philosophy 267哲学 4页

4Philosophy267Fall,2010ProfessorRichardArnesonIntroductoryHandoutClassmeetsTuesdays1-4intheDepartmentseminarroom.Myemail:rarneson@ucsd.eduThiscourseconsiderssomephilosophicalargumentsconcerningthejustificationoftheclaimthatundermodernconditions,thepoliticalorderofasocietyoughttobedemocratic.Nextquestion:howdemocraticoughtthepoliticalordertobe,andwhatdeterminesthenormativelyappropriatedegreeofdemocracyinparticularcircumstances.FollowingDavidEstlund,letussayastateislegitimateifitissuescommands(laws,publicpolicies)andenforcesthemanddoessopermissibly,andastatehasauthorityifithasthemoralpowertoissuecommands(laws,publicpolicies)toitssubjectsandtherebytobringitaboutthatthosecommandedhavesomemoralobligationtocomply.Undermodernconditions,mustastatebedemocraticinordertorulelegitimatelyandwithauthority?Texts:JoshuaCohen,Rousseau:AFreeCommunityofEquals;DavidEstlund,DemocraticAuthority:APhilosophicalFramework.J.S.Mill’sConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernmentisavailableonlineatwww.utilitarianism.net/jsmill/JasonBrennan’sforthcomingbooktheEthicsofVotingwillbemadeavailablebyemailattachment.SomeotherreadingswillbemadeavailablebyemailattachmentorinprintedcopiestobeplacedinthePhilosophyDepartmentLibraryorboth.Notethatthereadingforweeks1and2includesRousseau’sTheSocialContract,whichisneitherabookplacedontheshelvesofthebookstoreforthisclassnorspeciallymadeavailableintheDepartmentLibrary.I’mjustassumingeachofyoucanfindacopyofthistext;anyeditionwilldo.Courserequirements:Attendanceandparticipationatallseminarmeetings,someseminarpresentations(analyzingakeyargumentorclaiminareadingandleadingitsdiscussion),andatermpaper(about15-20pagesinlength)onsometopiccentraltocoursethemes.Regularauditorsoftheclassarewelcome,andwillbeaskedtocontributeseminarpresentations.Week1.September28.DemocracyasRousseau’ssolutiontotheproblemofinequalityandinflamedself-esteem.Reading:JoshuaCohen,Rousseau,AFreeCommunityofEquals,chaps.1-2;J-JRousseau,TheSocialContract,Books1and2.Furtherbackground:J-JRousseau,DiscourseontheOriginofInequality;JohnRawls,LecturesontheHistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy,LecturesIandIIonRousseau.Week2.October5.Freedom,Dependence,andtheGeneralWill.Reading:JoshuaCohen,Rousseau:AFreeCommunityofEquals,chaps3-4;J-JRousseau,TheSocialContract,Books3and4.Furtherbackground:Rawls,LecturesontheHistoryofPoliticalPhilosophy,LectureIIIonRousseau;FrederickNeuhouser,“Freedom,Dependence,andtheGeneralWill,”PhilosophicalReview(July,1993).Week3.October12.Millonrepresentativegovernment.Reading:Mill,ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment,chapters2-5.Recommended:CharlesBeitz,PoliticalEquality(PrincetonUP,1989),chapters2and5Week4.October19.Mill’selitism.Reading:ConsiderationsonRepresentativeGovernment,chapters6-8.Recommended:CharlesBeitz,PoliticalEquality,chapter6,“ProportionalRepresentation.”Alsorecommended:RichardArneson,“DemocracyIsNotIntrinsicallyJust”inGoodin,etal,eds,DemocracyandJustice(CambridgeUP,2004).Week5.October26.Epistemicproceduralism.Reading:DavidEstlund,DemocraticAuthority,chapters1-6.\n4Week6.November2.Reading:Democracyandlegitimateauthority.DavidEstlund,DemocraticAuthority,chapters7&8;alsoChristopherWellmanandA.JohnSimmons,IsThereaDutytoObeytheLaw(CambridgeUP,2005),3-30oftheWellmanentry,and83-189ofSimmons.Recommended:JeremyWaldron,“SpecialTiesandNaturalDuties,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs(1993).Alsorecommended:GopalSreenivasan,‘“Oh,butyoushouldhave’:EstlundonNormativeConsent,”Iyyun(2009).Week7.November9.Reading:DavidEstlund,DemocraticAuthority,chapters9-11,also14.Recommended:DavidEnoch,“OnEstlund’sDemocraticAuthority,”Iyyun(2009),A.J.Julius,reviewofDemocraticAuthorityinPhilosophicalReview,ThomasChristiano,“EstlundonDemocraticAuthority,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy(2009).Ontherelevanceorirrelevanceofthediscursivedilemma:PhilipPettit,“DeliberativeDemocracy,theDiscursiveDilemma,andRepublicanTheory,”inJamesFishkinandPeterLaslett,DebatingDeliberativeDemocracy(Blackwell,2003).Week8.November16.Theethicsofvoting.Reading:GeoffreyBrennan&LorenLomasky,“IsThereaDutytoVote?”,SocialPhilosophyandPolicy(2000).JasonBrennan,TheEthicsofVoting(forthcoming,2011),chapters1-4.G.Brennan&Lomasky&J.Brennanallargueagainsttheclaimthatthecitizeninawell-functioningdemocracyhasadutytovote.J.Brennanarguesforaconditionalpermissiveduty:Onehasnodutytovoteatall(exceptinspecialcircumstances)andoneoughtnottovoteunlessoneiscompetent,well-informed,andvotesforthecommongood.Week9.November23:Justicerequiresequalityandequalityrequiresademocraticpoliticalorder—ThomasChristianoonthejustificationofdemocracy.Reading:ThomasChristiano,theConstitutionofEquality,chapters1-3.Recommended:DavidEstlund,“OnChristiano’sTheConstitutionofEquality,”,JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy(2009);onpublicityasaconstraintonjustice,seeG.A.Cohen,RescuingJusticeandEquality(2008),chapter8.Week10.November30.Judicialreviewandotherconstraintsonmajoritywillindemocracies.Reading:JeremyWaldron,“TheCoreoftheCaseagainstJudicialReview,”YaleLawJournal(April,2006);PhilipPettit,“DepoliticizingDemocracy,”RatioJuris(2004);Recommended:ThomasChristiano,TheConstitutionofEquality,chapters6-7.Analternateweek10topic:Rightsofsecession.Reading:ChristopherHeathWellman,ATheoryofSecession:TheCaseforPoliticalSelf-Determination,chapters1-3;alsoAllenBuchanan,“TheoriesofSecession,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs(Winter,1997).(Evenifwedonottakeupthistopicinclass,itwouldstillbeanappropriatetermessaytopicforanyoneinterestedinit.)Someroughbackgroundondemocracy.Ademocraticpoliticalorderisasocietyinwhichallpermanentadultresidentsareeligibletobecomecitizensandallcitizenshaveequalrightstovoteandstandforofficeinfreeandfairelections.Afreeelectionisonethatoccurswhenfreedomofspeech,ofassociation,andassemblyareeffectivelyprotected.Afairelectionisoneinwhichtheoutcomeiscontrolledbyamajorityofvotescast.Inademocraticpoliticalorder,majority-rulevotesofcitizensinfreeandfairelectionseither(1)determinethemembershipofalegislativebodythatpassesthecoercivelyenforcedlawsofthesocietybymajorityruleprocedureandalsoselectstopofficialsofthegovernmentbranchthatenforcesthelawsandsetsotherpublicpoliciesandappointslower-levelofficialsor(2)directlyselectthelawsthatarecoercivelyenforcedandselecttopofficialsofthegovernmentbranchthatadministersthelaws.Apoliticalordercanbemoreorlessdemocratic,\n4alongseveraldimensions.Twoobviousdimensionsarethedegreetowhichdemocraticelectionsarefreeandfairasjustdescribed.Herearesomeothers:(a)Themoreitisthecasethatachangeinthewillofthemajorityofcitizensquicklybringsaboutcorrespondingchangesinthelawsandinthecompositionofthegovernmentbranchthatadministersthelaws,themoredemocraticthepoliticalorder.(b)Thefewerandlessimportantthemattersthatareplacedbyconstitutionalprovisionbeyondthepowerofmajorityrulevotesofcitizenstoalter,themoredemocraticthepoliticalorder.(Anexampleofsuchremovalofsomeitemsfromthepurviewofmajorityrulewouldbeasubstantivebillofrightsenforcedbyanindependentjudiciary.)(c)Themoreitisthecasethatanytwoadultcitizenswiththesamelevelofpoliticaltalentandthesameambitiontobepoliticallyinfluentialhavethesameprospectsofbeingpoliticallyinfluential,themoredemocraticthepoliticalorder.Bothaandbseemcrucialtobeingademocrat,butciscontestable,andsois(d):Themoreitisthecasethatthelawsandpublicpoliciescoercivelyenforcedbythegovernmentareselectedbyaprocessofcriticaldeliberationandreflectionaboutthecommongoodthatisdeepinthesenseofconsistingofhigh-qualitydiscussionandwideinthesenseofincludingasparticipantsallcitizens,andthatissuesinvotingbymajorityruleinfreeandfairelections,themoredemocraticthepoliticalorder.Theroughtaxonomyaboveraisesseveralquestionsandissues.Onequestionis,isthelistofdimensionsdemocracy(freedomandfairnessofelectionsplusa-d)complete,oraretherefurthervaluableaspectstobeingdemocratic?Orshouldtheidealofdemocracybepareddown,andsomeofa-deliminatedfromtheideal?Aresomeofa-dfarmoreimportantintheconstitutionoftheidealofdemocracythanotherelementsintheset,andifso,whyso?Anotherquestionis,whethersomeorallofthesedimensionsofdemocracyarerightlyregardedasmerelyinstrumentallyvaluablewhenvaluableatalloralsoasbeingintrinsicallymorallyvaluable?Noticethatsomeofthedimensionsa-dmightbesatisfiedinapoliticalorderthatisnotdemocraticatall.Equalopportunityforpoliticalinfluencemightbefulfilledinapoliticalorderinwhichthereisalimitedfranchise(e.g.onlythosecitizenswhopassapoliticalcompetencetesthavetherighttovote)orinapoliticalorderinwhichmajorityruleissharplycurtailedbythepowerofnonelectednonremovablejudgesorstatebureaucrats(whoobtainofficebypassingsometestforpoliticalcompetence).Dependingonhowtheideasofpoliticaltalentorpoliticalcompetenceareinterpreted,onemightholdthatinprinciplesomedictatorshipsmightsatisfyconditionc.Considerrulebyacommunistoregalitarianpoliticalparty,membershipintherulingpartybeingopentoallcitizens,andselectionintothepartybeingmadeonameritocraticbasis,withdedicationtocommunistoregalitarianprinciplesbeingpartlyconstitutiveofcompetence/talent.Ifoneinsiststhatpoliticaltalent/competencemustbeinterpretedinanideologicallyneutralfashion,soapersonwhoadherestoanypoliticalideologywhatsoevercanqualifyaspoliticallytalented/competent,thenthedictatorshipofasinglepoliticalparty,withanideologicalqualificationforadmissiontotheaparty,cannotsatisfyc.Noticealsothattobeplausible,theidealofequalopportunityforpoliticalinfluencemusttakethedistributionofpoliticalpreferencesinthepopulationatatimeasarandommatter,sothatifArneson,whosepoliticalideologychimesinwiththatof1/10ofonepercentofAmericanvoters,andBillClinton,whosepoliticalideologychimesinwiththatof60percentofAmericanvoters,areequallypoliticallytalented,thenClinton’shavinggreaterchancestobepoliticallyinfluentialbecausehisopinionschimeinwithmostAmericansdoesnotprecludeArnesonandClintonhavingequalopportunityforpoliticalinfluence.Amonarchyordictatorshipcouldinprinciplesatisfyconditionatoagreaterextentthanamajorityrulepoliticalprocessofthesortwewouldordinarilycall“democratic.”Supposethekingorqueenordictatorhappenstobeverysensitivetomajorityrule,andalwaysexercisesherdominantpoliticalpowerinwaysthatarereflectiveofthemajoritywillofthemoment.Theabsoluteruleofthesensitivemonarchsatisfiesconditiona.(Thisresultmightpromptustoreviseconditionasothatthisimplicationceasestohold.)\n4Also,therecouldbeademocraticallydeliberativenondemocracy.Considerapoliticalregimeinwhichpoliticalpowerisheldbyanhereditarymonarch.Broadfreespeechprotectionsareinplace,andthereisaculturethatstronglyencouragesdiscussionsofwhatpublicpolicyoughttobethatarewide(encompassesmanycitizens)anddeep(thediscussionplumbstofundamentals,whicharecarefullyconsideredandweighed).Thepoliticalregimeisstronglydeliberative,andthemonarchparticipatesinthedeliberation.Butattheendoftheday,whatthemonarchthinksanddecides,determinespolicy.Thisregimewouldnotsatisfyconditiondasstated,becausedemocraticvotesdonotdeterminepublicpolicyattheendoftheday.Butintheregimeasdescribed,democraticdeliberationdoesdeterminetheoutcomeofpublicpolicydecisions(viatheimpactofdemocraticdeliberationonthemindandwilloftheruler).Sothequestionarises,whetherthisdemocraticallydeliberativecharacteroftheregimeisrightlythoughttobemorallyvaluablewhensunderedfromanyconnectiontodemocraticrule.Theweek9topic,limitsonmajorityrulesuchaslimitsimposedbyanindependentjudiciarythatenforcesaconstitutionallyentrenchedcharterofrights,raisesmanyissuesincludingthefollowing:Dothemoralconsiderationsthatshowademocraticpoliticalordertobeintrinsicallypoliticallyvaluablealsoshowthatpeoplehavecertainmoralrights(otherthantherighttoademocraticsay),whichoughtabovealltoprotectedandsecured?Inthiswaytherighttoademocraticsaywouldbeself-limiting,inthatitifturnsouttobethecasethatlimitsonmajorityruleareinstrumentallyefficaciousinsecuringandprotectingthesecertainmoralrights,thentheveryconsiderationsthatwarrantdemocracyalsosetlimitstoitswrit.Discussionsofthemoralfoundationsofdemocracyoftenproceedbydescribinganidealformofdemocracyandaffirmingthatinanidealdemocracyitwouldbelegitimate(morallypermissible)fordemocraticrulerstoissuecommandsbackedbyforceandsuchcommandswouldhaveauthority(generatemoralobligationsincitizenstocomply).Undermodernconditions,nondemocraticregimeswouldlacklegitimacyandauthority.Theseaccountsmayleaveuswonderingwhatweoughttodowhenwecannotestablishandsustainanidealformofdemocracy.Areweobligatedtobringaboutthebestfeasibleapproximationoftheideal?Also,existingdemocraciesthatfallfarshortoftheidealstillstrikemanyofusasmorallyattractiveascomparedtothefeasiblealternatives.Afullaccountofthemoralfoundationsofdemocracywouldincludeanaccountofhowweoughttoregardnonideallydemocraticregimesandtelluswhethersuchregimescanbelegitimateandhaveauthority.Anotherquestionaboutdemocracyiswhetherindividualssubjecttononpoliticalauthorityinchurches,workplaces,andperhapsothersettingshaverighttoademocraticsay,andifso,why,andunderwhatconditions.Onthistopic,seeJoshuaCohen,“TheEconomicBasisofDeliberativeDemocracy,”SocialPhilosophyandPolicy(1989).SeealsoMichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice(1983).