《【摩尔】哲学研究.》 360页

'I\n'ifYl5CORJNELEUNiVt.lSITY'F-S"\nCornellUniversityLibraryB1647.M73P51922Philosophicalstudies.31924008824603DATEDUEIBMWWiuM.-,flRH^JULI?mf'h«««wN»fef^^^MfiLi-e2001-APR^^^^m-WGTQ'mT^'.bojg^ST!!®AU619^oor^m^,^1jj6jtPRINTCOINU.S.A.\nCornellUniversityLibraryTheoriginalofthisbookisintheCornellUniversityLibrary.TherearenoknowncopyrightrestrictionsintheUnitedStatesontheuseofthetext.http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924008824603\nPHILOSOPHICALSTUDIES\n\nPhilosophicalStudiesByG.E.MOORE,Litt.D.Hon.LL.D.(St.Andrews),F.B.A.LecturerinMoralScienceintheUniversityofCambridgeAuthorof"PrincipiaEthica"LONDONROUTLEDGE&KEGANPAULLTDBROADWAYHOUSE:68-74CARTERLANE,E.C.4\nFirstpubliskei\nCONTENTSI.TheRefutationofIdealism.II.TheNatureandRealityofObjectsofPer-CEPTION,...31III.WilliamJames'"Pragmatism"97IV.Hume'sPhilosophy....X47V.TheStatusofSense-Data168VI.TheConceptionofReality.197VII.SomeJudgmentsofPerception220VIII.TheConceptionofIntrinsicValue253IX.ExternalandInternalRelations376X.TheNatureofMoralPhilosophy310\n:Thoseofthepapersinthisvolume^whichhavebeenpreviouslypublished^originallyappearedasfollows—I."TheRefutationofIdealism"inMind^N.S.Vol.xii,1903.II."TheNatureandRealityofObjectsofPerception''inPro-ceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety^1905-6.III."ProfessorJames**Pragmatism'"inProceedingsoftheAris-totelianSociety^1907-8.IV."Hume'sPhilosophy"inTheNewQuarterly^November,1909.V."TheStatusofSense-Data"inProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety^1913*14.VI."TheConceptionofReality"inProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety1917-18.yVII."SomeJudgmentsofPerception"inProceedingsoftheAris-totelianSocietyy1918-19.IX."ExternalandInternalRelations"inProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety^1919-20.\nPREFACEAllthepaperscontainedinthisvolume,exceptthetwoethicalones(VIIIandX),havebeenpreviouslypublished;andofthosewhichhavebeenpreviouslypublishedall,exceptthaton**ExternalandInternalRelations*'(IX),areherere-printedwithoutchange.Theywerewrittenatvariousdatesbetweenipo'jand1921,andallarehereprintedintheorderinwhichtheywerewritten,exceptthatVIIIon"TheConceptionofIntrinsicValue,"whichwaswrittenearlierthanVIandVII,hasbeenmovedoutofitsproperplaceinordertobringitnearertoIXandX,tobothofwhichitiscloselyrelatedinsubject.All,exceptIVandX,wereprimarilyintendedforanaudiencefamiliarwiththewritingsofphilosophers;butIhopethattheymayneverthelessproveintelligibleeventothosewhohavereadlittleornophilosophy,sinceImakelittleuseoftechnicalterms,and,whereIhavedoneso,havedonemybesttoexplaininordinarylanguageexactlywhatImeanbythem.ThetoneofXissomewhatdifferentfromthatoftherest,becauseitwaswrittenasalecturefortheLeicesterPhilosophicalSociety^withregardtowhichIwasinformedthatImustnotassumeanypreviousacquaintancewithphilosophyinmostoftheaudience.Itaccordinglybearsmarksthroughoutofthekindofaudienceforwhichitwasintended.Anattentivereaderwilleasilydiscoverthatsomeoftheviewsexpressedinsomeofthepapersareinconsistentwithviewsexpressedinothers.ThefactisthatsomeoftheviewsexpressedinsomeoftheearlieronesareviewswithwhichInolongeragree;andIfeelthatsomeapologyisneededforneverthelessrepublishingthemexactlyastheystood.Inallcases,exceptone,myexcuseisthatthemistakenviewsinquestionaresoembeddedintheformandsubstanceofthepapersinwhichtheyoccur,thatitwouldhavebeenimpossibletocorrectthemwithoutpracticallysubstitutingnewpapersfortheoldones;andthat,inspiteofthesemistakes,theoldpapers,astheystand,stillseemtome,onthewhole,tosaythingswhichareworthsayinginaformwhich,howeverdefectiveitmay\n;viifPrefacebe,Idoubtmyownabilitytoimproveupon.Theonlycaseinwhich—Idoubtwhetherthisexcuseappliesisthatofthefirstpaper"TheRefutationofIdealism."Thispapernowappearstometobeveryconfused,aswellastoembodyagoodmarrydown-rightmistakes;soIamdoubtfulwhetherloughttohaveincludedit.ButinthiscaseIhaveanotherexcuse:namelythatitisapapertowhichagoodmanyallusionshavebeenmadebycontemporarywritersonphilosophy;andIwastoldthat,forsomereadersatallevents,itwouldbeaconveniencethatitshouldbereprintedalongwiththerest,ifonlyforthesakeofreference.Isaidabovethattheonlyoneofthepreviouslypublishedpapers,inwhichchangeshavebeenmade,isIXon"ExternalandInternalRelations.*'Inthiscasethechangesarenotduetoanychangeinmyviews,buttothefactthat,inthatpartofthepaperinwhichsymbolsareused,Itried,whenitwasfirstpublishedintheProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,tousethesymbolsadoptedbyWhiteheadandRussellinPrincipiaMathematica,andusedthemalsowithoutgivinganexplanationoftheirmeaningwhichwouldbesufficientforreadersnotacquaintedwiththatwork.Thesymbolsinquestionaresymbolswhichitisdifficultforprinterstoreproduce;andIhave,there-fore,thoughtitbetter,onthisoccasion,touseanothersetofsymbols,whichseemtometobeadequateforthelimitedpurposeIhadinview.Ihavetriedtogiveanexplanationoftheirmeaning,whichwillenableanyonetounderstandthem;andIhavetakentheopportunityofrewritingsomeofthepartsofthepaperinwhichtheyoccurinawaywhichwill,Ihope,makesomepointsclearerthantheyoriginallywere.IhavetothanktheCommitteeoftheAristotelianSocietyforpermissiontoreprintthelargenumberofpapers(viz.,II,III,V,VI,VIIandIX),whichoriginallyappearedintheProceedingsofthatSocietyandtheEditoroftheNewQuarterlyforpermissiontore-printthearticleonHume'sPhilosophy(IV),whichappearedinthatJournalinNovember,1909.G.E.MOORE.Cambridge,fanuary,igs2.\nPhilosophicalStudiesTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMModernIdealism,ifitassertsanygeneralcon-clusionabouttheuniverseatall,assertsthatitisspiritual.TherearetwopointsaboutthisassertiontowhichIwishtocallattention.Thesepointsarethat,whateverbeitsexactmeaning,itiscertainlymeanttoassert(i)thattheuniverseisverydifferentindeedfromwhatitseems,and(2)thatithasquitealargenumberofpropertieswhichitdoesnotseemtohave.Chairsandtablesandmountainsseemtobeverydifferentfromus;but,whenthewholeuniverseisdeclaredtobespiritual,itiscertainlymeanttoassertthattheyarefarmorelikeusthanwethink.Theidealistmeanstoassertthattheyareinsomesenseneitherlifelessnorunconscious,astheycertainlyseemtobe;andIdonotthinkhislanguageissogrosslydeceptive,butthatwemayassumehimtobelievethattheyreallyareverydifferentindeedfromwhattheyseem.Andsecondlywhenhedeclaresthattheyarespiritual,hemeanstoincludeinthattermquitealargenumberofdifferentproperties.Whenthewholeuniverseisdeclaredtobespiritual,itismeantnotonlythatitisinsomesenseconscious,butthatithaswhatwerecogniseinourselvesasthehigherformsofconsciousness.Thatitisintelligent;thatitispurposeful;thatitisnot\n2THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMmechanical;allthesedifferentthingsarecommonlyassertedofit.Ingeneral,itmaybesaid,thisphrase*realityisspiritual'excitesandexpressesthebeliefthatthewholeuniversepossessesallthequalitiesthepossessionofwhichisheldtomakeussosuperiortothingswhichseemtobeinani-mate:atleast,ifitdoesnotpossessexactlythosewhichwepossess,itpossessesnotoneonly,butseveralothers,which,bythesameethicalstandard,wouldbejudgedequaltoorbetterthanourown.Whenwesayitisspiritualwemeantosaythatithasquiteanumberofexcellentqualities,differentfromanywhichwecommonlyattributeeithertostarsorplanetsortocupsandsaucers.NowwhyImentionthesetwopointsisthatwhenengagedintheintricaciesofphilosophicdiscussion,weareapttooverlookthevastnessofthedifferencebetweenthisidealisticviewandtheordinaryviewoftheworld,andtooverlookthenumberofdifferentpropositionswhichtheidealistmustprove.Itis,Ithink,owingtothevastnessofthisdifferenceandowingtothenumberofdifferentexcellenceswhichIdealistsattributetotheuniverse,thatitseemssuchaninterestingandimportantquestionwhetherIdealismbetrueornot.But,whenwebegintoargueaboutit,Ithinkweareapttoforgetwhatavastnumberofargumentsthisinterestingquestionmustinvolve:weareapttoassume,thatifoneortwopointsbemadeoneitherside,thewholecaseiswon.IsaythislestItshouldbethoughtthatanyoftheargumentswhichwillbeadvancedinthispaperwouldbesufficienttodisprove,oranyrefutationofthemsufficienttoprove,thetrulyinterestingandim-portantpropositionthatrealityisspiritual.FormyownpartIwishittobeclearlyunderstoodthatIdonotsupposethatanythingIshallsayhasthesmallesttendencytoprovethatrealityisnot\n;THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM3spiritual:Idonotbelieveitpossibletorefuteasingleoneofthemanyimportantpropositionscontainedintheassertionthatitisso.Realitymaybespiritual,forallIknow;andIdevoutlyhopeitis.ButItake*Idealism'tobeawidetermandtoincludenotonlythisinterestingconclusionbutanumberofargumentswhicharesupposedtobe,ifnotsufficient,atleastnecessary^toproveit.IndeedItakeitthatmodernIdealistsarechieflydistinguishedbycertainargumentswhichtheyhaveincommon.Thatrealityisspiritualhas,Ibelieve,beenthetenetofmanytheologiansandyet,forbelievingthatalone,theyshouldhardlybecalledIdealists.Therearebesides,Ibelieve,manypersons,notimproperlycalledIdealists,whoholdcertaincharacteristicpropositions,withoutventuringtothinkthemquitesufficienttoprovesograndaconclusion.Itis,therefore,onlywithIdealisticargumentsthatIamconcerned;andifanyIdealistholdsthatnoargumentisnecessarytoprovethatrealityisspiritual,Ishallcertainlynothaverefutedhim.Ishall,however,attackatleastoneargument,which,tothebestofmybelief,isconsiderednecessarytotheirpositionbyallIdealists.AndIwishtopointoutacertainadvantagewhichthisproceduregivesme—anadvantagewhichjustifiestheassertionthat,ifmyargumentsaresound,theywillhaverefutedIdealism.IfIcanrefuteasinglepropositionwhichisanecessaryandessentialstepinallIdealisticarguments,then,nomatterhowgoodtherestoftheseargumentsmaybe,IshallhaveprovedthatIdealistshavenoreasonwhateverfortheirconclusion.Supposewehaveachainofargumentwhichtakestheform:SinceAisB,andBisC,andCisD,itfollowsAisD.Insuchanargument,though'CisD*BisC'and'maybothbeperfectlytrue,\n'4THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMyetif*AisB*befalse,wehavenomorereasonforassertingAisDthanifallthreewerefalse.Itdoesnot,indeed,followthatAisDisfalse;nordoesitfollowthatnootherargumentswouldproveittobetrue.Butitdoesfollowthat,sofarasthisargumentgoes,itisthebarestsupposition,withouttheleastbitofevidence.Iproposetoattackapropositionwhichseemstometostandinthisrelationtotheconclusion*Realityisspiritual/I;donotproposetodisputethat*RealityisspiritualIdonotdenythattheremaybereasonsforthinkingthatitis:butIdoproposetoshowthatonereasonuponwhich,tothebestofmyjudgment,allotherargumentseverusedbyIdealistsdependisfalse.Theseotherargumentsmay,forallIshallsay,beeminentlyingeniousandtrue;theyareverymanyandvarious,anddifferentIdealistsusethemostdifferentargumentstoprovethesamemostimportantconclusions.SomeofthesemaybesufficienttoprovethatBisCandCisD;butif,asIshalltrytoshow,their'AisB'isfalsetheconclusionAisDremainsapleasantsupposition.Idonotdenythattosuggestpleasantandplaus-iblesuppositionsmaybetheproperfunctionofphilosophy:butIamassumingthatthenameIdealismcanonlybeproperlyappliedwherethereisacertainamountofargument,intendedtobecogent.Thesubjectofthispaperis,therefore,quiteuninteresting.EvenifIprovemypoint,IshallhaveprovednothingabouttheUniverseingeneral.UpontheimportantquestionwhetherRealityisorisnotspiritualmyargumentwillnothavetheremotestbearing.Ishallonlyattempttoarriveatthetruthaboutamatter,whichisinitselfquitetrivialandinsignificant,andfromwhich,sofarasIcanseeandcertainlysofarasIshallsay,nocon-clusionscanbedrawnaboutanyofthesubjects\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM5aboutwhichwemostwanttoknow.TheonlyimportanceIcanclaimforthesubjectIshallin-vestigateisthatitseemstometobeamatteruponwhichnotIdealistsonly,butallphilosophersandpsychologistsalso,havebeeninerror,andfromtheirerroneousviewofwhichtheyhaveinferred(validlyorinvalidly)theirmoststrikingandinter-estingconclusions.AndthatithaseventhisimportanceIcannothopetoprove.Ifithasthisimportance,itwillindeedfollowthatallthemoststrikingresultsofphilosophy—Sensationalism.AgnosticismandIdealismalike—have,forallthathashithertobeenurgedintheirfavour,nomorefoundationthanthesuppositionthatachimeralivesinthemoon.Itwillfollowthat,unlessnewreasonsneverurgedhithertocanbefound,allthemostim-portantphilosophicdoctrineshaveaslittleclaimtoassentasthemostsuperstitiousbeliefsofthelowestsavages.Uponthequestionwhatwehavereasontobelieveinthemostinterestingmatters,Idothereforethinkthatmyresultswillhaveanimport-antbearing;butIcannottooclearlyinsistthatuponthequestionwhetherthesebeliefsaretruetheywillhavenonewhatever.ThetrivialpropositionwhichIproposetodisputeisthis:thatessexsperctpuThisisaveryambiguousproposition,but,insomesenseorother,ithasbeenverywidelyheld.Thatitis,insomesense,essentialtoIdealism,Imustforthepresentmerelyassume.WhatIproposetoshowisthat,inallthesensesevergiventoit,itisfalse.But,firstofall,itmaybeusefultopointoutbrieflyinwhatrelationIconceiveittostandtoIdealisticarguments.Thatwhereveryoucantrulypredicateesseyoucantrulypredicatepercipi^insomesenseorother,is,Itakeit,anecessarystepinallarguments,properlytobecalledIdealistic,and,whatismore,inallargumentshithertooffered\n:6THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMfortheIdealisticconclusion.Ifesseispercipi,thisisatonceequivalenttosayingthatwhateveris,isexperienced;andthis,again»isequivalent,inasense,tosayingthatwhateveris,issomethingmental.ButthisisnotthesenseinwhichtheIdealistconclusionmustmaintainthatRealityismenial.TheIdealistconclusionisthatesseispercipere;andhence,whetheressehepercipiornot,afurtheranddifferentdiscussionisneededtoshowwhetherornotitisalsopercipere.Andagain,evenifessebepercipere,weneedavastquantityoffurtherargumenttoshowthatwhathasessehasalsothosehighermentalqualitieswhicharedenotedbyspiritual.ThisiswhyIsaidthatthequestionIshoulddiscuss,namely,whetherornotessexspercipi^mustbeutterlyinsufficienteithertoproveortodisprovethatrealityisspiritual.But,ontheotherhand,Ibelievethateveryargumenteverusedtoshowthatrealityisspiritualhasinferredthis(validly-^orinvalidly)from*esseispercipere'asoneofitspremisses;andthatthisagainhasneverbeenpretendedtobeprovedexceptbyuseofthepremissthatesse\spercipi.Thetypeofargumentusedforthelatterpurposeisfamiliarenough.Itissaidthatsincewhateveris,isexperienced,andsincesomethingsarewhicharenotexperiencedbytheindividual,thesemustatleastformpartofsomeexperience.Oragainthat,sinceanobjectneces-sarilyimpliesasubject,andsincethewholeworldmustbeanobject,wemustconceiveittobelongtosomesubjectorsubjects,inthesamesenseinwhichwhateveristheobjectofourexperiencebelongstous.Oragain,that,sincethoughtentersintotheessenceofallreality,wemustconceivebehindit,init,orasitsessence,aspiritakintoours,whothinkthat'spiritgreetsspirit*initsobject.IntothevalidityoftheseinferencesIdonotproposetoenter:theyobviouslyrequireagreatdealofdiscussion.I\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM7onlydesiretopointoutthat,howevercorrecttheymaybe,yetifesseisnotpercipi,theyleaveusasfarfromaproofthatrealityisspiritual,asiftheywereallfalsetoo.Butnow:Isessepercipi?Therearethreeveryambiguoustermsinthisproposition,andImustbeginbydistinguishingthedifferentthingsthatmaybemeantbysomeofthem.Andfirstwithregardtopercipi.Thistermneednottroubleuslongatpresent.Itwas,perhaps,originallyusedtomean*sensation*only;butIamnotgoingtobesounfairtomodernIdealists—theonlyIdealiststowhomthetermshouldnowbeappliedwithoutqualification—astoholdthat,iftheysayesseispercipi,theymeanbypercipisensationonly.OnthecontraryIquiteagreewiththemthat,ifessebepercipiatall,percipimustbeunderstoodtoincludenotsensationonly,butthatothertypeofmentalfact,whichiscalled*thought;and,whetheressebepercipiornot,I'considerittobethemainserviceofthephilosophicschool,towhichmodernIdealistsbelong,thatthey'sensationhaveinsistedondistinguishing'and'thought'andonemphasisingtheimportanceofthelatter.AgainstSensationalismandEmpiricismtheyhavemaintainedthetrueview.Butthedis-tinctionbetweensensationandthoughtneednotdetainushere.For,inwhateverrespectstheydiffer,theyhaveatleastthisincommon,thattheyarebothformsofconsciousnessor,touseatermthatseemstobemoreinfashionjustnow,theyarebothwaysofexperiencing.Accordingly,whateveresseispercipimaymean,itdoesatleastassertthatwhateveris,isexperienced.AndsincewhatIwishtomaintainis,thateventhisisuntrue,thequestionwhetheritbeexperiencedbywayofsensationorthoughtorbothisformypurposequiteirrelevant.Ifitbenotexperiencedatall,it\n8THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMcannotbeeitheranobjectofthoughtoranobjectofsense.Itisonlyifbeinginvolves'experience'thatthequestion,whetheritinvolvessensationorthoughtorboth,becomesimportant.Ibeg,therefore,thatpercipimaybeunderstood,inwhatfollows,torefermerelytowhatiscommontosensationandthought.Averyrecentarticlestatesthemeaningofesseispercipiwithallde-sirableclearnessinsofaraspercipiisconcerned.**Iwillundertaketoshow,'saysMr.Taylor,'thatwhatmakes[anypieceoffact]realcanbenothingbutitspresenceasaninseparableaspectofasentientexpefience'IamgladtothinkthatMr.TaylorhasbeenintimetosupplymewithsodefiniteastatementthatthisistheultimatepremissofIdealism.MypaperwillatleastrefuteMr,TaylorsIdealism,ifitrefutesanythingatall:forIshallundertaketoshowthatwhatmakesathingrealcannotpossiblybeitspresenceasaninseparableaspectofasenientexperience.ButMr.Taylor'sstatementthoughclear,Ithink,withregardtothemeaningofpercipiishighlyambiguousinotherrespects.Iwillleaveitforthepresenttoconsiderthenextambiguityinthestatement:Esse\%percipi.Whatdoesthecopulamean?WhatcanbemeantbysayingthatEsseispercipi?Therearejustthreemeanings,oneorotherofwhichsuchastatementmusthave,ifitistobetrue;andofthesethereisonlyonewhichitcanhave,ifitistobeimportant.(i)Thestatementmaybemeanttoassertthattheword'esse'isusedtosignifynothingeithermoreorlessthantheword•percipi':thatthetwowordsareprecisesynonyms:thattheyaremerelydifferentnamesforoneandthesamething:thatwhatismeantbyesseisabsolutelyidenticalwithwhatis^InternationalJournalofEthics^October,1902,\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM9meantbypercipuIthinkIneednotprovethattheprincipleesseisperctpiisnotthusintendedmerelytodefineaword;noryetthat,ifitwere,itwouldbeanextremelybaddefinition.Butifitdoesnotmeanthis,onlytwoalternativesremain.Thesecondis(2)thatwhatismeantbyesse^thoughnotabsolutelyidenticalwithwhatismeantbypercipi,yetincludesthelatterasapartofitsmeaning.Ifthiswerethemeaningof*esseispercipi,'thentosaythatathingwasrealwouldnotbethesamethingastosaythatitwasexperienced.Thatitwasr^^/wouldmeanthatitwasexperiencedandsomethingelsebesides:'beingexperienced'wouldbeanalyticallyessentialtoreality,butwouldnotbethewholemeaningoftheterm.Fromthefactthatathingwasrealweshouldbeabletoinfer,bythelawofcontradiction,thatitwasexperienced;sincethelatterwouldh^partofwhatismeantbytheformer.But,ontheotherhand,fromthefactathingwasexperiencedweshouldnotbeabletoinferthatitwasreal;sinceitwouldnotfollowfromthefactthatithadoneoftheattributesessentialtoreality,thatitalsohadtheotherorothers.Now,ifweunderstandesseispercipiinthissecondsense,wemustdistinguishthreedifferentthingswhichitasserts.Firstofall,Itgivesadefinitionoftheword'reality,'assertingthatwordstandsforacomplexwhole,ofwhichwhatismeantby'percipi*formsapart.Andsecondlyitassertsthat*beingexperienced*formsapartofacertainwhole.Boththesepro-positionsmaybetrue,andatalleventsIdonotwishtodisputethem,Idonot,indeed,thinkthattheword'reality'iscommonlyusedtoinclude•percipi':butIdonotwishtoargueaboutthemeaningofwords.Andthatmanythingswhichareexperiencedarealsosomethingelse—thattobeexperiencedformspartofcertainwholes,is,of\nloTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMcourse,indisputable.ButwhatIwishtopointoutis,thatneitherofthesepropositionsisofanyimportance,unlessweaddtothemathird.That•real'isaconvenientnameforaunionofattributeswhichsometimesoccurs,itcouldnotbeworthanyone*swhiletoassert:noinferencesofanyim-portancecouldbedrawnfromsuchanassertion.Ourprinciplecouldonlymeanthatwhenathinghappenstohavepercipiaswellastheotherqualitiesincludedunderesse,itV^spercipi\andweshouldneverbeabletoinfer\kv2Xitwasexperienced,exceptfromapropositionwhichalreadyassertedthatitwasbothexperiencedandsomethingelse.Accordingly,iftheassertionthatpercipiformspartofthewholemeantbyrealityistohaveanyimportance,itmustmeanthatthewholeisorganic,atleastinthissense,thattheotherconstituentorconstituentsofitcannotoccurwithoutpercipi,evenifpercipicanoccurwithoutthem.Letuscalltheseotherconstituentsx.Thepropositionthatesseincludes/^r^j#2,andthatthereforefromessepercipicanbeinferred,canonlybeimportantifitismeanttoassertthatpercipicanbeinferredfromx»Theonlyimportanceofthequestionwhetherthewholeesseincludesthe^^xxpercipireststhereforeonthequestionwhetherthepartxisnecessarilyconnectedwiththe^2s\.percipiAndthisis(3)thethirdpossiblemeaningoftheassertionesseispercipi:and,aswenowsee,theonlyimportantone.EsseispercipiassertsthatwhereveryouhaveXyoualsohavepercipithatwhateverhasthepropertyxalsohasthepropertythatitisexperienced.Andthisbeingso,itwillbecon-venientif,forthefuture,Imaybeallowedtousetheterm*esse'todenotexalone.Idonotwishtherebytobegthequestionwhetherwhatwecommonlymeanbytheword'real'doesordoesnotinclude/^r^?^/aswellasx,Iamquitecontent\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMiithatmydefinitionof'esse'todenotex,shouldberegardedmerelyasanarbitraryverbaldefinition.Whetheritissoornot,theonlyquestionofinterestiswhetherfromxpe7cipicanbeinferred,andIshouldprefertobeabletoexpressthisintheform:canpercipibeinferredfromesse?OnlyletitbeunderstoodthatwhenIsayesse,thattermwillnotforthefutureincludepercipi:itdenotesonlythat;r,whichIdealists,perhapsrightly,includealongwithpercipiundertheirtermesse.ThatthereissuchanXtheymustadmitonpainofmakingthepropositionanabsolutetautology;andthatfromthisXpercipicanbeinferredtheymustadmit,onpainofmakingitaperfectlybarrenanalyticpro-position.Whetherxiloneshouldorshouldnotbecalledesseisnotworthadispute:whatisworthdisputeiswhetherpercipiisnecessarilyconnectedwithX,Wehavethereforediscoveredtheambiguityofthecopulainesseispercipi,sofarastoseethatthisprincipleassertstwodistincttermstobesorelated,thatwhateverhastheone,whichIcallesse,hasalsothepropertythatitisexperienced.Itassertsanecessaryconnexionbetweenesseontheonehandandpercipiontheother;thesetwowordsdenotingeachadistinctterm,andessedenotingaterminwhichthatdenotedbypercipiisnotin-cluded.Wehave,theninesse\spercipi,anecessarysyntheticpropositionwhichIhaveundertakentorefute._AndImaysay^toncethat,understoodassuch^itca^nnotberefuted.^IftheIdealistchoosestoassertthatitismerelyaself-evidenttruth,Ihaveonlytosaythatitdoesnotappeartometobeso.ButIbelievethatnoIdealisteverhasmain-tainedittobeso.Althoughthis—thattwodistincttermsarenecessarilyrelated—istheonlysensewhich'esseispercipi'canhaveifitistobetrueandimportant,itcanhaveanothersense,ifit\n12THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMistobeanimportantfalsehood.IbelievethatIdealistsallholdthisimportantfalsehood.TheydonotperceivethatEsse\%percipimust,iftrue,bemerelyaself-evidentsynthetictruth:theyeitheridentifywithitorgiveasareasonforitanotherpropositionwhichmustbefalsebecauseitisself-contradictory.Unlesstheydidso,theywouldhavetoadmitthatitwasaperfectlyunfoundedassumption;andiftheyrecognisedthatitwasunfounded,Idonotthinktheywouldmaintainitstruthtobeevident.Essexspercipi,inthesenseIhavefoundforit,mayindeedbetrue;Icannotrefuteit:butifthissensewereclearlyapprehended,noone,Ithink,wouldbelievethatitwastrue.Idealists,wehaveseen,mustassertthatwhat-everisexperienced,isnecessarilyso.Andthisdoctrinetheycommonlyexpressbysayingthat*theobjectofexperienceisinconceivableapartfromthesubject'Ihavehithertobeenconcernedwithpointingoutwhatmeaningthisassertionmusthave,ifitistobeanimportanttruth.Inowproposetoshowthatitmayhaveanimportantmeaning,whichmustbefalse,becauseitisself-contradictory.Itisawell-knownfactinthehistoryofphilosophythatnecessarytruthsingeneral,butespeciallythoseofwhichitissaidthattheoppositeisinconceivable,havebeencommonlysupposedtobeanalytic,inthesensethatthepropositiondenyingthemwasself-contradictory.Itwasinthisway,commonlysupposed,beforeKant,thatmanytruthscouldbeprovedbythelawofcontradictionalone.Thisis,therefore,amistakewhichitisplainlyeasyforthebestphilosopherstomake.EvensinceKantmanyhavecontinuedtoassertit;butIamawarethatamongthoseIdealists,whomostproperlydeservethename,ithasbecomemorefashionabletoassertthattruthsarebothanalyticandsynthetic.Now\n'THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM13withmanyoftheirreasonsforassertingthisIamnotconcerned:itispossiblethatinsomecon-nexionstheassertionmaybearausefulandtruesense.Butifweunderstand'analytic'inthesensejustdefined,namely,whatisprovedbythelawof_contradictionalonCyitisplainthat,if'synthetic'meanswhatisnotprovedbythisalone»notruthcanbebothanalyticandsynthetic.Nowitseemstomethatthdsewhodomaintaintruthstobeboth,doneverthelessmaintainthattheyaresointhisaswellasinothersenses.Itis,indeed,extremelyunlikelythatsoessentialapartofthehistoricalmeaningof''analytic'and*syntheticshouldhavebeenentirelydiscarded,especiallysincewefindnoexpressrecognitionthatitisdis-carded.InthatcaseitisfairtosupposethatmodernIdealistshavebeeninfluencedbytheviewthatcertaintruthscanbeprovedbythelawofcontradictionalone.Iadmittheyalsoexpresslydeclarethattheycannot:butthisisbynomeanssufficienttoprovethattheydonotalsothinktheyare;sinceitisveryeasytoholdtwomutuallycontradictory^opinions.^VhaFT^^uggesFthenIsthatIdealistshold^theparticulardoctrineinquestion,concerningtherelationofsubjectandobjectinexperience,becausetheythinkitisananalytictruthinthisrestrictedsensethatitisprovedbythelawofcontradictionalone.IamsuggestingthattheIdealistmaintainsthatobjectandsubjectarenecessarilyconnected,mainlybecausehefailstoseethattheyaredistinct^thattheyaretwo,atall.Whenhethinksof'yellowandwhenhethinksofthe'sensationofyellow,'hefailstoseethatthereisanythingwhateverinthelatterwhichisnotintheformer.Thisbeingso,todenythatyellowcaneverbeapartfromthesensationofyellowismerelytodenythatyellowcaneverbeotherthanitis;sinceyellowandthe\n:14THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMsensationofyellowareabsolutelyidentical.Toassertthatyellowisnecessarilyanobjectofex-perienceistoassertthatyellowisnecessarilyyellow—apurelyidenticalproposition,andthereforeprovedbythelawofcontradictionalone.Ofcourse,thepropositionalsoimpliesthatexperienceis,afterall,somethingdistinctfromyellow—elsetherewouldbenoreasonforinsistingthatyellowisasensation:andthattheargumentthusbothaffirms__anjd.deniesthatyellowL_and.sensationofyeljow_ai5distinct^itButthiscontradictioncaneasilybeoverlooked,becausethoughweareconvinced,inothercon-nexions,that*experience'doesmeansomethingandsomethingmostimportant,yetweareneverdistinctlyawarewhatitmeans,andthusineveryparticularcasewedonotnoticeitspresence.Thefactspresentthemselvesasakindofantinomy(i)ExperienceissomethinguniqueanddifferentfromanythingelseExperienceofgreen;(2)isentirelyindistinguishablefromgreen;twopro-positionswhichcannotbothbetrue.Idealists,holdingboth,canonlytakerefugeinarguingfromtheoneinsomeconnexionsandfromtheotherinothers.ButIamwellawarethattherearemanyIdealistswhowouldrepelitasanutterlyunfoundedchargethattheyfailtodistinguishbetweenasensationorideaandwhatIwillcallitsobject.Andthereare,Iadmit,manywhonotonlyimply,aswealldo,thatgreenisdistinctfromthesensationofgreen[butexpresslyinsistuponthedistinctionasanimportantpartoftheirsystem.Theywouldperhapsonlyassertthatthetwoformaninsepar-ableunity.ButIwishtopointoutthatmany,whousethisphrase,andwhodoadmitthedistinc-tion,arenottherebyabsolvedfromthechargethattheydenyitForthereisacertaindoctrine,very\n:THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM15prevalentamongphilosophersnowadays,whichbyaverysimplereductionmaybeseentoassertthattwodistinctthingsbothareandarenotdistinct.Adistinctionisasserted;butitisalsoassertedthatthethingsdistinguishedforman*organicunity/But,formingsuchaunity,itisheld,eachwouldnotbewhatitisapartfromitsrelationtotheother.Hencetoconsidereitherbyitselfistomakeanillegitimateabstraction.Therecognitionthatthereare*organicunities'and'illegitimateabstractions'inthissenseisregardedasoneofthechiefcon-questsofmodernphilosophy.Butwhatisthesenseattachedtotheseterms?Anabstractionisillegitimate,whenandonlywhenweattempttoassertofapart—ofsomethingabstracted—thatwhichistrueonlyofthezvholetowhichitbelongsanditmayperhapsbeusefultopointoutthatthisshouldnotbedone.Buttheapplicationactuallymadeofthisprinciple,andwhatperhapswouldbeexpresslyacknowledgedasitsmeaning,issome-thingmuchthereverseofuseful.Theprincipleisusedtoassertthatcertainabstractionsareinallcasesillegitimate;thatwheneveryoutrytoassertanythingwhateverofthatwhichispartofanorganicwhole,whatyouassertcanonlybetrueofthewhole.Andthisprinciple,sofarfrombeingausefultruth,isnecessarilyfalse.Forifthewholecan,naymust,besubstitutedforthepartinallpropositionsandforallpurposes,thiscanonlybebecausethewholeisabsolutelyidenticalwiththepart.When,therefore,wearetoldthatgreenandthesensationofgreenarecertainlydistinctbutyetarenotseparable,orthatitisanillegitimateabstractiontoconsidertheoneapartfromtheother,whattheseprovisosareusedtoassertis,thatthoughthetwothingsaredistinctyetyounotonlycanbutmusttreatthemasiftheywerenot.Manyphilosophers,therefore,whentheyadmitadis-\n:16THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMtinction.yet(followingtheleadofHegel)boldlyasserttheirright,inaslightlymoreobscureformofwords,alsotodenyit.Theprincipleoforganicunities,likethatofcombinedanalysisandsynthesis,ismainlyusedtodefendthepracticeofholding~5oihoftwocontradictory,propositions,whereverthismayseemconvenient.Intliisrasinothermatters,Hegel'smainservicetophilosophyhasconsistedingivinganametoanderectingintoaprinciple,atypeoffallacytowhichexperiencehadshownphilosophers,alongwiththerestofmankind,tobeaddicted.Nowonderthathehasfollowersandadmirers.Ihaveshownthen,sofar,thatwhentheIdealistassertstheimportantprinciple'EssexspercipVhemust,ifitistobetrue,meanbythisthat:What-everisexperiencedalsomustbeexperienced.AndIhavealsoshownthathemayidentifywith,orgiveasareasonfor,thisproposition,onewhichmustbefalse,becauseitisselfcontradictory.ButatthispointIproposetomakeacompletebreakinmyargument*Esseisperctptywehaveseen,assertsoftwoterms,asdistinctfromoneanotheras*green'and*sweet,'thatwhateverhastheone*beinghasalsotheother:itassertsthat'and*beingexperienced'arenecessarilyconnectedthatwhateverisisalsoexperienced.Ajidjhis,Iadmit,cannotbedirectlyrefuted.ButXiielieverrt.tobej'alse;andIhaveassertedthatanybodywhosawthat'esseandpercipi'wereasdistinctas'green'and*sweet'wouldbenomorereadytobelievethatwhateverisisalsoexperienced,thantobelievethatwhateverisgreenisalsosweet.Ihaveassertedthatnoonewouldbelievethat'elseispercipViftheysawhowdifferentesseisfrompercipi:butthisIshallnottry^to_^prove,Ihaveassertedthatallwho^believethat'esse\%percipVidentifywithitortakeasareasonforitaself-\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM17contradictoryproposition:^ut_this_I_shal^^toprove.Ishallonlytrytoshow~thatcertainpropositionswhichIasserttobebelieved,arefalse.Thattheyarebelieved,andthatwithoutthisbelief'esseispercipi'wouldnotbebelievedeither,Imustleavewithouta^proof.IpassTlHenTjrQm^^*Is*essepercipiT^ojCci^stillmoreuninterestingandapparent^'irrelevantquestionWhatisasensationoridea?'Weallknowthatthesensationofbluediffersfromthatofgreen.Butitisplainthatifbotharesensationstheyalsohavesomepointincommon.Whatisitthattheyhaveincommon?Andhowisthiscommonelementrelatedtothepointsinwhichtheydiffer?'Iwillcallthecommonelement'consciousnesswithoutyetattemptingtosaywhatthethingIsocallis.Wehavethenineverysensationtwodistinctterms,(i)'consciousness,'inrespectofwhichallsensationsarealike;and(2)somethingelse,inrespectofwhichonesensationdiffersfromanother.ItwillbeconvenientifImaybeallowed•object*ofasensationtocallthissecondtermthe:thisalsowithoutyetattemptingtosaywhatImeanbytheword.Wehavethenineverysensationtwodistinctelements,onewhichIcallconsciousness,andanotherwhichIcalltheobjectofconsciousness.Thismustbesoifthesensationofblueandthesensationofgreen,thoughdifferentinonerespect,arealikeinanother:blueisoneobjectofsensationandgreenisanother,andconsciousness,whichbothsensationshaveincommon,isdifferentfromeither.But,further,sometimesthesensationofblueexistsinmymindandsometimesitdoesnot;andknowing,aswenowdo,thatthesensationofblueincludestwodifferentelements,namelyconscious-\n'18THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMnessandblue,thequestionariseswhether,whenthesensationofblueexists,itistheconsciousnesswhichexists,orthebluewhichexists,orboth.Andonepointatleastisplain:namelythatthesethreealternativesarealldifferentfromoneanother.Sothat,tosay'Blueexistsifanyonetellsusthatisthesainethingastosaythat^*Bothblueandconsciousnessexist,'hemakesamistakeandaself-contradictorymistake.Butanotherpointisalsoplain,namely,thatwhenthesensationexists,theconsciousness,atleast,certainlydoesexist;forwhenIsaythatthesensationsofblueandofgreenbothexist,Icertainlymeanthatwhatiscommontobothandinvirtueofwhichbotharecalledsensations,existsineachcase.Theonlyalternativeleft,then,isthateitherbothexistortheconsciousnessexistsalone.If,therefore,anyonetellsusthattheexistenceofblueisthesamethingastheexistenceofthesensationofbluehemakesamistakeandaself-contradictorymistake,forheassertseitherthatblueisthesamethingasbluetogetherwithconscious-ness,orthatitisthesamethingasconsciousnessalone.Accordinglytoidentifyeither**blue'*oranyotherofwhatIhavecalled''objects"ofsensation,withthecorrespondingsensationisineverycase,aself-contradictoryerror.Itistoidentifyaparteitherwiththewholeofwhichitisapartorelsewiththeotherpartofthesamewhole.Ifwearetoldthattheassertion*'Blueexists"isineaninglessunlesswemeanbyitthat**Thesensationofblueexists,"wearetoldwhatiscertainlyfalseandself-contradictory.Ifwearetoldthattheexistenceofblueisinconceivableapartfromtheexistenceofthesensation,thespeaker/r^3(a:^/j/meanstoconveytous,bythisambiguousexpression,whatisaself-contradictoryerror.Forwecanandmustconceive\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM19theexistenceofblueassomethingquitedistinctfromtheexistenceofthesensation.Wecanandmustconceivethatbluemightexistandyetthesensationofbluenotexist.FormyownpartInotonlyconceivethis,butconceiveittobetrue.Eitherthereforethisterrificassertionofinconceivabilitymeanswhatisfalseandself-contradictoryorelseitmeansonlythatasamatterof/actbluenevercanexistunlessthesensationofitexistsalso.AndatthispointIneednotconcealmyopinionthatnophilosopherhaseveryetsucceededinavoidingthisself-contradictoryerror;thatthemoststrikingresultsbothofIdealismandofAgnosticismareonlyobtainedbyidentifyingbluewiththesensationofblue:thatesseisheldtobepercipiysolelybecausewhatisexperiencedisheldtobeidenticalwiththeexperienceofit.ThatBerkeleyandMillcommittedthiserrorwill,perhaps,begranted:thatmodernIdealistsmakeitwill,Ihope,appearmoreprobablelater.Butthatmyopinionisplausible,Iwillnowoffertwopiecesofevidence.Thefirstisthatlanguageoffersusnomeansofreferringtosuchobjectsas**blue'*and**green"and**sweet,*'exceptbycalling^themsensations:itisanobviousviolationoflanguagetocallthem"things"or'*objects"or**terms.'*Andsimilarlywehavenonaturalmeansofreferringtosuchobjectsas"causality*'or"likeness"or"identity,"exceptbycallingthem"ideas"or"notions'*or"conceptions."ButitishardlylikelythatifphilosophershadclearlydistinguishedinthepastbetweenasensationorideaandwhatIhavecalleditsobject,thereshouldhavebeennoseparatenameforthelatter.Theyhavealways"things**usedthesamenameforthesetwodifferent(ifImaycallthemso):andhencethereissomeprobabilitythattheyhavesupposedthese"things*'\n20THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMnoltobetwoanddifferent,butoneandthesame.And,secondly,thereisaverygoodreasonwhytheyshouldhavesupposedso.inthefactthatwhenwerefertointrospectionandtrytodiscoverwhatthesensationofblueis,itisveryeasytosupposethatwehavebeforeusonlyasingleterm.The**blue"termiseasyenoughtodistinguish,butthe"otherelementwhichIhavecalled"consciousness—thatwhichsensationofbluehasincommonwithsensationofgreen—isextremelydifficulttofix.Thatmanypeoplefailtodistinguishitatallissufficientlyshownbythefactthattherearematerialists.And,ingeneral,thatwhichmakesthesensationofblueamentalfactseemstoescapeus:itseems,ifImayuseametaphor,tobetransparent—welookthroughitandseenothingbuttheblue;wemaybeconvincedthatthereissomethingbutwhatitisnophilosopher,Ithink,hasyetclearlyrecognised.Butthiswasadigression.ThepointIhadestablishedsofarwasthatineverysensationorideawemustdistinguishtwoelements,(i)the"object,"orthatinwhichonediffersfromanother;and(2)"consciousness,"orthatwhichallhaveincommon—thatwhichmakesthemsensationsormentalfacts.Thisbeingso,itfollowedthatwhenasensationorideaexists,wehavetochoosebetweenthealternativesthateitherobjectalone,orconsciousnessalone,orboth,exist;andIshowedthatofthesealternativesone,namelythattheobjectonlyexists,isexcludedbythefactthatwhatwemeantoassertiscertainlytheexistenceofamentalfact.Thereremainsthequestion:Dobothexist?Ordoestheconsciousnessalone?Andtothisquestiononeanswerhashithertobeengivenuniversally:Thatbothexist.ThisanswerfollowsfromtheanalysishithertoacceptedoftherelationofwhatIhavecalled\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM21"object"to"consciousness"inanysensationoridea.Itisheldthatwhat1calltheobjectismerelythe"content"ofasensationoridea.Itisheldthatineachcasewecandistinguishtwoelementsandtwoonly,(i)thefactthatthereisfeelingorexperience,and(2)whatisfeltorexperienced;thesensationoridea,itissaid,formsawhole,inwhichwemustdistinguishtwo"inseparableaspects,""content"and"existence."Ishalltrytoshowthatthisanalysisisfalse;andforthatpurposeImustaskwhatmayseemanextraordinaryquestion:namelywhatismeantbysayingthatonethingis"content"ofanother?Itisnotusualtoaskthisquestionthetermisused;asifeverybodymustunderstandit.ButsinceIamgoingtomaintainthat"blue"isnotthecontentofthesensationofblue,andwhatismoreimportant,that,evenifitwerethisanalysiswouldleaveoutthemostimportantelementinthesensationofblue,itisnecessarythatIshouldtrytoexplainpreciselywhatitisthatIshalldeny.Whatthenismeantbysayingthatonethingisthe"content"ofanother?FirstofallIwishtopointoutthat"blue"isrightlyandproperlysaidtobepartofthecontentofablueflower.If,therefore,wealsoassertthatitispartofthecontentofthesensationofblue,weassertthatithastotheotherparts(ifany)ofthiswholethesamerelationwhichithastotheotherpartsofablueflower—andweassertonlythis:wecannotmeantoassertthatIthastothesensationofblueanyrelationwhichitdoesnothavetotheblueflower.Andwehaveseenthatthesensationofbluecontainsatleastoneotherelementbesideblue—namely,whatIcall"consciousness,"whichmakesitasensation.Sofarthenasweassertthatblueisthecontentofthesensation,weassertthatithastothis"conscious-ness"thesamerelationwhichithastotheother\n"22THEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISMpartsofablueflower:wedoassertthis,andweassertnomorethanthis.Intothequestionwhatexactlytherelationisbetweenblueandablueflowerinvirtueofwhichwecalltheformerpartofits'*content"Idonotproposetoenter.Itissufficientformypurposetopointoutthatitisthegeneralrelationmostcommonlymeantwhenwetalkofathinganditsqualities;andthatthisrelationissuchthattosaythethingexistsimpliesthatthequalitiesalsoexist.Thecontentofthethingiswhatweasserttoexist,whenweassertthatthethingexists.When,therefore,blueissaidtobepartofthecontentofthe**sensationofblue,"thelatteristreatedasifitwereawholeconstitutedinexactlythesamewayasanyother**thing."The**sensationofblue,"onthisview,differsfromabluebeadorabluebeard,inexactlythesamewayinwhichthetwolatterdifferfromoneanother:thebluebeaddiffersfromthebluebeard,inthatwhiletheformercontainsglass,thelattercontainshair;andthe'*sensationofblue"differsfrombothinthat,insteadofglassorhair,itcontainsconsciousness.Therelationofthebluetotheconsciousnessisconceivedtobeexactlythesameasthatofthebluetotheglassorhair:itisinallthreecasesthequalityofathing.ButIsaidjustnowthatthesensationofbluewasanalysedinto"content"and**existence,"andthatbluewassaidtobethecontentoftheideaofblue.Thereisanambiguityinthisandapossibleerror,which"Imustnoteinpassing.Theterm"contentmaybeusedintwosenses.Ifweuse"content"asequivalenttowhatMr,Bradleycallsthe'*what—ifwemeanbyitthewho/eofwhatissaidtoexist,whenthethingissaidtoexist,thenblueiscertainlynotthecontentofthesensationofblue:partofthecontentofthesensationis,inthissense\nTHEREFUTATIONOFIDEALISM23oftheterm,thatotherelementwhichIhavecalledconsciousness.Theanalysisofthissensationintothe"content""blue,"ontheonehand,andmereexistenceontheother,isthereforecertainlyfalse;initwehaveagaintheself-contradictoryidentificationof**Blueexists"with**Thesensationofblueexists,"Butthereisanothersenseinwhich"blue"mightproperlybesaidtobethecontentofthesensation—namely,thesenseinwhich"content."likee?sychologicalquestionsarenotwhatIproposetodiscuss.WhenIaskthequestion"Howdoweknowthatotherpeopleexist?"Idonotmean\n"OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION35'*Howdoesourbeliefintheirexistencearise?ButifIdonotmeanthiswhatdoImean?IhavesaidthatImeantoaskaquestionwithregardtothetruthofthatbelief;andtheparticularquestionwhichImeantoaskmightbeexpressedinthewords:Whatreasonhaveweforourbeliefintheexistenceofotherpersons?Butthesearewordswhichthemselvesneedsomeexplanation,andIwilltrytogiveit.Inthefirstplace,then,whenItalkof"areason,"Imeanonlyagoodreasonandnotabadone.Abadreasonis,nodoubt,areason,inonesenseoftheword;butImeantousetheword**reason"exclusivelyinthesenseinwhichitisequivalentto"goodreason."Butwhat,then,ismeantbyagoodreasonforabelief?IthinkIcanexpresssufficientlyaccuratelywhatImeanbyitinthisconnection,asfollows:—Agoodreasonforabeliefisapropositionwhichistrue,andwhichwouldnotbetrueunlessthebeliefwerealsotrue.Weshould,Ithink,commonlysaythatwhenamanknowssuchaproposition,hehasagoodreasonforhisbelief;and,whenheknowsnosuchproposition,weshouldsaythathehasnoreasonforit.Whenheknowssuchaproposition,weshouldsayheknowssome-thingwhichisareasonforthinkinghisbelieftobetrue—somethingfromwhichitcouldbevalidlyinferred.And**if,inanswertothequestionHow?"heweretostatesuchadoyouknowsoandsoproposition,weshould,Ithink,feelthathehadansweredthequestionwhichwemeanttoask.Suppose,forinstance,inanswertothequestion'*?Howdoyouknowthat"heweretosay"IsawitintheTimes'Then,ifwebelievedthathehadseenitintheTimes,andalsobelievedthatitwouldnothavebeenintheTimeSyunlessithadbeentrue,weshouldadmitthathehadansweredourquestion.\n36OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONWeshouldnolongerdoubtthathedidknowwhatheasserted,weshouldnolongerdoubtthathisbeliefwastrue.Butif,ontheotherhand,webelievedthathehadnotseenitintheTimes—if,forinstance,wehadreasontobelievethatwhathesawwasnotthestatementwhichhemade,butsomeotherstatementwhichhemistookforit;orifwebelievedthatthekindofstatementinquestionwasonewithregardtowhichtherewasnopresumptionthat,beingintheTimes,itwouldbetrue:ineitherofthesecasesweshould,Ithink,feelthathehadnotansweredourquestion.Weshouldstilldoubtwhetherwhathehadsaidwastrue.Weshouldstilldoubtwhetherheknewwhatheasserted;andsinceamancannottellyouhowheknowsathingunlesshedoesknowthatthing,weshouldthinkthat,thoughhemighthavetoldustrulyhowhecametobelieveit,hehadcertainlynottoldushowheknewit.Butthoughweshouldthusholdthathehadnottoldushowheknewwhathehadasserted,andthathehadgivenusnoreasonforbelievingittobetrue;wemustyetadmitthathehadgivenusareasoninasense—abadreason,areasonwhichwasnoreasonbecauseithadnotendencytoshowthatwhathebelievedwastrue;andwemightalsobeperfectlyconvincedthathehadgivenusthereasonwhyhebelievedit—thepropositionbybelievingwhichhewasinducedalsotobelievehisoriginalassertion.question,**HowdoweknowImean,then,bymy?thatotherpeopleexist"what,Ibelieve,isordinarilymeant,namely,**Whatreasonhaveweforbelievingthattheyexist?"andbythisagainImean,whatIalsobelieveisordinarilymeant,namely,*'Whatpropositiondowebelieve,whichisbothtrueitselfandisalsosuchthatitwouldnotbe?true,unlessotherpeopleexisted"AndIhopeitisplainthatthisquestion,thusexplained,isquitea\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION37differentquestionfromthepsychologicalquestion,whichIsaidIdidnotmeantoask—fromthequestion,**Howdoesourbeliefintheexistenceofotherpeoplearise?"Myillustration,Ihope,hasmadethisplain.ForIhavepointedoutthatwemayquitewellholdthatamanhastoldushowabeliefofhisarises,andevenwhatwasthereasonwhichmadehimadoptthatbelief,andyetmayhavefailedtogiveusany^oodreasonforhisbelief—anypropositionwhichisbothtrueitself,andalsosuchthatthetruthofhisbelieffollowsfromit.And,indeed,itisplainthatifanyoneeverbelieveswhatisfalse,heisbelievingsomethingforwhichthereisnogoodreason,inthesensewhichIhaveexplained,andforwhich,therefore,hecannotpossiblyhaveagoodreason;andyetitplainlydoesnotfollowthathisbeliefdidnotariseinanywaywhatever,noreventhathehadnoreasonforit—nobadreason.Itisplainthatfalsebeliefsdoariseinsomewayorother—theyhaveoriginsandcauses:andmanypeoplewhoholdthemhavebadreasonsforholdingthem—theirbeliefdoesarise(byinferenceorother-wise)fromtheirbeliefinsomeotherproposition,whichisnotitselftrue,orelseisnotagoodreasonforholdingthat,whichtheyinferfromit,orwhich,insomeotherway,itinducesthemtobelieve.Isubmit,therefore,thatthequestion,**Whatgoodreasonhaveweforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpeople?"isdifferentfromthequestion,"Howdoesthatbeliefarise?"ButwhenIsaythis,Imustnotbemisunderstood;Imustnotbeunder-stoodtoaffirmthattheanswertobothquestionsmaynot,inasense,bethesame.Ifullyadmitthattheverysamefact,whichsuggeststousthebeliefintheexistenceofotherpeople,mayalsobeagoodreasonforbelievingthattheydoexist.AllthatImaintainisthatthequestionwhetheritisagoodreasonforthatbeliefisadifferentquestion\n":38OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONfromthequestionwhetheritsuggeststhatbeliefifweassertthatacertainfactbothsuggestsourbeliefintheexistenceofotherpersonsandisakoagoodreasonforholdingthatbelief,weareassertingtwodifferentthingsandnotoneonly.Andhence,whenIassert,asIshallassert,thatwehaveagoodreasonforourbeliefintheexistenceofotherpersons,Imustnotbeunderstoodalsotoasserteitherthatweinfertheexistenceofotherpersonsfromthisgoodreason,orthatourbeliefinthatgoodreasonsuggestsourbeliefintheexistenceofotherpersonsinanyotherway.Itisplain,Ithink,thatamanmaybelievetwotruepropositions,ofwhichtheonewouldnotbetrue,unlesstheotherweretruetoo,without,inanysensewhatever,havingarrivedathisbeliefintheowQ/romhisbeliefintheother;anditisplain,atallevents,thatthequestionwhetherhisbeliefintheonedidarisefromhisbeliefintheother,isadifferentquestionfromthequestionwhetherthetruthoftheonebelieffollowsfromthetruthoftheother.Ihope,then,thatIhavemadeitalittleclearerwhat**Imeanbythequestion:Whatreasonhaveweforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpeople?andthatwhatImeanbyitisatalleventsdifferentfromwhatismeantbythequestion*':Howdoesourbeliefintheexistenceofotherpeoplearise?'*ButIamsorrytosaythatIhavenotyetreachedtheendofmyexplanationsastowhatmymeaningis.Iamafraidthatthesubjectmayseemverytedious.IcanassureyouthaiIhavefounditexcessivelytedioustotrytomakemymeaningcleartomyselfIhaveconstantlyfoundthatIwasconfusingonequestionwithanother,andthat,whereIhadthoughtIhadagoodreasonforsomeassertion,Ihadinrealitynogoodreason.ButImayperhapsremindyouthatthisquestion,"Howdoweknowsoandso?"'*Whatreasonhavewe\n;OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION39forbelievingit?"isoneofwhichphilosophyisfullandonetowhichthemostvariousanswershavebeengiven.Philosophylargelyconsistsingivingreasons;andthequestionwhataregoodreasonsforaparticularconclusionandwhatarebad,isoneuponwhichphilosophershavedisagreedasmuchasonanyotherquestion.Foroneandthesameconclusiondifferentphilosophershavegivennotonlydifferent,butincompatible,reasons;andconverselydifferentphilosophershavemaintainedthatoneandthesamefactisareasonforincom-patibleconclusions.Weareapt,Ithink,sometimestopaytoolittleattentiontothisfact.Whenwehavetaken,perhaps,nolittlepainstoassureour-selvesthatourownreasoningiscorrect,andespeciallywhenweknowthatagreatmanyotherphilosophersagreewithus,weareapttoassumethattheargumentsofthosephilosophers,whohavecometoacontradictoryconclusion,arescarcelyworthyofseriousconsideration.Andyet,Ithink,thereisscarcelyasinglereasonedconclusioninphilosophy,astowhichweshallnotfindthatsomeotherphilosopher,whohas,sofarasweknow,bestowedequalpainsonhisreasoning,andwithequalability,hasreachedaconclusionincompatiblewithours.Wemaybesatisfiedthatweareright,andwemay,infact,beso;butitiscertainthatbothcannotberight:eitherouropponentorwemusthavemistakenbadreasonsforgood.Andthisbeingso,howeversatisfiedwemaybethatitisnotwewhohavedoneso,Ithinkweshouldatleastdrawtheconclusionthatitisbynomeanseasytoavoidmistakingbadreasonsforgood;andthatnoprocess,howeverlaborious,whichisintheleastlikelytohelpusinavoidingthisshouldbeevaded.Butitisatleastpossiblethatonesourceoferrorliesinmistakingonekindofreasonforanother—insupposingthat,becausethereis,inone\n—40OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONsense,areasonforagivenconclusion,thereisalsoareasoninanother,orthatbecausethereis,inonesense,noreasonforagivenconclusion,thereis,therefore,noreasonatall.Ibelievemyselfthatthisisaveryfrequentsourceoferror:butitisatleastapossibleone.Andwhere,asdisagreementsshow,therecertainlyiserrorononesideortheother,andreason,too,tosupposethattheerrorisnoteasytodetect,Ithinkweshouldsparenopainsininvestigatinganysource,fromwhichitisevenpossiblethattheerrormayarise.ForthesereasonsIthinkIamperhapsdoingrightintryingtoexplainasclearlyaspossiblenotonlywhatreasonswehaveforbelievinginanexternalworld,butalsoinwhatsenseItakethemtobereasons.Iproceed,thenwithmyexplanation.Andthereisonething,which,IthinkmyillustrationhasshownthatIdonotmean.Ihavedefinedareasonforabeliefasafudproposition,whichwouldnotbetrueunlessthebeliefitself—whatisbelievedwerealsotrue;andIhaveused,assynonymouswiththisformofwords,theexpressions:Areasonforabeliefisatruepropositionfromwhichthetruthoftheh^x^ifollowsfromwhichitcouldbevalidlyinferred.NowtheseexpressionsmightsuggesttheideathatImeantorestricttheword"reason,"towhat,inthestrictestsense,mightbecalledalogicalreason—topropositionsfromwhichthebeliefinquestionyb//i9ee;5,accordingtotherulesofinferenceacceptedbyFormalLogic.ButIamnotusingthewords**follow,"*'validlyinferred,"inthisnarrowsense;Idonotmeantorestrictthewords**reasonforabelief"topropositionsfromwhichthelawsofFormalLogicstatethatthebeliefcouldbededuced.TheillustrationwhichIgaveisinconsistentwiththisrestrictedmeaning.IsaidthatthefactthatastatementappearedintheTimesmightbeagoodreasonforbelievingthat\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION41thatstatementwastrue.AndIamusingtheword**reason"inthewideandpopularsense,inwhichItreallymightbe.If,forinstance,theTimesstatedthattheKingwasdead,weshouldthinkthatwasagoodreasonforbelievingthattheKingwasdead;weshouldthinkthattheTimeswouldnothavemadesuchastatementasthatunlesstheKingreallyweredead.Weshould,indeed,notthinkthatthestatementintheTimesrendereditabsolutelycertainthattheKingwasdead.ButitisextremelyunlikelythattheTimeswouldmakeastatementofthiskindunlessitweretrue;and,inthatsense,thefactofthestatementappearingintheTimeswouldrenderithighlyprobable-~muc\\morelikelythannot—thattheKingwasdead.AndIwishittobeunderstoodthatIamusingthewords"reasonforabelief"inthisextremelywidesense.WhenIlookforagoodreasonforourbeliefintheexistenceofotherpeople,Ishallnotrejectanypropositionmerelyonthegroundthatitonlyrenderstheirexistenceprobable—onlyshowsittobemorelikelythannotthattheyexist.Providedthatthepropositioninquestiondoesrender\t.positivelyprobablethattheyexist,then,ifitalsoconformstotheconditionswhichIamabouttomention,Ishallcallita"goodreason."Butitisnoteverypropositionwhichrendersitprobablethatotherpeopleexist,whichIshallconsidertobeagoodanswertomyquestion.Ihavejustexplainedthatmymeaningiswideinonedirection—inadmittingsomepropositionswhichrenderabeliefmerelyprobable;butIhavenowtoexplainthatitisrestrictedintwootherdirections.Idomeantoexcludecertainpropositionswhichdorenderthatbeliefprobable.WhenIask:Whatreasonhaveweforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpeople.'*acertainambiguityisintroducedbytheuseoftheplural**we."Ifeachofseveral\n42OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONdifferentpersonshasareasonforbelievingthathehimselfexists,thenitisnotmerelyprobable,butcertain,accordingtotherulesofFormalLogic,that,inasense,they**haveareasonforbelieving**thatseveralpeopleexist;eachhasareasonforbelievingthathehimselfexists;and,therefore,allofthem,takentogether,havereasonsforsupposingthatseveralpersonsexist.If,therefore.Iwereaskingthequestion:Whatreasonhaveweforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpersons?inthissense,itwouldfollowthatifeachofushasareasonforbelievinginhisownexistence,thesereasons,takentogether,wouldbeareasonforbelievingintheexistenceofallofus.ButIamnotaskingthequestioninthissense:itisplainthatthisisnotitsnaturalsense.WhatIdomeantoaskis:Doeseachsingleoneofusknowanyproposition,whichisareasonforbelievingthatothersexist?Iamusing"we,"thatistosay,inthesenseof"eachofus."ButagainIdomeaneachofus:Iamnotmerelyaskingwhethersomeonemanknowsapropositionwhichisareasonforbelievingthatothermenexist.Itwouldbepossiblethatsomeoneman,orsomefewmen,shouldknowsuchaproposition,andyettherestknownosuchpro-position.ButIamnotaskingwhetherthisisthecase.Iamaskingwhetheramongpropositionsofthekindwhich(aswecommonlysuppose)alloralmostallmenknow,thereisanywhichisareasonforsupposingthatothermenexist.AndinaskingthisquestionIamnotbeggingthequestionbysupposingthatallmendoexist.Myquestionmight,Ithink,beputquiteaccuratelyasfollows.Therearecertainkindsofbeliefwhich,aswecommonlysuppose,alloralmostallmenshare.Idescribethiskindofbeliefas"our"beliefs,simplyasaneasywayofpointingoutwhichkindofbeliefImean,butwithoutassumingthatallmendoshare\n:OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION43them.AndIthenask:Supposingasinglemantohavebeliefsofthiskind,whichamongthemwouldbeagoodreasonforsupposingthatothermenexistedhavinglikebeliefs?This,then,isthefirstrestrictionwhichIputuponthemeaningofmyquestion.Anditis,Ithink,arestrictionwhich,intheirnaturalmeaning,thewordssuggest.Whenweask:Whatreasonhaveweforbelievingthatotherpeopleexist?wenaturallyunderstandthatquestiontobeequivalentto:Whatreasonhaseachofusforthatbelief?Andthisquestionagainisnaturallyequivalenttothequestion:Whichamongthepropositionsthatasinglemanbelieves,butwhichareofthekindwhich(rightlyorwrongly)weassumeallmentobelieve,aresuchthattheywouldnotbetrueunlesssomeotherpersonthanthatmanexisted?Butthereisanotherrestrictionwhich,Ithink,thewordsofmyquestionalsonaturallysuggest.Ifweweretoaskanyonethequestion:HowdoyouknowthatyoudidseethatstatementintheTimes}andheweretoanswer'*BecauseIdidseeitintheTimesandintheStandardioo^'weshouldnotthinkthathehadgivenusareasonforthebeliefthathesawitintheTimes,Weshouldnotthinkhisanswerareasoftybecauseitassertstheverythingforwhichwerequireareason.AndsimilarlywhenIaskHowdoweknowthatanythingorpersonexists,otherthanourselvesandwhatwedirectlyperceive?Whatreasonhaveweforbelievingthis?Imustnaturallybeunderstoodtomean:Whatproposition,otherthanonewhichitselfassertsorpresupposestheexistenceofsomethingbeyondourselvesandourownperceptions,isareasonforsupposingthatsuchathingexists?Andthisrestrictionobviouslyexcludesanimmensenumberofpropositionsofakindwhichallofusdobelieve.Weallofusbelieveanimmensenumberofdifferentpropositions\n44OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONabouttheexistenceofthingswhichwedonotdirectlyperceive,andmanyofthesepropositionsare,inmysense,goodreasonsforbelievingintheexistenceofstillotherthings.ThebeliefintheexistenceofastatementintheTimes,whenwehavenotseenthatstatement,may,asIimplied,beagoodreasonforbelievingthatsomeoneisdead.Butnosuchpropositioncanbeagoodanswertomyquestion,becauseitassertstheverykindofthingforwhichIrequireareason:itassertstheexistenceofsomethingotherthanmyselfandwhatIdirectlyperceive.WhenIamasking:WhatreasonhaveIforbelievingintheexistenceofanythingbutmyself,myownperceptions,andwhatIdodirectlyperceive?youwouldnaturallyunder-standmetomean:Whatreason,otherthantheexistenceofsuchathing,haveIforthisbelief.^Eachofus,then,wecommonlyassume,believessometruepropositions,whichdonotthemselvesasserttheexistenceofanythingotherthanhimself,hisownperceptions,orwhathedirectlyperceives.Eachofus,forinstance,believesthathehimselfhasandhashadcertainparticularperceptions:andthesepropositionsarepropositionsofthekindImean—propositionswhichdonotthemselvesasserttheexistenceofanythingotherthanhimself,hisownperceptions,andwhathedirectlyperceives:theyare,Ithink,bynomeanstheonlypropositionsofthiskind,whichmostofusbelieve:buttheyarepropositionsofthiskind.But,asIsay,Iamnotassumingthateachofus—eachofseveraldifferentpeople—doesbelievepropositionsofthiskind.AllthatIassumeisthatatleastonemandoesbelievesomesuchpropositions.AndthenIask:Whichamongthosetruepropositions,whichonemanbelieves,aresuchthattheywouldprobablynotbetrue,unlesssomeothermanexistedandhadcertainparticularperceptions?Whichamongthemare\n—OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION45suchthat\X,follows(inthewidesense,whichIhaveexplained)fromtheirtruth,thatitismorelikelythannotthatsomeothermanhasperceptions?Thisisthemeaningofmyquestion,sofarasIhavehithertoexplainedit:andIhopethismeaningisquiteclear.ItisinthissensethatIamasking:Whatreasonhaveweforbelievingthatotherpeopleexist?Howdoweknowthattheyexist?This,indeed,isnota//thatImeanbythatquestion:thereisoneotherpoint—themostimportantonewhichremainstobeexplained.Butthis\spaftofwhatImeantoask;andbeforeIgoontoexplainwhatelseImean,Iwishfirsttostopandenquirewhatistheanswertothispartofmyquestion.Whatistheanswertothequestion:Whichamongthetruepropositions,ofakindwhich(aswecommonlyassume)eachofusbelieves,andwhichdonotthemselvesasserttheexistenceofanythingotherthanthatpersonhimself,hisownperceptions,orwhathedirectlyperceives,aresuchthattheywouldprobablynotbetrueunlesssomeotherpersonexisted,whohadperceptionsinsomere-spectssimilartohisown?Nowtothisquestiontheanswerisveryobvious.Itisveryobviousthatinthissensewehavereasonsforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpersons,andalsowhatsomeofthosereasonsare.ButIwishtomakeitquiteplainthatthisisso:thatinthissenseonemanhasareasonforbelievingthatanotherhascertainperceptions.AllthatIamaskingyoutogrant,is,yousee,thatsomeofyouwouldnotbehavingjustthoseperceptionswhichyounowhave,unlessI,asIreadthispaper,wereperceivingmoreorlessblackmarksonamoreorlesswhiteground;orthatIontheotherhand,shouldnotbehavingjustthoseperceptionswhichInowhave,unlesssomeotherpersonsthanmyselfwerehearingthesoundsofmyvoice.AndIamnotaskingyou\n46OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONeventograntthatthisiscertain—onlythatitispositivelyprobable—morelikelythannot.Surelyitisveryobviousthatthispropositionistrue.ButIwishtomakeitquiteclearwhatwouldbetheconsequencesofdenyingthatanysuchpropositionsaretrue—propositionswhichassertthattheexist-enceofcertainperceptionsinonemanareareasonforbelievingintheexistenceofcertainperceptionsinanotherman—whichassertthatonemanwouldprobablynothavehadjustthoseperceptionswhichhedidhave>unlesssomeothermanhadhadcertainparticularperceptions.Itisplain,Ithink,that,unlesssomesuchpropositionsaretrue,wehavenomorereasonforsupposingthatAlexandertheGreateversawanelephant,thanforsupposingthatSindbadtheSailorsawaRoc;wehavenomorereasonforsupposingthatanybodysawJuliusCaesarmurderedintheSenateHouseatRome,thanforsupposingthatsomebodysawhimcarrieduptoHeaveninafierychariotItisplain,Ithink,thatifwehaveanyreasonatallforsupposingthatinallprobabilityAlexandertheGreatdidseeanelephant,andthatinallprobabilitynosuchpersonasSindbadtheSailoreversawaRoc,partofthatreasonconsistsintheassumptionthatsomeotherpersonwouldprobablynothavehadjustthoseperceptionswhichhedidhave,unlessAlexandertheGreathadseenanelephant,andunlessSindbadtheSailorhadnotseenaRoc.Andmostphiloso-phers,Ithink,arewillingtoadmitthatwehavesomereason,insomesenseorother,forsuchpro-positionsasthese.TheyarewillingtoadmitnotonlythatsomepersonsprobablydidseeJuliusCaesarmurderedintheSenateHouse;butalsothatsomepersons,otherthanthosewhosawit,hadandhavesomereasonforsupposingthatsomeoneelseprobablysawitSomescepticalphiloso-phersmight,indeed,denybothpropositions;and\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION47torefutetheirviews,Iadmit,otherargumentsareneededthananywhichIshallbringforwardinthispaper.Butmostphilosopherswill,Ithink,admitnotonlythatfacts,forwhichthereis,aswesay,goodhistoricalevidence,areprobablytrue;butalsothatwhatwecallgoodhistoricalevidencereallyisinsomesenseagoodreasonforthinkingthemtrue.AccordinglyIamgoingtoassumethatmanypropositionsofthefollowingkindaretrue.Pro-positions,namely,whichassertthatonemanwouldprobablynothavecertainperceptionswhichhedoeshave,unlesssomeothermanhadcertainparticularperceptions.Thatsomeofyou,forinstance,wouldprobablynotbehavingpreciselytheperceptionswhichyouarehaving,unlessIwerehavingtheperceptionofmoreorlessblackmarksonamoreorlesswhiteground.And,inthissense,Isay,wecertainlyhavereasonsforsupposingthatotherpeoplehaveperceptionssimilar,insomerespects,tothosewhichwesometimeshave.ButwhenIsaidIwasgoingtoaskthequestion:Whatreasonhaveweforsupposingthatotherpeopleexist?youwillcertainlynothavethoughtthatImerelymeanttoaskthequestionwhichIhavejustanswered.Mywordswillhavesuggestedtoyousomethingmuchmoreimportantthanmerelythis.When,forinstance,Isaidthattothequestion****Howdoyouknowthat?"theanswerIsawitintheTimes"wouldbeasatisfactoryanswer,youmayhavefelt,asIfelt,thatitwouldnotinallcircumstancesberegardedassuch.Thepersonwhoaskedthequestionmight,insomecases,fairly**Thatreply:isnoanswer:howdoyouknowthat,becauseyousawathingintheTimes,itisthereforetrue?"InotherwordshemightaskforareasonforsupposingthattheoccurrenceofaparticularstatementintheTimeswasareasonforsupposingthatstatementtrue.Andthisisaquestionto\n48OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONwhichweallbelievethattheremaybeananswer.Webelievethat,withsomekindsofstatementswhichtheTimesmakes—somekindsofstatementswithregardtoFiscalPolicyforexample—thefactthattheTimesmakesthemisnoreasonforsupposingthemtobetrue:whereaswithregardtootherkindsofstatements,whichitmakes,suchastatement,forinstance,asthattheKingwasdead,thefactthatitmakesthemisareasonforsupposingthemtrue.Webelievethattherearesomekindsofstatements,whichitisveryunlikelytheTimeswouldmake,unlesstheyweretrue;andotherswhichitisnotatallunlikelythattheTimesmightmake,althoughtheywerenottrue.Andwebelievethatareasonmightbegivenfordistinguishing,inthisway,betweenthetwodifferentkindsofstatement:forthinkingthat,insomecases(onpoints,forinstance,which,asweshouldsay,arenotsimplequestionsoffact)theTimesisfallible,whereasinothercases,itis,thoughnotabsolutelyinfallible,veryunlikelytostatewhatisnottrue.NowitispreciselyinthisfurthersensethatIwishtoconsider:whatreasonhaveweforbelievingthatcertainparticularthings,otherthanourselves,ourownperceptions,andwhatwedirectlyperceive,arereal?IhaveassertedthatIdohavecertainperceptions,whichitisveryunlikelyIshouldhave,unlesssomeotherpersonhadcertainparticularperceptions;that,forinstance,itisveryunlikelyIshouldbehavingpreciselythoseperceptionswhichIamnowhavingunlesssomeoneelsewerehearingthesoundofmyvoice.AndInowwishtoask:WhatreasonhaveIforsupposingthatthisisunlikely?Whatreasonhasanyofusforsupposingthatanysuchpropositionistrue?AndImeanby"havingareason"preciselywhatIformerlymeant.Imean:WhatotherpropositiondoIknow,whichwouldnotbetrue,unlessmyperceptionwereconnectedwith\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION49someoneelse'sperception,inthemannerinwhichIassertedthemtobeconnected?HereagainIamaskingforagoodreason;andamnotaskingapsychologicalquestionwithregardtoorigin.HereagainIamnotaskingforareason,inthestrictsenseofFormalLogic;Iammerelyaskingforapropositionwhichwouldprobablynotbetrue,unlesswhatIassertedweretrue.HereagainIamaskingforsomepropositionofakindwhicheachofusbelieves;Iamasking:Whatreasonhaseachofusforbelievingthatsomeofhisperceptionsareconnectedwithparticularper-ceptionsofotherpeopleinthemannerIasserted?—forbelievingthathewouldnothavecertainperceptionsthathedoeshave,unlesssomeotherpersonhadcertainparticularperceptions?AndhereagainIamaskingforareason—Iamaskingforsomepropositionotherthanonewhichitselfasserts:Whenonemanhasaperceptionofsuchandsuchaparticularkind,itisprobablethatanothermanhasaperceptionorthoughtofthisorthatotherkind.Butwhatkindofreasoncanbegivenforbelievingapropositionofthissort?ForbeHevingapropositionwhichassertsthat,sinceoneparticularthingexists,itisprobablethatanotherparticularthingalsoexists?OnethingIthinkisplain,namelythatwecanhavenogoodreasonforbelievingsuchaproposition,unlesswehavegoodreasonforbelievingsomegeneralisation.Itiscommonlybelieved,forinstance,thatcertainso-calledflintarrow-heads,whichhavebeendiscovered,wereprobablymadebyprehistoricmen;andIthinkitisplainthatwehavenoreasonforbelievingthisunlesswehavereasontosupposethatobjectswhichresembletheseincertainparticularrespectsaregenerallymadebymen—aremoreoftenmadebymenthanbyanyotheragency.Unlesscertain\n50OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONparticularcharacteristicswhichthosearrow-headshavewerecharacteristicswhichbelongedatleastmorefrequentlytoarticlesofhumanmanufacturethantoanyarticlesnotmadebymen,itwouldsurelybejustaslikelyasnotthatthesearrow-headswerenotmadebymen—thattheywere,infactnotarrow-heads.Thatisfosay,unlesswehavereasontoassertageneralisation—thegeneral-isationthatobjectsofacertainkindaregeneraUymadebymen,wehavenoreasontosupposethattheseparticularobjects,whichareofthekindinquestion,weremadebymen.Andthesame,sofarasIcansee,istrueuniversally.Ifweeverhaveanyreasonforassertingthat,sinceoneparticularthingexists,anotherprobablyexistsorexistedorwillexistalsopartofourreason,atleast,mustconsistinreasonsforassertingsomegeneralisation—forassertingthattheexistenceofthingsofaparticularkindis,moreoftenthannot,accompaniedorprecededorfollowedbytheexistenceofthingsofanotherparticularkind.Itis,Ithink,some-timesassumedthatanalternativetothistheorymaybefoundinthetheorythattheexistenceofonekindofthing**intrinsicallypointsto,"oris''intrinsicallyasignorsymbolof"theexistenceofanotherthing.Itissuggestedthatwhenathingwhichthuspointstotheexistenceofanotherthingexists,thenitisatleastprobablethatthething''pointedto"existsalso.Butthistheory,Ithink,offersnorealalternative.For,inthefirstplace,whenwesaythattheexistenceofonethingAisa"signofor*•pointsto"theexistenceofanotherthingB,weverycommonlyactuallymeantosaythatwhenathinglikeAexists,athinglike^generallyexiststoo.Wemay,nodoubt,meansomethingelsetoo\butthiswedomean.Wesay,forinstance,thatcertainparticularwords,whichwehearorread,area"sign"thatsomebodyhasthoughtofthe\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION51particularthingswhichwecallthemeaningofthosewords.Butweshouldcertainlyhesitatetoadmitthatthehearingorreadingofcertainwordscouldbecalleda'*sign"oftheexistenceofcertainthoughts,unlessitweretruethatwhenthosewordsareheardorread,thethoughtsinquestiongenerallyhaveexisted.Ifwhenthosewordswereheardorread,thethoughtshadgenerallynotexisted,weshouldsaythat,inonesenseofthewordatallevents,thehearingofthewordswasnotasignoftheexistenceofthethoughts.Inthissense,therefore,tosaythattheexistenceofA"pointsto"or**isasignof"theexistenceofBisactuallytosaythatwhenAexists.Bgenerallyexistsalso.But,nodoubt,thewords*'pointsto""isasignof"maybeusedinsomeothersense:theymay,forinstance,meanonlythattheexistenceofAsuggestsinsomewaythebeliefthatBexists.AndinsuchacasewecertainlymightknowthattheexistenceofApointedtotheexistenceofB,with-outknowingthatwhenAexistedBgenerallyexistedalso.Letussuppose,then,thatinsomesuchsenseAdoes**pointto"theexistenceofB;canthisfactgiveusareasonforsupposingitevenprobablethatBexisted.Certainlyitcan,provideditistruethatwhenAdoespointtotheexistenceofB,Bgenerallyexists.Butsurelyitcandoso,onlyonthiscondition.IfwhenKpointstotheexistenceofB,B,nevertheless,doesnotgenerallyexist,thensurelythefactthatApointstotheexistenceofBcanconstitutenoprobabilitythatBdoesnotexist:onthecontraryitwillthenbeprobablethat,eventhoughA"pointsto"theexistenceofB,Bdoesnotexist.Wehave,infact,onlysubstitutedthegeneralisationthatA!spointingtoBisgenerallyaccompaniedbytheexistenceofB,forthegeneralisationthatA'sexistenceisgenerallyaccompaniedbytheexistenceofB.If\n52OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONwearetohaveanyreasonforassertingthat,whenApointstoorisasignoftheexistenceofB,Bprobablyexists,wemuststillhaveareasonforsomegeneralisation—forageneralisationwhichassertsthatwhenonethingpointstotheexistenceofanother,thatoiki^xgenerallyexists.Itisplain,then,Ithink,thatifwearetofindareasonfortheassertionthatsomeparticularpercep-tionofminewouldprobablynotexist,unlesssome-oneelsewerehavingorhadhadaperceptionofakindwhichIcanname,wemustfindareasonforsomegeneralisation.Anditisalsoplain,Ithink,thatinmanycasesofthiskindthegeneralisationmustconsistinanassertionthatwhenonemanhasacertainkindofperception,someothermangenerallyhashadsomeotherperceptionorbelief.Weassume,forinstance,thatwhenwehearorreadcertainwords,somebodybesidesourselveshasthoughtthethoughts,whichconstitutethemeaningofthosewords;anditisplain,Ithink,thatwehavenoreasonforthisassumptionexceptonewhichisalsoareasonfortheassumptionthatwhencertainwordsareheardorread,somebodygenerallyhashadcertainthoughts.Andmyenquiry,therefore,atleastincludestheenquiry:Whatreasonshaveweforsuchgeneralisationsasthese?forgeneralisationswhichassertaconnectionbetweentheexistenceofacertainkindofperceptioninoneman,andthatofacertainkindofperceptionorbeliefinanotherman?Andtothisquestion,Ithink,butoneanswercanbegiven.Ifwehaveanyreasonforsuchgeneralisationsatall,somereasonmustbegiven,inonewayoranother,byobservation—byobserva-tion,understoodinthewidesenseinwhichitincludes**experiment."Nophilosopher,Ithink,haseverfailedtoassumethatobservationdoesgiveareasonforsomegeneralisations—forsome\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION53propositionswhichassertthatwhenonekindofthingexists,anothergenerallyexistsorhasexistedinacertainrelationtoit.Eventhosewho,likeHume,implythatobservationcannotgiveareasonforanything,yetconstantlyappealtoobservationinsupportofgeneralisationsoftheirown.Andeventhosewhoholdthatobservationcangivenoreasonforanygeneralisationabouttherelationofoneman'sperceptionstoanother's,yetholdthatitcangiveareasonforgeneralisationsabouttherelationofsometoothersamongaman'sownperceptions.Itis,indeed,bynomeansagreedhowobservationcangiveareasonforanygenerali-sation.Nobodyknowswhatreasonwehave,ifwehaveany,forsupposingthatitcan.Butikatitcan,everyone,Ithink,assumes.Ithink,there-fore,mostphilosopherswillagree,thatifwecanfindanyreasonatallforgeneralisationsofthekindinwhichIaminterested,areasonforsomeofthematalleventsmustbefoundinobservation.AndwhatIproposetoaskis:WhatreasoncanbefoundinobservationforevenasinglepropositionofthekindIhavedescribed?forapropositionwhichassertsthatwhenonemanhasonekindofperception,anothermangenerallyhasorhashadanother.But,whenitissaidthatobservationgivesusareasonforgeneralisations,twothingsmaybemeantneitherofwhichImean.Inthefirstplace,we**observationpopularlyuse"inasenseinwhichwecanbesaidtoobservetheperceptions,feelingsandthoughtsofotherpeople:inwhich,therefore,wecanbesaidtoobservetheverythingswithregardtowhichIamaskingwhatreasonwehaveforbelievingintheirexistence.Butitisuniversally*agreedthatthereisasenseinwhichnomancanobservetheperceptions,feelingsorthoughtsofanyotherman.AnditistothisstrictsensethatI^Notnowin1921.\n54OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONproposetoconfinetheword.Ishalluseitinasense,inwhichwecancertainlybesaidtoobservenothingbutourselves,ourownperceptions,thoughtsandfeelings,andwhatwedirectlyperceive.Andinthesecondplace,itmaybesaidthatobservationsmadebyanotherpersonmaygivemeareasonforbelievingsomegeneralisation.Anditiscertainlythecasethatformanyofthegeneralisationsinwhichweallbelieve,ifwehaveareasoninobserva-tionatall,itisnotinourownobservationthatwehaveit:partofourreason,atallevents,liesinthingswhichotherpeoplehaveobservedbutwhichweourselveshavenotobserved.Butinaskingthisparticularquestion,Iamnotaskingforreasonsofthissort.TheveryquestionthatIamaskingis:Whatreasonhasanyoneofusforsupposingthatanyotherpersonwhateverhasevermadeanyobservations?Andjustas,inthefirstmeaningwhichIgavetothisquestion,itmeant:Whatthing,thatanysinglemanobservesissuchthatitwouldprobablynothaveexisted,unlesssomeothermanhadmadeaparticularobservation?SonowIamasking:Whichamongthethings,whichonesinglemanobserves,aresuchthattheywouldprobablynothaveexisted,unlessitweretruethatsomeofthemgenerallystoodincertainrelationstoobservationsofsomeotherperson?Iamasking:Whichamongmyownobservationsgivemeareasonforsupposingthatsomeofthemareofakindwhicharegenerallyprecededoraccom-paniedbyobservationsofotherpeople?Which,forinstance,amongmyownobservationsgiveagoodreasonforthegeneralisationthatwhenIhearcertainwords,somebodyelsehasgenerallyhadcertainparticularthoughts,orthatwheneveranyonehearscertainwords,somebodyelsehasgenerallyhadthethoughtswhichconstitutewhatwecallthemeaningofthosewords?Iamasking:Which\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION55amongthevastseriesofobservations,whichany-oneindividualmakesduringhislifetime,giveagoodreasonforanygeneralisationwhateverofthiskind—ageneralisationwhichassertsthatsomeofthemaregenerallyprecededbycertainthoughts,perceptionsorfeelingsinotherpersons?Iquiteadmitthattherearesomegeneralisationsofthiskindforwhichtheobservationsofsomeparticularmenwillnotgiveareason.AllthatIaskis:Isthereevenonegeneralisationofthiskind,forwhichthekindofobservations,which(aswecommonlyassume)eachman,ornearlyeverymandoesmake,dogiveareason?Amongobservationsofthekindwhich(aswecommonlyassume)arecommontoyouandtome,doyours,bythemselves,giveanyreasonforevenonesuchgeneralisation?Anddomine,bythemselves,giveanyreasonforevenonesuchgeneralisation?Andiftheydo,which,amongtheseobservations,isitwhichdoso?Myquestionis,then:Whatreasondomyownobservationsgiveme,forsupposingthatanyper-ceptionwhatever,whichIhave,wouldprobablynotoccur,unlesssomeotherpersonhadacertainkindofperception?Whatreasondomyownobserv-ationsgivemeforsupposing,forinstance,thatIshouldnotbeperceivingwhatIdonowperceive,unlesssomeonewerehearingthesoundofmyvoice?Whatreasondoyourownobservationsgiveyouforsupposingthatyouwouldnotbeperceivingjustwhatyouareperceiving,unlessIwereperceivingmoreorlessblackmarksonamoreorlesswhiteground?Thequestiondoes,Ithink,appeartobeareasonableone;andmostphiloso-phers,Ithink,haveassumedthatthereisananswertoit.Yetitmaybesaidthatthereisnoanswertoit:thatmyownobservationsgivemenoreasonwhateverforanysinglepropositionofthiskind.Therearecertainphilosophers(evenapartfrom\n56OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONthoroughsceptics,withwhom,asIhavesaid,Iamnotnowarguing)whohavedeniedthattheydo.Therearecertainphilosopherswhoholdthatnothingwhichanysingleoneofusobservesorcanobserve,givestheslightestreasonforsupposingthatanyofhisownperceptionsaregenerallyconnectedwithcertainperceptionsinotherpegple.Therearephilosopherswhoholdthattheonlygeneralisationsforwhichourownobservationsdogiveanywarrantaregeneralisationsconcerningthemannerinwhichourownperceptions,thoughtsandfeelingsdoandprobablywillsucceedoneanother;andwhocon-cludethat,thisbeingso,wehavenoreasonwhat-everforbelievingintheexistenceofanyotherpeople.Andthesephilosophersare,Ithink,rightindrawingthisconclusionfromthispremiss.Itdoesnot,indeed,followfromtheirpremissthatwehavenotareasoninthesensewhichIjfirstex-plained,andinwhich,Iinsisted,itmustbeadmittedthatwehaveareason.Itdoesnotfollowthatsomeofourperceptionsarenotsuchaswouldprobablynotexist,unlesssomeotherpersonhadcertainperceptions.But,asIhaveurged,whenwesaythatwehaveareasonforassertingtheexistenceofsomethingnotperceived,wecommonlymeansomethingmorethanthis.Wemeannotonlythat,sincewhatweperceivedoesexist,theunperceivedthingprobablyexiststoo;wemeanalsothatwehavesomereasonforassertingthisconnectionbetweentheperceivedandtheunper-ceived.Andholding,aswedo,thatnoreasoncanbegivenforassertingsuchaconnection,exceptobservation,weshouldsaythat,ifobservationgivesnoreasonforassertingit,wehavenoreasonforassertingit;andhavingnoreasonforassertingthisconectionbetweentheperceivedandtheunper-ceived,weshouldsaythatwehavenoneeitherforassertingtheevenprobableexistenceoftheun-\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION57perceived.This,Ithink,iswhatwecommonlymeanbysayingthatwehavenoreasontobelieveintheexistenceofaparticularthingwhichwedonotperceive.Andhence,Ithink,thosephiloso-pherswhoholdthatourownobservationsgiveusnoreasonwhateverforanygeneralisationwhateverconcerningtheconnectionofanyofthemwiththoseofotherpeople,arequiterightinconcludingthatwehavenoreasontoassertthatanyotherpersoneverdidhaveanyparticularthoughtorperceptionwhatever.Ithinkthatthewordsofthisconclusion,understoodinthrirnaturalmeaning,expresspre-ciselywhatthepremissasserts.Weneednot,indeed,conclude,asmanyofthesephilosophersareinclinedtodo,that,becausewehavenoreasonforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpeople,itisthereforehighlydoubtfulwhethertheydoexist.Thephilosopherswhoadvocatethisopinioncommonlyrefutethemselvesbyassigningtheex-istenceofotherpeopleaspartoftheirreasonforbelievingthatitisverydoubtfulwhetheranyotherpeopleexist.Thatforwhichwehavenoreasonmay,nevertheless,becertainlytrue.And,indeed,oneofthephilosopherswhoholdmostclearlyandexpresslythatwedoknownotonlytheexistenceofotherpeoplebutalsothatofmaterialobjects,isalsooneofthosewhodenymostemphaticallythatourownobservationscangiveanyreasonforbelievingeitherintheoneorintheother.IrefertoThomasReid.Reid,indeed,allowshimselftousenotonlytheword**observe,"buteventheword**perceive,"inthatwidesenseinwhichitmightbesaidthatweobserveorperceivethethoughtsandfeelingsofothers:andIthinkthatthefactthatheusesthewordsinthissense,hasmisledhimintothinkingthathisviewismoreplausibleandmoreinac-cordancewithCommonSensethanitreallyis:byusingthewordsinthissenseheisabletoplead\n58OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION**observationthat"reallydoesgiveareasonforsomeofthosegeneralisations,forwhichCommonSenseholdsthat*'observation"(inanarrowersense)doesgiveareason.Butwithregardtowhatweobserveorperceive,inthestrictsensetowhichIamconfiningthosewords,heassertsquiteex-plicitlythatitgivesusnoreasoneitherforbelievingintheexistenceofmaterialobjectsorforbelievingintheexistenceofotherminds.Berkeley,hesays,hasprovedincontrovertiblythatitgivesusnoreasonfortheone,andHumethatitgivesusnoreasonfortheother.Nowthesephilosophersmayberightinholdingthis.Itmay,perhaps,betruethat,inthissense,myownobservationsgivemenoreasonwhateverforbelievingthatanyotherpersoneverhasorwillperceiveanythinglikeorunlikewhatIperceive.ButIthinkitisdesirableweshouldrealisehowparadoxicalaretheconsequenceswhichmustbeadmitted,ifthisistrue.Itmustthenbeadmittedthattheverylargepartofourknowledge,whichwesupposetohavesomebasisinexperience,isbynomeansbaseduponexperience,inthesense,andtotheextent,whichwesuppose.Wedoforinstance,commonlysupposethatthereissomebasisinexperiencefortheassertionthatsomepeople,whomwecallGermans,useonesetofwordstoexpressmuchthesamemeaningwhichweexpressbyusingadifferentsetofwords.But,ifthisviewbecorrect,wemustadmitthatnoperson'sexperiencegiveshimanyreasonwhateverforsupposingthat,whenhehearscertainwords,anyoneelsehaseverheardorthoughtofthesamewords,ormeantanythingbythem.Theviewadmits,indeed,thatIdoknowthatwhenIhearcertainwords,somebodyelsehasgenerallyhadthoughtsmoreorlesssimilartothosewhichIsupposehimtohavehad:butitdeniesthatmyownobservationscould\n—OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION59evergivemetheleastreasonforsupposingthatthisisso.Itadmitsthatmyownobservationsmaygivemereasonforsupposingthatz/anyonehaseverhadperceptionslikemineinsomerespects,hewillalsohavehadotherperceptionslikeothersofmine:butitdeniesthattheygivemeanyreasonforsupposingthatanyoneelsehashadaperceptionlikeoneofmine.Itadmitsthatmyownobservationsmaygivemereasonforsupposingthatcertainperceptionsandthoughtsinoneperson{iftheyexist)willbefollowedorprecededbycertainotherperceptionsandthoughtsinthatperson:butitdeniesthattheygivemeanyreasonwhateverforanysimilargeneralisationconcerningtheconnec-tionofacertainkindofperceptioninonepersonwithacertainkindofperceptioninanother.ItadmitsthatIshouldnothavecertainperceptions,whichIdohave,unlesssomeoneelsehadhadcertainotherperceptions;butitdeniesthatmyownobservationscangivemeanyreasonforsayingsoforsayingthatIshouldnothavehadthisperception,unlesssomeoneelsehadhadthat.Noobservationsofmine,itholds,caneverrenderitprobablethatsuchageneralisationistrue;noobservationofminecaneverconfirmorverifysuchageneralisation.Ifwearetosaythatanysuchgeneralisationwhateverisbaseduponobservation,wecanonlymean,whatReidmeans,thatitisbasedonaseriesofassumptions.WhenIobservethisparticularthing,Iassumethatthatparticularthing,whichIdonotobserve,exists;whenIobserveanotherparticularthing,Iagainassumethatasecondparticularthing,whichIdonotobserve,exists;whenIobserveathirdparticularthing,Iagainassumethatathirdparticularthing,whichIdonotobserve,exists.Theseassumedfacts—theassumedfactthatoneobservationofmineisaccompaniedbytheexistenceofoneparticularkind\n6oOBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONofthing,andthatanotherobservationofmineisaccompaniedbytheexistenceofadifferentparticu-larkindofthing,willthengivemeareasonfordifferentgeneralisationsconcerningtheconnectionofdifferentperceptionsofminewithdifferentexternalobjects—objectswhichIdonotperceive.But(itismaintained)nothingbutamassofsuchassumptionswillgivemeareasonforanysuchgeneralisation.NowIthinkitmustbeadmittedthatthereissomethingparadoxicalinsuchaview.Ithinkitmaybeadmittedthat,inholdingit,thephilosopherofCommonSensedepartsfromCommonSenseatleastasfarinonedirectionashisopponentshaddoneinanother.ButIthinkthatthereissomeexcuseforthosewhoholdit:Ithinkthat,inonerespect,theyaremoreintherightthanthosewhodonotholdit—thanthosewhoholdthatmyownobservationsdogivemeareasonforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpeople.Forthosewhoholdthatmyobservationsdogivemeareason,have,Ibelieve,universallysupposedthatthereasonliesinapartofmyobservations,inwhichnosuchreasonistobefound.ThisiswhyIhavechosentoaskthequestion:Whatreasondomyobservationsgivemeforbelievingthatanyotherpersonhasanyparticularperceptionsorbeliefs}IwishtoconsiderwhichamongthethingswhichIobservewillgivesuchareason.Forthisisaquestiontowhichnoanswer,thatIhaveeverseen,appearstometobecorrect.Thosewhohaveaskedithave,sofarasIknow,answerediteitherbydenyingthatmyobservationsgivemeanyreasonorbypointingtoapartofmyobservations,which,asitseemstome,reallydogivenone.Thosewhodenyare,itseemstome,rightinholdingthatthereasongivenbythosewhoaffirmisnoreason.Andtheircorrectopiniononthispointwill,1think,partlyserveto\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION6iexplaintheirdenial.Theyhavesupposedthatifourobservationsgiveusanyreasonatallforassertingtheexistenceofotherpeople,thatreasonmustliewhereithasbeensupposedtoliebythosewhoholdthattheydogiveareason.Andthen,findingthatthisassignedreasonisnoreason,theyhaveassumedthatthereisnoother.Iamproposingthentoask:Whichamongtheobservations,whichImake,andwhich(aswecommonlysuppose)aresimilarinkindtothosewhichalloralmostallmenmake,willgiveareasonforsupposingthattheexistenceofanyofthemisgenerallyconnectedwiththeexistenceofcertainkindsofperceptionorbeliefinotherpeople?Andinordertoanswerthisquestion,itisobviouswemustfirstconsidertwoothers.Wemustconsider,inthefirstplace:Ofwhatnaturemustobservationsbe,iftheyaretogiveareasonforanygeneralisationassertingthattheexistenceofonekindofthingisgenerallyconnectedwiththatofanother?Andwemustconsiderinthesecondplace:Whatkindsofthingsdoweobserve?NowtothefirstofthesequestionsIamnotgoingtoattempttogiveacompleteanswer.ThequestionconcerningtherulesofInductiveLogic,whichisthequestionatissue,isanimmenselydifficultandintricatequestion.AndIamnotgoingtoattempttosay,whatkindofobservationsaresufficienttojustifyageneralisation.Butitiscomparativelyeasytopointoutthatacertainkindofobservationsarenecessarytojustifyageneralisa-tion:andthisisallthatIproposetodo.Iwishtopointoutcertainconditionswhichobservationsmustsatisfy,iftheyaretojustifyageneralisation;withoutinanywayimplyingthatallobservationswhichdosatisfytheseconditions,willjustifyageneralisation.Theconditions,Ishallmention,areoneswhicharecertainlynotsufficienttojustify\n62OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONageneralisation;buttheyare,Ithink,conditions,withoutwhichnogeneralisationcanbejustified.Ifaparticularkindofobservationsdonotsatisfytheseconditions,wecansaywithcertaintythatthoseobservationsgiveusnoreasonforbelievingintheexistenceofotherpeople;though,withregardtoobservationswhichdosatisfythem,weshallonlybeabletosaythattheymaygiveareason.Whatconditions,then,mustobservationssatisfy,iftheyaretojustifyageneralisation}Letussupposethatthegeneralisationtobejustifiedisonewhichassertsthattheexistenceofakindofobject,whichwewillcallA,isgenerallypreceded,accom-panied,orfollowedbytheexistenceofakindofobject,whichwecallB.A.forinstance,mightbethehearingofacertainwordbyoneperson,andBthethoughtofthatwhichwecallthemeaningoftheword,inanotherperson;andthegeneralisationtobejustifiedmightbethatwhenonepersonhearsaword,notspokenbyhimself,someoneelsehasgenerallythoughtofthemeaningofthatword.WhatmustIhaveobserved,ifthegeneralisationthattheexistenceofAisgenerallyprecededbytheexistenceofB,'istobejustifiedbymyobservations?Onefirstpoint,Ithink,isplain.Imusthaveobservedbothsomeobject,whichisinsomerespectslikeA»andwhichIwillcalla,andalsosomeobjectinsomerespectslikeBwhichIwillcall^:ImusthaveobservedbothaandAandalsoImusthaveobserved^precedinga.This,atleast,Imusthaveobserved.ButIdonotpretendtosayhowlikeaand^mustbetoAandB;nordoIpretendtosayhowoftenImusthaveobserved^precedinga,althoughitisgenerallyheldthatImusthaveobservedthismorethanonce.Thesearequestions,whichwouldhavetobediscussedifweweretryingtodiscoverwhatobservationsweresufficienttojustifythegeneralisationthattheexistenceofAis\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION63generallyprecededbythatofB.ButIamonlytryingtolaydowntheminimumwhichisnecessarytojustifythisgeneralisation;andthereforeIamcontenttosaythatwemusthaveobservedsome-thingmoreorlesslikeBprecedingsomethingmoreorlesslikeA,atleastonce.Butthereisyetanotherminimumcondition.Ifmyobservationof/3precedingaistojustifythegeneralisationthattheexistenceofAisgenerallyprecededbytheexistenceofB,itisplain,Ithink,thatboththe^andthea,whichIobserved,musthaveexistedorbeenreal]andthatalsotheexistenceofj8mustreallyhaveprecededthatofa.Itisplainthatif,whenIobservedaand3,aexistedbutjQdidnot,thisobservationcouldgivemenoreasontosupposethatonanotheroccasionwhenAexisted,Bwouldexist.Oragain,if,whenIobserved^precedinga,both/8andaexisted,buttheexistenceof/3didnotreallyprecedethatofa,but,onthecontrary,followedit,thisobservationcouldcertainlygivemenoreasontosupposethat,ingeneral,theexistenceofA-^^sprecededbytheexistenceofB.Indeedthisconditionthatwhatisobservedmusthavebeenrealmightbesaidtobeincludedintheverymeaningoftheword**observa-tion."Weshould,inthisconnection,saythatwehadnotobserved|Sprecedinga,unless^andawerebothreal,and/3hadreallyprecededa.IfI**sayIhaveobservedthat,ononeoccasion,my'moonhearingoftheword'wasfollowedbymyimaginingaluminoussilverydisc,"IcommonlymeantoincludeinmystatementtheassertionthatIdid,onthatoccasion,reallyheartheword"moon,"andreallydidhaveavisualimageofaluminousdisc,andthatmyperceptionwasreallyfollowedbymyimagination.Ifitwereprovedtomethatthishadnotreallyhappened,IshouldadmitthatIhadnotreallyobservedit.Butthoughthiscondition\n64OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONthat,ifobservationistogivereasonforagenerali-sation,whatisobservedmustbereal,maythusbesaidtobeimplied'*observation,"intheveryworditwasnecessaryformetomentiontheconditionexplicitly.Itwasnecessary,because,asIshallpresentlyshow,wedoandmustalsousetheword"observation"inasenseinwhichtheassertion**IobserveA"bynomeansincludestheassertion**Aexists"—inasenseinwhichitmaybetruethatthoughIdidobserveA,yetAdidnotexist.Butthereisalso,Ithink,athirdnecessarycon-ditionwhichisveryapttobeoverlooked.Itmay,perhaps,beallowedthatobservationgivessomereasonforthepropositionthathens*eggsaregener-allylaidbyhens.Idonotmeantosaythatanyoneman'sobservationcangiveareasonforthisproposition:Idonotassumeeitherthatitcanorthatitcannot.NordoImeantomakeanyas-sumptionastowhatmustbemeantbythewords**hens"and'*eggs,"ifthispropositionistobetrue.Iamquitewillingtoallowforthemomentthatifit**istrueatall,wemustunderstandbyhens"and**eggs,"objectsveryunlikethatwhichwedirectlyobserve,whenweseeaheninayard,oraneggonthebreakfast-table.Iamwillingtoallowthepossibilitythat,assomeIdealistswouldsay,theproposition*'Henslayeggs"isfalse,unlesswemeanbyit:Acertainkindofcollectionofspiritsormonadssometimeshasacertainintelligiblere-lationtoanotherkindofcollectionofspiritsormonads.Iamwillingtoallowthepossibilitythat,asReidandsomescientistswouldsay,thepro-position"Henslayeggs"isfalse,ifwemeanbyitanythingmorethanthat:Certainconfigurationsofinvisiblematerialparticlessometimeshaveacertainspatio-temporalrelationtoanotherkindofcon-figurationofinvisiblematerialparticles.OragainIamwillingtoallow,withcertainotherphiloso-\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION6$phers,thatwemust,ifitistobetrue,interpretthispropositionasmeaningthatcertainkindsofsens-ationshavetocertainotherkindsarelationwhichmaybeexpressedbysayingthattheonekindofsensations**lay"theotherkind.Oragain,asotherphilosopherssay,theproposition**Henslayeggs"maypossiblymean:Certainsensationsofminewouldyundercertainconditions,havetocertainothersensationsofminearelationwhichmaybeexpressedbysayingthattheonesetwould"lay"theotherset.Butwhatevertheproposition"Hens'eggsaregenerallylaidbyhens"maymean,mostphilosopherswould,Ithink,allowthat,insomesenseorother,thispropositionwastrue.AndtheywouldalsoIthinkallowthatwehavesomereasonforit;andxhdXpartofthisreasonatalleventsliesinobservation:theywouldallowthatweshouldhavenoreasonforitunlesscertainthingshadbeenobserved,whichhavebeenobserved.Few,Ithink,wouldsaythattheexistenceofanegg'*intrinsicallypoints"tothatofahen,insuchasensethat,evenifwehadhadnoexperienceofanykindconcerningthemannerinwhichobjectslikeeggsareconnectedwithanimalslikehens,themereinspectionofaneggwouldjustifytheassertion:Ahenhasprobablyexisted.Iassume,then,thatobjectshavingallthecharac-teristicswhichhens'eggshave(whateverthesemaybe)aregenerallylaidbyhens(whateverhensmaybe);andIassumethat,ifwehaveanyreasonforthisgeneralisationatall,observationgivesussomereasonforit.Butnow,letussupposethattheonlyobservationswehadmadewerethosewhichweshouldcommonlydescribebysayingthatwehadseenahenlayinganegg.Idonotsaythatanynumberofsuchobservations,bythemselves,wouldbesufficienttojustifyourgeneralisation:Ithinkitisplainthattheywouldnot.Butletussuppose,\n66OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONforthemoment,thatwehadobservednothingelsewhichboreupontheconnectionbetweenhensandeggs;andthat,ifthereforeourgeneralisationwasjustifiedbyanyobservationsatall,itwasjustifiedbythese.Wearesupposing,then,thattheob-servationswhichwedescribeas"seeinghenslayeggs"givesomereasonforthegeneralisationthateggsofthatkindaregenerallylaidbyhens.Andiftheseobservationsgivereasonforthis,obviouslyinasensetheygivereasonforthegeneralisationthattheexistenceofsuchan^^gisgenerallypre-cededbythatofahen;andhencealso,theygiveusreasontosupposethatifsuchan^^^exists,ahenhasprobablyexistedalso—thatunlessahenhadexisted,theeggwouldnothaveexisted.ButthepointtowhichIwishtocallattentionisthatitisonlyinalimitedsensethattheydogivereasonforthis.Theyonlygiveusreasontosupposethat,foreach^%%,therehasexistedahen,whichwasatsometimeneartheplacewherethe%%^inquestionthenwas,andwhichexistedatatimeneartothatatwhichtheeggbegantoexist.Theonlykindofhens,whoseexistencetheydogiveusreasontosuppose,arehens,ofwhicheachwasatsometimeinspatialandtemporalproximity(or,ifIdealistsprefer,intherelationswhicharethe**intelligiblecounterparts"ofthese)toan^%%,Theygiveusnoinformationatallabouttheexistenceofhens(ifthereareany)whichnevercamewithinathousandmilesofanegg,orwhichweredeadathousandyearsbeforeanyeggexisted.Thatistosay,theydogiveusreasontosupposethat,ifaparticulareggexists,therehasprobablyexistedahenwhichwasatsometimenearthategg;buttheygiveusnoreasontosupposethat,ifaparticular^^gexists,theremusthaveexistedahenwhichnevercamenearthategg.Theydogiveusreasontosupposethat,foreach^gg,therehasprobablyexistedahen\n:OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION67whichatsometimestoodtotheegginquestioninthatrelationwhichwehaveobservedtoholdbe-tweenaneggandahen,whenweobservedthehenlayinganegg.Buttheygiveusnoreasontoinferfromtheexistenceofanegganyotherkindofhenanyhenwhichneverstoodtotheeggintherelationinwhichwehaveobservedthatsomehensdostandtoeggs.WhatIwishtosuggestisthatthisconditionisauniversalconditionforsoundinductions.IftheobservationoffiprecedingacanevergiveusanyreasonatallforsupposingthattheexistenceofAisgenerallyprecededbythatofB,itcanatmostonlygiveusreasontosupposethattheexistenceofanAisgenerallyprecededbythatofaBwhichstandstoourAinthesamerelationinwhich^hasbeenobservedtostandtoa.ItcannotgivetheleastreasonforsupposingthattheexistenceofanAmusthavebeenprecededbythatofaB,whichdidnotstandtoAintheobservedrelation,butinsomequitedifferentone.IfwearetohaveanyreasontoinferfromtheexistenceofanAtheexistenceofsuchaB,thereasonmustlieinsomedifferentobservations.Thatthisisso,inthecaseofhens*eggsandhens,is^Ithink,obvious:and,iftheruleisnotuniversal,somereasonshouldatleastbegivenforsupposingthatitdoesapplyinonecaseandnotinanother.Havingthusattemptedtopointoutsomeconditionswhichseemtobenecessary,thoughnotsufficient^whereobservationistogiveanyreasonforageneralisation,Imaynowproceedtomysecondpreliminaryquestion•Whatkindsofthingsdoweobserve?InordertoillustratehowmuchandhowlittleImeanby**observation"or**directperception,"Iwilltakeasaninstanceaverycommonvisualperception.Mostofusarefamiliarwiththe\n68OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONexperiencewhichweshoulddescribebysayingthatwehadseenaredbookandabluebooksidebysideuponashelf.Whatexactlycanwebesaidtoobserveordirectlyperceivewhenwehavesuchanexperience?Wecertainlyobserveonecolour,whichwecallblue,andadifferentcolour,whichwecallred;eachoftheseweobserveashavingaparticularsizeandshape;andweobservealsothesetwocolouredpatchesashavingtooneanotherthespatialrelationwhichweexpressbysayingtheyaresidebyside.Allthiswecertainlyseeordirectlyperceivenoiv,whatevermayhavebeentheprocessbywhichwehavecometoperceivesomuch.Butwhenwesay,asinordinarytalkweshould,thattheobjectsweperceivearebooks,wecertainlymeantoascribetothemproperties,which,inasensewhichweallunderstand,arenotactuallyseenbyus,atthemomentwhenwearemerelylookingattwobooksonashelftwoyardsoff.AndallsuchpropertiesImeantoexcludeasnotbeingthenobservedordirectlyperceivedbyus.WhenIspeakofwhatweobserve,whenweseetwobooksonashelf,Imeantolimittheexpressiontothatwhichisactuallyseen.And,thusunderstood,theexpressiondoesincludecolours,andthesizeandshapeofcolours,andspatialrelationsinthreedimensionsbetweenthesepatchesofcolour,butitincludesnothingelse.ButIamalsousingobservationinasenseinwhichwecanbesaidactuallytoobserveamove-ment.Wecommonlysaythatwecansometimesseearedbilliardballmovingtowardsawhiteoneonagreentable.And,hereagain,Idonotmeantoincludeinwhatisdirectlyperceivedorobserved,allthatwemeanbysayingthatthetwoobjectsperceivedarebilliard-balls.ButIdomeantoincludewhat(weshouldsay)weactuallysee.Weactuallyseeamoreorlessroundredpatchmoving\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION69towardsamoreorlessroundwhitepatch;weseethestretchofgreenbetweenthemdiminishinginsize.Andthisperceptionisnotmerelythesameasaseriesofperceptions—firstaperceptionofaredpatchwithagreenstretchofonesizebetweenitandthewhite;thenaperceptionofaredpatchwithagreenstretchofadifferentsizebetweenitandthewhite;andsoon.Inordertoperceiveamovementwemusthaveadifferentperceptionfromanyoneoftheseorfromthesumofthem.Wemustactuallyseethegreenstretchdiminishinginsize.Nowitisundoubtedlydifficult,insomeinstances,todecidepreciselywhatisperceivedinthissenseandwhatisnot.ButIhopeIhavesaidenoughtoshowthatIamusing"perceive"and**observe"inasenseinwhich,onagivenoccasion,itiseasytodecidethatsomethingscertainlyareperceived,andotherthings,ascertainly,arenotperceived.Iamusingitinasenseinwhichwedoperceivesuchacomplexobjectasawhitepatchmovingtowardsaredoneonagreenfield;butIamnotusingitinanysenseinwhichwecouldbesaidto'*perceive"or**observe"thatwhatwesawmovingwasabilliard-ball.AndinthesamewayIthinkwecandistinguishroughlybetweenwhat,onanygivenoccasion,weperceive,aswesay,"byanyoneoftheothersenses,"andwhatwedonotperceivebyit.Wecansaywithcertaintythat,onanygivenoccasion,therearecertainkindsof"content"whichweareactuallyhearing,andotherswhichwearenotactuallyhearing;thoughwithregardtosomeagainitisdifficulttosaywhetherweareactuallyhearingthemornot.Andsimilarlywecandistinguishwithcertaintyinsomeinstances,betweenwhatweareonagivenoccasion,actuallysmellingorfeeling,andwhatwearenotactuallysmellingorfeeling.\n;70OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONButnow,besidesthesekindsof''things,""objects,"or"contents,"whichweperceive,aswesay,"bythesenses,"thereisalsoanotherkindwhichwecanbesaidtoobserve.NotonlycanIobservearedandbluebooksidebyside;Icanalsoobservemyselfobservingthem.)canperceivearedpatchmovingtowardsawhite,andIcanalsoperceivemyperceptionofthismovement.AndwhatIwishtomakeasplainasIcanisthatmyperceptionofthemovementofacolouredpatchcanatleastbedistinguishedfromthatmovementitself,Iwishtomakeitplainthattoobserveacolouredpatchmovingistoobserveonething;andtoobservemyselfobservingacolouredpatchmovingisanother.WhenIobservemyownperceptionofamovement,IobservesomethingmorethanwhenImerelyobservethemovement,andsomethingverydifferentfromthemovement.Imayperceivearedandabluebooksidebysideonashelf;andatanothertimeImayperceivearedballmovingtowardsawhite.Theredandbluepatch,ofoneshape,atrestsidebyside,aredifferentfromthered,ofanothershape,movingtowardsthewhiteandyet,whenIsaythatbothare"perceived,"Imeanby"perceived"oneandthesamething.Andsince,thus,twodifferentthingsmaybothbeperceived,theremustalsobesomedifferencebetweeneachofthemandwhatismeantbysayingthatitisperceived.Indeed,inpreciselythesamewayinwhich1mayobserveaspatialrelationbetweenaredpatchandablue(whenIobservethem"sidebyside")Ido,whenIobservemyownperceptionofthem,observeaspatialrelationbetweenitandthem.IobserveadistancebetweenmyperceptionandtheredandbluebookswhichIperceive,comparableinmagnitudewiththebreadthorheightofthebluebook,justasthesearecomparableinmagnitudewithoneanother.And\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION71whenIsayIobserveadistancebetweenmyperceptionofaredbookandthatredbookitself,IdonotmeanthatIobserveadistancebetweenmyeyes,oranyotherpartofwhatIcallmybody,andtheredpatchinquestion.Iamtalkingnotofmyeyes,butofmyactualperception.Iobservemyperceptionofabooktobenearthebookandfurtherfromthetable,inexactlythesamesenseinwhichIobservethebooktobeneartheshelfonwhichitstands,andfurtherfromthetable.Andjustas,ifthedistancebetweenaredpatchandawhiteistobeperceived,theredpatchmustbedifferentfromthewhite,so,ifIperceiveacertaindistancebetweenmyperceptionandtheredpatch,myperceptionmustbedifferentfromtheredpatchwhichIperceive.Iassume,then,thatweobserve,ontheonehand,colouredpatchesofcertainshapesandsizes,andtheirspatialrelationstooneanother,togetherwithalltheotherkindsof"contents,"whichweshouldusuallybesaidtoperceive"throughthesenses."And,ontheotherhand,wealsosometimesobserveourownperceptionsofsuch"contents"andourthoughts.Andthesetwokindsof"content"aredifferentfromoneanother:myperceptionofaredpatchwithgoldlettersonit,isnotitselfaredpatchwithgoldlettersonit;andhence,whenIobservemyperceptionofthispatch,IobservesomethingdifferentfromthatwhichIobservewhenImerelyperceivethepatch.Eitherofthesetwokindsof"content"—eithercolours,movingoratrest,sounds,smells,andalltherest—or,ontheotherhand,myperceptionsofthese—eitherofthesetwokinds,orboth,mightconceivably,sincebothareobserved,givegroundsforageneralisationconcerningwhatexists.But,asIhavesaid,ifobservationsaretogiveanygroundforsuchageneralisation,itmustbeassumedthatwhatIs\n72OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONobservedexistsorisreal.Andsince,asIhaveinsisted,whenIobservemyperceptionofaredpatchwithgoldlettersonit,IobservesomethingdifferentfromwhatIobservedwhenImerelyobservedaredpatchwithgoldlettersonit,itfollowsthattoassumetheexistenceofmyperceptionofthisredandgoldisnotthesamethingastoassumetheexistenceoftheredandgolditself.Butwhat,itmaybeasked,doImeanbythispropertyof"existence"or**reality,"whichmay,itwouldseem,belongtoeverycontent,whichIobserve,ormayagainbelongtonone,orwhichmaybelongtosomeandnottoothers?Whatisthispropertywhichmaybelongtomyperceptionofamovement,andyetnotbelongtothemovementperceived,orwhichmayagainbelongtothemove-mentperceivedandnottomyperceptionofit,orwhichmayagainbelongtobothortoneither?Itisnecessary,Ithink,toaskthisquestionatthispoint,becausetherearesomephilosopherswhoholdthat,inthecaseofsomekindsof**content,"atallevents,tosaythatthey**exist"istosaythattheyare"perceived."Someholdthattosay**Aexists"istosayneithermorenorJessthan"Aisperceived"—thatthetwoexpressionsareperfectsynonyms;andothersagainwouldsaythatby**Aexistsorisreal"wemaymeanmorethanthat"Aisperceived,"butthatwemustatleastmeanthis.Now,Ihavehithertousedtheword"existence"prettyfreely,andIthinkthat,whenIusedit,Iuseditinitsordinarysense.IthinkitwillgenerallyhavesuggestedtoyoupreciselywhatImeanttoconvey,andIthinkthat,insomecasesatallevents,itwillnotevenhaveoccurredtoyoutodoubtwhetheryoudidunderstandwhatImeantbyit.But,ifthesephilosophersareright,then,ifyouhaveunderstoodwhatImeantbyit,Ihaveallalongbeenusingitinasense,whichrenderstheendof\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION7^mylastparagraphperfectnonsense.Ifthesephilosophersareright,then,whenIassertthatwhatisperceivedmayyetnotexist,Iamreallyassertingthatwhatisperceivedmayyetnotbeperceived—Iamcontradictingmyself.Iam,ofcourse,quiteunawarethatIamdoingso.Butthesephilosopherswouldsayeitheryouarecon-tradictingyourself,oryouarenotusingtheword•'exists"initsordinarysense.Andeitherofthesealternativeswouldbefataltomypurpose.IfIamnotusingthewordinitsordinarysense,thenIshallnotbeunderstoodbyanyone;and,ifIamcontra-dictingmyself,thenwhatIsaywillnotbeworthunderstanding.Now,withoneclassofthesephilosophers—theclasstowhich,Ithink,Berkeleybelongs—IthinkIcanputmyselfrightcomparativelyeasily.ThephilosophersImeanarethosewhosaythatitis"onlyinthecaseofoneparticularclassof"contents(thekindof"content"whichBerkeleycalls"ideas")thattosay"the'content'Aexists"istosay"Aisperceived,"andwhoadmitthatinthecaseofothercontents—myselfandmyperceptionsandthoughts,forexample—tosaythattheseexistorarereal,istosayofthemsomethingdifferentfromthis.Thesephilosophersadmit,thatistosay,thattheword"exists"hastwodifferentsenses:andthatinonlyoneofthesesensesisitsynonymouswiththewords"isperceived."When(theyhold)Isayofsuchacontentasaredpatchwithgoldlettersonitthatit"exists"Idomeanthatitisperceived;butwhenIsayofmyperceptionofsuchapatchthatitexists,Idonotmeanthatmyperceptionisperceivedbutsomethingdifferentfromthis.Now,itwouldbenothingstrangethatoneandthesamewordshouldbeusedintwodifferentsenses;manywordsareusedinmanydifferentsenses.Butitwould,Ithink,besomethingverystrangeindeed,ifinthecaseof\n74OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONawordwhichweconstantlyapplytoallsortsofdifferentobjects,weshoulduniformlyapplyittoonelargeclassofobjectintheonesenseandtheonesenseonlyandtheotherlargeclassintheothersenseandtheothersenseonly.Usually,inthecaseofsuchambiguouswords,ithappensthat,indifferentcontexts,weapplyittooneandthesameobjectinbothsenses.Wesometimeswishtosayofagivenobjectthatithastheoneproperty,andsometimeswewishtosayofthesameobjectthatithastheotherproperty;andhenceweapplythesamewordtothesameobject,atonetimeinonesense,andatanotherintheother.Ithink,therefore,that,eveniftherewerethesetwodifferentsensesoftheword*'existence,"itwouldbeveryunlikelythatweshouldnotcommonly,insomecontexts,applyitinthesense,inwhich(asisalleged)itdoesapplytoperceptions,to''contents"whicharenotperceptions.Indeed,Ithink,itisquiteplainthatweconstantlydoask,withregardtowhatisnotaperception,whetheritexists,inpreciselythesamesense,inwhichweask,withregadtoaperception,whetheritexists.Weaskinpreciselythesamesense:WastheRocarealbird,ormerelyanimaginaryone?and,didSindbad'sperceptionoftheRocreallyexist,orisitafictionthatheperceivedaRoc?Ithink,therefore,thatthesenseinwhichthesephilosophersadmitthatwedoapplytheword"existence"toperceptions,isoneinwhichwealsocommonlyapplyitto"con-tents"otherthanperceptions.But,evenifthisisnotthecase,Icansetmyselfrightwiththembyasimpleexplanation.IneedmerelyexplainthatthesenseinwhichIamproposingtoenquirewhetheraredpatchexists,ispreciselythesenseinwhichtheyadmitthatmyperceptionofaredpatchdoesexist.Andinthissense,itisplainthattosupposethatathingmayexist,whichisnot\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION75perceived,orthatitmaynotexist,althoughitisperceived,isatleastnotself-contradictory.Buttheremaybeotherphilosopherswhowillsaythat,inthecaseofaperceptionalso,tosaythatitexistsorisrealistosaythatitisperceived—eitherthataloneorsomethingmoreaswell.AndtothesephilosophersIwouldfirstpointoutthattheyareadmittingthattheproposition**Thisperceptionisreal"issignificant.Thereissomesenseorotherinwhichwemaysay:"Alexander'sperceptionofanelephantwasrealordidexist,butSindbad'sperceptionofaRocwasnotreal—neverdidexist":thelatterpropositionis,insomesenseorother,notself-contradictory.AndthenIwouldaskofthem:Whentheysay,thattocallaperception**real"istoassertthatitisperceived,dotheymeanbythisthattocallitrealistoassertthatitisreallyper-ceived,ornot?Iftheysay**No,*'thentheyareassertingthattocallaperception''real"ismerelytosaythatitwasperceivedinthesenseinwhicnSindbaddidperceiveaRoc:theyareassertingthattocallit''real"isnottosay,inanysense,thatitwasreallyperceived:theyareassertingthattocallaperception"real"istosaythatitwasperceived,insomesensequiteotherthanthatinwhichweordinarilyusetheword:forwecertainlycommonlymean,whenwesay"Awasperceived,"thataper-ceptionofAwas*'real":weshouldcommonlysaythatSindbaddidnotperceiveaRoc—meaningthatnosuchperceptioneverdidexist.Idonotthinktheydomeanthis;and,inanycase,iftheydo,Ithinkitisplainthattheyarewrong.Whenwesaythataperceptionis'*real,"wecertainlydonotmeanmerelythatitistheobjectofanotherper-ception,whichmayitselfbequiteunreal—purelyimaginary.Iassume,therefore,thatwhentheysay'*:Tocallaperceptionreal"istosaythatitisperceived;theymean,whatweshouldnaturally\n76OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONunderstand,namely,that:Tocallit**rear'istosaythatitisreallyperceived—tosaythatitistheobjectofanotherperception,whichisalsorealinthesamesense.And,iftheymeanthis,thenwhattheysayiscertainlyuntrue.Theirdefinitionofrealityiscircular.Itcannotbethecasethattheonlysenseinwhichaperceptionmaybesaidtobereal,isoneinwhichtocallitsoistoassertthatnotitalone,butanotherperceptionisrealalso.Itcannotbethecasethattheassertion**Aisreal"isidenticalwiththeassertion**AandBarebothreal,"whereAandBaredifferent,and"real"isusedinthesamesenseasappliedtoboth.Ifitistobetruethattheassertion"Aisreal"ever,inanysense,includestheassertion*'Aisreallyper-ceived,"theremustbeanothersenseoftheword"real,"inwhichtoassert**Aisreal"istoassertlessthan**A"isreallyperceived—thesense,namely,inwhichwehereassertthattheperceptionofAisreal.Wefind,therefore,thattheotherclassofphil-osopherswereatleastrightinthis:theywererightinallowingthatthesenseinwhichwecommonlysaythatourperceptionsexistisoneinwhich**ex-"istdoesnotinclude,evenasapartofitsmeaning,•*isperceived."Wefindthatthereisacommonsenseoftheword*'existence,"inwhichtosay**Aexists"mustmeanlessthan**Aisreallyper-ceived";since,otherwise,theonlypossibledefi-nitionoftheword"existence"wouldbeacirculardefinition.AndImaypointoutthattwootherdefinitions,whichhavebeensometimessuggestedbyphilosophersasgivingwhatwecommonlymeanby"reality"or'"existence"arevitiatedbythesamefault—theyalsoarecircular.Somephiloso-phershavesometimessuggestedthatwhenwecallathing"real,"wemeanthatitis"systematicallyconnected"insomewaywithotherthings.But,\n—OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION77whenwelookintotheirmeaning,wefindthatwhattheymeanis(what,indeed,isaloneplausible)systematicallyconnectedwithotherrealthings.Anditmaypossiblybethecasethatwesometimesusetheword**real*'inthissense:but,atleast,itmustbecertainlythecase,that,ifwedo,wealsouseitinanotherandsimplersense—thesenseinwhichitisemployedintheproposeddefinition.Andotherphilosophershavesuggestedthatwhatwemeanby**rearis—**connectedinsomewaywithapurpose—helpingorhindering,ortheobjectofapurpose."Butifwelookintotheirmeaning,wefindtheymean—connectedwitharealpurpose.Andhence,evenifwedosometimesmeanby"real,"**connectedwithar^a/purpose,"itisplainwealsosometimesmeanby*'real"somethingsimplerthanthis—thatnamely,whichismeantby"real"intheproposeddefinition.Itiscertain,therefore,thatwedocommonlyusetheword"existence"inasense,inwhichtosay"Aexists"isnottosay"Aisperceived,"or'*Aissystematicallyconnectedwithotherrealthings,"or"Aispurposive."Thereisasimplersensethananyofthese—thesenseinwhichwesaythatourownperceptionsdoexist,andthatSindbad*sper-ceptionsdidnotexist.ButwhenIsaythis,Iambynomeansdenyingthatwhatexists,inthissimplesense,maynotalwaysalsoexistinalltheothers;andthatwhatexistsinanyofthemmaynotalsoalwaysexistinthis.Itisquitepossiblethatwhatexistsisalwaysalsoperceived,andthatwhatisperceivedalwaysalsoexists.AllthatIamsayingisthat,evenifthisisso,thispropositionissignificant—isnotmerelyapropositionaboutthemeaningofaword.Itisnotself-contradictorytosupposethatsomethingswhichexistarenotper-ceived,andthatsomethingswhichareperceiveddonotexist.\n78OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONBut,itmaybeasked:Whatisthiscommonsimplesenseoftheword**exists"?Formyownpart,itseemstometobesosimplethatitcannotbeexpressedinotherwords,exceptthosewhicharerecognisedasitssynonyms.Ithinkweareallperfectlyfamiliarwithitsmeaning:itisthemeaningwhichyouunderstoodmetohavethroughoutthispaper,untilIbeganthisdiscussion.Ithinkwecanperceiveatoncewhatismeantbyassertingthatmyperceptionofblackmarksonawhitegroundis**real,"andthatnosuchperceptionas*'real"Sindbad'sofaRocwasever:weareper-fectlyfamiliarwiththepropertywhichtheoneper-ceptionisaffirmedtopossess,audtheothertobewithout.AndIthink,asIhavesaid,thatthispropertyisasimpleone.But,whateveritis,this,whichweordinarilymean,iswhatImeanby**existence"or"reality."Andthisproperty,wehaveseen,iscertainlyneitheridenticalwithnorinclusiveofthatcomplexonewhichwemeanbythewords"isperceived,"Imaynow,then,atlastapproachthemain"questionofmypaper.Whichamongthe"contentswhichIobservewillgivemereasontosupposethatmyobservationofsomeofthemisgenerallypre-cededoraccompaniedorfollowedbytheexistenceofcertainparticularperceptions,thoughtsorfeelingsinanotherperson?Ihaveexplainedthatthe"contents"whichIactuallyobservemaybedividedintotwoclasses:ontheonehand,thosewhich,aswecommonlysay,weperceive"throughthesenses";and,ontheotherhand,myperceptionsoftheselast,mythoughts,andmyfeelings.Ihaveexplainedthatifanyoftheseobservedcontentsaretogivereasonforageneralisationaboutwhatexists,theymustexist.AndIhaveexplainedthatwithregardtobothclassesof"contents"Iamusingtheword"exist"inpreciselythesamesense—asense\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION79inwhichitiscertainlynotself-contradictorytosupposethatwhatisperceived,doesnotexist,andthatwhatisnotperceived,doesexist;and,inwhich,therefore,theassumptionthataredpatchwithgoldlettersonitexists,isadifferentassump-tionfromtheassumptionthatmyperceptionofaredpaichwithgoldlettersonitexists;andtheassumptionthatmyperceptionofaredpatchwithgoldlettersonitexists,isadifferentassumptionfromtheassumptionthataredpatchwithgoldlettersonitexists.What,then,thatweobserve,cangiveusanyreasonforbelievingthatanyoneelsehascertainparticularperceptions,thoughtsorfeelings?Ithas,Ithink,beenverycommonlyassumedthattheobservationofmyownperceptions,thoughts,andfeelings,can,byitself,givemesuchareason.AndIpropose,therefore,toexaminethisassumption.If,asIhopetoshow,itisfalse;itwillthenfollow,thatifourownobservationgivesusanyreasonwhatever,forbelievingintheexistenceofotherpersons,wemustassumetheexistence,notonlyofourownperceptions,thoughtsandfeelings,butalsoofsome,atleast,amongthatotherclassofdata,whichImaynow,forthesakeofbrevity,call**sense-contents";wemustassumethatsomeofthemexist,inpreciselythesamesenseinwhichweassumethatourperceptions,thoughts,andfeelingsexist.ThetheorywhichIproposetoexamineis,then,thefollowing.Myobservationofmyownthoughts,feelings,andperceptionsmay,itasserts,givemesomereasontosupposethatanotherpersonhasthoughts,feelings,andperceptionssimilartosomeofmine.Letusassume,accordingly,thatmyownthoughts,feelings,andperceptionsdoexist;butthatnoneofthe"sense-contents,"whichIalsoobserve,doso.Whereamongmyperceptionsam\n8oOBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONItolookforanywhichmightconceivablygivemeareasonforsupposingtheexistenceofotherper-ceptionssimilartomyown?ItisobviouswhereImustlook.IhaveperceptionswhichIcallpercep-tionsofotherpeoplesbodies;andthesearecer-tainlysimilarinmanyrespectstootherperceptionsofmyownbody.ButIalsoobservethatcertainkindsofperceptionsofmyownbodyareprecededbycertainotherperceptions,thoughts,orfeelingsofmine.Imay,forinstance,observethatwhenIperceivemyhandsuddenlycatchholdofmyfootinaparticularway,thisperceptionwasprecededbyaparticularkindoffeelingofpain.Imay,perhaps,observethisoftenenoughtojustifythegeneralis-ationthattheperceptionofthatparticularmotionofmybodyisgenerallyprecededbythatparticularfeelingofpain.AndinthiswayImayperhapshavereasonforquiteanumberofgeneralisationswhichassertthatparticularkindsofperceptionsofmyownbodyaregenerallyprecededbyotherparticularkindsofperceptions,thoughts,orfeelingsofmyown.ButImayalso,nodoubt,havetheperception,whichIcalltheperceptionofanotherpersonshandcatchingholdofhisfoot,inamannersimilartothatinwhichIhaveperceivedmyownhandcatchholdofmyownfoot.Andmyperceptionofanotherperson'shandcatchingholdofhisfootmayun-doubtedlybesimilarinmanyrespectstomyperceptionofmyownhandcatchingholdofmyownfoot.ButIshallnotobservethesamekindoffeelingofpainprecedingmyperceptionofhishandcatchingholdofhisfoot,whichIhaveobservedprecedingmyperceptionoimyhandcatchingholdofmyfoot.Willmygeneralisation,then,givemeanyreasontosupposethatneverthelessmyper-ceptionofhishandcatchingholdofhisfootisprecededbyasimilarfeelingofpain,notinmebut\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION8iinhim?WeundoubtedlydoassumethatwhenIperceiveanotherperson'sbodymakingmovementssimilartothosewhichIhaveobservedmyownbodymaking,thisperceptionhasgenerallybeenprecededbysomefeelingorperceptionofhissimilartothatwhichIhaveobservedtoprecedemyperceptionofsimilarmovementsinmyownbody.Wedoassumethis;anditispreciselythekindofgeneralisation,which,Ihaveinsisted,mustbead-mittedtobetrue.Butmypresentquestionis:WillsuchobservationsasIhavedescribedgiveanyreasonforthinkinganysuchgeneralisationtrue?Ithinkitisplainthattheywillnotgivetheslightestreasonforthinkingso.Inthefirstplace,alltheperceptionswhichIcallperceptionsofanotherperson'sbodydifferveryconsiderablyfromanyofthosewhichIcallperceptionsofmyown.ButIamwillingtowaivethisobjection.Iamnotofferinganytheoryastowhatdegreeoflikenessissufficienttojustifyageneralisation:andthereforeIwillallowthatthedegreeoflikenessmaybesufficient.Butthereremainsanobjectionwhichis,Ithink,quitefataltotheproposedinference.ThisobjectionisthattheinferenceinquestionplainlydoesnotsatisfythethirdconditionwhichIsuggestedaboveasnecessary,whereveranygeneralisationistobejustifiedbyobservation.Iamwillingtoallowthatmyobservationsofthefactthatmyperceptionofacertainmovementinmyownbodyisprecededbyacertainfeelingofpain,willjustifythegeneralisationthatmyperceptionofanysuchmovement,whetherinmyownbodyorinthatofanotherperson,isgenerallypre-cededbyasimilarfeelingofpain.AndIallow,therefore,thatwhenIperceiveacertainmovementinanothersbody,itisprobablethatthefeelingofpainexists,thoughIdonotperceiveit.But,ifitisprobablethatsuchafeelingofpainex-\n82OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONists,suchafeelingmuststandinthesamerelationtomyperceptionofthemovementinanotherperson*sbody,inwhichasimilarfeelingofpainhasbeenobservedbymetostandtomyperceptionofsuchamovementinmyownbody.Thatistosaytheonlykindoffeelingofpain,whichmyobser-vationsdojustifymeininferring,if(asIadmittheymay)theyjustifymeininferringanyatall,isafeelingofpainofmyown.Theycannotpossiblyjustifythebeliefintheexistenceofanysuchfeelingexceptonewhichstandstomyperceptioninthesamerelationinwhichmyfeelingsdostandtomyperceptions—one,thatistosay,whichismyown.Ihavenomorereasontobelievethatthefeelingofpainwhichprobablyprecedesmyperceptionofamovementinanotherperson'sbodycanbethefeelingofanotherperson,than,inmyformerex-ample,Ihadreasontosupposethatthehen,whoseexistenceprobablyprecededthatofagivenegg,couldbeahen,whichhadneverbeenneartheegginquestion.Thetwocasesareexactlyanalogous.Iobserveafeelingofpainofmyownprecedingaperceptionofmyown,Iobservethetwo,thatistosay,asstandingtooneanother,inthoserelations(whatevertheymaybe)inwhichanyperceptionofminestandstoanyotherthought,perceptionorfeelingofmine,andwhichare,atallevents,differentfromanyrelationinwhichaperceptionorfeelingofanotherpersoncanstandtooneofmine.Ineverperceivethefeelingandtheperceptionasstandinginanyotherrelation.Inanycase,there-fore,whereIdoobservesomethingliketheper-ception,butdonotobservethefeeling,Icanonlybejustified(z/"justifiedininferringanyfeelingatall),ininferringanunperceivedfeelingofmyown.ForthisreasonIthinkthatnoobservationsofmyownperceptions,feelingsorthoughtscangivemetheslightestreasonforsupposingaconnection\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION83betweenanyofthemandanyfeeling,perception,orthoughtinanotherperson.Theargumentisperfectlygeneral,sinceallmyperceptions,feelingsandthoughtsdohavetooneanotherthoserelationsinvirtueofwhichIcallthemmine;andwhich,whenItalkofaperception,feelingorthoughtasbeinganotherpersons,Imeantosaythatithasnotgottoanyofmine,Ican,therefore,merelyfromobservationofthisclassofdataneverobtaintheslightestreasonforbeliefintheexistenceofafeeling,perception,orthoughtwhichdoesnotstandintheserelationstooneofmine—whichis,thatistosay,thefeeling,perceptionorthought,ofanotherperson.Buthowdifferentisthecase,ifweadoptthehypothesis,whichIwishtorecom-mend—ifweassumetheexistenceofthatotherI"classofdatawhichIhavecalled"sense-contentsOnthishypothesis,thatwhichIperceive,whenIperceiveamovementofmyownbody,isreal\thatwhichIperceivewhenIperceiveamovementofanother'sbodyisrealalso.Icannowobservenotmerelytherelationbetweenmyperceptionofamovementofmybodyandmyownfeelings,butalsoarelationbetweenarealmovementofmybodyandmyownfeelings.AndthereisnoreasonwhyIshouldnotbejustifiedininferringthatanotherperson'sfeelingsstandinthesamerelationtotherealmovementsofhisbody,inwhichIobservemyownfeelingstostandtosimilarrealmovementsofmine.Butthereisanotherargumentwhichmaystillbeurgedbythosewhoholdthatmyownperceptions,thoughts,andfeelings,bythemselves,maybesufificienttojustifyabeliefintheexistenceofotherpersons.Itmaybesaid;**Ourobservationofourownperceptionsmaybesufficienttoverifyorconfirmthehypothesisthatotherpersonsexist.Thishypothesisisonewhich*'works."The\n'84OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONassumptionthatotherpersonshaveparticularthoughts,feelingsandperceptionsenablesustopredictthattheywillhaveothersandthatourownperceptionswillbemodifiedaccordingly:itenablesustopredictfutureperceptionsofourown;andwefindthatthesepredictionsareconstantlyverified.Weobservethatwedohavetheperceptions,whichthehypothesisleadsustoexpectweshouldhave.Inshort,ourperceptionsoccurjustastheywoulddo,ifthehypothesisweretrue;ourperceptionsbehaveasifotherpersonshadtheperceptions,thoughtsandfeelingswhichwesupposethemtohave.Surely,then,theyconfirmthetruthofthehypothesis—theygivesomereasontothinkitprobablytrue?Allthis,whichIhavesupposedanopponenttourge,Iadmittobetrue.Iadmitthatthefactthatanhypothesisworksmaygivesomereasontosupposeittrue.Iadmitthatmyperceptionsoccurjustastheywoulddo,ifotherpeoplehadtheperceptionswhich1supposethemtohave.Iadmitthatthatassumptionenablesmetomakepredictionsastofutureperceptionsofmyown,andthatIobservethesepredictionstocometrue.Iadmitallthis,ButIadmititonlyinasenseinwhichitinnowayconflictswiththepositionwhichIammaintaining.Thewords,whichIhaveputintothemouthofasupposedopponent,may,infact,meanthreedifferentthings,whichitisworthwhiletodis-tinguish.Intwoofthosemeanings,whichIshalladmittobetrueandwhicharewhatmakethemseemplausible,theydonotdenywhatIassert.Onlyinthethirdsensearetheyanobjectiontomyposition:andinthatsensetheyarefalse.OneofthemeaningswhichIadmittobetrueisasfollows:—Ihavenotonlyadmittedbutinsistedthatsomeofmyperceptionsarejustsuchaswouldoccurifanotherpersonhadcertainparticular\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION85feelings:IhaveinsistedthatIshouldnothavejustthoseperceptionswhichIdohave,unlesssomeotherpersonhadcertainfeelingsandperceptionswhich1supposehimtohave.AndIadmitfurtherthatthefactthatIhaveoneoftheperceptionsinquestion—forinstance,thatofanotherperson'shandcatchingholdofhisfoot—thisfact,togetherwiththetrueassumptionthatIshouldnothavethisperception,unlesssomeotherpersonfeltpain,willjustifytheassertionthatanotherpersonhasfeltpain.Inthissense,Iadmit,thefactthatIperceivewhatIdoperceivewillgivemereasontosupposethatanotherpersonhasfeltpain.And,ontheotherhand,IalsoadmitthatthefactthatIhavethisperception,togetherv^iththetrueassumptionthatwhenIhaveitanotherpersonhasfeltpain,mayhelptojustifytheassumptionthatthepercep-tioninquestionisonewhichIshouldnothavehadunlessanotherpersonhadfeltpain—ithelpstojustifythegeneralisationthatcertainofmyper-ceptionsarejustwhatwouldoccur,ifanotherpersonhadfeltpain.Ingeneralterms,thatistosay,IadmitthattheoccurrenceofB,togetherwiththeassumptionthatBisjustthesortofthingwhichwouldoccurifAexisted,willjustifytheassertionthatAexistsinthatparticularinstance.AndIalsoadmitthattheoccurrenceofB.togetherwiththeassumptionthatAexistsinthatparticularinstance,mayhelptojustifytheassumptionthatBisjustthesortofthingwhichwouldexist,ifAexisted.Inotherwords:WhenitissaidthattheobservationofB*sexistenceconfirmsorverifiestheassumptionthatAexists,eitheroftwothingsmaybemeant.Itmaybemeantthat,assumingBtobethesortofthingwhichwouldexistifAexisted,theobservationofBconfirmstheassump-tionthatAexistsinthisparticularinstance.Or,ontheotherhand,itmaybemeantthat,assuming\n86OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONAtoexistinthisparticularinstance,theobservationofBmayconfirmthegeneralisation,thatBisjustthesortofthingwhichwouldexist,ifAexisted.Eithertheoneortheotherofthesetwothingsis,Ithink,whatisgenerallyassumed,whenitisas-sumedthatwhatwedoobserveconfirmsorverifiestheassumptionthatthereexistssomeparticularthingwhichwedon'tobserve.AndIamadmittingthatboththeseassumptionsaretrue.ButneitherofthemconflictsinanywaywiththepositionIammaintaining.WhatIammaintainingisthatnoobservationofmyownperceptions,byitself,canconfirmthegeneralisationthatanyoneofthemisjustwhatwouldoccurifanotherpersonhadaparticularfeeling.Iadmitthisgeneralisationtobetrue;andIadmitthatmyobservationofmyownperceptionsandfeelingsmaygivemereasontosupposethatifanotherpersonhascertainpercep-tionsorfeelingshewillalsohavecertainothers.WhatIdenyisthattheygivemetheslightestreasontosupposethattheexistenceofanysuchfeelingorperceptioninanotherhasanyconnectionwiththeexistenceofanyperceptionofmyown—tosupposethatanyperceptionofmyownisthesortofthingwhichwouldoccurifanotherpersonhadaparticularfeeling.Whattherefore,myopponentmustaffirmisthattheobservationofaperceptionofmyownwithouttheassumption(whichReidmakes)thatinthatparticularinstanceanyfeelingorperceptionofanotherperson,ofanykindwhatever,hasprecededit,maygivemereasontosupposethatthatperceptionofmyownisofakindwhichisgenerallyprecededbyaparticularkindoffeelinginanotherperson.Andthis,Ithink,isplainlyfalse.Butthereisyetathirdthingwhichmaybemeant,andwhichIamwillingtoadmitmaybetrue.Itmaybesaid:**Ibelievemanygeneralisationsof\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION87thefollowingkind.IbelievethatwhenIhaveaperceptionA,someotherpersonhasgenerallyhadafeelingX;IbelievethattheexistenceofthefeelingXisgenerallyfollowed,inthesameperson,bythatofthefeelingY;andIbelievealsothatwhenanotherpersonhasthefeelingY,IgenerallyhavetheperceptionB.Ibelieveallthis."Anditmust,Ithink,beadmittedthatwedobelievegeneralisationsofthiskind,andgeneralisationsinwhichtherearenotmerelytwostepsbetweenAandB,butagreatnumberofsteps.**Butthen,'*itmaybesaid,**mybeliefinthisgeneralisationcausesme,whenIobservemyper-ceptionA,toexpectthatIshallhavetheperceptionB;andsuchexpectations,Iobserve,areconstantlyrealised."Andthisalso,1think,mustbeadmittedtobetrue.'*But,finally,"itmaybesaid,"'beliefswhichproduceexpectationswhichareconstantlyrealisedaregenerallytrue.Andhencethefactthatthesebeliefsofmineabouttheconnectionoffeelingsinotherpersonswithperceptionsofmyowndoleadtoexpectationswhicharerealised,givesmereasontosupposethatthesegeneralisationsaretrueandhencethatotherpersonsdohaveparticularkindsoffeelings."And1amwillingtoadmitthatthisalsoistrue.Iamwillingtoadmitthattruepredictionscan,asarule,onlybeproducedbytruebeliefs.Thegeneralisationthatthisisso,is,indeed,onewhichcanonlybejustifiedbytheobservationsofbeliefs,whichare,insomeway,independentlyprovedtobetrue;andhence,ifitistobejustified,withoutassumingtheexistenceofanythingotherthanmyownperceptions,thoughts,andfeelings,itcanonlybejustifiedbymyobservationthatbeliefswithregardtothemannerinwhichIhesesucceedoneanothergenerallyleadtotruepredictions.Whethertheobservationofsuchbeliefsalonecouldgivesufficientreasonforit,is,Ithink,doubtful;but\n;88OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONIamwillingtoadmitthatitmaybeso.Onething,however,is,Ithink,quiteplain:namely,thatthisgeneralisation"Beliefswhichleadtotruepredictionsaregenerallytrue"cannotbetrue,unlesssomeotherofthe"contents"whichIobserve,besidemyownperceptions,thoughts,andfeelings,doexist.Thatistosay,ingivingareasonforsupposingtheexist-enceofotherpeople,thisgeneralisationalsogivesareasonfortheverytheorywhichIamadvocating,namely,thatsomeofthosedatawhichIhavecalled"sense-contents"doexistItdoesthis,becauseitisquitecertainthatbeliefsingeneralisationsabouttheexistenceofsense-contentscan(anddo)con-stantlyleadtotruepredictions.ThebeliefthatwhenIhaveobservedafireofacertainsizeinmygrate,somethingsimilartowhatIhaveobservedwillcontinuetoexistforacertaintime,can,andconstandydoes,leadtothetruepredictionthat,whenIcomebacktomyroominhalfanhour'stime,Ishallobserveafireofacertainsizestillburning.Wemakepredictionsonsuchgrounds,Ithink,everydayandalldaylong.Andhenceun-lesssuchbeliefsasthatwhatIobservewhenIseeafireburningdoesexist,aretrue,wecertainlyhavenoreasontosupposethatbeliefswhichleadtotruepredictionsaregenerallytrue.Andhenceonthishypothesisalsoitremainstruethat,unlesssomeofthecontentswhichIobserveotherthanmyownperceptions,thoughts,andfeelings,doexist,Icannothavetheslightestreasonforsupposingthattheexistenceofcertainpercep-tionsofmyownisgenerallyconnectedwiththatofcertainperceptions,thoughts,orfeelingsinanyotherperson.Iconcludethereforethat,unlesssomeoftheobserveddatawhich-Ihavecalledsense-contentsdoexist,myownobservationscannotgivemetheslightestreasonforbelievingthatanybodyelsehas\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION89everhadanyparticularperception,thought,orfeeling.And,havingarrivedsofartowardsananswertomyfirstquestion:Howdoweknowthatanyotherpersonsexist?Imaynowpointoutthatpreciselythesameanswe*-mustbegiventomysecondquestion:Howdoweknowthatanyparticularkindofthingexists,otherthanourselves,ourperceptions,thoughts,andfeelings,andwhatwedirectlyperceive?Thereisaviewconcerningwhatexists,whichdeserves,Ithink,muchmorerespectthanitgenerallyreceivesfromphilosophersnowadays.TheviewImeanistheviewthatmaterialobjects,suchastheyareconceivedbyphysicalscience,doreallyexist.Itisheldbysomepersons(andReidisamongthem)thatwedoknowoftheexistence,notonlyofotherpersons,butalsoofthemovementsofmatterinspace.Itisheldthatwedoknow,withconsiderableprecision,whatkindsofmovementsofmattergenerallyprecedemyperception,whenIhaveaparticularperception.Itisheld,forinstance,thatwhenIperceivearedandbluebooksidebysideonashelf,atacertaindistancefromme,therehaveexisted,betweentwomaterialobjects,whichmaybecalledbooks,andanotherkindofmaterialobject,whichmaybecalledmyeyes,certainwave-likemotionsofamaterialmedium;thattherehaveexistedtwodifferentsetsofwaves,ofwhichtheoneisconnectedwithmyperceptionofredandtheotherwithmyperceptionofblue;andthattherelativeheightsandbreadthsofthetwodifferentsetsofwaves,andtherelativevelocityoftheirmovementsareveryexactlyknown.Itisheldthatsomemenhaveavastamountofverypreciseinformationabouttheexistenceofobjectsofthiskind;andIthinktheviewthatthisissodeservesagreatdealofrespect.ButwhatIwishnowtopointoutisthatnoone'sobservationofhisownperceptions,thoughtsand\n90OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONfeelings,can,byitself,givehimtheslightestreasonforbelievingintheexistenceofanysuchmaterialobjects.AlltheargumentsbywhichIhavetriedtoshowthatthiskindofobservationalonecangivemenoreasontobelieveintheexistenceofanykindofperceptionorfeelinginanotherperson,apply,withatleastequalforce,toshowthatitcangivemenoreasontobelieveintheexistenceofanykindofmaterialobject.Ontheotherhand,ifwearetoadmittheprinciplethat**Beliefswhichleadtotruepredictions,aregenerallytrue,"thisprinciplewillgiveusatleastasmuchreasontobelieveintheexistenceofcertainkindsofmaterialobjectsastobelieveintheexistenceofotherpersons;sinceoneofthemostremarkablefactsaboutbeliefsintheexistenceofsuchobjectsisthattheydosooftenleadtotruepredictions.Butitmustberemem-beredthatwecanhavenoreasonforbelievingthisprincipleitself,unlessourownperceptions,thoughtsandfeelingsarenottheonlykindofobserved"content"whichreallydoesexist:wecanhavenoreasonforit,unlesssomesuchthingsaswhatIperceive,whenIseearedandbluebooksidebyside,doreallyexist.Itwouldseem,therefore,thatifmyownobser-vationsdogivemeanyreasonwhateverforbelievingintheexistenceeitherofanyperceptioninanyotherpersonorofanymaterialobject,itmustbetruethatnotonlymyownperceptions,thoughtsandfeelings,butalsosomeoftheotherkindsofthingswhichIdirectlyperceive—colours,sounds,smells,etc.—doreallyexist:itmustbetruethatsomeobjectsofthiskindexistorarerealinpreciselythesamesimplesenseinwhichmyperceptionsofthemexistorarereal.Istherethenanyreasontothinkthatthisisnottrue?Isthereanyreasontothink,forinstance,thatnoneofthecolourswhichIperceiveasoccupyingareasofcertainshapesandsizesreally\n:OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION91existintheareaswhichtheyappeartooccupy?ThisisaquestionwhichIwishedtodiscussatlength,becauseIthinkthatitisoneinwhichtherearerealdifficulties.ButIhavegivensomuchspacetootherquestions,thatIcanonlydealwithitverybrieflyhere.Somephilosophersareveryfondofassertingthatacolourcannotexistexceptwhenitisperceived;anditmightpossiblybethoughtthatwhenIsuggestthatcoloursdoreallyexist,IamsuggestingthattheydoexistwhentheyarenotperceivedIwish,therefore,brieflytopointoutthatthequestionwhetheranythingdoesexist,whenitisnotperceived,isonewhichIhavenotarguedandshallnotattempttoargueinthispaper.Ihave,indeed,triedtoshowthatsince**exists**"doesnotmeanisperceived,*'itis,atleast,conceivablethatthingsshouldexist,whentheyarenotperceived.ButIhaveadmittedthatitisquitepossiblenonedoso:itmaybethecasethatwheneverathingexists,itisalsoatthesametimeperceived,foranythingthatIhavesaidorshallsaytothecontrary.Ithink,indeed,that,ifsuchthingsascoloursdoexist,myobservationoftheirbehaviourwilljustifymeinconcludingthattheyalsoexistwhenImyselfam,atleast,notawareofperceivingthem:butsinceIhavenotattemptedtodeterminewhatkindsofobservationaresufficienttojustifyageneralisation,IdonotpretendtosaywhetherthisissoornotandstilllessdoIpretendtosaywhether,iftheyexistwhen/donotperceivethem,wearejustifiedinsupposingthatsomeoneelsemustbeperceivingthem.Thequestionwhetheranythingexists,whenitisnotperceived,and,ifso,whatthings,seemstometobeonewhichcanonlybesettledbyobser-vation;andthus,Iconceive,observationmightjustifyusinconcludingthatcertainkindsofthings-pains,forexample,donotexist,whentheyarenot\n92OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONperceivedandthatotherkindsofthings—colours,forexample,doexist,whentheyarenotperceived.Theonlyway,inwhich,sofarasIamaware,thetheoryIamadvocatingdoesconflictwithordinaryIdealisticconclusions,isthatitdoessuggestthatthings,whicharenot**spiritual,"dosometimesexist,asreallyandastruly,asthingswhichare.Thetheory,therefore,thatnothingexists,exceptwhenitisperceived,isnoobjection(evenifitbetrue)tothesuppositionthatcoloursdoexist.Whatobjectionsaretheretothissupposition?Allseriousobjectionstoitare,Ithink,ofonetype.Theyallrestupontheassumptionthat,ifacertainkindofthingexistsatacertaintimeinacertainplace,certainotherkindsofthingscannotexistatthesametimeinthesameplace.Theyareall,thatistosay,ofthesametypeasBerkeley'sargument:that,thoughthesamebodyofwatermayappeartobesimultaneouslybothhotandcold(ifoneofthehandsweplungeintoitiswarmandtheothercold),yettheheatandthecoldcannotbothreallybeinthesamebodyatthesametime.Anditisworthnoticingthatanyonewhousesthisargumentmustadmitthatheunderstandswhat**ismeantbyreallyexistinginagivenplace,"andthathemeansbyitsomethingoM^rthan**beingperceivedasinagivenplace.*'FortheargumentitselfadmitsthatboththeheatandthecoldareresWyperceivedasbeinginthe,sameplace,andthatthereisnodifficultyinsupposingthattheyareso;whereasiturgesthatthereisadifficultyinsupposingthattheybothreallyexistinit.Nowthereisoneobviousdefectinthistypeofargument,ifdesignedtoprovethatnosensiblequalityexistsatanyplacewhereitisperceivedasbeing—adefect,whichBerkeleyhimselfadmitsinhis"Principles,"thoughheomitstonoticeitwhereherepeatstheargumentinhis'*Hylas."Evenif\nOBJECTSOFPERCEPTION93weassumethattheheatandthecoldcannotbothexistinthesameplace(andIadmitthat,inthiscase,thecontraryassumptiondoesseemrepugnanttoCommonSense),itdoesnotfollowthatneitherexiststhere.Thatistosaythistypeofargument,evenifwegrantitsinitialassumption,willonlyentitleustoconcludethatsomesensiblequalitieswhichweperceiveasbeinginacertainplaceatacertaintime,donotexistinthatplaceatthattime.Andthiseonclusion,Iaminclinedtothink,istrue.Inthecase,forinstance,oftheso-called*'images"whichweperceiveinalooking-glass,wemayveryreadilyadmitthatthecoloursandshapeswhichweperceivedonotexistattheplaceswheretheyappeartobe—namelyatvariousdistancesbehindtheglass.Butyet,sofarasIcansee,wehavenoreasonwhateverforsupposingthattheydonot,excepttheassumptionthatourobservationsgiveusreasontobelievethatothersensiblequalitiesdoexistinthosepositionsbehindtheglass;andtheassumptionthatwheretheseothersensiblequalitiesdoexist,thosewhichweseeintheglassdonotexist.Ishould,therefore,admitthatsomesensiblequalitieswhichweperceiveasbeingincertainplaces,donotexistinthoseplaces,whilestillretainingmybeliefthatothersdo.hndperhapsthisexplanationistheonewhichshouldalsobeadoptedinthecaseofsensiblequalitieswhichappeartobeatagreatdistancefromus.When,forinstance,(aswesay),'*weseethemoon,"whatweperceive(ifthemoonbefull)isaroundbrightsilverdisc,ofasmallsize,ataplaceverydistantfromus.Doesthatsilverdiscexistatthatplace?Withwhatsuppositionsdoestheassumptionthatitdoesconflict?Only,sofarasIcansee,withthesuppositionthattheplaceinquestionisreallyoccupiedbyabodysuchassciencehastaughtustosupposethatthemoonreallyis—asphericalbodyimmenselylargerthan\n94OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONobjects,incomparisonwithwhichthesilverdiscwhichweperceiveissmall;orelsewiththesuppositionthattheplaceinquestionisreallyoccupiedbysomepartofouratmosphere,orsomepartofthemediumwhichsciencesupposestoexistbetweenouratmosphereandthemoon;orelsewiththesuppositionthattheplaceinquestionisreallyoccupiedbywhatwemightseeiifthemoonwerenearertousbymanythousandsofmiles.Unlesswesupposethatsomeotherobjectisintheplace,inwhichthesilverdiscappearstobe,andthatthisobjectisofakindwhichcannotoccupythesameplacewhichisoccupiedbyasilverdisc,wehavenoreasontosupposethatthesilverdiscdoesnotreallyexistintheplacewhereitappearstobe.And,inthiscase,weperhapshavereasonforbothsupposi-tionsandshouldthereforeconcludethatthesilverdisc,whichweperceive,doesnotexistinanyrealplace.Part,therefore,oftheseobjectionstoourtheorymay,Ithink,bemetbyadmittingthatsomeofthesensiblequalitieswhichweperceivedonotexistattheplaceswheretheyappeartoexist,thoughethersdo.Butthereis,Ithink,anotherclassofcases,inwhichwemaybejustifiedindenyingthattwothingswhich(itisasserted)cannotoccupythesamespace,reallycannot.Iwilltakeaninstancewhichis,Ithink,typical.Whenwelookatadropofbloodwiththenakedeye,weperceiveasmallredspot,uniformlyredallover.Butwhen(aswesay)welookatthesameobjectunderamicroscopeofacertainpower,Iaminformedthatweseeamuchlargerspot,ofsimilarshape,indeed,butnotuniformlyred—having,infact,smallredspotsatdifferentpositionsinayellowishfield.Andifwewereagaintolookatthesa7neobjectthroughamicroscopeofmuchhigherpowerstill,wemightperceiveyetathirddifferentarrangementof\n—OBJECTSOFPERCEPTION95colours.Isthereanyfatalobjectiontosupposingthatall/^r^^appearances—theuniformredspot,theyellowishfieldwithreddishspotsinit,andthethird,whateverthatmaybe—doallreallyoccupythesamerealspatialarea?Icannotseethatthereis.Wearefamiliarwiththeideathatagivenspatialareamaycontainpartswhichareinvisibletous.Andhence,Ithinkitisquiteconceivablethatpartsofagivenareamaybereallyoccupiedbyonecolour,whilethewholeisreallyoccupiedbyanother.Andthis,Ithink,iswhatweactuallydobelieveinmanycases.Atallevents,wecertainlybelievethattheareawhichappearstobeoccupiedbyonecolourreallyisthesameareaasthatwhichappearstobeoccupiedbyanother.And,unlessweassumethatthearea,inbothcases,reallyisthesame,wecancertainlyhavenoreasontodenythateachcolourdoesreallyoccupytheareawhichitappearstooccupy.ForthesereasonsIthinkthatthedifficultiesinthewayofsupposingthatsomeofthesensiblequalitieswhichweperceiveasbeingincertainplaces,reallyexistintheplacesinwhichweperceivethemtobe,arenotinsuperable.Ihaveindeednotdonejusticetothesedifficulties;butthen,neitherhaveIdonejusticetowhatistobesaidontheotherside.Atallevents,Ithinkitisplainthatwehavenoreasontoassert,inanycasewhatever,thataperceivedcolourdoesnotreallyexistintheplacewhereitisperceivedasbeing,unlessweassumethatthatverysameplacereallyisoccupiedbysomethingelseeitherbysomedifferentsensiblequalitiesorbymaterialobjectssuchasphysicalsciencesupposestoexist.Butwhatreasoncanwegiveforsuchanassumption.'*Ihavetriedtoshowthatourownobservationscangiveusnone,unlessweassumethatsomeofthesensiblequalities,whichweobserveasoccupyingcertainplaces,doreallyexistinthose\n—96OBJECTSOFPERCEPTIONplaces.And,ifthisisso,thenwemustadmitthatneitherhewhobelieves(withReid)intheexistenceofothermindsandofmatteralso,norhewhobelievesintheexistenceofothermindsanddeniesthatofmatter,canhave,inhisownobservations,theslightestreasoneitherforhisassertionorforhisdenial:wemustadmitthathecanhavenoreasonforeitherassertionordenial,exceptonewhichconsistsintheassumptionoftheexistenceornon-existenceofsomethingwhichhedoesnotobservesomething,therefore,oftheverysamekindasthatforwhichhegivesitasareason.Iamveryunwillingtosupposethatthisisthecase:IamveryunwillingtosupposethathewhobelievesthatSindbadtheSailorreallysawwhatthe''ArabianNights"representhimasseeing,hasjustasgoodreason(sofarashisownobservationgoes)forbelievingthisashewhodeniesithasfordenyingit.Stillthismaybethecase.Wemust,perhaps,becontenttoassumeascertainthatforwhichourobservationgivesnoreason:toassumesuchpro-positionsasthatSindbaddidnotseeaRoc,andthatyoudohearmyvoice.Butifitissaidthatthesethingsarecertain;thenitalsoappearstometobecertainthatthecolourswhichIperceivedoexist[someofthem)whereIperceivethem.ThemoreIlookatobjectsroundme,themoreIamunabletoresisttheconvictionthatwhatIseedoesexist,astrulyandasreally,asmyperceptionofitTheconvictionisoverwhelming.Thisbeing,then,thestateofthecase,IthinkImayatleastpleadthatwehavegroundsforsuspenseofjudgmentastowhetherwhatIseedoesnotreallyexistgrounds,too,forrenewedenquiry,more;carefulthansuchenquiryhassometimesbeeninthepast.\nWILLIAMJAMES'^'PRAGMATISM"MyobjectinthispaperistodiscusssomeofthethingswhichProf,WilliamJamessaysabouttruthintherecentbook,towhichhehasgiventheabovename.*InLectureVIheprofessestogiveanaccountofatheory,whichhecalls**thepragmatisttheoryoftruth;"andheprofessestogiveabrieferpreliminaryaccountofthesametheoryinLecture11.Moreover,inLectureVII,hegoesontomakesomefurtherremarksabouttruth.InalltheseLecturesheseemstometomakestatementstowhichthereareveryobviousobjections;andmymainobjectistopointout,asclearlyandsimplyasIcan,whatseemtometobetheprincipalobjectionstosomeofthesestatements.Wemay,Ithink,distinguishthreedifferentthingswhichheseemsparticularlyanxioustoassertabouttruth.(I)Inthefirstplace,heisplainlyanxioustoassertsomeconnectionbetweentruthand**verifica-tion"or*'utility.'*Ourtrueideas,beseemstosay,arethosethat*'work,"inthesensethattheyareorcanbe**verified,"orare**useful."(II)Inthesecondplace,heseemstoobjecttotheviewthattruth**static"or'*immut-issomethingable."Heisanxioustoassertthattruthsareinsomesense**mutable."(III)Inthethirdplace,heassertsthat"toan*Pragmatism:ANewNameforsomeOldWaysofThinking:PopularLecturesonPhilosophy,ByWilliamJames.Longmans,Gieen,andCo.,1907.\n"98WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"unascertainableextentourtruthsareman-madeproducts"(p.242).Towhatheassertsundereachofthesethreeheadsthereare,Ithink,seriousobjections;andInowproposetopointoutwhatseemtometobetheprincipalones,undereachheadseparately.(I)ProfessorJamesisplainlyanxioustoassertsomeconnectionbetweentruthand**verificationor"utility."Andthatthereissomeconnectionbetweenthemeverybodywilladmit.Thatmanyofourtrueideasareverified;thatmanyofthemcanbeverified;andthatmanyofthemareuseful,is,Itakeit,quiteindisputable.ButProfessorJamesseemsplainlytowishtoassertsomethingmorethanthis.Andonemorethingwhichhewishestoassertis,Ithink,prettyplain.Hesuggests,atthebegin-ningofLectureVI,thatheisgoingtotellusinwhatsenseitisthatourtrueideas"agreewithreality."Truth,hesays,certainlymeanstheiragreementwithreality;theonlyquestionisastowhatwearetounderstandbythewords"agree-ment"and"reality"inthisproposition.Andhefirstbrieflyconsidersthetheory,thatthesenseinwhichourtrueideasagreewithreality,isthatthey"copy"somereality.Andheaffirmsthatsomeofourtrueideasreallydodothis.Butherejectsthetheory,asatheoryofwhaitruthmeans,onthegroundthattheydonotalldoso.Plainly,there-fore,heimpliesthatnotheoryofwhattruthmeanswillbecorrect,unlessittellsusofsomepropertywhichbelongstoallourtrueideaswithoutexception.Buthisowntheoryisatheoryofwhattruthmeans.Apparently,therefore,hewishestoassertthatnotonlymanybutallourtrueideasareorcanbeverified;thatallofthemareuseful.Anditis,Ithink,prettyplainthatthisisoneofthethingswhichhewishestoassert.\n:WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"99Apparently,therefore,ProfessorJameswishestoassertthatallourtrueideasareorcanbeverified—thatallareuseful.Andcertainlythisisnotatruismlikethepropositionthatmanyofthemareso.Evenifthiswereallthathemeant,itwouldbeworthdiscussing.Buteventhis,Ithink,isnotall.Theveryfirstpropositioninwhichheex-presseshistheoryisthefollowing."Trueideas,"hesays(p.201)*'arethosethatwecanassimilate,validate,corroborateandverify.Falseideasarethosethatwecannot,"Andwhatdoesthismean?Letus,forbrevity'ssake,substitutetheword••verify"aloneforthefourwordswhichProfessorJamesuses,ashehimselfsubsequentlyseemstodo.Heasserts,then,thattrueideasarethosewhichwecanverify.Andplainlyhedoesnotmeanbythismerelythatsomeoftheideaswhichwecanverifyaretrue,whileplentyofothers,whichwecanverify,arenottrue.Theplainmeaningofhiswordsisthatalltheideaswhichwecanverifyaretrue.Noonewouldusethemwhodidnotmeanthis.Ap-parently,therefore,ProfessorJamesmeanstoassertnotmerelythatwecanverifyallourtrueideas;butalsothatalltheideas,whichwecanverify,aretrue.Andso,too,withutilityorusefulness.Heseemstomeannotmerelythatallourtrueideasareuseful;butthatallthosewhichareusefularetrue.Thiswouldfollow,foronething,fromthefactthatheseemstousethewords**verification"or**verifi-ability"and"usefulness"asiftheycametothesamething.But,inthiscasetoo,heassertsitinwordsthathavebutoneplainmeaning."Thetrue"hesays(p.222)"isonlytheexpedientinthewayofourthinking.""Thetrue"istheexpedientthatis,allexpedientthinkingistrue.Oragain:"Anideais'true'solongastobelieveitisprofitabletoourlives"(p.75).Thatistosay,everyidea,whichisprofitabletoourlives,is,while\n—looWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"Itisso,true.Thesewordscertainlyhaveaplainenoughmeaning.Apparently,therefore,ProfessorJamesmeanstoassertnotmerelythatalltrueideasareuseful,butalsothatallusefulideasaretrue.ProfessorJames'words,then,doatleastsuggestthathewishestoassertallfourofthefollowingpropositions.Hewishestoassert,itwouldseem(i)Thatwecanverifyallthoseofourideas,whicharetrue.(2)Thatallthoseamongourideas,whichwecanverify,aretrue.Thatallourtrueideasareuseful.(3)(4)Thatallthoseofourideas,whichareuseful,aretrue.ThesefourpropositionsarewhatIproposefirsttoconsider.Hedoesmeantoassertthem,atleast.Verylikelyhewishestoassertsomethingmoreeventhanthese.Hedoes,infact,suggestthathemeanstoassert,inaddition,thatthesepropertiesof"verifiability"and"utility"aretheonlyproperties(besidethatofbeingproperlycalled"true")whichbelongtoallourtrueideasandtononebuttrueideas.Butthisobviouslycannotbetrue,unlessallthesefourpropositionsaretrue.Andthereforewemayaswellconsiderthemfirst.First,then,canweverifyallourtrueideas?IwishonlytopointouttheplainestandmostobviousreasonswhyIthinkitisdoubtfulwhetherwecan.Weareveryoftenindoubtastowhetherwedidordidnotdoacertainthinginthepast.Wemayhavetheideathatwedid,andalsotheideathatwedidnot;andwemaywishtofindoutwhichideaisthetrueone.Veryoften,indeed,Imaybelieveverystrongly,thatIdiddoacertainthing;andsomebodyelse,whohasequallygoodreasontoknow,maybelieveequallystronglythatIdidnot\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"loiForinstance,Imayhavewrittenaletter,andmaybelievethatIusedcertainwordsinit.ButmycorrespondentmaybelievethatIdidnot.Canwealwaysverifyeitheroftheseideas?Certainlysometimeswecan.Thelettermaybeproduced,andprovethatIdidusethewordsinquestion.AndIshallthenhaveverifiedmyidea.OritmayprovethatIdidnotusethem.Andthenweshallhaveverifiedmycorrespondent'sidea.But,sup-posetheletterhasbeendestroyed;supposethereisnocopyofit.noranytrustworthyrecordofwhatwassaidinit;supposethereisnootherwitnessastowhatIsaidinit,besidemyselfandmycorre-spondent,•*Canwethenalwaysverifywhichofourideasisthetrueone?Ithinkitisverydoubtfulwhetherwecannearlyalways.Certainlywemayoftentrytodiscoveranypossiblemeansofverifi-cation,andbequiteunable,foratimeatleast,todiscoverany.Suchcases,inwhichweareunable,foratimeatleast,toverifyeitheroftwocontra-dictoryideas,occurverycommonlyindeed.Letustakeanevenmoretrivialinstancethanthelast.Badwhist-playersoftendonotnoticeatallcarefullywhichcardstheyhaveamongthelowercardsinasuit.Attheendofahandtheycannotbecertainwhethertheyhadorhadnotthesevenofdiamonds,orthefiveofspades.And,afterthecardshavebeenshufifled,adisputewillsometimesariseastowhetheraparticularplayerhadthesevenofdia-mondsornot.Hispartnermaythinkthathehad,andhehimselfmaythinkthathehadnot.Bothmaybeuncertain,andthememoryofboth,onsuchapoint,maybewellknowntobeuntrustworthy.And,moreover,neitheroftheotherplayersmaybeabletorememberanybetter.IsitalwayspossibletoverifywhichoftheseIdeasisthetrueone?Eithertheplayerdidordidnothavethesevenofdiamonds.Thismuchiscertain.Oneperson\nI02WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"thinksthathedid.andanotherthinkshedidnot;andboth,sosoonasthequestionisraised,havebe-foretheirmindsbothoftheseideas—theideathathedid,andtheideathathedidnot.Thisalsoiscertain.Anditiscertainthatoneorotherofthesetwoideasistrue.Butcantheyalwaysverifyeitherofthem?Sometimes,nodoubt,theycan,evenafterthecardshavebeenshuffled.Theremfeiyhavebeenafifthpersonpresent,overlookingtheplay,whosememoryisperfectlytrustworthy,andwhosewordmaybetakenassettlingthepoint.Ortheplayersmaythemselvesbeable,byrecallingotherincidentsofplay,toarriveatsuchacertaintyasmaybesaidtoverifytheonehypothesisortheother.Butveryoftenneitherofthesetwothingswilloccur.And.insuchacase,isitalwayspossibletoverifythetrueidea?Perhaps,theoreti-cally,itmaybestillpossible.Theoretically,Isup-pose,thefactthatoneplayer,andnotanyoftheotherthree,hadthecardinhishand,mayhavemadesomedifferencetothecard,whichmightbediscoveredbysomepossiblemethodofscientificinvestigation.Perhapssomesuchdifferencemayremainevenafterthesamecardhasbeenrepeatedlyusedinmanysubsequentgames.Butsupposethesamequestionarisesagain,aweekaftertheoriginalgamewasplayed.Didyou,ordidyounot,lastweekhavethesevenofdiamonds-inthatparticularhand?Thequestionhasnotbeensettledinthemeantime;andnow,perhaps,theoriginalpackofcardshasbeendestroyed.Isitstillpossibletoverifyeitheridea?Theoretically,Isuppose,itmaybestillpossible.Buteventhis,Ithink,isverydoubtful.Andsurelyitisplainthat,humanlyandpracticallyspeaking,itwilloftenhavebecomequiteimpossibletoverifyeitheridea.InallprobabilityitneverwillbepossibleforanymantoverifywhetherIhadthecardornotonthisparticular\nWILLIAMJAMES'^*PRAGMATISM"103occasion.Nodoubtweareherespeakingofanidea,whichsomemancouldhaveverifiedatonetime.ButthehypothesisIamconsideringisthehypothesisthatweneverhaveatrueidea,whichwecannotverify;thatistosay,whichwecannotverifyaftertheideahasoccurred.Andwithregardtothishypothesis,itseemstomequiteplainthatveryoftenindeedwehavetwoideas,oneorotherofwhichiscertainlytrue;andyetthat,inallproba-bility,itisnolongerpossibleandneverwillbepossibleforanymantoverifyeither.Itseemstome,then,thatweveryoftenhavetrueideaswhichwecannotverify;trueideas,which,inallprobability,nomaneverwillbeabletoverify.And,sofar,Ihavegivenonlycom-parativelytrivialinstances.Butitisplainthat,inthesamesense,historiansareveryfrequentlyoccu-piedwithtrueideas,whichitisdoubtfulwhethertheycanverify.Onehistorianthinksthatacertaineventtookplace,andanotherthatitdidnot;andbothmayadmitthattheycannotverifytheiridea.Subsequenthistoriansmay,nodoubt,sometimesbeabletoverifyoneortheother.Newevidencemaybediscoveredormenmaylearntomakeabetteruseofevidencealreadyinexistence.Butisitcertainthatthiswillalwayshappen?Isitcertainthateveryquestion,aboutwhichhistorianshavedoubted,willsomedaybeabletobesettledbyverificationofoneortheotherhypothesis?Surelytheprobabilityisthatinthecaseofanimmensenumberofevents,withregardtowhichweshouldliketoknowwhethertheyhappenedornot,itneverwillbepossibleforanymantoverifyeithertheonehypothesisortheother.Yetitmaybecertainthateithertheeventsinquestiondidhappenordidnot.Here,therefore,again,wehavealargenumberofideas—caseswheremanymendoubtwhetherathingdidhappenordidnot,andhavethereforethe\nI04WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"ideabothofitshavinghappenedandofitsnothavinghappened—withregardtowhichitiscertainthathalfofthemaretrue,butwhereitseemshighlydoubtfulwhetheranysingleoneofthemwilleverbeabletobeverified.Nodoubtitisjustpossiblethatmenwillsomedaybeabletoverifyeveryoneofthem.Butsurelyitisverydoubtfulwhethertheywill.AndthetheoryagainstwhichIamprotestingisthepositiveassertionthatwecanverifyallourtrueideas—thatsomeonesomedaycertainlywillbeabletoverifyeveryoneofthem.Thistheory,1urge,hasallprobabilityagainstit.AndsofarIhavebeendealingonlywithideaswithregardtowhathappenedinthepast.Theseseemtometobethecaseswhichofferthemostnumerousandmostcertainexceptionstotherulethatwecanverifyourtrueideas.Withregardtoparticularpastevents,eitherintheirownlivesorinthoseofotherpeople,menveryfrequentlyhaveideas,whichitseemshighlyimprobablethatanymanwilleverbeabletoverify.Andyetitiscertainthatagreatmanyoftheseideasaretrue,becauseinagreatmanycaseswehaveboththeideathattheeventdidhappenandalsotheideathatitdidnot,whenitiscertainthatoneorotheroftheseideasistrue.Andtheseideaswithregardtopasteventswouldbythemselvesbesufficientformypurpose.If,asseemscertain,therearemanytrueideaswithregardtothepast,whichitishighlyimprobablethatanyonewilleverbeabletoverify,then,obviously,thereisnothinginatrueideawhichmakesitcertainthatwecanverifyit.Butitis,Ithink,certainlynotonlyinthecaseofideas,withregardtothepast,thatitisdoubtfulwhetherwecanverifyallthetrueideaswehave.Inthecaseofmanygeneralisationsdealingnotonlywiththepastbutwiththefuture,itis,Ithink,obviouslydoubtfulwhetherweshalleverbeabletoverifyall\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"105thosewhicharetrue;althoughhere,perhaps,inmostcases,theprobabilitythatweshallnotisnotsogreat.Butisitquitecertain,thatinallcaseswherescientificmenhaveconsideredhypotheses,oneorotherofwhichmustbetrue,eitherwilleverbeverified?Itseemstobeobviouslydoubtful.Take,forinstance,thequestionwhetherouractualspaceisEuclideanornot.Thisisacasewherethealternativehasbeenconsidered;andwhereitiscertainthat,whateverbemeantby'*ouractualspace,"iteitherisEuclideanorisnot.Ithasbeenheld,too,thatthehypothesisthatitisnotEuclideanmight,conceivably,beverifiedbyobservations.Butitisdoubtfulwhetheriteverwillbe.Andthoughitwouldberashtosaythatnomaneverwillbeabletoverifyeitherhypothesis;itisalsorashtoassertpositivelythatweshall—thatwecertainlycanverifythetruehypotheses.Thereare,Ibelieve,eversomanysimilarcases,wherealter-nativehypotheses,oneorotherofwhichmustbetrue,haveoccurredtomenofscience,andwhereyetitisverydoubtfulwhethereithereverwillbeverified.Ortake,again,suchideasastheideathatthereisaGod,ortheideathatweareimmortal.Manymenhavehadnotonlycontradictoryideas,butcontradictorybeliefs,aboutthesematters.Andherewehavecaseswhereitisdisputedwhethertheseideashavenotactuallybeenverified.Butitseemstomedoubtfulwhethertheyhavebeen.Andthereisaview,whichseemstometodeserverespect,that,inthesematters,wenevershallbeabletoverifythetruehypothesis.Isitperfectlycertainthatthisviewisafalseone.'*Idonotsaythatitistrue.Ithinkitisquitepossiblethatweshallsomedaybeabletoverifyeitherthebeliefthatweareimmortalorthebeliefthatwearenot.Butitseemstomedoubtfulwhetherweshall.AndforthisreasonaloneIshouldrefusetoassenttothe\nio6WILLIAMJAMES'»PRAGMATISM"positiveassertionthatwecertainlycanverifyallourtrueideas.When,therefore,ProfessorJamestellsusthat"Trueideasarethosethatwecanassimilate,validate,corroborateandverify.Falseideasarethosethatwecannot,"thereseemstobeaseriousobjectiontopartofwhatthesewordsimply.Theyimplythatnoideaofoursistrue,unlesswecanverifyit.Theyimply,therefore,thatwheneveramanwonderswhetherornothehadthesevenofdiamondsinthethirdhandatwhistlastnight,neitheroftheseideasistrueunlesshecanverifyitButitseemscertainthatinthis,andanimmensenumberofsimilarcases,oneorotherofthetwoideasistrue.Either,hedidhavethecardinhishandorhedidnot.Ifanythingisafact,thisisone.Either,therefore,ProfessorJames*wordsimplythedenialofthisobviousfact,orelseheimpliesthatinallsuchcaseswecanverifyoneorotherofthetwoideas.Buttothistheobjectionisthat,inanyobvioussenseofthewords,itseemsverydoubtfulwhetherwecan.Onthecon-traryitseemsextremelyprobablethatinaverylargenumberofsuchcasesnomaneverwillbeabletoverifyeitherofthetwoideas.Thereis,therefore,aseriousobjectiontowhatProfessorJames*wordsimply.WhetherhehimselfreallymeanstoassertthesethingswhichhiswordsimplyIdonotknow.Perhapshewouldadmitthat,inthissense,weprobablycannotverifynearlyallourtrueideas.AllthatIhavewishedtomakeplainisthatthereis,atleast,anobjectiontowhathesays,whether'^towhathemeansornot.Thereisamplereasonwhyweshouldrefuseassenttothestatementthatnoneofourideasaretrue,exceptthosewhichwecanverify.Buttoanotherpartofwhatheimpliesbythewordsquotedabove,thereis,Ithink,noserious\n—WILLIAMJAMES'*'''PRAGMATISM107objection.Thereisreasontoobjecttothestate-mentthatwecanverifyallourtrueideas;buttothestatementthatallideas,whichwecan"ass-imilate,validate,corroborateandverify,"aretrue,Iseenoseriousobjection.Here,Ithink,wemightsaysimplythatallideaswhichwecanverifyaretrue.Tothis,whichisthesecondofthefourpropositions,whichIdistinguishedabove(p.35)aswhatProfessorJamesseemstowishtoassert,thereis.Ithink,noseriousobjection,ifweunderstandtheword**verify"initsproperandnaturalsense.Wemay,nodoubt,sometimessaythatwehaveverifiedanideaoranhypothesis,whenwehaveonlyobtainedevidencewhichprovesittobeprobable,anddoesnotproveittobecertain.And,ifweusethewordinthisloosesenseforincompleteverification,itisobviouslythecasethatwemayverifyanideawhichisnottrue.Butitseemsscarcelynecessarytopointthisout.Andwherewereallycancompletelyverifyanideaoranhypothesis,there,undoubtedly,theideawhichwecanverifyisalwaystrue.Theverymeaningoftheword"verify"istofindevidencewhichdoesreallyproveanideatobetrue;andwhereanideacanbereallyprovedtobetrue,itisofcourse,alwaystrue.ThisisallIwishtosayaboutProfessorJames'firsttwopropositions,namely:(i)Thatnoideasofoursaretrue,exceptthosewhichwecanverify.(2)Thatallthoseideas,whichwecanverify,aretrue.Thefirstseemstomeextremelydoubtful—infact,almostcertainlyuntrue;thesecondontheotherhand,certainlytrue,initsmostobviousmeaning.AndIshallsaynomoreaboutthem.Thefactis,IdoubtwhethereitherofthemexpressesanythingwhichProfessorJamesisreally\n—"—"io8WILLIAMJAMES'**PRAGMATISManxioustoassert.Ihavementionedthem,onlybecausehiswordsdo,infact,implythemandbecausehegivesthosewordsaveryprominentplace.ButIhavealreadyhadoccasiontonoticethatheseemstospeakasiftosaythatwecanverifyanideacametothesamethingassayingitisusefultous.Anditistheconnectionoftruthwithusefulness,notitsconnectionwith"verifica-tion,"thatheis,Ithink,reallyanxioustoassert.Hetalksabout"verification"only,1believe,becausehethinksthatwhathesaysaboutitwillsupporthismainviewthattruthiswhat"works,"is"useful,"is"expedient,""pays."Itisthismainviewwehavenowtoconsider.Wehavetoconsiderthetwopropositions:Thatallourtrueideasareuseful.\iThatallideas,whichareuseful,aretrue.First,then:isitthecasethatallourtrueideasareuseful.''Isitthecasethatnoneofourideasaretrue,exceptthosewhichareuseful?IwishtointroducemydiscussionofthisquestionbyquotingapassageinwhichProfessorJamesseemstometosaysomethingwhichisindisputablytrue.TowardstheendofLectureVI,heattackstheviewthattruths"haveanunconditionalclaimtoberecognised."Andinthecourseofhisattackthefollowingpassageoccurs:"MustI,"hesays,"constantlyberepeatingthetruth*twicetwoarefour'becauseofitseternalclaimonrecognition?orisitsometimesirrelevant?Mustmythoughtsdwellnightanddayonmypersonalsinsandblemishes,becauseItrulyhavethemi^—ormayIsinkandignoretheminordertobeadecentsocialunit,andnotamassofmorbidmelancholyandapology?"Itisquiteevident/*hegoeson,"thatourobligationtoacknowledgetruth,sofarfrombeing\nWILLIAMJAMES*"PRAGMATISM"109unconditional,istremendouslyconditional.TruthwithabigT,andinthesingular,claimsabstractlytoberecognised,ofcourse;butconcretetruthsinthepluralneedberecognisedonlywhentheirrecognitionisexpedient."(pp.231-232),WhatProfessorJamessaysinthispassageseemstomesoindisputablytrueasfullytojustifythevigourofhislanguage.Itisasclearasanythingcanbethatitwouldnotbeusefulforanyman'smindtobealwaysoccupiedwiththetrueideathathehadcertainfaultsandblemishes;ortobealwaysoccupiedwiththeideathattwicetwoarefour.Itisclear,thatis,that,iftherearetimesatwhichaparticulartrueideaisuseful,therecertainlyareothertimes£ttwhichitwouldnotbeuseful,butpositivelyintheway.Thisisplainlytrueofnearlyall,ifnotquiteall,ourtrueideas.Itisplainlytruewithregardtonearlyallofthemthat,eveniftheoccasionsonwhichtheiroccurrenceisusefularemany,theoccasionsonwhichtheiroccurrencewouldnotbeusefularemanymore.Withregardtomostofthemitistruethatonmostoccasionstheywill,asProfessorJamessayselsewhere,**bepracticallyirrelevant,andhadbetterremainlatent."Itis,then,quiteclearthatalmostanyparticulartrueideawouldnotbeusefulatalltimesandthatthetimesatwhichitwouldnotbeuseful,aremanymorethanthetimesatwhichitwould.Andwhatwehavetoconsideriswhether,injustthissenseinwhichitissoclearthatmosttrueideaswouldnotbeusefulatmosttimes,itisneverthelesstruethatallourtrueideasareuseful.Isthisso.?Areallourtrueideasuseful?ProfessorJames,wesee,hasjusttoldusthatthereareeversomanyoccasionsuponwhichaparticulartrueidea,suchasthat2+2=4,wouldnotbeuseful—when,onthecontrary,itwouldbepositivelyintheway.Andthisseemstobeindisputably\n;noWILLIAMJAMES*"PRAGMATISM'*clear.Butisnotsomethingelsealmostequallyclear?Isitnotalmostequallyclearthatcases,suchashesayswouldnotbeuseful,dosometimesactuallyhappen?Isitnotclearthatwedoactuallysometimeshavetruei-^'.eas,attimeswhentheyarenotuseful,butarepositivelyintheway?Itseemstometobeperfectlyclearthatthisdoessometimesoccur;andnotsometimesonly,butverycommonly.Thecasesinwhichtrueideasoccurattimeswhentheyareuseful,are,perhaps,farmorenumerousbut,ifwelookatmeningeneral,thecasesinwhichtrueideasoccur,attimeswhentheyarenotuseful,dosurelymakeuppositivelyaverylargenumber.Isitnotthecasethatmendosometimesdwellontheirfaultsandblemishes,whenitisnotusefulforthemtodoso?whentheywouldmuchbetterbethinkingofsomethingelse?Isitnotthecasethattheyareoftenunabletogettheirmindsawayfromatrueidea,whenitisharmfulforthemtodwellonIt?Stillmorecommonly,doesitnothappenthattheywastetheirtimeinacquiringpiecesofinfor-ationwhicharenousetothem,thoughperhapsveryusefultootherpeople?Allthisseemstometobeundeniable—^justasundeniableaswhatPro-fessorJameshimselfhassaid;and,ifthisisso,then,inonesenseofthewords,itisplainlynottruethatall,ornearlyall,ourtrueideasareuseful.Inonesenseofthewords.ForifIhavetheideathat2+2=«4ononeday,andthenhaveitagainthenext,Imaycertainly,inasense,calltheideaIhaveononedayoneidea,andtheideaIhaveonthenextanother,Ihavehadtwoideasthat2+2=4,andnotoneonly.OriftwodifferentpersonsboththinkthatIhavefaults,therehavebeentwoideasofthistruthandnotoneonly.Andinaskingwhetherallourtrueideasareuseful,wemightmeantoaskwhetherbothoftheseideaswereusefulandnotmerelywhetheroneofthemwas.Inthis\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"iiisense,then,itisplainlynottruethatallourtrueideasareuseful.Itisnottrue,thatis,thateverytrueideaisuseful,wheneveritoccurs.Inonesense,then,itisplainlynottruethatallourtrueideasareuseful.Buttherestillremainsaperfectlylegitimatesenseinwhichitmightbetrue.Itmightbemeant,thatis,notthateveryoccurrenceofatrueideaisuseful,butthateverytrueideaisusefulonatleastoneoftheoccasionswhenitoccurs.Butisthis,infact,thecase?Itseemstomealmostasplainthatitisnot,asthattheotherwasnot.Wehaveseenthattrueideasarenotbyanymeansalwaysusefuloneveryoccasionwhentheyoccur;thoughmostthatdooccurmanytimesoverandtomanydifferentpeopleare,nodoubt,usefulonsomeoftheseoccasions.Butthereseemstobeanimmensenumberoftrueideas,whichoccurbutonceandtooneperson,andneveragaineithertohimortoanyoneelse.Imay,forinstance,idlycountthenumberofdotsonthebackofacard,andarriveatatrueideaoftheirnumber;andyet,perhaps,Imayneverthinkoftheirnumberagain,noranybodyelseeverknowit.Weareall,itseemstome,constantlynoticingtrivialdetails,andgettingtrueideasaboutthem,ofwhichweneverthinkagain,andwhichnobodyelseevergets.Andisitquitecertainthatallthesetrueideasareuseful?Itseemstomeperfectlyclear,onthecontrary,thatmanyofthemarenot.Justasitisclearthatmanymensometimeswastetheirtimeinacquiringinformationwhichisusefultoothersbutnottothem,surelyitisclearthattheysometimeswastetheirtimeinacquiringinformation,whichisusefultonobodyatall,becausenobodyelseeveracquiresit,Idonotsaythatitisneverusefulidlytocountthenumberofdotsonthebackofacard.Plainlyitissometimesusefultobeidle,andoneidleem-ploymentmayoftenbeasgoodasanother.But\n112WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"surelyitistruethatmensometimesdothesethings*whentheirtimewouldhavebeenbetteremployedotherwise?Surelytheysometimesgetintothehabitofattendingtotrivialtruths,whichitisasgreatadisadvantagethattheyshouldattendtoasthattheyshouldconstantlybethinkingoftheirownthoughtsandblemishes?Icannotseemywaytodenythatthisisso;andthereforeIcannotseemywaytoassertpositivelythatallourtrueideasareuseful,evensomuchasononeoccasion.Itseemstomethattherearemanytrueideaswhichoccurbutonce,andwhicharenotuse-fulwhentheydooccur.Andifthisbeso,thenitisplainlynottruethatallouttrueideasareusefulinanysenseatall.Theseseemtometobethemostobviousobjectionstotheassertionthatallourtrueideasareuseful.Itisclear,wesawtobeginwith,thattrueideas,whicharesometimesuseful,wouldnotbeusefulatalltimes.Anditseemedalmostequallyclearthattheydosometimesoccurattimeswhentheyarenotuseful.Ourtrueideas,thereforearenotusefulateverytimewhentheyactuallyoccur.Butinjustthissenseinwhichitissoclearthattrueideaswhicharesometimesuseful,neverthelesssome-timesoccurattimeswhentheyarenot,itseemsprettyplainthattrueideas,whichoccurbutonce,are,someofthem,notuseful.Ifanidea,whichissometimesuseful,doessometimesoccurtoamanatatimewhenitisirrelevantandintheway,whyshouldnotanidea,whichoccursbutonce,occuratatimewhenitisirrelevantandintheway?Itseemshardlypossibletodoubtthatthisdoessome-timeshappen.But,ifthisbeso,thenitisnottruethatallourtrueideasareuseful,evensomuchasononeoccasion.Itisnottruethatnoneofourideasaretrue,exceptthosewhichareuseful.Butnow,whatarewetosayoftheconverse\n—WILLIAMJAMES'''PRAGMATISM"113proposition—thepropositionthatallthoseamongourideas,whichareuseful,aretrue?Thatweneverhaveausefulidea,whichisnottrue?Iconfessthematterseemstomeequallyclearhere.Theassertionshouldmeanthateveryidea,whichisatanytimeuseful,istrue;thatnoidea,whichisnottrue,iseveruseful.Anditseemshardlypossibletodoubtthatthisassertionisfalse.Itis,inthefirstplace,commonlyheldthatitissometimesrightpositivelytodeceiveanotherperson.Inwar,forinstanceitisheldthatonearmyisjustifiedintryingtogivetheenemyafalseideaastowhereitwillbeatagiventime.Suchafalseideaissometimesgiven,anditseemstomequiteclearthatitissometimesuseful.Insuchacase,nodoubt,itmaybesaidthatthefalseideaisusefultothepartywhohavegivenit,butnotusefultothosewhoactuallybelieveinit.Andthequestionwhetheritisusefulonthewholewilldependuponthequestionwhichsideitisdesirableshouldwin.Butitseemstomeunquestionablethatthefalseideaissometimesusefulonthewhole.Take,forinstance,thecaseofapartyofsavages,whowishtomakeanightattackandmassacreapartyofEuropeansbutaredeceivedastothepositioninwhichtheEuropeansareencamped.Itissurelyplainthatsuchafalseideaissometimesusefulonthewhole.Butquiteapartfromthequestionwhetherdeceptioniseverjustifiable,itisnotverydifficulttothinkofcaseswhereafalseidea,notproducedbydeception,isplainlyusefulanduseful,notmerelyonthewhole,buttothepersonwhohasitaswell.Amanoftenthinksthathiswatchisright,when,infact,itisslow,andhisfalseideamaycausehimtomisshistrain.Andinsuchcases,nodoubt,hisfalseideaisgenerallydisadvantageous.But,inaparticularcase,thetrainwhichhewouldhavecaughtbut\n114WILLIAMJAMES'''PRAGMATISM"forhisfalseideamaybedestroyedinarailwayaccident,orsomethingmaysuddenlyoccurathome,whichrendersitmuchmoreusefulthatheshouldbethere,thanitwouldhavebeenforhimtocatchhistrain.Dosuchcasesneveroccur?Andisnotthefalseideasometimesusefulinsomeofthem?Itseemstomeperfectlyclearthatitissometimesusefulforamantothi^khiswatchisriohtwhenitiswrong-.Andsuchinstanceswouldbesufficienttoshowthatitisnotthecasethateveryideaofours,whichiseveruseful,isatrueidea.Butletustakecases,not,likethese,ofanidea,whichoccursbutafewtimesortooneman,butofideaswhichhaveoccurredtomanymenatmanytimes.Itseemstomeverydifficulttobesurethatthebeliefinaneternalhellhasnotbeenoftenusefultomanymen,andyetitmaybedoubtedwhetherthisideaistrue.Andso,too,withthebeliefinahappylifeafterdeath,orthebeliefintheexistenceofaGod;itis,Ithink,verydifficulttobesurethatthesebeliefshavenotbeen,andarenotstill,oftenuseful,andyetitmaybedoubtedwhethertheyaretrue.Thesebeliefs,ofcourse,aremattersofcontroversy.Somemenbelievethattheyarebothusefulandtrue;andothers,again,thattheyareneither.AndIdonotthinkwearejustifiedingivingthemascertaininstancesofbeliefs,whicharenottrue,but,never-theless,haveoftenbeenuseful.Butthereisaviewthatthesebeliefs,thoughnottrue,have,nevertheless,beenoftenuseful;andthisviewseemstometodeserverespect,especiallysince,aswehaveseen,somebeliefs,whicharenottrue,certainlyaresometimesuseful.Arewejustifiedinassertingpositivelythatitisfalse}Isitperfectlycertainthatbeliefs,whichhaveoftenbeenusefultomanymen,maynot,nevertheless,beuntrue?Isitperfectlycertainthatbeliefs,whicharenot\n;WILLIAMJAMES''*PRAGMATISM"115true,havenotoftenbeenusefultomanymen?Thecertaintymayatleastbedoubted,andinanycaseitseemscertainthatsomebeliefs,whicharenottrue,are,nevertheless,sometimesuseful.Forthesereasons,itseemstomealmostcertainthatboththeassertionswhichIhavebeencon-sideringarefalse.Itisalmostcertainlyfalsethatallourtrueideasareuseful,andalmostcertainlyfalsethatallourusefulideasaretrue.ButIhaveonlyurgedwhatseemtometobethemostobviousobjectionstothesetwostatements;Ihavenottriedtosustaintheseobjectionsbyelaboratearguments,andIhaveomittedelaborateargument,partlybecauseofareasonwhichInowwishtostate.Thefactis,IamnotatallsurethatProfessorJameswouldnothimselfadmitthatboththesestatementsarefalse.Ithinkitisquitepossiblehewouldadmitthattheyare,andwouldsaythathenevermeanteithertoassertortoimplythecontrary.HecomplainsthatsomeofthecriticsofPragmatismareunwillingtoreadanybutthesilliestofpossiblemeaningsintothestatementsofPragmatism;and,perhaps,hewouldsaythatthisisthecasehere.Icertainlyhopethathewould.Icertainlyhopehewouldsaythatthesestatements,towhichIhaveobjected,aresilly.Foritdoesseemtomeintenselysillytosaythatwecanverifyallourtrueideas;intenselysillytosaythateveryoneofourtrueideasisatsometimeusefulintenselysillytosaythateveryideawhichiseverusefulistrue.IhopeProfessorJameswouldadmitallthesethingstobesilly,forifheandotherPragmatistswouldadmitevenasmuchasthis,Ithinkagooddealwouldbegained.Butitbynomeansfollowsthatbecauseaphilosopherwouldadmitaviewtobesilly,whenitisdefinitelyputbeforehim,hehasnothimselfbeenconstantlyholdingandimplyingthatveryview.Hemay\nii6WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"quitesincerelyprotestthatheneverhaseitherheldorimpliedit,andyethemayallthetimehavebeennotonlyimplyingitbutholdingit—vaguely,perhaps,butreally.Amanmayassureus,quitesincerelythatheisnotangry;hemayreallythinkthatheisnot,andyetwemaybeabletojudgequitecertainlyfromwhathesaysthathereallyisangry.Hemayassureusquitesincerelythathenevermeantanythingtoourdiscreditbywhathesaid—thathewasnotthinkingofanythingintheleastdiscreditabletous,andyetitmaybeplainfromhiswordsthathewasactuallycondemningusveryseverely.Andsowithaphilosopher.Hemayprotest,quiteangrily,whenaviewisputbeforehiminotherwordsthanhisown,thathenevereithermeantorimpliedanysuchthing,andyetitmaybepossibletojudge,fromwhathesays,thatthisveryview,wrappedupinotherwords,wasnotonlyheldbyhimbutwaspreciselywhatmadehisthoughtsseemtohimtobeinterestingandimportant.Certainlyhemayquiteoftenimplyagiventhingwhich,atanothertime,hedenies.Unlessitwerepossibleforaphilosophertodothis,therewouldbeverylittleinconsistencyinphilosophy,andsurelyeveryonewilladmitthatotherphilosophersareveryofteninconsistent.Andsointhiscase,evenifProfessorJameswouldsaythathenevermeanttoimplythethingstowhichIhavebeenobjecting,yetinthecaseoftwoofthesethings,Icannothelpthinkingthathedoesactuallyimplythem—naymore,thatheisfrequentlyactuallyvaguelythinkingofthem,andthathistheoryoftruthowesitsinterest,inverygreatpart,tothefactthatheisimplyingthem.Inthecaseofthetwoviewsthatallourtrueideasareuseful,andthatallourusefulideasaretrue,Ithinkthisisso,andIdonotmeanmerelythathiswordsimplythem.Amanswordsmayoftenimplya\nWILLIAMJAMES*"PRAGMATISM"117thing,whenhehimselfisinnoway,howevervaguely,thinkingeitherofthatthingorofanythingwhichimpliesit;hemaysimplyhaveexpressedhimselfunfortunately.Butinthecaseofthetwoviewsthatallourtrueideasareuseful,andallourusefulideastrue,IdonotthinkthisissowithProfessorJames.Ithinkthathisthoughtsseeminterestingtohimandothers,largelybecauseheisthinking,notmerelyofwords,butofthingswhichimplythesetwoviews,intheveryforminwhichIhaveobjectedtothem.AndIwishnowtogivesomereasonsforthinkingthis.ProfessorJamescertainlywishestoassertthatthereissomeconnectionbetweentruthandutility.AndtheconnectionwhichIhavesuggestedthathehasvaguelybeforehismindisthis:thateverytrueideais,atsometimeorother,useful,andconverselythateveryidea,whichiseveruseful,istrue.AndIhaveurgedthat-thereareobviousobjectionstoboththeseviews.Butnow,supposingProfessorJamesdoesnotmeantoasserteitherofthesetwothings,whatelsecanhemeantoassert?Whatelsecanhemean,thatwouldaccountfortheinterestandimportanceheseemstoattachtohisassertionofconnectionbetweentruthandutility}Letusconsiderthealternatives.And,firstofall,hemightmeanthatmostofourtrueideasareuseful,andmostofourusefulideastrue.Hemightmeanthatmostofourtrueideasareusefulatsometimeorother;andeventhatmostofthemareuseful,whenevertheyactuallyoccur.Andhemightmean,moreover,thatifweconsiderthewholerangeofideas,whichareusefultous,weshallfindthatbyfarthegreaternumberofthemaretrueones;thattrueideasarefarmoreoftenusefultous,thanthosewhicharenottrue.Andallthis,Ithink,maybereadilyadmittedtobetrue.Ifthiswereallthathemeant,Idonotthink\nii8WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"thatanyonewouldbeveryanxioustodisputeit.Butisitconceivablethatthisisallthathemeans?Isitconceivablethatheshouldhavebeensoanxioustoinsistuponthisadmittedcommonplace?Isitconceivablethatheshouldhavebeenofferingusthis,andnothingmore,asatheoryofwhattruthmeans,andatheoryworthmakingafussabout,andbeingproudof?Itseemstomequiteincon-ceivablethatthisshouldhavebeenallthathemeant.Hemusthavehadsomethingmorethanthisinhismind.But.ifso,whatmore?InthepassagewhichIquotedatthebeginning,asshowingthathedoesmeantoassertthatallusefulideasaretrue,heimmediatelygoesontoassertaqualification,whichmustnowbenoticed.*'"Thetrue,"hesays,isonlytheexpedientinthewayofourthinking"(p.222).Butheimmediatelyadds**Expedientinthelongrun,andonthe:whole,ofcourse;forwhatmeetsexpedientlyalltheexperienceinsightwon'tnecessarilymeetallfurtherexperiencesequallysatisfactorily.'*Here,therefore,wehavesomethingelsethathemightmean.Whatisexpedientinthelongrun,hemeanstosay,istrue.Andwhatexactlydoesthismean?Itseemstomeanthatanidea,whichisnottrue,maybeexpedientforsometime.Thatistosay,itmayoccuronce,andbeexpedientthen;andagain,andbeexpedientthen;andsoon,overaconsiderableperiod.But(ProfessorJamesseemstoprophesy)ifitisnottrue,therewillcomealime,whenitwillceasetobeexpedient.Ifitoccursagainandagainoveralongenoughperiod,therewillatlast,ifitisnottrue,comeatimewhenitwill(foronceatleast)failtobeuseful,andwill(perhapshemeans)neverbeusefulagain.Thisis,Ithink,whatProfessorJamesmeansinthispassage.Hemeans,Ithink,thatthoughanidea,whichisnottrue,mayforsometimeberepeatedly\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"119expedient,therewillatlastcomeatimewhenitsoccurrencewill,perhaps,neverbeexpedientagain,certainlywill,foratime,notheg'enera/fyexpedient.Andthisaviewwhich,itseemstome,maypossiblybetrue.Itiscertainlypossiblethatatimemaycome,inthefarfuture,whenideas,whicharenottrue,willhardlyever,ifever,beexpedient.AndthisisallthatProfessorJamesseemsherepositivelytomean.Heseemstomeanthat,ifyoutaketimeenough,falseideaswillsomedayceasetobeex-pedient.Anditisverydifficulttobesurethatthisisnottrue;sinceitisverydifficulttoprophesyastowhatmayhappeninthefarfuture.IamsureIhopethatthisprophesywillcometrue.Butinthemeantime(ProfessorJamesseemstoadmit)ideas,whicharenottrue,may,foranindefinitelylongtime,againandagainbeexpedient.Andisitconceivablethatatheory,whichadmitsthis,isallthathehasmeanttoassert?Isitconceivablethatwhatinterestshim,inhistheoryoftruth,ismerelythebeliefthat,somedayorother,falseideaswillceasetobeexpedient?**Inthelongrun,ofcourse,''hesays,asifthiswerewhathehadmeantallalong.ButIthinkitisquiteplainthatthisisnotallthathehasmeant.Thismaybeonethingwhichheisanxioustoassert,butitcertainlydoesnotexplainthewholeofhisinterestinhistheoryoftruth.And,infact,thereisquiteadifferenttheorywhichheseemsplainlytohaveinhismindinotherplaces.WhenProfessorJamessays,**inthelongrun,ofcourse,''heimpliesthatideaswhichareexpedientonlyforashortrun,areveryoftennottrue.Butinwhathesayselsewhereheassertstheveryoppositeofthis.Hesayselsewherethata'*solongastobelievebeliefistrueitisprofitabletoourlives"(p.75).Thatistosay,abeliefwillbetrue,solongasitisuseful,evenifitisnotuseful\nI20WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"inthelongrun!Thisiscertainlyquiteadifferenttheory;and,strictlyspeaking,itimpliesthatanidea,whichisusefulevenononeoccasion,willbetrue.Butperhapsthisisonlyaverbalimplication.IthinkverylikelythathereProfessorJameswasonlythinkingofideas,whichcanbesaidtohavearun,thoughonlyacomparativelyshortone—ofideas,thatis,whichareexpedient,notmerelyononeoccasion,butforsometime.Thatistosay,thetheorywhichhenowsuggests,isthatideas,whichoccuragainandagain,perhapstoonemanonly,perhapstoseveraldifferentpeople,oversomespaceoftimeare,iftheyareexpedientonmostoccasionswithinthatspaceoftime,true.Thisisaviewwhichheis,Ithink,reallyanxioustoassert;andifitweretrue,itwould,Ithink,beimportant.Anditisdifficulttofindinstanceswhichshow,withcertainty,thatitisfalse.Ibelievethatitisfalse;butitisdifficulttoproveit.because,inthecaseofsomeideasitissodifficulttobecertainthattheyeverwereuseful,andinthecaseofotherssodifficulttobecertainthattheyarenottrue.AbeliefsuchasIspokeofbefore—thebeliefineternalhell—isaninstance.1thinkthisbeliefhasbeen,foralongtime,useful,andthatyetitisfalse.Butitis,perhaps,arguablethatitneverhasbeenuseful;andmanypeopleontheotherhand,wouldstillassertthatitistrue.Itcannot,therefore,perhaps,fairlybeusedasaninstanceofabelief,whichiscertainlynottrue,andyethasforsometimebeenuseful.Butwhetherthisviewthatallbeliefs,whichareexpedientforsometime,aretrue,betrueorfalse;canitbeallthatProfessorJamesmeanstoassert}Canitconstitutethewholeofwhatinterestshiminhistheoryoftruth}Idonotthinkitcan.Ithinkitisplainthathehasinhismindsomethingmorethananyofthese\nWILLIAMJAMES''*PRAGMATISM"121alternatives,orthanallofthemtakentogether.AndIthinksopartlyforthefollowingreason.Hespeaksfromtheoutsetasifheintendedtotelluswhatdistinguishestrueideasfromthosewhicharenottrue;totellus,thatistosay,notmerelyofsomepropertywhichbelongstoallourtrueideas;noryetmerelyofsomeproperty,whichbelongstononebuttrueideas;butofsomepropertywhichsatisfiesboththeserequirementsatonce—whichbothbelongstoallourtrueideas,andalsobe-longstononebuttrueones.Truth,hesaystobeginwith,meanstheagreementofourideaswithreality*'asfalsitytheirdisagreement,";andheaddsAndheexplainsthatheisgoingtotelluswhatproperty'*itisthatismeantbythesewordsagree-mentwithreality."Soagaininthenextpassagewhich**Trueideas,"hesays**arethoseIquoted:thatwecanassimilate,validate,corroborateandverify."But,healsoadds,"Falseideasarethosethatwecannot."Andnoone,Ithink,couldpossiblyspeakinthisway,whohadnotinhisheadtheintentionoftellinguswhatpropertyitiswhichdistinguishestrueideasfromthosewhicharenottrue,andwhich,therefore,notonlybelongstoallideaswhicharetrue,butalsotononethatarenot.Andthathehasthisideainhisheadandthinksthatthepropertyofbeing'*useful"or**paying"issuchaproperty,isagainclearlyshownbya**Ouraccountoftruth,"hesayslaterpassage.(p.218)**isanaccountoftruthsintheplural,ofprocessesofleading,realisedinrebus,andhavingonlythisqualityincommon,thatthey/aj."Only\ki\squalityincommon!Ifthisbeso,thequalitymustobviouslybeone,whichisnotsharedbyanyideaswhicharenottrue;for,iftrueideashaveanyqualityincommonatall,theymusthaveatleastonesuchquality,whichisnotsharedbythosewhicharenottrue.Plainly,therefore,ProfessorJamesisin-\n122WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"tendingtotellusofapropertywhichbelongsbothtoalltrueideasandonlytotrueideas.Andthisproperty,hesays,'*paying."Butnowisthatof**paying,'*notletussupposethathemeansby*'paying^«^^atleast,"but,accordingtothealter-nativehesuggests,**payinginthelongrun"or**payingforsometime."Canhepossiblyhavesupposedthatthesewerepropertieswhichbelongedbothtoalltrueideasandalsotononebuttrueones?Theymay,perhaps,bepropertieswhichbelongtononebuttrueones.Idoubt,asIhavesaid,whetherthelatterdoes;butstillitisdifficulttoprovetheopposite.Butevenifwegrantedthattheybelongtononebuttrueones,surelyitisonlytooobviousthattheydonotfulfiltheotherrequire-ment—thattheydonotbelongtonearlyalltrueones.Cananyonesupposethatallourtrueideaspay**inthelongrun"orrepeatedlyforsometime1Surelyitisplainthatanenormousnumberdonotforthesimplereasonthatanenormousnumberofthemhavenorunatall,eitherlongorshort,butoccurbutonce,andneverrecur.Ibelievetrulythatacertainbookisonaparticularshelfabout10.15p.m.onDecember21st,1907;andthistruebeliefservesmewellandhelpsmetofinditButthebeliefthatthatbookisthereatthatparticulartimeoccurstonooneelse,andneveragaintome.Surelytherearethousandsofusefultruebeliefswhich,likethis,areusefulbutonce,andneveroccuragain;anditwould,therefore,bepreposteroustosaythateverytrueidea*'isusefulinthelongrun"orrepeatedlyforsometime.If,therefore,wesupposedProfessorJamestomeanthat"payinginthelongrun'*or"payingrepeatedlyoveracon-siderableperiod"werepropertieswhichbelongedtoalltrueideasaudtononebuttrueones,weshouldbesupposinghimtomeansomethingstillmoremonstrousthanifwesupposehimtomean\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"123that'*payingatleastonce"wassuchaproperty.Tosumupthen:IthinkthereisnodoubtthatProfessorJamesinterestin"thepragmatisttheoryoftruth"islargelyduetothefactthathethinksittellsuswhatdistinguishestrueideasfromthosewhicharenottrue.Andhethinksthedistinctionisthattrueideas"pay,"andfalseonesdon't.Themostnaturalinterpretationofthisviewis:Thateverytrueideapaysatleastonce;andthateveryidea,whichpaysatleastonce,istrue.ThesewerethepropositionsIconsideredfirst,andIgavereasonsforthinkingthatbotharefalse.ButProfessorJamessuggestedelsewherethatwhathemeansby"paying"is"payinginthelongrun."Andhere"payinitseemspossiblytruethatallideaswhichthelongrun"aretrue;butitiscertainlyfalsethatallourtrueideas"payinthelongrun,"ifbythisbemeantanythingmorethan'*payatleastonce."Again,hesuggestedthatwhathemeantbypayingwas"payingforsometime."Andhere,again,evenifitistrue(anditseemsverydoubtful)thatallideaswhichpayforsometimearetrue,itiscertainlyfalsethatallourtrueideaspayforsometime,ifbythisbemeantanythingmorethanthattheypay**atleastonce."This,Ithink,isthesimplestandmostobvious**instrumentalobjectiontoProfessorJames'"viewoftruth—theviewthattruth**works,"iswhat"pays,"is"useful."Heseemscertainlytohaveinhismindtheideathatthistheorytellsuswhatdistinguishestrueideasfromfalseones,andtobeinterestedinitmainlyforthisreason.Hehasvaguelyinhismindthathehastoldusofsomepropertywhichbelongstoalltrueideasandtononebuttrueones;andthatthispropertyisthatof"paying."Andtheobjectionis,that,whatever\n124WILLIAMJAMES^"PRAGMATISM"weunderstandby**paying."whether''payingatleastonce,"or**payinginthelongrun,"or'*payingforsometime,"itseemscertainthatnoneofthesepropertieswillsatisfybothrequirements.Asre-**payingatleastonce,"gardsthefirst,thatofitseemsalmostcertainthatitsatisfiesneither:itisneithertruethatallourtrueidtas"payatleastonce,"noryetthateveryideawhichpaysatleastonce,istrue.Onthecontrary,manytrueideasneverpayatall;andmanyideas,whicharenottrue,dopayonatleastoneoccasion.Andasregardstheothers,"payinginthelongrun"and"payingforsometime,"evenifthesedobelongtononebuttrueideas(andeventhisseemsverydoubtful),theycertainlyneitherofthemsatisfytheotherrequirement—neitherofthembelongtoallourtrueideas.For,inorderthateitherofthemmaybelongtoanidea,thatideamustpayatleastonce;and,aswehaveseen,manytrueideas'donotpayevenonce,andcannot,therefore,payeitherinthelongrunorforsometime.And,moreover,manytrueideas,whichdopayononeoccasion,seemtopayononeoccasionandoneonly.And.ifProfessorJamesdoesnotmeantoassertanyofthesethings,whatisthereleftforhimtomean?Thereisleftinthefirstplace,thetheorythatmostofourtrueideasdopay;andthatmostoftheideaswhichpayaretrue.Thisseemstometobetrue,and,indeed,tobeallthatiscertainlytrueinwhathesays.Butisitconceivablethatthisisallhehasmeant?Obviously,theseasser-tionstellusofnopropertyatallwhichbelongstoalltrueideas,andtononebuttrueones;and,moreover,itseemsimpossiblethatheshouldhavebeensoanxioustoassertthisgenerallyadmittedcommonplace.Whataverydifferentcomplexionhiswholediscussionwouldhaveworn,hadhemerelyassertedthis—thisquiteclearly,andnothing\nWILLIAMJAMES'«*PRAGMATISM"125butthis,whileadmittingopenlythatmanytrueideasdonotpay,andthatmany,whichdopay,arenottrue!And,besidesthiscommonplace,thereisonlyleftforhimtomeantwoone-sidedanddoubtfulassertionstotheeffectthatcertainpropertiesbelongtononebuttrueideas.Thereistheassertionthatallideaswhichpayinthelongrunaretrue,andtheassertionthatallideaswhichpayforsomecon-siderabletimearetrue.Andastothefirst,itmaybetrue;butitmayalsobedoubted,andProfessorJamesgivesusnoreasonatallforthinkingthatitistrue.Assumingthatreligiousideashavebeenusefulinthepast,isitquitecertainthattheymaynotpermanentlycontinuetobeuseful,eventhoughtheyarefalse?That,inshort,eventhoughtheyarenottrue,theyneverthelesswillbeuseful,notonlyforatime,butinthelongrun?Andasfortheassertionthatallideas,whichpayforacon-siderabletime,aretrue,thisisobviouslymoredoubtfulstill.Whethercertainreligiousideaswillorwillnotbeusefulinthelongrun,itseemsdifficulttodoubtthatmanyofthemhavebeenusefulforaconsiderabletime.Andwhyshouldwebetolddogmaticallythatallofthesearetrue}This,itseemstome,isbyfarthemostinterestingassertion,whichisleftforProfessorJamestomake,whenwehaverejectedthetheorythatthepropertyofbeingusefulbelongstoalltrueideas,aswellastononebuttrueones.Buthehasgivennoreasonforassertingit.Heseems,infact,tobaseitmerelyuponthegeneraluntenabletheory,thatutilitybelongstoalltrueideas,andtononebuttrueones;thatthisiswhattruthmeans.These,then,seemtometheplainestandmostobviousobjectionstowhatProfessorJamessaysabouttheconnectionbetweentruthandutility.Andthereareonlytwofurtherpoints,inwhathesaysunderthishead,thatIwishtonotice.\n126WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"Inthefirstplace,wehavehithertobeenconsider-ingonlywhetheritistrue,asamatterofempiricalfact,thatallourtrueideasareuseful,andthosewhicharenottrue,never.ProfessorJamesseems,atleast,tomeanthat,asamatteroffact,thisisso;andIhaveonlyurgedhithertothatasamatteroffact,itisnotso.Butaswehaveseen,healsoassertssomethingmorethanthis—healsoassertsthatthispropertyofutilityistheonlyonewhichbelongstoallourtrueideas.Andthisfurtherassertioncannotpossiblybetrue,if,asIhaveurged,therearemanytrueideaswhichdonotpossessthisproperty;orif,asIhaveurged,manyideas,whichdopossessit,areneverthelessnottrue.Theobjectionsalreadyconsideredare,then,sufficienttooverthrowthisfurtherassertionalso.Ifthereareanytrueideas,whicharenotuseful,orifany,whichareuseful,arenottrue,itcannotbethecasethatutilityistheonlypropertywhichtrueideashaveincommon.Theremustbesomeproperty,otherthanutility,whichiscommontoalltrueideas;andacorrecttheoryastowhatpropertyitisthatdoesbelongtoalltrueideas,andtononebuttrueones,isstilltoseek.Theempiricalobjections,hithertogiven,arethensufficientobjec-tionstothisfurtherassertionalso;buttheyarenottheonlyobjectionstoit.Thereisanotherandstillmoreseriousobjectiontotheassertionthatutilityistheonlypropertywhichalltrueideashaveincommon.Forthisassertiondoesnotmerelyimplythat,asamatteroffact,allourtrueideasandnonebuttrueideasareuseful.Itdoes,indeed,implythis;andthereforethefactthattheseem-piricalassertionsarenottrueissufficienttorefuteit.Butitalsoimpliessomethingmore.Ifutilityweretheonlypropertywhichalltrueideashadincommon,itwouldfollownotmerelythatalltrueideasareuseful,butalsothatanyidea,whichwas\nWILLIAMJAMES'<*PRAGMATISM"127useful,wouldbetruenomatterwhatotherpropertiesitmighthaveormightfailtohave.Therecan,Ithink,benodoubtthatProfessorJamesdoesfre-quentlyspeakasifthiswerethecase;andthereisanindependentandstillmoreseriousobjectiontothisimplication.Evenifitweretrue(asitisnot)thatallourtrueideasandnonebuttrueideasare,asamatteroffact,useful,weshouldstillhaveastrongreasontoobjecttothestatementthatanyidea,whichwasuseful,wouldh^true.Foritimpliesthatifsuchanideaasmine,thatProfessorJamesexists,andhascertainthoughts,wereuseful,thisideawouldbetrue,evenifnosuchpersonasPro-fessorJameseverdidexist.Itimpliesthat,iftheideathatIhadthesevenofdiamondsinmyhandatcardslastnight,wereuseful,thisideawouldbetrue,evenif,infact,Ididnothavethatcardinmyhand.Andwecan,Ithink,seequiteplainlythatthisisnotthecase.Withregardtosomekindsofideas,atallevents—ideaswithregardtotheexistenceofotherpeople,orwithregardtopastexperiencesofourown—itseemsquiteplainthattheywouldnotbetrue,unlessthey*'agreedwithreality"insomeothersensetha.ithatwhichPro-fessorJamesdeclarestobetheonlyoneinwhichtrueideasmustagreewithit.EvenifmyideathatProfessorJamesexistswereto"agreewithreality/'inthesensethat,owingtoit,IhandledotherrealitiesbetterthanIshouldhavedonewith-outit,itwould,Ithink,plainlynotbetrue,unlessProfessorJamesreallydidexist—unlesshewereareality.Andthis,Ithink,isoneofthetwomostseriousobjectionstowhatheseemstoholdabouttheconnectionoftruthwithutility.Heseemstoholdthatanyidea,whichwasuseful,wouldbetrue,nomatterwhatotherpropertiesitmightfailtohave.Andwithregardtosomeideas,atallevents,itseemsplainthattheycannotbetrue,unlessthey\n128WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"havethepropertythatwhattheybelievetoexist,reallydoesordidexist.Beliefsintheexistenceofotherpeoplemightbeusefultome.evenifIaloneexisted;but,nevertheless,insuchacase,theywouldnotbetrue.Andthereisonlyoneotherpoint,inwhatPro-fessorJamessaysinconnectionwiththe*'instru-mental"viewoftruth,uponwhichIwishtoremark.Wehaveseenthatheseemssometimestoholdthatbeliefsaretrue,solongastheyare*'profitabletoourlives."Andthisimplies,aswehaveseen,thedoubtfulpropositionthananybeliefwhichisusefulforsomelengthoftime,istrue.Butthisisnotallthatitimplies.Italsoimpliesthatbeliefsaretrueonlysolongastheyareprofit-able.NordoesProfessorJamesappeartomeanbythisthattheyoccur,onlysolongastheyareprofitable.Heseemstohold,onthecontrary,thatbeliefs,whichareprofitableforsometime,dosome-timesfinallyoccuratatimewhentheyarenotprofitable.Heimplies,therefore,thatabelief,whichoccursatseveraldifferenttimes,maybetrueatsomeofthetimesatwhichitoccurs,andyetuntrueatothers.Ithinkthereisnodoubtthatthisviewiswhatheissometimesthinkingof.Andthis,wesee,constitutesaquitenewviewastotheconnectionbetweentruthandutility—aviewquitedifferentfromanythatwehavehithertoconsidered.Thisviewassertsnotthateverytrueideaisusefulatsometime,orinthelongrun,orforaconsider-ableperiod;butthatthetruthofanideamaycomeandgo,asitsutilitycomesandgoes.Itadmitsthatoneandthesameideasometimesoccursattimeswhenitisuseful,andsometimesattimeswhenitisnot;butitmaintainsthatthissameideaistrue,atthosetimeswhenitisuseful,andnottrue,atthosewhenitisnot.AndthefactthatProfessorJamesseemstosuggestthisview,constitutes,I\nWILLIAMJAMES'*'PRAGMATISM"129think,asecondmostseriousobjectiontowhathesaysabouttheconnectionoftruthandutility.Itseemssoobviousthatutilityisapropertywhichcomesandgoes—whichbelongstoagivenideaatonetime,anddoesnotbelongtoitatanother,thatanyonewhosaysthatthetrueistheusefulnaturallyseemsnottobeoverlookingthisobviousfact,buttobesuggestingthattruthisapropertywhichcomesandgoesinthesameway.Itis,inthisway**instrumental"viewoftruthIthink,thattheisconnectedwiththeviewthattruthis"mutable."ProfessorJamesdoes,Ithink,implythattruthismutableinjustthissense—namely,thatoneandthesameideamaybetrueatsomeofthetimesatwhichitoccurs,andnottrueatothers,andthisistheviewwhichIhavenexttoconsider.(")ProfessorJamesseemstohold,generally,that*'truth"ismutable.Andbythisheseemssometimestomeanthatanideawhich,whenitoccursatonetime,istrue,may,whenitoccursatanothertime,notbetrue.Heseemstoholdthatoneandthesameideamaybetrueatonetimeandfalseatanother.Thatitmaybe,forIdonotsupposehemeansthatallideasdoactuallyundergothischangefromtruetofalse.Manytrueideasseemtooccurbutonce,and,ifso,they,atleast,willnotactuallybetrueatonetimeandfalseatanother,though,evenwithregardtothese,perhapsProfessorJamesmeanstomaintainthattheymightbefalseatanothertime,iftheyweretooccuratit.ButIamnotsurethatheevenmeanstomaintainthiswithregardtoallourtrueideas.Perhapshedoesnotmeantosay,withregardtoallofthem,eventhattheycanchangefromtruetofalse.Hespeaks,generally,indeed,asiftruthweremutable;but,inonepassage,heseemstoinsistthatthereisacertainclassoftrueideas,noneofwhichare\n'I30WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"mutableinthisrespect.''Relationsamongpurelymentalideas,''hesays(p.209),**formanotherspherewheretrueandfalsebeliefsobtain,andherethebeliefsareabsoluteorunconditional.Whentheyaretruetheybearthenameeitherofdefini-tionsorofprinciples.Itiseitheraprincipleoradefinitionthatiandimake2,that2andimake3,andsoon;thatwhitedifferslessfromgreythanItdoesfromblack;thatwhenthecausebeginstoacttheeffectalsocommences.Suchpropositionsholdofallpossible*ones/ofallconceivable*whites/•greys/and'causes/Theobjectsherearementalobjects.Theirrelationsareperceptuallyobviousataglance,andnosense-verificationisnecessary.Moreover,oncetrue,alwaystrue,ofthosesamementalobjects.Truthherehasan*eternalcharacter.Ifyoucanfindaconcretethingany-*wherethatis*one*or•whiteor'grey*oran'effect,'thenyourprincipleswilleverlastinglyapplytoit."ProfessorJamesdoesseemheretoholdthattherearetrueideas,whichoncetrue,arealwaystrue.Perhaps,then,hedoesnotholdthata//trueideasaremutable.Perhapshedoesnotevenholdthatalltrueideas,exceptideasofthiskind,areso.Buthedoesseemtoholdatleastthatmanyofourtrueideasaremutable.Andeventhispropositionseemstometobedisputable.Itseemstomethatthereisasenseinwhichitisthecasewitheverytrueideathat,ifoncetrue,itisalwaystrue.Thatistosay,thateveryidea,whichistrueonce,wouldbetrueatanyothertimeatwhichitweretooccur;andthateveryideawhichdoesoccurmorethanonce,iftrueonce,istrueateverytimeatwhichitdoesoccur.Thereseemstome»Isay,tobeasenseinwhichthisisso.Andthisseemstometobethesenseinwhichitismostcommonlyandmostnaturallymaintainedthatalltruthsare**immutable."ProfessorJamesseemstomeanto\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"131denyit,eveninthissense.Heseemstomecontsantlytospeakasiftherewerenosenseinwhichailtruthsareimmutable.AndIonlywishtopointoutwhatseemstometobetheplainestandmostobviousobjectiontosuchlanguage.And,firstofall,thereisonedoctrine,whichheseemstoconnectwiththisofhisthat'*truthsaremutable,"withregardtowhichIfullyagreewithhim.Heseemsveryanxioustoinsistthatrealityismutable:thatitdoeschange,andthatitisnotirrationaltohopethatinthefutureitwillbedifferentfromandmuchbetterthanitisnow.Andthisseemstometobequiteundeniable.ItseemstomequitecertainthatIdohaveideasatonetimewhichIdidnothaveatanother;thatchange,therefore,dossreallyoccur.Itseemstomequitecertainthatinthefuturemanythingswillbedifferentfromwhattheyarenow;andIseenoreasontothinkthattheymaynotbemuchbetter.Thereismuchmiseryintheworldnow;andIthinkitisquitepossiblethatsomedaytherewillreallybemuchless.Thisviewthatrealityismutable,xhaxfacisdochange,thatsomethingshavepropertiesatonetimewhichtheydonothaveatothertimes,seemstomecertainlytrue.Andsofar,therefore,asProfessorJamesmerelymeanstoassertthisobviousfact,Ihavenoobjectiontohisview.Somephilosophers,Ithink,havereallyimpliedthedenialofthisfact.Allthosewhodenytherealityoftimedoseemtometoimplythatnothingreallychangesorcanchange—that,infact,realityiswhollyimmutable.AndsofarasProfessorJamesismerelyprotestingagainstthisview,Ishould,therefore,agreewithhim.ButIthinkitisquiteplainthathedoesnotmeanmerelythis,whenhesaysthattruthismutable.Noonewouldchoosethiswayofexpressinghimselfifhemerelymeanttosaythatsomethingsare\n;132WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"mutable.Truth,ProfessorJameshastoldus,isapropertyofcertainofourideas.Andthoseofourideas,whicharetrueorfalse,arecertainlyonlyapartoftheUniverse.OtherthingsintheUniversemight,therefore,change,evenifourideasneverchangedinrespectofthisproperty.Andourideasthemselvesdoundoubtedlychangeinsomerespects.Agivenideaexistsinmymindatonemomentanddoesnotexistinitatanother.Atonemomentitisinmymindandnotinsomebodyelse's,andatanotherinsomebodyelse*sandnotinmine.IsometimesthinkofthetruththattwicetwoarefourwhenIaminonemood,andsometimeswhenIaminanother.Isometimesthinkofitinconnectionwithonesetofideasandsometimesinconnectionwithanotherset.Ideas,then,areconstantlychanginginsomerespects.Theycomeandgoandatonetimetheystandinagivenrelationtootherthingsorideas,towhichatanothertimetheydonotstandinthatrelation.Inthissense,anygivenideamaycertainlyhaveapropertyatonetimewhichithasnotgotatanothertime.Allthisseemsobvious;andallthiscannotbeadmitted,withoutadmittingthatrealityismutable—thatsomethingschange.Butobviouslyitdoesnotseemtofollowfromthisthatthereisnorespectinwhichideasareimmutable.Itdoesnotseemtofollowthatbecauseideas,andotherthings,changesomeoftheirproperties,theynecessarilychangethatonewhichweareconsidering—namely,'*truth."Itdoesnotfollowthatagivenidea,whichhasthepropertyoftruthatonetime,everexistsatanyothertimewithouthavingthatproperty.Andyetthatthisdoeshappenseemstobepartofwhatismeantbysayingthattruthismutable.Plainly,therefore,tosaythisistosaysomethingquitedifferentfromsayingthatsomethingsaremutable.Even,therefore,ifweadmitthatsomethingsare\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"133mutable,itisstillopentoconsiderwhethertruthisso.AndthisiswhatIwantnowtoconsider.Isitthecasethatanideawhichexistsatonetime,andistruethen,everexistsatanyothertime,withoutbeingtrue?Isitthecasethatanyideaeverchangesfromtruetofalse?Thatithasthepropertyofbeingtrueononeoftheoccasionswhenitexists,andthatithasnotthisproperty,butthatofbeingfalseinstead,onsomeotheroccasionwhenitexists?Inordertoanswerthisquestionclearly,itis,Ithink,necessarytomakestillanotherdistinction.Itdoescertainlyseemtobetrue,inasense,thatagivenideamaybetrueononeoccasionandfalseonanother.Weconstantlyspeakasiftherewerecasesinwhichagiventhingwastrueononeoccasionandfalseonanother;andIthinkitcannotbedeniedthat,whenwesospeak,weareoftenexpressinginaperfectlyproperandlegitimatemannersomethingwhichisundeniablytrue.Itistruenow,Imightsay.thatIaminthisroom;butto-morrowthiswillnotbetrue.Itistruenowthatmenareoftenverymiserable;butperhapsinsomefuturestateofsocietythiswillnotbetrue.Theseareperfectlynaturalformsofexpression,andwhattheyexpressissomethingwhichcertainlymaybetrue.Andyetwhattheydoapparentlyassertisthatsomethingorother,whichistrueatonetime,willnot,orperhapswillnot,betrueatanother.Weconstantlyusesuchexpressions,whichimplythatwhatistrueatonetimeisnottrueatanother;anditiscertainlylegitimatetousethem.Andhence,Ithink,wemustadmitthat,inasense,itistruethatathingmaybetrueatonetimewhichisnottrueatanother;inthatsense,namely,inwhichweusetheseexpressions.Anditis,Ithink,alsoplainthatthesethings,whichmaybetrueatonetimeandfalseatanother,may,inasense,beideas.Wemightevensay:TheideathatIaminthisroom,is\n134WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"'truenow;butto-morrowitwillnotbetrue.Wemightsaythiswithoutanystrainonlanguage.Inanyordinarybook—indeed,inanyphilosophicalbook,wherethesubjectweareatpresentdiscuss-ingwasnotbeingexpresslydiscussed—suchexpressionsdo,Ithink,constantlyoccur.Andweshouldpassthem,withoutanyobjection.Weshouldatonceunderstandwhattheymeant,andtreatthemasperfectlynaturalexpressionsofthingsundeniablytrue.Wemust,then,Ithink,admitthat,inasense,anideamaybetrueatonetime,andfalseatanother.Thequestionis:Inwhatsense?Whatisthetruthforwhichtheseperfectlylegitimateexpressionsstand?Itseemstomethatinallthesecases,sofaraswearenotmerelytalkingoifacts,butoftrueideas,thatthe**idea"whichwetrulysaytobetrueatonetime—andfalseatanother,ismerelytheideaoi^.sentencethatis,ofcertainwords.Andwedoundoubtedly***'callwordstrue."ThewordsIamatameetingoftheAristotelianSociety"aretrue,ifIusethemnow;butifIusethesamewordsto-morrow,theywouldnotbetrue.Thewords"GeorgeIIIiskingofEngland"weretruein1800,buttheyarenottruenow,Thatistosay,agivensetofwordsmayundoubtedlybetrueatonetime,andfalseatanother;andsincewemayhaveideasofwordsaswellasofotherthings,wemay,inthissense,saythesameofcertainofour"ideas."Wemaysaythatsomeofour"ideas"(namelythoseofwords)aretrueatonetimeandnottrueatanother.ButisitconceivablethatProfessorJamesmerelymeanttoassertthatthesamewordsaresometimestrueatonetimeandfalseatanother?Canthisbeallhemeansbysayingthattruthismutable?Idonotthinkitcanpossiblybeso.Noone,Ithink,indefinitelydiscussingthemutabilityoftruth,couldsaythattrueideasweremutable,and\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"135yetmean(althoughhedidnotsayso)thatthispropositionappliedsolelytoideasofwords.Pro-fessorJamesmust,Ithink,havebeensometimesthinkingthatotherideas,andnotmerelyideasofwords,dosometimeschangefromtruetofalse.AndthisisthepropositionwhichIamconcernedtodispute.Itseemstomethatifwemeanbyanidea,notmerelytheideaofcertainwords,butthekindofideawhichwordsexpress,itisverydoubtfulwhethersuchanideaeverchangesfromtruetofalse—whetheranysuchideaisevertrueatonetimeandfalseatanother.Andplainly,inthefirstplace,themerefactthatthesamesetofwords,asintheinstancesIhavegiven,reallyaretrueatonetimeandfalseatanother,doesnotaffordanypresumptionthatanythingwhichtheystandforistrueatonetimeandfalseatanother.Forthesamewordsmayobviouslybeusedindifferentsensesatdifferenttimes;andhencethoughthesamewords,whichformerlyexpressedatruth,mayceasetoexpressone,thatmaybebecausetheynowexpressadifferentidea,andnotbecausetheideawhichtheyformerlyexpressedhasceasedtobetrue.Andthat,ininstancessuchasIhavegiven,thewordsdochangetheirmeaningaccordingtothetimeatwhichtheyareutteredorthoughtof,isIthink,**evident.IfIusenowthewordsIaminthisroom,"thesewordscertainlyexpress(amongotherthings)theideathatmybeinginthisroomiscontemporarywithmypresentuseofthewords;andifIweretousethesamewordsto-morrow,theywouldexpresstheideathatmybeinginthisroomto-morrow,wascontemporarywiththeuseofthemthen.Andsincemyuseofthemthenwouldnotbethesamefactasmyuseofthemnow,theywouldcertainlythenexpressadifferentideafromthatwhichtheyexpressnow.Andingeneral,\n136WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"wheneverweusethepresenttenseinitsprimarysense,itseemstomeplainthatwedomeansome-thingdifferentbyiteachtimeweuseit.Wealwaysmean(amongotherthings)toexpresstheideathatagiveneventiscontemporarywithouractualuseofit;andsinceouractualuseofitononeoccasionisalwaysadifferentfactfromouractualuseofitonanother,weexpressbyitadifferentideaeachtimeweuseit.Andsimilarlywiththepastandfuturetenses.Ifanybodyhadsaidin1807*'Napoleonisdead,"hewouldcertainlyhavemeantbythesewordssomethingdifferentfromwhatImeanbythemwhenIusethemnow.HewouldhavemeantthatNapoleon'sdeathoccurredatatimeprevioustohisuseofthosewords;andthiswouldnothavebeentrue.ButinthisfactthereisnothingtoshowthatifhehadmeantbythemwhatImeannow,hisideawouldnothavebeenastruethenasmineisnow.Andso,ifIsay'*Itwillrainto-morrow,"thesewordshaveadifferentmeaningto-dayfromwhattheywouldhaveifIusedthemto-morrow.Whatwemeanby"to-morrow"isobviouslyadifferentday,whenweusethewordononeday,fromwhatwemeanbyitwhenweuseitonanother.Butinthisthereisnothingtoshowthatiftheidea,whichInowmeanby**Itwillrainto-morrow,"weretooccuragainto-morrow,itwouldnotbetruethen,ifitistruenow.Allthisissurelyveryobvious.But,ifwetakeaccountofit,andifweconcentrateourattentionnotonthewordsbutonwhatismeantbythem,isitsocertainthatwhatwemeanbythemonanyoneoccasioneverchangesfromtruetofalse?Ifthereweretooccurtometo-morrowtheverysameideawhichInowexpressbythewords**Iaminthisroom,"isitcertainthatthisideawouldnotbeastruethenasitisnow.?ItisperhapstruethatthewhaleofwhatImeanbysuchaphraseas\n—WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"137thisneverdoesrecur.Butpartofitdoes,andthatapartwhichistrue.PartofwhatImeaniscertainlyidenticalwithpartofwhatIshouldmeanto-morrowbysaying*'Iwasinthatroomlastnight/'Andthispartwouldbeastruethen,asitisnow.Andisthereanypart,which,ifitweretorecuratanytime,wouldnotthenbetrue,thoughitistruenow?Inthecaseofallideasorpartsofideas,whicheverdoactuallyrecur,canwefindasingleinstanceofone,whichisplainlytrueatoneofthetimeswhenitoccurs,andyetnottrueatanother?Icannotthinkofanysuchinstance.Andontheotherhandthisverypropositionthatanyidea(otherthanmerewords)whichistrueonce,wouldbetrueatanytime,seemstometobeoneofthosetruthsofwhichProfessorJameshasspokenashavingan''eternal,""absolute,""unconditional"character—asbeing"perceptuallyobviousataglance*'nosense-"andneedingverification."Justasweknowthat,ifaparticularcolourdiffersmorefromblackthanfromgreyatonetime,thesamecolourwoulddiffermorefromblackthanfromgreyatanytime,so,itseemstome,wecanseethat,ifaparticularideaistrueatonetime,thesameideawouldbetrueatanytime.Itseemstome,then,thatifwemeanbyanidea,notmerewords,butthekindofideawhichwordsexpress,anyidea,whichistrueatonetimewhenitoccurs,wouldbetrueatanytimewhenitweretooccur;andthatthisisso,eventhoughitisanidea,whichreferstofactswhicharemutable.Mybeinginthisroomisafactwhichisnow,butwhichcertainlyhasnotbeenateverytimeandwillnotbeateverytime.Andthewords"Iaminthisroom,"thoughtheyexpressatruthnow,wouldnothaveexpressedoneifIhadusedthemyesterday,andwillnotifIusethemto-morrow.Butifweconsidertheideawhichthesewordsnowexpress\n138WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"namely,theideaoftheconnectionofmybeinginthisroomwiththisparticulartime—itseemstomeevident'thatanybodywhohadthoughtofthatconnectionatanytimeinthepast,wouldhavebeenthinkingtruly,andthatanybodywhoweretothinkofitatanytimeinthefuturewouldbethinkingtruly.Thisseemstometobethesenseinwhichtruthsareimmutable—inwhichnoideacanchangefromtruetofalse.AndIthinkProfessorJamesmeanstodenyoftruthsgenerally,ifnotofalltruths,thattheyareimmutableeveninthissense.Ifhedoesnotmeanthisthereseemsnothingleftforhimtomean,whenhesaysthattruthsaremutable,except(i)thatsome/ac^saremutable,and(2)thatthesamewordsmaybetrueatonetimeandfalseatanother.Anditseemstomeimpossiblethathecouldspeakashedoes,ifhemeantnothingmorethanthesetwothings,Ibelieve,therefore,thatheisreallythinkingthatideaswhichhavebeenoncetrue{ideas,andnotmerelywords)dosometimesafterwardsbecomefalse:thattheverysameideaisatonetimetrueandatanotherfalse.Buthecertainlygivesnoinstancewhichshowsthatthisdoeseveroccur.Andhowfardoeshemeanhisprincipletocarryhim?DoesheholdthatthisideathatJuliusCaesarwasmurderedintheSenate-House,thoughtruenow,may,atsomefuturetimeceasetobetrue,ifitshouldbemoreprofitabletothelivesoffuturegenerationstobelievethathediedinhisbed?Thingslikethisarewhathiswordsseemtoimply;and,evenifhedoesholdthattruthslikethisarenotmutable,henevertriestotellustowhatkindsoftruthshewouldlimitmutability,norhowtheydifferfromsuchasthis.(Ill)Finally,thereremainstheviewthat"toanunascertainableextentourtruthsareman-made\n:WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"139products."AndtheonlypointIwanttomakeaboutthisviewmaybeputverybriefly.ItisnoticeablethatalltheinstanceswhichPro-fessorJamesgivesofthewaysinwhich,accordingtohim,**ourtruths"are**made"areinstancesofwaysinwhichourbeliefscomeintoexistence.Inmanyoftheseways,itwouldseem,falsebeliefssometimescomeintoexistenceaswellastrueones;andItakeitProfessorJamesdoesnotalwayswishtodenythis.Falsebeliefs,Ithinkhewouldsay,arejustasmuch"man-madeproducts"astrueones:itissufficientforhispurposeiftruebeliefsdocomeintoexistenceinthewayshementions.Andtheonlypointwhichseemstobeillustratedbyalltheseinstances,isthatinallofthemtheexistenceofatruebeliefdoesdependinsomewayorotheruponthepreviousexistenceofsomethinginsomeman'smind.TheyareallofthemcasesinwhichwemaytrulysayThismanwouldnothavehadjustthatbelief,hadnotsomemanpreviouslyhadsuchandsuchexperi-ences,orinterests,orpurposes.Insomecasestheyareinstancesofwaysinwhichtheexistenceofaparticularbeliefinamandependsuponhisownpreviousexperiencesorinterestsorvolitions.ButthisdoesnotseemtobethecaseinallProfessorJamesseemsalsoanxioustoillustratethepointthatoneman'sbeliefsoftendependuponthepreviousexperiencesorinterestsorvolitionsofothermen.And,asIsay,theonlypointwhichseemstobedefinitelyillustratedinallcasesisthattheexistenceofatruebeliefdoesdepend,insomewayorother^uponsomethingwhichhaspreviouslyexistedinsomeman'smind.Almostanykindofdependence,itwouldseem,issufficienttoillustrateProfessorJames'point.Andasregardsthisgeneralthesisthatalmostallourbeliefs,trueaswellasfalse,depend,insomewayorother,uponwhathaspreviouslybeenin\n140WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"somehumanmind,itwill,Ithink,bereadilyadmitted.Itisacommonplace,which,sofarasIknow,hardlyanyonewoulddeny.Ifthisisallthatistobemeantbysayingthatourtruebeliefsare"man-made,"itmust,Ithink,beadmittedthatalmostall,ifnotquiteall,reallyareman-made.AndthisisallthatProfessorJames'instancesseemtome,infact,toshow.ButisthisallthatProfessorJamesmeans,whenhesaysthatourtruthsareman-made?Isitcon-ceivablethatheonlymeanstoinsistuponthisundeniable,andgenerallyadmitted,commonplace?Itseemstomequiteplainthatthisisnotallthathemeans.Ithinkhecertainlymeanstosuggestthat,fromthefactthatwe**make"ourtruebeliefs,somethingelsefollows.AndIthinkitisnothardtoseeonethingmorewhichhedoesmean.Ithinkhecertainlymeanstosuggestthatwenotonlymakeourtruebeliefs,butalsothatwemakethemtrue.Atleastasmuchasthisiscertainlynaturallysuggestedbyhiswords.Noonewouldpersistentlysaythatwemakeourtruths,unlesshemeant,atleast,notmerelythatwemakeourtruebeliefs,butalsothatwemakethemtrue—unlesshemeantnotmerelythattheexistenceofourtruebeliefs,butalsothattheirtruth,dependeduponhumancon-ditions.This,itseemstome,isoneconsequencewhichProfessorJamesmeansustodrawfromthecommonplacethattheexistenceofourtruebeliefsdependsuponhumanconditions.Butdoesthisconsequence,infact,followfromthatcommonplace?Fromthefactthatwemakeourtruebeliefs,doesitfollowthatwemakethem,true?Inonesense,undoubtedly,eventhisdoesfollow.Ifwesay(aswemaysay)thatnobeliefcanbetrue,unlessitexists,thenitfollowsthat,inasense,thetruthofabeliefmustalwaysdependuponanyconditionsuponwhichitsexistencedepends.If,\nWILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"141therefore,theoccurrenceofabeliefdependsuponhumanconditions,so,too,mustitstruth.Ifthebeliefhadneverexisted,itwouldneverhavebeentrue;andthereforeitstruthmust,inasense,dependuponhumanconditionsinexactlythesamedegreeinwhichitsexistencedependsuponthem.Thisisobvious.Butisthisallthatismeant.^Isthisallthatwouldbesuggestedtousbytellingusthatwemakeourbeliefstrue?Itiseasytoseethatitisnot.Imayhavethebeliefthatitwillrainto-morrow.AndImayhave*'made"myselfhavethisbelief.ItmaybethecasethatIshouldnothavehadit,butforpeculi-aritiesinmypastexperiences,inmyinterestsandmyvolitions.ItmaybethecasethatIshouldnothavehadit,butforadeliberateattempttocon-siderthequestionwhetheritwillrainornot.Thismayeasilyhappen.Andcertainlythisparticularbeliefofminewouldnothavebeentrue,unlessitexisted.Itstruth,therefore,depends,inasense,uponanyconditionsuponwhichitsexistencedepends.Andthisbeliefmaybetrue.Itwillbetrue,ifitdoesrainto-morrow.But,inspiteofallthesereasons,wouldanyonethinkofsayingthat,incaseitistrue,Ihadmadeittrue?WouldanyonesaythatIhadhadanyhandatallinmakingittrue?Plainlynoonewould.WeshouldsaythatIhadahandinmakingittrue,ifandonlyifIhadahandinmakingtherainfall.Ineverycaseinwhichwebelieveintheexistenceofanything,pastorfuture,weshouldsaythatwehadhelpedtomakethebelieftrue,ifandonlyifwehadhelpedtocausetheexistenceofthefactwhich,inthatbelief,webelieveddidexistorwouldexist.Surelythisisplain.Imaybelievethatthesunwillriseto-morrow.AndImayhavehadahandin"making"thisbelief;certainlyitoftendependsforitsexistenceuponwhathasbeenpreviouslyinmymind.And\n142WILLIAMJAMES*"PRAGMATISM"ifthesundoesrise,mybeliefwillhavebeentrue.Ihave,therefore,hadahandinmakingatruebelief.Butwouldanyonesaythat,therefore,Ihadahandinmakingthisbelieftrue?Certainlynoonewould.Noonewouldsaythatanythinghadcontributedtomakethisbelieftrue,exceptthoseconditions(whatevertheymaybe)whichcontributedtomakingthesunactuallyrise.Itisplain,then,thatby"makingabelieftrue,"wemeansomethingquitedifferentfromwhat**makingProfessorJamesmeansby"thatbelief.Conditionswhichhaveahandinmakingagiventruebelief,may(itappears)havenohandatallinmakingittrue;andconditionswhichhaveahandinmakingittruemayhavenohandatallinmakingit.Certainlythisishowweusethewords.Weshouldneversaythatwehadmadeabelieftrue,merelybecausewehadmadethebelief.Butnow,whichofthesetwothingsdoesProfessorJamesmean?Doeshemeanmerelytheacceptedcommon-placethatwemakeourtruebeliefs,inthesensethatalmostallofthemdependfortheirexistenceonwhathasbeenpreviouslyinsomehumanmind?Ordoeshemeanalsothatwemakethemtrue—thattheirtruthalsodependsonwhathasbeenpreviouslyinsomehumanmind?Icannothelpthinkingthathehasthelatter,andnotonlytheformerinhismind.But,then,whatdoesthisinvolve?Ifhisinstancesof''truth-making"aretobeanythingtothepurpose,itshouldmeanthat,wheneverIhaveahandincausingoneofmyownbeliefs,Ialwayshavetothatextentahandinmakingittrue.That,therefore,Ihaveahandinactuallymakingthesunrise,thewindblow,andtherainfall,wheneverIcausemybeliefsinthesethings.Nay,more,itshouldmeanthat,wheneverI*'make"atruebeliefaboutthepast,Imusthavehadahandinmakingthistrue.Andif\n—WILLIAMJAMES'^^PRAGMATISM"143so,thencertainlyImusthavehadahandincausingtheFrenchRevolution,incausingmyfather'sbirth,inmakingProfessorJameswritethisbook.Certainlyheimpliesthatsomemanorothermusthavehelpedincausingalmosteveryevent,inwhichanymanevertrulybelieved.Thatitwaswewhomadetheplanetsrevolveroundthesun,whomadetheAlpsrise,andthefloorofthePacificsink—allthesethings,andotherslikethem,seemtobeinvolved.Anditistheseconsequenceswhichseemtometojustifyadoubtwhether,infact**ourtruthsaretoanunascertainableextentman-made."Thatsomeofourtruthsareman-made—indeed,agreatmanyIfullyadmit.Wecertainlydomakesomeofourbeliefstrue.TheSecretaryprobablyhadabeliefthatIshouldwritethispaper,andIhavemadehisbelieftruebywritingit.Mencertainlyhavethepowertoaltertheworldtoacertainextent;and,sofarastheydo**this,theycertainlymaketrue"anybeliefs,whicharebeliefsintheoccurrenceofthesealterations.ButIcanseenoreasonforsupposing'*maketruethatthey"nearlyallthoseoftheirbeliefswhicharetrue.AndcertainlytheonlyreasonwhichProfessorJamesseemstogiveforbelievingthis—namely,thattheexistenceofalmostalltheirbeliefsdependsonthem—seemstobenoreasonforitatall.Forunquestionablyamandoesnot*'maketrue"nearlyeverybeliefwhoseexistencedependsonhim;andifso,thequestionwhichoftheirbeliefsandhowmany,mendo'*maketrue"mustbesettledbyquiteothercon-siderations.Inconclusion,Iwishtosumupwhatseemstometobethemostimportantpointsaboutthis"pragmatisttheoryoftruth,"asProfessorJamesrepresentsit.Itseemstomethat,inwhathesays\n144WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"aboutit,hehasinhismindsomethingswhicharetrueandotherswhicharefalse;andIwishtotabulateseparatelytheprincipaloneswhichItaketobetrue,andtheprincipaloneswhichItaketobefalse.Thetrueonesseemtometobethese:—Thatmostofourtruebeliefsareusefultous;andthatmostofthebeliefsthatareusefultousaretrue.Thattheworldreallydoeschangeinsomerespects;thatfactsexistatonetime,whichdidn'tandwon'texistatothers;andthathencetheworldmaybebetteratsomefuturetimethanitisnoworhasbeeninthepast.Thattheverysamewordsmaybetrueatonetimeandfalseatanother—thattheymayexpressatruthatonetimeandafalsehoodatanother.Thattheexistenceofmost,ifnotall,ofourbeliefs,trueaswellasfalse,doesdependuponpreviouseventsinourmentalhistory;thatweshouldneverhavehadtheparticularbeliefswedohave,hadnotourpreviousmentalhistorybeensuchasitwas.Thatthetruth,andnotmerelytheexistence,ofsomeofourbeliefs,doesdependuponus.Thatwereallydomakesomealterationsintheworld,andthathencewedohelpto**maketrue"allthoseofourbeliefswhicharebeliefsintheexistenceofthesealterations.ToallofthesepropositionsIhavenoobjectiontooffer.Andtheyseemtometobegenerallyadmittedcommon-places.Acertainclassofphilosophersdo,indeed,implythedenialofeveryoneofthem—namely,thosephilosopherswhodenytherealityoftime.AndIthinkthatpartofProfessorJames'objectistoprotestagainsttheviewsofthesephilosophers.Allofthesepro-\n—;WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"145positionsdoconstituteaprotestagainstsuchviewsandsofartheymightbeallthatProfessorJamesmeanttoassert.ButIdonotthinkthatanyone,fairlyreadingthroughwhathesays,couldgettheimpressionthatthesethings,andnothingmore,werewhathehadinhismind.Whatgivescolourandinteresttowhathesays,seemstobeobviouslysomethingquitedifferent.And,ifwetrytofindoutwhatexactlythechiefthingsarewhichgivehisdiscussionitscolourandinterest,itseemstomewemaydistinguishthatwhathehasinhismind,wrappedupinmoreorlessambiguouslanguage,arethefollowingpropositions,toallofwhichIhavetriedtourgewhatseemtomethemostobviousobjections:Thatutilityisapropertywhichdistinguishestruebeliefsfromthosewhicharenottrue;that,there-fore,alltruebeliefsareuseful,andallbeliefs,whichareuseful,aretrue—by"utility"beingsometimesmeant**utilityonatleastoneoccasion,'*sometimes"utilityinthelongrun,"sometimes"utilityforsomelengthoftime."Thatallbeliefswhichareusefulforsomelengthoftimearetrue.Thatutilityistheonlypropertywhichalltruebeliefshaveincommon:that,therefore,ifitwereusefultometobelieveinProfessorJames*existence,thisbeliefwouldbetrue,evenifhedidn'texistandthat,if\x.werenotusefultometobelievethis,thebeliefwouldbefalse,evenifhedid.Thatthebeliefs,whichweexpressbywords,andnotmerelythewordsthemselves,maybetrueatonetimeandnottrueatanother;andthatthisisageneralrule,thoughperhapstheremaybesomeexceptions.Thatwhenevertheexistenceofabeliefdepends\n146WILLIAMJAMES'"PRAGMATISM"tosomeextentonus,thenalsothetruthofthatbeliefdependstosomeextentonus;inthesenseinwhichthisimplies,that,whentheexistenceofmybeliefthatashowerwillfalldependsuponme,then,ifthisbeliefistrue,Imusthavehadahandinmakingtheshowerfall:that,therefore,menmusthavehadahandinmakingtoexistalmosteveryfactwhichtheyeverbelievetoexist.\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHYInbothofhistwobooksontheHumanUnder-standing,Humehad,Ithink,onemaingeneralobject.Hetellsusthatitwashisobjecttodiscover"theextentandforceofhumanunder-standing,"togiveus"anexactanalysisofitspowersandcapacity."Andwemay,Ithink,expresswhathemeantbythisinthefollowingway.Heplainlyheld(aswealldo)thatsomemensometimesentertainopinionswhichtheycannotknowtobetrue.Andhewishedtopointoutwhatcharacteristicsarepossessedbythoseofouropinionswhichwecanknowtobetrue,withaviewofpersuadingusthatanyopinionwhichdoesnotpossessanyofthesecharacteristicsisofakindwhichwecannotknowtobeso.Hethustriestolaydowncertainrulestotheeffectthattheonlypropositionswhichwecan,anyofus,knowtobetrueareofcertaindefinitekinds.Itisinthissense,Ithink,thathetriestodefinethelimitsofhumanunderstanding.Withthisobjecthe,firstofall,dividesallthepropositions,whichwecanevensomuchascon-ceive,intotwoclasses.Theyareall,hesays,eitherpropositionsabout"relationsofideas"orelseabout"mattersoffact."Bypropositionsabout"relationsofideas"hemeanssuchpro-positionsasthattwicetwoarefour,orthatblackdiffersfromwhite;anditis,Ithink,easyenoughtosee,thoughbynomeanseasytodefine,what\n148HUME'SPHILOSOPHYkindofpropositionsitisthathemeanstoincludeinthisdivision.Theyare,hesays,theonlykindofpropositionswithregardtowhichwecanhave"intuitive"or"demonstrative"certainty.Butthevastmajorityofthepropositionsinwhichwebelieveandwhichinterestusmost,belongtotheotherdivision'*:theyarepropositionsaboutmattersoffact."Andtheseagainhedividesintotwoclasses.Sofarashiswordsgo,thislatterdivision**mattersofisbetweenfact,beyondthepresenttestimonyofoursenses,ortherecordsofourmemory,"ontheonehand,andmattersoffactforwhichwehavetheevidenceofourmemoryorsenses,ontheother.Butitis,Ithink,quiteplainthatthesewordsdonotrepresentquiteaccuratelythedivisionwhichhereallymeanstomake.Heplainlyintendstoreckonalongwithfactsforwhichwehavetheevidenceofoursensesallfactsforwhichwehavetheevidenceofdirectobservation—suchfacts,forinstance,asthosewhichIobservewhenIobservethatIamangryorafraid,andwhichcannotbestrictlysaidtobeapprehendedbymysenses.Thedivision,then,whichhereallyintendstomakeis^toputitquitestrictly)intothetwoclasses—(i)propositionswhichassertsomematteroffactwhichIam(inthestrictestsense)observingatthemoment,orwhichIhavesoobservedinthepastandnowremember;and(2)propositionswhichassertanymatteroffactwhichIamnotnowobservingandneverhaveobserved,or,ifIhave,havequiteforgotten.Wehave,then,thethreeclasses—(i)propositionswhichassert"relationsofideas";(2)propositionswhichassert"mattersoffact"forwhichwehavetheevidenceofdirectobservationorpersonalmemory;(3)propositionswhichassert"mattersoffact"forwhichwehavenotthisevidence.Andasregardspropositionsofthefirsttwoclasses,\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY149Humedoesnotseemtodoubtourcapacityforknowledge.Hedoesnotdoubtthatwecanknowsome(though,ofcourse,notall)propositionsabout*'relationsofideas"tobetrue;heneverdoubts,forinstance,thatwecanknowthattwicetwoarefour.Andhegenerallyassumesalsothateachofuscanknowthetruthofallpropositionswhichmerelyassertsomematteroffactwhichweour-selvesare,inthestrictestsense,directlyobserving,orwhichwehavesoobservedandnowremember.Hedoes,indeed,inoneplace,suggestadoubtwhetherourmemoryisevertobeimplicitlytrusted,buthegenerallyassumesthatitalwayscan.Itiswithregardtopropositionsofthethirdclassthatheischieflyanxioustodeterminewhichofthem(ifany)wecanknowtobetrueandwhichnot.Inwhatcasescananymanknowanymatteroffactwhichhehimselfhasnotdirectlyobserved?ItisHume'sviewsonthisquestionwhichform,Ithink,themaininterestofhisphilosophy.Heproposes,firstofall,bywayofanswertoit,arule,whichmay,Ithink,beexpressedasfollows:Noman,hesays,caneverknowanymatteroffact,whichhehasnothimselfobserved,unlesshecanknowthatitisconnectedby**therelationofcauseandeffect,"withsomefactwhichhehasobserved.Andnomancaneverknowthatanytwofactsareconnectedbythisrelation,exceptbythehelpofhisownpastexperience.Inotherwords,ifIamtoknowanyfact,A,whichIhavenotmyselfobserved,mypastexperiencemustgivemesomefoundationforthebeliefthatAiscausallyconnectedwithsomefact,B,whichIhaveobserved.Andtheonlykindofpastexperiencewhichcangivemeanyfound-ationforsuchabeliefis,Humeseemstosay,asfollows:Imust,hesays,havefoundfactslikeA"constantlyconjoined"inthepastwith^a^^^likeB.Thisiswhathesays;butwemustnot,Ithink,\n150HUME'SPHILOSOPHYpresshiswordstoostrictly.Imay,forinstance,knowthatAisprobablyafact,evenwheretheconjunctionoffactslikeitwithfactslikeBhasnotbeenquiteconstant.OrinsteadofobservingfactslikeAconjoinedwithfactslikeB,Imayhaveob-servedawholeseriesofconjunctions—forinstance,betweenAandC,CandD,DandE,andEandB;andsuchaseries,howeverlong,willdoquiteaswelltoestablishacausalconnectionbetweenAandB,asifIhaddirectlyobservedconjunctionsbe-tweenAandBthemselves.Suchmodificationsasthis.Humewould,Ithink,certainlyallow.But,allowingforthem,hisprincipleis,Ithink,quiteclear.Ican,heholds,neverknowanyfactwhat-ever,whichIhavenotmyselfobserved,unlessIhaveobservedsimilarfactsinthepastandhaveobservedthattheywere"conjoined"(directlyorindirectly)withfactssimilartosomefactwhichIdonowobserveorremember.Inthissense,heholds,allourknowledgeoffacts,beyondthereachofourownobservation,isfoundedonexperience.ThisisHume'sprimaryprinciple.Butwhatconsequencesdoeshethinkwillfollowfromit,astothekindoffacts,beyondourownobservation,whichwecanknow.-^Wemay,Ithink,distinguishthreeentirelydifferentviewsastoitsconsequences,whichhesuggestsindifferentpartsofhiswork.Inthefirstplace,whereheisspeciallyengagedinexplainingthisprimaryprinciple,hecertainlyseemstosupposethatallpropositionsofthekind,whichweassumemostuniversallyineverydaylife,maybefoundedonexperienceinthesenserequired.Hesupposesthatwehavethisfoundationinex-perienceforsuchbeliefsasthat"astonewillfall,orfireburn";thatJuliusCaesarwasmurdered;thatthesunwillriseto-morrow;thatallmenaremortalHespeaksasifexperiencedidnotmerelyrendersuchbeliefsprobable,butactuallyprovedthemto\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY151betrue.The**argumentsfromexperience"intheirfavourare,hesays,suchas**leavenoroomfordoubtoropposition."Theonlykindsofbelief,whichhedefinitelymentionsasnotfoundedonexperience,are**popularsuperstitions"ontheonehand,andcertainreligiousandphilosophicalbeliefs,ontheother.Heseemstosupposethatafew(averyfew)religiousbeliefsmay,perhaps,befoundedonexperience.ButasregardsmostofthespecificdoctrinesofChristianity,forexample,heseemstobeclearthattheyarenotsofounded.Thebeliefinmiraclesisnotfoundedonexperience;noristhephilosophicalbeliefthateveryeventiscausedbythedirectvolitionoftheDeity.Inshort,itwouldseem,thatinthisdoctrinethatourknowledgeofunobservedfacts**isconfinedtosuchasarefoundedonexperience,"hemeanstodrawthelineverymuchwhereitisdrawnbythefamiliardoctrinewhich**Agnosticism."Wecanknowsuchiscalledfactsasareassertedinbookson"history,ge-ographyorastronomy,"oron**politics,physicsandchemistry,"becausesuchassertionsmaybe'^foundedonexperience";butwecannotknowthegreaterpartofthefactsassertedinbooks**ofdivinityorschoolmetaphysics,"becausesuchassertionshavenofoundationinexperience.This,Ithink,wasclearlyoneofHume'sviews.Hemeanttofixthelimitsofourknowledgeatapointwhichwouldexcludemostreligiouspropositionsandagreatmanyphilosophicalones,asincapableofbeingknown;butwhichwouldincludealltheotherkindsofpropositions,whicharemostuniversallyacceptedbycommon-sense,ascapableofbeingknown.Andhethoughtthat,sofarasmattersoffactbeyondthereachofourpersonalobservationareconcerned,thispointcoincidedwiththatatwhichthepossibilityof**foundationonexperience"ceases.\n152HUME'SPHILOSOPHYBut,ifweturntoanotherpartofhiswork,wefindaverydifferentviewsuggested.Inaquitedistinctsectionofbothhisbooks,heinvestigatesthebeliefswhichweentertainconcerningtheexistenceof"externalobjects."Andhedistin-guishestwodifferentkindsofbeliefwhichmaybe*'Almostheldonthissubject.allmankind,andphilosophersthemselves,forthegreatestpartoftheirlives,"believe,hesays,that"theverythingstheyfeelandsee"areexternalobjects,inthesensethattheycontinuetoexist,evenwhenweceasetofeelorseethem.Philosophers,ontheotherhand,havebeenledtorejectthisopinionandtosuppose(whentheyreflect)thatwhatweactuallyperceivebythesensesneverexistsexceptwhenweperceiveit,butthatthereareotherexternalobjects,whichdoexistindependentlyofus,andwhichcauseustoperceivewhatwedoperceive.Humeinvestigatesbothoftheseopinions,atgreatlengthintheTreatise,andmuchmorebrieflyintheEnquiry^andcomestotheconclusion,inbothbooks,thatneitherofthemcanbe"foundedonexperience,"inthesensehehasdefined.Asregardsthefirstofthem,thevulgaropinion,hedoesseemtoadmitintheTreatisethatitis,inasense,foundedonexperience;butnot,heinsists,inthesensedefined.Andheseemsalsotothinkthat,apartfromthisfact,thereareconclusivereasonsforholdingthattheopinioncannotbetrue.Andasregardsthephilosophicalopinion,hesaysthatanybeliefinexternalobjects,whichweneverperceivebutwhichcauseourperceptions,cannotpossiblybefoundedonexperience,forthesimplereasonthatifitwere,weshouldneedtohavedirectlyobservedsomeoftheseobjectsandtheir"conjunction"withwhatwedoperceive,whichexhypothesiswecannothavedone,sinceweneverdodirectlyobserveanyexternalobject.\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY153Hume,therefore,concludes,inthispartofhiswork,thatwecannotknowoftheexistenceofany"externalobject"whatever.Andthoughinallthathesaysuponthissubject,heisplainlythinkingonlyofmaterialobjects,theprinciplesbywhichhetriestoprovethatwecannotknowthesemust,Ithink,proveequallywellthatwecannotknowany"externalobject'*whatever—noteventheexistenceofanyotherhumanmind.Hisargumentis:Wecannotdirectlyobserveanyobjectwhatever,exceptsuchasexistonlywhenweobservethem;wecannot,therefore,observeany**constantcon-junctions"exceptbetweenobjectsofthiskind:andhencewecanhavenofoundationinexperienceforanypropositionwhichassertstheexistenceofanyotherkindofobject,andcannot,therefore,knowanysuchpropositiontobetrue.Andthisargumentmustplainlyapplytoallthefeelings,thoughtsandperceptionsofothermenjustasmuchastomaterialobjects.Icanneverknowthatanyperceptionofmine,oranythingwhichIdoobserve,musthavebeencausedbyanyotherman,becauseIcanneverdirectlyobservea**constantconjunction"betweenanyotherman'sthoughtsorfeelingsorintentionsandanythingwhichIdirectlyobserve:Icannot,therefore,knowthatanyothermaneverhadanythoughtsorfeelings—or,inshort,thatanymanbesidemyselfeverexisted.Theview,therefore,whichHumesuggestsinthispartofhiswork,flatlycontradictstheviewwhichheatfirstseemedtohold.Henowsayswecannotknowthatastonewillfall,thatfirewillburn,orthesunwillriseto-morrow.AllthatIcanpossiblyknow,accordingtohispresentprinciples,isthat/shallseeastonefall,shallfeelthefireburn,shallseethesunriseto-morrow.Icannotevenknowthatanyothermenwillseethesethings;forIcannotknowthatanyothermenexist.Forthesamereason,Icannot\n154HUME'SPHILOSOPHYknowthatJuliusCaesarwasmurdered,orthatallmenaremortal.Forthesearepropositionsasserting*'external"facts—factswhichdon'texistonlyatthemomentwhenIobservethem;and,accordingtohispresentdoctrine,Icannotpossiblyknowanysuchpropositiontobetrue.Noman,inshort,canknowanypropositionabout''mattersoffact"tobetrue,exceptsuchasmerelyassertsome-thingabouthisownstatesofmind,past,presentorfuture—abouttheseoraboutwhathehimselfhasdirectlyobserved,isobserving,orwillobserve.Here,therefore,wehaveaverydifferentviewsuggested,astothelimitsofhumanknowledge.Andeventhisisnotall.Thereisyetathirdview,inconsistentwithbothofthese,whichHumesuggestsinsomepartsofhiswork.Sofaraswehaveyetseen,hehasnotinanywaycontradictedhisoriginalsuppositionthatwecanknowsomemattersoffact,whichwehaveneverourselvesobserved.Inthesecondtheory,whichIhavejuststated,hedoesnotcallinquestiontheviewthatIcanknowallsuchmattersoffactasIknowtobecausallyconnectedwithfactswhichIhaveobserved,northeviewthatIcanknowsomefactstobethuscausallyconnected.AllthathehasdoneistoquestionwhetherIcanknowanyexternal{^.cxtobecausallyconnectedwithanythingwhichIobserve;hewouldstillallowthatImaybeabletoknowthatfuturestatesofmyown,orpaststates,whichIhaveforgotten,arecausallyconnectedwiththosewhichInowobserveorremember;andthatImayknowtherefore,insomecases,whatIshallexperienceinthefuture,orhaveexperiencedinthepastbuthavenowforgotten.Butinsomepartsofhisworkhedoesseemtoquestionwhetheranymancanknowevenasmuchasthis:heseemstoquestionwhetherwecaneverknowanyfactwhatevertobecausallyconnected\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY155withanyotherfact.For,afterlayingitdown,aswesawabove,thatwecannotknowanyfact,A,tobecausallyconnectedwithanother,B,unlesswehaveexperiencedinthepastaconstantconjunctionbetweenfactslikeAandfactslikeB,hegoesontoaskwhatfoundationwehavefortheconclusionthatAandBarecausallyconnected,evenwhenwehaveinthepastexperiencedaconstantconjunctionbetweenthem.HepointsoutthatfromthefactthatAhasbeenconstantlyconjoinedwithBinthepast,itdoesnotfollowthatiteverwillbesoagain.Itdoesnotfollow,therefore,thatthetworeallyarecausallyconnectedinthesensethat,whentheoneoccurs,theotheralwayswilloccuralso.Andheconcludes,forthisandotherreasons,thatnoargumentcanassureusthat,becausetheyhavebeenconstantlyconjoinedinthepast,thereforetheyreallyarecausallyconnected.What,then,heasks,isthefoundationforsuchaninference?Custom,heconcludes,istheonlyfoundation.Itisnothingbutcustomwhichinducesustobelievethat,becausetwofactshavebeenconstantlyconjoinedonmanyoccasions,thereforetheywillbesoonalloccasions.Wehave,therefore,nobetterfoundationthancustomforanyconclusionwhateverastofactswhichwehavenotobserved.Andcanwebesaidreallytoknowanyfact,forwhichwehavenobetterfoundationthanthis?Humehimself,itmustbeobserved,neversaysthatwecan't.Buthehasbeenconstantlyinterpretedasiftheconclusionthatwecan'treallyknowanyonefacttobecausallyconnectedwithanyother,didfollowfromthisdoctrineofhis.Andthereis,Ithink,certainlymuchexcuseforthisinterpretationinthetoneinwhichhespeaks.Hedoesseemtosuggestthatabeliefwhichismerelyfoundedoncustom,canscarcelybeonewhichweknowtobetrue.And,indeed,heownshimselfthat,whenheconsiders\n156HUME'SPHILOSOPHYthatthisisouronlyfoundationforanysuchbelief,heissometimestemptedtodoubtwhetherwedoknowanyfactwhatever,exceptthosewhichwedirectlyobserve.Hedoes,therefore,atleastsuggesttheviewthateveryman'sknowledgeisentirelyconfinedtothosefacts,whichheisdirectlyobservingatthemoment,orwhichhehasobservedinthepast,andnowremembers.Wesee,then,thatHumesuggests,atleast,threeentirelydifferentviewsastotheconsequencesofhisoriginaldoctrine.Hisoriginaldoctrinewasthat,asregardsmattersoffactbeyondthe|reachofourownactualobservation,theknowledgeofeachofusisstrictlylimitedtothoseforwhichwehaveabasisinourownexperience.Andhisfirstviewastotheconsequencesofthisdoctrinewasthatitdoesshowustobeincapableofknowingagoodmanyreligiousandphilosophicalpropositions,whichmanymenhaveclaimedthattheyknew;butthatitbynomeansdeniesourcapacityofknowingthevastmajorityoffactsbeyondourownobservation,whichweallcommonlysupposethatweknow.Hissecondview,ontheotherhand,isthatitcutsoffatonceallpossibilityofourknowingthevastmajorityofthesefacts;sinceheimpliesthatwecannothaveanybasisinexperienceforassertinganyexternalfactwhatever—anyfact,thatis,exceptfactsre-latingtoourownactualpastandfutureobservations.Andhisthirdviewismorescepticalstill,sinceitsuggeststhatwecannotreallyknowanyfactwhat-ever,beyondthereachofourpresentobservationormemory,evenwherewehaveabasisinex-perienceforsuchafact:itsuggeststhatexperiencecannoteverletusknowthatanytwothingsarecausallyconnected,andthereforethatitcannotgiveusknowledgeofanyfactbasedonthisre-lation.Whatarewetothinkofthesethreeviews,and\nHUMFSPHILOSOPHY157oftheoriginaldoctrinefromwhichHumeseemstoinferthem?Asregardsthelasttwoviews,itmayperhapsbethoughtthattheyaretooabsurdtodeserveanyseriousconsideration.Itis,infact,absurdtosuggestthatIdonotknowanyexternalfactswhat-ever;thatIdonotknow,forinstance,eventhatthereareanymenbesidemyself.AndHumehimself,itmightseem,doesnotseriouslyexpectorwishustoaccepttheseviews.Hepointsout,withregardtoallsuchexcessivelyscepticalopinionsthatwecannotcontinuetobelievethemforlongtogether—that,atleast,wecannot,forlongtogether,avoidbelievingthingsfladyinconsistentwiththem.Thephilosophermaybelieve,whenheisphilosophising,thatnomanknowsoftheexistenceofanyothermanorofanymaterialobject;butatothertimeshewillinevitablybelieve,aswealldo,thathedoesknowoftheexistenceofthismanandofthat,andevenofthisandthatmaterialobject.Therecan,therefore,benoquestionofmakingallourbeliefsconsistentwithsuchviewsasthisofneverbelievinganythingthatisinconsistentwiththem.Anditmay,therefore,seemuselesstodiscussthem.Butinfact,itbynomeansfollowsthat,becausewearenotabletoadhereconsistentlytoagivenview,thereforethatviewisfalse;nordoesitfollowthatwemaynotsincerelybelieveit,wheneverwearephilosophising,eventhoughthemomentweceasetophilosophise,orevenbefore,wemaybeforcedtocontradictit.Andphilosophersdo,infact,sincerelybelievesuchthingsasthis—thingswhichflatlycontradictthevastmajorityofthethingswhichtheybelieveatothertimes.EvenHume,Ithink,doessincerelywishtopersuadeusthatwecannotknowoftheexistenceofexternalmaterialobjects—thatthisisaphilosophictruth,whichweought,ifwecan,solongaswearephilosophising,tobelieve.Many\n158HUME'SPHILOSOPHYpeople,Ithink,arecertainlytempted,intheirphilosophicmoments,tobelievesuchthings;and,sincethisisso.itis,Ithink,worthwhiletoconsiderseriouslywhatargumentscanbebroughtagainstsuchviews.Itisworthwhiletoconsiderwhethertheyareviewswhichweoughttoholdasphilo-sophicalopinions,evenifitbequitecertainthatweshallneverbeabletomaketheviewswhichweentertainatothertimesconsistent'withthem.Anditisthemoreworthwhile,becausethequestionhowwecanproveordisprovesuchextremeviewsasthese,hasabearingonthequestionhowwecan,inanycasewhatever,proveordisprovethatwedoreallyknow,whatwesupposeourselvestoknow.Whatarguments,then,aretherefororagainsttheextremeviewthatnomancanknowanyex-ternalfactwhatever;andthestillmoreextremeviewthatnomancanknowanymatteroffactwhatever,exceptthosewhichheisdirectlyobservingatthemoment,orhasobservedinthepastandnowremembers?Itmaybepointedout.inthefirstplace,that,iftheseviewsaretrue,thenatleastnomancanpossiblyknowthemtobeso.WhattheseviewsassertisthatIcannotknowanyexternalfactwhat-ever.Itfollows,therefore,thatIcannotknowthatthereareanyothermen,besidemyself,andthattheyarelikemeinthisrespect.Anyphilosopherwhoassertspositivelythatothermen,equallywithhimself,areincapableofknowinganyexternalfacts,is,inthatveryassertion,contradictinghimself,sinceheimpliesthathedoesknowagreatmanyfactsabouttheknowledgeofothermen.Noone,there-fore,canbeentitledtoassertpositivelythathumanknowledgeislimitedinthisway,since,inassertingitpositively,heisimplyingthathisownknowledgeisnotsolimited.Itcannotbeproper,eveninour\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY159philosophicmoments,totakeupsuchanattitudeasthis.Noone,therefore,canknowpositivelythatmeningeneral,areincapableofknowingexternalfacts.Butstill,althoughwecannotknowit,itremainspossiblethattheviewshouldbeatrueone.Nay,more,itremainspossiblethatamanshouldknowthathehimself\sincapableofknowinganyexternalfacts,andthat,ifthereareanyothermenwhosefacultiesareonlysimilartohisown,theyalsomustbeincapableofknowingany.Theargumentjustusedobviouslydoesnotapplyagainstsuchapositionasthis.Itonlyappliesagainstthepositionthatmeningeneralpositivelyareincapableofknowingexternalfacts:itdoesnotapplyagainstthepositionthatthephilosopherhimselfisincapableofknowingany,oragainstthepositionthattherearepossibfyothermeninthesamecase,andthat,iftheirfacultiesaresimilartothephilosophers,theycertainlywouldbeinit.Idonotcontradictmyselfbymaintainingpositivelythat/knownoexternalfacts,thoughIdocontradictmyselfifImaintainthatIamonlyoneamongothermen,andthatnomanknowsanyexternalfacts.Sofar,then,asHumemerelymaintainsthatheisincapableofknowinganyexternalfacts,andthattheremaybeothermenlikehiminthisrespect,theargumentjustusedisnotvalidagainsthisposition.Cananyconclusiveargumentsbefoundagainstit?Itseemstomethatsuchapositionmust,inacertainsense,bequiteincapableofdisproof.Somuchmustbegrantedtoanyscepticwhofeelsin-clinedtoholdit.Anyvalidargumentwhichcanbebroughtagainstitmustbeofthenatureofapetitioprincipii:itmustbegthequestionatissue.Howisthesceptictoprovetohimselfthathedoesknowanyexternalfacts?Hecanonlydoitbybringingforwardsomeinstanceofanexternalfact,\n^i6oHUME'SPHILOSOPHYwhichhedoesknow;and,inassumingthathedoesknowthisone,heis,ofcourse,beggingthequestion.Itisthereforequiteimpossibleforanyonexoproveinonestrictsenseoftheterm,thathedoesknowanyexternalfacts.IcanonlyprovethatIdo,byassumingthatinsomeparticularinstance,Iactuallydoknowone.Thatistosay,theso-calledproofmustassumetheverythingwhichitpretendstoprove.Theonlyproofthatwedoknowexternalfactsliesinthesimplefactthatwedoknowthem.Andthescepticcan,withperfectinternalcon-sistency,denythathedoesknowany.Butitcan,Ithink,beshownthathehasnoreasonfordenyingit.Andinparticularitmay,Ithink,beeasilyseenthattheargumentswhichHumeusesinfavourofthispositionhavenoconclusiveforce.Tobeginwith,hisarguments,inbothcases,dependuponthetwooriginalassumptions,(i)thatwecannotknowanyfact,whichwehavenotob-served,unlessweknowittobecausallyconnectedwithsomefactwhichwehaveobserved,and(2)thatwehavenoreasonforassuminganycausalconnection,exceptwherewehaveexperiencedsomeinstancesofconjunctionbetweenthetwofactsconnected.Andbothoftheseassumptionsmay,ofcourse,bedenied.Itisjustaseasytodenythem,astodenythatIdoknowanyexternalfacts.And,ifthesetwoassumptionsdidreallyleadtotheconclusionthatIcannotknowany,itwould,Ithink,bepropertodenythem:wemightfairlyregardthefactthattheyledtothisabsurdcon-clusionasdisprovingthem.But,infact,Ithinkitmaybeeasilyseenthattheydonotleadtoit.Letusconsider,firstofall,Hume'smostscepticalargument(theargumentwhichhemerelysuggests).Thisargumentsuggeststhat,sinceouronlyreasonforsupposingtwofactstobecausallyconnectedisthatwehavefoundthemconstantlyconjoinedin\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHYi6ithepast,andsinceitdoesnotfollowfromthefactthattheyhavebeenconjoinedeversomanytimes,thattheyalwayswillbeso,thereforewecannotknowthattheyalwayswillbeso,andhencecannotknowthattheyarecausallyconnected.Butob-viouslytheconclusiondoesnotfollow.Wemust,Ithink,grantthepremissthat,fromthefactthattwothingshavebeenconjoined,nomatterhowoften,itdoesnotstrictlyyb/^o;thattheyalwaysareconjoined.Butitbynomeansfollowsfromthisthatwemaynotknowthat,asamatteroffact,whentwothingsareconjoinedsufficientlyoften,theyarealsoalwaysconjoined.Wemayquitewellknowmanythingswhichdonotlogicallyfollowfromanythingelsewhichweknow.Andso,inthiscase,wemayknowthattwothingsarecausallyconnected,althoughthisdoesnotlogicallyfollowfromourpastexperience,noryetfromanythingelsethatweknow.And,asforthecontentionthatourbeliefincausalconnectionsismerelybasedon.custom,wemay,indeed,admitthatcustomwouldnotbeasufficientreasonforconcludingthebelieftobetrue.Butthemerefact(ifitbeafact)thatthebeliefisonlycausedbycustom,isalsonosufficientreasonforconcludingthatwecannoiknowittobetrue.Custommayproducebeliefs,whichwedoknowtobetrue,eventhoughitbeadmittedthatitdoesnotnecessarilyproducethem.AndasforHume'sargumenttoprovethatwecanneverknowanyexternalobjecttobecausallyconnectedwithanythingwhichweactuallyobserve,itis,Ithink,obviouslyfallacious.Inordertoprovethis,hehas,asherecognises,todisprovebothoftwotheories.Hehas.firstofall,todisprovewhathecallsthevulgartheory—thetheorythatwecanknowtheverythingswhichweseeorfeeltobeexternalobjects;thatistosay,canknowthattheseverythingsexistattimeswhen\ni62HUME'SPHILOSOPHYwedonotobservethem.Andevenhere,Ithink,hisargumentsareobviouslyinconclusive.Butweneednotstaytoconsiderthem,because,inordertoprovethatwecannotknowanyexternalobjects,hehasalsotodisprovewhathecallsthephilosophictheory—thetheorythatwecanknowthingswhichwedoobserve,tobecausedbyexternalobjectswhichweneverobserve.If,therefore,hisattempttodisprovethistheoryfails,hisproofthatwecan-notknowanyexternalobjectsalsofails;andIthinkitiseasytoseethathisdisproofdoesfail.Itamountsmerelytothis:Thatwecannot,exhypothesi,everobservethesesupposedexternalobjects,andthereforecannotobservethemtobeconstantlyconjoinedwithanyobjectswhichwedoobserve.Butwhatfollowsfromthis?HisowntheoryabouttheknowledgeofcausalconnectionisnotthatinordertoknowAtobethecauseofB,wemusthaveobservedAitselftobeconjoinedwithB;butonlythatwemusthaveobservedobjectslikeAtobeconstantlyconjoinedwithobjectslikeB,Andwhatistopreventanexternalobjectfrombeinglikesomeobjectwhichwehaveformerlyobserved?SupposeIhavefrequentlyobservedafactlikeAtobeconjoinedwithafactlikeB:andsupposeInowobserveB,onanoccasionwhenIdonotobserveanythinglikeA.Thereisnoreason,onHume*sprinciples,whyIshouldnotconcludethatAdoesexistonthisoccasion,eventhoughIdonotobserveit;andthatitis,therefore,anexternalobject.Itwill,ofcourse,differfromanyobjectwhichIhaveeverobserved*inrespectofthesimplefactthatitisnotobservedbyme,whereastheywere.Thereis,therefore,thisonerespectinwhichitmustbeunlikeanythingwhichIhaveeverobserved.ButHumehasneversaidanythingtoshowthatunlikenessinthissinglerespectissufficienttoinvalidatethe\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY163inference.ItmayquitewellbelikeobjectswhichIhaveobservedinallotherrespects;andthisdegreeoflikenessmay,accordingtohisprinciples,bequitesufficienttojustifyusinconcludingitsexistence.Inshort,whenHumearguesthatwecannotpossiblylearnbyexperienceoftheexistenceofanyexternalobjects,heis,Ithink,plainlycommittingthefallacyofsupposingthat,becausewecannot,exhypothesishaveeverobservedanyobjectwhichactuallyis"external,"thereforewecanneverhaveobservedanyobjectlikeanexternalone.Butplainlywemayhaveobservedobjectsliketheminallrespectsexceptthesingleonethatthesehavebeenobservedwhereastheothershavenot.Andevenalessdegreeoflikenessthanthiswould,accordingtohisprinciples,bequitesufficienttojustifyaninferenceofcausalconnection.Humedoesnot,therefore,bringforwardanyargumentsatallsufficienttoproveeitherthathecannotknowanyoneobjecttobecausallyconnectedwithanyotherorthathecannotknowanyexternalfact.And,indeed,Ithinkitisplainthatnocon-clusiveargumentcouldpossiblybeadvancedinfavourofthesepositions.Itwouldalwaysbeatleastaseasytodenytheargumentastodenythatwedoknowexternalfacts.Wemay,therefore,eachoneofus,safelyconcludethatwedoknowexternalfacts;and,ifwedo,thenthereisnoreasonwhyweshouldnotalsoknowthatothermendothesame.Thereisnoreasonwhyweshouldnot,inthisrespect,makeourphilosophicalopinionsagreewithwhatwenecessarilybelieveatothertimes.ThereisnoreasonwhyIshouldnotcon-fidentlyassertthatIdoreallyknowsomeexternalfacts,althoughIcannotprovetheassertionexceptbysimplyassumingthatIdo.Iam,infact,ascertainofthisasofanything;andasreasonablycertainofit.ButjustasIamcertainthatIdo\n:164HUME'SPHILOSOPHYknowsomeexternalfacts,soIamalsocertainthatthereareotherswhichIdonotknow.Andthequestionremains:Doesthelinebetweenthetwofall,whereHumesaysitfalls?IsittruethattheonlyexternalfactsIknowarefactsforwhichIhaveabasisinmyownexperience?AndthatIcannotknowanyfactswhatever,beyondthereachofmyownobservationandmemory,exceptthoseforwhichIhavesuchabasis?This,itseemstome,isthemostseriousquestionwhichHumeraises.Anditshouldbeobservedthathisownattitudetowardsitisverydifferentfromhisattitudetowardsthescepticalviewswhichwehavejustbeenconsidering.Thesescepticalviewshedidnotexpectorwishustoaccept,exceptinphilosophicmoments.Hedeclaresthatwecannot,inordinarylife,avoidbelievingthingswhichareinconsistentwiththem;and,insodeclaring,he,ofcourse,impliesincidentallythattheyarefalsesinceheimpliesthathehimselfhasagreatdealofknowledgeastowhatwecanandcannotbelieveinordinarylife.But,asregardstheviewthatourknowledgeofmattersoffactbeyondourownobservationisentirelyconfinedtosuchasarefoundedonexperience,heneversuggeststhatitisimpossiblethatallourbeliefsshouldbeconsistentwiththisview,andhedoesseemtothinkiteminentlydesirablethattheyshouldbe.Hedeclaresthatanyassertionwithregardtosuchmatters,whichisnotfoundedonexperience,canbenothingbut"sophistryandillusion";andthatallbookswhicharecomposedofsuchassertionsshouldbe**committedtotheflames."Heseems,there-fore,tothinkthatherewereallyhaveatestbywhichwemaydeterminewhatweshouldorshouldnotbelieve,onalloccasions:anyviewonsuchmatters,forwhichwehavenofoundationinexperience,isaviewwhichwecannotknowtobe\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY165evenprobablytrue,andwhichweshouldneveraccept,ifwecanhelpit.Isthereanyjustificationforthisstrongview?Itis,ofcourse,abstractlypossiblethatwedoreallyknow,withoutthehelpofexperience,somemattersoffact,whichweneverhaveobserved.Justasweknowmattersoffact,whichwehaveobserved,withouttheneedofanyfurtherevidence,andjustasweknow,forinstance,that2+2=-4,withouttheneedofanyproof,itispossiblethatwemayknow,directlyandimmediately,withouttheneedofanybasisinexperience,somefactswhichweneverhaveobserved.Thisiscertainlypossible,inthesamesenseinwhichitispossiblethatIdonotreallyknowanyexternalfacts:noconclusivedisproofcanbebroughtagainsteitherposition.Wemustmakeassumptionsastowhatfactswedoknowanddonotknow,beforewecanproceedtodiscusswhetherornotalloftheformerarebasedonexperience;andnoneoftheseassumptionscan,inthelastresort,beconclusivelyproved.Wemayofferoneoftheminproofofanother;butitwillalwaysbepossibletodisputetheonewhichweofferinproof.Butthereare,infact,certainkindsofthingswhichweuniversallyassumethatwedoknowordonotknow,justasweassumethatwedoknowsomeexternalfacts;andifamongallthethingswhichweknowascertainlyasthis,thereshouldturnouttobenoneforwhichwehavenobasisinexperience,Hume*sviewwouldIthink,beasfullyprovedasitiscapableofbeing.Thequestionis:Canitbeprovedinthissense?Amongallthefactsbeyondourownobservation,whichweknowmostcertainly,arethereanywhicharecertainlynotbaseduponexperience?Formypart,Iconfess,Icannotfeelcertainwhatistherightanswertothisquestion:IcannottellwhetherHumewasrightorwrong.Butifhewaswrong—ifthereareany\ni66HUME'SPHILOSOPHYmattersoffact,beyondourownobservation,whichweknowforcertain,andwhichyetweknowdirectlyandimmediately,withoutanybasisinexperience,weare,Ithink,facedwithaneminentlyinterestingproblem.Foritis,Ithink,ascertainasanythingcanbethattherearesomekindsoffactswithregardtowhichHumewasright—thattherearesomekindsoffactswhichwecannotknowwithouttheevidenceofexperience.Icouldnotknow,forinstance,withoutsomesuchevidence,suchafactasthatJuliusCsesarwasmurdered.ForsuchafactImust,inthefirstinstance,havetheevidenceofotherpersons;andifIamtoknowthattheirevidenceistrustworthy,Imusthavesomegroundinexperienceforsupposingittobeso.Thereare,therefore,somekindsoffactswhichwecannotknowwithouttheevidenceofexperienceandobservation.Andifitistobemaintainedthatthereareothers,whichwecanknowwithoutanysuchevidence,itoughttobepointedoutexactlywhatkindoffactstheseare,andinwhatrespectstheydifferfromthosewhichwecannotknowwithoutthehelpofexperience.Humegivesusaverycleardivisionofthekindsofpropositionswhichwecanknowtobetrue.Thereare,firstofall,somepropositionswhichassert"relationsofideas";thereare,secondly,propositionswhichassert**mattersoffact"whichweourselvesareactuallyobserving,orhaveobservedandnowremember;andthereare,thirdly,propositionswhichassert'*mattersoffact"whichwehaveneveractuallyobserved,butforbelievinginwhichwehavesomefoundationinourpastobservations.Anditis,1think,certainthatsomepropositions,whichweknowascertainlyasweknowanything,dobelongtoeachofthesethreeclasses.Iknow,forinstance,thattwicetwoarefour;IknowbydirectobservationthatIamnowseeingthesewords,\nHUME'SPHILOSOPHY167that[amwriting,andbymemorythatthisafter-noonIsawSt.Paul's;andIknowalsothatJuliusCaesarwasmurdered,andIhavesomefoundationinexperienceforthisbelief,thoughIdidnotmyselfwitnessthemurder.Doanyofthosepropositions,whichweknowascertainlyasweknowtheseandtheirlike,notbelongtoeitherofthesethreeclasses?Mustweaddafourthclassconsistingofpropositionswhichresemblethetwolast,inrespectofthefactthattheydoassert**mattersoffact,"butwhichdifferfromthem,inthatweknowthemneitherbydirectobservationnorbymemory,noryetasaresultofpreviousobservations?Theremay,perhaps,besuchafourthclass;but,ifthereis,itIS,Ithink,eminentlydesirablethatitshouldbepointedoutexactlywhatpropositionstheyarewhichwedoknowinthisway;andthis,sofarasIknow,hasneveryetbeendone,atallclearly,byanyphilosopher.\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATATheterm"sense-data"isambiguous;andthere-foreIthinkIhadbetterbeginbytryingtoexplainwhattheclassofentitiesiswhosestatusIproposetodiscuss.Thereareseveraldifferentclassesofmentalevents,allofwhich,owingtotheirintrinsicresemblancetooneanotherincertainrespects,may,inawidesense,becalled"sensoryexperiences,"althoughonlysomeamongthemwouldusuallybecalled"sensations,"Thereare(i)thoseevents,happeninginourmindswhileweareawake,whichconsistintheexperiencingofoneofthoseentities,whichareusuallycalled"images,"inthenarrowestsenseoftheterm.Everybodydistinguishestheseeventsfromsensationsproper;andyeteverybodyadmitsthat"images"intrinsicallyresembletheentitieswhichareexperiencedinsensationsproperinsomeveryimportantrespect.Thereare(2)thesensoryexperienceswehaveindreams,someofwhichwouldcertainlybesaidtobeexperiencesofimages,whileothersmightbesaidtobesensations.Thereare(3)hallucinations,andcertainclassesofillusorysensoryexperiences.Thereare(4)thoseexperiences,whichusedtobecalledthehavingof"after-images,"butwhichpsychologistsnowsayoughtrathertobecalled"after-sensations."Andthereare,finally,(5)thatclassofsensoryexperiences,whichareimmenselycommonerthananyoftheabove,andwhichmaybecalledsensationsproper,ifweagreetousethisterminsuchawayastoexcludeexperiencesofmyfirstfoursorts.\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA169Everyevent,ofanyoneofthesefiveclasses,consistsinthefactthatanentity,ofsomekindorother,isexperienced.Theentitywhichisexperiencedmaybeofmanydifferentkinds;itmay,forinstance,beapatchofcolour,orasound,orasmell,orataste,etc;oritmaybeanimageofapatchofcolour,animageofasound,animageofasmell,animageofataste,etc.But,what-everbeitsnature,theentitywhichisexperiencedmustinallcasesbedistinguishedfromthefactoreventwhichconsistsinitsbeingexperienced;sincebysayingthatitisexperiencedwemeanthatithasarelationofacertainkindtosomethingelse.Wecan,therefore,speaknotonlyofexperiencesofthesefivekinds,butalsooftheentitieswhichareex-periencedinexperiencesofthesekinds;andtheentitywhichisexperiencedinsuchanexperienceisneveridenticalwiththeexperiencewhichcon-sistsinitsbeingexperienced.Butwecanspeaknotonlyoftheentitieswhichareexperiencedinexperiencesofthiskind,butalsoofthesortofentitieswhichareexperiencedinexperiencesofthiskind;andthesetwoclassesmayagainbedifferent.Forapatchofcolour,evenifitwerenotactuallyexperienced,wouldbeanentityofthesamesortassomewhichareexperiencedinexperiencesofthiskind:andthereisnocontradictioninsupposingthattherearepatchesofcolour,whichyetarenotexperienced;sincebycallingathingapatchofcolourwemerelymakeastatementaboutitsin-trinsicquality,andinnowayassertthatithastoanythingelseanyoftherelationswhichmaybemeantbysayingthatitisexperienced.Inspeaking,therefore,ofthesortofentitieswhichareex-periencedinexperiencesofthefivekindsIhavementioned,wedonotnecessarilyconfineourselvestothosewhichactuallyareexperiencedinsomesuchexperience:weleaveitanopenquestion\n170THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAwhetherthetwoclassesareidenticalornot.Andtheclassofentities,whosestatusIwishtodiscuss,consistspreciselyofallthose,whetherexperiencedornot,whichareofthesamesortasthosewhichareexperiencedinexperiencesofthesefivekinds.Iintendtocallthisclassofentitiestheclassofsenstbles;sothatthequestionIamtodiscusscanbeexpressedintheform:Whatisthestatusofsensibles?Anditmustberememberedthatimagesandafter-imagesarejustasmuch*'sensibles,"inmysenseoftheterm,astheentitieswhichareexperiencedinsensationsproper;andso,too,areanypatchesofcolour,orsounds,orsmells,etc,(ifsuchtherebe),whicharenotexperiencedatall.InspeakingofsensiblesasthesortofentitieswhichareexperiencedinsensoryexperiencesIseemtoimplythatalltheentitieswhichareex-periencedinsensoryexperienceshavesomecommoncharacteristicotherthanthatwhichconsistsintheirbeingsoexperienced.AndIcannothelpthinkingthatthisisthecase,inspiteofthefactthatitisdifficulttoseewhatintrinsiccharactercanbesharedincommonbyentitiessodifferentfromoneanotherasarepatchesofcolour,sounds,smells,tastes,etc.For,sofarasIcansee,somenon-sensoryexperiencesmaybeex-actlysimilartosensoryonesinallintrinsicrespects,exceptthatwhatisexperiencedinthemisdifferentinkindfromwhatisexperiencedinanysensoryex-perience:therelationmeantbysayingthatinthemsomethingisexperiencedmaybeexactlythesameinkind,andsomaytheexperient.And,ifthisbeso,itseemstocompelustoadmitthatthedistinctionbe-tweensensoryandnon-sensoryexperiencesisderivedfromthatbetweensensibles,andnon-sensiblesandnotviceversd,Iaminclined,therefore,tothinkthatallsensibles,inspiteofthegreatdifferencesbetweenthem,havesomecommonintrinsicproperty,whichwe\n"THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA171recognise,butwhichisunanalysable;andthat,whenwecallanexperiencesensory,whatwemeanisnotonlythatinitsomethingisexperiencedinaparticularway,butalsothatthissomethinghasthisunanalysableproperty.Ifthisbeso,theultimatedefinitionof"sensibles"wouldbemerelyallentitieswhichhavethisunanalysableproperty.Itseemstomethattheterm"sense-data"isoftenused,andmaybecorrectlyused,simplyasasynonymfor"sensibles";andeverybody,Ithink,wouldexpectme,indiscussingthestatusofsense-data,todiscuss,amongotherthings,thequestionwhetherthereareanysensibleswhicharenot'*given."Itistruethattheetymologyoftheterm"sense-data"suggeststhatnothingshouldbecalledasense-datum,butwhatisgiven;sothattotalkofanon-givensense-datumwouldbeacontradictioninterms.But,ofcourse,etymologyisnosafeguideeitherastotheactualorthecorrectuseofterms;anditseemstomethattheterm"sense-data"isoften,andquiteproperly,usedmerelyforthesort^entitiesthataregiveninsense,andnotinanywaylimitedtothosewhichareactuallygiven.ButthoughIthinkImightthushaveused"sense-data"quitecorrectlyinsteadof"sensibles,"Ithinkthelattertermisperhapsmoreconvenient;becausethoughnobodyoughttobemisledbyetymologies,somanypeopleinfactare"so.Moreovertheterm"sense-dataissometimeslimitedinyetanotherway,viz,tothesortofsensibleswhichareexperiencedinsensationsproper\sothatinthissense"images"wouldnotbe"sense-data."Forboththesereasons,Ithinkitisper-hapsbettertodroptheterm"sense-dataaltogether,andtospeakonlyof"sensibles."Mydiscussionofthestatusofsensibleswillbedividedintotwoparts.1shallfirstconsiderhow,\n;172THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAincertainrespects,theyarerelatedtoourmindsandthen1shallconsiderhow,incertainrespects,theyarerelatedtophysicalobjects.(I)(i)Wecan,Ithink,distinguishprettyclearlyatleastonekindofrelationwhichsensibles,ofallthekindsIhavementioned,doundoubtedlysome-timeshavetoourminds.Idonowseecertainblackishmarksonawhitishground,andIhearcertainsoundswhichIattributetothetickingofmyclock.InbothcasesIhavetocertainsensibles—certainblackishmarks,intheonecase,andcertainsounds,intheother—akindofrelationwithwhichweareallperfectlyfamiliar,andwhichmaybeexpressed,intheonecase,bysayingthatIactuallyseethemarks,andintheother,bysay-ingthatIactuallyhearthesounds.ItseemstomequiteevidentthattherelationtothemarkswhichIexpressbysayingthatIseethem,isnotdifferentinkindfromtherelationtothesoundswhichIexpressbysayingthatIhearthem."Seeing"and"hearing,"whenthususedasnamesforarelationwhichwemayhavetosensibles,arenotnamesfordifferentrelations,butmerelyexpressthefactthat,intheonecase,thekindofsensibletowhichIhaveacertainkindofrelationisapatchofcolour,while,intheothercase,thekindofsensibletowhichIhavethesam.ekindofrelationisasound.AndsimilarlywhenIsaythatIfeelwarmorsmellasmellthesedifferentverbsdonotexpressthefactthatIhaveadifferentkindofrelationtothesensiblesconcerned,butonlythatIhavethesamekindofrelationtoadifferentkindofsensible.EvenwhenIcallupavisualimageofasensibleIsawyesterday,oranauditoryimageofasoundIheardyesterday,IhavetothoseimagesexactlythesamekindofrelationwhichIhavetothepatchesof\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA173colourInowseeandwhichIhadyesterdaytothoseIsawthen.Butthiskindofrelation,whichIsometimeshavetosensiblesofallsortsofdifferentkinds,imagesaswellasothers,isevidentlyquitedifferentinkindfromanotherrelationwhichImayalsohavetosensibles.Afterlookingatthisblackmark,Imayturnawaymyheadorclosemyeyes,andthenInolongeractuallyseethemarkIsawjustnow.Imay,indeed,have(Imyselfactuallydohaveatthismoment)avisualimageofthemarkbeforemymind;andtothisimageIdonowhaveexactlythesamekindofrelationwhichIhadjustnowtothemarkitself.Buttheimageisnotidenticalwiththemarkofwhichitisanimage;andtothemarkitselfitisquitecertainthatIhavenotnowgotthesamekindofrelationasIhadjustnow,whenIwasactuallyseeingit.AndyetIcertainlymaynomhavetothatmarkitselfakindofrelation,whichmaybeexpressedbysayingthatIamthinkingofitorrememberingit.Icannowmakejudgmentsaboutititself'—theverysensiblewhichIdidseejustnowandamnolongerseeing:as,forinstance,that1didthenseeitandthatitwasdifferentfromtheimageofitwhichIamnowseeing.Itis,therefore,quitecertainthatthereisamostim-portantdifferencebetweentherelationIhavetoasensiblewhenIamactuallyseeingorhearingit,andanyrelation(fortheremaybeseveral)whichImayhavetothesamesensiblewhenIamonlythinkingoforrememberingit.AndIwanttoexpressthisdifferencebyusingaparticulartermfortheformerrelation.Ishallexpressthisre-lation,whichIcertainlydohavetoasensiblewhenIactuallyseeorhearit,andmostcercainlydonothavetoit,whenIonlythinkoforrememberit,bysayingthatthereisinmymindadirectappre-hensionofit.Ihaveexpresslychosenthisterm\n174THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAbecause,sofarasIknow,ithasnotbeenusedhithertoasatechnicalterm;whereasallthetermswhichhavebeensoused,suchas''presented,""given,""perceived,"seemtometohavebeenspoiltbyambiguity.Peoplesometimes,nodoubt,usethesetermsasnamesforthekindofrelationIamconcernedwith.Butyoucanneverbesure,""whenanentityissaidtobe"givenor"presentedor"perceived,"thatwhatismeantissimplyandsolelythatithastosomeonethatrelationwhichsensiblesdoundoubtedlyhavetomewhenIactuallyseeorhearthem,andwhichtheydonothavetomewhenIonlythinkoforrememberthem,Ihaveusedtheratherawkwardexpression"Thereisinmymindadirectapprehensionofthisblackmark,"becauseIwanttoinsistthatthough,whenIseethemark,themarkcertainlyhastosomethingthefundamentalrelationwhichIwishtoexpressbysayingthatitisdirectlyappre-hended,andthoughtheeventwhichconsistsinitsbeingdirectlyapprehendedbythatsomethingiscertainlyamentalactofmineorwhichoccursinmymind,yetthesomethingwhichdirectlyapprehendsitmayquitepossiblynotbeanythingwhichdeservestobecalled"I'*or"me."Itisquitepossible,Ithink,thatthereisnoentitywhat-everwhichdeservestobecalled"I"or"me"or"mymind";andhencethatnothingwhateveriseverdirectlyapprehendedbyme.Whetherthisissoornot,dependsonthenatureofthatrelationwhichcertainlydoesholdbetweenallthosementalactswhicharemine,anddoesnotholdbetweenanyofmineandanyofyours;andwhichholdsagainbetweenallthosementalactswhichareyours,butdoesnotholdbetweenanyofyoursandanyofmine.AndIdonotfeelatallsurewhatthecorrectanalysisofthisrelationis.Itmaybethecasethatthe\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA175relationwhichunitesallthoseactsofdirectappre-hensionwhicharemine,andwhichiswhatwemeantosaythattheyhavetooneanotherwhenwesaytheyareallmine,reallydoesconsistinthefactthatoneandthesameentityiswhatdirectlyapprehendsineachofthem:inwhichcasethisentitycouldproperlybecJled"me,"anditwouldbetruetosaythat,whenIseethisblackmark,/directlyapprehendit.Butitisalsoquitepossible(andthisseemstometobetheviewwhichiscommonestamongstpsychologists)thattheentitywhichdirectlyapprehends,inthoseactsofdirectapprehensionwhicharemine,isnumericallydifferentineverydifferentact;andthatwhatImeanbycallingallthesedifferentactsmineiseithermerelythattheyhavesomekindofrelationtooneanotherorthattheyallhaveacommonrelationtosomeotherentity,externaltothem,whichmayormaynotbesomethingwhichdeservestobecalled**me."Onanysuchview,whatIasserttobetrueofthisblackmark,whenIsaythatitisseenbyme,wouldnotbesimplythatitisdirectlyapprehendedbyme,butsomethingmorecomplexinwhich,besidesdirectapprehension,someotherquitedifferentrelationwasalsoinvolved.Ishouldbeassertingboth(i)thattheblackmarkisbeingdirectlyapprehendedbysomething,and(2)thatthisactofdirectapprehensionhastosomethingelse,externaltoit,aquitedifferentrelation,whichiswhatmakesitanactofmine,Idonotknowhowtodecidebetweentheseviews,andthatiswhyIwishedtoexplainthatthefundamentalrelationwhichIwishtocalldirectapprehension,isonewhichquitepossiblyneverholdsbetweenmeandanysensible.But,oncethishasbeenexplained,Ithinknoharmcanresultfromusingtheexpression'*IdirectlyapprehendA"asasynonymfor"AdirectapprehensionofAoccursinmymind."And\n176THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAinfutureIshallsospeak,becauseitismuchmoreconvenient.Theonlyotherpoint,whichseemstometoneedexplanation,inordertomakeitquiteclearwhattherelationIcall**directapprehension"is,con-cernsitsrelationtoattention;andastothisImustconfessIdon'tfeelclear.IneverycasewhereitisquitecleartomethatIamdirectlyapprehendingagivenentity,itseemsalsocleartomethatIam,moreorless,attendingtoit;anditseemstome"possiblethatwhat**directapprehensionImeanbymaybesimplyidenticalwithwhatismeantby"attention,"inoneofthesensesinwhichthatwordcanbeused.Thatitcan,atmost,onlybeidenticalwithoneoftherelationsmeantbyattentionseemstomeclear,becauseIcertainlycanbesaidtoattend,insomesenseorother,toentities,whichIamnotdirectlyapprehending:Imay,forinstance,think,withattention,ofasensible,whichIsawyesterday,andamcertainlynotseeingnow.Itis,therefore,clearthattosayIamattendingtoathingandyetamnotdirectlyapprehendingit,isnotacontradictioninterms:andthisfactaloneissufficienttojustifytheuseofthespecialterm"directapprehension."ButwhethertosaythatIamdirectlyapprehendingagiventhingandyetamnotattendingtoit,inanydegreeatall,isorisnotacontradictioninterms,IadmitIdon'tfeelclear.Howeverthatmaybe,onerelation,inwhichsensiblesofallsortsdosometimesstandtoourminds,istherelationconstitutedbythefactthatwedirectlyapprehendthem:or,tospeakmoreaccurately,bythefactthateventswhichconsistintheirbeingdirectlyapprehendedareinourminds,inthesenseinwhichtosaythataneventisinourmindsmeansmerelythatitisamentalactofours—thatithastoourothermentalactsthatrelation(whateveritmaybe)whichwemeanby\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA177sayingthattheyareallmentalactsofthesameindividuaLAnditisclearthattosayofasensiblethatitisdirectlyapprehendedbyme,istosayofitsomethingquitedifferentfromwhatIsayofamentalactofmine,whenIsaythatthismentalactisinmymind\fornothingismorecertainthanthatanactofdirectapprehensionorbeliefmaybeinmymind,withoutbeingitselfdirectlyapprehendedbyme.If,therefore,bysayingthatasensibleisinourmindsorisourSywemeanmerelythatitisdirectlyapprehendedbyus,wemustrecognisethatwearehereusingthephrases*'inourminds"or*'ours"inquiteadifferentsensefromthatinwhichweusethemwhenwetalkofourmentalactsbeing*'inourminds"or**ours."AndwhyIsaythisisbecauseIthinkthatthesetworelationsareveryapttobeconfused.When,forinstance,wesayofagivenentitythat**experienced,"orwhentheGermansitissaythatitis"erlebt,"itissometimesmeant,Ithink,merelythatitisdirectlyapprehended,butsometimesthatitisinmymind,inthesenseinwhich,whenIentertainabelief,thisactofbeliefisinmymind.But(2)itseemstometobecommonlyheldthatsensiblesareofteninourmindsinsomesensequiteotherthanthatofbeingdirectlyapprehendedbyusorthatofbeingthoughtofbyus.Thisseemstometobeoftenwhatismeantwhenpeoplesaythattheyare"immediatelyexperienced"orare"sub-jectivemodifications";though,ofcourse,bothexpressionsaresoambiguous,thatwhenpeoplesaythatagivenentityisimmediatelyexperiencedorisasubjectivemodification,theymaymeanmerelythatitisdirectlyapprehended.AndsinceIthinkthisviewisheld,IwanttoexplainthatIseenoreasonwhateverforthinkingthatsensibleseverareexperiencedbyusinanyothersensethanthatofbeingdirectlyapprehendedbyus.\n178THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATATwokindsofargument,Ithink,aresometimesusedtoshowthattheyare.(a)Itisafamiliarfactthat,when,forinstance,weareinaroomwithatickingclock,wemayseemsuddenlytobecomeawareoftheticks,whereas,sofaraswecantell,wehadpreviouslynotheardthematall.Anditmaybeurgedthatinthesecases,sincethesamekindof'stimuluswasactingonourearsallthetime,wemusthaveexperiencedthesamekindofsensiblesounds,althoughwedidnotdirectlyapprehendthem.ButIthinkmostpsychologistsarenowagreedthatthisargumentisquiteworthless.Thereseemtometobetwopossiblealternativestothecon-clusiondrawn.Itmay,Ithink,possiblybethecasethatwediddirectlyapprehendtheticksallthetime,butthatwecannotafterwardsrememberthatwedid,becausethedegreeofattention(ifany)withwhichweheardthemwassosmall,thatinordinarylifeweshouldsaythatwedidnotattendtothematall.But,what,Ithink,ismuchmorelikelyisthat,thoughthesamestimuluswasactingonourears,itfailedtoproduceanymentaleffectwhatever,becauseourattentionwasotherwiseengaged.\6)Itissaidthatsometimeswhenwesuddenlybecomeaware,say,oftheeighthstrokeofastrikingclock,wecanrememberearlierstrokes,althoughweseemtoourselvesnottohavedirectlyapprehendedthem.IcannotsaythatIhaveevernoticedthisex-perienceinmyself,butIhavenodoubtthatitispossible.Andpeopleseeminclinedtoarguethat,sincewecanremembertheearlierstrokes,wemusthaveexperiencedthem,thoughwedidnotdirectlyapprehendthem.Buthereagain,theargumentdoesnotseemtomeatallconclusive.Ishouldsay,again,thatitispossiblethatwediddirectlyapprehendthem,but\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA179onlywithaveryslightdegreeofattention(ifanyVAnd,asanalternative,Ishouldurgethatthereisnoreasonwhyweshouldnotbeabletorememberathing,whichweneverexperiencedatall.Idonotknowwhatotherargumentscanbeusedtoshowthatwesometimesexperiencesensiblesinasensequiteotherthanthatofdirectlyappre-hendingthem.ButIdonotknowhowtoshowthatwedonot;andsincepeoplewhosejudgmentIrespect,seemtoholdthatwedo,Ithinkitisworthwhiletosaysomethingastowhatthissenseof**experience"canbe,incaseitdoesoccur,Ihavesaidthatsometimeswhenpeoplesaythatagivenentity**"isexperiencedtheyseemtomeanthatitbelongstosomeindividual,inthesenseinwhichmyactsofbeliefbelongtome.Tosaythatsensibleswereexperiencedbymeinthissensewould,therefore,betosaythattheysometimeshavetomyactsofbeliefandactsofdirectappre-hensionthesamerelationwhichthesehavetooneanother—therelationwhichconstitutesthemmine.Butthatsensibleseverhavethiskindofrelationtomymentalacts,isathingwhichIcannotbelieve.Thosewhoholdthattheyareeverexperiencedatall,insomesenseotherthanthatofbeingdirectlyapprehended,alwayshold,Ithink,that,whenevertheyaredirectlyapprehendedbyus,theyalso,atthesametime,havetousthisotherrelationaswell.AnditseemstomeprettyclearthatwhenIdodirectlyapprehendasensible,itdoesnothavetomethesamerelationwhichmydirectapprehensionofithas.If,therefore,sensiblesareeverexperiencedbyusatall,inanysenseotherthanthatofbeingdirectlyapprehendedbyus,wemust,Ithink,holdthattheyaresoinanentirelynewsense,quitedifferentbothfromthatinwhichtobeexperiencedmeanstobedirectlyapprehended,andfromthatinwhichtobe\n;:i8oTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAexperiencedmeanstooccurinsomeindividualsmind.AndIcanonlysaythatIseenoreasontothinkthattheyeverareexperiencedinanysuchsense.Iftheyare,thefactthattheyaresoispresumablyopentotheinspectionofusall;butIcannotdistinguishanysuchfactasoccurringinmyself,asIcandistinguishthefactthattheyaredirectlyapprehended.Ontheotherhand,Iseenowayofshowingthattheyarenotexperiencedinsomesuchsense;andperhapssomebodywillbeabletopointitouttome.Idonotwishtoassume,therefore,thatthereisnosuchsense;andhence,thoughIaminclinedtothinkthattheonlysenseinwhichtheyareexperiencedisthatofbeingdirectlyapprehended,Ishall,inwhatfollows,usethephrase*'experienced"tomeaneitherdirectlyapprehendedorhavingtosomethingthissupposeddifferentrelation,ifsucharelationtherebe.(3)Wemaynow,therefore,raisethequestionDosensibleseverexistattimeswhentheyarenotbeingexperiencedatall?Tothisquestionitisusualtogiveanegativeanswer,andtwodifferentapriorireasonsmaybeurgedinfavourofthatanswer.ThefirstiswhatshouldbemeantbyBerkeley'sdictumthattheesseofsensiblesispercipLThisshouldmean,whateverelseitmaymean,atleastthis:thattosupposeasensibletoexistandyetnottobeexperiencedinself-contradictory.Andthisatleastseemstometobeclearlyfalse.Anythingwhichwasapatchofcolourwouldbeasensibleandtosupposethattherearepatchesofcolourwhicharenotbeingexperiencedisclearlynotself-contradictory,howeverfalseitmaybe.Itmay,however,beurged(andthisisthesecondargument)that,thoughtosupposeathingtobeasensibleandyetnotexperiencedisnotself-contradictory,yetwecanclearlyseethatnothing\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAi8i«canhavetheonepropertywithouthavingtheother.AndIdonotseemywaytodenythatwemaybeabletoknow,apriorithatsuchaconnectionholdsbetweentwosuchproperties.Inthepresentcase,however,Icannotseethatitdoeshold,andtherefore,sofarasapriorireasonsgo,Iconcludethatthereisnoreasonwhysensiblesshouldnotexistattimeswhentheyarenotexperienced.Itmay,however,beasked:Isthereanyreasontosupposethattheyeverdo?Andthereason,whichweighswithmemost,isonewhichapplies,Ithink,toacertainclassofsensiblesonly;aclasswhichIwilltrytodefinebysayingthatitconsistsofthosewhichwould(undercert?.inconditionswhichactuallyexist)beexperiencedInasensationproper,ifonlyalivingbody,havingacertainconstitution,existedunderthoseconditionsinapositioninwhichnosuchbodydoesactuallyexist.IthinkitisveryprobablethatthisdefinitiondoesnotdefineatallaccuratelythekindofsensiblesImean;butIthinkthatwhatthedefinitionaimsatwillbecomeclearerwhenIproceedtogivemyreasonsforsupposingthatsensibles,ofakindtobedefinedinsomesuchway,doexistunexperienced.Thereasonissimplythat,inHume'sphrase,Ihave"astrongpropensitytobelieve"that,e,g.,thevisualsensibleswhichIdirectlyapprehendinlookingatthispaper,stillexistunchangedwhenImerelyalterthepositionofmybodybyturningawaymyheadorclosingmyeyes,providedthatthephysicalconditionsoutsidemybodyremainun-changed.InsuchacaseitiscertainlytrueinsomesensethatIshouldseesensibleslikewhatIsawthemomentbefore,ifonlymyheadwerestillinthepositionitwasatthatmomentormyeyesunclosed.Butif,insuchacase,thereisreasontothinkthatsensibleswhichIshouldsee,ifthepositionofmybodywerealtered,existinspiteof\n182THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAthefactthatIdonotexperiencethem,thereis,Ithink,anequalreasontosupposeitinothercases.Wemust,forinstance,supposethatthesensibleswhichIshouldseenow,ifIwereattheotherendoftheroom,orifIwerelookingunderthetable,existatthismoment,thoughtheyarenotbeingexperienced.Andsimilarlywemustsupposethatthesensibleswhichyouwouldsee,ifyouwereinthepositioninwhichIamnow,existatthismoment,inspiteofthefactthattheymaybemoreorlessdifferentfromthosewhichIsee,owingtothedifferentconstitutionofourbodies.Allthisimpliesofcourse,thatavastnumberofsensiblesexistatanymoment,whicharenotbeingex-periencedatall.Butstillitimpliesthisonlywithregardtosensiblesofastrictlylimitedclass,namelysensibleswhichwouldbeexperiencedinasensationproper,ifabody,havingacertainconstitution,wereinapositioninwhichitisnot,underthegivenphysicalconditions.Itdoesnot,forinstance,implythatanyimages^ofwhichitmaybetruethatIshould\iZ.v^them,underpresentphysicalconditions,ifthepositionofmybodywerealtered,existnow;nordoesitimplythatsensibleswhichwouldbeexperiencedbymenowinasensationproper,ifthephysicalconditionsexternaltomybodyweredifferentfromwhattheyare,existnow.Ifeel,ofcourse,thatIhaveonlysucceededindefiningmiserablyvaguelythekindofsensiblesImean;andIdonotknowwhetherthefactthatIhaveastrongpropensitytobelievethatsensiblesofakindtobedefinedinsomesuchway,doexistunexperienced,isanygoodreasonforsupposingthattheyactuallydo.Thebeliefmay,ofcourse,beamereprejudice.ButIdonotknowofanycertaintestbywhichprejudicescanbedistinguishedfromreasonablebeliefs.AndIcannothelpthinkingthattheremaybeaclassofsensibles,capableof\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA183definitioninsomesuchway,whichtherereallyisreasontothinkexistunexperienced.But,ifIamnotmistaken,thereisanempiricalargumentwhich,though,evenifitweresound,itwouldhavenotendencywhatevertoshowthatnosensiblesexistunexperienced,would,ifitweresound,showthatthisveryclassofsensibles,towhichalonemyargumentforunexperiencedexistenceapplies,certainlydonotsoexist.This,itseemstome,isthemostweightyargumentwhichcanbeuseduponthesubject;andIwant,therefore,togivemyreasonsforthinkingthatitisfallacious.Theargumentisonewhichassertsthatthereisabundantempiricalevidenceinfavouroftheviewthattheexistenceofthesensibleswhichweex-perienceatanytime,alwaysdependsupontheconditionofournervoussystem:sothat,evenwhereitalsodependsuponexternalphysicalconditions,wecansafelysaythatsensibles,whichweshouldhaveexperienced,ifonlyournervoussystemhadbeeninadifferentcondition,certainlydonotexist,whenitisnotinthatcondition.AndthefallacyofthisargumentseemstometoHeinthefactthatitdoesnotdistinguishbetweentheexistenceofthesensibleswhichweexperienceandthefadthatweexperiencethem.Whatthereisevidenceforisthatourexperienceofsensiblesalwaysdependsupontheconditionofournervoussystem;that,accordingastheconditionofthenervoussystemchanges,differentsensiblesareexperienced,evenwhereotherconditionsarethesame.Butobviouslythefactthatourexperienceofagivensensibledependsupontheconditionofournervoussystemdoesnotdirectlyshowthattheexistenceofthesensibleexperiencedalwaysalsosodepends.ThefactthatIamnowexperiencingthisblackmarkiscertainlyadifferentfactfromthefactthatthisblackmarknowexists.Andhencetheevidencewhichdoestendtoshowthat\n184THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAtheformerfactwouldnothaveexistedifmynervoussystemhadbeeninadifferentcondition,hasnotendencytoshowthatthelatterwouldnothavedonesoeither.Iamsurethatthisdistinctionoughttobemade;andhence,thoughIthinktheremaybeotherreasonsforthinkingthattheveryexistenceofthesensibles,whichweexperience,andnotmerelythefactthatweexperiencethemdoesalwaysdependupontheconditionofournervoussystems,itseemstomecertainthatthisparticularargumentconstitutesnosuchreason.AndIthinkthatthosewhosupposethatitdoesareapttobeinfluencedbyanassumption,forwhichalso,sofarasIcansee,thereisnoreason.IhaveadmittedthattheonlyreasonIcanseeforsupposingthatsensibleswhichweexperienceeverexistunexperienced,seemstoleadtotheconclusionthatthesensibleswhichwouldbeseenbyacolour-blindman,ifheoccupiedexactlythepositionwhichI,whoamnotcolour-blind,nowoccupy,existnow,justasmuchasthosewhichInowsee.Anditmaybethoughtthatthisimpliesthatthesensibles,whichhewouldsee,andwhichwouldcertainlybeverydifferentfromthosewhichIsee,areneverthelessatthismomentinexactlythesameplaceasthosewhichIsee.Now,formypart,Iamnotpreparedtoadmitthatitisimpossibletheyshouldbeinthesameplace.ButtheassumptionagainstwhichIwishtoprotest,istheassumptionthat,iftheyexistatall,theymustbeinthesameplace.Icanseenoreasonwhateverforthisassumption.AndhenceanydifficultiestheremaybeinthewayofsupposingthattheycouldbeinthesameplaceatthesametimeasthesensibleswhichIsee,donotatallapplytomyhypothesis,whichisonlythattheyexistnow^notthattheyexistinthesameplaceinwhichminedo.Onthisquestion,therefore,astowhethersensibleseverexistattimeswhentheyarenot\n—THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA185experienced,Ihaveonlytosay(i)thatIthinkthereiscertainlynogoodreasonwhateverforassertingthatnosensiblesdo;and(2)thatIthinkperhapsacertainamountofweightoughttobeattachedtoourinstinctivebeliefthatcertainkindsofsensiblesdo;andthathereagainanyspecialargumentswhichmaybebroughtforwardtoshowthat,whethersomesensiblesexistunex-periencedornot,thiskindcertainlydonot,are,sofarasIcansee,whollyinconclusive.(")Inowpasstothequestionhowsensiblesarerelatedtophysicalobjects.AndhereIwanttosay,tobeginwith,thatIfeelextremelypuzzledaboutthewholesubject.Ifinditextremelydifficulttodis-tinguishclearlyfromoneanotherthedifferentcon-siderationswhichoughttobedistinguished;andallIcandoistoraise,moreorlessvaguely,certainquestionsastohowcertainparticularsensiblesarerelatedtoceriai\npariiczi/arphysicalobjects,andtogivethereasonswhichseemtometohavemostweightforansweringthesequestionsinonewayratherthananother.IfeelthatallthatIcansayisverytentative.Tobeginwith,**physicalIdonotknowhowobject"istobedefined,andIshallnottrytodefineit.Ishall,instead,considercertainpro-positions,whicheverybodywilladmittobepro-positionsadoutphysicalobjects,andwhichIshallassumethatIknowtobetrue.AndthequestionIshallraiseisastohowthesepropositionsaretobeinterpretedinwhatsensetheyaretrue;incon-sideringwhich,weshallatthesametimeconsiderhowtheyarerelatedtocertainsensibles.Iamlookingattwocoins,oneofwhichisahalf-crown,theotheraflorin.Botharelyingontheground;andtheyaresituatedobliquelyto\n186THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAmylineofsight,sothatthevisualsensibleswhichIdirectlyapprehendinlookingatthemarevisiblyelliptical,andnotevenapproximatelycircular.Moreover,thehalf-crownissomuchfartherfrommethantheflorinthatitsvisualsensibleisvisiblysmallerthanthatoftheflorin.InthesecircumstancesIamgoingtoassumethatIknowthefollowinp"propositionstobetrue;andnoone,Ithink,willdenythatwecanknowsuchpropositionstobetrue,though,asweshallsee,extremelydifferentviewsmaybetakenastowhattheymean.Iknow{a)that,intheordinary'*see"senseofthewordIamreallyseeingtwocoins:anassertionwhichincludes,ifitisnotidenticalwith,theassertionthatthevisualex-periences,whichconsistinmydirectapprehensionofthosetwoellipticalpatchesofcolour,aresensa-tionsproper,andarenoteitherhallucinationsnormereexperiencesof**images"{b)thattheupper;sidesofthecoinsarereallyapproximatelycircular,andnotmerelyellipticallikethevisualsensibles;{c)thatthecoinshaveanotherside,andaninside,thoughIdon'tseeit;(d)thattheuppersideofthehalf-crownisreallylargerthanthatoftheflorin,thoughitsvisualsensibleissmallerthanthevisualsensibleoftheuppersideoftheflorin:(^)thatbothcoinscontinuetoexist,evenwhenIturnawaymyheadorshutmyeyes;butinsayingthis,Idonot,ofcourse,meantosaythatthereisabsolutelynochangeinthem;Idaresaytheremustbesomechange,andIdonotknowhowtodefineexactlywhatIdomean.Butwecan,Ithink,sayatleastthis:viz.,thatpropositions{b\{c\and{d)willstillbetrue,althoughproposition{a)hasceasedtobetrue.Nowallthesepropositionsare,Ithink,typicalpropositionsofthesortwhichwecallpropositionsaboutphysicalobjects;andthetwocoinsthemselves\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA187arephysicalobjects,ifanythingis.Myquestionis:Inwhatsensearethesepropositionstrue?Andinconsideringthisquestion,thereare,Ithink,twoprincipleswhichwecanlaydownascertaintobeginwith;thoughtheydonotcarryusveryfar.Theoneis(a)thattheuppersideofthecoin,whichIamsaidtosee,isnotsimplyidenticalwiththevisualsensiblewhichIdirectlyapprehendinseeingit.ThatthisissomightbethoughttofollowabsolutelyfromeachofthetwofactswhichIhavecalled{b)and{d);butIamnotquitesurethatitdoesfollowfromeitheroftheseorfrombothtogether:foritseemstomejustpossiblethatthetwosensiblesinquestion,thoughnotcircularinmyprivatespace,mayyetbecircularinphysicalspace;andsimilarlythatthoughthesensibleofthehalf-crownissmallerthanthatoftheflorininmyprivatespace,itmaybelargerinphysicalspace.ButwhatIthinkitdoesfollowfromisthefactthatanotherpersonmaybeseeingtheuppersideofthecoininexactlythesamesenseinwhichIamseeingit,andyethissensiblebecertainlydifferentfrommine.Fromthisitfollowsabsolutelythattheuppersideofthecoincannotbeidenticalwithbothsensibles,sincetheyarenotidenticalwithoneanother.Andthoughitdoesnotfollowabsolutelythatitmaynotbeidenticalwithoneofthetwo,yetitdoesfollowthatwecangetacaseinwhichitisnotidenticalwithm^ineandIneedonlyassumethatthecaseIamtakingissuchacase.Fromthisitfollowsthatwemustdistinguishthatsenseoftheword**see"inwhichwecanbesaidto*'see"aphysicalobject,fromthatsenseofthewordinwhich"see"meansmerelytodirectlyapprehendavisualsensible.Inapropositionoftheform'*IseeA,"whereAisanameordescriptionofsomephysicalobject,though,ifthisproposition\n—188THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAistobetrue,theremustbesomevisualsensible,B,whichIamdirectlyapprehending,yettheproposition**"IseeAiscertainlynotalways,andprobablynever,identicalinmeaningwiththeproposition"IdirectlyapprehendB."Inasserting**thatweIseeA"weareassertingnotonlydirectlyapprehendsomesensiblebutalsosome-thingelseaboutthissensible—itmaybeonlysomepropositionoftheform,**andthissensiblehascertainotherproperties,"oritmaybesomepropositionoftheform"andIknowthissensibletohavecertainotherproperties."Indeedwehavenotonlytodistinguishthatsenseoftheword"perceive"inwhichitisequivalentto"directlyapprehend,"fromonesenseinwhichwecanbesaidtoperceiveaphysicalobject;wehavealsotodistinguishatleasttwodifferentsensesinwhichwecanbesaidtoperceivephysicalobjects,differentbothfromoneanotherandfrom"directlyapprehend."ForitisobviousthatthoughIshouldbesaidtobenowseeingthehalf-crown^thereisanarrower,andmoreproper,sense,inwhichIcanonlybesaidtoseeonesideofitnotitslowersideoritsinside,andnotthereforethewholehalf-crown.Theotherprinciple,whichwecanlaydowntostartwithis(^)thatmyknowledgeofallthefivepropositions{a)to(e),isbased,inthelastresort,onexperiencesofmineconsistinginthedirectapprehensionofsensiblesandintheperceptionofrelationsbetweendirectlyapprehendedsensibles.Itisbasedonthese,inatleastthissense,thatIshouldneverhaveknownanyofthesepropositionsifIhadneverdirectlyapprehendedanysensiblesnorperceivedanyrelationsbetweenthem.What,inviewofthesetwoprinciples,canbethesenseinwhichmyfivepropositionsaretrue?(i)Itseemstomepossiblethattheonlytrue\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA189interpretationwhichcanbegiventoanyofthemisaninterpretationofakindwhichIcanonlyindicaterathervaguelyasfollows:Namely,thatallofthemexpressonlyakindoffactwhichweshouldnaturallyexpressbysayingthat,^certainconditionswerefulfilled,Iorsomeotherperson,shoulddirectlyapprehendcertainothersensibles.ForinstancetheonlytruethingthatcanbemeantbysayingthatIreallyseecoinsmaybesomesuchthingasthat,ifIweretomovemybodyincertainways,Ishoulddirectlyapprehendothersensibles,e,g,tactualones,whichIshouldnotdirectlyapprehendasaconsequenceofthesemovements,ifthesepresentvisualexperiencesofmineweremerehallucinationsorexperiencesof**images."Again,theonlytruethingthatcanbemeantbysayingthattheuppersidesofthecoinsarereallyapproximatelycircularmaybesomesuchthingasthat,ifIwerelookingstraightatthem,Ishoulddirectlyapprehendcircularsensibles.Andsimilarly,theonlytrueinterpretationof(c)maybesomesuchfactasthat,ifIweretoturnthecoinsover,orbreakthemup,Ishouldhavecertainsensations,ofasortIcanimagineverywell;of(d)thatifIwereatanequaldistancefromthehalf-crownandtheflorin,thesensible,Ishouldthenseecorrespondingtothehalf-crownwouldbebiggerthanthatcorres-pondingtotheflorin,whereasitisnowsmaller;o{(e)that,if,whenmyeyeswereclosed,theyhadbeenopeninstead,Ishouldhaveseencertainsensibles.Itisobvious,indeed,thatifanyinterpretationontheselinesistheonlytrueinterpretationofourfivepropositions,noneofthosewhichIhavevaguelysuggestedcomesanywhereneartoexpressingitinitsultimateform.Theycannotdosoforthesimplereasonthat,inthem,theconditionsunderwhichIshouldexperiencecertainothersensiblesarethem-selvesexpressedintermsolphysicalobjects,andnot\nI90THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAintermsofsensiblesandourexperienceofthem.Theconditionsareexpressedinsuchtermsas'*ifI**weretomovemybody,"ifIweretolookstraightatthecoins,"*'ifIweretoturnthecoinsover,"etc.;andalltheseareobviouslypropositions,whichmustthemselvesagainbeinterpretedintermsofsensibles,ifouroriginalfivepropositionsneedtobeso.Itisobvious,therefore,thatanyulHmateinterpretationofourfivepropositions,ontheselines,wouldbeimmenselycomplicated;andIcannotcomeanywhereneartostatingexactlywhatitwouldbe.Butitseemstomepossiblethatsomesuchinterpretationcouldbefound,andthatitistheonlytrueone.Thegreatrecommendationofthisviewseemstometobethatitenablesustosee,moreclearlythananyotherviewcan,howourknowledgeofphysicalpropositionscanbebasedonourexperieneofsensibles,inthewayinwhichprinciple{P)assertsittobe.If,whenIknowthatthecoinsareround,allthatIknowissomesuchthingasthatif,afterexperiencingthesensiblesIdonowexperience,Iweretoexperiencestillothers,Ishouldfinallyexperienceathirdset,wecanunderstand,asclearlyaswecanunderstandhowanyknowledgecanbeobtainedbyinductionatall,howsuchaknowledgecouldbebasedonourpreviousexperienceofsensibles,andhowitcouldbeverifiedbyoursubsequentexperience.Ontheotherhand,apartfromthedifficultyofactuallygivinganyinterpretationontheselines,whichwillmeettherequirements,thegreatob-jectiontoitseemstometobethis.Itisobviousthat,onthisview,thoughweshallstillbeallowedtosaythatthecoinsexistedbeforeIsawthem,arecircularetc.,alltheseexpressions,iftheyaretobetrue,willhavetobeunderstoodinaPickwickiansense.WhenIknowthatthecoinsexistedbefore\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA191Isawthem,whatIknowwillnotbethatanythingwhateverexistedatthattime,inthesenseinwhichthoseellipticalpatchesofcolourexistnow.AllihdXIknowwillbesimplythat,sincetheellipticalpatchesexistnow,itistrue,that,z/^certainunrealisedcon-ditionshadbeenrealised,IshouldhavehadcertainsensationsthatIhavenothad;or,?/"certaincon-ditions,whichmayormaynotberealisedinthefuture,weretobeso,Ishouldhavecertainexperiences.SomethinglikethiswillactuallybetheonlytruethingthatcanbemeantbysayingthatthecoinsexistedbeforeIsawthem.Inotherwords,tosayofaphysicalobjectthatitexistedatagiventimewillalwaysconsistmerelyinsayingofsomesensible,notthatitexistedatthetimeinquestion,butsome-thingquitedifferentandimmenselycomplicated.Andthus,though,whenIknowthatthecoinsexist,whatIknowwillbemerelysomepropositionaboutthesesensibleswhichIamdirectlyappre-hending,yetthisviewwillnotcontradictprinciple(a)byidentifyingthecoinswiththesensibles.Foritwillsaythattoassertagiventhingofthecoinsisnotequivalenttoassertingthesamethingofthesensibles,butonlytoassertingofthemsomethingquitedifferent.Thefactthattheseassertionsthatthecoinsexist,areround,etc.,will,onthisview,onlybetrueinthisoutrageouslyPickwickiansense,seemstometoconstitutethegreatobjectiontoit.Butitseemstometobeanobjectiononly,sofarasIcansee,becauseIhavea"strongpropensitytobelieve"that,whenIknowthatthecoinsexistedbeforeIsawthem,whatIknowisthatsomethingexistedatthattime,intheverysamesenseinwhichthoseellipticalpatchesnowexist.And,ofcourse,thisbeliefmaybeamereprejudice.ItmaybethatwhenIbelievethatInowhave,inmybody,bloodfiCndnervesandbrain,whatIbelieveisonlytrue,if\na192THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAitdoesnotassert,inthepropersenseoftheword'*existence,"\.\\q.presentexistenceofanythingwhat-ever,otherthansensibleswhichIdirectlyapprehend,butonlymakesassertionsastothekindofex-periencesadoctorwouldhave,ifhedissectedme.ButIcannotfeelatallsurethatmybelief,that,whenIknowofthepresentExistenceofthesethings(asIthinkIdo).Iamknowingofthepresentexistence(inthepropersense)ofthingsotherthananysensibleswhichIoranyoneelseamnowdirectlyapprehending,isamereprejudice.AndthereforeIthinkitisworthwhiletoconsiderwhat,ifitisnot,thesethings,ofwhoseexistenceIknow,canbe.(2)Itiscertainthatif,whenIknowthatthathalf-crownexistedbeforeIsawit,IamknowingthatsomethingexistedatthattimeinotherthanaPickwickiansense,Ionlyknowthissomethingbydescription;anditseemsprettyclearthatthedescriptionbywhichIknowitisasthethingwhichhasacertainconnectionwiththissensiblewhichIamnowdirectlyapprehending.Butwhatconnection?Wecannotsimplysay,asmanypeoplehavesaid,thatby**thathalf-crown'*Imeanthethingwhichcausedmyexperienceofthissensible;becauseeventswhichhappenbetweenthehalf-crownandmyeyes,andeventsinmyeyes,andopticnerves,andbrainsarejustasmuchcausesofmyexperiencesasthehalf-crownitselfButitmayperhapsbethecasethatthehalf-crownhassomeparticularkindofcausalrelationtomyex-perience,whichtheseothereventshavenotgot—kindwhichmaybeexpressed,perhaps,bysaying**source."Andhence,whenthatitisitsIknowthatthathalf-crowniscircular,Imayperhapsbeknowingthatthesourceofthisexperienceiscircular.Butwhatsortofathingcanthis"source"be.-*\n;THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA193Onekindofview,whichIthinkisverycommonlyheld,**"isthatitissomethingspiritualinitsnature,orsomethingwhosenatureisutterlyunknowntous.Andthosewhoholdthisviewareapttoadd,that**itisnotreallycircular/'inanysenseatallnoristhe*'source"ofmyhalf-crownexperience,inanysenseat**bigger"thanthatofmyflorinall,experience.Butifthisadditionwereseriouslymeant,itwould,ofcourse,amounttosayingthatpropositions(b)and{d)arenottrue,inanysenseatall;andIdonotthinkthatthosewhomakeit,reallymeantosaythis.Ithinkthatwhattheymeanisonlythattheonlysenseinwhichthose''sources"arecircular,andonebiggerthantheother,isoneinwhichtosaythismerelyamountstosayingthatthesensibles,whichtheywouldcauseustoexperience,undercertainconditions,wouldbecircular,andonebiggerthantheother.Inotherwords,inordertogiveatrueinterpretationtothepropositionsthatthecoinsarecircularandonebiggerthantheother,theysaythatwemustinter-prettheminthesamekindofwayinwhichview()interpretedthem;andtheonlydifferenceIbetweentheirviewandview(i),isthat,whereasthatsaidthatyoumustgiveaPickwickianinter-pretationbothtotheassertionthatthecoinsexistsandtotheassertionthattheyarecircular,theysaythatyoumust7totgiveittotheformerassertion,andmusttothelatter.Tothisviewmyobjectionisonlythatanyreasontheremaybeforsayingthatthe**sources"existinotherthanaPickwickiansense,seemstometobealsoareasonforsayingthattheyare*'circular"inasensethatisnotPickwickian.Ihavejustasstrongapropensitytobelievethattheyarereallycircular,inasimpleandnaturalsense,asthattheyexistinsuchasense:andIknowofnobetterreasonforbelievingeither.\n194THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA(3)Itmaybesuggested,next»thatthese"sources,"insteadofbeingsomethingspiritualintheirnatureorsomethingofanatureutterlyunknown,consistsimplyofsensibles,ofakindwhichIhavepreviouslytriedtodefine;namelyofallthosesensibles,whichanybodywould,undertheactualphysicalconditions,experienceinsensationsproperofwhichthehalf-crownandtheflorinwerethesource,iftheirbodieswereinanyofthepositionsrelativelytothosecoins,inwhichtheywouldgetsensationsfromthematallWesawbeforethatitseemspossiblethatallthesesensiblesdoreallyexistattimeswhentheyarenotexperienced,andthatsomepeople,atallevents,seemtohaveastrongpropensitytobelievethattheydo.Andinfavouroftheviewthatsomesuchhugecollectionofsensiblesistheuppersideofthehalf-crown,isthefactthatwedoseemtohaveastrongpropensitytobelievethatanyparticularsensible,whichwedirectlyapprehendinlookingattheuppersideofthehalf-crown,andofourdirectapprehensionofwhichtheuppersideisthesource,isintheplaceinwhichtheuppersideis.Andthatsomesensemightbegiventotheexpression**inthesameplaceas,"inwhichitcouldbetruethatsensiblesofallsortsofdifferentshapesandsizes,andofallsortsofdifferentcolours,wereinthesameplaceatthesametime,seemstometobepossible.Buttheobjectiontothisviewseemstometobethesameastothelast;namelythatiftheuppersideofthehalf-crownwereidenticalwithsuchacollectionofsensibles,thentheonlysenseinwhichitcouldbesaidtobe"circular,"orbiggerthanthatoftheflorin,wouldcertainlybeveryPickwickian,thoughnotthesameasonthatview.(4)If,forthereasonsgiven,werejectboth(i),(2),and(3)asinterpretationsofourfivepro-\nTHESTATUSOFSENSE-DATA195positions,theomyalternativeIcanthinkofthatremains,isonewhichisroughlyidentical,sofarasIcansee,withLockesview.Itisaviewwhichassertsthatthehalf-crownandtheflorinreallydidexist(inthenaturalsense)beforeIsawthem;thattheyreallyareapproximatelycircular(againinthenaturalsense);that,therefore,theyarenotcom-posedofsensibleswhichIorothersshoulddirectlyapprehendunderotherconditions;andthatthereforealsoneitherthesesensibles(evenifsuchdonowexist)northosewhichIamnowdirectlyappre-hendingareintheplaceinwhichthecoinsare.Itholds,therefore,thatthecoinsdoreallyresemblesomesensibles,inrespectofthe'*primary"qualitieswhichthesehave;thattheyreallyareround,andonelargerthantheother,inmuchthesamesenseinwhichsomesensiblesareroundandsomelargerthanothers.Butitholdsalsothatnosensibleswhichweeverdodirectlyapprehend,orshoulddirectlyapprehend,ifatagiventimewewereinotherpositions,arepartsofthosecoins;andthat,therefore,thereisnoreasontosupposethatanypartsofthecoinshaveanyofthe''secondary"—qualitiescolour,etc.—whichanyofthesesensibleshave.Onthisview,itisplain,thereisnothingtopreventusfromholdingthat,assuggestedinI(3),allsortsofunexperiencedsensiblesdoexist.Weareonlypreventedfromholdingthat,iftheydo,thosewhichhavethesamesourceallexistinthesameplaceastheirsource.Andthenaturalviewtotakeastothestatusofsensiblesgenerally,relativelytophysicalobjects,wouldbethatnoneofthem,whetherexperiencedornot,wereeverinthesameplaceasanyphysicalobject.Thatnone,therefore,exist*'anywhere*'inphysicalspace;while,atthesametime,wecanalsosay,asarguedinI(2),thatnoneexist"inthemind,"exceptin\n196THESTATUSOFSENSE-DATAthesensethatsomearedirectlyapprehendedbysomeminds.Andtheonlythingthatwouldneedtobeadded,isthatsome,andsomeonly,resemblethephysicalobjectswhicharetheirsource,inrespectoftheirshape.TothisviewIcanseenoobjectionexcepttheseriousonethatitisdifficulttoanswerthequestions:HowcanIevercometoknowthatthesesensibleshavea**source*'atall?AndhowdoIknowthatthese"sources"arecircular?Itwouldseemthat,ifIdoknowthesethingsatall,Imustknowimmediately,inthecaseofsomesensibles,boththattheyhaveasourceandwhattheshapeofthissourceis.AndtothisitmaybeobjectedthatthisisakindofthingwhichIcertainlycannotknowimmediately.Theargumentinfavourofaninterpretationoftype(i)seemstometorestwhollyontheassumptionthatthereareonlycertainkindsoffactswhichIcanknowimmediately;andhencethatifIbelieveIknowafact,whichisnotofthiskind,andwhichalsoIcannothavelearntimmediately,mybeliefmustbeamereprejudice.ButIdonotknowhowitcanbeshownthatanassertionoftheform:Factsofcertainkindsaretheonlyonesyoucanknowimmediately;isitselfnotaprejudice.Idonotthink,therefore,thatthefactthat,ifthislastviewweretrue,weshouldhavetoadmitthatweknowimmediatelyfactsofakindwhichmanypeoplethinkwecannotknowimmediately,isaconclusiveobjectiontoit.\n—THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYThefourthchapterofMr.BradleysAppearanceandReality*'isachapterheadedSpaceandTime,"andhebeginsthechapterasfollows:"Theobjectofthischapterisfarfrombeinganattempttodiscussfullythenatureofspaceoroftime.Itwillcontentitselfwithstatingourmainjustificationforregardingthemasappearances.Itwillexplainwhywedenythat,inthecharacterwhichtheyexhibit,theyeitherhaveorbelongtoreality."*Here,itwillbeseen,Mr.Bradleystatesthat,inhisopinion,Time,inacertaincharacter^neitherhasnorbelongstoreality;thisistheconclusionhewishestomaintain.AndtosaythatTimehasnotrealitywouldseemtobeplainlyequivalenttosayingthatTimeisnotreal.However,ifanybodyshoulddoubtwhetherthetwophrasesaremeanttobeequivalent,thedoubtmaybeeasilysetatrestbyareferencetotheconcludingwordsofthesamechapter,whereMr.Bradleyusesthefollowingveryemphaticexpression:'*Time,"hesays,"likespace,hasmostevidentlyprovednottobereal,buttobeacontradictoryappearance"(p.43).Mr.Bradleydoes,then,sayhere,insomanywords,thatTimeisnotreal.Butthereisoneotherdifferencebetweenthisstatementattheendofthechapter,andthestatementatthebeginningofit,•AppearanceandReality(2ndedn.),p.35.TheItalicsaremine.\n—;198THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYwhichwemustnotforgettonotice.Inthestate-mentatthebeginninghecarefullyqualifiesthe"assertion**Timeneitherhasnorbelongstoreality**Time,inthecharacterwhichbysayingitexhibits^neitherhasnorbelongstoreality,"whereasinthefinalstatementthisqualificationisnotinsertedherehesayssimply**Timeisnotreal."Thisqualification,whichisinsertedintheoneplaceandomittedintheother,might,ofcourse,bemeanttoimplythat,insomeothercharacter—somecharacterwhichitdoesnotexhibit—Timehasrealityanddoesbelongtoit.AndIshallpresentlyhavesomethingtosayaboutthisdistinctionbetweenTimeinonecharacterandTimeinanother,be-causeitmightbethoughtthatthisdistinctionistheexplanationofthedifficultyastoMr.Bradley'smeaning,whichIamgoingtopointout.However,sofaritisclearthatMr.Bradleyholdsthatinsomesense,atallevents,thewholepropo-sition'*Timeisnotreal"canbetrulyasserted.And,now,Iwanttoquoteapassageinwhichhesaysthingswhich,atfirstsight,seemdifficulttoreconcilewiththisview.ThisnewpassageisapassageinwhichheisnottalkingofTimeinparticular,butof**appearances"ingeneral.But,aswehaveseen,hedoesregardTimeasoneamongappearances,andIthinkthereisnodoubtthatwhatheheredeclarestobetrueofallap-pearancesismeanttobetrueofTime,amongtherest.Thisnev,^passageisasfollows:**Forthepresent,"hesays,***wemaykeepafastholduponthis,thatappearancesexist.Thatisabsolutelycertain,andtodenyitisnonsense.Andwhateverexistsmustbelongtoreality.Thisisalsoquitecertain,anditsdenialoncemoreisself-contradictory.Ourappearances,nodoubt,maybeabeggarlyshow,andtheirnaturetoanunknown"op,citpp.131-2\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY199extentmaybesomethingwhich,asitts,isnoitrueofreality.Thatisonething,anditisquitean-otherthingtospeakasifthesefactshadnoactualexistence,orasiftherecouldbeanythingbutrealitytowhichtheymightbelong.AndImustventuretorepeatthatsuchanideawouldbesheernonsense.Whatappears,forthatsolereason,mostindubitablyzs/andthereisnopossibilityofcon-juringitsbeingawayfromit."Thatisthepassagewhichseemstometoraiseadifficultyastohismeaningwhencontrastedwiththeformerpassage.Andthereasonwhyitseemstometoraiseoneisthis.IntheformerpassageMr,BradleydeclaredmostemphaticallythatTime**isnotreal;hesaid:Timehasmostevidentlyprovednottobereal."WhereasinthisoneheseemstodeclareequallyemphaticallythatTimedoesexist,andis.Andhislanguagehereagainisasstrongaspossible.HesaysitissheernonsensetosupposethatTimedoesnotexist,isnotafact,doesnotbelongtoreality.Itlooks,therefore,asifhemeanttomakeadistinctionbetween**beingreal"ontheonehand,and"existing,"*'beingafact,"and"being"ontheotherhand—asifhemeanttosaythatathingmayexist,andbe,andbeafact,andyetnotbereal..xAndIthinkthereis,atallevents,somesuperficialdifficultyinunder-standingthisdistinction.Wemightnaturallythinkthattosay"Timeexists,isafact,andis,"isequivalenttosayingthatitisreal.Whatmore,wemightask,canamanwhosaysthatTimeisrealmeantomaintainaboutitthanthatitexists,isafact,andis?Allthatmostpeoplewouldmeanbysayingthattimeisrealcould,itwouldseem,beexpressedbysaying"ThereissuchathingasTime."Anditmight,therefore,appearfromthisnewpassageasifMr.Bradleyfullyagreedwiththeviewthatmostpeoplewouldexpressbysaying\n;200THECONCEPTIONOFREALITY•*Timeisreal"—asifhedidnotatallmeantocontradictanythingthatmostpeoplebelieveaboutTime.But,ifso,thenwhatarewetomakeofhisformerassertionthat,nevertheless,Timeisw^/real?Heevidentlythinksthat,inassertingthis,heisassertingsomethingwhichisnotmerenonsenseandhecertainlywouldnothavechosenthiswayofexpressingwhathemeans,unlesshehadsupposedthatwhatheishereassertingaboutTimeisin-compatiblewithwhatpeopleoftenmeanwhentheysay*'Timeisreal."Yet,wehaveseenthathethinksthatwhatheisassertingisnotincompatiblewiththeassertionsthatTimeis,andisafact,andexists.Hemust,therefore,thinkthatwhenpeoplesay"Timeisreal"theyoften,atleast,meansomethingmorethanmerelythatthereissuchathingasTime,somethingtherefore,whichmaybedenied,withoutdenyingthis.Allthesame,thereis,Ithink,arealdifficultyinseeingthattheyeverdomeananythingmore,and,2/"theydo,whatmoreitisthattheycanmean.Thetwoexpressions"Thereissuchathingassoandso"and"Soandsoisreal"arecertainlysometimesandquitenaturallyusedasequivalents,eveniftheyarenotalwayssoused.AndMr.Bradley'sownlanguageimpliesthatthisisso.For,aswehaveseen,inthefirstpassage,heseemstoidentifybelongingtorealitywithbeingreal.TheconclusionwhichheexpressesinoneplacebysayingthatTimedoesnotbelongtorealityheexpressesinanotherbysayingthatitisnotrealwhereasinthesecondpassageheseemstoidentifythemeaningofthesamephrase"belongingtoreality"withexisting;hesaysthatwhateverexistsmustbelongtoreality,andthatitisself-contra-dictorytodenythis.Butifbothbeingrealandexistingareidenticalwithbelongingtoreality,itwouldseemtheymustbeidenticalwithoneanother.\n;THECONCEPTIONOFREALITY201And,indeed,inanotherpassageintheAppendixtothe2ndEdition(p.555)wefindMr.Bradleyactuallyusingthefollowingwords**:Anything,"hesays,"thatinanysensezlf,qualifiestheabsoluterealityandsoisreal."Moreover,aswehaveseen,hedeclaresittobenonsensetodenythatTimeis;hemust,therefore,allowthat,inasense,atallevents,itisnonsensetodenythatTimeisreal.Andyetthisdenialistheveryonehehasmade.Mr.Bradley,therefore,doesseemhimselftoallowthattheword'^real"may,so^nethnesatallevents,beproperlyusedasequivalenttothewords**exists,"**isafact,"**is."Andyethistwoassertionscannotbothbetrue,unlessthereisso77iesenseinwhichthewholeproposition*'Tineisreal"isnotequivalenttoandcannotbeinferredfrom**Timeis,"or"Timeexists,"or"Timeisafact."Itseems,then,prettyclearthatMr.Bradley""mustbeholdingthatthestatementTimeisrealisinonesense,notequivalentto"Timeexists";thoughheadmitsthat,inanothersense,itis.AndIwillonlyquoteoneotherpassagewhichseemstomakethisplain."If,"hesayslateron(p.206)"Timeisnotunreal,IadmitthatourAbsoluteisadelusionbut,ontheotherside,itwillbeurgedthattimecannotbemereappearance.Thechangeinthefinitesubject,wearetold,isamatterofdirectexperience;itisafact,andhenceitcannotbeexplainedaway.Andsomuchofcourseisindubit-able.Changeisafactand,further,thisfact,assuch,isnotreconcilablewiththeAbsolute.And,ifwecouldnotinanywayperceivehowthefactcanbeunreal,weshouldbeplaced,Iadmit,inahope-lessdilemma...Butourrealpositionisverydifferentfromthis.Fortimehasbeenshowntocontradictitself,andsotobeappearance.Withthis,itsdiscord,weseeatonce,maypassasan\n—202THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYelementintoawiderharmony.Andwiththis,theappealtofactatoncebecomesworthless."'*Itismeresuperstitiontosupposethatanappealtoexperiencecanprovereality.ThatIfindsome-thinginexistenceintheworldorinmyself,showsthatthissomethingexists,anditcannotshowmore.Anydeliveranceofconsciousness—whetheroriginaloracquired—'Hveranceofc»~>n5ciousness.isbutaItisinnocaseanoracleandarevelationwhichwehavetoaccej.tisafact,likeotherfacts,tobedealtwith;andJiereisnopresumptionanywherethat^.nyfactisbetterthanappearance."HereMr.Bradleyseemsplainlytoimplythattobe**real"issomethingmoreandotherthantobeafactortoexist.ThisisthedistinctionwhichIthinkhemeanstomake,andwhich,Ithink,istherealexplanationofhispuzzlinglanguage,andthisisthedistinctionwhichIamgoingpresentlytodiscuss.ButIwantfirsttosaysomethingastothatotherdistinction,whichIsaidmightbesup-posedtobetheexplanationofthewholedifficultythedistinctionimpliedbythequalification"Time,inthecharacterwhichitexhibits";thesuggestionthat,whenwetalkof**Time/'wemaysometimesmeanTimeinonecharacter,sometimesinanother,andthatwhatistrueofitintheonecharactermaynotbetrueofitintheother.Itmight,Ithink,besuggestedthatthisistheexplanationofthewholedifficulty.AndIwantbrieflytopointoutwhyIthinkitcannotbetheonlyexplanation.Statedverybadlyandcrudely,thedifficultywhichrequiresexplanationisthis:Mr.Bradleysays,"ItissheernonsensetosayTimeisnotreal"Butthisthingwhichhesaysitissheernonsensetosayistheverythingwhichhehimselfhadformerlysaid.Hehadsaid,"Timehasmostevidentlyprovednottobereal."Now,Mr.Bradleycertainlydoesnotmeantosaythatthispropositionofhis\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY203ownissheernonsense;andyethesays,inwords,thatitissheernonsense.Thisisthedifficulty.Whatistheexplanation?Quiteobviously,theexplanationcanonlytakeonepossibleform.Mr.Bradleymustbeholdingthatthewords'*Timeisreal"mayhavetwodifferentsenses.Inonesense,thedenialofthemissheernonsense;intheothersense,sofarfrombeingsheernonsense,denialofthemis,accordingtohim,evidentlytrue.Now,whatarethesetwodifferentsenses,betweenwhichthedifferenceissoenormous?Itisherethatthetwodifferentexplanationscomein.Thefirstand,asIthink,thewrongexplanation(thoughIthinkMr.Bradley'swordsdogivesomecolourtoit)isthis.Itmightbesaid**:Thewholebusinessisperfectlyeasytoexplain.WhenMr.BradleysaysthatTimeisnotreal,whathemeansisthatTime,inthecharacterwhichitexhibits,isnotreal.Whereas,whenhesays.Timedocsexist,isafact,andis,andthatitisnonsensetodenythis,whathemeansisthatTimedoesexist,htsomeothercharacter—somecharacterotherthanthatwhichitexhibits.Hedoesnotmeantomakeanydistinction,suchasyousuppose,betweentwomeaningsoftheword•real'—theoneofthemmerelyequivalentto'exists,*'is,'*isafact,'andtheothermeaningsomethingverydifferentfromthis.Theonlydistinctionhemeanstomakeisadistinctionbetweentwomeaningsof*Time'orofthewholesentence'Timeisreal.'Hedistinguishesbetweenthemeaningofthissentence,whenitmeans,'Timeinthecharacterwhichitexhibits,isreal,'whichmeaning,hesays,isevidentlyfalse;anditsmeaningwhenitmeans,'Timeinsome(7M^rcharacter,isreal,'andthismeaning,hesays,isevidentlytrue.Thisisthecompleteexplanationofyoursupposedpuzzle,whichis,infact,therefore,veryeasytosolve,"\n204THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYThis,Ithink,mightbeofferedasanexplanationofMr.Bradley'smeaning.Anditmustbead-mittedthatitwouldfurnishacompleteexplanationoftheparticularpuzzleIhavejuststated,itwouldcompletelyabsolveMr.Bradleyfromthechargeofinconsistency;andwouldshowthatwhereheap-pearstocontradicthimselfabouttherealityofTime,thecontradictionisverbalonlyandnotreal.Wemight,indeed,objecttothisdistinctionbetweenTimeinonecharacterandTimeinanother;onthegroundthatanythingwhichhasnotgotthecharac-terwhichTimeexhibits,butonlysomeothercharacter,oughtnottobecalledTimeatall.Weare,indeed,perfectlyfamiliarwiththeconceptionthatoneandthesamethingmayatonetimepossessacharacterwhichitdoesnotpossessatanother,sothatwhatistrueofitatonetimemaynotbetrueofitatanother.Weare,thatis,familiarwiththeideaofathingchangingitscharac-ter.ButTimeitselfasawholeobviouslycannotchangeitscharacterinthissense.Mr.Bradleycannotmeantosaythatitpossessesthecharacter"whichitexhibits"andinwhichitisunrealatonetime,andpossessessomeothercharacter,inwhichitisreal,atsomeothertime.AndhencewemightsayitiscertainlywrongtospeakasifTimeitselfcouldhavetwoincompatiblecharacters;sincenothingcanhavetwoincompatiblecharacters,unlessithasthematdifferenttimes.AndthisisanobjectionwhichdoesseemtoapplytoMr,Bradley'sdoctrineinanycase,sincehedoesinanycaseseemtoimplythisdistinctionbetweenTimeinonecharacterandTimeinanother,whetherthisdistinctionisthecompleteexplanationofourpar-ticularpuzzleornot.YetthisobjectionwouldnotnecessarilybemorethananobjectiontoMr.Bradley'swords;itwouldnotnecessarilybeanobjectiontohismeaning.Whereheseemsto\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY205implythatTime,insomecharacterotherthanthatwhichitexhibits,maybefullyreal,hemayonlymeanthatsomethingcompletelydifferentfromTime,butwhichdoesinsomesensecorrespondtoit,isfullyreal;andifhedoesmeanthis,ourobjectionwouldonlyamounttoanobjectiontohisgivingthenameof"Time"tothissupposedcounterpartofTime;wemightsay,andIthinkjustly,thatitismisleadingtospeakofthiscounter-partofTimeasifitwereTimeitselfinsomeothercharacter;butthiswouldgonowayatalltoshowthattheremaynotreallybesuchacounterpartofTime,whichisreal,whileTimeitselfisunreal.Wemightask,too,whatthissupposedcounterpartofTimeislike,or(toputitinMr.Bradley'sway)whattheprecisecharacteris,inwhichTimezVrealrAndIthinkMr.Bradleywouldadmitthathecannottellus.Butthis,yousee,wouldalsobenoobjectiontohisactualdoctrine.Hemightquitewellknow,andberightinsaying,thatthereisandmustbearealcounterpartofTime,completelydifferentincharacterfromTime,asweknowit,eventhoughhehasnottheleastideawhatthiscounterpartislike.Wemust,therefore,admitthatthisproposedexplanationofourpuzzlewouldbeacompleteexplanationofit.ItwouldcompletelyvindicateMr.Bradleyfromthechargeofinconsistency,andwouldgiveus,ashisdoctrine,adoctrinetowhichwehavehithertofoundnoobjectionexceptverbalones.But,nevertheless,Ithinkitisawrongex-planation,andIwanttoexplainwhy.IfweweretosupposethatthisdistinctionbetweenTimeinonecharacterandTimeinanotherweretheonlyoneonwhichMr.Bradleymeanttorely,weshouldhaveashisdoctrinethis:Weshouldhavetosup-posehimtoaffirmmostemphaticallythatTime,in\n;:2o6THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYthecharacterwhichitexhibits,neitherisreal,norexists,norisafact,noris.Weshouldhavetosupposehimtobeusingallthesefourexpressionsalwaysasstrictequivalents,andtomeanthatitisonlyinitsothercharacterthatTimeeitherexists,orisafact,oris.Andifhedidmeanthis,therewould,ofcourse,benodoubtwhateverthathedoesmeantocontradictthecommonviewwithregardtoTime;since,ofcourse,whatmostpeoplemeanby"Time"Iswhathechoosestocall**Timeinthecharacterwhichitexhibits."Yet,hislanguage,eveninthepassagesthatIquoted,seemstometoindicatethathedoesnotmeanthis.Ithink,onthecontrary,hemeanstoaffirmemphaticallythatTimeeveninthecharacterwhichitexhibits,doesexist,isafact,andindubitablyis,thoughitisnotrealinthatcharacter.Inthesecondpassage,forinstance,whereheinsistssoemphaticallythatap-pearancesdoexist,arefacts,andindubitablyare,heis,Ithink,plainlytalkingofappearances,inthecharacterwhichtheyexhibit—or,ashethereputsit,theirnature,asitis—hedoes,Ithink,meanthatappearances,eveninthischaracter,arefacts,exist,andare,though,inthischaracter,theyarenot"trueofreality."And,soagaininthethirdpassage,wherehesays,Changeisafact,andthisfact,assuch,isnotreconcilablewiththeAbsolutethislanguageissurelyquiteinexcusable,unlesshemeansthatChange,assuch—change,inthecharac-terwhichitexhibits—change,asitis,isafactthough,ofcourse,heholdsthatinthischaracteritcertamlyisnotreal.Ithink,therefore,wehavetoassumethatMr.Bradleymeanstomakeadis-tinctionnotmerelybetweenTime,inonecharacter,andTimeinanother,butalsobetween"real,"inonesense,and"real"inanother.Hismeaningisnotsosimpleasitwouldbe,ifheweremerelymakingadistinctionbetweenTimeinonecharacter\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY207andTimeinanother,anditisnot,afterall,atallplainwhetherhemeanstocontradictwhatordinarypeopleholdaboutTimeornot.HedoesnotmeantoassertthatTime,assuch,neitherisreal,norexists,norisafact,noris;but,onthecontrary,thatTime,evenassuch,doesexist,isafact,andis;but,nevertheless,isnotreal.This,atleast,iswhatIamgoingtoassumehimtomean.Andonthisassumption,wearebroughtfacetofacewiththequestionastothemeaningoftheword"real,"andalsoastothemeaningoftheseotherwords*'exists,"**isafact,"and**is."Mr.Bradleyseemstoadmit,wehaveseen,that"real"maysometimesbeproperlyusedasmerelyequivalenttotheseotherphrases.Weare,however,nowsupposingthathealsoholdsthatinanothersensetheyarenotequiva-lent,butthat"real"meanssomethingmorethantheothers,sothatitisquiteconsistenttomaintainthatTimeisnot"real,"andyetdoesexist,isafact,andis.InholdingthisIthinkheismistaken;andwhatIwanttodoistoexplain,asclearlyasIcan,whatsortofamistakeItakehimtobemaking,andwhatseemstometobethesourceofthismis-take.Imay,perhaps,bequitewronginthinkingthatMrBradleyhasmadethismistake,andthatitisinanydegreethesourceofthedistinctionheseemstodrawbetween"reality"and"existence."Tomaintainthatitissoisnopartofmymainobject.Mymainobjectissimplytomakeclearthenatureofthisparticularmistake,whethercom-mitttedbyMr.Bradleyornot.andthatitisamistake;becauseitseemstomethatitisamistakewhichitisveryeasytomake,andveryimportanttoavoid.Iam,ofcourse,notconcernedatalltodiscussthequestionwhetherTimeisrealornot,butonlytodiscussthequestionwhatsortofthingswouldhavetobetrue,ifitwereunreal,andwhether\n"2o8THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYifthosethingsweretrueitcouldstillbetruethatTimeeitherexists,oris,orisafact.Now,tobeginwith,IthinkIknowprettywell,inpartatleast,whatMr.Bradleymeanswhenhesaysthatitisunreal.Ithinkthatpartatleastofwhathemeansisjustwhatheoughttomean—justwhatanyoneelsewouldmeanifhesaidthatTimewasunreal,andwhatanyordinarypersonwouldunderstandtobemeant,ifheheardthosewords.ButIcanconceivethat,whenIhaveexplainedaswellasIcanwhatthisisthatheoughttomean,somepeoplemaybeinclinedtodisputewhetherhemeansanysuchthingatall.Theymaysaythatheisusingtheword'*real"exclusivelyinsomehighlyunusualandspecialsense,sothatinasserting**Timethatisunreal"heisbynomeansdenyinganypartofwhatordinarypeoplewouldmeanbysayingthat"Timeisreal."AndthatsomespecialsensemaycomeintohismeaningIampreparedtoadmit.IdothinkitispossiblethatpartofwhatMr.Bradleyisassertingmaybesomethingwhichnounsophisticatedpersonwouldthinkofexpressinginthesameway,andIwilladmit,therefore,thathe'*Timedoesnot,verylikely,meanbyisunrealmerelywhatotherpeoplewouldmeanbythisphrase,butsomethingelseaswelLWhat,how-ever,Icannothelpthinkingisthat,evenifhemeanssomethingmore,hedoesmeanwhatordinarypeoplewouldmeanaswell:thatwhattheywouldmeanisatleastz.partofhismeaning.Andifeventhisisdisputed,ifitismaintainedthatheisusingthewordsexclusivelyinsomespecialsense,IownIdonotknowhowtoarguethequestion.Ifany-bodyreallydoestaketheviewthat,whenhesays'*Timeisunreal,"absolutelyallthathemeansissomethingwhichisinnowayincompatiblewithwhatmostpeoplewouldmeanbysaying"Timeisreal,"Idonotknowhowtoshowthatthisviewis\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY209wrong.Icanonlysaythatifthishadbeenallthathemeant,Icannotbelievethathewouldhaveexpressedhisviewintheform**Timeisunreal."TheonlyfurtherargumentIshallbringinfavourofmyviewthathedoesmeanwhatheoughttomeanwilltaketheformofananswertoonepossibleargumentwhichmightbebroughtagainstitWhenIhaveexplainedwhatheoughttomeanbysayingthat*'Timeisunreal,"itwillbequiteclearthatthisissomethingwhichisinfactincompatiblewiththetruthofthepropositionsthatTimeis,orexists,orisafact.AnditmightbeurgedthatthefactthatitisthusincompatibleisastrongargumentagainsttheviewthatMr.Bradleydoesmeanwhatheoughttomean,since,ifhehadmeantit,hecouldhardlyhavefailedtoperceivethatwhathemeantwasinconsistentwiththesepropositions,whereas,aswehaveseen,hecertainlydoesnotperceivethis.Ihaveananswertothatargument,whichconsistsingivinganexplanation,whichIthinkaplausibleone,astohowhecouldcometothinkthatthepropositionsarenotinconsistent,wheninfacttheyare.What,then,oughtMr.Bradleytomeanby'*Timeisunreal"?Whatwouldmostpeoplemeanbythisproposition?Idonotthinkthereismuchdifficultyindiscoveringwhatsortofthingtheywouldmeanbyit.Ofcourse,Time,withabigT,seemstobeahighlyabstractkindofentity,andtodefineexactlywhatcanbemeantbysayingofanentityofthatsortthatitisunrealdoesseemtoofferdifficulties.Butifyoutrytotranslatethepropositionintotheconcrete,andtoaskwhatitimplies,thereis,Ithink,verylittledoubtastothesortofthingitimplies.Themomentyoutrytodothis,andthinkwhatitreallycomesto,youatoncebeginthinkingofanumberofdifferentkindsofpropositions,allofwhichplainlymustbeuntrue,if\n—2IOTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITYTimeisunreal.IfTimeisunreal,thenplainlynothingeverhappensbeforeorafteranythingelse;nothingiseversimultaneouswithanythingelse;itisnevertruethatanythingispast;nevertruethatanythingwillhappeninthefuture;nevertruethatanythingishappeningnow;andsoon.Youcanatoncethinkofaconsiderablenumberofkindsofpropositions(andyoucouldeasilyaddtothelist),thefalsehoodofallofwhichisplainlyimpliedbysayingthatTimeisunreal.Anditisclear,also,thattosaythatthefalsehoodofallpropositionsofthesekindsisimpliedisequivalenttosayingthattherearenofactsofcertaincorrespondingkindsnofactswhichconsistinoneeventhappeningbeforeanother;nonewhichconsistinaneventbeingpastorfuture,andsoon.That**Timeistosay,whatisunreal"impliesisthat,inthecaseofalargenumberofdifferentpropertieswhicharesuchthat,iftheydidbelongtoanything,whattheybelongedtowouldbefactshavingsomecommoncharacter-istic,whichwemightexpressbycallingthem**temporalfacts,"thepropertiesinquestiondo,infact,belongtonothing.Itimpliesthatthepropertyofbeingafactwhichconsistsinoneeventfollowinganotherbelongstonothing;thatthatofbeingapasteventbelongstonothing,andsoon.AndwhyItimpliesthatallthosedifferentspecialproper-tiesbelongtonothingis,Ithinkwemaysay,becausewhatitmeansisthatthegeneralpropertywhichIhavecalledthatofbeinga**temporalfact"belongstonothing.Tosaythatthepropertyofbeingatemporalfactbelongstonothingdoesimplythatsuchspecialpropertiesasthatofbeingafactwhichconsistsinoneeventfollowinganother,orthatofbeingafactwhichconsistsinsomethingbeingpast,alsobelongtonothing;inexactlythesamewayastosaythatthepropertyofbeing**coloured"belongstonothingimplieswithregard\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY211tothespecialproperties**beingred,"**beingblue,"etc.,thattheyalsobelongtonothing.Wemay,then,Ithink,saythatwhat**Timeisunreal"meansissimply'*Thepropertyofbeingatemporalfactbelongstonothing,"or,toexpressthisinthewayinwhichitwouldbeexpressedinordinarylife,**Therearenotemporalfacts."Andthisbeingso,wehaveexplainedtheusageof**unreal,"whereitispredicatedofTimewithacapitalT,byreferencetoamuchmorecommonandperfectlyfamiliarusageoftheterm.Theuseof"isunreal"inthephrase'*Timeisunreal"hasbeendefinedbyreferencetoitsuseinthephrase'*Temporalfactsareunreal."Anditsuseinthisphraseis,sofarasIcansee,exactlythesameasinhostsofphraseswithwhichweareperfectlyfamiliar;itis,Ithink,thecommonestandbyfarthemostimportantuseoftheterm**unreal."Theuseisthatinwhichweuseitwhenwesay,"Unicornsareunreal,""Griffinsareunreal,"'*Chimaerasareunreal,"andsoon.Itistheusageinwhichunrealisequivalentto**imaginary"andinwhichtosay'*Unicorns;areunreal"meansthesameas'*Therearenounicorns"or**Unicornsdonotexist."Injustthesamewaytheproposition**Temporalfactsareunreal,"intowhichwehavetranslated"Timeisunreal,"meansthesameas"Therearenotemporalfacts,"or"Temporalfactsdonotexist,"or"Tempo-ralfactsareimaginary,"Ithink,then,thatwhatMr.Bradleyoughttomeanby"Timeisunreal"canbedefinedby""referencetooneparticularusageofthewordreal—or,ifyouliketoputitthatway,tooneparticularoneamongtheconceptionsforwhichtheterm"reality"maystand.Andthisparticularcon-ceptionseemstometobebyfarthecommonestandmostimportantofthoseforwhichthetermdoesstand.Iwant,therefore,beforegoingon,to\n212THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYdwellalittleuponitsnature;althoughIdaresaythatallthatIhavetosayisperfectlyfamiliarandperfectlywellunderstoodbyeveryonehere.Ofcourse,ithasoftenbeensaidbefore,butIthinkitisstillveryfarfrombeinggenerallyunderstood.Ithink,perhaps,thepointIwanttoinsistoncanbebroughtoutinthisway,Ihavejustsaidthatwehavepointedoutoneparticularone,andthatthemostimportant,amongtheconceptionsforwhichtheterm'*reality"maystand;andthatisanexcusablewayofsayingwhatwehavedone.Butitwould,Ithink,bemorecorrecttosaythatwehavepointedoutoneparticular,andthatthemostimportant,usageoftheterms^^real"and'*unreal,"andthatoneofthepeculiaritiesofthisusageisthat**itissuchthattheterms"real"andunreal"cannot,whenusedinthisway,beproperlysaidtostandforanyconceptionwhatever.IwilltrytoexplainwhatImean.Wehavesaidthatwhat**Lionsarereal"meansisthatsomeparticularpropertyorother—Iwillsay,forthesakeofbrevity,ihepropertyofbeingalion,thoughthatisnotstrictlyaccurate,doesinfactbelongtosome-thing—thattherearethingswhichhaveit,or,toputitinanotherway,thattheconceptionofbeingalionisaconceptionwhichdoesapplytosomethings—thattherearethingswhichfallunderit.Andsimilarlywhat**Unicornsareti7treal"meansisthatthepropertyofbeingaunicornbelongstonothing.Now,ifthisisso,thenitseemstome,inaveryimportantsense,''real"and*'unreal"donotinthisusagestandforanyconceptionsatall.Theonlyconceptionswhichoccurintheproposition'*Lionsarereal"are,onthisinterpretation,plainly,(i)theconceptionofbeingalion,and(2)theconceptionofbelongingtosomething,andperfectlyobviously^'real"doesnotstandforeitherofthese.Inthecaseofthefirstthatisobvious;butitis\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY213worthwhilepointingoutthatitisalsotrueofthesecond.Forif**isreal"didstandfor**belongstosome-thing,"thentheproposition'*Lionsarereal"wouldstand,notfortheassertionthatthepropertyof"beingalion"belongstosomething,butfortheassertionthatlionsthemselvesarepropertieswhichbelongtosomething-,anditisquiteobviousthatwhatwemeantoassertisnotanysuchnonsenseasthis."Real,"therefore,doesnot,inthisproposition,standfortheconceptionof**belongingtosome-thing;"noryet,quiteplainly,doesitstandfortheconceptionof"beingalion."Andhence,sincethesearetheonlytwoconceptionswhichdooccurintheproposition,wemay,Ithink,saythat"real,"inthisusage,doesnotstandforanyconceptionatall.Tosaythatitdidwouldbetoimplythatitstoodforsomepropertyofwhichweareassertingthateverythingwhichhasthepropertyof**beingalion"alsohasthisotherproperty.Butwearenot,infact,assertinganysuchthing.Wearenotassertingofanypropertycalled"reality"thatitbelongstolions,asintheproposition"Lionsaremammalian"weareassertingofthepropertyof"beingamammal"thatitbelongstolions.Thetwopropositions"Lionsarereal"and"Lionsaremammalian,"thoughgrammaticallysimilar,areinrealityofwhollydifferentforms;andonedifferencebetweenthemmaybeexpressedbysayingthatwhereas"mammalian"doesstandforapropertyorconception,theverypointofthisusageof"real"isthatitdoesnot.ToreturntoMr,Bradley."Timeisunreal"oughttomean,accordingtome,"Temporalfactsareunreal,"inthesenseIhavetriedtoexplain.AndIcannothelpthinkingthatthiswhichheoughttomeanis,inpartatleast,whatMr.Bradleydoesmeanwhenhesays"Timeisunreal,"though\n214THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYpossiblyhealsomeanssomethingelseaswell.Butifso,itisquiteclear,Ithink,thatwhathemeansisinconsistentwithitsbeingtruethatTimeexistsorthatthereissuchathingasTime.TosaythatTimeexistsorthatthereissuchathing,istoassertatleast,thattherearesometemporalfacts:itmayassertmorethanthis,butitdoesassertthis,atleast.Andthis,wehaveseen,isexactlywhatisdeniedwhenitissaidthatTimeisunreal."Timeisunreal"justmeans'*Temporalfactsareunreal,"or**therearenotemporalfacts,"or"Temporalfactsdonotexist."Andjustthisisalsowhatismeantby*'Timedoesnotexist"or**ThereisnosuchthingasTime."Thereis,infact,nothing,elsefortheseexpressionstomean.What,therefore,Mr.Bradleyoughttomeanand(accordingtome)doesmeanby**Timeisunreal"is,infact,inconsistentwithwhatheoughttomeanby*'Timeexists"orby'*Timeis."Andyetplainlyhedoesnotthinkthatitisso.Isitpossibletoexplainwhyheshouldhavefailedtoperceivetheinconsistency?Ithinkhisfailurecanbeexplainedasfollows.Itmayhavebeennoticedthat,inthepassagesIquotedfromhim,heinsistsinoneplace,thattodenythatappearancesexistisnotmerelyfalsebutself-contradictory,andinanotherappealstotheprinciplethat"anydeliveranceofconsciousnessisbutadeliveranceofconsciousness"insupportofhiscontentionthatwhatisafactneed,nevertheless,notbereal.Andthefactthathedoesthesetwothingsdoes,Ithink,givecolourtothesuggestionthatthereasonwhyhethinksthatwhatisunrealmayyetexist,andbeafact,andbe,isthefollowing.Itisundoubtedlythecasethat,eveniftemporalfactsareunreal,i.e.,therearenosuchthings,wecananddothinkofthem,justasitisundoubtedlythecasethat,thoughunicornsareunreal,wecan\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY215anddoimaginethem.Inotherwords,**temporal'*and**unicornsfacts"arebothquitecertainly"deliverancesofconsciousness,"atleastinthesensethattheyare**objectsofthought";being"objectsofthought"theyare,inawidesense,"appearances"also,andIcannothelpthinkingthatMr.Bradleysupposesthat,merelybecausetheyareso,theymustatleastbe."How"(Iimaginehewouldask)"canathing*appear'oreven*bethoughtofunlessitistheretoappearandtobethoughtof?Tosaythatitappearsoristhoughtof,andthatyetthereisnosuchthing,isplainlyself-contradictory.Athingcannothaveaproperty,unlessitistheretohaveit,and,sinceunicornsandtemporalfactsdohavethepropertyofbeingthoughtof,therecertainlymustbesuchthings.WhenIthinkofaunicorn,whatIamthinkingofiscertainlynotnothing;ifitv/erenothing,then,whenIthinkofagriffin,Ishouldalsobethinkingofnothing,andtherewouldbenodifferencebetweenthinkingofagriffinandthinkingofaunicorn.Buttherecertainlyisadifference;andwhatcanthedifferencebeexceptthatintheonecasewhatIamthinkingofisaunicorn,andintheotheragriffin?AndiftheunicorniswhatIamthinkingof,thentherecertainlymustbeaunicorn,inspiteofthefactthatunicornsareunreal.Inotherwords,thoughinonesenseofthewordstherecertainlyarenounicorns—thatsense,namely,inwhichtoassertthattherearewouldbeequivalenttoassertingthatunicornsarereal—yettheremustbesomeothersenseinwhichtherearesuchthings;since,iftherewerenot,wecouldnotthinkofthem."Perhaps,itmaybethoughtthatthefallacyin-volvedinthisargumentistoogrossforittobepossiblethatMr.Bradleyshouldhavebeenguiltyofit.ButthereareotherpassagesinAppearance\n2i6THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYandReality—particularlywhathesaysaboutError—whichlooktomeasifhecertainlywasguiltyofit.Isupposeitwillbequiteobvioustoeveryoneherethatitisafallacy;thatthefactthatwecanthinkofunicornsisnotsufificienttoprovethat,inanysenseatall,thereareanyunicorns.Yet,IamnotsurethatIknowmyselfwhatisthemistakeinvolvedinthinkingthatitissufficient,andIamgoing,therefore,totrytoputasclearlyasIcan,whatIthinkitis,inthehopethatsomebodymaybeable,ifIamwrong,tocorrectme.Themainmistake,Isuppose,isthemistakeofthinkingthattheproposition**Unicornsarethoughtof*isapropositionofthesameformas*'Lionsarehunted";ortheproposition'*Iamthinkingofaunicorn''ofthesameformas"Iamhuntingalion";ortheproposition"Unicornsareobjectsofthought"ofthesameformas**Lionsareobjectsofthechase."Ofthesecondpropositionineachofthesethreepairs,itisinfactthecasethatitcouldnotbetrueunlesstherewerelions—atleastone.Eachofthemdoes,infact,assertbothwithregardtoacertainproperty—whichwewillcallthatof*'beingaHon"—thattherearethingswhichpossessit,andalsowithregardtoanother—thatofbeinghunted—thatsomeofthethingswhichpossesstheformerpossessthispropertytoo.Butitisobviousenoughtocommonsensethatthesameisbynomeanstrueoftheyfr.?^propositionineachpair,inspiteofthefactthattheirgrammaticalexpressionshowsnotraceofthedifference.ItisperfectlyobviousthatifIsay**Iamthinkingofaunicorn,"IamnotsayingboththatthereisaunicornandthatIamthinkingofit,although,if*'IsayIamhuntingalion,"Iamsayingboththatthereisalion,andthatIamhuntingit.Intheformercase,Iamnotassertingthatthetwopropertiesofbeingaunicornandofbeingthoughtofbymeboth\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY217belongtooneandthesamething;whereas,inthelattercase,Iamassertingthatthetwopropertiesofbeingalionandofbeinghuntedbymedobelongtooneandthesamething.Itisquiteclearthatthereisinfad,thisdifferencebetweenthetwopropositions;althoughnotraceofitappearsintheirverbalexpression.AndwhyweshouldusethesameformofverbalexpressiontoconveysuchdifferentmeaningsismorethanIcansay.Itseemstomeverycuriousthatlanguage,inthis,asintheotherinstancewhichwehavejustconsideredof*'Lionsarereal"and*'Lionsaremammalian,"shouldhavegrownupjustasifitwereexpresslydesignedtomisleadphilosophers;andIdonotknowwhyitshouldhave.Yet,itseemstomethereisnodoubtthatineversomanyinstancesithas.Moreover,exactlywhatismeantbysaying**Iamthinkingofaunicorn"isnotbyanymeanscleartome.Ithinkwecanassertatleastthis:Inorderthatthispropositionshouldbetrue,itisnecessary(i)thatIshouldbeconceiving,withregardtoacertainproperty,thehypothesisthatthereissomethingwhichpossessesit,and(2)thatthepropertyinquestionshouldbesuchthat,ifanythingdidpossessittherewouldbeaunicorn.Althoughthisisplainlytrue,itdoesnotgiveuscompletelywhat*'ismeantbythestatement,Iamthinkingofaunicorn";andIdonotknowwhatthecompletemeaningis.ItiscertainlynotthatIamconceivingwithregardtothepropertyof*'beingaunicorn,"thatthereissomethingwhichpossessesit;sinceImaybethinkingofaunicorn,withouteverhavingconceivedthepropertyof"beingaunicorn"atall.Whateveritdoesmean,thepointwhichconcernsusisthatitiscertainlynotnecessaryforitstruth,thatthepropertyofbeingaunicornshould,infact,belongtoanythingwhat-ever,or,therefore,thatthereshouldinanysense\n—218THECONCEPTIONOFREALITYwhateverbeaunicorn.AndthefallacyIamat-tributingtoMr.Bradleyisthatofsupposingthat,insomesense,itmustimplythislatter.This,then,iswhatIimaginetobeatleastoneofthereasonswhichhaveledMr.Bradleyto**Timesupposethatthepropositionisunreal,"mustbeconsistentwiththeproposition"ThereissuchathingasTime."Putshortly,itisthathe"sees(whatisperfectlytrue)that"Timeisunreal;"mustbeconsistentwith**WedothinkofTimehethinks(falsely)that"WedothinkofTime"**Theremustimply,insomesense,issuchathingasTime;"andfinally,infers(correctly)fromthistrueandthisfalsepremiss,thattherernustbesomesenseoftheproposition'*ThereissuchathingasTime"whichisconsistentwith**Timeisunreal."Itfollows,then,thatifMr.Bradleymeanswhatheoughtmeanbothby**Timeisunreal"andhy**Timeexists,"heiscontradictinghimselfwhenhecombinesthesetwopropositions.AndIhavesaidIfeelconvincedthathedoesmeanwhatheoughttomeanbytheformer.ButIfeelagooddealofdoubtastowhether,allthesame,heiscontradictinghimself,becauseitdoesseemtomedoubtfulwhetherhemeanswhatheoughttomeanbythelatter.ThekindofthingwhichIimaginemaybehappeningtohimwhenheinsistssostrouglythatTimedoesexist,isafact,andis,isthat,properlyspeaking,heisnotattachingtothesephrasesanymeaningwhatevernot,therefore,thatwhichtheyproperlybear.Itseemstomeverypossiblethathehassostronglyconvincedhimselfofthefalsepropositionthattheremustbesomesenseinwhich,ifIthinkofaunicorn,theremustbeaunicorn,thatwhereverheknowstheformerpropositionholds,heallowshimselftousethelatterformofwords,withoutattachinganymeaningtothem.Whatheisreallyassertingsoemphaticallymay,Ithink,be\nTHECONCEPTIONOFREALITY219notanythingwhichhiswordsstandfor,butsimplythisverbalpropositionthattheremustbesomesenseinwhichtheyaretrue.\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONIWANTtoraisesomechildishlysimplequestionsastowhatwearedoingwhenwemakejudgmentsofacertainkind,whichwealldoinfactexceedinglycommonlymake.ThekindofjudgmentsImeanarethosewhichwemakewhen,withregardtosomethingwhichweareseeing,wejudgesuchthingsas'*Thatisaninkstand,"'*Thatisatable-cloth,"**Thatisadoor,"etc.,etc.;orwhen,withregardtosomethingwhichwearefeelingwithourhands,wejudgesuchthingsas**Thisiscloth,"***'Thisisafinger,"Thisisacoin,"etc.,etc.Itisscarcelypossible,Ithink,toexaggeratethefrequencywithwhichwemakesuchjudgmentsasthese,noryetthecertaintywithwhichweareabletomakevastnumbersofthem.Anyman,whoisnotblind,can,atalmostanymomentofhiswakinglife,exceptwhenheisinthedark,makealargenumberofjudgmentsofthefirstkind,withthegreatestcertainty.Hehasonlytolookabouthim,ifheisindoors,tojudgewithregardtovariousthingswhichheisseeing,suchthingsas**Thatisawindow,""Thatisachair,"**Thisisabook";or,ifheisout-of-doors,suchthingsas'*ThatIsahouse.""Thatisamotor-car,""Thatisaman,"or"Thatisastone,""Thatisatree,""Thatisacloud."Andallofus,whoarenotblind,doinfactconstantlymakesuchjudgments,evenif,asarule,weonlymakethemaspartsofmorecomplicated\n—SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION221judgments.WhatImeanisthat,whenwemakesuchjudgmentsas**Hullo!thatclockhasstopped,"or"Thischairismorecomfortablethanthatone/*or"Thatmanlookslikeaforeigner,"judgmentsofthesimplerkindwithwhichIamconcernedare,sofarasIcansee,actuallyapartofwhatwearejudging.Injudging"Thatclockhasstopped,"partofwhatIamactuallyjudgingis,sofarasIcansee,"Thatisaclock;"andsimilarlyifIjudge"Thattreeistallerthanthisone,"myjudgmentactuallycontainsthetwosimplerjudgments"Thatisatree,"and"Thisisatree."Perhapsmostjudgmentswhichwemake,ofthekindImean,are,inthisway,onlypartsofmorecomplicatedjudg-ments:IdonotknowwhetherthisissoornotButinanycasetherecanbenodoubtthatwemakethemexceedinglycommonly.Andevenablindman,oramaninthedark,cananddoes,veryfrequently,makejudgmentsofthesecondkindi'udgmentsaboutthingswhichheisfeelingwithhislands.Allofus,forinstance,atalmostanymomentofourwakinglife,whetherweareinthedarkornot,haveonlytofeelcertainpartsofourownbodiesorofourclothes,inordertomake,withgreatcertainty,suchjudgmentsas"Thisisafinger,""Thisisanose,""Thisiscloth."AndsimilarlyIhaveonlytofeelinmypocketstojudge,withregardtoobjectswhichImeetwiththere,suchthingsas"Thisisacoin,""Thisisapencil,""Thisisapipe."Judgmentsofthiskindwould,Ithink,commonly,andrighriy,betakentobejudgments,thetruthofwhichinvolvestheexistenceofmaterialthingsorphysicalobjects.IfIamrightinjudgingthatthisisaninkstand,itfollowsthatthereisatleastoneinkstandintheUniverse;andifthereisanink-standintheUniverse,itfollowsthatthereisinitatleastonematerialthingorphysicalobject.This\na222SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONmay,ofcourse,bedisputed.Berkeley,ifIunder-standhimrightly,wasclearlyofopinionthattherewasnoinconsistencyinmaintainingthattherewereintheUniversethousandsofinkstandsandtreesandstonesandstars,andthatyettherewasinitnosuchthingasmatter.Andperhapsthedefini-tionofmatter,whichheadopted,wassuchthattherereallywasnoinconsistencyinmaintainingthis.Perhaps,similarly,otherphilosophershavesome-timesadopteddefinitionsoftheexpressions'*materialthings"and**physicalobjects,"whichweresuchthatallthejudgmentsofthiskindthatwemakemightquitewellbetrue,withoutitsbeingtruethatthereareintheUniverseanymaterialthingswhatever.Perhaps,even,theremaybesomejustificationforadoptingdefinitionsofthosetermswhichwouldyieldthesurprisingresultthatwemay,withperfectconsistency,maintainthattheworldisfullofmineralsandvegetablesandanimals,ofallsortsofdifferentkinds,andthatyetthereisnottobefoundinitasinglematerialthing.Idonotknowwhetherthereisorisnotanyutilityinusingtheterms**materialthing"or**physicalobject"insuchasenseasthis.But,whetherthereisornot,Icannothelpthinkingthatthereisamplejustificationforusingtheminanothersense—senseinwhichfromthepropositionthatthereareintheUniversesuchthingsasinkstandsorfingersorclouds,itstrictlyfollowsthatthereareinitatleastasmanymaterialthings,andinwhich,there-fore,wecannotconsistentlymaintaintheexistenceofinkstands,fingers,andclouds,whiledenyingthatofmaterialthings.ThekindsofjudgmentwhichIhavementioned,andthousandsofotherswhichmighteasilybementioned,areobviouslyallofthesamesortinoneveryimportantrespect—respectinwhich,forinstance,suchjudgmentsas'*Thisisanemotion,"**Thisisajudgment,""This\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION223isacolour,"arenotofthesamesortastheyare.Anditseemstomethatwearecertainlyusingtheterm"materialthing"inacorrectandusefulway,ifweexpressthisimportantcommonpropertywhichtheyhave,bysayingthatofeachofthemthesamecantrulybesaidaswassaidofthejudg-ment**Thatisaninkstand":that,justasfromtheproposition**Thereisaninkstand"itfollowsthatthereisatleastonematerialthing,sofromtheproposition**Thereisatablecloth,"itfollowsthatthereisatleastonematerialthing;andsimilarlyinalltheothercases.Wecancertainlyusetheexpression"Thingssuckasinkstands,tablecloths,fingers,clouds,stars,etc.,"tomeanthingssuchastheseinacertainveryimportantrespect,whichweallunderstand,thoughwemaynotbeabletodefine**materialthing"certainlyit.Andthetermisandcanbecorrectlyusedtomeansimplythingssuchastheseinthatrespect—whateveritmaybe.Sometermiscertainlyrequiredtomeanmerelythingssuchastheseinthatimportantrespect;and,sofarasIcansee,thereisnotermwhichcanbenaturallyusedinthissenseexcepttheterm''materialthings"anditsequivalents.Thusunderstood,theterm**materialthing"certainlydoesstandforanimportantnotion,whichrequiresaname.And,ifweagreetousetheterminthissense,thenitisobviousthatnomorecanbenecessaryforthetruthoftheassertionthattherearematerialthings,thanisnecessaryforthetruthofjudgmentsofthekindwithwhichIproposetodeal.Butnomorecanbenecessaryforthetruthofthesejudgmentsthanisactuallyassertedinorlogicallyimpliedbythem.Andifweapproachthequestionwhatisnecessaryforthetruthoftheassertionthattherearematerialthings,byaskingwhatitisthatweactuallyassertwhenwemake\n224SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONsuchjudgmentsasthese,certainreasonsfordoubtinghowmuchisnecessaryare,Ithink,broughtoutmuchmoreclearly,thanifweapproachthequestioninanyotherway.Manyphilosophershavetoldusaverygreatdealastowhattheysupposetobeinvolvedintheexistenceofmaterialthings;andsome,atleast,amongthemseemtohavemeantby"materialthings"suchthingsasinkstands,fingersandclouds.ButIcanthinkofonlyonetypeofviewastotheconstitutionofmaterialthings,whichissuchthatitistolerablyclearwhatanswerthosewhoholditwouldgivetothesimplequestion;WhatisitthatIamjudging,whenIjudge,asInowdo,thatthatisanink-stand?ThetypeofviewImeanisthattowhichtheviewthatMillsuggests,whenheexplainswhathemeansbysayingthatMatterisaPermanentPossibilityofSensation,andalsothevieworviewswhichMr.Russellseemstosuggestinhis"OurKnowledgeoftheExternalWorld,"seemtobelong.Inthecaseofviewsofthiskind,itis,Ithink,tolerablyclearwhatanswerthosewhoholdthemwouldgivetoallthequestionsIwanttoraiseaboutjudgmentsofthekindIhavedescribed.Butitdoesnotseemtomeatallcertainthatanyviewofthistypeistrue;andcertainlymanyphilosophershaveheldanddoholdthatallviewsofthistypearcfalse.Butinthecaseofthosewhodoholdthemtobefalse,Idonotknow,inanysinglecase,whatanswerwouldbegiventoallthequestionswhichIwanttoraise.Inthecaseofphilosophers,whodonotacceptanyviewoftheMill-Russelltype,none,sofarasIknow,hasmadeitclearwhatanswerhewouldgivetoallmyquestions:somehavemadeitclearwhatanswertheywouldgivetosomeofthem;butmany,Ithink,havenotevenmadeitclea»-whatanswertheywouldgivetoany.Perhapsthereissomesimpleandsatisfactoryanswer,whichhasescapedme,thatsuch\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION225philosopherscouldgivetoallmyquestions;butIcannothelpthinkingthatassumptionsastothenatureofmaterialthingshavetoooftenbeenmade,withoutitsevenoccurringtothosewhomadethemtoask,what,iftheyweretrue,wecouldbejudgingwhenwemakesuchjudgmentsasthese;andthat,ifthisquestionhadbeenasked,itwouldhavebecomeevidentthatthoseassumptionswerefarlesscertainthantheyappearedtobe.Idonotknowthatthereisanyexcusewhateverforcallinga//judgmentsofthekindImean*'judg-mentsofperception."Allofthemare,ofcourse,judgmentsaboutthingswhichweareatthemomentperceiving,since,bydefinition,theyarejudgmentsaboutthingswhichweareseeingorfeelingwithourhands;andallofthemare,nodoubt,alsobaseduponsomethingwhichweperceiveaboutthethinginquestion.ButthemerefactthatajudgmentisbothaboutathingwhichIamperceiving,andalsobaseduponsomethingwhichIperceiveaboutthatthing,doesnotseemtobeasufficientreasonforcallingitajudgmentofperception;andIdonotknowthatthereisanyotherreasonthanthisforcallinga//judgmentsofthekind1meanjudgmentsofperception.Idonotwanttherefore,toassertthatalloithemareso.Butitseemstomequiteplainthatenormousnumbersofthemareso,inaperfectlylegitimatesense.Thisjudgment,whichInowmake,totheeffectthatIhaiisadoor,seemstomequiteplainlytobeajudgmentofperception,inthesimplesensethatImakeitbecauseIdo,infact,seethatthatisadoor,andassertinitnomorethanwhatIsee;andwhatIseeI,ofcourse,perceive.IneverycaseinwhichIjudge,withregardtosomethingwhichIamseeingorfeelingwithmyhands,thatitisaso-and-so,simplybecau.seIdoperceive,bysightortouch,thatitisinfactathingofthatkind,wecan,Ithink,fairlysaythat\n226SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONthejudgmentinquestionisajudgmentofperception.Andenormousnumbersofjudgmentsofthekind1meanare,quiteplainly,judgmentsofperceptioninthissense.Theyarenotall,forthesimplereasonthatsomeofthemaremistaken.Imay,forinstance,judge,withregardtoananimalwhichIseeatadistance,thatitisasheep,wheninfactitisapig.AndheremyjudgmentiscertainlynotduetothefactthatIseeittobeasheep;sinceIcannotpossiblyseeathingtobeasheep,unlessitisone.It,therefore,isnotajudgmentofperceptioninthissense.Andmoreover,evenwheresuchajudgmentistrue,itmaynotalwaysbeajudgmentofpercep-tion,forthereasonthat,whereasIonlyseethethinginquestion,thekindofthingwhichIjudgeittobeisofsuchanature,thatitisimpossibleforanyone,bysightalone,toperceiveanythingtobeofthatkind.Howtodrawthelinebetweenjudgmentsofthiskind,whicharejudgmentsofperception,andthosewhicharenot,Idonotknow.Thatistosay,IdonotknowwhatconditionsmustbefulfilledinorderthatImaybetrulysaidtobeperceiving,bysightortouch,suchthingsasthatthatisadoor,thisisafinger,andnotmerelyinferringthem.Somepeoplemaynodoubtthinkthatitisveryunphilosophicalinmetosaythatweevercanperceivesuchthingsasthese.Butitseemstomethatwedo,inordinarylife,constantlytalkoiseeing%\x^things,andthat,whenwedoso,weareneitherusinglanguageincorrectly,normakinganymistakeaboutthefacts—supposingsomethingtooccurwhichneverdoesinfactoccur.Thetruthseemstometobethatweareusingtheterm*'perceive"inawaywhichisbothperfectlycorrectandexpressesakindofthingwhichcon-stantlydoesoccur,onlythatsomephilosophershavenotrecognisedthatthisisacorrectusageofthetermandhavenotbeenabletodefineit.Iamnot,\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION227therefore,afraidtosaythatIdonowperceivethatthatisadoor,andthatthatisafinger.Only,ofcourse,whenIsaythatIdo,IdonotmeantoassertthatpartofwhatI"perceive,"whenI**perceive"thesethings,maynotbesomethingwhich,inanimportantsense,isknowntomeonlybyinference.Itwouldbeveryrashtoassertthat**perception,"inthissenseoftheword,entirelyexcludesinference.Allthatseemstomecertainisthatthereisanimportantandusefulsenseoftheword"perception,*'whichissuchthattheamountandkindofinference,ifinferencetherebe,whichisinvolvedinmypresentperceptionthatthatisadoor,isnobartothetruthoftheassertionthatIdoperceivethatitisone.Vastnumbers,then,ofthekindofjudgmentswithwhichIproposetodealseemtometobe,inanimportantandlegiti-matesense,judgmentsofperception;althoughIamnotpreparedtodefine,anyfurtherthanIhavedone,whatthatsenseis.AndthoughitistruethatthequestionswhichIshallraiseapplyjustasmuchtothoseofthemwhicharenotjudgmentsofperceptionastothosewhichare,itis,ofcourse,alsotruethattheyapplyjustasmuchtothosewhichareastothosewhicharenot;sothatIshallbereallydealingwithalargeandimportantclassamongjudgmentsofperception.Itistruethat,ifcertainviewswhich,ifIunder-standthemrightly,somePhilosophershaveseriouslyentertained,weretrueones,itwouldbequiteimpossiblethatanyofthemshouldbejudgmentsofperception.Forsomephilosophersseemtometohavedeniedthatweeverdoinfactknowsuchthingsasthese,andothersnotonlythatweeverknowthembutalsothattheyareevertrue.And,if,infact,Ineverdoknowsuchathing,orifitisnevertrue,itwillofcourse,followthatIneverperceivesuchathing;sinceIcertainlycannot,inthis\n228SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONsense,perceiveanythingwhatever,unlessIbothknowitanditistrue.Butitseemstomeasufficientrefutationofsuchviewsasthese,simplytopointtocasesinwhichwedoknowsuchthings.This,afterall,youknow,reallyisafinger:thereisnodoubtaboutit:Iknowit,andyouallknowit.AndIthinkwemaysafelychallengeanyphiloso-phertobringforwardanyargumentinfavoureitherofthepropositionthatwedonotknowit,orofthepropositionthatitisnottrue,whichdoesnotatsomepoint,restuponsomepremisswhichis,beyondcomparison,lesscertainthanistheproposi-tionwhichitisdesignedtoattack.Thequestionswhetherwedoeverknowsuchthingsasthese,andwhetherthereareanymaterialthings,seemtome,therefore,tobequestionswhichthereisnoneedtotakeseriously:theyarequestionswhichitisquiteeasytoanswer,withcertainty,intheaffirmative.Whatdoes,Ithink,needtobetakenseriously,andwhatisreallydubious,isnotthequestion,whetherthisisafinger,orwhetherIknowthatitis,butthequestionwh%t,incertainrespects,Iamknowing,whenIknowthatitis.AndthisisthequestiontowhichIwillnowaddressmyself.Tobeginwiththereisonethingwhichseemstometobeverycertainindeedaboutsuchjudgments.ItisunfortunatelyathingwhichIdonotknowhowproperlytoexpress.Thereseemtometobeobjectionstoevery\vayofexpressingitwhichIcanthinkofButIhopeImaybeabletomakemymeaningclear,inspiteoftheinadequacyofmyexpression.ThethingImeanisathingwhichmaytosomepeopleseemsoobviousastobescarcelyworthsaying.ButIcannothelpthinkingthatitisnotalwaysclearlyrecognised,andeventhatsomephilosophers,tojudgefromwhattheysay,mightperhapsdisputeit.Itseemstometobeanassumptionwhichissilentlymadeinmany\n;SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION229treatmentsofthesubject,and,asIsay,itseemstometobeverycertainindeed.ButIthinkitisatalleventsworthwhiletotrytomaketheassumptionexplicit,incaseitshouldbedisputed.Ifitreallyisnottrue,thentheotherquestionstowhichIshallgoon,andwhichseemtomereallydubiousanddifficult,donot,Ithink,ariseatall.Iwilltrytoexpressthisfundamentalassumption,whichseemstomesoverycertain,bysayingitistheassumptionthat,inallcasesinwhichImakeajudgmentofthissort,Ihavenodifficultywhateverinpickingoutathing,whichis,quiteplainly,inasenseinwhichnothingelseis,thethingaboutwhichIammakingmyjudgment;andthatyet,thoughthisthingisthethingaboutwhichIamjudging,Iam,quitecertainly,not,ingeneral,judgingwithregardtoit,thatitisathingofthatkindforwhichtheterm,whichseemstoexpressthepredicateofmyjudgment,isaname.Thus,whenIjudge,asnow,thatThatisaninkstand,Ihavenodifficultywhateverinpickingout,fromwhat,ifyoulike,youcancallmytotalfieldofpresentationatthemoment,anobject,whichisundoubtedly,inasenseinwhichnothingelseis,theobjectaboutwhichIammakingthisjudgmentandyetitseemstomequitecertainthatofthisobjectIamnotjudgingthatitisawholeinkstand.AndsimilarlywhenIjudge,withregardtosome-thingwhich*'1amfeelinginmypocket,Thisisacoin,"Ihavenodifficultyinpickingout,frommyfieldofpresentation,anobject,whichisundoubtedlytheobjectwithwhichmyjudgmentisconcerned;andyetIamcertainlynotjudgingwithregardtothisobjectthatitisawholecoin.Isaythatalways^whenImakesuchajudgment,Icanpickouttheone,amongtheobjectspresentedtomeatthetime,aboutwhichIammakingit;butIhaveonlysaidthatingefieralIamnotjudgingwithregardtothis\n230SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONobjectthatitisathingofthekind,forwhichtheterm,whichseemstoexpressthepredicateofmyjudgment,isaname.AndIhavelimitedmysecondpropositioninthisway,becausetherearecases,inwhichitdoesnot,atfirstsight,seemquitesocertainthatIamnotdoingthis,asinthetwoinstancesIhavejustgiven.When,forinstance,Ijudgewithregardtosomething,whichIamseeing,**This"Thisisasoap-bubble,"orisadropofwater,"orevenwhenIjudge"Thisisaspotofink,"itmaynotseemquitesoplain,thatImaynotbejudging,withregardtotheveryobjectpresentedtome,thatitis,itself,awholesoap-bubble,awholedropofwater,orawholespotofink,asitalwaysis,inthecaseofaninkstand,oracoin,thatInevertakethepresentedobject,aboutwhichIamjudging,tobeawholeinkstand,orawholecoin.ThesortofreasonwhyIsaythiswill,ofcourse,beobvioustoanyone,anditisobviouslyofachildishorder.ButIcannotsaythatitseemstomequiteobviousthatinsuchacaseIamnotjudgingofthepresentedobjectthatitisawholedropofwater,inthewayinwhichitdoesseemtobeobviousthatIamnotjudgingoithispresentedobjectthatitisaninkstand.ThatiswhyIlimitmyselftosayingthat,ingeneral,whenIjudge"Thatisaso-and-so"Iamnotjudgingwithregardtothepresentedobject,aboutwhichmyjudgmentisthatitisathingofthekindinquestion.Asmuchasthisseemstometobeathingwhichanychildcansee.Nobodywillsuppose,foramoment,thatwhenhejudgessuchthingsas"Thisisasofa,"or"Thisisatree,"heisjudging,withregardtothepresentedobjectaboutwhichhisjudgmentplainlyis,thatitisawholesofaorawholetree:hecan,atmost,supposethatheisjudgingittobeapartofthesurfaceofasofaorapartofthesurfaceofatree.Andcertainlyinthecaseofmostjudgmentsofthiskindwhichwemake,\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION231whetherinthecaseofallornot,thisisplainlythecase:wearenotjudging,withregardtothepresentedobjectaboutwhichourjudgmentplainlyis,thatitisathingofthekind,forwhichthetermwhichappearstoexpressthepredicateofourjudgment,isaname.Andthatthisshouldbetrueofmostjudgmentsofthiskind,whetherofallornot,isquitesufficientformypurpose.Thismuch,then,seemstometobeverycertainindeed.ButIwilltrytomakeclearerexactlywhatImeanbyit,bymentioningagroundonwhichIimagineitmightperhapsbedisputed.TheobjectofwhichIhavespokenastheobject,aboutwhich,ineachparticularcase,suchajudg-mentasthisalwaysisajudgment,is,ofcourse,alwaysanobjectofthekindwhichsomephiloso-pherswouldcallasensation,andotherswouldcallasense-datum.Whetherallphilosophers,whentheytalkofsensations,meantoincludeamongthemsuchobjectsasthese,Idonotknow.Some,whohavegivenagreatdealofattentiontothesubject,andforwhomIhaveagreatrespect,talkofsensationsinsuchaway,thatIcannotbesurewhattheyaretalkingaboutatallorwhethertherearesuchthings.Butmany,Ithink,undoubtedlydomeantoincludesuchsubjectsasthese.Nodoubt,ingeneral,whentheycallthemsensations,theymeantoattributetothemproperties,whichitseemstomeextremelydoubtfulwhethertheypossess.Andperhapseventhosewhocallthemsense-data,may,inpart,beattributingtothempropertieswhichitmaybedoubtfulwhethertheypossess.Ifwewanttodefineasensationorasense-datum,inamannerwhichwillleaveitnotopentodoubtwhatsortofthingswearetalkingof,andthattherearesuchthings,Idonotknowthatwecandoitbetterthanbysayingthatsense-dataarethesortofthings,aboutwhichsuchjudgments\n232SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONasthesealwaysseemtobemade—thesortofthingswhichseemtobetherealorultimatesul)jectsofallsuchjudgments.Suchawayofdefininghowtheterm**sense-datum"isused,maynotseemverysatisfactory;butIaminclinedtothinkitmaybeassatisfactoryasanywhichcanbefound.Anditiscertainlycalculatedtoobviatesomemisunder-standingswhichmayarise;sinceeverybodycansee,Ithink,whatthethingiswhichIamdescribingasthethingaboutwhichheismakinghisjudgment,whenhejudges"Thatisaninkstand,"andthatthereissuchathing,evenifhedoesnotagreethatthisdescriptionappliestoit.Ican,infact,imaginethatsomeofthosewhowouldcallthisthingasensationwoulddenythatmyjudgmentisaboutitatall.Itwouldsometimesbespokenofasthesensationwhichmediatesmyperceptionofthisinkstandinthisinstance.AndIcanimaginethatsomeofthosewhowouldsospeakofitmightbeinclinedtosaythatwhenIjudge"Thisisaninkstand,"myjudgmentisaboutthisinkstandwhichIperceive,andnot,inanysenseatall,aboutthesensationwhichmediatesmyperceptionofit.Theymayperhapsimaginethatthesensationmediatesmyperceptionoftheink-standonlyinthesensethatitbringstheinkstandbeforemymindinsuchawaythat,onceitisbeforemymind,Icanmakeajudgmentaboutit,whichisnotajudgmentaboutthemediatingsensationatall;andthatsuchajudgmentistheoneIamactuallyexpressingwhen'*IsayThisisanink-stand."Suchaview,ifitisheld,seemstometobequitecertainlyfalse,andiswhatIhaveintendedtodeny.AndperhapsIcanputmostclearlythereasonwhyitseemstomefalse,bysayingthat,if(whichmaybedoubted)thereisanythingwhichisthisinkstand,thatthingiscertainlynotgiventomeindependentlyofthissense-datum,insucha\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION233sensethatIcanpossiblymakeajudgmentaboutitwhichisnotajudgmentaboutthissense-datum.Iamnot,ofcourse,denyingthatIdoperceivethisinkstand,andthatmyjudgmentis,inasense,ajudgmentaboutit.Boththesethingsseemtometobequiteobviouslytrue.IamonlymaintainingthatmyjudgmentisahOyinanothersense,ajudg-mentaboutthissense-datumwhichmediatesmyperceptionoftheinkstand.Thosewhosaythatthissense-datumdoesmediatemy{)erceptionoftheinkstand,would,ofcourse,admitthatmypercep-tionoftheinkstandis,inasense,dependentuponthesense-datum;thatitisdependentisimpliedinthemerestatementthatitismediatedbyit.Butitmightbemaintainedthatitisdependentonitonlyinthesenseinwhich,whentheideaofoneobjectiscalledupinmymind,throughassociation,bytheideaofanother,theideawhichiscalledupisdependentontheideawhichcallsitup.WhatIwishtomaintain,andwhatseemstometobequitecertainlytrue,isthatmyperceptionofthisinkstandisdependentonthissense-datum,inaquitedifferentandfarmoreintimatesensethanthis.Itisdependentonitinthesensethat,ifthereisanythingwhichisthisinkstand,then,inperceivingthatthing,Iamknowingitonlyasthethingwhichstandsinacertainrelationtothissense-datum.Whentheideaofoneobjectiscalledupinmymindbytheideaofanother,Idonotknowthesecondobjectonlyasthethingwhichhasacertainrelationtothefirst:onthecontrary,Icanmakeajudgmentaboutthesecondobject,whichisnotajudgmentaboutthefirst.Andsimilarlyinthecaseoftwosense-datawhicharepresentedtomesimultaneously,Idonotknowtheoneonlyasathingwhichhasacertainrelationtotheother.Butinthecaseofthissense-datumandthisinkstandthecaseseemstometobeplainly\n234SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONquitedifferent.Iftherebeathingwhichisthisinkstandatall,itiscertainlyonlyknowntomeasthethingwhichstandsinacertainrelationtothissense-datum.Itisnotgiventome,inthesenseinwhichthissense-datumisgiven.Iftherebesuchathingatall,itisquitecertainlyonlyknowntomebydescription,inthesenseinwhichMr.Russellusesthatphrase;andthedescriptionbywhichitisknownisthatofbeingthethingwhichstandstothissense-datuminacertainrelation.Thatistosay,whenImakesuchajudgmentas*'Thisinkstandisagoodbigone";whatIamreallyjudgingis:**Thereisathingwhichstandstothisinacertainrelation,andwhichisanink-"—wherestand,andthatthingisagoodbigone''this''standsforthispresentedobject.Iamreferringtooridentifyingthethingwhichisthisinkstand,iftherebesuchathingatall,onlyasthethingwhichstandstothissense-datuminacertairrelation;andhencemyjudgment,thoughinonesenseitmaybesaidtobeajudgmentabouttheinkstand,isquitecertainlyalso,inanothersense,ajudgmentaboutthissense-datum.Thisseemstomesoclear,thatIwonderhowanyonecandenyit;andperhapsnobodywould.ButIcannothelpthinkingthatitisnotcleartoeverybodypartly;because,sofarasIcanmakeout,nobodybeforeMr.Russellhadpointedouttheextremedifferencethereisbetweenajudgmentaboutathingknownonlybydescriptiontotheindividualwhomakesthejudgment,andajudgmentaboutathingnotknowntohimonlyinthisway;andpartlybecausesomanypeopleseemstillutterlytohavefailedtounderstandwhatthedistinctioniswhichheex-pressesinthisway.Iwilltrytomakethepointclear,inaslightlydifferentway.SupposeIamseeingtwocoins,lyingsidebyside,andamnotperceivingtheminanyotherwayexceptbysight.\n—SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION235Itwillbeplaintoeverybody,Ithink,that,whenIidentifytheoneas"Thisone'*andtheotheras"Thatone,"Iidentifythemonlybyreferencetothetwovisualpresentedobjects,whichcorrespondrespectivelytotheoneandtotheother.Butwhatmaynot,Ithink,berealised,isthatthesenseinwhichIidentifythembyreferencetothecorre-spondingsense-data,isonewhichinvolvesthateveryjudgmentwhichImakeabouttheoneisajudgmentaboutthesense-datumwhichcorrespondstoit,andeveryjudgmentImakeabouttheother,ajudgmentaboutthesense-datumwhichcorre-spondstoit:Isimplycannotmakeajudgmentabouteither,whichisnotajudgmentaboutthecorrespondingsense-datum.Butifthetwocoinsweregiventome,inthesenseinwhichthetwosense-dataare,thiswouldcertainlynotbethecase.Icanidentifyanddistinguishthetwosense-datadirectly^thisasthisone,andthatasthatone:Idonotneedtoidentifyeitherasthethingwhichhasthisrelationtothisotherthing.ButIcertainlycannotthusdirectlyidentifythetwocoins.Ihavenotfourthingspresentedtome(i)thissense-datum,(2)thatsense-datum,(3)thiscoin,and(4)thatcoin,buttwoonlythissense-datumandthatsense-datum.When,therefore,**IjudgeThisisacoin,"myjudgmentiscertainlyajudgmentabouttheonesense-datum,andwhen**IjudgeAndthatisalsoacoin,"itiscertainlyajudgmentabouttheother.Only,inspiteofwhatmylanguagemightseemtoimply,Iamcertainlynotjudgingeitheroftheonesense-datumthatitisawholecoin,noryetoftheotherthatitisone.This,then,seemstomefundamentallycertainaboutjudgmentsofthiskind.Wheneverwemakesuchajudgmentwecaneasilypickoutanobject(whetherwecallitasensationorasense-datum,ornot),whichis,inaneasilyintelligiblesense,the\n236SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONobjectwhichistherealorultimatesubjectofourjudgment;andyet,inmanycasesatallevents,whatwearejudgingwithregardtothisobjectiscertainlynotthatitisanobjectofthekind,forwhichthetermwhichappearstoexpressthepredi-cateofourjudgmentisaname.Butifthisbeso,whatisitthatIamjudging,inallsuchcases,aboutthepresentedobject,whichistherealorultimatesubjectofmyjudgment?Itisatthispointthatwecometoquestionswhichseemtometobereallyuncertainanddifficulttoanswer.Tobeginwith»thereisoneanswerwhichisnaturallysuggestedbythereasonIhavegivenforsayingthat,inthiscase,itisquiteobviousthatIamnotjudging,withregardtothispresentedobject,thatitisaninkstand,whereasitisnotinthesameway,quiteobviousthat,inmakingsuchajudgmentas*'This"*'isasoap-bubbleorThisisadropofwater,"Imaynotbejudging,oftheobjectaboutwhichmyjudgmentis,thatthatveryobjectreallyisasoap-bubbleoradropofwater.ThereasonIgaveisthatitisquiteobviousthatIdonottakethispresentedobjecttobeawholeinkstand:that,atmost,Ionlytakeittobepartofthesurfaceofaninkstand.AndthisreasonnaturallysuggeststhatthetrueanswertoourquestionmaybethatwhatIamjudgingofthepresentedobjectisjustthatitisapartofthesurfaceofaninkstand.ThisanswerseemstometobeobviouslyonquiteadifferentlevelfromthesuggestionthatIamjudgingitreallytobeaninkstand.ItisnotchildishlyobviousthatIamnotjudgingittobepartofthesurfaceofaninkstand,asitisthatIamnotjudgingittobeaninkstand—awholeone.Onthisview,whenIsaysuchthingsas*'Thatisaninkstand,"*'That'*isadoor,"Thisisacoin,"theseexpressionswouldreallyonlybealoosewayofsaying'*Thatispartofthesurfaceofanink-\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION237stand,"**Thatispartofthesurfaceofadoor,"**Thisispartofthesurfaceofacoin."Andtherewould,Ithink,plainlybenothingsurprisinginthefactthatweshoulduselanguagethusloosely.What,atfirstsight,appearstobeaparadox,namelythat,whereasIappeartobeassertingofagiventhingthatitisofacertainkind,Iamnotreallyassertingofthethinginquestionthatitisofthatkindatall,wouldbesusceptibleofaneasyex-planation.Andmoreover,ifthisviewweretrue,itwouldofferanexcellentillustrationofthedifferencebetweenathingknownonlybydescriptionandathingnotsoknown,andwouldshowhowentirelyfreefrommysterythatdistinctionis.Onthisview,whenIjudge"Thatinkstandisagoodbigone"IshallinefFectbejudging:"Thereisoneandonlyoneinkstandofwhichthisispartofthesurface,andtheinkstandofwhichthisistrueisagoodbigone."Itwouldbequiteclearthatthepartofthesurfaceoftheinkstandwasgiventomeinasenseinwhichthewholewasnot,justasitisinfactclearthatIdonow''see''thispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand,inasenseinwhichIdonot'*see"thewhole;andthatmyjudgment,whileitis,infact,aboutboththewholeinkstand,andalsoaboutoneparticularpartofitssurface,isaboutthemintwoentirelydifferentsenses.Thisviewisone,whichitisatfirstsight,Ithink,verynaturaltosupposetobetrue.Butbeforegivingthereasons,why,nevertheless,itseemstomeextremelydoubtful,IthinkitisdesirabletotrytoexplainmorepreciselywhatImeanbyit.Theword**part"isonewhichisoftenusedextremelyvaguelyinphilosophy;andIcanimaginethatsomepeoplewouldbewillingtoassenttothepropositionthatthissense-datumreallyis,insomesenseorother,a**part"ofthisink-stand,andthatwhatIamjudgingwithregardto\n238SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONit,whenIjudge**Thisisaninkstand,"is,ineffect,"Thereisaninkstand,ofwhichthisisapart,"whowouldbefarfromallowingthatthiscanpossiblybewhatIamjudging,whenoncetheyunderstandwhatthesenseisinwhichIamhereusingtheword"part."Whatthissenseis,Iamquiteunabletodefine;butIhopeImaybeabletomakemymeaningsufficientlyclear,bygivinginstancesofthingswhichareundoubtedly"parts"ofotherthingsinthesenseinquestion.Thereis,itseems**part,"inwhichwetome,asenseofthewordallconstantlyusethewordwithperfectprecision,and,which,therefore,weallunderstandverywell,how-everlittlewemaybeabletodefineit.Itisthesenseinwhichthetrunkofanytreeisundoubtedlyapartofthattree;inwhichthisfingerofmineisundoubtedlyapartofmyhand,andmyhandapartofmybody.Thisisasenseinwhicheverypartofamaterialthingorphysicalobjectisitselfamaterialthingorphysicalobject;anditis,sofarasIcansee,theonlypropersenseinwhichamaterialthingcanbesaidtohaveparts.TheviewwhichIwishtodiscussistheviewthatIamjudgingthispresentedobjecttobeapartofaninkstand,inthissense.Andthenatureoftheviewcanperhapsbebroughtoutmoreclearly,bymentioningoneimportantcorollarywhichwouldfollowfromitIam,ofcourse,atthismoment,seeingmanypartsofthesurfaceofthisinkstand.Butalltheseparts,exceptone,are,infact,themselvespartsofthatone.Thatoneistheoneofwhichweshouldnaturallyspeakas''thepartofthesurfacethatIamnowseeing"oras**thispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand."Thereisonlyonepartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand,whichdoesthuscontain,asparts,alltheotherpartsthatIamnowseeing.And,ifitweretruethatIamjudgingthispresentedobjecttobeapartofthesurfaceofaninkstandat\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION239all,inthesenseImean,itwouldfollowthatthispresentedobjectmust,'*ifmyjudgmentThisisaninkstand"betrue(asitcertainlyisj,beidenticalwiththispart,whichcontainsalltneotherpartswhichIamseeing;sincethereisplainlynootherpartwithwhichitcouldpossiblybeidentified.Thatistosay,ifIamreallyjudgingofthispresentedobjectthatitispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand,inthesenseImean,itmustbethecasethateverythingwhichistrueofwhatIshouldcall*'thispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand"is,infact,trueofthispresentedobject.Thisview,therefore,thatwhatwearejudgingoftheultimatesubjectofourjudgment,whenwejudge"Thisisaso-and-so,"is,ingeneral,merelythatthesubjectinquestionisapartofathingofthekindinquestion,can,Ithink,bemostclearlydiscussed,byaskingwhether,inthiscase,thispresentedobjectcanreallybeidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand.Ifitcan't,thenmostcertainlyIamnotjudgingofitthatitisapartofthesurfaceofaninkstandatall.Formyjudgment,whateveritis,istrue.Andyet,ifthispresentedobjectisnotidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand,itcertainlyisnotapartofaninkstandatall;sincethereisnootherpart,eitherofthisinkstandorofanyother,withwhichitcouldpossiblybesupposedtobeidentical.Canwe,then,holdthatthissense-datumreallyisidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand?Thateverythingwhichistrueoftheoneistrueoftheother?Anenormousnumberofveryfamiliarargumentshavebeenusedbyvariousphilosophers,which,iftheyweresound,wouldshowthatwecannot.Someoftheseargumentsseemtometobequiteclearlynotsound—all,forinstance,whichresteitherontheassumptionthatthissense-datumcanonly\n240SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONexistsolongasitisperceived,orontheassumptionthatitcanonlyexistsolongasitisperceivedbyme.OfothersIsuspectthattheymayhavesomeforce,thoughIamquiteunabletoseethattheyhaveany.Such,forinstance,areallthosewhichassumeeitherthatthissense-datumisasensationorfeelingofmine,inasensewhichincludestheassertionthatitisdependentonmymindintheverysamesenseinwhichmyperceptionofitobviouslyisso;orthatitiscausallydependentonmybodyinthesenseinwhichmyperceptionofitadmittedlyisso.Butothersdoseemtometohavegreatforce.Iwill,however,confinemyselftotryingtostateone,whichseemstometohaveasmuchasany.Itwillbefoundthatthisoneinvolvesanassumption,whichdoesseemtometohavegreatforce,butwhichyetseemstometobedoubtful.SofarasIknow,allgoodargumentsagainsttheviewthatthissense-datumreallyisidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceoftheinkstand,doinvolvethissameassumption,andhavenomoreforcethanithas.Butinthis,ofcourse,Imaybewrong.Perhapssomeonewillbeabletopointoutanargument,whichisobviouslyquiteindependentofit,andwhichyethasforce.TheargumentImeaninvolvesconsiderationswhichareexceedinglyfamiliar,sofamiliarthatIamafraideveryonemaybesickofhearingthemalludedto.But,inspiteofthisfact,itseemstomenotquiteeasytoputitquiteprecisely,inawaywhichwilldistinguishitclearlyfromotherargumentsinvolvingthesamefamiliarconsiderations,butwhichdonotseemtometobeequallycogent.Iwant,therefore,totrytoputitwithadegreeofprecision,whichwillpreventirrelevantobjectionsfrombeingmadetoit—objectionswhichwould,Ithink,berelevantagainstsomeoftheseotherarguments,butarenot,Ithink,relevantagainstit.\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION241Thefactisthatweall,exceedinglycommonly,when,ateachoftwotimes,separatedbyalongerorshorterinterval,weseeapartofthesurfaceofamaterialthing,inthesenseinwhichIamnowseeingthispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand,orwhenatonetimeweseesuchasurfaceandatanotherperceiveonebytouch,make,onthesecondoccasion,thejudgment"Thispartofasurfaceisthesamepartofthesurfaceofthesamething,asthatwhichIwasseeing(orperceivingbytouch)justnow."Howcommonlywealldothiscanscarcelybeexaggerated,Ilookatthisinkstand,andthenIlookagain,andonthesecondoccasionIjudge'*Thispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstandisthesameas,oratleastcontainsapartwhichisthesameasapartof,thepartofitssurfacewhichIwasseeingjustnow/'OrIlookatthisfingerandthenItouchit,andIjudge,onthesecondoccasion,**ThispartofthesurfaceofthisfingeristhesameasoneofthoseIwasseeingjustnow."Weallthusconstantlyidentifyapartofasurfaceofamaterialthingwhichweareperceivingatonetimewithapartwhichwewereperceivingatanother.'*ThisNow,whenwedothis—whenwejudgeisthesamepartofthesamethingas1wasseeingortouchingjustnow,"we,ofcourse,donotmeantoexcludethepossibilitythatthepartinquestionmayhavechangedduringtheinterval;thatitisreallydifferent,onthesecondoccasion,eitherinshapeorsizeorquality,orinallthree,fromwhatitwasonthefirst.Thatistosay,thesenseofsamenesswhichwearehereconcernedwithisonewhichclearlydoesnotexcludechange.Wemayevenbepreparedtoassert,ongeneralgrounds,inallsuchcases,thatthesurfaceinquestioncertainlymusthavechanged.Butneverthelessthereisagreatdifferenceinonerespect,betweentwokindsofsuch\n242SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONcases,bothofwhichoccurexceedinglycommonly.If1watchsomebodyblowingairintoachildsballoon,itconstantlyhappens,atcertainstagesintheprocess,thatIjudgewithregardtothepartofthesurfacewhichIamseeingatthatstage,notonlythatitislargerthanitwasatanearlierstage,butthatitisperceptiblylarger.Or,ifIpullthefaceofanindia-rubberdoll,Imayjudgeatacertainstageintheprocessthatthepatchofredcolouronitscheeknotonlyisdifferentinshapefromwhatitwasatthebeginning,butisperceptiblyso;itmay,forinstance,beaperceptiblyflatterellipsethanitwastostartwith.Or,ifIwatchapersonblushing,Imayjudgeatacertainstagethatacertainpartofthesurfaceofhisfacenotonlyisdifferentincolourfromwhatitwas,whenIsawitbeforehebegantoblush,butisperceptiblyso—perceptiblyredder.Inenormousnumbersofcaseswedothusjudgeofasurfaceseenatagiventimethatitisthusperceptiblydifferentinsize,orinshape,orincolour,fromwhatitwaswhenwesawitbefore.Butcasesareatleastequallynumerousinwhich,thoughwemight,ongeneralgroundsbepreparedtoassertthatitmusthavechangedinsomerespect,weshouldnotbepreparedtoassertthatithad,inanyrespectwhatever,c\\d.v\g(tdperceptibly.Ofthispartofthissurfaceofthisinkstand,forinstance,IamcertainlynotpreparedtoassertthatitisnowperceptiblydifferentinanyrespectfromwhatitwaswhenIsawitjustnow.AndsimilarcasesaresonumerousthatIneednotgivefurtherinstances.Wecan,therefore,dividecases,inwhichwejudge,ofapartofasurfacewhichweareseeing,**ThisisthesamepartofthesurfaceofthesamematerialthingastheoneIsawjustnow,"intocaseswhereweshouldalsojudge'*Butitisperceptiblydifferentfromwhatitwasthen,"andcasesinwhich,eventhoughwemightassert"Itmustbedifferent,"weare\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION243certainlynotpreparedtoassertthatitisperceptiblyso.Butnowletusconsiderthecasesinwhichwearenotpreparedtoassertthatthesurfaceinquestionhaschangedperceptibly.Thestrangefact,fromwhichtheargumentImeanisdrawn,isthat,inaverylargenumberofsuchcases,itseemsasifitwereunmistakablytruethatthepresentedobject,aboutwhichwearemakingourjudgmentwhenwetalkof"Thissurface"atthelatertime,ispercep-tiblydifferent,fromthataboutwhichwearemakingitwhenwetalkofthesurfaceIsawjustnow.If,atthelatertime.Iamatasufficientlygreaterdistancefromthesurface,thepresentedobjectwhichcorrespondstoitatthetimeseemstobeperceptiblysmaller,thantheonewhichcorrespondedtoitbefore.IfIamlookingatitfromasufficientlyobliqueangle,thelaterpresentedobjectoftenseemstobeperceptiblydifferentinshape—aperceptiblyflatterellipse,forinstance.IfIamlookingatit,withbluespectacleson,whenformerlyIhadnone,thelaterpresentedobjectseemstobeperceptiblydifferentincolourfromtheearlierone.IfIamperceivingitbytouchalone,whereasformerlyIwasperceivingitbysightalone,thelaterpresentedobjectseemstobeperceptiblydifferentfromtheearlier,inrespectofthefactthatitisnotcolouredatall,whereastheearlierwas,andthat,ontheotherhand,ithascertaintactualqualities,whichtheearlierhadnotgot.Allthisseemstobeasplainasitcanbe,andyetitmakesabsolutelynodifferencetothefactthatofthesurfaceinquestionwearenotpreparedtojudgethatitisperceptiblydifferentfromwhatitwas.Sometimes,ofcourse,wherethereseemstobenodoubtthatthelaterpresentedobjectisperceptiblydifferentfromtheearjier,wemaynotnoticethatitisso.Butevenwherewedonoticetheapparentdifference,wedo\n244SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONstillcontinuetojudgeofthesurfaceinquestion:Thissurfaceisnot,sofarasIcantellwithcertaintybyperception,inanywaydifferentfromwhatitwaswhenIsawitortoucheditjustnow;Iamnotpreparedtoassertthatithaschangedperceptibly.Itseems,therefore,tobeabsolutelyimpossiblethatthesurfaceseenatthelatertimeshouldbeidenticalwiththeobjectpresentedthen,andthesurfaceseenattheearlieridenticalwiththeobjectpresentedthen,forthesimplereasonthat,whereaswithregardtothelaterseensurfaceIamnotpreparedtojudgethatitisinanywayperceptiblydifferentfromthatseenearlier,itseemsthatwithregardtothelatersense-datumIcannotfailtojudgethatitispercep-tiblydifferentfromtheearlierone:thefactthattheyareperceptiblydifferentsimplystaresmeintheface.Itseems,inshort,thatwhen,insucha*'Thissurfacecase,Ijudge:isnot,sofarasIcantell,perceptiblydifferentfromtheoneIsawjustnow,"Icannotpossiblybejudgingofthepresented**Thisobjectisnot,sofarasIcantell,perceptiblydifferentfromthatobjectwhichwaspresentedtomejustnow,"forthesimplereasonthatIcantell,ascertainly,almost,asIcantellanything,thatitisperceptiblydifferent.Thatistheargument,aswellasIcanputit,forsayingthatthispresentedobject,isnotidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand;andthat,therefore,whenIjudge"Thisispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand,"Iamnotjudgingofthispresentedobject,whichneverthelessistheultimatesubjectofmyjudgment,thatitispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand.Andthisargumentdoesseemtometobeaverypowerfulone.Butneverthelessitdoesnotseemtometobequiteconclusive,becauseitrestsonanassumption,which,thoughitseemstometohavegreatforce,doesnotseemtomequitecertain.Theassumption\n—SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION245Imeanistheassumptionthat,insuchcasesasthoseIhavespokenof,thelaterpresentedobjectreallyisperceptiblydifferentfromtheearlier.Thisassumptionhas,ifIamnotmistaken,seemedtomanyphilosopherstobequiteunquestionable;theyhavenevereventhoughtofquestioningit;and1ownthatitusedtobesowithme.AndIamstillnotsurethatImaynotbetalkingsheernonsenseinsuggestingthatitcanbequestioned.But,ifIam,IamnolongerabletoseethatIam.Whatnowseemstometobepossibleisthatthesense-datumwhichcorrespondstoatree,whichIamseeing,whenIamamileoff,maynotreallybeperceivedtobesmallerthantheone,whichcorres-pondstothesametree,whenIseeitfromadistanceofonlyahundredyards,butthatitisonlyperceivedtoseemsmaller;thatthesense-datumwhichcorres-pondstoapenny,whichIamseeingobliquely,isnotreallyperceivedtobedifferentinshapefromthatwhichcorrespondedtothepenny,whenIwasstraightinfrontofit,butisonlyperceivedtoseemdifferent—thatallthatisperceivedisthattheoneseemsellipticalandtheothercircular;thatthesense-datumpresentedtomewhenIhavethebluespectaclesonisnotperceivedtobedifferentincolourfromtheonepresentedtomewhenIhavenot,butonlytoseemso;andfinallythatthesense-datumpresentedwhenItouchthisfingerisnotperceivedtobedifferentinanywayfromthatpresentedtomewhenIseeit,butonlytoseemso—thatIdonotperceivetheonetobecolouredandtheothernottobeso,butonlythattheoneseemscolouredandtheothernot.Ifsuchaviewistobepossible,weshallhave,ofcourse,tomaintainthatthekindofexperiencewhichIhaveexpressedbysayingoneseemsdifferentfromtheother*'seemscircular,"**seemsblue,"''seemscoloured,"andsoon—involvesanultimate,notfurtheranalysable,kind\n246SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONofpsychologicalrelation,nottobeidentifiedeitherwiththatinvolvedinbeing*'perceived"tobesoandso,orwiththatinvolvedinbeing**judged"tobesoandso;sinceapresentedobjectmight,inthissense,seemtobeelliptical,seemtobeblue,etc.,whenitisneitherperceivedtobeso,norjudgedtobeso.Butthereseemstometobenoreasonwhythereshouldnotbesuchanultimaterelation.ThegreatobjectiontosuchaviewseemstometobethedifficultyofbelievingthatIdon'tactuallyperceivethissense-datumtobered,forinstance,andthatothertobeelliptical;thatIonlyperceive,inmanycases,thatitseemsso.Icannot,however,nowpersuademyselfthatitisquiteclearthatIdoperceiveittobeso.And,ifIdon't,thenitseemsreallypossiblethatthispresentedobjectreallyisidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand;since,whenIjudge,asinthecasessupposed,thatthesurfaceinquestionisnot,sofarasIcantell,perceptiblydifferentfromwhatitwas,Imightreallybejudgingofthetwosense-datathattheyalsowerenot.sofarasIcantell,perceptiblydifferent,theonlydifferencebetweenthetwothatisperceptible,beingthattheoneseemstobeofacertainsize,shapeorcolour,andtheothertobeofadifferentandin-compatiblesize,shapeorcolour.Ofcourse,inthosecases,asinthatoftheballoonbeingblownup,whereI*'perceive"thatthesurfacehaschanged,e,g,insize,itwouldhavetobeadmittedthatIdoperceiveofthetwosense-datanotmerelythattheyseem'differentinsize,butthattheyareso.ButIthinkitwouldbepossibletomaintainthatthesenseinwhich,inthesecases,**Iperceive"themtobedifferent,isadiff*erentonefromthatinwhich,bothintheseandintheothers,Iperceivethemtoseemso.Possiblyinmakingthissuggestionthatsense-data,incaseswheremostphilosophershave\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION247assumedunhesitatinglythattheyareperceivedtobedifferent,areonlyreallyperceivedtoseemdifferent,Iam,asIsaid,talkingsheernonsense,thoughIcannot,atthemoment,seethatIam.Andpossibly,evenifthissuggestionitselfisnotnonsense,evenifitistrue,theremaybeotherfatalobjectionstotheviewthatthispresentedobjectreallyisidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand.Butwhatseemstomecertainisthat,unlessthissuggestionistrue,thenthispre-sentedobjectiscertainlynotidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand.Andsinceitisdoubtfulwhetheritisnotnonsense,andstillmoredoubtfulwhetheritistrue,itmust,Ithink,beadmittedtobehighlydoubtfulwhetherthetwoareidentical.But,iftheyarenotidentical,thenwhatIamjudgingwithregardtothispresentedobject,whenIjudge"Thisisaninkstand,"iscertainlynotthatitisitselfpartofthesurfaceofanink-stand;andhence,itisworthwhiletoinquirefurther,what,ifIamnotjudgingthis,Icanbejudgingwithregardtoit.Andhere,Ithink,thefirstnaturalsuggestiontomakeisthatjustas,whenItalkof"thisinkstand,"what'*Iseemreallytomeanistheinkstandofwhichthisispartofthesurface,"sothattheink-standisonlyknowntomebydescriptionastheinkstandofwhichthismaterialsurfaceispartofthesurface,soagainwhenItalkof**thismaterialsurface,"whatIreallymeanis''thematerialsurfacetowhichthis(presentedobject)hasacertainrelation,"sothatthissurfaceis,initsturn,onlyknowntomebydescriptionasthesurfacewhichhasacertainrelationtothispresentedobject.Ifthatwereso,thenwhatIshouldbejudgingofthispresentedobject,whenIjudge**Thisispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand,"wouldbenotthatitisitselfsuchapart,butthatthethingwhichstandstoit\n248SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONinacertainrelationissuchapart:inshort,whatIshouldbejudgingwithregardtoit,wouldbe**There'sonethingandoneonlywhichstandstothisinthisrelation,andthethingwhichdoessoispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand.'*Butifwearetoadopttheviewthatsomethingofthissortiswhatwearejudging,thereoccursatoncethepressingquestion:Whatonearthcantherelationbewithregardtowhichwearejudging,thatoneandonlyonethingstandsinittothispresentedobject?Andthisisaquestiontowhich,sofarasIknow,noneofthosephilosophers,whobothhold(asmanydo)thatthispresentedobjectisnotidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand,andalsothattherereallyissomethingofwhichitcouldbetrulypredicatedthatitisthispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand(thatistosay,whorejectallviewsoftheMill-Russelltype),havegivenanythinglikeaclearanswer.Itdoesnotseemtohaveoccurredtothemthatitrequiresananswer,chiefly,Ithink,becauseithasnotoccurredtothemtoaskwhatwecanbejudgingwhenwemakejudgmentsofthissort.Thereareonlytwoanswers,thatIcanthinkof,whichmightbesuggestedwithanyplausibility.Manyphilosophers,whotaketheviewthatthepresentedobjectsaboutwhichwemakethesejudg-mentsaresensationsofours,andsomeevenwhodonot,areinthehabitoftalkingof''thecauses"oftheseobjectsasifweknew,inthecaseofeach,thatithadoneandonlyonecause;andmanyofthemseemtothinkthatthispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstandcouldbecorrectlydescribedasthecauseofthispresentedobject.Theysuggest,therefore,theviewthatwhatIamjudginginthiscasemightbe:'*Thispresentedobjecthasoneandonlyonecause,andthatcauseispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand."Itseemstomequite\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION249obviousthatthisview,atallevents,isutterlyun-tenable.Idonotbelieveforamoment,nordoesanyone,andcertainlythereforedonotjudge,thatthispresentedobjecthasonlyon^cause:Ibelievethatithasawholeseriesofdifferentcauses.Ido,infact,believethatthispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstandisoneamongthecausesofmyperceptionofthispresentedobject:thatseemstometobeaverywellestablishedscientificproposition.AndIampreparedtoadmitthattheremaybegoodreasonsforthinkingthatitisoneamongthecausesofthispresentedobjectitself,thoughIcannotmyselfseethatthereareany.ButthatitistheonlycauseofthispresentedobjectIcertainlydonotbelieve,nor,Ithink,doesanybody,andhencemyjudgmentcertainlycannotbe**Thecauseofthisispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand."Itmightnodoubt,bepossibletodefinesomekindoicausalrelation,suchthatitmightbeplausiblyheldthatitanditalonecausesthispresentedobjectinthatparticularway.Butanysuchdefinitionwould,sofarasIcansee,benecessarilyverycomplicated.And,evenwhenwehavegotit,itseemstomeitwouldbehighlyimprobablewecouldtrulysaythatwhatwearejudginginthesecases**is:Thispresentedobjecthasoneandonlyonecause,ofthisspecialkind."Still,Idonotwishtodenythatsomesuchviewmd^ypossiblybetrue.TheonlyothersuggestionIcanmakeisthattheremaybesomeultimate,notfurtherdefinablerelation,whichwemightforinstance,callthe**beingamanifestationrelationofof,*'suchthatwemightconceivablybejudging**:Thereisoneandonlyonethingofwhichthispresentedobjectisamanifestation,andthatthingispartofthesurfaceofaninkstand."Andhereagain,itseemstomejustpossiblethatthismaybeatrueaccountofwhatwearejudging;onlyIcannotfindtheslightest\n250SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONsignthatIaminfactawareofanysuchrelation.Possiblyothersuggestionscouldbemadeastowhattherelationis.withregardtowhichitcouldbeplausiblysupposedthatinallcases,wherewemakethesejudgmentsweareinfactjudgingofthepresentedobject"Thereisoneandonlyonethingwhichstandstothisobjectinthisrelation."Butitseemstomeatleastverydoubtfulwhetherthereisanysuchrelationatall;whether,therefore,ourjudgmentreallyisofthisform,andwhethertherefore,thispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstandreallyisknowntomebydescriptionasthethingwhichstandsinacertainrelationtothispresentedobject.Butifitisn't,andif,also,wecannottaketheviewthatwhatIamjudgingisthatthispresentedobjectitself\sapartofthesurfaceofaninkstand,therewouldseemtobenopossiblealternativebutthatwemusttakesomeviewofwhatIhavecalledtheMill-Russelltype.Viewsofthistype,ifIunderstandthemrightly,aredistinguishedfromthosewhichIhavehithertoconsidered,bythefactthat,accordingtothem,thereisnothingwhateverintheUniverseofwhichitcouldtrulybepredicatedthatitisthispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand,orindeedthatitisapartofthesurfaceofaninkstand,oraninkstand,atall.Theyhold,inshort,thatthoughthereareplentyofmaterialthingsintheUniverse,thereisnothinginitofwhichitcouldtrulybeassertedthatitisamaterialthing:that,though,whenIassert''Thisisaninkstand,"myassertionistrue,andissuchthatitfollowsfromitthatthereisintheUniverseatleastoneinkstand,and,therefore,atleastonematerialthing,yetitdoesnotfollowfromitthatthereisanythingwhichisamaterialthing.WhenIjudge"Thisisaninkstand,"Iamjudgingthispresentedobjecttopossessacertainproperty,whichissuchthat,iftherearethings,whichpossess\nSOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTION251thatproperty,thereareinkstandsandmaterialthings,butwhichissuchthatnothingwhichpossessesitisitselfamaterialthing;sothatinjudgingthattherearematerialthings,wearereallyalwaysjudgingofsomeotherproperty,whichisnotthatofbeingamaterialthing,thattherearethingswhichpossessit.Itseemstomequitepossible,ofcourse,thatsomeviewofthistypeisthetrueone.Indeed,thispapermayberegarded,ifyoulike,asanargumentinfavourofthepropositionthatsomesuchviewmt^stbetrue.CertainlyoneofmymainobjectsinwritingitwastoputasplainlyasIcansomegravedifficultieswhichseemtometostandinthewayofanyotherview;inthehopethatsomeofthose,whorejectallviewsoftheMill-Russelltype,mayexplainclearlywhichofthealternativesIhavesuggestedtheywouldadopt,orwhether,perhaps,someotherwhichhasnotoccurredtome.Itdoesnotseemtometobealwayssufficientlyrealisedhowdifficultitistofindanyanswertomyquestion*'Whatarewejudginginthesecases?"towhichtherearenotverygraveobjections,unlessweadoptanansweroftheMill-Russelltype.Thatananswerofthistypeisthetrueone,Iamnotmyself,inspiteoftheseobjections,byanymeansconvinced.ThetruthisIamcompletelypuzzledastowhatthetrueanswercanbe.Atthepresentmoment,IamratherinclinedtofavourtheviewthatwhatIamjudgingofthispresentedobjectisthatitisitselfapartofthesurfaceofaninkstand—that,therefore,itreallyisidenticalwiththispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand,inspileofthefactthatthisinvolvestheviewthat,where,hitherto,Ihavealwayssupposedmyselftobeperceivingoftwopresentedobjectsthattheyreallyweredifferent,Iwas,infact,onlyperceivingthattheyseemedtobedifferent.But,asIhavesaid,itseemstomequitepossiblethatthis\n252SOMEJUDGMENTSOFPERCEPTIONviewis,asIhavehithertosupposed,sheernonsense;and,inanycase,thereare,nodoubt,otherseriousobjectionstotheviewthatthispresentedobjectisthispartofthesurfaceofthisinkstand.\nTHECONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEMymainobjectinthispaperistotrytodefinemorepreciselythemostimportantquestion,which,sofarasIcansee,isreallyatissuewhenitisdisputedwithregardtoanypredicateofvalue,whetheritisorisnota**subjective"predicate.Therearethreechiefcasesinwhichthiscontroversyisapttoarise.Itarises,first,withregardtotheconceptionsof**right**"andwrong,"andthecloselyalliedconceptionof"duty"or"whatoughttobedone."Itarises,secondly,withregardto"good"and"evil,"insomesenseofthosewordsinwhichtheconceptionsforwhichtheystandarecertainlyquitedistinctfromtheconceptionsof"right"and"wrong,"butinwhichneverthelessitisundeniablethatethicshastodealwiththem.Anditarises,lastly,withregardtocertainaestheticconceptions,suchas"beautiful"and"ugly;"or"good"and"bad,"inthesenseinwhichthesewordsareappliedtoworksofart,andinwhich,therefore,thequestionwhatisgoodandbadisaquestionnotforethicsbutforaesthetics..Inallthreecasestherearepeoplewhomaintainthatthepredicatesinquestionarepurely"subjective,"inasensewhichcan,Ithink,befairlyeasilydefined.Iamnotheregoingtoattemptaperfectlyaccuratedefinitionofthesenseinquestion;but,astheterm"subjective"issodesperatelyambiguous,Ihadbettertrytoindicate\n254CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEroughlythesenseIamthinkingof.Takethe**beautifulword"forexample.Thereisasenseoftheterm**subjective,"suchthattosaythat**beautiful"standsforasubjectivepredicate,means,*'Thisroughly,thatanystatementoftheformisbeautiful"merelyexpressesapsychologicalassertiontotheeffectthatsomeparticularindividualorclassofindividualseitheractuallyhas,orwould,undercertaincircumstances,have,acertainkindofmentalattitudetowardsthethinginquestion.AndwhatImeanby"havingamentalattitude"towardsathing,canbebestexplainedbysayingthattodesireathingistohaveonekindofmentalattitudetowardsit,tobepleasedwithitistohaveanother,towillitistohaveanother;andinshortthattohaveanykindoffeelingoremotiontowardsitistohaveacertainmentalattitudetowardsit~adifferentoneineachcase.Thusanyonewhoholdsthatwhenwesaythatathingisbeautiful,whatwemeanismerelythatweourselvesorsomeparticularclassofpeopleactuallydo,orwouldundercertaincircumstances,have,orpermanentlyhave,acertainfeelingtowardsthethingmquestion,istakinga*'subjective"viewofbeauty.Butinallthreecasestherearealsoagoodmanypeoplewhoholdthatthepredicatesinquestionarenot,inthissense"subjective";andIthinkthatthosewhoholdthisareapttospeakasiftheviewwhichtheywishtomaintaininoppositiontoitconsistedsimplyandsolelyinholdingitscontra-dictory—inholding,thatis,thatthepredicatesinquestionare'*"*'objective,"whereobjectivesimplymeansthesameas'*notsubjective."ButinfactIthinkthisishardlyeverreallythecase.Inthecaseofgoodnessandbeauty,whatsuchpeoplearereallyanxioustomaintainisbynomeansmerelythattheseconceptionsare'*objective,"butthat,besidesbeing"objective,"theyarealso,inasense\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE255whichIshalltrytoexplain,''intrinsic"kindsofvalue.Itisthisconviction—theconvictionthatgoodnessandbeautyareintrinsickindsofvalue,whichis,Ithink,thestrongestgroundoftheirobjectiontoanysubjectiveview.Andindeed,whentheyspeakofthe**objectivity"oftheseconceptions,whattheyhaveinmindis,Ibelieve,alwaysaconceptionwhichhasnoproperrighttobe**objectivity,"sincecalleditincludesasanessentialpartthisothercharacteristicwhich1proposetocallthatofbeingan"intrinsic"kindofvalue.Thetruthis,Ibelieve,thatthough,fromthepropositionthataparticularkindofvalueis*'intrinsic"itdoesfollowthatitmustbe*'objective,"theconverseimplicationbynomeansholds,butonthecontraryitisperfectlyeasytoconceivetheoriesof'*goodness,"accordingtowhichgoodnessB.g.would,inthestrictestsense,be"objective,"andyetwouldnotbe"intrinsic."Thereis,therefore,averyimportantdifferencebetweentheconceptionof"objectivity,"andthatwhich"internality;"Iwillcallbutyet,ifIamnotmistaken,whenpeopletalkaboutthe"objectivity"ofanykindofvalue,theyalmostalwaysconfusethetwo,owingtothefactthatmostofthosewhodenythe*'internality"ofagivenkindofvalue,alsoassertits"subjectivity."Howgreatthedifferenceis,andthatitisafactthatthosewhomaintainthe"objectivity"ofgoodnessdo,asarule,meanbythisnotmere"objectivity,"but"internality,"aswell,can,Ithink,bebestbroughtoutbyconsideringaninstanceofatheory,accordingtowhichgoodnesswouldbeobjectivebutwouldnotbeintrinsic.Letussupposeittobeheld,forinstance,thatwhatismeantbysayingthatonetypeofhumanbeingAis"better"thananothertypeB,ismerelythatthecourseofevolutiontendstoincreasethenumbersoftypeAandtodecreasethoseoftype\na256CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEB.Suchaviewhas,infact,beenoftensuggested,evenifithasnotbeenheldinthisexactform;itamountsmerelytothefamiliarsuggestionthat"better"means"betterfittedtosurvive."Ob-viously"better,"onthisinterpretationofitsmean-ing,isinnosensea"subjective"conception:theconceptionofbelongingtoatypewhichtendstobefavouredbythestruggleforexistencemorethananotherisas"objective"asanyconceptioncanbe.Butyet,ifIamnotmistaken,allthosewhoobjecttoasubjectiveviewof'*goodness,"andinsistuponits"objectivity,"wouldobjectjustasstronglytothis"interpretationofitsmeaningastoany"subjectiveinterpretation.Obviously,therefore,whattheyarereallyanxioustocontendforisnotmerelythatgoodnessis"objective,"sincetheyarehereobjecting;toatheorywhichis"objective"butsomethingelse.Andthissomethingelseis,Ithink,certainlyjustthatitis"intrinsic"—characterwhichisjustasincompatiblewiththisobjectiveevolutionaryinterpretationaswithanyandeverysubjectiveinterpretation.ForifyousaythattocalltypeA"better"thantypeBmeansmerelythatitismorefavouredinthestruggleforexistence,itfollowsthatthebeing"better"isapredicatewhichdoesnotdependmerelyontheintrinsicnatureofAandBrespectively.Onthecontrary,althoughhereandnowAmaybemorefavouredthanB,itisobviousthatunderothercircumstancesorwithdifferentnaturallawstheverysametypeBmightbemorefavouredthanA,sothattheverysametypewhich,underonesetofcircumstances,isbetterthanB,would,underanotherset,beworse.Here,then,wehaveacasewhereaninterpretationof"goodness,"whichdoesmakeit"objective,"isincompatiblewithitsbeing"in-trinsic."Anditisjustthissamefact—thefactthat,onany"subjective"interpretation,thevery\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE257samekindofthingwhich,undersomecircumstances,isbetterthananother,would,underothers,beworse—whichconstitutes,sofarasIcansee,thefunda-mentalobjectiontoall'*subjective"interpretations.Obviously,therefore,toexpressthisobjectionbysayingthatgoodnessis"objective"isveryin-correct;sincegoodnessmightquitewellbe**ob-jective"andyetnotpossesstheverycharacteristicwhichitismainlywishedtoassertthatithas.Inthecase,therefore,ofethicalandaesthetic"goodness,"Ithinkthatwhatthosewhocontendforthe•*objectivity"oftheseconceptionsreallywishtocontendforisnotmere"objectivity"atall,butprincipallyandessentiallythattheyareintrinsickindsofvalue.Butinthecaseof"right"and"wrong"and"duty,"thesamecannotbesaid,becausemanyofthosewhoobjecttotheviewthattheseconceptionsare"subjective,"neverthelessdonotholdthattheyare"intrinsic."Wecannot,therefore,saythatwhatthosewhocontendforthe"objectivity"ofrightandwrongreallymeanisalwayschieflythatthoseconceptionsareintrinsic,butwecan,Ithink,saythatwhattheydomeaniscertainlynot"objectivity"inthiscaseanymorethantheother;sincehere,justasthere,itwouldbepossibletofindcertainviews,whichareineverysense"objective,"towhichtheywouldobjectjustasstronglyastoanysubjectiveview.Andthoughwhatismeantby"objectivity"inthiscase,isnotthat"right"and"wrong"arethemselves"intrinsic,"whatis,Ithinksmeantheretooisthattheyhaveafixedrelationtoakindofvaluewhichis"intrinsic."Itisthisfixedrelationtoanintrinsickindofvalue,sofarasIcansee,whichgivestorightandwrongthatkindanddegreeoffixityandimpartialitywhichtheyactuallyarefelttopossess,andwhichiswhatpeoplearethinkingofwhentheytalkoftheir"objectivity."Here,too,therefore,\n258CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE"**objectivitytotalkofthecharacteristicmeantasisjustasgreatamisnomerasintheothercases;sinc^thoughitisacharacteristicwhichisincom-**subjectivity,"patiblewithanykindofitisalsoincompatible,forthesamereason,withmanykindsof"objectivity."ForthesereasonsIthinkthatwhatthosewhocontendforthe"objectivity"ofcertainkindsofvalue,orforthe"objectivity"ofjudgmentsofvalue,commonlyhaveinmindisnotreally"ob-jectivity"atall.buteitherthatthekindsofvalueinquestionarethemselves"intrinsic."orelsethattheyhaveafixedrelationtosomekindthatisso.Theconceptionuponwhichtheyreallywishtolaystressisnotthatof"objectivevalue,"butthatof"intrinsicvalue,"thoughtheyconfusethetwo.And1thinkthisisthecasetoaconsiderableextentnotonlywiththedefendersofso-called"objectivity,"butalsowithitsopponents.Manyofthosewhoholdstrongly(asmanydo)thatallkindsofvalueare"subjective"certainlyobjecttotheso-called"objective"view,notsomuchbecauseitisobjective,asbecauseitisnotnaturalisticoxpositivistic—acharacteristicwhichdoesnaturallyfollowfromthecontentionthatvalueis*'intrinsic.'*butdoesnotfollowfromthemerecontentionthatitis"objective."Toaviewwhichisatthesametimeboth"naturalistic"or"positivistic"andalso"ob-jective,"suchastheP^volutionaryviewwhichIsketchedjustnow,theydonotfeelatallthesamekindordegreeofobjectionastoanyso-called"ob-jective"view.Withregardtoso-called"objective"viewstheyareapttofeelnotonlythattheyarefalse,butthattheyinvolveaparticularlypoisonouskindoffalsehood—theerectingintoa"metaphysical"entityofwhatisreallysusceptibleofasimplenaturalisticexplanation.Theyfeelthattoholdsuchaviewisnotmerelytomakeamistake,buttomakeasuper-\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE259stitiousmistake.Theyfeelthesamekindofcon-temptforthosewhoholdit,whichweareapttofeeltowardsthosewhomweregardasgrosslysuperstitious,andwhichisfeltbycertainpersonsforwhattheycall"metaphysics."Obviously,therefore,whattheyreallyobjecttoisnotsimplytheviewthatthesepredicatesare'*objective,"butsomethingelse—somethingwhichdoesnotatallfollowfromthecontentionthattheyare'*objective,"butwhichdoesfollowfromthecontentionthattheyare**intrinsic,"Indisputes,therefore,astowhetherparticular**subjective,"kindsofvalueareorarenotIthinkthattheissuewhichisreallyfelttobeimportant,almostalwaysbyoneside,andoftenbyboth,isnotreallytheissuebetween"subjective"and"non-subjective,"butbetween"intrinsic"and"non-intrinsic."Andnotonlyisthisfelttobethemoreimportantissue;Ithinkitreallyisso.ForthedifferencethatmustbemadetoourviewoftheUniverse,accordingasweholdthatsomekindsofvalueare"intrinsic"orthatnoneare,ismuchgreaterthananywhichfollowsfromameredifferenceofopinionastowhethersomeare"non-subjective,"orallwithoutexception"subjective."Toholdthatanykindsofvalueare"intrinsic"entailsthere-cognitionofakindofpredicateextremelydifferentfromanyweshouldotherwisehavetorecogniseandperhapsunique;whereasitisinanycasecertainthatthereare"objective"predicatesaswellas"subjective."Butnowwhatisthis"internality"ofwhichIhavebeenspeaking?Whatismeantbysaying"intrinsic"withregardtoakindofvaluethatitis?Toexpressroughlywhatismeantis,Ithink,simpleenough;andeverybodywillrecogniseitatonce,asanotionwhichisconstantlyinpeoplesheads;butIwanttodwelluponitatsomelength,\n26oCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEbecauseIknowofnoplacewhereitisexpresslyexplainedanddefined,andbecause,thoughitseemsverysimpleandfundamental,thetaskofdefiningitpreciselyisbynomeanseasyandinvolvessomedifficultieswhichImustconfessthatIdonotknowhowtosolve.Ihavealreadygivenincidentallythemainideainspeakingofthatevolutionaryinterpretationof"goodness,"accordingtowhich,asIsaid,goodnesswouldbe"objective"butwouldnotbe''intrinsic."Ithereusedasequivalenttotheassertionthat'better,'onthatdefinition,wouldnotbe'intrinsic,'theassertionthatthequestionwhetheronetypeofbeingAwasbetterthananotherBwouldnotdependsolelyontheintrinsicnaturesofAandB^butoncircumstancesandthelawsofnature.AndIthinkthatthisphrasewillinfactsuggesttoeverybodyjustwhatIdomeanby"intrinsic"value.Wecan,infact,setupthefollowingdefinition.Tosaythatakindofvalueis''in-trinsic"meansmerelythatthequestionwhetherathingpossessesit,andinwhatdegreeitpossessesit^dependssolelyontheintrinsicnatureofthethinginquestion.Butthoughthisdefinitiondoes,Ithink,conveyexactlywhatImean,Iwanttodwelluponitsmeaning,partlybecausetheconceptionof*differinginintrinsicnature'whichIbelievetobeoffunda-mentalimportance,isliabletobeconfusedwithotherconceptions,andpartlybecausethedefinitioninvolvesnotions,whichIdonotknowhowtodefineexactly.WhenIsay,withregardtoanyparticularkindofvalue,thatthequestionwhetherandinwhatdegreeanythingpossessesitdependssolelyontheintrinsicnatureofthethinginquestion,Imeantosaytwodifferentthingsatthesametime.Imeantosay(i)thatitisimpossibleforwhatis\nICONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEa6istrictlyoneandthesamethingtopossessthatkindofvalueatonetime,orinonesetofcircumstances,andnottopossessitatanother;andequallytm^possibleforittopossessitinonedegreeatonetime,orinonesetofcircumstances,andtopossessitinadifferentdegreeatanother,orinadifferentset.This,Ithink,isobviouslypartofwhatisnaturallyconveyedbysayingthatthequestionwhetherandinwhatdegreeathingpossessesthekindofvalueinquestionalwaysdependssolelyontheintrinsicnatureofthething.Forifxandyhavedifferentintrinsicnatures,itfollowsthatxcannotbequitestrictlyoneandthesamethingasy;andhenceifxandycanhaveadifferentin-trinsicvalue,onlywheretheirintrinsicnaturesaredifferent,itfollowsthatoneandthesamethingmustalwayshavethesameintrinsicvalue.This,then,ispartofwhatismeant;andaboutthispartIthinkIneedsaynomore,excepttocallattentiontothefactthatitinvolvesaconception,whichasweshallseeisalsoinvolvedintheotherpart,andwhichinvolvesthesamedifficultyinbothcases—mean,theconceptionwhichisexpressedbytheword'impossible/(2)Thesecondpartofwhatismeantisthatifagiventhingpossessesanykindofintrinsicvalueinacertaindegree,thennotonlymustthatsamethingpossessit,underallcircum-stances,inthesamedegree,butalsoany-thingexactlylikeit,must,underallcircumstances,possessitinexactlythesamedegree.Ortoputitinthecorrespondingnegativeform:Itisim-possiblethatoftwoexactlysimilarthingsoneshouldpossessitandtheothernot,orthatoneshouldpossessitinonedegree,andtheotherinadifferentone.1thinkthissecondpropositionalsoisnaturallyconveyedbysayingthatthekindofvalueinquestiondependssolelyontheintrinsicnatureof\n262CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEwhatpossessesit.Forweshouldnaturallysayoftwothingswhichwereexactlyalikeintrinsically,inspiteoftheirbeingtwOythattheypossessedthesameintrinsicnature.ButitisimportanttocallattentionexpresslytothefactthatwhatImeanbytheexpression'havingadifferentintrinsicnature'isequivalentto'notexactlyalike'becauseherethereisrealriskofconfusionbetweenthiscon-ceptionandadifferentone.Thiscomesaboutasfollows.Itisnaturaltosupposethatthephrase'havingadifferentintrinsicnature'isequivalenttothephrase'intrinsicallydifferent*or*havingdifferentintrinsicproperties.'But,ifwedomakethisidentification,thereisariskofconfusion.Foritisobviousthatthereisasenseinwhich,whenthingsareexacdylike,theymustbe*intrinsi-callydifferent'andhavedifferentintrinsicproperties,merelybecausetheyaretwo.Forinstance,twopatchesofcolourmaybeexactlyalike,inspiteofthefactthateachpossessesaconstituentwhichtheotherdoesnotpossess,providedonlythattheirtwoconstituentsareexactlyalike.Andyet,inacertainsense,itisobviousthatthefactthateachhasaconstituent,whichtheotherhasnotgot,doesconstituteanintrinsicdifferencebetweenthem,andimpliesthateachhasanintrinsicpropertywhichtheotherhasnotgotAndevenwherethetwothingsaresimplethemerefactthattheyarenumericallydifferentdoes'inasenseconstituteanintrinsicdifferencebetweenthem,andeachwillhaveatleastoneintrinsicpropertywhichtheotherhasnotgot—namelythatofbeingidenticalwithitself.Itisobviousthereforethatthephrases*intrinsicallydifferent'and'havingdifferentintrinsicproperties'areambiguous.Theymaybeusedinsuchasensethattosayoftwothingsthattheyareintrinsicallydifferentorhavedifferentintrinsicpropertiesdoesnotimplythattheyarenotexactlyalike,butonly\n—CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE263thattheyarenumericallydifferent.Ortheymaybeusedinasenseinwhichtwothingscanbesaidtobeintrinsicallydifferent,andtohavedifferentintrinsicpropertiesonlywhentheyarenotexactlyalike.Itis,therefore,extremelyimportanttoinsistthatwhenIsay:Twothingscandifferinintrinsicvalue,onlywhentheyhavedifferentintrinsicnatures,Iamusingtheexpression'havingdifferentintrinsic'naturesinthelattersenseandnottheformer:inasenseinwhichthemerefactthattwothingsaretwo,ordiffernumerically,doesnolimplythattheyhavedifferentintrinsicnatures,butinwhichtheycanbesaidtohavedifferentintrinsicnatures,onlywhere,besidesdifferingnumerically,theyarealsonotexactlyalike.Butassoonasthisisexplained,anotherriskofconfusionarisesowingtothefactthatwhenpeoplecontrastmerenumericaldifferencewithakindofintrinsicdifference,whichisnotmerelynumerical,theyareapttoidentifythelatterwithqualitativedifference.Itmight,therefore,easilybethoughtthatby*differenceinintrinsicnature'Imean'differenceinquality.'Butthisidentificationofdifferenceinqualitywithdifferenceinintrinsicnaturewouldalsobeamistake.Itistruethatwhatiscommonlymeantbydifferenceofquality,inthestrictsense,alwaysisadifferenceofintrinsicnature:twothingscannotdifferinqualitywithoutdifferinginintrinsicnature;andthatfactisoneofthemostimportantfactsaboutqualitativediffer-ence.Buttheconverseisbynomeansalsotrue:althpughtwothingscannotdifferinqualitywithoutdifferinginintrinsicnature,theycandifferinintrinsicnaturewithoutdifferinginquality;or,inotherwords,differenceinqualityisonlyonespeciesofdifferenceinintrinsicnature.Thatthisissofollowsfromthefactthat,asIexplained,Iamusingthephrase'differentinintrinsicnature'as\n264CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEequivalentto'notexactlylike:*foritisquiteplainthattwothingsmaynotbeexactlyalike,inspiteofthefactthattheydon'tdifferinquality,e.g.iftheonlydifferencebetweenthemwereinrespectofthedegreeinwhichtheypossesssomequalitytheydopossess.Nobodywouldsaythataveryloudsoundwasexactlylikeaverysoftone,eveniftheywereexactlylikeinquality;andyetitisplainthereisasenseinwhichtheirintrinsicnatureisdifferentForthisreasonalonequalitativedifferencecannotbeidentifiedwithdifferenceinintrinsicnature.Andtherearestillotherreasons.Differenceinsize,forinstancemaybeadifferenceinintrinsicnature,inthesenseImean,butitcanhardlybecalledadifferenceinquality.Ortakesuchadifferenceasthedifferencebetweentwopatternsconsistinginthefactthattheoneisayellowcirclewitharedspotinthemiddle,andtheotherayellowcirclewithabluespotinthemiddle.Thisdiffer-encewouldperhapsbelooselycalledadifferenceofquality;butobviouslyitwouldbemoreaccuratetocallitadifferencewhichconsistsinthefactthattheonepatternhasaconstituentwhichisqualita-tivelydifferentfromanywhichtheotherhas;andthedifferencebetweenbeingqualitativelydifferentandhavingqualitativelydifferentconstituentsisimportantbothbecausethelattercanonlybede-finedintermsoftheformer,andbecauseitispossibleforsimplethingstodifferfromoneanotherintheformerway,whereasitisonlypossibleforcomplexthingstodifferinthelatter.IhopethisissufficienttomakeclearexactlywhattheconceptioniswhichIamexpressingbythephrase**differentinintrinsicnature."Theimportantpointsare(i)thatitisakindofdifferencewhichdoesnotholdbetweentwothings,whentheyaremerelynumericallydifferent,butonlywhen,besidesbeingnumericallydifferent,theyarealso\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE265notexactlyalikeand(2)thatitisnotidenticalwithqualitativedifference;althoughqualitativedifferenceisoneparticularspeciesofit.Theconceptionseemstometobeanextremelyimportantandfundamentalone,although,sofarasIcansee,ithasnoquitesimpleandunambiguousname:andthisisthereasonwhyIhavedweltonitatsuchlength.**Notexactlylike"istheleastambiguouswayofexpressingit;butthishasthedisadvantagethatitlooksasiftheideaofexactlikenesswerethefundamentalonefromwhichthiswasderived,whereasIbelievethecontrarytobethecase.Forthisreasonitisperhapsbettertosticktothecumbrousphrase**differentinintrinsicnature."Somuchforthequestionwhatismeantbysayingoftwothingsthatthey**differinintrinsicnature."Wehavenowtoturntothemoredifficultquestionastowhat*'"ismeantbythewordsimpossibleand"necessary"inthestatement:Akindofvalueisintrinsicifandonlyif,itisimpossiblethatxandyshouldhavedifferentvaluesofthekind,unlesstheydifferinintrinsicnature;andintheequivalentstatement:Akindofvalueisintrinsicifandonlyif,whenanythingpossessesit,thatsamethingoranythingexactlylikeitwouldnecessarilyormustalways,underallcircumstances,possessitinexactlythesamedegree.Asregardsthemeaningofthisnecessityandimpossibility,wemaybeginbymakingtwopointsclear.(i)Itissometimescontended,andwithsomeplausibility,thatwhatwemeanbysayingthatitispossibleforathingwhichpossessesonepredicateFtopossessanotherG,is,sometimesatleast,merelythatsomethingswhichpossessFdoinfactalsopossessG.Andifwegivethismeaningto**possible,"thecorrespondingmeaningofthestatementitisimpossibleforathingwhich\n266CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEpossessesFtopossessGwillbemerely:ThingswhichpossessFneverdoinfactpossessG.If,then,weunderstood**impossible"inthissense,theconditionforthe"internality"ofakindofvalue,whichIhavestatedbysayingthatifakindofvalue'*intrinsic"itmustbeimpossiblefortwoistobethingstopossessitindifferentdegrees,iftheyareexactlylikeoneanother,willamountmerelytosayingthatnotwothingswhichareexactlylikeoneanothereverdo,infact,possessitindifferentdegrees.Itfollows,that,ifthiswereallthatweremeant,thisconditionwouldbesatisfied,ifonlyitweretrue(asforallIknowitmaybe)that,inthecaseofallthingswhichpossessanyparticularkindofintrinsicvalue,therehappenstobenothingelseintheUniverseexactlylikeanyoneofthem;forifthiswereso,itwould,ofcourse,followthatnotwothingswhichareexactlyalikedidinfactpossessthekindofvalueinquestionindifferentdegrees,forthesimplereasonthateverythingwhichpossesseditatallwouldbeuniqueinthesensethattherewasnothingelseexactlylikeit.Ifthiswereallthatweremeant,therefore,wecouldproveanyparticularkindofvaluetosatisfythiscondition,bymerelyprovingthatthereneverhasinfactandneverwillbeanythingexactlylikeanyoneofthethingswhichpossessit:andourassertionthatitsatisfiedthisconditionwouldmerelybeanempiricalgeneralisation.Moreoverifthiswereallthatwasmeantitwouldobviouslybebynomeanscertainthatpurelysubjectivepredicatescouldnotsatisfytheconditioninquestion;sinceitwouldbesatisfiedbyanysubjectivepredicateofwhichithappenedtobetruethateverythingwhichpossesseditwas,infact,unique—thattherewasnothingexactlylikeit;andforallIknowtheremaybemanysubjectivepredicatesofwhichthisistrue.Itis,therefore,scarcelynecessarytosaythatIam\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE267notusing"impossible"inthissense.WhenIsay-thatakindofvalue,tobeintrinsic,mustsatisfytheconditionthatitmustbeimpossiblefortwothingsexactlyaliketopossessitindifferentdegrees,Idonotmeanbythisconditionanythingwhichakindofvaluecouldbeprovedtosatisfy,bythemereempiricalfactthattherewasnothingelseexactlylikeanyofthethingswhichpossessedit.Itis,ofcourse,anessentialpartofmymeaningthatwemustbeabletosaynotmerelythatnotwoexactlysimilarthingsdoinfactpossessitindifferentdegrees,butthat,iftherehadbeenorweregoingtobeanythingexactlysimilartoathingwhichdoespossessit.eventhough,infact,therehasnotandwon'tbeanysuchthing,thatthingwouldhavepossessedorwouldpossessthekindofvalueinquestioninexactlythesamedegree.Itisessentialtothismeaningof"impossibility"thatitshouldentitleustoassertwhatwouldhavebeenthecase,underconditionswhichneverhavebeenandneverwillberealised;anditseemsobviousthatnomereempiricalgeneralisationcanentitleustodothis.'But(2)tosaythatIamnotusing*necessityinthisfirstsense,isbynomeanssufficienttoexplainwhatIdomean.Foritcertainlyseemsasifcausallaws(thoughthisisdisputed)doentitleustomakeassertionsoftheverykindthatmereempiricalgeneralisationsdonotentitleustomake.Invirtueofacausallawwedoseemtobeentitledtoassertsuchthingsasthat,ifagiventhinghadhadapropertyorweretohaveapropertyFwhichitdidn'thaveorwon'thave,itwouldhavehadorwouldhavesomeotherpropertyG.Anditmight,therefore,bethoughtthatthekindof'necessity*''andimpossibilityIamtalkingofisthiskindofcausal'necessity*and'impossibility.'Itis,therefore,importanttoinsistthat1donotmeanthiskindeither.IfthiswereallImeant,itwould\n268CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEagainbebynomeansobvious,thatpurelysub-jectivepredicatesmightnotsatisfyoursecondcondition.Itmay,forinstance,forallIknow,betruethattherearecausallawswhichinsurethatinthecaseofeverythingthatis'beautiful,'anythingexactlylikeanyofthesethingswould,inthisUniverse,exciteaparticularkindoffeelingineverybodytowhomitwerepresentedinaparticularway:andifthatwereso.weshouldhaveasub-jectivepredicatewhichsatisfiedtheconditionthat,whenagiventhingpossessesthatpredicate,itisimpossible(inthecausalsense)thatanyexactlysimilarthingshouldnotalsopossessit.ThekindofnecessityIamtalkingofisnot,therefore,merecausalnecessityeither.When1saythatifagiventhingpossessesacertaindegreeofintrinsicvalue,anythingpreciselysimilartoitwouldnecessarilyhavepossessedthatvalueinexactlythesamedegree,Imeanthatitwouldhavedoneso,evenifithadexistedinaUniverseinwhichthecausallawswerequitedifferentfromwhattheyareinthisone.Imean,inshort,thatitisimpossibleforanypreciselysimilarthingtopossessadifferentvalue,inpreciselysuchasenseasthat,inwhichitis,Ithink,generallyadmittedthatitisnotimpossiblethatcausallawsshouldhavebeendifferentfromwhattheyare—asenseofimpossibility,therefore,whichcertainlydoesnotdependmerelyoncausallaws.Thatthereissuchasenseofnecessity—asensewhichentitlesustosaythatwhathasFwoMld\\z.v^G,evenifcausallawswerequitedifferentfromwhattheyare—is,Ithink,quiteclearfromsuchinstancesasthefollowing.Supposeyoutakeaparticularpatchofcolour,whichisyellow.Wecan,Ithink,saywithcertaintythatanypatchexactlylikethatone,wouldbeyellow,evenifitexistedinaUniverseinwhichcausallawswerequitedifferent\n'CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE269fromwhattheyareinthisone.Wecansaythatanysuchpatchmustbeyellow,quiteunconditionally,whateverthecircumstances,andwhateverthecausallaws.Anditisinasensesimilartothis,inrespectofthefactthatitisneitherempiricalnorcausal,thatImeanthe'must*tobeunderstood,whenIsaythatifakindofvalueistobe'intrinsic/then,supposingagiven-thingpossessesitinacertaindegree,anythingexactlylikethatthingmusipossessitinexactlythesamedegree.To*'goodnesssay,ofbeauty'or'thattheyare'intrinsic'isonly,therefore,tosaythatthisthingwhichisobviouslytrueof'yellowness'and'bluenessand'redness'istrueofthem.Andifwegivethissenseto'must'inourdefinition,thenIthinkitisobviousthattosayofagivenkindofvaluethatitisintrinsicisinconsistentwithitsbeing'subjective.'Forthereis,Ithink,prettyclearlynosubjectivepredicateofwhichwecansaythusunconditionally,that,ifagiventhingpossessesit,thenanythingexactlylikethatthing,would,underanycircum-stances,andunderanycausallaws,alsopossessit.Forinstance,whateverkindoffeelingyoutake,itisplainlynottruethatsupposingIhavethatfeelingtowardsagiventhingA,then/shouldnecessarilyunderanycircumstanceshavethatfeelingtowardsanythingpreciselysimilartoA:forthesimplereasonthatathingpreciselysimilartoAmightexistinaUniverseinwhichIdidnotexistatall.Andsimilarlyitisnottrueofanyfeelingwhatever,thatifsomebodyhasthatfeelingtowardsagiventhingA,then,inartyUniverse,inwhichathingpreciselysimilartoAexisted,somebodywouldhavethatfeelingtowardsit.Norfinallyisiteventrue,thatifitistrueofagiventhingA,that,underactualcausallaws,anyonetowhomAwerepresentedinacertainwaywouldhaveacertainfeelingtowardsit,thenthesamehypothetical\n—270CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEpredicatewould,inanyUniverse,belongtoany-thingpreciselysimilartoA:ineverycaseitseemstobepossiblethattheremightbeaUniverse,inwhichthecausallawsweresuchthatthepropositionwouldnotbetrue.Itis,then,becauseinmydefinitionof'intrinsic'valuethe'must'istobeunderstoodinthisun-conditionalsense,thatIthinkthatthepropositionthatakindofvalueis'intrinsic'isinconsistentwithitsbeingsubjective.Hutitshouldbeobservedthatinholdingthatthereisthisincon-sistency,1amcontradictingadoctrinewhichseemstobeheldbymanyphilosophers.Thereare,asyouprobablyknow,somephilosopherswhoinsiststronglyonadoctrinewhichtheyexpressbysayingthatnorelationsarepurelyexternal.AndsofarasIcanmakeoutonethingwhichtheymeanbythisisjustthat,wheneverrhasanyrelationwhat-everwhichyhasnotgot,xandjj/cannotbeexactlyalike:Thatanydifferenceinrelationnecessarilyentailsadifferenceinintrinsicnature.Thereis,Ithink,nodoubtthatwhenthesephilosopherssaythis,theymeanbytheir'cannot'and'necessarily'*and*must.'Andhenceanunconditional'cannotitfollowstheyareholdingthat,if,forinstance,athingApleasesmenow,thenanyotherthing,B,preciselysimilartoA,must,underanycircumstances,andinanyUniverse,pleasemealso:since,ifBdidnotpleaseme,itwouldnotpossessarelationwhichAdoespossess,andtherefore,bytheirprinciple,couldnotbepreciselysimilartoAmustdifferfromitinintrinsicnature.Butitseemstometobeobviousthatthisprincipleisfalse.Ifitweretrue,itwouldfollowthatIcanknowapriorisuchthingsasthatnopatchofcolourwhichisseenbyyouandisnotseenbymeiseverexactlylikeanypatchwhichisseenbymeandisnotseenbyyou;orthatnopatchofcolourwhichissurroundedbya\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE271redringiseverexactlylikeonewhichisnotsosurrounded.Butitissurelyobvious,that,whetherthesethingsaretrueornottheyarethingswhichIcannotknowapHori.ItissimplynotevidentapriorithatnopatchofcolourwhichisseenbyAandnotbyBiseverexacdylikeonewhichisseenbyBandnotbyA,andthatnopatchofcolourwhichissurroundedbyaredringiseverexactlylikeonewhichisnot.Andthisillustrationservestobringoutverywellbothwhatismeantbysaying*beautiful*ofsuchapredicateas'thatitisin-trinsic/andwhy,ifitis.itcannotbesubjective.WhatismeantisjustthatifAisbeautifulandBisnot.youcouldknowapriorithatAandBarenotexactlyalike;whereas,withanysuchsubjectivepredicate,asthatofexcitingaparticularfeelinginme,orthatofbeingathingwhichwouldexcitesuchafeelinginanyspectator,youcannottellapriorithatathingAwhichdie!possesssuchapredicateandathingBwhichdidnot,couldnotbeexactlyalike.Itseemstome,therefore,quitecertain,inspiteofthedogmathatnorelationsarepurelyexternal,thattherearemanypredicates,suchforinstanceasmost(ifnotall)subjectivepredicatesortheob-jectiveoneofbeingsurroundedbyaredring,whichdonotdependsolelyontheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessesthem:or,inotherwords,ofwhichitisnottruethatif^possessesthemand^doesnot,xandymustdifferinintrinsicnature.Butwhatpreciselyismeantbythisunconditional'must/ImustconfessIdon'tknow.Theobviousthingtosuggestisthatitisthelogical'must/whichcertainlyisunconditionalinjustthissense:thekindofnecessity,whichweasserttohold,forinstance,whenwesaythatwhateverisaright-angledtrianglemustbeatriangle,orthatwhateverisyelloww«^/be.eitheryelloworblue.ButImust\n272CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEsayIcannotseethatallunconditionalnecessityisofthisnature.Idonotseehowitcanbededucedfromanylogicallawthat,ifagivenpatchofcolourbeyellow,thenanypatchwhichwereexactlylikethefirstwouldbeyellowtoo.Andsimilarlyinourcaseof^intrinsic'value,thoughIthinkitistruethatbeauty,forinstance,is*intrinsic,'Idonotseehowitcanbededucedfromanylogicallaw,thatifAisbeautiful,anythingthatwereexactlylikeAwouldbebeautifultoo,inexactlythesamedegree.Moreover,thoughIdobelievethatboth"yel-low"(inthesenseinwhichitappliestosense-data)and"beautiful"arepredicateswhich,inthisunconditionalsense,dependonlyontheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessesthem,thereseemstometobeanextremelyimportantdifferencebetweenthemwhichconstitutesafurtherdifficultyinthewayofgettingquiteclearastowhatthisunconditionalsenseof"must"is.ThedifferenceImeanisonewhichIaminclinedtoexpressbysayingthatthoughbothyellownessandbeautyarepredicateswhichdependonlyontheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessesthem,yetwhileyellow-nessisitselfanintrinsicpredicate,beautyisnot.Indeeditseemstometobeoneofthemostimportanttruthsaboutpredicatesofvalue,thatthoughmanyofthemareintrinsickindsofvalue,inthesenseIhavedefined,yetnoneofthemareintrinsicproperties,inthesenseinwhichsuchpropertiesas**yellow"orthepropertyof"beingastateofpleasure"or"beingastateofthingswhichcontainsabalanceofpleasure"areintrinsicproperties.Itisobvious,forinstance,that,ifwearetorejectallnaturalistictheoriesofvalue,wemustnotonlyrejectthosetheories,accordingtowhichnokindofvaluewouldbeintrinsic,butmustalsorejectsuchtheoriesasthosewhichassert,forinstance,thattosaythatastateofmindisgood\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE273istosaythatitisastateofbeingpleasedorthat;tosaythatastateofthingsisgoodistosaythatitcontainsabalanceofpleasureoverpain.Thereare,inshort,twoentirelydifferenttypesofnaturalistictheory,thedifferencebetweenwhichmaybeillustratedbythedifferencebetweentheassertion,****AAisgood"meansispleasant"and****AtheassertionAisgood"meansisastateofpleasure."Theoriesoftheformertypeimplythatgoodnessisnotanintrinsickindofvalue,whereastheoriesofthelattertypeimplyequallyemphati-callythatitis:sinceobviouslysuchpredicatesasthat**ofbeingastateofpleasure,"or**containingabalanceofpleasure,"arepredicateslike''yellow"inrespectofthefactthatifagiventhingpossessesthem,anythingexactlylikethethinginquestionmustpossessthem.Itseemstomeequallyobviousthatbothtypesoftheoryarefalse:butIdonotknowhowtoexcludethembothexceptbysayingthattwodifferentpropositionsarebothtrueofgoodness,namely:(i)thatitdoesdependonlyontheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessesit—whichexcludestheoriesofthefirsttypeand(2)that,thoughthisisso,itisyetnotitselfanintrinsicproperty—whichexcludesthoseofthesecond.ItwasforthisreasonthatIsaidabovethat,ifthereareanyintrinsickindsofvalue,theywouldconstituteaclassofpredicateswhichis,perhaps,unique;forIcannotthinkofanyotherpredicatewhichresemblestheminrespectofthefact,thatthoughnotitselfintrinsic,ityetshareswithintrinsicpropertiesthecharacteristicsofdependingsolelyontheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessesit.SofarasIknow,certainpredicatesofvaluearetheonlynon-intrinsicpropertieswhichsharewithintrinsicpropertiesthischaracteristicofdependingonlyontheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessesthem.If,however,wearethustosaythatpredicatesof\n274CONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUEvalue,thoughdependentsolelyonintrinsicproperties,arenotthemselvesintrinsicproperties,theremustbesomecharacteristicbelongingtointrinsicpropertieswhichpredicatesofvalueneverpossess.Anditseemstomequiteobviousthatthereis;onlyIcan'tseewhatitis.Itseemstomequiteobviousthatifyouassertofagivenstateofthingsthatitcontainsabalanceofpleasureoverpain,youareassertingofitnotonlyadifferentpredicate,fromwhatyouwouldbeassertingofitifyousaiditwas*'good"—butapredicatewhichisofquiteadifferentkind\andinthesamewaythatwhenyouassertofapatchofcolourthatitis"yellow,"thepredicateyouassertisnotonlydifferentfrom'*beautiful,"butofquiteadifferentkind,inthesamewayasbefore.Andofcoursethemerefactthatmanypeoplehavethoughtthatgoodnessandbeautyweresubjectiveisevidencethatthereissomegreatdifferenceofkindbetweenthemandsuchpredicatesasbeingyelloworcontainingabalanceofpleasure.Butwhatthedifferenceis,ifwesuppose,asIsuppose,thatgoodnessandbeautyarenotsubjective,andthattheydosharewith''yellowness"and*'containingpleasure,"thepropertyofdependingsolelyontheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessesthem,IconfessIcannotsay.IcanonlyvaguelyexpressthekindofdifferenceIfeeltheretobebysayingthatintrinsicpropertiesseemtodescribetheintrinsicnatureofwhatpossessestheminasenseinwhichpredicatesofvalueneverdo.Ifyoucouldenumeratealltheintrinsicpropertiesagiventhingpossessed,youwouldhavegivenacompletedescriptionofit,andwouldnotneedtomentionanypredicatesofvalueitpossessedwhereasnodescriptionofagiven;thingcouldbecompletewhichomittedanyintrinsicproperty.But,inanycase,owingtothefactthatpredicatesofintrinsicvaluearenotthemselves\nCONCEPTIONOFINTRINSICVALUE275intrinsicproperties,youcannotdefine'*intrinsicproperty,"inthewaywhichatfirstsightseemsobviouslytherightone.Youcannotsaythatanintrinsicpropertyisapropertysuchthat,ifonethingpossessesitandanotherdoesnot,theintrinsicnatureofthetwothingsmustbedifferentForthisistheverythingwhichwearemaintainingtobetrueofpredicatesofintrinsicvalue,whileatthesametimewesaythattheyarenotintrinsicpro-perties.Suchadefinitionof**intrinsicproperty"wouldthereforeonlybepossibleif,wecouldsaythatthenecessitythereisthat,\ixand^possessdifferentintrinsicproperties,theirnaturemustbedifferent,isanecessityofadi^erc^itkindfromthenecessitythereisthat,ifxandyareofdifferentintrinsicvalues,theirnaturemustbedifferent,althoughbothnecessitiesareunconditional.Anditseemstomepossiblethatthisisthetrueexplanation.But,ifso,itobviouslyaddstothedifficultyofexplainingthemeaningoftheunconditional*'must,"since,inthiscase,therewouldbetwodifferentmeaningsof**must,"bothunconditional,andyetneither,apparently,identicalwiththelogical*'must."\nEXTERNALANDINTERNALRELATIONSIntheindextoAppearanceandReality(FirstEdition)Mr.Bradleydeclaresthatallrelationsare"intrinsical";andthefollowingaresomeofthephrasesbymeansofwhichhetriestoexplainwhathemeansbythisassertion."Arelationmustatbothendsaffect,andpassinto,thebeingofitsterms"**Everyrelationessentially(p.364).penetratesthebeingofitsterms,andis,inthissense,intrinsical"(p.392)."Tostandinarelationandnottoberelative,tosupportitandyetnottobeinfectedandunderminedbyit,seemsoutofthequestion"(p.142).AndagoodmanyotherphilosophersseeminclinedtotakethesameviewaboutrelationswhichMr.Bradleyisheretryingtoexpress.Otherphraseswhichseemtobesometimesusedtoexpressit,orapartofit,arethese:"Norelationsarepurelyexternal'*;"Allrelationsqualifyormodifyormakeadifferencetothetermsbetweenwhichtheyhold";"Notermsareindependentofanyoftherelationsinwhichtheystandtootherterms."(Seee,g.yJoachim,TheNatureofTruth,pp.11,12,46).Itis,Ithink,bynomeanseasytomakeoutexactlywhatthesephilosophersmeanbytheseassertions.Andthemainobjectofthispaperistotrytodefineclearlyoneproposition,which,evenifitdoesnotgivethewholeofwhattheymean,seemstometobealwaysimpliedbywhatthey\nEXTERNALRELATIONS277mean,andtobecertainlyfalse.Ishalltrytomakecleartheexactmeaningofthisproposition,topointoutsomeofitsmostimportantconsequences,andtodistinguishitclearlyfromcertainotherpropositionswhichare,Ithink,moreorlessliabletobeconfusedwithit.AndIshallmaintainthat,ifwegivetotheassertionthatarelationis"internal"themeaningwhichthispropositionwouldgivetoit,then,though,inthatsense,somerelationsare"internal,"others,nolesscertainly,arenot,butare"purelyexternal."Tobeginwith,wemay,Ithink,cleartheground,byputtingononesidetwopropositionsaboutrelations,which,thoughtheyseemsometimestobeconfusedwiththeviewwearediscussing,do,Ithink,quitecertainlynotgivethewholemeaningofthatview.Thefirstisapropositionwhichisquitecertainlyandobviouslytrueofallrelations,withoutexception,andwhich,thoughitraisespointsofgreatdifficulty,can,Ithink,beclearlyenoughstatedforitstruthtobeobvious.Itisthepropositionthat,inthecaseofanyrelationwhatever,thekindoffactwhichweexpressbysayingthatagiventermAhasthatrelationtoanothertermB,ortoapairoftermsBandC,ortothreetermsB,C,andD,andsoon,innocasesimplyconsistsinthetermsinquestiontogetherwiththerelation.ThusthefactwhichweexpressbysayingthatEdwardVIIwasfatherofGeorgeV,obviouslydoesnotsimplyconsistinEdward,George,andtherelationoffatherhood.Inorderthatthefactmaybe,itisobviouslynotsufficientthatthereshouldmerelybeGeorgeandEdwardandtherelationoffatherhood;itisfurthernecessarythattherelationshouldrelateEdwardtoGeorge,andnotonlyso,butalsothatitshouldrelatethemintheparticularwaywhichweexpressbysayingthatEdwardwas\n278EXTERNALRELATIONSfatherofGeorge,andnotmerelyinthewaywhichweshouldexpressbysayingthatGeorgewasfatherofEdward.Thispropositionis,1think,obviouslytrueofallrelationswithoutexception:andtheonlyreasonwhyIhavementioneditisbecause,inanarticleinwhichMr.BradleycriticisesMr.Russell{Mind,1910,p.179),heseemstosuggestthatitisinconsistentwiththepropositionthatanyrelationsaremerelyexternal,andbecause,sofarasIcanmakeout,someotherpeoplewhomaintainthatallrelationsareinternalseemsometimestothinkthattheircontentionfollowsfromthisproposition.ThewayinwhichMr.Bradleyputsitisthatsuchfactsareunitieswhicharenotcompletelyanalysable;andthisis,ofcourse,true,ifitmeansmerelythatinthecaseofnosuchfactisthereanysetofconstituentsofwhichwecantrulysay:Thisfactisidenticalwiththeseconstituents.Butwhetherfromthisitfollowsthatallrelationsareinternalmustofcoursedependuponwhatismeantbythelatterstatement.Ifitbemerelyusedtoexpressthispropositionitself,oranythingwhichfollowsfromit,then,ofcourse,therecanbenodoubtthatallrelationsareinternal.ButIthinkthereisnodoubtthatthosewhosaythisdonotmeanbytheirwordsmerelythisobviouspropositionitself;andIamgoingtopointoutsomethingwhichIthinktheyalwaysimply,andwhichcertainlydoesnotfollowfromit.Thesecondpropositionwhich,Ithink,maybeputasideatonceascertainlynotgivingthewholeofwhatismeant,isthepropositionwhichis,Ithink,thenaturalmeaningofthephrases''Allrelationsmodifyoraffecttheirterms"or*'Allrelationsmakeadifferencetotheirterms."Thereisoneperfectlynaturalandintelligiblesenseinwhichagivenrelationmaybesaidtomodifyatermwhichstandsinthatrelation,namely,thesensein\nEXTERNALRELATIONS279whichweshouldsaythat,if,byputtingastickofsealing-waxintoaflame,wemakethesealing-waxmelt,itsrelationshiptotheflamehasmodifiedthe"sealing-wax.Thisisasenseoftheword'*modifyinwhichpartofwhatismeantbysayingofanytermthatitismodified,isthatithasactuallyundergoneachange:andIthinkitisclearthatasenseinwhichthisispartofitsmeaningistheonlyoneinwhichtheword"modify"canproperlybeused.If,however,thosewhosaythatallrelationsmodifytheirtermswereusingthewordinthis,itsproper,sense,partofwhatwouldbemeantbythisassertionwouldbethatalltermswhichhaverelationsatallactuallyundergochanges.Suchanassertionwouldbeobviouslyfalse,forthesimplereasonthattherearetermswhichhaverelation?andwhichyetneverchangeatall.AndIthinkitisquiteclearthatthosewhoassertthatallrelationsareinternal,inthesenseweareconcernedwith,meanbythissomethingwhichcouldbeconsistentlyassertedtobetrueofallrelationswithoutexception,evenifitwereadmittedthatsometermswhichhaverelationsdonotchange.When,therefore.theyusethephrasethat'*modify"theirallrelationstermsasequivalentto"allrelationsareinternal,"theymustbeusing"modify"insomemeta-phoricalsenseotherthanitsnaturalone.Ithink,indeed,thatmostofthemwouldbeinclinedtoassertthatineverycaseinwhichatermAcomestohavetoanothertermBarelation,whichitdidnothavetoBinsomeimmediatelyprecedinginterval,itshavingofthatrelationtothattermcausesittoundergosomechange,whichitwouldnothaveundergoneifithadnotstoodinpreciselyhatrelationtoBandIthinkperhapstheywouldhinkthatthispropositionfollowsfromsomepropositionwhichistrueofallrelations,withoutexception,andwhichiswhattheymeanbysaying\n28oEXTERNALRELATIONSthatallrelationsareinternal.Thequestionwhetherthecomingintoanewrelationdoesthusalwayscausesomemodificationinthetermwhichcomesintoitisonewhichisoftendiscussed,asifithadsomethingtodowiththequestionwhetherallrelationsareinternalraswhen,forinstance,itisdiscussedwhetherknowledgeofathingaltersthethingknown.AndformypartIshouldmaintainthatthispropositioniscertainlynottrue.ButwhatIamconcernedwithnowisnotthequestionwhetheritistrue,butsimplytopointoutthat,sofarasIcansee.itcanhavenothingtodowiththequestionwhetherallrelationsareinternal,forthesimplereasonthatitcannotpossiblyfollowfromanypropositionwithregardtoa//relationswithoutexception.Itassertswithregardtoallrelationalpropertiesofacertainkind,thattheyhaveacertainkindo{effect;andnopropositionofthissortcan,Ithinkfollowfromanyuniversalpropositionwithregardtoallrelations.Wehave,therefore,rejectedascertainlynotgivingthewholemeaningofthedogmathatallrelationsareinternal:(i)theobviouslytruepropositionthatnorelationalfactsarecompletelyanaJysable,intheprecisesensewhichIgavetothatassertion;and(2)theobviouslyfalsepropositionthatallrelationsmodifytheirterms,inthenaturalsenseoftheterm"modify,"inwhichitalwayshasaspartofitsmeaning"causetoundergoachange."Andwehavealsoseenthatthisfalsepropositionthatanyrelationwhichatermcomestohavealwayscausesittoundergoachangeiswhollyirrelevanttothequestionwhetherallrelationsareinternalornot.Wehaveseenfinallythatiftheassertionthatallrelationsmodifytheirtermsistobeunderstoodasequivalenttotheassertionthatallareinternal,"modify"mustbe\nEXTERNALRELATIONS281understoodinsomemetaphoricalsense.Thequestionis:Whatisthismetaphoricalsense?Andonepointis,Ithink,prettycleartobeginwith.Itisobviousthat,inthecaseofsomerelations,agiventermAmayhavetherelationinquestion,notonlytooneotherterm,buttoseveraldifferentterms.If,forinstance,weconsidertherelationoffatherhood,itisobviousthatamanmaybefather,notonlyofone,butofseveraldifferentchildren.Andthosewhosaythatallrelationsmodifytheirtermsalwaysmean,Ithink,notmerelythateverydifferentrelationwhichatermhasmodifiesit;butalsothat,wheretherelationisonewhichthetermhastoseveraldifferentotherterms,then,inthecaseofeachoftheseterms,itismodifiedbythefactthatithastherelationinquestiontothatparticularterm.If,forinstance,Aisfatherofthreechildren,B,C,andD,theymeantoassertthatheismodified,notmerelybybeingafather,butbybeingthefatherofB,alsobybeingthefatherofC,andalsobybeingthefatherofD.Themereassertionthatallrelationsmodifytheirtermsdoesnot,ofcourse,makeitquiteclearthatthisiswhatismeant;butIthinkthereisnodoubtthatitisalwaysmeant;andIthinkwecanexpressitmoreclearlybyusingaterm,whichIhavealreadyintroduced,andsayingthedoctrineisthatallrelationalpropertiesmodifytheirterms,inasensewhichremainstobedefined.IthinkthereisnodifficultyinunderstandingwhatImeanbyarelationalproperty.IfAisfatherofB,thenwhatyouassertofAwhenyousaythatheissoisarelationalproperty—namelythepropertyofbeingfatherofB;anditisquiteclearthatthispropertyisnotitselfarelation,inthesamefundamentalsenseinwhichtherelationoffatherhoodisso;andalsothat,ifCisadifferentchildfromB,thenthepropertyofbeingfatherofCisadifferentrelational\n—282EXTERNALRELATIONSpropertyfromthatofbeingfatherofB,althoughthereisonlyonerelation,thatoffatherhood,fromwhichbotharederived.SofarasIcanmakeout,thosephilosopherswhotalkofallrelationsbeing'*internal,oftenactuallymeanby*'relations"relationalproperties";whentheytalkofallthe"relations"ofagiventerm,theymeanallitsrelationalproperties,andnotmerelyallthedifferentrelations,ofeachofwhichitistruethatthetermhasthatrelationtosomething.Itwill,Ithink,conducetoclearnesstouseadifferentwordforthesetwoentirelydifferentusesoftheterm"relation"tocall"fatherhood"arelation,and"fatherhoodofB"a"relationalproperty."Andthefundamentalproposition,whichismeantbytheassertionthatallrelationsareinternal,is,Ithink,apropositionwithregardtorelationalproperties,andnotwithregardtorelationsproperlyso-called.Thereisnodoubtthatthosewhomaintainthisdogmameantomaintainthatallrelationalpropertiesarerelatedinapeculiarwaytothetermswhichpossessthemthattheymodifyorareinternaltothem,insomemetaphoricalsense.Andoncewehavedefinedwhatthissenseisinwhicharelationalpropertycanbesaidtobeinternaltoatermwhichpossessesit,wecaneasilyderivefromitacorrespondingsenseinwhichtherelations,stricdysocalled,fromwhichrelationalpropertiesarederived,canbesaidtobeinternal.Ourquestionisthen:Whatisthemetaphoricalsenseof"modify"inwhichthepropositionthatallrelationsareinternalisequivalenttothepro-positionthatallrelationalproperties"modify"thetermswhichpossessthem?Ithinkitisclearthattheterm"modify"wouldneverhavebeenusedatalltoexpresstherelationmeant,unlesstherehadbeensomeanalogybetweenthisrelationandthatwhichwehaveseenisthepropersenseof"modify,"\nEXTERNALRELATIONS283namely,causestochange.AndIthinkwecanseewheretheanalogycomesinbyconsideringthestatement,withregardtoanyparticulartermAandanyrelationalpropertyPv/hichbelongstoit,thatAwouldhavebeendifferentfromwhatitisifithadnothadP:thestatement,forinstance,thatEdwardVIIwouldhavebeendifferentifhehadnotbeenfatherofGeorgeV.ThisisathingwhichwecanobviouslytrulysayofAandP,insomesense,wheneveritistrueofPthatitmodifiedAinthepropersenseoftheword:ifthebeingheldintheflamecausesthesealing-waxtomelt,wecantrulysay(insomesense)thatthesealing-waxwouldnothavebeeninameltedstateifithadnotbeenintheflame.ButitseemsasifitwereathingwhichmightalsobetrueofAandP,whereitisnottruethatthepossessionofPcausedAtochange;sincethemereassertionthatAwouldhavebeendifferent,ifithadnothadP,doesnotnecessarilyimplythatthepossessionofPcausedAtohaveanypropertywhichitwouldnothavehadotherwise.Andthosewhosaythatallrelationsareinternaldosometimestendtospeakasifwhattheymeantcouldbeputintheform:Inthecaseofeveryrelationalpropertywhichathinghas.itisalwaystruethatthethingwhichhasitwouldhavebeendifferentifithadnothadthatproperty;theysometimessayeven:IfPbearelationalpropertyandAatermwhichhasit.thenitisalwaystruethatAwouldnothavebeenAifithadnothadP.Thisis,Ithink,obviouslyaclumsywayofexpressinganythingwhichcouldpossiblybetrue,since,takenstrictly,itimpliestheself-contradictorypropositionthatifAhadnothadP,itwouldnothavebeentruethatAdidnothaveP.Butitisneverthelessamoreorlessnaturalwayofexpressingapropositionwhichmightquitewellbetrue,namely,that,supposing\n284EXTERNALRELATIONSAhasP,thenanythingwhichhadnothadPwouldnecessarilyhavebeendifferentfromA.ThisisthepropositionwhichIwishtosuggestasgivingthemetaphoricalmeaningof*'PmodifiesA/*ofwhichweareinsearch.ItisapropositiontowhichIthinkaperfectlyprecisemeaningcanbegiven,andonewhichdoesnotatallimplythatthepossessionofPcausedanychangeinA,butwhichmightconceivablybetrueofalltermsandalltherelationalpropertiestheyhave,withoutexception.AnditseemstomethatitisnotunnaturalthatthepropositionthatthisistrueofPandA,shouldhavebeenexpressedintheform.*'PmodifiesA/'sinceitcanbemoreorlessnaturallyexpressedinthepervertedform,**IfAhadnothadPitwouldhavebeendifferent,"—aformofwords,which,aswesaw,canalsobeusedwheneverPdoes,inthepropersense,modifyA.Iwanttosuggest,then,thatonethingwhichisalwaysimpliedbythedogmathat,"Allrelationsareinternal,"isthat,inthecaseofeveryrelationalproperty,itcanalwaysbetrulyassertedofanytermAwhichhasthatproperty,thatanytermwhichhadnothaditwouldnecessarilyhavebeendifferentfromA.ThisisthepropositiontowhichIwanttodirectattention.Andtherearetwophrasesinit,whichrequiresomefurtherexplanation.The**firstisthephrasewouldnecessarilyhavebeen."Andthemeaningofthiscanbeexplained,inapreliminaryway,asfollows:—TosayofapairofpropertiesPandQ,thatanytermwhichhadhadPwouldnecessarilyhavehadQ,isequivalenttosayingthat,ineverycase,fromthepropositionwithregardtoanygiventermthatithasP,itfollowsthatthattermhasQ:followsbeingunder-stoodinthesenseinwhichfromthepropositionwithregardtoanyterm,thatitisarightangle,it\nEXTERNALRELATIONS285followsthatitisanangle,andinwhichfromthepropositionwithregardtoanytermthatitisreditfollowsthatitiscoloured.Thereisobviouslysomeveryimportantsenseinwhichfromthepropositionthatathingisarightangle,itdoesfollowthatitisanangle,andfromthepropositionthatathingisreditdoesfollowthatitiscoloured.AndwhatIammaintainingisthatthemeta-phoricalsenseof"modify/'inwhichitismain-tainedthatallrelationalpropertiesmodifythesubjectswhichpossessthem,canbedefinedbyreferencetothissenseof"follows."Thedefinitionis:TosayofagivenrelationalpropertyPthatitmodifiesorisinternaltoagiventermAwhichpossessesit,istosaythatfromthepropositionthatathinghasnotgotPitfollowsthatthatthingisdifferentfromA.Inotherwords,itistosaythatthepropertyofnotpossessingP,andthepropertyofbeingdifferentfromAarerelatedtooneanotherinthepeculiarwayinwhichthepropertyofbeingaright-angledtriangleisrelatedtothatofbeingatriangle,orthatofbeingredtothatofbeingcoloured.Tocompletethedefinitionitisnecessary,how-ever,todefinethesenseinwhich"differentfromA"istobeunderstood.TherearetwodifferentsenseswhichthestatementthatAisdifferentfromBmaybear.ItmaybemeantmerelythatAisnumeric-allydifferentfromB.otherthanB,notidenticalwithB.Oritmaybemeantthatnotonlyisthisthecase,butalsothatAisrelatedtoBinawaywhichcanberoughlyexpressedbysayingthatAisqtialitativelydifferentfromB.Andofthesetwomeanings,thosewhosay"Allrelationsmakeadifferencetotheirterms,"always,Ithink,meandifferenceinthelattersenseandnotmerelyintheformer.Thatistosay,theymean,thatifPbearelationalpropertywhichbelongstoA,thenthe\n286EXTERNALRELATIONSabsenceofPentailsnotonlynumericaldifferencefromA,butqualitativedifference.But,infact,fromthepropositionthatathingisqualitativelydifferentfromA,itdoesfollowthatitisalsonumericallydifferent.Andhencetheyaremain-tainingthatevery**internalrelationalpropertyisto"itstermsinbothoftwodifferentsensesatthesametime.Theyaremaintainingthat,ifPbearelationalpropertywhichbelongstoA,thenPisinternaltoAbothinthesense(i)thattheabsenceofPentailsqualitativedifferencefromA;and(2)thattheabsenceofPentailsnumericaldifferencefromA.Itseemstomethatneitherofthesepropositionsistrue;and1willsaysomethingabouteachinturn.Asforthefirst,IsaidbeforethatIthinksomerelationalpropertiesreallyare'*internalto"theirterms,thoughbynomeansallare.But,ifweunderstand*'internalto"inthisfirstsense,Iamnotreallysurethatanyare.Inordertogetanexampleofonewhichwas,weshouldhave,1think.tosaythatanytwodifferentqualitiesarealwaysqualitativelydifferentfromoneanother:that,forinstance,itisnotonlythecasethatanythingwhichispureredisqualitativelydifferentfromanythingwhichispureblue,butthatthequality'*purered"itselfisqualitativelydifferentfromthequality'*pureblue."Iamnotquitesurethatwecansaythis,butIthinkwecan;andifso,itiseasytogetanexampleofarelationalpropertywhichisinternalillourfirstsense.Thequality"orange"isinter-mediateinshadebetweenthequalitiesyellowandred.Thisisarelationalproperty,anditisquiteclearthat,onourassumption,itisaninternalone.Sinceitisquiteclearthatanyqualitywhichwerenotintermediatebetweenyellowandred,wouldnecessarilybeotherthanorange;andifanyqualityotherthanorangemustbequalitativelydifferent\n—EXTERNALRELATIONS287fromorange,then**intermediatebe-itfollowsthattweenyellowandred"isinternalto**orange."That**in-istosay,theabsenceoftherelationalpropertytermediatebetweenyellowandred,"entailstheproperty**differentinqualityfromorange."Thereisthen,Ithink,adifficultyinbeingsurethatanyrelationalpropertiesareinternalinthisfirstsense.But,ifwhatwewanttodoistoshowthatsomearenot,andthatthereforethedogmathatallrelationsareinternalisfalse,Ithinkthemostconclusivereasonforsayingthisisthat\{allwereinternalinthisfirstsense,allwouldnecessarilybeinternalinthesecond,andthatthisisplainlyfalse.Ithink,infact,themostimportantconse-quenceofthedogmathatallrelationsareinternal,isthatitfollowsfromitthatallrelationalpropertiesareinternalinthissecondsense.Ipropose,there-fore,atoncetoconsiderthisproposition,withaviewtobringingoutquiteclearlywhatitmeansandinvolves,andwhatarethemainreasonsforsayingthatitisfalse.Thepropositioninquestionisthat,ifPbearelationalpropertyandAatermtowhichitdoesinfactbelong,then,nomatterwhatPandAmaybe,itmayalwaysbetrulyassertedofthem,thatanytermwhichhadnotpossessedPwouldnecessarilyhavebeenotherthan—numericallydifferentfromA:orinotherwords,thatAwouldnecessarily,inallconceivablecircumstances,havepossessedP,Andwiththissenseof''internal,"asdistinguishedfromthatwhichsaysqualitativelydifferent,itisquiteeasytopointoutsomerelationalpropertieswhichcertainlyareinternalinthissense.Letustakeasanexampletherelationalpropertywhichweasserttobelongtoavisualsense-datumwhenwesayofitthatithasanothervisualsense-datumasaspatialpart:theassertion,forinstance,withregardtoacolouredpatchhalfofwhichisredand\n288EXTERNALRELATIONShalfyellow:"Thiswholepatchcontainsthispatch'(where"thispatch"isapropernamefortheredhalf).Itishere,Ithink,quiteplainthat,inaperfectlyclearandintelligiblesense,wecansaythatanywhole,whichhadnotcontainedthatredpatch,couldnothavebeenidenticalwiththewholeinquestion:thatfromthepropositionwithregardtoanytermwhateverthatitdoesnotcontainthatparticularpatchitfollowsthatthattermisotherthanthewholeinquestion—thoughnotnecessarilythatitisqualitativelydifferentfromit.Thatpar-ticularwholecouldnothaveexistedwithouthavingthatparticularpatchforapart.Butitseemsnolessclear,atfirstsight,thattherearemanyotherrelationalpropertiesofwhichthisisnottrue.Inordertogetanexample,wehaveonlytoconsidertherelationwhichtheredpatchhastothewholepatch,insteadofconsideringasbeforethatwhichthewholehastoit.Itseemsquiteclearthat,thoughthewholecouldnothaveexistedwithouthavingtheredpatchforapart,theredpatchmightperfectlywellhaveexistedwithoutbeingpartofthatparticularwhole.Inotherwords,thougheveryrelationalpropertyoftheform"havingthisforaspatialpart"is"internal"inoursense,itseemsequallyclearthateverypropertyoftheform"isaspatialpartofthiswhole"isnotinternal,butpurelyexternal.Yetthislast,accordingtome,isoneofthethingswhichthedogmaofinternalrelationsdenies.Itimpliesthatitisjustasnecessarythatanything,whichisinfactapartofaparticularwhole,shouldbeapartofthatwhole,asthatanywhole,whichhasaparticularthingforapart,shouldhavethatthingforapart.Itimplies,infact,quitegenerally,thatanytermwhichdoesinfacthaveaparticularrelationalproperty,couldnothaveexistedwithouthavingthatproperty.Andinsayingthisitobviouslyfliesinthefaceofcommon\n:EXTERNALRELATIONS289sense.Itseemsquiteobviousthatinthecaseofmanyrelationalpropertieswhichthingshave,thefactthattheyhavethemisamerematteroffactthatthethingsinquestionmighthaveexistedwith-outhavingthem.Thatthis,whichseemsobvious,istrue,seemstometobethemostimportantthingthatcanbemeantbysayingthatsomerelationsarepurelyexternal.Andthedifficultyistoseehowanyphilosophercouldhavesupposedthatitwasnottrue:that,forinstance,therelationofparttowholeisnomoreexternalthanthatofwholetopart.Iwillgiveatonceonemainreasonwhichseemstometohaveledtotheview,thatallrelationalpropertiesareinternalinthissense.WhatIammaintainingisthecommon-senseview,whichseemsobviouslytrue,thatitmaybetruethatAhasinfactgotPandyetalsotruethatAmighthaveexistedwithouthavingP.AndIsaythatthisisequivalenttosayingthatitmaybetruethatAhasP,andyetnottruethatfromthepropositionthatathinghasnotgotPitfollowsthatthatthingisotherthanA—numericallydifferentfromit.Andonereasonwhythisisdisputedis,Ithink,simplybecauseitisinfacttruethatifAhasP,andXhasnot^itdoesfollowthatxisotherthanA,Thesetwopropositions,theonewhichIadmittobetrue(i)thatifAhasP,andxhasnotjitdoesfollowthatXisotherthanA,andtheonewhichImaintaintobefalse(2)thatifAhasP,thenfromthepropositionwithregardtoanytermxthatithasnotgotP,xifollowsthatxisotherthanA,are,Ithink,easilyconfusedwithoneanother.Anditisinfactthecasethatiftheyarenotdifferent,orif(2)followsfrom(i),thennorelationalpropertiesareexternal.For(i)iscertainlytrue,and(2)iscertainlyequivalenttoassertingthatnoneare.Itisthereforeabsolutelyessential,ifwearetomaintainexternalrelations,tomaintainthat(2)\n290EXTERNALRELATIONSdoesnotfollovfrom(i).Thesetwopropositions(i)and(2),withregardtowhichImaintainthat(i)istrue^and(2)isfalse,canbeputinanotherway,asfollows:(i)assertsthatifAhasP,thenanytermwhichhasnot,mustbeotherthanA.(2)assertsthatifAhasP,thenanytermwhichhadnot,wouldnecessarilybeotherthanA.Andwhentheyareputinthisform,itis,Ithink,easytoseewhytheyshouldbeconfused:youhaveonlytoconfuse*'must"or*'isnecessarily"with"wouldnecessarilybe."Andtheirconnexionwiththequestionofexternalrelationscanbebroughtoutasfollows:Tomaintainexternalrelationsyouhavetomaintainsuchthingsasthat,thoughEdwardVIIwasinfactfatherofGeorgeV,hemighthaveexistedwithoutbeingfatherofGeorgeV.Buttomaintainthis,youhavetomaintainthatitisnottruethatapersonwhowasnotfatherofGeorgewouldnecessarilyhavebeenotherthanEdward.Yetitis,infact,thecase,thatanypersonwhowasnotthefatherofGeorge,musthavebeenotherthanEdward.Unless,therefore,youcanmaintainthatfromthistruepropositionitdoesnotfollowthatanypersonwhowasnotfatherofGeorgewouldneces-sarilyhavebeenotherthanEdward,youwillhavetogiveuptheviewthatEdwardmighthaveexistedwithoutbeingfatherofGeorge.Byfarthemostimportantpointinconnexionwiththedogmaofinternalrelationsseemstometobesimplytoseeclearlythedifferencebetweenthesetwopropositions(i)and(2),andthat(2)doesnotfollowfrom(i).Ifthisisnotunderstood,nothinginconnexionwiththedogma,can,Ithink,beunderstood.Andperhapsthedifferencemayseemsoclear,thatnomoreneedbesaidaboutit.ButIcannothelpthinkingitisnotcleartoeverybody,andthatitdoesinvolvetherejectionofcertainviews,whicharesometimesheldastothemeaning\nqEXTERNALRELATIONS291of**follows."SoIwilltrytoputthepointagaininaperfectlystrictform.LetPbearelationalproperty,andAatermtowhichitdoesinfactbelong.IproposetodefinewhatismeantbysayingthatPisinternaltoA(jnthesensewearenowconcernedwith)asmeaningthatfromthepropositionthatathinghasnotgotP,"follows"thatititisotherthanA.Thatistosay,thispropositionassertsthatbetweenthetwoproperties**nothavingP"and"otherthanA."thereholdsthatrelationwhichholdsbetweentheproperty"beingarightangle"andtheproperty**beinganangle,"orbetweentheproperty**red"andtheproperty**coloured,"andwhichweexpressbysayingthat,inthecaseofanythingwhatever,fromthepropositionthatthatthingisarightangleitfollows,orisdeducible,thatitisanangle.Letusnowadoptcertainconventionsforexpress-ingthisproposition.Werequire,firstofall,sometermtoexpresstheconverseofthatrelationwhichweasserttoholdbetweenaparticularpropositionqandaparticularproposition/,whenweassertthatqfollowsfromor**entails"isdeduciblefromp.Letususethetermtoexpresstheconverseofthisrelation.Weshallthenbeabletosaytrulythat"/entailsy,"whenandonlywhenweareabletosaytrulythat''**followsfrom/"orisdeduciblefrom/,"inthesenseinwhichtheconclusionofasyllogisminBarbarafollowsfromthetwopremisses,takenasoneconjunctiveproposition;orinwhichthepro-**Thispositioniscoloured"followsfrom"Thisisred.""/entails^"willberelatedto"yfollowsfrom/"inthesamewayinwhich"AisgreaterthanB"isrelatedto"BislessthanA."Werequire,next,someshortandclearmethodofexpressingtheproposition,withregardtotwopropertiesPandQ,thatanypropositionwhich\n;292EXTERNALRELATIONSassertsofagiventhingthatithasthepropertyPentailsthepropositionthatthethinginquestionalsohasthepropertyQ.Letusexpressthispropositionintheformx^entails^Q"Thatistosay''x?entails;rQistomeanthesameas"Eachoneofallthevariouspropositions,whicharealikeinrespectofthefactthateachassertswithregardtosomegiventhingthatthatthinghasP,entailsthatoneamongthevariouspropositions,alikeiirespectofthefactthateachassertswithregardtosomegiventhingthatthatthinghasQ,whichmakesthisassertionwithregardtothesamething,withregardtowhichthepropositionofthefirstclassassertsthatithasP."Inotherwords'*xVentailsxQ''istobetrue,ifandonlyiftheproposition"APentailsAQ'*istrue,andifalsoallpropositionswhichresemblethis,inthewayinwhich**BPentailsBQ"resemblesit,aretruealsowhere'*AP"meansthesameas"AhasP."**AQ"**AhasQ"thesameasetc.,etc.Werequire,next,somewayofexpressingtheproposition,withregardtotwopropertiesPandQ,thatanypropositionwhichdeniesofagiventhingthatithasPentailstheproposition,withregardtothethinginquestion,thatithasQ.Letus,inthecaseofanyproposition,/,expressthecontradictoryofthatpropositionbyp.Theproposition**ItisnotthecasethatAhasP"willthenbeexpressedbyAP;anditwillthenbenatural,inaccordancewiththelastconventiontoexpressthepropositionthatanypropositionwhichdeniesofagiventhingthatithasPentailstheproposition,withregardtothethinginquestion,thatithasQ,byjirPentailsxQ,Andwerequire,finally,someshortwayofexpressingtheproposition,withregardtotwo\nEXTERNALRELATIONS293thingsBandA,thatBisotherthan(ornotidenticalwith)A.Letusexpress"BisidenticalwithA"by**B=A"and;itwillthenbenatural,accordingtothelastconvention,toexpress**BisnotidenticalwithA"byB=A.Wehavenowgoteverythingwhichisrequiredforexpressing,inashortsymbolicform,theproposition,withregardtoagiventhingAandagivenrelationalpropertyP,whichAinfactpossessess,thatPisinternaltoA,TherequiredexpressionisjrPentails{x=A)which**istomeanthesameasEverypropositionwhichassertsofanygiventhingthatithasnotgotPentailstheproposition,withregardtothethinginquestion,thatitisotherthanA."Andthispropositionis,ofcourse,logicallyequivalentto{x=A)entailsxPwhereweareusing**logicallyequivalent,"insuchasensethattosayofanypropositionpthatitislogicallyequivalenttoanotherpropositionqistosaythatboth/entailsqandqentails/.Thislastpropositionagain,is,sofarasIcansee,eitheridenticalwithorlogicallyequivalenttothepropositionsexpressedby**anythingwhichwereidenticalwithAwould,inanyconceivableuniverse,necessarilyhaveP"orby"AcouldnothaveexistedinanypossibleworldwithouthavingP";justasthepropositionexpressedby**Inanypossibleworldarightanglemustbeanangle"is,Itakeit,eitheridenticalwithorlogicallyequivalent**(xtothepropositionisarightangle)entails(risanangle)."Wehavenow,therefore,gotashortmeansofsymbolising,withregardtoanyparticularthingAandanyparticularpropertyP,thepropositionthatPisinternaltoAinthesecondofthetwosenses\na;294EXTERNALRELATIONSdistinguishedonp.286.Butwestillrequireameansofsymbolisingthegeneralpropositionthateveryrelationalpropertyisinternaltoanytermwhichpossessesit—theproposition,namely,whichwasreferredtoonp.287,asthemostimportantconsequenceofthedogmaofinternalrelations,andwhichwascalled(2)onp.289.Inordertogetthis,letusfirstgetameansofexpressingwithregardtosomeoneparticularrelationalpropertyP,thepropositionthatPisinternaltoanytermwhichpossessesitThisisapropositionwhichtakestheformofassertingwithregardtooneparticularproperty,namelyP,thatanytermwhichpossessesthatpropertyalsopossessesanother—namelytheoneexpressedbysayingthatPisinternaltoit.Itis,thatistosay,anordinaryuniversalproposition,like"Allmenaremortal."Butsuchaformofwordsis,ashasoftenbeenpointedout,ambiguous.Itmaystandforeitheroftwodifferentpropositions.Itmaystandmerelyfortheproposition**Thereisnothing,whichbothisaman,andisnotmortal"—propositionwhichmayalsobeexpressedby**Ifanythingisaman,thatthingismortal,"andwhichisdistinguishedbythefactthatitmakesnoassertionastowhetherthereareanymenornotor**itmaystandfortheconjunctivepropositionIfanythingisaman,thatthingismortal,andtherearemen,"It^illbesufficientforourpurposestodealwithpropositionsofthefirstkind—thosenamely,whichassertwithregardtosometwoproperties,sayQandR,thatthereisnothingwhichbothdoespossessQanddoesnotpossessR,withoutassertingthatanythingdoespossessQ.Suchapropositionisobviouslyequivalenttotheassertionthatanypairofpropositionswhichresemblesthepair**AQ"and"AR,"inrespectofthefactthatoneofthemassertsofsomeparticular\nEXTERNALRELATIONS295thingthatithasQandtheother,ofthesamething,thatithasR,standtooneanotherinacertainrelation:therelation,namely,which,inthecaseof"AQ"and**AR,"canbeexpressedbysayingthat**ItisnotthecaseboththatAhasQandthatAhasnotgotR."Whenwesay**ThereisnothingwhichdoespossessQanddoesnotpossessR"weareobviouslysayingsomethingwhichiseitheridenticalwithorlogicallyequivalenttotheproposition'*InthecaseofeverysuchpairofpropositionsitisnotthecaseboththattheonewhichassertsaparticularthingtohaveQistrue,andthattheonewhichassertsittohaveRisfalse."Werequire,therefore,ashortwayofexpressingtherelationbetweentwopropositionspandq,whichcanbeexpressedby**Itisnotthecasethat/istrueandqfalse."AndIamgoing,quitearbitrarilytoexpressthisrelationbywritingP^q^for*'Itisnotthecasethat/istrueandqfalse."Therelationinquestionisonewhichlogicianshavesometimesexpressedby**/impliesa!'Itis,forinstance,theonewhichMr.Russellinthe"PrinciplesofMathematicscalls"materialim-plication,"andwhichheandDr.WhiteheadinPrincipiaMathematica**implication."callsimplyAndifwedouse"implication"tostandforthisrelation,we,ofcourse,gottheapparentlyparadoxicalresultsthateveryfalsepropositionimplieseveryotherproposition,bothtrueandfalse,andthateverytruepropositionimplieseveryothertrueproposition:sinceitisquiteclearthat\{pisfalsethen,whatever*'istrueandqmaybe,itisnotthecasethatpqfalse,"andquiteclearalso,thatif/andqareboth*'true,thenalsoitisnotthecasethat/istrueandqfalse."Andtheseresults,itseemstome,appear"tobeparadoxical,solelybecause,**impliesifweuseinanyordinarysense,theyarequitecertainlyfalse.\n296EXTERNALRELATIONSWhylogiciansshouldhavethuschosentousetheword"implies"asanameforarelation,forwhichitneverisusedbyanyoneelse,Idonotknow.Itispartly,nodoubt,becausetherelationforwhich'*theydouseit—thatexpressedbysayingItisnot"—thecasethat/istrueandqfalseisoneforwhichitisveryimportantthattheyshouldhaveashortname,becauseitisarelationwhichisveryfundamentalandaboutwhichtheyneedconstantlytotalk,while(sofarasIcandiscover)itsimplyhasnoshortnameinordinarylife.Anditispartly,perhaps,forareasonwhichleadsusbacktoourpresentreasonforgivingsomenametothisrelation.Itis,infact,naturaltouse**/impliesf"tomeanthesameas"If/,theny."And"though"If/then^ishardlyever,ifever,usedtomeanthesameas**Itisnotthecasethat/istrueandqfalse";yettheexpression"IfanythinghasQ,ithasR"may,Ithink,benaturallyusedtoexpressthepropositionthat,inthecaseofeverypairofpropositionswhichresemblesthepairAQandARinrespectofthefactthatthefirstofthepairassertsofsomeparticularthingthatithasQandthesecond,ofthesamething,thatithasR,itisnotthecasethatthefirstistrueandthesecondfalse.Thatistosay,if(asIproposetodo)weexpress"ItisnotthecaseboththatAQistrueandARfalse"byAQ*AR,andif,further(ontheanalogyofthesimilarcasewithregardto"entails),"weexpressthepropositionthatofeverypairofpropositionswhichresembleAQandARintherespectjustmentioned,itistruethatthefirsthastherelation*tothesecondbyx(^*jrRthen,itisnaturaltoexpress^Q*jrR,by"Ifany-thinghasQ,thenthatthinghasR."Andlogiciansmay,Ithink,havefalselyinferredthatsinceitis\nEXTERNALRELATIONS297naturaltoexpress*'xQ*:i:R*'by'*Ifany^km^-h^sQ,then^AaithinghasR,"itmustbenaturaltoexpress•'AQ^AR"by**IfAQ,thenAR,"andthereforealsoby**AQimpliesAR."Ifthishasbeentheirreasonforexpressing**/it^"by**/impliesq''thenobviouslytheirreasonisafallacy.And,whateverthereasonmayhavebeen,itseemstomequitecertainthat*'AQ*AR"cannotbeproperlyexpressedeitherby"AQimpliesAR"orby"IfAQ,thenAR/'although"rQ*;^R"canbeproperlyexpressedby**IfanythinghasQ,thenthatthinghasR."Iamgoing,then,toexpresstheuniversalpro-position,withregardtotwoparticularpropertiesQandR,whichassertsthat"WhateverhasQ,hasR"or"IfanythinghasQ,ithasR,"withoutassertingthatanythinghasQ,by^Q*^R—ameansofexpressingit,whichsincewehaveadoptedtheconventionthat''p*q''istomeanthesameas"Itisnotthecasethat/istrueandqfalse,"bringsouttheimportantfactthatthispropositioniseitheridenticalwithorlogicallyequivalenttothepropositionthatofeverysuchpairofpropositionsasAQandAR,itistruethatitisnotthecasethatthefirstistrueandthesecondfalse.Andhavingadoptedthisconvention,wecannowseehow,inaccordancewithit,theproposition,withregardtoaparticularpropertyP,thatPisinternaltoeverythingwhichpossessesit,istobeexpressed.WesawthatPisinternaltoAistobeexpressedbyX?entails{x~A)orbythelogicallyequivalentproposition{x=A)entailsxYAndwehavenowonlytoexpressthepropositionthatanythingthathasP,hasalsothepropertythatPisinternaltoit.Therequiredexpressionis\n—298EXTERNALRELATIONSobviouslyasfollows.Justas"Anythingthathas"Q,hasRistobeexpressedbyxQ*xRso**AnythingthathasP,hasalsothepropertythatPisinternaltoit"willbeexpressedbyxF*{yPentails(jx)}orbyxP*{{vx)entails7P}.Wehavethusgot,inthecaseofanyparticularpropertyP,ameansofexpressingthepropositionthatitisinternaltoeverytermthatpossessesit,whichisbothshortandbringsoutclearlythenotionsthatareinvolvedinit.Andwedonotneed,Ithink,anyfurtherspecialconventionforsymbolisingthepropositionthateveryrelationalpropertyisinternaltoanytermwhichpossessesit—theproposition,namely,whichIcalled(2)above(pp.289,290),andwhichonp.287,1calledthemostimportantconsequenceofthedogmaofinternalrelations.Wecanexpressitsimplyenoughasfollows:(2)="WhatweassertofPwhenwesayxP*{yPentails{y—x^)canbetrulyassertedofeveryrelationalproperty."Andnow,forthepurposeofcomparing(2)with(),andseeingexactlywhatisinvolvedinmyIassertionthat(2)doesnotfollowfrom(i),letustry'toexpress(i)bymeansofthesameconventions.LetusfirsttaketheassertionwithregardtoaparticularthingAandaparticularrelationalpropertyPthat,fromthepropositionthatAhasP\tfollowsthatnothingwhichhasnotgotPisidenticalwithA.Thisisanassertionwhichisquitecertainlytrue;since,ifanythingwhichhadnotgotPwereidenticalwithA,itwouldfollowthatAP;andfromthepropositionAP,itcertainlyfollowsthatAPisfalse,andthereforealsothat'*Something\nEXTERNALRELATIONS299whichhasnotgotPisidenticalwithA"isfalse,orthat**NothingwhichhasnotgotPisidenticalwithA'*istrue.Andthisassertion,inaccordancewiththeconventionswehaveadopted,willbeexpressedbyAPentails{^P*{x=A))Wewant,next,inordertoexpress(i),ameansofexpressingwithregardtoaparticularrelationalpropertyP,theassertionthat,fromtheproposition,withregardtoanythingwhatever,thatthatthinghasgotP,\lfollowsthatnothingwhichhasnotgotPisidenticalwiththethinginquestion.Thisalsoisanassertionwhichisquitecertainlytrue;sinceitmerelyasserts(whatisobviouslytrue)thatwhatAPentails{x?*(x^A)}assertsofA,canbetrulyassertedofanythingwhatever.Andthisassertion,inaccordancewiththeconventionswehaveadopted,willbeexpressedbyxPentails{yP*{y=x)}.Theproposition,whichImeanttocall(i),butwhichIexpressedbeforeratherclumsily,cannowbeexpressedby(i)=*'WhatweassertofP,whenwesay,xPentails{j^P*{y=x)}canbetrulyassertedofeveryrelationalproperty."Thisisapropositionwhichisagainquitecertainlytrue;and,inordertocompareitwith(2),thereis,Ithink,noneedtoadoptanyfurtherconventionforexpressingit,sincethequestionswhetheritisorisnotdifferentfrom(2),andwhether(2)doesordoesnotfollowfromit,willobviouslydependonthesamequestionswithregardtothetwopro-positions,withregardtotheparticularrelationalproperty,P,xPentails{^P^{y=x)}andxP{yPentails(y—x)}\n300EXTERNALRELATIONSNowwhatImaintainwithregardto(i)and(2)isthat,whereas(i)istrue,(2)isfalse.Imaintain,thatistosay,thattheproposition**WhatweassertofP,whenwesayxF«{^Pentails0'=^)}."istrueofeveryrelationalpropertyisfalse,thoughIadmitthatwhatwehereassertofPistrueofsomerelationalproperties.Thoseofwhichitistrue,Iproposetocallinternalrelationalproperties,thoseofwhichitisfalseexterna/r^iAsiiionaiproperties.Thedogmaofinternalrelations,ontheotherhand,impliesthat(2)istrue;thatistosay,thateveryrelationalpropertyisinternal^andthattherearenoexternalrelationalproperties.AndwhatIsuggestisthatthedogmaofinternalrelationshasbeenheldonlybecause(2)hasbeenfalselythoughttofollowfrom(i).Andthat(2)doesnotfollowfrom(i),can,Ithink,beeasilyseenasfollows.Itcanfollowfrom(i)onlyiffromanypropositionoftheformpentails(^*r)therefollowsthecorrespondingpropositionoftheformp*{qentailsr),Andthatthisisnotthecasecan,Ithink,beeasilyseenbyconsideringthefollowingthreepropositions.Let/=*'A11thebooksonthisshelfareblue,"**let^=MycopyofthePrinciplesofMathematicsisabookonthisshelf,"andletr='*MycopyofthePrinciplesofMathematicsisblue,"Now/heredoesabsolutelyentail(^*r).Thatistosay,itabsolutelyfollowsfrom/that**MycopyofthePrinciplesisonthisshelf,"and**MycopyofthePrinciplesisnotblue,"arenot,asamatteroffact,bothtrue.Butitbynomeansfollowsfromthisthatp'k{qentailsr).Forwhatthislatterpro-positionmeansis"Itisnotthecaseboththat/istrueandthat{qentailsr)isfalse."And,asa\nEXTERNALRELATIONS301matteroffact,{gentailsr)isquitecertainlyfalse;*'MycopyofthePrinciplesforfromtheproposition**Mycopyoftheisonthisshelf"theproposition-Principlesisblue"doesnotfollow.Itissimplynotthecasethatthesecondofthesetwopropositionscanbededucedfromthefirstbyitself:itissimplynotthecasethatitstandstoitintherelationinwhichitdoesstandtotheconjunctiveproposition**AllthebooksonthisshelfareblueandmycopyofthePrinciplesisonthisshelf."Thisconjunctivepropositionreallydoesentail"MycopyofthePrinciplesisblue."But"MycopyofthePrinciplesisonthisshelf,"byitself^quitecertainlydoesnotentail"MycopyofthePrinciplesisblue."ItissimplynotthecasethatmycopyofthePrinciplescouldnthavebeenonthisshelfwithoutbeingsblue,{qentailsr)is,therefore,false.Andhence''p*{qentailsr),"canonlyfollowfromJ*/entails{qr),"iffromthislatterpropositionpfollows.But/>quitecertainlydoesnotfollowfromthisproposition:fromthefactthat(^*r)isdeduciblefrom/,itdoesnotintheleastfollowthatpistrue.Itis,therefore,clearlynotthecasethateverypropositionoftheformpentails(^*r)entailsthecorrespondingpropositionoftheformp*{(}entailsr),sincewehavefoundoneparticularpropositionofthefirstformwhichdoesnotentailthecorres-pondingpropositionofthesecond.Tomaintain,therefore,that(2)followsfrom(1)ismereconfusion.Andonesourceoftheconfusionis,Ithink,prettyplain,(i)doesallowyoutoassertthat,ifAPistrue,thentheproposition''y?*\{y=A)}"mustbetrue.Whatthe"must"hereexpressesismerelythatthispro-positionfollowsfromAP,notthatitisinitselfanecessaryproposition.Butitissupposed,through\n302EXTERNALRELATIONSconfusion,thatwhatisassertedisthatitisnotthecaseboththatAPistrueandthat*yF*(3/=A)"isnot,mitself,anecessaryproposition;thatistosay,itissupposedthatwhatisassertedisJ^AP*{yPentails(;'=A)}";sincetosaythat"*'^P*(j^r=A)is,znitself,anecessarypropositionisthesamethingastosaythat"j/Pentails{y=A)"isalsotrue.Infactitseemstomeprettyplainthatwhatismeantbysayingofpropositionsoftheform"xP^xQ"thatthey**apodeicticpropositions,arenecessary(or")ismerelythatthecorrespondingpropositionoftheform''xVentailsjrQ"isalsotrue.**:fPentails*'but,xQisnotitse//anecessaryproposition;if**xPentailsxQ"istrue,then*'xV*xQ"isanecessaryproposition—andanecessarytruth,sincenofalsepropositionsarenecessaryinthemselves.Thuswhat**ismeantbysayingthatWhateverisarightangle,isalsoanangle*'isanecessarytrnth,is,sofarasIcansee,simplythattheproposition**(xisarightangle)entails(xisanangle)"isalsotrue.Thisseemstometogivewhathas,infact,beengenerallymeantinphilosophyby'*necessarytruths,"e.g-,byLeibniz;andtopointoutthedistinctionbetweenthemandthosetrueuniversalpropositionswhichare**meremattersoffact."Andifwewanttoextendthemeaningofthename*'necessarytruth"insuchawaythatsomesingularpropositionsmayalsobesaidtobe**necessarytruths,"wecan,Ithink,easilydoitasfollows.WecansaythatAPisitselfanecessarytruth,ifandonlyiftheuniversalpro-position"{x=A)*xP''(which,aswehaveseen,followsfromAP)isanecessarytruth:thatistosay,ifandonlyif(.:i:=A)entailsxP,Withthisdefinition,whatthedogmaofinternalrelationsassertsisthatineverycaseinwhichagiventhingactuallyhasagivenrelationalproperty,thefact\nEXTERNALRELATIONS303thatithasthatpropertyisanecessarytruth;whereaswhatIamassertingisthat,ifthepropertyinquestion**internal*'property,thenthefactisaninquestionwillbeanecessarytruth,whereasiftheproperty**external,"thenthefactininquestionisquestionwillbeamere*'matteroffact."Somuchforthedistinctionbetween(i)whichistrue,and(2).orthedogmaofinternalrelations,whichIholdtobefalse.ButIsaidabove,inpassing,thatmycontentionthat(2)doesnotfollowfrom(i),involvestherejectionofcertainviewsthathavesometimesbeenheldastothemeaningof**follows";andIthinkitisv/orthwhiletosaysomethingaboutthis.Itisobviousthatthepossibilityofmaintainingthat(2)doesnotfollowfrom(i),dependsuponitsbeingtruethatfrom*'xP*xQ''theproposition'*xFentailsx-Q"doesnotfollow.Andthishassometimesbeendisputed,andis,Ithink,oftennotclearlyseen.Tobeginwith,Mr.Russell,inthePrinciplesofMathematicsthephrase"'qcanbe(p.34),treatsdeducedfrom^"asifitmeantexactlythesamethingas*'/*^"or'*/materiallyimplies^";andhasrepeatedthesameerrorelsewhere,e.g^,inPhilosophicalEssays(p.166),whereheisdiscussingwhathecallstheaxiomofinternalrelations.AndIamafraidagoodmanypeoplehavebeenledtosupposethat,sinceMr.Russellhassaidthis,itmustbetrue.Ifitweretrue,then,ofcourse,itwouldbeimpossibletodistinguishbetween(1)and(2),anditwouldfollowthat,since(i)certainlyistrue,whatIamcallingthedogmaofinternalrelationsistruetoo.ButIimaginethatMr.Russellhimselfwouldnowbewillingtoadmitthat,sofarfrombeingtrue,thestatementthat**^canbededucedfrom/>"meansthesameas**/*?"issimplyanenormous\n;304EXTERNALRELATIONS**howler";andIdonotthinkIneedspendanytimeintryingtoshowthatitisso.Butitmaybeheldthat,though*'pentailsg"doesnotmeanthesameas*'/*^,"yetnever-thelessfrom**xF*xQ"theproposition''xFentailsxQ"doesfollow,forasomewhatmoresubtlereason;and,ifthiswereso,itwouldagainfollowthatwhatIamcallingthedogmaofinternalrelationsmustbetrue.Itmaybeheld,namely,thatthough**APentailsAQ"doesnotmeansimply**AP*AQ"yetwhatitdoesmeanissimplytheconjunction*'AP*AQandthispropositionisaninstanceofatrueformalimplica-tion"(thephrase**formalimplication"beingunderstoodinMr.Russell'ssense,inwhich**xF*xQ"assertsaformalimplication).Thisviewastowhat'*APentailsAQ"means,has,forinstance,ifIunderstandhimrightly,beenassertedbyMr.O.StracheyinMind^N.S.,93.Andthesameviewhasbeenfrequentlysuggested(thoughIdonotknowthathehasactuallyassertedit)byMr.Russellhimself{e.g,,PrincipiaMathe-matica,p.21).Ifthisviewweretrue,then,though''X?entailsxQ^''wouldnotbeidenticalinmeaningwith'*j»:P*;»;Q,"yetitwouldfollowfromit;since,ifX?^x<^weretrue,theneveryparticularassertionoftheformAP*AQ,wouldnotonlybetrue,butwouldbeaninstanceofatrueformalimplication(namely":rP*xQ^")andthis,accordingtotheproposeddefinition,isallthat''xYentails;cQ"asserts.If,therefore,itweretrue,itwouldagainfollowthatallrelationalpropertiesmustbeinternal.Butthatthisviewalsoisuntrueappearstomeperfectlyobvious.ThepropositionthatIaminthisroomdoes*'materiallyimply"thatIammorethanfiveyearsold,sincebotharetrue\nEXTERNALRELATIONS305andtheassertionthatitdoesisalsoaninstanceofatrueformalimplication,sinceitisinfacttruethatallthepersonsinthisroomaremorethanfiveyearsold;butnothingappearstomemoreobviousthanthatthesecondofthesetwopro-positionscannotbededucedfromthefirst—thatthekindofrelationwhichholdsbetweenthepremissesandconclusionofasyllogisminBarbaradoesnotholdbetweenthem.Toputitinanotherway:itseemstomequiteobviousthattheproperties*'beingapersoninthisroom"and"beingmorethanfiveyearsold"arenotrelatedinthekindofwayinwhich*'beingarightangle"isrelatedto"beinganangle,"andwhichweexpressbysayingthat,inthecaseofeveryterm,thepropositionthatthattermisananglecanbededucedfromthepropositionthatitisarightangle.Thesearetheonlytwosuggestionsastothemeaningof''pentails^"knowntome,which,iftrue,wouldyieldtheresultthat(2)doesfollowfrom(i),andthatthereforeallrelationalpropertiesareinternal;andbothofthese,itseemstome,areobviouslyfalse.Allothersuggestedmeanings,sofarasIknow,wouldleaveittruethat(2)doesnotfollowfrom(i),andthereforethatImaypossiblyberightinmaintainingthatsomere-lationalpropertiesareexternal.Itmight,forinstance,besuggestedthatthelastproposeddefinitionshouldbeamendedasfollows—thatweshouldsay:''pentailsq"means**/*qandthispropositionisaninstanceofaformalimplica-tion,whichisnotmerelytruebutself-evident,likethelawsofFormalLogic."ThisproposeddefinitionwouldavoidtheparadoxesinvolvedinMr.Strachey'sdefinition,sincesuchtrueformalimplicationsas*'allthepersonsinthisroomaremorethanfiveyearsold"arecertainlynotself-\n3o6EXTERNALRELATIONSevident;and,sofarasI.cansee,itmaystatesomethingwhichisinfacttrueofpandq,wheneverandonlywhenpentailsq.Idonotmyselfthinkthatitgivesthemeaningof"/entails^,"sincethekindofrelationwhichIseetoholdbetweenthepremissesandconclusionofasyllogismseemstometobeonewhichispurely"objective"inthesensethatnopsychologicalterm,suchas**self-isinvolvedinthemeaningofevident,"isinvolvedinitsdefinition(ifithasone).Iamnot,however,concernedtodisputethatsomesuchdefinitionof**/entails^"asthismaybetrue.Sinceitisevidentthat,evenifitwere,mypropositionthat"jtrPentailsxQ"doesnotfollowfrom"ji-P^rQ,"wouldstillbetrue;andhencealsomycontentionthat(2)doesnotfollowfrom(i).Somuchbywayofarguingthatwearenotboundtoholdthatallrelationalpropertiesareinternalintheparticularsense,withwhichwearenowconcerned,inwhichtosaythattheyaremeansthatineverycaseinwhichathingAhasarelationalproperty,itfollowsfromthepropositionthatatermhasnotgotthatpropertythattheterminquestionisotherthanA.ButIhavegonefurtherandassertedthatsomerelationalpropertiescertainlyarenotinternal.AndindefenceofthispropositionIdonotknowthatIhaveanythingtosaybutthatitseemstomeevidentinmanycasesthatatermwhichhasacertainrelationalpropertymightquitewellnothavehadit:that,forinstance,fromthemerepropositionthatthisisthis,itbynomeansfollowsthatthishastootherthingsalltherelationswhichitinfacthas.Everybody,ofcourse,mustadmitthatifallthepropositionswhichassertofitthatithastheseproperties,doinfactfollowfromthepropositionthatthisisthis,wecannotseethattheydo.AndsofarasIcansee,thereisno\nEXTERNALRELATIONS307reasonofanykindforassertingthattheydo,excepttheconfusionwhichIhaveexposed.Butitseemstomefurtherthatwecanseeinmanycasesthatthepropositionthatthishasthatrelationdoesnotfollowfromthefactthatitisthis:that,forinstance,thepropositionthatEdwardVIIwasfatherofGeorgeVisa7nerematteroffact.Iwantnowtoreturnforamomenttothatothermeaningof**internal,"(p.286)inwhichtosaythatPisinternaltoAmeansnotmerelythatanythingwhichhadnotPwouldnecessarilybeotherthanA,butthatitwouldnecessarilybequalitativelydifferent.Isaidthatthiswasthemeaningof*'internal"inwhichthedogmaofinternalrelationsholdsthatallrelationalpropertiesare**internal";andthatoneofthemostimportantconsequenceswhichfollowedfromit,wasthatallrelationalpropertiesare**internal"inthelessextremesensethatwehavejustbeenconsidering.But,ifIamnotmistaken,thereisanotherimportantconsequencewhichalsofollowsfromit,namely,theIdentityofIndiscernibles.Forifitbetrue,inthecaseofeveryrelationalproperty,thatanytermwhichhadnetthatpropertywouldnecessarilybequalitativelydifferentfromanywhichhad,itfollowsofcoursethat,inthecaseoftwotermsoneofwhichhasarelationalproperty,whichtheotherhasnotthetwoarequalitativelydifferent.But,fromthepropositionthata:isotherthanjj/,itdoesfollowthatxhassomerelationalpropertywhichyhasnot;andhence,ifthedogmaofinternalrelationsbetrue,itwillfollowthatif:risotherthany,Xisalwaysalsoqualitativelydifferentfromy,whichistheprincipleofIdentityofIndiscernibles.Thisis,ofcourse,afurtherobjectiontothedogmaofinternalrelations,sinceIthinkitisobviousthattheprincipleofIdentityofIndiscerniblesisnottrue.Indeed,sofarasIcansee,thedogmaofinternal"relationsessentiallyconsistsinthejointassertionof\n3o8EXTERNALRELATIONStwoindefensiblepropositions:(i)thepropositionthatinthecaseofnorelationalpropertyisittrueofanytermwhichhasgotthatproperty,thatitmightnothavehaditand(2)theIdentityofIndis-cernibles.Iwant,finally,tosaysomethingaboutthephrasewhichMr.RussellusesinthePhilosophicalEssaystoexpressthedogmaofinternalrelations.Hesays'*Everyitmaybeexpressedintheformrelationisgroundedinthenaturesoftherelatedterms"(p.160).Anditcanbeeasilyseen,iftheaccountwhichIhavegivenbetrue,inwhatprecisesenseitdoesholdthis.Mr.Russellisuncertainastowhetherby*'thenature"ofatermistobeunder-stoodthetermitselforsomethingelse.Formypartitseemstomethatbyatermsnatureismeant,notthetermitself,butwhatmayroughlybecalledallitsqualitiesasdistinguishedfromitsrelationalproperties.Butwhichevermeaningwetake,itwillfollowfromwhatIhavesaid,thatthedogmaofinternalrelationsdoesimplythateveryrelationalpropertywhichatermhasis,inaperfectlyprecisesense,groundedinitsnature.Itwillfollowthateverysuchproperty\sgroundedinthetetm,inthesensethat,inthecaseofeverysuchproperty,itfollowsfromthemerepropositionthatthattermisthattermthatithasthepropertyinquestion.Anditwillalsofollowthatanysuchpropertyisgroundedinthequalitieswhichthetermhas,inthesense,thatifyoutakeallthequalitieswhichthetermhas,itwillagainfollowinthecaseofeachrelationalproperty,fromthepropositionthatthetermhasallthosequalitiesthatithastherelationalpropertyinquestion;sincethisisimpliedbythepropositionthatinthecaseofanysuchproperty,anytermwhichhadnothaditwouldnecessarilyhavebeendifferentinqualityfromtheterminquestion.Inbothofthesetwosenses,then,thedogmaof\nEXTERNALRELATIONS309internalrelationsdoes,Ithink,implythateveryrelationalpropertyisgroundedinthenatureofeverytermwhichpossessesit;andinthissensethatpropositionisfalse.Yetitisworthnoting,Ithink,thatthereisanothersenseof**grounded"inwhichitmayquitewellbetruethateveryrelationalpropertyisgroundedinthenatureofanytermwhichpossessesit.Namelythat,inthecaseofeverysuchproperty,theterminquestionhassomequalitywithoutwhichitcouldnothavehadtheproperty.Inotherwordsthattherelationalpropertyentailssomequalityintheterm,thoughnoqualityinthetermentailstherelationalproperty.\nTHENATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYISHOULDlike,ifIcan,tointerestyouto-nightinoneparticularquestionaboutMoralPhilosophy.Itisaquestionwhichresemblesmostphilosophicalquestions,inrespectofthefactthatphilosophersarebynomeansagreedastowhatistherightanswertoit:someseemtobeverystrongljrconvincedthatoneansweriscorrect,whileothersareequallystronglyconvincedoftheopposite.FdrmyownpartIdofeelsomedoubtastowhichansweristherightone,although,asyouwillsee.Iinclineratherstronglytooneofthetwoalternatives.Ishouldlikeverymuch,JfIcould,tofindsomeconsiderationswhichseemedtomeabsolutelycon-vincingontheonesideortheother;forthequestionseemstomeinitselftobeanexceedinglyinterestingone.IhavesaidthatthequestionisaquestionaboutMoralPhilosophy;anditseemstomeinfacttobeaverylargeandgeneralquestionwhichaffectsthewholeofMoralPhilosophy.Inaskingit,wearedoingnolessthanaskingwhatitisthatpeoplearedoingwhentheystudyMoralPhilosophyatall:weareaskingwhatsortofquestionsitiswhichitisthebusinessofMoralPhilosophytodiscussandtrytofindtherightanswerto.ButIintend,forthesakeofsimplicity,toconfinemyselftoaskingitintwoparticularinstances.MoralPhilosophyhas,infact,\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY311todiscussagoodmanydifferentideas;andthoughIthinkthissamequestionmayberaisedwithregardtothemall,Iintendtopickouttwo,whichseemtomeparticularlyfundamental,andtoaskitwithregardtothemonly.Myfirstbusinessmustbetoexplainwhatthesetwoideasare.ThenameMoralPhilosophynaturallysuggeststhatwhatismeantisadepartmentofphilosophywhichhassomethingtodowithmorality.Andweallunderstandroughlywhatismeantbymorality.Weareaccustomedtothedistinctionbetweenmoralgoodandevil,ontheonehand,andwhatissometimescalledphysicalgoodandevilontheother.Weallmakethedistinctionbetweenaman'smoralcharacter,ontheonehand,andhisagreeablenessorintellectualendowments,ontheother.Wefeelthattoaccuseamanofimmoralconductisquiteadifferentthingfromaccusinghimmerelyofbadtasteorbadmanners,orfromaccusinghimmerelyofstupidityorignorance.Andnolessclearlywedistinguishbetweentheideaofbeingunderamoralobligationtodoathing,andtheideaofbeingmerelyunderalegalobligationtodoit.Itisacommon-placethatthesphereofmoralityismuchwiderthanthesphereoflaw:thatwearemorallyboundtodoandavoidmanythings,whicharenotenjoinedorforbiddenbythelawsofourcountry;anditisalsosometimesheldthat,ifaparticularlawisunjustorimmoral,itmayevenbeamoraldutytodisobeyit—thatistosaythattheremaybeapositiveconflictbetweenmoralandlegalobligation;andthemerefactthatthisisheld,whethertrulyorfalsely,shows,atallevents,thattheoneideaisquitedistinctfromtheother.ThenameMoralPhilosophy,then,naturallysuggeststhatitisadepartmentofphilosophycojicernedwithmoralityinthiscommonsense.\n312NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYAnditis,infact,truethatonelargedepartmentofMoralPhilosophyissoconcerned.Butitwouldbeamistaketothinkthatthewholesubjectisonlyconcernedwithmorality.Anotherimportantdepartmentofitis,asIshalltrytoshow,concernedwithideaswhicharenotmoralideas,inthisordinarysense,though,nodoubt,theymayhavesomethingtodowiththem.AndofthetwoideaswhichIproposetopickoutfordiscussion,whileoneofthemisamoralidea,theotherbelongstothatdepartmentofMoralPhilosophy,whichisnotconcernedsolelywithmorality,andisnot,"Ithink,properlyspeaking,amoralideaatall.Letusbeginwiththeoneofthetwo,whichisamoralidea.TheparticularmoralideawhichIproposetopickoutfordiscussionistheonewhichIhavecalledabovetheideaofmoralobligation—theideaofbeingmorallyboundtoactinaparticularwayonaparticularoccasion.Butwhatis,sofarasIcansee,preciselythesameideaisalsocalledbyseveralothernames.TosaythatIamunderamoralobligationtodoacertainthingis,1think,clearlytosaythesamethingaswhatwecommonlyexpressbysayingthatIoughttodoit,orthatitismydutytodoIt.Thatistosay,theideaofmoralobligationisidenticalwiththeideaofthemoral**ought'*andwiththeideaofduty.Anditalsoseemsatfirstsightasifwemightmakeyetanotheridentification.TheassertionthatIoughttodoacertainthingseemsasifitmeantmuchthesameastheassertionthatitwouldbewrongofmenottodothethinginquestion:atalleventsitisquiteclearthat,wheneveritismydutytodoanything,itwouldbewrongofmenottodoit,andthatwheneveritwouldbewrongofmetodoanything,thenitismydutytorefrainfromdoingit.Inthecaseofthesetwoideas,theideaofwhatiswrong,andtheideaofwhatismydutyorwhatIoughttodo,different\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY313viewsmaybetakenastowhethertheoneismorefundamentalthantheother,orwhetherbothareequallyso;andonthequestion:Ifoneofthetwoismorefundamdntalthantheother,whichofthetwoisso?Thussomepeoplewouldsay,thattheideaof**wrong"isthemorefundamental,andthattheideaof**duty"istobedefinedintermsofit**:that,infact»thestatementItismydutytokeepthatpromise"merelymeans"Itwouldbewrongofmenottokeepit";andthestatement"Itismydutynottotellalie"merelymeans*'Itwouldbewrongofmetotellone."Othersagainwouldapparentlysayjusttheopposite:thatdutyisthemorefundamentalnotion,and'*wrong"istobedefinedintermsofit.Whileothersperhapswouldholdthatneitherismorefundamentalthantheother;thatbothareequallyfundamental,andthatthestatement"itwouldbewrongtodosoandso"isonlyequivalentto,notidenticalin**meaningwith,Ioughtnottodoit."Butwhicheverofthesethreeviewsbethetrueone,thereis,Ithink,nodoubtwhateverabouttheequivalencenotionofthetwoideas;andnodoubt,therefore,thatwhateveranswerbegiventothequestionIamgoingtoraiseabouttheone,thesameanswermustbegiventothecorrespondingquestionabouttheother.Themoralidea,then,whichIproposetodiscuss,istheideaofdutyormoralobligation,or,whatcomestothesamething,theideaofwhatiswrong—morallywrong.Everybodywouldagreethatthisidea—or,tospeakmoreaccurately,oneorbothofthesetwoideas—isamongthemostfundamentalofourmoralideas,whetherornottheywouldadmitthatallothers,forexampletheideasofmoralgoodness,involveareferencetothisoneintheirdefinition,orwouldholdthatwehavesomeotherswhichareindependentofit.andequallyfundamentalwithit.\n314NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYButthereisagooddealofdifficultyingettingclearastowhatthisideaofmoralobligationitselfis.Isthereinfactonlyoneideawhichwecallbythisname?Orisitpossiblethatonsomeoccasionswhenwesaythatsoandsoisaduty,wemeansomethingdifferentbythisexpressionfromwhatwedoonothers?Andthatsimilarlywhenwesaythatsoandsoismorallywrong,wesometimesusethisname**morallywrong'*foroneideaandsome-timesforanother;sothatoneandthesamethingmaybe*'morallywrong"inonesenseoftheword,andyetnotmorallywronginanother?Ithink,infact,therearetwodifferentsensesinwhichweusetneseterms;andtopointoutthedifferencebetweenthem,willhelptobringoutclearlymorethenatureofeach.AndIthinkperhapsthedifferencecanbebroughtoutmostclearlybyconsideringthesortofmoralruleswithwhichweareallofusfamiliar.Everybodyknowsthatmoralteachersarelargelyconcernedinlayingdownmoralrules,andindisputingthetruthofruleswhichhavebeenpreviouslyaccepted.Andmoralrulesseemtoconsist,toaverylargeextent,inassertionstotheeffectthatitisalwayswrongtodocertainactionsortorefrainfromdoingcertainothers;or(whatcomestothesamething)thatitisalwaysyourdutytorefrainfromcertainactions,andpositivelytodocertainothers.TheTenCom-mandmentsforexample,areinstancesofmoralrules;andmostofthemareexamplesofwhatarecallednegativerules—thatistosayruleswhichassertmerelythatitiswrongtodocertainpositiveactions,andthereforeourdutytorefrainfromtheseactions;insteadofruleswhichassertofcertainpositiveactions,thatitisourdutytodothemandthereforewrongtorefrainfromdoingthem.Thefifthcommandment,whichtellsustohonour\n:NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY315ourfatherandmother,isapparentlyanexception;itseemstobeapositiverule.Itisnot,liketheothers,expressedinthenegativeform*'Thoushaltnotdosoandso,"anditisapparentlyreallymeanttoassertthatweoughttodocertainpositiveactions,notmerelythattherearesomepositiveactionfromwhichweoughttorefrain.Thedifferencebetweenthisoneandtherestwillthusserveasanexampleofthedifferencebetweenpositiveandnegativemoralrules,adifferencewhichissometimestreatedasifitwereofgreatimportance.AndIdonotwishtodenythattheremaybesomeimportantdifferencebetweenseeingonlythatcertainpositiveactionsarewrong,andseeingalsothat,incertaincases,torefrainfromdoingcertainactionsisjustaswrongaspositivelytodocertainothers.Butthisdistinctionbetweenpositiveandnegativerulesiscertainlyofmuchlessimportancethananotherwhichis,Ithink,liabletobeconfusedwithit.Sofarasthisdistinctiongoesitisonlyadistinctionbetweenanassertionthatitiswrongtodoapositiveactionandanassertionthatitiswrongtorefrainfromdoingoneandeachoftheseassertionsisequivalenttoonewhichassertsaduty—thefirstwithanassertionthatitisadutytorefrain,thesecondwithanassertionthatapositiveactionisaduty.Butthereisanotherdistinctionbetweensomemoralrulesandothers,whichisofmuchgreaterimport-ancethanthisone,andwhichdoes,Ithink,giveareasonforthinkingthattheterm*'moralobliga-tion"isactuallyusedindifferentsensesondifferentoccasions.Ihavesaidthatmoralrulesseemtoconsist,ioalargeextent,inassertionstotheeffectthatitisalwayswrongtodocertainactionsortorefrainfromdoingcertainothers,ortheequivalentassertionsintermsofduty.Butthereisalarge\n;3i6NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYclassofmoralrules,withwhichweareallofusveryfamiliar,whichdonotcomeunderthisdefinition.Theyareruleswhichareconcernednotwithouractions,inthenaturalsenseoftheword,butwithourfeelings,thoughtsanddesires.AnillustrationofthiskindofrulecanagainbegivenfromtheTenCommandments.Mostoftheten,asweallknow,areconcernedmerelywithactions/butthetenthatleastisclearlyanex-ception.Thetenthsays'*Thoushaltnotcovetthyneighbour'shouse,norhiswife,norhisservant,norhisox,norhisass,noranythingthatishis,"'*"and,unlesscovetismerelyamistranslationofawordwhichstandsforsomekindofaction,weplainlyhaveherearulewhichisconcernedwithourfeelingsandnotwithouractions.Andonereasonwhichmakesthedistinctionbetweenrulesofthiskindandrulesconcernedwithactionsimportant,isthatourfeelingsarenot,asa'rule,directlywithinthecontrolofourwillinthesenseinwhichmanyofouractionsare.Icannot,forinstance,byanysingleactofwilldirectlypreventfromarisinginmymindadesireforsomethingthatbelongstosomeoneelse,evenif,whenoncethedesirehasarrived,Icanbymywillpreventitscontinuance;andeventhislastIcanhardlydodirectlybutonlybyforcingmyselftoattendtootherconsiderationswhichmayextinguishthedesire.ButthoughIthuscannotpreventmyselfaltogetherfromcovetingmyneighbour'spossessions,Icanaltogetherpreventmyselffromstealingthem.Theactionofstealing,andthefeelingofcovetous-ness,areclearlyonaverydifferentlevelinthisrespect.Theactionisdirectlywithinthecontrolofmywill,whereasthefeelingisnot.IfIwillnottotakethething(thoughofcoursesomepeoplemayfindagreatdifficultyinwillingthis)itdoesingeneralfollowdirectlythatIdonottakeit\n—NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY317whereas,it1willnottodesireit,itemphaticallydoesnot,eveningeneral,followdirectlythatnodesireforitwillbethere.Thisdistinctionbetweenthewayinwhichourfeelingsandouractionsareunderthecontrolofourwillsis,Ithink,averyrealoneindeed;wecannothelpconstantlyrecognisingthatitexists.Andithasanimportantbearingonthedistinctionbetweenthosemoralruleswhichdealwithactionsandthosewhichdealwithfeelings,forthefollowingreason.ThephilosopherKantlaiddownawell-knownpropositiontotheeffectthat'*ought"implies**can":thatistosay,thatitcannotbetruethatyou*'ought"todoathing,unlessitistruethatyoucoulddoit,ifyouchose.Andasregardsoneofthesensesinwhichwecommonlyusethewords"ought"and'*duty,"Ithinkthisruleisplainlytrue.Whenwesayabsolutelyofourselvesorother*?,*'Ioughttodosoandso"or"yououghtto,"weimply,Ithink,veryoftenthatthethinginquestionisathingwhichwecou/ddo,ifwechose;thoughofcourseitmayoftenbeathingwhichitisverydifficulttochoosetodo.ThusitisclearthatIcannottrulysayofanyonethatheoughttodoacertainthing,ifitisathingwhichitisphysicallyimpossibleforhimtodo,howeverdesirableitmaybethatthethingshouldbedone.AndinthissenseitisclearthatitcannotbetrulysaidofmethatIoughtnottohaveacertainfeeling,orthatIoughtnottohavehadit,ifitisafeelingwhichIcouldnot,byanyeffortofmywill,preventmyselffromhaving.Thehavingorthepreventionofacertainfeelingisnot,ofcourse,strictlyeveraphysicalimpossibility,butitisveryoftenimpossible,inexactlythesamesense,inwhichactionsarephysicallyimpossiblethatistosaythatIcouldnotpossiblygetitorpreventit,evenifIwould.Butthisbeingso,itisplainthatsuchamoralruleasthatIoughtnot\n3i8NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYtocovetmyneighbour'spossessionsis,ifitmeanstoassertthatIoughtnot,inthatsenseinwhich**can,"arulewhichcannot*'ought"impliespossiblybetrue.Whatitappearstoassertis,absolutelyuniversally,ofeveryfeelingofcovetous-ness,thatthefeelinginquestionisonewhichthepersonwhofeltitoughtnottohavefelt.Butinfactaverylargeproportionofsuchfeelings(Iaminclinedtosaythevastmajority)arefeelingswhichthepersonwhofeltthemcouldnothavepreventedfeeling,ifhewould:theywerebeyondthecontrolofhiswill.Andhenceitisquiteemphaticallynottruethatnoneofthesefeelingsalighttohavebeenfelt,ifweareusing*'ought"inthesensewhichimpliesthatthepersonwhofeltthemcouldhaveavoidedthem.Sofarfromitsbeingtruethatabsolutelynoneofthemoughttohavebeenfelt,thisisonlytrueofthoseamongthem,probablyasmallminority,whichthepersonwhofeltthemcouldhaveavoidedfeeling.If,therefore,moralruleswithregardtofeelingsaretohaveachanceofbeingnearlytrue,wemustunderstandthe"ought"whichoccursintheminsomeothersense.Butwithmoralrulesthatrefertoactionsthecaseisverydifferent.Takestealingforexample.HereagainwhattheEighthCommandmentappearstoimplyisthatabsolutelyeverytheftwhichhaseveroccurredwasanactwhichtheagentoughtnottohavedone;and,ifthe"ought"istheonewhichimplies**can,"itimplies,therefore,thateverytheftwasanactwhichtheagent,ifhehadchosen,couldhaveavoided.Andthisstatementthateverytheftwhichhasbeencommittedwasanactwhichthethief,ifhehadsowilled,couldhaveavoided,thoughitmaybedoubtedifitisabsolutelyuniversallytrue,isnotastatementwhichisclearlyabsurd,likethestatementthateverycovetousdesirecouldhavebeenavoidedbythewillofthe\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY319personwhofeltit.Itisprobablethatthevastmajorityofactsofthefthavebeenactswhichitwasinthepowerofthethieftoavoid,ifhehadwilledtodoso;whereasthisisclearlynottrueofthevastmajorityofcovetousdesires.Itis,there-fore,quitepossiblethatthosewhobelieveweoughtnevertostealareusing'*ought"inasensewhichimpliesthatstealingalwayscouldhavebeenavoided;whereasitisIthinkquitecertainthatmanyofthosewhobelievethatweoughttoavoidallcovetousdesires,donotbelieveforamomentthateverycovetousdesirethathaseverbeenfeltwasadesirewhichthepersonwhofeltitcouldhaveavoidedfeeling,ifhehadchosen.Andyettheycertainlydobelieve,insomesenseorother,thatnocovetousdesireottghtevertohavebeenfelt.Theconclusionis,therefore,itseemstome,unavoidablethatwedouse*'ought,'*themoral"ought,"intwodifferentsenses;theoneasenseinwhichtosaythatIoughttohavedonesoandsodoesreallyimplythatIcouldhavedoneit,ifIhadchosen,andtheotherasenseinwhichitcarrieswithitnosuchimplication.Ithinkperhapsthedifferencebetweenthetwocanbeexpressedinthisway.Ifweexpressthemeaningofthefirst''ought,"theonewhichdoesimply**can,"bysayingthat**I*'oughttohavedonesoandso"meansItactuallyivasmydutytodoit";wecanexpressthemeaning'*ofthesecondbysayingthate.g,Ioughtnottohavefeltsoandso"meansnol"itwasmydutytoavoidthatfeeling,"but*'itwou/dhsLvebeenmydutytoavoidit,z/lhadbeenable."Andcorrespondingtothesetwomeaningsof*'ought"weshould,Ithink,probablydistinguishtwodifferentsortsofmoralrules,whichthoughexpressedinthesamelanguage,doinfactmeanverydifferentthings.Theoneisasetofruleswhichassert(whethertrulyorfalsely)thatitalwaysactuallyzsadutytodoor\n—320NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYtorefrainfromcertainactions,andassertthereforethatitalwaysisinthepoweroftheagent'swilltodoortorefrainfromthem;whereastheothersortonlyassertthatsoandsowouldbeaduty,ifitwerewithinourpower,withoutatallassertingthatitalwaysiswithinourpower.Wemay,perhaps,giveanametothedistinctionImean,bycallingthefirstkindofrules—thosewhichdoassertthatsomethingactuallyisaduty''rulesofduty,"andbycallingthesecondkindthosewhichrecommendor—condemnsomethingnotinthecontrolofourwills"idealrules":choosingthislatternamebecausetheycanbesaidtoin-culcateamoral"ideal"—somethingtheattainmentofwhichisnotdirectlywithinthepowerofourwills.AsafurtherexampleofthedifferencebetweenidealrulesandrulesofdutywemaytakethefamouspassagefromtheNewTestament(Luke6,27)*'Loveyourenemies,dogoodtothemthathateyou,blessthemthatcurseyou,prayforthemthatdespitefullyuseyou."Ofthesefourrules,thethreelastmayberulesofduty,becausetheyrefertothingswhichareplainly,asarule,atleast,inthepowerofyourwill;butthefirst,if"love"beunderstoodinitsnaturalsenseasreferringtoyourfeelings,isplainlyonlyan"ideal"rule,sincesuchfeelingsareobviouslynotdirectlyunderourowncontrol,inthesamewayinwhichsuchactionsasdoinggoodto,blessingorprayingforapersonareso.Tolovecertainpeople,ortofeelnoangeragainstthem,isathingwhichitisquiteimpossibletoattaindirectlybywill,orperhapsevertoattaincompletelyatall.Whereasyourbehaviourtowardsthemisamatterwithinyourowncontrol:evenifyouhateaperson,orfeelangrywithhim,youcansocontrolyourselfasnottodohimharm,andeventoconferbenefitsuponhim.Todogoodtoyourenemiesmay,then,reallybeyourduty;butit\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY321cannot,inthestrictsense,beyourdutynottohaveevilfeelingstowardsthem:allthatcanpossiblybetrueisthatitwouldbeyourdutyifyouwereable.YetIthinktherecanbenodoubtthatwhatChristmeanttocondemnwastheoccurrenceofsuchfeelingsaltogether;andsince,ifwhathemeanttoassertaboutthemincondemningthem,wouldhavebeencertainlyfalse,ifhehadmeanttosaythatyoucou/dsivoideverfeelingthem,Ithinkitisclearthatwhathemeanttoassertwasno^this,ornotthisonly,butsomethingelse,whichmayquitepossiblybetrue.Thatistosay,hewasassertinganidealrule,notmerelyaruleofduty.ItwillbeseenthatthisdistinctionwhichIammakingcoincides,roughlyatallevents,withthedistinctionwhichisoftenexpressedasthedis-tinctionbetweenruleswhichtellyouwhatyououghttodeandruleswhichtellyoumerelywhatyououghttodo;orasthedistinctionbetweenruleswhichareconcernedwithyourinnerlife—withyourthoughtsandfeelings—andthosewhicharecon-cernedonlywithyourexternalactions.Theruleswhichareconcernedwithwhatyououghttodeorwithyourinnerlifeare,forthemostpartatallevents,"ideal"rules;whilethosewhicharecon-cernedwithwhatyououghttodooryourexternalactionsareveryoften,atleast,rulesofduty.AnditisoftensaidthatonegreatdifferencebetweentheNewTestamentandtheOldisitscomparativelygreaterinsistenceon"ideal"rules—uponachangeofheart—asopposedtomererulesofduty.AndthatthereisacomparativelygreaterinsistenceonidealrulesIdonotwishtodeny.ButthatthereareplentyofidealrulesintheOldTestamenttoomustnotbeforgotten.IhavealreadygivenanexamplefromtheTenCommandments:namelytherulewhichsaysyououghtnottocovetanythingwhichbelongstoyourneighbour.Andanotheris\n322NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYsuppliedbytheOldTestamentcommandment,'*Lovethyneighbourasthyself,"ifby**love"isheremeantafeelingwhichisnotwithinourowncontrol,andnotmerelythattheJewistohelpotherJewsbyhisexternalactions.Indeed,howevergreatmaybethedifferencebetweentheOldTesta-mentandtheNewinrespectofcomparativein-sistenceonidealrulesratherthanrulesofduty,Iaminclinedtothinkthatthereisatleastasgreatadifference,illustratedbythisveryrule,inanother,quitedifferent,respect—namelyinthekindofrules,bothidealandofduty,whichareinsistedon.Forwhereasby"thyneighbour"intheOldTestamentthereisplainlymeantonlyotherJews,anditisnotconceivedeitherthatitisthedutyofaJewtohelpforeignersingeneral,oranidealforhimtolovethem;intheNewTestament,wherethesamewordsareused,*'myneighbour"plainlyismeanttoincludeallmankind.Andthisdistinctionbe-tweentheviewthatbeneficentactionandbenevo-lentfeelingsshouldbeconfinedtothoseofourownnation,andtheviewthatbothshouldbeextendedequallytoallmankind,—adistinctionwhichhasnothingtodowiththedistinctionbetweenbeinganddoing,betweeninnerandouter,butaffectsbothequally—is,Iaminclinedtothink,atleastasimportantadifferencebetweenNewTestamentandOld,asthecomparativelygreaterinsistenceon*'ideal"rules.However,thepointuponwhichIwantatpresenttoinsististhedistinctionbetweenidealrulesandrulesofduty.Bothkindsarecommonlyincludedamongmoralrules,and,asmyexampleshaveshown,areoftenmentionedtogetherasifnogreatdifferencewereseenbetweenthem.WhatIwanttoinsistonisthatthereisagreatdifferencebetweenthem:thatwhereasrulesofdutydodirectlyassertoftheideaofduty,inthesenseinwhichtosaythatsomethingisyourdutyimplies\n;NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY323thatyoucandoit,thatcertainthingsareduties,the**ideal"rulesdo«(?/assertthis,butsomethingdifferent.Yetthe"ideal"rulescertainlydo,inasense,asserta"moralobligation."Andhencewehavetorecognisethatthephrase"moralobli-gation"isnotmerelyanameforoneideaonly,butfortwoverydifferentidea's;andthesamewill,ofcourse,betrueofthecorrespondingphrase"morallywrong."When,therefore,Isaythattheideaof"moralobligation"isoneofthefundamentalideaswithwhichMoralPhilosophyisconcerned,Ithinkwemustadmitthatthisonenamereallystandsfortwodifferentideas.Butitdoesnotmatterformypurposewhichofthetwoyoutake.Eachofthemisundoubtedlyamoralidea,andwhateveranswerbegiventothequestionwearegoingtoraiseabouttheone,willalsocertainlyapplytotheother.Butitisnowtimetoturntotheotheridea,withwhichIsaidthatMoralPhilosophyhasbeenlargelyconcerned,thoughitisnot,stricdyspeaking,amoralidea,atall.AndIthink,perhaps,agoodwayofbringingoutwhatthisideais,istorefertotheEthicsofAristode.Everybodywouldadmitthatthefunda-mentalidea,withwhichAristotle'sEthicsiscon-cerned,isanideawhichitisthebusinessofMoralPhilosophytodiscuss;andyetIthinkitisquiteplainthatthisideaisnotamoralideaatall.Aristodedoesnotsetoutfrom^theideaofmoralobligationordutyjindeedthroughouthistreatiseheonlymentionsthisideaquiteincidentally);norevenfromtheideaofmoralgoodnessormoralexcellence,thoughhehasagooddealmoretosayaboutthatbutfromtheideaofwhathecalls"thehumangood,"or"goodforman."Hestartsbyraisingthequestionwhatthegoodformanis,andhiswholebookisarrangedintheformofgivingadetailedanswerto\n314NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYthatquestion.AndIthinkwecangatherprettywellwhattheideais,whichhecallsbythisname,byconsideringwhathesaysaboutit.Therearetwopoints,inparticular,whichheinsistsuponfromtheoutset:first,thatnothingcanbegood,inthesensehemeans,unlessitissomethingwhichisworthhavingforitsownsake,andnotmerelyforthesakeofsomethingelse;itmustbegoodinitself\itmustnot,likewealth(touseoneexamplewhichhegives)beworthhavingmerelyforthesakeofwhatyoucandowithit;itmustbeathingwhichisworthhavingevenifnothingfurthercomesofit.Andsecondly(whatpartlycoverstheformer,butalso,Ithink,sayssomethingmore)itmust,hesays,besomethingthatis"self-sufficient":somethingwhich,evenifyouhadnothingelsewouldmakeyourlifeworthhaving.Andfurtherlightisthrownuponhismeaningwhenhecomestotellyouwhathethinks**thegoodformanis:thegood,hesays,ismental,activity—wheresuchactivityisofanexcellentkind,or,ifthereareseveraldifferentkindsofexcellentmentalactivity,thatwhichhasthebestandmostperfectkindofexcellence"(hesignificantly;andalsoadds)"mentalactivitywhichlaststhroughasufficientlylonglife."ThewordwhichIhaveheretranslated"excellence"iswhatiscommonlytranslated"virtue";butitdoesnotmeanquitethesameaswemeanby"virtue,"andthatinaveryimportantrespect."Virtue"hascometomeanexclusivelymoralexcellence;andifthatwereallAristotlemeant,youmightthinkthatwhathemeansby"good"cameverynearbeingamoralidea.Butitturnsoutthatheincludesamong"excellences."intellectualexcellence,andeventhathethinksthatthebestandmostperfectexcellenceofwhichhespeaksisaparticularkindofintellectualexcellence,whichnoonewouldthinkofcallingamoralquality,namely,thesortofexcellencewhich\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY325makesamanagoodphilosopher.AndasforthewordwhichIhavetranslated**activity,"themean-ingofthiscanbebestbroughtoutbymentioningthereasonwhichAristotlehimselfgivesforsayingthatmereexcellenceitselfisnot(assomeoftheGreekshadsaid)thegoodforman.Hesays,trulyenough,thatamanmaypossessthegreatestexcellence—hemaybeaveryexcellentman—evenwhenheisasleep,orisdoingnothing;andhepointsoutthatthepossessionofexcellencewhenyouareasleepisnotathingthatisdesirableybritsownsake—obviouslyonlyforthesakeoftheeffectsitmayproducewhenyouwakeup.Itisnotthere-fore,hethinks,merementalexcellence,buttheactiveexerciseofmentalexcellence—thestateofaman'smind,whenhenotonlypossessesexcellentfaculties,moralorintellectual,butisactivelyengagedinusingthem,whichreallyconstitutesthehumangood.Now,whenAristotletalksof**thegoodforman,"thereis,Ithink,asmyquotationissufficienttoshow,acertainconfusioninhismindbetweenwhatisgoodformanandwhatisbestforman.Whathereallyholdsisthatanymentalactivitywhichexhibitsexcellenceandispleas'irableisagood;andwhenheaddsthat,iftherearemanyexcellences,thegoodmustbementalactivitywhichexhibitsthebestofthem,andthatitmustlastthroughasufficientlylonglife,heonlymeansthatthisisnecessaryifamanistogetthebesthecanget,notthatthisistheonlygoodhecanget.AndtheideawhichIwishtoinsistonisnot,therefore,theideaof''thehumangood,"butthemorefundamentalideaof"good";theidea,withregardtowhichheholdsthattheworkingofourmindsinsomeexcellentfashionistheonlygoodthingthatanyofUscanpossess;andtheideaofwhich"better"isthecomparative,whenhesaysthatmentalactivity\n326NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYwhichexhibitssomesortsofexcellenceisie^^erth^rimentalactivitywhichexhibitsothers,thoughbotharegood,andthatexcellentmentalactivitycon-tinuedoveralongertimeisbetterthanthesamecontinuedforashorter.Thisideaofwhatis"good,"inthesenseinwhichAristotleusesitinthesecases,isanideawhichweallofusconstantlyuse,andwhichiscertainlyanideawhichitisthebusinessofMoralPhilosophytodiscuss,thoughitisnotamoralidea.Themaindifficultywithregardtoitistodistinguishitclearlyfromothersensesinwhichweusethesameword.For,whenwesaythatathingis**good,"oronething**better"thananother,webynomeansalwaysmeanthatitisbetterinthissense.Often,whenwecallathinggoodwearenotattributingtoitanycharacteristicwhichitwouldpossessifitexistedquitealone,andifnothingfurtherweretocomeofit;butaremerelysayingofitthatitisasortofthingfromwhichothergoodthingsdoinfactcome,orwhichissuchthat,whenaccompaniedbyotherthings,thewholethusformedis**good"inAristotle'ssense,although,byitself,itisnotThusamanmaybe**good,"andhischaractermaybe**good,"andyetneitherare**good"inthisfundamentalsense,inwhichgoodnessisacharac-teristicwhichathingwouldpossess,ifitexistedquitealone.For,asAristotlesays,agoodmanmayexist,andmayhaveagoodcharacter,evenwhenheisfastasleep;andyetiftherewerenothingintheUniversebutgoodmen,withgoodcharacters,allfastasleep,therewouldbenothingin"itwhichwas*'goodinthefundamentalsensewithwhichweareconcerned.Thus**moralgoodness/*inthesenseofgoodcharacter,asdistinguishedfromtheactualworkingofagoodcharacterinvariousformsofmentalactivity,iscertainlynot**good"inthesenseinwhichgoodmeans**goodforitsown\n—NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY327sake.'*Andevenwithregardtotheactualexerciseofcertainformsofmoralexcellence,itseemstomethatinestimatingthevalueofsuchexerciserelativelytootherthings,weareapttotakeintoaccount,notmerelyitsintrinsicvalue—thesortofvaluewhichitwouldpossess,ifitexistedquitealone—butalsoitseffects:werateithigherthanweshoulddoifwewereconsideringonlyitsintrinsicvalue,becausewetakeintoaccounttheothergoodthingswhichweknowareapttoflowfromit.Certainthingswhichhaveintrinsicvaluearedistinguishedfromothers,bythefactthatmoregoodconsequencesareapttoflowfromthem;andwherethisisthecase,weareapt,Ithink,quiteunjustly,tothinkthattheirintrinsicvaluemustbehighertoo.Onething,Ithink,isclearaboutintrinsicvalue—goodnessinAristotle'ssensenamelythatitisonlyactualoccurrences,actualstatesofthingsoveracertainperiodoftime—notsuchthingsasmen,orcharacters,ormaterialthings,thatcanhaveanyintrinsicvalueatall.Buteventhisisnotsufificienttodistinguishintrinsicvalueclearlyfromothersortsofgoodness:sinceeveninthecaseofactualoccurrences,weoftencallthemgoodorbadforthesakeoftheireffectsortheirpromiseofeffects.ThusweallhopethatthestateofthingsinEngland,asawhole,willreallybebettersomedaythanithasbeeninthepast—thattherewillbeprogressandimprovement:wehope,forinstance,that,ifweconsiderthewholeoftheliveslivedinEnglandduringsomeyearinthenextcentury,itmaytunfoutthatthestateofthings,asawhole,duringthatyearwillbereallybetterthaniteverhasbeeninanypastyear.Andwhenweuse**better"inthisway—inthesenseinwhichprogressorimprovementmeansachangetoabetterstateofthings—wearecertainlythinkingpardyofastateofthingswhichhasagreater\n;328NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYintrinsicvalue.AndwecertainlydonotmeanbyimprovementmerelymoralimprovementAnimprovementinmoralconditions,otherthingsbeingequal,maynodoubtbeagaininintrinsicvaluebutweshouldcertainlyholdthat,moralconditionsbeingequal,thereisyetroomforimprovementinotherways—inthediminutionofmiseryandpurelyphysicalevils,forexample.Butinconsideringthedegreeofarealchangeforthebetterinintrinsicvalue,thereiscertainlydangerofconfusionbetweenthedegreeinwhichtheactualliveslivedarereallyintrinsicallybetter,andthedegreeinwhichthereisimprovementmerelyinthemeansforlivingagoodlife.Ifwewanttoestimaterightlywhatwouldconstituteanintrinsicimprovementinthestateofthingsinourimaginedyearnextcentury,andwhetheritwouldonthewholebereally*'good"atall,wehavetoconsiderwhatvalueitwouldhaveifitweretobethelastyearoflifeuponthisplanet;iftheworldweregoingtocometoanend,assoonasitwasover;andthereforetodiscountentirelyallthepromisesitmightcontainoffuturegoods.Thiscriterionfordistinguishingwhetherthekindofgoodnesswhichweareattributingtoanythingisreallyintrinsicvalueornot,thecriterionwhichconsistsinconsideringwhetheritisacharacteristicwhichthethingwouldpossess,ifitweretohaveabsolutelynofurtherconsequencesoraccompani-ments,seemstometobeonewhichitisverynecessarytoapplyifwewishtodistinguishclearlybetweendifferentmeaningsoftheword"good,"Anditisonlytheideaofwhatisgood,whereby*'good"ismeantacharacteristicwhichhasthismark,thatIwantnowtoconsider.Thetwoideas,then,withregardtowhichIwanttoraiseaquestion,arefirstthemoralideaof**moralobligation"or**duty,"andsecondlythenon-moralideaof''good"inthisspecialsense.\n—NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY329Andthequestionwithregardtothem,whichIwanttoraise,isthis.Withregardtobothideasmanyphilosophershavethoughtandstillthinknotonlythink,butseemtobeabsolutelyconvinced,thatwhenweapplythemtoanything—whenweassertofanyactionthatitoughtnottohavebeendone,orofanystateofthingsthatitwasorwouldbegoodorbetterthananother,thenitmustbethecasethatallthatweareassertingofthethingorthingsinquestionissimplyandsolelythatsomepersonorsetofpersonsactuallydoeshave,orhasatendencytohaveacertainsortoffeelingtowardsthethingorthingsinquestion:thatthereisabsolutelynomoreinitthanthis.Whileothersseemtobeconvinced,nolessstrongly,thatthereismoreinitthanthis:thatwhenwejudgethatanactionisadutyorisreallywrong,wearenotmerelymakingajudgmenttotheeffectthatsomepersonorsetofpersons,have,ortendtohaveacertainsortoffeeling,whentheywitnessorthinkofsuchactions,andthatsimilarlywhenwejudgethatacertainstateofthingswasorwouldbebetterthananother,wearenotmerelymakingajudgmentaboutthefeelingswhichsomepersonorsetofpersonswouldhave,inwitnessingorthinkingofthetwostatesofthings,orincomparingthemtogether.Thequestionatissuebetweenthesetwoviewsisoftenexpressedinotherlessclearforms.Itisoftenexpressedasthequestionwhethertheideasofdutyandofgoodorvalue,areorarenot,'^objective'*ideas:astheproblemastothe"objectivity"ofdrtyandintrinsicvalue.Thefirstsetofphiloso-pherswouldmaintainthatthenotionofthe**objectivity"ofdutyandofvalueisamerechimera;whilethesecondwouldmaintainthattheseideasreallyare**objective."Andothersexpressitasthequestionwhethertheideasofduty**"orpurely:andofgoodareabsolute*'relative'^\n330NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYwhetherthereisanysuchthingasanabsolutedutyoranabsolutegood,orwhethergoodanddutyarepurelyrelativetohumanfeelingsanddesires.Butboththesewaysofexpressingitare,Ithink,apttoleadtoconfusion.Andanotherevenlessclearwayinwhichitisputisbyaskingthequestion:Istheassertionthatsuchandsuchathingisaduty,orhasintrinsicvalue,everadictateofreason?ButsofarasIcangather,thequestionreallyatissue,andexpressedintheseobscureways,istheonewhichIhavetriedtostate.Itisthequestionwhetherwhenwejudge(whethertrulyorfalsely)thatanactionisadutyorastateofthingsgood,allthatwearethinkingabouttheactionorthestateofthingsinquestion,issimplyandsolelythatweour-selvesorothershaveortendtohaveacertainfeelingtowardsitwhenwecontemplateorthinkofit.Andthequestionseemstometobeofgreatinterest,because,ifthisisall,thenitisevidentthatalltheideaswithwhichMoralPhilosophyiscon-cernedaremerelypsychologicalideas;andallmoralrules,andstatementsastowhatisintrinsicallyvaluable,merelytrueorfalsepsychologicalstate-ments;sothatthewholeofMoralPhilosophyandEthicswillbemerelydepartmentsofPsychology.Whereas,ifthecontraryisthecase,thenthesetwoideasofmoralobligationandintrinsicvalue,willbenomorepurelypsychologicalideasthanaretheideasofshapeorsizeornumuer;andMoralPhilosophywillbeconcernedwithcharacteristicsofactionsandfeelingsandstatesofaffairs,whichtheseactionsandfeelingsandstatesofaffairswouldormighthavepossessed,evenifhumanpsychologyhadbeenquitedifferentfromwhatitis.Which,then,ofthesetwoviewsisthetrueone?ArethesetwoideasmerelypsychologicalideasinthesensewhichIhavetriedtoexplain,oraretheynot?\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY331AsIhavesaid,Ifeelsomedoubtsmyselfwhethertheyareornot:itdoesnotseemtometobeamattertodogmatizeupon.ButIamstronglyinclinedtothinkthattheyarenotmerelypsycholo-gical;thatMoralPhilosophyandEthicsarenotmeredepartmentsofPsychology.Infavouroftheviewthatthetwoideasinquestionaremerelypsychological,thereis,sofarasJamaware,nothingwhatevertobesaid,exceptthatsomanyphilosophershavebeenabsolutelyconvincedthattheyare.Noneofthemseemtometohavesucceededinbringingforwardasingleargumentinfavouroftheirview.Andagainsttheviewthattheyare,thereseemtometobesomequitedefinitearguments,thoughIamnotsatisfiedthatanyoftheseargumentsareabsolutelyconclusive.Iwilltrytostatebrieflyandclearlywhatseemtomethemainargumentsagainsttheviewthatthesearemerelypsychologicalideas;although,indoingso,Iamfacedwithacertaindifficulty.Forthough,asIhavesaid,manyphilosophersareabsolutelycon-vinced,that**duty"and"good"domerelystandforpsychologicalideas,theyarebynomeansagreedwhatthepsychologicalideasareforwhichtheystand.Differentphilosophershavehitonverydifferentideasasbeingtheideasforwhichtheystand;andthisveryfactthat,iftheyarepsychologicalideasatall,itissodifficulttoagreeastowhatideastheyare,seemstomeinitselftobeanargu-mentagainsttheviewthattheyareso.Letmetakeeachofthetwoideasseparately,andtrytoexhibitthesortofobjectionthereseemstobetotheviewthatitismerelyapsychologicalidea.Takefirsttheideaofmoralobligation.WhatpurelypsychologicalassertioncanIbemakingaboutanaction,whenIassertthatitwas"wrong/*thatitoughtnottohavebeendone?\n'332NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYInthiscase,oneview,whichisinsomewaysthemostplausiblethatcanbetaken,isthatineverycaseIammerelymakinganassertionaboutmyownpsychology.ButwhatassertionaboutmyownpsychologycanIbemaking?Letustakeasanexample,theviewofProf.Westermarck,whichisasplausibleaviewofthistypeasanythatIknowof.HeholdsthatwhatIamjudgingwhenIjudgeanactiontobewrong,ismerelythatitisofasortwhichtendstoexciteinmeapeculiarkindoffeeling—thefeelingofmoralindignationordis-approval.HedoesnotsaythatwhatIamjudgingisthattheactioninquestionisactuallyexcitingthisfeelinginme.Foritisobviouslynottruethat,whenIjudgeanactiontobemuchmorewrongthananother,Iamalwaysactuallyfeelingmuchindignationatthethoughtofeither,ormuchmoreindignationatthethoughtoftheonethanatthatoftheother;anditisinconceivablethatIshouldconstantlybemakingsogreatamistakeastomyownpsychology,astothinkthatIamactuallyfeelinggreatindignationwhenIamnot.ButhethinksitisplausibletosaythatIammakingajudgmentastothetendencyofsuchactionstoexciteindignationinme;that,forinstance,whenIjudgethatoneismuchmorewrongthantheother,Iammerelyassertingthefact,taughtmebymypastexperience,that,ifIweretowitnessthetwoactions,undersimilarcircumstances,Ishouldfeelamuchmoreintenseindignationattheonethanattheother.^EWestermarck,TheOriginandDevelopmentofMoralIdeas^Vol.I,pp.4,13,17-18,loo-ioi.Onp.105,however,Westermarcksuggestsaviewinconsistentwiththisone:namelythat,whenIjudgeanactiontobewrong,Iamnotmerelyassertingthatithasatendencytoexcitemoralindignationinme,butamalsoassertingthatotherpeoplewouldbeconvincedthatithasatendencytoexcitemoralindignationinthem,ifthey*'knewtheactandallitsattendantcircumstancesaswellas[Ido],andif,atthesametimetheiremotionswereasrefinedas[mine]."\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY333Butthereisoneveryseriousobjectiontosuchaview,whichIthinkthatthosewhotakeitareaptnotfullytorealise.Ifthisviewbetrue,thenwhenIjudgeanactiontobewrong,Iammerelymakingajudgmentaboutmyownfeelingstowardsit;andwhenyoujudgeittobewrong,youaremerelymakingajudgmentaboutyours.Andhencetheword**wrong"inmymouth,meanssomethingentirelydifferentfromwhatitdoesinyours;just'*"asthewordIinmymouthstandsforanentirelydifferentpersonfromwhatitdoesinyours—inmineitstandsforme,inyoursitstandsforyou.ThatistosaywhenIjudgeofagivenactionthatitwaswrong,andyouperhapsoftheverysameactionthatitwasnot,wearenotinfactdifferinginopinionaboutitatall;anymorethanwearedifferinginopinionifImakethejudgment"IcamefromCambridgeto-day"andyoumakethejudgment**/didnotcomefromCambridgeto-day."**Thatwaswrong"When/sayIammerelysaying'*Thatsortofactionexcitesindignationinme,'*whenyousay*'NowhenIseeit;and;itwasnotwrong"youaremerelysaying*'Itdoesnotexciteindignationinme,when/seeit."Andobviouslybothjudgmentsmayperfectlywellbetruetogether;justasmyjudgmentthatIdidcomefromCambridgeto-dayandyoursthatyoudidnot,mayperfectlywellbetruetogether.Inotherwords,andthisiswhatIwanttoinsiston,ifthisviewbetrue,thenthereisabsolutelynosuchthingasadifferenceofopinionuponmoralquestions.Iftwopersonsthinktheydifferinopiniononamoralquestion(anditcertainlyseemsasiftheysometimes^ktnkso),theyarealways,onthisview,makingamistake,andamistakesogrossthatitseemshardlypossiblethattheyshouldmakeit:amistakeasgrossasthatwhichwouldbeinvolvedinthinkingthatwhenyou**sayIdidnotcomefromCambridgeto-day"you\n;334NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYaredenyingwhatIsaywhenIsay"Idid."Andthisseemstometobeaveryseriousobjectiontotheview.Don'tpeople,infact,sometimesreallydifferinopiniononamoralquestion?Certainlyallappearancesareinfavouroftheviewthattheydo:andyet,iftheydo,thatcanonlybeifwhenIthinkathingtobewrong,andyouthinkitnotto**wrongbewrong,Imeanby"theverysamecharacteristicwhichyoumean,andamthinkingthattheactionpossessesthischaracteristicwhileyouarethinkingitdoesnot.Itmustbetheverysamecharacteristicwhichwebothmean;itcannotbe,asthisviewsaysitis,merelythatIamthinkingthatithastomyfeelingstheverysamerelation,whichyouarethinkingthatithasnotgottoyourssince,ifthiswereall,thentherewouldbenodifferenceofopinionbetweenus.Andthisviewthatwhenwetalkofwrongorduty,wearenotmerely,eachofus,makingastate-mentabouttherelationofthethinginquestiontoourownfeelings,maybereinforcedbyanotherconsideration.Itiscommonlybelievedthatsomemoralrulesexhibitahighermoralitythanothers:that,forinstanceapersonwhobelievesthatitisourdutytodogoodtoourenemies,hasahighermoralbelief,thanonewhobelievesthathehasnosuchduty,butonlyadutytodogoodtohisfriendsorfellow-countrymen.AndWestermarckhimselfbelievesthat,somemoralbeliefs,'*markastageofhigherrefinementintheevolutionofthemoralconsciousness."*Butwhat,onhisviewcanbemeantbysayingthatonemoralbeliefishigherthananother?IfAbelievesthatitishisdutytodogoodtohisenemiesandBbelievesthatitisnot,inwhatsensecanA'sbeliefbehigherthanB's?Not,onthisview,inthesensethatwhatAbelievesistrue,andwhatBbelievesisnot;forwhatAisbelievingismerelythattheideaofnotdoinggood*Ibid.p.89.\n"NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY335toyourenemiestendstoexciteinhimafeelingofmoralindignation,andwhatBbelievesismerelythatitdoesnottendtoexcitethisfeelinginhim:andbothbeliefsmayperfectlywellbetrue;itmayreallybetruethatthesameactionsdoexcitethefeelinginA,andthattheydon'tinB.Whatthen,couldWestermarckmeanbysayingthatA'smoralityishigherthanB's?SofarasIcansee.what,onhisownviews,hewouldhavetomeanismerelythathehimself,Westermarck,sharesA*smoralityanddoesnotshareB's:thatitistrueofhim,asofA,thatneglectingtodogoodtoenemiesexciteshisfeelingsofmoralindignationandnottrueofhimasitisofB,thatitdoesnotexcitesuchfeelingsinhim.InshorthewouldhavetosaythatwhathemeansbycallingA'smoralitythehigherismerely**A'smoralityismymorality,andB'sisnot.Butitseemstomequiteclearthatwhenwesayonemoralityishigherthananother,wedonotmerelymeanthatitisourown.Wearenotmerelyassertingthatithasacertainrelationtoourownfeelings,butareasserting,ifImaysayso,thatthepersonwhohasithasabettermoraltastethanthepersonwhohasnot.Andwhetherornotthismeansmerely,asIthink,thatwhattheonebelievesistrue,andwhattheotherbelievesisfalse,itisatalleventsinconsistentwiththeviewthatinallcaseswearemerelymakingastatementaboutourownfeelings.Forthesereasonsitseemstomeextremelydifficulttobelievethatwhenwejudgethingstobewrong,eachofusismerelymakingajudgmentabouthisownpsychology.Butifnotaboutourown,thenaboutwhose?Ihavealreadysaidthattheviewthat,ifthejudgmentismerelyapsycho-logicaloneatall,itisajudgmentaboutourownpsychology,isinsomewaysmoreplausiblethananyotherview.AndIthinkwecannowseethatanyotherviewisnotplausible.Thealternatives\n336NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYarethatIshouldbemakingajudgmentaboutthepsychologyofallmankind,oraboutthatofsomeparticularsectionofit.Andthatthefirstalter-nativeisnottrue,is,Ithink,evidentfromthefactthat,whenIjudgeanactiontobewrong,Imayemphaticallynotbelievethatitistrueofallman-kindthattheywouldregarditwithfeelingsofmoraldisapproval.Imayknowperfectlywellthatsomewouldnot.Mostphilosophers,therefore,havenotventuredtosaythatthisisthejudgmentIammaking;theysay,forinstance,thatIammakingajudgmentaboutthefeelingsoftheparticularsocietytowhichIbelong—about,forinstance,thefeelingsofanimpartialspectatorinthatsociety.But,ifthisviewbetaken,itisopentothesameobjectionsastheviewthatIammerelymakingajudgmentaboutmyownfeelings.Ifwecouldsaythateveryman,whenhejudgesathingtobewrong,wasmakingastatementaboutthefeelingsofallmankind,thenwhenAsays**Thisiswrong"andBsays"No,itisn't,"theywouldreallybedifferinginopinion,sinceAwouldbesayingthatallmankindfeelinacertainwaytowardstheaction,andBwouldbesayingthattheydon't.ButifAisreferringmerelytohissocietyandBtohis,andtheirsocietiesaredifferent,thenobviouslytheyarenotdifferinginopinionatall:itmayperfectlywellbetrueboththatanimpartialspectatorinAssocietydoeshaveacertainsortoffeelingtowardsactionsofthesortinquestion,andthatanimpartialspectatorinB'sdoesnot.Thisview,therefore,impliesthatitisimpossiblefortwomenbelongingtodifferentsocietiesevertodifferinopiniononamoralquestion.AndthisisaviewwhichIfinditalmostashardtoacceptastheviewthatnotwomeneverdifferinopiniononone.ForthesereasonsIthinkthereareserious\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY337objectionstotheviewthattheideaofmoralobliga-tionismerelyapsychologicalidea.Butnowletusbrieflyconsidertheideaof"good,"inAristotle'ssense,orintrinsicvalue,Asregardsthisidea,thereisagainadifferenceofopinionamongthosewhoholdthatitisapsychologicalidea,astowhatideaitis.Themajorityseemtoholdthatitistobedefined,somehow,intermsofdesire;whileothershaveheldthatwhatwearejudgingwhenwejudgethatonestateofthingsisorwouldbeintrinsicallybetterthananother,isratherthatthebeliefthattheonewasgoingtoberealizedwould,undercertaincircumstances,givemorepleasuretosomemanorsetofmen,thanthebeliefthattheotherwas.Butthesameobjectionsseemtometoapplywhicheverofthesetwoviewsbetaken.Letustakedesire.AboutwhosedesiresamImakingajudgment,whenIjudgethatonestateofthingswouldbebetterthananother?Hereagain,itmaybesaid,firstofall,thatIammerelymakingajudgmentaboutmyown.Butinthiscasetheviewthatmyjudgmentismerelyaboutmyownpsychologyis,Ithink,exposedtoanobviousobjectiontowhichWestermarck'sviewthatmyjudgmentsofmoralobligationareaboutmyownpsychologywasnotexposed.TheobviousobjectionisthatitisevidentlynottruethatIdoinfactalwaysdesiremore,whatIjudgetobebetter:Imayjudgeonestateofthingstobebetterthananother,evenwhenIknowperfectlywellnotonlythatIdon'tdesireitmore,butthatIhavenotendencytodoso.Itisanotoriousfactthatmen'sstrongestdesiresare,asarule,forthingsinwhichtheythemselveshavesomepersonalconcern;andyetthefactthatthisisso,andthattheyknowittobeso,doesnotpreventthemfromjudgingthatchanges,whichwouldnotaffectthempersonally,\n338NATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHYwouldconstituteaverymuchgreaterimprovementintheworldscondition,thanchangeswhichwould.ForthisreasonalonetheviewthatwhenIjudgeonestateofthingstobebetterthananotherIammerelymakingajudgmentaboutmyownpsychology,must,Ithink,begivenup:itisincrediblethatweshouldallbemakingsuchmistakesaboutourfeelings,as,onthisview,weshouldconstantlybedoing.Andthereis,ofcourse,besides,thesameobjection,asappliedinthecaseofmoralobligation:namelythat,ifthisviewweretrue,notwomencouldeverdifferinopinionastowhichoftwostateswasthebetter,whereasitappearsthattheycertainlysometimesdodifferinopiniononsuchanissue.Myjudgment,then,isnotmerelyajudgmentaboutmyownpsychology:but,ifso,aboutwhosepsychologyisitajudgment?Itcannotbeajudg-mentthatallmendesiretheonestatemorethantheother;becausethatwouldincludethejudgmentthatImyselfdoso,which,aswehaveseen,Ioftenknowtobefalse,evenwhileIjudgethattheonestatereallyisbetter.Anditcannot,Ithink,beajudgmentmerelyaboutthefeelingsordesiresofanimpartialspectatorinmyownsociety;sincethatwouldinvolvetheparadoxthatmenbelongingtodifferentsocietiescouldneverdifferinopinionastowhatwasbetter.Butwehaveheretoconsideranalternative,whichdidnotariseinthecaseofmoralobligation.Itisanotoriousfactthatthesatisfactionofsomeofourdesiresisincompat-iblewiththesatisfactionofothers,andthesatisfac-tionofthoseofsomemenwiththesatisfactionofthoseofothers.Andthisfacthassuggestedtosomephilosophersthatwhatwemeanbysayingthatonestateofthingswouldbebetterthananother,ismerelythatitisastateinwhichmoreofthedesires,ofthosewhowereinit,wouldbe\nNATUREOFMORALPHILOSOPHY339satisfiedatonce»thanwouldbethecasewiththeother.Buttothisviewthefundamentalobjectionseemstometobethatwhethertheonestatewasbetterthantheotherwoulddependnotmerelyuponthenumberofdesiresthatweresimultane-ouslysatisfiedinit,butuponwhatthedesiresweredesiresfor.Icanimagineastateofthingsinwhichalldesiresweresatisfied,andyetcanjudgeofitthatitwouldnotbesogoodasanotherinwhichsomewereleftunsatisfied.AndforthisreasonIcannotassenttotheviewthatmyjudg-ment,thatonestateofthingsisbetterthananotherismerelyajudgmentaboutthepsychologyofthepeopleconcernedinit.ThisiswhyIfindithardtobelievethateithertheideaofmoralobligationortheideaofintrinsicvalueismerelyapsychologicalidea.ItseemstomethatMoralPhilosophycannotbemerelyadepartmentofPsychology.ButnodoubttheremaybeargumentsontheothersidetowhichIhavenotdonejustice.TheEnd\n\nINDEXAbstractions,"illegilimate"15"Given,"ambiguityof,174Agnosticism,5,30,151"Good,"ambiguityof,253,326"Analytic"truths,30-Iobjectivityof255-7,337-9Apprehension,direct,173-4,'7^"forman,"323-5Aristotle'sEthics,323-6Hegel,16Atiention,176Hume,53,58,147-167Awareness,25-6,29"I."174-5.333"Being"and"Reality"199-201,Idealism,1-3214-18Ideas,20-6Berkeley,19,30,58,73IdentityofIndiscerhiblcs,307-8Bradley,F.H.,197-218,276,278"Implication,"295-7Indi?cernib!es,Identityof,307-8Causalronnectirn,154-6,161-3Induction,necessity,267-8conditionsnecessaryfor,61-7Consciousness,17-18,20-21,23-25Internalrelations,"Conieut"21-4,26dogmaof,270-2,284-6,286-9,2S8,290,303,307-9twosensesof,286Deduction,40,291,303Intrinsicdifference,261-5Difference,nature,260-5numericalandfjualitatife,262-3predicates,272-5285-7,307-8taluc,259-60,327.8,337.9inuinsic,261-5Directapprehen^^ion173-4,176observation,14SJames,William,97-146perception,67-7;Joachim,H.H.,276DutyandWrong,312-3*'objectivity"of,257-8,332-7Kant,12,30,317Entails,391Knowledge,2430and"implies"300-1,303-6andbelief33-4Esse-Midpefripit7-12,72-7,180-1bydescription,234,247Existence,72-8and"reality,"199-201,214-8ofphysicalobjects,190-1Leibniz,302"Experience,"ambiguityof,177,179-80."Manifestationof,"'249-50Externalobject!!andfacts,152-4Materialobjectsorthings,30,89*90,relations,270-2,276-309153,221-5,228,250-2Mill.J.S.,19,224,250-2Fact,mattersof,148,302-3Mind"!,*•inour,"l'76-7"Follows,"40,2S4-5,291,300-1"Modify,"278-80,282-4303.6Moralrules,twokindsof,320-2\n342IndexNecessarytruths,12,302-3external,270-2,276-309Necessity,threesensesof,265-70interna],286-9logical,271-2,275Right,objectivityof,257,332-7unconditional,271-2,274-5Russell,B.,224,234,250-2,278303.304»308**Objectivity,''ambiguityof,255-9ofkindsofvalue,329-39"See,''ambiguityof,187-8Objects,**Seems,"245-6external,152-3Sensations,17-26,231-2material,30,89-90,221-3,250-2proper,168physical,andsensibles,185-96,Sense-data,168-171,23I-2221-3Sensibles,168-171Observation,53-4.67-7iih8Solipsism,29Organicunities,15Spiritual,1-2"Ought,"twomeaningsof,319Strachcy,O.,304objectivityof,332-7*'Subjective,"253-4and"wrong"312-3"Synthetic"truths,12-13Part,physical,2379Taylor,A,E.,8andwhole,288-9"Time,"209-u"Perception,"ambiguityof,174,Truth,225-8andmutability129-138direct,67-71pragmatisttheoryof,I43-6Percipiandessgy7-12,72-7,180-Iandutility,loS-129Physicalobjectsandsensibles,185-andverification,100-107196,221-3ofwords,134-6Pickwickiansenses,190,193,194"Truths,"analytic"and"synthetic"Possible,"threesensesof,265-7012-13Pragmatisttheoryoftruth,143-6"man-made"138-43**Presented,"ambiguityof,174necessary12,302-3Reality,72-8,199-20T,211-8Reason,"dictatesof,"330Value,intrinsic,259-60,327-8,337-9Reasons,35-41objectivityof,255-9,329-39Reid,T.,57,59.86,89Relationalproperties,281-2Westermarck,E.,332,334-5Relations,"Wrong,"objectivityof,332-7dogmaofinternal,270-2,2S4-6,and"ought,"312-3288,290,303.307-9\n\n\n\nInternationalLibraryofPsychology,Philosophy&ScientificMethodEditor:CKOgden(Demy8vo)PhilosophyAnton,JohnPeter,Aristotle'sTheoryofContrariety276pp.1957.Black,Max,TheNatureofMathematics242pp.1933.Bluck,R.S.,Plato'sPhaedo226pp.1955.Broad,C.D.,FiveTypesofEthicalTheory322pp.1930.TheMindandItsPlaceinNature694pp.1925.Burtt,E.A.,TheMetaphysicalFoundationsofModernPhysicalScienceAHistoricalandCriticalEssay364pp.2nd(revised)edition1932.Carnap,Rudolf,TheLogicalSyntaxofLanguage376pp.1937.Cornford,F.M.,Plato'sTheoryofKnowledge358pp.1935.Plato'sCosmology,TheTimaeusofPlato402pp.Frontispiece.1937.PlatoandParmenides280pp.1939.Crawshay-Williams,RupertMethodsandCriteriaofReasoning312pp.1957.Hulme,T.E.,Speculations296pp.2ndedition1936.Lazerowitz,Morris,TheStructureofMetaphysics262pp.1955.Mannheim,Karl,IdeologyandUtopia360pp.1954.Moore,G.E.,PhilosophicalStudies360pp.1922.SeealsoRamsey,F.P.Ogden,C.K.andRichards,I.A.,TheMeaningofMeaningWithsupplementaryessaysbyB.MalinowskiandF.G.Crookshank394pp.10thedition1949.(6thimpression1967.)Ramsey,FrankPlumpton,TheFoundationsofMathematicsandotherLogicalEssays318pp.1931.Richards,I.A.,PrinciplesofLiteraryCriticism312pp.2ndedition1926.MenciusontheMind.ExperimentsinMultipleDefinition190pp.1932.Smart,Ninian,ReasonsandFaiths230pp.1958.Vaihinger,H.,ThePhilosophyofAsIf428pp.2ndedition1935.Wittgenstein,Ludwig,TractatusLogico-Philosophicus276pp.1922.Wright,GeorgHenrikvon.LogicalStudies2Mpp.1957.Zeller,Eduard,OutlinesoftheHistoryofGreekPhilosophy248pp.13th(revised)edition1931.PsychologyAdler,Alfred,ThePracticeandTheoryofIndividualPsychology368pp.2nd(revised)edition1929.Eng,Helga,ThePsychologyofChildren'sDrawings240pp.8colourplates.139figures.2ndedition1954.Koffka,Kurt,TheGrowthoftheMind456pp.16figures.2ndedition(revised)1928.\nPrinciplesofGestaltPsychology740pp.112figures.39tables.1936.Malinowski,Bronislaw,CrimeandCustominSavageSociety752pp.6plates.1926.SexandRepressioninSavageSociety290pp.1927.SeealsoOgden,C.K.Murphy,Gardner,AnHistoricalIntroductiontoModernPsychology488pp.5thedition(revised)1949.Paget,R.,HumanSpeechSomeObservations^Experiments,andConclusionsastotheNature,Origin,PurposeandPossibleImprovementofHumanSpeech374pp.5plates.1930.Petermann,Bruno,TheGestaltTheoryandtheProblemofConfiguration364pp.20figures.1932.Piaget,Jean,TheLanguageandThoughtoftheChild220pp.3rdedition(revisedandenlarged)1959.JudgmentandReasoningintheChild276pp.1928.TheChild'sConceptionoftheWorld408pp.1929.TheChild'sConceptionofPhysicalCasualty318pp.1930.TheMoralJudgmentoftheChild438pp.1932.ThePsychologyofIntelligence198pp.1950.TheChild'sConceptionofNumber266pp.1952.TheOriginofIntelligenceintheChild448pp.1953.TheChild'sConceptionofGeometry428pp.1960.Piaget,JeanandInhelder,Barbel,TheChild'sConceptionofSpace512pp.29figures.1956.vanderHoop,J.H.,CharacterandtheUnconscious240pp.1923.Woodger,J.H.,BiologicalPrinciples508pp.1929.(Reissuedwithanewintroduction1966.)\nWm'l!^