciples”and“regulativeprin-ciples.”HecontendsthatRawls’sprinciplesofjusticeareregulativeprinciples,andthatassuchtheyarenon-fundamental:onlyjustifyingprinciples,liketheprinciplesinformingRawls’sidealoffreeandequalmoralpersons,canbefundamentalprin-9ciples.Buttheregulativenatureoftheprinciplesofjusticeshouldnotmakethemanyless“fundamental”thantheprinciplesusedtojustifythem.Forjustificatoryprin-ciplesandregulativeprinciplesofconductworkatdifferentlevels.Theformeraretheargumentativeingredientsthatcombinetoprovideepistemicsupportforregula-tiveprinciples.Butimportantly,theyarenotadequatebythemselvestotelluswhatweoughttodoorhowweoughttostructuresocialinstitutionsandrelations.Instead,justificatoryprinciplesprovidefundamentalreasonsthatenableustodecidewhataretheequallyfundamentalsubstantiveprinciplesofconductthatregulatewhatwearetodo.ThisjustifyingroleistakenoninRawlsbytheconceptionoffreeandequalpersons,theveilofignoranceandotherassumptionsthatgointoRawls’soriginalposition;theyareamongthe“restrictionsthatitseemsreasonabletoimposeonargumentsforprinciplesofjustice,andthereforeontheseprinciplesthemselves”(TJ18/16rev.)UtilitarianssuchasR.M.HareandJohnHarsanyiwouldarguethesameistrueoftheimpartialityassumptionsandaccountsofrationalchoiceasutility-maximizationthatunderlietheirimpartialchoiceargumentsforaprincipleofutility.Thesefact-freeprinciplesarefundamentalreasonsforacceptingfundamentalsubstantiveprinciplesofconduct.Hence,thefactthatsubstantiveprinciplesofjusticehaveajustificationshouldnotunderminetheclaimthatsubstantiveprinciplesarethefundamentalprinciplesofjusticetowhichweultimatelyaretoappealinsocialandpoliticalrelationsindecidinghowtostructureinstitutionsandmakelawsandotherrulesofconduct.Therearenomorebasicprinciples,includingfundamentalprinciplesofjustification,whichtakenbythemselvescananswerthatquestionforus.Butthisdivertsusfromthemainissue;whichiswhetherfactualconsiderationscanplayanyroleinestablishingwhatIamcallingfirstprinciplesofconduct.Cohensays,“Ultimateprinciplescannotbejustifiedbyfacts”(FP219).Rawlsdeniesthisandgoesagainstalongtraditioninphilosophywhichsaysthatthejustificationoffundamentalmoralprinciplesmustdependonlyonaprioritruths.Rawlssays,tothecontrary,thatfundamentalprinciplesofjusticemustinvokeandrelyupongeneralfactsabouthumantendenciesandsocialcooperation.Hisopponents,including10CohenandHabermas,replythatonceempiricalconsiderationsareinvokedtosup-portprincipleswehavenolongerafundamentalprinciple,butrathersomethingless:an“application”(Habermas)or“implementation”(Cohen)ofsomefact-freefundamentalprinciple(s).InthefollowingthreesectionsIaddressandtakeissuewithCohen’sandHabermas’sclaimsthatonlyfact-insensitiveprinciplescanbefunda-mentalprinciplesofjustice.Whyisthisissueimportant?What’sthepointbehindCohen’s“meta-ethicaltruth”that“Ultimateprinciplescannotbejustifiedbyfacts”(FP219)?Itmightbepurelyphilosophical,akintoKant’sambitiontodiscovertheprinciplesregulativeof“purepracticalreason”whateveritsempiricalconditions.Anotherreasonisthefearthatappealstofactsmakemoralprinciplescontingentoncircumstances,therebyraisingthespecter11ofrelativism.ButifthefactsRawlsappealstoarepermanentandapplygenerallyConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification45\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page46tohumanbeingsassuch,thenthereshouldbenothreatoftheculturalrelativismofmoralprinciplesofjustice(whichisthekindofrelativismthatmatterspracticallyspeaking).Finally,athirdfactorthatmightbemotivatingCohen’scritiqueisthat,ifhisargumentregardingfactsandprinciplesistrue,thenitmightinsulatehisluckegalitarianthesisfromrecentcriticisms.Ireturntothisissueintheconcludingsection.II.Justice,HumanNeedsandMoralCapacitiesThefirstreasoncitedearlierfortherelevanceoffactstofirstprinciplesofjusticeis:(1)Aconceptionofjustice(likeanymoralconception)shouldbecompatiblewithourmoralandpsychologicalcapacities.Itshouldberesponsivetobasichumanneedsandinterests,atleastinsofarasconscientiousmoralagentswhoaffirmtheconceptionshouldbecapableofdevelopingappropriateattitudesenablingthemtonormallyandregularlyactuponitsdemandsgiventheconstraintsofhumannature.Aprimaryexampleofafactabouthumanbeingsthatisrelevanttofundamentalmoralprinciplesisthevaluethatweputuponselfrespect.By“selfrespect”Imeanapsychologicalattitudethatincludesasensethatourindividuallivesmatterandareworthliving,thatourprimarypursuitsarealsoworthwhile,andthatwearecapableofrealizingthesepursuits.Intraditionalsocietiesasharedreligionoftenprovidedaprincipalbasisforself-respect,butinamoderndemocraticsociety,self-respectgenerallydependsuponothers’recognitionofapersonasanequalcitizen.Ifwewerestronglydisconnectedselves,withlittlesenseofourowngoodorevenofourpastorfuture,wewouldnotbesoconcernedabouteitherself-respectorothersrespectforusaspersons;norwouldwelikelybesoconcernedaboutindividuals’rights.AsDerekParfitargues,thismightstrengthenthecasefortheprincipleofutil-ity.Itissafetoassumethatoursenseofourpersonalidentityisnotbasedinourhavingasoulorbeinganimmutablesubstance.Itisacontingentfactwhetherwearepsychologicallydissociated,disconnectedselves,orare“stronglyconnected”withasenseofourselvesandourgood.Thissuggeststhatself-respectisacontingentbeliefandattitudetoo.Rawlssaysthatself-respectisperhapsthe“mostimportantprimarygood”(TJ440/386rev.).ThepartiesinRawls’soriginalpositionconsidertheeffectsofprinciplesandinstitutionsontheirsenseofself-respectincomparinganddecidingonprinciplesofjustice.Amongthebasesofself-respect,Rawlscontends,areprinciplesandinstitutionsthatmaintainpersons’statusasequalcitizens,includingequalpoliticalliberties,equal-ityoffairopportunities,andotherequalbasicrightsandliberties.Whyshouldwebeconcernedabouthavingequallibertiesandequalfairopportunities,ratherthanjustenoughtodowhatweneedorseektodo?Herethebasesofself-respectandourdesiretoberegardedasequalsplayacentralroleinRawls’sargumentforegal-itarianprinciplesandinstitutions.Principlesofjusticeareresponsivetothe“basicneeds”ofpersonswhoconceiveofthemselvesaswedo.OtherprimarygoodsRawlsrecognizes(liberties,powersandopportunities,andincomeandwealth)alsohaveanempiricalbasisinpsychologicalandsocialtendencies.46SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page47Itmightberepliedthatthegoodnessordesirabilityoftheseprimarygoodsisnotcontingentuponfacts.Evenifourdesireforself-respectdependsuponthepsycho-logicalfactthatweconceiveofourselvesasstronglyindividuatedselveswithapastandafuture,stillitisgood,independentofanysuchfactsaboutourselves,thatwehavesuchastrongsenseofindividualselfandaconcomitantdesireforself-respect.Ifwemetwithatribewhosemembershadnolong-termaimsorlife-plansandlittleornosenseofindividualself,butwholivedlikedronesalwaysselflesslyserv-ingsomedominantcommunalend(maximizingtheKing’spleasuresandoffspring,forexample),werightfullywouldthinkthisisabadwayforpeopletolivesinceitresultsintheirexploitationandviolationofhumanrights.Eveniftheydonotthinkofthemselvesasworthyindividualswiththeirownpurposesandseparatelivestolive,stilltheyshouldsincemaintainingindividualdignity,orfreeself-developmentandindividuality(forexample)arefundamentalhumangoods.So,theobjectioncontinues,evenifRawlsweretorelyonlyuponpsychologicalandsocialfactstojustifytheprimarygoods,theynonethelesshaveanindependentphilosophicalgroundinginmoralvalueshedoesnotinvoke.Rawlshimselfmightbeinterpretedasproviding(ontheKantianinterpretation,TJ§40)anon-empiricalgroundingfortheprimarysocialgoods.TheKantianinter-pretationsuggeststhatourconceptionofourselvesasunifiedselvesextendingovertimewithendsandalife-planofourownisnotsimplyacontingentfact,butisrootedintheconditionsofrationalmoralagency,themoralpowers,whichconstituteour“natureasfreeandequalrationalbeings.”Forapersontoactandhavereasonsatallrequireshavingacoherentplanoflifeanddevelopedmoralpowers.Otherwise,likedrones,oneisabeingtowhomthingsjusthappenandwhosebehaviorisaimlessandwithoutreason,oratmostabeingwithoutself-awarenesswhodoesnotactbutratherengagesinactivities(likedogsdiggingbones–thereisaim-directedactivity12butnotaction).OntheKantianjustificationoftheprimarysocialgoods,theyarenolongercontingentneedsofpersonswhohappentoconceiveofthemselvesaswedo.Theyarerathernecessaryconditionsforfullyrealizingrationalandmoralagency.Perhapsthenthecontingentgroundingofprimarysocialgoods(andtherewithprinciplesofjustice)mightbereplacedinsomewaybythisorsomeotherargumentfromtheirnecessity.Still,itisnotsoclearthattherelevanceofotherfactualgroundstoprinciplesofjusticeareexpendable.Supposethatprinciplesofjusticedemandmoreofusthanwearehumanlycapableofdoing.Itisoftenarguedthattheprincipleofutil-itymakesextraordinarydemandsonpeople.Asincereandconscientiousutilitarianisapersonwhoshouldhavenospecialconcernforhimselforherselfandwhoimparti-allypromoteseveryone’sinterests.Butitisbeyondourcapacitiestoforgowhateveraimsandinterestswehaveanddevelopasettleddispositionalwaystotakeevery-oneelse’sinterestsequallyintoaccountandacttomaximizeoverallutility.Tocon-tendthatwenonethelessoughttodosowhenwebynaturecannotistomakeanunreasonabledemand.Howcanareasonablemoralitydemandsomethingrealistic-allyimpossibleforpeople?Onewaytomitigateorneutralizetheeffectsofthe“oughtimpliescan”requirementisviatheindirectapplicationofmoralprinciples.Thus,theprincipleofutilitymightavoidtheproblemofimposingunreasonabledemandsby“effacing”itself(Parfit)andbecoming“esoteric”(Sidgwick).GiventhelimitationsofhumannatureperhapsthebestwaytomaximizeutilitymaybetoinculcateinpeopleaConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification47\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page48non-utilitarianmoralitywhoserules,whengenerallyobserved,infactcreategreaterutilitythananyotherruleshumansarecapableofregularlyobserving.Onthisindirectandesotericapplicationoftheprincipleofutility,itcanbearguedthatweindeedarecapableofcomplyingwiththedemandsoftheprincipleofutility,bydirectlyobservingothermoralrulesdesignedtotakeourlimitationsintoaccount.Theindirectand“esoteric”applicationofamoralprincipleisonewaytoreconcile“oughtimpliescan”withanoverlydemandingprinciplethatisbeyondhumancapa-citiesforregularcompliance.Sincereconscientiousmoralagentsthenarethosewhoarecommittedtoactingonandfromthesecondarymoralrulesthatbestimple-menttheoverlydemandingprinciple(e.g.,ofutility)inlightofhumannature.ThismaybeonewaytodefendCohen’sclaimthat“regulative”principlesofjusticearenoteverfundamentalbutrather“implement”fundamentalprinciples.Regulativeprinciplesmightberegardedinthesamemannerasindirectutilitariansconceiveofsecondarymoralprinciples;theyareapplicationsofmorefundamentalnormativeprincipleswhicharebeyondourcapacitiesregularlytocomplywithifdirectlyapplied.IdonotthinkthatCohenhimselfwouldacceptthe“esoteric”approachtofundamentalprinciples,largelyforreasonsIdiscussmomentarily.NextIwilldiscussfeaturesofacontractarianconceptionofjusticethatpreventtheesotericapproach,andshowwhyfactsmustbetakenintoaccountinthejustificationofultimateprinciplesofjustice.III:TheSocialRoleofaConceptionofJustice(2)Aconceptionofjusticeshouldprovidemoralagentswithprinciplesforpracticalreasoningandfulfillasocialroleinprovidingapublicbasisforjustificationamongpersonswithdifferentconceptionsoftheirgood.Toorientdiscussionofthissecondmethodologicalcondition,considerCohen’sandRawls’sdifferentconceptionsofpoliticalphilosophy:(i)“Thequestionforpoliticalphilosophyisnotwhatweshoulddobutwhatweshouldthink,evenwhenwhatweshouldthinkmakesnopracticaldifference”(G.A.Cohen,“FactsandPrinciples,”p.243,emphasesadded).(ii)“Aconceptionofjusticeisframedtomeetthepracticalrequirementsofsociallifeandtoyieldapublicbasisinthelightofwhichcitizenscanjustifytooneanothertheircommoninstitutions”(“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory,”Rawls’sCollectedPapers,p.347,emphasesadded).ThesestatementsrevealasignificantdifferencebetweenRawls’sandCohen’scon-ceptionsoftheroleofamoralconceptionofjustice.ForCohenitsroleismainlytheoretical;inthefirstinstanceamoralconceptionseeksthetruthregardlessofitspracticalconsequencesforsocialrelationsandcooperation.Ofcourse,anymoraltheoryseekstruthintheordinarysensethatitisaninquiryinto,andjustificationofthecorrectprinciples.Butifonethinksofmoraltruthandtheroleofamoralconceptionasmakingpotentially“nopracticaldifference”(Cohen,FP,p.243),thenitishardtoavoidtheideathatprinciplesofjusticearepriortoandindependentof48SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page49ourpracticalreasoningaboutthemasmoralagentswhoaresituatedandengagedinsociallife.Rawlssuggeststhatphilosopherswhoregardmoralphilosophyasasearchtodiscoverthetruthofantecedentnormativeprinciplesarenotgoingtobe13inapositiontoseethepossibilityofconstructivismasadistinctmethodinethics.Fortheunmediatedquestfortruemoralprinciples,pursuedasiftheyaretobediscoveredbytheoreticalreasonlikeanyotherbasictheoreticallawsorprinciples,leadstoneglectofthearguablyequallyimportantconceptionofthepersonanditsrelationshiptoprinciplesofjustice,andneglecttherewiththesocialroleofmoralprinciples.TheprimaryroleofaconceptionofjusticeforRawlsisapractical(asopposedtotheoretical)andsocialone.Thismeans:(1)Amoralconceptionisgearedtopro-vide,notallpossiblerationalandreasonablebeings,butrationalandreasonablepersonslikeus,whoconceiveofourselvesasfreeandequalmoralagentsandwhoaresubjecttotheconstraintsofhumannature,withpracticalguidanceregardingwhatweoughttodo.Tofulfillthispracticalrole,fundamentalmoralprinciplesshouldprovideuswithprinciplesofpracticalreasoningthatwecanreasonablyacceptandknowinglyapplyinourcapacityasfreeandequalmoralagents.(2)Amoralcon-ceptionhasasocialrole,toprovidebeingslikeuswithapublicbasisforjustificationregardingourmoral,social,politicalrelations.Thesetwoconditionsonaconceptionofjusticesuggestthatfundamentalmoralprinciplesofjusticeoughttobepubliclyknowableandgenerallyacceptabletothosetowhomtheseprinciplesapply,sothatprinciplescanfulfilltheirpracticalandsocialrolesasprinciplesofpracticalrea-soningforfreeandequalmoralagents,providinguswithpracticalguidanceandabasisforpublicjustificationsuitabletoourstatusasfreeandequalpersons.Assigningprioritytothepracticalandsocialrolesofamoralconceptionrulesoutformulatingamoralconceptiontrueofallpossibleworlds.Somephilosophershavethoughtthatethicalfirstprinciplesshouldbeindependentofallcontingentassumptions,thattheyshouldtakeforgrantednotruthsexceptthoseoflogicandothersthatfollowfromthesebyananalysisofconcepts.Moralconceptionsshouldholdforallpossibleworlds.Nowthisviewmakesmoralphilosophythestudyoftheethicsofcreation:anexaminationofthereflectionsanomnipotentdeitymightentertainindeterminingwhichisthebestofallpossibleworlds.Eventhegeneralfactsofnaturearetobechosen.Certainlywehaveanaturalreligiousinterestintheethicsofcreation.Butitwouldappeartooutrunhumancomprehension.(TJ137rev.,emphasesadded)Rawls’spointisthatthereissomethingmisguidedinconjecturingamoralityforallpossibleworlds.Moralphilosophyshouldtakeupthepracticalperspectiveofmoralagentsengagedindeliberationaboutwhatheorshe(orgroupsofwhichtheyaremembers)oughttodo.Thiscontrastswithanepistemologicalpointofviewofthedetachedobserverwhoseeksmoraltruthbyinquiringintothewaytheworld(orallpossibleworlds)reallyisoroughttobe.Constructivismsituatestheinquiryintomoralprinciplespracticallybyaskingnot(simply)“WhatmoralprinciplesshouldIbelievecorrectortrue?”but“WhatprinciplesofjusticeoughtIendorseandactuponinmycapacityasafreerationalmoralagentwithhumanpropensitiesandsituatedinthesocialworld?”Constructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification49\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page50Soconceivedconstructivismputscenterstageaconceptionofthepersonasmoralagentandseekstodiscoverprinciplesofjusticethataremostappropriateforexpressing/realizingthisconception.Aconceptionofthepersonasfreeandequal,reasonableandrationalmoralagentistheninterwovenintothecontentofprinciplesofjustice.Bycontrast,rationalintuitionismandrelatedviews,duetotheirdirectinquiryintotruemoralprinciplesunmediatedbytheirsocialorpracticalroles,areledtoeschewanyconceptionofthepersonasacentralfeatureofamoralconception.Thesocialroleofmoralityandtherelatedpublicityconditiononfirstprinciplesarerelevanttothisconceptionofpersons.Rawlsendorsesthefollowing:(A)respectforpersonsasfreeandequalmoralpersonsrequiresthatwejustifyourconducttothemontermsthattheycanreasonablyacceptintheircapacityasrationalmoralagents;(B)thefreedomandequalityofmoralpersonsrequiresthattheybeinapositionto14knowandacceptthefundamentalmoralbasesoftheirsocialrelations.Idiscusstheimplicationsof(A)inthissection,andof(B)insectionIV.Reasonableacceptability:Howdogeneralfactsenterintothejustificationofmoralprinciples,giventhecontractarianassumptionofreasonableacceptabilityofprin-ciplestopersonsintheircapacityasfreeandequalpersons?Whatdoesattendingtogeneralfactshavetodowithrespectforpeopleasfreeandequalmoralpersons?ContractariansinspiredbyKant(RawlsandScanlonaretheprimaryexamples)con-tendthattorespectpersonsasrationalmoralagentsrequiresthatthebasicmoralprinciplesstructuringandregulatingtheirrelationsbejustifiabletothem.Rawlsunder-standsthisidea(justificationtoaperson)tomeanthatprinciplesaretobeshowntobereasonablyacceptabletopersonsintheircapacityasfreeandequalmoralagentswithmoralandrationalcapacitiesandaconceptionoftheirgood,andinviewof15generalfactsabouthumansandtheirsocialrelations.Thereareanumberofwaystoworkoutthecontractarianideaof“justificationtoaperson,”suggestingpotentiallyseveraldifferentkindsofcontractviews.(Forexample,whatkindofknowledgearepeoplepresumedtohavetowhomjustificationsaremade?Whataretheirdesiresandinterests?Arepeoplepresumedtobesituatedinthestatusquo,astateofnature,orbehindaveilofignorance?)Iwillfocusonbutoneissue,namely,whetherwearetoassumethatthehypotheticalmoralagentstowhomcontractarianjustificationsaredirectedaresubjecttogeneralfactsofhumannatureandsociallife,andtakethesefactsintoaccountincomparinganddecidingontheacceptabilityofalternativeprinciples?Oraretheytoleaveasideconsiderationsregardinghumancapacitiesandsocialcooperationindecidingwhetherprinciplesaremoreorlessreasonable?Ontheonehanditmightbearguedthatmoralpersons,whoarebydefinitionreasonableandhencemorallymotivated,shouldnottakeintoaccountthesefacts,andinsteadshouldagreeonprinciplesthatapplywhateverthefactsabouttheirnatureandcircumstancesturnouttobe.Thentheywouldbechoosingprinciplestrueofall(ormany)possibleworlds.Theprinciplesthatthesehypotheticalpeoplecouldorwouldagreetowouldthenbedesignatedthemostrea-sonableprinciplesofjusticeforus.Ontheotherhand,itmightbearguedthatsinceallmoralpersonsknowntousaresubjecttohumantendencies,injustifyingprin-ciplestothemweshouldtakeintoaccountgeneralfactsabouthumannaturesuchasourtendencytodisagreementinphilosophical,religious,andmoralconvictions,ourdifferentcommitmentsandconceptionsofthegood,andthefactthatourcapa-citytoactonandfrommoralprinciplesisconstrainedbynaturalpsychological50SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page51tendencies(suchaslimitedaltruism).Theprinciplesofjusticethatfreeandequalmoralpersonswouldorcouldagreeto,inlightoftheirdistinctlyhumantendenciesandgeneralsocialconditions,arelikelytobequitedifferentthaniftheydidnottakeintoaccountthehumanconditionatall.RawlsandScanlonoptforthissecondposition.Principlesofjusticearetobejustifiabletoreasonableandrationalpersonswithnaturalhumantendenciesandwhoaresubjecttonormalconditionsofsociallifeamongbeingswithdifferentconcep-tionsoftheirgood.Itwouldbeunreasonabletoimposedemandsonpeoplethatdidnottaketheirnaturalpropensitiesandlimitationsintoaccount.Oneconsequenceofourhumannatureunderfreeconditionsisthatwedohavedifferentinterestsandfinalaimsaswellasconflictingphilosophical,religiousandmoralbeliefs.Forthisandotherreasonshumanshavedifferentconceptionsofthegoodandofwhatgivestheirlivesmeaning.Rawlsseeksprinciplesofjusticewhichtakethese“subjectivecircumstancesofjustice”intoaccount,andwhichcangaingeneralacceptancewithinafeasiblesocialworldamongreasonableandrationalpersonsconstrainedbyhumanpropensities.Theaimistofindtheconceptionofjusticethatrespectsus,notsimplyasreasonableandrationalbeings,butasdistinctlyhumanpersonswhoregardthem-selvesasfreeandequal.Assumeitisaconditionofthe(philosophical)justificationofamoralconceptionthatitbeabletofulfillthesocialroleRawlsassignstoit–namely,itshouldbecapableofprovidingapublicbasisforjustificationofsocialandpoliticalrelationsamongpersonswhoarereasonableandrational,whoregardthemselvesasfreeandequal,andwhohavedifferentconceptionsofthegood.Tofulfillthisrole,reason-ablepeoplemustfindamoralconception“reasonablyacceptable,”meaning(inpart)(1)thattheirhumancapacitiesenablethemtoregularlycomplywithitsdemands,and(2)theycanacceptitformoralreasonsandnotsimplybecauseitisthebestcompromisetheycanreachinpursuitoftheirnon-moralinterests.Aconceptionofjusticemustthenengageour“moralnature,”includingourcapacitiesforasenseofjustice.Thecrucialpointhereisthat,tofulfillasocialroleofpublicjustification,amoralconceptioncannotplacesuchgreatdemandsuponpeople’snaturalcapacitiesorpermissibleconceptionsoftheirgoodthatitexceedstheircapacitiesforcomplianceorconsistentlyfrustratestheirpursuitoftheirreasonableaimsandcommitments.Anymoralconceptionwhichexceedsthesefactuallimitationsisunreasonable.Thisrespondstotheproblemraisedattheendoftheprecedingsection,whereIdiscussedhowtwo-levelmoralconceptionsmightsatisfythe“oughtimpliescan”require-mentbyapplyingfundamentalmoralprinciplesindirectlytoconduct.Theproblemwiththisisthat,giventheirsocialrole,moralprinciplesofjusticehavetoservefreeandequalpersonswithahumannatureaspublicprinciplesofpracticalreasoningthatagentsthemselvescanapplyascitizenstodetermineandjustifytheirinstitutionsandactions.Itisbecauseofthissocialroleoffundamentalprinciplesofjusticethatthe“self-effacing,”“esoteric”approachtofirstprinciplesofjusticewillnotsuffice.Sincere,conscientiousmoralagentshavetobecapableofunderstanding,accepting,applying,voluntarilyactinguponandsincerelycommittingthemselvestofirstmoralprinciples.Theiracceptanceandcommitmenttoprinciplesassumesthatprinciplesarepubliclyknownandfulfillasocialroleinprovidingabasisforpublicjustificationoflawsandbasicsocialinstitutions.Otherwiseprinciplesareunreasonableforfreeandequalpersons;theyfailtorespectpersonsasfreeandequalwiththecapacitiesConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification51\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page52toreasonaboutjusticeanddowhatjusticerequiresforitsownsake.Theideathatbasicprinciplesofjusticeshouldbepubliclyknowableandserveasocialrolebyprovidingapublicbasisforjustificationamongconscientiousmoralagentswithdifferentconceptionsoftheirgoodisthenimplicitinrecognitionandrespectfor16othersasfreeandequalpersons.Todecideonthereasonablenessofmoralprinciplesmeansthatweneedtoknowagooddealabouthumanpsychology,economics,andbiology–includingknowingthenormalstagesofdevelopmentofpeople’smoralsensibilities–inordertodeter-minewhatpeople’smoralandothercapabilitiesareandthelimitsoftheirtoleranceofrestrictionsuponreasonableconceptionsoftheirgood.Forexample,ifamoralconceptionplacessuchgreatdemandsonsomepeoplewellbeyondtheircapacitiesforwillingcompliance(thelessadvantaged,forexample,arerequiredtogiveupachievingtheirprimaryaimssothatthosemoreadvantagedmayenjoystillgreaterrewards),thenthisisacompelling,perhapssufficientreasonfordisqualifyingthatmoralconception.(Rawlsrejectsutilitarianismforthisandotherreasons.)IV.JusticeandtheHumanGood(3)Amoralconceptionshouldnotfrustrate,butshouldaffirmachievementofessentialhumangoods.Therearedifferentwaystoconstruethisthirdcondition,dependinguponhowthehumangoodisconceived.IwillelaboratetheclaimbyreferencetoRawls’s“fulltheoryofthegood”inATheoryofJustice.Accordingly,(3)becomesthethesis(3”):Aconceptionofjusticeshouldenableustorealize(a)thevaluesofcommunity,and(b)ournatureasrationalmoralagents,makingpossiblethegoodofindividualandmoralautonomy.Non-Kantiansmayfindtheseclaims[(3”)(a)and/or(b)]unaccept-ablebutmightstillacceptthemoregeneralclaim(3)ongroundsofsomeotherconceptionofthehumangood.Rawls’snon-consequentialismpresupposesthattheconceptsof“theRight”and“theGood”requiredifferentprinciples.Hecharacterizesthegoodintermsofrationalchoice,oraccordingtocertainprinciplesofrationality.Generally,aperson’sgoodistherationalplanoflifethatpersonwouldchooseunderhypotheticalconditionsofdeliberativerationality(withfullknowledgeofrelevantfacts,fullyunderstandingtheconsequencesofchoice,etc.).Rawlscontendsotherprinciplesformallycharac-terizemoralityandtheconceptofright.These“reasonableprinciples”occupyadif-ferentpositionwithinourpracticalreasoningthandothe“rationalprinciples”providingshapetorationallifeplansandindividuals’good.Theroleofreasonableprinciplesistoregulateindividuals’andgroups’pursuitoftheirrationalgoodandconstraintheirchoiceofends.ButiftheRightregulatesandsubordinatestheGood,howcanactingrightandjustlyaccordingtoreasonableprinciplesbeagoodorrationalactivityforaperson?Theproblemof“congruence”oftheRightandtheGoodistoshowthatjusticeandreasonablenesscanthemselvesberationalandinte-graltoaperson’sgood.WithinRawls’sframework,congruencerequiresashowingthatitisrationalforeachpersoninawell-orderedsocietyofjusticeasfairnesstocultivateawillingnesstodojusticeforitsownsake.52SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page53Acriticmightreplythatthecongruenceproblemisnotessentialtodecidingthe17contentoffirstprinciplesofjustice.Forwhatjusticerequiresmustbeindependentofthequestionwhetheritisgoodforustodowhatjusticerequires.Somephilo-sophershavearguedthatwhetherornotitisgoodforanypersontodotheirduty18isirrelevanttothequestionofwhatdutyshouldbe.Thisconceptionofmorality,asdetachablefromthehumangood,ledNietzschetoregard“morality”asacalamityforus.For,beingentirelyindependentofthehumangood,theconstraintsmoralityimposesmuststuntthedevelopmentandexerciseofhigherhumancapacities,thusunderminingtherealizationofhumanflourishing.Whythenshouldwenotregardthepromptingsofourmoralsenseofjusticeasneuroticcompulsions,resultingfromasenseofweaknessandinferiority,orafearofauthority?Therequirementthataconceptionofjusticebe“congruent”withthegoodisresponsivetotheseandsimilarcriticisms.Areasonableconstraintonaconceptionofjusticeisthatitsprinciplesandidealsnotunderminethehumangood,butbecompatiblewith,andideallyevenaffirmit.Ifso,thenthecrucialpointformypurposesisthatgeneralfactsabouthumannatureareintegrallyrelatedtomostanyreasonableconceptionofthehumangood.Forwhethersomeactivityorstateofaffairsisagoodforapersondependsuponthatperson’scapacitiestoengageinorenjoyit.Nowassumethatthegoodforanypersonconsists(atleastinpart)intheirexercisingandrealizingtheirdistinctivelyhumancapacities.Thisresemblesapsy-chologicalclaimthatRawlscallsthe“Aristotelianprinciple.”This“deeppsychologicalfact”(TJ379rev.)suggests(roughly)thathumanbeingsgenerallyenjoyactivitiesthatengagetheexerciseoftheirrealizedcapacities,andtheirenjoymentincreasesthemorethecapacityisrealizedandthegreateranactivity’scomplexity(TJ374rev.).(Thus(Rawls’sexample)assumingapersonisequallyproficientatchessandcheckers,heorshewillnormallypreferplayingchesstoplayingcheckers.)Absentspecialcircumstances,toleaveone’smaturecapacitiesundevelopednormallyresultsinalifethatwillbefoundboringandunsatisfactory.Rawlscontendsthat“accept-ingtheAristotelianprincipleasanaturalfact”(TJ376rev.),itisrationalforindividualstorealizeandtrainmaturecapacities,andtochooseplansoflifethatinsignificantmeasurecallupontheexerciseanddevelopmentoftheircomplexhumancapacities(id.).Now,relyingontheAristotelianPrinciple,therearetwointrinsichumangoodsRawlsappealstoinATheoryofJusticetoconfirmandthusjustifytheprinciplesofjustice:(A)TheGoodofCommunity:TheAristotelianprincipleenablesRawlstoarguethatdevelopmentandexerciseitsownsakeofoursocialcapacitiesforasenseofjusticeareintegraltoaperson’sgoodsincetheyenableapersontoparticipateinasocialunionofsocialunions.ItfollowsfromtheAristotelianPrinciple(anditscompanioneffect)thatparticipatinginthelifeofawell-orderedsocietyisagreatgood(§79)....Becausesuchasocietyisasocialunionofsocialunions,itrealizestoapreeminentdegreethevariousformsofhumanactivity;andgiventhesocialnatureofmankind,thefactthatourpotentialitiesandinclinationsfarsurpasswhatcanbeexpressedinanyonelife,wedependuponthecooperativeendeavorsofothersnotonlyforthemeansofwell-beingbuttobringtofruitionourlatentpowers....YettosharefullyinthislifewemustacknowledgetheConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification53\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page54principlesofitsregulativeconception,andthismeansthatwemustaffirmoursenti-mentofjustice....Whatbindsasociety’seffortsintoonesocialunionisthemutualrecognitionandacceptanceoftheprinciplesofjustice;itisthisgeneralaffirmationwhichextendsthetiesofidentificationoverthewholecommunityandpermitstheAristotelianPrincipletohaveitswidereffect.(TJ500rev.,emphasisadded)ThedetailsandsoundnessofRawls’sargumentforthegoodofasocialunionofjusticearebeyondthescopeofmydiscussion.Butthegeneralpointcanbemadewithoutthedetails.Rawlsistryingtoshowhow“thevaluesofcommunity”(whichwouldinclude“solidarity”and“fraternity”)arepartofthehumangood.Thisisacentralfeatureofmanymoralconceptionsofjustice,includingG.A.Cohen’s.Rawlscontendsthatinordertorealizethegoodofcommunity,individualsmustactonandfromthecorrectprinciplesofjustice.WhetherornotoneacceptsRawls’sjusticeasfairness,thegeneralpointis:Assumingthatthevaluesofcommunityarepartiallyrealizedbypeoplecomplyingwithcorrectprinciplesofjusticefortheirownsake,thenamoralconceptionthataffirmsthatcommunityisessentialtothehumangoodmustinturnrelyupongeneralfactsabouthumannatureandpeoples’capac-itiestoactonandfromtheappropriateprinciplesofjustice.Thus,whenCohenhimselfmaintainsthatcommunity,solidarity,orhavingan“ethosofjustice”arehuman19goods(ashesuggestselsewhere)thenitseemsthathisprinciplesofdistributivejusticealsomustberesponsivetohumansocialcapacitiesforjusticeandtopursueandachievetheirgood.Otherwise,thepurportedgoodofcommunityandtheethosofjusticewouldnotbeachievableandperhapswouldbebeyondhumanreach.(B)MoralPersonalityandMoralAutonomy:Rawls’ssecondargumentforcon-gruenceoftheRightandtheGoodismorecontroversial,foritstemsfromRawls’s“Kantianinterpretationofjusticeasfairness”(TJ§40).Ingeneral,Rawls’sKantianinterpretationrestsuponanaccountofhumanagencyandpracticalreasoning:Byvirtueofthemoralpowerstobereasonableandrational(ourcapacitiesforjusticeandforarationalconceptionofthegood),wearecapableofengaginginpracticalreasonandactingonthereasonsthattheRight(morality)andtheGood(rational-ity)provide.Thesecapacitiesalsoenableustoformandrationallypursueacon-ceptionofourgood,andtherewiththeyenableustounifyourlivesandprovide“unitytotheself”(TJ§85).InTheoryRawlssaysthemoralpowersconstituteour“natureasfreeandequalrationalbeings.”TheaimofKantianInterpretationandofKantianConstructivismistodepicttheprinciplesofjusticeasderivablefroma“pro-cedureofconstruction”(theoriginalposition),whichitself“models,”“represents,”or“expresses”thesecapacitiesformoralandrationalagency.Kantdefinesautonomyasactingfromprinciplesthatreasonlegislatesforitself.OnepointofRawls’sKantianconstructivismistoprovidecontenttothistroublesomeidea.Sincetheprinciplesofjusticeare“constructed,”viatheoriginalposition,uponthebasisofthecapacitiesthatconstituteour“natureandfreeandequalrationalbeings,”Rawlscansaythattheprinciplesofjusticeareamongtheprinciplesthatreason“givesto”or“legislatesforitself”outofournatureasfreeandequalreasonableandrationalbeings.Thegeneralpointformypurposesisthat,thejustificationandcontentofprin-ciplesofjusticeareconditionedbythemoralpowers,these“naturalattributes”(TJ444rev.).Tobeamorallyautonomousagentwhofreelydesignsandactsuponaconceptionofthegoodincompliancewithprinciplesthataretheproductofour54SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page55moralpowersforpracticalreasoning,wehavetotakeintoaccountthecontingen-ciesofhumannatureandtheoptimalconditionsforthedevelopmentandexerciseofthesesamecapacities.Again,supposewewereempiricallyconstructedsothatwedidnotexpectreciprocityfromotherswithwhomwecooperate;instead,wehavenomoreconcernforourownwell-beingthanthatofcompletestrangers,andoursenseofjusticeismoreresponsiveto(Sidgwick’s)principleofimpartialbenevolencethantoRawls’sreciprocityprinciples.Thenitmaywellbethattheprincipleofutilitywouldbethemostsuitableprincipleforthedevelopmentandexerciseofourcapacityforasenseofjustice,andtherewithrealizingthisessentialgood.Butgivenhumannature,theprincipleofutilitydoesnotexpressorrealizeourcapacitiesforjusticeandthegood.Itisbeyondthecapacitiesofeventhemostsincereandcon-scientiousutilitariantoregularlyactuponthedemandsoftheprincipleofutility.AsRawls’spsychologicalprinciplesofreciprocitystate,wetendtoformattachmentstoprinciplesandinstitutionsthatdonotundermine,butrathersupportourpursuitofourgood.ThisisgoodreasonforpreferringRawls’sprinciplesofjusticetotheprincipleofutility,assumingthataconceptionofjusticeshouldbecompatiblewiththehumangood.Andtheargumentdependsuponnaturalfactsaboutourcapacityforasenseofjustice,includingthefactthatitismorelikelytobedevelopedandrealizedbytheprinciplesofjusticethantheprincipleofutility.V.MethodologicalRemarksReturningnowtoCohen,firstIwillconsiderverybrieflyapotentialdefenseofhisthesis,andthenwillconcludewithsomeremarksonthepracticalsignificanceofthisissue.Cohen’sthesisisthatfundamentalprinciplesareaprioriand“fact-free”andthatoncefactsarestatedinsupportofanyprinciples,theymustbesecondaryprinciplesthatareimplementationsoffact-freefundamentalprinciples.Considerthe20followingdefenseofCohen’sthesis,suggestedbyGideonRosen.Anyallegedly“fundamental”fact-sensitiveprinciple,suchasRawls’sdifferenceprinciple,canbeincorporatedastheconsequentofacomplicatedconditionalstatementwhichhasasitsantecedentapriorijustifyingprinciples(Pn)conjoinedwitha(conditional)state-mentofallthefacts(Fn)whichtogetherjustifythatfact-sensitiveprinciple(D).(Grosslysimplifying:[(Pn&Fn)→D].)Thiscomplicatedconditionalstatementdoesnotitselfassertthetruthofanyfacts,andthusisitself“fact-free.”NowgiventheaddedpremissesFnstatingthefactsintheantecedentofthiscomplicatedconditional,thefact-sensitiveprincipleDfollows(bymodusponens).Butifso,thenCoheniscor-rect:anyfactsensitiveprincipleDcanbeshowntopresupposeafact-freeprincipleintheformofourcomplicatedconditionalstatement.IamnotsurewhetherCohenwouldacceptRosen’sclaimasafriendlyamendmenttohisargument.ItraisesseveralquestionsandissueswhichIcanonlymention,butamnotinapositiontoadequatelyaddresshere.First,howarewetoindividuateprinciples?Isthecomplicatedconditional[(Pn&Fn)→D]aprinciple,orisitacon-catenationofnumerousfundamentalandsubordinatemoralprinciples,methodolo-gicalconditions,conditionalfacts,andlogicalconnectivesandoperators?Second,howcanthiscomplicatedconditionalserveasa“fundamentalprinciple”inCohen’ssense(seenote6)?(Coulditreallybe,onanyone’saccount,self-evident,orfollowfromanyConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification55\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page56reasonablemethodologicalprinciple?)Third,isthecomplicatedconditionalcapableofservingapublicsocialroleasaprincipleofpracticalreasoningthatindividualsanddeliberativegroupsapply(seePartIII),orisitsimplytoolong,complicated,andbeyondnormalcomprehensionforthosepurposes?Fourth,doesRosen’sclaimassumethatRawls’sargumentfortheprinciplesofjusticeisadeductiveargument?Ifsowouldn’tthismischaracterizethenatureoftheargumentfromtheoriginalposition,21whichsurelyisnotsolinearandtightlydrawn?Instead,theoriginalpositionargu-mentisanumberofdistinctreasonsandargumentswhoseconjunctionestablishesapreponderanceofreasonsinfavorofchoosingtheprinciplesofjusticeoveralltheotheralternativesprinciplesconsidered.Finally,doesRosen’sclaimpresupposethatlogicalconnectivesandoperatorsandrulesofinferencethatarepartofthecom-plicatedfact-freeconditionalstatementarethemselvespropositional?Ifsothenthisraisesthequestionwhetherthelogicalformofsentencesandrulesofinferencesuchasmodusponenscanserveaspremissesofargumentsorobjectsofcognitionfromwhichwereason?Aretheyrathernottheconditionsofjudgmentandinferencethat22makereasoningpossible?Again,theseandotherquestionswouldneedbeaddressedtorespondadequatelytoRosen’sclaim.ItwouldbeinterestingtoseewhetherCohenhimselfwouldwelcomeRosen’ssuggestion,orregarditascontrarytohispurposes.Finally,whatofpracticalsignificanceisatstakeinCohen’s“meta-ethical”argument?Again,Cohensays:Certainrecentcritiquesofthe“luckegalitarian”viewofjustice...aredisfiguredbyfailuretodistinguishbetweenrejectionoftheluckegalitarianviewasaproposedprincipleofregulationandrejectionofitatthefact-insensitivefundamentallevelatwhichtheviewisproperlypitched....[D]ifficultiesofimplementation,justassuch,donotdefeatluckegalitarianismasaconceptionofjustice,sinceitisnotaconstraintonasoundconceptionofjusticethatitshouldalwaysbesensibletostrivetoimplementit,whateverthefactualcircumstancesmaybe.(FP244)Oddly,thisargumentparallelsRawls’sownremarksregardingluckegalitarianism,orwhathecalls“theprincipleofredress”–“toredressthebiasofcontingenciesinthedirectionofequality”(TJ86rev.).RawlslikeCohensaysthisprinciplecannotbeusedbyitselftodecidedistributions,butonlyinconjunctionwithotherconsidera-tions.Butratherthancontendingthattheprincipleofredressisa“fundamentalprin-ciple”asCohendoes,Rawlssays,“Itisplausibleasmostsuchprinciplesareonlyasaprimafacieprinciple,onethatistobeweighedinthebalancewithothers”(TJ86).Rawlsregardstheluckegalitarianprincipleasacomponentofmoralintu-itionism(inhissense),theviewthatthereareapluralityofprimafacieprinciplesthataretobetakenintoaccountandweighedagainstoneanothertodecidewhatisrightorjusttodo.ThisseemstobeCohen’scontentiontoo;indecidingontheregulativeprinciplesofdistributivejusticeforstructuringeconomicinstitutionsanddistributingincomeandwealth,wearetoassignappropriateweighttoundeservedcontingencies,alongwithotherprinciples,andthenredresspeoples’situationsasmuchascircumstancesallow.Butwhycalltheseluckegalitarianconsiderations,“funda-mentalprinciples”?Whatiftheluckegalitarianintuitionisgroundedinsomemore23fundamentalprinciple;perhaps,asRawlsconjectures,thedifferenceprinciple?HereSidgwick’saccountoffirstethicalprinciplesisrelevant.Sidgwicksaysfirstprinciples(i)mustbeatleastascertainasanyothermoralprinciples,(ii)ofsuperior56SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page57validitytootherprinciples;and(iii)reallyself-evident,derivingtheirvalidity,orevid-ence,fromnootherprinciples.ThiscloselyresemblesCohen’scriteriaforfundamentalprinciples.LikeCohen’sargumentagainstRawls,Sidgwick’saccountofjustice(Methods,Bk.III:Ch.5)isdesignedtoshowthatnoneoftheprinciplesofjusticefoundincommonsensemoralitymeethiscriteriaforfirstprinciples,andhencemustbe24“middleaxioms,”orsubordinateprinciples.SupposeCohen’sluckegalitarianprin-ciple,suitablyelaborated,meetsSidgwick’sconditionslistedabove.Still,therearefurtherrequirementsSidgwickimposesthatCohen’sprinciplecannotmeet:(iv)Firstprinciplesmustcontainnolimitations,orexceptions,orrestrictions,unlesstheseareself-imposed;thatis,followfromtheprincipleitself,andarenotsimplyappendedasunexplainedprovisos;(v)Firstprinciplescannotbeprimafacieprinciplesbutmustyieldjudgmentsof“actualrightness,”allthingsconsidered;(vi)Firstprinciplesmustsystematizesubordinateprinciplestoorganizethemintoacompleteandharmoniousscheme;(vii)Theymustserveforrationalagentsasanactualguidetopractice,andcannotbevague,imprecise,orambiguous;(viii)afirstprinciplemustbeonethat25correctsourpre-reflectivejudgment.Rawls’sprinciplesofjusticemeetthesefurtherconditionsmuchbetterthanCohen’sluckegalitarianprinciple.(Forexample,notetheparallelbetween(vii)andthepublicityrequirement,whichrequiresthatfirstprinci-plesservereasonableandrationalagentsasprinciplesofpracticalreason.Sidgwick’srequirementin(vii)thatfirstprinciplesbeactualguidestopracticeisonethatCohen’sluckegalitarianprinciple,regardedasajustificatoryprinciple,cannotmeet.)Sidgwickarguesofcoursethattheprincipleofutilitysatisfiesallconditionsbetterthananyotheralternativeheconsiders.ButRawlsrejects(iii)therequirementofself-evidencebecauseofhisconstructivismandreflectiveequilibrium(andrejectsperhaps(i),(ii),and(iv)dependingonhowtheyareconstrued),andarguesthattheprinciplesofjus-ticearesuperiortotheprincipleofutilitywhenmeasuredbyconditionsresembling(v)–(viii),plusotherappropriateconditionsdiscussedaboveinsectionsII–IV.ThisisnotanargumentagainstCohen.Butitraisesthequestions,(1)whatothermethodologicalconditions,inadditiontothosehementions,heimposesonacon-ceptionofjustice;(2)whetherandifsowhyherejectsthefourfurtherconditions,(v)–(viii),whichareacceptedbybothRawlsandSidgwickasconditionsonfirstprin-ciples;andmoregenerally(3)whatconceptionofpracticalreasoningunderliesCohen’sconceptionofjusticeandmoraljustification?Finally,Cohen’sclaimthattheluckegalitarianprincipleisafundamentaljustify-ingprincipleleavesopenthepossibilitythatRawls’saccountofdistributivejusticemaybetruewhenregardedasprincipleofregulationinCohen’ssense.ThisisnotfarofffromRawls’sclaim:Althoughthedifferenceprincipleisnotthesameasthatofredress,itdoesachievesomeoftheintentofthelatterprinciple...Thedifferenceprinciplerepresents,ineffect,anagreementtoregardthedistributionofnaturaltalentsasinsomerespectsacommonassetandtoshareinthegreatersocialandeconomicbenefitsmadepossible,bythecom-plementaritiesofthisdistribution.Thosewhohavebeenfavoredbynature,whoevertheyare,maygainfromtheirgoodfortuneonlyontermsthatimprovethesituationofthosewhohavelostout.(TJ87rev.)Unlikeintuitionists,forwhomtheluckegalitarianprincipleistobeweighedagainstotherrelevantprinciplestodecideajustdistribution,forRawlstheprincipleofredressConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification57\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page58isregardedasa“commonsensepreceptofjustice”(TJ§47)which,alongwithotherprecepts(torewardpeopleaccordingtotheirneeds,theirefforts,andtheircontribu-tions,amongotherconsiderations)istobeaccountedforbythedifferenceprinciplewhenallrelevantconsiderationsaretakenintoaccountinreflectiveequilibrium.ThelikelihoodthatsomeversionofthedifferenceprincipleisconsonantwithCohen’s26luckegalitarianprincipleisalsosuggestedbyRawls’spoliticalliberalism.Accordingtoitjusticeasfairnesscanberegardedasa“politicalconceptionofjustice”thatfitsasa“module”withinreasonablecomprehensivemoraldoctrines,whichareinan“overlappingconsensus”aboutjusticeintheidealconditionsofawell-orderedsociety.Soregardedjusticeasfairnesswouldbe,withinthesedoctrines,clearlyderivativeandnon-fundamental.ButpoliticalliberalismisnotaconcessiontoCohen’sargu-ment.Rather,itavoidssuchmeta-ethicalissuesandprovidesanotherwaytoregardjusticeasfairnessasthecorrectconceptionofjusticewithoutdisturbingCohen’santi-constructivistposition.IontheotherhandhavetriedtomakethephilosophicalcaseforrejectingCohen’sargumentagainstconstructivism,basedinanalternativeaccount27ofmoraljustificationthantheoneheendorses.Notes1“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory,”TheDeweyLectures1980,inJohnRawls,CollectedPapers,SamuelFreeman,ed.(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),p.351(citedasCPintext).2RawlsspecificallynotesatthebeginningoftheDeweyLecturesthatthere“ThereareanumberofaffinitiesbetweenjusticeasfairnessandDewey’smoraltheorywhichareexplainedbythecommonaimofovercomingthedualismsinKant’sdoctrine”(Id.,CP304).3G.A.Cohen,“FactsandPrinciples,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs31(3)(2003):211–45,at233(citedasFPintext).4Cohenindicatesthat“FactsandPrinciples”ispartofalargerprojecthecalls“RescuingJusticefromConstructivism.”ThismanuscripthasbeenpublishedasRescuingJusticeandEqualitybyHarvardUniversityPress,whereherestatestheargumentin“FactsandPrinciples.”AllmyremarksherearebasedonthatearlierpaperanddonottakeintoaccountanychangesoradditionsCohenmakesinthesubsequentmanuscript.5HereIassumethe“MoralLaw”isKant’sfundamentalprinciple.It’struethatthecat-egoricalimperative,aninstanceoftheMoralLaw,appliesto“beingswithneeds.”Similarly,theprincipleofutilityappliestobeingslikeuswhoarecapableofexperienc-ingpleasureandpain.ButasIunderstandCohen,thisfactuallimitationintherangeofapplicationoftheseprinciplesdoesnotmeanthattheypresupposeempiricalfactsintheirjustification.Cohen’spositionisthatiftherearesensuousbeingswhohavetheseexperiences,theirpleasuresaretobemaximizedintheaggregate.Thisdoesnotrequirethatanysuchbeingsactuallyexist.6“Ultimateprinciplescannotbejustifiedbyfacts....[These]fact-freeprinciplesmightbeself-evidentlytrue,ortheymightforsomeotherreasonrequirenogrounds,ortheymightneedgroundsandhavegroundsofsomenon-factualsort(theymight,forexample,bejustifiedbysomemethodologicalprinciplethatisnotitselfanormativeprinciplebutaprinciplethatsayshowtogeneratenormativeprinciples),ortheymightneedgroundsbutlackthem,or...theymightbejudgedtobeoutsidethespaceofgrounds.”(FP219)7TosupporthisclaimthatRawls’sprinciplesofjusticearenot“fundamentalprinciples,”Cohenpointstotheassumptionoffreeandequalpersonsbehindtheoriginalposition58SamuelFreeman\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page59(FP238)andotherfact-freejustifyingprinciplesimplicitinRawls’sargumentforthedifferenceprinciple,suchas“oneoughtnotcausetoomuchinequality”(FP236).Thissuggests(toCohen)thatRawlshimselfreliesonmorefundamentalfact-freeprinciplestojustifyhisprinciplesofjustice(thatmoralpersonsoughttobetreatedequally,etc.).Other“fact-free”fundamentaljustifyingprinciplesRawlsinvokesthatCohenmighthavementionedaretheformalrequirementsofright(includinggenerality,universality,order-ingofclaims,finalityandpublicity),aswellasthestrongimpartialityconditionimplicitintheveilofignorance.8SeethequotationfromFP219innote6above.Cohensaysthatwhatmakesprinciples(orreasons)“ultimate”oralternatively“foundational”isthattheyareatthe“summit”(atermheuses)inthechainofreasonsthatjustifysubstantive(orregulative)moralprin-ciples.SeeminglyforCohenonly(some)justifyingprinciplescanbe“ultimate”or“foun-dational”principles.Also,Cohensaysthat“constructivistsaboutjustice”holdthat“allsoundprinciplesare...factsensitive[andthat]factsformatleastpartofthegroundsforaffirmingthem”(FP213).ButinthequotefromRawlsthatCohenusestosupportthisclaim(FP213n),Rawlssaysthat“Conceptionsofjusticemustbejustifiedbythecon-ditionsofourlifeasweknowitornotatall.”ConceptionsofjusticeforRawlsconsistofbothsubstantiveandjustificatoryprinciplesregardingmoralityandpracticalreason.ForRawls’sitissubstantiveprinciplesofjusticethatmustbefact-sensitive,andnotalljustificatoryprinciples.AsCohenhimselfnotes(seenote7above),manyoftheassump-tionsintheoriginalposition(theconceptionoffreeandequalmoralpersons,theveilofignorance,etc.)arenotfactsensitiveinCohen’ssense.Ontheotherhand,ifCohen’sclaimthat“[forconstructivists]allsoundprinciplesare...fact-sensitive”ismeanttobeapointaboutRawls’sreflectiveequilibrium,thenitmaybetrue.ForRawlstherearenofact-freefoundationalprinciplesthataretakenasself-evident,necessary,ordogmaticallyunrevisablewhatevernewinformationwemightencounter.Thisisinthenatureofestablishingareflectiveequilibriumofmoralprincipleswithconsideredmoralconvictions,includingfact-sensitivemoralconvictions,atalllevelsofgenerality.Cohenrejectssuch“holism”butsays“eveniftrue,holism(andquasi-holism)donotthreatenmyproceed-ings”(FP223).9Cohensaysthathisargument“refutesRawlsianconstructivismasameta-theoryofjustice”(FP243).OnereasonhegivesisthatRawlsfailstodistinguishbetween“prin-ciplesofregulationandtheprinciplesthatjustifythem”(FP244).Consequently,“hemisidentifiesthequestion‘Whatisjustice?’withthequestion‘Whatprinciplesshouldweadopttoregulateouraffairs?’”(Id.)Rawls’sprinciplesofjusticecannotbefundamentalprinciplesofjustice,forthesemustbeprinciplesofjustificationonCohen’saccount.10HabermasrejectsRawls’sstabilityargumentaspartofthejustificationoftheprinciplesofjustice,sinceitappealstoanumberoffactsabouthumannatureandsocialcoopera-tion.SeeJürgenHabermas,“ReconciliationThroughthePublicUseofReason,”JournalofPhilosophy92(March1995).RawlsrepliesinLectureIXofPoliticalLiberalism,“ReplytoHabermas.”11ThankstoSebastianoMaffetoneforpointingthisout.12DavidVellemandrawsadistinctionbetweenactionandactivityinhisThePossibilityofPracticalReason(Oxford:UniversityPress,2000),Ch.1,andChristineKorsgaardsimilarlydistinguishesbetweenactionsandactsinherLockeLectures.13“Aconsequenceofstartingwithmethodsofethicsdefinedasmethodsthatseektruthisnotonlythatitinterpretsjustificationasanepistemologicalproblem,butalsothatitislikelytorestrictattentiontothefirstprinciplesofmoralconceptionsandhowtheycanbeknown.Firstprinciplesarehoweveronlyoneelementofamoralconception;ofequalimportanceareitsconceptionofthepersonanditsviewofthesocialroleofmorality.Untiltheseotherelementsareclearlyrecognized,theingredientsofaconstructivistConstructivism,Facts,andMoralJustification59\nCDIC03.qxd2/4/0915:44Page60doctrinearenotathand”(“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory,”Rawls’sCollectedPapers,p.342).14Herefreedomistobetaken,amongotherways,inthesenseofpersons’rationalautonomyasauthorsoftheirlifeplansandtheirmoralautonomyasauthorsofmorallaws.Knowingandacceptingmoralprinciplesofcourseisapreconditionforactingforthesakeofmorallaws,whichisrequiredbymoralautonomy.15Scanlonhasasomewhatdifferentconceptionofjustificationtoaperson,thatistailoredtohismoregeneralprojectofprovidinganaccountofmoraldutiesweowetoeachother.16ThesocialroleofprinciplesiscloselyrelatedtoT.M.Scanlon’sideathatcorrectmoralprinciplesarethosethatcouldnotbereasonablyrejectedasabasisforgeneralagreementandjustificationamongpeoplewhoareconscientiousandmorallymotivated.17BrianBarrymakesthiscriticisminhisreviewofRawls’sPoliticalLiberalism,in“JohnRawlsandtheSearchforStability,”Ethics105(4)(July1995):874–915.18H.A.Prichard,“DoesMoralPhilosophyRestonaMistake?”(1912)inhisMoralObligation(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1949),Ch.1.19SeeIfYou’reanEgalitarianHowComeYou’reSoRich?(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).20ThisreconstructsmyunderstandingofRosen’sargument,whichhesuggestedatthe2006UNCPhilosophyColloquium.NodoubthecouldmaketheargumentmorepersuasivelythanIdohere.21IamgratefultoMichaelWilliamsforthissuggestion.RawlsconcursinJusticeasFairness,pp.133–4.22IamgratefultoR.JayWallaceandtoMarkLeBarfordiscussionofthispoint.23SeeRawls,TJ,318/280rev.There’snothingonitsfacethatmakesthedifferenceprinciple“fact-sensitive.”Onemightcontendthatitshouldbeintuitivelyobviousor“self-evident”that,sincethesocialproductisjointlyproducedandthemostadvantagedrarelyworkashardorexperiencethegravityofriskthattheleastadvantageddo,thenfairnessrequiresthattheeconomybedesignedtomaximizethesharegoingtotheleastadvantagedovertheirlifetimes.Whetherthisisanappropriatewaytoregardthedifferenceprinciple–asanintuitivelyobviousfundamentalprinciple(inCohen’ssense)thataccountsforourluckegalitarianintuitions–Cohen’saccountdoesnotseemtoruleitout.24AmongthesubordinateprinciplesSidgwickdiscussesareaprincipleofequalfreedom,Methods,pp.274ff.;andprinciplesofdistributionaccordingtoconscientiouseffort,actualcontribution,“fairprice,”andfreemarketvalue,Methods,pp.283ff.,etc.25Foranaccountoftheseconditionsseethe“LecturesonSidgwick,”LectureI,inRawls’sLecturesontheHistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2007).26Cohenhasotherargumentsagainstthedifferenceprincipleelsewhere.ButhisargumentsdonotappeartoinvalidatethedifferenceprincipleitselfbutonlyRawls’sinterpretationofitasapplyingdirectlytothebasicstructure,andonlyindirectlytoindividualactions.“Whynotapplyitdirectlytoboth?”(Cohenasksineffect).27Iamgratefulto:AndrewsReathforhisextensivecomments,andtoTomHill,GideonRosen,PhilipKitcher,andotherparticipantsatthe2006UniversityofNorthCarolina,ChapelHillPhilosophyColloquium;toMichaelWilliams,StevenGross,andothermem-bersoftheJohnsHopkinsPhilosophyDepartment;toBruceBrowerandothersatTulaneUniversity,toMarkLeBar,AlyssaBernstein,andothermembersofthePhilosophyDepartmentatOhioUniversity;toSebastianoMaffetoneandIngridSalvatoreandothersatLUISSinRome;andtoKokChorTan,SamuelScheffler,andR.JayWallace,allfortheirhelpfulremarksandcriticisms.60SamuelFreeman\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page61CHAPTERFOURReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizenStephenK.WhiteThroughmuchofthetraditionofWesternpoliticalthought,anappealtoreasonoccupiesacentralrole.Inthatappeal,thereresidesaconvictionthatanorientationtoreasoncarrieswithitatleastsomesortofinitialtractionforourengagementwiththemostsignificantproblemsofpoliticallife.By“traction,”Idonotmeanmerelyaninstrumentalgriponproblemsinthesenseofarationalstrategythatpromises1toefficientlyenhancemyself-interest.Rather,Ialsomeanatleastaminimalcog-nitiveanddispositionalgripinthesenseofsomeorientationtowardjusticeandgen-eralwell-being.Whenoneappealstoreasoninthisfullersense,onehaswhatIwill2callan“emphatic”conceptionofpracticalreason.InthehistoryofWesternpoliticalthought,thisemphaticcharacterwasoftenrep-resentedbyimagesofintenselightandpenetratingvision.ThinkofPlato’sdescriptionofemergingfromthecaveintothelight.OrthinkoftherepresentationsofEnlighten-mentidealsintheeighteenthcenturythatshowthesunpenetratingthroughtherain3cloudsandbringingrenewedwarmth,clarity,andwell-beingtothetownbelow.Translatedintomoral-politicalterms,reasoninthissensepromisestorevealaclearfoundationofuniversal,justprinciplesthatcanslackenthepropensitytosocialconflictandriseabovethediscordantparticularclaimsofdifferenttraditions,classes,religions,andnationalities.Suchanemphaticconceptionofpracticalreasoncameinforincreas-inglyintensecriticisminthetwentiethcentury.ThemostimportantlineofcritiqueforpresentpurposesistheoneusuallyseenasstretchingfromMaxHorkeimerandTheodorAdorno’sDialecticofEnlightenmentin1947,aswellasMartinHeidegger’sessaysofthatperiod,totheworkofMichelFoucaultandotherpost-structuralists4beginninginthe1970sandcontinuingtoday.Atthemostgenerallevel,thesephilosophersarguethatthosewhohaveoperatedwithinthedominantspiritoftheEnlightenmenthavefailedtounderstandadequatelyadangerunderlyingthedeter-minedpursuitoffreedomandreason.Theconfidentpursuitoftheseidealsintheformofuniversalizingideologiesandtechniquesofhumanorganizationbetraysanunacknowledgedwilltodominate.ThiswillknowsitselfonlyasabenigndesiretoContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page62subduenatureandtoreformtherecalcitrantqualitiesofselfandsociety,allinthenameofanincreasinglyjustandprogressivesociety.Awholeheartedadherencetothisrangeofprojectsbecameallthemorepressingasreligionwasincreasinglypushedtowardthemarginsofmodernlife.ThelossofChristianity’spromiseofimmortallifehadtobecompensatedforbythepromiseofanunendingexpansionofhumancapacitiesandwell-being.Theanxietyoffinitudewasthusdisplacedbyawilltodominatethatincreasinglybroughtwithitwhatonemightcallasenseofimmanentinfinitude.EdmundBurkewasperhapsthefirsttoperceivethisphenomenon.HesawittakingshapeintheFrenchRevolution.EvenbeforetheperiodoftheTerror,whenrootingoutenemiesoftherevolutionbecameanunendingtaskfortruepatriotslikeRobespierre,Burkesawinthegreatrevolutionaryfestivalsanewsenseoftheinfinitude5ofhumanwillandreason.Curiouslyenough,then,itisaconservativewhofirstdevelopsthekeyinsightoutofwhichradicalcriticsofthetwentiethcenturylaunchtheirarguments.TheclaimisthatentangledwiththeadmirableidealsofenlightenedWesternlifeisamoredisturbingandunacknowledgedwillfulness.DivineProvidencehasbeenreplacedbyamodeofreasonthatembodies“anattentive‘malevolence’thatturnseverythingto6account.”Itisonlyafterwehavefullyembracedtheworldasstandingcompletelyopentoourprojectsthatwecan–withthebestofintentions–findourselvessimul-taneouslypursuingemphaticnotionsofreasonandfreedom,whileatthesametimepersistentlyexpandingthereachofwhatFoucaultfamouslycalls“disciplinary7power”and“normalization.”Thus,forFoucaultandtheothertwentieth-centurycriticsofmodernity,attemptstoreasontowardjusticeandcommongoodthatstylethemselvesasanythinglikethebeneficentspreadingoflightintodarknessaredeeplydeficient.AlthoughFoucault,aswellasHorkheimerandAdorno,oftenspokeasifthisdeficiencyextendedtoeverypossiblevariantofemphaticpracticalreason,theyshouldnotbetakenattheirmosthyperbolicword.Thereisevidenceineachcasethattheydidnotsomuchcondemnemphaticreasonperse,astheycounseledfarmorecautionandself-reflection8inourappealstoreason.Wealwaysretainatleastsomecapacitytodevelopdis-positionsandpracticesthatpersistentlychastenreason’sgrandpromisetoreconcilethedifferentvoicesofhumankind.Theoverallaimofthispaperistoofferasketchofwhatsuchanappealtoachastened,butstillemphaticnotionofpracticalreasonmightlooklike,andwhatsortofcorenormativedispositionorethoswemightaffirmasappropriatetoareasonthatbearsthislate-modernburden.Iwanttorefertosuchachastenedappealandminimalorientationasexpressingthequalitiesof“reasonableness.”WhenIcalluponyoutobereasonableinthissense,Ihaveanexpectationthat,first,isorientedbytheacceptanceofcertainlate-moderninsightsthatcanbegatheredundertheumbrellaconcernofaninsufficientlyacknowledgedwilltodominate;and,second,takestheformofakindofmoralattentivenessandrestraintdisplayedinrelationtotheclashingvoicesthatengageoneanotherwithinthespacesofreason-givingthattogetherconstitutethecharacteristicinfrastructureoflate-modernethical-politicallife.Iwillrefertoonewhomanifestssuchadispositionashavingembracedanethosoflate-moderncitizenship.Insum,Iwillbetryingtobringtolifethisideaofaspiritordispositionthatwecandrawuponasaresourceforengagingtheinstitutions,practices,andcompetingfaithsofcontemporarypoliticallife.62StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page639Iunderstand“reasonable”tobeanessentiallycontestedconcept.Thismeansthatthecriteriaforapplyingtheconceptwillalways,atleastpotentially,beamatterofdispute.Theremaybe,however,clearconsensusonsomeminimalcriteriafortheuseoftheconcept;specifically,Iwouldarguethattheonesjustnoted–attentivenessandrestraint–constitutesuchcriteria.Whiletheremightberelativelystrongagree-menthere,thingsgetmorecontentiouswhenonetriestospecifyexactlyhowoneissupposedtosatisfythesecriteriaindifferentcontexts.Myintentionistodelineatehowthismightbedonewithinfouranalyticallydistinguishable,butoverlapping,spacesofreason-giving:whereagreementissoughtinvolvingthejusticeofbasicsocialandpoliticalstructures;wherereasonsarearticu-latedforaffirmingthe“foundations”or“sources”ofourethical-politicaljudgmentsandactions;wherereasonisappealedtointhestruggleforrecognitionofidentity;andwhereweargueaboutandpursuetheprogressiverealizationofdemocracy.Withineachofthesefourinterrelatedspaces,wecandelineateacorrespondingcoreethicaldisposi-tionthat,inturn,isanimatedbyaparticularsetofontologicalfigures.Theconstella-tionofdispositionandsupportingfigureswillprovideaminimalcontentinrelationtowhichtheexpectationsofattentivenessandrestraintwillbeorientedwithintherespec-tivespaces.Alate-modernethosofcitizenshipwillaccordinglydisplayitsfullcharacterinthejudgmentsandactionsofindividualswhosustainthisfourfoldsetofexpectations.Iwilltakeuponlythefirstthreeofthesespacesofreason-giving.Ihaveelse-10wheredealtwiththefourth.Accordingly,thepaperisdividedintothreesectionsthatcorrespondtothosefirstthreesites.SectionIconsidersthesiteuponwhichoneseekspossiblegroundsforcooperationinvolvingthebasicfairnessofsocialandpoliticalstructures.AmajorreasonforstartinghereisthatRawls’seffortsonthisterraincanfunctionbothasanaidandasafoilformyown.InPoliticalLiberalism,heproposesanexemplarywayofconstruingwhatitmeanstobereasonableinthisspace,andhowthatorientationconstitutesacentralcomponentofalate-modern11accountofjustice.Rawlscallshisprinciples“political”inthesensethattheycanbeagreedtoinafashionthatis“freestanding”inrelationtofoundationalphilo-12sophicalorreligiousviews.Thisstrategyofargumentmakesgoodsensegenerally,butIwilldrawattentiontoonewayinwhichhisaccountisinfactdependentonfoundationalcommitments.BythisImeanthathiscriteriaforwhatitmeansforapersontobereasonablearequitestrong;and,asCharlesLarmorehaspersuasivelyargued,theonlywayhecanjustifysostrongadefinitionisthroughatacitaffirma-tionofthefoundationalmoralideaofequalrespectandacorrespondingontologythatconstitutespersonsasentitieshavingdignityandthusbeingworthyofrespect.MyintentionincallingattentiontothisfoundationalelementinRawlsisnottocontestdirectlythevalidityofhistheoryofjustice.Rather,itistohelpisolateoneofthecentralmoral-ontologicalconstellationswithinwhichapersuasivenotionofalate-modernreasonablenesscantakeshape.AnotherwayofsayingthisisthatRawlsmaynotbeobligedtoworryaboutimplicitfoundationalissues,givenhisspecificgoalofconstructingapoliticalconceptionofjustice,butIam,givenmytaskofprovidingasensetotheideaofanethosthatreflectsmorebroadlyontherelationofreasonandpoliticstoday.InSectionsIIandIII,Ipursuethistaskfurtherbyteasingoutwhatitmightmeantobereasonableinrelationtotheothertwosites.InSectionII,IconsidermoredirectlythesitewherewearticulatethecentralontologicalfiguresthatprovidetheReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen63\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page64foundationsorsourcesofourcorenormativeclaimsinethicsandpolitics.InSectionIII,Iturntowhatisoftencalledthestruggleforrecognitionofidentity.Thisthirdsiteissomewhatdifferentfromthefirsttwo.ThesetwohavetraditionallybeenatthecenterofpoliticalreflectionintheWesterntradition.Whatisdifferenttodayisexactlyhowweorientourselvesontwosites.Buttheveryexistenceofthethirdsite13istoasignificantextentanartifactoflate-moderntimes.Myoverallintentionistoelucidatehowtheclaimtoreasonablenesswoulddrawustobeattentiveandexerciserestraintateachofthesethreesites.Thecriteriaofattentivenessandrestraintoperatedifferentlyateachsite;buttheclaimtoreason-ablenessatonesiteisconstitutivelyentangledwiththecorrespondingclaimtoreasonablenessontheothertwo.Onewhoseactionembodiessuchafull,threefoldclaimcanbesaidtomanifestwhatanemphaticbutchastenedreasonmightmeanforalate-moderncitizen.I.SiteOne:TheTermsofCooperationRawls’sPoliticalLiberalismisajustlyfamousefforttosketchoutwhattheimplicationsareofappealingto“reasonable”individualsforthepurposeofconstructingatheoryofjustice.Heunderstandsthisappealtoreasonasonethat(inmyterms)ischas-tenedbutstillemphatic.ItischastenedbyaprimaryinsightorlessontobelearnedfromthehistoryofmodernWesternpoliticallife:thattheclashesbetweendifferentconceptionsofthegoodshownosignsofbeingdefinitivelyresolvedinfavorofanyoneofthem;and,accordingly,wemusttakeaccountofthisunderlying“factofreason-14ablepluralism”whenwereflectuponpoliticallifetoday.Afailuretoacceptthisfactleavesasocietyopentopoliticaldominationbyonegrouporanotherclaimingtherighttoenforceitsviewofthegood.Atheoryofjusticethatrejectsthiskindofclaimmustconfigureitselfinsuchawaythatitremains,asInotedamomentago,freestandinginrelationtoanyparticularfoundational,or,inRawls’swords,“com-prehensive”moralorpoliticalview.Rawls’stheoryisthuschastenedinthesensethatitdisallowsappealstoreasonthatclaimtobecapableofpeeringthroughandfullyresolvingdifferencesbetweenalternativefoundationalclaims.Atheoryofjusticesuchashisfindsitsbasisofagreementatthelevelofan“overlappingconsensus”between15adherentstodifferent,butreasonable,comprehensiveviewsofthegood.IfthisisthewayRawlsinterpretsreason’sbeingchastened,howdoesheinterpretitsbeingemphatic?Thisisapparentinthenormativeanddispositionalcontentheassignstobeing“reasonable.”Being“reasonable”meansthatoneiswilling“topro-posefairtermsofcooperationandtoabidebythemprovidedothersdo.”Oneistobeattentivetoastandardoffairnessbetweencompetingclaims;andtorestrainoneselfsoastoaffirmandseekagreementononlythosepoliticalarrangementsthatembodysuchastandard.Inthesamespirit,onerestrainsanypropensityforintol-eranceofcomprehensivedoctrinesonemightdislike,aslongastheycanplausibly16beseenaswithintheboundsofreasonablepluralism.Forthemostpart,Rawls’sinterpretationhereofattentivenessandrestraintinrelationtothematterofthejusticeofbasicstructuresseemstometomakegoodsense.Italsomakesgoodsenseforhimtoseektomakehisaccountofjusticeasfreestandingashecan.But,asIindicatedearlier,itisnotentirelyfreestanding.Larmore64StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page6517hasmadethispointquiteclearly.HecontendsthatRawls’snotionofreasonableagentswhoarewillingtoseekandabidebyfairtermsofcooperationtacitlybuildsintohisaccountan“underlyingviewofhumandignityandoftherespectwethereby18oweeachotherandeveryhumanbeing.”Inotherwords,itisonlyindividualsalreadyembracingthisdispositionofequalrespectwhowillbemotivatedtoorientthemselvestowardagreementonfairprinciplesofcooperation.IfRawlsdidnotpresupposethiscorenormativedispositionofrespectandsomeontologicalfigureofdignitythatorientsit,thenthenotionof“reasonable”wouldhavetocontracttosomethingweaker–andthuslessuseful–like“exercisingthebasiccapacitiesofreasonandconvers-19ingingoodfaith.”WhatexactlyisthestatusinRawls’stheoryofthisimplicitaffirmationofdignityandequalrespect?LarmorethinksRawlsisnotasclearasheshouldbeaboutthis20issue.Rawlsdoesnotclaimthathistheoryofjusticeistotallyfreestandinginrela-tiontoallmoral-ontologicalfoundations.Headmitsthatitmayrequiretheaffirma-tionofsomeminimalcontent;butsuchaffirmationisjustifiedonlyifitis“necessary21tothepoliticalaimofconsensus.”Presumably,Rawlswouldfindthistobethecasewithregardtodignityandrespect,althoughhedoesnotexplicitlysayso.Ifhedidclearlyaffirmdignityandequalrespect,wouldthatmeanheowesussomesortoffurtherjustificationofitsfoundationalcharacter?Probablynot;ratherhewouldarguethathisaffirmationmerelyreflectswhatisalreadyawidelysharedassumptionin“moderndemocraticsociety.”Itissimplytheculturalpresenceofthisaffirmation22thatisthekeyissueforgettinghisconceptionofjusticestarted.Aslongasdig-nityandrespectareaffirmed,heneednotlookfurtherintoissuesofhowsuchanaffirmationisjustified.ThisstanceisperfectlyplausiblefromthepointofviewofRawls’sintentionto23constructapoliticalconceptionofthejusticeofthe“basicstructure”ofasociety.ButfromthebroaderperspectiveIamtakinginthispaper–anethosoflate-moderncitizenship–suchastanceofnon-engagementwiththefoundationalissuesabovecannotbejustified.Thereasonforthisisthatsuchanethosinquiresnotonlyaboutthejustnessofbasicstructures,butalsoabouthowwegoabout“living...the24structures”(inCharlesTaylor’swords).Thismeanswemustbeasconcernedwitheverydaydispositionsandmotivations,aswearewithfundamentalstructures.Rawlsdoes,ofcourse,imaginethatcitizenswholiveinafullyjuststatewouldadequatelyinternalizehisbasicprinciplesandthusspontaneouslysupportsuchanorder.Butperhapsthematterofindividualobligationandmotivationinthemidstofpoliticalcontestwouldneverbesosimple.Ifso,theneveninarelativelyjustpolityonewouldneedtothinkfurtherabouthowagivenethosmight,hereandnow,biasthereproductionofsocialstructuresindirectionsthataremoreratherthanlesshos-pitabletojustice.AusefulwayofunderstandingwhatisatissueheremightbetoconsidertherangeofconcernsexpressedbyJ.S.Millin“OnLiberty.”Millcertainlywantstohaveapoliticalsystemwithjustconstitutionalandotherlegalstructures.Butheisalsoconcernedwithabroaderethosofcitizenshipthatwillhelpmotivateindi-vidualstogobeyondtheminimumobligationtoobeyjustlaws.Thisbroaderethosemergesinrelationtowhatis,inessence,abasicinsightaboutsociallifeinmoderndemocraticsocieties;namely,theemergenceofthethreatofa“tyrannyof...25prevailingopinionandfeeling.”ThisisthedangerpresentedbythepressuretoReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen65\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page66conformtomajorityopinionthatoperatesnotjustinsideoftheconstitutionalandlegalstructure,butalsooutsideofit.Inthiscontext,onecanseeMillasappealingtoanethosofreasonablenessthatreachesbeyondlegalobligation.Itdrawsitscognitiveandmotivationalforcefromthefoundationtowhichheappeals;thatis,hisbasicsenseofwhatamorallyprogressiveindividualandsocietylooklike.Inorderforthissortofethostoberobustlysustainedineverydaylife,onewouldexpectthatthefoundationanimatingjudgmentandactionwouldbemoreconsist-entlyscrutinized,refinedanddrawnuponasIconfrontnewsituationstowhichitmustbeapplied.AslongaswestaywithRawls’sstructuralportrait,wearenotexpectedtohavetodrawuponfoundationsinsuchsituation-inflectedways.Butatthelevelofethos,wherewearepressedbythisexpectationofcongruencebetweenaspecificsituationrequiringjudgmentandmyfoundationalcommitment,itseemsplausibletothinkthatwewillbegintodiscoverwaysinwhichtheimplicationsofmyfoun-dationswillruncountertothoseofyours.Insum,onecansaythatanethosoflate-moderncitizenshipwillmotivateustoaffirma“politicalconceptionofjustice”(forexample,eitherRawls’sorsomeroughlycomparable,proceduralone)toasubstantialdegree,butitwillnotinsulateusentirelyfrommutualengagementandcontestationregardinghowourmoral-ontologicalfoun-dationsdrawustowardsomecoursesofactionversusothers.Giventhatsuchanethosthuscannotavoidsomeentanglementwithfoundationalissues,whatguidancemightitprovideatthismorebasiclevelofreflection?II.SiteTwo:Ontological“Sources”andTheirResistancetoFullArticulacyAnadequateanswertotheforegoingquestionwillrequire,first,somegeneralaccountoftheactivityofreflectingonone’smostbasicbeliefsandcommitments.Iwillarguethatthetwomostfamiliarwaysofenvisioningsuchreflection–uncoveringfoun-dationsandchoosingframeworks–areinsufficientlysensitivetotheinsightsoflatemodernity.MoreadequatewouldbeavariantoftheaccountCharlesTayloroffers26withhisnotionof“sourcesoftheself”.Iwanttoelucidatethismodel,showinghowandwhyitissuperiorforpresentpurposestothetwomorefamiliarones(A).ThenIturntofleshingoutthewaysuchaportraitofourontological-ethicalback-groundhelpsspecifythesortofattentivenessandrestraintthatwouldhavetobedisplayedatthissitebyareasonableindividual(B).A.Initsmostgeneralsense,reflectionuponwhatisbasictohumanbeingsisasearchformeaninginlightofhumanfinitude.Imeanbythelatter,first,thatwehaveforeknowledgeofourmortality;and,second,thatthisknowledgetinges27theimportantaspectsofourlives,whetherwewantittoornot.Whenwethinkofreflectinguponwhatgivesourlivesmeaning,wetend,asIsuggestedabove,togravitatetowardoneoftwomodelsforcomprehendingsuchasearch.Wetendtoenvisionourselves,ontheonehand,asuncoveringordiscoveringafoundationthatpossessesauthoritybecauseofitstranscendentcharacter;or,ontheotherhand,aschoosingthemostbasicimmanentframeworkofvaluesthatwillthenhavepriorityoverallofourothervalues.Iwillbrieflydelineatethesetwomodelsandthensug-gestthattheyaretooone-sidedtofullycapturetheinsightsthatpressuponusas66StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page67late-modernindividuals.Inthisregard,wedobettertoaffirmamodelthatcapturesthebasicqualitiesofbothdiscoveryandchoice.Inthefoundationsmodel,weenvisionourselvesdiggingdowntodiscoverwhatanimatesandlendscertaintytoourlivesandthecommitmentsthatguidethem.Thefigureofdepthisintendedtosignaltheexistenceofwhatistranscendentorbeyondtheeveryday,somethingpermanentandinfinitethatawaitsfullerillumination.Thetruthorrightnessthusdiscoveredgainsitspeculiaraffectiveandcognitiveforcepreciselybecauseitresidesbeyondtheeveryday.ThefigureofGodrepresentsthemostfamiliarsuchfoundation.Alternatively,wemightseetheactivityofreflectiononbasicsasakindofperiodiccognitivecheck-upoftherelationbetweenourjudgmentsandbeliefsinevery-daylife,ontheonehand,andourconsideredsupportforthen,ontheother.Thissupportingstructureorframeworkofbeliefisonewehavechosenorfreelyaffirmed;itsgreaterauthorityforusrestsinacrucialwayontheconditionthatwehavewilledit.Thingscouldhavebeenotherwise;IcouldhavewilledcompletelydifferentlyandImayinthefuture.Utilitarianismisanexampleofaphilosophicalperspectivethat28wouldhaveusseeauthorityinthisfashion.Onesimplyhasfullsovereignauthor-ityoveroneselfandexercisesitbymakingchoicesandarrangingpreferencesrelatedtoone’svaluesandprinciples.Taylorconstruesthecharacterofreflectiononbasicmattersquitedifferently.Letmefirstcontrasthisalternativewiththefoundationsmodel.Inplaceofthe29excavationoffoundations,hesubstitutesthe“articulation”of“sources.”Althoughbothimplyagestureofworkingtowardtheilluminationofsomethingcrucialtoone’spracticalinvestments,Taylor’spictureembodieskeydifferences.Partofthisdiffer-encefollowsfromeverydayconnotations.Theachievementofclarifyingfoundationshasastrongconnotationofenhancingmyknowledge,ofmakingmybeliefsmoresolidbyilluminatingthegroundoftheirtruth.Havingrecourseto“sources”cancertainlyhavesomethingofthissense.Butitcanalsocarrytheimplicationofbeingsustainedoranimatedbythecleanerwateronefindsbyjourneyingupastreaminsearchofitssource.Tayloraffirmsthelatter,ordinarymeaning,andaddstwootherdimensionsthatgivehisaccountofattendingto“sourcesoftheself”itspeculiarshape.Thefirstoftheseisthattheprocessofseekingone’ssourcesinvolvesnotonlydiscoveringbutalsocreatingandchoosing.Withinthefoundationsmodel,explorationistypicallyconstruedasaclearingawayoftheearththatobscuresafullerviewofone’ssources.Inshort,somethingalreadytherebutnotinsightisprogressivelybroughttolight.Butthelightmetaphorismisleading.AccordingtoTaylor,theprocessofbringingasourceintolanguageisitselfunavoidablycreative;nomeaningsstandfullypresenttothemselvesoutsideoflanguage,awaitingonlyamomentofphotographicillum-ination.Thischaracteristicisrelatedtoanother,namelythatoneneverattainsfullarticulacyinregardtosources.Astheworldthrowsupnewexperiences,Imustprogressivelybringthemtobearonthesourcesthatanimateme.Thereisnopointofcompletionorfullarticulacy,bothbecausemylifeisopen-endedandbecausearticulacyisalwaysachievedinthemediumofordinarylanguage,inrelationtowhich30Icanneverfindsovereigntransparency.Ourmortalitymeans,ofcourse,thattherewillbeanendtothisinterpretation;butcessationdoesnotequatetofullnessofarticulation.ReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen67\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page68Suchcharacteristicsmaketheactivityofarticulationtakeonthequalitiesofa31questoraprocessofcontinuallyworkingonapuzzle.Onealwaysseeksgreaterinsight;butsincefullarticulacyalwaysremainsupahead,thedispositionalqualitiesImanifestwithintheactivityofsearchingitselfbecomeasimportantastheintima-tionsImighthaveoftheultimategoalofmyjourneyorofthecharacterofthecompletedpuzzle.Onefurthercontrastbetweenthetwomodelsmustalsobehighlighted.Withinthepictureofexcavatingfoundations,hardworkissupposedtodiscoverordrawoutsomethingofessentiallyfixedshapeandsoliditywhosesignificanceisthenrenderedfullyevident.Ineffect,IknowwhereIstandandIknowthegroundissolid.Thisimageofclarity,solidity,andepistemologicalcertaintystandsinsharpcontrastwithTaylor’s,wherethereisnofixedendpoint,nocertaintyaboutthetruthofone’sbeliefs.InaworldwhereitisasourcethatIarticulate,Imayjustifiablycometofeelthedeepestandstrongestcommitmenttothatsource,butIshouldnotmistakenlyequatethatwithincreasingcertaintyofknowledge.Inshort,adeepeningofcommitmentthatsustainsmemorerobustlydoesnotequatetoagrowingcognitivecertaintythatmycommitmentswillpromptlytrumpothersthattheyencounter.Hereonecanseethattheone-sidednessofthefoundationsmodelliesinitscommitmenttothenotionthatreflectingonbasicsisamatterofenhancingmyconvictionoftruth.WhenIoperatewiththisportrait,Ihavelocatedtheotherwhocontestsmyviewsbetweenthetruthandme.Thiscreatesapersistenttendencytoscripttheotherasanobstacletomyfurtherelaborationandimplementationofthetruth.Thedangerthismightinvolveforethical-politicallifeisreadilyapparent.Atthispoint,aglancebackatRawlsishelpful.Heemphasizesalate-moderninsightwhoseaffirmationhelpskeepusfromsuccumbingtothepreceding,danger-oustrainofthought.Areasonableperson,hetellsus,willadmittothepersistenceof“burdensofjudgment.”Thismeansthatonewillrecognizethattheattempttoinsertcomprehensivefoundationaltruthsintothebasicarrangementsofapolityis32anexercisethatisalmostcertaintogowrong.Theadmissionthattherearesuchburdensthataffectthereliabilityofone’sjudgmentsisclearlyoneoftheprimarylessonslearnedbymodernWesternsocietiesfromtheReformationtothepresent.AproponentofthearticulationmodelwouldcertainlyaffirmRawls’swayoftryingtooperationalizethislessonintheformofrecognizingtheburdensofjudg-ment;shewould,however,alsoarguethatalate-modernethosapplyingtothesiteofbasicmattersrequiresmoreofus.ForRawls,wecanclearlydistinquishthose“reasonablecomprehensivedoctrines”thathavetakentoheartthefactofpluralism33fromtheunreasonableonesthathavenot.Foralate-modernethos,however,thingsarenotsoclear-cut.Suchanethoscertainlyaffirmstheideaofadistinctionlikethisone,butitalsohastobemoreattentivetothefactthatlessonsaresometimesless-than-fullylearnedorsusceptibletodegreesofqualificationthatdepletetheirpowertoguideaction.Thiskindofworryishardlyhypotheticalinthepost-9/11era,especiallyintheUnitedStates.PresidentGeorgeW.Bushreferredtotheensu-ingwaronterrorasa“crusade;”andhemadeitclearthatheconsultedGodonthe34decisiontoinvadeIraq.Suchstatements,aswellasthe2004prisoner-abusescandalatAbuGhraibandthepressuretocurbcivillibertieswithintheU.S.,shouldmakeusentertainseriouslythepossibilitythatasignificantsectoroftheAmericanpopula-tionmayincreasinglyenvisiontheU.S.assomethinglikea“Christiansecuritystate.”68StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page69Ifthisheadymixofideasgainsground,itwilldosoatthecostofadepletionoftherestraintpromisedbythenotionofacceptanceoftheburdensofjudgment.Itisinthecontextofsuchworriesthatonecanseemoreclearlywhyimaginingourmostfundamentalcommitmentsintermsofthearticulationmodelwouldappeartobemorereasonablethanimaginingthemintermsofthefoundationsmodel.ThelattertypicallyenvisionshumandignityaswarrantedbyourstatusasagentsofGod’struth.Thedifficultywiththisontologicalfigure,however,isthatdespiteallthehistoricallessonslearned,itstilldrawstruthandabsolutenesstogetherinwaysthatcandriftinpoliticallydangerousdirections.Inwhatwaymightanaffirmationofthearticulationmodelrenderuspotentiallylesssusceptibletosuchadrift?TheanswertothisquestionrestsontheelucidationofadifferentfigurationofdignitythatisascongruentwiththatmodelasthefigureoftheagentofGod’struthiswiththefoundationsmodel.Iamgoingtolettheshapeofthisalternativefigureemergeslowlythroughtheremainderofthepaper.Forthemoment,letmejustsaythatthefigureisthatofatravelerwithadistinctivesortofdispositionandconsciousness.Atthispoint,theonlycrucialthingtounderstandaboutsuchafigureofdignityisthatitscharacterwouldbesuchastomakeitunrea-sonableforthisbeingtoimagineitselfinpossessionofthefullnessoftruthaboutitssourcesandthusencouragedtodivideitsworldintothosefatefulandself-righteouscategoriesofbelieversoftruth,ontheonehand,andtheiropponents,ontheother.Theimplicationofthisisthattheexpectationofreasonablenesshastofindsomefootholdalreadyatthesiteofsourcesandnotjustwhenwearriveatthesiteoffairtermsofcooperation,aswithinRawls’sproject.Thearticulationmodelmakesitpossibletoimaginethesoftcollarofreasonable-nessbeingbroughttobearatthesiteofbasicmatters,becauseitputsthelinguis-ticallymediatedcharacterofhumanbeingatthecenteroftheprocessofarticulation.Sourcescannotbedirectlyrevealedinanyfashionnotmediatedbylanguageandthusinvolvingallthedifficultiesinherenttoanyprocessofinterpretation.Taylortakesthistobeanothercentral,latemoderninsight,onethatemergedwiththelin-guisticturninphilosophy,especiallyinWittgenstein,Heidegger,andGadamerinthemid-twentiethcentury.Whenweconsiderreflectionuponbasicmattersinlightofthisinsight,ithelpsustocomprehendtheshortcomingsofthefoundationsmodelandthekindofsubtlegravitationalforcecertaintyofbeliefexertsonit.ThisissueopensontoarelatedsenseinwhichthearticulationmodelhonorswhatIcalledearliertheanxietyoffinituderatherthanseekingtorepressortranscendit.Theproblemwiththefoundationsmodelinthisregardisthatitpositshumanbeing’sfinitudeinsuchawaythatthegravitationalforcetowardwhatiscertain,transcend-ent,andinfinitefeedsaperfectlyunderstandablewishtojumpthegapbetweenfinitudeandinfinitude.Theformerbecomesmerelyatemporary,inessentialcondition,away35fromwhichmyattentionoughttobedirected.Itmightbeobjectedatthispointthattheforegoingcriticismsofthefoundationsmodelalltendinthesamedirection;namely,towarddisqualifyingfromthestartanyvariantoftheism.Butthatisnotthecase.HereitisusefultorememberthatTaylordevelopshisarticulationmodelinthecontextofabroadcaseforakindoftheismthatisresponsivetothecentralinsightsofmodernity.Hisisatheismabletoengagequietlyandpersistentlywithfinitude,especiallyasitismanifestinourcharacteraslinguisticallymediatedbeings.WhatismostimportanttoemphasizeatReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen69\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page70thispointissimplythattheembraceofthismodeldoesnotstackthedeckfororagainsttheism.Iwanttoturnnowfromwhathasbeenshowntobetheone-sidednessofthefoundationsmodeltotheclaimthatthechosen-frameworkmodelissimilarlyguilty.Itsproblemofone-sidedness,however,isjusttheoppositeofthesortfoundationalismdisplays;thatis,theproblemnowisanoveremphasisoncreatingandchoosingasopposedtoanoveremphasisonthediscoveryofthatwhichhasessentialsolidity,authority,andtruthpriortotheactivityoftryingtocomprehendit.Thechosen-frameworkmodelisorientedtogainingclarityinthenameofgettinggreaterpotentialcontroloverallaspectsofourlives.Theincreaseincontrolpromises,inturn,toincreasehumanhappiness.TheideaoffulfillingthispromiseisoneofourcoreEnlightenmentlegacies.Theprobleminthepresentcontextis:whateffectistherewhenwefigurereflectionuponthemostbasicmattersofourlivesalongtheselines?Onemightdescribethischangeasoneofwillingallthatisthebackgroundofourlivesintotheforegroundwhereitcanbemoremanageablyenteredintorationalcalculationsaboutourhappiness.Butwhenwehavecommittedour-selvestosuchatask,wehavealsotherebyimplicitlyembracedanontologicalfigureofhumansassovereignentities.AsBurke,Adorno,andFoucaultallrealizedindifferentways,oncethisoccurs,wehavefashionedourselvesasfigureswhosewillsareinprincipleunlimitedandwhosereasonisinnoneedofchastening.Herethereemergesthatwilltoinfinitudeaboutwhichsuchcriticsofmodernitywishtowarnus.Itiscrucialinthinkingaboutthisdangernottolimitourconcerntothemostvisibleandgrandlyegregiousvariants,suchasBurkeobservedintheFrenchrevolution,orrecentgenerationshaveobservedintwentieth-centuryfascismandstatesocialism.WeneedtoworryaswellaboutthemoreunobtrusivevariantssuchasFoucaulthighlightswithhisnotionofdisciplinesthatseemtospreadalmostwith-outspecifichumanintention.B.SofarIhaveattemptedtosketchoutapictureofthegeneralterrainuponwhichwecanreflectonbasicmattersinafashionthatissensitivetotheconditionsandinsightsoflatemodernity.NowIturntothequestionofwhatitwouldmeantoconformtothecalltobereasonableaswearticulateoursourcesinrelationtooneanother.Morespecifically,howdoweconstruetheattentivenessandrestraintthatlargelyconstitutethefulfillmentoftheexpectationofreasonableness?Attentivenesswouldbedisplayedbyanaffirmationofthetwofoldcharacterofthearticulationofsources:thesenseinwhichsuchreflectioninvolvesbothdiscoveryandcreation.Inbeingsoattentive,Icontinuallyremindmyselfofthewaysinwhichsomeaccountsofbasicmattersrequireustorepresstoomanyoftheinsightsthatwelatemoderncitizenshave.Thecriterionofrestraintisdisplayedintheacceptanceoftheinsightthatinpursuingbasicmatterswearealwaysleftwithsomethinglessthanfullarticulacy;andthusthenext“other”Imeetmayholdsomethingcrucialtoafullerunderstandingofmysources.Whenrestraintiscomprehendedinthiswayasorientedaroundthearticulationmodel,itisnotdifficulttoseehowvirtuesofcarefulnessandhumilitytowardtheotherareprefiguredmoreclearlyherethanisthecaseineitherthefoundationsmodelortheframeworkmodel,wheretheotherismoresusceptibletobeingquicklyscriptedaseitheranobstacleoranentityofpossibleinstrumentaluse.70StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page71AttentivenessandrestraintgaintheircontentinrelationtothatfigureofajourneythatIhavesuggestedisimpliedinthenotionofarticulatingsources.Reasonablenessaccordinglyrefersustotheorientationofatravelerwhohasaroughsenseofthedirectioninwhichshemustheadbutisalsocruciallydependentontheinsightsofthoseshemeetsalongthewayforcluesastoherultimatedestination.Additionally,sheknowsthatalthoughshemaygainanincreasinglyfullersenseofthatdestination,shewillneverthelessremainatravelerwhoisalwaysstillonherwaytothatdestination.Theconstrualofdignityaroundtheportraitoftheanxious,butquietlycommittedtraveleriscertainlynotuncontroversialinitsfigurationofhumanbeingorinitsaffinityforsomeethicalvirtuesratherthanothers.Butthennoportraitcanguar-anteethatitwillmeetwithuniversalagreement.Therealissueisnotwhetheritisuncontroversial,butwhetheritcohereswithcentral,late-moderninsights,andwhetheritmightbemoreinclusivethan,say,thetraditional,theisticallybasedfigura-tions.And,onthispoint,thefigureoftheperpetualtravelerwhoseencounterwithlifequietlyandpersistentlyhonorsitssubjectiontomortalityseemsbetterableto36includeatleastsometheistsaswellassomenon-theists.Iwanttoturnnowtothefinalaspectofmyaccountoflate-modernreasonableness.JustasIshowedearlierthatreasonablenessinrelationtofairtermsofcooperationimpliesanengagementwithreasonablenessinrelationtothearticulationofsources,soInowwanttosuggestthatreasonablenessinthelattersenseisalsosimilarlyentangledwithreasonablenessinrelationtothedemandfortherecognitionofident-ity.Whatisthenatureofthisentanglement,andwhatexactlydoesreasonablenessamounttoonthisthirdsite?III.SiteThree:RecognizingIdentityIfwethinkintermsofagentsandtheirarticulationofsources,itseemstofollowprettyclearlythatwhatagentstaketobetheiridentityisconstitutivelyinvolvedwiththatprocess.ThehorizonprovidedbythatarticulationallowsmetoknowwhereIstandinmoralspace;and,asTaylornicelyputsit:“ToknowwhoIamisaspecies37ofknowingwhereIstand.”Nowpartofwhatisinvolvedinthisinterconnectionismyidentityinauniversalizablesense.AswesawinSectionsIandII,onethingthatanethosofreasonablenessexpectsofusisarecognitionofyourandmystatusaspersonswhopossessdignityandwhoarethusdeservingofrespect.Obviouslysuchrecognitionissignificant,butjustasobviouslythisdimensiondoesnotincorporateallofwhat,overthelastfewdecades,hasbeenreferredtowiththephrases“identity38politics”and“thepoliticsofrecognition.”Thesephrasesdrawourattentionnottorespectforpersonsintheuniversalisticsense,butrathertotheacknowledgementofpeople’sdiversity,theirdistinctivenessoflanguage,religion,nationality,andtradi-tionalpractices.Thisdemandthatmy/ouridentitybeacknowledgedinitsdistinc-tivenessordifferenceisoneofthemostcontroversialsubjectsincontemporarypoliticaltheory.Soitisimportanttoemphasizethatmyanalysisofthissiteofreflectionhasalimitedaim.Iamonlytryingtoelucidateacertainspiritordispositionthatcanbebroughttothereflectionon,andcontestationof,suchissuesunderthebannerReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen71\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page72ofacertainsortofclaimtoreason.Suchaspiritordispositionwillconstitutepartofathreefold,reasonable,late-modernethos.Asawayofinitiallyengagingthistopic,letmereturntothebeginningofthisessay,whereIdiscussedsometwentieth-centurycriticsoftheEnlightenment’sunderstandingofreason.Forsuchcritics,Enlightenmentreasoncarriesanunac-knowledgedwilltodominateinsideofitsmoreadmirablemanifestations.Thusthewilltoknow,toconstruct,tocontrol,toresolve,andtoreconcileareallmoreambiva-lentintheireffectsthanwasoriginallythoughtintheeighteenthcentury,whenthe“partyofreason”arrayeditselfcategoricallyagainstthepartyofignorance,superstition,anddomination.Onekeysitewherereasonanddominationevolveasco-conspiratorsratherthansimpleopponentsisintheconstructionandreproduc-tionoftheidentityoftheself.Theprocessofconstructingmyselfasanepitomeofenlightenment–thatis,asafree,rational,andresponsiblebeing–canonlyproceedbymeansofcontrasts.Inotherwords,theconstructionofmyidentitynecessarilyinvolvesthesimultaneousconstructionofothers,evenifonlyimplicitly,whoareunfree,irrational,andirresponsible–inshort,non-sovereignandpoten-tiallythreatening.ProminentexamplesofthisdynamicatworkinthehistoryoftheUnitedStatesincludethewayNativeAmericanswerepositionedinrelationtotheexpansionwestwardofwhitecivilization,especiallyinthenineteenthcentury,andthewaytheidentityofthe“Un-American”wasengenderedinthemid-twentiethcenturyduringtheColdWar.Inthelastcoupledecades,theexposureofthisdarksideofEnlightenmentreasonhassometimesseemedsothoroughgoingastovitiateentirelyanyidealofconstructinganadmirable,late-modernselfwithinthespiritofmodern,enlightenedreason.Butthatconclusionbetraysaperfectlyresistibledesire39toover-simplifywhatisinfactacomplicatedissue.Iintendrathertounpacksomeofthephilosophicalcomplexitythatresidesuponthisproblematicsite,andthenseeifsomeotherconclusionmightbewarranted;morespecifically,onethatallowsustoseehowasenseofreasonablenessmightinfusethediscourseofidentityrecognition.Towardthisend,itisusefultobeginbyseparatingouttwoinsightsaboutidentityanddifferencethatareatthecoreofthecritiqueofourEnlightenmentlegacy.Thefirstinformsusthatidentityanddiffer-encestandinamutuallyconstitutiverelationshipattheontologicallevel.Aprocessofidentityformationisalwayssimultaneouslyaprocessofdifferenceformation.Andthismeansthatidentitywillalwaysbeontologicallyindebtedtodifference.Thesecondinsightbuildsuponthefirstandshowshowmodernideasoftheselfasfree,rationalandresponsiblehavegivenrisetoparticularhistoricalformationsofdiffer-encewithinwhosescopeallmannerofgroupshavefallen.Thecombinedweightofthesetwoinsightswouldseemtoconstituteasolidbat-teringramagainstanycomfortingtalkaboutenlightenment.Thisisbecauseitseemsnecessarilytoimplicatereasonasacentralco-conspiratorinperpetuatingsomeofthegreatinjusticesthathaveaccompaniedWesterncolonizationandenlightenment.Wecan,however,resistsuchanimplicationifwefocusattentionuponexactlyhowweunderstandtherelationshipbetweenthesetwoinsights.ConsiderthewayinwhichIinitiallyintroducedthem.Theyappeartobeconstitutivelyjoined.Forexample,theidentityofnineteenth-centurywhiteAmericansastheactivesubjectsofthegeo-graphicextensionofreasonandfreedomnecessarilyandsimultaneouslyconstitutedNativeAmericansinsuchawayastoensurethattheirdistinctivenesswouldbedenied72StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page73recognition.And,ofcourse,thatwouldmakeitmorejustifiable(andthusperhapseasierontheconscience)totreattheminbarbaricways.Theupshotofgraspingtherelationofthetwoinsightsinthisfashionhasratherstarkconsequencesforhowweunderstandidentityandrecognition.BythisImeanthatoncetherelationshipisunderstoodinthisway,thentheveryprocessofidentityformationitselfisalwaysalreadyimplicatedinthemisrecognitionoftheother.Accordingly,ifIaskwhatIcandotoalleviatetheharmsarisingfromsuchmisrecognition,anadequateanswerwillrequiremetogobacktothemostbasiclevelofmyidentityconstitution;morespecifically,Imustsomehowde-constructmyidentityfromthegroundup.Thatistheonlywaytorelievethepressureofmisrecognition.Perhapsthemostvisiblerecentexampleofthislogicofidentityiscontainedin40JudithButler’sGenderTrouble.Theresheseemstobesayingthattheonlywaytointerruptthefatefulrelationbetweenidentityformationandmisrecognitionisto41engageinaprocessofcontinual,“insistentrifting”ofmyidentity.Inshort,inordertoextendrecognitiontotheother,Imustrenouncetheideaofanidentitythathascoherenceandcontinuity.Ascriticspointedout,thismakesitseemasthoughthe42veryideaofastableidentityis“inherentlyoppressive.”Clearly,suchanextremeremedyfortheillsofmisrecognitioncouldnotqualifyassomethingoneshouldfeelcompelledtoadministertooneselfasaresultonlyofthesoftcollarofreasonableness.Itmaybethatonecannotevencoherentlyimaginewhatitwouldbeliketobe“perpetuallyundoingtheidentitiesoneis43neverthelessboundtoconstruct.”Isthere,however,analternativewayofconceivingtheproblemofidentityandrecognitionwithinwhichwecanidentifyaremedy,therecoursetowhichmightqualifyasreasonable?Thereis,infact,aplaceonthisproblematicterrainatwhichanappealtothereasonablemightplausiblybeseenasgettingafoothold.Thisplacebecomesincreas-inglyevidentthemorewethinkintermsofteasingapartthetwoinsightsaboutidentity,recognition,andmisrecognition.Themostcogenteffortinthisregardcomes44fromWilliamConnolly.Hefullyacceptstheinsightaboutidentityanddifferencebeingconstitutivelyimplicatedontologicallywithoneanother.Buthedifferentiatesbetweentheconstructionofdifferenceintrinsicallyentailedbytheconstitutionofmyidentity,ontheonehand,andanatleastpartiallyseparable,resilient“tempta-45tionthatreadilyinsinuatesitself”intothatonto-logic,ontheother.Anidentityisestablishedinrelationtoaseriesofdifferencesthathavebecomesociallyrecognized.Thesedifferencesareessentialtoitsbeing.Iftheydidnotcoexistasdifferences,itwouldnotexistinitsdistinctnessandsolidity.Entrenchedinthisindispensablerelationisasecondsetoftendencies,themselvesinneedofexplora-tion,tocongealestablishedidentitiesintofixedforms,thoughtandlivedasiftheirstructureexpressedthetrueorderofthings.Whenthesepressuresprevail,themaintenanceofoneidentity(orfieldofidentities)involvestheconversionofsomedifferencesintootherness,intoevil,oroneofitsnumeroussurrogates.Identityrequiresdifferenceinordertobe,anditconvertsdifferenceintoothernessinordertosecure46itsownself-certaintyItisthelatterphenomenon,theconversionofdifferenceintootherness,thatcanbeseenasvaryinghistoricallyandcanberesistedbyvariousmeans.InmodernWesternculture,therehasbeenadistinctiveemphasisoncontrolormasteryoftheworldReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen73\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page74aroundus.Itisthispersistentorientation–aswellastheunderlyinganxietyoffinitudethatpersistentlyactivatesit–thatmakesusespeciallyvulnerabletothetemp-47tationthatConnollyidentifies.Inshort,whatevercannotbemasteredorcompre-hendedwithinfamiliarcategoriesdrawsuponitselfthestatusofsomethingthat,orsomeonewho,isapotentialthreattothesecurityandsovereigntyofmyidentity.Itisinrelationtothispropensitythatwecanreasonablybeexpectedtoshowsomerestraint.Suchadispositiondoesnotrequireawholesalede-constructingofmyownidentity.Butitdoesrequiremoreworkontheselfthanthesortofcom-mitmenttotolerancethatreceiveditsclassicalexpressioninMill’swork.Insayingthis,Idon’tmeantodenigrateMill.Hecertainlyrealizedthatintoleranceisdeeplyingrainedinhumanlife;and,asIsuggestedearlier,hetriedtocombatthisbylookingnotjusttolegalstructures,butalsotoanethosthatmightsuffuseallofpubliclife48andslackentheinsistentpressureofmajorityopinion.Nevertheless,Milldoesnotgiveusanadequateunderstandingoftherootsofintoleranceandotherassociatedmodesofdenigratingthosewhoareconstitutedastheothersofourmodernprojectsandidentities.OnevalueofputtingthingsinthesetermsisthatitprovidesuswithaplausiblewayofcomprehendinghowMillcanbesoeloquentaboutlibertywhilesimultaneouslymakinghisinfamousremarksaboutnon-Westernpeoplesas“bar-barians”whomustbeconstrainedbycolonialpowerstoaccepttheformsofWestern49civilization.Inordertodrawourselvesawayfromsimilarmistakes,weneedtolocatetherootsofthiswholecomplexofissuesconcerningothernessinthetemptationsassociatedwiththehighlychargedprocessofidentityconsolidation.Onlyafterthisshiftofatten-tionwillwebecapableofsketchingoutwhatareasonable,late-modernethosmightaskofusonthissite.Theprocessesofpluralizationandglobalizationtodayexertenormouspressureontheselfasittriestoadheretotheelusiveidealofthesovereign,rational,andresponsiblehumanbeing.Thesepressurescanevokeacontinuallow-gradefearof,orhostilityto,diversity,aswellasfrustrationwithapoliticalworldthatsooftenseemstodisappointthoseexcessive,normalizingexpectationsabout50whattheworldowesus.Alate-modernethoswouldaskustodevelopstrategiesoftheselfthatworktowarddampeningthathostilityandmoderatingthoseexpecta-tions.Strategiesofthissorthavebeenelaboratedbyanumberofcontemporaryphilosopherswhoarewrestlingwithquestionsoflate-modernlife.Theseeffortsmightusefullybecomprehendedasdifferentwaysofportrayingtheideaofanethosof“presumptivegenerosity”towardtheother.Exampleswouldinclude“criticalrespon-siveness”(Connolly);“fundamentallymorecapacious,generousand‘unthreatened’bearingsoftheself”(Butler);“hospitality”(Derrida);“receptivegenerosity”(RomandColes);and“openingourselvestothesurprises”ofengagementwiththeother(Patchen51Markell).Crucialinalloftheseperspectivesisasenseofthecognitiveandaffectiveneedtodampentheinitialwarinessandcertaintythatwearelikelytocarryintoourengagementwiththosewhomwealltooeasilysizeupasradicallyothertous.Gatheringtogetherthethreadsoftheprecedingdiscussion,Icannowspecifymoredirectlywhatitwouldmeantorespondtothecalltobereasonableinregardtotherecognitionofidentity.Thesenseofattentivenessistobeattachedtoawillingnesstocontinuallybereceptivetothedistinctionbetweentheonto-logicofthemutualconstitutionofidentityanddifference,ontheonehand,andthepsychosocial52temptationtotransformdifferenceintootherness,ontheotherhand.Andthesense74StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page75ofrestrainttowhichtheexpectationofreasonablenesswouldbindusisshowninthewillingnesstoresistthistemptation.Oneoftheprimarymeansofdoingthiseffectivelyliesinthecultivationofakindofinitialgenerosity–awillful,temporarysuspensionoftheengagementofmyfull,criticalapparatusofpracticaljudgment.Whenweconstruethecalltoreasonablenessinthisway,wearesubtlyreposi-tioningitasavirtueappropriatetotheselfashost,astheonewhostandsonfamil-iargroundandcraftstheaffectiveandcognitivetermsuponwhichhewillrespondtotheapproachofanothertohisdoor.Thefigureofthehostisascentralheretoanenlargedsenseofreasonablenessasisthefigureofthetravelerinthedomainofarticulatingsources.Asweimaginethiscentralroleofthehostinidentityrecognition,itisalsocrucialtoacknowledgethatitcannotbeconstruedinisolationfromthefirstsiteofreason-giving;namely,wheretheunderlyingfairnessofthetermsofinteractionisatissue.Byitself,theethosoftheadmirablehostformsasphereofreasonableengage-ment;butwhenitissoconstrued,itcanmaskstructuresofprivilegethatcaninturninconspicuouslycorruptthesceneofhospitality.Tosaythisismerelytoempha-sizethatthedynamicofidentityrecognitionalwaysoperatesagainstabackgroundofsocialrelationsandstructuresthatembodiesclaimsaboutjusticeandinjustice.Inshort,thethirdsphereofreasonablenessmustalwaysbeunderstoodasconstitutivelyentangledwiththefirst.IV.ConclusionTheideathatpracticalreasoninitsemphaticsenseshouldguidepoliticallifehascomeinforsomehardknocksoverthelastcenturyorso.Tomymind,onecannotignoretheseblows.Butneitherisoneobligedtoabandontheideaofemphaticreasonasthoroughlytrounced.Accordingly,Ihavetriedtoteaseoutaremaining,minimal,orchastened,accountofreasonthatonemightplausiblyfeelobligedtosustain.Mysketchofthisaccountiscomposedofathreefoldsetofexpectationsabouttheattentivenessandrestraintthatshouldbemetbycitizenswhounderstandtheirobligationstoarisenotjustfromagivenpolityinwhichtheyreside,butalsofromthetimeinwhichtheylive.Reasonablecitizenswillthusaffirmabroadlyconceivedethosthatembodiesthecentralinsightsregardingwhatwehavelearned,oftenagreatcost,inthecourseofWesternmodernity.Acknowledgements:IwouldliketothankmycolleaguesattheUniversityofVirginia,GeorgeKloskoandLawrieBalfour,aswellasMortSchoolmon,fortheirveryhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft.Notes1Foraclassicattempttoreducetheproblemofthesocialcontracttoacollectiveactionproblemresolvablepurelythroughstrategicrationality,seeJamesBuchananandGordonTullock,eds.,TheCalculusofConsent:LogicalFoundationsofConstitutionalDemocracy(AnnArbor,MI:UniversityofMichiganPress,1962).ReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen75\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page762TheodorAdornousestheterm“emphatic”(“nachdrucklich”)inasomewhatsimilar,butnotidenticalwayinNegativeDialectics,trans.E.B.Ashton(NewYork:ContinuumPublishingCompany,1966),pp.24,150–51.3SeethecoverillustrationofJamesSchmidt,ed.,WhatIsEnlightenment?EighteenthCenturyAnswersandTwentiethCenturyQuestions(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996).4MaxHorkheimerandTheodorAdorno,DialecticofEnlightenment:PhilosophicalFragments.ed.GunzelinSchmidNoerr,trans.EdmundJephcott(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2002);originallypubd1947.ForHeidegger,seeMartinHeidegger,“LetteronHumanism”and“TheQuestionConcerningTechnology,”inDavidFarrellKrell,ed.andtrans.,MartinHeidegger:BasicWritings(NewYork:HarperandRow,1977).Thefirstessaywasoriginallypublishedin1947;thelatterwasfirstgivenasalecturein1949,andpublishedinarevisedformin1954.ForFoucault,seeespeciallyMichelFoucault,DisciplineandPunish:TheBirthofthePrison,trans.AlanSheridan(NewYork:VintageBooks,1979).AlsoinsightfulisWilliamConnolly,“ThePoliticsofDiscourse,”inTheTermsofPoliticalDiscourse(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993,3rdedn),pp.213–43;andIdentity\Difference:DemocraticNegotiationsofPoliticalParadox(Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,2003,2ndedn).5SeemyEdmundBurke:Modernity,Politics,andAesthetics(Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield,2002,2ndedn),Ch.4.6Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,p.139.7Foucault,DisciplineandPunish,PartIII.8See,forexample,Foucault,“WhatIsEnlightenment?,”trans.C.Porter;and“PoliticsandEthics:AnInterview,”inPaulRabinow,ed.,TheFoucaultReader(NewYork:PantheonBooks,1984),pp.32–50,373–80;andHorkheimerandAdorno,DialecticofEnlightenment,p.xviii.9Foragoodaccountofthecharacterofessentiallycontestedconceptsinpoliticalphilosophy,seeConnolly,TheTermsofPoliticalDiscourse,Ch.1.W.B.Gallieintroducedthenotionin“EssentiallyContestedConcepts,”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,Vol.56(London,1955–6),citedinConnolly,p.10.10Issuesrelatedtothedomaininwhichweargueaboutandpursuetheprogressivereal-izationofdemocracyaretakenupinmyTheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2009).11JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),pp.48–81.12Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.9–10.13AnimportantaccountoftheproblemofidentityrecognitionisCharlesTaylor’s“ThePoliticsofRecognition,”inAmyGutmann,ed,Multiculturalism:ExaminingthePoliticsofRecognition,intro.AmyGutmann.(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1994),pp.25–73.14Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.17–18,36ff.15Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.10–11,54–60.16Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.54–8,81.17Larmore,“TheMoralBasisofLiberalism,”JournalofPhilosophy12(Dec.1999):599–625;and“RespectforPersons,”TheHedgehogReview.SpecialIssueonCommitmentsinaPost-FoundationalistWorld:ExploringthePossibilitiesof“WeakOntology.”7(2)(Summer2005):66–76.18CharlesLarmore,“RespectforPersons,”p.71;and“TheMoralBasisofLiberalism,”pp.601–2,607–8.19Larmore,“RespectforPersons,”p.75.20Larmore,“TheMoralBasisofLiberalism,”p.606–9;and“RespectforPersons,”p.75.21Rawls,“OverlappingConsensus,”OxfordJournalofLegalStudies7(Feb.1987):14.76StephenK.White\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page7722Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.xvi,8.23Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.11–12,andLectureVII.24CharlesTaylor,PhilosophicalArguments(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1995),p.xii.25J.S.Mill,“OnLiberty”andOtherWritings,ed.S.Collini(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),pp.8–9.26CharlesTaylor,SourcesoftheSelf:TheMakingofModernIdentity(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989),p.505.27Thesecond,broadersenseoffinitudeismeanttoincludeinsightssuchasnothavingthetimeorcapacitytosatisfyallofmydesiresandknowingthatwhenItakeamajordeci-sioninlife,Icannotlaterrevisitthatdecisionpointinexactlythesamewayasthefirsttime,onlythistimechoosingdifferently.28HereIamfollowingTaylor,SourcesoftheSelf,pp.30–2,331–2.29Taylor,SourcesoftheSelf,pp.8–9,91–6.30Taylor,SourcesoftheSelf,pp.18,22,34,334,419.31TaylordrawssomeofhissenseofhumanbeingfiguredasaquestfromAlasdairMacIntyreinAfterVirtue:AStudyofMoralTheory(NotreDame,IN:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981),pp.203–6.Thisistruetoadegree,butthesenseofaquestthatemergesinthearticulationmodelisnotsetagainstMacIntyre’sstarkmasternarrativeoflatemodernityas“thenewdarkageswhichisalreadyuponus”(ibid.,p.245).Suchadivisionoftheworldintolightanddarkthreatenstoswallowupthemoreengagingimplicationsoftheideaoflifeasadeeplyuncertainsortofjourney.32Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.54–61.33Rawls,PoliticalLiberalism,pp.58–64.34QuotedinPeterFord,“EuropeCringesatBush’s‘Crusade’againstTerrorists,”ChristianScienceMonitorSep.19,2001;http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p12s2-woeu.html.AccessedonFeb.14,2006.35Considerherethewaytheideaofthe“Rapture”seemstofunctiontodayamongsomeProtestantfundamentalistsintheUnitedStates.36Obviously,hugequestionsremainfortheexpandedsenseofreasonablenessdelineatedinthissection,aswellasforthealternatefigureofdignitythatIcontendisimpliedinsuchanexpansion.Forexample,onemightobjectthataperfectlyplausiblealternativefigureofdignitycouldbeeasilyerectedoutofthequalitieslikereason,freedom,oragency.Forreasonsofspace,Icannottakeupsuchoptionshere.ButIhavetriedelsewheretoshowthatthesealternativesarenotnearlyaseasytoconstructasonemightthink.See“UncertainConstellations:Dignity,Equality,Respectand...?”inM.SchoolmonandD.Campbell,eds.,TheNewPluralism:WilliamConnollyandtheContemporaryGlobalCondition(Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress,2008).VeryinsightfulastohowdifficultitistoarticulatethenotionofequalitythatisnecessarytoanyaccountofdignityisJeremyWaldron’sanalysisofLockeinGod,LockeandEquality:ChristianFoundationsinLocke’sPoliticalThought(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),Chs.3and8.37Taylor,SourcesoftheSelf,p.27.38Forsomegeneralsenseofthedebates,seeTaylor,“ThePoliticsofRecognition”;PatchenMarkell,BoundbyRecognition(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2003);andA.-G.GagnonandJ.Tully,eds.,MultinationalDemocracies(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001).39SeeSankarMuthu,EnlightenmentAgainstEmpire(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2003),foranexcellenttreatmentofthediversityofviewsamongEnlightenmentthinkersinregardtohowtheydidordidnotassociatereasonandfreedomwiththelegitimacyofempire.40JudithButler,GenderTrouble(NewYork:Routledge,1990).ReasonandtheEthosofaLate-ModernCitizen77\nCDIC04.qxd2/4/0915:44Page7841Butler,“TheForceofFantasy:Feminism,Maplethorpe,andDiscursiveExcess,”Differences2(2)(1990):121.42NancyFraser,“FalseAntitheses:AResponsetoSeylaBenhabibandJudithButler,”inS.Benhabibetal.,eds.,FeministContentions:APhilosophicalExchange(NewYork:Routledge,1995),p.71.ForadiscussionofhowButlerhasovercomethisprobleminlaterwork,seemySustainingAffirmation:TheStrengthsofWeakOntologyinPoliticalTheory(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000),Ch.4.43Markell,BoundbyRecognition,p.23.Hecallsthis“thePenelopeproblem.”44Connolly,Identity\Difference:DemocraticNegotiationsofPoliticalParadox,especiallytheIntroduction.45Connolly,Identity\Difference,pp.8–9.46Connolly,Identity\Difference,p.64.47Connolly,Identity\Difference,pp.9,16–20,29–32;andTheEthosofPluralization(Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1995),pp.16–20.Hefindsthatthetemptationalsogrowsinthecontextofreligiousattitudesofattunement.48Mill,“OnLiberty”andOtherWritings;atonepoint,Millcallsintolerancemorenaturalthantolerance;p.11.49Mill,“OnLiberty”andOtherWritings,p.13.50Theforceofthisportraitissupportedbyempiricalsocialscience;seeJohnR.HibbingandElizabethTheiss-Morse,StealthDemocracy:Americans’BeliefsaboutHowGovern-mentShouldWork(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),pp.105–6,134–5,149–50,156–7,221–3.Americanstendtobe“conflictaverse”anddeeplysuspiciousofamor-phous“others”whoseemtofomentdisagreementthatdisturbsthedeepconsensustheybelieve(incorrectly)characterizestheAmericanpopulation.51Connolly,TheEthosofPluralization,pp.178–88;Butler,“ForaCarefulReading,”inFeministContentions:APhilosophicalExchange,p.140;JacquesDerridaandAnneDufourmantelle,OfHospitality(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2000);RomandColes,RethinkingGenerosity:CriticalTheoryandthePoliticsofCaritas(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1997),p.23;andPatchenMarkell,BoundbyRecognition,pp.14–15,32–6.52Connolly,Identity\Difference,pp.8–9.78StephenK.White\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page79LIBERALISMPOLITICALNEUTRALITYContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page81CHAPTERFIVETheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutralityGeraldF.GausSection1ofthisessayexplicatestheconceptofneutrality.Section2providestwoargumentssupportingaconceptionofLiberalMoralNeutrality.Givenacertainunder-standingofmoralandrationalpersons,Iargue,moralneutralityisafundamentalandinescapablecommitment.Section3showshowliberalmoralneutralityleadstoLiberalPoliticalNeutrality.Fullygraspingthenatureofthisliberalpoliticalneutral-ity,Iargueinsection4,hasradicalimplicationsforourunderstandingoftheproperlimitsofgovernment.1.TheConceptofNeutralityForthelastfewdecadespoliticaltheoristshavevigorouslydebatedwhetherliberalismiscommittedtosomedoctrineof”neutrality,”andwhetherneutralityprovidesaplaus-ibleconstraintonlegitimatelawsandpolicies.Inmyview,thislong-runningcon-troversyhasbeendisappointing:theoriststendtostaketheirclaimasadvocatesorcriticsofneutrality,yettheprecisecontoursoftheconceptanditsjustificationremainvague.Tobesure,wehavewitnessedsomeimportantadvances.Discussionsofneutral-ityarenowcarefultodistinguish:(i)theideathatajustification(say,ofapolicy)shouldbeneutral;(ii)theclaimthattheaimsofpolicymakersshouldbeneutral;1(iii)theclaimthattheeffectsofpolicyshouldbeneutral.Yetinterpretationsof2neutralityarefarmorediversethanmostanalysesrecognize.Neutralityissome-3timesunderstoodasadoctrineabout:constraintsonlegislationorlegislators,the4properfunctionsofthestate,theprohibitionofthestate“takingastand”onsome56issues,theprohibitionofthestateenforcingmoralcharacter,ortherequirement7thatthestatetakeastanceofimpartiality.Alternatively,neutralitycanbeunderstood8asarequirementofatheoryjusticeratherthanstateaction.Therearealsodifferencesaboutwhetherneutralstates(ortheoriesofjustice,orlegislators)aresupposedtobe910neutralbetweenconceptionsofthegood,controversialconceptionsofthegood,ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page8211conceptionsofthegoodthatcitizensmayrightfullyadopt,comprehensivedoctrines1213andconceptionsofthegood,particularsetsofends,particularorsubstantivecon-141516ceptionsofthegood,waysoflife,orfinalends.Anditisunclearwhethereveryprincipleofneutralityisinherentlyoneofliberalneutrality,orwhetherliberalneutral-17ityisaspecificsortofneutralprinciple.Tomakeastartatclarifyingjustwhatthedebateisabout,Iproposethefollow-inggeneraldefinition-schema:A’sφ-ingisneutralbetweenXandYconcerningX’sandY’sdifferenceDiffφdoesnottreatXandYdifferentlyonthebasisofD.Thedefinition-schemais,Ithink,fullygeneralaboutclaimsconcerningneutrality.Itmustbestressedthatthedefinition-schemaisnotintendedtoresolvesubstantivedisputesabouttheproperinterpretationofneutrality;theaimistogetcleareraboutthevariablesaroundwhichcontroversycenters.Eachconceptionofneutralityprovidesadifferentinterpretationofthevariables.Themostfamiliarcontroversy,whichImen-tionedabove,concernstheproperinterpretationof“treatment.”Varyingconceptionsprofferdifferentexplications:thosewhothinkthatneutralityrequiresneutralityofeffectholdthatunlessA’sφ-inghasthesameeffectonXandYwithrespecttoD,A’sφ-ingtreatsthemdifferently;thosewhoupholdneutralityofjustificationmaintainthatAtreatsXandYthesamewhenAhasajustificationforφthatdoesnotappealtoD.Tobetterseehowthedefinition-schemaistobeapplied,considertheclassicalcaseofagovernmentthatisneutralbetweentwocombatants.Thegovernment(A)isneutralbetweenthecombatants(XandY)concerningthedifferencesintheirwaraims(D)whenA’sdecision,say,aboutshipmentsofarmsorwar-relatedmatters(φ)doesnottreatXandYdifferentlyonthebasisoftheirwaraims,alliances,etc.Noteafewpoints.(i)Therangeofφ–whatsortsofactionsmustbeneutral–isindis-putebetweendifferentnotionsofstateneutralityinwar(justasitisinliberalneu-trality).In1914PresidentWilsoninsistedthatTheUnitedStatesmustbeneutralinfact,aswellasinname....Wemustbeimpartialinthought,aswellasaction,mustputacurbuponoursentiments,aswellasuponeverytransactionthatmightbeconstruedasapreferenceofonepartytothestruggle18beforeanother.Butthatisanextremeinterpretationofφ(andwasnotlivedupto).TheSwedishGovernmentin1941declaredthatNeutralitydoesnotdemandthatnationsnotparticipatinginanarmedconflictshouldbeindifferenttotheissuesofthebelligerents.Thesympathiesofneutralsmaywelllieentirelywithoneside,andaneutraldoesnotviolatehisdutiesaslongashedoesnot19commitanyunneutralactsthatmightaidthesidehefavors.Adoptingthis,letuscallφsuchactsbythestate.(ii)NoticethattheSwedishdoctrineexplicitlyallowsthatA(theneutralgovernment)neednotalwaysrefrainfromdifferenttreatmentofXandYonthebasisoftheirwaraims(D):A’spublicschoolsmightstillfavorX’saims,andtreatXandYdifferentlyinitscurriculum,82GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page83butthiswouldnotimpairA’sneutralityregardingφ–e.g.,armsshipmentsorwarmaterials.(iii)Notealsothatthedefinition-schemadoesnotrequireaneutralAtoalwaystreatXandYthesamewhenφ-ing.SupposeAsellsarmstobothXandY,butXhaspaidandYhasnot(internationallawallowsneutralstosellarms).ThenAmaytreatXdifferentlythanYevenregardingφ,becausethedifferenceintreat-mentisnotgroundedonD(theirwaraims),butonwhetherpaymenthasbeenmade.Movingalittleclosertoourconcern,thinkaboutaneutralumpire.Theneutralumpire(A)doesnottreattheplayers(XandY)differentlywithregardtowhatteamtheyareonorwhethershepersonallylikesthem(D),whenmakingcallsinthegame(φ).But,ofcourse,Adoestreatthemdifferentlyinmakingcallsinthegame(φ)dependingonwhetheronehasviolatedtherules.AndAcanstillbeaneutralumpireif,whenbuyingChristmaspresents,sheselectsherhometownteam’sjersey,sodoes20sometimesbaseherdifferentialtreatmentonD(butnotwhenφ-ing).Philosophydiffersfrommysterywriting:inphilosophywecangivetheendingawaywithoutruiningthestory.Itmayhelptogiveageneraldescriptionofthecon-ceptionsofneutralitythatIdefendhere.LiberalMoralNeutrality:A[afreeandequalreasonablemoralperson]makingφ[amoraldemand]addressedtoY[afreeandequalreasonablemoralperson]mustbeneutralbetweenXandY[whereAisalsopersonX;thatiswhereAisoneoftherelevantparties]:thejustificationofA’smoraldemandmustnottreatYandAdifferentiallybasedonthedifferences(D)intheirevaluativestandards.LiberalPoliticalNeutrality:A[anagentofthestate]whenφ-ing[exercisingcoerciononcitizenXwhoisalsoafreeandequalreasonablemoralperson,orparticipatingintheauthorizationofsuchcoercion]mustbeneutralbetweenXandY[whereY=anyotherrationalcitizen/moralperson]:thejustificationofA’scoercionmustnotappealtoX’sandY’sdifferences(D)intheirevaluativestandards.LiberalMoralandPoliticalNeutrality,asIexplicatethem,arenotconcernedwithneutralitybetweenconceptionsofthegood(or,morebroadly,whatIwillcall“evaluativestandards”).Liberalism,Ishallargue,isneutralbetweenpersons,andthisneutralityrequiresnottreatingthemdifferentiallyonthebasisoftheirdiffer-ingevaluativestandards(or,loosely,conceptionsofthegood).Liberalismisnotcon-cernedwithneutralitybetweenconceptionsofthegood,asifconceptionsofthegoodthemselveshadclaimstoneutraltreatment.Itisonlybecausecitizensholdsuchcon-ceptionsthatneutralitybetweencitizenshasconsequencesforthewayconceptionsofthegoodcanenterintomoralandpoliticaljustification.Thismightseemtobeadistressinglypedanticpoint,but,Ithink,ithelpsusavoidconfusion.Supposeattimet1therearetwoconceptionsofthegoodinsociety,C1andC2butattimet2,every-onehascometoembraceC1.Itwouldseemthat,ifliberalismisreallycommittedtoneutralitybetweenconceptionsofthegoodperse,thenevenatt2,itmustbeneutralbetweenC1andC2.Butthisseemsimplausible.AsIunderstandliberalneutrality,sinceitisarequirementtobeneutralbetweenpersons,appealingatt2toC1doesnotrunafoulofneutrality,sincetherearenodifferencesbetweencitizensonthismatter.Soitisnotinitselfnon-neutraltoappealtoconceptionsofthegood;italldependsonthedifferencesthatobtainamongmoralpersonsandcitizens.TheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality83\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page842.LiberalMoralNeutrality2.1FreeandequalmoralpersonsItakeasmystartingpointthesuppositionthatweconceiveofourselvesandothersas(i)moralpersonswhoare(ii)freeandequal.Althoughthesefeaturesareassumedinthisessay,weshouldnotsupposethattheseassumptionscannotthemselvesbedefended.JohnRawlsrightlyarguesthatthisgeneralconceptionofmoralpersonsis21implicitinourpublicculture.Inmuchthesamevein,Ihavearguedthatourcom-mitmenttothepublicjustificationofourmoraldemandsoneachotherfollowsfrom22ourpresentconceptionofourselvesandothers.Letmebrieflyexplaineachofthesetwofundamentalcharacteristics.Amoralpersonisonewhomakes,andcanactupon,moraldemands.Moralpersonsthusconceiveofthemselvesasadvancingmoralclaimsonothers.Alternatively,wecansaythatmoralpersonsunderstandthemselvestobeowedcertainrestraints23andacts.Notallhumans–notevenallfunctioningadulthumans–aremoralpersons:psychopathsdonotappeartounderstandthemselvesaspressingmoralclaims24onothersthatdemandrespect,nordotheyseeothersasmoralpersons.Aswellasadvancingmoralclaims,moralpersonshavethecapabilitytoactonjustifiedmoralclaimsmadeonthem.Inthissensemoralpersonsarenotsolelydevotedtotheirownends;theyhaveacapacitytoputasidetheirpersonalendsandgoalstoactonjustifiedmoralclaims.Moralpersons,then,arenotsimplyinstrumentallyrational25agents;theypossessacapacityformoralautonomy.Insofarasmoralautonomypresupposestheabilitytodistinguishone’sownendsfromthemoralclaimsof26others,theideaofamoralpersonpresupposessomecognitiveskills.IntheSecondTreatiseJohnLockeheldthat“Thenaturallibertyofmanistobefreefromanysuperiorpoweronearth,andnottobeunderthewillorlegislative27authorityofman,buttohaveonlythelawofNatureforhisrule.”Toconceiveofoneselfasmorallyfreeistounderstandoneselfasfreefromanynaturalmoralauthor-itythatwouldaccordothersstatustodictateone’smoralobligations.Thisisnotatalltosaythatoneseesoneselfasunboundbyanymorality;asLockesuggests,wemayhavethelawofnatureasourrule.Althoughwearebynomeanscommittedtoanaturallawconceptionofmorality,thecrucialpoint,againoneinthespiritofLocke,isthatfreemoralpersonscallontheirownreasonwhendecidingthedic-tatesofmorallaw.Afreepersonemploysherownstandardsofevaluationwhenpresentedwithclaimsabouthermorallibertiesandobligations.Afreeperson,wecansay,hasaninterestinlivinginwaysthataccordwithherownstandardsofrightness,valueandgoodness.Ataminimum,toconceiveofoneselfasamorallyfreepersonistoseeoneselfasboundonlybymoralrequirementsthatcanbe28validatedfromone’sownpointofview.ThisconceptionoffreedomhasmuchincommonwithRawls’snotionoftherationalautonomyofpartiestotheoriginalposition,accordingtowhich“therearenogivenantecedentprinciplesexternalto29theirpointofviewtowhichtheyarebound.”Nowtosaythatmoralpersonsareequalistoclaim,firstly,thatquamoralpersonstheypossesstheminimumrequisitemoralpersonalitysothattheyareequalparticipantsinthemoralenterpriseand,secondly,thateachismorallyfreeinsofarasnooneissubjectedtothemoralauthorityofothers.Theequalityofmoralpersons84GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page85istheirequalityquafreemoralpersons:itisnotasubstantiveprincipleofmoralequalitybutisapresuppositionofthepracticeofmoraljustificationinsofarasitdefinesthestatusoftheparticipantsinmoraljustification.Whileamodestcon-ceptionofmoralequality,itrulesoutsomeconceptionsofmoraljustification.Rawlsnotonlyconceivesofmoralpersonsasadvancingclaimsoneachother,but30stressesthattheyviewthemselvesas“self-authenticatingsourcesofvalidclaims.”Itwouldseem,andapparentlyRawlsagrees,thatthosewhounderstandthemselvesasauthenticatingtheirownclaimswouldnotseethemselvesasboundtojustifytheirclaimsonothers–theywouldnotsupposethatonlyclaimsjustifiedtoothersare31valid.Buttoadvanceaself-authenticatingclaimonothersisnottorespecttheirmoralfreedom,forothersareboundonlybymoralclaimsthattheycanvalidatethroughtheirownreason:“therearenogivenantecedentprinciplesexternaltotheirpointofviewtowhichtheyarebound.”Thesuppositionofequalmoralfreedomthusrequiresthatone’smoralclaimscanbevalidatedbythosetowhomtheyareaddressed.Manyhaveadvancedstrongerconceptionsofmoralequality.Somehaveclaimed,forexample,thattheverypracticeofmoralitypresupposesan“equalrightofeach32tobetreatedonlywithjustification.”InasimilarveinS.I.BennandR.S.Petersdefendedtheprinciplethat“Theonusofjustificationrestsonwhoeverwouldmake33distinctions....Presumeequalityuntilthereisareasontopresumeotherwise.”Suchaprincipleofmoralequalitydoesnotsimplyrequireustojustifyourmoralclaimstoothers:itrequiresustojustifyallouractionsthatdisadvantagesome.Now,leav-ingasidewhethersomesuchpresumptiveegalitarianprinciplecouldbemorally34justified,thisconceptionofmoralequalityisnotpresupposedbytheveryideaofajustifiedmoralityamongfreeandequalmoralpersons.IfIacceptthisprinciple,Iclaimthatothersactwronglyiftheydisadvantagemewithoutgoodjustification.Butunlessthisnon-discriminatoryprincipleitselfcanbevalidatedbyothers,Idisrespecttheirmoralfreedom,asIammakingamoralclaimonthemtonon-discriminatoryactionthatisnotvalidatedbytheirownreason.Validationfromtherationalandreflectiveperspectiveofanother,however,isnotthesameasheractualconsent.Totreatanotherasafreeandequalmoralpersonistoacceptthatmoralclaimsmustbevalidatedfromherperspectivewhensheemploysherrationalfacultiesinacompetentmannerandreflectsuponthem.Now,althoughasJohnStuartMillnoted,thereisastrongpresumptionthateachknowsherown35perspectivebest,thisisnotnecessarilyso.Justasotherscanmakesoundjudg-mentsaboutaperson’sbeliefsandprinciples,andbecorrectevenwhenthepersondisagrees,socanothersbecorrect,andthemoralagentwrong,aboutwhatisvalidatedfromherperspectivewhenshereflectsonit.Knowledgeofoneselfisgenerallysuperiortoothers’knowledgeofone,butitisnotindefeasible.Peoplemaywithholdassentforavarietyofreasons,includingstrategicobjectives,pigheaded-ness,confusion,manifestlyfalsebeliefs,neurosis,andsoon.Nevertheless,respectfortheequalmoralfreedomofanotherrequiresthatthepresumptioninfavorofself-knowledgeonlybeoverriddengivenstrongreasonsforconcludingthatshehasmisunderstoodwhatisvalidatedfromherownpointofview.SupposethatAlfandBettyreasonablydisagreeaboutwhethersomemoralprinciplePisvalidatedfromBetty’srationalandreflectiveperspective.SaythatAlfhasgoodreasonstoconcludethatBettyhasmisunderstoodwhatisvalidatedfromherpointofview:P,hesays,TheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality85\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page86reallyisvalidatedfromherpointofview.Bettyhasreasontoinsistitisn’t.ForAlftoinsistthathismerelyreasonableviewofBetty’scommitmentsoverrideherownreasonableunderstandingofhermoralperspectiveconstitutesaviolationofhermoralfreedom,forAlfisclaimingauthoritytooverrideherownreasonableunderstanding36ofhermoralcommitmentswithhismerelyreasonableview.Crucialtomoralfreedomisthat,overawiderangeofdeliberativecompetency,thatone’smoraldeliberations37leadyoutoconcludeαauthorizesyoutobelieveα.2.2MoralityasgivingothersreasonsWecanreachmuchthesameconclusionbyadifferentroute.Ratherthanrelyingdirectlyonrespectingtheequalmoralfreedomofothers,wecanappealtoatheoryofmoralreasons.Moralityisinherentlyarationalandpracticalenterpriseinsofarasaddressingmoralclaimstoothersistogivethemreasonstocomply.TosaythatIhavevalidmoralclaimsbutthesegiveothers–evenrationalothers–noreasontocomplywiththemseemstounderminethepointofadvancingmoralclaims.Ifwearenotsimplyconcernedwithcallingothersnames–criticizingthemfor“doingwrong,”“beingguilty,”“violatingtherightsofothers,”andsoon–whatisthepointofadvancingmoralclaimsthatdonotappealtotheirrationalnature?Tobesure,viewsofmoralitythatattenuateitspracticalorrationalnatureinthiswayareoftendefended.Someseemoraljudgmentsasessentiallydescriptiveandsonotessentiallypractical(“φisbestdescribedasarightaction”).Andsomeunderstandmoralstate-mentsasawayexpressdisapprovalatwhatothersaredoing,andsoarenotessen-tiallyrational(“Bootoφ!”,“Idisapproveofφandyoushouldtoo!”).Suchviewsdonotcapturethecruxofmoralpractice:itisawayforustorelatetoeachotherasrationalagents,whocangiveeachotherreasonstoperform,orrefrain,fromactionsofcertaintypes.Ifweacceptthatmoralityisnecessarilyaboutgivingreasonstoothers,thenourunderstandingofmoraljustificationwillbedeeplyinfluencedbyourunderstandingofwhatconstitutesareason.Wecannotenterhereintothecomplexitiesofdifferentaccountsofreasons;consider,however,aplausibleview.Togivesomeoneareasonistogiveheraconsiderationtoφthat,ifsheemploysherrationalfacultiesinaninformed,careful,competent,andreflectiveway,shecanseeascountinginfavorofφ.SupposeAlfclaimsthatRisareasonforBettytoφ,butAlfadmitsthatevenwereshetobefullyinformedaboutinformationthatisrelevant,andshecarefullyandcompetentlyreflectsonR,shestillcouldnotseehowRisaconsiderationinfavorofφ-ing.ItishardtoseeinwhatwayAlfcansaythatRisareasonforBettytoφ;hehasadmittedthatitreallycannotbegraspedbyherreflectivedeliberation,andgiventhat,itcannotbeareasonforhertodoanything.Theideaofareasonthatisunabletoplayaroleindeliberationissurelyodd.PerhapsitwouldbegoodforBettytoφ,butitseemsimplausibletosaythatshehasanyconsiderationsthatcountinfavorofφ.Ifweacceptthisplausibleviewofwhatitistogiveanotherareason,combinedwithourpracticalandrationalconceptionofthemoralenterprise,weareagainledtotheviewthat,forAlftomakeavalidmoralclaimonBettythatsheφs,thisclaimmustbevalidatedfromBetty’sperspective:theremustbeareasonforher.86GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page872.3LiberalMoralNeutralityGiventherequirementsfortreatingothersasfreeandequalmoralpersonsandtherequirementsofmoraljustification,thetaskofpubliclyjustifyingamoralprinciplePrequiresthatPbevalidatedfromtheperspectiveofeachrationalandreflectivefreeandequalmoralperson.Topubliclyjustifyamoralprincipleistojustifyittoallrationalandreflectivefreeandequalmoralpersonswithinsomepublic,who38confronteachotherasstrangers.Ishallassumethattherelevantpublichereissomethinglikeasociety;wecouldalsodefinethepublicintermsofallpersons(auniversalisticcosmopolitanmorality)orasmallercommunity.Asourmaincon-cerniswithmoralityinsofarasitrelatestopoliticaljustice,focusonthenotionofasociety’smoralityisappropriate.Abstractingfromthenotionsofgoods,values,moral“intuitions”andsoon,letusprovisionallysaythatΣisanevaluativestandardformoralpersonAlfifandonlyifholdingΣ,alongwithvarioussoundbeliefsabouttheworld,isareasonfororagainstapurportedmoralprinciple,etc.fromAlf’srationalandreflectivepoint39ofview.Soaperson’sevaluativestandardsaretobedistinguishedfromjustifiedmoralrequirements.Suppose,then,thatAlfattemptstojustifysomemoralprinciplePonthebasisofhisevaluativestandardΣa,whichisnotsharedbyBetty.HeclearlyhasnotjustifiedP.ForPtobejustifieditmustbevalidatedfromBetty’sviewpoint.Thus,appealingtoanevaluativestandardaboutwhichAlfandBettyrationallyandreflectivelydisagreecannotbejustificatory:ifBetty’scarefulandrationalreflectioncannotendorseΣaasaconsiderationinfavorofP,thenPhasnotyetbeenjustifiedasamoralprincipleatall.Evenifacareful,rationalandreflectiveBettycanseeΣaasaconsiderationinfavorofP,thisisstillnotenoughtoshowthatPisvalidatedfromherview.ShemightalsohavereasontoembraceΣbandthatmaybeacon-siderationagainstP;thematterthenturnsonwhichconsiderationdefeatstheotherinheroverallrankingofevaluativestandards.ItiscrucialtoappreciatethatthisargumentdoesnotshowthatAlfhasamoral40obligationtojustifyhisclaimsonBetty.Onsuchaview,althoughAlfmayhaveamoralobligationnottoinsistonPwithoutjustification,hemighthaveanover-ridingmoralobligationtoactonPevenifitcannotbejustifiedtoher.OntheaccountIhavearticulatedhere,unlessPisvalidatedfromBetty’sperspective,itisnotamoralprincipleatall,andsocannotgroundanymoralreasons.Itsstatusasareason-givingmoralprincipleapplyingtosocietydependsonitsvalidationfromthepublicperspective.Moralitysupposesimpartiality,andimpartialityrequiresthattheprinciplebyvalidatedbyallmembersofthemoralpublic.IfAlfistorespectothersasfreeandequalmoralpersonsandprovidethemwithgenuinemoralclaims,heiscommittedto:LiberalMoralNeutrality:Alf’smoraldemandsaddressedtoBettymustbeneutralbetweenhisandBetty’sevaluativestandards:thejustificationofAlf’smoraldemandsmustnotrelyonrelevantdifferencesbetweenhisandBetty’sevaluativestandards.LetusconsidermorecarefullywhyAlfiscommittedtoLiberalMoralNeutrality.(i)WearesupposingthatAlfiscommittedtotreatingothersasfreeandequalmoralpersons,andisheisamoralpersoncommittedtomakingmoraldemandsonTheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality87\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page88others.Ifthisisso,hemustadvancemoraldemandsonothers,andforthesetobevalidmoraldemands(i.e.,toactuallybemoraldemands)theymustbejustifiedtothoseothers.(ii)LiberalMoralNeutralitydoesnotrequirethatAlfpresent,orevenbeawareof,thejustificationsforhismoraldemands–hemaybeunabletoarticulateargu-mentsaboutwhatothershavereasontoaccept.Butforhismoraldemandstobegenuine,theymustprovideconsiderationsforallreflectiveandrationalothers.Nowgiventhis,itcannotbethecasethattheirjustificationeitherfavorshisevaluativestandardsortheirsonarelevantdifferencebetweenthem.Ifthereisarelevantdifference(adifferencethataffectsthejustificationofP),thenifAlfisbiasedtowardshisownevaluativestandardshewillnotbeprovidingBettywithadequatereasons;shouldforsomereasonhefavorBetty’s,thenthemoraldemandwouldnotbevalidatedfromhisview:itwouldnotprovidehimwithasufficientreason.NotethatiftheirevaluativestandardsconvergeonP,thenthejustificationofthedemandmaybebasedintheirdifferentevaluativestandardsbecauseitwouldnotthenbeexploitingadifferencebetweenthem,butappealingtotheircommonality.Thisisimportant.Publicjustificationsmaybebasedeitheronconsensusorconvergenceof41evaluativestandards.AconsensusjustificationmaintainsthatPisjustifiedbecauseeveryonehasgroundstoendorseitonthebasisofthesameevaluativestandard;aconvergencejustificationmaintainsthatPisjustifiedbecauseAlfhasgroundstoendorseitonthebasisΣa,BettyonthebasisofΣb,etc.Nowaconsensusjustificationisperfectlyneutral:thejustificationdoesnotrelyonourdisagreementsaboutevaluativestandardsbut,instead,onouragreementabouttheimplicationsofourstandards.Thuswemustrejecttheplausibleideathatliberalneutralityprohibitsappealto“controversialconceptionsofthegood”;weseeherethatinsomecasessuchappealstreatallasfreeandequalmoralpersonstowhomweowereasons.(iii)Itshouldbeclearwhy“treatment”istobeunderstoodintermsofjustification.ThereasonweareledtoLiberalMoralNeutralityisaconceptionoffreeandequalmoralpersonswhoarecommittedtomakingmoraldemandsonothersthatprovidereasonsfromeveryone’sperspective.Thegroundingofmoralityisimpartialtreatmentquamoraljustification.Anymorerobustrequirementofnon-differentialtreatment–say,thateverystatepolicyshouldequallyimpacteachconceptionofthegoodlife–wouldhavetobejustifiedwithinthemoralorpolit-icalenterprises.Suchrobustconceptionsofnon-differentialtreatmentaresurelynotpresuppositionsofthemoralenterpriseitself.3.LiberalPoliticalNeutrality3.1TheNon-coercionPrincipleIdeemthisconceptionofmoralneutrality”liberal”becauseitstartsfromthequintessentiallyliberalconceptionofmoralpersonsasfreeandequal,rationalandreflective,agents.Itisnot,however,liberalinanymoresubstantivesense.InordertomovetowardLiberalPoliticalNeutralitywemustfirstmakeabasic,andIthinkfairlyuncontroversial,claimwithinmorality.IfanyclaimcanbejustifiedwithintheconstraintsofLiberalMoralNeutrality,itissurely:88GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page89TheNon-coercionPrinciple:(i)ItisprimafaciemorallywrongforAlftocoerceBetty,ortoemployforceagainsther.(ii)Withsufficientjustification,AlfmayhaveamoralrighttouseofcoercionorforceagainstBetty.AlmosteveryliberalpoliticalphilosopherhasunderstoodtheNon-coercionPrincipleasabasicmoralcommitmentofliberalpoliticalphilosophy.Theprinciple’scoreclaimisthat,otherthingsequal,theuseofforceorcoercionagainstanotheriswrong.Toshowthatotherthingsarenotequal,andsothattheuseofforceandcoercionis42morallypermissible,amoraljustificationisrequired.43ItishardtoseeaplausiblecaseagainsttheNon-coercionPrinciple.Whateverone’sevaluativestandards,solongasonehasanyreasontoactonthem,andsobeanagent,onemusthavestrongreasontoobjectwhenothersexerciseforceorcoerciontothwartone’sagency.Someonewhoseekstocoerceyou(withoutjustification)tomakeyoudoashewishesisattackingyourfundamentalinterestinactingonyourownevaluativestandards.Thewrongfulcoercersupplantsyourevaluativestandardswithhisownasthegroundsforyouraction.JeffreyReimanaptlydescribesthisasacaseof“subjugation”:i.e.,“thejudgmentofonepersonprevailsoverthecontraryjudgmentofanothersimplybecauseitcanandwithoutadequatejustificationforbelievingit44should.”AsReimansuggests,the“suspicionofsubjugation”canbedispelled–we45candistinguish“mightfromright”–ifthereisadequatejustification:tosaythatcoercionis“primafacie”wrongistosaythatreasonscanbeprovidedtovindicatesomeinstancesofcoercion.Supposesomeonedeniesthis:shesaysthatcoercioncanneverbejustified:sheacceptspart(i)oftheprinciplebutdenies(ii).Suchanobjectormust,then,seeself-defenseasalwayswrong:inresponsetothewrongfulforcebyanother,itwouldstillbewrongforhertoemployforcetoresist.Thoughsomehaveadvancedsuchextremepacifistviews,theclaimthatoneisneverjustifiedinemployinganydegreeofcoerciontorepelanywrongfulaggressionagainstoneselfishighlycounterintuitive;Iwillnotpausetoconsideritfurther.Ifouragencyisoffundamentalimportancetous,thenwemustacceptthat,atleastinsomecases,wehavereasontoendorseaprinciplethatallowscoercion–attheveryleast,tocountercoercionagainstus.3.2Themoralclaimsof,andconstrainton,liberalgovernorsGovernmentofficialsparticipateintheauthorizationofcoercion;unjustifiedcoercioniswrong,soifofficialsarenottoactwronglytheircoercionmustbejustified.Considerfirstthetwo-personcase:officialAlfiscoercingcitizenBetty,say,byimposingalaw.So,ataminimum,AlfmusthaveajustifiedmorallibertytocoerceBetty:itmust46be,morally,notwrongforhimtocoerceher.And,ofcourse,thisjustificationmustmeetthedemandsofLiberalMoralNeutrality:hecannotfavorhisownevaluativestandards.Butforthesamereason,thejustificationcannotfavortheevaluativestand-ardsofsomethirdparty,Charlie,whencoercingBetty.NowtakeanylawthatappliestobothBettyandCharlie:thejustificationofthelawAlfcannotexploitdifferencesinBettyandCharlie’sevaluativestandards,sincethenoneofthemwillhaveinad-equatereasontoacceptthatAlfhasamoralrighttoimposethelaw.SoAlf’sactofimposingthelawisonlymorallypermissibleifthereisajustificationforthe47impositionthatmeetsLiberalPoliticalNeutrality.TheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality89\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page90ThisallsupposesthattheNon-coercionPrincipleappliestogovernmentsanditsagents(quaagents).Thisisnotentirelyuncontroversial;arecurringviewinthehistoryofpoliticalphilosophyinsiststhatthe“normal”moralrestraintsthatapplytoindividualactorsdonotapplytothestate;“theState,assuch,certainlycannotbeguiltyofpersonalimmorality,anditishardtoseehowitcancommittheftor48murderinthesenseinwhichthesearemoraloffenses.”Moregenerally,whathasbeencalled“politicalrealism”insiststhattheconstraintsof“ordinary”moralityarenotapplicabletopolitics.AsMachiavellifamouslyobserved,“Amanwhowishestomakeaprofessionofgoodnessineverythingmustnecessarilycometogriefamong49somanywhoarenotgood.”Ifgovernorshaveadutytoprotecttheinterestsoftheircitizens,ithasseemedtomanythatintheunpredictableandmorallylaxenvir-onmentinwhichpoliticiansoftenoperate,theymustignorethenormalpreceptsofeverydaymoralityandlooktopromotethegoodoftheirpeople.Astherealistseesit,toinsistthattheNon-coercionPrincipleappliestothoseingovernmentfailstoappreciatethedistinctivecharacterofthepolitical.50Weneedtodistinguishthreedifferentconceptionsofthespecialnatureofpolitics.(i)The“realist”insiststhatthereisan“ineluctabletensionbetweenthemoral51commandandtherequirementsofsuccessfulpoliticalaction.”Onthisconceptionsuccessfulpoliticsrequiresimmorality:onemustoftenhavemorally“dirtyhands”tobeasuccessfulpolitician.Theliberaltraditioninpoliticsrejectssuchrealism:politicsisneitherabovenoroutsidetheclaimsofmorality.(ii)Thefirstviewispuz-zling:whyshouldthefact(ifitbeafact)thatpoliticalsuccessrequiresimmoralitybeareasontoignoremoralityratherthantoforgopoliticalsuccess?Ifatradeunionofficialtoldusthatsuccessfortheunionrequiresimmorality,wewouldhardlythinkthatthisexcusesherimmorality.Amoralplausibleviewisthatwhilemoralityappliestothegovernment,itisanentirelydifferentmorality:thestate,wearetoldbysome,cannotbeguiltyofpersonalimmorality–itisheldaccountabletoahighermorality:“successfulpoliticalaction”is“itselfinspiredbythemoralprincipleofnationalsur-vival,”andsopoliticianshaveno“moralright”tosacrificetheirstateinthepursuit52offidelitytotheprinciplesofindividualmorality.Thisspecial“moralityofthestate”isalsorejectedbytheliberaltradition:thereisnotonemoralityforpersonsandadifferentoneforstates,asifstateswerenotcomposedofindividualswithcommit-mentstorespectthemoralpersonalityofothers.(iii)However,todenythatthereisaspecialmoralityofthestateisnottodenythatthatthespecialcircumstancesofpoliticsmayallowforjustifyingactsthatotherwisewouldbewrong.Liberals(althoughnotperhapslibertarians)acceptthattheconditionsunderwhichtheagentsofthestatecanjustifiablyemploycoerciondifferfromtheconditionsunderwhichprivateindividualsmay.This,ofcourse,isthefundamentalconcernofpoliticalphi-losophy:howdoesthestatecometobeauthorizedtoemploycoercion(suchastopunish)whileprivateindividualsarenotsoauthorized?Toacceptthattheagentsofthestatearejustifiedinemployingcoercionwhennon-stateagentsarenotdoesnotmeanthattheNon-coercionPrinciplefailstoapplytogovernors:theliberalclaimsthatthereareargumentsthatmeetthetestofLiberalMoralNeutralitythat,insomecases,allowonlyagentsofthestatetojustifiablycoerce.Theupshotisthatunlesswewishtojointherealistinwithdrawingpoliticsfromthepurviewofmorality,orallowthatthestateissubjecttoitsownspecialmoralityofnationalinterest,theactionsofthosewhoareagentsofthestatemustconform90GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page91torequirementsofmorality,specificallytheNon-coercionPrinciple,andtheonlywaytoovercomethepresumptionagainstcoercionisthoughajustificationthatcon-formstothedemandsofLiberalMoralNeutrality.Wethushave:LiberalPoliticalNeutrality:Anagentofthestatewhencoercingacitizen,orparticip-atingintheauthorizationofsuchcoercion,mustbeneutralbetweenthatcitizenandanyothercitizen:thejustificationofthestateofficial’scoercionmustnottreatdiffer-entiallyreasonableandreflectivecitizen’sdifferencesintheirevaluativestandards.Noticethatwehaveswitchedourfocusfrommoralpersonstocitizens.Forthemostpart,Ishallleaveopentherelationbetweenthesetwoclasses.Wedoneedtosupposethatallmembersoftheclassofcitizensarealsofreeandequalmoralper-sons,sincethemoralfoundationsofLiberalPoliticalNeutralitylieinLiberalMoralNeutrality.Perhapsallmoralpersonsresidingwithinajurisdictionshouldbecon-sideredascitizens(Iamcertainlysympathetictothisproposal);however,Ishallleaveopenthepossibilitythatthatsomemoralpersonswithinajurisdiction(i.e.,residentaliens)mightbeexcludedfromtheclassofcitizens.Thisisanimportantissueinpoliticaltheory,butwecannotpausetodiscussithere.NothingIsayinwhatfollowsturnsonthispoint.3.3ThecoercivenatureofthestateDoesLiberalPoliticalNeutralityapplytoall,oronlysome,actionbystateofficials?JohnStuartMilldistinguishedauthoritativefromnon-authoritativeinterventionsbygovernment;whiletheformertaketheformofacommandbackedbyenforcement,thelattergivesadviceandinformation,orestablishesanagencytodealwithaprob-53lemwhileallowingotherstocompete.Althoughthegovernmentthreateningdruguserswithprisonsentencesisindeedanactofcoercion,drugeducationprograms,onMill’sview,wouldnotbecoercive.GeorgeShermakesmuchofthispoint.Inordertopromotecertainaims,governmentsmightofferrewards,engageineconomic54policiesthatfavortheaim,fundeducationalprograms,andsoon.Ifthesepoliciesarenotcoercive,thentheydonotfallundertheNon-coercionPrinciple.Whatissometimescalledthe“libertarian”responsemustberighthere:eachofthesupposedlynon-coercivemeasuresisonlypossiblebecauseofaprioractofcoercion,beitthreatsassociatedwiththetaxcode,threatsthatbackupbankingregulations(relevant,say,tosettinginterestrates),andsoon.Theaction“conductaneducationalprogram”presupposestheaction“raiseviataxationtherevenuestoconducttheprogram.”Assumingtheformerisimpossiblewithoutthelatter,itisinappropriatetoseparatelyevaluatethem.Anactthatdependsonhavingcertainresourcesorpowerscannotbeevaluatedwithoutconsiderationofthelegitimacyofobtainingthoseresourcesorpowers.Hereatleastisacasewherethedictumthat“Hewhowillstheendmustalsowillthemeans”isappropriate:toinsistthatthereisnothingcoerciveabouttheend,whentheonlywaytoachievetheendisthroughacoercivemeans,isdisingenuous.Tosaythatitisnotcoercivetospendyourmoney,eventhoughImustusecoerciontogetmyhandsonit,hardlyseemsconvincing.Theobjectofevaluationshouldbethecomplexact{raiserevenuesthroughtaxa-tion&spendthemonaneducationalprogram}.ThatthecomplexshouldbetheTheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality91\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page92focusofevaluationisbynomeanssimplyalibertarianview:theAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionsuespublicauthoritiesthatusetaxmoneytoadvertisereligion55(say,byusingpublicworkerstoerectsignssaying“JesusisLord”).Theideaisthatthisisnotamereeducationalmeasurethatdoesnotimposeburdensonsome;itdoesimposeburdensthatmustbebornbydissentingcitizensbecauseofthreatsofpunishmentbythetaxationdepartment.Itcan,though,plausiblybemaintainedthatsomestateactionsarelesscoercivethanothers.Justasathreatofashortprisonsentenceislesscoercivethanthreatofalongone,andthreatofasmallfineislesscoercivethanthreatofamoderatejailterm,sotoothecoercioninvolvedinanextraonepercentmarginaltaxrateis56typicallylesscoercivethanthethreatofjail.Thus,ifweconcernourselveswiththestrengthofthejustificationsrequiredtolegitimatethecoercion,thenadis-57tinctionbetweenstrongerandmilderformsofcoercionwillberelevant.ButthatdistinctionisnotrelevanttotheNon-coercionPrinciple,whichconcernsthesetofactionsthatrequirejustification.4.TheImplicationsofLiberalPoliticalNeutrality4.1ThedemandingnatureofLiberalPoliticalNeutralityToparaphraseRobertNozick,sostrongandfar-reachingisLiberalPoliticalNeutralitythatitraisesthequestionofwhat,ifanything,theofficialsofthestate58maydo.Itisunclearwhethermuchinthewayofpublicpolicysurvivestheneutralitytest.Sincewehaveseenthatwheneverstateofficialsacttheyparticipateinacoercion-authorizingprocess,toimplementanysuchpolicywouldrequireajustificationthatdoesnotexploitdifferencesintheevaluativestandardsofreason-ableandreflectivecitizens–i.e.,isneutralbetweenthem.Somemaythinkthatthisisnotterriblydemanding.Itisreasonabletosupposethat,afterall,citizensdosharemanyevaluativestandards.Althoughwemaynothaveconsensusonafull-fledgedconceptionofthegood,wemightstillidentify“apublicconceptionofthegood”:theremightbesubstantivesharedvaluesthatareamatterofoverlappingconsensus59ofeveryone’sconceptionsofthegood–say,health,securityandhappiness.Suppose,forexample,thatsomeevaluativestandardΣissharedbyall.ThenitwouldseemthatanappealtoΣinajustificationforpolicyPwouldnotrunafoulofLiberalPoliticalNeutrality:implementingpolicyPtreatsallcitizensneutrallysincethejustificationforitdoesnotappealtotheirreasonabledifferencesinevaluativestandards.Butthismovestooquickly,forweneedtotakeaccountofdifferentciti-zens’rankingsoftheirevaluativestandards.ReasonRdoesnotjustifyapolicycon-sistentwithneutralityunlessitwouldbeacceptedbyallfullyrationalandreflectivecitizens.NowalthougharationalBettymightrejectRasareasonbecauseitappealstoanevaluativestandardthatshedoesnotshare,shewillalsoreasonablyrejectitasagoodreasoninfavorofPwhenitappealstoarankingofevaluativestandardsthatshedoesnotshare;RmaybeareasoninfavorofP,butitisoverriddeninherrankingbyR*,whichisareasonagainstP.AccordingtoMiltonRokeach,apsy-chologist,Americansagreeinaffirmingasetofthirty-sixvalues;whattheydiffer60onis“thewaytheyorganizethemtoformvaluehierarchiesorpriorities.”Ifso,92GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page93ourmaindisagreementsarenotaboutwhatisofvalue(whatisanevaluativestand-ard),buttherelativeimportanceofourevaluativestandards.Evenifeveryoneagrees,say,thatsmokingcausescancerandthatthisisareasonforapolicydiscouragingsmoking,rationalpeopleclearlydodisagreeaboutwhetherthepleasuresareworththeriskofdeath.Giventhatrationalpeopleweightherelativevaluesofpleasureandsafetydifferently,coerciveactsthatcanonlybejustifiedonthegroundsthatthepleasuredoesnotoutweightherisktohealthfailtoprovideaneutralcase.Thus,althoughthebadnessofillhealthcausedbysmokingcanbeinvokedinaneutraljustification,thatitsbadnessoutweighsthegoodnessofthepleasureofsmokingcannot;andwithoutthat,nostatepoliciesdiscouragingsmokingwillbejustified.ThishasdirectrelevancetoUnitedStatesdrugpolicy,whichisbasedoncertainmiddleclassvaluerankings,61andwhichresultsinpoliciesthatplaceinordinatecostsonthepoor.Thisfundamentalpointdeservesemphasis.Politicalphilosophersareusuallyinsensitivetowhateconomistscall“opportunitycosts”:thecostofgettingonething62youvalueisthatyoumustforgosomethingelseyouvalue.Itisoftenassumedthatoncewerecognizeasharedvalue,wehavethebasisforaneutralpolicy:buteverythingdependsonwhetherachievingthissharedvaluerequiresthatsomegiveupsomethingofgreatervalue.Ifitdoes,thenforthosecitizenspursuingthissharedvalueisirrational:theyaregivingupsomethingmoreimportantforsomethingtheyprizeless.Soitdoesnogoodtosimplypointtosharedvalue:wemustpointtoasharedrankingofvalues,sothatallrationalandreflectivecitizenswillagreethatachievingthisvalueismoreimportantthananyothervaluesthatmightbeachieved.Butthisisadauntingtask:rationalandreflective,freeandequalpersonsappeartodisagreedeeplyontherankingsoftheirevaluativestandards(whatisa“conceptionofthegood”butaschemeinwhichvaluesareweighted?).Itlooksasifalmostanycollectivepursuitofvalueswillinvolvesomecitizensbeingcoercedintopursuingavaluethanislessimportanttothemthanavaluetheyhadtogiveup(say,becausetheyweretaxedforthecollectivelypursuedvalue).SometrytoblunttheradicalimplicationsofLiberalPoliticalNeutralitybyrestrictingtherangeoftheneutralityprinciple(theclassofcasescoveredbyφ)to63asmallsetofbasicpoliticalmatters.Rawls,forexample,appearstorestrictφtoconstitutionalissuesormattersofbasicjustice:unlessanissueconcernsa“consti-tutionalessential”neutralitydoesnotapply–apparentlynon-neutraljustificationscanbeemployedineveryday(non-constitutional)politics.Canthey?Supposethatwehaveaneutraljustificationofaconstitution,andnowareadvocatingpolicyP,whichisnotitselfaboutaconstitutionalmatter.Therearetwopossibilities.Itmightbethattheconstitutionwhichis,exhypothesineutrallyjustified,authorizesP.InthiscasePdoeshaveaneutraljustificationinsofarasitisjustifiedthroughthecon-stitutionwhichisneutrallyjustified.Theissue,though,iswhetheraconstitutionwithextensiveauthorizationsofthissortcouldbeneutrallyjustified.Itseemsdoubtfulindeedthat,forexample,aconstitutionthatallowsthegovernmenttousetaxationtodiscouragesmoking,encourageahealthylife-style,regulatedrugs,fundthearts,gotowartospreaddemocracy,seektoadvancehumanflourishing,protectthefamily,orpromotecommunity,iscapableofneutralpublicjustification.Givenwhathasbeensaidabove,thereisastrongpresumptionthatallcoercedcitizenscouldnotbegivenimpartialreasonsoftherequisitesortforgrantingthestateauthorityoverthesematters.Theotheralternativeisthattheconstitutionisneutrallyjustified,butonlyTheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality93\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page94theconstitution;thereisnoindirectneutraljustificationviatheconstitutionforpol-icyP.ThecaseforPisanothermatterentirely,outsideofthescopeofLiberalPoliticalNeutrality.ButthisimpliesthatPisacoerciveactwithoutadequatejustificationand,sowrong.Neutralitycannotberestrictedtoacertain“level”becausetheNon-coercionPrincipleisafullygeneralprinciple,applyingtoallcoerciveacts.4.2Thespecterofanarchism?IfLiberalPoliticalNeutralityisthatdemanding,isanylawjustified?Doweendupwithanarchism?EverythingIhavethusfarsaidaboutpublicpoliciesthatseektoadvancevaluessuchashealthwouldseemtoapplytomattersofbasicpoliticaljus-tice,suchasaregimeofpropertyrights.Whileeveryrationalandreflectivecitizenmayagreethatsomesystemofpropertyrightsisbetterthannone(forthenweavoidthestateofnature,wherethereisno“mineandthine”),noargumentforaspecificsystemofpropertycanfunctionasaneutraljustificationoftherequisitesort,asitwillberationallyrejectedbysome.Somewill,say,rankalibertariansystemofprop-ertyhigherthanawelfarestatesystem,whileotherswillhaveevaluativestandardsthatleadthemtothereverseranking.Thedifferencebetweenthesmokingcaseandthepropertyrightscaseliesinwheretheoption“nopolicyatallinthismatter”isoneachrationalcitizen’srankings.Supposethatallrationalcitizensendorseorpre-fersystemsofproperty{Pr1,Pr2,Pr3}overnosystemofpropertyrights,butsomeprefernosystemofpropertyrightsover{Pr4,Pr5}.Ifso,thereisaLiberalPoliticalNeutralistjustificationforselectingfromthesetof{Pr1,Pr2,Pr3};ourevaluativestandardsconvergeontheconclusionthatanymemberofthatsetisbetterthannopropertyregimeatall.Whatisrequirednext–andthisiswheredemocracyenters64in–isajustifiedproceduretoselectfromthatset.Ifwehavesuchaprocedure,thenwewillhaveafullyjustifiedsystemofpropertyrightsdespitethedisagree-mentsaboutwhatisthebestsystem–disagreementsontherelativemeritsof{Pr1,Pr2,Pr3}.Incontrast,inthetypicalpublicpolicycase,atleastoveraverywiderangeofissues,foreachandeverypolicyPinthesetofoptions,anumberofcitizensrankPasinferiorto“nopolicyatallonthismatter.”Nopolicywhatsoeverwillbepreferred,first,bythosewhoprefernopolicytoeverypolicy,andsorankPandallotherpoliciesbehindnopolicyatall(e.g.,classicalliberalsregardingporno-graphyregulation).Second,PwillalsoberankedworsethannopolicyatallbythosewhoprefersomeotherpolicyP*tonopolicyatall,butprefernopolicyatallto65P.ThusonissueswheresomerationalcitizensfallintooneofthesetwogroupsnopublicjustificationofPcanbeadvanced.Ofcourse,ifthereisapublicjustificationforsomepolicyonthismatter(forexample,regardingapublicgoodsuchaspollutioncontrol),andPisinthesetofadmissiblepolicies,thenwemovetoacaselikethatofpropertyrights.Itisverylikely,though,thatoncewetakeaccountofcomparativejudgments,LiberalPoliticalNeutralityprecludesagreatdealofcontemporarylegislation.4.3LiberalPoliticalNeutrality:criticalorapologetic?LiberalPoliticalNeutralityisaradicalprinciple:itexpressesasuspicionthatcoercionthreatenssubjugationand,basedonourunderstandingofothersasfree94GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page95andequalmoralpersons,advancesademandingtesttoovercomethissuspicion.PacealmostallcontemporaryadvocatesofLiberalNeutrality,IhavearguedthatLiberalPoliticalNeutralityisgenuinelyliberalinthesensethatitissuspiciousofallcoercionanddrasticallylimitsthescopeofgovernment.Manyofthethingsthatcon-temporarystatesdofailthetestofLiberalPoliticalNeutrality–whichistosaythatcontemporarystatesarenotgenuinelyliberal.Someadvocatesof“liberalneutrality”66seethisconclusionasareductioadabsurdum.Totheseliberals,anyadequatecon-ceptionofliberalneutralitymustshowthatmostofwhatcontemporarygovernmentsdoisjustified.Thussometellusthatifaconceptionofliberalneutralityexcludes,say,67publicschoolclassesindramaandmusic,itisshowntobeanabsurdconception.Thiscommonviewpresupposeswhatliberalsmustquestion:thatstatecoercionisjustified.Iseenogoodreasontoacceptwhatamountstoaconceptionofpoliticalphilosophyasanapologyforthecurrentstate.Toappropriateacontemporaryifnotpellucidterm,intheeyesofliberalsthestateisproblematic.Thatiswhytheclassicsocialcontracttheoriesbeginwiththestateofnature–aconditionwithoutanygovernment–andseektoshowthatconstructionofalimitedgovernmentisconsistentwithmoralprinciples.Currentadvocatesofneutralityworktheotherwayaround:theystartwithgovernmentasweknowitandtestmoralprinciplesbyshowingthattheyjustifyit.Evensupposingitistruethat“dailypoliticsisirretrievablyperfectionist”–thattheaimofpoliticsistomakepeoplemoreautonomous,orhealthier,orwiser,ormorefamily-oriented,ormoreGod-fearing–thiswouldbynomeansshowthatanti-68perfectionismisabsurdormisguided.Ifcompellingmoralclaimsshowthatmoststatecoercionisunjust,thentheloserisstatecoercion,notthesefundamentalmoral69convictions.Liberalmoralprinciplesareindeed“self-stultifying”whenwhatisbeingstultifiedisunjustifiedcoercionofsomebyothers.Moralitystultifiesahostofthingsthatwemaywishtodo,includingmakingothersmoreperfectinourowneyes.Notes1.SeeCharlesLarmore,PatternsofMoralComplexity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),pp.43ff.;WillKymlicka,“LiberalIndividualismandLiberalNeutrality,”Ethics99(Jul.1989):833–905;SimonCaney,“ConsequentialistDefensesofLiberalNeutrality,”ThePhilosophicalQuarterly41(Jan.1991):457–77.2.ThemostcarefuldiscussionisGeorgeSher,BeyondNeutrality:PerfectionismandPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),Ch.2.3.SeeJeremyWaldron,“LegislationandMoralNeutrality”inhisLiberalRights(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),pp.149ff.4.PeterJones,“TheIdealoftheNeutralState”inRobertE.GoodinandAndrewReeve,eds.,LiberalNeutrality(London:Routledge,1989),p.9;GovertDenHartogh,“TheLimitsofLiberalNeutrality,”Philosophica56(1995):59–89atp.61.5.ColinM.MacLeod,“LiberalNeutralityorLiberalTolerance?”LawandPhilosophy16(Sep.1997):529–59atp.532;PaulRosenberg,“LiberalNeutralismandtheSocial-DemocraticProject,”CriticalReview8(1994):217–34atp.218.6.WojciechSadurski,“TheoryofPunishment,SocialJusticeandLiberalNeutrality,”LawandPhilosophy7(1988/89):351–74atp.371.7.SeeJones,“TheIdealoftheNeutralState,”p.9.TheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality95\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page968.SeePhilippevanParijs,RealFreedomforAll(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),p.28.9.BruceA.Ackerman,SocialJusticeintheLiberalState(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1980),p.11.10.Larmore,PatternsofMoralComplexity,pp.53ff.11.RobertTalisse,DemocracyAfterLiberalism(London:Routledge,2005),p.33.12.SeeJohnRawls,JusticeasFairness:ARestatement,ed.ErwinKelly(Cambridge,MA:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,2001),p.152.13.Jones,“TheIdealoftheNeutralState,”p.9.14.SeeBrianBarry,JusticeasImpartiality(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),pp.139–45;RonaldDworkin,“Liberalism”inhisAMatterofPrinciple(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1985),p.191;RogerPaden,“DemocracyandLiberalNeutrality,”ContemporaryPhilosophy14(1):17–20.15.Kymlicka,“LiberalIndividualismandLiberalNeutrality,”p.886.16.J.DonaldMoon,ConstructingCommunity:MoralPluralismandTragicConflicts(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993),p.55.17.SeeBarry,JusticeasImpartiality,pp.125ff.RobertE.GoodinandAndrewReeve,“LiberalismandNeutrality”intheireditedcollection,LiberalNeutrality,pp.1–8.18.WoodrowWilson,MessagetoCongress,63rdCong.,2dSession,SenateDoc.No.566(Washington,DC,1914),pp.3–4.19.http://lawofwar.org/Neutrality.htm20.Thisassumesthatexpressivestancesareaformoftreatment.OnthisseeChristiDawnFavor,“ExpressiveDesertandDeservingCompensation,”inJulianLamont,ChristiDawnFavorandGeraldGaus,eds.,EssaysonPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomics(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2009).21.SeeJohnRawls,“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory,”inSamuelFreeman,ed.,JohnRawls:CollectedPapers(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),pp.303–58,esp.305ff.ThisisnottosaythatRawlsandIadvancepreciselythesameconceptionoffreeandequalmoralpersons,asshallbecomeclearinwhatfollows.22.SeemyValueandJustification(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),pp.278ff.23.SeehereJ.R.Lucas,OnJustice(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1980),p.7.Foradevelopmentofthisconceptionofmorality,seeThomasScanlon,WhatWeOweEachOther(Cambridge,MA:BelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,1998),esp.pp.177ff.24.IarguethisinValueandJustification,pp.281ff.25.SeeJohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,paperbackedition(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),p.51.26.Iargueforthisclaimin“ThePlaceofAutonomyinLiberalism,”inJohnChristmanandJoelAnderson,eds.,AutonomyandtheChallengestoLiberalism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),pp.272–306.27.JohnLocke,SecondTreatiseofGovernmentinTwoTreatisesofGovernment,ed.PeterLaslett(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1960),§22.28.Italsoprovidesthebasisforunderstandingmoralityasself-legislated.Idevelopthisideafurtherin“ThePlaceofAutonomyinLiberalism.”29.Rawls,“KantianConstructivism,”p.334.30.Rawls,JusticeasFairness,p.23.Theimportanceoftheideaofself-authenticationiseasilyoverlookedinRawls’sthinking.Itfirstappearedinhis1951paperonan“OutlineofaDecisionProcedureforEthics,”whichconceivedofethicsasadjudicatingtheclaimsofindividuals,whichheclearlysawasself-authenticating.Seesection5ofthatpaperinRawls’sCollectedPapers,Ch.1.31.Hence,becauseofthis,partiestoRawls’soriginalpositionarenotrequiredtoadvancejustificationsfortheirclaims.Rawlsarguesthisin“KantianConstructivism,”p.334.96GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page9732.HadleyArkes,FirstThings:AnInquiryintotheFirstPrinciplesofMoralandJustice(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986),p.70.Italicsomitted.33.S.I.BennandR.S.Peters,SocialPrinciplesandtheDemocraticState(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,1959),p.110.34.IarguethatitcannotinJustificatoryLiberalism(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),pp.162ff.35.J.S.Mill,OnLiberty,inOnLibertyandOtherEssays,ed.JohnGray(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1991),pp.84–5(ch.IV,para.4).Millalsowasawarethatthisassump-tiondoesnotalwaysholdtrue.SeehisPrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,inJ.M.Robson,ed.,TheCollectedWorksofJohnStuartMill(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1963),vols.IIandIII,BookV,Ch.xi,§9.36.IdealwiththiscomplexquestionmoreformallyinJustificatoryLiberalism,PartsIandII.37.Again,Irecognizethecomplexitiesofthismatter.Itrytoshedalittlemorelightonitin“LiberalNeutrality:ARadicalandCompellingPrinciple,”inStevenWallandGeorgeKlosko,eds.,PerfectionismandNeutrality:EssaysinLiberalTheory(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2003),pp.136–65,atpp.150ff,andValueandJustification,pp.399–404.38.Ontheconceptofthepublic,seeS.I.BennandG.F.Gaus,“TheLiberalConceptionofthePublicandPrivate,”inS.I.BennandG.F.Gaus,eds.,PublicandPrivateinSocialLife(NewYork:St.Martin’s,1983),pp.31–66.39.IleaveasideherewhetherΣisitselfabeliefabouttheworld,asethicalnaturalistswouldhaveit.Itisimportanttostressthatnothinginmyaccountprecludesmoralrealismasameta-ethicalormetaphysicalthesis;theepistemicconstraintonmoralreasonsisthecrucialprincipleonwhichtheanalysisrests.40.ThisinterpretationisadvancedbyChristopherEberle,ReligiousConvictionsinLiberalPolitics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),Ch.3.41.Onconvergenceasamodeofjustification,seeFredD’Agostino,FreePublicReason:MakingItUpAsWeGo(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),pp.30–1.42.Inordertosimplify,Iwillhenceforthreferto“coercion”ratherthanthemorecumber-some“forceandcoercion.”43.Ihaveconsideredsomepossibleobjectionsin“LiberalNeutrality:ARadicalandCompellingPrinciple.”44.JeffreyReiman,JusticeandModernMoralPhilosophy(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1990),p.2.45.Reiman,JusticeandModernMoralPhilosophy,p.2.46.AccordingtoWesleyHohfeld,Alfhasalibertytoφ,ifandonlyifBettyhasnoclaimagainstAlfthathenotφ.ForHohfeld’sclassicanalysis,seehis“SomeFundamentalLegalConceptionsasAppliedinJudicialReasoning,”YaleLawReview23(1913):16–59.47.Notethatshouldthelawnotapplytosomeotherparty,thelawwouldnothavetobejustifiedtohim:alawmightapplytoonlya“sectionofthepublic.”Think,forexample,ofalawthatregulatesmotorcycleuse:itmaynotrequirejustificationtosomeclassofcitizens(say,thosewhodonotdrive).StanleyBennandIexploretheideaofa“sectionofthepublic”in“TheLiberalConceptionofthePublicandPrivate.”48.BernardBosanquet,ThePhilosophicalTheoryoftheStateinThePhilosophicalTheoryoftheStateandRelatedEssays,ed.GeraldF.GausandWilliamSweet(Indianapolis,IN:St.AugustinePress,2001),p.285.EvenBosanquet,however,insistedthat,whilethestateassuchcouldnotbeguiltyofimmorality,“ifanagent,evenundertheorderofhisexecu-tivesuperior,commitsabreachofmorality,bonafideinordertodowhatheconceivestobeapublicenddesiredbytheState,heandhissuperiorarecertainlyblamable...”(p.284).TheMoralFoundationsofLiberalNeutrality97\nCDIC05.qxd2/4/0915:45Page9849.NiccolòMachiavelli,ThePrinceinThePrinceandtheDiscourses(NewYork:ModernLibrary,1950[1515]),p.56.50.Iconsidertheseissuesinmoredetailin“DirtyHands”inR.G.FreyandKitWellman,eds.,TheBlackwellCompaniontoAppliedEthics(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,2003),pp.169–79.51.HansJ.Morganthau,PoliticsAmongNations,5thedn(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1973),p.10.SeealsoReinholdNeibuhr,MoralManandImmoralSociety(London:StudentChristianMovementPress,1963).52.Morganthau,PoliticsAmongNations,p.10.NotethatMorganthauseemstoadvocatebothpositions(i)and(ii).Itisoftendifficulttoknowwhether“realists”arearguingagainstapplyingmoralconsiderationstopolitics,orarearguingforaspecialpoliticalmorality.53.Mill,PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy,BookV,Ch.XI.54.Sher,BeyondNeutrality,pp.34–7.55.TheTimes-Picayune(NewOrleans),SundayFeb.24,2002,MetroSection,p.1.56.SeeDanielM.Weinstock,“NeutralizingPerfection:HurkaonLiberalNeutrality,”Dialogue38(1999):45–62.57.Iexploretheproblemsofdegreesofcoercionandstrengthofjustificationin“Coercion,Ownership,andtheRedistributiveState,”SocialPhilosophy&Policy(forthcoming2010).58.Nozick,Anarchy,StateandUtopia,p.ix.59.Weinstock,“NeutralizingPerfection,”p.55.60.SeeMiltonRokeach,TheNatureofHumanValues(NewYork:TheFreePress,1973),p.110;MiltonRokeach,“FromIndividualtoInstitutionalValues,”inhisUnderstandingValues(London:CollierMacmillan,1979),p.208.61.SeeJ.DonaldMoon,“DrugsandDemocracy”inPabloDeGreiff,ed.,DrugsandtheLimitsofLiberalism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1999),pp.133–55.62.GeorgeKloskoissomethingofanexception.Heacknowledgesthatpeopledisagreeintheirrankings,butheinsiststhatsomehowthisisnotaproblemforjustification.Thushetellsusthatitisnot“forbiddenthatgovernmentpolicyprioritiesreflectsomeconcep-tionsmorethanothers.Neutralityrequiresonlythatpublicpoliciesbeintendedtorealizenonsectarianvaluesandthattherelevantmeansbesimilarlydefensible.”[“ReasonableRejectionandNeutralityofJustification”inStevenWallandGeorgeKlosko,ed.,PerfectionismandNeutrality:EssaysinLiberalTheory(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2003),pp.167–89atp.178.]Klosko’spositionseemstobethatsolongaspolicyisjustifiedon“non-sectarian”grounds,itisneutrallyjustified,evenifthepolicy“reflects”somecitizens’rankingoverothers.Icannotseethemotivationforrestrictingjustificationtothekindsofreasonsadvancedbutnottheirimportance;unlessamorecomplicatedaccountisoffered,apersonhasnoreasontoacceptapolicythatisbasedonarankingofevaluativecriteriathatshereasonablerejects.Kloskothusdefendsmotor-cyclehelmetlawsas“neutral”eventhoughheadmitsthattheypresupposerankingsofvaluesthatarerationallyrejectedbysomecitizens.Klosko’smainmotivation,Ithink,issimplytoensurethatliberalneutralitydoesnothaveradicalimplications;see§4.3below.63.Weinstock,“NeutralizingPerfection,”p.54.64.IhavearguedthatconstitutionaldemocracyissuchaprocedureinJustificatoryLiberalism,PartIII.65.Iexplorethisprobleminmuchmoredepthin“TheLegalCoordinationGame,”AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation’sNewsletteronPhilosophyandLaw1(Spring2002):122–8.66.See,e.g.,Klosko,“ReasonableRejectionandNeutralityofJustification,”pp.175ff.;Weinstock,“NeutralizingPerfection,”p.47.67.SeeKlosko,“ReasonableRejectionandNeutralityofJustification,”p.175.Kloskoisreport-ing,butapparentlyconcurringwith,theviewsofRichardKraut.68.DenHartogh,“TheLimitsofLiberalNeutrality,”p.59.69.ThistermisWeinstock’s.98GeraldF.Gaus\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page99CHAPTERSIXPerfectionisminPolitics:ADefenseStevenWallManycontemporarywritersonpoliticsholdthatthestatecannotlegitimatelypromotethegood–atleastwhenthegoodthatistobepromotedissubjecttoreasonable1disagreement.Perfectionistpoliticaltheoriesrejectthisclaim.Accordingtothese2theories,thefactthatsomeproposedpoliticalarrangementthataimstopromotethegoodissubjecttodisagreement,reasonableorotherwise,mayprovideareasonnottoestablishthearrangementinthisorthatcircumstance,butitdoesnotshowthatdoingsoisinprincipleillegitimate.Thispaperdefendsperfectionisminpolitics.Itdoessoinpartbyclarifyingthecoreclaimsofperfectionistpoliticaltheory.Avarietyofclaimshavebeenassociatedwith3thegeneralnotionofperfectionisminmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.Distinguishingthecorefromtheinessentialclaimsallowsperfectionistpoliticaltheorytosidestepsomeofthecommonobjectionsthathavebeenpressedagainstit.Thepaperalsodefendsperfectionismbyrebuttingsomeinfluentialargumentsthatcorrectlyidentifyitscoreclaims.Finally,thepaperdefendsperfectionismbyadvancingonemodestargumentinitsfavor.Thisargumentholdsthatperfectionistpoliticaltheory,unlikeitschiefanti-perfectionistrival,iscompatiblewiththeholismofpoliticalandmoraljustification–aholismofjustificationthatisindependentlycompelling.I.ThePerfectionistIdeaInspeakingofthecoreclaimsofperfectionistpoliticaltheory,Imeantoidentifyasetofclaimsthatarebothplausibleandgeneral.Theyshouldbeplausibleinthesensethattheyexpressideasthatcontemporaryandhistoricalwritersassociatedwithperfectionistpoliticsseektodefend.Theyshouldbegeneralinthesensethattheyarecompatiblewithawiderangeofcompetingperfectionistviews.Theideaistopresentperfectionismasageneraltheoreticalapproachtopoliticsthatisbothattrac-tiveandhistoricallydistinctive.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page100Wecanbeginwithawidelycited,butunsatisfactory,characterizationofperfec-tionism.AccordingtoJohnRawls,perfectionismis“ateleologicaltheorydirectingsocietytoarrangeinstitutionsandtodefinethedutiesandobligationsofindividuals4soastomaximizetheachievementofhumanexcellenceinart,scienceandculture.”Tobefair,Rawlsisnotattemptingtoofferanaccountofperfectionistpolitics.Hepresentsperfectionismasageneralmoraltheory.Butsincehischaracterizationhasbeeninfluentialinpoliticaltheory,itisworthpausingtoconsiderit.Rawls’scharacterizationisinsufficientlygeneralbecauseitidentifiesaparticularsetofgoods–achievementinart,scienceandculture–asthegoodsthatthatoughttobepromotedbytheperfectionistsociety.Ageneralcharacterizationofperfectionismshouldnotbetiedtoparticularaccountsofthegoodthatistobepromoted.Rawls’scharacterizationisalsonotveryplausible.Iamawareofnocontemporaryperfec-tionistwriterwhoholdsthatthestateshouldmaximallypromotethegoodsofart,5scienceandculture.Mostperfectionistwritersholdthatiftheseparticulargoodsshouldbepromotedtheyshouldbepromotedtosomenon-maximalextentalongwithothergoodsthathaveaclaimtosupport.Amorepromisingideaisthattheperfectioniststateshouldmaximallypromotenotparticulargoods,butthegood,how-6everthisisconceived.But,whilemorepromising,thisideatooshouldnotbeincludedwithinageneralcharacterizationofperfectionism.For,dependingonhowthegoodischaracterized,amaximizingapproach,asopposedtosayasatisficingapproach,willlookmoreorlessattractive.Ageneralcharacterizationofperfectionistpoliticaltheory,then,shouldnotbetiedtoparticulargoodsthatwarrantstatesupportandshouldnotincludethemax-imizinginjunction.Whatpositiveclaimsshouldbeincludedinthecharacterization?Iclaimedabovethatallperfectionistsholdthatthestatecanlegitimatelypromotethegood,evenwhenwhatisgoodissubjecttoreasonabledisagreement.Thisclaimrequiresunpacking.How,morespecifically,doperfectionistsunderstandthegoodthatistobepromoted?Hereitishelpfultodistinguishanaccountofperfectionist7goodsfromaperfectionistaccountofthegoodlife.Thegoodtobepromotedbytheperfectioniststatemightrefertoeitherorbothofthese.Perfectionistgoodsmaycontributetothegoodnessofahumanlife,buttheyneednot.ItispossiblethatthepreservationoftherainforestsinSouthAmericaisaperfectionistgood,evenifitdoesnotcontributetothegoodnessofanyhumanlife.Bycontrast,aperfectionistaccountofthegoodlifeidentifiesactivities,states,events,charactertraits,etc.thatarevaluablebecauseandtotheextentthattheycontributetogoodhumanlives.Ageneralcharacterizationofperfectionistpoliticaltheoryshouldnottakesidesonwhetherthestateshouldpromotegoodhumanlivesonlyorwhetheritshouldalsopromoteperfectionistgoodsthatdonotcontributetogoodhumanlives.Still,mostperfectionistsputtheaccentonthefirstofthese.Thestate,theybelieve,shouldtakeanactiveroleincreatingandmaintainingsocialconditionsthatbestenable8theirsubjectstoleadgoodlives.Ishallassume,accordingly,thatthisistheprimaryfunctionoftheperfectioniststate;andIshallnotsayanythingmoreaboutthepossiblelegitimacyofpromotingperfectionistgoodsunrelatedtogoodhumanlives.Agoodhumanlifecanbeunderstoodinatleasttwoimportantlydifferentways.Ontheonehand,itcanbeunderstoodintermsofwell-being.Onthisunderstand-ing,agoodhumanlifeisalifethatgoeswellforthepersonwholeadsit.Onthe100StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page101otherhand,itcanbeunderstoodintermsofvalue.Amaximallyvaluablelifeneednotbeonethatisbestintermsofwell-being,foritispossiblethatthemostvaluablelifethatapersoncouldliverequireshimtomakesacrificesinhisownwell-being9forthesakeofotherpersonsorgoods.Sincethenotionofavaluablelifeisbroaderandmoreinclusivethanthenotionofwell-being,thereisreasontoholdthattheperfectioniststateshouldpromoteitratherthanwell-being.Thepointcanbedevelopedasfollows.Theperfectioniststateshouldprotectandpromotevaluablehumanlives.Itmayturnoutthatthebestwayforittodosoistoprotectandpromotethewell-beingofthosesubjecttoitsauthority.Thus,itmay10betruethatthe“promotionofwell-beingisthepivotalethicalpreceptofpublicaction,”butthisfactmightbeexplainedultimatelybyappealtothegoodofpromotingvaluablelives.Thedifferencebetweenthesetwogoals–promotingvaluablelivesandpromotingwell-being–dependsinpartontheaccountofwell-beingthatisbeingassumed.Ifitisthought,forexample,thataperson’swell-beingislargelyafunctionofhissuc-cessinpursuingworthwhilegoals,andifworthwhilegoalsareobjectivelyvaluableandmustbepursuedinwaysthatareappropriatelyresponsivetothegoodofothers,thenthedifferencewillbesmall.Inthiscase,itmaybeappropriatetocharacterizetheprimaryfunctionoftheperfectioniststateintermsoftheprotectionandpromotionofwell-being.Still,inpresentingageneralcharacterizationofperfectionistpoliticaltheory,weshouldnotinsistonaparticularaccountofwell-being.Weshouldholdthattheprimaryfunctionoftheperfectioniststateistopromotevaluablehumanlives.Thisclaim,atthislevelofabstraction,doeslittletodistinguishperfectionistfromanti-perfectionistpoliticaltheory.Forsurelyanyplausiblepoliticaltheorywillholdthatthestateshouldplayaroleinprotectingandpromotingvaluablehumanlives.Weneed,accordingly,toaddsomeconcretenesstothecharacterization.Perfectionismisnottiedtoanyparticularaccountofthegood,butitdoesrequiretherejectionofsubjectivetheoriesofthegood.Writerswhohaveidentifiedthemselves,andwhohavebeencharacterizedbyothers,asperfectionist,whatevertheirdifferences,havetendedtoacceptwhatIshallcalltheobjectivegoodcomponentofperfectionistpolit-11icaltheory.Subjectivetheoriesofthegoodexplainthevalueofthingstopersonsbyrefer-encetotheirmentalstates–desires,attitudes,experiences,sensations,emotions,etc.Initscrudestformulation,subjectivismholdsthatsomethingisgoodforsomeoneif,andonlyif,heactuallydesiresit.Lesscrude,andmorephilosophicallyrespectable,versionsofsubjectivismexplainthevalueofthingsbyreferencetopleasurableexperienceorinformeddesire.Perfectionistsrejectallsuchviews.Accordingtotheobjectivegoodcomponentofperfectionistpoliticaltheory,atleastsomethingsthataregoodarenotmadesobecauseofanyconnectiontothementalstatesofper-sons.Anexampleillustratestheidea.Knowledgeofthephysicalworldisvaluablenotbecausepeopledesireitorwoulddesireitiftheywerefullyinformed,butbecauseitisagood.Thefactthatitisagood(ifitisafact)providespeoplewithreasonstoseekit.Perfectionistsoftenrelateobjectivegoodstothedevelopmentofhumannature.Thedevelopmentofrationality,forexample,isoftenconsideredtobeanobjectivegoodbecauseitisacapacityessentialtoanddistinctiveofhumannature.FollowingAristotle,anumberofcontemporarywritershavesoughttodevelopaccountsofthePerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense101\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page10212humangoodalongtheselines.Wecanusethetermhumannatureperfectionismtorefergenerallytoaccountsofthehumangoodthatrelateobjectivegoodstothedevel-opmentofhumannature.Recently,however,anumberofwritershavecharacterizedperfectionismwithoutanyreferencetohumannature.DerekParfit,forexample,char-acterizesperfectionismintermsoftheachievementorrealizationof“thebestthings13inlife.”Hereitistheexistenceoftheobjectivegoods,andnottheirrelationtothedevelopmentofhumannature,thatishighlighted.Wecanusethetermobjectivelistperfectionismtorefergenerallytoaccountsofthehumangoodthatidentifyperfec-14tionistgoodswithoutrelatingthemtothedevelopmentofhumannature.Proponentsofhumannatureperfectionismmustdefendanaccountofhumannature.Moreprecisely,theymustgiveanaccountofthepropertiesorcapacitiesthatarecentraltohumannatureandthedevelopmentofwhichhavevalue.Bycontrast,proponentsofobjectivelistperfectionismmustexplainwhysomegoods,andnotothers,areincluded.Objectivelistperfectionistsneednotformulateanexhaustivelistofobjectivegoods.Theymaybelievesuchanundertakingtobemisguided.Buttheyshouldhavesomethingtosayaboutwhatmakesanallegedgoodanobjectivegood,oneworthyofpursuit.Astheseremarksbringout,theobjectivegoodcomponentofperfectionistpoliticaltheorypresentsahostofquestionsandpuzzles.Itisnaturaltowonderhowfeaturesorstatesoftheworldgeneratereasonsforactionforpersons,andhowpersonscancometoappreciateandrespondtothesereasons.Butperfectionismassuchdoesnotrestonanyparticularsetofanswerstothesequestions.Whatiscrucialisthecommitmenttoanobjectiveunderstandingofthegood,howeverthismightbeexplained.Theobjectivegoodcomponentisneutralwithrespecttotheissueofpluralism.Whetherthereisoneormanywaysoflifethatareobjectivelygoodforpersonsisleftopen.Further,theobjectivegoodcomponentdoesnotexcludethepossibilitythatsomegoodsforpersonshavesubjectiveconditions.Withrespecttomanyobjec-tivelyvaluableactivities,itmaybethatinorderforthemtocontributetothevalueofthelivesofthosewhoengageinthemtheactivitiesmustbepursuedwillinglyor15intherightspirit.Thepresenceofcertainattitudesishereunderstoodtobeaneces-16saryconditionofsuccessfulengagementwiththeseobjectivelyvaluableactivities.Recognitionofthesepointsbluntsthecommoncriticismofobjectiveaccountsofthegoodthattheyareinsensitivetodifferencesbetweenindividualpersons.Theobjectivegoodcomponentdistinguishesperfectionistpoliticaltheoryfromarangeofinfluentialpoliticaltheoriesthatopenlyortacitlyrestonsubjectivism17aboutthegood.Butsomewhorejectperfectionism,includingsomeofthemostinfluentialcontemporarycriticsoftheview,alsorejectsubjectivismaboutthegood.Thesewritersholdthatperfectionisminpolitics,evenwhenitisbasedonasoundunderstandingofthegood,isunjustified.Thisbringsustoasecondcomponentofperfectionistpoliticaltheory,onethatwecancalltherejectionofstateneutrality.Thedoctrineofstateneutralityhasbeenmuchdiscussedinrecentyears.Thedoc-18trineholdsthatthestatemustbeneutralbetweenrivalconceptionsofthegood.19Thedoctrinearticulatesaprincipled(i.e.non-contingent)constraintonpermissibleorlegitimatestateaction.Theconstraintcan,andhasbeen,formulatedindifferent20ways.Threeformulationsoftheconstrainthaveattractedsupportoflate,andcan21bementionedbrieflyhere.102StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page103(a)Thestateshouldnotpromotethegood,eithercoercivelyornon-coercively,unlessthosewhoaresubjecttothestate’sauthorityconsenttoitsdoingso.(b)Thestateshouldnotaimtopromotethegoodunlessthereisasocietalcon-sensusinsupportofitsdoingso.(c)Thestateshouldnotjustifywhatitdoesbyappealingtoconceptionsofthegoodthataresubjecttoreasonabledisagreement.Astheseformulationsbringout,theideaofstateneutralityhasbeenunderstood22verybroadlyinrecentpoliticaltheory.Anaturalinterpretationofthedoctrineofstateneutralitywouldallowthestatetopromotethegood,solongasitdidsoinaneven-handedmanner.Butmostproponentsofthedoctrinewishtokeepthestateoutofthebusinessofpromotingthegoodaltogether,atleastifthegoodtobepromotediscontroversialorsubjecttoreasonabledisagreement.Perfectionismrejectsthedoctrineofstateneutralityonalltheseformulations.Accordingtotherejectionofstateneutralitycomponent,thereisnogeneraltheor-eticallygroundedconstraintinpoliticalmoralitythatforbidsthestatefromdirectlypromotingthegood,evenwhenthegoodissubjecttoreasonabledispute.Itwillbehelpfultospelloutinalittlemoredetailtheimplicationsofthiscomponent.Thefirstformulationpresentedabovefollowsfromaconsent-basedaccountofpoliticallegitimacy.Perfectionistpoliticaltheoryrejectsconsenttheoryandsorejectsthisformulationoftheneutralityconstraint.Thesecondformulationappealstosocietalconsensus,ratherthanactualconsent.Itholdsthatinlargepluralisticsocieties,thestateshouldnotaimtopromotethegood,sinceoftenwhatisgoodwillbesubjecttocontroversy.Thisformulationoftheconstraintisnotextension-allyequivalenttothefirstone,sincetherecanbeasocietalconsensusthatsome-thingisagoodandoughttobepromotedbythestateevenwhenthereisnotuniversalagreementonthematter.Thesecondformulationalsotargetstheaimsofstateofficials.Theseaimsarenotalwaysopentoview,andstateofficialsmayhaveavarietyofdifferentmotivationsinmindwhentheymakepoliticaldecisions.Forthisreason,somehavethoughtthatitismorepromisingtoapplytheneutralityconstraintnottotheaimsofstateofficials,butrathertothejustificationstheygiveinpublicforthedecisionstheymake.Thisyieldsthethirdformulationoftheneutralityconstraint.Defendersofstateneutralityoftendefendthedoctrinebyappealingtotheidealofpublicreason.Publicreasons,theyargue,mustbeshareableinawaythatexcludesappealtocontroversialidealsofthegood.Stateneutralityandpublicjustificationinpoliticsthusemergeasdif-ferentsidesofthesamecoin.Thesecondandthirdformulationsoftheneutralityconstraintfigureinrecentinfluentialversionsofsocialcontracttheory,mostnotablythatofRawlsandhis23followers.Theseviewsrepresentthechiefcontemporaryrivaltoperfectionistpolit-icaltheory.Indevelopinganaccountofpoliticalmorality,thesemoderndaycon-24tractualistsinstructustobracketourfullunderstandingofthehumangood.Onlybysodoing,isitpossibletopresentanaccountofpoliticalmoralitythathasahopeofsecuringtheallegianceofcitizenswhoholdverydifferentconceptionsofthegood.Thisbracketingstrategymarksasharpbreakwiththemainstreamtraditionofpolit-icalphilosophy.Asweshallseebelow,thisisabreakthatperfectionistsbelievetobeseriouslymisguided.PerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense103\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page104Consenttheoristsandcontractualistsrejectperfectionismbecausetheybelievethat,atleastinlargeandpluralisticsocieties,itisillegitimateforthestatetopromoteobjectivelyvaluablehumanlives.Thedoctrineofstateneutrality,ontheseviews,hasaprincipledrationale.Evenifthestatecaneffectivelypromotethegood,itshouldnotdoso.Butothercriticsofperfectionismhavesoughttoshownotthatperfec-tionistpoliticsareinprincipleillegitimate,butratherthattheyareorwouldbeself-defeating.Afewwritersevenhavesuggestedthatthebestwayforthestateto25promotethegoodisforittoadherestrictlytothedoctrineofstateneutrality.Dotheseviewsrepresentagenuinedeparturefromperfectionism?Onthechar-acterizationofperfectionismIhaveprovided,theanswerisnotstraightforward.True,somewritershaveproposedanobjectiveaccountofthegoodlifeandthenderived26acommitmenttostateneutralityfromit.Theirproposedaccountofthegoodlifeexplainswhydirecteffortsbythestatetopromotethegoodareruledoutinprinciple.Thiskindofviewisnotperfectionist.Butothers,whileconcedingthattheprimaryfunctionofthestateistopromotevaluablelives,havearguedthat,foravarietyofcontingentreasons,directeffortsbythestatetopromotethegoodareunlikelytobesuccessful.Whetherthiskindofviewcountsasperfectionistislessclear-cut.Wecandistinguishlocalfromglobalversionsoftheself-defeatingworry.Apersonmightthinkthataparticularstateshouldnotdirectlyfavorsomeconceptionsofthegoodoverothers.Hemightthinkthisbecausehebelievesthatthosecurrentlyinpowerareincompetent.Alternatively,hemightthinkthatstatesingeneralshouldnotdirectlypromoteparticulartypesofgoods.Hemightthink,forexample,thatfriendshipisagoodthatcontributestotheobjectivevalueofhumanlives,butthatifstatestrytopromoteitdirectlytheywilldomoreharmthangood.Thesearebothinstancesofthelocalself-defeatingcharge.Theglobalversiongeneralizesfromeitherorbothoftheseworries.Itholdseitherthatallstateslackthecompetencetopromotethegoodorthatall(orperhapsmost)goodsaresuchthatitwouldbecounterpro-ductiveforthestatedirectlytopromotethem.Localworriesabouttheeffectivenessofperfectionistpoliticspresentnoproblemforperfectionistpoliticaltheory.Noseriouswriteronpoliticsdoesnotsharethem27tosomeextent.Therearegoodreasons,however,torejecttheglobalversion.Globaldistrustofperfectionistpoliticsrestsonimplausibleclaimsaboutthegoodorexag-gerationsofvalidworriesaboutthepotentialforstatestoabusetheirpower.Still,itisimportantnottoconfusemeanswithends.Theendofperfectionistpoliticsistheprotectionandpromotionofobjectivelyvaluablehumanlives.Thequestionofwhereandhowoftenthestateshouldrelyonindirect,ratherthandirect,measures28topromotethegoodisaquestionwithinperfectionistpoliticaltheory.Thoughnoth-ingofmuchimportanceturnsonit,Iproposetocategorizeaviewthatholdsthatperfectionistpoliticalendsare,forcontingentreasons,alwaysbestpursuedindirectlyasagenuineinstanceofperfectionism.Itisnotaplausibleview,butitremainsper-fectionistnonetheless.Havingdistinguishedthetwocomponentsofperfectionistpoliticaltheory,itisnaturaltowonderhowtheyarerelated.Aswehaveseen,therejectionofstateneu-tralitydoesnotfollowdirectlyfromtheobjectivegoodcomponent.Itispossibletorejecttheformerandaffirmthelatterandviceversa.Butwhilenotlogicallycon-nected,thetwocomponentscomplementeachother.Perfectionistsholdthatthestateshouldtakeanactiveroleincreatingandmaintainingsocialconditionsthatbest104StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page105enabletheirsubjectstoleadgoodlives.Goodlivesareunderstoodinobjectiveterms,thusmakingitplausibletobelievethatthestate(orstateofficials)haveadutytoencouragesomepursuitsanddiscourageothers.Thesatisfactionofthisduty,inturn,requirestherejectionoftheconstraintofstateneutrality.Furthermore,thetwocom-ponentstakentogether,markperfectionismasadistinctiveapproachtopolitics,onethatcontrastswithKantiansocialcontractualism,Hobbesian/Humeansubjectivism,andLockeanconsenttheory.II.PluralismandSkepticismThecoreclaimsofperfectionistpoliticaltheorydonotsettletheissueofpluralism.Butsincethisissueisofgreatimportanceforcontemporarypolitics,weneedtosaysomethingaboutit.Isthebestversionofperfectionismonethatholdsthatthereisbutonewayoflifethatisbestforhumanbeings,oronethatholdsthatthereareapluralityofequally–orperhapsincommensurably–valuablewaysoflifeforhumanbeings?Thequestionismuchtoolargetoanswerhere.Butitwillbehelpful,forpresentpurposes,tocometoabetterunderstandingoftheissuesitraises.Severaldimen-sionsofpluralismareworthmarking.Pluralismcanrefertothebeliefsofpeople.Theterm“reasonablepluralism”hascometorefertothepurportedfactthatreason-ablepeople,underfreeconditions,willaffirmincompatiblecomprehensivedoctrinesabouthowtolive.Pluralismismorecommonlyassociatedwith“valuepluralism”–theviewthatthereexistsarangeofirreduciblydistinctobjectivevalues.Onthisview,twoormorewaysoflifemaybeequallyvaluableif(a)theyrealizethesameobjectivegoods,butorderthemdifferentlyor(b)theyrealizedifferentobjectivegoods.Further,theplur-alityofobjectivevaluesmightbetraceabletoasinglesourceormightnotbeunifiedinthisway.Somerecentdefensesofperfectionismtaketheformermoremoderate29view,whileothersadvancearadicalformofpluralism,assertingtheexistenceof30apluralityofgoodswithoutseekingtotiethemtoacommonsource.Valuepluralism,ofthemoderateorradicalvariety,canhelptoexplaintheplural-ismofreasonablebeliefs.Forifvaluepluralismweretrue,thenwewouldhaveanexplanationforhowreasonablepeoplecanaffirmdifferentandincompatibleeval-uativedoctrines.Still,whatRawlsterms“reasonablepluralism”iscompatiblewiththeclaimthatthereisonlyoneultimatevalue.Reasonablepluralistscanbevalue31monists.Ishallhavemoretosayaboutreasonabledisagreementinpoliticsshortly.FornowIwanttoexploretheimplicationsoftakingpluralisticperfectionismseriously.Pluralisticperfectionismreferstoanyversionofperfectionistpoliticaltheorythataffirmseithertheradicalormoderatedoctrineofvaluepluralismdistinguishedabove.Criticsofperfectionismoftenoverlookthepossibilityofpluralisticperfectionism.Thishasledtosomebadargumentsforstateneutrality.Rawls,forexample,lumpscon-temporarypluralisticperfectioniststogetherwiththosewhoholdthat“thereisbut32onereasonableandrationalconceptionofthegood.”Hethenarguesthatacon-ceptionofjusticeinformedbysuchviewscouldbestableonlyifitwerebackedup33bytheoppressiveuseofstateforce.Toachieveastablenon-oppressivepoliticalPerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense105\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page106order,heconcludes,wemustavoidperfectionistpoliticsandseekaconceptionofjusticethatcanbeacceptedbypeoplewhoaffirmdifferentconceptionsofthegood.Sincepluralisticperfectionismrejectstheclaimthatthereisbutonereasonableandrationalconceptionofthegood,thisargumenthasnoforceagainstit.Ifitweretruethatreasonablepeoplecanaffirmdifferentconceptionsofthegoodlife,thenaconcernfornon-oppressivepoliticalstabilitywouldprovideareasontorejectmonisticversionsofperfectionism.However,itwouldprovidenoreasontofavorstateneu-tralityoverpluralisticperfectionism.Thelessontodrawfromthisissimple:toaccommodatepluralismweneednotembraceanti-perfectionism.Still,despiteitsacceptanceofvaluepluralism,pluralisticperfectionismpurportstodistinguishsoundfromunsoundaccountsofthegood.Forsomecriticsofperfectionismthisistheproblem.Thesecriticsarguethatperfection-34istpoliticsrestsonindefensibleepistemologicalclaims.Onthisskepticalview,itisthoughtthatwhentwopeople,forexample,disagreeovertheimportanceofreligiouspracticetothegoodlife,then–whiletheremaybeafactofthematterastowhoisright–neitherpartycanknowthattheothersideismistaken.Skepticismwithrespecttoquestionsofthegoodlifeisoftenfueledbytheadop-tionofimplausiblyhighstandardsforknowledgeinthisdomain.Ifknowledgeof35whatcontributestoagoodhumanliferequirescertainty,thenwemayhavelittleornoknowledgeofsuchmatters.Butsurelythissetsthebartoohigh.Inotherareasofinquiry,wedonot(andshouldnot)demandcertaintyasaconditionofknow-ledge.Further,althoughIhavenotarguedforthishere,thebestversionsofperfec-tionismarefallibilistandopentorevision.Abetterskepticalmoveistoarguethatquestionsofthegoodliferaisespecialepistemologicaldifficultiesnotpresentinotherevaluativedomains.Onecommonstrat-egyistodrawasharpdistinction,forinstance,betweentherightandthegoodandthenarguethatknowledgeofthelatterisproblematicinawaythatknowledgeoftheformerisnot.Doctrinesofjustice,includingtheprincipleofstateneutrality,canbeknown.Doctrinesofthegoodcannot.Callthistheasymmetryclaim.Adefenseoftheasymmetryclaimcanproceedinoneoftwoways.Ageneraldefenseseekstoidentifyfeaturesofthegoodlifethatareespeciallyproblematicfromanepistemo-logicalstandpoint,withouttakingastandonwhatisthebestaccountofagoodlife.Bycontrast,aparticulardefenseoftheasymmetryclaimassumesparticularaccountsofjusticeandthegoodlife.Totakeanexample,consideratheorythataffirmsa36KantianviewofjusticeandaSidgwickeanviewofthehumangood.Onsuchatheory,knowledgeofthegoodmayraisespecialepistemologicaldifficulties(e.g.howexactlyarewetoknowwhichlifewewouldchooseifwehadfullinformationofallthepossibilities?)notpresentwithknowledgeofjustice.Thedifficultiesherefollowfromtheparticularaccountofthegoodthatisaffirmed.Generaldefensesoftheasymmetryclaimhaveproventobeunpromising.Noonehasidentifiedageneralreasontothinkthatthegoodishardertoknowthan,say,37therightorthebeautiful.Thosewhowishtodefendtheasymmetryclaimmustfirstdefendanaccountofthegoodandthenshowthatknowledgeofthegoodishardtocomeby,giventhisaccount.Theissuesraisedbytheasymmetryclaimarethereforeissuesthatreallyconcerntheobjectivegoodcomponentofperfectionistpoliticaltheory.Ifitcouldbeshownthatthebestaccountofobjectivegoodgener-atesspecialepistemologicaldifficulties,thentheasymmetryclaimwouldhaveforce.106StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page107Itwouldprovideanindependentreasontorejectperfectionistpolitics.Lackinganygoodreasontothinkthatthebestaccountofobjectivegoodhasthisconsequence,wecanleavetheasymmetryclaimbehind.Skepticismis,inalllikelihood,anexaggeratedresponsetoagenuineproblem.Thisistheproblempresentedbyseeminglyintractabledisagreement.Itiseasytoslidefromthethoughtthattwopeoplereasonablydisagreeaboutsomemattertotheconclusionthatneithersidecouldhaveagoodreasonforthinkingthathisown38viewwascorrect.Theslide,ofcourse,isunwarranted;buttheseriousobjectiontoperfectionistpoliticaltheoryhasnothingtodowithskepticism.Itconcernsdisagreementinpoliticsandhowbesttorespondtoit.Theworryisthatperfectionistpoliticaltheoryfailstoappreciatethepoliticalchallengeposedbyintractabledisagreementaboutmoralityandthegood.ThisisaworryIshallattempttoallayinthenexttwosections.III.TheChallengeofJustificatoryLiberalismThusfarIhaverebuttedanumberofobjectionstoperfectionistpoliticaltheorythatmisfirebecausetheymisidentifyitscoreclaims.Butsomeobjectionstoper-fectionismdonotrestonmisunderstanding.Animportantstrandofcontemporarypoliticalphilosophyholdsthat,atleastundermodernconditions,thecentralpolit-icaltaskistofindprinciplesofpoliticalassociationthat,toasgreatanextentaspossible,peoplecanagreeondespitetheirdifferences.Sinceperfectionistpoliticaltheoryhastendedtorejectthischaracterizationofthepoliticaltask,itisopentotheobjectionthatitfailstorespondadequatelytopoliticalcontroversyundermodernconditions.Theobjectionisoftenformulatedintermsofpoliticallegitimacy.Alegitimatepoliticalorder,itissaid,isonethathasapubliclyjustifiedconstitutionandsetoflaws.Publicjustificationistheproperresponsetointractablepoliticaldisagreementundermodernconditions.Publicjustification,inturn,demandsthateachmemberofthepoliticalorderbegivenajustificationforthepoliticalarrangementsthatbind39himthathecanaccept,givenhisbackgroundbeliefs.Theproblemwithperfec-tionism,onthisview,isthatitdoesnottaketheprojectofsharedpublicjustificationseriouslyenough.Perfectionistpoliticaltheorymustberejectedbecauseityieldsaflawedaccountofpoliticallegitimacy.Letususethetermjustificatoryliberalismtorefertoanypoliticaltheorythat40acceptsthepublicjustificationconditiononpoliticallegitimacy.Ifanyversionofjustificatoryliberalismiscorrect,thenperfectionisminpoliticsismisguided;forthepublicjustificationconditiononpoliticallegitimacyrulesoutperfectionistpolitical41actionthatissubjecttoreasonabledisagreement.JustificatoryliberalsembracethebracketingstrategyImentionedearlier.Controversialperfectionistpoliticalactionisruledillegitimateinprinciple,irrespectiveofwhetheritisbasedondefensibleclaimsaboutthehumangood.Justificatoryliberalshavedevelopedanimpressivechallengetoperfectionistpoliticaltheory.Nevertheless,Ishallarguethatthechallengecanbemet.Ishallarguethatthereisnogoodcaseforacceptingthepublicjustificationconditiononpoliticallegitimacy.Defensesofpublicjustificationeither(i)overstatethevaluesservedbyPerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense107\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page108publicjustificationor(ii)groundtheconditionofpublicjustificationonanimplaus-ibleaccountofmoralreasons.Wecanbeginbylookingatthevaluesthatthepublicjustificationconditionisallegedtoserve.AccordingtoRawls,therequirementofpublicjustificationservestwoimportant,andinterrelated,values:stabilityandreciprocity.Apubliclyjustifiedpoliticalorderwillbemorestablethanonethatlackspublicjustification.ThestabilityinquestioniswhatRawlsterms“stabilityfortherightreasons;”namelythateachcitizencanviewthepoliticalorderasjustifiedfromwithinhisownmorecomprehensivesetofevaluativebeliefs.Stabilityfortherightreasonsalsoensuresthateachcitizenistreatedwithreciprocalconcern.Reciprocitycharacterizestherelationsbetweencitizensinawell-orderedpoliticalsociety.Itestablishesthat42relationshipasoneof“civicfriendship.”Stabilityandreciprocityarevaluesthatcomeintotheirowngiventheexpecta-tionofintractabledisagreementonmoralityandthegood.Ifcitizenswereinclinedtoagreeonthesefundamentalmatters,thenstabilityandreciprocitywouldlosemuchoftheirnormativesignificance.Withthisinmind,wecandistinguishthecontentofaconceptionofjusticefromitsjustificatoryreach.Thinkofthecon-tentofaconceptionofjusticeasconsistingofthesubstantiveprinciplesitpro-43posesfordeterminingtheassignmentofrightsandentitlementstopersons.Andassumethatthecontentofaconceptionofjusticeisdeterminedbydrawingon“thefullresourcesofphilosophicalreason.”Bycontrast,thejustificatoryreachofaconceptionofjusticereferstotherangeandnumberofpersonstowhomitcanbejustified.Thevaluesofstabilityandreciprocitygiveusreasontofavoraconceptionofjusticewithgreaterjustificatoryreachoveronewithless.Withthisdistinctioninhand,wecanask,shouldaconcernforstabilityandreciprocityalsoleadustomodifythecontentofwhatwetaketobeasoundconceptionofjustice?ItishardtoknowwhatRawlshimselfthoughtonthismatter.Hebelievedthatjusticeasfairnessidentifiesthecorrectcontentofjustice.Buthealsobelievedthatjusticeasfairnesscouldbepresentedinawaythatensuresthatithaswidejustificatoryappeal.IfRawlsisright,thenwecanhaveitbothways.Wecankeepsoundcontentwhileincreasingjustificatoryreach.ButifRawlsiswrong,thenwewillneedtodecidehowmuchweightthevaluesofstabilityandreciprocityhavewithrespecttoothervaluesservedbyjustice.Thesepointscastsomelightonthepublicjustificationcondition.Supposeweviewpublicjustificationasanidealinthesensethatitservesthevaluesofstabilityandreciprocity.Andsupposewethinkthatthisideal,whileimportant,nonethelesscanbeoverridden.Thatis,supposewethinkthatsometimeswemustchoosebetweenexpandingthejustificatoryreachofourconceptionofjusticebymodifyingitscontentorretainingitscontentbutmakingnoadvanceonitsjustificatoryreach.Thisunderstandingofpublicjustificationisonethatperfectionistscantakeonboard.Butitisnotanunderstandingthatfitswellwiththeideathatpublicjustificationisanecessaryconditionofpoliticallegitimacy.Analternativeunderstandingofpublicjustificationviewsitasaconstraintonlegitimatepoliticalaction.Onthisunderstanding,thevaluesofstabilityandrecipro-cityeithernevercomeintoconflictwithothervaluesrelevanttojusticeor,whentheydocomeintoconflictwiththem,theyalwaysoverridethem.Thisunderstandingof108StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page109publicjustificationsupportstheclaimthatpublicjustificationconditionspoliticallegit-imacy,butitishardtoaccept.Whyshouldwethinkthatstabilityandreciprocity44alwaystakeprecedenceoverothervalues,oreventhattheydosomostofthetime?MysuspicionisthatRawlsavoidsthisproblembyassumingoptimisticallythatthecontentofjusticeasfairnessneednotbealteredwhenitispresentedas“apolit-icalconceptionofjustice.”Perfectionistsdonothavetheluxuryofthisconceit.Theyknowthat,atleastundermodernconditions,thepursuitofjusticebringsthemintoconflictwiththosewhoholddifferentviewsaboutmoralityandthegood.Inthefaceofthisconflict,itmaybenecessarytoalterthecontentoftheprinciplesofjusticethatoneproposesinordertoincreasetheirjustificatoryappeal.Thismaybenecessarybothforlow-levelpragmaticreasonsandbecausethevaluesofstabilityandreciprocitythatRawlscallsattentiontohavesomeweight.Noneofthisrequiresacommitmenttopublicjustificationasanecessaryconditionofpoliticallegitimacy.Perfectionistpoliticaltheorycanaccommodatethevaluesthatunderliepublicjustificationbyincludingthemwithinamorecomprehensiveaccountofpoliticalmorality,onethatcentersonestablishingandmaintainingsocialcon-ditionsthatenablepeopletoliveobjectivelyvaluablelives.Indeed,thismorecom-prehensiveaccountofpoliticalmorality,willprovideguidanceastotheweightthatshouldbeassignedtovalueslikestabilityandreciprocitywhentheycomeintoconflictwithothervaluesrelevanttojustice.Absent,then,someconvincingargumentthatthevaluesunderlyingpublicjustificationshouldalwaystakeprecedenceoverothervalues,theappealtopublicjustificationprovidesnoreasontorejectperfectionistpoliticaltheoryandpursuealesssound,butpossiblymorewidelyjustifiable,con-ceptionofjustice.Ihavebeenassumingthatthesoundnessofaconceptionofjusticecanbeassessedindependentlyofanassessmentofitsjustificatoryreach.Butthisassumptioncanbechallenged.Ineffect,Ihavebeenarguingthatiftherearesoundvaluesthatunder-lietheidealofpublicjustification,thenthesevaluescanbeaccommodatedwithinaperfectionistaccountofpoliticalmorality.Butitmaybethoughtthatpublicjustificationisnotsomuchanidealtobeaccommodated,butratheranessentialfeatureofmoraljustificationinpolitics.45GeraldGaushasrecentlypresentedaninterestingargumentalongtheselines.Gausarguesthatthepublicjustificationconditionderivesfromadeeperaccountofmoralreasons,onethatweshouldaccept.Moralreasons,hecontends,areimpartialreasons;andimpartialreasonsarereasonsthatallfullyrationalpersonswouldacknow-ledge.Reconstructed,Gaus’sargumentunfoldsasfollows.(i)Allinterferenceswiththeactionsofpersonsstandinneedofjustification.(ii)Whenthestateinterfereswiththeactionsofpersonsitsinterferencestandsinneedofjustification.(iii)Tojustifyaninterferencewithaperson’sactiononemustpresentthepersonwithareasonfortheinterference.(iv)AconsiderationRisareasonforaperson,ifandonlyif,theperson,ifhewerefullyrational,wouldacceptthatitwasareason.(v)Therefore,forstateinterferencetobefullyjustified,itmustbethecasethateachpersoninterferedwithispresentedwithaconsiderationthat,ifhewerefullyrational,hewouldacceptasareason.PerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense109\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page110Assumingthat“justified”and“legitimate”politicalactionaresynonymous,thenitfollows,ontheargument,thatlegitimateinstancesofstateinterferencerequirethestatetojustifyitsactionstoeachpersoninterferedwithintermsthateachpersoncanrationallyaccept.Thisisamodestversionofthepublicjustificationcondition.ThefirstpremissofGaus’sargumentarticulatesaprinciplethatestablishesageneralpresumptioninfavorofnon-interference.Versionsofthisprinciplehave46beensubjecttovigorouscritique.Forargumentativepurposes,however,Ishallgrantit.Thekeypremiss,inthepresentcontext,ispremiss(iv).AsGausrecognizes,hisargumentsucceedsingroundingthepublicjustificationconditiononlyifweaccept47aparticularaccountofwhatitmeanstogiveapersonareason.Thisrequiresaspecificationofthecrucialphrase“ifhewerefullyrational”thatappearsinpremiss(iv).Gausprovidesthefollowingproceduralspecification.Arationalpersontakesintoaccountalltherelevantavailableevidence,makesnoerrorswhenevaluatingit,makesallthecorrectinferences,andsoisnotsubjecttovariousdistortionsofdeliberationoraction(forexample,heisnotundertheinfluenceofdrugs48orcompulsions),andsoon.Whenthisproceduralspecificationispluggedintopremiss(iv),Gaus’sargumentestab-lishesthatthejustificationofstateinterferencemustbedirectedtoeachpersongivenhisepistemicsituation.Thisdeliverstheconclusionthatlegitimatestateinterferencesmustbepubliclyjustified.Soconstrued,Gaus’sargumentholdsthatreasonsrelevanttothejustificationofstateinterferencemustbeimpartialreasonsinthesensethatallpersonssubjecttotheinterferencemustbeabletorationallyacceptthem.Ineffect,hisargumentholdsthatallreasonsrelevanttothejustificationofstateinterferenceareaspecialkindofinternalreason.Tobeajustifyingreasonaconsiderationmustbeonethatapersonwouldacknowledgetobeareason,irrespectiveofhisinitialsetofvalues,beliefs,motivations,etc,ifhedeliberatedrationallyinthespecifiedproceduralsense.Ishallnowarguethatthisaccountofreasonsisnotplausibleonindependentgrounds.Itthereforecannotprovideindependentsupportforthepublicjustificationcondition.Tobringthisout,considerthefollowingtworeasonstatements:(R1)DavidhasareasontodoAincircumstancesC.(R2)SallyhasareasontodoAincircumstancesC.Andnowconsiderthefollowingtwopossiblestatesofaffairs:(S1)DaviddoesnotacceptthatconsiderationRisareasonforhimtodoAincircumstancesC,buthewouldacceptthisifhehadaccesstoinformationI.(S2)SallydoesnotacceptthatconsiderationRisareasonforhertodoAincircumstancesC,butshewouldacceptthisifshedidnotsufferfromdeficiencyD.Ontheaccountofreasonsthatwearenowconsidering,(R1)willbefalsein(S1)ifinformationIisnotrationallyavailabletoDavid.Thishascounterintuitiveimplica-tions.SupposetheinformationisnotrationallyavailabletoDavidbecausenooneknowsitorsupposetheinformationisavailabletoDavidinsomesense,butitisnotrationallyavailabletohimbecauseitwouldbeirrationallycostlyforhimto110StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page111acquireit.Inbothofthesecases,itisplausibletoholdthatwhiletheconsiderationthatmakesittruethatDavidhasareasontodoAisnotrationallyavailabletohimhenonethelesshasareasontodoAincircumstancesC.Likewise,(R2)willbefalsein(S2)ifSarah’sdeficiencyDisnotoneassociatedwiththemechanismsofcognitiveprocessingmentionedintheproceduralspecificationofrationality.Thedeficiencyinquestion,forexample,mightinvolveacharacterdefectthatpre-49ventsSarahfromrecognizingthatarelevantevaluativeconsiderationappliestoher.Onceagain,itisplausibletoholdthatSarahnonethelesshasareasontodoAincircumstancesC.Theseexamplesillustrateafundamentalpointaboutreasonsforaction,includingmoralreasons.Thefailuretoacknowledgethatonehasareasondosomethingmay,butneednot,involveirrationality.Notethatthispointcanbeacceptedbybothpro-ponentsandcriticsoftheclaimthatallreasonsforactionareinternalreasons.(Callthisclaiminternalismanditsdenialexternalism.)Manyproponentsofinternalismwillsaythat(R1)istrue,given(S1),iftheinformationthatDavidlacksisinforma-tionrelevanttosomegoalorconcernthathehas.Thefactthattheinformationisnotrationallyavailabletohimdoesnotchangethefactthatitprovideshimwithareason.Externalistswillconcur,butaddthat(R2),given(S2),istrueaswell.Thisisnottheplacetoconsidertherelativemeritsofthesetwoviewsaboutreasons.Mostperfectionists,Isuspect,acceptanexternalistaccount.Otherthingsbeingequal,thefactthatsomeactionwouldfurtheraperson’sobjectivegoodisareasonforhimtoundertakeit,whetherornothewouldrationallyacceptthatitisareason.Deficienciesofvariouskindscanpreventpeoplefromrecognizingthereasons50thatapplytothem.So,attheveryleast,Gaus’sargumentbegsthequestionagainsttheexternalistperfectionist.Still,evenifexternalismisputtooneside,Gaus’sargu-mentforthepublicjustificationconditioncanberejectedsinceitrestsonanaccountofreasonsthatimplausiblyconflatesconsiderationsofrationalitywithreasonsforaction.Theconflationiscrucialforderivingtheconclusionthatpublicjustificationisanecessaryconditionofpoliticallegitimacyfromthegeneralpresumptioninfavorofnon-interferenceandrelativelymodestclaimsaboutthenatureofmoralreasons.Nowitmightbesaid,inreply,thatreasonsforthejustificationofinterferencearedifferentinkindfromotherreasons.Onemightadvance,asasubstantiveclaim,thefollowing:RisareasontointerferewiththeactionsofanotherpersonifandonlyifRwouldbeacceptedbythatperson,ifhewerefullyprocedurallyrational.Thisclaimdoesnotfollowfromadeeperaccountofmoralreasons,butitmightbe51correctnonetheless.Theimportanceofvalueslikereciprocityandmutualrespectmightexplainwhyjustifyingreasonsforinterferencemustbesuchthattheycanberecognizedbyallrationalagentssubjecttotheinterference.ButthislineofargumentbringsusrightbacktotheRawlsianstrategyofgroundingthepublicjustificationconditiononpoliticallegitimacybyappealtothevaluesthatunderliepublicjustification–astrategythatwehavealreadyconsideredandfoundwanting.IV.Justification,Power,andRestraintThechallengetoperfectionismposedbyjustificatoryliberalismcanbeanswered.YettheworrythatperfectionistpoliticaltheorydoesnottakepoliticaldisagreementPerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense111\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page112seriouslyenoughmaypersist.Iflegitimatestateactiondoesnotneedtomeetapub-licjustificationtest,thenitmayseemthatperfectionistslackanyprincipledgroundforrestraintinthepursuitofpoliticalends.Asonecritichasputit,“[T]heapplica-tionandenforcementof[perfectionist]principlesisafunctionmerelyofpower–theforceofthosewhohappentohavesuperiorabilitytoenforcetheirviewofthe52good.”Thereisanelementoftruthinthischarge;buttobringitintosharpfocusitisnecessarytosaymoreabouttherelationbetweenjustificationandpower.Proponentsofpublicjustificationinsistthatjustificationinpoliticsisrelational.Unlikeaprooforademonstration,ajustificationisdirectedtowardthosewithwhomonedisagrees.Tobesuccessful,ajustification,sounderstood,mustproceed“from53whatallpartiestothediscussionholdincommon.”Ifthisisthenotionofjustificationinplay,thenperfectionistsrejectit.Itdoesnotfollowthatperfectionistscannotbeconcernedwiththejustifiabilityoftheirprinciplesorthattheymustviewtheapplicationandenforcementoftheseprinciplesasraisingmerelyissuesofpower.Tomarkthispoint,itwillbehelpfultodistinguishjustificationsimpliciter(justifications)fromtherelationaljustification(justificationr)justmentioned.Tojus-tifysapoliticalarrangementonemustpresentvalidreasonsforacceptingitandthesereasonsmustbeofsufficientweighttooverridecompetingreasonsforrejectingthearrangement.Validreasonsneednotbereasonsthatone’spoliticalopponentsacceptorevenareinapositiontoappreciatefully.Thisnotionofjustificationisrootedfirmlyinthefirst-personstandpoint.Still,successfuljustificationsofapoliticalarrange-mentrequiresthatthereasonsoneoffersinsupportofthearrangementnotonlyarebelievedbyonetobevalidandsufficientlyweighty,butalsoinrealityare.Nothingintheideaofjustifications,however,excludesthepossibilitythatacon-cernforthecharacterofrelationsbetweencitizensinapoliticalsocietycanprovidereasontoshowrestraintinthepursuitofsoundpoliticalobjectives.WhatRawlsterms“civility”or“civicfriendship”mayprovideareasontoshowrestraint,evenifthisreasondoesnotalways,orevenoften,overrideotherconsiderations.Italsomaybetruethattheseconsiderations–callthemcivilityconsiderations–canbegroundedinaperfectionistaccountofthegood.Ishallnotexplorethispossibilityhere.Thepresentpointismerelythattherejectionofjustificationrinfavorofjustificationsdoesnotexcludeprincipledreasonsforrestraint.Inowwanttoarguethatjustificationsispriortojustificationrasanaccountofjustificationinpolitics.Thecaseforitspriorityrestsontheholisticnatureofpolit-icalandmoraljustification.Thisargument,ifsound,supportsperfectionistpolitical54theoryoveritschiefanti-perfectionistrival.Wehaveseenthataprominentstrandofanti-perfectionistpoliticaltheoryholdsthatcitizensshouldbrackettheircontro-versialethicalbeliefswhenformulatingprinciplesofpoliticalmorality.Therecom-mendation,ineffect,isforcitizensto“walloff”someoftheirethicalbeliefsfromotherswhenthinkingaboutprinciplesofjusticefortheirpoliticalsociety.Thisrecommendation,onitsface,runscountertoabasicrequirementofpracticalrationality;namely,thatwhendecidingwhattodoinagivencontextoneshouldconsiderallthereasonsthatisoneawareofthatapplytothedecision.Someonewhobracketssomeofhisethicalbeliefsinthinkingabouttherequirementsofjus-ticewillrunafoulofthisrequirement,atleastifthosebeliefsbearonthematterofjustice.Thisbasicrequirementofpracticalrationalityreveals,orperhapsexpresses,theholismofpoliticalandmoraljustification.112StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page113Thebasicrequirementofpracticalrationalityisnotassimpleasmycrispform-ulationofitsuggests.Properlyunderstood,itdoesnotexcludeindirectstrategiesforcomplyingwiththedemandsofreason.Rule-baseddecision-making,forexample,satisfiestherequirementtotheextentthatitenablesonetocomplybetterwiththedemandsofreason,eveniftherulesdirectonetoignorecertainconsiderationsthatarerelevanttothedecisionstherulesaddress.Toadoptsomefamiliarterminology,55somevalidreasonsforactionaresecondorder“exclusionaryreasons.”Compliancewiththebasicrequirementofpracticalrationalitydoesnotrequireonetoactonlyonfirst-orderreasons.Butthiscomplexityinthestructureofpracticalrationality,whileimportant,doesnotaffectmypresentargument.Thisargumentholdsthatifoneacceptsthebasicrequirementofpracticalratio-nality,thenoneshouldfavorjustificationsoverjustificationrforpurposesofpoliticaljustification.Buthereitisimportanttotreadslowly.Itistruethat,insomecon-texts,wehaveagoodjustificationsforbracketingreasonsthatapplytoagivendeci-sion.Think,forinstance,ofacriminalproceedinginwhichjurorsareinstructedtodisregardinformationthatisplainlyrelevanttoformingabeliefontheaccused’sinnocenceorguilt.Still,thispracticeof“wallingoff”relevantinformationmustbejustifieds,ifitisjustifiedatall.OrsoIclaim.Perhapstheanti-perfectionistpropon-entofthebracketingstrategyhasasimilarideainmind.Hemightbelievethatthereisasoundcasefromwithinhisowncomprehensivesetofethicalbeliefsforrecom-mendingthatcitizensbrackettheircontroversialethicalviewswhenformulating56principlesofjusticeforapluralisticsociety.Thatis,hemightthinkthatthejusti-fyingreasonsforadvancingapoliticalconceptionofjusticearereasonsthatshouldnotbeopenlypresented.Buttakingthislinemakesitplainthatforpurposesofpolit-icaljustificationjustificationsultimatelyispriortojustificationr.Imentionedabovethatonemightsupportananti-perfectionistconceptionofjusticebecauseonebelievesthatthevaluesofstabilityandreciprocityalwaystakeprecedenceoverallcompetingconsiderations.Thatview,Isuggested,isnotveryplausible;butnowwecanseethat,ifitweresound,itwouldjustifysthepracticeof“wallingoff”controversialconsiderationsfromdeliberationsabouttherequirementsofjustice.If,however,thisviewisrejected,thenthebasicrequirementofpracticalrationalitythatIhavebeendiscussingfavorsperfectionisttheoriesoveranti-perfectionisttheories,likethatofRawls,thatgiveprimacytorelationaljustificationinpolitics.Returnnowtothechargethatperfectionismmakestheenforcementofpoliticalprinciplesturnonconsiderationsofpower.Plainly,ifthereisnopoliticalsupportforaperfectionistproposal,then,irrespectiveofitsmerits,itwillnotbeundertaken.Likewise,ifpoliticalsupportincreasesforaparticularproposal,thenitwillbecomeeasiertoenforceitsuccessfully.Tothisextent,perfectionisminpoliticsissensitivetobalanceofpowerconsiderations.Thechargethatperfectionismmakestheenforcementofpoliticalprinciplesturnonconsiderationsofpowernowlooksprettyinnocuous.Everyconceptionofpolit-icalmoralitymakestheenforcementofitsprinciplessensitivetobalanceofpowerconsiderationstosomeextentordegree.EventheachievementofaRawlsianover-lappingconsensusturnsonthepresenceofsufficientpoliticalsupportforsuchaconsensus.Yetitremainstruethat,unlikesomeinfluentialversionsofcontemporaryliberalism,perfectionistpoliticaltheorydoesnottiepoliticallegitimacytothePerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense113\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page114consentofthegoverned,whetheractualorhypothetical.Thiscleanbreakwiththeconsenttraditioninpoliticsis,inmyjudgment,astrengthofperfectionism.Effortstodepictprinciplesofjusticeasexpressingorrestingonsharedcommitmentshavebecomeincreasinglystrainedasthepluralismofmodernsocietieshasbeenfullyrec-ognized.Still,thelongingforaconsensualpolitics,howevermisplaceditmaybeforourtimes,continuestomotivateworkinpoliticalphilosophy.Thislongingdoesmuchtoexplainwhysomeconcludethatevenasoundperfectionistpoliticalprogramwouldrequireforitsimplementationanunacceptablemeasureofsubjugation.V.ConclusionPerfectionistpoliticaltheoryhastwobasiccomponents:theobjectivegoodcomponentandtherejectionofstateneutralitycomponent.Ihavebeendefendingthesecondcomponentinsomedetail.Ihavesaidverylittleindefenseofthefirst.Themainreasonforthisisthatthemostinfluentialargumentsagainstperfectionisminpol-iticshavesoughttovindicatesomeversionofstateneutrality.Butafulldefenseofperfectionistpoliticaltheorymustdefendthefirstcomponentagainstsubjectivistandskepticalchallenges.Innotdiscussingthesechallengesindetailhere,Icertainlydonotmeantodownplaytheirimportance.Foravarietyofreasons,manyhavelostconfidenceoflateinthecapacityofhumanreasontoresolveevaluativequestions.Thislossofconfidence–sometimesdramaticallyreferredtoasthe“failureoftheEnlightenmentproject”–hasprovokedsometoembracerelativismand/orskepticismaboutvaluesgenerally.Inothers,ithaspromptedthemoremoderateresponseofrestrictingthescopeofreasontofewerandfewerevaluativedomains.Thus,itisnowfashionabletothinkthatreasoncansettlequestionsoffairdealingandjustice,butthatitissilentonquestionsconcerningthehumangood.Torespondtotheseanti-rationalisttendencies,per-fectionistpoliticaltheoryneedsanaccountofobjectivevaluethatcanabatethepuzzlesthatnourishthem.Thesuccessfulcompletionofsuchanaccountiseagerly57awaited.Notes1PerfectionistpoliticaltheoryincludesabroadrangeofhistoricalviewsincludingthoseofPlato,Aristotle,Aquinas,Mill(atleastonsomeinterpretations)MarxandT.H.Greenaswellasalargenumberoflessinfluentialthinkers.Amongcontemporarywritersper-fectionisminpoliticshasbeendefendedby,amongothers,RichardArneson,JohnFinnis,ThomasHurka,JospehRaz,andGeorgeSher.2Iusetheterm“politicalarrangement”toreferindiscriminatelytopoliticalinstitutions,constitutions,laws,policies,directives,etc.3Perfectionismcanrefertoamoraltheory,anaccountofwell-beingoranaccountofpol-itics.InthischapterIusethetermtorefertoanaccountofpolitics.4JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971),p.325.5Rawls’scharacterizationappearstobebasedonhisreadingofNietzsche’selitistversionofperfectionism.HecitesNietzsche’sstatementthat“Mankindmustworkcontinuallytoproduceindividualgreathumanbeings–thisandnothingelseisthetask...”(ATheory114StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page115ofJustice,p.325,n.51).Butthiselitismisincidentaltoperfectionistpoliticaltheory,andthebestversionsofperfectionismrejectit.6SeeHurka’sclaimthat“thebestperfectionismisamaximizingconsequentialismthatistime-andagent-neutral,tellingustocareequallyabouttheperfectionofallhumansatalltimes.”ThomasHurka,Perfectionism(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),p.55.7GeorgeSher,BeyondNeutrality(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),p.154.8SeemycharacterizationinStevenWall,Liberalism,PerfectionismandRestraint(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),p.8.9ThedistinctionisdrawnbyT.M.Scanlon.SeeWhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),p.112.10JosephRaz,EthicsinthePublicDomain(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1994),p.vi.11See,forexample,VinitHaksar,Equality,LibertyandPerfectionism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1979),JosephRaz,TheMoralityofFreedom(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),JohnFinnis,NaturalLawandNaturalRights(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1979),ThomasHurka,Perfectionism,andGeorgeSher,BeyondNeutrality.12SeeThomasHurka,PerfectionismandPhillipaFoot,NaturalGoodness(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).13DerekParfit,“OverpopulationandtheQualityofLife”inPeterSinger,ed.,AppliedEthics(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).14Thedistinctiondrawnherebetweenhumannatureandobjectivelistperfectionismissim-ilartoHurka’sdistinctionbetweennarrowandbroadperfectionism.SeeThomasHurka,Perfectionism,p.4.15Seethediscussionof“whole-hearted”engagementinJosephRaz,EthicsinthePublicDomain,pp.5–6.16Anextremeversionofthisviewholdsthatallobjectivegoodshavesubjectiveconditions.Whilenotveryplausible,suchaviewisconsistentwiththeobjectivegoodcomponent.Bycontrast,subjectivistsaboutthegoodholdthatthepresenceofappropriatementalstatesisnotonlynecessary,butalsosufficient,forsomethingtocontributetothevalueofaperson’slife.17Itdistinguishesperfectionismfromclassicalutilitarianaccountsofpoliticalmorality,likethatdefendedbyBenthamandSidgwickandfromwritersinthesocialcontracttraditionwhofollowHobbes.ItalsodistinguishesperfectionismfromHume’ssentimentalistpoliticalethics.18Foracleardefense,seeCharlesLarmore,PatternsofMoralComplexity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),pp.40–68.19Theimportanceofthequalifier“principled”willbecomeapparentshortly.20Defendersofstateneutralitydifferastowhichpoliticaldecisionstheconstraintappliesto:toallpoliticaldecisions,toconstitutionalissuesonly,tocoercivelawsandpolicies,etc.Iignorethiscomplicationhere.21Itiscommontomentiontheviewthattheconsequencesofstateactionshouldbeneutralbetweenconceptionsofthegood.Heretheconstraintisformulatedintermsofneutralityofeffect.Butproponentsofstateneutralitygenerallymentionthisviewtoputittooneside.Whethertheyareentitledtodosoisdiscussedinmy“NeutralityandResponsibility,”JournalofPhilosophy(2001).22Razdistinguishesthedoctrinethatthestateshouldnottakesidesbetweendifferentcon-ceptionsofthegoodfromadoctrinethatenjoinstheexclusionofidealsfrompoliticaljustification.SeeJosephRaz,TheMoralityofFreedom(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),pp.108–9.Iamusingthedoctrineofstateneutralitytoincludebothofthesedoctrines.23SeeJohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),ThomasNagel,EqualityandPartiality(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1991),CharlesLarmore,PatternsofMoralComplexityandBrianBarry,JusticeasImpartiality(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995).PerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense115\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page11624Theremaybeversionsofcontractualismthatarecompatiblewithperfectionistpolitics.IusethelabeltorefertotheviewsofRawlsandhisfollowers.25See,forexample,WillKymlicka,ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990),pp.199–205.26SeeRonaldDworkin,“TheFoundationsofLiberalEquality,”TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues:VolumeXI(1990).27SeeGeorgeSher,BeyondNeutrality,pp.106–39,ThomasHurka,“IndirectPerfectionism:KymlickaonStateNeutrality,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy3(1995):36–57,andSimonCaney,“ConsequentialistDefencesofStateNeutrality,”ThePhilosophicalQuarterly41(1991):457–77.28Onthispointseethedistinctionbetweenstate-centeredandmulti-centeredperfectionisminJosephChan,“Legitimacy,Unanimity,andPerfectionism,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs29(1)(Winter2000):5–42.29SeeGeorgeSher,BeyondNeutrality,pp.199–244.30SeeJosephRaz,TheMoralityofFreedom.31ThispointiswelldevelopedbyCharlesLarmore,“PluralismandReasonableDisagreement,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy11(1)(1994):61–79.32JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,p.135.33JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,p.37.34BrianBarry,JusticeasImpartiality,pp.168–73.35AsBarryamongothers,holds.36Notanidlepossibility,forsuchapositionisfoundinRawls’sATheoryofJustice.37Rawls’sappealtothe“burdensofjudgment”isacaseinpoint.Ifthesefactorsexplainreasonabledisagreementconcerningmattersofthegood,thentheyalsoexplainreason-abledisagreementinotherevaluativedomains.38ForagoodinstanceoftheslideseeJoshuaCohen,“MoralPluralismandPoliticalConsensus”inDavidCopp,JeanHampton,andJohnE.Roemer,eds.,TheIdeaofDemocracy(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),p.284.39Aweakerversionofthedemandholdsthattheremustexistapublicjustificationforthepoliticalarrangementsthatbindeachmember,suchthateachmemberofthepoliticalordercouldacceptit,givenhisbackgroundbeliefs.SincenothingIsayhereturnsonwhetherthepublicjustificationmustbeactuallypresentedormerelyonethatcouldbepresented,Ishallignorethiscomplicationinwhatfollows.Ishallalsoignoretheverydifficultissueofhowtospecifythebackgroundbeliefstowhichpublicjustificationisrelativized.40ThetermistakenfromthetitleofGeraldF.Gaus’sbookJustificatoryLiberalism(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996).Heusesittorefertohisownfavoredpoliticaltheory;andnot,asIdo,totheoriesingeneralthatmakepublicjustificationanecessaryconditionofpoliticallegitimacy.Forahelpfulsummaryofdifferentversionsofjusti-ficatoryliberalismseeFredD’Agostino,FreePublicReason(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996).41Perfectionismiscompatiblewithsomerelativelyweakformulationsofthepublicjustificationcondition.HereIunderstandpublicjustificationinthestrongsensethatithascometohaveincontemporarypoliticalphilosophy,onethatdemandsthatpoliticaljustificationsnotonlybepresentedopenly,butalsotheybeacceptabletoallreasonableorrationalpersons.42JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,p.li.43So,onthisdistinction,thecontentofjusticeasfairnessisgivenbythetwoprinciplesofjusticeandthelexicalorderingrelationsthatholdbetweenthem.44Rawlsclaimsthatpoliticalvalues“normallyhavesufficientweighttooverrideallothervaluesthatmaycomeintoconflictwiththem”(PoliticalLiberalism,p.138).Butnotethat116StevenWall\nCDIC06.qxd2/4/0915:46Page117politicalvaluesforRawlsincludesjustice.Sinceperfectionistsalsovaluejustice,therelevantcontrastisbetweenthevaluesofreciprocityandstability,whicharedistinctiveofapoliticalconceptionofjustice,andothervalues,whichmayormaynotincludejustice.45SeeGeraldF.Gaus,“LiberalNeutrality:ARadicalandCompellingPrinciple”inStevenWallandGeorgeKlosko,eds.,PerfectionismandNeutrality:EssaysinLiberalTheory(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2003),andGeraldF.Gaus,“ThePlaceofAutonomywithinLiberalism”inJohnChristmanandJoelAnderson,eds.,AutonomyandtheChallengestoLiberalism:NewEssays(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005).46SeeDouglasHusak,“ThePresumptionofFreedom,”Noûs17(3)(1983):345–62.47Supposeweconstrue“ifhewerefullyrational”tomean“ifheweretoseemattersrightly.”Thiswouldmakepremiss(iv)atrivialclaim.ItwouldalsodisableGaus’sargumentfromjustifyinganyrecognizablepublicjustificationcondition.48GeraldF.Gaus,“ThePlaceofAutonomy,”p.290.Seealso“LiberalNeutrality,”pp.143–4.49Infailingtoappreciatetheevaluativeconsideration,Sarahmaymakenorationalmis-take.OnthispointseeScanlon’sdiscussionofinternalandexternalreasonsinWhatWeOwetoEachOther,pp.363–73.50Talkofdeficienciesincapacitiestoappreciatereasonsmightsuggesttosomeanelitistpictureofmoralreasons,wherebysomehaveunimpairedaccesstomoraltruthswhileothersdonot.Butsuchelitismisnotintegraltoanexternalistaccount.Eachofus,invaryingwaysandtovaryingdegrees,maysufferfromsuchdeficiencies.Certainlynooneisimmunefromthem.51See,forexample,Gaus’sinterestingdiscussionoftheclaimthateachperson’sreasoningmeritssomerespect:“LiberalNeutrality,”pp.149–55.Thisclaimisasubstantiveaddi-tiontotheargumentaboutthenatureofmoralreasonsthatwehavebeendiscussing.52JohnChristman,“ProceduralAutonomyandLiberalLegitimacy,”inJamesStaceyTaylor,ed.,PersonalAutonomy:NewEssaysonPersonalAutonomyandItsRoleinContemporaryMoralPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),p.291.53JohnRawls,TheoryofJustice,p.580.54Obviously,itdoesnotsupportperfectionismoverallanti-perfectionistviews.55Fortheseminaldiscussionofthisidea,seeJosephRaz,PracticalReasonandNorms(London:Hutchinson,1975).56Rawlsdoesclaimthatcitizensneedtofindawaytoembedthepoliticalconceptionwithintheirmorecomprehensiveviews.Butwhenitcomestopoliticaljustificationcitizens“aretoconducttheirfundamentaldiscussionswithintheframeworkofwhateachregardsasapoliticalconceptionofjusticebasedonvaluesthat[othercitizens]canreasonablybeexpectedtoendorse.”PoliticalLiberalism,p.226.57ThankstoDavidSobelforhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraftofthischapter.PerfectionisminPolitics:ADefense117\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page119LIBERALISMLIBERTYANDDISTRIBUTIVEJUSTICEContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page121CHAPTERSEVENIndividualismandLibertarianRightsEricMackI.IntroductionThisessayisapartialdefenseoftherightsthatareatthecoreoflibertarianpoliticaltheory.Itprovidessomelinesofreasoningindefenseofrights-basedpoliticaltheory1thatarrivesatlibertarianconclusions.Tosaythatthetheoryisrights-basedistosaythatitsmostfundamentalinterpersonalnormsareexpressionsofrightsthatindividualspossessagainstothers–rightsthatrestrictthepermissibleactionsofthoseotheragents.Tosaythatthetheoryisrights-basedisnot,however,tosaythatittakesthosefundamentalrightstobephilosophicalprimitivesorself-evidenttruths.Thus,theneedforthedefensethatthisessaypartiallyprovides.Eventheprovisionofapartialdefenseoftheserightsis,tosaytheleast,aformidablephilosophicaltask.Myhopeisthatthisexcusestheboldandhighlyprogrammaticpresentationofthisessay’ssubstantivenormativeargument–anditsneglectofmeta-ethicalniceties.Thetwofundamentalrightsthatwillcometotheforeasweproceedaretherightofeachindividualoverherownperson(therightofself-ownership)andtherightofeachindividualtothepracticeofprivateproperty.Sometimestwoversionsofliber-tarianismareidentified–“right”libertarianismwhichcombinesself-ownershipand(atleastalmost)unrestrictedprivateownershipofextra-personalmaterial–and“left”libertarianism–whichcombinesself-ownershipandsomeformofegalitarianown-ershipof(atleastnatural)extra-personalmaterial.Thisessaysupportsthecorerightsofthefirstversionoflibertarianism.ThegeneralstrategythatIemployhereforthedefenseofsuchrightsistosituatetheaffirmationofsuchrightswithinamoreencompassingmoralindividualism.SoIneedtobeginwithabriefdescriptionofthismoralindividualismandofthenon-question-beggingbasesonwhichitsaffirmationisreasonable.Itakethecentral–andindependentlyplausible–rootideaofthisindividualismtobetheseparate,freestandingimportanceofeachindividual’slifeandwell-being.Moralindividualismisanarticulationofthisrootidea.ThemorethearticulationcapturesandclarifiesContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page122whatmakesitattractiveinitsmoreinchoateform,andthemorethearticulationyieldsamoralstructurecomposedofmutuallyreinforcingelements,themoretheplausibilityofthatrootideaisenhanced.Ifwetakeseriouslytheseparateimportanceofpersons,weshouldexpectthatindividualA’sownseparateimportancewillhaveadifferentsortofdirectiveimpactonherthantheseparateimportanceofothershasforA.Thus,thekeyworkinghypo-thesisassociatedwiththerootideaisthat,foreachindividual,theseparate,freestand-ing,irreducibleimportanceofeachindividual’slifeandwell-beinghastwodistinctkindsofdirectiveimport.Foreachindividual,thedirectiveimportofherownseparateimportanceisthatherlifeandwell-being–herlifegoingwell–standsasthefinalrationalendofheractions;hergoal-orientedrationalityconsistsinherchoosingandactinginwaysthatresultinorconstituteherlivingaswellaspossible.Inaffirmingtheseparate,freestanding,andirreducibleimportanceofeachindividual’slifeandwell-being,eachindividualAaffirmsthattherationalfinalendforeachotherindi-vidualBistheadvancementofB’sownlifeandwell-being.ButtheseparatenessoftheimportanceofBblocksanyinferencefromB’slifegoingwellstandingasafinal2rationalend(forB)toitsbeingafinalrationalendforA.IftheseparateimportanceofB’slifeandwell-beingassuchhasanydirectiveimportforA,itmustbedifferentinkindthanprovidingAwithanendsheisrationaltopromote.Intuitively,theredoesseemtobethissecond,differentinkind,directiveimport.ThemostintuitivelyobjectionabletreatmentsofBbyAaretreatmentsinwhichAdisposesofBasthoughBisaresourceavailableforA’suseandexploita-tion.TheseactionsarenaturallydescribedasA’streatingBasthoughBisnotabeingwhoselifeandwell-beingareofseparate,freestandingimportance–asA’streatingBasthoughBisnotabeingwithrationalendsofhisown.IfthesensethatitisunreasonableforAtoengageinsuchactionsbecauseoftheseparateimportanceofB’slifeandwell-beingiscorrect,itmustbebecauseB’sseparateimportancehasdirectiveimportforA–wherethatimportisarequirementinreasonthatAnottreatBasthoughheisnotabeingwhoselifeandwell-beingareofseparateimport-ance.SucharequirementimposesconstraintsonthemeansbywhichAmaytransactwithBinthecourseofpromotinghervaluedends.So,therootideaoftheseparate,freestandingimportanceofeachindividual’slifeandwell-beingseemstohavebothgoal-oriented(teleological)importandmeans-eschewing(deontic)import.Thefirstimportprovidesindividualswiththeendsthattheyrespectivelyhavereasontopromote;thesecondimportprovidesindividualswithrestrictionsontheirtreatmentofotherswhichtheyhavereasontorespect.Thefirst(teleological)importsuppliesthekeydistinctivefeatureofmoralindividualism’stheoryofthegood,viz.,theindividualizationoragent-relativizationofthegood;eachindividual’slifeandwell-beingisanultimategood–relativetotheagentwhoselifeandwell-beingitis.Thesecond(deontic)importsuppliesthecoreinterpersonalnormsofmoralindividualism’stheoryoftheright,viz.,rights-correlativerestrictionsonthemeansthatagentsmayemployinthepursuitoftheirrespectiveends.Moralindividualism’srootideagainsplausibilityasthatwhichprovidesthroughitsarticu-lationaunifyingexplanationfortheindependentlyplausibleviewthattoberationalinthepursuitofendsistobegenuinelyprudentandfortheindependentlyplausibleviewthatitisreasonableforindividualstoconstraintheirconducttowardsotherpersonsindependentofthatconstraintbeingconducivetotheirrationalpursuitof122EricMack\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page123ends.Itseekstoprovideaunifyingpictureoftherationalityofthepromotionofgoalsandthereasonablenessofconstraintinthecourseofthatpromotion–area-sonablenessofconstraintthatdoesnotreducetotheexpediencyofthatconstraint.Sincetherationalityofprudenceisthemostminimalanduncontroversialclaimaboutpracticalrationality,itisthenaturalstarting-pointformoraltheory.Normativetheorizingnaturallybeginswiththeprincipleofchoicefortheindividualaccordingtowhich“Apersonquiteproperlyacts,atleastwhenothersarenotaffected,toachieve3hisowngreatestgood,toadvancehisrationalendsasfaraspossible.”Muchtheor-izingthenproceedsbyarguingthattherationalityofprudentialactionismerelyaspecialcaseoftherationalityofpromotingthegeneralsocialgood.Therationalityofanindividualimposingsomesacrificeuponherselfforthesakeofagreatergainforherselfis,accordingtosuchtheorizing,merelyaspecialcaseoftherationalityofanindividualimposingsuchasacrificeuponherselfforthesakeofagreatergainformembersofsocietyatlarge.Thegoalofrationalactionisthecommonsocialgood;andthiscommonsocialgoodprovidesthestandardforadjudicatingdisputesamongindividualswhochampionconflictingactions.IfindividualAfavorsscratch-inghernosewithherrightindexfingerandBfavorsseasoningastewwiththatfinger,theinterpersonallysoundresolutionoftheirdisputewillbesuppliedbyadeterminationofwhichaction(orsetofrulesforpickingamongconflictingactions)willdirectly(orindirectly)moreenhancethecommonsocialgood.Moralindividualism,however,fullyjoinsJohnRawlsandRobertNozickintheircontentionthattheattempttoconstruetherationalityofprudenceasaspecialcaseoftherationalityofsocialoptimizationfailstotakeseriouslytheseparatenessof4persons.Yetthisreaffirmationoftherationalityofprudencemaybethoughttoleaveuswithoutanyprinciplescapableofprovidinginterpersonallysoundresolutionsofdisputesamongthechampionsofconflictingactions.Or,atbest,suchprincipleswillbeungroundedandunconnectedwiththesalientstarting-pointfornormativetheorizing,therationalityofprudence.Thedefenseofrightsandrights-correlativerestrictionsthatwillbeofferedheretraversesadifferentroutefromtherationalityofprudencetotheaffirmationofinterpersonallyforcefulnorms–aroutethatdoesnotabandonitsownstarting-point.Thefirstlegoftherouteisfromtherationalityofprudenceandtheassociatedprerogativeofeachindividualtoeschewimposingsacrificesuponherselfforthesakeofadvancingtheendsofotherstotheseparate,freestandingimportanceofeachindividual;inthelanguageweshallsoonemploy,thislegtakesustotherationalefortheaffirmationofthisprudenceandthispre-rogative.Thesecondlegisfromthisrootidea–orrationale–totheaffirmationofrights-correlativerestrictions.Theroutebeginswithamovefromprudenceandtheprerogativeofeschewingsacrificetotherootideaorrationalethathasprudenceandthisprerogativeasitsfirstdirectiveimport;itthenproceedstotherightsandconstraintsthatarethesecond–anddifferentinkind–directiveimportofthatrootideaorrationale.ItraversethisroutebyrespondingtoachallengethatSamuelSchefflerissuesin5TheRejectionofConsequentialism.Scheffleragreesthattheseparatenessofpersons–whichhecastsasthenaturalindependenceofthepersonalpointofview–hasthefirstkindofdirectiveimport.Thenaturalindependenceofeachindividual’sviewpointallowshertogiveatleastsomespecialweighttoherowninterestsinherdecisionsaboutwhethershewillsacrificeherinterestsinservicetotheexternalimpersonalIndividualismandLibertarianRights123\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page124standpoint.But,Scheffler,ineffect,deniesthattheseparatenessofpersonshasthesecondkindofdirectiveimport;thenaturalindependenceofthepersonalpointofviewisnotarationaleforaffirmingrights-correlativerestrictions.Schefflerchal-lengesthosewhothinkthattheseparateimportanceofindividualshasbothkindsofdirectiveimporttoshowthatamoralitythatincorporatesthefirstkindofdirectiveimport–aprerogativeofgivingatleastsomespecialweighttoone’sowninterests–isunacceptableifitdoesnotalsoincorporatethesecondkindofdirectiveimport–constraintsonthemeansthatindividualsmayuseintheirpursuitofvaluedends.6Inthesectionsthatfollow,Ifurtherexplainandmeetthischallenge.Ishowhowmeetingitsupportsindividualism’slinkageofthegoal-orientedrationalityofpru-dencewiththemeans-eschewingreasonablenessofcompliancewithrights.Indeed,theconjunctionof(i)therecognitionthatamoralitythatincorporatesapreroga-tivetoeschewimposingcostsononeselfmustalsoincorporaterights-correlativerestrictionsagainstinterferenceswiththeexerciseofthatprerogativeand(ii)theaffirmationofanappropriaterobustprerogativeyieldsthecorelibertarianrightstoself-ownershipandthepracticeofprivateproperty.Further,thefactthattheargumentofferedherefortherightofself-ownershipalsosupportstherighttothepracticeofprivatepropertyunderminestheleftlibertariancontentionthatonecancoherentlyendorsethefirstoftheserightswithoutendorsingthesecond.II.Prerogatives,Rationales,andRestrictionsWhilethenaturalindependenceofthepersonalpointofviewismanifestedineachindividual’stendencytobemovedbyherowncoredesiresorcommitments“outofproportion”totheirsignificancefromanyimpersonalperspective,whatiscrucialisthat,foreachindividual,“[h]isownprojectsandcommitmentshaveadistinctive7claimonhisattention.Thus,thenaturalindependenceofthepersonalpointofviewprovidesarationalefortheinclusionwithinmoralityofapersonalprerogativeaccord-ingtowhichitisatleastmorallypermissibleforeachindividualtogivespecialweighttoherownseparatesystemofendsinherdeterminationofhowsheshallact.Theinclusionofsuchaprerogativeinmoralityamountstotherecognitionthattheattainmentofanindividual’sgoodhasagent-relativevalueandthatagent’spro-spectivegoodprovidesherwithreasontogoforthatgoodquiteasidefromanyagent-neutralreasonthatagentmayhavetogoforortoforegothatgood.OnScheffler’sview,therecognitionoftheindependenceofthepersonalview-pointandtheassociatedrecognitionofagent-relativevaluesandreasonsforactionprovidearationaleforamodestprerogative;onethatmerelyallowseachindividualtogivesomespecialweighttoherowngoodinthedeterminationofhowsheshallact.Eachagentmuststillfirstidentifywhichactionavailabletoherwouldbesociallyoptimal,i.e.,wouldmostadvancetheoverallagent-neutrallyvaluablesocialgood.Onlythenmayanindividualdeterminewhetherherprerogativeallowshertoforegothissociallyoptimalaction.AScheffler-styleprerogativewillspecifysomeMsuchthat,ifthepersonalcosttoAofthesociallyoptimalactionmultipliedbyMisequaltoorgreaterthantheimpersonalgaintotheworldifAweretoperformthesociallyoptimalaction,thenitispermissibleforAtoeschewthatsociallyoptimalact.So,e.g.,ifallliveshaveequalweightinthiscalculusandM=4,thenAmaydecline124EricMack\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page125todonatehervitalorganstosavethreeotherwisedoomedstrangers;fortheper-sonalcosttoA(1)multipliedbyM(4)exceedsthenetlosstotheworld(2)ofhereschewingthesociallyoptimalact.If,instead,sixstrangerscouldbesavedbyA’sdonation,thenAwouldremainobligatedtoperformthatsociallyoptimalact.Ineffect,aScheffler-styleprerogativeprovidesindividualswithalimiteddispensationfromcompliancewiththedemandsforpersonalsacrificethatareissuedfromtheimpersonalstandpoint.Schefflerrecognizesthattheoristswhofavortheincorporationofaprerogativeintomoralityarealsolikelytofavortheincorporationofdeonticrestrictionsthatprotectindividualsagainstinterferencewiththeirchosenactionsevenifthoseactionsarenotoptimalfromsomestandpointexternaltotheirown.Indeed,suchtheorists–amongwhommoralindividualistsarethemostardent–tendtothinkthatthebasisfortheincorporationofaprerogativeintomoralityisalsothebasisfortheintroductionintomoralityofdeonticrestrictionsandtherightsthatarecorrelativetothoserestrictions.Theytendtothinkthattheseparate,freestandingimportanceofeachindividualortheseparatenessofpersonsorthenaturalindependenceofthepersonalpointofviewunderwritesbothapersonalprerogativeandrights-correlativedeonticrestrictions.Schefflerissuesageneralchallengetotheoriststoshowthatamoralitywithaprerogativebutwithoutrights-correlativerestrictionsisunacceptable.Andheissuesthemorespecificchallengetothosewhotendtothinkthatthebasisfortheincorporationofaprerogativeintomoralityisalsothebasisfortheintro-ductionintomoralityofdeonticrestrictionstoshowthattherationalefortheformerisalsoarationaleforthelatter.Meetingthismorespecificchallengewould,ofcourse,alsonicelymeetsthemoregeneralchallenge.TomeetScheffler’sspecificchallenge,Ishalldefendthefollowingcentralclaim:“Therationalefortheincorporationofapersonalprerogativeintomoralitywillnotbesatisfiedunlessthatprerogativeisaccompaniedbyrights-correlativerestrictionsthatprotectindividualsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogative.”Theintroductionofanakedprerogativewillnotsatisfytherationaleforitsintro-duction;therationalewillbesatisfiedonlyiftheprerogativeisprotectivelyclothedinrights-correlativerestrictions.Thatiswhyaprerogativewithoutaccompanyingrestrictionsisunacceptable.Andthatiswhy,ifitisreasonabletoincorporateapre-rogativeintomorality,itisalsoreasonabletoincorporaterights-correlativerestric-tionsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogative.AmodestScheffler-styleprerogativereflectstheviewthattherearesomeagent-relativevaluesandvalue-orientedreasonsforactionandthattheseprovideabitofcounter-weightforeachindividualagainsttherequirementthatshedevoteherselfasmuchasispossibletotheserviceofagent-neutrallybestoutcomes.Accordingly,therationalethatSchefflerlocatesforthisprerogativeiscomparablymodest.Thatrationaleisthepartial(perhapsquitemarginal)liberationoftheindividualquaagentofherownsystemofendsfromtheauthoritativeexternaldemandsoftheimpersonalpointofview–theimpersonalstandpointbeing,forScheffler,thesalientexternalstandpoint.Incontrast,whatwemightlabelthe“individualistprerogative”reflectstheviewthatallvaluesandallvalue-orientedreasonsforactionareagent-relative;theideathattheagent-neutralvalueof(purportedly)optimalsocialoutcomessummonIndividualismandLibertarianRights125\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page126theindividualtotheirpromotionsothat,atleastsometimes,theindividualhasall-things-consideredreasontosacrificehergoodforthesakeofthesocialgood,isentirelyrepudiated.Themuchmorerobustrationaleforthismuchmorerobustprerogativeisthetotalliberationoftheindividualquaagentofherownsystemofendsfromthedemandsofstandpointsexternaltotheagent.Thisincludesliberationfromthesupposed,butspecious,demandsoftheimpersonalstandpointandliberationfromthenowemancipatedstandpointsofotherindividuals.Themorerobustaprerogativeis,thegreatertherangeofactionsthatwillbeatleastmorallypermissibleforindi-viduals.Forthisreason,ifthecentralclaimiscorrect,themorerobustthepreroga-tiveis,themoreextensivewillbetherangeofmoralimmunitythatindividualsenjoyinvirtueoftherights-correlativerestrictionstowhichothersaresubject.Sowhatistheargumentforthecentralclaimand,afortiori,fortheinstanceofitthatconcernstheindividualistprerogativeanditsrobustrationale?Theargumentisthattherearetwodistinctcrucialdimensionsalongwhichtherationaleofliberationfromexternalviewpointscanbesatisfiedorleftunsatisfiedandthataprerogativecanonlyprovidesatisfactionofthisrationalealongoneofthosedimensions.Apre-rogativewithoutaccompanyingrights-correlativerestrictionsagainstinterferencewithexercisesofthatprerogativewill,therefore,leavetherationalefortheprerogativeentirelyunsatisfiedalongacrucialseconddimensionand,thus,willfailtosatisfytherationaleforthatprerogative.Thosetwodimensionscanbedesignatedasthe“selfimposedsubjugation”dimensionandthe“otherimposedsubjugation”dimension.ConsiderindividualAwhoisfacedwiththechoicebetweenactionEthatmostservesanexternalviewpoint–eithertheimpersonalstandpointinsofarasthatstand-pointisstillinplayorthepersonalstandpointofanotherindividualinsofarasthishascomeintoplay–andactionPthatbetterservesA’sinterests.SupposealsothatApossessesaprerogativethatallowsAtochoosePratherthanE.Thisistosaythat,giventhecostsfromthatexternalviewpointofAchoosingPandthepersonalcoststoAofherchoosingE,A’sprerogativeprotectsAfromtherequirementthatsheherselfsubjugateherselftotheexternalviewpointthatEbestserves.Anypre-rogativewill,inthisway,provideAwithsomedegreeofliberationfromself-imposedsacrificeinservicetosomeexternalviewpoint.Nevertheless,howeverrobustA’sprerogativeis,howeverextensiveisA’sliberationalongthisself-imposedsub-jugationdimension,A’sbareprerogativeleavesAentirelysubjecttoother-imposedsubjugationintheserviceoftherelevantexternalstandpoint.SupposethatA,intheexerciseofherprerogative,choosesactionPoveractionE;butsuppose,further,thatB,anagentfortherelevantexternalstandpoint,canintervenewithoutsignificantcostfromthatexternalstandpointtooverrideA’schoiceandgetAtoperformE.NothingaboutA’sprerogativeprotectsheragainstsuchinterventionbyB;andeverythingabouttheexternalstandpointthatagentBservescallsuponBtosubjugateAtothatexternalstandpoint.AlthoughitiswithinA’sprerogativetodoPratherthanE–ifAcangetawaywithdoingPunderthewatchfuleyeoftherelevantexternalviewpoint–nothingprecludesagentsofthatexternalviewpointfromsuppressingA’schoiceandsubjugatingAtothedemandthatsheoptimallyservethatexternalviewpoint.AlthoughA’sprerogativeliberatesAtosomedegreefromtherequirementthatsheimposesacrificesonherselfforthesakeoftherelevantexternalviewpoint,itdoesnothingtolimitthesacrificesthatothersmayimposeuponherinthenameoftheexternalviewpoint.126EricMack\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page127Ofcourse,iftheinterventiontooverrideA’schoiceitselfhassignificantcostsfromtheexternalstandpointthatisinplay,itmaybethattheagentofthatstandpointoughtnottointervene.But,insuchcases,thereasonfornon-interferencewithA’sexerciseofherprerogativeissimplythatinterferenceisnotoptimalfromthatexternalviewpoint.Thefactthatsometimes,fromsomeexternalviewpoint,itwillnotpaytosuppressA’sexerciseofherprerogativedoesnotindicateanydegreeofliberationofAfromother-imposedsubordinationtothatexternalviewpoint.TheabsenceofrestrictionsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogativeleavesAtotallyunliberatedfromtherelevantexternalstandpointalongtheother-imposedsubjugationdimension.Giventhattherationalefortheprerogativeistheliberationoftheindividualfromexternalstand-points,aprerogativewithoutaccompanyingrestrictionsfailstosatisfythatrationale.AmoralityprovidesAwithlittleliberationfromthedemandsofanexternalstandpointif,asagentsofthatstandpointdragherofftothesacrificialaltar,itatmostrequiresthoseagentstoassureAthatshewasnotmorallyrequiredtovolunteerforthisfate.ThesepointscanbemademoreconcretelyandvividlybyconsideringforamomentScheffler’smodestprerogativeandthesortofliberationitwouldprovideorfailtoprovideforindividualAfromtheimpersonalstandpoint(whichremainstherelevantexternalstandpointwithinScheffler’smoralscheme).SupposethatthesociallyoptimalactionEisA’ssurrenderoffourofhervitalbodilyorgansthetransplantationofwhichintofourdyingstrangerswillsavethosefourpersons,andthatthepersonallylesscostlyactionPisA’sretentionofthoseorgans.Supposefurtherthatthroughitsspecifica-tionofMaScheffler-styleprerogativemakesitmorallypermissibleforAtochosePoverE.ThecrucialpointisthatthepermissibilityofA’sdecliningtosacrificeherselfforthefourstrangersisentirelyconsistentwithitsbeingpermissibleorevenobligatoryforanagentofsocialoptimization(e.g.,thegovernment)toimposethatsacrificeuponA.Indeed,itwillbepermissibleandobligatoryforthisagenttoimposethatsacrificeuponAunlessthereareverysubstantialperipheralsocialcosts–costs8fromtheimpersonalstandpoint–associatedwiththeimposedorgantransfer.SoA’sScheffler-styleprerogativedoesnotatallliberateherfromother-imposedsubjugationtotheexternalviewpointthatremainssalientwithinScheffler’sscheme.Andbeingsubjecttoother-imposedsubjugationtothisexternalviewpointprettymuchmakesamockeryofA’smodestliberationfromtherequirementthatsheherselfchoosethatsubjugation.Thisshouldbenosurprise,asSchefflerrepeatedlyemphasizesthat,withinacodethatincludesaprerogativebutnorestrictions,italwaysremains9permissibletoengageinsociallyoptimalaction.Mysenseisthat,whenSchefflersaysthis,heisthinkingofindividualAremain-ingmorallyfree,despiteherprerogative,tochoosetoengageinthepersonallysacrificialandsociallyoptimalaction.Yetthemorestrikingimplicationofeveryoneremain-ingmorallyfreetoengageinsociallyoptimalactionisthatB,theagentoftheimper-sonalstandpoint,remainsmorallyfree(andusuallyobligated)toengageinsociallyoptimalactionbyimposingsociallyoptimizingsacrificesuponA.ItisbecauseofthisabsenceofrestrictionsagainstinterferencewithA’sexerciseofherprerogativethattheliberationistrationaleforaScheffler-styleprerogativeisunsatisfiedalongtheother-imposedsubjugationdimension.Themoralindividualistis,ofcourse,particularlyinterestedintheinstanceofthecentralclaimthatconcernstheindividualistprerogativeanditsrationale.Thisisthemorespecificclaimthat:IndividualismandLibertarianRights127\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page128“Therationalefortheincorporationoftheindividualistprerogativeintomoralitywillnotbesatisfiedunlessthatprerogativeisaccompaniedbyrights-correlativerestrictionsthatprotectindividualsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthisprerogative.”Toaffirmthisinstanceofthecentralclaimistoaffirmthat,ifitisreasonabletoendorsetheindividualistprerogative,itisalsoreasonabletoendorseindividualrightsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogative.Giventhemoralindividu-alist’sendorsementoftheantecedentinthisconditionalproposition,theindividualistarrivesatthereasonablenessofendorsingthoserights.Furthermore,toaffirmthismorespecificclaimistoaffirmindividualism’scontentionthatwhatunderwritestheteleologicaldirectiveimportoftheseparateimportanceofindividuals–animportthatappearswithinthepresentargumentastheindividualistprerogative–alsounder-writesthedeonticdirectiveimportoftheseparateimportanceofindividuals–animportthatappearswithinthepresentargumentasthoserights-correlativerestric-tionsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogative.AsIhavejustsaid,theconjunctionofthereasonablenessoftheindividualistpre-rogativeandtheclaimthattherationalefortheprerogativewillbesatisfiedonlyifthatprerogativeisaccompaniedbyrights-correlativerestrictionsyieldsthereason-ablenessofaffirmingthoserestrictionsandtherightsthatarecorrelativetothem.Yetwecanseekandshouldbepleasedtofindfurtherexplanationforthereason-ablenessofthisaffirmation.Thefurtherexplanationproposedbymoralindividual-ismisthattherootphenomenonoftheseparate,freestandingimportanceofeachindividual’slifedoeshavebothkindsofdirectiveimport.WhilethedirectiveimportforindividualAoftheseparateimportanceofherlifeistherationalityofherpro-motionofhergood,thedirectiveimportforothersoftheseparateimportanceofA’slifeandwell-beingisthereasonablenessoftheirbeingcircumspectintheirtreatmentofAinthecourseoftheirrespectivepursuitofvaluedends.III.TheIndividualistPrerogativeandSelf-OwnershipWhatisincludedwithintheindividualistprerogativeandafortioriprotectedbyrights-correlativerestrictionsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogative?Personalprerogativesareincorporatedintomoralitytoliberateindividualsatleasttosomedegreefromtherequirementthattheyimposesacrificesonthemselvestomaketheworldbetterfromsomeexternalstandpoint.Thisiswhyaprerogativeisalwayscastasmakingitatleastmorallyallowablefortheindividualtodeclinetosurrenderhergoodforthesakeofadvancingtheendsofothers.Thereisnoreasontounderstandanysuchprerogativeasincludingthepermissibilityoftheindividualimposingsacrificesuponothersinordertoachievegainsforherself.(Tosaythatsuchprerogativedoesnotincludethepermissibilityofimposingsacrificesonothersisnottosaythatitincludestheimpermissibilityofimposingsuchsacrifices.)Indeed,aprerogative’snon-inclusionofthepermissibilityoftheimpositionoflossesonothersisanimplicitconditionofourtakingitsincorporationintomoralitytobereasonable.ShellyKagannicelypointsoutthatScheffler’sexplicitformulationofhispreroga-tivehassymmetricalimplicationsforthepermissibilityofA’sdecliningtoimposesacrificesuponherselfandthepermissibilityofA’sattaininggainsthroughimposing128EricMack\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page12910sacrificesonothers.Asfarastheexplicitformulationgoes,aScheffler-stylepre-rogativeinwhichM=4allowshealthyAtodeclinetosurrenderthreeofhervitalorgansevenifthiswouldsavethelivesofthreestrangers;butitequallyallowssickAtoextractorgansfromthreehealthystrangersinordertosaveherself.MypointisthatKagan’spointisnicelysurprisingpreciselybecause,giventheliberationistroleofaprerogative,weimplicitlytakeareasonableprerogativetoallowindividualstoeschewsacrificeandnotsymmetricallytoallowtheirimpositionofsacrifices.Hereisanotherwayofmakingthispointabouttheroleofpersonalprerogatives.Prerogativesareincorporatedintomoralitytoalloweachindividualtodevoteherselftotheirownvaluedendsandnotthevaluedendsofothers;theyarenotincorporatedintomoralitytomakeitpermissibleforeachindividualtodevoteotherstohervaluedends.Ifwethinkintermsofwho,accordingtoaspecificprerogative,eachindividualmayespeciallydevotetotheserviceofherseparatesystemofends,wepresumethatthisprerogativesaysthateachindividualmayespeciallydevoteherself(notothers)tothatend.Uponinspection,thisimplicitpresumptionisevidenteveninScheffler’sowndiscussionofhisproposedprerogative.Schefflerrepeatedlycastshispreroga-tiveintermsofthepermissibilityofAdevoting“attentionandenergy”toherownfavoredendsoutofproportiontotheimpersonalimportanceofthoseends.SchefflerneverexplicitlysayswhoseattentionandenergyAmayespeciallydevotetoherownends.However,anyonewhoreadsthesepassagesinSchefflerwiththequestioninmind,“WhoseattentionandenergymayAespeciallydevotetoherownends?”willtakeSchefflertobesayingthatitisA’sattentionandenergythatAmayespeciallydevotetoadvancingherends.HadSchefflermeantthatA’sprerogativealsooperatesoverothers’attentionandenergy,hewouldhaveseenimmediatelythatceterisparibushisproposedprerogativejustasmuchallowsAtoextractvitalorgansfromeachofthreehealthystrangerstosaveherlifeasitallowshertodeclinetosurrenderthreeofhervitalorganstosavethelivesofthree(otherwise)fatallyillstrangers.Weshouldnoteafurtherargumentforwhyaprerogative–inparticular,theindi-vidualistprerogative–shouldnotbeunderstoodasencompassingthepermissibilityoftheindividual’simpositionofsacrificesuponotherstoachievegainsforherself.Iftheindividualistprerogativedidincludethepermissibilityoftheindividualimposingsuchsacrifices,thengiventheunacceptabilityofaprerogativewithoutaccompanyingrights-correlativerestrictionsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogative,wewouldarriveatrightsagainstinterferencewiththeeschewingofsuchsacrificesandrightsagainstinterferencewiththeimpositionofsuchsacrifices.BwouldhavearightagainstinterferencewithhisexerciseofhisprerogativetodeclinetobesubjecttosacrificesimposedbyAandAwouldhavearightagainstinterferencewithherexerciseofherprerogativetoimposesacrificesuponBtoadvanceA’sgood.Wewould,then,arriveatasetofdeeplyincompossiblerights.Toavoidthistheoreticallyunattractiveconclusion,weneedtoavoidthemisstepthatconsistsintakingtheindi-vidualistprerogativetoincludethepermissibilityofimposingsacrificesonothers.Letuscontinuetothinkoftheindividualistprerogativeasaspecification,foreachindividual,ofwhomthatindividualmaydevotetotheattainmentofherowngood.Unlikelessrobustprerogatives,theindividualistprerogativesaysthateachindividualmayalwaysdevoteherownpersontotheattainmentofhergreateradvantage.Ifwecastmattersthisway,wearriveatanalternativestatementoftherightsthatarecorrelativetotherestrictionsthatmustaccompanytheindividualprerogativeifIndividualismandLibertarianRights129\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page130therationaleforthatprerogativeistobesatisfied.Therightsthatarecorrelativetotherestrictionsagainstinterferencewithindividuals’respectiveexerciseofthispre-rogativearetheirrespectiverightsovertheirownperson.Ifone(i)incorporatestheindividualistprerogativeintomorality;(ii)specifiestherangeofactionsthatareren-deredpermissiblebythatprerogativeintermsofwhomeachindividualmayalwaysdeployassheseesfitinserviceofherends;(iii)recognizesthatitisunacceptabletoincorporatethisprerogativewithoutalsoincorporatingrestrictionsagainstinter-ferencewithitsexercise,onewillarriveateachindividual’srightsoverherownperson,i.e.,overpersonalresourcesthatconstituteherperson.Thatis,onearrivesatthefamiliarlibertarianrightofself-ownership.IV.TheIndividualistPrerogativeandtheRighttothePracticeofPrivatePropertyRights-orientedlibertariantheoristscommonlyfirstgoforself-ownershipandthenemploythepremissofself-ownershipwithinafurtheranddiscreteargumentforindi-vidualrightsoverextra-personalobjects.Locke,quaproto-libertariantheorist,firstestablisheseachindividual’spropertyinhisownperson,infersfromthisthateachhasapropertyinhisownlabor,andaffirmspropertyinextra-personalobjectsonthebasisofeachindividualretaininghisrightsoverthelaborthathehasinvestedinextra-personalobjects.Nozick,whileseekingtoavoidLocke’smixingoflabormetaphor,groundshisLockeanentitlementdoctrineofpropertyrightsintheclaimthatallalternativestoentitlementdoctrinerequiretheviolationofindividuals’rightsofself-ownership.Incontrast,IwanttoexplorethepossibilitythattheargumentthatIhavepresentedasyieldingarightofself-ownershipwill,ifmorebroadlycon-strued,alsoyieldrightswithrespecttoextra-personalobjects.Isay“rightswithrespecttoextra-personalobjects”becausetherightsIhaveinmindarenotparticularrightstoactualholdingsbutrathertheabstractrightpossessedbyeachindividualthatothersabidebynormsunderwhichthatindividualisprotectedinheracquisition,transformation,deployment,andconsumptionofextra-personalobjects.Ireferto11thisabstractrightastherighttothepracticeofprivateproperty.Particularrightstoactualholdingswillobtaininvirtueofindividualsacquiringthoseactualextra-personalobjectsinaccordancewiththenormscompliancewithwhichfulfillsindi-12viduals’rightstothepracticeofprivateproperty.AsIhavepresentedit,theargumentfromtheindividualistprerogativetorightstakesthatwhichtheindividualmaydevotetohervaluedendstobethementalandphysicalcomponentsandcapacitiesthatconstituteherperson.But,onreflection,weshouldseethatthisconstruestoonarrowlyandtoostaticallytheambitofwhat,underthatprerogative,eachindividualmaydedicatetotheserviceofhersystemofends.Fewactionsandnoextendedcourseofactioninvolveonlytheagent’sdeploy-mentofcomponentsorcapacitiesofherperson.Almostallactionsandallextendedcoursesofactioninvolvealsothedeploymentofextra-personalresources.Actionrarelyisperformedentirelywithinthespacedefinedbytheoutersurfaceoftheagent’sskin;andevenwhensuchactionisperformed,itisalmostalwaysmadepossiblebyotherperformancesoftheagentthatrequirethedeploymentofextra-personalresourcesandisalmostalwaysinserviceofyetfurtheractionthatinvolvesthe130EricMack\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page131deploymentofextra-personalresources.Itwouldbemuchclosertothemarktosaythat,undertheindividualistprerogative,eachindividualmaydevoteherlife–asitdevelopsthroughherongoingpurposiveengagementofherpersonwithdiverseextra-personalmaterial–tohervaluedends.So,ratherthanexplicatingtheindividualistprerogativemerelyintermsofwhoeachindividualmaydevotetotheattainmentofhergood,weshouldexplicateitmorebroadlyintermsofwhateachindividualmaydevotetotheattainmentofhergood–where,foreachindividual,thespecifiedresourcesforpermissibleactionwillincludeherperson.Whatisalsowithintheambitofanygivenindividual’spreroga-tivearetheextra-personalmaterialsthatshehaspurposivelyincorporatedintoherlifeorthatshecanpurposivelyincorporateintoherlifewithouttherebyinterferingwithanyotherindividuals’dispositionofextra-personalmaterialsthattheyhaveincor-poratedintotheirownlives.Whatisnotwithintheambitofagivenindividual’sprerogativeareotherpersonsandtheextra-personalmaterialstheyhaverespectivelyincorporatedintotheirownlives.Theindividualistprerogativepermitshertodirectherlife–notmerelytodirectherperson–toherownends.Sheneednotdiminishthatlifeinordertoenhancethelivesofothers.But,sincetheprerogativedoesnotencompassthepermissibilityofanyindividualdiminishingthelivesofothersinordertoenhanceherown,theambitoftheprerogativedoesnotincludeotherpersonsandtheextra-personalmaterialthattheyhaveintegratedintotheirrespectivelives.Intuitively,thepictureissimplythatofthepermissibilityofindividualsoutthereintheworld,livingtheirlivesastheyseefitinlargemeasurethroughtheacquisition,use,transformation,retention,exchange,consumption,anddisposalofextra-personalmaterial.Itshould,onreflection,benosurprisethatapersonalprerogative–especiallyarobustpersonalprerogative–willaffirmnotjustthemorallibertyofeachtodis-poseofherpersonassheseesfitbutwill,morebroadly,affirmthemorallibertyofeachtoliveherworld-interactivelifeassheseesfit.Althougheachactualpersoniswithintheambitofherprerogativetoliveherlifeassheseesfit,whatparticularextra-personalmaterialwillcomeundertheambitofherprerogativewilldependuponwhatextra-personalmaterialthatagentactuallypermissiblyincorporateswithinherdevelopinglife.Theprerogativeisaprerogativetoacquire,use,transform,retain,exchange,consume,andotherwisedisposeofextra-personalmaterialthatisnotalready–ornotuntilthepointofsomevoluntaryexchange–withintheambitofanyother’slikeprerogative.Thereisnopre-ordainedshareofextra-personalmaterial–notevenanypreordainedshareofnaturalextra-personalmaterial–thatdefinesthescopeofeachindividual’spermissibleendeavors.Thereisnomoresomeantecedentruleabouttheproperorfairorrightfuldistributionofextra-personalmaterial–evennaturalextra-personalmaterial–thanthereisan13antecedentruleabouttheproperorfairdistributionofpersonalresources.Recall,however,thatevenasweconstruetheindividualistprerogativeasliber-atingnotmerelypersonsbutpersons’world-interactivelives,thatliberationisonlyfromthemoralrequirementthattheythemselvesforegogainsintheirlivesinordertopromotegainsinthelivesofothers.Aswehaveseen,byitselfthisliberationfromself-imposedlosses,leaveseachindividualentirelysubjecttothesameorsimilarother-imposedlosses.Thebareprerogativeleaveseachindividualentirelysubjecttointerferenceswiththeexerciseofherprerogative.So,theprerogativebyitselffailstosatisfyitsrationaleofthoroughlyliberatingtheindividualfromsubordinationtoIndividualismandLibertarianRights131\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page132externalviewpoints.Whatisalsoneededforthatrationaletobesatisfiedarerights-correlativerestrictionsagainstinterferencewiththeexerciseofthatprerogative.Whatisneededisastructureofrightsthatimmunizestheindividualinherchosenlife-constitutingworld-interactiveendeavors.Suchastructureofrightswillincludeboththerightofself-ownershipandtherighttothepracticeofprivateproperty.Thefor-merprotectstheperson–fromtheoutersurfaceofherskininward–inthecourseofherendeavors.Thelatterprotectsherlifeendeavorsbymorallysecuringforhertheresultsofherprerogative-sanctionedacquisitions,transformations,retentions,exchanges,anddispositions.So,e.g.,Aneednotkeepthatgatheredacornwithinhersweatygraspinorderforotherstoberequirednottoseizeit,andBneednotintroducehisbodybetweentheobjecthehastradedforandthosewhocovetitinorderforthemtoberequiredtorespecthisdominionoverit.Thismoralprotectionofagents’world-interactiveendeavorsisaccomplishedthroughasystemofrulesthatspecifyjustwhatprocessesofacquisition,transformation,exchange,andsoonconferownershiponthepartoftheagenttotheresultingholdings.Therightthatindi-vidualshavewhichaccomplishestheirmoralliberationasworld-interactiveagentsfromsubordinationtoexternalviewpointsistherighttoothers’respectfortheentitlementsthattherulescomprisingsuchapracticeofprivatepropertyconfer.Theargumentheretoforehasfocusedontheneedtoincludesucharighttothepracticeofprivatepropertyformoralitytoaccomplishtheliberationofindividualsfromother-imposedsubordinationtoexternalviewpoints.Inadditiontothismoralliberation,therearetheexcellentconsequencesofgeneralrecognitionandcompli-ancewiththerulesconstitutiveofsuchapractice.Thatgeneralrecognitionandcom-plianceprovidesindividualswithactual,predictableliberationfromother-imposedsubordination.Ittherebyprovidesindividualswiththeincentivetoengageintheprotectedendeavorsofacquisition,transformation,exchange,andsoon.Further,thisstructureofprivaterightsextendsthelibertytodeterminehowanyparticularresourcewillbeusedtotheagentwhohasthemostspecificinformationabouttheusefulpropertiesofthatresource–orenablestheagentwiththatinformationtobecomethepartywiththeprotectedlibertyofchoosingitsdisposition.Thisisgoodfortheindividualwhoseworld-interactiveendeavorsareprotected;anditisgoodforthosecomparablyshieldedindividualswhointeractdirectlyorindirectlywiththeprotectedindividual.Toputitascontentiouslyaspossible,itisgoodfortheagentstohavetheircapitalistactsprotected;anditisalsogoodforthosesimilarlyshieldedindividualswhointeractwiththosecapitalistsas,e.g.,employeesorcustomersorsuppliersorimitators.Thecontentionisthattheprotectionofcapitalistactsreleasesarisingtidethatatleaststronglytendstoelevateall(whoarewillingtoswimwithitorwhomswimmersarewillingtotowalong).Itisworthmentioningoneadditionalconnectionbetweentheteleologicalanddeonticfacetsofmoralindividualism.Theteleologicalfacetwithitsfocusontheagent-relativityofvalueanditsendorsementoftheindividualistprerogativeinvolvestherejectionofanyagent-neutralistmeasureofalternativesocialstates.Ittherebyundercutsanyattempttoadjudicatedisputesaboutwhichoftwoormoreincompatibleactions–e.g.,AscratchinghernosewithherrightindexfingerandBusingthatfingertoseasonastew–bydeterminingwhichofthoseactionsyields(orisexpectedtoyield)theagent-neutrallybetteroveralloutcome.Intheabsenceofsuchateleologicaladjudicationofsuchdisputes,howcantherebeanypublic,132EricMack\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page133interpersonallysoundadjudication?Theansweris,bydeterminingwhohastherightoverand,hence,therighttodisposeassheorheseesfitoftheresourceattherootofthedispute–e.g.,whoastherightoverA’srightindexfinger.Acomprehensivestructureofindividualrightsprovidesacomprehensivealternativeapproachtotheadjudicationofsuchdisputesbydisaggregatingthedecision-makingauthorityovertheresourcesoverwhichthereiscontention.Underthisdisaggregationofdecision-makingauthority,oneparticulardeploymentofagivenresourcecanbesaidtobefavoredbymorality–butonlyinthesensethatitisthedeploymentchosenbytheagentwhohastitleoverthatresource.AdisputebetweenAandBaboutwhichofthemshouldhaveauthorityoversomecurrentlyunownedobjectwill,ofcourse,notberesolvablebyappealtoexistingtitles.Suchadisputecanonlyberesolvedbyoneofthepartiesacquiring(throughinitialacquisitionorexchange)thesoughtafterobjectinaccordancewiththerulesoftheapplicablepractice–whichwillincluderulesagainstacquisitionthroughconductthatviolatesthealreadyexistingrightsofothers.Circumventingoftheneedforasharedsocialevaluationofcontentiousactionbythisdisaggregationofdecision-makingauthoritydefusessocialconflictbyallowingeachtodisposeofhimselfandhisownwithoutthepresumptionthatallendorsethechosendispositions.BcanconcedethatAhastherighttodeterminebyherchoicehowA’sfingerwillbeusedwithoutatallbetrayinghisbeliefthatitwouldbefarbetterforthefingertobeusedinseasoningthatstewthaninscratchingA’snose.BcanconcedethatAhastherighttodeterminebyherchoicehowanyofherbodilypartsareemployedwithoutatalltraducinghisconvictionthatA’schosenemploymentiswicked.BcanconcedethatAhastherighttosacrificehercalves–thebovinesort–inthecourseofherreligiousriteswithoutatallbetrayinghisbelief14thatGodabhorssuchsacrificialrites.Anabidingfeatureofliberalindividualism–andmorespecificallyofmoralindividualism–isthedeep-seatedrejectionoftheideaofasharedsubstantivesocialendorhierarchyofendstowhichallmembersofsocietyaretobedevoted.Themoreseriousthisrejectionofasharedsocialendthatissupposedtoorderandcoordinateourlives,themoreseriousmustbetheturntoastructureofrightsthatprotectsindividualsinthepursuitoftheirownvaluedends,oftheirownconceptionsofthegood,and–notaccidentally–thatprovidesaframeworkwithinwhichindividualscannon-sacrificiallycoordinatetheirown15chosenendeavors.V.ASelf-OwnershipProvisoLockeandNozickfollowingLockeattachaLockeanProvsiototheirdoctrinesofself-ownershipandprivateentitlements.Suchaprovisorendersimpermissiblesomeactionsthatwouldotherwisecountaslegitimateexercisesofrights,e.g.,certaininstancesofownerAexcludingindividualBfromdrinkingfromA’swaterhole.Suchaprovisotakessomeofthesharpedgeoffoflibertariandoctrine.IbelievethatLockeandNozickarecorrecttoadoptsuchaproviso,butthattheydonotproperlytietheirprovisostotheclaimsofself-ownership.Theadoptionofaprovisowithaspecificgroundingandcharacterisanimportantissueforlibertariantheory–andfortherelationshipbetween“right”and“left”libertarianism.Forthisreason,IpausebeforeIndividualismandLibertarianRights133\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page134myconcludingsectiontoindicatebrieflyhowaprovisomaybefoundeduponthesamerecognitionofindividualsasworld-interactiveagentsthatgroundstherightto16thepracticeofprivateproperty.HereIwillconsideronlythemostobviousandsimpleapplicationofaproviso,viz.,itsapplicationtotheexerciseofpropertyrightsthathavearisenthroughtheinitialacquisitionofnaturalmaterial.Thecrucialintuitiveideaisthat,becauseindividualsareworld-interactiveagents,theirself-ownershiprightscanbecontravenednotonlybytrespassesupontheirpersonsbutalsobysomeactionsthatblockthemfrompurposivelybringingtheirself-ownedpowerstobearontheextra-personalworld.IfAgentlyencasessleepingBwithinacapsulecomposedofA’smoldableplasticandrefusestoreleaseB,AnullifiesB’sself-ownedworld-interactivepowersandcontravenesB’sself-ownership.Thequestionis,whatotherdispositionsofrightfulholdingsbysomeindividualssimilarlycontravenetheself-ownershiprightsofotherindividuals?Ithinktheroughshod,butcorrect,libertarianansweris,dispositionsthatonnetleaveindi-vidualswithanenvironmentlessopentotheirbringingtheirpowerstobearinpursuitoftheirendsthanthoseindividualswouldfacewereindividualsunabletoestablishprivatepropertyrights.Solelyasaroughillustration,considerthecaseoffirstarriverstoapreviouslyunownedregionandtheirsubsequentdispositionofthepropertytheyobtainthroughinitialacquisition.Thefirstarrivers’establishmentofpropertyrightsblockslaterarriversfrombringingtheirpowerstobearbywayofinitialacquisition.However,thatinitialestablishmentofpropertymaywell,inotherways,increasethelaterarrivers’opportunitiestobringtheirpowerstobearintheserviceoftheirendsoverwhatthoseopportunitieswouldhavebeenhadfirstarriversandlaterarriversnotbeenmorallyempoweredtoestablishpropertyrightsoverthosenaturalmaterials.Withouttheirintendingtheiractionstohavethisresult,thepioneersandtheirestablishmentofinitialentitlementsmaywellcreateaworldthatisonnetmorehospitabletotheendeavorsoftheindividualsinthesubsequentwavethanthoseindividualswouldencounterwereindividualsinallwavespecludedfromestablishingprivatetitles.Itisverymisleadingtothinkthatthosewhoarrivefirstandengageininitialacquisitiondowellintheirpioneeringendeavorsattheexpenseofthosewhogettofollowinthepathstheyhaveblazed.Surelyall(oralmostall)ofwepath-followersarebetteroffthanwewouldhavebeenhadwe–notothers–hadtobethefirstacquiring17pioneers.(ThinkofhowmuchmorehospitableHongKongwasinthelastdecadesofthetwentiethcenturytoinnumerablewavesoflaterarriversthanitwouldhavebeenhadearlierarriversnotbeenabletoestablishprivatepropertyrights.)Nevertheless,stillfocusingontheeasycasesoffirstversussubsequentarrivers,thefirstarriversmightsoactastorendertheworldtheyhaveenteredlesshospitableonnettolaterarriversbringingtheirpowerstobearintheserviceoftheirends.Thefirstarriversmight,e.g.,devotemuchoftheirtimeandenergytobuildingbarrierstopreventthelandingofsecondandthirdwaves.Iftheydoso,theywouldactinviolationoftheself-ownershipproviso;theblockedimmigrantswouldhaveacaseonthebasisoftheirlibertarianrightsagainstsuchblockingactions.Awell-developedrights-orientedlibertariantheorywouldspellouthowsuchaprovisowouldapplytothehistoricallycomplexworldinwhichwelive–asitwouldaddressallthosequestionsaboutwhatsortofpoliticalandlegalinstitutionsthatworkedouttheory18wouldlegitimate.134EricMack\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page135VI.ConclusionIhavemaintainedthattherationalityandmoralpermissibilityofindividualspursuingtheirowndistinctendsintheirownchosenwaysandthepossessionbyindividualsoftherightsofself-ownershipandprivatepropertythatcharacteristicallyprotectindi-vidualsintheirchosenpursuitsaretwodistinctdirectiveimportsoftherootideaoftheseparate,freestandingimportanceofeachindividual’slifeandwell-being.Thelinkagebetweenthefirst(teleological)importandthesecond(deontic)importhasbeensupportedbyshowingwhyanormativecodethatincludesarobustpreroga-tivethatallowstheindividualtoeschewimposingsacrificesonherselfmustbealsoincludebroadrestrictionsonothersthatforbidthemfrominterferingwiththeindividual’sexerciseofthatprerogative.Therightsthatarecorrelativetothoserestric-tionsarethelibertarianrightsofself-ownershipandprivateproperty.Moreover,thelinkagebetweenthatrobustprerogativeandthoserightsistheirsharedrationale–whichisnothingbuttheseparateimportanceofeachindividual’slifeandwell-being.Finally,Ihavegesturedtowardacomplicationwithinlibertarianrightsdoctrine–theself-ownershipproviso–whichallowsthelibertariantheoristtoexplaintheimpermissibilityofcertaindispositionsofholdingsthatotherwiseappeartobepermissibleonlibertariangrounds.Notes1IgratefullyacknowledgesupportforportionsoftheworkonthisessaythatIhavereceivedthroughgrantsfromtheEarhartFoundationandtheMurphyInstituteofPoliticalEconomyatTulaneUniversity.2Ofcourse,forsomeAsandsomeBs,enhancementsofB’sgoodareinstrumentallyorevenconstitutivelyconducivetoA’sgood.Thegoodofparticularindividualsdoesnotobtaininatomicisolation.3JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice,1stedn(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971),p.23.4SeeATheoryofJustice,22–7andRobertNozick,Anarchy,StateandUtopia(NewYork:BasicBooks,1974),pp.32–3.5.SamuelScheffler,TheRejectionofConsequentialism(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1982).6.MyresponsetoSchefflerappearsinmorelengthyforminEricMack,“Prerogatives,Restrictions,andRights,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy22(1)(Winter2005):357–93.ForanearlierandsimilarcriticismofScheffler,seeLawrenceAlexander,“SchefflerontheIndependenceAgent-CenteredPrerogativesfromAgent-CenteredRestrictions,”JournalofPhilosophy84(1987):277–83.7.TheRejectionofConsequentialism,p.57,emphasisadded.8.IftherearesignificantpersonalcostsforagentBwhowouldbeimposingthesacrificeuponA,thenB’sprerogativewillrenderitpermissibleforBtoeschewimposingthesacrificeuponA.However,itstillcouldeasilybethecasethatagentC,theback-upagentforsocialoptimization,shouldstepinandimposeuponBthecostly(toB)actofimposingcostsuponA.9.Asidefromhisdenialthattherationaleforanyprerogativewouldalsobearationaleforaccompanyingrestrictions,Scheffleroffersanumberofgroundsfordisbeliefinrights-correlativerestrictions.Oneishisunshakeableconvictionthatitisalwaysatleastpermissibletoengageinsociallyoptimalaction.FromthisitfollowsthattherecanbeIndividualismandLibertarianRights135\nCDIC07.qxd2/4/0915:46Page136norightagainstbeingsubjecttosuchaction.AnothergroundforSchefflerishisbeliefthatdeonticrightsareparadoxicalbecause–aseveryfriendofdeonticrightsinsists–theyforbidactsthatviolatethoserightsevenifthoseactswouldminimizetheoverallviolationofrights.10.ShellyKagan,“DoesConsequentialismDemandTooMuch?,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs13(1984):239–54.11.SeeEricMack,“Self-OwnershipandtheRightofProperty,”TheMonist73(4)(October1990):519–43.12.WhenIsaythatindividualshavearighttothepracticeofprivatepropertyIdonotmeanthatindividualshavearightthatsuchapracticebeinventedanddeliveredtothem.Rather,Imeanthat,shouldsuchapracticehavecometoexistwithinanindividual’ssocialorder,that(lucky)individualwillhavearighttoothers’compliancewithitsconstitutivenorms.Furthermore,hadasomewhatdifferentsetofnormsevolvedinthatsocialorder–butstillasetthatqualifiesasapracticeofprivateproperty–theindividualsinhabitingthatorderwouldhaverightstoothers’compliancewiththenormsconstitutingthatpractice.13.HereImarkmyoppositiontothe“left-libertarian”attempttocombineadoctrineofself-ownershipwithadoctrineoforiginalrightstoequalshares–orequaljointownershipof–naturalextra-personalobjects.ForadvocacyofthisviewseePeterVallentyne’scon-tributiontothisvolume.Forsomecriticismofit,asithasbeenadvancedbyHillelSteiner,seethesection“AgainstLeft-WingLiberalism”(pp.12–20)inEricMack,“Right-WingLiberalism,Left-WingLiberalism,andtheSelf-OwnershipProviso”inKarl-HeinzLadeur,ed.,LiberalInstitutions,EconomicConstitutionalRights,andtheRoleofOrganizations(Baden-Baden:NomosVerlagsgesellschaft,1997),pp.9–29.14.JohnLocke,ALetterConcerningToleration(Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishing,1983),p.42.15.Onhowasystemof“rulesofjustconduct”thatlargelyoperatestospecifywhatismineandwhatisthineistheculturallyevolvedsolutiontotheproblemofhowindividualswhoradicallydifferfromoneanotherintheirvalues,preferences,beliefs,skills,andcircumstancescanlivetogethertomutualadvantage,seethefirsttwovolumesofF.A.Hayek’sLaw,Legislation,andLiberty–“RulesandOrder”(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1973)and“TheMirageofSocialJustice”(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1976),esp.pp.107–13ofthelatter.16.Acaseforthisself-ownershipprovisoisdevelopedinEricMack,“TheSelf-OwnershipProviso:ANewandImprovedLockeanProviso,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy12(1)(Winter1995),186–218andfurtherdevelopedinEricMack,“Self-Ownership,Marxism,andEgalitarianism:PartII”Politics,Philosophy,andEconomics1(2)(June2002):237–76,esppp.243–51.17.SeeDavidSchmidtz,TheLimitsofGovernment(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1991),Ch.2.18.Rights-basedlibertariantheorymustalsoaddresstheissueoftheabsolutenessofrights.Foronepreliminarydiscussion,seeEricMack,“Non-AbsoluteRightsandLibertarianTaxation,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy23(2)(Jul.2006):109–41.136EricMack\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page137CHAPTEREIGHTLeft-LibertarianismandLibertyPeterVallentyneIshallformulateandmotivatealeft-libertariantheoryofjustice.Likethemorefamiliarright-libertarianism,itholdsthatagentsinitiallyfullyownthemselves.Unlikeright-libertarianism,itholdsthatnaturalresourcesbelongtoeveryoneinsomeegalitarianmanner.Left-libertarianismis,Iclaim,aplausibleversionofliberalegalitarianismbecauseitissuitablysensitivetoconsiderationsofliberty,security,andequality.1.JusticeIshallbeformulatingaleft-libertarianismtheoryofjustice,buttheterm“justice”isusedinseveraldifferentways.HereIshallunderstanddutiesofjusticetobedutiesthatwemorallyowesomeone.Justiceinthissenseisconcernedwithavoidinginter-personalwrongs(i.e.,actionsthatviolatesomeone’srights),butnotwithimpersonalwrongs(i.e.,actionsthatarewrongwhetherornottheywronganyone;e.g.,perhaps,destroyingculturalrelicswhennooneisharmedandeveryoneconsents).Aslongasrightsareunderstoodbroadlyasperhapsprotantoandhighlyconditionalcon-straintsprotectingtheholder’sinterestorherwill,justiceinthissenseisabroadtopic.Itissensitivetoallmoralissuesaffectingthemoralpermissibilityofactions,exceptthoseissuesthatarerelevantonlytoimpersonalduties(which,bydefinition,arenotsensitivetotheinterestsorwillsofindividuals).Inwhatfollows,referencestowhatispermittedshouldbeunderstoodasreferencestowhatispermittedbyjustice.Anactionissopermittedifandonlyifitviolatesnoone’srights.2.LibertarianismLibertarianismissometimesadvocatedasaderivativesetofrules(e.g.,onthebasisofruleutilitarianismorcontractarianism).Here,however,IreservethetermfortheContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page138naturalrightsdoctrinethatagentsinitiallyfullyownthemselvesinasensethatIshallclarifybelow.Allformsoflibertarianismendorsefullself-ownership.Theydifferwithrespecttothemoralpowersthatindividualshavetoacquireownershipofexternalthings.Thebest-knownversionsoflibertarianismareright-libertariantheories(e.g.,thatofNozick1974),whichholdthatagentshavearobustmoralpowertoacquirefullprivatepropertyinnaturalresources(e.g.,space,land,minerals,air,andwater)withouttheconsentof,oranysignificantpaymentto,othermembersofsociety.Left-libertarianism,bycontrast,holdsthatnaturalresourcesbelongtoeveryoneinsomeegalitarianmannerandthuscannotbeappropriatedwithouttheconsentof,orsignificantpaymentto,othermembersofsociety.Below,Ishallfirstexaminethecontentanddefendtheplausibilityoffullself-ownership.Followingthat,Ishalldiscusstheroleoflibertyandsecurityinlibertariantheory.Finally,Ishalldiscussthemoralpowersthatagentshavetoappropriateunownedresources.Ishallsuggest–butwithoutelaboratedefense–thataversionofleft-1libertarianismoffersthemostplausibleaccountofthesemoralpowers.3.FullSelf-OwnershipLibertarianismiscommittedtothethesisoffullself-ownership(foragents),accordingtowhicheachagent,atleastinitially(e.g.,priortoanywrongdoingsorcontractualagreements),morallyfullyownsherself.Theroughideaoffullself-ownershipisthatofhavingallthemoralrightsoveroneselfthatanownerofaninanimatething(e.g.,acar)hasoveritunderthestrongestformofprivateownershipofinanimatethings.Theroughideaisalsothatafullself-ownermorallyhasalltherightsoverherselfthataslave-ownerlegallyhasoveraslaveunderthestrongestpossiblelegalform2ofprivateslave-ownership.Throughout,weareconcernedwithmoralself-ownershipasopposedtolegalself-ownership.Weareconcerned,thatis,withaparticularsetofmoralrightsindependentlyofwhetherthesearerecognizedbyanylegalsystem.TheslavesoftheantebellumU.S.A.werelegalslaves,butmorallyspeaking,onthelibertarianview,theyfullyownedthemselves.Indeed,itisbecausetheymorallyfullyownedthemselvesthatlegalinvoluntaryslaverywassuchagreatinjustice.Ownershipofathingisasetofrightsoverthatthing,andthecorerightistherighttocontroluseofthatthing.Forthesepurposes,useisunderstoodbroadlytoincludeallthewaysthatagentscanphysicallyimpactuponanobject.Possession,occupation,incursion,intrusion,disposition,alteration,anddestructionareformsofuseinthisstipulativesense.Anagenthasfullself-ownershipjustincaseshefullyownsherself.Thisissimplythespecialcaseoffullownership,wheretheownerandtheentityownedarethesame.Assumingthatone’sbodyispartofoneself,thisentailsthatoneownsone’sbody.Fullownershipofanentityconsistsofafullsetofthefollowingownershiprights:(1)controlrightsovertheuseoftheentity(bothaliberty-righttouseitandaclaim-rightthatothersnotuseit),(2)rightstocompensation(whensomeoneusestheentitywithoutone’spermission),(3)enforcementrights(ofpriorrestraintifsomeoneisabouttoviolatetheserights),138PeterVallentyne\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page139(4)rightstotransfertheserightstoothers(bysale,rental,gift,orloan),and(5)immunitiestothenon-consensuallossoftheserights.Fullownership,likeownershipgenerally,isabundleofparticularrights.Itissimply3thelogicallystrongestsetofownershiprightsoverathing.Ownershipcancomeinvariousdegreesandformsandfew,ifany,legalsystemsrecognizefullownershipinthissense.Onecan,forexample,havefullcontrolrightsoverathingwithouthavingrightstotransferthoserights.Thethesisoffullself-ownershipdoesnotclaimthatownershipiseitherallornothing.Itclaimsthat,asamatterofnormativefact,4agentsfullyownthemselvesasopposedtosomethingweakerornotatall.Thereare,ofcourse,differentconceptionsofrights.Somearguethatrightsprotectchoiceswhereasothersarguethatrightsprotectinterests.Forbrevityofexpression,inwhatfollows,Ishallassumeachoice-protectingconceptionofrights.Thisishowownershiprightsarenormallyunderstoodandhowrightsarenormallyunderstoodbylibertarians.Myownviewisthatrightsprotectbothchoicesandinterestswiththeformerbeinglexicallyprior.Introducingthisview,would,however,introduce5needlesscomplexitiesforthepurposesofthispaper.Sofar,wehaveconsideredthecontentoftheconceptoffullself-ownership.Letusnowconsideritsplausibility.Ishouldemphasizethatmygoalisverymodest:toprovideareasonablyplausiblerationaleforendorsingfullself-ownership.Aswithallfundamentalmoralprinciples,itisimpossibletoprovideacompellingjustification.Mygoalissimplytoprovideenoughdefenseoffullself-ownershiptoestablishthatitneedstobetakenseriouslyasamoralprinciple.Fullself-ownershipisthethesisthatonehas,inafullest(orstrongest)mannerpossible,controlrights,compensationrights,enforcementrights,transferrights,andimmunityrightsoveroneself(e.g.,one’sbody).Mostpeopleacceptsomeformofpartialself-ownership.Itcanbepartialinthesensethatonlysomeoftheabovetypesofrightsarepresentoritcanbepartialinthesensethattheforceoftherights,foragivenelement,islessthanfull.Moreover,theforceofarightcanbelessthanfullintwodistinctways.Oneisthattherightmaynotbeconclusive(orabsolute)inthesensethatitsinfringementisalwayswrong.Therightscouldbemerelyprotantomoralconsiderations,or(morestrongly)protantoconsiderationsthatarelexicallypriortoimpersonalconsiderations(i.e.,thatareweighedagainstothercon-flictingrightsbuttrumpimpersonalconsiderations).Thesecondwaythattheforceofarightcanbelessthanfullisbybeingconditional(holdingonlyundercertainconditions).Forexample,therightnottobekilledmightbeconclusive(absolute)butapplyonlywherenosocialcatastropheisatissue.Below,Ishallattempttodefendfullself-ownership(conclusiveandunconditionalrightsforeachofthefourelements).Afallbackpositionistodefendsomeformofpartialself-ownership(e.g.,controlself-ownershipinsomeprotantoand/orcondi-tionalform).This,however,wouldbeadeparturefromlibertarianisminthestrictsense.Weshallconsiderthesecurityrights,libertyrights,transferrights,andimmunitiestolossthatarepartoffullself-ownership.(Hereweleaveasidethecompensationandenforcementrights,sincethereisindeterminacywithrespecttotheseinthecon-ceptoffullownership.)Considerfirst,thesecurityrightsthatarepartofthecontrolrightsofownership.Theseareclaimrightsagainstinterferencewithone’sperson.Left-LibertarianismandLiberty139\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page140Thesecurityrightsofself-ownershipare,Iclaim,aplausibleconstraintonhowagentsmaybetreatedbyothers.Agentsarenotmerelyobjectsintheworld.Theyhavemoralstandingandarecapableofautonomouschoices.Asaresult,theyhaveakindofmoralprotectionagainstinterferencethatlimitshowtheymaybeused.Forexample,itisunjusttokillortortureinnocentpeopleagainsttheirwill–nomatterhowmuchitpromotesotherimportantmoralgoals(equality,totalutility,orwhatever).Thesecurityrightsoffullself-ownershipreflectthisspecialstatusthatagentshave.Ofcourse,somedeny–asactconsequentialistsdo–thatthereareanynon-goal-basedconstraintsonhowindividualsmaybetreated.Evenifoneagreesthattherearesomesuchconstraints,however,onemightstilldenythatindividualshaveanyrightsagainstbeingsotreated.Instead,onemightholdthatthereissimplyanimpersonalduty(owedtonoone)nottotreatpeopleincertainways.Suicideandgaysex,forexample,maybewrongevenwhenconsensual,intheinterestsoftheindividuals,anddonebyadultsinprivate.Itiscertainlypossible(indeedheldbysome)toholdthatallconstraintsareimpersonalconstraints,butitisaveryilliberalview.First,itfailstorecognizethatcertainformsoftreatment(suchaskillingorassault)arenotmerelywrong–theywrongtheindividualssotreated.Second(andcloselyrelated),itfailstorecognizethatthevalidconsent(oralternativelynon-set-backoftheinterests)ofanindividualtobetreatedinvariousways(e.g.,bekilledortouched)issufficienttoremovethemoralforceofthatconstraint.Thepurposeofconstraintsistoprotectindividualsfromcertainkindsofinterferenceintheirlives.Ifapersonhasvalidly(e.g.,informedlyandfreely)consentedtoacertaintreatment(e.g.,beingpunchedaspartofaboxingmatch),thenthereisnothingmorallywrongwithsuchtreatmentifothersarenotadverselyaffected.Theconstraintsprotectingindividuals,thatis,arerights-based,ratherthanimpersonalconstraints.Evenifoneagreesthatindividualshavealltherightsofself-ownership,onemightstillinsistthattherightshaveonlyaprotanto(allelsebeingequal)forceand/orareonlyconditional(e.g.,whennosocialcatastropheisinvolved).Libertarianism(ofthestandardsorthereconsidered),however,holdsthatrightsareconclusive(abso-6lute)andunconditional.Sounderstood,thethesisoffullself-ownershipissubjecttothepowerfulobjectionthatitentailsthatitiswrongtoslightlyinjureapersoninordertosavemillionsoflives.Thisisindeedanimplicationoftheviewanditisadmittedlyverydifficulttoswallow.Clearly,reasonableanddecentpeoplewouldtypicallyinfringethesecurityrightsofself-ownershipinsuchcases.Thisdoesnot,however,establishthatitisjusttodoso.Itmaysimplybethatitisreasonabletobehaveunjustlyinsuchextremecircumstances.Indeed,thisiswhatIclaim.Forinsuchcases,alltheusualconcomitantsofinjusticearestillpresent.Guiltisappropriateforwhatonedidtothesacrificedindividuals.Compensationisowedtotheindividual.Andsoon.Aslongaswerecognize,asIthinkweshould,thatreasonableanddecentpeoplesometimesactunjustlywhenthestakesaresufficientlygreat,theadmittedcounterintuitivenessofrecognizingconclusiveandunconditionalsecurityrightsofself-ownershipneednotbeaconclusiveobjection.Ofcourse,itremainsasignificantcounterintuitiveimplication,butalltheorieshavesomesuchcounterintuitiveimpli-cations.Therealtestofatheoryisitsoverallplausibility–bothintheabstractandinapplicationoverabroadrangeofcases.Sometimesintuitivejudgmentsaboutcon-cretecasesmustberejectedinlightofplausibleabstractprincipledconsiderations.140PeterVallentyne\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page141Myclaimisthatthoseintuitionsthatconflictwiththethesisoffullself-ownershipshouldberejected.Sofar,wehaveconsideredthesecurityrightsthatarepartofthecontrolrightsoffullself-ownership.Letusnowconsiderthelibertyrightsthataretheotherpartofthesecontrolrights.Afullself-ownerhasafulllibertyrighttouseherperson.Thisdoesnotmeanthatsheispermittedtodoanythingthatshewantswithherperson.Clearly,usingherfisttopunchyouinthenoseisnotpermitted.Havingalibertyrighttouseone’spersononlymeansthatnooneelsehasanyclaim-rightonone’suseofone’spersonassuch.Thus,althoughIneedyourpermissionforittobepermissibletousethecarthatyouown,Idon’tneedtogetanyone’spermissiontousemypersontodrivethecar(asafullslavewould,andapartialslavemight).Thefullownershiplibertyrightsoveroneself,thatis,giveoneafulllibertytouseone’sperson,but,sinceeveryactioninvolvestheuseofotherresources(land,air,etc.),itleavesopen(dependingontheownershipoftheotherresources)whatactionsarejust.Thelibertyrightsofinitialfullself-ownershipreflecttheviewthatothersinitiallyhavenoclaimagainstusconcerningtheuseofourperson.Initially,wedonotrequiretheirpermission,noraretheirinterestsrelevant,inorderforustopermissiblyuseourpersonassuch–although,ofcourse,weneedtheirpermissiontouseresourcesthattheyown.Ofcourse,wecanlosesomeofourlibertyrightsoverourselvesthroughouractions–forexample,whenwecontracttoprovidepersonalservicesorviolatesomeone’srights.Havingfulllibertyrightstouseone’spersonhasthecounterintuitiveimplicationthatwehaveno(initial)dutytoprovidepersonalassistancetoothers.Themostprob-lematiccaseiswherewecouldavertasocialcatastrophe(e.g.,thedeathofmillionsofpeople)atonlyasmallpersonalcost(e.g.,pushabuttonsothataterroristbombdoesnotgooff).(Unlikethesecurityrightsissueabove,theissuehereconcernsthedutiesofagentstoprovidepersonalservices,whereasthesecurityrightsissuecon-cernedthepermissibilityofothersusingone’sperson.)Averysignificant,butsome-whatlessdramaticcaseisonewhereonecouldprovideagreatbenefittoasingleperson(e.g.,saveherlife)atonlyasmallpersonalsacrifice.Lesssignificant,butstilltroublesome,arecaseswhereonecouldprovideasmallbenefittoothersatasmallercosttooneselfaspartofacooperativeenterprisethatgenerallybenefitsall.Again,intheextremecasestheseareindeedpowerfulobjections.Nonetheless,Ibelievethattheirforcecanbeweakenedenoughtomakethempalatable–giventhegeneralplausibilityoftheviewthatweareinitiallyatlibertytouseourpersonasweplease.Letmeexplain.Thereareseveralwell-knownwaysofsofteningthisobjection.Oneistoagreethatitishighlymorallydesirablethatonehelpsinthesecases,buttoinsistthatonehasnoobligationtodoso.Weallagreethatthereissomethingmorallyflawedaboutnotprovidingpersonalserviceswhenthiswouldgreatlybenefitothersandimposeonlyasmallcostononeself.Notallmoralflaws,however,involvewrongdoing.Failingtohelpanelderlyneighborcarryhergrocerieswhensheishavingdifficultyandwecoulddosoeasilyisnotmorallyideal,butitisnottypicallymorallywrong.Asecondwayofsofteningtheobjectionistograntthatitmaybewrongtofailtoprovidepersonalservicestoothersinneed(etc.),butdenythattheyhaveanyrighttosuchhelp.Iftheyhavenoright–andnooneelsedoeseither–thenthereLeft-LibertarianismandLiberty141\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page142isnoinjusticeinfailingtoprovidetheservicesinquestion.Itisanimpersonalduty,butnotadutyowedtoanyone.Giventhatwearehereconcernedonlywiththetheoryofjustice–thedutiesweoweeachother–failuretorecognizeimpersonaldutiesisnotadefect.Thetopicofimpersonaldutiesissimplyatopicthatisnotbeingaddressed.BecauseIbelieve(butshallnothereargue)thattherearenoimpersonalduties,thisreplydoesnotseempromisingtome.Nonetheless,itisopentothosewhobelievethatthereareimpersonalduties.Yetanotherwaytosoftentheobjectionagainstfulllibertiestouseone’spersonistopointouttheradicalimplicationsofrecognizinganobligationtootherstohelpeveninthespecialcaseswherethebenefittothemisgreatandthecosttooneissmall.Fortherearetypicallyagreatnumberofpeople(poorpeople,severelydisabledpeople,orphans,etc.)thatwouldgreatlybenefitfromanhour’spersonalserviceperweek.Mostofusdenythatwehaveadutytoprovidesuchservice.Afinalandimportantwaytosoftentheobjectionagainsthavingfulllibertiestouseone’spersonistonotethattheclaimisonlythatindividualshavethisfulllibertyinitially(e.g.,atthestartofadultlife).Itcanbeweakenedorlostbyourchoicesovertime.Forexample,if,asIshallsuggestbelow,theuseorappropriationofmorethanone’sshareofnaturalresourcesgeneratesalimiteddutytopromoteequalityofeffectiveopportunity,thensomeofthefulllibertyrightsofself-ownershipwillbelostwhenoneusesorappropriatesmorethanone’sshare.Themoregeneralpointhereisthattheimplicationsoffullself-ownershipcannotbedeterminedwithoutknowinghowotherthingsareowned.Insum,Ifullyacknowledgethatthesecurityrightsandthelibertyrightsoffullself-ownershiphavesomesignificantcounterintuitiveimplications.Ontheotherhand,alltheorieshavesomesuchimplications,andthenormativeseparatenessofpersonsreflectedinfullsecurityrightsandfulllibertyrightshasgreattheoreticalappeal.Althoughitishighlycontroversial,Iclaim,thatonbalancethethesisoffullcontrolself-ownershipissufficientlyplausibletobetakenseriously.Evenifagentshavefullcontrolself-ownership(fulllibertyrightsandfullsecurityrights)overthemselves,itdoesnotfollowthatagentsfullyownthemselves.Thedeterminatecoreoffullself-ownershipincludestwoadditionalrightsthatmustbedefended:thefullpowertotransferthoserightstoothersandtheimmunitytonon-consensuallossexcept,perhaps,undercertainconditions.Considerfirsttheimmunitytonon-consensuallossofrights.Itholdsthatindividualslosetheirrightsofownershiponlyuptotheextentthattheyowecom-pensationfortheuseofotherresourcesortotheextenttheylosesomesecurityrightssoastomakeitpermissibletostopthemfromviolatingtherightsofothers.Thisleavesopenawiderangeofviewsbetweennolossandmaximumlosswithintheseconstraints.Moreover,theconstraintsonlossofrightsarealsofairlyplausible.Onedoesnot,forexample,becomesomeoneelse’sslavesimplyfortakinganapplefromhisproperty.Onemerelyowescompensation(trivialinmostcases)andonelosesonlythosesecurityrightsthatinterferewitheffectivewaysofstoppingonefromviolatingtheother’srights(onedoesnot,forexample,loseone’srighttolifewhenonecanbestoppedfromtheviolationsimplybybeingyelledat).Onemayloseone’srighttolifewhenbeingkilledistheonly(orperhapstheonlycosteffective)wayofstoppingonefromviolatingrights,butonedoesnotloserightsthatdonotinterferewithsuchprevention.142PeterVallentyne\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page143Morecontroversialisthefullpowertotransfertherightsofself-ownership.Thismeansthatonehasthemoralpowertosell,rent,loan,orgiveawayone’srightsoveroneself.Thisincludes,asanextremecase,therighttosell(orgift)oneselfintoslavery.Involuntaryenslavement,ofcourse,isagrossviolationoffullself-ownership,butvoluntaryenslavementissomethingthatfullself-ownershipallows.Intuitively,ofcourse,thisseemsproblematic.Oneobjectiontotherightofself-enslavementisthatthereisnosuchright,since7itisimpossibletotransferone’sagency(controlofone’sperson)toanother.Thecoreideaisthatitisimpossibletoalienateone’swill.Thisistruebutirrelevant.Onlyyoucanexerciseyouragency,butthatleavesopenwhethersomeoneelsehasmoralauthorityoveryouragency(i.e.,whetheryouhaveamoraldutytoobeysome-oneelse’scommands).Youcannottransferagency,butyoucantransferrightsoverthatagencyandtherebytransfertheauthorizingpowerofconsentconcerningtheuseoftheperson.WhenIsignacontracttomowyourlawn,Igiveyousomemoralauthorityovertheexerciseofmyagency.Itbecomeswrongformetofailtomowyourlawnascontractedwithoutyourconsent.Theissueconcernstransfersofrights–notofagency.Soadifferentargumentisneedediftherightsofself-ownershiparetobenon-transferable.Anotherobjectiontovoluntaryenslavementisthatitmakesone“ameretoolof8someoneelse’swill.”Theideahereisthataslavehasnomoralagency,butnoagent(nobeingthathasthepsychologicalcapacityforagency)canbewithoutmoralagency(moralresponsibility).Hence,morallylegitimateenslavementisnotpossible.Thefirstpremissofthisargument,however,isfalse.Slavesarestillmoralagents.First,slavesmayownexternalproperty.Aslaveissomeonewhoisownedbysomeoneelse.Thisiscompatiblewiththeslaveowningsomethings(althoughadmittedlyhisuseofthosethingswillbesubjecttohisowner’swill).Second,slavesstillhavemoralduties.Forexample,theyhavemoralobligationstotheirowners.Moreover,slaveshaveallthenormaldutiestootherpeople(e.g.,nottokillthem).Apersoncantransfersomeofherrightstosomeoneelse,butshecan’ttransferherinterpersonaldutiestoothersunlessthepersontowhomthedutyisowedconsents.Intypicalcases,thepeopletowhomthedutiesareoweddonotconsenttoanytransferofdutiesand,hence,typicallyslaveshaveallthenormaldutiestoothers.Slaveshavefewerrights,buttheydonotautomaticallyhavefewerduties.Adeeperpointtonoteisthatfullself-ownershiponitsowndoesnotentailthatvoluntaryenslavementispermittedbyjustice.Fullself-ownershipincludesthemoralpowertotransferone’srightsoveroneself,butitdoesnotensurethatothershavethemoralpowertoacquirethoserights.Transferofrightsfromonepersontoanother(byexchangeorbygift)requiresthatboththatthetransferorhavethepowertotransfertherightsandconsentstodosoandthatthetransfereehavethemoralpowertoacquiretherightsandconsentstodoso.Fullself-ownershipisthuscompatiblewithnoonehavingthepowertoacquirebytransferrightsoveranotherperson.Fullself-ownershipensuresthatonehasthepowertorenounce(i.e.,abandon)one’srightsoveroneself(whichdoesnotrequirearecipient),andthatonehasthepowertocon-sensuallytransferone’srightstoanyonewhohasthepowertoreceivethem.Itdoesnot,however,requirethatanyonehavethepowertoreceivethem.Thatissuecon-cernsthepowersthatothershavewithrespecttoone’sperson(viz.thepowertoacquirerightsoveroneundercertainconditions).Ofcourse,mostlibertariansholdLeft-LibertarianismandLiberty143\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page144thatallagentsinitiallyhavethesepowerstoacquirerightsoverothers(aswellasovernaturalresourcesandartifacts),andsotheobjectionisindeedapplicabletomostversionsoflibertarianism.Thepointhereisthatthelegitimacyofvoluntaryenslavementdoesnotfollowfromself-ownershipalone.Itrequirescertainmoral9powerstoacquirerightsoverotherpersons.Finally,itisnotclearthatthemoralpossibilityofvoluntaryenslavementissoimplausible.Ifonethinksthatamainconcernofjusticeistoprotectthehavingofeffectiveautonomy,ortopromotethehaving,orexercising,ofeffectiveautonomy,thenvoluntaryenslavementwillindeedseemproblematic.Ontheotherhand,ifonethinksthatamainconcernofjusticeistoprotecttheexerciseofautonomy,itisnot.Awell-informeddecisiontoselloneselfintoslavery(e.g.,foralargesumofmoneytohelpone’sneedyfamily)isanexerciseofautonomy.Indeed,underdesperateconditionsitmayevenrepresentanextremelyimportantwayofexercisingone’sautonomy.Theparallelwithsuicideisrelevanthere.Inbothcasesanagentmakesadecisionthathastheresultthatsheceasestohaveanymoralautonomyandthusceasestoexerciseany.Inbothcasesitwilltypicallybeoneofthemostimportantchoicesintheagent’slife.Surely,assumingnoconflictingcommitments,protectingtheagent’sexerciseofherautonomyinsuchacaseoverridesanyconcernforpro-tectingorpromotinghercontinuedpossessionofmoralautonomy.Onehastherighttochoosetoceasetobeautonomous(bydyingorbylosingrightsofcontrol).Thus,genuinevoluntaryenslavementisnotproblematic.Itissimplythelimitingcaseofthesortsofpartialvoluntaryenslavementthatoccurswhenwemakebindingcom-10mitmentsandagreements(e.g.,tojointhemilitary).Iconclude,then,thatthethesisthatagentsinitiallyfullyownthemselvesissufficientlyplausibletobetakenseriously.Allformsoflibertarianismarecom-mittedtofullself-ownership.Theydifferwithrespecttothemoralpowersthatagentshavetouseandappropriatenaturalresources.Below,Ishalldefendaformofleft-libertarianism,whichholdsthatnaturalresourcesaretobeusedtopromoteeffectiveequalityofopportunityforagoodlife.First,however,itwillbeusefultocommentontheroleoflibertyandsecurityinlibertariantheory.4.Freedom:LibertyandSecurityLibertarianismisconcernedwithfreedom.Itissometimesclaimedthatlibertarianismisthetheorythatmaximizesindividualfreedom.ShellyKagan(1994),however,hasinsightfullyshownthatatmostahighlyqualifiedversionofthisclaimistrue.Inthissection–whichdrawsheavilyonKagan’swork,butdoesnotpurporttorepre-senthisviews–Iclarifyhowlibertarianismisconcernedwithfreedom.Thefirstpointtonoteisthatlibertarianismisnotconcernedwithmaximizingthetotal(oraverage)freedomthatindividualshave.Atbest,itisconcernedwithmax-imizing(initial)freedomsubjecttotheconstraintthatallhaveequal(initial)freedom.Itisconcernedwithmaximumequalfreedom.Second,libertarianismisconcernedwithmoralfreedomasopposedtoempiricalfreedom.Itisconcernedwiththerangeofactionsthatindividualsaremorallypermittedtoperformandtherangeofinterferingactionsthatothersaremorallyprohibitedfromperforming–asopposedtotherangeofactionsthatindividualscan144PeterVallentyne\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page145actually(empirically)performandtheempiricalabsenceofinterferencebyothers.Libertarianismcondemns,forexample,imprisoninganinnocentpersonevenwherethisisaneffectivemeanstopromotingmaximumequalempiricalfreedom.Suchimpris-onmentisamorallyprohibiteduseofforceagainsttheperson.Libertarianismiscon-cernedwithgivingeveryonemaximumequalmoralfreedomandnotwithmaximumequalempiricalfreedom.Third,libertarianismisconcernedwithfreedominthebroadsensethatincludesbothnegativefreedom(freedomfrominterferencefromothers)andpositivefreedom(freedomofaction).Thisisreflectedinitsendorsementofthetwokindsofcontrolrightsoffullself-ownership:Securityrightsoffullself-ownershipensurethatothersarenotpermittedtouseyourpersonagainstyourwillaslongasyouhavenotviolatedtherightsofothers(negativemoralfreedom).Libertyrightsoffullself-ownershipensurethatyouarepermittedtouseyourpersonasyouchooseaslongasdoingsodoesnotviolatetherightsothers(positivemoralfreedom).Individualscanhavemoralsecurityrightswithouthavinganysignificantmorallibertyrights.Forexample,every-onemighthaveadutytomaximizehappinessintheworldsubjecttotheconstraintagainstviolatinganyone’ssecurityrightsagainstforcibleinterference.Onecanalsohavelibertyrightswithoutanymoralsecurityrights.Forexample,everythingmightbemorallypermittedforeveryone.Libertarianismrejectsbothoftheseviews(aswellastheviewthatonehasneitherkindofright).Itholdsthatindividualshavestrongmoralsecurityrightsandstrongmorallibertyrightsandthatfullself-ownershipisthecoreofthebasisfortheserights.Finally,evenwherenoonehasviolatedanyrights,thereisanindeterminacyinlibertariantheoryconcerningsecurityrightsandlibertyrights(inadditiontotheone,notedabove,involvingcompensationrights,enforcementrights,andimmunitytoloss).Sofar,wehaveconsideredfullself-ownershipastheonlysourceoflibertyandsecurityrights.Fullself-ownership,however,iscompatiblewiththerestoftheworld(thenon-agentpartoftheworld)beingownedbyoneperson.Ifthisisso,thenothershaveeffectivelynofreedomofaction,since–althoughtheyhavefulllibertyrightsovertheirperson–theyhavenolibertyrightstouseotherthingsintheworld.Sinceallactionrequirestheuseofthingsinadditiontoone’sperson(e.g.,landtostandon,airtobreathe),otheragentshavenofreedomofaction(sinceanyactionrequiresthepermissionoftheowner).Alllibertarians,however,wanttoguar-anteeamorerobustinitialfreedomofaction.Thus,alllibertariansimposesomecon-ditionsontheinitiallibertyandsecurityrightsthatindividualshavetousenaturalresources.Libertariansalsoimposeconditionsunderwhichtheseinitialrightscanbemodifiedandindividualscanappropriatenaturalresources.Fullself-ownershipiscom-patiblewithmanydifferentpositionsonwhatmoralpropertyrightsindividualshave,orcanacquire,inexternalthings.Afulllibertariantheoryneedstospecifywhatlib-ertyrightsandsecurityrightsindividualshavebeyondthoseoffullself-ownership.5.NaturalResources:LibertyRightstoUseandMoralPowerstoAppropriateFullself-ownershipgivesagentscertainrightsoverthemselves.Thisleavesopen,however,whatrightsagentshavetousenon-agentresources(naturalresourcesandLeft-LibertarianismandLiberty145\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page146artifacts).Italsoleavesopenwhatmoralpowersagentshavetoacquireadditionalrights(overotheragents,naturalresources,andartifacts):powerstoacquirebycon-sensualtransfer(e.g.,bysaleorgift)andpowerstoacquirerightswithouttheconsentofothers(e.g.,unilateralappropriationofunownedresources).Theplausibilityofanygivenversionoflibertarianismdependscruciallyonitspositionontheseissues.Forsimplicity,Ishallfocussolelyonnaturalresourcesintheirinitialstate–thatis,allthenon-agentresourcesintheworldpriortomodificationbyagents.Moreover,Ishallfocusontherightstousethemandmoralpowerstoacquirenon-consensuallyrightsoverthem(appropriation).Aswillbecomeapparent,Ifavorahighlyegalitarianviewofrightsovernaturalresources.Thisviewishighlycontroversialandinneedofadefense.Myaimhere,however,ismodest.Imerelyhopetoarticulateandmotivatetheegalitarianstanceasawayofsettingthestageforthedebate.One(crazy)possibleviewholdsthatinitiallynoonehasanylibertyrighttouse,oranymoralpowertoappropriate,naturalresources.Aradicalversionofjoint-ownershipleft-libertarianism,forexample,holdsthatindividualsmayusenaturalresourcesonlywiththecollectiveconsent(e.g.,majorityorunanimous)ofthemembersofsociety.Giventhatallactionrequirestheuseofsomenaturalresources(land,air,etc.),thisleavesagentsnofreedomofaction(exceptwiththepermissionofothers),andthisisclearlyimplausible.Alessradicalversionofjoint-ownershipleft-libertarianismallowsthatagentsmayusenaturalresourcesbutholdsthattheyhavenomoralpowertoappropriatenaturalresourceswithoutthecollectiveconsentofthemembersofsociety(e.g.,Grunebaum1987).Althoughthisleavesagentsasignificantrangeoffreedomofaction,itleavestheminadequatesecurityintheirplansofaction.Theyhavethesecuritythatothersarenotpermittedtousetheirperson(e.g.,assaultthem)withouttheirconsent,buttheyhaveonlylimitedsecurityintheirpossessionsofexternalthings(exceptwiththeconsentofothers).Agentsarepermittedtocultivateandgatherapples,butothersarepermittedtotakethemwhenthisviolatesnorightsofself-ownership(e.g.,whentheycansimplytakethemfromthecollectedpile).Giventhecentralimportanceofsecurityofsomeexternalresources,itisimplaus-iblethatagentshavenopowertoappropriatewithouttheconsentofothers.Morespecifically,itismostimplausibletoholdthattheconsentofothersisrequiredforappropriationwhencommunicationwithothersisimpossible,extremelydifficult,orexpensive(asitalmostalwaysis).Andevenwhencommunicationisrelativelyeasyandcostless,thereisnoneedfortheconsentofothersaslongasoneappropriates11nomorethanone’sfairshare.Joint-ownershipleft-libertarianismisthusimplausible.Aplausibleaccountoflibertyrightsandpowersofappropriationovernaturalresourcesmust,Iclaim,beunilateralistinthesensethat,underabroadrangeofcir-cumstances(althoughperhapssubjecttovariousconditions),(1)agentsareinitiallypermittedtousenaturalresourceswithoutanyone’sconsent,and(2)agentinitiallyhavethepowertoappropriate(acquirerightsover)naturalresourceswithoutanyone’sconsent.Thisisjusttosaythatinitiallynaturalresourcesarenotprotectedbyapropertyrule(requiringconsentforpermissibleuseorappropriation).Accordingtoaunilateralistconceptionofthepowertoappropriate,agentswhofirstclaimrightsoveranaturalresourceacquirethoserights–perhapsprovidedthatcertainotherconditionsaremet.Theseadditionalconditionsmayincludesomekind146PeterVallentyne\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page147ofaninteractionconstraint(suchasthattheagent“mixedherlabor”withtheresourceorthatshewasthefirsttodiscovertheresource)andsomekindof“fairshare”con-straint.Inwhatfollows,forsimplicity,Ishallignoretheinteractionconstraintand12focusonthefairshareconstraint.Letus,then,considersomeunilateralistversionsoflibertarianism.Radicalright-libertarianism–suchasthatofRothbard(1978,1982),Narveson(1988:Ch.7;1999),andFeser(2005)–holdsthatthattherearenofairshareconstraintsonuseorappro-13priation.Agentsmaydestroywhatevernaturalresourcestheywant(aslongastheyviolatenoone’sself-ownership)andtheyhavethepowertoappropriatewhatevernaturalresourcestheyfirstclaim.Onthisview,naturalresourcesareinitiallynotmerelyunprotectedbyapropertyrule;theyarealsounprotectedbyacompensationliabilityrule.Thisview,however,isimplausible.Nohumanagentcreatednaturalresources,andthereisnoreasonthattheluckypersonwhofirstclaimsrightsoveranaturalresourceshouldreapallthebenefitthattheresourceprovides.Noristhereanyreasontothinktheindividualsaremorallypermittedtoruinormonopolizenaturalresourcesastheyplease.Somesortoffairshareconditionrestrictsuseandappropriation.ThestandardfairshareconditiononappropriationistheLockeanproviso,which14requiresthat“enoughandasgoodbeleftforothers.”Indeed,aslongasthisclauseisallowedtobeinterpretedloosely(asweshall),theLockeanprovisosimplyistherequirementthatsomekindoffairshareconditionbesatisfied.Throughout,we’llinterprettheLockeanproviso(followingNozick)toallowthatindividualsmayappropriatemorethantheirfairshareofnaturalresourcesaslongastheycompensateothersfortheirlossfromtheexcessappropriation.TheLockeanproviso,thatis,is15arequirementthatafairshareofthevalueofnaturalresourcesbeleftforothers.TheLockeanprovisoisofteninterpretedasapplyingonlytoactsofappropri-ation(andnottomereuse)andasimposingaconditionthatonlyneedstobemetatthetimeofappropriation.I,however,shallinterpretitmorebroadly.Afairsharerequirementisjustasplausiblewhenappliedtomereuse.Oneisnotatlibertytousenaturalresourcesanywaythatonewants.Othershavesomeclaimstoenoughandasgoodbeingleftforthem.Oneisnotpermitted,forexample,todestroy,ruin,ormonopolizemorethanherfairshareofnaturalresources–evenifonemakesnoclaimsofownership.Moreover,withrespecttoappropriation,itisnotsufficienttosatisfythefairshareconditionmerelyatthetimeofappropriation.Thefairshareconditionisanongoingrequirementforcontinuedownership.Suppose,forexample,thattherearejusttwopeopleintheworldandtheydividenaturalresourcesbetweenthemselvesinafairway.Tenyearslater,twomorepeoplepopintoexistence(butnotasaresultofanychoicesthefirsttwopeoplemade).Itisimplausibletothinkthatthedivisionofrightsovernaturalresourcesremainsfairjustbecauseitwasinitiallyfair.Instead,theLockeanproviso(orfairsharetest)shouldbeunderstoodasanongoingrequirementthatcanbeinitiallysatisfiedbutthenfailtobesatisfiedduetolaterbruteluckchangesinthetotalvalueofnaturalresourcesorthenumber16agentsintheworld.LetusnowconsiderLockeanlibertarianism,whichallowsunilateraluseandappro-priationbutrequiresthatsomeversionoftheLockeanprovisobesatisfied.Itviewsnaturalresourcesasinitiallyunprotectedbyanypropertyrule(noconsentisneededforuseorappropriation)butasprotectedbyacompensationliabilityrule.ThoseLeft-LibertarianismandLiberty147\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page148whousenaturalresources,orclaimrightsoverthem,owecompensationtoothersforanycostsimposedbutsuchuseorappropriation.Nozickeanright-libertarianisminterpretstheLockeanprovisoasrequiringthatno17individualbemadeworseoffbytheappropriationcomparedwithnon-appropriation.This,Iwouldargue,setsthecompensationpaymenttoolow.Itbasescompensa-tiononeachperson’sreservationprice,whichisthelowestpaymentthatwouldleavetheindividualindifferentwithnon-useornon-appropriation.Useorappropriationofnaturalresourcestypicallybringssignificantbenefitsevenafterprovidingsuchcompensation.Thereislittlereasontoholdthatthosewhofirstuseorclaimrightsoveranaturalresourceshouldreapalltheexcessbenefitsthatthoseresourcesprovide.Sufficientarian(centrist)libertarianisminterpretstheLockeanprovisoasrequiringthatothersbeleftanadequateshareofnaturalresources(onsomeconceptionof18adequacy).Therearedifferentcriteriathatmightbeinvokedforadequacy,butthemostplausibleonesarebasedonthequalityofone’slifeprospects:forexample,enoughforlifeprospectsworthliving,enoughforbasicsubsistencelifeprospects,orenoughfor“minimallydecent”lifeprospects.Dependingonthenatureoftheworldandtheconceptionofadequacy,thesufficientarianprovisomaybemore,orless,demandingthantheNozickeanproviso.Ifnaturalresourcesaresufficientlyabund-antrelativetotheindividuals,thenNozickeanprovisowillbemoredemanding(sincemanyindividualswouldgetmorethananadequatesharewithouttheuseorappropriation),butifnaturalresourcesaresufficientlyscarce,thenthesufficientarianprovisowillbemoredemandingthantheNozickianone.AlthoughsufficientarianlibertarianismisanimprovementoverNozickeanliber-tarianismbybeingsensitivetothequalityoflifeprospectslefttoothersbytheuseorappropriation,itneverthelessfails,Iwouldargue,torecognizetheextenttowhichnaturalresourcesbelongtoallofusinsomeegalitarianmanner.Supposethatthereareenoughnaturalresourcestogiveeveryonefabulouslifeprospects,andsomeoneappropriates(oruses)naturalresourcesleavingothersonlyminimallyadequatelifeprospectsandgeneratingultra-fabulouslifeprospectsforherself.Itisimplausibletoholdthatthosewhouseorfirstclaimanaturalresourceareentitledtoreapallthebenefitsinexcessofwhatisneededtoleaveothersadequatelifeprospects.Naturalresourceswerenotcreatedbyanyhumanagentandtheirvaluebelongstoallofusinsomeegalitarianmanner.19Letusnowconsiderleft-libertarianism.Itholdsthatnaturalresourcesinitiallybelongtoeveryoneinsomeegalitarianmanner.Wehavealreadyrejectedoneversion–joint-ownershipleft-libertarianism–forfailingtobeunilateralist(i.e.,becauseitrequiresthepermissionofothersforuseorappropriationofunownednaturalresources).WeshallnowfocusonLockean(andhenceunilateralist)versionsofleft-libertarianism.Equalshareleft-libertarianism–suchasthatofHenryGeorge(1879)andHillelSteiner(1994)–interpretstheLockeanprovisoasrequiringthatoneleaveanequallyvaluablepercapitashareofthevalueofnaturalresourcesforothers.Individualsaremorallyfreetouseorappropriatenaturalresources,butthosewhouseorappropriatemoretheirpercapitashare–basedonthecompetitivevalue(basedondemandandsupply;e.g.,marketclearingpriceorauctionprice)undermorallyrelevantconditions–oweotherscompensationfortheirexcessshare.148PeterVallentyne\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page149Equalsharelibertarianismis,Iwouldargue,notsufficientlyegalitarian.Althoughitrequiresthatthecompetitivevalueofnaturalresourcesbedistributedequally,itdoesnothingtooffsetdisadvantagesinunchoseninternalendowments(e.g.,theeffectsofgenesorchildhoodenvironment).Equalsharelibertarianismisthuscompatible20withradicallyunequallifeprospects.21Consider,then,equalopportunityleft-libertarianismsuchasthatofOtsuka(2003).ItinterpretstheLockeanprovisoasrequiringthatoneleaveenoughforotherstohaveanopportunityforwell-beingthatisatleastasgoodastheopportunityforwell-beingthatoneobtainedinusingorappropriatingnaturalresources.Individualswholeavelessthanthisarerequiredtopaythefullcompetitivevalueoftheirexcesssharetothosedeprivedoftheirfairshare.Unliketheequalshareview,thosewhoseinitialinternalendowmentsprovidelessfavorableeffectiveopportunitiesforwell-beingareentitledtolargersharesofnaturalresources.Iclaimthatequalopportunityleft-libertarianisthemostplausibleversionoflibertarianism.Allversionsoflibertarianismgiveagentsasignificantamountoflib-ertyandsecurity.Themainissueathandconcernsrequirementsforsomekindofmaterialequalityofagents(equalityoflifeprospects).Accordingtoequalopportun-ityleft-libertarianism,onehasthepowertouseorappropriatenaturalresourcesaslongasonepaysforthecompetitivevalueoftheuseorrightsinexcessofone’sequalityofopportunityforwell-beingshare.Thepaymentisowedtothosewhohavebeenleftwithlessthanequalopportunityforwell-being.Thus,equalopportunityleft-libertarianismholdsthatthereisalimiteddutytopromoteequality.Onedoesnotneedtodoeverythingpossibletopromoteequality.Onehasnodutyatalltopromoteequalityifonehasnotuseduporappropriatedmorethanone’sequalityofoppor-tunityshareofnaturalresources.Ifoneusesuporappropriatesmore,thenoneacquiresadutytopromoteequalityofeffectiveopportunityforwell-being,butthatdutyislimitedtowhatcanbeefficientlyachievedwiththepaymentthatoneowes.Insum,giventheimportanceoflibertyandsecurity,aplausibleversionoflibertarianismmustbeunilateralistandpermittheuseandappropriationofnaturalresourceswithouttheconsentofothers.Ifonealsograntstheimportanceofequal-ityoflifeprospects,thenequalopportunityleft-libertarianismis,Iclaim,themostplausibleversionoflibertarianism.Obviously,theimportanceofequalityingeneral,andequalityoflifeprospects(effectiveopportunityforwell-being)inparticular,arehighlycontroversial,butIshallnotattemptadefensehere.Mygoalherehasbeensimplytolayoutthemainissuesthatseparatedifferentversionsoflibertarianismandtosuggest–withoutdefense–thatequalopportunityleft-libertarianismisat22leastaplausibleversion.Notes1Ishallnothereaddresslibertarianpositionsonthejusticeofthestate.Forthedevelopmentofaleft-libertarianpositiondefendingthepossibilityofajuststate,seeVallentyne(2007).2Forinsightfulanalysisofthenotionofownership,seeChristman(1994).Forasuperbanalysisoftheconceptofself-ownership,uponwhichIbuild,seeCohen(1995),especiallyCh.9.3Here,forsimplicity,Itreatthenotionoffullownershipasfullydeterminate.Infact,althoughithasadeterminatecore,ithassomesignificantindeterminacyconcernrightstoLeft-LibertarianismandLiberty149\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page150compensation,enforcementrights,andimmunitytoloss.SeeFried(2004,2005)andVallentyneetal.(2005).4It’sworthnotingthat,becausewearefocusedsolelyonthedutiesthatweoweeachothers,weareconcernedwiththenotionoffullinterpersonalownership–whichiscompatiblewiththeexistenceofimpersonalconstraintsonlibertyrightsandimpersonallimitationsonpowers(e.g.,transferoracquisition).5Formoreonthechoice-prioritizingconceptionofrightsthatIfavor,seeVallentyne(2007).6AnimportantpossibleexceptionisNozick(1974),who,inthenoteonp.30,leavesopenthepossibilitythatitmaybepermissibletoinfringerightsinordertoavoidmoralcatastrophe.7ThisobjectionismadebyRothbard(1982:40,134),Barnett(1998:77–82).8Inanotherwiseexcellentarticle,Kuflik(1984:286)makesthismistakenclaim.9Ofcourse,manywillstillobjecttothepowertorenounceone’srightsoveroneself,andsothereisstilladebatableissueaboutthealienabilityofone’srightsoverone’sperson.10Forfurtherdefensefortherightofvoluntaryenslavementsee:Steiner(1994:232–4);Feinberg(1986:Ch.19);Nozick(1974:331)).11Forelaborationsofthiscriticism,see,forexample,Fressola(1981)andCohen(1995).12Givengreaterspace,Iwouldarguethatnointeractionconstraintisneeded.Alltheagentneedstodoistoclaimrightsoverunownedresourcesandsatisfythefairshareconstraint.13Kirzner(1978)alsoarguesagainstanyfairsharecondition.Hedoesso,however,onthegroundthatthosewhodiscoveraresourceareactuallycreatingitandthatcreatorsareentitledtotheircreations.Ibelievethatthisargumentfailsbutcannotherearguethepoint.14Locke(1980[1690])wasnotaLockeanlibertarian.Hedisallowedappropriationthatwouldleadtospoilage,herejectedtherightofvoluntaryself-enslavement,andheheldthatonehadadutytoprovidethemeansofsubsistencetothoseunabletoprovideforthemselves.15TheLockeanprovisocouldbeunderstoodmoreweaklyasrequiringthatenoughandasgoodbeleftforothers,ifthisiscompatiblewithoneobtaininglifeprospectsworthliving.Inaworldinwhichtherearenotenoughnaturalresourcestogiveeveryonelifeprospectsworthliving,thisweakenedprovisowouldallowindividualstouseorappro-priatewhateverisnecessaryforthemtoobtainlifeprospectsworthliving.AlthoughIbelievethisweakeningtobeplausible,forsimplicity,Ishallhereignoreit.16Theneedforanongoingprovisothatalsoappliestomereuseisforcefullyandinsight-fullydefendedbyMack(1995)–althoughhedefendsaveryweakproviso.Roark(2006)defendstheneedforaprovisoonuseandnotmerelyonappropriation.17Nozick(1974)sometimesinterpretstheprovisoasrequiringonlythatthesystemofprivatepropertymakenooneworseoffthanasystemofcommonuse(whereeveryoneisfreetousewhattheywant).Thisappealtosystems,however,isinappropriateforlibertariantheory.Thefocusmustbeonthespecificactinquestion.18Simmons(1992,1993)defendsapositionroughlyofthissort–althoughhispositionisnotstrictlylibertarianinafewrespects.19Left-libertariantheorieshavebeenpropoundedforoverthreecenturies.Forselectionsofthewritingsofhistoricalandcontemporarywritings,seeVallentyneandSteiner(2000a,2000b).20Steiner(1994)arguesthatgerm-linegeneticinformationisanaturalresourceandappealstothisasawayofcompensatingforunequalinternalendowments.Iamnot,however,convincedbyhisarguments.21VanParijs(1995)isinthesamespiritasequalopportunityleft-libertarianism–althoughwithsignificanttwistsongiftsandjobrents.22Forhelpfulcomments,IthankJasonGlahn,AxelGosseries,EricHeidenreich,JustinMcBrayer,EricRoark,AlanTomhave,andJonTrerise.150PeterVallentyne\nCDIC08.qxd2/4/0915:47Page151ReferencesBarnett,Randy.1998.TheStructureofLiberty:JusticeandtheRuleofLaw(Oxford:ClarendonPress).Christman,John.1994.TheMythofProperty(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress).Cohen,G.A.1995.Self-Ownership,Freedom,andEquality(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).Feinberg,Joel.1986.HarmtoSelf(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress).Feser,Edward.2005.“ThereIsNoSuchThingasanUnjustInitialAcquisition,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy22:56–80,esp.58–9.Fressola,Anthony.1981.“LibertyandProperty,”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly18:315–22.Fried,Barbara.2004.“Left-Libertarianism:AReviewEssay”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs32:66–92.Fried,Barbara.2005.“Left-Libertarianism,OnceMore:ARejoindertoVallentyne,Steiner,andOtsuka,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs33:216–22.George,Henry.1879.ProgressandPoverty(NewYork:RobertSchalkenbachFoundation).Grunebaum,James.1987.PrivateOwnership(NewYork:Routledge&KeganPaul).Kagan,Shelly.1994.“TheArgumentfromLiberty”,inJulesColemanandAllenBuchanan,eds.,InHarm’sWay:EssaysinHonorofJoelFeinberg(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),pp.16–41.Kirzner,Israel.1978.CompetitionandEntrepreneurship(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress).Kuflik,Arthur.1984.“TheInalienabilityofAutonomy,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs13:271–98.Locke,John.1980[1690].SecondTreatiseofGovernment,ed.C.B.Macpherson(Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishing).Mack,Eric.1995.“TheSelf-OwnershipProviso:ANewandImprovedLockeanProviso,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy12:186–218.Narveson,Jan.1999.“OriginalAppropriationandLockeanProvisos,”PublicAffairsQuarterly13:205–27,esp.218.(ReprintedinRespectingPersonsinTheoryandPractice,Lanham,MD:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishers,2002,pp.111–31).Narveson,Jan.1988.TheLibertarianIdea(Philadelphia,PA:TempleUniversityPress).Nozick,Robert.1974.Anarchy,State,andUtopia(NewYork:BasicBooks).Otsuka,Michael.2003.LibertarianismwithoutInequality(Oxford:ClarendonPress).Roark,Eric.2006.“UsingandComingtoOwn:ALeft-LibertarianTreatmentoftheJustUseandAppropriationofNaturalResources”(U.Missouri-Columbia,dissertation,2008).Rothbard,Murray.1978.ForaNewLiberty(NewYork:MacmillanPublishing).Rothbard,Murray.1982.TheEthicsofLiberty(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress).Simmons,A.John.1992.TheLockeanTheoryofRights(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress).Simmons,A.John.1993.OntheEdgeofAnarchy(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress).Steiner,Hillel,1994.AnEssayonRights(Cambridge,MA:BlackwellPublishing).Vallentyne,Peter.2007.“LibertarianismandtheState”,SocialPhilosophyandPolicy24(1)(Jan.):187–205.Vallentyne,PeterandHillelSteiner,eds.2000a.TheOriginsofLeftLibertarianism:AnAnthologyofHistoricalWritings(NewYork:PalgravePublishersLtd.).Vallentyne,PeterandHillelSteiner,eds.2000b.LeftLibertarianismandItsCritics:TheContemporaryDebate(NewYork:PalgravePublishersLtd.).Vallentyne,Peter,HillelSteiner,andMichaelOtsuka.2005.“WhyLeft-LibertarianismIsn’tIncoherent,Indeterminate,orIrrelevant:AReplytoFried”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs33:201–15.VanParijs,Philippe.1995.RealFreedomforAll(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress).Left-LibertarianismandLiberty151\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page153LIBERALISMEQUALITYContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page155CHAPTERNINEIlluminatingEgalitarianism*LarryS.TemkinThegoalofthisarticleismodest.Itissimplytohelpilluminatethenatureofegalit-arianism.Moreparticularly,Iaimtoshowwhatcertainegalitariansarecommittedto,andtosuggest,thoughcertainlynotprove,thatequality,astheseegalitariansunderstandit,isanimportantnormativeidealthatcannotsimplybeignoredinmoraldeliberations.Thearticleisdividedintosixmainsections.InsectionI,Idistinguishbetweendifferentkindsofegalitarianpositions,andindicatethetypeofegalitarianismwithwhichIamconcerned.InsectionII,Idiscusstherelationsbetweenequality,fairness,luck,andresponsibility.InsectionIII,Imakeseveralmethodologicalpointsregard-ingtheequalityofwhatdebate.InsectionIV,Idefendegalitarianismagainstrivalviewsthatfocusonsubsistence,sufficiency,orcompassion.InsectionV,Iintroduceprioritarianism,anddefendegalitarianismagainstthelevelingdownobjection.InsectionVI,Iillustrateegalitarianism’sdistinctappeal,incontrasttoprioritarianism’s.Iendwithabriefconclusion.I.DistinguishingDifferentKindsofEgalitarianismNumerousquitedistinctpositions–rangingfromutilitarianism,tolibertarianism,toRawls’smaximinprinciple–havebeendescribedas,orperhapsconflatedwith,versionsofegalitarianism.But,ofcourse,mostofthesepositionshavelittleincommon.Correspondingly,indiscussingequalityitisextremelyimportantthatonebeclearaboutthesenseoneisusingtheterm.Inthissection,Idistinguishseveralegalitarianpositions,andclarifythesenseinwhichIshallbeusingthenotionofegalitarianism.Philosophershavelongdistinguishedbetweenpurelyformalandsubstantiveprin-ciplesofequality.Unfortunately,thisdistinctionisnotespeciallycleanorhelpful.Moreusefully,onemightdistinguishbetweenequalityasuniversality,asimpartiality,orascomparability.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page156Abasicprincipleofrationality,equalityasuniversalityreflectstheviewthatallreasonsandprinciplesmustbeuniversalintheirapplication.ThisistheviewembodiedinAristotle’sfamousdictumthatequalityrequiresthatlikesbetreatedalike.Notice,sinceitappliesuniversally,eventheviewthatalltallpeopleshouldbewelloff,andallshortpeoplebadlyoff,meetsthis“egalitarian”principle.Equalityasimpartialityreflectstheviewthatallpeoplemustbetreatedimparti-ally.Ofcourse,positionsvarydramaticallyregardingwhatconstitutestreatingpeopleimpartially.Forexample,forKantiansimpartialityrequirestreatingpeopleasendsandnevermerelyasmeans,whileforUtilitariansitrequiresneutralitybetweendif-ferentpeople’sinterestswhenmaximizingthegood.Arguably,itistheconceptionofequalityasimpartialitythatAmartyaSenhasinmindincontendingthatallplaus-iblemoralviewsareegalitarian,theymerelydifferintheanswerstheygivetothe1“equalityofwhat?”question.Whileallplausiblemoraltheoriesarecommittedtoequalityasuniversalityandimpartiality,equalityascomparabilityreflectsadifferent,andIbelievedeeper,com-mitmenttoequality.Equalityascomparabilityisfundamentallyconcernedwithhowpeoplefarerelativetoothers.Thisisadistinctivesubstantiveviewthatrivals“non-egalitarian”positionslikeutilitarianismandlibertarianism.Anotherimportantdistinctionisbetweeninstrumentalegalitarianism,whereequalityisvaluableonlyinsofarasitpromotessomeothervaluableideal;andnon-instrumentalegalitarianism,whereequalityissometimesvaluableitself,beyondtheextenttowhichitpromotesotherideals.Onnon-instrumentalegalitarianism,anycompleteaccountofthemoralrealmmustallowforequality’svalue.Ibelievethatmanywhothinkofthemselvesasegalitariansare,infact,merelyinstrumentalegalitarians;or,moreaccurately,instrumentalegalitarianscombinedwithequalityasuniversalityandimpartialityegalitarians.Thisistrue,forexample,ofmanyhumanitarians,Rawlsians,communitarians,andso-calleddemocraticegalitarians,whoonlyfavorredistributionfrombettertoworseoffasameanstoreducingsuffering,aidingtheworstoff,fosteringsolidarity,orstrengtheningdemocraticinstitutions.Suchreasonsaremorallysignificant,andcompatiblewithequalityasuniversalityandimpartiality.Buteachisalsocompatiblewiththerejectionofnon-instrumentalegalitarianismandequalityascomparability.Wemightfurtherdistinguishbetweenperson-affectingversionsofegalitarianism,accordingtowhichinequalityonlymattersinsofarasitadverselyaffectspeople;andimpersonalversions,accordingtowhichinequalitycanmatterevenwhenitdoesn’tadverselyaffectpeople.Similarly,wecandistinguishbetweendeontic-egalitarianism,whichfocusesondutiestoaddressthelegitimatecomplaintsofvictimsofinequalitybyimprovingtheirsituations;andtelic-egalitarianism,whichfocusesonremovingobjectionableinequalitiesasameansofimprovingthegoodnessofoutcomes.Deontic-egalitarianismfocusesonassessingagentsoractions,sounavoidableinequalitiesforwhichnoonewasresponsibledonotmatter;whereastelic-egalitarianismfocuseson2thegoodnessofoutcomes,sosuchinequalitiesmaymatter.Withthesedistinctionsinmind,Iwanttostressthatmyconcerninthisarticleiswithequalityascomparability,understoodasasubstantiveversionofnon-instrumentalegalitarianism.AsIpresentanddevelopthisposition,itisanimpersonal,telicversionofegalitarianism.156LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page157Finally,letmeemphasizethategalitariansarepluralists.Noreasonableegalitarianbelievesthatequalityisallthatmatters.Buttheybelievethatitmatterssome.Thus,fortheegalitarian,equalityisonlyoneimportantideal,amongothers,including,3perhaps,freedom,utility,perfection,andjustice.II.Equality,Fairness,Luck,andResponsibilityIfIgiveonepieceofcandytoAndrea,andtwotoRebecca,Andreawillimmediatelyassert“unfair!”Thisnaturalreactionsuggestsanintimateconnectionbetweenequal-ityandfairness.Arguably,concernaboutequalityisthatportionofourconcernaboutcomparativefairnessthatfocusesonhowpeoplefarerelativetoothers.Specifically,concernaboutequalityreflectstheviewthatinequalityisbadwhen,andbecause,itisunfair,wheretheunfairnessconsistsinonepersonbeingworseoffthananothernomoredeserving.Thus,Iclaimthatpeoplewhoareegalitariansinmysensearenotmotivatedbyenvy,butbyasenseoffairness.So,onmyview,concernforequalityisnotsepar-ablefromourconcernforacertainaspectoffairness;theyarepartandparcelofasingleconcern.Wesaythatcertaininequalitiesareobjectionablebecausetheyareunfair;butbythesametoken,wesaythatthereisacertainkindofunfairnessincertainkindsofundeservedinequalities.Manycontemporaryegalitarians,includingCohen,Dworkin,andArneson,have4beenidentifiedasso-calledluckegalitarians.Acknowledgingtheimportanceofautonomyandpersonalresponsibility,luckegalitarianismsupposedlyaimstorectifytheinfluenceofluckinpeople’slives.Correspondingly,acanonicalformulationofluckegalitarianism,invokedbybothGerryCohenandmyself,isthatitisbadwhen5onepersonisworseoffthananotherthroughnofaultorchoiceofherown.So,luckegalitariansobjectwhenequallydeservingpeopleareunequallywelloff,butnotwhenonepersonisworseoffthananotherduetoherownresponsiblechoices,saytopursuealifeofleisure,orcrime.Infact,Ithinkluckegalitarianismhasbeenmisunderstoodbymostofitsproponents,aswellasmostofitsopponents.Theegalitarian’sfundamentalconcernisn’twithluckperse,orevenwithwhetherornotsomeoneisworseoffthananotherthroughnofaultorchoiceofherown,itiswithcomparativefairness.Butpeoplehavebeenconfusedaboutthisbecause,asithappens,inmostparadigmaticcaseswhereinequalityinvolvescomparativeunfairnessitalsoinvolvesluck,orsomeonebeingworseoffthananotherthroughnofaultorchoiceofherown.Thus,oncloseexamination,theintimateconnectionbetweenequalityandfairnessilluminatestheultimaterolethatluckplaysintheegalitarian’sthinking,aswellastherelevanceandlimitationsofthewell-known“throughnofaultorchoiceoftheirown”clause.Amongequallydeservingpeople,itisbad,becauseunfair,forsometobeworseoffthanothersthroughnofaultorchoiceoftheirown.Butamongunequallydeservingpeopleitisn’tbad,becausenotunfair,forsomeonelessdeserv-ingtobeworseoffthansomeonemoredeserving,eveniftheformerisworseoffthroughnofaultorchoiceofhisown.Forexample,egalitariansneedn’tobjectifafullyresponsiblecriminalisworseoffthanalaw-abidingcitizen,evenifthecriminalIlluminatingEgalitarianism157\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page158craftilyavoidedcapture,andsoisonlyworseoffbecause,throughnofaultorchoiceofhisown,afallinglimbinjuredhim.Additionally,insomecasesinequalityisbad,becauseunfair,eventhoughtheworseoffareresponsiblefortheirplight;aswhentheworseoffaresobecausetheychosetodotheirduty,orperhapsactedsupererogotorily,inadversecircumstancesnotoftheirmaking.So,forexample,ifI’munluckyenoughtowalkbyadrowningchild,andIinjuremyselfsavingher,theegalitarianmightthinkitunfairthatIendupworseoffthanothers,eventhoughIamsoasaresultofmyownresponsiblefree6choicetodomydutytohelpsomeoneinneed.Correspondingly,onreflection,luckitselfisneithergoodnorbadfromtheegal-itarianstandpoint.Egalitariansobjecttoluckthatleavesequallydeservingpeopleunequallywelloff.Buttheycanacceptluckthatmakesequallydeservingpeopleequallywelloff,orunequallydeservingpeopleunequallywelloffproportionaltotheirdeserts.Thus,luckwillbeapprovedoropposedonlytotheextentthatitpromotesorunderminescomparativefairness.Someluckegalitariansdistinguishbetweenoptionluck,lucktowhichwerespons-7iblyopenourselves,andbruteluck,luckthatsimply“befalls”us,unbidden.Thisdistinction’sadvocatesbelievethatanyoptionluckinequalitiesthatresultfrompeopleautonomouslychoosingtogamble,orinvestinthestockmarket,areunobjection-able.Bycontrast,bruteluckinequalitiesthatresultfromsomebeingbornwithlessintelligence,ortopoorerparents,orsomebeingstruckdownbylightning,oranaccident,areobjectionable.Irejectthewaytheoption/bruteluckdistinctionistypicallyinvoked.Inpart,thisisbecausedrawingthelinebetweenthemisdifficult.Butmoreimportantly,IbelievethatitisobjectionableifMarytakesaprudentrisk,andJohnanimprudentone,yetMaryfaresmuchworsethanJohn,becausesheisthevictimofbad,andhethebeneficiaryofgood,optionluck.Likewise,ifMaryandJohnareequallydeserving,andchoosesimilaroptions,butJohnendsupmuchbetteroffthanMary,becauseheenjoysvastlygreateroptionluck,Ibelievethereisanegalitarianobjectiontothesituation.Aswithparadigmaticcasesinvolvingbruteluck,insuchacaseMaryendsupmuchworseoffthanJohn,thoughsheisinnowaylessdeservingthanhe.Thisseemstomepatentlyunfair.Itisacaseofcomparativeunfairnesstowhichmykindofegalitarianshould,Ithink,object.Thisdiscussionisrelevanttomanypracticalissuesofpublicpolicy.Ifitistruethatpeoplecanhavepersonalresponsibilityfortheiractionsinawaythatiscom-patiblewithameaningfulconceptionofdesert–andIshouldstressthatthisisabig“if”,butonethatmanyaccept,andthatIshallassumeintherestofthisdiscussion–thenforthereasonssuggestedabovenotallsubstantiveinequalitieswillinvolvecomparativeunfairness,andhencebeobjectionablefromanegalitarianstandpoint.Thispositionhasdeepandimportantimplicationsforthenatureandextentofourobligationstowardsthelessfortunatewhosepredicamentsresultedfromtheirownfullyresponsiblechoices.Thismightincludeconditionsresultingfromindividuallyresponsiblechoicesinvolvingjobselection,lifestyle,riskybehavior,andsoon.Clearly,thescopeofthisissueistoolargetodealadequatelywithithere,butletmejustmakefiverelevantpoints.First,thestartingpointofourdiscussionisthatthemerefactthatsomearemuchworseoffthanothers,doesnotmeanthatthereisanegalitarianreasontoaidthem.Thereisanegalitarianreasontoaidsomeone158LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page159ifhersituationisunfairrelativetoothers,andwhetherthisissoornotwillsurelydependonfactsofindividualresponsibilitypertinenttothecase.Second,evenifthereisnoegalitarianreasontoaidsomeonewhoisneedy,therearemanypowerfulnormativeconsiderationsthatmaydictateourdoingso.Thesemayincludemaximinorprioritarianconsiderationsthatspeakinfavorofgivingspecialweighttothosewhoarepoorlyoff,humanitarianconsiderationstoeasepainandsuffering,utilitarianreasonstopromotethegeneralwelfare,virtue-relatedrea-sonsofcompassion,mercy,beneficence,andforgiveness,andsoon.Asnotedabove,egalitariansarerightlycommittedtopluralism,andwehavetobesensitivetothefullrangeofreasonsforaidingtheneedythathavingnothingtodowithconsider-ationsofcomparativefairness.Butthird,wheretheothermorallyrelevantfactorsareequal,orevensufficientlyclose,egalitarianreasonsofcomparativefairnessmaywellhelpdeterminewhoamongtheneedyhasthestrongestmoralclaimonscarceresources.So,forexample,ifonehastochoosebetweenwhogetsthelastavailablebedintheICUunit,perhapsitoughttogototheinnocentpedestrianwhowasstruckbyadrunkdriver,ratherthanthepersonwhowasdrivingdrunk.Fourth,fromthestandpointofcomparativefairness,itiscrucialthatonedetermineappropriatecomparisonclasses,sothatoneiscomparingallrelevanttypesofbeha-viorinthesameway.Forexample,itwouldbeobjectionabletodowngradethemedicalclaimsofAIDSpatientswhoengagedinunprotectedsex,ifonewasn’tsim-ilarlypreparedtodowngradethemedicalclaimsofpregnantwomenwhoengagedinunprotectedsex,orperhapsobesestrokevictimswhodidnothingtocurbtheirindulgenceoffood.Finally,inaccordancewiththepointaboutoptionlucknotedabove,itisimport-antfromthestandpointofcomparativefairness,thatonenotmerelycomparethe“losers”ofthosewhomakepoorchoiceswiththe“winners”ofthosewhomakegoodchoices,butthat,inaddition,onecomparethewinnersandlosersofbothcategorieswitheachother.Mostsmokersdon’tdeveloplungcancer,mostpeoplewhoovereatdon’thaveastroke,andmosthelmetlessmotorcyclistsdon’tendupintheemer-gencyroom.Thus,fromthestandpointofcomparativefairness,itisimportanttobearinmindthatfullresponsibilityforone’schoicesdoesn’tautomaticallytranslateintofullresponsibilityforone’spredicament.Indeed,asKantrightlysaw,thetwoareonlyloosely,andcoincidentally,connected.Correspondingly,considerationofequalityascomparativefairnessrequiresthatwepayattentionnotonlytoactualoutcomes,buttoconsiderationsofexpectedutility.Moreparticularly,considerationsofcomparativefairnesswillrequirethatwepayattentiontotheextenttowhichdifferentpeopleendupbetterandworseoffthantheexpectedvalueoftheirchoices.Unfortunately,Icannotpursuetheseissueshere.III.EqualityofWhat?Manyegalitarianshavedebatedthefollowingquestion:insofarasweareegalitarians,whatkindofequalityshouldweseek.Ahostofcandidateshavebeenchampioned,including,amongothers:income,resources,primarygoods,wealth,power,welfare,opportunity,needssatisfaction,capabilities,functionings,rights,andliberties.ItisIlluminatingEgalitarianism159\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page160difficulttoexaggeratetheimportanceofthistopic,sinceequalityofonekindwilloftenrequireinequalityofanother.Forexample,equalityofincomemaycorrelatewithinequalityofneedsatisfactionbetweenthehandicappedandthehealthy,andviceversa.Ishallnottrytoofferaparticularsubstantiveanswertothe“equalityofwhat?”question.However,Ishallmakeseveralobservationspertinenttothistopic.Ibeginwithamethodologicalremark.Philosophersfavoringdifferentconceptionsofwhatkindofequalitymattershavegonetogreatlengthsillustratingcaseswhererivalconceptionshaveimplausibleimplications.Thesephilosophersseemtoassumethatsuchconsiderationsprovidegoodreasonforrejectingtherivalconceptions.Moreover,manyseemtoimplicitlyassumethatconcernforonekindofequalityrulesoutconcernforothers.Unfortunately,onapluralisticviewofmorality,towhichallreasonableegalitariansarecommitted,suchassumptionsaredubious.Elsewhere,Ihavepointedoutthatthefactthatidealslikeequality,utility,orfreedomsometimeshaveimplausible,oreventerrible,implications,doesnotshowthatthoseidealsdonotmatter.Itmerelyshowsthateachideal,alone,isnotallthat8matters.Likewise,thefactthatdifferentconceptionsofwhatkindofequalitymatterssometimeshaveimplausibleimplicationsdoesnotnecessarilyshowthatthosecon-ceptionsdonotmatter.Equality,likemoralityitself,iscomplex.Andmorethanoneconceptionmayberelevanttoour“allthingsconsidered”egalitarianjudgments.Perhapsdifferentkindsofequalitymatterindifferentcontexts.Orperhapseveninthesamecontexttherearestrongreasonsforpromotingdifferentkindsofequality.Thus,the“equalityofwhat?”questionmayhaveseveralplausibleanswers.Myownviewisthatalargecomponentoftheegalitarian’sconcernshouldbewithequalityofwelfare;butasIuseit“welfare”isatechnicaltermthatneedstobeinterpretedbroadly,andwithgreatcare.Itmustappropriatelyinclude,amongotherthings,mostoftheelementsthatAmartyaSencarefullydistinguishesinhis9sophisticatedaccountoffunctionings,capabilitysets,freedom,agency,andwell-being.However,Ialsothinktheegalitarianshouldgiveweighttoequalityofopportunity.Suppose,forexample,thatwelivedinaworldnottoounliketheactualone,inwhicharelativelysmallpercentageofpeoplewereverywelloff,whilethevastmajor-ityweremuchworseoff.Concernforequalityofwelfarewouldimpelustoraiseeveryonetothelevelofthebest-off.Butsuppose,givenlimitedresources,thiswerenotpossible.Concernforequalityofwelfaremightthenimpelustoredistributefromthebetter-offtotheworse-off.Butifthepercentageofbetter-offweresmall,thismightdolittletoimprovetheworse-off,itsmaineffectmightbetoreducethebetter-offtotheleveloftheworse-off.Evenifwethinkthiswouldbeanimprove-mentregardingequalityofwelfare,wemightagreeitwouldnotbeanimprovementallthingsconsidered,andinanyeventitmightnotbepoliticallyfeasible.Thus,wemightconcludethatinsuchacasewemustaccept,evenifnothappily,asigni-ficantlyunequalsituationregardingwelfare.Still,wemightdistinguishtwoversionsofthisscenario.Inoneversion,thebetter-offgrouparemembersofahereditaryaristocracy.They,andtheirdescendants,havebeenguaranteedaplaceinthebetter-offgroup.Likewise,themembersoftheworse-offgroup,andtheirdescendants,aredestinedtoremainintheworse-offgroupregardlessoftheirabilitiesorefforts.Inasecondversion,thereisgenuineequalityofoppor-tunity.Atbirth,eachperson,andhisorherdescendants,hasanequalchanceofendingupinthebetter-offgroup.160LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page161Byhypothesis,thetwoversionsofthescenarioareequivalentregardingequalityofwelfare.Yet,Ithinkmostwouldagreethatthesecondisbetterthanthefirstallthingsconsidered,andbetterlargely,ifnotwholly,becauseitisbetterregardingequalityofopportunity.Ithink,then,thatquaegalitarian,oneshouldcareaboutequalityofopportunity.Butthisconcernshouldbeinadditionto,ratherthaninplaceof,aconcernforequalityofwelfare.Thesecondsituationmaybeperfectregard-ingequalityofopportunity–butitstillinvolvesmanypeoplewhoareworseoffthanothersthroughnofaultorchoiceoftheirown,inawaythatinvolvescom-parativeunfairness.Theegalitarian,quaegalitarian,willregardthisasobjectionable.Itwouldbebetter,regardingequality,if,inadditiontoeveryonehavingequaloppor-tunities,thoseequallydeservingactuallyfaredequallywell.Equalityofopportunityplaysacrucialroleindebatesaboutrationing.Inthefaceofscarceresources,wherenotallneedscanbemet,whatsystemwillensurethatamongthosewhoareequallyneedyanddeserving,everyoneatleasthasanequalopportun-itytohavetheirneedsmet?Note,theremaybedifferentwaysoffullyorpartiallysatisfyingtheidealofequalityofopportunity.Andofcourse,here,aselsewhere,therewillbeothermoralidealsthatcompetewiththeidealofequalityofopportunity,orprovidereasonsforfullyorpartiallysatisfyingitonewayratherthananother.Theprecedingconsiderationsarerelevanttoseveralrelatedtopics,suchaswhetherweshouldbeconcernedaboutexanteequality–equalityinpeople’sprospectsconcerningthelivestheymightlead–orexpostequality–equalityinoutcomesconcerningtheactuallivesthatpeopleendupleading;andsimilarly,whethertheegalitarian’sconcernshouldbemainlywithproceduralfairness,orwithsomemorerobustoutcome-relatedconceptionofsubstantivefairness,accordingtowhichanoutcomethatresultedfromaperfectlyfairprocedure,mightnonethelessbesubstantivelyunfair,andrequireamelioration.Thesetopicsraiseahostofcomplexissues,thatcannotbeadequatelydealtwithhere;butletmegiveasenseformyviewofthesetopics,andofferafewexamplesthathelpillustratemyreasoning.First,justasIthinkoneshouldcareaboutbothequalityofopportunityandequal-ityofwelfare(broadlyconstrued),soIthinkthatforsimilarreasonsoneshouldcareaboutbothexanteandexpostequality,andalsoaboutbothproceduralfairnessandamorerobustoutcome-relatedconceptionofsubstantivefairness.Insomecases,perhaps,exanteequality,orproceduralfairness,willbeallthatisrealizable,andinothersourmainconcernmightbewithexpost,orsubstantivefairness.Butinfact,incertaincircumstancesthetwowillbeintimatelyrelated.So,forexample,itisarguablethatundercertaincircumstances,whateveroutcomeresultsfromasituationthatmeetssufficientlydemandingcriteriaforexanteequality,orproceduralfairness,will,infact,alsobeguaranteedtomeetthemostplausibleconceptionofexpostequality,orsubstantivefairness.Moreover,itisalsoarguablethatundercertaincircumstances,nocoherentaccountcanbegivenofwhatexpostequality,orsubstantivefairnessdemands,independentlyofcertainfavorableconditionsinitiallyobtainingthatwouldatleastpartiallysatisfythecriteriaforexanteequalityorproceduralfairness.Icannotfullydefendtheseclaimshere,butletmeoffersomeobservationstohelpilluminatethem.Egalitariansrecognizethatinthegameoflife,eachofus,tosomeextent,mustplaythecardswearedealt.Buttheyalsorecognizethatsometimesourcardsarebothdealttous,andplayedforus.Onthisanalogy,theconcernforexanteequality,IlluminatingEgalitarianism161\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page162andproceduralfairness,reflectstheconcernthatthedeckshouldnotbestackedagainstcertainplayers,andthatthereshouldbenocheatingintheplayofthehand.So,minimally,theegalitarianwantseachperson’shandtobedeterminedbyafairdealandfairlyplayed.If,forexample,thedeckisstackedinfavorofwhitesormen,sothattheyarealwaysdealtacesandkings,whileblacksorwomenarealwaysdealtdeucesandtreys,thatsituationwillbepatentlyunfair,anditcanberightlycriti-cizedfromthestandpointofexanteequality,orproceduralfairness.Likewise,itwillbeunfairifthecardsaredealtfairly,butunfairlyplayed;if,forexample,whitesormalesareallowedtolookatthehandsofblacksorwomen,beforedecidingwhatcardstoplay.Ensuringthateachperson’shandwillbedeterminedbyafairdealandplayedfairlyensuresthat,inadvanceofthedeal,theexpectedvalueofeachhandisthesame,andwecansaythatthatmeetsanimportantcriterionforexanteequality,orproceduralfairness.Butsurely,theegalitarianwantsmorethanjustafairdealandafairplay,since,byitself,thiswoulddonothingtoprecludetheresultthatsomepeoplewillbedealtacesandkings,whileothers,nolessdeserving,willbedealtdeucesandtreys.Thatis,inthegameoflife,thecardsdon’thavetobestackedagainstparticulargroupsorindividualsforittostillturnoutthatsomearebornwithextraordinaryadvantages,andhenceextraordinarylifeprospects,relativetoothers.Fortheegalitarian,thisisdeeplyunfair,evenif,inanimportantsense,itisnotasunfairassuchasituationwouldhavebeenhaditresultedfromastackeddeckofbiasordiscrimination.Theprecedingsuggeststhattheegalitariannotonlywantsthedealtobefair,hewants,asitwere,eachhandtobefair.Thatis,hedoesnotmerelywanttheexpectedvalueofeachhandtobethesameinadvanceofeachdeal,hewantstheexpectedvalueofeachhandtobethesameafterthedeal.Thus,itshouldnotonlybethatinadvanceofbringingachildintotheworld,onecanreasonablyexpecttheexpectedvalueofitslifetobeasgoodasanyoneelse’s,butratherthatanychildthatisactuallybroughtintotheworldshouldfaceaconstellationofnaturalandsocialcircumstancesthatgiveitslifeprospectsanexpectedvalueasgoodasanyoneelse’s.Notice,thisviewreflectsaconcernthatinonewayresemblesanexpostview–sinceitseeksequalityinpeople’slifeprospectsafterthedeal,asitwere.Butinanotherwayitresemblesanexanteview–sinceitfocusesontheexpectedvalueofpeople’slifeprospects,ratherthantheoutcomethatwillresultwhenthehandisactuallyplayed,whichistosaythevalueofthelivesthatthepeopleactuallyendupleading.Formypurposes,Ishallcountsuchaviewassettingfurtherrequire-mentsonthecriteriathatmustbemetforexanteequality,orproceduralfairness,tobefullysatisfied.Butthesecriterianeedfurtherstrengthening.Toseethis,letusdevelopourcardanalogyabit.Supposethateachpersonistobedealtfourcards,eachofwhichrepresentsapossiblelifethatsomeonemightlead.Supposefurtherthatoneofthesecardswillbeselectedatrandom.Ifanaceisselected,someonewillleadaveryhighqualitylifewithavalueof20,000,ifaneightisselectedsomeonewillleadamod-eratelyhighqualitylifeofvalue10,000,andifadeuceisselectedsomeonewillleadaverypoorqualitylifeofvalue0.NowsupposethatinoutcomeAeachmemberofalargepopulationhasbeendealtfourcards.Andsupposethatasaresultofacom-pletelyfairdeal,involvingmanydecks,halfthepopulationhasbeendealttwoaces162LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page163andtwodeuces,whiletheotherhalfhasbeendealtfoureights.Here,wemeettheinitialcriteriathatpriortothedealtheexpectedvalueofeachlifeisthesame,andwefurthermeettheadditionalcriteriathatafterthedealtheexpectedvalueofeachlifeisthesame,namely10,000.Still,althoughtheexpectedvaluesoftheirlivesarethesame,itisclearthatsomepeopleinAfacesignificantlydifferentlifeprospects.Thosewhohavebeendealtfoureightsfacethecertaintyofalifeofvalue10,000,andthestatisticallynearcertainoutcomeofendingupintheirsociety’smiddle-off10group.Thosewhohavebeendealtacesandtwos,facetheequalprobabilitythattheywillendupwithalifeofvalue20,000oralifeofvalue0,anditiscertainthattheywilleitherendupintheirsociety’sbest-offgroup,oritsworst-offgroup.Hence,whateverhappens,itiscertainthatthosewhoweredealtdifferentkindsofcardswillleadsignificantlydifferentkindsoflivesofsignificantlydifferentvalue.ContrastoutcomeAwithoutcomeB,where,everyoneisdealtfoureights,andhencefacesthecertainprospectoflivingalifeofvalue10,000,oroutcomeC,where,every-oneisdealttwoacesandtwodeuces,andhencefacesanequalprobabilityoflivingalifeofvalue20,000oralifeofvalue0.Clearly,thereisarespectinwhicheachperson’soveralllifeprospectsarethesameinB,andsimilarlyinC,butnotinA.Ibelievethattherespectinwhichthisissoreflectsanimportantelementofwhatoneshouldcareaboutinsofarasonecaresaboutexanteequality,orproceduralfairness.Arguably,fromthestandpointofexanteequality,orproceduralfairness,BandCarebothperfect.Oneshouldbeindifferentbetweenthem,and,eachshouldbepreferredtoA.Ifright,theprecedingsuggeststhatinsofarasonecaresaboutexanteequality,orproceduralfairness,oneshouldnotmerelybeconcernedwiththeexpectedvalueofdifferentlives,eitherinadvanceoftheircomingtobe,orevenatbirth.Rather,foreachkindoflife,L,withvalueV,thatsomeonefacesatbirthwithprobabilityp,itwillbedesirableifeveryoneelse,atbirth,alsofacesakindoflife,L’,withprobabilityp,thatalsohasvalueV.Note,thispositiondoesnotcommitonetothekindofradicalegalitarianpositionthatKurtVonnegutJr.skeweredinhisnotoriouslyanti-egalitariandiatribe“HarrisonBergeron,”whichwouldrequirethateveryonefacetheexactsamesetofcircumstances,andthateveryonebeexactlythesameinall11oftheircharacteristics.Ontheviewinquestion,eachkindoflife,LandL’maydiffersubstantiallyinallsortsofrespects,aslongastheiroverallvalueisthesame.Supposewefullyachievedexanteequality,orproceduralfairness,alongthelinessuggestedabove.So,foreverytwopeopletherewouldbeaone-to-onecorrespon-denceofequivalentalternativesinvolvingthedifferentlifeprospectstheyfaced,thevalueofthoseprospects,andtheirprobabilities.Inthiscase,wewouldhavemettheegalitariangoalthatnooneshouldbedisadvantagedrelativetoanothermerelybythecircumstancessurroundingtheirbirth.Still,theegalitarianwouldwantmorethanthis,assuchexanteequality,orproceduralfairness,wouldbecompatiblewithundeservedexpostinequalityofanysize.Andegalitarianswillobjecttosuchinequal-itypreciselywhen,andbecause,itinvolvesthesubstantive,comparativeunfairnessofsomepeoplebeingworseoffthanothers,thoughtheyarenolessdeserving.ConsideranoutcomelikeC,above.Suppose,atbirth,everyonefacesoneoftwoprospectswithequalprobability.Eithertheywillliveaveryhighqualitylifeofvalue20,000,oraverylowqualitylifeofvalue0.Letusassumethatthisreflectsafairsituation,equivalenttoeachbeingdealtafairhand,fromafairdeckthathasbeenIlluminatingEgalitarianism163\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page164fairlyshuffled.Andsupposethatitwillbepurechancewhichkindoflifetheyendupleading,sothatnochargeofbiasorunfairnesscanbemaderegardingthe“playofthehand”thatultimatelydeterminedwhatkindoflifetheywouldlead.Evenso,ifoneassumesthatnooneislessdeservingthananyoneelse,theegalitarianwillregarditascomparativelyunfairifhalfthepeopleendupwithlivesofvalue20,000andhalfwithlivesofvalue0.Exanteequalityandproceduralfairnessmaybedesir-able,butinsuchcircumstances,theyarenosubstituteforexpostequality,orsub-stantivefairness.Insuchacase,atleast,theegalitarianwouldnotbesatisfiedwiththeresultingoutcome.Instead,shewouldmuchpreferthefairersubstantiveoutcomewhereeachpersonlivedalifeofvalue10,000.Next,supposethatthegameoflifewas“stacked”sothatatbirthcertaingroupshadamuchgreaterchanceofendingupwelloffthanothers.Ontheanalogywehavebeenusing,wecanimaginethatsomepeoplehavebeenunfairlydealtthreeacesandadeuce,whileothershavebeenunfairlydealtthreedeucesandanace,butthat,asbefore,whatlifeeachpersonwillactuallyleadwillbedeterminedbyarandomselectionofoneofhercards.Clearlythiswouldbeobjectionablefromthestandpointofexanteequalityandproceduralfairness,andtherewouldbeegalitarianreasontotrytopreventsuchunfairnessinpeople’sinitialstartingpointsifonecould.Still,assumingthatneithertheadvantagednordisadvantagedwerelessdeservingthantheothers,if,infact,bothgroupsofpeoplehadacesdrawn,sothatbothendeduplivingveryhighqualitylivesofvalue20,000,theegalitarianwouldseenoreasontochangetheoutcome.Andsimilarly,ifbothgroupsofpeoplehaddeucesdrawn.If,ontheotherhand,oneofthegroupsofpeoplehadanacedrawn,andtheotheradeuce,theegalitarianwouldfavorredistributionbetweenthebetterandworseoffwhichevergroupwasbetteroff.Here,itseemsclearthattheconcernforexpostequality,andsubstantivefairness,woulddictatehowtheegalitarianwouldrespondtotheactuallivespeopleendedupleading,andanyconcernsshemighthaveaboutexanteequalityorproceduraljusticewouldplaynoroleinthatresponse.Mighttheegalitariansimplyfocusonachievingexpostequality,andnotworryaboutwhetherornotexanteequality,orproceduralfairnessobtains?Ithinknot.Letmemakeseveralpointsregardingthis.First,theconcernforexanteequalityandproceduralfairness,reflecttheviewthatitnotonlymattershowpeopleendup,itmattershowtheyhavebeentreated;forexample,thattheyaretreatedasequalssothatnooneisdiscriminatedagainst,orotherwisedealtanunfairhandtoplay.Importantly,italsomattersthateachpersonbegivenafairstartfromwhichtoautonomouslyplanandleadalifeoftheirownchoosing,sothateachpersonissignificantlyresponsiblefortheirownlotinlife.Moreover,suchfactorsarerelevanttotelicconsiderationsregardingthegoodnessofoutcomes,andnotmerelydeonticconsiderationsofhowpeopleoughttoact.Thus,forexample,itisnotonlytruethatpeopleoughttotreatpeopleasequals,itistruethattreatingpeopleasequalsisitselfagood-makingfeatureofoutcomes;sothat,otherthingsequal,anoutcomeinwhichpeoplehavebeentreatedasequalsisbetterthanonewheretheyhavenot.Second,asnotedaboveindiscussingequalityofopportunity,theremaybesomecaseswhereexpostequalityisunobtainable,orundesirableallthingsconsidered,whereitwouldbebetter,preciselybecausefairer,iftheoutcomeresultedfromaninitialsituationofexanteequality,orproceduralfairness,thanifitdidn’t.164LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page165Third,expostequalityisitselfdesirableonlywhenitreflectsasituationofcom-parativefairness.So,asindicatedearlier,otherthingsequal,theegalitarianshouldnotpreferanequaloutcomeinwhichafullyresponsiblecriminalendedupaswelloffasalawabidingcitizen.Likewise,supposethatJohnisdealtaninitialhandthatenableshimtolivealiferanginginvaluefrom10,000to20,000,whileMaryisdealtahandthatonlyenableshertolivealifeofvaluefrom0to10,000.EvenifJohnandMaryendupequallywelloff,sothereisperfectexpostequality,theegalitarianwouldhavegoodreasontoworrythattheoutcomewascomparativelyunfair.ItmightwellbethatMary,havingdoneherbesttotakefulladvantageofeveryopportunityavailabletoher,oughttoendupmuchbetteroffthanJohn,whomayhavewill-inglyandknowinglyfritteredawaytheabundantopportunitiesavailabletohim.So,thecomparativefairnessegalitariancan’tjustignorequestionsofexanteequality,andproceduralfairness,andfocusonbringingaboutoutcomesofexpostequality.Butthisraisesafourthimportantissue.Onecan’tsimplyassumethatMarydeservestobebetteroffthanJohn,basedontheextenttowhichtheydifferedinmaximiz-ingtheirpotential.PerhapsifJohnhadbeengivenMary’sinitialstartingpoint,hewouldhaveactedasMaryinfactdid,andsimilarlyforMary.Inthatcase,perhapsMaryandJohndeservetobeequallywelloffafterall,despitetheircompletelydif-ferent,andseeminglyunfair,initialstartingpoints.Thisshowsthatitmaybeimport-anttopromoteexanteequalityandproceduralfairness,toensurethatpeoplehavesufficientlycomparablestartingpoints,inordertomakemeaningfuljudgmentsof12comparativefairness.Furthermore,if,contrarytofact,onecouldensurethatpeople’sinitialstartingpointsfullymettherobustcriteriaforexanteequalityandproceduralfairness–so,inparticular,peoplehadbeendealtsimilarhandsintermsoftalents,temperament,individualresponsibility,andlifeprospects–andif,inaddition,onecouldlaterremoveorrectifytheinfluenceofluckonpeople’schoices–so,ultimately,eachpersonwasresponsibleforhowtheyendeduprelativetoothers;then,ofcourse,thecomparativefairnessegalitarianwouldbefullysatisfiedwiththeoutcome,regardlessofwhetheritinvolvedexpostequality,inthesenseofpeopleactuallyendingupequallywelloff.Finally,letmeconcludethissectionwithanothermethodologicalpoint.Thereis,Ibelieve,muchtruthtothemaximthat“toapersonwithahammer,everythinglookslikeanail.”So,forexample,someonewithabadbackislikelytoreceiveaverydifferenttreatmentdependingonwhetherhegoestoachiropractor,apsychologist,orabacksurgeon.Understandably,eachofusconfrontsproblemsintermsofthemodelsandtheoriesthatwehavemastered,andwhichhaveserveduswellinothercontexts,especiallyiftheproblemsseembothamenabletoanalysis,andtractable,intermsofourfamiliarmodelsandtheories.Thepointisobvious,butitisimportanttobearinmindinthinkingaboutthe“equalityofwhat”debate.Theworldisfilledwithinequalities,andamongthestarkestofthese,ofnormativesignificance,arethevasteconomicinequalitiesofincomeandwealth.Correspondingly,manyofthebrightestmindswhohavetakenupthetopicofequalityhavebeeneconomists.Naturally,theyhaveusedthepowerfultoolsofeconomicstoassessinequality,and,infacttheproblemofinequalityseemsparticu-larlyamenabletoanalysis,andpotentiallytractable,whenthefocusisoneconomicequality.Afterall,wehavehighlydevelopedeconomictheoriesthatprovidepreciseIlluminatingEgalitarianism165\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page166waysofidentifyingandmeasuringeconomicinequalities,andthatyieldsolidguid-anceastohowsocialandeconomicpoliciesmightbechangedtoamelioratesuchinequalities.Givenallthis,itis,perhaps,unsurprising,thatwhilephilosophershavedefendedawiderangeofanswerstothe“equalityofwhat?”question,inthe“realworld”thebattlegroundofegalitarianismislargelyaneconomicone.Policymakersrelyheav-ilyoneconomiststomeaningfullymeasuredisparitiesinincomeandwealth,andsocialpoliciesaredevisedwiththegoalofreducingeconomicdisparities.But,asweshallseenext,thismaybeproblematic.Considertheoldbromidethatifyoudon’thaveyourhealthyoudon’thaveanything.Onthisview,whileitmaybebettertoberichthanpoor,itisevenmoreimportanttobehealthythanill.Thisviewmaywellexpressadeepandimportanttruth.Suppose,onreflection,wethinkitdoes.This,ofcourse,wouldhaveimport-antegalitarianimplications.Insteadoffocusingonimprovingthelotofthepoor,therewouldbestrongreasontofocusonimprovingthelotoftheill.Tobesure,therewouldbereasontofocusontheillpoor,beforetheillrich,buttherewouldalsobereasontofocusontheillrich,beforethehealthypoor.Afterall,increasingtheincomeorwealthofthehealthypoorwouldreducethegapbetweenthehealthypoorandthehealthyrich,butindoingthisitwouldincreasethegapbetweenthehealthypoorandtheillrich.Ontheviewinquestion,thiswouldbeakintoimprovingthelotofsomewhowere,infact,alreadyamongtheworld’sbetteroffintermsofwhatmattersmost,andthismight,infact,worsenthesituation’soverallinequality.Similarremarksmightholdforothercomponentsthatplayacentralroleinourlives.So,tonotebutoneotherexample,if,assomebelieve,mostlove-filledlivesarebetterthanmostlovelesslives,andif,asseemsplausible,beingrichisneithernecessarynorsufficientforhavingalove-filledlife,thenitmaywellbethateffortstoincreasetheincomeorwealthofthepoorwouldofteninvolvereducingthegapbetweenthelove-filledpoorandthelove-filledrich,butincreasingthegapbetweenthelove-filledpoorandthelovelessrich.Asbefore,thismightamounttoimprov-ingthelotofsomewhowerealreadyamongtheworld’sbetteroffintermsofwhatmattersmost,andmightactuallyworsenthesituation’soverallinequality.Letmebeclear.Iamnotarguingthatwehavereasontobecomplacentaboutourworld’sextraordinaryeconomicinequalities.Indeed,ashasbeenamplydemon-strated,thereareimportantcorrelationsbetweeneconomicstatusandmanyother13centralcomponentsofwell-being.Still,theprecedingdiscussionmayhaveimport-antimplicationsregardingtheaimsandfocusofegalitarianism.Iftheinequalitiesthatmattermostareactuallyinequalitiesoffood,health,safety,andthelike,orinequalitiesinrights,freedom,stablehomes,orlove,thentheremayneedtobeaprofoundshiftinthetools,approach,andpoliciesofrealworldegalitarianism.Perhapsegalitariansneedtoconsultdoctors,nutritionists,agronomists,politicalscientists,psychologists,sociologists,socialworkers,andothers.Perhapstheyrequiremeaningfulmeasuresofseriousillness,nutritionaldeprivation,humanrightsreal-ization,politicalstability,functionalfamilylife,ormeaningfullove,atleastasmuchasmeasuresofeconomicinequality.Similarly,perhapsthefocusofegalitarianismneedstochangefromeffortstoshiftthewagescale,alterpeople’ssavingshabits,orredistributewealth,toalteringthefocusanddistributionofmedicalcare,increasing166LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page167cropyields,changingpatternsofnutritionalconsumption,promotingpoliticalstabil-ityorhumanrights,developingstablefamilies,fosteringlovingrelationships,andsoon.Eventosuggestthategalitariansshouldtakeonsuchtasksmaysoundludicrous.Afterall,itisbynomeansclearwhatmightevencountasafullysatisfactorysitu-ationinsomeoftheserespects,muchlesshowonemightgoaboutquantifying,ormeasuring,someofthesefactors.Moreover,itmayseemutterlybeyondourreachtothinkwecoulddevelopeffectivesocialpoliciestoreducetheinequalitiesinsomeoftheseareas,evenifweagreedthatdoingsomightbedesirable.Andnodoubtthemessinessandcomplexitiesassociatedwiththetasksenvisioned,helptopartlyexplainthepropensitytofocusoneconomicinequalities;which,asnotedabove,arereadilyidentifiable,measurable,and,inprinciple,rectifiableviadiscernibleeconomicpolicies.Moreover,itmayseemclearthateconomicinequalitiesarebad,andshouldbeaddressed,eveniftheyarenottheonlyinequalitiesthatmatter.However,theprecedingremarkssuggestthatthecontemporarypreoccupationwitheconomicinequalitiesmaybeproblematic.Focusingoneconomicinequalitymaydirectourattentionawayfromtheinequalitiesthatactuallymattermost,andsoinvolveawasteofeffortandresourcesinthefightformeaningfulequality.Worse,insomecasesreducingeconomicinequalitymightnotmerelybeinefficient,itmightbecoun-terproductive,exacerbatingoverallinequalityintermsofwhatmattersmost.Iconcludethatwemustbewaryofregardingtheproblemofinequalityasakindeconomic“nail,”becauseweareinpossessionof,andfairlyadeptatusing,thepower-ful“hammer”ofeconomicanalysis.Wemusttakeseriouslythefullrangeofcom-plexanswersthatmightbegiventothe“equalityofwhat”question,thinkinghardaboutwhatfactorsaremostcentralandvaluableforhumanflourishing,andhowthevariouscomponentsofwell-beingarerelatedanddistributed.Correspondingly,inidentifying,measuring,andaddressinginequality,wemayneedtouse,andperhapsevenforge,ahostofother,non-economic,“tools”forsocial,cultural,andpsycho-logicalanalysis.IV.TheSubsistenceLevel,Sufficiency,andCompassionSomebelievethatthesubsistencelevelhasaspecialroletoplayinourunderstandingofinequality’simportance–orlackthereof.Theyimagineconditionsofscarcity,wherethereareinsufficientresourcestosupporteveryone.Theythennotethatiftheresourcesaredistributedequally,sothateveryoneisatthesamewelfarelevel,orhasequalaccesstoadvantages,everyonewillbebelowthesubsistencelevel,andhenceevery-onewilldie.If,ontheotherhand,resourcesaredistributedunequally,atleastsome,thoughnotall,willlive.Considerationofsuchexampleshasledsomepeopletoconcludethatinequalitydoesn’tmatter,sincetheunequaloutcomeinwhichsomepeopleliveisclearlyprefer-14abletotheequaloutcomeinwhicheveryonedies.Othershaveusedsuchexamplestosupporttheconclusionthatinequalitymatterslessinpoorsocietiesthanrichones,15asonlyrichsocietiescan“affordtheluxury”ofequality.Suchargumentsarepopular.Thisisunfortunate.Undoubtedly,theunequalsitu-ationinwhichsomepeopleliveisbetterthantheequalsituationwhereeveryoneIlluminatingEgalitarianism167\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page168diesallthingsconsidered.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatinequalityinapoorsituationdoesn’tmatter,muchlessthatinequalitydoesn’tmatteratall.Rather,suchargumentsmerelyservetoremindusthatinequalityisnotallthatmatters.Butwhowouldhavethoughtdifferently?Surely,theegalitarianwouldsay,theworse-offpeopleintheunequalsituationhaveasignificantcomplaintregardinginequality.Theyaremuchworse-offthantheothers,thoughnolessdeserving(wearesupposing).Moreover,thedifferencebetweenthequalityoftheirlivesismostsignificant.Itisadifferencemeasuredintermsoflife’sbasicnecessities;adifference,quiteliterally,betweenwholivesanddies.Tosuggestthatsuchundeservedinequalitydoesn’tmatterisludicrous.Andtorespondtosuchsituations,asnon-egalitariansarewontto,that“nobodysaidthatlifewasfair,”istoadmit,eveninone’scynicism,theperspectiveofthecompara-tiveegalitarian.Totheegalitarian,theinequalityinthesituationwheresomelive,andothersdie,isverybadanditmattersagreatdeal.Still,asbadasthesituation’sinequalityis,ifthecostofremovingitwereasituationwherenonesurvived,eventheegalitariancouldadmit,quapluralist,thatthecostwastoohigh.Letusnextconsidertheclaimthatinsteadofcaringaboutequality,weshouldcareaboutsufficiency–thatpeoplehave“enough,”andtherelatedclaimthatitisimportanttoshowcompassionforpeoplewhoarepoorlyoff,butnottopromoteequality,perse.HarryFrankforthasarguedthat“Itis...reasonabletoassignahigherprioritytoimprovingtheconditionofthose...inneedthantoimprovingtheconditionofthose...notinneed,”butheassertsthatthisisonlybecausewehavereasontogiveprioritytotheneedy,notbecausethereisanygeneralobligationto16giveprioritytothosewhoareworseoff.Thus,hecontendsthat“Wetendtobequiteunmoved,afterall,byinequalitiesbetweenthewell-to-doandtherich....Thefactthatsomepeoplehavemuchlessthanothersismorallyundisturbingwhenitis17clearthattheyhaveplenty.”RogerCrispechoesFrankfort’sposition.Hebelievesthatwhencircumstanceswarrantourcompassionwehavereasontogiveprioritytoonepersonoveranother,butwhenpeopleare“sufficiently”welloff,compassionisnolongerwarrantedandthereisnoreasontogiveprioritytoonepersonoveranother18merelybecausetheoneisworseoff.FrankfortandCrisp’spositionschallengeegalitarianism.ButIbelieveweshouldrejecttheirviews.Toseewhy,considerthefollowingexample.Ihavetwodaughters.Mydaughtersaren’tsuper-rich,butbythecriteriathattrulymattermost,theyaretheyareincrediblywelloff.Supposethefollowingistrue.Bothareextremelyattractiveandintelligent,havedeepfriendships,astablehome,afamilythatnurturesthem,excellentschools,highself-esteem,financialsecurity,rewardingprojects,goodhealth,fantasticcareersandalonglifeaheadofthem.Inshort,imaginethatmytwodaughtersaredestinedtoflourishinallthewaysthatmattermost.Byanyreasonablecriteria,wemustassumethatmydaughterswillhave“sufficiently”goodlives.SupposeIknowthisaboutmydaughters.SupposeIalsoknowthatinfactAndreaisalittlebetteroffthanBeckyinmostoftherelevantcategories,andaswelloffinalloftheothers.So,Andreaissmarter,hasmorerewardingfriendships,willlivelonger,andsoon.AndsupposethatthedifferencebetweenAndreaandBeckyisjustamatterofblindluck.NeitherAndreanorBeckyhasdoneanythingtodeservetheirdifferentfortunes.168LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page169Finally,tomaketheexamplesimpleandclean,imaginethatAndrea’sincrediblygoodfortuneevenextendstothemosttrivialofmatters.Sheis,inaword,justplainluckyineverythingshedoes.Hereisonewayinwhichsheislucky.Everytimeshegoesforherweeklywalk,shefindsatwenty-dollarbill.Shedoesn’tlookformoneyasshewalks,ortakeparticularrouteswhereshethinksrichpeoplewithholesintheirpocketstread,shejustalwayscomesacrossmoneywhenoutwalking.Blindluck.Ofcourse,forsomeoneaswelloffassheisintermsofwhattrulymattersinlife,findingtwentydollarsonceaweekdoesn’tmakemuchofarealdifferencetoherlife,butsheneverlosesthethrilloffindingmoneyonherpath,anditinvari-ablybrightensherday,andbrieflybringsawarmsmiletoherfaceandaglowinherheart.Becky,ontheotherhand,doesn’tsharehersister’sincredibleluck.ShewalksevenmoreregularlythanAndrea,andtakessimilarpathsatsimilartimes.Butforsomereasonsheneverfindsanymoney.Ofcourse,inalifeasrichandfulfillingashers,thishardlymatters;itsimplymeansthatshemissestheexcitementAndreafeelswhenshecomesacrossmoney,togetherwithitsattendantoutwardsmileandinwardglow.Finally,letussupposethatAndreanevermentionsthemoneythatshefinds,notbecausesheishidingitfromanyone,butbecauseitnevercomesup.So,Beckyisn’ttheleastbitenviousofhersister’sgoodfortune.Indeed,wemayadd,ifwelike,thatBeckyissuchapreciouschild,shewouldn’tbeenviousofAndrea’sgoodfortuneevenifsheknewaboutit–shewouldjustbehappyforher.NowsupposeIknewallofthistobethecase.AndIwasoutwalkingwithmytwodaughters.IfIwaswalkingdownthepath,andsawtwentydollarsfloatingtowardsAndrea(yes,likemannafromheaven!),IhavenodoubtthatIwouldregarditasagoodturnofeventsifagustofwindarosetoredirectittowardsBecky.Myimme-diatewishwouldbeforBeckytodiscoverthatwonderfulpleasureof“finding”moneyonawalk.Butmoregenerally,IwouldregarditasbetterifBeckyfoundthemoneyratherthanAndrea,tomakeupforthefactthatAndreawasalreadydestinedtobebetteroffthanBeckyoverthecourseofherlife.OnCrisp’sview,sinceAndreaandBeckybothlead“sufficiently”goodlives,com-passionwon’tbewarranted,andhencetherewouldbenoreasonformetogiveBeckypriorityoverAndreainthisway.IthinkCrispishalfright.IagreethatinthiscaseIwouldn’tfeelcompassionforBecky.Hersisnotalifeofmiseryorsuffering,norisitalifelackinginanyofthewaysthatmattermost.Still,IwouldgiveBeckypriorityinthemannersuggested.Myreasonforthisisegalitarianinnature.ItispureluckthatAndreacontinu-allyfindsmoneyandBeckydoesn’t.PureluckthatAndreaisbetteroffinmanywaysthatmatter.Hence,BeckyisnotmerelyworseoffthanAndrea,sheisworseoffthroughnofault,orchoice,ofherown.EgalitariansbelievethiscrucialfactabouttherelationbetweenBeckyandAndreaprovidesthemwithreasontogiveBeckypriorityoverAndrea.Notthereasonprovidedbycompassion,butthereasonofequality,orcomparativefairness.Note,asabove,ifsomeoneweretoclaim,onBecky’sbehalf,thatitwasn’tfairthatsheneverfoundmoney,whilehersisteralwaysdid,itwouldbenoanswertothatchargeforsomeonetoretortthat“lifeisn’tfair.”Tothecontrary,suchacyn-icalretortvindicatestheegalitarian’sviewofthesituation,evenwhenitisofferedinsupportoftheviewthatweneedn’tdoanythingaboutBecky’ssituation.TheIlluminatingEgalitarianism169\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page170egalitarianisacutelyawarethat“lifeisn’tfair.”Thatisthestartingpointofherview.Whatseparatestheegalitarianfromtheanti-egalitarianisthewayshereactstolife’sunfairness.Theessenceoftheegalitarian’sviewisthatcomparativeunfair-nessisbad,andthatifwecoulddosomethingaboutlife’sunfairness,wehavesomereasonto.Suchreasonsmaybeoutweighedbyotherreasons,buttheyarenot,asanti-egalitarianssuppose,entirelywithoutforce.19V.PrioritarianismandtheLevelingDownObjectionFormanyyears,non-egalitarianshavearguedthatweshouldrejectsubstantivenon-instrumentalegalitarianism.Instead,somebelieve,weshouldbeprioritarians,andinfact,Ibelievethatmanywhothinkofthemselvesasegalitariansactuallyareprior-itarians.Roughly,prioritarianswanteveryonetofareaswellaspossible,buttheworseoffsomeoneisinabsoluteterms,thegreaterweighttheygivetoherclaimsintheirmoraldeliberations.Thisviewtendstofavorredistributionbetweenthebetter-andworse-off,butthekeypointtonoteisthatwhileonthisviewonehasaspecialcon-cernfortheworse-off,one’sultimategoalisforeachtofareaswellaspossible.Prioritarianismmayseemtocapturesomeofthestrengthsofutilitarianismandmaximin,whileavoidingtheirshortcomings.Likeutilitarianism,itgivesweighttotheconcernsofall,andhenceisabletoavoidmaximin’sexclusive–andimplausible–focusontheworst-off.Butlikemaximin,prioritarianismexpressesaspecialcon-cernforthoseworse-off,andhenceisabletoavoidutilitarianism’sexclusive–andimplausible–focusonmaximization.Still,prioritarianismhasmainlybeenofferedasanalternativetosubstantivenon-instrumentalegalitarianism.Inparticular,manythinkthatprioritarianismistheclosestthingtoaplausibleegalitarianposition.Thegistofthisviewisnotthatprioritarianismisaplausibleversionofnon-instrumentalegalitarianism,butratherthatnon-instrumentalegalitarianismisimplausible.Hence,ifonegenerallyfavorstransfersfrombetter-toworse-off–asmanydo–oneshouldbeaprioritarianinsteadofanon-instrumentalegalitarian.ManyareattractedtotheforegoingbytheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjections.Roughly,theLevelingDownObjectionclaimsthatthereisnorespectinwhichasituationisnormativelyimprovedmerelybylevelingdownabetter-offpersontothelevelofsomeoneworse-off.Likewise,theRaisingUpObjectionclaimsthatthereisnorespectinwhichasituationisnormativelyworsenedmerelybyimprov-ingsomepeople’slives,evenifthosepeoplearealreadybetteroffthaneveryoneelse.But,itisclaimed,sincelevelingdownmayundeniablydecreaseinequality,andraisingupmayundeniablyincreaseinequality,thisshowsthatthereisnothingvaluableaboutequalityitself,andhencethatsubstantivenon-instrumentalegalit-arianismmustberejected.20Elsewhere,IhavearguedthattheLevelingDownandRaisingUpObjectionshavegreatintuitiveappeal,butthattheyderivemuchoftheirforcefromapositionIcalltheSlogan,accordingtowhichonesituationcannotbeworse(orbetter)thananotherinanyrespect,ifthereisnooneforwhomitisworse(orbetter)inanyrespect.IhaveshownthattheSloganmustberejected,andcontendedthatthisdeprivestheLevelingDownandRaisingUpObjectionsofmuchoftheirrhetoricalforce.170LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page171ManypeopleacceptmyclaimsabouttheSlogan,butstillfindtheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjectionscompellingagainstnon-instrumentalegalitarianism.MostsuchresponsesturnonrejectingtheSlogan,asanarrowperson-affectingprinciple,21infavorofawideperson-affectingprinciplethatassessesthegoodnessofalterna-tiveoutcomesnotintermsofhowtheparticularpeoplewhowouldbeineachout-comewouldbeaffectedforbetterorworse,butratherintermsofhowpeopleare22affected,forbetterorworse,ineachoutcome.TimScanlononcewrotethat“rights...needtobejustifiedsomehow,andhowotherthanbyappealtothehumaninter-eststheirrecognitionpromotesandprotects?Thisseemstobetheuncontrovertible23insightoftheclassicalutilitarians.”Followersoftheviewinquestionextendthe“uncontrovertibleinsight”beyondrightstoallofmorality.AsRogerCrispputsthepoint,“theworryarisesfromtheideathatwhatmattersmorallycouldbesomething24thatwasindependentofthewell-beingofindividuals.”Iacceptmycritics’claimthatonecouldrejecttheSloganandstillendorsetheLevelingDownandRaisingUpObjections,bymovingtoawideperson-affectingprinciple.AndIreadilygrantthatthewideperson-affectingprinciplealsohasgreatinitialappeal.Butwhileawideperson-affectingprinciplecanhandleoneoftheprob-25lemsIleveledattheSlogan,namelytheNon-IdentityProblem,itcan’thandleanyoftheotherproblemsIraisedfortheSlogan.Forexample,Inotedthatmostpeo-plefirmlyjudgethatthereisatleastonerespectinwhichanoutcomewherevicioussinnersfarebetterthanbenignsaints,isworsethananoutcomewherethesinnersandsaintsbothgetwhattheydeserve,evenifthesaintsfarejustaswellinthetwooutcomes.ButneithertheSlogannorthewideperson-affectingprinciplecancapturethisjudgment.Thus,liketheSlogan,thewideperson-affectingprincipleisunabletocapturethenon-instrumentalvalueofproportionaljustice,avaluetowhichmanyarecommitted.Moregenerally,thewideperson-affectingprinciplehasthesamefundamentalshortcomingasthenarrowprinciple,namely,thatitallowsnoscopeforanyimpersonalmoralvalues.IhavearguedagainstbasingtheLevelingDownandRaisingUpObjectionsona26wide-personaffectingviewatlengthelsewhere,andshallnotrepeatthoseargu-mentshere.Still,letmeobservethefollowing.Wideperson-affectingviewscombinethefollowingtwoclaims:claim1,onlysentientindividualsaretheproperobjectsofmoralconcern;andclaim2,forpurposesofevaluatingoutcomes,individualwell-beingisallthatmatters.Althoughbothclaimscanbequestioned,forthesakeofargumentIamwillingtoacceptclaim1.Butclaim1mustbecarefullyinterpretedifitisnottobedeeplymisleading.Forexample,claim1ismostplausible–thoughstillquestionable–insofarasitassertsthemoralprimacyofsentientindividuals,asopposedtogroupsorsocieties.But,importantly,sentientindividualsarenotmerelytheobjectsofmoralconcern,theyarealsothesourceofmoralconcerns,andofbothmoralandnon-moralvalues.Thus,forexample,rationalagentscangiverisetomoralconcernsandvaluesthatnon-rationalbeingscannot.Onceonerecognizesthatsentientindividualsarenotmerelytheobjectsofmoralconcern,butalsothesourceofmoralconcernsandvalues,claim2losesitsappeal.Forpurposesofevaluatingoutcomes,whyshouldweonlycareaboutthewell-beingofindividuals?Whyshouldn’twealsocareaboutwhethermoralagentsgetwhattheydeserve(justice),orhowindividualsfarerelativetoothers(equality),orwhetherrationalagentshaveactedfreely,autonomously,ormorally?MosthumanshaveIlluminatingEgalitarianism171\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page172extraordinarycapacitiesbeyondtheircapacityforwell-being.Thesecapacitiesserveasasourceofvalueintheworld;forexample,thevaluethatcanbefoundinfriend-ship,love,altruism,knowledge,perfection,beauty,andtruth.Noneofthesevaluesariseinaworlddevoidofsentientbeings,andthattruthmayunderlieclaim1’sappeal.But,importantly,suchvaluesdoarisewhenrationalormoralagentsstandincertainrelationstoeachotherortheworld.Moreover,Isubmitthatthevalueofsuchrelationsisnotbestunderstoodinstrumentally;andinparticular,thatitdoesnotliesolelyintheextenttowhichsuchrelationspromoteindividualwell-being.Individualwell-beingisvaluable;butitisagrotesquedistortionoftheconceptionofvaluetothinkthatitistheonlythingthatmattersforthegoodnessofoutcomes.Ifonesituationcouldn’tbeworsethananotherinanyrespect,ifitwasn’tworseforpeople,thentheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjectionswouldbecompellingagainstegalitarianism.Butifonesituationcouldbeworsethananotherinonerespect,evenifitwasn’tworseforpeople,thentheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjectionsdolittlemorethanpointoutanobviousimplicationofnon-instrumentalegalitarian-ism.Thenon-instrumentalegalitarianclaimsthatthereisonerespectinwhichanequalsituationisbetterthananunequalone,evenwhenitisnotbetterforpeople.ProponentsoftheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjectionsinsistentlydenythis;but,howeverheartfelt,aninsistentdenialhardlyconstitutesanargument,muchlessacrushingone.Isn’titunfairforsometobeworseoffthanothersthroughnofaultoftheirown?Isn’titunfairforsometobebornblind,whileothersarenot?Andisn’tunfairnessbad?Thesequestions,posedrhetorically,expressthefundamentalclaimsofnon-instrumentalegalitarians.Onceonerejectsperson-affectingprinciplesascapturingthewholeofmoralityrelevanttoassessingoutcomes,asIbelieveoneshould,thereislittlereasontoforsakesuchclaimsinthefaceoftheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjections.But,theanti-egalitarianwillincredulouslyask,doIreallythinkthereissomerespectinwhichaworldwhereonlysomeareblindisworsethanonewhereallare?Yes.DoesthismeanIthinkitwouldbebetterifweblindedeveryone?No.Equalityisnotallthatmatters.Butitmatterssome.Considerthefollowingexample.Manychildrenareafraidofdeath.Parentswhodon’tbelieveinanafterlifeareoftenatalossastowhattheycanhonestlysaytoassuagetheirconcerns.Andintruth,thereisnotmuchonecansaythatwillgenuinelyanswertheirchildren’sworries.So,instead,grasping,parentsoftenmakealotoforthogonalpoints–abouthowtheoldmustmakewayfortheyoung,abouthowmuchofwhatmakeslifesovaluableisrelatedtodeath,andsoon.Andonepointparentsoftenemphasizeishowdeathisapartoflife,thatinfacteveryonedies,andindeed,thatalllivingthingsdie.Itisstrikingthatoneshouldhopetheuniversalityofdeathwouldprovidecom-forttooneworriedaboutherowndeath.Afterall,thefactthateveryoneelsewillalsodie,doesn’tlessentheterrorofone’sowndeath.Yetsomehow,itseemsworthnotingthatweareallinthesamepredicament.Eachofuswholives,inevitablydies.Butsupposeitweren’tthatway.Supposesomepeoplehadaccidentallystumbledacross,andeaten,somerareberriesthatmiraculouslymadethemimmortal.Sothatinfact,whilesomepeopledied,otherslivedforever.Whatshouldonethensayifone’schildlamentedthatshedidn’twanttodie,andthenaddedtheplaintivecomplaint172LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page173thatitwasn’tfair!Why,asone’schildmightputit,shouldshehavetodie,whenKatiedoesn’t?Itseemstomethatinsuchasituationthechargeofunfairnessstrikesdeepandtrue.Thesituationwouldbeunfair,terriblyunfair,andthiswouldbesoeveniftheimmortalityberriesweren’tactuallyworseforthosewhoremainedmortal,butmerelybetterforthoseonwhomtheybestowedeternallife.DoesthismeanIthinkitwouldactuallybeworse,allthingsconsidered,iftherewerealimitedsupplyofsuchberries?Notnecessarily.Butontheotherhand,I’mgladIdon’tactuallyhavetomakesuchadecision.Forasgreatasthegainsofimmortalitymightbeforthefortunateones,theresultingunfairnesswouldbeofcosmicproportions.Itwouldbe,tomymind,terriblyunfair,andtothatextentbad.SoIcontendthathere,asbefore,somethingcanbebadinanimportantrespectevenifitisnotbadforpeople.AdvocatesoftheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjectionsareamongthemanyanti-egalitariansmesmerizedby“pure”equality’sterribleimplications.But,ofcourse,asobservedearlier,equalityisnottheonlyidealthatwould,ifexclusivelypursued,haveimplausibleoreventerribleimplications.Thesameistrueofjustice,utility,freedom,andprobablyeveryotherideal.RecallKant’sviewthat“justicebedonethoughtheheavensshouldfall.”Dowereallythink,withKant,thatitwouldbewrongtofalselyimprisonaninnocentmanforevenfiveminutes,ifthatwerenecessarytosaveamillioninnocentlives?Orconsidertheprincipleofutility,whichwouldrequireustotortureaninnocentpersonifonlyenoughpeoplehadtheirlivesimprovedbythetiniestofamountsbecauseofouraction.Orfinally,considertheimplicationsofunfetteredfreedomtoactasonewantswithoutgovernmentinter-ference,aslongonedoesn’tinterferewiththerightsorlibertiesofothers.Suchaprinciplemightallowcompleteneglectoftheleastfortunate,evenregardingbasicnecessitiessuchasfood,clothing,shelter,andhealthcare.Suchconsiderationsdonotshowthatjustice,utility,andfreedomshouldberejectedasmoralideals,onlythatmoralityiscomplex.ThemainlessonoftheRaisingUpandLevelingDownObjectionsisthatweshouldbepluralistsaboutmorality.Egalitarianshavelongrecognized,andaccepted,thislesson.Unfortunately,thesamecannotbesaidfortheiropponents.VI.EqualityorPriority?IllustratingEgalitarianism’sDistinctAppealEgalitariansandprioritarianswilloftenagreeonthesamecourseofaction.Thisisespeciallysogiventhategalitariansarepluralists.Butitisimportanttoemphasizethatequalityandpriorityexpressseparateconcerns,andrepresentdistinctpositions.Toseethis,considerthefollowingexample.Thoughfar-fetched,itclearlyilluminateswhatisatstakebetweenegalitarianismandprioritarianism.Imaginethatyouareinaspaceship,headingtowardsadistantgalaxy.Youlearnthatthereisamineral-richasteroidthatwillsoonarrivewhereyoucurrentlyare.Ifyoudelayyourtravels,youcanuseyourphaserstosafelydivertittoaplanetbelow.Doingsowillbenefittheplanet,becauseitwillthenbeabletousetheasteroid’srichminerals.Ifyoudon’tlinger,theasteroidwillcarryitsmineralsintodeepspace,wheretheywillbeofusetonoone.IlluminatingEgalitarianism173\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page174Here,mostagreethatIhavesomereasontolingeranddiverttheasteroid,thoughtheforceofthatreasonwilldepend,amongotherthings,onhowmuchI’dbegivingupbydoingso,andhowmuchtheplanetwouldactuallybenefitfrommyaction.Forexample,ifwaitingfortheasteroidwouldcostmychildherlife,andhardlybenefitthosebelow,thensurelyIcouldpermissiblyflyon.Ontheotherhand,ifdivertingtheasteroidmerelymeantmissingtheopeningactofanintergalacticopera,andtheplanetwouldusethemineralstosavethousands,itwouldbeheinoustoflyon.Next,considertwoscenarios.Onthefirst,itturnsoutthattheplanetbelowisloadedwithvaluableresources,andinadditionhasalreadyreceivedmanymineral-richasteroids.Itis,infact,smackinthemiddleofamineral-richasteroidpath.Moreover,nootherplanetshavebenefitedfromsuchgoodfortune.Tothecontrary,thepeopleonotherplanetshaveonlybeenabletoekeoutadecentlivingbydintofincrediblyhardwork.Thus,onthefirstscenario,itturnsoutthatthepeopleontheplanetbeloware,thoughnomoredeserving,muchbetteroffthaneveryoneelseintheuniverse.Onthesecondscenario,thepeoplebeloware,inabsoluteterms,aswelloffastheywereinthefirstscenario.Buttheirplanethasfewnaturalresources,andtheyhavehadtoworkincrediblyhardtoachievetheircurrentlevelofwell-being.Moreover,theyhavebeenterriblyunlucky.Whiletheyareinthemiddleofamineral-richaster-oidpath,theyhaveyettohaveasinglemineral-richasteroidlandontheirplanet.Therehavebeennearmisses,indeedlotsofthem.Butnothingmore.Moreover,everyotherpopulatedplanetisloadedwithnaturalresources,andeachhasbenefitedfromthearrivalofcountlessmineral-richasteroids.Thus,onthesecondscenario,itturnsoutthatthepeopleontheplanetbeloware,thoughnolessdeserving,muchworseoffthaneveryoneelseintheuniverse.Nowthesimplequestionisthis.Doesitmakeanydifferenceatall,tothestrengthofone’sreasonstodiverttheasteroid,whetherscenariooneortwoobtains?Onaprioritarianviewtheanswertothisquestionis“no.”Allthatmattersonaprior-itarianviewistheabsolutelevelofthepeopleImightaid.Since,byhypothesis,thepeopleareatthesameabsolutelevelinscenariosoneandtwo,thesacrificeIshouldbewillingtomaketoaidthepeopleshouldbethesameinbothcases.Onanegal-itarianviewmattersaredifferent.Whatmattersisnotmerelytheabsolutelevelpeopleareat,butcomparativefairness.Inscenarioone,thepeoplebelowarealreadybetteroffthaneveryoneelseintheuniverse,duetopuregoodluck.Inscenariotwo,thepeoplebelowarealreadyworseoffthaneveryoneelse,duetopurebadluck.Inthesecondcasethepeoplearethevictimsofnaturalunfairness.Inthefirst,theyarethebeneficiariesofit.Tomymind,howevermuchIshouldsacrificeforthepeoplebelowinthefirstscenario,Ishouldsacrificemore,ifnecessary,inthesec-ondscenario,wherethesituationexertsagreaterclaimonme.Thegreaterforceofreasonsinthesecondscenariohasanegalitarianexplanation.Itisthedifferenceincomparativeunfairnessthataccountsformyreactiontothetwoscenarios.Thiskindofanexampleisnotanargumentforegalitarianism.Butitclearlyilluminatesthedifferencebetweenegalitarianismandprioritarianism.AndIampleasedtoreportthatmanysharemyjudgmentthatthereasonsforhelpingaremorecom-pellinginthesecondscenariothanthefirst.Still,somepeopleareunmovedbysuchexamples.Theyinsistthatallthatmatterstothemistheabsolutelevelofthepeople,sothattheextenttowhichthey174LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page175shouldgooutoftheirwaytodivertthemineral-richasteroidwouldbethesamein27bothscenarios.Ican’tprovethatsuchapositionismistaken,butIhaveahardtimebelievingthatmostpeoplewhoespousesuchaviewarereallygovernedbyitintheirthinking.Toseewhy,letmeconsideronefinalexample.Thisexampleconcernsafairly“typical”poorpersonintheUnitedStates,whomIshallcall“Ruth.”Ruthisn’tdesperatelyillorwretched,butsheisthemotheroffour,workstwojobs,drivesanoldcar,frequentlyworrieshowshe’llmeetthepay-mentsonhertwo-bedroomhouse,andhasnoideahowshe’llbeabletosendherchildrentocollegeonthefamily’sannualincomeof$20,000.ManyaredeeplymovedbytheplightofpeoplelikeRuthinalandwheresomanyothersliveinhalf-million-dollarhomes,owntwoorthreefancynewcars,sendtheirkidstoprivateschools,takeexpensivevacations,andhaveannualhouseholdincomeswellover$100,000.Isn’titclearthattheextenttowhichpeoplearemovedtohelppeoplelikeRuthisheavilyinfluencednotmerelybyhowshefaresinabsoluteterms,butbyhowshefaresrelativetotheothermembersofherincrediblywell-offsociety?Afterall,wemaysuppose,atleastRuthhasaroofoverherhead,indoorplumbing,atelephone,aTV,andacar.Moreover,sheisn’tlivinginawar-torncountry,orruledbyadic-tator,andsheneedn’tfearsmallpox,tuberculosis,malaria,ordiphtheria.Shedrinkssafewater,eatsthreemealsdaily,andhasareasonablylonglife-expectancy.Inshort,withoutromanticizingtheplightofAmerica’spoor,itseemsthatformostofhumanhistory,someoneaswelloffasRuthwouldbeamongtheverybestoff.Moreover,importantly,IthinkRuthmustprobablybecountedamongtheworld’sfortunateeventakingfullaccountofthegenuinelybadeffectsofbeingpoorinarichsociety.Toputthepointbluntly,asbadasitmaytypicallybetoberelativelypoorinarichsociety,itismuchworsetowatchone’schilddyingofstarvationordisease!Isuspect,then,thatiftheworlddidn’tincludeotherswhowereevenbetteroff,sothatRuthwasactuallybetteroffthaneveryoneelse,wewouldn’tbenearlyasconcernedtoimprovehersituationaswenoware,andthatthisissoevenifweassume,contrarytofact,thatherabsolutelevelinthatsituationwouldbeexactlythesameasitisnow.Surely,ourattitudetowardsAmerica’spoorisdeeplyshapedbythepresenceofsomanyotherswhoaresomuchbetteroff.AssumingI’mright,isthisjustamistakeonourpart?Prioritariansmustcontendthatitis.I,respect-fully,disagree.Althoughtherearepowerfulreasonstocaregreatlyaboutabsolutelevels,relativelevelsalsomatter.Itseemsunfair,andhencebad,forsomeonelikeRuthtobemuchworseoffthanotherswhosheisnolessdeservingthan.Thisviewiscapturedbyegalitarianism,butnotbyprioritarianism.Isubmit,then,thathowevermuchwemaycareaboutotherideals,including,perhaps,prioritarianism,weshouldalsocareaboutequalityascomparativefairness.Ihavecertainlynotproventhatweshould,butIbelievethattheconsiderationsIhaveprovidedsupportsuchaview.VII.ConclusionThisarticlehastriedtoilluminatethenatureandappealofegalitarianism,under-stoodasapositionwhosefundamentalconcerniswithcomparativefairness.ThoughIlluminatingEgalitarianism175\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page176ithasaddressedmanyissues,ithas,perforce,hadtoignoremanyotherimportantissues.Forexample,ithasnotbroachedanyofthecomplicatedissuesassociatedwithinequality’senormouscomplexity,withinequality’smatteringmoreatlowlevelsthanhighlevels,withhowvariationsinpopulationsizeaffectinequality,orwithwhetheregalitariansshouldbeconcernedaboutcomparingpeople’slivestakenas28completewholes,ordifferentsegmentsoftheirlives.Norhasitbroachedtheissuesoftheextents,ifany,towhichegalitariansshouldbeconcernedaboutinequalities29acrosstime,space,societies,orspecies.Butifthisarticleisright,wecannotsimplyignoresuchissues;forequalityascomparativefairnessisoneimportantideal,amongothers,thatmustbetakenseriously.Notes*OvertheyearsIhavebeeninfluencedbymanypeopleonthetopicsdiscussedhere.Whilemypoormemorypreventsmefromproperlyacknowledgingthemall,I’dliketothankJohnBroome,G.A.Cohen,RogerCrisp,NilsHoltug,SusanHurley,ThomasNagel,DerekParfit,IngmarPersson,andAndrewWilliams.I’dalsoliketothanktheeditorsofthisvolume,ThomasChristianoandJohnChristman.Finally,Ineedtoacknowledgethatthisarticledrawsonanumberofmypreviouslypublishedworks,especially,“Equality,Priority,andtheLevellingDownObjection”(inMatthewClaytonandAndrewWilliams,eds.,TheIdealofEquality,MacmillanPressLtd.andSt.Martin’sPress,Inc.,2000,pp.81–125);“Inequality:AComplex,Individualistic,andComparativeNotion”(inErnieSosaandEnriqueaVillanueva,eds.,PhilosophicalIssues11,BlackwellPublishers,2001,pp.327–52),and“EgalitarianismDefended”(inEthics113,2003:764–82).1SeeAmartyaSen,InequalityReexamined(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1992).2DerekParfitintroducestheterminologyoftelicanddeonticegalitarianismin“EqualityorPriority?”(TheLindleyLecture,UniversityofKansas,1991,copyright1995byDepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofKansas;reprintedinTheIdealofEquality.CorrespondingnotionsarealsointroducedinChapter1ofmybookInequality,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1993,p.11).3Therecanbepluralismatmanylevels.So,forexample,Ibelievethatdifferentversionsofequalitymayallbeplausibletovaryingdegrees;thatwithinanygivenversionofegalitarianismdifferentkindsofequalitymaybeplausible(seesectionIII);thatdifferentaspectsofequalitymayberelevantformeasuringanyparticularkindofequalitythatmatters(seeInequality);andsoon.Moreover,Ibelievethatsomeconceptionsofequal-ity,andinparticularequalityascomparability,canthemselvesberegardedasbutonecomponentofaconceptionofjustice,whichitselfisbutonecomponentofastillwiderconceptionofjustice,thatcanincludesuchdiverseelementsasaRawlsianconceptionofjusticethatfocusesontheplightoftheworstoffgroup,andaKantianconceptionofabsolutejustice,accordingtowhichthegooddeservetofarewell,andtheevildeservetofarepoorly.Likewise,theremaybemorethanoneplausibleconception,kind,oraspectoffreedom,utility,perfection,oranyotheridealthatmatters.4Forclassicstatementsoftheirviews,seeRichardArneson,“EqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfare,”PhilosophicalStudies56(1989):77–93;RonaldDworkin,“WhatisEquality?Part1:EqualityofWelfare,”and“Part2:EqualityofResources,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs10(1981):185–246,283–345,andG.A.Cohen,“OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice,”Ethics99(1989):906–44.5SeeCohen’s“OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice”andmyInequality.176LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page1776HereI’massumingthatonemighthaveadutytosavethedrowningchild.Butonemightfeelthesamewayaboutthecaseifwethoughtthepersonactedsupererogatorilyinhelp-ingthechild.However,notallinstancesofsomeone’sendingupworseoffthanothersasaresultofsupererogatoryactionmightwarrantegalitarianrectification.Perhapssomecaseswouldinvolvecomparativeunfairness,butothersnot.7ThedistinctionbetweenoptionluckandbruteluckisintroducedbyDworkininhis“WhatIsEquality?”articles;seealsoChapters1and2ofDworkin’sSovereignVirtue(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).Foranimportantcritiqueofthedistinc-tion,seeKasperLippert-Rasmussen’s“Egalitarianism,OptionLuck,andResponsibility”(Ethics111,2001:548–79).8Ihavemadethispointinnumerouspublications,includingInequality,“Equality,Priority,andtheLevellingDownObjection,”and“Inequality:AComplex,Individualistic,andComparativeNotion.”9SeeInequalityReexamined,andalsoAmartyaSen’s“Well-being,Agency,andFreedom:TheDeweyLectures1984,”JournalofPhilosophy82(1985):169–220.10Inalargegroup,approximatelyhalfoftheothergroup’smembersshouldendupbetteroffthanthey,andhalfworseoff.Still,Ihavetosay“virtuallycertain”toacknowledgetheextraordinarilyremotestatisticalpossibilitythat,bycosmiccoincidence,everymem-beroftheothergroupwouldendupatthesamelevel.11Vonnegut’s“HarrisonBergeron”appearsinhiscollectionWelcometotheMonkeyHouse(DellPublishing,1998);itisreprintedinLouisPojmanandRobertWestmoreland’scollectionEquality(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997,pp.315–18).Interestingly,BernardWilliamsraisesaworrysimilartoVonnegut’sregardingtheultimateimplicationsofthedemandforequality,attheendofhisclassicarticle“TheIdeaofEquality”(inPeterLaslettandW.G.Runciman,eds.,Philosophy,Politics,andSociety,SecondSeries,Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1962,pp.110–31).Theviewthateveryoneshouldbeexactlythesamewasdubbed“radicalegalitarianism”byHugoBedauinhisarticle“RadicalEgalitarianism”(inR.PennockandJ.Chapman,eds.,NomosIX:Equality,PaloAlto,CA:AthertonPress,1967,pp.3–27).12SusanHurleystressedtheimportanceofthispointinanimportantarticlechallengingthecoherenceofegalitarianviewsthattrytorecognizethesignificanceofindividualrespons-ibility.Seeher“LuckandEquality,”SupplementtotheProceedingsofTheAristotelianSociety75(2001):51–72.SeealsoherJustice,LuckandKnowledge(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2003).13See,forexample,theclassicworkbySirMichaelMarmotononeaspectofthisissue,thesocialdeterminantsofdisease.Arepresentativepublicationishis“EconomicandSocialDeterminantsofDisease,”BulletinoftheWorldHealthOrganization79(2001):906–1004.14See,forexample,NicholasRescher’sDistributiveJustice(Indianapolis,IN:Bobbs-Merrill,1967).15AmartyaSenseemstoimplythatvariouseconomistshaveheldthispositioninOnEconomicInequality(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1973).16“EqualityasaMoralIdeal,”Ethics98(1987):267.17Ibid.,p.268.18SeeCrisp’s“Equality,Priority,andCompassion,”Ethics113(2003):745–63.19Ifirstintroducedthetermprioritarianisminmyarticle“Equality,Priority,andtheLevellingDownObjection”toreplaceDerekParfit’sterm“thePriorityView”(suggestedinParfit’s“EqualityorPriority?”deliveredastheLindleyLectureattheUniversityofKansas,November21,1991.Copyright1995byDepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofKansas.ReprintedinTheIdealofEquality).ButIfirstdiscussedprioritarianism,whichIthencalled“extendedhumanitarianism,”inearlydraftsofmy1983PrincetonPh.D.dissertation,“Inequality.”Manyofthepointsnotedbelow,andthatParfitnotesin“EqualityorPriority?”IlluminatingEgalitarianism177\nCDIC09.qxd2/4/0915:47Page178canbetracedtomyearlydissertationdrafts,includingthefactthatprioritarianismwasoftenconflatedwithegalitarianism,canavoidthelevelingdownobjectionand,hence,mightappeartomanyasthemostdefensibleversionof,orplausiblealternativeto,egalitarianism.20Seeforexample,Chapter9ofInequality;“HarmfulGoods,HarmlessBads”(inR.G.FreyandChristopherMorris,eds.,Value,WelfareandMorality,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993,pp.290–324);and“Equality,Priority,andtheLevellingDownObjection.”21DerekParfitintroducesthedistinctionbetweennarrowandwideperson-affectingprinciplesinPartFourofReasonsandPersons(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),seeesp.sections134–6.22AdvocatesofthiskindofviewincludeNilsHoltug,in“GoodforWhom?”(TheoriaLXIX,Part1–2,2003:4–20);BrettDoranin“ReconsideringtheLevelling-downObjectionagainstEgalitarianism”(Utilitas13,1,2001:65–85);CampbellBrowninhistypescript“HowtoHavetheLevellingDownIntuitionandRejecttheSloganToo”;andRogerCrispinhis“Equality,Priority,andCompassion.”23“Rights,Goals,andFairness,”reprintedinStuartHampshire,ed.,PublicandPrivateMorality(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978),p.93.Scanlon’sarticleoriginallyappearedinErkenntnis11(1977):81–95.24“Equality,Priority,andCompassion,”p.3.25HereIfollowedDerekParfit,whoidentifiestheNon-IdentityProblemanddemonstratesitsdevastatingimplicationsfornarrowperson-affectingprinciplesinPartFourofReasonsandPersons.26See,forexample,“PersonalversusImpersonalPrinciples:ReconsideringtheSlogan,”TheoriaLXIX,Part1–2(2003):21–31.ThisisaresponsetoNilsHoltug’s“GoodforWhom?”27DanBrockonceclaimedtoholdsuchaviewinaseminarIgaveon“TheMeaningofEquality”intheDepartmentofClinicalBioethicsattheNationalInstitutesofHealth(Bethesda,Maryland,Spring2002).However,Brockrecentlyinformedmethathehassincecomearoundmoretomyview.28Iaddresstheseissues,amongothers,inInequality.Butthereismuchmoretobesaidoneachofthesetopics.29Iaddressquestionsaboutinequalitiesacrossspace,time,andsocietiesin“JusticeandEquality:SomeQuestionsaboutScope”(inE.F.Paul,F.D.Miller,andJ.Paul,eds.,SocialPhilosophyandPolicy12,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995,pp.72–104).PeterVallentynediscussesthequestionofinterspeciesinequalityin“OfMiceandMen:EqualityandAnimals,”JournalofEthics9(2005):403–33.However,asabove,muchworkremainstobedoneonthesetopics.178LarryS.Temkin\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page179CHAPTERTENAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianismJohnKekesIThispaperhasacriticalandaconstructivepart.Thefirstshowsthategalitarianismisunreasonable;thesecondprovidesareasonablealternativetoit.Thisisalargetopic,Imustkeepitwithintheallottedspace,consequentlysomeofwhatIhaveto1saywillbesketchy.Thebasicideaofegalitarianismhasbeenexpressedindifferentways:humanbeingsoughttobetreatedwithequalconcern;everyone’sinterests2matterequally;oreveryoneoughttohaveanequalshareofmaterialresources.Egalitariansregardthisideaasatruismthatoughttobeacceptedbyallreasonable3andmorallycommittedpeopleincontemporaryWesterndemocracies.Alittlethought,however,issufficienttocastdoubtonthissupposedtruism.Humanbeingsdifferincharacter,personality,circumstances,talentsandweaknesses,capa-citiesandincapacities,virtuesandvices;inmoralstanding,politicalviews,religiousconvictions,aestheticpreferences,andpersonalprojects;inhowreasonableorunreasonabletheyare,howwellorbadlytheydevelopnativeendowments,howmuchtheybenefitorharmothers,howhard-workingordisciplinedtheywereinthepastandarelikelytobeinthefuture;andsoforth.Whyshouldthey,then,beshownequal,ratherthanunequal,concern?Thequestionsmountwhenitisasked,asitmustbe,whooweswhomequalcon-cern?Clearly,parentsshouldnottreattheirownandotherpeople’schildrenwithequalconcern;wedonotoweequalconcerntothoseweloveandtostrangers;governmentsbetraytheirelementarydutyiftheytreatcitizensandforeignerswithequalconcern;andasocietywouldbeself-destructiveifitshowedequalconcernforitsfriendsandenemies.Thequestionsgrowinnumberandurgencywhenitisasked,asitmustagainbe,whatdifferenceswouldwarrantunequalconcern?Ifdif-ferencesinmorality,reasonability,law-abidingness,andcitizenshipcount,thenverylittleremainsofequalconcern,sincetherearegreatdifferencesamongpeopleintheserespects.Andifsuchdifferencesarenotallowedtocount,thenhowcoulditContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page180bejustifiedtoignoretheminhowpeoplearetreated?Thesequestionsshowattheveryleastthatthebasicideaofegalitarianismisnotatruismandthatitneedsareasoneddefensethatanswersthesequestions.Yetwhencriticsaskthem,theirquestionsare4deploredassignsofimmoralityandirrationality.Egalitarianssimplyassumethatequalconcernisabasicrequirementofreasonandmorality,andtoquestionitistoviolatereasonandmorality.Whatjustificationdoegalitariansofferforthisassumption?Theplaintruthisthattheyoffernone.Moreover,theyclaimwithvariousdegreesofself-righteousnessthatnoneisneeded.RichardArnesonconcedesthat“non-utilitarian5moralitieswithrobustsubstantiveequalityidealscannotbemadecoherent.”Henever-thelessregardsdisagreementwiththemasbeyondthepaleofcivilizeddialogue.BrianBarrysays:“Thejustificationoftheclaimoffundamentalequalityhasbeenheldtobeimpossiblebecauseitisarock-bottomethicalpremissandsocannotbe6derivedfromanythingelse.”Thisisamealy-mouthedadmissionthategalitarianismrestsonanunjustifiableassumption.IsaiahBerlintellsus:Equalityisoneoftheoldestanddeepestelementsinliberalthoughtanditisneithermorenorless‘natural’or‘rational’thananyotherconstituentinthem[sic].Likeall7humanendsitcannotbedefendedorjustified,foritisitselfwhichjustifiesotheracts.Soegalitarianismisbasedonarationallyindefensiblearticleoffaith.RonaldDworkinwrites:Ihavetriedtoshowtheappealofequalityofresources,asinterpretedhere,onlybymakingplainitsmotivationanddefendingitscoherenceandpracticalforce.Ihavenottriedtodefendinwhatmightbeconsideredamoredirectway,bydeducingitfrommoregeneralandabstractpoliticalprinciples.Sothequestionariseswhetherthesortofdefensecouldbeprovided....IhopeitisclearthatIhavenotpresentedanysuch8argumenthere.Andalittlefurtheronwehave:Myargumentsareconstructedagainstthebackgroundofassumptionsaboutwhatequalityrequiresinprinciple....Myargumentsenforceratherthanconstructabasicdesignof9justice,andthatdesignmustfindsupport,ifatall,elsewherethaninthesearguments.Dworkinthusadmitsthattheassumptionsonwhichhisviewrests,andonthebasisofwhichheregardsdisagreementwithitasimmoralandshameful,havenotbeenjustified.JoelFeinbergdeclaresthategalitarianism“isnotgroundedonanythingmoreultimatethanitself,anditisnotdemonstrablyjustifiable.Itcanbearguedfurtheragainstskepticsthataworldwithequalhumanrightsismorejustworld...alessdangerousworld...andonewithamoreelevatedandcivilizedtone.Ifnoneofthisconvincestheskeptic,weshouldturnourbackonhimandexaminemore10importantproblems.”Iwonderwhetheregalitarianswouldbesatisfiedwithsucharesponsewhentheyquestionconservativeorreligiousattitudes.WillKymlickaclaimsthat180JohnKekes\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page181everyplausiblepoliticaltheoryhasthesameultimatesource,whichisequality....Atheoryisegalitarian...ifitacceptsthattheinterestsofeachmemberofthecommunitymatter,andmatterequally....[I]fatheoryclaimedthatsomepeoplewerenotentitledtoequalconsiderationfromthegovernment,ifitclaimedthatcertainkindsofpeoplejustdonotmatterasmuchasothers,thenmostpeopleinthemodernworldwould11rejectthattheoryimmediately.Thisinvitesustoacceptasanobvioustruththatmostpeoplewouldimmediatelyrejecttheviewthattorturersandtheirvictims,orthescourgesandbenefactorsofhumanitydonotmatterequally.Kymlickagivesnoreasonforthisbreathtakingclaim:itistheassumptionfromwhichheproceeds.Nagelsaysthatheisgoingtoexplorea“typeofargumentthatIthinkislikelytosucceed.Itwouldprovideamoralbasisforthekindofliberalegalitarianismthat12seemstomeplausible.Idonothavesuchanargument.”Thisdoesnotstophim,however,fromclaimingthat“moralequality,[the]attempttogiveequalweight,inessentialrespects,toeachpersons’pointofview...mightevenbedescribedasthe13markofanenlightenedethic.”Yearslaterhesays:“Myclaimisthattheproblemofdesigninginstitutionsthatdojusticetotheequalimportanceofallpersons,with-outunacceptabledemandsonindividuals,hasnotbeensolved,”buthenevertheless“present[s]acaseforwishingtoextendthereachofequalitybeyondwhatiscus-14tomaryinmodernwelfarestates.”AlthoughNagelexplicitlyacknowledgesthelackofjustification,heholdsthatthemarkofanenlightenedethicistoaccepthisunjustifiedview.Imaginethehowlofindignationifconservativesclaimedthatalthoughtheycanoffernojustificationforit,theyneverthelessholdsthatthemarkofenlightenedethicistoacceptconservatism.JohnRawlsconcludeshisdiscussionof“TheBasisofEquality”bysayingthat“essentialequalityis...equalityofconsideration,”andgoeson:“ofcoursenoneofthisisliterallyanargument.Ihavenotsetoutthepremissesfromwhichthiscon-15clusionfollows.”Thustheassumptionthatreasonandmoralityrequireequalconcernformoralandimmoral,reasonableandunreasonable,law-abidingandcriminalpeopleisputforwardwiththeexplicitacknowledgmentthatthepremissesfromwhichitissup-posedtofollowhavenotbeenjustified.Inreadingthroughmuchofthewritingsofcontemporaryegalitarians,Ihavenotfoundevenanattempttoprovideareasonedcaseforthisbasicegalitarianassumption.IILetusnowconsiderhowegalitarianismmayneverthelessbedefended.Itmightbesaidthattherequirementofequalconcernissimplytheformalrequirementoftreatinglikecasesalike.Itisperhapsthisthatexplainswhyegalitariansregarditunnecessarytojustifytheirposition.Ifequalconcernwereaformalrequirement,thenitwouldbeonethateveryonemusteithermeetorforfeittheclaimtobeingreasonable.Butclaimingthatequalconcernisaformalrequirementinvolvesanelementaryconfusionbetweenconsistencyandequalconcern.Consistencyisindeedaformalrequirement:treatinglikecasesalikeanddifferentcasesdifferentlyisaconditionoftheapplicationAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianism181\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page182ofallrules.Itmakesnodifferencewhattheruleisabout,orwhatmakescasesalikeordifferent.Rulesofarithmetic,tennis,beautycontests,andlegalproceedingsmustallbeappliedconsistently.Equalconcern,bycontrast,specifieswhatsimilaritiesanddifferencesarerelevanttohowpeopleshouldbetreated.Itisnotaformalrequire-ment,butasubstantiverule.Ofcoursepeoplewhoarealikeshouldhavelikegoodorbadthings,butunlessitisspecifiedwhatmakespeoplealike,equalconcernsaysnothingabouthowinparticulartheyshouldbetreated.Theegalitarianrequirementofequalconcern,therefore,mustgobeyondformalconsistencyandspecifyinsub-stantivetermswhatmakespeoplealike,or,ifitremainsformal,itwillbeuselessasaguidetohowpeopleshouldbetreated.Nowegalitariansdoprovideasubstantivespecification:theysaythatinallrelevantrespectspeoplearealikeandthatiswhytheyshouldbetreatedwithequalconcern.Butthis,ofcourse,requiresjustificationthatgoesfarbeyondthejustifica-tionneededforconsistency.Egalitariansneedtojustifytheirclaimthatdifferencesinhowreasonable,moral,orlaw-abidingpeopleareshouldberegardedasirrelevanttohowtheyaretreated.And,aswehaveseen,thisispreciselywhattheydisdainofdoing.Intheabsenceoftheneededjustification,criticscanagreethatpeoplewhoarealikeinallrelevantrespectsshouldbetreatedwithequalconcernandpointoutthatveryfewpeopleindeedarealike,sincetherearerelevantdifferencesbetweenmostpeopleinrespecttohowreasonable,moral,andlaw-abidingtheyare.Thatiswhy,accordingtocritics,theyshouldnotbetreatedwithequalconcern.Asecondthingthatmaybesaidindefenseofegalitarianismisthattherequire-mentofequalconcernisprimafacie,notabsolute.Reasonandmoralitynormallyrequireequalconcernforeveryone,buttheremaybereasonsforunequalconcerninexceptionalcases.Thisprimafacierequirementmaybefurtherqualifiedbysay-ingthatitisgovernments(notindividuals)whoshouldtreatwithequalconcerntheircitizens(noteveryone).Thesequalificationsmakethesupposedtruismappearmoreplausible,buttheappearanceisdeceptiveforegalitarianismthusqualifiedfacesadilemmaitcanneitheravoidnorresolve.Thedilemmaisposedbythequestion:dodifferencesamongcitizensinhowreasonable,moral,andlaw-abidingtheyarecountasreasonsforthegovernment’shavingunequalconcernforthem?Iftheanswerisyes,thenverylittleremainsoftheprimafacierequirementofequalconcernsincetherearegreatdifferencesamongpeopleintheserespects.Itmakessensetotalkaboutaprimafacierequirementonlyifitholdsasarule,normallyandusually,andrareexceptionstoitneedjustification.Theprimafacierequirementtotellthetruth,keeppromises,paydebtsmeansthatpeoplearenormallyexpectedtodothat,unlessexceptionalcircumstancesintervene.Or,sayingthatthereisaprimafaciereasonforsupposingthatpeoplewanttostayaliveandbehealthymeansthatmostofusnormallywantboth,buttheremayberareexceptionsinunusualsituations.Butthedifferencesamongcitizensinhowreasonable,moral,andlaw-abidingtheyaredonotoccurinexceptionalcasesorunusualsituations,thesedifferencesexistasarule;theyarenormal,usual,andpredictable.Ifthereisaprimafacierequirement,itisforthegovernmenttohaveunequalconcernforthevastmajorityoftheircitizenswhodifferintheserespects.Suppose,then,thattheansweristhatdifferencesamongcitizensinhowreason-able,moral,orlaw-abidingtheyarehavenoeffectonthegovernment’sobligationtoshowequalconcernforthem.Thiswouldrequirethegovernmenttotreatcitizens182JohnKekes\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page183whoareterroristsandhostages,murderersandintendedvictims,homeownersandburglars,taxpayersandtax-cheatswithequalconcern.Theresultofconformitytothissupposedobligationwouldbetoignorethepredictableconsequencesofimmoral,unreasonable,andillegalactions,andthusendangertheessentialconditionsofcivilizedlifethatreason,morality,andthelawaresupposedtoprotect.Anygovernmentthatdidthiswouldbetrayitsmostelementaryobligationtoprotectthesecurityofitscitizens.Iconcludethattheattempttodefendegalitarianismbyinterpretingitasimposingaprimafacie(notanabsolute)requirementonthegovernment(notonindividuals)doesnothelptomakethefalselysupposedtruismofequalconcernanythelessplausible.Egalitariansmayattempttodefendtheirpositionbyclaimingthattheywouldhavetofacethisdilemmaonlyiftheprimafacierequirementofequalconcernwerebasedonpeople’sactions,whichadmittedlydifferinrespecttomorality,reason,andlegality,buttheobligationofequalconcernisnotbasedonactions.Itisbasedthe16capacityforautonomythatallnormalhumanbeingsareassumedtopossessitequally.Ifthisweretrue,thedilemmawouldnotariseandegalitarianscouldconsistentlyacknowledgetheobviousdifferencesamongpeopleinwhattheydowiththeirauto-nomy.Reasonandmoralitycouldthenbesaidtorequireequalconcernforallwhopossessthecapacityforautonomybecausetheypossessitequally.Thecapacityforautonomyincludesthecapacityforchoice,butgoesbeyondit.Forchoicescanbearbitrary,uninformed,forced,orirrational.Autonomyinvolvesthecapacitytochooseamongalternativesthatonehasunderstoodandreasonably17evaluated.Ifautonomyisunderstoodinthissense,thenthisegalitarianattempttoavoidthedilemmacannotsucceed.Forpeoplepossessthecapacityforautonomyunequally;eveniftheypossesseditequally,itwouldnotwarrantequalconcern;andifitwarrantedequalconcern,itwouldbeunjustifiedtorestrictthegovernmentsobligationofequalconcerntocitizens.Itisobvious,however,thatpeoplepossessthecapacityforautonomyunequallysinceautonomyisacomplexcapacitythatdependsonnumerousothercapacities.Thereasonableunderstandingandevaluationofavailablealternativesdependsonaconsiderabledegreeofintelligence,education,emotionalstability,attentionspan,self-knowledge,self-control,objectivity,andsoon.Thereareenormousdifferencesamongpeopleinthedegreetowhichtheypossessthesecapacities.Sincethecapacityforautonomydependsonthepossessionoftheseothercapacitiesandthesecapacitiesarepossessedunequally,itfollowsthatpeoplepossessthecapacityforautonomyunequally.Ifconcernforpeopledependsontheircapacityforautonomy,thenthegovernment’sconcernforpeopleoughttobeunequal,notequalasegalit-ariansclaim.Letusgrant,however,forthesakeofargumentandcontrarytofact,thatpeoplehaveanequalcapacityforautonomy.Whyshouldreasonandmoralityrequirethatthegovernment’sconcernforcitizensshouldbebasedonacapacitytheyhave,ratherthanonwhattheydowiththecapacitytheyhave?Theconditionsofsecurityandcivilizedlifethatreason,morality,andthelawareintendedtoprotectarenotvio-latedbypeople’spossessionofacapacity,butbyactionsthatthecapacitymakespossible.Itistruethatwithoutthecapacitytherewouldbenoaction.Butitisalsotruethatthecapacityneednotresultinanyaction;ifitresultsinaction,theactionmaybemoralorimmoral,reasonableorunreasonable,legalorcriminal;oritmayAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianism183\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page184beanactionthathasnosignificantbearingonsuchweightyissuesasreason,moral-ity,orthelaw.Surely,thegovernment’sconcernmustbewithwhatpeopledo,notwithwhattheycando.Andsincewhatpeopledodiffersgreatlyinmorality,reasonability,andlegality,thegovernment’sconcernmusttakethesedifferencesintoaccount,andhencebeunequal.Thisremainstrueregardlessofwhetherpeople’scapacityforautonomyisequalorunequal.Consequentlythedilemmastands:ifthegovernmentrecognizesthesedifferences,reasonandmoralityrequireittoshowunequalconcernforcitizenswhodifferintheseways;ifthegovernmentfailstorecognizethesedifferences,itfailsinitselementaryobligationtoprotecttheconditionsofsecur-ityandcivilizedlifeforitscitizens.Suppose,however,againforthesakeofargumentandcontrarytofact,thatthecapacityforautonomyisequalanditspossessionwarrantsthegovernment’sequalconcern.Clearly,thepossessionofanequalcapacityforautonomywouldnotbetheexclusivepossessionofthecitizensofastate,buttheuniversalpossessionofallnormalhumanbeings.Ifthegovernment’sobligationofequalconcernwerebasedonthepossessionofanequalcapacityforautonomy,thenthegovernmentoughttoshowequalconcernforallhumanbeings,notjustforitscitizens.Anygovernmentthatactedonthissupposedobligation,however,wouldbetrayitsmostelementaryobligationtothosewhoelectedittorepresenttheirinterests,nottheinterestsofforeigners.Itwouldimposeonagovernmenttheabsurdobligationtobeequallyconcernedwiththehealth,education,security,livingstandard,happiness,andsoforthofitsowncitizensandthecitizensofotherstates;tousetaxmoneyscollectedfromitscitizenstopromotethewelfareofallhumanbeings,notjustitscitizens’;towagewar,whenitmust,byshowingequalconcernforitsownandfortheenemy’stroops;andtobeasconcernedwiththeinfrastructureofotherstatesaswithitsown.Noreasonablepersoncantakesuchabsurditiesseriously,buttheabsurditieswouldfollowifegalitarianismweretrue.Onefurtherattempttodefendegalitarianismrestsonanemotionalappealthatislikelytobesharedbymanypeople.Oneexpressionofitistherhetoricalquestion:“howcoulditnotbeanevilthatsomepeople’sprospectsatbirthareradicallyinferior18toothers?”Therearetwothingstobesaidaboutthis.First,givenanypopulationandanybasisofrankingprospects,somewillrankmuchlowerthanothers.Lowest-rankedprospectswillberadicallyinferiortothehighest-rankedones.Inveighingagainstthisstatisticalnecessityislikelamentingdifferencesinintelligenceormanualdexterity.Tocallitanevilisasentimentalcheapeningofthemostseriouscon-demnationmoralityaffords.Itmisdirectstheobligationpeoplefeel.Ifegalitarianswouldmerelysaythatitisbadifpeopleundeservedlysufferandthosewhocanshouldhelpthem,thenmanypeoplewouldagreewiththem.Butthisagreementhastodowithdecency,pity,orfellow-feeling,notwithequalconcern.Werespondtotheemotionalappealbecausewearemovedbyundeservedsuffering,notbecausewearecommittedtothepsychologicalabsurdityofbeingequallyconcernedwitheveryone’swell-being.Second,theemotionalappealofthisquestioninvitesthethoughtthatcontemporaryWesterndemocraciesareguiltyoftheevilofdoomingmanyoftheircitizenstoalifeofpoverty.Whatthisoften-repeatedchargeoverlooksisthehistoricallyunpreced-entedsuccessofWesterndemocraciesinhavingonlyasmallminorityofpoorcitizens(about10–15percent)andalargeatleastmodestlyaffluentmajority(about184JohnKekes\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page18585–90percent).Thetypicalratioinpastsocietieswasclosertothereverse.Itcallsforcelebration,notcondemnation,thatforthefirsttimeinhistorywehaveapoliticalsysteminwhichalargepartofthepopulationhasescapedpoverty.Ifegalitarianshadahistoricalperspective,theywouldbeinfavorofprotectingthissystem,ratherthanadvocatingradicalchangestoitwithincalculableconsequences.Iconcludethategalitarianismisnotonlyunreasonable,butalsodangerous,becauseconformitytoitsrequirementsendangerssecurityandcivilizedlife.Insteadofabusingtheircriticsbycallingthem“whitesupremacists,”“Nazis,”“shameful,”“immoral,”or19“lackinginmoraldecency,”egalitariansshouldheedthewordsoftheirally:“Theworstoffense...whichcanbecommittedbyapolemicistostigmatizethosewho20holdcontraryopinionsasbadandimmoral.”Andinsteadofself-righteouslyspurn-ingthebadlyneededjustificationoftheirposition,egalitariansshouldprovideit–iftheycan.IIITheconstructivepartoftheargumentistoproposeareasonablealternativetoegalitarianism.Iwanttostress,however,thatitsconstructiveandthecriticalpartsareindependent.TheprecedingcriticismsofegalitarianismwouldnotbeaffectedbythefailureoftheconstructivealternativeIwillnowpropose.Supposeyouhavetochoosetoliveinoneoftwosocietiesthatareidenticalinallbutonerespect:inthefirst,goodandbadthingsareenjoyedorsufferedran-domlyacrossthepopulation;inthesecond,thereareexactlythesamegoodandbadthings,butgoodpeoplehavethegoodonesandbadpeoplethebadones.Iwillcallthefirstsocietyhaphazard,andthesecondcommensurate.Inwhichsocietywouldyouchoosetolive?IhaveaskedmanypeopleandIhaveyettomeetonewhowouldnotchoosetoliveinacommensuratesociety.Thischoiceisreasonablebecausethosewholiveinthehaphazardsocietyhavenoreasontobelievethattheiractionswillleadtotheirgoals.Disciplineandself-indulgence,consideredandthoughtlesschoice,intelligentandstupidactionhaveexactlythesamechanceofsuccess.Inthecommensuratesociety,bycontrast,peoplehavemuchmorecontroloverthegoodnessorbadnessoftheirlives,andthatiswhyitispreferabletothehaphazardsociety.Inordertounderstandbetterthenatureofthiscontrol,considerasimplesituationleadingtoanaction.Itisabeautifulday,Ienjoybeingoutside,andIdecidetogoforawalkonanearbycountrylane.Thisinvolvesasetofbeliefs(e.g.,theweatherisunlikelytochange,therearenoteenagerswithloudradios,thecountrylanehasnotbeenpavedover)andpossessionoftherequiredcapacities(e.g.,Icanwalk,trustmymemorytofindthelane,takepleasureinbeingaloneinnature).Theconstitu-tiveelementsofthesituation,then,aremotive,belief,capacity,goal,anddecision.Eachoftheseelementsmaybedefective.Myrealmotivemaybetoescapefromboringwork.Mybeliefmaybefalsebecauseastormisclosingin.ImaymisjudgemycapacitybecauseIamcomingdownwithanillness.Mygoalmaybeunattain-ablebecausethelaneisclosed.Andmydecisionmaybeill-advisedbecauseIwillmissanimportantdeadline.Suppose,however,thatnoneoftheconstitutiveelementsisdefectiveandIactaspromptedbytheirconjunction.Iexpect,then,thatmyactionAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianism185\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page186willbesuccessful.Insimplesituationswenormallyhavegoodreasontothinkthattheelementsarefreeofdefectsandourexpectationwillbemet.Controloverouractions,however,ismademuchharderbydifficultiesthattrans-formsimplesituationsintocomplexones.Weoftenhaveseveralmotivespromptingincompatibleactions.Wemustfrequentlyjudgethereliabilityofourbeliefsonthebasisofimperfectknowledgeandinsufficientevidence.Wecanrarelybecertainwhetherwehaveadequatecapacities,energies,andtimetoachieveourvariousgoals.Andweroutinelyhavetodecideabouttherelativeimportanceofourconflictinggoals.Copingwithsuchcomplexitiesrequiresgoodjudgment,whichisdifficulttohave.Suppose,however,thatourjudgmentisgood,weuseittodecidewhatweshoulddoinacomplexsituation,andwedoit.Thisisnotsufficientforcontrolbecausethesuccessofmanyofouractionsdependsonthecooperation,oratleastthenon-interference,ofothers,andtheymayhavegoodreasonsnottocooperateortointer-ferewithus.Theymayhavemoreimportantconcerns;theymaywantforthemselveswhatwewantforourselves;orwhatwewantmayruncountertotheinterestoftheinstitution,cause,orcollectivitytheywishtoprotect.Havingcontroloverouractions,therefore,requiresustocooperatewithoneanother.Therulesofcooperationwillhavetobesetandbeknownbythosewholivetogetherinasociety,andtheymustbeadequateformaintainingtheconditionsinwhichasmanyofusaspossiblecangoaboutgettingwhatwewant.Iwillshortlydiscusswhatmakessuchrulesreasonable,butassumeforthemomentthatwhateveritis,theyhaveit.Itisnowpossibletosaymoreclearlywhylifeinthecommensuratesocietyispreferabletolifeinthehaphazardone.Itisbecauseifpeoplelivinginithaveachievedsomecontrolovertheiractionsthroughgoodjudgmentandconformitytoreason-ablerulesofcooperation(simply“rules,”fromnowon),thentheyhaveareasonableexpectationthattheiractionswillbesuccessful.Thisreasonableexpectationisofhavingthegoodthingstheydeserveandnothavingthebadthingstheydonotdeserve.Thelikelihoodthattheirexpectationwillbemetisabenefitpracticalreasonismeanttoprovide.Iamproposing,therefore,thefollowingconstructivealternativetoegalitarianism.Theunreasonablebeliefthatthegovernmenthasanobligationtotreatcitizenswithequalconcernshouldbereplacedwiththereasonablebeliefthattheprevailingrulesshouldmakeitmorelikelythanitwouldotherwisebethatpeoplewhocon-troltheiractionswillhavethegoodthingstheydeserveandwillnothavethebadthingstheydonotdeserve.Thereasonabilityofrulesdependsontheextenttowhichtheysucceedinmakingthispossible.Inowturntothequestionofhowtheycandothat.IVTheserulesareconventionsregardingthegoodandbadthingsthatpeoplelivinginaparticularsocietyataparticulartimedeserveordonotdeserve.Thereareverymanysuchrulesineverysociety.Idoubtthattheycanbeenumerated,andIdonotproposetotry.Iwillconsiderinsteadthreegeneraltypesthatnoenduringsocietycandispensewith.Beingconventional,theserulesreflectthepracticesthathaveemerged186JohnKekes\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page187inthecourseofthehistoryofaparticularsociety.Theychange,butusuallyslowly.Atanygiventime,however,theyprovideacontinuumofpossibleevaluationsthatrangebetweentheterminiofgoodandbad,withmanyintermediatejudgmentsinbetweenthem.Theresultingevaluationsimplyobligationsthatpeopleinthatsocietyhave;praisewhentheobligationsarehonored;blamewhentheyarenot;andcon-ditionsunderwhichfailuremaybeexcusedorblameextenuated.Manyofpeople’sreasonableexpectationsregardingtheirownandothers’conductarebasedontheserules.Onetypeofruleconcernsrelationshipsbetweenlovers,friends,parentsandchil-dren,teachersandstudents,judgesanddefendants,physiciansandpatients,andsoon.Rulesofthistypespecifytheobligationspeopleinsuchrelationshipshavetowardoneanotherandtheycreatereasonableexpectationsthattheobligationswillbehonored.Asecondtypeofrulegovernsagreements,suchaspromises,contracts,employ-ment,commercialtransactions,politicalorlegalrepresentation,membershipsinprivateorpublicorganizations,andthelike.Someoftheseagreementsareformal,writtendown,andlegallybinding.Othersareinformal,derivedfromthespokenortacitunderstandingoftheparties,andtheforcebehindthemismutualtrustandreciprocalgoodwill.Athirdtypeofruleregulatesactionsthataffectthesecurityofothers.Asocietycannotendureunlessitprotectsthoselivinginitfrommurder,mayhem,theft,andlikeinjuries.Take,forinstance,homicide.Allsocietiesmusthaverulesspecifyingwhenitconstitutesmurder,whenitisjustifiedorexcusable,andwhatthestatusisofcapitalpunishment,infanticide,euthanasia,suicide,abortion,dueling,andotherformsofkilling.Thesethreetypesofrulearegeneral.Societiescannotdowithoutthem,buttherearemanywaysinwhichageneraltypemaybeinstantiatedinaparticularcontext.Rulesmaybewrittenorunwritten;enforcedbylaw,priests,elders,orpublicopinion;violationsmaybepunishedseverely,mildly,physically,orpsychologically;theymayspecifyacceptablejustificationsandexcusesverydifferently;andwaysandmeansofchangingorregisteringchangesofthemmayvarygreatly.Enduringsocietiesarealike,therefore,inhavingsuchrules,buttheydifferinthespecificformstheprevailingruleshave.Tosaythattheserulesareconventionalistorecognizethattheymayvarywithcontexts,butitistorecognizealsothathumanwell-beingrequiresthespecificationofthepossibilitiesandlimits,aswellastheobligationsandexpecta-tions,thatregulaterelationships,agreements,andsecurityinaparticularsocietyataparticulartime.TheimportanceoftheserulesforthereasonablealternativetoegalitarianismthatIamproposingisthattheygosomewaytowardestablishingwhatpeopleinapar-21ticularcontextdeserveanddonotdeserve.Theydeservewhattherulesspecifyandtheydonotdeservewhatwouldviolatetherules.Therulesthusprovidereasonsforsomeoftheobligationsandexpectationspeoplehave,aswellasstandardswithref-erencetowhichobligationsandexpectationscanbejustifiedorcriticized,andclaimsregardingwhatisorisnotdeservedevaluated.Childrendeserveadecentupbring-ingfromtheirparentsbecausethatishowweunderstandtheirrelationship;sellersdeservetobepaidbybuyersbecausethatispartofwhatweregardastheircom-mercialagreement;andmurderersdeservetobejailedbecausethatishowwepro-tectsecurity.Humanwell-beingrequiresthatchildrenbebroughtup,thetransferofpropertyberegulated,andlivesbeprotected,butweinthissocietyarewhoweareAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianism187\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page188partlybecausewehaveourwayofmeetingtheserequirementsandourownviewsaboutwhodeserveswhatgoodorbadthings.Howwedoallthisisconventional,butitisnotconventionalthatwemusteitherdoitinsomewayoranotherorriskthedisintegrationofoursociety.Oneobviousimplicationofthiswayofthinkingaboutwhatpeopledeserveisthatdifferentpeopledeservedifferentgoodandbadthingsbecausetheirrelationships,agreements,andactionsaffectingthesecurityofothersdiffer.Andthatmeansthattheegalitarianbeliefthatthegovernmentshouldtreatallcitizenswithequalcon-cerniscontrarytohumanwell-beingbecauseitiscontrarytotherequirementsoftherulesonwhichhumanwell-beingdepends.Itisimportanttorealizethatthis,tomymindfatal,objectiontoegalitarianismisnotbasedontheparticularruleswehappentohaveinoursociety.Allsuchruleshaveanti-egalitarianconsequencesbecause,regardlessoftheirparticularforms,theyimposetheobligationtotreatdifferentlypeoplewhounavoidablystandindifferentrelationships,makedifferentagreements,andperformdifferentactionsaffectingthesecurityofothers.Sincetheequalconcernegalitariansmistakenlyfavorviolatestherules,egalitarianismisnotmerelyunrea-sonable,butalsodangerous.VClaimsaboutwhatpeopledeservemaybemistaken,ofcourse.Iwillconsidertwowaysinwhichthismayhappen:first,therulesonwhichtheclaimsarebasedmaybereasonable,buttheirapplicationismistaken;second,therulesthemselvesmaybefaulty.Anyclaimaboutwhatsomeonedeservesmaybeinvalidatedifitinvolvesamistakeabouttherelevantfacts.Apersonmistakenforacriminaldoesnotdeservetobepunished;anincompetentphysiciandoesnotdeserveaccredita-tion;andanabusiveparentdoesnotdeserverespect.Evenifthefactsarewhattheyaretakentobe,mistakesinproportionmayoccur.Athiefdeservespunishment,butnottohaveanarmcutoff;agoodperformancedeservesapplause,butnotadulation;alawyerdeservesafeeforservicesrendered,butnotthedeedtoaclient’shouse.Mistakesaboutfactorproportionarerelativelysimplemistakesaboutwhatpeopledoordonotdeserve.Suchmistakesoccur,buttheycanbecorrected,and,inanycase,donotcountagainstthemisappliedrule.Whatisatfaultistheapplication,nottheruleapplied.Claimsaboutwhatpeopledeservearefallible,asotherclaimsare,butjustasoccasionalmistakesdonotmakeallperception,calcu-lation,ormemoryunreliable,sotheydonotcastdoubtonallclaimsaboutwhatisdeserved.Another,farmoreserious,mistakeaboutwhatisdeservedistorelyonanunrea-sonablerule.Thisbringsusbacktothequestionofwhatmakesrulesreasonable.Aruleisreasonableifitmeetsthefollowingconditions.First,formanyyearspeoplehavegenerallyactedinconformitytotheruleinappropriatecircumstancesandthosewhodidnotwereblamedfortheirfailure.Theremaybemanyreasons,ofcourse,whypeoplegenerallyactinconformitytoarule.Iftheruleisreasonable,however,thentheyfollowitvoluntarily,notbecauseofcoercionortheabsenceofalternatives.Areasonablerule,therefore,meetsthesecondconditionthatpeopleconformtoitvoluntarilyevenincircumstanceswhentheyhavetheoptionofnotconforming.But,188JohnKekes\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page189onceagain,peoplemayconformtoarulevoluntarilyformanyreasons.Theymaybestupid,deceived,indoctrinated,bribed,orlazyandhabit-ridden.Aruleisreason-ableifpeoplegenerallyconformtoitforaparticularreason:namely,theybelievethattherulehelpsthemhaveabetterlifethantheywouldhavewithouttherule.Andthatisthethirdconditionthatareasonablerulemeets.Beliefsofthiskindneednotbeconsciousorverbalized.Thereasonforascribingthemtopeoplemaybethattheyactasiftheyheldthebeliefsanditwouldbemysteriouswithoutascribingthebelieftothemwhytheyactastheydowhentheyhaveotheroptions.Suchbeliefs,ofcourse,maythemselvesbereasonableorunreasonable.Thefourthconditionofareasonablerule,therefore,isthatthetacitlyorexplicitlyheldbelief–thatconformitytotherulemakesthebeliever’slifebetter–isreasonable.Whatmakessuchbeliefsreasonableisthat,asaconsequenceofgeneralconform-itytotherules,peoplearemorelikelythanotherwisetohavethegoodthingstheydeserveandneedforabetterlifeandnothavethebadthingstheydonotdeserveandwhichwouldmakelifeworse.AsIhavenoted,thereisagreatvarietyofthesegoodandbadthings,butthebenefitsderivablefromhumanrelationships,reliableagreements,andphysicalsecurityareprominentamongthem.Or,toputthesamepointslightlydifferently,suchbeliefsarereasonableifbyfollowingtherulespeopleachievebettercontrolovertheiractionsandthusmaketheirsuccessmorelikely.Ofcoursethisrequiresthattherulebefollowedgenerallysothatpeoplecanrelyonthecooperationoratleastthenon-interferenceofothers.Insum,aruleisreasonableifpeopleconformtoitgenerally,voluntarilyevenwhentheyhaveotheroptions,becausetheybelievethatconformitywillmaketheirlivesbetter,andtheirbeliefisreasonable.Inacommensuratesocietytherearemanyreasonablerules,theyenablepeopletocontroltheiractionsbetter,makeitmorelikelythatpeoplewillhavethegoodthingstheydeserveandnotthebadthingstheydonotdeserve,and,asaresult,theirliveswillinfactbebetterthantheywouldbeotherwise.Thisis,then,whyitisreasonabletoprefertoliveinacommensuratesocietyratherthaninahaphazardone.Itmaybethoughtthatthisaccountofwhatmakesarulereasonableisunsatis-factory.Thesupposedlyreasonablealternativetoegalitarianismisthatdifferentpeopleshouldbetreateddifferently,notwithequalconcern,becausetheydeservedifferentgoodandbadthingsdependingonhowreasonable,moral,andlaw-abidingtheyare.Whatparticularthingstheydeserveissaidtodependontheprevailingrules,andtheserulesgoverntheobligationsandexpectationspeoplehaveinrelationships,agree-ments,andactionsaffectingsecurity.But,itmaybethought,thisaccountissilentaboutthepossibilitythatpeoplemayfollowaruletheyregardasreasonableandyetbemistakenbecausetheruleis,infact,unreasonable.Onwhatgroundscoulditbedecided,itmaybeasked,whetherarulethatisthoughttobereasonableisindeedreasonable?Thisisalegitimatequestion,buttheanswertoitreadilyfollowsfromwhathasalreadybeensaid.Thatarulehasbeenfollowedgenerally,voluntarily,andaforlongtime,thatpeoplewhofollowitbelievethatitisareasonablerulebecauseitmakestheirlifebetterarereasonsforthinkingthattheruleisreasonable,butnotconclusiverea-sons.Ifcriticsdoubtthereasonabilityoftherule,thentheymusthavesomereasonsfortheirdoubt.Whatmightthesereasonsbe?Well,itmightbethattheapplica-tionoftheruleinvolvesmistakesoffactorproportion,orthatpeoplehavebeenAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianism189\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page190bamboozledandthatiswhytheyfollowtherulevoluntarily,orthattheruleisdetrimentaltorelationships,leadstounfairagreements,orfailstoprotectsomepeople’ssecurity.Suchmistakes,ofcourse,mayhappenandhavehappenedwithmanyrulesinmanysocieties.Master–slaverelationshipsareprejudice-riddenbecausetheyfalselysupposethatslavesareinferiortomasters.Marriagecontractsinwhichthehusbandacquirescontrolofthewife’spropertyareunfairbecausetheywronglydenythewife’scapacitytomakereasonabledecisions.Thepunish-mentoftheftbymutilationisdeplorablebecauseofitsdisproportionality.Butwhatunderliesallthesereasonsistheclaimthatrulesareunreasonablebecausefollowingthempreventspeoplefromhavingwhattheydeserveornothavingwhattheydonotdeserve.Thereasonsfordoubtingthereasonabilityofparticularrules,therefore,appealtothebasicideathatmotivatesthealternativetoegalitari-anism,namely,thatpeopleshouldhavewhattheydeserveandnothavewhattheydonotdeserve.Itmustbeacknowledged,ofcourse,thattheremaybeseriousdisagreementsaboutwhetherornotaparticularruleisreasonable.Suchdisagreements,however,concernquestionsofdetailaboutwhatparticulargoodorbadthingsaredeserved,notwhetherpeopleshouldhavewhateverthatis.Thesedisagreementsabouttherulesoccuronlybecausethepartiestothemalreadyacceptthatpeopleshouldhavewhattheydeserve.Theveryexistenceofsuchdisagreements,therefore,countsinfavorofthealterna-tivetoegalitarianismIamproposingandagainstthesupposedobligationofequalconcern.Itiscompatiblewiththisalternativeviewthatmanyrulesinoursociety,orinanysociety,areinfactunreasonable,regardlessofwhatpeoplebelieveaboutthem.Thealternativetoegalitarianismisthusnotthatpeopleshouldhavewhatthepre-vailingrulessaytheydeserve.Thealternativeisthatpeopleshouldhavewhattheydeserveaccordingtoreasonablerules.Andwhatmakesrulesreasonableisthattheyhavebeengenerallyandvoluntarilyfollowed,thattheyarebelievedtobereasonablebythosewhofollowthem,andtheyarefreeofmistakesinfactandproportion,andhelpratherthanhinderpeople’srelationships,agreements,andsecurity.VIAnoften-voicedobjectionmadebybothegalitariansandsomeoftheiropponentstothesortofviewIhavebeenproposingisthatitisunrealistictoaimatasociety22inwhichpeoplehavewhattheydeserveanddonothavewhattheydonotdeserve.IncontemporaryWesternsocieties,itissaid,thereisnoagreementaboutwhatthingsaregoodandbad.People’sbeliefsaboutgoodandbadthingsderivefromtheircon-ceptionsofagoodlife,butthereareverymanydifferentconceptionsheldbypeoplewhodifferintheirreligious,moral,political,andaestheticviews.Consequentlytheywilldisagreeaboutwhatpeopledeserve.Furthermore,whatpeopledeservecanbeascertainedonlybytakingintoaccounttheirbeliefsandefforts,aswellasthebeliefstheymighthaveheldandeffortstheymighthavemade,butdidnot.Suchactualandpossiblebeliefsandeffortsarenotopentoobservation.Itisunrealistictosup-pose,runstheobjection,thatrulesgoverningwhatpeopleshouldorshouldnothavecouldtakeintoaccountsuchsubjectivepsychologicalstates.190JohnKekes\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page191Thisobjectionassumes,first,thatwhatpeopledeservedependsontheirpsycholo-gicalstatesand,second,thatitisthegovernment’sobligationtoassurethatpeoplehavewhattheydeserve.Bothassumptionsaremistaken,buteachcontainspartofthetruth,soneitheristotallymistaken.Reasonsforsayingthatpeopledoordonotdeservesomethingmaybebasedontheirpsychologicalstates,buttheymayalsobebasedontheirrelationships,agreements,andactions,whicharereadilyobservableandnotsubjective.Thegovernmentdoeshavetheobligationtoassurethatpeoplehavesomeofwhattheydeserve,buttherearenumerousnon-governmentalcivicinstitutionsthathavethesameobligation.Thegoodandbadthingsthatpeopledeserve,Ihaveargued,arebasedontherulesthatgovernrelationships,agreements,andactionsthataffectthesecurityofothers.Rulesaboutpsychologicalstates,suchasvirtuesandvices,maybereason-ablyaddedtotheseotherrules,butthiswouldnotmakethefirstassumptiononwhichtheobjectionrestsmoreplausible.Evenifpsychologicalstatesweresub-jectiveandunobservable,theywouldnotbethesolebasisforsayingwhatpeopledeservebecausetheotherbases–relationships,agreements,andactions–wouldremain,andbeneithersubjectivenorunobservable.But,ofcourse,oftenthereisnogreatdifficultyinascertainingwhatpeople’spsychologicalstatesarebecausetheycanbeinferredfromwhattheysayanddoorwhattheydonotsayordo.Families,lovers,friends,teachers,employers,coaches,andjudges,amongothers,oftendrawsuchinferences.Suchinferencesmaybemoreorlessreliable,butreliableonesestablishconclusivelythatwhatthisassumptionclaimstobeimpossibleis,infact,possible.Andwhentheinferencesarebad,itisofteninsufficientinformationorpersonalbiasthatstandsintheirway,notanyimpossibility.Thesecondmistakenassumptiononwhichthisobjectionrestsisthatthegov-ernmenthastheobligationtoassurethatpeoplehavewhattheydeserve.Itsmis-takeistwofold.Althoughthegovernmenthasthatobligation,itisnotaloneinhavingit.Civicinstitutions,suchasschools,universities,corporations,athleticcompetitions,smallbusinesses,orchestras,museums,foundations,paroleboards,andmanyothermoreorlessformalassociationsalsohavetheobligationtoassurepeoplehavethegoodthingstheydeserveandnotthebadthingstheydonotdeserve.Suchcivicinstitutionsawardgoodthings,likemoney,honors,prestige,prizes,promotion,andsoforth.Evenifthegovernmentcouldnotdischargetheobligationtoawardtheappropriategoodthingsonthebasisofwhatpeopledeserve,thereareotherwaysbyotherinstitutionsinwhichitmaybedone.Moreover,itisobviousthatthegovern-mentcandischargethatobligationbecauseitoftendoesit.Thegovernmenthasnogreatdifficultyinidentifyingsomerequirementsofrelationships(e.g.,ofparenhoodorcitizenship);ofagreements(e.g.,oftakingoutamortgageorenlistinginthearmy),orofactionsaffectingthesecurityofothers(e.g.,drivingacarorpracticingmedicine).Iconclude,therefore,thatthisobjectionisgroundlessbecausetheassumptionsonwhichitrestsaremistaken.Butthesensemayneverthelesspersistthatitisunreal-istictoholdthatthegoodandbadthingspeoplehaveshouldbebasedonwhattheydeservetohave.Inclosing,Iwanttosaysomethingaboutthislingeringdoubt.NothingIhavesaidismeanttoimplythatpeoplehavingwhattheydeserveandnothavingwhattheydonotdeservedependsonlyonreasonablerules.Suchrulesarenecessarybutnotsufficientfortheachievementofthisimmenselydesirableend.Infact,however,nomatterhowdesirableitis,itwillnotbeachieved.WecanonlyAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianism191\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page192comeclosertoapproximatingitbecausethecontingencyoflifeandthescarcityofresourcesstandintheway.Noteventhemostreasonablerulescanpreventthemisfortuneofundeservingvictims.Lightningwillstrike,buildingswillcollapse,volcanoeswillerupt,cancerwillattack,viruseswillmutateandinvadetheimmunesystem.Humanlifecannotbefreedfromsuchcontingenciesandfromtheundeservedbadeffectstheycause.Thesameistrueofscarcity,ifwetakeabroadandrealisticviewofhowweunder-standresources.Itisnotjustaquestionofmoneyorfood,butalsooftalentandtraining.Goodteachers,physicians,plumbers,andpoliticiansarealwaysinshortersupplythanneeded;themeansforthedistributionofurgentlyneededfood,medicine,sanitation,orclothingareoftenlacking;ignorance,prejudice,corruption,andmisunderstandingfrequentlystandinthewaymakinguseofavailablegoods.Ifthelingeringsensethatitisunrealistictoexpectthatreasonableruleswillassurethatpeoplehavewhattheydeserveisbasedontheobstaclespresentedbythecontingencyoflifeandthescarcityofresources,thenIshareit.Reasonablerulesdonotguaranteethatgoodpeoplewillhavegoodthingsandbadpeoplebadthings.Butifthelingeringsenseofunrealismisbasedondoubtingthatreasonablerulesarepossible,thenIthinkitismisguided.Thereisnoreasonwhywecouldnotmakeexistingrulesmorereasonable,andtherearegoodreasonswhyweshouldtrytodoso.Reasonablerulesarethebulwarkthatprotectscivilizedlifefrombarbarism.Theyareindispensablemeanstomakinglifebetter.Notes1Forafullerstatement,seeAgainstLiberalism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1997),ACaseforConservatism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1998),andTheIllusionsofEgalitarianism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2003).2“Everynationoftheworldisdividedintohavesandhave-nots....Thegap...isenormous.Confrontingthesedisparities,theegalitarianholdsthatitwouldbeamorallybetterstateofaffairsifeveryoneenjoyedthesamelevelofsocialandeconomicbenefits.”RichardJ.Arneson,“Equality,”inRobertGoodinandPhillipPettit,eds.,ACompaniontoContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(Oxford:Blackwell,1993),p.489.“Fromthestand-pointofpolitics,theinterestsofthemembersofthecommunitymatter,andmatterequally.”RonaldDworkin,“InDefenseofEquality,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy1(1983):24–40/24.“Everyonemattersjustasmuchaseveryoneelse.[I]tisappallingthatthemosteffectivesocialsystemswehavebeenabletodevisepermit...materialinequalities.”ThomasNagel,EqualityandPartiality(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1991),p.64.“Beingegalitarianinsomesignificantwayrelatestotheneedtohaveequalconcern,atsomelevel,forallpersonsinvolved.”AmartyaSen,InequalityReexamined(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1992),p.ix.“Abasicprincipleofequality[is]theprincipleofequalconsiderationofinterests.Theessenceoftheprincipleofequalconsiderationofinterestsisthatwegiveequalweightinourmoraldeliberationstothelikeinterestsofallthoseaffectedbyouractions.”PeterSinger,PracticalEthics,2ndedn.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),p.21.“Wewantequalizationofbenefits...[because]inallcaseswherehumanbeingsarecapableofenjoyingthesamegoods,wefeelthattheintrinsicvalueoftheenjoymentisthesame....Weholdthat...oneman’swell-beingisasvaluableasanyother’s.”GregoryVlastos,“JusticeandEquality,”inRichardB.Brandt,ed.,SocialJustice(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1962),pp.50–1.192JohnKekes\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page1933“Nogovernmentislegitimatethatdoesnotshowequalconcernforthefateofallthosecitizensoverwhomitclaimsdominionandfromwhomitclaimsallegiance.”RonaldDworkin,SovereignVirtue:TheTheoryandPracticeofEquality(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000),p.1;“Thefundamentalargumentisnotwhethertoacceptequal-ity,buthowbesttointerpretit.”WillKymlicka,ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1900),p.5;“Theprinciplethatallhumansareequalisnowpartoftheprevailingpoliticalandethicalorthodoxy.”Singer,PracticalEthics,p.21;“Wewantequal-izationofbenefits...[because]inallcaseswherehumanbeingsarecapableofenjoyingthesamegoods,wefeelthattheintrinsicvalueoftheirenjoymentisthesame.”GregoryVlastos,“JusticeandEquality,”inSocialJustice,RichardB.Brandt,ed.(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1962),pp.50–1.And“Webelieve...thatinsomesenseeverycitizen,indeedeveryhumanbeing...deservesequalconsideration....Weknowthatmostpeopleinthepasthavenotshared[thisbelief]....Butforus,itissimplythere.”BernardWilliams,“PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline,”Philosophy75(2000):477–96/492.4“Allhumanshaveanequalbasicmoralstatus.Theypossessthesamefundamentalrights,andthecomparableinterestsofeachpersonshouldcountthesameincalculationsthatdeterminesocialpolicy....Theseplatitudesarevirtuallyuniversallyaffirmed.AwhitesupremacistoranadmirerofAdolfHitlerwhodeniesthemisrightlyregardedasbeyondthepaleofcivilizeddialogue.”RichardJ.Arneson,“What,IfAnything,RendersAllHumansMorallyEqual?”inDaleJamieson,ed.,SingerandHisCritics(Oxford:Blackwell,1999),p.103;“Wecannotrejecttheegalitarianprincipleoutright,becauseitis...immoralthat[thegovernment]shouldshowmoreconcernforthelivesofsomethanofothers.”Dworkin,SovereignVirtue,p.130,and“adistributionofwealththatdoomssomecitizenstoalessfulfillinglifethanothers,nomatterwhatchoicestheymake,isunacceptable,andtheneglectofequalityincontemporarypoliticsisthereforeshameful.”RonaldDworkin,“Equality–AnExchange,”TLS,Dec.1(2000),p.16;“Sometheories,likeNazism,denythateachpersonmattersequally.Butsuchtheoriesdonotmeritseriousconsideration.”WillKymlicka,Liberalism,Community,andCulture(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1989),p.40;“Anypoliticaltheorythataspirestomoraldecencymusttrytodeviseandjustifyaformofinstitutionallifewhichanswerstotherealstrengthofimpersonalvalues”andcommitsoneto“egalitarianimpartiality.”Nagel,EqualityandPartiality,p.20.5Arneson,“What,IfAnything,”p.126.6BrianBarry,“Equality,”inLawrenceC.BeckerandCharlotteB.Becker,eds.,EncyclopediaofEthics(NewYork:Garland,1992),p.324.7IsaiahBerlin,“Equality”inHenryHardy,ed.,ConceptsandCategories(London:HogarthPress,1978),p.102.8Dworkin,SovereignVirtue,pp.117–18.9Dworkin,SovereignVirtue,p.118.10JoelFeinberg,SocialPhilosophy,(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1973),p.94.11Kymlicka,ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy,pp.4–5.12ThomasNagel,MortalQuestions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979),p.108.13Nagel,MortalQuestions,p.112.14Nagel,EqualityandPartiality,p.5.15JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971),pp.507,509.16“Thecoreofthistraditionisaninsistencethattheformsofsociallifeberootedintheself-consciousvalueaffirmationsofautonomousindividuals.”BruceA.Ackerman,SocialJusticeandtheLiberalState(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1980),p.196;“Themostimportanttaskforwhichautonomyhasbeenharnessedincontemporarypoliticalphilosophyistoargueforacertainidealoftheliberalstate....TherootideaisthattheAReasonableAlternativetoEgalitarianism193\nCDIC10.qxd2/4/0915:48Page194statemustrecognizeandacknowledgetheautonomyofpersons.”GeraldDworkin,“Autonomy,”inACompaniontoContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy,p.361;“Theliberalindividualisfullyrational,whererationalityembracesbothautonomyandthecapacitytochooseamongpossibleactionsonthebasisofone’sconceptionofthegoodasdeter-minedbyone’sreflectivepreferences....Asanautonomousbeing,theliberalindividualisawareofthereflectiveprocessbywhichherlaterselvesemergefromherpresentself,sothatherpreferencesaremodified,notinarandomoruncontrolledway,butinthelightofherownexperiencesandunderstanding.”DavidGauthier,MoralsbyAgreement(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),p.346;“Actingautonomouslyisactingfromprinciplesthatwewouldconsenttoasfreeandequalrationalbeings....Theyaretheprinciplesthatwewouldwanteveryone(includingourselves)tofollowwerewetotakeuptogethertheappropriategeneralpointofview.Theoriginalpositiondefinesthisperspective.”Rawls,TheoryofJustice,p.516;seealsoRawls’sPoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993),p.72;“Onecommonstrandinliberalthoughtregardsthepromotionandprotectionofpersonalautonomyasthecoreoftheliberalconcern.”JosephRaz,MoralityofFreedom(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),p.203;“Theessence[ofliberalism]isthatindividualsareself-creating,thatnosinglegooddefinessuccessfulself-creation,andthattakingresponsibilityforone’slifeandmakingofitwhatonecanisitselfpartofthegoodlife.”AlanRyan,“Liberalism,”inACompaniontoContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy,p.304.17“Iamautonomous.Iobeylaws,butIhaveimposedthemon,orfoundthemin,myownuncoercedself.Freedomisobedience,but‘obediencetoalawwhichweprescribetoour-selves’....Heteronomyisdependenceonoutsidefactors,liabilitytobeaplaythingoftheexternalworldthatIcannotmyselffullycontrol.”IsaiahBerlin,“TwoConceptsofLiberty”inFourEssaysonLiberty(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1969),p.136;“Autonomyisasecond-ordercapacityofpersonstoreflectcriticallyupontheirfirst-orderpreferences,desires,wishes,andsoforth,andthecapacitytoacceptorattempttochangetheseinthelightofhigher-orderpreferences.”GeraldDworkin,“Autonomy,”p.360;anautonomousindividualis“onewhocanstepbackfromhismoralbeliefsandhisdesires...and...testtheirvaliditybyreferencetoaninbuiltstandard,whichishisowntendencytorationalcoherenceandconsistencyinthinking.”StuartHampshire,MoralityandConflict(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1983),p.56;anautonomousindividualis“asubjectwithendshehaschosen,andhisfundamentalpreferenceisforconditionsthatenablehimtoframeamodeoflifethatexpresseshisnatureasafreeandrationalbeingasfullyascircumstancespermit.”Rawls,TheoryofJustice,p.561.18Nagel,EqualityandPartiality,p.28.19SeeNote4above.20JohnStuartMill,OnLiberty(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett,1978[1859]),p.51.21Informulatingthisview,Idrewontherapidlygrowingrecentworkonwhatitmeanstosaythatsomethingisorisnotdeserved.See,e.g.,JoelFeinberg,“JusticeandPersonalDesert,”inCarlJ.FriedrichandJohnW.Chapman,eds.,NomosVI:Justice,(NewYork:Atherton,1963);WilliamGalston,JusticeandtheHumanGood(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1980);JohnKekes,AgainstLiberalism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1997),Ch.6;DavidMiller,SocialJustice(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1976);MichaelJ.Sandel,LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982);andGeorgeSher,Desert(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1987).22“Theideaofrewardingdesertisimpracticable.”Rawls,TheoryofJustice,p.312.SeealsoFriedrichA.Hayek,TheConstitutionofLiberty(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1960),Ch.6.194JohnKekes\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page195DEMOCRACYANDITSLIMITSTHEVALUEOFDEMOCRACYContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page197CHAPTERELEVENTheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSayRichardJ.ArnesonDemocraticinstrumentalismisthecombinationoftwoideas.Oneisinstrumentalismregardingpoliticalarrangements:theformofgovernmentthatoughttobeinstitutedandsustainedinapoliticalsocietyistheonetheconsequencesofwhoseoperationwouldbebetterthanthoseofanyfeasiblealternative.Thesecondideaistheclaimthatundermodernconditionsdemocraticpoliticalinstitutionswouldbebestaccord-ingtotheinstrumentalistnormandoughttobeestablished.“Democraticinstrumentalism”isnotacatchypoliticalsloganaptforcar-bumperstickers.Tomyknowledgepeoplehavenevermarchedinsolidarityunderitsbanner.Infactitisadrearypoliticalabstraction.Yetithasalotgoingforit,morally,politic-1ally,andintellectually.Thisessaydefendsdemocraticinstrumentalism.Thedemocraticinstrumentalistopposesthedoctrineofthedivinerightofkingsalongwiththeideathataristocratsareinherentlymoreworthythancommonersandassuchareuniquelyentitledtorule.Strikingamorecontroversialnote,thedemocraticinstrumentalistalsoopposesthesuggestionthateachadultpersonhasafundamentalmoralrighttobeadmittedasafullmemberofsomepoliticalsociety,entitledtorunforofficeandvote(onaone-person-one-votebasis)infreeelectionsthatselectthepublicofficialsintopgovernmentpostsanddirectlyorindirectlydeterminethecon-tentofthelawsandpoliciesthatthegovernmentenforcesonallmembersofthe2society.Callthistherighttoademocraticsay.Hereamoralrightisanindividualclaimthatothersoughttohonor.Ifonehasamoralright,oneiswrongedifothersdonothonorit;agivenrightisconstitutedbyspecifieddutiesthatspecifiedothersareboundtofulfill.Afundamentalmoralrightholdsindependentlyofsocialandpoliticalarrangements,culturalunderstand-ings,orpeople’sopinions.Italsoholds,atleasttosomedegree,independentlyof3theconsequencesthatwouldensueifitwereupheldornotupheld.Afundamentalmoralrightmightbehedgedwithconditions.Forexample,onemightholdthatpeoplehaveafundamentalmoralrighttoademocraticsayinpoliticaldecision-makingjustinthecasethatmassliteracyobtainsandthesocietyhasasufficientlydevelopedContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page198andwealthyeconomy.Thedemocraticinstrumentalistdeniesnotonlytheabsolutistpositionthatpeoplehavearighttoademocraticsaywhatevertheconsequences,butalsoweakernonabsolutistversionsofthedoctrine,andshelikewisedeniesnotonlyunconditionalaffirmationsofthefundamentalrighttoademocraticsay,butalsoanyconditionalaffirmationsofsucharight.Anyconsequencescausedbyinstitutingandsustainingoneoranotherpoliticalsystemarerelevanttoitsassessmentaccordingtotheinstrumentalistorbestresultsaccount.Somehavespeculatedthattheoperationofpoliticaldemocracymightwork4toimprovepeople’scharacterontheaverage.Ifso,ademocraticpoliticalordermightbepreferabletoanondemocraticalternativeallthingsconsideredevenifthelawsandpublicpoliciesgeneratedbythenondemocraticorderwouldbesuperiortothosedemocracywouldproduce.Thedemocraticinstrumentalistmightbeaninstrumentalistacrosstheboardwhodeniesthatanyoneeverhasanyfundamentalmoralrightasjustspecified.Onthisviewallclaimsaboutmoralrights,ifvalidatall,arevalidinvirtueofbeinginstru-mentallyjustified.InthisessayIfocusonanarrowerinstrumentalistposition.Thenarrowinstrumentalistdoesnotassertthattherearenofundamentalmoralrightsbutholdsthatifthereareanysuchthings,thefundamentalrighttoademocraticsay(ortothestatusofpoliticalequality)isnotamongthem.TheIdealofDemocracyDemocracyisnotallornothing.Apoliticalordercanbedemocraticorundemocratictovariousdegrees.Instrumentalismprovidesastandardforfixingthedesirabledegreeofdemocracyforanygivensociety.Theoptimaldegreeofdemocracyforagivensocietyisthatextentofdemocracyhavingwhichproducesconsequencesmorallybetterthanthosethathavinganyotherlevelofdemocracyinplacewouldproduce.Theinstrumentalistissuesachallengetothosewhowouldaffirmthatdemocracyisintrinsicallyandnotmerelyinstrumentallyjust,whichIamtakingasequivalenttotheclaimthatpersonshaveafundamentalmoralrighttoademocraticsay.Anyonewhomakessuchassertionsowesusanaccountofhowmuchdemocracyisdeemedintrinsicallyjustandanexplanationofhowandwhereandwhythelineisdrawnbetweentheextentofdemocracythatisamatterofmoralrightandthefurtherextentofdemocracywhichisleftmorallyoptional.Considertherighttoademocraticsayascharacterizedabove(paragraph3).Thefeaturesthatconstitutethisrightthatcanholdtovaryingdegreesincludethefollowing:1.Apoliticalorderwithmajorityvotingbutlackingfreedomofspeechisnottrulydemocratic.Freedomofspeechobtainsinasocietywhenlawseffectivelyprotectthefreedomofwillingspeakerstoaddresswillingaudiencesonanymattersofpublicconcern.Freedomofspeechcanobtaintovaryingdegrees.2.Endorsingrepresentativedemocracy,J.S.Millassertsthat“theideallybestformofgovernmentisthatinwhichthesovereignty,orsupremecontrollingpowerin5thelastresort,isvestedintheentireaggregateofthecommunity.”Thissaysnothingaboutelections.InthesamepublicationMillexplainsthat“Themeaningofrepresentativegovernmentis,thatthewholepeople,orsomenumerousportion198RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page199ofthem,exercisethroughdeputiesperiodicallyelectedbythemselvestheultimate6controllingpower.”Havingpoweroversomethinginthelastresortlookstobecompatiblewithhavingpowertodeterminehowthatthinggoesonlyinthelongrun.Intheshortrun,onemightbepowerless,whilecontrollingtheissueinthelastresort.Herethenisadimensionalongwhichagovernmentstruc-turemightbemoreorlessdemocratic.Theshorterthetimelagbetweenthetimeoftheformationofamajoritywillonsomeissueandthetimeatwhichthatmajoritywillisputintoeffect,themoredemocraticthepoliticalprocess.3.Anotherdimensionalongwhichapoliticalsystemcanregisterasmoreorlessdemocraticistheextenttowhichpoliciesandlawsaredeterminedbymajor-ityruleasopposedtobeingfixedindependentlyofthatwill.Asocietyinwhichthereisabillofrightsthatconstrainsthepolicychoicestheelectedleg-islaturemaypermissiblymake,thebillofrightsitselfnotbeingrevocableoralterablebylegislativedecision,islessdemocraticthanoneinwhichtheelectedlegislatureisnotsoconstrained.Inthesameway,ifpublicpoliciesandlawsinsomepolicyareaaresetbyaking,andtheelectedlegislativehastheauthor-ityonlytoenactpublicpoliciesandlawsintheremainingpolicydomains,thepoliticalsystemislessdemocratic,thesmallerthescopeoftheauthorityoftheelectedlegislature.Also,themoreitisthecasethatapublicpolicyestablishedbyanimpeccablydemocraticprocedureiseffectivelyimplemented(providedthemajoritywillseffectiveimplementation),themoredemocratic7thesociety,otherthingsbeingequal.4.Afourthdimensionalongwhichapoliticalsystemcanbevariouslydemo-craticisequalopportunityforpoliticalinfluence.Equalopportunityforpolit-icalinfluenceobtainsinasocietywhenanytwopersonswithequalpoliticalambitionandequalpoliticaltalentshavethesamechancesofinfluencingpolit-8icaloutcomes.Thecloserasocietycomestoachievingequalityofpoliticalinfluence,themoredemocraticitis,inthisrespect.Inthesocietythatachievesthisideal,suchfactorsaswealth,socialstatus,socialconnections,sex,race,sexualorientation,andsoon,donotperseaffectthedegreeofpoliticalinfluenceanindividualcommands.5.Afifthdimensionisthedegreetowhichapoliticalorderisdeliberativelydemocratic.Asocietyismoredeliberativelydemocratic,themoreitisthecasethatitslawsandpoliciesarepickedbymajorityvoteofanelectorateallofwhomhavereflectedcarefullyaboutwherethecommongood(therequire-mentsofsocialjustice)liesandhavevotedconscientiouslywiththeaimofadvancingthiscommongoodastheyseeit.(Itisnotincoherenttopostulatethatpeoplehaveamoralrighttoinhabitasocietythatisdeliberativelydemo-cratic.Thiswouldbearightpossessedbyanindividualthatimposesonothermembersoftheelectoratethedutytoconductthemselvessothatthepoliticalprocessisdeliberativelydemocratic.)InFavorofInstrumentalismWhydenythatthereisafundamentalmoralrighttoademocraticsay,oralterna-tively,thatdemocracyisintrinsicallyjust?ThatachoiceofpoliticalsystemwouldTheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSay199\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page200producebetteroutcomesthananyalternativeiswidelyagreedtobeafactormorallyrelevanttothejudgmentthatoneoranotherpoliticalsystemoughttobeintroduced.Thecontroversialquestioniswhetheritistheonlyfactorthatmatters.Roughlyspeak-ing,theopponentofinstrumentalismholdsthatdemocracyisanintrinsicallyfairpoliticalprocedure,andthatitsintrinsicfairnesscanoutweighsomeshortfallin9productionofgoodconsequences.OneconsiderationappearsinJ.S.Mill’sConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment.Millineffecturgesthatthepoliticalfranchiseisasmallbitofpoliticalpower,powertocontrolthelivesofotherpersons,andonehasnofundamentalmoralrighttohavepoweroverotherpersonsinanycase.Inparticularcircumstancesitmightbemorallybest,allthingsconsidered,foranindividualtoplaceherselfinapositionofpoweroverothersandexerciseitandbestforotherstoallowthispowerovertheirlivestobeexercised.Butamoralcaseforhavingandexercisingpoweroverothersisneverstraightforwardlyanindividualmoralrightbutinsteadisjustifiedbyashowingthatthisuseofpowerinthegivencircumstanceswouldfairlyadvancetheinterestsofallpersonsaffectedbyit.Objection:Doesn’tanymoralrightwhatsoevergivetherightholderpoweroverotherpeople?IfIhaveamoralrightofownershipofacabin,thatgivesmethepowertoexcludeothersfromitsuse.Lookedatthisway,therighttoademocraticsayisnotproblematic.Response:Idenythatanymoralrightwhatevergivesonepoweroverothers.Somerightsdoandsomedonot.Considertheclaimthateachpersonhasamoralrighttopersonalsovereignty,todowhatshechoosessolongasshedoesnottherebyharmnonconsentingotherpeople.Thisrightagainstpaternalisticinterferencegiveseachpersonpoweroverherownlife,notthelivesofothers.Moreover,moralrightsthatdoinvolvepoweroverothersvaryinthecharacterandqualityofsuchpower.Thepowertosetrulesthatotherpeoplewillbecoercedtoobeybythreatofseriouspenaltyfornoncomplianceisaspecialpowertodirectthelivesofothers.Therighttoparticipatebyvotinginthelegislativeandexecutiveprocessesofademocraticstateisinasmallwayaninstanceofarighttoexerciseaspecialpowertodirectthelivesofothers.Othermoralrightssuchastherighttofreespeechlackthischaracter.Soonecandenythatanyoneeverhasabasicmoralrighttopowertodirectthelivesofotherswithoutdenyingthatanyoneeverhasabasicmoralrightofanysort.Ifitistrueacrosstheboardthatanyassumptionofpowerbyanindividualisjustifiedonlybyashowingthattheassumptionwouldfairlyadvancetheinterestsofallpeopleaffected,thiswillalsobetrueoftheassumptionofpoliticalpower,andeventheassumptionofthetinybitofpoliticalpowerthatgoeswiththepoliticalfranchise.TheInstrumentalistCaseagainstDemocracyFurtherlightondemocraticinstrumentalismisshedbyconsideringtheinstrumentalistcaseagainstdemocraticpoliticalinstitutions.Aconvincingdemocraticinstrumental-ismmustrebutthiscase.Onefamiliarclaimisthatmembersofsocietydifferinabilityanddispositiontoexercisesoundpoliticaljudgment,andthatif(thisisofcourseabigif)areliable200RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page201selectionprocesscanbefoundtopickoutthosespeciallyqualifiedtorule,theyshouldbetherulers.Butitisworthnotingthatacaseagainstdemocracycanbemadewithoutrelyingonsuchclaimsaboutunequalqualificationstorule.Supposethatweareconsideringademocraticpoliticalorderthatwouldbeinstitutedinacomplexmodernsocietywithalargeadultpopulation.Withalargepopulation,thedemocraticfranchiseconfersonlyatinybitofpoliticalpower.Thinkofanationalelectioninasocietywithhundredsofmillionsofvoters.Thechancethatanygivenindividualvoterwouldbedecisiveincastinghervoteonewayortheotherisextremelysmall.Evenifone’svoteinfluencesthevotesofothers,thechancesthathowonevotesmightaffecttheoutcomeoftheelectionarestillextremelysmall.One’svotewillnotchangewhoiselectedorwhatpartycontrolsthelegislature.One’svotedoesaffecttheoutcomeinasmallway–thetotalvotecountwouldhavebeendiffer-entifSmithhadvotedforcandidateXratherthancandidateY.Butthiseffectistrivial.Althoughone’svoteis,intermsofefficacy,inconsequential,theresponsibilitytovotewellisnonethelessaheavyresponsibility.Iassumethevoterdoesnotdischargeherdutyasacitizenbyvotingherself-interest(thoughdecidinghowtovoteonthisbasiswouldstillbedauntinglycomplex).Thevoterisexpectedtodiscoverandsupportpoliciesthatarebestaccordingtoappropriatemoralstandards.Oneshouldseekbyone’svotetosupportpoliciesthatcomparedtoalternativesonofferdomosttoadvancethecommongoodorthecauseofjustice.Whatthesepoliciesareisexceed-inglydifficulttodiscern.Havingasoundunderstandingoffundamentalmoralprin-ciplesisitselfamountainofatask,butgainingsuchunderstandingdoesnotsufficetodeterminehowone’svoteshouldbecast.Oneneedsalsotoknowtherelevantempiricalfactsthatbearontheissuesupforreview.Tobecomegenuinelywellinformedandabletovotewithsoundunderstandingevenonarathersimplemattersuchasalocalsewageandwaterpolicyissuewouldrequireanenormousinvestmentoftimeandotherresourcesbyeachvoter.Tobecomeawell-informedvoterableanddisposedtovotewiselyontheentirerangeofissuespresentedinasinglenationalelectionwouldbeanenormoustask,drainingresourcesthatcouldbewellusedinotherareasofone’slife.Andforwhat?Asmentionedalready,one’svoteisadropinthebucket,inconsequential.Infacttheresponsibilitiesofvotingdonotweighheavilyoncitizensindemo-cracies.Wevotersroutinelywavethemasidewithoutmuchconcern.Andinfactgiventhetremendousinvestmentofresourcesthatonewouldhavetomaketovotewiselyineachelectionandthetremendousinconsequenceofone’svotehowevercarefullyconsidereditmightbe,itisimplausibletosupposethatallthingsconsideredthereisaseriousmoralobligationtovotewisely.Invotingmodelsthatpresumeself-interestedmotivationonthepartofvoters,astableresultisrationalvoterignorance:inself-interestedterms,becomingwell-informed10isabadbet.Butrationalvoterignoranceisprescribedalsoifthebackgroundassump-tionisthatoneismorallyrequiredtovoteforthecommongoodasbestonedis-cernsitandthatvotersarenotpurelyself-interestedbutaremotivatedtosomedegreetovoteaccordingtothecommongood.Therearesometricksonecanplaytoeconomizeoninformation-gatheringandreducethecostofmoralandpoliticaldeliberationpreparatorytoresponsibleexerciseoftherighttovote,buttheydonotinmyjudgmentseriouslyalleviatetheTheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSay201\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page202problem.Onecanchooseapoliticalpartythatreflectsone’snormativeoutlookandtrustthepartytopickoutpoliciesthateffectivelypursuethesenormsincurrentcir-cumstances.Butwhatpartycanbetrusted?Anyway,thedecisiontopickapartyisitselfexceedinglycomplex,andamorallyresponsiblevoterwouldhavetokeepcheckinghisinitialdecisiontosupportaparticularpartyinkaleidoscopiccontinu-allychangingpoliticalcircumstances.Onemightlooktopoliticalpunditsforguid-ance,butthesameproblemsrecuratthelevelofdecidingwhichauthoritiestoaccept.Thisdecisionisitselfverycomplexandneedsmoreorlesscontinuouslytobereviewedandreconsidered.Theupshotofthisdiscussionisthatforanymorallyresponsibleagentwhoisavoterinacomplexmodernsocietywithlargepopulation,thecostsandbenefitsofvotinginafullyinformedandfullyreflectivemanneraresuchthatremainingignorantandrefrainingfromfullreflectionareatleastmorallypermissibleandveryprobablymorallyrequired.Givenlimitedpersonalresources,foralmostanyvoter,othermoraldemandscrowdoutthedemandtovotewell.Butthenonecanhardlyexpectdemocracyunderthesecircumstancestofunctionwell.Evenmorallydisposedandconscientiouscitizenswillnotvotewell.Itwouldbeaflukeifcitizenswhoarenotmoralandconscientiousvotedwell,sooneshouldexpectbadvotingandpoorcontrolofpoliticsbyvotersinpoliticalsystemsinwhichmajorityruleisimportant.Themoralpermission/requirementtovotewithoutbecomingwellinformedanddeliberatingcarefullyholdsonlygivencertainconditions.Iflargenumbersofvotersabstainedfromexercisingtheirrighttovote,atsomepointtheefficacyofthevotesleftinthehandsofremainingvoterswouldbelargeenoughtotriggerrequirementstousethevotewell.Butthisisanunlikelyscenario.IntheconditionsthatJean-JacquesRousseaumayhaveassumedasbackgroundconditionsforhisargumentforpoliticaldemocracy,namelyasocietywithasmallpopulationandasimplehomo-11geneousmodeoflife,theproblemjustdiscusseddoesnotarise.Buttheseconditionswillnotholdinthesettingsinwhichweadvocatepoliticaldemocracytoday;norshouldwestrivetochangetheworldsothattheconditionsdoobtain.Theargumentfromrationalvoterignorancedoesnotshowthat,allthingsconsidered,democracyisabadpoliticalsystemthatshouldnotbeestablishedandsustained.Oneexpectsdemocracytoworkpoorlyandtobeapoortoolforgener-atingjustlawsandsocialpolicies,butperhapsallfeasiblealternativestodemocracywouldexpectablyperformevenworse.Buttheinherentstructuralweaknessofdemocracyasadeviceforsecuringgoodpolicycastsadarkshadowontheclaimthatthereisastrongmoralpresumptioninfavorofpoliticaldemocracyindependentoftheexpectedconsequencesofitsoperation.Thisshadowfallsondoctrinesthatholdthatdemocracyisauniquelyfairpro-cedurefordeterminingthesubstanceofthelawsandpoliciesthatgovernmentenforcesonthemembersofsociety.DemocracyasIhavejustcharacterizeditisasystemofgovernancethatplacesmorallyconscientiousindividualsinabind:theidealofdemo-cracyisthatpoliciesshouldbechosenbythemajorityvoteofcitizenschoosinginfreeelectionswithfullinformationaftercarefuladequatedeliberationdirectedtowarddeterminingwherethecommongoodlies.Ifpeopledolessthanthis,thereisnoparticularreasontothinkthatpolicieswillbeguidedbyadefensiblecon-ceptionofthecommongood.Buttheinformationgatheringandfactsiftingandempiricaltheoryunderstandinganddeliberatingonmoralprinciplesandapplyingof202RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page203carefullyselectedmoralprinciplestothefactsathandthatarerequiredifvotingistofulfilltheidealofdemocracyareinalmostallcircumstancesmorethanoneismorallyobligatedorevenmorallypermittedtodo(giventhepressofothermoralconcerns).Howcanthispoliticalprocedurebefairatall,letaloneuniquelyfair?Noticethatthedoubtsaboutpoliticaldemocracyraisedsofarinthissectiondonotrelyonanyclaimsabouttheunequalpracticalreasoningabilityandconscien-tiousnessandpoliticalexpertisecapacityofcitizens.Theproblemarisesevenifallcitizensareequallycompetentandknowntobeso.Onecouldmeettheconcernsaboutrationalvoterignorancewithoutadoptinganythingresemblingelitistminorityrule.Forexample,onemightpickatrandomasmallgroupofcitizensandassignthemtheresponsibilitytobecomeenlightenedontheissuesofthedayandtoparticipateinmajorityvotethatdirectlyorindirectlydetermineswhatlawsshallbeestablishedandwhatpersonsshallbecometopgovern-mentofficials.Periodicallyanewrandomdrawismadefromthesetofcitizensandanewgroupofpeopleisassignedtheresponsibilityofvoting.Callthissystemrandomsubsetdemocracy.Supposethatundersomecircumstancesassigningpeopleimportantresponsibilit-iesinducesthemtorisetothetask,toputforthextraconscientiouseffort.Thehatmakestheman,asthesayinggoes.Thenundertherightcircumstancesapermanentassignmentofpoliticalpowertorandomlyselectedcitizensmightbeexpectedtoleadtobetterpoliticaloutcomesthanmaintainingrandomsubsetdemocracy.Atthispointonehasanargumentforanondemocraticpoliticalorderthatdoesnotrelyontheclaimthatsomepeoplearemoreablethanotherstoexercisepoliticalpowerwisely.Democraticinstrumentalismbecomesplausiblebysuccessfulrebuttaloftheclaimsthatrationalvoterignoranceandunequaldistributionofpoliticalwisdomacrosscitizenscanbeparlayedintoargumentsfornondemocraticpoliticalorder.DemocracyandMutualRespectTheideathatdemocracyisintrinsicallyjustissupportedbyclaimstotheeffectthatfailuretoaccordeverymemberofsocietywhopossessesrationalagencycapacitytheopportunitytoparticipateonequaltermswiththeothermembersinthemakingofthelawsenforcedonallisfailuretorespecteachpersonasarationalagent.Acloselyrelatedclaimisthateachpersonrationallymustsafeguardforherselfalevelofself-respectandself-esteemneededforeffectiveagency.Aconditionformaintainingthisnecessaryself-respectisthatoneisrespectedbyothers,thatone’sstatusasaratio-nalagentissupportednotundermined,andbeingdeniedtherighttoademocraticsayisbeingdeniedthiselementalandnecessaryrespectfromothers.Democracyisintrinsicallyjustinteraliabecauseitisanecessaryconditionofmutualself-respectwhichnorationalagentcanabjure.Thisisobviouslyacrudecapsuleversionofanargumentthatcriesoutfordetailedelaboration.ButIhopethatthesimpleobjectionIraisewouldapplytoanyelabora-tionofit.Manyofusspendmuchofourlivesworkingindecidedlyundemocratichierar-chicalorganizations.Weworkinlarge,top-down,bureaucraticorganizationstofulfillplanssetbytopofficials.Theseorganizationsincludegovernmentagencies,businessTheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSay203\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page204firms,andnonprofitorganizations.Therelationofsubordinatestobossesinthesehierarchiesisinawayunliketherelationofcitizenstothestate,inthatwehavesomevoluntarycontrolastowhethertosubmittotheauthorityofanenterprisehierarchyandlessvoluntarycontrolastowhetherornottoallowthestatetoimposeitswillonus.Butthiscontrastisnotstark.Inanyrealisticsense,oneoftenhasnoreasonableemploymentoptionexcepttosubordinateoneselftoanenterprisehier-archy,andoftenthecostsfortheindividualofshiftingfromassociationwithoneparticularenterprisearelarge.Ontheotherside,theindividualhasoptionstoexitfromanyparticularstatejurisdiction.Nodoubtbureaucraticenterprisesoftenmistreatthosewholaborforthem,especiallythoselowonthechainofcommand.ButIfindithardtotakeseriouslytheideathatfailuretoaccordtherighttoademocraticsaytothemembersofsuchenterprisesispersedisrespectfulmistreatmentortreatmentthatisincompatiblewithconditionsofmutualrespectandpromotionoftheself-respectofall.Thisissueishardtoaddressintheabsenceofadevelopedtheoryofhumanebureau-cracy.Itsurelymatterswhetherornotdemocraticorganizationoftheenterprisewouldbetteradvancelegitimateenterprisegoals,balancedagainstthecostsandgainsthataccruetootherlegitimateinterestsaffectedbythisadvancement,comparedtonon-democraticmodesoforganization.Ifnot,themaintenanceofanondemocraticmodeoforganizationthatisvindicatedbyamorallysensitivecostandbenefitassessmentisnotinherentlydisrespectfulorinsultingtothosedeniedademocraticsayindeci-sionsabouthowtoruntheenterprise.Also,inahumanebureaucracyrelationsbetweenpersonsatdifferentlayersoftheorganizationalhierarchyareregulatedbyrulesdesignedbothtoadvancethefulfillmentofenterprisegoalsandtoprotectthoselowerinthehierarchyfromarbitrarytyrannicalsupervisionandalsofromoverzealoussupervisionthatimposesexcessivecostsonsubordinatesinthecourseofadvancingenterprisegoals.Moregenerally,therulesandpoliciesofthehumanebureaucracyensureproperattributionofcreditforachievementandfairsharingofthebenefitsandburdensofthecooperativeproject.Itisimportanttoanyonewhoisasubordinateinsuchanenterprisethatitshouldbededicatedtoservingmorallyvaluablegoalsandreasonablywellorganizedtoachievesuccessinthispursuit.Obeyingordersthatarearbitraryandcapricious,notreason-ablyaimedatfurtheringthemorallyacceptableenterprisegoals,isdispiritingandultimatelydegrading.Butobeyingrulesandcommandsandpoliciessetbyotherpersonswithoutregulationbyanydemocraticprocessisnotperseinimicaltoself-respectormutualrespect.Somybroadsuspicionisthatifdemocracyatthesociety-widelevelisintrinsic-allyjustandmorallymandated,soshouldbedemocracyattheenterpriselevel.Buttheinferenceisbetterrunintheotherdirection:democracyattheenterpriselevelisnotarequirementofjustice,norisitmorallymandatoryasnecessaryforneces-saryself-respectatthesociety-widelevel.Iadmitthattherearemorallyimportantdifferencesbetweenundemocracyinbureau-craticorganizationsandundemocracyatthelevelforthenation-state.Soonemightholdthatbasicrequirementsofmutualrespectforpersonsmandatedemocracyasintrinsicallyjustonlyatthelevelofthestate.Onesalientdifferencethatonemightexploittomakethisargumentwouldbethegrossdifferenceinvoluntarinessofsubmission.Tosomedegreeonehastheoptionwhethertosubmitoneselftothe204RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page205undemocraticauthorityofanemployingenterprise,buteverycitizenmustsubmittowidespreadstatecoercionthataffectstheirlivesdeeplyandcontinuously.Thestatemassivelycoercesthecitizenandseriouslycrimpsherpersonalsovereigntyandthisimpositioniscompatiblewithmutualself-respectamongallcitizensonlyifthepolit-icalorderisdemocratic.Soonemighthold.Idoubtthatthatthefactthatthestatemassivelycoercesthosesubjecttoitsjurisdictionunderconditionsthatdonotallowforsignificantindividualvoluntaryconsenttothiscoerciveimpositiongeneratesamoralrequirementofdemocracyasaconditionofmutualrespect.Coercionperseisnotmorallymomentous.Ifoneiscoercedfornogoodreason,thatisaterribleinfringementofone’srighttoauto-nomy.Butbeingcoercedtocomplywithdemandsthatoneisanywaymorallyboundtofulfillisnotaseriousinfringement,atleastifthecoercionisproportionatetothegravityoftherequirement(itisnotacceptabletothreatenthedeathpenaltyeventoservethegoodcauseofinducingpeopletorefrainfromjaywalking).Ifthestate’scriminaljusticesystemcoercesmenottomurdermywife,thiscoerciondoesnotseriouslyinfringemyautonomyifIhavenodesiretomurderher,andalthoughitdoesseriouslyinfringemyautonomyifIdoharbormurderousaims,inthisunfor-tunatescenariothedropinmyautonomyisnottoberegretted.Thesameistrueacrosstheboard.Whenanumberofpersonsengageinamutu-allyadvantageouscooperativeventureaccordingtorules,andthusrestricttheirlibertyinwaysnecessarytoyieldpublicgoodsforall,thosewhohavesubmittedtotheserestrictionshavearighttoasimilaracquiescenceonthepartofthosewho12havebenefitedformtheirsubmission.Ifthegoodsprovidedtoallaresufficientlyimportant,andtherulesprovideforfairsharingofthebenefitsandburdensofcoop-eration,coercionnecessarytosustaintheschemeandensurethatallwhobenefitcontributetheirfairsharetotheprojectcanbemorallyacceptable,inmyview.Thiscanbetrueinvirtueofthegoodsubstanceofthecooperativeschemeandindepend-entlyofhowitcametobeorhowitiscurrentlyadministered.Thisallholdstrueiftheschemeisprovisionofpublicgoodsincludingtheruleoflawandgoodorderbyastatethatclaimsamonopolyoftheuseofforceonitsterritory.Mutualrespectinsuchaschemeissustainedbymorallydefensiblesubstance.Theprocessofdecidingonthetermsoftheschemeanddecidinghowtoadministeritmattersmorallybecauseitaffectsthedegreetowhichthesubstantiveoutcomesoftheschemearefairandright.Butthoseaffectedbythescheme,includingthosecoercedtocontributetheirfairsharetoit,donothaveabasicrighttobetreatedbyanyparticularsortofprocessorprocedure,democraticorotherwise.Rights,Disagreement,andDemocracyConsiderthisinstrumentalistposition:theprimaryproperjobofthestateistosafe-guardpeople’simportantmoralrights(otherthanthedisputedrighttoademocraticsay),andsoifitcanbeshownthatsomenondemocraticpoliticalorderwouldingivencircumstancesdobetterthananydemocraticalternativetosafeguardthesemoralrights,thenondemocraticorderoughttobeinstituted.Appealingtothemoralimpera-tiveofrespectingmoralrights,onemightdefendconstitutionalfeaturessuchasjudicialreviewthatlimittheextenttowhichapoliticalorderqualifiesasdemocratic.TheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSay205\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page206JeremyWaldronhasarguedthattheassumptions(1)thatpeoplehaveimportantmoralrights,whichcanbeviolatedbypoliciesestablishedbymajorityrule,and(2)thatclaimsaboutwhatmoralrightspeoplehavearegenuineassertionsthatcanbeobjectivelytrueorfalsedonotgiveanytractiontoonewhoarguesforcurtailing13majorityruleinordertoprotectpeople’simportantmoralrights.First,anyformofgovernancecangiverisetoviolationsofpeople’smoralrights,sothepossibilityofrightsviolationdoesnotautomaticallytellinfavorofanyparticularformofgovernance.Second,oneofthecentralbackgroundfactsthatcreatetheneedforauthoritativepolicymakingwithcoerciveenforcementthatgovernmentsprovideisthatrightsarecontroversial.Peopledisagreeaboutthecontentofthemoralrightsofindividuals.Partofthepointofhavingagovernmentistoprovideapracticalresolutionofsuchdisagreementsothatthedisagreementsdonoterodesocialorder.Themoraldisagreementsremain,butwhereconvergenceinpeople’sactionsononespecificationofrightsisneeded,somegovernmentaldecision-makinggeneratestheneededspecification.Youcangrantthattherearerightsandthatquestionsaboutwhatmoralrightspeoplehaveadmitofcorrectanswers,butthatdoesnothingtoeliminatetheneedforauthoritativegovernmentalspecificationonthesemattersintheabsenceofuncontroversiallyknownrightanswerstoquestionsofmoralright.Thisappealtorights,theirrealexistence,theircentralityinmorallife,theirobjec-tivestatusdoesnothingatalltooverturnthenaturalandreasonablepresumptionthatwhenpeopledisagreeastowhatrightsshouldbeproclaimed,guaranteed,andenforcedbythestate,themorallyappropriatemethodofdecisiontosettlegovern-mentalrightspolicyisademocraticprocessinwhichallmembersofsocietyhavetheopportunitytoparticipateonequaltermsandwithanequalvote.AccordingtoWaldron,theobjectiverealityofmoralrightsandtheeviloftheirviolationhavenobearingonthecasefordemocraticmajorityrule.ManyofthepiecesfittogetherinWaldron’sargumentarecorrect,butheneglectstomentionbigpiecesofthepuzzle,andbyignoringthemhereachesawrongconclusion.Disagreementamongpeopleastowhatmoralrightspeoplehavecanberoughlydividedintothreecategories:(1)thereisdisagreementamongpeopleincasesaboutwhichreasonable,well-informed,competentjudgeswouldnotdisagree,(2)thereisdisagreementamongpeoplewherereasonable,well-informed,competentjudgeswouldfindthemselvesinstabledisagreement,inourpresentepistemiccondition,and(3)thereisdisagreementamongpeoplewherereasonable,well-informed,competentjudgeswoulddisagree,becausesomereasonable,well-informed,competentjudgesareheremakingademonstrablemistake(perhapsasubtlemistakeonadifficultquestion).Ifthereisacaseforcurtailingorlimitingorevenabolishingdemocraticpoliticalrulewithrespecttoaparticularrangeofissues,inparticularcircumstances,inaparticularcountry,thecaseemergesfromconsideringdisagreementoftypes1and3.Suchclaimsasthesewouldberelevant.Manycitizenswhoexercisethevoteindemocraciesarenotreasonable,competent,well-informedjudgesofthemoralissuesatstake,sotheysometimesvoteinwaysthatissueingovernmentlawsandpoliciesthatenforceorallowseriousviolationsofpeople’smoralrightsthenatureandexist-enceofwhicharebeyondthepaleofreasonabledisagreement.Manycitizenswhoexercisethevoteindemocraciesaremorallylaxinthattheyallowthemselvestovoteforpoliciesthatsuittheirinterestsandprejudicesevenwhentheirownpractical206RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page207reasoningrightlysignalstothemthatwhattheyarevotingforisclearlymorallywrong.Manycitizenswhoexercisethevoteindemocraciesarelesscompetent,well-informed,andreasonablejudgesthantheminorityofcitizenswhoarewellaboveaverageintheserespects,sothatwhenfacedwithdifficultandsubtlepolicyissuesinvolvingcomplexdeterminationsofmoralright,thebulkofcitizenspredictablygoeswrongandvotesforrights-denyingpolicieswhenthemorallymorecompetentcitizensgetitrightanddonotvoteforrights-denyingpolicies.Theseclaimsdonotbythemselvesmakeevenaprimafaciecaseforlimitingorabolishingdemocracyinparticularsettings,buttheyaregermane.Waldronhashiseyeonlyontype2dis-agreement,butthatisnotthetypethatleadssensiblepeopletobeambivalentaboutthemoralproprietyofmajorityruleandopentolimitationsonitinthenameofprotectingmoralrights.Ofcoursethepossibilityofrightsviolationsperpetratedthroughmajorityruledoesnotraisedoubtsaboutthemoralproprietyofmajorityrulegovernanceunlessonehassomesensibleviewthatminorityruleorcurtailmentsonmajorityrulemightdobetter.Ifoneconceivesofmoraldisagreementaboutrightsasalwaysandeverywherereasonabledisagreementamongreasonablepeopleondifficult,perhapsintractablydifficultandunsolvablemoralquestions,thepossibilityoftyrannyofthemajoritywillbehardtodiscern.Butalongsidereasonabledisagreementamongreasonablepeoplethinkingreasonablyontheparticularoccasionaboutquestionsofrights,thereisalsodisagreementthatismanifestlyandblatantlyunreasonableanddisagreementthatisunreasonable(wouldnotpersistifallpartiesreasonedcorrectlyandexercisedpracticalreasoningexcel-lently)thoughnotmanifestlyorblatantlyso.Ifwegrantthepossibilityofmoralknowledge,weshouldalsograntthepossibilityofmoralexpertise–superiordevel-opedpracticalreasoningability.Ifthereismoralexpertise,itisdogmatictoinsistthatitmustbespreadevenlyacrossthepopulationofamodernsociety.Istheremoralexpertise?Althoughthisisalargequestionandthisessaycannotworkthroughit,myhunchisthatthereisadeeptensioninanypositionthatcombinesaffirma-tionofmoralknowledgeanddenialofmoralexpertise.Denialofmoralexpertisepressesonetowardmoralskepticism.It’salongwayfromacknowledgementthattherearemoralexpertstotheclaimthatauthoritarianrulebypeopleselectedbysomeprocessasmoralexpertswouldbeagoodideainanyparticularsociety.Thedemocraticinstrumentalistholdsthatthisargumentativetraversecannotbesuccessfullycompleted.Nonethelessthedemocraticinstrumentalistpositionhasacertainaffinitywiththepositionthatpossessionofmoralexpertisebyagroupofpeopleinasocietycanjustifytheirclaimthattheirauthoritarianruleismorallylegitimate.Thedemocraticinstrumentalistobjectstotheargumentthatthemoralexpertsshouldbethepolit-icalrulersonpracticalandempiricalgrounds,notongroundsofhighprinciple.Thereisnoreliablewaytoselectmoralexpertstobepoliticalrulers.Eveniftherewereatheoreticallyvalidselectionprocedure,anyattempttoputitintoeffectwouldbefraughtwithdifficulty,andlikelyfail.Rulebymoralexpertsmightprovokeextra-constitutionalmeasuresbygroupsexcludedfromthepoliticalprocessthatwouldresultinbadconsequences.Rulebymoralexpertsmightgenerateapopularcultureofalienationfrompubliclifeorinotherwaysdegradepublicculture,andgoodpublicpoliciesmightproveunabletoeliminatethesebadeffects.TheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSay207\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page208PoliticalLiberalismPhilosopherssometimesassociatetherighttoademocraticsaywiththemesofpolit-icalliberalism.Inmodernsocietiesthatdonotengageinsuppressionoffreedomofspeech,peoplewillnotconvergeovertimeonanysingleconceptionofthegoodortheoryofmoralright.Insteadtheywilltendtofanoutintheirbeliefs,embracingdiversemutuallyconflictingdoctrines.Thistendencytopluralismisnotmerelyaresultofthefactthatsomepeopleareineptandirrationalinformingtheirevalu-ativeandnonevaluativebeliefs.Inamodernsocietyreasonablepeoplewilloverthelonghaulcontinuetodisagreeaboutfundamentalethicalandmoralissues.Theprojectofpoliticalliberalismaimstodevelopaconceptionofjusticesuitableforamodernsocietymarkedbystablepluralismofbelief.Thekeyideaisthatthesocietyshouldberegulatedbyprinciplesacceptabletoallreasonablepersonsfromtheirdivergentperspectives.Whensocietyiseffectivelyregulatedaccordingtosuchprinciples,allmembersofsocietycanaffirmthebasicarrangementsdespitetheiracross-the-boarddisagreementsabouthowtoliveandwhatweoweeachother.Theflipsideofthisthoughtisthatitiswrongtoimposeonpeopleinthenameofprin-ciplestheycouldreasonablyreject.JohnRawlsformulateswhathecallsa“liberalprincipleoflegitimacy:”“ourexerciseofpoliticalpowerisfullyproperonlywhenitisexercisedinaccordancewithaconstitutiontheessentialsofwhichallcitizensasfreeandequalmayreasonablebeexpectedtoendorseinthelightofprinciplesandidealsacceptabletotheircommonhumanreason.”Headdsthatbasicquestionsofsocialjusticeastheyariseinthecourseofpoliticsshouldbesettledaccordingtoprinciplesandidealsacceptabletoall.Theliberalprincipleoflegitimacymightseemimmediatelytoruleoutofcourtnondemocraticpoliticalconstitutions.Perhapsinahomogeneouscommunity,forexample,acommunityofreligiousbelieverssharingacommonfaith,allmightfindacceptablearuleofsuccessionthatconferspoliticalpoweronthepersonsingledoutbyacouncilofeldersaswisestandholiest.Criteriaforeliterulemightbefoundacceptabletoall.Butinadiversesociety,anyproposedmovementawayfromthesymmetryofone-person-one-votewillbecontroversial,andwillberejectedbysomereasonablepersons.Ifthereissomesoundargumentfromthelegitimacyprincipletotherighttodemo-cracy,andifthelegitimacyprincipleitselfiscompelling,thenwehaveanargumentfortherighttoademocraticsaythatisindependentofclaimsaboutthegoodorbadconsequencesofinstitutingandmaintainingademocraticregime.Anysuchargu-mentbearscarefulexamination.Itclearlythreatensdemocraticinstrumentalism.ButIshallarguethatthethreatfromthisquarterisinert.Ratherthanengagewiththedetailsofthisargument,Iwanttovoiceabroadobjection.Inanycontextinwhichitisplausibletoclaimthatrestrictingpoliticalpowertoanelitegroupwouldproducebetterjusticeresultsthanretainingdemo-cracy,thenormofpoliticalequalitythatdictatesmajorityruleandone-person-one-voteasthebasicpoliticalcharterwillitselfbecontroversial,reasonablyrejectablefromnormativestandpointsthatgivegreatweightinchoosingpoliticalarrangementstotheconsequencesofputtinganyproposedsetofarrangementsinplace.Sotheideathatdemocraticarrangementsareuniquelyuncontroversialandhencesingledoutasuniquelyacceptablebythefilteroftheliberallegitimacynormlookstobe208RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page209off-basefromtheoutset.Ifanyandeverynondemocraticconstitutionissimilarlyrejectable,thenoneoftwoconclusionsmustfollow.Eithertheliberallegitimacyrulesetsthebarofacceptabilitysohighthatnoconstitutionandpolicycouldclearthebarandallareruledoutasunacceptable,orthisresultmustbetakenasaninitialproblemforhigher-orderdeliberation.Ifthe“noconstitutionismorallylegitimate”outcomeisalsounacceptabletoreasonablepersons,thenfurtherrefiningoftheliberallegitimacynormisneeded,sothatastandardthatgradesproposalsfordegreesofunacceptabilityandthatsinglesoutsomeproposalasleastunobjectionableevenwhennoproposalisfullyunobjectionableisidentifiedandaffirmed.Neitherthecon-clusionthatnoconstitutionislegitimatenortheconclusionthatthelegitimacynormneedstoberelaxedtoavoidthisresultyieldsanendorsementofdemocracyasuniquelyjustinthefaceofpluralismofbelief.TheIdealofDemocraticEqualityRuminatingontheuniqueopportunityforhonorandglorythattheEnglishsoldiershad,facingalargerFrenchforceinthegreatbattleofAgincourt,Shakespeare’sKingHenryVismovedtograndspeech:“Wefew,wehappyfew,webandofbrothers:14/Forhetodaythatshedshisbloodwithme/Shallbemybrother.”Whatisbeingspokenofhereisapromisedislandofmeritocraticsolidarityinaseaofascriptivefeudalhierarchy.Butademocraticversionofthesentimentreadilycomestomind,andhasaclearappeal.OnecanimagineaWaltWhitman-inspiredShakespearewriting,“Wemany,wehappymany,webandofbrothersandsisters.”Theappealistoanidealofdemocraticequality,meanttoholdacrossapoliticalsociety.Thesocietyofdemocraticequalityisoneinwhichpeoplerelatetoeachotheras15equals.Encountersbetweenpersonsarenotrigidlystructuredbyexpectationsandconventionstiedtohierarchicalstatusrelationsofrace,class,gender,orevenaccomplishment,occupation,orcelebrity.Eachpersonisaddressedasmr.orms.–ranksandtitlesascribedatbirthareabolished.Inthissocietyacontinuoussuccessfuleffortismadetoensurethateveryoneregardseveryoneasfundamentallyequalinstatusandworth.Differencesinnativetalents,developedskills,earnedmerit,virtuesandvices,andsoonarerecognized,butnottoomuchismadeofthem.Also,agreatmanykindsofexcellenceareprized,andoneisalwaysawarethatpeoplewhomanifestlyscorelowonmanydimensionsofexcellencemayscorehighalongotherdimensionsofexcellencethatareforthepresentorfromaparticularvantagepointnotvisible.Theindividualwhoappearstobeadunceorbuffoonmaybeafinepreacherorcleverengineer;thebumonthestreetmaybeapoet.Anyway,excellenceinachievementisnotthebasisofmutualrespectandconcern,whicharereciprocallyaccordedtoallcompatriots,regardedasbrothersandsisters.Sustainingacultureofdemocraticequalityrequiresconstantvigilancetopreventdistinctions,honors,andfashionablestatusfromcongealingintonewformsofcastehierarchyortheirequivalent.Theidealofpoliticalequalityandtheassociatedrighttoademocraticsayarebothmajorconstituentsofacultureofdemocraticequalityandimportant,verylikelyindispensablemeanstotheestablishmentandmaintenanceofotherelementsofsuchaculture.Ifdemocraticequalityisvaluable,soispoliticalequality.TheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSay209\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page210Thedemocraticinstrumentalistneednotbecommittedtodenyingthevalueofdemocraticequality.Shecanembraceitasanelementofavaluablewayoflife.Shecanalsoaccepttheclaimthatpoliticaldemocracyisanimportantelementofdemocraticequalityandthefurtherempiricalclaimthatpoliticaldemocracyisanimportant,perhapsindispensablemeanstootherelementsofthedemocraticequal-itypackage.Abestresultsstandardfordeterminingwhatpoliticalarrangementsoughttobeinstitutedcanallowthatbringingaboutthegoodofdemocraticequalitycanfigureamongtheresultsthataffecttheallthingsconsideredinstrumentalassess-mentofpossiblepoliticalarrangements.Butfromthefactthatdemocraticequalityisgooditdoesnotfollowthatpeoplehaveamoralrighttopoliticaldemocracyanymorethanitfollowsfromthefactthathoneyisgoodthatpeoplehaveamoralrighttobeehivesortopotsofhoney.Accordingtoinstrumentalism,thepoliticalrightsthatpeoplemorallyoughttohavearethosehavingwhichwouldbeproductiveofbestconsequences.Inthisessaythestandardsforassessingconsequencesareleftasatopicforanotheroccasion.Idon’truleoutthepossibilitiesthatacultureofdemocraticequalityisaformidablygoodstateofaffairsandthatpoliticalequalitypromotesthisculture.Thesenormativeclaimsmightbepartofthecasefordemocraticinstrumentalism,buttheycouldjustaswellbeacceptedbyaninstrumentalistwhoattheendofthedaydecidesthatthebestresultsstandardsinglesoutsomeformofnondemocraticpoliticsasmorallymandatory.Acknowledgingthegoodnessofacultureofdemocraticequalityallowstheinstru-mentalisttoavoidtheperhapsunpalatablepositionthatthereisnothingtoregretifaninstrumentalistassessmentestablishesthatanondemocraticpoliticalorderingivencircumstanceswouldproducebetteroutcomesthanademocraticorder,sodemo-cracyshouldnotbesustained.Ifinstitutinganondemocraticpoliticalorderreducesthegoodofdemocraticequality,itisregrettablethatweoughttooptforanundemo-craticregimeeventhoughitisbestallthingsconsidered.InpassingInotethatitisanopenquestion,towhatextentwhatisattractiveinthevaguebutcompellingidealofdemocraticequalitymightbeachievedinanon-democraticpoliticalorder.Anondemocraticpoliticalorderthatwecouldimagineemergingasbestbythebestresultsstandardwouldnotbeauthoritarianordespotic.Itwouldbealiberalsocietywithfreespeechguaranteesandafreewheelingongoingpublicdialogueontheissuesoftheday.Proceduresforcontestingpoliticaldecisionsthatsomecitizensviewaswrongheadedwouldbeinplace.Thestatedandactualgoalsofpoliticswouldbetoachieveaninclusivecommongood,nottheadvance-mentofsomeeliteclass.Checksandbalances,bothpoliticalandcultural,wouldhavetobeworkingtoguardagainstthetendencyofbiasandprejudiceintherulingelitetosolidifyintounjustclassprivilege.Apopularcultureofcap-in-handsubmissive-nessanddeferenceinthefaceofpoliticalauthoritywouldbeunhelpfulandcoun-terproductiveinthisregard;insteadwhatwouldbeneededisacultureofdemocraticassertiveness.Itishardtogetagriponthequestion,couldanondemocraticpoliticalordersustainacultureofdemocraticequality,becausethelatteridealisvagueandelusive.AsSamuelSchefflerobserves,relationsofunequalpower,authority,andstatusare16ubiquitousinmoderndemocraticsocieties.Whatsortsofunequalrelationshiparecompatiblewiththedemocraticcultureideal?Onepartialresponseistodistinguish210RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page21117limited-purposedeferencefromacross-the-boardkowtowing.Onedeferstothemedicalauthorityofone’sdoctorbutdoesnotreasonablyregardherasahighersortofbeing,obeysone’sboss(sometimes,asappropriate)butdoesnotregardhimasanaristocratorking,andsoon.Butthisisstillvagueandmetaphorical.Moreover,adifficultylurks.Ifwerespondthatpeopleshouldbedeferentialtoofficialsjustwheredeferenceiscalledfor,cedetoexpertsofvarioustypesjusttherightmeasureofauthority,conformtothewilloftheirbossjusttothedegreethatdoingsobestadvanceslegitimateenterprisegoalsbalancedagainstcompetingvalues,andsoon,thenwearedangerouslyclosetosayingthatdemocraticequalitysaysthatpeopleshouldbehaveastheyoughttobehaveanddevelopanddisplaytheattitudestheyoughttodevelopanddisplay.Democraticequalitysoconstruedwouldbeanunob-jectionablebutunhelpfuldirective.Idonotintendbytheremarksinthelastparagraphtoregisteranopinionthatthedemocraticequalityidealcollapsesunderscrutinyandfailstoidentifysignificantgood.Whatweshouldrathersayisthatfurtherarticulationandanalysisofthisidealwouldbedesirable.Perhapsitwillturnouttobenotoneidealbutseveral,ofvary-ingworthandsignificance.ConclusionThesescrappyremarksaimtoestablishthatdemocraticinstrumentalismisapromis-ingapproachtothequestions,“whatjustifiesademocraticpoliticalorder?”and“whatmorallydetermineshowdemocraticapoliticalorderoughttobe?”Thisapproachmeritsfurtherscrutiny.Notes1ThisessaydrawsonRichardArneson,“DemocraticRightsatNationalandWorkplaceLevels,”inDavidCopp,JeanHampton,andJohnE.Roemer,eds.,TheIdeaofDemocracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),pp.118–48;Arneson,“DefendingthePurelyInstrumentalAccountofDemocracy,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy11(2003):122–32;andArneson,“DemocracyIsNotIntrinsicallyJust,”inKeithDowding,RobertE.Goodin,andCarolePateman,eds.,DemocracyandJustice(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),pp.40–58.2AmongthosewhoendorsetheideathatademocraticpoliticalorderforamodernsocietyisintrinsicallyandnotmerelyinstrumentallyjustareJohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice,2ndedn.(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999);JoshuaCohen,“ForaDemocraticSociety,”inSamuelFreeman,ed.,TheCambridgeCompaniontoRawls(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),pp.86–138;JeremyWaldron,LawandDisagreement(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999);ThomasChristiano,TheRuleoftheMany(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1996);Christiano,“KnowledgeandPowerintheJustificationofDemocracy,”AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy79(2001):197–215;DavidEstlund,“BeyondFairnessandDeliberation:TheEpistemicDimensionofDemocraticAuthority,”inJamesBohmanandWilliamRehg,eds.,DeliberativeDemocracy:EssaysinReasonandPolitics(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1997),pp.173–204.3Onthenatureofrights,seeJudithJarvisThomson,TheRealmofRights(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1990).TheSupposedRighttoaDemocraticSay211\nCDIC11.qxd2/4/0915:49Page2124SeeJ.S.Mill,ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment.5Mill,ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment,Ch.3.6Mill,ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment,Ch.5.7Theparentheticalphraseallowsthatmajoritywillmightfavortheenactmentofalawbutnotitseffectiveimplementation.Forexample,themajoritymightwillthatalawagainstgamblingbeonthebooksbutnotenforced.Insuchacase,themajorityisgettingitsway.Butifamajorityisabletobringitaboutthatalaworpolicyisformallyestab-lishedbutnotthatitiseffectivelyimplemented,forexample,becausethepoliceforceorsomeotherbureaucraticagencyisabletoexertitswillagainstmajoritywill,tothatdegreethesocietyfailstobefullydemocratic.8Thisisaroughformulation.Foronething,indeterminingwhethertwoindividualshaveequalprospectsofbeingpoliticallyinfluential,onemustabstractfromtheactualdistributionofpoliticalattitudesandopinionsinthesociety.Twopersonswithequalpoliticalambi-tionandequalpoliticaltalent,onepursuingaconservativepoliticalaimsinasocietywhosemembershaveconservativeattitudesandopinions,onepursuingradicalcommun-istpoliticalaimsinthesamesociety,maywellhaveverydifferentprospectsofbeingpoliticallyinfluential.Theidealofequalityofopportunityforpoliticalinfluenceisform-ulatedbyJohnRawlsinPoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996).9Onecouldofcourserejectinstrumentalismwithoutholdingthatprinciplesofproceduralfairnessentailamoralrighttoademocraticsay.10MancurOlson,TheLogicofCollectiveAction:PublicGoodsandtheTheoryofGroups(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971).11Jean-JacquesRousseau,TheSocialContract.12ThewordsofthissentencearetakenfromRawls,TheoryofJustice,p.96.13JeremyWaldron,“TheCoreoftheCaseAgainstJudicialReview,”YaleLawJournal115(2006):1346–1406;JeremyWaldron,“ARight-BasedCritiqueofConstitutionalRights,”OxfordJournalofLegalStudies13(1)(1993):18–51.14WilliamShakespeare,KingHenryV,4.3.60–2.15AseminalarticulationoftheideaisinMichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice:ADefenseofPluralismandEquality(NewYork:BasicBooks,1983).SeealsoDavidMiller’sessayinthecollectionheco-editedwithMichaelWalzer,Pluralism,Justice,andEquality(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).SeealsoElizabethAnderson,“WhatIsthePointofEquality?”,Ethics109(1999):287–337;alsoSamuelScheffler,“WhatIsEgalitarianism?”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs31(1)(2003):5–39;alsoScheffler,“Choice,Circumstance,andtheValuerofEquality”,Philosophy,Politics,andEconomics4(2005):5–28.16Scheffler,“Choice,Circumstance,andtheValueofEquality,”p.17.ItshouldbenotedthatSchefflerisnotherevoicingskepticismabouttheidealofdemocraticequality(equal-ityofdemocraticstatus),whichheembraces.17Anotherpartialresponseisthattotreatanotherpersonasanequalistorespondtoheronthebasisofone’sperceptionsofherparticulartraitsrelevanttoactioninthecir-cumstancesratherthantoperceptionsofhergeneraltraits,hermembershipinvariousclassificationsofpeople.Butasstatedthisproposalsuffersfromthedefectnotedaboveinthetext.Inmanysituationsrespondingtopeopleonthebasisoftheirgeneraltraitsisperfectlyappropriate:ifyouknowIamapedophile,thatisprobablyallyouneedtoknow,toknowthatIamnottobeentrustedwithunsupervisedresponsibilitytocareforyouryoungchild;ifyouknowIamadrunkard,thatshoulddisqualifymyapplicationtobetheregularschoolbusdriver.Whatcountsasaparticularversusageneraltraitisnotespeciallyclear,andnotmuchhangsonthedistinction.Thesepointsdonotgain-saythefactthatsometimesrespondingtopeoplemerelyonthebasisofstereotypes,e.g.,beingsaddenedthatone’sdaughterismarryingamanofanotherrace,ismorallyvicious.212RichardJ.Arneson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page213CHAPTERTWELVEDemocracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValueElizabethAndersonWhatisdemocracy?Doesithaveonlyinstrumentalvalue?Onecommonpictureofdemocracyidentifiesitwithcertaingoverningpractices,andclaimsthatithasonlyinstrumentalvalue.Onthisview,thepurposeofgovernment,likethatofthemarket,istosatisfyindividualpreferences.Individualpreferencesareassumedtobeformedexogenouslytodemocraticprocesses.Democraticmechanismsofaccountabilityareinstitutedtoensurethatgovernmenttriestosatisfythesepreferences.Themainsuchmechanismisvoting,adeviceforchoosingpublicofficialsandpoliciesbyaggre-gatingindividualpreferencesintoacollectivedecision.Votingistheprimarywayinwhichcitizensparticipateindemocracy.Itsvalue,likethevalueofotherdemo-craticgoverningpractices,isplainlyinstrumental.Inthisessay,Ishallnotdenythatvotinghasinstrumentalvalue.Ifvotingwerenotameanstoreachingcollectivedecisionsresponsivetothedesiresoftheelectorate,orifitledtoresultsthatsystematicallyunderminedtheinterestsoftheelectorate,itwouldbeworthless.Butitdoesnotfollowthatvotinghasonlyinstrumentalvalue.Inourconsumerculture,wetakeitforgrantedthatshoppingisanactivitymanypeopleenjoy,beyonditsinstrumentalvalueinenablingpeopletoacquiregoodstheydesire.Evenifacomputercouldbeperfectlyprogrammedwithaconsumer’stastessothatitautomaticallyorderedonlineexactlywhattheconsumerprefers,manycon-sumerswouldprefertopersonallysurveytheiroptionsandchooseforthemselves.Fortheseconsumers,shoppinghasnoninstrumentalaswellasinstrumentalvalue.Yetitsnoninstrumentalvalueisconditionalonitsinstrumentalvalue.Althoughsomepeoplecancontentthemselveswithpurewindow-shoppingforgoodsbeyondtheirreach,mostwouldstayhomeifshoppingmallscontainedonlygoodsthattheycouldnotacquirebyshopping.Ishallarguethesameaboutdemocraticparticipation.Itwouldmakenosenseifitdidn’tachievetheendsforwhichitisinstituted.Yetinvirtueofitsinstrumentalvalue,itacquiresanoninstrumentalvaluetoo–ifnot,formanycitizens,asanactivitypeopleenjoy,thenassomethingtheyrightlyvalueasaconstitutivepartofawayContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page214oflifethattheyvaluenoninstrumentally.Evenifadictatorshipcouldgivethemwhattheywanted,asthegovernmentofSingaporeclaimsitdoesforitssubjects,democraticcitizenswouldprefertogovernthemselves.Ishallalsoarguethatthedemocraticwayoflifecanbejustifiedasamatterofjustice.Eachmemberofastateisentitledtohaveequalstandingtomakeclaimsonothersregardingtheprotectionoftheirinterests,andtoparticipateindecisionscon-cerningthesharedbackgroundconditionsoftheirinteractionsandtheadoptionofcollectivegoals.Thedemocraticwayofliferealizestheuniversalandequalstandingofthemembersofsociety,andisthereforejustifiedasmorallyright.Toappreciatethesenoninstrumentalvaluesofdemocracy,weneedtoalterourunderstandingofdemocracy.IjoinatraditionofdemocraticthinkingadvancedbyJohnStuartMillandJohnDewey.Bothheldthatdemocracyismorethanasetofgoverningpractices.Itisacultureorwayoflifeofacommunitydefinedbyequal-ityofmembership,reciprocalcooperation,andmutualrespectandsympathyandlocatedincivicsociety.OnMill’sview,democraticparticipationisawayoflifethatunitestwohigherpleasures–sympathyandautonomy.OnDewey’sview,itistheexerciseofpracticalintelligenceindiscoveringandimplementingcollectivesolutionstosharedproblems,whichisthebasicfunctionofcommunitylife.Onbothoftheirviews,votingisjustonemodeofdemocraticself-expressionamongmanyothersthatconstituteademocraticwayoflife.I’llalsobearguingforachangeinthewaywethinkaboutinstrumentalvs.non-instrumentaljustification.Here,IjoinJohnDewey,whoofferedatrenchantcritiqueoftraditionalwaysofunderstandingnoninstrumentalor“intrinsic”values.Asmyshoppingexampleillustrates,“intrinsic”valuescannotalwaysbeidentifiedpriortoandindependentlyofinstrumentalvalues.Amongreflectivepersons,judgmentsofintrinsicandinstrumentalvalueinteractbi-directionally.Thiscontrastswiththestand-ardphilosophicalview,accordingtowhichwefixontheintrinsicvaluesfirst,andthenidentifytheinstrumentalvaluesaswhateverbringsabouttheintrinsicvalues.DemocracyasaWayofLifeIshallbeginbybroadeningourconceptionofdemocracy.Democracycanbeunder-stoodonthreelevels:asamembershiporganization,amodeofgovernment,andaculture.Asamembershiporganization,democracyinvolvesuniversalandequalciti-zenshipofallthepermanentmembersofasocietywholiveunderthejurisdictionofastate.Asamodeofgovernment,democracyisgovernmentbydiscussionamongequals.Asaculture,democracyconsistsinthefreewheelingcooperativeinteractionofcitizensfromallwalksoflifeontermsofequalityincivilsociety.Thesethreelevelsworktogether.Inparticular,democracyasamodeofgovernmentcannotbefullyachievedapartfromademocraticculture.Atthesametime,thepointofademo-craticcultureisnotsimplytomakedemocraticgovernmentwork;rather,democraticgovernmentisamanifestationofdemocraticculture;itspointistoservethedemo-craticcommunity,torealizeitspromiseofuniversalandequalstanding.Considerfirstdemocracyasamembershiporganization.Aconstitutiveprincipleofdemocracyisthatallwhoarepermanentlysubjecttothelawsofagovernmentshouldbeentitledasayinitsoperations,eitherdirectly,inparticipatorydemocracy,214ElizabethAnderson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page215orindirectly,throughtheelectionofrepresentatives.Thisentailsthatalltheperman-entmembersofasocietyshouldbeentitledtothestatusofcitizens,notsubjects,withrightstovoteuponreachingadulthood,andalloftheotherrights–topermanentresidence,freedomofspeech,topetitiongovernment,runforpoliticaloffice,sitonjuries,etc.–thatarerequiredforhavingasay.Exceptionstothegeneralruleofuniversalcitizenshipmaybetolerableatthemargins,withrespecttosmallnumbersoflegalpermanentresidentswhomayworkinacountrywithoutacquiringcitizenship.Butevenhere,ademocraticsociety’sinterestinuniversalcitizenshipissubstantial(Brubaker1989:162).Thedemocraticidealsupportsthemajorpushthatoccurredinthe1990stomovepermanentU.S.residentstocitizenship,andtherelaxationofstandardsforforeignpermanentguestworkerstogaincitizenshipinseveralEuropeancountries.Whatdemocracycannotallowforlongwithoutcompromisingitselfisalargepermanentpopulationofmet-ics,ofpeopledesignatedasoutsiders,subjecttolawsalthoughtheyhavenorightstoparticipateinshapingthem(Walzer1983).Thisisintolerablebecausedemocracyasamembershiporganizationrequiresequalityaswellasinclusion.Pressuretowarduniversalinclusionfollowsfromthedemandsofequality.Equalityisunderstoodhereasarelationamongpersons,wherebyeachadultactivelyrecognizeseveryoneelse’sequalauthoritytomakeclaimscon-cerningtherulesunderwhichallshallliveandcooperate,andthisrecognitioniscommonknowledgeamongall.Asthestandarddemocraticslogangoes,everyonecountsforoneandnooneformorethanone.Thisisnotmerelyavotingaggrega-tionrule(“oneman,onevote”)butamoregeneralprinciplefororganizingsocialinteractioninademocraticsociety.Considernextdemocracyasamodeofgovernment.Weareaccustomedtothinkingofdemocracyasasetofgoverninginstitutions,involvingsuchthingsasauniversalfranchise,periodicelections,representativepublicofficialsaccountabletothepeople,decisionsbymajorityvote,transparentgovernment,afreepress,andtheruleoflaw.Whatisthepointofthissetofgoverninginstitutions?Democratictheoryissplitbetweentwobroadviews:majorityrule(aggregationofgivenpreferences),anddeliberativedemocracy.Followingthesecondview,WalterBagehot(2001[1872]:89)famouslydefineddemocracyas“governmentbydiscus-sion.”Itcontrastsbothwithgovernmentbycustomandgovernmentbythedecreeofarulingclass.IwouldaddtoBagehot’sdefinitionthatdemocracyisgovernmentbydiscussionamongequals.Inademocracy,thereisbutoneclassofcitizens;nocitizenissecond-class,andnopermanentmemberofsocietyisexcludedfromaccesstocitizenship.Deliberativedemocratshaveseveralreasonsforresistingthe“majorityrule”formulafordemocracy.First,withinaconceptionofdemocracyasmajorityrule,individualrightstendtobeconstruedasconstraintsondemocracyratherthanconstitutivefeaturesofit.“Majorityrule”suggeststhatthemajorityisentitledtogetwhateveritwants.Ifthemajoritypreferstosilence,marginalize,orsubordinatevariousminor-itygroups,majorityrulesupportsthisoutcome.Againstthis,manyhavedecriedthe“tyrannyofthemajority”asathreattoindividualrights.Onthisconstrual,indi-vidualrightsimposeconstraintsondemocracy.Fromthestandpointofdeliberativedemocracy,thiswayofcounter-posingindividualrightstodemocraticformsisdeeplyconfused.ManyindividualrightsareDemocracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValue215\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page216constitutiveofdemocracy(Ely1980:87–104).Democracyrequiresthatcitizensfromdifferentwalksoflifetalktooneanotheraboutmattersofcommoninterest,todeter-minewhatissueswarrantcollectiveaction,whatkindsofactionmightmakesense,andwhoismosttrustedtoholdpoliticaloffice.Thisentailsthatnumerousrights,includingtherightstovote,andfreedomofspeech,association,andmovement,arepartofthestructuralfeaturesofdemocracyratherthanconstraintsuponit.Thesamepointappliestovariousrightsthathelpsecuretheequalityofcitizens,suchasrightsagainstestablishmentofreligion,theprohibitionofreligioustestsforholdingpublicoffice,andtheprohibitionofracialsegregationinpublicinstitutionsandcivilsociety.ItappliesaswelltotheU.S.Constitutionallimitationoncriminalchargesoftreasontomakingwaragainstone’scountryoraidingitsenemies–alimitationdesignedtosecureroomforthe“loyalopposition”ofminoritieswhoareoutofpower.Amajoritythatsilencesorsegregatesminorities,limitstheirrightstoparticipatebecausetheyhavethe“wrong”religion,orthreatensdissenterswithtreasoncharges,istyran-nicallyundemocratic.Asecondreasondeliberativedemocratsreject“majorityrule”asadefinitionofdemocracyisthatthelattertakesindividualpreferencesasunqualifiedinputsintocollectivedecisions.Butnoteverypreferenceisentitledtocollectivesatisfaction,evenifitisheldbyamajorityofcitizens.Aswehaveseen,somepreferences,suchastostampminoritygroupswithbadgesofinferiority,ortomarkthemasoutsiders,areruledoutbytherequirementsofdemocracyitself.Moregenerally,democraticdiscussionisacriticalwayforthepublictocometoanunderstandingofwhatitsaimsareasapublic–todecidewhichconcernsareproperlymattersofpublicinterest,entitledtolayaclaimoncollectiveresourcesandcooperationtosecuretheirfulfillment.Democraticdialoguedoesnottakepreferencesasgiven,buttransformsthem,notjustinthesenseofchangingindividuals’mindsaboutwhateachwants,butofchangingourmindofwhatwewantwhenweactcollectivelyascitizens.Athirdreasondeliberativedemocratsreject“majorityrule”asadefinitionofdemo-cracyisthatitfailstomakecentralaroleforintelligenceandlearningindemocraticdecision-making.Ifdemocracyisjustgivingthemajoritywhatitwants,whynotjustletthepublicdecideissuesdirectlybypopularreferendum?Deliberativedemocratsreplythattomakeintelligentdecisionsandlearnfromtheirmistakes,decision-makersmustbeabletothinkanddeliberatetogether.Thisrequiresthatlegislativebodiesberelativelysmall,investigateissuesjointly,andreasontogetheronthebasisofcommonknowledge.Theymusthavefeedbackmechanisms,tiedtomechanismsforaccountability,thatinformthemoftheconsequencesoftheirdecisionsandprovidethemwiththemeansandincentivestorevisetheirdecisionsinlightofknowledgeoftheireffects.Whiletherepresentativevs.directdemocracydistinctionisorthogonaltothedeliberativevs.preferenceaggregationdistinc-tion,deliberativedemocrats,becausetheystressthecentralityofdeliberationtodemocraticprocesses,haveanedgeinexplainingwhyrepresentativeinstitutionsarepreferable.Deliberativedemocratshavesometimesbeenthoughttogotoofarinassumingthattheaimofdemocracyistoconstructandpromoteacommongood,whichistheobjectofoverwhelmingconsensus.Ifthatwereconsistentlypossible,thenwewouldhardlyneedvotingrulessuchasthemajorityruleatall.Decision-making216ElizabethAnderson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page217couldproceedbyconsensus.Thosewhoareexperiencedwithdecision-makingbyconsensusunderstanditsweaknesses.Often,decisionsmustbemadebeforeatrueconsensushasbeenreached.Theneedtomakeadecisionputsoverwhelmingpres-sureondissenterstoconform.Thatprocessisn’tdemocratic.Itisessentialtothedemocraticprocesstoleaveroomforlegitimatedissent.Becausedemocraticdecisionsmustoftenbemadeintheabsenceofconsensus,andmustpreserveroomforlegitimatedissent,votingisanecessarymomentintheextendedprocessofdemocraticdecision-making.Butevenwhendissenterslose,theirroleisnottherebycancelled.DeliberativedemocratswhofollowDewey(1927)stresstheprovisionalandexperimentalcharacterofvoting.Votingdoesnotmakeafinaldecision,butratherrepresentsthecitizens’orthestate’slegitimatedecisionofwhattotrynextuntilsomethingbettercomesalong.Citizens’collectivedeliberationandfeedbackonpublicdecision-makingiscontinuousanddoesnotstopjustbecausealawhasbeenenacted.Theriseoftheregulatorystatehasentailedthatadministra-tiveagenciesissuethousandsofrulespursuanttogenerallaws.Criticaltothedemo-craticprocessisparticipatorycitizenfeedbackonproposedregulationspriortotheirenactment(Richardson2002).Thisisaformofcitizeninputintoregulatorydelib-eration.Oncearegulationisadopted,citizensprovidefeedbacktooneanotherandtopublicofficeholdersontheeffectsoftheregulationastheyseeit.Thisprovidesfurtherdeliberativeinputintotheregulatoryprocess,sometimesleadingtorevisionorwithdrawalofregulations.Iftheeffectsofpoliciesarebadenoughasjudgedbyaffectedcitizens,theywilldemandreformandelectthosewhomtheyviewasbetterabletomakethem.OntheviewofdemocracyIpropose,votinganddeliberationrepresentalternat-ingmomentsinacontinuousprocessofprovisionaldecision-making,theaimofwhichissimultaneouslytolearnaboutwhatworksandtodecideuponcriteriaofwhatcountsasworkingfromtheperspectiveofcitizensactingandthinkingcollectively.Decisionsareprovisionalandcontinuouslysubjecttorevisioninlightoffeedbackfromcitizensabouttheirconsequences.Feedbackgetsitsbitethroughmechanismsofaccountability,includingnotjustperiodicelectionsbutpublicprotest,petitionstorepresentatives,citizenparticipationinregulatorydeliberation,andparticipationinpublicopinionpolling,amongmanyothermechanisms,notleastscrutinyofpublicproblems,policies,andofficeholdersbyaskepticalpress.Citizenscommunicatenotjustwiththeirrepresentativesandotherpublicofficeholders,butwithoneanother,sothattheymaycometoanunderstandingofwhattheydemandasapublic,andnotjustasisolatedindividuals.Noneofthiswouldworkifdemocracywerenothingmorethanasetofgoverninginstitutions.Deweyurgedusto“togetridofthehabitofthinkingofdemocracyassomethinginstitutionalandexternalandtoacquirethehabitoftreatingitasawayofpersonallife,”foronlysocouldgenuinedemocracyberealized(Dewey1981:228).Democraticinstitutionsamounttolittleunlesscitizensenact,intheirday-to-dayinter-actions,aspiritoftolerantdiscussionandcooperation.Thisleadstothethirdaspectofdemocracy,whichiscultural.Asacultureorwayoflife,democracyconsistsin“freegatheringsofneighborsonthestreetcornertodiscussbackandforthwhatisreadinuncensorednewsoftheday,”and“personalday-by-dayworkingtogetherwithothers.”ItDemocracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValue217\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page218isthebeliefthatevenwhenneedsandendsorconsequencesaredifferentforeachindi-vidual,thehabitofamicablecooperation–whichmayinclude,asinsport,rivalryandcompetition–isitselfapricelessadditiontolife.Totakeasfaraspossibleeveryconflictwhicharises–andtheyareboundtoarise–outoftheatmosphereandmediumofforce,ofviolenceasameansofsettlementintothatofdiscussionandofintelligenceistotreatthosewhodisagree–evenprofoundly–withusasthosefromwhomwemaylearn,andinsofar,asfriends.(Dewey1981:227–8)Asthecitizensofex-communistcountriesofEasternEuropeareaware,democracyrequiresnotjusttheinstallationofdemocraticgoverninginstitutionsbuttheflour-ishingofcivilsociety.Civilsociety,thelocusofdemocraticculture,isasphereoflifeintermediatebetweentheprivatesphereoffamilyandfriends,andthesphereofthestate.Itconsistsinthedomainswherecitizensfreelyinteractandcooperate,spon-taneouslyinpublicstreetsandparks,andinmoreorganizedfashioninfirmsandnon-profitassociationsofallkinds.Thesearetheprimarylocationswherecitizensfromdifferentwalksoflifecommunicatewitheachother,inwaysthatshapetheirsenseofwhattheirpropergoalsareasapublic.Thisiswherecitizens’preferencesaretransformedthroughdiscussionandbecomemattersofpublicandevensharedinterest,notsimplyisolatedprivatepreferences.Thisiswheremattersofprivateconcerncanbecomemattersofpublicconcern,whencitizenspoolinformationabouttheirproblemsanddiscoverthatsomeproblemstheythoughtwerepersonalaresharedbyothersinthesamepredicament,andcausedbyfactorssubjecttocollectivecontrol(Dewey1927).Theconstructionofademocraticcultureincivilsocietyrequiresseveralelements.One–foremostinthemindsofthosewhoseektoconstructcivilsocietyinEasternEurope–istopromotethespontaneousself-organizationofcitizensintonumerousassociationsnotdirectedbythestate.Mostoftheseassociations,includingprivatefirms,clubs,andfraternalassociations,donothavedirectpoliticalaims.Yettheycontributetoademocraticculturebyprovidingexperienceincitizenself-organizationandself-governanceonasmallscale,settingsinwhichinformaldiscussionscontri-butetotheformationofpublicopinion,andsitesoffeedbackongovernmentdecisions(Estlund2005;Rosenblum1998;Skocpol2003).Myownworkondemocracystressesanotherrequirementofademocraticcul-ture:associationswherecitizensfromdifferentwalksoflifecanlearntointeractandcooperateontermsofequality(1995,2004).Thisrequiresthatthedominantasso-ciationsofcivilsociety,notablytheworkplace,beintegratedalongwhateversocialdivisions–racial,ethnic,religious,sexual–marksignificantsystematicinequalitiesamongcitizens.Successfulintegrationrequiresnotjustcontact,butwillingandactivecooperation.Insuchcooperativeassociations,citizenslearntotreatoneanotherasequals:aseligibleforinclusionincollectiveprojects,entitledtoanequalvoice,whoseconcernsmeritequalattentionandresponse.TheValuesofaDemocraticWayofLifeWhatgoodisleadingademocraticwayoflife–livinginademocraticculture,basedonuniversalandequalmembershipofallpermanentresidentsofastate,constituted218ElizabethAnderson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page219inpartbypoliticalparticipation?HereIwanttostressthepluralityofgoodsreal-izedinlivinguptodemocraticideals,postponingconsiderationofwhetherthesegoodsare“intrinsic”or“instrumental.”First,democracyembodiesrelationsofmutualrespectandequality,whicharerequiredasamatterofright.Second,democracyhelpsavoidsomeoftheevilsofundemocraticwaysoflife.Ithelpssecureindividualsagainstabuse,neglect,subordination,andpariahstatus.Italsoprotectsagainstthecorruptionofcharacterofthosewhooccupyprivilegedpositionsinsociety.Third,democraticwaysofliferealizethesharedgoodsofsympathyandautonomy.Fourth,democracyisamodeofcollectivelearning.Mylistofthegoodsofademocraticwayoflifefocusesongoodsspecifictoorinherentinthatwayoflife.Thisapproachcontrastswithanotherwayonemightarguefordemocracy:onecouldfirstlayoutthegoodsthatanygovernmentissup-posedtoprovideforitspeople,andthenarguethatdemocracyisbestabletosecurethem.Anyminimallydecentgovernmentneedstoprovidebasicexternalandinternalsecurityforitsmembers;tolayoutcommonrulesofinteractionandcooperation;andtoeitherdirectlysupplyorsecuretheconditionsforotherinstitutionstosupplypublicgoodssuchastheinfrastructureoftransportationandcommunication,andpublichealthmeasures.Ifwestartoffwithafixedlistofsuchgoods,asintheoriesoftheminimalstate,itcouldbearguedthatdemocracyisnotnecessarytosecurethem.Singaporehasbeencitedasacounterexampletothatclaim.Againstthis,AmartyaSenhasarguedonempiricalgroundsthatdemocraciesaremorelikelytoprovidethegoodsneededfortheirmemberstoflourish.Forexample,Senarguesthatnomassfaminehaseverhappenedinademocracy(Sen1999).ThereismuchtobesaidforSen’sview.ButIshallsetthisargumentativestrategyaside,alongwithmoregenericstrategiesthatarguethatdemocracywillbettersatisfymostcitizens’preferencesthanalternativemodesofgovernment,inordertofocusongoodsthataremoretightlyconnectedtodemocraticwaysoflife.Turningtothefirstitemonmylist,thecorevalueofdemocracyisequalityofsocialrelations.ByequalityIdonotmeanthateveryoneenjoysequalesteemorrep-utation,orequallygoodjobsorincome,northateveryoneisequalinvirtueormerit.Democraticequalityratherdenotesakindofstandingincivilsocietytomakeclaimsonothers,thattheyrespectone’srights,paydueregardtoone’sinterests,andincludeoneasafullparticipantincivilsociety,includingthosethatinformdemocraticgovernance.Democracyregardseachcitizenas“aself-originatingsourceofclaims”(Rawls1980:543).Theymakeclaimsintheirownright,notmerelyasfunctionariesinasocialorderdesignedforotherends,suchasthegreatergloryofGodorthestate.Everyonecounts,andeveryonecountsequally.Thisisaclaimofright.Callthe“good”thatwhichproperlyappealstousorattractsus;andthe“right”thatwhichmaybeexactedfromus,asanauthoritativedemand(DeweyandTufts1981:216).Iclaimasamatterofrightthateveryonesubjecttoacommonsetofcoerciverulesandpoliciesisentitledtoequalconsiderationintheirconstruction.Ishallnotofferanelaborateargumentforthisclaim.Instead,Ipointtotheexperienceinwhichitisrooted:namely,theexperienceofbeingcalledtoaccountbyanotherwhoseinterestsweareneglectingorwouldotherwiseneglect(Darwall2004).Thisexperienceisadeep,constitutivepartofgrowingupinsociety.Grantingitspurportedauthoritywithrespecttosomepersons,thereisnocasefordenyingittoanyone.Thefailureofallargumentsoftheform“thepurportedauthorityDemocracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValue219\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page220ofclaimsoriginatingfrompeopleoftypexisinvalid”wherexreferstoanyofthesupposedgroundsofantidemocraticsubordination(race,ethnicity,class,caste,sex,religion,ignoblebirth,etc.),vindicatesthedemocraticstandardofright.Theexperienceoftheauthorityofanother’sclaimsisthefeelingknownasrespect.Weexpressthisfeelinginactionbyheedingother’sclaims–takingthemseriouslyindeliberation,weighingthemequallywiththesymmetricalclaimswemakeonothers.Democracyisawayoflifewherebywecollectivelyheedourmutualclaimsononeanotherinconstructingrulesandgoalsforthosepartsofourlivesthatweliveincommonwithourfellowcitizens.Ittherebyembodiesrelationsofmutualrespect,whicharerequiredasamatterofright.Thisisthefirstdistinctivevalueofdemocracy.Havingdistinguishedtherightfromthegood,wemaywonderwhetherademo-craticwayoflifeisalsogood,orwhetheritismerelysomethingexactedfromusreluctantly.Whatisthegoodofdemocraticequality?Considerwhatlifeislikeforthoseinundemocraticsocieties,whoaredeemednottocountatall,oronlyassub-ordinatesorfunctionaries.Nonpersons,pariahs,untouchables,andoutlawsenjoynoprotectionagainstthecrueltyandabuseofothers.Subordinatessufferunderthehumiliatingcontemptofsuperiors.Merefunctionariesarethrownawaywhennolongeruseful.Theseevilsareavoidedbyeffectivestandingasanequal.Thus,JohnStuartMillarguedthatevenifwomenwereproperlysubordinatetotheirhusbands,theywouldstillneedpoliticalrightstoensureagainstmen’sabuseoftheirdomesticauthor-ity.“Men,aswellaswomen...needpoliticalrights...inorderthattheymaynotbemisgoverned”(Mill1975:192).Millalsoarguedthatthecharacterofthosewhoenjoysuperiorrankinundemo-craticsocietiesiscorruptedbytheirpoweroverothers(Mill1975).Wherelordsarefreetoexploittheirtenants,slaveownerstowhiptheirslaves,husbandstorapetheirwives,HindustoriotagainstMuslims,thoseontopbecomecruel,despotic,anddepraved.Evenmilderformsofinequality,institutionalizedthroughnormsthatexcludeandsilencethoseoflowerrank,propagateignoranceandnegligenceonthepartofthepowerful.Democraticequalityprotectstheadvantagedfromthevicesofarrogance,malice,andstupidity.Ademocraticwayoflifeisnotmerelygoodforeachmemberofsociety,consid-eredindividually.Itisalsoasharedgood,realizedbyallofustogether.Callagood“shared”bythemembersofagroupifaconditionofitsgoodnessisthatitbegood,andcommonlyknowntobegood,foreveryoneelseinthegroup(Taylor1985).Equalityofsocialrelations,asrealizedinademocraticcommunity,isasharedgood.Democraticcitizensfeelthiswhenevertheydecrythesubordinationorexclusionoftheirfellowcitizens.Itisfeltasanassaultnotjustontheirfellowcitizens,butonthem–eveniftheyare,throughthatsubordination,grantedasuperiorstatus.Tobeplacedhighthroughthedegradationoffellowcitizens–aswhiteswereplacedhighthroughthesubordinationofblacksintheU.S.–is,fromademocraticpointofview,tobedeprivedofthegoodofequalstanding,andhencetobeinanimportantsensedegraded.AsJohnStuartMillclaimed,Thereoughttobenopariahsinafull-grownandcivilizednation....Everyoneisdegraded,whetherawareofitornot,whenotherpeople,withoutconsultinghim,takeuponthem-selvesunlimitedpowertoregulatehisdestiny.(Mill1862:173)220ElizabethAnderson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page221Truedemocratsdespisetitlesofnobilityandbadgesofhigher-castestatusthatmaybeofferedtoorimposedonthemasnotsimplyunjustbutdegrading,indeprivingthemoftheequalstandingtheyneedtoliveindemocraticcommunitywiththeirfellowcitizens.Tobeheldhighistobeexcludedfromcamaraderieandcandidrela-tionswithothers.Tobeademocratistolocateone’ssenseofdignityinequalsocialrelationswithothers,andone’sgoodinlivinginacommunityofmutualrespectandsympathywiththem.Thedemocraticwayoflifeinacommunityofequalshascharacteristicformsofactivity:meetingtogetherandtalkingfreelyaboutcommonproblems,forgingcollectiveplanstosolvetheseproblems,observingwhatlifeinaccordancewiththeseplansislikeandrevisingtheplansaccordingly,allwithequalregardtotheinterestsofallmembersofthecommunity.Theseactivitiesexercisethreepowers:sympathy,autonomy,andintelligence.Sympathyorsolidarity–whatMillcalledthe“feelingofunitywithothers”–isexpressedinaperson’sneverconceivingofhimself“otherwisethanasamemberofabody”whosegoverningprincipleisthatofa“societybetweenequals,”which“canonlyexistontheunderstandingthattheinterestsofallaretoberegardedequally”and“consulted”(Mill1957:40).Millthoughtsuchmutuallysympatheticsocietiesofequalsexistedinmanyforms,includingmarriageandworkers’cooperatives.Butitsbroadestformisdemocraticgovernment.Toinsistontheimportanceofsympathyamongcitizensisnottodenythatpar-tisanrivalryandcompetitionamonginterestgroupsispartandparcelofdemocraticlife.RecallingDewey’sremarksabove,democraticsympathyrequiresrecognitionofrivalsasloyalopponentsfromwhomonemaylearn.(Partisanrivalsareoftenloathtopubliclyadmitthis,evenwhile“stealingissues”fromoneanother.)Italsorequiresthatonecastone’sjustificationsforpublicpoliciesintermsofthepublicinterest,andnotjustintermsofnarrowpartisanorfactionalinterests.Finally,itrequiresasearchformutuallyacceptablecooperativesolutionstoproblems,insteadofconquestandrepression.Autonomyindemocraticparticipationisexpressedincitizens’settingsharedprin-ciples,goals,andrepresentativesforthemselves.Whatcountsasalegitimatematterofpublicinterestisnotgiventocitizens.Itissomethingtheydecideforthemselves,throughdiscussion,voting,andpetitioning.Theprocessofcomingtoasharedunder-standingofproblemsofpublicinterestanddeterminationtosolvetheseproblemscollectively(eitherdirectly,orthroughrepresentatives)waswhatDewey(1927:283)calledthepubliccomingtorecognizeitselfasapublic.Formembersofacommunitytorecognizethemselvesasconstitutingapublicisforthemtobecomeacollectiveagentindeterminingtheirownaffairs–forcitizenstoacttogethertodeterminethecollectiveconditionsandgoalsoftheircooperativelife.Thisistoexerciseautonomycollectively(Anderson2002).Finally,democraticactivityisanexerciseofintelligence,inthesenseoflearningbetterwaystoliveourcollectivelives.Citizensfromallwalksoflifelearnfromoneanotherinsympatheticdiscussionabouttheirproblemsandprospectivesolutionstothem.Moreheadsaregenerallybetterthanfewer,inthattheybringtobearawiderdiversityofexperiencesandknowledgetotheidentificationandsolutionofcollec-tiveproblems,andensurethateveryone’sinterestsarevoiced.Citizensalsolearnfromdiscussingproblemswiththesolutionstheyhavealreadyimplemented.Democracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValue221\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page222HereIendorsean“epistemic”conceptionofdemocracywithoutclaimingthattheoutcomeofvotingconstitutivelydeterminestherightanswer.Thetrueepistemicvirtuesofdemocracyarenotfoundinthestaticoutcomesofvotingbutratherinthedynamicprocessesofdiscussionandfeedbacktogovernmentonpoliciesalreadyimplemented.Dewey(1927)sawdemocracyasthecollectiveimplementationofexperimentalintelligenceindetermininghowtolive.Votingdoesnotdecidewhatanswerisright.Itratherselectsapreferredhypothesistobetried–thattheseofficeholderswillleadthecountryinabetterdirection,thatthesepolicieswillsolveourproblems.Thesehypothesesarethentestedbylivinginaccordancewiththem,seeingwhathappens,andpoolinginformationaboutdisparatecitizens’favorableandunfavorableresponsestothem.Thefeedbackmechanismsofdemocraticparticipation–voting,petitioning,discussioninpublicmedia–deliverjudgmentsthateithersupportthecurrentleader-shipordemandchangeinwhatthepublichypothesizesisabetterdirection.Bythesemeans,citizensroughlysteertheshipofstate,butnottowardadestinationdeter-minedoutsideofthedemocraticwayoflifeitself.Rather,wefigureoutonthewaywhatpathsseemmorepromising,muchashikersexploringnewterritorieswithoutamaptakethetrailsthatinterestthematthetime.IntrinsicandInstrumentalValuesofDemocracyDoesmylistofthevaluesofdemocracyshowittobeonlyinstrumentallyvaluable?Onastandardinstrumentalistmodel,wefirstestablishintrinsicallyvaluablestatesofaffairstobeattained,wherethevalueofthesestatesisindependentofthepro-cessesthatbringthemabout,andthenjustifyactionsandinstitutionsascausallyefficaciousinbringingabouttheseindependentlyidentifiedstates.Someaspectsofmyaccountofthevalueofdemocracyappeartofitthismodel.Thus,Iarguedthatdemocracyhelpsavoidtheoppressionandneglectofthosewhowouldotherwiselackavoiceingovernance,andcorruptionofthecharacterofthosewhowouldother-wisehavearbitrarypoweroverthosewithoutvoice.Notice,however,thatincharacterizingdemocracyasamodeofcollectiveauto-nomy,Irejecttheideathatwecancomprehensivelyidentify,independentofdemo-craticprocesses,thepropergoalsthatdemocracyshouldseek.Therearesomesuchgoals,suchassecurityandsocialorder.Butthesecanbeattainedbyalibertarianminimalstate.Thegoalsofademocraticstaterangemorewidely,butnot,inalib-eralstate,overanythingwhatever.(Recalltheliberalstate’sabstentionfromreligiousimpositions.)Rather,democracyisamodeofcollectivegovernancewherebycitizensworkouttogetherwhatgoalstheyshallshare.Thisisspecificallytorejecttheideathatdemocracyisagenericpreferencesatisfactionmechanism(Anderson2002).Indemocracies,someoutcomes,evenifindividuallypreferredbyamajority,enjoynopublicstanding.Supposeweadoptedanexpandedinstrumentalistmodel,accordingtowhichsomeoftheintrinsicallyvaluablestatesofaffairsincludecausalprocesses,andnotjustoutcomes.Onsuchanexpandedview,someworldscanbebetterthanothersbecausetheirendstateswereachievedinaparticularway.Tojustifydemocracyontheexpandedmodelistoclaimnotjustthatdemocraticprocessesbringaboutbetterstatesthannondemocraticprocesses,butthattheworldisabetterplaceforcontainingactsthat222ElizabethAnderson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page223instantiatedemocraticprocesses.Idonotthinkthismodelcapturesthevalueofdemo-craticprocesses,however.Wedonotvoteinordertohavemoreactsofvotingintheworld.Theworldisnotbetterforcontainingmoresuchactsthanfewer.Ontheinstrumentalistmodel,whetherstandardorexpanded,statesofaffairsareassumedtohave“intrinsic”value,andeverythingelseisextrinsicallyvaluableasaninstrumenttobringingabouttheintrinsicallyvaluablestatesofaffairs.Here,“intrinsic”valuedenotesthepointatwhichjustificationcomestoanend.Thisisthepointwherewehaveidentifiedsomethingthatisvaluable,independentofthevalueofanythingelse.Valueisessentiallynormativeforactionandfeeling:itprescribesan“ought”toagentstobringaboutand/orcareaboutwhatisvaluable.So,tosaythatsomethingisintrinsicallyvaluablemeanswehavereasontobringaboutand/orcareaboutit,independentlyofanyreasonwemayhavetocareaboutanythingelse.Therearemodelsofpoliticsthatpositintrinsicallyvaluablestatesoftheworld,whichitisthepointofpoliticstorealize.OnPlato’s(1961)view,thepointofpol-iticsistoachieveaharmoniousorderingofsocialclasses,soastoproduceahar-moniousinternalorderingofindividualsouls,inwhichthevirtueofjusticeconsists.Aworldofvirtuoussoulsisanintrinsicallyvaluableworld,andpoliticsisjustifiedforbringingthisworldabout.Contemporary“teleological”egalitariansadoptasimilarmodel,inholdingthattheworldisbetterforcontainingamoreequaldistributionofgoods(Parfit2000).Irejectmodelsofpoliticaljustificationofthissort,becausetheybringjustificationtoanendatthewrongplace.Theproperpointofpoliticsistoservepeople.Theproperformofpoliticaljustification,then,recognizesthatstatesofaffairsaretobepursuedforthesakeofpeople,inrecognitionoftheauthorityofpeopletosettheirownends.Thisentailsthatthestatesofaffairsproperlysoughtinpoliticsdonotfigureinpoliticaljustificationasintrinsicvalues.Theyareonlyextrinsicallyvaluable.Weproperlycareaboutstatesofaffairsinthepoliticalrealm,onlybecausewecareaboutpeople.People,notstatesoftheworld,arewhathasintrinsicvalueinpolitics.Instrumentalistmodelsofpoliticaljustificationneglectthispoint.Thus,evenwhenmylistofthevaluesofdemocracyappearstobeinstrumentalist,itisnot,becausetheoutcomesdemocraticprocessesaresupposedtobringaboutarethem-selvesnotintrinsicallyvaluable,butgoodonlyforthesakeofpeople,whoaretheoriginalsourcesofvalue.Theproperformofpoliticaljustificationstartsfromthepremissthatpeopleareintrinsicallyvaluable,inthesensethattheyareself-originatingsourcesofclaims,andhaveequalauthoritytomakeclaims.Recallmythree-levelaccountofdemo-cracy:asamembershiporganization,aformofcultureorwayoflife,andamodeofgovernance.Eachofthesethreelevelsisfoundedonrecognitionofthevalueofpeopleasequalandself-originatingsourcesofclaims.Asamembershiporganiza-tion,democracyrecognizestheuniversalandequalstandingofallpermanentresid-entswithintheterritorialjurisdictionofthestatetomakeclaimsascitizens.Asacultureorwayoflife,thelocusofwhichiscivilsociety,democracyrealizesthisequalityinhabitsofmutualconsultationandcooperationthatexpressrespectandsympathyforallfellowcitizens.Asamodeofgovernance,institutionsandpracticessuchas“oneperson,onevote,”recognitionofaloyalopposition,afreepress,protestsandpetitions,aimtorealizeequalconsiderationofcitizens’claimsandtherebyDemocracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValue223\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page224establishcitizensasequalsinrelationtoeachother.Hence,myjustificationofdemocracyasgroundedinconsiderationsofrightorjustice,trackstheproperformofpoliticaljustification.IhastentodistancemyselffromaparticularwayofunderstandingpoliticaljustificationthatmightlooksimilartowhatIhaveproposed.Onthatmodel,polit-icaljustificationisanaprioriaffair,amatterofprincipleratherthanpragmatism.Thisfollowsfromthesuppositionthat,inrejectinganinstrumentalistjustificationofdemocracy,onecommitsoneselftoaprioriargumentsthatabstractfromcon-siderationoftheconsequencesofdemocraticpractices.IallymyselfwithJohnDeweyinrejectingthepremissesbehindthismodel.Thereisadeepprincipleofequalmoralstandingunderlyingthejustificationofdemocracy.However,likeallmoralclaims,thisoneisnotderivedfrompureaprioriargument,butrootedinourexperiencesoftheauthorityofotherstomakeclaimsonus,whicharerootedinourexperiencesofrespectforthem.(Thattheseexperiencesareveridical–i.e.,oughttobeheeded–andthattheirpropergroundisnotbasedonarbitrarycharacteristicssuchasancestry,requirescriticalreflectionontheseexperiencesaswellasontheconsequencesofheedingthem.)Furthermore,thesupposedlysharpdistinctionbetweenprincipledandpragmaticjustificationisitselfquestionable.IagreewithDeweyandMillthatpracticalprin-ciplesaresubjecttoempiricaltestingthroughexperimentsinliving.Wetestourprin-ciplesbylivinginaccordancewiththem,andseeingwhetherdoingsosolvestheproblemsweweretryingtosolve,anddeliversotherconsequencesthatwefindaccept-able.Thereisnoapriorideductionofthevalueofperiodicelections,transparentgovernment,afreepress,andsoforth.Iftheseprocessesledtosocialdisorderandmisery,asconservativecriticsofdemocracysupposed,theywouldbebad.Norcanwesimplyexaminetheconceptofequalstandingofcitizenssoastologicallydeducewhatconcretesocialnormsofdemocraticinteractionincivilsocietyactuallyrealizethiselusiveideal.Rather,suchinsightscanonlybewonthroughthehardworkoftestingrivaldemocraticconceptionsinpracticeandseeinghowtheywork.Thisrequiressystematicreformnotjustofexternalinstitutionalrules,asofvoting,butofourhabitsandaffects.Acenturyandahalfafterabolishingslavery,Americansarestillmiredindisdainandantipathyforthedescendentsofslaves,andmanyofusarestillsearchingforasharedwayout.Toinsistontheimportanceofevaluatingpracticalprinciplesinlightoftheircon-sequencesisnottorevertto“merely”instrumentalistjustification.Recall:consequencesarenotgoodinthemselves;theirvaluedependsonthevalueofpeople,forthesakeofwhichweseekthem.Moreover,forpurposesofpoliticaljustification,thattheconsequencesareautonomouslywilledbycitizensasacollectivegoalisnotanaccidentalfeatureofmostgoalsofademocraticstate,butcriticaltolegitimatingtheuseofstatecoerciontobringthemabout.Hence,thejustificationofpoliticalgoalsdoesnotrestoutsideofdemocraticprocesses.Whichgoalsarelegitimatelypursuedbythestateisitselfdeterminedwithindemocraticprocesses,andjustifiedinpartbecausethoseprocessesembodyaformofcollectiveautonomy.Ihavebeenfocusingonalargeobjectofevaluation:democracyasamember-shiporganizationandasawayoflife,includingamodeofgovernance.Ihavearguedthatthejustificationfordemocracy,sounderstood,isnotmerelyinstrumental,butisbasedonaconceptionofpersonsasself-originatingsourcesofclaims,asworthy224ElizabethAnderson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page225ofrespectandsympathy.Justificationtakestheconsequencesofdemocraticorgan-izationandpracticesintoaccount.Butthoseconsequencesarenotintrinsicallyvalu-able.Theyareratherjustifiedintermsofdemocraticprocesses,whichexpresstheautonomyandequalstandingofcitizens.Mostdebatesoverthevalueofdemocracyhavefocusedmorenarrowlyondemo-craticprocessesoractivitiesinanarrowsense:thoseactivitiesofcitizensthatdirectlyimpactgovernance,suchasvoting,participatingintownmeetings,andpetitioningrepresentatives.Perhapstheseareonly“instrumentally”justified,inthesensethattheirvalueislimitedtotheirproductionofindependentlyjustifiedstatesofaffairs?Again,notif“independentlyjustified”meansjustifiedindependentlyofthedemocraticcharacteroftheprocessesthatbringthemabout.Supposewenarrowourtargetofevaluationfurther,bysettingasidecon-siderationsofjusticeandlegitimacy,andjustlookatthegoodorappealingvalueofdemocraticactivities.Shouldwesaythenthattheirgoodnessiswhollydependentonthevalue(appeal)oftheirconsequences?SinceIrejecttheideathatpoliticalpracticescanbejustifiedapartfromconsiderationoftheirconsequences,Idoagreethatthevalueofdemocraticpracticesdoesdependontheirconsequences.Ifdemocraticelectionsregularlyresultedinpoliciescatastrophictotheelectors–andworsethanwhatalternativesystemsofgovernancewoulddeliver–theywouldnotbejustified.Butthisisnotenoughtoshowthattheirgoodnessiswhollyderivativeofthegoodnessoftheirconsequences.Thepropertestofthenoninstrumentalgoodnessofanactivityisnotwhetherwe’dstillprefertodoit,evenifitdidn’tresultindesirableconsequences.Itisratherwhetherwe’dstillprefertoengageinit,evenifthesameconsequencescouldbebroughtaboutbyother(passive)means.Ialludedtothistestintheintroductiontothispaper,whenIdiscussedthevalueofshopping.Evenifacomputerperfectlypredictedallofone’swants,shoppedonone’sbehalf,andarrangedforthegoodstobedeliveredtoone’shomewithoutanyinterventiononone’sownpart,onemaystillprefertoshoponeself.Theactivityitselfisvalued:imaginingoneselfwearingvariousclothesandjewelry,actuallytryingontheprops,isanenjoyableformofadultplay,aswellasanexpressionofautonomyinformingone’spreferences.IfollowMillandDeweyinholdingthatparticipatingindemocraticwaysoflife,includingdemocraticgovernance,satisfiesthesametestofnoninstrumentalappeal-ingvalue.Evenifadictatordeliveredthesameconsequencesasthepeoplewouldwant,weretheytochoosedemocratically,citizenswouldstillprefertoachievethoseconsequencesthroughdemocraticactivities.Whyshouldthisbeso?Recallthatdemocraticactivitiesexpresssympathyforfellowcitizens,exerciseourcollectiveautonomy,andmanifestaformofcollectivelearning.Millarguedthatsympatheticandautonomousactivities,asexpressionsofhigherfaculties,arehigherpleasures:thoseexperiencedwiththemwouldnotgivethemupevenforanyamountoflowerpleasures(thosethatgratifythemotiveswesharewithanimals)(Mill1957:12).Evenifadictatorcouldarrangeouraffairstoourliking,wewouldstillprefertobeautonomous–tomanageourcollectiveaffairsforourselves,accordingtoourowncollectivejudgment.Andevenifadictatorcoulddeliverhappinesstoall,we’dstillprefertodothisourselves,asawayofexpress-ingmutualsympathyandrespectforourfellowcitizens.Democracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValue225\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page226Deweymadethesamecaseforthevalueoflearning.Activityisnotvaluablejustforthestatesoftheworlditachieves.Thevalueoflifeisintheactivelivingofit,notsomegoalexternaltoactivity(Dewey1976a:193–9).Learningisintegraltohumanliving.Wearealwayslearningaboutwhatisgoodbyconfrontingproblems,testingsolutions,seeingwhatworks,incorporatingdiscoveriesaboutwhatworksintoourpractices.Weareconstantlyremakingourpracticesinlightofreflectiononlivinginaccordancewiththem.Thisdoesnotdescribeamerephaseoflife,butthewholeofpracticalintelligenceinaction.Learningisnotjustforthesakeofknowing;thosewhotakethisattitudeareforeverpostponinggratificationinthelearningprocess,untilitis“complete.”Butlearningisnevercomplete,becausecircumstancearealwayschanging,requiringthecontinuousmodificationofourpractices.Todesiretoskipaheadtothe“finalresults”istodesiretoskiphumanlifeitself.Democracyasawayoflifeisthecollectiveexerciseofpracticalintelligenceorlearning,appliedtotheproblemsoflivingtogetherasequals.Itmakesnomoresensetoskipaheadto“theend”thanitdoestoexitthelifeofademocraticcommunityitself.Dewey(1976b)arguedthatthesharpcontrastbetween“instrumental”and“intrinsic”valuation,asappliedtoactivitiesandstatesoftheworld,isfalse.Theyrepresenttransitoryandalternatingmomentsinanongoingprocessofliving,notfixedpointsofjustificationandevaluativedependence.Whatisimmediatelyvaluedatonemomentisreassessedinlightofitsconsequences,whichmayeitherreinforceorunder-minetheoriginalimmediatevaluation.Valuationsoftheconsequencesthemselvesmaychange,onceweunderstandwhatittakestoachievethem.Whatisvaluedasameansatonemomentisvaluedinitselfatanother.Thesamepointappliestothevaluesofademocraticwayoflife,ofwhichparticipationingovernanceisacon-stitutivepart.Onceweseedemocracyasawayoflifeofacommunityofequals,andnotjustasamodeofgovernance,itishardtoconcludeotherwise.Thegoodofawayofcommunitylifeisintheactivelivingofitwithothers,notinsomestateoftheworldexternaltoit.ReferencesAnderson,Elizabeth.1995.“TheDemocraticUniversity:TheRoleofJusticeintheProductionofKnowledge,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy12:186–219.Anderson,Elizabeth.2002.“ConsumerSovereigntyvs.Citizens’Sovereignty:SomeErrorsinNeoclassicalWelfareEconomics,”inHerlindePauer-StuderandHertaNagl-Docekal,eds.,Freiheit,GleichheitundAutonomie(ViennaandMunich:VerlagOldenbourg).Anderson,Elizabeth.2004.“RacialIntegrationasaCompellingInterest,”ConstitutionalCom-mentary21:101–27.Bagehot,Walter.2001[1872].PhysicsandPolitics(Kitchener,ON:BatocheBooks).Brubaker,WilliamRogers.1989.“MembershipWithoutCitizenship”inWilliamRogersBrubaker,ed.,ImmigrationandthePoliticsofCitizenshipinEuropeandNorthAmerica(Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica).Darwall,Stephen.2004.“RespectandtheSecond-PersonStandpoint,”ProceedingsandAddressesoftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation78:43–60.Dewey,John.1927.ThePublicandItsProblems(NewYork:H.HoltandCompany).Dewey,John.1976a.HumanNatureandConduct,inJ.A.Boydston,ed.,TheMiddleWorksofJohnDewey,1899–1924,Vol.14(Carbondale,IL:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress).226ElizabethAnderson\nCDIC12.qxd2/4/0915:49Page227Dewey,John.1976b.“ValuationandExperimentalKnowledge,”inJ.A.Boydston,ed.,TheMiddleWorksofJohnDewey,1899–1924,Vol.13(Carbondale,IL:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress).Dewey,John.1981.“CreativeDemocracy:TheTaskBeforeUs,”inJ.A.Boydston,ed.,TheLaterWorksofJohnDewey,1925–1953,Vol.14(Carbondale,IL:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress).Dewey,John,andJamesTufts.1981.Ethics,rev.edn.,inJ.A.Boydston,ed.,TheLaterWorksofJohnDewey,1925–1953,Vol.7(Carbondale,IL:SouthernIllinoisUniversityPress).Ely,JohnHart.1980.DemocracyandDistrust(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).Estlund,Cynthia.2005.WorkingTogether:HowWorkplaceBondsStrengthenaDiverseDemocracy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Mill,JohnStuart.1862.ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment(NewYork:Harper&Brothers).Mill,JohnStuart.1975.“SubjectionofWomen,”inThreeEssays(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Mill,JohnStuart.1957.Utilitarianism(Indianapolis,IN:Bobbs-Merrill).Parfit,Derek.2000.“EqualityorPriority?”inMatthewClaytonandAndrewWilliams,eds.,TheIdealofEquality(NewYork:St.Martin’sPress).Plato.1961.“Republic,”inTheCollectedDialoguesofPlato,ed.EdithHamiltonandHuntingtonCairnes,trans.PaulShorey(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress).Rawls,John.1980.“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory,”DeweyLectures,JournalofPhilosophy77:515–72.Richardson,Henry.2002.DemocraticAutonomy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Rosenblum,Nancy.1998.MembershipandMorals(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress).Sen,Amartya.1999.“DemocracyasaUniversalValue,”JournalofDemocracy10:3–17.Skocpol,Theda.2003.DiminishedDemocracy(Norman,OK:UniversityofOklahomaPress).Taylor,Charles.1985.“TheDiversityofGoods,”inPhilosophyandtheHumanSciences(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).Walzer,Michael.1983.SpheresofJustice(NewYork:BasicBooks).Democracy:Instrumentalvs.Non-InstrumentalValue227\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page229DEMOCRACYANDITSLIMITSDELIBERATIVEDEMOCRACYContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page231CHAPTERTHIRTEENDeliberativeDemocracyRussellHardinFormorethanacentury,roughlyfromJohnStuartMill(1977[1861])toCarolePateman(1970),democratictheoryaspragmaticallyappliedtolargemodernsocietieswasoftenaboutparticipatorydemocracy.Itwasoftenhortatoryinsayingpeopleshouldpar-ticipate,ataminimumbyvotingintelligently.Morerecentlythatfocushasbeendisplacedbyorredefinedasconcernwithdeliberation.Aswastrueforparticipation,deliberationisnotawell-definedoruniversallyunderstoodterm,becauseitisappar-entlysoattractiveatermthatitcoversamultitudeofconsiderationsandpractices,dependingontheauthorofthemoment.Earlyinthisdevelopmenttherehasbeenadeeplyskepticalvisionofthepracticalimpossibilityordesirabilityofeitherparticipationordeliberationinanymeaningfulorsubstantialsense(Schumpeter1950[1942];Downs1957;Converse12006[1964];Stimson2004).Ifourconcernwithdemocracyispragmaticasopposedtoidealistic,therecanbelittledoubtthattheskepticshavethebetterarguments,notleastbecausetheyactuallyhavedataonvoters’knowledgeandpoliticalbeliefs.2Thedataaremercilessandbrutal.Thetypicalvoterispoliticallyignorantandoftenmisguided.Considertwostrikinganddemoralizingfacts.First,sincepollingbeganinthe1930s,aboutafifthofU.S.voterscallthemselvesconservativesandvoteaccordinglybuttakeliberalstandsonmajorissues(Stimson2004).Ifthesevoterscorrectedtheirownself-assessmentsandvotedforliberalcandidates,theDemocraticPartywouldmas-sivelydominateAmericanpolitics.Second,eventhosewhoparticipateoftendosowithcorruptedknowledgeandunderstandingoftheissuesthatmotivatethem.Hereisoneeasilyassessedexample.Theinternetisacclaimedforitspotentialtoenhancepoliticalparticipation.Therearemorethan12millionblogscurrentlyactive,manyofthemconcerningpoliticalissues.About400,000oftheseaddressenvironmentalissues.Thescientificconsensusonratesofspeciesextinctionsarecurrentlyamaxi-mumbetween74and150speciesgoingextincteveryday.Asurveyofthirtysitesrevealsthattheyclaimfromonetoseveralthousandeveryday(AshlinandLadleContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page2322006).Presumablytheaveragebloggerspendsalotoftimeandeffortonpublishingclaimsovertheweb.Buttheireffortisoftentriviallybad.Theyandtheirreadersarecommonlyeco-illiterateeveninthisinstanceinwhichitisnothardtodiscoverscientificviews.Inboththeseexamples,evenenergeticparticipationmaybegener-allyharmfulbothtotheparticipatorsandtothegeneralpublic.AlexisdeTocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:159–61)holdsthatsmallnationsarethecradleofpoliticallibertyfromtheparticipationofcitizens;growinglargemeansalossinparticipationandhenceoffreedom.And,indeed,thereisnohis-toricalexampleofalargerepublic.Buttherearecompensatingadvantagesoflargescaleintheeconomy,thearts,andinvention,andinareducedthreatofmilitaryconquest.BecauseinthelargeUnitedStates,therearefeweropportunitiestoriseabovethemanytohavepower,theambitionforpowergivesplacetoloveofwell-being,amorevulgarbutlessdangerouspassion.Tocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:57,96)saysthatwhencitizensareallmoreorlessequal,theywillfinditdifficulttodefendtheirfreedomsagainstpower.Theargumentisroughlythatofthelogicofcollectiveaction.Withequalityofbenefitfromseekinglibertyforall,noonehasastrongenoughinterestalonetofightforit.Withgreatasymmetryofwealthandpower,therewillbesomeindividualswhohavesufficientinterestindefendingtheirlibertythattheywilldoso.Againsttheclaimthatsmallsocietiesarethecradleofliberty,however,Tocquevillemayover-estimatethecostsofdefendingone’sliberty.Onemightarguethatlargeliberalnationswithstrongcourtsystemsareespeciallygoodatsecuringindividualliberties,inlargepartbymakingthejusticesystemresponsiveeventothosewithoutgreatfortunes,atleastinsofarasdefendingtheirconstitutionallibertiesisatissue.Nexttovirtue,Tocquevillesays,nothingissobeautifulasrights,whicharetheconceptionofvirtueappliedtopolitics(Tocqueville1966[1835and1840]:237–8).AsaFrenchobserverwritingontheU.S.,thisviewisperhapstooeasy.Thesetwonationshaveledthewayonconstitutionalizingenumeratedrights.ParticipatoryDemocracyItisperhapsheresytosaysuchathing,butitispossiblethatmostcitizenswillbebetteroffiftheirparticipationinpoliticsisverylimited,asinfactitisforthetypicalpersoninalllarge-scalerepresentativedemocracies.Forthevastmajorityofcitizensinapopulousrepresentativedemocracytodomuchmorethanvoteinregularelectionsmightwellhavenegativeconsequencesforthestabilityandcoherenceofgovernment.Asanindividualyoumightinanycasesupposemoreoftenthannotthatyourownsocialidealsoryourinterestswillbebestfurtheredbywell-organizedgroupsandbyactualpoliticiansratherthanbytheparticipationofthemassofpeoplewhohappentoshareyourinterestsandideals.Mostcitizenscannotspendthetimetomastertheissueswellenoughtotakemeaningfulstandsonanybutocca-sionalmajorissues,suchaswhethertogotowarortocontinuewithawar,orwhethertointroducemajorsociallegislationtoaddressafailingeconomyorinequalitiesintheirsociety.Madison(2001[1787]:329)toldhisfellowcitizensthattheyshouldhavenoactiveroleinpoliticsbeyondvotinginelections.Betweenelectionstheyshouldacquiesceinthepoliciesoftheirgovernors.232RussellHardin\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page233ThereasondemocracymightworkwellatallinasocietyaslargeanddiverseasclassicalAthensisthatitmapsthedistributionofknowledge(asinAustrianeconomictheory).Forexample,theknowledgethat“Athens”hadwastheusualdistributedknowledgeofaproductiveandvariedsocietywithmanyfunctionstobefilled(agriculturalandmarketproduction,politicalandmilitaryleadership,etc.).Noonepersonorevensignificantinstitutioncouldoverseeormasterallofthisknow-ledge,eveninthesmallsocietyofAthens.Areasonfordemocracy’ssometimefailure,fromgoingtowarforexample,maybethatitislessgoodthanmonarchyinlookingafterthecollectiveinterestofthewholesociety,whichiscommonly(butnotalways)theinterestofthemonarch(thisisanargumentofThomasHobbes19943[1651]:Ch.19,p.120).Hence,evenifwewishtodefenddemocracy,participatorydemocracy,ordeliberativedemocracy,weshouldmaketheAustriantheoryofknowledgeacenterpieceofourargument.Mill(1977[1861]:399–400)seemstoagreewiththistheorywhenhesaysacentraladministrationcannotknowenoughtogovernwell.Similarly,Tocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:91)assumesaversionofthistheoryinhisclaimthatcentraladministrativepowercannotknowenoughto4doitsjob;itexcelsatpreventing,notdoing.Ashenotes,peoplemayholdafirmbeliefwithoutinvestigatingit.Mostpeopleeitherwillbelievewithoutknowingwhyorwillnotknowwhattobelieve.Fewwillachieveconvictionbornofknowledge,butsuchbeliefmaynotinspiretheardoranddevotionthatdogmaticbeliefsinspire(1966[1835and1840]:187,187n).Asaconsequence,peoplewholacktimeandmeanstostudyissues,canbemisledeasily(198).Asocietyof150orevenseveralhundredpeoplemightbeaface-to-facesociety,inwhichallcanparticipatewithallingovernanceofthesociety(seefurther,Laslett1956).ItisatleasttechnicallypossiblethatAthens,withperhaps6,000citizensinitsheyday,solvedtheproblemofmakingpoliticsworkalmostasthoughitwereinaface-to-facesociety.Butinincreasingthescalefromseveralthousandtoseveralmillionorevenseveralhundredsofmillioncitizens,itisinconceivablethatwecanmakethesocietyworkasthoughitwereface-to-face.Thisisthefundamentalprob-lemoftheapplicationofvirtuallyallidealtheoriestolarge-scalecontemporarydemo-cracies.Hence,democracyin,say,theU.S.doesnothavetheappealsofdemocracyinAthens.Indeed,onanycommonsensedefinitionofit,participatorydemocracymaybeneitherdesirablenorevenpossibleintheU.S.ifitissupposedtogomuchbeyondvotingandmaybeabitoftimespentinstudygroupsorreadingpoliticalblogs.SocialCapitalandParticipatoryDemocracyAlexisdeTocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:243)supposesthatparticipationincludesactivityinassociations,perhapsespeciallythosethathavenopoliticalobject(513).Politicalactivityinassociationsspillsoverintocivilsociety,andthisisagreatadvantageofdemocracy.Butactivityinnon-politicalassociationsspillsoverintopoliticsthroughtheeducationalortrainingeffectofactivitiesinassociations,activitieswhosemasterymaybeusefulinmanifoldways,politicalandprivate.They5createaspecialformofhumancapital.Civilassociationsthereforepavethewayforpoliticalonesandviceversa(521).Theresultisenlightenmentbornofexperi-ence(304),participationinlegislation,notmerelyfromreadingorstudy.AstandardDeliberativeDemocracy233\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page234criticismofatleastU.S.democracyinourtimeisthatcivilsocietyiscrumblingandthereforedemocracyisthreatenedwithdecline(Putnam2000).Wesupposedlypar-ticipatelessinvariousnon-politicalgroupsandthereforealsolessinpolitics.Thisthesisstillisinneedofdemonstration.Atbestitisabroadbutweakcorrelation,notacausallydemonstratedfact.InrecentdecadesintheU.S.,citizenshavemobilizedovercivilrightsandthewarinVietnam,buteveninsuchmajorcrises,thenumberofthosewhoareactiveissmall.Thefeministmovementmayhaveengagedmorepeoplethaneitherofthesemovements,possiblybecausetherewereoftensignificantpersonalbenefitsfromparticipating.Noteapeculiarityofthecivilsocietythesis.Welivelocally.Tocqueville’sobservationsofciviclifeintheU.S.arealmostallalsolocal.Hesaysitishardtogetpeopletobeinterestedingeneralpolitics,easiertointeresttheminlocalissuesthatdirectlyaffecttheirownproperty(Tocqueville1966[1835and1840]:511).Itisnotclearthatwhatherecountsisrelevanttonationalpoliticstodayunless,perhaps,itaffectselectionstonationallegislativebodies.Localpoliticsisindeclineinmanyplaceswhereprofessionalmanagersrunmanypublicprojects.Ourmoregrievousproblem,however,isthatnationalpoliticsseemstobeindecline.Thisproblemseemstobeamatterofthelogicandinstitutionalizationofpoliticalpowermorethanamatterofthepopularstancetowardgovernment.Politicianshavebecomeaclassapart.Ifparticipationinlocalassociationsaffectsnationalpolitics,weneedanaccountofhowthatworks.HereisTocqueville’s(1966[1835and1840]:520)limitedaccount.Hesaysthatthemorewejoininassociations,themorewedevelopacapacitytopursuegreataimsincommon.Thisseemstoimplythatwedevelopbothhumanandsocialcap-ital.Suchcapitalmightbeofuseandevenofgreatvalueinvariedcontexts.Withsometrainingthroughyourmembershipinassociations,youmayfinditeasytoaffecthowyouorfamilymembersaretreatedbygovernmentagencies,suchasschools.Youmightalsolocallydevelopthecapacitytoaffectpoliticsathigherlevels,althoughthereseemstoberelativelylittleactivityofcitizenstakingpartinnationalpolitics.IdealTheoryAnyonewhoreadscontemporarytheoriesofdemocracymustoftenbeledtowonderwheretheworldofdemocraticpracticefitsinthetheory.InhisConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment,JohnStuartMill(1977[1861])spendshislastfewchapterstrollingthroughproblemsofhowtomakedemocraticgovernmentworkonthegroundinvariouscontexts.Hegetslostandloseshisreadersinamorassofminutepoints,butonecanatleastsayhestaysrelevanttoourexperiencebecauseitisactualexperiencethatdriveshisconcern.BernardManin(1997)fitsdemocraticpracticeoverthemillenniatothetheoriesitmightgroundorreflect.Herelateschangingconceptionsofdemocracytochangingsocialconditions,especiallytotheincreasingscaleofthesocietiestobegoverned.Muchofcontemporarydemocratictheory,however,isarguedatthelevelofalmostabstracttheory,asadefinitionalistoridealexercise.Sometheoristsmightbecom-mittedtoidealtheoryindependentlyofitsrelevancetoactualpractice.Forexample,onemightholdthatthepracticeinsomenationshouldnotbeaguidetousin234RussellHardin\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page235creatingdemocraticinstitutionselsewhere.Thiscomplaintmightgenerallybeapt.Butthepracticeinmanynationsthathavestruggledtocreatedemocraticinstitu-tionsmightsuggestreallimitsonwhatcanbedone–orrealpossibilitiesforwhatwemightdo.Hence,actualconditionssetthecontextfordemocratictheory.Theonlytheorythatcanbecompellingforusmustbepragmatic,notideal.DavidEstlund(2007)holdsthatthereisnoneedtoshoworarguethepracticalimportanceofthetheory.Notevenforitspossibility?CanourtheoryrequirethateverychildinLakeWoebegonbeaboveaverage?Notethathostilitytoademocraticpoliticalphilosophythatisutopiandoesnotturnonsuchfactsasthatvotersarewoefullyignorant(seefurther,Estlund2007:Ch.1).Thedeepproblemwithvoterignoranceisthatitisentirelyrationalandmoral(Hardin2006a).Itwouldbewrongformostvoterstoinvestsubstantiallyinmas-teringpoliticsandpublicpolicy.Mostvotersshouldnotwastethetimetobecomefarmoreknowledgeableunlesstheyhavereasonsotherthantheirowneffectasvotersontheoutcomes.Fearofnormativestandardsthatjusthappenunlikelyevertobemetisnottheissuehere.Theissueisalsonotwhetheradequateknowledgecouldbehad,butwhetheritshouldbe.Therearefarmorevaluablethings,includingmorallypraiseworthythings,mostpeoplecandowiththeirtimethanmasterknow-ledgeofpoliticsandpoliticalpossibilities.OnemightreadSchumpeter’s(1950[1942]:262)accountofvoterignoranceascriticalorevenaccusatory.Butitcanbebetterreadasjustificatory.Heisexplainingfromthevoters’owninterestswhytheyknowsolittleaboutpolitics.Andhisexplanationjustifiestheirignorance.Incidentally,thisrejectionofidealtheoryappliesaswelltomoralastopolitical6theory.Forexample,themoralrulesdeducedfromKant’sKingdomofEnds(fullyrationalbeings)areirrelevantforusandourworldbecausethereisgoodreasontosupposethattheyshouldnotapplyintherealworldoffarlessmorallycommittedorrationalbeings.Indeed,toapplysomeofthemintherealworldwouldbeheinousandimmoral,andyetKantiantheoryiscommonlysupposedtorequirethatwefollowtheserules.Autilitarianismthatassumesthatutilityisinterpersonallycomparableoververyfinedistinctionsinutility,ascriticsofutilitarianismoftenassume,issimilarlyirrelevanttoourlivesandislittlemorethanagamethatsomephilosophersplay.DeliberativeDemocracyMuchoftheliteratureondeliberativedemocracyisabouthowitshouldwork.7Toolittleisabouthowitisactuallyusedinrealsocieties.Deliberativedemocracymightbepossibleifdefinedincertainways,butthenitisunlikelytobeofanyrealinterest.Forexample,atapublicmeetingontheseissues,whenIsaidthereisverylittlerealdeliberationinAmericanpolitics,Iwasrebukedwiththeclaimthatthereisdeliberationeverywhere,forexampleintheU.S.Congress.InotedthattherehadbeenlittledeliberationinCongressinrecentyearsorevendecades,thatspeechesintheCongressaremoreaboutre-electionthanaboutdesigninggoodpolicies,andmyrespondentretortedthatthereisdeliberationamongthe(un-elected)staffmembers8ofcongressionalcommittees.Amajorargumentfordeliberationisthatithelpsusdiscovertruths.Forexample,Manin(1997:185)somewhatvaguelysaysthatdebatediscoverstruth;hencetheDeliberativeDemocracy235\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page236bestwaytomakelawsisthroughabodythatcandebate,suchasalegislatureoraparliament.Thisisvaguebecauseitdoesnotspecifythekindoftruththatthelegislativebodycandiscover.Therearethreedistinctivelydifferentissuesforthetruthsthatmightbesoughtinpolitics.First,deliberationcannotleadustofindanytruthsthatdonotexist,suchasthenormative“truth”ofwhatisthebestwaytoliveortoorganizegovernment.Valuesandendsarenotdecidable.Reasonwillnotdeterminethem.Theymayfinallybeagreeable,andasubstantialmajoritymayadoptorsupportthesamevaluesorends.Butthisisacontingent,notanecessary,fact.Theonlydiscoveryatissuehereisnotthatofintellectualdebatebutthatofapollofeveryonetofindoutwhattheirdiverseinterestsmightbe.Second,deliberationcanleadustoabettergraspofbettermeanstoachieveagoalbydiscoveringcausalfacts.Butdeliberationovermeansisapttobeespeciallyproductiveofgoodinsightsifthedeliberatorsareexpertsofrelevantkinds.Theaver-agerunofthepopulationcannotcompetewithexpertiseonsuchmatters,norforthatmattercanelectedofficials.Thebroadpopulationisactuallyaskedtoperformthetaskofdiscoveringtruthinoneveryimportantrealm:trialbyjury.Thehistoryoftheriseoftrialbyjuryundercutssomeofthenormativeacclaimforit.Inthedaysofcircuit-ridingjudgesinancientEngland,thejudgeshadnoresourcesforestab-lishingthetruthofanyaccusation,sotheyturnedtothepeersoftheaccusedtoaskthemwhethertheaccusedwaslikelytohavecommittedthecrimeatissue(Green1985).Pitythepoorpersoninavillagewhowaswidelydisliked,anoffensethatmustoftenhavebecomecapital.Third,deliberationcanhelpusdiscovertheseriousnessofourdisagreementsoverends.Initsearlyhistory,parliamentarygovernmentwassupposedtoyieldvirtuallyunanimousagreementoverpoliciesbecausetherewassupposedtobesuchagree-ment,andindeedvoteswerevirtuallyunanimous(Kishlanski1977).Homogeneity9arguablymadedirectdemocracypossibleinancientrepublics(Manin1997:186)butthegrowthofstateseventuallyfracturedhomogeneity.Andthehopeforunanim-ityinmodernlegislaturesorpolitiesislongdead.Whenstudentstodayaretoldthattherewasatimewhenparliamentarybodiesvotedwithnearunanimityonmajorissuestheyareincredulous.AbeststateofaffairsPerhapsthebiggestsingledisagreementbetweencontemporaryrationalchoicetheoristsandAristotle(andotherGreeks)isAristotle’sinsufficientlyarguedassump-tionthatthereisabestformforsociety.JamesBuchananandmanyothersarewitheringintheirscornforsuchaview(seeespeciallyBrennanandBuchanan1985).Perhapsthemainresultofanyeffortatparticipatorydemocracywillbetore-discoverthelackofcoherenceofpopularviewsandinterestsandthereforethelackofabeststateofaffairstowhichwecanaspirepolitically.JosephSchumpeter(1950[1942])saysthereisnopublicinterestinthesenseofaninterestthatoverridesindividualinterests.Hedoesnotruleoutthepossibilitythatwemightallagreeonsomeinterestorpolicy,butinthatcasethepublicinterestismerelyanaggregationoftheindividualinterests.BrianBarry’sexampleofapublicinterestisthatAmericanswoulduniversallyagreethatturningthebombersoftheStrategicAirCommandagainstAmericancitieswouldbebad.Aneasyposi-236RussellHardin\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page237tivegoodisthedrivingconvention,andthevarietyofconventions–abouttwodozen–mentionedbyHume(2000[1739–40]:Book3).BrennanandBuchanandistinguishthedifferencebetweentruth-seekingandvalue-seeking.Onlyinchoosingmeanstoaccomplishapoliticalgoalistruth-seekingatissueforthem.Fordecidingonthegoal,truth-seekingisnotatissue.Somedeliberativedemocratsseemtosupposethattheconclusionsofdeliberationconstitutethetruthaboutrightnessorjustice.Thismightbeanoddmovefromfactstovalues.Thismoveisphilosophicallylegitimateonlyifwemakeagreementthecriterionoftheright,assometheoristsofdelibera-tivedemocracydo(seefurther,Christiano2004,p.267).Politicaldebateisaboutbothtruthandvaluesorends.Itisaboutthebestmeans(commonlyasocialscientificormilitaryissue,andthereforeanissueofthefactsofthematter)andaboutends,althoughitwouldbewrongtospeakofthebestends(unlessoneisnotyetintheworldofmodernpoliticalandmoralphilo-sophy).IncharacterizingHannahArendt’sviews,DavidEstlund(2007:21)says,“truthisnotanappropriatecategory,sincepoliticsmustnotbeginwithconclusions.”Becausefactsoftenmatterinnormativepoliticaldebate,debateoverthetruthofoneoranotherfactisnotamatterofbeginningwithconclusions,nordoesitevenguar-anteereachingconclusions,atleastnotconclusionsthatmostorallwouldaccept(socialscienceisoftenveryhard).Arendthereseemssimplynottonotethecleardis-tinctionbetweentruth(causalclaims)aboutmeansandtruth(valueclaims)aboutends.ThePlatonicandAristotelianassumption(notalwaysconsistentlyheld)thatthereisabestwaytoorganizeasocietyseemsabsurdinourworld.AbestwaytoorganizeasocietyofradicalMuslimsandliberalsecularists?Utterlyhopeless.ButAustrianandothereconomicknowledgeargumentscontinuetoworkforeconomicproductivityeveninoursocieties.Economicproductionisrelativelydistributedandmuchofitislocal.MeansandexpertiseKnowledgehasseveraldistinctrolesingovernance.Sometimesweneedtohaveexpertknowledge.Sometimesknowledgeisveryimportantforselectingapointofcoordination.Sometimesknowledgeislocalinsomecompellingsense.Austrianeconomicandsocialtheoryisgroundedinthevalueorusefulnessoflocalknow-ledgethatcannotbeaggregated.Tosomeextent,democraticparticipationdrawsonoratleastinprincipletakesaccountofsuchknowledge.Coordinationknowledgeveryisimportantinmakingpolicies,especiallyifthepoliciesaresupposedlybeneficialtothewholegrouporsociety.Althoughputtinglocalorcoordinationknowledgetoworkmightbedifficultattimes,theuseofexpertisemaybethemostfraughtissueindemocraticpractice.Arelegislatorseventuallyexpertsaswellasrepresentativesofparticularcommunities?Ifwedefertoexperts,asweregularlydoinmedicalcare,civilengineering,andmanyotherspecializedundertakings,thenwedefactomakethemauthoritativeoversomeissue.Amovefromexpertisetoauthorityisamovefromtruthtovaluesandisclearlyillegitimatephilosophically,withperhapsamajorexception.Democratictheoryprobablyrequiresalegalsystemwithcourts.Democraticallyelectedofficeholders,asdiscussedfurtherbelow,aredefactoaprofessionalclass.TheirtrainingisnotviaeducationalinstitutionsbutviatrialbyDeliberativeDemocracy237\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page238fire.Theyhavespecializedskillsthatcanbeusedtobenefitcitizensbutthatcanalsobeusedforself-aggrandizement.WithouttheoccasionalDanRostenkowski,wecannotexpecttaxorothercomplicatedlegislationtobewellcraftedortobemadeappealingtoenoughlegislatorstogetitpassed.ButwhenaRostenkowskiisenorm-ouslysophisticatedathandlingsuchissues,hemayturnhismindtobenefitinghimselfthroughcorruptactions.Yet,whileinofficeandbeforeexposure,heisanauthoritativefigure,becausewhathesaysontaxpolicyhasagreatchanceofbecomingthepolicy.Andcitizenswouldthinkitright,moreorless,forhimtohavesuchauthorityasdevolveduponhimovertheyearsthroughstandardcongressionalpracticesofselectingaleadership.Hisexpertisebringshimauthority.ConflictinginterestsTothisday,commentatorsstillrefertothepublicgoodasthoughtherewerea10relativelyfar-reachingconsensusonmanypoliticalissues.Infact,however,eventospeakofpoliticalissuesisusuallytoevokeasenseofconflict.Forexample,increaseinnationalincomeisgenerallythoughttobeagood.Butthatdependsonhowtheincreasehappens.Ifpovertyincreaseswhileoverallwealthincreases,manywould11thinkthechangenotagood.Foranotherexample,almosteveryonefavorswelfareprogramstosomedegreetopreventgrimpoverty,especiallyforchildren.ButEuropeansincreasinglyworrythatgenerouswelfareprogramsareamajorfactorintheseparatistisolationandgrowinghostilityofimmigrantgroupswho,withwelfaresupports,avoidintegrationintothenationaleconomy,polity,andsociety(Buruma2006).Forvirtuallyeveryconceivableobjectofgeneralimprovement,onecanima-ginetradeoffsthatwouldmakeitnotaunanimouslyapprovedchange.Thereisalmostinprinciplenochanceofconsensusonmajorsocialissues.Forpoliticaldeliberatorswhoareopentodiscovery,comingtorecognizethedepthofrealdisagreementsandconflictsofinterestisamajorresultofdeliberation,perhapsthemajorresult.ThisseemstobethepointofManin’s(1997:186–7)claimthatitisthecollectiveanddiversecharacteroftherepresentativeorgan,andnotbeliefinanysupposedvirtuesofdebate,thatexplainstheroleofdiscussioninalegislature.Ashesays,theveryideaofrepresentativegovernmentisvirtuallyalwayslinkedwiththeideaofdiversity,meaningdifferenceofviewsandhencelikelyconflict.Thefoundersofrepresentativedemocracydidnotconfuseparliamentwithalearnedsociety(190).Fortheoristsofdeliberativedemocracy,thefactthatthereislegisla-tivedebateisthoughttojustifylegislativeresults.Itapparentlydoesnotmatterthattodaythestaffsofun-electedbureaucratsdraftmostlawsofanysignificance(191).Orthatadisconcertingfractionofmajorpiecesoflegislationarecraftedfortheirvalueinenablingthere-electionoflegislators(see,e.g.,DahlbergandJohansson2002).AudienceDemocracyBernardManin(1997)arguesthatrepresentativedemocracyhasbeentransformedinto“audiencedemocracy”inrecenttimes.Themainphenomenonisthatsocioeconomicstatusnolongerdeterminesvotingpatterns(218).Voterschooseaperson,notaplat-formorparty.Andtheycampaignbytelevision.Wethereforeseenotachangein238RussellHardin\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page239representativedemocracybutachangeinthenatureofthosewhoareelected.Theyaremediaexperts,asremarkablyanalyzedbythegreatplaywrightArthurMiller(2001).Westillmeettheminimumvisionofdemocracythat,attheveryleast,wecanturnincumbentsoutofoffice–althoughthisclaimisseverelyundercutbydeliberategerrymanderingoflegislativeelectoraldistrictstoprotectincumbentsofbothmajorU.S.parties.(Thischangecontributestotheriseofcorporatistdemocracy,asdis-cussedbelow.)Theendresultsofthesedevelopmentsarethatpoliticianshavetheinitiativeinsettingthetermsofdebateandthattheelectorateisreducedtobeinganaudience.Candidatesaretheperformerswhomtheywatch(Manin1997:222–3).Thischangeresultsinpartfromachangeofissues:left-righteconomicpolicyisnolongerabigdividerbecausetheviewthattheeconomyshouldmostlyrunitselfhasbecomewidelyacceptedbymembersofbothmainpartiesintheU.S.andoftenofthemultiplepartiesinEurope,sothattheissuespaceofrelevancetovotersisincreasinglyfracturedand12largelyincoherent(seefurther,Hardin2006b,Chapter8).Similarly,asC.E.Lindblom(1977)persuasivelyargues,businessdoessomuchofwhatgovernmentneedsthatitisperversetothinkofitasamereinterestgroup,onaparwithdoctors,farmers,environmentalists,orlawyers.Itisapartner,indeedamorethanequalpartnerinmanyrespects.Onmanyfundamentallyimportantissues,itisevenapartnertolaboranditsunionsbecauseitssuccessorfailuremeanssuc-cessorfailureforworkers,asworkersindyingorshrinkingindustrieslearnalltoopainfully.Unionandcorporationleadersjointogetherinlobbyinggovernmentonmanyissuesofjointconcern.Whilethatrelationshipwasatitsheight,however,corporationsusedtheirpowertoslowlydestroyunionsandeventuallyeventodestroyworkers’jobs.Nevertheless,mostofusareeconomicallydependentonlargecor-porationsandwedonotgenerallyopposethempolitically.TheeconomydominatedbylargecorporationsisoneofthethingsTocquevillethinksaredonewelloutsidethecontrolorsponsorshipofgovernment.Unfortunatelythesechangeselevatetheproblemofthecostofinformationforknowinghowtovoteone’sinterests,becausepartiesnolongersymbolizeorstandforspecificinterests(Manin1997:228)andbusinessinterestsdonotevendefineaparty.Partydemocracyinanearliereramadeitpossibletovoteprospectivelybecausepartiescouldbeidentifiedwithimportantinterests.Thatismuchharderintheageofaudiencedemocracy,whenelectedoffice-holdersareinaperformanceroleasindividualsratherthanasrepresentativesofaparty,andwhengovernmentofficialsarevirtuallyaclassapartsothattheyhavemoreinterestsincommonwitheachotherthanwithgroupsintheirconstituencies.Theresultofallofthesechangesistoheightentheproblemthatvotershaveinlearningenoughtovoteintheirinter-ests.Thesedevelopmentsundercutthepossibilitiesofmeaningfulparticipationanddeliberation.Theriseoftheoriesofdeliberativedemocracythereforecomeswhentheirapplicabilityhasdiminishedtoalmostnothing.Theircoreideaistoolateforus.CorporateDemocracyTocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:242–3),echoingAdamSmith,remarksonthebustleandactivityofafreecountry.Despiteallofthebustle,thereseemstobeDeliberativeDemocracy239\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page240decliningparticipationordecliningpayoffsforparticipationinpoliticsandpublic-spiritedactivitiesingeneraldespitetheprevalenceofmajorissuesfordemocraticdecision.In,forexample,Swedenoverthepastseveraldecadessuchmajorissueshaveincludedwhethertomaintainthewelfarestatesubstantially,tobeopentosubstantialmigration,tocontinuetorelyonnuclearenergy,andtomovefullyintotheEuropeanUnion.IntheUnitedStatesduringthesameperiod,warsloomdistressinglyverylarge.Butpoliciesonracialdivision,taxation,andwelfarehavealsohadmajoreffectsonthesociety.Manyofthechangesintheseareashavecomemorefrompoliticalleadersthanfrompopularpolitics,althoughsubstantialprotestsprobablyplayedrealrolesindesegregationandthewithdrawalfromVietnam.Manymajorpoliciesadoptedduringthosedecadeswerenotsubjecttoextensivepopulardemocraticparticipationbutweredeterminedbyadministrationselectedfor13otherreasons.Thepolicieswerethenundemocraticallyimposedfromabove.ThechangeintheSwedishdrivingconventionfromdrivingonthelefttodrivingontherightinSeptember1967wasautocraticallycarriedoutbythenationalgovernmentafterthechangewasoverwhelminglyrejectedinanadvisory,non-binding195514referendumbyavoteof82.9percentto15.5percent.TheadministrationofGeorgeW.Bushhasintroducedsomeofthemostfar-reachingpolicychangesofthepostwarera,andyetfewofthosechangeshavebeensupportedbypopularmandates.Evenifonesupposesthatextensivedemocraticparticipationisgoodorislikelytohavegoodresults,onemustgrantthatitcommonlyhasonlyverylimitedeffectivenessindeterminingpolicy.Thestoryofthesechangesisnotoneofpopularuseofsocialcapitalnorisitplausiblethatsuchcapitalcouldhavesubstantiallyaffectedtheadoptionsoftherelevantpolicies.Popularparticipationinelectionsandthesocialcapitalthathelpedtomobilizevotersaroundtherelevantissuespresumablydidplaysubstantialrolesinthenatureofthepartiesthatranthesetwonationsduringthe1930s.Butitwouldbestretchingtosaythatsocialcapitalhadanyarticulateeffectonthenatureofthepoliciesthatwereadoptedthen.IntheU.S.,forexample,FranklinRooseveltwasempoweredbasicallytodowhathecouldtobringprosperityback,andintheearly1940shewasempoweredtorunthewarashesawfit.Extensiveapplicationofsocialcapitaltoinfluencethemajorpoliciesofthesetwoperiodswouldnothavebeenbeneficialforanybutperhapsveryspecialinterests.In1937,fiveyearsintoRoosevelt’sadministration,theeconomyreacheditslowestpoint,andyethewasre-electedhandilyin1940.Thisassessmentoftheeffectsofextensivepoliticalparticipationsuggeststhatsuchparticipationmightnotmerelybeunlikelybutalsobedestructive.Itwouldbecostlyattheleveloftheindividualcitizeninthefollowingsense.Atypicalcitizeninaverylargerepresentativedemocracycanhaveonlyvanishinglysmalleffectonpolit-icaloutcomes(Downs1957;Schumpeter1950[1942]).Ifthisistrue,thentypicalcitizenshavelittleincentivetovote.Butifthisistrue,thenitcannotbeworthverymuchtothesecitizenstoinvestinlearningenoughaboutpoliciestovoteintelli-gentlyintheirowninterestsoraccordingtotheirownideals(Hardin2002).Indeed,onecanreasonablysaythatitisgoodthatmanypeopleinvesttheirtimeinother,morerewardingactivitiesratherthaninmasteringpublicpolicyissues.Hortatoryclaimsthatcitizensshouldparticipatefullyinpoliticsarehencewrongontwocounts.Suchparticipationwouldcommonlybedisruptivewithoutoffsettingbenefitandit240RussellHardin\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page241wouldtakecitizensawayfromdoingmorevaluablethingsforwhichtheyhavegreatercompetence(seeDowns1957:260ff.,onrationalabstention).Unfortunately,thesetrendsaugurillfordemocracyasrepresentative.Instead,weincreasinglyhavewhatcanbecalledcorporatedemocracy,withthegovernmentsep-aratingitselfeverfurtherfromthepeopleandmakingthegovernorstheofficersofourcorporation.Theseofficersmakepolicymoreorlessindependentlyofpopularwillbecausemuchofthetimethereisnoeasilyspecifiedpopularwill.Onsomeissueslargepartsofthepopulacecanbemobilizedtotakepartattheleastthroughelectingofficialswhoseviewstheythinkareinlinewiththeirown.Forexample,so-calledmoralissuesofabortionandgaymarriageandissuessuchasimmigrationthatmightentailsomeconflictofinterestcanprovokevoterstoact.AsJohnC.Calhoun(1992[1853])argues,themembersofthegovernmentbecomeaseparateclassbyvirtueofholdingtheiroffices.Theyevenshareaninterestindefendingallmembersofthisclassagainstthelargersocietydespitethefactthattheyaredividedintosupposedlyconflictingparties.IntheU.S.,forexample,theycolludeingerrymanderingtheirelectoraldistrictstosecuretheirre-electionatanastonishinghighrate.AnthonyDowns(1957:112)contends“thatthedesiretoobtainandkeeppowerperseplaysalargerroleinthepracticaloperationofdemocraticpoliticsthanthedesiretoimplementideologicaldoctrinesorserveparticularsocialgroups.”Itwouldbewrongtoarguethatweshouldconstructgovernmenttobecorporateinthissense.Butitisalsowrongtoignorethepowerfulforcesthatpushustowardsuchaformof“democratic”government.ThesecondPresidentBushopenlydeclaredthathewouldrunthegovernmentasacommitteeoflike-mindedbulldogswhowouldpushtheirownprogram.HeassertedtoCongressthathewouldsignhundredsofpiecesoflegislationbutwouldregularlyappendacommentary–asigningstatement–sayingtowhatextenthewouldorwouldnotactuallybeboundbythem.Butthedriftintocorporatedemocracyislargelyunintended.Wethecitizenswhoarenotmembersofthegoverningclassenjoythefruitsofprivatelife.Inthatlife,asTocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:244–5)insists,itisnotthethingsdonebypublicadministrationthataregreatinademocracybutthosethingsdonewithout15itshelpandbeyonditssphere.Democracymaybringnogreatcreationsbutitwillhelptobringgreatprosperityandwell-being,whichmaydistractusfromgovern-mentaswefocusonourindividualandfamilialprosperity.NormativeClaimsforDemocracyTocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:235)saysthatinaristocracymendoevilwith-outintent;indemocraciestheybringaboutgoodwithoutintent.Oddly,beginningwiththeriseofcorporatedemocracyinrecentdecades,thepoliticallyquietmassofcitizenshavehelpedtobringaboutwhattheywouldthinkbadwithoutintendingto.Theyhavehelpedtheirgovernmenttohiveitselfofffromthelargersociety.Possiblynoteventhepoliticianswhoareclassbeneficiariesofthisdevelopmentrecognizeitandtheymighteveninsistoncallingthemselvesservantsofthepeople.Someservice.Manin(1997:189)saysthatwhatturnsapropositionintoapublicdecisionisnotdiscussionbutconsent.ButforcitizensconsenthascometohaveevenlessforcefulDeliberativeDemocracy241\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page242meaningthanwhatMadisoninsistedistheroleofthecitizenapartfromvotinginelections:acquiescence.Inhistime,manymayhaveknownthattheymerelyacqui-esced.Afterall,inexplainingtheworkingsoftheproposednewconstitution,draftedin1787,Madisonforcefullytoldthemthatwasallthatwaswantedfromthem.Manypeopleinourtimeareinsultedbytheclaimthattheymerelyacquiesce.Consentdoesnotmakeapoliticalactionordecisiongoodorright(Hardin1990).Moreover,although“consentseemsanappropriatebasisforlegitimateauthorityinmorallypermissibleorevenadmirableassociations,itisnotthebasisofpoliticalauthority”(Christiano2004:283).Typically,youandIareboundbydemocraticdecisions.Thisisnotanormativebutonlyapositiveclaim.Acompetentdemocraticstatecangenerallyenforceitsdecisions.Unfortunately,thismeansthatacorrupteddemocracycandosoaswell,ascanacompetentautocracy.Theimplicationofaudienceandcorporatedemocra-ciesisthattheycanbroadlyfailtoachievenormativelycompellingoutcomes.Hencewecannotmakeastraightnormativeclaimindefenseofsuchdemocracy.Tocquevillesupposes,withSmith,thatourself-seekingwillbenefitthelargersocietywithoutourintendingtoservethegoodofthesociety.InSmith,myprofit-seekingwillprovidedesiredgoodstoothers.“Thenaturaleffortofeveryindividualtobetterhisowncondition,whensufferedtoexertitselfwithfreedomandsecurity,issopowerfulaprinciple,thatitisalone,andwithoutanyassistance,notonlycapableofcarryingonthesocietytowealthandprosperity,butofsurmountingahundredimpertinentobstructionswithwhichthefollyofhumanlawstoooftenencumbersitsoperations;thoughtheeffectoftheseobstructionsisalwaysmoreorlesseithertoencroachuponfreedom,ortodiminishitssecurity”(Smith1976[1776]Book4,Ch.5,p.540).Therefore,itistheinterestofeachtoworkforthegoodofall(Tocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:525;thisisalsotheviewofDowns1957:28–9).Becauseheisimplicitlyawelfarist,Tocquevilleconcludesthatthedoctrineofselfinterestproperlyunderstoodisthebestmoraltheoryforourtime(1966[1835and1840]:527).This,however,ispresumablynotasupportfordemocracy,because,again,hesupposesthatwhatistrulygreatinademocraticsocietyiswhatthecitizensthemselvesachieveindependentlyofwhatgovernmentdoes.Downs(1957:19)assertsthatthereisonlyonenormativeelementindemocracy.Thatistheprinciple:oneperson,onevote.Intruth,ofcourse,democracieshaveoftenviolatedthisprinciple,sometimesbygivingsomeindividualsmorethanonevoteandsometimesbydeprivingmanycitizensofanyvoteatall.Mill(1977[1861]:473–9)favoredgivingmorethanonevotetotheeducatedelite;hereferstouni-versalbutunequalsuffrage,andeventhenonlyofthosewhoareliterate.Manydemocratsarguethatthegreatmeritofdemocracyisitscapacitytothrowtheras-calsout.Buteventhatcapacityhasbeengrievouslyweakenedinmanycases.Electedtyrantswinlargemajoritiestoamendtheirconstitutionstoallowthemtocontinue“serving”indefinitelydespiteconstitutionallyprescribedtermlimits.Americanleg-islatorshavegerrymanderedthemselvesintoextremelysecurevotingdistricts.Inthesupposedlydecisiveelectionof2006,theU.S.HouseofRepresentativessawlessthanoneincumbentintwentylosetheirseats.Wecanturnthemoutprimarilywhentheyattempttomoveontohigheroffice.Withtheircontrolofpartylists,Europeanpartiescommonlyguaranteetheselectionofpartyleadersforenduringincumbencyevenwhenthoseleadershavedoneverybadlyinoffice.242RussellHardin\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page243ConcludingRemarksDemocracyinanytraditionallystrongsensedoesnotandverylikelycannotworkinourcontext.Mill(1977[1861]:467)supposesthatfullyrepresentativedemocracy16istheonlytruedemocracyinacomplexsociety.Almosteveryoneseemstoagree.ButMill’sdefensesofthisviewarenotconvincing.Hesaysthatonlythroughpar-ticipationcanoneensureone’sownrights(404).Onemightwonderhowthisistowork.Forexample,evenwheretheyhadthevote,blackAmericansinthe1950swerehardlyabletosecuretheirownrights.Millalsosweepinglysaysthatthebestgovernmentisparticipatory.Madison(2001[1787]:329)forcefullydisagreesifparticipationissupposedtogoveryfarbeyondvoting.InFederalist63hesaysthatthenewlydraftedU.S.constitutionmarkedlydifferedfromclassicaldemocraciesinthatitprovidedfor“thetotalexclusionofthepeopleintheircollectivecapacityfromanyshare”intheproceedingsofgovernment.AndMillsaysthatparticipationinallthingsisuseful.Formillionsofpeopleattemptsatparticipationmustcommonlyhaveproducedfrustrationandevenharm,notbenefits.AllofMill’sclaimsadduptocom-mendrepresentativegovernment(412).Strangely,however,heconcludesthatamongtheforemostbenefitsofparticipationiseducation(467–8).Thegreateducationallessonmanypeoplelearnisthattheirparticipationdoesnotcountinanysignificantpoliticalresult.Abitofnumericallogicwouldbeenoughtoteachthislesson,althoughthatparticularbitofnumericallogicseemsverydifficulttomaster.Ofcourse,par-ticipatorygovernmentinasmallstateneednotberepresentative,soMillhereisaddressinghiskindofsociety,ofmanymillionsofcitizens.Theclaimthatdemocracyisgoodforthereasonthatitenhancespersonalauto-nomyorcharacterindependentlyofitseffectsonthepublicbusinessisattributedtoMill.ButtheargumentthatdemocracyisgoodbecauseitcontributestoourpersonaldevelopmentisoddeveninMill’s(1977[1861]:400)owndiscussionofit.Hedis-qualifiestheclaiminhisaccountoftheneedforcausalefficacyifouractionsaretohavemeaning:Apersonmusthaveaveryunusualtasteforintellectualexerciseinandforitself,whowillputhimselftothetroubleofthoughtwhenitistohavenooutwardeffect,orqual-ifyhimselfforfunctionswhichhehasnochanceofbeingallowedtoexercise.Theonlysufficientincitementtomentalexertion,inanybutafewmindsinageneration,istheprospectofsomepracticalusetobemadeofitsresults.Thetestofrealandvigorousthinking,thethinkingwhichascertainstruthsinsteadofdreamingdreams,issuccessfulapplicationtopractice(Mill1977[1861]:Ch.3,paras.2and17).Withtheseclaims,MillgivesfullforcetotheSchumpeter–Downsargumentthatmostcitizensdonotevenhaveadequatereasontoknowenoughtovoteintelligently,becauseherecognizesthat“allcannot,inacommunityexceedingasinglesmalltown,participatepersonallyinanybutsomeveryminorportionsofthepublicbusiness,”sothattheyhaveinsufficientincitementtomentalexertionoverpolitics(Ch.3,finalpara.;seealsoPateman1970:28–35).Furthermore,suchademocracyhaswithinitthetendencytowardcorporatedemocracyandtheendofextensiverepresentation.Itneednotleadtodisastertohavesomedegreeofdemocracy,asanattempttointroduceitinBurundididandDeliberativeDemocracy243\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page244asanotherattemptperhapswillinIraqifeveritisputintoplacethere.Butweshouldbegladifthesumofallprivateundertakingsfarsurpassesanythingthegovernmentmighthavedone,asTocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:95)supposednearlytwocenturiesagointhefreshbloomofademocraticsocietyheadywithexpectations.Itwouldbewrongtosayweshouldthereforejunkrepresentativedemocracyandtrysomethingelse.Historicallywehavetriedmanyotherformsofgovernmentandtheyhavenotbeenbetterthandemocracywithallitsflaws.Perhapscorporatedemocracywillfallintobadhandsandwewillsufferbadlyfromit.Butinadvancedsocieties,theremaybescantpossibilitythatanyonecangainfullcontrolofgovernmentagainstboththeclassofcitizensandCalhoun’sclassofourgovernors.Moreover,thecountervailingpowerofbusinessmayconstrain–aswellasenable–anygovernmentthatwishestoprosper.Classicalliberalsmightwellbegladthatbusinessperformsthispoliticalserviceforusbecauseitisaservicethatcitizenscannotperformforthemselves,anditisaservicethatdemocratic(oranyother)governmentcannotperformforus.Notes1Subsequentcontributionsarevoluminous.SeeConverse(1975,1990,2000);DelliCarpiniandKeeter(1996);Friedman(1998);KullandDestler(1999);Somin(1998);Stimson(2004).Therearealsomanyargumentsagainstthethesisofvoterignoranceandalsomanyargu-mentsthatsuchignorancedoesnotactuallymatter.2Forrecentaccountings,seespecialissueofCriticalReview18(1–2)(2006).3Tocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:228–30)hasasimilarview.Hesaysthatdemocracyisinferiorintheconductofforeignaffairs(228).Inforeignpolicy,aristocracy’sinterestistypicallythesameasthenation’s(229).Anaristocracyhasverystableviews;amonarchcanvacillateordie;anaristocracyistoosmalltobesweptbypassions;anaristocraticbodyisafirmandenlightenedmanwhoneverdies(230).4ThisclaimrecallsabitofstandardFrenchhumor:Bureaucratshavealmostnopower.Theonlypowertheyhaveisthepowertodenyanyreasonablerequest.Atthetimehewrote,Tocqueville(1966[1835and1840]:125)claimedthattherewere138,000govern-mentbureaucratsinFrancebutonly12,000intheU.S.5Manypeopleacquiresuchcapitalthroughtheirprofessionalactivities(Hardin1999).6Estlund(2007)rhetoricallyaskswhetherutopianmoraltheorymightsimilarlybecriticizedforitsimpossibility.7ButseeGutmannandThompson(1996).8TheexchangewasreminiscentoftheclaimsoftheKingstontriothattheirnextnumberwouldbeinFrench.AndforthosewhospeakFrench,theintroductioncontinued,itisinLouisianacreoleFrench;andforthosewhospeakLouisianacreoleFrench,itisinLouisianacreoleFrenchasspokeninnorthwesternLouisiana.Eventuallythefieldofplaycouldbenarroweddowntoarelevantrealmfortheclaims.9Mill(1977[1861]:548–9)continuestoholdthisviewintothemodernerawhenhomo-geneityisnotpossibleinanylargenation.Hesaysthatboundariesofgovernmentsshouldcoincidewithboundariesofnationalities.10Mill(1977[1861]:447)oftenreferstothegeneralinterestandseemstosupposethatitisabroadcategory.11Rawls(1999[1971])andOkun(1975)supposethatthereisasubstantialtradeoffbetweenoverallproductionandequality.244RussellHardin\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page24512SomeevidenceforthisclaimisthenearlyuniversalpraiseforMiltonFriedmanafterhisdeathinNovember2006.Hewasonceapariahtoliberals,buttodaymanyofhisviewshavebecomewidelyacceptedandheisseenashavingtrumpedJohnMaynardKeynesinpolicycircles.13TheargumentofthissectiondrawsonHardin(2004).14See“RulesoftheRoad”atwww.answers.com/topic/rules-of-the-road.15Mill(1977[1861]:396–7)perhapsdisagreesabitwiththisclaim.Hesaysthatgovern-mentmustenablethepeopletodowell.Tocquevilleseemstothinkthatitissufficientforgovernmenttoleaveuslargelyalone.16Milldoesnotaddthedisclaimerofapplyinghisviewonlytoacomplexsociety.ButheisclearlyconcernedwiththeEnglandofhisowntime,andthatwasaverycomplexsocietywithnumerousgroupsofteninconflictwitheachother.ReferencesAshlin,Alison,andRichardJ.Ladle.2006.“EnvironmentalScienceAdriftintheBlogosphere,”Science312(April14):201.Thisbriefarticleisenhancedatwww.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/312/5771/201/DC1(activeasofNovember25,2006).Brennan,Geoffrey,andJamesM.Buchanan.1985.TheReasonofRules:ConstitutionalPoliticalEconomy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).Buruma,Ian.2006.MurderinAmsterdam:TheDeathofTheovanGoghandtheLimitsofTolerance(NewYork:Penguin).Calhoun,JohnC.[1853]1992.ADisquisitiononGovernment.InUnionandLiberty:ThePoliticalPhilosophyofJohnC.Calhoun,ed.RossM.Lence(Indianapolis,IN:LibertyFund),pp.3–78.Christiano,Thomas.2004.“TheAuthorityofDemocracy,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy12(3):266–90.Condorcet,JeanAntoine.[1795]1999.“EssayontheApplicationofMathematicstotheTheoryofDecision-Making,”inCondorcet,SelectedWritings(Indianapolis,IN:Hackett),pp.33–70.Converse,PhilipE.2006[1964].“TheNatureofBeliefSystemsinMassPublics,”CriticalReview18(1–2):1–75.Converse,PhilipE.1975.“PublicOpinionandVotingBehavior,”inFredI.GreensteinandNelsonW.Polsby,eds.,HandbookofPoliticalScience.Reading,MA:Addison-Wesley,Vol.4.Converse,PhilipE.1990.“PopularRepresentationandtheDistributionofInformation,”inJohnA.FerejohnandJamesKuklinski,eds.,InformationandDemocraticProcesses.Urbana,IL:UniversityofIllinoisPress.Converse,PhilipE.2000.“AssessingtheCapacityofMassElectorates,”AnnualReviewofPoliticalScience3:331–53.Dahlberg,Matz,andEvaJohansson.2002.“OntheVote-PurchasingBehaviorofIncumbentGovernments.”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview96(March):27–40.DelliCarpini,MichaelX.,andScottKeeter.1996.WhatAmericansKnowaboutPoliticsandWhyItMatters(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress).Downs,Anthony,AnEconomicTheoryofDemocracy(NewYork:HarperandRow,1957).Estlund,David.“DemocraticAuthority:APhilosophicalFramework”(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007).Friedman,Jeffrey.1998.“PublicIgnoranceandDemocraticTheory,”CriticalReview12(4):397–411.Green,ThomasAndrew,VerdictAccordingtoConscience:PerspectivesontheEnglishCriminalTrialJury,1200–1800(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1985).Gutmann,Amy,andDennisThompson.1996.DemocracyandDisagreement(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).DeliberativeDemocracy245\nCDIC13.qxd2/4/0915:50Page246Hardin,Russell.1990.“Contractarianism:WistfulThinking,”ConstitutionalPoliticalEconomy1:35–52.Hardin,Russell.1999.“SocialCapital,”inJamesAlt,MargaretLevi,andElinorOstrom,eds.,CompetitionandCooperation:ConversationswithNobelistsaboutEconomicsandPoliticalScience(NewYork:RussellSageFoundation),pp.170–89.Hardin,Russell.2002.“TheStreet-LevelEpistemologyofDemocraticParticipation,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy10(2):212–29.Hardin,Russell.2004.“TransitiontoCorporateDemocracy?”inBuildingaTrustworthyStateinPost-SocialistTransition,ed.JanosKornaiandSusanRose-Ac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erencesbetweenandamongpartiesandpursuedwiththeexpectationthatthepartieswillbeheldaccountabletotheirannouncedprograms.Theunderlyingparticipatoryideaisthatcitizensinademocracyaretoengagewiththesubstanceoflawandpolicy,andnotsimplydelegateresponsibilityforsuchsubstantiveengagementtorepresentatives.Alongwithparticipation,radicaldemocratsemphasizedeliberation.Insteadofapoliticsofpowerandinterest,radicaldemocratsfavoradeliberativedemocracyinwhichcitizensaddresspublicproblemsbyreasoningtogetherabouthowbesttosolvethem–inwhich,atthelimit,noforceisatwork,asJürgenHabermassaid,5“exceptthatofthebetterargument.”Accordingtothedeliberativeinterpretation,democracyisapoliticalarrangementthattiestheexerciseofcollectivepowertoreason-givingamongthosesubjecttocollectivedecisions.Oncemore,weseesub-stantialdifferencesamongdifferentformulationsofthedeliberative-democraticideal.Someseedeliberativedemocracyasamatterofformingapublicopinionthroughdispersedandopenpublicdiscussionandtranslatingsuchopinionintolegitimatelaw;othersasawaytoensurethatelections–orlegislativedebates,orperhapsdis-cussionswithincourtsoragencies–arethemselvesinfusedwithinformationandreasoning;othersasawaytobringreasoningbycitizensdirectlytobearonaddress-ingregulatoryissues.Butinallcases,thelargeaimofadeliberativedemocracyistoshiftfrombargaining,interestaggregation,andpowertothecommonreasonof6equalcitizens–democracy’spublicreason–asaguidingforceindemocraticlife.Inthisessay,Iwillexplorethesetwodistinctstrandsoftheradical-democraticproject–participatoryanddeliberative–thoughIwillfocusonthedeliberativebecausethatisthetopichere.Mycentralpointisthatparticipationanddeliberationarebothimportant,butdifferentandimportantfordifferentreasons.Moreover,itishardtoachieveboth,buttheprojectofadvancingbothiscoherent,attractive,andworthourattention.Ibeginbypresentinganideaofdeliberativedemocracy.Second,Iwillsketchthreeattractionsofdeliberativedemocracy.Third,Idiscussfourlinesofskepticalargument.Fourth,Isketchthreetensionsbetweendeliberationandparti-cipation.Fifth,Iconsidertwopoliticalandinstitutionalstrategiesforbluntingthosetensions.Iconcludebymentioningtwolargechallenges.2.DeliberationCarlSchmittsaidthatdeliberationbelongstotheworldoftheparliament,wherelegislatorsreasontogetherabouthowtoaddresspublicproblems.Itdoesnotbelong248JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page249totheworldofmassdemocracy,whereethno-culturallyhomogeneouspeoplesfindleaderswhopickthepeople’sfriendsandenemies.AccordingtoSchmitt,“Thedevel-opmentofmodernmassdemocracyhasmadeargumentativepublicdiscussionan7emptyformality.”RejectingSchmitt’sview,aswellasitsmorebenigncontemporaryprogeny,deliberativedemocratsexplorepossibilitiesofcombiningdeliberationwithmassdemocracy.Andnotjustexplore:wearehopefulaboutthepossibilitiesoffosteringamoredeliberativedemocracy.Deliberation,genericallyunderstood,isaboutweighingthereasonsrelevanttoadecisionwithaviewtomakingadecisiononthebasisofthatweighing.Soanindividualcanmakedecisionsdeliberatively;ajuryhasaresponsibilitytodeliberate;andacommitteeofoligarchscandeliberate:deliberation,inshort,isnotintrinsicallydemocratic.The“democracy”in“deliberativedemocracy”isnotpleonastic.Democracyisawayofmakingcollectivedecisionsthatconnectsdecisionstotheinterestsandjudgmentsofthosewhoseconductistoberegulatedbythedecisions.Theessentialideaisthatthosegovernedbythedecisionsaretreatedasequalsbytheprocessesofmakingthedecisions.Democracy,asTocquevilleemphasized,isalsoakindofsociety–asocietyofequals–butIwillbeconfiningmyselfasageneralmattertothemorespecificallypoliticalunderstandingofdemocracy.Ofcourse,evenifwethinkofdemocracypolitically,asawaytomakebindingcollectivedecisions,constructingamoredeliberativedemocracyisnotanarrowlypoliticalproject:delib-erativedemocracyrequiresattentiontoencouragingdeliberativecapacities,whichis,8interalia,amatterofeducation,information,andorganization.Iwillreturnbrieflytothispointneartheend.Deliberativedemocracy,then,combinesthesetwoelements,neitherreducibletotheother.Itisaboutmakingcollectivedecisionsandexercisingpowerinwaysthattraceinsomewaytothereasoningoftheequalswhoaresubjecttothedecisions:notonlytotheirpreferences,interests,andchoices,butalsototheirreasoning.Essentially,thepointofdeliberativedemocracyistosubjecttheexerciseofpowertoreason’sdiscipline,towhatHabermasfamouslydescribedas“theforceofthebetterargument,”nottheadvantageofthebettersituated.Deliberativedemocracydoesnotaimtodoawaywithpower,anideathatmakesnosense;norsimplytosubjectpowertothediscipline–suchasitis–oftalking,becausetalkingisnotthesameasreasoning(considerverbalassaults,insults,racialslurs,lies,blowingsmoke,exchangingpleasantries,exploringcommonexperiences);norisitsimplytoreasontogether,becausereasoningtogethermaybewithouteffectontheexerciseofpower.Moreover,thenotionofreason’sdisciplineisnotnearlydefiniteenough.Plato’sphilosopher-guardianssubjectpowertoreason’sdiscipline–that,atanyrate,iswhattheysaytheyaredoing.Butdeliberativedemocracyisakindofdemocracy,sothereasoningmustbeinsomerecognizablewaythereasoningoftheequalpersonswhoaresubjecttothedecisions.Andnotjusttheprocessofreasoning,butthecontentofthereasonsthemselvesmusthaveaconnectiontothedemocraticconceptionofpeopleasequals.Deliberativedemocracyisaboutreasoningtogetheramongequals,andthatmeansnotsimplyadvancingconsiderationsthatonejudgestobereasons,butalsofindingconsiderationsthatotherscanreasonablybeexpectedtoacknowledgeasreasons.That’swhydeliberationfocuses,asaconstitutivematter,onconsiderationsReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy249\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page250ofthecommongood,andalsowhy–orsoIhavearguedelsewhere–basicpersonallibertiesareessentialelementsofadeliberativedemocracy.Deliberativedemocracyisnotmajoritarian,andthesesubstantiveconditions–thecommongoodandpersonalliberties–areessentialtodemocraticdeliberation,underconditionsofreasonablepluralism.Inshort,theidealofdeliberativedemocracyistodisciplinecollectivepowerthroughthecommonreasonofademocraticpublic:throughdemocracy’spublic9reason.Tobesure,discussion,evenwhenitisfoundedonreasons,maynot–andoftendoesnot–issueinconsensus.Noaccountofdeliberativedemocracyhaseversuggestedotherwise.Allcomplexpracticalproblems–fromtradeandsecuritytoorganizingschoolsandtransportation,providingcleanwaterandpublicsafety,allocatinghealthcareandensuringfaircompensation–implicatearangeofdistinctvalues,andreasonablepeopledisagreeabouttheprecisecontentofandweightstobeassignedtothosevalues.Inanyallocativedecision,forexample,therearelikelytobepeoplewhothinkthattheworst-offpersonshouldhavepriority,otherswhothinkthereshouldbeequalchances,otherswhothinkthepersonwhobenefitsmostshouldgetthegood.Inallocatingmedicalresources,somewillthinkthatprioritygoestotheworstoff;others,tothosewhowouldbenefitmost;otherswillthinkweshouldassistthelargestnumberofpeople;othersmayholdthatweshouldensurethatallpeoplehavefairchancesatreceivinghelp,regardlessoftheurgencyoftheirsituationandofexpectedbenefitsfromtreatment.Sonomatterhowdeliberativethedemocracygets,collectivedecisionswillalwaysbemadethroughvoting,undersomeformofmajorityrule.Indeed,deliberationmayworkbestwhenparticipantsdonot(asinajurysetting)feelthepressuretoadjusttheirviewsforthesakeofconsensus–asifattentiontoreasonsensuredconvergence,anddisagreementrevealedbiasor10incapacityorsomeotherfailure.Theremaybesometemptationtothinkthattheprospectofmajorityruledefeatsdeliberation:becausecollectivedecision-makingconcludeswithavote,participants–anticipatingthatfinalstageofresolution–willnothaveanyincentivetodeliberateinearlierstages,sowillfocusinsteadoncountingheadsratherthanonweighingreasons:aggregationattheendoftheday,thenaggregationallday.Butthattemptationshouldberesisted.Evenifeveryoneknowsthat,attheendoftheday,headsmaybecounted,theymaystillaccepttheideaofarrivingatacollectivejudgmentbasedonconsiderationsthatothersacknowledgeasreasons.Theymay,forexample,believethatreason-givingisanimportantexpressionofrespect,orthatitistherightwaytoacknowledgethecollectivenatureofthedecision.Iftheydo,theywillbewillingtodeliberateinthestagesleadinguptothevote,evenwhentheyknowavoteiscoming.Deliberativedemocracy,thusunderstood,isadistinctiveinterpretationofdemocracy:democracy,nomatterhowfair,nomatterhowinformed,nomatterhowparticipatory,isnotdeliberativeunlessreasoningiscentraltotheprocessofcollectivedecision-making.Norisdemocracydeliberativesimplybecausetheprocessanditsresultsarereasonable:capableofbeinggivenarationaldefense,evenarationaldefensethatwouldberecognizedassuchonreflectionbythosesubjecttothedecisions.Thecon-cernforreasonablenessmustplayaroleintheprocess.Thusthecontrastbetweendeliberativeandaggregativedemocracy.Inanaggregativedemocracy,citizensaimtoadvancetheirindividualandgroupinterests.Iftheprocessisfair,theresultsmay250JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page251wellbereasonable.Butunlessthereasonablenessisaimedatbyparticipantsintheprocess,wedonothavedeliberation.Ofcourse,itmightbearguedthatreasonableresultsmustbeaimedattobeachieved,andthatdemocracymustthereforebedeliberativetobereasonable.So,for,example,ifwehaveahypotheticaltestfortherightnessofdecisions,wherethehypotheticalprocessinvolvesreasoningunderidealizedconditionsaboutwhatisbesttodo,thenitmightbesaidthattheactualprocessmustlooksomethinglikethehypothetical11toprovideabasisforconfidenceintherightnessofresults.Still,itisbesttoseethisconnectionbetweenreasonablenessanddeliberationasabroadlyempiricalclaim,andtokeepdeliberationasawayofdeciding–awaythatcomprisesboththenatureoftheprocessandthecontentofthereasons–distinctfromreasonablenessasapropertyofdecisions.Aggregativeanddeliberativedemocracydonotexhaustthespaceofinterpreta-tionsofdemocracy.Consideracommunityofpoliticallyprincipledcitizens,eachofwhomendorsesaconceptionofjustice.Theconceptionstheyendorsediffer,buteachpersonacceptssomeconceptionassettingboundsonacceptablepolicyanddecentinstitutions.Assumefurtherthattheydonotseemuchpointinarguingaboutwhatjusticerequires,thoughtheydiscussissueswithaneyetogeneratinginformation,andeachconscientiouslyuseshisorherownconceptioninreachingpoliticaldeci-sions.Nooneinthispoliticalcommunitythinksthatpoliticsissimplyaboutadvanc-inginterests,muchlessaSchmittianstrugglebetweenfriendsandenemies.Butreasoningtogetherplaysaveryrestrictedroleinpublicpoliticallife:themembersacceptthattheyoweoneanotheranexerciseofconscientiousjudgment,butnotthattheyoweajustificationbyreferencestoreasonsthatothersmightreasonablybeexpectedtoaccept.IwillnotdevelopthisdistinctionfurtherhereImentionittounderscorethatthecasefordeliberativedemocracyneedstobemadenotsimplyincontrastwithaccountsofdemocracythatfocusoninterestsandpowerbutalsoincontrastwithviewsthatassumeaconscientiousexerciseofmoral-politicaljudgmentbyindividualcitizens,althoughnotdeliberation.Thisemphasisonsubjectingpowertoreason’sdisciplineisathreadthatrunsthrough12muchoftheliteratureondeliberativedemocracy.Thus,AmyGutmannandDennis13Thompsonsaythat“deliberativedemocracy’sbasicrequirementis‘reason-giving’.”JonElsteralsoemphasizesthatdeliberationisaboutargument,infactarguments14addressedtopeoplecommittedtorationalityandimpartiality.JohnDryzeksaysthata“definingfeatureofdeliberativedemocracyisthatindividualsparticipatingindemocraticprocessesareamenabletochangingtheirmindsandtheirpreferences15asaresultofthereflectioninducedbydeliberation.”Elsewhereheemphasizes“com-16municationthatencouragesreflectionuponpreferenceswithoutcoercion.”ButDryzek’scharacterizationsofdeliberativedemocracyarenotliterallydefining:theyfollowfromthemorefundamentalcharacteristicsofdeliberativedemocracy.Thepointofdelib-erativedemocracyisnotforpeopletoreflectontheirpreferences,buttodecide,inlightofreasons,whattodo.Decidingwhattodoinlightofreasonsrequires,ofcourse,awillingnesstochangeyourmind,sinceyoumightbeginthedeliberativetaskwithaviewaboutwhattodothatisnotsupportedbygoodreasons.ButthecrucialpointisthatDryzekemphasizesthatdeliberationisbasicallyaboutreason-ing–aboutrationalargument–andthatotherkindsofcommunicationneedtobe17“heldtorationalstandards.”ReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy251\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page2523.ReasonsforDeliberativeDemocracyWhyisdeliberativedemocracyagoodthing?Itisofcoursehardtodenythattheexerciseofcollectivepowershouldbesupportedbyappropriatereasons.Butdelib-erativedemocracyisnotsimplytheundisputedideathattheexerciseofpowershouldberationallydefensible,thusnon-arbitrary.Thequestioniswhyitisimportanttodisciplinetheexerciseofpowerbyactuallyreasoningtogether.Iwillmentionthreeconsiderations.Thefirstisaboutpromotingjustice.Thussupposewethinkthatrequirementsofjusticearefixedbyidealizedreasoningunderconditionsoffullinformationandequalstanding.Oneargumentfordeliberativedemocracyisthatactualdeliberationisneededifcollectivedecisionsaretomeetthestandardsofpoliticalrightthatwouldbeacceptedunderidealizedconditionsofinformationandequality.Soifjusticeisfixedbyimpar-tialreasoninginhypotheticalconditionsinwhichagentsaimtojustifyprinciplestoothers,then,arguably,wewillonlyachievejusticeifwemakecollectivedecisionsusingreasoningofasimilarkind.Wecannottrusttheachievementofjusticetothepursuitofindividualandgroupinterests,evenunderfairconditions.Asecondlineofargumentisthatreason-givingisadistinctiveformofcommun-ication,andthatitmayhavedesirableconsequences,apartfrompromotingjustice.Thus,therequirementthatIdefendmyproposalswithreasonsthatarecapableofbeingacknowledgedassuchbyothers,will–whatevermyownpreferences–imposesomedesirableconstraintontheproposalsIcanadvanceanddefend.Ofcourseifeveryproposalcanberationalizedinanacceptableway,thentherequirementofdefendingproposalswithacceptablereasonswillnothavemucheffect:butIamskepticalaboutthisclaim.Moreover,theneedtogivereasonsacceptabletoothersmightproducedesirableconsequencesifreason-givingitselfchangespreferences,oratleastsaliences.SowhileIstartpreferringmostwhatisbestformeormygroup,thepracticeofdefendingproposalswithreasonsmaychangemypreferences,dampen-ingthetensionbetweenmybeliefsaboutwhatisrightorpoliticallylegitimateandmypreferences:notbecausethatisthepointofdeliberation,butbecausethatisitseffect.Inaddition,deliberationmayimproveresultsbyelicitinginformation:thoughtherearecertainlytruth-tellingequilibriaforstrategicactors,Iassumethattheinformationaleffectsofdeliberationdependinpartonacommitmenttotruthfulnessorsincerityincommunication,whichmayitselfbereinforcedthroughdeliberation,althoughitishardtoconstructfromnothing.Butthatistrueabouttheentireaccountofdeliberation:thoughdeliberationmayreinforceapriorcommitmenttoargueontermsthatotherscanacknowledgeasreasons,somesuchpriorcommitmentmustbeinplaceiftheenterpriseofmutualreason-givingistogetoffthegroundandbesustained.Athirdcasefordeliberativedemocracy,notaboutconsequences,isthatthedeliberativeviewexpressestheideathatrelationsamongpeoplewithinapluralistic,democraticorderarerelationsofequals.Itrequiresthatweofferconsiderationsthatothers,despitefundamentaldifferencesofoutlook,canreasonablybeexpectedtoaccept,notsimplythatwecounttheirinterests,whilekeepingourfingerscrossedthatthoseinterestsareoutweighed.Theideaofcollectiveauthorizationisreflectednotonlyintheprocessesofdecision-making,butalso–asIsaidearlier–intheformandthecontentofdemocracy’spublicreason.252JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page253Thispointabouttheattractionsofthedeliberativeinterpretationofcollectivedecisionscanbestatedintermsofanideaofself-government.Inadeliberativedemo-cracy,lawsandpoliciesresultfromprocessesinwhichcitizensdefendsolutionstocommonproblemsonthebasisofwhataregenerallyacknowledgedasrelevantreasons.Tobesure,citizenswill,asImentionedearlier,interpretthecontentofthoseconsiderationsdifferently,andassignthemdifferentweights.Thereasonsrelevanttoparticulardomainsarecomplexandoftencompeting,andthereoftenwillbenoclear,principledbasisforrankingthem:reasonablepeoplemayreasonablydisagreeonhowtheyshouldbeweighted,evenafterallthereasonshavebeenaired.Nevertheless,theymayaccepttheresultsofthedeliberativeprocessinpartbyvirtueoftheprocesshavinggivendueconsiderationtoreasonsthatallreasonablyaccept.Whencitizenstakethesepoliticalvaluesseriously,politicaldecisionsarenotsimplyaproductofpowerandinterest;evencitizenswhoseviewsdonotwinoutcanseethatthedecisionsaresupportedbygoodreasons.Asaresult,memberscan–despitedisagreement–allregardtheirconductasguided,ingeneralterms,bytheirownreason.Establishingsuchpoliticaldeliberationwouldrealizeanidealofself-governmentorpoliticalautonomyunderconditionsofreasonablepluralism.ItmaybeascloseaswecangettotheRousseaueanidealofgivingthelawtoourselves.4.SkepticismAboutDeliberationIwantnowtoconsiderfourobjectionsthathavebeenraisedagainstthedeliberativeconceptionofdemocracy.Theinterestofexploringthetensionsbetweendeliberationandparticipationwillbegreaterifsomeoftheseconcernscanbedispelled.1.Thefirstisaboutinequality.Itbeginswiththeobservationthatreasoningisanacquiredcapacity,andnotequallydistributedamongall.Socollectivedecision-makingthroughreason-givingmaynotneutralizepower,butmayinsteadcreatea“logocracy,”inwhichpoliticalpoweriseffectivelyshiftedtotherhetoricallygifted(oratleasttotheverballyuninhibited),whichmaywellcompoundexistingsocialinequalities,anddeliverpoliticalpowertotheeducated,oreconomicallyadvantaged,18ormen,orthosepossessedofculturalcapitalandargumentativeconfidence.Whiletheconcernisimportantandunderstandable,theevidence,suchasitis,suggeststhatthisobjectionexaggeratesthefearedeffect,inpartby“depoliticizing”it–moreprecisely,byunderestimatingthecapacitytorecognizeandalleviateit,shoulditarise.Democracy,toborrowaphrasefromJaneMansbridge,isalwaysaworkinprocess,andmuchcanbedonetoaddressthisconcern.ThusArchonFungfindsthatcitizenparticipationinChicagopolicingeffortsisgreaterinpoorerneighborhoods(notaverylargesurprise,givencrimeratesindifferentneighbor-hoods),andthatthecity,cognizantofobviousconcernsaboutculturalandclass19bias,investedresourcesintrainingparticipantsinpolicingandschoolingefforts.StudyingthecaseofparticipatorybudgetinginPortoAlegre,AbersandBaiocchifindhighratesofinvolvementbypoorer,less-educatedcitizens,andsubstantialrates20ofparticipationbywomenandAfro-Brazilians.Thethreadrunningthroughtheseandrelatedcasesisthatparticipationisnotexogenouslygiven.Deliberativebodiescanundertakeaffirmativemeasurestoaddressparticipatorybiases.Inparticular,theyReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy253\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page254canhelptotrainparticipantsintheissuesdecidedbythebodyandinhowtoframeargumentsabouttherelevantpolicies.Nowitmightbearguedthatinthefavorablecasesjustnoted,thedeliberativebodiesaimtosolverelativelyconcreteproblems–toimprovepolicyinrelativelywell-definedareas(say,pertainingtotheprovisionoflocalpublicgoods)–nottohaveanopen-endedpublicdebate.Inequalitiesofargumentativeskillsonbroader21mattersmayresistremedy.Butevidencefromdeliberativepollingsuggestsother-wise:deliberativecapacitiesseemreasonablywidelyshared,evenwhenissuesaremoreabstractandlesslocallyfocused.Criticsofdeliberation,itseems,weretooquicktoconcludethatdeliberativedecision-makingempowerstheverballyagile.2.Asecondobjectionisabouteffectiveness.Thusitmightbesaidthatadeliberativeprocessdoesnotmitigatetheeffectsofpoweronoutcomesofcollectivedecisions.Inaddressingthisissue,wefacealargemethodologicalproblem.Asageneralmatter,andputtingasidetheissueofdeliberativedemocracy,itishardtomakeanempiricallycompellingcasethatprocesschangesproduceoutcomechanges,becausechangesinprocessandinresultmaywellbothbeproducedbysomethirdfactor:as,forexample,whenapartywitharedistributiveprojectempowersthelessadvantagedandpromotesashiftineconomicresourcesaswell,thussuggesting(incor-rectly)thatthechangeinprocessproducedthechangeinresult.Afewstudies,thoughnotofdeliberativedemocracy,haveforcefullyaddressedtheseproblemsofspuriousness.Ansolabehere,Gerber,andSnyderhaveshownthatcourt-orderedreapportionmentinthe1960sshiftedpublicgoodsspendinginthestatesinthedirectionofpreviouslyunderrepresenteddistricts:aspecialcasebecause22reapportionmentwasacourt-orderedexogenousshock.Similarly,ChattopadhyayandDuflohavemadethecasethatreservedseatsforwomenonIndianvillagecouncilshaveledtoshiftsinpublicgoodsspending,withgreaterspendingongoodsthatare23preferredbywomenwhentheheadofthevillagecouncilisawoman.Heretheproblemofspuriousnessissolvedbyrandomnessintheprocessthatdetermineswhichvillagecouncilswillbeheadedbywomen.Wehavenocomparablycompellingcasethatincreaseddeliberativenessleadstochangesinthecontentofthedecisions.Still,wehavesomesuggestiveevidence.Thus,participatorybudgetinginPortoAlegreandinvillagecouncilsinKeralaappeartohaveproducedsubstantialshiftsintheallocationofpublicresourcestothepoor:inPortoAlegre,forexample,thereisnowfullcoverageofwaterandsewers,andathreefoldincreaseinschoolattend-24ance.Similarly,LucioBaccarohasarguedthatinternaldemocraticreforminItalianunionsproducedlargeshiftsinunionpolicyindirectionsmorefavorabletotheinterestsofoutsiders(pensions,employment,andregionaldevelopmentissues).Tobesure,theresultsinthesecasesmaycomenotfromdeliberation,butfrombroaderparticipationorthedominanceofaleftparty.Butdeliberationseemstobepartofthestory,bothbecausedeliberationshiftspreferencesandbecauseitshiftscollec-tivedecisionsbymakingsomeproposalshardertodefend:namely,proposalsthatcannotbedefendedinpubliconthebasisofacceptablereasons.(Baccaromakesa25goodcasethatdeliberationmadethedifference.)3.Athirdconcernisaboutdeliberativepathologies.Asocial-psychologicalvari-antofthisconcernsaysthatgroupdiscussionimposesnormativepressureongroupmembers:avariance-reducingpressurenottobelessextremethanthegroupmedian,andamean-shiftingpressurenottobelessextremethanthegroupmean.Acognitive254JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page255storyclaimsthatgroupdiscussioninarelativehomogeneousgroupisdominatedbyargumentsembracedbythemajority,sothatwhenpeopleupdateonarelatively26homogeneousargumentpool,theyconsolidate.Ineithercase,itisbadforoutsiders.Theseareveryseriousconcerns,butatleastinprinciple,theremediesseemstraight-forward,whateverthelikelihoodoftheiradoption.Ifdeliberationunderconditionsofhomogeneitydrivespolarization,thenitisimportanttoensurethatdeliberativesettingsinsomewayreflectthewiderdiversity:insomedeliberativesettings,thecompetitivequalityofthedecision–whentheissueatstakeistheallocationofscarceresources–engenderssuchexpression.Inothersettings,ensuringdiversityofopinionmaybeamatterofinstitutionalprincipleortheresponsibilityofamoder-ator.Insettingsofgroupdiscussion,thismightmeanensuringthatsometimeisdevotedtoexpressingbeliefsorjudgmentsthatareassumednottobesharedbyothersinthegroup:ensuringthatthishappensseemstobewellwithinthereachofmoderatorsorparticipantsthemselves.Puttingitmoregenerally,thepointisthatstudiesofdeliberativepathologiesneedtobetreatedwithsomecare.Thosepathologiesmayemergefromgroupdecision-makingconductedwithouteffortstoavoidthepathologicalresults.Sosuchstudiesmayoftenbeinterpretableassourcesofcautionarynotesandrecommendationsforimprove-mentratherthanasunderminingthecasefordeliberation.Thatsaid,itisalsotruethatthemorefragiledeliberationis,themorestructurethatneedstobeinplacetomovefromdiscussiontogooddeliberation,thelessconfidencewecanresideintheprojectofbuildingamoredeliberativedemocracy.Anaïveversionofthedeliberativeidealsupposesthatpeoplearewaitingtodeliberate,andneedonlytogetcompetitivepolit-icalstructuresoutoftheway.Deliberationmaybeamorefragileaccomplishment.274.Thefinalobjectionisaboutnaïvetéconcerningpower.Becauseconstraintsonwhatcountsasareasonarenotwelldefined,theadvantagedwillfindsomewaytodefendself-servingproposalswithconsiderationsthatarearguablyreasons.Forexample,theymaymakeappealstoideasofthecommonadvantage,butpressaconceptionofthecommonadvantagethatassignsgreatweighttoadeeplyunequalstatusquo.Oriftheyfailinthis,theadvantagedwillsimplyrefusetoacceptthedisciplineofdeliberation.Ifthisobjectionisright,thenproposalsfordeliberativedemocracythatareinattentivetobackgroundrelationsofpowerwillwastethetimeofthosewhocanleastafforditsloss:thosenowsubordinateinpower.Thetimeandenergytheyspendinargument,laboringundertheillusionthatsweetreasonwillconstrainthepowerthatsuppressesthem,couldhavebeenspentinself-organization,instrumentaleffortstoincreasetheirownpower,orlikeeffortstoimposecostsonopponents.Thecomplaintthatdeliberativedemocracyistouchinglynaïveaboutpowerbetraysvertiginouslyboundlessconfusion.First,theimportanceofbackgrounddifferencesinpowerisnotacriticismofthedeliberativeidealperse,butaconcernaboutitsapplication.Deliberativedemocracyisanormativemodelofcollectivedecision-making,notauniversalpoliticalstrategy.Andcommitmenttothenormativeidealdoesnotrequirecommitmenttothebeliefthatcollectivedecision-makingthroughmutualreason-givingisalwayspossible.Soitmayindeedbethecasethatsomeroughbackgroundbalanceofpowerisrequiredbeforepartieswilllistentoreason.Butobservingthatdoesnotimportantlylessentheattractionofthedeliberativeideal;itsimplystatesaconditionofitsreasonablepursuit.ReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy255\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page256Thus,inHabermas’saccountoftheidealspeechsituation,orinmyownaccountofanidealdeliberativeprocedure,inequalitiesinpowerarestipulatedawayforthesake28ofpresentinganidealizedmodelofdeliberation.Theseidealizationsareintendedtocharacterizethenatureofreasonedcollectivedecision-makingandinturntoprovidemodelsforactualarrangementsofcollectivedecision-making.Butactualarrangementsmustprovidesomebasisforconfidencethatjointreasoningwillactu-allyprevailinshapingtheexerciseofcollectivepower,andgrossinequalitiesofpowersurelyundermineanysuchconfidence.Sodiscussionthatexpressesthedeliberativeidealmust,forexample,operateagainstabackgroundoffreeexpressionandasso-ciation,thusprovidingminimalconditionsfortheavailabilityofrelevantinforma-tion.Equally,ifpartiesarenotsomehowconstrainedtoaccepttheconsequencesofdeliberation,if“exitoptions”arenotforeclosed,itseemsimplausiblethattheywillacceptthedisciplineofjointreasoning,andinparticularreasoninginformedbythedemocraticideaofpersonsasequals.Firmsretainingamoreorlesscostlessabilitytomoveinvestmentelsewherearenot,forexample,likelytoacceptthedisciplineofreasoneddeliberationaboutlaborstandards,withworkersastheirdeliberativeequals.Saying“Ifyoudon’tlistentoreason,youwillpayahighprice”isnotajoke:itissometimesnecessarytoresorttodestabilization,threats,andopenconflictasanswerstopeoplewhowon’treasoningoodfaith.Asuckermaybeborneveryminute,butdeliberativedemocracyisnotarecommendationthatwealljointheclub.Butifthewillingnesstoreasondoesdependonthebackgrounddistributionofpower,doesn’tthatdefeatthepointofdeliberativedemocracybyreducingdeliberationtobargain-ingunderabalanceofpower?Notatall.Oncepeopledolistentoreason,theresultsmayreflectnotonlythebalanceofpowerthatdefeatedtheirpreviousimpervious-ness,buttheirattentivenesstoreasonsthatcanbeshared.IfIneedtodrinksomeespressotoconcentratehardenoughtoproveatheorem,itdoesnotreducetheorem-provingtoacaffeinehigh.Sosimilarly,payingattentiontopowerandthreatstoexerciseitdoesn’treducedeliberationtobargaining.Tosupposeotherwiseislikethinkingthatifyouneedtotrustyourmathteacherinordertolearnhowtodoaproofthenthereisnothingmoretoproofthantrust.Itconfusesconditionsthatmakeanactivitypossiblewiththatactivityitself.5.SomeTensionsBetweenParticipationandDeliberationIstartedbynotingtwostrandsintheradicaldemocratictradition:participatoryanddeliberative.ButIhavenotsaidmuchatallaboutpoliticalparticipation:delibera-tivedemocracyisaboutpoliticalreasoning,notthebreadthanddepthofparticipa-tion.Tobeverybrief:participationisparticularlyimportantinconnectionwithachievingfairpoliticalequality,becauseshiftingthebasisofpoliticalcontestationfromorganizedmoneytoorganizedpeopleisapromisingalternativetotheinfluenceconferredbywealth.Similarly,expandinganddeepeningcitizenparticipationmaybethemostpromisingstrategyforchallengingpoliticalinequalitiesassociatedwithtraditionalsocialandpoliticalhierarchies.Moreover,itmaybeimportantinencouragingasenseofpoliticalresponsibility.256JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page257Butparticipationisonething,anddeliberationisanother,andtheymaypullin29differentdirections.Considerthreesourcesoftension.1.Improvingthequalityofdeliberationmaycomeatacosttopublicparticipa-tion.Suppose,forexample,thatlegislators,regulators,andjudgesweretoembraceadeliberativeformofdecision-making.Insteadofseekingtoadvancetheinterestsoftheirconstituentsorsingle-mindedlymaximizingtheirprospectsofre-election,forexample,legislatorswouldengageinreasonablediscussionandargumentaboutpolicies.Judgeswould,inturn,reinforcethelegislatorsbyrequiringexplicitatten-tiontoreasonsinlegislativeandadministrativedecision-making.Butdoingsomightrequireinsulationfrompublicpressures.2.Expandingparticipation–eitherthenumbersofpeople,ortherangeofissuesunderdirectpopularcontrol–maydiminishthequalityofdeliberation.Initiativesandreferenda,forexample,allowvoterstoexercisemoredirectandpreciselytargetedinfluenceoverlegislation,policyquestions,andevenelectedofficials.Butfarfromimprovingdeliberation,suchmeasures–inpartbecausetheyultimatelyfocusonayes/nodecisiononawell-definedproposition–maydiscouragereasoneddiscussionincreatinglegislation.Andevenbringingpeopletogethertodiscussspecificlawsandpoliciesmay–withahomogeneouscollectionofpeople,oralackofcommitmenttoaddressingacommonproblem–diminishdeliberation,asdiscussiondissolvesinto30posturing,recrimination,andmanipulation.3.Morefundamentally,socialcomplexityandscalelimittheextenttowhichmodernpolitiescanbebothdeliberativeandparticipatory.Deliberationdependsonparticipantswithsufficientknowledgeandinterestaboutthesubstantiveissuesunderconsideration.Butonanyissue,thenumberofindividualswithsuchknowledgeandinterestisboundtoberelativelysmall,andsothequalityofdeliberationwilldeclinewiththescopeofparticipation.Ofcourse,knowledgeandinterestarenotfixed,anddeliberationmayimproveboth.Still,timeandresourceconstraintsmakeitundesir-ableforanyparticularareaofpublicgovernancetobebothfullydeliberativeandinclusivelyparticipatory.6.AndSo?Thesethreetensionsnotwithstanding,publicdecision-makinginliberaldemocraciescouldbecomebothmoreparticipatoryanddeliberative.Thechallengeistodevisepracticalprojectsthatcanincorporateboth.Radicaldemocratshavetwobroadstrat-egiesforachievingthataim.whichIwillsketchinverybroadstrokes.ThefirstaimstojoindeliberationwithmassdemocracybypromotingcitizendeliberationonpoliticalmattersinwhatHabermascallsthe“informalpublicsphere,”31constitutedbynetworksofassociationsincivilsociety.Becausesuchinformaldis-cussiondoesnotaimatapracticaldecisionbut–insofarasithasanaim–atinformedopinion,itcanpursueanunencumbereddiscussionaboutpoliticalvaluesandpublicgoals.Moreover,thesedisperseddiscussions–oneelementofapoliticalsociety’sprocessofcollectivedecision-making–arepotentiallyverybroadlyparticipatory,fortheytakeplacethroughstructuresofnumerous,opensecondaryassociationsandsocialmovements.Forthismixofmassdemocracyanddeliberation,theessentialingredients,apartfromensuringbasicliberties,areadiverseandindependentmedia,ReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy257\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page258vibrant,independentcivilassociations,andpoliticalpartiesthatoperateindependentlyfromconcentratedwealthandhelptofocuspublicdebate.Allofthisarguablyhelpstofosterdeliberativecapacities–apointImentionedearlier,andpromisedtoreturnto.Themarriageofopencommunicationintheinformalpublicspherewithatranslation–throughelectionsandlegislativedebate–ofopinionformedthereintolawpro-vides,onthisview,thebesthopeforachievingagreatermixofparticipationanddeliberationunderconditionsofmassdemocracyandaruleoflaw.Muchoftheattractivenessofthisview,then,hingesfirstuponthedeliberative-nessofdiscourseinthepublicsphereandthenuponthestrengthofthelinksbetweensuchdeliberationandthedecisionsoflegislativebodiesandadministrativeagencies.Butbecausedispersed,informalpublicdeliberationandpublicpolicyareonlylooselylinked,amoreparticipatoryanddeliberativeinformalpublicspheremayhavelittleimpactondecisionsbyformalinstitutions.Citizenparticipationintheinfor-malpublicsphere,then,maybeoflimitedpoliticalrelevance,andthemarriageofreasonwithmassdemocracymayproceedinsplendidisolationfromtheexerciseofpower.Tobeclear:Iamnothereobjectingtothisfirstapproach,onlypointingtoaconcernandapossiblelimitation.Asecondradical-democraticapproachbuildsonthedistinctivepracticalcompet-encethatcitizenspossessasusersofpublicservices,subjectsofpublicpolicyandregulation,orasresidentswithcontextualknowledgeoftheircircumstances.Theideaistodrawonthesecompetenciesbybringingordinarycitizensintorela-tivelyfocuseddeliberationsoverpublicissues.Typically,suchstrategiescreateopportunitiesforlimitednumbersofcitizenstodeliberatewithoneanotherorwithofficialstoimprovethequalityofsomepublicdecision,perhapsbyinjectinglocalknowledge,newperspectives,andexcludedinterests,orbyenhancingpublicaccountability.Oneapproachrandomlyselectssmallgroupsofcitizenstodeliberateongeneralpoliticalissuessuchaslawsandpublicpolicies.CitizenjuriesintheUnitedStatesandplanningcellsinGermany,forexample,empanelsmallgroups(12–40)ofran-domlyselectedcitizenstodiscussissuessuchasagriculture,healthpolicy,andlocal32developmentconcerns.Fishkinandhiscolleagueshavesponsoredlargergatheringsof300–500citizens–withrandomization–todeliberateuponsuchissuesastheadoptionoftheEuroinDenmark,publicutilityregulationinTexas,andU.S.foreign33assistance.Onanambitiousanalyticalinterpretation,post-deliberationpollsprovideinsightintowhatthepeoplethinkaboutapolicyissue.Politicalimpactisanothermatter.Aswithcitizensjuriesandplanningcells,theirpoliticalimpact–totheextentthattheyhaveimpact–comesfromtheircapacitytoserveinanadvisoryrole,andtoalterpublicopinionorchangethemindsofpublicofficials.Anotherstrategyconvenesgroupsofcitizenstodeliberateanddevelopsolutionstoparticularproblemsofpublicconcern.Suchparticipatory-deliberativearrangements–characteristicindifferentwaysofassociativedemocracyanddirectly-deliberativepolyarchy–differfrompoliticaljuriesintwomainways.Whereaspoliticaljuriesusuallyconsidergeneralissuessuchaseconomic,healthcare,orcrimepolicy,thesedeliberationsaimtoaddressmorespecificproblemssuchasthemanagementofanecosystem,theoperationofapublicschoolorschooldistrict,crimeinaneighbor-hood,oracity’sallocationofresourcesacrossprojectsandneighborhoods.Whereaspoliticaljuriesrecruitimpartialanddisinterestedcitizensbyrandomlyselectingthem,258JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page259participatory-deliberativearrangementsrecruitparticipantswithstronginterestsintheproblemsunderdeliberation.Becauseofthespecificityofthesearrangements,citizensmaywellenjoyadvant-agesinknowledgeandexperienceoverofficials.InChicago,forexample,residentsdeliberateregularlywithpoliceofficersineachneighborhoodtosetprioritiesonaddressingissuesofpublicsafety,usingtheirbackgroundknowledgeasabasisfordeliberation.AndinPortoAlegrecitizensmeetregularlyattheneighborhoodleveltoagreeuponprioritiesforpublicinvestment(forexample,streetpaving,sanitation,andhousing);thecapitalportionofthecity’sbudgetisproducedbyaggregatingtheprioritiesthatemergefromthosedeliberations.Participatory-deliberativearrangements–inareassuchaseducation,socialser-vices,ecosystems,communitydevelopment,andhealthservices–showpromisingcontributionstopoliticalequalitybyincreasingpopularengagementinpoliticaldecision-making.AsImentionedearlier,inChicago’scommunitypolicingprogram,forexample,participationratesinlow-incomeneighborhoodsaremuchhigherthanthoseinwealthyneighborhoods.Similarly,poorpeoplearesubstantiallyoverrepres-entedinboththebudgetinginstitutionsofPortoAlegreandlocaldevelopmentandplanninginitiativesinKerala,India.Directly-democraticarrangementsthataddressproblemsofparticularurgencytodisadvantagedcitizenscaninverttheusualpartici-pationbiasinfavorofwealth,education,andhighstatus.Theycanalso,however,createlargepotentialpoliticalinequalities.Ifsystematicandenduringdifferences–indeliberativecapabilities,disposableresources,ordemographicfactors–separatethosewhoparticipatefromthosewhodonot,decisionsgeneratedbyparticipatory-deliberativearrangementswilllikelyservetheinterestsofparticipantsattheexpenseofothers.Theproliferationofdirectly-deliberativeinstitutionsfostersdemocraticself-governmentbysubjectingthepoliciesandactionsofagenciessuchasthesetoaruleofcommonreason.Butthesecontributionstoself-governmentare,however,limitedbythescopeoftheseinstitutions.Mostparticipatory-deliberativegovernanceeffortsaimtoaddresslocalconcernsanddonotextendtobroaderissuesofpolicyandpublicpriorities.Moreover,thereisthedangerofadministrative“capture”:thatbyenteringthecircuitofregulatoryproblemsolvingwithitspragmaticconcernabouttheeffectivenessofpolicy,participatingcitizensandgroupslosetheircapacityforindependentactionandtheirsenseoftheimportanceofopen-endedreflectionand34morallymotivatedcriticismandinnovation.Theymaybecomedependentonthestateanditsofficialrecognitionforpowerandresources,andtheirpoliticalhorizonmaycometobeundesirablyconfinedbyattentiontopolicyconstraints.Ifthisisright,thentheallegedlimitationofinformal,society-widedeliberation–thefactthatitsimpactissoindirect–isreallyitsvirtue.Thepreconditionoftheuncon-straineddiscussiononwhichpublicdeliberationdependsrequiresdistancebetweencivilsociety’sassociativelifeandthestate’sdecision-makingroutines.FinalReflectionsSoachievingbothparticipationanddeliberationiscomplicated.Butbecauseoftheirmoredirectbearingontheexerciseofpower,participatory-deliberativearrangementsReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy259\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page260haveaparticularpromiseasastrategyforachievingtheendsofradicaldemocracy.Twolargechallenges,however,lieonthatpath.Thefirstconcernstherelationshipbetweenconventionalinstitutionsofpolitical35representationandparticipatory-deliberativearrangements.Participatory-deliberativearrangementsmakeitpossibletoaddresspracticalproblemsthatseemrecalcitranttotreatmentbyconventionalpoliticalinstitutions.Butthosearrangementsarenotawholesalereplacementofconventionalpoliticalinstitutions:theyhavelimitedscopeandlimitednumbersofdirectparticipants.Totheextentthattheyaresuccessful,however,participatory-deliberativearrangementsandconventionalpoliticalrepres-entationcanbetransformedandlinkedsothateachstrengthenstheother.Ifsucharrangementsbecameacommonformoflocalandadministrativeproblemsolving,theroleoflegislaturesandpublicagencieswouldshiftfromdirectlysolvingarangeofsocialproblemstosupportingtheeffortsofmanyparticipatorydeliberations,maintainingtheirdemocraticintegrity,andensuringtheircoordination.Conversely,thosewhoparticipateddirectlyinthesenewdeliberativearrangementswouldformahighlyinformed,mobilized,andactivebasethatwouldenhancethemandateandlegitimacyofelectedrepresentativesandotherofficials.Thesecondchallengeistoextendthescopeofradicaldemocracy.Canparticipatorydeliberationhelpdemocratizelarge-scaledecisionsaboutpublicpriorities–warandpeace,healthinsurance,publicpensions,andthedistributionofwealth?Onewaytoaddresstheselargerquestionsistoconnectthedisciplined,practical,participatorydeliberationsaboutsolvingparticularproblems–say,effortstoreduceasthmaratesinalow-incomecommunity,oreffortstoprovidedecentmedicalcareinNewOrleansorLosAngeles–tothewiderpublicsphereofdebateandopinionformation–aboutthecostsofhealthcare,accesstoit,andtheimportanceofhealthrelativetootherbasicgoods.Participantsindirectdeliberationsareinformedbythedisperseddis-cussionsintheinformalpublicsphere,andthosemorefocuseddeliberationsinturninvestpublicdiscussionwithapracticalityitmightotherwiselack.Theambitioushopeisthatcitizenswhoparticipateinconstructingsolutionstoconcreteproblemsinlocalpubliclifemayinturnengagemoredeeplyininformaldeliberationinthewiderpublicsphereandinformalpoliticalinstitutionsaswell.Intheend,then,radicaldemocracy–understoodasanefforttocombinethevaluesofbothparticipationanddeliberation–haspromisetobeadistinctiveformofdemocracy,inwhichtheinformalpublicsphereandconventionaldemocraticinsti-tutionsarereshapedbytheirconnectionswithparticipatory-deliberativearrangementsforsolvingproblems.Whetheritwilldeliveronthatpromiseremains,ofcourse,averyopenquestion.Notes1IpresentedearlierversionsofthisessayattheUniversityofSouthernCaliforniaLawSchoolandataPrincetonUniversityconferenceondeliberativedemocracy.Iamgratefultotheaudiencesonbothoccasionsfortheircommentsandcriticisms.2Forrepresentativeideas,seeJohnRoemer,EqualShares:MakingMarketSocialismWork(NewYorkandLondon:Verso,1996);SamuelBowlesandHerbertGintis,RecastingEgalitarianism:NewRulesforCommunities,StatesandMarkets(NewYorkandLondon:Verso,1999);StuartWhite,TheCivicMinimum(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003);260JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page261BruceAckermanandAnneAlstott,TheStakeholderSociety(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2000);RichardFreeman,TheNewInequality(Boston,MA:BeaconPress,1998).3Ihavewrittenelsewhereonthisradical-democraticproject:withJoelRogers(onassociativedemocracy),ChuckSabel(ondeliberativepolyarchy),andArchonFung(onparticipationanddeliberation).Inwritingthisessay,Ihavedrawnfreelyonthisjointwork,andamverygratefultomyco-authorsforthecollaborationsthatproducedit.SeeJoshuaCohenandJoelRogers,AssociationsandDemocracy(London:Verso,1995);JoshuaCohenandCharlesSabel,“Directly-DeliberativePolyarchy,”EuropeanLawJournal3(4)(Dec.1997):313–42;JoshuaCohenandJoelRogers,“PowerandReason,”inArchonFungandErikOlinWright,eds.,DeepeningDemocracy:InstitutionalInnovationsinEmpoweredParticipatoryGovernance(NewYorkandLondon:Verso,2003);JoshuaCohenandCharlesSabel,“GlobalDemocracy?,”NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolicy37(4)(2006):763–97;JoshuaCohenandArchonFung,“RadicalDemocracy,”SwissJournalofPoliticalScience10(4)(2004).4Rousseauhimselfexploredotherformsofdemocraticparticipation,particularlyinhisConstitutionofPoland,whereconsiderationsofsizeprecludeddirectcitizenparticipationinlaw-making.5JürgenHabermas,LegitimationCrisis,trans.ThomasMcCarthy(Boston,MA:BeaconPress,1973),p.108.Inthispassage,Habermasisnotdescribinganidealizeddemocracy,butahypotheticalsituationsuitedtothejustificationofnorms.6Wenowhavemanystatementsofthedeliberativeconception.Formyown,whichIdrawonhere,seeJoshuaCohen,“DeliberationandDemocraticLegitimacy,”AlanHamlinandPhillipPetit,eds.,TheGoodPolity(Oxford:Blackwell,1989);“ProcedureandSubstanceinDeliberativeDemocracy,”inSeylaBenhabib,ed.,DemocracyandDifference:ChangingBoundariesofthePolitical(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1996);“DemocracyandLiberty,”inJonElster,ed.,DeliberativeDemocracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998);and“Privacy,Pluralism,andDemocracy,”inJosephKeimCampbell,MichaelO’Rourke,andDavidShier,eds.,LawandSocialJustice(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2005).7CarlSchmitt,TheCrisisofParliamentaryDemocracy,trans.EllenKennedy(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1985),p.6.8InIsDemocracyPossibleHere?(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2006),RonaldDworkinemphasizestheimportanceofeducationinawell-functioning,deliberativedemo-cracy,andassertsthat“themostdauntingbutalsomosturgentrequirementistomakeaContemporaryPoliticscoursepartofeverhighschoolcurriculum”(148).Theideaofsuchacourseissensibleenough,butithardlyseemsthemosturgentissueaboutthereformofoureducationalsystem,forthepurposesoffosteringthepartnershipinargumentthatissocentraltodemocracy.9AsRawlsobserves,anideaofpublicreasonisoneofthe“essentialelementsofdeliberativedemocracy.”See“TheIdeaofPublicReasonRevisited,”inLawofPeoples(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),p.139.10Onproblemswithdeliberationunderaunanimityrule,seeDavidAusten-SmithandTimothyFeddersen,“Deliberation,PreferenceUncertainty,andVotingRules,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview100(2006):209–18.11See,forexample,JürgenHabermas,BetweenFactsandNorms,trans.WilliamRehg(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1996),pp.296,304.12Theemphasisondeliberationasreason-givingisnotcapturedinmodelsofdeliberationascheaptalksignaling,wherethepointistoconveysomepieceofprivateinformation,andsuccessdependsonbeliefsaboutthetrustworthinessofthespeaker(seeAusten-SmithandFeddersen,“Deliberation,PreferenceUncertainty,andVotingRules”).Foraninter-estingefforttomodeldeliberationasreasoning–arguingfrompremissestoconclusions,ReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy261\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page262whereindividualscancheckthequalityofthereasoningthemselves–seeCatherineHaferandDimitriLanda,“DeliberationasSelf-DiscoveryandInstitutionsforPoliticalSpeech,”JournalofTheoreticalPolitics19(3)(2007).13AmyGutmannandDennisThompson,WhyDeliberativeDemocracy?(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004),p.3.14“Introduction,”DeliberativeDemocracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),p.8.15DeliberativeDemocracyandBeyond(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),p.31.16DeliberativeDemocracyandBeyond,p.8.17DeliberativeDemocracyandBeyond,p.167;and,ingeneral,Ch.3.18IbelievethatLynnSanderswasthefirsttoraisethisobjection,in“AgainstDeliberation,”PoliticalTheory(1997):347–76.19ArchonFung,EmpoweredParticipation:ReinventingUrbanDemocracy(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004),Ch.4.20SeeRebeccaAbers,“ReflectionsonWhatMakesEmpoweredParticipatoryGovernanceHappen,”inFungandWright,DeepeningDemocracy,p.206,andmoregenerallyherInventingLocalDemocracy(Boulder,CO:LynneRienner,2000);GianpaoloBaiocchi,MilitantsandCitizens:ThePoliticsofParticipatoryDemocracyinPortoAlegre(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2005).21Inhiscritiqueofdeliberativedemocracy,Posnerislesshostiletolocallyfocuseddiscus-sionabouttheprovisionofpublicgoods,perhapsforreasonsofthekindnotedinthetext.SeeLaw,Pragmatism,andDemocracy(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2003).22StephenAnsolabehere,AlanGerber,JamesM.Snyder,“EqualVotes,EqualMoney:Court-OrderedRedistrictingandtheDistributionofPublicExpenditureintheAmericanStates,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview(Aug.2002).23EstherDuflo,“WomenasPolicyMakers:EvidencefromaRandomizedPolicyExperimentinIndia,”Econometrica72(5)(2004):1409–43.24GianpaoloBaiocchi,TheCitizensofPortoAlegre,BostonReview31(2)(Mar.–Apr.2006).25LucioBaccaro,“TheConstructionofDemocraticCorporatisminItaly,”PoliticsandSociety30(2)(Jun.2002):327–57.26CassSunstein,“GroupJudgments:StatisticalMeans,Deliberation,andInformationMarkets,”NYULawReview80(Jun.2005):962–1049;andTaliMendelberg’sveryinstructivedis-cussionofdeliberationandsmall-groupdecision-making,in“TheDeliberativeCitizen:TheoryandEvidence,”inMichaelX.DelliCarpini,LeonieHuddy,andRobertShapiro,eds.,PoliticalDecision-Making,Deliberation,andParticipation:ResearchinMicropolitics,vol.6(Greenwich,CT:JAIPress,2002),pp.151–93.27SeeCohenandRogers,“PowerandReason.”28SeeCohen,“DeliberationandDemocraticLegitimacy,”andHabermas,BetweenFactsandNorms,Ch.7.29DianaMutzexploresadifferenttensionbetweendeliberationandparticipationinherimportantbook,HearingtheOtherSideDeliberativeVersusParticipatoryDemocracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006).Mutzarguesthatdeliberationamongthediverseencouragesgreatertoleration,butdampensparticipationbecauseofadesiretoavoidconflictwiththepeopletowhomonetalks.Participationinturnisanimatedbyasenseofpassionthatisdampenedbydeliberation.IamnotsurethatMutz’sresultsextendoutsideparticipationinhighlycompetitivepoliticalsettings.Butthechallengesheraisesisdeepandneedstobeaddressed.30See,forexample,DerekBell,“TheReferendum:Democracy’sBarriertoRacialEquality,”WashingtonLawReview54(1)(1978):1–29;YannisPapadopolous,“AFrameworkforAnalysisofFunctionsandDysfunctionsofDirectDemocracy:Top-DownandBottom-UpPerspectives,”PoliticsandSociety23(1995):421–48.262JoshuaCohen\nCDIC14.qxd2/4/0915:52Page26331Habermas,BetweenFactsandNorms,Ch.8;JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),pp.14,382–3.32JuliaAbelson,Pierre-GerlierForest,JohnEyles,PatriciaSmith,ElisabethMartin,andFrançois-PierreGauvin,“DeliberationsaboutDeliberativeMethods:IssuesintheDesignandEvaluationofPublicParticipationProcesses”inSocialScienceandMedicine57(2003):239–51;NedCrosby,“Citizens’Juries:OneSolutionforDifficultEnvironmentalQuestions,”inO.Renn,T.Webler,andP.Wiedelmanneds.,FairnessandCompetenceinCitizenParticipation:EvaluatingModelsforEnvironmentalDiscourse(Boston,MA:KluwerAcademicPress,1995),pp.157–74;G.SmithandC.Wales,“TheTheoryandPracticeofCitizens’Juries,”PolicyandPolitics27(3)(1999):295–308;JohnGastil,ByPopularDemand(LosAngelesandBerkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2000).33Forasketchofpollsandimplications,seeBruceAckermanandJamesFishkin,DeliberationDay(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2005),esp.Ch.3.34SeeLucioBaccaroandKonstantinosPapadakis,“TheDownsideofDeliberativePublicAdministration”(unpublished).35Fordiscussionoftheissuessketchedhere,seeCohenandSabel,“Directly-DeliberativePolyarchy,”CohenandSabel,“GlobalDemocracy?,”andCohenandSabel,“SovereigntyandSolidarityintheEU,”inJonathanZeitlinandDavidTrubek,eds.,GoverningWorkandWelfareinaNewEconony:EuropeanandAmericanExperiments(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),pp.345–75.ReflectionsonDeliberativeDemocracy263\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page265DEMOCRACYANDITSLIMITSCONSTITUTIONALISMContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page267CHAPTERFIFTEENConstitutionalism–ASkepticalViewJeremyWaldron1.IntroductionInthischapter,Iwillcastaskepticaleyeoverthepoliticaltheoryassociatedwiththeterm“constitutionalism.”Iknowthat“constitutionalism”isatermofapprobation;weareallsupposedtobeconstitutionalistsnow.Butitmaybeworthsoundingacriticalnoteortwo.Apartfromanythingelse,evensupportersofconstitutionalismshouldworrythat,withoutanoccasionallivecritictocontendwith,theirfaithmaybecomeadeaddogmaratherthanalivingtruth,asuperstitionorprejudiceclingingaccident-1allytoaformofwordsthatonceconveyedsomethinginterestingandcontroversial.2.TheWeakestMeaningof“Constitutionalism”Thepotentialfor“constitutionalism”todegenerateintoanemptysloganisexacerbatedbythefactthatthewordissometimesusedinawaythatconveysnotheoreticalcontentatall.Oftenthetermseemstomeanslittlemorethanthethoughtfulorsystematicstudyofconstitutionsandvariousconstitutionalprovisions.Thereisnothingwrongwiththisuseof“constitutionalism.”Peoplecanusewordshowevertheylike,andtheOxfordEnglishDictionaryseemstoacceptthisusage.Thefirst2meaningsuggestedfor“constitutionalism”is“aconstitutionalsystemofgovernment.”Itisnotanunreasonableusage.“Constitutionalism”isagrandioseword:whynotuseitssevenoreightsyllablestomakethestudyofconstitutions,constitutionallaw,andconstitutionalsystemsofgovernmentsoundimportant?3.ConstitutionalismasaTheoryStill,thelasttwosyllables–the“-ism”–shouldatleastalertustoanadditionalmeaningthatdoesdenoteatheoryorsetoftheoreticalclaims.ConstitutionalismisContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page268likeliberalismorsocialismorscientism.Itisperhapsworthaskingwhatthattheoryisand,whethertheclaimsitcomprisesaretrueorvalid.Imentionedamomentagothedictionarydefinitionoftheterm.Thesecondmean-ingproposedforthetermbytheOxfordEnglishDictionaryreferstoanattitudeor3disposition–“[a]dherencetoconstitutionalprinciples.”Aconstitutionalist,inthissense,isonewhotakesconstitutionsveryseriouslyandwhoisnotdisposedtoallowdeviationsfromthemevenwhenotherimportantvaluesareinvolved.“Constitution-alism”thereforereferstothesortofideologythatmakesthisattitudeseemsensible.Constitutionalism,thetheory,includesattheveryleasttheclaimthatasociety’sconstitutionmatters,thatitisnotjustdecoration,thatithasanimportancethatjustifiesmakingsacrificesofotherimportantvaluesforitsforitssake.4.ParticularandGeneralConstitutionalismSuchaviewmighthavetwoaspects:(i)itmaybetheviewthattheprinciplesofaparticularconstitutionareimportant;or(ii)itmaybethegeneralviewthatconsti-tutionsassuchareimportant.Forexample,underheading(i),wemightthinkthatEnglishconstitutionalismattributesgreatimportancetoparliamentarysovereigntywhereasAmericanconsti-tutionalismincludesgreataffectionforfederalstructuresandfortheseparationof4powers.Underheading(ii),bycontrast,wewouldtryandlookatwhatvariousconstitu-tionalismshaveincommon,evenwhentheychauvinisticallycelebratedifferently-shapedarrangements.RogerScruton’sdefinitionoftheterminhisDictionaryofPoliticalThoughtishelpfulasanexampleof(ii):hedefines“constitutionalism”astheadvocacyofconstitutionalgovernment,i.e.of“governmentchanneledthroughandlimitedby5aconstitution.”Onthisview,aconstitutionalistisonewhothinksitimportantforgovernmenttobeorganizedthroughandrestrainedbyasetofconstitutionalrules;suchapersonwillbeopposedtovariousformsofabsolutism,becausethatinvolves6repudiatingtheideaofruleslimitinggovernmentatthehighestlevel.Wemightsaythatdespitethedifferencesbetween(say)AustralianandAmericanconstitutionalism,constitutionalistsinbothcountriescelebrateandadvocateformsofpoliticalstruc-turingthatlimitthepowerofgovernmentinvariousways.Someoftheseformsaresimilar(likefederalism);someofthemaredifferent(likethemoreextensiveprovi-sionforjudicialreviewoflegislationintheUnitedStates).Buttheideaofusingformallyarticulatedstructuretorestraingovernmentisheldincommonbythetwosetsofconstitutionalists,anditmaybecontrasted,ontheonehand,withtheviewthatgovernmentsarebestrestrainedbyanunarticulatedethosofmoderationand,ontheotherhand,bytheabsolutistconvictionthatitmaynotbeappropriatetotrytolimitgovernmentatall.5.ExplicitandImplicitConstitutionsButmaybethesearefalsecontrasts.Perhapsweoughttosaythateverystablesystemofgovernmenthasaconstitution,ifbyaconstitutionwemeanasetoffundamental268JeremyWaldron\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page269rulesestablishingthewaygovernmentalpowersareexercised,whoexercisesthem,whattheirjurisdictionis,howlawsaremadeandchanged,andsoon.Onthisaccount,evenadictatorshiporanabsolutemonarchyhasaconstitution;itsconstitutionmaydifferfromthatofasystemofparliamentarysovereigntyorfromarepublicansystem7ofchecksandbalances;butitisstillaconstitution.Ifgovernmentwereimaginablewithoutaconstitution,itwouldbeastheadventitiouspersistenceoftraditionalwaysofdoingthingswithoutanyconsciousnessofthemasrules;buteventhensomewouldsaythatthesewaysofdoingthingscanbeidentifiedandspokenaboutasconstitutionalnormsatleastbyoutsiders,evenifitdoesn’toccurtoparticipantstothinkaboutthemintheseterms.WhenAlexanderHamiltonremarkedattheverybeginningofTheFederalistPapersthatitseemstohavebeenreservedtothepeopleofthiscountry,bytheirconductandexample,todecidetheimportantquestion,whethersocietiesofmenarereallycap-ableornotofestablishinggoodgovernmentfromreflectionandchoice,orwhetherthey8areforeverdestinedtodependfortheirpoliticalconstitutionsonaccidentandforce.heseemedtobeassumingthatcountrieswhosesystemsofgovernmentarenotestab-lishedbyreflectionandchoicedostillhaveconstitutions.Butevenifthatisright,Ithinkconstitutionalism–thegeneralideology–meanssomethingalittlebitmorespecificthanthis.ItisoftenassociatedspecificallywiththesortofthingthatHamiltonthoughtdistinguishedtheUnitedStatesfromothersystemsofgovernment,i.e.,theimportanceofconsciousreflectionandchoiceupontheforms,structuresandarrangementsforgovernment.6.ConstitutionalismandWrittenConstitutionsIsconstitutionalismthecelebrationofwrittenconstitutions?Itisoftensaidthatthemainadvantageofputtingone’sconstitutionintowritingisthatitestablishesitsauthorityashigherlaw,makingitenforceablebythejudiciary.ThisiswhatJusticeMarshallsaidinMarburyv.Madison:[A]llthosewhohaveframedwrittenconstitutionscontemplatethemasformingthefundamentalandparamountlawofthenation,andconsequentlythetheoryofeverysuchgovernmentmustbe,thatanactofthelegislaturerepugnanttotheconstitution9isvoid.Thistheoryisessentiallyattachedtoawrittenconstitution....Onitsface,however,thisisanimplausibleargument.Thewritten-nessofaconsti-tutioniscompatiblewithitsbeing(treatedas)ordinarylegislation,liketheNewZealandConstitutionActof1986.Oritiscompatiblewithitbeingtreatedmerelyasapieceofpaper,withlittlelegaleffect,liketheSovietConstitutionof1936.Ontheotherhand,judicialreviewonconstitutionalgroundscanbethoughtlegitimateevenwhere10therelevantprovisionofhigherlawisunwritten.Amoreplausibleaccountofwritten-nessisthatitallowstheconstitutiontohaveamorepalpablepresenceinthepolity.HannahArendtsaidthat,inAmerica,itwasimportantthattheConstitutionbe“atangibleworldlyentity,”“anendurableobjec-tivething,which,tobesure,onecouldapproachfrommanydifferentanglesandConstitutionalism–ASkepticalView269\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page270uponwhichonecouldimposemanydifferentinterpretations,...butwhichnever-11thelesswasneverasubjectivestateofmind,likethewill.”Thismaybeparticularlyimportantwhenconstitutionalarrangementsarebeingconsideredanddebated.Asetofimplicitrulesisveryhardtoreflectuponinanycoherentwayamongalargenumberofpeople.Deliberationcanseemfutileunlessitisfocusedonatextthatservesasafocalpointfordebate–awrittentext,by12whichissuesareseparated,andonwhichamendmentsmayberegistered.Idonotwanttoquarrelwiththisaspectofconstitutionalism.Itishighlydesirableforattentiontobegivenexplicitlytotheconstitutionalarrangementsofasociety:theyaretooimportanttobeleftto“accidentorforce”asHamiltonputit.Iwouldenterthreecaveatshowever.First,whatisimportantisnotjustthatthereshouldbesomeformofconsciousandexplicitreflectiononconstitutionalarrangements,butthatthisshouldbetheworkofthepeoplewhosesocietyistobegovernedbythesearrangements.Iwilltalkmoreaboutthisinsection11.Second,thetextualqualityofawrittenconstitutionmayhavedrawbacks,par-ticularlyinthecontextoflegalismandjudicialreview.Withawrittenconstitutionastheirbattlefield,lawyers,andjudgesarelikelytobeheavilydistractedintheirdiscussionsbyside-argumentsaboutinterpretivetheory.Alternatively,thewrittenformulationsofaBillofRightsencouragerigidtextualformalism;thewordsofeachprovisiontakeonalifeoftheirown,becomingasortofobsessivecatch-phraseforexpressinginawaythatmakesitdifficulttofocusonwhatisreallyatstake.(Forexample,inassessingAmericansocialandeconomiclegislationintheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcentury,wasitreallyworthspendingsomuchenergydiscussingwhether“dueprocess”canbesubstantive?)Isuspectthatthesedisadvantagesoftextualityareprobablyoutweighedbytheearlierpointsaboutfacilitatingdeliberation.Buttheyaredrawbacksnonetheless.Andthereisadangerthatthebalancewillsliptheotherway.ThecasethatIhavemadeforawrittentextisthatithelpsconcentratethemindsofthosewhoaredeliberatinguponandchoosingconstitutionalarrangements.Butformanyconstitutionalists,reflectionandchoiceisamatterofhistory,oftenquitedistanthistory–amatterfor“theFramers”notforcurrentpolitics.Fromthisperspective,thevalueofthewrittentextisthewaythevenerablecalligraphyoftheeighteenthcenturyenduestherulesitembodieswithanauraofancestralauthorityandimmutability.Andthatseemstometocountagainstwritten-ness.ForIamnotaccepting–thisismythirdcaveat–thatthevalueofawrittentextconsistsintheeffectivenessoftheconstraintsthatitembodies.Whetheritisactuallythepointofaconstitutiontoconstraingovernment,asopposedtoempowerit,issomethingthatneedstobediscussed.7.ConstitutionalismandConstraintThisbringsustothemoresubstantiveaspectofconstitutionalism.Unlike,say,theRuleofLaw,constitutionalismisnotjustanormativetheoryabouttheformof13governance.Itisaboutcontrolling,limiting,andrestrainingthepowerofthestate.Numerousbooksonconstitutionalismmakethisclearintheirtitles.ScottGordon’sbookonthesubjectiscalledControllingtheState:ConstitutionalismfromAncient270JeremyWaldron\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page271AthenstoTodayandAndrásSajóentitleshisbookLimitingGovernment:A14IntroductiontoConstitutionalism.InaforewordtoSajó’sbook,StephenHolmeswritesthat“[c]onstitutionsaregiantrestrainingordersmotivatedbyapassionforavoidance.Theyareinevitablypropelledbythedesiretoescapespecificdangerous15andunpleasantpoliticaloutcomes.”Thethemeisaperennialone.“Inallitssuc-cessivephases,”accordingtoC.H.McIlwain,“constitutionalismhasoneessential16quality:itisalegallimitationongovernment.”Therearesomemorenuancedviews.CassSunsteininsiststhatlimitedgovern-17mentisjustoneofmanyprinciplesassociatedwithconstitutionalism.Butthisgoesagainstthegeneraltrend.Formostwriters,constitutionalismequalsconstraint.TheyacceptMcIlwain’scharacterizationorthatofCarlFriedrich,whospokeofconstitu-18tionalismas“effectiveregularizedrestraint”ongovernment.Constitutionalismseemstoassumethatthepowerofthestateneedstoberestrainedorlimitedorcontrolled,lestitgetoutofhand.ItispartofwhatJudith19Shklarcalled“theliberalismoffear.”Theideaisthattheconcentrationofpowerleadstoitsabuseandthisiswhythepower-dispersing,thepower-slowing,thepower-checkingelementsofconstitutionalstructureareimportant.Howseriouslyshouldwetakethelanguageofconstraint?EspeciallyintheAmericanlawreviewliterature,thereisatendencyjusttorepeatwell-wornformu-lationsandslogans,andtopaylittleattentiontothedetailedformulationofone’sposition.Forconsiderthetermsthatareusedforthisconnectionbetweenconstitu-tionsandvariousformsofconstraint.Themostcommonlyusedphraseis“limitedgovernment,”butthereisalsotalkofaconnectionbetweenconstitutionalismand“restraints”uponpowerandofconstitutionalismasadoctrineof“control”(asinScottGordon’stitle“ControllingtheState”).Now,consideredanalyticallythesephrases–“limitedgovernment,”“restrainedgovernment,”and“controlledgovern-ment”–arenotsynonymous.Theymeandifferentthingsandtheyhavedifferentconnotationsinthetheoryofpolitics.Letusbeginwith“control.”Theideaofcontrollingthestateisnotnecessarilyanegativeorconstrainingidea.IfIcontrolavehicle,Ideterminenotonlywhereitdoesnotgo,butalsowhereitdoesgo.Andifgovernmentiscontrolled,onemightthinkthattheimportantquestioniswhoisinthedrivingseat.Oftenconstitutionalstructurehasthisaspectofcontrol:wesubordinatethecourtstothelegislatureandtheexecutivetothecourts,sothatthesortofcontrolenvisagedinlegislationisconveyedtothoseresponsibleforexecutingthelaw.SomeonemayrespondthatwhatIhavejustsaidisaboutintra-governmentalcontrol,whereasthosewhotalkofcontrollingthestatehaveinmindcontrolofthewholeentity,ofthelegislatureaswellasthecourtsandtheexecutive.Butevenatthislevel,weneednottaketheviewthatcontrolisequivalenttoconstraint.Wemaysayinsteadthatitisimportantforthegovernmentasawholetobecontrolledbythepeopleand,again,wemayunderstandthiscontrolasnotsomethingpurelynegative,butasamatterofarticulateresponsetothepeople’swill.Ifthepeoplewanttheirgovernmenttoamelioratepoverty,forexample,itisthetaskofthecon-stitutiontoprovideinstitutionsthatcanbecontrolledbythisdesire.Restraint,ontheotherhand,isdefinitelyanegativeidea:itistheideaofpre-ventingthegovernmentfromdoingcertainthings.A“restraint”viewproceedsonthebasisthatwecanidentifycertainabusesthatwewanttoavoidandweConstitutionalism–ASkepticalView271\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page272specificallyprohibitthem,buildingtheseprohibitionsintotheverydocumentthatconstitutesgovernmentalauthority.Suchprohibitionsoftentaketheformofrights–arightnottobetortured,arighttobefreefrominterferencewithreligiousbelief,andsoon.Theideaisthatwhateverthegovernmentaffirmativelydoes,itmustnotdothesethings.Insomecases,theprohibitionisabsolute–asinmostconstitutionsitisinthecaseoftorture.Inothercases,theprohibitionworksasaspecificationoftheconditionsunderwhichthingsmaybedonewhichmightotherwisebeoppres-sive:nodetentionwithouttrial,notrialwithouttheassistanceofcounsel,andsoon.Muchofthepopularityofmodernconstitutionalismisduetothefactthatitconnectswithhumanrightsinthisway.Butitisinterestingthatfewconstitution-alistsarewillingtoresttheirtheoryonthisbasisalone.Notcontentwithrestraintsonpower,constitutionalistsoftensaythatthefunctionofconstitutionsisalsotolimitaffirmativelythesortofthingthatgovernmentscando.“Limitedgovernment,”then,refersnotjusttotheavoidanceofparticularabuses,20buttoabroadersenseofwhatisandwhatisnotthegovernment’sproperfunction.Nodoubt,thereissomecontinuitybetweenthetwoideas.Onemightsay,asamatterofrestraint,thatthegovernmentmaynotinterferewithreligiousfreedom.Oronemightsayasamatteroflimitsthatitisnotthegovernment’sfunctiontoestablishanyformofpublicworship.Forothercases,however,theoverlapbetweenrestrainandlimitisdeceptive.Onemightsay,astheU.S.Constitutionsays,thatthegov-21ernmentisrestrainedfrompassing“any...lawimpairingtheobligationofcontracts.”Butitwouldbeafurtherstep–quiteadrasticstep–tosaythatitisnotthefunc-tionofthegovernmenttointerfereinthemarketeconomy.If,however,onetreatslimitedgovernmentasthecoreprincipleofconstitution-alism,thenoneisinapositiontomovemoredirectlytotheideathatmanyoftheaspirationsofgovernment–particularlydemocraticgovernment–areperseille-gitimate.Thosewhosetupademocracymaybehopingforgovernmentinterven-tiontoamelioratepoverty,promotepublichealth,andprotecttheenvironment.Theyknowtheyarelikelytofaceoppositionfromopponentswhoclaimthatthisisnoneofthegovernment’sbusiness.Butnowitseemsthattheseopponentscantakeonthemantleofconstitutionalism,andaddtotheircaseagainstinterventionthattheinterventionistsdonottaketheconstitutionaldimensionofgovernanceseriouslyenough.Constitutionalism,asaresult,getsassociatedwithsomethinglikethepoliticaltheoryoftraditionalminimal-stateliberalism,andcommentatorsbegintotalkof“laissez-faireconstitutionalism,”notjustasoneextremeformofconstitutionalistideology,22butassomethingtowhichallconstitutionsshouldaspire.AmIbeingtoopedanticinthisexplorationofthedifferencesbetweencontrol,limitation,andrestraint?Surelyallthatismeant,whenthesetermsareusedlooselyassynonymsofoneanother,isthataconstitutionconsistsofruleswhichregulatetheactionsandpracticestheyapplyto.Wemightacceptthisasanabstractpoint,butifwerefusedtogobeyondthisinouranalysisofconstitutionalism,Ithinkwewoulddraintheconceptofmuchofitsdistinctivecharacterasatheory.Nodoubtmanyconstitutionalistswouldbehappierwithasituationinwhichnoonelookedtoocloselyatthecontentoftheirposition,sothattheywerefreetocapitalizeonacertainloosenessintherhetoricandusetheequivocationsthatthelanguageofcontrol,restraint,andlimitmakespossibletoleveragethegood-heartedmoderationofthepersonwhobelievesthatthegovernmentshouldn’tbeallowedtodojust272JeremyWaldron\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page273anythingintoacceptanceofthedoctrinethatitisunwisetoallowthegovernmenttodotoomuch.Butitisnotourtaskinthestudyofconstitutionalismtoassisttheminthatpractice.8.EmpowermentandAuthorityWhatdoconstitutionsdothatconstitutionalistsdownplay?Firstandforemosttheyempower:theyestablishinstitutionsthatallowpeopletocooperateandcoordinatetopursueprojectsthattheycannotachieveontheirown.Totakeasimplebutobviousexample:weneedanagencytoactdecisivelyinlarge-scalenaturalemergenciesforwhichindividualorvoluntaryeffortswillbeinadequate;aconstitutionprovidestheinstitutionalauspicesunderwhichthatagencycanbecreatedandempowered.Theneedmaybeforpeopletoactinconcertinlargenumbers(perhapshundredsofthousands,evenmillions),andtheycannotdothatwithoutthesortofarticulatedpowerthatinstitutionsprovide.Constitutionsalsoinvestinstitutionslikethiswithpublicauthority.BythatImean,theynotonlyprovidetheinstitutionswithpowersofcoercion,theyalsoensurethattheycanactcrediblyinthenameofthewholesocietyandtheyseetoitthatthisamountstomorethanjustalabelbuttoasub-stantialsourceoftheiractuallegitimacy.Governmentalinstitutionshavetohavestand-inginthecommunityasafocusofloyaltyandasapointofreferenceororientationforthemillionsofothersinthesocietywhoarefiguringouthowtheirconcernsandactionsandresourcesaretoberelatedtotheconcerns,actions,andresourcesthattheinstitutioncommands.Allsortsofinstitutionsneedtobeestablishedinthisspirit.Aconstitutionhastosetupcourtstoresolvedisputesinthenameofthewholesociety;ithastoestablishalegislatureasanagencywhichinthenameofthewholesocietywillkeepitsstandingrulesunderreview;andithastoestablisharmedorgan-izationstokeepthepeaceinasocietyandtodefenditsinterests,againinthenameofthewholesociety.Themannerinwhichtheconstitutionperformsthattask,themodeofoperationitestablishesfortheseinstitutions,andthewayitrelatesthemtooneanother,areallcrucialcomponentstotheestablishmentofauthorityinthissense.WhatIhavejustsaidisplatitudinousandsomereaderswillthinkthatconstitu-tionalistscanbeforgivenforbrushingpasttheseobviouspointsandcuttingstraighttothequestionofhowtheinstitutionssetupinthesewaysandforthesepurposesaretobelimitedorcontrolled.Theymayacceptthatconstitutionsarenecessarytoconstitutethepowerofthestate.Buttheirconstitutionalismissomethingextra.InSajó’swords,“[c]onstitutionsareaboutpower;aconstitutionimpregnatedwiththe23ideasofconstitutionalismisaboutlimitedpower.”Butevenputtingthematterlikethatstillleadstoadistortioninourthinking.Itindicatesthattheestablishingofpoliticalpowerdoesnotneedthesortofattentionthatconstitutionalismdevotestothesubsetofprovisionsconcernedwithrestraintandlimitation.Besidesactuallyestablishingcentersofpublicpower,constitutionslaydownproceduresfortheiroperation,oftenquiteformalisticprocedureslimitingnotsomuchwhatcanbedonebuthowitisdone.Aconstitutionalizedpoliticsisanarticulatepoliticsthatmovesdeliberatelyanddeliberativelyfromstagetostageandforumtoforum,takingseriouslytheintegrityofeachpartof(say)thelaw-makingprocessorConstitutionalism–ASkepticalView273\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page274ofotherprocessesofpoliticaldecision.Ihaveinmindprocesseslikebicameralleg-islation,therequirementofexecutiveconsent,andthearticulaterelationbetweenlegislatureontheonehand,andthecourtsandagentsoftheexecutivewhoadmin-ister,interpretandenforcethelaws.Fromaconstitutionalistperspective,thereisatendencytothinksimplisticallyofdeviceslikethese:theyareconceivedjustasbrakesuponthelaw-makingprocess,pointsofpossibleresistanceagainstoppressivelegis-lation.Equallythereisatendencytothinkoftheformalseparationofpowersbetween(say)legislature,executive,andjudiciarysimplyaswaysofdilutingpowerandmakingitharderforittobeexercised.Everythingisseenthroughthelensofconstraint.Butsuchdevicesneednotbeseeninthislight:articulateprocesscanbeseenasawayofstructuringdeliberation;bicameralarrangementscanbeseenaswaysofempoweringdifferentvoicesinthecommunity;andtheseparationofpowerscanbeseenasawayoftakingseriouslytheintegrityofwhatcomesintoexistenceasthe24resultofagenuinelegislativeexercise.ThatthelegislaturemaynotcontrolwhathappenstoanActonceitpassesintothehandsofthecourtsisnotjustamethodforpreventingoppression(byensuringthatthelegislatorsthemselvesaresubjectto25theforceofwhattheyhaveenacted),itisalsoawayofmarkingsomethingaboutwhathasbeendoneinthelegislature.Byvirtueofthelegislature’ssolemndecision,whathasbeenproducedcomestohavethespecialstatusoflaw;itisnotjustanothergovernmentalmeasure.Anditshandlingafteritleavesthelegislatureisthetributepaidtothatfactthroughinstitutionalarticulation.Ingeneral,weneedtounderstandtheimportanceofthewayinwhichaconsti-tutionprovideshousingforthepoliticalactivityofasociety,establishinganin-betweenoffurnitureandformalitysothatpublicdeliberationbecomesastructuredenter-prise,allowingtheviewsofonepersontobebroughtarticulatelyintorelationwiththeviewsofothersandfacilitatingtheformationofwell-thought-through,respons-26ible,andpoliticallyeffectiveopinions.Thisisnotprimarilyamatterofconstraint;itisamatterofwhataconstitutionaffirmativelymakespossibleoutofwhatwould27otherwisebethelooseandlurchingpoliticsofthestreet.9.Democracy:ConstraintorEmpowerment?ManyofthepointsIhavemadeapplymostvividlytodemocracy,andtheskepticalnotesthatIamsoundingaboutconstitutionalismasanideologyaredemocraticnotes.Whenaconstitutionalistthinksofdemocracy,hisfirstthoughtis:Howcanwepreventdemocracyfromdegeneratingintotyrannyofthemajority?Whatdevicesareavailabletorestrainthetyrannicalexcessestowhichdemocraciesareendemic-allyliable?Butofcoursetherearepriorquestionsthatneedtobeattendedtoaswell.Howisademocracytobeconstituted?Whatistobethesystemofrepresenta-tion?Whatarethedifferentrequirementsofdemocracyfordifferentkindsofpolit-icaloffice(theelectionofaheadoftheexecutive,forexample,versustheelectionofalegislator)?Howistheintegrityoftheelectoralprocesstobeguaranteed?Andaboveall,dominatingallofthesequestions:Howisthecentralprincipleofpoliticalequality,whichisthefoundationofdemocracy,tobeupheldandenforced?Ithinkthereisanimportantcontrastherebetweentheconstitutionofpowerindemocraticandnon-democraticsocieties.Innon-democraticsystemsofgovernment,274JeremyWaldron\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page275itisusuallythetaskoftheconstitutiontoformalizetheauthorityofthosetowhom,asitwere,powercomesnaturallyorwho,asithappens,havebeenvestedhistoric-allywithpoweroveragivensociety.Theconstitutionofademocracy,bycontrast,involvesempoweringthosewhowouldotherwisebepowerless,theordinarypeoplewhoinmostpolitiesarethesubjectsnottheagentsofpower.ThemanwhomColonelRainboroughreferredtoas“thepooresthethatisinEngland”isthehardestmantoempower,becauseifthingsarelefttothemselveshewillhavenopoliticalpower28atall.Ifhisempowermentisachieved,itistheachievementofademocraticcon-stitutionthatgoesoutofitswaytoensurethathehasasmuchformalpoliticalauthorityas“thegreatesthe.”Also,itisnotenoughtogivethepeopleequalpoliticalpower;onehastomain-taintheminthatstatusbecausethisequalityisendemicallyliabletosubversionfromallsortsofdirections.Whenoneisdealingwithmillionsofpeople,themaintenanceofpoliticalequalityrequiresconsiderableattention.Itissomethingapoliticalsystemhastoworkat,keepingnotonlyitsformalrepresentativeandelectoralarrangementsunderconstantreview,butalsopayingattentiontothesurroundingphenomenaofpolitics,suchastheinfluenceofwealthandotherformsofsocialandeconomicpower,toensurethatthepoliticalequalitydefinitiveofdemocracyremainsarealityforthemembersofthesocietyandnotjustdecoration.Butif,ontheotherhand,wepreoccupyourselves–asconstitutionalistsdo–withchecking,restraining,limitingpoliticalpowerinthehandsofthosetowhomitisformallyassigned,thenthereisadangerthatthisconstantnecessaryattentiontoequalitywillfallbythewayside.Constitutionalismisadoctrineaboutwhereatten-tionisproperlydirectedsofarasasociety’sbasiclegalandpoliticalarrangementsareconcerned:bybeingdirectedconstantlytowardsconstraint,attentionisdistractedfromthoseconstitutionalarrangementsinademocracywhosefunctionitistokeepfaithwiththeenfranchisementofordinarypeople.10.ConstitutionalismversusDemocracyIfanything,mattersareinevenworseshapethanthis.Theproblemisnotjustthatconstitutionalismneglectsthetaskofempowerment;constitutionalismtakesdemocracyandthepowerthatisassignedtoordinarypeoplethroughelectiveandrepresentativeproceduresasitsnaturalenemy.Onewouldthinkthatatheoryofpoliticsdevotedtoimposingconstraintsupontheabuseofpowerwouldhaveinitssightsallformsoftyranny,allformsofoppression.Butagainandagainintheconstitutionalistliterature,onereadsthatitisthetyrannyofthemajoritythatconstitutionalismisconcernedtocheck,nottyrannyingeneral.So,forexample,wehearscholarstalkingof“constitutionalism’sfundamental29commitmenttoprotectcertaindecisionsfromcurrentmajoritarianimpulses”anddescribingconstitutionalismas“atbase,protectionagainsttheconsequencesofmajor-30itarianpower.”Itispossible,Isuppose,thatthisemphasisonmajoritarianoppres-sion(asopposedtootherformsofoppression)andthedangersofdemocracy(asopposedtothedangersofoligarchy)isborneofasensethatwecantakeforgrantedtheascendancyofdemocracy,andthatitisonlyitsabusesthatweneedtoworryabout.Butthenthatreturnsustotheconcernsoftheprevioussection.Constitutionalism–ASkepticalView275\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page276Idon’twanttobepaintingtooManicheanapicturefromeitherperspective–democracyasconstitutionalism’snaturalenemy,orconstitutionalismastheconstantobjectofademocrat’sfearandsuspicion.Onewayinwhichtheoppositionmaybeblurredisthroughtheredefinitionof“democracy”toassociateitmorecloselywiththeconstitutionalistideal.RonaldDworkinhastakenthisapproach.Hemaintainsthattruedemocracydoesnotexistunlessthemembersofapoliticalcommunitytreatoneanotherastheirequalsinasensethatgoesfarbeyondformalpoliticalequal-ity:theymustalsoevinceequalconcernforoneanotherandequalrespectforoneanother’sautonomy.Withoutthis,hesays,anyversionofdemocracythatrequires“deferencetotemporarymajoritiesonmattersofindividualrightis...brutaland31alien,and...nationswithfirmdemocratictraditionsnowrejectitasfake.”Soheconcludesthatatruedemocracywillcontaininitsrulingstructuresprovisionsthatensurethismoreextensiveformofequalconcernandrespect,evenatthecostof32disempoweringamajority.Howfarweshouldtakethisisamatterofdebate.11.PopularSovereigntyOneareawherewefindthatconstitutionalistsarepreparedtoemphasizedemocraticideashastodowiththeauthorshipofaconstitution.Isaidearlierthatconstitu-tionaliststhinkitimportantfortheretobeconsciousreflectionuponthedesignofasociety’sconstitution.Butthatputsthemattertoopassively.Constitutionalistsbelieveitisimportantforthemembersofasocietytopayattentiontotheconstitutionaldesignoftheirpolity:theconstitutionalschemeneedstheimprimaturofpopularlegit-imacy.Thoughitiswidelybelievedthatconstitutionaldesignisascience,inwhichrightanswersarewellknowntoexperts,stillitisthoughtimportantthatthelessonsofthissciencebeseentobefreelyadoptedbythecitizensofthepolitythatistobeboundbythem.Inthisway,thelimitationsthataconstitutionimposesontheordinaryoperationofthedemocraticprocesshavesomesortoflegitimacythatcanwithstandcompetitionwiththelegitimacyofthemeasuresadoptedbyacurrentmajor-33ity.So,forexample,theU.S.SupremeCourtinMarburyv.Madisonbeganfromthepremissthat“thepeoplehaveanoriginalrighttoestablish,fortheirfuturegovern-ment,suchprinciplesas,intheiropinion,shallmostconducetotheirownhappiness”andarguedthatajudicialpowertostrikedownunconstitutionallegislationwas34necessarytogiveeffecttothe“originalandsupremewill”ofthepeople.Ifconstitutionalismiscommittedtopopularsovereignty,whatbecomesofwhatIhavedescribedasitsinherentsuspicionofdemocracy?Thetwoelementsarenotinconsistent.Popularsovereigntyanddemocracyshareobviouscommoncommitments,buttheideathatthepeoplehavetherighttoestablishtheirownformofgovernmentisintheorycompatiblewiththeirestablishmentofanon-democraticconstitution35oraheavilycompromisedformofdemocracy.Neverthelesstensionsdoinevitablysurfaceinthismodel.Onedifficultyisthateveniftheconstitutionalrestrictionsonmajoritywillrepresentapopularcommitmentattheconstitution-makingstage,mostsuchrestric-tionsarephrasedveryvaguelyinconstitutionaldocuments,leavingopenmajorchoicesforthesocietyaboutrightsandconstitutionalstructure.Thesensethatthesechoicesareconstitutionalincharacterleads,ontheconstitutionalistmodel,toaconviction276JeremyWaldron\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page277thatatallcoststheymustnotbemadebyacurrentmajority.Buttheniftheyaretobemadeatall(intheordinarylifeofapolity)theymustbemadebyanon-majoritarianbranchofgovernment,suchasthejudiciary,andthiscanleadtodifficul-tieswhichwewillexploreinsection12.Theotherdifficultyhastodowiththeperceiveddistanceintimebetweenthedecisionsofthepopularsovereignandthepopularmajoritywhichitissupposedtobepresentlyconstraining.LarryAlexanderhasarguedthatconstitutionalismrepres-36entsthepowerofpastmajoritiesoverpresentandfuturemajorities.Butobviouslythereisalegitimacyproblemdependingonhowdistantinthepasttheconstrain-ingmajorityisperceivedtobe.Wemayreveretheframersoftheconstitution,butancestor-worshipbyitselfisapoorcompetitortothesortoflegitimacythatameas-ureenactedbyacurrentdemocraticmajoritycanclaim.Ifwewanttopresenttheconstraintonthecurrentmajorityasaprecommitmentofthesovereignpeoplethemselves,thenwemustfindawaytoconnectthepeoplewhomadethatpre-commitmentsixgenerationsagotothepeoplewhonowseemtobesubjecttoits37constraint.Maybewecansaythatifthepeoplehavenotbotheredtoamendtheconstitution,thenthatsignifiestheirpresentconsent.Butthisisalmostalwaysanunconvincingargument,restingeverythingasitdoesonatenuousandcontestableextrapolationfrommereacquiescencetoopposeameasurethathastherealimprimaturofthepeoplegrantedthroughademocraticprocessworkingactuallyandexplicitlyrightnow.Inconfrontingthisdifficulty,modernconstitutionalistscharacteristicallyveerbetweenanargumentthattries,howeverunconvincingly,torescuethepopular-sovereigntycredentialsoftheconstitutionalnormandacasethatby-passespopularsovereigntyaltogetherandarguessimplyforthemoralnecessityoftheconstraint.Butthedifficultywiththelattercaseisthatitignoresthesignificanceofmoraldis-agreement.Membersofthemajoritywhichenactedtheconstitutionallyproblematicmeasurepresumablydenythattheconstitutionalnormembodiesanobjectivemoraltruth.Theirbestmoraljudgmentisthatthenormiswrongoroutdated;thatiswhytheyvotedforthepresentmeasure.Theymaybewrongaboutthat,butthentheconstitutionalist’spositionbegsthequestionofhowtheserivalclaimsofrightandwrongaretobeadjudicatedinaconstitutionalcontext.Asalast-ditcheffort,theconstitutionalistmaytrytoclaimthatthecurrentmajor-ity’sdecisionrepresentsnothingmorethantheascendancyofitspreferences;itisnotamoralpositionthatcanbeopposedtothemoralprincipleembodiedintheconstraint.Butthistooisunconvincing.Thereisnoreasonforsayingthatpopularmajoritiesareincapableofthinkinginprincipledterms;timeandagainrepresenta-tiveinstitutionsprovethisconstitutionalistprejudicewrongwhentheyproduceprincipleddeliberationsthat,intheirmoralcharacter,rivalanythingthatcanbeseen38inthenon-electivebranchesofgovernment.12.JudicialReviewofLegislationThisbringsus,finally,tothequestionofjudicialpowerinaconstitutionalsystem.Ifaconstitutionisnottobemerelyasetofpaperrules,theremustbesomewayinwhichtheforceofitsprovisionsisbroughttobearoncurrentpoliticalactivity.VariousConstitutionalism–ASkepticalView277\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page278methodsarepossible.Oneistonurtureanethosofrespectfortheconstitutionamongmembersofthepolity,particularlyactiveplayersinthepoliticalsystem,sothatasenseofconstitutionalobligationbecomesasharedpointofreferenceinalltheirdecisions.Anotheristodesigninstitutionssothatthewayinwhichtheyaccom-modatethedynamicsofpowerandambitionyieldsconstitutionaloutcomesbyasortofinvisiblehand,evenwhenfewornoneoftheparticipantstakesconstitutional39obligationseriouslyforitsownsake.Fewmodernconstitutionalistsaresatisfiedwithoptionslikethese.Theytendtobeinterestedinformalmechanismsofenforcement,amongthemostpopularofwhichistheuseofjudicialpowerintheconstitutionalsystemtopatrolbreachesofcon-stitutionalconstraintsbyotherbranchesofgovernment.Ifconstitutionalrulesareseenasconstitutionallaw,thenitseemsappropriatetoentrusttheirenforcementtocourtsinthewaythattheenforcementofotherlegalrulesisentrusted.Andif,asconstitutionalistsbelieve,thepointofthemostimportantprovisionsofamodernconstitutionistorestrainorlimittheexerciseoflegislativeauthority,thenitmakessensetoseethesenotjustaslaw,butashigherlaw,enforceablebythecourtsagainstordinarystatutes.Supportforjudicialreview,therefore,seemstobepartandparcelofwhatismeantbymodernconstitutionalism.40Elsewhere,Ihavecriticizedthepracticeofstrongjudicialreviewasundemocratic.Thatcritiqueofcourseisquestion-begginginthepresentcontext,sincemostcon-stitutionaliststhinkthatbeingundemocraticispartofthepointofconstitutionalarrange-ments.Butthereareacoupleoffurtherdifficulties.Treatingjudicialauthorityasthemainbasisforconstitutionalenforcementleavestheconstitutionalityofjudicialpoweritselfeffectivelyunchecked.Connectedwiththisisthedangerthatjudicialreviewmighttooeasilybecomeaformofconstitu-tionallaw-makingbythejudiciary.Manyoftheprovisionsfoundinmodernconstitutionsareleftdeliberatelyvagueorabstract,usuallyasthecostofsecuringthesortofpopularacceptanceofthemthatwouldjustifytheirimpositionascon-stitutionalconstraints.Asaresult,majorfeaturesofthecountry’spoliticalarrange-ments,thelimitsongovernment,ortherestraintsimposedongovernmentalpowerareleftundefined.(Americanexperiencehasshownthattheseissuesarenotalwaysmarginalorborderlineissues;oftentheyaremajorwatershedissuesabouttheshapeandnatureofthepolityandofindividualandminorityrights.)Thiscanleadtothefollowingdifficulty.Whenalegislativemeasureischallengedincourtforviolatingoneoftheseprovisions,itislikelythatthecourtwilltrytosettletheconstitutionalissuebypinningdownthemeaningoftheprovisioninquestionmoreprecisely.Fromthecourt’spointofview,thismayseemnomorethanfulfillingitsdutytointerprettheprovisionsitisrequiredtoapply.Butfromapointofviewthatpaysattentiontothesourcesofconstitutionalchange,itwillseemasthoughamajordecisionabouttheshapeandcharacterofthesociety’sconstitutionisnowbeingmadebyabodythathasnogreaterrightthantheelectivebranchestotakeonthemantleofpopularsovereignty.Someconstitutionalistsmaybehappytosaythatthecourtsareentitledtospeakforthepopularsovereignwhenthepeoplecannotactuallyassembleinaconstitu-tionalconventiontosettlesomepointofuncertaintyordispute.Othersaresimplyresignedtotheprospect,reckoningthatanyothermethodofsettlingdisputedpoints278JeremyWaldron\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page279wouldhavetheeffectofdisempoweringthecourtsevenincaseswherejudicialreviewdoesnotrunintothisdifficultyandtheeffectofempoweringtheverymajoritiesthatconstitutionalprovisionsaresupposedtodisable.Still,unlessthecommitmenttopopularsovereigntyisnothingbutlipservice,onecannotavoidthethoughtthatthecurrentdeliberationsanddecisionsoftheelectivebranchesofgovernmentonmattersconstitutionalhaveatleastasmuchclaimtobeidentifiedwithpopularsovereigntyasthedeliberationanddecisionsofunelectedjudges.Probablyitisamistakeforanybranchofgovernmenttoassumethemantleof41popularsovereign.Butifthereisamajorunresolvedissueintheconstitutionandifthematterneedstobesettledrightnow,onewouldthinkthatwhoeverfindsthem-selvesstuckwiththedecisionoughttobeassensitiveaspossibletotheviewsofallelementsinthepolity,andnotjustinsistthattheironebranch–letalonetheleastrepresentativebranch–betheonetotakethedecision.Onewayoranother,weareleftwiththeconclusionthatanycommitmenttopopularsovereigntyonthepartofmodernconstitutionalistsisratherthin.Constitu-tionalistswillusethelanguageofpopularsovereigntywhenitisusefultolegitimatizetheconstraintsthattheyproposetoplaceuponcurrentpoliticalmajorities.Buttheywillretreatquicklyfromthelogicofpopularsovereignty,assoonasitthreatenstheauthorityofnon-populistinstitutionslikecourts,whichtheytaketohavebeenentrustedwiththetaskofrestrainingandlimitingthepopularwill.14.ConcludingRemarkIhavetriedinthischaptertopresentapictureofconstitutionsdifferingsomewhatfromthepictureusuallyputforwardinthenameofconstitutionalism.Constitutionsarenotjustaboutretrainingandlimitingpower;theyareabouttheempower-mentofordinarypeopleinademocracyandallowingthemtocontrolthesourcesoflawandharnesstheapparatusofgovernmenttotheiraspirations.Thatisthedemocraticviewofconstitutions,butitisnottheconstitutionalistview.Accordingly,Ihaveemphasizedtheoppositionbetweenconstitutionalismanddemocracyand,throughconstitutionalism’sembraceoftheideaoflimitedgovernment,theideo-logicalantipathybetweenconstitutionalismandmanyofdemocracy’scharacteristicaims.Ofcourse,itisalwayspossibletopresentanalternativetoconstitutionalismasanalternativeformofconstitutionalism:scholarstalkof“popularconstitutionalism”42or“democraticconstitutionalism.”Ihavenothingagainstsuchusages,thoughIhavetriedtosharpentheissuesthatIhavebeendiscussingbyavoidingthem.Nodoubtthishasledtosomeexaggeration.Nodoubtamoremoderateconstitutionalismcanbeenvisaged.(Andnodoubtallsortsofequivocationsareimaginablebywhichtheissuesdiscussedinthischaptercanbefudged.)ButIthinkitisworthsettingoutastarkversionoftheantipathybetweenconstitutionalismanddemocraticorpopularself-government,ifonlybecausethatwillhelpustomeasuremoreclearlytheextenttowhichanewandmaturetheoryofconstitutionallawtakesproperaccountoftheconstitutionalburdenofensuringthatthepeoplearenotdisenfranchisedbytheverydocumentthatissupposedtogivethemtheirpower.Constitutionalism–ASkepticalView279\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page280Notes1IhaveadaptedtheseformulationsfromJohnStuartMill,OnLiberty,ed.CurrinV.Shields(Indianapolis,IN:Bobbs-Merrill,1956),p.43.2OxfordEnglishDictionaryonline,entryfor“Constitutionalism”(visitedFeb.19,2007).3OxfordEnglishDictionaryonline.Theinstancesgivenare“1871DailyTel.2Nov.,TheypersuadedtheKingthatConstitutionalismwashisnaturalrole”and“1889Times19Feb.9/2ThefrigidandnegativeconstitutionalismofM.Carnot.”4A.V.Dicey,IntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution,8thedn.of1915(Indianapolis,IN:LibertyClassics,1982),p.386,uses“constitutionalism”inthissensewhenhewritesthat“theaimofAustralianstatesmenhasbeentocombine...ideasborrowedfromthefederalandrepublicanconstitutionalismoftheUnitedStates,...withideasderivedfromtheUnitarianandmonarchicalconstitutionalismofEngland.”5RogerScruton,ADictionaryofPoliticalThought(London:Macmillan1982),p.94.6Thebest-knownversionofabsolutismisthatofThomasHobbesinLeviathan,ed.RichardTuck(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),Chs.18and26.7ButcomparetheresponseofPaulJ.Magnarella,“TheComparativeConstitutionalLawEnterprise,”WillametteLawReview30(1994):510.“Bydefinition,everystate,evenonewithadictatorship,hasaconstitution–asetoflegalnormsandproceduresthatstructureitslegalandgovernmentalsystems....Intheabsenceoftherulingelite’scommitmenttolimitedgovernmentalpowersundertheruleoflaw,astatemayhaveaconstitutionwithoutconstitutionalism.Insuchacase,comparativistswouldlabelitsconstitution‘nom-inal,’ratherthan‘normative’.”8AlexanderHamilton,JohnJay,andJamesMadison,TheFederalist,ed.GeorgeW.CareyandJamesMcLellan(Indianapolis,IN:LibertyFund,2001),p.1.9Marburyv.Madison5U.S.137(1803),at177.10ThiswasthestanceoftheHighCourtofAustraliainAustralianCapitalTelevisionPty.Limitedv.CommonwealthofAustralia177CLR106(1992),strikingdownafederalelec-tionlawdeemedincompatiblewiththeunwrittencommitmentofthecommonlawtofreedomofexpression.11HannahArendt,OnRevolution(Harmondsworth:PenguinBooks,1973),p.157.12IhavearguedthispointfortextuallawgenerallyinJeremyWaldron,LawandDisagreement(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1999),pp.69–87.13Cf.LonL.Fuller,TheMoralityofLaw,rev.edn.(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1969),p.96.14ScottGordon,ControllingtheState:ConstitutionalismfromAncientAthenstoToday(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1999)andAndrásSajó,LimitingGovernment:AnIntroductiontoConstitutionalism(Budapest:CentralEuropeanPress,1999).15Sajó,LimitingGovernment,p.x.16C.H.McIlwain,ConstitutionalismAncientandModern(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1940),p.24(quotedbyGordon,ControllingtheState,p.5).17CassR.Sunstein,“ConstitutionalismaftertheNewDeal,”HarvardLawReview101(1987):421,esp.434–36.18CarlJ.Friedrich,ConstitutionalGovernmentandDemocracy:TheoryandPracticeinEuropeandAmerica,4thedn.(Waltham,MA:BlaisdellPub.Co.,1968),pp.35–6.19JudithN.Shklar,“TheLiberalismofFear,”inacollectionofheressays,PoliticalThoughtandPoliticalThinkers,ed.StanleyHoffman(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1998),p.3.20Notice,though,thatsometimesaparticularagencyofgovernmentislimited,nottolimitgovernmentassuch,buteffectivelytoempowersomeotheragencyofgovernmentwith280JeremyWaldron\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page281thetaskthatthefirstoneisconstrainedfrompursuing.Thishappensparticularlyinthewaycentralgovernmentislimitedinafederalsystem.IamgratefultoRickHillsforthispoint.21UnitedStatesConstitution,ArticleI,10.22Cf.LindaBosniak,“ConstitutionalCitizenshipthroughthePrismofAlienage,”OhioStateLawJournal63(2002):1285,esp.p.1287.SeealsoDouglasSturm,“AProspectiveViewoftheBillofRights:TowardaNewConstitutionalism,”JournalofLawandReligion13(1996–8):27,esp.pp.29–30:“[C]onstitutionalism,atraditionofpoliticaltheoryandpracticewithwhichtheideaofhumanrightsisoftenassociated,hastheconnotationoflimitedgovernment.Atoneextreme,constitutionalismislinkedwiththeconceptofalaissez-fairestate....”23Sajó,LimitingGovernment,p.2.24Cf.Dicey’saccountofseparationofpowersinhisattempttoreconcileparliamentarysovereigntyandtheruleoflaw:Dicey,IntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution,pp.268–73.25Cf.JohnLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,ed.PeterLaslett(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988),pp.329–30andF.A.Hayek,TheConstitutionofLiberty(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1960),pp.154–5.26Foranexcellentaccountofhowconstraintonpoliticalparticipationmayhave,inthelongrun,anaffirmativelyempoweringandstructuringeffect,seeSamuelIssacharoff,“FragileDemocracies,”HarvardLawReview120(2007):1405–67.27ThethemesIhavementionedhereareparticularlyprominentintheconstitutionaltheoryofHannahArendt;seeJeremyWaldron,“Arendt’sConstitutionalPolitics,”inTheCambridgeCompaniontoHannahArendt,ed.DanaVilla(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001).28IamthinkingofColonelRainborough’sexclamationin1647atPutney:“[T]rulyIthinkthatthepooresthethatisinEnglandhasalifetoleadasthegreatesthe;andthereforetruly,sir,Ithinkit’sclearthateverymanthatistoliveunderagovernmentoughtfirstbyhisownconsenttoputhimselfunderthatgovernment”(“TheDebatesattheGeneralCounciloftheArmy,Putney,29October1647,”inTheEnglishLevellers,ed.AndrewSharp,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998,p.103).29RobertA.Schapiro,“PolyphonicFederalism:StateConstitutionsintheFederalCourts,”CaliforniaLawReview87(1999):1415,atp.1438.30SandraSchultzNewmanandDanielMarkIsaacs,“HistoricalOverviewoftheJudicialSelectionProcessintheUnitedStates:IstheElectoralSysteminPennsylvaniaUnjustified?”VillanovaLawReview49(2004):1atp.16.31RonaldDworkin,Freedom’sLaw:TheMoralReadingoftheAmericanConstitution(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1996),p.71.32IhavecriticizedDworkin’spositioninWaldron,LawandDisagreement,Ch.13.33Cf.BruceAckerman,WethePeople:1.Foundations(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1991).34Marburyv.Madison5U.S.137(1803),at176.35SeeLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,pp.329–30,354–6,andThomasHobbes,DeCive:TheEnglishVersion,ed.HowardWarrender(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1983),pp.37,131ff.36LarryAlexander,“ConstitutionalRules,ConstitutionalStandards,andConstitutionalSettlement:Marburyv.MadisonandtheCaseforJudicialSupremacy,”ConstitutionalCommentary20(2003):369,esp.p.373,defines“constitutionalism”as“constraintofpres-entmajoritarianbodiesbypastmajorities.”37SeeWaldron,LawandDisagreement,pp.255–81foracritiqueofthisidea.Constitutionalism–ASkepticalView281\nCDIC15.qxd2/4/0915:52Page28238SeethecomparisonofjudicialargumentandparliamentaryargumentaboutabortioninJeremyWaldron,“LegislatingwithIntegrity,”FordhamLawReview72(2003):373,esp.pp.390–1.39ThiswasMadison’sapproachtoseparationofpowersinHamilton,Jay,andMadison,TheFederalist,p.268(#51):“Ambitionmustbemadetocounteractambition.Theinterestofthemanmustbeconnectedwiththeconstitutionalrightsoftheplace.”40SeemostrecentlyJeremyWaldron,“TheCoreoftheCaseAgainstJudicialReview,”YaleLawJournal115(2006):1346.41IdevelopthisargumentfurtherinJeremyWaldron,“JudicialPowerandPopularSovereignty,”inMarburyversusMadison:DocumentsandCommentary,ed.MarkGraberandMichaelPerhac(Washington,DC:CQPress,2002),p.181.TheargumentisbasedonprinciplesenunciatedbyEmmanuelJosephSièyes,WhatIstheThirdEstate?(1788),trans.M.Blondel(NewYork:FrederickA.Prager,1964).42See,e.g.,LarryD.Kramer,ThePeopleThemselves:PopularConstitutionalismandJudicialReview(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2004)andFrankI.Michelman,“What(ifAnything)IsProgressive-LiberalDemocraticConstitutionalism?”WidenerLawSymposium4(1999):181.SeealsoMarkTushnet,TakingtheConstitutionAwayfromtheCourts(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2000).282JeremyWaldron\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page283CHAPTERSIXTEENConstitutionalismLarryAlexanderWhatareconstitutions,whatfunctionsdotheyperform,andaretheyonbalancedesirable?Thesearelargequestions,tobesure,andspacedoesnotpermitmemorethanaquitesuperficialstabatansweringthem.Nevertheless,Ihopetoprovideatleastausefulframeworkwithinwhichmorecompleteanswerscanbeelaborated.Itakeupthesethreequestionsinturn.I.WhatAreConstitutions?Considerthefollowingstylizedaccountofhowaconstitutionmightariseandthevariousphilosophicalproblemsthatitentails(Alexander1998;Grey1979;Kay1998).Atstep1,Janebeginswithherownviewsaboutprinciplesofjusticeandotheraspectsofpoliticalmorality,aboutprinciplesofwisegovernance,andabouttheinstitutionalarrangementsbestsuitedtorealizingthesevariousprinciples.IfJanecouldimposetheseprinciplesandinstitutionsbyherself,Janewoulddoso(unlesstheyincludedprinciples,suchasdemocraticsideconstraints,thatprohibitedtheirunilateralimposi-tion).BecauseJanedoesnothavesuchpower,however,Janeneedstheassistanceofothers,otherswhowillnotshareallofJane’sviewsaboutpoliticalmorality,wisegovernance,andinstitutionalarrangements.Atstep2,then,JaneseekswideagreementonrulesofgovernmentalbehaviorandrulesdefininggovernmentalinstitutionsthatrealizeJane’sownpersonalprin-ciplesandviewstoagreaterextentthananyalternativesetofsuchrulesonwhichJanecanobtainwideagreement.Inotherwords,underJane’sownprinciples,itispreferablethattheynotbefullyrealizedthanthatanarchyprevail(becauseoflackofwideagreement),butthattheyberealizedasfullyaspossibleconsistentwithwideagreement.Otherswhoholddifferentprinciplesandviewswillreasonsimilarly,whichwillresultinagreementonrulesofgovernmentalbehaviorandrulesdefininginstitutionsthatnoonebelievesareoptimalbutthatmostbelievearegoodenoughContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page284–thatis,superiortoanarchy.(Obviously,notjustanysetofruleswillbesuperiortoanarchyaccordingtoeveryone’sprinciplesofpoliticalmoralityandwisegovern-ance;therulesmustbethebestthatcanbewidelyagreeduponandaboveevery-one’sanarchythresholdofacceptability.)Understandinghowthisagreementatstep2canbeachievedisworthpondering.Forunderstandingthisisthekeytounderstandinghowconstitutionscanchangewithoutformalamendment,howrevolutionscanbedomesticated,howseparatesystemsofauthoritativerulescanexistsidebysideinthesamecommunity(andwhythishappenslessfrequentlythanmightbeexpected),andothermysteriesofconstitutionalismandoflawmoregenerally.Ishallbeginwiththesimplestversionofthestory(AlexanderandSherwin2001).Membersofthecommunitydisagreeaboutorareuncertainabouthowtheircom-monmoralprinciplesaretobeappliedconcretely.Theyperceivethemoralneedforauthoritativesettlementofthosedisagreementsanduncertainties.Janepreferstherule“LetJanedecide.”Johnpreferstherule“LetJohndecide.”Andsoonforeachmemberofthecommunity.Jane’ssecondbestruleis“LetSarahdecide.”ButalthoughitisalsoSarah’spre-ferredrule,itmustcompetewithJohn’ssecondbestrule,“LetJimdecide,”whichis,orcourse,supportedbyJimandJohn.Butnowsupposethateveryone’sthird-,second-,orfirst-choiceruleis“Letthemajoritydecide.”Ifeveryoneunderstandsthatotherfirst-andsecond-choiceruleswillnotcommandagreement–andifeveryonebelievesthat“Letthemajoritydecide”ismorallysuperiortothealternativeofnoauthoritativedecision-maker–thenevery-onehasastrategicreasonforaccepting“Letthemajoritydecide”asthefounda-tionalauthoritativerule.Isay“strategic”toemphasizethatperhapseveryonewillviewtherule,notasthebestruleforsettlingmoralcontroversies,butasthebestrulethattheycangetotherstoaccept.(Inanimportantsense,ofcourse,becausethepurposeofauthoritativerulesistosettlemoralcontroversies,bybeingthebestruleeveryonecanacceptandtheonlyrulethatwillactuallyperformthesettlementfunction,thissuboptimalrulebecomes,foreveryone,theoptimalrule.)Nowaswecomplicatethestoryandmovefromtheonebasicrule,“Letthemajor-itydecide,”toacomplexsetofrulesregardingrights,procedures,andinstitutions,includingperhapssupermajorityinstitutionswiththepowertopromulgate,repeal,andamendthoserules,itbecomesmoreandmorelikelythattheresultingsetofrulesthatmustbeagreeduponisfarfromanyone’sidealsetofsuchrules.Someoftherulesmaybesomemembers’firstorsecondchoices,butotherswillbefurtherdownontheirlist,andsomemayevenbemorallyrepugnant.Still,allhavegoodreasontoagreetotheentireset,includingtherulesthattheyfindmorallyrepug-nant,ifthatisthebestsetofrulestowhichtheycangettheotherstoagree,andifthatsetofrulesismorallypreferabletotheabsenceofauthoritativesettlement.Andagain,becauseauthoritativesettlementrequiresagreementonauthoritativerules,themorallybestrulesonwhichagreementcanbeobtainedareinsomesensethemorallybestrules.Rulesthatcannotcommandagreementcannotperformtheirmoralfunctionofsettlingwhatshouldbedoneandarethusundesirable,nomatterhowgoodthoseruleswouldbeiftheydidcommandagreement.Hereisthepicturethusfar.Ourmythicalcommunityhasreachedagreementaboutcertainfoundationalrules,rulesthatsetupsomeinstitution(orperson)asthebasic284LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page285rulepromulgatoranddecision-maker,thatprescribecertainrightsandproceduresandsetupcertainadditionalinstitutions,andthatsetupasupermajoritarianinstitu-tionforexpandingorchangingthesebasicrules.Themembersagreetothiscomplexpackageofrules,butnotnecessarilybecauseitisanyone’sideal,andnotnecessar-ilybecausetherearenorulesinthepackagethatanyonefindsmorallyrepugnantasopposedtosuboptimal.Rather,theyagreetothepackagebecauseitisfromevery-one’spointofviewbothmorallysuperiortotheabsenceofauthoritativesettlementandalsothemorallybestsuchpackagetowhichtheycangetotherstoagree.Andbecauseitmeetsthoseconditions,thepackageisinanimportantsenseeveryone’smorallyidealpackageofrules.Theruleswidelyacceptedatstep2maybeentrenchedtovariousdegrees.Thatis,itmaybewidelyacceptedthattheserulesmaynotbealteredever,maynotbealteredforacertainlengthoftime,and/ormaynotbealteredexceptbyextraordin-aryprocedures.Themembersofthecommunitymaybelievethattheyhavethebestrulestheycaneverhave,andthatthereisfarmoredangeroflossofpoliticalwisdomorwillorlossofmoralconcernthanthereisdangerthatwideagreementonbetterruleswillbethwarted.Atthemomentofagreementontheentrenchedrulesatstep2,theruleswillmeanwhatthosewhohaveagreedtothemmeanbythem.Inotherwords,thosewhohaveagreedtotheruleswillhavenotmerelyagreedtocertainsymbolsorsounds,buttoparticularmeaningsofthosesymbolsandsounds.Theiragreementcanbememori-alizedonlyinsymbolicform,however,whichmeansthatthesymbolstheyhaveagreeduponandwhattheymeanbythosesymbolscancomeapart.Therefore,atstep2theymightagreenotonlyontherulesofgovernmentalbehaviorandinstitutions,butalsoonrulesaboutwhoistodecideatlatertimeswhattheymeantbythoserules.Itmightbeuseful,then,todistinguishaconstitutionasacollectionofagreed-uponsymbolsfromametaconstitution(orpreconstitutionalrules),withthelatterconsistingofagreed-uponnorms–metarules–aboutwhichparticularsetofsymbolsistheconstitution,whoistointerpretthosesymbols,andwhosesemanticintentionsshallcountastheauthoritativemeaningofthesymbols.Theconstitutionandthemetaconstitutionareinseparableatthemomentofagreementinstep2,buttheycancomeapartatanytimethereafter.Thus,althoughthecommunitymayatsomelatertimelacktheearliersubstantiveagreementregardingthecontentoftherulesthattheyhadatstep2–forexample,theymightnowdisagreeaboutwhatfreedomofspeechshouldcoveroraboutwhetherseparationofpowersisagoodidea–theycanstillhavewideagreementonthemetaconstitution.Andthatagreementmightstillbesufficientunderourprinciplesofpoliticalmoralitytofavortheconstitutionoveranarchy.Thisdiscussionofthemetaconstitutionanditsrelationtothesymboliccon-stitutionillustratesvariouswaysthataconstitutionmightchangeatstep3.First,thesymbolicconstitutionmightchangewithoutachangeinthemetaconstitution.Constitutionalamendmentinpursuanceofthe(originalmeaningofthe)amendingruleslaiddowninthesymbolicconstitutionchangestheoriginalconstitutionorganically.Second,aconstitutionalrevolutionmightoccurinwhichagreementonthefirstmetaconstitutionisreplacedbyagreementonanothermetaconstitutionthatinturnpicksoutadifferentsymbolicconstitution.ThecommunitymaydraftabrandnewConstitutionalism285\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page286constitution,widelyagreeonwhatitmeansandthatitismoredesirablethanthecurrentconstitution,andalsoagreethatit,andnotthecurrentconstitution,shallnowbeauthoritativeforthem.(Arguably,theUnitedStatesConstitutionitselfwastheproductofsuchaconstitutionalrevolution.)Third,thesymbolicconstitutionmightremainthesame,butthemetaconstitutionmightchange.Thus,theoriginalmetaconstitutionalagreementmightbesupplantedatstep3byanewmetaconstitutionalagreement,onethatdeemssomepartsofthesymbolicconstitutiontobenonauthoritative,thatsubstitutesanewunderstandingofthesymbolsfortheiroriginalmeaning,orthat“ratifies”otherwiseimproperinter-pretationsofthesymbolicconstitution.Justasitisunderstandablehowpeopleofdifferingmoralandpoliticalviewscouldnonethelessagreetoentrenchasetofconstitutionalrulesandmetaconstitutionalrules,soitisunderstandablehowtheymightcometoagreeonnewrulesandmetarulesandhenceeffectaconstitutionalrevolution.Becauseitisonlytheagreementthattheserulesandmetarulesshallbesupremelyauthoritativethatmakesthemso,anysubsequentagreementcansupplanttheoriginalagreementtothiseffect.Ofcourse,somewhomighthavegonealongwiththeoriginalagreementanditsconstitutionmaynotgoalongwiththelaterone.Forthem,thenewconstitutionwillnotbeauthoritativeevenifitisobliging.Atleast,itwillnotbesoiftheirpolitical-moralbeliefsfavoranarchyorresistancetothenewconstitution.Butthatwillbethecaseforanydissentersfromaconstitutionalagreementaslongastheiracceptanceoftheconstitutionisnotnecessarytoachievethedegreeofeffectivenessrequiredtosustaintheothers’acceptanceoftheconstitution.WhyshouldJaneatstep4acceptasauthoritativeaconstitutionorconstitutionalprovision–whetherintheoriginalconstitutionofstep2orasupplantingconstitu-tionofstep3–ifshedoesnotviewtheconstitutionortherelevantprovisionthereoftobemorallyandprudentiallyideal?Thereasonisthesameoneshehadatsteps1and2:aneffectivesetofrelativelygoodentrenchedrules,evenifnonideal,mayberankedbyJane’sownidealpoliticalmoralityasbetterthaneitheranarchyoranyothersetofentrenchedrulesthathasachanceofgainingwideagreement.Finally,thereisthequestionofwhyanyoneshouldeveracceptanyruleormetaruleasauthoritative–thatis,asprovidingherwithacontent-independentreasonforaction.WhatIhavearguedthusfaristhatJanecanhavecontent-dependentreasons–reasonsderivedfromherpoliticalmorality–toestablishandentrenchrulesthatothersrecognizeasauthoritative.ButwhyshouldJanerecognizethoserulesasauthoritative?WhyshouldJanenotdepartfromthemwheneverherpoliticalmoral-itymarksdisobedienceasthepreferablecourse?Ofcourse,ifherpoliticalmoralitysupportstheserulesasthebestJanecangetagreementupon,thenherpoliticalmoral-itywillneverdictatedisobedienceifthatwouldundermineagreement.Butitmightwelldictatesecretdisobedience.Thisisthecentraldilemmaofrule-following.Followingarulebecauseitisaruleiswhatismeantbyattributingpracticalauthoritytotherule.Butifpracticalauthor-ityisimpossible,claimsofpracticalauthoritywillbefalse,andhencerulesquaruleswillbeundermined,whichbyhypothesisismorallynonoptimal.Soitappears,para-doxically,thatitismorallyoptimaltomakeclaimsonbehalfofrulesthatonemightknowtobefalse.Andwhatgoesforrulesgenerallyappliesequallytotheentrenchedrulesofconstitutionallaw.286LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page287Letusnowlookmorecloselyatvariousaspectsofthis“justso”storyofadoptingaconstitution.First,thestoryassumesdistinctionsbetween,ontheonehand,theconstitutionandthemetaconstitutionalrulesand,ontheotherhand,theconstitu-tionandordinarylaw.Buthowarethesedistinctionstobedrawn?Takethedistinctionbetweentheconstitutionandthemetaconstitution.Recallthatatstep2,Janeandhercommunityacceptedaparticularsetofrulesformakingandchangingvalidlaws(settlementsofwhatthey,asasociety,shoulddo),alongwithrulesregardinghowthatfirstsetofrulesmayamended,howitshouldinterpreted,bywhom,andwithwhatdegreeofentrenchmentiftheinterpretationislaterthoughttobewrong.Nowsupposetherulesformakingandchangingvalidlaw(andperhapstherulesforamendingtheserules)arewritten,buttheotherrules(regardingthehow,thewho,andtheeffectofconstitutionalinterpretation)arenot.(ThisdescribestheUnitedStatesConstitutiononmostunderstandings.)Areonlythewrittenrules“theconstitution,”withtheunwrittenrulesbeingmeta-orpreconstitutional?Alloftheserules,writtenandunwritten,restonacceptance.Moreover,thewrittenrulescouldhavebeenunwritten,andtheunwrittenrulescouldhavebeenwritten.Considernowthedistinctionbetweentheconstitutionandordinarylaw.Presumably,theconstitutioncontainstherulesgoverninghowordinarylawismadeandchanged.Butordinarylawmayitselfprescribehowotherlawismadeandchanged.(Considerlegislationsettingforththerulesgoverningtheenactmentandrepealofadminis-trativeregulations,orstatelegislationgoverninglaw-makingbymunicipalitiesandcounties.)Moreover,muchoflawconsistsofrulesspecifyinghowlegalobligationscanbecreated,modified,orexpunged–therulesgoverning“privateordering.”Atwhichlevelinthehierarchydotherulesgoverningthemakingofotherrulesbecome“constitutional”?Onemightbetemptedtodistinguishconstitutionsfromordinarylawbysubjectmatter.Constitutions,onemightsuppose,containbroadgeneralrulesestablishingthebasicproceduresforgovernanceandperhapssomeindividualrightsandotherlimitationsongovernmentalaction.Ordinarylaws,ontheotherhand,dealwithmoremundanemattersorwithtemporarymatters.But,ofcourse,theprecedingisnottrueofmostexistingconstitutionsasweunderstandthem.TheUnitedStatesConstitutioncontains,inadditiontothebasicstructuralandempoweringrulesforthenationalgovernment,andthemagisterialrightsintheBillofRights,severalquitespecificrules,manyofwhichwereresponsestohistoricalproblemsthathavelongsincedisappeared.AndwhatistrueoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionisevenmorecharacteristicofotherconstitutions(Fineretal.1995).TheconstitutionsofFrance,Germany,andRussia,particularlythelattertwo,arechock-fullofveryspecificrulesaddressingverylimitedproblemsorrootedinverytimeandplace-boundtraditionsandconcerns.Ontheotherhand,muchordinarylawestablishesbasicstructures(forexample,theCabinetdepartmentsandadministrativeagencies)andbasicindividualrights(forexample,thosefoundinthe1964CivilRightsActandthe1965VotingRightsAct).Whatabout“writtenness”?Doesnotthefactthatconstitutionsarewrittendis-tinguishthemfrommetaconstitutionalrulesalthoughnotfromordinarystatutorylaw?Iwouldsubmitthat“writtenness”isneithernecessarynorsufficientforconstitu-tions,nordoesitdistinguishthemfrommetaconstitutionalrules.Thelattermightallbememorializedinwriting.Whatwouldthendistinguishthemfrom“theconsti-tution”mightbeonlythefactthattheauthorityofthemetaconstitutionalrulesrestsConstitutionalism287\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page288directlyonthefactofacceptance,whereasthe“constitution’s”authoritywouldderivefromtheauthorityofthemetaconstitutionalrulesandwouldrestonacceptanceonestepremoved.Onecoulddissentfromtheconstitutionalrulesbutacceptthemasauthoritative,whereasthatwouldnotbepossiblewithmetaconstitutionalrules.Ofcourse,becausethewholeedificerestsonacceptance–andbecauseacceptanceofmetaconstitutionalrulesisrationaleveniftheyarenotidealfromanyone’sperspective,butonlyidealinthesensethattheyarethebestrulesthateveryonecanaccept–thelinebetween“theconstitution”and“themetaconstitution”appearsimpossibletodrawasatheoreticalmatter.Perhapsthenweshouldjustsaythatwhentheauthorityofwrittenrulesrestsonunwrittenmetaconstitutionalrules,thewrittenrulescanbedeemed“theconstitution.”Although“writtenness”wouldthendistinguishconstitutionsfrommetaconstitutions,itwouldstillnotdistinguishconstitutionsfromotherwrittenlaws.Moreover,justas“writtenness”isnotsufficientforidentifyingconstitutions,neitherisitnecessary.Althoughitwouldbeimpracticalinanysocietyoveracertainsize,orinanylegalsystemintendedtolastformanyyears,thereisnologicalimposs-ibilityinhavingalllaws,includingtheconstitution,beunwritten.Memorializingrulesinwritingisenormouslyuseful,ofcourse,becauseitavertscontroversiesoverjustwhatruleswereposited.Itwouldbeamistake,however,toview“writtenness”asanecessaryattributeoflaworofconstitutions.Perhapsthemostpromisingwayofdistinguishingconstitutionsfrommetaconsti-tutionalrulesandfromordinarylawisbyreferencetodegreesofentrenchment.Onemightarguethatconstitutionsarerulesthataremoreentrenchedagainstchangethanordinarylaws.Thus,intheUnitedStates,theConstitutionmaybechangedonlybythesupermajorityrequirementssetforthinArticleV–andtherulegiving“equalsuffrage”tothestatesintheSenatemaynotbechangedatall–whereasordinarylegislationanditsrepealisaccomplishedbymajorityvotesinCongress.Therelativeentrenchmentstoryis,however,amorecomplicatedone.Consider,first,thattheexistenceoftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesitselfdependsonthepublic’sacceptancenowandfrommomenttomomentoftheauthorityofthedocumentdraftedinPhiladelphiain1787andratifiedaccordingtothetermsitsetforth.Thatacceptance–themetaconstitution–isneverentrenched,norcoulditbe.EventhemostentrenchedpartoftheConstitution–the“equalsuffrage”rule–isauthoritativeonlybecauseitisacceptedassuchatanygiventime.(Thispointreflectstheparadoxofauthoritativerules:Weacceptthemasmeansofsettlingdisagree-mentsaboutwhatshouldbedone;butbecause,toeffectsuchsettlements,theymustbedeterminateandthusmustdivergeinarangeofcasesfromwhatismorallyoptimal,wehavereasontodepartfromwhatwehavereasontoaccept,andthesecompetingreasonscannotbeweighedorbalancedbecausetheyareaspectsofthesamereasonandoperateatdifferentlevels.)Insayingthateventhemostentrenchedrulesrestonmomenttomomentacceptance,Iamnotoverlookingthepossibilitythatattheirinception,theseruleswereagreedtobytheentirecommunity.Therearethreepointstomakeaboutsuchconstitutionalagreements.First,itisdifficulttothinkofanexistingconstitutionalregimethatwasfoundedonuniversalagreement.TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatessurelywasnot.Notonlyweremanyofthosesubjecttoitdisenfranchised,butalsomanyofthosewhocouldvoteonitsratificationopposedit.288LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page289Second,forthesamereasonthatapromisetocommitawrongisnotmorallybinding,anagreementtobeboundbyaruleisnotmorallybindingwhentheruleislaterassessedtobemorallyiniquitous.Third,howevermanyfoundersagreedtotheconstitutionalrules,andwhateverforcesuchanagreementmighthavefortheirbeingbound,thesuccessorgenerationsarenotboundbyvirtueofanoriginalagreementofthefounders.Thefounders’rulesareauthoritativeforsuccessorgenerationsonlythroughthesuccessors’acceptanceofthatauthority.Ofcourse,thatdoesnotmeanthatiftheydonotaccepttherules,itiswrongforthosewhodoacceptthemtoimposethoserulesonthedissenters.Oncethelevelofacceptancedeclinessufficiently,however,theruleswillbecomeineffectiveinsettlingcommunitydisagreementsoverwhattodo,whichmeansthatthosewhoacceptedtheruleswillnowthemselveshavenoreasontodoso.Thecommunitywillneedtocoordinatearoundanewsetofrulesinordertosettlecontroversies.Thepointhereisthateventhemostentrenchedrule–arulelikethe“equalsuffrage”rulethatcannotbeamended–ultimatelyrestsonacceptanceofitsentrenchment.Ontheotherhand,eventheleastentrenchedrule–say,onethatcanatanytimebeoverturnedbyamajority–mustbeentrenchedforsomeperiodoftimeforittobeeffectiveasarule.Considerarulethatcanbereconsideredoverandoveratanytime,andthatisalternatelyenactedandrepealedwithretroactiveeffectagainandagainwithinasingleday.Sucharuleis,duringitsvariousenact-ments,toounentrenchedtoperformitsfunction.Thatexampleis,intermsofentrenchment,thepolaroppositeofthetotallyentrenched“equalsuffrage”rule.Butbetweenthetwoarerulesthatareentrenchedtovaryingdegrees.Forexample,wetypicallydistinguishtheprovisionsintheUnitedStatesConstitutionthatcanberepealedonlythroughthesupermajoritarianprocessesofArticleVfromordinarystatutespassedbyCongress,whichcanberepealedbysub-sequentordinarystatutes.Thelatterwedeemtobeordinarylaw,whereastheformerwedeemtobeconstitutionallaw.Anditistruethatconstitutionalprovisionsaremoreentrenchedthanordinarystatutes.Butnoticethattoenactorrepealastatute,thestatutemustreceiveamajorityvoteinthetwohousesofCongressandthenbesignedbythePresident.IfthePresidentrefusestosign,thestatuteorrepealrequiresatwo-thirdsvoteofbothhouses.Surely,then,thestatusquoof“ordinary”lawoftheUnitedStatesisentrenchedagooddealmorethanitwouldbeiflawswerepassedandrepealedsolelybymajorityvoteinaunicamerallegislatureorinaplebiscite.InadditiontothetwohouseandpresidentialconcurrencerequirementsoftheUnitedStatesConstitution,therearevariousadditionalrulesintheUnitedStatesandinothercountriesthatentrenchordinarylawstovaryingdegrees.Thereareusuallynumer-ousproceduralrulesaboutwhenandhowissuesmayberaisedthatbothentrenchthestatusquosomewhatandavoidproblemsofcyclingthatArrow’sTheoremwouldotherwisepredictforsimplemajoritarianismandunentrenchedrules.AndasJohnMcGinnisandMichaelRappaportillustrateintheirexhaustivestudyofthetopic,theUnitedStatesConstitutionhasanumberofrulesthatentrenchordinarylawsagainstchange,suchasthetwo-thirdsvoteintheSenaterequiredtoapproveatreatyortoconvictafederalofficialinanimpeachmenttrial(McGinnisandRappaport2002).Thus,althoughconstitutionsmightbedistinguishedbythedegreetowhichtheirrulesareentrenched,ordinary,nonconstitutionallawsarealwaysentrenchedtosomeConstitutionalism289\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page290extent.AndinconstitutionssuchasthatoftheUnitedStates,manyordinarylawsarehighlyentrenchedduetothebicameralismandpresidentialconcurrencerequire-mentsandtospecificsupermajorityrulesintheConstitutionitself.ManyreadersmaybelievethatIhaveomittedthemostobviouswaytodistinguishconstitutionsfromordinarylaw,whichisnotbyrelativedegreesofentrenchmentbutisinsteadbylocationinthehierarchyoflegalvalidity.Onthisview,ordinarylawsarelegallyvalidiftheyareconsistentwiththeconstitution.Theconstitution’slegalvalidity,however,doesnotdependonitsconsistencywithanyhigherlawbutrestsonacceptance.Moreover,onthisview,ordinarylawsmaybemoreentrenchedthantheconstitu-tion.Thus,theconstitutionmayprovidethatitcanbeamendedbymajorityvote.Aconstitutionalprovisionmay,however,authorizeentrenchmentofordinarylaws,sothatthelegislaturecanenactstatutesthatmayonlyberepealedbysupermajorities.Therefore,accordingtothisview,degreeofentrenchmentcannotbethecriterionthatdistinguishesconstitutionsfromordinarylaws.NowIwishtoconcedethataconstitutioncouldprovidefortheentrenchmentofstatutespassedbymajorities.Andtheconstitutionitselfmightbeamendablebyabaremajority.Suchastateofaffairsispossible,thoughitwouldobviouslybeaquitefragilearrangement.Ifamajoritywishedtorepealastatutethathasbeenentrenchedagainstmajorityrepeal,itwouldsurelybetemptedtoamendtheconstitutiontoallowittodoso,giventhatitcouldamendtheconstitutionbymajorityvote.Indeed,itcouldamendtheconstitution,repealthestatute,andthenchangetheconstitutionbackagaintore-allowstatutoryentrenchments.Ofcourse,itmightexerciseenormousself-restraintandrefusetotakethiscourseofaction.Butthereareobviousreasonswhyentrenchmentsareusuallynotauthorizedbynon-entrenchedprovisions.Havingconcededthepossibilitythata“constitution”mightbelessentrenchedthan“nonconstitutionallaw,”whynotdistinguishconstitutionsfromordinarylawintermsofwhatvalidateswhat?Theproblemwithusinglocationinthehierarchyoflegalvalidityrelationstomarkoffconstitutionsisthis:Whatwenormallyregardasunitaryconstitutionsarethemselvesmadeupofpartsthatarelocatedatdifferentpointsinthelegalvalidityhierarchy.ConsidertheUnitedStatesConstitution.Arguably,itisArticleVIIthereof,whichdescribestheratificationrequirementsfortheConstitutionitself,thatisthemostfun-damentalprovisionintheConstitution,theprovisionthatvalidatesallothers.Thisprovisionwaswhatwasacceptedasthe“ruleofrecognition,”sothateventhosewhovotedagainstratificationwouldaccepttheConstitutionifitwereratifiedaccord-ingtoArticleVII’sterms(Green2004).IfArticleVIIstandsatthetopofthevalidityhierarchy,ArticleV,theamend-mentprovision,isonestepbelowit.AndthatmeansthatthoseamendmentsmadeinpursuanceofArticleVaretwostepsbelowArticleVII.If,therefore,locationinthevalidityhierarchywerethecriterionthatdistinguishedconstitutionsfromordinarylaw,andnotrelativeentrenchment,theFourteenthAmendmentwouldbeordinarylaw,notpartoftheconstitutionrightlysocalled.Indeed,sowouldArticlesIthroughVI.Isuggestthatlocationinthevalidityhierarchyisnotadescriptivelycogentmethodforidentifyingwhatwenormallycallconstitutions.Iconcede,however,thatitispossibleforwhatwenormallycallconstitutionstobelessentrenchedthanwhatwe290LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page291normallymightcallordinarylaw.Ibelievethatdegreeofentrenchmentwillnorm-allymarkoffwhatwethinkofasconstitutionsbetterthanvalidityrelations,butthetwocriteriawillmorefrequentlythannotgotogether.And,ofcourse,theentireedificerestsonacceptance.II.WhatFunctionsDoConstitutionsPerform?Ifconstitutionsarelawsthataremoreentrenchedthanordinarylaws–remember-ingthatentrenchmentisoftenamatterofdegree,andthateventhemostentrenchedlawsultimatelyrestonmomenttomomentacceptance–whatfunctionsdoconsti-tutionsperform?Theoretically,aconstitutioncouldentrenchacompletelegalcode,withnomechanismsforchangingthatcodeotherthanthroughconstitutionalamendmentorrevolution.Inmodernsocieties,however,suchastaticlegalsystemwouldbehighlydysfunctional.Therefore,realistically,ataminimum,constitutionsentrenchtherulesgoverningthemakingandchangingofordinary(nonconstitutional)law.Thoserulesmightdonomorethanestablishasimple,unicameralparliament-arydemocracy.Evensuchasimpleconstitutionalsystemwouldprobablyhaverulesregardinghowtheparliamentisselected,whotheeligiblevotersare,andsoon,thoughitispossiblethattheserulesmightnotbeentrenchedandcouldbealteredbypar-liamentitselfinitsordinarylaw-makingcapacity.Iftheconstitutionalentrenchmentsarenotabsolute,thentheconstitutionwillnormallycontainentrenchedrulesabouthowtheconstitutioncanitselfbealtered.Mostconstitutionsgobeyondentrenchingasimpleparliamentarydemocracyandproceduresforconstitutionalamendment.Theymayentrenchrulessettingupmorecomplexlaw-makingprocedures–forexample,thebicameralandpresidentialcon-currencerequirementsoftheUnitedStatesConstitution.Theymayentrenchrulesestablishingexecutiveandjudicialdepartmentsandspecifyingtheirpowers,proce-dures,andmembershipcriteria.Theymayentrenchfederalsystemsofdividedandlimitedlaw-makingpowers.And,ofcourse,theymayentrenchcertainrightsheldbyindividualsagainstthegovernmentoragainstotherindividuals.Whyentrenchrulesagainstrepealoramendmentbycurrentmajorities?Afterall,nomatterhowwiseandvirtuous,constitutionalfoundersknowthattheyarefall-iblebothmorallyandprudentially.Whatwouldmotivatethemtoentrenchrulesthatmaywellturnouttobesuboptimalorevenmischievous?Thereareseveralreasonsthatmightjustifyentrenchment.Oneisareasonthatliesbehindallattemptstoguidebehaviorthroughposited,determinaterules,namely,settlementofcontroversiesoverwhatshouldbedone.Suchcontroversiesproducemoralandprudentialcostsintermsofdecision-makingtimeandexpense,failuretocoordinatedecisions,andtheinabilitytomakeoptimaluseofexpertise.Determinaterulessimplifydecision-making,makecoordinationpossible,and,ifpositedbyauthoritiesselectedfortheirexpertiseortheirabilitytoutilizeexpertise,aremorelikelytobemorallyandprudentiallyoptimalornearoptimalthanrandomdecisions.Determinaterulesproducethesesettlementbenefitstoagreaterextentthemoretheyareentrenchedagainstrepeal.Ifsuchrulesaresubjecttorepealatanymomentuponaslightshiftinmajoritysentiment,theyarelessreliableforcoordinationpurposes,andmoreresourceswillbespentinattemptingtorepealthem(andfight-Constitutionalism291\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page292ingoffsuchattempts).Soalthoughthereisadangerinentrenchingrules–therulesmaybeimprudentoriniquitous–therearesettlementbenefitsderivedfromentrenchments.Moreover,thereareparticularclassesofrulesthatfoundersmightthinkareparticularlyaptforentrenchment.Somerule-entrenchmentsprotectagainstpredictablelegislativeshortsightedness.Forexample,the“contractsclause”oftheUnitedStatesConstitutioninArticleI,section10,whichforbidsthestatesfromimpairingtheobli-gationsofcontracts,wasentrenchedbecauseineconomicdownturns,debtors,whogreatlyoutnumbercreditors,finditintheirinteresttohavelegislaturespasslawsrelievingthemoftheirdebts.Suchlawsbenefitthecurrentdebtors,butbecausetheymakeextensionofcreditrisky,theyraisetheinterestratesfuturedebtorsmustpayandareultimatelyeconomicallydisastrous.Legislativemajoritiescannotbecountedontoprotectfuturegenerationsofdebtors,who,ofcourse,cannotcurrentlyvote.Thescenariothatliesbehindthecontractsclauseisatypicalexampleofthetypethatisofinteresttopublicchoicetheoristsregardingwhenlegislativemajoritieswillpredictablybeuntrustworthyandwhereanentrenchedrulewillbeofbenefit.Otherexamplesinthisveinareentrenchedrulesthatare,inJohnEly’swords,“representation-reinforcing”(Ely1980).Thus,rulesthatdefinewhoiseligibletovoteforthelegislaturemightbeentrenchedsothatamomentarymajoritycannotfreezeoutthosewhofavortheoppositionbydisenfranchisingthem.Similarly,rulesthatguaranteefreespeechmightbeentrenchedtopreventmomentarymajoritiesfromsilencingtheircritics.AnotherclassofrulesthatmightseemquiteappropriateforentrenchmentarethoseAdrianVermeulecalls“veilofignorancerules,”“eligibilityrules,”and“recusalrules,”allofwhichfindexpressioninprovisionsoftheUnitedStatesConstitution(Vermeule2001).Veil-of-ignorancerulesarerules,suchasthoserequiringthatlawsbegeneralandprospective,thatpreventthepredictablelegislativeabusesthatoccurwhenlegislatorsareawareoftheparticularpeoplewhomtheirlawsbenefitandburden.Eligibilityrulesandrecusalrulespreventpredictableconflictsofinterestfromoccur-ring.Allofthesetypesofrulesareentrenched,whentheyare,becausethedangersthatself-interestwillimpairgovernmentaljudgmentoutweighwhateverdangersattendentrenchmentitself.Ofcourse,theruleswhoseentrenchmentsinconstitutionsareoftenmostcon-troversialarethoseestablishingcertainrights.Onesourceofcontroversyisoverwhethersuchconstitutionalrightsshouldberestrictedtorightsagainstgovernmentaction–rightsthatgovernmentnotinfringevariousliberties,thatgovernmentnottakeorexcessivelyregulateproperty,orthatgovernmentnotdiscriminatealongvariousaxes,suchasonthebasisofrace,sex,religion,ornationality–orwhetherconstitutionalrightsshouldincludeclaimrightstocertaingovernmentalactions,suchasrightstoemploymentortoacertainlevelofincome,healthcare,andthelike,orshouldincluderightsagainstprivatepartiesandinstitutionsinadditiontorightsagainstthegovern-ment.Negativerightsprotectinglibertyandpropertyhavetheadvantageofbeingeasiertoenforcejudiciallythanaffirmativeclaimrightstoemployment,healthcare,andincome,particularlybecausetheyarefrequentlyviewedaslesssensitivetocontext,thoughthisdoesnotinitselfmakethelatterunsuitableforconstitutionalentrenchment(Sunstein2001).Thepre-legal(moral)existenceofnegativerightsisalsolesscontroversialthantheexistenceofaffirmativeones.292LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page293Themoreimportantcontroversyregardingtheconstitutionalizationofrightsiswhetherthereissufficientjustificationforentrenchingrightsagainstdemocraticrevi-sion.Ononeview,rightsareparticularlyaptforconstitutionalentrenchmentbecausetheyrepresentlimitsonwhatmajoritiesareentitledtodo,andbecausemajoritiescannotbetrustedtoupholdrightswhenrightsthwarttheirambitions.Ontheoppos-ingview,rightsshouldbelefttomajoritydeterminationbecausethecontentofrightsisfrequentlycontroversial,andnopastdeterminationofthatcontentshouldcon-strainthecurrentmajority’sviewofit.Thiscontroversyismorefullyelaboratedandevaluatedinthefinalsection.III.AreConstitutionsDesirable?Constitutionsentrenchrulessothattheycannotbeoverturnedbymerelegislativemajorities.Forthatreason,constitutionalismandjudicialreview–thepracticegivingcourtstheauthoritytooverturnmajoritariandecisionsfoundbythemtobeinconsistentwithconstitutionallyentrenchedrules–havebeenattackedasanti-democraticandthereforemorallyillegitimate.Issuchanattackwarranted?Attheoutsetitwillbeusefultodistinguishbetweenattackingconstitutionallyentrenchedrulesbecausetheycannotbeoverturnedbycurrentmajoritiesandattack-ingthoserulesbecausetheyareinterpretedbynondemocraticbodies.Theformerattackisontheveryideaofconstitutionalentrenchment.Thelatterisontheprac-ticeofjudicialreview.Onecanhaveaconstitutionofentrenchedrulesbutleavetheinterpretationofthoserulestodemocraticdecision-making,andmanycountriesdojustthat.Nonetheless,thetwoattacksarecloselyrelatedinthissense.Iftheconstitutionalrulesarequitedeterminate,sothatademocraticmajoritywilllikelyinterpretthemnodifferentlyfromhowacourtwould,thatmajorityisstillbeingboundbyadecisionmade,notbythecurrentmajority,butbytheconstitutionalfounders.Judicialreviewdoesnotchangematters.The“despotism”isthatofthefounders.Ontheotherhand,iftheconstitutionalrulesareindeterminatestandards,judicialreviewessentiallybecomesrulebythecourtsorjudicialdespotism.Onlythecombinationofanindeterminatesetofconstitutionalstandards“interpreted”bycurrentmajoritiesleavesthosecur-rentmajoritiesuntethered.Inotherwords,onlyifwearefreetodecidewhattodobasedentirelyonwhatthecurrentmajoritydeemsbesthavewesatisfiedthepuredemocrat.Determinateconstitutionalruleslegislativelyinterpretedarenolessanti-democraticthanindeterminaterulesjudiciallyinterpreted.JeremyWaldroniswellknownforhisdefenseofthesupremacyofdecisionsmadebydemocraticlegislaturesovertheenforcementofwrittenconstitutionalguaranteesbyjudges(Waldron1999;Waldron1998).Inotherwords,Waldronisfirmlyonthesideofmajoritariandecision-makingandagainstjudicialreview.BecauseweliveinwhatWaldroncallsthecircumstancesofpolitics–weeachholddifferentjudgmentsregardingwhatweasagroupoughttodo,andwhatweasagroupoughttoallowindividualstodo;andweeachpreferthatweadoptasinglepolicyonthesematters,evenifitisnottheonewefavor,thanthatweeachactonourownbutdifferingjudgmentsaboutwhatoughttobedone–therefore,arguesWaldron,weneedamech-anismforcollectivelydecidinguponsuchasinglepolicy,anddemocraticlegislationConstitutionalism293\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page294isthemorallysuperiorofthepossiblemechanisms.Moreover,forWaldron,abillofrights,judiciallyenforced,thatissupposedtotrumpanydemocraticallymadedecisionsinconsistentwithit,isamorallyinferiormechanismtodemocraticdecision-making,evenwithrespecttoprotectingindividualrights.Forifwedisagree,aswedoandwill,aboutwhatthoserightsare,howtheyaretobeelaborated,andwhatweighttheypossessvis-à-visothervalues,thenwewillneedtoreachadecisionaboutthesecontestedmatters.Anddemocraticdecision-makingismorallysuperiortonondemocraticjudicialreviewwhenthecontestedmattersareindividualrightsandtheircontours,justasitiswithrespecttootherpolicydisputes.Inotherwords,thecircumstancesofpoliticsapplytoquestionsofindividualrightsasmuchastootherissues,anddemocraticdecision-makingismorallymandatedforallcontestedmatters.ThatisWaldron’spositionpaintedwithaverybroadbrush.Buttheargumentfromthecircumstancesofpoliticstothemoralsuperiorityofdemocratic-majoritariandecision-makingis,Ifind,elusive.IshallexaminewhatIbelievearethethreepossibleargumentsthatWaldronmightmake.Intheend,IconcludethatnoneofthethreecangetWaldronwhathewants,namely,aknockdownmoralcaseagainstconstitutionalismandjudicialreview.Whatarethethreeargumentsthatmightbeadvancedtosupportthemoralsuper-iorityofdemocraticdecision-makingoverconstitutionalismwithjudicialreview?Oneargumentisepistemic.Thedecisionsenactedbydemocraticmajoritiesmightbemorelikelymorallycorrectthanthoseenforcedbyjudgesinthenameofrightsendorsedatsomepointinthepast.Presentdemocraticmajoritiesmightbebetterinformedthanpastmajoritiesandtheirjudicialagents,bothbecausetheycandrawuponthewisdomofboththepastandthepresent,andbecausetheyarebetterabletoassesstheinterestsofallwhowillbeaffectedbytheirdecisions.And,paceCondorcet,whomWaldroncitesonthispoint,themorewhosupportadecisionasthemorallycorrectone,themorelikelythedecisionistobecorrect,atleastgiventheassumptionthatindividualsareeachmorelikelytodecidecorrectlythanincorrectly.(Condorcet’sapplicationtochoicesthatarenotbinaryis,however,muchlessoptimistic.SeeEstlund2005.)Theepistemicargumentforthesuperiorityofdemocraticdecision-makingoverconstitutionalismwithjudicialreviewisnotrejectableonanalyticgrounds,butitishostagetothefacts.Andthefactsaboutdemocraticdecision-makingdonotestablishitsepistemicsuperiorityacrosstheboardonthoseissueswithinitspurview.Majoritiesarebetterinformedonsomemoralmattersthanonothers.Theyaremorelikelytodeliberatethoughtfullyonsomemattersthanonothers.Thesamegoesforconstitutionalframersandforjudges.Theproofofthepuddinghereiswhetheruncon-strainedmajoritarianismproducesmorallybetterlegislationthantheimpuremajor-itarianismof,say,theAmericanlegalsystem,withitsmixofbicameralism,executiveveto,federalism,and,ofcourse,constitutionalrights,theconstitutionalamendmentprocedure,andjudicialreview.Conceivably,unconstrainedmajoritarianismmightbeepistemicallysuperioratsometimesandplaces.ButIdoubtthatitcanbeshowntobeforalltimesandplaces.Intheend,withrespecttotheepistemicargument,Icon-cludethateventhoughthemorewhoopposemeonsomemoralissue,themoreIshouldbeawareofmyownfallibility,intheend,numbersdonotguaranteemoralcorrectness,andhewhoswimsagainstthemoralcurrentisnotalwayswrongtodoso.AlthoughWaldrondoesnotdisputethispoint,Ibelievethatthispointultimately294LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page295underminesanyepistemicargumentfordemocracy.Forthesameepistemicreasonsweexcludeinfants,theinsane,andperhapsfelonsfromthefranchise,wemightalsoestablishbicameralism,theveto,andjudiciallyenforcedconstitutionalrights.Weknowwearesubjecttopoliticalweaknessofwillandotherformsofcognitiveandmoraldistortion.Weknowaboutpublicchoicepredicamentsandrent-seekingcosts.Andparticularlyiftheconstitutionallyentrenchedruleswereadoptedbyasupermajorityafterfulldeliberation,wemayhavemoreconfidenceinthedecisionsoflong-deadconstitutionalfoundersthaninpresent-daybaremajorities.Theepistemicargumentturnsaswellonwhethertheconstitutionalfoundersentrenchedstructuresandrightsthroughdeterminaterulesorthroughindeterminatestandards.Thereareinrealitythreeprincipalpossibilitiestoconsider.First,theconstitutionalfoundersmayhaveattemptedtosettlewhatourrightsrequireandentrenchedthatsettlementthroughconstitutionalrulesimplementingthoserights.Becausetherightswouldbeentrenchedintheformofrules,theywouldclearlywarrantjudicialinterpretationandenforcement.Suchaconstitutionalentrenchmentthroughruleshasclearsettlementadvantages.Moreover,ithassomeepistemicadvantages–the“constitutionalmoment”ofthefoundingmayhaveproducedunusuallywidespreadandthoughtfuldeliberation–andsomedemocraticwarrant,particularlyifratifiedbyasupermajority.Thoseadvantagespassthroughtothecourtsthatapplytheconstitutionallyentrenchedrules.Second,theconstitutionalfoundersmayhaveentrenchedrightsintheformofstandards,andthecourts,ininterpretingandimplementingthosestandards,mighttranslatethemintoratherdeterminatedoctrinalrules(Schauer2005).Inthisscenario,becausethecourtsarebothresolvingcontroversialevaluativemattersandthen“legislating”–comingupwithimplementingrules–inawaythattrumpsthelegislatureitself,thecourtsareonweakergroundthaninthefirstscenario.Iftheyareappointedratherthanelected,thecourtshavenodemocraticwarrant,notevenfromaratifyingsupermajority,asthefoundersdelegatedtherightsquestionsratherthanresolvedthem.Asfortheepistemiccase,thecourtsmayormaynothaveanepistemicadvantageoverthelegislature,dependingonwhetheryoubelieveRonaldDworkinorbelieveWaldron(Dworkin[1985]arguesfamouslythatbecausecourtsare“forumsofprinciple,”theydohaveanepistemicadvantageoverlegislaturesinascertainingourmoralrights.)Third,theconstitutionmayeitherentrenchrightsintheformofstandardsorbesilentregardingrights,andthecontentandimplementationofmoralrightsisnotlefttocourtsbutisleftentirelytocontemporarydemocraticbodiesactingintheirordinarylegislativemodes.Thosebodieswill,ofcourse,havedemocraticwarrantfortheirdecisionsaboutrights.Andtheymayhavesomeepistemicadvantagesovercourts–forexample,theyareunconstrainedbytheadjudicativeform–andovertheconstitutionalfounders(theyhavemorehistorytodrawuponandliveinthecircumstancestowhichtheirlegislationwillapply).TheseareWaldron’spoints.Butthesebodieswillalsohaveepistemicdisadvantagesvis-à-viscourts(Dworkin’spoint)andvis-à-visthefounders(theyarelessbehindamorallyusefulveilofignorance,theyarequitelikelytobelessdeliberative,andtheywillfacevariousdistortingpressuresfromperhapsrights-insensitivemajoritiesorminorities).Inassessingwhichofthesethreealternativesispreferable,onenotonlyhastoweightheepistemicanddemocraticadvantagesanddisadvantages,butonealsohasConstitutionalism295\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page296todeterminehowdesirableorundesirableistheentrenchmentthroughrulesoftheresolutionsofcontroversialmoralquestions.Entrenchmentthroughruleshastheordinaryadvantagesofsettlement–predictability,coordination,anddecision-makingefficiency.Andithastheordinarydisadvantagesofsettlementaswell–thesettlingruleswillbeblunt(overandunderinclusive)evenifidealasrules;andgivenhumanfallibility,theywillalmostsurelynotbeideal.Whatdegreeofentrenchmentdoourresolutionsofmoralquestionscallfor?Notabsoluteentrenchmentforsure.Entrenchmentthatonlysupermajoritiescanoverturn?Entrenchmentthatonlysuper-majoritiesorcourtsoverrulingjudicialprecedentscanoverturn?Ornoentrenchmentwhatsoever?Asstated,theepistemicargumentishostagetothefacts.Forsome,epistemicconsiderationsshouldbedispositive(Alexander2002;Alexander1998;Arneson2004).Theybelievethatwhateverdecision-makingformproducesthemorallybestdecisionsshouldbechosen,democraticornot.Democracyisonlyameanstoanend,andifanothermeansisinstrumentallybetter,somuchtheworsefordemocracy.Thesecondargumentinfavorofdemocraticdecision-makingisastraightforwardmoralone.WhereAbelievesmoralitydictatespolicyX,andBandCbelievesitdictatespolicyY,BandChaveamoralrighttohavepolicyYprevailevenif(fromtheGod’s-eyepointofview)policyXismorallycorrectandpolicyYismorallyflawed.AssumingbothXandYaffectthelivesofthosewhoopposethem,themoralrightofBandCtohaveincorrectpolicyYprevailisthenamoralrighttocommitmoralwrongsagainstothers.Therighttodemocraticdecision-makingis,onthisargument,arighttodowrong.NowIbelievethereindeedaresomerightstoactimmorally.Butthisargumentgoesfarbeyondthatlimitedsetofrightsandappliestoallmoralwrongssolongasthedemocraticmajorityvotestopermitorcompelthem.Butsucharighttodowrongisuntenable.Toseethis,imaginethatforA,thecircumstancesofpoliticsdonotexistbecauseAcanenforcehiswillagainstBandC.(Heisendowedwithsuperiorstrengthandtechnology.)AndsupposeAbelieves–weshallassumecorrectly–thatwhatBandCproposeisprofoundlyunjust.Ontheargumentunderconsideration,AmustletBandChavetheirway,despitethefactthatwhattheyproposeismorallywrongandthatAcanpreventtheimmoraloutcome.Butsuchamoralmustisquiteimplausible.Numbersdonot,anymorethanmight,makeright.ConsiderasanillustrationavariationofthesituationdescribedinWalterVanTilburg’sTheOxBowIncident(1940).Alargepossehascapturedsomesuspectedkillersandcattlerustlers.Mostofthepossewants,onmoralgrounds,tohangthemonthespotratherthanturnthemovertothelawfulauthoritiesandlawfulprocesses.Afewonthepossedissent,however,andarguevigorouslyforthelattercourse.Afterlengthydiscussion,thepossevotes,andimmediatehangingwinsbyalargemargin.Thedissenters,however,appalledatthedecision,discusswhethertheyshouldemploytheelementofsurprise,pulltheirgunsonthemajority,andforceittohandoverthesuspectstothedissenters,whowouldseethatthesuspectsreceivedfulldueprocess.Waldroncanbereadasarguingthatthedissenterswouldbeactingmorallywronglyinfollowingtheirownratherthanthemajority’smoralviewofthematter.I,ontheotherhand,likeothers(Arneson),cannotseewhythemajority’sdecisionshouldbegivenmoremoralweightthanitsepistemiccredentialswarrant.296LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page297Nordoesthenotionof“respect”morallydictatethatAaccedetoBandC’simmoralproposal.A’smoraltheorymayholdthatBandCmustberespectedaspersons,orsomesuchthing;butitwouldbeastrangemoraltheorythatcontainsanotionofrespectthatmadethemoraltheory“self-effacing”(AlexanderandKress1997).Waldronsometimesappearstobemakingamoralargumentonbehalfofdemo-craticdecision-making.ButifsuspensionofthecircumstancesofpoliticsdoesnotleaveAwithamoralobligationtoaccedetotheimmoralBandC,itisdifficulttoseehowplacingAinthecircumstancesofpoliticscreatesamoralobligationtodoso.ThecircumstancesofpoliticsdobearonwhatAismorallyobligatedtodo,asIshallshow.Buttheydonotdosointhewaythisargumentclaims.Waldrondoesnotdealatlengthwithcontrolofthefranchise.Butsuchcontrolaffectsthemoralargumentfordemocraticdecision-making.SupposeB,C,andDvotetoexcludeEfromthefranchise.(Eisuneducated,andB,C,andDenactafran-chiserestrictionexcludingtheuneducated.)Abelieves–correctly,weshallassume–thatsuchanexclusionisunjust,andvotesagainsttheexclusion,alongwithE.Becausethetwoofthemareoutvoted,Eisexcluded.NowB,C,andDvoteforanothermeasure(X)thatAbelieves–again,correctly–isunjust.IsAboundbysuchanunjustmeasurepassedbyademocraticmajoritythathasunjustlyexcludedsomefromthefranchise?Ifunjustmeasuresaremorallyobligatingifdemocraticallyenacted,doesthatapplytodemocraticallyenactedlimitationsofthefranchise?(Christiano2000).(Remember,Edidvoteonhisownexclusion;hejustlost.)Again,itisdifficulttoseehowonecandistinguishthetwotypesofunjustbutdemocraticallyenactedmeasures.Butitisalsodifficulttobelievethatdemocraticallyenactedbutunjustmeasuresaremorallyobligatorywhenthedemocraticfranchisehasbeenunjustlyrestricted.(WaldronalsodoesnotdiscussArrovianproblemsindefiningtheoutputofdemo-craticmajorities.Thoseproblemsareusuallyavoidedbyvariousrulescontrollingtheagendaorprivilegingthestatusquoante,rulesthatviolateArrovianconditions.Withthoserules,wedonothavepuremajoritarianism;withoutthem,wewouldhavetrouble,becauseofcycling,etc.identifyingtherelevantdemocraticallyendorsedpositions.)Ithinkitisamistaketopositdemocraticdecision-makingasadeontologicalside-constraintongovernance.ThecasefordemocracythatIfavoristheWinstonChurchillone–it’sbetterthanthecompetitors.Andifit’sbetterasageneralmatter,itmightbebetterstillifitisrepresentativeratherthandirect,ifithasseparatedpowers,andifitislimitedbyrightsthatarejudiciallyenforced.Inshort,Irejectamoralrighttodemocraticdecision-making,exceptasaninfelicitouswayofclaimingdemocracy’ssuperiorityonconsequentialistgrounds,includ-ingaconsequentialismofrightsprotection.Theallegedmoralrighttodemocracysurelydoesnotfollowfromanyplausibleegalitarianism.Itdoesnotfollowfromequalityofwelfare(ortheopportunitytherefor),norfromequalityofresources,bothofwhichmightbebettersecuredinabenigndespotism.Nordoesitfollowfromequalityofrespect;forwhatisupforrespecthereisnototherpeople’swelfare,butotherpeople’sjudgmentsaboutwhateveryone’smoralrightsanddutiesare.Thosejudgmentsmaybewrong,inwhichcaserespectingthemmayentailallowingthosewhosejudgmentstheyaretoimposeimmoralconstraintsanddutiesonotherpeople.Respectforpersonsdoesnotextendtorespectingtheirviolationsofothers’Constitutionalism297\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page298rights,andrespectcannotbedemandedforerroneousmoraljudgmentsintheformofaccedingtothem.Thereisnorighttoviolateothers’rightssolongasenoughpeopleagreewithyou.ThethirdargumentWaldronmightmakeagainstconstitutionalentrenchmentdoestakethecircumstancesofpoliticsseriously.ItisdescribedatthebeginningofsectionIandiswhatIshallcallastrategicmoralargument.SupposethatAbelievesthatmoraltheoryTiscorrect.WereAall-powerful,AwouldimposeT,evenovertheobjectionofeveryoneelse.ButAisnotall-powerful.ThequestiontheniswhatisthemoralimperativethatAfacesgiventhecircum-stancesofpolitics?Moreparticularly,isthatmoralimperativetooptformajoritariandecision-making?Ibelievethattheanswergoessomethinglikethis.AwantsanoutcomethatisascloseashecangettotheoutcomedictatedbycorrectmoraltheoryT.Hethereforewantsthatsystemofgovernmentthatis(1)mostlikelytoproduceresultsclosesttowhatTdictatesand(2)mostlikelytobeagreeduponbyasufficientnumberofpeopletoeliminatethecircumstancesofpoliticsproblem.IfeitherAandBorAandCaresufficientlypowerfultoimposetheirwill,andB’smoralviewsareclosertoTthanC’s,AwilljoinwithBinwhateverformofgovernmenttheycanagreeto.Moreover,ifCmorallyprefersthelikelyoutcomesoftheA-Bsystemtoanarchy,Cwillhaveamoralreasontoaccepttheauthorityofthatsystem.Thesystemmightturnouttobemajoritariandemocracy,butitmightturnouttobesomethingelse.Whateachofushasamoralreasontoacceptisthatformofgovernmentthatismostlikelytogetitrightfromourpointofviewamongthoseformsthatwecangetenoughotherstoaccept.Becausethemoralcostsofanarchyareusuallyassessedtobequitehighfrommostpeople’smoralstandpoints,manygovernmentalarrangementswouldbeacceptedoveranarchy.Majoritariandemocracymaybeoneofthem.Butsomightconstitutionalismandjudicialreview.ReferencesBooksAlexander,L.,andE.Sherwin.2001.TheRuleofRules(Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress).Dworkin,R.M.1985.AMatterofPrinciple(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).Ely,J.H.1980.DemocracyandDistrust(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).Finer,S.E.,V.Bognadorand,B.Rudden.1995.ComparingConstitutions(Oxford:ClarendonPress).Sunstein,C.R.2001.DesigningDemocracy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).VanTilburg,W.1940.TheOxBowIncident(NewYork:RandomHouse).Waldron,J.1999.LawandDisagreement(Oxford:ClarendonPress).ArticlesinBooksAlexander,L.A.1998.“Introduction,”inL.A.Alexander(ed.),Constitutionalism:PhilosophicalFoundations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),pp.1–15.Arneson,R.J.2004.“DemocracyIsNotIntrinsicallyJust,”inK.Dowding,R.E.Goodin,andC.Pateman(eds.),JusticeandDemocracy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),pp.40–58.298LarryAlexander\nCDIC16.qxd2/4/0915:53Page299Grey,T.C.1979.“Constitutionalism:AnAnalyticFramework,”inJ.R.PennockandJ.W.Chapman(eds.),Constitutionalism(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress),pp.189–209.Kay,R.S.1998.“AmericanConstitutionalism,”inL.A.Alexander(ed.),Constitutionalism:PhilosophicalFoundations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),pp.16–63.Waldron,J.1998.“PrecommitmentandDisagreement,”inL.A.Alexander(ed.),Constitutionalism:PhilosophicalFoundations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),pp.271–99.ArticlesinJournalsAlexander,L.A.2003.“ConstitutionalRules,ConstitutionalStandards,andConstitutionalSettlement:Marburyv.MadisonandtheCaseforJudicialSupremacy,”LawandPhilosophy20:369–78.Alexander,L.A.2002.“IsJudicialReviewDemocratic?:ACommentonHarel,”LawandPhilosophy22:277–83.Alexander,L.A.1998.“AreProceduralRightsDerivativeSubstantiveRights?,”LawandPhilosophy17:19–42.Alexander,L.A.,andK.Kress.1997.“RepliestoOurCritics,”IowaLawReview82:923–41.Christiano,T.2000.“WaldrononLawandDisagreement,”LawandPhilosophy19:513–43.Estlund,D.2005.Bookreview,Ethics115:609–14.Green,M.2004.“LegalRevolutions:SixMistakesAboutDiscontinuityintheLegalOrder,”NorthCarolinaLawReview83:331–409.McGinnis,J.O.,andM.B.Rappaport.2002.“OurSupermajoritarianConstitution,”TexasLawReview80:703–806.Schauer,F.2005.“TheTyrannyofChoiceandtheRulificationofStandards,”JournalofContemporaryLegalIssues14:803–14.Vermeule,A.2001.“VeilofIgnoranceRulesinConstitutionalLaw,”YaleLawJournal111:399–442.Constitutionalism299\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page301PERSONS,IDENTITYANDDIFFERENCEINDIVIDUALISMANDCOMMUNITYContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page303CHAPTERSEVENTEENIndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunityRichardDaggerInthelasttwodecadesofthetwentiethcentury,theso-calledliberal-communitariandebateoccupiedmuchoftheattentionofpoliticalphilosophers.Thedebatelingersoninthenewcentury,butitseemsincreasinglyclearthatthe“communitarians”haveabandonedthefield,eitherbyforswearingcommunitarianismorbytakinguprelatedcauses,suchasmulticulturalism.Butthatisnottosaythatcommuni-tarianismhasbeenutterlyvanquishedorthatthereisnothingofvalueinthepositionscommunitariansadvancedinthecourseofthedebate.Ifnothingelse,theirargumentsshouldhelpustoseethatindividualismcanbetakentoofarandtheclaimsofcommunitytakentoolightly.So,atleast,Ishalltrytodemonstrateinthisessay.WhatIshallnottrytodemonstrateisthatpoliticalphilosophersmustchoosebetweentheclaimsoftheindividualandthoseofthecommunity.Therearetimes,certainly,whenthoseclaimsseemtopullinoppositedirections.Theindividual’srighttoownandoperateabusinesssometimescomesintoconflictwithcommunitystandardsofdecencyorhealth,forexample;orthecommunity’sneedtoguardagainstterrorismmayconflictwiththeindividual’sfreedomofassociationandexpression.Casessuchastheserequiredecisionsthatareseldomclear-cutandoftenpainful.Yettheyshouldnotobscurethefundamentalpoint,whichisthatcommunitiescannotexistwithoutindividualmembersandindividualscannotexist,muchlessthrive,withoutcommunity.Wherepersonsareconcerned,inotherwords,therearenoindividuals,noindividuality,andnoindividualismwithoutcommunityofsomesort.Communitiestakevariousformsanddirections,however,justasindividualsdo,andsomeofthemaremorelikelytostifleindividualitythantofosterit.Ifindividualismcanbepressedtoofar,sotoocantheclaimsofcommunity.Thechallengeistobringtheclaimsoftheindividualandcommunityintobalance.Tomeetthischallengeistofindandsupportformsofcommunitythatpromotenotsimplyindividuality,butthekindofpublic-spiritedindividualitythatrecognizeshowmuchitowestoothersandstrivestodischargethisdebt.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page304I.LiberalsversusCommunitarians?Asoftenhappenswithacademicdisputes,theliberal–communitariandebatehasbeenamurkyaffair,withtheopposingpositionsvaguelydefinedandtheparticipantsfrequentlytalkingpastoneanother.Tosome,infact,theentiredebateappearseithertohavebeen“misconceived”ormarkedby“cross-purposesandjustplainconfusion....”(Caney1992;Taylor1995:181).Onepoint,however,seemsclear.Deepasitsrootsinoldercontroversiesmaygo,theliberal–communitariandebateofrecentyearsbeganwiththepublicationoffourbooksintheearly1980s:AlasdairMacIntyre’sAfterVirtue(1981),MichaelSandel’sLiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice(1982),MichaelWalzer’sSpheresofJustice(1983),andCharlesTaylor’sPhilosophicalPapers1(1985).Eachofthesebooksexpressed,initsownway,dissatisfactionwiththeaimsandambitionsofliberalism,especiallyintheformofliberaltheoriesofjusticeandrights.ThemaintargetwasJohnRawls’sATheoryofJustice(1971),butRobertNozick’sAnarchy,State,andUtopia(1974),RonaldDworkin’sTakingRightsSeriously(1977),andBruceAckerman’sSocialJusticeintheLiberalState(1980)alsocameinforcriticism.AtypicalcomplaintwasthatthetheoriesRawlsandtheothershaveadvancedaretooabstractanduniversalistic.Inopposingthem,Walzerproposeda“radicallyparticularist”approachthatattendsto“history,culture,andmembership”byaskingnotwhat“rationalindividuals...underuniversalizingconditionsofsuch-and-suchasort”wouldchoose,butwhatwould“individualslikeuschoose,whoaresituatedasweare,whoshareacultureandaredeterminedtogoonsharingit?”(1983:xiv,5).InthiswayWalzercalledattentiontotheimportanceofcommunity,whichheandotherstooktobesufferingfrombothphilosophicalandpoliticalneglect.NordidWalzerandtheotherswhocametobeknownascommunitariansbelievethatphilosophicalortheoreticalindifferencehadmerelycoincidedwiththeerosionofcommunitythattheysawintheworldaroundthem.InvariouswaysWalzer,MacIntyre,Sandel,andTaylor,amongothers,allchargedthattheliberalemphasisondistributivejusticeandindividualrightsworkstodividethecitizensofthemodernstateagainstoneanother,fosteringisolation,alienation,andapathyratherthancom-mitmenttoacommoncivicenterprise.Liberalsrespondedtothesecomplaints,ofcourse,andthedebatewason.Thoseenlistedonthecommunitariansideofthedebatehavepressedfourmajorobjectionsagainsttheir“liberal”or“individualist”opponents.Thefirst,alreadynotedinWalzer,isthatabstractreasonwillnotbeartheweightphilosophershaveplacedonitintheirattemptstogroundjusticeandmorality.This“Enlightenmentproject”(MacIntyre1981)isdoomedbyitsfailuretorecognizethatreasoningaboutthesematterscannotproceedapartfromsharedtraditionsandpractices,eachwithitsownsetofroles,responsibilities,andvirtues.Second,theliberalemphasisonindividualrightsandjusticecomesattheexpenseofcivicdutyandthecommongood.InSandel’swords,“justicefindsitslimitsinthoseformsofcommunitythatengagetheidentityaswellastheinterestsoftheparticipants”;“tosomeIowemorethanjusticerequiresorevenpermits...invirtueofthosemoreorlessenduringattachmentsandcom-mitmentswhichtakentogetherpartlydefinethepersonIam”(1982:182,179).Contemporaryliberalsareblindtotheseenduring,unchosenattachmentsandcom-mitments,accordingtothethirdcharge,becausetheytoooftenrelyonanatomistic304RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page305conceptionoftheself–an“unencumberedself,”inSandel’sterms–thatissup-posedlypriortoitsendsandattachments.Suchaconceptionisbothfalseandper-nicious,forindividualselvesarelargelyconstitutedbythecommunitiesthatnurtureandsustainthem.WhenRawlsandother“deontologicalliberals”teachindividualstothinkofthemselvesassomehowpriortoandapartfromthesecommunities,theyareengaged,quiteliterally,inaself-defeatingenterprise.Thefourthobjection,then,isthattheseabstractanduniversalistictheoriesofjusticeandrightshavecontributedtothewithdrawalintoprivatelifeandtheintransigentinsistenceonone’srightsagainstothersthatthreatenmodernsocieties.Insuchconditionsthereislittlesenseofacommongoodorevenacommongroundonwhichcitizenscanmeet.InMacIntyre’swords,theconflictbetweentheadvocatesofincommensurablemoralpositionshassorivenmodernsocietiesthatpoliticsnow“iscivilwarcarriedonbyothermeans...”(1981:253).Thebestwecandointhesecircumstancesistoagreetodisagreewhilewetrytofashion“localformsofcommunitywithinwhichcivilityandtheintellectualandmorallifecanbesustainedthroughthenewdarkageswhicharealreadyuponus”(MacIntyre1981:263).Thecommunitarianshavenotpressedalloftheseobjectionswithequalforce,norhavetheyallunderstoodthemselvestobecriticizingliberalismfromtheoutside.Taylor(1995),forinstance,hasarguedthatreasonableliberalsandcommunitariansshareacommitmentto“holistindividualism”–aviewtowhichIshallreturninsectionIIofthisessay.Othertheoristswithcommunitarianleaningscontinuetoregardthem-selvesasliberals(Galston1991;Spragens1995,1999).Fromtheirpointofview,thefundamentalworryisthatsomeprominentliberalsaresopreoccupiedwiththerightsandlibertiesofabstractindividualsthattheyputthesurvivalofliberalsocietiesatrisk.Whetherthisworryiswellfoundedisaquestionthatthe“liberal”sideofthedebatehasraisedinresponsetothe“communitarians.”Herewemaydistinguishthreeinterlockingresponses.Thefirstisthatthecom-munitarians’criticismsaremisplacedbecausetheyhavemisunderstoodwhattheliberalshavebeentryingtodo.Inparticular,thecommunitarianshavemisunder-stoodtheabstractnessofthetheoriestheycriticize.ThusRawlsmaintains(1993:LectureI)thathis“political”conceptionoftheselfaspriortoitsendsisnotameta-physicalclaimaboutthenatureoftheself,asSandelbelieves,butsimplyawayofrepresentingthepartieswhoaretochooseprinciplesofjusticefrombehindthe“veilofignorance.”Nordoesthisconceptionoftheindividualasaselfcapableofchoos-ingtheendsitshallpursuerequireliberalstodenythatindividualidentityisinmanywaystheproductofunchosenattachmentsandsocialcircumstances.“Whatiscentraltotheliberalview,”accordingtoWillKymlicka,“isnotthatwecanperceiveaselfpriortoitsends,butthatweunderstandourselvestobepriortoourends,inthesensethatnoendorgoalisexemptfrompossiblere-examination...”(1989a:52,emphasisinoriginal).Tosaythattheselfispriortoitsendsisthustosaythatnoparticularselfiscompletelydefinedorexhaustedbyitscurrentends.IfIweresome-howtocompileacomprehensivecatalogueofmyends,commitments,andattachments,thatcataloguewouldnodoubtprovideabroadanddeepaccountofwhoIam:ofmyself.Italsowouldincludesomeendsandattachments,suchasthoseinvolvingfamilyandcountry,thatwereatleastpartlyfixedatbirth.Yetitcouldnotcaptureeverythingaboutmyself,foritwouldnotincludemy(self’s)abilitytoaddnewitemstothatcataloguewhileamendinganddiscardingothers.ThereisaconceptualIndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunity305\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page306sense,then,inwhichtheselfispriortoitsendseventhoughsomeofitsendsand2attachmentsnecessarilyprecedeittemporally.Sandelandothercommunitariansarenodoubtrightasamatterofphilosophicalanthropology.Wearethepersonswearelargelybecauseoffamily,tribe,sect,nation,andotherformativeforces.Totheextentthatliberalshavearguedasifwewereisolatedatoms,altogetherfreefromsuchinfluences,theyareguiltyofthechargeofmisconceivingtheself.Butthatisnotamisconceptionthatliberalsmustadopt,norisitonethatnecessarilyattachestothosewhoclaimthattheselfispriortoitsend.Thesecond“liberal”responsehascenteredonthemeaningandvalueofcommun-ity.Inthiscasetheresponsehastakenbothadefensiveandoffensiveform.Defensively,liberalshavedeniedthattheyareeitherhostileorindifferenttocommunity.JoelFeinberg,forexample,hasinsistedthatthereisnothingintheliberal’sideologythatneedblindhimtothesocialnatureofhumanbeingsandtheimportancetoallofusofcommunitymemberships....[H]ecan,indeedhemust,concedewhatisplainfact,thatmostofwhatwefulfillwhenwefulfillourselvesaredispositionsimplantedbyourcommunities,andmostofwhatweexercisewhenweexerciseourautonomyiswhatourcommunitiescreatedinusinthefirstplace.(Feinberg1988:89,emphasisinoriginal)Theliberalshavealsotakentheoffensivebychargingthatcommunitariansneithermakeclearwhattheymeanby“community”norhavesufficientfaithinpeople’sabilitytoformandsustaincommunities.AsKymlickasays,Liberalsbelievethatpeoplenaturallyformandjoinsocialrelationsinwhichtheycometounderstandandpursuethegood....Itiscommunitarianswhoseemtothinkthatindividualswilldriftintoanomicanddetachedisolationwithoutthestateactivelybring-ingthemtogethertocollectivelyevaluateandpursuethegood.(Kymlicka1989b:904)Thethird“liberal”response,finally,istopointtothedangersoftheappealtocommun-itynorms.Communitieshavetheirvirtues,buttheyhavetheirvices,too–smugness,intolerance,andvariousformsofoppressionandexploitationamongthem.Thefactthatcommunitariansdonotthemselvesembracethesevicessimplyrevealstheper-versityoftheircriticism:they“wantustoliveinSalem,butnottobelieveinwitches”(Gutmann1992:133).Ifliberalsrelyonabstractionsanduniversalconsiderationsintheirtheoriesofjusticeandrights,thatisbecausetheymustdosotoriseabove,andcriticallyassess,localprejudicesthatcommunitariansmustacceptsolongastheirstandardissimplythegoodofcommunityassuch.Communitarianrejoindersindicatetheirsensitivitytothislastpoint.Withoutabandoninghiscriticismof“rights-orientedliberalism,”Sandelhascometoidentifyhimselfwith“republicanism”(1996,2000),observingthatthe“term‘communitarian’ismisleading...insofarasitimpliesthatrightsshouldrestonthevaluesandpre-ferencesthatprevailinanygivencommunityatanygiventime”(2005:212–13).3Forhispart,MacIntyrehasdeniedthatheisoreverwasacommunitarian.Otherscontinuetoembracethecommunitarianlabel,buttheirrejoindersto“liberal”criticismsstresstheirdesiretostrikeabalancebetweenindividualrightsandcivicrespons-ibilitiesinorderto“moveclosertotheidealofcommunitylife”–alifeinwhich“we306RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page307learnthevalueofintegratingwhatweseekindividuallywiththeneedsandaspirationsofotherpeople”(Tam1998:220,emphasisadded;alsoEtzioni1996;Selznick2002).Ifthis,however,iswhatcommunitarianstrulywant–alifeinwhichpeoplefreelypursuetheirindividualendswhileremainingresponsiblemembersofthecommunity–thenitseemsthatthedebaterestedinlargepartonafalsedichotomybetweenliberalindividualismandsituatedselvesembeddedincommunity.Oncethatdichotomyisrejected,thedebateturnsouttobeanintramuralaffairamongpeoplewhoallvaluetolerationandindividualfreedom–thatis,adebatereflecting“internaltensionswithinliberalism”(Feinberg1988:82).Tobesure,astrictcommunitarianmightcontinuetoinsistthatliberalindividualismtrulyisopposedtocommunity,buttakingsuchananti-individualisticstancesimplyallowsliberalstopresentthem-selvesaschampionsoffreedomandtheiropponentsascollectivistsofavaguebutdangeroussort(Bird1999:204–11).Thatisnottosay,however,thattheliberal-communitariandebatehasbeenfruit-less.Onthecontrary,MacIntyre,Sandel,Taylor,Walzer,andothersonthecommun-itariansidehaveperformedatleasttwovaluableservices,firstbydirectingmoreattentiontothevalueofcommunityand,second,byraisingreasonableconcernsabouttheimplicationsofindividualism.Testimonytothevalueoftheseservicesisevidentintherecenteffortsofliberalphilosopherstoaddressproblemsofbelonging,iden-tity,andcommunityintheirownwork(e.g.,Kymlicka1989a,1995;Dworkin1986,41992;Gewirth1996;Mason2000;Kukathas2003).Liberalshaverightlydeniedthatliberalismisnecessarilyhostiletocommunity,inotherwords,buttheyalsodowelltorecognizethatcommunityandcommunity-likeconsiderationsrequirenotonlyphilo-sophicalattentionbutpoliticalcare.II.IndividualismOneindicationofthissensitivitytoconsiderationsofcommunitymaybefoundintheindicesofRawls’sworks.Noentryfor“community”appearsintheindextoATheoryofJustice(1971),butonedoesinbothPoliticalLiberalism(1993)andJusticeasFairness:ARestatement(2001).Inthelastbook,tobesure,thebriefentryreads“Communityvs.DemocraticSociety,”followedbyareferencetothemoreextensiveentryfor“PoliticalSociety.”NordoesRawlsembracecommunityasanidealeitherinthatbookorinPoliticalLiberalism.Onthecontrary,hetakespainstodistinguishcommunityfromboth“association”andhisownidealofa“democratic”or“well-5ordered”politicalsociety(1993:40–3;2001:3–4,198–200).Thathesawtheneedtodrawthesedistinctionsinhislaterworks,however,suggeststhatthecommunitarians’effortswerenotwithouteffect.WhatRawlshadnoneedtodoinhislaterworkwastoabandonordefendtheatomistic,abstractindividualismthatcommunitarianshaveoftenassociatedwithliberalism.ThereisabstractionaplentyinATheoryofJustice,buttheabstractindi-vidualsintheRawlsian“originalposition”whoagreetoprinciplesofjusticebehindthe“veilofignorance”arenot,aswehaveseen,reflectionsofRawls’sbeliefthathumanbeingsareessentially“unencumbered”selves.WhenRawlsportraystheseindividualsas“mutuallydisinterested,”moreover,hedoessotopreventenvyandpartialityfrominfectingtheprinciplesofjusticethatthepartiestothesocialIndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunity307\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page308contractchoose,notbecausehetakespeopletobeself-containedatoms.Hesays,infact,that“itisonlyinactivecooperationwithothersthatone’spowersreachfruition.Onlyinasocialunionistheindividualcomplete”(Rawls1971:525,n.4).Rawlsmaywellbeanindividualist,butheclearlyisnotoneoftheatomistickind.NorisRawlsanexceptiontotheliberalruleinthisregard.Ifliberalsareallindi-vidualists,thedifferencesamongthemillustratethevarietyofformsthatindividu-alismcantake.Indeed,ColinBirdhasdistinguishedsixwaysofconstruingtheclaim,supposedlycharacteristicofliberalism,that“theindividualispriortosociety”(Bird1999:47–72).Forpresentpurposes,though,theimportantpointisthatindividual-ismmaytakeformsthataremoreandlesscongenialtotheclaimsofcommunity.AlexisdeTocquevilleandJohnStuartMillprovideanilluminatingcontrasthere,forbothfearedthestiflingeffectsof“thetyrannyofthemajority”ontheindividual’sfreedomtothinkandactinunconventionalways.Millcelebratedindividuality,however,whileTocquevilledeploredindividualism,whichhedefinedas“acalmandconsideredfeelingwhichdisposeseachcitizentoisolatehimselffromthemassofhisfellowsandwithdrawintothecircleoffamilyandfriends...,[leaving]thegreatersocietytolookafteritself”(1969:506).Ifwhatwemeanby“individualism”issome-thingliketherecognitionandpromotionofindividuality,thenweshouldregarditasavitalcontributiontoahealthycommunity–atleast(asMillandeveryotheradvocateofindividualitymustacknowledge)ifitisnotcarriedtoofar.Butindi-vidualisminTocqueville’ssenseofthewordisalwaysathreattocommunity.Communitiesandpolitiesrequirecare,and“citizens”whoisolatethemselvesfromthemassoftheirfellowswillnotfreelyandhappilyprovideit.Thereare,then,goodandbadformsofindividualism,andthereareliberalswhoadvocateeachkind,ifinadvertentlysointhecaseofthebadforms.Thebadformsarethosethatdonotgivecommunity(orcommunity-likeconsiderations)itsdue,typicallybecausetheyrestonaconceptionoftheindividualthatisnottruetothefactsofhumanlife.Muchaswemayliketothinkofourselvesasautonomous,self-determining,orindependentindividuals,thefactisthatweare,inMacIntyre’sphrase(1999),“dependentrationalanimals.”Wearenotbornofourownefforts,norcanweliveentirelybythem.AstheancientriddleoftheSphinxteaches,theperiodofourlivesinwhichwewalkupright,andperhapssetourownpath,fallsbetweeninfancyandtheinfirmitiesofoldage–twoperiodsduringwhichwearehighlydependentonothers.Eveninthefullnessoflife,whateverindependenceweenjoyislargelyowingtotheeffortsofparents,teachers,andotherswhoenabledustobecome,andhelpustoremain,“independentpracticalreasoners”(MacIntyre1999:96).Thatistrue,moreover,ofthemostable-bodiedandsharp-mindedofus.Ifwesufferfromsomeseriousdisability,ourdependenceonothersisevenmoreextensive.Whenindividualismbeginsandendswithaconceptionoftheindividualasafitandrationaladult,itsimplyfailstorecognizethesefactsoflife.Thisfailurehasimportantimplicationsfortheethicsofindividualism.Oneoftheseisthefailure,inethicaltheoryasinpublicpolicyanddailylife,tovaluecareandcare-giversproperly.Asanumberoffeministshaveobserved,suchneglectislikelytooccurwhen“theindividual”isassumedtobeafitandrationaladultmale;foritiswomenwhodomostofthecare-giving(Noddings1984;Friedman1993:PartII;Held2000;Tronto2001).Anotherimplicationofthisfalseindividualismistheneglect–again,inboththeoryandpractice–ofdisabledindividuals(Kittay1999;Wellman308RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page3092005).Andanother,asthecommunitarianshaveinsisted,isafailuretoacknowledgewhatweowe,asindividuals,tothecommunities,societies,traditions,orpracticesthatenableustoachievewhatevermeasureofindependenceorautonomywecometoenjoy.AsTaylorpointsout,wecannotevenaspiretoautonomyorself-developmentuntilwelearntoconceiveofourselvesasindividualswiththepotentialfor“developedfreedom”;yet“thisself-understandingisnotsomethingwecansustainonourown,but...isalwayspartlydefinedinconversationwithothersorthroughthecommonunderstandingwhichunderliesthepracticesofoursociety”(Taylor1985:209).Rawls,Ihaveclaimed,isnotaproponentofthismisguidedformofindividualism,noraremostofthoseintheliberaltradition.ButThomasHobbesis,andsoarethosefollowersofhisnowcalled“contractarians.”So,too,aretoday’slibertariansand“philo-6sophicalanarchists.”HobbesprovidesperhapsthemostcolorfulstatementofthisextremeindividualisminDeCive,whereheinvitesusto“returnagaintothestateofnature,andconsidermenasifbutevennowsprungoutoftheearth,andsuddenly,likemushrooms,cometofullmaturity,withoutallkindofengagementtoeachother”7(Hobees1978:205).InHobbes’scase,ofcourse,atomisticindividualismleadstotheconclusionthatwemustvestallauthorityinanall-powerfulsovereign,andinthatrespecthediffersmarkedlyfrommostextremeindividualists,whosesuspicionofpoliticalauthoritytypicallyleadsthemtocallforstrictlimitstothepowersofgovernment.Someoftheseindividualists–perhapsbecausetheyfindtheirinspirationinKantorLockeratherthanHobbes–gosofarastodenythelegitimacyorauthorityofthestate.Amongthesearelibertariananarchists,whowouldabolishgovernmentiftheycould(e.g.,Rothbard1973),andthemorecircumspectgroupofphilosophicalanarchists.Anarchistsofthelattersortholdthatthestateisillegitimate,buttheydenythatthereis“astrongmoralimperativetoopposeoreliminatestates;rather,theytypicallytakestateillegitimacysimplytoremoveanystrongmoralpresumptioninfavorofobedienceto,compliancewith,orsupportforourownorotherexistingstates”(Simmons2001:104).Somephilosophicalanarchists–mostnotablyRobertPaulWolff–maintainthatstatesnecessarilylackmorallegitimacy.Astheyseeit,thestate’sclaimtotheauthoritytoissuebindinglawsiscontrarytotheindividual’sprimarymoraldutyofautonomy,whichrequires“submissiontolawswhichonehasmadeforoneself”(Wolff1998:14).OthersagreewithJohnSimmons(1979:194–201;2001),whoarguesinaposteriorifashionthattherepeatedfailureofattemptstoestablishthemorallegitimacyofthestateiswhatwarrantsthephilosophicalanar-chists’conclusion.Eitherway,thephilosophicalanarchistobeysthelawnotbecauseitisthelaw,butbecauseheorshefindsindependentmoralreasonsforobedience.Whatmakestheseanarchistsimportantforpresentpurposesisnottheiranarchismsomuchasthewaytheyarriveatit.Afterall,PeterKropotkin(1972)andotheranarcho-communistsvaluecommunitysohighlythattheythinkitspromotionrequirestheabolitionofthestate.Theproblemwiththelibertarianandphilosophicalanar-chistsistheiratomisticorvoluntaristicindividualism.InWolff’scase,autonomyisnotonlyamoraldutybutsomethingthattheindividualmustprotectagainstany-onewhoclaimstohaveauthorityoverher.Howwecometodevelopautonomy,and8whatweowetothosewhoenableustoexerciseit,isnotWolff’sconcern.ForSimmons,thefactthatweare“bornintopoliticalcommunities”ismuchthesameas“being‘droppedinto’acooperativescheme”thatwehavenotconsentedtojoin(1979:137–8).IndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunity309\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page310Thetendencyinbothkindsofphilosophicalanarchismisthustoenvisiontheindi-vidualasafitandrationaladultwhoissetapartfromacommunityorcooperativeschemethatistryingtoimposeitswillonher.Philosophicalanarchistsmayrespondthattheyarenothostiletocommunityoreventogovernment,whichperformsusefulservices,intheirview,despiteitslackofmorallegitimacy.Theseanarchistsmayevendesiretheformationofcommunities,atleastifacommunityisunderstoodtobeagroupofindividualswhoshareinter-estsorvaluesandwhoarefreetoenterorleavethegroupwhentheychoose.Whattheydonotwantistoidentifycommunitieswithstates.Communitiesdonotclaimtheauthoritytoissuebindingcommands,asstatesdo,nordotheyimposethesecommandsonindividualswhohavenottrulyconsentedtobecomemembers.Com-munityiscompatiblewiththeindividual’sautonomy,inshort,butthestateisnot.Thisresponseseemsplausible,butacloserlookatphilosophicalanarchismexposesthreesignificantproblems.Oneisthatitistoooptimisticorcavalierwherethepreservationofcommunityisconcerned–apointIshallreturntoinsectionIV.Thesecondisthattheemphasisontheindividual’sautonomy,ortheneedfortheindividualtoconsenttobeingunderanobligation,hasacorrosiveeffectonthestate’sperceivedauthority–aneffectthatthephilosophicalanarchistsbothdoanddonotwanttoachieve.Thatis,theywantustoobeythelaw,atleastmostofthetime,onthegroundsthatthelawoftenforbidsustodowhatwehaveindependentreasonsfornotdoing–committingmurderandassault,forexample–andbecausepeopledevelopreasonableexpectationsabouthowtoconducttheirlivesbasedontrafficregulationsandotherlaws.Yettheyalsowantustorecognizethatthelawassuchhasnoauthorityoverus.Thisistantamounttopointingoutthattheemperorhasnoclotheswithoutexpectingthepeoplesoinformedtomockorscornhim.Whethertheskepticismtheywantustoadoptiscompatibleinthelongrunwithgeneralobediencetothelawis,inotherwords,doubtful.Simmonsarguesthatthelikelyoutcomeisaproperlychastenedand“lessstatelike”state(Simmons2001:118),butitlookstoothersasifthewidespreadadoptionofphilosophicalanarchismmustweakenthestatemoredrasticallythantheseanarchiststhemselvesdesire.Asonecriticremarks,a“democraticstatecanonlybevitiatedbypopulardoubtsaboutitsrighttoexist,andaweakenedstateistothatextentlessabletodowhatonlyitcando,forexample,9protecttheweakandmeekagainstthestrongandloud”(Edmundson1998:1).Letusgrant,however,thatthephilosophicalanarchistscanaccomplishthetrickofunderminingthestate’sperceivedauthoritywithoutrenderingitineffective.Evenso,thethirdproblemremains.Assumingthattheadoptionofphilosophicalanarchismwouldnotproducerampantdisobedience,itwouldstillhavetheeffectofdiminishingthestateanddenigratingpublicservice.Thespreadofthisattitudeamongpeoplewhoaresupposedlyself-governingposestwodangers.Ontheonehand,ifeveryonebecomesaphilosophicalanarchist,therewillbenoonelefttomakethedecisionsandrunthegovernment.Ontheother(andmorelikely)hand,iftoomanystandonthesidelines,governmenteitherwillbecomesoweakastoloseitsabilitytoperformtheusefulfunctionsthateventhephilosophicalanarchistswantittoperform,oritwillfallintothehandsofthosewhoarealltooeagertoclaimauthorityandwieldpowerovertherestofus.Philosophicalanarchism,insum,fostersTocquevilleanindi-vidualismbyencouragingpeopletoleave“thegreatersocietytolookafteritself.”Theresult,asTocquevillewarned,islikelytobedespotism,whetherofasoftorhard310RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page311form.Ineithercase,theresultwillnotbeonethatpleasesphilosophicalanarchists,liberalsingeneral,orindividualistsofanykind.Thethreatenedresult,however,doessupporttheclaimthattherearebadformsofindividualism.Furthermore,theexampleofphilosophicalanarchismshowsthatcommunitarianshavenotbeencompletelywrongtochargethatliberalismissus-ceptibletoatomisticorexcessivelyvoluntaristicindividualism.Mostliberalsdonotadheretothiskindofindividualism,asIhavesaid,butthephilosophicalanarchistsdo.Sodothoselibertarianswhoconceiveofrightsas“side-constraints”(Nozick1974),orinviolablebarriersthatshieldpeoplefrom–ratherthanrelatethemto–oneanother.Andsodothose“contractarians”whoholdthatthewaytojustifynotonlypoliticalauthoritybutmoralityasawholeistodemonstratehowtheycanbederivedfromthechoicesofrational,self-interestedindividuals(e.g.,Gauthier1986).ButitiswrongtoattributeatomisticorexcessivelyvoluntaristicindividualismtoRawlsandthosewhoarenowcalled“contractualists.”Contractualistsdifferfromcontractariansbecausetheybeginwithacommitmenttomorality,understoodroughlyasimpartiality,andthentrytodeterminetheprin-ciplesofmoralityorjusticethatindividualswouldchooseweretheynotonlyrationalbutreasonable–thatis,willingtolivetogetherundertermsthatallcanacceptasfreeandequalpersons.AsRawlssays,inphrasesthatreverberatethroughouthislaterworks,the“mostfundamentalideainthis[i.e.,Rawls’s]conceptionofjusticeistheideaofsocietyasafairsystemofcooperationovertimefromonegenerationtothenext”(Rawls2001:5).Thecontractualistindividualisnot,then,someonewhostandsapartfromsociety,orthinksofherselfas“droppedinto”acooperativeschemewithoutherconsent.Shemaybeinthesocietywithoutconsent,butthatisprobablybecauseshewasbornintoit,seeingherselfnotonlyasapartofitnow,butovertimeandacrossgenerations.Sheiswillingtodoherpart,moreover,andasksonlytheassurancethatthesocietywillbecooperativeandfair.Sheisanindividual,ofcourse,withinterestsofherown,butsheisanindividualembeddedin,ifnotacom-munity,thenapoliticalsocietythatshehopestoseewellordered.Contractualismthusaffordsanexampleofliberaltheorythatpromisestopromoteindividualitywhilerespectingtheclaimsofcommunity,orofsomethingresemblingcommunity.Itisthuscompatible,atleast,with“holist”or“holistic”individualism,whichTaylordefinesas“atrendofthoughtthatisfullyawareofthe(ontological)socialembeddingofhumanagentsbut,atthesametime,prizeslibertyandindi-10vidualdifferencesveryhighly”(Taylor1995:185).Itisthekindofindividualism,inotherwords,thatisbothtruetothefactsofhumanlifeandcommittedtothevalueofindividuality.WhetherliberalismoftheRawlsianorcontractualistvariety–or,indeed,anybrandofliberalismthatsubscribestothisgoodformofindividu-alism–issufficientlyappreciativeofthevalueofcommunityisthequestiontowhichwemustnowturn.Toanswerthisquestion,weshallhavetolookmorecloselyattheconceptofcommunity.III.CommunityInLiberalismandtheLimitsofJusticeSandeldistinguishedbetween“weak”and“strong”11conceptionsofcommunity.Liberalviewsofcommunityhavebeenweak,heasserted,IndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunity311\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page312becausetheyareeither“instrumental”–“whereindividualsregardsocialarrange-mentsasanecessaryburdenandcooperateonlyforthesakeofpursuingtheirfinalends”–or“sentimental”–asinRawls’svisionofasituationinwhich“theparti-cipantshavecertain‘sharedfinalends’andregardtheschemeofcooperationasagoodinitself”(Sandel1982:148;quotingRawls1971:522).Againsttheseweakconceptions,Sandelproposedwhathetooktobeatruerconceptionofcommunity:Onthisstrongview,tosaythemembersofasocietyareboundbyasenseofcommun-ityisnotsimplytosaythatagreatmanyofthemprofesscommunitariansentimentsandpursuecommunitarianaims,butratherthattheyconceivetheiridentity–thesub-jectandnotjusttheobjectoftheirfeelingsandaspirations–asdefinedtosomeextentbythecommunityofwhichtheyareapart.Forthem,communitydescribesnotjustwhattheyhaveasfellowcitizens,butalsowhattheyare,notarelationshiptheychoose(asinavoluntaryassociation)butanattachmenttheydiscover,notmerelyanattributebutaconstituentoftheiridentity.Incontrasttotheinstrumentalandsentimentalcon-ceptionsofcommunity,wemightdescribethisstrongviewastheconstitutiveconception.(Sandel1982:150;emphasisinoriginal)AccordingtoSandel,then,liberalscannotbesufficientlyappreciativeofcommunity,fortheyareblindtothewayinwhichcommunitiesconstituteouridentities.Butisheright?Astheargumentsoftheprecedingsectionofthisessayindicate,IthinkthatSandelisrightaboutsomeliberals–philosophicalanarchists,libertarians,andcontractariansinparticular–butwrongaboutmostofthem.Thereisnothingtopreventliberalsfromrejectingatomisminfavorofaholistontology,oraccountofsociallife,andtheymaydosowithoutcommittingthemselvestoacollectivistpositioninethicsorpolitics(Taylor1995).Moreover,thosewhoembracethisholistindividualismwillreadilyagreewithSandelthatouridentityis“definedtosomeextentbythecommunityofwhich[we]areapart”(1982:150;emphasisadded).Theywilldeny,however,thatthisagreementisenoughtomakethemcommunitar-ianswhoproceedfromaconstitutiveconceptionofcommunity.ThereareatleastthreereasonstofindSandel’sconstitutiveconceptionofcom-munityunsatisfactory,includingonealreadytouchedoninthisessay.Thatis,Sandel’sconstitutiveconceptionseemstobetoostrong.Ifthisconceptiontakesacommun-itytobeanassociationthatshapestheidentityofitsmembers,thenitapparentlyapprovesofasituationinwhichtheindividual’ssenseofidentitywiththecommun-ityissopowerfulanddeepthatheorshewillbeunabletothinkatallcriticallyaboutitspracticesandtraditions.Thesenseofidentitycouldbesopowerful,infact,thatpeoplewhocannotconceiveofthemselvesasindividualsinanywayapartfromthecommunitymaybeconsignedtoalifeofcommunity-sanctionedoppressionandexploitation.Individualismcanbetakentoofar,asIhaveargued,butsotoocanidentificationwithone’scommunity.ThatiswhyitisimportanttostressthreewordswhenSandelsaysthatidentityis“definedtosomeextentbythecommunityofwhichtheyareapart.”Nodoubtitis,andagoodthing,too,asthesenseofidentityorbelongingcontributestoasecuresenseofself–uptoapoint.Thatpointispassed,however,whenone’sidentityisdefinedalmostentirelybyone’scommunity;forthenthereislittleroomleftforasenseofself,letaloneindividuality.Thesecondproblemwiththeconstitutiveconceptionofcommunityisthesug-gestionthatoneandonlyonecommunityconstitutestheindividual’sidentity.Such312RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page313aviewofcommunityisimplausible,atleastinthemodernworld,foronlyinexcep-tionalcircumstanceswillacommunitysubstantiallyconstituteanyone’sidentity.ChandranKukathasgoestoofarintheoppositedirection,Ithink,whenhesaysthatthe“truthaboutthenatureofcommunityisthatallcommunitiesareinfact‘par-tialassociations’(2003:169;emphasisinoriginal).Wecancertainlyconceiveofacommunitysoisolatedandall-encompassingastoformthesoleconstituentofitsmembers’identities–asIhavedoneintheprecedingparagraph–andIseenoreasontodoubtthatsuchacommunitymayexistortakeshapesomewhereintheworld.Nevertheless,Kukathasisrighttoinsistthatanall-encompassingcommunitywouldbemuchdifferentfromthecommunitiesthatweordinarilyencounter.Thecommunitieswithwhichwearefamiliarareindeed“partialassociations”thatmayconstitutesomepartofaperson’sidentity,butnotthewholeofit.Whenonecommunitypullsapersoninonedirectionandasecondtugshimorherinanother,furthermore,thepersoncaughtinthisconflictwillhavetoriseabovebothcommitmentsandactasaselfinsomesensepriortoitsendsandattachments.SandeladmitsasmuchinDemocracy’sDiscontentwhenheobservesthatwe“multiply-situatedselves”and“multiply-encumberedcitizens”must“negotiateourwayamongthesometimesoverlapping,sometimesconflictingobligationsthatclaimus,and...livewiththetensiontowhichmultipleloyaltiesgiverise”(1996:350).Sandel’sconstitutiveconceptionofcommunityisbothtoostrong,then,andimplausible.Italsorestsonadistinctionthatismisleadinglytidy.WhenSandeldistinguishesamonginstrumental,sentimental,andconstitutiveconceptionsofcommunity,hesuggeststhatwecannotorshouldnotconceiveofcommunityintwoormoreofthesewaysatonce.Yetthereisamplereasontobelievethatwecanandevenshouldthinkofcommunityinbothinstrumentalandconstitutiveterms.Peoplewhoarebornandraisedinasmalltown,forexample,mayseethemselvesasboundupwiththeircommunity,butthatfirmsenseofidentityneednotpreventthemfromaskingwhetherthecommunityistreatingthemfairlyorprovidingthemwithoppor-tunitiestheywanttopursue.Toconceiveofcommunity,inotherwords,isnottochoosebetweenathoroughlyinstrumentalvisionwithinwhicheveryone’ssoleconcernis“What’sinitforme?”andathoroughlyconstitutivevisionwithinwhicheveryone’sconstantpreoccupationis“doingwhat’sbestforthegroup.”Thereisamiddlegroundbetweenthesetwovisions,anditislikelytoprovideamoresolidfoundationforahealthycommunitythaneitherastrictlyinstrumentalorastrictlyconstitutiveconception.Noristhereanyreasontothinkthatliberalsofaholistinclinationcannotbecomfortableinthismiddleground,whereinstrumentalreasons,sentiment,andasenseofidentityallcontributetocommunity.Toputthepointanotherway,liberalscanbesufficientlyappreciativeofcommunity.Howfarthatappreciationshouldextend,however,isaquestionthatrequiresaclearerdefinitionof“community”–atermthatIhavethusfarused,inkeepingwithcommonpractice,ratherloosely.StatementssuchasSandel’s“themembersofasocietyareboundbyasenseofcommunity...”illustratethedifficultyhere.Ontheonehand,asocietyseemstobea(kindof)community,foritmakessensetosaythatitsmemberscanbeboundbyasenseofcommunity;ontheotherhand,asocietycannotbeacommunityitself,forweoftenspeakofthemanycommunitieswithinasociety.Moreover,itseemsclearthatsomesocieties–andsomeassociationsandpolities–aremorelikecommunitiesthanIndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunity313\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page314others.Therearecommunities,then,andtherearecommunity-likeentities.Butwhatisacommunity?Theonepointonwhicheveryonewhowrestleswiththisquestionagreesisthatagroupformsacommunity,ratherthanamereaggregation,whenitsmemberssharevaluesorinterests.Whetherthosecommoninterestsorvaluesaresufficienttomakeacommunityofagroupisadisputedpoint.Formypart,IamalwayshappytofindthatotherssharemyadmirationforthenovelsofJaneAustenormydevotiontotheSt.LouisCardinalsbaseballteam,butIthinkitstretchestheconcepttoofartosaythatweJaneitesorCardinalsfansformacommunity.Thepeoplewhoworkinacoalmineandthepeoplewhoownitwillshareaninterestinthemine’spros-perity,butthatishardlytosaythattheyformacommunity–especiallywhenthe“owners”areshareholderswhoneverseteyesonthemineoritsminers.Membersofacommunitymustbemorecloselyassociatedthanthat.Buttheycannotbetoocloselyassociated,forthentheyformaunit–asinFeinberg’sexampleofa“well-marriedcouple”(Feinberg1988:104)–ratherthanacommunity.Defining“community”thuspresentsaquantitativeprobleminthathavingtoolittleortoomuchincommonmayprecludeagroupfrombeingacommunity.Thereisaqualitativeproblem,too,astheconnotationsof“community”seemtobegenerallypositive.Indeed,somepeopleholdthatcommunity–oratleast“true”or“genuine”community–isbydefinitionagoodthing.WilliamGalston,forinstance,statesthateverycommunityrepresentsacooperativeendeavorinpursuitofsharedpurposes.Eachtermofthispropositionoffersakeyingredientofcommunity.“Cooperation”presup-posesmutualbenefit,ratherthantheexploitationofsomemembersbyothersthroughforceorfraud;“endeavor”impliesthatthegoodmustbecreated,ratherthanpassivelyreceivedorconsumed;and“sharedpurposes”defineacommongoodthecommunityseekstobringintobeingandtosustain,notmerelyprivateindividualadvantage.(Galston1992:59,emphasisinoriginal)Thereareadvantagestodefining“community”inthisway,especiallyasitwouldblockthecomplaintthatSandel’sstrongconceptionallowsforpeopletoaccepttheiroppressionorexploitationaspartofwhatitmeanstobeamemberofthecommunity.Therearealsodisadvantages,however.Oneisthatthisdefinitionwoulddisqualifysomeidentity-constitutinggroupsorentitiesthatSandelandothersbelievehaveaclaimtoourallegiance.InDemocracy’sDiscontent,forinstance,SandelsuggeststhatRobertE.Leewasright,ontheeveoftheCivilWar,toidentifywith“‘mynativestateandsharethemiseriesofmypeople’”(1996:15).Asaslave-holdingsociety,however,Lee’snativestateofVirginiacouldnotcountasacommunityunderGalston’sdefinitionnomatterhowpowerfulitsidentity-constitutingforcewas.Norisitclearthatwewouldgainanythingbydeclaringcommunitiesgoodasamatterofdefinition.Withaneutraldefinition,weleaveopenthepossibilitythatthiscommunitymaybegoodanddesirablewhilethatoneistobedeploredanddissolved;withapositivedefinition,wewillfinditnecessarytodistinguishthetrueandgenuinefromfalseorillusory“communities.”Wemight,followingAndrewMason(2000:20–38),distinguish“moralized”from“ordinary”conceptsofcommunity,therebydispellingtheconfusionthatoftenariseswhenonepersontakesXtobeanexampleofabad314RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page315communityandanotherdeniesthatXisacommunityatall.Helpfulasthatdistinctionmightbe,itwouldstillleaveuswiththequestionofwhetheranentityisacommunityinthemoraloronlyintheordinarysense,ifeither;andcompleteorreadyagreementonthatquestionisunlikely.An“ordinary”community,further-more,willconstituteitsmembers’identitiestosomeextent,leavingustodeterminewhat,ifanything,weowetoacommunitythatmaybeoppressiveandexploitative.“Community,”inshort,isatroublesometermforbothquantitativeandqualita-tivereasons.NordoIseeanywaytoescapethesetroubles.Wemustchoose,itseems,amongfourpossibilities:adefinitionofcommunitythat(1)isrestrictiveratherthanexpansiveinwhatitwillcountasacommunityandaimsatneutralitybydenyingthatcommunityisnecessarilygood;orthat(2)isrestrictivebutpositiveinthatittakescommunitytobenecessarilygood;orthat(3)isexpansivebutaimsatneu-trality;orthat(4)isexpansiveandpositive.Myownviewisthatweshouldtakethefirstoptionanddefine“community”asnarrowlyandneutrallyaspossible.Doingsowillresisttheconceptualinflationthatthreatenstorobthetermofitsvalue.Itwillalsohelpustoappreciateboththevalueofthecommunitarians’worriesaboutthecorrosiveeffectsofliberalindividualismandthelimitationsofthefocusoncommunity.IV.FromCommunitytoRepublicForasuitablynarrowandneutraldefinition,wemayturntoMichaelTaylor’sCommunity,AnarchyandLiberty.AccordingtoTaylor,“communityischaracterizedbysharedvaluesandbeliefs,directandmany-sidedrelations,andthepracticeofreciprocity...”(Taylor1982:32).Thelasttwoconditionsespeciallymakethisanar-rowdefinition,forinalargeandchangingmassofpeople,fewrelationsbetweenindividualscanbedirectormany-sided,andreciprocitycannotflourishonawidescale,sinceitscontinuationforanylengthoftimerequiressomeactualreciprocation,whichinturnrequiresstablerelationswithknownindividuals.(Taylor1982:32,emphasisinoriginal)Thedefinitionisnarrow,then,butnotabsolutelyprecise,aseachofthethreecriteria“canbesatisfiedinvaryingdegrees,sothatacollectionofindividualsmaybemoreorlessofacommunity”(ibid.:32,emphasisadded).Evenso,thedefinitionispre-ciseenoughtoruleoutmanythingsthatarenowoftencalledcommunities–suchasthe“academiccommunity”andthe“globalcommunity”–andtoraisedoubtsaboutthe“politicalcommunity,”amongothers.Whetheritiswiseordesirabletoruleoutorraisedoubtsaboutmanyso-calledcommunitiesis,asIhavesaid,acontroversialandtroublesomematter.Idoubt,how-ever,thatwewillloseanythingotherthanthehalothatsooftensurroundstheuseof“community”ifwespeakinsteadofacademicorglobalsociety,forexample,orsimplyofacademicsandacademicprinciples,orofpeoplewhohavehumanrights.Inanycase,Taylor’srestrictivedefinitionclearlyidentifiesthecentralorcoremean-ingof“community”asthesmall,face-to-facesociety,thekindofplaceinwhichthepersonatthecashregisterisnotmerelyaclerkbutsomeoneyouknowtobe,say,IndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunity315\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page316aneighbor,parent,memberofthechurchchoir,andholderofpoliticalviewsquitedifferentfromyours.Thisrestrictivedefinitionalsohasthevirtueofhelping,intwoways,toclarifythecommunitariansideoftheliberal–communitariandebate.First,therestrictivedefinitionhelpstoexplainwhysomepoliticalphilosophersworryaboutthelossofcommunity.Thisworrystrikessomeliberalsasbothmisplacedandparadoxical,asInotedinsectionI,quotingKymlicka:Liberalsbelievethatpeoplenaturallyformandjoinsocialrelationsinwhichtheycometounderstandandpursuethegood....Itiscommunitarianswhoseemtothinkthatindividualswilldriftintoanomicanddetachedisolationwithoutthestateactivelybring-ingthemtogethertocollectivelyevaluateandpursuethegood.(Kymlicka1989b:904)Thereisreasontowonder,though,whetheritisthecommunitarians’worryorKymlicka’soptimismthatismisplaced.Kymlickamaywellberighttothinkthat“peoplenaturallyformandjoinsocialrelations”andthattheydonotneedthestatetobringthemtogether.Still,thereisadifferencebetween“socialrelations”andthebondsofcommunity,adifferencethatisespeciallyclearifwetakecommunitytoinvolvesharedvaluesandbeliefs,directandmany-sidedrelations,andreciprocity.Ifitiscommunityinthisrestrictivesensethatcontributesmosteffectivelytoasecuresenseoftheself–moreeffectively,atleast,thanmeresocialrelations–thenthereisreasontobelievenotonlythatcommunitymaybelost,butthatitslosswillbeofdireconsequence.Inourincreasinglyurban,commercial,andcos-mopolitanworld,moreover,neitherthepersonatthecashregister–nowworkingforWal-Mart–northe“neighbor”downthestreetislikelytobesomeonewithwhomwehavedirectandmany-sidedrelations.Inthesecircumstances,thepossibility“thatindividualswilldriftintoanomicanddetachedisolation”isnottobedismissedoutofhand.Therestrictivedefinitionof“community”helpstoclarifythecommunitariansideofthedebateinasecondway,too,butthistimeinawaythatismorecongenialtothecriticsthantheadvocatesofcommunitarianism.Thatisbecausecommunitar-ianshavenotadheredtoanarroworrestrictivedefinitionof“community.”OnSandel’s“strongview,”forexample,“themembersofasocietyareboundbyasenseofcommunity”when“theyconceivetheiridentity...asdefinedtosomeextentbythecommunityofwhichtheyarepart”(1982:150,emphasisadded).In“TheProceduralRepublicandtheUnencumberedSelf”hewritesof“thoseloyaltiesandconvictionswhosemoralforceconsistspartlyinthefactthatlivingbythemisinseparablefromunderstandingourselvesastheparticularpersonsweare–asmembersofthisfamilyorcommunityornationorpeople,asbearersofthathistory,ascitizensofthisrepublic”(Sandel2005:167,emphasisadded).Furthermore,thoseloyaltiesareundercutby“theliberalvision”thatis“parasiticonanotionofcommunityitofficiallyrejects...”(ibid.:168–9).Thesenseofcommunitythusseemstobesomethingdesir-ableinassociationsrangingfromfamiliestonations,peoples,andhistoricaltradi-tions.ItiseasytoseewhySandelandothersdrawsoheavilyonthesenseofcommunity,foritissomethingthatgroundsindividualswhomightbeanomic,anonymous,androotlesswithoutit.Itisalsoarichsourceofwhathascometobeknownas“socialcapital”(Putnam2000).Todrawthisheavilyonit,however,istoloadmoreontocommunitythanitcanproperlybear.Itistotakewhatistrueofcommunities316RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page317intherestrictivesenseandtoassumethatitappliestoallsortsofcommunity-likeentities.Todothisisnotonlytodrawtooheavilyoncommunitybuttodenigrateotherformsofassociationandattachment.Consider,inthislight,theso-calledpoliticalcommunity.AsIsaidearlier,Taylor’srestrictivedefinitionraisesdoubtsabouttheexistenceofpoliticalcommunities.Itispossible,ofcourse,thatapolitymaybesmallandstableenoughforitsmemberstosharebeliefsandvalues,engageindirectandmany-sidedrelations,andexperiencereciprocitywithoneanother.Mostmodernpolities,politicalsocieties,orpoliticalasso-ciations,however,willbemuchtoolargeandfluidtocountascommunitiesonTaylor’sdefinition.Inaddition,thereisasenseinwhichacommunityhaslittleornoneedofpolitics,taking“politics”torefertotheconsciousanddeliberateefforttoguideagroup’saffairs.Especiallywhentheyareremovedfromexogenousinfluences,communitiesmayoperateonthebasisofcustomgenerationaftergeneration,withlittleawarenessofthepossibilityofconductingtheiraffairsinanywaybutthetraditional.Politicalassociationsmaybecommunities,inshort,buttheyneednotbe;andcommunitiesmaybepoliticalassociations,buttheyneednotbe.Thesedoubtsabout“politicalcommunity”bearoncommunitarianismintwoways.First,communitarianshaveregardedascommunitiesgroupsorassociations,includ-ingpoliticalsocieties,thatverylikelyhelptoconstitutetheidentityofindividuals,butarenottrulycommunities.Second,communitarianshaveaspecialinterestinpoliticsandpoliticalbodiesthattakesthemwellbeyondtherealmofcommunityassuch.Neithercitizenshipnortheruleoflawneedbeafeatureofacommunity,forexample,yetnoneofthephilosophicalcommunitarianshasevincedanyinterestinabandoningeithercitizenshiportheruleoflaw.Onthecontrary,theybelievethatcitizenshipisinneedofrevivalandtheruleoflawinneedofprotection.InSandel’swords,weshouldworrythat“thecivicorformativeaspectofourpoliticshaslargelygivenwaytotheliberalismthatconceivespersonsasfreeandindependentselves,unencumberedbymoralorcivictiestheyhavenotchosen”(Sandel1996:6,emphasisadded).Itisnoteworthy,though,thatthisstatementistobefoundinDemocracy’sDiscontent,abookinwhichSandeladvancesarepublicanratherthancommunitarianposition.Theappealistocivicconcerns,nottocommunityassuch.That,inmyview,isasitshouldbe.Communityhasitsclaims,butsodoestherepublicorthecommon-wealth.Thesenseofcommunityisvaluable,butsoarethebondsofcivicfriendship,whichworkthrough“theconstitution,adoctrineofindividualrights,andthepublicstandardsofacceptablecivicbehavior”(Schwarzenbach1996:122).Civicfriendshipmaybefoundinacommunity,butitneednotbe.Itmayalsobefoundinaliberalsocietythatrespectsindividualitybutdemonstratesthatrespectinlargepartthroughthecareandunderstandingofcitizensfortheirfellowcitizens(ibid.:122;Spragens1999:Ch.7).Itisacommunity-likeconsideration,butitisnotthesenseofcom-munityassuch.Communityhasitsclaims,anditwouldbeunwisetoneglectthem.Thepolityhasclaims,too,anditwouldbeunwisetoneglectthem–ortoconflatethemwiththoseofcommunity.Neitherthepolitynorcommunityisthreatenedbyliberalismorindi-vidualism,however,butonlybythoseatomistic,voluntaristicformsofindividualismthatwoulddissolvethebondsofcommunityandleadtheindividualtoretreatfromthecommoncivicenterpriseofpubliclife.IndividualismandtheClaimsofCommunity317\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page318AcknowledgmentsThisessaywaslargelywrittenwhileIwasaFacultyFellowoftheCenterforEthicsandPublicAffairsatTulaneUniversity.IoweadeepdebtofgratitudetotheCenternotonlyforthefellowship,butforsustainingmeandtheother2005–06fellowsintheaftermathofHurricaneKatrina.IamalsoindebtedtoGeorgeKlosko,JonathanQuong,andaudiencesatVanderbiltUniversityandWashingtonUniversityinSt.Louisforvaluablecommentsonearlierdraftsofthisessay–morevaluable,Ifear,thantheywillfindreflectedinthisfinaldraft.Notes1Forabriefattempttotracethehistoricalrootsofthedebate,seeDagger(2004),onwhichIdrawinthissection.AvineriandDe-Shalit(1992)collectsmanyofthekeywritingsinthedebate,andHampton(1998:170–91),providesalucidshortsurvey.Thestandardfull-lengthaccountisMulhallandSwift(1992,2ndedn.1996),andBell(1993)putsthedebateintotheformofadialoguebetweenacommunitarianandaliberal.2Forelaborationofthispoint,seeDagger(1999:esp.184–95).3SeeBell(1993:4andn.14),onthereluctanceofMacIntyre,Walzer,Taylor,andSandeltoadmittobeingcommunitarians.SeealsoMacIntyre(1998:243–50,andesp.1994:302):“Contemporarycommunitarians,fromwhomIhavestronglydisassociatedmyselfwheneverIhavehadanopportunitytodoso,advancetheirproposalsasacontributiontothepoliticsofthenation-state.”4R.A.Duffhasevengroundedapowerfultheoryofcriminalpunishmenton“aliberal-communitarianidea(l)ofpoliticalsociety...”(2001:xviii).5InRestatement,Rawlssaysthathistheoryofjusticeasfairness“doesindeedabandontheidealofpoliticalcommunityifbythatidealismeantapoliticalsocietyunitedonone(partiallyorfully)comprehensivereligious,philosophical,ormoraldoctrine”(2001:198–9;also1993:201).Buthegoesontosaythat“apoliticalsocietyisacommunityifwenowmeanbyacommunityasociety,includingapoliticalsociety,themembersofwhich–inthiscasecitizens–sharecertainfinalendstowhichtheygiveveryhighpriority,somuchsothatinstatingbeforethemselvesthekindofpersontheywanttobetheycounttheirhavingtheseendsasessential”(2001:199–200).Asthecontextmakesclear,a“well-orderedsociety”maybeconsideredacommunityinthelattersenseifitscitizensshare“theendofsupportingjustinstitutionsandgivingoneanotherjusticeaccord-ingly,nottomentiontheotherendstheymustalsoshareandrealizethroughtheirpolit-icalcooperation”(199).6Itakeitthatmost,ifnotall,contractarians,libertarians,andphilosophicalanarchistsarealsoliberals,broadlyconstrued,butSamuelFreeman(2002)arguesthatlibertarians–asdistinctfromsuch‘classicalliberals’asMiltonFriedmanandFriedrichHayek–falloutsidetheliberalfold.Inanycase,Ibelieve(withBird1999:29)thatoneneednotbealiberaltobeanindividualist.7Hampton(1999:42)quotesthispassagefromCh.8,§1ofDeCive.Foralesscolorfultranslation,seeHobbes(1998:102).8AsIargueelsewhere(Dagger1997:66–8),Wolffoverlooksthesocialdimensionofautonomy.9SeealsotheexchangebetweenThomasSenorandSimmonsinPhilosophyandPublicAffairs(1987).10SeealsoPettit(1993:217–24,284–6)andRyan(1993:esp.98–105).11PartsofthissectiondrawonDagger(1997:48–59).318RichardDagger\nCDIC17.qxd2/4/0915:54Page319ReferencesAckerman,Bruce.1980.SocialJusticeintheLiberalState(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress).Avineri,Shlomo,andAvnerDe-Shalit,eds.1992.CommunitarianismandIndividualism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Bell,Daniel.1993.CommunitarianismandItsCritics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Bird,Colin.1999.TheMythofLiberalIndividualism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).Caney,Simon.1992.“LiberalismandCommunitarianism:AMisconceivedDebate,”PoliticalStudies40.Dagger,Richard.1997.CivicVirtues:Rights,Citizenship,andRepublicanLiberalism(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress).Dagger,Richard.1999.“TheSandelianRepublicandtheEncumberedSelf,”TheReviewofPolitics61:181–217.Dagger,Richard.2004.“CommunitarianismandRepublicanism,”inGeraldGausandChandranKukathas,eds.,HandbookofPoliticalTheory(London:SagePublications).Duff,R.A.2001.Punishment,Communication,andCommunity(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Dworkin,Ronald.1977.TakingRightsSeriously(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).Dworkin,Ronald.1986.Law’sEmpire(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).Dworkin,Ronald.1992.“LiberalCommunity,”inS.AvineriandA.De-Shalit,eds.,CommunitarianismandIndividualism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Edmundson,William.1998.ThreeAnarchicalFallacies:AnEssayonPoliticalAuthority(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).Etzioni,Amitai.1996.TheNewGoldenRule:CommunityandMoralityinaDemocraticSociety(NewYork:BasicBooks).Feinberg,Joel.1988.“AutonomyandCommunity,”inFeinberg,HarmlessWrongdoing:TheMoralLimitsoftheCriminalLaw,vol.4(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress).Freeman,Samuel.2002.“IlliberalLibertarians:WhyLibertarianismIsNotaLiberalView,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs30:105–51.Friedman,Marilyn.1993.WhatAreFriendsFor?(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress).Galston,William.1991.LiberalPurposes:Goods,Virtues,andDiversityintheLiberalState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omethingisanobjectofchoice,thepersonorchoosermustbeconceivedofasdistinctfromandpriortoit.Butthis–Sandelalleges–isinternally7incoherent,forRawls’sdifferenceprinciplecannotbejustifiedonsuchgrounds.Anothercriticism–developedmoreclearlybyCharlesTaylorinhisessayon“Atomism”–isthatthis(theliberalviewoftheself)failstoconsiderproperlythesocialenvironmentthatprovidesmeaningfulchoices,andsupportsthedevelopmentoftheexerciseofautonomy.Heidentifiesliberalsasendorsingtheidealofpersonalautonomy–i.e,theidealofaself-choosingandself-formingbeing,whichincludesthecapac-8itytoassesswhatisofvalue–asfundamentaltoliberalism.Hearguesthatthisdevelopedcapacityforautonomyrequiresasocialenvironmentofacertainkind:Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity323\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page324thefreeindividualoftheWestisonlywhatheisbyvirtueofthewholesocietyandcivilizationwhichbroughthimtobeandwhichnourisheshim....[S]incethefreeindi-vidualcanonlymaintainhisidentitywithinasociety/cultureofacertainkind,hehas9tobeconcernedabouttheshapeofthissociety/cultureasawhole.ItisclearthatthiscriticismoftheabstractliberalselfappliestoNozick’stheory,butitisnotclearthatitappliestomoresociologicallysophisticatedliberalthinkers,likeJ.S.Mill’s“OnIndividuality”orindeedawholerangeoftheoristswhoaccepttheliberalpoliticalthesis.Relatedtotheabovecriticismabouttheexcessivelyabstractnatureoftheliberalpersonwasasecondcriticism:thattherearebiasesassociatedwithliberalism.Onthisview,liberalismisnon-neutralinapernicioussense:itisbiasedagainstparticular(communal)waysoflifeandcommunities.Theconceptionofthepersonunderlying10liberalrulesofjustice,itwasalleged,wasofanautonomouschooser:thisexplained,inSandel’sterms,“thepriorityoftherightoverthegood,”viz.,thefactthatliberalrulesweredecisiveinthepoliticalsphereandsowerelegitimatearbitersofrival11conceptionsofthegood(heldbydistinctindividuals).This,accordingtoSandel,seemstonegatethepossibilityofbasingthesocietyorcommunityonasharedcon-12ceptionofthegood.Heidentifiesparallelsbetweentheliberalconceptionoftheperson,whichisabstract,anddevoidofaconceptionofthegood(atleastforthepurposesofarrivingataconceptionofjustice);theliberalconceptionofthestate,whicheschewscontroversialsubstantivemoralconceptions;andthedeficienciesofthecurrentAmericanstate,whichinvolvesapoliticsoftherightratherthanapoliticsofthecommongood.Sandelidentifiesa“gradualshift,inourpracticesandinsti-tutions,fromapublicphilosophyofcommonpurposestooneoffairprocedures,fromapoliticsofgoodtoapoliticsofright,fromthenationalrepublictotheprocedural13republic.”Communitarianarguments–argumentsbasedonacommongood–wereexcludedfromliberalpoliticaltheory,whichtendedtobefocusedonidentifyingapoliticsoftheright;andthisexclusionismanifestinRawls’sownprocedureinATheoryofJustice,wherebytheselvesintheoriginalpositionmustreasonbehindaveilofignorance,andincludedintheveilareconceptionsofthegood(notjustcon-ceptionsofwhatonepersonallyfindsgood,butalsoofthecommongood).Althoughthesecriticismsformedafairlycoherentlineofattack,focusingontheindividualisticnatureofliberalism,theytendedtobestatedinveryabstractterms,14andthecriticismswereeithernotclearlydeployedagainstparticularliberaltheoristsortheyweredeployedagainstoneparticulartheoristbutthenassumedtoapplyto15thewholeliberaltradition.Thislackofclarityencouragedliberalstodefendbasicliberalvaluesbyarguingthattheywerefullycompatiblewithmoderatecommunitarianism;thatliberalismwasnotself-interestedlyegoistic,incapableofembracingcommunity,unabletoaccount16forunchosenobligations,andsoon.BothRazandKymlicka,forexample,claimedthatitiswrongtoconceiveofliberalismasfundamentallyindividualisticorabstract;andtheyprovedtheirpointbyjustifyingliberalpoliticalprinciplesintermsofaconceptionofavaluablelife,whichincludesother(substantive)values.Razarguedthathisliberaltheoryescapesthechargeofbeingindividualisticbecausecollectivegoodsandcommunalvaluesareconstitutiveofhisobjectiveconceptionofthegood17life.TheSandelianversionofthe“abstractself”criticismwaseasilyaddressedin324MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page325thefollowingway:liberalismdoesnotpresupposean“empty”self;indeed,itisentirelyconsistentwiththeviewthattheselfisoftenembeddedinarangeofsocialprac-tices.TheTaylorargumentaboutthesocialconditionsofindividualautonomywasgenerallyviewedasafairargumentagainstlibertarianliberals,likeNozick,butthatthesocialconditionscriticismwasnotapplicabletomanymoresociologicallysen-sitiveversionsofliberalism.Indeed,Kymlickaclaimedthatliberalismcouldn’tbebasedon...[abstractindividualism]....Ifabstractindividualism[was]...thefundamentalpremise[ofliberalism],there’dbenoreasonto...supposethatpeoplearebeingmadeworseoffbybeingdeniedthesocialconditionsnecessaryto18freelyandrationallyquestiontheircommitments.Kymlickathenwentontoarguethatliberalspresupposeonlythattheconceptionofthegood,orendsoflife,arerevisableandchangeovertime(withinalife).This,heclaimedissufficienttojustifyliberalrightstoprotectthepursuitofpeople’sliberty.AllenBuchananofferedamorespecificrejoindertothenon-neutralityobjection,aimedatcriticismsthattooktheformthatliberalismisbiasedagainst,orhostileto,communities.Hedetailedvariouswaysinwhichspecificliberalrights–e.g.,freedomofexpression,freedomofassociation,freedomofreligion–helptoprotectcommunities,andsopresupposethevalueofcommunities.Therealthreattocom-munities,heargued,comesfromtotalitarianstates;andtheserightshelptoprovide19abulwarkagainstthetotalitarianimpetusofthemodernstate.Hearguedintheconclusionofhisessayfor“afruitfulconvergenceofwhatisbestinliberalismand20communitarianism,notavictoryoftheoneovertheother.”Althoughmanynowregardtheliberal–communitariandebateas“sterile”inthesensethattheparticularpointsofcontentionseemedtoevaporateoncloserexamination,itdidcontributetothearticulationofmoresophisticatedversionsof21liberalism,andmoresophisticateddefensesofliberalpoliticalprinciples.However,thedebatewasnotveryhelpful,ultimatelybecauseitwasinsufficientlycontextual,andsotheissuesbetweenthem,statedabstractly,tendedtoevaporateuponcloserexamination.3.Multiculturalism/IdentityPolitics:Non-NeutralityandStructuralInjusticeAdecadelater,animportantchallengetoliberalismhascomefromproponentsofwhatisvariouslycalledthepoliticsofidentity,thepoliticsofrecognitionorthepoliticsofmulticulturalism.Theoristsinthepoliticsofidentity/recognition/multiculturalism“tradition”arealsodifficulttodefine,becausetherearemanydifferentversions,butthecentralplankinthischallengeistheviewthatthepresenceofdeepculturaldiver-sitywithinmodernliberaldemocraticstatesposesasignificantchallengetotraditionalliberalism,orindeedanysortofliberaltheory.Aswiththeliberal–communitariandebate,therearemanyliberalswhobelievethatanadequateliberalpoliticaltheorycanincorporatethelegitimateclaimsofidentity/multiculturalpoliticsintotheirtheory(although,ofcourse,eventheseliberalsdisagreeonwhatconstitutesalegitimate22claim).Interestingly,manyofthecriticismsraisedbyproponentsofidentity/Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity325\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page326multiculturalpoliticsaresimilarto,orpossibly,moresophisticatedormorepreciseversionsof,thecriticismsraisedduringthe“firstwave”oftheliberal-communitariandebatebyso-calledcommunitarians.Inthispaper,Iarguethattherearerealissuesatstake,butthesearemorefruitfullyexploredinrelationtoparticulardemandsandstrategiesofaccommodation.Justascommunitariantheoristsarguedthatliberalismwasbasedonanindividu-alisticandabstractconceptionoftheperson–andthatitwasthereforenotneutralamongconceptionsofthegood(becausebiasedagainstmorecommunitariancon-ceptions)–soproponentsofidentitypoliticsarguethattheliberalmodelofequalcitizenshipandpoliticalinclusionfailstoaccommodatefullyorauthenticallypeoplewholocatethemselvesinthesociallandscapedifferently.Itwasalsonon-neutralorbiased,althoughherethebiaswasnotagainstparticular(communal)waysoflifebutagainstcertaincategoriesofperson.Second-wavefeminism,theBlackCivilRightsMovementintheU.S.,gayandlesbianliberation,and,toalesserextent,ethnicandnationalgroupclaimstorecogni-tion,arebasedonargumentsaboutinjusticesdonetoparticularsocialgroups.Manyofthesesocialmovementsbeginfromananalysisofoppression,andespeciallytheideathatmembershipincertainsocialgroupsrenderspeopleparticularlyvulner-abletocertainformsofoppression:marginalization,exploitation,culturalimperialism23(stereotyping),powerlessness,andgroup-targetedviolence.Thesefive“faces”ofoppres-siontendtomarkthosewhoseidentitieshavebeenhistoricallyneglected,suppressedorinterpretedbydominantsocialgroups,e.g.,Blacks,women,gaysandlesbians,Chicanos,Asians,indigenouspeoples,anddisabledpeople.Inthispaper,Ifocusontheclaimmadebysomeproponentsofidentitypolitics24thatliberalmodelsofinclusionareinsufficient.Therearetwoaspectstothiscriti-cism:onedimensionistheclaim,whichmirrorstoasignificantextenttheearlier“abstractself”criticismofthecommunitariantheorists,thatliberalismisbasedonanexcessivelyindividualisticand/orabstractselfandsocannotproperlyorfullyincludepeoplewhohaveadifferentidentity.Itcanincorporaterightsandindivi-dualinterests,butclaimsthattaketheformthat“such-and-suchshouldn’tbeallowedbecauseitviolatesmyreligiousorethnicornationalidentity”orthat“such-and-suchisrequiredasanexpressionofrespectformyidentity”–isnotthesortofclaimthatcanbeaccommodatedwithinaliberalpoliticalorder.Liberalismregardslegitimatepoliticaldemandsasrootedininterests:fundamentalinterests,suchastheinterestinautonomy,areaccordedtheprotectionofliberalrights,butothersortsofinterestshavetobesubjecttothegive-and-takeofdemocraticpolitic.Liberaljusticeisinsufficient,criticssuggest,becauseitcannotaddressthelegitimatejustice-based25demandsthatarisefromgroup-basedidentityclaims.Thesecondaspectofthecriticismconcernstherelatedissueofhowliberalrulesandrightstendtopresupposeacertaintypeofperson,andsoarenon-neutralforcertainpeopleinsociety,particularlythebearersofhistoricallydenigratedidentities.IrisYoung,forexample,hasarguedthatnormalizingstandardstendtodisadvantagemembersofhistoricallyexcludedgroups,andthattheliberalcommitmenttoimpartialitytendstomaskthe26particulariststandardsthatlurkbehindtheimpartialistideal.Thislattercriticism–whichwecanlabeltheStructuralInjusticeobjection–isimportantlyrelatedtothefirsttypeofcriticism,becauseitpresupposesthatidentityclaimsrepresentlegitimatepoliticaldemandsinthefirstplace.326MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page327Therearetwocommonliberalresponsestothesetypesofcriticism,neitherofwhichisverysatisfactory;and,whiletheymayseemopposed,theyoftenappeartogetherinthesensethatmanytheoristsadoptthemasdualstrategies.Thefirststrategy–whichIwillcall“identitydenial”–arguesthatanyclaimthatisbasedonidentityortheaccommodationofaparticularidentityisproblematic,notjustforliberalpolitics,butproblematicinitself,andshouldnotbeconsidered.Waldronarguesthatidentityclaimsshouldnotlegitimatelyenterpoliticaldiscourse,becausetheyposean“incompossibilityproblem”–theproblemthatrespectingdifferentpeople’siden-titiesinthesamestatemaynotbecompossible(possibletogether)becauserespect-ingA’sidentityrequiresapolicyorproposalthatisinconsistentwithrespectingB’s27identity.IfidentityclaimsconflictinthewaythatWaldronsuggeststhattheywill,thenitwillnotbepossibletosetupaconstitutionalorlegalregimethatrespectseveryone’sidentity,sincedifferentidentitiesgiveconflictinganswerstothesamesetofquestions.Thisistroublingbecauseoftwocharacteristicfeaturesofidentityclaims,asopposedtoclaimsaboutinterest:(1)theattachmenttoidentityrenderstheclaimrelativelynon-negotiable;and(2)identityclaims,bytheirnature,aresubjectiveanddifficulttoverify.Thefirstfeaturereferstotheideathatthelanguageofidentityrenderstheclaimsnon-negotiableinawaythatisdetrimentaltothegive-and-takeofdemocraticpolitics.Theideahereisthatthesignificanceoftheclaimisenhancedbyitsattachmenttotheperson’sveryidentity.Thesecondfeatureofidentityclaimsistherelativelackofevidentiarystandardsrelatedtoidentity.Inthiscontext,Waldronsuggeststhatliberals,socialist,egalitariansandothersarerighttobeconcernedabouttheelasticityoftheconcept–whichheidentifiesasrelatedtoitssubjectivecharacter–andworryaboutwhetherwecanorganiseaframeworkoflawsandrightstoliveunderwhichrespectseveryone’sidentity.“Theviabilityoftheliberalenterprise,”he28writes,“dependsonclaimsofthissortbeingfairlylimited.”Hesuggeststhat,understandardliberaltheory,thereareonlyasmallnumberofintereststhatrequirethespecialnon-negotiabletreatmentthatisusuallyassociatedwithrights;andthatitisthepotentialproliferationofidentityclaims,andtheirunverifiablenature,whichposesachallengetotheliberalorder.Asecondtypeofresponseisthesuggestionthatthesesortsofidentityclaims,insofarastheyrepresentclaimstofairtreatment,arefullydealtwithintheliberalpolity.Actually,thisresponseisoftenpartofthefirststrategy,whichishostiletoformulationsintermsofparticularidentities,butstillwantstoclaimthatliberalrulesofjusticeinfactarebasedonthefactofpluralism,andcanaccommodatemanydifferentformsoflifeandconceptionsofthegood,subjectonlytorulesofjustice.Onthisview,theliberalpoliticalthesisshouldnotbeseenasdependentonadeeper,highlyindividualisticphilosophyoftheself:onthecontrary,therightsthatthethesisendorses–rightstofreedomofreligion,thought,associationandexpression–canaccommodateawiderangeofdifferentformsoflifeandconceptionsofthegood,andprotectpeoplesothattheycanformcommunitiesfreefromstatecoercionandotherformsofinterference.Indeed,akeyfeatureinRawls’sargumentistheassump-tionofreasonablepluralism.Thefactthatpeoplehavedifferentconceptionsofthegood,differentaims,identitiesandinterests,isakeyjustificatoryplankinRawls’sargumentforliberalprinciplesandrights;thesepoliticalrulesandrightsarejustifiedpreciselybecausetheyareimportantinprotectingpeople’sdiverseaimsandinterests.Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity327\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page328Atthispoint,itseemsthattheargumentbetweenliberalsandidentitypoliticsproponentshasreachedthesamesortofimpassethattheliberal–communitariandebatereached,withliberalsdenyingthattheydohavethemetaphysicalcommitmentsandhencestructuralbiasesthatcommunitariansandidentitypoliticstheoristsallege.But–infact–muchofthisdebatehasoccurredatamoreconcretelevel,anditisatthislevelthatitispossibletoseepreciselythekindsofaccommodationsthatliber-alismcanmaketowardsrecognitionofparticularidentities,andthelimitationsofitsformsofaccommodation.Indeed,mycentralargumentinthischapteristhattheonlywaythisdebatemakesanysenseisifweleavetheabstractlevelandconsiderpreciselywhattypesofclaimscanlegitimatelybeincludedinaliberaltheoryofjustice,andwhattypescan’tbe.Althoughtherearedifferentcriticismsleveledbyproponentsofapoliticsofiden-tity,Iwanttofocusonthetwoargumentsoutlinedabove.Thefirstdemonstratesthereasonswhyidentityispoliticallyimportantandshouldnotbeignored,andthisdebateisrelatedtothefirstcriticismconcerningtheabstractandindividualisticnatureoftheliberalself.Thesecondargument,whichisstronglyrelatedtothefirst,pressesonthepossibilitythatconceivingofequalityasequaltreatment,inthecontextofdeepdifferencesinmaterialandsocialposition,andculturaldifferences,canbeunfair.Incertaincases,thiscanimposeunfairburdensoncertaincategoriesofpeopleinsocieties.Thisstructuralinjusticeobjectiontoliberalismpresupposesthevalidityofidentityclaims,sinceitconceivesofignoringordenyingformsofidentityasunjust.4.LiberalIndividualsandTheirIdentitiesIdentityclaimsaredirectlyrelevanttothecriticismthatliberalismisexcessivelyindi-vidualisticandabstract.Thisisbecauseidentityclaimsareclaimstoconsiderationpreciselyonthebasisof(typically)collectiveformsofidentity,andintermsofcon-creteinterests,aims,andattachments.Therearethreereasonswhywemightthinkthatidentityclaimsshouldbetreated29seriously,andsooughttobeanobjectofaccommodationinaliberalstate.Wecancallthese(1)theintegrityreason;(2)theethicalcommitmentreason;and(3)theascriptivereason.Whensomeoneclaimsthatsomethingiscentraltohis/heridentity,itsuggestsanintegralrelationshiptotheself.One’sidentityislinked,causally,withone’ssenseofself,orone’sintegrityasaperson.Itisthebasisonwhichone’sother(non-identity)interests,values,andpreferencesarebased.Thissuggeststhatweshouldthinkverycarefullyaboutenforcingrulesandpoliciesthatviolatepeople’sidentities,orrequirepeopletoactcontrarytowhattheyregardascentraltotheirsenseofself.Attheveryleast,thestateshouldhaveverygoodreasonsforpoliciesthatforcepeopletoactinwaythattheyexperienceasaviolationoftheirveryidentity.Second,andfollowingfromtheintegritynotion,one’sidentityisstronglylinkedwiththemoralcoreoftheperson.Itisgenerallyacceptedthatthereisastrongrela-tionshipbetweenone’ssenseofselfandone’sessentialethicalcommitments.Itisoftenthoughttobeunreasonableforthestatetodemandthatthepersonconformtorulesanpoliciesthataredirectlycountertohis/herstrongestmoralbeliefs,or,atleast,thatitshouldn’tdosofortrivialorevenutilitarianreasons.328MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page329Finally,theascriptiveaspectofmanyidentitiesisrelevanttotheburdensthatthestatecanlegitimatelyplaceonmembersofparticularidentitygroups.Thereareatleasttworeasonsfordescribingidentitiesasnon-voluntary:oneisthattheyarehard-wiredorbiologicallybased;thesecondiswhethertheyareratifiedbyothers,regardlessofwhetherornotthepersonidentifieswiththem.Oneargumentthathasbeenraisedbygaymenandwomenabouttheunequaltreatmentthattheyexperi-enceatthehandsofthestateisthattheiridentitiesarebiologicallybased:thesearenotmerepreferences,butarehardwired,asitwere.Unequaltreatmentofthetwodifferentsexualorientationsisthereforeprofoundlyunfair.Othersfocusontheideathatidentitieshavetoberatifiedbyothers:thereisalimittotheidentitiesthataregenuinelyavailabletoone;andsomeidentitiesaredifficulttoescape.Thisisnotsimplythepointthattheidentitiesthatonecomestohavearepartlytheproductofinvoluntarysocializationandeducationbyothers–Ithinkallidentitiesmaybedescribedthisway–butinthemuchdeepersensethatidentitiesdepend,toalargeextent,onhowothersseeoneandidentifyone.Bothtypesofnon-voluntarinessaremorallyrelevantsinceitmaybethoughtthatthestatehasaresponsibilitynottoimposeonerousburdensonthebearersofparticular(unchosen)identities.Itisinterestingthattheappealtoidentityisatoneremovefromadirectappealtothebeliefsthatapersonhas,whichistypicallytheobjectofliberalpluralism.Theclaimtoaccommodationofanidentityisunlikeaclaimbasedonaparticularcon-ceptionofthegoodinthesensethatanidentityclaimbyitsverynatureappealstoageneralizableinterestinhavinganidentityofacertainkindandtheimplicationsofthis.Toseethis,considerthedifferencebetweensaying,forexample,“Xisrequiredbymyreligion”and“Xisrequiredbymyreligiousidentity.”Theformerreferstothereasonsforthebelief.Itexplainstheperson’sbeliefstructure,themotivationalandpossiblyjustificatoryreasonsforhis/heractions,butonethat,inthecontextofreligiousdiversity,isnothelpfultoresolvingdisagreementsaboutthepoliciesorprac-ticesofthesociety.Thereferencetoidentity,bycontrast,appealstoageneralizableinterest,whicheveryonecanunderstand,inhavinganidentityofacertainkind,inhavingdeepmoralcommitmentsandasenseofself.Itappeals,thatis,totheunder-lyingintegrity,moralcommitment,andsense-of-selfarguments.Theappealtoidentity,ratherthanthevaluesdirectlyimplicitintheidentityitself,makessenseespeciallyinthecontextofdiversity.Itisnotanargumentthatonewouldmakewhenappeal-ingtosomeonewithinone’sidentitygroup,aninterlocutorwhoalreadyacceptsone’sreligionortheimportanceofone’sculturalpractices.Butitisanargumentthatonewouldmaketooutsiders,whomaynotbeconvincedbythetruthofthereligion,orthesuperiorityofthepractice,butcanatleastunderstandthatitisimportantto30you,andthatitbearsonyourverysenseofself.Thesethreeconsiderations–theintegrity,moralcommitmentandascriptivereasons–donotbearonallidentities,andarenotperfectlyaligned.Somereligiousidentitiesmaybereasonablyvoluntary,especiallyinthecaseofaconvert,buttendtorankquitehighonthedimensionofimportancetothepersonandrelationshiptothecoreethicalcommitmentsoftheself.Aracialorgenderidentitymaybemoreascriptive,butmaynotbeascloselyboundupwiththenormativecommitmentsoftheself.Theyare,howeverrootedinsomebiologicalfactsabouttheperson,andsomaybeexperiencedbythepersonascentraltohisorhersenseofself.Althoughtheseconsiderationsdonotmapneatlyoneachother,andnoneindependentlyLiberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity329\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page330representsanecessaryconditionforthepossessionofanidentity,theyarethekindsofreasonswehaveforthinkingthatidentity-relatedclaimsshouldbetakenseri-ously.Theyhelpexplainthenormativeforceofparticularidentityclaims.Ifweaccepttheaboveargumentforwhyidentityclaimsrepresentalegitimatetypeofclaiminaliberal-democraticpolity,andwhyafulltheoryofsocialjusticeshouldbeattentivetosuchconcerns(whichdoesn’tmeanthatitshouldaccommod-ateautomaticallyeachandeveryclaim),thenwehavegonesomewaytoacceptingtheargumentofidentitypoliticsproponents.ItimpliesthatwedonotacceptthedismissivestrategyadoptedbyBarryandWaldron,viz.,theargumentthatthesesortsofclaimsaresimplynotacceptable,evenasclaims,inaliberalorder.Ofcourse,ultimately,thecentralquestioniswhetheraliberalorderisfairtodiversetypesofidentities,andthiscanonlyberesolvedbyexaminingpreciselyhow,andtheextenttowhich,theliberalorderhastheresourcestoaccommodatediverseidentityclaimsandpractices.5.LiberalRulesandStructuralInjustices:Rules-and-ExemptionsThisbringsustothesecond,mostcompellingcriticismofliberalism,whichisthatparticularistformsofidentityarenotproperlyorfullyaccommodatedintheliberalstate,orthattheliberalstatehasstructuralbiasesagainstthebearersofparticularkindsofidentities.ThissecondcriticismcanbecalledtheStructuralInjusticeobjec-tiontoliberalism(SIO).Itisimportanttoconsiderthiscriticism,becauseitbearsonthesecondelementoftheliberalresponsetotheidentity/multiculturalchallenge,viz.,thatliberalismiscapableofaccommodatingandrespondingtoallsortsofdiversity(including,implicitly,diversityofidentities).Indeed,wemightacceptthefirstview–thatidentityclaimsrepresentanimportantclaimtojusticewhichshouldbeaccom-modated–butstillthinkthatliberalismhastheconceptualresourcestofullyaccom-modateandaddressthesesortsofclaims.This,then,isthemostimportantargumentthatboththecommunitariansandtheidentitypoliticsproponentshavemade.InordertodealwiththeStructuralInjusticeObjection,itisnecessarytoconsidertheconcretewaysinwhichtheneutralliberalstatemightbethoughttobebiasedagainstthebearersofparticularidentities.Inthatcontext,itisnecessarytothinkofthetypeofaccommodationsthatareconsistentwithliberalism,whichaliberalstatecould,andoftendoes,make.Manyoftheclaimsputforwardbymulticulturalgroupsareattemptstoensurethatstatepoliciesdonotunfairlydisadvantagecertaingroups:theyareargumentsforacceptanceofparticularpractices,notsimplyinthesensethatthepracticeisde-criminalized,andsoopentotheindividualintheprivatesphere,butinthedeepersensethatthepracticesandpoliciesofthestatedonotunfairlydisadvantagemem-bersoftheidentitygroup.MuslimgirlsinFranceandQuebechavechallengedrulesdenyingthemtherighttowearheadscarvesinschools,SikhsinCanadahavearguedthatmotorcyclehelmetlawsandthecodeofappropriatedressintheRoyalCanadianMountedPolice–wheretheuniformincludesahatthatisnotcompatiblewithaturban–discriminatesagainstthem.OrthodoxJewsintheUnitedStatesmilitaryhavesoughttherighttoweartheyarmulke.Gaysandlesbiansinmanycountrieshave330MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page331arguedthatthedefinitionofthefamilyinlawandinstatepolicieshasservedtoexcludethemandtodenythemthebenefitsaccordedtoheterosexualmarriedcouples.Inallthesecases,thebasicclaimistobetreatedfairly,toensurethataparticularculturalpracticeorwayoflifeisincludedinthelargersociety.Inmanycases,theclaimforaformofaccommodationisnotonlyaclaimaboutfairness,butalsoa31claiminwhichaccommodationcantaketheformofexemptiontoarule.Inalltheabovecases,theoffendingpracticeisforcedonanunwillingsubject,andthepersonarguesthatthepracticeviolatesherreligious,sexualorientation,gender,orcultural/nationalidentity.Manyoftheselegalcasesarethiskind,andinvolveanexemptionfromastate-wideruleorpractice.Inmostofthecasesabove,theargu-mentadvancedbytheidentitygroupisanargumentfortoleration.Itisanargu-mentfortolerationofaparticularreligiouslyassociatedformofdress,orexemptions(forhalelandkoshermeats)fromanimalcrueltylawstoalloworpermitacertainreligiouslyorientatedpractice.Ineachcase,thestate-widelawcreatedburdensfortheminority.Further,innoneofthesecaseswasWaldron’sconcernaboutincom-possibilityapotentialproblem:thesedemandsdonotrequirethattherulebescrappedinfavorofanew(state-wide)rule,asaconditionofmyidentity,butonlythatthepracticeordressorritualbetoleratedbythemajoritysociety.Itishardtoseewhatisparticularlyilliberalaboutaccommodatingthistypeofidentityclaim.First,thereisalong-standingissueinliberaltheorysurroundingconscientiousobjection,whichtakespreciselytheexemption-from-ruleform,andwhichhasalonghistoryofaccommodationwithinliberalstates.Inthecaseofconscientiousobjection(towar),thestateadmitsexemptionsforawholecategoryofpeople(typically,thosewhocandemonstrateeithermembershipinapacifistreli-giousgroup,suchastheQuakers,orpeoplewhocandemonstratealong-standing32moralcommitmenttopacifism).Moreover,theexemptionsaskedfordonotreifytheculturalpracticesinques-tion.Theexemptiononlyappliesifthepersoninquestionisactuallyapracticingmemberofaparticularreligiousgroup.Consider,forexample,thedemandthatSikhsshouldbegrantedanexemptionfromcertainrulesregardingheadgeartopermitthemtowearaturban.Theexemption,itistrue,isgrantedtopeopleonthebasisofareligion,anditmaybethoughtthattheexemptionisover-inclusiveinthesensethattheremaybe“beneficiaries”ofthisexemptionwhodonotcaremuchabouttheirreligion.However,iftheclaimtoaccommodationisaclaimforanexemptionfromastate-widerule(onthebasisofanidentityclaim),thereisnoproblemcon-nectedtoincludingpeoplewhoshouldnotbegrantedanexemption.Exemptions,bytheirverynature,donotrequirethepersontotakethemup:ifthepersoncareslittleforhisorherreligion,heorshewillnotneedtheexemptioninthefirstplace.TheexemptionforSikhsisonlynecessaryifthepersonactuallydoeswearaturban.Anon-practicingSikh,whodoesnotconformtoSikhdresscodes,wouldhavenoneedofsuchanexemption.Now,atthispoint,theStructuralInjusticeObjectioncanbereformulatedasfollows:althoughitistruethatblatantlyunfairapplicationsofrulescanbedealtwithbyexemptions,thisisn’tfullyadequate.Itfailstoaddresstheissuethatthereisstillaruleorstandard,whichispresentedasnormalizing,andwhichdefinecertaincategoriesofpeopleasdeviant.ThiscanbecalledtheStructuralInjusticeObjection2(SIO2).Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity331\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page332Itishardtoknowhowtorespondtothisformulationoftheobjection,sinceitseemstohaveawideapplication(farbeyondspecificallyliberalrules)toanylawsorrulesinmodernlarge-scalebureaucraticsocietiesthattakeageneralform.Inmanycases,thereareverygoodreasonsforgeneralrulesandsoitdoesnotseemagood33idea(norpossibleinamodernbureaucraticsociety)toavoidallgeneralrules.Inthecaseofmotorcyclehelmetlegislation,forexample,thegeneraljustificatoryargu-mentisintermsofasafetyrequirement.ThissafetyconcernstillappliestoSikhs,butitisdeemedoverriddenbythereligiousrequirements.Moreover,manyoftheproposalsonofferwithinthemulticultural/identityliteratureare“guilty”ofthisobjection.Consider,forexample,IrisYoung’sownproposalsforadeliberativeforuminwhichdifferentgroupsareincludedandtheirinputisimportantinshapingtherulesunderwhichpeoplelive.Thisisnotmerehopefulthinking,sinceYoungmakessomeconcreteinstitutionalproposalsforhowthismightberealized,suchas34avetooverareasthatareofparticularconcerntoparticulargroups.Muchcanbesaidbothforandagainstthisproposal,butwhatisinterestinghereisthatitraisesthesamestructuralproblemsastherule-and-exemptionproposal.Itcarvesoutaparticularareaofjurisdictionalauthority,aparticularareaofinterestforgroups,anddoesn’tpermitoutsideinterferenceinthatarea.Itisthereforesubjecttothenormalizingstandardobjection(SIO2),andforpreciselythesamereason,viz.,elsewherejurisdictionalauthoritytakesageneralform,andpeoplecanseethem-selvesascollectiveauthorsoftherulesunderwhichtheyliveandtheconditionsoftheirexistence,exceptincaseswhereanargumentcanbemadethatthisruleshouldn’tapply.Inconclusion,itseemsthatliberalismiscapableofrespondingtothefirstandmostcoherentversionoftheStructuralInjusticeobjection,anditiscapableofdoingsobecauseliberalismisatheorythattakesequalityseriously.The“equality”principleimplicitinmostjustificationsofliberalismisadmittedlyanabstractprinciple,butitisnotpurelyformal:itembodiesaparticularsubstantivevalue–namely,equaltreat-mentbythestate.Ifequalityisinterpretedasequaltreatment,then,whereequaltreatmenthasprofoundlyanddemonstrablyunfairresults,thereisastrongargu-mentforremedyingthis.However,interestingly,thisonlymakessenseifonetakesseriouslythepossibilitythatinterpretingequalityasrequiringequaltreatmentmight,inthecontextofdeepdifferencesinmaterialandsocialposition,andculturalandidentitydiversity,haveunfairresults;andthisisaclaimthatmanyliberalscan,anddoaccept.Onewaytoviewthatchallengeisthatithasforcedliberalstofocusontheneedtoattendto,ratherthanabstractfrom,suchdifference;andtheneedtocontextualizethespecificrequirementsofliberalism.Rulesandexemptionsdonotrepresentasystematicwaytoensuresuchacontextualizationoftheequality35requirement,buttheydosuggesttheneedtoexaminethespecificwaysinwhichliberalrulesandprinciplesareinstitutionalizedinconcretesettings.6.LiberalTolerationandStructuralInjustice:EqualityasRecognitionIntheprevioussection,Iarguedthatmulticulturalandidentitypoliticsclaimsthattaketheformofdemandinganexemptionfromageneralruledonotposeafun-332MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page333damentalchallengetoliberalism,butarefullyinaccordwithacertaininterpretationofequality,whichisafundamentalprincipleofliberaltheory.However,otherdemandsposeadeeperchallengetoliberaltheory,atleastinsofarastheysuggesttheinsufficiencyofthetraditionalliberalmodeloftoleration,andthesupposedneutralityofthestateondecisionsthatareessentiallymoral.Theargumentbygayandlesbianactivistgroupsforachangeinthedefinitionofthefamilytoincludegayandlesbianmarriagesis,Ithink,entirelyconsistentwiththeliberalcommitmenttoequaltreatmentofallcitizens,andpublicneutralityonmoralquestions.Gaysandlesbiansinmanycountrieshaveargued,Ithinkcom-pellingly,thatthedefinitionofthefamilyinlawandstatepolicieshasservedtoexcludethemandtodenythemthebenefits(bothfinancialandsymbolic)accordedtoheterosexualmarriedcouples.Inmanyways,thisissimilartothestructuralinjusticeobjection,sinceitpointsoutadeepinequalityinthestructureofthelawsandpoliciesof(supposedly)liberalstatesandtheliberalprinciplesregardingequaltreatmentofcitizensandpublicneu-tralityonquestionsofthegoodlifeoughttoapply.Forthisreason,liberalsshouldhavenodifficultyaccommodatingthisparticularidentity-relatedclaim.However,itisinterestingtonote,first,thatinthiscasetheremedytotheinjusticethattheyface(changeinmarriagelaws)issomewhatdifferentfromtheonesdis-cussedintheabovesection.Gaysandlesbiansdonotseeksimplytolerationoftheirpracticesandwaysoflifebythewidersocietybutfullrecognitionandacceptanceintherulesandpracticesofthesociety.Theydonotseekmerelyexemptionsfromstate-widerules,but,rather,toaltertherulesoftheover-archingsocietyandtherebyclaimequalstatusfortheirwayoflife.Itisusefultocomparetheoldliberalmodeloftolerationliteraturewiththisnew36demandforrecognition.Thestandardliberaltolerationdoctrine,whichdevelopedintheseventeenthcentury,asameanstoreconciledivergentreligions,assumedmoral37pluralism–notsocialandculturalpluralism.Inthecaseofclassicalregimesoftoleration,tolerationrevolvedaroundtheprivatizationofdiverse(religious)identi-ties:peoplewouldprivatelyviewcertainreligiousviewsasprofoundlyworrying,evenheretical,buttheywouldtoleratethem.Theterm“toleration”inthissensedoesnotmeancelebratingtheirpracticesorbeliefsorinanywayaffirmingthem:indeed,ithasacertain“grit–yourteeth”componentwhenfacedwithobjectionablebeliefsandpractices,whichneverthelesshavetobetoleratedinthesensethatthestatecannotjustifiablyinterfereinthesebeliefsandpractices.Privatizationofreligiousbeliefswasnecessaryformutualcoexistence,whileatthesametimeitdidnotrequirethetolerantpersontoacknowledgethevalueorvalidityoftheoffendingorimmoralpractice(sointhatsensewasn’tbasedonadeeperskepticism).Clearly,classicaltolerationisinsufficientfromthestandpointofgaysandlesbians,whodonotseekdecriminalization(andthereforeprivatization)ofhomosexuality,butitsaffirmationasavalidwayoflife.Inthatsense,thedemandforachangetotheunfairmarriagelawsdoesnotrepresentamechanismtoaccommodatepluralism:itinvolvespreciselytherejectionofthereligiousperson’sviewsofthesanctityofheterosexualmarriage,andestablishinglaws,notonthebasisofmutualaccom-modation,butonthebasisofequality.Similarly,theU.S.ClintonAdministration’sdoctrineregardinghomosexualityinthemilitary–thefamous“don’task,don’ttell”policywas,likeclassicalliberaltoleration,focusedontheprivatizationofdiverseLiberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity333\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page334identitiesandorientations.Itwasalsosimilarlyinadequateindealingwiththedeepstructuralbiasesofthemilitary’spoliciesinthefirstplace.Interestingly,however,thiscasedoesnotaffirmWaldron’sargumentabouttherelationshipbetweenidentityclaims,whichhaveastronglysubjectiveelement,andincompossibility(theproblemthatitmightnotbepossibletocreategeneralrulesthatrespectoraffirmdifferentsortsofidentities).Atfirstglance,itmightseemtoraiseissuesofincompossibility,insofarastheseidentityclaimsrequireachangeinthemarriagelaw,andthismightconflictwithamoreconservativereligiousperson’sidentityclaim,whichlinkstheirreligiousidentitywiththeviewthatmarriageisaunionofamanandawoman.Infact,however,thegayandlesbianclaim,likethemulticulturalclaimsexaminedabove,isaclaimforequality,fortheremovalofastructuralinjustice,notaclaimthatisappropriatelyconceivedasamethodtoachieve38stabilityinthecontextofmoralpluralism.Thissuggeststhattheoriginalrootsofliberaltoleration,whichdevelopedinthecontextofreligiousdiversity,asameanstoavoidconflictandviolence,mayresultinadifferentprescriptiveproposalthanclaimsrootedintheprincipleofequaltreatmentbythestateofvariousdifferentidentities.Theoriginalmodelsuggestedprivatizationofallidentities,andwasmainlydefendedintermsoftheneedtoregulatediverseviews.Bycontrast,thenewpoliticsofrecognition,basedasitisonasubstantivereadingoftheequalityprinciple,suggestsequaltreatmentofallcitizensandidentitiesbythestate.Thistraditionimpliesthatequalityasanormhasasignificantsubstantivecontent,whichcannotalwaysbereconciledwithdifferentmoralconceptions.Liberalrulescanbeneutralamongindividualsinthesensethat39theirjustificatoryargumentisnotbasedonaparticularconceptionofthegood–asliberalshavearguedintheirdefenseofjustificatoryneutrality–butitrequiresafundamentalcommitmenttoindividualequality,andinpracticethiswillconflictwithsomemoralconceptions.Itisalsoconsistentwithafairlytypicalliberalviewconcerningadivisionoflaborbetweenindividualsandsocialinstitutions.Onthisview,politicalandsocialinsti-tutionsarerequiredtoembodyimpartialconcern,andequalityamongtheinterestsofindividuals,whereasindividualscanbepartialtowardsthemselvesandtheirfamilies,andactinwaysthatdonotembodyimpartiality,aslongastheydon’t40harmothersorviolatetheirrights.7.StructuralInjusticeandJurisdictionalAuthorityTherearecaseswheretheclaimonthepartofidentitygroupstoequaltreatmentposesaseriouschallengetotheneutralliberalstate.Thesearecaseswherethereislimitedpublicspaceoverwhichidentitygroupscontest;wheresuchgroupsdemandachangeinstatepolicyorstructure;andwherestateretreatfromthecontestedareaisnotpossible(asitwasinthecaseofreligiousdiversity);andwherefairnessisdifficulttoachieve.Inthissection,Iwilldiscusstwotypesofcases:demandsforlinguisticfairnessonthepartofminoritylanguagegroups;anddemandsforself-determinationbyminor-itynationalists.Inbothtypesofcases–asinthegayandlesbianfamilycase–thegroupinquestionismakingabasicdemandforfairtreatmentorneutraltreatment334MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page335orequaltreatment.Typically,theyareadvancingtheirclaiminacontextwherethebackgroundorbaselineisunfair.Minoritylanguagegroups,forexample,oftenoperateinstateswheretheminoritylanguageisrelegatedtotheprivatesphere,andsomeother(usually,majority)languageisthelanguageofthestate’scourts,bureaucracy,educationsystem,andsoon.Minoritylanguagegroupsarenotmakingaclaimfor41specialtreatment,butforequality.Traditionalliberaltheory,whichisconcernedtoregulateconceptionsofthegoodandjustifyrulesandpracticesinawaythatisneutralbetweenconceptionsofthegood,doesnotaddressthissortoffairnessissue.Thisisbecauseliberals(anddemocrats)haveoftenoperatedwithconvenientsimplifyingassumptions:theyhavebeencon-cernedtojustifyandarguefortheruleoflaw,thepracticeofdistributivejustice,democraticgovernance,andrespectforhumanrights,buthavefailedtoconsiderthedomainoftheruleoflaw,democracyordistributivejustice.Theyhaveconsideredwhatrightswe(oughtto)have,butnotwhichlanguagetherightshavebeenwrittenin,orwhatlanguage(s)shouldthebusinessofthecourtsorthelegislaturebeconductedin.Whilethebasicclaimisoneoffairness,itisclearthatthereproductionoflan-guagerequiresapublicsphere,sothatstatedecisionsonlanguageteachinginpublicschoolsandlanguagerequirementsinthestatelegislatureandbureaucracyarecrucialtothesuccessordemiseofparticularlanguages.Privatizationisnotanoption,because42themodern,bureaucraticstatecannotescapesomedecisionsontheseissues.Moreover,itisnotclearwhatpreciselyfairnessrequiresinthecaseofdiverselinguisticiden-tities.Oneproblemstemsfromtheveryreasonwhyprivatizationisnotpossible:thestateisdeeplyimplicatedinlinguisticaccommodationdecisions;andthisissofor43reasonsthatrundeepintothefunctionalimperativesofthemodernstate.AsGellnerhasargued,sincetheriseofthemodernbureaucraticstate,withmassliteracyandincreasinglystandardizedmodesofinteraction,thestateisinextricably44linkedwiththereproductionofvaluesandcultures.Itisnotpossibletohaveamodernstateandgiveequalrecognitiontoallthelanguagesspokenindiversecosmopolitancities.Signs,education,publicdebatehastobeinoneortwoorthreelanguages–thereisclearlyanupperlimithere–butthereiscertainlyaneedforsomecommonlanguage(s),inwhichdifferentpeoplemeetanddiscusstheircom-monalitiesandrecognizeeachotherasfellowcitizens.Iamnotsuggestingtherethatwedenythelegitimacyofidentityclaimsinthepublicsphere,asWaldronandBarrypropose.Thereisadifficult,butfundamental,questionofhowthestateshouldtreatitsdiversepeoplefairlyandwithequalrespect.Policiesofabsolutelyequaltreatment–multilingualism–arenotpossibleinthemodernstate.Privatizationisalsonotapossibility,andisnot,inanycase,fair.Unfortunately,itisnotclearwhataliberalstate,whichseekstotreatitsdiverseidentitiesfairly,oratleastseekstobalanceidentityrelatedinterestswithotherlegitimateinterestsofamorefunctionalkind,woulddo.Itisnotclearwhetherfairtreatmentoflinguisticidentities,forexample,requiresapolicyofofficialbilingual-ism,forexample,orwhetheritisafairermodeltooptforanormandexemption45approach.AlanPattenhasofferedreasonsforthinkingthatofficialbilingualismisthefairermodel,butmuchwouldseemtodepend(ashesays)onthecontextoneisoperatingwith,suchas:howmanylinguisticgroupsthereare,andhowaccom-modationaffectspeople’snon-identityrelatedinterestsincommunicationandtheir46interestsinhavingafunctioningmodernstate.Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity335\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page336Minoritynationalists,too,makeaclaimtostructuralinjustice,similartotheclaimsmadebyvariousculturalgroups,gaysandlesbians,andminoritylanguagegroups.Minoritynationalistshavearguedthattheliberalstateisnotinfactneutralamongvariousnationalidentities,forthestateinfactiscrucialtothereproductionofparticularnationalgroupsontheterritory.Moreprecisely,minoritynationalistshavearguedthatpoliticalborders–or,moreprecisely,wherepoliticalbordersaredrawn–canprivilegesomegroupsandnotothers.Theydonotmeanheresimplyeconomicormaterial“privilege”butarealsoreferringtothefairtreatmentofcertainkindsofidentities.Indeed,inthecaseofnationalidentities,whereacrucialcomponentofbeinganationalgroupishavingapoliticalidentityasamemberofapotentiallycollectivelyself-governinggroup,thestatestructureiscrucialtowhetherthisaspirationisrealized.Inmostcases,nationalgroupshavethecapacitytobedemo-craticallyself-governing;todispensejusticeandcreateacommon,publiclifeinwhichpeoplecanparticipate.Relatedtothis,theyaregenerallysufficientlyterritoriallycon-centratedthattheexerciseofself-governmentispossible,andisonlydeniedbyastateorder,inwhichtheyareaminority,andwhichtypicallypermitssomeother(e.g.,majority)grouptobecollectivelyself-governing.Thestatecannotbediscon-nectedfromthisissue:whethertheminoritynationalidentityisrecognizedordenied,thegroup’saspirationsfulfilledorunfulfilled,isinextricablyboundupwiththeinsti-tutionalstructureofthestateandmajoritywillingnessorunwillingnesstocounten-ancechangestothestatestructure.Itisthestate,typicallycontrolledbythemajoritynationalcommunity,whicheitherfunctionstofacilitatethispoliticalself-governmentthroughdevolvedpower,orsomeotherinstitutionalexpressionofthisaspiration,orservestodenyit.Indeed,inthecurrentpoliticalorder,wherethestateisinextricablylinkedwiththereproductionofidentities,fairnesstonationalgroupsisoftenassumedtorequireeitherafairmultinationalstate,inwhichtheminoritynationalgrouprealizessomesortofcollectiveself-government(shortofsecession),orsecessionfromthestatetobecomeitsownstate.Liberals–oratleastliberalmulticulturalistsandliberalnationalists–havegonesomewaytowardsaddressingtheminoritynationalistversionofthestructuralinjusticeobjection.Theirparticularformofaccommodationtypicallyinvolvesthreeinter-connectedarguments.Thefirstinvolvesacceptingbordersasinsomesenseconsistentwithliberaltheory.Thesecondconsistsofamorecomplexargumenttotheeffectthatminoritiesmayrequiregroup-differentiatedrights–andincludedhereisarighttopoliticalautonomyorjurisdictionalauthority–toequalizetheirconditionvis-à-vismajoritygroups.Thefirstclaimconcernswhetherpoliticalboundariesaredefensibleinthefirstplace,onliberaltheory.Thisiscontested:ontheonehand,boundariesrepresentasignificantembarrassmenttotheuniversalityandmoralworthofpersons,whichunder-girdsmostliberaltheory,insofarasitisclearthatpeople’slifechances,opportunities,well-being,andexerciseofautonomy–andindeedtheprotectionoftheirrights–dependsonwheretheyareborn.AsJoeCarenshasargued,peoplebornononesideoftheRioGrandearebornintothemodernequivalentofthenobility,whilepeoplebornafewmilesontheothersideoftheborderarebornintothemodernequiva-47lentofserfdom.Onthisview,boundariesarenotthemselvesjustifiedonliberalgrounds;however,liberaltheorycanproceed,pragmatically,asitwere,toassume336MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page337theirexistenceasabaselinefromwhichtheoryproceeds,sincepoliticalcosmopol-itanismisnotlikelyintheforeseeablefuture.Thereis,however,anotherliberalargument,arguedforsuggestivelybyJohnRawlsinLawofPeoples,thatdifferentiatedpoliticalauthoritiesarenecessaryprotectionforliberty,insofarascentralizedpowerismoresusceptibletoabuse,andinefficiency,anddispersedpowerismoreconsonantwitheffective,andyetrestrainedgovern-ment.Rawlswrites:Theseprinciples[ofglobaljustice]...willnotaffirmaworldstate.HereIfollowKant’sleadinPerpetualPeace(1795)inthinkingthataworldgovernment–bywhichImeanaunifiedpoliticalregimewiththelegalpowersnormallyexercisedbycentralgovernments–wouldeitherbeaglobaldespotismorelsewouldruleoverafragileempiretornbyfrequentcivilstrifeasvariousregionsandpeoplestriedtogaintheir48politicalfreedomandautonomy.Havingestablishedthatpoliticalboundariesareeitherjustifiedorareabaselinefromwhich(non-idealnormative)reasoningshouldproceed,thenext,andindeedcrucial,elementintheargumentistheclaimthatminoritynationalistsneedsomejurisdic-tionalauthority,somepoliticalself-government,toequalizetheirconditionvis-à-visthemajoritynationalgroupontheterritory.Thisargumentproceedsinseveralsteps.First,asWillKymlicka,themostfamousexponentofthisposition,hasargued,liberalrulesarejustifiedintermsoftheirroleinfacilitatingpersonalautonomy;andcultureisanimportantbackgroundconditionfortheexerciseofautonomy.Acentralmoveinthisargumentistheclaimthatcultureprovidesthecontextfromwhichindividuals’choicesabouthowtoliveone’slifecanbemade.AccordingtoKymlicka,“individualchoiceisdependentonthepresenceofasocietalculture,defined49bylanguageandhistory.”Cultureprovidestheoptionsfromwhichtheindividualchooses,andinfusesthemwithmeaning,sothatself-formingautonomousbeingshavesomeconceptionofvaluewithwhichtoguidetheirchoices.Thenextstepintheargumentistheclaimthat,sincearichandflourishingcultureisanessentialconditionoftheexerciseofautonomy,liberalshavegoodreasontoadoptmeasuresthatwouldprotectculture.Atthispoint,theargumenthasonlyshownthattheexist-enceofa(orsome)flourishingculturalstructureisnecessarytotheexerciseofauto-nomy,butnotaparticularculture.However,hethenmakestheempiricalpointthat50“mostpeoplehaveaverystrongbondtotheirownculture.”Kymlickathenpointstotheequalityprincipletojustifyjurisdictionalauthorityforminoritygroups:itisunfairformajoritiestohavetheprotectionoftheirculturewhichcomesfrombeingamajorityinthestate,forthisplacesanunfairburdenonminorities,whofindthattheyhavetobearthecostsformaintainingtheirculture.Thissupportshisconclu-sionthatminoritynational(orsocietal)culturesshouldbesupportedasacontext5152inwhichpersonalautonomyisexercised.Thistakesanumberofforms,buttheoneofinteresttominoritynationalistsispoliticalautonomy,orjurisdictionalauthority,whichisexplored(inKymlicka’swork)withinthestatecontext,althoughitseemsthatthistypeofargumentwouldjustifysecessionfromthestateifthisisnecessarytoensurethatthegrouphasthejurisdictionalauthoritytoprotectitsownculture.Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity337\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page338Thiskindofargument–indeed,theminoritynationalistclaimtostructuralinjustice–doesraiseincompossibilityissues,insofarasitisnotpossibletomakeadecisionthatfullysatisfiestheidentity-relateddemandsofdiversegroups.Moreover,inthissortofcase,unlikeinthecaseofrule-and-exemption,theclaimistoachangeinthebasiclaws,policiesorstructureofthestate;andthisraisesthepotentialforincludingorapplyingtopeoplewhoarenotmembersoftheidentitygroupinquestion.Thisraisesthepossibilityofimpositiononpeoplewhodonotsharetheidentity.Interestingly,however,theproblemdoesnotseemintrinsicallyconnectedtoidentityclaims,assuch,asWaldronandBarrybothclaimed.Theproblemarisesbecausestatesareterritorial,notpersonal:indeed,inthecontextofamultinationalstatelikeCanada,Waldron’sproposal(ofmakingidentityclaimsinadmissible)simplyrepresentsdefactosupportfortheCanadiannationalidentityandadenialofthelegitimacyofminority(e.g.,Quebec)nationalidentities.Theliberalmulticulturalresponseisatleastanattempttoequalize,asfaraspossible,theunfairnessattachedtothepoliciesandstructureofthecontemporaryterritorialstate.8.ConclusionInthispaper,Ihaveassessedtworelatedcriticismsofliberalpoliticaltheory,whichhavebeendeployedbybothcommunitariansandproponentsofmulticulturalismoridentitypolitics.Theseare(1)thecriticismthattheliberalselfisexcessivelyabstractandindividualistic;and(2)thattherearebiasesassociatedwithliberalism,viz.,thatliberalismiseithernon-neutralorbiasedagainstparticular(communal)waysoflifeandcommunities(communitarianism)oragainstcertaincategoriesofpeople(politicsofidentity).Onethemeofthispaperhasbeentonotethesimilaritiesbetweenthecriticismsofcommunitariansandmulticulturalists.Thecentralargument,however,isthatthesesortsofcriticismscanonlybeconsideredandassessedbyexaminingpreciselyhowliberalrulesaresupposedtobeunfair,andwhetherliberalismhastheresourcestoaccommodatetheseconcernsandaddressthesesortsofunfairness.Aslongasliberaltheoristsarepreparedtoacceptthepossibilitythatconceivingofequalityasequaltreatmentmightbeunfairincontextsofdeepdivisionofindi-vidualandsocialposition,andculturaldifference,theywillthenaccepttheneedforacontextualassessmentoftheoperationoftherulesofjusticeorprinciplesofliberalisminthesociety.Liberalismisfundamentallycommittedtoequaltreatment,andthisprincipledoesnotinitselfprecludemorecontextualassessmentofrulesandpoliciesintheinterestsofequality.Indeed,inexaminingthesevariousclaims,Ihavearguedthattheliberalcommitmenttoequality–thecommitmenttoequalrespectwhichunderlieshumanrightsandrulesofjustice–supportsgrantingexemptionsinthecaseofdemonstratedburdensandchangingrulesandpolicieswhenthesediscriminateagainstindividualsinsociety.Thispaperarguesthatformsofaccommodationthattakearule-and-exemptionformaretheeasiesttoimplementandtheleastproblematic,butthatgeneralchangesintherulesandstructureofsocietytoaddressunfairnesscanbejustified.Ihavearguedthatthesearesometimesproblematic.First,theycanconflictwiththeregu-latorydimensionofliberaljustice(aswhenpeople’smoralconceptionsconflictwith338MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page339theequalityprinciple)and,second,theremightbenowaytoequalizefullytheposi-tionofallpeopleinalarge,bureaucraticandlaw-governedsociety.Nevertheless,sincethemaincriticismsareintermsofequalityandsinceliberalismisfundamentallyatheorythattakesequalityseriously,itiscapableofbeingextendedindirectionsthataddresstheclaimsofstructuralinjusticeraisedbytheoristsandactivistsinthemulticultural/politicsofidentitycamp.Thecentralargumentinthispaperisthattheseissuescannotberesolvedattheabstractlevel,inthewayinwhichtheywereoriginallydebatedinthe“firstwave”oftheliberal–communitariandebate.Thisisbecausetheyarefruitfullyexploredintermsofrivalconceptionsofthelegitimacyofcertaintypesofargumentsandclaimsinthepublicsphere,andthisrequiresananalysisofwhatpreciselyisbeingclaimed,inordertoknowwhetheritcanbeincorporatedwithinadefensibleliberaltheory.Atagenerallevel,then,thisessayisapleaforamuchmorecontextualandpre-cisediscussionoftheseissues.Morespecifically,thisessayargues,withregardtoidentitypolitics,thatliberalscanincorporatesomefeaturesofidentitypoliticsandidentityclaims,especiallyclaimsthattakearule-and-exemptionform,butthatarelimitstothis;andthatthedebatemustbeaddressedinmoreconcretetermsaboutspecificproposals,claimsandrights.Notes*TheauthorwouldliketothankMiraBachvarovaforhelpfulcommentsonanearlierversionofthisessay,andpermissiontoincorporatesomesharedworkinthispaper.1AllenBuchanan,“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritiqueofLiberalism”,Ethics99(Jul.1989):852–82,esp.853.2AllenBuchananidentifiesfivefundamentalcriticismsofliberalism,whichheassociateswithcommunitarianisminhisarticle“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritique.”WillKymlickafocusesontwocentralcriticisms,oneofwhichisthecomplicatedcriticismthathelabels“thesocialthesis.”SeeWillKymlicka,ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy,anIntroduction,2ndedn(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),pp.208–83.3IrisMarionYoung,WilliamConnolly,JudithButler,andBonnieHonigareinterestedin“difference”theoryandwhatIcallherethepoliticsofidentity.4HomiBhabha,“CulturesinBetween,”inDavidBennett,ed.,MulticulturalStates:RethinkingDifferenceandIdentity(London:Routledge,1998),p.31.5AlasdairMacIntyre,AfterVirtue;AStudyinMoralTheory(London:Duckworth,1981);AlasdairMacIntyre,WhoseJustice?WhichRationality?(NotreDame,IN:NotreDameUniversityPress,1988);MichaelSandel,“TheProceduralRepublicandtheUnencumberedSelf,”inShlomoAvineriandAvnerde-Shalit,eds.,CommunitarianismandIndividualism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1992);MichaelSandel,LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982);CharlesTaylor,PhilosophyandtheHumanSciences:PhilosophicalPapers,vol.ii(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985);MichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice:ADefenseofPluralismandEquality(Oxford:Blackwell,1983).6ThislistismainlydrawnfromAllenBuchanan,“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritique.”7ThedifferenceprincipleisRawls’scentralprincipleofredistributivejustice,whichjustifiesinequalitiesonlyiftheyaretotheadvantageoftheworst-off.Sandel’spointhereisthatthisprincipleisessentiallyaprincipleofsharing,andseemstopresupposesomeconceptionofthecommunityinwhichsuchredistributionwouldtakeplace.Liberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity339\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page3408Tayloridentifiespersonalautonomywiththecapacityfor“conceivingalternativesandarrivingatadefinitionofwhattheyreallywant,aswellasdiscerningwhatcommandstheiradherenceortheirallegiance.”CharlesTaylor,“Atomism,”inAvineriandde-Shalit,CommunitariansimandIndividualism,p.43.9Taylor,“Atomism,”pp.45–7.10Sandel,LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice,pp.55–9;CharlesTaylor,HegelandModernSociety(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1979),pp.75–8.11Buchananargued,persuasively,thatthiscouldbeexplainedsolelybythefactofplural-ism.Hewrites:“Rawls’contractapproachonlyassumesthattheseareindividualsorgroupswithdifferentconceptionsofthegood.Thisdoesnotseemtobeanexcessivelyrestric-tiveassumptionforatheoryofjusticetomake.Attheveryleastitishardtoseehowatheorythatdidnotmakethisassumptionwouldberelevanttoourundeniablyplural-isticworld”(Buchanan,“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritique,”p.864).12SeeSandel,“TheProceduralRepublicandtheUnencumberedSelf,”pp.81–96.13SeeSandel,“TheProceduralRepublicandtheUnencumberedSelf’,pp.26–7.14SeeTaylor’scritiqueofliberalismin“Atomism.”15SeeSandel’scritiqueofRawlsinLiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice.16SeeWillKymlicka,Liberalism,CommunityandCulture(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989);Buchanan,“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritique,”pp.852–82.17JosephRaz,TheMoralityofFreedom(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),p.216.18Kymlicka,Liberalism,CommunityandCulture,p.18.19Buchanan,“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritique,”pp.862–4.20Buchanan,“AssessingtheCommunitarianCritique,”p.882.21Oftenthisiswithinatraditionthatemphasiseswell-being,ratherthanjustindividualautonomy.SeeJamesGriffin,Well-Being:ItsMeaning,MeasurementandMoralImportance(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986);MarthaNussbaum,WomenandHumanDevelop-ment:TheCapabilitiesApproach(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000);AmartyaSen,RationalityandFreedom(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).22Liberalmulticulturalists–ormulticulturalliberals–suchasJosephRaz,WillKymlicka,JacobLevy,andindeedmyselfinarecentbook–tendtogofurtherthanotherliberalsinincorporatingsuchconcernsintothetheory,whereasmanyliberaltheoriststendtothinkthattheseconcernsarenotlegitimate.SeeKymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995);JacobLevy,MulticulturalismofFear(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000);JosephRaz,“Multiculturalism:ALiberalPerspective”,Dissent(Winter1994):67–79;MargaretMoore,EthicsofNationalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).23SeeIrisMarionYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993),pp.39–65.24Thereisanenormousdebatearoundthemetaphysicaltensionbetweenidentityanddifference,andparticularlytheproblemofessentialisminthefaceofthefluidityandhybridityofidentities.SeeElizabethSpelman,InessentialWoman:ProblemsofExclusioninFeministThought(Boston,MA:BeaconPress,1988);JaneRolandMartin,“Methodolo-gicalEssentialism,FalseDifference,andOtherDangerousTraps,”Signs19:630–57.See,however,GayatriSpivak,ThePost-ColonialCritic:Interviews,Strategies,Dialogues(NewYork:Routledge,1990)foranargumentthatidentityclaimsshouldberegardedpolitic-allyandstrategically,butthattheyneednotimplyadeeperunity.25Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference.26Sometimesthisispresentedasnecessarilyimplicatedinthequesttoarriveatuniversalstandards.Shewrites:“Moralreasonthatseeksimpartialitytriestoreducethepluralityofmoralsubjectsandsituationstoaunitybydemandingthatmoraljudgmentbedetached,dispassionate,anduniversal.But...suchanurgetototalizationnecessarilyfails.340MargaretMoore\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page341Reducingdifferencestounitymeansbringingthemunderauniversalcategory,whichrequiresexpellingthoseaspectsofthedifferentthingsthatdonotfitintothecategory.Differencethusbecomesahierarchicaloppositionbetweenwhatliesinsideandwhatliesoutsidethecategory,valuingmorewhatliesinsidethanwhatliesoutside”(Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,p.103).27JeremyWaldron,“CulturalIdentityandCivicResponsibility,”inWillKymlickaandWayneNorman,eds.,CitizenshipinDiverseSocieties(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),pp.155–74.28Waldron,“CulturalIdentityandCivicResponsibility,”,p.159.29Thediscussionheredrawsonasimilardiscussioninmyarticle,“IdentityPoliticsandIdentityClaims:ALimitedDefence,”inIgorPrimoratzandAleksandarPavkovic,eds.,IdentityandSelf-determination(London:Ashgate,2006).30Theargumentintermsofrespectforone’sidentitycontainswithinitanimplicitrecog-nitionthatotherpeoplealsohaveidentities,whichareimportanttothem.Thewaytheargumentisformulatedsuggeststhatonecouldnotarguefortheimpositionofshariah,forexample,asarequirementofrespectformyreligiousidentity.Itmightbearequire-mentofmyreligion,properlyunderstood.Butanargumentintermsofreligiousiden-tityreferstotheimportanceofhavinganidentity,andinsofarasthatisageneralizableinterests,itrecognizesthatotherpeople,too,haveidentities,possiblyofdifferentkinds,anditwouldbewrongtorequirethingsofthemthatwouldviolatetheirdeeplyheldcommitmentsandidentities.31However,asIwillshowbelow,thegayandlesbianargumentagainstthedefinitionofthefamilyinmanyliberalstatesdoesnottakethisform.32AmyGutmanntalksaboutthiscaseatlength.Historically,exemptionswereaccordedtomembersofpacifistreligiousgroupsonly–suchastheQuakers–buttherelevantmoraldistinction–betweenconscientiousandnonconscientiousobjection–doesnotmapneatlyonthereligion–nonreligiousdistinction.Forthisreason,thereisnowamovetoincludenonreligiousbutstilldemonstrableandmoralcommitmentstononviolenceaspossiblecasesofconscientiousobjection.SeeAmyGutmann,IdentityinDemocracy(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2003),pp.180–2.33Indeed,itisnotclearthatitisgenerallydesirabletoseektoavoidgeneralformulationsoflawsandrules,sincethisformulationmaybehelpfulinavoidingnepotismandeliteinterests,andlessgeneralformulationsmayhavethenegativeconsequencesofexacer-batingfragmentationanddivision.34Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,pp.184–8.35Deliberativedemocratictheorydoestrytoofferamoresystematicwayinwhichdifferentvoicesareincludedintheformulationofpolicies.Also,manytheoriesofjustice–mostnotably,Rawls’stheory–doeshaveasystematicrequirementconsiderhowrulesandprinciplesgetoperationalized.Thisisonewaytointerprethismethodologicalcommitmenttoreflectiveequilibrium.36SeehereAnnaElisabettaGaleotti,TolerationasRecognition(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002).37Foradebatethattherequirementsofliberaltolerationarequitedifferentfrommoderndemandsforrecognition,seeJohnHortonandSusanMendus,eds.,AspectsofToleration(London:Methuen,1985);StevenSmith,“TolerationandLiberalCommitments,”inJeremyWaldronandMelissaWilliams,eds.,NOMOSXLVIII:TolerationandItsLimits(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,2008),pp.243–81;Bernard.Williams,“ToleratingtheIntolerable,”inSusanMendus,ed.,ThePoliticsofTolerationinModernLife(Durham,NC:DukeUniversityPress,2000).38Moreover,Iarguein“IdentityClaimsandIdentityPolitics,”itiswrongtointerprettheconservativereligiouspersonasmakingaclaimaboutidentity.TheconservativeLiberalism,Communitarianism,andthePoliticsofIdentity341\nCDIC18.qxd2/4/0915:54Page342Christiancannotlegitimatelyclaimthatherveryidentityrequiresaheterosexistinter-pretationofthefamily:rather,suchaviewofthefamilyisanimportantelementofherreligiousbelief.Herbasicargumenthereisthatgaymarriageor,indeed,agaywayoflife,iswrong.Thegayperson,bycontrast,ismakinganidentityclaim,which,liketheothers,iscentrallyabouttolerationofhis/hercommunity’spractices:he/sheisacceptingthattherearedifferentversionsofthefamilyandaskingonlythathertypeoffamilyalsobeincludedasafamily.39Foranexcellentdiscussionofjustificatoryneutrality,seeBrianBarry,Culture&Equality:AnEgalitarianCritiqueofMulticulturalism(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2001).40SeeThomasNagel,TheViewfromNowhere(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).Thisleavesitunclearwhetherthedivisionoflaborrepresentsafundamentaldivision,wherethereareactuallydifferentstandardsordifferentmoralities,orwhetherthereisonlyonefundamentalmoralstandard,butthatthedivisionoflaborrepresentsthemostefficientwaytopromotetheendsofmorality.SeehereSamuelScheffler,BoundariesandAllegiances,ProblemsofJusticeandResponsibilityinLiberalThought(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),pp.82–96foranexcellentdiscussionofsplit-levelmorality.41Forthisreason,itiswrongtoclaim,asWaldrondoes,thattheclaimisfortheprotec-tionofidentity-relatedinterests,inthesamewayasothertypesofinterests(whicharethentreatedasrights).Thebasicclaimistoequality.Heisrighttopointtothedifficultyofmeetingthesevarioussortsofclaims,however.42ThisisdifferentfromKymlicka’srecentemphasisontherelationshipbetweennationbuildingbythedominantstateandminoritynationalistmobilizationbehindself-determinationprojects.Ithinkthisisavalidempiricalpoint,andonethatputstheburdenonthemajority-dominatedstate,butitiswrongtothinkthatnationalistconflictcanbeavoidedsimplybyavoidingcoerciveformsofnation-building.Therearecertainstructuralimperativesinthemodernstate,whichmayhaveaside-effectofcreatingunfair-ness.Moreover,simpleminoritystatus,initself,doesnot–contraYoung’sanalysisinJusticeandthePoliticsofDifference–seemtowarrantthechargeof“oppression.”43TheargumentaboutthefunctionalimperativesofthemodernstateisdrawnfrommybookEthicsofNationalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),Ch.5.44ErnestGellner,NationsandNationalism(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1983),pp.17–40.45AlanPatten,“LiberalNeutralityandLanguagePolitics,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs31(4)(Autumn2003):356–86.46Patten,“LiberalNeutralityandLanguagePolitics,”pp.379–86.47JoeCarens,“AliensandCitizens:TheCaseforOpenBorders,”ReviewofPolitics49(3)(1987):251–73.48JohnRawls,LawofPeopleswith“theIdeaofPublicReasonRevisited”(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),p.36.49Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,pp.85–6.50Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,p.8.51Ofcourse,thisargumentonlyjustifiesgroup-differentiatedrightsthatprovideexternalprotections–thatis,rightswhicharedesignedtodefendgroupsfromexternalthreatstotheirexistence.Itdoesnotjustifyinternalrestrictions,whicharelimitationsonrightsthatgroupsimposeontheirmemberstomaintaingroupidentity(seeKymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,pp.34–48).52Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,pp.34–48.Polyethnicrights,self-governmentsrightsandspecialrepresentationrightsarealldesignedtoequalizethepositionofmajorityandminoritygroups.342MargaretMoore\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page343PERSONS,IDENTITYANDDIFFERENCEIDENTITYANDTHEPOLITICSOFDIFFERENCEContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page345CHAPTERNINETEENRelationalLiberalismandDemandsforEquality,Recognition,andGroupRightsAnthonySimonLadenPoliticalphilosophy,despiteoccasionalprotestationsofpuritytothecontrary,generallydevelopsinreactiontoandconversationwithactualpoliticaleventsanddevelop-ments.ThisisoneofthetruthsbehindHegel’sremarkthat“theowlofMinervabegins1itsflightonlywiththeonsetofthedusk,”anditiscapturedsomewhatlesspoetic-allyinR.G.Collingwood’sclaimthat“thehistoryofpoliticaltheoryisnotthehistoryofdifferentanswerstooneandthesamequestion,butthehistoryofaproblemmore2orlessconstantlychanging,whosesolutionwaschangingwithit.”Duringtheendofthetwentiethcentury,perhapsnoareaofpoliticalphilosophywasmoreexplicitlytiedtoparticularpoliticalmovementsanddevelopmentsthanthatvariouslydescribedasarticulatingapoliticsofidentity,differenceorrecogni-tion.PhilosopherslikeCatharineMacKinnon,IrisYoung,andJamesTullyallbegintheirphilosophizinglessinthedominanttheoriesoftheirdayandmoreinthedemands3ofvarioussocialmovements.Becauseofthisclosetiebetweenidentitypoliticsanditsphilosophy,thedebatessurroundingthisareaofpoliticalphilosophyraisenotonlysubstantivequestionsaboutstandardtopicslikejustice,equality,citizenship,orrights,butalsomoremethodologicalquestionsabouttherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandpolitics.Tounderstandhowthesedebateshavedevelopedandhowtheymightmoveforward,itisimportanttoplacethemintheirpoliticalcontext,toconnectthemtothepoliticalandsocialmovementsthatinspirethem,andtounder-standwhypartisansofthosemovementsfelttherewasaneedtoarticulateanddevelopphilosophicalpositionsinconnectionwiththem.Iwillsuggestthatmuchofthephilosophythathasbeendevelopedtosupportidentitypoliticsarisesasanattempttorespondtovariousdeflationaryinterpretationsofthepoliticaldemandsofsocialmovementsbyestablishedpoliticalinstitutionsandagents.Thatis,thephilosophyofidentitypoliticsisbornoutofthefailureofpolit-icalandsocialinstitutionstohearandrespondadequatelytothedemandsofsocialContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page346movements.Itisthusmotivatedbythethoughtthatthisfailureisrootedinsomedeepfeatureofthepoliticalsysteminplace,probablyinitslegitimatingandstructuringphilosophicalground.Themovetophilosophyismeanttoshiftthatgroundsothatthepoliticaldemandsofsocialmovementscanbeproperlyheard.Theresultingphilosophyhasgeneratedarichsetofcriticismsofliberaltheoryandpractice,butithasalso,moreoftenthannot,merelypushedthefailuretobeheardtotheleveloftheory.Inthissense,thoughthemovetophilosophyhasbeenphilosophicallyfruitful,ithasnotyetprovidedasolutiontotheproblemofmisunderstandingthatinspiredit.Onereasonforthisisthatjustaspoliticalinstitutionshavenotadequatelyheardthedemandsofvarioussocialmovements,manymainstreampoliticalphilo-sophershavefailedtograspthechallengesraisedbythephilosophyofthepoliticsofidentity,differenceandrecognition.Thisdeeperfailurehasmovedsomephilosophers4toevenmorefoundationalcriticisms.Inthispaper,however,Isuggestadifferentpath.Iarguethatthewayforwardrequiressomephilosophicalexcavationfromtheliberalsideofthings.Withinthebasicbuildingblocksofliberaltheoryliesomeoftheingredientsforconstructingaphilosophicalcommongroundbetweenliberalinstitutionsandthedemandsofsocialmovements.Itis,veryroughly,thegroundofdemocracy.Theresultisnotaneatphilosophicalvictoryforeitherside,butrathersomephilosophicalmovesthatmightadvancetheworkforwhichthephilosophyofidentitypoliticsarose:makingpos-siblethearticulationofthedemandsofsocialmovementsinalanguagethatneitherdistortsthemnordoomsthemtomisunderstanding.Openingupsuchapossibilityistheworkofphilosophy.Butphilosophyreachesitslimitsattheboundariesofcon-ceptualclarityandpossibility,andthusmakinguseofthepossibilitiessuggestedbelowwillrequireongoingpolitics.Ibeginwiththedemandsforequalitymadebythewomen’sandcivilrightsmove-ments,andthephilosophicalcriticismsofliberaltheoriesofequalitythatfollowed.Oneformthemisunderstandingoftheseclaimshastakenistheirtreatmentasdemandsfortherecognitionofdifference.Thus,thediscussionofequalityleadsconceptuallyifnothistoricallytothedemandsforrecognitionofethnic,culturalandlinguisticdifference,andtheresultantdiscussionsofmulticulturalism,andtheplaceofidentityinpolitics.Thesedemandshaveoftenbeenmisheardasdemandsforspecialgrouprights,andsoIamled,finally,tonationalistdemandsforself-determinationandthedebateovertheexistenceandplaceofgrouprights.Thesethreetypesofstrugglehavethusgeneratedphilosophicaldebateoverthenatureofequality,identity,andrights.Inthelastpartofthepaper,Iofferademocraticinterpretationofthesethreeconceptsasfundamentallyrelationalandintersubjective,andarguethatsounderstoodtheyprovidethenecessarycommongroundforproductivepoliticaldeliberation.1.DemandsforEqualityIntheUnitedStatesinthelatterhalfofthetwentiethcentury,strongsocialmovementsdemandedequalityforwomenandnonwhites.Atthebeginningofthesemovements,womenandnonwhiteswereunequaltowhitemeninatleasttwobroadlydifferentways.First,theywereexcludedfromavarietyofsocial,political,andeconomicoppor-tunitiesandactivitiesopentowhitemen.Sincesuchexclusioninvolvestheseparation346AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page347ofpeopleintodistinctcategories(onthebasisofraceorsex)andthedifferentialtreatmentofeachcategory,suchexclusionisamatterofdiscrimination.Second,theyweresystematicallysubordinatedtowhitemeninthesensethatwhitemenexer-cisedthepowerandauthorityovermajorpolitical,economicandsocialdecisionsinamannerthatmeantthatbeyondtheirmereexclusion,womenandnonwhitesweresystematicallydisadvantaged,controlledandconfinedtoparticularareasoflife.Suchcontrolcanbutneednotfunctionthroughdiscriminationandexclusion.Sinceitisfundamentallyamatterofhierarchicalrelationshipsofpower,suchinequalityisfundamentallyaquestionofoppression.Itisarguablethatbothsocialmovements’demandsforequalityweredemandsfortheendofoppression.However,theyweretakenupandrespondedtoasdemandsfortheendofdiscrimination.Insomesense,thisshouldnotbesurprising.Endingdiscriminationinvolveswideningtheboundariesofinclusion,butnotfundamentallyalteringtheterrainwithinthoseboundaries.Thatis,endingdiscriminationagainstwomencanbeaccomplishedbytreatingwomenthesameasmen,byignoringthemeredifferenceinsexbutneverthelesskeepinginplacealltheothersocialfactorsthatgointothecriteriaforthedistributionofrights,privilegesandopportunities.Itisthusrelativelyeasytoaccomplishpolitically,legally,andsocially.ItisalsoeasytojustifyintermsofthekindofliberaltheorythatservesasanintellectualsupportforU.S.lawandpolitics.Discriminationonthebasisofsexorraceisonlyjustifiedonsuchatheoryifdistinctionsinraceandsexarenot“arbi-5traryfromamoralpointofview.”Thereareanynumberofwaystojustifytheclaimthatsex,andespeciallyrace,arearbitraryfromamoralpointofview,andarguablyoneeffectofthesocialmovementsforwomen’sandcivilrightsweretomakeitplaintoawideswathoftheAmericanpublicthatthiswasthecase,thatthosedemandinginclusionwereessentiallynodifferentfromthosealreadyincluded.Withintheconceptualandpoliticalframeworkthatsawtheendtodiscriminationasmeetingthedemandsofthesesocialmovements,however,themovements’con-tinueddemandsforequalityweremetwithconfusionandoftenhostility–“Whatmoredothesepeoplewant?”Anditwasthisresponsethatwasarguablytheinspira-tionforfeministandotherradicaldiscussionsofequalityintermsofoppression.TheworkofphilosopherslikeCatharineMacKinnonandIrisYounginthe1980sand1990smadeatwo-stepargument.First,thedemandsofthesocialmovementsthatinspiredthemwereinfactdemandsforanendtooppressionandnotmerelydis-crimination.Second,therewassomedeepblocktothesocialandpoliticalstructuresgraspingthisfact.CatharineMacKinnon,forinstance,arguesthattheinterpretationofsexequalityintermsofnondiscriminationisnotcapableofaddressingtheoppres-sionofwomen,mostofwhichitleavesunchecked.Butshegoesontoarguethattheproblemhereisnotoneofbrutepoliticalobstinacybutthephilosophicaltheoryofwhatequalityisattheheartofliberaltheory,atheorythatdefinesequalityinterms6oftreatingsimilarcasessimilarly,andwhichshelabelsthe“differenceapproach.”Furthermore,shearguesthatliberalsarepronetoadoptthedifferenceapproachbecauseofanevendeepertheoreticalcommitmenttoaparticularnormofobjectivity.Itisthiscommitment,sheclaims,thatpreventsthemfromseeingargumentsaboutthe7oppressionofwomenasraisinglegitimatepoliticalclaims.Similarly,IrisYoung,inherJusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,providesarichpictureofwhatshecallsthe“fivefacesofoppression”andhowthenatureofRelationalLiberalism347\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page348oppressionissuchthatitcannotbecapturedmerelyintermsofanunequaldistri-butionofrightsandgoods.Butshegoesontoarguethatliberalismisunabletofullyappreciatetheharmofoppressionbecauseitreliesonanindividualistic“distributiveparadigm.”Inotherwords,demandsfortheendtooppressionhavebeenmisheardbytheliberalstateandsocietybecauseofthenatureofitsunderlyingphilosophy,8whichrestsonwhatYoungcallsan“individualistconceptionofsociety.”Thus,bothMacKinnonandYoung,aswellasmanyotherswhohaveworkedalongroughlythesamepaths,tracethepoliticalfailureofthesocialmovementsthatinspiretheminparttophilosophicalsourcesandjointhestruggleatthatlevel.Itisworthnotingseveralconsequencesofthisgeneralmove.First,ithasbeenphilosophicallyproductive,asithaswidenedphilosophicaldebatesaboutequalitytoincludeques-tionsofoppression,hierarchy,anddominationandsubordination.Thiscanbeseeninpartbylookingatthetransformationinmainstreampoliticalphilosophyfromtheratherlimited“equalityofwhat”debatesinthe1980sand1990swhichfocusedontheindexformeasuringdistributiveinequalitytothebroaderdebatesamongrepub-licans,liberals,feminists,andcriticalracetheoriststhatconsidertheissuesraisedbyMacKinnon,Young,andothers,andmoreexplicitlytheorizetherelationships9betweenfreedom,equality,andpolitics.Atadeeperlevel,theircritiqueshavealsoprovokedimportantphilosophicalreconsiderationsofthenatureofobjectivityandindividualism.Second,ithasbeenfruitfulinprovidingaphilosophicalvocabularyandprecisionforclearlyarticulatingthedemandsofoppressedgroups,andthushelpedtoinspirethecurrentphilosophicalvibrancy(ifnotalwaysthewideracceptance)ofsuchoncecompletelymarginalizedareasofthefieldasfeminismandcriticalracetheory.Butthird,theirdeepestphilosophicalcriticismsofmainstreamtheorieshavemetwithagreatdealofresistanceandincomprehension.Whereasmanyliberalthe-oristsmightnowacknowledgethatoppressionisadistinctformofinequalityfromdiscrimination,theyaremuchlesslikelytogiveuponnormsofobjectivityorafun-damentalindividualism,andtotheextentthattheyhaveinterpretedMacKinnonorYoungasclaimingthatthepoliticaldemandsfortheendtooppressionrestontherejectionofobjectivityorindividualism,thishasactuallyprovidedthemwithakindofphilosophicalcoverfornottakingseriouslythemoreradicalpoliticaldemandsbeingmadebythesephilosophersandthesocialmovementsthatinspirethem.Thus,inanimportantsense,themovetophilosophyasawayofaddressingincomprehensionhassofarprovedineffective.Andthismayinpartaccountforthefourthconsequence:thesephilosophicalinterventionshavenotmademuchpolitical10difference.AtleastintheU.S.,mainstreampoliticaldebatesoversuchpoliciesasaffirmativeaction,abortion,pornography,orparentalleavearestillverymuchcouchedinthelanguageofdiscriminationandthedistributionofindividualrightsandprivileges.Becausethephilosophicalchallengestoliberalismhavebeenmetmorewithresistanceandincomprehensionthanaccommodationanddialogue,liberalshaveoftenbeenmovedtore-classifythecontinueddemandsforanendtotheoppressionofwomenandnonwhitesintheU.S.andelsewhereasdemandsfortherecognitionofdifferenceratherthantheendofoppression.Thatis,fromwithinthemainstreamframeworkthatassessespoliticalsystemsintermsofhowtheydistributerights,oppor-tunities,andgoods,ifagroupofpeoplefacesnodiscriminationandthustothatextenthasequalityofbasicrightsandopportunitiesbutneverthelesscontinuesto348AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page349demandsomethingelse,thosedemandscanonlypossiblybedemandsforsomesetofspecialprivileges,eitherintheformofspecialrightsorspecialformsofrecogni-tionofdifference.Thus,thedemandsforequalitythatcharacterizethewomen’smove-mentandthecivilrightsmovementgetfoldedintothedemandsmadebyothersocial11movementstowhichInowturn.2.DemandsforRecognitionThesocialmovementsthataremosteasilyconnectedwiththedemandsforre-cognitionarethosewhichadvocateonbehalfofnational,cultural,andlinguisticminoritiesforvariousformsofwhathascometobecalledmulticulturalaccommo-dation.Demandsforrecognition,likedemandsforequality,canbeseenasademandforaformofinclusionthatgoesbeyondnondiscrimination,andthisisnodoubtoneofthereasonswhydemandsforsexandracialequalityaresooftenconflatedwithdemandsforrecognition.AsIclaimedabove,apolicyofnondiscriminationisconsistentwiththemaintenanceofunequalcriteriaforthedistributionofgoods,rights,andopportunities.Inthecaseoffailuresofrecognition,theproblemarisesbecausethesecriteriaareculturallyspecificandservetoplacedemandsonminoritygroupsthatarenotplacedonthemajority.Asaresult,thepriceofinclusionforsuchgroupsisaformofassimilation.Whatsocialmovementsthatdemandrecog-nitiondemand,then,isthatthoseforwhomtheyadvocatebeincludedinthesocialandpoliticallifeofthesocietywithouthavingtogiveupsomeaspectoftheiridentitysuchastheirculturalpracticesorlanguage.Thus,aswiththemovementsforcivilandwomen’srights,thesemovementsdemandnotonlythatthecircleofinclusionbewidenedtoincludethoseforwhomtheyadvocate,butthattheterrainwithinthecirclebealteredsothatitaccommodatesthemoneventerms.Inpractice,thedemandsofsuchmovementshaveoftencomeintheformofdemandsforparticularexemptionstogenerallawsorgovernmentsubsidiestoparticulargroupsortheirrepresentativeorganizations.Sikhshavedemandedexemptionstohelmetrequire-mentsanduniformcodesthatinterferewiththewearingofturbans.ObservantMuslimsandJewshavedemandedexemptionsfromanimalcrueltylawsinordertopreparemeataccordingtoreligiousrequirements,andfromschooldresscodestoallowforreligiousclothingsuchasheadscarvesandyarmulkes.Otherreligiousgroupshavedemandedexemptionsfromcertaineducationalrequirementswheretheseconflictwiththeircommunitypracticesorreligiousbeliefs.Culturalgroupshavedemandedper-missiontoengageinavarietyofotherwiseprohibitedpracticesthattheyclaimareimportanttotheirwayoflife,fromfemalegenitalcuttingtoritualanimalsacrificetotheuseofhallucinogenicdrugs.Finally,somegroupshaverequestedgovernmentsupportforculturalinstitutionsandfestivalsorofficialgovernmentrecognitionofparticularholidaysorevents.Becausethesedemandsareallparticularinthesensethattheyseekdifferentialtreatmentformembersofagivenminority,theyhaveoftenbeenmetwithhostilityandrejectionbythosewhoclaimtobeupholdingliberalnormsofequalityandneutrality.Fromtheperspectiveofmanyliberalthinkers,thedifferentialaccom-modationofvariousculturalgroupslooksstructurallyindistinguishablefromanynumberofovertlydiscriminatoryregimesfromtheOttomanEmpiretotheJimCrowRelationalLiberalism349\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page350SouthernU.S.toapartheidSouthAfrica.Fromthisliberalperspective,demandsforparticularrecognitioncanonlybedemandsfordifferentialrights,opportunities,orclaimstogoods,andsuchdemandsflyinthefaceofevenliberalcommitmentstoequality.Itis,then,arguablythiskindofconflationbetweendemandsforinclusionaryrecog-nitionandexplicitlyracistregimesthathasinspiredphilosophicalarticulationsofthedemandforrecognition.Anditshouldthusnotbesurprisingthatthephilosophicalworkinthisdomainhasgrownoutofaseriesofdiagnosesofthesourceofthemis-understanding.Threeinterrelateddiagnoseshavebeenofferedandusedasabasisforre-articulatingthedemandsforrecognition.First,somephilosophershavearguedthattheproblemliesinthestandardliberalmethodforaccommodatingdifference,astrategythatgrewoutofattemptstoaccommodatedoctrinaldifferencesamongEuropeanChristiansinthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies.Thatstrategybasicallyinvolvedade-politicizationofreligiousidentities.Thatis,liberalsarguedthatthewayforpeopleofdifferentfaithstoneverthelesslivetogetherinharmonyasfellowcitizenswastoseeone’sfaithasanonpoliticalorprivatematter,aquestionofindividualconscience,andassuch,notonethatshouldaffectone’spoliticalstatus.Asthisstrategyofprivatizationisgeneralized,theresultistotreatanyandalldifferenceswithinapopulationvialib-12ertyofconscienceandfreedomofassembly.One’sreligiousbeliefs,one’sculturalaffiliations,evenone’snativelanguageallbecomemattersofindividualconnection,perhapsvaryinginimportancealongaspectrumthatrunsfrommeretastestomattersofconscience.Theliberalstatethusallowspeopletobehaveandthinkastheywishoutsideofthepoliticalrealm,andtocongregatewithwhomevertheychoose,butexpectsallcitizenstoleavesuchbeliefsandconnectionsbehindastheydontheroleofcitizen.Itconsidersthatcitizenshavebeentreatedfairlyiftheyallhavethesamebasicrightsofbelief,assembly,andexit.Advocatesofapoliticsofrecognitionclaimthatthisframeworkofde-politicizationpreventsliberalsfromunderstandingwhatdemandsforrecognitiondemand.Thatis,thosewhodemandrecognitionareessentiallydemandingthatsomeaspectoftheiridentitythatdifferentiatesthemfromthemajorityberecognizedaspoliticallyrelev-13ant.Sincetheliberaltheoreticalframeworkassignsallparticularidentitiestoasphereoutsideof(thoughadmittedlyprotectedby)politics,ithasnospacetograspwhatisbeingdemanded.Thosewhoargueforapoliticsofrecognitiongobeyonddiagnosingthefailureofcommunicationhere,andurgethattheliberalframeworkisultimatelymistaken.Theproblem,theysuggest,isthattheliberalisleftimaginingcitizensasstripped-downmererightsbearers,andthusnotonlyfailstoadequatelydescribetheimportanceofparticularminorityidentitiesbutalsofailstocaptureaccu-ratelywhatisinvolvedinbeingacitizen,evenformembersofthemajorityculture.Thisfurtherlineofcriticismcanthenleadadvocatesofthepoliticsofrecognitiontowardssupportforvariousformsofnationalismandcommunitarianism,butitneednot.Republicans,forinstance,alsorejectthecharacterizationofcitizensasessen-tiallymererights-bearersandinsteadarguethatcitizensshouldbeseenasengagedinthecollectiveactivityofself-government.Theseconddiagnosisalsopointstotherelativelythincharacterizationofcitizensinliberaltheory,thoughdrawsasomewhatdifferentconclusion.Whatdrawsliberaltheorytothisthincharacterization,thissecondlineofargumentgoes,isthemistaken350AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page351conflationofsimilaritywithequality.AlthoughthispointechoesinsomewayMacKinnon’sargumentinthatitdrawsattentiontoandcriticizesalinkbetweensimilarityandequality,itdrawsaslightlydifferentlesson.Here,theworryisnotsomuchthatafocusonsimilarityblindsustoinequalitywhenittakestheformofoppression,butratherthattheconnectionbetweenequalityandsimilarityleadsliberaltheoryandliberalstatestosearchoutacommoncoreofhumanitywhichcanserveasthebasisofequality.Thisnotonlyhastheconsequenceofdrivingliberalstoadoptthindescriptionsofcitizenship,butalsoofseeingdeepdifferencesbetweenpeopleassomethingtobeerasedandovercomeratherthanfairlynegotiated.TheresultisthatliberaltheoryhasembracedwhatJamesTullycallsan“empireofuni-14formity.”Againstthisbackground,demandsforrecognitionofdifferencecan’tbesquaredwithequaltreatmentandcanonlycomeacrossascallsforspecialprivileges15orseparatismandthusthreatstopoliticalunity,stability,andequality.Fromthisdiagnosis,advocatesofapoliticsofrecognitionhavearguedforadif-ferentconceptionofequality,onethatturnsnotonsomecommonhumansimilar-itybutonanequalabilitytoparticipateindialogueabouttheconditionsunderwhichwelive.Theequalityastateconcernedwithtreatingitscitizensfairlyshouldthusguaranteeaboveallistheequalabilityofeachcitizentospeak,beheardandtaken16seriouslyinturn.Finally,athirdlineofdiagnosisfollowsonthefirstbydrawingtwofurtherconsequencesfromtheliberalstrategyofde-politicizationofidentity.First,thisstrategyobscuresanimportantdistinctionbetweenthechoiceswemake,andthebackgroundagainstwhichwemakethosechoices.Ifcertainfeaturesofouridentity,suchasourculturalbackground,ourreligionorourlanguage,formthebackgroundagainstwhichwemakeotherchoices,thentotreatthemasmattersofindividualconsciencefundamentallymistakestheroletheyplayinourlivesandthustheirpolit-icalsignificance.Second,theliberalstrategyofde-politicizationofidentitymakestheimportanceofthisdistinctionformattersofequalityparticularlyhardtoseeasitpushesintothebackgroundthewiderculturalandsocialbackgroundagainstwhichallcitizens,majorityandminority,makechoices.Itthusobscuresfromviewanunfairadvantagethatmembersofamajorityculturemayhave:thesecureentrenchmentandsupportofthebackgroundcultureagainstwhichtheycanmakemeaningfulchoices.Seenthisway,demandsforrecognitionandculturalprotectionarenotdemandsforspecialprivilegesinthesenseofdemandsforsomethingoverandabovewhatcitizensofthemajorityculturereceive,butdemandsforakindofcompensatorysubsidytoensurethatallcitizenshaveequallysecurebackgroundsagainstwhichtomakethechoicesthattheliberalstateaimstoprotect.Championsofthisdiagnosisalsopointoutthatthefactthatthecultureofthemajorityenjoystheentrenchedandthusinvisiblestatusthatitdoesisnotmerelytheresultoftheblindworkingsofnumericaladvantage,butisoftentheresultofquiteconsciouseffortsonthepartofevenlib-eralstatestoengageinnation-buildinginsupportofthedominantcultureandat17theexpenseofminoritygroups.Liberalresponsestothesephilosophicalmoveshave,ingeneral,beennomorefriendlyoraccommodatingthanthosethathavemetthephilosophicalinterventionsofradicalfeministsandcriticalracetheorists.Andonceagain,theseresponsescanbeseenasthereassertionofadeepcommitmenttoakindofindividualismandtheclaimthatthesourceofthephilosophicalcriticismsraisedonbehalfofthoseRelationalLiberalism351\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page352demandingrecognitionmustbeanultimatelymuddle-headedrejectionofthatindi-vidualism.Thus,forinstance,appealstothepoliticalimportanceofculturalidentityaretakentorequireabeliefinsomeorganicunitycalledacultureoranationora18people,ofwhichitsmembersaremereappendages.Moreover,demandsforrecog-nitionarethoughttorequireadeferencetothecurrentcharacteristicsofparticularcultures,andthusakindofessentialismaboutculturalidentitywhichunfortunatelyidentifiesallmembersofaculturewiththeparticularideologyofthedominant19membersofthatculture.Failingtoseethewaysinwhichmanydemandsforrecog-nitionarenotonlyparticulardemands,butaremadeagainstparticularcontext,andthusfailingtoappreciatethatthecontextinwhichthesedemandsaremademaymakeadifference,defendersofabstractuniversalliberaltheoryoftenassumethatallthesedemandsmustbemakingafundamentallysimilardemand,andsincethatcannotbeademandforindividualrightsofconscienceandassemblyoranyoftheotherstandardliberalindividualrights,theymustbearguingfortheprotectionofanewspeciesofrights:grouprights.Asaresult,afinalmoveoftenmadetorebuffdemandsforrecognitionistofoldthemintodemandsfortheself-determinationofparticulargroupsandthusthedemandforso-calledgrouprights,asubjecttowhich20Inowturn.3.DemandsforSelf-DeterminationInordertodistinguishdemandsforself-determinationfromdemandsforrecognition,ithelpstodistinguishbetweentwotypesofrightsclaims.Membershiprightsarerightsthatindividualshaveinvirtueoftheirmembershipinaparticulargroup.Theyarethusnotheldbyallmembersofagivensociety,butarenonethelessindividualrights.TherightsofQuakerstoavoidmilitaryservice,orofSikhmembersoftheRoyalCanadianMountedPolicetowearturbansinsteadofthetraditionalwide-brimmedhataremembershiprights.Asanon-Quakerandnon-Sikh,Idonothavesuchrights,andthusifIjointheRCMP,IcannotavoidwearingtheuniformevenifIhaveasetofdeeplyheldreasonsfornotwantingtowearwide-brimmedhats.Somedemandsforrecognitioncomeintheformofdemandsformembershiprights.Contrastthesewithgrouprights,whicharerightsthatbelongtoentiregroups.Grouprightsaremostoftendemandedbynationalistandanti-colonialmovementsthatdemandrightsofself-determinationandsecessionfromthewidersocietiesorempiresinwhichtheyfindthemselves.IfIclaimthattheQuebecoishavearighttosecedefromCanadaandformtheirownstate,Iamclaimingthattheycollectivelypossessagroupright.ItdoesnotfollowfromthepossessionofthisrightthatanyindividualQuebecoisecandecidetoleavetheCanadianfederationandstartherownstate.Ofcourse,justhowtointerpret21claimstogrouprightsisamatterofsomecontroversy,towhichIwillreturnbelow.Demandsforself-determinationbycolonizedpeopleshave,ofcourse,historicallymetwithcombinationsofbruteforceandracistargumentsaboutthepeopleinques-tion’scapacitiesforself-government.Butevenliberalswhoshyawayfromeitherofthesemoveshavebeengenerallywaryofsuchdemandsbyminoritynations,suchastheQuebecois,theCatalans,orvariousAboriginalpeoples.Sometimesthesedemandsarerejectedforreasonssimilartothoseusedtorejectdemandsforequalityandrecog-nition:intheabsenceofdiscrimination,andgivenvariousmembershiprights,there352AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page353isnoroomleftforlegitimatecomplaint.Butinaddition,threekindsofconsidera-tionsaregiventhatpertainspecificallytodemandsforself-determination.First,con-cernsareexpressedfortheprotectionoftheequalityandindividualrightsofpeoplewithintheminoritynation,whetherinternalminorities(e.g.non-FrancophonesinQuebec),otherwiseatrisksub-populations(e.g.womeninaboriginalorreligiousnations),orjustindividualdissidentswhodonotendorsethenationalistprojectinitscurrent22form.Second,concernisexpressedoverhowthegroupgoesaboutexercisingitscollectiveright.Thosewhodemandrightsofself-determinationmayholdpositionsofauthoritythatgivethemtheabilitytomakethesedemands,butnotinwaysthatlegitimatelyallowthemtospeakfortheentiregroup.Third,evenifitisacceptedthatparticulargroupspossesssomerightsofself-determination,theseareclaimednottoextendtomattersofseccession.TheQuebecois,onthislineofargument,havetherightsofaprovincetoelecttheirowngovernment,andmakedemandswithintheexistingstructureoftheCanadianfederationforvarioussubsidies,regulations,andpowers,andevenforchangestothatstructure,buttheydonothavetherighttoexitcompletelythatstructureunilaterally.Onceagain,unsympatheticpoliticalresponseshaveledtoattemptsatfurtherphilo-sophicalarticulation.Twoissueshavebeenattheforefrontofthesedebates.Thefirstturnsonquestionsofessentialism.Theideahereisthatpartoftheresistancetotherecognitionofdemandsforgroupself-determinationistheassumptionthatsuchdemandsrestonakindofessentialismaboutcultures,wherebyculturesorpeoplesornationsaresaidtohaveparticularessentialfeaturesthatdistinguishthemfromothergroups,anditisintheserviceofprotectingtheseessentialfeaturesthattheyneedrightstoself-determination.Culturalessentialismisthenblamedforthefailureofproponentsofgrouprightstobesensitivetointernaldivisionsanddebateswithinagroup.Defendersofdemandsforself-determinationhavethusarguedthatthesedemands,andthepresenceofgrouprightsneednotrestonproblematicassumptions23ofculturalessentialism.Onepathfordoingthisistodrawsimilaritiesbetweengroupandcorporaterights.Variouswell-constitutedorganizationshaverightswithinvariouslegalsystemsthatbelongtotheorganizationasawholeratherthantoindi-vidualmembers.Thus,suchrightsaregroupratherthanmembershiprights,buttherecognitionofsuchrightsisnotgenerallythoughtofasrequiringanessentialistviewoftheorganization.Thus,forinstance,withinaprofessionalsportsleague,teamshavevariousrightstotradeplayers,draftplayersenteringtheleague,andappealdecisionsofrefereesandleagueofficials.Thesearerightsheldbyteams,notplayers,unlike,saytherightsofmembersofagiventeamtowearitsuniformonthefieldduringleaguegames.Butnoonethinksthattheintelligibilityoftheserightsturnsonclaimsabouttheessentialnatureandcharacteristicsofparticularteams.Thesecondissueturnsonthenatureandusefulnessofgrouprights,andhereithelpstoseparateouttwoissues.First,someliberalshavedeniedthatgroups,asopposedtowell-constitutedorganizations,liketeamsandcorporations,canhaverights.Second,eveniftheontologicalstatusofsuchrightsisnotdisputed,manyliberalsclaimthattheyaddnothingofvaluetoindividuals,andthusdeservenoprotection.Debatesovertheontologicalstatusofgrouprightsgenerallyturnonquestionsaboutthenatureofrightsmoregenerally,sincethefoundationsofatheoryofrightsisgenerallythoughttodeterminesuchquestionsaswhichrightsare“real”andwho24canbesaidtohavethem.HeredefendersofgrouprightsandtheliberalswhodenyRelationalLiberalism353\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page354thepossibilityofsuchrightsoftencometologgerheadsoverliberalism’sindividu-25alism.Liberalismisarguablydefinedbyitsprioritizingofindividualrightsclaimsoverclaimsofgeneralsocialwelfare,anditisthoughtbybothliberaltheoristsandtheircriticsthatthebasisforthispriorityisanindividualistontologythatclaimsthatsocietyisbuiltupfromessentiallyseparateindividuals,andthatthereisnoth-inginasocietythatisnotultimatelyreducibletoitsconstituentindividuals,theirinterests,desires,plans,projects,goods,etc.Startingfromanindividualistontology,itcanseemobviouswhythefeaturesofindividuals,liketheirbeingagents,havinginterests,beingnaturallyfreeorendowedbytheirCreator,shouldbethesourceof26theirhavingrights.Thequestionthenbecomeswhetherthisframeworkcanbeextendedbeyondindividualhumanbeings,andespeciallytoratherlooselydefinedcollectiv-itieslikepeoples,cultures,ornations.Somedefendersofgrouprightshavethuschal-lengedthisindividualistontology,arguingthatthereisnoreasontoassumethatweshouldbeginouraccountofrightsfromisolatedindividualsandthusnoreasonto27assumethatgroupsaremoreproblematicbearersofrightsthanindividuals.Asomewhatdifferentissueturnsnotonthepossibleexistenceofgrouprights,butontheneedfortheminaliberalsociety.Theclaimhereisthatthereisnoharmtoindividualsthatcanbecausedbythedenialofgroupbutnotindividualrights,andthat,moreover,muchharmcancometoindividualsiftheexerciseofgroup28rightscomesattheexpenseofindividualrights.Thus,evenifthecategoryofgrouprightsdoesnotrestonaconceptualconfusion,theirprotectioninaliberalstatewouldbeamistake.Onceagain,defendersofdemandsforself-determinationhavetriedinparttoanswerthischargeonaphilosophicallevel,thoughheretheirworkdovetailswithissuescoveredinthediscussionofdemandsforrecognition.Theharmmostoftencitedbydenialsofgrouprightsareharmstothepossibilityofmaintainingcertainparticularidentitiesasmembersofthegroupinquestion.Thus,forinstance,ifagivennativetribeisunabletocollectivelyprotectitsland-holdings,ortoman-agecertainfisheriesthatarecentraltoitswayoflife,thenitispossibleforthesecollectiveresourcestoslipawaythroughaseriesofindividualrights-respectingtransactions.Individualtriballand-ownersselltheirlandtopeopleoutsidethetribe.Non-tribalfishermanfishthelandinaccordancewithgovernment,butnottribalregulations,withtheresultthatthefisheryisdepleted.Asaresult,membersofthetribeinquestioncannolongermaintaintheiridentities:thetribewindsupwithno29land,ornotraditionalfishinggrounds.Ofcourse,whethertheseharmstoindi-vidualscountaspoliticallyrelevantdependsonourviewofthepoliticalimportanceofsuchidentities.Ifidentitiesareessentiallynonpoliticalmatters,thenevenifIhavearighttoengageinthepracticesthatmyidentitiesdemand,Idon’thavearighttotheprotectionoftheproperspaceforthosepractices.IfIamauserofCresttooth-paste,thoughIhavearightnottobepreventedfrombuyingandusingCrest,andnottobeforcedtobuyColgate,IhavenorighttoforcethemakerofCresttocontinuemanufacturingit.IfmyidentityasaNavajoorQuebecoisorCatalanisbasicallylikemyidentityasaCrest-user,thenthedemiseofthoseculturesmayharmmebutnotinanywaythataliberalgovernmentneedheed.Ontheotherhand,ifidentitiesarepoliticallyrelevant,thenitmaybethecasethatthedemiseofacul-turerobsmeofsomethingofpoliticalvalueevenintheabsenceofthedenialofindividualrights.Thusthequestionofthevalueofgrouprightsultimatelyturnsonthepoliticalrelevanceofparticularidentities.354AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page3554.ShiftingtheGroundsofLiberalismThedemandsforequality,recognition,andself-determinationhavethusinspiredphilo-sophicalchallengestothebasicliberalconceptionsofequality,identityandrights.Ineachcase,philosophersinspiredbythosedemandshavearguedthatliberals’individualistconceptionsoftheseideaspreventthemfromgraspingthebasicjusticeofthedemandsofvarioussocialmovements,andhaveurgedalternativesocialonto-logiesandconceptualframeworksinwhichsuchdemandscanbeadequatelyheard.Ofcourse,notallliberalshavebeenhostiletothedemandsofthesesocialmovements,andinsomecases,liberalshavegonealongwaytowardstryingtofitconcernswithoppression,thepoliticalrelevanceofparticularidentitiesandgrouprightsintoliberal30theorieswhileholdingontoanindividualistontology.Inthisfinalsectionofthepaper,Isketchoutreasonsforthinkingthatliberalismdoesnotandoughtnotrestonanindividualistontologytobeginwith,andhowshiftingourunderstandingofthebasisofliberaltheoryprovidesamoreaccommodatingconceptualframeworkin31whichthesocialmovements’demandscanbeproperlyheard.Thebasicthrustofmyargumentisthatthecoreelementsofliberaltheoryarebetterunderstoodastakingastheirsubjectmatternottheaggregationofindividualsandtheiractions,butratherthenatureoftherelationshipsbetweenandamongpeople,andassuch,theconceptsofrights,identityandequalitycanbeinterpretedinwaysthatallowthevariousclaimsofidentitypoliticstobeproperlyheard.Thedifferencebetweentakingthesubjectmatterofatheorytobeindividualagentsandtheirindividualactionsontheonehand,andtherelationshipsbetweenpeopleontheotherisbothdeepandhardtofullygrasp.Iwillnotbeabletogiveafullaccount32ofthedetailsofthisdifferenceherenorargueforitsgeneraltheoreticalimportance.Thebasicidea,however,shouldbeclearenough.Itisthedifferencebetweenaskingquestionslike,whichindividualactionsarepermitted,andhowmuchstuffdoeseachpersongetontheonehand,andaskingwhethertherelationshipsamongpeoplearecharacterizedbyhierarchyorreciprocity,violenceandcoercion,orthedeliberativegiveandtakeofreasons.Ratherthanunpackingthegeneraldistinctionhereanyfurther,Iinsteadarguewhyseveralkeyliberalcommitmentstothepriorityofrights,thediver-sityofidentity,andequalityshowthatliberalismis,atitsheart,arelationaltheory.Twofeaturesofrightsproveparticularlydifficultfortheoristsofrightstoexplain.First,atleastsomerightscomewithcorrelativeduties.IfIhavewhatisoftencalledaclaimrighttosomethingthenthisimpliesthatothers(perhapsallothers)haveadutytonotinterferewith(andpossiblyaidmeinmypursuitof)myhavingit.ButifItreatrightsasbasicallyissuingpermissionstoindividuals,asbasicallygovern-ingtheactionsofindividuals,itcanbehardtoseewhytheyshouldalsogeneratedutiesforothers.Theloosenessoftheconnectionbetweensomerightsandothers’dutieshasformedthebasisofargumentsagainstextendingtheterrainofrightsbeyondsomecoreliberalrightslikethosetolibertyofconscienceorevenforabandoning33over-relianceonrights-talkentirely.ButIthinktheproblemultimatelystemsfromtryingtotreatrightsasthepossessionsofindividualsandcertainrelevantlysimilaragents.Withinsuchaframework,thereisalwaysagaptobebridgedbetweentherightspossessedbyonepersonandthedutiesthatplacesonothers.Second,rightsstandinanuncomfortablerelationtothegood.Oneoftheobviousvaluesofindividualrights,especiallyforliberals,isthattheguaranteeofsuchrightsRelationalLiberalism355\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page356preventscertaintypesofactionsfrombeingtakeninthenameofvariousgoodssuchasoverallsocialwelfare.Onestandardcriticismofautilitarianismthateitherrecog-nizesnorightsorjustifiesthemintermsoftheirvalueinmaximizingthegood,isthatitcannotruleoutandmayevenservetoadvocatethehorrifictreatmentofsomeindividualsifthatwillbringaboutgreatertotalgood.Butifrightsaretoactassideconstraintsortrumpsonourindividualorcollectivepursuitofthegood,then34weareleftwonderingabouttheirultimatejustification.Onestandardindividualistargumentisthatrightsprotectvariousindividualgoods,suchasthegoodofbeingincontrolofyourownlifeorpursuingwhatyoutaketobegoodregardlessofprevailingopiniononthematter.Butifthisisright,thenitishardtoseewhyrightsshouldbegiventhekindofabsoluteprioritytheyaregiveninliberaltheory.Afterall,ifthepointofprotectinganindividual’srightsisultimatelyasameanstooraconstituentofpromotinghisgood(evenhisgoodasheseeit),thenitdoeslookliketherewillbecaseswherewemorefullyadvancethegood(evenhisgoodashesees35it)byviolatingratherthanprotectinghisrights.Butbothoftheseproblemsdissolveifwethinkaboutrightsasstructuringrela-tionships.Thatis,ratherthanthinkingaboutmoralityasgoverningwhatwedo,andwhatwedotooneanother,thinkofitasgoverningthestructureofourrelation-ships.Then,rightsenterthepicturenotasanecessaryadd-onthatpreventssomepursuitsofthegoodfromgettingoutofhand,butratheraspartofthedescriptionofwhatourrelationshipstooneanothercanandoughttobe.Enshriningrightsintolawisimportantnotsomuchforcontributingtothegoodofsocietyviatheprovi-sionofabasiclevelofsecurity,asJohnStuartMillargued,butasakindofpublicannouncementthatdemocraticcitizensmaketooneanotherthattheyaretaking36certainkindsofsocialcalculationsoffthetable.Thepointofsuchpublicannounce-ments,onsuchaview,isthattheyconstitutepartofthereciprocalrelationshipamongfreeandequalpeoplethatisthehallmarkofdemocraticcitizenship.So,onthisview,thebasisofvariousrightsliesnotintheinherentqualitiesofindividuals,butinaviewaboutthemoralvalueofcertainkindsofrelationships.Andtheirjustificationneednotultimatelycomedowntoquestionsaboutpromotingsomeultimategood;itcanrestdirectlyonthekindsofrelationshipstheycreate.Ifwethinkofrightsthisway,thenitisalsoeasiertoseetherelationshipbetweenrightsandduties.Theyare,onthisview,reallyjustflipsidesofthesamecoin.Theybothdescribeaspects(andarguablythesameaspects)ofvariousrelationships.Bothnowbecomeintersubjectiveterms.Atthesametime,wecanseetheintelligibilityofarticulatingandguaranteeingcertainrightswithoutidentifyingthosewhobearthecorrelativeduties.Partofthepointofestablishingasetofsocialandeconomicrightsthatmightservetoinstitutionalizeanegalitarianliberaltheoryofdistributivejus-tice(suchasRawls’sdifferenceprinciple)wouldbenotonlytopubliclyrecognizethateachcitizenhasasetofnon-negotiableendsthatmeritreciprocalrespect(thisbeingthepointofrightsofconscience,assembly,etc.),butalsotorecognizethateachmeritsstatusasafullycontributingmemberofthesocialandeconomiclifeofthesociety,and,asRawlsputsthepoint,thepoorarenotmerelytheobjectsofour37charityandcompassion.Andpartoftheeffectofestablishingsuchrightsevenintheabsenceofaninstitutionalizedschemeofcorrelativedutieswouldbetorecognizethenatureofcertainkindsofdemands.Whenthosewhofarepoorlyinagiveneco-nomymakeclaimsonthebroaderpublic,dowerecognizethoseclaimsasasserting356AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page357rightsormerelyaskingforkindness?Thedifferencehereisimportantevenifwehavenotdecidedaheadoftimewhoisresponsibleforansweringtheirclaims.Butnownotethatbyshiftingthegroundofrightstoarelationalview,wearealsoinapositiontothinkdifferentlyaboutthedemandforgrouprights.Thebasisofrightsclaimsliesinanidealofreciprocalrelationshipsbetweenfreeandequalpersons.Toestablishtheneedforcertainrights,oneneedstoshowhowtheysup-portsuchrelationshipsorhowtheymightovercometheircurrentabsence.Atleastsomeoftheargumentsforgrouprights,andagreatdealofthoseformembershiprights,turnonorcanbereformulatedwithoutdamagetoturnon,preciselythissort38ofconsideration.Mypointhereisnotthatallgrouprightsclaimswillorevenshouldfindahomewithinaliberaltheory,butratherthatthediscussionovertheneedforparticulargrouprightscancontinueattherightlevel.Thatgrouprightsareintelli-gibledoesnotmakethemautomaticallyadvisable,soadvocatesofself-determinationmustmaketheircase.Butthatcasecannotberuledoutaheadoftimebyphilo-sophicalreflectionaboutthenatureof“real”rightsthatdismissesthepossibilitythatlooselyboundgroupslikepeoplesandnationscouldbethebearersofrights.Turnthentotheplaceofidentityinarelationalliberalism.Ifliberalismis,ultim-ately,abouthowwerelatetooneanther,whatplacedothesortsofidentitythatanimatedemandsforrecognitionplay?Agreatdeal,itturnsout.Toseewhy,notetwothingsaboutthosedemands.First,recognitionisitselfintersubjective.Thedemandforrecognitionis,afterall,ademandthatotherswhoserecognitionmatterstoyou,relatetoyouinaparticularway,andsoitinvolvesnotonlythedemandthattheyactacertainway,butthatyourelatetooneanotherinacertainway.Asrecogni-tiontheoristsfromRousseauandHegeltoCharlesTaylorandAxelHonnethhaveinsisted,recognitionisatwo-waystreet.Furthermore,whenthedemandforrecog-nitionisademandthatoneberecognizedasabearerofacertainidentity,thatiden-tityisalsoalwaysrelational.Thatis,tosaythatIhaveagivenidentityisnotmerelytomakeaclaimaboutmyindividualcharacteristics,butmoreimportantly,istosaysomethingabouthowIrelatetoothers.Itmayhighlightthenatureofmyrelationshipstothosewhosharetheidentity,whetherthemerefactthatweformacohesivegrouporthatwerelatetooneanotherinparticularways.Itmayalsohighlighttherela-tionshipwebeartothewidersociety,bothinthesenseofdemandingthatthatrela-tionshipchangefromonewhereweareexcludedanddespisedtoonewherewearetreatedasfullequalsandrespectedinourdifference,andinthesenseofinsisting39onthewaysinwhichwestandapartatleastinsomethings.Therecognitionthatadvocatesofmulticulturalism,thepoliticsofrecognitionandmembershiprightsthusalldemandfitsintotheframeworkofarelationalliberalism.Infact,itmightbearguedthattheessentialfeaturesofliberalismallderivetheirpointfromestablishingakindofregimeofreciprocalrecognitionamongdiversebutequalcitizens.Part,butnotall,ofthatregimeisconstructedfromrights.Otherpartsareconstructedfromguaranteesofsocialandeconomicfairness,democraticproce-duresanddeliberation,andtheruleoflaw.Seeninthisway,however,thedemandsforrecognitioncanclearlybeseenaschallengestoparticularliberalpractices,butnottoitsunderlyingfoundations.Finally,turntothequestionofequality.PhilosopherslikeIrisYoungdrawacontrastbetweendistributiveconceptionsofjusticeandrelationalconceptionsofjusticethatfocusontheeliminationofinstitutionalizedrelationsofdominationandRelationalLiberalism357\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page35840oppression.Thedistributiveconceptiontakesequalitytodescribeparticularalloca-tionsofgoodstoindividuals.Ifeveryindividualhasroughlythesamegoodsinherbasket,thenthereisequality.Therelationalview,incontrast,conceivesofequalityastheabsenceofdomination,ofhierarchicalrelations.Ifliberaltheoriesarefunda-mentallyrelational,however,thenweshouldexpectthemtohaverelationalcon-ceptionsofequalityattheircore.Ihavealreadyclaimedthattherelationshipliberalismdescribesamongcitizenscaststhemasfreeandequal,andthatsuggestsonelinkbetweenitsconceptionofequalityandnondomination.Clearly,ourabilitytorelatetooneanotherasequalsishinderedbyrelationsofdominationandhierarchybetweenusinamuchmoredirectwaythanthemeredifferenceinthequantityofgoodsin41ourrespectivebaskets.Toseehowthisrelationalconceptionofequalityfindsitsarticulationinthedetails42ofliberaltheory,InoteseveralfeaturesofRawls’stheoryasanexample.First,mostoftheegalitarianworkinjusticeasfairnesstakesplaceinthepartsofthetwoprinciplesthatarelexicallypriortothedifferenceprinciple:intheguaranteeofequalbasiclibertiesandtheguaranteeoffairequalityofopportunity.Bothoftheseguaranteescanbeseenasensuringthateventhesortsofinequalitiesinprivateholdingsofprimarygoodsthatthedifferenceprincipleallowscannotservetoestab-lishhierarchicalrelationsamongcitizens.ThattheyaremeanttoplaythisroleisfurtheremphasizedwhenRawlsnamestheinterpretationofthetwoprinciplesthathefavors“democraticequality.”Itisthekindofequalitythatbefitsdemocraticcitizens,peopleengagedinacollectiveprojectofself-governmentthroughtheirrelationshipstooneanotherasfreeandequal.Second,theultimatebasisforthisconceptionofequalitylyingattheheartofhisconceptionofjusticeisthatitwouldmeetwithagreementfromcitizens.Hereitisimportanttonotethattheagreementinquestionisnotmerelythatofthestripped-downpartiesintheoriginalposition,butrealcitizensonwhosecontinuedreflectiveendorsementconsiderationsofstabil-ityturn.Fromthispoint,thethirdpointfollows:thefundamentalequalityinRawls’sconceptionofjusticeispoliticalequality:theequalabilitytoparticipateinandinfluencethecourseofdemocraticdeliberation.Thatisaformofequalitythatisclearlyham-peredbythekindsofinequalitythatthewomen’sandcivilrightsmovementsaimedtomakevisibleanderadicate.Aswiththedemandsforgrouprightsandrecognition,thedemandsforequalityfindahearingwithinarelationalliberalism:theyturnouttobecouchedinveryrecognizablyliberallanguage,evenifmanyliberalshavefailedtorecognizethisfact!Thatanargumentordemandiscouchedintheappropriatelanguagetobeheardandtakenseriouslydoesnot,ofcourse,meanthatitoughttobeaccepted.Itdoesmeanthatifitistoberejected,itmustbemetheadon.Neitherliberalsnortheirfeministandcriticalracetheoreticalcriticscanendthepoliticaldiscussionthroughphilosophicalconsiderationsalone.Thedemandsthesemovementsmakeforequal-ityunderstoodastheabsenceofoppressionaredemandsliberalsaretheoreticallycommittedtotakingseriously.Butthereisstillagapbetweentakinganargumentseriouslyandacceptingitsconclusions.Whetheranydemocraticcitizensshouldgrantvariousdemandsforequality,recognitionandgroupself-determinationis,however,43notsomethingforphilosophyalonetoanswer.Thephilosophersassociatedwithsocialmovementsmakingthesedemandsinthelatetwentiethcenturywere,Ihaveargued,largelymovedtophilosophybythefailure358AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page359ofthesemovementstogetaproperhearing.Theywerenottryingtoreplacepoliticswithphilosophy.IfliberalphilosopherscanmeetthemonthesortofcommongroundIhavesketchedhere,thenperhapswewillbeabletoconclude,whenduskfallsonthetwenty-firstcentury,thattheseeffortswerenotonlyphilosophicallyfruitful,butsuccessfulontheirownterms.Notes1G.W.F.Hegel,ElementsofthePhilosophyofRight,trans.H.B.Nisbet,ed.AllenWood(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),p.23(Preface).2R.G.Collingwood,AnAutobiography(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1939),p.62.3See,forinstance,CatharineMacKinnon,FeminismUnmodified(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1987),andWomen’sLives,Men’sLaws(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUni-versityPress,2005),JamesTully,StrangeMultiplicity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),IrisMarionYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990),andInclusionandDemocracy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000).4CatharineMacKinnon,forinstance,hascriticizedliberalism’srelianceonnormsofobjectivity.5JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971,rev.edn.,1999),pp.72–5,rev.edn.,pp.63–5.IdonotmeantosuggestherethatRawls’stheoryinitsentiretyspellsout,muchlessservesas,theintellectualunderpinningofU.S.lawandpolitics.Rawlsisactuallyquitecriticalofmuchofthoseunderpinnings.Buthisuseofargumentstoeliminatedistributiveeffectsthatarebasedondistinctionsthatarearbitraryfromamoralpointofviewareinlinewiththattradition(interestinglyenough,theyplaymuchless,ifany,roleinRawls’slaterarticulationsoftheargumentforhistheoryofjustice.SeehisJusticeasFairness:ARestatement(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000).6C.A.MacKinnon,“TowardsaNewTheoryofEquality,”inWomen’sLives,Men’sLaws,pp.44–57.7Fordiscussionofthiscriticism,seeSallyHaslanger,“OnBeingObjectiveandBeingObjectified,”inCharlotteWittandLouiseAntony,eds.,AMindofOne’sOwn(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1993):85–125,andAnthonySimonLaden,“RadicalLiberals,ReasonableFeminists:Reason,ObjectivityandPowerintheworkofMacKinnonandRawls,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy11(2)(Jun.2003):133–52.8Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,p.36,butseepp.15–38generally.9Keyarticlesintheequalityofwhatdebateinclude:AmartyaSen,“EqualityofWhat?,”repr.inhisChoice,WelfareandMeasurement(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1982):pp.353–69;RonaldDworkin,“WhatIsEquality?Part2:EqualityofResources,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs10(4)(Autumn1981):283–345;G.A.Cohen,“OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice,”Ethics99(4)(Jul.1989):906–44.Foranexampleofthekindofbroaderreflectiononpoliticsinpartinspiredbytheworkdiscussedhere,seePhilipPettit,Republicanism:ATheoryofFreedomandGovernment(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).10Ofcourse,thismaybemoretheconsequenceofthegeneralfactthatphilosophicaldevelopmentsofanysortrarelyhaveanytangiblepoliticalimpact,orofamorelocalbutgeneralconservativebacklash,thanaconsequenceoftheparticularphilosophicalmovesdiscussedabove.11Forcriticaldiscussionsofthismove,seeCharlesMills,“Multiculturalismas/and/orAnti-Racism”andIrisMarionYoung,“StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,”RelationalLiberalism359\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page360bothinMulticulturalismandPoliticalTheory,DavidOwenandAnthonySimonLaden,eds.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007).12See,forinstance,ChandranKukathas,“AreThereAnyCulturalRights?”PoliticalTheory20:1(1992):105–39.13Forthreerelatedversionsofthisargument,seeCharlesTaylor,“MulticulturalismandthePoliticsofRecognition,”inAmyGutman,ed.,Multiculturalism(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992);Tully,StrangeMultiplicity;AxelHonneth,TheStruggleforRecognition(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1995).Forsomefurtherconnectionsbetweenthedemandforrecognitionandthedemandforequality,seemyReasonablyRadical:DeliberativeLiberalismandthePoliticsofIdentity(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2001)and“ReasonableDeliberation,ConstructivePowerandtheStruggleforRecognition,”inBertvandenBrinkandDavidOwen,eds.,RecognitionandPower(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),pp.270–89.14Tully,StrangeMultiplicity,pp.58–98.Seealso:ChantalMouffe,TheDemocraticParadox(London:Verso,2000),pp.17–36;BonnieHonig,PoliticalTheoryandtheDisplacementofPolitics(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1993).15See,forinstance,BrianBarry,CultureandEquality(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000),andArthurSchlesinger,TheDisunitingofAmerica(NewYork:W.W.Norton,1998).16ThislanguagefollowsthatofTullymostclosely,butothershavemadesimilarmoves.17WillKymlicka,“TheNewDebateoverMinorityRights”inhisPoliticsintheVernacular(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),andDavidOwen,“Culture,EqualityandPolemic”EconomyandSociety32(2)(2003):325–40.18SeeKukathas,“AreThereAnyCulturalRights?”andBarry,CultureandEquality.19See,forinstance,SusanOkin,“IsMulticulturalismBadforWomen?,”inJoshuaCohen,MatthewHoward,andMarthaNussbaum,eds.,IsMulticulturalismBadforWomen?(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1999);AyeletShachar,“FeminismandMulticulturalism:MappingtheTerrain,”inOwenandLaden,Multiulturalism,pp.115–48;AmartyaSen,IdentityandViolence,(NewYork:W.W.Norton,2006);AnthonyKwameAppiah,TheEthicsofIdentity(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005).Shachar’sarticledoesn’tsomuchvoicethisconcernasdiscussthedebatesthatithasgenerated.ThoughbothSenandAppiahdoraisethisworry,andarethusmoreskepticalofdemandsforrecognitionthanphilosopherslikeTaylorandTully,theirskepticismdoesnotleadthemtocompleterejectionsofthepoliticalimportanceofidentity.20ThisconflationiscriticallydiscussedinKymlicka,“TheNewDebateoverMinorityRights.”21Fordiscussionsofthedifferencebetweenmembershipandgrouprights,seeDavidMiller,“GroupRights,HumanRights,andCitizenship”EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy10(2)(2002):178–95.Millertheredistinguishesbetweencategoryrightsandgrouprights,andthenbetweengrouprightsthatareexercisedbymembersofthegroups,andthoseexer-cisedbythegroupasawhole.SeealsoPeterJones,“HumanRights,GroupRightsandPeople’sRights,”HumanRightsQuarterly21(1)(1999):80–107,wherehedistinguishesbetweencollectiveandcorporateconceptionsofgrouprights.22Foradiscussionofsomeoftheseissues,seeDanielWeinstock,“Liberalism,Multicul-turalismandtheProblemofInternalMinorities”andAyeletShachar,“FeminismandMulticulturalism,”inOwenandLaden,Multiculturalism.23SeeAndrewMason,“MulticulturalismandtheCritiqueofEssentialism,”inOwenandLaden,Multiculturalism.24See,forexample,CarlWellman,RealRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).25Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference.26AlanGewirtharguesforanagent-basedtheoryofrightsin“TheBasisandContentofHumanRights,”inJ.RonaldPennockandJohnW.Chapman,eds.,HumanRights(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1980).JosephRazdefendsaninterest-basedtheoryof360AnthonyS.Laden\nCDIC19.qxd2/4/0915:55Page361rightsin“OntheNatureofRights,”Mind93(1984):194–214.JohnLockearguedforrightsclaimsonthebasisofanaturallawoffreedominhisSecondTreatiseofGovernment,andThomasJeffersonforrightsastheendowmentofaCreatorinTheDeclarationofIndependence.27IrisYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,p.37,andInclusionandDemocracy,pp.81–121.28Kukathas,“AreThereAnyCulturalRights?”29Tully,StrangeMultiplicity;WillKymlicka,Liberalism,CommunityandCulture,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989);andCharlesTaylor,“SharedandDivergentValues,”inhisReconcilingtheSolitudes(Montreal:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,1993),pp.155–87.30WillKymlicka’sworkisthebest-knownexampleofthisstrategy.31MuchofwhatfollowsdrawsonargumentsIhavemadeatgreaterlengthinmyReasonablyRadical.32Ihave,however,doneso,elsewhere.Seemy“TakingtheDistinctionBetweenPersonsSeriously,”JournalofMoralPhilosophy1(3)(2004):277–92,and“EvaluatingSocialReasons:Hobbesvs.Hegel,”JournalofPhilosophy102(7)(Jul.2005):327–56.33See,forinstance,OnoraO’Neill,“Women’sRights:WhoseObligations?”inherBoundsofJustice(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),andMauriceCranston,“AreThereAnyHumanRights?”Daedalus(1983):1–17.Foroneresponsetothesecriticisms,seeAmartyaSen,“ElementsofaTheoryofHumanRights,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs32(4)(2004):315–56.34ThisworryisraisedbyT.M.Scanloninhis“Rights,GoalsandFairness,”Erkenntnis2(1)(1977):81–94.Scanlongoesontheretoofferanindividualisttheoryofrightsthatattemptstoanswerthisworry.Inlaterwork,however,Scanlonhasurgedamorerela-tionalapproachtomoralphilosophythathecallscontractualism.See,forinstance,WhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1998).35Thisisrelatedtotheso-calledparadoxofdeontology.MyresponseheresharesmuchwithandisindebtedtotheworkofTamarShapiro.SeeShapiro,“ThreeConceptionsofActioninMoralTheory,”Noûs35(1)(2001):93–117.36Mill’sargumentistobefoundinCh.VofUtilitarianism.ThealternativeargumentismadebyJohnRawls,TheoryofJustice,p.161.37Rawls,JusticeasFairness,p.139.38SeeMiller,“GroupRights,HumanRights,andCitizenship.”39Oneimportantwaythatliberalsimaginerecognitionthatisoftenoverlookedbyadvocatesofapolitcsofidentityisintheformoftherespectweshoweachotherbyleavingoneanotheraloneandnotdemandingofeachotherjustificationforsomeofouractionsandchoices.IamgratefultoSamFleischackerforremindingmeofthispoint.40Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,p.15.41Laden,ReasonablyRadical,Ch.6.42Thesearealldiscussedinmoredetailinmy“JohnRawls:ATheoryofJustice,”inJohnShand,ed.,CentralWorksofPhilosophy,vol.5:QuineandAfter(London:Acumen,2006),pp.64–85.43Idonotmeantodenyherethatphilosophicalworksuchasthatabovecannothelpshapeourunderstandingofhowtogoaboutengagingpolitically.OnerecentmoveinthisdirectionwhichIthinkisphilosophicallyinlinewiththeargumentsofferedhereadvocateswhatsomecallapoliticsof“civicengagement.”SeeDavidOwenandRussellBentley,“EthicalLoyalties,CivicVirtueandtheCircumstancesofPolitics”PhilosophicalExplorations4(3)(2001):223–39;BertvandenBrink,“ImaginingCivicRelationsintheMomentoftheirBreakdown:ACrisisofCivicIntegrityintheNetherlands,”inOwenandLaden,Multiculturalism;DanielleAllen,TalkingtoStrangers(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2005);andYoung,InclusionandDemocracy.RelationalLiberalism361\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page362CHAPTERTWENTYStructuralInjusticeandthe1PoliticsofDifferenceIrisM.YoungAsasocialmovementtendencyinthe1980s,thepoliticsofdifferenceinvolvedtheclaimsoffeminist,anti-racist,andgayliberationactiviststhatthestructuralinequalitiesofgender,race,andsexualitywerenotwellperceivedorcombatedbythedominantparadigmofequalityandinclusion.Inthisdominantparadigm,thepromotionofjusticeandequalityrequiresnondiscrimination:theapplicationofthesameprinciplesofevaluationanddistributiontoallpersonsregardlessoftheirparticularsocialposi-tionsorbackgrounds.Inthisideal,whichmanyunderstoodastheliberalparadigm,socialjusticemeansignoringgender,racial,orsexualdifferencesamongpeople.Socialmovementsassertingapoliticsofdifference,andthetheoristsfollowingthem,arguedthatthisdifference-blindidealwaspartoftheproblem.Equatingequalitywithequaltreatmentignoresdeepmaterialdifferencesinsocialposition,divisionoflabor,social-izedcapacities,normalizingstandardsandwaysoflivingthatcontinuetodisadvantagemembersofhistoricallyexcludedgroups.Commitmenttosubstantialequalitythusrequiresattendingtoratherthanignoringsuchdifferences.Inthecontextofethnicpoliticsandresurgentnationalism,anotherversionofapoliticsofdifferencegainedcurrencyinthe1990s,whichfocusedondifferencesofnationality,ethnicity,andreligion.Liketheanti-racistandfeministpoliticsofdif-ference,thisversionchallengesthenotionthatliberalequalityrequirestheapplica-tionofthesameprinciplestoallinthesameway.Itemphasizesthevalueofculturaldistinctnesstoindividualsandarguesthatpublicaccommodationtoandsupportofsuchculturaldifferenceiscompatiblewithliberalinstitutions.InthisessayIfirstdistinguishtheargumentsofthesetwoversionsofapoliticsofdifference,whichIcallthestructuralinequalitymodelandthesocietalculturemodel,respectively.Thefirsttermismyowncoinage,andItakesomeofmyownwritingonthepoliticsofdifferenceasparadigmaticofthisapproach.ThesecondtermItakefromWillKymlicka,whosetheoryofmulticulturalcitizenshipItakeasparadigmaticofthesecondapproach.TheirdifferencesbearnotingbecausesomepoliticalandtheoreticaltreatmentsofapoliticsofdifferenceormulticulturalismtendContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page363tomergethetwoorpassfrompremissesmoretypicalofthefirsttoconclusionsmoretypicalofthesecond.Idiscusssomeofthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthetwoapproachesandlocateseveralpoliticaltheoristsintheseterms.Thestructuralinequalityandsocietalcultureapproachestoapoliticsofdifferencesharesomecommitments,andtheirargumentsarecompatibleinmanycontexts.Bothmodelsraiseimportantissuesandproponentsofeachoffergoodargumentsforpublicandprivatepracticestopayattentiontogroupdifferenceforthesakeofjustice.Iwillargue,however,thattheascendancyofthesocietyculturalapproachoverthestructuralinequalityapproachamongpoliticaltheorists–whichhascounterpartsintrendsingeneralpublicdiscourse–improperlynarrowsthescopeofissuesofjustice.Racismasaformofstructuralinjustice,forexample,Iwillargue,tendstodisappearfromview,leavingonlyethnicdifference.Whereasthestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifferencechallengesliberalconceptualizationsoftherelationofpublicandprivate,Iwillsuggest,thesocietalcultureapproachreinstatesitinwaysthatbothobscuresomeofthemechanismsforproducinginjusticeandlimittheimaginationforremedy.Thesocietalculturalapproachalsotendstoreconfigureconflictconcerninggroupdifferencesfromstrugglesaboutopportunitiesforachievingwell-beingtocon-cernsabouttoleranceanditslimits.Thisreconfigurationsometimesoperatestorein-scribealogicofnormalanddeviantthatthestructuralinequalityapproachcriticizes.I.TheStructuralInequalityApproachStructuralsocialgroupsarerelationallyconstitutedthroughinteractionsthatmakecategoricaldistinctionsamongpeopleinahierarchyofstatusorprivilege.Majorstruc-turalaxesinmodernsocietiesinclude:thesocialdivisionoflabor;relativepowertodecideinstitutions’actions,ortochangetheincentivesfacedbylargenumbersof2people;theestablishmentandenforcementofhegemonicnorms.TheproductionandreproductionofwhatCharlesTillycalls“durableinequality”involvesprocesseswherepeopleproduceandmaintainadvantagesforthemselvesanddisadvantagesforothers,intermsofaccesstoresources,power,autonomy,honor,orreceivingserviceanddeference,bymeansoftheapplicationofrulesandcustomsthatassumesuchcat-3egoricaldistinctions.InTilly’smodel,economicdifferencesoftenbroughtundertherubricofclassdifference–inincome,propertyownershipandcontrol,occupationalprivilege,andtheabilitytopasstheseontoone’schildren–intersectwithandusu-allyworkthroughtheseothercategoricaldifferences.Thepresenceofcategoricalrelationsofrelativeprivilegeandrelativedisadvant-agedoesnotimplythatallmembersofasubordinatedcategoryarebadlyofforthatallmembersofaprivilegedcategoryarewelloff.Nordoesitmeanthattherearenopersonsthatslipoutoforoverthecategories.SomeAfrican-Americanmenorwhitewomen,forexample,occupypositionsofconsiderableprivilege.Inequalityofstructuredsocialgroupsdoesmeanthatpersonscategorizedinthesubordinatepositionsgenerallyfacegreaterobstaclesinthepursuitoftheirambitionsandinterests,orhaveanarrowerrangeofopportunitiesofferedtothemfordevelopingcapacitiesandexercisingautonomyovertheconditionsoftheiraction.Suchstruc-turalinequalitycountsasgroupbasedinjustice,then,becauseitviolatesaprinciple4ofsubstantiveequalityofopportunity.StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference363\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page364Afirststepinresistingstructuralinequalityconsistsinchallengingformalrulesthatrequireorallowinstitutionsorindividualsexplicitlytoconfinesomecategoriesofpersonstodisadvantagedorsubordinatepositions.Acommitmenttoprinciplesoftheequalmoralworthofindividuals,andthereforethatalldeserveopportunitiesforachievingwell-being,however,standsonshiftingsandswhereveritexiststoday.Thestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifferencearguesthatpublicandpri-vateinstitutionalpoliciesandpracticesthatinterpretequalityasrequiringbeingblindtogroupdifferencesarenotlikelytounderminepersistentstructuralinequalitiesandcantendtoreinforcethem.Evenintheabsenceofformallydiscriminatorylawsandrules,adherencetonormalrulesandpracticesofoccupationalassignment,bodyesthetic,struggleoverpower,andthelike,willtendtoreproducegivencategoricalinequal-itiesunlessinstitutionstakeexplicitactiontocounteractsuchtendencies.Thustoremoveunjustinequalityitisnecessaryexplicitlytorecognizegroupdifferenceandeithercompensatefordisadvantage,revaluesomeattributes,positions,oractions,ortakespecialstepstomeettheneedsofandempowermembersofdisadvantagedgroups.NowIwillexplicatethreeexamplesofcategoricalstructuralinequality,alongwithcorrelativeargumentsforwhyattendingtoratherthanbeingblindtogroupdiffer-enceisanappropriateresponsetothisinequality:thestructuralpositionofpeoplewithdisabilities,institutionalracism,andgenderinequality.A.DifferenceBlindnessandDisabilityInhisrecentbookattackingallversionsofapoliticsofdifference,BrianBarrydevotesconsiderablespacetodefendingastandardprincipleofmeritintheallocationofpositions.Meritinvolvesequalityofopportunityinthefollowingsense:itrejectsasystemthatawardspositionsexplicitlyaccordingtoclass,race,gender,familyback-ground,andsoon.Underameritprinciple,allwhowishshouldhavetheopportun-itytocompeteforthedesirablepositions,andthosemostqualifiedshouldwinthecompetition.Positionsofauthorityorexpertiseshouldbeoccupiedbythosepersonswhodemonstrateexcellenceinparticularskillsandwhobestexhibitthedemeanorexpectedofpeopleinthosepositions.Everyoneelseisaloserinrespecttothose5positions,andtheysuffernoinjusticeonthataccount.Inthismeritsystem,accordingtoBarry,itisnaturalthatpeoplewithdisabilitieswillusuallyturnouttobelosers.Surelyitistobeexpectedinthenatureofthecasethat,acrossthegroup(disabled)asawhole,itsmemberswillbelessqualifiedthanaverage,eveniftheamountofmoney6spentontheireducationistheaverageormorethantheaverage.Barry’sisacommonopinion.Inourschemeofsocialcooperation,certainskillsandabilitiescanandshouldbeexpectedofaverageworkers,anditis“inthenatureofthecase”thatmostpeoplewithdisabilitiesdonotmeettheseexpectations.Thustheydonotmeritthejobsandincomeattendantonmeetingthem.Thesepeople’sdeficienciesarenottheirfault,ofcourse.Soadecentsocietywillsupporttheirneedsinspiteoftheirinabilitytocontributesignificantlytosocialproduction.Oneoftheobjectivesofthedisabilityrightsmovementhasbeentochallengethisbitofliberalcommonsense.Mostpeoplewhohavenotthoughtabouttheissues364IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page365verymuchtendtoregardbeing“disabled”asanattributeofpersons:somepeoplesimplylackthefunctioningsthatenablenormalpeopletoliveindependently,com-peteinjobmarkets,haveasatisfyingsociallife,andsoon.Manyinthedisabilityrightsmovement,however,conceptualizetheproblemthatpeoplewithdisabilitiesfaceratherdifferently.Theproblemisnottheattributesindividualpersonshaveordonothave.Theproblem,rather,isthelackoffitbetweentheattributesofcertainpersonsandstructures,practices,norms,andestheticstandardsdominantinthesoci-ety.Thebuiltenvironmentisbiasedtosupportthecapacitiesofpeoplewhocanwalk,climb,see,andhearwithinwhatarethoughtofasa“normalrange”ofperformance,andpresentssignificantobstaclesforpeoplewhosecapacitiesareoutsidethatrange.Bothinteractiveandtechnicalwaysofassessingtheintelligence,skill,andadapt-abilityofpeopleinschoolsandworkplacesassumewaysofevaluatingaptitudeandachievementthatunfairlyexcludeordisadvantagemanypeoplewithdisabilities.Thephysicallayoutandequipmentinworkplacesandtheorganizationofworkprocesstoooftenmakeitimpossibleforapersonwithadisabilitytousetheskillstheyhave.Hegemonicstandardsofcharm,beauty,grace,wit,orattentivenesspositionsomepeoplewithdisabilitiesasmonstrousorabject.Theseandotheraspectsofthedivisionoflaborandhegemonicnormsconstitutestructuralinjusticeforpeoplewithdisabilities.Manypeoplewithdisabilitiesunfairlysufferlimitationontheiropportunitiesfordevelopingcapacities,earningalivingthroughsatisfyingwork,havingarewardingsociallife,andlivingandautonomousadults.Adifferenceblindliberalismcanofferonlyverylimitedremedyforthisinjustice.Itisnoresponsetothepersonwhomovesinawheelchairwhotriestogotoacourt-roomaccessibleonlybystairsthatthestatetreatsallcitizensinthesameway.Itisnoresponsetotheblindengineerthatthiscompanyusesthesamecomputerequipmentforallemployees.Theopportunitiesofpeoplewithdisabilitiescanbemadeequalonlyifothersspecificallynoticetheirdifferences,ceaseregardingthemasunwanteddeviancefromacceptednormsandunacceptablecoststoefficientoperations,andtakeaffirmativemeasurestoaccommodatethespecificcapacitiesofindividualssothattheycanfunctionattheirbestandwithdignity.The1990AmericanswithDisabilitiesActrecognizedthisinprinciplewhenitrequiresthatemployers,landlordsandpublicservicesmake“reasonableaccommodation”totheneedsofpeoplewithdisabilities.Itcodifiedapoliticsofdifference.Unfortunately,theonlyenforcementpowertheADAcontainsispermissiontolitigateinfraction.Coupledwiththecostsavingandfearofdenyinginterestsofmostpeoplewhothinkofthemselvesasable-bodied,theADA’slimitationsconspiretoreproducetheseinjus-ticestopeoplewithdisabilitiesasagroup.Theexampleofpeoplewithdisabilitiesrepresentsaclearcasewheredifference-blindtreatmentorpolicyismorelikelytoperpetuatethancorrectinjustice.Itisalsoaclearcasewhererelevantsocialdifferencesareconstitutedbytherelationofsomepersonstohegemonicculturalnormsanddominantdefinitionsofefficiency,ratherthanbyinternalprocessesofmutualidentificationsuchasreligion.IhavebegunwiththeexampleofinjusticetowardspeoplewithdisabilitiesbecauseIwishtosuggestthatitisparadigmaticofthestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifferenceingeneral.Itrepresentsaclearcasewheredifference-blindtreatmentorpolicyismorelikelytoperpetuatethancorrectinjustice.Thesystem-aticdisadvantageatwhichfaciallyneutralstandardsputsmanypeopleinthiscase,StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference365\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page366however,doesnotderivefrominternalculturalattributesthatconstituteagroup,peoplewithdisabilities.ItmaybeplausibletospeakofaDeafculture,totheextentthatmanyDeafpeoplespeakauniqueandcommonlanguageandsometimeslivetogetherinDearcommunities.Inawidersense,however,thereisnocommunityorcultureofpeoplewithdisabilities.Instead,thiscategorydesignatesastructuralgroupconstitutedfromtheoutsidebythedeviationofitsmembersfromnormalizedinsti-tutionalassumptionsabouttheexhibitionofskill,definitionoftasksinadivisionoflabor,idealsofbeauty,builtenvironmentstandards,comportmentsofsociability,andsoon.Althoughjusticeforpeoplewithdisabilitiescertainlyinvolvesmorepublicrecognitionoftheirdistinctiveanddiverseexperiencesandperspectivesonsociallife,justiceinthiscasedoesnotconsistintherecognitionofagroupcultureorwayoflife.Instead,theremedyforinjusticetopeoplewithdisabilitiesconsistsinchallengingthenormsandrulesoftheinstitutionsthatmostconditionthelifeoptionsandtheattainmentofwell-beingofthesepersonsstructurallypositionedasdeviant.Issuesofjusticeraisedbymanygroup-basedconflictsandsocialdifferences,Isug-gest,followthisparadigm.Theyconcernthewayindividualswithstructurallysimilarphysicalattributes,socializedcapacities,culturalrepertoires,sexualorientations,familyandneighborhoodresources,andsoon,arepositionedinthesocialdivisionoflabor,relationsofdecision-makingpower,andhegemonicnormsofachievement,beauty,respectability,andthelike.Thestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifferencefocusesontheseissuesofinclusionandexclusion,andtheavailabilityorlimitationofsubstantiveopportunitiesfordevelopingcapacitiesandachievingwell-being.B.RacialInequalityClearlythisessay’spurposeisnottogiveanaccountofthestructuralinequalitiesofinstitutionalracism.Inthiscontext,Iwanttomakeonlyafewpointsaboutracialinequalityandthepoliticsofdifference.OneofthemainworriesthatmotivatesthesereflectionsonrecentpoliticaltheoryofdifferenceisthattheascendanceofwhatIwillshortlydescribeasthesocietalculturemodelofapoliticsofdifferenceseemstoobscureracismasadistinctandvirulentformofstructuralinjustice.Itoperateswithamodelofgroupsinternallyconstitutedbyculturalidentification,whounder-standeachotherasculturallydistinctandsidebyside.Consequently“race”seemstobereconstitutedasethnicityinthesocietalculturalmode.ThushereIwantonlytopointoutsomesalientfeaturesofracismasastructuralprocess,oneoftenbuiltonbutnotreducibletoculturaldifference.AlthoughIwillfocusonracializedprocessesofstructuralinequalityintheUnitedStates,Ithinkthatracialinequalitystructuresmanysocietiesintheworld.Icharacterizeracismasstructuralprocessesthatnormalizebodyesthetic,determinethatphysical,dirty,orservileworkismostappropriateformembersofracializedgroups,producesandreproducessegregationofmembersofracializedgroups,andrendersdeviantthecomportmentsandhabitsofthesesegregatedpersonsinrelationtodominantnormsofrespectability.Whatdistinguishes“race”fromethnicityornation,conceptually?Theformernaturalizesor“epidermalizes”theattributesofdifference.Racismattachessignific-ancetobodilycharacteristics–skincolor,hairtype,facialfeatures,andconstructshierarchiesofstandardoridealbodytypesagainstwhichothersappearinferior,366IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page367stigmatized,deviant,orabject.InWesternstructuresofanti-Blackracismthishier-7archyappearsbothasdichotomousandscaler.Processesofracializationstigmatizeordevaluebodies,bodytypes,oritemscloselyattachedtobodiessuchasclothing;thisstigmatizationandstereotypingappearinpublicimagesandinthewaysomepeoplereacttoothers.Racializationconcerns,moreover,understandingsoftheproperworkofsomeanditshierarchalstatusinrelationtoothers.ThestigmaofblacknessinAmerica,forexample,hasitsorigins8inthedivisionoflabor,namelyslavery.Theslavedoeshardlaborunderdomina-tion,fromwhichowners’accumulateprofits;ortheslavedoesservilelabortoattendtheneedsandelevatethestatusoftherulegroup.Whilechattelslaverywasabol-ishedacenturyandahalfago,racializedpositionsinthesocialdivisionoflaborremain.Theleastdesirablework,theworkwiththelowestpay,leastautonomy,andloweststatus,isthehardphysicalwork,thedirtywork,andtheservantwork.IntheUnitedStatestheseareracializedformsofwork,thatis,workthoughttobelongtoblackandbrownpeopleprimarily,andtheseincreasinglyarealsoforeigners.AsimilarprocessofracializationhasoccurredinEurope,wherepersonsofTurkish,NorthAfrican,SouthAsian,andMiddleEasternorigin,inadditiontopersonsofSouthernAfricanorigin,arepositionedasotherandtendtoberestrictedtolowerstatuspositionsinthesocialdivisionoflabor.Segregationisathirdcommonstructureofracialinequality.Althoughracializedsegregationmaybuildonorexploitperceivedethnicdifference,urbanprocessesof9clusteringandprocessesofsegregationaredifferent.Evenwhennotproducedbylegallyenforcedspatialexclusion,racialsegregationisaprocessofresidentiallycon-centratingmembersofbodilystigmatizedgroupsthatoperatestoaccruematerialgoodsaswellasstatusfordominantgroups–morespace,lowerprices,neighborhoodeffectsofaffluence,andsoon.Withsegregation,thestigmaofracializedbodiesanddenigratedlabormarksspaceitselfandthepeoplewhogrowupandliveinneighborhoods.Peoplewholivetogetherinsegregatedneighborhoods,moreover,tendtodevelopgroupspecificidiom,stylesofcomportment,interests,andartisticforms.Thesealsoareliabletobedevaluedandstigmatizedbydominantnorms.Peoplewhowishtoappearrespectableandpro-fessional,forexample,hadbettershedthehabitsofwalking,laughing,andtalkinginslangtheyhavelearnedonthehomeblock.Thesestructuralrelationsofbodilyaffect,meaningsandinterestsinthesocialdivisionoflabor,segregation,andnormalizationofdominantculturehabitus,operatetolimittheopportunitiesofmanytolearnandusesatisfyingskillsinsociallyrecog-nizedsetting,toaccumulateincomeorwealth,ortoattaintopositionsofpowerandprestige.Apoliticsofdifferencearguesthatsuchliabilitiestodisadvantagecannotbeovercomebyrace-blindprinciplesofformalequalityinemployment,politicalpartycompetition,andsoon.Whereracializedstructuralinequalityinfluencessomanyinstitutionsandpotentiallystigmatizesandimpoverishessomanypeople,asocietythataimstoredresssuchinjusticemustnoticetheprocessesofracialdifferentiationbeforeitcancorrectthem.Evenwhenovertdiscriminatorypracticesareillegalandwidelycondemned,racializedstructuresareproducedandreproducedinsomeofthemosteverydayinteractionsincivilsocietyandworkplace.Projectstoredressracialinjusticemustnoticetheseaswell.StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference367\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page368C.GenderInequalityAtleastastheseappearintheliteratureofpoliticaltheory,thestructuralinequalitymodelandthesocietalculturemodelofthepoliticsofdifferencepositionwomen’sissuesdifferently.AsIwilldiscussbelow,someproponentsofasocietalculturemodelimplicitlyinvokegenderjusticeundernormsofequaltreatment.Inthestructuralinequalitymodel,bycontrast,feministpoliticsareaspeciesofthepoliticsofdifference.Letmeexplainhow.Inthelastquarter-centurytherehavebeenmanychangesingenderednormsofbehaviorandcomportmentexpectedofmenandwomen,withagreatdealmorefreedomofchoiceintasteandself-presentationavailabletomembersofbothsexesthaninthepast.Manywomenneverthelesssufferadverseconsequenceswhentheydeviatefromanormalized,implicitlymale,bodythatdoesnotmenstruate,isnotpregnant,doesnotbreastfeed.Intheserespectsatleast,thefemalebodyretainsa10monstrousaspectinthesocietalimagination.Peopletoooftenreacttopublicevidenceofthesefemalespecificconditionswithaversion,ridicule,ordenial.Publicinstitutionswhichclaimtoincludewomenequallytoooftenfailtoaccommodatetotheneedsofmenstruating,pregnant,andbreastfeedingwomen.Thissometimesdiscouragesthemfromparticipationintheseinstitutions.Sometimesthecoststowomenofbeingpositionedasdeviantinrela-tiontonormalbodiesaresmallinconveniences,likerememberingtocarrytamponsinanticipationthatthewomen’sroomatworkwillnotsupplythem.Sometimes,however,womensufferseriousdiscomfort,threatstotheirhealth,harassment,job11loss,orforegobenefitsbywithdrawinginordertoavoidtheseconsequences.Includingwomenasequalsinschools,workplaces,andotherinstitutionsentailsaccommodat-ingtoourbodilyspecificitytotheextentthatwecanbothbewomenandexcelinorenjoytheactivitiesofthoseinstitutions.Thesocialdifferencesproducedbyagenderdivisionoflabor,however,aremorefundamentalforgenderedstructuralinequalitiestowhichinstitutionsandpracticesaimingatjusticetowardwomenshouldattend.Althoughtherehavebeenhugechangesinattitudesaboutthecapacitiesofmenandwomen,andmostformalbarrierstowomen’spursuitofoccupationsandactivitieshavebeenremoved,inatleastonerespectchangehasbeenslowandminor.Astructuredsocialdivisionoflaborremainsinwhichwomendomostoftheunpaidcareworkinthefamily,andmostpeopleofbothsexesassumethatprimaryresponsibilityforcareofchildren,otherfamilymembers,andhousecleaningfallsprimarilytowomen.AsSusanOkintheorizeditmorethanfifteenyearsgo,thisgenderdivisionoflaboraccountsinlargemeasureforinjusticetowomen,whetherornottheythem-selvesarewivesormothers.Thesocializationofgirlscontinuestobeorientedtowardcaringandhelping.Occupationalsexsegregationcontinuestocrowdwomeninarelativelyfewjobcategories,keepingwageslow.Heterosexualcouplesfinditratio-naltodependonaman’spaycheckfortheirprimaryincome.Thuswomenandtheir12childrenarevulnerabletopovertyincasetheyraisetheirchildrenalone.Mostemployersinstitutionalizeanassumptionthatoccupantsofagoodjob–onethatearnsenoughtosupportafamilyatadecentlevelofwell-beingandwithadecentpension,vacationtime,andjobsecurity–candevotehimselforherselfprimarilytothatjob.Workerswhosefamilyresponsibilityimpingeonorconflictwithemployer368IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page369expectationsaredeviants,andtheyarelikelytobesanctionedfortryingtocombinerealworkandfamilyresponsibility.Feminismconstruedasapoliticsofdifferencethusarguesthatrealequalityandfreedomforwomenentailattendingtobothembodied,socialized,andinstitutionalsexandgenderdifferencesinordertoensurethatwomen–aswellasmenwhofindthemselvespositionedlikemanywomeninthedivisionoflabororincomportmentandtaste–donotbearunfaircostsofinstitutionalassumptionsaboutwhatwomenandmenareoroughttobedoing,whotheyfeelcomfortableworkingwithorvotingfor,andsoon.Forwomentohaveequalopportunitieswithmentoattainpositionsofhighstatus,power,orincome,itisnotenoughthattheyprovethattheirstrength,leadershipcapacities,orintelligenceareasgoodasmen’s.Thisiseasy.Itismoredifficulttoovercomethecostsanddisadvantagesderivingfromapplicationofsup-posedlydifference-blindnormsofproductivity,respectability,orauthoritatativenessthatinfactcarrystructuralbiasesagainstmanywomen.Tosummarize,thestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifferencecon-siderstheproblemsofinjusticetowhichitrespondsasarisingfromprocessesofthedivisionoflabor,socialsegregation,andalackoffitbetweenhegemonicnormsandinterpretedbodies.Undersuchcircumstancesofstructuralinequality,trulyequaliz-ingopportunitiesrequiresattendingtosuchstructuralnormalizingdifferences.II.SocietalCultureApproachAlthoughthestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifferencecontinuestobeexpressed,thesocietalcultureapproachhascometodominatepoliticaltheoryliteraturethatarguesforattendingtogroupdifferenceinpoliticsandpolicy.Itaketheterm“societalculture”fromWillKymlicka,whopioneeredthisapproach.InMulticulturalCitizenship,Kymlickahimselfdistinguisheshisapproachtowardthepoliticsofdifferencefromoneconcernedwiththesituationofdisadvantagedsocialgroups.“Themarginalizationofwomen,gaysandlesbians,andthedisabled,”hesays,“cutsacrossethnicandnationallines–itisfoundinminorityculturesandhomo-geneousnation-statesaswellasnationalminoritiesandethnicgroups–anditmust13befoughtinalltheseplaces.”Kymlickaarguesthatitisimportanttodistinguishthesesortsofissuesofapoliticsofdifferencefromthosethatinvolvedifferencein“societalculture.”Thistermrefersforhimonlytodifferencesofnationandethnicity.A“societalculture,”saysKymlicka,issynonymouswith“anation”or“apeople”–thatis,asanintergenerationalcommun-ity,moreorlessinstitutionallycomplete,occupyingagiventerritoryorhomeland,shar-ingadistinctlanguageandhistory.Astateismulticulturalifitsmemberseitherbelongtodifferentnations(amulti-nationstate),orhavemigratedfromdifferentnations(apolyethnicstate),andifthisfactisanimportantaspectofpersonalidentityandpolit-14icallife.Onthesocietalculturemodel,thequestionofthepoliticsofdifferenceisthis:giventhatapoliticalsocietyconsistsoftwoormoresocietalcultures,whatdoesjusticeStructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference369\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page370requireinthewayoftheirmutualaccommodationtooneanother’spracticesandformsofculturalexpression,andtowhatextentcanandshouldaliberalsocietygivepublicrecognitiontotheseculturaldiversities?Theproblemtowhichtheargumentsofthesocietalculturemodelofferthesolu-tionisalsooneofinequality.Theassumedstartingpointofthesocietalculturemodelisastateorpolityinwhichamajorityculturedominates,andbypoliticalmeanscanlimittheabilityofoneormoreculturalminoritiestoliveouttheirformsofexpression;ormorebenignly,thesheerubiquityofthedominantculturethreatenstoswamptheminorityculturetotheextentthatitssurvivalmaybeendangered.Underthesecircumstancesofinequalityorunfreedom,membersofembattledculturalgroupsfrequentlydemandspecialrightsofterritorialgovernance,languagerightsinpublicinstitutions,supportforculturalexpressionandpreservation,andsoon.Thesocietalcultureapproachexplicitlyrejectspoliticalprinciplesandpracticeswhichassumethatasinglepolitymustcoincidewithasinglecommonculture.Freedomandaffirmationofculturaldifferenceiscompatiblewithliberalismandasinglestateconstitutionthatarrangespoliticalcooperationamongdiverseculturalgroups.ForKymlicka,issuesofapoliticsofdifferenceconcern:freedomofexpressionandpractice,territorialautonomyandself-governmentforhistoricnations,publicsup-portforculturepreservation,argumentsforexemptingmembersofsomegroupsfromcertainregulationsonculturalgrounds;measurestoensurerepresentationofminor-ityculturesinmajorpoliticalinstitutionsofthestate;defenseagainstmembersofminoritycultureshavingtobearunfaircostsduetotheirdesiretoremaincommittedtoandmaintaintheirculture.Themainreasonthatindividuals’commitmentstocul-turalmembershipshouldberecognizedandsupportedinpoliticallife,onthismodel,isthattheformsofexpression,practices,andcommunityrelationshipofthesocietal15cultureprovideindividualswiththecontextfortheiroptionsanddecisions.Kymlickaconsidersthequestionofwhetherliberalpolitiesoughttogosofarastotoleratepracticesthatacultureregardsasimportant,butwhichawidersocietaljudgmentfindsviolatestandardsofliberalaccommodationandindividualhumanrights.Hearguesthatsuchpracticesshouldnotbetolerated.IhavedweltonKymlicka’stextbecausehemoreexplicitlythanothersdistin-guishessocietalcultureapproachfromwhatIamcallingthestructuralinequalityapproach.Withoneexception,theissuesandargumentsheadvancesinMulticulturalCitizenship,andwhichheelaboratesinmorerecentwritings,moreover,covertherangeofissuesdebatedinthehugeliteratureaboutissuesofpoliticsanddifferenceunderthesocietalculturemodelinthelastdecade.Writersdisagreeonthelimitsoftoleration,therightsofnationalminorities,theclaimsofimmigrantsandethnicminorities,theextenttowhichstatesandmajorityculturesareobligedbyjusticeto16supportculturalpreservation,andsimilarissues.TotheissuesKymlickatreats,othervoicesinthesedebateshaveaddedanother:theextenttowhichreligiousdifference17shouldbeaccommodatedandaffirmedinamulticulturalliberalpolity.Whilewriterstakevaryingpositionsonthisquestionaswell,itisclearthatreligionhasgainedmoreattentionasaspecificformofculturalmembershipthatprovidesacontextforthechoicesofmanypeoplewhoclaimspecificrightsonthataccount.ThusIincludereligiousdifferenceinthesocietalculturemodelasitishasevolved.Sincebothofthesetheoreticalapproachesareversionsofapoliticsofdifference,itshouldnotbesurprisingthattheysharesomefeatures.Ifindtwomajorsimilarities370IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page371intheanalysesandargumentsofthestructuralinequalityapproachandthesocietalcultureapproach.Bothworryaboutthedominationsomegroupsareabletoexerciseoverpublicmeaningandcontroloverresources.Second,bothchallengedifference-blindpublicprinciple.Theyquestionthepositionthatequalcitizenshipinacommonpolityentailsacommoncommitmenttoacommonpublicinterest,asinglenationalculture,andsinglesetofrulesthatappliestoeveryoneinthesameway.Theybotharguethatcommitmenttojusticesometimesrequiresnoticingsocialorculturaldifferencesandsometimestreatingpeopledifferently.Whiletheyarelogicallydistinct,eachapproachisimportantandtheirargumentsareoftencompatibleingivenpoliticalcontexts.Thesocietalcultureapproachisimport-antbecauseitoffersvisionandprincipletorespondtodominativenationalistimpulses.Wecanlivetogetherincommonpoliticalinstitutionsandstillmaintaininstitutionsbywhichwedistinguishourselvesaspeoplesorcultureswithdistinctpracticesandtraditions.Actingonsuchavisioncanandshouldreduceethnicandnationalistviolence.Thestructuralinequalityapproachisimportantbecauseithigh-lightsthedepthandsystematicityofinequality,andshowsthatinequalitybeforethelawisnotsufficienttoremedythisinequality.Itcallsattentiontorelationsandprocessesofexploitation,marginalization,normalizationthatkeepmanypeopleinsubordinatepositions.Myprojectinthisessay,then,isnottoarguethatpoliticalactorsandtheoristsoughttoacceptoneoftheseapproachesandrejecttheother.Iwish,rather,toarguethatitisimportanttonoticethedifferencebetweenthem,adifferencesometimesignoredinrecentliterature.AmajordifferencethatIwilldiscussinthemeaningoftheterm“culture”asitarisesineach.Iwillargue,further,thattheascendancyofthesocietalcultureapproachinpoliticaltheoryisproblematicforseveralreasons.Emphasizingthesocietalculturalapproachtendstoobscurestructuralinequalitiessuchasracism.Becausethesocietalcultureapproachusuallybringsissuesofdif-ferenceunderaliberalparadigm,moreover,ittendstonarrowtheissuesofjusticeatstakeinapoliticsofdifferencetothoseconcerningfreedomandautonomy,pay-ingrelativelylittleattentiontoissuesofequalopportunity.Asunderaliberalparadigm,finally,thesocietalcultureapproachoftenreconfiguresquestionsofattentiontosocialgroupdifferenceintermsoftolerationanditslimits.Thisframingoftheissuesintroducesanormalizingdiscourseofthesortthatthestructuralinequalitymodelexposesandcriticizes.BeforeIproceedwiththesearguments,however,Iwillindic-atewhichofvariouspoliticaltheoriststakeoneorbothapproach,asIperceivethem.III.Who’sWhointhePoliticsofDifference?InCultureandEquality,BrianBarryincludesahugearrayofpoliticaltheoristsinthesingledemonizedcategoryofthosewhodepartfromthestraightandnarrowofdifference-blindliberalequalityandwanderintohopelessthicketsofculturalrecog-nition.InsodoingheoftenmergestheargumentsofthoseIcategoriesunderthestructuralinequalityapproachwiththoseIputunderasocietalcultureapproach.Ihavealreadyreferredtosomeofthesewriters,butatthispointImaybeusefultolocatesomekeycontributorstothisliteratureintermsofthetwoapproachesIhavelaidout.Thiswillhardlybeacomprehensivereviewoftheliterature,butservesStructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference371\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page372simplyasawaythatreadersmightapplythedistinctionamongtypesoftheoriesthatIhavedrawn.Mostofmyownwritingonjustice,democracyanddifferencehasemphasizedthestructuralinequalityapproach.BothJusticeandthePoliticsofDifferenceandInclusionandDemocracycriticallyassessthetendencyofbothpublicandprivateinstitutionsincontemporaryliberaldemocraticsocietiestoreproducesexual,racialandclassinequalitybyapplyingstandardsandrulesinthesamewaytoall.Eachbook,however,containselementsthatrelatemoretoasocietalcultureapproach.JusticeandthePoliticsofDifferencereferstoclaimsofindigenouspeople,andspeaksapprovinglyofmovementsofstructurallyoppressedgroupstoresiststigmabycon-structingpositivegroupaffinities.InonechapterofInclusionandDemocracyIargueforarelationalnotionofself-determinationtocontrastwithmorerigidstandardnotionsofnationalsovereignty;hereIintendtomakeamoveinthesocietalculturalapproachtoapoliticsofdifference.Thusthedominantorientationofmywritingaboutpol-iticsofdifferencehasoperatedwiththestructuralinequalityapproach,butasabodytheworkstraddlesthedistinction.Onemotivationforthispaper,indeed,istosortthesedistinctionsoutformyself.AmyGutmann’srecentbook,IdentityandDemocracy,straddlesthedistinctionwiththeoppositebalance.Mostofherchaptersconcernhowliberalpolitiesoughttorespondtothepresenceofethnicandreligiousdifferencesinthesesocieties.Inachapteraboutwhatshelabels“ascriptiveidentity,”however,Gutmanntreatsissuesofstigma,exclu-sionanddiscriminationmoretypicalofthosewhomIhavesaidarepositionedinrelationsofstructuralinequality,suchaswomen,peoplewhotransgressheterosexualnorms,AfricanAmericansandmembersofotherracializedgroups.Whereasrecog-nizingandaccommodatingculturalandreligiousdifferencewithinthelimitsofliberalrightsistheproperresponsetoethnicandreligiouspoliticalconflict,accordingtoGutmann,thisargumentdoesnotapplytoascriptivegroups.Gutmann’sargumentsinthischaptercoincidetoalargeextentwiththosebelongingtowhatIcallastruc-turalinequalityapproach.Amajordifference,however,concernstheimpliedtheoryofthebasisofinequality.Gutmann’scategoryofascriptivegroupsobscuresthesocialprocessofconstitutingwork,normalizingbehaviors,anddefendingpositionsofpowerthatproduceorallowindividualdiscrimination.TotheextentthatNancyFraserarguesforapoliticsofdifference,sheinterpretsitlargelyintermsofthestructuralinequalityapproach.Inarecentstatementofherdistinctionbetweenredistributionandrecognition,Fraserdistinguishestwoformsofwhatshecallsrecognitionpolitics:onethatseeks“participatoryparity”andtheother18thatseeksaffirmationofgroupspecificity.ThisdifferencewhichforheriswithinapproachestoapoliticsofrecognitionisanalogousincertainwaystothedistinctionIamdrawingbetweenastructuralinequalityandsocietalcultureapproachtoapoliticsofdifference.ExceptforCharlesTaylor,FrasergiveslittleattentiontowritersIasso-ciatewiththesocietalcultureapproach,andshefavorstheapproachshecallsparticip-atoryparityasaresponsetostructuralinequalitiesofgender,race,andsexuality.Byinsistingonacategoricaldistinctionbetweenwhatshecalls“redistribution”and“recognition,”however,IthinkthatFraser’stheoryobscurestheoperationsofsuchstructuralinequalities.Inthefirstplace,someofthemajorsourcesofstructuralinequality,suchasthesocialdivisionoflabor,thedefinitionoftasksandqualifica-tionsforthemwithinagivenoccupation,decision-makingpoweroverpublicand372IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page373privateinvestment,aremorefundamentalthanissuesofdistributionandredistribu-tion.Intherecentessay,however,Frasersaysthatsheaimstoincludeallthesewithinthecategoryofredistribution.Ifalltheseissuesareincluded,however,then“redis-tribution”isamisleadingnamefortheissuesofjusticeatstake.Moreimportantly,perhaps,Ithinkthatitisbothtoopolarizingandtoosimpli-fyingtoconstructadichotomybetweeneconomyandcultureasmutuallyexclusivecategories,andthenadmitthatsomestructuralinequalitycombinesboth.Ithinkthatitismoreusefultohaveseveralcategoriesreferringtosocialprocessesthatlimitopportunitiesoraccesstoresources(suchasexploitation,marginalization,domina-tion,normalization,orstigmatization),andthentoconsidertheaccountneededfor19variousstructurallypositionedgroups.Ifindthatfewotherpoliticaltheoristswritingaboutapoliticsofdifferenceadoptastructuralinequalityapproach.MelissaWilliamsassumestheissueasstructuralinequal-ityinherargumentsforspecialattentiontovoiceandrepresentationforhistorically20marginalizedgroups.AnnePhillips’argumentsaboutgroupconsciouspoliciesofpoliticalrepresentationandpoliciespromotingotheropportunitiesalsoadopta21structuralinequalityapproach.Inmyobservation,mostrecentpoliticaltheorizingchallengingadifference-blindliberalismtakesthesocietalcultureapproach.Theydefinethekindsofgroupswhosedifferenceisacourseofpoliticalconflictrequiringadjudicationlargelyintermsofnational,ethnicorreligiousgroups.InadditiontoKymlicka,prominentcontributorstothesocietalcultureapproachtoapoliticsofdifferenceincludeCharlesTaylor,YaelTamir,JamesTully,ChandranKukathas,JosephCarens,RainerBauboeck,JacobLevy,AyaletShachar,BhikhuParekh,JeffreySpinner-Halev,DuncanIvason,andSeylaBenhabib.Thisisaverypartiallistinanever-enlargingfieldofdiscussion.Therearemanydifferencesinspecificissuestreatedandspecificpositionstakenamongthesewriters,andthedebatesamongthemarerichwiththeoreticalnuance.InthenextsectionIwilldiscusssomedifferenceamongthemintheextenttowhichtheyconceptualizecultureasunifiedordifferentiated.Iwillanalyzetheissuesthatoccupythemandargumentstheymakefurtherintheconcludingsection,whereIraisesomecriticalquestionsabouthowthesocietalcultureapproachhasevolved.IV.TheMeaningofCultureBrianBarrycitesthedefinitionofcultureIofferinJusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,andnotesthatitisratherdifferentfromthatofferedbyKymlickainMulticulturalCitizenship.NoticingthedifferingmeaningsdoesnotpreventBarryfrommergingthetwoaccountsandcriticizingboth–aswellasthatofothers,includingNancyFraser,JamesTully,andBhikhuParekh–for“politicizing”culture.Asinthiscase,someoftheconfusionbetweenthetwoversionsofapoliticsofdifferencethatIdis-tinguishherecanbeattributedtoslidingbetweenusagesandmeaningsofculture.Thestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifferenceandthesocietalculturalapproachusetheterm“culture”indifferentways.ThedefinitionofthetermculturethatIofferintheworkBarrycitesisthefollowing:cultureincludes“thesymbols,images,meanings,habitualcomportments,storiesandsoon,throughwhichpeopleexpresstheirexperienceandcommunicateStructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference373\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page37422withoneanother.”Consideringhowdebatesaboutthepoliticsofdifferencehaveplayedout,ifIweretorewritemyversionofthestructuralinequalityapproach,Iwouldnotgivethetermculturesoprominentaplaceasithasinthatbook,andwouldsubstituteseveralmorespecificterms,suchasnormalization,habit,andprac-23tice.Ineverthelessstandbytheintentofthedefinitionasidentifyinganaspectofprocessesthatproduceandreproducestructuralinequality.Inthisusage,culturereferstoanaspectofallactioninsofarasitiscommun-icativeaction.Culturesimplyreferstospecificmeaningsthatpeopleuseandunder-standwhentheyinteract–fromsimplegesturessuchasbowing,totheformalitiessurroundingandcontentofthepublicspeechofoneheadofstatetoanother,totheimplicitnormsinvolvingtoneofvoice,modeofstanding,andsentencestruc-turethatsignal“authoritative”inamodernwesternsociety.Inthisusage,peopleunderstand,partlyunderstand,misunderstandordonotatallunderstandmeaningsconveyedbyspeech,bodilycomportments,orsymbols.Totheextentthatsomepeopledonotunderstandormisunderstand,thismaywellbeduetotheirhavingaculturalrepertoirederivedfromadifferentplaceorgroup.Onthismeaningofculture,however,thereisnoreasontorefertoacultureasasinglesubstantialentity,withcoherentboundedlimitsthatunifyitanddistinguishitentirelyfromothersimilarlysubstantialculturesoutsideit.Thedefinitionofcultureasthemeaningsofcommunicativeactionisentirelycompatiblewith,indeedevenrequires,anunder-standingofcultureasfluid,changing,andwithoutfixedbordersdistinguishinginsideandoutside.Understoodinthissense,cultureisapervasiveaspectofprocessesthatproduceandreproducestructuralinjustice.Thefeelingsofaversionorpitysomesightedorwalkingpeoplefeelinthepresenceofblindpeopleorpeoplewhomoveinwheelchairsarepartofourculture,inthattheirexpressionsarelearned,understood,andtoacertainextentshared.Genderdifferencesinvolvemanywidelyunderstoodmeanings,symbols,bodilyhabits,stylesofspeaking,tastes,andsoon.Racialstereo-typesareoneaspectoftheproductionandreproductionofracialinequality.Noneofthestructuresthatdisadvantagepeoplewithdisabilities,women,orraciallymarkedgroupscanbereducedtoculture.Theorganizationofthedivisionoflabor,forexample,involvesaprojecttoextractbenefitsforthemselvesbypersonsorsectorsthatcontrolthatorganization.Whilethephysicallayoutofbuildingsorcitieswhichconstituteanaspectofthestructuresthatpositionraciallydisadvantagedgroupsorpeoplewithdisabilitieshavesomeculturaldeterminants,theyarenotreducibletoculture.Asocialtheoryneedsconceptssuchasresources,power,theorganizationofcooperativeandcompetitiverelations,inadditiontoculture,inordertogiveanaccountofstructuralprocesses.Becausestructuresareproducedandreproducedbyactionsandactionsusuallyinvolvecommunication,however,itisusuallyimpossibletodistinguishfactorsofpower,resourceuse,organizationalnetworks,themanipu-lationofincentives,andsoon,fromculturalmeanings.Structuralinequalitiesassociatedwithclass,moreover,arejustasmuchculturalonthisunderstandingasarethoseofrace,gender,anddisability.PierreBourdieu,forexample,describeshowtheprivilegesofbeingmiddleandupperclassarecon-stitutedandreproducednotsimplybyhavingaccesstoorcommandovermaterialresources,butsimultaneouslybyinternalizingtastesandbodilycomportmenttyp-24icalofthoseinthatclassposition.Again,inmyview,suchanaccountdoesnot374IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page375reducethematerialmanifestationsofaffluenceororganizationalpowertoculture,butsaysthatculturalmeaningsareusuallyanaspectofthem.Accordingtothestructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifference,then,politicalprojectstoreducestructuralinjusticemustoftenhaveaculturalaspect:cre-atingaffirmativeexpressionfordenigratedgroups,becomingself-consciousaboutandreformingsomebodilyhabitsofinteraction,andsoon.AsIwilldiscussshortly,notthestatebutcivilsocietyistheprimarysiteofeffortstochangehabits,meaningsandformsofexpressionwithaviewtoundermininginjustice.Thesocietalcultureapproachtoapoliticsofdifference,bycontrast,understandsacultureasasubstantive,coherent,boundedentity.AsIquotedabove,Kymlickadefinessocietalcultureas“anintergenerationalcommunity,moreorlessinstitutionallycomplete,occupyingagiventerritoryorhomeland,sharingadistinctlanguageand25history.”Understoodasasubstantive,asocietalculturereferstotheentiretyofsharedunderstandingsandwayoflifeofacommunityorpeoplewhotakethem-selvesasdistinctfromothercommunitiesorpeoples.AsKymlickarightlynotes,thisisameaningofculturewithwidecurrency.Thisisthemeaningofculturethathascometopredominateindebatesaboutapoliticsofdifference,onereferringtonation,ethnicgroup,orreligionprimarily.Debatesaboutpoliticsandculture,sounderstood,tendtocomeundertheparadigmoflib-eralpluralism.Modernsocietiescontainapluralityofdistinctcultures–systemsofbeliefsandpracticesthataretoacertainextentincommensurate.Thepoliticalprob-lemiswhatitmeanstogiveadherentsofeachduerespectandatthesametimeenforceprinciplesofjusticeoverallofthem.Foralltheirdifferences,thetheoriesofJosephCarens,AyaleteShachar,ChandranKukathas,JacobLevy,SusanOkin,AmyGutmann,operatealongwithKymlickawithinthisgeneralliberalpluralistparadigm.Becausethesocietalcultureapproachdefinesgroupdifferenceasdifferenceincomprehensiveculture,ithasatendencytoessentializeculturesorregardthemasself-identicalwithin.Whatmakesagroupagroupisthatallitsmembersshareattributes–speakingthesamelanguage,say,oradheringtoaspecificsetofhistorictraditions.Becausetheconceptofsocietalculturedefinesagroupintermsofasharedcom-munityofinsidersdistinguishedfromoutsiders,itcanappeartofreezethenotionofculturethegrouphas.Thistendencyappearsnotonlyamongtheoristsofsocietalculture,butalsoinnationalistandethnicpolitics.Leadersdefinetheirculturalorreligiousgroupsinstaticandessentialisttermsthattheyconstructasotherthanandincompatiblewithneighboringcultures.Criticsofapoliticsofdifferencetypicallyraisethespecterofessentialismandculturalconflictasreasonstorecommitustodifferenceblindformalism.Despitethedangersofconsideringculturesastoounifiedandboundedthatattendthisapproach,thetheoristsoperatingwithinitnearlyalwayscondemnessentialismandfundamentalismandofferavisionwhereculturaldifferenceisnotrigidorclosed.Thesetheoriesgenerallyaimtodevelopprinciplesofopeninteractionandcooperationasananswertotheproblemsofallegedincommensurabilityandconflictofcommitmentsinactualpolitics.WriterssuchasCharlesTaylor,JamesTully,BhikhuParekh,andJosephCarens26offervaryingaccountsofpoliticsasinterculturaldialogue.Morerecently,SeylaBenhabaddstotheseanaccountoftherelationofindividualstotheculturestowhichtheythinkofthemselvesbelongingasinvolvinganarrativeofselfinrela-27tiontoothers.Thisnarrativeinterpretationofsocietalcultureallowsforchange,StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference375\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page376influence,andindividualvariationatthesametimethatitcanretainanotionofculturaldistinctness.IhavedistinguishedthemeaningsofcultureIfindtypicalofthestructuralinequal-ityandsocietalculturemodelsofapoliticsofdifference,becauseIthinkcomment-ariesandcriticismsofthesecurrentstoooftenconflatethem.Thereareimportantdifferencesbetweensaying,ontheonehand,womenaspiringtobecorporateexecu-tivesintheUnitedStatesaresometimesdisadvantagedbyevaluativenormsthatprivilege“cultural”attributesassociatedwithmasculinecomportment,andontheotherhand,sayingthatJapaneseandAmerican“cultures”eachhavedifferencesintheirnormsofmasculinity.Thesecondoftheseusagesismoretotalizingthanthefirst.Itmightbeagoodideatoexcisethegeneralterm“culture”entirelyfromourtheoreticalvocabu-lariesandusemorespecificterms.Inanycase,theusagesarecompatible,butdif-ferent,andconclusionsdrawnaboutthesecondshouldnotbeappliedtothefirst.V.WorriesabouttheAscendancyoftheSocietalCultureModelAlthoughthesocietalcultureapproachhasadifferentlogicthanthestructuralinequal-ityapproach,Ihavearguedthateachisimportantandthattheirargumentsareoftencompatibleinaparticularpoliticalcontext.Therearereasonsnevertheless,Isuggest,tofinddisturbingthetrendamongpoliticaltheoriststooperatelargelywithinthesocietalculturemodel.Approachingissuesofpoliticalconflictandsocialgroupdif-ferenceprimarilywithinthesocietalculturemodelinappropriatelynarrowstheissuesofjusticeatstake.Becausemostwritersusingthesocietalcultureapproachpositionthepoliticsofdifferenceunderaliberalparadigm,furthermore,ittendstooperatewithtoostate-centeredaconceptionofpoliticalactionandtendstowardtheverysortofnormalizationthatthestructuralinequalityapproachcriticizes.AsIdiscussedabove,themainkindsofclaimsthatnational,ethnic,andreligiousgroupsmakeonwhichtheoristsofthesocietalculturemodelreflectcenteraroundissuesoffreedom:thefreedomofindividualstopursuelifeplanwithinaculturalcontextthatgivessubstancetotheirsenseofself;thefreedomofmembersofethnicorreligiousgroupstoexpresstheircommitmentsinpublic,toassociatewithlike-mindedothers,undercircumstancesofrespectfromothers;theabilityofgroupstoestablishandperpetuatetheirowninstitutionsofself-governmentandculturalpreservation.Whilenotallclaimsofnational,ethnic,orreligiousgroupsonthisordershouldbesupportedallthetime,theydeservetobetakenseriouslyasclaimsofjustice.Totheextentthatthesocietalculturemodelcomestobeidentifiedwithpoliticalissuesinvolvinggroupdifference,however,someissuesofjusticerecedefromview.AsIhavearguedinmyaccountofthestructuralinequalityapproach,theseissuesincludethefollowing.Interactivenormsconstitutethebodiesofsomepeopleasabject.Theorganizationofthesocialdivisionoflaborprivilegessomeanddisadvantagesothersinwaysthattendunfairlytolimitopportunitiesofmanypeoplefordevel-opingcapacitiesandachievingadecentlevelofmaterialwell-being.Institutionaldecision-makingpowerisconcentratedinthehandsofdominantstructuralgroups.Dominantstandardsofmoral,intellectual,andoccupationalevaluationassume376IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page377normsbiasedagainstmembersofsubordinatedgroups.Thesesortsofprocessesoftenoperatetogethertocircumscribemanypeopleincategoricallydefinedpositionsofdisadvantagethatarereproducedovergenerations,butnoneofthemiswellcon-ceptualizedunderparadigmsoflibertyorfreedomofexpressionandassociation.Takingnational,ethnic,andreligiousgroupsasthemainsortsofgroupsatissue,thesocietalculturemodelgiveslittleattentiontotheoppressionofbeingpositionedasdisabled,thenormalizationsproducedbyclasshegemony,orracialistinequality.Letmedwellonthecaseoftheorizingracism.Ithinkthatthesocietalculturalmodelofapoliticsofdifferencedoesnothaveaconceptualplaceforracialdifference.Raceis,ofcourse,asocialconstruct,notsomekindofnaturaldivisionamonghumanbeings.Racializedsocialprocessesareusu-allybuiltuponperceiveddifferencesinsocietalculture–language,cosmologicalbeliefs,religion,andsoon;manyperceptionsofculturaldifferenceandevenviolentconflictsbetweengroupswhoconstitutethemselvesasdifferingpeoples,however,historicallyhavenotandtodaydonotcountasracialized.Historically,racismhasoftenentailedcomprehensiveideologiesofthephysiognomic,moralintellectual,andesthetichier-archyofpeoples.Whiletodaysuchcomprehensiveracialistdoctrinesarelesscom-mon,asIsummarizedabove,racializedsocialstructurespervademanysocieties.Thesignsofthisarestereotypedanddespisedbodies,aswellasitemsassociatedwithbodies,suchasclothing,theassignmentofmenial,dirty,orservileworkwithmem-bersofgroupssostereotyped,thestructuralmarginalizationofgroupmembersfromhigh-statuspositions,andtendenciestowardspatialsegregation.MuchofwhatsomepeopleinEuropeansocietiestellthemselvesisconflictarisingfromculturalorreli-giousdifferenceinvolves,inmyopinion,racisminatleastsomeoftheseways.Thesocietalcultureapproachtendstoobscurethewaythatmanygroup-basedpoliticalclaimsandconflictsincontemporarymulticulturalsocietiesinvolvebothissuesofculturalfreedomandissuesofstructuralinequalitysuchasracism.Wherethereareproblemsofalackofrecognitionoforaccommodationtonational,cultural,religiousorlinguisticgroupsinliberaldemocraticsocietiestoday(aswellasothers),theseareoftenplayedoutthroughdominantdiscoursesthatstereotypemembersofminoritygroups,findthemtechnicallyineptormorallyinferior,spatiallysegregatethemandlimittheiropportunitiestodevelopskillsandcompeteforhigh-status28positions.IssuesofjusticeforLatinosintheUnitedStates,forexample,concernnotonlyculturalaccommodationandacceptance,butalsoexposureandcriticismofinstitu-tionalracism.Manybelievethatthetwoaredeeplyintertwined.DemandsforandimplementationofpoliciesthatmandateEnglishonlyinpublicinstitutionssuchascourtsandschoolsbothlimitthefreedomofsomeLatinostoexpressthemselvesfreely,stigmatizethem,andoftenlimittheirabilitytodevelopmarketableskills.ThepositionofmanyLatinosisracialized,moreover,inthattheirbrownskinandfacialfeaturescategorizethemtogetherasagroupintheeyesofmanyAnglos,inspiteofthefactthattheyortheirparentshailfromdifferentpartsofLatinAmericaandexperiencedifferencesoflanguageandtraditionamongthemselves.Withinthedominantstructures,“Hispanics”occupyparticularpositionsinthesocialdivisionoflabor,andthebenefitsthatemployersderivefromthispositioningaresignificantenoughtolimittheopportunitiesofmembersofthisracializedgrouptomoveinto29otheroccupationalpositions.StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference377\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page378Everywherethatindigenouspeoplemakeclaimstofreedomofculturalexpressionandpoliticalself-determination,totakeanotherexample,theydosointhecontextofracializedstructuralinequality.IndiansinNorthAmerica,AboriginalsinAustralia,indigenousinLatinAmerica,areallvictimsofhistoricallyracistpoliciesofmurder,removal,spatialconcentration,theftoftheirlandandresources,andlim-itationoftheiropportunitiestomakealiving.Structuresofracializedinequalityrundeepinthesesocietiesanddiscriminationagainst,andstereotypingof,indigenouspeoplepersist.Theclaimstoculturalfreedomandautonomyofmanygroups,moreover,oftenstandinfororderiveaddedresonancefromgrievancesderivingfromstructuralrela-tionsofprivilegeanddisadvantage.TheclaimsofmanyMuslimsthattheyshouldbefreetowearheadscarvesormaketheirprayercallsintheEuropeancitieswheretheyliveshouldnotbedivorcedfromthemarginalizedstatusofthemajorityofmembersofthesegroupsinlabormarketsandpoliticalinstitutions.Bringingsuchconflictssquarelyunderaliberalparadigm,asdomostformulationsofthesocietalcultureapproach,suppressesthesestructuralissuesofexploitation,marginalization,andnormalizationastheyunderliesomeofthesedebatesaboutaccom-modationtoculturaldifference.Inmostpoliticalcontexts,claimsforculturalrecog-nitionarenotassertednoraretheydisputedpurelyfortheirownsake.Theyarepartofdemandsforpoliticalinclusionoreconomicopportunity,undercircumstanceswherethesearesystematicallylimitedformanymembersofgroupsdefinedasdifferentfromthedominantnorms.Theliberalparadigmunderwhichthesocietalculturemodeloperatesnarrowstheaccountofpoliticsanddifferenceinanothersignificantway.Itpresumesthatpoliticalstruggleisaboutstatepolicyprimarily,andthusfailstofindnon-stateinstitutionsaslocationsofinjusticeandsitesofstruggleforredress.Thesocietalculturemodelgenerallyassumesasimplemodelofpoliticalcommunityasconsistingofwhatispublic–whichcoincideswithwhatisundertheadministrativeregulationofthestate,andwhatisprivate,whichiseverythingelse.Underthisliberalmodel,themainquestionsare:Whatshallthestatepermit,support,orrequire,andwhatshallitdiscourageorforbid?Mostoftheissuesanddebatesaboutpoliticsandculturaldifferenceinrecentpoliticaltheoreticalliteratureconcernstatepolicyinthatway.Shallthestatealloworevensupportculturalautonomy?Shouldthestateallowexemptionsfromsomeofitsregulationsforthesakeofrespectingcul-turalorreligiousdifference?Cangrantingspeciallanguagerightsbecompatiblewithsharedpoliticalcommunity?Canreligiousexpressionbeallowedinstate-sponsoredinstitutions?Arespecialrightsofgrouprepresentationinpoliticalbodiesofthestatecompatiblewithaprincipleofequalpoliticalrights?Framingquestionsofthepol-iticsofdifferencelargelyintermsofwhatthestateshouldorshouldnotdoignorescivilsocietyasanarenaofaction,institutionaldecision-making,policy,andstrug-30glewhichisveryimportanttocausinginjusticeandmakingchangetoremedyit.Theassumptionthatpoliticsconcernsonlywhatthestateallows,requiresorforbids,moreover,cangenerateseriousmisunderstandingaboutpositionstakenbyproponentsofapoliticsofdifference,particularlywithinthestructuralinequalitymodel.BrianBarryisonceagainacaseinpoint.HequotesdisapprovinglymyclaiminJusticeandthePoliticsofDifferencethat“nosocialpracticesoractivitiesshouldbeexcludedasimpropersubjectsforpublicdiscussion,expressionandcollectivechoice,”378IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page379andthencitesRobertFullinwider’sinterpretationofthisstatementtotheeffectthat31Iadvocatepoliticalinterventionandmodificationinto“privatechoices.”ThespecterthatBarryandFullinwiderfearislimitationofindividuallibertybackedbystatesanction.Apparentlytheyenvisionnoobjectofpublicdiscussionandcol-lectivechoiceotherthanstatepoliciesandlaws.Certainlytheseareimportantobjectsofpublicdiscussionandchoiceinademocracy.Apoliticaltheoryconcernedwiththeproductionandreproductionofstructuralinequalitiesevenwhenlawsguaranteeformallyequalrights,however,mustshineitslightonothercornersaswell.MovementsofAfricanAmericans,peoplewithdisabilities,feminists,gaymenandlesbians,indigenouspeople,aswellasmanyethnicmovements,realizethatsocietaldiscrimination,processesofsegregation,andmarginalizationenactedthroughsocialnetworksandprivateinstitutionsmustbeconfrontedintheirnon-stateinstitutionalsites.Whilelawcanprovideaframeworkforequality,andsomeremedyforegre-giousviolationsofrightsandrespect,thestateandlawcannotandshouldnotreachintoeverycapillaryofeverydaylife.Apoliticsofdifferenceseekingtounderminestructuralinequalitiesthusrecommendsthatchurches,universities,productionandmarketingenterprises,clubsandassociationsallexaminetheirpolicies,practices,andprioritiestodiscoverwaystheycontributetounjuststructuresandrecommendschang-ingthemwhentheydo.SuchapositionisnottantamounttocallingthecultureGestapotopoliceeveryjokeorbathroomdesign.Manyofthesocialchangesbroughtaboutbythesemovementsinthelastthirtyyearshaveinvolvedactionsonthepartofmanypeoplethatwerevoluntary,inthesensethattheywereneitherrequirednorencouragedbystatepolicy.Indeed,statepolicyasoftenfollowsonactionwithin32civilsocietydirectedatunderminingstructuralinequalityasleadsit.SeylaBenhabibdistinguishessucha“dualtrack”approachtopolitics,whichsheassociateswithcriticaltheory,andarguesthatliberalpoliticaltheorytypicallyignoresnon-statedimensionsofpolitics.Indeliberativedemocracy,asdistinguishedfrompoliticliberalism,theofficialpublicsphereofrepresentativeinstitutions,whichincludesthelegislature,executiveandpublicbureaucracies,thejudiciaryandpoliticalparties,isnottheonlysiteofpoliticalcontestationandofopinionandwillformation.Deliberativedemocracyfocusesonsocialmovements,andonthecivil,cultural,religious,artistic,andpoliticalassociationsofthe33unofficialpublicsphere,aswell.Barryandotherswhoconsiderissuesofdifferenceunderaliberalparadigm,ignoresthisunofficialpublicsphereofcontestationandaction,andthus“attemptstosolve34multiculturalconflictsthroughajuridicalcalculusofliberalrights.”Aconceptionofjusticeabletocriticizerelationsofdominationandlimitationofopportunitysuf-feredbygender,racialized,ethnic,orreligiousgroupsmustconsiderrelationswithin35privateactivitiesandcivilsocietyandtheirinteractionwithstateinstitutions.Bringingissuesofthepoliticsofdifferenceunderaliberalparadigm,finally,tendstorecastthemintermsofquestionsoftoleration.Inthislogic,atendencytoposeissuesofthepoliticsofdifferenceintermsofsocietalcultureandapplyingtothemliberaltheorytendstoreinforceeachother.Thequestionofdifferenceinaliberalsocietyiswhatsortsofdifferencesinbeliefsandpracticescanweallow,tolerate,andwhatnot.TheprimarysocialgroupdifferencesvisibleinthatquestionareStructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference379\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page380religiousandethno-culturaldifferences.Structureddifferencesinaccesstospaces,opportunitiesforthedevelopmentofcapacities,orinteractivestylesareirrelevanttothisquestion.Framingissuesofdifferenceintermsoftoleration,however,oftenintroducesanormalizinglogicintodebatesaboutmulticulturalism.Thelogicofthequestionsandarguments,thatis,tendstopresumeapointofviewofanormal,majorityculturedebatingamongthemselvesjusthowfartheycangoinaccommodationtoandaffirma-tionofaculturemarkedasdeviant.Assuchdebatesaretheorized,theyseemnottoincludethepointofviewofthosepersonswhosebeliefsorpracticesareatissue.Theideaoftoleration,moreover,impliesalimitbeyondwhichsomepracticesareintolerable.Fromthepointofviewofpersonswhoseactivitiesarethesubjectofsuchdebates,however,itisoftendemeaningtobepositionedasdeviantsinthisway,evenwhensomeactionsorpracticesarecontestedamongthemselves.Afunnythingoftenhappenstogenderissueswhenthesocietalculturemodelofdifferencepoliticsframesitsdebatesunderthislogicoftoleration.Inmanywritingsonmulticulturalism,genderissuesserveasteststothelimitsoftoleration.Canwetoleraterulesofanationalminoritythatrefusetorecognizethewomenwhomarryoutsidethegroupasmembers?Canweallowcommunitiesandfamiliestoexpectorpressurewomentocovertheirheadsinpublic?Surelywecannotpermitarrangedmarriagesofteenagewomenorgenitalcuttingunderanycircumstances?Incallingattentiontotherolethatgenderissuesoftenplayinliberaldebatesaboutaccommodationtoculturalandreligiousgroups,Idonotaimtotakepositionsontheseparticularquestions.Ibringthisupasaninstanceofaconstructionofnormalanddeviantthatoftenappearsinthesedebates,andwhichpositionsgenderissuesquitedifferentlyfromthewaythestructuralinequalitymodelconstructsthem.Onthestructuralinequalitymodel,youwillrecall,feminismisapoliticsofdiffer-ence.Becausethesocialdivisionoflabor,genderedsocialization,andnormsofpowerandauthoritativenessoperatetolimittherealopportunitiesofmanywomen,acom-mitmenttoequalityforwomenentailsnoticingsomeofthesedifferencesinpolicyandpractice,inordertounderminetheirdisadvantagingconsequences.Whenwomen’sissuesappearinthemulticulturaltolerancedebates,however,theyareinvokedwitharesonanceofequalityassameness.Thelimitbeyondwhichtol-erationshouldgo,itissuggested,isonethatdeniesthatwomenshouldhavethesamerightsasmen.Inthesedebatesthepositionclaimedbythenormalizing“we”isafeministposition,suggestingthatgenderinequalityisnotaseriousissueforthedominantculturesinWesternliberalsocieties.Theseassumptionsmaskthegendered36inequalitiesthatpersistinmanyinstitutionsandpractices.Thepurposeofthisessayhasbeentoclarifydifferencesinapproachestopoliticalandtheoreticaldebatesaboutwhetherandtowhatextentjusticecallsforpayingattentiontoratherthanignoringsocialgroupdifferences.Ihavearguedthatasocietalculturalapproachtoapoliticsofdifferencehasmoreoccupiedpoliticalthe-oristsinrecentyearsthanastructuralinequalityapproach.Thistrendislamentable,Ihavesuggested,becauseittendstonarrowthegroupsofconcerntoethnic,national,andreligiousgroups,andtolimittheissuesofjusticeatstaketothoseconcernedwithfreedomandautonomymorethanequalopportunitytodevelopcapacitiesandlivealifeofwell-being.Itsrelianceonaliberalparadigm,moreover,tendstolimit380IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page381politicstostatepolicyandtoreintroducenormalizingdiscoursesintowhatbeganasdenormalizingmovements.Myobjectiveinmakingthesedistinctionsandargumentshasnotbeentorejectthesocietalculturemodel,buttoencouragepoliticaltheoriststorecommittheirattentiontogroupdifferencesgeneratedfromstructuresofpowerandthedivisionoflabor,astheycontinuealsotoreflectonconflictsovernationalorreligiousdifference.Notes1Editors’note:ThisessaywascompletedindraftformatthetimeofProf.Young’sdeath.Sheintendedtorevisethepiecefurther,althoughaversionofthesesameideaswaspro-ducedforaMulticulturalismandPoliticalTheory,ed.AnthonyLadenandDavidOwen(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007).WiththepermissionofProf.Young’slit-eraryexecutor,DavidAlexander,weareincludingthisessayintheformwereceivedit.Inourjudgment,thisisapolishedandvaluableessaythatraisesimportantissuesaboutthepoliticsofdifferenceandsocialidentities;wethereforepresentitherewiththecaveatthatitsauthorwouldlikelyhavemadefurtherchangestoithadshebeengiventhechance.Wehavemademinortypographicalchangesandcompletedthebibliographicalcitationswithoutnotation;anyotherchangesaredulyindicatedinnotes.2Ihaveelaboratedanotionofstructuralgroupdifferenceandstructuralinequalityinseveralpreviouswritings.SeeInclusionandDemocracy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),pp.92–102;“EqualityofWhom?SocialGroupsandJudgmentsofInjustice,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy9(Mar.2001):1–18;Ielaboratethesethreeaxesofstructuralinequality–divisionoflabor,decision-makingpower,andfitwithhegemonicnorms–intworecentpapers.See“LivedBodyvs.Gender:ReflectionsonSocialStructureandSubjectivity,”Ratio15(4)(Dec.2002):410–28and“TakingtheBasicStructureSeriously,”PerspectivesonPolitics4(2006):91–7;seealsomyessay“GenderasSeriality:ThinkingaboutWomenasaSocialCollective,”inIrisMarionYoung,IntersectingVoices:DilemmasofGender,PoliticalPhilosophy,andPolicy(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1997).3CharlesTilly,DurableInequality(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1999).4Substantiveequalityofopportunitymeansmorethannotbeingformallypreventedfrompursuingprojectsorcompetingforgoods.Itmeansbeable,bothbecauseoftheskillsanddispositionsonehasdeveloped,andbecauseoftherelationsonehaswithothers,toenactaplanforoneselfamongarangeofreasonableoptions.Foronetheoryofsub-stantiveequalityofopportunity,seeJohnRoemer,EqualityofOpportunity(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999).5Ihavearguedthatso-calledmeritstandardsoftennormalizeattributes,comportments,orattainmentsassociatedwithsocialgroups,andthusoftendonotservetheimpartialpur-posetheyclaim.SeemyJusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990),Ch.7;BrianBarryrebutsthiscritiqueinCulturalandEquality(Cambridge:PolityPress,2001),pp.90–102;ForagoodreplytoBarryonthesepointsfromthepointofviewofastructuralinequalityapproachtoapoliticsofdifference,seePaulKelly,“DefendingSomeDodos:Equalityand/orLiberty?,”inPaulKelly,ed.,MulticulturalismReconsidered(Cambridge:PolityPress,2002),pp.62–80;seealsoClareChambers,“AllMustHavePrizes:TheLiberalCaseofInterferenceinCulturalPractices,”inthesamevolume,pp.151–73.6Barry,CulturalandEquality,p.95.7SeeLewisGordon,BadFaithandAnti-BlackRacism(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress,1995).StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference381\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page3828SeeGlenLoury,AnatomyofRacialInequality(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2002).9SeeIrisMarionYoung,InclusionandDemocracy,Ch.6.10SeeChristineBattersby,ThePhenomenalWoman:FeministMetaphysicsandthePatternsofIdentity(NewYork:Routledge,1998).11InanotherplaceIdiscusssomeofthestigmaanddisadvantagethatcomestowomenbecauseinstitutionsoftenfailtoaccommodatemenstruation.See“MenstrualMeditations,”inOnFemaleBodyExperience:“ThrowingLikeaGirl”andOtherEssays(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005).12SusanOkin,Justice,GenderandtheFamily(NewYork:BasicBooks,1989).13Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,p.19;cf.Kymlicka,Liberalism,CommunityandCulture(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).14Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,p.18.15Oncultureasacontextofselfformationandchoice,seeCharlesTaylor,Multiculturalismandthe“PoliticsofRecognition”(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992)andYaelTamir,LiberalNationalism(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1993).16Inadditiontowritingsalreadycited:JacobLevy,TheMulticulturalismofFear(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000);BhikhuParekh,RethinkingMulticulturalism(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000);JosephCarens,Culture,Citizenship,andCommunity:AContextualExplorationofJusticeasEvenhandedness(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000).17SeeespeciallyJeffSpinner-Halev,SurvivingDiversity:ReligionandDemocraticCitizenship(Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2000).18“SocialJusticeintheAgeofIdentityPolitics,”inNancyFraserandAxelHonneth,RedistriubutionorRecognition?APolitical-PhilosophicalExchange(London:Verso,2003):7–109.19SeeIrisMarionYoung,“UnrulyCategories:ACritiqueofNancyFraser’sDualSystemsTheory,”NewLeftReviewI/222(Mar.–Apr.1997):147–60.20SeeMelissaS.Williams,Voice,Trust,andEquality(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1997).21AnnePhillips,“ThePoliticsofPresence,”inRicardoBlaugandJohnJ.Schwarzmantel,eds.,Democracy:AReader(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2001):161–4.22Young,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference,p.23.23Itakesomestepsinthisdirectionin“TakingtheBasicStructureSeriously.”24PierreBourdieu,Distinction:ASocialCritiqueoftheJudgementofTaste(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1984).25Kymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,p.18.26Prof.Youngindicatedthatsheintendedtoexpandonthisobservationinfurtherrevisionsofherpaper(Eds.).27SeylaBenhabib,TheClaimsofCulture:EqualityandDiversityintheGlobalEra(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2002).28SeemyInclusionandDemocracy,pp.102–7.29SeeIrisMarionYoung,“Structure,Difference,andHispanic/LatinoClaimsofJustice,”inJorgeJ.E.GraciaandPablodeGreiff,Hispanics/LatinosintheUnitedStates:Ethnicity,RaceandRights(NewYork:Routledge,2000),pp.147–66.30InCh.5ofInclusionandDemocracyIfurtherdiscussthevirtuesandlimitationsofactionincivilsocietyforremedyinginjustice.31Barry,CultureandEquality.32BrianBarryalsoblanchesattheassertionImakeinJusticeandthePoliticsofDifferencethattheremedyfornormalizingsocialprocessesis“culturalrevolution.”Inthisphrase,whichIborrowedfromJuliaKristeva,“culture”carriesthefirstofthetwomeaningsI382IrisM.Young\nCDIC20.qxd2/4/0915:56Page383discussedintheprevioussection.Itreferstomodesofcomportment,gestures,speechstylesandothermodesofcommunicationandhowpeopleunderstandthese.“Revolution”maybeanoverlydramaticterm.Eliminatingwaysthatwomen,peoplewithdisabilities,orpoorpeoplearesometimesdenigrated,however,amongotherthingsrequireschang-ingsomesymbolicmeaningsandinteractivehabitsofsomepeople.Inherreactiontothephrase“culturalrevolution”AmyGutmannalsomanifestsanassumptionthatstateandlawaretheprimarymotorsofsocialchangetoundermineinjustice.33Benhabib,TheClaimsofCulture,p.21.34Benhabib,TheClaimsofCulture,p.21.35SeealsoBenhabib,TheClaimsofCulture,pp.118–21.36Prof.Youngindicatedinherdrafttextthatsheintendedtoexpandonthispoint(Eds.).StructuralInjusticeandthePoliticsofDifference383\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page385GLOBALJUSTICECOSMOPOLITANISMContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page387CHAPTERTWENTY-ONECosmopolitanismandJustice1SimonCaney[T]heseGentlemanhaveformedaplanofGeographicalmorality,bywhichthedutiesofmeninpublicandinprivatesituationsarenottobegovernedbytheirrelationstotheGreatGovernoroftheUniverse,orbytheirrelationstomen,butbyclimates,degreesoflongitudeandlatitude,parallelsnotoflifebutoflatitudes.Asif,whenyouhavecrossedtheequinoctiallineallthevirtuesdie....ThisGeographicalmoralitywedoprotestagainst.(EdmundBurke,“SpeechonOpeningofImpeachment”(ofWarrenHastings),February16,1788,inBurke1788[1999]:221)IamaJew.HathnotaJeweyes?hathnotaJewhands,organs,dimensions,senses,affections,passions?fedwiththesamefood,hurtwiththesameweapons,subjecttothesamediseases,healedbythesamemeans,warmedandcooledbythesamewinterandsummer,asaChristianis?Ifyouprickus,dowenotbleed?ifyoutickleus,dowenotlaugh?ifyoupoisonus,dowenotdie?(Shylock,TheMerchantofVenice,Act3,Scene1,lines56–65)Theworldischaracterizedbyextensiveglobalpovertyandmarkedinequalities.Inadditiontothis,theEarth’sclimateisundergoingprofoundchangesandtherisingsea-levels–increasedtemperaturesandincreaseinunpredictableweathereventswillhavedramaticeffectsonthebasicinterestsofmany.Thesephenomenapromptthequestionofwhetherthereareglobalprinciplesofdistributivejustice.Ithastradi-tionallybeenassumedthatprinciplesofdistributivejusticeapply,iftheyapplyatall,withinastate.Debatesaboutdistributivejusticehaveoftentakenitforgrantedthatthescopeofdistributivejusticeissetbythebordersofthestate(orthenation)ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page388andthefocushasbeenmoreonwhatdistributiveprincipleisappropriateaswellasonwhatshouldbedistributed.Theconceptofinternationaljustice,inthiscontext,referrednottoanyprinciplesofdistributivejusticebuttoprinciplesofnon-interventionandjustwartheory(Rawls1999a:331–3).Inrecentyears,however,anumberofpoliticalphilosophershavedefendeda“cosmopolitan”accountofdistributivejustice.Theyhave,thatis,arguedthatthereareglobalprinciplesofdistributivejustice,whichincludeallindividualswithintheirscope.InthischapterIshallprovideananalysisofsomeleadingcosmopolitanperspectivesondistributivejusticeandalsoprovidesomesupportforwhatItaketobeacompellingversionofit.I:ThreeConceptionsofCosmopolitanism§1.Itisnecessarytostartwithafurtherclarificationandelaborationoftheconceptofcosmopolitanism.Cosmopolitanismaffirmsthatpersonsare“citizensoftheworld.”Suchideashaveanancientlineage.ItissaidofDiogenestheCynicthatwhenhewas“[a]skedwherehecamefrom,hesaid,‘Iamacitizenoftheworld’”(DiogenesLaërtius1931:65).ForDiogenestheCynic,“[t]heonlytruecommonwealthwas,hesaid,thatwhichisaswideastheuniverse”(ibid.:75).TheseideasweretakenfurtherbyStoicthinkerssuchasCicero,Seneca,Plutarch,Epictetus,andtheRomanemperorMarcusAurelius.Allofthelatteraffirmedtheidealofbeingacitizenoftheworld.Persons,onthisview,arenotsimplycitizensoftheircity-state–rathertheircountryisthewholeworld(indeedthecosmos).CosmopolitanidealswerealsocommonlyinvokedduringtheEnlightenmentandpoliticalphilosophersofverydifferenthuesidentifiedthemselvesascosmopolitans.BothJeremyBenthamandImmanuelKant,forexample,adoptedacosmopolitanperspective.ThusBenthambeginshisessayonthe“ObjectsofInternationalLaw”byaskingwhatacitizenoftheworldwouldwant:“Ifacitizenoftheworldhadtopre-pareanuniversalinternationalcode,whatwouldheproposetohimselfashisobject?Itwouldbethecommonandequalutilityofallnations”(1843[1786–9]:537).Further-more,ImmanuelKantinvokesthecosmopolitanidealandaffirmssome(minimal)principlesof“cosmopolitanright”inhisessayon“PerpetualPeace”(1989[1795]:105–8).§2.Myfocusis,however,oncontemporarycosmopolitantheorieswhich,thoughtheyshareacommitmenttotheconceptofworldcitizenship,providedifferentinterpret-ationsofthisidealtothatofferedbyeitherancientorEnlightenmentcosmopolitanthinkers.Focusingnowwhollyoncontemporarycosmopolitanism,itisimportanttodrawattentiontothreedistinctkindsofcosmopolitanism–whatIshalltermjuridicalcosmopolitanism,ethicalcosmopolitanism,andpoliticalcosmopolitanism.Juridicalcosmopolitanismisaclaimaboutthescopeandnatureofdistributivejustice.Itmaintainsthatthereareglobalprinciplesofdistributivejusticethatincludeallpersonsintheirscope.Putslightlydifferently,whatIhavetermedjuridicalcos-mopolitanism(andwhatotherslikeSamuelSchefflercall“cosmopolitanismabout388SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page389justice”(Scheffler2001:esp.111))aversthatthescopeofsomeprinciplesofdis-tributivejusticeshouldincludeallpersonswithintheirremit.Weareallcitizensoftheworldinthesensethatweshouldallbeincludedwithinacommonschemeofdistributivejustice.Thisviewstandsopposedtothosewhomaintainthatdistribu-tivejusticeappliesonlyamongmembersofthesamenationorstate.Thiskindofcosmopolitanismisaffirmedbyavarietyofdifferentthinkers.InPoliticalTheoryandInternationalRelations(1999)CharlesBeitzdrawsonRawls’stheoryofjusticeandarguesthatthereshouldbeaglobaldifferenceprinciple.Furthermore,HenryShuearguesinBasicRights(1996)thatthereisahumanrighttosubsistencewhichentailsnegativedutiesonothersnottodeprivethemandpositivedutiestoprovidesuchsubsistenceifitbenecessary.Togiveathirdexample,ThomasPogge’smorerecentWorldPovertyandHumanRights(2008)providesanargumentfortheexistenceofglobalprinciplesofdistributivejustice.Considernowasecondkindofcosmopolitanism–whatIhavetermedethicalcos-mopolitanism.Whereasjuridicalcosmopolitanismisaclaim(orsetofclaims)abouttheright,ethicalcosmopolitanismisaclaim(orsetofclaims)aboutthegood.Ethicalcosmopolitanismholdsthatpersonsarecitizensoftheworldinthesensethattoflourishoneneednotconformtothetraditionalwaysoflifeofone’scommunity.Flourishingmayinclude(and,onsomeconstruals,shouldinclude)drawingonaspectsofothercultures.AfineexampleofthisisJeremyWaldron’simportantessayon“MinorityCulturesandTheCosmopolitanAlternative.”InthisWaldroncelebratestheidealofsomeonewhodrawsonideasandbeliefsfromavarietyofdifferentcoun-tries(Waldron1992).Schefflerreferstoasimilarviewandtermsit“cosmopolitanismaboutculture”(Scheffler2001:esp.111).AlthoughthekindofcosmopolitanismatstakeundoubtedlyraisesquestionsaboutcultureIthinkthatthistitleisrathermis-leading.Itisworthdistinguishingbetweentwodifferentaspectsofanyculture–thoseaspectswhichconcernwhatmakeslifefulfilling(theviewsaboutthegoodlifethatareembeddedintheculture)andthoseaspectswhichconcernthefunctioningofthepoliticalsystem(whatpoliticalscientiststerm“politicalculture”).NowWaldronandScheffler’sconcernsareaboutthefirstkind(theyareinterestedinthetenabil-ityofacosmopolitanidealofthegoodlife)but,astheconceptof“politicalculture”attests,notallculturalquestionsareconcernedwiththegoodlife.2Considernowfinallywhatisoftencalledpoliticalcosmopolitanism.Thisholdsthatthereshouldbesupra-statepoliticalinstitutions.Sothiskindofcosmopolitanismmaintainsthatpersonsarecitizensoftheworldinthesensethatthereshouldbepoliticalinstitutionsthatencompassall.Oneversionofpoliticalcosmopolitanismholds,forexample,thatthereshouldbeasystemofmultilevelgovernance,inwhichtherearesupra-stateinstitutions,state-likeinstitutions,andsub-statepoliticalstructures(Pogge2008:Ch.7;cf.alsoCaney2005a:Ch.5,2006).§3.Withthesethreekindsofcosmopolitanisminhand,weshouldnownotethateachof3themcomesinamildoraradicalform.Themildversionofjuridicalcosmopolitanism,forexample,holds(i)thattherearesomeuniversalprinciplesofdistributivejusticewhichincludeallwithintheirscopebutitalso(ii)allowsthattheremightbesomenational-levelorstate-levelprinciplesofdistributivejustice.TheradicalformofCosmopolitanismandJustice389\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page390juridicalcosmopolitanism,bycontrastholdsaffirms(i)butdenies(ii).Thesamedis-tinctionmightbeappliedtopoliticalcosmopolitanism.Themildversion(i)holdsthatthereshouldbesomeglobalpoliticalinstitutionsand(ii)allowsthattheremightbesomenational-levelorstate-levelpoliticalinstitutions.Againtheradicalversion–encapsulatedintheviewthatthereshouldbeaworldstate–affirms(i)butdenies(ii).Finally,tocompletethesurveywecanapplythesamedistinctiontoethicalcosmopolitanism.Themildversionholds(i)thatthe“cosmopolitan”conceptionofthegoodisafulfillingconceptionofthegoodand(ii)allowsthatmore“local”con-ceptionsofthegoodmightalsobefulfillingconceptionofthegood.Theradicalversion,bycontrast,affirms(i)anddenies(ii).Somehavearguedthatmildjuridicalcosmopolitanismisnotahelpfulcategoryonthegroundsthatonthisdefinitionprettymucheveryoneisacosmopolitan(Miller2002:975).Ibelievethatthisismistaken.Inthefirstplace,weshouldnotethatthecosmopolitanclaimsnotsimplythatthereareglobalprinciplesofdistributivejustice(whichiscompatiblewithstateshavingdutiesofdistributivejusticetootherstates):itrequiresthattheyapplyprinciplesofdistributivejusticetoallindividuals.Giventhis,applyingamildcosmopolitanismwouldrequirearadicaltransformationinthewaythatpowerfulstatesactintheworldandmay(dependingonwhatglobalprinciplesareaffirmed)requireconsiderablechangestothepowerandroleofinter-nationalinstitutions.Italsobearsnotingthatthisapproachwouldbedeniedbyverymanydifferentschoolsofthought.Itstandsopposedtoalmostall“realist”thinking(perhapsthedominantapproachamonginternationalrelationsscholars).Itwouldberejectedbythosewhoadheretotheidealofasocietyofstates.InadditiontothisitisincompatiblewithMichaelWalzer’saccountofthescopeofjustice(1983)andJohnRawls’streatmentinTheLawofPeoples(1999b).MildcosmopolitanismisalsodeniedbyThomasNagel(2005).Sotheideathatmildcosmopolitanismisacom-monplaceis,regrettably,notthecase.Perhapsthemostimportantpointisthis,however.Whetherthemildviewisbanalandoverlyinclusivedependson(a)itscontentand(b)itsmoralweight.If,forexample,amildcosmopolitanismaffirmsanultraminimalcontentthenitismoreopentothechargethatitissayingsomethingthatprettymuchanyonecanaccept,whereasonethataffirms,say,fairlyegalitarianprincipleswouldnot.Similarly,amildcosmopolitanwhoaffirmscosmopolitanprinciplesthatareveryeasilyoverriddenis,again,failingtoprovideadistinctiveviewpoint.Mildcosmopolitanismisonlyanuninterestingviewifitiscommittedtoratherweakandanodyneprinciplesthatnoonedisputes.Itcantakethisformbutthereisnoreasonwhyitshould.II:TwoKindsofJuridicalCosmopolitanismLetusturnnowtojuridicalcosmopolitanism.Anumberofdifferentkindsofcos-mopolitanismhavebeenproposed.Itisworthdistinguishing,inparticular,betweentwoapproachestocosmopolitandistributivejustice.First,somearguethatprinciplesofdistributivejusticeapplytopersonswhobelongtoacommon“scheme”,whereIusetheword“scheme”asacatch-allphrasetorefertosomekindofsystematicinteractionandinterdependence.Proponentsofthisapproachthenarguethatthereisaglobalschemeandhence,thereareglobalprinciplesof390SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page391distributivejusticethatincludeallpersonsintheirjurisdiction.Onthisapproach,onemayhavehumanitariandutiestonon-membersbutonedoesnothavedutiesofdistributivejusticetothem.Putotherwise:thisviewmaintainsthatthescopeofprin-ciplesofdistributivejusticeisdefinedintermsofwhobelongtowhichschemes.Letustermthisthe“interdependence-based”conception.SophisticatedversionsofthiskindofargumenthavebeenadvancedbyCharlesBeitz(1999)andThomasPogge(1989,2008)andweshallturntotheirargumentsshortly.Priortodoingsoweshouldintroduceasecondkindofapproach.Thissecondkindholdsthatprinciplesofdistributivejusticeshouldapplygloballyirrespectiveofwhetheraglobalschemeexists.Itsimplyholdsthatallpersons,quahumanbeings,shouldbeincludedwithinthescopeofjustice.ItismotivatedbyacommitmenttothedignityofpersonsandthesentimentseloquentlyexpressedbyShylockinthequotationatthestartofthischapter.Letustermthisthe“humanity-based”con-4ception.Onthisaccount,onemighthaveanaturaldutyofjusticetoaidothers,regardlessofwhethertheyareinone’sschemeornot(Buchanan1990,2004:cf.alsoCaney2005a,2007).Onehasobligationsofjusticetoothersbecausetheyarefellowhumanbeings–withhumanneedsandfailings,andhumancapacitiesfor,andinterests,inautonomyandwell-being–andfactsaboutinterdependencedonot,inthemselves,determinethescopeofdistributivejustice.OneearlystatementofthisviewcomesfromDavidRichards.Hereasonedthatallpersons,invirtueoftheirhuman-5ity,shouldbeincludedinaglobaloriginalposition(Richards1982).Ofcourse,con-sequentialisttheoriesalsofitintothismold.Sincetheymaintainthatutilityshouldbemaximizedtheyattributenofundamentalmoralimportancetonationalorstate6boundaries(Singer2002).Thetwokindsofcosmopolitanismdiffer,then,intheconceptsof“moralperson-7ality”thattheyemploy.Whereasthesecondmaintainsthatpersonshaveentitle-mentssimplyquahumanpersonsandinvirtueoftheirhumanity,thefirstmaintainsthatpersonshaveentitlementsquamembersofasocioeconomicscheme.Sincetheydifferintheiraccountofmoralpersonalitytheywillsometimesdifferintheiraccountofthescopeofdistributivejustice.Ifthereisatrulyglobal“scheme”(howeverthattermisdefined)thentheywillconverge,butifthereisnotthentheirconclusionsaboutthescopeofdistributivejusticewilldiverge.III:BeitzonCosmopolitanJusticeWiththesetwoaccountsinmind,letusconsidertwoeminentversionsofthefirstapproach.ThefirstmajorattempttoargueinthiswaywasdevelopedbyCharlesBeitzinPoliticalTheoryandInternationalRelations(1999)–originallypublishedin1979.BeitzsoughttoarguethatRawls’stheoryofjusticeshouldleadustoembraceaglobaldifferenceprinciple.Beitzthusaccepts,likeRawls,thatprinciplesofdis-tributivejusticeapplytowhatRawlstermsthe“basicstructure”(Rawls1999a:6–10).Hethenargues,however,thatsuchistheextentofglobalinteractionandinterde-pendencethatthereisinfactaglobalbasicstructure.Drawingonalargeempiricalliterature,BeitzclaimsthatRawls’sassumptionthatsocietieswereself-containedisfalse.TheextentoftradeandcommunicationandthegrowthoftransnationalregimesandinstitutionsissuchthatwecannowsaythatwearelivinginaglobalbasicCosmopolitanismandJustice391\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page392structure.Inthelightofthis,Rawls’sapproachshouldcommitustoadoptingaglobaloriginalposition,and,givenRawls’sargument,itwouldfollowthatthereshouldbeaglobaldifferenceprinciple(1999:143–53).Beitz’sargumentraisesseveralquestions.Thefirstconcernstheextentofinter-dependenceatthegloballevel.AsBeitzpointsout,itwouldbeimplausibletothinkthatatinybitoftradeissufficienttomakethedifferenceprincipleapplicable.Ashenotes,itwouldbeimplausibletothinkthatonecountrysellingsomeapplestoanothercountryinexchangeforsomepearssufficestoestablishthatthereshouldbeatransnationaldifferenceprinciple(Beitz1999:165).Beitzinfersfromthisthataglobaldifferenceprincipleisapplicableonlyifthevolumeandintensityofinter-dependencereachesacertainlevel.Hesuggeststhatthereis“athresholdofinter-dependenceabovewhichdistributiverequirementslikeaglobaldifferenceprinciplearevalid,butbelowwhichsignificantlyweakerprincipleshold”(1999:165,165–7).Thisraisestwofurtherquestions.First,whatdegreeofglobalintegrationmustexistforaglobaldifferenceprincipletocomeintoplay?Thisisnotsimplyapracticalproblembutaphilosophicalone.Welackanycriteriaastowheretodrawthelineanditisnotclearhowwewouldgoaboutderivingsuchcriteria.ButweneedsuchacriterionifBeitz’sderivationofaglobaldifferenceprincipleistosucceed.Second,whatprincipleappliesatthesub-thresholdlevelofintegration?Howwouldweascertainsuchaprinciple?Againweappeartolackanymethodforderivingthatprincipleorprinciples.Beitz’saccountoftherelationshipbetweenthelevelofeco-nomicintegrationandthecontentofglobaldistributivejusticeisinherentlyprob-lematicforitcannottelluswhenaglobaldifferenceprincipleoranyotherprincipleisappropriate.Second,andevenmorefundamentally,onemightaskwhyprinciplesofdistribu-8tivejusticeshouldapplytothemembersofabasicstructure.Whydoesthescopeofdistributivejusticedependinthiswayonwhetherthereisaglobalornon-globalbasicstructure?Beitz’sanswerisanorthodoxRawlsianone.Thebasicstructuremattersbecauseofitsimpactonpeople’slives.Itaffectstheextenttowhichpeoplecanrealizetheirinterests(Rawls1999a:7;Beitz1999:166,201).However,tosaythisistoascribeimportanceastowhetherpeoplecanenjoytheirinterests.Itistobeconcernedwithrealizingcertainoutcomes.Nowifthisisthecasethenwehaveamoralreasontoassistinthefurtheranceoftheseinterestswhetherornotweareinthesameschemeasthem.Ifweascribeimportancetowhetherpersonscanengageintheactivitiesinwhichtheyhaveaninterestthenthisshouldsurelybearnotsimplyonhowthebasicstructureisorganizedbutalsoonthebehaviorofthosewhoareexternaltoitbutwhomaybeabletohaveaconsiderableeffectonthose9interests(Caney2007:283).IV:PoggeonCosmopolitanJusticeGiventheseproblemsletusturntoasecondinterdependence-basedaccountofcos-mopolitanism–thatadvancedbyThomasPogge.PoggehasdevelopedhisargumentsinmanyarticlesandinthelastpartofRealizingRawls(1989:PartIII).Hismostsystematicexpositionofhisargumentsis,however,inhisbookjustlyinfluentialbookWorldPovertyandHumanRights(firstpublishedin2002andthenpublishedinan392SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page393expandedversionin2008).InthelatterPoggemakesthefollowingthreeclaims.First,hemaintains(veryplausibly)thatagentshaveanegativedutyofjusticenottoparticipateinunjustsocialpracticesorinstitutions.Poggesometimespresentsthisasanegativedutynottoharmothers.Thisrequiresananalysisof“harm”.ThisleadsustothesecondcomponentofPogge’sargument.Second,Poggearguesthatweshouldthinkofharmasfollows.Harmisdefinedintermsof(i)thoseimpactsonhumanrightsthat(ii)areproducedbysocialinstitutions.Furthermore,Pogge’sfocusison(iii)thedutyofthosewhocreateandupholdthesesocialinstitutions.Finally,Poggemaintainsthananinstitutionisharmfulonlyifitsmaligneffectsonhumanrightsare(iv)“foreseeable”,(v)“reasonablyavoidable”and(vi)thecreators/upholdersoftheinstitutionsknowthattheseinstitutionscanbedesignedtoavoidthesemalign10effects.Now,ifweputPogge’sclaimthatthereisanegativedutynottoharmwiththisaccountofharmwereachtheconclusionthatagentsareunderanegativedutyofjusticenottocreateorupholdinstitutionswhichforeseeablyandavoidablyresultina“humanrightsdeficit”(2008:26).Pogge’sthirdstepisanempiricalone.Hearguesthatwearelivingina“globalinstitutionalorder”(2008:15).Globalpracticesandruleshaveanenormouseffectonpeople’slivesandthesecurityoftheirrights.Many,ofcourse,resistsuchaclaim,arguingthathumanrightsabusesstemfrom“local”variables–suchascorruptelitesanddespoticrulers.However,Poggemakesagoodcaseforthinkingthatglobalrulesoftenencouragesuchunjustformsofgovernance.Hepersuasivelyargues,forexample,thattheassumptionthatthegovernmentofacountryisentitledtotakeoutloans(“theinternationalborrowingprivilege”)andthatitisentitledtoselltheresourceswithinitsjurisdiction(“theinternationalresourceprivilege”)fuelunjustregimes(2008:118–21).Nowifwecombinethesethreetenets,thenwereachtheconclusionthatagentshaveanegativedutyofjusticenottoupholdaglobalorderwhichforeseeablyandavoidablyfailstosecurehumanrights.Agentshaveadutytoeradicateglobalpoverty–notbecausetheyhaveapositivedutyofjusticetoaidtheneedy–butbecausethereisanegativedutyofjusticenottoimposesuchunjustrulesontherestoftheworld.Pogge’sworkisrichandrewardingandmeritsmoreanalysisthanIcangiveithere.Thenegativedutyofjusticethathepostulatesisacompellingone.Inadditiontothishisanalysisofthewaysinwhichinternationalpracticescontributetopovertyispersuasive.Furthermore,sinceweoftenascribegreatermoralimportancetohonor-ingnegativedutiesthantopositiveduties,Pogge’suseofnegativedutiesofjusticegivesitanimportantmotivationaladvantageoverotherarguments.OnepotentialproblemwithPogge’saccountconcernshowmuchglobalpovertyitcanaddress.ThoughPoggehasmadeagoodcaseforthinkingthataffluentstatesandinternationalrulesplayamajorroleincausingglobalpoverty,thereareotherrelevantcausalvariables–including(a)thenatureandpoliciesofstatesindevel-opingcountriesand(b)geographicalfactors.Tostartwith(a):asPoggewouldrec-ognize,someglobalpovertystems,inpart,fromcorruptormisconceivedpoliciesadoptedbystatesindevelopingcountriesandtheircorruptionorincompetenceisnotwhollyexplicablebyglobalvariables.Solocalactorsmustbearsomerespons-ibility.Turningnowto(b),JeffreySachsandPaulCollierhavebotharguedthatgeographicalfactorsplayacausalroleintheproductionofglobalpoverty(Collier2007:Ch.4;Sachs2005:57–9;Sachs2008:212–17;Gallupetal.1999).TwocausalCosmopolitanismandJustice393\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page394factors,inparticular,areemphasized.First,botharguethatwhetheracountryisland-lockedornotmakesasignificantcontributiontowhetheritisimpoverishedornot(Collier2007,Chapter4;Gallupetal.1999,esp.p.184).Second,Sachshasarguedthatmalariacontributestoeconomicunderdevelopmentandsothosewholiveinmalaria-proneareasaredisadvantagedbythatfact(Sachs2005:196–9;Sachs2008:216–17;GallupandSachs2001:85–96).Thishastheupshotthatevenifaffluentstateshonortheirnegativedutyofjusticethereareliketobesome,perhapsmany,livingingrindinganddegradingpoverty(Caney2007:291ff.)–peopleimpoverishedbecauseofgovernmentcorrup-tionorincompetenceorbecauseofaninhospitableclimateortheirgeographicalloca-tion.Pogge’stheorycannot,therefore,eradicateglobalpoverty.Todothatitneedstobesupplementedbypositiveduties.Furthermore,itisnotclearwhyPoggeeschewspositivedutiesofjusticeandwhetherhecanconsistentlydoso.Toseewhetherhecanweneedtoknowwhatrationalehehasforadheringtohisnegativedutyofjus-ticenottoimposeanorderonothers.If,forexample,theargumentisthatpersonshavevitalneedswhichwouldbeunmetifpeopleimposedanunjustorderonthemtheobviousresponseisthatifweattributefundamentalsignificancetopeoplehav-ingtheirneedsmetthenweshouldalsoacceptsomepositivedutiesofjustice(Buchanan2004:89–92).V:CosmopolitanismandHumanity§1.Letusturnnowtoasecondkindofjuridicalcosmopolitanism–whatItermedearliera“humanity-centered”conception.Whyadoptthisapproach?Thebestargumentinfavorofthishumanity-centeredconceptionofcosmopolitanjusticestartsfromtheobservationthatthereisastrongconvictionthatpersonsshouldnotfareworseinlifebecauseofmorallyarbitrarycharacteristicssuchastheirethnicityortheirreli-gionortheirregionalidentity.Distributivejustice,wehold,shouldbeblindtosuchfeaturesofpersons.Thisisevidentinourunderstandingofequalityofopportunity.Hereweholdthatcertainfactors–someone’sclassorethnicity–shouldnotbearontheiropportunities.Nowhumanity-centeredcosmopolitanismadoptsthesameintu-itionandconcludesthatpersonsshouldnotalsofaceworseopportunitiesbecauseoftheirnationalityortheircitizenship.Todosowouldalsobetopenalizepeopleformorallyarbitraryreasons.Thusfarthisargumentisinagreementwiththosecosmopolitanswhoholdthatprinciplesofdistributivejusticeonlyapplywithineconomicschemes.Pogge,forexample,hasfamouslyarguedthatnationalboundariesaremorallyarbitrary.Inanoft-quotedpassagehewritesthat“[n]ationalityisjustonefurtherdeepcontingency(likegeneticendowment,race,gender,andsocialclass)”(1989:247).InasimilarspiritDarrelMoellendorfwritesthat“[s]inceone’splaceofbirthismorallyarbitrary,itshouldnotaffectone’slifeprospectsorone’saccesstoopportunities”(2002:55).Onthishumanity-basedcosmopolitansandinterdependence-basedcosmopolitansareagreed.However,humanity-centeredcosmopolitanismthenarguesthatthereasoningthatbothtypesofcosmopolitanismemploytocriticizethemoralrelevanceofnational394SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page395boundariesalsoshowsthattheboundariesofeconomicschemesarealsomorallyarbitrary.Ifone’s“placeofbirthismorallyarbitrary”(Moellendorf)thensurelyone’sbirthintooneinstitutionalschemeratherthananotherisalsoarbitraryandthusshouldalsonot“affectone’slifeprospects”(Moellendorf).Toascribedifferentialentitlementstopeoplebecauseoftheirmembershipofdifferentschemesistopenalizesomeformorallyarbitraryreasons.Isn’tone’smembershipofascheme“justonefurtherdeepcontingency”(Pogge)?Thisargumentmightbepresentedinadifferentway.Theoriesofjusticecomprise,atleast,twocomponents–anentitlement-bearercomponent(thatspecifieswhoisentitledtowhat)andaduty-bearercomponent(thatspecifieswhoisduty-boundtodowhat).Letusfocusfirstontheentitlement-bearercomponent.Judgedfromanentitlement-bearerperspective,itishardtoseewhymembershipofa“scheme”hasanyfundamentalmoralrelevance.Comparetwopeople–oneinschemeAandoneinschemeB.Supposethenthattheyareequallytalented,equallyneedy,equallyindus-trious,andsoon.Judgedfromtheentitlement-bearerperspectivethereisnoreasonwhyoneshouldreceivemoreorlessthantheircounterpart.“Membershipofascheme”isamorallyirrelevantfactor(Barry1989:239).Nooneisentitledtomorebecauseofitforitdoesnotcorrelatewithanynormaldistributivecriterion.§2.WegainabetterunderstandingofthisargumentifweconsiderarecentcriticismofitdevelopedbyDavidMiller.Millerarguesthatargumentstotheeffectthatnation-alityis“moralarbitrary”relyonanambiguitybetweentwodistinctnotionsofmoralarbitrariness(Miller2007:32–3).Ontheonehand,moralarbitrarinessisusedasapremiss.Underthisreadingafeatureissaidtobemorallyarbitraryifitisone“forwhichpeoplecannotbeheldmorallyresponsible”(ibid.:32).Letuscallthisversion1.Millerthensaysthatsometimesreferringtoapropertyasmorallyarbitraryisto“signaltheconclusionoftheargumentasopposedtoitspremise”(ibid.:32).Callingapropertymorallyarbitraryistosaythatpersonsshouldnottreatpeopledifferentlyonthebasisofthisproperty(ibid.:32).Letuscallthisversion2.Miller’sclaimisthatonecannotsimplyaffirmversion2:weneedanargumentforit.Buthealsoclaimsthatversion1doesnotsupportversion2.Headdsthatitwouldifoneintroducedanewpremiss(premiss2below)andreasonedasfollows:ArgumentA:premiss1:aperson’snationalityisapropertyforwhichshecannotbeheldmorallyresponsible(version1arbitrariness)premiss2:ifapropertyisoneforwhichapersonisnormorallyresponsiblethenitiswrongtotreatthemdifferentlybecauseofthisproperty(newpremiss)Therefore:Conclusion:itiswrongtotreatpersonsdifferentlybecauseoftheirnationality(version2arbitrariness).(Miller2007:33)However,asMillerpointsout,premiss2inthisargumentisobviouslyfalse.Considersomeonewhoisinneed.Thisisapropertyforwhich(letusstipulate)someonecannotbeheldmorallyresponsiblebutatthesametimeitisnottruethatitiswrongCosmopolitanismandJustice395\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page396totreatthemdifferentlytoanable-bodiedpersonbecauseofthisproperty(2007:33).Weoughttotreatpeopledifferentiallyhere.Premiss2isthereforeincorrect.Andtheclaimthatthatpeoplearenotmorallyresponsiblefortheirnationalitydoesnotshowthatitisamorallyarbitraryfactaboutthem.Ibelievethatthisargumentisunsuccessfulforthreereasons.First,andcrucially,thecosmopolitansMillerhasinminddonot,contraMiller,affirmMiller’ssecondconceptionofmoralarbitrariness.Theydonotholdthatitiswrongtotreatpeopledifferentlybecauseofmorallyirrelevantdifferences.Whattheyholdisthatitiswrongthatpeoplefaceworseopportunitiesbecauseofmorallyirrelevantdifferences(whatwemightcallversion3).Sothe(radical)cosmopolitanclaimisthatitiswrongthatpeoplefaceworseopportunitiesbecauseoftheirnationality.ThatXisamemberofonenationshouldnotinformwhatentitlementstheyreceive.CosmopolitansarethusnotseekingtoestablishtheConclusionasitisdescribedinArgumentAabove.Thisiscrucialandifwebearthisinmindwecanseethatthearbitrariness-inspiredreasoningforcosmopolitanismsidestepsMiller’sobjection.ForratherthanofferingArgumentA,theywillofferArgumentBbelow,whichreformulatestheConclusionandpremiss2ofArgumentAinlightofthepointIhavejustmadeabove.Thisargumentreadsasfollows:ArgumentB:premiss1:aperson’snationalityisapropertyforwhichshecannotbeheldmorallyresponsible(version1arbitrariness)premiss2*:ifapropertyisoneforwhichapersonisnormorallyresponsiblethenitiswrongthattheypossessdifferententitlementsbecauseofthisproperty(newpremiss)Therefore:Conclusion*:itiswrongthatpersonspossessdifferententitlementsbecauseoftheirnationality(version3arbitrariness)Nowifahumanity-centeredcosmopolitanmakesthisargument,theycaneasilyaccommodateMiller’spointaboutneed.Theycanagreethatneedinessis(withthepossibleexceptionofsomeself-imposedharms)apropertyforwhichpersonscannotbeheldresponsible.However,andthisisthecrucialpoint,theycanalsoagreewithMiller’sclaimthatthestateshouldtreatpeopledifferentlybecauseofthismorallyarbitraryproperty.Premiss2*doesnotdenythis.Infactpremiss2*emphaticallyaffirmsthispoint,callingfordifferentialtreatmentsothatnooneisworseoffbecauseofmorallyarbitraryfactors.ThusArgumentBprovidesavalidargumentthatmovesfromthefactthatpeoplearenotresponsiblefortheirnation-alitytotheconclusionthatnationalityshouldnotaffectwhatopportunitiestheyfaceinlife.ThisissufficienttoundermineMiller’sargument.However,asecondpointisalsoworthnoting.Miller’scritiqueofcosmopolitaninvocationsofthemorallyarbitrarynatureofnationalityassumesthatcosmopolitansmustaffirmhisversion1concep-tionofmoralarbitrariness.Itisthereforeworthnotingthatthisisnotthecase.Acosmopolitanmighteschewversion1andaffirminsteadafourthnotionofmoralarbitrarinesswherethisfourthconceptionholdsthatapropertyismorallyarbitrary11ifitdoesnottrackanymorallyrelevantproperties.Employingthisconceptionof“moralarbitrariness”,someonemayholdthatnationalityismorallyarbitrary–not396SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page397onthegroundsthatitisapropertyforwhichapersonisnotmorallyresponsible(version1)–butonthegroundsthataperson’snationalitydoesnotcorrespondtoanymorallyrelevantcharacteristics.Thereareanumberofcrediblecriteriathatonemightclaimshouldinformwhoisentitledtowhat.Thefactthatsomeoneisneedyorthattheyaretalentedorindustriousorthattheyareperforminganimportanttaskareallquitereasonablepossiblegroundsfordistributingresourcestothem.(Iamnotendorsinganyofthese,justsayingthattheyareatleastplausiblepossiblegrounds.)Butmembershipofanationdoesnottrackanyofthese.ToclaimthatIamentitledtosomemorebecauseIhaveperformedanunpleasanttask(Ihavecleanedthesewers,say)orbecauseIhaveworkedveryhardorbecauseIamingreatneedareallrea-sonablecandidatesasentitlement-generatingproperties.TosayIamentitledtomorebecauseIamSwedish,bycontrast,isnot.Welackanyreasontothinkeitherthatnationalityisanentitlement-generatingpropertyorthatittrackssomeentitlement-12generatingproperty.LetuscallthisArgumentC.NotethatthisargumentismoreecumenicalthanArgumentB.Itdoesnotrelyon“luckegalitarian”sentimentssuchthatnoshouldbepenalizedbecauseofpropertiesforwhichtheyarenotmorallyresponsible.Itcanallowthatpeoplemayberewardedforproperties(liketalent)forwhichtheyarenotmorallyresponsible.Thus,unlikeArgumentA,itiscompatiblewithadesert-basedtheoryofjustice(e.g.,onethatholdsthatpeopleshouldberewardedaccordingtotheirtalents).Itjustarguesthatnationalityismorallyarbitraryonthegroundsthatitdoesnotmapontoanystandardordefensibledistributivecriteria.Inshort,then,cosmopolitanscangivetwoseparatearbitrariness-inspiredargu-mentsforcosmopolitanjustice,neitherofwhichrestontheambiguitythatMilleridentifies.Itmightbehelpfultoclosethediscussionherebyreflectingonclassorethnicitybecausetheyillustratethecaseforcosmopolitanjustice.Itiswidelyheldthatclassandethnicityaremorallyarbitraryandthereforeshouldnotinformpeople’sentitlements.Myclaimisthataperson’snationalityshouldbethoughtofinanana-logousfashion.Thereasoningunderlyingtheirrelevanceofbothclassandethnicity,ontheonehand,andnationality,ontheother,mightbeeither(i)thatthesearepropertieswhichpeoplearenotmorallyresponsibleforpossessing(àlaArgumentB)or(ii)thatthesepropertiesdonottrackanymorallyrelevantdistributivecriteria(àlaArgumentC).Whicheverversionweadopt,thepointisthattheexamplesofethnicityandclassillustrateacasewhereweall(includingMiller)wouldseethemasmorallyarbitraryandhenceasfactorswhichshouldnotaffectpeople’sentitlements.Onceweseethatnationalityisdirectlyanalogoustothesetwoothercategorieswecanmakefurthersenseofthemoralarbitrarinessofnationality.§3.Miller’sargumentisintendedtounderminebothinterdependence-basedandhumanity-basedcosmopolitanism.Letusnowturntoachallengetohumanity-centeredapproach.Many,forexample,thinkthatithashighlycounterintuitiveimplications.Moellendorf,forexample,challengesthiskindofapproachonthegroundsthatitentailsthecon-clusionthatweoweobligationsofjusticeto“intelligentbeingswithwhomwehavenointercoursebutonlyanawarenessoftheirexistence–say,intelligentbeingsonthesecondplanetorbitingsomedistantstar”(2002:31).CosmopolitanismandJustice397\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page398Idonotthink,however,thatthisisapersuasiveargument.Considerfourpointsinreply.First,itisworthnotingthatbyreferringtosome“distantstar”andto“intel-ligentbeings”Moellendorf’sargumentrunstogethertwoissues–whetherthereareobligationsofjusticetononhumans(aretheseintelligentbeingsaliens?)andwhetherthereareobligationsofjusticetopersonsoutsideofourinstitutionalframework.Referencetothoseonanotherplanetthusunnecessarilymuddiesthewater.Second,thefact(ifitisafact)thatitiscounterintuitivetoholdthattherearedutiesofdis-tributivejusticetopersonsonotherplanetscanbeexplainedbyotherconsidera-tions.Inthefirstplace,(i)wemightverynaturallythinkthatitisnotpossibletohelppeopleona“distantstar,”andifthisisthecasethen(assumingthat“oughtimpliescan”)wewouldconcludethatwelackdutiesofdistributivejusticetothoselivingonthisotherplanet.Inthesecondplace,(ii)wemightalsothinkthatevenifitisitispossibletoaidthoseonadistantstaritwouldbeundulyonerous.Itisnaturaltothink,forexample,thattotransportfoodsupplies,medicines,ortechno-logytopeopleonadistantstarwouldbeveryexpensive.Thethoughtthatwelackobligationsofdistributivejusticetothoseonadistantplanetcanthusbeexplainedby(i)and(ii).Putotherwise:theclaimthat(A)“welackdutiesofdistributivejusticetopersonsonadistantplanet”doesnotthenentailthat(B)“welackdutiesofdistributivejusticetoallwholiveoutsideofour‘scheme’.”Therearereasonswhichexplain(A)whichdonotentail(B).Giventhesefirsttwopoints,abetterwaytotesttheintuitionthatMoellendorfisadvancingwouldbetoconsiderthefollowingexample.Imagineasituationwiththefollowingfourfeatures.First,therearepersonswholiveoutsideofourschemeandwithwhomwehavenolink.Theyliveonanislandandneitherwenoranyoneelseinourschemehaveanydiplomaticortradelinkswiththem.Wealsohavenoimpactontheirenvironment.Itisnotthecase,forexample,thatweareemittinggreenhousegaseswhichleadtodangerousclimatechangeorthatwearedestroyingtheozonelayer.Imaginetoothatwearenotpreventingthemcomingtous.Thewatersbetweenusandthemareperilousandtheyareunabletotraversethembutthisinabilityontheirpartstemswhollyfromnaturalobstacles.Inshortwehaveabsolutelynocon-tactwiththematall.Second,letussupposethattheyarebadlyoff.Third,supposethatweknowoftheirexistence(wecanseewhattheydoacrossthechannelthatdividesusbylookingthroughtelescopes).Fourth,andfinally,supposethatwecaninfacthelpthemandatareasonablecost.Wearebothextremelywealthyandwehavetheknow-howtoeradicatetheirpoverty.This,Ithink,isabetterexampletousethanthedistantplanetexample.Itmakesitclearthatthoseinvolvedarehumanbeings.Furthermore,bymakingclearthatthoseoutsidetheschemecanhelpandcandosoatareasonablecost,itovercomesthelimitationsofthedistantplanetexample.Itmakesusfocusonwhatisatstakehere–shouldsomeone’smembershipornotofourschemesettlewhethertheyareincludedwithinthescopeofdistributivejusticeornot?Oncewereflectonthissituationandwebearinmindthemoralarbitrarinessofbeingononesideofthechannelasopposedtotheotheritdoesnotseemcounterintuitivetoholdthatthoseinthewealthyschemehavedutiesofdistributivejusticetoalleviatethepoverty398SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page39913acrossthechannel.Noneoftheorthodoxdistributivecriteria–suchasdistribu-tionaccordingtoneedortodesert–couldgiveusreasontoexcludethemfromthescopeofjustice.Thedifferencebetweentheneedyonthemainlandandtheneedyontheislandissimplytheirdifferentphysicallocationandthisishardlyamorallysignificantproperty.§4.Twofurtherpointsbearnotingaboutthehumanity-centeredapproach.First,althoughitholdsthatthescopeofprinciplesofdistributivejusticeisnotdeterminedbywhetheraglobalschemeexistsornotitneednotdenythattheextenttowhichthereisglobalinterdependencedoeshavemoralrelevance.Indeeditcanrecognizethatfactsaboutglobalinterdependencehavemoralrelevanceinthreedistinctways.Theextentofglobalintegrationaffects(i)thecontentofdistributivejusticeandthemagnitudeofpeople’sentitlements,(ii)thetypeofdutyofjusticethatpeopleare14under,and(iii)themoralweightofthedutyofjusticethatpeopleareunder.Letusexamineeachinturn,startingwith(i).ConsiderneedypeoplewholiveinaremotesectionofIndonesiaandsupposethatwhileIndonesiaiswithinaglobalscheme,thereare,attimet1,onlyratherminimaltradeandtransportlinkswiththerestoftheworld.SupposenowthattheintensityoftradebetweentherestoftheworldandIndonesiaincreasessuchthatattimet2itismucheasiertofurthertheinterestsoftheseimpoverishedIndonesians.Nowinvirtueofthisincreasedcontactonemightsaythatthedisadvantagedhaveanentitlementtomoreassistancethantheycouldclaimundert1.Att1,membersoftherestoftheworldmaynot,forexample,havebeenabletoprovidethenecessarymedicationforcertaindiseasesbutnowatt2theycandosoatareasonablecost.Asaconsequence,itseemsreasonabletosaythattheneedypeoplearenowentitledtothenecessarymedicationwhereasbeforetheywerenot.Theextentofglobalinterdependencecanthenaffectthenatureofpeople’sentitlements.Considernow(ii).Thepointtobemadehereisthathumanity-basedcosmopolitanscanarguethatwhetherthereisglobalinterdependenceaffectsthetypeofdutythatpersonsareunder.Theywillsaythatwithoutaglobalschemeofinter-dependencetherearepositivedutiesofjusticetobringaboutafairworld.Theycanalsoaddthough(drawingonPogge)thatifthereisglobalinterdependencethenthereisanegativedutyofjusticenottobepartofanunjustglobalorder(Pogge2008).Affirmingahumanity-basedapproachdoesnotprecludeonefromaffirmingPogge’spowerfulclaimabouttheexistenceofnegativedutiesnottocollaboratewithanunjustsetofpracticesandinstitutions.Letusturnnowto(iii).Thisthirdpointfollowsonfromthelastpointbutitmakestheadditional,plausible,pointthatwetendtoascribegreatermoralweight,allthingsconsidered,tonegativedutiesthantopositiveduties.So,withthisinmind,ahumanity-basedcosmopolitancanalsoacceptthatthedegreetowhichthereisglobalintegrationaffectsthemoralweightofourresponsibilitiestoothers.Forifitisthecasethatwehavenegativedutiesofjusticetothosewithinourschemeandifitistruethatnegativedutiesenjoyprioritythenitfollowsthatwhereglobalinterdependenceexiststhenpersonsareunderweightierglobalrespons-ibilitiesthantheywouldbewithoutsuchinterdependence.Inthesethreeways,then,ahumanity-basedcosmopolitanismcanacceptthatthenatureofglobalinterdepend-enceismorallyrelevant.CosmopolitanismandJustice399\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page400Second,itisalsoworthrecordingthatthehumanity-centeredbrandofcos-mopolitanismcanrecognizethattheextentornotofinterdependenceismorallyrelevantinafurtherway.Forexample,itcanholdtheviewthatinequalitieswithinstateshavecertaindistinctiveworryingeffects–forexample,theyleadtolackoftrustandpoorhealthallround(Marmot2004;Wilkinson2005).Toholdthategalitarianprinciplesshouldapplygloballyindependentlyofwhetherthereisaglobalschemeiscompatiblewithholdingthattheremightbesomeconsiderationsinfavorofequalitythatmayapplyonlywithinthestate.VI:ThreeChallengestoCosmopolitanJusticeHavingsoughttomotivatesupportforanegalitarianliberalbrandofcosmopolitanism,onegroundedinparticularonthedignityofpersons,Ishallconcludetheanalysisbyconsideringthreeobjectionsoftenleveledagainstegalitariancosmopolitanideals15ofdistributivejustice.§1.OneargumentthathasbeendevelopedbyMillerandRawlsstartsfromacommit-menttoself-governingpoliticalcommunities.Itthenholdsthatifasocietyisself-determiningit,ratherthanoutsiders,shouldbetreatedasaccountableforthestandardoflivingofitsmembers.Soifonesocietyselectspoliciesthatprovetobesuccessfulandasecondoneselectspoliciesthatarefarlesssuccessfulthenitiswrongtoredistributefromtheformertothelatter(Miller1995:108;Miller2007:68–75;Rawls1999b:117–18).Globalegalitarianismisthusuntenable.Itrequiresredistributionwherenoneisjustified.Severalcommentsshouldbemadeaboutthisoften-invokedargument.Thefirstcon-cernsitstarget.MillerandRawlsemploythisargumenttorejectglobalegalitarianism.Atthesametimetheyalsoembracesomeminimalrights(Miller2007:Ch.7;Rawls1999b:65)andsopresumablyholdthatwhenpoliticalcommunitiestaketrulycalamitousdecisionstheirmembersshouldbesparedbearingtheconsequencesoftheirpolity’sactions.Sotheargumentisthoughttounderminesomedistributiveideals(egalitarianones)butnotothers(minimalones).Theproblemhereisthatwhileonecanseetheforceofthisargumentagainstastrictlyegalitarianviewmany“egal-itarian”cosmopolitanscallforsomethingelselikeaglobaldifferenceprinciple.AnditisunclearherewhyMillerandRawls’sargumentshouldgiveusreasontoabandonaglobaldifferenceprinciple(asRawlsthinksitwould(1999b:117)).Aproponentofaglobaldifferenceprinciplecanreasonasfollows:weshoulddesignaglobalsetofinstitutionsandrulessothat,giventhepredictablechoicesofindividuals,firmsandstatesthatoperatewithinthisframework,thisglobalsetofinstitutionsandruleswillpromotetheconditionofthegloballeastadvantaged.Withinthisfairframe-work,agents(includingstates)shouldtakesomeresponsibilityfortheirdecisionsbuttheglobalframeworkisstructuredsoastomaximizethepositionoftheleastadvantaged.AseconddistinctweaknessinMillerandRawls’sargumentisthatitisunfairtoindividuals.Whyshouldamemberofadevelopingcountrybeeconomically400SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page401disadvantagedbecauseofadecisionthataneliteinthatcountrymadeandwithwhichtheydisagreed(Caney2005a:130)?Ofcourse,aswehavejustseen,MillerandRawlsmayrightlyreplythattheybothaffirmathresholdbelowwhichpeopleshouldnotfall.Sotheextenttowhichindividualswillsuffertheconsequenceofothers’evilorincompetenceislimited.However,howsatisfactorythisisdependspartlyonhowlowthatthresholdis.Supposesomeonedefendsaveryminimalsetofhumanrights,thenthissecondchallengehasconsiderableforce.Whyshouldsome-oneliveatjustabovesubsistencelevelandanotherliveingloriouscomfortwhenthedifferencesintheirqualityoflifestemfromthedecisionsoftheirrespectivegovernmentsandwhenneitherhashadanyinputintothem?Ontheotherhand,ifthethresholdlevelisratherhigh,thenallowingdifferentialoutcomesislesstrou-bling.MillerandRawls’sargumentthusfacesadilemma:eithertheyaffirmaveryminimalsetofrights(inwhichcasetheirargumentisveryunfairtominorityindividualswhosufferbecauseofbaddecisionstakenbyothers)ortheyaffirmamaximalsetofrights(inwhichcase,theirpositionbecomesmuchlessdistinguish-ablefromegalitariancosmopolitanism).§2.Considernowasecondchallenge.Itiswidelyrecognizedthatpersonshavespecialobligationstosome(e.g.,familymembers).Somebuildonthis,arguingthatpersonsalsohavespecialobligationsofjusticetofellownationalsand/orfellowcitizens(Miller1995:Ch.3,2007:34–43).Theythenfaultradicalcosmopolitanismonthegroundsthatitfailstorecognizethis.Thecomplaintthenisthatradicalcosmopolitanismfliesinthefaceofpeople’sintuitionsaboutspecialduties.Againanumberofoptionsareavailabletothedefenderofradicalcosmopolitanism.First,somemightchallengethenationalistclaimthattherearespecialobligationsofjusticetofellownationals.Suchacriticmight(Ithinkshould)affirmtheclaimthatpersonshavespecialdutiestofamilymembersandtofriends.Butshemightchallengeeithertheclaimthatwehavespecialdutiestofellownationalsortheclaimthatanysuchdutiesaredutiesofdistributivejustice.Itisnotimmediatelyapparentthatanindividualhasspecialdutiesofdistributivejusticetoothersjustbecausetheyhappentosharetheirnationality.Asecondresponsewouldbetoadoptamoreconciliatoryapproachandarguethattherearedutiestofellownationalsbutinsistthattheseshouldoperatewithintheparameterssetdownbycosmopolitanidealsof16justice.Thisadoptsamildformofcosmopolitanism.Thereis,however,athirdresponsewhichbothseekstoaccommodatetheobjection’scoreclaim(unlikethefirstresponse)butwhichalsoaffirmsaradicalcosmopolitanism(unlikethesecondresponse).Thisthirdviewstartsfromtheobservationmadeearlierthattheoriesofdistributivejusticecomprisebothclaimsaboutpersons’entitlementsandclaimsaboutpersons’obligations.NowifoneispersuadedbytheargumentsadducedinsectionIII–Vonewillholdthatperson’sentitlementsshouldbespecifiedbyacosmopolitantheoryofjustice.However,onecanaffirmthisandyetholdthatpersons’dutiesofjusticeshouldbeinformedbyone’smembershipofastate.Onthisview,personsmight(ascitizensofastate)haveaspecialdutytoprotectthecos-mopolitanrightsoftheircitizens,aswellasageneraldutynottoviolateandto17protectthecosmopolitanrightsofall.SuchanapproachcombinesacosmopolitanCosmopolitanismandJustice401\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page402accountofpersons’entitlementswitha(partially)statistaccountofpersons’respons-18ibilities.Inthiswayradicalcosmopolitanscanaccommodatetheintuitiondrivingtheargumentfromspecialduties.§3.Considernowathirdchallenge.Recentlysomehavearguedthatsomeorallprinci-plesofdistributivejusticeapplyonlywithincoerciveframeworksandtheyinferfromthisthattheseprinciplesapplyonlywithinthestate.ThomasNagel,forexample,hasclaimedthatnoprinciplesofdistributivejusticeapplyoutsideofcoerciveframe-worksandheaffirmsonlyhumanitariandutiestoaidtheglobalneedy(2005).Moremoderately,MichaelBlakehasarguedthatsomeprinciplesofdistributivejustice(thosesecuringtheconditionsofautonomyforall)applyoutsideofcoerciveframeworksbutthatotherprinciplesofdistributivejustice(inparticular,egalitarianones)applyonlywithinthekindofcoercivesystemcharacterizedbythemodernstate(2001).Whyshouldcoercionmattersomuch?ThefullestanswertothisisgivenbyBlakeandsoIshallconcentrateonhisanalysis.IndeedNagel,ratherengagingly,concedesthat[t]hecosmopolitanconceptionhasconsiderablemoralappeal,becauseitseemshighlyarbitrarythattheaverageindividualbornintoapoorsocietyshouldhaveradicallylowerlifeprospectsthantheaverageindividualbornintoarichone,justasarbitraryasthe19correspondingdifferencebetweenrichandpoorinarichbutunjustsociety.(2005:126).ConsiderthenBlake’sargument.Hemaintainsthatautonomyisvaluableand,assuch,coercioncanbepermissibleonlyifitisjustifiedtothosesubjecttoit.Hefurthermaintainsthatacommitmenttojustificationleadstoacommitmenttoequality.This,however,justifiesequalitywithinthestatebutitdoesnotjustifyglobalegalitarian-ismbecausetheinternationalsystem,hecontends,isnotcoercive(Blake2001).Oneobviouslineofcriticismproteststhattheinternationalorderisinfactcoercive.Borderrestrictionsare,forexample,anobviousinstanceofthis(Arneson2005:150;Tan2004:176–7:cf.173;Abizadeh2007:348ff.).Blake,however,hasanticipatedthislineofcriticism(2001:265,280).Hisreplyisthatthekindofcoer-cionpracticedbythestateisdifferentinkindtoothertypesofcoercion,includingthecoercioninvolvedinpreventingpeoplefrommigrating.Hisconsideredviewisthattherearevariousdifferentformsofcoercionand“eachdistinctformofcoercionrequiresadistinctformofjustification”(2001:280,fn.30).Butthenthissecond20positionisalsoproblematic.Inthefirstplaceitisnotclearwhatformofjusti-ficationwouldfollowfromotherkindsofcoercionsuchas“international”coercion.Inthesecondplace,wehavebeengivennoreasontothinkthattheseotherkindsofjustificationwouldnotjustifyequality.Whyshouldweassumethatthekindofjustificationthatisrequiredbystate-likecoercionleadstoequality?Inshort,then,eitherBlakeclaimsthatstatescoerceonlytheirowncitizens(version1),or,heallowsthatotherkindsofcoercionexist(suchasstatescoercingforeignersortheinterna-tionalsystemcoercingallwithinitsreach)butinsiststhattheydonotleadtotheformsofjustificationthatrequireequality(version2).Neitherversionispalatable.Thefirstisfalsebutthesecondismysteriousandunsubstantiated.402SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page403AsecondproblemwithBlake’sclaimconcernshisassertionthatthereisalinkbetweenthenecessityofjustification,ontheonehand,andequality,ontheother.Twopointscanbemadehere.First,ifcoercivepoliciesareenactedforagoodreasonthenitisnotclearwhythereisneedforanykindofegalitarianremuneration.Ifautonomyisjustifiablyrestricted(saytopreventharmorforce)thenthatrationalealonegivesusreasonenoughtojustifycoercion.Nofurtherfinancialpaymentisduetothosewhohavebeencoerced(Arneson2005:137–8,145–6).Second,Blake’sargumentisarguablyculpableofacategorymistake.Considercoercionagain.Theexerciseofcoercion,onecanagree,doeshavenormativesignificance.Itrequiresthatcoerciveactorsjustifytheiractions.But–andthisisthecrucialpoint–thiscanbedonewithoutleadingtoanycommitmenttoequality.Onemight,forexample,holdthattheexerciseofcoercionisjustifiedif(i)itrespectspeople’shumanrights,(ii)thedecision-makingprocessisprocedurallyfairandgiveseveryonesubjecttothelawsafairopportunitytoparticipateintheprocess,and(iii)thedecision-makersgivethereasonsfortheirpolicies.Thisseems–tomeatleast–alegitimateandfairwaytotreatthosesubjecttocoercion.Andifthisiscorrect,itshowsthatthereisnoneces-sarylinkbetweentheclaimthat“thosewhoarecoercedbythestateareowedajustification,”ontheonehand,andtheclaimthat“thosewhoarecoercedbythestateshouldreceiveequalentitlements,”ontheother.Putbluntly:thefactofcoercion21callsforalegitimatedecision-makingprocessnotegalitariandistributivejustice.VII:ConcludingRemarksCosmopolitanism’scommitmenttotheequalmoralstandingofallpersons(Pogge2008:175)anditsemphasisonthearbitrarinessofnationalandstatebordersmakeitanappealingview.Giventheextentofglobalizationitisnaturaltofocusoninterdependence-basedversionsofcosmopolitanism.Inthischapter,Ihope,though,tohavebroughtouttheappealofahumanity-basedcosmopolitanism.Thelattergivesexpressiontoapoliticalmoralitythatisbasedonrespectingpersons–notquamem-bersofone’snationnorquamembersofone’seconomicscheme–butasfellowhumanbeings.Notes1ThispaperwascompletedwhileIheldaLeverhulmeResearchFellowship.IamverygratefultotheLeverhulmeTrustforitssupport.2Othersuseotherterms.Beitzcallsit“institutionalcosmopolitanism”(Beitz1994:124–5)andPoggetermsit“legalcosmopolitanism”(Pogge2008:175).3Thedistinctionbetween“mild”and“radical”cosmopolitanismfollowsasimilardistinctionmadebySamuelSchefflerbetween“moderate”and“extreme”cosmopolitanism(Scheffler2001:115ff.).4ForthedistinctionbetweenthesetwotypesofcosmopolitanismseeCaney(2003:295–8,2005a:111–15,2007:278ff.).Thedistinctionissimilarto,butdistinctfrom,AndreaSangiovanni’sdistinctionbetween“relational”and“nonrelational”approaches(2007:5–8).Sangiovannidefinesarelationalapproachasfollows:“Thosewhoholdthatprinciplesofdistributivejusticehavearelationalbasisholdthatthepractice-mediatedrelationsinwhichCosmopolitanismandJustice403\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page404individualsstandconditionthecontent,scope,andjustificationofthoseprinciples”(2007:5).Nonrelationalapproachesdenythisandseefactsabouttheexistenceofpracticesasmerelyissuesofhowantecedentlydefinedprinciplesshouldbe“applied”(2007:6).Asweshallsee,whatItermthehumanity-centeredapproachallowsthatthe“content”ofprinciples(andthe“justification”ofthatcontenttothoseprinciples)maybeinformedbytheexistenceorotherwiseofpractices.Factsaboutsocialpracticesarethusnotsimplyamatterofhowantecedently“principlesareapplied”(2007:6).5SeealsoBeitz(1983:esp.595).6Ihavealsosoughttodefendsuchanapproach:Caney(2001,2005a,2007).7Theconceptof“moralpersonality”comesfromRawls(1999a:442–6).8Thereare(atleast)twokindsofissuethatthisquestionraises.First,thereisthequestionofwhetherprinciplesofdistributivejusticeincludeintheirscopepeoplewhodonotbelongtotheirbasicstructure.Itsfocusisonwhichpeopleareincludedwithinthescopeofdistributivejustice.Second,thereisthequestionofwhetherprinciplesofdistributivejusticeapplytopeople’spersonalconductorwhethertheyapplyonlytothebasicinsti-tutionsthatcomprisethebasicstructure.Itsfocusisnotonwhoisincludedwithinthescopeofdistributivejusticebutonwhetheritshouldinformpeople’spersonallife(theirchoiceofcareer,salarylevel,howtheyspendtheirmoney).Foraseminalcontributiontothelatter,seeCohen(2000).Myfocushereisonthefirstquestion.Notethattosaythatthetwoissuesaredistinctisnottosaythatthereisnoconnectionbetweenthetwo.Seenote9below.9TheargumentthatIgiveinthisparagraphissimilarinspirittoCohen’s(2000:136–40).Inbothcases,thecritiqueclaimsthatthereasongivenforfocusingonthebasicstructure(itseffectsonpeople’slives)doesnotyieldtheintendedconclusion.ForfurtherdiscussionofthispointseeCaney(2007:283fn.14).10ThesesixfeaturesofharmcomefromPogge(2008:26).11Thenotionof“tracking”comesfromRobertNozick’sPhilosophicalExplanations(1981:317–26)thoughIemployitinadifferentway.12ThispointismadebyFriedrichHayekinaninterestingdiscussioninTheConstitutionofLiberty(1960).Hayekrepudiates“thecontentionthatmembershipinaparticularcom-munityornationentitlestheindividualtoaparticularmaterialstandardthatisdeter-minedbythegeneralwealthofthegrouptowhichhebelongs”(1960:100).Ashewrites,“[t]hereisclearlynomeritinbeingbornintoaparticularcommunity,andnoargumentofjusticecanbebasedontheaccidentofaparticularindividual’sbeingborninoneplaceratherthananother”(1960:100).13FortheoppositeviewseeRobertNozick’sexamplewithtenRobinsonCrusoesontenislandsinAnarchy,StateandUtopia(1974:185).Nozickdoes,though,haveanexcel-lentsustainedinterrogationoftheassumptionthatdistributivejusticearisesonlywherethereissocialcooperation(1974:185–9).ForaresponseinlinewiththeviewdefendedinthetextseeFabre(2007:152).14Therelationshipbetweenglobalintegrationandthesethreeissuesisrarelydiscussed.ForanexceptionseetheinterestingdiscussionbyJonMandleofthelinksbetweentheextentofglobalintegration,ontheonehand,andthe“content”ofdistributivejusticeandthe“strength”ofthedutiesofdistributivejustice,ontheother(2006:esp.618–21).15Whatfollows,obviously,cannotclaimtobeexhaustive.OtherargumentsareexaminedinCaney(2005a:Ch.5).16SeePogge(2008:Ch.5)andTan(2004:PartIII).Onthemoregeneralquestionofthecompatibilityofglobalegalitarianismwithspecialduties,seeAbizadehandGilabert(2008).17Forthedistinctionbetweenspecialandgeneralrightsandduties,seeH.L.A.Hart(1985).18NotethattheoriginalproponentofthiskindofreconciliationwasDavidMillerinOnNationality.Hearguedtherethatmembershipofanationgeneratesobligationstouphold404SimonCaney\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page405thehumanrightsofone’sfellownationals(1995:75–7).Iamsympathetictothisrec-onciliatorystrategy,but,unlikeMiller,donotthinkthatthespecialresponsibilitiesarisefrommembershipofanation.Rathertheyarisefrommembershipofastateorotherpoliticalorganizations.19ForcriticismofNagel’saccount,seeCohenandSabel(2006)andJulius(2006).20Forfurtheranalysis,see(2008)andalsoAbizadeh(2007:349–51).21AnotherwayofmakingthesamepointistosaythattheexerciseofcoercionraisesthekindofquestionsconcerningthenatureofliberallegitimacythatRawlsexaminesinPoliticalLiberalism(1993)anditisquiteseparatefromthequestionsconcerningthenatureofdistributivejusticethatRawlsexaminesinATheoryofJustice(1999a).ReferencesAbizadeh,Arash.2007.“Cooperation,PervasiveImpact,andCoercion:OntheScope(notSite)ofDistributiveJustice”,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs35(4):318–58.Abizadeh,ArashandGilabert,Pablo.2008.“IsThereaGenuineTensionbetweenCosmopolitanEgalitarianismandSpecialResponsibilities?,”PhilosophicalStudies138(3):349–65.Arneson,Richard.2005.“DoPatrioticTiesLimitGlobalJusticeDuties?”,JournalofEthics9(1–2):127–50.Barry,Brian.1989.TheoriesofJustice:ATreatiseonSocialJustice,Vol.1(London:HarvesterWheatsheaf).Beitz,Charles.1983.“CosmopolitanIdealsandNationalSentiment,”JournalofPhilosophy80(10):591–600.Beitz,Charles.1994.“CosmopolitanLiberalismandtheStatesSystem,”inChrisBrown,ed.,PoliticalRestructuringinEurope:EthicalPerspectives(London:Routledge),pp.123–36.Beitz,Charles.1999.PoliticalTheoryandInternationalRelations(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress),withanewafterwordbytheauthor.Bentham,Jeremy.1843[1786–9].“ObjectsofInternationalLaw,”EssayIofPrinciplesofInternationalLaw,inTheWorksofJeremyBentham,Vol.2(Edinburgh:WilliamTait),ed.JohnBowring,pp.537–40.Blake,Michael.2001.“DistributiveJustice,StateCoercion,andAutonomy,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs30(3):257–96.Buchanan,Allen.1990.“JusticeasReciprocityversusSubject-CentredJustice,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs19(3):227–52.Buchanan,Allen.2004.Justice,Legitimacy,andSelf-Determination:MoralFoundationsforInternationalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Burke,Edmund.1788[1999].“SpeechonOpeningofImpeachment,”inEmpireandCommunity:EdmundBurke’sWritingsandSpeechesonInternationalRelations(Oxford:Westview),ed.DavidP.FidlerandJenniferM.Welsh,pp.203–34.Caney,Simon.2001.“CosmopolitanJusticeandEqualizingOpportunities,”Metaphilosophy32(1/2):113–34.Caney,Simon.2003.“Entitlements,Obligations,andDistributiveJustice:TheGlobalLevel,”inDanielA.BellandAvnerde-Shalit,eds.,FormsofJustice:CriticalPerspectivesonDavidMiller’sPoliticalPhilosophy(Lanham,MD:RowmanandLittlefield),pp.287–313.Caney,Simon.2005a.JusticeBeyondBorders:AGlobalPoliticalTheory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Caney,Simon.2005b.“GlobalInterdependenceandDistributiveJustice,”ReviewofInternationalStudies31(2):389–99.Caney,Simon.2006.“CosmopolitanJusticeandInstitutionalDesign:AnEgalitarianLiberalConceptionofGlobalGovernance,”SocialTheoryandPractice32(4):725–56.CosmopolitanismandJustice405\nCDIC21.qxd2/4/0915:57Page406Caney,Simon.2007.“GlobalPovertyandHumanRights:theCaseforPositiveDuties,”inThomasPogge,ed.,FreedomfromPovertyasaHumanRight:WhoOwesWhattotheVeryPoor?(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress),pp.275–302.Caney,Simon.2008.“GlobalDistributiveJusticeandtheState,”PoliticalStudies(forthcoming).Canovan,Margaret.1996.NationhoodandPoliticalTheory(Cheltenham,Glos:EdwardElgar).Cohen,G.A.2000.IfYou’reanEgalitarian,HowComeYou’resoRich?(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress).Cohen,Joshua,andCharlesSabel.2006.“ExtraRempublicamNullaJustitia?,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs34(2):147–75.Collier,Paul.2007.TheBottomBillion:WhythePoorestCountriesAreFailingandWhatCanBeDoneaboutIt(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Fabre,Cécile.2007.“GlobalDistributiveJustice:AnEgalitarianPerspective,”CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,suppl.vol.31:139–64.Freeman,Samuel.2007.JusticeandtheSocialContract:EssaysonRawlsianPoliticalPhilosophy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress).Gallup,JohnLuke,JeffreyD.SachsandAndrewMellinger.1999.“GeographyandEconomicDevelopment,”InternationalRegionalScienceReview22(2):179–232.Gallop,JohnLuke,andJeffreyD.Sachs(2001)“TheEconomicBurdenofMalaria,”TheAmericanJournalofTropicalMedicine&Hygiene64(1–2):85–96.Hart,H.L.A.1985.“AreThereAnyNaturalRights?,”inJeremyWaldron,ed.,TheoriesofRights(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress),pp.77–90.Hayek,F.A.1960.TheConstitutionofLiberty(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul).Julius,A.J.2006.“Nagel’sAtlas,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs34(2):176–92.Kant,Immanuel.1989[1795].“PerpetualPeace:APhilosophicalSketch,”inKant’sPoliticalWritings(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),ed.withanintro.andnotesbyHansReiss,trans.H.B.Nisbet,pp.93–130.Laërtius,Diogenes.1931:(orig.pubn.dateunknown)“Diogenes,”inLivesofEminentPhilosophers,Vol.II(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress),withE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s.Onmyview,thedutyofjusticethateachofushastowardeveryoneelsehastwoparts.Itrequires,first,thatwerespectbasichumanrights,andsecond,thatnobodybesubordinatedtothearbitrarychoicesofanotherperson.Thefocusofthispaperwillbeonthenonsubordinationrequirement,butletmefirstmakeacommentaboutthehumanrightsrequirement.FollowingtheworkofHenryShue,Ibelievethathuman6rightsgeneratebothso-callednegativeandpositiveduties.Forexample,inaddi-tiontohavingadutyowedtoeveryonenottomurderthem,wealsohaveadutyowedtoeveryonetohelpthemavoidbeingmurdered.Perhapsaviolationoftheformerwouldbeamoreseriousinjusticethanaviolationofthelatter–perhaps,thatis,intheeventofaconflict,theformernegativedutyshouldreceivegreaterweightthanthelatterpositiveduty.Butthisdoesn’tmeanthatwecansimplyignorethelatter,orthatitmightnotoutweighsomeothernegativeduties(forexample,thedutynottolie).Whenhumanlivesareatstake,evenapositivedutycanhavegreatweight.Ifweacceptthatthereisahumanrighttoashareofresourcesnecessaryforadecentlevelofhumanfunctioning,thisobviouslyimpliesthatweallhaveadutynottodeprivepeopleofthoseresources.Butitalsoimpliesthatthereisadutytoassisttheminsecuringsuchnecessities.Andgiventheextentofseverepovertyintheworldtoday,wecitizensofwealthycountriesareviolatingthepositiveduties7–andarguablysomenegativeduties,aswell–thatweowetowardthoseinextremepoverty.Butevenifafocusonsecuringbasichumanrightsgeneratesdutiesofconsider-ableurgency,itdoesnotbyitselfgenerateacommitmenttoegalitarianprinciplesofdistributivejustice.Oncebasichumanrights,includinganecessaryshareofresources,havebeensecured,distributiveinequalitiesabovethatleveldonot(ingeneral)vio-latehumanrights.Nor,Iclaim,doesthenonsubordinationrequirementgenerateageneralprincipleofegalitariandistribution.So,it’ssomewhatunclearhowmycom-mitmenttohumanrightsandnonsubordinationwillgenerateanyegalitarianprin-ciplesofdistributivejusticeatall.Iwilltrytoanswerthatquestionlater,butfirstIwanttodevelopacriticismofaninfluentialargumentforglobalegalitarianismthat,aswewillsee,isbasedonakindofluckegalitarianism.ConsiderKok-ChorTan’sversionofglobalegalitarianismwhichholdsthat“ajustglobaldistributiveschemewouldbeonewhichmeets[Rawls’s]secondprincipleofjustice–equalityofopportunityandtheregulationofglobalequalitybythedif-8ferenceprinciple.”Tanholdsthat“theideaofequalrespectandconcernapplies9globallytoallindividualsandnotjusttocitizenswithinboundedgroups.”Ifacom-mitmenttoequalconcernandrespectgeneratesRawls’segalitarianprinciplesdomest-ically,heargues,italsorequiresthemonaglobalscale.However,Tanrecognizesthat“anaccountofglobaljusticethatdoesnotallowsufficientspaceforthespecialtiesandcommitmentsthatpeoplereasonablyfindvaluableisonewhichpeoplemay10reasonablyreject.”Thesespecialtiesandcommitmentshaveindependentworthandarenottobevaluedsimplybasedontheinstrumentalcontributionthattheymaketowardachievingthegoalofdistributivejustice.Onthecontrary,Tanholds,“theoriesofjusticebeginfromtheassumptionthatpersonalandpartialpursuitsarewhatgiveDistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroad409\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page410meaningandworthtoindividuallives,andthattheaimofprinciplesofjusticeisnottoruleoutthesepartialcommitmentsandpursuitsassuch,buttodefinethesocialcontextwithinwhichindividualsmayfreelyandfairlypursuetheirownpro-11jects.”Iagree,andthisisafundamentalpointaboutliberalconceptionsofjustice:12theyareuncompromisingbutnotall-controlling.Therefore,Tanrestrictstheapplicationoftheegalitarianprinciplestoinstitutionaldesignratherthantothe13regulationof“individuals’day-to-dayinteractionwitheachotherassuch.”Themodelhere,ofcourse,isRawls’sfocusonthebasicstructureofsociety,nowextendedbyTan(andothers)totheglobalinstitutionalorder.ButRawls’sfocusonthebasicstructurehasbeencriticizedbyG.A.CohenandLiamMurphy,amongothers.Cohenarguesthat“justicecannotbeamatteronlyofthestate-legislatedstructureinwhichpeopleactbutisalsoamatteroftheactsthey14choosewithinthatstructure,thepersonalchoicesoftheirdailylives.”Cohenidentifiesthefollowingashis“rootbelief”:“thereisinjusticeindistributionwheninequalityofgoodsreflectsnotsuchthingsasdifferencesinthearduousnessofdifferentpeople’slabors,orpeople’sdifferentpreferencesandchoiceswithrespecttoincome15andleisure,butmyriadformsofluckyandunluckycircumstance.”Ifjusticeaimsatdistributingbenefitsandburdensinawaythatisisolatedfromsuchluckyorunluckycircumstances,thereiscertainlygoodreasontobeconcernedaboutthedesignofbasicsocialinstitutions.Butthereisnogoodreasontobeconcernedexclusivelywithinstitutionaldesign.Afterall,the“ethos”ofasocietyandthechoicesmadebyindi-vidualswillalsoaffectthepatternofdistributionofgoods.Or,asLiamMurphyasks,ifequalityorwell-beingistheunderlyingconcernthatproducesatheoryofjustice,whywouldpeoplenotbedirectlyconcernedaboutthesethings?Ifpeoplehaveadutytopromotejustinstitutions,whydotheylackadutytopromotewhateveritisthatjust16institutionsarefor?Ifwehaveadutytopromoteinstitutionsthateliminatetheinfluenceofbruteluck,whydon’twehaveadutytoeliminatesuchinfluencedirectly?NowonanextremeinterpretationofCohen’sapproach,itwouldbewrongforindividualsevertoactinsuchawaythatresultedinaninequalityunchosenbythepeoplesubjectedtoit.Asithappens,Cohenrejectsthisextremeformofmoralrigorism–orjusticerigorism.Heallowsthat“eachpersonhasarighttopursueher17ownself-interesttosomereasonableextent.”Inotherwords,Cohengrantsthatindi-vidualshaveaself-interestedprerogativethatsometimesallowsthemtooverrulethedemandsofdistributivejustice.DavidEstlundarguesthattheseprerogativesshouldproperlybemuchwiderthanCohensuggests:“GivenCohen’sacceptanceofapre-rogativethatlimitstheclaimsofjustice,allowingsomeroomforthepursuitof18self-interest,heoughttorecognizearangeofrelatedprerogatives.”Butsuchpre-rogativesarelessamodificationoftheaccountofjusticeandmorearecognitionthatothervaluescansometimesbemoreimportant.AsEstlundexplains,theseprerogativesare“permissibledeviation[s]inindividualdeliberationfromwhatsocial19justicewouldrequireconsideredalone.”Thatis,prerogativesaregeneratedbycompetingvaluesthatsometimesoverridewhatdistributivejusticeitselfwouldrequire.Ananalogouspositionisavailabletoaglobalegalitarian.Shecould,forexample,recognizenationalprerogatives,whichwouldprovidescopeforcountries410JonMandle\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page411topursuetheirownnarrowinterestsevenwhendoingsogeneratesinequalitiesamongindividualsgloballythatwouldbecontrarytowhatdistributivejusticewouldrequireconsideredalone.Butanysuchprerogativeswouldrequirethatweabandonourunder-standingofjusticeasuncompromisingbutnotall-controlling.Ifjusticeisamatter20ofpromotingacertainpatternofequaldistribution,thentheonlywaytoavoidmakingitall-controllingistocompromiseitwhenitcompeteswithothervaluesthatmightalsoaffectthepatternofdistribution.Consideranexampleinthedomesticcontext.SupposeIownandrunapizzashop.I’veinvestedeverythinginit,andI’mdoingprettywell.I’msquarelyinthemiddlequintileinincomeinmysociety.You,too,areinthemiddlequintile,workingasanaccountant.Butyou’rereadyforacareerchange.Youdecidetoopenasushibar,andyoudosodownthestreetfrommypizzashop.Yourrestaurantdoesgreatbusiness,luresawaymycustomers,andsoonI’mforcedtoshutdown.Ifallintothelowestquintile,whileyoumakeitintothetop.Assumethatalthoughmylevelofwell-beingplunges,thankstovariousformsofsocialprovision,Istillhaveaccesstoadequatefoodandshelterandhealthcare–andthesameformyfamilymembersanddependents–sothatwe’reallabovethelevelatwhichourbasicfunctioningwouldbeinjeopardy.Infact,supposeoursocietyhasarrangeditsinstitutionssothatcitizensinthelowestquintile–likeme,now–areatleastaswell-offasthecitizensinthelowestquintilewouldbeifwehadanyothersetofinstitutions.Youractionsresultedinadramaticloweringofmylevelofwell-being(aswell21asmy“accesstoadvantage”).Youcreatedanewandsignificantinequality,unre-latedtohowhardIworkedoranychangesinmypreferencesoranythingthatIagreedto.Frommypointofview,itwassimplybadluckthatyouopenedyourrestaurantwhereyoudid.Andyet,Iwanttoinsist,youcommittednoinjusticeagainstme.It’snotcleartomewhetherCohenwouldsaythatyourconductfallswithinapersonalprerogative.Perhapshewouldsaythatthatdependsonyourintentionsinopeningthebusinessandperhapswhatyoudowiththemoneythatyoumake.Butevenifhethinksthatyourconductwouldfallwithinapersonalprerogative,thatwouldn’tshowthatitisjust.Rather,itwouldshowthatitispermissibledespitebeingcontrarytowhatdistributivejusticewouldrequireifconsideredalone.Incontrast22toCohen’sanalysis,Ibelievethatincaseslikethisnotonlyisyourconductjust(notunjust),yourmotivesareirrelevant.Ofcourse,othervirtuesbesidesjusticemaybeatstake,andyourmotivesmayberelevanttothosevirtues.Perhapsyouwereinconsiderateorevenmalicious.Butasfarasdistributivejusticeisconcerned,youhavedonenowrong,regardlessofyourmotivesortheeffectsofyouractionsonmywelfareoreventheeffectsofyouractionsonthegeneralwelfare.Thisisnottosaythattheonlyissueofjusticeiswhetheryourconductislegal(aviewthatCohensometimesattributestohisopponents).Perhapstherearenolawsconcerningslander,andyouscaredcustomersawayfrommyrestaurantbyfalselyclaimingthatmypizzawasmakingpeoplesick.Orworse,supposeyouengageinthisslander,knowingthattherearelawsagainstitbutthatcourtswillnotadmittestimonyfromplaintiffsofmyraceagainstdefendantsofyourrace.Justiceisnotmerelyamatterofconformitywithlaw,sincelawscanbeinadequateorunjust.Yourconductmightbeunjustevenifinconformitywiththelaw.Butinexampleslikethese,theinjusticeisnotthatyouhaveviolatedthenormsofdistributivejustice.TandefendshisinstitutionalfocusagainstCohen’scriticismsbyarguing:DistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroad411\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page412ifweareconcernedaboutequalitybecauseofadirectconcernwithmitigatingtheeffectsofcontingenciesonpeople’slifechances,thereisnoimmediatereasonwhysuchaconcernmusttakeusbeyondthebasicstructure.Thebeliefofinstitutional(luck)egalitariansisthatanappropriatelyorderedbasicstructurewillcomeclosetoannullingtheeffectsofchanceandbruteluckonpeople’sliveswithoutintrudingonpeople’s23libertiestopursuetheirends.Butwehavejustseenacaseinwhichaconcernwithmitigatingtheeffectsofcon-tingencieswouldtakeusbeyondthebasicstructure.Althoughinstitutionscan(andshould)mitigatesomeofthemostdamagingeffectsofbadluck,theycannotcomeanywherecloseto“annullingtheeffectsofchanceandbruteluck.”Tanofferstworepliestothiscriticism.Thefirstisthattheoutcomeof“abusinessventure...isnotthekindofluckthatluckegalitariansneedtonullify,eventhoughhowthings24actuallydoturnoutinthisventureistosomedegreeaffectedbyluck.”Perhapsitisamatterof“optionluck”(forwhichweholdindividualsresponsible)ratherthan“bruteluck”(forwhichwecompensateindividuals).However,iftheimpulsetoegal-itarianismistocompensateindividualsforoutcomesthattheyhavenotchosenorarenotresponsiblefor,itishardtoseewhyIshouldn’tbeentitledtocompensationfromyouwhenyoudrivemeoutofbusiness.Ididn’tformanyagreementwithyouandifnotforyourconduct,Iwouldhavebeenmuchbetteroff.Itmaybetruethatthereareactionsthatwouldhaveprotectedmeagainstthisoutcome.Butthetestofoptionluckcannotbethatindividualscouldhavetakenstepsthatwouldhaveledtoadifferentoutcomesincethiswouldexpandoptionlucktoencompassvirtuallyalloutcomes.Beingstruckbyameteoriteisbruteluck,notoptionluck,evenifIcouldhavemovedtoadifferentspotjustbeforeitstruck,totakeRonaldDworkin’s25example.Tan’sother“moreimportant”replyisthattheinstitutionalfocusisnecessaryinordertomakespaceforindividualchoiceandpursuitofdiverseends.Aslongastheeffectsofluckcanbesufficiently(evenifnotcompletely)mitigatedbyinstitutionalmeans,anyattemptatcounteringtheeffectsofluckinpersonalconductbyinterferingwithpersonalpursuitswithintherulesofjustinstitutionswillbeoverlybroad.Theresidualinequalitiesofluckonpersonallifeisacceptablegiventhegreater26costsofattemptingtoeliminatetheseinequalities.IagreewithTanthatacomprehensiveapplicationofegalitariandemandstopersonalconductisoverlybroad.ButaswesawwithCohen’spersonalprerogatives,Tan’sargumenthereisnotthatpersonalconductisjustevenwhenitgeneratesinequalitiesthatarenotchosen(bythoseaffectedbyit).Rather,hisargumentisthatenforcingjusticeinsuchcaseswouldbetoocostlyintermsofothercompetingvaluessuchaspersonalautonomy.Ultimately,TansharessomethinglikeCohen’s“rootbelief”regardingthenatureofjustice.Ashesays,“Theaimofdistributivejusticeistocounter27theeffectsofunchoseninequalityofcircumstancesonpersons....”Butonceagain,virtuallyanyactionthataffectsothersrisksgeneratinganinequalitythatisnotchosenbythoseaffectedbyit.Ifdistributivejusticeisamatterofeliminatingtheseeffects,itthreatenstobeall-encompassing.BothCohenandTanresistthisimplica-tion–CohenbygrantingpersonalprerogativesandTanwithhisinstitutionalfocus,whichis,ineffect,simplyaverylargepersonalprerogative.Buttheycanonlyavoid412JonMandle\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page413makingdistributivejusticeall-encompassingbycompromisingitwhenitcompeteswithothervalues(suchaspersonalautonomy).Inordertorestoreourunderstandingofjusticeasuncompromisingbutnotall-controlling,weshouldbeginagainwiththetwocomponentsIassertedatthebeginningofthepaper:respectforbasichumanrights(includingarighttoashareofresourcesnecessaryforadequatefunctioning)andnonsubordination.Distributiveinequalitydoesnotviolatebasichumanrightsaslongastherightsaresecuredatanadequatethresholdlevelforall.Nordoesdistributiveinequalitynecessarilysubordinatethewillofonepersontoanother.AsTimScanlonobserves,“Itdoesnotseemthatingeneralweareunderevena‘primafacie’dutytopromotetheequal28welfareofall.”Ontheotherhand,whenindividualssharepoliticalandlegalstruc-tures,thenonsubordinationrequirementputsconstraintsonthepermissibledesignsofthosestructures.Individualshaveadutytoensurethatbasicinstitutionalstruc-turesarejust.Theydonothaveadutytoensurethatanyparticularpatternofdis-tributionisachieved.Soonmyview,thereisnomysteryastowhyopeningyourrestaurantwouldinvolvenoinjusticetowardme.Youhavenodirectegalitariandutyofdistributivejusticetowardme,althoughyoudohaveadutytoensurethatthebasicstructurethatweshareisjust,andassumingittobejust,youhaveadutytocomplywithitsrequirements.Ifthesedutiesaresatisfied,thenthereisnoinjusticebecausealthoughyouractionshaveanegativeeffectonmywell-being,notchosenbyme,theydonotsubordinatemywilltoyours.Thisviewmaylooksuspiciouslylibertarian.Theremayappeartobeaclosesim-ilaritybetweenmyrestaurantexampleandNozick’srejectionofpatternedprinciples29ofdistributivejusticeandhisfamousdiscussionofWiltChamberlain.Butthereisacrucialdifference,andmypositionisnotlibertarian.Afterall,inmyexample,Ispecifiedthatyourconducttakesplacewithinabasicstructureinwhichmembersofthelowestquintiledoatleastaswellasthemembersofthelowestquintilewouldunderanyotherinstitutionalarrangement.Idefendanegalitarianstandard,suchas30thedifferenceprinciple,forevaluatingthebasicstructure.Butwhatgroundsarethereforrestrictingtheegalitarianfocustothebasicstructureandnotevaluatingindividualconductaccordingtothatsamestandard?Forthatmatter,whyshouldegalitarianprinciplesapplyatallif,asI’vesaid,inequalitydoesnotingeneralviolatethenonsubordinationrequirement?31TheanswercanbedevelopedfromanelementofKant’spoliticalphilosophy.SupposethatyouandIwereinastateofnature–thatis,outsideofanypoliticalorlegalstructures.Eachofuscultivatesourcropsinisolationfromeachother,andweareabletosatisfyourbasicneeds.Justicedoesnotrequiredistributiveequalityinsuchasituation.Thefactthatyou’veproducedmorethanIhave,whetherthisisduetohardworkortobruteluck,doesnotbyitselfsubordinatemywilltoyours.Aslongasourbasicrightsaresecure,thereisnotyetanyinjusticeinview.Ofcourse,inthisconditionourbasicrightsarenotverysecureforavarietyofreasons,andthiscreatespressuretoenterpoliticalsociety.ButIwanttofocuselsewhere,andfromhereon,Iwillassumebasichumanrightsarenotatissue.Thereisakindofproto-propertyinthiscondition.Inthesimplestcase,ifIstealthericethatyouhavegrown,Ihavecommittedaninjusticeagainstyou.Ihavedeprivedyouofthemeansthatyouareentitledtouseinpursuingyourendsandhaveappropriatedthosemeanstomyends.Ihave,ineffect,subordinatedyourwillDistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroad413\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page414–orpartofit,anyway–tomine.Wecanalsoimagine,inthiscondition,simpletrading.Imayexchangesomeofmybeansforsomeofthericethatyouhaveproduced.Assuming,intheclassicformulation,thatthereisnoforceorfraud,thereisnoinjusticebecausethereisnosubordination.Butsimplecaseslikethis,onwhichthelibertarianedificeisconstructed,aremisleadingbecausetheydonottakeusfarenough.Ifweinteractwithoneanothermorethanonlyoccasionally,wewillbeabletosustainthissystemofproto-propertyonlyforashorttimeandonlyifweareverylucky.Ormoreprecisely,onlyifweareveryluckywillwebeabletoavoidcommittinginjusticetowardeachother.Toseewhy,considerfirstLocke’sargumentforenteringpoliticalsocietyfromastateofnaturemuchliketheoneI’vedescribed.Nowintheideal,individualswouldbeinaStateofperfectFreedomtoordertheirActions,anddisposeofthetheirPossessions,andPersonsastheythinkfit,withintheboundsoftheLawofNature,withoutasking32leave,ordependingupontheWillofanyotherMan.Intheideal,wewouldexistinastateofjustice.Unfortunately,humannaturebeingwhatitis,soonerorlatersomeonewillbeinclinedtoviolatethelawofnatureand33toactunjustly.Imaybetemptedtostealyourrice,forexample.Inorderforthelawofnaturenottobeinvain,Lockeargues,itmustbeenforced,andifanyone34hasthepowertoenforceit,theneveryonehasthatpower.Butagain,humannaturebeingwhatitis,“itisunreasonableforMentobeJudgesintheirownCases,[since]35Self-lovewillmakeMenpartialtothemselvesandtheirFriends.”Hence,Lockecon-cludes:“CivilGovernmentistheproperRemedyfortheInconveniencesoftheStateofNature,whichmustcertainlybeGreat,whereMenmaybeJudgesintheirown36Case.”So,forLocke,itispossibleforustointeractinthestateofnaturewithoutviolatingthenonsubordinationrequirement.However,owingtothedeficienciesofhumannature–ourtendencytoviolatethelawofnatureandourinabilitytoenforceitimpartially–thisisveryunlikely.Asaresult,itmakessensetosetupastatewiththepowertoenforcethelawofnatureimpartially.ForLocke,enteringpolit-icalsocietydoesnotfundamentallychangethestructureofpropertyrightsthatexistedinthestateofnature.Whatisgainedistheeffectiveandimpartialenforcementofthosepre-existingrights.ForKant,however,thestructureofpropertyrightsinthestateofnaturereallyis37inadequate–hecallsit“provisional”–andnotonlybecauseofhumanfailingsandthelackofimpartialenforcement.Apoliticalstructureisnecessary“however38welldisposedandlaw-abidinghumanbeingsmightbe.”Theimportantissueisnotthehumantendencytoviolatenaturalpropertyrightsbutrathertheirindeterminacy.SupposethatthebeansthatIdelivertoyouinexchangeforyourricearenotofthequalitythatyouexpected,butarenodifferentfromanyothersthatIproduce.Orsupposethatyouclaimtwoun-ownedplotsofland,intendingtorotateyourcropsovertime.Youplantseedsononeplotandallowtheothertogofallow.Seeingthatthesecondplothasnotyetbeenworked,Iplantitandclaimitformyown.OrsupposethatIallowyoutousemytraptohunt,whileIuseyourfishingpole.Youusethetrapproperly,butitisdestroyedbyawildanimal.Ikeepyourfishingpoleascompensation,butyoudemanditback,claimingthatyoudidnowrong.Incaseslikethese,themainproblemisnotthatIhaveviolatedyourpropertyrightsorthat414JonMandle\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page415welackadequateenforcement.Theproblemisdeeper.Thereareindefinitelymanypropertyregimesthatwouldseemtobeconsistentwiththenonsubordinationrequirement.Accordingtosomeofthese,myactionswouldbejustwhileaccordingtootherstheywouldbeunjust.Thespecificationofadditionaldetailsinthesecaseswouldnothelpresolvetheseindeterminacies,norwouldfurtherreflectiononbasichumanrightsandthenonsubordinationcondition.Weneedapoliticalregimenotonlytoapplyandenforcepropertyrightsimpartially,butalsotomaketherights39determinateinthefirstplace.So,forKantitispossiblethatinthestateofnaturewewillsuccessfullytradebeansforrice.Butifwedoso,itisonlybecausewearesimplyluckythatourunder-standingsofourpropertyrightshavenotbroughtusintoconflict.Andwecan’tcountonsustainingthatluck.Althoughtherearemanyschemesofpropertyrightsthatwouldbeconsistentwiththenonsubordinationrequirement,thereisnowaytoselectonewithoutsubordinatingthewillofonepersontoanother.Noindividualhastheauthoritytoimposeanyparticularschemeonanyoneelse.Itispreciselybecauseofthediversityofpotentiallypermissibleschemesandthelackofalegit-imatemechanismforselectingoneofthemthatthereisnowaytoavoidinjusticeinthestateofnature.AsKantexplains,Itistruethatthestateofnatureneednot,justbecauseitisnatural,beastateofinjustice,ofdealingwithoneanotheronlyintermsofthedegreeofforceeachhas.Butitwouldstillbeastatedevoidofjustice,inwhichwhenrightsareindispute,there40wouldbenojudgecompetenttorenderaverdicthavingrightfulforce.Insuchacondition,anyresolutionwouldbeunjustbecauseanyimpositionofaparticularschemewouldsubordinatethewillofonepersontothatofanother.Inordertoavoidtheinjusticeofsubordinatingthewillofonepersontothatofanotherintheselectionofaneconomicschemeandsystemofprivateproperty,weneedajustpoliticalstructure.Weneed,thatis,apoliticalmechanismthatitselfrespectsthenonsubordinationrequirement.Andherewefirstseethetransformationofthenonsubordinationrequirementintoademandforequality–inthiscase,politicalequality.Apoliticalmechanismselectslawsthatwillbecoercivelyimposedonasociety,soifindividualsarenottreatedasequalsinthisprocess,thechoicesofotherswillbecoercivelyimposedonthem,andthisispreciselywhatthenonsubor-dinationrequirementprohibits.Nowthepoliticalequalitythatisrequiredtosatisfythenonsubordinationre-quirementisnotthesameasdistributiveequality,anditmayseemasthoughthe41nonsubordinationrequirementonlyentailstheformer.Thethoughtwouldbethatonceajustpoliticalmechanismisinplace,itcanselectanyoftheeconomicschemesthatwehavealreadyseenarecompatiblewiththenonsubordinationrequirement.Andthereisasenseinwhichthatiscorrect.Anychoicethatajustpoliticalmech-anismmakesfromthisrangeofpermissibleeconomicschemeswouldbelegitimate.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatallofthesechoiceswouldbeequallyjust.Differentmembersofthesociety,weassume,havedifferentpreferencesconcerningwhichofthepermissibleschemeswouldbebest.Nowconsidertheissuefromtheperspectiveofaparticipantinthepoliticalprocess–alegislator,forexample.Onwhatgroundsshouldthelegislatorvoteforoneschemeoveranother?IfshevotesforoneschemeDistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroad415\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page416becauseshebelievesthatherowninterestswouldbestbeservedunderthatscheme,hervotewouldbeviolatingthenonsubordinationrequirement.Shewouldbesay-ingthatshecanelevateherowninterestsovertheinterestsofothersinthedesignofthebasicschemeofrightsthatwillbeimposedoneveryone.Votingontheinter-estsofanynarrowconstituencywouldbeobjectionableforthesamereason.Torespectthenonsubordinationrequirementinselectinganeconomicscheme,aconscientiouslegislatormustvoteonthebasisofprinciplesthatcanbejustifiedtoallreasonablecitizens,notonlytosome.Itisanontrivialtasktodeterminewhichprinciplescanbejustifiedtoallreason-ablecitizens.OnewaytomodelthischoiceistoconsideritfromRawls’soriginalposition.Thisheuristicdevicehasthevirtueofdisplayingthetransitionfromthenonsubordinationconditiontotheegalitarianprinciplesofdistributivejustice.IthinkastrongcasecanbemadethatthepartieswouldchooseRawls’sprinciplesofjustice–anequalschemeofbasicliberties(includingensuringthefairvalueofthepoliticalliberties),aswellasfairequalityofopportunityandthedifferenceprinci-ple–butmyargumentdoesnotdependonthedetailsoftheseprinciples.Thepointisthatwewillgetsomekindofegalitarianconstraintonthedesignofthebasiceconomicinstitutions.Anythingelsewouldsubordinatethewillofonetothatofothersintheselectionandimpositionofaschemeandthereforewouldbeunjust.Aschemethatislessegalitarianthantheprinciplesrequiremaystillbelegitimateifitisselectedbyajustpoliticalprocedure.Andthismaybesufficienttoavoidtheproblemofinjusticeinthestateofnaturethatwediscussed.Butiftheselectionoftheschemeisbasedonprinciplesthatcannotbejustifiedtoall,thenthereisstillaviolationofthenonsubordinationrequirementandthereforetheselectionofthatscheme,eveniflegitimate,isunjust.So,I’vearguedthatfromthestateofnatureitisarequirementofjusticethatindividualsmakeacollectivedecisionconcerningtheschemeofpropertyrightsthattheywillenforceagainstoneanother.Weneedapoliticalmechanismtodothis,andthenonsubordinationrequirementmustapplytothisprocessaswellastotheschemechosen.Thisismoredemandingthanitmightseem,forthenonsubordinationrequire-mentineffectbecomesastandardofreciprocitythatappliestothedesignofthepoliticalstructureaswellastothejustificationsthatareofferedwithinthatprocess.Anequalrighttovote,forexample,isinsufficientbyitself.Ifanumericalmajorityselectsaschemeonthebasisoftheirnarrowself-interest,aminoritymayproperlycomplainthattheirwillsarebeingsubordinatedtothoseofthemajorityintheselec-tionprocess.Fundamentalpoliticaldecisionsmustnotbemerelyanexpressionoftheprivateinterestsofthemajority.Theymustnotsimplyreflectthewillofall,asRousseauwouldputit.Politicalactorsmustaimtoprovidejustificationsthatall42reasonablecitizenscanaccept.Theymustaimatidentifyingthegeneralwill.Byreflectingonthechoicefromtheoriginalposition,wecanconsiderwhichprinciplesshouldapplytotheschemeofpropertyrightsinordertomeetthisjustificatoryburden.Whateverthedetails–andagain,Ileavethemaside–itseemsclearthatitwillinvolvesomekindofegalitariancommitment.Thecollectivedecisionregardingeconomicschemesmusttreatallindividualsasfreeandequal.OntheviewthatIhavebeendefending,aschemeofpropertyrightsisnotpurelyconventional,sinceitmustrespectbasichumanrightsandthenonsubordinationrequire-ment.However,propertyrightsareessentiallyindeterminateandincompleteoutside416JonMandle\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page417ofalegitimatepoliticalandlegalsystemthatcanspecifythem,applythemtopar-43ticularcases,andenforcethosejudgments.Kant’sinsightwasthatjusticeitselfrequiresthatweenterintoalegitimatepoliticalstructureinordertoavoidinjusticeinourpropertyclaims.Whenitcomestotheselectionofaschemeofpropertyrightsthroughajustpoliticalmechanism,thenonsubordinationrequiremententailsanegalitarianstandard.However,distributivejusticeisnotamatterofachievinganyparticularpatternofdistribution.AsRawlsputsit,“Ifitisaskedintheabstractwhetheronedistributionofagivenstockofthingstodefiniteindividualswithknowndesiresand44preferencesisbetterthananother,thenthereissimplynoanswertothisquestion.”Instead,distributivejustice,asopposedtoallocativejustice,isamatterofpurepro-45ceduraljustice.Onceajustschemeofpropertyrightsandeconomicinstitutionsisinplace,“thedistributionthatresultswillbejust(oratleastnotunjust)whatever46itis.”Alargeinequalityintheresultingallocationofgoodsmaybeunjustifitcameaboutthroughaviolationofjustprocedures,orifitunderminesthefairvalueofthepoliticalliberties,orifitunderminesfairequalityofopportunity,orifitgen-eratesexcusableenvythatunderminesself-respect.Beyondthis,alargeinequalitymaybeevidencethatthebasicstructuredoesnotsatisfythedifferenceprincipleifitseemslikelythattheleastadvantagedwoulddobetterunderadifferenteconomicregime.Butevenifthisisso,theinjusticeliesnotdirectlywiththesharesthatdif-ferentpeoplereceivebutwiththebackgroundinstitutionalarrangement.Theinsti-tutionalscheme,notthespecificallocationofgoods,issubjecttoanegalitarianrequirementbecauseitisintheselectionoftheschemethatthenonsubordinationrequirementmightbeviolated.Uptothispoint,I’vebeentalkingabouttheglobalegalitariansinthefirstgroupthatIidentifiedatthebeginningofthispaper.NowIwanttosaysomethingverybrieflyaboutthoseinthesecondgroupwhopredicatetheiregalitarianismontheemergenceofglobalinstitutions.NearthebeginningofATheoryofJustice,whenRawlsintroducestheideaofthebasicstructure,hewrites:“Thebasicstructureistheprimarysubjectofjusticebecauseitseffectsaresoprofoundandpresentfrom47thestart.”Cohencitesthispassagetomakethecaseforapplyinganegalitarian48standardnotonlytothebasicstructurebuttoindividualactionsaswell.Afterall,aswehaveseen,individualactionscandramaticallyaffectthedistributivesharesofothers.Inaneraofglobalization,internationalinstitutionscanalsohaveprofoundeffectsonthewell-beingofindividualsaroundtheworld.Notsurprisingly,DarrelMoellendorfcitesthissamepassagefromRawlswhenhearguesthatbecausetheglobaleconomyhasasubstantialimpactonthemoralinterestsofpersonsinvir-tuallyeverycorneroftheworld...dutiesofjusticeexistbetweenpersonsgloballyandnotmerelybetweencompatriots.Theeffectsofglobaleconomicinstitutionsandprin-49ciplesonthelifeprospectsofpersonsare,inRawls’swords,“profoundfromthestart.”ButIhavebeenarguingthathavingprofoundeffectsonothersisinsufficientto50establishthatthereareegalitariandemandsofdistributivejustice.Economicschemesmustsatisfyanegalitarianstandardbecausethatistheonlywayforthemtosatisfythenonsubordinationrequirement.Butassumingsuchaschemetobeinplace,anindividualactiondoesnotviolatethisrequirementevenwhenitseffectontheallocationofgoodsisprofound.DistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroad417\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page418Justicedoesnotrequirethatthedistributionofgoodsconformtoanyparticularpattern,eitherdomesticallyorglobally.Distributiveinequalityassuchdoesnotoffendjustice,eitherdomesticallyorglobally.Ofcourse,asIsaidearlier,humanrightsdoapplyglobally,andgiventheextremepovertyintheworldtoday,inequalitypointstoourunfulfilledobligationtoprovideassistanceinsecuringthem.Thenonsubor-dinationconditionalsoputsconstraintsonpermissibleglobalinteractionsthatare51arguablyviolatedbycurrentpractice.Forexample,althoughallmembersoftheWorldTradeOrganizationhavenominallyequalstanding,so-called“green-room”nego-tiationsoftenexcludeallbutthemostpowerfulstates,and“closeto70percentofthetotaldeveloping-countrymembershipoftheWTO...washandicapped”bylackofadequatestaffing.Amongdevelopingcountries,“thevastmajorityhaveonlyweak52ornorepresentation.”AndtheInternationalMonetaryFund,whichonedefenderofglobalizationhasdescribedas“asecretiveandarrogantorganization,”doesnot53haveevenaformalpolicyofonecountry,onevote.Thesepoliciesandpracticesarguablysubordinatethechoicesofthemembersofonestatetothoseofanother.Butagain,noneofthisentailsanegalitarianprincipleofglobaldistributivejustice.Letmeconcludebyconsideringtwoobjections.First,itmightbeacknowledgedthatglobalinequalityassuchdoesnotviolatethenonsubordinationconditionandsoisnotunjust.However,withincreasedinternationaltrade,therearemoreandmoreopportunitiesforconflictsamongdifferentsystemsofpropertyandprivatelaw.Ifthereisadisputeamongpartiestoaninternationalcontract,underwhichsystemshoulditbeadjudicated?Justasinthestateofnaturetheimpositionofoneparty’sjudgment(evenifreasonableinitself)onanotherwouldviolatethenonsubordina-tionrequirementandbeunjust,itmightbearguedthatweneedaglobalsystemofpropertythatwillcarryegalitariandemandswithit.Thisargumentisnotsuccessfulbecausetherearecrucialdifferencesbetweenindividualsinthestateofnature,wheretherearenolegitimatepoliticalstructures,54andindividualswhoaresubjecttodifferentlegitimatesystemsofproperty.Inter-nationalcontractscanraisedifficulties,buttheseareissuesofjurisdictionwhichcanusuallyberesolvedthroughalargebodyofcaselaw,bi-ormultilateraltreaties,or,perhapsmostsimply,byhavingthecontractitselfspecifytheapplicablesystemfordisputeresolution.Noneofthesemechanismsisavailabletopartiesinthestateofnature,wherenosystemofprivatelawisavailable,andthereforethereisnononarbitrarymechanismforthespecificationofrights,orfortheirapplicationtoparticularcases,orfortheenforcementofsuchjudgments.Whetherornotitisarequirementofjusticethatweestablishaglobalsystemofproperty,perhapsitwillbesaidthatwealreadyhaveone,carryingwithitegalitariandemands.NothingI’vesaidrulesoutthepossibilityofcreatingsuchaglobalscheme,butitdoesnotyetexist.Wedonothaveaglobalpoliticalmechanismthatcanspecifythecontentofpropertyrights,aglobaljudiciarythatcanapplythemtoparticularcases,oraglobalenforcementmechanism.TheWTOhasmadesomecon-55troversialmovesinthisdirectionwithrespecttointellectualproperty.Butwearefarfromthepointthatwecouldproperlysaythatthereisasingleglobalsystemofpropertyandprivatelaw,andthereareessentiallynoprospectsforsuchasystemintheshortorevenmediumterm.TheEuropeanUnionisperhapsanothermatter,anditmayverywellbethecasethatitissufficienttogenerateegalitariandistributivedemandsacrossthebordersofitsmemberstates.Thespecificsofthiscasecontinue418JonMandle\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page419toevolve,andIremainagnosticonthispoint.Stilltheveryuncertaintyaboutthiscaserevealsjusthowfarwearefromasinglesystemofpropertyandprivatelawonaglobalscale.Globalizationhasincreasedourinfluenceononeanotheracrossborders.Wenowhavenewopportunitiestoenterintocooperativeprojectstopursueourvariousgoals.Therearealsonewopportunitiesforinjustice,whenwefailtorespectthebasichumanrightsofothersorsubordinateandexploitthem.Butjusticedoesnotrequirethatwepromoteapatternofequaldistributionofgoodsonaglobalscaleanymorethanitrequiresthatwedosoinourordinary,day-to-dayactivities.Rather,itrequiresthatweuseegalitarianstandardswhenwedesignourbasicinstitutions,includingbothourpoliticalinstitutionsandthestructureofourpropertyrights.Thestrongtemptationistothinkthategalitariandemandsonthedesignofthebasicstructurearisefromtheindependentvalueofanequalallocationofgoods.Butthisgetsthingsclosetobackwards.AsArthurRipsteinargues,itisamistaketoassume“thatmoral-ityiscompletewithoutinstitutions,sothatinstitutionsshouldbedesignedsoasto56approximatearesultthatcanbespecifiedwithoutreferencetothem.”Justicerequiresthatweenterapoliticalstructureguidedbytheidealsoffreedomandequalityinordertomakeourrightscompleteanddeterminate.Suchstructuresfundamentallychangeourrelationswithoneanotherbecausetheygiveeachofusaschemeofdeterminaterightscompatiblewithalikeschemeforothers.Inordertoavoidunjustsubordination,wemustassessthoseschemesthatwecoercivelyimposeonourselvesaccordingtoanegalitarianstandard.Ifwehadaglobalpoliticalstructurethathadtheabilitytospecifyrights,applythem,andenforcethem,thenittoowouldbesubjecttoanegalitarianstandardofevaluation.Butaglobalpoliticalorderisnotrequiredbyjustice,andinitsabsencethereisnooccasionforegalitariandemandsofdistributivejusticeonaglobalscale.Notes1VersionsofthispaperwerepresentedattheXXIIIWorldCongressofPhilosophyofLawandSocialPhilosophyinKrakow,Poland,August2007,andattheUniversityofTennessee,inNovember2007.Thankstobothaudiences,andtoKristenHessler,GeorgeKlosko,andArthurRipsteinforvaluablediscussionandsuggestions.2See,forexample,DavidRichards,“InternationalDistributiveJustice”inJ.RolandPennockandJohnChapman,eds.,Ethics,Economics,andtheLaw:NOMOSXXIV(NewYork:NewYorkUniversity,1982);Kok-ChorTan,JusticeWithoutBorders:Cosmopolitanism,NationalismandPatriotism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004);andSimonCaney,JusticeBeyondBorders:AGlobalPoliticalTheory(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005).3See,forexample,CharlesBeitz,PoliticalTheoryandInternationalRelations,withanewafterword(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1999);andDarrelMoellendorf,CosmopolitanJustice(Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,2002).4See,forexample,JohnRawls,TheLawofPeoples(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999);MichaelBlake,“DistributiveJustice,StateCoercion,andAutonomy,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs30(3)(Summer2001);andJonMandle,GlobalJustice(Cambridge:PolityPress,2006).5See,forexample,thedatacitedinMandle,GlobalJustice,Ch.5.DistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroad419\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page4206HenryShue,BasicRights:Subsistence,Affluence,andU.S.ForeignPolicy,2ndedn.(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1996).Cf.Mandle,GlobalJustice,Ch.4.7SeeThomasPogge,WorldPovertyandHumanRights(Cambridge:PolityPress,2002).8Tan,JusticeWithoutBorders,pp.60–1.9Tan,JusticeWithoutBorders,p.6.10Tan,JusticeWithoutBorders,p.135.Seealsohis“JusticeandPersonalPursuits,”JournalofPhilosophy101(7)(Jul.2004).11Tan,JusticeWithoutBorders,p.157.12ThisphraseisusedbyDavidEstlund,“Liberalism,Equality,andFraternityinCohen’sCritiqueofRawls,”TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy6(1)(1998),p.107,whocitesRawls’sclaimthatalthoughjusticeis“givenprecedence,”thatdoes“notmakeitallcon-trolling.”(JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice,rev.edn.(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1999),p.495).13Tan,JusticeWithoutBorders,p.157.14G.A.Cohen,IfYou’reanEgalitarian,HowComeYou’reSoRich?(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000),p.122.15Cohen,IfYou’reanEgalitarian...,p.130.16LiamMurphy,“InstitutionsandtheDemandsofJustice,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs27(4)(Fall1998):280.ItisnotobviousthatCohenwouldendorsethisposition.SeeThomasPogge,“OntheSiteofDistributiveJustice:ReflectionsonCohenandMurphy,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs29(2)(Spring2000),esp.154–63.17Cohen,IfYou’reanEgalitarian...,p.206,n.24.Cf.G.A.Cohen,“Incentives,Inequality,andCommunity,”inGrethePeterson,ed.,TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues,vol.13(SaltLakeCity:UniversityofUtahPress,1992),pp.302–3.18Estlund,“Liberalism,Equality,andFraternityinCohen’sCritiqueofRawls,”p.102.ForothervaluablediscussionsofCohen’sposition,seeAndrewWilliams,“Incentives,Inequality,andPublicity,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs27(3)(Summer1998);PaulSmith,“IncentivesandJustice:G.A.Cohen’sEgalitarianCritiqueofRawls,”SocialTheoryandPractice24(2)(Summer1998);JoshuaCohen,“TakingPeopleasTheyAre?”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs30(4)(Fall2001);SamuelScheffler,“IstheBasicStructureBasic?”inChristineSypnowich,ed.,TheEgalitarianConscience:EssaysinHonourofG.A.Cohen(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2006).19Estlund,“Liberalism,Equality,andFraternityinCohen’sCritiqueofRawls,”p.102.20Ingeneral,Iwillnowuse“inequality”asshorthandforanydistributioncontrarytowhat-everpatternistakentoberequiredbytheprinciplesofdistributivejustice,including,forexample,thegoalofeliminatingtheinfluenceofluckorunchosencircumstances.Theprecisemetricisunimportanttomyargument.21G.A.Cohen,“OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice,”Ethics99(4)(Jul.1989).22Cases,thatis,inwhich:1.thebasicstructureisjust;2.theconductislegallypermis-sible;3.thebasicinstitutionaldesignisnotatstake;4.basichumanrightsviolationsarenotatstake;and5.noperson’sprivatewillissubordinatedtoanother’s.23Tan,“JusticeandPersonalPursuits,”p.356.Inthisarticle,Tandoesnotendorseluckegalitarianism,butelsewherehedoes.See,forexample,note27below.24Tan,“JusticeandPersonalPursuits,”p.357.25RonaldDworkin,SovereignVirtue(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2000),p.73.26Tan,“JusticeandPersonalPursuits,”pp.358–9,noteexcluded.27Tan,JusticeWithoutBorders,p.70.28T.M.Scanlon,“TheDiversityofObjectionstoInequality”repr.inTheDifficultyofTolerance(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),p.206.29RobertNozick,Anarchy,State,andUtopia(NewYork:BasicBooks,1974),pp.149–64.420JonMandle\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page42130Thereareotherimportantdifferencesbetweenmypositionandstandardlibertarianviews.Forexample,libertariansoftenassumethattherearenopositivedutiesinthestateofnature.ButIhavealreadyassertedthathumanrightsgeneratebothnegativeandposi-tiveduties.Seenote6above.31MyaimisnottoofferaninterpretationofKant,buttopursueanddevelopalineofargumentthathesuggests.I’mindebtedtoaseriesofarticlesbyArthurRipsteinthatbringoutthisposition.Seeesp.“AuthorityandCoercion,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs(1)(Winter2004);“PrivateOrderandPublicJustice:KantandRawls,”VirginiaLawReview92(2006);and“KantandtheCircumstancesofJustice”inElisabethEllis,ed.,Kant’sPoliticalTheory:InterpretationsandApplications(UniversityPark,PA:PennStatePress,forthcoming).32JohnLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,ed.PeterLaslett(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1960),secondtreatise,sec.4,p.269.33Or,moreprecisely,someonewillaccusesomeoneelseofviolatingthelawofnature.Thestructureoftheproblemisthesamewhethertherewasanactualviolationornot.34Locke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,secondtreatise,sec.7,pp.271–2.35Locke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,secondtreatise,sec.13,p.275.36Locke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,secondtreatise,sec.14,p.276.37AllcitationstoworksbyKantwillbetothetranslationsincludedinPracticalPhilosophy,ed.MaryGregor(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),asfollows:TheMetaphysicsofMorals,sec.9and15,pp.409,416[Ak.6:256,264].38Kant,TheMetaphysicsofMorals,sec.44,p.456[Ak.6:312].39Kanthimselfrecommendsresolutionstosomeanalogousproblemsinthestateofnature,despitehisclaimthat“Theindeterminacy,withrespecttoquantityaswellasquality,oftheexternalobjectthatcanbeacquiredmakesthisproblem(ofthesole,originalexter-nalacquisition)thehardestofalltosolve.”(TheMetaphysicsofMorals,sec.15,p.418[Ak.6:266].Forexample,heasks,“inordertoacquirelandisitnecessarytodevelopit(buildonit,cultivateit,drainit,andsoon)?”Andheanswers:“No....Whenfirstacqui-sitionisinquestion,developinglandisnothingmorethananexternalsignoftakingpossession,forwhichmanyothersignsthatcostlesseffortcanbesubstituted”(TheMetaphysicsofMorals,sec.15,p.417[Ak.6:265]).Signs,however,areconventional,andaresubjecttodisputeintheabsenceofanauthoritativedetermination.Healsosug-geststhatwhenanobjectisloaned,theborrowerisresponsibleiftheobjectislostordamaged(regardlessofnegligence).Butthisseemstobelargelyanappealtoconventionaswell:“Foritisnotamatterofcoursethattheowner,inadditiontograntingtheborrowertheuseofhisthing...hasalsoissuedtheborroweraguaranteeagainstanydamagethatcouldarisefromhishavingletitoutofhiscustody”(TheMetaphysicsofMorals,sec.38,p.444[Ak.6:298–9]).40Kant,TheMetaphysicsofMorals,sec.44,p.456[Ak.6:312].41Kanthimselfapparentlythoughtthis.See,forexample,“OntheCommonSaying:ThatMayBeCorrectinTheorybutNotinPractice,”p.292[Ak.8:291–2].Ontheotherhand,hedidholdthatalegitimatestatemust“maintainthosemembersofthesocietywhoareunabletomaintainthemselves.Forreasonsofstatethegovernmentisthereforeauthor-izedtoconstrainthewealthytoprovidethemeansofsustenancetothosewhoareunabletoprovideforeventheirmostnecessarynaturalneeds”(TheMetaphysicsofMorals,sec.49,p.468[Ak.6:326]);cf.“OntheCommonSaying...,”p.298[Ak.8:298–9].42ForRousseau,thegeneralwillisthebasisofthedemandfortheequalityamongcitizens:“thefundamentalpact,ratherthandestroyingnaturalequality,onthecontrarysubsti-tutesamoralandlegitimateequalityforwhateverphysicalinequalitynaturemayhaveplacedbetweenmen,andthatwhiletheymaybeunequalinforceoringenius,theyallbecomeequalbyconventionandbyright.”Rousseau,TheSocialContractandOtherLaterDistributiveJusticeatHomeandAbroad421\nCDIC22.qxd2/4/0915:57Page422PoliticalWritings,ed.VictorGourevitch(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),Bk.I,Ch.9,para.8,p.56.43Ripstein,“AuthorityandCoercion,”p.32.44Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,p.76.45Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,p.77.46Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,p.267.47Rawls,ATheoryofJustice,p.7.48Cohen,IfYou’reandEgalitarian...,pp.138–9.49Moellendorf,CosmopolitanJustice,pp.37–8.50SeeRipstein,“PrivateOrderandPublicJustice,”p.1437.51Thus,theviewIamdefendingisaformofwhatJoshuaCohenandCharlesSabelcall“weakstatism”in“ExtraRempublicamNullaJustitia?”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs34(2)(Spring2006),p.150.52ConstantineMichalopoulos,DevelopingCountriesintheWTO(London:Palgrave,2001),pp.159–60.OnexclusivenegotiationsattheWTO,seeKentJones,Who’sAfraidoftheWTO?(NewYork:Oxford,2004),p.26.53MartinWolf,WhyGlobalizationWorks(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2004),p.289.54CompareKant,“TowardPerpetualPeace,”p.327[Ak.8:355–6]:“whatholdsinaccord-ancewithnaturalrightforhumanbeingsinalawlesscondition,‘theyoughttoleavethiscondition,’cannotholdforstatesinaccordancewiththerightofnations(since,asstates,theyalreadyhavearightfulconstitutioninternallyandhencehaveoutgrowntheconstraintofotherstobringthemunderamoreextendedlaw-governedconstitutioninaccordancewiththeirconceptsofright).”Instead,heargues,reasonrequiresa“pacificleague”that“doesnotlooktoacquiringanypowerofastatebutonlytopreservingandsecuringthefreedomofastateitselfandofotherstatesinleaguewithit,butwithouttherebeinganyneedforthemtosubjectthemselvestopubliclawsandcoercionunderthem(aspeopleinastateofnaturemustdo).”55TheAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights(TRIPS)itselfarguablyviolatedthenonsubordinationrequirementinbothitscontentandtheprocessofitscre-ation.It“wasamajorsourceoftheNorth–Southcontentioninthelead-uptotheUruguayRound[thatcreatedtheWTO].”Eventually,“theECandtheUnitedStatessuccessfullydraftedanintellectualpropertyagreementinthecontextoftheUruguayRoundandimposeditondevelopingcountries.”JohnBarton,JudithGoldstein,TimothyJosling,andRichardSteinberg,TheEvolutionoftheTradeRegime:Politics,LawandEconomicsoftheGATTandtheWTO(Princeton,NJ;PrincetonUniversityPress,2006),p.140.TRIPSisaratheranomalouspartoftheWTO,since“themaineffectoftheagreementistoprotectrentsinprofitableactivities.ThethrustoftheTRIPSisthereforeverydifferentfromthenotionof‘drivingout’rentsbythesteadyreductionofprotectionattheborder.”Barton,etal.,TheEvolutionoftheTradeRegime,p.142.EvenmanydefendersoftheWTOarecriticalofTRIPS.See,forexample,Jones,Who’sAfraidoftheWTO?,pp.158–60,andWolf,WhyGlobalizationWorks,pp.216–17.56Ripstein,“PrivateOrderandPublicJustice,”p.1411,n.47;cf.p.1392.422JonMandle\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page423GLOBALJUSTICEHUMANRIGHTSContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page425CHAPTERTWENTY-THREETheDarkSideof1HumanRightsOnoraO’NeillInhisReflectionsontheRevolutioninFranceEdmundBurkeasksWhatistheuseofdiscussingaman’sabstractrighttofoodormedicine?Thequestionisuponthemethodofprocuringandadministeringthem.InthatdeliberationIshallalwaysadvisetocallintheaidofthefarmerandthephysicianratherthanthepro-2fessorofmetaphysics.Burke’squestionissharp.Whatisthepointofhavingaright?Morespecificallywhatisthepointofhavinganabstractright,unlessyoualsohaveawayofsecuringwhateveritisthatyouhavearightto?Whyshouldweprizenaturalorabstractrightsifthereisnowayofensuringtheirdelivery?Andifweneedtosecuretheirdelivery,arenot“thefarmerandthephysician”notmerelyofgreaterusethanabstractornaturalrights,butalsoofgreaterusethanpositiverightstoclaimfoodormedicine?Forahungryperson,positiveandjusticiablerightstofoodaretobesurebetterthanabstractrightsthatarenotjusticiable:butthosewhoknowhowtogrow,harvest,store,andcookfoodaremoreuseful,andhavingthefoodisbetterstill.Whenweareill,positiveandjusticiablerightstohealthcarearetobesurebetterthanabstractrightsthatarenotjusticiable:butskilleddoctorsandnursesaremoreuseful,andreceivingtheircareisbetterstill.InawayitissurprisingtofindBurkediscussingabstractrightstofoodorhealth-care,forthesepresumedrightscametofullprominenceonlyinthelatetwentiethcentury.Theyarecommonlycalledwelfarerights,andcontrastedwithlibertyrights.This,Ithink,isamisnomer.Thesalientfeatureoftheserightsisnotthattheycontributetothewelfareoftherecipient(althoughtheyarelikelytodoso),butthattheyarerightstogoodsorservices.Iftherearetoberightstogoodsorservices,thosegoodsandservicesmustbeprovided,andmorespecificallyprovidedbysomeone–forexample,bythefarmerandthephysician.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page426MostoftheabstractrightsagainstwhichBurkecampaignedweretherightsproclaimedintheDeclarationoftheRightsofManandoftheCitizenof1789(Declarationof1789).Theyarewhatwenowcalllibertyrights.TheshortlistinArticle2oftheDeclarationstatessuccinctly“thenaturalrightsofman,whichmust3notbeprevented...arefreedom,property,securityandresistancetooppression.”Needlesstosay,therighttopropertyisnottobeunderstoodasarighttosomeamountofproperty,butasarighttosecurityoftenureofproperty:ittooisa4libertyright,notarighttoanygoodsorservices.MuchoftheDeclarationof1789isconcernedwiththerightstoprocessneededtomakelibertyrightsjusticiable:rightstotheruleoflaw,tohabeascorpus,towhatwewouldnowcallaccountablepublicadministration.TherightsoftheDeclarationof1789arerightsagainstallothersandallinstitutions.Libertyrightsareuniversal–andsoarethecorrespondingobligations.Theyarecompromisedifanyothersareexemptfromthosecounterpartobligations.Ifanyonemayinfringemyrightstofreedom,propertyandsecurity,ortoresistoppression,Ihaveonlyincompleteandblemishedrightsofthesesorts.Oncloserconsideration,mattershaveturnedouttoberathermorecomplicated.Theinstitutionsforsecuringandenforcinglibertyrightsrequireanallocationofcer-tainobligationstospecifiedothersratherthantoallothers.First-orderobligationstorespectlibertyrightsmustbeuniversal,butsecond-orderobligationstoensurethateveryonerespectslibertyrightsmustbeallocated.Thereisnoeffectiveruleoflawwithoutlawenforcement,andlawenforcementneedslawenforcerswhoareassignedspecifictasks;thereisnoeffectiveaccountabilityofpublicadministrationwithoutinstitutionsthatallocatethetasksandresponsibilitiesandholdspecifiedoffice-holderstoaccount.Nevertheless,theasymmetrybetweenabstractlibertyrightsandabstractrightstogoodsandservicesisconvincing:wecanknowwhoviolatesalibertyrightwithoutanyallocationofobligations,butwecannottellwhoviolatesarighttogoodsorservicesunlessobligationshavebeenallocated.Thiswell-knownpointhasnotimpededtheriseandriseofaninternationalhumanrightsculturethatisrepletewithclaimsaboutabstractrightstogoodsandservices,nowseenasuniversalhumanrights,butoftenmuddledorvague,orboth,abouttheallocationoftheobligationswithoutwhichtheserightsnotmerelycannotbemet,butremainundefined.Thecornucopiaofuniversalhumanrightsincludesbothliberty5rightsandrightstogoodsandservices,andspecificallyrightstofoodandrightstohealthcare.TherighttofoodisproclaimedinArticle11ofthe1966InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(CESCR),whichasserts“therightofeveryonetoanadequatestandardoflivingforhimselfandhisfamily,includingadequatefood,clothingandhousing,andtothecontinuousimprovementofliving6conditions”(thecontinuousimprovementisanicetouch!).Article11ofCESCRhasbeenadoptedasaguidingprincipleoftheFoodandAgricultureOrganization7(FAO),whichhasmadeitsmission“foodsecurityforall”.Therighttohealth(tohealth,notjusttohealthcare:anothernicetouch!)isproclaimedinArticle12oftheCESCR,whichrecognizes“therightofeveryonetotheenjoymentofthehighestattain-8ablestandardofphysicalandmentalhealth.”Article12hasbeenadoptedasthe9guidingprincipleoftheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO).ThereisaninterestingdifferencebetweenArticles11and12ofCESCR.Therighttofoodisviewedasarighttoadequatefood,nottothebestattainablefood;therighttohealthisviewedasarighttothehighestattainablestandard...ofhealth,426OnoraO’Neill\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page427andnotasarighttoadequatehealth.OnecanseewhythedraftersoftheCovenantmayhaveshrunkfromproclaimingarighttoadequatehealth,butinqualifyingthisrightasarighttothehighestattainablestandardofhealthmanyquestionswerebegged.Isthisrightonlyarighttothestandardofhealththatapersoncanattainwithlocallyavailableandaffordabletreatment–howevermeagrethatmaybe?Orisitarighttothehigheststandardavailableglobally–howeverexpensivethatmaybe?Thefirstisdisappointinglyminimal,andthelatterbarelycoherent(howcanevery-onehavearighttothebest?).Andwhatisrequiredofthefarmer,thephysicianandotherswhoactuallyhavetoprovidefoodandhealthcare?Uncertaintiesofthissortareunavoidableunlesstheobligationsthatcorrespondtorightstogoodsandservicesarewellspecified.Norms,aspirationsandcynicismDoesanyofthismatter?PerhapsweshouldviewtheDeclarationsandCovenantsthatpromulgatehumanrightsassettingoutnobleaspirations,whicharehelpfultoarticulateandbearinmindwhenestablishinginstitutions,programs,policiesandactivitiesthatallocateobligations.Ineffect,wewouldconcedethattherhetoricofuniversalhumanrightstogoodsorserviceswasdeceptive,butdefenditasanobleliethathelpstomobilizesupportforestablishingjusticiablerightsofgreatimport-ance.ThereissomethingtobesaidforthisviewofhumanrightsDeclarationsandCovenantsasideologicaldocumentsthatcanhelpmobilizeenergyforactionthatmakesadifference,butmanywouldseethisascynical.Inanycase,thisinterpretationofhumanrightsclaimswouldbewhollyatoddswithordinaryunderstandingsofrights.Bothlibertyrightsandrightstogoodsandservicesarestandardlyseenasclaimrightsorentitlementsthatarevalidagainstthosewiththecounterpartobligations.Rightsareseenasonesideofanormativerelationshipbetweenright-holdersandobligation-bearers.Wenormallyregardsup-posedclaimsorentitlementsthatnobodyisobligedtorespectorhonorasnullandvoid,indeedundefined.Anunderstandingofthenormativeargumentsthatlinkrightstoobligationsunderliesdailyandprofessionaldiscussionbothofsupposedlyuniversalhumanrights,andofthespecialrightscreatedbyspecificvoluntaryactionsandtransactions(treaty,contract,promise,marriage,etc.).Therecannotbeaclaimtorightsthatarerightsagainstnobody,ornobodyinparticular:universalrightswillberightsagainstallcomers;specialrightswillberightsagainstspecifiableothers.Onlyifwejettisontheentirenormativeunderstandingofrightsinfavorofamerelyaspirationalview,canwebreakthenormativelinkbetweenrightsandtheircoun-terpartobligations.Ifwetakerightsseriouslyandseethemasnormativeratherthanaspirational,wemusttakeobligationsseriously.Ifontheotherhandweoptforamerelyaspirationalview,thecostsarehigh.Forthenwewouldalsohavetoacceptthatwherehumanrightsareunmetthereisnobreachofobligation,nobodyatfault,nobodywhocanbeheldtoaccount,nobodytoblameandnobodywhoowesredress.Wewouldineffecthavetoacceptthathumanrightsclaimsarenotrealclaims.Mostadvocatesofhumanrightswouldbereluctanttojettisonthethoughtthatthey10areprescriptiveornormativeinfavorofseeingthemasmerelyaspirational.WeTheDarkSideofHumanRights427\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page428generallyviewhumanrightsclaimsassettingoutrequirementsfromthestandpointofrecipients,whoareentitledtoorhaveaclaimtoactionorforbearancebyotherswithcorrespondingobligations.Fromanormativeorprescriptiveview,thepointofhumanrightsclaimswouldbeerodedifnobodywererequiredtoactorforbeartomeettheseclaims.Anormativeviewofrightsclaimshastotakeobligationsseriously,sincetheyarethecounterpartstorights;itmustviewthemasarticulatingthenormativerequirementsthatfalleitheronalloronspecifiedobligation-bearers.Fewproponentsofhumanrightswouldcountenancethethoughtthattherearehumanrightsthatnobodyisobligedtorespect.(Theconversethoughtisunproblematic:therecanbeobligationsevenwherenoclaimantsaredefined;such“imperfect”obligationsaregenerallyseenasmoralobligations,butnotasobligationsofjusticewithcounterpartrights.)Theclaimthatrightsmusthavewell-specifiedcounterpartobligationsisnotequivalenttothecommonplacepietythatrightsandresponsibilitiesgotogether,whichassertsonlythatright-holdersarealsoobligation-bearers.Thisisoften,butnotalways,true.Manyagents–citizens,workers,students,teachers,employees–arebothright-holdersandobligation-bearers.Butsomeright-holders–infants,theseverelydisabled,thesenile–cannotcarryobligations,sohavenoresponsibilities.Bycontrast,theclaimthatrightsmusthavecounterpartobligationsassertstheexceptionlesslogicalpointthatwhereanyoneistohavearighttheremustbeidentifiableothers(eitherallothersorspecifiedothers)withaccuratelycorrespondingobligations.Fromanormativeviewofrights,obligationsandclaimablerightsaretwoperspectivesonasinglenormativepattern:withouttheobligationstherearenorights.Sowhileobligationswilldropoutofsightifwereadhumanrights“claims”merelyasaspira-tionsratherthanrequirements,sotoowillrights,astheyareusuallyunderstood.Unsurprisingly,aspirationalreadingsofhumanrightsdocumentsarenotpopular.However,suchreadingsatleastofferanexitstrategyifweconcludethatclaimingrightswithoutspecifyingcounterpartobligationsisanunacceptabledeception,andfindthatwecan’tdevelopanadequatenormativeaccountofobligationsandrights.Clearlyitwouldbepreferabletoofferaseriousaccountoftheallocationofobli-gationsthatcorrespondtoallhumanrights.ButdoDeclarationsandCovenantspro-videanaccount–orevenaclue–totheallocationoftheobligationsthatarethecounterpartstorightstogoodsandservices?Thispointwascomplicatedatthebirth11ofhumanrightsbytheunfortunatelyobscuredraftingofthe1948UDHR,whichgesturestothethoughtthatcertainobligationsliewithstates,thenconfusinglyassignsthemindifferentlytonations,countriesandpeoplesaswellasstates.Notallofthesehavetheintegratedcapacitiesforactionanddecision-makingneededforagency,and11soforcarryingobligations.ForpresentpurposesIshallleaveproblemsarisingfromthisunfortunatedraftingaside,andrelyonthefactthatinlaterdocuments,includ-ingCESCR,theseambiguitiesareapparentlyresolvedinfavorofassigningobligationstostatesparty,thatistothesignatorystates.Thisapproachhasapparentadvantages–andstingsinitstail.ThefirststingisthatstatesthatdonotratifyaCovenantwillnotincurtheobligationsitspecifies:notawelcomeconclusiontoadvocatesofuniversalhumanrights,sincethesestatestherebyescapeobligationstorespect,letaloneenforce,therightspromulgated.Thesecondstingissharper.TheobligationscreatedbysigningandratifyingCovenantsarespecial,notuniversalobligations.Sotherightsthataretheircorollarieswillalsobespecialorinstitutionalrights,notuniversalhumanrights.Oncewetakeanormative428OnoraO’Neill\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page429viewofrightsandobligations,theymustbeproperlymatched.Ifhumanrightsareindependentofinstitutionalstructures,iftheyarenotcreatedbyspecialtrans-actions,sotooarethecorrespondingobligations;converselyifobligationsarethecreaturesofconvention,sotooaretherights.Theseunwelcomeimplicationsoftakingthehumanrightsdocumentsatfacevaluemightbeavoidedinseveralways.Onewell-knownthoughtisthatsolongasweconfineourselvestolibertyrightsthereisnoallocationproblem,sincetheserightsareonlycompleteifallothersareobligedtorespectthem.Wecancoherentlyseeuniversallibertyrightsasindependentofinstitutionsortransactions,andreadthepartsofinstrumentsthatdealwithlibertyrightsasaffirmingratherthancreatingthoserights(justifyingsuchclaimswouldbeafurthertask).Butthefactthatlibertyrightsdonotfaceanallocationproblem(althoughenforcingthemraisesjustthatproblem)offerssmallcomforttothosewhohopetoshowthatrightstogoodsorser-vices,forexampletofoodormedicine,areuniversalhumanrightsratherthanthecreaturesofconvention.Anormativeviewofhumanrightscannotviewrightstofoodandmedicineaspre-institutionalwhiledenyingthatthereareanypre-institutionalcounterpartobligationsorobligationholders;itmusttakeacongruentviewofthecounterpartobligations.Butthissuggeststhatsuchrightsmustbespecial,institu-tionalrightsratherthanuniversalhumanrights.Thereis,ofcourse,nothingwrongorproblematicaboutconventionalorinstitutionalrights,butifDeclarationsandCovenantscreaterightstogoodsandservices,claimsthattheyareuniversalorhumanrightslackjustification.DeclarationsandCovenantscannotshowthatsomeparticularconfigurationofinstitutionalrightsandobligationsisuniversallyoptimalordesir-able,orevenjustifiable.Thisdilemmamightbefudgedbyallowingtheideaofhumanrightstogoodsandservicestodriftbetweentwointerpretations.Aviewofrightstogoodsandservicesasindependentofinstitutionsandtransactionscouldbecitedasofferingabasisforjustifyingsomeratherthanotherinstitutionalarrangements.Aviewofrightstogoodsandservicesasthecreaturesofconventioncouldfitwithwell-definedcounterpartinstitutionalobligations,butoffersnoclaimsabouttheirjustificationotherthanthefactthat(some)stateshavesigneduptothem.Equivocationisadesperatejustificatorystrategy.Yetthisequivocationisdisconcertinglycommonindiscussionsofhumanrightsclaims.Thisdilemmawithinnormativeviewsofrightsandobligationscanberesolvedinmorethanoneway.Wecouldconcludethatlibertyrightsarefundamentalanduniversal,andclaimthattheycanbejustifiedwithoutreferencetoCovenantsorinstitutions,butconcedethatrightstogoodsandservicesarespecial(institutional,positive)rightsthatcanbejustifiedonlybyappealtospecifictransactions,suchassigningandratifyingCovenants.Wecouldtrytojustifyaconfigurationofspecialrightsandtheinstitutionalstructuresthatsecurethemandtheircounterpartobliga-tions.Forexample,wemightarguethatcertainrightstogoodsandservicesandtheircounterpartobligationsprotectbasichumanneedsorinterests,orthattheyhaveutilitarianoreconomicjustification.Orwecouldjustifyinstitutionalstructuresthatdefineandsecurespecialrightsandobligationsmoredeeplybyappealingtoatheoryofthegood(moralrealists)oratheoryofduty(Kantians).Theoptionthatisclosedistoclaimthathumanrightsandobligationsarecorollarynormativeclaims,butthattherearesomeuniversalrightswithoutcounterpartobligations.SothereareTheDarkSideofHumanRights429\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page430plentyofpossibilities–althougheachmayraiseitsowndifficulties.Ifnoneofthesepossibilitiescanbemadetowork,thedefaultpositionwouldbetorejectnormativeviewsofhumanrightsandtoseehumanrightsclaimsasaspirational(notingthataspirationsneedjustificationtoo)andtotreatthetaskofestablishinginstitutionsthatallowforjusticiableclaimsasatasktobeguidedinpartbyappealingtothoseaspirations.Andthen,itmayseem,weineffectendorseacynicalreadingofthehumanrightsDeclarationsandCovenants.StateobligationsTheseareawkwardproblems,butIthinkthatothersmayliedeeper.Thedeepestproblemmaybethattheobligationsassignedtostatesbysomeofthemostsigni-ficantDeclarationsandCovenantsarenotthecorollariesofthehumanrightsthatthedocumentsproclaim.TheCovenantsdonotassignstatesstraightforwardobliga-tionstorespectlibertyrights(afterall,libertyrightshavetoberespectedbyall,notonlybystates),butrathersecond-orderobligationstosecurerespectforthem.Equally,theydonotassignstatesobligationstomeetrightstogoodsandservices,butrathersecond-orderobligationstoensurethattheyaremet.Forexample,Article2oftheCESCRproclaimsthatEachStatePartytothepresentCovenantundertakestotakesteps,individuallyandthroughinternationalassistanceandco-operation,especiallyeconomicandtechnical,tothemaximumofitsavailableresources,withaviewtoachievingprogressivelythefullrealisationoftherightsrecognizedinthepresentCovenantbyallappropriatemeans,12includingparticularlytheadoptionoflegislativemeasures.“Achievingprogressivelythefullrealisationof...rights...byallappropriatemeans”isevidentlynotmerelyamatterofrespectingtherightsrecognizedinCESCR.Itisamatterofensuringthatothers–bothindividualsandinstitutions–carryouttheobligationsthatcorrespondtothoserights.LatercommentsbytheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightsspelloutsomeoftheobligationsthatstates13aretakentoassumeiftheyratifythetwoCovenants.AnimmediateandencouragingthoughtmightbethatiftheobligationsassignedtostatesbytheinternationalDeclarationsandCovenantsarenotthecounterpartsofthehumanrightsproclaimed,butsecond-orderobligationstoensureorsecurerespectforsuchrights,thenthismayresolvetheallocationproblemforrightstogoodsandservices.StatespartytoaCovenantareseenasacquiringspecialobligationsbysigningandratifyingtheinstrument.Itwouldthenbeclearthatthosespecial,second-orderobligationsdidnothavecounterpartrights,letalonecounterpartuni-versalhumanrights.Theyaresecond-orderobligationstosecuresomeconfigurationoffirst-orderrightsandobligations.Thisthoughtmaybehelpful:sinceobligationswithoutcounterpartrightsarenormativelycoherent(unlikerightswithoutcounter-partobligations),wecantakeanormativeviewoftheobligationsassumedbystatesthatsignandratifytheCovenants,andcanseethemassettingrequirements.HumanrightsenterintotheCovenantsonlyindirectlyasaspectsofthecontentofsecond-orderstateobligations.430OnoraO’Neill\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page431Butasecondthoughtisfarlesscongenialtothosewhowouldliketoseehumanrightsasnormative.IftheobligationsthattheDeclarationsandCovenantsassigntostatesarenotthecounterpartsofthehumanrightstheseinstrumentsdeclareorrecognize,thentheyalsodonotdefinethefirst-orderobligationsthatarethecoun-terpartsofhumanrights.Rathertheproblemofgivingacoherentnormativeinstan-tiationofDeclarationsandConvenantsisdevolvedtothestatesparty,whichmay(ormaynot)setouttosecurepositiverightsfortheircitizens.Iftheclaimsofthehumanrightsdocumentshavenormativeforcetheymustbematchedbyobligations;iftheyarenotmatchedbyobligations,theyareatbestaspirational.AsIsuggestedearlier,itmaynotbewhollyamisfortuneifthesupposedrightsdeclaredintheDeclarationsandCovenantsareseenasaspirations.Legalcomment-atorsmightbewillingtosaythatthereisstillsubstanceinthere,inthattheStatespartytakeonrealobligationstorealizetheseaspirations.Non-lawyersmayhabitu-allymakethemistakeofthinkingthatDeclarationsandCovenantsclaimthattherearepre-institutionaluniversalhumanrights,buttheirmistakeisnotnecessary–althoughpoliticallyconvenient–forprogresstowardtherealizationoftheunderlyingaspi-rations,oncestateshavesignedup.Thisisacoherentposition,butunlikelytobepopularwiththosewhoseektobaseethicalandpoliticalclaimsonappealstohumanrights,whichtheyseeasnormativelyfundamentalratherthanasthecreaturesoftheconventionthatareanchoredintheCovenantsthatassignobligationstorealizeaspirationstostates.Andtherearefurtherdifficulties.IfwereadDeclarationsandCovenantsasinstru-mentsbywhichstatesassumesecond-orderobligationstodefineandallocatefirst-orderobligationsthatcorrespondtocertainhumanrights(nownolongerseenasuniversalrights),whyshouldalltheobligationsliewithstates?Aplausibleanswerwouldbethatstates,andonlystates,havethepowersnecessarytocarrytherelev-antsecond-orderobligationstodefineandallocatefirst-orderobligationsandrightstoindividualsandinstitutions.ThestoryistoldofajournalistwhoaskedthebankrobberWillieSuttonwhyherobbedbanksandgotthepuzzledanswer:“That’swherethemoneyis.”SimilarlywemightreplytoanyonewhowonderswhyDeclarationsandCovenantsassignobligationsthataretosecurehumanrightstostatesbypoint-ingoutthatthat’swherethepoweris.Butthethoughtthatitmakessensetoassignallsecond-orderobligationstodefineandallocateobligationstostatesbecausethey,andonlythey,havethepowertodischargetheseobligationsisoftenlessthancomforting.Manystatesviolateratherthanrespecthumanrights.Assigningsecond-orderobligationstodefineandallocatefirst-orderobligationsandrightstoagentswhodonotevenreliablyrespectthefirst-orderobligationsthatcorrespondtothoserightsmayberatherlikeputtingfoxesinchargeofhenhouses.Itistrueenoughthatthosewhoaretoachieveprogressivelythefullrealizationofhumanrightsmusthavecapacitiestodoso–butitdoesnotfollowthatthosewith(agoodrangeof)thenecessarycapacitiescanbetrustedtodoso.Somestates–notonlythosewethinkofasroguestates–disregardorover-ridemanyoftheCovenantrights.Somesignandratifytherelevantinternationalinstruments,butmakelimitedeffortstoworktowardtheirfullrealization.Otherstateslackthepowertocarrytheobligationsto“achieveprogressivelythefullrealisationoftherightsrecognized”inDeclarationsandCovenants.Weakstates–failedstates,quasistates–cannotcarrysuchdemandingobligations.AlthoughTheDarkSideofHumanRights431\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page432theymaynotalwaysviolatethem,theycannotsecuretheirinhabitants’libertyrights;stilllesscantheyensurethattheirinhabitantshaveeffectiveentitlementstogoodsandservices.Itisanemptygesturetoassigntheobligationsneededforhumanrightstoweakstates,comparabletotheemptygesturemadebytowncouncilsinBritaininthe1980sthatproclaimedtheirtownsnuclearfreezones.Indeed,evenstrongandwillingstatesmayfindthattheycannot“achieveprogressivelythefullrealisationoftherightsrecognized”inDeclarationsandCovenants.Strongstatesmayhaveamonopolyofthelegitimateuseofforcewithintheirterritories;buttheyseldomhaveamonopolyoftheeffectiveuseofotherformsofpower.Thereareplentyofreasonsforthinkingcarefullyaboutthespecificcharacterofstatepower,andforquestion-ingtheassumptionthatpowerful–letaloneweak–statescancarrytherangeofsecond-orderobligationsthattheyostensiblytakeoninsigningandratifyinghumanrightsinstruments.Giventheserealities,itmaybeworthreconsideringwhetherallsecond-orderobligationstosecurehumanrightsshouldliewithstates.Perhapssomeofthemshouldliewithpowerfulnonstateactors,suchastransnationalcorporations,powerfulnongovernmentalorganizations,ormajorreligious,cultural,andprofessionalandeducationalbodies.Theassumptionthatstatesandstatesaloneshouldholdalltherelevantobligationsmayreflecttheextraordinarydominanceofstatepowerinthelatetwentiethcentury,ratherthanatimelesssolutiontotheproblemofallocatingobligationstoprovidegoodsandserviceseffectively.Forpresentpurposes,Ishallleavetheseunsettlingpossibilitiesunexplored,butsayalittlemoreaboutsomeoftheculturalandpoliticalcoststhatarelinkedtopersistentconfusionbetweennorm-ativeandaspirationalviewsofhumanrights.ControlandblameIfhumanrightsarenotpre-conventional,universalrights,butaregroundedinthespecialobligationsassumedbystates,thenthereis–attheveryleast–anawkwardgapbetweenrealityandrhetoric.Thesecond-orderobligationsofstatesaredischargedbyimposingfirst-orderobligationsonothersandenforcingthem.Therealityisthatstateagencyandstatepower,andthatofderivativeinstitutions,isusedtoconstructinstitutionsthat(partially)securerights,andthattodothisitisnecessarytocontroltheactionofindividualsandinstitutionssystematicallyandindetail.Ifstatespartyaretodischargethesecond-orderobligationstheyassumeinsigningandratifyinghumanrightsCovenants,theymustnotonlyensurethatlibertyrightsarerespectedbyall,butmustassignandenforcefirst-orderobligationswhosedischargewilldeliverrightstogoodsandservicestoall.Humanbeings,itisevident,willnotmerelybetheintendedbeneficiariesoftheseobligations,butwillcarrytheintendedburdens.Thesystemofcontrolthatstatesmustimposetoensurethattheseobligationsaredischargedislikelytobedauntinglycomplex.Yet,asBurkepointedout,whatwereallyneedifwearetohavefoodandmedicineistheactiveengagementof“thefarmerandthephysician.”Canthatactiveengagementbesecuredorimprovedbyimposingdetailedandcomplexobligationsonthosewhoaretocarrytherelevantfirst-orderobligations?Thereismuchtoconsiderhere,andIofferverybriefcom-mentsunderfourheadings:complexity,compliance,complaintandcompensation.432OnoraO’Neill\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page433ComplexityDetailedcontrolisneededto“achieveprogressivelythefullrealisation”ofverycom-plexsetsofpotentiallyconflictingrights,whichmustbemutuallyadjusted.Itisnowonderthatlegislationintheageofhumanrightshasbecomeprolixanddemanding.Thosewhoframeithavetoseektoensurethatindividualsandinstitutionsconformtoaverylargenumberofconstraintsinallactivities,sohavetosetandenforce14verydetailedrequirements.Itisnowcommonindevelopedsocietiestofindthatlegislationimposeshighlycomplexproceduresthatbristlewithdutiestoregister,dutiestoobtainpermission,dutiestoconsult,rightstoappeal,aswellasproliferatingrequire-mentstorecord,todisclose,andtoreport.Suchlegislationistypicallysupplementedbycopiousregulation,relentless“guidance”,prolixcodesofgoodpractice,andhighlyintrusiveformsofaccountability.Thesehighlydetailedformsofsocialcontrolmaybeunavoidableinapublicculturethataimsto“achieveprogressivelythefullreal-isation”ofanextraordinarilycomplexsetofrights,sohastoimposecomplexdemandsandburdensonallactivitiesandallareasoflife.Theresultsaredemandingforthestateagenciesthataresupposedtosettherequire-mentsandpolicethesystem.Theycanbedementingfortheinstitutionsandindi-vidualsthataretocarrythefirst-orderobligations–notleastforthefarmerandthephysician.Complexcontrolsriskstiflingactiveengagement.Thoseofwhomtoomuchthatisextraneoustotheirbasictasks–growingfood,caringforthesick–isrequiredarelikelytoresenttheproliferatingandtime-consumingrequirementstoobtainpermissions,toconsultthirdparties,torecord,todisclose,toreport,andtocomplywiththedemandsofinspectorsorregulators.Theserequirementsforcontrolandaccountabilityimposeheavyhumanandfinancialcosts,andareoftendamagingtotheperformanceofprimarytasks.Thosewhofacetheseburdensontheirattemptstoperformdemandingsubstantivetasks–thefarmerandthephysician–maycomplyandresent(andsometimesengageindefensivepractices);theymayprotestandcom-plain;ortheymaywithdrawfromactivitiesthathavebeenmadetooburdensome.Thecostsofcomplexcontrolsystemsarepaidinincreasingwarinessandweariness,skepticismandresentment,andultimatelyinlessactiveengagementby“thefarmerandthephysician,”andbyotherswhocometoseethemselvesprimarilyasobligation-bearersratherthanasright-holders.ComplianceIndividualswhoaresubjecttohyper-complexlegislation,regulationandcontrolareofferedtworoles.Asobligation-bearerstheirroleiscompliance;asrightholderstheyarepermittedandencouragedtoseekredressandtocomplainwhenothersfailtocomply.Theindividualsandinstitutionsonwhomfirst-orderobligationsareimposedinthenameofsecuringhumanrightsareofferedlimitedoptions:theycansoldierloyallyonincompliancewiththeobligationsstatesimpose;theycanvoicetheirdiscontent;theycanexitfromthetasksthathavebeenmadetooburdensome15bytheexcesscomplexityoflegislationandregulation.Loyalcompliancebecomesharderandmoreburdensomewhenthesheernumberandcomplexityofrequire-mentsimposeddamagesthequalitywithwhichsubstantivetaskscanbeachieved.Voicingconcernandobjectingtothesecontrolsprovidessome,butlimitedrelief.TheDarkSideofHumanRights433\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page434Exitfromtheactivitiesthathavebeenmadetooburdensomemayoftenbethemostreasonableandthepreferredoption.For“thefarmerandthephysician,”exitmeansgivingupgrowingfoodandcaringforthesick.Theremaybewaysofextendinghumanrightsthatdonotcarrythesecosts,that16usea“lightertouch”,thatachieve“betterregulation”.Butthejuryisoutonthismatter.Atpresent,andcertainlyintheU.K.,thejuggernautofhumanrightsdemands,ateverystageoflegislationandoftheregulatoryprocess,tendstoincreasecomplexityevenwhenthecostsfor“thefarmerandthephysician”,andthedamagetotheservicestheyprovide,arehighandwellknown.ComplaintFirst-orderobligation-bearersarealsoright-holders,anditmaybethattheburdenstheirobligationsimposearerecompensedbytherightstheyenjoyasaresultofothersdischargingtheirobligations.However,theexperienceofright-holdersisnotsymmetricwiththatofobligation-bearers.Individualsactasright-holdersonlywhensomethinghasgoneawry.Inthatsituationtheymaycomplain,seekredressandcompensation.Thelegislationandregulationofstatesthattakehumanrightsseri-ouslyoftenprovidearangeofremedies–forthosewiththetime,energy,courage(orfoolhardiness)topursuethem.Whencomplaintswork,redressmaybeachievedand,compensationmaybesecured.Butoftentheexperienceofcomplainantsislessthanhappybecausetheprocessofachievingredressiscomplex,exhaustingandfrustrating,andtheremedieslessthanwouldsatisfyandassuageasenseofinjury.Sincetheroleofcomplainantistoooftenonethatexhausts,demoralizes,andunderminesactiveengagement,manywhoarewrongeddonotchoosethiscourseofaction.For“thefarmerandthephysician”andformanyothersthechoiceismainlybetweenloyaltyandexit:givingvoiceisnotgenerallyapositiveexperi-ence,sinceitrequirescomplainantstoseethemselvesasvictimsratherthanasactivelyengaged.CompensationandblameThebestoutcomeofthevoiceoptionisthat,withluckandpersistence,thosewhotakeontheroleofvictimorcomplainantachieveredressandcompensation,orsomeopportunityforthedubiouspleasuresofcastingblame.Compensationclearlyhasitspositiveside–althoughitmaybehardtoachieve,limitedinamountandisnotalwaysworththestrugglethroughthecomplexitiesofprocess.Blamingbycontrastisareadilyavailableandcheappleasure–evenforcomplainantswhosecaseisnotupheld.Thosewhocastblamecanappropriate,enjoy,andprolongtheirroleandstatusasvictims,canenjoyindignationandafeelingofsuperiority,eveniftheycannotquiteidentifyordemonstratethefailingsofothers.Ifitprovesimpossibletoidentifyablameworthyculprit,theycanatleastblamethesystem,thatistosaytheinstitutionalframeworkthatisfailingtoachieve“progressivelythefullrealisationoftherightsrecognized...byallappropriatemeans,includingparticularlytheadoptionoflegislativemeasures”Thereisadarkandtemptingundercurrentofpleasureinblaming.Nobodyhaswrittenaboutthepsychologyofblaming,oraboutitsmurkyappealandinsidious434OnoraO’Neill\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page435psychologicaleffects,morebrilliantlyanddarklythanNietzsche.Someofhiscom-mentsareparticularlyapttotherealitiesofthefarmerandthephysician:Sufferingpeopleallhaveahorriblewillingnessandcapacityforinventingpretextsforpainfulemotionalfeelings.Theyalreadyenjoytheirsuspicions,they’rebroodingoverbadactionsandapparentdamage.Theyransacktheentrailsoftheirpastandpresent,lookingfordarkanddubiousstories,inwhichtheyarefreetofeastonanagonizingsuspicionandtogetintoxicatedontheirownpoisonousanger.Theyripopentheoldestwounds,theybleedthemselvestodeathfromlong-healedscars.Theyturnfriends,wives,children,andanyoneelsewhoisclosesttothemintocriminals.“Iamsuffering.Someone17orothermustbetoblameforthat”.Idonotwishtosuggestthatthehumanrightscultureinevitablypromotesthisran-corousapproachtolife.ButIdonotthinkweshouldacceptatfacevaluetheviewthatitisallaboutrespectforpersonsandtreatingothersasagents.Muchofitisindeedaboutprotectingtheweakandvulnerable.Butitisalsoaboutextendingthepowerofstatesovernonstateactorsandhumanindividuals,aboutestablishingsystemsofcontrolanddisciplinethatextendintotheremotestcornersoflife,aboutrunningpeople’slivesforthemwhileleavingthemwiththeconsolingpleasuresofblame.AsBernardWilliamsputsit,blameis“thecharacteristicreactionofthemoral-18itysystem”inwhichobligationsandrightshavebecomethesoleethicalcurrency.Wefinditunsurprisingthattherulingideasofpasterashavebeensupersededandmodified,andwecanhardlydoubtthathumanrightsareacentralrulingideaofourage.Yetwedonotfindmuchcurrentdiscussionofthelikelihoodthattheideaofhumanrightsmaysufferthesamefate.Publicdiscourseisforthemostpartadmiring,andoftenrepresentshumanrightsasunquestionabletruthandprogress:wemayquestionanything–excepthumanrights.Indeed,unlikesomeearlierdom-inantideologies,thehumanrightsmovementhasacquiredthebeguilingfeatureofbeinganideologynotonlyofandfortherulingclasses,butanideologyfor–andincreasinglyof–theoppressed.Thisseemstomeagoodreasonforthinkingpar-ticularlycarefullyandcriticallyabouttheinternalstructureofhumanrightsclaims,fortryingtobelessgesturalabouttheirbasisandtheirlimits,andforbeingmoreexplicitabouttheircostsaswellastheirbenefits.Thefarmerandthephysician,andotherswhoseworkandcommitmentareindispensable,arethekeytosecuringadecentstandardoflifeforall:theiractiveenthusiasmandeffortsaremorevaluablethantheirdourcompliancewithprescribedprocedures,theirresentfulprotest,letalonetheirrefusaltocontribute.Notes1ThisisarevisedversionoftheMartinWightLecturegivenattheLondonSchoolofEconomicsonOctober14,2004.Iamgratefulforanumberofhelpfulcommentsatandfollowingthelecture,especiallyfromConorGearty,NickRengger,andChrisBrown.2EdmundBurke,ReflectionsontheRevolutioninFrance,ed.ConorCruiseO’Brien(London:PenguinBooks,1984),pp.151–2.3DeclarationoftheRightsofManandoftheCitizen,1789,www.magnacartaplus.org/french-rights/1789.htm.TheDarkSideofHumanRights435\nCDIC23.qxd2/4/0915:58Page4364NotealsoArticle17oftheDeclarationof1789:“Property,beinganinviolableandsacredright,noonemaybedeprivedofit;unlesspublicnecessity,legallyinvestigated,clearlyrequiresit,andjustandpriorcompensationhasbeenpaid.”5SetoutintheUNInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,1966(CCPR).ThisCovenantalso“recognizes”variousrightsthatarenotlibertyrights.Seewww.magnacartaplus.org/uno-docs/covenant.htm.6CESCR,Art.11.Seewww.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.7SeetheFAOwebsiteatwww.fao.org/UNFAO/about/index_en.html.8CESCR,Art.12.ThetwoArticlesexpandonrightsproclaimedinArticle25iftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsof1948(UDHR),whichruns‘Everyonehastherighttoastandardoflivingadequateforthehealthandwell-beingofhimselfandofhisfamily,includingfood,clothing,housingandmedicalcareandnecessarysocialservices,andtherighttosecurityintheeventofunemployment,sickness,disability,widowhood,oldageorotherlackoflivelihoodincircumstancesbeyondhiscontrol’.ForthetextoftheUDHRseewww.bee-leaf.com/universaldeclarationhumanrights.html.9TheWHO’sobjective,assetoutinitsConstitution,is“theattainmentbyallpeoplesofthehighestpossiblelevelofhealth,”definedexpansivelyas“astateofcompletephys-ical,mentalandsocialwell-beingandnotmerelytheabsenceofdiseaseorinfirmity,”www.who.int/about/en/.10SeerecentlyJamesGriffin,“DiscrepanciesbetweentheBestPhilosophicalAccountofHumanRightsandtheInternationalLawofHumanRights,”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,CI(2001):1–28.11Thetextcanbefoundatwww.imcl/biz/docs/humanrights.pdf.ForfurthercommentsonsomeconfusionsaboutobligationsandagencyinUDHR,seeOnoraO’Neill,“AgentsofJustice,”inThomasW.Pogge,GlobalJustice(Oxford:Blackwell,2001),pp.188–203.12Article2CESCRatwww.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.13TheNatureofStatesPartiesObligations,Art.2,para.1oftheCovenant,Fifthsession,1990,OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights,CESCRGeneralcomment3,www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument.14MichaelMoran,TheBritishRegulatoryState:HighModernismandHyper-Innovation(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003).Moranarguesthatthenewregulatorystateisneitherlib-eralnordecentralizing,despiteitscommitmenttohumanrights.Ratheritisbothinter-ventionistandcentralizinginwaysthatcolonizehithertorelativelyindependentdomainsofcivilsociety–includingthoseofthefarmerandthephysician.15SeeAlbertO.Hirschmann,Exit,VoiceandLoyalty:ResponsestoDeclineinFirms,OrganizationsandStates(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1970),foraclassicanalysisoftheseoptions.16TheUnitedKingdomgovernmentestablishedaBetterRegulationTaskForcein1997.Itpromotesthe“fiveprinciplesofbetterregulation,”whicharesaidtobeProportionality,Accountability,Consistency,Transparency,andTargeting(consistencyisanicetouch!).Seethetaskforce’swebsiteatwww.brtf.gov.uk/.17FriedrichNietzsche,TheGenealogyofMorals,Pt.III,sec.15.Thistranslation,whichdrawsonearlierreceivedversions,canbefoundatTheNietzscheChannel’swebsiteatwww.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/onthe3.htm#3e15.18BernardWilliams,EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy(London:Fontana,1985),p.177.436OnoraO’Neill\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page437CHAPTERTWENTY-FOURADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights*JamesW.NickelHumanrightsarenowasettledpartofinternationallawandpolitics.By2000themainhumanrightstreatieshadbeenratifiedbyalargemajorityoftheworld’scountries.AsAnnBayefskywrites,“EveryUNmemberstateisapartytooneormoreofthesixmajorhumanrightstreaties.80%ofstateshaveratifiedfourormore”(Bayefsky2001).Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,thatmoststatesfullycomplywiththesetreaties.Rightstoeconomicbenefitsandservices,variouslyknownas“eco-nomicandsocialrights”or“welfarerights,”areamongthefamiliesofrightsthataresecurelyestablishedininternationallaw.TheAmericanDeclarationoftheRightsofMan(OrganizationofAmericanStates1948)andtheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UnitedNations1948)assertedrightstoanadequatestandardofliving,healthservices,andeducation.Tomaketheserightspartofinternationallaw,theUnitedNationscreatedtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights(hereinafter“EconomicandSocialCovenant,”UnitedNations1976).Morethan140countrieshaveratifiedthistreaty.TheEconomicandSocialCovenant’slistofrightsincludesnondiscriminationinemployment(Articles2and3),freedomtoworkandopportunitiestowork(Article4),fairpayanddecentconditionsofwork(Article7),therighttoformtradeunionsandtostrike(Article8),socialsecurity(Article9),therighttoadequatefood,cloth-ing,andhousing(Article11),therighttobasichealthservices(Article12),andtherighttoeducation(Article13).Althougheconomicandsocialrightsaresecurelyestablishedwithininternationallaw,theideathattheyarefullyjustifiablehumanrightsremainscontroversialamonglawyersandpoliticaltheorists.Economicandsocialrightsareoftenallegedtobedesirablegoalsbutnotreallyrights.Thispaperoffersadefenseofeconomicandsocialrightsbyconstructingandapplyingajustificatorystructureandbyrebuttingvariousobjectionstothem.ContemporaryDebatesinPoliticalPhilosophyEditedbyThomasChristianoandJohnChristman©2009BlackwellPublishingLtd.ISBN:978-1-405-13321-0\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page438I.TheVanceConceptionofEconomicandSocialRightsHumanrightsarenotidealsofthegoodlifeforhumans;theyareratherconcernedwithensuringtheconditions,negativeandpositive,ofaminimallygoodlife.Ifweapplythisideatoeconomicandsocialrightsitsuggeststhatthesestandardsshouldnotbeconcernedwithpromotingthehighestpossiblestandardsoflivingorwithidentifyingthebestormostjustformofeconomicsystem.Rathertheyshouldattempttoaddresstheworstproblemsandabusesintheeconomicarea.Theirfocusshouldbeonhunger,malnutrition,preventabledisease,ignorance,andexclusionfrompro-ductiveopportunities.Somephilosophershavefollowedthislineofthoughttotheconclusionthatthemaineconomicandsocialrightis“subsistence.”HenryShue,JohnRawls,andBrianOrendmakesubsistencethecenterpieceoftheirconcernforeconomicandsocialrights.Shuedefinessubsistenceas“unpollutedair,unpollutedwater,adequatefood,ade-quateclothing,adequateshelter,andminimalpreventivehealthcare”(Shue1996).Orend’sdefinitionisverysimilar:“Materialsubsistencemeanshavingsecureaccesstothoseresourcesonerequirestomeetone’sbiologicalneeds–notablyaminimallevelofnutritiousfood,cleanwater,freshair,someclothingandshelter,andbasicpreventivehealthcare”(Orend2001).Rawlsincludes“subsistence”onhisveryshortlistofhumanrights,treatingitalongwithsecurityaspartoftherighttolife.Rawlsinterprets“subsistence”asincluding“minimumeconomicsecurity”or“havinggeneralall-purposeeconomicmeans”(Rawls1999).Theideaofsubsistencealoneofferstoominimalaconceptionofeconomicandsocialrights.Itneglectseducation,givesanextremelyminimalaccountofhealthservices,andgenerallygivestoolittleattentiontopeople’sabilitytobeactiveparticipantsandcontributors(seeSen1999b:27;Nussbaum2001).Itcoverstherequirementsofhavingalife,butneglectsimportantmaterialconditionsofbeingabletoleadone’slife.IfShue,Rawls,andOrenderrbymakingeconomicandsocialrightstoominimal,internationalhumanrightsdocumentsmakethemexcessivelygrandiosebyinclud-ingaspirationsandideals.Theyvieweconomicandsocialrightsasprescriptionsforprosperityandanamplewelfarestate.Forexample,theEuropeanSocialCharter,whichsetthepatternforothertreatiesinthisarea,includesahumanrighttovoca-tionalguidance,ahumanrighttoannualholidayswithpay,andahumanrightto“protectionofhealth”thataspires“toremoveasfaraspossiblethecausesofill-health”(Articles9,2,11,and26).Irecognize,ofcourse,thatthesearegoodthingsthatpoliticalmovementslegitimatelypromoteatthenationallevel.AsaresidentofarichcountryIwouldvoteforthem.Butthesestandardsgofarbeyondtheconditionsofaminimallygoodlife.Further,itwouldnotbeplausibletocastigateacountryasahumanrightsviolatorbecauseitfailstofundoccupationalguidance,torequireemployerstoprovideemployeeswithholidayswithpay,ortomountananti-smokingcampaign(smokingissurelyoneofthemaincausesofill-health).Thepointisnotmerelythatpoorercountriesshouldbeexcusedfromtheserequirements.Itisthattheseformulationsdonothaveagoodfitwiththeideaofhumanrightsasminimalstandardsevenwhenwearethinkingaboutrichcountries.Iadvocateaconceptionofeconomicandsocialrightsthatgoesbeyondsubsist-encetoincludehealthcareandeducation.Icallitthe“VanceConception”because438JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page439itconformstothelistadvocatedbyformerU.S.SecretaryofStateCyrusVanceinhis1977LawDayspeechattheUniversityofGeorgia(Vance1977).InthatspeechVancesetoutaviewofhumanrightsthatincluded“therighttothefulfillmentofsuchvitalneedsasfood,shelter,healthcareandeducation.”Althoughthislistismoreexpansivethansubsistencealone,itadherestotheideathateconomicandsocialrights,likeotherhumanrights,areconcernedwiththeconditionsofhavingamin-imallygoodlife.Ittherebyavoidstheexcessesofcontemporarytreatiesoneconomicandsocialrights.Thisconceptionsuggeststhateconomicandsocialrightsfocusonsurvival,health,andeducation.Itobligatesgovernmentstotakeactionsandadoptandimplementlawsandpoliciesthatallowthefollowingquestionstobeansweredaffirmatively:1.SubsistenceDoconditionsallowallpeopletosecuresafeair,food,andwateraswellasenvironmentallyappropriateshelterandclothingiftheyengageinworkandself-helpinsofarastheycan,practicemutualaidthroughorgan-izationssuchasfamilies,neighborhoods,andchurches,andprocurehelpfromavailablegovernmentassistanceprograms?Dopeopleenjoyaccesstoproductiveopportunitiesthatallowthemtocontributetothewell-beingofthemselves,theirfamilies,andtheircommunities?2.HealthDoenvironmentalconditions,publichealthmeasures,andavailablehealthservicesgivepeopleexcellentchancesofsurvivingchildhood,achievingphys-icalandmentalcompetence,andlivinganormallifespan?3.EducationDoavailableeducationalresourcesgivepeopleagoodchanceoflearningtheskillsnecessaryforsurvival,health,functioning,citizenship,andproductivity?TheVanceConceptionofeconomicandsocialrightsidentifiesthreebroadandinter-lockingrightswhosefulfillmentisneededforallpeopletohaveminimallygoodlives.ThedefinitionoftherighttosubsistenceusedinthisconceptionismuchlikeShue’s,exceptthathealthismovedtoaseparatecategory.Somehealth-relatedconcernsremainwithinsubsistence,however,sinceair,food,andwatermustbesafeforintake,andshelterandclothingarerequiredtobeenvironmentallyappropriatewherethatincludesprotectionsneededforhealthfromcold,heat,andprecipitation.Further,itincludesaccesstoeconomicopportunitiesandthusincorporatessomeaspectsoftherighttowork(seeArneson1990).TheVanceConceptionviewstherighttohealthservicesinabroaderwaythanShue’s“minimalpreventivehealthcare.”Itcoverspreventionthroughpublichealthmeasuressuchassanitationsystemsandinoculationprograms.Butitgoesbeyondthesepreventivemeasurestoincludeemergencyreparativeservicessuchashelpinsettingbrokenbonesanddealingwithinfections.Anditcoversminimalservicesrelatedtopregnancyandbirth.Thesehealthservicesarecostly,buttheyareneces-sarytomanypeople’sabilitytohaveaminimallygoodlife.Further,addressingmajorhealthproblemspromotespeople’sabilitytopursueeducationandworkinanenergeticway.Therighttobasiceducationfocusesonliteracy,numeracy,andpreparationforsocialparticipation,citizenship,andeconomicactivity.Ithelpsorienteconomicandsocialrightstowardsaction,choice,self-help,mutualaid,andsocial,political,andADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights439\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page440economicparticipation.TheUniversalDeclarationemphasizesthatbasiceducationshouldbebothfreeandcompulsory.Familiesdonothavethelibertytokeepchil-drenuneducatedandilliterate.Buttheydohaveregulatedlibertiestocontrolthekindofupbringingandeducationtheirchildrenreceive(Article26).TheVanceConceptionisattractivebecauseitviewseconomicandsocialrightsasminimalstandardswithoutlimitingtheirrequirementstosubsistenceandwhileexpectingthesestandardstobeexceededinmostcountries.Keepingeconomicandsocialrightsminimalalsomakestheirrealizationaplausibleaspirationforpoorercountriesandmakesitmorelikelythateconomicandsocialrightscanpassareason-abletestoffeasibility.SeveralofthearticlesoftheEconomicandSocialCovenantconformtotheVanceConception.ThetreatmentoffoodandofanadequatestandardoflivinginArticle11mostlyfits.Thatarticlecommitsthecountriesratifyingthetreatytoensureevery-one“anadequatestandardoflivingforhimselfandhisfamily,includingadequatefood,clothingandhousing,”andto“thecontinuousimprovementoflivingcondi-tions.”TheVanceConceptioninterprets“adequatestandardofliving”asrequiringaleveladequateforaminimallygoodlife,notforanexcellentlife.Itwouldrejectthedemandfor“continuousimprovementoflivingconditions”asaconfusionofthedesirablewiththeimperative.ThereisalsoafairlygoodfitwiththestatementoftherighttoeducationintheEconomicandSocialCovenant.Article13requiresfreeandcompulsoryprimaryedu-cationforallchildren,thatsecondaryeducationbegenerallyavailable,andthathighereducationbeequallyaccessibletothoseequallytalented.Theideaofgivingprior-itytoprimaryeducationisagoodone.OntheVanceConception,highereducationisnotdirectlyamatterofhumanrights.TheEuropeanConvention’sformulationisbetter,althougharguablytoovague:“Nopersonshallbedeniedtherighttoeducation”(Protocol1,Article2).Astillbetterformulationmightdescribearightofallper-sonstobasiceducation,availablefreetoallandcompulsoryforchildren,toachieveliteracy,numeracy,andtheknowledgeandskillsnecessaryforhealth,economiccom-petence,citizenship,andsociallife.NotallofthearticlesconformtotheVanceConception.Forexample,article12oftheEconomicandSocialCovenantputsforwardarighttohealththatrecogn-izes“therightofeveryonetotheenjoymentofthehighestattainablestandardofphysicalandmentalhealth.”Thisarticledeviatesfromtheideaofhumanrightsasminimalstandardsindemandingoptimizationofhealthratherthansettingathreshold.II.JustifyingEconomicandSocialRightsSinceeconomicandsocialrightsremaincontroversialinsomequarters,makingastrongcaseforthemwillbeuseful.InsketchingthiscaseIwillpresupposetheVanceConceptionofeconomicandsocialrights.Wecanbeginbysketchingalinkageargu-mentthattriestoshowthattheeffectiveimplementationofeconomicandsocialrightsisnecessarytotheeffectiveimplementationofotherhumanrights.AfterthatIproposeanduseajustificatoryframeworktodefendeconomicandsocialrights.440JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page441A.LinkageargumentsHenryShuepioneeredtheuseoflinkageargumentstodefendtherighttosubsist-ence.Linkageargumentsjustifyacontroversialrightbyshowingthatitisnecessarytotheeffectiveimplementationofanotherrightthatisalreadyuncontroversialandaccepted.Shuedefendedtherighttosubsistencebyclaimingthatitwasnecessarytotheeffectiveimplementationofanyotherright:“Noonecanfully...enjoyanyrightthatissupposedlyprotectedbysocietyifheorshelackstheessentialsforareasonablyhealthyandactivelife...”(Shue1996:24–5).Inhisdefenseofarighttosubsistence,Shueisnotmerelymakingthepoint,sometimesmadebyMarxists,thatguaranteesofsecurityorpoliticalparticipationarenotveryvaluableifonemustconstantlyworryaboutwhereone’snextmealiscomingfrom.Instead,heismakingthemuchstrongerclaimthatapersonwhodoesnothaveaneffectivelyimple-mentedrighttosubsistenceenjoysnorightsatall.InShue’sview,apersondoesnotreally“enjoy”aright(or,alternatively,arightisnoteffectivelyimplemented)unlesstherearesocialguaranteestoprotectthesubstanceoftherightagainstthemostcommonthreats.Itisimportanttoguardagainstexaggeratedclaimsabouttheimpossibilityofenjoy-inganyotherrightswithoutenjoyingsubsistencerights.Shue’sargumenthasanimportantlimitationsincethesacrificeofsomepeople’ssubsistencerightsmightsup-plythemeanstoimplementrightstoimplementdueprocessrights,say,forothers.Shue’sargumentsthereforedonotshowthatasocietywithoutsubsistencerightsforeveryonecannotprovideothereffectivelyimplementedrightstosomepeople.Atmosttheyshowthatsuchasocietycannotprovideanyothereffectivelyimple-mentedrightstoeveryone.Further,Shue’sclaimthatimplementedsubsistencerightsareneededforthesuccessfulimplementationofanyotherrightssuggests,contrarytofact,thatpropertyrightswerenoteffectivelyimplementedinnineteenth-centuryAmericasincesubsistencerightsclearlywerenotimplementedintheUnitedStatesatthattime.ButShue’skeyideacanbestatedinamoreprobabilisticform,onethatsaysthatwithoutprotectionsforsubsistence,basichealthcare,andbasiceducation,peopleinseverepovertywillfrequentlybemarginalright-holders.Theywillbeunlikelytoknowwhatrightstheyhaveorwhattheycandotoprotectthem,andtheirextremeneedandvulnerabilitywillmakethemhardtoprotectthroughsocialandpoliticalaction.Ifyouwantpeopletobethekindofright-holderswhocaneffectivelyexer-cise,benefitfrom,andprotecttheirrightsthenyoumustensuretheyenjoybasiceconomicandsocialrights.B.DirectjustificationsThejustificatoryframeworkIproposerequiresthatajustifiedhumanright(1)fitthegeneralideaofhumanrights,(2)besufficientlyimportant,(3)respondtorecurrentthreats,(4)requirethemodalityofrightsratherthansomeweakernorm,(5)imposeburdensontheduty-bearersthatarenotwrongfulorexcessivelyheavy,and(6)befeasibleinmostoftheworld’scountriestoday.1.Doeconomicandsocialrightsfitthegeneralideaofhumanrights?ADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights441\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page442Economicandsocialclaimsareeasilyformulatedasrights–normswithright-holderswhohaveclaims,powers,andimmunities;addresseeswhohavedutiesandliabilities;andscopesorobjectsspecifyingaliberty,protection,orbenefitthattheright-holderistoenjoy.Further,theycanbeimplementedthroughlegislationandadjudication(Fabre2000).Itissometimesobjected,however,thatwecannotidentifytheaddresseesofeconomicandsocialrights.Let’sdiscussthiswithreferencetotherighttofood.Peopleareoftenperplexedbytheideaofaninternationalrighttoadequatefoodbecausetheyarenotsurewhatitmeansforthem.Doesitmeanthattheyhaveanobliga-tiontofeedsomefairshareoftheworld’shungry?Iproposeacomplexviewoftheaddresseesofhumanrightsthatholdsthat:(1)governmentsaretheprimaryaddresseesofthehumanrightsoftheirresidents;(2)governmentshavenegativedutiestorespecttherightsofpeoplefromothercountries;(3)individualshavenegativeresponsibilitiestorespectthehumanrightsofpeopleathomeandabroad;(4)indi-vidualshaveresponsibilitiesasvotersandcitizenstopromotehumanrightsintheirowncountry;and(5)governments,internationalorganizations,andindividualshaveback-upresponsibilitiesforthefulfillmentofhumanrightsaroundtheworld.Thisviewiseasilyappliedtoeconomicandsocialrights.2.Areeconomicandsocialrightssufficientlyimportant?Itissometimesallegedthateconomicandsocialrightsdonothavetheimportancethatcivilandpoliticalrightshave(Beetham1995;Cranston1973).Iftheobjectionisthatsomeformulationsofeconomicandsocialrightsininternationalhumanrightsdocumentsaretooexpansiveandgobeyondwhatisnecessarytoaminimallygoodlife,thatpointcanbeconcededandthoseformulationsrejected.Butiftheobjectionisthatcoreeconomicandsocialrightsdonotprotectveryimportantmoralclaimsitisutterlyimplausible.Onewayofshowingtheimportanceofbasiceconomicandsocialrightshasalreadybeenprovided,namely,thelinkageargumentsgivenabove.Theyshowthateffec-tivelyimplementingotherhumanrightsforallisdifficultorimpossibleinsituationswheremanypeople’sbasiceconomicandsocialrightsareunprotectedandinsecure.Theoreticalapproachestothejustificationofhumanrightstypicallyrequireonetoleaveasidemanyplausiblestartingpointsandargumentsinordertohaveaninte-gratedandparsimonioustheoreticalstructure.Ifhumandignity,forexample,isnotoneofthefundamentalnormsofthetheoryitislikelytodisappear,nevertobeseenagain.Itwillnotdoanyworkinjustifyinghumanrights,evenifitiswellsuitedtodoso.Althoughnormativetheoryisavaluableprojectwithinphilosophy,itspursuitoftheoreticalsimplicitymaymakehumanrightsseemlessjustifiablethantheyactuallyare.Whenonepushesgoodwaysofjustifyinghumanrightsoffthestageandputsasinglefavoredgroundinthelimelight,thefavoredjustificationislikelytolookthinandvulnerable.Aloneunderthespotlight,itsweakspotsarelikelytobeapparentanditmayseemobviousthatitcannotpossiblyjustifythefullrangeofhumanrights.Readersmaythinkthatifthisisthebestjustificationforhumanrights,thoserightsarereallyshaky.JamesGriffin,forexample,justifieshumanrightsentirelybyreferencetothevaluesof“personhood”(orautonomy)and“practicalities.”Hetakesthistobethe“bestphilosophicalaccountofhumanrights”:442JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page443Whatseemstomethebestaccountofhumanrightsisthis.Itiscenteredonthenotionofagency.Wehumanbeingshavethecapacitytoformpicturesofwhatagoodlifewouldbeandtotrytorealizethesepictures.Wevalueourstatusasagentsespeciallyhighly,oftenmorehighlyeventhanourhappiness.Humanrightscanthenbeseenasprotectionsofouragency–whatonemightcallourpersonhood.(Griffin2001a:4;seealsoTasioulas2002)Autonomybyitselfdoesn’tseemlikelytobeabletogenerateeconomicandsocialrights,dueprocessrights,orrightstonondiscriminationandequalitybeforethelaw.Tocompensate,Griffinaccordinglyreliesheavilyon“practicalities”inallowingtheserights.Theresultistomakethejustificationofrightsotherthanlibertiesappearshakyandderivative.Thiscouldhavebeenavoidedbyintroducingsomeotherfun-damentalvaluesornorms,particularlyarequirementoffairtreatmentwhenveryimportantinterestsareatstake(moreonthisbelow).Afairnessnormwouldbenomorecontroversialthanautonomyasastartingpointforhumanrights,anditwouldallowdueprocessrightstobeascentralandnonderivativeaslibertyrights.Ifwethinkofanargumentforahumanrightasprovidingalegorsupport,writerswhowanttoprovidestableandwidelyappealingjustificationsforhumanrightshavereasontopreferamany-leggedapproach.Ifarighthasmultiplejustifications,thefailureofonewillbelesslikelytocalltheright’sjustificationintodoubt.Further,rightswithmultiplejustificationshaveabetterchanceoftranscendingculturalandreligiousdifferences.Accordingly,Iproposeapluralisticconceptionofthenormsandinterestsunderlyinghumanrights.Mystartingpointisaframeworkthatsug-geststhatpeoplehavesecure,butabstract,moralclaimsonothersinfourareas:•asecureclaimtohavealife;•asecureclaimtoleadone’slife;•asecureclaimagainstseverelycruelordegradingtreatment;•asecureclaimagainstseverelyunfairtreatment.Thesefourabstractrightswithassociateddutiesare“secure”inthesensethattheydonothavetobeearnedthroughmembershiporgoodbehavior(althoughclaimstolibertycanbejustifiablysuspendeduponconvictionofacrime).Theyarealso“secure”inthesensethattheiravailabilitytoapersondoesnotdependonthatperson’sabil-itytogenerateutilityorothergoodconsequences.Thesefourprinciplesascribeabstractobligationstorespectandprotecttoeveryone–whetherindividuals,governmentofficials,orcorporateentities.Someofthedutiesinvolvedareobviouslypositive;negativedutiesarenotgivenaprivilegedposition.Costsmatter,butnotwhetherthosecostsresultfromtryingtofulfillanegativeorapositiveduty(Nickel1987;HolmesandSunstein1999).Eachofthefourclaimsiscenteredonafundamentalhumaninterest.Buttheoveralltheoryisdeontologicalinthesensethatitstartswithabstractrightsandassociatedduties.Thebasicinterestsservetoorienttherightsandduties.Aunify-ingideaforthesefoursecureclaimsisthatifperfectlyrealizedtheywouldmakeitpossibleforeverypersonlivingtodaytohaveandleadalifethatisdecentorminimallygood.Thisisasubstantialbutlimitedcommitmenttoequality.Becausetheseprinciplesprescribeasecurefloorofrespect,protection,andprovisionforeachADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights443\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page444person,theyholdtheprospectofgroundingtheuniversalityofhumanrights.Nopersonistobedeniedrespect,protection,orprovisionexceptongroundsofimposs-ibility,unacceptablyhighcoststothebasicinterestsofothers,orasareasonablepunishmentforaseriouscrime.Thistheoryofthesupportingreasonsforhumanrightsismodest.Itsetsalowstandard,namelyalifethatisdecentorminimallygood.AsShueemphasized,humanrightsofferamoralityofthedepths,notoftheheights(Shue1996:18ff.).Theyareconcernedwithavoidingmiseryandruinousinjustice.Second,itrecognizesthattherearemanysourcesofmiseryinhumanlifethathumansdonotcontrolsuchasnaturaldisasters,diseases,andgeneticmisfortunes.Third,itrecognizesthatthespecifichumanrightstobegeneratedfromtheseabstractrightswillmainlyaddressthestand-ardthreatsinvariousareastoadecentorminimallygoodlife.Perfectprotectionisnotenvisioned.Finally,itdoesnotclaimtoofferacompletemoralorpoliticaltheory.ThesecureclaimtohavealifeAcentralhumaninterestissecurityagainstactionsofothersthatleadtodeath,destruc-tionofhealth,orincapacitation.Thesecureclaimtolifeincludesnegativedutiesnottomurder,useviolenceexceptinself-defense,orharmnegligentlyormaliciously.Itincludesaclaimtofreedomandprotectionfrommurder,violence,andharm.Therearepositivedutiestoassistpeoplewhentheyneedhelpinprotectingthemselvesagainstthreatsofmurderandviolence(onthenegativeandpositivedimensionsoftherighttolife,seeRawls1999:65).Intoday’sworldthesedutiestoprotectandprovidewillmostlybedischargedthroughthecreationandfundingoflegalandpoliticalinsti-tutionsatthelocal,national,andinternationallevels.Havingalife,however,requiresmorethanmerelybeingfreefromviolenceandharm.One’sbodymustbecapableofmostnormalfunctions,andtomaintainbodilycapacitiespeoplemustsatisfyphysicalneedsforfood,water,sleep,andshelter.Peoplecanusuallysupplythesethingsforthemselvesthroughwork.Buteveryonegoesthroughperiodssuchaschildhood,illness,unemployment,disability,andadvancedoldagewhenself-supplyisimpossible.Peopleunabletosurviveontheirownhaveclaimsuponotherstoassistance.Thesecureclaimtoleadone’slifeNormaladultsareagents,andputgreatvalueoncontinuingtobeagents.Theyevalu-ate,choose,deliberate,andplan.Theyrecognizeandsolvepracticalproblems.Theymakeplansforthefutureandattempttorealizethem.Evaluation,choice,andeffortsatreformoftenextendtoaperson’sowncharacter.Thedevelopment,maintenance,andexerciseofagencyhavephysical,social,andpoliticalrequirements.Requirementsofsurvivalandhealthareprotectedbyeconomicandsocialrights.Socialrequirementsareprotectedbyrightstoeducationandfreedomofassociation.Andthepoliticalrequirementsareprotectedbyfundamentalfreedomsandrightsofpoliticalparticipation.Theclaimtoleadone’slifeyieldsclaimstofree-domsfromslavery,servitude,andtheuseofone’slife,time,orbodywithoutone’sconsent.Italsoyieldsclaimstolibertiesinthemostimportantareasofchoicesuchasoccupation,marriage,association,movement,andbelief.Andityieldsclaimstothelibertiesofamoralbeing–libertiestoparticipateinsocialrelations,tolearn,think,discuss,decide,respond,act,andacceptresponsibility.Asthissuggests,specificfreedomsaremainlyselectedasfundamentalandthereforeasprotectedunderthelibertyprin-444JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page445ciplebyshowingtheirimportancetotherealizationanduseofagency.Theclaimtoleadone’slifeisstrongestinregardtoactionsthatstructureorsetthedirectionforone’slife,andinvolvemattersthattakeupmuchofone’stimesuchaswork,marriage,andchildren.Thesecureclaimtolibertyisnotjustaclaimtorespectforornoninterferencewithone’sliberty.Itisalsoaclaimtoassistanceinprotectingone’sliberty,andforthecreationandmaintenanceofsocialconditionsinwhichthecapacityforagencycanbedevelopedandexercised.Asystemofunqualifiedrespectforlibertywouldlicenceotherpeopletoengageinviolenceandharm;suchasystemwouldsetbackone’sfundamentalinterestsmorethanithelpedthem.Thesolutionistobuildrestrictionsintotheprincipleofliberty.Someofthesefollow,obviously,fromtherestrictionsonviolencealreadydiscussed.Indecidingwhichlibertiestoincludeorexcludetheappropriatequestionsarewhetheraparticularlibertyisessentialtoourstatusaspersonsandagentsandwhetherthecostsofrespectingandprotectingitarelikelytobesohighthatitisnotworthprotecting.Dutiesofassistancetootherscarveanexceptionintotheclaimtoliberty.Withinlimitsthatpreventexcessiveburdensandsevereunfairness,peoplecanbecalledontoexpendtheirtimeandresourcesinprotectingandprovisioningothersandinsup-portinginstitutionsthatprovidesuchassistanceinsystematicandefficientways.ThesecureclaimagainstseverelycruelordegradingtreatmentAsimpleformofcrueltyimposesseverepainonanotherpersonthoughtlesslyorgleefully.Thistypeofcrueltycandegradeapersonbecauseitsuggeststhathehasnofeelingsorthathissufferingdoesnotmatter.Morecomplicatedformsofcrueltyarecalculatedtodegradeapersonbysuggesting,orbringingitabout,thatsheisacreaturethatsheandotherswillthinkbaseorlow.Slaveryisdegradingbecauseittreatstheslaveasifhelackstheagencyneededtoleadhisownlife.Rapeisdegrad-ingbecauseittreatsapersonasameresexualresourcetobeusedwithoutconsent,orbecauseinmanyculturesitdestroysone’ssocialstandingasavirtuousandpureperson.Degradationmaydepriveapersonoftherespectofselfandothers.Asecureclaimagainstseverecrueltyforbidsthesesortsofactionsandrequiresindividualandcollectiveeffortstoprotectpeopleagainstthem.Theseverityofcrueltydependsonhowdegradingitcanreasonablybetakentobe,thedegreeofmaliciousintent,andtheamountofharmthatitislikelytocause.ThesecureclaimagainstseverelyunfairtreatmentHumansarekeenlyattunedtounfairness,particularlywhenittakestheformofdoinglessthanone’sfairshareincollectiveenterprises.Fairnessandfair-mindednessaremoralvirtues,andsomedegreeoffairnessindealingwithothersisamoralduty.Here,however,severeunfairnessisanappropriatetestbecausebeingsubjecttolesserformsofunfairnessisprobablycompatiblewithhavingaminimallygoodlife.Forpresentpurposesweareconcernedwithformsofunfairnesssoseverethattheyaremattersofruinousinjustice.Theseverityofunfairtreatmentdependsonthedegreeofunfairness,whetherornotmaliciousintentispresent,andtheamountofharmordegradationthattheunfairnessislikelytocause.Theclaimagainstseverelyunfairtreatmentisaclaimtofreedomfromsuchtreatmentandaclaimtoindividualandcollectiveeffortstoprotectpeopleagainstit.Forexample,governmentshaveadutynottoimprisoninnocentpeopleandthereforeadutytoprovidetheaccusedwithfairtrials.ADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights445\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page446AllfourprinciplesprotectaspectsofhumandignityTheUniversalDeclarationspeaksofthe“inherentdignity...ofallmembersofthehumanfamily”andassertsthat“Allhumanbeingsarebornfreeandequalindignityandrights.Theyareendowedwithreasonandconscience.”ThefourgroundsofhumanrightsthatIhaveproposedprovideaninterpretationoftheseideas.Werespectaperson’sdignitywhenweprotectherlifeandagencyandwhenwepreventothersfromimposingtreatmentthatisseverelydegradingorunfair(ondignityseeSchachter1983;Nussbaum2001).Allfourprinciplesshouldbethoughtofasrequirementsofhumandignity,ofwaystorecognizeandrespondtothevalueorworththatisfoundinlifeasaperson.Accordingly,wecanspeakofdignitywithreferencetoanyparticularfeatureofper-sonsthathasdistinctivevalue(e.g.,theirabilitytosuffer,theirlives,theiragency,theirconsciousnessandreflectivecapacities,theiruseofcomplicatedlanguagesandsymbolicsystems,theirrationality,theirindividuality,theirsocialawareness).Thesecureclaimtolifeplaysacentralroleinjustifyingeconomicandsocialrights.Withoutsafefoodandwater,lifeandhealthareendangeredandseriousillnessanddeathareprobable.Theconnectionbetweentheavailabilityoffoodandbasichealthcareandhavingaminimallygoodlifeisdirectandobvious–somethingthatisnotalwaystruewithotherhumanrights.Educationalsopromotesthefunda-mentalinterestinlifebyteachinghealth-relatedknowledgeandskillsaswellaswaysofsupportingone’slifethroughwork.Thesecureclaimtoleadalife,tobeabletodevelopandexerciseone’sagency,alsosupportstheimportanceofbasiceconomicandsocialrights.Developingandexercisingagencyrequiresafunctioningmindandbodyaswellasoptionsandoppor-tunities.Theavailabilityoffoodandbasichealthcarepromotesandprotectsphysicalandmentalfunctioning.Andtheavailabilityofbasiceducationpromotesknowledgeofsocial,economic,andpoliticaloptions.Inthecontemporaryworld,lackofaccesstoeducationalopportunitiestypicallylimits(bothabsolutelyandcomparatively)people’sabilitiestoparticipatefullyandeffectivelyinthepoliticalandeconomiclifeoftheircountry(seeHodgson1998).Thesecureclaimagainstseverelyunfairtreatmentsupportseconomicandsocialrights.Itisseverelyandruinouslyunfairtoexcludesomepartsofthepopulation(ruralpeople,women,minorities)fromaccesstoeducationandeconomicopportun-ities.Basiceconomicandsocialrightsprotectagainstthatkindofunfairness.3.Recurrentthreats?Manyhavesuggestedthatourformulationsofconstitutionalandhumanrightsarisefromtheexperienceofinjustice(Shue1996:17,32–3;Donnelly2003[1985]:46,92;Dershowitz2004:9).Thatexperiencemaybedirect(whenoneendurestheinjusticeoneself)orindirect(whenonelearnsoftheinjusticefromthosewhoendureditorfromjournalistsorhistorians).Thedevelopmentoflistsofrightstobeprotectedthroughpoliticalactionrepresentsakindofsociallearning.Peoplegraduallylearnthemostseverewrongsandinjusticesthathumanpsychologyandinstitutionsproduceanddevelopmeansofprotectingthemselvesandtheirfellowcitizensagainstthoseinjustices.Theworld’s200orsocountriesnowusesimilarsortsofpoliticalandlegalinsti-tutionsincludingcentralizedpoliticalpower;alegalsystemincludinglegislators,courts,andprisons;policeandarmedforces;largebureaucracies;mediaofmasscommunica-446JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page447tion;amonetarysystem;amixtureofpublicandprivateproperty;andtaxsystems(onthemodernstate,seeMorris1998).Theseinstitutions,usedaroundtheworld,givecountriessharedproblemsandleadtotheadoptionofsimilarremediesforthoseproblems.Ifallcountriesusethesamebasicinstitutions,andiftheseinstitutionsposesomedistinctivethreatstovaluesthatmostpeopleshare,thenhumanrightswilloftenfloatfreeofculturaldifferences.Donnellyholdsthathumanrightsareneededinallcountriesbecausethemodernstateisnowusedeverywhereandinternationalhumanrightsaresociallylearnedremediesforitsbuilt-indangers(Donnelly2003[1985]:46,92).Theformsthesethreatstakeandhowtodealwiththemaregraduallylearned,emerging“fromtheconcreteexperiences,especiallythesufferings,ofrealhumanbeingsandtheirpoliticalstrug-glestodefendorrealizetheirdignity”(Donnelly2003[1985]:58).Oncethedangersandremedieshavebeenlearned,thelessonsoughttobesharedwithalltheusers.Indeed,sincetheEuropeancolonialpowersbothdevelopedandpromotedthespreadofthemodernstate,theyhaveresponsibilitiestoaddressitsdangers.Arecalloftheproductisnotpossible,butsharingthelessonsaboutitsdangersandremediesis.Donnellydescribesthesortsofthreatsthatmakespecificrightsnecessaryasonesthatare“widespread,systematic,andegregious”(Donnelly2003[1985]:226).Itisamistake,however,toputtoomuchemphasisonthemodernstate.Contem-porarypoliticalinstitutionsevolvedfromearliersystemsofgovernment,law,andproperty,anditisimplausibletosuggestthatnoneofthedangersofthemodernstatewerepresentintheearlierversions.Thedangersoftherecklessandcorruptuseofpoliticalpower,offoodscarcityduetosystemsofprivateagriculturalproperty,andthedangersofunconstraineddemocracyhavebeenknownanddiscussedformorethan2,000yearsInadequateaccesstosubsistence,basichealthcare,andbasiceducationisamajorprobleminmanycountriestoday.Countriesthatdonothavepoliticalprogramstoensuretheavailabilityofthesegoodstoallpartsofthepopulationhavehighratesofhunger,disease,andilliteracy(Pogge2002).Peoplewhorecognizetheirrespons-ibilitytoprovideforthemselvesandtheirfamiliesmayneverthelessfindthatlimitedabilities,harshcircumstances,oracombinationofbothmakeitimpossibleforthemtogainsufficientaccesstosubsistence.Adroughtmaymakeitimpossibletogrowfood,forexample,orsevereillnessmaymakeoneunabletowork,orthewagespaidforworkingmaybeinsufficienttocoverbasicneeds.Further,actionbyindividualsorfamiliesisofteninadequateinthefaceofsevereillness,infectiousdiseases,andmattersofpublichealthsuchaswaterandsewagesystems.4.Wouldsomeweakernormbeaseffective?Economicandsocialrightsmightbeunnecessaryifpeopleparticipatedinself-help,assistancetofamilymembers,andcharitablegivingtothoseinneed.Thisproposalsuggeststhatwecanrecognizethatpeoplehavemoralclaimstoassistanceinregardtosubsistence,healthcare,andeducationwithouthavingtoviewtheseclaimsasgeneratingrightsorasrequiringpoliticalaction.Aharmoniouscombinationofself-helpandvoluntarymutualassistanceiscer-tainlytobeencouraged,butsuchamixtureofferslittleprospectofprovidingade-quatelyforalloftheneedyandincapacitatedifitisviewedasasubstituteforratherthanasasupplementtopoliticallyimplementedeconomicandsocialrights.First,ADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights447\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page448somepeopleareunabletohelpthemselvesbecausetheyaresick,disabled,veryyoung,orveryold.Second,somepeoplelackfamiliestoassistthem,andimpoverishedpeopleoftencomefromlow-incomefamilieswithlimitedabilitiestoassisttheirmembers.Third,thelimitsofcharitablegivingassourcesofaidtotheneedyareobvious.Thereareoftentoofewdonorsfortheneedspresent.Further,coveragefortheneedyislikelytobespottyratherthancomprehensive.Thismaybebecausenocapabledonoriswithincallorbecausethecapabledonorsthatarewithincallhaveusedtheirdiscretionandgiventoothercauses.ThisspottinesswasnotedbyJohnStuartMill.Heremarkedthat“Charityalmostalwaysdoestoomuchortoolittle:itlavishesitsbountyinoneplace,andleavespeopletostarveinanother”(Mill1848,BookV,Chapterxi,section13).5.Aretheburdensjustifiable?Afamiliarobjectiontoeconomicandsocialrightsisthattheyaretooburdensome.Frequentlytheclaimthateconomicandsocialrightsaretooburdensomeusesother,lesscontroversialhumanrightsasastandardofcomparison,andsuggeststhateco-nomicandsocialrightsaresubstantiallymoreburdensomeorexpensivethanlibertyrights,forexample.Libertyrightssuchasfreedomofcommunication,association,andmovementrequirebothrespectandprotectionfromgovernments.Andpeoplecannotbeadequatelyprotectedintheenjoymentoflibertiessuchastheseunlesstheyalsohavesecurityanddueprocessrights.Thecostsofliberty,asitwere,includethecostsoflawandcriminaljustice.Onceweseethis,libertiesstarttolookalotmorecostly.Toprovideeffectivelibertiestocommunicate,associate,andmoveitisnotenoughforasocietytomakeaprohibitionofinterferencewiththeseactivitiespartofitslawandacceptedmorality.Aneffectivesystemofprovisionfortheselibertieswillrequirealegalschemethatdefinespersonalandpropertyrightsandprotectstheserightsagainstinvasionswhileensuringdueprocesstothoseaccusedofcrimes.Providingsuchlegalprotectionintheformoflegislatures,police,courts,andprisonsisveryexpensive.Further,weshouldnotthinkofeconomicandsocialrightsassimplygivingevery-oneafreesupplyofthegoodstheserightsprotect.Guaranteesofsubsistencewillbeintolerablyexpensiveandwillundermineproductivityifeveryonesimplyreceivesafreesupply.Aviablesystemofeconomicandsocialrightswillrequiremostpeopletoprovideforthemselvesandtheirfamiliesthroughworkaslongastheyaregiventhenecessaryopportunities,education,andinfrastructure.Government-implementedeconomicandsocialrightsprovideguaranteesofavailability(or“secureaccess”),butitshouldnotbenecessaryforgovernmentstosupplytherequisitegoodsinmorethanasmallfractionofcases.Basichealthcareandeducationmaybeexceptionstothissincemanybelievethatgovernmentsshouldprovidefreehealthservicesandeducationirrespectiveofabilitytopay.Countriesthatdonotacceptandimplementeconomicandsocialrightsstillhavetobearsomehowthecostsofprovidingfortheneedy.Ifgovernmentdoesnotsupplyfood,clothing,andsheltertothoseunabletoprovideforthemselves,thenfamilies,friends,andcommunitieswillhavetoshouldermuchofthisburden.Itisonlyinthepastcenturythatgovernment-sponsoredeconomicandsocialrightshavetakenoverasubstantialpartoftheburdenofprovidingfortheneedy.Thetaxesassoci-atedwitheconomicandsocialrightsarepartialreplacementsforotherburdensome448JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page449duties,namelythedutiesoffamiliesandcommunitiestoprovideadequatecarefortheunemployed,sick,disabled,andaged.Decidingwhethertoimplementeconomicandsocialrightsisnotamatterofdecidingwhethertobearheavyburdens,butratherofdecidingwhethertocontinuewithtotalrelianceonsystemsofinformalprovisionthatprovideinsufficientassistanceandwhosecostsfallveryunevenlyonfamilies,friends,andcommunities.Oncewerecognizethatlibertyrightsalsocarryhighcosts,thatintelligentsys-temsofprovisionforeconomicandsocialrightsneedsupplytherequisitegoodstopeopleinonlyasmallminorityofcases,andthatthesesystemsaresubstitutesforother,morelocalwaysofprovidingfortheneedy,thedifferencebetweenthebur-densomenessoflibertyrightsandtheburdensomenessofeconomicandsocialrightsceasestoseemsolarge.Eveniftheburdensimposedbyeconomicandsocialrightsarenotexcessive,theymightstillbewrongtoimposeonindividuals.Libertariansobjecttoeconomicandsocialrightsasrequiringimpermissibletaxation.Withoutattemptingheretoprovideacritiqueoflibertarianism,Inotethatthisviewisvulnerabletoanattackontwogrounds.First,taxationispermissiblewhenusedtodischargethemoraldutiesoftaxpayers,aswhenitisusedtosupportgovernment-organizedsystemsofhuman-itarianassistancethatfulfillmoreeffectivelythancharitydutiesofassistancethatallindividualshave(Beetham1995:53).Second,propertyrightsarenotsoweightythattheycanneverbeoutweighedbytherequirementsofmeetingotherrights.6.FeasibilityThefinaltestoffeasibilityforaninternationalhumanrightisthatmostcountriesintheworldtodayareabletoimplementtherightinquestion.Feasibilityisachal-lengingtestforbasiceconomicandsocialrightsbecausesomeoftheworld’scoun-triesaretooimpoverished,troubled,anddisorganizedtorespectandimplementthemeffectively.Thisisparticularlytruein“low-income”countries(onesinthelowestquartileintermsofaverageindividualincome).ThesearecountriessuchasHaiti,India,andNigeriawheretheaverageincomeislessthanU.S.$500peryear,theaveragelifespanisslightlyunder60years,childhoodimmunizationisnear60per-cent,andilliteracyratesaremorethan40percent.Theabilitiesandresourcesoftheleastcapablecountriesarenotanappropriatestandardoffeasibility.Thelegaldutiesofparents,forexample,arenotlimitedtotheonesthateventheleastcapableparentscansatisfy.Instead,wesetahigherstandardthatmostbutnotallparentsareabletosatisfy.Analogously,thestandardoffeasibilityforhumanrightsshouldbeonethatmostcountriescansatisfy.Theappropriatequestioniswhethercountriesinthetoptwoquartilesandsomeofthoseinthethirdhavetheresourcesandcapabilitiestoimplementbasiceconomicandsocialrights.Countriesinthetopquartileclearlycan.TheyincludecountriessuchasCanada,Denmark,Greece,Japan,andSingapore.Socancountriesinthesecondquartile.TheyincludecountriessuchasChile,Hungary,Mexico,andPoland.AveragepersonalincomeinthesecountriesisaroundU.S.$5000,theaveragelife-spanis73years;infantimmunizationratesarearound95percent,andilliteracyratesarelessthan10percent(WorldBankDevelopmentReport2003).Mostofthemalreadyhaveprogramstopromoteandprotectbasiceconomicandsocialrights,althoughthequalityandefficiencyoftheseprogramsissometimespoor.ADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights449\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page450Butwhataboutcountriesinthethirdquartile?Ifsomeofthemareabletoimple-mentbasiceconomicandsocialrights,thefeasibilitytestwillbepassed.ThesearecountriessuchasBrazil,China,Columbia,Fiji,Jordan,andTurkey.TheaveragepersonalincomeinthesecountriesisU.S.$1350;theaveragelifespanis69years;childhoodimmunizationratesarearound80percent,andilliteracyislessthan20percent.Manyofthesecountriesalreadyhaveprogramstoreducehunger,pro-motehealth,andprovideeducation,butthoseprogramsareoftenunderfundedandfailtocoverallregionsandpartsofthepopulation.Butitseemslikelythatatleastthetopthirdofthemareabletoimplementbasiceconomicandsocialrights.Thus,ifweusetheVanceConceptionofeconomicandsocialrightsitseemsthatthefeasibilitytestcanbemet.Ifalloftheappropriatejustificatorytestscanbemetbyeconomicandsocialrights,thismeansthattheserightsarejustifiedforthewholeworld.Mostcountriescanimplementthemandhavenoexcuseongroundsofresourcesfornotdoingsoasquicklyaspossible.Incountriesthataregenuinelyunabletoimplementthem,theserightsexistasjustifiedinternationalnorms,buttheirgovernmentsandpeoplesareexcusedongroundsofinabilityfortheirfailuretomakethemavailable.Thisdoesnotrendertherightsirrelevant,however.Theystandasnormstoberealizedasfarandassoonaspossibleandwhoselackofrealizationisanappropriatematterofregret.Further,thoserightscalluponsecondaryandback-upaddresseestocomeforwardandprovidemeaningfulassistance.TheInternationalCovenantonEconomicandSocialRightsonlycommitsitssignatoriestoprogressiveimplementationofeconomicandsocialrights.Article2.1requiresratifyingcountriesto“takesteps,individuallyandthroughinternationalassis-tanceandco-operation...tothemaximumofitsavailableresources,withaviewtoachievingprogressivelythefullrealizationoftherightsrecognizedinthepresentCovenant.”TheEconomicandSocialCovenanttreatsthedutiesassociatedwitheconomicandsocialrightsasdutiestotry–tomakeagood-faitheffortprogressivelyovertimetoimplementtheserightsforallofthepopulationinallpartsofthecountry.Thisallowscountriestobeincompliancewiththeirlegaldutieseventhoughsubsist-ence,minimalhealthcare,andbasiceducationarenotavailabletoalloftheirpeople.AbetterapproachwouldhavebeentousethesamecommitmentclausefoundinArticle2oftheCivilandPoliticalCovenant,namelyto“respectandtoensuretoallindividualswithinitsterritory...therightsrecognizedinthepresentCovenant.”Asupplementalstatementcouldhavesaidthatcountriesgenuinelyunabletoimplementeconomicandsocialrightsaretemporarilyexcusedbuthavedutiestoimplementtheserightsassoonandasfarastheycan.Beyondthis,dutiesofrichercountriestoassistlow-incomecountriesinrealizingbasiceconomicandsocialrightsshouldhavebeenspecifiedabstractlybutexplicitly(seeRawls1999:37).Althoughtheeconomicandsocialtreatiescallforprogressiveimplementation,thecommitteesadministeringthesetreatieshavetriedtodealwiththedeficienciesofthisapproachbyintroducingthesupplementalideasofmakingagoodfaithandmeas-urableeffortandofmeetingminimumstandards.Thedutiestotryassociatedwiththeideaofprogressiveimplementationallowcountriesthataredoinglittleornothingtoimplementeconomicandsocialrightstosaythattheyareengaginginhopefulwaiting,tosaythattheyhavedoneallthattheycanandthattheyaresimplywaitingformoreresourcestoappear.Thismakesgenerallyavailablearationalizationfor450JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page451inaction.Onepossibleresponsetothis,ofcourse,istochallengethetruthfulnessoftheclaimaboutinabilityinlightofexpendituresonthingsthatseemtohavelowerpriority.Anotherapproachistorequirethatcountriesbedoingsomething,thattheybetakingmeasurablesteps.Economicandsocialrightscanbefurtherstreng-thenedbyaddingdutiestosatisfywithoutdelayfeasibleminimalstandardswhilemakingeffortstorealizetherightfullyoveralongerterm.Thisisoftendescribedasa“minimumcore.”Arightofthissortmightbethoughtofashavingtwoobjects.One,theminimalobject,issetatalevelthatalmostallcountriescanmeetandrequiresnearlyimmediatecompliance.Inregardtofood,theminimumcoremightbeadutytopreventmassivefamines,whiletheoutercoreissecureaccesstoadequatefoodforall.Itsetsamoredemandinggoalthatprovidesabroaderfocusfortherightandthatissupportedbyadutytotry.III.ImplementingEconomicandSocialRightsThissectionconsiderstheobjectionthateconomicandsocialrightsaredeficientasrightsbecausetheycannot–orperhapsshouldnot–beimplementedbyjudgesalone.Itmightbeargued,forexample,thatjudgescanandshouldhavethepowersnecessarytoimplementtherighttofreedomofreligionortherighttoafairtrial,butthattheydonotandshouldnothavethepowersnecessarytoimplementtherighttobasiceducation.Judges,afterall,cannotcreateorfundaschoolsystem–andinademocracytheyshouldnottryto.Whenacountryhasacceptedarighttofreedomofreligionbyputtingtherightinitsconstitutionorbyratifyinganinternationalhumanrightstreaty,judgescanproceedtoimplementitthroughjudicialreview.Ifthelegislaturepassesalawfor-biddingthebeliefsandpracticesofJehovah’sWitnesses,andapractitionerofthatreligionisconvictedunderthatlaw,onappealjudgescannullifytheconvictionanddeclarethelawunconstitutionalorincompatiblewiththecountry’sinternationalobligations.Judgescanmakeimportantandlegitimatecontributionstotheimple-mentationoffreedomofreligion.Nowsuppose,incontrast,thatacountryhasacceptedarighttobasiceducationbyputtingtherightinitsconstitutionorbyratifyinganinternationalhumanrightstreaty.Perhapstheformulationoftherightgoeslikethis:Childrenhavearighttoeducation.Accordingly,theLegislatureshallcreateandfundasystemoffreepublicschoolsopentoallchildrenandavailableinallpartsofthecountry.Freepubliceducationshallbeavailableforatleasttenyearsofschooling.Supposefurtherthatthelegislatureignoresthisinstructionandneithercreatesnorfundsschools.Agroupofparentswhowantfreepubliceducationtobeavailablefilesuit,askingthejudgetoorderthelegislaturetoperformitsconstitutionalduties.Ajudgemightissuesuchanorder,butcannotenforceitbynullifyingalawbecausethereisnolawtonullify.Judgescannotdoanythingtoimplementtherightuntilthelegislaturehascreatedandfundedasystemofpublicschools.Beyondthis,inademocracyitwouldbewrongforajudgetotakeovertheroleoflegislatorandsaythatifthelegislatureADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights451\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page452refusedtofulfillitsdutythenthejudiciarywilldesignandimplementaschoolsystemandappropriatethenecessaryfunds.Itisnotajudge’sproperroletotakemoneyfrombridgeconstructionorprisonsanddivertittoschoolfunding.Theconclusiondrawnfromthesecontrastingexamplesmightbethatjudicialimple-mentationonlyworkswhenjudgescannullifylawsordecisions,andaccordinglythatrealrightsareonesthatarestrictlynegative,thatforbidgovernmentsfromsup-pressinganyreligionorinfringingpeople’sspeech.Thisargumentcannotbesoundbecauseisitimpliesafalseproposition,namelythatdueprocessrightsarenotrealrights.Toseethis,consideranexampleexactlyanalogoustotheoneabouttherighttoeducation.Supposethatacountryhasacceptedarighttoafairtrialbyputtingtherightinitsconstitutionorbyratifyinganinter-nationalhumanrightstreaty.Perhapstheformulationoftherightgoeslikethis:Inallcriminalprosecutions,everyaccusedpersonhastherighttoafairandpublictrial,byanimpartialjury.Attrial,allaccusedpersonshavetherighttotheassistanceofcounsel,providedatpublicexpenseifnecessary.Supposefurtherthatthelegislatureignoresthisrightandcontinuesputtinginjailwithouttrialpeoplethatthepolicebelievecommittedcrimes.Therearenocriminalprosecutions,nolegislativeprovisionforthem,andnosystemtoprovidefreelegalcounsel.Accordingly,judgesplaynoroleinpunishingcriminals.Supposenowthatapersonwhohasbeenputinjailwithoutprosecutionortrialfilessuit,askingajudgetoorderthepolicetoreleasehimorbringhimtotrial.Ajudgemightissuesuchanorder,butcannotenforceitbynullifyingalawbecausethereisnolawtonullify.Judgescannotdoanythingtoimplementtherightuntilthelegislaturehascreatedandfundedasystemofcriminalprosecutionandtrial.Thejudgescanorderthepolicetostopimprisoningpeoplewithouttrialbeforeajudge,butthepolicemayscoffatthisorder,jestingthatjudgeshaveveryfewweapons.Beyondthis,inademocracyitwouldbewrongforajudgetotakeovertheroleoflegislatorandsaythatifthelegislaturerefusedtofulfillitsdutythenthejudiciarywilldesignandimplementacriminaljusticesystemandappropriatethenecessaryfunds.Itisnotajudge’sproperroletotakemoneyfrombridgeconstructionorschoolsanddivertittofundingcourtsandlawyers.Becauseoftheprominentplaceofdueprocessrightsinhistoricbillsofrightsitisimplausibletoarguethatdueprocessrightsarenotrealrights.Dueprocessrightsmayseemtobenegativerights,onesthatmerelyrequirethegovernmenttorefrainfromcertainactions.Butinfacttheyaremorelikepositiverights,onesthatrequiretheiraddresseestoprovideaservicetotheright-holders.Ithinkthattheyarebestclassifiedasconditionallypositive.Theysaythatifthegovernmentplanstopunishsomeonethenitmustgivethatpersonvariousproceduralprotectionsandlegalservicesalongwiththeopportunitytohaveatrial.Theantecedentofthiscondi-tionalissuretobecontinuouslysatisfiedbecausegovernmentsneedtothreatenandcarryoutpunishmentsinordertogovern,andthusgovernmentswillhavedutiestoprovidedueprocessservicesinmanycases.Fromapracticalpointofviewdueprocessrightsimposedutiestoprovide,justliketherighttoeducation.Theyrequiregovernmentstoprovideexpensivelegalservicesthatrequirelargeandexpensivebureau-craciesandinfrastructures.452JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page453Claimsaboutwhatjudgescandotoimplementrightsarerelativetoabackgroundofinstitutionsandpractices.Wethinkofjudgesascapableofimplementingdueprocessrightsbecauseweassumepracticesandlawsgivingjudgessignificantpowerovercriminalprosecutions.Buttakeawaythatbackgroundandjudgesarenomoreabletoimplementrightstodueprocessthantheyareabletoimplementtherighttoeducationwhenthelegislaturehasneverbeenwillingtodoanythingaboutedu-cation.Inalmostallcases,theeffectiveimplementationofrightsrequiresajointeffortbylegislaturesandcourts.Toreturntotheexampleoftherighttoeducation,judgescanplayasignificantroleinimplementingthatrightonceasystemofeducationhasbeencreatedandfunded.Ifsomeparentsinalargeregionwherenopublicschoolshavebeenpro-videdfilesuitdemandingthattheirchildren’srighttoeducationbefulfilled,ajudgecanordertheCommissionerofEducationtocreateaschoolinthatregion.Similarly,judgescandealwithcomplaintsofdiscriminatoryexclusionofsomestudents,orfailurestoprovidetenyearsofinstruction.Thesameistrueforrightstosubsistenceandtobasichealthcare.Oncelegislativelydefinedandfunded,judgescanimplementtheserights.Witheconomicandsocialrights,however,itisprobablymoreefficienttoputimplementationinthehandsofspecializedbureau-craciesleavingjudgesthejobofdealingwithappealsfromthedecisionsofthoseofficials.IV.TheWidespreadAcceptanceofEconomicandSocialRightsEconomicandsocialrightsconformingtotheVanceConceptionareverywidelyaccepted.Asnotedearlier,aboutthree-quartersoftheworld’scountrieshaveratifiedtheEconomicandSocialCovenant.Mostcapitalists,socialists,communitarians,authoritarians,anddefendersofhierarchyaccepttheideathatgovernmentshavehigh-priorityresponsibilitiestoensurethatpeoplecanmeettheirbasicneeds.Radicallibertariansaretheonlyrejectionists.Ispeculatethatworldwideacceptanceofeconomicandsocialrights,understoodinaccordancewiththeVanceConception,alreadyexists.Worldwideacceptanceofahumanrightistheideathatinmostcountriesamajorityofpeoplewhohaveanopiniononthematterwouldendorsetheright.Wecouldtestthisspeculationwithopinionpollsthataskedquestionspertainingto(1)universality;(2)high-priority;and(3)associatedduties.Universalitymightbetestedbyaskingpeopletoindicatestrongdisagreement,disagreement,agreement,strongagreement,orlackofopinionconcerningpropositionssuchas:•Allpeopleeverywhereoughttoenjoyopportunitiestomakealivingthroughwork.•Allthosepeoplewhoaregenuinelyunabletomeettheirbasicneedsthroughworkorrelianceonsavingsshouldbeeligibletoreceiveassistancefromgovernment-fundedprograms.Theideathateconomicandsocialrightsaremandatoryorduty-generatingmightbetestedbypropositionssuchas:ADefenseofWelfareRightsasHumanRights453\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page454•Itiswrongforgovernmentstofailtoensurethateducationisavailabletochildrenwhenitispossibleforthemtodoso.•Governmentshaveadutytoprotectpublichealthbyensuringthatsafewaterisavailable.Beliefinthehighpriorityofhumanrightscouldbetestedbyformulatingproposi-tionsaboutspecificrights,orfamilies,ofrights,asquestionsaboutimportance.Questionsaboutpropositionssuchasthesecouldbeposed:•Itisveryimportantthatpeopleenjoyprotectionsagainstfamines.•Itisimperativethatchildrenbeensuredopportunitiesforeducation.Ifitturnsoutthatmyspeculationabouttheworldwideacceptanceofeconomicandsocialrightsisempiricallycorrect,thatwouldexplainthepoliticalstabilityofsuchrightsindemocraticcountries.TheUnitedStatesisnotknownforbeingstrongoneconomicandsocialrights,butatleastsomeofitsprogramstoensurethem–inparticularsocialsecurityandpubliceducation–arepoliticallyuntouchable.Politicianswhoputthemselvesinwholesaleoppositiontotheseprogramswouldbevotedoutinthenextelection.Thepoliticsofwelfarerightsmaybemorestableiftheimplementingprogramsalsoofferbenefitsorguaranteestothemiddleclasses,therebyprovidingthemwithprudentialreasonsforpoliticalsupport.Thismakestheprogramsmoreexpensive,buthelpsensurethatthequalityofbenefitswillbeadequate.TheVanceConceptionofeconomicandsocialrightscanhelpleadtoastablepoliticalbalancebecauseitacceptsthemostimportantdemandsofboththelessandthemoreadvantaged.Itacceptsthedemandofthelessadvantagedthattheybeabletosurviveontermsthatareatleastdecent,enjoyfullcitizenshipandpoliticalparti-cipation,andhaveaccesstoeducationandopportunitiesforeconomicparticipation.Anditacceptsthedemandofthemoreadvantagedthattheynotbesubjectedtoadictatorshipoftheproletariat;thattheykeeptheirpoliticalrightsandeconomicliberties.OfcoursetheVanceConceptionprovidesaminimum,notalimit.Farmoreegalitarianarrangementsarepossibleincountrieshavingthenecessaryresourcesandpopularsupport.Note*Thisessayisarevisedandexpandedversionof“PovertyandRights,”ThePhilosophicalQuarterly55(2005).ReferencesAiken,W.andLaFolette,H.,eds.1996.WorldHungerandMorality(UpperSaddleRiver,NJ:Prentice-Hall).Alston,P.1987.“OutoftheAbyss:TheChallengesConfrontingtheNewUNCommitteeonEconomicandSocialRights,”HumanRightsQuarterly9:332–81.454JamesW.Nickel\nCDIC24.qxd2/4/0915:58Page455Arneson,R.1990.“IsWorkSpecial?JusticeandtheDistributionofEmployment,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview84:1127–47.Bayefsky,A.2001.TheUNHumanRightsTreatySystem:UniversalityattheCrossroads(Ardsley,NY:Transnational).Beetham,D.1995.“WhatFutureforEconomicandSocialRights?”PoliticalStudiesXLIII:41–60.Bentham,Jeremy.1970.“AnarchialFallacies,”inA.Melden,ed.,HumanRights(Belmont,CA:Wadsworth),pp.30–1.CouncilofEurope.1950.EuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms.Receivedenoughratificationstobecomeoperativein1953.CouncilofEurope.1961.EuropeanSocialCharter.Receivedenoughratificationstobecomeoperativein1965.CouncilofEurope.1965.EuropeanSocialCharter.Receivedenoughratificationstobecomeoperativein1965.Cranston,M.1967.“HumanRights,RealandSupposed,”inD.D.Raphael,ed.,PoliticalTheoryandtheRightsofMan(London:Macmillan).Cranston,M.1973.WhatAreHumanRights?London:BodleyHead.Dershowitz,Alan.2004.RightsfromWrongs:TheOriginsofHumanRightsintheExperienceofInjustice(NewYork:BasicBooks).Donnelly,J.2003[1985].UniversalHumanRightsinTheoryandPractice,2ndedn.(Ithaca,NYandLondon:CornellUniversityPress).Eide,A.1989.“TheRealisationofSocialandEconomicRightsandtheMinimumThresholdApproach,”HumanRightsLawJournal10:35–51.Fabre,C.2000.SocialRightsUndertheConstitution–GovernmentandtheDecentLife(Oxford:ClarendonPress).GallupOrganization.2002.GallupPolloftheIslamicWorld.Gould,C.2004.GlobalizingDemocracyandHumanRights(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress).Griffin,J.1996.ValueJudgement:ImprovingOurEthicalBeliefs(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).Griffin,J.2001a.“DiscrepanciesBetweentheBestPhilosophicalAccountofHumanRightsandtheInternationalLawofHumanRights,”ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety.Griffin,J.2001b.“FirstStepsinanAccountofHumanRights,”EuropeanJournalofPhilosophy9.3:306–27.Halstead,P.2002.“HumanPropertyRights,”ConvenyancerandPropertyLawyer:153–73.Henkin,L.1994.“EconomicRightsUndertheUnitedStatesConstitution,”ColumbiaJournalofTransnationalLaw32:97–132.Hodgson,D.1998.TheHumanRighttoEducation.Aldershot,Hants:AshgatePublishing.Holmes,S.,andC.Sunstein.1999.TheCostofRights:WhyLibertyDependsonTaxes(NewYork:Norton).Howard,R.1987.“TheFull-BellyThesis:ShouldEconomicRightsTakePriorityoverCivilandPoliticalRights?”HumanRightsQuarterly5:467–90.Mill,J.1848.PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy(London:Longmans,GreenandCo.).Morris,C.1998.AnEssayontheModernState(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).Morris,C.2002.AnEssayontheModernState(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).Nickel,J.1987.MakingSenseofHumanRights(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress).Nickel,J.1993.“AHumanRightsApproachtoWorldHunger,”inWillAikenandHughL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237classicalliberalism,15,94,244burdensofjudgment,68–69Clinton,WilliamJefferson,333Burke,Edmund,62,70,387,425–426,coercion,5,16–17,18,83,88–95,103,188,432200,205,219,224,251,273,Buruma,Ian,238327–328,355,402–403,415,419Burundi,243cognitivism,32Bush,GeorgeWalker,68,240–241Cohen,G.A.,4,41–46,48,54–58,157,Butler,Judith,73–74410–413,417Cohen,Joshua,12,37Calhoun,JohnC.,241,244Coles,Romand,74Canada,338,352–353,449collectiveactionproblems,24,232458Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page459collectivedecision-making,11–13,16,contractarianism,35,50,137,208,309,213–218,221–222,224–226,311,312247–259,378–379,416seealsosocialcontractcollectivism,312contracts,10,272,292,418,427Collier,Paul,393–394contractualism,103–105,311Collingwood,R.G.,345contribution,43,58,356,435,438Colombia,449ControllingtheState(Gordon),270–271commongood,3,62,123–126,133,159,convergence,88,206,250199,201,202,210,214,216,218,cooperation,11,42,45,48,64–65,69,71,233–234,236,238,242,249,255,141,186,205,215–219,221,223,304,306,314,317,324,411273,309–311,314,364,370,communism,218374–375,419communitarianism,13–15,156,303–317,cosmopolitanism,2,16–18,336–337,322–339,350,453388–403community,214,226,251,303–317,ethical,388–390323–324,336,349,366,369,375,juridical,388–403378,380,389,400interdependence-basedvs.humanity-moralizedvs.ordinary,314–315based,390–394,396–397,399–400,weakvs.strong,311–312403seealsosocialenvironmentpolitical,388–390Community,Anarchy,andLiberty(Taylor),radicalvs.mild,389–390,396,401315seealsodistributivejustice,globaljusticecompassion,9,155,159,168–169,184,crimeandcriminals,8,9,15,90,157–158,356165,183–184,205,216,220,236,253,competition,33,91,191,218,221,248,258,295,443,444,448,452–453255,364–367,374,377seealsodecriminalizationcompliance,18,51–52,54,86,188–190,Crisp,Roger,168–169,171200,328,432–434criticaltheory,19,322,348,351,358,379Condorcet,Marquisde,294culture,13–16,65,214,217–219,223,249,Connolly,William,73–74253,304,322,324,325,329–332,consensus,88,92,103,114,216–217,238,335,337,346,349–353,362,366,250,283,358370–380,389,447overlapping,64–65,92,113culturalimperialism,326consent,5,85,103,105,114,137,138,seealsomulticulturalism,societalculture140–141,143,146–147,200,205,CultureandEquality(Barry),371241–242,444ConsiderationsonRepresentativeDagger,Richard,14Government(Mill),200,234Dahlberg,Matz,238constitution,370Darwall,Stephen,219defined,268–269DeCive(Hobbes),309explicitvs.implicit,268–269deTocqueville,Alexis,232–234,239–242,written,269–270,287–288244,249,308,310–311constitutionalessentials,93–94,208deVitoria,Francisco,17constitutionalism,2,12–13,267–279,decriminalization,330283–298deference,211,363American,268degradingtreatment,19,73,220–221,356,English,268380,445–446particularvs.general,268deliberation:seecollectivedecision-making,constructivism,24,37,42,49–50,54,57–58democracy,publicjustificationIndex459\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page460democracy,2,4,8,10–12,14–16,18,19,differenceprinciple,33,37,43–45,55–58,63,93,94,156,183,197–211,323,356,358,411,413,417213–226,231–244,247–260,272,global,389,391–392,400,409274–276,279,293,296,335,346,differentialrights:seeidentitypolitics,357,372,379,447,451,454rights,specialprivilegesaccountabilityin,215,217,242,248,258dignity,19,47,63,65,69–71,221,365,seealsoelections391,400,442–447andjudicialreview,278Diogenes,388seealsojudiciarydirtyhands,90,140–141audience,238–239,242disability,9,16,30,142,160,172,308,corporate,239,241–243326,364–366,369,374,377,379,deliberative,11–12,199,201–202,396,428215–218,220–222,231–239,AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct(1990),365248–260,332,346,358,379discrimination,15,85,162,164,347–350,democraticsociety,46,65,179,184,190,352,362,364,367,372,378–379,214–215,217–223,225,235,243,437,453249,307,325,326–327,330–333,dissidents,216–217,219,223,240,255,356,377286,353direct,214,216,233,236,257,260seealsominoritiesjustificationof,10–11,13,214,220,distributivejustice,2,6–8,16–18,42–44,222–22656–57,149,165–166,172–173,250,seealsoinstrumentalvalue,intrinsic258,304,335,347–349,355–358,value387–392,394–395,397–403,laboratoriesof,247408–419radical,247–248,256–260vs.allocative,417randomsubset,203seealsojustice,redistribution,socialsocial,247justiceseealsoparticipation,populardiversity,71,74,208,238,255,257,325,sovereignty,representation,voting329–330,332,338,357,366,370Democracy’sDiscontent(Sandel),313–314,divineright,197317seealsoreligionDenmark,258,449divisionoflabor,11,16,334,362–363,dependence,308–309365–369,372,374,376–377,Derrida,Jacques,74380–381desert,10,158,171,188–191,397,399seealsosexualdivisionoflabordeserving,157–158,160–165,168–169,domination,4,16,62,64–66,72–73,89,94,174–175,184,186–188,192221,347–348,351–352,357–358,despotism,210,220,225,292,297,370–371,373310–311,337,393Donnelly,Jack,447soft,310–311Downs,Anthony,231,240–243Dewey,John,19,41,214,217–219,drugs,91,93–94,159,349221–222,224–226Dryzek,John,251DialecticofEnlightenment(Horkeimeranddueprocess,270,441,443,445,448,Adorno),61451–453DictionaryofPoliticalThought(Scruton),Duflo,Esther,254268duties,17,53,137,140–143,145,149,158,difference,14–16,72–74,179–182,259,355–356,387,391,395,398–399,322,326,328,345–350,362–381,401–402,413,417,433,445396civic,201–203,304,306,442460Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page461naturaldutyofjustice,391,410environment,231–232,239,272negative,19,121,355,389,393–394,globalwarming,17,387,398399,409,442–444pollution,94,398positive,19,355,389,393–394,399,409,envy,157,307,417443–444Epictetus,388toobeythelaw,310epistemology,41,49seealsocivicduties,obligationsequality,4,5,8,9,15–16,33,137,140,Dworkin,Ronald,157,180,276,295,304,149,155,159–160,165–167,412180–184,215,334,338–339,345–353,355,357–358,362,369,economics,165–167379,380,400,402–403,415,419Austrianeconomictheory,233,237ascomparability,155–165,168–170,seealsopoliticalknowledge174–176economy,8,33,43–45,56,198,232,asimpartiality,155–156238–240,247,272,292,356–357,asuniversality,155–156373,392,394–395,403,417exantevs.expost,161–163businesses,239,244ofcapabilities,159–160,165,183–184,policy,44,91,166–167,239,258,270,253,259292,347ofcitizenship,8,10–11,14,46,214–216,seealsofreemarket,globalization218–220,224,226,232,248–249,Edmundson,William,310252,274,276,326,357–358,371education,19,91,95,183–184,234,243,democratic,209–211,249,256249,250,253–254,258–259,335,ofconcern,9,170,179,181–183,186,349,364,377,437–441,446–448,188–190,276,408,409450–451,453–454ofconsideration,44,47,181,218–219,egalitarianism,4,6,8,9,18,43,46,85,221,223,351121,137,146,148–149,155–176,ofdistribution,8,43,223,411,413,419179–190,247,250,297,327,356,ofincome,9,159–160,165–166,219358,390,400–403,408–413,oflibertyandfreedom,7,8,46,85,144,416–419,454159,232,358,416asset,247oflifeprospects,8–9,18,148–149,instrumentalvs.non-instrumental,156162–165,184,394–395,402,412personalvs.impersonal,156ofmoralstatusandstanding,9,84–84,telicvs.deontic,156,164214–215,220–221,223–225,seealsoequality,inequality250–251,256,336,380,403,418elections,11,197–199,201,202,215,217,ofneedsatisfaction,159–161,250,396224–225,232,234–235,238,ofopportunity,7,8,9,15–16,18,44,46,240–242,274,454142,149,159–161,164–165,199,gerrymandering,239,241–242203,297,346,358,363,365,367,plebiscite,289369,371,380,394,396,409,417seealsovotingofpower,8,12,159,210,215,253,256,Elster,Jon,251259,274–275,372,378,403Ely,JohnHart,216,292ofresources,9,16,149,159,179–180,emotivism,32,86259,297Enlightenment,3,61–62,70,72,114,304,ofrights,378–379388ofsocialgoods,8,159,232,348,358entitlement,43,44,108,130,133,395–397,oftreatment,15,85,156,164,180–183,399,401–403,413,427322,328–329,332–338,351,362,entrenchment,285–298368,395–396,408Index461\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page462equality(continued)Feser,Edward,147ofwealth,1,6–7,8–9,159,165–166Fiji,449ofwelfare,159–161,297,413Fishkin,James,258ofworth,364Foucault,Michel,61–62,70seealsoegalitarianism,inequalityFrance,330equity,43,156,181,347Frankfurt,Harry,168errortheory,32Fraser,Nancy,372–373essentialism,353,375freeandequal:seepersonsessentiallycontestedconcept,63freemarkets,8,213,272Estlund,Cynthia,218seealsocapitalism,economyEstlund,David,235,237,294,410freedom,1,4,5,7,14,18,28,61–62,72,84,ethics,32,49,64144–146,157,160,166,171,173,ethnicity,16,218,220,249,326,346,232,242,307,324,348,369–371,362–363,366–367,369,372–373,376–378,380,410,414,419,426375–376,379–380,394,397developed,309EuropeanSocialCharter(1961,1966),438,moral,84–86,127,131,144–145440negative,145EuropeanUnion,240,418ofassociationandassembly,216–217,exemptions:seeequalityoftreatment,256,303,325,327,350,352,356,reform,specialprivileges377,448experimentsinliving,224ofmovement,216,402exploitation,47,122,306,312,315,326,ofreligion,216,272,325,327,330–331,371,373,378,419350,451expressivism,32ofspeechandexpression,44,198,200,externalities,9,398208,210,215–216,256,272,285,292,303,327,351,370,377factsensitivity,4,15,23–38,55–58ofthoughtandconscience,327,352,seealsoprinciples355–356,444fairness,7,9,63–65,69,71,75,114,political,19,232,237,337,416–417146–147,155,157–159,161–165,positive,145168–170,172–176,190,200,practical,43202–203,205,250–251,252,256,seealsoautonomy,civilliberties,liberty311,322,324,327–338,350–351,Freeman,Samuel,4357,376,399–401,403,410,417,Friedrich,Carl,271443,445–446Fullinwider,Robert,379proceduralvs.substantive,161–165Fung,Archon,253fallibilism,106family,9,93,166–167,179,234,306,308,Gadamer,Hans-Georg,69316,331,333,364–365,368–369,Galston,William,314380,401,411,426,448–449Gaus,Gerald,5,6,109–111seealsomarriageGellner,Ernest,335fascism,70gender,16,209,329,331,362,364,feasibility,4,5,11–12,31,160,231,257368–369,372,374,379–380,394federalism,268,294GenderTrouble(Butler),73FederalistPapers,The(Hamilton,Jay,andGeorge,Henry,148Madison),243,269Gerber,Alan,254Feinberg,Joel,180,306–307,314Germany,258feminism,15,19,234,326,347–349,351,GLBT,15,140,241,326,329,331,358,362,368–369,379–380333–334,336,362,369,372,379seealsoidentitypolitics,womenseealsomarriage,sexualorientation462Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page463globaljustice,2,17,19,387–389,393–394,HongKong,134397–400,408–409Honneth,Axel,357seealsocosmopolitanism,distributivehonors,6,191,363justice,justiceHorkeimer,Max,61–62globalization,74,247,403,408,417–419humannature,4,18,24,33,42–43,46,good49–55,66,70,101–102,322,351,conceptionof,6,47–55,64,81–83,88,41492–93,99–108,114,122,124,133,seealsocircumstancesofjustice,identity,190,208,323–325,327,334,335,persons389–390humanrights:seerightsseealsopluralismhumanrightsdeficit,393goods:seeprimarygoods,property,publichumanitarianism,156,159,391,402goods,socialgoodsHume,David,30,43,105,237Gordon,Scott,270–271Hungary,449Greece,449Green,ThomasAndrew,236idealtheory,4–5,233,234–235,252,Griffin,James,442–443255–256Grotius,Hugo,17seealsonon-idealtheorygrouprights:seerightsidentity,14–16,19,46–47,63–64,71–75,Grunebaum,James,146304–308,312–313,317,322–339,Gutmann,Amy,251,372,375350–355,357,369,394multiply-situatedselves,313Habermas,Jürgen,19,45,248–249,256,unencumberedself,305,307,316257seealsoidentitypolitics,personsHaiti,449IdentityandDemocracy(Gutmann),372Hamilton,Alexander,269–270identitypolitics,322–339,345–346,happiness,6,25,34–35,70,92–93,145,349–355,362–381184,225seealsodifference,socialmovements,Hardin,Russell,11–12,235,239–240,242societalculture,structuralinequalityHare,R.M.,45ideology,61,231,233,241,268,269,272,harm,19,73,104,137,179,200,232,243,274,352,377334,348,354,393,403,444–445immigration,17,215,238,240–241,367,369Harsanyi,John,43–45seealsofreedomofmovementhealthandhealthcare,9,19,92–95,159,impartiality,4,45,47,81–82,87–88,93,160,166,175,182,184,219,237,156,179,251,307,311,326,334,250,258–260,292,368,399–400,414–415411,425–427,429,432,437–441,seealsoequality,neutrality446–450,453–454imperativism,32Hegel,G.W.F.,322,345,357InclusionandDemocracy(Young),372Heidegger,Martin,61,69income,46,56,165–166,238,247,259,HenryV,209292,363–364,368–369,410hierarchy,4,11,16,190,203–204,209,India,254,259,449220,256,347–348,355,358,363,indigenouspeoples,15,72–73,326,377,453352–354,370,372,378–379seealsoclass,socialrolesandpositions,individualism,13–14,47,171,303–317,socialstatus322–324,326,328,338,348,Hobbes,Thomas,6,10,105,233,309351–353,355–356Holmes,Stephen,271holist,305,311–312,375–376homogeneity,16,236,249,255,257,369seealsoidentity,moralindividualism,seealsosocialgroupspersons,self-interestIndex463\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page464inequality,2,16,33,37,156–160,163–170,Japan,449172,176,218,232,253–256,259,Johansson,Eva,238347–348,351,358,387,400,408,joint-ownership:seenaturalresources,411–413,417,418property,rightsseealsoegalitarianism,equality,structuralJordan,449inequalityjudiciary,12,232,236,237,248,277,379,injustice,2,4–5,15–16,72,75,138,140,451–453142,221,297,322,326,328,judicialreview,13,205,269,270,276,330–334,336,338–339,362–381,277–279,293–295,298,451393–394,399,402,408–411,juries,236,249–250,258413–417,419,445–446justwar,17,388institutions,1,5,10,12,13,16,18,19,34,justice,7,8,10,13,14,16,17–18,24,43–46,48,51,55,56,63,156,191,31–38,41–44,46,48–58,61–66,81,215–219,222,233,235,247,251,87,93,105–106,108–109,112,114,259–260,284–285,287,332,334,137,141–144,157,164,171,173,336,345–346,362,364,366–367,180,201–204,214,223–224,237,368–372,376–380,389–390,393,251–252,322,324,327–328,330,399,408,410,412,417,419,345,355,362–363,365–366,368,426–427,429–430,433–434,447370–373,376–377,379,380,388–391,seealsobasicstructure,international393–395,397,399,401,408–411,institutions413–414,417,419,428,430,441instrumentalvalue,10–11,13,156,172,inter-generational,311,369,377213–214,219,222–226seealsodistributivejustice,globaljustice,instrumentalism,197injustice,principles,socialjusticedemocratic,197,199–203,222JusticeandthePoliticsofDifferenceinterestgroups,12,221,232,239–240,(Young),323,347–348,372,373,378258justiceasfairness,41–42,52,54,58,interests,7,11,13,14–16,18–19,24,108–109,358,389,391–39246–47,50–51,89–90,123–124,137,JusticeasFairness(Rawls),307140–141,156,171,179,181,184,justification,5–6,10–11,27,36,41–45,48,200,213–214,218,221,232,54,57–58,81–89,91–95,139,140,234–236,238–241,248–254,259,171,180–182,185,187,222–224,326–329,332,334,354,363,365,226,235,324,329,332,334,337,367,387,391–392,399,411,429,356,402–403,408,429,437,443,443,444450seealsopreferences,self-interestholismof,99,112InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialseealsopublicjustificationandCulturalRights(1966,1976),426–432,437,450Kagan,Shelly,128–129,144internationalinstitutions,17,389–391,393,Kant,Immanuel,17,41–45,47,50,54,105,400,408,417–419106,156,159,173,235,309,337,internationallaw,83,437388,413–416,429internationalrelations,17,72,82–83,390Kekes,John,9–10intolerance:seediscrimination,tolerationkingdomofends,235intrinsicvalue,10–11,156,198–200,214,Kishlanski,Mark,136219,222–226Kropotkin,Peter,309Iraq,68,244Kukathas,Chandran,313,373,375is/ought,23,30,37Kymlicka,Will,16,180–181,305,306,316,Italy,254323–325,337,362,369–370,373,Ivason,Dunca,373375464Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page465Laden,Anthony,15–16justificatory,107–111Ladle,Richard,231minimalstate,219,222,272language,334–335,337,346,348–351,366,seealsolimitedgovernment369–370,375,377–378offear,271seealsoidentitypoliticspolitical,208–209,379Larmore,Charles,63–65seealsoneutralityLaslett,Peter,233LiberalismandtheLimitsofJusticelate-modernreasonableness,61–75(Sandel),304,311lawofnature,84,414liberationstruggles:seeidentitypolitics,LawofPeoples,The(Rawls),337,390inequality,injustice,sociallaws:seelegislation,rulesmovementsLee,RobertE.,314libertarianism,7,44,90–92,94,121–135,legalinterpretation,270,285,287,293,137–140,143–149,155–156,222,330–331309,312,325,413–414,449,453legalism,270left-libertarianism,8,121,124,133,legislation,10,12,18,43,45,81,94,232,137–138,144,146,148–149233,238,241,248,257,274,equalopportunityleft-libertarianism,283–290,293–294,310,433149legislatures,12–13,199,216,234–236,equalshareleft-libertarianism,148–149237–238,241–242,248,258,260,right-libertarianism,7–8,121,133,273,289,295,335,379,451–453137–138,147bicameral,274,289–291,294–295sufficientarian,148reapportionment,254seealsoclassicalliberalismunicameral,289,291liberty,12,15,34,44,46,84,132,legitimacy137–138,141,149,173,232,250,appropriatebases,8–9,133,397377,379,412,448liberalprincipleof,208seealsoautonomy,civilliberties,freedomofclaimsanddemands,322,325–326,limitedaltruism:seecircumstancesofjustice328–330,339,347limitedgovernment,95,222,268,270–273ofinstitutionsandlaws,13,16,17,81,LimitingGovernment(Sajó),27194,107–109,113,134,207,217,limitsofgovernment,81,92,95,239,309,242,248,273,276–277,309,346,322415–418seealsolegitimacyofpoweroverothers,11,13,51,84,Lindblom,C.E.,239143–144,217,220–221,222,224,Locke,John,6,10,84,105,130,133,148,252,353,403309,414ofprinciples,4,324Lockeanproviso,133–134,147–149ofstateaction,1,5,17,89–92,100,logocracy,253–254102–103,108,110,217,224,260,luck,8,43,147,155,157–159,165,272,309,432168–169,174,410–415ofthesovereign,10,242optionvs.brute,158,412levelingdown,9,155,160,170–173luckegalitarianism,37–38,44,46,56–58,seealsoequality,redistribution157–158,397,409,412Levy,Jacob,373,375seealsomorallyarbitraryliberalism,5–6,13–17,81,83,88,90,95,113,133,140,180,222,232,257,Machiavelli,Niccolò,90268,322–339,346–359,362–363,MacIntyre,Alasdair,14,304–307,308,323364–365,370–373,375–381,400,Mack,Eric,7,8408,410MacKinnon,Catherine,345,347–348,351deontological,305Madison,James,10,232,242–243Index465\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page466Mandle,Jon,18moraldemands,82–84,87–95,202,219,Manin,Bernard,234,235–236,238–239,326,348–357241seealsoduties,obligations,publicMansbridge,Jane,253justificationMarburyv.Madison(1803),269,276moralindividualism,8,121–135marginalization,16,215,326,347,369,seealsoindividualism,prerogatives,371,373,377–379separatenessofpersonsMarkell,Patchen,74morality,5,7,35,47,52–53,57,84–88,90,Marmot,Michael,400123,124–126,129–130,135,marriage,15,190,220,221,241,314,331,137–138,141,143,160,171,333–334,380,427,444–445179–185,207,235,237,308,311,Marshall,John,269333,390,419Marx,Karl,6political,103,109,113,283,285–286,403Marxism,17,441morallyarbitrary,8,18,159,172,224,336,Mason,Andrew,314–315347,394–400,402,408maximin,155,159,170seealsoluckMcGinnis,John,289MulticulturalCitizenship(Kymlicka),McIlwain,C.H.,271369–370,373media,12,215,217,223–224,257,446–447multiculturalism,14,303,322–323,membershipandinclusion,187,214–215,325–326,330,332–339,346,357,218–219,221,223–224,234,362–363,369–370,377,379–380304–307,309,312,326,347,seealsoculture,identitypolitics,societal349–350,352,354,362,366,370,culture378,395–396,398,400–401,403,Murphy,Liam,410443seealsoparticipation,socialgroupsNagel,Thomas,181,390,402merit,6,8,209,219,364Narveson,Jan,147metaethics,24,32,35,37,42,45,56,121nationalinterest,91,234,250metaphysics,41,328nationalism,184,336–338,346,350,Mexico,449352–353,362,370,401militaryservice,15,144,191,330–331,nationality,61,71,292,326,331,334–336,333–334,352349,366,369,373,375–377,381,Mill,JohnStuart,6,10,43,65–66,74,85,394–397,401,403,40891,198–200,214,220–221,224–225,nation-state,2,10,369,389–390,394,402231,233,234,242–243,308,324,asaclosedsystem,17,391356,448seealsobordersMiller,David,390,395–397,400–401naturallaw,6,17–18,84minorities,2,15–16,215–216,331,naturalresources,133–134,137–138,334–338,349–353,369–370,377,142–149380,401,416seealsoproperty,rightsMoellendorf,Darrel,394–395,397–398,417need,6,9,13,18,42–43,46,58,141,144,monarchy,10,233159,161,168,173,189,364–365,Moore,Margaret,14–15368,391,393–397,399,402,409,moralagency:seepersons413,429moralclaims,64,82–87,89–90,95,138,neutrality,5,13–15,81–95,102–106,114,141,147,159,174,188,214,323–326,330,333–336,338,349219–220,224,326,425,427–435liberalmoralneutrality,5,81,83–84,personsasself-authenticatingsources,87–91,9584–87,219,223–224liberalpoliticalneutrality,5,81,83,88–95seealsoduties,obligations,rightsseealsoagent-relativevs.agent-neutral466Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page467NewZealandConstitutionAct(1986),269opportunitycosts,93Nickel,James,19oppression,5,15–16,73,105,221,222,Nietzsche,Friedrich,53,435275,306,312,315,326,347–348,Nigeria,449351,355,358,372,377,426,435non-coercionprinciple:seecoercion,non-Orend,Brian,438interferenceoriginalposition,4,32–34,36,43–46,54,non-cognitivism,2856,84,307,323–324,358,416non-idealtheory,235,337global,391–392seealsoidealtheoryOtsuka,Michael,149non-interferenceOttomanEmpire,349withindividuals,7,19,109–111,121–135,oughtimpliescan,30–31,47,51139–140,144–145,173,186,189,overlappingconsensus:seeconsensus200,327,332–333,349,355seealsopaternalismpacifism,89,331withstates,17,388Parekh,Bhikhu,373,375seealsosovereigntyParfit,Derek,46–47,102,223normativity,32,36,155,170,223,242participation,10–12,213–216,219,norms,123,224,254,442–443,447–450221–222,225–226,231–234,constitutional,236,269,285236–237,239–241,243,247–248,hegemonic,363,365–367,369,371,250–251,253–260,358,368,372,373–374,376–378403identity-based,16,362–363,365–369,particularism,304372–376Pateman,Carole,231,243international,17paternalism,200Nozick,Robert,7,43,92,123,130,133,Patten,Alan,335138,147–148,304,324–325,413perfectionism,6,10,95,99–114,157PerpetualPeace(Kant),337,388obligationspersonalidentity,46ofindividuals,2,65–66,75,84,87,100,persons127,141–142,158,168,184,187,asfreeandequal,12,34,43–47,49–52,189,201,203,278,286,287,297,54,72,83–88,91,93,208,356–358,391,397–398,401,432–435,442416ofofficialsandgovernments,90,105,asmoralagents,42,46–52,54,81,168,179,182–184,186,188,191,84–87,89,91,140,143,160,428–432,442,445171–172,183–186oforganizations,432asreasonableandrational,12,49–51,54,ofunspecifiedagents,426–42865,68,72,81,83–84,87–88,93–94,specialobligations,10,323,401–402,208427–428capacitiesof,42,46–47,49–55,62,officials,89–92,213,215–217,222,225,183–184,221,234,249,253–254,232,234–242,248–249,257–258,258,365–366,368,376,380,391260,345,371,379,415–416conceptionsof,13–15,47,50,235,Okin,Susan,368,375323–324,326,350–351oligarchy,249minimallydecentfunctioning,408–409,OnLiberty(Mill),65411,413O’Neill,Onora,19statusas,71,391,403opportunity,6,16,149,165,336,346–350,seealsoidentity363–367,373,376–378,380,394,Peters,R.S.,85396,448,454Phillips,Anne,373seealsoequalityofopportunityPhilosophicalPapers(Taylor),304Index467\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page468Plato,6,10,17,61,223,237,249practices,62,71,213–214,223–226,231,pluralism,51,74,327,329,333,375234–235,309,312,322,324–325,moral,9,102–107,113–114,208,334,329–335,349,354,357,363–365,410370–371,374,378–380,393,399,ofprinciples,9,56,157,159–160,168,418173,443seealsotraditionspolitical,15,252pragmatism,19reasonabledisagreement,12–13,24,50,preferences,67,92–94,213,216,218–219,62,64,68,93,99–100,103,222,225,249,251–252,254,284,105–111,190,205–209,218,236,328,329,410–411,415238,249–250,253prerogatives,410–412Plutarch,388againstself-sacrifice,122–135,140–141Pogge,Thomas,389,391,392–395,399national,410–411Poland,449primarygoods,46–47politicalknowledge,216,219,221,225,principles231–233,235–236,239,243,251,asevaluativestandards,1,4–5,15,83,257–25887–89,91–94,226PoliticalLiberalism(Rawls),63–65,307constitutional,268politicalparties,12,202,231,239–240,242,groundingof,23–38,41,180–182,323248,258,367,379moral,47–52,56–57,87,95,139,284,politicalpower,2,3,5,6,8,11,13,46,91,311199–203,208,222,232,234,241,normative,23–24,32,44,49,221248–249,251–253,255–256,objectivityof,23,32258–260,273–275,278,283,353,ofconduct,4,43–45,89,224363–364ofjustice,4,13,31–37,41–58,61,108,seealsopower,separationofpowers113–114,283,307–308,311,338,PoliticalTheoryandInternationalRelations375,388–390,392,399,402(Beitz),389,391pluralistic:seepluralismpoliticians:seeofficialsuniversal,5,13,17,61,156popularsovereignty,198–199,214,216,prioritarianism,155,159,168–170,276–279,358173–175,250pornography,348prison,91–92,145,173,446,448post-colonialism,19,72,74,323,352privacy,15,140post-modernism,19,62,69PrivateOwnership(Grunebaum),146post-structuralism,61privilege,16,219–220,253,336,351,363,poverty,2,4,93,142,166–168,175,184,374,376,378238,253–254,259–260,271,seealsoclass,identitypolitics,social367–368,387,393–394,399,402,status408–409,418,441proceduresandprocesses,94,200,203,217,seealsoincome,subsistence,wealth222–225,241,250–254,259,power,62,112–113,138,143–144,284–285,289,324,357,373–374,146–147,200,216,232,347,364,377,415–418,433369,372,374–375,380–381,390,seealsoinstitutions,rules414,431–432,435promises,10,25–26,182,187,427powerlessness,199,326property,1,7–8,42,94,121,124,130–135,seealsopoliticalpower138,141–143,145–149,187,190,practicalreason,29,41–42,44,48–49,213–214,234,292,358,363,51–52,54–56,61–62,75,86,102,413–418,426,447108–112,185–186,189,236,249,propertyrights:seerights308property-owningdemocracy,44468Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page469proviso:seeLocke,Nozickreason:seelate-modernreasonableness,psychology,4,33,167,254practicalreason,publicjustificationseealsohumannature,personsreasonabledisagreement:seepluralismpublicchoice,292,295reason-giving:seepublicjustificationpublicgoods,7,94,205,219–220,254,324,reasons358exclusionary,113publicjustification,3,11,18,42,48–52,56,internalvs.external,110–11162–64,82–89,92,94,103,107–114,reciprocity,55,108–109,111,113,209,215–216,221,248–256,332,214,309,315–316,355–357,416402–403,416recognition,15,63–64,71–75,223,seealsojustification322–323,325–328,332–336,publicservice,310345–358,366–367,370–372,publicity,43,49–52,57377–378,380punishment,10,187,188,190,444,452redistribution,1,7,8,9,16,91,138,156,seealsocapitalpunishment,crime,prison160,164–167,170,247,250,Putnam,Robert,234254–255,260,372–373,400,410seealsodistributivejustice,equality,Quebec,330,338,352–354inequalityQuine,W.V.O.,41ReflectionsontheRevolution(Burke),425reflectiveequilibrium,57raceandspecificracialgroups,15–16,19,reform,1,16,217,224,240,253–254,162,199,209,216,218,220,240,333–338,349243,292,326,329,346–352,358,Reiman,Jeffrey,89362–364,366–367,371–372,374,RejectionofConsequentialism,The377–379,394,408,411(Scheffler),123Rainborough,Thomas,275relativism,45–46,114rankings:seehierarchy,preferencesreligionandspecificreligiousgroups,15,Rappaport,Michael,28946,50,61–63,68–69,71,92,133,rationalchoice,44–45,52,236,323,304,208,216,218,220,222,237,272,311292,326,329–334,349–350–353,rationalignorance,110–111,201–203,235,362,365,370,372–373,375–381,240–241,243394,443,451seealsopoliticalknowledgeseealsofreedomofreligionrationalintuitionism,32,34,50rent-seeking,295rationality,3,31–32,52,72,84,86,93,representation,14,187,198–199,215–217,101,109–111,122–124,135,156,232,237–239,241,243–244,248,254,180,183,235,251,446260,274,370,373,378–379,418Rawls,John,4,6–7,8,15,17,32–37,republicanism,14,232,269,306,317,348,41–58,63–65,68–69,84–85,93,350100,103,105,108–109,111–113,residentaliens:seeimmigration123,155–156,181,208,219,304,respect,12,19,25–26,46,51–52,63,65,305,307–309,311–312,323–324,71,85,87,203–205,209,219–221,327,337,356,358,388–392,223,225,250,278,297–298,400–401,409–410,416–417,438,326–327,356,366,369,375,379,444403,408,444,448Raz,Joseph,16,324–325seealsorecognition,self-respectrealismresponsibility,8–10,18,72,74,111,143,ininternationalrelations,17,390155–159,164–165,201–203,256,political,90329,357,368–369,393,395–397,RealizingRawls(Pogge),392399–402,426,428,444,453Index469\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page470revolution,19,62,70,284–286,291Rostenkowski,Dan,238seealsosocialmovementsRothbard,Murray,147,309rewards,10Rousseau,Jean-Jacques,1,10,202,248,Richards,David,391253,357,416Richardson,Henry,217ruleoflaw,5,205,215,258,270,317,335,rights,5,7,11,12,14,16,108,121–126,357,426128–130,133,137–149,171,173,ruleofrecognition,290197,200,205–207,215–216,232,rules,10,35–37,45,132,137,181–182,243,284–285,287,294,297,304,186–192,200,204,215,217,306,326–327,334–335,345,219–220,224,269,272,284–295,348–357,372,378–379,400–401,326,331–335,338–339,349,425–435364–366,372,380,400assideconstraints,122–123,125,140,215–216,311,356Sachs,Jeffrey,393–394choice,139,200Sajó,András,271,273claims,292,427,442Sandel,Michael,13,14,304–307,311–317,constitutional,232,272,292–295323–324corporate,353satisficing,100democratic,197–211Scanlon,Thomas,50,171,413economic,356,437scarcity,148,159,161,167,192,202,255exit,204,310,350moderatescarcity:seecircumstancesofgroup,15,346,350,352–358justicehuman,2,18–19,47,166–167,272,335,Scheffler,Samuel,123–125,127–129,210,338,370,389,393,401,403,409,388–389413,416,419,425–435,437–454Schmitt,Carl,248–249,251interest-based,2,18,139scholasticism,6,8,17legal,138,443Schumpeter,Joseph,231,235–236,240,liberalandliberty,378–379,426–427,243429–430,432Schwartzenbach,Sibyl,317seealsocivilliberties,freedomscientism,268membership,352–353,357scopeofgovernment:seelegitimacy,limitsnatural,7,138ofgovernmentnegative,19,292,452Scruton,Roger,268political,216,220,322,378,442secession,314,336–337,352–353positive,19,292,425,429,447,452SecondTreatiseofCivilGovernment,Theproperty,1,7–8,94,121,124,130–135,(Locke),84138–139,145–149,414–419,426,security,1,92,137–138,146,149,166,441,448183–185,187,189–191,219,222,tocommand,310242,250,356,426,438,441,444,todowrong,296448tolife,438,444–445self-defense,89,444towork,439self-determination,15,218–219,253,308,welfare,425,437–454334,336–337,346,350,352–355,Ripstein,Arthur,419357–358,370,372,376,378,400Robespierre,Maximilien,62self-development,47,309Rokeach,Milton,92seealsopersonsRoosevelt,FranklinDenalo,240self-interest,11,13,61,201,206,242,255,Rosen,Gideon,55–56257,311,324,410,416Rosenblum,Nancy,218self-ownership,7–8,121,124,128–135,Ross,W.D.,43137–149470Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page471self-respect,46–47,203–205,417socialontology,63,65–66,69–74,221,Sen,Amartya,156,160,219353–358,363Seneca,388socialrelations,16,45,49–51,75,172,separatenessofpersons,7,47,121–125,187–191,215,219–221,252,316,127,142,354355–358,363,375,379,419seealsonon-interference,prerogativessocialrolesandpositions,16,322,328,332,separationofpowers,241,268,274,285,362,364,367,372,374,377,408297socialstatus,199,209–210,238,259,sexes,199,218,220,253,292,347,349,362–363,367,369,377362,368–369,372seealsohierarchy,recognition,socialseealsowomenrelationssexualdivisionoflabor,16,368–369socialism,17,44,70,247,268,327,453sexualorientation,199,329,331,334,366,societalculture,362–363,366,368–381372seealsoculture,difference,identityseealsoGLBTpolitics,multiculturalismShachar,Ayalet,373,375sociology,36,324,325Sher,George,91SouthAfrica,350Shklar,Judith,271sovereignty,372,393Shue,Henry,389,409,438–441,444seealsonon-interferenceSidgwick,Henry,43,47,55–57,106SovietConstitution(1936),269Simmons,A.John,309specialprivileges,327,335,346,349,351,Singapore,214,219,449378Singer,Peter,391seealsorightsSkocpol,Theda,218SpheresofJustice(Walzer),304slavery,8,10,34–36,138,141–144,190,Spinner-Halev,Jeffrey,373220,224,367,444–445stability,105,108–109,113,166–167,232,Smith,Adam,239,242315,334,351,358,454Snyder,JamesM.,254starvation,166–167,219socialcapacities,362–363,365–366stateofnature,50,94,95,309,413–416,seealsopersons418socialcapital,233–234,240,316Steiner,Hillel,148socialcontract,13,95,103,187,307–308stereotypes,16,326,367,377–378socialenvironment,8,90,134,149,Stimson,James,231323–325,351,365–366stoics,17,388seealsoculturestructuralinequality,362–381socialgoods,19,47,62,168,219,348,350,seealsodifference,equality,identity354politics,inequalitysocialgroups,13–16,220,241,250,252,subjugationandsubordination,18,89,94,326,329–332,336,338,348–349,114,215–216,219–220,255,353,363,365–367,369–373,347–352,363–364,370–371,375–379,409376–378,409,413–419seealsoidentitypoliticssubsidies,93,353socialjustice,6,199,208,330,362,410subsistence,167,389,401,438,441,447,seealsojustice450,453SocialJusticeintheLiberalStatesuffering,28,156,159,184,435,447(Ackerman),304sufficiency,168socialmovements,15–16,17,240,257,Sunstein,Cass,271345–349,352,355,358–359,362,Sweden,82,240365,372,379,381,435sympathy,24,82,214,219–221,223–225,seealsocivilrightsmovements353Index471\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page472TakingRightsSeriously(Dworkin),304veilofignorance,43–45,50,292,295,305,talents,7,8307,324Tamir,Yael,373Vermeule,Adrian,292Tan,Kok-chor,402,409–413Vietnam,234,240taxes,1,91–93,184,238,240,447–449violence,4,140,187,218,326,334,355,Taylor,Charles,14,65–69,71,220,371,377–378,380,409,444–445304–307,309,311,323–325,357,virtue,6,8,10,191,209,219,220,223,372–373,375232,411,445Taylor,Michael,315–317seealsocharacterTemkin,Larry,8–9voluntarism,309,311,317terrorism,68,141,183,303voluntarytextualformalism,270voluntaryagreements,17,188–191,205,TheoryofJustice,A(Rawls),6–7,34,36,42742,52–54,304,307,324,417seealsocontractsThompson,Dennis,251voluntaryassociations,11,218,221,Thucydides,17233–234,257–259,376Tilly,Charles,363seealsofreedomofassociationandtoleration,15,75,217,306–307,331,assembly,socialgroups333–334,363,370–371,379–380voluntaryexchange,7,131–133,139,torture,68,140,173,181,272,309,312142–144,146totalitarianism,325voting,198–203,206–208,213–217,trade,17,250,391–392,398–399,414,418221–225,231–233,235–236,seealsoeconomy,globalization238–243,250,369,416traditions,14–15,61,71,371,375,377,389seealsocollectivedecision-making,Tufts,James,219electionsTully,James,345,351,373,375Turkey,449Waldron,Jeremy,12–13,206–207,293–298,tyranny,175,207,216,242,274,275,337327,330–331,334,335,338,389ofthemajority,65,215–216,274–275,356Wall,Stephen,6Wal-Mart,316unions,90,239,254,437Walzer,Michael,14,215,304–307,323,390UnitedKingdom,236,434war,82–83,93,175,184,232–233,234,UnitedStates,19,68,93,138,175,215,240,260220,224,231–236,239,240–243,civilwar,314254,258–260,268,269,272,324,wealth,6,19,46,56,165–166,168–169,333,346–350,366–367,376–377191,198,199,232,238,242,253,UnitedStatesConstitution(1789),216,256,258–260,367,373,398,242–243408–409UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsseealsoequalityofwealth,redistribution(1948),428–432,437,440,446welfarestateandwelfarepolicies,44,94,utilitarianism,34–36,43–48,52,55,57,67,238,240,438123,137,140,155–156,159,well-being,7–8,9,14,28,42,55,62,170–171,173,180,235,328,356,100–101,121–122,128,135,149,391,429160–162,166–168,171–172,175,utility,45,157,159,160,162–163,235,184,187–189,192,232,241,336,388356,363–364,366,368,376,380,391,410,411,413,417,425,439Vallentyne,Peter,7,8well-orderedsociety,52,58,108,307,311valueneutrality:seeneutrality,pluralismWhite,Stephen,3–4Vance,Cyrus,439–440,450,453–454Wilkinson,RichardG.,400472Index\nCDID01.qxd2/4/0915:42Page473Williams,Bernard,435worldgovernment,17,337,390,418–419Williams,Melissa,373seealsocosmopolitanism,internationalWilson,ThomasWoodrow,82institutionsWiltChamberlainexample,413WorldPovertyandHumanRights(Pogge),Wittgenstein,Ludwig,41,69389,392–393Wolff,RobertPaul,309women,8,10,15–16,162,190,220,Young,IrisMarion,16,323,326,332,345,253–254,326,346–349,353,358,347–348,357–358363,368–369,372,374,376,380seealsofeminism,sexeszero-sum,15Index473DownloadmoreeBookshere:http://avaxhm.com/blogs/ChrisRedfield