社会与政治哲学 273页

\nSOCIALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy:ContemporaryPerspectivesintroducesandexploresthecentralquestionsofsocialandpoliticalphilosophyfromopposingperspectives.Eachessayhasbeenaccessiblywrittenbyaphilosopherattheforefrontofthefield,advancingthediscussioninwaysthatareofinteresttoprofessionalphilosophersandstudentsalike.Traditionalperspectivesarebalancedwithnewchallengesthathaveemerged.Thebookconcludeswithanattempttorespondtoandreconcileanumberoftheargumentspresentedintheessays.SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy:ContemporaryPerspectivesisanexcellentcollectionthatfocusesandreinvigoratesdiscussiononthecentralquestionsofsocialandpoliticalphilosophy.JamesP.SterbaisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNotreDame.Heistheauthorofnumerousbooks,includingHowtoMakePeopleJust,FeministPhilosophies(2ndedn),MoralityinPractice(6thedn),EarthEthics(2ndedn),JusticeforHereandNowandThreeChallengestoEthics.\nSOCIALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYContemporaryperspectivesEditedbyJamesP.SterbaLondonandNewYork\nFirstpublished2001byRoutledge11NewFetterLane,LondonEC4P4EESimultaneouslypublishedintheUSAandCanadabyRoutledge29West35thStreet,NewYork,NY10001RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroupThiseditionpublishedintheTaylor&Francise-Library,2005.“TopurchaseyourowncopyofthisoranyofTaylor&FrancisorRoutledge’scollectionofthousandsofeBookspleasegotowww.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”©2001JamesP.Sterbaforselectionandeditorialmatter;individualchapters©thecontributorsAllrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereprintedorreproducedorutilizedinanyformorbyanyelectronic,mechanical,orothermeans,nowknownorhereafterinvented,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orinanyinformationstorageorretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublishers.BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataAcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibraryLibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationDataSterba,JamesP.Socialandpoliticalphilosophy:contemporaryperspectives/JamesP.Sterba.Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.1.Socialjustice.2.Justice(Philosophy).3.Socialethics.4.Politicalscience—Philosophy.5.Sociology—Philosophy.I.TitleHM671.S742001303.372–dc2100–062761ISBN0-203-46264-5Mastere-bookISBNISBN0-203-77088-9(AdobeeReaderFormat)ISBN0-415-21795-4(hbk)ISBN0-415-21796-2(pbk)\nCONTENTSNotesoncontributorsviPrefaceixPARTIIntroduction1Justiceforhereandnow2JAMESP.STERBAPARTIIFoundationsofsocialandpoliticalphilosophy30Moralmethodology311Onthehistory,natureanddisadvantagesofwarmakingphilosophy32EVEBROWNINGCOLERationality372Therationaljustificationofmoralityrevisited38ALANGEWIRTH3Theoreticalversuspracticalrationality42BERNARDGERTPARTIIIAlternativesocialandpoliticalperspectives48Libertarianism494Libertarianjustice50TIBORR.MACHAN5Lettingpeoplebepeopleandtherighttoproperty62JANNARVESONWelfareliberalism686What(welfare)justiceowescare69EVAFEDERKITTAY7Liberalismandfreedom81JOHNDEIGHVirtueethicsandcommunity898Justiceasavirtue90ROBERTC.SOLOMON9Justice,community,andthelimitstoautonomy99MICHAELBOYLANSocialism10710Socialismandegalitarianjustice108KAINIELSEN11Democraticegalitarianism122\nvCAROLC.GOULDPARTIVChallengestosocialandpoliticalphilosophy130Feminism13112Feminismandtheobjectsofjustice132ALISONM.JAGGAR13Justiceforhereandnoworthereandthen?142ROSEMARIETONGLesbianandgayperspectives15114RoutestoLakeWobegon152CLAUDIACARD15JusticeforGlennandStacy:ongender,morality,andgayrights158JOHNCORVINORacialandmulticulturalperspectives16816Whitesupremacyandracialjustice,hereandnow169CHARLESW.MILLS17Therelationshipbetweenthejusticeofthestateandthejusticeofpersons178CHUNG-YINGCHENGEnvironmentalism18218Enforcingenvironmentalethics:civiclawandnaturalvalue183HOLMESROLSTONIII19Themoralstatusofnonhumanlife194MARYANNEWARRENPARTVTheapplicationofsocialandpoliticalphilosophytononidealconditions203Justwartheoryandpacifism20420Pacifismfornonpacifists205ROBERTL.HOLMESCivildisobedienceandrevolutionaryaction21421Themoralselfinthefaceofinjustice215LAURENCETHOMASPARTVIConclusion223Towardreconciliationinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy224JAMESP.STERBAIndex244\nCONTRIBUTORSEveBrowningColeisanassociateprofessorinthephilosophydepartmentattheUniversityofMinnesotaDuluth.SheearnedaPh.D.atU.C.SanDiego,whereshefirstlearnedthattheexpression“gotothemats”(asinphilosophicalargument)doesn’trefertoyogaortranscendentalmeditation.SheworksonancientGreekphilosophy,feministphilosophy,andethics.Shehaspublishedtwobooks,ExplorationsinFeministEthics(1992)andPhilosophyandFeministCriticism(1993).AlanGewirthbeganhisteachingcareerattheUniversityofChicagoin1947,whereheisnowanemeritusprofessorofphilosophy.Hehasreceivedmanygrantsandawards.HehasbeenaRockefellerFellow,aGuggenheimFellow,andaFellowoftheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences.HeisalsopastpresidentoftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation’sWesternDivisionandpastpresidentoftheAmericanSocietyforPoliticalandLegalPhilosophy.Hisbooksinclude:ReasonandMorality(1978),HumanRights:EssaysonJustificationandApplication(1982),TheCommunityofRights(1996)andSelf-Fulfillment(1998).BernardGertisStoneProfessorofIntellectualandMoralPhilosophyandChairofthePhilosophyDepartmentatDartmouthCollegeandAdjunctProfessorofPsychiatryatDartmouthMedicalSchool.HehasalsotaughtattheJohnsHopkinsUniversity,theUniversityofEdinburgh,theHebrewUniversityofJerusalem,theNacionalUniversidaddeLaPlataandtheUniversidaddeBuenosAires.HewasthePrincipalInvestigatoronaGrantfromNationalInstitutesofHealth,“EthicalIssuesArisingfromtheHumanGenomeProject”(1990–93),whichresultedinthebookMoralityandtheNewGenetics(1996).HeiseditorofManandCitizen(1991)(ThomasHobbes’sDeHomineandDeCive);firstauthorofBioethics:AReturntoFundamentals(1997);andauthorofMorality:ItsNatureandJustification(1998).TiberR.MachanisaFreedomCommunicationsProfessorattheArgyrosSchoolofBusinessandEconomics,ChapmanUniversity,California,ResearchFellowattheHooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity,andpoliticaladvisertoFreedomCommunications,Inc.Heisawidelypublishedcolumnist,authorof20books,mostrecentlyAynRand(PeterLang,2000)andInitiative:HumanAgencyandSociety(HooverInstitutionPress,2000),editorofanother15andhaswrittenacoupleofhundredscholarlypapers.HeisalsoeditoroftheseriesPhilosophicalReflectionsonaFreeSocietyattheHooverInstitutionPress.HepublishesandeditsReasonPapers,anannualjournalofinterdisciplinarynormativestudies.JanNarvesonwaseducatedattheUniversityofChicagoandatHarvard,andisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofWaterlooinOntario,Canada,wherehehastaughtsince1963.HealsotaughtattheUniversityofNewHampshire,1961–3,andasVisitingProfessoratJohnsHopkins(1967),Stanford(1968),andCalgary(1976),andwasVisitingResearchScholarattheCentreforPhilosophyandSocialPolicy,BowlingGreenStateUniversity,Ohio(1990).Hispublicationsincludeovertwohundredpapersandreviewsinphilosophicalperiodicalsandanthologies,mainlyonethicaltheoryandpractice.HispublishedbooksincludeMoralityandUtility(JohnsHopkinsPress,1967),TheLibertarianIdea(TempleUniversityPress,1989),MoralMatters(BroadviewPress,1993),PoliticalCorrectness(co-authoredwithMarilynFriedman,1994);andtwoanthologies:MoralIssues(OxfordUP.1983)andForandAgainsttheState,co-editedwithJ.T.Sanders(Rowman&Littlefield,1996).EvaFederKittayisProfessorofPhilosophyatSUNYatStonyBrook.Inadditiontonumerousarticles,shehaspublishedthefollowingbooks:Metaphor:ItsLinguisticStructureandItsCognitiveForce(OxfordUniversityPress,1987),WomenandMoralTheory(Rowman&Littlefield,1987),Frames,FieldsandContrasts:NewEssaysinSemanticsandLexicalOrganization(LawrenceErlbaumAssociates,1992),Love’sLabor:EssaysonEqualityandDependency(Routledge,1999).JohnDeighteachesmoralandpoliticalphilosophyatNorthwesternUniversity.HeistheauthorofTheSourcesofMoralAgency,acollectionofessaysinmoralpsychology.HeistheeditorofEthics:AnInternationalJournalofSocial,PoliticalandLegalPhilosophy.RobertC.SolomonisQuincyLeeCentennialProfessorofBusinessandPhilosophyandDistinguishedTeachingProfessorattheUniversityofTexasatAustin.HeistheauthorofAbovetheBottomLine,It’sGoodBusiness,EthicsandExcellence\nviiandNewWorldofBusinessaswellasThePassions,IntheSpiritofHegel,AboutLove,APassionforJustice,UptheUniversityand(withKathleenM.Higgins)AShortHistoryofPhilosophy,APassionforWisdom,TheJoyofPhilosophy,and(mostrecently)WhatNietzscheReallySaid.MichaelBoylanisProfessorofPhilosophyatMarymountUniversity.HeistheauthorofBasicEthics,anessayinnormativeandappliedethics.Hehasalsowrittenoreditedsevenotherbooksinphilosophy.AlongwithbeingaphilosopherhehasalsopublishedfiveworksinfictionandpoetryandhasdirectedapoetryseriesintheWashington,DC,areasince1990.Boylanhasoversixtypublishedarticlesrangingfromethicstothehistoryofsciencetocriticalstudiesofcontemporaryfiction.KaiNielsenreceivedhisPh.D.fromDukeUniversity,Durham,NC.HeiscurrentlyEmeritusProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCalgaryandadjunctProfessorofPhilosophyatConcordiaUniversity.Hespecializesinmetaphilosophy,contemporaryethicalandpoliticaltheory,andMarxism.Heistheauthorofsome22booksand415articles.HismostrecentbooksareTransformingPhilosophy(1995),andNaturalismWithoutFoundations(1996).CarolC.GouldisProfessorofPhilosophyatStevensInstituteofTechnology,ResearchAssociateattheCentredeRechercheenEpistemologieAppliquée,EcolePolytechnique,C.N.R.S.,Paris,andAdjunctProfessorofInternationalandPublicAffairsatColumbiaUniversity.In2000–01,sheisFulbrightFlorenceChairofPoliticalandSocialScienceattheEuropeanUniversityInstituteinFiesole,Italy.SheistheauthorofMarx’sSocialOntology(MITPress,1978)andofRethinkingDemocracy(CambridgeUniversityPress,1988),editororco-editorofsixbooks,includingWomenandPhilosophy(withM.W.Wartofksy);BeyondDomination:NewPerspectivesonWomenandPhilosophy;TheInformationWeb:EthicalandSocialImplicationsofComputerNetworking,Gender,andmostrecently,CulturalIdentityandtheNation-State(withPasqualePasquino,Rowman&Littlefield,2001),andhaspublishedoverfortyarticles.SheiscurrentlyCo-ExecutiveDirectoroftheSocietyforPhilosophyandPublicAffairsandPresidentoftheAmericanSocietyofValueInquiry.AlisonM.JaggarisProfessorofPhilosophyandWomenStudiesattheUniversityofColoradoatBoulder.HerbooksincludeFeministFrameworks(3rdedn1993);FeministPoliticsandHumanNature(1983);Gender/Body/Knowledge:FeministReconstructionsofBeingandKnowing(1989);LivingwithContradictions:ControversiesinFeministSocialEthics(Westview,1994),MoralityandSocialJustice(1995);TheBlackwellCompaniontoFeministPhilosophy(1998).Presently,sheisworkingonSex,TruthandPowerAFeministTheoryofMoralReasonandabookofessaysonsexualequality.JaggarwasafoundermemberoftheSocietyforWomeninPhilosophy,pastchairoftheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociationCommitteeontheStatusofWomen,andpastco-presidentoftheNorthAmericanSocietyforSocialPhilosophy.RosemarieTongisDistinguishedProfessorinHealthCareEthicsintheDepartmentofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatCharlotte.Anaward-winningteacherandprolificwriterandlecturer,sheistheauthorofWomen,Sex,andtheLaw(1984),FeminineandFeministEthics(1993),FeministApproachestoBioethics:TheoreticalReflectionsandPracticalApplications(1997),andFeministThought:AMoreComprehensiveIntroduction(1998).Tongcurrentlyservesasco-coordinatoroftheInternationalNetworkonFeministApproachestoBioethics,andsheisco-editorofananthologytentativelyentitledGlobalizingFeministBioethics:Women’sHealthConcernsWorldwideandscheduledforpublicationin2000.ClaudiaCardisaFullyRevoltingHagattheUniversityofWisconsinwithtenureintheDepartmentofPhilosophyandteachingaffiliationsinWomen’sStudiesandEnvironmentalStudies.SheistheauthorofLesbianChoices(1995)andTheUnnaturalLottery:CharacterandMoralLuck(1996)andeditorofFeministEthics(1991),AdventuresinLesbianPhilosophy(1994),andOnFeministEthicsandPolitics(1998).In1996shewashonoredasDistinguishedWomanPhilosopheroftheYearbytheSocietyofWomeninPhilosophy.ShechairstheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation’sCommitteeontheStatusofLesbian,Gay,Bisexual,andTransgenderedPeopleintheProfession.Sheiscurrentlyatworkonabookontheconceptofevil,forwhichshehasreceivedanAmericanCouncilofLearnedSocietiesSeniorFellowshipandaResidentFellowshipattheInstituteforResearchintheHumanitiesattheUniversityofWisconsin.JohnCorvinoisSeniorLecturerinthephilosophydepartmentatWayneStateUniversity,Detroit.HeistheeditorofSameSex:DebatingtheEthics,Science,andCultureofHomosexuality(Rowman&Littlefield,1997).Inadditiontosexualethics,hisresearchinterestsincludebusinessethicsandHume’smetaethics.CharlesW.MillsisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofIllinoisatChicago.HereceivedhisPh.D.fromtheUniversityofToronto.Hismainresearchinterestsareinoppositionalpoliticaltheory,particularlyaroundissuesofclass,genderandrace.HehaspublishedtwobooksfromCornellUniversityPress:TheRacialContractandBlacknessVisible:EssaysonPhilosophyandRace.Chung-YingChenghasbeenamemberofthePhilosophyDepartmentattheUniversityofHawaiiatMonoasince1963.HereceivedhisdoctoratefromHarvardUniversityinthefieldofanalyticalphilosophyandlogic.Hehasreceivedfellowships\nviiiandgrantsfromtheNationalScienceFoundation,thePacificCulturalFoundationandtheStanfordInstituteinthePhilosophyofScience.HeisthefounderandapastpresidentoftheInternationalSocietyofChinesePhilosophy.HealsofoundedandservesaspresidentoftheInternationalSocietyforYijingStudies.ChenghaseditedtheJournalofChinesePhilosophysinceitsfoundingin1972andhasreceivedanHonoraryDoctoratefromtheFarEasternInstituteoftheRussianAcademyofSciences.Chenghasauthoredandedited15booksandover150articlesinWestern,Chinese,andcomparativephilosophy.Heiscurrentlyworkingonabookononto-hermeneuticsandabookoncontemporaryChinesephilosophy.HolmesRolstonIIIisProfessorofPhilosophyandUniversityDistinguishedProfessoratColoradoStateUniversity,FortCollins.HeistheauthorofEnvironmentalEthics:DutiestoandValuesintheNaturalWorld,PhilosophyGoneWild,ConservingNaturalValue,andScienceandReligion:ACriticalSurvey.HisGiffordLecturesattheUniversityofEdinburgharepublishedasGenes,GenesisandGod.HeisAssociateEditorofthejournalEnvironmentalEthicsandpastpresidentoftheInternationalSocietyforEnvironmentalEthics.MaryAnneWarrenisProfessorofPhilosophyatSanFranciscoStateUniversity.Shewritesonarangeofissuesinbiomedicalandappliedethics,includingabortion,affirmativeaction,sexsegregationineducation,medicalmeansofpre-selectingthesexofchildren,invitrofertilizationandembryoresearch,animalrights,andenvironmentalethics.Shehaspublishedthreebooks,TheNatureofWoman:AnEncyclopediaandGuidetotheLiterature(Edgepress,1980);Gendercide:TheImplicationsofSexSelection(LittlefieldAdams,1985);andMoralStatus:ObligationstoPersonsandOtherLivingThings(OxfordUniversityPress,1997).RobertL.HolmesisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofRochester,NY,andauthorofOnWarandMorality(1989)andBasicMoralPhilosophy,2ndedn(1998).FormereditorofPublicAffairsQuarterly,hehasbeenFulbrightLecturertotheSovietUnionandhasheldtheRajivGandhiChairinPeaceandDisarmamentatJawharlalNehruUniversity,NewDelhi,India.LaurenceThomasisprofessorinthedepartmentsofpoliticalscienceandphilosophyatSyracuse,wherehealsoteachesintheJewishStudiesprogram.HeistheauthorofnumerousarticlesandthreebooksLivingMorally,VesselsofEvilandSexualOrientationandHumanRights.JamesP.SterbaisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNotreDame,IN,whereheteachesmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.Hehaswrittenmorethan150articlesandpublished23books,includingHowtoMakePeopleJust(1988),ContemporarySocialandPoliticalPhilosophy(1995),SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy:ClassicalTextsinFeministandMulticulturalPerspectives,2ndedn(1998),FeministPhilosophies,2ndedn(1999),EarthEthics2ndedn(2000),MoralityinPractice,6thedn(2000),andThreeChallengesToEthics(2000).Hisbook,JusticeforHereandNow,publishedwithCambridgeUniversityPress,wasawardedthe1998BookoftheYearAwardoftheNorthAmericanSocietyforSocialPhilosophy.HeispastpresidentoftheInternationalSocietyforSocialandLegalPhilosophy,theAmericanSection,pastpresidentofConcernedPhilosophersforPeace,andpastpresidentoftheNorthAmericanSocietyforSocialPhilosophy.Hehaslecturedwidely—inEurope,Asia,andAfrica,aswellasintheUnitedStates.\nPREFACEThisisaground-breakingworkinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy.Twenty-onewell-knownphilosophershavewrittennewandsubstantialessaysexploringthecentralquestionsofsocialandpoliticalphilosophy.Eachessayhasbeenaccessiblywrittenbyaphilosopherattheforefrontofthefield.Thecontributorshavealsowrittenessaysinwhichtheycandeveloptheirownviews,andadvancethediscussionofsocialandpoliticalphilosophyinwaysthatwouldinterestprofessionalphilosophersaswellasstudents.ThethemesoftheessaysareinitiallyintroducedintheIntroduction,anddrawonmybook,JusticeforHereandNow.Differentessaysinthevolumediscussthefoundationsofsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,alternativesocialandpoliticalperspectives,challengestosocialandpoliticalphilosophy,andtheapplicationofsocialandpoliticalphilosophyundernonidealconditions.TheConclusionattemptstorespondtoandreconcileanumberoftheargumentspresentedintheessays.Thebookisidealforallrangesofcoursesinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy.Itisdesignedtoenablestudentstobuildtheirownsocialandpoliticalphilosophybymovingthemthroughthevariousstepsrequiredforitsconstruction.Theuniquenessofthecollection,thelistofwell-knowncontributors,andthefactthatthebookhastheworthypedagogicalgoalofofferingstudentsthetoolsnecessarytobuildtheirownsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,shouldmakethisanthologyawelcomeadditiontothemarket.IwishtoespeciallythankTonyBruceatRoutledgeforencouragingmeinthisprojectfromtheverybeginning;andalsotheUniversityofNotreDameforfundingtheconferenceon“AlternativeConceptionsofJustice”,14–16April2000,atwhichatnumberofthecontributionstothisvolumewerefirstpresentedandprofitablydiscussed.JamesP.Sterba\nPartIINTRODUCTION\nJUSTICEFORHEREANDNOWJamesP.SterbaToooften,doingphilosophyismodeledafterfightingabattleormakingwar.Argumentsareattacked,shotdown(likeaplane)orsunk(likeaship).Thesesaredefended,defeated,ordemolished(likethewallsofacity).Ideas(likepeople)arekilledanddestroyed.1Thereareclearlyproblemswithdoingphilosophyinthisway.Thereisunfairnessinherentinthepractice,alongwithitstendencytoundercutthepossibilityofreachingtrulyjustifiedviews.Fortunately,thereisapeacemakingalternative.Thiswayofdoingphilosophythat,whileseekingtodeterminewhatarethemostjustifiedphilosophicalviews,iscommittedto1afair-mindednessthat,amongotherthings,putsthemostfavorableinterpretationontheviewsofone’sphilosophicalopponents,2anopennessthatreachesouttounderstandchallengingnewphilosophicalviews,and3aself-criticalnessthatrequiresmodifyingorabandoningone’sphilosophicalviewsshouldtheweightofavailableevidencerequireit.FromrationalitytomoralityNowafirststeptoimplementingapeacemakingwayofdoingphilosophywithrespecttosocialandpoliticalphilosophyistoexaminecarefullythepossibilityofgroundingmoralityonthewidelysharednormsofrationality.Thisrequiresnotsimplyshowingthatmoralityisrationallypermissible,becausethatwouldimplythategoismandimmoralitywererationallypermissibleaswell.Rather,whatneedstobeshownisthatmoralityisrationallyrequired,thusexcludingegoismandimmoralityasrationallypermissible.Inhisrecentbook,TheRationalandtheMoralOrder,KurtBaierattemptstoovercomethisgapbetweenegoismandmoralitybyinterpretingmoralityasasystemofreasonsofmutualbenefitthatareappropriateforcontextsinwhicheveryone’sfollowingself-interestedreasonswouldhavesuboptimalresultsforeveryone.2Sointerpreted,moralreasonsapplyonlywhenthereexistsanadequateenforcementsystemthatmakesactingagainstthosereasonsunprofitable.Moralitysoconstruedneverrequiresanydegreeofaltruismorself-sacrifice;itonlyrequiresthatpeopleactuponreasonsofmutualbenefit.AccordingtoBaier,[The]LimitedGoodWill[ofmorality]isnotastraightforwardother-regardingorbenevolent,letaloneanaltruistic…pattern…Personsoflimitedconditionalgoodwillmaythusbemotivatedprimarilybyconcernfortheirowngoodlifeandtheirconformingwith[moral]guidelinesisacontributiontotheconcernsofothers,which(sincetheymaynotcareabouttheseothers)ismademainlyoronlybecausetherealizationoftheirownendsisseentodependonthecontributionsmadebyothers,andbecausetheyarepreparedtorecognizethereasonablenessofreciprocityinthismatter.3Giventhisinterpretationofmorality,itisnotpossiblefortheegoisttodobetterbyactingagainstmorality.Soconstrued,moralityandegoismdonotconflict.Unfortunately,thisdoesnotseemtobethedefenseofmoralityforwhichwewerehoping.Itsucceedsonlybyredefiningmoralityinaquestion-beggingwaysothatitnolongerdemandsanydegreeofaltruismorself-sacrifice,e.g.forthosewhoarepoorandmisfortunate,andinthatwayisrenderedcompatiblewithegoism.Searchingforsuchanon-question-beggingjustificationofmorality,AlanGewirthhasproposedaquitedifferentargument.4Thecentralpremisesofhisargumentcanbesummarizedasfollows:1Allagentsregardtheirpurposesasgoodaccordingtowhatevercriteriaareinvolvedintheiractionstofulfillthem.2Therefore,allagentsmustaffirmarighttothefreedomandwell-beingnecessarytoachievetheirpurposes.\nINTRODUCTION33Allagentsmustaffirmsucharightonthebasisofsimplybeingprospective,purposiveagents.4Hence,allagentsmustaffirmthateveryprospective,purposiveagenthasarighttofreedomandwell-being.Gewirthclaimsthattheuniversalizedrightaffirmedintheconclusionofhisargumentisamoralright,thatis,arightthatisaction-guidingfortherightholderandforothersaswell,arightthatimpliesatleastthatothersoughtnottointerferewiththeexerciseofthatright.Suchrightsaresymmetricallyaction-guidingbecausetheyareaction-guidingbothfortherightholderandforothersaswell.Nevertheless,thesuccessofGewirth’sargumentdependsontheimpossibilityofinterpretingtheuniversalizedrightinhisconclusionasanythingotherthanamoralright.UnfortunatelyforGewirth’sargument,anotherinterpretationispossible.Accordingtothisinterpretation,auniversalizedrightcanbededucedfromthepremisesofhisargument,butitisaprudentialright,notamoralright.ThisinterpretationisplausiblebecauseGewirthmaintainsthattherightreferredtoinpremise3isprudential,5andtheuniversalizationofaprudentialrightcanbeunderstoodtobeaprudentialright,albeitauniversalone.6Now,whatdistinguishesaprudentialrightfromamoralrightisthataprudentialrightisaction-guidingfortherightholderonly,andnotforothers,andsoitdoesnotimplythatothersoughtnottointerferewiththeexerciseofthatright.Suchrightsareasymmetricallyaction-guidingbecausetheyareaction-guidingonlyfortherightholderandnotforothers.Prudentialrightsarealsoanalogoustotheoughtsfoundinmostordinarycasesofcompetitivegames—casesthatweotherwisewouldhavethoughtconformtotherequirementsofpracticalreason.Forexample,infootballadefensiveplayermaythinkthattheopposingteam’squarterbackoughttopassonathirddownwithfiveyardstogo,whilenotwantingthequarterbacktodosoandindeedhopingtofoilanysuchattemptthequarterbackmakes.Or,toadaptanexampleofJesseKalin’s,ifyouandIareplayingchess,atacertainpointinthegameImayjudgethatyououghttomoveyourbishopandputmykingincheck,butthisjudgmentisnotaction-guidingforme.WhatIinfactshoulddoissitquietlyandhopethatyoudonotmoveasyouought.Ifyoufailtomaketheappropriatemoveand,laterinthegame,IjudgethatIoughttoputyourkingincheck,thatjudgment,bycontrast,wouldbeaction-guidingforme.Soprudentialrightsareasymmetricallyaction-guidinginjustthesamewayastheseoughtsofcompetitivegamesareasymmetricallyaction-guiding.Giventhattheuniversalrighttofreedomandwell-beingintheconclusionofGewirth’sargumentcanthusplausiblybeinterpretedtobeaprudentialright,Gewirth’sjustificationofmoralitycannotsucceed,becauseitdependsontheimpossibilityofinterpretingtheuniversalrightintheconclusionofhisargumentasanythingotherthanamoralright.Still,wecantakefromGewirth’sworktheviewthatifmoralityistoberationallyrequired,itmustbegivenanon-question-beggingjustification.MyowndefenseofmoralityemploysthesamegeneralstrategyasthoseofferedbyBaierandGewirth.Itdiffersfromtheirsprimarilyinthatitintroducestheperspectiveofaltruisminconstructinganon-question-beggingargumenttoshowthategoismiscontrarytoreason.ButIclaimthatthisisjustthemissingingredientthatisneededtomaketheargumentwork.Toseethis,letusbeginbyimaginingthateachofusiscapableofentertainingandactinguponbothself-interestedandmoralreasons,andthatthequestionweareseekingtoansweriswhatsortofreasonsforactionitwouldberationalforustoaccept.7Thisquestionisnotaboutwhatsortofreasonsweshouldpubliclyaffirm,sincepeoplewillsometimespubliclyaffirmreasonsthatarequitedifferentfromthosetheyarepreparedtoactupon.Ratheritisaquestionaboutwhatreasonsitwouldberationalforustoacceptatthedeepestlevel—inourheartofhearts.Ofcourse,therearepeoplewhoareincapableofactinguponmoralreasons.Forsuchpeople,thereisnoquestionabouttheirbeingrequiredtoactmorallyoraltruistically.Yettheinterestingphilosophicalquestionisnotaboutsuchpeoplebutaboutpeople,likeourselves,whoarecapableofactingself-interestedlyormorallyandareseekingarationaljustificationforfollowingaparticularcourseofaction.Intryingtodeterminehowweshouldact,letusassumethatwewouldliketobeabletoconstructagoodargumentfavoringmoralityoveregoism,andgiventhatgoodargumentsarenon-question-begging,weaccordinglywouldliketoconstructanargumentthatdoesnotbegthequestionasfaraspossible.Thequestionatissuehereiswhatreasonseachofusshouldtakeassupreme,andthisquestionwouldbebeggedagainstegoismifweproposetoansweritsimplybyassumingfromthestartthatmoralreasonsarethereasonsthateachofusshouldtakeassupreme.Butthequestionwouldbebeggedagainstmoralityaswellifweproposedtoanswerthequestionsimplybyassumingfromthestartthatself-interestedreasonsarethereasonsthateachofusshouldtakeassupreme.Thismeans,ofcourse,thatwecannotanswerthequestionofwhatreasonsweshouldtakeassupremesimplybyassumingthegeneralprincipleofegoism:Eachpersonoughttodowhatbestserveshisorheroverallself-interest.Wecannomoreargueforegoismsimplybydenyingtherelevanceofmoralreasonstorationalchoice,thanwecanargueforpurealtruismsimplybydenyingtherelevanceofself-interestedreasonstorationalchoiceandassumingthefollowinggeneralprincipleofpurealtruism:\n4JAMESP.STERBAEachpersonoughttodowhatbestservestheoverallinterestofothers.8Consequently,inordernottobegthequestion,wehavenootheralternativebuttogranttheprimafacierelevanceofbothself-interestedandmoralreasonstorationalchoice,andthentrytodeterminewhichreasonswewouldberationallyrequiredtoactupon,allthingsconsidered.Noticethatinordernottobegthequestion,itisnecessarytobackofffromboththegeneralprincipleofegoismandthegeneralprincipleofpurealtruism,thusgrantingtheprimafacierelevanceofbothself-interestedandmoralreasonstorationalchoice.Fromthisstandpoint,itisstillanopenquestionwhethereitheregoismorpurealtruismwillberationallypreferable,allthingsconsidered.Inthisregard,therearetwokindsofcasethatmustbeconsidered.First,therearecasesinwhichthereisaconflictbetweentherelevantself-interestedandmoralreasons.Second,therearecasesinwhichthereisnosuchconflict.Itseemsobviousthatwherethereisnoconflictandbothreasonsareconclusivereasonsoftheirkind,bothreasonsshouldbeactedupon.Insuchcontexts,weshoulddowhatisfavoredbothbymoralityandbyself-interest.Whenwerationallyassesstherelevantreasonsinconflictcases,itisbesttocasttheconflictnotasaconflictbetweenself-interestedreasonsandmoralreasons,butinsteadasaconflictbetweenself-interestedreasonsandaltruisticreasons.9Viewedinthisway,threesolutionsarepossible.First,wecouldsaythatself-interestedreasonsalwayshavepriorityoverconflictingaltruisticreasons.Second,wecouldsayjusttheopposite,thataltruisticreasonsalwayshavepriorityoverconflictingself-interestedreasons.Third,wecouldsaythatsomekindofcompromiseisrationallyrequired.Inthiscompromise,sometimesself-interestedreasonswouldhavepriorityoveraltruisticreasons,andsometimesaltruisticreasonswouldhavepriorityoverself-interestedreasons.Oncetheconflictisdescribedinthismanner,thethirdsolutioncanbeseentobetheonethatisrationallyrequired.Thisisbecausethefirstandsecondsolutionsgiveexclusiveprioritytooneclassofrelevantreasonsovertheother,andonlyacompletelyquestion-beggingjustificationcanbegivenforsuchanexclusivepriority.Onlybyemployingthethirdsolution,andsometimesgivingprioritytoself-interestedreasons,andsometimesgivingprioritytoaltruisticreasons,canweavoidacompletelyquestion-beggingresolution.Noticealsothatthisstandardofrationalitywillnotsupportjustanycompromisebetweentherelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasons.Thecompromisemustbeanonarbitraryone,forotherwiseitwouldbegthequestionwithrespecttotheopposingegoisticandaltruisticperspectives.10Suchacompromisewouldhavetorespecttherankingsofself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsimposedbytheegoisticandaltruisticperspectives,respectively.Sinceforeachindividualthereisaseparaterankingofthatindividual’srelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasons(whichwillvary,ofcourse,dependingontheindividual’scapabilitiesandcircumstances),wecanrepresenttheserankingsfromthemostimportantreasonstotheleastimportantreasons,asshowninthetable.IndividualAIndividualBSelf-interestedreasonsAltruisticreasonsSelf-interestedreasonsAltruisticreasons111122223333............NNNNAccordingly,anynonarbitrarycompromiseamongsuchreasonsinseekingnottobegthequestionagainsteitheregoismorpurealtruism,willhavetogiveprioritytothosereasonsthatrankhighestineachcategory.Failuretogiveprioritytothehighest-rankingaltruisticorself-interestedreasonswould,otherthingsbeingequal,becontrarytoreason.Ofcourse,therewillbecasesinwhichtheonlywaytoavoidbeingrequiredtodowhatiscontrarytoyourhighest-rankingreasonsisbyrequiringsomeoneelsetodowhatiscontrarytoherhighest-rankingreasons.Someofthesecaseswillbe“lifeboatcases,”as,forexample,whereyouandtwoothersarestrandedonalifeboatwhichhasonlyenoughresourcesfortwoofyoutosurvivebeforeyouwillberescued.Butalthoughsuchcasesaresurelydifficulttoresolve(maybeonlyachancemechanismcanofferareasonableresolution),theysurelydonotreflectthetypicalconflictbetweentherelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsthatweareorwereabletoacquire.Typically,oneortheotheroftheconflictingreasonswillranksignificantlyhigheronitsrespectivescale,thuspermittingaclearresolution.\nINTRODUCTION5Nowwecanseehowmoralitycanbeviewedasjustsuchanonarbitrarycompromisebetweenself-interestedandaltruisticreasons.First,acertainamountofself-regardismorallyrequiredoratleastmorallyacceptable.Wherethisisthecase,high-rankingself-interestedreasonshavepriorityoverlow-rankingaltruisticreasons.Second,moralityobviouslyplaceslimitsontheextenttowhichpeopleshouldpursuetheirownself-interest.Wherethisisthecase,high-rankingaltruisticreasonshavepriorityoverlow-rankingself-interestedreasons.Inthisway,moralitycanbeseentobeanonarbitrarycompromisebetweenself-interestedandaltruisticreasons,andthe“moralreasons”thatconstitutethatcompromisecanbeseenashavinganabsolutepriorityovertheself-interestedoraltruisticreasonsthatconflictwiththem.11Ofcourse,exactlyhowthiscompromiseistobeworkedoutisamatterofconsiderabledebate.Yethoweverthisdebateisresolved,itisclearthatsomesortofacompromisemoralsolutionisrationallypreferabletoeitheregoismorpurealtruismwhenjudgedfromanon-question-beggingstandpoint.Inthisway,itispossibletoarguefromrationalitytomorality.Nevertheless,mostcontemporaryphilosophersdonottrytojustifymoralitybyappealingtonormsofrationalityalone.Rather,theyclaimthatmoralitymustbegroundedintheacceptanceofmoralvalueslikeliberty,fairness,equality,orthecommongood,andtheonlyquestioniswhatthesemoralvaluesrequireinpractice.Atthisjuncture,somephilosophershavetakenamorepessimisticturnwhileothershavetakenamoreoptimisticone.Thosewhohavetakenthemorepessimisticturncontendthatbecausethemoralvaluesthatpeopleholdareincommensurabletheyleadtoradicallydifferentpracticalrequirements.12Thosewhohavetakenthemoreoptimisticturncontendthatwhilepeopledoholdsomeincommensurablevalues,itisstillpossibletoachieveatleastapartialagreementonpracticalrequirements.13Onestrategyfordeterminingwhichoftheseviewsiscorrectistoexaminesocialandpoliticalphilosophicalperspectivesthatappeartohaveminimalpracticalrequirements,likelibertarianism,todeterminewhatpracticalrequirementsactuallydofollowfromthem.Ifitturnsoutthatthepracticalrequirementsofsuchsocialandpoliticalphilosophicalperspectivescanbeshowntobemoreextensivethantheiradvocatesmaintain,itmaybepossibletoreconcilethematthepracticallevelwithothersocialandpoliticalphilosophicalperspectives.Forexample,ifthelibertarian’sidealoflibertycouldbeshowntohavethesamepracticalrequirementsasthewelfareliberal’sidealoffairnessandthesocialist’sidealofequality,then,atleastatthepracticallevel,itwouldbepossibletoreconcilelibertarianismwithwelfareliberalismandsocialism.Sinceourpeacemakingmodelofdoingphilosophyiscommittedtoprovidingthestrongestpossiblejustificationforpracticalrequirements,asecondsteprequiredbythismodelistoexaminecarefullythepossibilityofachievingapracticalreconciliationofalternativesocialandpoliticalphilosophicalperspectivesbyarguinginthisfashion.14FromlibertytoequalityThus,supposeweinterprettheidealoflibertyinthemannerfavoredbylibertarians.15Sounderstood,libertyistheabsenceofinterferencebyotherpeoplefromdoingwhatonewantsorisabletodo.Interpretingtheiridealinthisway,libertariansclaimtoderiveanumberofmorespecificrequirements,inparticulararighttolife,arighttofreedomofspeech,pressandassembly,andarighttopropertyHereitisimportanttoobservethatthelibertarian’srighttolifeisnotarighttoreceivefromothersthegoodsandresourcesnecessaryforpreservingone’slife;itissimplyarightnottobekilledunjustly.Correspondingly,thelibertarian’srighttopropertyisnotarighttoreceivefromothersthegoodsandresourcesnecessaryforone’swelfare,butratherarighttoacquiregoodsandresourceseitherbyinitialacquisitionorbyvoluntaryagreement.Ofcourse,libertarianswouldallowthatitwouldbeniceoftherichtosharetheirsurplusresourceswiththepoor.Nevertheless,accordingtolibertarians,suchactsofcharityshouldnotbecoercivelyrequired.Forthisreason,libertariansareopposedtocoercivelysupportedwelfareprograms.Now,inordertoseewhylibertariansaremistakenaboutwhattheiridealrequires,consideratypicalconflictsituationbetweentherichandthepoor.Inthisconflictsituation,therich,ofcourse,havemorethanenoughresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.Bycontrast,thepoorlacktheresourcestomeettheirmostbasicneedseventhoughtheyhavetriedallthemeansavailabletothemthatlibertariansregardaslegitimateforacquiringsuchresources.Undercircumstanceslikethese,libertariansusuallymaintainthattherichshouldhavethelibertytousetheirresourcestosatisfytheirluxuryneedsiftheysowish.Libertariansrecognizethatthislibertymightwellbeenjoyedattheexpenseofthesatisfactionofthemostbasicneedsofthepoor;theyjustthinkthatlibertyalwayshaspriorityoverotherpoliticalideals,andsincetheyassumethatthelibertyofthepoorisnotatstakeinsuchconflictsituations,itiseasyforthemtoconcludethattherichshouldnotberequiredtosacrificetheirlibertysothatthebasicneedsofthepoormaybemet.Ofcourse,libertarianswouldallowthatitwouldbeniceoftherichtosharetheirsurplusresourceswiththepoor.Nevertheless,accordingtolibertarians,suchactsofcharityarenotrequiredbecausethelibertyofthepoorisnotthoughttobeatstakeinsuchconflictsituations.Infact,however,thelibertyofthepoorisatstakeinsuchconflictsituations.Whatisatstakeisthelibertyofthepoornottobeinterferedwithintakingfromthesurpluspossessionsoftherichwhatisnecessarytosatisfytheirbasicneeds.Whenlibertariansarebroughttoseethatthisisthecase,theyaregenuinelysurprised,onemightevensayrudelyawakened,fortheyhadnotpreviouslyseentheconflictbetweentherichandthepoorasaconflictofliberties.16\n6JAMESP.STERBAWhentheconflictbetweentherichandthepoorisviewedasaconflictofliberties,wecaneithersaythattherichshouldhavethelibertynottobeinterferedwithinusingtheirsurplusresourcesforluxurypurposes,orwecansaythatthepoorshouldhavethelibertynottobeinterferedwithintakingfromtherichwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneeds.Ifwechooseoneliberty,wemustrejecttheother.Whatneedstobedetermined,therefore,iswhichlibertyismorallypreferable:thelibertyoftherichorthelibertyofthepoor.Isubmitthatthelibertyofthepoor,whichisthelibertynottobeinterferedwithintakingfromthesurplusresourcesofotherswhatisrequiredtomeetone’sbasicneeds,ismorallypreferabletothelibertyoftherich,whichisthelibertynottobeinterferedwithinusingone’ssurplusresourcesforluxurypurposes.Toseethatthisisthecase,weneedonlyappealtooneofthemostfundamentalprinciplesofmorality,onethatiscommontoallsocialandpoliticalperspectives,namely,the“ought”implies“can”principle.Accordingtothisprinciple,peoplearenotmorallyrequiredtodowhattheylackthepowertodoorwhatwouldinvolvesogreatasacrificethatitwouldbeunreasonabletoask,and/orincasesofsevereconflictofinterest,unreasonabletorequirethemtoabideby.Forexample,supposeIpromisedtoattendadepartmentalmeetingonFriday,butonThursdayIaminvolvedinaseriouscaraccidentwhichputsmeintoacoma.SurelyitisnolongerthecasethatIoughttoattendthemeetingnowthatIlackthepowertodoso.OrsupposeinsteadthatonThursdayIdevelopaseverecaseofpneumoniaforwhichIamhospitalized.SurelyIcouldlegitimatelyclaimthatIcannotattendthemeetingonthegroundsthattherisktomyhealthinvolvedinattendingisasacrificethatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskmetobear.Orsupposetherisktomyhealthfromhavingpneumoniaisnotsoseriousthatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskmetoattendthemeeting(asupererogatoryrequest),itmightstillbeseriousenoughtobeunreasonabletorequiremyattendanceatthemeeting(ademandthatisbackedupbyblameorcoercion).Whatisdistinctiveaboutthisformulationofthe“ought”implies“can”principleisthatitclaimsthattherequirementsofmoralitycannot,allthingsconsidered,beunreasonabletoask,and/orincasesofsevereconflictofinterest,unreasonabletorequirepeopletoabideby.Theprincipleclaimsthatreasonandmoralitymustbelinkedinanappropriateway,especiallyifwearegoingtobeabletojustifiablyuseblameorcoerciontogetpeopletoabidebytherequirementsofmorality.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatwhilemajorfiguresinthehistoryofphilosophy,andmostphilosopherstoday,includingvirtuallyalllibertarianphilosophers,acceptthislinkbetweenreasonandmorality,thelinkisnotusuallyconceivedtobepartofthe“ought”implies“can”principle.Nevertheless,Iclaimthattherearegoodreasonsforassociatingthislinkbetweenreasonandmoralitywiththe“ought”implies“can”principle,namely,ouruseoftheword“can”asintheexamplejustgiven,andthenaturalprogressionfromlogical,physicalandpsychologicalpossibilityfoundinthetraditional“ought”implies“can”principletothenotionofmoralpossibilityfoundinthisformulationofthe“ought”implies“can”principle.Inanycase,theacceptabilityofthisformulationofthe“ought”implies“can”principleisdeterminedbythevirtualuniversalacceptanceofitscomponents,andnotbythemannerinwhichIhaveproposedtojointhosecomponentstogether.17Applyingthe“ought”implies“can”principletothecaseathand,itseemsclearthatthepoorhaveitwithintheirpowerwillinglytorelinquishsuchanimportantlibertyasthelibertytotakefromtherichwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneeds.Nevertheless,itwouldbeunreasonabletoaskorrequirethemtomakesogreatasacrifice.Intheextremecase,itwouldinvolveaskingorrequiringthepoortositbackandstarvetodeath.Ofcourse,thepoormayhavenorealalternativetorelinquishingthisliberty.Todoanythingelsemayinvolveworseconsequencesforthemselvesandtheirlovedonesandmayinviteapainfuldeath.Accordingly,wemayexpectthatthepoorwouldacquiesce,albeitunwillingly,toapoliticalsystemthatdeniedthemtherighttowelfaresupportedbysuchaliberty,atthesametimethatwerecognizethatsuchasystemimposedanunreasonablesacrificeuponthepoor—asacrificethatwecouldnotmorallyblamethepoorfortryingtoevade.18Analogously,wemightexpectthatawomanwhoselifewasthreatenedwouldsubmittoarapist’sdemands,atthesametimethatwerecognizetheutterunreasonablenessofthosedemands.Bycontrast,itwouldnotbeunreasonabletoaskandrequiretherichtosacrificethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedssothatthepoorcanhavethelibertytomeettheirbasicneeds.19Naturally,wemightexpectthattherich,forreasonsofself-interestandpastcontributions,mightbedisinclinedtomakesuchasacrifice.Wemightevensupposethatthepastcontributionoftherichprovidesagoodreasonfornotsacrificingtheirlibertytousetheirsurplusforluxurypurposes.Yet,unlikethepoor,therichcouldnotclaimthatrelinquishingsuchalibertyinvolvedsogreatasacrificethatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskandrequirethemtomakeit;unlikethepoor,therichcouldbemorallyblameworthyforfailingtomakesuchasacrifice.Consequently,ifweassumethathoweverelsewespecifytherequirementsofmorality,theycannotviolatethe“ought”implies“can”principle,itfollowsthat,despitewhatlibertariansclaim,therighttolibertyendorsedbythemactuallyfavorsthelibertyofthepooroverthelibertyoftherich.Yetcouldn’tlibertariansobjecttothisconclusion,claimingthatitwouldbeunreasonabletoasktherichtosacrificethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedssothatthepoorcouldhavethelibertytomeettheirbasicneeds?AsIhavepointedout,libertariansdon’tusuallyseethesituationasaconflictofliberties,butsupposetheydid.Howplausiblewouldsuchanobjectionbe?Notveryplausibleatall,Ithink.\nINTRODUCTION7Forconsider:whatarelibertariansgoingtosayaboutthepoor?Isn’titclearlyunreasonabletorequirethepoortosacrificethelibertytomeettheirbasicneedssothattherichcanhavethelibertytomeettheirluxuryneeds?Isn’titclearlyunreasonabletorequirethepoortositbackandstarvetodeath?Ifitis,then,thereisnoresolutionofthisconflictthatwouldbereasonabletorequireboththerichandthepoortoaccept.Butthatwouldmeanthatlibertarianscouldnotbeputtingforthamoralideal,becauseamoralidealresolvessevereconflictsofinterestinwaysthatitwouldbereasonabletoaskandrequireeveryoneaffectedtoaccept.Therefore,aslongaslibertariansthinkofthemselvesasputtingforthamoralideal,theycannotallowthatitwouldbeunreasonableincasesofsevereconflictofinterestbothtorequiretherichtosacrificethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedsinordertobenefitthepoor,andtorequirethepoortosacrificethelibertytomeettheirbasicneedsinordertobenefittherich.ButIsubmitthatifoneoftheserequirementsistobejudgedreasonable,then,byanyneutralassessment,itmustbetherequirementthattherichsacrificethelibertytomeetsomeoftheirluxuryneedssothatthepoorcanhavethelibertytomeettheirbasicneeds;thereisnootherplausibleresolution,iflibertariansintendtobeputtingforthamoralideal.Inbrief,Ihavearguedthatalibertarianidealoflibertycanbeseentosupportarighttowelfarethroughanapplicationofthe“ought”implies“can”principletoconflictsbetweentherichandthepoor.IntheinterpretationIhaveused,theprinciplesupportssuchrightsbyfavoringthelibertyofthepooroverthelibertyoftherich.Inanotherinterpretation(developedelsewhere),theprinciplesupportssuchrightsbyfavoringaconditionalrighttopropertyoveranunconditionalrighttoproperty.20Ineitherinterpretation,whatiscrucialtothederivationoftheserightsistheclaimthatitwouldbeunreasonabletorequirethepoortodenytheirbasicneedsandacceptanythinglessthantheserightsastheconditionfortheirwillingcooperation.Inhisbook,IndividualsandtheirRights,TiborMachancriticizesmyargumentthatalibertarianidealoflibertyleadstowelfarerights,acceptingitstheoreticalthrustbutdenyingitspracticalsignificance.21HeappreciatestheforceoftheargumentenoughtograntthatifthetypeofconflictcasesIdescribebetweentherichandthepooractuallyobtained,thepoorwouldhavewelfarerights.Buthedeniesthatsuchcases—inwhichthepoorhavedoneallthattheylegitimatelycantosatisfytheirbasicneedsinalibertariansociety—actuallyobtain.“Normally,”hewrites,“personsdonotlacktheopportunitiesandresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.”22Butthisresponsevirtuallyconcedeseverythingthatdefendersofwelfarerightshadhopedtoestablish.Forthepoor’srighttowelfareisnotunconditional.Itisconditionalprincipallyuponthepoordoingallthattheylegitimatelycantomeettheirownbasicneeds.Soitisonlywhenthepoorlacksufficientopportunitytosatisfytheirownbasicneedsthatarighttowelfarehasmoralforce.Accordingly,onlibertariangrounds,Machanhasconcededthelegitimacyofjustthekindofrighttowelfarethatdefendersofwelfarehadhopedtoestablish.Itispossiblethatlibertariansconvincedtosomeextentbytheaboveargumentsmightwanttoacceptarighttowelfarebutdenythatthereisarighttoequalopportunity.Suchastance,however,isonlyplausibleifweunjustifiablyrestricttheclassofmorallylegitimateclaimantstothosewithinagiven(affluent)society,foronlythenwouldarighttoequalopportunityrequiresomethingdifferentfromarightnottobediscriminatedagainstinfillingrolesandpositionsinsocietythatfollowsfromarighttowelfare.23Toseewhythisisthecase,considerwhatisrequiredbyarighttowelfarewhentheclassofmorallylegitimateclaimantsisnotunjustifiablyrestricted,butistakentoincludebothdistantpeoplesandfuturegenerations.Atpresentthereisprobablyasufficientworldwidesupplyofgoodsandresourcestomeetthenormalcostsofsatisfyingthebasicnutritionalneedsofallexistingpersons.AccordingtoformerUSSecretaryofAgriculture,BobBergland,Forthepast20years,iftheavailableworldfoodsupplyhadbeenevenlydividedanddistributed,eachpersonwouldhavereceivedmorethantheminimumnumberofcalories.24Otherauthoritieshavemadesimilarassessmentsoftheavailableworldfoodsupply.25Accordingly,theadoptionofapolicyofsupportingarighttowelfareforallexistingpersonswouldnecessitatesignificantchanges,especiallyindevelopedcountries.Forexample,thelargepercentageoftheUSpopulationwhosefoodconsumptionclearlyexceedsevenanadequatelyadjustedpovertyindexmighthavetoaltertheireatinghabitssubstantially.Inparticular,theymighthavetoreducetheirconsumptionofbeefandporkinordertomakemoregrainavailablefordirecthumanconsumption.(Currently,37%ofworldwideproductionofgrainand70%ofUSproductionisfedtoanimals.26)Thusatleastthesatisfactionofatleastsomeofthenonbasicneedsofthemoreadvantagedindevelopedcountrieswillhavetobeforgone,ifthebasicnutritionalneedsofallthoseindevelopingandunderdevelopedcountriesaretobemet.Ofcourse,meetingthelong-termbasicnutritionalneedsofthesesocietieswillrequireotherkindsofaid,includingappropriatetechnologyandtrainingandtheremovaloftradebarriersfavoringdevelopedsocieties.27Inaddition,raisingthestandardoflivingindevelopingandunderdevelopedcountrieswillrequireasubstantialincreaseintheconsumptionofenergyandotherresources.Butsuchanincreasewillhavetobematchedbyasubstantialdecreaseintheconsumptionofthesegoodsindevelopedcountries;otherwise,globalecologicaldisasterwillresultfromincreasedglobalwarming,ozonedepletionandacidrain,loweringvirtuallyeveryone’sstandardofliving.28Forexample,sometypeofmutuallybeneficialarrangementneedsto\n8JAMESP.STERBAbenegotiatedwithChina,which,with50%oftheworld’scoalresources,planstodoubleitsuseofcoalwithinthenexttwodecades,yetiscurrentlyburning85%ofitscoalwithoutanypollutioncontrolswhatsoever.29Furthermore,oncethebasicnutritionalneedsoffuturegenerationsarealsotakenintoaccount,thesatisfactionofthenonbasicneedsofthemoreadvantagedindevelopedcountrieswouldhavetobefurtherrestricted,inordertopreservethefertilityofcroplandandotherfood-relatednaturalresourcesfortheuseoffuturegenerations.Obviously,theonlyassuredwaytoguaranteetheenergyandresourcesnecessaryforthesatisfactionofthebasicneedsoffuturegenerationsistosetasideresourcesthatwouldotherwisebeusedtosatisfythenonbasicneedsofexistinggenerations.Andoncebasicneedsotherthannutritionalonesaretakenintoaccountaswell,stillfurtherrestrictionswillberequired.Forexample,ithasbeenestimatedthatpresentlyaNorthAmericanusesaboutfiftytimesmoregoodsandresourcesthanapersonlivinginIndia.ThismeansthatintermsofresourceconsumptiontheNorthAmericancontinent’spopulationaloneconsumesasmuchas12.5billionpeoplelivinginIndiawouldconsume.30So,unlessweassumethatbasicgoodsandresources,suchasarableland,iron,coal,oil,andsoforth,areinunlimitedsupply,thisunequalconsumptionwouldhavetoberadicallyalteredinorderforthebasicneedsofdistantpeoplesandfuturegenerationstobemet.31Accordingly,recognizingarighttowelfareapplicablebothtodistantpeoplesandtofuturegenerationswouldleadtoastateofaffairsinwhichfewresourceswouldbeavailablefordirectlymeetingnonbasicneeds,andthiswouldsignificantlyaffecttherighttoequalopportunitythatpeoplecanbeguaranteed.TheformofequalopportunitythatJohnRawlsdefendsinATheoryofJusticerequiresthatpersonswhohavethesamenaturalassetsandthesamewillingnesstousethemhaveanequalchancetooccupyrolesandpositionsinsocietycommensuratewiththeirnaturalassets.32Soconstrued,equalopportunityprovidestwosortsofbenefit.Itbenefitssocietyasawholebyhelpingtoensurethatthemosttalentedpeoplewillfillthemostresponsiblerolesandpositionsinsociety;itbenefitsindividualsbyensuringthattheywillnotbediscriminatedagainstwithrespecttofillingtherolesandpositionsinsocietyforwhichtheyarequalified,therebygivingthemafairchanceofsecuringwhateverbenefitsattachtothoserolesandpositions.Ihaveargued,however,thatonceitisrecognizedthattheclassofmorallylegitimateclaimantsincludesdistantpeoplesandfuturegenerations,thenguaranteeingarighttowelfaretoallmorallylegitimateclaimantswouldleadtoastateofaffairsinwhichfewresourceswouldbeavailablefordirectlymeetingnonbasicneeds,althoughsuchneedsmightstillbemetindirectlythroughthesatisfactionofbasicneeds.Asaconsequence,therenormallywouldnotbegreaterbenefitsattachingtocertainrolesandpositionsinsociety,sincepeoplecanexpectonlytohavetheirbasicneedsdirectlymetinwhateverrolesandpositionstheyhappenedtooccupy.Ofcourse,wewouldstillwantthemosttalentedpeopletooccupythemostresponsiblerolesandpositionsinsociety,itisjustthatoccupyingthoserolesandpositionswouldnormallynotsecuregreaterbenefitstothosewhooccupythem.Therefore,toensurethatthemosttalentedpeopleoccupyrolesandpositionscommensuratewiththeirabilities,wewillneedtodosomethinglikethefollowing.First,borrowinganideafromsocialistjustice,wewillneedtomaketherolesandpositionspeopleoccupyasintrinsicallyrewardingaspossible.Second,wewillneedtoconvincethemoretalentedthattheyhaveamoralresponsibilitytothelesstalentedandtosocietyasawholetousetheirtalentstothefullest.Consequently,theequalopportunitythatwillbeguaranteedtoeveryoneinsocietywill,forthemostpart,beafairmeansofensuringthateveryone’sbasicneedsaremet,ratherthanameansofprovidingdifferentialrewardsorofservingdirectlytomeetnonbasicneeds.Accordingly,mypracticalreconciliationargumentfailstoguaranteearighttoequalopportunitythatprovidesgreaterbenefitstothetalented,enablingthemdirectlytomeetnonbasicaswellasbasicneeds.Butthisfailureisnoobjectiontomyargument,giventhathavingthissortofequalopportunityisincompatiblewiththemorefundamentalrequirementofmeetingeveryone’sbasicneeds.Onthisaccount,bothlibertariansandwelfareliberalswouldcometoendorsethesamerighttoequalopportunity—anequalrightnottobediscriminatedagainstinfillingrolesandpositionsinsocietythatiscompatiblewitharighttowelfare.Whattheseargumentsshow,therefore,isthatlibertarianismoralibertarianconceptionofjusticesupportsthesamepracticalrequirementsaswelfareliberalismorawelfareliberalconceptionofjustice:bothfavorarighttowelfareandarighttoequalopportunity.Still,onemightwanttopressMachan’sobjectiontothisargumentfromlibertytoequality,whichisthattheargumenthasnopracticalsignificancebecause“personsdonotlacktheopportunitiesandresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.”However,thisobjectionisparticularlyeasytorefuteoncethelibertarianidealisseentogroundauniversalrighttowelfare.Thisisbecausethereissimplynodenyingthatmostofthe1.2billionpeoplewhoarelivingtodayinconditionsofabsolutepoverty“lacktheopportunitiesandresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.”33Yettheobjectionalsofailswhenwelookcloselyatthepoorwithinourownsociety.Itisestimatedthatsome32millionAmericanslivebelowtheofficialpovertyindex,andthatonefifthofAmericanchildrenaregrowingupinpoverty.34SurelymanyoftheseAmericansalso“lacktheopportunitiesandresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.”Itmightalsobeobjectedthatthisargumentfallsvictimtoitsownsuccess.Ifauniversalrighttowelfarerequiresanequalsharingofresources,wouldn’ttalentedpeoplesimplylacktheincentivetoproduceaccordingtotheirabilitywhensucharightisenforced?Butwhatsortofincentiveisneeded?Surelytherewouldbemoralincentiveforthetalentedtomakethe\nINTRODUCTION9necessarysacrificesiftheidealoflibertyrequiressucharighttowelfare.Yet,exceptforthosewhocloselyidentifywithsuchmoralincentives,therewouldnotbesufficientself-interestedincentivetoaccepttheequalityofresourcesrequiredbyauniversalrighttowelfare.Evenso,ifitcanbeshown,asIclaim,thatmoralityhaspriorityoverself-interestedprudence,thereisnoquestionofwhatoughttobedone.Soinbrief,alibertarianconceptionofjusticesupportsthesamerightstowelfareandequalopportunityasthoseendorsedbyawelfareliberalconceptionofjustice.Inthisway,itispossibletoarguefromlibertytoequality.FromequalitytofeminismNowawelfareliberalconceptionofjustice,invirtueofitsrighttoequalopportunity,hasbeenappealedtobycontemporaryfeministsinsupportofaconceptionoffeministjusticethataccordswiththeidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussociety.Buthowisthisidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussocietytobeinterpreted?Itisasocietywherebasicrightsanddutiesarenotassignedonthebasisofaperson’sbiologicalsex.Beingmaleorfemaleisnotthegroundsfordeterminingwhatbasicrightsanddutiesapersonhasinagender-freesociety.Butthisistocharacterizethefeministidealonlynegatively.Ittellsuswhatweneedtogetridof,notwhatweneedtoputinitsplace.Amorepositivecharacterizationisprovidedbytheidealofandrogyny.Puttingtheidealoffeministjusticemorepositivelyintermsoftheidealofandrogynyalsohelpstobringoutwhymenshouldbeattractedtofeministjustice.Inawellknownarticle,JoyceTrebilcotdistinguishestwoformsofandrogyny.35Thefirstpostulatesthesameidealforeveryone.Accordingtothisformofandrogyny,theidealperson“combinescharacteristicsusuallyattributedtomenwithcharacteristicsusuallyattributedtowomen.”Thusweshouldexpectbothnurturanceandmastery,opennessandobjectivity,compassionandcompetitiveness,fromeachandeverypersonwhohasthecapacitiesforthesetraits.Bycontrast,thesecondformofandrogynydoesnotadvocatethesameidealforeveryone,butratheravarietyofoptionsfrom“pure”femininityto“pure”masculinity.AsTrebilcotpointsout,thisformofandrogynyshareswiththefirsttheviewthatbiologicalsexshouldnotbethebasisfordeterminingtheappropriatenessofgendercharacterization.Itdiffersinthatitholdsthat“allalternativeswithrespecttogendershouldbeequallyavailabletoandequallyapprovedforeveryone,regardlessofsex.”Itwouldbeamistake,however,todistinguishsharplybetweenthesetwoformsofandrogyny.Properlyunderstood,theyaresimplytwodifferentfacetsofasingleideal.For,asMaryAnneWarrenhasargued,thesecondformofandrogynyisappropriateonly“withrespecttofeminineandmasculinetraitswhicharelargelymattersofpersonalstyleandpreferenceandwhichhavelittledirectmoralsignificance.”36However,whenweconsiderso-calledfeminineandmasculinevirtues,itisthefirstformofandrogynythatisrequired,becausethen,otherthingsbeingequal,thesamevirtuesareappropriateforeveryone.Wecanevenformulatetheidealofandrogynymoreabstractlysothatitisnolongerspecifiedintermsofso-calledfeminineandmasculinetraits.Wecanspecifytheidealasrequiringnomorethanthatthetraitsthataretrulydesirableinsocietybeequallyopentobothwomenandmenor,inthecaseofvirtues,equallyexpectedofbothwomenandmen,otherthingsbeingequal.Mostcontemporarydefensesoftheidealofandrogynyattempttoderiveitfromvariousconceptionsofequality.Somefeministshavetriedtoderivetheidealfromawelfareliberalconceptionofequalopportunity,andothersfromasocialistconceptionofequalself-development.Letmebrieflyconsidereachofthesedefensesinturn.Obviously,arighttoequalopportunitycouldbeinterpreted,minimally,asprovidingpeopleonlywiththesamelegalrightsofaccesstoalladvantagedpositionsinsocietyforwhichtheyarequalified.Butthisisnottheinterpretationthatshouldbegiventhisright,eitherbywelfareliberalsorbylibertarians.Rather,itwasarguedthatarighttoequalopportunityshouldbeinterpretedasarightnottobediscriminatedagainstinfillingtherolesandpositionsinsociety,anditisthisrighttoequalopportunitythatfeministshavetendedtofocusoninattemptingtojustifytheidealofandrogyny.37Thepointfeministshavebeenmakingissimplythatfailuretoachievetheidealofandrogynytranslatesintoafailuretoguaranteeequalopportunitytobothwomenandmen.Asitturnsout,supportfortheidealofandrogynyprovidedbyasocialistconceptionofequalself-developmentisasdirectasthatprovidedbyawelfareliberalconceptionofequalopportunity.38Justastheidealofandrogynycanbeseentoberequiredbyawelfareliberalorlibertarianrighttoequalopportunity,sotoocanitbeseentoberequiredbyasocialistrightofequalself-development.Infact,oncethesocialistrighttoequalself-developmentiscorrectlyunderstoodtobeanequalrighttotheprovisionofresourcesforself-development,itcanbeseentobeequivalenttothewelfareliberal’srighttoequalopportunity.39Whatremainsdistinctiveaboutthesocialistdefenseofandrogyny,however,isitsclaimthatincontemporarycapitalistsocieties,theidealofandrogynyisbestachievedbysocializingthemeansofproduction,whichistosaythatacureforcapitalistexploitationwillalsobeacureforwomen’soppression.40Nowonelocusfortheradicalrestructuringrequiredbytheidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussocietyisthefamily.Heretwofundamentalchangesareneeded.First,allchildren,irrespectiveoftheirsex,mustbegiventhesametypeofupbringing\n10JAMESP.STERBAconsistentwiththeirnativecapabilities.Second,normallymothersandfathersmustalsohavethesameopportunitiesforeducationandemploymentconsistentwiththeirnativecapabilities.41Yet,atleastintheUnitedStates,thisneedradicallytomodifytraditionalfamilystructurestoguaranteeequalopportunityconfrontsaseriousproblem.Giventhatasignificantproportionoftheavailablejobsareatleast9to5,familieswithpreschoolchildrenrequireday-carefacilitiesiftheiradultmembersaretopursuetheircareers.Unfortunately,formanyfamiliessuchfacilitiesaresimplyunavailable.42InNewYorkCity,forexample,morethan144,000childrenundertheageofsixarecompetingfor46,000full-timeslotsinday-carecenters.InSeattle,thereislicensedday-carespacefor8,800ofthe23,000childrenwhoneedit.InLosAngeles,thereisnolicensedchildcareavailablefor135,000childrenwhoneedsuchprograms.InMiami,twochildren,threeandfouryearsold,wereleftunattendedathomewhiletheirparentworked.Theyclimbedintoaclothesdryerwhilethetimerwason,closedthedoor,andburnedtodeath.43Moreover,eventheavailableday-carefacilitiesarefrequentlyinadequate,eitherbecausetheirstaffsarepoorlytrainedorbecausethechild/adultratioinsuchfacilitiesistoohigh.Atbest,manysuchfacilitiesprovidelittlemorethancustodialcare;atworst,theyactuallyretardthedevelopmentofthosechildrenundertheircare.44Whatthissuggestsisthatatleastunderpresentconditions,ifpreschoolchildrenaretobeadequatelycaredfor,frequentlyoneoftheadultmembersofthefamilyhastoremainathometoprovidethatcare.Butbecausemostjobsareatleast9to5,thisrequiresthattheadultmemberswhostayathometemporarilygiveuppursuingacareer.However,suchsacrificeappearstoconflictwiththeequalopportunityrequirementoffeministjustice.Familiesmighttrytomeetthisequalopportunityrequirementbyhavingoneparentrelinquishacareerforacertainperiodoftimeandtheothergiveuppursuingacareerforasubsequent(equal)periodoftime.Butthereareproblemsheretoo.Somecareersaredifficulttointerruptforanysignificantperiodoftime,whileothersneveradequatelyrewardlatecomers.Inaddition,giventhehighrateofdivorceandtheinadequaciesofmostlegallymandatedchildsupport,thosewhofirstsacrificetheircareersmayfindthemselveslaterfacedwiththeimpossibletaskoftryingtobeginorrevivethemwhilecontinuingtobetheprimarycaretakeroftheirchildren.45Furthermore,thereisconsiderableevidencethatchildrenwillbenefitmorefromequalrearingfrombothparents.46Sotheoptionofhavingjustoneparentdoingthechildrearingforanylengthoftimeis,otherthingsbeingequal,notoptimal.Itwouldseemtherefore,thattotrulysharechild-rearingwithinthefamilywhatisneededareflexible(typicallypart-time)workschedulesthatallowbothparentstobetogetherwiththeirchildrenforasignificantperiodeveryday.Someflexibleworkscheduleshavealreadybeentriedbyvariouscorporations.47Butifequalopportunityistobearealityinoursociety,theoptionofflexibleworkschedulesmustbeguaranteedtoallthosewithpreschoolchildren.Arecentestimateshowsthatmarriedfull-timecareerwomenstilldoalmostasmuchofthehouseworkchores—70%—astheaveragefull-timehousewife,whodoes83%ofthehousework.48Obviouslythiswillhavetochangeifwearetoachievetheidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussociety.Asecondlocusofchangerequiredbytheidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussocietyisthedistributionofeconomicpowerinthesociety.IntheUnitedStates,thepercentageofwomeninthelaborforcehasrisensteadilyforthreedecades,from35%(ofthoseagedsixteenormore)in1960to59%in1995.Roughly70%ofwomenwithchildrenathomewereemployedin1995,includingmorethan63%ofmotherswithchildrenundertheageofsixand59%ofmotherswithchildrenundertheageofone.49Yetin1995womenemployedfull-timestillearned$.72forevery$1menearned,upfromthe$.60forevery$1thatheldfromthe1960sthroughthe1980s.Earningsdoincreasewitheducationforallworkers,butallwomen,aswellasmenofcolor,earnlessthanwhitemenateverylevelofeducation.Forexample,womenwithfouryearsofcollegeeducationearnlessonaveragethanmenwhohavenotcompletedhighschool.50Sometimeswomenandmenworkinginthesamejobcategoryhavedifferentincomes.Forexample,whilefemaleclericalworkersearnedamedianwageof$384perweekin1995,themedianwageformaleclericalworkerswas$489.51Morefrequently,however,womenandmentendtobeemployedindifferentjobcategoriesthatarepaiddifferently.AccordingtoonestudydoneafewyearsagointhestateofWashington,womenemployedasclerk-typistsearnedlessthanmenemployedastruckdriversorwarehouseworkers.InanotherstudydoneinDenver,womenemployedasnursesearnedlessthanmenemployedastreecutters.Whileineachofthesecasesthewomenearnedabout20%lessthanthemen,thewomen’sjobs,whenevaluatedintermsofskill,responsibility,effort,andworkingconditions,weregivenequalorhigherscoresthanthemen’sjobswithwhichtheywerecompared.Clearly,denyingwomentheopportunitytoearnthesameasmendoforequalorcomparableworkisabasicinjusticeinoursociety,anditwillbeaverycostlyonetocorrect.52Toremedytheseinequalitiessufferedbywomenintheeconomicspherewillrequireprogramsofaffirmativeactionandcomparableworth.Affirmativeactionisneededtoplacequalifiedwomeninpositionstheydeservetooccupybecauseofpastdiscrimination.Withoutaffirmativeaction,thestructuralviolenceofpastdiscriminationwillnotberectified.Onlywithaffirmativeactioncanthecompetitionfordesirablejobsandpositionsbemadefairagain,givenourpasthistoryofdiscrimination.Thereareevencaseswhereaffirmativeactioncandidatesareclearlythemostqualified,butwherethosein\nINTRODUCTION11chargeofhiring,becauseoftheirprejudice,canonlyseethecandidatesassimplyqualifiedbutnotasthemostqualifiedcandidates.53Comparableworthisalsoneededbecause,withoutit,womenwillnotreceivethesalariestheydeserve.Theywilldoworkthatisjudgedequalorcomparabletotheworkthatmenaredoinginmale-dominatedoccupations,butwithoutcomparableworththeywillbepaidlessthanthemen.Payingforcomparableworthprogramswillnotbeeasy,butitcanbedone.ThestateofWashingtonspent$115millionoversevenyearsonacomparableworthprogram,andthestateofIowaspentalmost9%ofitspayrolloverathree-yearperiodtoachievecomparableworth.54Athirdlocusofchangerequiredbytheidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussocietyistheovertviolenceperpetratedagainstwomeninoursociety.AccordingtoformerSurgeonGeneralAntoniaNovello,“ThehomeisactuallyamoredangerousplacefortheAmericanwomanthanthecitystreets.”“One-thirdofthewomenslainintheU.S.,”shecontinues,“dieatthehandsofhusbandsandboyfriends.”55Inaddition,womenintheUnitedStatesliveinfearofrape.Twentypercentofwomenarerapedatsometimeduringtheirlives,accordingtoonenationalstudy;44%ofwomenaresubjectedeithertorapeorattemptedrapeatsomepointduringtheirlives,accordingtoanotherstudydoneintheSanFranciscoarea,andalmost50%ofmalecollegestudentssaytheywouldcommitrapeiftheywerecertainthattheycouldgetawaywithit.56Notinfrequently,womenarebeatenbytheirownhusbandsandlovers(betweenonequarterandonethirdofwomenarebatteredintheirhomesbyhusbandsandlovers).57Onethirdofallwomenwhorequireemergency-roomhospitaltreatmentarethereasaresultofdomesticviolence.58Thirty-eightpercentoflittlegirlsaresexuallymolestedinsideoroutsidethefamily.59Sincemostofthesecrimesareminimallyprosecutedinoursociety,womeninoursocietycanberaped,battered,orsexuallyabusedaschildren,andlittle,ifanything,willbedoneaboutit.Whatthisshowsisthattheconditionofwomeninoursocietyisactuallythatofbeingsubordinatetomenbyforce.60Feministjusticedemandsthatweputanendtotheovertviolenceagainstwomen,whichtakesthedistinctiveformofrape,battery,andsexualabuse.Thisovertviolenceisineverywayasdestructiveastheotherformsofviolenceweoppose,sowecannotinconsistencyfailtoopposeit.Accordingtoonecross-culturalstudyofninety-fivesocieties,47%ofthemwerefreeofrape.61Thisshowsthatitispossibletoeliminate,oratleastdrasticallyreduce,overtviolenceagainstwomen.Onewaytohelpbringaboutthisresultistobanhard-corepornographythatcelebratesandlegitimizesrape,battery,andthesexualabuseofchildren,astheSupremeCourtofCanadahasrecentlydone.62CatharineMacKinnonhasarguedthatpornographyofthissortgoesbeyondmerespeechinconstitutingapracticeofsexdiscriminationthatisaviolationofwomen’scivilrights.63AccordingtoMacKinnon,menwhoparticipateinthepracticelearnthroughthepleasuresofmasturbationtoenjoytheforcefulsubordinationofwomen,andtheyseektofindwaystoimposethatsamesubordinationonthewomenwhocomeintotheirlives.Becauseoftheseverityoftheseimpositions,MacKinnonandotheranti-pornographyfeministsclaimthatthepracticeofhard-corepornographyviolateswomen’scivilrightsbydenyingtheirequalstatusascitizens.64Anotherlocusofchangerequiredbytheidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussocietyoverlapstheprevioustwo.Itisrootedinthedistributionofeconomicpowerinsocietyanditfrequentlytakestheformofovertviolenceagainstwomen.Itistheproblemofsexualharassment.Actually,sexualharassmentwasnotrecognizedasanoffensebyUStrialcourtsuntilthelate1970s,anditwasonlyaffirmedbytheUSSupremeCourtasanoffenseinthe1980s.Theterm“sexualharassment”wasnotevencoineduntilthe1970s.Sothemoralproblemofsexualharassmentisonethatmanypeoplehaveonlyrecentlycometorecognize.TheSenateJudiciaryCommitteehearingsonAnitaHill’schargethatClarenceThomashadsexuallyharassedherobviouslyheightenedpeople’sawarenessofthisproblem.In1986,theUSSupremeCourt,inMeritorSavingsBankv.Vinson,ruledthattherecouldbetwotypesofsexualharassment:harassmentthatconditionsconcreteemploymentbenefitsongrantingsexualfavors(oftencalledthequidproquotype),andharassmentthatcreatesahostileoroffensiveworkenvironmentwithoutaffectingeconomicbenefits(thehostileenvironmenttype).65Nevertheless,theSupremeCourtmadeitdifficultforaplaintifftoestablishthateitherofthesetypesofsexualharassmenthadoccurred.Forexample,apoliteverbal“no”doesnotsufficetoshowthatsexualadvancesareunwelcome;awoman’sentireconductbothinsideandoutsidetheworkplaceissubjecttoappraisalinordertodeterminewhetherornotshewelcomedtheadvances.Forexample,intheVinsoncase,therewas“voluminoustestimonyregardingVinson’sdressandpersonalfantasies,”andintheSenateJudiciaryCommitteehearings,AnitaHillwasnotabletopreventintensiveexaminationofherprivatelife,althoughClarenceThomaswasabletodeclarekeyareasofhisprivatelifeasoff-limits,suchashispracticeofviewinganddiscussingpornographicfilms.TheSupremeCourtalsomadeitdifficulttoclassifyworkenvironmentsashostiletowomenunlesstheharassmentissufficientlysevereorpervasive.ApplyingtheSupremeCourt’sstandard,alowercourt,inChristoforouv.RyderTruckRental,judgedasupervisor’sactionsoffondlingaplaintiff’srearendandbreasts,propositioningher,andtryingtoforceakissataChristmasparty,tobe“toosporadicandinnocuous”tosupportafindingofahostileworkenvironment.66Similarly,inRabiduev.OsceolaRefiningCo.,aworkplacewherepicturesofnudeandscantilycladwomenabounded(includingone,whichhungonawallforeightyears,ofawomanwithagolfballonherbreastsandamanwithhisgolfclubstandingover\n12JAMESP.STERBAherandyelling“Fore!”)andwhereaco-worker,neverdisciplineddespiterepeatedcomplaints,routinelyreferredtowomenas“whores,”“cunts,”“pussies,”and“tits,”wasjudgedbyalowercourtnottobeasufficientlyhostileenvironmenttoconstitutesexualharassment.67Notice,bycontrast,thattheSenateArmsServicesCommittee,initsrecenthearings,regardedanenvironmentinwhichknownhomosexualsaresimplydoingtheirdutyinthemilitarytobetoohostileanenvironmentinwhichtoaskmaleheterosexualstoserve.YetwhyshouldweaccepttheSupremeCourt’scharacterizationofsexualharassment,especiallygivenitsunwelcomenessandpervasivenessrequirements?AstheSupremeCourtinterpretssexualharassment,aperson’sbehaviormustbeunwelcomeinafairlystrongsensebeforeitconstitutessexualharassment.Butwhyshouldawomanhavetoprovethattheoffer“Ifyoudon’tsleepwithme,youwillbefired”isunwelcomebeforeitconstitutessexualharassment?68Isn’tsuchanofferobjectivelyunwelcome?Isn’titjustthekindofofferthatthoseinpositionsofpowershouldnotbemakingtotheirsubordinates,anofferthatpurportstomaketheircontinuingemploymentconditionaluponprovidingsexualfavors?Surely,unlesswearedealingwithsomeformoflegalizedprostitution,andmaybenoteventhen,suchoffersareobjectivelyunwelcome.69Given,then,thatsuchoffersareobjectivelyunwelcome,whyisthereanyneedtoshowthattheyarealsosubjectivelyunwelcomebeforeregardingthemasviolationsofTitleVIIoftheCivilRightsAct?Therequirementofsubjectiveunwelcomenessissimplyagratuitousobstaclethatmakestheplaintiff’scasefarmoredifficulttoprovethanitshouldbe.70Inaddition,iftheplaintiffisfiredafterrefusingsuchanoffer,theSupremeCourtrequireshertoprovethatthefiringoccurredbecausetheofferwasrefused,whichisverydifficulttodounlessoneisaperfectemployee.Wouldn’titbefairertorequiretheemployertoprovethattheplaintiffwouldhavebeenfiredevenifshehadsaid“yes”totheoffer?Ofcourse,employerscouldavoidthisburdenofproofsimplybynotmakinganysuchoffersinthefirstplace.71Butwhentheydomakeobjectivelyunwelcomeoffers,whyshouldn’ttheburdenofproofbeonthemtoshowthatanysubsequentfiringwasclearlyunrelatedtotheplaintiff’srefusaloftheoffer?Fairnessisparticularlyrelevantinthiscontextbecausewearecommittedtoequalopportunityintheworkplace,whichrequiresemployingwomenandmenonequalterms.Accordingly,wemustguardagainstimposingspecialburdensonwomenintheworkplace,whentherearenocomparableburdensimposedonmen.Feministjustice,withitsidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussociety,willbesatisfiedwithnothingless.72ThedemandforequalopportunityintheworkplacealsoappearstoconflictwiththeSupremeCourt’spervasivenessrequirementforestablishingahostileenvironment.Citingalowercourt,theSupremeCourtcontendsthat,tobeactionable,sexualharassment“mustbesufficientlysevereorpervasive‘toaltertheconditionsofthe[victim’s]employmentandcreateanabusiveworkingenvironment.’”73Butasthisstandardhasbeeninterpretedbylowercourts,thepervasivenessofcertainformsofharassmentintheworkplacehasbecomegroundsfortoleratingthem.InRabidue,themajorityargued:[I]tcannotseriouslybedisputedthatinsomeworkenvironments,humorandlanguageareroughhewnandvulgar.Sexualjokes,sexualconversationsandgirliemagazinesabound.TitleVIIwasnotmeanttoorcanchangethis.TitleVIIisthefederalcourtmainstayinthestruggleforequalemploymentopportunityforthefemaleworkersofAmerica.ButitisquitedifferenttoclaimthatTitleVIIwasdesignedtobringaboutamagicaltransformationinthesocialmoresofAmericanworkers.74TheSupremeCourtitselfseemstosoundasimilarthemebyemphasizingtheapplicationofTitleVIItoonlyextremecasesofsexualharassmentasfoundinVinson.However,astheEEOC(EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission)interpretsTitleVII,thelawhasabroaderscope.Itaffordsemployeestherighttoworkinanenvironmentfreefromdiscriminatoryintimidation,ridicule,andinsult.AccordingtotheEEOC,sexualharassmentviolatesTitleVIIwhereconductcreatesanintimidating,hostile,oroffensiveenvironmentorwhereitunreasonablyinterfereswithworkperformance.75Buthowarewetodeterminewhatunreasonablyinterfereswithworkperformance?InRabidue,themajoritylookedtoprevailingstandardsintheworkplacetodeterminewhatwasreasonableorunreasonable.YetJusticeKeith,indissent,questionedthisendorsementofthestatusquo,arguingthatjustasaJewishemployeecanrightfullydemandachangeinherworkingenvironmentifheremployermaintainsananti-Semiticworkforceandtoleratesaworkplaceinwhich“kike”jokes,displaysofNaziliterature,andanti-Jewishconversation“mayabound,”surelywomencanrightfullydemandachangeinthesexistpracticesthatprevailintheirworkingenvironments.76InHensonv.Dundee,themajorityalsodrewananalogybetweensexualharassmentandracialharassment:Sexualharassmentwhichcreatesahostileoroffensiveenvironmentformembersofonesexiseverybitthearbitrarybarriertosexualequalityattheworkplacethatracialharassmentistoracialequality.Surely,arequirementthatamanorwomanrunagauntletofsexualabuseinreturnfortheprivilegeofbeingallowedtoworkandmakealivingcanbeasdemeaninganddisconcertingastheharshestofracialepithets.AndthispassageisalsoquotedapprovinglybytheSupremeCourtinVinson.\nINTRODUCTION13Movedbysucharguments,themajorityinEllisonv.Bradyproposedthat,ratherthanlookingtoprevailingstandardstodeterminewhatisreasonable,weshouldlooktothestandardofareasonablevictim,orgiventhatmostvictimsofsexualharassmentarewomen—thestandardofareasonablewoman.77Theycontendthatthisstandardmaybedifferentfromthestandardofa“reasonableman.”Forexample,whatmalesuperiorsmaythinkis“harmlesssocialinteraction”maybeexperiencedbyfemalesubordinatesasoffensiveandthreatening.78Nevertheless,ifweareconcernedtoestablishtheequalopportunityintheworkplacethatfeministjusticewithitsidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussocietydemands,thereshouldbenoquestionaboutwhatstandardofreasonablenesstousehere.Itisnotthatofareasonablewoman,northatofareasonablemanforthatmatter,butthestandardofwhatisreasonableforeveryonetoaccept.Forequalopportunityisamoralrequirement,andmoralrequirementsarethosewhicharereasonableforeveryonetoaccept.Thisassumesthatapparentconflictsoverwhatisreasonabletoaccept—forexample,conflictsbetweenthestandardofareasonablewomanandthatofareasonableman—areconflictsthatcanandshouldberesolvedbyshowingthatoneoftheseperspectivesismorereasonablethantheother,orthatsomestillotherperspectiveisevenmorereasonable.However,atleastinthecontextofsexualharassment,thisstandardofwhatisreasonableforeveryonetoacceptwillaccordcloselywiththestandardofareasonablewoman,giventhatoncewomen’sperspectivesareadequatelytakenintoaccount,thecontrastingperspectiveofareasonablemanwillbeseenasnotsoreasonableafterall.Insum,theachievementoffeministjusticerequiresanumberofimportantchangesinoursociety.Itrequireschangesintraditionalfamilystructuressothatchildren,irrespectiveoftheirsex,willhavethesametypeofupbringing,andmothersandfathershavethesameopportunitiesforeducationandemployment.Itrequireschangesinthedistributionofeconomicpowerinoursocietythroughprogramsofaffirmativeactionandequalpayforcomparableworkthatremovethestructuralviolenceagainstwomen.Itrequiresthechangesthatarenecessarytoputanendtoovertviolenceagainstwomenintheformofrape,battery,andsexualabuse.Last,itrequireschangestoimplementnewprogramsagainstsexualharassmentintheworkplaceinordertoachievetheequalopportunitythatfeministjusticepromisestoeveryone.Allofthesechanges,andmore,arerequiredbyfeministjustice’sidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussociety.FromfeminismtomulticulturalismDespiteitsobviousimportance,itwouldbeamistaketopursuefeministjusticealone,giventhatitisboththeoreticallyandpracticallyconnectedtootherformsofjustice.Moreover,apeacemakingwayofdoingphilosophydemandsthatweworkoutjustsuchconnectionsinordertobuildasbroadapoliticalconsensusaspossible.Accordingly,weneedtofocusonboththetheoreticalandthepracticalconnectionsoffeministjusticetothreeotherformsofjustice:racialjustice,homosexualjustice,andmulticulturaljustice.Whilefeministjusticeseekstoremedytheinjusticeofsexism,racialjusticeseekstoremedytheinjusticeofracism,homosexualjusticeseekstoremedytheinjusticeofheterosexism,andmulticulturaljusticeseekstoremedytheinjusticeofEurocentrism.Asitturnsout,eachoftheseinjusticesissupportedbysimilartheoreticalarguments.Themoreblatantargumentbeginsbynotingcertaindifferencesamongeitherindividuals,groupsorcultures.Itthenclaimsthatthesedifferencesaregroundsforregardingsomeindividuals,groups,orculturesassuperiortootherindividuals,groups,orcultures.Thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofsomeindividuals,groupsandculturesbyotherindividuals,groupsandcultures.79Ineachcase,thetheoreticalargumentmovesfromaclaimofdifferencetoaclaimofsuperiorityandthentoaclaimofdomination.Inthecaseofsexism,thebiologicaldifferencesbetweenmenandwomen,orotherdifferencesclaimedtobelinkedtothesebiologicaldifferences,aresaidtobegroundsforregardingmenassuperiortowomen;thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofwomenbymen.Inthecaseofracism,specificallytheprincipalformofracismintheUnitedStates,80thebiologicaldifferencesbetweenwhitesandblacks,orotherdifferencesthatareclaimedtobelinkedtothesebiologicaldifferences,aresaidtobegroundsforregardingwhitesassuperiortoblacks;thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofblacksbywhites.Inthecaseofheterosexism,thebiologicaloracquireddifferencesbetweenheterosexualsandhomosexualsaresaidtobegroundsforregardingheterosexualsassuperiortohomosexuals;thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofhomosexualsbyheterosexuals.InthecaseofEurocentrism,theculturaldifferencesbetweenWesterncultureandnon-WesternculturesaresaidtobegroundsforregardingWesterncultureassuperiortonon-Westerncultures;thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofnon-WesternculturesbyWesternculture.Inresponse,feministjustice,racialjustice,homosexualjusticeandmulticulturaljusticeclaimthatnoneoftheseformsofdominationcanbejustified.Sometimes,however,thetheoreticalargumentforsexism,racism,heterosexismorEurocentrismtakesalessblatantform.Thisargumentbeginsbyrenouncingformsofdominationadoptedinthepastasunjustified.Simplytodenypeopleequalopportunityonthebasisoftheirsex,race,sexualorientation,orcultureisclaimedtobewrongbythisversionoftheargument.81Buttheargumentfurtherclaimsthatpeoplenow,forthemostpart,arenolongerbeingdeniedequalopportunityonthebasisofsex,race,sexualorientation,orculture.Accordingly,itisclaimedthatthewaysinwhichmenarestillfavoredoverwomen,whitesoverblacks,heterosexualsoverhomosexuals,orWesterncultureovernon-Westerncultures,musteither\n14JAMESP.STERBAbegroundedinalegitimatesuperiorityofoneovertheotherorbearesidueofpastinjusticesthatcannotberemovedwithoutdoingadditionalinjustice.Ofcourse,whetherthemoreblatantorlessblatantargumentforsexism,racism,heterosexismorEurocentrismisemployed,dependsonhowplausibleitistoclaimthatpeoplenowarenolongerdeniedequalopportunitybyoneoranotheroftheseformsofdomination.Clearly,onlywithrespecttomenandwomenorblacksandwhitesdoestheclaimseemevenremotelyplausible.So,aswouldbeexpected,itisonlyinthesetwocontextsthatthelessblatantargumenttendstobeused,maintainingasitdoesthatthewaysinwhichmenarestillfavoredoverwomen,andwhitesoverblacks,musteitherbegroundedinalegitimatesuperiorityofoneovertheother,orbearesidueofpastinjusticesthatcannotberemovedwithoutdoingadditionalinjustice.Still,itisdifficulttodefendeventhisargumentbecausedatasuchaswenotedabovemakeitdifficulttomaintainthatequalopportunitycurrentlyexists,eitherbetweenmenandwomenorbetweenwhitesandblacks.Asaconsequence,thosewhoemploythisformoftheargumentusuallytrytoshowthatmostoftheinequalitythatdoesexistisaresidueofpastinjusticesthatcannotberemovedwithoutdoingadditionalinjustice.Specifically,theyattackbothaffirmativeactionandcomparableworthasattemptstocorrectforpastinjusticesthatproducenewinjustice.Bycontrast,neitherheterosexistsnorEurocentristsargueinthisroundaboutwayfortheirview.Instead,theyendorsethemoreblatantargumentforheterosexismorEurocentrismandmaintainthattherearecertaindifferencesbetweenheterosexualsandhomosexuals,orbetweenWesterncultureandnon-Westerncultures,thatgroundthesuperiorityoftheformeroverthelatter.Thissuperiorityisthenfurtherclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofhomosexualsbyheterosexuals,orofnon-WesternculturesbyWesternculture.Inviewofthistheoreticalconnectionbetweenfeministjustice,racialjustice,homosexualjustice,andmulticulturaljustice,thepracticalconnectionbetweentheseformsofjusticeisquitestraightforward:itisthattheseformsofjusticeshouldbepursuedtogether,asmuchaspossible,becausegiventhetheoreticalconnectionbetweentheseformsofjustice,failuretopursuethemtogetherwillbelookeduponwithsuspicionanddistrustbyanyonewhosecauseisexcluded.Ofcourse,itcanbedifficulttopursuealltheseformsofjusticetogether.Tobuildapoliticalmovementstrongenoughtoeffectthenecessarychanges,itmaybenecessarytofocusattentiononthepursuitofjustoneoftheseformsofjustice.Yetevenwhenthisisnecessary,itispossibletorecognizetheneedfortheotherformsofjusticewhilestillfocussingprimarilyononlyoneformofjustice.Forexample,advocatesoffeministjusticecanrecognizetheneedtoachieveracial,homosexualandmulticulturaljusticeaswellasfeministjustice.Similarly,advocatesofracial,homosexualandmulticulturaljusticecanalsorecognizetheneedtoachievefeministjustice.Thusbeingasinclusiveaspossiblecanservetobringtogetherasmanypeopleaspossibleinsupportofone’scause,andalsotosignaltosupportersandnonsupportersaliketheuncompromisingjusticeofthatcause.Surely,giventhetheoreticalandpracticalconnectionsbetweentheseformsofjustice,apeacemakingwayofdoingphilosophyconcernedtofashionaconceptionofjusticeforhereandnowcanbesatisfiedwithnothingless.FromanthropocentrismtononanthropocentrismAcentraldebate,ifnotthemostcentraldebate,incontemporaryenvironmentalethics,isbetweenthosewhodefendananthropocentricethicsandthosewhodefendanonanthropocentricethics.ThisdebatepitsdeepecologistslikeGeorgeSessionsagainstreformorshallowecologistslikeJohnPassmore.82ItdividesbiocentricegalitarianslikePaulTaylorfromsocialecologistslikeMurrayBookchin.83Fortunately,wecangosomewaytowardresolvingthisdebateinaccordwithapeacemakingmodelofdoingphilosophybyshowingthat,whenthemostmorallydefensibleversionsofeachoftheseperspectivesarelaidout,theywillleadtothesamesetofprinciplesforachievingenvironmentaljustice.84Inthiscontext,ourpeacemakingmodelfordoingphilosophywillleadtopeacemakingofadifferentsortbysignificantlyrestrictingtheviolencethathumanscanlegitimatelydotonature.Considerfirstthenonanthropocentricperspective.Insupportofthisperspective,itcanbearguedthatwehavenonon-question-begginggroundsforregardingthemembersofanylivingspeciesassuperiortothemembersofanyother.Itallowsthatthemembersofspeciesdifferinmyriadways,butarguesthatthesedifferencesdonotprovidegroundsforthinkingthatthemembersofanyonespeciesaresuperiortothemembersofanyother.Inparticular,itdeniesthatthedifferencesbetweenspeciesprovidegroundsforthinkingthathumansaresuperiortothemembersofotherspecies.Ofcourse,thenonanthropocentricperspectiverecognizesthathumanshavedistinctivetraits,whichthemembersofotherspecieslack,likerationalityandmoralagency.Itjustpointsoutthatthemembersofnonhumanspeciesalsohavedistinctivetraitsthathumanslack,likethehomingabilityofpigeons,thespeedofthecheetah,andtheruminativeabilityofsheepandcattle.Norwillitdotoclaimthatthedistinctivetraitsthathumanshavearemorevaluablethanthedistinctivetraitsthatmembersofotherspeciespossess,becausethereisnonon-question-beggingstandpointfromwhichtojustifythatclaim.Fromahumanstandpoint,rationalityandmoralagencyaremorevaluablethananyofthedistinctivetraitsfoundinnonhumanspecies,since,ashumans,wewouldnotbebetteroffifweweretotradeinthosetraitsforthedistinctivetraitsfoundinnonhumanspecies.Yetthesameholdstrueofnonhumanspecies.Generally,pigeons,cheetahs,sheepandcattlewouldnotbebetteroffiftheyweretotradeintheirdistinctivetraitsforthedistinctivetraitsofotherspecies.85\nINTRODUCTION15Ofcourse,themembersofsomespeciesmightbebetteroffiftheycouldretainthedistinctivetraitsoftheirspecieswhileacquiringoneoranotherofthedistinctivetraitspossessedbysomeotherspecies.Forexample,wehumansmightbebetteroffifwecouldretainourdistinctivetraitswhileacquiringtheruminativeabilityofsheepandcattle.86Butmanyofthedistinctivetraitsofspeciescannotbe,evenimaginatively,addedtothemembersofotherspecieswithoutsubstantiallyalteringtheoriginalspecies.Forexample,inorderforthecheetahtoacquirethedistinctivetraitspossessedbyhumans,presumablyitwouldhavetobesotransformedthatitspawsbecamesomethinglikehandstoaccommodateitshumanlikementalcapabilities;therebyitwouldloseitsdistinctivespeedandceasetobeacheetah.Sopossessingdistinctivelyhumantraitswouldnotbegoodforthecheetah.87And,withthepossibleexceptionofournearestevolutionaryrelatives,thesameholdstrueforthemembersofotherspecies:theywouldnotbebetteroffhavingdistinctivelyhumantraits.OnlyinfairytalesandintheworldofDisneycanthemembersofnonhumanspeciesenjoyafullarrayofdistinctivelyhumantraits.Sotherewouldappeartobenonon-question-beggingperspectivefromwhichtojudgethatdistinctivelyhumantraitsaremorevaluablethanthedistinctivetraitspossessedbyotherspecies.Judgedfromanon-question-beggingperspective,wewouldseeminglyhavetoregardthemembersofallspeciesasequals.Nevertheless,Iwanttogoontoclaimthatregardingthemembersofallspeciesasequalsstillallowsforhumanpreference,inthesamewaythatregardingallhumansasequalsstillallowsforself-preference.Firstofall,humanpreferencecanbejustifiedongroundsofdefense.ThuswehaveAPrincipleofHumanDefense:Actionsthatdefendoneselfandotherhumanbeingsagainstharmfulaggressionarepermissibleevenwhentheynecessitatekillingorharmingindividualanimalsandplants,orevendestroyingwholespeciesorecosystems.88ThisPrincipleofHumanDefenseallowsustodefendourselvesandotherhumanbeingsfromharmfulaggression,first,againstourpersonsandthepersonsofotherhumanbeingstowhomwearecommittedorhappentocareabout,andsecond,againstourjustifiablyheldpropertyandthejustifiablyheldpropertyofotherhumanbeingstowhomwearecommittedorhappentocareabout.89Thisprincipleisanalogoustotheprincipleofself-defensethatappliesinhumanethics90permittingactionsindefenseofoneselforotherhumanbeingsagainstharmfulhumanaggression.91Inthecaseofhumanaggression,however,itwillsometimesbepossibletoeffectivelydefendoneselfandotherhumanbeingsbyfirstsufferingtheaggressionandthensecuringadequatecompensationlater.Sinceinthecaseofnonhumanaggressionthisisunlikelytoobtain,moreharmfulpreventiveactions,suchaskillingarabiddogorswattingamosquito,willbejustified.Therearesimplymorewaystoeffectivelystopaggressivehumansthantherearetostopaggressivenonhumans.Second,humanpreferencecanalsobejustifiedongroundsofpreservation.Accordingly,wehaveAPrincipleofHumanPreservation:Actionsthatarenecessaryformeetingone’sbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeingsarepermissibleevenwhentheyrequireaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofindividualanimalsandplants,orevenofwholespeciesorecosystems.92Nowneeds,ingeneral,ifnotsatisfied,leadtolacksordeficiencieswithrespecttovariousstandards.Thebasicneedsofhumans,ifnotsatisfied,leadtolacksordeficiencieswithrespecttoastandardofadecentlife.Thebasicneedsofanimalsandplants,ifnotsatisfied,leadtolacksordeficiencieswithrespecttoastandardofahealthylife.Themeansnecessaryformeetingthebasicneedsofhumanscanvarywidelyfromsocietytosociety.Bycontrast,themeansnecessaryformeetingthebasicneedsofparticularspeciesofanimalsandplantsaremoreinvariant.93Ofcourse,whileonlysomeneedscanbeclearlyclassifiedasbasic,andothersclearlyclassifiedasnonbasic,therestillareotherneedsthataremoreorlessdifficulttoclassify.Yetthefactthatnoteveryneedcanbeclearlyclassifiedaseitherbasicornonbasic,asistrueofawholerangeofdichotomousconceptslikemoral/immoral,legal/illegal,living/nonliving,human/nonhuman,shouldnotimmobilizeusfromactingatleastwithrespecttoclearcases.94Inhumanethics,thereisnoprinciplethatisstrictlyanalogoustothisPrincipleofHumanPreservation.95Thereisaprincipleofself-preservationinhumanethicsthatpermitsactionsthatarenecessaryformeetingone’sownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherpeople,evenifthisrequiresfailingtomeet(throughanactofomission)thebasicneedsofstillotherpeople.Forexample,wecanuseourresourcestofeedourselvesandourfamilyevenifthisnecessitatesfailingtomeetthebasicneedsofpeopleinThirdWorldcountries.But,ingeneral,wedon’thaveaprinciplethatallowsustoaggressagainst(throughanactofcommission)thebasicneedsofsomepeopleinordertomeetourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherpeopletowhomwearecommittedorhappentocareabout.Actually,theclosestwecometopermittingaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofotherpeopleinordertomeetourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofpeopletowhomwearecommittedorhappentocareabout,isouracceptanceoftheoutcomeoflife-and-deathstrugglesinlifeboatcases,wherenoonehasanantecedentrighttotheavailableresources.Forexample,ifyouhadtofightoffothersinordertosecurethelast\n16JAMESP.STERBAplaceinalifeboatforyourselforforamemberofyourfamily,wemightsaythatyoujustifiablyaggressedagainstthebasicneedsofthosewhomyoufoughttomeetyourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofthememberofyourfamily.96Nevertheless,oursurvivalrequiresaprincipleofpreservationthatpermitsaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofatleastsomeotherlivingthingswheneverthisisnecessarytomeetourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeings.Heretherearetwopossibilities.Thefirstisaprincipleofpreservationthatallowsustoaggressagainstthebasicneedsofbothhumansandnonhumanswheneveritwouldserveourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeings.Thesecondistheprinciple,statedabove,thatallowsustoaggressagainstthebasicneedsofonlynonhumanswheneveritwouldserveourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeings.Thefirstprincipledoesnotexpressanygeneralpreferenceforthemembersofthehumanspecies,andthusitpermitsevencannibalism,providedthatitservestomeetourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeings.Incontrast,thesecondprincipledoesexpressadegreeofpreferenceforthemembersofthehumanspeciesincaseswheretheirbasicneedsareatstake.Ofcourse,itwouldbetheoreticallypossibletointeractwiththemembersofone’sownspeciesonthebasisofthefirstprincipleofpreservationconsideredabove—theonethatpermitsevencannibalismasameansformeetingbasicneeds.Inthecaseofhumans,adoptingsuchaprinciplewouldclearlyreducethedegreeofpredationofhumansonotherspecies,andsowouldbeofsomebenefittootherspecies.Yetimplicitnonaggressionpactsbasedonareasonableexpectationofacomparabledegreeofaltruisticforbearancefromfellowhumanshavebeenenormouslybeneficialandprobablywerenecessaryforthesurvivalofthehumanspecies.Soitisdifficulttoseehowhumanscouldbejustifiablyrequiredtoforgosuchbenefits.Moreover,torequirehumanstoextendthesebenefitstothemembersofallspecieswould,ineffect,betorequirehumanstobesaints,andsurelymoralityisnotinthebusinessofrequiringanyonetobeasaint.Given,then,thatthisgreateraltruismcannotbemorallyrequired,thedegreeofpreferenceforthemembersofourownspeciessanctionedbytheabovePrincipleofHumanPreservationisjustified,evenifweweretoadoptanonanthropocentricperspective.97Nevertheless,preferenceforhumanscangobeyondbounds,andtheboundsthatarecompatiblewithanonanthropocentricperspectiveareexpressedbythefollowing:APrincipleofDisproportionality:Actionsthatmeetnonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumansareprohibitedwhentheyaggressagainstthebasicneedsofindividualanimalsandplants,orevenofwholespeciesorecosystems.Thisprincipleisstrictlyanalogoustotheprincipleinhumanethicsmentionedpreviouslythatprohibitsmeetingsomepeople’snonbasicorluxuryneedsbyaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofotherpeople.98Withoutadoubt,theadoptionofsuchaprinciplewithrespecttononhumannaturewouldsignificantlychangethewayweliveourlives.Suchaprincipleisrequired,however,ifthereistobeanysubstancetotheclaimthatthemembersofallspeciesareequal.Wecannomoreconsistentlyclaimthatthemembersofallspeciesareequalandyetaggressagainstthebasicneedsofsomeanimalsorplantswheneverthisservesourownnonbasicorluxuryneeds,thanwecanconsistentlyclaimthatallhumansareequalandaggressagainstthebasicneedsofsomeotherhumanbeingswheneverthisservesournonbasicorluxuryneeds.99Consequently,ifspeciesequalityistomeananything,itmustbethecasethatthebasicneedsofthemembersofnonhumanspeciesareprotectedagainstaggressiveactions,whichonlyservetomeetthenonbasicneedsofhumans,asrequiredbythePrincipleofDisproportionality.100Sowhileanonanthropocentricperspectiveallowsforadegreeofpreferenceforthemembersofthehumanspecies,italsosignificantlylimitsthatpreference.101Toseewhytheselimitsonpreferenceforthemembersofthehumanspeciesareallthatisrequiredforrecognizingtheequalityofspecies,weneedtounderstandtheequalityofspeciesbyanalogywiththeequalityofhumans.Weneedtoseethat,justasweclaimthathumansareequalyetjustifiablytreatthemdifferently,sotoowecanclaimthatallspeciesareequalyetjustifiablytreatthemdifferently.Inhumanethics,variousinterpretationsaregiventohumanequalitythatallowfordifferenttreatmentofhumans.Inethicalegoism,everyoneisequallyatlibertytopursuehisorherowninterests,butthisallowsusalwaystopreferourselvestoothers,whoareunderstoodtobelikeopponentsinacompetitivegame.Inlibertarianism,everyonehasanequalrighttoliberty,butalthoughthisimposessomelimitsonthepursuitofself-interest,itissaidtoallowustorefrainfromhelpingothersinsevereneed.Inwelfareliberalism,everyonehasanequalrighttowelfareandopportunity,butthisneednotcommitustoprovidingeveryonewithexactlythesameresources.Insocialism,everyonehasanequalrighttoself-development,andalthoughthismaycommitustoprovidingeveryonewithsomethinglikethesameresources,itstillsanctionssomedegreeofself-preference.Sojustastherearethesevariouswaystointerprethumanequalitythatstillallowustotreathumansdifferently,therearevariouswaysthatwecaninterpretspeciesequalitythatallowustotreatspeciesdifferently.Nowonemightinterpretspeciesequalityinaverystrongsense,analogoustotheinterpretationofequalityfoundinsocialism.ButthekindofspeciesequalitythatIhavedefendedismoreakintotheequalityfoundinwelfareliberalismorinlibertarianismthanitistotheequalityfoundinsocialism.Inbrief,thisformofequalityrequiresthatwenotaggressagainstthebasicneedsofmembersofotherspeciesforthesakeofthenonbasicneedsofmembersofourownspecies(thePrincipleofDisproportionality),butitpermitsustoaggressagainstthebasicneedsofmembersofotherspeciesforthesakeofthe\nINTRODUCTION17basicneedsofmembersofourownspecies(thePrincipleofHumanPreservation),anditalsopermitsustodefendthebasicandeventhenonbasicneedsofmembersofourownspeciesagainstharmfulaggressionbymembersofotherspecies(thePrincipleofHumanDefense).Inthisway,Ihavearguedthatwecanaccepttheclaimofspeciesequalitywhileavoidingimposinganunreasonablesacrificeononeselforthemembersofourownspecies.102Butsupposeweweretorejectthecentralcontentionofthenonanthropocentricperspective,anddenythatthemembersofallspeciesareequal.Wemightclaim,forexample,thathumansaresuperiorbecause,throughculture,they“realizeagreaterrangeofvalues”thanmembersofnonhumanspecies,orwemightclaimthathumansaresuperiorinvirtueoftheir“unprecedentedcapacitytocreateethicalsystemsthatimpartworthtootherlife-forms.”103Orwemightoffersomeothergroundsforhumansuperiority.104Suppose,then,weadoptthisanthropocentricperspective.Whatfollows?Firstofall,weshallstillneedaprincipleofhumandefense.However,thereisnoneedtoadoptadifferentprincipleofhumandefensefromtheprinciplefavoredbyanonanthropocentricperspective.Whetherwejudgehumanstobeequalorsuperiortothemembersofotherspecies,weshallstillwantaprinciplethatallowsustodefendourselvesandotherhumanbeingsfromharmfulaggression,evenwhenthisnecessitateskillingorharminganimalsorplants.Second,wewillalsoneedaprincipleofhumanpreservation.Butheretoothereisnoneedtoadoptadifferentprinciplefromtheprincipleofhumanpreservationfavoredbyanonanthropocentricperspective.Whetherwejudgehumanstobeequalorsuperiortothemembersofotherspecies,wewillstillwantaprinciplethatpermitsactionsthatarenecessaryformeetingourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeings,evenwhenthisrequiresaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofanimalsandplants.Thecrucialquestioniswhetherwewillneedadifferentprincipleofdisproportionality.Ifwejudgehumanstobesuperiortothemembersofotherspecies,willwestillhavegroundsforprotectingthebasicneedsofanimalsandplantsagainstaggressiveactiontomeetthenonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumans?Hereitisimportanttodistinguishbetweentwodegreesofpreferencethatwenotedearlier.First,wecouldpreferthebasicneedsofanimalsandplantsoverthenonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumanswhentodootherwisewouldinvolveaggressingagainst(byanactofcommission)thebasicneedsofanimalsandplants.Second,wecouldpreferthebasicneedsofanimalsandplantsoverthenonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumanswhentodootherwisewouldinvolvesimplyfailingtomeet(byanactofomission)thebasicneedsofanimalsandplants.Inhumanethics,whenthebasicneedsofsomepeopleareinconflictwiththenonbasicorluxuryneedsofothers,thedistinctionbetweenfailingtomeetandaggressingagainstbasicneedsseemstohavelittlemoralforce.Insuchconflictcases,bothwaysofnotmeetingbasicneedsareobjectionable.105Butinenvironmentalethics,whetherweadoptananthropocentricoranonanthropocentricperspective,wewouldseemtohavegroundsformorallydistinguishingbetweenthetwocases,favoringthebasicneedsofanimalsandplantswhentodootherwisewouldinvolveaggressingagainstthoseneedsinordertomeetourownnonbasicorluxuryneeds,butnotwhenitwouldinvolvesimplyfailingtomeetthoseneedsinordertomeetourownnonbasicorluxuryneeds.Thisdegreeofpreferenceformembersofthehumanspecieswouldbecompatiblewiththeequalityofspecies,becausehumanscanreasonablyexpectthisdegreeofaltruisticforbearancefromtheirfellowmembersbutnotfrommembersofotherspecies.Evenso,thistheoreticaldistinctionwouldhavelittlepracticalforce,sincemostofthewayswehaveofpreferringourownnonbasicneedsoverthebasicneedsofanimalsandplantsactuallyinvolveaggressingagainsttheirbasicneedstomeetourownnonbasicorluxuryneeds,ratherthansimplyfailingtomeettheirbasicneeds.106Yetevenifmostofthewayswehaveofpreferringourownnonbasicorluxuryneedsdoinvolveaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofanimalsandplants,wouldn’thumansuperiorityprovidegroundsforpreferringourselvesorotherhumanbeingsintheseways?Or,putanotherway,shouldn’thumansuperiorityhavemoretheoreticalandpracticalsignificancethanIamallowing?Not,Iclaim,ifwearelookingforthemostmorallydefensiblepositiontotake.Forconsider:giventhatwehaveshownthatnonhumanshaveexcellencesoftheirown,theclaimthathumansaresuperiortothemembersofotherspecies,ifitcanbejustifiedatall,issomethingliketheclaimthatapersoncameinfirstinaracewhereotherscameinsecond,third,fourth,andsoon.Itwouldnotimplythatthemembersofotherspeciesarewithoutintrinsicvalue,becausetheydohaveexcellencesoftheirown.Infact,itwouldimplyjusttheopposite—thatthemembersofotherspeciesarealsointrinsicallyvaluable,althoughnotasintrinsicallyvaluableashumans,justastheclaimthatapersoncameinfirstinaraceimpliesthatthepersonswhocameinsecond,third,fourth,andsoonarealsomeritorious,althoughnotasmeritoriousasthepersonwhocameinfirst.Thislineofargumentdrawsfurthersupportonceweconsiderthefactthatmanyanimalsandplantsaresuperiortohumansinonerespectoranother,e.g.thesenseofsmellofthewolf,ortheacuityofsightoftheeagle,orthesurvivabilityofthecockroach,orthephotosyntheticpowerofplants.107Soanyclaimofhumansuperioritymustallowfortherecognitionofexcellencesinnonhumanspecies,evenforsomeexcellencesthataresuperiortotheircorrespondinghumanexcellences.Infact,itdemandsthatrecognition.Moreover,iftheclaimofhumansuperiorityistohaveanymoralforce,itmustrestonnon-question-begginggrounds.Accordingly,wemustbeabletogiveanon-question-beggingresponsetothenonanthropocentricargumentfortheequalityof\n18JAMESP.STERBAspecies.Yetforanysuchargumenttobesuccessful,itwouldhavetorecognizetheintrinsicvalueofthemembersofnonhumanspecies.Evenifitcouldbeestablishedthathumanbeingshavegreaterintrinsicvalue,wewouldstillhavetorecognizethatnonhumannaturehasintrinsicvalueaswell.Sotherelevantquestionis:howarewegoingtorecognizethepresumablylesserintrinsicvalueofnonhumannature?Nowifhumanneeds,evennonbasicorluxuryones,arealwayspreferredtoeventhebasicneedsofthemembersofnonhumanspecies,wewouldnotbegivinganyrecognitiontotheintrinsicvalueofnonhumannature.Butwhatifweallowedthenonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumanstotrumpthebasicneedsofnonhumannaturehalfthetime,andhalfthetimeallowedthebasicneedsofnonhumannaturetotrumpthenonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumans?Wouldthatbeenough?Certainly,itwouldbeasignificantadvanceoverwhatwearepresentlydoing.Forwhatwearepresentlydoingismeetingthebasicneedsofnonhumannature,atbest,onlywhenitservesourownneedsortheneedsofthosewearecommittedtoorhappentocareabout,andthatdoesnotrecognizetheintrinsicvalueofnonhumannatureatall.108Afifty-fiftyarrangementindeedwouldbeanadvance;butitwouldnotbeenough.Thereasonwhyitwouldnotbeenoughisthattheclaimthathumansaresuperiortononhumannaturenomoresupportsthepracticeofaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofnonhumannaturetosatisfyourownnonbasicorluxuryneeds,thandoestheclaimthatapersonwhocameinfirstinaracewouldsupportthepracticeofaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofthosewhocameinsecond,third,fourth,andsoon,tosatisfythenonbasicorluxuryneedsofthepersonwhocameinfirst.Ahigherdegreeofmeritdoesnottranslateintoarightofdomination,andtoclaimarighttoaggressagainstthebasicneedsofnonhumannatureinordertomeetourownnonbasicorluxuryneedsisclearlytoclaimarightofdomination.109Allthatoursuperiorityashumanswouldjustifyisnotmeetingthebasicneedsofnonhumannaturewhenthisconflictswithournonbasicorluxuryneeds.Whatitdoesnotjustifyisaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofnonhumannaturewhenthisconflictswithournonbasicorluxuryneeds.Insum,Ihavearguedthatwhetherweendorseananthropocentricoranonanthropocentricenvironmentalethics,weshouldfavoraPrincipleofHumanDefense,aPrincipleofHumanPreservation,andaPrincipleofDisproportionality,asIhaveinterpretedthem.Inthepast,failuretorecognizetheimportanceofaPrincipleofHumanDefenseandaPrincipleofHumanPreservationhasledphilosopherstooverestimatetheamountofsacrificerequiredofhumans.110Bycontrast,failuretorecognizetheimportanceofaPrincipleofDisproportionalityhasledphilosopherstounderestimatetheamountofsacrificerequiredofhumans.111Iclaimthattakentogether,thesethreeprinciplesstriketherightbalancebetweenconcernsofhumanwelfareandthewelfareofnonhumannature.FromjustwartheorytopacifismTraditionally,pacifismandjustwartheoryhaverepresentedradicallyopposedresponsestoaggression.Pacifismhasbeeninterpretedtoruleoutanyuseofviolenceinresponsetoaggression.Justwartheoryhasbeeninterpretedtopermitameasureduseofviolenceinresponsetoaggression.112Ithasbeenthoughtthatthetwoviewsmightsometimesagreeinparticularcases,forexample,thatpacifistsandjustwartheoristsmightunconditionallyopposenuclearwar,butbeyondthatithasbeengenerallyheldthatthetwoviewsleadtoradicallyopposedrecommendations.Byapplyingapeacemakingmodelofdoingphilosophytotheanalysisofthesetwoviews,Ihopetoshowthatthisisnotthecase.Specifically,Iwillarguethatpacifismandjustwartheory,intheirmostmorallydefensibleinterpretations,canbesubstantiallyreconciledbothintheoryandpractice.Intraditionaljustwartheorytherearetwobasicelements:anaccountofjustcauseandanaccountofjustmeans.Justcauseisusuallyspecifiedasfollows:1Theremustbesubstantialaggression.2Nonbelligerentcorrectivesmustbeeitherhopelessortoocostly.3Belligerentcorrectivesmustbeneitherhopelessnortoocostly.Needlesstosay,thenotionofsubstantialaggressionisabitfuzzy,butitisgenerallyunderstoodtobethetypeofaggressionthatviolatespeople’smostfundamentalrights.Tosuggestsomespecificexamplesofwhatisandisnotsubstantialaggression,usuallythetakingofhostagesisregardedassubstantialaggression,whilethenationalizationofparticularfirmsownedbyforeignersisnotsoregarded.Butevenwhensubstantialaggressionoccurs,frequentlynonbelligerentcorrectivesareneitherhopelessnortoocostly.Andevenwhennonbelligerentcorrectivesareeitherhopelessortoocostly,inorderfortheretobeajustcause,belligerentcorrectivesmustbeneitherhopelessnortoocostly.Traditionaljustwartheoryassumes,however,thattherearejustcauses,andgoesontospecifyjustmeansasimposingtworequirements:1Harmtoinnocentsshouldnotbedirectlyintendedasanendorameans.\nINTRODUCTION192Theharmresultingfromthebelligerentmeansshouldnotbedisproportionatetotheparticulardefensiveobjectivetobeattained.Whilethejustmeansconditionsapplytoeachdefensiveaction,thejustcauseconditionsmustbemetbytheconflictasawhole.Itisimportanttonotethattheserequirementsofjustcauseandjustmeansarenotessentiallyaboutwaratall.Essentially,theyconstituteatheoryofjustdefensethatcanapplytowar,butcanalsoapplytoawiderangeofdefensiveactionsshortofwar.Ofcourse,whatneedstobedeterminediswhethertheserequirementscanbejustified.Sincejustwartheoryisusuallyopposedtopacifism,tosecureanon-question-beggingjustificationforthetheoryanditsrequirements,weneedtoproceedasmuchaspossiblefrompremisesthatarecommontopacifistsandjustwartheoristsalike.Thedifficultyhereisthatthereisnotjustoneformofpacifismbutmany.Soweneedtodeterminewhichformofpacifismismostmorallydefensible.Whenmostpeoplethinkofpacifismtheytendtoidentifyitwithatheoryofnonviolence.Wecancallthisview“nonviolentpacifism.”ItmaintainsthatAnyuseofviolenceagainstotherhumanbeingsismorallyprohibited.Ithasbeenplausiblyargued,however,thatthisformofpacifismisincoherent.Inawellknownarticle,JanNarvesonrejectsnonviolentpacifismasincoherentbecauseitrecognizesarighttolifeyetrulesoutanyuseofforceindefenseofthatright.113Theviewisincoherent,Narvesonclaims,becausehavingarightentailsthelegitimacyofusingforceindefenseofthatrightatleastonsomeoccasions.Giventhecogencyofobjectionsofthissort,somehaveoptedforaformofpacifismthatdoesnotruleoutallviolencebutonlylethalviolence.Wecancallthisview“nonlethalpacifism.”ItmaintainsthatAnylethaluseofforceagainstotherhumanbeingsismorallyprohibited.Indefenseofnonlethalpacifism,CheyneyRyanhasarguedthatthereisasubstantialissuebetweenthepacifistandthenonpacifistconcerningwhetherwecanorshouldcreatethenecessarydistancebetweenourselvesandotherhumanbeingsinordertomaketheactofkillingpossible.114Toillustrate,RyancitesGeorgeOrwell’sreluctancetoshootatanenemysoldierwhojumpedoutofatrenchandranalongthetopofaparapethalf-dressedandholdinguphistrouserswithbothhands.RyancontendsthatwhatkeptOrwellfromshootingwasthathecouldn’tthinkofthesoldierasathingratherthanafellowhumanbeing.However,itisnotclearthatOrwell’sencountersupportsnonlethalpacifism.ForitmaybethatwhatkeptOrwellfromshootingtheenemysoldierwasnothisinabilitytothinkofthesoldierasathingratherthanafellowhumanbeing,butratherhisinabilitytothinkofthesoldierwhowasholdinguphistrouserswithbothhandsasathreatoracombatant.Underthisinterpretation,Orwell’sdecisionnottoshootwouldaccordwellwiththerequirementsofjustwartheory.Letussuppose,however,thatsomeoneisattemptingtotakeyourlife.Whydoesthatpermityou,thedefenderofnonlethalpacifismmightask,tokillthepersonmakingtheattempt?Themostcogentresponse,itseemstome,isthatkillinginsuchacaseisnotevil,oratleastnotmorallyevil,becauseanyonewhoiswrongfullyengagedinanattemptuponyourlifehasalreadyforfeitedhisorherrighttolifebyengaginginsuchaggression.115So,providedthatyouarereasonablycertainthattheaggressoriswrongfullyengagedinanattemptuponyourlife,youwouldbemorallyjustifiedinkilling,assumingthatitistheonlywayofsavingyourownlife.Thereis,however,aformofpacifismthatremainsuntouchedbythecriticismsIhaveraisedagainstbothnonviolentpacifismandnonlethalpacifism.Thisformofpacifismneitherprohibitsallviolencenorevenallusesoflethalforce.Wecancalltheview“anti-warpacifism”becauseitholdsthatAnyparticipationinthemassiveuseoflethalforceinwarfareismorallyprohibited.116Indefenseofanti-warpacifism,itisundeniablethatwarshavebroughtenormousamountsofdeathanddestructionintheirwakeandthatmanyofthosewhohaveperishedinthemarenoncombatantsorinnocents.Infact,thetendencyofmodernwarshasbeentoproducehigherandhigherproportionsofnoncombatantcasualties,makingitmoreandmoredifficulttojustifyparticipationinsuchwars.Atthesametime,strategiesfornonbelligerentconflictresolutionarerarelyintensivelydevelopedandexploredbeforenationschoosetogotowar,makingitallbutimpossibletojustifyparticipationinsuchwars.117Todeterminewhethertherequirementsofjustwartheorycanbereconciledwiththoseofanti-warpacifism,however,weneedtoconsiderwhetherweshoulddistinguishbetweenharmintentionallyinflicteduponinnocents,andharmwhoseinflictiononinnocentsismerelyforeseen.Ontheonehand,wecouldfavorauniformrestrictionagainsttheinflictionofharmuponinnocentsthatignorestheintended/foreseendistinction.Ontheotherhand,wecouldfavoradifferentialrestrictionthatismoresevereagainsttheintentionalinflictionofharmuponinnocents,butislesssevereagainsttheinflictionofharmthatis\n20JAMESP.STERBAmerelyforeseen.Whatneedstobedetermined,therefore,iswhetherthereisanyrationaleforfavoringthisdifferentialrestrictiononharmoverauniformrestriction.Letusfirstexaminethequestionfromtheperspectiveofthosesufferingtheharm.Initially,itmightappeartomatterlittlewhethertheharmwouldbeintendedormerelyforeseenbythosewhocauseit.Fromtheperspectiveofthosesufferingharm,itmightappearthatwhatmattersissimplythattheoverallamountofharmberestricted,irrespectiveofwhetheritisforeseenorintended.Butconsider.Don’tthosewhosufferharmhavemorereasontoprotestwhentheharmisdonetothembyagentswhoaredirectlyengagedincausingharmtothem,thanwhentheharmisdoneincidentallybyagentswhoseendsandmeansaregood?Don’twehavemorereasontoprotestwhenwearebeingusedbyothersthanwhenweareaffectedbythemonlyincidentally?Moreover,ifweexaminethequestionfromtheperspectiveofthosecausingharm,additionalsupportforthislineofreasoningcanbefound.Foritwouldseemthatwehavemorereasontoprotestarestrictionagainstforeseenharmthanwehavereasontoprotestacomparablerestrictionagainstintendedharm.Thisisbecausearestrictionagainstforeseenharmlimitsouractionswhenourendsandmeansaregood,whereasarestrictionagainstintendedharmonlylimitsouractionswhenourendsormeansareevilorharmful,anditwouldseemthatwehavegreatergroundsforactingwhenbothourendsandmeansaregoodthanwhentheyarenot.Consequently,becausewehavemorereasontoprotestwhenwearebeingusedbyothersthanwhenwearebeingaffectedbythemonlyincidentally,andbecausewehavemorereasontoactwhenbothourendsandmeansaregoodthanwhentheyarenot,weshouldfavortheforeseen/intendeddistinctionthatisincorporatedintojustmeans.Itmightbeobjected,however,thatatleastsometimeswecouldproducegreatergoodoverallbyviolatingtheforeseen/intendeddistinctionofjustmeansandactingwiththeevilmeansofintentionallyharminginnocents.Onthisaccount,itmightbearguedthatitshouldbepermissibleatleastsometimestointentionallyharminnocentsinordertoachievegreatergoodoverall.Nowitseemstomethatthisobjectioniswelltakeninsofarasitisdirectedagainstanabsoluterestrictionuponintentionalharmtoinnocents.Itseemsclearthatthereareexceptionstosucharestrictionwhenintentionalharmtoinnocentsis1trivial(e.g.asinthecaseofsteppingonsomeone’sfoottogetoutofacrowdedsubway)2easilyrepairable(e.g.asinthecaseoflyingtoatemporarilydepressedfriendtokeepherfromcommittingsuicide),or3greatlyoutweighedbytheconsequencesoftheaction,especiallytoinnocentpeople(e.g.asinthecaseofshootingoneoftwohundredcivilianhostagestopreventintheonlywaypossibletheexecutionofalltwohundred).Yetwhileweneedtorecognizetheseexceptionstoanabsoluterestrictionuponintentionalharmtoinnocents,thereisgoodreasonnottopermitsimplymaximizinggoodconsequencesoverall,becausethatwouldplaceunacceptableburdensuponparticularindividuals.Morespecifically,itwouldbeanunacceptableburdenoninnocentstoallowthemtobeintentionallyharmedincasesotherthantheexceptionswehavejustenumerated.And,allowingfortheseexceptions,wewouldstillhavereasontofavoradifferentialrestrictionagainstharminginnocentsthatismoresevereagainsttheintentionalinflictionofharmuponinnocentsbutislesssevereagainsttheinflictionofharmuponinnocentsthatismerelyforeseen.Again,themaingroundsforthispreferenceisthatwewouldhavemorereasontoprotestwhenwearebeingusedbyothersthanwhenwearebeingaffectedbythemonlyincidentally,andmorereasontoactwhenbothourendsandmeansaregoodthanwhentheyarenot.Sofar,Ihavearguedthattherearegroundsforfavoringadifferentialrestrictiononharmtoinnocentsthatismoresevereagainstintendedharmandlesssevereagainstforeseenharm.Ihavefurtherarguedthatthisrestrictionisnotabsolute,sothatwhentheevilintendedistrivial,easilyrepairableorgreatlyoutweighedbytheconsequences,intentionalharmtoinnocentscanbejustified.Moreover,thereisnoreasontothinkthatanti-warpacifistswouldrejecteitheroftheseconclusions.Anti-warpacifistsareopposedtoanyparticipationinthemassiveuseoflethalforceinwarfare,yetthisneednotconflictwiththecommitmentofjustwartheoriststoadifferentialbutnonabsoluterestrictiononharmtoinnocentsasarequirementofjustmeans.118Wherejustwartheorygoeswrong,accordingtoanti-warpacifists,isnotinitsrestrictiononharminginnocents,butratherinitsfailuretoadequatelydeterminewhenbelligerentcorrectivesaretoocostlytoconstituteajustcause,orlackingintheproportionalityrequiredbyjustmeans.Accordingtoanti-warpacifists,justwartheoryprovidesinsufficientrestraintinbothoftheseareas.Nowtoevaluatethiscriticism,weneedtoconsiderawiderangeofcaseswherekillingorinflictingseriousharmonothersindefenseofoneselforothersmightbethoughttobejustified,beginningwiththeeasiestcasestoassessfromtheperspectivesofanti-warpacifismandthejustwartheory,andthenmovingontocasesthataremoredifficulttoassessfromthoseperspectives.Case1,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorwouldpreventone’sowndeath.119Thiscaseclearlypresentsnoproblems.Inthefirstplace,anti-warpacifistsadoptedtheirviewbecausetheywereconvincedthattherewereinstancesofjustifiedkilling.And,inthiscase,theonlypersonkilledisanunjustaggressor.Sosurelyanti-warpacifistswouldhavetoagreewithjustwartheoriststhatonecanjustifiablykillanunjustaggressorifitistheonlywaytosaveone’slife.\nINTRODUCTION21Case2,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystanderwouldpreventone’sowndeathandthatoffiveotherinnocentpeople.120Inthiscase,wehavetheforeseenkillingofaninnocentpersonaswellasthekillingoftheunjustaggressor,butsinceitistheonlywaytosaveone’sownlifeandthelivesoffiveotherinnocentpeople,anti-warpacifistsandjustwartheoristsalikewouldhavereasontojudgeitmorallypermissible.Inthiscase,theintendedlife-savingbenefitstosixinnocentpeoplearejudgedtooutweightheforeseendeathofoneinnocentpersonandtheintendedorforeseendeathoftheunjustaggressor.Case3,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystanderwouldpreventthedeathofmanyinnocentpeople.Inthiscase,despitethefactthatwelackthejustificationofself-defense,savingthelivesoffiveinnocentpeopleintheonlywaypossibleshouldstillprovideanti-warpacifistsandjustwartheoristswithsufficientgroundsforgrantingthemoralpermissibilityofkillinganunjustaggressor,evenwhenthekillingofaninnocentbystanderisaforeseenconsequence.Inthiscase,theintendedlife-savingbenefitstofiveinnocentpeoplewouldstilloutweightheforeseendeathofoneinnocentpersonandtheintendedorforeseendeathoftheunjustaggressor.Case4,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingoffiveinnocentpeoplewouldpreventthedeathoftwoinnocentpeople.Inthiscase,neitheranti-warpacifistsnorjustwartheoristswouldfindthecostandproportionalityrequirementsofjustwartheorytobemet.Toomanyinnocentpeoplewouldhavetobekilledtosavetoofew.Herethefactthatthedeathsoftheinnocentswouldbemerelyforeseendoesnotoutweighthefactthatwewouldhavetoacceptthedeathsoffiveinnocentsandthedeathoftheunjustaggressorinordertobeabletosavetwoinnocents.Noticethatuptothispointininterpretingthesecases,wehavesimplybeencountingthenumberofinnocentdeathsinvolvedineachcaseandoptingforthesolutionthatminimizedthelossofinnocentlivesthatwouldresult.Suppose,however,thatanunjustaggressorisnotthreateningthelivesofinnocentsbutonlytheirwelfareorproperty.Wouldthetakingoftheunjustaggressor’slifeindefenseofthewelfareandpropertyofinnocentsbejudgedproportionate?Considerthefollowingcase.Case5,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorwouldpreventseriousinjurytooneselfand/orfiveotherinnocentpeople.Sinceinthiscasetheintentionalorforeseenkillingoftheunjustaggressoristheonlywayofpreventingseriousinjurytooneselfand/orfiveotherinnocentpeople,then,byanalogywithcases1–3,bothanti-warpacifistsandjustwartheoristsalikewouldhavereasontoaffirmitsmoralpermissibility.Ofcourse,iftherewereanyotherwayofstoppingunjustaggressorsinsuchcasesshortofkillingthem,thatcourseofactionwouldclearlyberequired.Yetifthereisnoalternative,theintentionalorforeseenkillingoftheunjustaggressortopreventseriousinjurytooneselfand/orfiveotherinnocentpeoplewouldbejustified.Insuchcases,theseriousinjurycouldbebodilyinjury,aswhenanaggressorthreatenstobreakone’slimbs,oritcouldbeseriouspsychologicalinjury,aswhenanaggressorthreatenstoinjectmind-alteringdrugs,oritcouldbeaseriousthreattoproperty.Ofcourse,inmostcaseswhereseriousinjuryisthreatened,therewillbewaysofstoppingaggressorsshortofkillingthem.Unfortunately,thisisnotalwayspossible.Instillotherkindsofcase,stoppinganunjustaggressorwouldrequireindirectlyinflictingseriousharm,butnotdeath,uponinnocentbystanders.Considerthefollowingcases.Case6,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseeninflictionofseriousharmuponanunjustaggressorandtheforeseeninflictionofseriousharmupononeinnocentbystanderwouldpreventseriousharmtooneselfandfiveotherinnocentpeople.Case7,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseeninflictionofseriousharmuponanunjustaggressorandtheforeseeninflictionofseriousharmupononeinnocentbystanderwouldpreventseriousharmtofiveotherinnocentpeople.Inbothofthesecases,seriousharmisindirectlyinflictedupononeinnocentbystanderinordertopreventgreaterharmfrombeinginflictedbyanunjustaggressoruponotherinnocentpeople.Incase6,wealsohavethejustificationofself-defense,whichislackingincase7.Nevertheless,withregardtobothcases,anti-warpacifistsandjustwartheoristsshouldagreethatpreventingseriousinjurytofiveorsixinnocentpeopleintheonlywaypossiblerendersitmorallypermissibletoinflictseriousinjuryuponanunjustaggressor,evenwhentheseriousinjuryofoneinnocentpersonisaforeseenconsequence.Inthesecases,byanalogywithcases2and3,theforeseenseriousinjuryofoneinnocentpersonandtheintendedorforeseeninjuryoftheunjustaggressorshouldbejudgedproportionate,giventheintendedinjury-preventingbenefitstofiveorsixotherinnocentpeople.Uptothispointtherehasbeenthebasisforgeneralagreementamonganti-warpacifistsandjustwartheoristsastohowtointerprettheproportionalityrequirementofjustmeans,butinthefollowingcasethisnolongerobtains.Case8,whereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystanderwouldpreventseriousinjuriestothemembersofamuchlargergroupofpeople.Theinterpretationofthiscaseiscrucial.Inthiscase,weareaskedtosanctionthelossofaninnocentlifeinordertopreventseriousinjuriestothemembersofamuchlargergroupofpeople.Unfortunately,neitheranti-warpacifistsnorjustwartheoristshaveexplicitlyconsideredthiscase.Bothanti-warpacifistsandjustwartheoristsagreethatwecaninflictseriousinjuryuponanunjustaggressorandaninnocentbystandertopreventgreaterinjurytootherinnocentpeople,asincases6and7,andthatonecanevenintentionallyorindirectlykillanunjustaggressortopreventseriousinjurytooneselforotherinnocentpeople,asincase5.Yetneither\n22JAMESP.STERBAanti-warpacifistsnorjustwartheoristshaveexplicitlyaddressedthequestionofwhetherwecanindirectlykillaninnocentbystanderinordertopreventseriousinjuriestothemembersofamuchlargergroupofinnocentpeople.Rathertheyhavetendedtoconfusecase8withcase5whereitisagreedthatonecanjustifiablykillanunjustaggressorinordertopreventseriousinjurytooneselforfiveotherinnocentpeople.Incase8,however,oneisdoingsomethingquitedifferent:oneiskillinganinnocentbystanderinordertopreventseriousinjurytooneselfandfiveotherinnocentpeople.Thiskindoftrade-offisnotacceptedinstandardpolicepractice.Policeofficersareregularlyinstructednottoriskinnocentlivessimplytopreventseriousinjurytootherinnocents.Noristhereanyreasontothinkthatatrade-offthatisunacceptableinstandardpolicepracticewouldbeacceptableinlarger-scaleconflicts.Thus,forexample,eveniftheBalticrepublicscouldhaveeffectivelyfreedthemselvesfromtheSovietUnionbyinfiltratingintoMoscowseveralbandsofsaboteurswhowouldthenattackseveralmilitaryandgovernmentinstallationsinMoscow,causinganenormouslossofinnocentlives,suchtrade-offswouldnothavebeenjustified.Accordingly,itfollowsthatiftheproportionalityrequirementofjustwartheoryistobemet,wemustsavemoreinnocentlivesthanwecausetobelost,wemustpreventmoreinjuriesthanwebringabout,andwemustnotkillinnocents,evenindirectly,simplytopreventseriousinjuriestoourselvesandothers.Ofcourse,sometimesourlivesandwell-beingarethreatenedtogether.Orbetter,ifweareunwillingtosacrificeourwell-beingthenourlivesarethreatenedaswell.Nevertheless,ifwearejustifiedinouruseoflethalforcetodefendourselvesincaseswherewewillindirectlykillinnocents,itisbecauseourlivesarealsothreatened,notsimplyourwell-being.Andthesameholdsforwhenwearedefendingothers.Whatthisshowsisthattheconstraintsimposedbyjustwartheoryontheuseofbelligerentcorrectivesareactuallymuchmoreseverethananti-warpacifistshavetendedtorecognize.121Indeterminingwhenbelligerentcorrectivesaretoocostlytoconstituteajustcause,orlackingintheproportionalityrequiredbyjustmeans,justwartheoryunderitsmostmorallydefensibleinterpretation:1allowstheuseofbelligerentmeansagainstunjustaggressorsonlywhensuchmeansminimizethelossandinjurytoinnocentlivesoverall;2allowstheuseofbelligerentmeansagainstunjustaggressorstoindirectlythreateninnocentlivesonlytopreventthelossofinnocentlives,notsimplytopreventinjurytoinnocents;3allowstheuseofbelligerentmeanstodirectlyorindirectlythreatenoreventakethelivesofunjustaggressorswhenitistheonlywaytopreventseriousinjurytoinnocents.ItmightbeobjectedthatallthatIhaveshownthroughtheanalysisoftheaboveeightcasesisthatkillingindefenseofoneselforothersismorallypermissible,notthatitismorallyrequiredormorallyobligatory.Thatistrue.Ihavenotestablishedanyobligationtorespondtoaggressionwithlethalforceinthesecases,butonlythatitismorallypermissibletodoso.Foronething,itisdifficulttogroundanobligationtouselethalforceonself-defensealone,aswouldberequiredincase1orinoneversionofcase5.Obligationstooneselfappeartohaveanoptionalqualitythatisabsentfromobligationstoothers.Incases2–3and5–7,however,theuseofforcewouldpreventseriousharmordeathtoinnocents,andhereIcontenditwouldbemorallyobligatoryifeithertheproposeduseofforcerequiredonlyarelativelysmallpersonalsacrificefromus,orifwewerefairlyboundbyconventionorbyamutualdefenseagreementtocometotheaidofothers.Insuchcases,Ithinkwecanjustifiablyspeakofamoralobligationtokillorseriouslyharmindefenseofothers.Anotheraspectofcases1–3and5–7towhichsomeonemightobject,isthatitisthewrongfulactionsofothersthatputusintosituationswhereIamclaimingthatwearemorallyjustifiedinseriouslyharmingorkillingothers.122Butfortheactionsofunjustaggressors,wewouldnotbeinsituationswhereIamclaimingthatwearemorallypermittedorrequiredtoseriouslyharmorkill.Yetdoesn’tsomethinglikethishappeninawiderangeofcaseswhenwrongfulactionsareperformed?SupposeIamonthewaytothebanktodepositmoneyfromafundraiser,andsomeoneaccostsmeandthreatenstoshootifIdon’thandoverthemoney.IfIdohandoverthemoney,IwouldbeforcedtodosomethingIdon’twanttodo,somethingthatinvolvesalosstomyselfandothers.Butsurelyitismorallypermissibleformetohandoverthemoneyinthiscase.Anditmayevenbemorallyrequiredformetodosoifresistancewouldleadtotheshootingofothersinadditiontomyself.Soitdoesseemthatbadpeople,byalteringtheconsequencesofouractions,canalterourobligationsaswell.Whatourobligationsareundernonidealconditionsaredifferentfromwhattheywouldbeunderidealconditions.IfagroupofthugscomesintoaclassroomwhereIamlecturingandmakeitveryclearthattheyintendtoshootmeifeachofmystudentsdoesn’tgivethemonedollar,Ithink,andIwouldhopethatmystudentswouldalsothink,thateachofthemnowhasanobligationtogivethethugsonedollarwhenbeforetheyhadnosuchobligation.Likewise,Ithinkthattheactionsofunjustaggressorscanputusintosituationswhereitismorallypermissibleorevenmorallyrequiredforustoseriouslyharmorkill,whenbeforeitwasnot.Nowitmightbecontendedthatanti-warpacifistswouldconcedethemoralpermissibilityofcases1–3and5–7,butstillmaintainthatanyparticipationinthemassiveuseoflethalforceinwarfareismorallyprohibited.Thescaleoftheconflict,anti-warpacifistsmightcontend,makesallthedifference.Ofcourse,ifthissimplymeansthatmanylarge-scaleconflictswill\nINTRODUCTION23haveeffectsthatbearnoresemblancetocases1–3or5–7,thiscanhardlybedenied.Still,itispossibleforsomelarge-scaleconflictstobearaproportionateresemblancetotheabovecases.Forexample,itcanplausiblybearguedthatIndia’smilitaryactionagainstPakistaninBangladesh,andtheTanzanianincursionintoUgandaduringtheruleofIdiAmin,resemblecases3,5or7intheireffectsuponinnocents.123Whatthisshowsisthatanti-warpacifistsarenotjustifiedinregardingeveryparticipationinthemassiveuseoflethalforceinwarfareasmorallyprohibited.Instead,anti-warpacifistsmustallowthatatleastinsomereal-lifecases,warsandotherlarge-scalemilitaryoperationsbothhavebeenandwillbemorallypermissible.Thisconcessionfromanti-warpacifists,however,needstobematchedbyacomparableconcessionfromjustwartheoriststhemselves,becausetoofrequentlytheyhaveinterpretedtheirtheoryinmorallyindefensibleways.124Whenjustwartheoryisgivenamorallydefensibleinterpretation,Ihavearguedthatthetheoryfavorsastrongjustmeansprohibitionagainstintentionallyharminginnocents.Ihavealsoarguedthatthetheoryfavorstheuseofbelligerentmeansonlywhensuchmeans1minimizethelossandinjurytoinnocentlivesoverall,2threateninnocentlivesonlytopreventthelossofinnocentlives,notsimplytopreventinjurytoinnocents,and3threatenoreventakethelivesofunjustaggressorswhenitistheonlywaytopreventseriousinjurytoinnocents.Obviously,justwartheory,sounderstood,isgoingtoplacesevererestrictionsontheuseofbelligerentmeansinwarfare.Infact,mostoftheactualusesofbelligerentmeansinwarfarethathaveoccurredturnouttobeunjustified.Forexample,theUSinvolvementinNicaragua,ElSalvadorandPanama,theSovietUnion’sinvolvementinAfghanistan,andIsraeliinvolvementintheWestBankandtheGazaStrip,allviolatethejustcauseandjustmeansprovisionsofjustwartheoryasIhavedefendedthem.EventherecentUS-ledwaragainstIraqviolatedboththejustcauseandjustmeansprovisionsofjustwartheory.125Infact,onestrainstofindexamplesofjustifiedapplicationsofjustwartheoryinrecenthistory.TwoexamplesIhavealreadyreferredtoareIndia’smilitaryactionagainstPakistaninBangladesh,andtheTanzanianincursionintoUgandaduringtheruleofIdiAmin.Butaftermentioningthesetwoexamplesitisdifficulttogoon.Whatthisshowsisthatwhenjustwartheoryandanti-warpacifismaregiventheirmostmorallydefensibleinterpretations,bothviewscanbereconciled.Inthisreconciliation,thefewwarsandlarge-scaleconflictsthatmeetthestringentrequirementsofjustwartheoryaretheonlywarsandlarge-scaleconflictstowhichanti-warpacifistscannotjustifiablyobject.126Wecancalltheviewthatemergesfromthisreconciliation“justwarpacifism.”127Itisaviewwithwhichapeacemakingmodelofdoingphilosophywithitsgoalofreconcilingalternativemoralandpoliticalperspectivescanrestcontent.ConclusionPursuingpeacemakingasamodelfordoingphilosophy,Ihavearguedthatnotonlydoesrationalityrequiremorality,butthatevenaminimalmoralitylikelibertarianismrequiresrightstowelfareandequalopportunitythatleadtosocialistequalityandfeministandrogyny.Inthisway,Ihavebroughttogetherthemoralidealsoflibertarianism,welfareliberalism,socialismandfeminismintowhatcouldbecalledareconciliationistconceptionofjustice.Inaddition,Ihavearguedthatthepursuitofthisreconciliationistconceptionofjustice,especiallyinitsfeministdimensions,istheoreticallyandpracticallyconnectedtothepursuitofracialjustice,homosexualjusticeandmulticulturaljustice,andisfurtherconstrainedbyspecificprinciplesofenvironmentaljusticeandjustwarpacifism.Unfortunately,manycountrieswithadequateresourceshaveyettosecurearighttowelfareforalltheircitizens,norhasareasonableeffortbeenmadetoextendthisrighttopeopleinothercountries,letalonetofuturegenerations.Therearealsothesignificantinjusticessufferedbywomen,blacks,homosexualsandmembersofnon-Westerncultures.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatvictimsofinjusticeandtheiralliesshouldconsiderchangingorremovingexistinginjustices,firstbynormalpolitics,thenbylegalprotest,thenbycivildisobedience,andonlythenbyrevolutionaryaction.Butwhatifallofthesemeanshavebeentriedandarereasonablyjudgedineffective;or,alternatively,whatifthesemeansarereasonablyjudgedtoocostlyforthosewhomtheyareintendedtobenefit?Ifeitheroftheseconditionsobtain,whatispermissibleforthevictimsofinjusticetodo?Isitpermissibleforthemtoengageinprivateillegalactstosecurethosegoodsandresourcestowhichtheyaremorallyentitled?Ifweassumethatnormalpolitics,legalprotest,civildisobedience,andrevolutionaryactionhaveallbeentriedandreasonablyjudgedineffective,orthatsuchmeansarereasonablyjudgedtoocostlyforthosewhomtheyareintendedtobenefit,thenitwouldseemthatcriminallydisobedientactswouldbemorallypermissible,providedthattheyaredirectedatappropriatingsurplusgoodsfrompeoplewhohavemorethanafairshareofopportunitiestoleadagoodlife,andatappropriatingsuchgoodswithaminimumofphysicalforce.Inaddition,therewouldbenomoraljustificationforpunishingthissortofcriminalactivity.Forthosewhodislikethislimitonthemoraljustificationforpunishmentinsocietieslikeourown,thereisanappropriateremedy:guaranteethebasichumanrightsrequiredbythisreconciliationistconceptionofjustice,andmorepunishmentforcrimeswillthenbemorallyjustified.\n24JAMESP.STERBANOTES1Foradiscussionofthesimilaritiesbetweenargumentandwar,seeGeorgeLakoffandMarkJohnson,MetaphorsWeLiveBy(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1980)pp.4–6,77–86;andEdwinBurtt,“PhilosophersasWarriors,”inTheCritiqueofWar,editedbyRobertGinsberg(Chicago:HenryRegneryCo.,1969)pp.30–42.LakoffandJohnsonarguethatthesesimilaritiesbetweenargumentandwarareconstitutivefeaturesofthenatureofargument.2Baier,TheRationalandtheMoralOrder(LaSalle:OpenCourt,1995).Baier’smostrecentdefenseofmoralityisquitesimilartoDavidGauthier’sinMoralsbyAgreement(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986).IdiscussGauthier’sviewlaterinthischapter.3Baier,TheRationalandtheMoralOrder,p.188.4AlanGewirth,ReasonandMorality(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978)chapters1and2;“TheRationalityofReasonableness,”Synthese,vol.57(1983)pp.225–47;“FromthePrudentialtotheMoral,”Ethics,vol.95(1985)pp.302–4;“WhyThereAreHumanRights,”SocialTheoryandPractice,vol.11(1985)pp.235–48;“EthicsandthePainofContradiction,”PhilosophicalForum,vol.23(1992)pp.259–77.5ForGewirth’sclaimthattherightinpremise3isprudential,see“RepliestoMyCritics,”inGewirth’sEthicalRationalism,editedbyEdwardRegis(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1984)pp.205–12.6NodoubtsomewillfindGewirth’snotionofa“prudentialright”tobesomethingofanoxymoron,butinhisaccountthenotionisclearlydefinedtobetheequivalentofaprudentialasopposedtoamoralought.Soifitwouldhelp,barringalittleawkwardness,itispossibletorestateGewirth’sargument,aswellasmyresponse,bysimplyreplacingeveryoccurrenceof“right”withoneof“ought.”7“Ought”presupposes“can”here.Sounlesspeoplehavethecapacitytoentertainandfollowbothself-interestedandmoralreasonsforacting,itdoesnotmakeanysenseaskingwhethertheyoughtoroughtnottodoso.Moreover,moralreasonshereareunderstoodtonecessarilyinclude(some)altruisticreasons,butnotnecessarilytoexclude(all)self-interestedreasons.Sothequestionofwhetheritwouldberationalforustofollowself-interestedreasonsratherthanmoralreasonsshouldbeunderstoodasthequestionofwhetheritwouldberationalforustofollowself-interestedreasonsexclusively,ratherthansomeappropriatesetofself-interestedreasonsandaltruisticreasonswhichconstitutestheclassofmoralreasons.8Iunderstandthepurealtruisttobethemirrorimageofthepureegoist.Whereasthepureegoistthinksthattheinterestsofotherscountforthembutnotforherselfexceptinstrumentally,thepurealtruistthinksthatherowninterestscountforothersbutnotforherselfexceptinstrumentally.9Thisisbecausemoralityitselfalreadyrepresentsacompromisebetweenegoismandaltruism.Sotoaskthatmoralreasonsbeweighedagainstself-interestedreasonsis,ineffect,tocountself-interestedreasonstwice—onceinthecompromisebetweenegoismandaltruismandthenagainwhenmoralreasonsareweighedagainstself-interestedreasons.Buttocountself-interestedreasonstwiceisclearlyobjectionable.10Noticethatby“egoisticperspective”hereImeantheviewthatgrantstheprimafacierelevanceofbothegoisticandaltruisticreasonstorationalchoiceandthentriestoargueforthesuperiorityofegoisticreasons.Similarly,by“altruisticperspective”Imeantheviewthatgrantstheprimafacierelevanceofbothegoisticandaltruisticreasonstorationalchoiceandthentriestoargueforthesuperiorityofaltruisticreasons.11Forfurtherdiscussion,seemyJusticeforHereandNow(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),chapter2.12Forexample,AlasdairMacIntyre,AfterVirtue(NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981).13Forexample,JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993).ForRawls,justifiedagreementonpracticalrequirementsnecessitatesanoverlappingconsensusonpoliticalvalues,butunfortunatelyRawlsneverestablishesthatthereisanysuchoverlappingconsensusonpoliticalvalues.Myapproachisdifferent.Iarguethattherearegroundsforjustifiedagreementonpracticalrequirementsevenintheabsenceofaconsensusonpoliticalvalues.14GoodexamplesofphilosopherswhohavetakenthisapproachareWillKymlicka,ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990)andSeylaBenhabib,SituatingtheSelf(NewYork:Routledge,1992).15SeeJohnHospers,Libertarianism(LosAngeles:NashPress,1971).16Ibid.,chapter7.17IamindebtedtoAlasdairMaclntyreforhelpingmemakethispointclearer.18SeeJamesP.Sterba,“IsThereaRationaleforPunishment?”,TheAmericanJournalofJurisprudence(1984).19Bythelibertyoftherichtomeettheirluxuryneeds,Icontinuetomeanthelibertyoftherichnottobeinterferedwithwhenusingtheirsurpluspossessionsforluxurypurposes.Similarly,bythelibertyofthepoortomeettheirbasicneeds,Icontinuetomeanthelibertyofthepoornottobeinterferedwithwhentakingwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneedsfromthesurpluspossessionsoftherich.20Forthisotherinterpretation,seemyHowToMakePeopleJust(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1988)chapter5.21TiborMachan,IndividualsandTheirRights(LaSalle:OpenCourt,1989)pp.100–11.22Ibid.,p.107.23Moreover,libertarianshavenotrestrictedtheclassofmorallylegitimateclaimantsinthisfashion.Afterall,thefundamentalrightsrecognizedbylibertariansareuniversalrights,thatis,rightspossessedbyallpeople,notjustthosewholiveincertainplacesoratcertaintimes.Ofcourse,toclaimthattheserightsareuniversalrightsdoesnotmeanthattheyareuniversallyrecognized;obviouslythefundamentalrightsthatflowfromthelibertarianidealhavenotbeenuniversallyrecognized.Rathertoclaimthattheyareuniversalrights,despitetheirspottyrecognition,impliesonlythattheyoughttoberecognizedatalltimesandplacesbypeoplewho\nINTRODUCTION25haveorcouldhavehadgoodreasonstorecognizetheserights,whetherornottheyactuallydidordoso.Norneedtheseuniversalrightsbeunconditional.Thisisparticularlytrueinthecaseoftherighttowelfare,which,Ihaveargued,isconditionalonpeopledoingallthattheylegitimatelycantoprovideforthemselves.Inaddition,thisrightisconditionalontherebeingsufficientgoodsandresourcesavailablesothateveryone’swelfareneedscanbemet.So,wherepeopledonotdoallthattheycantoprovideforthemselves,orwheretherearenotsufficientgoodsandresourcesavailable,peoplesimplydonothavearighttowelfare.YeteventhoughlibertarianshaveclaimedthattherightstheydefendareuniversalrightsinthemannerIhavejustexplained,itmaybethattheyaresimplymistakeninthisregard.Evenwhenuniversalrightsarestrippedofanyclaimtobeinguniversallyrecognizedorunconditional,stillitmightbearguedthattherearenosuchrights,thatis,thattherearenorightsthatallpeopleoughttorecognize.Buthowwouldoneargueforsuchaview?Onecouldn’targuefromthefailureofpeopletorecognizesuchrights,becausewehavealreadysaidthatsuchrecognitionisnotnecessary.Norcouldonearguethatnoteveryoneoughttorecognizesuchrightsbecausesomelackthecapacitytodoso.Thisisbecause“ought”doesimply“can”here,sothattheobligationtorecognizecertainrightsonlyappliestothosewhoactuallyhaveoratsomepointhavehadthecapacitytodoso.Thus,theexistenceofuniversalrightsisnotruledoutbytheexistenceofindividualswhohaveneverhadthecapacitytorecognizesuchrights.Itwouldberuledoutonlybytheexistenceofindividualswhocouldrecognizetheserightsbutforwhomitwouldbecorrecttosaythattheyought,allthingsconsidered,nottodoso.Butwehavejustseenthatevenaminimallibertarianmoralidealsupportsauniversalrighttowelfare.AndasIhavearguedinchapter2,when“ought”isunderstoodprudentiallyratherthanmorally,anon-question-beggingconceptiontorationalityfavorsmoralityoverprudence(seechapter2).Soforthosecapableofrecognizinguniversalrights,itsimplyisnotpossibletoarguethatthey,allthingsconsidered,oughtnottodoso.24BobBergland,“AttackingtheProblemofWorldHunger,”TheNationalForum(1979)vol.69,p.4.25Hunger1995:FifthAnnualReportontheStateofWorldHunger(SilverSpringsMD:BreadfortheWorldInstitute,1994)p.10;RuthSivard,WorldMilitaryandSocialExpenditures(WashingtonDC:WorldPriorities,1993)p.28;FrancesMooreLappe,WorldHunger(NewYork:GrovePress,1986)p.9.26LesterBrown,ChristopherFlavinandHalKane,VitalSigns1996(NewYork:Norton,1996)pp.34–5;JeremyRifkin,BeyondBeef(NewYork:Penguin,1992)p.1.27HenryShue,BasicRights(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1980)chapter7.28Foradiscussionofthesecausalconnections,seeCherylSilver,OneEarth,OneFuture(WashingtonDC:NationalAcademyPress,1990);BillMcKibben,TheEndofNature(NewYork:AnchorBooks,1989);JeremyLeggett(ed.)GlobalWarming(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1990);andLesterBrown(ed.)TheWorldWatchReader(NewYork:Nelson,1991).29CharlesParkJr(ed.)EarthResources(WashingtonDC:VoiceofAmerica,1980)chapter13;LesterBrown,StateoftheWorld1995(NewYork:Norton,1997)chapter7;LesterBrown(ed.)TheWorldWatchReaderp.268.ChinacurrentlyusesmorecoalthantheUS.SeeLesterBrown,StateoftheWorld1995(NewYork:Norton,1997),p.9.30G.TylerMillerJr,LivingwiththeEnvironment(Belmont:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1990)p.20.SeealsoJanetBeseckerandPhilElder,“LifeboatEthics:AReplytoHardin,”inReadingsinEcology,EnergyandHumanSociety,editedbyWilliamBurch(NewYork:Harper&Row,1977)p.229.ForhigherandlowerestimatesoftheimpactofNorthAmericans,seeHolmesRolstonIII,“FeedingPeopleversusSavingNature?”inWorldHungerandMorality,2ndedn(EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall,1996)pp.259–60;PaulEhrlich,AnneEhrlichandGretchenDaily,TheStorkandthePlow(NewYork:Grosset/Putnam,1995)p.26.31Successesinmeetingthemostbasicneedsofthepoorinparticularregionsofdevelopingcountries(e.g.theIndianstateofKerala)shouldnotblindustothegrowingnumbersofpeoplelivinginconditionsofabsolutepoverty(1.2billionbyarecentestimate)andhowdifficultitwillbetomeetthebasicneedsofallthesepeopleinasustainablewaythatwillallowfuturegenerationstohavetheirbasicneedsmetaswell,especiallywhenwereflectonthefactthatthewayweinthedevelopedworldarelivingisnotsustainableatall!32JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971)chapter2.33AlanDurning,“LifeontheBrink,”WorldWatch,vol.3no.2(1990)p.24.34Ibid.,p.29.35JoyceTrebilcot,“TwoFormsofAndrogynism,”reprintedinFeminismandPhilosophy,editedbyMaryVetterling-Braggin,FrederickEllisonandJaneEnglish(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1977)pp.70–8.36MaryAnneWarren,“IsAndrogynytheAnswertoSexualStereotyping?”,in“Femininity,”“Masculinity,”and“Androgyny”,ed.MaryVetterling-Braggin(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1982)pp.178–9.37See,forexample,VirginiaHeld,RightsandGoods(NewYork:FreePress,1984)especiallychapter11;andGloriaSteinem“WhatitWouldbeLikeifWomenWin,”Time,31August1970,pp.22–3;MaryJeanneLarrabee,“FeminismandParentalRoles:PossibilitiesforChanges,”JournalofSocialPhilosophy,vol.14(1983)p.18.SeealsoNationalOrganizationforWomen(NOW)BillofRights,andStatementontheEqualRightsAmendment,UnitedStatesCommissiononCivilRights(1978).38See,forexample,AnnFerguson,“AndrogynyasanIdealforHumanDevelopment,”inFeminismandPhilosophy,pp.45–69;andEvelynReed,“Women:Caste,ClassorOppressedSex?”inMoralityinPractice,2ndedn,ed.JamesP.Sterba(Belmont:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1983)pp.222–8.39JamesP.Sterba,HowToMakePeopleJust(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1988)pp.125–6.40Unfortunately,itisdoubtfulwhetherthisdistinctiveaspectofasocialistdefenseofandrogynycanbemaintained.SeeHeidiHartmann,“TheUnhappyMarriageofMarxismandFeminism:TowardaMoreProgressiveUnion,”inFeministPhilosophies,ed.JanetKourany,JamesP.SterbaandRosemarieTong(EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice-Hall,1992)pp.343–55.41Thereasonforqualifyingthisclaimisthatmothersandfathers,unlikechildren,maylegitimatelywaivetheirrighttoequalopportunitywhenthereasonsarecompellingenough.\n26JAMESP.STERBA42Childcareexpensesconsumeaboutafifthofthebudgetsoflow-incomefamiliesthatpayforchildcare.SeeCynthisCostelloandAnneStone,TheAmericanWoman,1994–95(NewYork:Norton,1994),p.306.43NewYorkTimes,25November1987;RuthSidel,“DayCare:DoWeReallyCare?”inIssuesinFeminism,ed.SheilaRuth(MountainViewCA:MayfieldPublishingCo.,1990)p.342.OneexplanationofthislackofdaycareintheUSisthatatpresent99%ofprivateUSemployersstilldonotofferittotheiremployees.SeeSusanFaludi,Backlash(NewYork:CrownPublishingCo.,1988)p.xiii.44NewYorkTimes,25November1987;RuthSidel,“DayCare:DoWeReallyCare?”;seealsoPhyllisMoen,Woman’sTwoRoles(NewYork:AuburnHouse,1992).AccordingtoonenationwidestudybyanagencyoftheUSDepartmentofLabor,1%ofdaycarefacilitieswere“superior,”15%were“good,”35%wereessential“custodial”or“fair,”andnearlyhalfwereconsidered“poor.”SeeSidel,p.341.SeealsoCost,QualityandChildOutcomesStudyTeam,Cost,QualityandChildOutcomesinChildCareCenters,2ndedn(Denver:UniversityofColorado,1995).45SeeLenoreWeitzman,TheDivorceRevolution:TheUnexpectedSocialandEconomicConsequencesforWomenandChildreninAmerica(NewYork:FreePress,1985).46DorothyDinnerstein,TheMermaidandtheMinotaur(NewYork:Harper&Row,1977);NancyChodorow,Mothering:PsychoanalysisandtheSociologyofGender(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1978);VivianGornick,“Here’sNews:FathersMatterasMuchasMothers,”VillageVoice,13October1975.47NewYorkTimes,27November1987.48Women’sActionCoalition,WACStats:theFactsAboutWomen(NewYork:TheNewPress,1993)p.60.49StatisticalAbstractsoftheUnitedStates1996(WashingtonDC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,1996)pp.393,400.50SeeStatisticalAbstractsoftheUnitedStates1996,p.469.NewYorkTimes,6,18,and19October1992;seealsoMoen,Women’sRoles;ElaineSorenson,“TheComparableWorthDebate,”inMoralityinPractice,4thedn,ed.JamesP.Sterba(Belmont:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1994)pp.293–4.51SeeStatisticalAbstractsoftheUnitedStates1996,p.426.52SeeJerryJacobsandRonnieSteinberg,“CompensatingDifferentialsandtheMale-FemaleWageGap,”SocialForces,vol.69(December1990)pp.439–68.53GertrudeEzorsky,RacismandJustice(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1991).54ElaineSorensen,ComparableWorth(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1994)pp.88–9.SeealsoEllenPaul,EquityandGender(NewBrunswick:Transaction,1989);andMaryAnnMason,“BeyondEqualOpportunity:ANewVisionforWomenWorkers,”NotreDameJournalofLaw,EthicsandPublicPolicy,vol.6(1992)pp.359–92.55NewYorkTimes,17October1991.SeealsoElizabethSchneider,“TheViolenceofPrivacy,”TheConnecticutLawReview,vol.23(1991)pp.973–99.56SeeMaryKoss,INeverCalledItRape(NewYork:HarperandRow,1988).OriginallyKoss’studyindicateda25%incidenceofrape,butrespondingtocriticismofoneofhersurveyquestions,Kossrevisedherfindingsandcameupwitha20%incidenceofrape.57CommitteeontheJudiciary,UnitedStatesSenate,ViolenceAgainstWomen,AMajorityStaffReport(USGovernmentPrintingOffice,1992);RonThorne-Finch,EndingtheSilence:TheOriginsandTreatmentofMaleViolenceAgainstWomen(Toronto:UniversityofTorontoPress,1992)chapter1;AlbertRoberts,HelpingBatteredWomen(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996)partI.58DeirdreEnglish,“ThroughtheGlassCeiling,”MotherJones,November1992.59DianaRussell,TheSecretTrauma(NewYork:BasicBooks,1986)p.61;DianaRussell,“TheIncidenceandPrevalenceofIntrafamilialandExtrafamilialSexualAbuseofFemaleChildren,”ChildAbuseandNeglect:TheInternationalJournal,vol.7(1983)pp.133–46.60Onthispoint,seeCatharineMacKinnon,FeminismUnmodified(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1987)pp.169–71.61MyriamMiedzian,BoysWillBeBoys(NewYork:Doubleday,1991)p.74.62DonaldVictorButlerv.HerMajestyTheQueen(1992).63CatharineMacKinnon,FeminismUnmodified(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1987)chapter14;OnlyWords(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1993)chapter1.AccordingtoMacKinnon,thematerialsusedinthepracticeofhard-corepornographyaresexuallyexplicit,violent,andsexist,andtheyarecontrastedwiththematerialsusedinthepracticeoferoticawhicharesexuallyexplicitandpremisedonequality.Butobviouslyitisnotalwayseasytoproperlyclassifysexuallyexplicitmaterials.64SeeMacKinnon,FeminismUnmodified,chapter14.SeealsoAndreaDworkin,Pornography:MenPossessingWomen(NewYork:Plume,1989);SusanCole,PornographyandtheSexCrisis(Toronto:Amanita,1989)andPornographyandSexualViolence:EvidenceoftheLinks(London:EverywomanLtd,1988).65MeritorSavingsBank.477U.S.57,106S.Ct.2399,91L.Ed.49(1983).66Christoforouv.RyderTruckRental.668F.Supp.294(S.D.N.Y.1987).67Rabiduev.OsceolaRefiningCo.805F.2d611,620(6thCir.1986).68Obviouslymostoffersofthissortwillbemoresubtle,butiftheyaregoingtoservetheirpurposetheirmessagemuststillberelativelyeasytodiscern.69Evenwherethereislegalizedprostitution,suchoffersmaystillbeobjectivelyunwelcome.70Thereisananalogousrequirementofsubjectiveconsentinthelawconcerningrapethatissimilarlyindefensible.SeeSusanEstrich,“SexatWork,”StanfordLawReview,vol.43(1991)pp.813–61.71Ortheycouldsimplynotfirethosetowhomtheymaketheoffers.\nINTRODUCTION2772BarbaraGutekcontendsthatsexualharassmentiscausedbythefactthatwomenarestereotypicallyidentifiedassexualobjectsinwaysthatmenarenot.Shenotesthatwomenarestereotypicallycharacterizedassexy,affectionateandattractive,whereasmenarestereotypicallycharacterizedascompetentandactive.Thesestereotypes,Gutekclaims,spilloverintotheworkplace,makingitdifficultforwomentobeperceivedasfellowworkersratherthansexobjects,anditistheseperceptionsthatfostersexualharassment.SeeGutek,“UnderstandingSexualHarassmentatWork,”NotreDameJournalofLaw,EthicsandPublicPolicy(1992)pp.335–8.Itwouldseem,therefore,thateliminatingtheproblemofsexualharassmentfromoursocietywillrequirebreakingdownthesestereotypes.Butthis,ofcourse,isjustwhattheidealofagender-freeorandrogynoussocietyhopestodo.73MeritorSavingsBankv.Vinson.74Rabiduev.OsceolaRefiningCo.805F.2d611,620(6thCir.1986).75“EEOC1980GuidelinesonSexualHarassment,”inFairEmploymentPractices,LaborRelationsReporter,TheBureauofNationalAffairs,Inc.76Rabiduev.OsceolaRefiningCo.805F.2d611,620(6thCir.1986).77Ellisonv.Brady,924f.2d872(9thCir.1991).78AsoneofGutek’sstudiesshows,reasonablemenandreasonablewomencandisagreeoverwhatconstitutessexualharassmentintheworkplace.Inthisstudy,67.2%ofmenascomparedto16.8%ofwomenwouldbeflatteredifaskedtohavesex,while15%ofthemenand62.8%ofthewomensaidtheywouldbeinsultedbysuchanoffer.Gutek,“UnderstandingSexualHarassmentatWork.”79Foradiscussionofthisformofargument,seeKarenWarren,“ThePowerandPromiseofEcoFeminism,”EnvironmentalEthics,vol.12(1990)pp.121–46.80AlthoughIwillbefocussingonracismdirectedatAfricanAmericans,theargumentIwillbedevelopingappliestoallformsofracism.81Denyingpeopleequalopportunityonthebasisofcultureisawayofshowingdisrespecttothemandtheirculture.Accordingly,itispossibletoconceiveofmulticulturaljusticeasrequiringrespectforculturaldiversity.SeemyContemporarySocialandPoliticalPhilosophy(Belmont:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1995)chapter7.82SeeJohnPassmore,Man’sResponsibilityforNature(London:CharlesScribner’sSons,1974);andGeorgeSessionsandBillDevall,DeepEcology(SaltLakeCity:GibbsSmithPublisher,1985).83SeePaulTaylor,RespectforNature(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1987);andMurrayBookchin,TheEcologyofFreedom(Montreal:BlackRoseBooks,1991).ItisalsopossibletoviewPassmoreaspittedagainstTaylor,andBookchinaspittedagainstSessions,buthoweveronecaststhedebate,thosewhodefendananthropocentricethicsarestillopposedtothosewhodefendanonanthropocentricethics.84MyreconciliationprojectcontrastswithBryanNorton’sinTowardUnityAmongEnvironmentalists(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1991).WhileNorton’sreconciliationprojectseekstoachieveareconciliationatthelevelofpracticalpolicies,mineseeksareconciliationatthelevelofgeneralprinciplesaswell.WhileNorton’sreconciliationprojecttendstoexcludedeepecologistslikeGeorgeSessions,andbiocentricegalitarianslikePaulTaylor,fromtheclassofenvironmentaliststhatheisseekingtoreconcile,myreconciliationprojectexplicitlyincludesthem.85SeeTaylor,RespectforNature,pp.129–35;andR.andV.Routley,“AgainsttheInevitabilityofHumanChauvinism,”inEthicsandProblemsofthe21stCentury,ed.K.E.GoodpasterandK.M.Sayre(NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1979)pp.36–59.86AssumingGodexists,humansmightalsobebetteroffiftheycouldretaintheirdistinctivetraitswhileacquiringoneoranotherofGod’squalities,butconsiderationofthispossibilitywouldtakeustoofarafield.Nonhumananimalsmightalsobebetteroffiftheycouldretaintheirdistinctivetraitsandacquireoneoranotherofthedistinctivetraitspossessedbyothernonhumananimals.87Thisassumesthatthereisanenvironmentalnichethatcheetahscanfill.88Formypurposeshere,Iwillfollowtheconventionofexcludinghumansfromtheclassdenotedby“animals.”89Foranaccountofwhatconstitutesjustifiablyheldpropertywithinhumanethics,seeJusticeforHereandNow,chapter3.90Byhumanethics,Isimplymeanthoseformsofethicsthatassume,withoutargument,thatonlyhumanbeingscountmorally.91Ofcourse,onemightcontendthatnoprincipleofhumandefenseappliesinhumanethicsbecauseeither“nonviolentpacifism”or“nonlethalpacifism”isthemostmorallydefensibleview.However,Iwillargueinthenextsectionthatthisisnotthecase,andthatstillotherformsofpacifismmorecompatiblewithjustwartheoryarealsomoremorallydefensiblethaneitheroftheseformsofpacifism.92ThePrincipleofHumanPreservationalsoimposesalimitonwhenwecandefendnonhumanlivingbeingsagainsthumanaggression.DefenseofnonhumansagainsthumanaggressionisonlyjustifiedwhenthehumanswhoareaggressingarenotdoingsotomeettheirbasicneedsaspermittedbythePrincipleofHumanPreservation.93Thedifferencebetweenastandardofadecentlifeandastandardofahealthylifeis,however,onlyoneofdegree.Astandardofadecentlifeemphasizestheculturalandsocialdimensionsofbasicneeds,whileastandardofahealthylifeemphasizestheirphysicalandbiologicaldimensions.Forfurtherdiscussionofbasicneeds,seeJamesP.Sterba,HowToMakePeopleJust(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1988)pp.45–50.94Moreover,thiskindoffuzzinessintheapplicationofthedistinctionbetweenbasicandnonbasicneedsischaracteristicoftheapplicationofvirtuallyallourclassificatoryconcepts,andsoisnotanobjectiontoitsusefulness.95ItshouldbepointedoutthatthePrincipleofHumanPreservationmustbeimplementedinawaythatcausestheleastharmpossible,whichmeansthat,otherthingsbeingequal,basicneedsshouldbemetbyaggressingagainstnonsentientratherthansentientlivingbeings,soastoavoidthepainandsufferingthatwouldotherwisebeinflictedonsentientbeings.96Itisimportanttorecognizeherethatwealsohaveastrongobligationtopreventlifeboatcasesfromarisinginthefirstplace.\n28JAMESP.STERBA97ItshouldalsobepointedoutthatthePrincipleofHumanPreservationdoesnotsupportanunlimitedrightofprocreation.Infact,thetheoryofjusticepresupposedheregivesprioritytothebasicneedsofexistingbeingsoverthebasicneedsofpossiblefuturebeings,andthisshouldeffectivelylimit(human)procreation.NordoesthePrincipleofHumanPreservationallowhumanstoaggressagainstthebasicneedsofanimalsandplants,eventomeettheirownbasicneeds,whenthoseneedscouldeffectivelybemetbyutilizingavailablehumansurplusresources.98Thisprincipleisclearlyacceptabletowelfareliberals,socialists,andevenlibertarians.Forargumentstothateffect,seechapter3.SeealsoHowToMakePeopleJust,andthespecialissueoftheJournalofSocialPhilosophy,vol.22,no.3,devotedtoHowToMakePeopleJust,includingmy“NineCommentators:ABriefResponse.”99Ofcourse,libertarianshaveclaimedthatwecanrecognizethatpeoplehaveequalbasicrightswhile,infact,failingtomeet,butnotaggressingagainst,thebasicneedsofotherhumanbeings.However,Ihavearguedinchapter3thatthisclaimismistaken.100ItshouldbepointedoutthatalthoughthePrincipleofDisproportionalityprohibitsaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofanimalsandplantstoservethenonbasicneedsofhumans,thePrincipleofHumanDefensepermitsdefendingoneselfandotherhumanbeingsagainstharmfulaggressionofanimalsandplants,evenwhenthisonlyservesthenonbasicneedsofhumansTheunderlyingideaisthatwecanlegitimatelyserveournonbasicneedsbydefendingourpersonsandourpropertyagainsttheaggressionofnonhumanothersbutnotbyaggressingagainstthem.Inthecaseofhumanaggression,aslightlyweakerprincipleofdefenseholds:wecanlegitmatelyserveournonbasicneedsbydefendingourpersonsandpropertyexceptwhenhumansareengagedinaggressionagainstournonbasicneedsbecauseitistheonlywaytomeettheirbasicneeds.Thisexceptionisgroundedinthealtruisticforbearancethatwecanreasonablyexpectofhumans.Inaddition,inthecaseofhumanaggression,evenwhenthataggressionisillegitimate,itwillsometimesbepossibletoeffectivelydefendoneselfandotherhumanbeingsbyfirstsufferingtheaggressionandthensecuringadequatecompensationlater.Sinceinthecaseofnonhumanaggressionthisisunlikelytoobtain,moreharmfulpreventiveactionsagainstnonhumanaggressionwillbejustified.Therearesimplymorewaystoeffectivelystopaggressivehumansthantherearetostopaggressivenonhumans.101Itmightbeobjectedherethatthisargumentisstillspeciesistinthatitpermitshumanstoaggressagainstnonhumannaturewheneveritisnecessaryformeetingourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofhumanswehappentocareabout.Butthisobjectionsurelylosessomeofitsforceonceitisrecognizedthatitisalsopermissibleforustoaggressagainstthenonbasicneedsofhumans,wheneveritisnecessaryformeetingourownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofhumanswehappentocareabout.Actually,thedifferencesinourmoralrequirementswithrespecttohumansandnonhumansaregroundedinaltruisticforbearancethatwecanreasonablyexpectofhumansbutnotofnonhumans,andintheadditionalwayswehaveofeffectivelystoppinghumanaggressionbutnotnonhumanaggression.102Anotherwaytoputthecentralclaimhereistosaythatspeciesequalityrulesoutdomination,wheredominationistakentomeanaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofotherlivingbeingsforthesakeofsatisfyingnonbasicneeds.Sounderstood,speciesequalitydoesnotruleouttreatingspeciesdifferently,evenpreferringone’sbasicneeds,orthebasicneedsofone’sspeciestothebasicneedsofnonhumanindividuals,species,andwholeecosystems.103HolmesRolstonIII,EnvironmentalEthics(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1988)pp.66–8;Bookchin,TheEcologyofFreedom,p.xxxvi.104SeethediscussionofpossiblegroundsofhumansuperiorityinTaylor,RespectforNature,pp.135–52;andinBryanNorton,WhyPreserveNaturalVariety?(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1987)pp.135–50.105Thisisclearlytrueforwelfareliberalsandsocialists,anditcanevenbeshowntobetrueforlibertarians,becausemostfailingstomeetthebasicneedsofothersreallyturnouttobeactsofaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofothers,andsotheearlierargumentfromlibertytoequalityapplies.106Thesameholdstrueinhumanethicswheremostofthewayswehaveofpreferringourownnonbasicneedsoverthebasicneedsofotherhumansactuallyinvolveaggressingagainstthoseneedstomeetourownnonbasicorluxuryneedsratherthansimplyfailingtomeetthem,asIhavearguedearlier.107Cockroacheshavebeenknowntosurviveeveninsidenuclearreactors.108Actually,whatwearepresentlydoingmaybeonlymeetingourshort-termandnotevenourlong-termneeds,andalmostcertainlynotmeetingthelong-termneedsoffuturegenerationsofhumanbeings.Accordingly,apolicythattookourlong-termneedsaswellastheneedsoffuturegenerationsofhumanbeingsintoaccountwouldmostlikelybeapolicythatwasmoreincoincidencewiththeneedsofnonhumannature.Nevertheless,itwouldbeoddtoexpectacompletecoincidenceofinteresthereanymorethanwewouldexpectacompletecoincidenceofinterest(paceAdamSmith)amongallhumanbeings.Inaddition,anycoincidenceofinterestbetweenhumansandnonhumannaturewouldonlyprovidefurthersupportfortherequirementsofmyprinciplesofenvironmentaljustice.(Forfurtherdiscussionofthedegreeofcoincidenceofinterestsbetweenhumansandnonhumannature,seeNorton,TowardUnityAmongEnvironmentalists.)109AssumingGodexists,evenshewouldnothavearighttodominatehercreatures.Intruth,noonecanhavesucharightbecausenooneissuperiortoanotherlivingbeinginsuchawaythatheorshewouldhavearighttodominateit.110Forexample,in“AnimalLiberation:ATriangularAffair,”BairdCallicotthaddefendedEdwardAbbey’sassertionthathewouldsoonershootamanthanasnake.111Forexample,EugeneHargrovearguesthatfromatraditionalwildlifeperspective,thelivesofindividualspecimensofquiteplentifulnonhumanspeciescountforalmostnothingatall.Seechapter4ofhisFoundationsofEnvironmentalEthics(EnglewoodCliffs:PrenticeHall,1989).112Somewouldsaywithtoogenerousameasure.113JanNarveson,“Pacifism:APhilosophicalAnalysis,”Ethics,vol.75(1965)pp.259–71.\nINTRODUCTION29114CheyneyRyan,“Self-Defense,PacifismandthePossibilityofKilling,”inTheEthicsofWarandNuclearDeterrence,ed.JamesP.Sterba(Belmont:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1985)pp.45–9.115Alternatively,onemightconcedethateveninthiscasekillingismorallyevil,butstillcontendthatitismorallyjustifiedbecauseitisthelesseroftwoevils.116Fortwochallengingdefensesofthisview,seeDuaneL.Cady,FromWarismtoPacifism(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1989)andRobertL.Holmes,OnWarandMorality(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1989).AmongthemembersofConcernedPhilosophersforPeace,anti-warpacifismseemstobethemostwidelyendorsedpacifistview.117SeeCady,FromWarismtoPacifism,pp.51,89ff;andHolmes,OnWarandMorality,p.278.118Thisisbecausethejustmeansrestrictionsprotectinnocentsquitewellagainsttheinflictionofintentionalharm.119Byan“unjustaggressor”Imeansomeonewhomthedefenderisreasonablycertainiswrongfullyengagedinanattemptuponherlifeorthelivesofotherinnocentpeople.120Whatisrelevantinthiscaseisthattheforeseendeathsarearelativelysmallnumber(oneinthiscase)comparedtothenumberofinnocentswhoselivesaresaved(sixinthiscase).Theprimaryreasonforusingparticularnumbersinthiscaseandthosethatfollow,istomakeitclearthatatthisstageoftheargumentnoattemptisbeingmaketojustifythelarge-scalekillingthatoccursinwarfare.121Andmoreseverethansomejustwartheoristshavetendedtorecognize.122SeeHolmes,OnWarandMorality,pp.208–11.123AlthoughthereisastrongcaseforIndia’smilitaryactionagainstPakistaninBangladesh,andtheTanzanianincursionintoUgandaduringtheruleofIdiAmin,therearequestionsthatcanberaisedaboutthebehaviorofIndiantroopsinBangladeshfollowingthedefeatofthePakistaniforces,andabouttheregimeTanzaniaputinpowerinUganda.124See,forexample,WilliamV.O’Brien,TheConductofJustandLimitedWar(NewYork:Praeger,1981)andJohnCourtneyMurray,MoralityandModernWar(NewYork:CouncilonReligionandInternationalAffairs,1959).125Thejustcauseprovisionwasviolatedbecausetheextremelyeffectiveeconomicsanctionswerenotgivenenoughtimetowork.Itwasestimatedatthetimethatwhencomparedtopasteconomicblockades,theblockadeagainstIraqhadanear-100%chanceofsuccessifgivenaboutayeartowork(seetheNewYorkTimes,14January1991).Thejustmeansprovisionwasviolatedbecausethenumberofcombatantandnoncombatantdeathswasdisproportionate.Asmanyas120,000Iraqisoldierswerekilled,accordingtoUSintelligencesources.Moreover,whatwehavelearnedaboutIraq’sresistancetothelessstringenteconomicblockadethatfollowedthewardoesnotundercutthereasonablenessofpursuingamorestringenteconomicblockadeonthebasisoftheavailableinformationwehadbeforethewar.Moreover,thehumiliatingdefeatofIraqiforcesintheGulfWarmayhavecontributedtothehardenedIraqiresistancetothelessstringentpost-wareconomicblockage.126Ofcourse,anti-warpacifistsarerighttopointoutthatvirtuallyallwarshavebeenfoughtwithlessandlessdiscriminationandhaveledtounforeseenharms.Theseareconsiderationsthatinjustwartheorymustweighheavilyagainstgoingtowar.127Foranotheruseofthisterm,seeKennethH.Wenker,“JustWarPacifism,”ProceedingsoftheAmericanCatholicPhilosophicalAssociation,vol.57(1983)pp.135–41.Foradefenseofasimilarviewtomyown,whichisconsideredbytheauthortobeadefenseofpacifism,seeRichardNorman,“TheCaseforPacifism”JournalofAppliedPhilosophy,vol.2(1988)pp.197–210.\nPartIIFOUNDATIONSOFSOCIALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY\nMoralmethodology\n1ONTHEHISTORY,NATUREANDDISADVANTAGESOFWARMAKINGPHILOSOPHYEveBrowningColeWaristhefatherofallandthekingofall,andsomeheshowsasgods,othersasmen;somehemakesslaves,othersfull.(Heraclitus,fr.80)1WhetherornotHeraclitus’pointistrueofthecosmos,ithascertainlybeentrueoftherecenthistoryofphilosophy.“War,”polemos,findsitscontemporaryphilosophicalcounterpartinpolemic,thelifebloodofmostacademicphilosophicalcareerstodayandthemainstayofmostphilosophyjournalarticlesaswell.Philosophicalwarfareissupposedtobegenteel,“sparring”or“scrimmaging”ratherthanout-and-outbloodshed.Yetittooshows“some…asgods,othersasmen”;tothevictorsgothespoils—whethertheseareasilencedstudent,animpressedlectureaudience,a“downed”opponent,oranappreciativereaderwhoenjoysthespectacleofintellectualcarnage.Philosophicalcombat,atleastinitsAnglo-Americanmanifestations,isgladiatorialratherthanmodelingthepitchedbattlesof,forexample,theancientRomans,inwhichorganizedgroupsofsoldiersfoughtinregularunison.Philosophersdon’tjoinshieldsandcreepalonginthe“testudo”ortortoiseformationwhichthelegionnairesfoundsoeffectiveatsubduingbaffledbarbarians;theysallyforthalonepackingafewfootnoteslikedayrations.Wedon’tgoinforattacksonschoolssomuchaswranglingbetweenindividuals.2Philosophy’sparticularbrandofpolemoshasitscritics.Amongthemostinsistentcriticsofphilosophizing-as-warfareisJamesP.Sterba,whose1998bookJusticeforHereandNowpresentsboththecasefora“peacemakingwayofdoingphilosophy”andacase-studyinthismethodappliedtosomeoftheliveliesttheoreticaldebatesofourtimesinmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.Thebookalsoprovidesdiscussionofpracticalapplicationsforeachissue,whichistreatedalongpeacemakinglines:oncetruceisdeclared,onecanthinkandtalkconcretelyaboutwhatconstitutesjustactionwithinourworldhereandnow,andwhatkindofworldweshouldbeworkingtoward.Thegroundrulesforphilosophizinginapeacemakingwayaresimpleandfew.Theyinclude:1aprincipleofcharity,orplacing“themostfavorableinterpretationontheviewsofone’sphilosophicalopponents”;2open-mindedness,orthewillingnesstoconsidernewviewswhicharechallengingtoone’sown;and3intellectual“mobility”asitwere,thewillingnesstoabandonviewsinlightofdecisiveevidenceagainstthem.3Whenstatedthus,thepeacemakingphilosophicalmethodseemsindistinguishablefromcertainbasicsphilosophyinstructorsexpect,orperhapsevendemand,ofallintro-levelstudents.Prejudicialreadingorlistening,dogmatism,andmentalbullheadednesswithoutrationalearearecipeforapoorgradeinmostphilosophyclassesIknowof.YetSterbaconvincinglyshowsthatjustsuchattitudesdefinebusinessasusualinlargesectorsoftheacademy,includingmuchofacademicphilosophy.Thisisaparadox.Sterba’sbookalsopresentsadeeperparadox.Whenherecountshavingusedthepeacemakingmethodtoreconcilehisviewswiththosewhohavethoughtthemselvesindisagreementwithhim,attemptingtoresolvesubstantivetheoreticaldifferencesandshowingthatbothsidescancommittothesamepracticalagenda,heencountersresistance.Suchrefusalsoftruceareoftenrecountedinthefootnotes,andtheymakeapoignantundercurrenttothemainargumentsofthetextitself.Whyarethebasicprerequisitesforphilosophicalintegrity,whicharewidelytaughtinundergraduateclasses,oftenhonoredonlyinthebreachatresearchlevelsofacademicphilosophicalactivity?Whyisitsoeasytogetacclimatizedtotheaggressivequestioningstyleofthecolloquium“discussionperiod,”whichusuallysomewhatshocksandunnervesthenoviceobserver?Whyareverbalfisticuffsevereffectiveasasubstituteforcarefulandconsiderateconversation?(Asanaside:whydoestheMontyPythonskitabouttheargumentshop,inwhichsillyargumentssuchas“Noitisn’t!”“Yesitis!”“Thisisn’tanargument!”“Istoo!”bringsuchlaughterfromphilosophystudents?)Whyaresomanyjournalarticles(andthebookswhichgrowoutofthem)rootedinawarmongeringratherthanapeacemakingmethodofphilosophizing?Andwhenitcomesto\nONWARMAKINGPHILOSOPHY33evaluatingthepolemicalandthepacificmethodsforaddressingmoralandpoliticalissues,which(ifeither)isthemoremoralmoralmethodology?InthisessayIwillreflectontheanswerstotheabovequestions,whichfallintotwoclasses:1Psychologicalandhistoricalquestionsabouttheappealandtheoriginsofthepolemicalmethod;and2Evaluativequestionsaboutthemoralstatusofthepolemicalandthepeacemakingmethodsrespectively.InafinalsectionIwillreturntoSterba’sspecificapplicationofthepeacemakingmethodanditspotentialpracticalimplications.IPhilosophicalwarfare:whenceandwhyThepervasivenessofthepolemicalmodelforphilosophizing,atleastinthedominantcultureoftheAnglo-Americanuniversityanditsproducts(bothpeopleandresearch),wouldargueforacomplexanswertothequestionsofitsoriginanditsappeal.Pointingtoahistoricalsourcemaybeworthwhileeventhoughitdoesnotgiveafullexplanation,sincethequestionwhyanyparticularphilosopherphilosophizedpolemicallywouldstillremain.Westernphilosophyinitsearliestmanifestationsdoesdisplayapredilectionfortheantithetical.Heraclitusinthequoteattheheadingofthispaperisafamouscaseinpoint.OnemightalsothinkoftheatleastprimafaciecontradictorypartsofParmenides’poem,the“WayofTruth”andthe“WayofSeeming”.AndEmpedocles,withhisalternationsofcosmicepochsruledatonetimebyStrifeandatanotherbyLove,alsomadebinaryoppositionscentraltotheworkingsoftheuniverse.Buttheseearlyphilosopherswereadvancingthesesaboutabinaryconflictortensionordualityattheheartofnature,oratthecenterofourexperienceofnature;theywerenotadvocatingnor(asfaraswecantellfromthepaucityofourhistoricalevidence)themselvesexemplifyingapolemicalmethodofphilosophizing.BothParmenidesandEmpedocleswrotepoemswhichmayhavebeensung;itishardtopicturethecontemporarypugnaciousphilosophersinginghisrefutationsandcounter-examplestotheaccompanimentofhisownlyre-playing.No;forthefirstundeniableinstanceofpolemicalphilosophywemustwaitforPlato.AndinPlato’sdialoguesIthinkwecometooneofthefountainheadsofwhatSterbadeploresincontemporaryphilosophy:one-on-onephilosophicalskirmishing,inaformalsemi-publicsetting,designedtokilloffcompetinglinesofargument,andoftenresultinginaclearvictor/vanquishedscenario.TheingredientsofthecontemporaryAPAconventionareallprovidedhere.Itmaybetrue(asIbelieve)thatPlatohadcomplexintentionsinwritingphilosophythewayhedid,andthatnowhereamongthesewastheintentiontoadvocateverbalsparringasameansofachievingenlightenment.Nevertheless,themodelhecreated,especiallyintheearly“Socratic”dialogues,hadsuchpowerthatitcontinuestofascinate,invigorate,andinspireemulationamongthephilosophystudentswhoarestilloftenintroducedtothesubjectbyreadingoneofPlato’searlierdialogues.Inthisconnection,itisinterestingtocomparePlato’sstarstudentAristotleonthesubjectofmethodandspecificallyofpolemicizing.InAristotle’sworkswefindbothstraightforwardpolemic,sometimesagainst“theFriendsoftheForms”whichprobablyincludedPlatohimself,andalsowhatIwouldconsider“appropriativepeacemaking”.BythelatterImeantextssuchasAristotle’sMetaphysicsI.3–10,inwhichearlierthinkersaretakenupandfitted(orinsomecasesshoehorned)intoAristotle’sownschemaofthefourcauses.HereAristotle’sintentionistoshowthattheearlythinkers’contributionsdonotpresentanytypeofcausewhichfallsoutsidehisschema—andalsothathislistoffourismorecomprehensivethananypreviousanalysisofcausalityinnature.4NodoubtPlato’sdepictionsofarefutation-orientedSocratescastalongshadowoversubsequentWesternphilosophyandstilldoso.Butwhatistheappeal?Tociteaprecedentisnottoexplainthemechanismbywhichtheprecedentattractedasubsequentmindtoemulateit.Whyispolemicalphilosophysoappealing?Polemicalphilosophyiscombative;itstakesoutterritory,defendsthatterritory,meetschallengerswithcounter-attack,anticipateshostileincursionsanddevelopscounter-strategiesfordemolishingthem.Itisintellectualbattle.Andbattleisappealing.J.GlennGrayhaswrittenpersuasively,withmuchdocumentationfromwarjournalsandveterans’interviews,ofthespecificwaysinwhichrealcombatexperiencescanberegardedasenjoyable,beneficial,fulfilling.5Grayisolatesthreecomponentsofthecombatexperiencewhichmarkitaspositiveforcombatants:1“delightinseeing”:thespectacleofbattleissurprisinglybeautifulto(atleastsome)participants.2“delightincomradeship”:aparticularformofsolidarityisconstructedbythebattleconditions.And3“delightindestruction”:lamentablethoughitmayseem,theexperienceofblowingthingsup,blastingheadsoff,causingmayhem,etc.,isinsomedeepwaypleasurableandevenexhilarating.6\n34EVEBROWNINGCOLEAlthoughGrayisfarfromcelebratingthesepositiveaspectsofcombatexperience,hedoesarguethattheycontributetothepersistenceofwarasaproblem-solvingstrategyinhumanhistory,andthattheymakepacifismafarmoredifficultproject.Canthese“enduringappealsofbattle”shedanylightonphilosophy’spenchantforthewarmakingratherthanpeacemakingmodeofoperation?Theactivityofaggressivelydefendingaposition,inwritingorinperson,andsoalsothepassiveexperienceofobservingsuchanaggressivedefensewhenwellexecuted,cancertainlybepleasurable.Thesepleasureresponsesareprobablyrelatedtothemoreharmlesspleasuresofplayingorwatchingacompetitivesport.Thereare“goodmoves,”“volleys,”“quickrecoveries,”andpointsarescoredorconcededandlost.Thiscapturesthestrategicsideofcombatpleasure,philosophicalandmilitary.Onthepurelyvisualoraestheticside,thegraceor(mentalorphysical)athleticismofthecombatantscanbepleasing,ascanthesymmetryofawellconstructedattackordefense(argument,phalanx,orsoccersquad).Asforcomradeshiporsolidarity,theindividualismofthephilosophicalpolemicintheAnglo-Americanacademiccommunitywouldseemtoruncountertothis.However,advancingasuccessfulpolemicmeanswinninganaudience—whetherofinvisiblereadersorvisiblesymposiumattendees.Itmayalsomeanattractingdisciples,intheformofstudents.Thefootnotesofphilosophyjournalarticlesoftendisplayakindofsolidarity-groupconstructionproject:“OnthispointIagreewithXasagainstY…”whichisanalogoustoteam-choosingorclub-joining,surrogatecomradeshipifyouwill.Sothelonelinessofthephilosophicalgladiatormaybemoreapparentthanreal;his/herrhetoricalsituationisoneofaggressiveteam-orherd-buildingviaexclusionofthecompetitor.Finally,“delightindestruction”seemsalltooeasytodetectintheintensitywithwhichmanyphilosophersinclinedtowardthewarmakingmethodleapintothefray.Readersandaudiencestoomayparticipateinthe(perverse?)pleasureofseeingaposition,evenapositionrepresentedbyapresentperson,appeartofalltopiecesunderenemyfire.TheexplanationforthepleasureofwitnessingorperpetratingmayhemwouldliedeepinthewellspringsofhumanpsychologicalenergyIamsure;buttheevidenceforsuchapleasureseemsundeniable,whetheroneisconsideringthechilddemolishingherowncarefullyconstructedsandcastleorthephilosopherdeployingherdevastatingcounter-argument.7SoitwouldappearthatsomesimilaritiesexistbetweentheattractionsofrealcombatandthoseofintellectualcombatasfoundintheacademicphilosophicalcommunitySomuchforsomepossiblesourcesandattractionsofthewarmakingmethodofphilosophizing.Whataboutitsmoralstatus,especiallyascontrastedwiththepeacemakingmethodadvocatedandexemplifiedbySterba?IIEvaluatingmoralmethodologiesMoralevaluationofphilosophicalmethodologiesisaninfrequentpracticeinthecurrentliterature.OneimportantcontributionwhichSterba’sJusticeforHereandNowwillcertainlymaketocurrentphilosophyistheencouragementofmoreself-criticalthinking,speakingandwritingincurrentphilosophicalcircles.8Sterbaarguesthatapproachingphilosophicalquestionsinthepolemicalspiritproduceslessgoodphilosophy,becauseitencouragesmisreading,deflectsgoodcriticisms,andrewardsintransigence.Inaddition,itcanbewastefulofhumantimeandresources,sinceitleadstooverlookinggoodsolutionsandfavoringpooronessimplybecausetheyareone’sown.Suchconsiderations,ifvalid,wouldleadtoahighermoralvaluationofpeacemakingphilosophicalmethod(s)onconsequentialistgroundsifonnoother,provideditcouldbeshownthatpeacemakingphilosophicalmethodshavethevirtueswhichcorrespondtothesefaultsattributedtothepolemicalmethods.Thatis,ifitcanbeshownthatpeacemakingphilosophyencouragescarefulreadingofextantpositions,considersgoodcriticismswiththecaretheydeserve,anddiscouragesdogmatism,then(absentotheroptimizingconsiderations)thegreaterphilosophicalgoodisclearlyservedbypeacemakingmethods.Againstthispointonemightargueeither,first,thatwarlikephilosophicalmethodsdohaveotheroptimizingconsequencesoverlookedbySterba;orsecond,thatSterbahasmisconstruedthenatureofphilosophyanditsgoals.Iwillpursuethesepotentialcounter-argumentsseparately.Whileitistruethatcombative,position-defending,rear-guarding,point-scoringphilosophicalmethodshavethepotentialfortheabovenotedshortcomings,theyalsohavesomeassets.Thefirstwemaycallthecalisthenicbenefit.Itisgreatmentalexercisetoaggressivelydefendaposition.Thethrillofthecombatcallsforthmentalenergywhichquietandreflectivemullingofaproblemmaynotbeabletoevoke.Theintellectualathleticismofthesuccessfulskirmish,andthepalmofvictoryorignominyofdefeat,areeffectiveinducementstotheveryactivityofphilosophizingandimprovementthereof.9Thesecondwemaycallthewinnowingbenefit.Avigorouslogicaldrubbinggetsridofthedustandfleaswhichmayhaveclungtoanyphilosophicalposition.Inlightofthefactthathumantimeisalimitedresource,itmustatleastsometimesbethecasethatthebestwaytouselimitedtimeistosubjectapositiontostrenuouscriticismandseewhatisleftoverattheend,i.e.toapproachitcombativelyratherthanpacifically.Itispossiblethatthewarlikeapproachwillbethemostefficientapproachforaphilosophicalpositionwhichjustisuntenable,andwhichpeacemakingmethodswouldtakemuchlongertoexposeassuch.Finallyweshouldconsidertherecruitmenteffectofpolemicalmethods.Philosophyhassoughtadherents,“converts”ifyouwill,\nONWARMAKINGPHILOSOPHY35sinceitsinception.Socratesisknowntousonlybecausehewasaneffectivephilosophicalrecruiter.AcademicphilosophydepartmentscontinuetoexistonlyaslongastheycanemulateSocratestosomedegree.Andpolemicalmethodsbringinmajors.10The“appealsofbattle”areseductiveinthissphere.Arethecalisthenic,winnowingandrecruitmentfactorssufficienttomorallyjustifyapreferenceforpolemicalphilosophy?Ortoputitdifferently,isthechoicebetweenwarlikeandpeacemakingphilosophicalmethodsamorallyneutralchoice?Ibelieveitisnot.Toseewhy,weneedtoconsiderthegoalsofthisactivity“philosophizing.”Ifphilosophizingwereconstruedasitselfamorallyneutralactivity,thenthebenefitsofaggressivementalcalisthenics,thewinnowingsofphilosophicaltriage,andthe“enduringappealsofbattle”inattractingyoungmindswouldberedeeming(outcome-optimizing)featuresofpolemicalphilosophy.However,philosophizing,especiallyasunderstoodbySterba,isnotamorallyneutralactivity.Atleastaspracticedwithinthehallsofacademe,itistheuseofscarceresourcesavailabletoaprivilegedfew,anditshouldbedirectedtowardtheimprovementofthehumancondition.Withintheseparameters,warmakingphilosophicalmethodsareirresponsible.Thepolemicalphilosopheristooinclinedtosubstitutegamesmanshipforsocialresponsibility.Sheisalsotooinclinedtodestroybeforesympatheticallyunderstanding.Andeachfresh“victory”rendersherlessamenabletofundamentalchangesinherownconvictions.Noneoftheseisamorallydeleteriousconsequenceunlessphilosophizingisitselfamorallychargedactivitywhichgeneratesmoralresponsibilitiesforthosewhopursueitinanorganizedfashion.ThatitissomorallychargedisclearlyapresuppositionofSterba’sentireproject,andonewhichIcompletelyendorse.CrucialissuesofhumanwelfareareatstakeinthedebatesintowhichSterbaenterswithhispeacemakingmethod:oppressionsofvariousforms,poverty,environmentaldegradation,andtheverypossibilityofaviablefutureforthehumanrace.Aslongasphilosophersfeeljustifiedinconductingsandboxwarsamongstthemselves,ratherthanfindingcommongroundandmakingstrongcasesforgoodpolicy,philosophersaremakingmorallydefectivemethodologicalchoiceswhichrendertheirhard-wonconclusionsimpracticalandthereforefunctionallyirrelevant.Thus,onSterba’sgrounds,wecanarguethatpeacemakingphilosophicalmethodsaremorallypreferabletopolemicalones,andthatthechoicebetweenthemisnotamorallyneutralonetobeviewedasmerelypreference-driven.Instead,astrongimperativetowardpeacemakingmethodscanbejustified,giventhemoralparametersinwhichphilosophyexists“hereandnow.”ConclusionIfindSterba’scaseforthemethodofconciliationorpeacemaking,andalsohispracticalapplicationsinmanyareas,bothcompellingandrefreshing.Performthisthought-experiment:imaginethatfromthismomentforward,allthephilosophicalconversationsinwhichyoubecomeinvolved,allthephilosophicalarticlesandbooksyouread,andallthephilosophyclassesbeingconductedworldwide,suddenlyadheretoSterba’srecommendations.First,everyonelistensorreadswiththeutmostcareandfairnessofmind.Then,everyonecharitablyputsthebestpossibleconstructiononeveryclaimandargument.Ifobjectionsoccurtousaswelistenorread,weattempttorespondtotheseobjectionsourselves,eitherfromwithinthepositionbeingpresentedorbyintroducingadditionalconsiderationscompatiblewithit.Andifthepositionpresentediscompelling,everyoneiswillingtoadoptit.InsuchaphilosophicalUtopia,itishardformenottobelievethatbetterphilosophywouldbetheresult.Inaddition,theconsolidationofpracticalimplicationsattheoutcomeofthereconciliationswhichSterbaproposeswouldallowphilosophytohaveanefficacywhichitnowlacks,inbeingarecognizableandcrediblevoiceforsocialchange.NOTES1G.S.Kirk,M.E.RavenandM.Schofield,ThePresocraticPhilosophers(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983)p.193.2ThisindividualismseemsmuchlessfrequentinContinentalphilosophy,Russianphilosophy,andChinesephilosophyofourtime;forthese,mostphilosophicalcontroversiesseemtotakeplacebetweenoramongschools,orgroupsidentifiedbytheiraffiliationwithoneparticularleader.3JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)p.10.4SterbaalsoengagesinwhatIamcalling“appropriativepeacemaking”atseveralpointsinhisbook,mostnotablywithhisaccountofanongoingexchangewithJanNarveson,JusticeforHereandNow,chapter3,pp.72ff,althoughinNarveson’scase,theappropriationandthepeacemakingareapparentlybothresisted.Sterba’sappropriativepeacemakingwithNarvesondoesnotappeartobeofthe“shoehorning”variety;but,likeAristotle,Sterbaintendstostrengthenthejustificationofhisownaccountbydemonstratingthatitisnotincompatiblewithotheraccounts.5J.GlennGray,TheWarriors:ReflectionsonMeninBattle(NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1959).Aselection,“TheEnduringAppealsofBattle,”isreprintedinLarryMay,RobertStrikwerda,andPatrickD.Hopkins(eds)RethinkingMasculinity:PhilosophicalExplorationsinLightofFeminism(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1996)pp.45–62.6Gray,asreprintedinMayetal,op.cit.,pp.47ff.\n36EVEBROWNINGCOLE7ThisphenomenonisalsoapparentwhenrespondentstopaperspresentedatAPAmeetingssimplycannotberestrainedfrommakingyetanothercriticalpoint,timelimitsnotwithstanding.8AsIwasreadingSterba’sbookIfoundmyteachingandwaysofrespondingtostudentsintheclassroomundergoingsomechanges,eventhoughIhaveneverconsideredmyselftobeaparticularlycombativephilosophicalpersonality.IalsofoundmyselfmoreactivelyandexplicitlyencouragingstudentstobringtheattitudesSterbaadvocatesattheendofhisintroduction(p.13)totheirreadingsofassignedtexts.Ibelievetheclasswasthebetterandmorephilosophicalbecauseofthesechanges.9Anyphilosophyinstructorwhohasusedstagedclassroomdebates,inwhichonesideoftheclassroommustargueX,theothernot-X,canattesttotheawakeningeffectofsheerturf-defenseresponsibilityasagainstavisible“enemy”.10Itisofcoursepossiblethatthemajorswhoaredrawninbypolemicalmethodsarethose,andonlythose,whoarepredisposedtotakepleasureincombat,andthatotherstudentschoosemorepacificavenuesfortheireducationalpursuits.\nRationality\n2THERATIONALJUSTIFICATIONOFMORALITYREVISITEDAlanGewirthInthispaper,IshallfirstcommentonthediscussionoftheargumentIhavepresentedfortherationaljustificationofmoralityinReasonandMorality.ThenIshallcommentontheargumentforthesamegeneralpurposethatJamesP.SterbasetsforthinJusticeforHereandNow.IMyargumenthasbeenverywidelydiscussedinthetwodecadessincethepublicationofReasonandMorality,andIandothershaverepliedextensivelytothevariouscriticismsthathavebeenmade.1SoI’mafraidIshallnotsaymuchthatisnewhere,butIshallfocusonthespecificemphasisSterbagivesinhiscriticism.Heholdsthat“thenormsofrationality…implyacommitmenttoconsistencyandnon-question-beggingness”(p.184;seep.6).Iagreewiththis,butIwouldaddthatconsistencyinvolves,amongotherthings,theuseofconceptualanalysis,whichIconstrueonthemodelofdeductivelogic,inthatwhenacomplexconceptAisanalysedascontainingconceptsB,C,andD,theseconceptsbelongtoAwithlogicalnecessity,sothatitiscontradictorytoholdthatAapplieswhiledenyingthatB,C,orDapplies.InmyargumentIobtainandusetheconceptsofactionandagentbysuchconceptualanalysis;atthesametimetheseconceptsrepresentactualphenomenaofhumanconduct.Myargumentproceedsbyanalysingwhatanyagentlogicallymustacceptonthebasisofherengaginginvoluntaryandpurposivebehavior.Thisgivestheargumentakindofmaterialnecessityaswellasformalnecessity,foritinvolvesthatthecontentofagencyhascertainnecessaryfeatures.2Sterbaquestionsacrucialstepinmyargument(Iusehisnumberingasgivenonp.20,butIrephrasetherespectivesentences).Theargumentdependsontheinterpretationofthetransitionfrom(3)“Ihavearighttofreedomandwell-beingbecauseIamaprospectivepurposiveagent”to(4)“Allprospectivepurposiveagentshaverightstofreedomandwell-being.”Ihaveheldthatthe“right”in(3)isaprudentialright,whilethe“right”in(4)isamoralright.Itisimportanttobeclearaboutthemeaningoftheserespectivecharacterizationsofrights.Therightin(3)isprudentialinthatitsaimistosupporttheinterestsoftheagentorspeaker.Therightin(4),ontheotherhand,ismoralinthat,inaffirmingthatallprospectivepurposiveagentshavetheserights,theoriginalagentorspeakertakesfavorableaccountoftheinterestsofatleastsomepersonsotherthanorinadditiontohimself.So“moral”hasherethetraditionalmeaningofsupportingtheinterestsofotherpersons.Thecontrastbetween“prudential”and“moral”isonethatgoesbackatleasttoKant.Itisamatteroffinalcauses:whoseinterestsaresupportedorupheld.Thetransitionfromtheprudentialtothemoralisaccomplishedthroughthelogicalprincipleofuniversalizability:ifsomesubjectShaspredicatePbecauseShasthequalityQ(wherethis“because”isoneofsufficientconditionorreason),theneveryothersubjectS1,S2…SNthathasQmustalsohaveP.AsSterbacorrectlypointsout,“thesuccessof[my]argumentdependsontheimpossibilityofinterpretingtheuniversalizedrightin[my]conclusionasanythingotherthanamoralright”(p.20).Thisimpossibilityderivesfromtheuniversalizabilityprinciplejuststated,togetherwiththesocialmeaningof“moral”indicatedabove.ButSterbadeclaresthat“anotherinterpretationispossible.”Accordingtothisinterpretation,theuniversalizedrightthatcanbededucedfrommypremises“isaprudentialright,notamoralone”(p.21).And“aprudentialrightisaction-guidingfortheright-holderonlyandnotforothers,andsoitdoesnotimplythatothersoughtnottointerferewiththeexerciseofthatright”(p.21).ThereisaseriousdifficultywithSterba’sinterpretation.ItwillhavebeennotedthatwhereIdistinguishprudentialandmoralrightsintermsofwhoseintereststherightsareintendedtosupport—eithertheagent’sowninterestsortheinterestsalsoofotherpersons—Sterbaputsthedistinctionintermsofwhethertherightis“action-guiding”onlyfortheagentorright-holderoralso“forothersaswell”(p.20;seealsop.21).Butthesetwodistinctionsdonotcoincide.Arightcanbeaction-guidingforsomepersonAwithoutbeingonlyforhisowninterests.ForAmayguidehisactionwiththeaimofsupportingtheinterestsofotherpersonsaswellasorinadditiontohisowninterests.SoSterba’sreformulationdoesnotquitecapturethemeaningofmyargumentasIintendedit.Hence,Icannotaccepthiscontentionthatmyargumentcanbecorrectlyinterpretedasestablishingonlyaprudentialright,notamoralone.Hisreinterpretationmayindeedbe“plausible,”ashesays,\nTHERATIONALJUSTIFICATIONOFMORALITY39butonlyif“prudential”isconstruedinawaythatisdifferentfromtheoneIintended.AsI’vesaid,myinterpretationof“prudential”hasalonglineage,goingbackatleasttoKant.WhereIholdthattheuniversalizationoftheagent’sprudentialright-claimentailsamoralright,Sterbasaysthat“theuniversalizationofaprudentialrightcanbeunderstoodtobeanotherprudentialright,albeitauniversalone”(p.21).Butthisunderstandingisincorrectonthefinal-causeinterpretationof“prudential”and“moral.”Forwhentheagenthastoaccept,onthebasisofuniversalization,thatallprospectivepurposiveagentshaverightstofreedomandwell-being,sheistherebyupholdingtheinterestsofotherpersonsaswellasherself—of“allprospectivepurposiveagents.”Thisisnotaprudentialright,preciselybecauseshetherebytakespositive,favorableaccountoftheinterestsofotherpersonsintheirownfreedomandwell-being.Itmustberecognizedthatuniversalizationalonedoesnotaccomplishthetransitiontouniversalistmoralitythatfiguresinmyargument,wherebyitistheinterestsof“allprospectivepurposiveagents”thatareupheldbytheconcludingrights-judgment.Forthisuniversalismtobeattained,whatisrequiredbesidestheformalaspectoflogicaluniversalizationisthematerialorcontentualaspectwherebyitisprospectivepurposiveagentsassuchwhoareheldtohavetherights.Ifthecontentisnotthusuniversalist—aswhenonesays,forexample,that“allAmericanshavecertainlegalrights”—whatthisgivesusisonlywhatIhaveelsewherecalled“particularistmorality,”asagainstuniversalistmorality.3InReasonandMoralityIhavegivenmyreasonsforholdingthatthecontenttowhicheveryagentislogicallycommitted—therelevantsimilarityonwhichtheargumentisbased—istheuniversaltraitofbeingaprospectivepurposiveagent.4Howismyinterest-basedconceptionofamoralrightinmyconclusionrelatedtoSterba’sthesisthat,because“aprudentialrightisaction-guidingfortheright-holderandnotforothers…itdoesnotimplythatothersoughtnottointerferewiththeexerciseofthatright”(p.21)?Tobeginwith,themoralrightdoesimplythat“othersoughtnottointerfere.”Thisisentailedbythecorrelativityofclaim-rightsandduties:ifAhasarighttohaveordoX,itlogicallyfollowsthatallotherpersonsoughtatleasttorefrainfrominterferingwithA’shavingordoingX,andinsomecasesoughtalsotohelpAtohaveordoX.Sothehavingofamoralrightentailscorrelativedutiesatleastofnon-interferenceonthepartofotherpersons.WhatofSterba’sideathattherights-judgmentwithwhichmyargumentconcludes“isaction-guidingfortheright-holderonlyandnotforothers”(p.21)?Thisisindeedanimportantpoint.Wecanelaborateitasfollows:Theagentright-holdermaywellconcludethatallotherprospectivepurposiveagentshavethegenericrights,butthiscommitsonlyhimtorespectingtherightsorinterestsofotherpersons—itdoesnotcommitotherpersonstoactaccordingly.Sohere,“action-guidingforotherpersons”wouldmeansomethinglike:imposingobligationsonotherpersonswhichtheyarecommittedtorecognizingandaccepting.Letuscallthistheinterpersonal-recognitionobjection.Whatmustbestressedinreplyisthepersonal-dialecticalcharacterofmyargument.Theargumentestablishesthat,fromwithinthestandpointoftheindividualagentwhoisgoingthroughtheargument,hemustrecognizethatallotheragentshavethegenericrights,sothathehascorrelativeobligationstowardthem.Buthealsorecognizesthatallotheragentscan,atleastinprinciple,gothroughthesameargument,withthesamenecessaryconclusionaboutuniversalrights,sothattheymustrecognizeoneanother’sgenericrights.Hencetheotheragentsareaslogicallycommittedtoacknowledgingoneanother’srightsasheistorecognizingtheirrights.This,Isubmit,ishowtheinterpersonal-recognitionobjectionistobeanswered.5IILetusnowturntoSterba’sownargumentasgiveninJusticeforHereandNow,pp.14–40.Hepresentsashisgoal“toshowthatmoralityisgroundedinrationality…thatmoralityisrationallyrequired,thusexcludingegoismandimmoralityasrationallypermissible”(p.14).ThispassagesuggeststhatSterbaviewsmoralityintheusualwayasopposedsimplytoegoism.But,onthecontrary,heuses“morality”inawaythatmayincludebothegoisticandaltruisticreasons:“moralreasonshereareunderstoodnecessarilytoinclude(some)altruisticreasonsbutnotnecessarilytoexcludeallself-interestedreasons”(p.188);indeed,“moralityitselfalreadyrepresentsacompromisebetweenegoismandaltruism”(p.190).Itisnotanomaloustoholdthatthesphereofmoralityincludessomeversionofself-interesttogetherwithaconcernforothers’interests.Thisisepitomized,forexample,inKant’ssecondversionofthecategoricalimperative:“Actsothatyoualwaystreathumanity,whetherinyourownpersonorinthatofanother,alwaysasanendandneverasameansonly.”6AsimilarinclusionisfoundinthePrincipleofGenericConsistency:“Actinaccordwiththegenericrightsofyourrecipientsaswellasofyourself.”7Itwillbenotedthatintheseversionsofwhatmaybecalled“moderatealtruism,”8theself-concernthatisupheldissubjectedtobasicmorallimitations:itinvolvestreatingoneselfasanendinoneself,ashavinggenericrights.Becauseofthesecommonmorallimitations,thereisultimatelynoconflictbetweenself-concernandconcernforothers:therightsofallmustbeequallyprotected.Todealwithconflictsthatmayariserequiresaconsiderationofdegreesofneedfulnessforaction,9and,inthepoliticalsphere,aconstitutionalorderthatincludestheruleoflawandotherinstitutionsthatupholdequalanddignity-respectingrights.\n40ALANGEWIRTHIsanycomparablemorallimitationprovidedbySterba’sviewofmoralityasa“compromise”betweenaltruismandegoism?Thequestionbecomesespeciallysignificantincaseswherethereisconflictbetweenself-interestedandaltruisticreasons.Sterbaanswersthisquestionbyanappealto“rankings”:“Suchacompromisewouldhavetorespecttherankingsofself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsimposedbytheegoisticandaltruisticviews,respectively”(p.26).Reasonsmayrankhigherorlower,butineverycasethosereasonsthatrankhighestmusthavepriority:Anynonarbitrarycompromiseamongsuchreasonsinseekingnottobegthequestionagainstegoismoraltruismwillhavetogiveprioritytothosereasonsthatrankhighestineachcategory.Failuretogiveprioritytothehighest-rankingaltruisticorself-interestedreasonswould,otherthingsbeingequal,becontrarytoreason.(p.26)Toevaluatethesoundnessofthisconceptionofmoralityasacompromisebetweenself-interestedandaltruisticreasons,wemustaskhowtherelevantrankingsaredetermined.Sterba’smainanswertothisquestionseemstomaketherankingsrelativetotheindividualagentaschooser:“foreachindividualthereisaseparaterankingofthatindividual’srelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasons”(p.26).Butifthisisso,itmayseemthatthemorallimitationsonself-concerntowhichIreferredabovemaybedispensedwith.ThusSterbawrites:“acertainamountofself-regardismorallyrequired,oratleastmorallyacceptable.Wherethisisthecase,high-rankingself-interestedreasonshavepriorityoverlow-rankingaltruisticreasons”(p.27).IfIunderstandhimcorrectly,Sterbaseemsnottohaverealizedthemorallyinjuriousconductwhichthiscommitshimtoupholdingas“rational.”Hisexamplesofself-interestedreasonsincludemarketingaharmfulbabyformula(p.24)andharmfuldisposaloftoxicwastes(p.25).Ineachofthesecaseshearguesthataltruisticreasonsaretobegivenpriority.Butwhatifforsomeindividualcertainreasonsofself-interestthatareveryharmfultoothersranksohighthattheyoutweighanyaltruisticreasons?SupposeSmith’shighest-rankingdesireistodominateotherpeople,whilehisdesiretohelpotherpeopleranksverylowforhim.OnSterba’saccount,themoral“compromise”heregivesprioritytoSmith’sself-centered“reason”ofdominance.Butthisthenputsmoralityonthesideofmoralevil.AtonepointSterbatakesupthequestionof“reasonssignificantlyopposedtotherelevantmoralreasons”(p.24).Hegivesasanexample“malevolentreasonsseekingtobringaboutthesufferinganddeathofotherhumanbeings”(p.24;originalemphasis).Hisresponseisasfollows:“assumingthatsuchmalevolentreasonsareultimatelyrootedinsomeconceptionofwhatisgoodforoneselforothers,thesereasonswouldhavealreadybeentakenintoaccount,andbyassumptionoutweighedbytheotherrelevantreasonsinthiscase”(p.24).Thecontextinwhichheaddressesthisconsiderationisonewherethereisno“conflictbetweentherelevantself-interestedandmoralreasons”(pp.23–4).Hesays,“itseemsobviousthatwherethereisnoconflictandbothreasonsareconclusivereasonsoftheirkind,bothreasonsshouldbeactedupon.Insuchcontexts,weshoulddowhatisfavoredbybothmoralityandself-interest”(p.24).SoSterba’spointaboutthe“malevolent”reasonsisthateventhoughtheyareself-interested,theywillhavebeensummedintothe“conclusivereasons”which,exhypothesi,donotconflictwithmorality.Ifindthisaratherdubiouswayofdealingwithmalevolentreasons.Attheveryleastitshouldhavebeenshownhowtheyare“takenintoaccount”inarrivingatalackofconflictwithmorality.AsIhavealreadyindicated,Sterba’ssubsequentappealto“rankings”doesnothelpmatters.AtsomepointsSterbaseemstosuggestamoreobjectivecriterionofrankingsofreasons.Hesays,forexample,thathis“defenseofmoralitypresupposesthatwecanestablishaconceptionofthegood,atleasttothedegreethatwecandeterminehigh-andlow-rankingself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsforeachagent”(p.190).Thismightbeinterpretedasmeaningthatreasonsrankhigherorloweraccordingtosome“conceptionofthegood.”Onthisinterpretationtheself-interestedreasonofthemalevolentpersonwhowantstodominateothersmightranklowerthananaltruisticreasonbecauseofitsoppositionto“aconceptionofthegood.”Thismightbeapromisinglineofapproach,althoughSterbadoesnotdevelopit.Theconclusionweareleftwith,inanycase,isthat,likecompromiseinthepoliticalsphere,therearelimitstothecompromiseSterbaenvisagesinhisinterestingideaofMoralityasCompromise.Untilhesetsouttheselimitsmuchmorefully,hecanhardlybeheldtohaveestablishedarationaljustificationofmorality.NOTES1SeeespeciallyEdwardRegisJr(ed.)Gewirth’sEthicalRationalism:CriticalEssayswithaReplybyAlanGewirth(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1984);andDeryckBeyleveld,TheDialecticalNecessityofMorality:AnAnalysisandDefenseofAlanGewirth’sArgumenttothePrincipleofGenericConsistency(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1991).2SeeA.Gewirth,ReasonandMorality(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978)pp.161–71.\nTHERATIONALJUSTIFICATIONOFMORALITY413SeeGewirth,Self-Fulfillment(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1998)p.52.4ReasonandMorality,pp.104–28.5Forextensivediscussionofthispoint,seeBeyleveld,DialecticalNecessity,pp.201–31,455–7,464–6,468–9.6FoundationsoftheMetaphysicsofMorals,chapter2(Akad.edn,p.429;trans.L.W.Beck[Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1959]p.47;emphasisadded).7ReasonandMorality,p.135.8SeeSelf-Fulfillment,p.88.9SeeGewirth,TheCommunityofRights(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1996)pp.45–54.\n3THEORETICALVERSUSPRACTICALRATIONALITYBernardGertThereisalong-standingdisputeamongphilosophersconcerningtherelationshipbetweenrationalityandmorality.Philosophersdisagreeaboutwhetherrationalitysupportsmoralityinanysignificantway.Somephilosophersholdthatrationalityrequiresallrationalpersonstoputforwardmoralityasaguidetobehaviorthatgovernsallofthem.Othersgoevenfurtherandclaimthatrationalityrequireseveryonetoactmorally.JamesP.Sterbainhisbook,JusticeforHereandNow,isoneofthelatterphilosophers.Others,likemyself,claimthatrationalityclearlydoesnotrequireactingmorally,andthatitrequiresallrationalpersonstoputforwardmoralityasaguidetobehaviorthatgovernsallofthem,onlywithsomesignificantqualifications.ThedisagreementbetweenSterbaandmyselfinvolvesbothouraccountsofrationalityandouraccountsofmorality,butitalsoinvolvessomethingelse.Wedisagreeaboutwhetherwhatneedstobeshownisifitispracticalrationalityortheoreticalrationalitythatrequiresactingmorally.WhenIclaimthatrationalityclearlydoesnotrequireactingmorally,Iamtalkingaboutpracticalrationality,thatis,rationalitywithregardtoaction.Practicalrationalityisconcernedwithharmsandbenefits,bothwithregardtooneselfandwithregardtoothers.ItistherelationshipbetweenpracticalrationalityandmoralitythatIregardascrucial.Sterba,onthecontrary,seemstobeconcernedwiththerelationshipbetweentheoreticalrationalityandmorality.AsIunderstandtheoreticalrationality,itisprimarilyconcernedwithbeliefsandarguments,thatis,itrequiresthatoneuseonlytruebeliefs,validarguments,andacceptablemodesofargumentation.Ofcourse,sincethedesiredconclusionisthatrationalityrequiresactingmorally,theconclusionsoftheoreticalreasonaresupposedtoentailconclusionswithregardtopracticalreason.Amongthosephilosopherswhoclaimthatreasonrequiresactingmorally,therearetwogroups.Some,likeThomasHobbes,andsomecontemporaryfollowersofHobbessuchasKurtBaierandDavidGauthier,dotrytoshowdirectlythatpracticalrationalityrequiresactingmorally.Others,likeJamesP.SterbaandAlanGewirth,claimthatitistheoreticalreasonthatrequiresactingmorally.BothSterbaandGewirthclaimthatpracticaljudgmentscanbetrueorfalse,andsotheyacceptthattheoreticalreason,whichisconcernedwithtruth,canentailconclusionsabouthowarationalpersonshouldact.Sterbadoesnotthinkthatpracticalreason—byitself,thatis,simplyaconcernaboutharmsandbenefits—canrequireactingmorally.Heholdsthatinordertoshowthatreasonrequiresactingmorally,onemustusetheconceptoftheoreticalreason.Inoure-mailconversationsaboutthismatter,hesays,“Ifwhatisrequiredbyreasonissimplynotactingirrationally,asyoudefineit,then,asyouputit,onlycrazypeoplewouldnotwanttodowhatisrequiredbyreason.”IunderstandSterba’sremarktoacknowledgethatpracticalreasondoesnotrequireactingmorally,butthatheisconcernedwithadifferentsenseofrationality,theoreticalreason,whichismoredemandinginwhatitrequires.Hesays,ButIthinkthatwhatisrequiredbyreasonisabitmoredemandingthanthis.Specifically,Ithinkthatreasonalsorequiresthatwesupportourviewswithgoodarguments,and,sincegoodargumentsmustbenon-question-begging,Ithinkthatreasonrequiresthatwenotbegthequestion.NowIagreewithyouthat,giventhismoredemandingdefinitionofwhatreasonrequires,noncrazypeople,thatis,peoplewhoarenotirrationalinyoursenseoftheterm,maywanttosupportordefendviewsforwhichtheyknowtheycannotgivegoodarguments,thatis,argumentswhicharenon-question-begging,but,ofcourse,wecanunderstandandexplainhowthiscanbethecase,thatis,wecanunderstandandexplainhow,forexample,itcanbeinpeople’sself-interesttosupportordefendsuchviews.ItisimportanttonotethatSterba’sremarksmakeitclearthathethinksthatreasonsometimesrequiresonetoactagainstone’sself-interest.Althoughitisquiteclearthatmoralitysometimesrequiresonetoactagainstone’sself-interest,itisnotatallclearthatpracticalreasoneverrequiresthis.Onthenormalunderstandingofrationality,itallowsonetoactagainstone’sself-interest,butitneverrequiresoneto.Itisperfectlyrationalforapersontosacrificehisowninterestsforthegreaterinterestsofothers,butontheordinaryconceptofrationality,itisalsoperfectlyrationalforonetorefusetodoso.Ontheordinaryconceptofpracticalrationalityitisperfectlyrationaleithertobeselfishortobeunselfish.OnSterba’saccountofrationalityitiscontrarytoreasontobeselfishwhenthisinvolvesthesacrificeofthegreaterinterestsofothers.Sterbacanclaimthatreasonrequiresnotbeingselfishbecauseheisnotprimarilyconcernedwithpracticalrationality,ratherheis\nTHEORETICALVERSUSPRACTICALRATIONALITY43concernedwiththeoreticalrationality.Heiscertainlycorrectthattheoreticalreasondoesnotallowonetotailorone’sargumentsbecauseofreasonsofself-interest.Thegoaloftheoreticalreasonistruth,andsotheoreticalreasonrequiresthatonenotdistortthereasoningprocessforreasonsofself-interest.AlanGewirthagreeswithSterbathattheoreticalreasonrequiresonenottoactselfishlyorimmorally.HealsoagreeswithSterbathatiftheoreticalreasonrequiresthis,thenpracticalreasonmustalsodoso,forbothholdthattheoreticalreasonismorebasicthanpracticalrationality.WhatImeanbytakingtheoreticalreasonasmorebasicthanpracticalreason,istakingrationalitytobemoreconcernedwithtruththanwithbenefitsandharms.Ifoneisconcernedtoshowthatreasonsupportsmoralityoveregoism,itisextremelytemptingtotaketheoreticalreasonasbasic,forinseekingthetruththereisnoplaceforegoism.Truthisdeterminedinacompletelyimpartialmanner;whetheranargumentisvalidorastatementistrueisnotaffectedatallbywhetherI,oranyoneelse,willbenefitorbeharmed.Thusitisnotsurprisingthatthosewhoregardtheoreticalreasonasbasictrytoshowthatactingimmorallyinvolvesusinganinvalidargument,unacceptablemethodofargumentation,orafalsestatement.Showingthisis,forthem,sufficienttoshowthatitiscontrarytoreasontoactimmorally.Asamatteroffact,nophilosopherhasevershownthatactingimmorallyalwaysinvolvesusinganinvalidargument,anunacceptablemethodofargumentation,orafalsestatement;butevenweresomephilosophertodoso,itwouldnotshowthatpracticalreasonrequiresactingmorally.Allthatitwouldshowisthatactingimmorallyinvolvesactingcontrarytotheoreticalreason;itwouldnotshowthatactingimmorallyinvolvesactingcontrarytopracticalreason.Although,ingeneral,actingcontrarytotheoreticalreasoninvolvesactingcontrarytopracticalreason,itisnotnecessarilyso.Grantedthatemployinginvalidarguments,etc.,willgenerallyleadtomoreharmsandlessbenefitsthanemployingvalidarguments,etc.,itdoesnotalwaysdoso.RationalpersonswhoknewthetruthaboutOedipus’parents,andalsoknewwhatharmsandbenefitswouldresultfromhisfindingoutthistruth,wouldhaveadvisedhimnottoseekthetruth.Althoughgenerallyonewillavoidmoreharmsorgaingreaterbenefitsbyemployingvalidargumentsandtruestatements,onthoseoccasionswheretheoreticalreasonandpracticalreasonconflict,rationalpersonsadviseactingonpracticalreason.Unlessonecouldshowthatemployinginvalidargumentsandfalsestatementsalways,perhapsnecessarily,involvessufferinggreaterharmsandgaininglessergoodsthanemployingvalidargumentsandtruestatements,onewouldnothaveshownthatpracticalreasonalwaysrequiresavoidinginvalidargumentsandfalsestatements.Butinvalidargumentsandfalsestatementsdonotalwaysleadtosufferinggreaterharmsandgaininglessergoodsthanemployingvalidargumentsandtruestatements.Thisisclearlythecaseifactingimmorallynecessarilyinvolvesemployinginvalidargumentsorfalsestatements,forsomecasesofimmoralactiondonotresultinanyonesufferinggreaterharmsandgaminglessergoods.SterbatriestoshowthatGewirth’sattempttoshowthatreasonrequiresactingmorallyisfaulty.IshallnotdiscusswhetherhiscriticismofGewirthiscorrect,forGewirth’sprimaryobjectiveistoshowthatactingimmorallyinvolvescontradictingoneself.Sterba’sobjectionstoGewirth’sargumentsareinalonglineofobjectionsraisedtoGewirth’sarguments,butIamnotconcernedwithwhetheranyofthesearevalidobjections.MyconcerniswiththepowerofGewirth’sconclusion.Suppose,contrarytofact,thatGewirthactuallydidshowthatifoneactedimmorallyonenecessarilycontradictedoneself.Whatshouldweconcludefromthis,thatitisirrationaltoactimmorally?ThatistheconclusionthatGewirthwantsustodraw,butifwedrawthisconclusion,thenthefollowingquestionmakesperfectlygoodsense:“WhyshouldIavoidactingirrationally?”Butifthisquestionmakessense,thatis,ifapersonwhowouldandshouldbeheldresponsibleforhisactionscansensiblyaskthisquestion,thenirrationalityhaslostitsforce.Thus,evenifGewirthhadactuallyshownthatactingimmorallyinvolvescontradictingoneself,nothingofpracticalsignificancewouldfollowfromthisabouthowoneshouldact.Unlessonehadanoverpoweringphobiaconcerningself-contradiction,itwouldstillbeanopenquestionwhetheritwouldberationaltoactimmorally.Especiallyifitturnedoutthatactingimmorallyandthuscontradictingoneselfresultedinlessharmsandgreatergoodsforoneselfandallone’sfriends.Thatis,showingthattheoreticalrationalityrequiresactingmorallyisofextremelylimitedpracticalimportanceexcepttothose,suchassomephilosophers,whoaredeeplycommittedtotheoreticalrationality.Tothesepeople,itisimportanttoshowthatactingimmorallyinvolvesviolatingtheoreticalrationality.However,if,asseemsquitelikely,theoreticalrationalityrequiresimpartiality,thenonedoesnotneedmuchmoreofanargumenttoshowthattheoreticalrationalityrequiresactingmorally.But,althoughitisclearthatpracticalrationalitydoesnotrequireactingimpartially,itcertainlyallowsonetoactimpartially,atleastinthoserespectsinwhichmoralityrequiresimpartiality,andwithregardtothatgrouptowardwhichmoralityrequiresimpartiality,Hobbes,themoralandpoliticalphilosopherfromwhomIhavelearnedthemost,triestoshowthatbreakingapromiseinvolvescontradictingoneself.However,Hobbesrealizesthatshowingthisisnotsufficienttomotivateallrationalpersonstoavoidbreakingpromises.Hobbesisawarethatitisfarmoreimportanttorationalpersonstoavoidharmtothemselvesandthosewhomtheylove,thantoavoidself-contradictions.ThusHobbesoffersotherconsiderationsinfavorofkeepingpromises,andtheseotherconsiderationsinvolveavoidingharmtooneselfandothers.ItisactingagainsttheseotherconsiderationsthatHobbescorrectlyregardsasbeingmoreimportantinshowingthatitisirrationaltobreakvalidpromises.LikeHobbes,Irealizethatifirrationalityistohavethenormativeforcethatmakesitworthwhiletoshowthatitisirrationaltoactimmorally,thennopersonwhoisheldresponsibleforheractionscaneverwanttoactirrationally.\n44BERNARDGERTSterba’sattempttogroundmoralityinrationalityis,asheadmits,inthesametraditionasGewirth’s.However,insteadoftryingtoshowthatactingimmorallyinvolvescontradictingoneself,Sterbatriestoshowthatactingimmorallyinvolvesbeggingthequestion.Moreprecisely,Sterbatriestoshowthatifapureegoistisarguingwithapurealtruist,thentheonlynon-question-beggingargumentwillbeoneinwhichbothagreetoactinawaythatSterbadefinesasactingmorally.SterbacriticizesKurtBaier’smostrecentattempttogroundmoralityinrationalitybyclaimingthatitresultsinadistortedaccountofmorality.Ironically,thesamecriticismcanbemadeofSterba’sattempt.Hisnon-question-beggingjustificationofmoralityresultsinamoralitythathasonlyaslightresemblancetoourordinaryconceptofmorality.Hisaccountofmoralityonlyrulesoutimmoralactsdoneforself-interest.Butthemostimportantimmoralactsarenotthosedonefromself-interest,butforthesakeofsomecause,one’scountry,religion,race,ethnicgroup,colleagues,etc.Manyoftheseactionsactuallyinvolvesomesacrificeofself-interestinordertobenefittheseotherpeople.Further,unlesshebegsthequestionbyincorporatingmoralreasonsintohisaccountofhigh-rankingaltruisticreasons,Sterbahastocountasmorallyacceptablethoseunjustifiedpaternalisticactionsthataregenuinelymotivatedbythedesiretohelpthepersontowardwhomoneisactingpaternalistically.Further,Sterbamakesnodistinctionbetweenhurtingsomeonetoavoidalesserharmtooneselfandnothelpingsomeonebecausedoingsowouldresultinaharmtooneself,eventhoughitisalesserharm.Thatis,hisaccountofmoralitymakesnodistinctionbetweenviolatingamoralrule,e.g.DonotkillandDonotcausepain,andnotactingonamoralideal,e.g.PreventdeathandPreventpain.Indeed,Sterba’scompromiseaccountofmoralityseemstocountcheatingonone’sincometaxwhenthegaintooneselffromcheatingisgreaterthanthelosstothegovernment,asactingmorally.Ofcourse,ifeveryonewereallowedtocheatontheirincometax,thiswouldcausesignificantharm,butSterba’saccountofmoralityonlyconsiderstherankingofreasonsforandagainsttheparticularact.Manyimmoralactsdonotcauseanydirectharmtoothers,oronlyverylittleharm;andtheybenefitthepersonactingquiteabit.Astudentwhocansafelycheatonanexammaysufferseriousharmifhefails,whereas,evenifthecourseisgradedonacurve,nooneelsesuffersseriousharmatall.ThusonSterba’saccount,cheatingismoralbecausethecheaterhasahigh-rankingreasonforcheatingthatrequireslittleornosacrificefromotherstofulfill(p.27).AmoredirectobjectiontoSterba’saccountofrationalityasavoidingquestion-beggingderivesfromthefactthatwhetherawayofarguingisquestion-beggingistobedeterminedbytheparticipantsinthediscussion.Whatisquestion-beggingwhenarguingwithonegroupofdiscussantswouldnotnecessarilybequestion-beggingwhenarguingwithanothergroup.Sterbaenvisionstheparticipantsinthediscussiontobeapureegoistandapurealtruist.Apureegoistisonewhoassumes:1’)Allhigh-rankingself-interestedreasonshavepriorityoverconflictinglower-rankingaltruisticreasons,and2’)Alllow-rankingself-interestedreasonshavepriorityoverconflictinghigher-rankingaltruisticreasons(p.28).Apurealtruistassumes:1)Allhigh-rankingaltruisticreasonshavepriorityoverconflictinglower-rankingself-interestedreasons,and2)Alllow-rankingaltruisticreasonshavepriorityoverconflictinghigher-rankingself-interestedreasons(pp.27–8).Thecompromiseviewofmoralityacceptsboth1and1’.ItisnotclearwhySterbahaschosenthesetwoparticipants,butitseemsclearthatitisnotagoodchoice,forthepurealtruistseemstobeirrational.AnyonewhochooseshisowntotalruintopreventtheleastuneasinesstoanIndian,orpersonwhollyunknowntohim,contrarytoHume,isactingirrationally.ButaccordingtoSterba’saccountofthepurealtruist,thatiswhatthepurealtruistwouldchoose.Grantedthatthepureegoistisalsonotthekindofpersononewouldwanttohavearound,heisatleastrational.Whywouldheevenenterintoadiscussionwithsuchanirrationalpersonasthepurealtruist?Andwhyshouldanyoneelsecareaboutanynon-question-beggingsolutiontotheirdispute?Sterbadoesnotprovideuswithanyanswerstotheseimportantquestions.ButevenifSterbaweretohaveshownthatmoralityprovidestheonlynon-question-beggingresponsetoanydisputeabouthowtoact,whyshouldonetakethattobeimportant?Ifonehasachoicebetweenbeggingthequestionandavoidingseriousharmforoneselfandone’sfriends,wouldanyrationalpersonhaveanydoubtaboutwhichhewouldchoose?Ofcourse,ifthealternativeactionavoidedevengreaterharmtoothers,thenarationalpersonmightchoosenottoavoidharmtohimselfandhisfriends.Buttherelevantpointisthatifarationalpersonchosetosufferharmhimself,itwouldbetoavoidgreaterharmtoothers,nottoavoidbeggingthequestion.Idonotwanttodenythatmanypeople,especiallyphilosophers,dowanttoavoidbeggingthequestion,justasmanypeople,especiallyphilosophers,dowanttoavoidcontradictingthemselves.However,giventhechoicebetweenbeggingthequestionorcontradictingoneself,andsufferingseriousharm,onlyanobsessivephilosopherwouldchoosetosuffertheseriousharm.Tothinkotherwiseistoranktheoreticalreasonasmorebasicandmoreimportantthanpracticalreason.Ifanyonewereactuallytoactonthisranking,thatis,tosuffersignificantharmssimplytoavoidcontradictingoneselfortoavoidbeggingthequestion,thatpersonwouldbeactingirrationally.IcanunderstandwhySterbaandothershavewantedtoshowthatreasonrequiresactingmorally.Theywanttomotivatepeopletoactmorally.Giventhisgoal,itseemsquiteanaturalstrategytotrytoshowthatactingimmorallyisactingcontrarytoreason.Thisseemsanaturalstrategybecauseoneassumesthatnorationalpersonwantstoactcontrarytoreason.Butthisassumptionholdsonlyifactingcontrarytoreasonissomethingthatrationalpersonsintheordinarysenseallwanttoavoidmorethantheywanttoavoidanythingelse.Butnotallrationalpersonswanttoavoidself-contradictionorbeggingthequestionmorethantheywanttoavoidanythingelse.Aspointedoutinthepreviousparagraph,rationalpersonsforcedtochoosebetweenself-contradictionorbeggingthequestion,andsufferingsignificantharm,willchoosetocontradict\nTHEORETICALVERSUSPRACTICALRATIONALITY45themselvesortobegthequestion.Thusifactingimmorallyisnecessarytoavoidsufferingsignificantharm,showingthatactingimmorallyinvolveseitherself-contradictionorbeggingthequestionwillnothavethemotivationalforcethatonemighthaveinitiallythought.ItmaybethoughtthatSterbaandothersarenotreallyconcernedwithmotivatingordinarypeopletoactmorally.Philosophersarenotpreachers.Further,Sterbaknowsthatfew,ifany,peoplewilldecidetoactmorallyonthebasisofhavingreadhisbook.Indeed,Sterbaknowsthatrelativelyfewpeoplewillevenreadhisbook,letaloneunderstanditandacceptit.Thisisnotintendedasadisparagingremarkabouthisbook.AsfarasIknow,noseriousphilosophybookhasevermadeitontoanybest-sellerlist.Philosophybooksarenotbigsellers.Further,Sterbaisawarethatnoargumentpurportingtoshowthatreasonrequiresactingmorallyhaseverbeenacceptedbyanysignificantpercentageofphilosophers.Thusitseemsthat,contrarytowhatheexplicitlyclaimstobedoing,Sterbaisnotattemptingtoprovideanargumentthatwillservethepracticalpurposeofmotivatingordinaryrationalpeopletoactmorally.Rather,themostplausibleaccountofwhatSterbaisdoingisthatheisengagedinapurelyphilosophicaltask,namely,showingthatdefendingegoisminvolvesbeggingthequestion.Hemightbetryingtoshowthatnonon-question-beggingargumentcanbegivenindefenseofegoism.AndfollowingKurtBaier’spositioninTheMoralPointofView,hemightalsowanttoshowthatnonon-question-beggingargumentcanbegivenindefenseofaltruism.Baier’sinsightwastoseethataltruismisnotthesameasmorality,thatasamatteroffact,aworldofpureegoistswouldprobablybeabetterworldthanthatofpurealtruists.Nonetheless.Baiercorrectlycontendsthataworldofpeopleactingmorallywouldbebetterthaneither.AlthoughSterbacriticizesBaier’sattempttogroundmoralityinrationality,hedoesacceptBaier’sdistinctionsbetweenegoism,altruism,andmorality,andusesthesedistinctionsinhisargument.IfSterbaistakenasattemptingtodemonstratetophilosophersthattheycannotgiveanynon-question-beggingargumentinfavorofadoptingeitheregoismoraltruism,hehasabetterchanceofbeingsuccessful.Ofcourse,hisargumentmaystillnotbesuccessful.Nonetheless,consideringSterba’sargumentasdirectedtophilosophers,whichitcertainlyseemstobe,thenpointingouttothemthattheywillbeactingcontrarytotheoreticalreasonbydefendingegoismmayhaveconsiderableforce.Asindicatedearlierinthispaper,Ibelieverationalityclearlydoesnotrequireactingmorally,andthatitrequiresallrationalpersonstoputforwardmoralityasaguidetobehaviorthatgovernsallofthem,onlywithsomesignificantqualifications.Thesequalificationsinvolvelimitingthemselvestobeliefsthataresharedbyallotherrationalpersons,togetherwithonefurtherqualification.Thisfurtherqualificationcanbethattheyaretryingtoreachagreementamongallrationalpersons.Byarationalperson,Imeanapersoninsofarasheisactingrationally,andIprovidethefollowingdefinitionofarationalaction.Anactionisirrationalinthebasicsenseifandonlyifitisanintentionalactionofapersonwithsufficientknowledgeandintelligencetobefullyinformed,andwho,iffullyinformed,would(1)believethattheactioninvolvessignificantlyincreasedriskofhissufferingdeath,non-trivialpain,lossofability,lossoffreedom,orlossofpleasure,and(2)nothaveanadequatereasonfortheaction.Areasonforactingisaconsciousrationalbeliefthatone’sactionwillincreasetheprobabilityofsomeone’savoidinganyoftheharmslistedaboveorgaininggreaterconsciousness,ability,freedom,orpleasure.Areasonisadequateifanysignificantgroupofmoralagentsregardtheharmavoidedorbenefitgainedtocompensatefortheharmsuffered.Anyintentionalactionthatisnotirrationalisrational.(Morality:ItsNatureandJustification,p.84)Thisisanaccountofpracticalrationality,notoftheoreticalrationality.Idonotprovideanexplicitaccountoftheoreticalrationality,eventhoughIdoprovideanexplicitaccountofarationalbelief.Contradictingoneselforbeggingthequestionmayindeedbecontrarytotheoreticalreason,butacceptanceofmyaccountofarationalactionrequiresacceptingthatpracticalrationalityismorebasicandmoreimportantthantheoreticalrationality.Aspointedoutabove,inanyconflictbetweentheoreticalrationalityandpracticalrationality,practicalrationalitywins;thatis,itisirrationaltoactaccordingtotheoreticalrationalitywhendoingsoconflictswithpracticalrationality.Myaccountofrationalityhasanumberoffeaturesthatdistinguishitfromalmostallotherphilosophicalaccountsofrationality.However,itistheonlyaccountwhichcorrectlydescribestheordinaryconceptofrationality.Thesetwofeaturesarenotaccidentallyrelated.Idevelopedmyaccountofrationalitysothatitwouldcorrectlydescribetheordinaryconceptofrationality.ThismeantthatIhadtoabandonmuchofwhatwastakenforgrantedinmostphilosophicalaccountsofrationality.Thus,contrarytomostphilosophicalaccounts,myaccountofrationalitystartswithirrationality,andsimplydefinesarationalactionasonethatisnotirrational.Thishasthesignificantresultthattherecanbeseveralincompatiblerationalactions.Startingwithadefinitionofarationalactionanddefininganirrationalactionasonethatisnotrationalalmostinevitablyleadstotheviewthatnoactionisrationallyallowed,thatis,thatnoactionisneitherrationaltodonorirrationalnottodo.Butinordinarylife,mostoftheactionswedoareofthiskind.Itisrationallyallowedtogotoagivenmovieornottogotoit,toorderagivenmealornottoorderit.Bystartingwithadefinitionofanirrationalaction,myaccountofrationalityexplainsthisfeatureoftheordinaryconceptofrationality.\n46BERNARDGERTMostphilosophicalaccountsofrationalityrelaterationalityverycloselytoactingonreasons;indeed,somephilosophicalaccountsofrationalitydefineactingrationallyasactingonreasons,oractingonthebestreasons.Thisisanexampleofprovidingapositivedefinitionofrationality.Onmyaccountofrationality,inwhichactingrationallyonlyrequiresnotactingirrationally,onecanactrationallywithoutactingonanyreasonsatall.Aslongasoneisnotactingirrationally,thatis,notdoinganythingthatinvolvessignificantlyincreasingone’sriskofsufferingdeath,non-trivialpain,lossofability,lossoffreedom,orlossofpleasure,thenanythingonedoescountsasarationalaction,whetherornotonehasanyreasonsforactinginthatway.Thus,aslongasoneknowsthatoneisnotriskingsufferinganyharm,onecanactonawhimandstillbeactingrationally.Thisaccordswiththenormaluseoftheconceptofrationality,forinnocentandtrivialactsarenotnormallyregardedasirrational.Itisonlyphilosophers,thosewhothinkabouteveryactiontheytake,whoclaimthatarationalactionhastobebasedonreasons.Mostphilosophersdonotevenhaveaclearaccountofareason.Theygenerallyrelatereasonsverycloselytomotives,eithermotivesthatoneactuallyhas,ormotivesthatonewouldhaveifonewerefullyinformed.Butreasons,insofarastheyarerelatedtorationality,arerelatedtojustification,nottoexplanation,andtheyneednotmotivateatall.Myaccountofrationalityalsohasafeaturethatphilosophers,aswellasordinarypeople,regardasessential,namelythatnooneeverwantstoactirrationally.Whereasonallotheraccountsofrationality,includingallthosewhichtaketheoreticalrationalityasbasic,onecandescribesituationsinwhichapersonwouldwanttoactirrationallyherself,ortoadvisethoseshelovestoactirrationally,onmyaccountnoonewoulddoso.However,thecostofhavingthisfeatureisthatitisclearlyfalsethatrationalityrequiresactingmorally.Somephilosophers,Sterbaforexample,findthistoohighacost.However,iftheaccountofrationalitydoesnothavethisfeature,thenitisofrelativelylittlevaluetoshowthatrationalityrequiresactingmorally.Itisofrelativelylittlevaluebecausethenonecanask“WhyshouldIactrationally?”Ifonecansensiblyaskthisquestion,thenwhatisgainedbyshowingthatrationalityrequiresactingmorally?AsfarasIknow,myaccountofreasonsforactionsistheonlyaccountwhichprovidesalimittothebeliefsorfactsthatcancountasbasicreasonsforacting.Inthedefinitionofarationalactionprovidedabove,Ipresentedanaccountofbasicreasonsintermsoftheircontent.Butonecanalsodefinereasonsforactinginaformalway.Reasonsforactingareconsciousrationalbeliefsthatcanmakesomeotherwiseirrationalactions,rational(p.56).Notethatthisdefinitionofreasonsdependsonhavinganaccountofwhat“anotherwiseirrationalaction”wouldbe.Withoutsuchanaccount,itisimpossibletoprovideanaccurateaccountofreasons.Butinadditiontothisformalaccountofareason,onealsoneedsacorrespondingaccountofanadequatereason,fornotallreasonsareadequatereasonsforallactions.Anadequatereasonforactingisaconsciousrationalbeliefthatcanmaketheotherwiseirrationalactionforwhichitisareason,rational(p.57,modifiedonthebasisofacriticismbyRobertAudi).Thisaccountofreasonsandadequatereasonsallowsforonetodistinguishbetweenbeliefs(orfacts)thataregood(adequate)reasons,thosethatarebad(inadequate)reasons,andthosethatarenotreasonsatall.Nootheraccountdoesthis.Further,thisaccountofreasonsallowsonetorankreasons.Thatis,itprovidesanobjectivewayofmeasuringthestrengthofreasons.IfreasonAwouldbeanadequatereasonforeveryotherwiseirrationalactthatreasonBwouldbeanadequatereasonfor,andforsomeotherwiseirrationalactsaswell,thenreasonAisastrongerorbetterreasonthanreasonB(pp.77–8).Thestrengthofareasondoesnotdependonwhoisbenefitedorharmed,simplyontheamountofthebenefitorharm.ThisaccountofthestrengthofreasonsmayprovideanexplanationofSterba’sviewthatreasonrequiresactingmorally.ForSterba,actingmorallyinvolvesactingonthestrongerreasons.ThisyieldsSterba’scompromiseviewofmorality,whereallhigh-rankingself-interestedreasonshavepriorityoverconflictinglower-rankingaltruisticreasons,andallhigh-rankingaltruisticreasonshavepriorityoverconflictinglower-rankingself-interestedreasons.Indeed,myaccountisevenmoregeneralthanSterba’s,andsoallowsonetorankreasonsrelatedtocountry,religionorrace,aswellasegoisticandaltruisticreasons.Sterbaacceptsthisplausiblesoundingaccountofmorality,andheprobablyalsoacceptsthecommonphilosophicalviewthatrationalityrequiresactingonthebestorstrongestreasons.Ifhedoesacceptbothoftheseviews,hedoesnotevenneedtobringinanythingaboutbeggingthequestion.Hisviewthatrationalityrequiresactingmorallysimplyfollowsfromthesetwoveryplausibleviews.However,thoughtheseviewsareplausible,theyarenotcorrect.Itisnotalwaystruethattherearebetterorstrongerreasonsforactingmorallythanforactingimmorally.Itistruethatthereareneverbetterorstrongerreasonsforactingimmorallythanforactingmorally,butthatisadifferentclaim.Thislatterclaimhastobetrueorelseitwouldsometimesbeirrationaltoactmorally.Thiswouldhappenifone’sself-interestconflictedwithactingmorallyandthereasonsforactinginone’sself-interestwerestrongerthanthereasonsforactingmorally.Reasonsforactingimmorallycanneverbestrongerthanthereasonsforactingmorally,butthereverseneednotbetrueeither.Itmaybethatneithersetofreasonsisstrongerthantheother.Somewhatmoretroublingtothosewhowantrationalitytorequireactingmorally,isthehybridcharacterofrationality.Althoughthestrengthofreasonsisdeterminedimpartially,nopreferencebeinggiventoreasonsofself-interestoraltruisticreasons,irrationalityisnotsimilarlyimpartial.Theonlyirrationalactionsarethoseinwhichoneisactinginawaythatoneknowsorshouldknowwillcauseorsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofonesufferingharmoneself,eitherdirectlyorbecausesomeoneforwhomoneisconcernedwillsufferharmorhaveasignificantlyincreasedprobabilityofsufferingharm.\nTHEORETICALVERSUSPRACTICALRATIONALITY47Thosewhohurtothersforwhomtheyarenotconcernedwhentheyknowthatneithertheynorthoseforwhomtheyareconcernedwillsufferanyharmorincreasedriskofsufferingharm,arenotactingirrationallyeveniftheyareactingcontrarytothebestreasons.Theordinaryconceptofrationalitydoesnotviewcleverburglarsasactingirrationally.Theyareactingimmorally,butthatisadifferentmatter.Indeed,itisbecausetheyareactingbothrationally(rationallyallowed)andimmorallythattheordinaryconceptofrationalitydoesnotholdthatrationalityrequiresactingonthebestorstrongestreasons.Failuretorecognizethehybridcharacterofrationalityiswhatleadsphilosopherstoholdtheviewthatrationalityrequiresactingmorally.Thesephilosopherstakeallofrationalitytobeliketheconceptofareason,thatis,theytakeallofrationalitytobedeterminedimpartially.Theoppositemistakeisheldbythosewhoholdtorationalegoism.Theytakeallofrationalitytobedeterminedinthewayirrationalityisdetermined,thatis,egoistically.Butrationalityisahybridconcept;theonlyirrationalactionsarethosethatgoagainstone’sself-interest,ortheinterestsofthoseaboutwhomoneisconcerned,eventhoughreasonsrelatedtotheinterestsofothersaboutwhomoneisnotconcernedcanmakeitrationaltogoagainstone’sself-interestortheinterestsoffriends.Thismakestheconceptofarationallyallowedactionevenmoreimportant.Giventhehybridcharacterofrationality,itturnsoutthatinalmostallconflictsbetweenactingmorallyandactinginone’sself-interest,itisrationallyallowedtoactineitherway.Indeed,eveninconflictsbetweenmoralityandtheinterestsofone’scountry,raceorreligion,itisalmostalwaysrationallyallowedtoactineitherway.Surprisingly,eveninconflictsbetweenself-interestandtheinterestsofone’scountry,raceorreligion,itisalsoalmostalwaysrationallyallowedtoactineitherway.Rationalitydoesnotrequireactinginanywaythatanysignificantnumberofpeoplenormallyregardedasrationalwouldnotact.Onlyifthisfeatureofrationalityisacceptedcanitbeimportanttoshowthatrationalityrequiresactinginaparticularway.Asignificantnumberofpeoplenormallyregardedasrationalknowinglyactimmorally;thusrationalitycannotrequireactingmorally.Ifanyphilosopherdoesshowthatrationalityrequiresactingmorally,thenthesenseofrationalitythatheisusingisnotthebasicsense.Itisasenseofrationalitysuchthatpeoplenormallyregardedasrationalcansensiblyask“Whyactrationally?”Iprefertousethebasicsenseofrationalityinwhichnopersonnormallyregardedasrationalwouldeverask“Whyactrationally?”Unfortunately,forthoselikeSterbawhowantrationalitytorequireactingmorally,rationalityinthisbasicsensedoesnotandcannotrequirethis.\nPartIIIALTERNATIVESOCIALANDPOLITICALPERSPECTIVES\nLibertarianism\n4LIBERTARIANJUSTICETiborR.MachanThenatureofjusticeBylibertarianjusticeonewouldhaveinmindtheaccountofjusticeadvancedinlibertarianpoliticaltheory.Sincewhatjusticeishasbeenandremainsinserious,oftendeep-seateddispute,therearewidelydifferentconceptionsofitemanatingfromdifferentschoolsofpoliticalthought,eachaimingtobethetrueorrightone.Libertarianismproposesone,asdosocialism,fascism,welfare-statism,andsoforth.1Astowhichconceptionofjusticeisrightorwhatjusticereallyis,thereisagreatdealtobesaidonhowthatmightbedetermined.InthisdiscussionIshallnotbeaimingtofindafixed,final,perfectidealofjustice,alonglinessuggestedinsomeofPlato’sdialogues.NoramIconvincedthatsomeconsensusiswhatiswanted,northatnodeterminationispossible.Instead,itseemstomethataconceptionthatarisesfromjustifiedandthusmostreasonablepropositionsinvariousbranchesofhumaninquiry,startingwithmetaphysicsandincludingpsychology,economicsandethics,willconstitutetherightideaofwhatjusticeis.Whythisshouldbesoisastorythatistoolongtotellhere,eventhoughagreatdealdependsonit.2Todojusticeistotreatsomethingappropriatetoitsnatureorasitdeservesoroughttobetreated.Onlycertainkindsofbeingscanbesaidtodeserveorbeowedjustice.(Thereisnoproblemaboutdoingjusticetoarockorthemoon,althoughsomeenvironmentalistsarguethattheissuedoesarisevis-à-vistrees,andevenmountains.3)Whenwewanttolearnwhatitistodojusticetohumanbeings,wemustfirstlearnwhatisduethem.That,inturn,dependsonwhatkindofbeingstheyare.Asananalogouscaseinpoint,whendefendersofanimalrightslayouttheirreasonsforwhyanimalshaverights,theytellusaboutthenatureofanimals.Theyfocusonwhatkindofbeingstheyare,onwhatintheirnaturewarrantsourascribingtothemandrespectingtheirrights.4Justicefortheanimalsconsistsoftreatingtheminaccordancewithstandardsderivedfromaconsiderationoftheirnature.5LibertarianjusticeLibertarianstakeitthatjusticeconsistsinestablishingandmaintainingapoliticalsysteminwhichtherespectandprotectionoftherighttolife,libertyandpropertyofthehumanindividualareofprimarylegalsignificance.6Theymaintainthathumanbeingsareessentiallycreative,inventive,andchoosingbeings.Tobehumanisthen,primarily,totaketheinitiativeviaone’sthinkingmind,whichthenissuesinintentions,deliberations,wants,omissions,andsoforth,forallofwhichonecanberesponsible.Inparticular,thethinkingmindofahumanbeingisnotapassive,reflexiveorreactivebutanactivefaculty.Individualhumanbeingsaredistinguishedbyvirtueoftheircapacitytoactivatetheirconceptualformofawareness,theirthinking,soastolearnhowtoliveandflourish.7We,then,regardandtreathumanbeingsappropriatelybyacknowledgingthattheydosuchthinking.Wedothemjusticeifwedon’tthwarttheirrationalcapacityforcreativity,inventiveness,andinitiative.JusticeaslibertyJusticeasliberty,incontrasttojusticeasfairness,order,harmonyorwelfare,8restsontheaboveview.Humanbeingsareinpossessionoffreewill,andneedtoguidetheirownlivestoexcellenceorflourishing.Thedecisiveissueaboutjustice,asaguidingprincipleofacommunity,hastobehumannature.Beforeturningtohumannature,Iwishtospelloutthemostbasictenetsoflibertarianism.Ifthesetenetsarewrong,thensoislibertarianism.\nLIBERTARIANJUSTICE511Adulthumanbeings(andchildrenderivativelyandwithproperadjustments)aresovereignovertheirlives,actionsandbelongings.Theyhavetherightstolife,libertyandproperty.2Theyhavetheresponsibilityintheircommunitiestoacknowledgeandactintermsofthisfact(namely1above)vis-à-visallothers.3Theyoughttodevelopinstitutionsthatassuretheprotectionoftheirsovereignty,delegatingtherequiredpowerstoagents(governments,privatedefenseagencies,legalauthoritiesorsomesuchspecialgroup)forthispurpose.4Suchdelegationofpowersmustitselfoccurwithouttheviolationofsovereigntyorindividualrights.5Theagenciestowhichthepowerofprotectingrightsisdelegatedmustexercisethispowerforthesolepurposeofprotectingtheserights.96Allconcernsapartfromtheprotectionofindividualrightsmustbeactedonbymembersofcommunitieswithouttheviolationofthoserights.Aswithallnormativetheories,libertarianismhasseveralversions,eventhoughtheabovetenetsarenotverycomplicated.Mostlibertarianpoliticaltheoristswouldnotfindseriousobjectionsagainstthemalthoughtheirexactterminologymaydiffer.10LibertarianismandindividualsovereigntyLibertariansupholdthesovereigntyofeachadultindividualinsociallife.Theyholdthatpersonsoughttobeself-governingandoughtnottoberuledbyotherswithouttheirconsent.LibertariansdistinguishthemselvesinthepoliticalarenainmostWesterncountriesfromboththeleftandtheright,bothofwhichenlistgovernmentforthepurposeofregimentingcertainaspectsoftheindividual’slife,thusconflictingwiththelibertarianconcernwithindividualsovereigntyorself-rule.Thisisbecause,ontheonehand,theleftisconcernedwitharrangingcommunitylifesoastoprotectthemateriallyworstofffromthebestoff,takingtheinterestsofthetwotobeinunavoidableconflict.Sotheyregimenteconomiclifeandthusunderminethesovereigntywithwhichlibertariansareconcerned.Therightdoesthesamewhenitcomestotheirspiritualormentallife,sinceitseesthoseelementsofhumancommunitylifeashavingprimaryimportance.Thelibertarian,incontrast,seesjustificationforonlythoselawsthataimatprotectingeveryone’ssovereignty.Since,however,bodyandsoularen’teversharplydivided,boththeleft’sandright’sadministrationofjusticeinvolvesregulatingbothpeople’sspiritualandtheireconomicactivities(e.g.whenadvertisersareregulatedinwhattheymaysayintheircommercials,andwhenSundaybluelawsprohibitcommerceinliquor,respectively).11So,intheparticularareasoftheirphilosophicalfocus,theleftandrightbothwantgovernmenttowieldpowersfarbeyondwhatisconsistentwithlibertarianism.12ProtectingrightsthehighestpublicgoodThelibertarianseesthejustfunctionofthelegalsystemandauthoritiesas,firstandforemost,toprotectindividualrights.Inthisrespectthelibertarianismoreloyaltothe(original)visionoftheAmericanrepublicthanarerepublicans,democrats,socialists,conservatives,liberals,communitarians,aswellasIslamic,Christian,Hinduorotherreligiousfundamentalistswithpowerfulpoliticalagendas.Theseallseektoimposewaysofprivateconduct,oftenclaimingthattheredoesnotevenexistasphereoflegitimateprivacyinhumanlife.13LibertariansbelievethattheyfleshouttheUSDeclarationofIndependencemoreaccurately,consistentlyandcompletelythandoallothers.Why?Becauseifwereallydohavetherighttoourlives,forexample,thenwemayandevenoughttoestablishalegalsystemthatprotectsusagainstalleffortsonthepartofeithercriminals,foreignaggressorsorthelegalauthoritiesthemselvestoforceustoliveourlivesinanywayotherthanhowwechooseto.14Noofficialpaternalisticintervention,evenforthesakeofimprovingsomeaspectofourlives,istolerable—beitbansondrugabuseandsmokinginprivateplaces,orregulationofemployment.Adultsareoff-limitsasfarasregimentingtheirlives,actionsandgoalsisconcerned.Thatiswhathavinganunalienablerighttolife,libertyandthepursuitofhappinesscomesto,nothingless.Aproperlegalorderhasasitsprimarygoaltoprotecttheserights.15CasesinpointConsidertheparticularlycontroversiallibertarianpositionthatnoonehastheauthoritytopreventasovereignadultcitizenfromcommittingorseekingassistedsuicide,unlessitisdemonstrablyevidentthatoneisderanged.Orconsidertheviewthatadultsmaynotbeprohibitedfromusingharmful,debilitatingdrugs,evenonesthatmaybeaddictiveforsomeone.Oragainthatriskyactivitiessuchasmountainclimbing,racecardriving,sexualpromiscuity,andsoforth,shouldnotbeprohibited.\n52TIBORR.MACHANInallthesecasesthelibertarianholdsthepositionthatadultshavethebasicrighttomakethechoicetopursuethecoursetheywanttopursue,providedtheyarenot“dumping”thedamagingresultsonotherpersonsbyviolatingtheirrights.Puttingitplainly,libertariansholdthatone’srighttolifeimpliesthefinal,unqualifiedauthoritytodecidewhathappenstoone’slife.Sothatif,forexample,someonewhocanassistwithsuicideisfreely,voluntarilyinvitedtohelp,prohibitingitiswrongandoughttobeunlawful.Therighttolife,accordingtolibertarianism,meansthattheindividualagent,nototherpeople,shouldbetheonewhomakesdecisionsabouthisorherlife,includingwhethertodelegatetosomeoneelsewhoiswillingtheauthoritytohelpwithendingit,whethertoruinitwithdrugs,andsoforth.Rightsareprinciplesidentifiedinthefieldofpoliticaltheorythatspellout“borders”aroundus,oranindividual’ssphereofpersonalauthority.Thissothatthesovereigntyoftheindividualasamoralagentisacknowledgedandcanbeprotectedinthemidstofsociallifewhereinotherscanchoosetoencroachuponit.Inordertocrossthoseborders,thoseinsidemustprovidethoseoutsidewithpermission,anactionthatcanthenbeevaluatedasrightorwrongfortheagenttohavecarriedout.Soiftherearebasicindividualrightsthentheymaynotbeviolated.Tohavetheauthoritytomakesomeoneactasonewouldwant,thatperson’spermissionisrequired.Thesimplestexampleissexualintercourse.Onlyifsomeoneconsentstosuchinteractionmaytheintercoursecommence.Butevenlessdrasticinstancesapply:nopublicauthoritymayforciblymakeonepersonprovideservicesforanother,howevervitaltheseservicesmaybe.16Andiftheserviceconsistsofsupplyingthepersonwithresourceswantedorneeded,thosetoomustbeobtainedwiththepermissionoftheowner.Sincewhatisowned,eveningreatabundance,canbewhatapersoncreatesorproduces,toholdthatothersindireneedowntheseresourcesistobelievethatothersaredueinvoluntaryservitudeandevenowntheagent’slifeandeffortswhichcreatetheresources.(Wewillseeshortlythatrarelytheremaybejustificationforsomeonetoexpropriatesomeoneelse’sresources,thoughthiswouldnotjustifyclaimingthattheyhavearighttothem.)RightsandsovereigntyAwaytoappreciatethisissueofindividualrightsistofocusontherighttoprivateproperty,aswenormallyunderstandit.Rightsidentifybordersforallpersonsorcitizenswithinwhichactionsmaybetakenfreeofothers’interference,regardlessofthemoralqualityofthoseactions.Thoseactionsneednotbeequalintheirmoralquality,yetnonemaystoporregulatethemagainsttheagent’swill.Inthecaseofuniversalprivatepropertyrights,thebordersaroundone’sactionsaremostclearlyapprehensiblebecausetheyoftenconsistofactionsvis-à-visobjectswithclearphysicallimits.Ifitisyourcar,youhavetheauthoritytouseit,providednothirdpartiesareunavoidablyaffected.17NormanMalcolmtellsthefollowingillustrativestoryaboutWittgensteinwhichmakestheabovepointquiteclear:Wheninverygoodspiritshewouldjestinadelightfulmanner.Thistooktheformofdeliberatelyabsurdorextravagantremarksutteredinatone,andwiththemien,ofaffectedseriousness.Ononewalkhe“gave”meeachtreethatwepassed,withthereservationthatIwasnottocutitdownordoanythingtoit,orpreventthepreviousownersfromdoinganythingtoit:withthosereservationstheywerehenceforthmine.18Ownershipwithouttheauthoritytodecidetowhatusetheowneditemwillbeputismeaningless,absurd.Similarly,ifitisyourlife,somebodywhowantstodosomethingtoitmustgainyourpermission—aswhenyouauthorizeaphysiciantoperformariskyoperationoracabbytodriveyoutotheairport.Ontheotherhandif,forexample,youdon’twanttogointotheringwithaworldchampionboxerwhowantstofightyou,that,too,isproperlyuptoyou,notsomebodyelse.Ifyouwanttosmoke,drink,takedrugs,climbmountainsorgoskiing,providednoone’srightsareviolatedbysuchactions,youneednoone’spermission.What,then,issofundamentalaboutlibertarianismisthatitproposesthatindividualsaretheoneswhoaresovereign19overthemselvesandtheirbelongings,notthelegalauthoritiesandnoteventhemajorityofthepeople.Sovereigntyinthepresentcontextisthatconditionunderwhichsomebodyhasthefundamentalrighttogovernanceandothersmustaskpermissionbeforetheyintrudeonthespherebeinggoverned.Personalorindividualsovereignty,whichiswhatisatissuehere,concernsself-governance.Accordingly,incaseswhereinsomearebeinggovernedbyothers—forexample,legaladjudicationoramedicalprocedure—theconsentofthosewhoaretobegovernedisnecessarybeforethegovernmentbyothersthanoneselfcancommence.Thatisbecausethelivesofthosewhosegovernanceisatissuearetheirown,notsomeoneelse’s—thefamily’s,society’s,nation’s,race’s,ethnicgroup’s,gender’sorhumanity’s—evenifonemisgovernsoneself,evenifonewastesone’slifeaway.Peoplemayofferothersadvice,writeeditorialsdirectedatthem,sendthemletters,trytotalkwiththem—inshort,theymayapproachothersinpeacefulways.Buttheyhavenoauthoritytotakeoverthegovernanceofanother’slife.20Arguably,thisistheveryideaofcivilizedlife,onecateringtopersonsascitizensandnotassubjects.\nLIBERTARIANJUSTICE53LibertarianismversusdemocracyEvenargumentsfordemocracy—meaningfortheruleofmany,indeed,thebulkofthepeople—donotvoidthisindividualsovereignty.Whyshouldthey?Afterall,themajorityiscomposedofindividuals,andifalonetheyaren’tauthorizedtointrudeonyourlife,togethertheyaren’teither.Democracyisamethod,mainly,ofselectingadministratorsofvarious,includinggovernmental,tasks.Confinedinlinewithsoundmoralprinciples,itmaybedeployedforthelimitedpurposeofselectingadministratorsofalegalorderthatrespectsandprotectsindividualrightsinwaysthatdonotviolatethoserights.Oritisamethodwhichcanbeusedtoreachdecisionsonagreatmanyissues,providedallthoseaffectedhaveagreedtoitsuse,asintheRotaryorLionsClub.Onemustauthorize—delegateauthorityto—legaladministratorstodocertainthings.Onlythendotheyacquireproperauthority—asopposedtomerepower—todothem.Iftheauthoritywasnotgiven,thentheofficialslackitandmuststayoutofone’slife(educational,commercial,scientific,religious,oranythingelse)aswellasone’sactions—thatiswhathavingtherighttolibertymeans.IamfreeinthepoliticalsenseifIcantakevariousactionswithoutinterferencefromotherpeople.(Thereareothersensesof“freedom”buttheyarenotrelevanthere.21)IfIwanttopursuealifeofproductivity,creativity,art,scienceoreducation,Imayembarkonthosepursuitsandnoonemayprohibitmefromdoingso.Ifonerequiresthecooperationofothersforsuccesswiththesepursuits,theirconsentismorallynecessary.Andifonechoosesnottoembarkuponsuchpursuitsbut,instead,choosestobeidle,lazy,imprudent,neglectfultowardoneselfandone’sbestinterests,includingmakingcontributionstoone’sfellowhumanbeingsinneed,this,thoughoftenmorallyreprehensible,isalsosomethingonehasarighttodo.Nooneistobeplacedintoinvoluntaryservitudetoothersoreventooneself.Voluntaryassociationismorallyandpoliticallyessentialtofreemenandwomen.22TherisksoflibertyAnoftrepeatedreasonforrejectingthelibertarianpositionisthatwhenoneiswronginwhatonechoosestodo,thenonehasnorighttoactfreely.Thisiswhysomekindsofforcibleinterference,includingandespeciallybygovernment,isthoughttobejustified.Sothat,forexample,ifonechoosestopursuealifeoflaziness,drugaddictionordebauchery,thenthismaybeforciblyprevented.23AgoodexampleofthiskindofobjectionislaidoutbyRobertSpeamann,inconnectionwithhissupportforanideaarticulatedbySocratesagainstThrasymachus,totheeffectthatgovernmentmustbetheshepherdofthepeoplesothatthepeopleactrightlyratherthanmerelytopleaseoneanotherforprofit:Socrateshadusedtheimageoftheshepherdtocharacterizetherulerinastate.Thrasymachuspointsoutthattheshepherddeliversthesheeptothebutcherandthereforedoesn’thavethewell-beingofthesheepinview.Socratesrepliesthatthisendisaccidentaltotheshepherd’sart.Asshepherdtheshepherdprovidesforthewell-beingofthesheep.Atthebottomofthisisthefactthatthebestsheepforpeoplearetheonesthathavealsobestbeenabletodevelopassheepduringtheirlives.Theartofthebutcherdoesnotdefinetheartoftheshepherd.Preciselythischangesinthemodernworld.Here,themarketdictatestothebreederhowheistokeeptheanimals,andinnowayisthekeepingattunedtotheanimals’well-being.Theviewpointsoftheanimalprotectorareexternaltothoseoftheanimalkeeperandmustbeasserted“fromwithout.”24Inanswertothis,thelibertarianclaimsthatwemustaccepttheriskthatgoeswithbeingfree,includinginthemarketplace.Yes,someprofessionals,forexample,willnotpursueexcellencebutmerelycatertowhateverconsumersdemand.Withtheauthoritytorunone’slife,includingone’sprofession,goestheriskthatonemaymismanagethese.Butmalpracticebynomeansneedstobetheconsequenceofself-government.Theshepherd,forexample,oughttoactinlinewithhisownintegrity.Thiswillnotoccurasaresultofregimentationbygovernment.Theconsumeroughtalsotoactwithintegrityandinfluencethe“shepherd”accordingly.Theyallneedtochoosetodowhatisright,notmadetobehavecorrectly,forexample,bydintofgovernmentregimentation.Thatishowthelibertariansystemaccordswithnature,thatis,withthemoral—i.e.choicemaking—natureofthecitizensofacountry.Justbecausenoguaranteeexiststhatpeoplewillusetheirlibertysoastodotherightthing,itdoesnotfollowthatnonewilldoitorthatmakingthemdoitisavalidsubstitute.Anditisunjustifiablycynicaltothinkthatthoseinafreemarketwouldnotfreelychoosetopursueexcellencewhileattemptingtopreparetheirwaresandservicesforpurchaseinthemarket.Themarketisviewedasmuchtoodemand-drivenbythelikesofSpeamann.Infact,however,moreoftenitisbecauseofthedesireforexcellencethatthemarketprovidesonewithwhatisdesirable.Themutualpursuitofexcellencebyproducerandconsumerismorelikelywhatmarketsamountto,insteadofthemutualpursuitofsheerandmeagersatisfaction.\n54TIBORR.MACHANThereareotherrisksoftheprotectionofindividualrightstolibertythathavebeenheldtobeintolerablebysomecriticsoflibertarianism.JamesP.Sterbahasarguedinmanyforathattheriskposedtotheinnocentpoororhelplesswhocannotfindhelpinsocietybasedonvoluntarycontributionsismorallyandoughttobelegallyintolerable.Itasksoftheseindividualstoacceptsomethingthatisunreasonabletoaskanyonetoaccept,namely,torespecttheprivatepropertyoftheveryrichevenwhiletheyarethreatenedwithdevastation.25Sterbasaysthatbecauseofthisunacceptablesituation,theinnocentpoororhelplesshavearighttowelfare,namely,toportionsofthewealthofthosewhohaveenoughforthemselvesnottomissit.26YetSterba’scaseisnotagoodonebecausethereisnojustificationforevenagoodpersontodepriveanotherfromwhatbelongstoanothermerelybecausehemayneedsustenance.Noonehasarighttomysecondkidney,eventhoughImaynotneedit,ormysecondeye,eventhoughIcouldseewellenoughwithoutit.IfindeedIownmywealth,thereisnojustificationforanothertotakeitfromme,evenifIhaveplentyoramnotmakinggooduseofit(asindeedmanydowiththeirtalentsorotherassets).Sterbahasargued,also,thatwhetheroneownssomethingistobeestablishedbyreferencetocertaindistributiveprinciples,notbyreferencetowhetherthepersonhasobtaineditwithoutdoingviolencetoothers.Iassumethathewouldconsideritdoingviolencetoothersnottohelpthemwhenonehasthecapacitytodosowithoutexcessiveharmtooneself.Butthisomitsfromconsiderationthatnothelpingothersisnotdoingviolencetothembecauseevenifonewerenotalive,thoseotherswouldbeinneed.Onethencannotbesaidtohavecausedtheneedinessandthushasnoobligationtorepairit.27Undercertaincircumstances,however,itwouldbeunreasonabletodemandofadesperatelyneedyinnocentpersonthatherespecteveryone’spropertyrights.Suchanemergencycanmakeitreasonableforthatpersontosteal.Yetthatwouldremainstealing,onlyforgivableorexcusablestealing.Tochangethelegalsysteminlightofthisfactfallsunderthewellknownedictthathardcasesmakebadlaw.Theideaisthatwhenextraordinarycircumstancesaremetwithextraordinarychoices—forexample,cannibalismintheDonnerPartyormurderinanoverloadedlifeboat—theevaluationofthatbehavioroughtnottobegeneralizedtosimilarbehaviorinnormalcircumstances.Indeed,thelegalsystemsofmanysocietiesrespondtosuchcaseswiththeinstrumentofjudicialdiscretion.(Courtssometimesconvictrarecasesofcannibalismperformedunderextremeduress,onlytolaterpardontheconvict.28)Moreover,therearesystemicwaysfortheinnocentpoororhelplesstoobtainsupportwithouttheviolationofanyindividual’srighttoprivateproperty.Theymaynotbeguarantees,butthenneithercouldwelfarefromstatesourcesbeguaranteed,eitherinademocracyoranyothersystem.MichaelOtsukahasarguedthatwealthmightbeobtainedfortheinnocentpoororhelplessfrompunishmentofrichcriminals.29Andearlierhemaintainedthatsuchhelpcouldbeobtainedfromresourcesnotownedbyanyone.30Sonotonlywoulditbewrongtoadjustajusthumancommunitytohelptheinnocentpoororhelplessbyinstitutingsystematicbreachesofprivatepropertyrights,butitwouldbeunnecessaryinordertohelpsuchpersons.31OnereasonthatSterbamaybetemptedtoderivewelfarerightsfromlibertarianismisthatmanylibertarianshavenotpostulatedapriorethicaltheoryfromwhichtheyderivelibertarianism.However,naturalrightslibertarianism,whichistherichestinnormativecontent,doesnotseetheuniversalbasicrightsofhumanbeingsasnormativelyprimary.First,asinLocke,itisnecessarytoidentifyasoundethicsbywhichhumanbeingsoughttoconductthemselvesbeforeonecanidentifyprinciplesofcommunitylife.Second,Ihavearguedthattheethicsofethicalegoism,intermsofwhicheachpersonoughtto(chooseto)strivetolivehisorherlifesoastoaspiretothefullestdevelopmentofone’shumanity,arethebasisforthenaturalrighttoone’slife,libertyandproperty.Furthermore,sinceamorallifeisamatterofachievement,somethingonereachesbyalongseriesofchoices,praiseworthyadherencetoprinciplesofethicspersemaynotbecoerced.Noonemayforciblymakeanotherbehavetherightway-forexample,tobegenerous,charitable,kind,orhelpful.Itmattersnotthattheseareindeedthewaysoneoughtattimestoact—forexample,generously,charitably,kindly.Theprimarygoaloftheethicallifeisself-perfection,self-developmentasagoodhumanbeing,andsocoercivelytobringaboutthegenerousorhelpfulbehavioroftherichoranyoneelseismorallyandoughttobelegallywrong.32TheintegrityoflawThelegalauthoritywithinagivenjurisdictionisakindofrefereewhoseintegrity—whosenatureasthereferee—wouldbesacrificedbyintrudingonthepeacefulchoicesmadebythecitizenry.Thelegalauthorityisonlyconcernedwithmaintainingpeaceandthemaximumabsenceofviolenceagainstindividualrights,andwithno-oneabridgingthoserightswithimpunity.Thatmeansthatifsomeone’srightsareviolated,theculpritatleastgetspunishedforthedeed.Neitherthelegalauthoritiesnoranyoneelsecanalwayspreventtheviolationofrights.Justlikearefereeinabasketballcourtwhocannotalwayspreventtheplayersfrommisbehaving.Butoncetheyhavemisbehaved,adverseconsequencesfollow—theymustgetpenalizedforit.Sosimilarly,thefunctionofthelegalauthority,asthelibertarianseesit,istoprotectagainstandpenalizeviolatorsofindividualrights.\nLIBERTARIANJUSTICE55Asadultsweallhaveequalstatus—noteconomically,notintermsofourbeauty,ourbackgroundorhowniceourparentsarebutintermsofourrights.“Allmenarecreatedequal”doesnotmeanthatwearecreatedequallywise,smart,wealthy,luckyorbeautiful.Itmeansthatweareallequallyinchargeofourlives.InthecaseoftheUSDeclarationofIndependence,whereintheLockeanlibertarianpoliticalstanceisclearlysketchedout,wehaveanexampleofhowtheidealsoftherighttonegativelibertyfunction.TheDeclarationcouldbeusedbyAbrahamLincoln,forexample,soastocriticizetheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,whichtoleratedslavery.BecauseintheDeclarationtherewasnotoleranceofslavery.TheDeclarationwasnotapoliticalinstrumentastheConstitutionwasandstillis,whereinalotofcompromiseswereandarestillbeingmade.TheDeclarationarticulatedanunblemishedvisionofafreesociety.Itmadereferencetounalienablerightstolife,libertyandthepursuitofhappiness,andthefunctionofgovernmenttosecuretheserights.WhatgovernmentsareforThelibertariantheoryofjusticeislaidoutintheDeclaration.Suchjusticeconsistsofrespectingthebasicrightstolife,libertyandthepursuitofhappiness.Andgovernmentaimstomaintainingsuchjusticewhenitsecuresthoserights,protectsthemandactsintermsofthem.Governmentisnotestablishedtodoanythingelse.Nottomanageapostoffice,buildmonuments,runAmtrak,conductAIDSpreventionprograms,maintainparks,forestsandbeachesorundertaketheeducationofchildren.Rather,thedistinctivetaskofgovernmentorthelegalauthoritiesistosecurethebasicrightsthatindividualshave.Thisarisesfromtheimperativetohaveone’srightsprotected,somethingthatmostlikelyrequiresexpertise—dueprocess,forexample,isrequiredintheadministrationoflaws.Libertarianismseestheruleoflawsecuredviathesystemofconstitutionalnegativerightsthatfunctionasasystemofconsistentstandardsofjustice.Incontrasttoasystemofnegativeandpositiverights,whichconflictandthusrequiredemocraticorsomealternativearbitrationamongbasicrights,libertarianjusticereliesonthissystemofrightstoserveasstandardsforadjudicatingconflictingclaimsoflegality.Wecangraspthisdistinctivenessofthelibertarianpolitybyrecallingthat,incontrast,manyconservativesandsocialdemocratsormodernliberalsendorsesuchpublicpoliciesasestablishingminimumwages,socialsecuritysystems,licensingofprofessions,regulationsofindustry,the“warondrugs”,closerunitybetweengovernmentandchurch,andbansonprostitution,gambling,pornographyandothervices.Eachofthesepolicieschampionsanunjustifiedpaternalismandpriorrestraint.Theyalsoriskabandoningtheruleoflawinfavorofwhatwillofteninvolve,intheend,arbitrarinessandlackofobjectivity(becauseofthefrequentresistancetosuchpaternalismandpriorrestraintthatmustbemetwithsanctionsthatarebytheirnatureunjust).Thelibertarianviewofjusticestressesconsistencyandintegrity,andfunctionstodiminishtheroleofthewillofthelegalauthorities.Thisisachievedbylayingdownandmaintainingasystemofinternallyconsistent,compossiblenegativeindividualrightsasthestandardsforlegaladministrationandadjudication.(Thuswhensomecasecomestothehighestcourt,themostbasicquestioniswhetherthevariouspartieshaveengagedintheviolationofsuchrights,andnotwhichofvariousbasicrightsoughttobeprotected.33)Thequestioncanberaisedofcourse,dopeoplereallyhavetheserights?Thatisthemostcontroversialpoliticalquestionaboutthelibertarianpositiononjustice.Oncewehavecorrectlyidentifiedtheserightsitprettymuchfollowsthattheonlytimesomeonemayuseforceagainstanotherperson—whichiswhatthelegalauthoritiessuchasthecourts,police,military,andbureaucracyareprofessionallytrainedtodo—isintheprotectionofthoserights.Butwhatifthosebasic,naturalrightsareallafiction,amyth?Whatiftheyare—ashasbeenclaimedbyphilosophicalluminariesfromJeremyBenthamandKarlMarxtoRichardRorty—nonsense,anideologicalinventionandjustplainlyuntenable,respectively?BenthamthoughtverylittleofthembecausehedistrustedthereasoningfoundinJohnLockeinsupportforbasicindividualrights.Marxthoughttheywerethinlydisguisedideologicaltoolsformaintainingtheruleofthebourgeoisie.AndRortyjustthinkstheyareculture-boundfictionshavingnofoundationsatall.RightsandrelativismSo,clearlyitisprominentlymaintained,inoppositiontolibertarianpoliticaltheory,thattherightsspokenofintheDeclarationofIndependencearecontrivances.Indeed,almostallintellectualswithaccesstoprominentforaconstruebasicindividualrightstolife,libertyandpropertyaseighteenth-centurymyths.Thisviewofrightsisclosetoasimilarpositiononpoliticalprinciplesingeneral,namely,relativism.Whenonehearsitsaid,forinstance,thatforthepeopleofCubasocialismmaybeasoundsystem,whileforthoseintheUSAitmaywellnotbe,oneishearingpoliticalrelativism.Itsaysthatforcertainpeople,relatedtotheirspecialhistoricalsituationorparticulareconomicortechnologicaldevelopment,itisokayforonepartyoradictatortobasicallyruntheirlives.\n56TIBORR.MACHANSomegovernmentofficialsatthe1996Viennaconferenceonhumanrights,fromAfricaandAsia,protestedtheUnitedNations’endorsementoftheveryideaofbasicindividualrightsbecause,theysaid,thatthoseideasdonotapplytotheirsociety.Andthereiswidespreadagreementwiththisideaonthepartofmanypeopleinuniversityphilosophy,politicalscienceandhistorydepartments.WecanciteRichardRortyagainhere,whomaintainsthat“Non-metaphysicians[ofwhomRortyand,byhisaccount,allotherwisemenaremembers]cannotsaythatdemocraticinstitutionsreflectamoralrealityandthattyrannicalregimesdonotreflectone,thattyranniesgetsomethingwrongthatdemocraticsocietiesgetright.”34Isthereananswertothat?Yesthereis,asthelibertarianseesit.Apartfrommetaphysicalissues,therecouldwellbecertainfactsthatremainstableorsteadyinhumanaffairsaslongasthespeciesexistsasadistinctivekindofentity.IfthoseinthefifthcenturyBCweremembersofthehumanspecies,aswerethoseinthenineteenth,arethoseinthetwenty-firstandwillbethoseinthetwenty-thirdcentury,thatfact,ofourmutualhumanity,couldhavecertainethicalandpoliticalimplications.Someprinciplesofethicsandpoliticscouldthenbeuniversalizable,applythroughoutthehumanspecies,includingtheideathateachindividualisasovereignoverhisorherlife.Itisnoeasytasktodemonstratethatthekindofbeingwehumansareimpliescertainnormativeprinciples,butthereisampleevidencethatsuchaninferencecanbedrawnfromwhatweknowofhumans.Ifwedoindeedhaveadistinctivenatureinvolvingthecapacityforcreativethoughtandself-government,asuitablecommunitylifewouldrequirethatthesebasicfactsaboutusbeasfullyaccommodatedaspossible.35Ofcourse,notallthinkersthroughallhistoricalperiodshavestressedtheimportanceofindividualsovereignty.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatindividualsovereigntywasnotrightbackthenorisunimportant,onlythatmanythinkerspaidlittleattentiontoit.Theremaybemanyreasonsforthat.Forexample,giventhatthesethinkerswerepartofaclassofpeoplewhobenefitedfromtreatingmanyothersasifthoseotherscouldbeusedagainst—andthusnotpermittedtofollow—theirownwill,thisisnotsurprising.Pointingouttotheworldthateveryindividualisequallyimportantisnotalwaysinone’svestedinterest.Leadersoftribes,countries,nations,statesandotherpoliticalunitswouldverylikelylosetheirstandingifitweretobecomewidelyknownthattheyarenotentitledtotheirspecialpositions.Individualism,avitalcomponentoflibertarianism,wouldmostlikelybesuppressedevenifitcametolightphilosophically.Itis,thus,noargumentagainsttheuniversalvalidityofthepositionthatinmanysocietiesitisnotprominentlyembracedand,rather,anti-individualistpositionsarethedominanttraditions.But,giventhefactofsomepermanentfeaturesofhumannature,itistrue,amongotherthings,thatnohumanbeingshouldbemadetoservethewillofanotherhumanbeingagainsthisorherchoice.Inotherwords,thatslavery,whetheritisfull-scale,partialorevenminimal,hasalwaysbeenandwillalwaysbewrongwhenitcomestohumanbeings.Itisnoexcusethatinthe1900sorinAthenianGreece,science,economics,sociologyorpoliticsweredifferent.Slaverywaswrongthenanditwaswrong150yearsagoandwillalwaysbeso,aslongasthoseslavesarehumanbeingsorhavethecharacteristicsofhumanbeings,freewillandmoralresponsibilityovertheirlives.Suchaprinciplecouldbecorrectevenifnotwidelyembraced—agreementwithitisn’twhatmakesittrue.UniversalismandlibertarianismTheanti-slaverystanceisanexampleofauniversalpositionthatthelibertarianembraces.Notthatallprinciplesarecomparablywidelyuniversalizable.Forexample,howyoushoulddressorkeepcleanorevenrearyourkidswillchange,basedontechnological,agriculturalandotherdevelopments.Theanswerstovariousparticular,specialquestionsarenotthesameastheywere200or3,200yearsago.Theseanswersdependagreatdealonthevehicleswedrive,thekindofdwellingsinwhichwelive.Giventhesechanges,itwouldbesillytomaintainthatthereisafundamentalprincipleconcerningthosedetails—howweshouldfurnishourapartmentsandsoforth.Thosemattersdependtoomuchoncertainvariableaspectsofhumanlife.Theyincludeagreatdealofwhatmakesupvariousdifferentandequallyvalidhumancultures.Buttherearebasicprinciplestowhichpeoplealludewhentheysaythatcertainvaluesorprinciplesofconductdonotchange.Thereasonforthelibertarianthinkingthisisright,isthathumanbeingsdoremainfundamentallythesamethroughoutallthosetechnologicalandrelatedchanges.Nomatterwhatthechangesmaybe,ourhumanityremainsintact.HumannatureandhumanrightsItisthisideaofouruniversalhumanityandthatcertainnormsofhumaninteractionfollowfromitforcommunitylifethatisimplicitlyacceptedbyhumanrightswatchgroupsgoingfromcountrytocountry,examiningwhethersuchpracticesasslavery,forcedlaborandsuppressionofdissentexist.ItdoesnotmatterwhetheritexistsinChina,Burundi,theUSAorCanada.Thesehumanrightswatchgroupsconsidercertainpracticesandpoliciestobeinexcusablebecauseofthefundamentalhumanityoftheinhabitantsofallthesecommunities.Underlyingtheideaoftheserightstolife,libertyandthepursuitofhappiness—orproperty—isthefactofourhumannature.Andthisnatureisunderstoodtobedistinctivebyvirtueofthebasicfactofourcreativepotentialandourlife-\nLIBERTARIANJUSTICE57sustainingneedtotaketheinitiativeinlife,aswellasthecorrespondingmoralresponsibilitywehaveforlivingourlivesproperly(whateverthatcomesto).Forus,unlikefortherestoftheanimalworld,thereareveryfewinstinctsonwhichwecanrelytoguideusinourlives.Wemustdiscoverhowtoliveandflourish.That’swhyweneededucation—wearenotbornwithsufficientlydetailedgeneticallybuilt-inprogramsthatguideusthroughlifethewayinwhichgeese,catsoreventhehighermammalsare,whodotherightthingnearlyautomatically.Wemustlearnthatwehaveveryfewbuilt-inmeasuresthatsustainourlives.Wehavetolearneverything—howtoeat,talk,walk,driveandthemany,manyfarmorecomplextasksthatamounttolivinghumanlives.Nearlyeverythingwedotolivereasonablysuccessfullyhastobelearned.Soweeithermakegooduseofourmindsorwedon’t.Humanbeingshavethecapacitytogetthemselvesgoingortofailtodoso.Thisisfundamentaltothemall.Unlesstheyarethwartedinthistaskbygovernments,criminalsorinvadingarmies,theyarefreeeithertopayheedtowhattheirlivesrequireornottodosoandthentoactaccordingly.Andtherightconditionfortheirhumanlivesiswhenothersdonotpreventthemfromdoingso.Thewildsandtherestofnon-humanworld—viruses,maddogs,earth-quakes,floods,andsoforth—donotalwaysleaveusinpeace,undisturbedandunharmed,sothatwedooftenfaceterriblehardshipcausedbythem.However,otherpersonscanandoughttorefrainfromimposingthemselvesonuswhenwedonotgiveourpermissionforthemtodoso,namelybyconsistentlyrespectingourrights.Inotherwords,itisrightforusallnottobeintrudedupon,bythosewhohaveachoiceabouthowtheywillact.Thiswillenhanceourchancestomaketheefforttothinkthroughtheproblemsthatfaceusandtoactsoastoreachsolutionstothoseproblems.Insteadofinteractingwithotherscoercively,wewillthenenjoythefruitsofvoluntarycooperativeinteractions,includingcompetingwithothers,tradingwiththemandsoforth.Itisonlysuchacommunityofothersthatissuitabletousall,oneinwhichweasadulthumanbeingsinteractonavoluntarybasis.LibertarianismandcommunityBynomeansdoesthismean,assomecriticsofclassicalliberalismandlibertarianismhavesuggested,36thatcommunitylifeisalientous,quitethecontrary.Peopleflourishbestamongotherpeople.Butonlyiftheseotherpeopledonotthwarttheirfreedom.Wenotonlyhavetherighttobutdefinitelyshouldformclubs,churches,associations,corporationsandthusembarkonthesolutionsofallofourproblemsandtheattainmentofouraspirationsinthecompanyofotherpersons.Butonlyifthisdoesnotinvolvecoercion,compulsion,orsomeotherviolationoftheseotherpersons’sovereignty.ConservativeslikeGeorgeWillandmodernliberalsandcommunitariansuniteagainstthelibertarian,however,ongroundsthathisviewofhumanbeingsistoonarrow.WilljoinsMichaelSandel,claimingthatmuchdamageisdonewhenwedefinehumanbeingsnotassocialbeings—notintermsofmorallyseriousroles(citizen,marriagepartner,parent,etc.)—butonlywithreferencetothewateryideaofasingle,morallyemptycapacityof“choice.”Politicsbecomesempty;citizenship,too.37Butthisisaboguscriticism,repeatedsinceHegelandMarxadvanceditinmoreorlessformidableways,byallthosewhowouldforciblytwistthelivesofpeopletofollowavisionthattheyhavenotfreelyembraced.Ofcourse,humanbeingsare“socialbeings.”ButthisdoesnotmeanwhatMarxmeantbyit,namely,“Thehumanessenceisthetruecollectivityofman.”38Ratheritmeansthathumanbeingsliveandflourishmostinthecompanyofothers.Yetthisissomethingashumanbeingstheymustdobychoicewhentheyreachmaturity,otherwiseitisn’tafullyhumancommunityinwhichtheylive.Forthesocialoptionsavailabletothemarenumerous,somesuitable,somenot.Andtheyareresponsibleformakingtherightchoiceaboutthekindofsocialunionsinwhichtheywillpartake.Andwhentheyarepreventedfromexercisingthischoice,asinatotalitarianstate,violenceisdonetothemevenwhilethoseperpetratingtheviolenceclaimtheyaremerelyreformingthevictimsbysendingthemtoinsaneasylumsorjailingthemforcounter-revolutionaryconduct.Theconditionoffreelychoosinghowtolivetheirownlivesisaquintessentiallyhumanrequirementbasedonthefactthatmoralchoicecannotbesecuredfrommenandwomenwhoarecoercedtoliveeveninwaysthatmaybebestforthem.F.A.Hayekmadethispointasfollows:Thatfreedomisthematrixrequiredforthegrowthofmoralvalues—indeednotmerelyonevalueamongmanybutthesourceofallvalues—isalmostself-evident.Itisonlywheretheindividualhaschoice,anditsinherentresponsibility,thathehasoccasiontoaffirmexistingvalues,tocontributetotheirfurthergrowth,andthenearnmoralmerit.39Hayekalsoarguedthat\n58TIBORR.MACHANThegrowthofwhatwecallcivilizationisduetothisprincipleofaperson’sresponsibilityforhisownactionsandtheirconsequences,andthefreedomtopursuehisownendswithouthavingtoobeytheleaderofthebandtowhichhebelongs.40Humanbeingsareproperlyheldresponsibleforassumingvarioussocialrolesinlife—intheirmarriages,families,polities,etc.—butthisresponsibilityisemptyifnotchosenbythembutimposedonthemcoercivelyby,forexample,anelite.WhatWillsocavalierlyandcallouslyregardsasa“morallyemptycapacityof‘choice’,”is,infact,theabsolutelyindispensableprerequisiteofthemorallife.Inthemakingoftheseandotherchoicesinourlives,wemayormaynotwintheprizeofsuccess.Thereisnoguarantee.Thatisoneofthereasonsthatalibertarianproposesanon-utopianformofcommunity.Suchanarrangementdoesnotpromisetosolveallofourproblems.Itrestsontherecognitionthatfreemenandwomenmightnotsolvetheirproblemsormightdosoinadequately,incompletely.TheymayjustdecidetositandfiddletheirthumbsandwatchTVtalkshowsalldaylong.Thereisplentyofevidenceandcommonsensetosupportthisview.Thereisnoguaranteethatpeoplewilldotherightthingwhentheyarefree.Yetitismorelikelythattheywilldiscovertherightthingtodoiftheyarefree,thaniftheyareregimentedaroundbyotherswhohavetheirownlivestoattendtoand,inanycase,oughttomindtheirownbusiness.Freemenandwomenaremorelikelythanthosewhoaren’tfreetodetecttheconsequencesoftheirownchosenactionsandlearnfromthem.Theirownlivesaremorefamiliartothemthantoothers;theywillexperiencetheadverseconsequencesofirresponsibleconduct,whetherviafailureswithintheirownlivesorfromadversereactionsfromotherswhohavebeeninjuredbythem.Ifalegalsystemconcentratesonretaliationratherthanprevention,thelessonsitcanteachwillnotonlyfollowtheprinciplesofjusticebutalsohaveabetterchanceofregisteringandproducinglessonsforthosewholivewithinitsframework.Priorrestraintisnotonlymorallyandpoliticallyobjectionablebecauseitdoesviolencetoindividualsovereigntyandinvolvespaternalism,butalsobecauseitcontributestowhatIhavedubbedthemoraltragedyofthecommons.Thereintheresultsofirresponsibilityarenottiedtothosewhoperpetrateitbutaredumpedonthecommunityatlarge,includingmanywhoarecompletelyinnocentofanywrongdoing.41Whengovernmentagentsforceustopayaminimumwage,tellushowtorunourbusiness,andtomeetvariousrequirementssoastobecomedoctors,psychologists,orchiropractors,theyaddressanareathatweoughttobelefttoaddressinourvoluntarycooperativegroups.Thesemattersarenotproperlyandfruitfullyaddressedbymeansofregimentationbyothers.Theyarenottobedealtwithbypettyormajortyrannicalpolicies—thatis,bypeoplewhowieldgunseveniftheymeanwell.Thatisthemostfundamentalnotionconcerningpublicpolicy,accordingtothelibertarian.Basedonthisnotionandvariousdetailswelearnfromallfieldsofknowledge,wecanfigureout,also,variouspeacefulwaysofdealingwith,forexample,cloning,education,drugabuse,childraising,mentalhealth,diseasesandallkindsofissueswithwhichlifeconfrontsus.Thesearesomeoftheissuesnotdirectlydealtwithinlibertariantheoryandmustbeleftforotherfieldsthanpoliticstoaddress.Butthereisatleastonepointimpliedbylibertarianismforallareasofsociallife:coercion—whichistosayrightsviolation—isnotsuitedforanypartofit.Itistherighttofreedomofassociationforallpersonswhoarenotcruciallyincapacitatedthatgeneratesthispoint.LibertyincontextAsonemustfillinalotofdetailsinordertolearntheimplicationsofthefundamentalprinciplesofphysicsfordealingwithaparticularareaofthephysicalworld,similarly,inpoliticsthebasicprinciplesdonottelluseverything.Theyprovideabasicframeworkwithinwhichwearerequiredtosolveourproblems.Thatmeansthatifwearetosolveproblemsinsociety,theonlythingstrictlyforbiddeninlawistheviolationofanyone’srights.42Itisthisthatconstitutesthecentraltenetofalibertariantheoryofjusticeandmustguideanylegalorderwhosegoalistoestablish,maintainandfurtherjusticeinhumancommunitylife.Whenimportantendsotherthanjusticeareattainableviatheuseofcoerciveforce,usingsuchforceoffsetsanygainsthatmightbereaped,beitorder,culturalintegrity,spiritualdevelopment,ecologicalharmonyoranyotherendproposed.43AswehavealreadyrecalledwithF.A.Hayek’sobservation,“freedomisthematrixrequiredforthegrowthofmoralvalues.”44,45NOTES1InrecentyearsJamesP.Sterbahasargued,however,thatnearlyallsupposedlydifferenttheoriesofjusticehavebasicelementsfromwhichonlyhiswelfarestatistconceptionwouldfollow.IwilladdresssomeofSterba’spointslaterinthispaper.2InthemainIamconvincedthatanaturallawmethodforidentifyingprinciplesofrightandjusticeiscorrect.SeeTiborR.Machan,“Law,JusticeandNaturalRights,”WesternOntarioLawReview,vol.14(1975)pp.119–30;“EssentialismsansInnerNatures,”\nLIBERTARIANJUSTICE59PhilosophyoftheSocialSciences,vol.10(1980)pp.195–200;“AReconsiderationofNaturalRightsTheory,”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,vol.19(1982)pp.61–72;“AnotherLookatNaturalistEthicsandPolitics,”Cogito,vol.3(1985)pp.75–114;“Metaphysics,EpistemologyandNaturalLawTheory,”AmericanJournalofJurisprudence,vol.31(1986)pp.65–77;and“TowardsaTheoryofNaturalIndividualHumanRights,”NewScholasticism,vol.61,no.1(winter1987)pp.33–78.SeealsoTiborR.Machan,IndividualsandTheirRights(Chicago:OpenCourtPublishingCo.,1989),whereIconsiderseveralofthecentralmethodologicalissuesofnormativepolitical3SeeforexampleChristopherStone,ShouldTreesHaveStanding?,25thedn(DobbsFerryNY:OceanaPublications,1996).4SeeTomRegan,TheCaseforAnimalRights(BerkeleyCA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984).5Forexample,theycontend,amongotherthings,thatanimalshaveinterestsoracertaintypeofconsciousnessandbecauseofthistheymustnotbeusedagainsttheirwill.See,however,TiborR.Machan,“Rights,LiberationandInterests:IsthereaSoundCaseforAnimalRightsorLiberation?”(forthcoming).SeealsoTiborR.Machan,“DoAnimalshaveRights?”,PublicAffairsQuarterly,vol.5(April1991)pp.163–73.6Theexceptionsarelibertarianswhoarepurepositivistsandhavenoaccountofrights.Itshouldalsobenotedthatnormativelibertarianswouldfirstestablishthatsuchrightsexistanddeserverespect.Thentheywouldgoon,asamatteroftheirpoliticalscience,toshowwhysuchrightsoughttobeprotectedandhow—somedefendingananarchist,othersalimitedgovernmentapproach.SeeJohnT.SandersandJanNarveson(eds)ForandAgainsttheState(LanhamMD:Rowman&LittlefieldPublishersInc.,1996).7AmongphilosopherswhosharecrucialelementsofthisviewwecanlistSocrates,Aristotle,Augustine,Aquinas,Descartes,Spinoza,Kant,Wittgeinstein,and,ofcourse,AynRand,whohasspawnedperhapsthemostphilosophicallypotentargumentsforlibertarianjustice.(Tobesure,Randdidnotcallherselfalibertarianbut,morefundamentally,anobjectivist.Yettheconclusionsshereachedinthesphereofpoliticsarelibertarianones.)8Forhowmuchinlawandpublicpolicyispromptedbytheseandrelated(mis)conceptionsofjustice,seeThomasSowell,TheQuestforCosmicJustice(NewYork:TheFreePress,1999).ButseealsoAmartyaSenandMarthaCravenNussbaum(eds)TheQualityofLife:StudiesinDevelopmentEconomics(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1993)wherejusticeasfairnessorequalityischampionedbythecontributorsandeditors.Interestingly,manyoverlookthefactthatJohnRawls,inhisATheoryofJustice(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971),whileendorsingjusticeasfairness,alsosupportscertainbasicrightsasprimaryoverdistributivejustice.Andheallows,also,thatunfairnessisacceptablewhenitresultsinoverallbetterment.SomelibertarianseveninvokeRawlsbecausetheyclaimthefreemarketsystem,forexample,producesjustthatresult.9Forhowthisappliestoacommunity’smilitarypolicy,seeTiborR.Machan,“DefendingaFreeSociety,”JournalofValueInquiry,vol.33,no.4(December1999)pp.451–5.10Thismaybeoverstatingthepointabit.Aswithotherschoolsofthought,especiallyinnormativedisciplines,therearedistinctsub-schoolsinlibertarianism.Whiletheirconclusionsregardingpoliticsandpublicpolicytendtobenearlyidentical,thepathstheytaketoarriveatthemdiffer.Minewillbethenaturallaw,naturalrightspath,ifonewishestoputasuccinctlabeltoit(seenote2formoreonthis).11Conservativesaren’tunitedsomuchondoctrineasonwaystothinkaboutnormativematters.Theyholdthathowwedecideourinstitutions,lawsandpracticesshouldbegroundedintradition:whathasworkedinthepast,whathasbeentriedandfoundtrue.12AynRandnotedthisalongtimeago—shesuggested,thereby,thatmetaphysicshasagooddealofimpactonpublicpolicy.(Theright’sidealismandtheleft’smaterialismtendtodictatewhatistobecontrolled.)SeeAynRand,Philosophy:WhoNeedsIt?(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1982),whereshenotesonpages228–9:Yetitistheconservatives…whoproclaimthesuperiorityofthesouloverthebody…andtheliberalswhoarepredominantlymaterialist,whoregardmanasanaggregateofmeat….Thisismerelyaparadox,notacontradiction:eachcampwantstocontroltherealmitregardsasmetaphysicallyimportant;eachgrantsfreedomonlytotheactivitiesitdespises.Someotherlibertarianorcapitalistpoliticaleconomistsandtheoristsdonotsharetheviewthatmetaphysicsmattersmuchinpoliticaltheory.Idisagreewiththisbutleavethematteruntreatedfornow.13MuchinkhasbeenusedindebatingwhethertheUSConstitutionprizesprivacy,buttheclaimthatonlyiftheexacttermisusedexplicitlywoulditdosocanberejectedbyreferencetothecounseloftheNinthAmendmenttotheUSConstitutionandtheuseof“privateproperty”intheFifth.Onewhodrawsbackintohisprivatepropertyenjoysprivacythereby.14Ofcourse,whatconstitutesourlivesiscontroversial.SomecommunitarianssuchasCharlesTaylorwouldinsistthatwebelongtoourcommunitiesandthustheliveswehavearenotactuallyours.SeeCharlesTaylor,PhilosophyandtheHumanSciences,vol.2(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985),p.188.HereTaylorspeaksapprovinglyof“aprinciplewhichstatesourobligationasmentobelongtoorsustainsociety,orasocietyofacertaintype,ortoobeyauthorityoranauthorityofacertaintype.”IaddressthisissueindetailinTiborR.Machan,ClassicalIndividualism(London:Routledge,1998),chapter14.15IwishtonoteherethatpaceTaylorandothers,itisnotthecasewithallclassicalliberalorlibertarianpoliticalpositionsthatbasicrightsarenormativelyfundamental.EvenforLocke,whomTayloraccusesofholdingthisidea,certainnaturallaws,ethicalprinciples,arepriortoanyindividualrights,onesthatarisefromtheselawsoncewebecomeconcernedwithoursocialrelations.16Insomedrasticcasesprivateindividualsmaygainmoraljustificationtodisregardthoseborders.Formoreonthis,seeTiborR.Machan,“PrimaFaciev.Natural(Human)Rights,”JournalofValueInquiry,vol.10,no.1(1976)pp.119–31.SeealsoEric\n60TIBORR.MACHANMack,“EgoismandRights,”ThePersonalist,vol.54(1971)pp.5–33;and“EgoismandRightsRevisited,”ThePersonalist,vol.58(1977)pp.282–8.WhenSterbaclaimsitisunreasonabletorequirethoseindirestraitstorespecttheprivatepropertyrightsofthosewhocouldbailthemoutoftheirtrouble,heisimplicitlyendorsingaformofethicalegoism.Yetifheuniversalizesthisethicalposition,ashesurelymust,thosewiththecapacitytohelpalsooughttostrivetoadvancetheirowninterestanddosoasamatterofchoice.Thismayincludehelpingthoseindirestraits,asIargueinTiborR.Machan,Generosity:VirtueinCivilSociety(WashingtonDC:CatoInstitute,1998).Butifsuchgenerosityistohavemoralsignificance,itmustbevoluntary,notcoerced,asSterbaproposesviahistheoryofpositiverights(i.e.proposesthattherightsoftheneedybeprovidedforbythosewhoareabletodothis—whichwould,viataxation,involvecoercingthelattertomaketheprovisions).17Thisisaproblematicconcept.WhenIsellmycarforaverylowprice,thismayleadotherpersonstolowertheirs.Butnotunavoidably.Theyarenotforcedtodosobutchoosetodothisoftheirownfreewill.IfIbecomedrunkorotherwisealtermyselfwithdrugs,othersmaychoosenottoassociatewithmenorfollowmylead.Butagain,thisisnotunavoidable—theyarefreeagentsintheprocess.Beinginfluencedandbeingforcedaresignificantlydifferentfromthemoralpointofview.18NormanMalcolm,LudwigWittgenstein:AMemoir(London:VanNostrandRineholdCo.,1970)pp.31–2.19Theconcept“sovereign”relates,historically,tosupremeruleoversomerealm,includingthoseattachedtothatrealm.Onlywiththeemergenceofindividualismwoulditbeappliedtoself-ruleorself-governance.SeeJ.D.P.Bolton,Glory,Jest,andRiddle:AStudyoftheGrowthofIndividualismfromHomertoChristianity(NewYork:Barnes&Noble,1973).20Someexceptionsincludewhenapersonhasbecomecruciallyincapacitated.Eveninthecaseofpunishingcriminals,itisarguablefromthelibertarianpositionthatthecriminalshavechosenorimplicitlyconsentedtobepunished,giventherationalimplicationoftheircriminalconduct.21IdiscussthoseinTiborR.Machan,Initiative:HumanAgencyandSociety(StanfordCA:HooverInstitutionPress,2000)chapter2.Thereis,briefly,freedomofthewill,freedomfromnaturalimpedimentstodevelopment,freedomfromintrusionsbyotherpersons,andsoforth.22See,formoreonthis,TiborR.Machan,“IsThereARighttoBeWrong?”InternationalJournalofAppliedPhilosophy,vol.2(1985)pp.105–9.23Forastatementoftheviewthatonehasnorighttobewrong,seeTalScriven,“Utility,AutonomyandDrugRegulation,”TheInternationalJournalofAppliedPhilosophy,vol.2(1984)pp.27–42.24RobertSpeamann,“TheOntologyof‘Right’and‘Left’,”inReinerSchuermann(ed.)ThePublicRealm(AlbanyNY:SUNYPress,1990)p.148.25Sterbahasadvancedhisviewsinmanyforums,includinghisintroductiontoabookheedited,Justice:AlternativePerspectives(BelmontCA:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1991);severalpapersforscholarlyjournalssuchasTheJournalofSocialPhilosophy,SocialTheoryandPracticeandEthics;hiscontributiontothevolumeheorganized,MoralityandSocialJustice(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1995);anothervolumeheedited,SocialandPoliticalPhilosophy(BelmontCA:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1995);andhissingle-authorvolumeonpoliticalphilosophy,ContemporaryPoliticalandSocialPhilosophy(BelmontCA:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1995).ForsomereactionstoSterbaotherthanthosecomingfromlibertarianpoliticaltheoristssuchasDouglasB.Rasmussen,EricMackandJanNarveson,see,forexample,RuthSample,“LibertarianRightsandWelfareRights,”SocialTheoryandPractice,vol.24,no.3(1998)pp.393–418.26Sterbacallsthis“surpluswealth”buthedropsthecrucialcontextofthatconcept,namely,Marxianeconomicanalysis.27LesterH.Hunt,“AnArgumentAgainstaLegalDutytoRescue,”JournalofSocialPhilosophy,vol.36(1994);andEricMack,“BadSamaritarianismandtheCausationofHarm,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,vol.9(Spring1980)pp.230–59.28Iamtold,however,thatinsomepartsofFrancewhenapersonindirestraitsstealssoastoobtainfood,thereisadefensetotheeffectofnecessitythatexculpatestheaccused.Iamnotfamiliarwiththedetailsandcanonlyassumethatthisisforextraordinarycasesandhasnotgeneratedageneralrighttotakefromthosewhohavebythosewholack.Inanycase,itshouldnot.29MichaelOtsuka,“MakingtheUnjustProvidefromtheLeastWellOff,”TheJournalofEthics,vol.2(1998)pp.247–59.30MichaelOtsuka,“Self-OwnershipandEquality,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,vol.27(1998)pp.65–92.31Theonlyseriousexceptionwouldbeorphanedorseverelyneglectedchildren,althoughwiththeconsiderabledemandforadoptionsandthegeneralcompassionmostpeoplehaveforchildren,itdoesn’tseemlikelythatunfortunatechildrenwouldfailtofindsufficientsupportfortheirflourishinginafreesociety.(IthankRandallR.Dipertforraisingthisissuetome.)32Foradevelopmentofthecaseforthekindofrobustethicalegoismorindividualismthatsupportsapoliticalsystemofnaturalrights,seeMachan,ClassicalIndividualism.33Incontrast,theUnitedNationsDeclarationofHumanRightsisasystemofmutuallyexclusivebasicrights.Therighttofreedomofchoice,forexample,competeswithsuchmeasuresastherighttohealthcare,wheretheoneortheothermustbeselectedassuperior,requiringtheauthoritiestoselectwhich.34RichardRorty,“TheSeerofPrague,”TheNewRepublic,1July1991,pp.35–40.ForRorty,non-metaphysicsoranti-foundationalismisthecorrectpositiontotakeonanyphilosophicalissue,includingmoralityandpolitics.Thegistofthispositionisthatwhatguidessoundthinkingisnotsomeargumentthatissoundindependentlyofsomeperspectiveorcommunity,butone’scommunity’sframework.Andno-onecanescapehisorhercommunity’sframeworksoastogetattheultimatetruthofthings.Ergo,nojudgmentastowhichcommunity’sframeworkisbetterispossible,exceptasanexpressionofcommunitypreference.SeeRichardRorty,Objectivity,Relativism,andTruth(London:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991),especiallytheessays“SolidarityversusObjectivity”and“ThePriorityofDemocracyoverPhilosophy.”35Formydevelopmentoftheseelementsofaversionoflibertarianism,seeTiborR.Machan,IndividualsandTheirRights(LaSalleIL:OpenCourtPublishingCo.,1989).\nLIBERTARIANJUSTICE6136SeeforexampleThomasS.Spragens,“TheLimitationsofLibertarianism,”TheResponsiveCommunity(1992).SeealsoAmitaiEtzioni,TheSpiritofCommunity(NewYork:Morrow,1995).ButseeAeonSkoble,“AnotherCaricatureofLibertarianism,”ReasonPapers,no.17(1992).37GeorgeWill,“WhatCourtsAreTeaching,”Newsweek,7December1998,p.98.38KarlMarx,“OntheJewishQuestion,”inD.McLellan(ed.)SelectedWritings(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1977)p.126.39F.A.Hayek,“TheMoralElementinFreeEnterprise,”inMarkW.Hendrickson(ed.)TheMoralityofCapitalism(Irvington-on-HudsonNY:TheFoundationforEconomicEducation,1992)(originallywrittenforTheFreeman,1962).40F.A.Hayek,“SocialismandScience,”inChiakiNishiyamaandKurtR.Leube(eds)TheEssenceofHayek(StanfordCA:HooverInstitutionPress,1984)p.118.41SeeMachan,ClassicalIndividualism,whereIdiscusswhatIhavedubbed“themoraltragedyofthecommons,”acircumstanceinwhichwehavenowaytodifferentiatebetweenthegoodandevildeedsofdifferentindividuals;theyallgetmixedupwithoneanotherandthusleadtotheperpetuationoftheprocessofwrongdoing.Neitherblamenorcreditcanbetakeninthecaseofsuchdumping.Thegoodthatpeopledowillnotbeasourceofself-esteem,northeevilasourceofguilt.(p.49)42Andbecausepeopleoftenresisttheseimplicationsandevendenythem,thedrawingofthembecomesmuchmorecontroversialthandrawingouttheimplicationsofasoundtheoryofthephysicaluniverse.43Atthisstageofourdiscussionitwillbeusefultopointoutthattherearelibertarianpoliticaltheoristswhowouldseriouslydisagree,andargueinsteadthatif,say,socialismproducedabettereconomiclifeforall,libertarianismwouldhavetobeconsideredundesirableincomparison.Thenaturalrightslibertariandoesnot,ofcourse,arguethatsocialismwillorislikelytopromoteeconomicwell-being.Butnaturalrightslibertarianismholds,inpart,thatitisbecauseofthenatureofhumanlifethatthisissoandthatwecanhave,accordingly,confidenceinlibertarianpoliticsasamatterofprinciple,notmerelyasapragmatictool.44Hayek,“TheMoralElementinFreeEnterprise.”45IwishtothankRandallR.Dipertforhiscriticalcommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.\n5LETTINGPEOPLEBEPEOPLEANDTHERIGHTTOPROPERTYJanNarvesonIntheminorityviewaboutpropertyandincomethatIshallbegenerallydefendinghere,mostcontemporarygovernmentsarepursuingthewrongpolicies,andweareallverymuchtheworseoffasaresult.Thosepoliciesareverymuchinfluencedbythephilosophyofequalityanditsentailedcollectiveoverseeingofoureconomiclivesthatisbyfarthemajorityviewamongcontemporaryphilosophers,andnotablybyJamesP.Sterba.If,asIthink,theyareindeedwrong,it’sobviouslyprettyimportant.1Thesubjectofjusticeistherightuseofforceagainstindividuals:whatdowegettomakeourfellowsdo,whethertheylikeitornot?Libertarianismisthepositionthatnoonemayuseforce(orfraud,whichItaketobeaspecialcaseofforce)againstanyonewhohasnothimselfinitiateditagainstanyoneelse.Soweareconfinedtousingforcetocombatforce,including,whereneeded,tocorrectpreviouswrongfulusesofit.Byextremecontrast,egalitarianstellusthatforcemaybeusedtoequalizepeople’sfortunesandcircumstances.Thepoorshouldbeshoredupwiththemoneyoftherich,theenergeticandcapablerequiredtoworkfortheincapableandlessenergetic,thehealthyforthesick,andsoon.Onthefaceofit,itisdifficulttoseehowanyonecanthinktobetalkingof“reconciliation”betweensuchoppositeviews,andquiteclearthatthatisnotwhatSterbadoes.Instead,hethinkshecanshowthatlibertariansshouldbesocialistsafterall;thereconciliationconsistsindeclaringoneofthepartiestobewrong.Whetherheisrightaboutthat,ofcourse,isthebasicquestion.1LibertyastheindicatedchoiceChoosinggeneralaltruismoregalitarianismorRawls’maximinprinciple,asmostpeopleunderstandit,isnotwhatwecanexpectfromanappealtothereasonofall.Whatthereisageneralcasefor,though,isnotdoingthingsthatworsenthesituationsofourinteractees.Weshouldallconstrainourpursuitofourinterestsinsuchawaythatweconfineourselvestobehaviorthatdoesnotleavetheotherfellowworseoff,insofarasthatispossible.Anditalmostalwaysispossible.Butthismeansthatwemustrejectegalitarianandmyopicallyaltruisticprinciples,forthosewilloftenrequireagentstodowhatworsenstheirownsituations,forthesakeofothers,andwithoutcompensation.SimilarlyforRawls’DifferencePrinciple,whichapparently2requiresthetalented,energeticandproductivetosacrificetheirgainsforthesakeofimprovingthelotoftheworseoff.Noneofthesemakesrationalsensetoallthepartieswhosebehaviorweareattemptingtodirectbymeansoftheseprinciples.Thelibertarianentersthediscourseatthispointbysuggestingthatthereisoneespeciallygreatprobleminhumanrelations,andonethatissusceptibletosolutionatthehandsofthesortofinstitutionthatmoralityis.Thatproblemistheuseofcoerciveforceinhumanaffairs,thetendencyforAtogethiswayattheexpenseofBinsteadofwithB’svoluntarycooperation.Thelibertariancallsuponustoforegothoseadvantagesthatwemighttrytogainbytakingadvantageofcertainlibertieswhich,viewedinisolation,maylookgood,butwhich,onreflection,weseetobethesourcesofmoreevilthangood.IfIamfreetogainbyinflictingdamageonothers,itappearsatfirstthatIcandobetterthanifIlackedsuchfreedom.ButwhenIreflectthatotherscanplaythisgameaswellasI,Ihadbetterthinktwiceaboutit.PerhapsIcangainfromkillingyou,yes;butthen,youorsomeoneelsecangainfromkillingme,ormybrother,andthenwherearewe?Theanswer,inshort,isthatweareatwar,andverymuchworseoffthanifinsteadwecouldbeatpeace.Therationalthingtodoistoswearoffthisliberty,providedothersdosoaswell.Thespecialfeatureofthelibertarianviewliesinitsassessmentofpreciselyhowthoseotherscount.Itsconcerniswiththeuseofinterpersonallyadministeredforceinhumanaffairs.Force,usedagainstotherwiseinnocentpersons,defeatscooperation,makesenemiesofus.Butcooperationisthegreatengineofprosperityandsecuregoodlivingforall.Withcooperationwecanhavenotonlybread,buttwohundredkindsofit,alongwithpizzas,computers,balletproductions,institutionsofhigherlearning,andinnumerableothergoodsthatcanexistonlybytheconcertedeffortofmanypeople.Forcecancelsthegoodoftheseefforts.Inbeingforcedtodosomething,AnolongerworksforwhatAseestobegood.Thestingsofthewhip,thedeprivationsofthethiefandthetaxman,diminishthevalueofeffortintheeyesofthosewhoexertit.That\nLETTINGPEOPLEBEPEOPLE63someothersbenefitfromthem,iftheydo,isnoconsolationtotheindividualsubjecttotheseincursions.IfIlikedthosepeoplethatmuch,Iwoulddothingsforthemwithoutbeingforcedto.Multiplythatbyseveralbillion,andthepointisclear.Philosophiesthatimposeburdensthatarenotalso,onthewhole,beneficialtothoseimposedonareantitheticaltosociallife,andthus,itseemstome,ofhumanlife.Butwhentheywouldbebeneficial,whywouldtheyneedtobeimposed?ThisbringsustothesortofviewsthatSterbaandothersfriendlytoequalityhaveadvocated.Suchtheoriespermitustoimposeonmillionsandbillionsofpeopleinordertoshoreuptheprospectsoftheremainder.Howcansuchviewsbereconciledwiththephilosophyofcooperationthatistheessenceofthesocialcontract?“Reconciliation”seemsoutofthequestion—itseemslikereconcilinggoodandevil.Thelibertarian’sboldproposal,whichIstateinterminologyduetoDavidGauthier,3isthatweproscribe,acrosstheboard,allandonlybehaviorthatworsens,onbalance,thesituationsofothersinthecourseoftryingtobetterthesituationoftheagent.Therearetwoqualifications:first,theproscriptionappliesprovidedthattheothersinquestiondonotthemselvesfallafoulofit;andsecond,itapplies,assumingthattheagentcancomplywithoutsubstantiallyworseninghisownsituationintheprocess.Notealsothat“onbalance”doesnotmeanthatweaddupthegainstosomeandweighthemagainstlossestoothers,àlautilitarianism,oràlaconservatism.Instead,itmeansthateachindividualuponwhomourbehaviorimpingesmustbesuchthatonbalanceshereckonsherselftobenoworseoffforourimpingement.Ifageneralproscriptiononworseningofothers’situationsisenvisaged,thenthereisaparticularclassofother-regardingintereststhatwecannotcountasa“goodtoothers,”morallyspeaking,howeverwelcomeitmaybetoitsimmediatelyintendedrecipient.Thisclassconsistsofwhatwemaycallnegativelyother-regardinginterests.IfSueisSam’senemy,andshewouldbedelightedathishavingtoendurecertainevils,thenwecansatisfythisinterestofSue’sonlyattheexpenseofSam.Sinceourprincipleforbidsallworseningsofothers’situations,however,italsoforbidsthisone.Malevolentinterestsarenongrata.Itwillbenotedthatthereachofthislastrestrictionisprofound.Consider,forexample,moralegalitarianism,whichrequiresustobringitaboutthateveryonehasaboutthesameamountofsomething.Whatifweonlyachievethisbytakingitfromsomewhoalreadyhaveit?Thefactthatwethereupongiveittootherswhodonothaveitmakesnodifference:wehaveactedattheexpense,tothedetriment,ofthe“haves,”andourproposedprincipleproscribessuchaction.Iftheproposedgeneralrighttolibertyistoberespected,wemustpursueequalityinsomeotherway.Theprincipleadvocatedhereisknownas“libertarianism”becausetheinflictionofevilsonothersarecurtailmentsintheirpursuitoftheirpreferredvalues,henceoftheirliberty.Inflictedevilskeeponefromdoingwhatonewants,whichistopursuethegoodlifeasoneseesit.Giventhatourcriterionforassessinggoodandevilisliberal,notconservative,Jonesbenefits,intherelevantsense,onlyifJonespreferstheputativebenefittoitsabsence,inthecircumstances.Jonesisatliberty,sociallyspeaking,insofarasothersrefrainfrominterferingwithhisintentionallyadoptedlineofactivity.InvadingJones’bodycountsasaninterferencewithhis“liberty”inthatitgoesagainstwhathewantsforhimself:itimposeswhatheseestobeacost.Manythingsbesidestheactionsofotherscankeepusfromdoingwhatwewouldlike,butmoralityonlyconcernstheactionsofagents.Thereisnopointissuingmoralrulesandproscriptionstomountains,trees,tigers,oramoebas.Now,someproposethatJonesisnotatlibertyunlessexternalthingsareinoneconditionratherthananother—e.g.heisamoeba-free.Butthereplytothatisthatsuchthingsarerelevanttomoralsonlyiftheimplicationisthatsomebodyelseistodosomethingaboutit.Atthatpoint,however,werunupagainstthefactthatthesomebodyinquestionmaynotbeinclinedtodothethinginquestion.ShemaynotcareaboutJones,ormayfindthecostmorethansheiswillingtopay.Ifso,thenforcinghertodoitisimposingonher,andthatisproscribedbyourgeneralproposal.Whyacceptthegeneralproposal?Theansweristhatwecanallbecertainthatwewillallgainfromitsgeneralobservance,ascomparedwiththesituationwecanexpectinitsabsence.Thisisnottrueofanyothermoralproposal.Forexample,itisnottrueofaproposaltotheeffectthat“allneedsmustbesatisfied.”Forthosecalledupontosatisfythemmaynotwanttodothat,fortheymayfindthecostexcessive.ItmaybeclaimedbythetheoristthatMsSmithneedsx“less”thanMrJonesdoes,butthatdoesn’tmeanthatsheishappytosurrenderxtoministertoJones.AndifshefindsthecostofministeringtoJonesexcessive,thenitisexcessive,givenliberalism.Onlyifreciprocationisreasonablyexpected,ataleveljustifyingthecostofcateringtoothers’needs,isthereabasisforexpectingitfrompersonswhosesympathieswillnototherwisemotivatethemtocatertotheneedsinquestion.Anditisreasonabletosupposethatinmanycasesneitherofthoseconditionswillobtain.Itisthereforeunreasonabletoinsistthatmoralityincludeverystrongrequirementsofaidtoothers.Ifweseekarationalmorality,itmustbeconsistentwiththefacts.2MutualaidThisisnottosaythatthereisnobasisforanyamountofrequirementtohelpothers.Thereis,Ithink,areasonablebasisforsomesuchprincipleasthefollowing.IfAcanprovideaverylargebenefit,X,toB,atverylowcosttoA,andXisabenefit\n64JANNARVESONofageneraltypesuchthat(1)otherscouldpossiblyprovideittoA,(2)itisprobablethatatleastoccasionallyAislikelytobeinapositionofnothavingXandthathavingXwouldbehighlybeneficialtoA,and(3)inthecircumstancesAcouldonlygetXbytheuntransacted-forvoluntaryassistanceofothers,thenAoughttoprovideXtoB.4Ishallcallthistheprincipleof“mutualaid.”Itistobeemphasizedthatthisisnotanacross-the-boarddutytohelpothers,andnotanenforceabledutyofjustice.Butitisnontrivial,andIbelieveitstates,insuitablyimpreciseterms,aprinciplethatvirtuallyeveryonedoesactuallyacceptinday-to-dayencounterswithotherpeople.ItistobeemphasizedthatthemutualaidprincipleisnotthatAistodogoodtoBprovidedthatBhimselfdoesalikegoodtoA.Itis,rather,aprincipletoenterintoageneralsocialnetinwhich,thoughwemayneveragainseethepersonwehelponoccasionO,yetwetoowilllikelybethebeneficiaryofneededassistancefromotherstrangersatothertimes.Itisaprincipleofgeneralizedsocialreciprocity,notamatterofat-the-timetransactions.Weshouldalsobegratefultothosewhohelpus,andexpressourgratitudeinsomewayifwecan—ifnomorethanbysaying“thankyou.”Itis,Ithink,quiteclearthatwearejustifiedinsayingdemeaningthingsaboutthosewhosignallyfailtoobservetheprincipleofmutualaid.Butitisalsoquiteclearthatwearejustifiedinnormallydoingratherlittletohelpothers,exceptonabasisofagreedexchange,asincommerce.3Sterba’sscenarioofrichandpoorSterbaarguesthatthewell-offhaveanenforceableduty,adutyofjustice,toallow“starvingpoorpersonsunabletofindwork”totakefromtheir“surplus.”Hedoesthisonthegroundthatotherwise,thosepeoplearebeingdeniedaliberty,namely“theliberty…nottobeinterferedwithintakingfromthesurpluspossessionoftherichwhatisnecessarytosatisfytheirbasicneeds.”5Ihavepreviouslypointedout6thatthisgoesagainsttheplainmeaningofthelibertarianprinciple.Thelibertytotake,fromanyinnocentperson,simplyisnotanavailablelibertyinthelibertarianscheme,foritinvolvesaviolationofthatprincipleinthefirstplace.Thepoor,intakingfromtherich,arecommandeeringthelatter’senergiestotheirownpurposes,withoutcompensation,whichisplainlycontrarytotherequirementthatallrefrainfromimposingonothers.Somemightarguethatthewell-offarecompensatedbyparticipatinginasysteminwhichtheyinvoluntarilysupportthosewhocannotsupportthemselves.Howwouldthisbeso,though?Themostlikelyreplyisthattheytherebyavoidasortofwar:feed’emandtheywon’tbotheryou!Thisappearstobeexactlythesamesortofreasoningthathasmotivatedappeasementstrategiesdownthroughtheages.Anditarguablydoesn’twork.Butwhetheritdoesornot,whatisthebasisforit?Whatanyonereceivesinreturnforhiscommittinghimselftopeacefulrelationswithothersis—peacefulrelationswithothers.Whyshouldanyone,richorpoor,beabletoclaimahigherpricethanthat?Tosaythatsomeoneisentitledtosuchaclaimis,ofcourse,toincorporateexploitationintherelationship.Theunableexploitthemoreable:“youfeedusforfree,orwehityou!”Whyshouldanyonethinkthatthatconstitutesjustice?Therehave,tobesure,beenafewanswerstothat,ofsorts.Mostsimplyconsistinanunconsideredassumptionof“egalitarianism.”Butsomethinkthereisanargumentforit,usuallyofthe“therebutforthegraceofGodgoI!”variety.Thebright,talented,energetic,creative,and,ingeneral,productivedidnot,itwillbesaid,deservetobesuch.Noproblemthere.Butwhatofit?Well,itisthensaid,thereforewedon’tdeserveourtalentsanymorethantheuntalented,etc.,deservethelowleveloftalentstheypossess.Letusagreewiththatalso.Still,whatofit?Itseemsthategalitariansthinkthatitsomehowfollowsthattherichshouldsharetheirgoodfortunewiththepoor.Butitdoesn’t.Allthatfollowsisthatnobodycanbesaidtodeservetobethepersonheorsheis.Thisbeingso,ifwearetohavesomebasisfor“rewarding”somepeople,it’sgoingtohavetobesomethingotherthanthefactthattheydeservetobethepeopletheyare.Noproblemthere,either.Whatweinfactrewardpeopleforistheircontributionstowhateveritiswethinkisvaluable,andthismightbeeasyordifficultforthosewhosocontribute,butwedon’tbasicallycarewhichitis.Wepreferthemoreefficient,themoreproductive,becauseweareinterestedinwhattheyproduce,andnothowitisthattheyareultimatelycapableofproducingit.Whatmotivatesmostofustoassistthepoor,thehelplessandtheunfortunateisgeneralhumansympathy,whichmostofushaveinappreciablequantities.Whyshouldwegettoexploitourfellowmembersoftheproductiveclassbyexactingfromthemasa“duty”theirassistanceincateringtotheunfortunatepersonswedecidetohelp?Tobesure,itwouldbequiteotherwiseifitwasourfaultthatthepoorarepoor.Manytheoriststendtotalkasifpoorpeoplearepeoplewhohavebeendonedownandexploitedbyothers,the“rich.”Andprobablytherearesomecasesinwhichsomethingofthesortmayhavehappened,thoughitisveryfarfromtypical.Muchmorelikely,however,inthesortofcasesSterbamayhavehadinmind,isthatthepersonsinquestionlackedacombinationofemployableskills,enterpriseinseekingwork,theabilitytomakeoneselfpresentableenoughtoinduceemployerstohirethem,andthelike.ItistothesecasesthatSterba’sclaimmustbecentrallyaddressed.InthecasewhereAdeliberatelyimpoverishesB,AmayoweBcompensation.InthecasewhereimpoverishedBissoduetosheerfailuretoexerthimselfwhenhecouldhavedoneso,againSterbaisnotinsistingthatweoweBthedutyinquestion.\nLETTINGPEOPLEBEPEOPLE654TherightofprivatepropertyInallthis,Ihavetalkedasiftheownershipofvariousthings,bysomepersonstotheexclusionofothers,isunproblematic.Therearethosewhodenythis,however.Someofthesedenierswouldnodoubtrejecttheideaofafoundationformorality.Amongthosewhodon’trejectit,somesuccumbtobadargumentsofthekindjustnoted.Buttheseriousquestioniswhetherageneralprincipleofthesortespouseddoesinfactupholdarightofprivateproperty.Iclaimthatitdoesindeeddoso.Thegeneralrighttodoaswewill,providedonlywenotinvadeandworsenothers,isallweneed.Fromtheretoprivatepropertyisashortstep,givenoneassumption:thatinacquiringsomepreviouslyuntouchedbitoftheworld,theacquirerdoesnotipsofactorelevantlyworsenthesituationofotherswho,perhaps,comehistoricallylater.Thereplytothismeritsalengthierdiscussionthancanbeundertakenhere,buttheshortofitisthis.First,thereis,onthecontractarianview,nobasiswhateverfortheideathatotherpeoplehavesomekindofbasicclaimontheworld,independentlyofwhattheyactuallydo.Second,theclaimthatifAgetsx,thenBdoesnot,istruebutirrelevant,sinceitistrueofeveryoneinrelationtoeverything,always.Nothingfollows,therefore.Zero-sumgames,sofarastheygo,havenosolutionsacceptabletoallparties,bydefinition.Finally,andperhapsmosttothepoint,propertyforA,andmoregenerallythesystematicrighttoacquireitbyworkingorbygettingitvoluntarilyfromsomeoneelsewhointurngotitbywork,etc.,isbeneficialtoB,notmerelytoA.Thisdoesbringustoaproblemaboutreal-worldethicsversusabstractpossibilities.Idenythatintheabstractlycharacterizedcase,wehaveanenforceabledutytothepoor.ButIneedalsotopointoutthatintherealworld,especiallythatofNorthAmericatoday,thepictureofraggedandstarvingpersonsunabletofindworkisessentiallyunreal.Ithasnothingtodowiththepresent-day“poor”incontemporaryAmerica,orinanyfirst-linecountryintheworld.Foronething,thereisaseriousproblemofdefinitionhere,sincetheofficiallypooraresobyvirtueofhavingearnedincomesoflessthansomequitehighamount(incomesinthehighteensofthousands,forexample)asspecifiedbypoliticiansandbureaucrats.Moreover,thecriteriaforpoverty-levelincomearedrawnnarrowly,sothatinfacttheAmericanpoormanagetospendabouttwicewhattheyallegedlyearn.Ifyoulookatwhattheyhave,ratherthanwhatpoliticianssayaboutthem,theAmericanpoorareinfactbetteroffintheusual“material”terms,asagroup,thanthecitizenryasawholeinothercountries—notjustThird-Worldones.Theyhavemorecars,TVs,electricranges,housingspace,andsoonandon,thantheaveragecitizensofotherfirst-linecountries,nottomentionthoseintheSecondandThirdWorlds.Ifthisis“poverty,”itiscertainlynotwhatSterbaistalkingaboutinhisexamples.7Ifwesubstituteslogansforthoughtandresearchonthesematters,ofcourse,itiseasytoseethatwewouldhaveanargumentinnameonly,andonenotlikelytobesettledbysuchmeans.Butwelfare-stateenthusiastsuninterestedinthefactsarelivinginafool’slimbo(hardlya“paradise,”afterall).SincemuchoftherealincomeofcontemporaryAmerican“poor”peoplecomesfromthestate,tobesure,thereisthequestionhowtheywouldbedoingifthestateweren’tsodeeplyinvolvedintheirlives.Thisisaquestionofeconomicanalysis,withaconsiderableburdenofproof.Butifweallowabitofcommonsenseaswellasreasonablefamiliaritywiththecurrenteconomicfacts,thereaderwouldnotfindithardtobelievethatthelower-incomegroupsinAmericanandCanadiansociety,atleast,wouldbebetteroff,notworseoff,ifthewelfarestatehadneverexistedatall.Suchistheburdenofmanystudiesonthesubject8—allofwhichwillberejectedwithoutfurtherthoughtbymostreadersonthegroundthattheyare“rightwing.”Butcommonsenseisenoughtodiscernthatthecostofelevatingtheincomesofpeoplewhowouldotherwisebeworkingbyextractingmoneyfromthebetter-offandtransferringittothemisveryhigh.Itincludesnotonlythepaymentofmiddle-classsalariestothenumerousadministratorsofthesystem,butthelossofproductionfromthosewhowouldotherwisebeworking(almostcertainlyalmostallofthem,sincemostpeopleprefermakingaliving).Sterbaisfarfromaloneinthinkingthattheexistenceofpeoplewithrelativelylowincomesinaffluentcountriesissymptomaticofinjustice.Butinordertothinkthis,youhavetoassumethatweallhaveadutytoseetoitthateveryonehasnotonly“enough”toliveon,butinfactaquitehighincome.Thatassumption,however,isonehedoesnotespouse—happily,sinceithasnothingwhatevertobesaidinitsfavor,ifweinsistonamoralityderivedfromreasonratherthanthesentimentsofacademics.Thesituationis,infact,quiteentirelythereverse.ThosewithlowerincomesincontemporaryAmericaandCanadahaveveryhighincomesbyworldstandards,andtheyhavethembecauseof,notdespite,theeconomicactivitiesoftheso-called“rich.”Thereisnogoodreasontodoubtthatiftherichwereallowedtogetricher,thepoorwouldlikewisebericher.Wealthcomesfromproductivity.Allwealthisduetosomebody’sefforts—nowealthliterallyconsistsin“naturalresources,”sincethey,insitu,areofnovaluewhatever.Theybecomevaluablewhensomeoneworksoutwaystoutilizethem,someoneelsesetstoworkutilizingtheminthatway,andstillotherssettoworkmarketingtheresults.Wealthycountriesarecountriesinwhichtheproductivityofpeopleishigh,andthatisduetotheirworkinginenvironmentsdesignedandproducedbyotherhard-workingandinventivepeople.Onemanproducesseveraldozenvarietiesofwheatthatwithstanddifficultconditionsbetterandhaveenormouslyhigheryields;thisonesetofdiscoveriesenablesliterallyhundredsofmillionsofpeopletoeatbetterthaneverbefore.Onemaninventedthemechanicalreaper,andothersrefinedit,whichenabledAmerican,thenEuropean,andeventuallyallfarmerstoproducefarmorewithfarlesswork.Andsoon.Weallrideonaroadpavedby\n66JANNARVESONtheingenuityofothers.Intheprocess,weutilizesucheffortandskillasweareable,yieldingusefuloutputthatisacquiredbyothersinexchangeforpurchasingpower,whichthengoestostimulatestillotherproductiveeffortelsewhere.Allthisiselementary,butseemstobeoftenoverlookedincontemporaryacademicdiscussions.Somewillrespondtoremindersliketheabovewiththethoughtthat,seeingourgeneralindebtednesstoallthoseingeniouspeople,weshouldbethemorereadytoacceptageneraldutytoattendtotheneedsofothers.Butitdoesn’tfollow.Foronething,thoseinventorshave,characteristically,beenwellpaidfortheirefforts—suchbeingthenatureoffree-marketactivity.Moreover,insofarasallarebenefitingfromthem,thereisforthatveryreasonnooccasionforinsistingonstillfurtherbenefitsbeingsuppliedbyonebeneficiarytoanother.Andinanycase,theindigentandtheuntalentedalsobenefitfromallthatpastactivity.Thepanhandler’saffluentclienteleareabletosupporthiminmuchbetterstyle,thestorefrontshehangsoutinfrontofaremuchmoreattractive,andingeneraltheunfortunateareverymuchmorefortunatethantheirforerunnersonmodernAmericanstreets.Oratanyrate,theywouldbeifmodernlaw-enforcementagencieswerenotatworkharassingthemmoreeffectivelythanofold—butthatisanotherstory.Meanwhile,contemporarypanhandlershavesetnewmarksintheirbusiness.InToronto,anewspaperreporterposingasoneofthehomelessinthatcitypocketedsome$223inaday’s“work”,allfromordinarywell-meaningpassers-by,observingthathe,anamateur,couldhardlysupposehimselftobedoingbetterthanhisseasonedcolleaguesamongthehomeless.Healsotouredthelodgingsofferedtosuchpeoplebythemanychurchesandothercharitiesintown,passingonratingsbyhismoreexperiencedcompeers.9(Inotedwithsomeinterestthatanenterprisingpanhandler,assumingthisposer’sexperiencestobetypicalandassumingthathepaidnotaxesonhisincome,actuallyhadtake-homepaysomewhatexceedingthiswriter’s—andIamafullprofessor!)Underthecircumstances,itisdifficulttoaddresswithastraightfaceSterba’sscenariosofrichandpoor,thelatterinabjectmiseryandfacingstarvation.Thosethingsarefromstorybooksnowadays,inmostpartsoftheworld.Ifweseekvictimsinthemodernworld,weshouldbelookingnotattheaffluentpoor,butatthevictimsofpolicestateviolence,whicharenumerousandincreasingyearly—or,perhaps,thehundredsofmillionsofpeoplegenuinelypoorbyAmericanstandards,andbeyondthereachofwelfarestatepoliciesasadvocatedbySterbaandmostothers.ThemillionsofAmericanofficially“poor”donotcompare,ascasesforconcern,withthemillionsofAmericansimprisonedovertheyearsbecauseofitsdraconianenforcementofpunitiveandilliberallawsagainstthetakingofrecreationaldrugs.AndtheincomesevenofcomparativelywealthyAmericanscouldbemuchhigherbutforthenumerousregulatoryincursionsandhugetaxbillsoftheirgovernments.Thelistofimpositionsagainstordinarypeopleinthenameoflawandorderanddemocracydwarfbycomparisonthosesupposedlysufferingfromtheactivitiesofpeoplemakingtheirlivingsfromcommerce.Tiredmarxist“analyses”inwhichevilrichpeopleexploitthevirtuouspoorshouldnotbesubstitutedforreality,thoughtheycharacteristicallyareamongtoday’slegionsofsocialphilosophers.Mostofall,theysufferfromaphenomenallyquestion-beggingandirrelevantuseofstandardsinappraisingthesituationsofpeoplearoundtheworld.ComparedtoAmericansorCanadians,mostpeopleintheworldarepoor,andthelesswellpaidpeopleinBoliviaorIndonesiadismallyso.Butinthoseareasoftheworldinwhichinternationalcapitalismisallowedtoflourish,workingpeopleareverymuchbetteroffthantheywereindecades,letalonecenturies,past.Theseimprovementshavenottakenplacebecausewell-meaningpeopleintheWesthavedoneanythingtohelp—foreignaid,neverlarge,haslatelyshrunktovirtuallynothing.Norisittheresultofthebenignpoliciesofnationalgovernments,whichareascallousandcorruptasever.Itistheindirectandunintendedresultoftheactionsofsoullessmultinationalsandrapaciouslocalentrepreneurs,whoseonlyconcernwastotakeadvantageoftheprofitopportunitiesofferedbycheaplabor.Itisnotanedifyingspectacle;butnomatterhowbasethemotivesofthoseinvolved,theresulthasbeentomovehundredsofmillionsofpeoplefromabjectpovertytosomethingstillawfulbutnonethelesssignificantlybetter.10TheseobservationsmakecontemporaryAmericanacademics’lipscurlindisgust.Ifthoseacademicshadtheirwayaboutit,commercialactivitiesofthatkindwouldbepricedoutofthemarketinthosecountries—andinsteadofsubstantialbutslowlyimprovingpoverty,theworldwouldbeenjoyingthespectacleofabsolutelydesperatepoverty,totalhopelessness,andalifeexpectancyofthreeorfourdecadesinsteadofthefiveorsixalreadybeingenjoyedinthoseplaces.Redistributivetaxation,whichhasbeenalltherageindemocraticcountriesformanydecadesnow,cannotbeacureforpoverty.Thereisonlyonesuchcure:greaterproductivityandgreaterfreedomintheeconomicrealm.Theideathatyoucanmakemeaningful,long-termimprovementsinthelivesofmillionsbyhiringarmiesofbureaucratstoharasstheproductiveand“reallocate”theirincomestopeoplewhodonothing,andwhoseincentivesaretodomoreofsame,isnotonethatcommendsitselftotheimpartialintellect—especiallywhenthosesamebureaucratsareseenbythepoorasharassingthemwhilethey’reatit.Whycontemporaryintellectsaresocharacteristicallynotimpartialonsuchpointsisaninterestingquestion—butonewemustleaveforanothertime.Meanwhile,thecaseforimpositionsonproductiveactivitiesinthesupposedinterestsof“equity”doesnotemergefromarationalanalysisofthefoundationsofmorals.Whatdoesemergeisthewisdomof\nLETTINGPEOPLEBEPEOPLE67freedom,completewithpropertyrightsandprotectionofindividualsagainsttheviolenceoftheirneighbors,includingthoseinuniform.Finally,weshouldrememberthatSterbahimselfhassetthetermsofreferenceforthisdiscussionasfollows:thiscaseforrestrictingthelibertyoftherichdependsuponthewillingnessofthepoortotakeadvantageofwhateveropportunitiesareavailabletothemtoengageinmutuallybeneficialwork.11Itakethistomeanthatpoliticalmethodsforfeedingthepooroutoftaxationarenotjustifiedunlessallprivatemethodsofdoingsofail.Betweenprivatesoup-kitchens,privatehandoutsbysympatheticpassers-byinthestreets,privatehostelsforthehomeless,andsoon,itissimplyobviousthatprivatemethodsareverymuchmorethanadequatetodealwithanysituationthatcouldreasonablybedescribedintermsofgenuine,desperate-typeneed.ThusonSterba’sowngrounds,thecaseforthewelfarestateisactuallynil—anotunimportantresult,ifourfocusisreallyonjustice“hereandnow.”NOTES1ThisessayisdrawnfromalongeressaywhichalsoconsidersSterba’sargumentfromrationalitytomorality.2Ihaveargued,however,thatitprobablyprovesnothingofthesort.See“APuzzleAboutEconomicJusticeinRawls’Theory,”SocialTheoryandPractice,vol.4,no.1,fall1976,pp.1–28.3DavidGauthier,MoralsbyAgreement(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1986)laysdownessentiallythesameprinciple,callingitthe“LockeanProviso.”Itrequiresustorefrainfrompursuingourownutilitybyimposingdisutilityonourinteractees,relativetothebaselineofnoninteraction,exceptwhenthisisnecessaryinordertoavoidanevengreaterdisutilitybeingimposedonourselves.Seep.203.4Seemydiscussionin“Morality,AffluenceandDistantPeople,”presentedattheAPAPacific,2April1999;forthcominginDeenChatterlee(ed.)(titletba).5Sterba,op.cit.,p.45.6“Sterba’sProgramofPhilosophicalReconciliation,”JournalofSocialPhilosophy,XXX.3,winter1999,pp.402ff.7Forfiguresalreadyadecadeold,seeRobertRecord,“How‘poor’areAmerica’spoor?”inJulianSimon(ed.)TheStateofHumanity(Oxford:Blackwell,1995).Evenatthattime,thesituationwasstriking;itisingeneralstillbettertoday.Herearesomesummaries:1987:38%ofofficiallypoorAmericansownedtheirownhouses;themedianvalueoftheirhomeswas$39,205–60%ofthemedianvalueofallowner-occupiedhousing.Only7.5%ofthishousinghadmorethanonepersonperroom.TheywerelesscrowdedthanaverageWestEuropeanhouseholdsof1980.At0.56personsperroom,thisputsthemaheadoftheaverageJapanese(at0.8).TheyenjoyedanaveragelivingspacepercapitathatwastwicetheJapanesestandard,andfourtimestheSoviet.Only1.8%ofAmericanpoorhouseholdslackedindoorflushtoiletsin1980.Thiscompareswith6%intheUK,7%inWestGermany,17%inFrance,and54%inJapan—forallhouseholds,notjusttheir“poor”.By1987virtually100%ofAmerican“poor”householdshadrunningwater,flushtoilets,showers,electriclights,etc.62%ownatleastonecar,truck,orvan;14%ownedtwoormore,athirdhadmicrowaves,and29%ownedtwoormorecolorTVs.49%hadair-conditioning(56%amongthosewhoownedtheirownhomes).Fewerthan1%lackarefrigerator.17%haveautomaticdishwashers;95%ownatleastoneTV.ApoorAmericanhouseholdismuchmorelikelytoownacolorTVthantheaveragehouseholdinFrance,WestGermanyorItaly.TheofficialUS“poverty”thresholdinthe1960swasaboutthirtytimesgreaterthantheworldmedianpercapitaincome.In1987thewelfarespendingignoredintheofficialpovertyreportcameto$9,058perpoorhousehold,onaverage.8Theclassicstudyis,ofcourse,thatofCharlesMurrayinLosingGround(NewYork:BasicBooks,1984).9SeetheTorontoGlobeandMailfor16–23December1999.10PaulKrugman,“InPraiseofCheapLabor,”Slate,20March2000.[http://slate.msn.com/Dismal/97–03–20/Dismal.asp]11Sterba,op.cit.,p.51.\nWelfareliberalism\n6WHAT(WELFARE)JUSTICEOWESCAREEvaFederKittayFromlibertarianismtowelfarism—maybe,maybenotJamesP.Sterbaoffersusaconceptionofphilosophyascooperationratherthanconflict—aspeacemakingratherthanwar-making.Beingapeace-lovingpersonmyself,Ifindthisnotionverycongenial.Philosophyistoooftenbasedonanantagonist/agonisticmodelwherethewinnerinaphilosophicaldebateisshewhoproffersthemostdevastatingargumentagainstheropponent.However,inthephilosophicalwargames,orpeacegames,theonlyrealvictorshouldbetruth—and,inthiscontext,thetruthofjustice—orbetterstill,whatcantrulyandjustlybeestablishedhereandnow.IwouldliketoengagewithSterbainthespiritofhispeacemaking.ButifIseemtobemoreconflictualthanconciliatory,itisbecauseIwanttheoutcometobewhatismosttrueanduseful.Mysenseis,however,thatalthoughIbelieveIdisagreewithSterba,hewillnonethelessshowthat,infact,ourviewsareentirelycompatible,andperhapsevenidentical.Infact,whereIwanttobeginquestioninghispositionwithrespectto“welfarejustice”ispreciselythepointatwhichSterbademonstrateshisuncannyabilitytoreconcilewhatseem,atfirstatleast,tobediametricallyopposedviews.TothosewhohavenotfollowedthedialoguethatSterbahascarriedonwithlibertarians,Sterbaseemstomakeasurprisingclaim,namelythatthepositionofwhathecalls“welfareliberals”(amongwhomhecountshimself)canbereconciledwiththatoflibertarians.1Proponentsofa“welfarestate”holdtheviewthattheonlywaythatademocraticmarket-basedstatecanadequatelydispensejusticetoallistoprotectusfrom,andtocompensateusfor,theextremeinequalitiesanunfetteredcapitalismislikelytoproduce.Thewelfarestateisintendedtoaddresstheneedswehavewhenwearemostvulnerable—whenwearetoooldforgainfulemployment,tooweakduetoillnessordisability,tooyoungorotherwiseincapableofcompetinginthemarketplace.Itismeanttohelpprotectusfromdisasterwhentheeconomyshrinksorcollapses,orwhenourownmarketableskillsarenolongerneeded.Thewelfarestateisaresponsetoaparticulareconomicandpoliticalsystem.ItiswiththissortofwelfarejusticethatIamconcerned,becauseitisthissortofwelfarismthatIbelievepertainsto“justicehereandnow,”toborrowaphrasefamiliartoSterba’sreadersThestandardargumentbetweenlibertarians,whoresistargumentsforstateprovisionofmostsorts,andwelfareliberals,whoinsistonstateprovisionofmanygoodsandservices,isgenerallycastasaconflictbetweenlibertyandequality,withlibertariansespousinglibertyandwelfareliberalschampioningequality.Libertariansarguethataslongasthemeansbywhichwealthwasfirstobtained,andwassubsequentlytransmitted,accordswithjustlaws,thereisnothingunjustintheresultingpatternofdistribution,nomatterhowunequaltheresultingpatternofdistribution.Attemptingtoalterthatpatternbytaxingtherichtosubsidizethepoor,orotherwiseredistributewealth,isanunwarrantedinterferencebythestateintothelivesofitscitizens,violatingfundamentalrightstoproperty.Thegoalofequalizingresourcesmustgivewaytotheprimarygoalofthestate,whichistoinsurethelibertyofitscitizensandtoprotecttheirrightstoproperty.Sterbawantstoshowusthatwhatlookslikeaconflictbetweentwotraditionalvaluesofliberalism,andsoaconflictbetweenlibertariansandawelfareliberallikehimself,isreallyaconflictbetweenthelibertyorlibertyrightsofonegroupofpersons(thosewithwealth)andthatofanothergroup(thosewhoarepoor).Theexerciseofthelibertyofthewealthytodisposeoftheirwealthis,accordingtolibertarians,justifiedaslongasdoingsowillnotinterferewiththelibertyofanothertoleadtheirlifeaccordingtotheirownlights.But,saysSterba,wherethereexistpeoplesopoorthattheycannotsatisfytheirmostbasicneeds,thelibertyofthewealthytodisposeoftheirsurpluswealthastheyseefitdoesinterferewiththelibertyofthepoortoappropriatethatsurplustomeettheirbasicneeds.Theclaimsonthepartofthepoorcanbecastintermsoflibertynolessthancantheclaimsonthepartoftherich.Therefore,evenifwegrantthatlibertyrightstrumpallotherrights,thelibertarianismistakeninholdingthattheclaimsofthewealthyarelibertyclaims,whilethoseofthepooraremerelyclaimsforequality.Butinthatcase,alibertariancouldjustaswellchampiontherightsofthepoornottobeinterferedwithintheireffortstoavailthemselvesofsurpluswealth,astochampiontherightofthewealthynottobeinterferedwithindisposingoftheirsurplusastheydesire.NotethatSterbaisnotonlycastingtheconflictasaconflictbetweentwoliberties,butthathealso\n70EVAFEDERKITTAYsucceedsinfindingaformulationthatcaststheconflictasoneofcompetingnegativeliberties,sousingtheonlylibertiesandrightsmostlibertariansrecognize(negativelibertiesandnegativerights).2AnobviousobjectiontoSterba’sargumentwouldbethatheapparentlydoesnotweighpropertyrightsinthesamewaymostlibertariansdo.ButSterbapointsoutthatevenlibertariansdonotprivilegelibertyrightsoverallotherrights,andsoweneednotworryourselvesabouttheclaimofthewealthytopropertyrights.Itisapparentthatthewealthywillnotsuffernearlyasmuchbylosingsomeoftheirsurpluswealthasthepoorwillbybeingpreventedfromappropriatingthesurplusofthewealthy.Thestatethereforeneedstoprotectthenegativewelfarerightsofthepoormorestrenuouslythanprotectingpropertyrightsofthewealthy.UsingSterba’sprincipleofmorality,wecanconcludethatthewealthywhohordetheirresourcesinfaceofthegraveneedsofothers,andthestatewhichprotectstheirsurplus,behaveimmorally;whilethepooractwithintheboundsofmorality(providing,thatis,thattheyhavemadeeveryefforttomeettheirneedsbymeansoftheirownefforts,thattheyconfinetheirappropriationstowealththatcanreasonablybethoughttobesurplus,andthattheydonottakemorethantheyneedforsubsistence).Arguingthatifwehavethecapabilitytodowhatweoughttodo,wethenhavethedutytodoit,Sterbacanmaintainthatthosewhocanpreventsuchlife-threateninghardshipshavethedutytodoso.Thusnotonlydothepoorhaveanegativerighttowelfare,butwehaveanobligationtoprovidewelfare,oratleast,wecansaythatthestatehasarighttoprotectthenegativerightofthepoortoappropriatewhattheyrequiretosurvive.Whatwouldsuchprotectionamountto,shortofhavingdifferentlawsforwhenitisandisnotpermissibleforsomeonetohelponeselftowhatisotherwiselegallyanother’s?Areasonableanswerwouldbetaxationofsurpluswealth.Sterba’sclaim,then,isnotonlythatlibertarianismiscompatiblewithawelfareliberalism,butthatwelfarejusticecanjustaswellbederivedfromaminimalistlibertarianismasfromarobustliberalism.Furthermore,sincethisneedissharedbymanythroughouttheworld,andsincetheirneedisasgreat,ifnotgreaterthanthosewhoareproximate,theytoowouldhavetherighttothelibertytoappropriatethesurplusofthewealthy.Ourobligationthencontinuesuntilthereisnomoresurplustogivetootherneedypersons.Astherearesomanymoreneedythanwealthy,theeffectofthisredistributionistoachieveanearequalityofwealthamongall.Hence,wegofromlibertytoequality.HereIwillnotattempttoexaminethedetailsoftheargument.Itappearsthattheargumenthasbeenpickedapartandobjectionshavebeenrespondedtooftenenough.3NorwillIlookattheargumentasalibertarianmight.However,IdowanttonotethatalthoughSterba’sisaminimalistwelfare—theneedyareonlyentitledtowhatwillkeepthemfromstarvationandotherlife-threateningills—giventhesheernumbersofthe“havenots,”itissodemandingonthe“haves”thatonecouldchargehisviewwithexactingan“overloadofobligations.”Furthermore,onemayarguethatwhenwealthwouldbesoseverelyreducedthroughwelfareobligations,themotivationtoproducethewealthmaynotbestrong.Inthatcase,lesswealthwillbeproducedandeveryonemaybeworseoffthanunderthelessegalitarianscheme.ButasAlanGewirth(1996)hasargued,welfare,evenofamoregeneroussort,neednotresultinsuchoverloadifaproperdistinctionismadebetweenwhatisowedbyoneindividualtoanotherindividual,andwhatagovernmentowestoindividuals.OneproblemwiththeaccountSterbagivesisthatthereisnoaccountingfortheroleofinstitutionsinprovidingwelfare.AsOxfamandotheraidorganizationshaveincreasinglycometosee,aidthatenablesandencouragesgovernmentstoprovidethemeansbywhichitsresidentscanproduceforthemselvescanbemoreeffectivethandirectaid.Infact,directaidintheformofcashtransferredfromthewealthydirectlytopoorpopulationscan,infact,perpetuatetheveryproblemsitismeanttosolve.However,thisisnotmymainpoint.Iammoreconcernedwiththeminimalismofthewelfareprovided,boththeminimalamountthatthepoorareentitledto,andthefactthatonlysomepoorareentitledtoaid.Thesestrictures,I’llshow,aredirectlyrelatedtoSterba’sattempttoreconcilewelfareliberalismwithlibertarianism.FromlibertytowelfareSWelfareisaformofpublicprovision,andasMichaelWalzerhastaughtus,everysocietydeterminesitsownformofpublicprovision,aswellasitsownjustificationfortheformofpublicprovisionitchooses.Thejustificationsforwelfareneedtoaddressnotonlyourobligationtoprovideforothers,butalsothesortofsocialgoodsweareobligedtoprovideandforwhomtheyaretobeprovided.Sterba,inJusticeforHereandNow,sayslittledirectlyaboutthesortofwelfareheenvisionsandattemptstojustify.Wecan,however,extrapolatefromhisremarks.Welfare,asheunderstandsit,isprovisiontothepoorestcitizensandfellowhumanbeings;particularlythoseamongthemwhomakeeveryefforttoprovideforthemselvesandnonethelessdon’tsucceed.Theseprovisions,whichareminimalandbare,arethenconfinedtothedeservingpoor.Thenotionofthedeservingpooralreadyrevealssomethingimportantaboutthisunderstandingofthewelfare.Thejustificationforwelfare,onSterba’saccount(andonmanyaccounts),reliesontwoassumptions,neitherofwhichisthoughtsufficient,butwhichtogetherarenecessaryandjointlysufficienttowarranttheaidweknowaswelfare.Thefirstisthatneed,whenitisurgentorconcernsbasicnecessities,oughttobeaddressedbythosewhoareinapositiontoproviderelief.The\nWHAT(WELFARE)JUSTICEOWESCARE71secondisthatanindividual’sentitlementtoresourcesisproportionaltothewillingness(orability)oftheindividualtoassumeburdensandobligationsassociatedwithbeingtherecipientofthebenefitsofsocialcooperation.Thesecondassumption,orconditionofaid,isfrequentlycashedoutintermsofanindividual’scontribution(potentialoractual,pastorcurrent)totheproductionofwealth,asindicatedbyincome-producinglabor.Attheveryleast,itisassumedthatthewillingnesstosocontributemustbesincereandactivelypursuedtothedegreepossible,giventheindividual’scapabilities.Inamoney-basedeconomy,animportantcolloraryofthesecondassumptionisthatnon-income-producingactivityisnot“work.”Itsproductsorconsequencesarenotincludedinreckoningthewealthofanation.Welfare,asunderstoodhere,islimitedtothosewhoarethepoor.Furthermore,itisrestrictedtothedeservingpoor.Forifanindividualfailstomeetthesecondcondition,evidenceofthatperson’sneeddoesnotinandofitselfobligateotherstorespondtothoseneeds.Inthisway,thedeservingpoororneedyaredistinguishedfromtheundeservingpoororneedy.Whereentitlementtopublicprovisionisconnectedtothewillingness(andsometimesability)tobe“productive,”thatis,engaginginincome-producingactivities,theprovisionforthe“undeservingpoor”is,atbest,averydebasedandfrequentlyevenpunitivewelfare.Itspurposeisasmuchtocontrolthebehaviorofthe“undeserving”poor(andoftenthe“deserving”pooraswell—forhowdoyoureallytellthedifference?)astorelieveneed.4Thosewhoseewelfareasbasedonthetwoassumptionsaboveworryaboutwelfarebecominga“drug”or“crutch”orlegitimatedwayofexistingandthereforeadisincentivetowork.Consequently,thiswelfare,evenwhendoledouttothe“deservingpoor,”isfrequentlycarriedoutwithsignificantstateintrusionintothelivesofitsrecipients,anditisnevergenerous.IwillcalltheformofwelfaredoledoutthedeservingpoorwelfareS(“S”standingforstigmatized,stingyandsubjecttostatesurveillance).What’sprovidedforthosethoughttobethe“undeserving”wecoulddubwelfareS2(thesamebutworse).It’sworthnotingthatwelfareS2exertsadownwardpressureonwelfareS.FromwelfareStowelfareEWelfare,understoodaspublicprovision,isnotonlyandalwaysunderstoodinthesenseofwhatisprovidedtothepoorandneedy,deservingorundeserving.Itisalsounderstoodasthatwhichgivesaworkerandcitizenasourceofdignityandmaintainsalevelofwell-beingthoughttobecommensuratewiththeaffluenceofthesocietyinwhichonelives.Onthisview,welfareisasocialright,whichraisescitizensabovesubsistencelevelsofexistence,providingsecurityandagooddegreeofwell-being,aswellasprotectionfromthedeprivationsofpoverty.Itdoesnotmerelysavethepoorfromstarvation.Itaimstopreventorendpoverty.T.H.Marshallspeaksofwelfareinthissenseasmarkingtherightsof“socialcitizenship.”Herewelfarecontinuestodependonthesecondconditionabove,butratherthanbasingprovisiononlyon“need,”provisionisbasedon“rights”—positiverightstofreedomandwell-being.Citizenshavearighttodemandthatthegovernmentstepintoprotectthemfromfallingintopovertywhen,througheithermarketfailuresorpersonalimpediments,theyarenotinapositiontocompeteinthemarketplace,andalsotofulfillrolesandfunctionsthatareillservedbythemarket.Inthismoreexpansivesenseofwelfare,whichI’llcallwelfareE,thestateservesasaninsurerandproviderofcertainsocialgoodsthoughttobeessentialforagoodlife.Walzercharacterizeswelfareinthissensethus:Certainkeysocialgoodshavebeentakenoutofprivatecontroloroutofexclusiveprivatecontrolandarenowprovidedbylawtoall(ortosomesubsetofcitizensandresidents).Thedistributionispaidforwithpublicfundsandorganizedbypublicofficials.SocialSecurityisaneasyexample.(Walzer1983,13)Universalhealthcare,unemploymentinsuranceandworkers’compensationplansarealsogoodexamples.ThewelfareEstatejustifiestheredistributionofresourcesinherentinsocialinsuranceschemes.Itnotesthatundercapitalismthedistributionofresourcesisnotnecessarilywellalignedwitheitherthecontributionsortheneedsofitsmembers;thatcapitalism,withitscapacitytoproducegreatwealth,alsoproducesgreatpoverty;andthatthemarketiseitheraninadequateoranimperfectwayinwhichtoarrangethedistributionofcertaincriticalresourcesandservices.Furthermore,welfareEisbasedonthepremisethatallwhohavecontributedtotheproductionofwealthshouldnotneedtobereducedtopovertybeforetheybenefitfromthatwealth,evenifthewealthhasbeenaccumulatedinprivatehands.Thatis,thatamodeofredistributionisjustified,wherethebenefitsofcontributingtotheproductionofwealthareveryunevenlydistributed.WelfareEstillcarvesoutacategoryoftheundeservingpoor,namelythosewhocouldbutdonotcontribute.Generally,astigmatizedwelfareisavailableservingonlythemostbasicneedsforthoseindividuals,onthegroundsthatneed,inandofitself,oughttobeaddressedbythoseinapositiontodoso.Justaswedonotconditionthemedicaltreatmentofmotorcyclistswhohavebeeninjuredonwhetherornottheywerewearinghelmetsatthetimeofaccident,5theproponentofwelfareEarguesthatweshouldnotdemandthatthosewhohaven’tshownsufficientmotivationtoearntheirbreadoughtnottoeat,especially\n72EVAFEDERKITTAYwhenfoodisplentiful.Still,individualswhodonotcontribute,ormaketheeffortto,maygetsomeprovision,buttheydonotbecomefullcitizensofthewelfarestate—theyhaveapariahstatus.FromwelfareEtowelfareC:thedemandsofdependencyWhereentitlementtowelfareE(1)dependsuponanindividual’sproductivity;(2)assumeswomentobeprimarilywives,mothers,anddaughters,notworkers,andpresumestheworkertobemale,wehaveapatriarchalwelfarestate.Women’sentitlementtowelfareappearstobeconditionedbyhertietoa“productiveworker”.But,CarolePatemanasks,howcanwomenbecitizensofthepatriarchalwelfarestate?Forcitizenshipdependsonmakingacontributiontothewelfarestate.“What,”sheasks,“could,ordidwomencontribute?”Andshereplies:“Theparadoxicalansweristhatwomencontributed—welfare”(Pateman1988,247).Thatistosay,thepatriarchalwelfarestateisitselfdependentonthefreelaborofwomendoingtheworkofprovidingwelfare,butinaprivatizedform.ForPateman,theproblemmanifestsitselfinwhatshecalls“Wollstonecraft’sDilemma”6(1988,252).Thedilemmaisfoundwherecitizenshiphasbeenmodeledonanddefinedbythemalewageearner,andarisesfromtwoincompatibledemands:thedemandtobeaccordedequalcitizenshipandthedemandthatwomen’sspecialresponsibilitiesaswomenberecognized.AttheheartofWollstonecraft’sDilemma,Ibelieve,liesthefailuretoincludewithinpoliticaltheorytheconcernsoffundamentalhumandependencyandthegender-specificwayinwhichconcernsofdependencyhavebeenallocated.Liberaltheorybeginswiththeassumptionthatsocietyisanassociationofequals,ofthosewhocanfunctionindependently,andwhoareequallysituatedwithrespecttopower.Ittherebyexcludesthosepersonswhosedependencyistheresultofinevitableconditionsrelatedtoage,abilityandhealth,andinsodoingmakesinvisiblethecontributionsofthoselaborsdevotedtocaringfordependents.Thosewhocarefordependents,Ihavecalled“dependencyworkers”(Kittay1999).Intheremainderofthispaper,IwishtoargueforanddefendasenseofwelfarethatisstrongerstillthanwelfareE.WelfareEisnotadequatetoresolvingWollstonecraft’sDilemma,evenwhereemploymentopportunitiesareopenedtowomen,becausewomencontinuetobethewives,mothers,caregivingdaughters,andpaidandunpaidcareproviders.Thisstrongersenseofwelfare,whichIwillcallwelfareC,centersontherightsaswellastheprovisionsthatenableonetogiveandreceivecare.Itiscare,orrathertheprovisionofcare,thatis,ifyouwill,“welfarized”—thatis,takenoutofexclusiveprivatecontrol,providedbylawtoall,andpaidforbypublicfunds.WeneedwelfareCtoaddresswhatIcalldependencyconcerns,theneedsandinterestsofthose1whoaredependentbyvirtueofyouth,frailoldage,illnessandseveredisability(theseIcallinevitabledependencies)7and2dependencyworkers,thatis,thosewhoattendtoandhaveprimeresponsibilityforthecareofdependents.By“welfarizedcare”Imeantherightofcaregiversanddependentsaliketopublicprovisionthatenablescaregiverstoprovidecarewithout1compromisingtheirabilitytocarefortheirownneeds,2sacrificingtheneedsofthedependents,or3failingtorespectthenonfungiblenatureofmostsignificantcaregivingrelations.Insofaraswomenarestill,inlargepart,dependencyworkers,assuringwomen’seconomicsecurityandfullequalityrequiresenlargingwelfareEtoincorporatewelfareC.ReconcilingwelfareCandlibertarianprinciplesSterba’saimtoreconcilethewelfareliberalwiththelibertarian,andtoinsistthatfromtheprimacyoftherightto(negative)freedomwecanderivetherighttowelfare,limitshimtoaright(anditscorrelateduty)towelfareS.Onlyurgentneedgivesusanyrighttotakepropertythatisanother’s.Otherwise,allcasesoftheftthatdidn’tleavethevictimworseoffthanthethiefwouldbejustified.Butinthatcase,allpropertyrightsarejeopardized,andwehaveasortofHobbesianwarofallagainstall.Theonlywaytodistinguishwelfarerightsfromrobbery(thelibertariangenerallysoundsasifhetakesthistobeadistinctionwithoutadifference)isbyinsistingthatonlythedeservingpoorhaveaclaimtoappropriatethepropertyofthewealthy,andthattheyonlyhavesuchaclaimwhenitrescuesthemfromadesperatestate.Ifweadmitlibertyrightstoincludenotonlyanegativeconceptionoffreedomandrights,butalsorightstopositivefreedom,whatGewirthcallsadditiverights(asopposedtosubtractiverights)ortherighttowell-being,wecandefendtherighttowelfareE.However,todosomaymeannotgrantingthepremisesof,atleast,mostlibertarianpositions.\nWHAT(WELFARE)JUSTICEOWESCARE73Theproblem,Ibelieve,iswithalibertarianpositionthatinsiststhattheonly(orprimary)reasonforgovernmentistoprotect(negative)freedom.Evenif,asSterbaclaims,someconceptionofwelfarecanbederivedfromsuchnegativefreedomalone,thatconceptionislimitedtowelfareS.Butwhygrant,evenforthesakeofargument,suchalimitedviewofthereasonforsocietyorpoliticalassociation?Whynotsaythatthemost(oratleastamost)fundamentalreasonforsocialandpoliticalassociationistomakepossiblethesurvivalandthrivingofdependentpersons?Thisisareasonforsocialorganizationasbasicastheprotectionofnegativefreedomandproperty(evenwhentheterm‘property’includesourownperson).Fromrecognizingthefundamentalimportanceofmakingpossibleandsupportingrelationsofdependency,wecanderivearighttowelfareCandacorrelativedutytoprovidewelfareC.Iwilldevelopandargueforastrongconceptionofwelfare,welfareC,onewhichcannotbereconciledwithlibertarianprinciples,eveniflibertarianprinciplescanbereconciledwiththeweaksenseofwelfarethatIhavecalledwelfareS.However,Idonottakethistobeaweakness.RatherItakethelibertarianconceptionofpoliticalassociationtobefundamentallyflawed,anditisflawedinsuchawaythatwomen,inparticular,failtobeincludedinitsunderstandingofjustice.WelfareC,“welfarizing”careFollowingWalzer,Iusetheterm“welfarize”todenotetheprocessoftakingcertainkeysocialgoodsoutofexclusivelyprivatecontrolbymakingthesegoodsavailabletoallbylaw,wherethedistributionispaidforbypublicfunds.Iamarguingforthewelfarizingofcare,ormoreexactly,Iwanttoadvocatethewelfarizationofprovisionforcare.Inmybook,Love’sLabor(Kittay1999),Iarguethatthecareofdependentsrendersthedependencyworker“derivativelydependent”.Thecareandattention,theinvestmentoftimeandone’sinterestsneededtoallowadependentpersontosurviveandthrivemakesthedependencyworkernecessarilyneglectfulofherowninterests.Aseveryparentwhohasgottenupinthemiddleofthenighttocareforasickchildknows,one’sowncondition,desires,needsaresubordinatedtoattendingtothechild.Toneglectachild’sillnesscanbedisastrous—thechildcanloseimportantcapacities,orlifeitself.Thisisespeciallythecasewherethechildisvulnerabletoitscaretakeralone,andwherethechildistooyoungorilltohelpherself.Innonagrariansocieties,caringforadependentisnotcompatiblewiththelaborthatprovidesincome.Togivecaretoavulnerabledependent,especiallyhands-oncare,canmeansignificantsacrificesinemploymentopportunities,prospectsofleisure,health,andsoforth.Insomecontexts,itcanmeanthefullinabilitytoprovideevensubsistenceforoneselfandone’sdependent.Therefore,thedependencyworkerisdependent—tosomedegreeoranother—on“aprovider,”thatis,onsomeone,orsomeinstitutionthatwillprovideincome,respite,andattentiontothewell-beingofthecaregiver.Aslongaswomenarelargelydependencyworkersanddependencyworkremainsprivatized,theprogresstowardaworldsharedbymenandwomeninbothfreedomandequalitywilleludeus.Privatizedprovisionforcarekeepswomenwhododependencyworkwithinthepowerofthose(usuallymen,husbands,fathers,lovers)whoserveasproviders,givingdependencyworkerspoorexitoptionsandaworsebargainingpositioninwhatAmartyaSencallsa“cooperativeconflict.”Thosewhoattempttoservebothroles,provideranddependencyworker,enterthecompetitiveeconomicarenawithadistinctdisadvantage.Andwhilehighlyeducatedandtrainedwomenwhoseskillscommandaheftysalarycandelegatedependencyworktoothers,thoseothersaregenerallypoorwomen,oftenpoorwomenofcolor,whothemselveshavefamilialdependencyresponsibilities.Theburdenfallsmostheavilyonwomenwhoarepoor,lackagoodeducationorhighlyvaluedskills,aredisabled,andarenonwhite.Giventhenormativeheterosexualitypresumedintheseprivatizedarrangements,lesbians,transsexualsandgaymenpayaheavypricewhentheyundertakedependencyresponsibilities.Theygarnernobenefitsofthoseinstitutionalstructuresthatdosupportdependencywork(familyleave,healthinsuranceforfamilymembers,etc.).Theyfrequentlylackemotionalandfinancialsupportsfromfamily,understandingfromco-workers,legalprotectionsfortherelationshipsinwhichtheycarefordependents.Butevenwomenwhoaremiddleclass,welleducated,andnotsubjecttoracismorotherformsofexclusion,findthattheireconomicwell-beingandprofessionalsuccessareimpactedbydependencyresponsibilities.8OneofthefewprogramsthatdidallowcaretobepubliclyfundedisthenowdefunctAFDC.However,ithadallthetrademarksofwelfareS.Itwasstigmatized,stingyandintrusive.Itwasdispensedonlytodestitutepersonswithdependents.Still,itwasguaranteedasanentitlement,9andsopermitted,toasmalldegree,thesocialgoodofcaretoescapeexclusivelyprivatecontrol.10Theprogramthatreplaceditendedtheentitlementandadded(more)punitivepractices.Inwhatsenseisthepublicprovisionofcare,thewelfarizationofcare,asolutiontowomen’spoverty,inequality,anddiminishedfreedom?Canwejustifythepublicexpendituresforsuchcare?First,weshouldnoticethatcareassuchcannotbedispensedbyagovernment,astateoranyimpersonalassociation.Carehastobegivenbythosewhoarecarers—whohave,orhaveforged,arelationshipwiththoseinneedofthecare.Whatanationcandoisassurethatthosewhogivecareandtheirdependentsareprovidedforandhavethefullsocialcitizenshipoftheindependentcitizenandworker.\n74EVAFEDERKITTAYWelfarizingcareandwomen’sequalityDespitetheirprofoundimpactonwomen’sfreedomandequality,11politicalphilosophiesrarelyconcernthemselveswiththesocialorganizationofdependencyworkandwhatajustorganizationofsuchworkmightlooklike.Instead,idealsofself-sufficiencyandindependencearenotonlyprized,butaretakenasthestartingpointofallinquiryintojustsocialinstitutions.Thelibertythatlibertarianstaketobetheprimaryvaluetakesnonoteoftheessentialdependencyrelationsthatallowustobindintoasociety.Inourdependencyweneedtobecaredforbyonewho,willinglyornotsowillingly,putstheirownlibertyonholdinordertotendtoourneeds.(Thinkoftheadultsonordaughterofanageingparentwhofallsillandmustbetakencareof.Surely,theyhaveadutytoseetoitthattheirparentistakencareof,regardlessofwhethertheywishtohavethisresponsibility.Orconsiderapersonwhoselong-timespouseorloverhasanaccidentthatleavesthembrain-injured,developsAlzheimer’sdisease,orcontractsanotherserious,chronicdiseaserequiringlong-termcare.Eventhespousewhorefusestodothedailycarehastheresponsibilitytoensurethattheirpartneriscaredfor—whetherornottheywanttheresponsibility.Andineachcase,thepersonsinvolvedhavetoforegocertainlibertiesinassumingtheseresponsibilities.)Bybeginningwithourdependency,andrecognizingthederiveddependencyofthedependencyworker,wecometoseesocietynotasanassociationoffreeandequalindependentpersonswhoassociatetoprotecttheirlibertyandproperty,butasameansbywhichtofacilitatethecareofvulnerabledependents.Thejustificationofwelfare,andevenarobustunderstandingofwelfare,growsquitenaturallyfromsuchastartingpoint.Tojustifywelfaremeanstoanswerthequestion,“WhyamIobligatedtoprovidefortheneeds(ofacertainsort)foranother?”Alternatively,itistoanswerthecorrelativequestion,“Whydo(certain)othershaveaclaimonmyresourcestomeettheirneeds(ofacertainsort)?”Thereciprocityofsocialcooperationisfrequentlyusedasananswertosuchquestions.Hencetherequirementthatonlythosewhomakeabonafideefforttocontributetotheproductivityofacommunity(attimesbroadlyconceivedasthecommunityofhumanbeings)havealegitimatecallonitsresources.Yetthisresponsesupposesthepartiesinvolvedaresymmetricallysituatedtoreciprocate.12Notsoforthedependencyworkerandhercharge.InLove’sLaborIsuggestanotionofreciprocitybettersuitedtodependencyrelations.Itermthisformofsocialcooperationdoulia.Iadoptthetermfromthepostpartumcaretaker,thedoula,whoassiststhemotherwhohasjustgivenbirth,notbycaringfortheinfantasmuchasbycaringforthemothersothatthemothercanherselfcarefortheinfant.Theideaisthatthosepersonswhoseattentionandresourcesaredirectedtoaidingothers,thosewhocannotfendforthemselves,alsoneedtobetendedtoandsupportedbyothers.Iargueforapublicconceptionofdoulia(service)bywhichweacknowledgethesocialresponsibilitytocareforthecaretaker.Inthecaseofthenewborn,thisisnecessitatedbythenewborn’sneedandthemother’sneedinessinherowncarewhileshedevotesherphysicalandemotionalenergy—alreadysomewhatdepletedinthedependencyworkthatisthenurturingofthefetusinherwombandthedeliveringoftheinfantinchildbirth—totendingtotheutterlyhelplessnewborn.Thenewborncannotreciprocate—shecannotsay“Mom,takeabreak,I’llcookupamealforuswhileyoutakeanap.”Similarly,duringperiodsofdependencyinlaterlife,whenweneedtobecaredfor,weareunabletoreciprocateatthemomentwhenthecaretakerneedssustenance,needstofetchmaterialresources,etc.Another—thosewhobenefitfromthedependencyworkers’careofdependents,societyatlarge,aswellasthosemoreintimatelyinvolved—ismorallyobligatedtoattendtothecaretaker,because,Iwanttoinsist,attheheartofournotionofequalityistheideathatweare“allsomemother’schild”—weareeachpersonswhohavebenefitedfromthecareofanother,whohavebeenseenasworthyofthecareandattentionwerequiremerelytosurvive,muchlessthriveaswegrowintoadults.Ifanotherisworthyofmycare,itisbecauseItooamworthyofcare.Thisisanotionoffairnessandreciprocitythatisnot,asonecommentatorhaspointedout,dyadic,butinvolves—atleast—athirdparty,infactaninfinitespiralofrelationshipsthatreachesbothintoourpastandprojectsintofuturegenerations.Thisarguesforacollective,socialresponsibilityfortheprovisionofcare.Thisunderstandingcontraststothetraditionalliberalcontractarianposition,suchasthatofRawls,13whowrites:“Thosewhocantakepartinsocialcooperationoveracompletelife,andwhoarewillingtohonortheappropriatefairtermsofagreementareregardedasequalcitizens”(Rawls1992,302).PoliticaltheoristMaryShanley(Shanley1999)writes,“Recognizinghowandwhycontractisinadequatetocharacterizethetiesthatbindeitherfamilymembersorcitizenstooneanotherandtothestatemaybethefirststepinestablishingbothfamily(andpolitical)lifeonfirmerandmoresatisfyingground.”Ratherthanafoundingcontract,careofdependentshastobeseenassittingattheverycenteroftherelationshipsthatformsnotonlythefamilybutsocialordergenerally,becausenosocietycanexistbeyondonegenerationunlessitsyoungestdependentsaretosurviveandmatureintoadulthood,andnodecentsocietycanneglectthosewhobecomedependentduringtheyearsthatintervenebetweenbirthanddeath.Evenifwetakelibertyorautonomyoragencyasthehallmarksofpersonhood,werecognizethatthedevelopmentoffreepersons,personswhoareautonomousandwhocanbeagents,notonlywillhaveperiodsofdependency,butwillhavehadtobenurturedthroughtheirfirstdependency.14Whilewomenremainedwithinthe“privatesphere,”wheredependentswerecaredfor,theirhiddenlaborkeptdependencyfromthepurviewofpoliticalconcerns.Aswomenmoveoutintothepublicarena,thedependencyhiddenfrompublicviewbecomesvisibleandisrevealedashavingthesocialdimensionithasinfactalwayshad.\nWHAT(WELFARE)JUSTICEOWESCARE75JustifyingthewelfarizationofcareDependencyworkisworkHowever,evenasdependencyconcernsbecomevisible,dependencyworktakesonanewsortofinvisibility.Thefactthatsomanywomenwithdependentchildrenareemployed,andmanageemploymentandresponsibilitytodependents,hasonlyreaffirmedthenotionthatcareofdependentsisnotwork,andassuchdoesnotconstituteasocialcontributionthathasthestatusorlegitimacyofpaidemployment.AnddependencyworkthatispaidretainstheaspectofwhatIvanIllichhascalled“shadowwork”(Illich1981).Thatthisshadowworkismarginalandpoorlypaidis,Isuggest,importantlyconnectedtothefactthatitcompeteswithalargepoolofunpaiddependencyworkers.Thereislittledoubtthattheincreaseofwomeninpaidemploymentfueledthefiresofawelfarereformthatevisceratedsupportforpoorwomenwithdependentchildren.Thereigningpresumptionofwelfarereformhasbeenthatpaidemploymentandmarriageofferwomenwithdependentstwoacceptablewaysofprovidingfortheirdependentsandthemselves.InthatcasethereisnoneedforAidtoFamilieswithDependentChildren(AFDC),onlyTemporaryAidforNeedyFamilies(TANF).Thenewemphasisonworkfaresometimesseemsasifconservativecriticsofwelfareareincahootswithold-fashionedfeminismwhichinsistedthatwomen’sliberationdependsonwomen’sentranceintothepaidworkforce.Yetworkfare,15asRickieSolinger(Solinger1999)hasargued,isonlyreallypunitive:punishingwomenfortheirindependenceandfor“badchoices,”the“choice”tobepoorandyethaveachild;tobeunwedandhaveachild.16Thesepointsbringustothepresumptionthatfamilialdependencycareisnot“work.”Butwhyisitnotwork?Ittakestimeandenergyawayfromactivitiesonemightotherwiseengagein.Itmaybedoneoutoflove,butsoareahostofjobs:beinganartist,anathlete,awriter,aprofessor(allthegoodjobs).Itissociallyuseful—infact,indispensable.Itisactivitythat,whenpaid,iscalledwork.Howisittobecomerecognizedaswork?Theanswerseemsalltooobvious.Bypayingallwhoengageindependencywork—whetherinaprivatesettingorpublicsetting(wepayeducatorswhoeducatewhetherinpublicschoolsorprivate,whetherinclassroomsorintutorialsettings)—whetheritisdonebythepoororbythewealthy,andwhetheritisdoneoutofnecessity,dutyorlove(wecontinuetopayathletesnomatterhowwealthytheybecomeandnomatterhowmuchtheyloveplayingthegame).Butwhoistopay?Thechildnormallyhasnoresourcestoremuneratehercaretaker;noroftendoesanadultwhoisdependentduetoillness,disabilityorthefrailtyofoldage.Yeteveninamarketeconomynotallservicesaresubjecttomarketforces.Childrenwhoarebeingeducateddonotpaytheirteachers—norevendirectlydotheirparents.(Ofcourse,weshouldnotethatlibertariansaregenerallyopposedtopubliceducationaswell.)Theeducationofchildren,forinstance,isunderstoodasasocialimperative,whoseutilityissharedbytheentiresociety;andtheresponsibilityfortheprovisionofeducationisunderstood(byallbutlibertarians)tobeassuchasocialresponsibility.Howcouldthisbeanylesstrueforthecareof(inevitable)dependents?SocietalobligationsimposedbydependencyworkIfdependencycareiswork,itisworkwheretheobligationtodotheworkderivesnotfromtheonewhopaysthetab,butfromonewhorequiresourcare.Hence,(1)ifthedependencyworkerisobligatedtothedependent,andthedependentisnotpoisedtoreciprocate,thecompensationduethedependencyworkerisowedfromaprovider.And(2)whenrelationshipsbetweenthedependencyworker,aprovideranddependentsfracture,thefaultlinedividestheproviderfromdependencyworkeranddependent.Toofrequently,thedependencyworkerisleftstrandedwithadependentandwithoutprovision.Itisnotmerelywomen’sperversesocialization,northeirinevitablebiology,thatmakeswomencling—oftenfiercely—totheirdependentsandtheirdependencyresponsibilities,eveninthefaceofeconomichardshipandsocialstigma.Itisrathertheexpectationsanddemandsofdependencyworkthatformbondsandobligationsstrongenoughtoendurethepunishment.Norwouldwewantdependencyworktobedonewithoutsuchrelationship.DietmutBubeck(1995)asksustoenvisionafullyautomatedsocietywhere“sick,old-aged,anddisabledpeopleareputintofullyautomatedhospitalsandasylums,andwherechildrenarebroughtupbyrobots.”Thisis“adystopia”(Bubeck1995,28)notonlybecausewedon’twanttobecaredforthisway.Eventhoughno-oneenjoyscleaningbedpans,therelationshipofcaringforsomeonewhorequiresourassistanceisdeeplyfulfilling,andtheworkdevelopsimportanthumancapacitieswhicharebasicandfoundational.17Moreover,thenotionofself-sufficiencyandindependencederivedfrompaidemploymentisachimera.Allemploymentinvolvessomedependency.18Wagedworkersarethemselvesinvolvedinnesteddependencies—theyaredependentonanemployerwho,inturn,isdependentonamarketandonaparticularconfigurationofeconomicstructuresandforces,suchasinterestrates,globalcompetition,etc.19\n76EVAFEDERKITTAYFigure6.1Nesteddependency:reciprocityasdouliaIntegratingcareintoaschemeofsocialcooperationAlltheaboveconsiderationsargueforasocialobligationtothedependencyworkerthatextendsbeyondtheprivateprovisiontoasocialobligationfortheprovisionofcare.Butifprivatizedprovisionmakesthedependencyworker(and,inturn,thedependent)vulnerabletothegoodwill,nonviolence,industryandgoodfortuneofanindividualprovider(usuallyaman),whydoesn’tpubliclysupportedprovisionsimplymakethedependencyworkerbeholdentothestate—replacing“aman”with“theman”,justifyingalltheintrusions(andmaybemore)andsurveillancewhichwomencurrentlyparticipatinginthewelfaresystemnowdecry?Indeed,isn’tsuchcontrolandoversightsimplytheright,eventheduty,ofanemployer?Usingthefollowingdiagram(Figure6.1)mayhelpexplainwhypublicprovisiongivesthestatenosuchright,althoughassuringthewell-beingofthechargeremainsadutyofthestate.Theinnermostcoreisthefullydependentindividual,whomayormaynotbeabletoreciprocateatalatertimeinherlife.Thecontingenciesofhumanvulnerabilityaresuchthatwecanneverknowifthesameindividualweassistnowwillreciprocateourassistanceatsomepointwhentheyarefullyfunctioning,forthattimemaynevercome.Theobligationtothatfullydependentindividualsitsnestedwithinthescopeofresponsibilitiesofthepersontowhomsheismostvulnerable—beitaparent,anadultchild,afriendorapaiddependencyworker.Butthevulnerabilitiesincurredbythecareofafullyvulnerablepersoncreateasetofobligationswhich,inturn,sitsnestedwithinthescopeofresponsibilitiesofanothertowhomthedependencyworkerismostvulnerable.Again,thismaybeafamilialoraninstitutionalrelationship.Eventuallytheresponsibilityspillsouttothelargersocialorderofwhichthedependentanddependencyworkerareapart.Thetaxpayerpaysforsocialprogramsthatreimbursefamiliesanddependents;thecitizenobligatesthestatetoassurerightsandresponsibilitiestoseethatcareisadequatelyprovidedandcompensated.Butthelinesofresponsibilityoraccountabilityfollowthelinesofobligation.Thatis,thedependencyworkerisbothobligatedtocareforthedependent,andherresponsibilityistothedependent—nottotheprovider.Inthisrespectitdiffersfromordinaryemployment.Allformsofdependencycarehavethisstructure.Ratherthanunderstandsocialcooperationasreciprocationbetweenequalindependentactors,theprincipleofapublicethicofcare,doulia,isaprinciplethattakesreciprocitytoinvolvesuchnestedsetsofobligations.Suchaprincipleassertsthatinsofaraseachindividualrequiresacaringrelationshipwithsignificantothersinordertogrow,flourish,andsurviveorendureillness,disability,andfrailty,thefollowinghold:First,itisasocialresponsibilitytosupportthoserelationsinwhichindividualscanbecaredforwhileinastateofdependencythatisinevitablebyvirtueofage,disabilityorillness.Second,socialinstitutionsmustfosteranattitudeofcaringandarespectforcarebyenablingcaregiverstodothejobofcaretaking.Suchenablingrequiresprovisionofthematerialconditionsneededtosustainthecaregiverandthedependentand/orbyenablingthecaregiver,tocompetefairlywithinthemarketplacebymakingavailablehigh-qualitycarefordependents,sothatentranceintothatcompetitiondoesnotjeopardizethecaregiverorthecaregiving.\nWHAT(WELFARE)JUSTICEOWESCARE77Whatsuchaprincipledoesnotsayisthateachandeveryoneofusmustbeengagedindependencywork.However,itdoesrequirethateachandeveryoneofusmustsharetheresponsibilityforthecost(inthelargersenseoftheterm)ofdependencywork,nowtoooftenbornebythosewhoengageinit.Anditalsorequiresthatboththosewhoaredependentsandthosewhoengageindependencyworkbeensuredrightsaimedatprotectingcarersfromharmastheyfulfilltheirobligationstocare.Thevision:whatwouldawelfarizedcareandacaringwelfarelooklike?Inthispaper,Ihavesketchedatheoreticalframeworkthatjustifiesarobustconceptionofwelfare,onewhichentitleseachofustocareforourdependentsbothasafundamentalsocietalinterestandasafundamentalsocialright.Suchaninterestandrightrequiresbothlegalprotectionandconditionsthatenableonetofulfillone’sresponsibilitiestocare.Notonlydotheseargumentsjustifypublicexpenditureforpoorwomentoraisetheirchildren,buttheyjustifyde-privatizingtheprovisionofcareforallwhocarefordependents.Basictosuchaconceptionofwelfareistheremuneration(bothjustandadequate)forallformsofdependencywork,aswellashigh-qualitysubstitutearrangementsthatcanbepurchasedinlieuofdoingthedependencyworkoneself.Equallycentralisarespectfordependencyworkthatisevincedbyproperlytrainingcitizensfordependencywork,andacknowledgingthespecialskillsinvolvedindoingsuchworkextrafamilially.Weneedprotectionsagainstthespecialvulnerabilitiesofdependencywork.Forexample:incomesufficienttoleaveabusiverelations,retrainingwhenfamilialdependencycareisnolongerneeded,timeoffinthecaseofcaringforseverelyandprofoundlydisabledfamilymembers,arecognitionoftheimportanceandnonfungiblenatureofthosewhostandinarelationofdependencytooneanother,aworkplacemoreadaptedtoworkers’familialdependencyconcerns,andtheassurancethatifweareunabletoprovidecaretoonewhodependsonit,thatcarewillstillbeprovided.20Careofdependentsnotonlyneedstobevaluedaswork,butashighlyvaluedwork.Nootherhumanactivityexpressessowellorsocompletelytheimperativesofsocialcooperationthatdrawusintosocialandpoliticalassociation.Justicecanonlyberealizedifthosewhoattendtosuchvulnerabilitiesarenotexcludedfromthesharingofpower,whereweunderstandpowertoincludepolitical,economicandsocialresources.Throughoutourhistory,suchexclusionhasbeenstandardpractice.Suchexclusiongoesunnoticedinpoliticaltheoriesinwhichinevitablehumandependencyisnothighlighted.Libertariantheoriescannotputdependenceatthecenter,fordependentsanddependencyworkersarepoorexemplarsofthenegativerighttoliberty.Whenyouareadependencyworkerandthelifeorfundamentalwell-beingofyourchargerestswithyou,theexerciseoflibertyisonlyasusefulasitenablesyoutocarryonyourdutiestoyourcharge.Manyothersocialgoodsseematleastassignificant.Inaddition,yourownlibertyishighlyconstrainedbyanurgentmoralobligationtoanother.Whenyouaretooillortoofrailtosurvive,muchlessthrivewithouttheofficesofanothertosatisfyeventhemostbasicofneeds,manyrightsappeartotrumplibertyrights.JohnHosperswritesthatwehavenorighttoenlistotherstoouraid(Hospers1982).Yetifthedependenthadnosuchclaimonanother,dependentswouldnotsurvive,andtheworldwouldhavenohumansinitsfuture.PerhapsHosperssupposesthatallcaringlaborisdone“voluntarily.”Buthowmanypersonswhodofamilialcaring,whenaskedwhytheydoit(especiallywhenitseemsaboveandbeyondwhatthedependentcoulddemand)respondwiththereply:“WhatchoicedoIhave?”Themoralobligationthatmakestheclaimonthosewhoarecloseathand,whoasGoodin(Goodin1985)says,arevulnerabletoyouractions,overridesclaimstolibertyandpropertyforeveryonewhohastherequisitemoralsensibility.Whensocietyhascarefullytaughtgirlsandwomen,butnotboysandmen,toheedmoralpromptingsofthissort,thecollectiveobligationsocietyhastoitsdependentpersonsisdischargedthroughthefreeorpoorlyrecompensedlaborofwomen,andoftenmenandwomenofcolor.Libertariansignoresuchmattersattheexpenseofnearlyhalfthepopulation.Women,whohavebeenexcludedfromtheconcernsofsomanytheoriesofjustice,notonlythelibertarian’s,needtoclaimnotonlytherighttowork,buttherighttocareandtocareinsuchawaythatwedodamageneithertoourselvesnortothoseinourcharge.Toargueforsucharobustsenseofwelfaremayseemtobebesidethepointwhenothersaretryingtoconvinceopponentsandskepticsofevenaminimalwelfarethatdirectsitselftotheurgentneedsofworldhungerandpoverty.Yetmuchofthepovertyworldwide,aswellaswithinourownborders,isthatofwomen—womenandtheirdependentchildren.IfwelfareS,andtheminimalwelfareEthattheUSservesup,hasdonesuchapoorjobofeliminatingpovertyandhungeramongitsownwomenandchildren(mostoftheadultpovertyintheUSisthatofwomen,andbetweenonefourthandonefifthofchildrenintheUSarepoor)howwellwillithelpinnationsmuchpoorerthanourown?Toalleviatepoverty,weneedtolookatwhoispoorandwhytheyarepoor.Thepovertyofdifferentgroupsrequiresdifferentapproaches.Lookingattheparticularneedsoftheelderly,andsoalteringsocialsecurityprovisiontoaccommodatetheircircumstances,significantlyalleviatedpovertyamongtheelderly.Thesamemustbedoneforthepovertyofwomen.Women,underrepresentedingovernment,boardrooms,theprofessorate,andsoforth,areoverrepresentedamongthepoor.Andchildpovertyislargelyaconsequenceofmaternalpoverty.Withoutanappropriateconceptionofwelfareandofwhoispoor,wecannotbegintoaddressadequatelyworldpoverty.Evenifweconvinceourlibertarianopponentsofthejustificationforwelfare,ifweareonlyarguingforastingyandstigmatizedwelfare,wewillnotmakesignificantheadwayinbringingaboutwelfarejustice.Onlyacaringwelfarecandoso.\n78EVAFEDERKITTAYNOTES1Sterbaisnotaloneamongphilosopherswhohavemadeanefforttoshowthatwelfareliberalismmaybederivedfromlibertarianprinciples.SeeBuchanan(1981),whoarguesforthecaseondifferentgrounds.2ThisbriefrehearsalofSterba’sargumentisabitcrude,forSterbahimselfdistinguishesSpencerianlibertarians,whoderiveallrightsfromtherighttoliberty,fromLockeanlibertarians,forwhomlibertyistheabsenceofconstraintsintheexerciseofafundamentalsetofrights.MyargumentagainstSterba’saccommodationoflibertarianismtowelfaristclaimsappliesequallyandinthesamewaytobotharguments,andsoIhavetakenthelibertyofpresentingtheminthisundifferentiatedform.3TheinterchangebetweenSterbaandlibertariansiscitedinSterba(1998;seenotestochapter3).Foranexcellentdiscussionofthedifficultiesofreconcilingwelfaristandlibertarianviews,includinganargumentagainstanearlierversionofSterba’sargument,seeSample(1998).4SeeforexamplePivenandCloward(1973);Abramovitz(1996).5IborrowthisexamplefromGoodin(SchmidtzandGoodin1997).6PatemanpositsWollstonecraft’sDilemmaasthecomplementtowhatDonaldMoon(1988)hascalled“Hegel’sDilemma,”thatis,thatwhiletheredistributionofwealthcanmitigatethepoverty,suchredistribution(throughcashtransfersortheprovisionofgoodsandservicesinkind)may,ontheonehand,undermineacitizen’ssenseofparticipationincommunityandsounderminethecitizen’ssenseofself-worth.If,ontheotherhand,thestatestepsintocreatejobs,suchactioninterfereswiththeautonomousfunctioningofthemarket,andsodisruptsthemachinethatgenerateswealth.7SeealsoFineman(1995).8Foranaccountofhowthewagegapimportantlycorrelateswithhavingchildcareresponsibilitiesmoresignificantlythanwithgender,seeHewlett(2000).SylviaAnnHewlett,afellowatHarvard’sCenterfortheStudyofValuesinPublicLife,ischairmanoftheNationalParentingAssociation.9TANFstillprovidescashassistancetodestitutepersonswithdependents,butnotasaguaranteetoanyonewhomeetsthecriteriaofneed.Timelimits,workfarerequirementsandrestrictionsregardingcitizenshipmeanthatallthoseinthepositionofhavingtocarefordependentsarenolongerguaranteedanincome(howeverstingy).Thewelfarizationofcarethatwasstingily,restrictively,andoftenpunitivelymetedouttopoorwomenneededtoberevamped,butnotinthedirectionofthemorerestrictive,morestingyandstillmorepunitivelegislationthatpassedaswelfarereform.Thereformweneedmovesentirelyintheoppositedirection.10Thishas,forexample,enabledwomeninabusiverelationstoleaveandknowthattheywillnotsubjectthemselvesandtheirchildrentostarvationandutterdestitution.ThehighincidenceofdomesticabuseamongAFDCparticipantsisdocumentedbytheMcCormackInstituteandtheCenterforSurveyResearch,whofoundthatamongarepresentativesampleoftheMassachusettsTransitionalAidtoFamilieswithDependentChildren(TAFDC)caseload,65%wouldbeconsideredvictimsofdomesticviolencebyacurrentorformerboyfriendorhusbandusingMassachusettsstatelawdefinitionofabuse.11NoticethatIamincludingnotonlyeconomicinequalityasaconsequenceofwomen’smajorresponsibilityfordependencywork,butamalsopointingtotheconstraintonwomen’sfreedom,apointdevelopedinKittay(1996)andagaininKittay(1999).12SeeGewirth(1996)foraninterestingdiscussionofthedifferencebetween“reciprocity”and“mutuality.”Gewirtharguesthattheconceptofmutualityisabetterwaytounderstandtherelationbetweenrights-bearingpersons,anditisthisnotion,notreciprocity,thatheemploysinhisdiscussionofwelfarerights.WhileIagreethat“mutuality”isthebetterconcepttoemploy,ittoosuffersfromthesymmetryofreciprocity—asymmetrythatdoesnotpertaininthecaseofdependencyrelations.13InATheoryofJustice,socialcooperationischaracterizedinthefollowingway:Themainideaisthatwhenanumberofpersonsengageinamutuallyadvantageouscooperativeventureaccordingtorules,andthusrestricttheirlibertyinwaysnecessarytoyieldadvantagesforall,thosewhohavesubmittedtotherestrictionshavearighttoasimilaracquiescenceonthepartofthosewhohavebenefitedfromtheirsubmission.(Rawls1971,112)14SeeMacIntyre(1999)foradiscussionofasimilarpoint,namelythattobecomerationalmoralagentswewillhavehadtopassthroughaperiodofdependencywhenanotherassumedthevirtueofcaringfordependents.15However,weshouldnotforgetthatthePersonalResponsibilityandWorkOpportunityActhadasoneofitsmajoraims:“strengtheningthefamily.”Theveryfirstpartofthebillis“Title1—ReducingIllegitimacy.”Itbegins:ItisthesenseoftheCongressthat:1marriageisthefoundationofasuccessfulsociety;2marriageisanessentialsocialinstitutionwhichpromotestheinterestsofchildrenandsocietyaslarge;3thenegativeconsequencesofanout-of-wedlockbirthonchild,themother,andsocietyarewelldocumentedasfollows:…(104thCongress,HR.4,“ThePersonalResponsibilityAct”)16Infact,withbeautifulirony,someconservativecriticsevenworrythatwereworkfaretoreallysucceedinmakingwomenwithdependentsself-sufficient,itwouldunderminethegoalofstrengtheningthefamily.HornandBush(1997),forexample,state:\nWHAT(WELFARE)JUSTICEOWESCARE79Ratherthansimplyhelpingsingle-parenthouseholdsfigureoutawaytogenerateearningsintheabsenceofafather,statereformsmustfindwaystobringmorefathersbackinto(orintoforthefirsttime)thelivesoftheirchildren.Theycontinue:Theproblemisthatstrategiesforpromotingfatherhoodandmarriageare,toaverylargeextent,inconflictwiththosethatseektohelpsinglemothersachieveself-sufficiencythroughwork.Indeed,awelfaresystemthathelpssinglemothersbecomeemployed,butignorestheneedtopromotefatherhoodandmarriage,mayserveonlytoenableunmarriedwomentorearchildrenwithoutthepresenceofthefather.Idonotmeantoignoretheimportanceofmeninthelivesofyoungpersonsgrowingup,northeimportanceofmenengaginginnurturingwork.However,tothinkthattheonlywaytoachievethisendisforwomentomarry,andtodosotoavoidimpoverishment,isafailureofimaginationandpoliticalwill.17MaryL.Shanley,“CommentsonLove’sLabor,”deliveredattheWorkingGrouponLaw,CultureandtheHumanities,WakeForestLawSchool,Winston-Salem,NorthCarolina,March1999.18EvenLocke,intheSecondTreatiseofGovernment,acknowledgesourinextricableinterdependencywhenheadducestheextentandvarietyofthelaborthatgoesintoevenahumbleloafofbread:Foritisnotbarelytheploughman’spains,thereaper’sandthresher’stoil,andthebaker’ssweat[that]istobecountedintothebreadweeat;thelaborofthosewhobroketheoxen,whodiggedandwroughttheironandstones,whofelledandframedthetimberemployedabouttheplough,mill,oven,oranyotherutensils,whichareavastnumberrequisitetothiscorn.…Itwouldbea“strangecatalogueofthingsthatindustryprovidedandmadeuseof,abouteveryloafofbread”beforeitcametoouruse,ifwecouldtracethem:iron,wood,leather,bark,timber,stone,bricks,coals,lime,cloth,dyeingdrugs,pitch,tar,masts,ropes,andallthematerialsmadeuseofintheshipthatbroughtanyofthesecommoditiesusedbyanyworkmentoanypartofthework;itwouldbealmostimpossible,atleasttoolong,toreckonup.(Locke1976[1690]p.26)19Eventhepossibilityofwagesthataresufficienttomeettheneedsoffamiliesdependsontheestablishmentofaflooronwages,whichisimportantlymaintainedbytheexistenceofwelfarebenefitsthatassurepotentialworkersthattheydonothavetoselltheirwagesbelowacertainpriceinordertosurvive.Therefore,theverypossibilityofmaintainingwagesatalevelwhereafamilycanbeself-supportingdependsonstructureswherebysomepersonsarenotself-supportinginthissense.20Morecanbesaid,butIreferyoutoadocumentproducedbyfeministacademicsandactivists,WC100/Project2002entitled“AnImmodestProposalforEndingWomen’sPoverty,”inSojourner:TheWomen’sForum,May,vol.25,no.9,andfoundonhttp:www.welfare2002.org.ReferencesAbramovitz,M.(1996)RegulatingtheLivesofWomen,BostonMA:SouthEndPress.Bubeck,D.(1995)Care,Gender,andJustice,Oxford:ClarendonPress.Buchanan,A.(1981)“DerivingWelfareRightsfromLibertarianRights,”inP.G.Brown,C.JohnsonandP.Vernier(eds)IncomeSupport:ConceptualandPolicyIssues,TotowaNJ:Rowman&Littlefield.Fineman,M.A.(1995)TheNeuteredMother,theSexualFamilyandotherTwentiethCenturyTragedies,NewYork:Routledge.Gewirth,A.(1996)TheCommunityofRights,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Goodin,R.(1985)ProtectingtheVulnerable,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Hewlett,S.A.(2000)“HaveaChild,andExperiencetheWageGap,”NewYorkTimes,16May,p.23.Horn,W.andBush,A.(1997)“Fathers,Marriage,andWelfareReform,”HudsonInstituteReport,March1997.Hospers,J.(1982)“LibertarianismandLegalPaternalism,”inT.R.Machan(ed.)TheLibertarianReader,TotowaNJ:Rowman&Littlefield,135–44.Illich,I.(1981)ShadowWork,BostonMA:MarionBoyars.Kittay,E.F.(1996)“HumanDependencyandRawlsianEquality,”inD.T.Meyers(ed.)FeministsRethinktheSelf,BoulderCO:WestviewPress.——(1999)Love’sLaborEssaysonWomen,EqualityandDependency,NewYork:Routledge.Locke,J.(1976)[1690]TheSecondTreatiseofGovernment,Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill.Maclntyre,A.(1999)DependentRationalAnimals:WhyHumanBeingsNeedtheVirtues(PaulCarusLectures,20thseries),LaSalleIL:OpenCourtPublishingCompany.\n80EVAFEDERKITTAYMoon,D.J.(1988)“TheMoralBasisoftheDemocraticWelfareState,”inA.Gutman(ed.)DemocracyandtheWelfareState,PrincetonNJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,27–53.Pateman,C.(1988)inA.Gutman(ed.)DemocracyandtheWelfareState,PrincetonNJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,231–60.Piven,F.F.andCloward,R.A.(1973)RegulatingthePoorTheFunctionofPublicWelfare,NewYork:Pantheon.Rawls,J.(1971)ATheoryofJustice,CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.——(1992)PoliticalLiberalism,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Sample,R.(1998)“LibertarianRightsandWelfareRights,”SocialTheoryandPractice,24,3,fall,393–418.Schmidtz,D.andGoodin,R.E.(1997)SocialWelfareasanIndividualResponsibility:ForandAgainst,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Shanley,M.L.(1999)“Revisiting‘MarriageContractandSocialContract,’”unpublishedmanuscript,NewYork.Solinger,R.(1999)“DependencyandChoice,”inG.Mink(ed.)WhoseWelfare?,IthacaandLondon:CornellUniversityPress,7–35.Sterba,J.P.(1998)JusticeforHereandNow,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Walzer,M.(1983)SpheresofJustice,NewYork:BasicBooks.\n7LIBERALISMANDFREEDOMJohnDeighIItisacommonplaceofintellectualhistorythatwhatchieflyseparatesthepoliticalthoughtofthemodernsfromthatoftheancientsandthemedievalsisaconcernwithindividualfreedom.Rousseau,inthemostfamouslinefromtheSocialContract,expressedthisconcernbrilliantlywhenhewrote,“L’hommeestnélibreetpartoutilestdanslesfers.”1OnecanonlymarvelathowmuchofmodernpoliticalphilosophyRousseaucrystallizedinthesetwelvewords.Itisthebirthrightofeveryhumanbeingtobefree,anditisthetaskofpoliticalphilosophytofindanarrangementoftheinstitutionsandpracticesofpoliticalsocietythatwillsecurethisrightforeachofitsmembers.Asocietythatfallsshortofthisidealisanunjustsociety.Itdeniessomeofitsmembersthisright.Itkeepstheminchains.Liberalismisthetraditionthatwemostcloselyidentifywiththesearchforthisideal.Itshallmarkisthedefenseofindividuallibertyagainstvariousformsoftyrannythatarejustifiedandprosecutedinthenameofsomeother,allegedlyhigherideal:higher,itsproponentswillargue,becauseitisofgreaterimportanceinthegrandschemeofthingsthanthelifeofanindividual,orbecauseitisofgreaterimportancethanlibertytoanindividual’slife.Liberalismopposesallsuchclaims,andithasbeentheprimarybulwarkagainsttheauthoritarian,totalitarian,andsupremacistprogramstowhichtheygiverise.Atthesametime,thoughliberalismisfirstamongmovementsandtheoriesofmodernpoliticalthoughtinitsconcernwithindividualliberty,theconcernisnotexclusivetoit.Anarchismtoo,insomeofitsforms,springsfromthisconcern.AnditisalsoaprincipalthemeinMarx’searlywritings,theessay“OntheJewishQuestion,”theEconomicandPhilosophicalManuscriptsof1844,andTheGermanIdeology.Ofcourse,therearelargedisagreementsacrossthesemovementsandtheories,notonlyaboutwhatinterferenceswithactioncountasviolationsofindividualliberty,butalsoabouttheverynotionofindividualliberty:whetheritisanessentiallynegativenotion,asHobbesargued,orhassomepositiveelementinit,asRousseauthought.Whatismore,largedisagreementsonthesequestionsexistwithinliberalismitself.ThedisputebetweenlibertariansandwelfarestateliberalsthatresurfacedaquartercenturyagointheUnitedStatesandBritainwiththereturntopopularityofanti-governmentpoliticsisperhapstheforemostexample.2ItdefinedoneofthemajorsplitswithintheBritishLiberalpartyinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,dividedasthepartywasbetweenitstraditionalandradicalwings.Theformercontainedtheclassicalorlaissez-faireliberalsforwhom,followingLocke,individuallibertywassecuredforallbyinstitutinglimitsonthepowersofgovernmentsoastoprotectprivate,voluntarytransactionsfromgovernmentinterference.Thelattercontainedthereformliberalsforwhom,followingT.H.Green,individuallibertywassecuredforthemembersoftheweakerclassesbyprotectingthemfromfallingintoservitudeandwageslaveryasaresultoftheirpovertyandignorance.Thereformliberals’programcalledforthegovernmenttointerferewithcontractsbetweenworkersandownersofprivatebusinessesintheinterestsoftheformer,anditthusputthereformliberalsatloggerheadswiththetraditionalwing.Theearliestlegislationthatthereformliberalssuccessfullygotenactedincludedrestrictionsonthehoursthatabusinessownercouldemploywomenandchildren,andrequirementsthatabusinessownermaintainasafeandsanitaryworkplace.Italsoincludedcompulsoryeducationlaws,whichatthetimewereseenasinterferingwiththefreedomofparentstocontractwithbusinessownersforthelaboroftheirchildren.Thereformliberals,itisimportanttokeepinmind,endorsedsuchlegislationonthegroundsthatitwasnecessaryforsecuringindividuallibertyfortheworkersandtheirchildreninwhoseintereststheselawswereenacted.Theycouldnothaveadvocateditaspartofaliberalprogramotherwise.Thatitwasnecessaryformeetingthesepeople’sbasicneeds,forinstance,wouldnothavebeenadistinctlyliberalbasisforthelaws,sincethatwouldbeconsistentwiththeilliberalregimeofnoblesseoblige.Howtheysawthelawsassecuringindividuallibertyfortheseworkersandtheirchildrenisthereforecrucialtounderstandingthegroundsofwelfarestateliberalism,sincelaterreformsthatareevenmoredistinctiveofthispoliticalprogram,reformssuchasthoseachievedthroughlawsestablishingaminimumwage,entitlementtocompensationforon-the-jobinjuries,andunemploymentandoldageinsurance,hadasimilarjustification.\n82JOHNDEIGHGreen’simportantlectureonliberallegislationsuppliesthekeyargument.3Inbrief,Green’sargumentwasthatindividuallibertyisrealizedonlythroughthedevelopmentofthosehumanfacultiesbywhoseexercisemenandwomencould“makethebestofthemselves,”andsuchdevelopmentisnotpossibleintheconditionsofpovertyandignorancetowhichBritishfactoryworkers,railwayworkers,minersandtheirfamiliesseemedcondemnedasaresultofbeingleftontheirowntoselltheirlabortotheownersofprivatebusinesses.Intheseconditions,Greenargued,workerswereruledbytheirprimitivedesiresandinclinations.Theylackedthematurityofjudgmentandstrengthofcharacteressentialtorealizingafullyhumanexistence,andconsequentlytheiractionswereclosertomereanimalbehaviorthantotheconductofatrulyfreeagent.Merelyremovinglegalconstraintsontheirconductsothattheymightactontheirdesiresandinclinationsastheypleased,Greenpointedout,wouldnotenablethemtoadvancebeyondsuchanimpoverishedlifeandlimitedselfhood.Rather,suchadvancementrequiredpositiveactionbythestate.Itrequiredthestatetocreatetheconditionsnecessaryfortheirdevelopingthosefacultieswithoutwhichahumanbeingcouldnotenjoytheblessingsofindividualliberty.4J.S.Mill’sinfluenceonGreen’sthoughtisapparentinthisargument.Theargument’sappealtothedevelopmentofourdistinctivelyhumanfacultiesechoesMill’sownappealtoself-developmentinchapter3ofOnLiberty.Mill,ofcourse,wasconcernedwithhowcustomandpopularopinionworkedtostuntsuchdevelopmentandcrushitsexpressioninamanorwoman’sindividualpersonality,andtheargumentattheheartofOnLibertyisanargumentforabsolutefreedomofpurelypersonalconduct,freedomtoliveone’slifebyone’sownlightsandplans,asanecessaryconditionforself-developmentandtheindividualitythatresultsfromit.Hewasnotthenconcernedwithhoweconomicforcescouldworktopreventpeoplefromdevelopingtheirintellectualandmoralpowers.Inparticular,hewasnotconcernedwithhowsuchforcescouldkeeppeoplewholackedindependentmeans—manuallaborers,tenantfarmers,theirfamilies,andthelike—indigentandwithouthopeofbetteringthemselvesorimprovingthelivesoftheirchildren.Nonetheless,thereisnoreasontosupposethatonecouldnotremakeMill’sargumentintoonethatappliedtothecircumstancesoftheindigent,orthatdoingsowouldviolateitsspirit.Thereisnothing,thatis,inMill’sargumentthatopposesananalogousargumentinsupportofstateregulationofeconomicforcesforthepurposeofcreatingconditionsinwhichpeopleotherwiseatthemercyofthoseforces,andthusreducedtoacruelandbrutishexistence,coulddeveloptheirintellectualandmoralpowersandrealizeamoredistinctivelyhumanlife.Inthisway,onecanseeGreen’sargumentasjustsuchanextensionofMill’s.Unliketheoriginal,however,Green’sargumentwasmeanttosupportpoliticalactionthatcollideddirectlywiththepoliticsofclassicalliberalism.Green,thatis,unlikeMill,hadthisclashinmindindevelopingtheargumentofhislecture,andtoemphasizeit,heexplicitlydefinedanotionofindividuallibertyincontradistinctiontothenotionfavoredbytheclassicalliberals.Truefreedom,Greendeclared,wasapositivepowerorcapacitytoactinpursuitofmorallyandsociallyworthyends.5Itwasnotmerelyfreedomfromconstraintorcompulsion,notmerelyfreedomtodoasonepleased.Accordingly,inpresentinghisargument,Greensetthepositivelibertywhoseconditionswereforwardedbythereformliberals’politicalprograminoppositiontothemerelynegativelibertywhosesecuritywastheuppermostconcernofclassicalliberalthought,andhavingsetupthisopposition,hethenmaintainedthatonlytheformermettheidealofhumanfreedom.DoesthisshowthatGreeninfactdidmorethanmerelyextendMill’sargument?Doesitshowthathewentbeyonditsterms?Itwouldbeeasytothinkthathedid,sincetheprincipleoflibertythatMilldefendedinhisessayplainlyconcernsnegativeliberty.Yetthisthoughtwouldbeamistake.WhileitistruethattheprincipleMilldefendedconcernsnegativeliberty,theargumenthegaveinitsdefenseisthatitsrealizationinsocietyisanecessaryconditionofthedevelopmentandexercisebyindividualsofpowersandcapacitiesofthekindGreenidentifiedwithpositiveliberty.Hence,Milltoocanbereadasmakingtheadvancementofpositivelibertytheultimateappealinhisargument.6Tobesure,Millhimselfdidnotspeakofpositivelibertyoridentifylibertywithanysetofpowersorcapacities.ButhisrelianceonasimilaridealofhumanfreedomastheoneGreenendorsedisunmistakable.Itisevident,forinstance,insuchthesesandremarksfromchapter3ofOnLibertyasthathumanwell-beingrequiresthedevelopmentandexerciseofcapacitiesformakingchoicesthatexpressone’sindividuality,that“theproperconditionofahumanbeing,arrivedatthematurityofhisfaculties,[is]touseandinterpretexperienceinhisownway,”andthat“individualspontaneity”mustbeseen“ashavingintrinsicworth…anddeserving…regardonitsownaccount.”7Asseveralrecentcommentatorshavenoted,theidealtowhichMillappealsiswhatwenowcommonlyrefertoasautonomy,andautonomyonourcommonunderstandingofitisaformofself-commandorself-determinationandthereforeaformofpositiveliberty.8Green’sargument,byinvokingadistinctionbetweenpositiveandnegativeliberty,thusexplainshowthereformliberalskeptindividuallibertyattheforefrontoftheirpoliticswhilerejectingthedoctrinesofclassicalliberalismthatcalledfortheimmunityofprivate,voluntarytransactionsfromstateinterference.Theexplanation,though,isopentobeingmisunderstood.Thelanguageofpositiveandnegativelibertyisnotoriouslyimpreciseandcannotaloneservetocapturethedifferencebetweenthenotionofindividuallibertythatgaveimpetustothereformliberals’politicalprogram,andthenotionthatdefinedthesecoredoctrinesofclassicalliberalism.Afterall,evenLocke,whosepoliticalphilosophyisthemostauthoritativesourceofthesedoctrines,didnotconsiderindividuallibertytobemerelynegative.Heneithertookittobetheabsenceofcompulsionandconstraint,noridentifieditwithfreedomtodoasonepleased.Liberty,LockedeclaredearlyintheSecondTreatise,isnotlicense.9Onedoesnotexerciseitsimplybydoingwhatonewantsordesires.Tothecontrary,itsexerciserequires\nLIBERALISMANDFREEDOM83thatoneactunderthedirectionofreason,whichLockeunderstoodtobethedirectionoflawsthatonecanknowonlythroughreason.10ThepointofcourseisnotthatLocketooshouldbereadasatheoristofpositiveliberty.Itisratherthatthedisagreementbetweenreformandclassicalliberalsovertheidealofhumanfreedomismuchricherthanthesimpleoppositionbetweenpositiveandnegativelibertysuggests.Classicalliberalsareconcernedwiththedistributionofindividuallibertyundertheruleoflaw.Locke’sdistinctionbetweenlibertyandlicensereflectsthisconcern.ForLocke,theruleoflawisinthefirstinstancetheruleofreasonasinformedbytheNaturalLaw.Accordingly,Lockeconnectedlibertywithactionsdoneinthelightofreason,forheunderstoodlibertyassomethingonlypeoplewhoarecapableofactingundertheguidanceoflawcanenjoy.Specifically,hisviewwasthatlibertyissomethingoneexercisesinvoluntaryactions,actionsthatproceedfromone’svolitions,andvolitionsareformedthroughrationalthoughtaboutone’scircumstances.Actionsdone,unthinkingly,onimpulseorfromsomeoverwhelmingdesire,donotproceedfromtheactor’svolitionsandtherefore,nomatterhowhappilytheactordoesthem,arenotexercisesofliberty.Lockelikenedsuchactionsinsteadtotheactionsofbeasts,who,becausetheylackreason,areincapableofactingundertheguidanceoflawandarethusincapableofactingvoluntarily.Thegeneralidea,whichhistheorypresentsandwhichotherstrandsofclassicalliberalismendorse,isthattheenjoymentoflibertyisthespecialprivilegeofhumanbeingswhoqualifyaslegallycompetentactorsbyvirtueoftheircapacityforvoluntaryaction.They,then,enjoylibertytotheextentthattheyexercisethiscapacityandarenotcoercedbyothers.Themainagentofsuchcoercionisofcoursethestate,andhencetheenjoymentoflibertychieflydependsonthereasonablenessandjusticeofthestate’slaws.Here,then,isthenuboftheclassicalliberals’defenseofliberty:thevoluntaryactionsofindividualsmustbeprotectedfromthestate’suseofitscoercivepowerinwaysthatareneitherreasonablenorjust.Thereformliberals,bycontrast,didnotregardallvoluntaryactionsasexercisesofindividualliberty.Theydidnotthinktheenjoymentoflibertyconsistedinactingfromvolitionsformedinuncoercivecircumstances.Intheirview,itdependedonhowthosevolitionsor,astheywouldsay,choices,wereformed.Tobesure,apersonisnotfreeiftheiractionsarecoerced.Butinaddition,theymaintained,apersonisnotfreeiftheiractionsproceedfromchoicestheymakeasaresultofgeneralignorance,weak-mindedness,uncriticalornaivebeliefs,addictionstocrudeorinfantilepleasures,orthesteadyundercurrentoffearandanxietythatcomeswithlivinginseverelydeprivedorhostilecircumstances.11Thusthereformliberals,bytakingaperson’senjoymentofindividuallibertytodependonhowthechoicesfromwhichtheiractionsproceedareformed,advancedanotionofindividuallibertythatpresupposedcomplexityanddepthtohumanpsychologysignificantlygreaterthanwhattheclassicalliberals’notionimpliedorwhatclassicalliberals,intheirdefenseofliberty,entertained.Inthisrespect,thesimple,seventeenth-centuryfacultypsychologythatinformsLocke’stheoryistelling.OnthisbasicallyCartesianpsychology,thehumanmindisconstitutedbytwoprincipalfaculties,understandingandwill,whichoperateonthesensoryandaffectiveexperiencestowhichitissubject,transformingthemintoopinionandaction.12Oneexercisesone’sunderstandingininterpretingtheexperiencesandjudgingtheirpracticalimport,andthen,onthebasisofthesejudgments,oneexercisesone’swillinformingthevolitionsfromwhichone’sactionsproceed.Whatismissingfromthispsychologyisanymentionofcharacterorindividualpersonalityasafactorintheformationofvolitions.Andthereasonwhyisclear.Thepsychologyistoosimple.Itlackstheconceptualresourcesnecessaryforunderstandingaperson’svolitionsasdetermined,atleastinpart,bytheircharacterorpersonality.Afortiori,itlackstheconceptualresourcesnecessaryforunderstandingaperson’svoluntaryactionsasreflectionsofstrengthsorweaknessesintheircharacterorasreflectionsoftheirhavingamoreorlesswell-orderedpersonality.Hence,anynotionofindividuallibertythatincludestheideathatapersonisfreertothedegreethattheircharacterissound,theirpersonalitywellordered,whichistosay,tothedegreethattheyareincommandoftheiropinionsandactions,entirelyescapesitsgrasp.Whatitsupportsisanotionthatmakesactingatthedirectionofone’svolitionsandintheabsenceofcoercionthetestofliberty,andthussuitsapoliticalphilosophythattakesthereachofthestate’scoercivelawsasthemainmeasureofindividualliberty.Onsuchaphilosophy,thedegreetowhichapersonexercisesself-commandintheformationoftheirvolitionsneverentersthepicture.Theclassicalliberals’unconcernwithhowaperson’svolitionsareformediswellexpressedbyLocke’sfamousassertionthat“person”isaforensicterm.13Thedifference,then,betweenthenotionofindividuallibertythatgaveimpetustothereformliberals’politicalprogram,andthenotionthatsupportsthecoredoctrinesofclassicalliberalism,istraceabletoadifferenceinthewayanindividual’swillisconceived.Thelatternotionissupportedbyaconceptionofthewillasabasichumanfacultydistinctfromotherbasichumanfacultiessuchasunderstandingandfeeling.Theformer,bycontrast,followsfromaconceptionofthewillasasynthesisofvariousfacultiesandcapacitiesthatapersonexercisesinmakingchoicesandthathelptoconstitutetheirpersonality.Thisdifferenceinconceptionofthewillcorresponds,then,toadifferenceinhowparticularexercisesofthewillareunderstood.Ontheconceptionofitasabasicfacultydistinctfromotherbasicfaculties,particularexercisesarelikewiseunderstoodasdistinct,basicmentalacts,andtheterm“volition”istheappropriatequasi-technicaloneforsuchacts.Ontheconceptionofthewillasasynthesisofvariousfacultiesandcapacities,particularexercisesareunderstoodasmentalprocessesthatcombineanumberofdifferentmentaloperations,ratherthanasindividualmentalacts.Accordingly,theuseoftheword“volition”asaquasi-technicaltermceasestobeappropriate,andthelanguageofchoiceanddecision-making,which\n84JOHNDEIGHisbettersuitedtotheideaofaprocessinvolvingtheexerciseofvariousfaculties,isfavoredinstead.ThepointringsclearlyinMill’semphaticdescriptionofthefacultiesthatarecalleduponinmakingapersonalchoiceofalifeplan.Hewholetstheworld,orhisownportionofit,choosehisplanoflifeforhimhasnoneedofanyotherfacultythantheapelikeoneofimitation.Hewhochooseshisplanforhimselfemploysallhisfaculties.Hemustuseobservationtosee,reasoningandjudgmenttoforesee,activitytogathermaterialsfordecision,discriminationfordecision,andwhenhehasdecidedfirmnessandself-controltoholdtohisdeliberatedecision.14ThisshiftfromthelanguageofvolitionstothatofchoicesanddecisionsmarksarecoveryofAristotelianideasabouthumanpsychology.ForAristotle’spsychology,unliketheCartesianpsychologythatLockehadadopted,doesnotincludeabasicfacultyofthewillwhoseexerciseisthesourceofallvoluntaryactions.Rather,onAristotle’spsychology,voluntaryactions—moreexactly,thoseactionsthatwouldcountasvoluntaryonaCartesianpsychology—followfromtheactor’sdeliberativechoices,andtheactorcomestothesechoicesthroughtheexerciseofvariousintellectualandmoralcapacities.15Inthispsychology,unlikeLocke’sCartesianpsychology,aperson’sdeliberativechoicesissuefromthecomplexofintellectualandmoralcapacitiesthatformshischaracter.Theydonotissuefromaseparate,basicfacultyforproducingvoluntaryactions.Thereisnosuchfaculty.Thecomplexityofthehumansoul,onAristotle’spsychology,contrastsstrikinglywithitssimplicityonthatofDescartes.TherecoveryofAristotelianideasinthephilosophythatinspiredthereformliberals’programisevidentinanotherwayaswell.Forthenecessityofthedevelopmentoftheintellectualandmoralcapacitiestotherealizationofone’shumanityisalsoacentralthemeinAristotle’sthought.Onhistheory,thedevelopmentofthesecapacities,whenfullandbalanced,yieldsthemoralandintellectualexcellencesthatconstitutetheidealthetheoryseekstoestablish,andthisidealisentirelyconsonantwiththeidealofhumanfreedomexpressedintheargumentsfromwhichthereformliberalsdrewinspiration.TheinfluenceofAristotle’sideasabouthumanpsychologyontheargumentofchapter3ofOnLiberty,thoughperhapsnotdirect,isnonethelesssubstantial.TheirinfluenceonGreen’sthoughtisnolessprofound.Theunderstandingofindividuallibertythatthesethinkersadvancedandthatgaveimpetustothereformliberals’program,theprogramonwhichwelfarestateliberalismwasfounded,arisesoutoftheseAristotelianideas.Andincontemporarypoliticalthought,thesameunderstandinghasnowresurfacedinthecapabilitiesapproachesofAmartyaSenandMarthaNussbaum,eachofwhomhaspresseditintheserviceofadvocatingliberalreformstoeconomicandpoliticalpoliciesininternationaldevelopment.16IIContrary,then,topopularbelief,thephilosophicaldisputebetweenclassicalandwelfarestateliberalismdidnotoriginateintheHarvardPhilosophyDepartmentinthe1970s.Thisbelieforsomethinglikeithascontributedtothemisconceptionofthedisputeasaquarrelbetweenliberalswholovelibertyandliberalswholoveequality.Itisamisconceptionbecause,asSenhasinstructivelypointedout,theoppositionbetweenlibertyandequalityitassumesisafalsedichotomy.17Classicalliberals,nolessthanwelfarestateliberals,valueequalityinthepossessionofliberty,justaswelfarestateliberals,nolessthanclassicalliberals,valueindividualliberty.Botharechampionsofequalfreedom;bothmaintainthateveryonehasanequalrighttobefree.Theydiffer,asourreviewoftheargumentsofthepoliticalprogramonwhichwelfarestateliberalismwasfoundedmakesclear,inhowtheyconceiveofindividuallibertyandinwhattheycountasitsviolation.Andtheydonotnecessarilydifferintheirsupportforequalityinthedistributionofothersocialgoods,exceptinsofarassuchdistributionisnecessaryforsecuringequalindividualliberty.Orinotherwords,anydifferenceintheirsupportforequalityinthedistributionofothersocialgoods,exceptinsofarassuchdistributionisnecessaryforsecuringequalindividualliberty,isinessentialtounderstandingthedifferencebetweenthem.Theessentialdifferencebetweenthem,therefore,isnotreflectedindisputes,suchasthatbetweenRawlsandNozick,overwhetherdistributionsofwealthinasocietymust,tobejust,conformtosomeegalitarianstandardlikeRawls’sdifferenceprinciple.Tobesure,welfarestateliberalism,becauseitsconceptionofindividuallibertypresupposesself-development—theacquisitionofthecentralhumancapabilities,touseNussbaum’shelpfulterm—supportsgovernment-enforcedtransfersofwealthforthepurposeofsecuringforeveryonewhoneedsthemthegoodsnecessaryfordevelopingandexercisingthesecapabilities.Butsuchtransfersareconsistentwithhugedisparitiesinthedistributionofwealth.Hence,theyarenotundertakentoachieveandmaintainsomeegalitarianpatterninthisdistribution,andtransfersofwealththatareundertakenforthatpurposeshouldhavenoplaceinaliberalpoliticalprogramiftheyentaillossofindividuallibertybythosewhoseestatesarereducedbythesetransfers.Indeed,onecanconstruct,followingSen’swellknowncriticismofRawls’saccountofprimarygoods,examplessupportingthispoint.Sen’scriticismisthatRawls’sconcernwithachievinganegalitariandistributionofprimarygoods,andsowealthandincomeinparticular,isinsensitivetohumandiversity.18Thevalueofthosegoodsvarieswiththeneedsandabilitiesofthosewhopossessthem,andthusatransferofwealth,asrequiredbythedifferenceprinciple,fromsomeone,A,whowas\nLIBERALISMANDFREEDOM85betteroffasmeasuredbythebundleofprimarygoodstheypossessedtosomeone,B,whowasworseoffbythesamemeasure,couldturnouttoimpairA’sabilitytofunctionphysicallyormentallywhilemerelyimprovingB’sbottomline.HencethetransferwouldachieveitsaimofgreaterequalityinthedistributionofwealthatthecostofA’sliberty,andnoliberaltheoryofjusticeshouldendorsethis.Thislastpoint,tobesure,doesnotimmediatelyapplytoRawls’stheory.Rawls,afterall,didnotfollowGreenandotherreformliberalsinrejectingthenotionofindividuallibertycontainedinthecoredoctrinesofclassicalliberalism.Tothecontrary,heacceptedit,andasaresultcould,bypointingtohisdoctrineofthepriorityofliberty,denythathistheorycalledforimposinglossesofindividuallibertyonsomeinordertoincreasethewealthofothers.19ButwhatthisresponsewoulddowasbringoutRawls’sunderstandingofhistheoryasonethatsupportstheinstitutionsofthewelfarestateandatthesametimeretains,asthesolenotionofindividualliberty,thenotionthatiscentraltodoctrinesthatsuchliberalismopposes.20Whatitshows,then,isthatRawls,havingexcludedthepossibilityofappealingtoanidealofindividuallibertytojustifytheinstitutionsofthewelfarestate,mustturninsteadfortheirjustificationtoanidealofequalityinthedistributionofsocialgoods.Thushistheorycomestorepresentaconceptionofwelfarestateliberalismthat,inoppositiontoclassicalliberalism,endorsesanidealofequalityinthedistributionofsuchgoods,incomeandwealth,inparticular.Anditisreasonabletosupposethatthenowcommonunderstandingofwelfarestateliberalism,asdifferingfromclassicalliberalisminbeingcommittedtoanidealofequalitythatcomesintoconflictwiththatofindividualliberty,arisesforthesamereason.Thatis,itarisesbecauseofanassumptionthatthenotionofindividuallibertyinformingthelatteridealisthenotioncontainedinthecoredoctrinesofclassicalliberalism,forgiventhisassumption,onethennaturallysupposesthattojustifytheinstitutionsofthewelfarestate,appealtotheformeridealisnecessary.Thisunderstandingofwelfarestateliberalism,asthediscussionofSectionImakesclear,departsfromtheideasonwhichthereformliberalsgroundedtheirpoliticalprogram.Itdepartsfromthem,moreover,intwoways.Notonlydoesitincorporatetheclassicalliberals’notionofindividuallibertyandnotthenotionthereformliberalsfavored,italsoelevatestheidealofequalityinthedistributionofsocialgoodstoanidealworthrealizingforitsownsake.Ittreatsthisidealasaseparatestandardfromthatofindividualliberty.Thisseparationofthetworepresentsarevisionofliberalthought.Tobesure,liberalism,whetherclassicalorreform,isanegalitarianphilosophy.Itbowstonoothertraditioninitscommitmenttopromotingequalindividuallibertyforall.Atitscoreisthedoctrinethateverymanorwomanhasanequalrighttofreedom.Whatismore,itpromotesequalityinthedistributionofothersocialgoodswhereverinequalitiesintheirdistributionthreatensomewithlossorcurtailmentofthisright.Butuntilrecently,liberalthinkersdidnotregardinequalitiesinthedistributionofsuchsocialgoodsasincomeandwealth,asinjusticesindependentlyoftheirbeingathreattohumanfreedom.Theydidnotsupportmeasurestomakethedistributionofwealthinasocietymoreequalsimplyforthesakeofachievinggreaterequalityinitsdistribution.Liberalismisself-identifiedasaprogressivephilosophy.Theaimofexpandingpeople’sindividuallibertyisaprogressiveaim.Itisanarticleofliberalfaiththathumanityadvancesthroughthepromotionoffreedomforall.Theaimofmakingthedistributionofwealthmoreequalisnot,asafinalaim,obviouslyaprogressiveone.Itisnotobviousthatrealizingthisaiminitselfmakeshumanlifebetter.Thedistinctionbetweenpromotinggreaterequalityinthedistributionofwealthasanidealworthrealizingforitsownsakeandpromotingitasnecessaryforprotectingpeople—thepoorermembersofsocietyinparticular—fromlossorcurtailmentoftheirrightoffreedom,iscrucialtoseeingwhythenowcommonunderstandingofwelfarestateliberalismrepresentsafundamentalchangeinliberalthoughtfromtheideasonwhichthereformliberalsgroundedtheirpoliticalprogram.Forthedistinctionexplainshowthereformliberalscouldbestrongsupportersofgreaterequalityinthedistributionofwealthwithouteverregardingcontingentinequalitiesinitsdistributionasinthemselvesunjust.Itexplains,inotherwords,howthestrengthofone’scommitmenttoreducingsuchinequalitiesneednotdependonone’sregardingthemasinherentlybad.Onemightseetheminsteadasconditionsthatthreatenpeople’sliberty,particularlythosewhoseshareofthisgoodistheleastbountiful.Hencethecruxofthedifferencebetweenthenowcommonegalitarianunderstandingofwelfarestateliberalismandtheunderstandingofthereformliberals,liesintheplaceinaliberaltheoryoftheidealofequalityinthedistributionofwealth,andnotinthestrengthofthecommitmenttothatideal.Theformerunderstanding,becauseitincorporatestheclassicalliberals’notionofindividualliberty,placestheidealincompetitionwiththatofsecuringequalindividuallibertyforall.Thelatter,bycontrast,placesitinapositionofsupport.Onthereformliberals’understanding,promotinggreaterequalityinthedistributionofwealthadvancesthecauseoffreedom.Thekeyconceptintheargumentonwhichreformliberalsbasedthisviewistheconceptofthecommongood.Humanbeings,theyheld,areessentiallysocial.Politicalsocietiesarenot,assometheoristssuppose,organizationshumansformtoescapethedangersanddeprivationsofasolitarylife,andtheoristswhostartwiththissuppositionmisconceivepoliticalphenomenafromtheget-go.Conceivinghumanbeingsassocial,then,thereformliberalsunderstoodtheintellectualandmoralcapacitieswhosedevelopmentwasnecessarytoenjoyinglibertyasprimarily,thoughnotexclusively,capacitiesforengaginginsociallife.Suchengagementconsistsinactinginconcertwithothermembersofone’ssocietyforthepromotionofacommongood,agoodinwhicheveryoneshares,andconsequentlyone’senjoymentoflibertyisconditionedonone’slivingalifeinwhichsuchactivitiesareprominent,orinwhichonecanseetheactivitiesthatareprominentascontributingto\n86JOHNDEIGHsocialgood.Green,forinstance,identifiedtheobjectsofsuchactivitieswiththemorallyandsociallyworthyendsinthepursuitofwhich,hemaintained,peopledevelopedthepowerstomakethebestofthemselvesandsoachievefreedom.“Whenwemeasuretheprogressofasocietybyitsgrowthinfreedom,”hewrote,wemeasureitbytheincreasingdevelopmentandexerciseonthewholeofthosepowersofcontributingtosocialgoodwithwhichwebelievethemembersofthesocietytobeendowed;inshort,bythegreaterpoweronthepartofthecitizensasabodytomakethemostandbestofthemselves.21Andagain,atthebeginningofthenextparagraph,heasserted,“Freedom…[is]theliberationofpowersofallmenequallyforcontributionstoacommongood.”22Thecommongood,asthereformliberalsconceivedofit,comprisestheinterestsofeverymemberofsociety.Inaddition,eachmember’sinterestscontributeequallytoitscomposition.Theinterestsofeach,inotherwords,areequalinweightandworthtothoseofeveryoneelse.Theyallcountthesame,thoughofcourseinanygivensituationthebestmeanstoadvancingthecommongoodmayentailbenefitingsomemembersmorethanothers.Toliveinasociety,therefore,inwhichsomemembers’interestscountlessthanothers,inwhichthelawsandcustomstreatthehonorandwell-beingofsomeaslessworthyofprotectionandpromotionthanthehonorandwell-beingofothers,andinwhichtheinstitutionsandpracticesmostlyoperateforthebenefitofsomeandnotothers,wouldbetoliveinasocietyinwhichsocialengagementsdidnotofferopportunitytoactinconcertwithothersinthepromotionofthecommongood.Itwouldbetoliveundersocialconditionsthatwereunconducivetoone’sdevelopingthemoralandintellectualpowersoneneedstoengagewholeheartedlyinsuchactivities.Hence,onthereformliberals’notionofindividualliberty,itwouldbetoliveundersocialconditionsunsuitedtotheenjoymentofsuchliberty.Worsestill,theseconditionswouldfostertypesofpersonalityinwhichthemoralandintellectualfacultieswerearrestedintheirdevelopment,ordistortedinwaysthatcrippledtheirpossessorsforengagementinsociallife.Thetypesarewellknownfromhistoryandliterature.Ontheonehand,whenasenseofsuperiorityisbredintopeopleasaresultoftheirenjoyingfrombirthinstitutionalprivilegesfromwhichothersareexcluded,theupshotoftenistocreateinthemaninnerneedtoseethosetheyregardasbeneaththemsupplicateandsuffer.Havingasenseofsuperiority,theyneedtohaveitconfirmedinthebehavioroftheir“inferiors,”andunderthepressuresofthisneedtheydevelopdependenciesthatleavethemexcessivelyself-involvedandunfree.Ontheother,whenpeoplecometoseethemselvesasinferiortoothersasaresultofbeingexcludedfrominstitutionalprivilegesthatthoseothersenjoy,theycaneasilyfallintostatesofhumilityandsubserviencethatleavethemwithoutinitiative,andpreytothecontrolandmanipulativenessofothers.Alternatively,though,iftheyretainasenseoftheirownworth,theymaythenbeconsumedbyanangerthat,becauseitwouldbeimprudenttoventitonthedistantkeepersandbeneficiariesoftheinstitutionsthatoppressthem,isdisplacedontolocalobjectsindestructiveandself-destructiveways.Ineithercase,theconditionsofcasteandexclusiongivethemembersofthelowercastelittlechanceofdevelopingtheenergeticandbalancedpersonalitiesonwhichtheenjoymentofindividuallibertydepends.Thereformliberals’programthusincludedlegislationintendedtorootoutentrenchedprivilegefromsociety’sinstitutionsandpractices.Maleprivilegeandclassprivilege,inparticular,werebothobjectsofreformseliminatingbarrierstotheparticipationinpubliclifebywomenandthelowborn,andtotheiroccupationofpositionsofadvantageandinfluenceinsocialandeconomicaffairs.Andeffortsatestablishingstateprovisionoffree,universaleducationwerelikewiseaimedateliminatingtheentrenchedprivilegesofsexandclass.Alloftheseeffortswerebackedbytheanalysesofsuchprivilegeascreatingconditionshostiletofreedom,asdenyingthosecondemnedtosocialandpoliticalinferioritytheopportunitiesnecessaryforself-development,andasalsoproductiveofdisorderedpersonalitiesthatlefttheirpossessorsunhappyandunfree.ThusHobhouse,writingaboutliberalism’sdismantlingof“thoserestraintsontheindividualwhichflowfromthehierarchicorganizationofsociety,andreservecertainoffices,certainformsofoccupation,andperhapstherightoratleasttheopportunityofeducationgenerally,topeopleofacertainrankorclass,”coulddeclare,“Oncemorethestruggleforlibertyisalso,whenpushedthrough,astruggleforequality.”23Byextension,then,thesameanalysiscanapplytolargedisparitiesinthedistributionofwealthwithinasociety.Becausesuchdisparitiescantakeonthecharacterofclassdivisions,theytoocanbeathreattoindividualliberty.Wherewealthsoinfluencestheoperationsofsociety’sinstitutionsastocausethemtodeliverdisproportionatelymorebenefitstothosewithlargeestatesthantothosewithmodestones,andwhereitsoinfluenceslegislationandsocialconventionastohavethelawsandcustomsofsocietytailoredtotreatwealthierpeopleasworthyofgreaterprotectionoftheirhonorandpromotionoftheirwell-beingthanthelesswealthy,thesameconditionsdeleterioustoindividuallibertyariseasarecreatedbyentrenchedprivilegesofsexandclass.Andwhere,asaresultofthesedistortionsintheworkingsofthesociety’sinstitutionsandpractices,lawsandcustoms,thewealthiermembersareencouragedtoseetheirgoodfortuneasabadgeofsuperiorityandthepooreronestoseetheircomparativelackofwealthasasocialstigma,thesametypesofdisorderedpersonality,thesamesocialpathologies,arisewithinthesepopulations.Consequently,effortsatcurbingdisparitiesinthedistributionofwealthsoastokeepthemfrombecomingsolargeorpronouncedastocreatesocialconditionsunsuitabletotheenjoymentofindividual\nLIBERALISMANDFREEDOM87liberty,becamepartofthereformliberals’program.Aprimeexample,preciselybecauseoftheprivilegedcharacterofinheritedwealth,waslegislationimposingstiffinheritancetaxesonlargeestates.Itisthecorruptivepowerofwealthwhenamassedbyprivateindividuals,therefore,thetendencyofconcentrationsofgreatwealthinprivatehandstotakeonthetrappingsofaristocracy,thatjustify,onthereformliberals’theoryofthewelfarestate,effortsatcurbinglargedisparitiesinthedistributionofwealth.Thisthreatofcorruptionismostseriouswhenitcentersonpublicinstitutions,apointofparticularimportanceonthereformliberals’theory.Ontheirtheory,publicinstitutions,aboveall,mustworkandbeseentoworkinwaysthatcounteveryone’sinterestsasequal,fortheseinstitutions,morethananyothers,affordcitizensthemostdirectandfundamentalopportunitiesforactinginconcertwithothercitizensinthepromotionoftheircommongood.Theseinstitutions,thatis,morethananyothers,affordcitizenswiththemostdirectandfundamentalopportunitiesforengaginginthekindofactivitiesthroughwhichindividuallibertyisrealized.Thusdisparitiesofwealthmustnotbeallowedtobecomesolargeastoenablewealthiercitizenstousetheirgreaterwealthtoinfluencetheworkingsoftheseinstitutions,inwaysthattilttheresultstotheiradvantageandtodisadvantageofpoorercitizens.Theycannotbeallowedtobecomesolargeastoenablethemtousetheirwealthtoincreasesignificantlytheprospectsofelectingofficialswhowillactintheirspecialinterests,toinducelawmakersdirectlytoshapelegislationinwaysmorefavorabletothosespecialinterests,ortoharnessthepowerofthecourtsintheserviceofthoseinterests.Suchusesofwealth,thetendencytowhichisperhapsinevitableinitsamassing,destroysthecommongoodasanend,towardthepromotionofwhichcitizenscanseethemselvesactingthroughtheirparticipationintheseinstitutions.Rousseau,intheSocialContract,offeredthatwealthshouldnotbecomesounequalinitsdistributionastoenableawealthycitizentobuyapoorone.24Hedidnotobjecttosuchinequalityasunjustinitself.HesawitinsteadasdestructiveoftheGeneralWillandsoofthelibertythatdependsonit.Equality,hesaid,isanobjectoflegislativeinterestnotbecauseitisgoodinitselfbutbecauselibertycannotexistwithoutit.25ThereformliberalsdidnotendorseRousseau’speculiartestforwheninequalityinthedistributionofwealthhasbecometoogreattobeallowed.Theydidnotmakeitpartoftheirprogram.Buttheirideasandsentimentsonthequestionofhowmuchinequalityinthedistributionofwealthtoallowwereotherwisethesame.26NOTES1“Manisbornfreeandeverywhereheisinchains,”SocialContractandDiscourses,trans.G.D.H.Cole(NewYork:E.P.Dutton&Co.,1950)p.3.2Foradefttreatmentofthisdispute,seeJamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)pp.41–76.3Lectureon“LiberalLegislationandFreedomofContract,”inT.H.Green,LecturesonthePrinciplesofPoliticalObligation,edsP.HarrisandH.Murrow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986)pp.194–212.4Ibid.5Ibid.6Ofcourse,Millsaidthattheutilitywastheultimateappealofhisargument.Buthequicklyadded,“itmustbeutilityinthelargestsense,groundedonthepermanentinterestsofmanasaprogressivebeing,”andutilityinthislargestsensecanencompasspositiveliberty.OnLiberty,ed.DavidSpitz(NewYork:WWNorton,1975)p.12.OnthispointseeRichardWollheim,“TheEndsofLifeandthePreliminariesofMorality:JohnStuartMillandIsaiahBerlin,”inhisTheMindandItsDepths(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1993)pp.22–38.7OnLiberty,pp.54–5.8SeeforexampleGeraldDworkin,“Paternalism,”inMoralityandtheLaw,ed.R.Wasserstrom(BelmontCA:Wadsworth,1971)pp.107–26;FredR.Berger,Happiness,JusticeandFreedom:TheMoralandPoliticalPhilosophyofJohnStuartMill(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984)pp.232–7.9SecondTreatise,§6.10Ibid.,§57.11PerhapstheboldeststatementofthisideaisfoundinL.T.Hobhouse’sLiberalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1964),wherehewrites,Itisalsopossible…tofosterthedevelopmentofwill,ofpersonality,ofself-control,orwhateverwepleasetocallthecentralharmonizingpowerwhichmakesuscapableofdirectingourownlives.Liberalismisthebeliefthatsocietycanbesafelyfoundedonthisself-directingpowerofpersonality.(p.66)12SeeLocke,AnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding,bookII,chapter21.13Ibid.,bookII,chapter27,§26.14OnLiberty,p.56.\n88JOHNDEIGH15OnAristotle’sviewsofvoluntaryaction,seeMarthaNussbaum,TheFragilityofGoodness(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986)pp.264–89.16See,forexample,AmartyaSen,InequalityReexamined(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1992)andMarthaNussbaum,WomenandHumanDevelopment:TheCapabilitiesApproach(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000).17Ibid.pp.21–3.18Ibid.,pp.79–84.19ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971)pp.201–5,243–51.NotethatRawlsimplicitlyrepudiatesthereformliberals’notionoflibertywhenhewrites(p.204)thatpovertyandignorancereducethevalueoftheirsufferers’libertybutnottheirlibertyitself.20Rawlsnonethelessavoidsadirectclashbetweentheidealofindividuallibertyandthatofequalityinthedistributionofsocialgoods,bylimitingtheformertowhathecallsbasicliberties.Theseincludefreedomofspeechandassembly,freedomofconscienceandthought,therighttovoteandholdpublicoffice,andsoforth.Hedoesnotexplicitlyincludefreedomofcontractamongthesebasicliberties.Hementions“therighttohold(personal)property”butleaveswhatthisrightentailsunspecified.Nonetheless,histheoryasawholemakesitplainthathedoesnotthinkthisrightprecludesthestate’sinterferingwithaperson’scontroloverhisestateorhislaborforthepurposeofachievinggreaterequalityinthedistributionofwealthandincome.Hisdoctrineofthepriorityofliberty,inotherwords,doesnotprotectfreedomofcontractfrombeinginterferedwithbythestateforthepurposeofpromotinggreaterequalityinthedistributionofwealth,anditthereforefollowsthatfreedomofcontractisnotoneofthebasicliberties.Seeibid.,p.61.21“LiberalLegislation,”p.199.22Ibid.,p.200.SeealsoHobhouse,Liberalism,pp.67–9.23Liberalism,p.21.24SocialContractandDiscourses,p.50.25Ibid.,pp.49–50.26IamgratefultoDanBrudney,EvaKittay,MarthaNussbaum,andJimSterbaforcommentsonanearlierdraftofthisessay.\nVirtueethicsandcommunity\n8JUSTICEASAVIRTUERobertC.SolomonInthisessay,Iamconcernedwithjusticeasapersonalvirtue.Talkingaboutjusticebywayofthevirtuesandmoralpsychologyhastwoconsiderablebenefits:first,itembedsjusticeinconcretepracticesandpersonalities,ratherthanleavingitintheabstractasjustsomuch“theory”(accordingly,virtueethicshassometimesbeencalleda“‘notheory’theory”).Andsecond,itmakesjusticeintosomethingpersonal,asIthinkitwasforthegreatthinkersinthehistoryofthesubject,beginningwithSocratesandPlatoandcertainlyincludingAristotle,DavidHume,AdamSmithand,lookingbackandtowardsAsia,Confucius(IwouldalsoaddNietzsche,althoughwhathehastosayaboutjusticewouldbemuchtoocomplicatedformetogetintohere).Onemightsaythatjusticeisoneof,orakinto,themoralsentiments.Whichisnottosaythatjusticeis,asourundergraduateswouldsay,merely“subjective.”Itisrathertoinsistthatitisinextricablefrompeopleandcommunity.Itisinthissense“communitarian,”andvirtueethicsandcommunitarianismareoftenconsideredstronglylinked,ifnot(sometimes)identical.ThisiseasytounderstandinthelightofAristotle,andmythesisheremightwellbecalledan“Aristotelian”conceptionofjustice.ButIdon’twanttowedmyselftoAristotle’sparticularconcerns.NordoIwanttoaccepthisratherantiquatedobjectionstocommerce.NordoIwanttosuggestanysympathywhateverfortheAthenianslave-statesocialstructureinwhichAristotleelaboratedhisPolitics.Aristotle,ofcourse,issometimesconsideredtheparagoncommunitarian,intheinnocentsensethathisconceptionofjusticesimplyassumestheroleofcommunityinjustice.Furthermore,althoughthisisapointthatismoreoftenmadeincriticizingAristotle,itisthecommunitythatdetermineswhatsortsofthingscountasjustandunjust.Butratherthanjointhisattenuatedefforttore-classifyAristotleinmodernideologicalgarb,Iwanttolimitmyselftohisgeneralconceptionofethicsintermsofthevirtues,andofjusticeinparticularasasocialvirtue.Asforcommunitarianism,Iwanttodistancemyselfasmuchaspossiblefrommanyoftheviewsthatparadeunderthisbanner,astancethatAlasdairMacIntyre,perhapsthemostrespectedproponentofthiskindofview,hasalsotaken.Asheputsit,“therearegoodcommunitiesandtherearebadcommunities.”1Tobesure,insofarascommunitarianjusticeisconceivedjustastheemphasison“thecommongood”andtracedbacktoAristotle,asJimSterbaconceivedofitinhispreviouswork,2thenotionseemsinnocentenough.Butcommunitarianjustice,insofarasitacceptstheprimacyofthecommunityovertheindividualandtothatextentunderminesthesignificanceoftheindividualandindividualrights,isaconceptionofjusticeaboutwhichIhavegravereservations.Itmakesnosenseexceptinconnectionwithotherpeople.Youmightsaythatjusticeisacommunalvirtue,butthemoveIwanttoresististhemovetopredicatejusticeofcommunitiesorsocietiesor,moretothepointofmypaper,toabstractsocialsystemsorschemas,ratherthanofpeopleandtheiractions.Tosaythatjusticeisasocialvirtueistoinsist,asConfuciussays,thatasavirtue(jen,orhumanity)itonlymakessenseinthecontextoftwoormorepeople.AnditisasocialvirtueforthedeeperConfucianreasonthatitisavirtuethatisconstitutedbysocialnorms,expectations,andpractices(li,orritual).ItiswhatHegel,inoppositiontoKant,emphasizedasSittlichkeit,anethicsofactualcustomsandpracticesasopposedtoanethicsofapriorirationalprinciples.WhereIdisagreewithHegel(andagreeratherwithhiscriticsSchopenhauerandNietzsche)isinhisminimizingtheroleofwhattheycalled“personality”inhisconceptionofjustice,orwhatIamhighlightingasthecentralroleofpersonalvirtue.IalsothinkthatthisiswhereIdisagreemostwithSterbaandanynumberofothertheoristsofjusticewhowouldgiveprimacytoimpersonaltalkoverthepersonal.3Letmeveryclearaboutthelimitsofmyclaimthatjusticeisavirtue.KurtBaier,severalyearsago,4distinguishedbetween“strong”or“radical”virtueethicalpositionsontheonehand,and“weak”positionsontheother.AlthoughtheNietzscheaninmebristlesatthethoughtofit,myclaimhereisonlyofthe“weak”variety.Thatis,Idonot,likeMichaelSlote,forexample,takevirtueethicstoencompassthewholeofethics,muchlessthewholeofsocialphilosophy.Ionlyclaimthatconsiderationsofvirtueandcharacterareindispensableindiscussionsofjustice,andsupplement(notreplace)considerationsofthepublicgood,obligation,andthelike.Tobesure,suchconsiderationscanandshouldbebuiltintotheconceptionofasocialvirtue,butIwouldnotwanttoputtoomuchweightonthatsortofanalysis.IdonotbyanymeansdenyaroleforKantianorMillianconsiderations.Infact,onemightwellargue(andithasbeenwellargued)thatbothKantandMillarenot-so-closetedvirtueethicists.\nJUSTICEASAVIRTUE91MythesisthereforehasacomplexandnotentirelyantagonisticrelationshiptowhatSterbahasarguedinJusticeHereandNowandmanyofhisotherworks.Iapplaudhisdefenseofananti-gladiatorialwayofdoingsocialphilosophy,whathecalls“peacemaking,”butIwouldaddthatthepeacemakingprocesscanbegreatlyenhancedifpersonalfeelingsandpracticesareputonthetableinsteadofbeingveiledintheabstractionsofpuretheory.Ofcourse,philosophicalprejudicegoesinexactlytheoppositedirection,butthissuggestsseveralunappreciatedintellectualandsocialvirtues,whichIwouldbethefirsttopraiseifnotalwaystopractice.IalsoapplaudJim’scareer-longambitiontoestablishwhathecalls“commonground.”Butisthereanysuchcommonground,asJimtriestoargue?Isharethedoubtthatthenotionofliberty(asopposedtothenotionofrights)ofthepoorwouldhavemuchimpactonadiehardlibertarian,andthisisn’tbecauseJimfailstomakehiscasefortrans-ideologicaltranslation.Mydoubtconsistsratherofmythinkingthattherearerealincommensurabilities,andnotonlyonatheoreticalorideologicallevel.Nevertheless,therealbenefitofthevirtueapproachtojusticeisthatitdoesnotseethefieldofjusticemainlyintermsofdebatesanddilemmas.Thiswasapointwelldefendedbymycolleague,thelateEdmundPincoffs,inoneoftheseminalbooksonvirtueethics.5Hearguedthattoomuchofthediscussionsofethicshadfocusedonethicaldilemmasandbitterdisputes,andwhatwasleftoutwasthelessdramaticday-to-daybehaviorofpeoplejustgoingabouttheirjobsandtheirlives.Thereneedbenoconflictinorderforadiscussionofjusticetobeperfectlyappropriate.Andwhentherearegenuineanddifficultdisputesitisnotinsignificanttolookattheeverydaypracticesandpersonalitiesinvolved,aswellasanyabstractprinciplesthatmayhavebearingontheissue.Theincommensurabilitiesandseeminglyirresolvableconflictsthatcontinuetorivetourattentionmaydependnotjustonaclashofprinciplesandconflicts(“rights,”“liberty,”etc.)butondeeperandmorepersonalconsiderationsanddeterminations.DavidMillerhaswrittenanimpressivebutunder-appreciatedbookabouthowvarious“theories”ofjusticearebasedondifferingsocialpractices.6Iwouldonlyaddthattheymayalsobebasedondifferenttemperaments,bothpersonalandcultural.Isuggestthatmostofushavenoticed,howevermuchweresiststereotyping,thatfolkswhopursueoneoranotherofthestandardsocial-politicalagendassharemorethanjustanideology,avocabulary,andasetofphilosophicalassumptions.Totakeafamiliarexample,someanarchiststendtoberebelswithanauthorityproblem.Ithinkitissafe,insuchcases,tosuggestthatneithertheirrebellioustemperamentnortheiranti-authoritarianismhasbeenacquiredbywayofphilosophicalargument.Ofcourse,philosophicalconversionsareofspecialinteresthere,andagain,ifIcanappealtoourcommonexperience,thenowfamiliartransformationoflate1960shippiesintoright-wingconservativesissomethingthatallofus,whetheroutofapprovalordisgust,havetriedtoexplain.Whatusuallyunderliessuchexplanationsissomethingalongthelinesof“heorshewasthatwayallalong,”where“thatway”specifiessomepersonalitytraitthatiscontinuousthroughsuchasocio-politicalBildungsroman.Idonotintendthesebriefreflectionsasanysortofreductionistapproachtojusticeasmerelyamatterofpsychology.Mypointisratherthatjusticeisgrounded(althoughIhavetroublewiththatmetaphorforvariousreasons)notinreasonorinthemurkycrucibleof“highestvalues”butinparticularsocialandpersonalpractices,circumstancesandthesecond-natureresponsesandfeelingstheyengender.Oneoftheseoftenneglectedingredientsinourvariousconceptionsandpracticesofjusticeistrust.Trustplaysanoftenunacknowledgedroleinhowweconceiveofjustice.Toputthematterintermsofablunthypothesis,themorethatonetrustsone’sfellowcitizens,thelessimportantabstractschemesofjusticebecome.Thelessonetrustsone’sfellowcitizens,themoreimportantabstractschemesofjusticebecome.This,Isuspect,mightbearevealingopticfromwhichtoreadmanyphilosophicaltheoriesofjustice.Itwillbe,Iamsure,animportantconsiderationaswebuildtheso-calledglobaleconomy.But,toreiteratemymainpointhere,avirtue,thevirtueofjusticeinparticular,isamanifestationoftheconfluenceofsuchsocialandpersonalpractices,circumstances,second-natureresponsesandfeelings,andthesearenotirrelevanttoourhigher-levelreflectionsofjustice.JusticeasapersonalvirtueAsmygrandfathertaught,itisnotnecessaryforeveryonetosacrificeourlivesforothers.We[just]needtotakealittletimefromourlivestohelp.ArunGandhi(Newsweek,4March1989)LookingbackovertheWesterntraditioninsocialphilosophy,onemightwellobjecttocallingjusticeavirtue.BernardWilliams,forexample,whohasmanyaffinitieswithAristotle,hasclaimedthattheveryideaofjusticeasapersonalvirtue—suchasonefindsinAristotle—isacategorymistake,anincoherenceifnotactuallyanoxymoronoracontradictioninterms.JohnRawls,ofcourse,saysattheverybeginningofhisgreatTheoryofJusticethatjusticeis“thefirstvirtueofsocialinstitutionsastruthisofsystemsofthought.”Butavirtueofinstitutions,likethevirtueofbeta-caroteneandvitaminC,isn’twhatIhaveinmind.Withoutgettingintothelargequestionaboutagencyinorganizations,letmejustsaythatthevirtuesinquestionarethevirtuesofpersons,andinthatsensepersonal.\n92ROBERTC.SOLOMONThereisalsoafurthersense,lessobviousbutequallycentraltomythesis,thatthevirtuesarepersonalinsofarasitisnecessaryforpeopletocare,bothabouttheirbeingvirtuousandaboutthesituationandcircumstancesinwhichtheirvirtuesareappropriate.AsforRawls’ownconsiderablevirtues,Iamafraidthatthe“virtue”partofhismessageistooeasilylostinthetheoreticalrigmaroleoftheVeilofIgnoranceandthedebateoverminimaxpreferences.Thisisn’tjustamatterofdistraction.ForallofhisdebttoRousseau—andIbelievethatitisaheavydebtindeedandoftenunacknowledgedbyRawls’followers—thesenseinwhichjusticeisavirtueeitherofinstitutionsorofpersonsiscanceledout,ontheonehand,bytheblockingofparticularitiesbehindtheVeilofIgnorance(forwhatisavirtueifitisnotaparticularity?)andontheotherbyRawls’heavyemphasisonwhathasoftenbeenrecognizedastheKantianaspectsofhistheory(theintimaterelationbetweenRousseauandKantnotwithstanding).Wedon’tgettowhatRawlscalls“thesenseofjustice”untilpage453,andnotsurprisinglythatsensehasmoretodowiththeinternalizationofthetheorythathasprecededthisbelateddiscussionthanithastodowithwhatRousseauwouldhaveclearlyseenaspersonalvirtue.Nevertheless,noneofthisistodenythatreasonanddeliberationareessentialtooursenseofjustice.Toputthemattersimplyandbluntly,theabilityandwillingnesstodeliberateanddebateisascentraltotheworkingsofjusticeascaringandtherightsortsoffeelingsandpractices.CaringcantooeasilydegenerateintothatpointlessformofpitythatNietzschesodespised,andthemoralsentimentswithoutbroaderunderstandingcantooeasilymanifestthemselvesinthatobnoxiousformcommentedonbyWilliamJames,inwhichawealthymatronweepsatanItalianoperaaboutthehorrorsofpovertywhileherfootmanfreezestodeathoutsideinthesnow.Deliberationandreflectionarevirtuesofjustice,asAristotlesawsoclearly.Itisthesynthesisoffeeling,habit,thoughtandconversation(notnecessarilydebate)thatconstitutesajustlife.SinceSocratesasked“Whatisjustice?”twenty-fivecenturiesago,philosophicaldiscussionsofjusticehaveemphasizedthesupremacyofrules,reasonandrationality,andtherehasbeentoolittleappreciationoftheroleofthevirtues.Platoinsistson“harmony”betweenpassionsandreasonasthehallmarkofvirtue,althoughIthinkthatNietzscheisultimatelyrightwhenheaccusesSocrates,andwithhimPlato,ofmakinga“tyrant”outofreason.Rawls,asIsaid,tendstothinkofthesentimentsasdispositionstoactonrationalprinciples,andtothisextentseemstoviewthemasinessentialinthedeterminationofjustice.7Ofcourse,suchsentimentsmayenterintothe“reflectiveequilibrium”throughwhichweevaluateourvarioustheoriesagainstpre-theoreticalintuitions(whichRawlsvariouslydescribesas“intuitivelyappealingaccounts,”“variousreasonableandnaturalpresumptions”and“initialconvictions”).ButRawlsrarelydescribestheseassentimentsassuch,andseemstotaketheiraffectivecharactersimplyforgranted.Manyotherauthors,ofcourse,havesimplydismissedallsuchtalkofthevirtuesandthesentimentsasmere“sentimentality”andinsistedthatourpersonalfeelings,suchascompassion,onlyconfuseanddistorttherationaldeliberationsofjustice.Kantfamouslydegradesthevarious“inclinations”asatbestsecondarytomorality,andsarcasticallydismisses“meltingcompassion”or“tendersympathy”inaninfamouspassageontheinjunctionto“lovethyneighbor,”justashevigorouslyrejectsanyroleforvengeanceinhisretributiveaccountofjustice.8Nevertheless,Kanthadearlierreferredtocompassionas“beautiful,”albeitwithout“moralworth.”Ihaveelsewherearguedthattherecanbenoadequateunderstandingofjusticewithoutanappreciationandunderstandingoftheroleoftheemotionsingeneralandthemoralsentimentsinparticular,butthisstancedoesn’tmakemuchsenseunlessonethinksofjusticeasapersonalvirtue.InthisIamclearlyinleaguewithHumeandSmith,bothofwhomcountedjusticeamongthemoralsentiments(thoughtheygavethemverydifferentstatus).ButIwouldaddthatthisessentialrolefortheemotionsmustmakeroomfornotonlythosebenignmoralsentimentssuchassympathy,careandcompassionandother“fellow-feelings”butalsothenastieremotionsofenvy,jealousy,resentmentand,especially,vengeance.(AsmuchasIenjoytalkingaboutthese,Iwillnotdosohere.)Oneproblemwithvirtuetalkisthatittendstobeoverlyindividualistic,itsoriginsinphilosopherslikeAristotleandConfuciusnotwithstanding.Someofthis,nodoubt,comesfromthemoralsentimenttheoristsoftheeighteenthcentury.Someofitisaspill-overfromKant,whodespitehisindifferencetovirtuetalk(thatis,inthesenseof“virtue”intendedhere),wasradicallyindividualistinhisethics,the“KingdomofEnds”notwithstanding.Muchofit,needlesstosay,comesfromourownAmericanobsessionwithindividuality,libertarianismbeingjustoneofthemoredramaticversionsofanontologythatdeeplyinfectseveryethicalandpoliticalpositionintheUnitedStates(andespeciallyinTexas).Buttotalkaboutjusticeasapersonalvirtueisnecessarilytotalkaboutjusticeasasocialvirtueandtoinsistthatjusticeisnecessarilytwo-sided:itispersonalinthatitisavirtuehadandpracticedbyaperson,butitisessentiallysocialinthatithasnecessarilytodowithourresponsestoandinteractionwithotherpeople.Aristotle,despitehisanti-commercialbias,wasclearaboutthisinsofarasheinsistedthatjusticeisallaboutfairexchange.Tojuxtaposejusticeasapersonalvirtueagainstjusticeasafeatureofabstractsystemsleavesoutthecentralfeatureofjustice,andthatishumaninteraction,including,notleastofall,thevirtueoflisteningtootherpeople.IthinkthatConfuciusisespeciallygoodonthis.Hedistinguishesjenor“humanity”andlior“ritual,”whichwe(nothe)mightidentifyasthe“internal”andthe“external”aspectsofoneandthesamevirtue.TheclassicConfucianexampleisfilialpietywhich(contraAristotle)hasmanyaffinitieswithjustice.Tohavetherightsortsoffeelingsforyourparentsispraiseworthy,butonlyinsofarasthosefeelingsgetexpressedinactions,inpracticesthatexemplifyrespectandreverence.Butsuchactionsandpracticesareworthyofpraiseonlyinsofarastheyare“filled”withtherightkindsoffeelings(notjust\nJUSTICEASAVIRTUE93“puttingonashow”).Buteventotalkintermsoffeelingsandtheiroutwardexpressionistodistortthephenomenon.ThusConfuciusarguesthatfilialpietyisnotonlyanattitude,norevenanattitudeplusaction.Itisontologicallyafunctionoftwo(ormore)people,anexampleof“co-humanity”or“sharedhumanity”(accordingtoConfucianscholarWing-sitChan).9So,too,Iwanttoarguethatjusticeasapersonalvirtueshouldnotforamomentbeconsideredintermsofsomedisposition,the“inside”ofwhichisappropriatelymanifestedonthe“outside,”inbehavior.Itisbothpersonalandsocialinsofarastheindividualisdefinedandconstitutedbytheirroleandrelationshipsinthecommunitywithotherpeople.Thusweshouldnotconfusejusticewithbenevolence,norevenwithbeneficence.Inthis,Ithink,HumewasrightandSmithwrong(inhisdescriptionofjusticeintermsofbeingpainedatthesufferingofothers).So,tothisextent,Iwouldadmitthatweshouldresistthetemptationtotalkaboutthevirtueofjusticeintermsoffeelings,even“compassion”and“benevolence.”10ItisperhapsinstructivethatArthurSchopenhauer,noexemplarofthevirtues,managedtorestthewholeofethics—inoppositiontoKant—onthesentimentofcompassion,whichhesimplycharacterizedastherealizationthatwe’reallinthesameshit.ButSchopenhauerdidn’tfeelcompelledtodoanythingwhatever,whichhejustifiedonthebasisofhisersatzBuddhism.IfhehadstudiedConfucianism,orChinesephilosophymoregenerally,itmighthavebeenaverydifferentballgame(Iwouldsaythesame—infact,evenmoreso—forNietzsche).TosummarizemypositioninChinese,justicerequiresbothjenandli.Thatiswhatmakesitavirtue.Isjusticeasavirtue“relative”?Virtueisalwaysandnecessarily“relativeto”somesetofsocialandpersonalpractices,thecircumstances,theculture,and,Iwouldargue,personalandculturaltemperamentsandexperiences.Thisraisesthespecter,althoughitsnatureisbynomeansclear,ofrelativism.Thenot-so-innocentimplicationisthattheremaybenoultimatewayofadjudicatingdifferencesbetweenconceptionsofjustice,writlarge,but,moreimportantinmybook,theremaybenoultimatewayofadjudicatingdifferencesinthestreet-leveldisagreementsoverspecificactsandpracticesconcerningjusticeandinjustice.Sterba,likealmosteveryotherwriteronthetopic,dismissesrelativismas,ifnotabsurd,difficultandimplausible,11towhichmyresponseis,“notsofast.”IamoftenamazedthatthinkerslikeRichardRorty,forinstance,whowouldseemtobedrawntorelativismliketheproverbialducktowater,givenwhatelsehehasargued,neverthelessdistanceshimselffromitasmuchaspossible,givingitaninterpretationthatno-onewouldwanttodefend.IamnotsoamazedthatAlasdairMacIntyresimilarlydistanceshimselffromrelativism,givenwhatelsehehasargued,butneverthelessIthinkthathisargumentpokingsomefunatDonaldDavidson’sblandTarskiism(“‘snowiswhiteistrue’iffsnowiswhite”)andhisuseofthetellingexampleofthedifferentmeaningsofLondonderry/DoireColumcille(orAl-QudsandYerusalayim)(WhoseJustice?WhichRationality?,p.378)isthebestargumentforrelativismandincommensurabilityIhaveeverheardorread.12Butrelativism,orperhapsjusttheword,rubsarawnerveinphilosophers(andinsomepoliticianstoo).Ihavealwaystriedtounderstandwhy.Tobesure,the“anyviewisasgoodasanyother”interpretationisonethatno-onecouldholdforlong.Anditisindeedaveryrealquestion,asJimasks,“relativetowhat?”andindeedapersonstuckinaconflictedsituation—thearchetypalexampleisHuckwithJiminMarkTwain’sHuckleberryFinn—inwhichthequestionof“relativetowhat?”isbynomeansaphilosopher’schallengebutareal-lifeexistentialdilemma.13Perhapswe,likeTwain,canreadofHuck’sperplexitywithacertainamusement,certainaswearethatslaveryisjustplaindeadwrongandthesubcultureinwhichitwasanessentialpracticeandconsideredlegitimatewasjustplainwrong.Butthereareallsortsofcaseswherethemoralconsiderationsarenotsoone-sided,andIdonotmeanonlythoseover-stressed“contemporarymoralproblems”suchasabortion,euthanasia,thedeathpenalty,andsoon.Thequestionof“humanrights”inChinaisonesuchcasethatIwouldbringupforconsideration,inpartbecauseitsobadlyfitsintotheliberal-libertarian-socialisttrichotomythatdominatessomuchofourdiscussion.ThefactthattheChinese,underconsiderableinternationalpressure(mainlyfromtheUS),havelearnedtoadaptthelanguageofrightsinthedebatejustmakestheveryrealincommensurabilityofpositionsallthemoretroublesome.Tobearelativistisnottoconcludeapriorithatsuchdisputesareirresolvable,buttotrytounderstandsuchconfrontationsinverydifferenttermswithoutprejudgingtheinevitabilityofonesideturningouttoberightandtheotherwrong.Todemonizerelativismistoooftenaquicksteptowardinsistingonasingle“absolute”senseofvaluesandaconclusion,withoutevenforamomentbotheringtolistentotheotherside.IguessIjustdon’tseewhat’sso“moral”aboutsuchanabsolutiststance.NordoIseewhatissowrongwithrelativism,soconceived.AgainIapplaudJimSterba’sattemptatpeacemaking,butIquestionhisecumenicaloptimism.Makingpeacemaysometimesconsistinjust“callingitadraw.”ThusIwouldarguethatbecausetheconceptionofjusticeasasocialvirtueisdependentoncommunalconceptionsandsocialcontext,Iam(relatively)arelativistonjustice.Fairnessisnotfirstofallamatteroflogicorproportionorequality.Itisafunctionoflocalexpectations,conversationandconsensus.Thisisnottodenytheobvious,thatinpluralisticcultures(oreveninsupposedlyhomogeneouscultures)peopleseriouslydisagree,butthedisagreementsthemselvesaretheproductofthecultureanditsoftendivergentexpectationsandconversations.Noristhistodeny—whatMarthaNussbaumhasbeentirelesslycampaigningaboutinrecentyears—thatthereareuniversalvaluesandvirtues,notinanapriorisensebutonthe\n94ROBERTC.SOLOMONbasisoftheuniversalcontingenciesofthehumancondition.Nevertheless,whatcountsasjusticeorinjusticeandwhatcountsasaseriousissueordebateaboutjusticeandinjusticedependsverymuchonthelocalsituation,theeconomy,thesociology,thereligion(s),thephilosophy.Considerthisratheraucourantexample:withthewaveofIPOinternetstocksandsuch,therearenowagreatmanytwenty-eight-year-oldmultimillionaires.(MichaelKinsleyhascoinedthephrase“internetenvy”todescribethesocialeffectsofthis.)Isthisunjust?Fiftyyearsago,indeedeventwenty-fiveyearsago,itwouldhavebeenthoughtsobymostAmericans.Today?Idoubtit.Onemaylamentorcelebratethechangeinattitudestowardluck,risk,hardwork,meritandthevicissitudesofwealth,butitisevidentthatattitudeshavechanged,andwiththatacriticalperceptionoffairnesshaschangedwiththeculture.Someofthis,ofcourse,hastodowithscopeandperspective.What’swrongwithatwenty-eight-year-oldmultimillionairebyluck?Perhapsnothing,orsotheargumentgoes,ifthemultimillionaireinquestionhasprofitedfromhisownratheringeniousinsightorinvention(althoughIamhesitanttoincludethosemanysmallinternetfortunesthatarebasedonnothingotherthanbuyingupmarketablewebsitenames).Buteventhemostavidfreemarketeershouldbesomewhatconcernedwiththelotteryaspectofthemoderneconomy,andwhenoneaddstothisthefactthatnearlyaquarterofAmericans—andmorethan3billionpeopleworldwide—arelivinginpoverty,thequestionofjusticepainfullysurfaces.Ofcourseitsoonfoundersonthequestionsofgovernmentinterventionandcontrol.Whatistobedone?Taxtherich?Regulateinvesting?Eliminatethestockmarket?Crushcapitalism?Urgethepoortoinvestinstart-upcompaniesandIPOs?Idon’texpectmuchagreementhere,butIjustwanttonotehowsignificantlyfeelingsaboutjusticehavechangedinonlyafewyears,andthatiswithinanalreadyheavilyifnotobsessivelyfreemarketculture.Butwhatdoesthishavetodowithperceptionsofjusticeasavirtue?Doesn’tthissuggest,tothecontrary,thatjusticeandinjusticearefunctionsofsocietyanditsattitudes?Well,no.Societyanditsattitudes(thatisourattitudes)dodeterminewhatwillcountasjusticeandinjustice.Buttheobjectofourjudgmentsisnotsomuchtheoverallportraitofthesocietyanditsstatisticsasthebehavioroftheindividualswithinthatsociety,and,inparticular,thebehaviorofthosetwenty-eight-year-oldmultimillionaires.Whatismoretothepointthanthefactofgrossinequalityandthechargesofdubiousmeritistheshamefulfactthatmostoftheseyoungmillionairesgivevirtuallynothingtocharityandhavenothoughtofanyobligationtodoso.HereiswhereIwanttofocusmyattention,notonthejusticeandinjusticeofinstitutionsorthesocietyasawhole,butonthemoralintuitionsandpracticesofpeople.Onemightsaythattheconceptofjusticehasnotcaughtupwiththeneweconomicsandthenewsociologythatgoesalongwithit.ButIwouldsaythattheinjusticeliesnotsomuchinanewworldinwhichwhatusedtobederidedas“speculation”paysoffsowellandsoquicklyasitliesintheinsensitivityandlackofresponseofthosewhoenormouslyprofitinthatworld.Thisisnottodenythatthereareunjustsocialarrangements,ofcourse,butIwanttobeveryverycautiousaboutmakingthemaprioriso.WerethesocietiesofNebuchadnezzarandAssurbanipal(betterknownintheguiseofthemythologizedSardanapalus)unjust?Let’snotjumptomiddle-classliberalconclusions.Thesameconceptualdramaisbeingenactedontheglobalstage.Ourcollectiveconceptsofjusticehavenotcaughtupwiththeneweconomicandtechnologicalrealitiesandthenewsocialworld.Platonistsofallstripesmayprefertothinkofjusticeassomethingthatprecedesanyparticularsocialsituation,butIwouldsuggestthatconceptionsofjusticeandsocialsituationsareco-evolving.Whatisitthatremainsthesame?Nothingbutthatsentimentoffellow-feeling,andwithitthesensitivitytothepainandsufferingofothersandsocialpracticesthatreflect(andbringabout)theparticularitiesoffellow-feelingandsensitivityineachandeveryparticularculture.TheConfucianChinesehaveaverydifferentconceptionofthenatureofsocietyandtheplaceoftheindividualwithinitthandidScottishindustrialsocietyintheeighteenthcentury.AndyetitisremarkablethatwefindpassagesinMenciusthatcouldhavecomerightoutofAdamSmith,andvice-versa.Concernandcaringandthesocialpracticesthatexpressthemarewhereanyconceptionofjusticestarts,andwithoutthem,justiceisjustanemptyphilosopher’sscheme.Ofcourse,otherpeople’senvyisalsoasortofsuffering,andlestwejumptooquicklyintoanoverlysaccharineportraitofhumannature,letusremindourselveshowhardweworkbothtocultivateandtodefuseenvyinothers.Communitiesarenotjustsocialarenasofcooperation.Theyalsoinvolvecompetitionandaretherebybreedinggroundsforenvy.Oneoftheproblemswithso-calledcommunitarianismisitstendencytowhitewashcommunalrelations,butjustice,surely,meanscopingwithenvyjustasmuchasitmeanssharingwithothersorhavingarighttoone’sownwealth.Andhowwecopewithenvy,includingourreadinesstoprovokeitinothers,hasagreatdealtodowiththevirtueofjustice.Whatoneenvies,however,isalmostentirelydeterminedbytheparticularrelationsandexpectationsofthesocietyorculture.Justice,toputthematteroverlybluntly,is“relativeto”envy,totheparticularsocialandculturalconstructionsofcompetitionandinterpersonalcomparison.Moralityversusself-interest:anuntenabledualismOneofthemainvirtuesofthevirtueapproachtojusticeandtoethicsingeneralisthatitprettymuchby-passestheoppositionthatiscentraltoSterba’sconcerns,betweenmoralandself-interestedconceptionsofthegood.Jimsuggeststhatthe\nJUSTICEASAVIRTUE95oppositionreappearsas“differentaspectsoftheself”inAristotelianethics,butIthinkthisunderstateswhatismostimportantabouttheconceptofvirtue.Tobesure,avirtueapproachsuchasAristotle’sdoesnotprecludethepossibilityofself-interestedmotivation,whichatitsmostvulgarandanti-socialappearsasvice.Onecanstilltalkof“moreorless”asameasureofself-interestalongseveraldimensions(e.g.isitprofitable?doesitmakeyoufeelgood?Doesitincreaseyourstatusinthecommunity?Doesitincreaseyourpower?Doesitprovideinsightorotherwiseimproveyourcontemplativeunderstanding?).Butinthecasesthatcountformostindiscussionsofsocialjustice,forinstance,givingsomeofone’sgoodstoothersandwieldingpoweroverthem,thebreakdownoftheoppositionbetweenmoralandself-interestedconceptionsofthegoodissurelywelcomenews.Theoppositionbetweenmoralsandself-interestlendsitselftoenormousabuse,bothinphilosophy(whereitraisesallsortsofdilemmaswhichdistractusfromworryingaboutjustice)andontheproverbialstreet,whereitinspiresmuchmischiefandmisunderstanding.Howmuchinjusticeisduetotherationalization“Well,itwaseitherthemorme!”asifthedichotomyofselfandothersisabsolute?Howmuchcheapmoralizinghasgatheredunderthebannerof“Well,italsoservedhisownself-interest”(e.g.whenTedTurnergaveabillionbuckstotheUnitedNations,andhiscriticsonlypointedtotheclevertaxadvantagesstructuredintothegift).Generosity,ifitreallyisgenerosity,isnotarationalmoralduty,norisittaintedbythepleasureandpossiblyeventhetaxdeductionsonegetsoutofit.AsAristotleandConfuciusbothsowiselypointedout,itgivesonepleasuretobegenerous,whichisnottoeithersuggestordenythatareasonforbeinggenerousistoobtainthatpleasure.IrecentlyopenedupanendowmentattheUniversityofTexasforcreativehonorsstudents.Astheysaythesedays,Ifeltthat“itwastimetogivesomethingback.”Whatsurprisedme,infactalmostoverwhelmedme,wasthejoyIgotfromdoingit.Yes,Ididgetaheftytaxdeduction.Andyes,itisanon-goingprocesstowhichIhavecommittedmoremoneyintheimmediateandcontinuingfuture.And,yes,IdohopetorecapturesomeofthatpleasurewhichIenjoyedonthefirstroundofgiving.Butdoanyoftheseadmittedlyself-interested(oratanyrateself-satisfying)reasonscompromisemygenerosity?Idonotthinkso.Whyshouldweinsiston“givinguntilithurts”asthesignofthetruevirtue?Whyshouldweexpectcorporationstosacrificetheirself-interest(or,moreaccurately,compromisetheirfiduciaryobligationtothestockholders)inthenameofsomeothervalueorconcern?ButtoleapfromthistotheFriedmanianargumentthatcorporatecharityis“stealingfromthestockholders”(nottomention“pure,unadulteratedsocialism”)isjusttoshowtheinvidiousnessandthedestructivenessofthemoralversusself-interestdichotomy.Wecancontinuetocondemnoutrightselfishness,andwecancontinuetopraisesaint-likesacrifice,butlet’snotmakethemthepolesofthedebatetowhicheveryonemustcommitthemselves,onewayortheother.Iwanttorejectthesupposedoppositionbetweenegoismandmoralityonthegroundsthatagooddealofourbehaviorisneitherself-interestednorprincipled,butparticipatory,motivatedbyourmembershipinthisorthatcommunityandparticipatinginitsrituals.IwenttoaconferenceamonthorsoagoandheardRussellHardin,alwaysbrilliant,alwaysperverse,argue(andmostofthepoliticalscientistsagreed)thatvotingisirrationalasthecostsalmostalwaysoutweighanypossibleimpactonemighthaveontheelection.14Iwas,asusual,aghast.Tounderstandwhypeoplevoteistounderstandthatpeoplevalueparticipationoverso-called“utilityfunctions,”andIwouldsaythatanynotionofrationalitythatfailstoappreciatethisisdegenerate.Inthissense,Iamacommunitarian,andIholdthatthevirtuesofcivic-mindednessaremorebasictojusticethanprinciplesorconceptions.Backtobasics?IamnottheonlyonewhohaslatchedontothevirtueapproachtoethicsbecauseIthinkthattherolesofdeliberation,theuseofmoralprinciples,theabstractionsofethicaltheory,andcentralityofrationalityareoftenoverstatedinphilosophy.Wedonotusuallydeliberatebeforedoingtherightthing.Wedonotnormallyhaveaprinciple“inmind”whenweactmorally.Ofcourseonecandeliberateandentertainsuchaprincipleinthewaythatphilosophersargue,althoughIwouldsuggestthatitismainlyphilosopherswhodothis.Butmostpeopleareutterlyincompetentwhencalledupontojustifyorevenexplainwhattheyaredoingwhentheyactrightly,althoughtobesuretheywillusuallyparrotsomeprinciple(“It’swrongtolie”)whenprovoked.Theiractionsareneithermotivatedby,noraretheytobeexplainedintermsof,rationalprinciples.Thequasi-articulate,virtuousphrases,“becauseIjustfeltitwasright”or“becausethat’sthekindofpersonIam”arewhatweexpectfrommostnon-philosophers,andit’snotbecausetheydon’tunderstandwhattheyaredoingorwhy.Thereisconsiderableslipperinessbetweentheappearanceofprinciplesinordinarydeliberationandtheuseofsuchprinciplesinthejustificationofethicalbehaviorinphilosophy.Idon’twanttocastaspersionsonthephilosophicalquestforjustification(althoughIthinkthatthephilosophicalquestforajustificationofmorality,thatis,ofmoralityüberhaupt,isillconceived).NordoIthinkthatitisamistaketolookforphilosophicaljustificationsofoneoranotherconceptionsofjustice(though,again,Ithinkthatthephilosophicalquestforajustificationofjustice,thatis,ofjusticeüberhaupt,isillconceived).Suchphilosophicaldeliberationssharpenourfocusandclarifyourconversation.Ithinkthatconflictandconfrontationinmoralmattersisagoodthing—exceptperhapsatthedinnertableandinbed.Peacemaking,asSterbaconceivesofit,should\n96ROBERTC.SOLOMONnotbeconfusedwithslurringoverthedifferences,orwithlazyrelativism,whichrespondswithanindifferentshrugoftheshoulders,whichisverydifferentfromanysortofdefensiblerelativism.Butso,too,peacemakingshouldnotconceiveofitssuccessonlyintermsofovercomingallconflictandcontroversy,orfindingbasicprinciplesuponwhichopposingphilosopherscanagree.Peacemakingmaybenomorethanurgingtolerance,makingitpossibletolivetogether,ifnotharmoniouslythenatleastwithouthostility.Thephilosophicalemphasisonbasicprinciples,Iamafraid,moreoftenexacerbatesconflictratherthanencouragingmutualtolerance.Ithinkthattheultimatevirtueofthevirtueapproachtojustice(andethicsmoregenerally)is,inmyview,thefactthatitisa“bottom-up”approach,asopposedtomostphilosophers’“top-down”wayofthinkingaboutthesethings.Thatimage,ofcourse,goesstraightbacktoPlato(althoughSocrates,Iwouldargue,ismuchmoresubtle).Itisthistop-downwayofthinkingthatinsistsonnon-question-beggingargumentsandonbasicprinciples(“normsofrationality”).Idon’tthinkthatthisiswhatgoesonmuchinthestreet(thustheamusementwithwhichtheformulationofmostphilosophicalargumentsaregreetedinpracticalcontexts).CharlesTaylor,addressingtheseriousmulticulturalissuesinhisnativeQuebec,encourageswhathecalls“ingeniousadhoccery.”Thisisnotonlyopposedtotheemploymentofgeneralprinciples.Itconstitutesanadmissionthat,inthecasesthatreallycountasmattersforseriousdebate,therearenosuchprinciples,norusefulargumentstoorfromsuchprinciples,andsonosuchmajorconcernoverbeggingthequestionornotdoingso.Moregenerally,IwouldsuspectthatwhenSterbaarguesthat“alibertarian’sideaoflibertyhasthesamepracticalrequirementsasawelfareliberal’sidealoffairnessandasocialist’sidealofequality,”15evenifthisistrue,thestreet-levelargumentsbetweenthem—whethertocutorraisetaxes,whethertoexpandorcontractstatewelfaresystems—wouldnotberesolved.Perhapsthelanguagewouldshift.Perhapstheliberalwouldstartarguingintermsof“liberty”forthepoorinsteadofthetraditionalliberallanguageof“rights.”ButIsuspectthatabroadincommensurabilitywouldremain.Butthen,Sterbaisanoptimist.Isuspectthathehastobe.Iamnot.Butthis,Ithink,saysalotmoreaboutthetermsofourdebatethanthetraditionaldiscussionsaboutjusticewouldcaretoexplore.Whichraisesthemoregeneralquestionofrationalityanditsrelationtomorality(“moralitygroundedinrationality”).Sterbarehearsesanumberofargumentsforrationallyfavoringmoralityoveregoism.Ihavealreadyquestionedthatdichotomy(asSterbadoesverybriefly,inpassing,onpage23ofJusticeHereandNow),butIwouldalsowanttoraisesomesimilarquestionsaboutthenatureofrationality.Thequestion“Whyberational?”isonethathasalwaysstuckinthephilosopher’scraw.Outofirritation,thequerygetsarapidanddismissiveresponse:“Whatkindofanswerdoyouwant?Ifarationalanswer,thenyouhavealreadyacceptedblah,blah,blah.Andifyouwon’tacceptanyansweratall,thenblah,blah,blah.”It’snotaveryconvincingperformance.Amorehonestwayofputtingitwouldbe,“Ifyoudon’twanttoplaythegame,thengetoutoftheseminarroom.”ButIwanttoaskaNietzscheanquestion,whichmightbestated,“Whymustwehaverationalityatanycost,anyway?”or“What’sthevalueofrationality?”Sincejusticeisoftenequatedwithrationality(inthesocialsphere,asismoralityinthemorepersonalsphere),thisisnotanirrelevantormerelyrudequestion.Sterbatakesnon-question-beggingnessasoneofthetouchstonesofrationality.ButIamnotsurethatthereisanon-question-begginganswertotheveryquestion“Whatisrationality?”Exactlywhatistherationalitythatisatstakeinsocio-politicaldebates?Obviously,Iwon’tpursuethisatlengthhere,althoughIhavetriedtodosoinarecentbookofmine,whichalsotalksaboutjustice,calledTheJoyofPhilosophy.Letmejustsaythat,first,whateverelseitmaybe,justiceisnot,asinmanyrecentgame-theoreticalandeconomictreatments,themaximizationofself-interests,whetherornotthisinvolvesconsiderationsofoptimizationorotherpeople’sinterestsaswellasone’sown.Inotherwords,itisnotthedegeneratenotionofrationalitythatIdismissedattheendoftheprecedingsection.Andsecond,itisnot,asinthelegacyleftfromKant,amatterofimpersonality,afeaturethatisvariouslysuggestedinsuchcriteriaas“universalizability”and“nevertreatingyourselfasanexceptiontotherule.”Tothecontrary,theselfisdeeplyinvolved,thoughnotnecessarilyinaself-interestedway,inevendistantcasesofjusticeandinjustice.IthinkthereisagooddealtobesaidagainsteventhemostminimalconstraintsofsuchKantiancriteria,whichmightbesummarizedas“consistency.”(Don[notJohn]Locke,manyyearsago,arguedquitenicelythatuniversalizability,despiteallthefuss,camedowntonomorethanademandforconsistency.)Butasoftennoted,onecanalwaysfindsomedifferencebetweenanytwocasessuchthatamoraljudgmentappliestooneandnottheother,evenifthatdifferenceisnomorethanonesituationfollowstheother.Specifyingtherelevanceofsuchreasonsis,asalsooftennoted,notaformalmatter.Itinvolvesaheavydoseofcontextualism,and,Iwouldargue,aconsiderationoflocalpractices.Mereconsistencyisnotonlythehobgoblinoflittleminds.Itisalsoaphilosophicaldeadend.Asisuniversalizability.Asisanyconceptionofreasonthatpretendstobeitselfvalue-free.Inmybookandelsewhere,Isuggestthatrationality—thatis,theversionofrationalitythatisatstakeinthesedebates—comesdowntothis:caringabouttherightsortsofthings.Idonotpretendthatthisisnon-question-begging.Andofcourse,itleavesquiteopenwhattherightsortsofthingsmightbe.ButtheshiftIamsuggesting,nonetoosubtlely,isthatrationalityisnotimpersonal.Thisshouldnotbeconfusedwithanydefenseofthatdegeneratesenseofrationalitythatisequatedwithself-interest.Rather,rationalityiscaring,andcaringintelligently.Theupshotofthis,ofcourse,isthatweshouldcareaboutjusticeandjusticeistherebyrational(asopposedtotheotherwayaround:justiceisrationalandweshouldthereforecareaboutit).Again,Iamawareofthequestion-beggingnatureof\nJUSTICEASAVIRTUE97thisresponse:“Howdoyouknowitistherightthingtocareaboutotherthanthefactthatitisrationaltocareaboutit?”butIsuspectthatthismaybethebestthatwecandowheresuchglobalhumanissuesasthewell-beingofotherpeopleisinvolved.(Inparticularcases,ofcourse,the“whyshouldyoucare?”questionalmostalwayshassomesortofanswer,namely,fittingintoalargerframeworkthatistheappropriatecontextforcaring.)Themoreprobingquestionishowanysuchsuggestionhelpsresolvethedebateamongcompetingconceptionsofjusticeor,onalargerscale,competingpracticesofrationality.Myansweristhatitdoesn’t,nordoIthinkthatanynon-question-beggingconceptionofrationalitycandoso.AsIreadthroughJimSterba’sbook,thestrongtemptation,naturally,wastomeethimoncommonground,considerthestrongeststatementofhisposition,andIamsurethatthatiswhatmanyoftheotherdiscussantshavebeendoing.Butmyobjectionisthatthiswouldleavesomethingessentialoutofthediscussion.Abstractionsabout“liberty”and“equality,”thoughtheyprovidegristforthephilosopher’smillaswellasbannersandslogansforpoliticalpundits,demagoguesandsacrificiallambsalike,donotcapturethewaywethinkaboutjusticeor,justasimportant,haveonlysecondarilytodowithhowwefeelaboutjustice.Farmorebasicarethepersonalpracticesthatwelearnfromourculture,theattitudesweformaccordingly,andthevirtueswecometodevelopbypursuingthosepracticesandcultivatingthoseattitudes.Needlesstosay,Iamnotsayingthatweshouldeliminatethelanguageof“liberty”and“equality”fromourdebatesaboutjustice.Butinsofaraswedospeakonthatlevel,IhopethatwealllearnsomethingfromSterba’seffortstobea“peacemaker”andreconcileopposingpositionsusingsomesharedvocabulary.Butmynagginglamentisthatsuchdebatestooeasilyleaveoutthe“heart”ofjustice,andthisiswhatthevirtueconceptionofethicstriestocorrect.Itisnotasubstitutebutasupplementtowhatissovigorouslyarticulatedanddebatedinourhigh-falootin’philosophicallanguageofjustice.Itremindsusthatitisnotwhatwethink,norevenwhatwedo,thatmakesusjust.Itisalsowhatwefeel,howwerespond,andwhatsortofpersonsweare.ConclusionSocrates,itseems,hadtwoverydifferentkindsoflessonstoteachus.16Thefirst,exemplifiedinhischaracteraswellashisdiscussions,istheimportanceofjustice—admittedlyinabroadersensethanouruseoftheterm—asapersonalvirtue,awayofrespondingtotheworldandotherpeople.Soconceived,justiceishighlypersonalandalwayssituatedinaparticularsocialcontext.Indeed,thepoliticalvisionofTheRepubliccanbeviewedasanattempttoschematizejustthatsocialcontextwhichwillmosteffectivelymanifestandcultivatethatvirtueineachandeverycitizen.ThesecondlessonhastodowiththemorephilosophicalvisionofasingularidealFormofjustice,whichtodaytranslatesintothesearchforanall-embracingphilosophicaltheory.Thetwolessonsarenotallthatobviouslycompatible,butinanycase,theycertainlyurgeusintwoverydifferentdirections.ThereisnoquestioninwhichdirectionAnglo-Americanphilosophyhasgone.Justice,weareremindedagainandagainandagain,isamatterofabstract,dispassionate,impersonal,rationalprinciplesandconcepts.Theresult,I’mafraid,isthatwearelosingourvocabularyofvirtue.Becauseofourloveofleapingfromtheparticularcontext—inwhichoursenseofjusticeiskeenandhealthy—towhattheFrenchpostmodernistLyotardcalls“totalizations,”emptybutdangerousgeneralizationsabout“communism”and“nationalsecurity.”Myargumentisthatweshouldbehumbleandsuspiciousofthesegrandgeneralizationsandtheoriesandrememberthatjusticeisnotsomegrandidealorabstraction,butapersonalvirtue,anopenandreceptivemindtowardtheworld.Infact,thepluralismandunprecedentedinternationalawarenessofourownsocietymakesusparticularlykeentounderstandthelegitimacyofdifferencesandreadytosharewithothersocieties.Ouruniquesenseofpowerandaffluence,evenasitencouragesarrogance,alsoprovokesinusadeepsenseofconcern.MyactivistfriendswillnodoubtcomplainthatIdonotactuallytellpeoplewhattodo,andradicalswillcomplainthatItooreadilyacceptourstatusquowithoutadvocatingitsoverthrow.ConservativeshavecomplainedthatIamfartooliberal,andliberalshavearguedthatIhavegivenfartoomuchawaytotheconservatives.ThatmakesmethinkIhaveitjustaboutright.Choosingbetweenideologiesisnotmyworry,andadvocatingsomebold,grandschemeofactionwouldonceagainturnthepursuitofjusticeintoaspecializedcareerinsteadofapersonalconcernwhicheveryoneoughttohaveandpracticeintheireverydaylives.ItisjustthatgapbetweenthepersonalandtheimpersonalthatIwishtofillhere,andmyargumentisthat,ifjusticeisn’tpersonallyfeltandpracticed,thentherecanbenojusticeatall.NOTES1Inconversation,atsomeAmericanPhilosophicalAssociationmeetingorother,about1985.2JamesP.Sterba,HowtoMakePeopleJust(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1988).Thecommunitarianconceptionseemstohaveloststatusinthepresentbook,Sterba’sJusticeHereandNow(CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).3Sterba,JusticeHereandNow,especiallychapter2.4KurtBaier,“RadicalVirtueEthics,”inMidwestStudiesinPhilosophyXIII(NotreDameIN:NotreDameUniversityPress,1988)pp.126ff.5EdmundPincoffs,QuandriesandVirtues(Lawrence:UniversityofKansasPress,1986).\n98ROBERTC.SOLOMON6DavidMiller,SocialJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1976).7Rawls1971,pp.479,481,489,540.8“SchmelzenderTheilnehmung,”Kant,Grundlegung(inWerke,BandIV,p.399).Kant,GroundingoftheMetaphysicsofMorals,trans.J.W.Ellington(Indianapolis:Hackett,1980)pp.12,399.“Meltingcompassion”isPaton’stranslation,“tendersympathy”LewisWhiteBeck’sandElliston’s);Kant’saccountofretributionisinhisPhilosophyofLaw,trans.W.Hastie(Edinburgh:Clark,1889).IhavecommentedatlengthonKant’sdistinctionbetweenretributionandvengeance,adistinctionheshareswithRobertNozickandagreatmanyothertheorists,inmyAPassionforJustice(Addison-Wesley,1990,Rowman&Littlefield,1994),especiallychapter6.9Wing-sitChan,ASourceBookinChinesePhilosophy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1963).10ThisissomethingofaretreatfrommyargumentinAPassionforJustice,whichismainlyconcernedwiththeroleoffeelingsinjusticeratherthanwithjusticeasavirtue.11Sterba,JusticeHereandNow,pp.14–17.12AlasdairMacIntyre,WhoseJustice?WhichRationality?(NotreDameIN:NotreDameUniversityPress,1988)pp.378ff.13JonathanBennett,“TheConscienceofHuckFinn,”Philosophy,1976.14RussellHardin,“StreetLevelEpistemologyandDemocraticParticipation,”apapergivenatthe“DeliberatingDeliberativeDemocracy”conferenceattheUniversityofTexasatAustin,4–5February2000.15Sterba,JusticeHereandNow,p.7.16AlexanderNehamas,TheArtofLiving(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1999).ReferencesAristotle,NichomacheanEthics(T.Irwin,trans.)(Indianapolis:Hackett,1985).Augustine,TheCityofGod(PhilipLevine,trans.)(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1956).Bennett,Jonathan,“TheConscienceofHuckFinn,”Philosophy,1976.Calhoun,CheshireH.,“Justice,CareandGenderBias,”JournalofPhilosophy,85(September1988).Chan,Wing-sit,ASourceBookinChinesePhilosophy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1963).Hume,David,ATreatiseofHumanNature(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1978).Kant,Immanuel,TheMetaphysicalElementsofJustice(J.Ladd,trans.)(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1965).——TheGroundingoftheMetaphysicsofMorals(J.W.Ellington,trans.)(Indianapolis:Hackett,1980).MacIntyre,Alasdair,WhoseJustice?WhichRationality?(NotreDame,IN:NotreDameUniversityPress,1988).Miller,David,SocialJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1976).Nehamas,Alexander,TheArtofLiving(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1999).Pincoffs,Edmund,QuandriesandVirtues(Lawrence:UniversityofKansasPress,1986).Plato,TheRepublic(Grube,trans.)(Indianapolis:Hackett,1985).Rawls,John,ATheoryofJustice(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971).Rousseau,Jean-Jacques,DiscourseontheOriginofInequality(D.Cress,trans.)(Indianapolis:Hackett,1983).Schopenhauer,Arthur,TheBasisofMorality(Payne,trans.)(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1965).Smith,Adam,TheTheoryofMoralSentiments(London:GeorgeBell&Sons,1880).Solomon,RobertC.,TheJoyofPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).——APassionforJustice(ReadingMA:Addison-Wesley,1990).Sterba,JamesP.,HowtoMakePeopleJust(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1988).——JusticeforHereandNow(CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).Walzer,Michael,SpheresofJustice(NewYork:BasicBooks,1983).Young,Iris,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1991).\n9JUSTICE,COMMUNITY,ANDTHELIMITSTOAUTONOMYMichaelBoylanOneofthecentralissuesinvolvedinthedebateaboutthelimitsofhumanautonomyistheroleofthecommunityandtraditionalauthorityasacheckuponwhattheagentmayormaynotdo.Asacasestudytobringthisissueintosharprelief,IwillexamineapositionofJamesP.Sterbafromhisbook,JusticeforHereandNow.Arisingfromthisanalysiswillbetheoutlinesofapositionofpublicphilosophythatwilloffersuggestionsonhowthisparameteroughttobedemarcated.MystrategyinthisessaywillbefirsttoexaminethecasestudyofGretchen(presentedbySterbainhisbook).Next,Iwillintroducetheinterpretativeframeworkofjustice.Finally,Iwillofferasolutiontotheproblemthatinvolveslimitationsonindividualautonomyduetoacommunity’sconceptionofthepublicgood.1ThecaseofGretchenLetmebeginbycitingSterba’scaseofGretchen.1Gretchen,whoismorallyentitledtoa$8,000income,receivesonlya$5,000incomethroughlegalchannels.Supposefurtherthateverymeansofcorrectingthisinjustice,savecriminaldisobedience,hasbeentriedsoastobereasonablyjudgedtobeineffective,orthatusingsuchmeansisreasonablyjudgedtoopersonallycostlyforGretchen.Ifthisisthecase,itwouldbemorallypermissibleforhertobecriminallydisobedient,providedthathercriminalactivityisdirectedatappropriatingsurplusgoodsfrompeoplewhohavemorethanafairshareofopportunitiestoleadagoodlife,andatappropriatingsuchgoodswithaminimumofphysicalforce.Ofcourse,Gretchenwillnormallyengageinsuchcriminalactsonlyifthereissomelikelihoodthatshewillbesuccessfulatappropriatingthe$3,000incometowhichshehasabasicright.Suppose,however,thatGretcheniscaughtbythelegalauthorities.Shouldtheypunishher?Inabasicallyjustsociety,thegroundsforpunishingapersonisthejudgmentthatthecriminal,unlikethevictimofcrime,wouldhavebeenreasonably(i.e.,morally)expectedtoactotherwise.Butwhilethiscomparativeopportunityjudgmentgenerallyholdsinabasicallyjustsociety,itdoesnotholdintheunjustsocietyinwhichGretchenlives.Shecouldnotbereasonablyexpectedtoactdifferently.InthesocietyinwhichGretchenlives(whichappearstobestrikinglysimilartoourown),therewouldbenogroundsforpunishingGretchen’scriminalactivity.Beforeofferingananalysisofthiscase,thereareseveraldetailsthatwewillhavetofillinoratleastspeculateabout.First,itisnotstatedwhethera$5,000ayearincome(fromapresumablyminimumwagejob-paying$2.50perhourforaforty-hourweek,fiftyweeksayear)2isadequatetoprovideforthebasicgoodsofexistence:food,shelter,clothing.IntheUnitedStates(weareencouragedtothinkthatthisexampleoccursintheUnitedStates),3theminimumwagewasaroundthislevelin1977.4In1977mywifeandIhadacombinedincomeof$3,500ayear.Itwasverytight,butwecouldaffordrent(inapoorneighborhood),food(justthebasics),utilities,andclothing.Wedidn’tgoouttoeatorhaveenoughmoneyforentertainment,butwehadatelephone(onlysixtycallspermonth,local),atelevision(blackandwhite),andaccesstoamajorresearchlibrary.Youmightthinkthesebiographicaldetailsareirrelevant,butmypointistosituateGretchen.Wasshelikeme,whocouldmeetthenecessitiesoflifebutnotthelittlenicetiesthatoursocietytellsusaresoimportant—suchasbeingabletoorderoutforpizza,orbeingabletoaffordmovies,orbuyingnewshoeswhenyougetaholeinthesoleinsteadofhavingthempatched(someofmyfriendsusedcardboardinstead)?Thisisanimportantissue.First,ifGretchenweredeniedoneofthebasicnecessitiesoflifesuchthatshemightdiewereshetocontinueinthatstate,thenwemightbeinvolvedinan“oughtimpliescan”sortofproblem.Inotherwords,Gretchenmighthaveamoraloughttoobeythelaw,butbecauseofherlife-threateningpoverty,shemighthavetostealtheproverbialloafofbread.5Thissortofcaseweshallcallbreakingthelawduetoalackofthebasicgoodsoflife(food,clothingandshelter).\n100MICHAELBOYLANCaseslikethisareratherspecial,sincewithoutthebasicgoodsofaction,onecannotbesaidtobeafullyfunctioningpurposiveagent.6Thus,sincebeingafullyfunctioningpurposiveagentisanecessaryconditionformoralculpability,theindividualwhostealsaloafofbread(oritsequivalent)inordertokeepfromstarvingisnot,ceterisparibus,fullyresponsibleforheraction,andanycompassionatejudgeshouldshowhereveryleniency.However,thecasebecomesmorecomplicatedwhenGretchenalreadypossessesthesefirst-orderbasicgoods.Inthiscasetheadditionalmonieswillbefortheacquisitionofgoodsthatgobeyondfirst-orderbasicagency.Thesegoodsareoftwovarieties.First,therearegoodsthatthoughtheyarenotfirst-orderbasicgoodsofagency,theyneverthelesspromotemoreeffectivefundamentalagency.Theseincludeeducation,accesstobooks,andspecificjobskills.Whereasthesesecond-orderbasicgoodsarebeyondfirst-orderbasicgoods,nevertheless,theyarefundamentalinordertocompetewithinthesocietyeffectively.ItismyopinionthatGretchenhasarightsclaimagainstsocietyforthesesecond-orderbasicgoods.Partofthenatureofthesegoodsisthattheyareoftenculturallysituatedsothatonemustacceptthecommunityperspectiveinordertoprofitfromthem.Forexample,ifonewerereceivingjobtrainingitisforthesakeofimprovingone’sjobprospectsinanactualjobofferedinthesociety.Oneisnotlearningtheseskillssimplytopassacourseortopursuenefariousdesigns.Therefore,itwouldseempeculiarforGretchentobreakthelawinordertoobtainthesesortsofgoods.However,ifGretchenweredeniedaccesstothesesecond-orderbasicgoodsbecauseofdiscrimination,thenIwouldbesympathetictoherbeingabletosneakintothelibrarytoreadabookortopopintoaclassatapublicuniversityandlistentolecturestuition-free.Thenextsortofgoodsisdesignedtoprovidepleasuretotheagent,butissuperfluoustofundamentalaction(actinginordertoprovideone’sselfwithfirst-orsecond-orderbasicgoods).Theseareadditivegoods.Sportsequipment,fancyclothes,restaurantdinners,fastcars,etc.,fallintothiscategory.ItiscertainlypossiblethatwhatGretchendesires(inthecasepresented)isfurtherenjoymentofadditivegoods.Butifthisisthecase,thenitisdifficulttounderstandthemoraljustificationofheraction.HowcanGretchenclaimamoralrighttoaVCRoracolortelevision?Neitheroftheseitemsisnecessaryforbasicactionorenhancedeffectiveaction.Itseemsclearlyacaseofonepersonseeingthingsthatothershave(thataresupposedtoyieldpleasure),andthatperson’sresultingdesirethatgrowswithintheagenttopossessthosethingsforherself.Ifwereadthecasethisway,thenthereareproblems.Wecouldemendthecasetoread,“IfWilliamG.istherichestpersonintheworld,andifwedefinetheclassofalltherestofthepeopleasphi,thenletJohnandGretchenbemembersofphi.BothJohnandGretchenbelievethatwhatevertheirsalariesare,theyaremorallyentitledtomore.TheylooktoWilliamG.ashavingasurplus,therefore;JohnandGretchengetajobatWilliamG.’scompanyand(usingtheprivatedisobediencetheory)proceedtoembezzleWilliamG.’smoneyfromhim.”Whatmakesthissecondversionofthecaseaplausiblecompaniontothefirstisthatwhenthemoralbasisofdesertsisbaseduponone’sdesiretoacquireadditivegoods(becausetheyhavebeenunequallydistributedinfavorofanother),thenthereisnolimittodesiresforallmembersofphi.Sincephiisdefinedaseveryonesavefortherichestperson,allmembersofphihavesomethingtobecovetousof,namelyWilliamG.Thisis,ofcourse,untenablebecauseanarchywouldresult.Thebasisofthedifficultyliesin:(a)thedefinitionofeconomicjustice(hencethebasisofthemoralclaimsrightformore),and(b)thedefinitionofmoralagencyandhowwearetodemarcatethelimitsofautonomy.Let’sexamineeachoftheseinorder.2JusticeFirstisthedefinitionofeconomicjustice.IfweholdtotheprinciplethatIhaveenunciatedelsewherethat,allthingsbeingequal,wemustalwaysbeginwithegalitarianism,7thenthismeansthatoneoughttodistributegoodsinalikemannertoall.Theproblemisthatthingsarerarelyequal.Therearecountlessinstancesinwhichsomesortofmerit-basedcompensationsystemwillbenefiteveryoneconcerned.Therearemanytheoriesofdistributivejustice.8Eachmakesdifferentrecommendationspertainingtoresourceallocation.Oneofthedifficultiesintheoriesofjusticeisthatdifferentsituationsseemtorequiredifferenttheories.Thiscomplicatestheissueof“howtochooseatheoryofjustice.”Suchanexerciseisbeyondthescopeofthisessay;however,Iwillsetoutaselectedsampleoftheoriestomakemyintendedpoint.Somemajortheoriesofjusticethatarerelevantinthiscontextincludecapitalism(toeachaccordingtotheirwork),socialism(toeachaccordingtotheirneed),egalitarianism(toeachequally),aristocracy(toeachaccordingtotheir“inheritedstation”)andkraterism(toeachaccordingtotheirpowertograspwhattheywant).Iwouldcontendthatthefairestsituationisegalitarianism,unlesssituationswarrantotherwise.9Thiswouldmeanthatthedefaultsystemofallocationisalwaystogivetoeachpartyequallyunlessthereisagoodreasontodeviate.\nJUSTICE,COMMUNITY,LIMITSTOAUTONOMY101Ifoneweretodeviate(ontheprincipleofeconomicefficiency,forexample),thenIwouldadvocatesomesortofmixtureofcapitalismandsocialism(asdefinedabove).Thewaytoputthisinaverycondensedfashionisthategalitarianismshouldbeadoptedunlesscompellingreasonsindicatethatanothertheory(ormixoftheories)ismoreappropriate.Whatwouldcountasacompellingreason?Iwouldsaythatitwouldbeapracticalneedthatmakesitscaseinthecontextofamoraltheory.Inmycasethatwouldmeanadeontologicaltheorythatemphasizedrightsandduties.10Sinceegalitarianismhasproved(inamacrosense)tobeaveryinefficientsystemuponwhichtobaseaneconomy,wewouldturntocapitalism(modifiedbysocialism).Asamatteroffact,thisisthedirectionthatalltheindustrializedcountriesintheworldhavetaken.Thebalancebetweencapitalismandsocialismiswhatisatissue.Variouscountriesleantowardrewardingworkwhileothersemphasizemeetingessentialhumanneeds(theso-called“cradletograve”ideal).WhydoIadvocateegalitarianismasthe“default”systemofjustice?Thereasonforthisliesatthemicrolevel.Atthemicrolevelonehasmanysortsofallocationdecisions.Forexample,inafamilyonemustdecidehowtodividethechocolatecakefordessert.Giventhateveryonelikeschocolatecakeequallyandthattherearenootherhealthconsiderationstothinkabout,thefairest11distributionistogiveeveryoneanequalslice.Itismyopinionthatthisis(orshouldbe)thedrivingprincipleofdistributionamongfamilies.Ifweareallocatingclothes,food,oranyotherdesirablegoodwithinthefamily,thenitismyopinionthatitshouldbedoneequally.Birthdaypresents,parents’time—everythingseemsbestdistributedequally.Ifthefamilyisthebasicsocialunitofsociety,thentheprinciplesofjusticethatholdthere,oughttoholdupwardsuntilthereisaprinciplethattrumpsit.Certainlythisthesisisaveryambitiousone.Itshouldencompassamonographinitself.Butifthisbrieftreatmentcanbetakenassuggestive,thenIwouldputforththefollowingprocesswherebywecanlinktheseruminationstothecaseofGretchen(onthelastinterpretation,i.e.herquestforadditivegoodsbycriminaldisobedience).Step1Webeginwithegalitarianism.Ifweweretoallocateinthisfashion,thensurelyunder-representedgroups(includingGretchen)wouldbecompensated(throughenhancedaccesstojobs,schoolingandgovernmentcontracts)sincethestrategyistoallocate“toeachequally.”Step2Egalitarianismisnotthemostefficientmacro-allocationstrategy.Therefore,inmacrocasesitshouldbereplacedwithasystemofcapitalism/socialism(themixturetobearguedforinanothervenue).Step3ThecapitalismsideoftheequationcouldarguethatifGretchenwantsmoremoneysheshouldgetajobthatsocietyvalues,andearnmorethatway,e.g.asacomputerprogrammer.Underthisscenario,institutionsinthesocietyinvestinindividualsofdisadvantagedgroupsthatarenotpresentlyproducingatwhatonemightexpect(inordertogetqualifiedlaborthatwillmaketheownersmoremoney).“Toeachaccordingtotheirwork”heremustbeunderstoodinanAristotelianpotentialitysense.Wewill,asasociety,investinthatwhichispotentiallyalucrativemarket,namelyourownpeoplewhoareunderrepresentedintheworkplace.Itisnotunusualforcapitalismtoinvestinpotentialmarkets.AtthewritingofthisessayveryfewIT(informationtechnology)stocksareshowinganythingclosetoaprofitonWallStreet,yettheyarebesiegedwithofferstofinancethem.Peopleseeactualizedearningsdowntheroadeventhoughsomeparticularcompany—rightnow—hasnevershownaprofit.IfwearewillingtogambleinthiswayonITandinternetstocks,thenwhycan’twegambleonourownpeople?Nowobviously,thedepictionofcapitalism’sacceptanceofhelpingpeoplesuchasGretchensucceedinthesystemmaynotbeacceptedbyeveryone.Oneofthemostprominentcriticsofmyviewheremightsaythatatruecapitalistwoulddenyanyconsiderationtothosewhoviolatethebasicformula:“toeachaccordingtotheirwork.”12Butthisbegsthequestionofwhatthesocietyistodowithsuchindividuals(underacapitalistmind-set).Forthesepeoplewillnotsimplyvanish.Theywon’tstarvetodeathbecausetheyhavenoemployment.Attheveryleast(thatshouldberecognizedbyeventhemostardentfreemarketer),thedisadvantagedwillposeathreattotheadvantagedbecauseasthegapwidensbetweenthegroups,angerandfrustrationwillaccelerate.Allofthose“welldeserved”possessionsacquiredbythosewhohaveflourishedundertheconditionsofthepresentsystemareinjeopardyifasignificantsegmentofthepopulationdecidesthattheyhavenothing,andtherefore“nothingtolose.”Suchpeoplearedangeroustothoseinvestedinthestatusquo.Fromthemacroperspective,societiesworkbestwheneveryoneisbroughtintotheeconomicpicture.Theadvantagedwhoignorethedisadvantaged(“letthemeatcake!”)dosoattheirperil.Thus,evenfromanon-moralprudentialcalculation,itmakesnosensetodisenfranchiseanysubstantialdisadvantagedgroup.Societyneedsthesepeopletotakeapositiverole,orsocietymayfaceseverecivilunrest.Thesecondhalfofmydistributionformulaincludessocialism,“toeachaccordingtotheirneeds.”Aswehaveseenabove,“needs”mustberelatedtogoodsthatarebasictohumanaction(eitherintheprimaryorthesecondarysense)andgoodsthatarenotbasictoactionbutrepresentanindividual’sdesiresatisfaction(additivegoods).13Itseemstomethatthecapitalism/socialismamalgamwillnotbeableeffectivelytodealwiththisproblemexceptthroughthemanagementofincomedifferentialsbetweenclassesofpopulation.WhatImeanbythisisthedifferentialbetweenthelowest20%andthehighest20%.Thisgapdescribesthedisparityinincomedistributioninagivencommunity.Ideally,underegalitarianismtherewouldbenogapatall.Butascommunitiesgrowinsize,thisidealseemspracticallyimpossibletoachieve.Thuswearethrownintoanefficiency/productivityv.income\n102MICHAELBOYLANequityequation.Aswerewardthemostproductivemoreandmore,productivityincreasesandthegapbetweentherichestandthepoorestincreases.TheGretchensoftheworldlooktothosewhoarebaskinginmaterialluxuriesthattheythemselveshavetroubleevenimagining,andfeelresentment,jealousy,andcovetousness.Thesearepowerfulemotionsofthesoul,andwillinclineGretchentowanttostealherportionofthepie.HowdoesGretchenreacttoherdesiretostealherportionoftheeconomicpieofadditivegoods?ThiswilldependuponthevisionofthegoodthatGretchenholds,andwhetherGretchenherselfshouldmodifyherconceptionofthegoodinlightofthecommunityinwhichshelives.Shouldthesocietybevalue-neutral,allowingallofitscitizensfullexpressionofdevelopingtheirownviewofthegood—nomatterwhatitis—orshouldthesocietyendorseaviewofthegoodthatmayguidedecisionsofjusticesuchaswearediscussing?JamesP.Sterbaaddressesthesequestionsbycontendingthatthereisawayrationallytoviewpracticalandmoralsituationswithasimilarcost/benefitlens.14Sterba’sanalysishereisonethatIshareinmanyrespects.Histableofrankingtheimportanceofpracticalv.moralissuesiscompatiblewithmyown“theoryofembeddedness.”15IagreewithSterbathatwhenonecanadequatelyjudgethelevelofembeddednessofaproblem(betweenmoralandpracticalconsiderations)thenthehighestlevelofembeddednessoughttorulethedecision-makingprocess.Thusaproblemthathasahighdegreeofembeddednessatthepractical,prudentiallevelwilltrumpamoralprinciplethathasalowlevelofembeddedness(i.e.isrelativelytrivial).Thismodel(eitherSterba’sormine)isinSterba’sterms“anon-question-begging”methodforrationalchoicethatutilizesassumptionsfromprudentialdecisiontheoryandappliesittomoralmattersalso.However,SterbaandIdifferonourevaluationofcasesinwhichmoralandpracticalproblemsareequallyembedded.Sterbacallsthese“lifeboatcases”andbracketsthemaside.Thisisbecausehethinksthattheyarequiterareinoccurrence.Ifeelthatthesesortsofcasesoccurregularly.Itismycontentionthatinsituationssuchasthisethicsshouldtrumppracticalconsiderations.Butwhy?Thisisthequestionthatisnot“non-question-begging.”Itinvolvesthequeryofwhysomeoneshouldrelinquishapossibilityofself-satisfactionatthepriceofdoingsomethingthatismorallyright.Whyshouldtheagentcare?Thisleadsusintothefinalsectionofthepaper,whichdiscussesthelimitsofautonomy.3ThelimitsofautonomyTheonlywayinwhichtheproblemraisedattheendoftheprevioussectioncanbesolved,isbyprovidingtoGretchen(orothersuchagents)acompellingreasonwhysheshouldnotstealgoodsfromothersinordertoprovideherwithadditivegoodsthatshedesires.ThisreasonmustbeconsonantwithGretchen’sworldviewifitistobecompellingtoher.Sterbaaddressthisissueintwoways.ThefirstistorefertorationalethicaltheoristsAlanGewirthandKurtBaier,whohavemadesuchargumentsthecornerstoneoftheirphilosophies.16Thisisoneofthecentralproblemsofethicsandmayneverberesolvedtoeveryone’ssatisfaction,butthesetwoproponentshavevaluablearguments(thoughIampartialtoGewirth).ThesecondappealistowardthephilosophyofreconciliationthatliesattheheartofSterba’sphilosophy.17Inthiscase,themoralphilosophertriestoenterintoanegotiationofsortsinordertodiscoverawayofaccommodating(asmuchaspossible)mostofthecentralconcernseachholds.ThewayIfavorforevaluatingthisprocessisbyappealingfirsttoaperson’sworldview.18Aperson’sworldviewcontainsherviewofthegood.Itismyviewthatthevaluesthatconstituteone’sworldview(ethics,aestheticsandreligion)oughttobeworkedoutinconcertwitheachothersothat“Allpeoplemustdevelopasinglecomprehensiveandinternallycoherentworldviewthatisgoodandthatwestrivetoactoutinourdailylives.”19Inquestionsofpublicphilosophy(thatincludesjustice),thisviewofthegoodmustbeseeninrelationtoothers’viewofthegoodinordertocreateacommunity’sviewofthegood.Idepictthisprocessthisway.Eachagent(afterhehascreatedhispersonalworldview)mustalsoengageotheragentswithwhomhelivesinhiscommunity20increatingasharedcommunityworldview.ThisisdictatedbytheSharedCommunityWorldviewImperative,“Eachagentmuststrivetocreateacommonbodyofknowledgethatsupportsthecreationofasharedcommunityworldview(thatiscomplete,coherentandgood)throughwhichsocialinstitutionsandtheirresultingpoliciesmightflourishwithintheconstraintsoftheessentialcorecommonlyheldvalues(ethics,aestheticsandreligion).”Thereareseveralkeyelementstothisimperative.First,thereistheexhortationtocreateacommonbodyofknowledge(discussedbelow).21Thisisanessentialelementinorderforpositivegroupdiscussiontoproceed.Second,thereisadialecticalprocessofdiscussionamongmembersofasinglecommunityandbetweenmembersofvarioussinglecommunitiesthatareunitedinalargerheterogeneouscommunity.Thisdiscussion(whichissimilartoSterba’sconceptofphilosophicalreconciliation)shouldseektoformanunderstandingaboutthemissionofthecommunitywithinthecontextofthecommonbodyofknowledgeandthecommonlyheldcorevaluesheldbymembersofthecommunity.Thesevalueswillincludeethicalmaxims,aestheticvaluesandreligious\nJUSTICE,COMMUNITY,LIMITSTOAUTONOMY103values.Ofcoursetherewillbedisagreements,butaprocessthatisenjoinedingoodfaithwillcreateasharedworldviewthatiscomplete,coherentandgood.22Third,theresultofthisdialecticalcreationofasharedcommunityworldviewistoemployitinthecreation(orrevision)ofsocialinstitutionsthatareresponsibleforsettingpolicywithinthecommunity/socialunit.Itshouldbeclearthatthistenetseemshighlyinclinedtowarddemocracy.Itis.However,itisnotrestrictedtothis.Evenintotalitarianstatestheinfluenceofthesharedcommunityworldviewissignificant.Onecan,forexample,pointtothegreatdifferencesamongcommuniststatesinEasternEurope,theSovietUnion,China,NorthKorea,andCubaduringthe1960s-1980s.Allwerecommunist;yetthereweregreatdifferencesinthewaythetotalitarianregimesoperatedineachinstance.Thisisbecause,evenwithoutthevote,thesharedcommunityworldviewcastsastronginfluenceupontheoperationofsociety’sinstitutionsandtheirresultantpolicies.Finally,itshouldbenotedthattheactionsofthoseinstitutionsmustalwaysbeframedwithinthecorevaluesofthepeoplewhomakeupthesociety.Wheneverthesocietyveerstoofarawayinitsimplementationofthesocialworldviewfromthepersonalworldviewsofitsmembers,thenarealignmentmustoccur.Inresponsivedemocraciesthistakestheformof“throwingthebumsout”inthenextelection.Intotalitarianregimes,changewillalsooccur,butgenerallybycoupd’étatorarmedrevolution.23ThenextprincipletoconsideristheCommonBodyofKnowledgethatisasetoffactualandnormativeprinciplesaboutwhichthereisgeneralagreementamongacommunityorbetweencommunitiesofpeople.Thisincludes(butisnotlimitedto)agreementonwhatconstitutesobjectivefactsandhowtomeasurethem.Italsoincludes(butisnotlimitedto)whatcountsasacceptablevaluesthatwillberecognizedasvalidintherealmsofethics,aestheticsandreligion.24Atfirstglance,manywouldholdthatthecreationofthecommonbodyofknowledgeisaverysimplething.Butinourcontentiousworldthesepointsarenottobetakenforgranted.Byengagingtheissueheadon,thereisamuchgreaterchanceatmeaningfuldialogueamongthoseinvolvedinseriousdisputation.Theimportofthesedistinctionsinprivateandpublicmoralityisclear.Itisacommandthateachofusindividuallyexamineourownlivesandstrivetocreatecoherence,completenessandgoodnessamongthemyriadvaluemaximsthatwehold.Inthesocialsphereitdemandsthatweseektodothesamewithothers.Theforcebehindthecommunityimperativeisthefactthatourlivesashumansontheearthareincreasinglyinterdependent.Thismayhavealwaysbeentrue(asperJohnDonne’s“Nomanisanislanduntohimself”),butinthetwenty-firstcenturyitisapracticalrealityaswell.Attheveryleast(aminimalistposition)thiscanbeverifiedbyinteractionbetweentheenvironmentsinwhichwelive.Fromabiologicalpointofview,however,eventhisminimalistpositioncontainssomestrongduties.25Noneofuslivesinsomesortofhermeticallysealedbubblewithallweneedinside.Wearesocialanimals.Welivewithotherhumans.Wealsoliveincommunitywithallofnature.Wecannotconfinethisconcerntotheimmediateenvironmentsinwhichwelive,butmustextendthistotheentireworld(andperhaps,byextension,thesolarsystem,thegalaxy,andbeyond).Withinourownworld,warmwatersoffofPerucalledtheElNiñoaffecttheweatherandthewell-beingofecosystemsfromeasternAsiatoNorthAmericatoEurope.ItmaybeastretchtosaythatabutterflysuddenlyfallingfromtheskyinBrazilaffectsafarmerinCanada(assomeofthepurveyorsofpopularchaostheoryhavesaid),butitisameteorologicalcommonplacethatregionalandevenglobalweathersareintricatelyconnected.26Theweatherisanimportantcomponentofthewellbeingoftheecosphere(thecombinedecosystemsoftheworld).Therefore,attheveryleast,everyonemustacknowledgethatonedoesnotactinisolation.Almosteveryactionthatwecommithaspersonal,socialandecologicalconsequences.Whatistheresultofsuchaprocessofdiscussioninanattempttofindanadequatereconciliationthatwillconstitutethesharedcommunityworldview?First,allparticipantsinthediscussionarecommittedasmembersofthecommunitytofurtheringtheviewofthegoodthatsuchaprocessengenders.Thismeansthattherewillbecasesinwhichapersonislimitedintheexerciseoftheirautonomy.Sinceourdiscussionisaboutadditivegoods,ourexampleswillonlyreflectthese.Inexample1,letussaythereisaruraltownthatissmallenoughsothattheremightbeatownmeetingthatactsasacommitteeofthewhole.Inthetownmeetingitisagreedthattherewillbenohuntingwithincertainclearlydefinedparameters.Thereasonforthetown’sdecisionisthattherehavebeenseveralhuntingaccidentsinthepastfewyears,andthetownholdsthesafetyofitscitizensasasharedcommunityvalue.Evenifyou(asamemberofthetown)lovetohuntandareirritatedthatyouhavetohikeordriveanothertenmilestosatisfythenewlimits,youmustfollowthedictatesofthesharedcommunityworldview.Thehunter’spersonalconvenienceandviewofapersonalgood(tobeabletohuntwithinyardsofwherehelivedinhisruralvillage)istrumpedbyatenetofthesharedcommunityworldview,namelythatthesafetyofthegroupdemandsthathuntersgotospotsofmuchlowerpopulationdensity.Inexample2letussaythereisasituationinwhichtherehasbeenvandalismandbrokenbottlesaroundacommunityplaygroundthatisoneofthesoleareasofgreenopenspaceintheneighborhood.Thecommunityassociationmeetsanddecidesthattheonlyremedyistotakethingsintoitsownhands.Tenpeoplearedelegatedthetaskofassigningpeopletocovertheplayground—especiallyintheeveninghoursof8p.m.tomidnight.Atfirstmanyofthecitizensintheneighborhood\n104MICHAELBOYLANcomplain.“Say,Ididn’tgotonomeetingofyours.WhyshouldIhavetodothis?”saidoneyoungmanwhowasapproachedbythecanvasser.“Doyouwantustocallanothermeetingsothatwecanrevisittheissue?”“Yeah.”“Willyouattend?”“Sure.”“ThemeetingisFridayatDeSableHighat7p.m.”“Okay.”“Youunderstandthatifyoudon’tattend,I’llbebackonSaturdaymorning.”Thiscausessomeconsternation.“Saywhat?”“Youheardme.”“ButIdon’tevengotnokids.”“Youlivehere.Youdon’tlikeit,getaplacedowninWentworth.”Theyoungmanwasmad.Yetthatmanwenttothemeetingandheadedateamthatsupervisedtheplayground.Thecrazythingwasthatassoonasenoughpeoplewereinvolvedinthesolution,theproblemdisappeared.27Inexample2theyoungman’sabilitytolivelifejustthewayhewantedtoaccordingtohispersonalviewofthegoodwaslimited.Itwaslimitedbyhishavingtodevoteonedayamonthtosupervisingtheplaygroundandtobeingonaphonetreethatmadesurethateverynightwascovered.Thismeantthathecouldnotpursuehispersonalviewofthegoodduringtheseintervals,buthadtoworkforthesharedviewofthegood.Itisofinterestthatinexample2,thepointismadethateventhosewhodonotactivelyparticipateindemocracymustbearthedutiesofcommunitycitizenship.Themeetingwasopentoall.Iftherewereenoughpeoplewhowantedtocreateanothervisionofthecommunitygood,thentheywerefreetoexpresstheirviews.28Inthecasepresented,thenon-participantsweregivenasecondopportunitytodoso.ThisisakeyprinciplethatSaulAlinksky(themanwhofoundedthisneighborhoodassociation)believedin.Thecrucialproblemforthoseadvocatingcommunityvaluesisthattheydonotbecome“exclusive”or“coercive.”29Inthesesituations,thevalueoffreeandopendemocraticdialogueislost.Butwhentheprocessisopenandfree,thenpeoplemustfollowtheresults(regardlessofwhethertheyparticipatedpersonallyintheprocess).Thus,whenwereturntothecaseofGretchenandherquandaryofwhethertopursuebycriminaldisobedienceadditivegoodsthatshethinksareowedtoherbyasystemshejudgestobeimmoral(perhapsbecauseitismorecapitalistthansocialist),wecansaysheshouldnotbreakthelaw.Gretchenshouldabidebythedecisionofthesharedcommunityvalues(becausetheywerearrivedatinademocraticmanner).ThoughGretchenmightfeelthatwhatshedoesoughttobeeconomicallyvaluedbyhercommunity,thefactisthatherexistingcommunitydoesnot.SinceGretchenlivesinademocracyshecantravelaboutthecountrytofindothercommunitiesinwhichshemightfeelbettersituated.ShemightalsotraveltoCanadaorMexicoandexplorewhetherthesecommunitiesmightcoincidemorecompletelywithhercorepersonalworldviewvalues.Thesharedcommunityvaluesmustberespectedorchanged.Iftheycannotbechanged(andonelivesinademocracy—evenanimperfectone),thentheagentshouldacceptthelimitationsplacedonherabilitytogarneradditivegoods,orelseadoptthecommunity’svisionofthegoodandtrytocompeteaccordingtothoserules,orelseleaveandfindanothercommunitymoreconsonantwithherownpersonalworldview.Inanyevent,itismyviewthattheanswertothequestionofwhyapersonshouldlimitherownviewofthegoodanditsimplementationisbecauseofthecommunityinwhichshelives.Eachofuslivesinnumerouscommunitiesofascendingsizes.Wearesocialanimalsandmusttakethatintoaccount.Wearenotandshouldnotbecompletelyempowered,self-absorbedautonomousagentsseekingonlyourownpathtoourpersonalgood.Wemustalsobeself-andother-regarding,30andasaresultweareenjoinedtoactivelyengageourfellowcommunitymembersinanongoingdialoguethatwilldeterminethepoliciesbywhichwemayalllive.Thecommonvisionofasharedgoodthatfollowsfromthisprocess,bindseveryindividualinthecommunity.Itisinthiswaythatthesharedcommunityworldviewlimitspersonalautonomy.Withoutthiscommunityauthorityovertheindividual,theidealofaparticipatorydemocracywillbecomeafiction.Andwhenthathappens,wewillallbediminished.NOTES1JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)pp.179ff.2IhavecomeupwiththesefiguresbyassumingGretchenworksfiftyweeksayear($5,000dividedby50=$100perweek).ThenIassumedGretchenworksaforty-hourweek($100dividedby40=$2.50perhour.\nJUSTICE,COMMUNITY,LIMITSTOAUTONOMY1053Ofcourse,allofthesedeliberationsareskewedifweareconsideringacountrythatistotalitarian.Insuchasituationapersonmightreactdifferentlytoanunmetdutyofthestatebecausethestateisunresponsiveandtherearefewalternatives.Forsimplicity,wewillconsidertheUnitedStates(orasimilardemocracy).4Itwasactuallymovingfrom$2.30to$2.60inthisyear,butthepointisessentiallycorrect.Forthehistoryoftheminimumwagesince1954seeStatisticalAbstractoftheUnitedStates—1999(SpringfieldVA:NationalTechnicalInformationService,1999).5SincewearetalkingabouttheUnitedStates,IwouldnotethattheButternutCompany,atthistime,putalltheirstalebreadintoaspecialbinoutsidetheir55thStreetoutletstore.Thatbreadwasneverpickedupbygarbagemen,wheneverIwentpast.Thoseintheneighborhoodwhosefoodstampsdidnotcovertheirfoodcostspickeditupanduseditasafilleralongwithathirty-five-centcanofmeat.6IbelievethatSterbaintendshisGretchencasetorefertooneofthetwolevelsofbasicgoodsandnottoadditivegoods.IfIamright,thenGretchenwillnotbefullyculpableforheractionsbecauseshelacksthebasicgoodsofagency.ForafullerdiscussiononthebasicgoodsofagencyseeAlanGewirth,ReasonandMorality(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978);cf.mycommentaryonGewirthin“ChoosinganEthicalTheory,”inGewirth:CriticalEssaysonAction,Rationality,andCommunity(LanhamMD,BoulderandOxford:Rowman&Littlefield,1999).7“AffirmativeAction,”JournalofSocialPhilosophy(forthcoming).8Abriefsurveyofpositionsrelevanttothisessayinclude:A.W.H.Adkins,MeritandResponsibility(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1960);ClaudiaCard,“OnMercy,”PhilosophicalReview,81(1972):182–207;JoelFeinburg,DoingandDeserving(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1970);LloydFields,“ParfitonPersonalIdentityandDesert,”PhilosophicalQuarterly,37(1987):432–40;AlanGoldman,“RealPeople:NaturalDifferencesandtheScopeofJustice,”CanadianJournalofPhilosophy,17(June1987):377–94;FriedrichA.Hayek,TheConstitutionofLiberty(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1960);KaiNielsen,EqualityandLiberty(TotowaNJ:RowmanandAllenheld,1985);C.Perleman,Justice,LawandArgument(Dordrecht:D.Reidel,1980);NicholasRescher,DistributiveJustice(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1966);GeorgeSher,Desert(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1987);MichaelWalzer,SpheresofJustice(NewYork:BasicBooks,1983);IrisYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990);JamesP.Sterba(ed.)Justice:AlternativePoliticalPerspectives(BelmontCA:WadsworthPublishingCompany,1980).9Thereasonforthischoicecomesfroma“microtomacro”orientation.LikePlato,whointheRepubliclookedfirsttowardthedynamicsoftheindividualinhisfamilialandinterpersonallevelstogroundhisunderstandingofthepolis,Ialsobelievethatthisistheplacetostart.Barringanyotherchangesinnormaloperatingrules(suchasgivingone’schildrenapieceworksysteminwhichthefamilymemberswhodosomeparticulartaskwillgetthelargestsliceofcakeorwhatever)weshouldallocateaccordingequally.EveryonegetsthesamehelpingofdinnerunlessthereareextenuatingcircumstancessuchasJohnisonadietorJanemustgainweightforlacrosse.Thispointofviewassertsthat(onthemicrolevel)thenaturalsystemofdistribution(justice)isegalitarianism.10WhatIamsayinghereisthatapracticalneedperseisnotenough.Ofcourse,thoughsomemoraltheoriessuchasutilitarianismmightmakethepracticalandmoralcalculationsseamless,thebroaderpointisthatonemustpresentacompellingmoraljustificationformovingawayfromthedefault,egalitariandistributionformula.Inmostmacro-economicsituations,thisiseasilypresented.Butinindividual,microinteractions,thisismostoftennotthebestwaytoallocategoods.Families,smallorganizationsandcommunitygroupsarebetteroffbeginningwithegalitarianismandthenarguingforadifferentallocationmethodifitisabsolutelynecessary.11HereIamfollowingaconventionalwayofdescribingavaluejudgmentbetweentheoriesofjustice.Thenormativeterm“fairest”reallymeans“thebest”whichpresupposesatheoryofwhatconstitutes“thebest.”Inthisinstance(sincesuchadiscussionisbeyondthescopeofthisessay),IwillsimplyinvokeaKantiannotionofKingdomofEnds,Thedutytotreatothersasendsandneverasmeansonlyisgroundedinatheorythatcountseachpersonequallyanddistributesbasicrightsequally.Thereissomefundamentalsense,therefore,thategalitarianismistruewithrespecttobasicmoralrightsandduties.Thefurtherstepisintotherealmofwell-being.Thisincludesdistributionoftangiblegoods.Itismyopinionthatthissenseofegalitarianismcarriesoverhere,aswell.Foranargumentonhowbasichumangoodsofwell-beingmustalsobedistributedaccordingtoegalitarianism,oneneedonlylooktosuchneo-KantiansasAlanGewirth,ReasonandMorality(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978).12Thereis,ofcourse,theunexaminedissueofthevalueofworkitself.Isallworkonapar?Isthe“invisiblehand”ofthemarketplacetheonlyindicatorofwhatisgoodorbad?Aretherenoother“prescriptive”standardsincapitalism?ThisisanimportantquestionthatIhopetobeabletoaddressinanothervenue.13Ialsoliketoaddaclassofgoodsthatrepresentsthosegoodswealreadypossess.Thisclasscanbecalled“personalproperty.”14Sterbaexplicatesthisviewin“LiberalismandaNon-Question-BeggingConceptionoftheGood,”inTheLiberalism/CommunitarianismDebate,ed.C.F.Delaney(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1994)pp.227–44;cf.JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)pp.24–32.15Foradiscussionofmytheory,seeMichaelBoylan,EthicalIssuesinBusiness(NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1995)andMedicalEthics(UpperSaddleRiverNJ:PrenticeHall,2000).16IamverysympathetictothismoveinSterba’sargument—bothinitsinvocationandintheacceptancethattheremightbedifficultiesinitsjustification.SeeAlanGewirth,ReasonandMorality(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1978);KurtBaier,FromaMoralPointofView(IthacaNY:CornellUniversityPress,1958);cf.Sterba(1998)pp.17–21.17Foranexampleofthisreconciliationprocedureinthevenueofliberalism,communitarianismandaviewofthegood,seeJamesP.Sterba,HowtoMakePeopleJust:APracticalReconciliationofAlternativeConceptionsofJustice(TotowaNJ:Rowman&Littlefield,1988)pp.74–84,132–43.Iwouldalsoliketonotethatthephilosophyofreconciliationgoesmuchdeeperthananyoneparticularissue;itisapeaceful,sincerestrivingtowardtruth(inthetraditionofSocrates).Thisisnotalwaysthegoalofmanycontemporaryphilosophers.Foradiscussionoftheseissues,seeJusticeforHereandNow,chapter1.\n106MICHAELBOYLAN18Foradiscussionofmyviewsofworldview,seeMichaelBoylan,BasicEthics(UpperSaddleRiverNJ:PrenticeHall,2000)introduction.19IcalltheseconditionsthePersonalWorldviewImperative.IjustifytheseinsomedetailinBasicEthics,IntroductionandChapter8.20BycommunityhereImean(inascendingorder)thefamily;theneighborsinhisgeographicalregion—somenaturalunitofamileorso;hiscity,township,orcounty;hisstate;hiscountry,andtheworlditself.Allareincommunitiesthatwecannotignore.IbelievethatoneshouldbeginintheorderIhavelistedbecausethatorderallowsthemostinteractionofindividualsinthepoliticalprocess.21IdiscussthecommonbodyofknowledgeingreaterdetailasitpertainstologicalargumentinTheProcessofArgument(EnglewoodCliffsNJ:PrenticeHall,1988)chapter1.22Idiscussanexampleofhowthissharedcommunityworldviewmightariseinmyessay,“AffirmativeAction:StrategiesfortheFuture,”JournalofSocialPhilosophy(forthcoming).23Incasesofrevolutionagainsttotalitarianstates,privateactsofcriminaldisobediencemaybeconsideredpartoftherevolution,providedthattheyaredirectedagainsttheoffendingstateorindividualswhoaresymbolsofthetotalitarianstate.24ThisisnottosuggestthatIamarguingforasharpdistinctionbetweenanalyticandsynthetictruths;IagreewithQuine’sinsistencethatanalyticandsynthetictruthsdon’teasilysegregate.See“TwoDogmasofEmpiricism,”inFromaLogicalPointofView(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1953)however;thestructureofdeontictruthsandotherpropositionsdoformanaturalclassification.25Itisnotthepurposeofthisessaytoarguethatonlytheminimalistpositionoughttobeadopted,butratherthatthispositionissobasicthatallrationalagentsmustacceptitsauthority.Byadoptingsuchastrategy,itishopedthatawiderrangeofassentcanbeachieved(cf.CommonBodyofKnowledge).26OneaccessibleoverviewoftheserelationscanbefoundinMarcelLeroux,DynamicAnalysisofWeatherandClimate:AtmosphericCirculation,Perturbations,ClimaticEvolution(NewYork:JohnWiley&Sons,1998)especiallypartIII.27ThisisafictionalizedaccountofanactualeventthatoccurredinthecityneighborhoodinwhichIlived.28Thisisnotanexpressionofutilitarianismpersebutonlyperaliud,sincedemocraticdecisionsoperateonsuchprinciples.Whatmakesitdifferentfromutilitarianismisthatinthemeetingapersonmaybringupavaluefromherpersonalworldviewthatconvincesotherstowardpolicyxevenwhenpolicyxisagainstthecommunity’saggregateoraveragepleasure.29Foradiscussionofthesetwodrawbackstowardtheestablishmentofavisionofgoodforthecommunity(alongwithreplies),seeMichaelSandel,Democracy’sDiscontent:AmericainSearchofaPublicPhilosophy(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1996),especiallytheargumentfrompages205–321thatassertsthatoursocietymustpromotecommunityandworkagainsttoomuchcentralizationofpowerandtheerosionoftraditionalformsofauthority.30Foradiscussionofself-regardingv.other-regardingdispositions,seeMichaelSlote,FromMoralitytoVirtue(OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992)pp.126–44.\nSocialism\n10SOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICEKaiNielsenIIshallfirstsetoutwhatsocialismisandwhatithopestoachieve.IshallthenweavethisaccountinwithacriticalexaminationofJamesP.Sterba’sJusticeforHereandNow.Mycentralefforttherewillbetoshow—itsgenuineinsights,generosityofspiritandwell-meaninginitiativesnotwithstanding—whatSterba’saccountleavesoutinsayingwhatadecentandjustworldwouldbeand,independentlyofSterba,toarticulatetheconditionsnecessaryforitsrealizationorapproximation.Iwillendbyarguingwhatmustbedoneifwearetohavesuchaworld.Theprospectsforitareprettydimandseematleasttobegrowingdimmer.ButletusremindourselvesofAntonioGramsci’ssloganaboutthepessimismoftheintellectandtheoptimismofthewill.IIFirst,forsocialismanditsdiscontents.Socialismandleftismgenerallyhavecomeonbaddays.Frombeingapowerfulsocialforcefearedandhatedbytherightandbycentristliberalsalike,ithas,particularlyinNorthAmerica,becomesomethingofajoke.Ithasnomilitantmassnorevenabroadlysympatheticmassattunedtoit.Thereislittlebywayofasocialistegalitarianethosintherichcapitalistdemocracies.InNorthAmericatherearenoleftishparties,notevensocialdemocraticparties,withanystanding(theNDPinCanada,dwindlingawayasitis,isaweakexception).AndintheUnitedStatesthe“leftwing”oftheDemocraticPartyhaspracticallydisappeared.Itistruethatsocialdemocraticpartieshaverecently(1998–2000)wonvictoriesinWesternEurope.France,Germany,Italy,Sweden,Denmark,theUnitedKingdomandGreecehavegovernmentssoformed.Butwiththemajorplayersatleast—France,Germany,ItalyandtheUnitedKingdom—wehavesocialdemocraticgovernmentsthat,onceinpower,abitofrhetoricandsomeband-aidpoliciesaside,lookprettymuchliketheirneo-liberalright-wingpredecessors.TheBlair/SchroederManifestosoundsverymuchlike,somevapidremarksaboutsocialresponsibilityaside,Thatcherismrecycled(BlairandSchroeder2000).Andsimilarthingscanbesaidofthepresent(2000)governmentsofFranceandItaly.Theysparkedsomehopewhentheywereelected,butnowthathopeisdashed.Theprospectsfortheleftseemnowverybleak.Cynicismandhopelessnessaboutthepublicsphereareverywidespread.Thisisexacerbatedbytheso-calledlessonsof1989.Manyofusontheleft—somewithalittleambivalence—welcomedthetumblingdownoftheoldSovietempire.WehopedthatwithThermidorgoneasocialist/socialdemocraticsocialorder,providingathoroughlydemocraticmiddleground,wouldcomeintobeinginthosecountriesthathadformerlybeenpartofthatempire:awaythatwasneitherSovietauthoritarianstatismnorcapitalism.Butnothinglikethatwaswantedbymostofthepeopleinthesecountries.OnceliberatedfromSovietdominationtheywentstraightforcapitalism.AndintheformerSovietUnionitself,capitalismofthecrudestsort.Therewasforthemno“middleway.”Amongintellectualsinthosecountriesthebeliefremainedthatsocialismwasnotonlyinherentlyundemocraticbutgrosslyinefficientaswell.Remember,Hayekisaherointhosecountries.Youcan’t,itwaswidelybelieved,runanefficienteconomyansweringtopeople’sneedsonasocialistmodel.Inthecapitalistdemocraciesmanyliberalsandleftists,perfectlyawarethatthereisnothinginherentlyundemocraticaboutsocialism,andsomeofthem(SidneyHook,IrvingHoweandRichardRorty)convincedthatagenuinesocialismcouldnotbutbedemocratic,thoughtthatwehadnowcometosee,asclearlyascouldbe,thatincomplexmodernsocietiesasocialistorganizationoftheeconomywouldnotwork.Itwasn’tthatsocialismcouldn’tbedemocratic—itcouldnotbeefficient.Wewould,theyargued,ifwewouldbereasonable,havetosettleforasegalitarianaformofliberalegalitarianwelfarestatismasiscompatiblewithcapitalism.Thereissimplynorationalalternativetocapitalism(Rorty1998a;1998b).Thisview,asweshallsee,isnotwithoutitscritics.Still,culturallyandpoliticallyspeaking,particularlyinNorthAmerica,andmostparticularlyintheUnitedStates,thecountervailingforcesarepoliticallyspeakingveryweak.Giventhemassmedia,giventhepoliticalpartiesinpower,inreachofpowerorinfluential,thenearworldwidevictoryofneo-liberalismseems\nSOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICE109closetobeingtotal.Evenwithalargenumberofeducatedpeopleawareoftheevilsofglobalization—therichgettingricherandthepoorpoorerandincreasinglymanypeoplelivinglivesofgreaterinsecurity,greaterstressandinmanyinstancesadiminishedabilitytomeettheirneeds—thereislittleinthewayofamovementtotheleft.Therich,withincreasingvigorandsuccess,arerippingoffthepoorintherichcapitalistdemocraciesand,whenthesesocietiesarecomparedwiththeSecondandThirdWorlds,therip-offisevengreater.Thedisparityoflife-conditionsissimplystaggeringbetweentheFirstWorldandtheThird.IntheThirdWorldwidespreadstarvationandmalnutritionarerampant.Theconditionsoflifeforvastnumbersoftheworld’spopulationcanonlybeaccuratelydescribedasswinish.Thirtymillionpeopledieofhungereveryyearandmorethan800millionliveinextremepoverty.FiftymillionpeopleareunemployedinEurope,onebillionareunemployedorunderemployedintheworldasawhole.Andthosethatdoworkareoftensavagelyexploited,including300millionchildrenworkinginconditionsofstarkbrutality.Allofthisgoesonwhiletheproductivewealthofthesociety,rootedinthedevelopmentofitsproductiveforces,growsandtherichgetricherandthepoorgetpoorer,withmorepeoplebecomingimpoverished.Therichestquintileoftheworldpopulationhaswellover90%oftheworld’sincome,andthepoorestquintileholds0.25%.Thisyieldsaquintileincomeinequalityratioofaround400:1.Ifwealthistakenintoconsiderationtheinequalityisevengreater(Pogge1996).Withcapitalistglobalizationsteadilymarchingon,thingsaregettingworse.In1960therichest20%oftheworld’spopulationhadanincomethirtytimeshigherthanthepoorest20%.Thewealthofthatrichest20%iseighty-twotimeshighernow(1999).Ofthe6billioninhabitantsofthisplanet,barely500millionliveincomfortorsomethingapproachingcomfort—leaving5.5billioninneed.“Inneed”putstooniceafaceonit.Manyofthemliveintrulyhellishconditionswithlittlepossibilityofescape.Moreover,giventhesedisparitiesandtheworld’sproductiveforces,itisclearenoughthattransferscouldbemadetothepoorwithoutimpoverishingtherich.Itisnotthelackofdevelopedproductivepowersthatkeepsusfromsomeetingneeds.Itisthewayweorganizesociallife,alongwiththeutterlyuncaringattitudesandshort-sightednessofthewealthyandpowerfulofthisworld.Itiscapitalismandtheattitudesthatgowithitandnottheworldthatistheproblem.Thattheseconditionsobtainisnota“necessaryfact”orlawofnatureorofhumannature,butaresultofthedesignoftheneo-liberalcapitalistorderthatwehavecreatedandsustain.Butgiventhepowerandpervasivenessofthisorder,itislikelytofeeltomostofuslikesomethingtowhichthereisnoalternative.This,Ibelieve,accountsinpartforthesenseofhelplessnessandhopelessnessthatmanyofourstudentsfeel—oftenthemostsensitiveandreflectiveamongthem.Itcausespoliticalinactivityandprobablydoesmuchtogenerateandsustainpostmodernism.Moreover,andmoreimportantly,generallyinthepopulationthereisthissenseofpowerlessnessandhelplessness.Thereisjustthisbigpoliticalmachineouttherewecandonothingabout.Thisishowmanyhavebecomeattunedtotheworld.RichardRortyisrightinsayingthattheleftisthepartyofhope.Withoutitthereisnoreasonablehopeforjusticehereandnoworeverorevenforadecentsociety(Rorty1998b).Butitalsoseemslikethereisnohopefortheleftandso,unlesswecanplayreligioustricksonourselves,weareleftwithouthope.Inthelastpagesofhisbook,JamesSterbashowssomeawarenessofthis(Sterba1998,174–81).IIIIwillsetoutanormative-descriptiveinterpretivescenariowhichconsiderssomeofthepossibilitiesfor,inthefaceofallthis,ajustsocialorder—ajustworld—andtakesashotatacharacterizationofwhatitwouldlooklike.InthiscontextIwillconsiderhowwellSterba’saccountsatisfiesthisandhowwellhisdistinctivemethodologyworkshere.Butfirst,Iwillportrayalittlemorefullythedismalstateofaffairsforsocialism,andsaysomethingaboutwhatsocialism,andmorebroadlyofwhattheleft,canandshouldbe.RichardRorty—whileregardingsocialism,asshownby“thelessonsof1989,”tobeimpossible—optsforareformistnon-socialistleftposition(hecallsit“OldLeft”)(Rorty1998a).Heusefullydistinguishesbetweentheoldleft,thenewleftandtheculturalleft.Inthefollowingtypology(Table10.1)IexpandandmodifyhistypologyandcharacterizationintowhatIthinkyieldsausefultypologyoftheleft.Likeanytypologyitwillhavesomeblurrededgesandleavesomecontestableclassificationsandrequireclarifications.YetIbelieveitprovidesausefulclassificationofsocialismandtheleftmoregenerally,andamapforspottingvitaloptionsandnon-vitaloptionsfortheleft.Table10.1TypologyoftheleftIOLDLEFTIINEWLEFTIIICULTURALLEFTIVANALYTICALLEFTA.ReformistC.Neo-marxists(Hayden,F.ExistentialistMarxistsH.AnalyticalMarxistsCallinicos)(Beauvoir,Merleau-Ponty,Sartre)1.Socialdemocrats(Hook,5.RationalchoicetheoristsHowe,Rorty)(Elster,Roemer)\n110KAINIELSENIOLDLEFTIINEWLEFTIIICULTURALLEFTIVANALYTICALLEFT2.Socialists(Bernstein,6.Non-rationalchoicetheoristsThomas,Dewey)(G.A.Cohen,E.O.Wright,Levine)B.RevolutionaryD.Neo-anarchist(Chomsky)G.Culturalcritics(Jameson,Eagleton)3.Marxists4.Anarchistsocialists(Bakunin,Malatesta)E.Anti-theorist(Foucault,I.Analyticalsocialists/socialBaudrillard)democrats(JoshuaCohen,StuartHampshire)ByasocialistofanysortIamgoingtomeansomeonewhofavorsthepublicownershipofatleasttheprincipalmeansofproductioninaworldwhichistobecomeaworld(ifitbecomessocialist)inwhichthereareonlyworkersorretiredworkersorchildrenwhoinduecoursewillbecomeworkerswhentheygrowup,andinaworldinwhich,amongable-bodiedpeople,generallythesepeoplearecommittedtoademocraticorderingofsociety.Somepeople(insomeformsofsocialism)mayownsmallenterprisesofvarioussorts,buttodosotheymustalsobeworkers,typicallyworkingintheirownenterprises.Noable-bodiedmentallystableadultpersoncanbesustainedbythesocietywithoutwork.Andtheremustbemadeavailabletoeverynon-retiredadultpersonworkiftheychoosetowork(childcareandhouseworkalsocountasworkandshouldinsomewayberemuneratedasanyotherworkinsociety).Wewillinshorthaveasocialorderoffullemployment.Apersonmaychoosenottowork,butiftheydosochoose,workbeingavailabletoeveryone,theycanexpectnoaidfromthesocietyiftheyareable-bodied,adult,ofsoundmind,andhavenotreachedwhateversocietyfixesastheretirementage.Therewill,ofcourse,beindividualprivateproperty(clothes,tooth-brushes,cars,houses,tools,etc.),butproductivepropertywillbepubliclyownedexceptperhaps—andnodoubtdesirably—forsomesmallbusinesses,e.g.familyrestaurants,shops,smallplotsoflandproducingvegetables,andthelike.But,withoutextensivepublicownershipwedonothavesocialism.Thiscouldmeanforthispublicpropertytobestate-owned,butpublicpropertycouldalsobeworker-ownedandcontrolledwithvariousschemesofworkerownershipandcontrol.SoRorty’slinkingofsocialismwithnationalizationconfusesaparticulartypeofsocialism(andaproblematiconeatthat)withsocialismsansphrase.Thekeyhereispublicownership,publiccontrolanddemocraticgovernance,wherepublicownershipneednotatallmeanstateownershipandcontrol.Itmayjustbethatworkersjointlyownandcontroltheenterprisestheyworkinoronceworkedinwheretheyareretired.Incapitalismtherearetwoprincipalclasses:capitalists,whoownand,directlyorindirectly,controlatleasttheprincipalmeansofproductionandwhomayormaynot,astheychoose,alsoworkforawage(awageevenintheirownfirms,afteralltheirentrepreneurialworkiswork);andworkers(proletarians,ifyouwill)whoworkforawageandtypicallyownnomeansofproduction,butiftheydo,theydonotownsufficientmeansofproductiontosustainthemselvesjustwiththat.1ThisstatusleadstoMarxistsclassifyingworkersincapitalistsocietiesaswageslaves.Theyaredependent,unlesstheycanbreakoutoftheirclassandbecomesmallcapitaliststhemselves,oncapitalistsoronthestate(andthusinacapitalistsocietyindirectlyoncapitalists)fortheirsustenanceandthesustenanceoftheirfamilies.Moreover,onlyafewcouldbreakoutoftheirproletariancondition,forifafewbreakouttheywillblocktheexitsforothers.Thereisnoreasonablechoiceundercapitalismbutforthegreatmassofworkerstoremainworkers(G.A.Cohen1983).Insocialism,bycontrast,therewouldbenoclassdivisions,forallable-bodiedpersonswouldbeworkers,potentialworkers(i.e.children)orretiredworkers.Inthisimportantwayitwouldbeaclasslesssociety,althoughsinceworkinacomplexsocietywilloftenbeverydifferent,therewillbedistinctionsandperhapsstratadistinctionsbetweendifferentworkers(Marxinhismaturethoughtgaveuptheidealofanendtoanydivisionoflabor).Thoughthesedivisionsoflaborwillexistinaproperlyfunctioningdemocraticsocialistsociety,itwillnotbethecase,wherethesesocietiesareproperlyfunctioningsocialistsocieties,thatsometypesofworkers(intellectualworkersorbureaucraticworkers)willbeabletogaincontroloverothertypesofworkerssuchthattheywillgainpoliticaloreconomicpoweroverthem,orsuchthatsometypesofworkerswillhavemuchgreaterwealthormuchbetterlifeconditionsthanothers.(Ideally,therewillbenobetterlifeconditionsforanygroupofworkersthanforothers,butifsomedoarisetheywillbesmallandnotinherited.)Asocialistsocietyandasocialistworld(bydefinition,ifyouwill)mustbethoroughlyegalitarian,whereeveryonehasequalmoralstandinginsociety,andwheretherearenosystematicdifferencesinwealthorcontrolofsociety.Itmusthave,tobesocialist,athoroughlyegalitarianethos.\nSOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICE111Returningtomytypology,itisimportanttorecognizethatsocialistsarealwaysontheleft(again,bydefinitionifyouwill)butalsothatnotallleftistsaresocialists.ThemostsignificantexceptionsareA1old-leftreformistsocialdemocrats(e.g.RichardRorty,IrvingHoweandSidneyHook),Enewleftanti-theorists(e.g.MichelFoucault)andIanalyticalsocialdemocrats(e.g.JoshuaCohenandStuartHampshire).IshallarguethatthemostfundamentalchoicestobemadeontheleftarebetweenA1,A2andI(takenasoneratherdifferentiatedgroup)andH5andH6(takenasanothersuchgroup)(B3andB4aretraditionalrevolutionarysocialismsbutH5orH6mayalsobeanalyticalMarxistrevolutionarysocialisms.Myownsocialismisofthatsort).TheonlyotherseriouschoiceisbetweenH5andH6andDandE(takentogether)orEbyitselfasrepresented(thoughdifferently)intheworkofNoamChomskyandMichelFoucault.RichardRortyhasmadeapowerfulcaseforA1,asdidSidneyHookbeforehim(Rorty1998a;1998b).Hook’scaseiscloudedbyhisroleintheColdWar—bywhatbecamehisobsessionwithanti-communism—butRorty,thoughhegoesfirmlyonrecordassupportingtheColdWarandcommendsHookforhisColdWarcampaign,isnotsocompromisedbyhisanti-communism,nordoesitseriouslymarhisleft-wingcredentials(Rorty1998a).Alltheleftpositionsinthetypology(withthepossibleexceptionofsomeG,i.e.someculturalcritics)aremembersingoodstandingofthepartyofhope.ButinmyviewthemostseriouschoicesarebetweensomeformsofDand/orE,A1andA2,ononeside,andH5andH6andIontheother.IshallwithapparentdogmatismsetasideB3(classicalMarxism)andB4(classicalsocialistanarchism).Forsomeofthereasonsthatevensomepeopleontheleftareattractedtolibertarianism,areadingofMikhailBakunin’sStateandAnarchycannotbutattractonetoitsvisionoflibertyandastatelessclasslesssociety.But,viewedmoresoberly,itistooUtopianavision.Thereisnojustsmashingthestateanywhere,anytimeandthenmovingdirectlytoaclasslessstatelesssociety.Thereis,first,theinescapabilityofwhatMarxistscallthetransitionperiod;andsecond,thefactthatrevolutionscanbesuccessfullymadeandsocialismsuccessfullyestablished(ifitcanbeestablishedatall)onlyundercertainconditions.Moreover,revolutionsarenotjustovernighthappenings(Nielsen1971).Andthatwecouldevermove,incomplexsocieties,toastatelesssocietyisveryproblematical.MarxandEngelsandtheotherclassicalMarxiststhoughtwecould,butitisverydoubtfulifaproperunderstandingofhistoricalmaterialismoranythingelsewouldmakethatplausible(Moore1993).ItisMarxtheyoungUtopianwhothoughtthatwecouldeventuallyliveinastatelesssociety.Sustainedbyhisearlyphilosophicalanthropology,hecontinuedtohavethathopewhileheshouldhaveseenthathisownworkinhistoricalmaterialismmadesuchabeliefutterlyUtopian(Moore1993).Suchabeliefis,thatis,asunjustifiedinMarxasinBakunin,thoughMarxsawthatwecouldnotdirectlyleaptostatelessnessafterasuccessfulrevolutionaryseizureofpower.Thepointisthatthereisnoreasontothinkthatincomplexsocietieswecangettostatelessnessatall.ClassicalrevolutionaryMarxismshouldalsonotbetakenaschurch.Indeeditneedsextensivemodification.IamananalyticalMarxianandarevolutionaryoneatthat.IregardMarxandEngels,andRosaLuxemburgaswell,asmasterthinkersofmodernity.Muchofmythinkinghasbeenformedandsustainedbythem.ButIuse“analyticalMarxian”advisedly,onanalogywith“Darwinian”ratherthan“Darwinist”.ModernbiologistsareoverwhelminglyDarwinian,buttheyarenot“Darwinists”.Theyrealize—andhowcoulditbeotherwisewithabroad-rangingscientificaccount—thatDarwinwaswrongaboutmanythings.ButtheirverywayofthinkingwasdeeplyformedbyDarwinandtheyregardhimasascientificgiant.IfeelexactlythesameaboutMarx.Moreover,Iregardhisaccountasasocialscientificoneandnot(paceKolakowskiandRorty)asphilosophy,andmostfirmlynotaspeculativeHegelianteleologicalphilosophyofhistory.Itakehistoricalmaterialismtobeascientifictheoryofepochalsocialchangewhich,unfortunately,hasprobablybeendisconfirmed(JoshuaCohen1992).Butitisaperfectlyproperempiricaltheoryforallofthat(Nielsen1983;1989c;G.A.Cohen1978;JoshuaCohen1982;LevineandWright1980).Theabovenotwithstanding,present-dayclassicalMarxismhasbecomeafundamentalistMarxismrigidlyholdingontothelabortheoryofvalue,theideaofacommandeconomy,anddialecticalmaterialism.Ithasbecomeametaphysicaltheoryandnottheattemptatthelarge-scaleandsystematicscientifictheorythatitwasinthehandsofMarx.Iturnnow,referringbackagaintomytypology,tothenewleft.Thenewleftdidsomefinepracticalthings.ItbroughtanendtotheVietnamWar,helpedustoviewhumanrelationsinanewwayandtookaninsouciantlydismissiveattitudetocapitalistsociety.Rortymaintainsthattheculturalleft,acontinuationofthenewleft,afteritretreatedintotheacademy,abandoned(forthemostpart)politicalcontestationforculturalcritique.Stillitdid,inastrikinglyusefulway,someimportantthings(Rorty1998a;1998b).2Ithelpedusspotlightthelifeconditionsofpeoplewhoaremarginalizedinvariouswaysandusefully(ifinsomeinstancesproblematically)challengedthewaysthingsaredoneinuniversities.Buttheculturallefttends,somemoresothanothers,tobeconceptuallyincoherentandnaïve.Theydonotprovideanewrationaleforsocialismoranyotherkindofplausibleleftism.And,ineffect,ifnotinintention,thenewacademicsamongthem(GratherthanF)aredeeplyapolitical.Theyareprobably,atleasttosomeextent,responsibleforturningmanyserioussocialthinkers,includingactivists,awayfromsocialismandMarxism.\n112KAINIELSENIVTakingsocialismoratleastleftismseriously,theseriousoptionsarebetweenvariousformsofthereformistleft(A)andanalyticalsocialdemocracyandreformistsocialism(I)(e.g.JoshuaCohen2000),ontheonehand,andvariousformsofanalyticalMarxism(e.g.G.A.Cohen,JohnRoemer,AndrewLevine)ontheother.Letus,toevenfurtherpinpointmatters,contrastold-leftsocialdemocracywithanalyticalMarxismtoseeifwecanascertainwhichgivesusthebestmodelofwhatajustandotherwisedesirablesocialist/socialdemocraticworldwouldlooklike.SocialdemocratssuchasRichardRortyrejectsocialism,andparticularlysocialism,analyticalorotherwise,withaMarxianflavor.Theydosoonthreeprincipalgrounds.1TheSovietexperimenthasabundantlyshownusthat,inamoderndynamiceconomyansweringtopeople’sneeds,asocialismwithoutmarketswillnotwork.Itisinefficient,andfeaturesastiflingbureaucracy.Itcannotobtaingoodsandserviceswhentheyareneededandwheretheyareneeded.Itcannotbeinnovativeandproducethingsthatpeoplewant.Peopleinsuchaworldwillnotadequatelygeteitherwhattheyneedorwant.2Thereisastrongtendencyforasocialistsocietytoeithernotbedemocraticatallortobeminimallyandinsecurelydemocratic.Historicallyspeakingtheyarenotsocieties(toputitminimally)withafirmtrackrecordofrespectinghumanrights.TheMarxisttradition,asRortyputsit,isatradition“thatiscoveredwithfilthbecauseofthemarksofthegovernmentsthathavecalledthemselvesMarxist”(Rorty1998a,21).(However,weshouldcarefullynoteandnotforgetthatwithrespecttocapitalism,thisisthepotcallingthekettleblack.)Marx,EngelsandLuxemburghadgoodintentionsalright,buttheyassumedtooeasilyandnaivelythataftersuchaclass-basedrevolution,withthestruggle,disciplineandcontrolthiswouldrequire,thatwithaworkers’victory,nodoubtinthebeginninganinsecurevictory,democracywouldeventuallyobtain.Wecould,andwould,theythought,movefromasocialistsocietyvictoriousinaclass-basedcivilwartoafullydemocraticsociety.Butthatisveryunrealisticanditdidnothappen.3MarxistsandMarxians,bothclassicalandanalytical,puttoomuchtrustintheory,andparticularlyingrandsocialtheory:atheorythatwouldmakeplaintheunderlyingstructureandnecessarydevelopmentofsociety.Thereisnosuch“scienceofsociety,”andbeliefinoneleadsnotinfrequentlytoarbitrarinessandtodogmatismand,whenthingsgobadly,sometimeseventofanaticism.Theintellectualleftgenerally,andMarxistsinparticular,are,Rortyputsit,“dominatedbythenotionthatweneedatheoreticalunderstandingofourhistoricalsituation,asocialtheorywhichrevealsthekeystothefuturedevelopment,andastrategywhichintegrateseverythingwitheverything”(Rorty1998a,45).TheMarxistideaisnotjusttohaveabunchofdisparateconcreteproposalsforreformwithaminimalordering,buttorejectsuchpiecemealsolutionsunlesstheyareintegratedintoageneraltheoreticalpackage,theoreticallysustained.Marxians,forexample,aimatachievingacertainsortofsociety.Theywantinthecourseofdoingsotoseeexactlyhowitisthatthericharerippingoffthepoor,whattheunderlyingmechanismsandstructuresareandhowitcanbepermanentlysothatwejustdon’tclearuponelocalproblem—makeonelocalsolution—onlytocreateanotherlocalproblem(perhapsevenaworseproblem)elsewhere.Theywant,workingholistically,toachievearationalorderingofsociety.Todothatweneedintelligent,general,integratedplans,butthisrequiressomesophisticatedgeneraltheory.Itisnaturaltobelievethattoknowwhichinitiativestopressforwardwithandinwhatorderandhowtointegratethem,weneedtostepbackoneremovefromthesituationinordertogainaclearerviewsoastoseewhatthemorespecificinitiativesshouldbeandhowtoprioritizethem.Rorty,aswereKarlPopperandFriedrichHayek,isutterlyskepticalaboutthis.Heremarks,“Itneverworkedbefore.Whyshoulditworknow?”(Rorty1998a,43).Wehaveno“scienceofsociety”or(whichissomethingelseagain)generalmoraltheorywhichwillgiveusafixhere(hereheisatloggerheadswithSterba).Allwecando,Rortyhasit,is,asreflectivelyandconcretelyaswecan,introducespecificinitiatives—specificproposalsbackedupbyspecificcampaigns—thatmightrelievesomespecificsufferingwithoutattemptingsomeoveralltheoreticalunderstandingandintegration(Rorty1998b,111–24).Rortyremarks,takingaresoluteanti-theoreticalstance,inwhathetakestobeagoodpragmatistspirit,“Allsocialinitiativeshaveunforeseen,andoftenbad,sideeffects.Theideathatyoucanstepbackandfixitsothatyourinitiativewon’tinterferewithanybodyelse’sinitiativeiscrazy”(Rorty1998a,47).ThefirstobjectiontoanalyticalMarxismisperhapsthemosttractable.Rortyutterlyignoresthepossibilityofmarketsocialism.Commandeconomies,hestresses,ashavemanyothers,donotwork,atleastincomplexindustrialsocieties.Wecannotinamodernsocietyandinamoderninterdependentworldhaveamarket-freeplannedeconomy—evenoneplannedwiththeconsiderableintelligenceandthebestwillintheworldtomaximallyandequitablymeethumanneeds.Theyworkstaggeringlybadly.Evenifwehadhadconscientioussociallycommittedegalitarianplannersatthetopsteeringsociety,insteadofthugsorindifferentbureaucratsouttofilltheirownpockets,itcouldnotbedone.Allocations,iftheyaretobesufficientlysensitive,foracomplexsociety,cannotbemadethisway.Itisnot,asinextremeformsoflaissezfaire,thatthereisnoneedforplanning.Acomplexcapitalistsocietywillhavebothmarketandplan.Yetmarketsremainabsolutelyessential(Nove1983).\nSOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICE113However,marketsocialismrecognizes,andindeedstresses,this.Marketsocialistshaveworkedout,sometimeswithgreatsophisticationandwithattentiontofeasibilityconsiderations,modelsforamarketsocialistsocietythatwouldbebothsocialist,inthesenseIcharacterized,andhavemarketsaswell.JohnRoemer’sandDavidSchweickart’smodelsarewellknownandcarefullyarticulatedexamples(Roemer1994;Schweickart1993).3Mostsurely,aswithanyscientificenterprise,theycanbeimprovedonandtheywillneedtoberevised.Buttheyhavebeenworkedoutwithgreatcareandeconomicsophistication.NeitherRorty,noranyoneelsewhoclaimsthatthereisnofeasibleandattractivealternativetocapitalism,willhavemuchcredibilityinthatclaimuntiltheyhavecarefullyconsideredsuchmodelsandshownhowmarketsocialismisnotviableasamodelthat,ifgivenachance,couldwork.Reformistsocialdemocraticleftistsmightrespondthatitisnotthereasonabilityofsuchmarketsocialistmodelsthatbothersthem,buttheirpoliticalimpossibility.Giventhepoliticalformsthatareinplay,thereisnochancethatinanyoftherichcapitalistdemocracies—theplaceswhere,iftheycouldbeputinpractice,theymightwork—thatmarketsocialismwillbegivenatry.Capitalistsandthepoliticiansintheirservicewillnotallowthistohappen.Theywillnotwillinglytransformtheirsocietiesintosomethingwhichisnotcapitalist,evenifaverystrongcase,consideringtheneedsofpeoplegenerally,ismadeforit.Anddemocracyandthemediaaresufficientlyhijackedbythemforittobenon-utopiantothinkthereareforcesinsuchsocieties—thatisinoursocieties—tobringmarketsocialismontotheeconomicandpoliticalagenda.Howevergooditmaylookonpapertoafewintellectuals,therearenoevidentpoliticalmechanismsinoursocietiestogetitontheagenda.Wesimplydonotknowhowtogetfromheretothere.Thisisapowerfulargumentagainstanyformofsocialism,andperhapsitcannotbemet.But,forallthat,itisnotasdecisiveasmanythink.Neo-liberalism,asitsharshglobalizingfaceisbecomingevermoreevident,isworkingverybadly—ishurtingmanypeopleandnotyieldingitsrosypromises.Anditisgeneratingincreasingopposition,someofitradical,mostofitliberal:aclamorontheradicalsidefortheoverthrowofcapitalism,andontheliberalsideforarathermoresociallyresponsiblecapitalism.Butthereisaconsiderablereluctanceonthepartofthemultinationalstobecomesociallyresponsible.Forexample,thebigGMproducerssuchasMonsantoclaimthattheirproductsaresafeandthatitisjustignoranceforanyonetothinkotherwise.Buttheyrefusetoputtheirmoneywheretheirmouthis.ByfiercelobbyingtheyhavesuccessfullyblockedthepassageofabillintheEuropeanParliamentwhichwouldholdthemlegallyliableiftheirfoodturnedouttobeharmfultohumansortheenvironment.Thisisjustoneinstanceofrepeatedoccurrenceswheremultinationalsinconjunctionwithconservativepoliticiansmakethingsworseforhumanbeings—notjustafewhumanbeingsbutmanyhumanbeingsindifferentconditionsindifferentcountriesandindifferentwalksoflife.Thenaturalthing,afterthis,inEurope(butnotNorthAmerica)istovoteinsocialdemocrats,sometimesincoalitionwithgreensorsocialists.Butwhenitisseenthatthesepartiesdonotdeveloppoliciesthatimprovethings,thereisconsiderabledisillusion(intheUK,forexample,thegapbetweentherichandpoorhasactuallyincreasedunderthecurrentLabourgovernment).Perhaps,afterrepeatedsuchbumps,theelectoratemaybewillingtogivesocialismatry,whereforthesocialists’parttheypresentanintelligentplanformarketsocialism.Thismightproducearight-wingcoup,butthisisunlikelyincountriessuchasBritain,France,Germany,HollandandtheScandinavianbloc.Again,weshouldrememberGramsci’sslogan.Moreover,therewillbenoachievinganythingwithoutengaginginstruggle.Thereisalsothebadnamethatsocialistsocietieshaveacquiredfromtheirtendencyinsomeinstancestobecome(tounderstateit)undemocratic.Morethanthat,somesocieties,runningunderthebannerofsocialismandMarxism,havebeensoakedinblood.Thismustbeacknowledgedandnotforgotten.ButitisalsoimportanttokeepinmindthatnoteverythingcallingitselfsocialistandMarxistisindeedso.WemustseeclearlywhatMarxandEngelsstoodfor,andalsounderstandthatthesetyrannicalandbloodthirstyregimeshavenothingincommonwithwhatMarxandEngelswereabout.Andwemustneverforgethowthenascentsocialistcountrieshadtheirbacksdriventothewallbythecapitalistcountries.Thereis,tobesure,vanguardism.ButtherearealsoMarxistclaimsabouttheilleffectsofthepervasivenessofbourgeoisideology,andhowbourgeoisattitudesaffectoursociallivesinawaythatrunsagainsttheattainmentofcommunityamongus.Thisleadstosubtle,andsometimesnot-so-subtle,waysinwhichworkersaredominated.Themilitancyofsocialistscomesfromtherecognitionoftheneedtofightbackhere.Wecannot,asRortyis,reasonablybedismissiveaboutthis.Recognizingoftheneedforvigilanceandmilitancy,vanguardismbecameanintegralpartofLenin’sthought,andhasledawayfromdemocraticwaysofdoingthings.ButthevanguardismisLenin,notMarxandEngels.Theyrecognizedtheneedforvigilanceandmilitancy,butthisisadifferentmatter.Marx,inhisseethingrage(notunjustified)atthewaypeoplearetreatedundercapitalism,sometimesbecameabitfanatical.Butthatisnotatallcentraltohisthought,anditcertainlyhasnoplaceinanalyticalMarxismorsocialismproperlyunderstood.Socialistshavebeenincapitalistsocietiessubjecttoallkindsofrepression,anddeliberatedisinformationconcerningthemhasbeenandstilliswidespread.Think,forexample,ofthefateofPaulRobeson.4Soitisnaturalforsocialiststodistrustthebourgeoisieandtoworryabouthowtheyinfiltratesocialistranks.Butsocialismdoesnotrestonthatdistrustofbourgeoisintellectualsandrelatedphenomena.AndcertainlyanalyticalMarxismandthesocialismthatgoeswithitisnon-vanguardistanddemocraticthroughandthrough.Moreover,wheresocialistrevolutionshaveturnedsourtheyoccurredinsocietieslackingintwofeaturesessentialforthedevelopmentandsustainingofsocialism:first,developedeconomicforces;and\n114KAINIELSENsecond,atraditionofliberaldemocracy.5Marxclearlysawthatsocialismdevelopsonthebackofcapitalismwhiletransformingit.Itdidn’thaveachanceinRussiaorChina,wheretherewaslittlecapitalistdevelopment.Forittoworkitmustariseintherich(economicallydeveloped)capitalistdemocracieswhichare,forreasonsMarxwellexplained,alsoliberaldemocracies.Theywouldremainsuchdemocracieswiththetransformationtosocialism.Indeed,withatransitiontosocialisminsuchconditions,thedemocracywouldactuallyevendeepen,fortworeasons:first,itwouldthenbealsosomeformofeconomicdemocracyandnotjustapoliticaldemocracy;andsecond,thepoliticaldemocracywouldbefuller,forfinallyordinarypeoplewouldhaveasayinhowtheirsocietyisordered.WhatJohnRawlscallsconstitutionalessentialswouldremaininplace,butitwouldalsobesothatpeople,giventheendofclassdomination,wouldhaveagreatercontrolovertheirlives.Pacelibertarianism,therewouldbemorelibertywithsocialism,notless(Nielsen1985).Iturnnowtothethirdold-leftsocialdemocraticpointagainstanalyticalMarxismandMarxismmoregenerally—apointstressedparticularlybyRorty—namelyitsallegedovertheoreticism.WhenRortythinksoftheoryinthecontextofMarxistsocialtheoryhethinksofgrandphilosophicaltheoryseekingtointegrateeverything:adialecticalandhistoricalmaterialismthatwillshowushowsocietiesmustdevelopand,withthisteleologyofhistoricalinevitability,whattheendofhistoryandthedestinyofhumanbeingsmustbe.WhilemostanalyticalMarxistsarehistoricalmaterialists,theirhistoricalmaterialismisnotsuchagrandphilosophicalteleologicaltheoryrepletewithaphilosophicalanthropology.Itisnotaphilosophicaltheory,grandorungrand,atall,anditisnotateleologicaltheory.Itisratheranintegratedclusterofempirical—andthusfalsifiable—hypothesesaboutepochalsocialchange(G.A.Cohen1988;Satz1989;Nielsen1983,1989c).SoherewehaveRortyversusstrawman.However,thisdoesnotendthematteraboutovertheoriticism.Thatgrand“meta-narratives”areblatheristolerablyevident.Whatiscrucial,evenwhentakingMarxistsocialtheoryinsuchanon-teleological,non-metaphysicalway,asanalyticalMarxistsrightlydo,istodeterminewhetherwecanhavewarrantedlyassertableandusefultheoriesofsuchgeneralscopeasanalyticalMarxists(andMarxistsgenerally)believewecan,andasDurkheimandWeberandcontemporaryDurkheimiansandWeberiansbelievewecanaswell,orwhetherwithRortyandPeterWinchwemust,oratleastshould,stickwithcontextual,practice-dependent,morepiecemealapproachestosociallifeandtosocialproblems.Theanti-Marxianclaimis,whetherphilosophical,empirical,normativeorsomeamalgam,thatweshouldnottrustingeneraltheories.Weshould(paceSterba)nomoretrustingeneralethicaltheoriesthaningeneralempiricallyorientedinterpretative-empiricaltheories.They(paceMarxists)areofnouseinguidingpractice;theyarenotwarrantedlyassertableandtheirverycoherenceisproblematic.Wearenotgoingtogetsuchatheoreticalunderstandingofourhistoricalsituationorindeedanyhistoricalunderstanding;wearenotgoingtogetinanywaysuchasystematicintegratedunderstanding.Leftism,theargumentgoes,tobedefendablemustbeapragmatic,atheoretical,piecemeal,reformistsocialdemocracy,orperhapsapragmaticsocialismwithouttheoreticaldanglers—atleastthegrandtheoreticaldanglersoftheclassicalsociologicaltradition(Nielsen1999,513–16).Idonotwantorneedinmyarticulationanddefenseofsocialismhere,andparticularlywithmyjuxtapositionofitwithSterba’saccountofjustice,totakesidesonthisissue,thoughitis,Ibelieve,averyimportantandverycontestableissue.Butformypurposeshere,evenaratheratheoreticalsocialismwilldo.WhatwedoneedtodoistoseethatwithoutitatleastRortyisnotgoingtobeabletorealizehisUtopianhopesforaclassless,casteless,non-sexist,non-homophobic,non-racistegalitarianworld.Hecannotpossiblyrealizeitinacapitalistworld,nomatterhowsocialdemocratic.Acapitalistsocietywithoutclassesisacontradictioninterms.Iftherewerenocapitaliststherewouldbenocapitalism.Andwhere,asincapitalism,therearecapitalistsandworkers,therewillbeatleastsomeinequalities;perhapsjustifiableoratleastunavoidableinequalities,butinequalitiesallthesame.If,asRortythinks—andassocialdemocratsgenerallythink—someformofcapitalismisfunctionallyorrationallyinescapableincomplexmodernsocieties,thenhecannothavehisclasslessegalitariansocietyoraclasslessegalitarianworldunlessperchancehewouldhaveusperimpossiblereturntoasituationwhereweliveinstatelesshunter-gatherersocieties.HecannothaveitevenasaUtopianhope,foritmakesnosensetohopeforwhatonefirmlybelievesnottobeachievable.Ifwearestuckwithcapitalism,asRortybelievesweare,andindeedreasonablyso,thenwecannotcoherentlyhopeforaclasslessegalitariansociety.Idonotthinksuchahopeisunreasonable,butthenIdonotthinkthatsocialismisunreasonable,undesirableorimpossible.VIturnnowtoconsiderationofacasethatcouldbemadeforthisinthecontextofcomparingitwiththeaccountSterbagivesofjustice.IwanttosayinitiallythatIaminstrongagreementwithSterba’sconceptionof“apeacemakingwayofdoingphilosophy.”Philosopherstoooftengoaroundlikegamecocksspoilingforafight.Theyseethemselvesasengaginginaphilosophicalbattleinwhichtheaimistodemolishtheiropponents,toshootdowntheirargumentsandtodestroytheirconceptions.Butthatisinfantile.ThemodelshouldnotbethatoftheLoneRangerouttogundown“theerrants,”butC.S.Peirce’simageofphilosophyasanimpartialcooperativeinquirywherephilosophers,assumingafallibilisticorientation,seektolearnfromeachotherandtogethertoconstructthebestaccounttheycanmakeofwhateverisatissueandtobeprepared,indeedevenin\nSOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICE115mostcasestoexpect,tomodifyoreventoabandontheiraccountasinquiryproceeds.Thecasesofsuchmacho-childishbehavioronthepartofphilosophersthatSterbacitesinhisfirstchapterare,unfortunately,perfectlyaccurateandbringshameonourprofession.“Philosophyaswarmaking”isnotphilosophy—toengageinjustifiedpersuasivedefinition—butsomethinglikeasillyverbalbattle.Ifthatiswhatphilosophyis,philosophysurelyshouldcometoanend.Iwouldonlyaddthatavoidinganddetestingthatisperfectlycompatiblewithaphilosopherofintegritystickingwithsomethingthatshegenuinelyandreflectivelythinksissoandisofcentralimportanceeveninthefaceofuniversalopposition.Shesurelyinsuchacircumstanceshouldthinktwice(toverymuchunderstateit)aboutthatoppositionandtohonestlyconsiderandtaketohearttheirobjections.Inthefaceofuniversalopposition,ifsheisreasonable,shewillthinkthatitisverylikely—indeedalmostcertain—thatsheismistaken.Shemust,thatis,taketheiropposingviews,withsuchamassiveoppositiontoherown,assomethingthatisverylikelywelltaken.Butafternon-evasivelydoingthatshestillmightbelievethatherviewsareatelling-it-like-it-isandnotcrazy,andthusstickwiththem,tryingtoarticulatethemmoreadequatelysothattheymightfairlyanswertheobjectionsdirectedatthem.6Intheprocessofdoingthisshemightcometoagreewithhercritics,butstillshemightinsteadstickwithherviews.Butwhatshecannotdoandstillbeactingreasonablyandindeedstillbedoingphilosophy,istopersistinherviews“attheexpenseoffairmindedness,opennessorself-criticism”(Sterba1998,10).Tonotproceedinadeliberatelybiasedmannerjustgoeswiththejob,oratleastwithagenuinesenseofone’svocationasaphilosopherandintellectual.Sterbaisrightinclaimingthatweshoulddophilosophyinsuchawaythatwemaximizethepossibilityofcomingupwithgenuinelyjustifiedviews(Sterba1998,3–9).Sterbanotonlyarguesthatacommitmenttomoralityisrationallyacceptable—onecanactrationallyinactinginaccordancewiththemoralpointofview—butmorethanthatthatmoralityisrationallyrequiredofus.Thereis,hebelieves,norationalalternativetoactingfromthemoralpointofview.Theremustbesomefailureinrationalityifapersondoesnotactonmoralprinciple.Hobbes’s“foole”isindeedafool.Itisnotonlyimmoral(oratleastamoral)nottosoact(oratleastsincerelystrivetosoact),butirrationalaswell.IhavearguedatlengthagainstKurtBaier,DavidGauthier,AlanGewirthandothersthatsuchamoralrationalismcannotbesustained.Whatcanbesustainedinsteadisthatitisrationaltobecommittedtothemoralpointofview,butitcanberationalaswelltobeanegoistoramoralist.Reasondoesnotdecidethingshere.Itispermissive(Nielsen1989a;1996a,207–71;2001).Sterba’sarticulationanddefenseofwhatIshallcallmoralrationalism—theviewthatrationalityrequiresacommitmenttomorality—isdeveloped,sophisticatedandoriginal,andwellawareofthepitfallsofsuchaccounts.And,ifheisright,itisaveryimportantclaiminmoralphilosophy.Iam,perhaps,notseeingthemoteinmyowneye,butinclinedtothinkthatthispartofhisviewhasnotbeenmadeout.Whereothershavefailed,fromPlatotoGauthier,hefailstoo.Iwishitweremymandatetoexaminehisaccounthere.Butitisnot,andinsettingouthisrelationtosocialismIshallassume(whatIactuallydonotbelieve)thatthispartofhisaccount—hismoralityascompromise—isbasicallysound,andIwilllimitmyselftoexamininghisclaimthatevenwhenMoralityasCompromiseisgiventheminimalinterpretationofalibertarianidealofliberty,itleads,notaslibertariansclaimtothepracticalrequirementsofaminimalornight-watchpersonstate,buttothepracticalrequirementsofawelfarestateandbeyond.(Sterba1998,40)Ishallparticularlybeconcernedwiththe“beyond”andwhetherhisaccountleadsustosocialismand,ifso,towhatkindofsocialismand,independentlyofSterba,toaconsiderationofwhethersocialismofanykindcanbesustained.Libertarianismappearsatleasttohaveminimalpracticalrequirements,andsohereasonablystartsthereinarticulatinghistheoryofjustice(Sterba1998,7).Hebelievesthathehasestablishedthatthelibertarians’idealoflibertyhasthe“samepracticalrequirementsasthewelfareliberals’idealoffairness”(Sterba1998,7).Theclaimisthat,despitewhatlibertariansclaim,thesamerightstowelfareandequalopportunitythatareusuallyassociatedwithawelfareliberalidealareactuallyentailedbylibertarianism(Sterba1998,8).Hefurtherarguesthat“thesetworightsleadtosomethingliketheequalitythatsocialistsendorse”(Sterba1998,8).Libertariansoperatewithapared-downconceptionoflibertyandrightsasnegativelibertiesandnegativerightsonly.Libertyiscenterstageforlibertariansofanysort.Butitisanegativeliberty.Peopleareunfree,ontheiraccount,whentheyarekeptfromdoingwhattheywanttodoorareentitledtodobythepositiveactionsofothers.Theirrightsareviolatedwhentheyarepreventedfromdoingbythepositiveactsofotherswhattheyareentitled(legitimatelyfree)todo.Theytakeitasafundamentalpoliticalidealthateachpersonshouldhavethegreatestamountoflibertycommensuratewiththesamelibertyforall.IfastarvingstrangertowhomIowenothing—oratleastIinlibertariantermsowenothing—comestomydoorbeggingforfoodwhenIhavemorethanenoughandaminfactenjoyingasumptuousfeast,ifIamakindandcharitablepersonIwillgivehimsomething.ButifIturnhimawaywithoutgivinghimanythingIhave,libertariansmaintain,notwrongedhim.Ihavenotviolatedhisrightsorlimitedhislibertyorkeptfromhimanythingtowhichheisentitled.Ihavedonehimnowrong,thoughIhavecertainlynotbeenkindorcharitable.Thisremainstrueevenifasaresultofmyomission\n116KAINIELSENhediesafewhourslater.Imaynotmakehimworseoffthanhealreadyis,butIaminnowayrequiredtoaidhim.Nicepeople,ofcourse,willhelphim,butIaminnowaymorallyrequiredtobenice.People,ofcourse,maycontracttoengageinmutualaid,butthereisnoantecedentdutyorobligationtomutualaid.Sterbathinksthatlibertariansfailtounderstandthelogicoftheirownposition.Peopleinsuchcircumstances(e.g.suchasastarvingperson)implicitly,theself-understandingoflibertarianstothecontrarynotwithstanding,giventheverylogicofthelibertarians’ownaccount,havelegitimateclaimsonothers.Considerconflictsituationsbetweentherichandthepoorwherethepoor,throughnofaultoftheirown,lackthegoodsandresourcestomeeteventheirmostbasicneedswhiletherichhavemorethanenoughgoodsandresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.Libertariansargue,aswehaveseen,thattherichareatlibertytoignorethepoorandtousetheirowngoodsandresourcestosatisfytheirdesiresforvariousluxuriesifthatiswhattheywanttodo.Thislibertycanberightlyenjoyedbytherichevenattheexpenseofthemeetingbythepooroftheirmostbasicneeds.Liberty,libertariansbelieve,alwayshaspriorityoverotherpoliticalideals.Thelibertyofthepoor—itisclaimed—isnotatstakehere.Nobodyisdeprivingthemoftheirliberty.Nothingthatistheirsisbeingtakenfromthem;theyarenotpreventedfromexercisinganyoftheirownliberties.Itwouldbeakindthingtohelpthem,butsuchcharitableactscannotbemorally,orotherwise,requiredbecausethepoorhavenotbeenpreventedfromdoinganythingtheyarefreetodo.However,Sterbaresponds,theirlibertyhasbeenaffected.Itisaffectedinthisway:thepoorarenotfreetotakefromthesurplusoftherichwhatisneededtosatisfytheirownbasicneeds.Libertarianswill,ofcourse,saytheyhavenosuchliberty.Butonwhatgrounds?Thepoorneednotbeappealingtoapositiveliberty,butonlytotheverysamenegativelibertythatlibertariansareappealingto;thelibertyofthepoorisnotbeingtreatedasa“positiverighttoreceivesomethingbutanegativerightofnoninterference”(Sterba1998,45).Wehavehereagenuineconflictofliberties—negativeliberties—betweentherichandthepoor.Eithertherichshouldhavethelibertynottobeinterferedwithinusingtheirsurplusgoodsandresourcesforluxurypurposesor…thepoorshouldhavethelibertynottobeinterferedwithintakingfromtherichwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneeds.Ifwechooseoneliberty,wemustrejecttheother.Whatneedstobedetermined,therefore,iswhichlibertyismorallypreferable:thelibertyoftherichorthelibertyofthepoor.(Sterba1998,45–6)Wecould,ofcourse,saythatthereisnomoralresolutionpossibleinsuchcircumstancesandwejusthavetofightitout.Wearesimplyfacedwithanakedpowerstruggle.Butthatishardlyadesirablecoursetotakeifthereisanyreasonableresolutioninsight.And,Sterbaclaims,thereissomethingreasonablethatcanbesaid.Wemoralagentshavetwoveryfundamentalprinciplesofmoralitywhicharewidelysharedandarereasonable,andtheycanbereasonablyusedinsuchconflictsituations.Theyarethe“OughtImpliesCan”Principleanditscontrapositive,the“ConflictResolutionPrinciple”(Sterba1998,46–8).ThefirstprinciplereadsPeoplearenotmorallyrequiredtodowhattheylackthepowertodoorwhatwouldinvolvesogreatasacrificethatitwouldbeunreasonabletoaskthemtoperformsuchanactionand/or,inthecaseofsevereconflictsofinterest,unreasonabletorequirethemtoperformsuchanaction.(Sterba1998,46)ThesecondprinciplereadsWhatpeoplearemorallyrequiredtodoiswhatiseitherreasonabletoaskthemtodoor,inthecaseofsevereconflictsofinterest,reasonabletorequirethemtodo.(Sterba1998,48)7Thesituationhere—theconflictdescribedbetweentherichandthepoor—isanextremeconflict-of-interestsituationand,giventheaboveprinciples,itisclearlymorereasonable,Sterbahasit,fortherichtorelinquishtheirlibertyherethanforthepoortodoso.Forthepoortorelinquishtheirlibertyhereistoallowthemselvestostarvetodeathorsomethingveryclosetothat.Wecannotreasonablyexpectthemtodothatwhilefortherichnosuchdireprospectobtains.Iftheconflictisresolvedintheotherway,therichwilllosesomeopportunitiestoacquireluxurygoods,goodswhichtheywouldlikeverymuchtohave.ButtheConflictResolutionPrincipleisareasonableprincipletoinvokehere.Itrequireseveryoneaffectedtoacceptitanditfavors,insituationsofthetypedescribed,thelibertyofthepoorovertherich.But,Sterbaclaims,theConflictResolutionPrincipleaswellastheOughtImpliesCanPrincipleareprincipleslibertariansmustacceptiftheywouldbereasonable,andtheseprinciplesrequirelibertarianstohavemoralcommitments,e.g.toacceptnegativewelfarerightsthattheydidnotthinktheywerecommittedto(Sterba1998,49–50).\nSOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICE117Sterbaalsoarguesthatlibertarians,iftheythinkthingsthroughreasonably,willbeledfrompurelynegativewelfarerights(asinconsideringthepoor)tothericherpositiveliberalwelfarerightsespousedbywelfareliberalsandsocialists.Sterbaargues:inrecognizingthelegitimacyofnegativewelfarerights,libertarianswillcometoseethatvirtuallyanyoftheirsurpluspossessionsislikelytoviolatethenegativerightsofthepoorbypreventingthepoorfromrightfullyappropriating(somepartof)theirsurplusgoodsandresources.So,inordertoensurethattheywillnotbeengaginginsuchwrongfulactions,itwillbeincumbentonthemtosetupinstitutionsguaranteeingadequatepositivewelfarerightsforthepoor.Onlythenwilltheybeabletouselegitimatelyanyremainingsurpluspossessionstomeettheirownnonbasicneeds.(Sterba1998,55–6)Thereasonablethingtodo,heclaims,isto“setupinstitutionsguaranteeingadequatepositivewelfarerights.Forthesereasons,recognizingnegativewelfarerightsofthepoorwillultimatelyleadlibertarianstoendorsethesamesortofwelfareinstitutionsfavoredbywelfareliberalsandsocialists”(Sterba1998,56).Sterbaextendswhathesaysabouthowareasonablelibertarianwouldcometoacceptnotonlynegativewelfarerightsbutpositivewelfarerightsaswelltoaconceptionofequalityofopportunity(Sterba1998,63–4).Wehavearighttowelfareandarighttoequalopportunity,forbotharerequiredformeetingpeople’sbasicneeds,andwithoutthemeetingofbasicneedslibertyisundermined(Sterba1998,64).“Whattheseargumentsshow,”claimsSterba,“isthatlibertarianismoralibertarianconceptionofjusticesupportsthesamepracticalrequirementsaswelfareliberalismorawelfareconceptionofjustice”(Sterba1998,65).Furtherinpursuitofhisreconciliationproject,Sterbaarguesthattheequalwelfarerightsandequalopportunityrightsusually“associatedwithawelfareliberalidealleadtosomethingliketheequalitythatsocialistsendorse,oncedistantpeoplesandfuturegenerationsaretakenintoaccount”(Sterba1998,172–3).Sterbahassummarizedhisownbasicargumentwellinthefollowingpassage:Insum,pursuingpeacemakingasamodelfordoingphilosophy,Ihavearguedthat,notonlydoesrationalityrequiremorality,butevenaminimalmoralitylikelibertarianismrequiresrightstowelfareandequalopportunitythatleadtosocialistequalityandfeministandrogyny.Inthisway,Ihavebroughttogetherthemoralidealsoflibertarianism,welfareliberalism,socialismandfeminismintowhatcouldbecalledareconciliationistconceptionofjustice.Inaddition,Ihavearguedthatthepursuitofthisreconciliationistconceptionofjustice,especiallyinitsfeministdimensions,istheoreticallyandpracticallyconnectedtothepursuitofracialjustice,homosexualjustice,andmulticulturaljusticeandisfurtherconstrainedbyspecificprinciplesofenvironmentaljusticeandjustwarpacifism.(Sterba1998,174)VIIapplaudSterba’sreconciliationprojectasfarasitcanbeplausiblycarriedoutwithoutblurringtheedgesbetweendifferentconceptionsandpositionswhichmaywellneed,fortheveryjustifiedviewherightlyseeks,sharperarticulationanddifferentiation.Butwhenthissharperarticulationhasbeencarriedoutwemayhavelostourreconciliation.Ifurtherthinkthatagoodcasecanbemadethatmorality—(paceGauthier)theveryfullbodiedmoralitythatSterbabelievesiscrucialforanadequatesocialandmorallife—isinaccordancewithrationality,butIbelieve(paceSterba)thatitisnotrequiredbythenormsofrationality(Nielsen1989,269–83).Ifurtherbelieve,likeRawls,thatweshoulddistinguishbetweenreasonabilityandrationality(Nielsen1996a,427–50;1998a;Rawls1993).Sterbarepeatedlymakesgreatplaywithreasonability,whichheunfortunatelydoesnotclearlydistinguishfromrationality.Hiscriticismoflibertarianism,takenonitsownterms,isthatitcommitsustothingswhichareunreasonable.Butinmanysituations—andparticularlyinsituationswhereSterbauses“reasonable”and“unreasonable”—itisitselfamoralnotion,oftenmeaningroughly“fair”or“impartial”and(for“unreasonable”)“unfair”or“notimpartial.”Thereis,ofcourse,noderivingmoralityfromit,forwearealreadyinthemoraldomain.Moreover,“reasonably,”ifnot“essentiallycontested,”isadeeplycontestednotion.Anditisnotclearthat,inappealingtoitinarguingagainstHobbesianlibertarianssuchasJanNarveson,hehasnotbeggedthequestion(Sterba1998,72–6).Becauseofthesedifficulties,Sterba’sreconciliationistprojectwouldbebetterserved,particularlyoverdistinctivelymoralandpoliticalmatters,ifhewoulddroptryingtoderivemoralnormsfromthenormsofrationality;distinguishclearlybetweenreasonabilityandrationality;and,recognizingthatreasonabilityisitselfinmanyofitscontextsamoralnotion,abandonwhatisineffecthisethicalrationalismandutilizeinsteadacoherentistapproachlikethatofRawls,deployingthemethodologyofappealingtoconsideredconvictionsinwidereflectiveequilibrium.8\n118KAINIELSENIdonotarguethishere,thoughIhavearguedforsuchamethodologyelsewhere(Nielsen1996a,12–19,159–272).Ihopethatsomewhereinthisvolumesomeonewillinsomewaytaketheseissuesup.However,torepeatwhatIsaidearlier,inwhatfollowsIshallassumethatSterbaisrightaboutderivingmoralityfrom“thenormsofrationality,”thatindeedtherearesuchnorms,thatthereisnothingproblematicabouthisappealtoreasonabilityandthatheisrightinthinkingthatlibertarianism,properlyunderstood,leadstowelfareliberalismandperhapseventosomethinglikeasocialistequality.“Perhaps”istoowishy-washy.PartofthetroubleisthatSterbadoesnotsaywhathemeansby“socialism”or“theequalitythatsocialistsendorse.”IthinkheisinrealitytalkingaboutsocialdemocracyandoftheegalitarianismofsocialliberalssuchasBrianBarryandJohnRawls.Whattheysayisforthemostpartsocialism-friendly,buttheydonotendorsesocialismand,thoughtheiregalitarianismisrobust,itisnotdistinctivelysocialistanddoesnottakeusbeyondwelfareandfair-equalopportunityliberalism.Socialistequality,rightlyorwrongly,isstillmorerobust(Nielsen1985,1996b;G.A.Cohen1992,1996,2000).Ishallspecifysomethingofwhatthiscomesto.BeyondwhatSterbaarguesfor,thoughstartingthere,socialistswant,wherethiscanbehad,notonlythesettingofconditionsforagenuineequalopportunityforanequalmeetingofbasicneedsbut,aswell,forthemeetingofallneeds.Moreover,theyalsowanttoseeaworldwhereeveryonewillbeableasfullyaspossibletosatisfythoseoftheirwantsthattheywouldcontinuetowantonreflection,andwithagoodunderstandingofthecausesandconsequencesoftheirsatisfyingthem,thatarealsowantscompatiblewitheveryoneelsebeingabletosatisfytheirwantswheretheymeetthesameconditions.Inshort,theywantaworldwhereeveryonecouldsatisfythosecompossiblewantsthattheyasindividualswouldreflectivelyandinformedlyendorse.Theaspirationofsocialistegalitariansisfortheretobeaworldinwhichitispossibleforeveryonetohavethebestlifethatispossibleforhumanbeingstohave.Thatistheequalityofconditionthatsocialiststaketobeaheuristicideal.Thisgoesalongwaybeyond,thoughofcourseitinvolves,acommitmenttoseekingequalityinthemeetingofthebasicneedsforeveryone.Thisshouldhaveafurtherfilling-inandspecification.Weshouldaskwhataresocialistegalitarianaspirations?Whataretheutopianhopesofsocialists?Whatsortofworldwouldsocialistsideallyliketosee?Itistohaveaworldofequals—aworldwithoutanybowingandscraping—wherethelifeofeveryonemattersandmattersequally.Wesocialistegalitarianswantaclassless,casteless,genderless,non-racist,non-homophobicworldwhereanegalitarianethosprevails(G.A.Cohen1992and2000).Socialistegalitariansaspiretoaworldofequals,peoplewithequaleffectivehumanrights,equal(insofarasthisisfeasible)inpower,equalinaccesstoadvantage,equalinwhole-lifeprospects.Butwealsowantaworldinwhichpeoplehaveasenseofcommunity,withthecommoncommitmentsthatgowithit.Socialistegalitarianswant,aswell,asfarasthatispossible,thatwell-beingbesomethingthateveryonehasatthehighestlevelitispossibleforthemtoattain.Suchanegalitarianhopeisnotjusttomakethebadlyoffwelloff,or,ifthatisnotpossible,tomakethemasclosetobeingwelloffaspossible,buttohaveaworldinwhichtherearenobadlyoffindividualsorgroupsofpeople,aworldthatisnothierarchicallystratified(ifthatisnotapleonasm)alongthelinesof“theworstoff,”“thenextworseoff,”“themiddlinglysituated,”“thewelloff,”“thebetteroff”and“thebestoff”(Nielsen1996b).Putinpoliticalterms,socialistegalitariansaresocialistsandnotwelfarestatesocialdemocrats.Inpracticalterms(andasidefromidealtheory),insocietiessituatedaseventhebetteroffandmoreprogressiveofoursocietiesare(e.g.Denmark,Holland,Finland,Iceland,Norway,Sweden),socialistegalitarianswill,vis-à-visequalityinsuchaworld,optforverymuchthesamethingsthatsocialdemocratswilloptfor:tomaketheworstoffstrataofsocietyaswelloffastheycanbe.Weshouldredistributeuntilnofurtherredistributionwouldleavetheworstoffbetteroff.Buttheirunderlyingaim,utopianthoughitmaybe,istocausetocomeintoexistenceandtobesustainedaworldofequals:aclassless,genderless,non-racistworldwherethenecessarystratahierarchies(ifsuchtheremustbe)areasminimalastheypossiblycanbecompatiblewithareasonablyefficientorderingofsociety.(Thisisnottosaythatefficiencytrumpsjustice,butitistosaythatefficiencyremainsanimportantconsiderationintheproperorderingofoursocialworld.)Mostessentially,anystratadifferentiationsthatmayremainorarisemustnotbesuchastobeasourceofsomepeoplehavingpoweroverothers.Perhapsthatisanidealimpossibletoevenreasonablyapproximate,astheradicalhistorianEugeneGenovese,alongwithmanyothers,wouldinsist,butforsocialistegalitariansitisthereasatleastaheuristic.Thisistheidealforaperfectlygoodandjustworld.Itis,ofcourse,wildlyUtopian,butitgivesusastandardagainstwhichtomeasureouractualsocietiesandactualworld.9Ourworldisindeedverydistantfromthat.Inourworld,tospeakofglobaljusticeissuchajokeastomakeonewanttocryandsneeringlylaughatthesametime(Nielsen1998b).Eventhebestofoursocieties(saySwedenorIceland)areverydistantfrom“thesocialistideal.”Butmeasuredagainstitsstandard,IcelandandSwedencomeoffmuchbetterthantheUnitedStatesortheUnitedKingdom.Andthey,inturn,comeoffmuchbetterthanBurmaandSaudiArabia.Sothestandard,howeverUtopian,helpsusinsomewaytoguideconduct.ShouldSterbaextendhiswelfarestateequalopportunityliberalismtosuchasocialistegalitarianism?Heshould,forwithoutithecannotget,ashewishes,toaclasslesssociety,letaloneaclasslessworldthatbothheandsocialistswant.Moreover,givenhiscommitmenttomoralequality(thelifeofeveryonemattersandmattersequally)andtoaworldofequals(equalmoralstanding),hecannotgeteitherwithoutsocialism,forwithoutit,aswehaveseen,therewillbeclassesandpowerdifferentialsrootedintheverystructureofoursocialworld.Andtheseunderminemoralequalityandcommitmenttoaworldofequals.Itmakesanegalitarianethosandthesenseofcommunitythatgoeswithitveryhardtoattainandsustain.\nSOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICE119ItmightberespondedthatIamignoringSterba’sOughtImpliesCanPrinciple.Ifsocialismisimpossibleperiod,orimpossibleasareasonableoption,thenthefactthataclasslessorhierarchicallyunstratifiedsocietycannotbeachievedinacapitalistsocietyisnotalegitimatecriticismofcapitalism,orofanegalitarianconceptionofjusticecompatiblewithliberalsocialdemocraticcapitalism.Ifsocialism(asRorty,forexample,believes)cannotbehad,orcannotbereasonablyhad,itisirrationaltokeepgoingonaboutit.Sterba,ifthiscriticismstands,shouldnotendorsesocialistegalitarianism.Ishallarguethatitdoesnotstand.Thistakesusbacktothefirstpartofthisessay.Asocialismwithoutmarketsisnotafeasibleoption,butthereremainmarketsocialistalternatives.Herewehavewellworkedoutandfeasiblemodelsformarketsocialism—modelsthatcouldbeappliedinouractuallyexistingdevelopedsocietiesandeventuallycouldhaveworldwideapplication.Thecrucialproblem,aswehaveseen,isnotsocio-economiccoherenceandplausibility,butbaldlypolitical.Peopleinthedevelopedcapitalistsocietieswhereitarguablycouldworkarenotwillingtogiveitatry;andinpoorsocietieswherepeoplearewillingtogiveitatry,theirmodesofproductionarenotsufficientlydevelopedtomakesocialismpossible.Butthisisaweak“impossibility.”Forsometimesthings—importantbigthings—changeveryrapidlyandunexpectedly.Think,forexample,ofthesuddencollapseoftheSovietempireortheendoftheapartheidregimeinSouthAfrica.Socialismisanon-starternow,butadecadedowntheroad,withneo-liberalismandglobalizationtakingtheirtollinallsortsofuglyandreallyharmfulwaysintheFirst,SecondandThirdWorlds(thoughsomewhatdifferentlyineach),socialismmaywellbecomeareasonablepossibility.Thismaybewishfulthinkingonmypart,butagainitmaynotbe.Thereisobviouslyworkforsocialistintellectualsandactivistshere(theysometimesarethesame).Centrally,forthem,itwillbeamatterofmakingclearandcompellingargumentsthatsocialismcanwork,thatthehorribleworldweliveinnowisnotinevitableandforever,thatthereisanalternativethatwillyieldthepossibilityofadecentlifeforeveryone.Socialdemocracy,ifitcancontinuetoexistwithglobalization,andifitcanbeappliedglobally,willcarryuspartoftheway.ImagineSwedenbeingtheworld.(Therearealsosomereasonstothinkthatthatmaynotbeafeasiblepossibility.TheSwedishconditionoflifeisnotcausallyindependentofwhatgoesonintherestoftheworld.)But,evenifitisafeasiblepossibility,itcannotcarryusalltheway.Itcannotgiveusasegalitarianandfreeasocialworldasitispossibleanddesirabletohave,foritcannotgiveusaclasslesssociety,economicaswellaspoliticaldemocracy,anditcannotequalizepowerasfullyascanobtainin(tobepleonastic)ademocraticsocialistsociety(Nielsen1985).Socialistintellectualsneedtomakethisplain,notonlytotheacademybutmoregenerally.Theopportunitiestodothisinoursocietiesarelimited,butthereareenoughcracksinthewalltogiveussomeopportunities.Iftruthisonoursidehere,we,ifweseizetheday,ifwethrowourselvesintothetaskwithvigor,integrityandalltheintelligencewecanmuster,wecanperhapshavesomeeffect.Ifwehaveanysenseofourvocationhere,wemustsetoutthecaseforsocialismclearly,informedly,compellinglyandrepeatedly.Itmaynotbeaspittingintothewind.Andrememberweareagentsandnotjustneutralobservers,forweareinvolvedintheverypracticeswedescribe.Togainthethoroughlyjustworldthatweegalitariansseek,wemustreplacecapitalismwithsocialism(wemaydothisandstillnotgainit,butitisanecessaryconditionforgainingit).Averyrealworryforpeopleisoverthemannerofitsreplacement.Itwould,ofcourse,bedesirableifthereplacementcouldcomebytheballotbox.Butgiventhewaythingshavegonehistorically,andhowreasonably—fromthecapitalistpointofview—itistotrytomakethemgothus,itisveryunlikelythatcapitalistswouldsorelinquishpower(rememberChile).Thatmeanssomehowtopplingcapitalistsfrompower,andthatmeanssomesortofrevolution.Somepeoplemightpullbackhere,notbecausetheythinkrevolutioninsuchacircumstanceismorallywronginitself,butbecausetheyfearallthedeathanddestructionthataprotractedwarwouldbringabout.Theforcessupportingcapitalismhaveawesomemeansofcontrol,repressionanddestructionandwouldclearlyuseit,ifnecessary,toprotecttheirturf.However,wemustgainsomeperspectivehere.Wemustremembertherearerevolutionsandrevolutions.Someareshortanddecisivewithminimalamountsofkillinganddestruction(Nielsen1971).Itisalsoimportanttorecognizethatthemilitaryandthepolicetooarepeoplecapableofseeingthesituationforwhatitisandchangingsides.Therankandfilehereandthelowerrankingofficerssufferlikeeveryoneelse,andtheyhavepeoplenearanddeartothemwhosufferfromrepression.Whyassumeitisimpossibleforthemtoseethroughtheideologyandchangesides?Theyalsoknowthatiftheyacttogethertheyhaveaconsiderableamountofpower.Atleasttwothingsareinvolvedhere.First,tomakeaclearandcompellingcaseforanegalitariansocialistconceptionofjustice.SterbahasnudgedusinthisdirectionandI,ashasG.A.Cohen,haveheretriedtoindicatesomethingofwhatitwouldtaketocompletethattask.Second,wemustshowthatsocialismisnotjustaUtopianmoralideal—merepieinthesky—butcouldbe,andreasonablyso,awayoforganizingoursociallife.Thatisbyfarthemoredemandingtask.Ihavegesturedatwhatneedstobedonehere.ButSterbahasdonenothinginthisrespect.Herehesticksclosetothestandardphilosophicalpreoccupations.Butwithoutengaginginthistasktherecanbenoserioustalkaboutsocialistjustice.Itwouldbejusttheself-indulgentorself-deceptivemoralizingthatMarxrepeatedlyinveighedagainst(Nielsen1989b).Marxfamouslysaid,“Thephilosophershaveonlyinterpretedtheworld;thepointistochangeit.”Ashislife’sworkmakesabundantlyclear,hedidnotthinkwecouldsensiblychangeit—orindeedsuccessfullychangeit—withoutunderstandingit.Weneedalltheunderstanding\n120KAINIELSENwecanget,butwhatweverymuchneednowaswell—particularlyintherichcapitalistdemocracies—isanewrevolutionarymilitancy.NOTES1Itistheirownershipandcontrolofproductivepropertythatmakespeoplecapitalists.Theirentrepreneurshipmayremainif(forexample)theywerespecializedworkers—workersdoingentrepreneurialwork—insocialistfirms.Theirbeingentrepreneursdoesnotmakethemcapitalists.2Thisislargelytrueoftheacademicculturalleft,buttherearethousandsofactivistculturalleftists,somewiththeirdistinctiveorganizations,outsidetheacademy,whodoengageinpoliticalcontestation(CohenandRogers1998).3SeealsoNove(1983)foranimportant,carefullyandempiricallyresearched,andmorehistoricallyorientedargumentthanRoemer’sorSchweikart’sformarketsocialism.4PaulRobesonwasanAfrican-American.Hewasalawyer,afamousoperaandspiritualsingerandanequallyfamousactor.Hisworkinallthesedomainswasdestroyedbyblacklistingandotherformsofharassmentasaresultofhisprincipledcommitmenttosocialism.HerefusedtobackdownorcompromiseinhisdefenseoftheSovietUnion,eveninthemostdifficultMcCarthyyears.Hispersecutionwassointenseandsocontinuousthathewasfinally,towardtheendofhislife,physicallyandemotionallydestroyed(Williston1999).5Czechoslovakiamightbethoughttobeanexception.Priortotheimpositionfromtheoutsideofsocialism,itwasbotheconomicallydevelopedandliberal.Butitisnotanexception,foritssocialismwasimposedonitfromtheoutside.Anditssocialismendedwhenthatpressurecametoanend.6GivenRorty’santi-representationalismandperspectivism,bothofwhichIampartialto,howdoIgetofftalkingabouttellingitlikeitis?SinceIbelievethattherecanbenoonetruedescriptionoftheworldorawaytheworldisinitself,then(theclaimgoes)Icannotcoherentlytalkabouttellingitlikeitis.ButjustasRortycananddoesspeakoftruthwithoutthinkingtruthiscorrespondence,soheandIcanspeakoftellingitlikeitiswithoutbelievingthereisaonetruedescriptionoftheworld.Tellingitlikeitisishavingwhatforthetimeisthebestjustifiedclusterofbeliefsthatwecanobtain.Andthatiscertainlypossible.Thereisnothingmorecompellingthatwecanobtain.Herethe“we”doesnotreferjusttoRortyandmyselfbuttopeoplemoregenerally(Nielsen1999).7Itseemstomeplainlyfalsetosaythatwhateveritisreasonabletoaskmetodoismorallyrequiredofme.Itisreasonabletoaskmetohavebettertablemanners,butthisisnotmorallyrequiredofme.Onlyamannersfanaticwouldthinkitso.8How,onsuchanapproach,dowedealwithlibertarians?Quiteshortlyandbluntly.AnapproachwhichentailssayingthatifIletachilddrowninashallowpoolwhenIcaneasilysavehimIhavenotwrongedhim,havenotdoneanythingthatIoughtnottodo,canbejustrejectedoutofhand.Thatwedonotletachilddrownwhomwecaneasilysaveisadeeplyingrainedconsideredconviction(judgment)ofoursthatfitswellinawidereflectiveequilibrium.Wecannotfindourfeetwithsomeonewhothinkswehavenoobligationhere.Foranargumentthatwecannot,eitherinmoralreflectionorindoingmoralphilosophy,bypassconsideredconvictions,seeNielsen(1996a,261–72).Itishardtoseehowareconciliationprojectcanworkhere.9TherearelegitimateDeweyianworrieshereaboutthenecessityofameans/endscontinuum.Icannotpursueithere,butIbelieveDewey’ssoundsenseabouttheentanglementofmeansandendscanbemadecompatiblewithwhatIsayhere.Ifitcan’tthenIhavetogobacktothedrawingboard.ReferencesBlair,TonyandSchroeder,Gerhard(2000)“TheThirdWay/DieNeueMitte:AManifesto,”Dissent(Spring2000)51–65.Cohen,G.A.(1978)KarlMarx’sTheoryofHistory:ADefense,Oxford:ClarendonPress.——(1983)“TheStructureofProletarianUnfreedom,”PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,vol.12,3–33.——(1988)History,LabourandFreedom,Oxford:ClarendonPress.——(1992)“Incentives,InequalityandCommunity,”inG.B.Peterson(ed.)TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues,SaltLakeCity:UniversityofUtahPress,262–329.——(1996)“Self-Ownership,HistoryandSocialism:AnInterviewwithG.A.Cohen,”Imprints,vol.1,no.1,7–25.——(2000)IfYou’reanEgalitarian,HowComeYou’reSoRich?,CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.Cohen,Joshua(1982)“G.A.Cohen,Marx’sTheoryofHistory,”TheJournalofPhilosophy,vol.79/5,253–73.——(1992)“MinimalistHistoricalMaterialism,”inRodgerBeehleretal.(eds)OntheTrackofReason,BoulderCO:WestviewPress,155–74.——(1999–2000)“Equality,JusticeandDemocracy:AnInterviewwithJoshuaCohen,”Imprints,vol.4,no.2,103–18.Cohen,JoshuaandRogers,Joel(1998)“ReviewofRorty’sTruthandProgressandAchievingOurCountry,”LinguaFranca.Levine,A.andWright,E.O.(1980)“HistoryandtheForcesofProduction,”NewLeftReview,vol.123,47–69.Moore,Stanley(1993)MarxVersusMarkets,UniversityParkPA:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress.Nielsen,Kai(1971)“OntheChoiceBetweenReformandRevolution,”Inquiry,vol.14,271–95.——(1983)“TakingHistoricalMaterialismSeriously,”Dialogue,vol.XXII,319–38.——(1985)EqualityandLiberty:ADefenseofRadicalEgalitarianism,TotowaNJ:Rowman&Allanheld.\nSOCIALISMANDEGALITARIANJUSTICE121——(1989a)WhyBeMoral?,BuffaloNY:PrometheusBooks.——(1989b)MarxismandtheMoralPointofView,BoulderCO:WestviewPress.——(1989c)“Afterword”inRobertWareandKaiNielsen(eds)AnalyzingMarxism,Calgary:UniversityofCalgaryPress,497–539.——(1996a)NaturalismWithoutFoundations,AmherstNY:PrometheusBooks.——(1996b)“RadicalEgalitarianismRevisited:OnGoingBeyondtheDifferencePrinciple,”inMarciaValiante(ed.)TheWindsorYearbookofAccesstoJustice,vol.15,121–58.——(1998a)“LiberalReasonabilityaCriticalTool?ReflectionsAfterRawls,”Dialogue,739–59.——(1998b)“IsGlobalJusticeImpossible?”,ResPublica,vol.IV,no.2,131–66.——(1999)“TakingRortyseriously,”Dialogue,vol.XXXVIII,no.3,503–18.——(2001)“MoralPointofViewTheories,”inLawrenceC.BeckerandCharlotteB.Becker(eds)EncyclopediaofEthics,SecondEdition,NewYork:GarlandPublishingInc.Nove,Alec(1983)TheEconomicsofFeasibleSocialism,London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin.Pogge,Thomas(1996)“TheBoundsofNationalism,”inJocelyneCoutureetal.(eds)RethinkingNationalism,Calgary:UniversityofCalgaryPress,463–504.Rawls,John(1993)PoliticalLiberalism,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Roemer,JohnE.(1994)AFutureforSocialism,CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.Rorty,Richard(1998a)AgainstBosses,AgainstOligarchies:AConversationWithRichardRorty,CharlottesvilleVA:PricklyPearPamphlets.——(1998b)AchievingOurCountry:LeftistThoughtinTwentiethCenturyAmerica,CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.Satz,Debra(1989)“Marxism,MaterialismandHistoricalProgress,”inRobertWareandKaiNielsen(eds)AnalyzingMarxism,Calgary:UniversityofCalgaryPress,393–424.Schweickart,David(1993)AgainstCapitalism,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Sterba,JamesP.(1998)JusticeforHereandNow,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Williston,Floyd(1999)“PaulRobeson,1898–1998,”SocialistStudiesBulletin,no.56,32–45.\n11DEMOCRATICEGALITARIANISMCarolC.GouldIstheconceptofsocialismand,moregenerally,socialisttheory,anylongerrelevant,giventhecurrentdominanceofglobalcorporationsandmarkets,aswellasincreasingworldwidedemocratization,atleastofaformalsort?Isthereanypointinattemptingtorescuetheold-fashionedideaofsocialismfromitsignominiousassociationwithvariousrepressiveandauthoritarianregimesofthetwentiethcentury?Certainlytherearestrandsinsocialisttheorythatarestillofinterest,andmanyofthesehavebeenexploredanddevelopedbynumerousphilosophersandpoliticaltheoristsinrecentdecades.Amongthesearetheconceptofpositivefreedom,therequirementforgreaterequalityandmutualityinsocialandeconomiclife,theimportanceofeconomicdemocracy,andofcoursethecritiquesofalienation,exploitationandimperialism.Increasingly,self-identifiedsocialistshavealsotakenthemselvestobefeminists,multiculturalists,andanti-colonialists,andhaveintegratedanemphasisondifferencesbeyondthoseofclassintotheirdiverseapproaches.Crucialdisagreementspersist,however,nolongeraboutformsofgovernment—thereisuniformcommitmenttodemocracy—butaboutglobalizationandtrade,intheirimplicationsforlaborstandardsandworkers’rights.Doeconomicglobalizationandtheworldmarketsimplyrepresentthepredictablecourseofcapitalistdevelopment,openingopportunitiesforincreasinglaborsolidarityworldwideandnecessaryeconomicdevelopmentintheThirdWorld?Ordotheyinsteadrepresentthetriumphofglobalcorporations,concernedonlywithprofitattheexpenseofworkersandofhumanneedsmoregenerally?Orperhapsbothatthesametime?Onamoretheoreticallevel,too,importantdifferencespersistintheinterpretationandjustificationofequality,theroleofrights,includingthehumanrights,thenatureandrequirementsofeconomicdemocracy,andtheroleofthestateinfacilitatinggreatereconomicandsocialequality.Thesepersistingquestionssettheframeworkformyconsiderationsinthispaper.Iwanttotakeupafewofthephilosophicalissuesthatarisefromsocialisttheorizing,anditsmorecurrentformofwhatIcalldemocraticegalitarianism.Itwillbeofinteresttoconsidertheimportofthisapproachatthisspecifichistoricaljuncture,characterizedbyincreasingglobalizationandinternationalinterdependence—economic,technological,social,andtoadegreepolitical—combinedwithdemocratization,andincreasinglyseriouscommitmenttotheideaofhumanrights.Andifweareconcernedwithjustice(andalsofreedomanddemocracy)for“hereandnow,”itisrelevanttobeginwithJamesP.Sterba’srecentattempttocharacterizetherequirementsofsuchjusticeinhismasterfuleffortatreconcilingahostofdiversesocialandpoliticaltheories.Inthispaper,mydiscussionofcurrentimplicationsofademocraticandegalitarianapproachwilltakeofffromanexaminationofSterba’sclaimsaboutsocialismandthesenseofjusticethathesuggestsitentails.Iwillfocusprimarilyoncertaintheoreticalissues,butwillconcludethepaperwithsomemorepracticalreflectionsabouttheimportoftheseviewsforapproachingcurrentglobalizationprocesses.IntheintroductiontoJusticeforHereandNow,Sterbaprovocativelystatesthatwhiletheymayclaimotherwise,“thelibertarian’sidealofliberty…actuallysupportsthesamerightstowelfareandequalopportunitythatareusuallyassociatedwithawelfareliberalideal,”andthat“thesetworightsleadtosomethingliketheequalitythatsocialistsendorse.”1Likewise,inhisconclusion,hesummarizeshisviewonthismatterbysaying“Ifurtherarguedthatthesetworightsthatusuallyareassociatedwithawelfareliberalidealleadtosomethingliketheequalitythatsocialistsendorse,oncedistantpeoplesandfuturegenerationsaretakenintoaccount.”2Soherewehaveaninterestingsetofclaimsforourconsideration,buthowshallweinterpretthephrase“theequalitythatsocialistsendorse”?Unfortunately,ifwelooktotheinterveningchaptersinSterba’sbook,wefindonlyahandfulofreferencestosocialismandnoexplicitargumentforhisassertionsaboutit,soifwearetogivemeaningtohisclaims,wewillhavetoreadbetweenthelines.Inhisexplicitreferences,inthechapter“Fromlibertytoequality,”socialistsaregroupedwithwelfareliberalsininterpretingthepossibleconstraintsonliberty“toinclude,inaddition,negativeacts(actsofomission)thatpreventpeoplefromdoingwhattheyotherwisewantorareabletodo,”andnotonlythe“positiveacts(actsofcommission)thatpreventpeoplefromactingastheychoose”towhichlibertariansrestricttheseconstraints.Hefurtherseesthisdistinctionasonewayofunderstandingthedebatebetweennegativeandpositiveliberty.3Furtherexpandingthisnotionofsocialismalittle,Sterbarefersto“welfareinstitutions”toguarantee“adequatepositivewelfarerights,”which,heargues,libertarianswillthemselveshavetoendorse(contrarytotheirownself-understanding),ifthey\nDEMOCRATICEGALITARIANISM123aretoavoidhavingthepoorusetheirowndiscretioninexercisingtheirnegativewelfarerights(bytakingwhattheyneedfromtherich).4Theotherreferences(ofatotalofsix)includeoneinwhichSterbasuggests“borrowinganideafromsocialistjustice,”inafuturesocietywhere“fewresourcesareavailablefordirectlymeetingnonbasicneeds.”Inorderto“ensurethatthemosttalentedpeopleoccupyrolesandpositionscommensuratewiththeirabilities,”hesaysthat“wewillneedtomaketherolesandpositionspeopleoccupyasintrinsicallyrewardingaspossible.”5Finally,therearetworeferencesinpassingtoasocialistprincipleofequalrightstoself-development,which,attheoutsetofthediscussionoffeministjustice,isheldtosupportSterba’sinterpretationoftheidealofandrogyny,6andatalaterpointisrecognizedaspermittingsomedegreeofself-preference,whilerequiringthateveryonebeprovided“withsomethinglikethesameresources.”7Iamofcoursepleasedwiththelasttworeferences,toequalrightstoself-development,sincethisistheversionofaquasi-socialistprinciplethatIhavedefendedinmypreviouswork,includingMarx’sSocialOntologyandRethinkingDemocracy.8ButwhatcanwesayaboutSterba’sownaccountofsocialism,ashintedatinthesereferences?Canitprovideuswithsuggestionsforarevitalizedsocialisttheory?And,moretothepointofSterba’sownconcerns,ishecorrectinclaimingthatlibertarians,welfareliberalsandsocialistscanagreeonhistworights—towelfareandequalopportunity—whichhecalls“practicalrequirements”entailedbyallthreeapproaches(aswellasothertheories)?Isthisinfactacorrectexampleofasupposedly“peacemaking”methodofphilosophizing?HowdoesitcomparetothedialecticalapproachinphilosophythatemergesintheHegelian-Marxisttradition?Beforeturningtothesequestions,weshouldconsiderwhetherthereisinfactsomefurtherpositiononsocialisminSterba’sworkbeyondthesefewreferencesthatseemtoidentifyitprimarilywithacommitmenttoequalityandratherextensivewelfarerequirements.Indeed,ifwereadbetweenthelines,itseemspossiblethatSterbaidentifieshisownviewinwhichbasicneedsfor“distantpeoplesandfuturegenerations”shouldbemetwithasocialistperspective,oratleastonethatowesagreatdealtosocialism.Clearly,noneoftheotherapproacheshediscussesnecessarilysupportthisrequirementinthewaythatheregardsasimpliedbysocialistperspectives.Further,inhiscommentonmypaperinourjointlyauthoredvolumeMoralityandSocialJustice,SterbaendorsestheprincipleofequalpositivefreedomthatIdefendandclaimstoagreewiththenormativeconclusionsthatIdrawthere,wheretheseconclusionsabouttheextentofdemocraticrequirementsmaybeconsideredbroadlysocialistandegalitarian.9HisreservationisthatIproposeaprincipleofpositiveinadditiontonegativeliberty,whichmakesmyaccountlessagreeabletolibertariansthantheoneheproposes.Yet,becauseofhismethodofbeginningwitheachsocialandpoliticaltheorytoshowagreementonthetworightshefavors(welfareandequalopportunity),Sterbaunfortunatelygivesfewargumentsofhisownfortheserightsandforhismoredemandingideathattheyapply—seeminglywithoutqualification—todistantpeoplesandfuturegenerations.Withoutattemptingtoconstructsuchargumentshere,wecanlookfirsttotheconceptofbasicneedsthatseemssocentraltoSterba’sclaims.Commendablyfromasocialistperspective,Sterbaholdsthatpeople’sbasicneedsshouldbemet,eventhoseof“distantpeoples,”andthatthisnormativerequirementhaspriorityoverthemeetingofnonbasicneedsofthewelloff.Butwhatarethesebasicneeds?WhereasSterba’sprevalentexampleofbasicnutritionalneedssuggestsanaustereinterpretationofthese,inanotherplaceheseemstoenlargethesphereofbasicneedsenormously.Thusatonepointhewrites,“Accordingly,recognizingarighttowelfareapplicablebothtodistantpeoplesandtofuturegenerationswouldleadtoastateofaffairsinwhichfewresourceswouldbeavailablefordirectlymeetingnonbasicneeds.”10Butinasecondplacehewrites,“Basicneeds,ifnotsatisfied,leadtosignificantlacksordeficiencieswithrespecttoastandardofmentalandphysicalwell-being.Thus,aperson’sneedsforfood,shelter,medicalcare,protection,companionship,andself-developmentare,atleastinpart,needsofthissort.”11Whatstandard,wemightask?Still,itisclearthatthelattersuggestsaconsiderablymoreexpansiveaccountofbasicneeds,andwhendefinedthisway,mightnotsupporttheredistributionheotherwiseseeksfromrelativelywealthysocietiesliketheUnitedStatestolessdevelopedcountries.Afterall,wearefarfrommeetingthebasicneeds,inthissense,ofeveryoneintheUnitedStates,andsuchafullview,coupledwithacertainprioritytocompatriotsortomembersofone’sownpoliticaloreconomicsociety,wouldseemtoleavenothingforredistributionelsewhere.Butletusassumewecansomehowsettlethisissuesatisfactorily.Inotherrespectsaswell,therighttowelfareinterpretedasrequiringthemeetingofbasicneedsworldwide,howeverenlightenedthisdemandmaybe,hascertaininadequaciesfromasocialistperspective.Itseemsatonetimetooweakandtoostrong.Itistooweakinthefirstplacebecauseitdoesnotspeaktotheneedfordemocraticparticipationineconomiclife,oreveninthepoliticalsphere.LetusassumethatthiswelfarerightinSterba’sanalysiscanbeconstruedsomewhatalongthelinesofahumanrighttomeansofsubsistence.Ifso,itdoesnotaddressmostoftheotherhumanrights,eventakentogetherwithSterba’srighttoequalopportunity.Andespeciallynoteworthyforitslackisanyaccountofrightstodemocraticdecision-making,whichareclearlycrucialinthemselvesandalsofortheircontributiontopreservingandadvancingotherrightsandinterests,includinggainingmeansofsubsistence.12Thesenseinwhichhisapproachistoostrongisperhapslessobvious,butitisindirectlyrelatedtothepreviouspoint.Sterbaabstractsfromanyconsiderationoftheproductionprocessandconsidersonlyredistributiveprinciplesofjustice.However,asNozickarguedagainsttheearlyRawls,disregardingtheproductionprocessandpropertyrightsinmeansofproductionisproblematic.Andhere,socialisttheorytendstosidewithNozick,butwithaverydifferentinterpretationofthe\n124CAROLC.GOULDnatureofproduction.WhereNozicksawthisasindividual,socialistshaveemphasizedthesocialandinterdependentnatureofeconomicproductionprocesses,whichgiverisetorightstosocialpropertyalongwithrightstopersonalpossessions.13Thesocialcharacterofthisproductionsupportsclaimsofworkerstothebenefitsoftheirworkand,togetherwithrequirementsoffreedominthisprocessandtodemocraticparticipation,givesrisealsototheirrightstoparticipateincontrollingtheproductionprocess.Asmembersofaneconomicandnotonlyapoliticalcommunity,peoplegainrightstoworkandtobenefitfromtheirwork.14Sterbabycontrastadoptsapurelyredistributiveprinciple,whereassocialisttheoryisconcernedwithmeetingbasicneedsbyattendingtotheorganizationofeconomicandsocialinstitutionstopermitthistohappeninaneffectiveandmoreuniversalwaythanatpresent.AsIalsosuggestedinapreviouspublishedcommentdirectedtoanearlier,butverysimilar,statementofhisview,Sterba’swelfareprinciplesupposesacompleteabstractionfromnation-statesanddiverseeconomiccommunities.15Thismakesitconsiderablymorevisionarythanitmightatfirstappear,anditisn’tclearhowhefeelsitcanbeimplemented.WoulditbethroughaSinger-likerequirementofeachpersoninaffluentsocietiesdonatingonefifthoftheirincometofightfamineormoregeneralpovertyinlessdevelopedcountries,orwoulditratherproceedthroughanewenforcementofhumanrights(andifso,how?throughinternationallaw?)?Whatmightseemtobeaminimalrequirementofjusticenowappearsasadistantvision.Sterba’sabstractionfromsocialproductionismirroredalsoinhisefforttoderive“socialist”principlesofequalityfromnegativelibertyalone,withitsconcomitantindividualistpremises.Oneofthestrengthsofsocialisttheory,intheHegelian-Marxisttradition,hasinfactbeenitsemphasisonthesocialityofindividuals.Whilethishashistoricallysometimesbeengivenanunfortunateholisticinterpretation,I(andothers)havearguedthatitispossibletointerpretthissocialityorcommonalityinawaythatgivesscope,evenpriority,tostrongprinciplesofindividualityanddifference.16YetSterbatriestoderivehiswelfaristprinciplefromtheconflictbetweenthenegativelibertyoftherichandthenegativelibertyofthepoor,andtheideathatthepoorhavetherighttotakefromtherichwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneeds.Specifically,hewritesthat“Whatisatstakeisthelibertyofthepoornottobeinterferedwithintakingfromthesurpluspossessionsoftherichwhatisnecessarytosatisfytheirbasicneeds.”17ThisclaimhaspuzzledmesinceitsappearanceinSterba’searlierversionofhispresentchapter“Fromlibertytoequality.”18Asidefromitsconnotationofeachagainsttheothers,does“taking”hereincludeatgunpoint,forexample,orotherobviousharmsorinfringementsonanother,evendirectlyontheirperson?Clearlythesortofconstraintonothersthatthiswouldentailwouldviolatetheprincipleofnegativeliberty(amongotherrights),inasmuchasthisprincipleisunderstoodaspermittinglibertycompatiblewithalikelibertyforothers;itis,asSterbarecognizeselsewhere,aprincipleofequalliberty.WhileitisnotmyaimheretodefendlibertarianismagainstSterba’sarguments,Iwouldsuggestthatheistacitlyappealingtoaprincipleofpositivelibertyorfreedomatthispointofhisanalysis.Theideaofpositivefreedom,which,asIarguedelsewhere,canbefoundinMarx’sanalysisandhasinpartAristotelianroots,emphasizesthatchoices,tobeeffective,requireaccesstocertain“enabling”materialandsocialconditions,inadditiontobeingfreefromtheexternalconstraintsorimpedimentsthatareentailedintheideaofnegativeliberty.Touseasomewhatsimplisticexample,whileIamfreetomakethechoicetotraveltoTahiti,withoutthematerialmeanstodoso(money,inthiscase),Iamnotreallyfreetogo.Althoughsometheorists,eveninthesocialisttradition,havechosentolookattheabsenceofmeansofsubsistenceasanimpedimenttofreechoice,19itseemsmoreadequatetoretainthecommonsensedistinctionbetweenfreedomfromconstraintonone’schoicesandtheaccesstothemeansnecessarytoeffectthem,betweenconstrainingandenablingconditions.20Inadditiontofocusingonlyonconstrainingconditionsandneglectingthefurtherpositiveconditionsthatarerequirediffreedomistobesubstantiveandnotmerelyformal,libertariansalsonarrowdownconstraintstoomuch,byfailingtoincludedominationandexploitationamongthem,andfocusingonlyongovernmentinterferenceorcoercionfromothers.Further,whiletheoristshavecorrectlyobservedthatnegative,aswellaspositive,libertyrequirespositiveactionsandrightsforitsenforcement(e.g.Shueoncourts,prisons,etc.21),nonethelesswecanstillusefullydistinguishbetweenothersnotconstrainingusandourhavingthemeansforeffectingourchoices.Thepositivefreedomtraditioninsiststhatmaterialandsocialconditions,includingmeansofsubsistenceandrecognitionbyothers,arealsorequiredifequalfreedomistoberealandnotmerelyaformalpossibility.Democraticegalitarianism,asIhaveproposedit,goesbeyondthistoemphasizethedevelopmentorflourishingofpeopleovertime,ratherthansimplylookingattheirabilitytoperformasingleaction.Onthegroundsoftherecognitionofeveryone’sequalagency,wheretheexpressionofthisagencyrequiresaccesstoconditions,itcanbeseentofollowthatthereare(primafacie)equalrightstotheconditionsofself-development.Thisistheprincipleofequalpositivefreedomasaprincipleofjustice.22Inthisaccount,individualsareunderstoodtobesocialbeings,engagedincommonorjointactivities,aswellashavingindividualprojectsandgoalsoftheirown,whereparticipationinthesecommonactivitiesisamongtheconditionsofself-development.Butifindividualshaveequalrightstodeterminetheirownactions(entailedintheirequalagency),thenwheretheirengagementincommonactivitiesisconcerned,theyhaveequalrightstoparticipateindecision-makingconcerningthem,thatis,arightofco-determinationoftheseactivities.Thisrightofdemocraticparticipationappliesgenerally,notonlytopoliticsbuttosocialandeconomicactivitiesaswell.23Henceequalpositivefreedomasunderstoodhere\nDEMOCRATICEGALITARIANISM125includesnotonlyrelativelyegalitariandistributionalrequirements,butalsotheneedfordemocraticformsofdecision-makingconsiderablymoreextensivethanpresentlyinterpreted.Inaddition,inasmuchastheemphasisonfreedomasnotonlyfreechoicebutasself-developmentgivesthisviewanindividualistfocus,itrequiresalsoanaccountofhumanrights,anddistinguishesbetweenbasicandnonbasicones,wherethebasicrightsconcernconditionsnecessaryforanyhumanactionwhatever,andthenonbasicconcernrightstoconditionsnecessaryforthefullerdevelopmentofpersons.24Atthedistributionallevel,theemphasisonself-developmentrequiresattentiontopeople’sdifferencesandtheconditionsfortheirflourishing,andpreventsanyleveling-downinterpretationofthisegalitarianapproach.25ReturningtoSterba’sanalysis,then,hisideathatbasicneedshavetobemetasaconditionforlibertyorfreedomistacitlyanappealtothepositivelibertytradition,withitsemphasisonaccesstothemeans,althoughitdoesnotnecessarilyentailthefulleraccountofdemocraticegalitarianismthatIhavejustsketched.Sterba’srelianceontheterms“rich”and“poor”alsoleavesopentheissueofthecriteriaformembershipintheseclasses.Presumably,heregardsasrichallthosewhohaveaccessto“luxuries”asheputsit,ortomeetingtheirnonbasicneeds.Butasidefromtheissuementionedearlierofwhataretocountasbasicneeds,thisapproachremainsblindtoissuesofexploitationanddomination,andtoconcernsthatworkersreceivewhattheyareduefortheirwork.Itisn’ttheuseofluxuriesbytherichthat(classical)socialisttheoryfoundespeciallyobjectionable,butrathertheircontrolovercapital—howmoneyusedforinvestmentcangivetosomeadisproportionatecontroloversocialproduction,includingtheproductiveactivitiesoflargenumbersofworkingpeople.Itis,Ithink,astrengthofthesocialisttraditiontohaveplacedemphasisonthesefactorsofsocialproductionandtheirimportforquestionsofdistributivejustice.Sterba’sanalysisofrichandpoorregrettablyobscuresthesesignificantissues.Ofcourse,fromahumanrightsperspective,thereismeritinfocusingonrightstomeansofsubsistenceasauniversalright.Nonetheless,inconsideringhowsocietiescanassumetheirsharedresponsibilitiesforprovidingforthisright,weneedtoconsidereconomicandsocialinstitutionsandtheiractualfunctioning,aswellasnation-statesandinternationalorganizations,iftheserightsaretoberealizedatall,andiftheyaretoberealizedinamannerrequiredbyjustice.Sterba’sabstractapproach,intermsofpeoplehavingrightstotakefromeachother,ortogivetoeachother,doesnotyetaddressthesecentralcontemporaryissues.BeforeturningtoSterba’sreconciliationistmethodology,itisperhapshelpfultoclarifyhowthedemocraticegalitarianismIhavepresentedmayatthesametimeberegardedasasortof“libertariansocialism,”whiledifferingincrucialrespectsfromlibertarianism.Itislibertarianinitsemphasisonthecentralityofthevalueoffreedom,andontheinsistencethatthisincludesnegativeliberty,withitstraditionalrequirementsofmaximalcivillibertiesandpoliticalrights.Asnoted,itaddstothesetheideaoffreedomfromdominationandexploitation,andaccesstoenablingconditions—materialandsocial—formakingone’schoiceseffectiveandthusmeaningful.Inthisrespect,itdiffersfromsomeliberalthinkers,likeBerlin,whodonotregardtheseaspartoflibertyitself,butonlyasconditionsforit,aswellasfromthelibertariananalysis.Yettheapproachherealsodifferssignificantlyfrommanyexponentsofnegativelibertyandindividualpropertyright,whoargue—mistakenly,Isuggest—thatlibertyandequalityarenecessarilyinconflictwitheachother,andinfactexistininverseproportion—themoreofone,thelessoftheother.Againstthisincompatibilitythesis,itshouldbenotedthatevenlibertariansrecognizetherequirementofequaldistributions(ofliberty).Butmoretothepointhere,wecanarguefortheconsistencyoffreedomandequalitybyshowingthattheidealofequalitycanbederivedfromtheidealoflibertyorfreedom,understoodasnotonlythebarecapacityforchoice,butalsoitsexerciseindevelopingcapacitiesandrealizingprojectsovertime.Theargument,inbrief,isthatsincethecapacityforchoice,oragency,characterizesallhumans,therecognitionofallashumanentailsarecognitionoftheirequalrightstotheexerciseofthiscapacityasanactivityofself-development,andthereforeaprimafacieequalrighttotheconditionsormeansformakingchoiceseffective.Thisisineffectaprincipleofequalitywhichisimmanentinthenatureoffreedom.Ifso,thefundamentalrelationbetweenthetwoisevident.However,asalreadysuggested,theprincipleofequalpositivefreedomdoesnotentailequaldistributionofthemeansofaction,butratherdifferentialclaimsbasedonthevarietyofneeds,wantsandabilitiesthatcharacterizedifferentindividuals.Thispointhassometimesbeenmisconstruedasrequiringanequalapportionmentofresources.Thismistakenkindoflevelingoftheconceptofequalityseemstobecommonamongcriticsofegalitarianism.Onesourceoftheideaofincompatibilitybetweenfreedomandequalityisthesetofrelatedargumentsthatproceedfromthepremiseofthenaturalegoismofhumannatureorfromaconceptionofnegativelibertyandproperty.Thephenomenologicalobservationonwhichsuchargumentsmaybebasedisthatpeoplenaturallywanttobefreetopursuetheirowninterestsandsatisfytheirdesires;andthattheywanttobefreealsotokeepordisposeofwhattheyacquireinthiswayastheyseefit.Anyconstraintontheirfreedomofacquisition,retentionanddispositionofwhatisacquiredthatisintroducedtobenefitotherslesssuccessfulthanthemselvesisthenfeltasaviolationoftheirliberty.Ifsuchconstraintsareintroducedonthegroundsofamoreequalapportionmentofgoodsorresourcesthenitwillbeplainthatsuchequalityisdirectlyincompatiblewithliberty.Thephilosophicalcorrelateofthisprofessedobservationisthetheorydiscussedabove,ofabstractnegativelibertyastherighttodoasonepleaseswithoutexternalinterferenceandtherelatednotionofunlimitedentitlementtopropertyacquiredbyone’sownactivity.Anytaxoruseofsuchacquisitionsofwealthorresourcesintheinterestsofsomenormativeprincipleofequalityorofjustdistributionisseentoconflictwithsuchlibertyandpropertyrights.\n126CAROLC.GOULDYet,asalreadynoted,theclassicalformulationofsuchliberty,e.g.byHobbes,imposesthenaturalconstraintofequalliberty,whichmeansthatone’sfreedomtodoasonepleasesislimitedbytherequirementnottoinfringeonanother’sequalrighttodoso.Again,ontheclassicliberalview,e.g.ofLocke,therightofpropertyandofentitlementisnotunlimited,asiswellknown.Contemporaryversionsoftheseviewssometimesrejectorneglecttheselimitsestablishedbyrightstoequalityinlibertyandentitlement.Butevenwheretheyarerecognized,suchviewspersistinseeingaconflictbetweenfreedomandequality,eitherbecauseofacommitmenttothepriorityofpropertyentitlements,ortoconceptionsoflibertyassimplyamatteroffreechoice(withouttherequirementofaccesstothemeansthatwouldmakesuchchoiceseffective);orfinally,acommitmenttoabstractindividualistconceptionsofsociallife,whichdonottakeintoaccountcooperativeandinteractivemodesofactionandthecorrelativephenomenaofaltruismandsocialresponsibility.Tothedegreethatlibertariansdorecognizethevalueofequallibertybutinterpretitasnegativeliberty,whilesocialistsgenerallyemphasizeequalfreedominapositivesenseaswell,thedisputebetweenlibertariansandsocialistsisnotadisputebetweenthevalueoflibertyasagainstthatofequality,asSterbahimselfhassometimesputit,26butbetweentwoconceptionsoffreedom.Thereiscertainlysharedagreementontheimportanceofthevalueoffreedom,thougheachtheoreticalapproachinterpretsitinimportantlydifferentways.Itservesnopurpose,Ithink,topresentthisagreementasthougheachtypeoftheoristalreadyagreeswiththeotherinanyfullersense,forexample,onthepracticalrequirementsoftheirviews,andsimplyfailstorecognizeit.ThisiswhatisentailedinSterba’seffortatpeacemaking,anditisinterestingtocontrastthiswithdialecticalorsyntheticmethodsofphilosophizingthatemergefromtheHegelian-Marxisttradition.InonesenseitisnotsurprisingthatthereshouldbeaharmonybetweenseveraloftheviewsthatSterbadiscusses—inparticular,thesocialist,feminist,anti-racistandmulticulturalperspectives.Afterall,asphilosophicalapproaches,manyversionsofthesehaveinlargemeasurecomeoutof,orareindebtedto,thesamephilosophicaltraditions,namelythecritiqueofdominationandexploitationinMarx,basedonHegel(e.g.themaster/slavesectionofthePhenomenology)andtheleft-Hegelians.Asiswellknown,whileMarxandEngelsfocusedonclass,theywerealsoattunedtowomen’ssubordination(asweretheMills,ataboutthesametime).SimonedeBeauvoir’sfeministtheory,27andmorerecentonesintheUnitedStates,owedagreatdealtothistraditionaswell,asdidcriticalracetheory,28multiculturalemphasesonrecognitionandinclusion,29andbotholderandmorerecentanticolonialisttheories.30Thusitistobeexpectedthattheseverydiverseapproachesshouldnonethelessagree,atleastonthecritiqueofdominationandoppression.Further,manyexponentsofoneoftheseperspectivesarealsoexponentsofoneormoreoftheothers.TheecologicalapproachesthatSterbadiscussesarelessobviouslyconnectedtothistradition,becauseMarxandhisfollowerssometimestendedtobringinolder,perhaps“industrial,”conceptsofthedominationoratleasttransformationofnaturetomeethumanneeds.31Nonetheless,therehasbeennoshortageofpersuasiveeffortstocriticallyrelatethedominationofnaturetoothertypesofdomination,especiallyofwomen,whereallofthesesortsofdominationareseenassociallyconstructed,andwheretheargumentthenisthatnewapproachestonaturearerequiredalongthelinesofsocialecologyorofecofeminism.32ThemorecontroversialclaimregardingagreementthatSterbamakesconcernstheharmonybetweenlibertarian,welfareliberalandsocialistviews,andIwouldtakeissuewiththeversionofpeacemakingphilosophythathepromotesinthatcontext.Ihavealreadysuggestedthattheconceptionoflibertyimportantlydiffersbetweenlibertarianandsocialistapproaches,andthereisnotinfactagreementonthepracticalrequirementsthatflowfromeachapproach(althoughalibertariansocialismispossible,alongthelinessketchedearlier).IseenoadvantageinattemptingtoconvincelibertariansthattheirviewalreadyentailsSterba’sstrongrighttowelfare,andwonderwhetherthisisreallywhatisentailedinshowingduerespectfortheirapproach.Itseems,bycontrast,thatrespectindialogue,asininteraction,centrallyinvolvesacknowledgingdifferences.WhatcanSterbasaytolibertarianthinkerswhoadamantlyrejecthisinterpretationoftheirviewsanddonotbelievethattheirpositionentailsrequirementsequivalenttohisown?Ishecommittedtosayingthattheyalreadyinfactagreewithhimbutsimplydon’trealizeit?Ihaveproposedinsteadthatthereisagreementonasharedvaluebutdisagreementaboutitsinterpretation.Moreover,itneedstobeacknowledgedthatthelibertarianinsistenceontherequirementofnegativeliberty,includingthecentralroleofcivilliberties,politicalrights,andratherlimitedstateinterferenceinindividuals’activities,isofgreatimportanceforpoliticalphilosophy.Fromadialecticalordialogicalstandpoint,however,thelibertarianapproachappearsasone-sidedorpartial,onceitisputininteractionwithotherviewsthatmaybecriticalofitorthataddnewfeaturestothediscussion.Suchadialecticalconceptionoftheoreticalinteractionandconstructiondoesnotfocussimplyoncompromiseonasetofminimalrequirements,whereeachtheoreticalperspectiveremainsessentiallyunchangedintheconfrontation.Suchamovemayindeedbeimportantinpoliticalcontextstoreachpracticalagreement,wheretheremaysometimesbeaneedforcompromiseonthelowestcommondenominator.Butwhenwearediscussingsocialandpoliticaltheories,amoredynamicdialecticalapproachaimsatsynthesesamongtheoriesthatcontributeimportantinsightstoachangingandhopefullymoreadequateandcomprehensiveoveralltheoreticalframework.Givenalsothatthesearetheoriesaboutsocietyandpolitics,thechangingunderstandingsalsocanbeexpectedtoberesponsivetonewlyemergentsocial-historicalrealitiesthatintroduceheretoforeunanticipatedfactorsintotheanalysis.Animportantelementofsuchanapproachiscritique,bothsocialandpurelytheoretical:thefirstinvolvesacritiqueofviewsthatmaybepartialbecauseideological,andthesecondinvolves\nDEMOCRATICEGALITARIANISM127considerationsofconsistencyandadequacytothephenomena.Insuchadialecticalordialogicalinteractionamongtheorists,peacemakinghastobebasedonacknowledgementoftheuniqueanddivergentperspectivesoftheinterlocutors.WhereasSterbadoesrecognizethisfactorinhisoriginalpresentationofhisversionofpeacemakingphilosophy,Iwouldsuggestthathedoesnothewtoitforcefullyenoughinhistreatmentofsomeoftheperspectiveshediscusses.Thepeacemakingapproachbrieflysketchedhereis,Iwouldsuggest,moretheoretical,moresocial,andperhapsmoreencouragingofdifferencesthanSterba’sversion.Itismoretheoreticalbecauseitdoesnotabstractfromtheactualtheoreticalperspectivesofinterlocutorstoachieveagreementononlypracticalrequirements.Asnoted,whilethismaysufficeinpolitics,itdoesnotsufficeinpoliticalphilosophy.Itismoresocialbecauseitseestheoriesasinpartsociallyconstructedoutofthehistoricalandsocialpracticesinwhichtheoristsaregrounded,althoughtheymayalsotranscendthesepracticesinvariouswaysthroughtheirtheoreticalactivity.Finally,itrecognizesdifferencesaswellascritiqueascentralfortheprocessofunderstandingitself,andfortherevisionsandsynthesesthatmayresult.Whatthenisthepossiblegroundforagreementontheprinciplesdiscussedhere,forexample,onequalrightstotheconditionsofdevelopment,oronthehumanrightsthemselves?Withoutgoingintothisdifficultissuewiththeseriousnessitmerits,Iwouldsuggestthatitisnottobefoundinconceptualcompromises,butinanotherdirection.Here,thesocialontologythatunderliestheanalysisIhavegivenplaysanimportantrole(thoughthereismuchdisagreementwithinthebroadlydemocratic-egalitariantraditiononthisissue).Whenwespeakoffreedomasavaluethatpeopleshouldrespectineachotherandthatgivesrisetoequalrightstoconditionsforit,itisthecharacterofpeopleasfreethatishereproposedasthebasisforagreementontheimportanceofthisvalue.Inthisquasi-foundationalistbutnonessentialistapproach,whatprovidesacommonbasisforequalityandthehumanrightsisthephenomenologicallyevidentfactthatpeoplearetransformativeandself-transformative.Thismustnotbeinterpretedasnecessarilyamatterofindividualself-transformation;itmaybesocialorculturalaswell.Theconceptualframeworkisbasedonthis“normativefact”ofindividualorsocio-culturalself-transformationovertime,i.e.freedom.Inaddition,people’ssharedneedsandtheircommonprojects,increasinglyuniversalistinnature,alsosupportthepossibilitiesofsharedperspectivesemergingovertime.33Onthisview,then,theverygeneralfeaturesofthefreedomandsocialityofpersonsprovidestherequiredbasisformutualrecognitionandcommonunderstandings.Butwhataboutthecross-culturaldimensionhere,andthecriticismthatdespitetheopensocialinterpretationoffreedomgivenherethatencompassessocialaswellasindividualself-transformation,thisvalueseemstohavebeenarticulatedmorefullywithinWesterntraditions,indeedratherrecentonesatthat?Thisdifficultissuemeritsconsiderablediscussion,andhasnotbeenattendedtosufficientlybysocialistorothertheoreticians.ButIwouldsuggestthatthisgroundinginhumanfreedomhasadvantagesoverSterba’sproposalofrationality.Indeed,Sterbaexplicitlyputsasidethisissueofthepossibleculturalrelativismofhisapproach.Whilehegrantsthat“Atothertimesandinotherplaces,particularlyinnon-Westernsocieties,therequirementsofjusticemaybedifferent,”34henonethelessconcludesthatOnceoneconsidersthatthereconciliationistconceptionofjusticedefendedinthisbookisgroundedinthenormsofrationality,andthatitsverydemandingrequirementsofarighttowelfareandarighttoequalopportunityfollowfromevenaminimalmoralitylikelibertarianism,itisdifficulttoseehowthemostmorallydefensiblerequirementsofjusticeforothertimesandplacescouldsignificantlydifferfromthebasicrightsrequiredbythisreconciliationistconceptionofjustice.35Thisseemstoostrongaclaim.Clearly,rationalityitself,soimportanttoSterba’sanalysis,isnotinterpretedinthesamewaybytheTaoisttradition,justtochooseoneexample,andthelatterisindubitablyalsofarfromrecognizingarighttoequalopportunityasheproposes!Perhapsthisisunfair,anditmightbesuggestedthatsimilarcriticismscouldbemadeoftheideaoffreedomorsharedhumandignityintheanalysisIgive.ButIthinkthatthelatterideasaremoresusceptibleoftherequireduniversality,giventhatthegeneralhumancapacitiesoftransformationthattheyrefertoneednotbetakeninapurelyindividualistsense.Moreover,theactualinterpretationofthesevalues,togetherwiththeconcomitantideaofhumanrights,candrawstrengthandenrichmentfromthediversebutinterconnectedinterpretationsthattheyreceivefromvarioustraditions,includingnon-Westernones.Indeed,thewaythathumanrightsintheirspecificinterpretationhavearisenfromthecontributionsnotonlyofWesternEuropeanandNorthAmericanreadings(thecivilandpolitical“firstwave”rights),butalsofromEasternEuropeanapproaches(“secondwave”economicandsocialrights)aswellasreadingsfromdevelopingcountriesortheThirdWorld(the“thirdwave”culturalanddevelopmentalrights),lendsplausibilitytothemoredialecticalinterpretationIhaveadvancedhere.Whilebuildingonthehumanfreedom/dignitycore,theveryideaofhumanrights(andnotonlyitsapplications)havebeenalteredandenrichedbytheinterplayoftheseculturallydiversetheoreticalinterpretations.Comingtogripswiththevarietyofculturaltraditionsthatinfluencetheoreticalapproachesisoneoftheoutstandingissuesfacingbothsocialisttheoryandotherperspectivesinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy.Butthereareothersthatariseespeciallyfromthecurrentcontext,andinthefinalsectionofthispaperIwouldliketosketchonesetofnewissuesthatareofpracticalsignificancethatdemocraticegalitarianismseemsespeciallywellsuitedtoaddress.Theseissuesareposedforsocialand\n128CAROLC.GOULDpoliticaltheorybyglobalization,initsvariousdimensions—economic(globalcorporationsandmarkets),technological(especiallytheinternetand,moregenerally,informationandcommunicationstechnologies),socio-cultural(media,voluntaryassociations,theartsandmusic,etc.),andtoadegreepolitical(newregionalorganizations,e.g.theEuropeanUnion,andsomestrengtheningofinternationalorganizationsandNGOs).Inthiscontext,ifweareconcernedwithjustice(andfreedomanddemocracy)forhereandnow,thenitisrelevanttoconsidernotonlyprinciplesforglobalredistributionofwealthorresources,butalsothequestionofwhatIwouldcalldemocraticglobalization.36Thisisnotsimplytheissueofextendingpoliticaldemocratizationworldwide,wherethecurrenthopeisthateconomicglobalizationwillbringdemocratizationandrespectforhumanrightsalongwithit,butalsothequestionofdemocratizingdecision-makingininternationalorganizations,includingthosethathaveeffectsonglobaldistributivejustice.Iindicatedearlierthattheprincipleofequalpositivefreedomsupportsarequirementofdemocraticdecision-makingconcerningthecommonactivitiesthatoneisengagedin,wheretheseincludenotonlypoliticalcontextsofactivity,butsocialandeconomiconesaswell.Theideaofeconomicdemocracyisthusanimplicationofthisview,wherethisgivesriseinthefirstinstancetoconceptionsofworkerself-management.Giventheincreasingscaleofeconomiccooperation,however,thequestionarisesoftheapplicabilityofeconomicdemocratizationtothisbroadersphere.Theideaofequalfreedomineconomiccontextswouldalsoleadtoaconcernintheglobalcontext,notonlywiththeobviousrequirementfortheeliminationofunfree(evenslave)labor,butmoregenerallywithworkers’rightsandinternationallaborstandards,aswellasgreaterequalizationofhealthcare,education,andsoforth.Thesocialistperspectiveclarifiesthewaysinwhichincreasinglyglobalcorporations,whileemployingnewworkersinmanycountries,understandablyalsotendtoplaceprofit-seekingaboveaconcernwithworkers’freedomandwell-being.Itisbynowatruismtoobservethatthesecorporationsalsohaveconsiderableinfluenceontheorganizationsthatseektofosterdevelopmentandtrade,theInternationalMonetaryFund,theWorldBank,andmorerecentlytheWorldTradeOrganization.AdemocraticegalitarianframeworkofthesortIhavesketchedrequiresthatwegobeyondspeakingoftheresponsibilitiesofglobalcorporations(thoughthisalsohasmerit)toconsidermorefundamentallywhattherequirementsarefordemocratizingtheinternationalorganizationsthataredesignedtofostertradeanddevelopment,sothattheycanbemoreresponsivebothtoworkersandtopeopleinthelessdevelopedcountries.Ifprofit-maximizingcorporationsandtradealonecannotbecountedontoachievegreaterglobaldistributivejustice,andiftheseandotherinternationalorganizationsaretomakedecisionsconcerningdevelopment,tradeandequalization,thenthereneedstobeinputfromandaccountabilitytothosemostdirectlyinvolved.Thissuggeststheneedforrepresentationoftheseaffectedgroupswithinthesebodies,perhapsbydirectlyincludingrepresentativesofunions,NGOs,andenvironmentalandhumanrightsgroups,andbygivingamoreeffectiveroletorepresentativesofthelessdevelopedcountries.Itisapparentaswellthatthetraditionaldemocraticrequirementofopennessofdeliberationswouldbehelpfulintheseneworganizations.Inaddition,tothedegreethattheseorganizationsremainresponsiveprimarilytocorporateinterests,theycannotbeexpectedtosupporttheneededhealthandwelfareprogramsindevelopingcountries,ortheenvironmentalprotectionsandregulations,thatarerequiredbyprinciplesofglobaljustice,whetherofSterba’ssortorthoseofamoreexplicitlydemocraticegalitarianism.Whereasdemocratizingdecision-makingwithintheseinternationalorganizations,alongwiththemoreestablishedpoliticalonesliketheUnitedNationsanditsorgans,seemsadauntingtask,andthepracticaldetailsremaintobeworkedout,itisadirectionclearlyentailedbythesocialandpoliticalphilosophyadvancedhere.Itisperhapsworthadding,however,thatthisdemocratizationcouldbeexpectednotonlytohelprealizesomeofthehumanrights(includingSterba’sbasicrights),butwouldalsohavetobeconstrainedbyrespectforothersoftheserightsthemselves.Becausethedemocracydiscussedhereisintheserviceoffreedomandrequiredbyit,waysalsohavetobefoundtoprotectthebasicliberties(andminorityrights)fromencroachmentbymajoritydecisionsinthesenewcontexts,aswellaswaystousedemocraticdecision-makingtoadvanceequalfreedom.Iwouldsuggestthatextendingrightsanddemocraticparticipationtothisinternationaldomainisanissuethatcallsfornewattentionbysocialandpoliticalphilosophers,democraticegalitarianandotherwise.NOTES1JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)p.8.2Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.172.3Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.42.4Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.56.5Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.63.6Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.77.7Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.130.\nDEMOCRATICEGALITARIANISM1298CarolC.Gould,Marx’sSocialOntology:IndividualityandCommunityinMarx’sTheoryofSocialReality(CambridgeMA:MITPress,1978);andRethinkingDemocracy:FreedomandSocialCooperationinPolitics,Economy,andSociety(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988).9JamesP.Sterba,TiborR.Machan,AlisonJaggar,WilliamGalston,CarolGould,MiltonFiskandRobertC.Solomon,MoralityandSocialJustice(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1995)pp.216,219.10Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.63.11Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.194n5.12Cf.forexampleHenryShue,BasicRights(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1980)esp.chapter3.SeealsoGould,RethinkingDemocracy,esp.pp.209–10.13Cf.mydiscussioninGould,RethinkingDemocracy,chapter6(reprintedfrom“ContemporaryLegalConceptionsofPropertyandtheirImplicationforDemocracy,”TheJournalofPhilosophy,vol.LXXVII,no.11,November1980,pp.716–29).14Cf.RossZucker,DemocraticDistributiveJustice(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming2000).15“ACommentbyCarolC.Gould,”inSterbaetal.,MoralityandSocialJustice,pp.53–7.16Cf.Gould,Marx’sSocialOntology,esp.chapters1and4;andRethinkingDemocracy,esp.chapter2.17Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.45.18JamesP.Sterba,“ReconcilingConceptionsofJustice,”inSterbaetal.,MoralityandSocialJustice,esp.pp.4–11.Seemy“CommentsbyCarolC.Gould”concerningthatpaperinSterbaetal,MoralityandSocialJustice,pp.53–7.19SeeforexampleC.B.Macpherson,DemocraticTheory:EssaysinRetrieval(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1973)pp.95–119.20SeeGould,RethinkingDemocracy,esp.pp.35–60.21Shue,BasicRights,pp.37–8.22SeeGould,RethinkingDemocracy,esp.pp.40–71.23Forafullerstatementofthisargument,seeGould,RethinkingDemocracy,esp.pp.71–90.24SeeGould,RethinkingDemocracy,chapter7.25Gould,RethinkingDemocracy,chapter5,andCarolC.Gould,“DemocracyandDiversity:RepresentingDifferences,”inSeylaBenhabib(ed.)DemocracyandDifference:ChangingBoundariesofthePolitical(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1996)pp.171–86.26Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.7;seealsoSterba,“ReconcilingConceptionsofJustice,”inSterbaetal.,MoralityandSocialJustice,pp.1–2.27SimonedeBeauvoir,TheSecondSex,trans.H.M.Parshley(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1952and1980).28Cf.AnthonyK.Appiah,InmyFather’sHouse:AfricainthePhilosophyofCulture(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992);CornelWest,RaceMatters(BostonMA:BeaconPress,1993);CharlesMills,TheRacialContract(IthacaNY:CornellUniversityPress,1997).29SeeforexampleCharlesTaylor,MulticulturalismandthePoliticsofRecognition(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992);IrisMarionYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990).30SeeforexampleFranzFanon,TheWretchedoftheEarth(NewYork:GrovePress,1963).31AlthoughMarx’s1844manuscriptssuggestaratherdifferentdirection,withtheideaofthehumanizationofnature,butalsothenaturalismofhumanbeings.SeeespeciallyKarlMarx,“PrivatePropertyandCommunism,”inWritingsoftheYoungMarxonPhilosophyandSociety,ed.LoydD.EastonandKurtH.Guddat(GardenCityNY:AnchorDoubleday,1967)pp.301–14.32Cf.MurrayBookchin,“TheConceptofSocialEcology,”ValPlumwood,“EcosocialFeminismasaGeneralTheoryofOppression,”andVandanaShiva,“Development,Ecology,andWomen,”allinCarolynMerchant(ed.)Ecology(AtlanticHighlandsNJ:HumanitiesPress,1994)pp.152–62,207–19,272–80;andCarolynMerchant,RadicalEcology(NewYork:Routledge,1992).33ThisargumentisdevelopedinCarolC.Gould,“TwoConceptsofUniversalityandtheProblemofCulturalRelativism,”forthcominginC.GouldandP.Pasquino(eds)CulturalIdentityandtheNation-State(Boulder:Rowman&Littlefield,2001);originallypresentedattheFifteenthInternationalSocialPhilosophyConference,NorthAmericanSocietyforSocialPhilosophy,August,1998.34Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.174.35Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,pp.174–5.36Cf.alsoDavidHeld,AnthonyMcGrew,DavidGoldblattandJonathanPerraton,GlobalTransformations(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1999).\nPartIVCHALLENGESTOSOCIALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHY\nFeminism\n12FEMINISMANDTHEOBJECTSOFJUSTICEAlisonM.JaggarInthispaper,IexplainwhatItaketobeoneofthemostsignificantcontributionsmadebyfeminismtoWesternunderstandingsofsocialjustice.Thisisfeminism’sdisclosureofobjectsofjusticeignoredbymostothermainstreamphilosophers.1Ialsoconsiderwhetherafeministapproachtosocialjusticeisusefullydescribedasawayoffleshingouttheidealofandrogyny.Centraltojusticeisthenotionofmoralbalance.Philosophersoftenexpressthisideaintermsofgivingeachherdue,meaningthatgoodsandevilsshouldbedistributedinquantitiesandqualitiesproportionatetothedesertoftherecipients.Sayingthatthepunishmentshould“fit”thecrimeisonewayofexpressingthisintuition.Justiceasasocialidealthusinvokesaconditionofmorallyappropriatebalancewithinasystemofsocialrelationships.Contemporaryaccountsofsocialjusticeusuallydivideitintotwobranches,distributiveandcorrectivejustice,andtheytypicallypresenttheoriesofjusticeasproposingrivalanswerstothequestion:1Whatshouldcountasjustdeserts?Thatistosay,accordingtowhatprincipleshouldgoodsandevilsbedistributedinajustsocialsystem?Indiscussionsofso-calleddistributivejustice,thisquestionisgenerallyinterpretedasaskingformoralgroundscapableofjustifyingstateinterventiontoredistributematerialgoods.2Intermsofcorrectivejustice,thequestionisofteninterpretedasoneaboutwhichprinciplesshoulddeterminethekindsofbehaviorthatdeservetobepunishedbylawandthekindsoflegalpenaltiesthatareappropriateor“fitting.”Feministshaveproposedavarietyofanswerstothesequestions,buttheyhavealsoraisedseveraladditionalquestionsaboutjustice,oneofwhichisthefollowing:2Whatarethekindsorcategoriesofthingsthatshouldbedistributedinajustmanner?Icallthisthequestionoftheproperobjectsofjusticeand,inthepresentpaper,Ishowhowrecentworkbyfeministphilosophershaschallengedsomewidelyacceptedanswerstothisquestion.JohnRawlsfamouslydefinesjusticeasafairdistributionoftheburdensandbenefitsofsocialcooperation(Rawls1971).Contemporarytheoriesofjusticerecognizevarioustypesorcategoriesofsuchburdensandbenefits,whichmaybeusedtodistinguishseveralkindsorcategoriesofjustice:1Politicaljusticeisconcernedwiththeproperdistributionoflegallyguaranteedauthorities,powersandliberties,andoflegallyrequiredobligations,suchasmilitaryservice,jurydutyand,mostgenerally,obediencetothelaw.2Economicjusticeisconcernedwiththeproperdistributionofmaterialgoodsandthehumanlaborneededtoproducethem.3Recentdiscussionsofjusticeincreasinglyhaveraisedquestionsconcerningtheproperdistributionofintangiblebenefitsandburdens.Suchgoodsinclude“Honor,respect,esteem,praise,prestige,status,reputation,dignity,rank,regard,admiration,worth,distinction,deference,homage,appreciation,glory,fame,celebrity”(Walzer1983,252).Theevilsincludedishonor,contempt,disgrace,discredit,insult,degradation,shame,stigma,scorn,andhumiliation.Thesegoodsandevilsareofteninstitutionalizedinsymbolicsystemssuchasformsoflanguage,ranks,titles,rituals,andpublicholidays.Thebranchofjusticeconcernedwiththedistributionofsuchgoodsandevilscouldbecalledjusticeinthedistributionof“socialrecognition.”NancyFrasercallsitculturalorsymbolicjustice(Fraser1997,14).4Finally,correctivejusticeisconcernedwiththeproperdistributionofrewards,punishmentsandcompensationsforbehaviorthatislegallyrequired,permittedorprohibited.ManyfeministsarguethattheWesternphilosophicaltraditionhastendedtoidentifythevariousobjectsofjusticeinwaysthatonthesurfacearegender-neutralbutwhich,onadeeperlevel,aregender-biased.Specifically,theycontendthatmanyWesternphilosophershavefailedtoacknowledgethefullrangeofprivilegesenjoyedbysome,especiallybymanymen,ortoappreciatethefullrangeofburdensimposedonothers,especiallyonmostwomen.TheyalsoarguethatWesternphilosophers\nFEMINISMANDTHEOBJECTSOFJUSTICE133typicallyhavefailedtocreditthefullrangeofcontributionsmadebysomegroups,especiallythoughnotexclusivelybywomen.Finally,feministsarguethatWesternphilosophershavefailedtorecognizethatthedisproportionbetweentheprivileges,burdensandcontributionsofmenandwomenrespectivelyoftenresultsfromchoicesbymenandwomenmadeinthecontextofsocialinstitutionsthatimposeonthemconstraintsthataresystematicallyunequalandunjust.Inwhatfollows,Iillustratethesefeministclaimswithexamplesdrawnfromtherealmsofpolitical,economicandculturaljustice;becauseofspacelimitations,Idonotaddressfeministworkoncorrectivejustice.1FeminismandtheobjectsofpoliticaljusticeFeministworkonpoliticaljusticehighlightsdistinctpoliticalprivilegesenjoyedbymanymenandinjuriessufferedbymanywomenthathavebeenignoredbymostmainstreampoliticaltheory.Italsodrawsattentiontopoliticalcontributionsmadebywomenthatmainstreamtheoryhasgenerallydisregarded.Finally,feministworkidentifiesunjustandalsolargelyneglectedsocialconstraintsthatinfluencethegenderdistributionofpoliticalprivileges,burdensandcontributions.I’llsketchthesepointsquitebriefly,beginningwithquestionsofformalelectoralpolitics.ItisoftenforgottenthatwomeninWesternEuropeandNorthAmericawonthevoteonlyinthelifetimesofmanypeoplealivetoday(1920inUS;1947inFrance;1971inSwitzerland).Moreover,itisnotwidelyknownthatwomen’sfightforsuffrageoftenhadtobefollowedbyseparatestrugglesforothercitizenrightsthatarewidelyassumedtoaccompanythesuffrage.Theseincludedwomen’srightstopasstheircitizenshipontotheirchildren,toretaintheircitizenshiponmarriagebasedontheirownnationalityandplaceofresidenceratherthantheirspouse’s,torunforandholdpoliticalofficeandtoserveonjuries.Womenstillhavenotgainedquitealloftheserightsinalloftheadvancedindustrialdemocraciesbut,inmostofthem,women’spoliticalrightsandresponsibilitiesarefairlyclosetothoseofmen.ThusWesternwomenarenowabletovoteandrunforpublicofficeonthesametermsasmen,atleastasfarasthelawisconcerned.Despitetheirformalpoliticalequality,womenremainstrikinglyunderrepresentedinelectoralpolitics,especiallyatthenationalandinternationallevels.Forexample,eightyyearsafterwomenwonthevoteintheUnitedStates,whitemenconstitute80%oftheHouseofRepresentatives,90%oftheSenate,and100%ofallpresidentsandvice-presidents.Newsphotographsoftoppoliticalleadersinvariablyshowarowofsuitedwhiteandoccasionallybrownmen,againstwhichthefewwomenleaders,suchasMargaretThatcherandMadeleineAlbright,standoutinstrikingcontrast.FemalefacesrarelyappearinphotographsofpoliticalleadersintheNorthAtlanticdemocracies.Systematicinequalityinthepoliticalstandingofmembersofgroupsthatareformallyequalcallsforexplanationinliberaldemocraticsocieties,becauseitisaprimafaciesignofinjustice.Howcanthesexual,aswellasracial/ethnic,disproportionbetweenpublicofficialsandtheirelectoratesbeexplained?Doesitresultfromfreeandrationalcitizenchoices,ordowomen,especiallypoorwomenandwomenofcolor,currentlyhavedisproportionatelylimitedopportunitiestoexercisetheirformalrightstoassumepoliticaloffice?Feministshaveidentifiedanumberofmutuallyreinforcingwaysinwhichsystematicinequalitiesbasedonclass,sexandrace/ethnicityrestrictthepoliticalopportunitiesofwomen,especiallypoorwomenandwomenofcolor.3Forexample,thevastmajorityofsuccessfulcandidatescomefromahandfulofeliteprofessionssuchaslaw,whichrequirehighlevelsofeducation,yetmanywomen,especiallywomenofcolor,enjoyfewereducationalopportunitiesthandomostwhitemen.Arecordofmilitaryserviceisalsohelpfulinestablishingapoliticalcareer,butitismoredifficultforwomentoachievesucharecord,asweshallsee.Inaddition,runningsuccessfullyfortheUSCongresscostsagreatdealofmoneyandfewwomen,especiallywomenofcolor,havethefinancialresourcesnecessarytomountasuccessfulcampaign.Studiesshowthatpartyactivistsaretypicallylesswillingtoraisefundsforthecampaignsofpromisingwomencandidatesthantheyareforthoseofwhitemen.4Whenwomendomanagetogetelected,theyarelikelytobeexcludedfromtheinformalpoliticalrelationshipsthatarecrucialtoasuccessfulpoliticalcareer.Finally,somevotersregularlyrejectwomencandidates,especiallywomenofcolor,solelyonthebasisoftheirsexandethnicity.Studiesshowthateventhosevoterswhoconsiderthemselvestobe“open-mindedtowardwomencandidates”arelesslikelytovoteforwomenwithsmallchildren.Thus,evenwhenwomen’sformalpoliticalrightsareequalwiththoseofmen,women’ssociallyavailableopportunitiestoexercisethoserightsaresystematicallyunequaltothoseofmen.Differentialliabilityformilitaryserviceremainsthemostconspicuousdifferencebetweentheformalrightsandresponsibilitiesofmenandwomenrespectivelyinsomeliberaldemocracies,includingtheUnitedStates.WomenintheUnitedStates,unlikemen,haveneverbeensubjecttoconscription,andtoday,stillunlikemen,theyarenotrequiredtoregisterforthedraft;moreover,althoughwomenmaynowserveinthemilitaryinmostcapacities,theyarestillexcludedfromsomecombatpositions.Women’sexemptionfromcompulsorymilitaryserviceandthelimitsonthepositionstheymayoccupymightbeconstruedasanunjustbenefittowomenratherthanaburdenonthem,butsomefeministsarguethatthelimitsonwomen’sopportunitiesformilitaryserviceconstituteanunjustburdenonthem.Forinstance,notonlydotheywithholdfromwomenthecareeropportunitiesprovidedbymilitaryservice,buttheyalsodeprivewomenpoliticalcandidates\n134ALISONM.JAGGARofcredibilityonmilitarymatters.Moregenerally,theselimitsreinforceapublicperceptionthatwomen(likegaymen)arelessthanfullcitizensinsofarastheyneedtheprotectionof(presumedheterosexual)men(Carter1996;Allen2000).Inadditiontoformalpoliticalinequities,second-wavefeministshaveidentifiedotherformsofpoliticalinjusticetowomenthathavebeeninvisibleinmainstreamphilosophy.Theproblemsthatmostwomenexperienceasespeciallyacuteintheirdailylivesinclude:problemsregardingbodilyappearanceandself-presentation,whichsometimesleadtolife-threateningeatingdisorders;problemsregardingsexuality,includingsexualharassmentandtheabsenceoforgasminheterosexualrelations;problemswithviolence,includingincest,rapeanddomesticviolence;andproblemsregardingthedomesticdivisionoflaborandresponsibilityforthecareofdependentfamilymembers.Mostoftheseproblemsfallintotherealmthatliberalpoliticaltheorycategorizesaspersonalandtheyarestillusuallyaddressedbyurgingwomento“cope”better,forinstance,byadoptingvariousself-helpmethods.Forwomenofmygeneration,however,muchoftheinspirationalforceofsecond-wavefeminismderivedfromitsslogan,“Thepersonalispolitical,”whichsuggestedthat,onthemostbasiclevel,womenwerenotindividuallytoblameformanyoftheirso-calledpersonalproblems.Thesloganreflectedtheinsightthattheseproblemsdidnotariseprimarilyfromwomen’slaziness,selfishness,weaknessofthewill,poorcopingskillsoranyotherindividualdefect—eventhoughmostwomen,likemostmen,arecertainlylazy,selfish,weak-willedandlackingincopingskillsonoccasion.Ratherthanrootingwomen’sso-calledpersonalproblemsinindividualdeficiencies,theslogan“Thepersonalispolitical”impliedthatmanyoftheseproblemshadsystemiccauses,rootedininstitutionalarrangementsthatweresystematicallymale-dominatedandcompoundedbyracismandpoverty.Thesloganalsohintedthatjusticerequiredaddressingtheseproblemsbychanginginstitutionalarrangements,ratherthanbyaskingindividualwomentodevelopbettercopingskills.Feministsdonotcontendthatwomenbearnoindividualresponsibilityforcreatingoraddressinganyoftheproblemstheyface.However,theydoarguethatmainstreampoliticaltheoryfailstorecognizethatmanyofwomen’sso-calledpersonalproblemsaresystematicallygeneratedbysocialinstitutions.Forinstance,thereisareasonwhythevastmajorityofthosewithhealth-andlife-threateningeatingdisorders,aswellasthevastmajorityofthosewhoundergocosmeticsurgery,arewomen,andthatreasongoesbeyondpersonalgreedorvanity.Thereason,inanutshell,isthatawoman’sface(andherfigure)stillconstitutesmuchofherfortunetoday,justasinthetimeofthenurseryrhyme.Women’sappearanceinfluencestheiropportunitiesforpoliticalandcareeradvancementtoamuchgreaterextentthanmen’sappearence.Italsoinfluencestheiropportunitiesformarriage,whichisstillmostwomen’sbestchanceforeconomicsecurity.Marriageoffersagoodexampleofasocialinstitutionthatoftencreatesproblemsforwomenthatmainstreamtheoryconstruesas“personal.”Marriageisarelationshipofformalequalityandatleastonephilosopherhastakenthewedding,withitssmilingbridegroom,asaparadigmcaseoffreewill(Flew1956).Mostbridesaswellasgroomssmileattheirweddings,yetfeministshavepointedtotheeconomicandsocialpressuresthatmakemarriagemoreimperativeforwomenthanformen(Okin1989).Feministshavealsonotedthatthesamepressuresoftencompelmanywomentoremainmarried,evenaftertheyfindthattheyareunhappyintheirmaritalrelationship.Forinstance,manywomenstaymarriedbecausetheyfearthat,iftheydivorced,theywouldnotbeabletosupportthemselvesandtheirchildren,andotherwomenstaymarriedbecausetheyfearphysicalharmiftheyleave.Women’sfearsfortheirphysicalsafetyareoftenwellfounded,asSterbaconvincinglydocuments(Sterba1998,89–90).Manywomenaresubjectedtosexualassaultbystrangerswhobreakintotheirhomesorattackthemonthestreet,andmanytimesmorewomenarebeatenandkilledbypresentandpreviousboyfriendsandhusbands.Yetdespitethesehighratesofviolenceagainstwomen,contemporarystatesseemcuriouslyindifferenttowomen’sphysicalsafety.Totheextentthattheirbodilyintegrityisnotguaranteed,womensurelylackoneofthebasicrightsofcitizenship.Somefeministsarguethatwomenaresubjectedtosystematicpoliticalterrorism,andSterbaassertsthat“theconditionofwomeninoursocietyisactuallythatofbeingsubordinatetomenbyforce”(Sterba1998,80).Whenwomen’sproblemsaregeneratedbyinstitutionalstructuresthatassignwomensystematicallylesspowerthanmen,feministscontendthattheredesignofthosestructuresshouldbeseenasamatterofpoliticaljusticeratherthanofprivatemorality.Buildingontheinsightexpressedintheslogan,“Thepersonalispolitical,”manyfeministpoliticalphilosophershavearguedthatthepublic/privatedistinction,socentraltoWesternpoliticaltheory,infacthasoftenoperatedideologicallytoexcludemanyharmstowomenfromtherealmofpoliticaljustice.Forinstance,intheworkofliberalpoliticalphilosopherssuchasJohnRawlsandJürgenHabermas,thepublic/privatedistinctiondividesmattersofethicsorthegoodlife,determinedbysubjectivepreference,frommattersofmoralityorjustice,determinedbyimpartialandobjectivereason(Benhabib1992).However,evenwhenitisacknowledgedthataddressingwomen’sproblemsrequiressomesocialchanges,liberalpoliticaltheorydoesnotusuallycategorizetheseaschangesinwhatRawlscallsthe“basicstructure”or“basicinstitutions”ofsociety.Evenifwomenarenotdirectlyblamedfortheir“personal”problems,placingthemwithinthedomainofprivatemoralitymeansthattacklingtheseproblemsisnotamatterofjusticeandthereforenotamongastate’sfirstpriorities.Ifsocialinstitutionssystematicallypromoteharmtowomen,thenworkaddressedtochangingthoseinstitutionsisnecessarilyaformofpoliticalactivism.Yetwomen’srelativeabsencefromformalpoliticsisoftentakenasevidencethattheyarepassiveorapatheticratherthanactivecitizens,living“theirlivesinaprivatesphereprotected…fromthemainstreamof\nFEMINISMANDTHEOBJECTSOFJUSTICE135‘public’lifeandpolitics”(Ackelsberg1988,297).MarthaAckelsbergchallengesthisviewbypointingoutthatwomenhavebeenextremelyactiveincommunitylifeatlocalorgrassrootslevel.Womenhavebeen“leadersandactivistsin‘breadriots’andtenantorganizations…participatedinfactory-basedstrikesthatengendered,anddependedon,localcommunitysupport…theyhaveledstrugglesfornewandbetterschools”(Ackelsberg1988,303).Women,especiallypoorwomenofcolor,havealsobeenleadersinstrugglesforenvironmentaljustice.Inaddition,womenhavealsoledexplicitlyfeministstrugglesagainstrape,sexualharassment,domesticviolence,andsoon.Thereareatleasttworeasonswhymainstreampoliticaltheoryhasoftenfailedtorecognizetheextentandvalueofwomen’spoliticalcontributions.First,womenin,forinstance,theAfricanAmericancivilrightsmovementandintradesunionshaveoftenavoidedhigh-profilerolesandinsteadsupportedmalespokespersons(Sacks1988).Thuswomen’sleadershipstylehasoftenmadetheircontributionslessvisible.Second,women’sactivitiesareoftendistinguishedfrompoliticsproperbybeingcalledcommunityorganizing,atendencythathasbeenreinforcedwiththerecentadventofatheoreticaldiscourseemphasizingthedistinctionbetweencivilsocietyandthestate.Feministsarguethatabroaderandlessgender-biasedunderstandingofpoliticalactivitywouldenablewomen’spoliticalcontributionstoberecognizedmoreadequately.Feministsthusarguethatmainstreamtheorieshaveofferedinadequateandgender-biasedaccountsoftheobjectsofpoliticaljustice.Thesetheorieshaveignorednotonlyunjustconstraintsonwomen’sabilitiestoexercisetheirpoliticalrights,butalsoseriousviolationsofsuchbasiclibertiesastherighttobodilyintegrity.Mainstreamtheoristshavealsofailedtorecognizemanypoliticalbenefitsenjoyedbymen,includingdisproportionatepowerandauthorityinbothpublicandprivatespheres.Finally,mainstreamtheoristshavedisregardedthenumerousandsubstantivepoliticalcontributionsmadebywomen.2FeminismandtheobjectsofeconomicjusticeFeministworkoneconomicjusticeincludesseveralclaimsthatareparalleltothosemadebyfeministtheoristsofpoliticaljustice.Thatistosay,feministsarguethatmostcontemporarytheoriesdefineeconomicbenefits,burdensandcontributionsinwaysthatexcludemanyofthebenefitsenjoyedbymen,theburdenscarriedbywomenandthecontributionsthatwomenmake.Themostegregiousexampleofneglectingwomen’seconomicburdensandcontributionsisthepractice,standardinmainstreameconomictheoryandinsystemsofnationalaccounting,ofignoringunpaidworkinthefamilyandthecommunity.5Muchfeministscholarshiparguesthatsubsistence,maintenanceandreproductivelabor—includingsexual,emotionalandsometimesevengestationallabor—is“realwork”inseveralsenses.Ittakesatoll—oftenaheavyone—ontheworker’stimeandenergy;itrequiresskillsthatareoftensophisticated;anditproducesgoodsandservicesthatareoftensociallyindispensableandwhichwouldcommandahighpriceifpurchasedonthemarket(Anderson1993;Folbre1994;Waring1988).Notallunpaidlaborisperformedbywomen,ofcourse.Itisalsoperformedbyindigenouspeople(menaswellaswomen),mostofwhoselifeactivitiesoccuroutsidethemarket;bypoorpeople(menaswellaswomen),whocannotaffordthegoodsandservicesavailableonthemarket;andbypeoplewithplentyoftimeandmoney(menaswellaswomen),whosimplyenjoyexercisingtheskillsnecessaryforthiskindofproduction.However,feministscontendthat,incontemporarysocieties,unpaidworkforfamiliesisperformeddisproportionately(thoughnotexclusively)bywomen,thatthebenefitsofthisfamilylaborareenjoyeddisproportionatelybymenandbylargersocialinstitutions,andthatthesamemenandinstitutionswithholdreciprocaleconomicbenefitsfromthewomenwhodothiswork.Feministsalsoarguethatthegendereddivisionoflaborassigningthisunpaidworkisnotfreelychosen.Thosewhobenefitfromwomen’sunpaidlaborare,inthefirstinstance,theirchildrenandthemalemembersoftheirimmediatefamilies.Leavingasidechildren,whoarenotexpectedtoengageinfaireconomicexchanges,itisoftenarguedthatmenmorethanrepaywomen’sdomesticlabor,includingsexualandemotionallabor,bytheirlargermonetarycontributiontothefamilybudget;indeed,manywomenandchildrenaresavedfrompovertyonlybyaman’swage.However,feministsrespondthatthiseconomicexchangeisquiteunequalwhenitismeasuredintermsoftimeandenergyratherthanmoney.Studieshaveshownthatadultmalesacrosstheworldtendtoenjoybenefitsthatthewomenintheirfamiliesenjoytoamuchlesserextent.Forinstance,malefamilymemberstendtohavemoreleisuretimethanfemalemembersandtheyhavehigherlevelsofsexualsatisfactionandself-esteem.Marriagelengthensaman’slifebutshortensawoman’s.Moreover,becausewomentakeonthebulkofthenecessarydomesticlabor,menhavemoretimeandenergyforpaidworkandthusareenabledtoadvancetheircareers,whereaswomen’scareeroptionsarelimited.Men’srelativelystrongerpositioninthemarketthengivesthemgreaterexitoptionsfrommarriagethanwomen,andthisinturnsuppliesthemwithmorepowerinthefamily(Okin1989).Thusawoman’sunpaidlaborinthefamilytendstostrengthenherhusband’spositionattheexpenseofherown—justas,accordingtotheMarxistanalysisofalienation,wageearners’laborstrengthensthepositionofcapitalistsvis-à-vistheiremployees.\n136ALISONM.JAGGARWomen’sunpaidlaboralsocarriesbenefitsforthosebeyondtheirimmediatefamiliesbecauseitprovidesgoodsandservicesthatthenneednotbepaidforeitherbyprivateindustryorbypublicfunds.Companiescanpaywagesthatdonotcoverthecostofbuyingmanygoodsandservices,suchaspreparedfood,laundryandhousecleaning,andtheycanrequiretheirmaleemployeestoworklonghoursontheassumptionthatsomeoneelseistakingcareofchildrenandhouseholdmaintenance.Itbecomespossibletoavoidmakingpublicprovisionforthedisabled,theinfirmortheelderly,andhealthcareservicescandischargesickpatientsfromhospitalsormentalhealthfacilitiesontheassumptionthattheywillbecaredforathome.Indebtornationsworldwide,policiesofstructuraladjustmentcanshiftmanysocialresponsibilitiesfromthestateontowomen.Thuswomen’sunpaidworkprovidesahiddensubsidybothtoprivateindustryandtopubliccoffers.Despiteitsenormousmonetaryaswellassocialvalue,women’sunpaidlaborisnotseenasentitlingthosewhoperformittopublicrecompense,suchaspensionsorsocialsecurity.Onthecontrary,womenwhoworkwithoutpayareportrayedasnotbeingself-supportingorself-sufficient,andtheiruseofsocialservicesisstigmatizedasdependent(FraserandGordon1997).Feministsarguethattheconventionallyaccepteddefinitionsofeconomicconceptssuchasself-sufficiency,independenceanddependencearearbitraryandgenderbiased.Forinstance,theyignorethefactsthatwomen’scaringworkmakesanindispensablesocialcontributionandthatpaidworkmayoftenbesociallycounterproductive,eventhoughitraisestheGNP.IrisM.Young’sexampleofsuchsociallycounterproductiveworkisdesigningjunkfoodcommercialsforchildren’stelevision(Young1997).Theuseof“dependency”asanepithetmisleadinglysuggeststhatwomenwhofinditdifficulttotakeonwellpaidjobsbecauseoftheirunpaidfamilyresponsibilitiesareundeserving,inthesenseofbeinglazyorinept.However,feministsarguethatitisfarmorelikelythatsuchwomenaredisadvantagedbyinstitutionalsexism,oftencompoundedbyclassismandracism,includingemploymentdiscrimination,lowerpayforjobsthatareofcomparablevaluetomen’s,andtheassignmentofprimarycare-takingresponsibilitiesforchildren,spouses,orparents.Thedistinctionbetween“entitlement”benefits,whichdonotpositiontheirrecipientsideologicallyasdependents,and“charity”benefits,whichdosopositionthem,restsonassumptionsaboutsocialcontributionanddesertthataregender-biased.Forinstance,governmentpaymentsfromwhichmenaremorelikelytobenefit,suchasagriculturalsubsidies,corporatetaxconcessionsandmilitaryexpenditures,donotstigmatizetheirrecipientsasdependent.NancyFraserarguesthat,intheUSeconomy,thesystem’srealfree-ridersaremenwhoshirkcareworkanddomesticlaborandcorporationswhofree-rideonthelaborofworkingpeople,bothunderpaidandunpaid(Fraser1997,62).Gender-biaseddefinitionsofeconomiccontributionsareextremelyunjusttowomen,sincetheyshapepublicperceptionsofwhatwomenareentitledtoreceive,especiallywomenwhohavefewmarketableskills,whoarewomenofcolor,and/orwhohaveassumedprimaryresponsibilityforcarework.Somefeministscontendthatnoindividualiseconomicallyindependentinthesenseofnotneedingtorelyonthecontributionsofothers.Socialistsandanarchistshavepointedoutforoverahundredyearsthateveryone’sknowledgeandskillsarederivedfromthestockcreatedbythespecies,andthatweallneedthehelpofothersinacquiringashareofit;moreover,mostpeople’seconomiccontributionsaremadepossibleonlybytheirparticipationinalargereconomicsystemthatcoordinatesthecontributionsofmanyothers(Kropotkin1987).Forthisreason,somefeministsarguethatthenotionofeconomicself-sufficiencyisanideologicalfictionorillusion,whatEvaKittaycallsa“conceptualchimera,”servingprimarilytorationalizetheprivilegeofthosewhosegoodfortunehasplacedtheminapositiontoreceiveeconomicbenefitsinamarketeconomy(Kittay1999,141).Economicjusticedoesnotrequirethatallindividualsorgroupsshouldmakequantitativelyequalcontributionstoagivensystemofcooperation,northatallshouldreapquantitativelyequalbenefits.AsMarxnotedlongago,assessingjusticealsorequiresconsideringpeople’sdifferingabilitiesandneeds.Thusitwouldnotnecessarilybeunjustforwomentomakedisproportionatelylargecontributionstomen’seconomicwell-beingifwomen’sabilitiesweretypicallygreaterthanmen’sorifmen’sneedsweretypicallygreaterthanwomen’s.However,itishardtoimaginehoweitheroftheseclaimsmightbeargued.Itwouldalsonotbeunjustforwomentomakeadisproportionatelylargecontributiontomen’seconomicwell-beingifwomenfreelychoselower-paidoccupationsorfreelychosetomakeagiftoftheirtimeandenergy.However,feministshavearguedthatwomen’soccupationalchoicesinfactareoftenconstrainedbyinstitutionalfactors,suchasemploymentopportunitiesandculturalnorms,inwaysthatmostmen’schoicesarenot(Folbre1994).Thepaidlaborforceisstilllargelysexsegregated,“female”occupationsaredevalued,anditisstilltypicallywomenwhofindthemselvesrequiredtocareforchildrenandotherfamilymemberswhocannotcareforthemselves.Mostwomen’sactionsareconstrainedbytheseinstitutionalfactorstosuchanextentthattheyareoftenvirtuallyforcedintotraditionallyfemaleoccupationsandtoengageinadisproportionateamountofunpaidlabor.Itisthepresenceoftheseelementsofcoercionthathasencouragedsomefeministtheoriststoarguethatwomenareexploitedbothbythemenintheirfamiliesandbythelargersociety(Holmstrom1981).6Tosummarize,feministsdonotarguethatso-calledwomen’swork,eitherpaidorunpaid,isinherentlyunpleasantordegrading.Instead,theycontendthatthepresentsocialorganizationofthisworkisunjustforseveralreasons.First,thisworkisperformeddisproportionatelybywomen,whoarecoercedtoperformitbygender-specificsocialconstraintsthatdonotsimilarlycoercemen.Yetmenreapdisproportionatebenefitsfromthiswork,bothasindividualfamilymembersandasparticipantsinmale-biasedinstitutions.Finally,themenandinstitutionsthatbenefitfromwomen’sunpaidfamilylabordonotreciprocate,rewardorevenrecognizethewomenwhoperformit.Onthecontrary,thisworkisunfairlydevaluedasmenial\nFEMINISMANDTHEOBJECTSOFJUSTICE137andunskilledandthewomenwhoperformitareoftendespisedpreciselyonthataccount.Thosewhoperformthesociallyindispensableworkofcaringfordependentothers,becomethemselvesstigmatizedas“dependent.”Thusdofeministscontributetoourunderstandingoftheobjectsofeconomicjusticebyofferingexpandedconceptionsofeconomicburdensandbenefits,costsandcontributions,aswellasbydrawingattentiontostructuresofsocialconstraintthathithertowereunacknowledged.Feministshavemadevisiblewhatwaspreviouslyinvisibleintraditionaltheoriesofeconomicjustice—despitebeingquitevisibletomostwomen.3FeminismandtheobjectsofculturaljusticeWithafewexceptions,suchastheUnitedKingdom,present-dayliberalsocietieshavelargelyabolishedhereditarydistinctionsofrank.Forthisreason,theoriesofjusticeinthetwentiethcentury(unlikeearliertheories)haveusuallyignoredmattersofpublicrespectordishonor,andrestrictedtheirfocustopoliticsandeconomics.Intheclosingdecadesofthetwentiethcentury,however,theoristsofjusticeonceagainbegantoaddressquestionsofsocialhonorandshame,recognitionandmisrecognition.Thenewattentiontothesequestionsemergedaspartofamoregeneralconcernwithmattersofculturalrepresentation,whichinturnwaslinkedbothwithpostcolonialresistancetoEurocentrismandwiththeever-increasingculturaldiversityinthepopulationsofmoststates,duetounprecedentedpoliticalandeconomicmigrations.Inthesphereofculture,justasinthespheresofpoliticsandeconomics,feministshavedrawnattentiontoinjuriestowomenthathavebeenignoredbymainstreamtheoriesofjustice.Forinstance,theyhavecomplainedthatmanyeverydaysocialpracticesreflectaculturalclimateofmasculinedominance,inwhichwomenregularlyexperienceshame,embarrassmentandvulnerability.Wellknownexamplesofsuchpracticesincludemen’stouchingorcommentingonwomen’sbodiesinprofessionalorworksettings,staringatwomen’sbodyparts,andusingstylesofaddressthatareinappropriatelyaffectionateorintimate(“honey,”“dear”),orthatdefinewomenbytheirfamilyratherthanprofessionalrelationships(usingMissorMrsratherthanDoctororProfessor).Otherexamplesincludeconversationalinteractionsinwhichmeninterrupt,ignoreormisrepresentwhatwomensayortelljokesthatridiculeorsexualizewomen.Atmyownuniversity,femalefacultyandteachingassistants,especiallyjuniorfaculty,haverecentlyreportedmanycasesofwhattheycall“genderharassment”bydisruptiveanddisrespectfulstudents.AculturalinjuryofwhoseextentIhavebecomeawareonlyrecentlyisthatofvoyeurism,whichnowinvolvesnotonlythefamiliarphenomenonofpeepingtomsoutsidewomen’sbedroomwindowsbutcamerashiddeninhomes,underofficedesks,inwomen’sbathrooms,andsoon.Peoplewhoareunsympathetictofeministconcernsaboutculturalandrocentrismoftenaccusefeministsofbeingoverlysensitive,lookingfortrouble,unabletotakeajokeortodealwithnormalsexualattraction—evenofseekingtoimposeartificialstandardsof“politicalcorrectness.”Suchcriticsfailtorecognizethatculturalnormsandstandardsthatarecovertlymasculine,coupledwithoffensivestereotypesoffemininity,operatetorationalizepoliticalandeconomicharmstowomen.Theymaketheexclusionofwomenfrompoliticsappeartobechosen,sexualharassmentandassaultsonwomenappeartobenormal,andthesexualdivisionoflaborappeartobenatural.Beyonditsroleinrationalizingpoliticalandeconomicinjustice,culturalcontemptforwomenandthefemininealsoconstitutesaharminitsownright.Insultmaybeaninjuryinitself,especiallywhenoffensiveviewsarewidelyshared.Sterbarightlyobservesthatwomenarehumiliatedbysexualharassment,whetherornotitculminatesinjobloss,andtheyaredeeplytraumatizedbyrape,eveniftheysufferlittlephysicalinjury.Sexualharassmentandassaulthumiliateanddegradewomeninwaysthataredistinctivelygendered,whichexplainswhywomenwhohavebeenharassedorassaultedaretypicallyreluctanttoreportsuchincidentsandevengotogreatlengthstoconcealthem,whentheywouldnothesitatetoreportatheft.7JohnRawlsassertsthatself-respectistheprimarysocialgood,butitisdifficultforwomentomaintaintheirself-respectinacultureinwhichwomenandeverythingassociatedwiththefemininearesystematicallyscorned,mocked,belittledanddisparaged.8EvenWesternphilosophyhasparticipatedintheculturaldevaluationofwomenandthefemininebycontrastingmindwithbody,reasonwithemotion,publicwithprivate,thesublimewiththebeautiful,andculturewithnatureandthenassociatingthefirstandsuperiortermofeachoppositionwiththemasculineandthesecond,inferior,termwiththefeminine.Feministshaverespondedtotheculturaldevaluationofwomenandthefeminineinavarietyofways.Somehavecontendedthatwomenareascapableasmenofrealizingvaluesculturallycodedasmasculine;othershaveembracedthehithertodevalued“feminine”poleofthebinaries;yetothershavetriedsomehowtocombine“masculine”and“feminine”values,whileothersstillhavesoughttode-genderthesesymbolicoppositions.Finally,somefeministsareworkingtodeconstructmanyoftheconceptualdichotomies.Thusfeminismtendstorevalueboththeculturallymasculineandtheculturallyfeminine,andfeministworkinthisdirectioncanbeobservednotonlyinpoliticalandeconomictheory,aswehaveseen,butalsoinart,literatureandsports.Rejectingthepre-eminenceofmasculinestandardsofvalueaccordswiththeliberalidealofacceptingdiversityinconceptionsofthegood,andislikelytobenefitnotonlywomenbutalsolargenumbersofmen,whoareunableorunwillingtomeetrigid,unrealisticandoftenabhorrentmasculinenormsandstandards.\n138ALISONM.JAGGARFeministreflectionsontheobjectsofculturaljusticerunparalleltofeministworkinpoliticalandeconomicjustice,byrevealinginjuriestowomenthatmainstreamtheoristsofjusticehaveignoredandbypointingtoaspectsoftheculturallyfemininethatdeservetoberevalued.Thedevaluationofwomenandthefeminineissodeep-rootedinWesternculturethatitisofteninvisibletoitsmembers,withtheresultthatfeministsoftenappeartobechallengingthenaturalorderofthings.Forthisreason,thestruggleforculturaljusticeisinsomerespectsthemostdifficultfeministstruggleofall.4FeminismandtheobjectsofsocialjusticeSeverallinkedthemesrunthroughfeministthinkingabouttheobjectsofsocialjustice.Firstisthethemeofmakingvisiblethoseburdensandbenefitsofsocialcooperationthathavebeenlargelyignoredinmainstreamsocialtheory,andrelatedtothisisthethemeofgenderblindnessasgenderbias.Asecondthemeisthatoftheneedtochallengemasculinenormsineverydomain,andafinalthemeisthatallthevariousdimensionsoraspectsofjusticeareinter-relatedandmutuallyreinforcing.Forinstance,justastheculturaldevaluationoffemininityrationalizespoliticalandeconomicdiscriminationagainstwomen,sopoliticalandeconomicinjusticestowomenalsoinflictpsychologicalandemotionaldamage.9Ithasoftenbeenobservedthatpeopleofcolorsuffernotonlyfromvariousformsofdisenfranchisementanddiscrimination,butalsofromraciststigmatization,andthatworking-classpeoplesuffernotonlyfrompovertybutalsofromwhathavebeencalledthehiddeninjuriesofclass.Inthesamesortsofways,politicalandeconomicinjusticestowomennotonlyreinforceeachotherbutalsomakeitdifficultforwomentomaintaintheirself-respect.5AndrogynyJamesP.Sterba’srecentbook,JusticeforHereandNow,echoesthereconciliationistprojectofhis1988book,HowtoMakePeopleJust,insofarasitseekstodemonstratethatthepoliciesgeneratedbyseveralconceptionsofjusticearelargelycompatiblewitheachotheronthepracticallevel.Inadditiontoitssubstantivearguments,JusticeforHereandNowmodelsanapproachtodoingphilosophywhichSterbapresentsasanalternativetothedominantapproach.Sterbacallsthedominantapproachthe“warmaking”model,andtheexamplesofthisthatheoffersinhisopeningchapterallinvolvephilosophersseekingbyfairmeansorfoultorefuteotherphilosophers,whomtheypositionasadversariesoropponents.Inoppositiontothewarmakingapproach,Sterbarecommendswhathecallsapeacemakingmodelofdoingphilosophy.Thepeacemakingmodelpositionsotherphilosophersasco-learnersorcollaborators,andrequiresthattheybefair,openandself-critical.Sterba’sexamplesofthewarmakingapproacharesadlyfamiliar,whilesomethinglikethepeacemakingmodelhaslongbeenassociatedwithfeministphilosophy(Moulton1983).IshallthereforeapproachSterba’saccountoffeministjusticeinapeacemakingspirit.I’dliketobeginbysayinghowmuchIappreciateSterba’ssustainedandseriousengagementwithfeministphilosophy.Feministandmainstreamphilosophybothstandtobenefitfromdirectinteractionwitheachother,asSterbarightlypointsout,yetfeministcontributionstoooftenareignoredinthemainstream.I’dalsoliketocomplimentSterbaonhisknowledgeofthefeministpublicpolicyliterature.Ithinkhisdiscussionsoftheneedtochangethesocialorganizationofpaidworkandtoendviolenceareexcellentandhisdiscussionofsexualharassmentissuperb.Indeed,IfindlittlewithwhichtodisagreeinthepolicysectionofSterba’schapteronfeministjustice.However,Idohavesomeconcernwiththetheoreticalsectionsofhischapter,whichraiseanolddebatebetweenSterbaandmyselfastowhetherfeministjusticeisbestcharacterizedasandrogyny.ThelasttimethatSterbaandIdiscussedthiswasin1992onapanelattheAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation.Atthattime,Iresistedcharacterizingfeminismasandrogynyforseveralreasons:1Ithoughtthatthetermsuggestedamixofconventionallymasculineandfemininecharacteristicswithinasingleindividual.WhenSterbaexplainedthatinsteadhemeanttheeliminationofgendernormsinsocietyatlarge—i.e.theeliminationofsocialexpectationsandpracticesdesignedtoensurethatmalesweremasculineandfemalesfeminine—Isuggestedthatitwouldbelessmisleadingtorefertothisidealbythesametermasthatusedbyotherfeminists,namely,genderlessness.2Ialsodislikedtheterm“androgyny”becauseIthoughtitfocusedattentiononchangingpeopleratherthanonchangingsocialinstitutions.3Strategically,Ithoughtthattalkingabout“androgyny”wouldscarepeopleawayfromfeminismbecauseitwouldseemtorequirearadicalreconstructionoftheirpersonalidentities.4Ipointedoutthatthesubstantiveidealtowhich“androgyny”referredwasincompatiblewiththeviewsofsomefeminists.\nFEMINISMANDTHEOBJECTSOFJUSTICE1395Iworriedthatdefiningfeminismasacommitmenttoandrogynywoulddrawtoosharpalinebetweenfeminismandotherpoliticalintellectualtraditions,obscuringcontinuitiesandinterconnections.Forinstance,itwouldmakeitmoredifficulttoseethatfeministsarenotproposinganidealthatiscompletelydifferentfromtheidealsthatSterbaassignstoothertheoriesofjustice,idealssuchasequality,freedom,democracyandcommunity,butratherproposingre-interpretationsofthesetraditionalideals.6Finally,myconclusionexpressedsomeresentmentaboutSterba’sinsistenceondefiningfeminismintermsofandrogyny,eventhoughfewcontemporaryfeministsacceptedthatterm.IexplainedthatIthoughtitwaspresumptuousingeneraltolabelpeopleintermsthatnotonlywerenottheirownbutwhichtheyevenrejectedexplicitly.Moreover,Iworriedthatimposingthelabel“androgyny”onfeminismwouldtendtoreduceitsrichnessanddiversityandtosuppressdissidentvoiceswithinthefeministtradition.Ofcourse,thisfinalobjectionwouldhavecollapsedifSterbahadassertedthatandrogynywassimplyhisownpersonalidealoffeminism.Myreasonsforopposingtheuseoftheterm“androgyny”tocharacterizefeministjusticedidnotpersuadeSterba,sincehecontinuestousethistermtoday,buthedoesaddressmyconcernsinasectionofJusticeforHereandNowentitled“Feministobjections.”Here,heacknowledgesthatsomefeministsdoopposetheidealofandrogynybuthearguesthatIshouldnotdoso,despitemycriticismofhisuseoftheterm,sincemypracticalviewsonsexualequalityareveryclosetohis.Aftercomparingapassagefrommyworktoapassageinhis,Sterbaconcludesthat,“thereisverylittleseparatingtheidealthatJaggarendorsesfromtheidealofandrogynythatIendorse”(Sterba1998,86).Severalquestionscanberaisedaboutthisargument:1IsSterbajustifiedininferringsubstantiveagreementbetweenhispracticalviewsandmine?2EvenifheandIagreeonmostpracticalpolicies,whatdootherfeministsthink?3Iffeministsagreeonmostpracticalpolicies,doesthismeanthatdisagreementonhowtocharacterizethisclusterofviewsis“only”verbalandthustrivialandunimportant?Inotherwords,doeslabellingmatter?Withrespecttothefirstquestion,IthinkSterbaiscorrectthatheandIsharesubstantiveagreementregardingmanypracticalquestionsoffeministjustice—thoughIsuspectthatwemaydifferonsomeissues,suchaspornography,abortionandtheneedtoabolishsocialclass.IdonotknowwhetherornotSterbaacceptsallofmyviewsontheobjectsofjustice,butIhavenoreasontosupposethatherejectsthemandIshallthereforeassumethatheandIshareawiderangeofpracticalagreements.Withrespecttothesecondquestion,SterbaknowsthatheandIdonotrepresentallfeminists,butheseemstobelievethat,ifonestudiestheirwork,onecanseethatittoopointstowardwhathecallsandrogyny.Letusassumeforthesakeofargumentthatheiscorrectaboutthis,sothatSterba,Iandmostotherfeministsareingeneralagreementabouttheneedtoabolishgendernorms.Doesthismeanthatourdisagreementoverwhetherfeministjusticeshouldbecalled“androgyny”is“only”averbaldisagreementandthereforetrivialandunimportant?Letusoncemoreconsiderwhatmightbegainedandlostiffeministjusticeisdefinedasacommitmenttoandrogyny.TheadvantagesthatIseeincharacterizingfeministjusticeasandrogynyareasfollows:1“Androgyny”isahandylabel,whichdefinesfeminismintermsofapositivesocialvisionratherthansimplyinnegativeorreactiveterms.2Itsuggeststhatthesocialchangesrequiredbyfeminismgoverydeep,requiringchangenotonlyinsocialinstitutionsbutalsoinwhatisoftentakentobehumannature.3Theidealofandrogynyisthin,openandflexible.Likeothersocialideals,suchasfreedom,equalityandcertainlyjustice,itissusceptibletomultipleinterpretationsandthuscanbeadaptedtonewcircumstances.SomeofthedisadvantagesthatIseeincharacterizingfeministjusticeasandrogynyaretheinverseoftheadvantages.1First,anegativedefinitionoffeministjusticemaybeeasierformanypeopletoacceptthanapositiveone.ThereareseveralreasonswhyIusuallychoosetodefinefeminisminminimalisttermsasacommitmenttoendingwomen’ssubordination.Onereasonisthatthisdefinitionisnon-controversial;fewfeministsdisagreewithit.Inaddition,thisdefinitionhelpspeopletoacceptthatfeminismisnotawildlyunreasonabledoctrine,sincemostpeopleopposethesystematicsubordinationofanygroup.Finally,thisdefinitionleavesopen—properly,inmyview—thequestionofwhatasocietywouldbelikeinwhichwomenwerenolongersubordinated.2“Androgyny”isanunsuitablecharacterizationforatheoryofsocialjustice,because,etymologicallyandinitshistoricalassociations,itisacharacteridealratherthanasocialideal.DefiningfeminismintermsofacharacteridealdistinguishesitfromalltheothertheoriesofjusticethatSterbadiscusses,sinceliberty,equality,communityandtheopportunityforself-developmentareallsocialideals.AlthoughIagreewithSterba’sassertionthatcharactertypesareintegrallyrelated\n140ALISONM.JAGGARtosocialinstitutions,noteveryoneholdsthisviewandIworrythathighlightingacharacteridealwillencouragethebeliefthatfeminismfocusesprimarilyonpersonalratherthaninstitutionalchange.Sinceitiscommontospeakofindividualmenorwomenasandrogynous,takingandrogynyasthedefiningfeministidealmightevenbethoughttoimplythepossibilityofindividualliberationintheabsenceofsystemicsocialchange.Thisrunscountertoanotherfavoritesloganofsecond-wavefeminism,namely“Therearenoindividualsolutions.”3Iftheopennessorvaguenessof“androgyny”isitsstrength,itisalsoitsweakness.ThetermdoesnotevenhintatmanyofthedeepestcontributionsthatfeministshavemadetoWesternunderstandingsofjustice.Evenif“androgyny”isunderstoodinsocialratherthanindividualterms(namelyasarecommendationthattheburdensandbenefitsofsocialcooperationshouldbedistributedwithoutregardtosexorgender),itdoesnotindicatethatfeministshaveraisedfundamentalquestionsabouthowtoidentifythosebenefitsandburdens.Nordoesitpointtowardothertheoreticalcontributionsmadebyfeminists,whichIhavenotraisedhere,regardingthedomainofjusticeandevenitsultimatevalue.Forallthesereasons,aswellasforsomeofthosethatIlistedin1992,IcontinuetoresistSterba’srecommendationtodefinefeministjusticeasacommitmenttoandrogyny.However,Idosharehissincereandsubstantivecommitmentsbothtofeministjusticeandtoapeacemakingmodelofdoingphilosophy.NOTES1ThispaperwaswrittenforaconferenceonAlternativeConceptionsofJusticeattheUniversityofNotreDame.TheconferencewasorganizedtodiscussJamesP.Sterba’sJusticeforHereandNow(Sterba1998),andI’dliketothankJimSterbaandtheUniversityofNotreDameforgivingmethisopportunitytothinkaboutfeministviewsonjustice.2Forexample,JamesSterba’sclassictextbook,Justice:AlternativePoliticalPerspectives(Sterba1980),takesthistobethecentralquestionofjustice.3Thefollowingpointsaredrawnfromanunpublishedpaper,“PreferringWomen:IncreasingWomen’sParticipationinMarketandState,”byAlisonJaggarandMichelleWilcox.4Thusitmaynotbecoincidentalthattheninety-year-oldcitizenwhowalkedacrossthecountryin1999–2000advocatingcampaignfinancereformwasawoman,DoloresHaddock,a.k.a.“GrannyD.”5Inthelate1960sandearly1970s,alongandacrimoniousfeministdebatetookplaceovertheMarxistpracticeofcategorizingwomen’sproductionof“usevalues,”includinggoodsfordomesticconsumptionandtheservicesinvolvedinmaintainingthehomeanditsinhabitants,as“unproductive,”incontrasttomen’ssupposedly“productive”generationof“exchangevalues”forthemarket.6Adifferentexampleofgender-biasinassessingeconomiccontributionisthesystematicallyvaryingvaluationplacedontraditionallymaleandfemaleoccupations.AsSterbaexplains,“men’s”jobs,suchastruckingortree-cutting,arepaidmorehighlythan“women’s”occupations,suchasclerk-typistornursing,despitebeingcomparableintermsofskill,responsibility,effortandworkingconditions(Sterba1998,86).Thefeministmovementforcomparableworthseekstoreassessthevalueof“men’s”and“women’s”occupationsbyreferencetocriteriasuchasthoselistedabove.7Thisisnottodenythatmentoocanbesexuallyassaultedandraped—butpartoftheshameofsuchassaultsformenisthattheyhavebeenmadesymbolicallyfeminine.8Thisisnottoassertthatitiseasyformostmentomaintaintheirself-respectincontemporarysocietieswhosenormsofmasculinityaresimultaneouslyracist,classistandheterosexist.9Forinstance,arecentreportonsexdiscriminationbytheUSInformationAgencyanditsone-timebroadcastingagency,theVoiceofAmerica,washeadlined“Attheheartofalonglegalbattle:notjustjobsbutself-esteem”(NewYorkTimes,24March2000,p.A11).BibliographyAckelsberg,MarthaA.(1988)“Communities,resistance,andwomen’sactivism:someimplicationsforademocraticpolity,”inWomenandthePoliticsofEmpowerment,edsAnnBookmanandSandraMorgen,Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress.Allen,Holly(2000)“Gender,sexualityandthemilitarymodelofUSnationalcommunity,”inGenderIroniesofNationalism:SexingtheNation,ed.TamarMayer,NewYorkandLondon:Routledge.Anderson,Elizabeth(1993)ValueinEthicsandEconomics,CambridgeMAandLondon:HarvardUniversityPress.Benhabib,Seyla(1992)SituatingtheSelf:Gender,CommunityandPostmodernisminContemporaryEthics,NewYork:Routledge.Carter,April(1996)“Women,militaryserviceandcitizenship,”inGender,PoliticsandCitizenshipinthe1990s,edsBarbaraSullivanandGillianWhitehouse,Sydney:UniversityofNewSouthWalesPress.Flew,Antony(1956)“Philosophyandlanguage,”inEssaysinConceptualAnalysis,ed.AntonyFlew,London:Macmillan.Folbre,Nancy(1994)WhoPaysfortheKids?GenderandtheStructuresofConstraint,NewYork:Routledge.Fraser,Nancy(ed.)(1997)JusticeInterruptus:CriticalReflectionsonthe“Postsocialist”Condition,NewYork:Routledge.Fraser,NancyandGordon,Linda(1997)“Agenealogyof‘dependency’:tracingakeywordoftheUSwelfarestate,”inNancyFraser(ed.)JusticeInterruptus:CriticalReflectionsonthe“Postsocialist”Condition,NewYork:Routledge.Holmstrom,Nancy(1981)“‘Women’swork,’thefamilyandcapitalism,”ScienceandSociety,XLV:2(summer)pp.186–211.\nFEMINISMANDTHEOBJECTSOFJUSTICE141Kittay,EvaFeder(1999)Love’sLaborEssaysonWomen,EqualityandDependency,NewYorkandLondon:Routledge.Kropotkin,Peter(1987)“Anarchistcommunism:itsbasisandprinciples,”inPeterKropotkin:TwoEssays,ed.NicolasWalter,London:FreedomPress.Moulton,Janice(1983)“Aparadigmofphilosophy:theadversarymethod,”inDiscoveringReality,edsSandraHardingandMerrillB.Hintikka,Dordrecht:Reidel,pp.149–64.Okin,Susan(1989)Justice,GenderandtheFamily,NewYork:BasicBooks.Rawls,John(1971)ATheoryofJustice,CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress.Sacks,Karen(1988)“Genderandgrassrootsleadership,”inWomenandthePoliticsofEmpowerment,edsAnnBookmanandSandraMorgen,Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress.Sterba,JamesP.(1980)Justice:AlternativePoliticalPerspectives,BelmontCA:WadsworthPublishingCo.——(1988)HowtoMakePeopleJust,TotowaNJ:Rowman&Littlefield.——(1998)JusticeforHereandNow,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Walzer,Michael(1983)SpheresofJustice:ADefenseofPluralismandEquality,NewYork:BasicBooks.Waring,Marilyn(1988)CountingforNothing:WhatMenValueandWhatWomenareWorth,Wellington:Allen&Unwin.Young,IrisM.(1997)“Mothers,citizenshipandindependence:acritiqueofpurefamilyvalues,”inIntersectingVoices:DilemmasofGender,PoliticalPhilosophyandPolicy,PrincetonNJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.\n13JUSTICEFORHEREANDNOWORTHEREANDTHEN?RosemarieTongJamesP.Sterba’slatestbookonjustice,JusticeforHereandNow,representsasignificantimprovementoverhisearlierbook,HowtoMakePeopleJust.Alwayseagertorespondtohiscritics,Sterbahasaddressedvirtuallyeveryconcernthatwasraisedagainsthispreviouseffortstoprovideatheoryofjusticebroadenoughtoaccommodateallrationalpersonshappily.MorethananyotherphilosopherIknow,Sterbastrivestopracticewhathepreaches;namely,“apeacemakingwayofdoingphilosophy.”1Heassesseshisopponents’argumentsfairly;hetriestounderstandpositionswithwhichheisunfamiliarorwithwhichhedisagrees;hetriestoundohisownobjectionstoothers’arguments;andhewillinglymodifiesorabandonshisownviewswheneverotherpersons’viewsappearmorecompelling.2Nevertheless,despitethefactthatSterba’spositiononjusticeisinprinciplealwaysopentorevision,ithasremainedessentiallythesameovertheyears.ThebasicargumentofJusticeforHereandNowisverysimilartothebasicargumentofHowtoMakePeopleJust.Inbothofhismajorworksonjustice,Sterbabravelyinsiststhatifitispossibletodemonstratethatthelibertarianidealoflibertyhasthesamepracticalrequirementsasthewelfareliberalidealofequality,thenitisalsopossibletoshowthatallthemajor(Western?)theoriesofjusticehavethesesamepracticalrequirements.Afterall,ifthelionoflibertarianismcanrestbesidethelambofwelfareliberalism,thenthelessdiametricallyopposedcreaturesinthekingdomofjusticetheoriescanalsofindcommonground.Notwantingtokeephisreadersinsuspense,Sterbaquicklyletsusknowthatwhatunifieslibertarians,welfareliberals,socialists,feminists,andexponentsofracialjustice,homosexualjustice,multiculturaljusticeandenvironmentaljusticeistheirsupposedsharedcommitmenttoasetofwelfarerightsandequalopportunityrights,theenforcementofwhichwilleliminatetheunjustifieddisparitieswhichplagueushereandnow.Inmanyways,Sterba’slatestefforttodophilosophypeacefullyisatourdeforceinwhichhebringstogetherandrelatesalltheissuestypicallycoveredinoneofthemany“socialjustice”anthologiescurrentlyonthemarket.IcaneasilyimaginemyselfusingoneofthesetextbooksinconjunctionwithJusticeforHereandNowtoshowmystudentshowissuessuchasenvironmentalbiodegradation,hungerandpoverty,warandviolence,genderdiscrimination,racialandethnicdiscrimination,andhealthcarereformcaneachbeclassifiedeitherasa“welfare”or“equalityofopportunity”issue.(NotethatSterbahasmovedfromclaimingthatallmajor(Western?)theoriesofjusticesupportwelfarerightsandaffirmativeactionrights,toinsteadclaimingthattheyallsupportwelfarerightsandequalityofopportunityrights.Thereis,afterall,anargumenttobemadethatinsofarasaffirmativeactionisunderstoodasacompensatoryrighttopreferentialtreatment,itexceedsthescopeofanequalityofopportunityright.)Nevertheless,despitemysupportforSterba’sgenerallineofreasoning,Ifindcertainaspectsofhisrevisedtheoryofjusticeunsatisfactory.First,IamspecificallydissatisfiedthatSterbacontinuestoidentify“androgyny”ashispreferredidealforfeministjustice;topresentasuncontroversialamongfeministsarangeofissuesthatremaincontested;andtodownplaycertaintopicsinhisdiscussionofmen’sandwomen’sreproductiverightsandresponsibilities.Second,IamgenerallyworriedthatSterba’stheoryofjusticemight,afterall,besomewhatdated—ajusticetheorynotforhereandnow,theyear2000,butforthereandthen,theUnitedStatesinthe1960sand1970s.ISpecificconcernsAccordingtoSterba,androgynyisthegoaloffeministjustice.Tohiscredit,Sterba’sdefinitionofandrogynyisbetterthanmost.Asheseesit,androgynyrequires“nomorethanthatthetraitsthataretrulydesirableinsocietybeequallyopentobothwomenandmen,orinthecaseofvirtues,equallyexpectedofbothwomenandmen,otherthingsbeingequal.”3Sterbarealizesthatmanyofthemasculineandfemininetraitswhichsocietycurrentlyviewsasdesirablearenot,fromafeministpointofview,trulydesirable.Forexample,sincesupposedlyfemininetraitssuchas“gullibility”andsupposedlymasculinetraitssuchas“brutality”arenottrulydesirablefromafeministpointofview,theyarenotopentoSterba’sandrogyne.4Sofarsogood,butwhatSterbafailstoseeishowprescriptiveandlimitinghisidealofandrogynyis,despitethefactthatherequiresmonoandrogynyonlyinsofarasbonafide“feminine”and“masculine”virtuesareconcerned,permittingpolyandrogynywithrespecttoacceptable“feminine”and“masculine”psychologicaltraits.5Inotherwords,althougheverymanandwomanmust,\nROSEMARIETONG143accordingtoSterba,displaythesupposedlyfemininevirtueofcareandthesupposedlymasculinevirtueofjustice,eachmanandwomanisfreetodevelopatotally“feminine”personality,atotally“masculine”personality,orsomecombinationthereof.Arguingthatandrogynyisnotnecessarilythebestortheonlywayforfeministstobreakdownsexualpolarization,KathrynPauleyMorgannotesthattheremightbeevenbetter(i.e.morefeminist)waystoendmale/femaleopposition.Shenotes,forexample,thatwemightexpandthenumberofsexesthatwerecognize,forexample,throughthecategoryofintersexes…[or]wemightadvocateastageoftheoryofSex-roleTranscendencewhichpositsathreestageprocessofsexualdevelopment.Thistheorynecessitatesasecondstageoflearned,polarized,oppositionalsex-roles.Itthenproposesathird,finalstageofcompletelyindividualizedresponses,inwhichassignedgenderisirrelevantintheindividual’sdecision-makingprocess.(Theproponentsofthistheorysharplydistinguishitfromandrogyny)…[orwemight]callforinstitutionalizeddegenderizationofbehavior,personalitytraits,formsoflaborandsoon.Thisprocesswouldleavecompletelyopenthequestionofwhathumanbeingsshouldbelikeinsuchasociety.6AsMorganseesit,thesealternatives(ifoperationalized)wouldleadtothebreakdownofsexualdichotomization,butnoneofthemwouldresultinthekindofandrogynousindividualsSterbaenvisions.SincethealternativestoandrogynyMorgansuggestsareallviablefeministideals,Iseenoreasontoprivilegeandrogynyoveranyoneofthem.Infact,IseesomereasonstopreferMorgan’sidealsoverSterba’sidealofandrogyny,fortheformerwaystobreakdownthemale/femaledividehavetheadvantageofnotintroducingavaguedistinctionbetweendesirabletraitsandexpectedvirtues.Sterbaprovidesneitherasetofcriteriafordistinguishingbetweendesirabletraitsandexpectedvirtues,norasetofconditionsunderwhichdesirabletraitsmightearnthestatusofexpectedvirtues.Forexample,is“beingcompassionate”adesirablefemininetraitoranexpectedfemininevirtue?Isitapsychologicalfeatureofone’spersonalityoramoralfeatureofone’scharacter?IthinkSterbaviews“beingcompassionate”asanexpectedfemininevirtuetobecultivatedbymenandwomenequally.Butthereisacasetobemadethatsocietyingeneralmightview“beingcompassionate”simplyasadesirablefemininetraitratherthananexpectedfemininevirtue.Moreover,fromtheperspectiveofsomefeminists,thereisacasetobemadethat“beingcompassionate”isnotreallyadesirablefemininetrait—letaloneavirtue—becausewhatthelargersocietyunderstandsby“beingcompassionate”requirestoomuchself-sacrificeandnotenoughself-affirmationandself-careonthepartofthecompassionateindividual,who,moreoftenthannot,isawoman.7Finally,evenifitispossibletodistinguishbetweendesirabletraitsandexpectedvirtues,andtoestablishthat“beingcompassionate”isindeedanexpectedfemininevirtue,Sterbafailstoexplainhowatotallymasculinepersonality(exhibitedbyeitheramaleorfemaleperson)iscapableofcultivatingtheexpectedfemininevirtueof“beingcompassionate.”Istherenorelationshipbetweentraitsandvirtues;betweenourpsychologicalpersonalitiesandourmoralcharacters?ButevenifIamwrong,andSterba’sidealofandrogynyisindeedbetterthananyoftheotherfeministidealsMorganproposes,Istillthinkitismisleadingtodescribeandrogynyasthegoaloffeministjustice.IagreewithAlisonJaggarthatthetaskoffeministjusticeistoreformsociety,nottoreformindividuals.8Inotherwords,theessentialworkoffeministsistoeliminatethosestructures,systems,ideologies,andsoforththatperpetuatemaledominationandfemalesubordinationsothatwomenandmencanhaveequal(thoughnotnecessarilythesame)freedomandwell-being(material,psychological,spiritualandsocial).Itisnottoimposeanabstractconceptionoffullpersonhoodonthebodiesandpsychesofconcretemenandwomen.OverandbeyondrejectingSterba’sinsistenceonupholdingtheidealofandrogynyasfeminists’piècederésistance,thereismuchthatconcernsmeabouthispresentationofthepracticalapplicationsoffeministjustice.Hepresentsasuniversalfeministdogmawhatamountstoaverymainstreamliberalpositiononthefamily,theworkplace,andsexualrelationships.AlthoughSterbaclaimsheisinterestedinjusticeforbothracialandethnicminoritiesandhomosexualsandlesbians,hepresentsasidyllically“feminist”adual-parent,dual-career,child-centeredheterosexualfamily.Thisidealofthefamilyworkswellenoughforrelativelyprivilegedcouplesbothofwhomhavemeaningfulcareersandadesiretoincludechildrenintheirlives.However,itdoesnotworknearlysowellforworking-classcoupleswhoseworkplace(howaboutachickenfactory,atextilemill,orafast-foodrestaurant?)isnotlikelytofostereithertheproductionofdesirabletraitsorthecultivationofexpectedvirtues,andwhosehomeisnotahavenoftranquillitybutaplaceinwhichtocollapseattheendofanexhaustingday.CanSterba’srecommendationsforflex-time,maternityleaves,anddadandmomtakingturnscookingsolvewhatiswrongwiththelatterscenario?Furthermore,thedual-parent,dual-career,child-centeredheterosexualfamilyidealdoesnotfitsingle-parenthouseholds,acertainproportionofwhicharedeliberatelyone-parented;lesbianorhomosexualhouseholds;childlessbychoicehouseholds;andhouseholdsinwhichonemember,withtheother’swholeheartedconsent,choosesnottoworkoutsideofthehome.Arewetoconcludethattheadultsandchildreninsuchhouseholdsarelikelytohavefewerdesirabletraitsandexpectedvirtuesthantheadultsandchildrenindual-career,dual-parent,child-centeredheterosexualhouseholds?Ifnot,Sterbaneedstoconsider\n144JUSTICEFORHEREANDNOWORTHEREANDTHEN?thepossibilitythathisidealofandrogynyisfarfromuniversal,combiningasitdoesprimarilythosemasculineandfeministtraitsandvirtuesthatmainstreamliberals,includingliberalfeminists,findrespectivelydesirableandexpected.Inadditiontoproposingwhathe,butnotallfeminists,wouldregardasa“radical”modificationofthewagestructure,9Sterbaclaimsthatwomen’sandmen’seconomicstatusneedstobeequalized.Asheseesit,thebestwaytoachievethisgoalisthroughrequiredprogramsofaffirmativeactionandcomparableworth.Notonce,however,doesSterbamentionorconsiderhowdividedfeministsare,forexample,aboutthedesirabilityofcomparableworthprograms.LikeSterba,liberalfeministswanttousecomparableworthasameanstoendgenderdiscriminationbyprovingthatwomenareindeedmen’sequalssincetheycandoanddodomen’swork.IntheStateofWashingtonstudySterbacites,liberalfeministsarguedthatintermsof“worthpoints”forthefourcomponentsfoundinmostjobs—“knowledgeandskills,”“mentaldemands,”“accountability”and“workingconditions”—manylow-payingfemale-dominatedjobswereactuallyworthmoreinpointsthanmanyhigh-payingmale-dominatedjobs.10Thustheyconcludedthat,forexample,nursepractitioners(mostlyfemale)whoscored385worthpointsshouldearnmoreandnotthesameasboileroperators(allmale)withonly144pointstotheircredit.11Initially,radicalculturalfeminists,whoaffirmwomen’svaluesandvirtuesovermen’s,werealsoattractedtothecomparableworthmovement.Theyvieweditasawayforsocietytoproperlyrewardwomen’straditional“caring”work.Overtime,however,radicalculturalfeministscametosuspectthatthestandardsandmeasuresdevelopedtoassesscomparableworthwerenomoregenderneutralthantheschemaLawrenceKohlbergdevisedtomeasure“human”moraldevelopment.12Kohlberg’sscalerecognizedpersonsasmorallydevelopediftheyspokethelanguageofabstractprinciplesandrulesratherthanthelanguageofconcreteresponsibilitiesforandattachmentstohumanpersons.Sincemenaremoreinclinedtospeaktheformerlanguagethanthelatter,menconsistentlyscoredhigherthanwomenonKohlberg’smoraldevelopmentscale,withtheimplicationthatwomenarelessmorallydevelopedthanmen.LikeKohlberg’sscale,manycomparableworthschemesusemalestandardsandmeasurestoaddandsubtract“worthpoints.”Thusradicalculturalfeministsgraduallyconcludedthatcomparableworthschemesrewardwomenforthewrongreasons;namely,fordoing“manly”activities.Consider,forexample,HelenRemick’sanalysisofcomparableworthinitiatives,particularlyinthefieldofnursing.Nursing,likemostotherareasinthehealthcarefield,haschangeddrasticallyovertime.Nursingspecialties,forexample,canmakeextensiveuseofelectronicmonitors,involvesignificantamountsofteaching,and/orrequiresophisticateddiagnosticwork.Unfortunately,theworkofnursesisnotalwaysvisibletothepatient,inpartbecauseofstereotypesaboutnursesandwomeningeneral.Inawell-publicizedexample,aftertheattemptedassassinationofPresidentReagan,herecalledthenursewhohadbeensocomfortingtohimwhilehewasintheintensivecareunitandconductedasearchtothankher.Givingcomfortwasoneofherleastimportantdutiesintermsofhissurvival;shewasconstantlymonitoringhisvitalsignsforchangeandwasfullycompetenttoinitiateemergencyproceduresshouldthesituationhavecalledforit.(myitalics)13Remickconcludesthatthereisatendencytoundervalueandunderestimatewhatwomendo,eventhoughwomen’sjobsrequirejustasmuchinthewayofknowledgeandskills,mentaldemands,accountabilityandworkingconditionsasmen’sjobs.AlthoughRemick’sconclusionseems“pro-woman,”onecaneasilyseewhyradicalculturalfeministsfoundheranalysisultimatelydisappointing.TheyaccusedRemickofundervaluingandunderestimatingthefemaleorfemininevalueofnurturance.Whyseektojustifyhigherwagesforanurseonthegroundsthatsheexhibits“doctor-like”characteristics?Whynotinsteadseektojustifylowerwagesforadoctoronthegroundsthathefailstoexhibitenough“nurse-like”characteristics?Thus,ifcomparableworthistosatisfyradicalculturalfeminists’concerns,newmeasuresandstandardsmustbedevelopedtoselectforandtorewardcharacteristicstraditionallyassociatedwithwomen.ThisislikeaskingLawrenceKohlbergtoreconstructhisscaleofmoraldevelopmenttofavorthosewhoareenmeshedintheworldofconcreteparticularsratherthanthosewhoarecommittedtothepursuitofabstractuniversals.Or,evenmoredifficult,itislikeaskingKohlbergtogettogetherwithhismostperceptivecritic,CarolGilligan,14toconstructaunitaryscaleofmoraldevelopmentthatmeasureswomen’sandmen’smoralityequallywell.AlthoughitpleasesmethatSterbanowrealizesthatifmenandwomenaretobecomeequal,wemustnotonlytransformfamilystructuresandpaywomenthekindofwageswepaymen,butalsoeliminatesexualviolenceagainstwomen,Iamnonethelessdisappointedthathisdiscussionofpornographyglossesovertheprofounddisagreementsfeministshavehadaboutsexually-explicitdepictionsofwomen.Althoughmanyfeministsviewpornography,particularlyviolentpornography,ascontributingtomen’stendencytoviewwomenasmeresexualobjectsratherthanfullhumanpersons,otherfeministsviewpornographymorepositively.15Thislattergroupoffeministsclaimthatwomenneedtoexplorethedarkeraswellaslightersidesoftheirsexuality,andtoexperimentwithrough,evenviolent,sexaswellasthekindofgentlesexthatlinksonebodyto\nROSEMARIETONG145anotherinacomfortingembrace.16Theymaintainthatmanyfeministsenjoyallsortsofpornographyanduseittofueltheirsexualfantasies.ContributingtomydisappointmentwithSterba’sdiscussionofsexualityistheadditionalfactthathemakesnomentionoftheso-calledbeautytrapwhich,inmyestimation,doesmoreharmtomorewomenthanthepornographyhesinglesoutforspecialcondemnation.Tobesure,whenitisunderstoodnotasanopportunityforwomentoexplorethefullrangeofhumansexuality,butaspartofaseriesofrelatedactions,allofwhichdemeanwomen,pornographyiscertainlynotsomethingforwomentoapplaud.Theimagesofwomenportrayedinmostpornographyare,asCatharineMacKinnonhasargued,onesthatcreateaframeofreferenceinwhichwomenareviewedaslesshumanandthereforelessdeservingofrespect,goodtreatmentandrewardsthanmen.17Butsincetheworsttypesofpornographytendtobehiddenandpurchasedrelativelyinfrequentlybymen,IdonotworryabouttheimagesofwomeninpornographynearlyasmuchasIworryabouttheimagesofwomenontelevision,inthemovies,andinpopularfashionmagazines.Imagesofrail-thinwomenwithperfectskin,teethandfacialfeatureshaveproducedmoreinthewayofanorexic,bulimic,weight-preoccupiedandexercise-obsessedwomenthananythingelseIcanthinkofinoursociety.Womenarefarmorefocusedontheirbodiesthanmenareinoursociety;andtothedegreethatawomanispreoccupiedwithherphysicalappearance,shecannotfocusonthinkingthekindofideasandgeneratingthekindofactionsthathavethepowertotransformanunjustsocietyintoajustsociety.Finally,itutterlybewildersmewhySterbadoesnotincludeanysubstantialdiscussionofwomen’sreproductiveroleandthewaysinwhichitaffectswomen’sequalitywithmen.Whenhedoesbringuptheissueofwomen’sreproductiverole,Sterbatrivializesit.Hecommentsthat:nowsomefeministswouldwanttopursuevariouspossibletechnologicaltransformationsofhumanbiologyinordertoachieveequalopportunity.Forexample,theywouldliketomakeitpossibleforwomentoinseminateotherwomenandformentolactateandevenbringfertilizedovatoterm.18Tobesure,inallfairnesstoSterba,somefeministshavearguedthatinordertoachievegenderequity,artificialreproductionwouldhavetobeintroduced.Forexample,MargePiercyenvisionsafeministUtopiacalledMattapoisettinwhichbabiesarebornfromwhatistermedthe“brooder.”Femaleova,fertilizedinvitrowithmalespermselectedforafullrangeofracial,ethnic,andpersonalitytypes,aregestatedwithinanartificialplacenta.PiercyexplainsthatthewomenofMattapoisettdidnotcasuallygiveupbiologicalreproductionfortechnologicalreproduction.Theydidsoonlywhentheyconcludedthatthelossofbiologicalreproductionwasthepricetheyhadtopaytoeliminateracismandclassismaswellassexism.Itwaspartofwomen’slongrevolution.Whenwewerebreakingalltheoldhierarchies.Finallytherewasonethingwehadtogiveuptoo,theonlypowerweeverhad,inreturnfornopowerforanyone.Theoriginalproduction:thepowertogivebirth.Causeaslongaswewerebiologicallyenchanted,we’dneverbeequal.Andmalesneverwouldbehumanizedtobelovingandtender.Soweallbecamemothers.Everychildhasthree.Tobreakthenuclearbonding.19Piercysuggests,inotherwords,thatasaresultofwomengivinguptheirmonopolyonthepowertogivebirth,thesupposedparadigmforpowerrelationswasdestroyed,andeveryoneinMattapoisettwasinapositiontoreconstitutehumanrelationsinwaysthatdefythehierarchicalideasofbetter/worse,higher/lower,stronger/weaker,andespeciallydominant/submissive.WhateverthemeritsofPiercy’sviews,Idonotthinkthatmostfeministsthinkthatwomenhavetogiveupbiologicalreproductioninordertobemen’sequals.RatherIthinktheybelieve,asIdo,thatprovidedwomencancontroltheirreproductivecapacitiesthroughcontraception,sterilizationandabortion,womencanachieveparitywithmen.Aprogramseriousaboutgenderjusticebeginswiththeprovisionofcontraceptiveservices.Men(andwomen)mustrejectthebeliefthatanunwantedpregnancyisthewoman’sproblem.Men,nolessthanwomen,aremorallyobligatedtoprotectthemselvesfromunwantedpregnancies.Indeed,feministMaryMahowaldgoessofarastosuggestthat,atpresent,menmaybemoreobligatedthanwomentousecontraceptives.Sheclaimsthat:Fromanegalitarianperspective,responsibilityforcontraceptionshouldbesharedbysexualpartnersinamannerthatrespectsthevaluesandpreferencesofeach,andthedisproportionateburdensandbenefitsthatpregnancyinvolvesforeach.Itmaybeargued,forexample,thatmenhaveastrongerobligationtopractice(accepttheburdenof)contraceptionbecausetheburdenofpregnancyfallsonwomenratherthanmen.Ifpregnancyisseenasabenefitmainlytowomen,theoppositeclaimcouldlegitimatelybemade.20EvenifMahowaldiswrongaboutmen’spurportedreproductiveobligations,mostfeministsstillthinkitistimeforsocietytoshifttheburdenofresponsibilityforcontraceptionoffofwomenandontobothsexes.Itisnotfairthatwomenshouldhaveto\n146JUSTICEFORHEREANDNOWORTHEREANDTHEN?shouldertherisksofusingsometimesunsafecontraceptivesaswellastherisksassociatedwithbearingachild,whenmorecontraceptivesotherthanthecondomcouldbeandareinfactalreadybeingdevelopedformen.Increasingly,feministsalsothinkthattherighttohaveanabortion—theissuethatSterbaseemsmostreluctanttodiscuss—shouldbeviewedasan“equality”rightratherthana“privacy”right.Forexample,accordingtoCatharineA.MacKinnon,therighttoprivacyworksfarbetterformenthanforwomensinceithelpsmenkeepwomenhidden,subjected,anddominatedintheso-calledpersonalrealm.Itisinthisrealmthatmengetwomenpregnantandthentellthemto“handle”thesituationbygettinganabortion.CommentsMacKinnon:Themeaningofabortioninthecontextofasexualcritiqueofgenderinequalityisitspromisetowomenofsexwithmenonthesametermsaspromisedtomen—thatis,“withoutconsequences.”Underconditionsinwhichwomendonotcontrolaccesstooursexuality,thisfacilitateswomen’sheterosexualavailability.Inotherwords,underconditionsofgenderinequality,sexualliberationinthissensedoesnotfreewomen,itfreesmalesexualaggression.Theavailabilityofabortionthusremovestheoneremaininglegitimizedreasonthatwomenhavehadforrefusingsexbesidetheheadache.AsAndreaDworkinputsit,analyzingmaleideologyonabortion:“Gettinglaidwasatstake.”ThePlayboyFoundationhassupportedabortionrightsfromdayone;itcontinuesto,evenwithshrinkingdisposablefunds,onalevelofprioritycomparabletoitsoppositiontocensorship.21Inshort,accordingtoMacKinnon,womenmustunderstandthattheirrighttoabortionisdependentnotontheirhavingmoreprivacy,butontheirhavingmoreequalitywithmen.OneofMacKinnons’sinterpreters,philosopherRussellMcIntyre,restatesherviewonabortionrightsverystrongly.Heclaimsthat:theonlywayinwhichawomancantrulycompeteequallywithmeninthissocietyisifsheistrulyequalbothinopportunityandprotectionunderthelaw….Becausewomen—andnotmen—getpregnantandhavetointerrupttheirlives(personalandprivate)tobemothers,theyhaveunequalopportunitiesunlesswomenareasfreeasmennottobeundertheburdenofanunplannedorunwantedpregnancy.22Ifthelawtrulyviewedwomen’sabortionrightsasamatterofequalityratherthanofprivacy,saysMcIntyre,itwouldhavetopermitwomentoterminatetheirpregnanciesatanypointintimeandforanyreason.Realizingthatthisinterpretationofwomen’sabortionrightsentirelyunderminesanyclaimtolifethatafetusmighthave,McIntyreaddsthatwomenshouldhavetheirabortionsassoonaspossible—ideally,beforethefetusisviable.Inhisestimation,thereisnoneedforwomentoasserttheirabortionrightsbydeliberatelytimingtheirabortionsaslateaspossibleintheirpregnancy.23ThefactthatSterbapaysbutslightattentiontoreproductiveissuesisamajorproblemforhisdiscussionoffeministjustice.Indeed,unlessSterbatakesreproductiveissuesasseriouslyasheapparentlytakessexuality,socializationofchildren,andworkplaceissues,hewillcontinuetopresent,as“feminist”justice,aversionofjusticethatresembleswelfareliberaljusticedressedinaskirt.Yearsago,feministJulietMitchellabandonedthetraditionalMarxistfeministposition,accordingtowhichwoman’sconditionissimplyafunctionofherrelationtocapital,ofwhetherornotsheispartoftheproductiveworkforce.Inplaceofthismonocausalexplanationofwoman’soppression,Mitchellsuggestedthatwoman’sstatusandfunctionaremultiplydeterminedbyherroleinproduction,reproduction,thesocializationofchildren,andsexuality.TheerroroftheoldMarxistwastoseetheotherthreeelementsasreductibletotheeconomic;hencethecallfortheentryintoproductionwasaccompaniedbythepurelyabstractsloganoftheabolitionofthefamily.Economicdemandsarestillprimary,butmustbeaccompaniedbycoherentpoliciesfortheotherthreeelements(reproduction,sexualityandsocialization),policieswhichatparticularjuncturesmaytakeovertheprimaryroleinimmediateaction.24Sterbahascoherent,thoughadmittedlycontestablepoliciesfornotonlywomenandproduction,butalsoforwomenandsexualityandthesocializationofchildren.Butwhereishispolicyforwomenandreproduction?Untilhetellsushowajustsocietyshouldhandlewomen’sreproductiverightsandresponsibilities,whatMitchellcalledthecausalchainof“maternity—family—absencefromproductionandpubliclife—sexualinequality”25willcontinuetobindwomentotheirsubordinatestatustomen.IIGeneralconcernsAsrealasmyspecificconcernsaboutSterba’stheoryofjusticeare,mymajorworryaboutitisfarmoreserious.ThemoreIreflectonJusticeforHereandNow,themoreIthinkthatSterba’sviewofjusticeistheoldliberalwelfaretheoryofjustice—\nROSEMARIETONG147atheoryofjusticethathasseenbettertimesandmightbereadyforretirement.Inrecentyearsasignificantgroupofpoliticaltheorists,someofwhomhappentobefeminists,haveclaimedthatdiscussionsofjusticefocustoomuchonissuesofeconomicredistribution.Theoriesofjusticepreoccupiedwiththeredistributionofrightsandresourcesfinditdifficulttoaccommodatekeycomponentsofgenderinjustice—e.g.violenceagainstwomen(includingrapeanddomesticbattery),thesexual“doublestandard,”thereductionofwomentobodiesthatmustbedisciplinedtofitthenarrowcontoursofanunrealisticidealofbeauty.Similarly,theoriesofjusticepreoccupiedwiththedistributionofrightsandresourcesalsofinditdifficulttocapturefeminists’attemptstorecognizethevalueof“feminine”traitsandvirtuesasmuchas“masculine”traitsandvirtues.Notunawareofthesedevelopments,Sterbahas,asnotedabove,soughttorespondtothem.Yet,despiteimportantwomen-centeredrevisionsinSterba’sthinking,Sterba’stheoryofjusticeremainsatraditionaltheoryofdistributivejustice,increasinglyillsuitedtohandlethecomplexitiesofthenewworldthatistakingshapearoundus.Inmyestimation,redistributivetheoriesofjusticeneedtobereplacedbymorerecenttheoriesofjusticethatattendtothenon-economiccausesandconsequencesofinjusticewiththesameintensitythattheyattendtotheeconomiccausesandconsequencesofinjustice.Asitsohappens,twoofthesemorecompletetheoriesofjusticearethoseoffeministsIrisMarionYoungandNancyFraserrespectively.AccordingtoYoung,oppressioncantakeoneoffiveformsdependingonwhichsortofhumancapacitiesitinhibits:exploitation,marginalization,powerlessness,culturalimperialismorviolence.Exploitationoccurswhensomepeopleliveunderthecontrolofothers,accordingtothepurposesandforthebenefitofothers,therebysystematicallyincreasingthepowerofothers.Marginalizationistheprocessbywhichpeoplewhomsocietyregardsasvirtuallyuseless—e.g.theold,theyoung,thedisabled,theunderclass—areexcludedfromgainfulemploymentandtheresponsibilitiesandrightsoffullcitizenship.Powerlessnessconsistsinalwaysbeingtoldwhattodobyothersbutneverhavingtheopportunitytobethepersonincharge.Culturalimperialismistheuniversalizationandestablishmentofthedominantgroup’sexperienceandethosasthegoldstandardforallgroups,whichhastheresultofrenderinginaudibleandinvisibletheso-calledOther.Violenceissusceptibilitytosystematicattacksonone’spersonand/orpropertyatrandomandfornoreasonotherthanthefactthatonebelongstoadisfavoredsocialgroup.26AlthougheachofthefiveformsofoppressionisuniqueinYoung’smind,theyappeartofallintotwocategories,accordingtoNancyFraser.Exploitation,marginalizationandpowerlessnessseemtobethedirectproductsofeconomicdisadvantage.Incontrast,culturalimperialismandviolenceseemtobethedirectproductsofsocialdisadvantage—ofbeingsilenced,putinone’splace,disregarded,shownwho’s“boss,”andthelike.ThusYoung’sprescriptionforjusticeistwofold:eliminateeconomicdisadvantagebyrestructuringthedivisionoflabor,andeliminatesocialdisadvantagebyaffirmingthevalueofdifference.27However,ifthisisYoung’sremedyforinjustice,perhapshertheoryisnotreallythatnewafterall.InallfairnesstoSterba,herepeatedlycommentsinJusticeforHereandNowthatequaladvantagesinthemarketplacecannotachievejusticeforallunlesstheyareaccompaniedbymajorsocialchangesthatacknowledgepeople’sdifferences.ButevenifYoung’stheoryofjusticeisintheendsimilartoSterba’s,Fraser’stheoryofjusticeclearlydepartsfrombothoftheirefforts.CommentingonYoung’stheoryofjusticeinparticular,Fraserclaimsthatincontrasttoaquarterofacenturyagowhentheonlyparadigmofjusticewasaredistributiveparadigm(thinkhereofRawlsandNozick),wenowhavetwoparadigmsofjusticeequalinstrength:aredistributiveparadigmandarecognitionparadigm.28Theproblem,saysFraser,isthatthesetwoparadigmsdonotworkintandeminaliberalwelfarestate,noteveninaliberalwelfarestatethatdoffsitshattomulticulturalism.Infact,theredistributiveandrecognitionparadigmsoftenpullintwodifferentdirections.Theredistributionparadigmpullsusinthedirectionofviewingmenandwomenasthesame—asbeingentitledto(becausecapableof)thesamekindsofjob,forexample.Incontrast,therecognitionparadigmpullsusinthedirectionofviewingmenandwomenasdifferent—asenjoyingdifferentkindsofworkbecauseofdifferentbiologicalandpsychologicaldifferences.Moreover,totheextentthattheseparadigmsaremixed,andwomenaregiventhesamejobsasmenbutwithallowancesmadeforwomen’sbiologicalandpsychologicaldifferencesfrommen(e.g.women’s[supposed]needformaternityleave),resentmentwillbedirectedagainstwomen.Theonlywaytoavoidthisstateofaffairs,saysFraser,istorecognizethatSterba’ssolutionforinjustice—combiningtheliberalwelfarestateagendawithamainstreammulticulturalismagenda—willnotpermitustoescapethe“viciouscirclesofmutuallyreinforcingculturalandeconomicsubordination.”29Whatwillhelpusoutofthisdizzyingvortexisinstead“socialismintheeconomyanddeconstructionintheculture.”30Wehavetofigureoutthewaysinwhichwewanttobetreatedthesame,andthewaysinwhichwewanttobetreateddifferently.Clearly,Fraser’stheoryofjusticeisnewcomparedtoSterba’s.WhetheritisbetterthanSterba’stheoryofjusticeis,ofcourse,amatterfordebate.Certainly,Fraser’stheoryisfarless“peaceful”thanSterba’s.Iverymuchdoubtthatlibertarians,welfareliberals,socialists,feminists,andadvocatesofracialjustice,homosexualjusticeandmulticulturaljusticecaneachbeinterpretedtosupportdeeprestructuringofrelationsofproductionandrelationsofrecognition.Nevertheless,IsuspectthatFraserisright:thatjusticedemandsnolessthanthetransformationshehasinmind.Unfortunately,Iverymuchdoubtthat“peaceful”typesareinthemoodforarevolution.TowardtheendofJusticeforHereandNowSterbaaskswhymoreofthehave-notsintheUSarenotrebellingagainsttheirlotinlife.Hespeculatesthatthereasonrebellionisnotintheair,despitethefactthatthingsaregettingworseforthe\n148JUSTICEFORHEREANDNOWORTHEREANDTHEN?have-notsrelativetothehaves,isthatthehave-notsdonothavepowerfulalliesamongthehaves;andthatsincerevolutionarysuccessisunlikelywithoutthesupportofsomeofthehaves,itisnotreasonableforthehave-notstorisklifeandlimbfornothingorverylittle.31NotonlydoIfinditproblematictosuggestthatthehave-notsareinneedofsaviorsfromtheclassofthehaves,IalsofinditoddthatSterbafailstoconsideranotherpossibility;namely,thatthewelfareliberalstatehasgiventhehave-notsjustenoughinthewayofwelfareandequalityofopportunityrightstotaketheedgeofftheirmisery.Furthermore,asIseeit,Sterbaunderestimatesthepowerofco-optationwhenheclaimsthatBecausewomenarefoundatalleconomiclevelsofsociety,thefeministmovementmaymoreeasilybeabletogeneratethekindofpoliticalpowernecessarytoridsocietyofthelackofequalopportunityforwomen.Itmayalsohappenthat,intheprocessofsecuringjusticeforwomen,otherformsofjusticewillberecurredaswell.32Inthefirstplace,notallwomenarefeminists.Second,likeallhumanbeings,evenfeministwomenareimperfect.Itisnotclearthatwomen,includingfeministwomeninthehighereconomicbracketsofsociety,arereallyreadytodefendasmorallyjustifiedthosepoorwomenwhowouldappropriatefromthemtheirsurplusgoods—theirtreasured“luxuries.”Perhapssomeprivilegedfeministwomenmightbewillingtodothis,butmyguessisthattheirnumberwouldberelativelysmall.IIIConclusionSinceIambynatureapeacemakingperson,IhavetoadmitthatitwasnoteasyformetofindfaultwithSterba’stheoryofjustice.Itisonethingtofindthemotesinacolleague’seyesandquiteanothertoofferaperspectiveonjusticethathasfewerflawsthantheperspectiveonehasbeeninvited-indeedencouraged—tocritique.UnlikeSterba,Icannotpresentacompletetheoryofjustice,butIcansuggestaviewoffeministjusticethatisnotbasedontheconceptofandrogyny.Forme,feministjusticeisnotsomuchaboutpermittingand/orrequiringmenandwomentodevelopcertaintraits,asitisaboutgivingwomenthesameopportunitiesmenhavetodeveloptwosetsofwhatMarthaNussbaumterms“functionalhumancapabilities”33—thosewhich,ifleftundeveloped,renderalifenothumanatall;andthosewhich,ifleftundeveloped,renderahumanlifelessthanagoodhumanlife.Nussbaum’sfulllistofcapabilitiesincludes1life2bodilyhealth3bodilyintegrity4senses,imaginationandthought5emotions6practicalreason7affiliation8otherspecies9play10controloverone’senvironment34Tobesure,Nussbaum’slististheproductofherownmind,andassuchitiscontestableonthegroundsthatonceagain,aself-appointedWesternexperthasdecidedwhatitistobefullyhuman.Butthisobjectionissurmountable,forNussbaum’sdefinitionofahumanbeingisverysimilartothedefinitionstypicallyproducedwheneverandwhereverpeoplehavetheopportunityandmeanstoexpresstheirdeepestdesiresforthemselvesandtheirchildrenfreely.Beforeweendorsethenormsofasociety,wemustdeterminewhetherthosewhosaytheyespousethemgenuinelyacceptthem.Inordertomakethisdeterminationwemust,saysJürgenHabermas,askwhetherunderconditionsofundistortedcommunication,everyonewhoiscurrentlyabidingbythesenormswouldcontinuetoembracethemasrationalstandardsforappropriatehumanbehavior.Iftheanswertothisquestionis“no,”weshould,inhisestimation,concludethatthemembersofthecommunityinquestionhavebeentricked,mystifiedorotherwisemanipulatedintointernalizingitsnorms.35Inotherwords,weshouldnotassumethatsimplybecauseawomanoragroupofwomendefendsculturalpracticesthatsubordinatewomentomen,thatawomanoragroupofwomenwould,uponreflectionandgivencertainopportunities,continuetoendorsesuchpractices.Defendinghercapabilitiesapproachtoconstructingagloballyjustethics,MarthaNussbaumcomments:Thecapabilitiesapproachinsiststhatawoman’saffiliationwithacertaingrouporcultureshouldnotbetakenasnormativeforherunless,ondueconsideration,withallthecapabilitiesatherdisposal,shemakesthatnormherown.Weshouldtakecaretoextendtoeachindividualfullcapabilitiestopursuetheitemsonthelistandthenseewhetherthey\nROSEMARIETONG149wanttoavailthemselvesoftheseopportunities.Usuallytheydo,evenwhentraditionsaystheyshouldnot.MarthaChen’sworkwith[Indian]widowslikeMethaBairevealsthattheyarealreadydeeplycriticaloftheculturalnormsthatdeterminetheirlifequality.Oneweekatawidows’conferenceinBangalorewassufficienttocausetheseformerlysecludedwidowstoputonforbiddencolorsandtoapplyforloans;oneelderlywoman,“widowed”attheageofseventy,dancedforthefirsttimeinherlife,whirlingwildlyinthecenterofthefloor….Whyshouldwomenclingtoatradition,indeed,whenitisusuallynottheirvoicethatspeaksortheirintereststhatareserved?36TheimageofNussbaum’sdancingseptuagenarianbringsasmiletomyfaceinawaythattheimageofSterba’svirtuousandrogynedoesnot.Feministjusticeisnotaboutmakingwomenandmenrightlyorderedandwellbalanced;rather,itisaboutprovidingwomenandmenwithequalcapabilitiesforleadingafullhumanlife.InthefeministUtopiaIenvision,societywillnothavetorequirepeopletobevirtuous,forpeoplewillwanttobevirtuous,havingrecognizedthatunlesstheytreateachotherwithequalrespectandconsideration,rejoicingineachother’sdifferences,theywillnotonlyfailtoflourishbutfailtosurviveasasociety.NOTES1JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)pp.1–13.2Ibid.,p.13.3Ibid.,p.78.4Ibid.,p.79.5JoyceTrebilcot,“TwoFormsofAndrogynism,”inMaryVetterling-Braggin(ed.)“Femininity,”“Masculinity,”and“Androgyny”(TotowaNJ:Littlefield,Adams,andCo.,1982)pp.71–3.6KathrynPauleyMorgan,“Androgyny:AConceptualCritique,”SocialTheoryandPractice,no.3(fall1982)p.255.7SarahLuciaHoagland,“SomeThoughtsAboutCaring,”inClaudiaCard(ed.)FeministEthics(Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,1991)p.255.8AlisonJaggar,“CommentsonJamesP.Sterba,”inJamesP.Sterba,TiborR.Machan,AlisonJaggar,WilliamGalston,CarolGould,MiltonFiskandRobertC.Solomon,MoralityandSocialJustice(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1995)pp.45–52.9Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.86.10HelenRemick,“MajorIssuesinaprioriApplications,”inHelenRemick(ed.)ComparableWorthandWageDiscrimination:TechnicalPossibilitiesandPoliticalRealities(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1984)p.102.11Ibid.,p.103.12LawrenceKohlberg,“FromIstoOught:HowtoCommittheNaturalisticFallacyandGetAwaywithItintheStudyofMoralDevelopment,”inT.Mischel(ed.)CognitiveDevelopmentandEpistemology(NewYork:AcademicPress,1971)pp.164–5.13HelenRemickandBonnieJ.Steinberg,“TechnicalPossibilitiesandPoliticalRealities:ConcludingRemarks,”inRemick(ed.)ComparableWorthandWageDiscrimination,p.289.14CarolGilligan,“ConceptsoftheSelfandofMorality,”HarvardEducationReview,47,no.4(November1977)pp.481–517.15AnnFerguson,“SexWars:TheDebateBetweenRadicalandLibertarianFeminists,”Signs:JournalofWomeninCultureandSociety,10,no.1(autumn1984)pp.108–10.16DeirdreEnglish,AmberHollibaughandGayleRubin,“TalkingSex:AConversationonSexualityandFeminism,”SocialistReview,13,no.4(July/August1981).17CatharineA.MacKinnon,“FrancisBiddle’sSister:Pornography,CivilRights,andSpeech,”inCatharineA.MacKinnon,FeminismUnmodified:DisclosuresonLifeandLaw(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1987)p.176.18Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.82.19MargePiercy,WomanontheEdgeofTime(NewYork:FawcettCrestBooks,1976)pp.105–6.20MaryMahowald,WomenandChildreninHealthCare:AnUnequalMajority(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992)p.79.21CatharineA.MacKinnon,“Roev.Wade:AStudyinMaleIdeology,”inLewisM.Schwartz(ed.),ArguingAboutAbortion(BelmontCA:Wadsworth,1993)p.223.22RussellL.McIntyre,“AbortionandtheSearchforPublicPolicy,”HealthCare,LawandEthics,8,no.3(Summer1993)p.15.23Ibid.24JulietMitchell,Woman’sEstate(NewYork:PantheonBooks,1971)pp.100–1.25Ibid.,p.107.26IrisMarionYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990)pp.47–63.27NancyFraser,JusticeInterruptus:CriticalReflectionsonthe“Postsocialist”Condition(NewYork:Routledge,1997).28Ibid.,pp.11–40.29Ibid.,p.33.30Ibid.31Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,pp.177–8.32Ibid.,p.178.33MarthaNussbaum,SexandSocialJustice(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999)p.41.\n150JUSTICEFORHEREANDNOWORTHEREANDTHEN?34Ibid.35JürgenHabermas,CommunicationandtheEvolutionofSociety,trans.T.McCarthy(Boston:BeaconPress,1979)p.75.36Nussbaum,SexandSocialJustice,pp.146–7.\nLesbianandgayperspectives\n14ROUTESTOLAKEWOBEGONClaudiaCardGarrisonKeillor,narratorofthepopularradioshowAPrairieHomeCompanion,reportsthatinLakeWobegonallthewomenarestrong,allthemenaregoodlooking,andallthechildrenareaboveaverage.Presumably,themenarestrong,too,andthewomenalsogoodlooking,andhowcouldthechildrenofsuchparentsfailtobeaboveaverage?TheLakeWobegonself-imageisnotonlyidealizedbut,inasense,androgynous.Whatevertherealities,thisidealremainscompelling,especiallyifweexpandittoincludeandemphasizetraitsofcharacter.Buthowtomakesuchanidealareality?JamesP.Sterbahassomesuggestions,forhereandnow.Ihavesomealternativesuggestions.InJusticeforHereandNowSterbaoffersarefreshingandattractive“peacemaking”wayofdoingphilosophy.1Heseekspracticalreconciliationsofalternativemoralandpoliticalperspectivesbydrawingonpositionsheldincommonbythosewhohavethoseperspectives,exploringtheimplicationsoftheirpositionswithaviewtolocatingacompromisethathonorssomethingimportant,equally,ineachposition.Hearguescreativelythatlibertarians’minimalinterpretationofmoralitycommitsthem,forallpracticalpurposes,toacknowledgingrightstowelfareandequalopportunityandeventosomethingliketheequalitythatsocialistsendorse.Hethenappliesthislibertarian/welfare-liberalmoralitytothecasesoffeminist,racial,homosexualandethnicjustice.ThroughoutJusticeforHereandNow,philosophicalargumentationisconductedinapeacemakingspiritofcompromise.ButSterbaalsorecognizesthatnoteverythingshouldbeupforcompromise.Morality,forexample,isnottobecompromised,althoughbothegoismandaltruismare,andmoralityrepresentsthecompromisebetweenthem.Feminism,likewise,isnotcompromisable.Itispresentedastheapplicationofmorality(justice)tocertainkindsofissues.Yetthefeminismalsodefendedinthisbookispresentedasitselfacompromise—orintermediate—betweentwoextremeviewsaboutwomen,adifferentsortofcompromisefromthatofmorality.Oneoftheextremesbetweenwhichitisacompromiseistheviewofwomenasmerelyvictims.Theotheristheviewofwomenassuperiorbeings.Bothviewshavebeenassociatedbyanti-feminists,andevenbysomeliberalfeministcritics,withradicalfeministseparatism,althoughSterbadoesnotexplicitlymakethatassociationhimself.Inthischapter,IofferafeministseparatistvisionthatIfindcompatiblewithSterba’sidealoffeministjusticeforhereandnow.Althoughittakesveryseriouslythefactthatwomeninmisogynistsocietyhavebeenvictimsofhostilepractices,itpresentswomenasmuchmorethanvictims,butwithoutclaimingthesuperiorityoffemalestomalesinnativeendowment.Sterba’sfeministidealisthatofan“androgynous”societyinthesenseofasocietythatis“genderfree.”Androgynyasheunderstandsitrequiresthat“trulydesirabletraitsinsocietybeequallyavailabletobothwomenandmenor,inthecaseofvirtues,beequallyexpectedofbothwomenandmen”(p.173).Heconsidersinsomedetailwhatsocialchangesmightberequiredtoimplementthisideal,andhearguesforseveralfairlyspecificandpracticablechanges.Inordertogivechildrenofbothsexesthesametypeofupbringingandtogivemothersandfathersthesameopportunitiesforeducationandemployment,heproposesthatemployersinstitutemoreflexibleworkschedulestoallowallparentstospendmoretimewiththeirchildrenwithoutsacrificingcareeroreducationalopportunities.Hedefendscertainprogramsofaffirmativeactionandofcomparableworthandtheimplementationofprogramsagainstsexualharassmentasmeanstochangethedistributionofeconomicpowerinsociety,soastoremovestructuralviolenceagainstwomen.Hetakesseriouslytheideaofbanningviolentpornographyasonestrategyforaddressingtheovertviolenceofrape,domesticbatteryandsexualabusethatforciblykeepswomenandgirlsinsubordinatepositions.Sterba’schapteronfeministjusticeisremarkableforitsappreciationofthepervasivenessandseriousnessofviolenceagainstwomenandgirlsandforitswilltoproposeconstructivemeasurestoreduceandeventuallyeliminatethatviolence.Itcontainsdetailedstatisticaldocumentationoftheimpactonwomenandgirlsofbothstructuralandovertviolence.ThechallengeofjusticeforhereandnowwithrespecttosuchviolenceistocomeupwithplansofactionthatarelikelytomoveustowardwhatSterbacallstheandrogynousideal.Thephrase“justiceforhereandnow”callstomindjusticeforwhatJohnRawlswouldcallanonidealsociety.Anonidealsocietyisoneinwhichtheredoesnotexistperfect,orevennearlyperfect,complianceamongitsmemberswithinstitutionswhosedefiningnormssatisfybasicprinciplesofjustice.Insuchasocietypeoplecannotcountonmostothersbeingmoved\nROUTESTOLAKEWOBEGON153mostofthetimebyaneffectivesenseofjustice.Buttheycancountonmostpeopleknowingthisveryfactabouteachother.Achievinganythinglikejusticeindeeplyunjustsocietiesisoneofthemostdifficultofmoralchallenges.InsocietieslikethatoftheUnitedStatestoday,whichhavelegaciesofprofoundinjusticeagainstracialandethnicminorities,lesbiansandgaymen,theelderlyanddisabled,andagainstfemalesofallgroups,nocourseofactionmaybeavailablethatdoesnotviolateanyone’sjustclaims.Anyremedyweseekmaybelessthanjusttoatleastsomeofthosewhoareaffectedbyit.Thechallengeisthentoidentifywhichalternativepoliciesorcoursesofactionwouldminimizeinjusticewhileatthesametimemovinguscloserthanweweretotheidealofperfectjustice.Thismeansthatweshouldbeprepared,regardinganyremedywepropose,forrationallygroundedclaimstotheeffectthatourproposalwouldbeunjusttosomeparties.Justificationwillneedtotaketheformofarguingthatthemostrealisticalternativestotheproposedchangeareevenmoreunjust,orthattheywouldevenmoregreatlyimpedeprogresstowardajustsociety,orboth.Affirmativeactionisagoodexample.Theremaybenowaytoimplementaffirmativeactionsoastofulfilleveryone’sjustclaims.Argumentsinfavorofaffirmativeaction(includingSterba’s)tendtopointouttheevengreaterinjusticesinthealternativeofimplementingequaltreatmenthereandnowasitwouldbeimplementedinaperfectlyjustsociety.Theyarguethattoimplementsuchequalitynowwouldimpedeprogresstowardajustsocietyinthatitwouldsimplypreservethestatusquo.Themostcompellingwaytocriticizeaffirmativeactionwouldbetoproposeanalternativethatwouldalsomovesocialpracticetowardidealsofjustice,andatthesametimebelessunjustthanaffirmativeaction.Itisnotenoughsimplytopointoutthelikelyinjusticesofaffirmativeaction.InthatspiritIproposesomealternativestosomeofSterba’sfamilyrestructuringproposalsforimplementinghisandrogynousideal.Ashehascharacterizedit,Ifindtheandrogynousidealitselfentirelyunobjectionable.Itiscompatiblewithgreatvarietyofpersonalstyles,butinsistsonlythatwhenitcomestomoralcharactertraits,differencesofsexareirrelevant.Allhumanbeingsshouldhaveequallytheopportunitytodevelopallhumantraitsthataretrulyandfundamentallydesirable,andthetrulyhumanvirtuesshouldbeequallyexpectedofallhumanbeings,atleastinthesensethatnooneisexcludedinadvancesimplybecauseoftheirsex.Iwouldnotcallthisideal“androgynous,”however,becauseofahistoryinfeministtheorythatassociatesthe“andro”andthe“gyn”withthegenderconceptsof“masculine”and“feminine”ratherthanwiththemorebiologicalconceptsof“male”and“female.”Ifweunderstand“masculine”and“feminine”intheircurrentmeaningsasnotjustaccidentallyincorporatingtheperspectivesofdominatoranddominated,theresulting“androgyne”wouldbesomethinglikeanincoherentorschizophrenic“master-slave,”whereastheintentionbehindSterba’sidealisaperspectivethatisneitherthatofamasternorthatofaslave.Sterbaunderstands“androgynous”as“genderfree,”aconceptwhich,onapsycho-socialunderstandingof“gender,”maybejustrightforanaimoffeministjustice.Thecombinationhefavorsisofthebesthumantraitsthathavebeenhistoricallymoreavailabletomenwiththebesthumantraitsthathavebeenhistoricallymoreavailabletowomen.Thisideaalsoseemstomeentirelyunobjectionable.Moreconcretely,inhisgenderfreesociety—reminiscentofLakeWobegon—womenaswellasmenwouldbeindependent,decisive,andstrong,andmenaswellaswomenwouldbecooperative,open,andnurturing(ifnotgood-looking).Andwemightexpectthechildrenraisedbysuchwomenandsuchmentobedefinitelyaboveaverage(thatis,theaverageofhereandnow).Itmightappearatfirstthattransgenderedpeoplewouldobjecttotheideaofagenderfreesociety,andpreferinsteadagreatervarietyofsociallyacceptedgenderswithindividualfreedomtochoose,ortoown,whicheverone(orones)feelsright.Ifgenders,astransgenderedpeopleunderstandthem,couldbedefinedindependentlyofmoralcharactertraitsandconsideredsimplymattersofpersonalstyle,however,thereneedbenoincompatibilitybetweenthesocietythatSterbacalls“genderfree”andthetransgenderidealofgendermultiplicity.Presumably,thetransgenderidealwouldnotincludegendersthatweredefinedinpartbyunacceptablemoralcharactertraitsorbytheabsenceofmorallyimportantones.Fromapragmaticpointofview,thequestionthenis,“Howcanwegetfromwhereweare,withaminimumofinjustice,toasocietythatproducespeoplelikethat,peoplewhohaveallthebasicmorallydesirabletraitsofcharacter?”Sterbabeginsbycitingthefamilyasalocusforradicalrestructuring.Theradicalrestructuringthatheproposesisthatmendotheirfairshareofthehouseworkandchildcareandthatbothfemaleandmaleparentshaveflexibleworkschedulestomakeitpossibleforeachtodotheirfairshareofchildcareandhousework.Lestanyonefindthisnotsucharadicalrestructuring,inviewofthetrendofthepastseveraldecadesformentotakeonhouseholdandchildcaretasks,IwouldpointoutthatlegalscholarJoanWilliams,inherworkonconflictsbetweenfamilyandpaidlabor,hasdocumentedthatinthe1990swomenintheUSstilldothelion’sshareofhouseworkandchildcare,andthatwomen’sjobstendtobepart-time,underpaidbecausepart-time,andlackinginbenefitsandopportunitiesforadvancement.2Herproposals,whichmeshwellwithSterba’s,includepayingpart-timeworkersatthesamerateasfull-timeworkersandofferingthemproportionalbenefitsandopportunitiesforadvancement.Somethinglikethefamilyisactuallyaverygoodplacetobegin,consideringthatitiswherewomenandgirlssuffersomuchoftheviolencethatSterbadocuments.However,Iwouldgofurtherthanhedoesinradicalrestructuring.Iwouldbegin,morespecifically,withhouseholds.Heterosexualcohabitationisanextremelyimportant,influential,andpervasivepracticethatdeservestobere-evaluatedfromafeministperspective.\n154CLAUDIACARDWhatmanypeopleunderstandtodaybytheir“family”isactuallyahouseholdofpeople,oftenincludingmemberswhoarenotbiologicalkin,sometimesentirelymemberswhoarenotbiologicalkin,wholivetogetherforanextendedperiodoftime,peoplewhoareintimatelyinterdependentinavarietyofways(economic,sexual,emotional—itvaries).Sounderstood,“families,”orhouseholds,maybeeitherheterosexual(mixed)orsame-sex.Thuslesbianstodayspeakof“familieswechoose”bycontrastwiththeir“familiesoforigin.”Sterba’sdiscussionofchangestobemadeinfamiliesseemstotakeforgrantedthecontextofaheterosexual(mixed)household.Hisreferencestoparentsseemlikewisetoassumethatachild’sparentswillconsistofonemaleandonefemale.Yethouseholdscanalsobesame-sex,andparenting(understoodas“raisingchildren”)canbedonebypersonsofthesamesex.Inwhatkindofhouseholdisitmostlikelythatwomenandgirlswilllearntobeindependent,decisive,andstrong?Inwhatkindofhouseholdisitmostlikelythatmenandboyswilllearntobecooperative,open,andnurturing?Inanall-femalehousehold,womenarelesslikelytodependonmenfordecision-making,income,physicaldefense,householdrepairsorsocialstatus.Theymaybemorelikelytocultivateinthemselvesandineachothersomeofthevaluabletraitsandskillsthataheterosexualsocietyencouragesawomantoseekinaman.Likewise,inanall-malehousehold,menmaybelesslikelytodependonwomenfortheday-to-dayemotionalsupportandnurturancethatmostpeopleneed,forsomeonetolistentotheirideasorstoriesandofferconstructiveorsympatheticresponses,andforhousework,laundry,andmealpreparation.Consequently,menalsomaybemorelikelytocultivateinthemselvesandineachotherthetrulydesirabletraitsandskillsthataheterosexualsocietyencouragesamantoseekinawoman.Ofcourse,thereisnoguarantee.Peopleofthesamesexcancertainlytakeupmasculineandfemininerolesinthesamehousehold.Manyhavedoneso.Evenwhentheydo,however,atleastsomemembersofsuchhouseholdsarelikelytodevelopvaluabletraitsandskillsthataheterosexualsocietyencouragesonlyinmembersoftheothersex.Althoughitispossibleforawomanwhohaslearnedtodependonmensimplytotransferthatdependencetoanotherwoman,same-sexhouseholdsmaybeabetterbetforbringingaboutthedesiredcharactertraitsandskills,ratherthansimplytryingtoreformheterosexualhouseholdsinthecontextofamisogynistsocietywithalaundrylistofnewrulesreapportioningtasks.Iusetheterms“heterosexual”and“same-sex”heretodescribeonlythesexesofhouseholdmembers,nottheactivitiesinwhichtheyengagewitheachother(whichmayormaynotincludesexualactivities).Asame-sexhouseholdcouldincludememberswhohadheterosexualrelationshipswithpeopleoutsidethehouseholdorwhobecamethebiologicalparentsofchildrenwiththem.Still,Idraw,inthisthoughtexperiment,onwhatIhaveobservedoflesbianhouseholdsandgaymalehouseholdsoverthepastfewdecades.Contrarytopopularmyth,itisnotunusualforalesbianhouseholdtoconsistofadultfemales,allofwhomhavebeenraisedtodependonmen,norforagaymalehouseholdtoconsistofadultmales,allofwhomhavebeenraisedtoseekemotionalnurturancefromwomen.Same-sexcohabitationinsuchcircumstancesisapowerfullearningexperience.Notonlymightsame-sexcohabitationbemorelikelytobeeffectiveforbringingaboutthecharactertransformationsthattheandrogynousidealrequires,butitmightalsobefairertochildren.TheoneaspectofSterba’sproposalforrestructuringthefamilythatIfindtrulydisturbingisthesuggestionthatmenwouldlearntobecooperative,openandnurturingbycaringforchildren.Henotesthat“thetraitsofopenness,cooperativeness,andnurturancethatpromotepeacefulsolutionstoconflictstendtobefosteredexclusivelyinwomen,whoareeffectivelyexcludedfrompositionsofpowerinasocietycharacterizedbywidespreadovertandstructuralviolenceagainstwomen”(pp.91–2).Hethenargues,plausibly,thatonlyifourleadersdevelopthesetraitscanweexpectpeaceintheinternationalarena.Thisreasoningprovidesagoodargumentforputtingmorewomen,hereandnow,intopositionsofleadership.ButSterba’sonlyproposalformaleleadershipisthat“menwillacquirethesetraitsthroughequalsharingofchild-rearingandhousekeepingtasks”(p.92).Itsoundsasthoughtheideaisthatmenwhoarenotalreadycooperative,openandnurturingwouldbegivenmajorchildcareresponsibilitiesandthatchildrenwouldpaythepriceofthelearningexperiencesoftheirmalecaretakers.Theproposalisevenmoredisturbingifweunderstandittoimplythatmenwhohavealreadybeensocializedtofindchildrensexy,tothinkthatrapeisnatural,andtoexpressangerviolentlywouldalsobegivenchildcareresponsibilitiesasameanstoeducatethemoutofsuchattitudes.Thelatteridea,whichSterbadoesnotexplicitlyconsider,remindsmeoftheproposalmadespontaneously(andwithgenuinegoodwill)byamalestudentinmyfeminismandsexualpoliticscoursemanyyearsago—thatmenwhoarefoundguiltyofrapeorbatteryshouldbesentencedtoworkinsheltersforbatteredwomen.Evenwereittruethatsuchmaleperpetratorswouldlearnvaluablelessonsbyservingsuchasentence,howcouldweinflictsuch“care-takers”onwomenwhohadsoughtshelterfromothermenguiltyofsimilarcrimes?Thestudentwhomadethisproposal,ofcourse,quicklyrealizedthathewastakingonlythemen’sperspective,thatis,thinkingonlyofwhatwouldbegoodforthemen,whattheyneededtolearn.InthecaseofSterba’sproposal,weneedtoincludethechildren’sperspectivesaswell,notjustthoseofadultswhomightbenefitbyhavingtheresponsibilitiesofcaringforthem.Andwhatwouldbegoodforthechildren?Whoshouldpaythepriceofmen’slearningtobegoodcare-takers?Thequestionofwhoshouldpaythepriceseemstometheeasierone.Itisnotonlythatmenneedtolearnhowtogivecare.Caregivingrequiresskillsthatfemalesarenotbornwitheither,andthoseskillsarenaturallydevelopedthroughpractice.Butthereare\nROUTESTOLAKEWOBEGON155attitudesthatstandinthewayofacquiringthoseskills,attitudesthatwomenarenotasencouragedtodevelopasaremeninamisogynistsociety.Theproblemformenraisedinsuchasocietyisthattheyareencouragedtowardviolentdisplaysofangerandtowardtheeroticizingofthosewhoarevulnerable.Theycanoftenincorporatetheseattitudesintotheirbehaviorwithoutactuallyfallingfouloflawsthatprohibitassault,andwithoutordinarilygettingcaughtevenwhentheydoso.Theyneedtounlearnthatsocialization,aswellastoacquirecaregivingskills.Inthespiritofpoeticjustice,Ithinkmen,thosewhodoneedtounlearnthesethings,shouldpracticeoneachother.Youngermen,forexample,couldbeginbycaringforoldermenandforsickmenwhohavebeensocializedtothesameviolentanderoticattitudes.Menwhoarenotalreadygoodcaregiversshouldpaythepriceoftherelevantlearningandunlearningexperiencesofothermen.Itwouldnotaddresstheproblemifmenweretoidentifysomesociallydisfavoredminoritygroupofmentobecaregivers,ashasbeendonealltooofteninthehistoryofracism.Whatwouldbegoodforchildren,however,isfarfromobvious.Sterba’sandrogynousidealincludestheideathatallchildrenwouldhavethesamekindofupbringing,inthesensethatbothgirlsandboyswouldbeencouragedequallytodevelopallofthehumanvirtuesandallhumanlydesirabletraits.Iwouldpointoutthatthisgoal,however,neednotrequirethatbothboysandgirlsbeparentedbybothwomenandmen,especiallyinanidealsocietyinwhichwomenandmenhadthesametraits.Norneeditrequireeventhateachchildbeparentedbyexactlytwopeopleorbyparentswhoareofthesamegeneration.Parenting(child-rearing)canbesharednotonlybyparentsofthesamesexbutalsobygrandparentsandotheroldermembersofthehousehold,byauntsanduncles,friends,andmanymembersoflargercommunities.Heterosexualparentingmightbefine,althoughnotnecessarilythemostusualform,inaperfectlyjustsociety.Butforhereandnow,itishighlyproblematicinrelationtojustthoseformsofviolencethatSterbaacknowledges.Childrenareespeciallyvulnerable.Theyrequirenotjustcaretakerswhohaveskills,butcaretakerswhoseattitudesarenurturing,nonviolentandnonexploitative.Fewmenhavebeenencouragedtodeveloptheseattitudeshereandnow.Ithereforeconcludethatendorsingwidespreadheterosexualcoparentingoughtnottobeamongthefirststepstakeninaprogramformovingfromwherewearetowardanandrogynoussociety.Otherstepsoughttobetakenfirsttowardundoingwhatisproblematicandtoooftendangeroustochildrenintheprevalentmisogynistandviolentsocializationofmen.Itmaybepointedoutthatmuchisalsoproblematicinwomen’ssocialization,andthatissurelytrue.Butwhenwecomparethelikelyinjusticesofparentingbysexistwomenandparentingbysexistmen,thedangertochildrenfromovertviolenceseemstometotipthebalancetowardtoleratingparentingbywomenasthelesseroflikelyinjusticestochildren.Atanyrate,girlsareprobablyingeneralmoreatriskfrommaleparentingbysexistmenthanfromparentingbywomen,andmoreatriskthanmalechildrenwouldbefromparentingbyeithersex.AnexperimentworthtryingmightbetoresurrecttheancientAmazoncustomofwomenraisinggirlsandmenraisingboys.Aswithaffirmativeaction,myproposalthatpeoplechooseonprincipletocohabitandcoparentonlywithmembersofthesamesex,isconceivednotasanendinitself(althoughformanyindividualsthechoicemightwelllastalifetime)butasapracticalstepformovingtowardanandrogynoussociety.Withtheachievementofandrogynoussociety,therewouldpresumablybenoneedforindividualstoruleoutthepossibilityofheterosexualcohabitationandcoparenting,althoughtherewouldpresumablyalsobenoreasontoexpectthatthesewouldbethedominantforms.Thetaskforhereandnowistocreateasettinginwhichbothwomenandmenwouldbemorelikelythanatpresenttodevelopaswholepersons,morallyspeaking,withtheeventualgoalbeingsustainabledevelopmentofandrogynouscharacters.Itmightbeprotestedthatprohibitingheterosexualhouseholdswouldbeunfairtoindividualmenandwomenwhohavealreadytranscendedthestereotypesofmasculinityandfemininitythattheandrogynousidealrequiresbeovercome.Thereare,hereandnow,individualmenwhoareopen,cooperativeandnurturing,moresothansomeindividualwomen.Prohibitingmengenerallyfromraisingdaughters,forexample,wouldbeunfairtomenwhodonot(andperhapsneverdid)findlittlegirlssexy,whocancontroltheiranger,andsoforth.ThereareseveralthingsIwouldpointoutinresponse.OneisthatIamnotrecommendingalegalprohibitionofheterosexualhouseholds.TheexistingsexistdistributionofpowerthatSterbadescribessowellintherealmofeconomicsalsoappliesintherealmoflaw.Thisdistributionofpowermakesitunlikelythatsuchlawswouldfindsupport,giventhehistoryofsexistexploitationofheterosexualhouseholds.Buteveniftheydidfindsupport,suchprohibitionsmightwellencouragemorerebellionthananythingelse.Itisimportantthathouseholdsbemaintainedvoluntarily.Iamthinkingextra-legallyofchoicesthatpeoplecouldmake,althoughasocietycouldtakemanystepstoencouragesame-sexhouseholdsandmakethemmoreattractivetopeoplethantheyareatpresent.Iwouldatleastrecommendandencourageindividualsinthevoluntaryexperimentofprincipledsame-sexhouseholds.Thatis,althoughIdonothereandnowrecommendalegalbanonheterosexualhouseholds,Irecommendthatindividualsrejectthemasamatterofprincipleforhereandnow.Second,itistruethatnoteveryoneinasexistsocietyfitsthestereotypesthatsuchasocietyencouragesandrewards,andthatthereisacertainunfairnessinapractice,orevenintheprincipleddecisiononthepartofanindividual,thattreatsallmembersoftheothersexasthoughtheydidfitthestereotype.Thereisacertainunfairnesstotrustworthymen,forexample,inthepracticeofawomen’stransitservicedesignedtoofferwomensaferidesatnight,thatexcludesmenfrombeingdrivers.However,thisunfairnessneedstobecomparedwiththatriskedinalternativepolicies.Itisnotunreasonableinarapeculture\n156CLAUDIACARDforwomennottotrustmenwhoappeartobequiteordinary.Itmaybeunfair,eveninarapeculture,forwomentodistrustevenmenwhoseindividualtrustworthinesstheyhavehadorcouldhaveampleopportunitytoascertain.Thatunfairnessneedstobeweighedinthebalanceinevaluatingsocialpoliciesthatexcludemenfromcertainpositionsoftrust.However,womenmightrejectheterosexualcohabitationhereandnowwithoutassumingtheuntrustworthinessofallindividualmen,anddosoasasteptowardmakingsame-sexoptionseventuallyatleastassociallyeligibleasheterosexualones,thusmakingpossiblegenerallysaferenvironmentsforwomenandchildren.Theprogressinjusticetowomenandchildrenmightwelloutweightheinjusticetomen.Third,theobservationthatnoteveryonefitssexiststereotypesalsosuggestscertainmoremodestpoliciesthatmightbeimplementedandevenenactedinlaw,regardlessofthesexualidentityconstitutionofhouseholds.Forexample,aslongastheinstitutionofmarriageexistsandmarriedpartnersbecomeguardiansofchildren,therecouldbeelementaryrestrictionsonwhoispermittedtomarry(orevenbecomeadomesticpartner)thatwouldmakemorefundamentalgoodsensethanthecurrentprohibitiononmarryingclosebiologicalkin.Anyonefoundguiltyofdomesticviolenceorchildabusemightbedeniedalicenseforfuturemarriages(orbedeniedfuturedomesticpartnershipstatus),theircurrentpartnersbegrantedimmediatedivorceuponrequest,andchildrenberemovedfromtheguardianshipoftheviolentorabusiveparent.Itcouldbelegallyrequired,atleast,thatinformationaboutone’shistoryasanabuser(reports,arrests,convictions)besuppliedtoprospectivespousesorpartners,asamatterofcourseoronrequest.AsIhavearguedelsewhere,thedangersofbaddrivingaregenerallytakenmoreseriouslyhereandnowthanthoseofdomesticabuse.3Onecanautomaticallyloseadriver’slicenseasaresultofflagrantlyabusingdriverprivileges.Yetdomesticabusersdonothavemaritalprivilegesrevokedbythelicensegrantor(thestate).Itisuptotheabusedpartnertoseekaninjunctionordivorce,whichcanbehighlydangerousforthemtodo.Theupshotisthatusuallyabusersretainintimateaccesstotheirvictims.Andifdivorced,abuserscangenerallyandreadilyobtainalicensetomarryagainwhenevertheyplease.Sterbapresentshisandrogynousidealas,ifnotacompromise,thenatleastintermediatebetweentwoextremeviews,whichherejects.Oneextremeisthenegativeviewoffeminismassimplyanemancipationofwomenfromtraditionalrolesinorderthattheymaybefreetodevelopinwayshithertoencouragedonlyinmen.Theotheristhepositiveviewoffeminismasbasicallyacelebrationoffemalesuperiority.OnSterba’sviewtherearegenuinelybadthingstobeescapedbywomen,butalsogoodthingsinwomentobepreservedandsharedmorewidely.Thisisasensibleview.However,itshouldalsobeclear(thoughithasnotalwaysbeentocriticsoffeminismoreventofeministtheorists)thatfemaleseparatismneednotbebasedonabeliefinfemalesuperiority,inthesenseofsuperiornativeendowment.Onecanholdthatfemalesandmalesarebornwithroughlysimilarpotentialitiesforcharacterdevelopmentandyetacknowledgethatasexistsocietyencouragesthedevelopmentofdangerouspotentialitiesinmenthatwomenarenotgenerallyencouragedtodevelop.Butfurther,theseparatistpracticeofsame-sexhouseholdsthatIhavehereproposeddoesnotpresupposeevengenerallysuperiorcharacterdevelopmentinfemales,orthatwomen’scharactersinsexistsocietyarenotseriouslyflawed,althoughIhavesuggestedthatinasexistsociety,menaregenerallymoredangeroustochildren,especiallytogirls.Thevicesthatwomenlearninasexistsociety,suchasdeviousness,tendtodifferfromthosethatmenlearn.Theargumentthatwomeninsame-sexhouseholds(atleast,householdswheretheadultsarewomen)maybemorelikelytodevelopthedesirabletraitsthataheterosexualsocietyencouragesawomantoseekinamansimplyentertainsthehypothesisthathereandnowwomenmaybebetterforwomen(andgirls)infundamentalwaysthanmenareforwomen,anopinionthatwasalsoheldbyMargaretFullerinWomanintheNineteenthCentury.4Aparallelargumentappliesforsame-sexmalehouseholds.Inthecontextofasexistsociety,menmaywellbeinsomewaysbetterformenthanwomenareformen,aswomen’sattitudestowardmenareboundtobedeeplyambivalentinanysocietythathasahistoryofmakingwomendependentonmenforprotectionagainstmen.Butyetanotherargumentformalesame-sexhouseholdscomesfromthepointofviewoffairness:itshouldnotbewomen’sresponsibility,eveniftheycould,toimprovethecharactersofadultmenwhohavealreadyhadmorethantheirfairshareofprivilege.ThustheseparatismthatIproposeneednotviewwomeninsexistsocietyonlyasvictims,either.Ifseparatismisagoodideaforcohabitation,itmayalsobeagoodidea,forsomeofthesamereasons,intheareasofeconomicsandeducation.Forexample,insteadofseekingtointegratewomenintoanexistinglaborforcebyaffirmativeaction,comparableworth,andprogramstoaddresssexualharassment,womenmightdobettertoorganizefemalebusinesses,femalecreditunions,andsoforth.Therationalewouldbethatdoingsowouldmoreeffectivelypromotetheandrogynous(genderfree)idealanddosowithlessinjusticethanalternatives.Atanyrate,suchexperimentsoughttobetriedbysomeandencouragedbyeveryoneconcerned,evenifothersareworkingonaffirmativeactionandsoforth.Thereformofheterosexualfamiliesisacommonliberalfeministproposal.ThespiritofcompromisethatcharacterizesSterba’speacemakingwayofdoingphilosophysuggestsbringingopposingpartiestogether,notdrivingthemapart.Inthecaseoffeminism,thatspiritisapttosuggestbringingwomenandmentogether,notseparatingthem.However,Ihavearguedthataliberal,asSterbaunderstandsher,neednotbesuchareformist.Whathewantstobringtogetheraretraits,notnecessarilythesexes.Itmaybethatseparatingthesexesinthecontextofasexistsocietyisthemosteffectiveandleastunjustwaytobringthosetraitstogether.Theformthatwomen’soppressionhastaken,whichsome1970sfeministscalled“interior\nROUTESTOLAKEWOBEGON157colonization,”hasproducedanalienationofwomenfromotherwomenthathasnoparallelamongmen.Ithasmandatedaone-on-onebondingofwomentomen,whoareencouragedtobecomemorebondedtoothermenthantoanywoman,andithasencouragedamorelopsideddevelopmentoftraitsinwomenthaninmenbywayofthatcombinationhothouse-and-refrigeratorenvironmentthatJohnStuartMillfamouslydeploredinhis1869essayTheSubjectionofWomen.5Thedisastrousrelationshipsthatwomenhavehadwithmenmaynotbechangeable,asasocialpattern,withoutaradicalbreakthatmakespossibleandsociallyeligiblewomen’sbondingwithotherwomen.Abandoningheterosexualcohabitation,ratherthantryingtoreformitinthecontextofamisogynoussociety,mightbeamoreeffectiveandlessunjustwaytofurthertheandrogynousideal.ThisideamighthavepresenteditselfnaturallyhadSterbadiscussed“homosexualjustice”inthesamechapterwithfeministjustice,ratherthaninthechapteronracialandmulticulturaljustice.“Homosexualjustice,”asSterbaunderstandsit,isconcernedwithhowpeoplearetreatedwhentheyareknownorbelievedtoengagein(orperhapstowanttoengagein)sexualactswithpeopleofthesamesex.Itwouldseemnaturaltotreathomosexualjusticeasanalogoustoracialandethnicjusticeifoneassumedthatregardlessofwhetherpeopleacquireorinherithomosexualdesires,ahomosexualorientationisnomoreofachoicethanone’sraceorethnicity.However,contemporarylesbianandgayliberationmovementshavebeenconceivedmuchmorebroadlythanasaconcernwiththelibertytoengageinsexualactswithpartnersofone’schoice.Theyhavebeenconcernedwithorientationsthatareasmuchsocialastheyaresexual—withdomesticpartnerships,forexample,which(likemarriages)areordinarilymuchmorethansexualcontracts.Farmoreradicalthanengaginginhomosexualsexualactsmaybethechoicetolivehomosexuallythroughoutone’ssociallifeinsofarasonecan—tomaintainasame-sexhousehold,forexample,andtoforeswearheterosexualcohabitationaslongasonelivesinarapeculture.NOTES1JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).2JoanWilliams,UnbendingGender:WhyFamilyandWorkConflictandWhatToDoAboutIt(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).3ClaudiaCard,“AgainstMarriageandMotherhood,”Hypatia,11:3(summer1996)pp.1–23.4MargaretFuller,WomanintheNineteenthCentury(NewYork:Norton,1971).5JohnStuartMill,TheSubjectionofWomen(Indianapolis:Hackett,1988)p.23.\n15JUSTICEFORGLENNANDSTACYOngender,morality,andgayrightsJohnCorvinoDuringarecentcommencementceremonyattheuniversitywhereIteach,anawardwaspresentedto“theoutstandingmanandtheoutstandingwoman”inthegraduatingclass.Thisaward,whichisgivenannually,struckmeasratherodd.Thereisnothingodd,ofcourse,aboutrecognizingoutstandingstudents—indeed,theaward,aswellastheexuberantspeechesgivenbytherespectiverecipients,remindedmeofthefamiliarhighschooltraditionofselectingaclassvaledictorian.Butunlesstherecipientswereexpectedtomakeababyaftertheceremony,Icouldnotfathomwhyitwasimportanttoselectonemanandonewoman.Wewouldnotthinktograntanawardtotheoutstandingwhitestudentandoutstandingnon-whitestudentintheclass—eventhough,givencurrentsocialconditionswhereIteach,raceislikelytoaffecttheeducationalexperienceatleastasmuchasgender.Norwouldweconsidergrantinganawardtotheoutstandingstudentover5’8”andtheoutstandingstudentunder5’8”,ortheoutstandingstudentwhohadsufferedthroughCorvino’sIntrotoPhilosophyclassandtheoutstandingstudentwhohadnot.Yettheaudience—amajorityofwhomwerecollegegraduates,atleastbytheendoftheceremony—showednosignsofpuzzlementatthegenderdivision.Weliveinagenderedsociety—notmerelyintheobvioussensethatpeoplehavegenders,butinthelessobvioussensethatweactasifagreatdealmorehingesonthisfactthanactuallydoes.Iamnotsuggestingthatgenderisanunimportantorirrelevantfeatureofhumanbeings.Rather,Iamaskingwhereandwhyitisrelevant.PlatoillustratesthispointaboutrelevancenicelyintheRepublic,whenhearguesthatalthoughwomenandmenhaveoppositenatures,thatdifferenceisirrelevanttothequestionofwhetherwomenshouldberulers:Wemightthereforejustaswell,itseems,askourselveswhetherthenatureofbaldmenandlong-hairedmenisthesameandnotopposite,andthen,agreeingthattheyareopposite,ifweallowbaldmentobecobblers,notallowlong-hairedmentobe,oragainiflong-hairedmenarecobblers,notallowtheotherstobe.1LikePlato,Iampreparedtograntthatmenandwomenaredifferentinimportantways.Thequestionistowhatendssuchdifferencesarerelevant.Aretheyrelevanttowhoshouldrulethestate?Aretheyrelevanttowhoshouldreceiveagraduationaward?Thetendencytothinkofmenandwomenasopposite—aswhenwereferto“theoppositesex”—mayleadustoanumberofconclusionsunjustifiedbytheirdifferences,(Thistendencydoubtlessexplainsthedifficultymanypeoplehavewithunderstandingbisexuality:theyconceiveofthesexesasoppositeandtheninvalidlyinferthefalseconclusionthatinsofarasapersonisattractedtoonetheymustnotbeattractedtotheother.)Thesubjectofhomosexualityisaparadigmaticcaseofgenderplayingafarmoreinfluentialrolethanitseffectsmerit—orsoIshallargueinthispaper.Considerthefollowingscenario:GlennandStacyloveeachotherverymuchandhavechosentocommitthemselvestoamonogamousrelationship.Theydonotplantohavechildren—indeed,Stacyissterileasaresultofachildhoodaccident—althoughtheymightconsideradoptingsomeday.Butevenwithoutchildren,theirrelationshipisasourceofmeaningandgrowthintheirlives.Toputitsimply,GlennandStacybelieve—andtheevidencesuggests—thattheirrelationshipwitheachothermakesthembetterpeople.Glenn’soutgoingnaturehasbrokenthroughStacy’sshyness;Stacy’seven-temperednesshassoftenedGlenn’simpatience.Thephysicalaffectionthattheysharewitheachotherisanimportantelementofthatrelationship,enablingthemtoexpressandcreatefeelingsforwhichmerewordswouldbeinadequate.Insum,theirrelationship—includingitsphysicalcomponent—realizesavarietyofconcretegoodsthatareevidenttoboththemandthosewhoknowthem.Ihavedeliberatelychosenthenames“Glenn”and“Stacy”becausebotharesomewhatgender-ambiguous(cf.GlennCloseandStacyKeach).Manypeople—perhapsamajorityinoursociety—wouldreadtheaboveparagraphquitedifferentlyinthehomosexualcasethanintheheterosexualone.Theymightarguethatwhateverbenefitscamefromsucharelationship,theywouldbeinspiteofthehomosexuality,andbesides,thattheharmsorevilsbroughtaboutbythehomosexualitywouldoutweighanysuchbenefits.Whatseemedatfirstglancetobeanobviousgoodbecomesatbestcontroversialandatworstamoralabominationsimplybychangingthegenderofoneoftheparties.\nJOHNCORVINO159IncontemporaryAmericansociety,thehomosexualGlennandStacywouldbetreatedquitedifferentlyfromtheheterosexualGlennandStacy—morally,sociallyandpolitically.Morally,theywouldbesubjecttocensure;socially,theywouldbesubjecttoostracismandridicule,andpolitically,theywouldbesubjecttoprosecution(instateswithanti-sodomylaws)andwouldbedeniedtheprotectionsaffordedbylegalmarriagetotheheterosexualGlennandStacy.ThehomosexualGlennandStacywouldlackcertainhospitalvisitationrights,inheritancerights,taxbenefits,andahostofotherprivilegesaffordedtotheheterosexualGlennandStacy.Ifoneofthemwereaforeigner,theothercouldnotsecurecitizenshipstatusforhimorher.Moreover,eachcouldbeforcedtotestifyagainsttheotherincourt,robbingthemofakindofmaritalprivacytheheterosexualGlennandStacywouldlikelytakeforgranted—alongwithscoresofotherlegalbenefits.Allbecauseofadifferenceingender.InhisimportantworkJusticeforHereandNow,JamesSterbaarguesthatajustsocietymustbeanandrogynous,orgenderfree,society.Byanandrogynoussocietyhemeansoneinwhichbasicrightsanddutiesarenotassignedonthebasisofgender.Moregenerally,anandrogynoussocietyisonethatsubstitutes“asocializationbasedonnaturalability,reasonableexpectation,andchoiceforasocializationbasedonsexualdifference.”2Thusput,theidealofanandrogynoussocietysoundsdesirable,andforthepurposesofthispaperIwillassumethatSterbaiscorrectinadvocatingit.ThequestionIwishtoexploreiswhethertheidealofanandrogynoussocietyhasimplicationsforhomosexualjustice,asSterbasuggests.FormanywouldagreewithSterbathatrightsanddutiesbeassignedonthebasisof“naturalability,reasonableexpectation,andchoice”whilemaintainingthatsocietyisneverthelessjustifiedintreatingthehomosexualGlennandStacyratherdifferentlyfromtheheterosexualGlennandStacy.InthispaperIdeveloptheconnectionbetweengenderjusticeandhomosexualjusticebyarguingthatgenderisirrelevanttothemoralcharacterofromanticandsexualrelationships,andthustotherightsanddutiesassociatedwithsuchrelationships.Thepaperproceedsasfollows.Inthefirstsection,Idefinegenderandarguethat,despiteinitialappearances,neithergendernorgenderdiscriminationisnecessarilyinconsistentwithSterba’sandrogynousideal.Ialsosituatediscriminationagainsthomosexualswithinthecontextofgenderdiscriminationandaskwhetherdiscriminationagainsthomosexualsisjustifiedwithrespecttosomegood.Inthesecondsection,Iattempttoanswerthatquestionbydevelopingaprimafaciecaseforthemoralequivalenceofhomosexualandheterosexualrelationships,andthenconsideringthreeimportantattemptstorebutthatprimafaciecase.Ingeneral,myaimistobuttressSterba’sclaimthatdiscriminationagainsthomosexualsisincompatiblewiththeandrogynousideal.GenderandtheandrogynoussocietyLetmebeginbydistinguishinggenderfrombiologicalsex.Idefinebiologicalsex—forwhichIshallusetheterms“male,”“female,”and“intersexed”—intermsofchromosomalstructure:femalesareXX,malesareXY,andintersexedpersonsarethosewithanyothercombination.3Gender—forwhichIshallusetheterms“man”and“woman”4—ismuchmoredifficulttodefine.ConsiderthecaseofBrandonTeena,whosestorywasrecentlypopularizedinthecriticallyacclaimedfilmBoysDon’tCry.BrandonTeenawasbiologicallyfemale(bornTeenaBrandon)butconceivedofhimselfasmanandsuccessfullypresentedhimselfassuchforatime.Suchpersons,whosebiologicalsexdiffersfromtheirgenderidentity,areconsidered“transgendered”.Morebroadly,theterm“transgender”issometimesusedtorefertoanyonewhosegenderidentitychallengestraditionalnotionsofgender.(“Transsexual”issometimesusedtorefertothosewhosesexcharacteristicshavebeensurgicallyorhormonallyaltered.)Buttosaywhatgenderisnot(biologicalsex)isnottodemonstratewhatitis.Somehaveattemptedtodefinegenderidentityintermsofself-perception—thatis,apersonisawomanifandonlyifsheconceivesofherselfasawoman.Butfirst,thisdefinitionfailstoexplainwhatitistoconceiveofoneselfasawoman;andsecond,moreimportant,theconditionseemstooweak.JustasthinkingthatIamamillionairedoesn’tmakemeamillionaire,thinkingthatIamfemaledoesnot(byitself)makemefemale.Apersonwhohadallofmyotherproperties—includingmyphysicalandmentalhistory,mypublicpresentation,andmyvariouspreferences—butconceivedofhimselfasawomanwouldnotbeawoman;hewouldsimplybeconfused.What,then,isgender?Isubmitthatitisamistaketotrytocapturegenderintermsofnecessaryandsufficientconditions.Rather,beingawomanandbeingamanarefamilyresemblanceconcepts.5Tobeawomanoramanistopossessasubstantialportionofaclusterofcharacteristics,noneofwhichisnecessarybutsomeofwhichmustbepresentinorderforthetermtoapplycorrectly.Suchcharacteristicswouldinclude,butarenotlimitedto•beingbiologicallymaleorfemale•having(orwantingtohave)acertainkindofbodilystructure(e.g.broadornarrowshouldersorhips,bodyhair,andsoon)•having(orwantingtohave)maleorfemalegenitalia•conceivingofoneselfasamanorawoman•presentingoneselfasamanorawoman\n160JUSTICEFORGLENNANDSTACY•exhibitingcertainmasculineorfemininecharacteristics(manyofwhichmaybeculturallybound)•relating(ordesiringtorelate)tootherpersonssexuallyinaparticularway(e.g.penetratingorbeingpenetrated)Ihavelistedtheseinnoparticularorder,althoughitmaybethecasethatsome(notablyself-conception)havepriorityoverothers.Itiscrucialtoremember,first,thatthislistisbynomeansexhaustive,andsecond,thatnoneofthesecharacteristicsindividuallyisanecessarydeterminantofgender.Biologicalsexaside,apersonmightpresenthimselfasawoman(perhapsfortheatricalpurposes),exhibitcertainstereotypicallyfemininetraits,andenjoybeingpenetratedbymen(orwomen),yetstillbeaman;andapersonmightpresentherselfasaman,exhibitcertaincharacteristicallymasculinetraits,andenjoypenetratingwomen(ormen),yetstillbeawoman.Ontheotherhand,ifapersonlackedallofthecharacteristicstypicallyassociatedwithbeingofaparticulargender(exceptperhapsbiologicalsex)butstillclaimedtobeofthatgender,somethingwouldbeamiss.SupposeJacktellsme,“Iwanttoconceiveofmyselfasawoman,andIwantbreasts,anarrowwaist,andbroadhips,andIwanttowearmake-upanddressesandlonghair,”andsoon,includingallofthenon-biologicalcharacteristicscommonlyassociatedwithbeingawomaninoursociety.Itwouldbenaturalformetoreply,“Youmeanyouwanttobeawoman.”Ifheweretorespond,“Actually,Iwanttobeamanwhohasallofthosethings,”IwouldbeconfusedaboutwhatbeingamanmeanstoJack.Surely,itmustmeanmorethanhavingYchromosomes:TeenaBrandonwantedtobeamanbutpresumablydidnotwantYchromosomes(fortheirownsake).Attheveryleast,IwouldexpectthatIhadmissedsomerelevantbackgroundinformation:perhapsJackisaspywhoneedsthetransformationforespionagepurposes.Butbarringsuchbackground,itseemsthatJackissimplyconfusedaboutwhatitistobeamanorawoman.Again,noneofthisistosaythatapersoncouldnotbeofaparticulargenderbutlack(anddesiretolack)severalfeaturestypicallyassociatedwiththatgender.Comparetheparadigmaticcaseofafamilyresemblanceconcept:games.Apersonmightwanttoplayagamethatinvolvesnootherpeople(e.g.solitaire)eventhoughthepresenceofothersisatypicalfeatureofgames.Similarly,apersonmightwanttobeawomanbutnotwanttowearclothingculturallydesignatedasfeminine,eventhoughwearingsuchclothingistypicalofwomen.Orshemightwanttohavecertaintypicallymalebodilypartswithoutwantingtobeaman(perhapsfortheconvenienceofbeingabletopeewhilestanding).Idefineahomosexualrelationshipasonebetweentwopeopleofthesamegender.Thus,arelationshipbetweenamanandafemale-to-maletransgenderedperson(suchasBrandonTeena)isahomosexualrelationship,butarelationshipbetweenamanandamale-to-femaletransgenderedpersonisnot.Itfollowsthatdiscriminationagainsthomosexualsisonitsfaceaformofgenderdiscrimination.Amongtheinterestingimplicationsofmydefinitionofgenderarethatapersonmaybemore-or-lessamemberofaparticulargenderandthusthatarelationshipmaybemore-or-lesshomosexual(forexample,allelsebeingequal,abutch-femmelesbianrelationshipwouldappeartobelesshomosexualthana“plain”lesbianrelationship).Sterbaconceivesofgender(asopposedtobiologicalsex)asbeingessentiallyconnectedwithoppressivesocialroles;thusheconceivesofthegenderfreesocietyasliterallythat—withoutgender.Forhim,asocietywithgenderisonethatunjustlyrestrictstheopportunitiesavailabletomenorwomeninvirtueoftheirbeingmenorwomen.Bycontrast,Iwishtoadvocateabroader,value-neutralconceptionofgender,suchthatthepresenceofgenderiscompatiblewithegalitariansocialstructures.Toeliminateitwouldbetoeliminateaninterestingandvaluableelementofhumandiversity.Itistruethatonmyview,oneofthedefiningcharacteristicsofgenderissocialsexrole—havingmasculineorfemininecharacteristics—andthatsuchroleshavetendedtolimitopportunitiesforbothgenders,especiallywomen.Butthisneednotbeso:wecouldacknowledgethataroleistypicalofwomenwhilestillpermittingandevenencouragingmentopursueit.Moreover,onmyfamily-resemblanceview,socialsexroleisnotanecessarydeterminantofgender(sincenoneofthecharacteristicsareofthemselvesnecessary),andmanyoftheothercharacteristicsassociatedwithgender(e.g.biologicalsex,bodilystructure,sexualpreference)areclearlyvalue-neutralinthemselves.Suppose,then,thatweweretoachievetheandrogynousidealthatSterbaandIbothadvocate,onewhererightsanddutiesarebasedon“naturalability,reasonableexpectation,andchoice.”Insuchasociety,itispossible(andperhapslikely)thattherewouldbemuchlessofacorrelationbetweenbiologicalsexandgenderthaninourownsociety.Itisalsopossible(andperhapslikely)thattherewouldbemanyfewergenderedpersonsorpersonsofanunambiguousgender.Butitdoesnotfollowthatgenderwouldnecessarilydisappear.Onemightaskwhatthepointofmakinggenderdistinctionswouldbeinsuchasociety:afterall,nooneisrestrictedfrompursuinganycharacteristicorrole(savecertainbiologicalones)onthebasisofeithergenderorsex.Theanswer,Ithink,isthatinsuchasocietygenderwouldbethoughtofinamorepositiveway:notasalimitationindicatingwhatpeoplecannotdo,butasaconvenientshorthandforclustersofcharacteristicseachofwhich(exceptforthebiological)isintheoryopentoeveryone.6Again,inanandrogynoussocietytheremightbefewerpeoplefallingneatlyintosuchclusters.Butthatdoesnotmeanthattheclustersareincompatiblewithsuchasociety:theycanindicatedifferencewithoutindicatinghierarchy.Andthedifferencesthattheyindicatemightbeveryusefulforanumberofbenignpurposes.Datingstrikesmeasoneobviousexample.SupposePhyllis,awoman,likestodatemen.Thisdoesnotentail,ofcourse,thatshelikestodatemenwhoareaggressive,orwearmasculineclothing,orhavebroadshoulders,narrowhipsandchesthair\nJOHNCORVINO161—allofwhicharetypicalbutnon-essentialdefiningcharacteristicsofmen.Nordoesitentailthatshelikestodatebiologicalmales,forindeed,shemightbequiteindifferenttoherpartners’chromosomalstructuresprovidedthatasufficientnumberoftheothertypicalcharacteristicsofmalesarepresent(astheywereinthecaseofBrandonTeena).SoPhyllis,whoisherselfgendered,hasagenderpreferenceinpartners.Becauseshelikestodatemen,shemightfrequentplaces(e.g.straightsinglesbars)attendedbymenwholiketodatewomen;moreover,shemightmakeherfriendsawareofthis(aswellasother)preferencessothattheymightsuggestsuitablepartnersforher.Phyllis’expressedpreferenceforandpursuitofmenstrikesmeasmorallyunproblematicofitself—especiallyinanidealsocietywheretheevilofsexismhasbeenovercome.Butthispreferenceandpursuitmakeampleuseofgenderdistinctions,andwouldbefarmorecomplicatedwithoutsuchdistinctions.Letusheredistinguishbetweentwodifferentsensesof“discrimination.”Inonesense,todiscriminateissimplytotreatthingsdifferently.Wediscriminateinthissenseallthetime—whenwechooseripeproduceoverunripeoroverripeproduce,flatteringclothingoverunflattering,goodbooksoverbad.Inallofthesecases,thedifferentialtreatmentisjustifiedwithrespecttosomegood.Butinanothersense,todiscriminateistotreatthingsdifferentlyforirrelevantorunjustreasons.Mostofwhatwecall“racialdiscrimination,”forexample,fallsintothislattercategory.Phyllis’preferenceformenisacaseofdiscriminationintheformer,benignsense.Itisjustifiedwithrespecttosomegood—namely,thegoodofherbeingabletoenjoyfulfillingrelationships.Itfollowsthatgenderdiscrimination(inthesenseofdifferentialtreatment)maybecompatiblewiththeandrogynoussociety,providedthatitisjustifiedwithrespecttosomegood.Discriminationagainsthomosexualsisoneformofgenderdiscrimination.Coulditbejustified?Therearesomecaseswhereitwouldbeobviouslyso:forexample,ifwewereconductingasurveyofhomosexualpeopleforthepurposeofbetterunderstandingdiversityoncampus.Suchasurveywouldinsomesensediscriminateagainstheterosexualpeople,thougharguablyforanoverridinggood.ButthecasesIhaveinmindarethemorecontroversialones:isitpossible,forexample,thatthediscriminationagainstthehomosexualGlennandStacyintermsofthevariousmarriagerightsIhavediscussediscompatiblewiththeandrogynousideal?Iturnnowtosomeargumentsregardingthistypeofdiscrimination.ThemoralequivalenceofhomosexualityandheterosexualityAtfirstglance,theidealofandrogynoussocietymightseeminconsistentwithsuchdiscrimination.Consideroneofthemoreblatantformsofsuchdiscrimination:anti-sodomylaws.Atthetimeofwriting,anti-sodomylawsareofficiallyonthebooksineighteenstatesplusPuertoRicoandtheUSmilitary.Fiveofthesestates—Arkansas,Kansas,Missouri,OklahomaandTexas—prohibitonlyhomosexualsodomy.7Thelawsintheselatterstatesseemclearlytodiscriminateonthebasisofgender:theyallowwomentoperformcertainactsthatmencannotandvice-versa.Assuch,theyassignalegalrightonthebasisofgenderratherthan“naturalability,reasonableexpectation,andchoice”—astheandrogynousidealrequires.Buttheissueisnotsosimple.First,manypeopleseeallanti-sodomylaws—andnotjustthosethatspecifyhomosexualsodomy—asdiscriminatory.Itisbynomeansclearhowtheidealofandrogynyimpliesanythingaboutthegender-nonspecificsodomylawsintheotherthirteenstates.Second,eveninthestateswithgender-specificsodomylawsthetraditionalistscanmakethefollowingargument:noindividual—maleorfemale—ispermittedtoengageinhomosexualsodomy;ergo,thelawsdonotunjustlydiscriminateonthebasisofgender.Itisnotenoughtorespondtothisargumentbypointingoutthattheconceptofhomosexualsodomydependsupongenderdistinctions,since,asIhavejustargued,notallgenderdistinctionsareinvidious.Theissueisthefollowing:aretheregoodreasonsfortheprohibitionofhomosexualsodomy?Evenanandrogynoussocietycouldallowforgenderdistinctionsincaseswheresuchdistinctionsarejustifiedwithrespecttosomegood.Thecentralreasonofferedfortheprohibitionofhomosexualsodomy—andindeed,formostoppositiontogayrights—isthathomosexualityismorallywrong.Notallpoliticaloppositiontogayrightspresupposesthismoralclaim.Forexample,opponentsofgaysinthemilitaryoftenclaimthatregardlessofthemoralstatusofhomosexuality,thereareconcernsaboutunitcohesionthatjustifyexclusionarypolicies.8Nevertheless,evenwhenmoraloppositionisnotanexplicitrationale,itisoftenlurkinginthebackground.Considerthegaymarriagedebate.Someopponentsofgaymarriagearguethatthisdebateisnotaboutthemoralstatusofrelationshipsatall.Rather,thestatechooses,forthepurposeofprotectingchildren,tosupportthoserelationshipsthatcanproducethem;homosexualrelationshipscannotproducechildren;therefore,homosexualrelationshipsdonotmeritstatesupport.Butthisargumentisnotentirelyconvincing,sinceitisbynomeansclearthatthisisthestate’sprimaryjustificationforbeinginthemarriagebusiness.Foronething,neitherallnoronlyheterosexualpartnershavechildren,anditwouldseemthatthechildrenoflesbianmothers(forexample)areasdeservingofasecurehomeasanyotherchildren.Moreover,thestatepermitscouplespastchildbearingagetomarry,aswellascoupleswhomitwishestodiscouragefromhavingchildren—forexample,coupleswhereoneorbothpartnersisincarcerated,orpartnerswithcertaininheritablediseases—nottomentionthosewhohavebeenconvictedofdomesticabuse.9NotethatourheterosexualGlennandStacycanbemarriedeventhoughtheyarenomorecapableofproducingchildrenthanourhomosexualGlennandStacy(recallthatStacyissterile).Sincethecapacityforbearingchildrenisnotanecessaryconditionformarriage,itsabsenceseemsshakygroundfordenyingmarriagetothehomosexualGlennandStacy.10\n162JUSTICEFORGLENNANDSTACYThemoreingenuousapproachforopponentsofgaymarriagetotakeistoacknowledgethatoppositiontogaymarriageisgroundedinthebeliefthathomosexualrelationshipsaremorallyinferiortoheterosexualrelationships,andthusundeservingofsocialandlegalsanction.Icontendthatthisbeliefistheprimaryrationaleformostformsofanti-gaydiscrimination—includinganti-sodomylaws,denialoflegalmarriage,andhousingandjobdiscrimination,amongothers.Therefore,inwhatfollowsIwillfocusonthemoralevaluationofhomosexuality.InattackingthemoraloppositionIhopetoundercutmuchofthepoliticalandsocialoppositionaswell.SinceIamultimatelyinterestedinaquestionofpublicpolicy,Iwillfocusonthesecularmoralarguments.11Manydefensesofhomosexualityfocusexclusivelyonrebuttingtheargumentsagainsthomosexuality.Iwishtobeginsomewhatdifferently,bydevelopinganargumentforhomosexuality.ThecaseofGlennandStacysuggestsanargumentfromanalogy.ArgumentsfromanalogyattempttoshowthatbecauseAandBaresimilarinsomerelevantrespects,theyarelikelysimilarinotherrespectsaswell.Forexample,ifBruce’scargetsgoodgasmileage,thenSusan’scar—whichhasasimilarengineandasimilarweight—islikelytogetgoodgasmileageaswell.Thekeyhereis“relevantrespects.”IfBruce’scarandSusan’scarweresimilarincertainotherrespects—forexample,beingthesamecolororbeingAmerican-made—theconclusionwouldbefarlessprobable.Enginedesignandweightaredirectlyrelevanttogasmileage;colorandnationaloriginarenot.ThusAandBmustbesimilarinwaysthatarerelevanttotheconclusionthatonewantstoestablish.TheconclusionIwanttoestablishisthatthehomosexualGlennandStacyhavearelationshipthatismorallyequivalenttothatoftheheterosexualGlennandStacy—ormorebroadly,thatgenderisirrelevanttothemoralcharacterofrelationships.Myprimafacieargumentfortheequivalenceisquitesimple.ConsiderthecaseoftheheterosexualGlennandStacy.Virtuallyeveryonewouldagreethattheirrelationshipismorallygood,oratleastmorallypermissible.Why?Ihavealreadyobservedthatitbringsthemhappiness,andhelpsthemgrow,andexpressesandfacilitatestheirlong-termcommitment.Thesearegoodreasonsforregardingtherelationshipasgood.YetthesereasonsareallpresentinthecaseofthehomosexualGlennandStacyaswell.HereIwishtostaveoffalikelyobjection.Opponentsofhomosexualitymightretortthatmyprimafacieargumentequivocatesontheterm“relationships.”ItisnotthefactthatthehomosexualGlennandStacyofferemotionalsupporttoeachother,orshareahousehold,orshopatIKEA,thatismorallytroublesome—itisthefactthattheyhavegenitalsexualcontact.Theseotherthingsmightbemorallyneutralorevenmorallygood,myopponentsmightconcede,buttheyareentirelyseparablefromtherelationship’ssexualaspect.ItispreciselythislastcontentionthatIwishtodeny.Thereisnoreasontoassume—andindeed,therearegoodreasonstodoubt—thatonecanremovethesexualaspectoftherelationshipandhaveallothersremainthesame.Sexcanbeapowerfulanduniquewayofbuilding,celebrating,andreplenishingintimacyinarelationship.Thisisoneimportantreasonwhyheterosexualpeoplehavesexeveniftheydon’twantchildren,don’twantchildrenyet,ordon’twantanymorechildren.Itisareasonwhysexlessmarriagesaretypicallycauseforconcern.Toassumethatonecansubtractsexwithoutaffectingtherestoftheequationistotakeanaiveandreductionisticviewofsexualrelationships.Thisisnottosaythatphysicalintimacyisalwaysconnectedwithotherformsofintimacy:sexissometimesimpersonal,mechanical,orfleeting.ButinthecasesthatI’mconsidering,sexismuchmorethanthat.Thephysicalunionofthepartnersmanifestsandcontributestoamuchlargerunion.VirtuallyeveryonewouldagreethatthesexualrelationshipbetweentheheterosexualGlennandStacyisgood—eventhoughitcannotproducechildren.Itrealizes,ofitselfandthroughitseffects,avarietyofconcretebenefits.Pleasureisoneofthesebenefits,but(asIhaveargued)itisnottheonlyone.ButwhataboutthehomosexualGlennandStacy?Atfirstglance,theonlydifferencebetweenthetwocasesappearstobethegenderofoneoftheparties.Alloftheotherfactors—themutualregard,thelong-termcommitment,thepersonalgrowth—arepresent.Thisconstitutesastrongprimafaciecasefortreatingthetworelationshipsequally—morally,sociallyandpolitically.Theburdenofproofisnowonthosewhowouldtreatthemdifferently.Myclaimaboutburdenofproofdeserveselaboration.InofferingaprimafacieargumentinfavorofhomosexualityIintendtocorrectwhatIperceivetobearhetoricalmiscalculationonthepartofsomegayrightsadvocates.Theseadvocatesholdthatnoargumentinfavorofhomosexualrelationshipsisnecessary:theburdenofproofisalwaysonthosewhowouldcondemnpeopleorrestricttheirrelationshipoptions.Theiropponents,bycontrast,claimthattheburdenofproofisalwaysonthosewhowouldalterestablishedtradition.Inasensethey’rebothwrong:theburdenofproofisonwhoeverwantstoprovesomething.Thus,inlinewithwhatSterbacalls“apeacemakingwayofdoingphilosophy,”12Ibeginmyargumentwithgayrightsopponentsonapointofagreement.WeagreethattheheterosexualGlennandStacy’srelationshipisgoodandworthyofapproval.Mynextmoveistopointoutthat,atfirstglance,theonlyintrinsicdifferencebetweenthemandthehomosexualGlennandStacyisthegenderofoneoftheparties.Whyisthatdifferencemorallysignificant?Inresponsetomyprimafacieargumentfromanalogy,opponentsofhomosexualityhavethreeoptions(assumingthattheywishtobeconsistent).Theycanextendtheiroppositiontonon-procreativeheterosexualrelationships.Forobviousreasons,fewwilldothis.Theycanrenouncetheiroppositiontohomosexualrelationships.Or,finally,theycanexplainwhygenderconstitutesamorallyrelevantdifference,eitherofitselforthroughitseffects.Mostopponentschoosethisthirdoption.Iturnnowtothreerepresentativeattempts:JohnFinnis’naturallawargument,MichaelLevin’sabnormalityargument,andwhatI\nJOHNCORVINO163call“thePIBreductio.”Sincethefirsttwoargumentshavereceivedconsiderableattentionelsewhere,Ishallkeepmyremarksaboutthemsomewhatbriefandinsteadfocusonthethird.13Finnis’argumentisespeciallyrelevantfortworeasons.First,Finnishasexplicitlyaddressedthequestionofwhythehomosexualcoupleshouldbeevaluateddifferentlyfromthesterileheterosexualcouple,whoseematfirstglancetoresembletheirhomosexualcounterpartsineveryrespectbutone.Second,Finnishasexplicitlyconnectedhismoralargumenttopublicpolicyconsiderations,includingnotonlygaymarriagebutalsocivilrightsprotectionsaswell.14UnderstandingFinnis’argumentrequiresunderstandinghisnaturallawtheory.Asoneofthe“newnaturallawyers,”Finnisholdsthattherearecertainbasicgoodsthatareintrinsicallyworthyofpursuit.By“basic,”hemeansthattheyareirreducibletoothergoods(e.g.happiness).OneofthesegoodsiswhatFinniscalls“themaritalgood.”Themaritalgoodisthetwo-in-onefleshunionofahusbandandwife.Thisunionrealizestwoimportantvalues(thoughitisnotreducibletoeither):procreationandfriendship.Evenincaseswhereprocreationisimpossible—asinthecaseofthesterileheterosexualcouple—asexualactcanstillbeof“thereproductivekind”—thatis,ofthesortnormallysuitableforreproduction.Suchanactactualizesthetwo-in-one-fleshbiologicalunionofthepartnersinawaythathomosexualactscannot.Theproblemwithhomosexuality,asFinnisseesit,isthatitturnsawayfromabasicgoodandputsacounterfeitinitsplace.Insteadofrealizingthemaritalgoodthroughbodilyunion,thehomosexualcoupletreattheirbodiesasmereinstrumentsofpleasure.Homosexualconductisthereforeunnatural,immoral,andworthyofcondemnation.Suppose,forthesakeofargument,weweretograntthathomosexualintercoursecannotachieve“themaritalgood.”Finnis’argumentneverthelessseemstodependonafalsedichotomy:eithersexualactsachievethemaritalgoodortheyfailtoachieveanygoodsatall,insteadcounterfeitingthemaritalgoodandtreatingthebodyasamereobject.ButwhataboutthevariousconcretegoodswedescribedinthecaseofGlennandStacy?Theirsexualactsareawayofgenerating,replenishingandenhancingemotionalintimacy.Theyareanavenueofcommunicationforwhichwordswouldbeinadequate.Moregenerally,theymakeGlennandStacyhappy—notmerelyinashort-term,hedonisticsense,butinalong-term,“bigpicture”way.Suchgoodsareatleastasintelligible—andvaluable—asFinnis’somewhatnebulous“maritalgood.”Indeed,oncloserinspection,“themaritalgood”appearstobeanadhocconstructionfordistinguishingbetweenthesterileheterosexualcoupleandthehomosexualcouple,whoareotherwiseessentiallysimilar.MichaelLevin’sargumentdependsupontheconceptof“normality”ratherthan“naturalness.”ForLevin,thedifferencebetweentheheterosexualGlennandStacyandthehomosexualGlennandStacyisthatthelatter’sbehaviorisabnormalandthuslikelytoleadtounhappiness.15ItisabnormalbecausethehomosexualGlennandStacyarenotusingtheirsexualorgansforwhattheyarefor.Penisesareforinsertingintovaginas,notforinsertingintomouthsorotherorifices;vaginasareforreceivingpenises,notforrubbingupagainstothervaginas.Anorganisforsomefunctionifandonlyifthatfunctionexplainsitsexistence(i.e.whyitwasselectedthroughevolution).Ourteethareforchewing:wehaveteethbecauseourancestorswhousedtheirteethforchewingtendedtosurviveandreproduce,creatingprogenywhoalsohadteethandusedthemforchewing.Levinillustrateswithananalogy:Sharkteetharefortearingflesh,sinceprimevalsharkswithsharpteethdevouredpreymoreefficientlythanlesswell-endowedcompetitors,andweretherebyfitter.Thus,theirabilitytotearfleshexplainswhytherearesharkteeth.Sharkteethalsoimpressaquariumvisitors,butthatisnotwhatsharkteethareforbecauseimpressingaquariumvisitorsisnotwhytoday’ssharkshavesharpteeth.16Simplyput,wehavepenisesandvaginasbecauseourancestorswhoputtheirpenisesintovaginas(orputtheirvaginasaroundpenises)tendedtoreproduce,passingalongthetendencytohavepenisesandvaginasandtousetheminthisway.AccordingtoLevin,abnormalbehaviorinhumanstendstocauseunhappinessbecauseevolutionreinforces(makesusenjoy)normaloradaptivebehaviors.Ourancestorswhoenjoyedusingtheirteethforchewingtendedtousetheirteethinthiswayandthuslivelongerandcreatemoreoffspring,whointurnenjoyedusingtheirteethinthisway.Inasense,weare“programmed”throughevolutiontoenjoyusingourorgansinevolutionarilyadaptive(i.e.normal)ways.Correspondingly,wearelikelytobeunhappywhenweusetheminabnormalways.Becauseoftheconnectionbetweenabnormalityandunhappiness,itisreasonableforsocietytodiscourageabnormalbehaviorsthroughlegalandsocialsanctions.HereinliesLevin’sjustificationfortreatingthehomosexualGlennandStacydifferentlyfromtheheterosexualGlennandStacy.ThehomosexualGlennandStacy,insofarastheyareengaginginabnormalbehavior,arelikelytobelesshappythantheirheterosexualcounterparts.Societyhasaninterestinmaintainingandpromotingthehappinessofitsmembers.Therefore,societyisjustifiedinusinglegalandsocialsanctionstodiscouragethehomosexualGlennandStacyfrompursuingtheirrelationship.IshouldnotethatLevindoesnotseehisargumentasestablishingamoraldifferencebetweenthetwocases.Rather,heclaimsthathomosexualityisintrinsicallybadinaprudentialsense.ThereismuchtosayaboutLevin’sargument,andinparticularabouthisaccountofevolution,butIshallfocusontwobriefpoints.17First,Levin’sargumentdependsontheimplausiblepremisethatthereisoneandonlyonepurposethatthegenitalorgansarefor.GivenLevin’ssenseof“for”—inwhichathingisforwhateverpurposeexplainsitscontinued\n164JUSTICEFORGLENNANDSTACYexistencethroughevolution—itisnotsurprisingthatLevinidentifiesprocreationaswhatgenitalorgansarefor.Butitisalsoplausible,givenLevin’saccount,toholdthatthegenitalsareforexperiencingpleasureandintimacy.Ourancestorswhousedtheirgenitalsforexperiencingpleasureandintimacyinavarietyofsituations—bothprocreativeandnon-procreative—wouldlikelybehappier,livelongerandproducemoreoffspringthanthosewhodidnot(allelsebeingequal).Pleasureandintimacyareconducivetoemotionalhealth,whichisinturnconducivetophysicalhealth,andbothareconducivetolongevity,whichisconducivetoprocreation.Homosexualintercoursewouldnothavepreventedourancestorsfromprocreatinganymorethanmywritingphilosophypaperspreventsmefromprocreating—theyaresimplynon-procreativeactivities.Levin’sargumentthushastheabsurdimplicationthatthehomosexualGlennandStacywouldceasebeingabnormalaslongastheybeganusingtheirgenitalsinprocreativewaysfromtimetotime(perhapswithopposite-sexloversontheside).Or,toputthepointanotherway,Levin’saccountseemstoentailthatevenifhomosexualbehaviorisabnormal,bisexualbehaviorisnot.Mysecondresponsehastodowiththeconnectionbetweennormalityandhappiness.HereLevin’sargumentseemsblatantlytoignoretheevidence.Mosthomosexualsareinhomosexualrelationshipspreciselybecausesuchrelationshipsmakethemhappierthanheterosexualrelationshipswould.Levinseemstothinkthatifheterosexualityisnormalandifnormalbehaviorsmakepeoplehappierthanabnormalbehaviors,thenheterosexualityshouldmakepeoplehappierthannon-heterosexuality.Butthatconclusionisatbestapredictionregardingwhattoexpect,notanaccountofwhatinfactoccurs.Andevenif,contrarytothebestavailableevidence,heterosexualswereonaveragehappierthanhomosexuals,andevenifthatsupposeddisparityhadnothingtodowithsociety’streatmentofthegroupsinquestion,Levin’sconclusionabouthowtotreatthehomosexualGlennandStacywouldn’tfollow.Forifthepointistoencourageahappysociety,thequestiontoaskisnot,“Whoishappier—heterosexualsorhomosexuals?”Thequestiontoaskis“Issocietybetteroff(i.e.happieroverall)bysupportingordiscouragingthehomosexualGlennandStacy?”GiventhatGlennandStacy’srelationshipnotonlyenhancestheirownhappinessbutalsomakesthemmorecheerful,stable,andproductivemembersofsociety,supportingtherelationship(andotherslikethem)producesanetgaininoverallhappiness.Conversely,condemningtherelationshipfailstomakethemoranyoneelsehappier.ThefinalargumentIwishtoconsiderisquitedifferentfromthatofFinnisorLevin.Accordingtothisargument,ifweaccepthomosexuality,thenthereisnoprincipledreasonfornotacceptingpolygamy,incestandbestiality(PIBforshort).AsDrLauraSchlessingerofradiofameputit,inresponsetotheVermontdecisiongrantingstatewidedomestic-partnerbenefits:Iftwomencanbesanctifiedinthiscountryasmarriage,thenwhatisyourlogicalorjustifiablereasontoexcludeadultincest?Amanandawoman—consensual,25yearsold,whoarebrotherandsister—shouldnotbediscriminatedagainstbecausetheyhaveageneticrelationship.18Althoughthereareseveralwaysofparsingtheargument,thegeneralformseemstobethatofareductioadabsurdum:thereasonsinfavorofhomosexualrelationshipsconstitutereasonsinfavoroftheclearlyobjectionablePIBrelationships;ifthelatterareworthyofcondemnation,thensoaretheformer.WhydoopponentsofhomosexualitythinkthatthereasonsinfavorofhomosexualrelationshipsconstitutereasonsinfavorofPIBrelationships?Theanswer,Ithink,isthattheymisunderstand—ormischaracterize—theargumentinfavorofhomosexualrelationships.Theytaketheargumenttobe,“Itfeelsgoodandit’sconsensual,soitmustbepermissible.”Ifthatwereallthereweretotheargumentinfavorofhomosexualrelationships,itwouldindeedoffersupporttomanyPIBrelationships.19Butthatargumentisastrawman.Thebetterargumentforhomosexualrelationshipsistheargumentfromanalogydevelopedabove:homosexualrelationshipsofferallofthesignificantbenefitsofnon-procreativeheterosexualrelationshipswithoutanyapparentdrawbacks.“Butwait,”objectthetraditionalists.“Can’tyoumakethesameargumentforPIBrelationships?”Notexactly.ItistruethatyoucanusethesameformofargumentforPIBrelationships:PIBrelationshipshavebenefitsX,YandZandnorelevantdrawbacks.ButwhetherPIBrelationshipsdoinfacthavesuchbenefitsandlacksuchdrawbacksisanempiricalmatter,onethatwillnotbesettledbylookingtohomosexualrelationships.Toputthepointmoredirectly:toobservethatmanypeopleflourishinhomosexualrelationshipsisnottoprovethatothersmightflourishinincestuous,bestialorpolygamousrelationships.Whethertheywouldornotisaseparatequestion—onethatrequiresawholenewsetofdata.SomyanswertothePIBchallengeistoarguethatthereisnoreasontoassumethatconcretebenefitsrealizedinhomosexualrelationshipscanberealizedinPIBrelationships.(ThisisnottoprovethattherearenobenefitssufficienttojustifyPIBrelationships;exploringthatissuewouldtakemetoofarafieldhere.)ButthereisanotherwaytounderstandthePIBreductio,onethatescapestheargumentIhavegiven.Onthisapproach,thepointofthePIBargumentistoprovethatnotallofourmoraljudgmentscanbecapturedintermsofflourishingandharmconsiderations.Thisclaimiscontroversial.Sterba,forinstance,explicitlycontradictsitinJusticeforHereandNow:Nowitmightbeobjectedherethatwhatiswrongwithcontraception,masturbation,andhomosexualityisthattheyallviolatetheprinciplethatoneshouldnever(intentionally)doevilthatgoodmaycomeofit,whereitisclaimedthatthe\nJOHNCORVINO165evilinvolvedintheseactsisthatofinterferingwithorfrustratingthehumanprocreativeprocess.Butifinterferingwithorfrustratingthehumanprocreativeprocessisalwaysevil,whomdoesitharm?Surelyifevilisdone,someoneisharmed,andifnooneisharmedthentheactionsinquestioncannotbeevil.20Manytraditionalistswoulddenythislastcontention.OnesuchtraditionalistisDavidBradshaw,whousesthe“Whynotbestiality?”objectioninhisresponsetomydefenseofhomosexualrelationshipsinthebookSameSex.21AccordingtoBradshaw,whatiswrongwithhomosexualityisnot(necessarily)thatitproducesharm,orthatitfailstopromoteflourishing,butthatitfailstorespectwhathecalls“thebody’smoralspace.”Considerthefollowingtwodistinctions:1male/female2animal/humanBradshawarguesthatjustasbestialityiswrongbecauseitfailstorespecttheseconddistinction,homosexualityiswrongbecauseitfailstorespectthefirst.(Setasideforamomenttheobviousquestionabouthowhomosexuality“failstorespect”themale/femaledistinction.Clearly,inonesense,itpresupposesthisdistinction.)There’ssomethingintuitivelyappealingtomanypeopleabouttheclaimthathomosexualityfailstorespectdistinction1andbestialityfailstorespectdistinction2,andthatbotharewrongforpreciselythosereasons.ThisargumentfitswithalargerpointBradshawwantstomakeabouthowmuchofourmoralunderstandingcannotbeunderstoodintermsofflourishingandharm.ThusthequestionIhaveraisedaboutpotentialbenefitsofPIBrelationshipsisbesidethepoint,accordingtoBradshaw.Bestialityandhomosexualityarewrong,notbecausethey’reharmful(thoughtheymaybeinmanycases),orbecausethey’renotconducivetoflourishing,butforaquitedifferentreason.OnBradshaw’sview,thePIBreductioappliesnotmerelytoanargumentabouthomosexuality,buttothelargerattempttogroundmoralclaimspurelyonconsiderationsofflourishingandharm.Ifwerestrictourmoraldiscussionstoconsiderationsofflourishingandharm,heargues,thenwewillhavetoembraceparadigmaticallyimmoralactivitieslikebestiality.InwhatremainsIrespondtothisargument.Consideranotherdistinction:3caucasian/non-caucasianOnecaneasilyimaginesomeonearguing(peoplediditnotverylongago)thatinterracialrelationshipsarewrongbecausetheyfailtorespectdistinction3.Mostofustodaywouldrespond“Whyisthatmorallyrelevant?”KeepinmindthattheBradshaw-typetraditionalistcouldnotdenythemoralrelevanceof3onconsequentialist(ormorebroadly,flourishing/harm)grounds,sincehehasalreadyabandonedthatperspective.Norwouldanappealtotraditionwork,sincejustafewdecadesagoonecouldmakethesameappealinbothcases.Rather,wehavereachedanimpasse:eitheryoudrawthelineofmoralrelevancebefore3orafter3.Andtheredoesn’tseemtometobeanyprincipledreasonfordrawingitonewayortheotherwithoutappealingtoflourishing/harmconsiderations.Onemightretortthatwhile1and2bothinvolvebodilystructure,3doesnot,andthatmightbeareasonfordrawingasharplinebetween2and3.Butthisresponseiscircular.Igrantthat1and2dealwithbodilystructureand3doesn’t,butthequestionathandiswhydrawthelineatbodilystructure?Whyisthatamorallyrelevantfact?Whynotdrawthelineatgeneralappearance(below3)ormerelyatspecies(between1and2)orsomewhereelse?Idon’tseethatthetraditionalisthasmuchofanansweratthispoint,excepttosay,“That’sjustthewaythingsare.”ButasIarguedabove,theopponentofinterracialrelationshipscansaythesamething.SuchananswerisinsufficienttojustifytreatingthehomosexualGlennandStacysubstantiallydifferentlyfromtheheterosexualGlennandStacy.Thisraises,Ithink,amoregenerallessonabouthowtoproceedinappliedethics—particularlywhenusingargumentsfromanalogy,whicharealmostunavoidableinthatarea.Myargumentinthispaperbeginswithananalogybetween(a)somethingwidelyapproved(non-procreativeheterosexualrelationships)and(b)somethingcontroversial(homosexualrelationships).Bradshaw’sargumentbeginswithananalogybetween(b)somethingcontroversial(homosexualrelationships)and(c)somethingwidelycondemned(PIBrelationships).Myargumentproceedsbyshowingthat(a)and(b)aresimilarinmorallyrelevantrespectsandthattheylackanymorallyrelevantdifferences.Bradshaw’sargument,bycontrast,doesnotbeginbyshowingthat(b)and(c)aresimilarinmorally\n166JUSTICEFORGLENNANDSTACYrelevantrespects,sincethereasonsforcondemning(b)(namelythatitfailstorespectthemale/femaledistinction)aredifferentfromthereasonsforcondemning(c)(namelythatitfailstorespectthehuman/non-humandistinction).22Assuch,themoraldistinctionsdrawnbyBradshawsmackofarbitrariness.ConclusionIhavearguedthatthebestmoralargumentsagainsthomosexualrelationshipsfailtorebuttheprimafaciecaseintheirfavor.Itispossiblethatbetterargumentsmightsurface.Butintheabsenceofsucharguments,thecasefortreatingheterosexualandhomosexualrelationshipsasmorallyequivalentstands.Andinsofarasthejustificationsofferedfortreatingthemdifferentlysociallyorpoliticallydependuponthemoralarguments,thecasefortreatingthemthesamesociallyandpoliticallyalsostands.IconcludethatthecontroversialformsofdiscriminationagainstthehomosexualGlennandStacyareincompatiblewiththeandrogynousideal.Wearealongwayfromthatideal,particularlywithrespecttohomosexualjustice.Asnotedabove,therearescoresoflegalbenefitsdeniedtothehomosexualGlennandStacythattheheterosexualGlennandStacytakeforgranted.Butthereissomereasonforoptimism.WhiletheVermontdecisionextendingdomestic-partnerbenefitstogayandlesbiancitizenshasnotmetwithuniversalacclaim,ithasfurtheredanationaldiscussionontherightsofhomosexualpersons.Moreover,astateappealscourtinHoustonhasjustruled(inJune2000)thattheTexassodomylawisunconstitutionalunderthestate’sEqualRightsAmendment;variousotherstatesfacesimilarchallenges.23ItisworthnotingthatboththeVermontdecisionandtheTexasdecisionarebasedonpremisesregardingsex(or,morebroadly,gender)discrimination:theyarguethattheexistinglawstreatmenandwomendifferentlyinwaysthatareunjustifiedwithrespecttoanycompellingstateinterest.24Theconnectionsbetweengenderjusticeandhomosexualjusticemeritfurtherexploration.25NOTES1Plato,Republic,454c,trans.G.M.A.Grube(Indianapolis:Hackett,1974)p.116.2JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)p.80.3Thisisnottodenythatthereareotherplausibledefinitionsofbiologicalsexorthattherearedifficult,vagueorborderlinecases.4Idonotmeantoprecludethepossibilityofadditionalgenders;perhapsweshouldaddthecategoryof“intergendered”?5IamindebtedtoJacobHaleforenlighteningexchangesonthisissue,aswellastoAdrianeFriedl,HerbertGranger,LawrenceB.Lombard,BruceRussell,SusanVinebergandRobertJ.Yanal.6Itmayhappenthatbecauseofnaturalabilitysomecharacteristicsaremoredifficultforsomeindividualstoattain.Thepointisthat,inanandrogynoussociety,one’sbiologicalsexwillneverconstituteanabsolutebartoanydesirablecharacteristic.7Theremainingthirteenstates,whichhavegender-nonspecificsodomylaws,areAlabama,Arizona,Florida,Idaho,Louisiana,Massachusetts,Michigan,Minnesota,Mississippi,NorthCarolina,SouthCarolina,UtahandVirginia.Severaloftheeighteenstatescurrentlyfacecourtchallengesthatcouldoverturntheiranti-sodomylaws.8ForadefenseofthisviewseeJohnLuddy,“MakeWar,NotLove:ThePentagon’sBanisWiseandJust,”inJohnCorvino(ed.)SameSex:DebatingtheEthics,Science,andCultureofHomosexuality(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1997)pp.267–73.ForaresponseseePaulSiegel,“Dry-CleaningtheTroopsandOtherMatters:ACritiqueof‘Don’tAsk,Don’tTell’,”inthesamevolume,pp.274–80.9InTurnerv.Safely482U.S.78(1987),theUSSupremeCourtaffirmedtherightofprisonerstomarryonthegroundsthattheemotionalandlegalbenefitsofmarriageweresufficientjustificationsformarriagedespitethelimitationsofprisonlife.Foradiscussionofthispoint,seeWilliamN.EskridgeJr,TheCaseforSame-SexMarriage(NewYork:FreePress,1996)chapter5.10Infairness,theremaybemorecomplexindirectargumentsconnectinglegalmarriagewiththenurturingofchildren.ButIwouldargue(givenmorespacethanIhavehere)thatthesearelesssuccessfulthanargumentsconnectingmarriagetothenurturingofhumanbeingsmoregenerally.11Fordiscussionofsomereligiousarguments,seeDanielHelminiak,WhattheBibleReallySaysAboutHomosexuality(SanFrancisco:AlamoSquarePress,1994);andJohnCorvino,“TheBibleCondemnedUsurers,Too,”TheHarvardGayandLesbianReview,vol.III,no.4(fall1996)pp.11–12.12Op.cit.,chapter1.13ForfullerresponsestoFinnisseeStephenMacedo,“HomosexualityandtheConservativeMind,”GeorgetownLawJournal,vol.84,no.2(December1995);andAndrewKoppelman,“HomosexualConduct:AReplytotheNewNaturalLawyers,”SameSex,op.cit.ForfullerresponsestoLevin,seeTimothyF.Murphy,“HomosexualityandNature:HappinessandtheLawatStake,”JournalofAppliedPhilosophy,4(1987)pp.195–205;LaurenceM.Thomas,“PreferencesandEquality:AResponsetoLevin,”inLaurenceM.ThomasandMichaelE.Levin,SexualOrientationandHumanRights(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1999)pp.159–68.ForadiscussionofbothseeAndrewKoppelman,“IsMarriageInherentlyHeterosexual?”,42Am.J.Juris.51(1997).14FinnistestifiedinRomerv.Evans,acaseinwhichtheSupremeCourtultimatelyinvalidatedColoradovoters’attemptthroughreferendumtorepealvariouscityordinancesbanningdiscriminationonthebasisofsexualorientation.Finnisarguedthatsuch\nJOHNCORVINO167discriminationwasreasonablegiventhemoralstatusofhomosexuality.SeeJohnFinnis,“Law,Morality,and‘SexualOrientation’,”inSameSex,op.cit.ThearticlegrewoutofFinnis’affidavitintheRomerv.Evanscase.15SeeMichaelLevin,“WhyHomosexualityisAbnormal,”Monist,vol.67(1984)pp.251–83;and“Homosexuality,Abnormality,andCivilRights,”PublicAffairsQuarterly,vol.10,no.1(January1996)pp.31–48.16“Homosexuality,Abnormality,andCivilRights,”op.cit.,p.32.17Forafullerdiscussionseethearticlescitedinnote13.18QuotedintheAdvocate,15February2000,p.35.19Sexwithanimalsoccurswithouttheanimals’consent;ontheotherhand,sodoallofourotherdealingswithanimals.Adult-childincestisnon-consensualbutpeerincestmaybeconsensual.20Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow,p.113.21SeeJohnCorvino,“WhyShouldn’tTommyandJimHaveSex?,”andDavidBradshaw,“AReplytoCorvino,”inJohnCorvino(ed.)SameSex:DebatingtheEthics,ScienceandCultureofHomosexuality(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1997).22Bradshawmightreplythat(b)and(c)arewrongforsimilarreasons:bothfailtorespectthebody’smoralspace.Butwhyisthesamenottrueofinterracialrelationships?Itseemstomethattheonlysalientsimilaritybetween(b)and(c)isthatthey’vetraditionallybeencondemned.Butthatconsiderationisquestion-begging:theissueathandiswhyshould(b)becondemned?23JohnGeddesLawrenceandTyronGarnerv.TheStateofTexas,FourteenthCourtofAppeals,8June2000.24Iwouldarguethatwhattheycall“sexdiscrimination”isbettertermed“genderdiscrimination,”sinceitisbasedonexternalcharacteristicsratherthanchromosomes.25Iamindebtedtonumerouspeoplefordiscussionsthataidedthedevelopmentofthispaper,especiallyLawrenceB.Lombard,BradRoth,BruceRussell,JamesP.Sterba,SusanVineberg,ThomasWilliamsandRobertJ.Yanal.\nRacialandmulticulturalperspectives\n16WHITESUPREMACYANDRACIALJUSTICE,HEREANDNOW1CharlesW.MillsIntheever-expanding,impossible-to-keep-up-withphilosophicalliteratureonjustice,JamesP.Sterba’sJusticeforHereandNow2isdistinguishedbymanyvirtues:theaccessibilityandclarityofthewriting;theself-consciousattempttobecomprehensiveinhiscoverageofcontemporaryissues;theconstantrecoursetocrucialempiricaldata;andtheprovocative“reconciliationist”program.IfIamcriticalofSterbaoncertainpoints,asIwillbe,thisshouldnotbetakentoimplythatIdonotthinkthebookhasconsiderablemerit.Indeed,thereisanironicsenseinwhichSterbaopenshimselfuptocriticismbythisverymeritoriousness,inthathisambitiontobecomprehensiveraisesmoreissuesthancanpossiblybedealtwithadequatelyina250-pagebook.Eventhesingletopicofracialjustice,Iwillsuggest,hasmoredimensionsthanSterbaaddresses.1ChallengingtheorthodoxframeworkMycontributioninthispresentvolumeislocatedundertheumbrellaheading,“Challengestosocialandpoliticalphilosophy.”Insomesense,then,itissupposedtoberadical,unconventional.Takeaminutetothinkaboutthis.Whatexactlyisthe“challenge”posedbytheideaofracialjustice?Onewaytoanswerthisquestionmightbetoaskourselveswhataraciallyjustsocietywouldbelike.Astraightforwardresponseisthatitwouldbeasocietyinwhichpeople’slife-chanceswouldbeindependentofrace;thatnobodywouldbeunfairlyadvantagedordisadvantagedbecauseofrace.Articulatingnormsofracialjustice,then,isnotthesameaspropoundingall-encompassingcriteriaforjusticeasawhole.Inthisrespect,racialjusticediffersfromsocialistjustice,andthosevarietiesoffeministjusticewhichdohavesuchpretensions(feminismasacomprehensiveandself-sufficientworld-view).SomeAfrocentristsmightarguethatanAfrican-centeredethicaloutlook,drawingonpre-colonialcommunitarianvalues,wouldbeabletoprovidesuchaframeworktocompetewiththemorefamiliarWesternones—forexample,throughbeingpredicatedonadifferentmodeloftheselfthanthatfamiliarfromliberaltheory.Butinterestingthoughthischallengemightbe,Iamnotseekingtodevelopithere.Forme,then,racialjusticeisonlyapartofjustice,andonecouldhaveasocietywhichisraciallyjustbutunjustinotherways.Racialjusticeisbestseenascorrectivejustice,remedialjustice,addressingthelegacyofthepastandtheongoingpracticesofthepresent.Sopartofthephilosophicalworkthathastobedoneindeterminingwhatracialjusticerequiresisgettingstraightonthislegacy.Politicalphilosophyissometimesrepresentedasapurelynormativesubject,butinfactitalsohasacrucialdescriptive/explanatorycomponent.Indeed,wecanregardmoraljudgmentsingeneral,includingjudgmentsaboutjustice,asbasedonacombinationoffactualandvalueclaims,asexpressedinthefollowingsimpleequation:FACTS(whathappened,whatishappening,whatislikelytohappen,whatisthecase)+VALUES(whatisgood/right)=OVERALLMORALJUDGMENT.(Iamusing“facts”broadlyenoughtocoverbothempiricallymorediscrete,localizableevents,andlargerongoingstates-of-affairsthatwouldneedtobecharacterizedinsystemicterms.)Peoplecan,ofcourse,disagreeaboutboth,butusuallyinethicsandmainstreampoliticalphilosophy,thefocusisondivergenceinvalues,e.g.debatesamongutilitarians,Kantians,andlibertariansaboutthemostdefensibleaxiology,andwhatitsimplicationswouldbe.Itisnotthatnoattentionatallispaidtothefacts.Utilitarians,forexample,willtypicallyarguethatoncewetakelikelyfutureconsequencesintoaccount,wewillbeabletoseewhytheirrecommendedpolicyisthebetterone.Libertarianswillbeconcerned,amongotherthings,totracethepastfactualhistorywhich,accordingtothem,givespeoplenormativeentitlementtocertainpropertyholdings.Andallpartiesmay,fromtimetotime,appealtoempiricalfeaturesoftheworld,whethernaturalorsocial.Sofactsdoplaysomeroleinthesedebates.Butbecausetherewillbe,orwillbepresumedtobe,ahighdegreeofcommonsensicalorscientificconsensusonthefactualpicture(thedescriptionofnaturalandsocialreality),ittendstodropoutasamajorfactor.Inotherwords,evenwhenutilitariansandlibertariansaretracingfutureconsequencesorpastcausalchains,theyaredoingsowithinaframeworkonwhich“we”canagree—theyareremindingusofthingswe(putatively)alreadyknow,orspellingoutingreaterdetailwhatthatpictureimplies.Sothefactualcomponentoftheequationistakentobe—not\n170CHARLESW.MILLSexactly,butmoreorless—relativelyuncontroversialbetweenthedifferentparties,andtherealfightisthenoverwhatfollowswhendifferentconceptionsoftherightandthegoodarelinkedwiththesefacts,andhowwell,insomecoherentistprocessofcognitiveequilibrium,theoutcomematchesourmoralintuitions.Butforthosejudgedtobepolitically“radical”—forexample,socialistsandfeminists—theagendaisdifferent.Usuallyitispreciselythefactual,orallegedlyfactual,pictureofthesocialworldthatcomesunderchallenge.Whatisseenasanuncontroversial,largelyconsensualcharacterizationofsociopoliticalrealitybymainstreamfiguresisexactlywhatiscontestedbytheheterodox.3Theradicalnatureoftheirchallenge,then,ofteninheresnotinastartlingnewaxiology,butinastartlingnewpictureoftheworld,whichoverturnstheconventionalwisdomandtheorthodoxconsensusonwhat“we”knowaboutsocialreality.Indeed,itputsintoquestiontheideaofanuncontested“we”ascognizingagentbyarguingthatthe“consensus”ismorelikelytoreflecttheperspectiveofthesociallyprivileged(bourgeois,male)thanaclassless,genderless“idealobserver.”Marxistsclaimthatevenwhatseemtobeinclusivistandegalitarianliberaldemocraciesarestructuredbyoppressiverelationsofclassexploitation.Feministsclaimthatmaledomination,patriarchy,hasbeensoubiquitousthatithasbeennaturalized,ignoredatbest,whennotovertlyjustified,bythe(male)politicalphilosopher.4Soitwilloftenbethecasethattheheartofthematter—or,toswitchmetaphors,whatdoesmostoftheworkinthe“challenge”tomainstreamtheorizingonjustice—reallylieshere.Oncethisdivergentfactualpicturehasbeensketched,onceacasehasbeenmadeforthepervasivenessofclassandgenderdomination,andthemechanismsbywhichtheyreproducethemselves,thusperpetuatingsystemicunfairness,evenethicistswithfairlydivergentvalue-commitmentsshouldbeabletoagreethatagivensocietyisunjust.SusanMollerOkin’sJustice,Gender,andtheFamily,forexample,doesahighlyeffectivefeministjobsimplybygoingthrougharangeofdifferentmaletheoristswithquitedivergentaxiologicalassumptions—MichaelSandel,AlasdairMacIntyre,MichaelWalzer,RobertNozick,JohnRawls;communitarianism,libertarianism,welfareliberalism—andshowinghowtheirprescriptionswouldallhavetoberadicallyrevisedoncethereal-life(asagainstthemythicalidealized)familyanditsgender-structuringisexamined.5Inthisspirit,IrisMarionYoungarguesthatfromtheperspectiveofleftwing“criticaltheory”:Normativereflectionmustbeginfromhistoricallyspecificcircumstances….Reflectingfromwithinaparticularsocialcontext,goodnormativetheorizingcannotavoidsocialandpoliticaldescriptionandexplanation….Unlikepositivistsocialtheory,however…criticaltheorydeniesthatsocialtheorymustaccedetothegiven.Socialdescriptionandexplanationmustbecritical,thatis,aimtoevaluatethegiveninnormativeterms.Withoutsuchacriticalstance,manyquestionsaboutwhatoccursinasocietyandwhy,whobenefitsandwhoisharmed,willnotbeasked,andsocialtheoryisliabletoreaf-firmandreifythegivensocialreality.6Fromthesomewhatdifferentviewpointofmainstreamanalyticpoliticalphilosophy,JeanHamptonstrikesasimilarnote.Shecriticizesthoseconceptionsofpoliticalphilosophythatwouldrestrictitpurelytonormativetheorizing,andpointsoutthatdescriptive/explanatoryclaims,thoughatadifferentlevelofabstractionthanpoliticalscience,arealsocrucial:Thetaskofpoliticalphilosophyisnotanysurfacedescriptionofparticularpoliticalsocieties.Instead,thepoliticalphilosopherwantstounderstandatthedeepestlevelthefoundationsofstatesandtheirethicaljustification….[the]politicalandsocial“deepstructure”whichgeneratesnotonlyformsofinteractionthatmakecertainkindsofdistributions[ofresources]inevitablebutalsomoraltheoriesthatjustifythosedistributions.7Boththeoristsagree,then,thattheprescriptiveneedstobeanchoredinthedescriptiveaswellastheaxiological:weneedtounderstandhowthepolityworks,andinparticularhowsystemicunjustdisadvantagemaybecontinuouslyreproduced,inordertomakewellinformedjudgmentsaboutjusticeandwhatitrequiresofusinthewayofsocialreformortransformation.Andonthereflexive,meta-theoreticallevel—whereweself-consciouslytheorizeaboutourtheories—weneedtobeparticularlywatchfulthatourmoralreflectiondoesnotincrucialrespectssimplyadapttoexistingbackground“deepstructures,”“givensocialrealities,”ofinjusticeinsteadofputtingthemintoquestionalso,sincesuchadaptationispreciselywhatthesestructuresandrealitiespromote.Sotosummarize:here,andelsewhereinradicalpoliticaltheory,itisoftenreallythefactsthataredoingtherevisionaryworkratherthanthevalues.Andonecanmountachallengetomainstreamorthodoxysimplybycontestinghegemonic,butmisleading,picturesofsocialrealityandbringingtheunderlyingdeepstructuresofinjusticetolight.2CriticalracetheoryLetusnowturntorace,which,Iamclaiming,isoneofHampton’s“deepstructures.”Socialismandfeminismarewellestablishedviewpointsinpoliticalphilosophy.Butbecauseofthewhitenessoftheprofession,demographicandconceptual,\nWHITESUPREMACYANDRACIALJUSTICE171raceisstillaverynewandunfamiliarperspectivetomostphilosophers.SoIwanttoprovideabriefbackgroundsketchbeforeIgoanyfurther.Thereisabodyofworkemergingacrossanumberofdifferentdisciplinesthatisbeginningtobeknownas“criticalracetheory.”Theprovenanceofthetermislegaltheory:“criticalracetheorists”wasthedesignationofracialminoritieswithinthecriticallegalstudiesmovement(CLS)who,whileapplaudingthe“crits’”critiqueofmainstreamconceptionsofthefunctioningofthelaw,wereinturncriticalofthemfortheirneglectofracialissues.8Butthetermisincreasinglybeingusedinamuchbroadersensetorefertotheorythattakesracetobecentraltothemakingofthemodernworld,andtriestoelucidateandunravelitscomplicatedimplicationsinvariousareas—culturalstudies,filmtheory,genderstudies,laborhistory,even(dareonesayit?)philosophy.9Theadjective“critical”signifiesseveraldifferentthings.(i)Itself-consciouslydistancescriticalracetheoryfromtheuncritical“racetheory”ofthepast,forexamplenineteenth-andtwentieth-centurySocialDarwinism,orNaziRassenwissenschaft.Unlikethesetheoreticaloutlooks,criticalracetheoryisexplicitlyanti-racist,(ii)Indeed,inasenseitself-consciouslydistancesitselffrom“race”also,byputtingthewordinscare-quotestoindicateitsconstructedratherthanbiologicalcharacter,(iii)Finally,itlinkscriticalracetheorywiththeolderleftideaofa“criticaltheory”thatseekstounderstandstructuresofsocialoppressionfortheemancipatorypurposeoftransformingthem.Whatwouldcriticalracetheorymeaninpoliticalphilosophy?Ihavearguedelsewherethatitwouldmeanfollowingthefeminist,and,beforethat,theMarxistexample,andlookingatsocietyasasystemofgroupdomination.10Marxiststalkaboutclasssocietyingeneral,and,forthemodernperiod,capitalism.Feministsusetheterm“patriarchy.”Theequivalenttheoreticalmoveforcriticalracetheoristsinpoliticalphilosophy,Isuggest,wouldbetorevivetheterm“whitesupremacy.”Ontherareoccasionsthetermisusednowadaysinmainstreamdiscourse,itisemployedtorefertothevaluesandbeliefsofracistfringegroups,forexampleskinheads,theKuKluxKlan,AryanNations,etc.Sothesenseintendedisreallyideationalandattitudinal:theindividual’ssubjectivebeliefs.TheusageIamrecommending,bycontrast,whichcanbefoundintheblackradicaltradition,isobjective.“Whitesupremacy”ismeanttorefertoacertainpolitico-economicsystemwhichisfoundedonwhiteracialdomination.Soracewouldbeseenasa“deepstructure,”thatgeneratesnotonlydisadvantageousandunjustpatternsofsocialinteractionandresourcetransfer,butmoraltheoriesthatnaturalize/justify/obfuscatethissystemicinequity.Nowtheinterestingthingaboutthistermisthat—howeveroddlyitmightstrikepeopletoday—originallytherewasnothingintheleastcontroversialaboutit.BycontrastwiththeoppositionalMarxistcharacterizationof“classsociety,”orthefeminist“patriarchy,”whichwereoriginally,andformanystillare,quitecontroversial,“whitesupremacy”wasadescriptionthatthedominantgroup,i.e.thewhitepopulation,originallyembracedquitematter-of-factly.Therewaslittlepretense,inotherwords,thatthesocietywassupposedtoberaciallyinclusive:rather,theUnitedStateswasexplicitlythoughtofasa“whiteman’scountry.”InhisrecentbookTroubleinMind,whichseemslikelytobethedefinitivehistoryofJimCrowforyearstocome,PulitzerPrize-winninghistorianLeonLitwackwrites:“Americawasfoundedonwhitesupremacyandthenotionofblackinferiorityandblackunfreedom….Theideologyofwhitesupremacyalwaysrestedonthearrogantassumptionthatwhitepeopleownedthecountry,thatthiswasessentiallytheirdomain.”11Similarly,inwhatisregardedasaclassicworkofcomparativehistory,GeorgeFredrickson’sWhiteSupremacy,theauthorarguesthatthephrase“applieswithparticularforce”toSouthAfricaandtheUnitedStates,sincethey,morethanothermulti-racialsocieties,“havemanifestedoverlongperiodsoftimeatendencytopushtheprincipleofdifferentiationbyracetoitslogicaloutcome—akindofHerrenvolksocietyinwhichpeopleofcolor…aretreatedaspermanentoutsiders.”12Sothehistoricalrealityhereiswelldocumented(ifaclosedbooktocontemporarywhitepoliticalphilosophers).Thatthephrasenowstrikesusasradical,perhapsevenextremist,isatributetoaremarkablysuccessfulengineeredamnesiaaboutanow-embarrassingpast.PennyvonEschenpinpointstheideologicaltransitioninthepostwar,Cold-WarconcernoftheAmericangoverningeliteaboutnecessarystrategiesforwinningoveracoloredThirdWorld,andtheneedfordistancingfromtheideasofthedefeatedThirdReich.Intheinterwaryears,andintothe1940s,“racismhadbeenwidelyportrayednotonlybyAfricanAmericanintellectualsbutalsoinpopulardiscourseaslocatedinthehistoryofslavery,colonialism,andimperialism,”theproductof“globalprocesses.”13Soracewasexplicitlyseenintermsofpoliticaleconomy,thesystemicdominationandexploitationofonegroupbyanotherbroughtaboutthroughEuropeanexpansionismandracialcapitalism.Butthepostwarideological“consensus,”recoilingfromleft-winganalyses,undertooka“retreatfromexplanationsgroundedinpoliticaleconomy.”Racewasnowframedintermsof“prejudice,”theproblematicattitudesofindividualpersonalities,havingnoconnectionwiththebroadersocialstructure:“Theeclipseofhistoricalanalysis…inthe1950sreconstructed‘race’and‘racism’fromsomethingrootedinthehistoryofslaveryandcolonialismtosomethingseenasapsychologicalproblemandanaberrationinAmericanlife.”14(This,itwillbeappreciated,ishow“whitesupremacist”getsitscurrenttransformedusage.)SoitisimportanttounderstandthatwhatIamdoinghereisnotconceptualinnovation:thisisnotanewparadigm,buta\n172CHARLESW.MILLSresurrectedoldone.Rather,itistherecoveryofwhatusedtobeastandardusagewhich,forpoliticalreasons,andtheneedtowhitewashandsanitizethepast,wasdeliberatelydropped.15Racialdominationasasystemvanishes,andweareleftwithatomicindividuals,someofwhomhavebadattitudes.Therealityis,then,thatwhiteracialdomination—whitesupremacy—hasbeencentraltoUShistory.Whetheronewantstodatetherepublicfrom1776,orgoallthewaybackto1607,wehavehadhundredsofyearsofdejurediscrimination,thatis,discriminationbackedbytheforceofthelawandthestate,followedbydecadesofdefactodiscrimination.Thecruciallegaldecisionsformallyendingthesepractices—Brownv.BoardofEducationin1954,theCivilRightsActin1964,theVotingRightsActin1965,theFairHousingActin1968—areallcomparativelyrecent,andinsomecasesthepracticeshavecontinued.Afterabriefperiodof(partial)desegregationineducation,thecountryissegregatingagain,astheHarvardCivilRightsProjecthasdocumented.16Infact,ina2000NewYorkTimesarticledecrying“Thelostpromiseofschoolintegration,”somecommentatorspredictthat“thecentralpremiseoftheBrowndecision—thatintegratedpublicschoolsarethemostimportantinstitutionsinapluralisticsociety—willnotsurvivethe21stcentury.”17Residentially,thecountryismoresegregatedtodaythanacenturyago,astheauthorsofAmericanApartheidhavedemonstrated.18Andthewhitebacklashagainstaffirmativeaction,anti-discriminationlaws,congressionalredistricting,andotherrace-consciouspolicieshasimperiledthosegainsearliermade.Indeed,PhilipKlinknerandRogersSmitharguethatsubstantiveracialprogressinUShistoryhasbeenconfinednarrowlytothreeperiods(theRevolutionaryWar,theCivilWaranditsaftermath,andtheColdWar),hasbeenmotivatedbycontingenthistoricalcircumstancesandperceivedwhitebenefitratherthanwhitemoraltransformation,andhasalwaysbeenfollowedbyaperiodofrollbackandretrenchment—suchas,intheiropinion,theperiodwearelivingthroughnow.19Thesepoliticaltruthshave,ofcourse,longbeenrecognizedintheblackradicalpoliticaltradition.FromDavidWalkerandMartinDelaney,throughMarcusGarveyandW.E.B.DuBois,toMalcolmXandStokelyCarmichael,blackshavehadlittledifficultyinperceivingthecentralrealityofwhiteracialdomination.20Butthesefiguresandtheirviewswerenot,ofcourse,seenasacademicallyrespectable.Withinmainstreampoliticalscience,asRogersSmithhasrecentlymassivelydocumented,theorthodoxconceptionoftheAmericanpolity—asrepresentedbytheclassictextsofAlexisdeTocqueville,GunnarMyrdalandLouisHartz—hasbeenthatofaflawed(whereflawsareconceded)liberaldemocracy:the“anomaly”viewofAmericanracism.Itisadmitted(whenitisadmitted)thattherewassomeracism,butthisisatbestanoffhandorsottovoceconcessionthatdoesnotaffectthedominantconceptualizationsofthepolityitself.Inaremarkableevasionofthefacts,thesystemicsubordinationofpeopleofcolorbybothlawandcustomistheoreticallyignored.Thusinsteadofthe“anomaly”view,Smithadvocateswhathecallsthe“multipletraditions”view,whichrecognizesthatalongsidethetraditionofliberalinclusiveness,thereisalsothelong-standingtraditionofwhite-supremacistexclusion.21(Anolderposition,moreradicalthanSmith’s,isthe“symbiosis”view,whichwouldclaimthatthedivergent“traditions”arenotinanynecessarytension,asSmithsupposes,sinceliberalismdevelopsasaracialliberalismsothatitscrucialtermsarereallyonlymeanttoextendfullytowhites,i.e.thehumanpopulation.)22IndecidinghowtoconceptualizetheAmericanpolityinitspresentperiod,then,onewouldattheveryleasthavetoutilize,andworkouttheimplicationsof,theconceptofa“whiteprivilege”thatrestsonthelegacyofwhitesupremacy.Andsometheoristswouldarguethat—admittedlyinaweakersense—wearestilllivingunderwhitesupremacy,thoughofadefactoratherthandejureform.Butineithercase,whitedominationinitsvariousmanifestationswouldneedtoberecognizedandbetakenseriouslybythepoliticalphilosopherconcernedaboutjustice.3WhitesupremacyandracialjusticeThishasbeenalongbackgrounddiscussion,butitisnecessarytosetthestageformycritiqueofSterba.Iwouldsuggestthatmostwhitesocialandpoliticalphilosophersworkwiththephilosophicalversionoftheanomalyview.Ifyouthinkthisisunfair,justreflectonthemostimportantworksinpoliticalphilosophyofthepastfewdecades,andaskyourselfinwhichofthemthefactofsystemicracialsubordination,andwhatisneededtocorrectforit,getsanysustaineddiscussion.CanitbefoundinRawls,Nozick,Walzer,Sandel?Theansweris,ofcourse,no.Itisararepiecebyawhiteauthorthatbegins,asAmyGutmann’srecentarticledoes,“Racialinjusticemaybethemostmorallyandintellectuallyvexingprobleminthepubliclifeofthiscountry.”23Inthisrespect,mostwhitepoliticalphilosophyreflectsitsracialorigins,its“whiteness”—notinthesenseofovertlyadvocatingtheracialsuppressionofpeopleofcolor,butintheweakersenseofbeingwrittenfromtheperspectiveofwhiteracialprivilege,sothatcertainrealities,certainstructuresofoppression,donotcomeintoviewatall,ordosoonlydistantly,non-urgently,sothatnorecommendationsaremadefortheirelimination.(ComparethepejorativeMarxistterm“bourgeois”theory,thefeminist“androcentric”theory.)Ifthefactswereconceded,theirrecommendationsforjustice—giventheirownvalue-commitments—wouldhavetoberadicallydifferent.Thestrategyofmycritiqueshouldnowbeobvious.WhatIwillclaimisthatSterba’srecommendations,thoughpraiseworthy,areinadequatebecausetheydonotappreciatethemulti-dimensionalityofwhitesupremacy.Nominally,he\nWHITESUPREMACYANDRACIALJUSTICE173rejectstheanomalyview,sincehesaysexplicitly(e.g.p.102)thatwhiteshavedominatedblacks.Butbecausethedetailsarenotspelledout,wedonotgetenoughofasenseofwhatthismeansinpractice—thewholediscussion,especiallywhencomparedwithhisdiscussionoffeminism,issomewhatcursory.Infact,ausefulcontrastcanbedrawnbetweenSterba’streatmentofgenderandhistreatmentofrace,startingwiththeformalallocationofawholechaptertotheformer(andpartofasecondchaptertoo)andmerelyasubsectionofachaptertothelatter.(IshouldemphasizethatIdonotmeantosingleSterbaoutasabadexample-onthecontrary,heismoreconscientiousthanmost.Thelackofattentionhereisonethatpervadesthefield.)Histreatmentofgenderdrawsextensivelyontheimpressivebodyofworkbyfeministphilosophers,whichhastransformedthewaywethinkaboutpoliticalphilosophy.Butthereisaconspicuouslackofcitationofblackphilosophers,withonlyone—BernardBoxill—evenbeingmentioned(thoughtobefair,otherblackthinkersarecited).Andwhilethefamilyasamainsiteofgenderinjustice,theneedtoreformdomesticstructures,theroleofrapeanddomesticviolenceinforciblysubordinatingwomen,theidealofandrogyny,allgetextensivediscussioninSterba’stext,thematerialonraceisbriefandunder-theorized.Thereisnosenseofwhitesupremacyasapervasivesystemofentrenchedracialadvantagewithinterlockingmanifestationsinnumerousspheresthattendstoreproduceitself,andwhoseeliminationisarequirementforracialjustice.(ItshouldbenotedthatBoxill’sclassicBlacksandSocialJusticehasbeenoutsince1984,andhasbeenre-issuedinarevisededition.24HowardMcGary’sRaceandSocialJusticewasonlypublishedlastyear,buttheessayscollectedtherehavebeenaroundformuchlonger.25BillLawsonhasanimportanteditedcollectionontheunderclass,TheUnderclassQuestion,thathasobviousimplicationsforissuesofsocialjustice,andhasalsoco-authoredanessaycollectionwithMcGary,BetweenSlaveryandFreedom.26Thesebooksareallmoreorlessintheanalytictradition,anddealexplicitlywithnormativeissues.Therearealsomanyotherblackphilosopherswhoworkonraceandracismfromsomewhatdifferentperspectivesandwhoarewellknown—CornelWest,LuciusOutlaw,AnthonyAppiah,LaurenceThomas,LewisGordon—aswellaswhitephilosopherssuchasDavidTheoGoldberg,whoseworkwouldberelevant.)InaforthcomingpieceintheBlackwellCompaniontoAfrican-AmericanPhilosophy—youknowafieldisindangerofbecomingrespectablewhentheystarttopublishcompanions,guides,etc.—Isuggestthatwhitesupremacyhasatleastsixdimensions:economic,juridico-political,somatic,cultural,cognitive-evaluative,and“ontological.”27Completeracialjusticewouldthusrequireeliminatingwhiteprivilege/advantageinalltheseareas.Butbecauseofshortageofspace,Iwillhavetoconfinemyselftotheeconomicdimension,whichisSterba’smainfocus.Sterbadefendsaffirmativeactionandpoliciesof“comparableworth”againsttheircritics.Inthepresentperiodofnationalrollbackoftheformerinparticular,thisiscertainlyastandtobeapplauded.Idonothavemuchtoaddortocriticizeinwhathesaysinresponsetothefiveobjectionsheconsiders(pp.105–9),thoughIdothinkthatmorecouldbesaidinresponsetotheidentityobjectionraisedbypeoplelikeChristopherMorris.28Butsettingthataside,Iam,asonewouldexpect,infavorofSterba’soverallstrategy.Theproblem,however,isthatbecauseofhisinadequateframingofthefulldimensionsofblackeconomicdisadvantage,thismeasure,evenifitwerestrengthenedandretained,canonlygoalimitedwaytoremedyingthesituation.Tobeginwith,thereisnodiscussionofatrainingprogramforblackswithouttheskillstobeeligibleforaffirmativeaction;forexample,thoseintheso-calledunderclass.29Sterbawantstodefeattheconservativeobjectionthataffirmativeactionwillmeangivingjobstotheunqualified,sohisfocusisonthosequalifiedblackswhoare,orarelikelytobe,thevictimsofdiscrimination.Butnothingissaidaboutthelargenumberofblackswhodon’thavetheskills,notbecauseofpersonalirresponsibilitybutbecauseofanunjusteducationalsystem.Historically,forexample,intheSouthfewerresourceswereallocatedtoblackschools.Sochildrenwhograduatedfromsuchaprogramwereunderprepared,andnotabletocompeteadequatelyonequalterms.Butifweaskthequestionofwhytheylackedtherequisiteskills,wedonotcomeupagainstbedrock,orsomethingimpermeabletoissuesofjustice,butratheraconsciouspublicpolicydecision.Today,schoolscontinuetobesegregated—thereis,asmentioned,apatternofresegregationoccurring—andschoolsintheinnercityaregenerallyinferiortothoseinthesuburbs.30Andagain,ifweaskwhythisisso—why,forexample,thesuburbantaxbaseishigher—weencounterfactsthatarenotremotelyneutral,butthelegacyofdecadesofwhitesupremacistpolicies.Moreover,segregationhasbroaderramificationsthatneedtobeexamined.Itisnoteworthythattheword“segregation”doesnotevenappearinSterba’sbook.Thatisnottosaythatitmakesmuchofanappearanceinthebooksofotherwhitepoliticalphilosophers.Indeed,asDouglasMasseyandNancyDentonpointout,inthe1970sand1980stheterm“disappearedfromtheAmericanvocabulary,”avanishingactallthemorestartlingsince“itoncefiguredprominentlyintheoriesofracialinequality.”31Butsegregationtoday,atthestartofthetwenty-firstcentury,remainsaprincipalfeatureofthetopographyoftheUnitedStates.Andsegregationisakeyfactorintheperpetuationofracialinequality,throughpoorhousing,lackofanequalchancetoacquireagoodhomeandbuildwealth,sub-standardeducation,inferioraccesstoneweconomicopportunitiesandthejobsinthenew“edgecities,”etc.Infact,MasseyandDentonarguethatthoughtherearevariousprocessesofracialdomination,\n174CHARLESW.MILLSResidentialsegregationistheinstitutionalapparatusthatsupportsotherraciallydiscriminatoryprocessesandbindsthemtogetherintoacoherentanduniquelyeffectivesystemofracialsubordination.UntiltheblackghettoisdismantledasabasicinstitutionofAmericanurbanlife,progressamelioratingracialinequalityinotherareaswillbeslow,fitful,andincomplete.32Whyhavewhitesbeensoreluctanttointegratesociety?Weneed,Isuggest—aspartofthereconceptualizationofthepolity—tofocusonthebenefitswhitesasagroupderivefromthepresentorder,andtostarttalkingaboutracialexploitation.ThereisaninterestingcomparisonherewithMarxism’sviewofgroupdomination.ForMarxisttheory,thecentralsocietalrelationshipisclassexploitation,andthis—forthosewhodotakeanormativeposition—iswhatmakescapitalismunjust.SotheMarxistchallengeinheresintheclaimthatwhatseemtobeequalconsensualrelationsbetweenwage-laborerandemployerarereallystructuredbydominationandexploitation.NowtheMarxistclaimis,ofcourse,nottakenseriouslythesedays,forvariousreasons—therejectionofthelabortheoryofvalue,thecontroversyoverthethesisabouteconomicconstraintnarrowingproletarianchoice,theseemingnon-viabilityofsocialistalternativesunderlinedbythecollapseoftheformerSovietUnionandtheEasternEuropeanstates.Butthepointisthatwecanallseehowtheargumentwouldgothrough,ifthepremiseswereinfactdefensible.Thefactofclassexploitationpervadessociety;becauseofclassexploitation,theworkerisalwaysatadisadvantage;andtheresultofclassexploitationisanunfairnettransferofassetsfromtheworkerstothecapitalists.NowwhatIwanttoargueisthatastraightforwardcasecanbemade—farmoreeasilyanduncontroversiallythantheMarxistcase—thatracialexploitationhasbeencentraltoUShistory,andthatitstructuressocietyasawhole,sothatunjusteconomictransfersfromtheblacktothewhitepopulationaregoingonallthetime.Thereareanumberofilluminatingcontraststobedrawnwithclassexploitation.First,racialexploitationtakesplacefarmorebroadlythanatthepointofproduction.Itcertainlyincludesinequitableeconomicarrangementslikeslaveryandthedebtservitudeofsharecroppingwhichsucceededit.ButIamalsousingthetermbroadlytocoverthingslikethedenialofequalopportunitytohomesteadtheWest,differentialallocationofeducationalresources,jobdiscrimination,promotiondiscrimination,blockingofunionmembership,segregationinhousing,inequitabletransferpaymentsbythestate,etc.Sothereisaconstellationofdifferentfactorswhoseneteffectistosystematicallydepriveblacksofanequalchancetoaccumulatematerialandhumancapital,andwhichbenefitwhitesasagroup.Butthesecondilluminatingcontrastisthatwhereasclassexploitationisthesubjectofahugebodyofliterature,racialexploitation—whichshouldbequiteuncontroversialbyconventionalliberalbourgeoisstandards,andthuscondemnedbyaphilosophicalaudiencemuchbroaderthanthepoliticalleft—isatopiconwhichthereisvirtualsilence.Onerecentanthologyonexploitationinaleft-wingserieshasonlyonechapteroutoftwenty-oneonthesubject,anditissqueezedintoaMarxistframework.33Andarecent,highlypraisedliberaltreatmentbyAlanWertheimerdoesnotevenhave“race”intheindex.34Finally,whereas,givenMarx’sconceptualization,classexploitationcanonlybeeliminatedbymovingbeyondcapitalismtocommunism,racialexploitationcan—intheoryanyway—beendedwithinacapitalistframework.35Thoughundiscussedbyphilosophers,agrowingbodyofliteratureelsewhereisbeginningtomaptheseprocessesintheirdifferentdimensions.Thereisolderworkthatisstillvaluable—BorisBittker’sTheCaseforBlackReparationsandLesterThurow’sPovertyandDiscrimination.Buttherearealsomanymorerecentbooks:TheWealthofRaces,BlackLabor,WhiteWealth,Race,Money,andtheAmericanWelfareState,ThePossessiveInvestmentinWhiteness,and,perhapsmostimportantly,andmostwidelyread,theprizewinningBlackWealth/WhiteWealthbyMelvinOliverandThomasShapiro.36Thelastundertakesasystematicsurveyofhouseholdsandananalysisofstatisticsonwealthtotracktheprocessesbywhichwealthisaccumulated,theracialdisparitiesinwhiteandblackchancesatobtainingit,andtheconsequentoveralldifferentialimpactonpeople’slives.Whattheauthorsconcludeisthatwealthisfarmoreimportantthanincomeindeterminingthelong-termprospectsforracialequality.Wealthfurnishesacushionintimesoflayoffsandmedicalemergencies,enablesonetostartasmallbusiness,canbeinvested,usedtoinfluencethepoliticalprocess,andtoprovideaheadstartforone’schildrenthroughbettereducationandinheritance.Sowealthrepresentspasthistory,andinthecaseofraceitrepresentsapasthistoryofaccumulatedillicitadvantageanddisadvantage.Thestandardpracticeistousewhite/blackincomedifferentialsasthemeasureofracialinequality,andthesefiguresaresomewhere(dependingonthetimeperiodandsocialclassbeingconsidered)inthe50–70%range.Butthefiguresonthewealthdifferentialaremuchgreater:themedianwhitehouseholdhasmorethantentimesthewealthofthemedianblackhousehold.Thisisnotbecausewhitepeoplearetentimesassmartasblacks(eventheBellCurveauthorslimitittoonestandarddeviationonIQcurves),anditiscertainlynotbecausetheyhaveworkedtentimesashard!Whatthisdifferentialreflectsissystemicillicitadvantage,carriedoutatthepersonal,institutional,stateandfederallevel,inpursuanceofapolicyofprivilegingthewhitepopulationattheexpenseoftheblackpopulation.Sooriginalinjusticeiscompoundedbyfurtherinjustice—it’snotjustslavery,it’snotjustthatthefreedslavesnevergottheirfortyacresandamule,andwerepromptlyresubordinatedthroughdebtservitude,it’salsoJimCrow,thedenialofaccesstowhitemarkets,theblockingfrombetterjobs,thedenialofpromotions,thedifferentialineducationalfunding,thediminishedopportunityasaresultofdiscriminatoryFederalHousingAuthoritypolicyforblackstoowntheirownhome,theburningdown,insomecases,ofsuccessfulblackbusinessesbywhitemobs,aswiththe1921TulsaRiot,wherethe\nWHITESUPREMACYANDRACIALJUSTICE175Greenwoodbusinessdistrict(knownasthe“BlackWallStreet”)wasdestroyedintheworstUSraceriotofthetwentiethcentury,withperhapsasmanyas300deaths,anddetailsoftheincidentsuppresseduntilveryrecently,andsoforth.Sothere’sawholesetofmechanisms,whichanadequatetheoryofracialjusticewouldneedtotrackdownandshowtheworkingsof,drawing,obviously,onresearchinpoliticalscience,economicsandsociology.Thefairystoriesthatwhitepoliticalphilosopherstelleachotherwouldbeblownaway.Sothefacts,asIemphasizedatthestart,wouldbedoingtherealworkintheargument.Thesewouldconstitutetheequivalent,forrace,ofthekindsofsociologicalpointsthat,forgender,Sterbadoestalkabout.Thebasicideawouldbetoshowhowsystemicracialadvantageisproducedandreproduced,throughmechanismsofracialexploitationthatcontinueinsomewhatdifferentformstoday.Andtheimplicationwouldbethatthesefacts,putintoconjunctionwithmostmainstreamvalues,haveradicalimplicationsforhowwethinkaboutjusticeandwhatourmoralprioritiesshouldbe.OliverandShapirosumuptheirfindings:Thisbook[BlackWealth/WhiteWealth]developsaperspectiveonracialinequalitythatisbasedontheanalysisofprivatewealth….Privatewealth…capturesinequalitythatistheproductofthepast,oftenpasseddownfromgenerationtogeneration….Wearguethat,materially,whitesandblacksconstitutetwonations….Totakethesefindingsseriously,aswedo,meansnotshirkingtheresponsibilityofseekingalternativepolicyideaswithwhichtoaddressissuesofinequality.Wemightevenneedtothinkaboutsocialjusticeinnewways.37(myemphasis)Notethattheclaimisnotthattheyhavecomeupwitharevolutionarynewsetofvalues—afterall,theyaresociologists,notphilosophers.Rather,thepointisthatsimplybydocumenting,trackingandanalyzingthedifferentmechanismsthathaveaffectedtherespectivefatesofblacksandwhites,acasecanbemadeforradicalconclusionsevenwithinaconventionalnormativeframework.Astheypointoutlater:Thesedimentationofinequalityoccurredbecauseblackshadbarriersthrownupagainstthemintheirquestformaterialself-sufficiency.Whitesingeneral,butwell-offwhitesinparticular,wereabletoamassassetsandusetheirsecureeconomicstatustopasstheirwealthfromgenerationtogeneration.Whatisoftennotacknowledgedisthattheaccumulationofwealthforsomewhitesisintimatelytiedtothepovertyofwealthformostblacks.Justasblackshavehad“cumulativedisadvantages,”whiteshavehad“cumulativeadvantages.”Practically,everycircumstanceofbiasanddiscriminationagainstblackshasproducedacircumstanceandopportunityofpositivegainforwhites.Whenblackworkerswerepaidlessthanwhiteworkers,whiteworkersgainedabenefit;whenblackbusinesseswereconfinedtothesegregatedblackmarket,whitebusinessesreceivedthebenefitofdiminishedcompetition;whenFHA[FederalHousingAuthority]policiesdeniedloanstoblacks,whiteswerethebeneficiariesofthespectaculargrowthofgoodhousingandhousingequityinthesuburbs.Thecumulativeeffectofsuchaprocesshasbeentosedimentblacksatthebottomofthesocialhierarchyandtoartificiallyraisetherelativepositionofsomewhitesinsociety.38Iapologizeforthelengthofthisquotation,butIwouldarguethatitvindicatesmypointaboutwheretherealchallengeposedbytheoriesofracialjusticelies.Inwhichbookonjusticethatyouhavereadinthelastthreedecadesdofactssuchastheseappear?Herewehavevividlyillustratedthethematic/conceptualwhitenessofpoliticalphilosophy—aprocessofmassiveinjusticecarriedoutoverdecadesisallbutignoredinthemostprestigiouspublicationsonthesubject.AndthisbringsmetoanotherwayinwhichSterba’streatmentofracialjusticeneedssupplementation.Thereisnodiscussionatallofreparations.Thisissuehasnevergoneawayintheblackcommunity,andinrecentyearsithasgainedrenewedvigorbecauseoftheprecedentsindealingwithNativeAmericansandtheJapanese-AmericansinternedduringWorldWarII,theCanadiangovernment’streatywithnativepeoples,GermanreparationstoIsrael,and,earlierthisyear,thepublicationofthewellknownTransAfricaactivistRandallRobinson’sTheDebt,whichhasbeengettingalotofpublicityintheblackmedia.39Since1989,Rep.JohnConyers(D-MI)hasbeenintroducinginCongressH.R.3745,the“CommissiontoStudyReparationProposalsforAfricanAmericansAct.”Sofarithasyettomakeitoutofcommittee,butithastheendorsementofmanymainstreamblackorganizations,suchastheNationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeopleandtheSouthernChristianLeadershipConference.40Thereisalsoanationalumbrellagroupfocusedspecificallyonthisquestion,theNationalCoalitionofBlacksforReparationsinAmerica(N’COBRA),andvariousprominentblackintellectualshavecalledforapublicdiscussionoftheissue(atleastoneprominentwhiteconservative,CharlesKrauthammer,hasendorsedtheidea).Theargumentwouldbethatblackshavebeensystematicallydeprivedofanequalopportunitytoaccumulatematerialandhumancapital,andthatwhitesingeneralhaveillicitlybenefitedfromthis,sothatreparationsareowedonrespectableLockeangrounds.Thereisnoextensiveopposingliteratureonthissubjectbywhitephilosophers,sinceitisseenassooff-the-wall(whenitisseenatall)asnoteventomeritareply.Butthebasiccounter-argumentwouldprobablybethepointthatthesamepersonsare\n176CHARLESW.MILLSnotinvolved,sincetheoriginalvictimsofslaveryarelongsincedead.Therearetworeplieshere.Thefirstistoarguethatthedescendantsofthevictimsarestillsufferingthelong-termconsequencesoftheseprocesses,evenifitisjustslaverythatisconsidered.Moreover,iftheindictmentisdirectedagainstwhitesupremacymorebroadly,andnotjustslavery,theninmostcasesitwillbepeoplestilllivingwhohavebeendirectlyaffected.Andcertainlythe“papertrail”bywhichsubsequentgenerationshavebeendisadvantagedisfareasiertodocumenthere,sincethesearetwentieth-centurypractices.Onewouldtalkaboutthemassivedisadvantageblackssuffertodayintermsofinferioreducation,lowerlifeexpectancies,differentialincarcerationrates,worsejobs,confinementtounsafeneighborhoods,etc.,which,withthehelpoffact-findingbookslikeOliverandShapiro’s,canplausiblybetracedtothelegacyofwhitesupremacy.Moreover,itisnotasifwearetalkingaboutreducingwhitestopenury,butratherfollowingsomepolicyofprogressivetaxation,especiallywiththebudgetarysurplusesthattherecentWallStreetboomhascreated.Overall,then,Ithinkthattheissueofreparationsdeservestobetakenfarmoreseriouslybymainstreampoliticalphilosophythanithasbeen.4ConclusionObviously,thereisagreatdealmorethatwouldneedtobesaid,ontheeconomicquestionalone,quiteapartfromalltheotherdimensionsofracialinjusticeIhavesuggestedwealsoneedtoconsider(juridico-political,somatic,cultural,cognitive-evaluative,“ontological”).Theunwhiteningofmainstreampoliticalphilosophyhasbarelybegun.Aprerequisiteisanendtothepatternoftheoreticalevasionbywhitephilosophers,andtheiracknowledgment—attheconceptuallevel—ofthehistoricalrealityandcontinuingsignificanceofwhitesupremacy.NOTES1Anearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheconferenceon“AlternativeConceptionsofJustice,”UniversityofNotreDame,14–16April2000.2JamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).Allpagereferenceswillbetothisbook.3Sometimes,ofcourse,thereisanaxiologicalchallengealso.ManytheoristshaveseenMarxismasbeinganti-moralist,butamongthosewhohavesoughttoextractanethicalcommitmentfromhiswork,ithassometimesbeenarguedthatheimplicitlyadvocatedaleft-wingcommunitarianism.Marxistssympathetictothislineofargumentwouldthencritiquethemainstreamdiscourseofrightsandjusticeasthecontaminatedsuperstructureofalienatedbourgeoisclasssociety,andrepresentcommunismasaUtopiabeyondjusticeandrights(suchclaimshaveobviouslynotwornverywell…!).Somewhatsimilarly,somefeministshavearguedforadistinctivefeminist“ethicofcare,”whichallegedlyarisesoutofthepeculiarmoralstandpointofwomen,anditsdifferencefromtheperspectiveofbrittlemaleegosmaintainingtheirdistancefromeachotherinthemasculinistpublicsphere.Butthepointisthatmanysocialists,andmanyfeminists,havesimplyreliedonmainstreammoralvaluestoindictcapitalismandmaledomination.(Thisisadmittedlylessthecasefordeepecologistsas“radical”theorists,wherethevalueshiftawayfromananthropocentricnormativesystemiswhatisreallycrucial.)4See,forexample,SusanMollerOkin,WomeninWesternPhilosophy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1979),andJustice,Gender,andtheFamily(NewYork:BasicBooks,1989).5Okin,Justice,Gender,andtheFamily.6IrisMarionYoung,JusticeandthePoliticsofDifference(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1990)p.5.7JeanHampton,PoliticalPhilosophy(BoulderCO:WestviewPress,1997),pp.xiii–xv.8AllanC.Hutchinson(ed.)CriticalLegalStudies(TotowaNJ:Rowman&Littlefield,1989);RichardDelgado(ed.)CriticalRaceTheory:TheCuttingEdge(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1995);KimberléCrenshaw,NeilGotanda,GaryPellerandKendallThomas(eds)CriticalRaceTheory:TheKeyWritings(NewYork:NewPress,1995).9Foranimportantpioneeringarticle,seeLuciusOutlawJr’s“TowardaCriticalTheoryof‘Race’,”inAnatomyofRacism,ed.DavidTheoGoldberg(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1990)pp.58–82.10SeemyTheRacialContract(IthacaNY:CornellUniversityPress,1997),andBlacknessVisible:EssaysonPhilosophyandRace(IthacaNY:CornellUniversityPress,1998)esp.chapter6,“TheRacialPolity.”11LeonF.Litwack,TroubleinMind:BlackSouthernersintheAgeofJimCrow(NewYork:Knopf,1998)pp.xvi,205.12GeorgeFredrickson,WhiteSupremacy:AComparativeStudyinAmericanandSouthAfricanHistory(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1981)pp.xi–xii.13PennyM.vonEschen,RaceAgainstEmpire:BlackAmericansandAnticolonialism,1937–1957(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1997)pp.22,155.14Ibid.,pp.6,155.15Obviouslythereisnoroomtoexplorethisissuehere,butitneedstoberecognizedthattheAmericancaseisjustpartofabroaderprocessoftherewritingandreconceptualizationof“race”thattookplaceintheWestintheperiodofpostwardecolonization.Foradiscussion,seeFrankFüredi,TheSilentWar.ImperialismandtheChangingPerceptionofRace(NewBrunswickNJ:RutgersUniversityPress,1998).\nWHITESUPREMACYANDRACIALJUSTICE17716TheHarvardCivilRightsProjecthasmappedapatternofresegregationineducation.Thenumberofblackstudentsinschoolswhereatleasthalfthestudentswereminoritieswas76.6%in1966–7,fellto62.9%in1980–1,buthasrisento68.8%in1996–7.ForLatinostudents,thefigureswere54.8%in1968–9andhaverisento74.8%in1996–7.MostwhiteAmericanstudentstodaygotonearlyall-whiteschools(NewYorkTimes,18July1999).17“TheLostPromiseofSchoolIntegration,”NewYorkTimes,2April2000,section4,pp.1,5.18DouglasS.MasseyandNancyA.Denton,AmericanApartheid:SegregationandtheMakingoftheUnderclass(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1993).19PhilipA.KlinknerwithRogersM.Smith,TheUnsteadyMarch:TheRiseandDeclineofRacialEqualityinAmerica(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1999).20SeeforexampleWilsonJeremiahMoses(ed.)ClassicalBlackNationalism:FromtheAmericanRevolutiontoMarcusGarvey(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1996);WilliamL.VanDeburg(ed.)ModernBlackNationalism:FromMarcusGarveytoLouisFarrakhan(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1997).21RogersM.Smith,CivicIdeals:ConflictingVisionsofCitizenshipinU.S.History(NewHavenCT:YaleUniversityPress,1997).22Foradiscussion,seeJenniferL.Hochschild,TheNewAmericanDilemma:LiberalDemocracyandSchoolDesegregation(NewHavenCT:YaleUniversityPress,1984)chapter1.23AmyGutmann,“RespondingtoRacialInjustice,”inK.AnthonyAppiahandAmyGutmann,ColorConscious:ThePoliticalMoralityofRace(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1996)p.107.24BernardR.Boxill,BlacksandSocialJustice(1984)revisededn(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1992).25HowardMcGary,RaceandSocialJustice(MaidenMA:Blackwell,1999).26BillE.Lawson(ed.)TheUnderclassQuestion(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1992);HowardMcGaryandBillE.Lawson,BetweenSlaveryandFreedom:PhilosophyandAmericanSlavery(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1992).27CharlesMills,“WhiteSupremacy,”inJohnPittmanandTommyLott(eds)TheBlackwellCompaniontoAfrican-AmericanPhilosophy(forthcoming).28ChristopherMorris,“ExistentialLimitstotheRectificationofPastWrongs,”AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,vol.21(1984)pp.175–82.29SeetheLawsoncollection,TheUnderclassQuestion.30SeeforexampleJonathanKozol,SavageInequalities:ChildreninAmerica’sSchools(NewYork:Crown,1991).31MasseyandDenton,AmericanApartheid,pp.1,3.32Ibid.,p.8.33SeeGaryA.Dymski,“RacialInequalityandCapitalistExploitation,”inKaiNielsenandRobertWare(eds)Exploitation(AtlanticHighlandsNJ:HumanitiesPress,1997).34AlanWertheimer,Exploitation(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1996).35ThequalificationisnecessarysincesomelefttheoristshavearguedthattheracialnatureofAmericancapitalism,originallycontingent,isnowanintegralpartofit,andsotoodeeplyembeddedtobeeliminatedwithoutdisruptingtheclasssystemitself.36BorisBittker,TheCaseforBlackReparations(NewYork:RandomHouse,1973);LesterC.Thurow,PovertyandDiscrimination(Washington:BrookingsInstitution,1969);RichardF.America(ed.)TheWealthofRaces:ThePresentValueofBenefitsfromPastInjustices(NewYork:GreenwoodPress,1990);ClaudAnderson,BlackLabor,WhiteWealth:TheSearchforPowerandEconomicJustice(EnglewoodMD:Duncan&Duncan,1994);MelvinL.OliverandThomasM.Shapiro,BlackWealth/WhiteWealth:ANewPerspectiveonRacialInequality(NewYork:Routledge,1995);GeorgeLipsitz,ThePossessiveInvestmentinWhiteness:HowWhitePeopleProfitfromIdentityPolitics(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1998);MichaelK.Brown,Race,Money,andtheAmericanWelfareState(IthacaNY:CornellUniversityPress,1999).37OliverandShapiro,BlackWealth/WhiteWealth,pp.2–9.38Ibid.,pp.50–1.39RandallRobinson,TheDebt:WhatAmericaOwestoBlacks(NewYork:Dutton,2000).40SeethecoverstoryinEmergemagazine(February1997)“RightingaWrong,”byLoriRobinson,pp.43–9.\n17THERELATIONSHIPBETWEENTHEJUSTICEOFTHESTATEANDTHEJUSTICEOFPERSONSChung-yingChengJohnRawls’theoryofjusticeisprimarilyatheoryofpoliticaljusticewhichappliestothesystemofsocietyasawhole.Hiskeynotionofjusticeasfairnessseemstoimplyawiderrangeofapplication,asindicatedinhiswishtostudyrightnessasfairnessinregardtointerpersonalrelationships.1Wemayinferfromthisthatfairnesscouldapplyequallytoawholesystemandtoindividualpersons,andthusinthissensewecanspeakofbothjustsocietyandjustpersons.Buttherealquestioniswhetherajustsocietymustimplytheexistenceofjustpersons.Itmightbesuggestedthatajustsocietymusthavesomejustpersonssothatitcouldbecalledjust,inthesamewayajustpersonmustperformsomejustactionssothathecouldbecalledajustperson.Wemayagreetosuchasuggestionandyetweareunclearhowajustsocietymustproducejustpersons,orjustcitizensforthatmatter.WhenajustsocietyismerelydefinedinRawls’theoryofjusticeasfairness,weseenomechanismorprocessoftransformationwhichwouldtransferthequalityoffairnessofasystemtoapersoninthesystem,sothatthepersoncanbesaidtobeequallyasfairorjustinanindependentsenseofjustice.Thisisbecausetherearetwolevelsofreference,namelythelevelofthestateandthelevelofindividualpersons,whichrequireadifferenceandstratificationprincipleofspecificationandexplanation.Howthesetwolevelsarerelated,ontheotherhand,requiresaprincipleofcompositionandsynthesisforexplainingthenaturalinteractionbetweenthetwolevels,inlightofhistoricalexperienceandprescriptionsfornormativeinteractioninlightofrationalreflection.Inbothprocessesofinteractionwemightbeabletodevelopanewenrichedsenseofjustice,tobepositedasaconditionfordemandingsatisfactionatboththelevelofstatejusticeandofpersonaljustice.PerhapswemayconceiveajustpersoninaRawlsianjustsocietyasonefullyconsentingtoRawls’twoprinciplesofjustice,andalsoasonedevotedtovigorouslypracticingthem.Thussuchapersonclaimshisrights,respectsothers’rights,seeksoutequalopportunitiestobenefitordevelophimself,andagreestoanystrategyofstructuralarrangementasheseesfitaccordingtothesecondprincipleofjustice.Willthesemakethispersonjustorwillthismatchoursenseofjustice,whetherwithinaculturaltraditionoracrossdifferentculturaltraditions?Thisappearstobeadifficultquestiontoanswer,andthedifficultyconsistsinthatwemayhavedifferentsensesofjustice,particularlywhenwereflectonthefactthatsometraditions,whichmayincludetraditionsfromtheWest,donotreadilyidentifyjusticewithlawfulnessasinthemodernWest.Thuswecouldhaveacold-minded,calculatingindividualwhohasnocarenorcharitytowardhisfellowcitizens,butwhomayfollowthelawinameticulousmannerandyetmanipulatethelawandthesystemofjurisprudenceandjusticetoadvancehisinterestsateveryavailableopportunity.ThiswouldbeapersonwhomtheConfuciansagewouldnotcalljust,northePlatonicphilosopher,northeChristianbeliever.ThisproblemariseswithrespecttoJamesP.Sterba’sworkonjustice,particularlyhisbooksHowToMakePeopleJustandJusticeforHereandNow,becauseheclearlyidentifiesmorewiththeRawlsianthanwiththeConfuciantraditioninpoliticalphilosophy.Ontheotherhand,fromtheConfucianpointofview,ajustpersonisabenevolentandrighteous(dutiful)person,whorespectstheproperrelationshipsinsocietyandrelatestotheminpropriety;yetitistotallyconceivablethathemayhavenosenseoflawinthemodernsenseatall.Forexample,hemayjudgeothersbyhismoralstandardandmaynotbeawarethathisattitudes,language,decisionsandbehaviormightbebiasedandcausegreatharmtothefairprocessoflaw,andthusdamagetherightsandequalchancesofadvancementofotherindividualsinthesamesystem.Inotherwords,aConfucianjustpersonwhoisawareofhiselitiststatuscanbeself-righteous,yetlackknowledgeorrationalperspectivetoprovideafairjudgementregardinghisownrightsandinterests,therightsandinterestsofothers,andtherightsandinterestsofthewholecommunity.2Confucianisminsistsonthedistinctionbetweenrighteousnessandprofits,butthereisnoobjectivestandardonhowthedistinctioncanbealwayseffectivelymade.Itoftenbecomesamatteroftrustandamatterofattribution.Henceitistotallyconceivablethatonemayhavejusticeatthepersonallevelwithoutnecessarilyentailingjusticeatthelevelofstate.Infact,thisisthepermanentpredicamentofConfucianidealisminpoliticalphilosophy:torealizeouterkinglinessonthebasisofinnersageliness(neisheng-waiwan).3ButhistoryhasinevitablylefttheConfucianistinthemiddleofanunrealistichopeoftheconverse:torealizeinnersagelinessonthebasisofouterkingliness.NotonlymaytheidealConfuciangovernmentnotbeajuststateinthemodernsense,butevenwhenthereissomebeneficialinfluenceofitssagelylearningontheruleritcanbeverylimited,andthereisnoguaranteethatitwillcontinueorevenbeself-correcting.ThisistheConfucian\nCHUNG-YINGCHENG179predicamentandthisistheConfucianirony.Whenwecometomoderntimes,thequestionbecomeshowthejusticeofasystemcanguaranteethejusticeofaperson,sincepersonaljusticeisregardedasthegoalofsociety.Thelogicofvirtueandthelogicofpoliticalpowerorinterestaresimplydifferentlogics,justasthestateandthepersonaredifferententities.Eachmusthaveitsrangeofapplication,andeachneedstoperformwellinorderthattheentiretyofhumankindasrealizedonthesetwolevelsmayfunctionwell,anditsindividualsfeelsatisfied.Thereshouldbenounrealistichopeofsubstitutingonefortheother,orinsistenceontheself-sufficiencyofoneforthewell-beingofhumanityentire,orofthewholeindividualforacitizenofthenation-state.Itisinthissensethatthetwolevelscanbemutuallysupportiveandcapableofmutualharmonization,andthissenseofmutualsupportandharmonizationispremisedonrealizingthedistinctionbetweenpersonandstateandthedistinctionbetweentheirdistinctlogicsofself-realization.InthelightoftheaboveIdonotwishtoargueforincommensurabilitybetweenjusticeinonetraditionandjusticeinanother,inthenarrowsenseoffindingacommondenominator.Whatweneedforboth,fromthedepthofheartandmindofhumanexistence,andabovebothlevels,istheidealharmonyforthefulfilmentofthelogicsofbothlevels,towhichtheholisticexistenceofhumanity—whetherinanindividualoracommunity—againaspires.Itgivesrisetoboth,andneedstodevelopboth;anditalsoneedstoseebothworkandfunctioninmutualsupportandharmony,notinmutualcancellationorconflict.Inthissensewealreadyhaveacommonground,andthereforeacommonmeasureinthecommonexistenceofhumanity,tocomposethestratifiedwisdomandidealvaluesasembodiedinthemodernandclassicaltraditions,orintherationalityofthesystemandthehumanityoftheindividual.MyconcernisnottocontrastrationalityfromtheGreektraditionortheWestwithhumanityorco-humanity(ren)fromtheChineseConfuciantradition;itisrathertocontrastrationalityonthestatelevelwithco-humanityonthepersonallevel.Tocontrasttheseistoseethepossibilitiesofmutualcomplementarity.Therecouldbeco-humanitytocomplementrationalityonthestatelevel,justastherecouldalsoberationalitytocomplementco-humanityonthepersonallevel.ItisnecessaryinfacttoseehowtheGreektraditionmergeswiththeConfuciantraditiononthepersonalleveltomakeamorerationallyconsciousjustjunzi(thesuperiorman)ontheConfucianside,aswellastomakeamorehumanelyconsciousandlessself-interest-drivencitizenonthemodernWesternside.Sincejusticesandrationalitiescanbecontested,asMacIntyreexplains,4theycanalsobesynthesizedoncewerecognizethedistinctionsbetweendifferentlevelsandfunctions.Wehavecountedonfunctionalcorrespondencestotranslateoneconceptofjusticeintoanother.Dowenotalsoneedtoexploretheconceptofapotential“universalhumannatureinthemaking”inordertoharmonizethetwolevelsofjustice(stateandpersonal)andharmonizevarioustraditionsofjusticeonthesetwolevels?Wemaynowseethatthejusticeofpersonsdoesnotguaranteejusticeofsocietyorstate,nordoesthejusticeofstateorsocietyguaranteethejusticeofpersons.OnemayarguethatsinceConfuciusandMenciusextendedtheirnotionofamoralpersontothatofamoralruler,andthentothatofamoralcommunity,theremustbesomestructuralandcausalinterdependencebetweensocietyandtheindividual.InthecaseofXunzi,itisthemoralsage-kingwhowouldtransformsocietyintoacommunityofpropriety(li)becausehebelievedthathumannatureisfundamentallybadandneedsguidancefromabove.WehaveseenhistoricallythatintheformationoftheConfucianstatetherecanbejustpeopleandevenajustsociety(familyandcommunity)andyetnotnecessarilyjustrulersorjustpoliticalsystems.Asweknow,thehistoricalConfucianstateisnottheidealConfucianstatethatagenuineConfucianistwoulddreamof.5Thediscrepancy,ofcourse,couldbeexplainedandunderstood,butthisexplanationandunderstandinginnowayalleviatesthedifficultyofthetransformationofindividualandinterpersonaljusticeintothemoralityofastate.Similarly,howtotransformthemoralityofstatejusticeintothemoralityofpersonaljusticeprovesanequallydifficulttask.Thenetresultisthatthereneednotbefullcommensurabilitybetweenjusticeatsystemlevel(asprojected)andjusticeatindividuallevel(asactual):theybelongtodifferentcategories,anditisamistaketomixthemup.WecouldofcoursearguethatthereasonwhyRawlscoulddevelophisnotionofjusticeisthatweasindividualshavealreadydevelopedapartialunderstandingofthecontractrianposition,andRawls’theoryofjusticeasfairnessismerelyaformalarticulationofacombinationofthebestoftheproprietariantraditionofLockeandthebestoftheutilitariantraditionofMillfromahistoricalandtheoreticalpointofview.Inthissensewecanseethatwemusthavethejustpersonbeforepushingforthefoundingofthejuststateandthejustsociety.ItmayevenbethatthefoundingoftheUSArepresentssuchaprocessoftransformation.ConsequentlytheremaybebothajustmanandajuststateinthesamesenseofjusticeascharacterizedbyRawls.However,asapragmatictestwehavealsotomentionthatsocialandpoliticalissuessuchasabortion,drugs,racismand,notleast,bureaucraticinefficienciesincontemporaryAmerica,haveallsuggestedtheactuality,notsimplythepossibility,oftheco-existenceofajustsystemasfaraslawsareconcernedwithunjustindividualsasfaraspracticeisconcerned.6OfcourseitmaybethattheactualsystemofjusticedoesnotfullyincorporatetheRawlsianidealofjusticeasfairness.ButthenthereisnothingintheRawlsiantheoryofjusticewhichguaranteesorevensuggeststhatthejusticeofastatesystemmustgiverisetoindividualswhoareboundtobejustpersonsdoingjustactions.AsthejusticeoftheConfucianstatemaynotharmonizewiththejusticeoftheConfucianperson,andthejusticeofamodernliberalstatemaynotharmonizewiththejusticeofthemodernliberalindividualistinregardtooptimumfulfillmentof\n180JUSTICEOFTHESTATEANDOFPERSONSjustice,wemaythereforesuggestthatweseparatethelevelofsystemfromthelevelofindividuals,andconsidertheirseparatestandardsofjusticeasbelongingtotwodifferentcategories,eachreflectingadifferenthistoricaltradition,andeachrequiringdifferentvaluestosatisfyitsdifferentdeepneedsofhumanity.InthissensewecouldcombinetheConfucianconceptofjusticeasvirtueforindividualpersonswiththeRawlsianconceptofjusticeasfairnessforthestate,toachieveacombinationofjustpersonsandjuststate.ThereisnointrinsicincompatibilitybetweenthesocialethicsofjusticeforthepersoninConfucianismandthepoliticaltheoryofjusticeforthestateinmodernpoliticalliberalism.Anyconflictarisingfromacombinationofthetwohastoberesolvedinfavoroftheinterestofmutualsupportandmutualenrichment,whichshouldtakeplaceinthedirectionofintroducingmorerationalityonthepersonallevel,andintroducingmoreconsiderationofequalityandbenevolenceonthestatelevel.Butinordertomakeasuccessfulcombinationofthetwoasamatterofimaginativeexperiment,apartfrommakingacleardistinctionbetweenthetwolevels,onehasalsotoaskthepersontoplaytwodifferentroles,namelyasacitizenofthestateandasanindividualhumaninanetworkofinterpersonalandsocialrelationships.Hehastoresolveconflictsofinterestandvaluesbyobeyinglaws,andyethehasalsotobeamorallycultivatedorvirtuouspersoninhimselfsothathemayusehiswisdomandunderstandingtoresolvesocialandmoralproblems,withorwithoutthebenefitoflaw.Withregardtotheneedofabalancedunitybetweenlawsandvirtuesinpromotingabenevolentgovernment(renzheng),Menciussayssomethingveryinstructive:“Bymerevirtuesonecannotconductgovernment;bymerelawsthegovernmentwillnotmovebyitself.”7Menciusarguedthatarulermayhavetheheartofren,butifhedoesnotuseprovenlawsandnormsfromthepast,hewillnotmakeagoodruler.NoticethatMenciusrequirestherulertobeagoodpersonfirstandthenurgeshimtousegoodmethodofruleinordertobecomearuler.Thiscanbeinterpretedasrequiringajustrulertobeajustpersonfirst,beforehedevisesorusesjustlawsforrule.ThismeansthatalthoughinpracticeMenciusseesapriorityorderoftwolevelsofjustice,thejusticeofpersonsfirst,followedbythejusticeofthestate,hestressesboththeinterdependenceandthemutualindispensabilityofthejusticeofthestateintheformoffa(lawsandnorms)andthejusticeofpersonsintheformofvirtues.ItisinterestingtonotethatConfuciuscanbesaidtohavealsorecognizedtheneedtodistinguishtwolevelsofjustice,andtohavecalledinsteadfortherecognitionoftheprimordialimportanceandindispensabilityofrenatthepersonallevelasthefoundationforjusticeatstatelevel.Confuciusdistinguishesbetweenthevirtueofrenaswholevirtueontheonehandandzhi(knowledge)ontheotherhand.Althoughknowledgecanbealsoregardedasavirtue,thespecialvalueofknowledgeforConfuciusistoenablementoestablishthemselvesinsocietyandrelatetootherpeople,andinabroadersensecouldbesaidtoimplyunderstandingofthewaysofgovernment.8Withthisunderstanding,wemayseehowConfuciusfocusedonthesustainingimportanceofrenforzhi.Hesays:Ifonehasknowledge,butcannotpreserveitwithbenevolence,evenifonehasacquiredtheknowledge,onemustloseit.Ifonehasknowledge,andcanpreserveitwithbenevolence,butdoesnotapproachitwithsolemnity,thenpeoplewillnotshowrespect.Ifonehasknowledgeandcanpreserveitwithbenevolenceandfurtherisabletoapproachitinsolemnity,andyetactwithoutfollowingthepropriety(li),thiscannotbesaidtobegood.9Confucius’messageisveryclear:evenifwehavethebestkindofjusticesystem,andevenifweknowitthoroughly,yetifwedonothavethewholevirtueandwholehearttocherishitandpracticeitcorrectly,theknowledgewillloseitsvalueoritsmeaning.Ifweinterpretrenaspertainingtojusticeonthepersonallevelandzhiaspertainingtojusticeonthestatelevel,itisclearthatforConfucius,justiceonthepersonallevelisnotonlyastartingpointforjusticeonthestatelevel,itistheconstantguardandmoving(notmerelymotivating)forceforthejusticeofthestatebasedonknowledge.Henceajustsocietycannotbejustwithoutjustpersonswhowillnotabandonjusticeforasinglemoment.Logicallyspeaking,thedistinctionofthelevelsoflaws(fa)andvirtues(shan)inMencius,andthedistinctionofthelevelsofknowledge(zhi)andwholehumanity(ren)inConfucius,providesuswithacluetoperceivingtherelationshipbetweenthetwolevelsofjustice.FortheConfucianist,personaljusticeisabsolutelyfundamental.Butevenso,theclassicalConfucianistalsoalwaysrecognizesthenecessityofstatejusticewhichcanbeacquiredbyknowledgeandwhichistobeexpressedinnormsandlaws.ThereforethereisnoreasonwhyaConfuciantheoryofjusticeasvirtueonthepersonallevelmaynotbeintegratedwithaliberalanddemocratictheoryofjusticeasfairnessonthestatelevel.Aslawsdonotregulateeverything,andjusticeasfairnesscannotbeexpectedtocovereverything,itisalsofairthatwedevelopeddifferentusefultraditionsofjusticetotheirutmosttoseeifitcouldenhanceourpracticalwisdom(orphronesis)andhelpustoreachaconcreteuniversalitybycommonexperienceandrationalinterchange.Inthiswaywemayexpecttointegratethemwherepossibleinaframeworkofharmonizationofrenandzhiwhichallowsfullpeacefulinteractionamongalltraditions,whilepreservingthebasicrightsandlibertiesofpeopleasequalparticipantscapableofrationaldialogueanddiscourse.Thedevelopmentofaframeworkofharmonizationmaytakesometime,butitsgoalofachievinganinter-groupandinter-traditionrecognitionofjusticeasanoverallsystemofhumancooperationandmutuallearningandsupportcannotbedoubted.\nCHUNG-YINGCHENG181Itisnotonlypossibleandjustthatfollowingtheparadigmofinterpretingjusticeasfairnesswecanexplainandinterpretallvirtuesasfairness,itisequallypossibleandjusttostartattheotherendandinterpretfairnessasjusticebutallothervirtuesasjusticealso.RawlshasmadeanimportantandsuccessfulsteptowardintegratingtheEuropeantraditionsofnaturalrightsandutilitarianisminacontractarianunityinthebestrationalGreekspiritoflogos,andSterba’sworkhasaddedtothisprojectaswell.PerhapsthenextsignificantstepwillbeatheoreticalattempttounifythemodernliberalpoliticaltraditionofhumanrightsanddemocracywiththehumanistictraditionsofrenyianddikaiosyneinclassicalChinaandGreece.WhatIhavedoneindistinguishingthetwolevelsofstateandindividual,andinarguingfortheirmutualdependence,shouldbeanexampleofsuchanattempt.ItcanbesaidthattherationalisticspiritofmodernjusticeaslawfulnessandequityisalreadyamanifestationoftheheritageoftheGreek;whatthereforeneedstobestressedinrealityistheincorporationofthemoralhumanismofrenandthehumanespiritattheinterpersonalandsociallevelfromtheConfuciantradition.Thisisagreatchallengeforphilosophersandnon-philosophersalike.NOTES1Analects,17.2InmodernandinrecentChinesehistorytherehavebeenmanyactualpersonagesbefittingthistype,particularlyinlightofthetortuousprocessoflate-Qingreforms,dealingwithforeignpeople,revolutionsandmodernization.3ThephraseisderivedfromtianxiapianoftheZhuangzi.OnecanseethechaptercalledDaxueinLijiasanillustrationandpresentationofthethesisofneisheng-waiwan,whichalsobecomesoneofthemainthemesofneo-ConfucianismintheSungPeriod.4AlasdairMacIntyre,WhoseJustice,WhichRationality?(NotreDameIN:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1988).5ThereisnoindicationintheConfuciansystemthatjustpersonsintheConfuciansensemakethejustsystemoftheRawlsiantype.NeitherdoestheConfucianistvisionofajustorevenperfectsocietyonthebasisofvirtuouspersonsandperhapsaperfectlyvirtuoussage-kingmatchtheliberalpoliticalsocietywhichRawlshasimplicitlyassumedinhistheory.6InaspeechfollowingtheelectionsofNovember1994,RepresentativeNewtGingrich,thenewlyelectedRepublicanleaderintheHouse,claimedthatcontemporaryAmericansocietyhadlostitsmoralityandhadnoculture.SeealsotheessaybyLanceMorrow,“YinandYang,SleazeandMoralizing,”inTimemagazine,26December1994,p.158.AtypicalcaseofjustsystemandunjustmaniswellillustratedinthecaseofAnitaHillv.ClarenceThomas.7SeetheMencius,4A-1.Ofcoursethelaws(fa)whichMenciushasinmindarenotlawsinthemodernsense,butnormsandwaysofgovernmentaspracticedbyearlysage-kings.8ThereisarichrepertoireofConfucius’statementsonknowledge,whetherpracticalortheoreticalorevenmetaphysical,intheAnalects.Ihavediscussedtheseinvariousarticlesofmine:cf.“TheoryandPracticeinConfucianism,”JournalofChinesePhilosophy,I:2,1974,pp.179–98;“LunGongzizhizhiyuZhuzizhili(OnKnowledgeinConfuciusandPrincipleinZhuxi),”inmybookZhishiYuJiazhi(KnowledgeandValue)(Taipei:LinkingPress,1986)pp.141–72.9SeetheAnalects,15–33.\nEnvironmentalism\n18ENFORCINGENVIRONMENTALETHICSCiviclawandnaturalvalueHolmesRolstonIIIHowmuchenvironmentalethicsshouldwewriteintolaw?Careforourenvironmentissomethingonwhichwemustgainminimalconsensus,butalsosomethingthatwillrequireconsiderableenforcement.Notalldutiesaremattersofjustice,butmanyare.Ifyoudoubtthat,trystealing.Orkilling.Orraping.Ordumpinghazardouswastes(maybeakindofkilling,stealing,orraping).Ourinquiryishowfarsuchenforcementisandoughttobeso,howfarenvironmentalethicsis,inthislargersense,environmentaljustice.Politically,“commandandcontrol”solutionsareoutofvogue;whatweneedinstead,manycry,are“incentives.”Evenincentives,suchaspollutionpermits,operateagainstabackgroundofrequiredcompliance.Theysweetentheobediencetoenvironmentallaw,andintroducesomevoluntarychoices,buttheinsistentcommandisstillthere.Wedanglecarrotsupfront,butattherearweholdastick.Ethically,law-likeformsofethicsarealsooutofvogue;whatweneedinstead,manycry,is“caring.”Othersemphasize“virtues.”Caring,virtuouspersonsneednorules.Thatmaybetrueinlaterstagesofpersonalmoraldevelopment;butinpubliclife,caringinconcertneedsregulation.Thevirtuousahead,upfront,mayneednolaws;butthoseattherear,andmostofusalongtheway,needenforcement,reinforcement—whichhelpsusmovealong.Ruleschannelcaringanddisciplinevirtuousintentions.Tothisissuewewillreturn.1LegislatingenvironmentalcareYoumaybesurprisedhowmuchisenforced,andathowmanylevels,fromActsofCongresstolightingcampfires.Startingatthetop,recalladozenexamplesfromoveronehundredActsoftheUSCongress.•CleanAirAct(1955),Amendments(1963,1965,1969,1977,renewed1970,1990)•WildandScenicRiversAct(1968)•WildernessAct(1964)•NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(1969)•MarineMammalProtectionAct(1972)•EndangeredSpeciesAct(1973,1982),Amendments(1976,1977,1978,1979,1980)•NationalForestManagementAct(1976)•FederalLandPolicyandManagementAct(1976)•InternationalEnvironmentalProtectionAct(1983)•ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation,andLiabilityAct(Superfund)(1980),Amendments(1986)•CleanWaterAct(1987)•EmergencyWetlandsResourcesAct(1986)Withagencyandcourtinterpretation,theseactsenforcemuchenvironmentalbehavior.Ifyoudoubtthis,tryshootingabaldeagle,orfillingawetland,orridingamotorbikeinadesignatedwilderness.Followingthelastquartercenturyofenvironmentallawandregulation,enforcedbytheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,no-oneintheUnitedStatestodaycandobusinesslegallyinthemannerinwhichourparentsandgrandparentsroutinelyconductedbusiness.Internationally,thereareover150internationalenvironmentalagreementsregisteredwiththeUnitedNations,andtheseareoftenenforcedbytheparticipatingnations(UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme,1991;andseebelow).TwoexamplesaretheConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpeciesofWildFaunaandFlora(CITES)(1973)andtheUnitedNationsConventiononBiologicalDiversity(1992).IfyouarecaughttryingtobringasnowleopardskinintotheUnitedStates,youwillfindyourselfinprisonwithafineoftensofthousandsofdollars.\n184HOLMESROLSTONIIIMorelocally,withstateandlocalgovernments,courtdecisions,actionsofregulatoryagencies,suchastheUSFishandWildlifeService,orevendecisionsofthedistrictrangers,thisenforcementenlarges,ramifies,andbecomesquitedetailed.Goelkhuntingadayearly,andyoumayendupinjailwithyourweaponconfiscated.Doyouwanttodoamaster’sthesisinwildlifebiology?Yourprojectistofindoutamongantelopeswhatproportionofmalesandfemalessurvivethewinter,withaviewtochangingthehuntingseasonforbettersurvivaloftheherd.Failtofillinapermitformdetailingwhetheryouhaveusedthemosthumanemethodofcapture,andtheAnimalWelfareCommitteefortheColoradoDivisionofWildlife,onwhichIsit,willcancelyourproject.AnyonewhobackpacksinColoradowildernessisprohibitedfromcampingwithin100feetoflakes,streams,trails.Thatzoneisoftenwherenearlyallthedesirablecampsitesare.Twoyearsback,intheRawahWilderness,afterahardday’sclimb,partlybecausetherewasmoresnowatthetreelinelakesthanexpected,Itookextraefforttofindalegalsite.Ipitchedalatecamp,onlytofindthenextday,alas,behindmytent,halfburiedyetinthesnow,atrailthatIhadnotseen.Sureenough,thebackcountryrangercamethrough,andaskedmetomovemytent.Fortunatelyheappearedlatethesecondday;Iwasleavingthenextmorning,soherelented.Buthehadthelegalpower,andifIhadinsistedonstayingontheredespitehisorders,Iwouldhavebeentakentocourt.IspenttheeveningwithoutthecampfireIwished,sincefiresareprohibitedinthesubalpinezones.Adduptheseenforcements,greatandsmall,andonecouldprobablyconcludethat,farfromenvironmentalethicsbeingoptionalandvoluntary,tothecontrary,mostofitisenforced.Environmentalethicsisapersonalethic,oritisnoethicatall.Butitisequallytruethatenvironmentalethicsmustgopublicor,likewise,itwillbenoethicatall.Enforcementismoreappropriateincommunalspace,andtheenvironmentiscommunalspace.2Concernandconcert;cheatingandcoercionTheenvironment,apublicgood,cannotbeaprivatematteronly;howweactmustbecollective,institutional,coordinated,corporate.Inacommunity,therearethingswecannotdounlesswedothemtogether.Letusanalysewaysinwhichthisrequiresciviclawprotectingnaturalvalue.Manyenvironmentalproblemsresultfromtheincrementalaggregationofactionsthatareindividuallybeneficial.Apersonmaybedoingwhatwouldbe,takenindividually,aperfectlygoodthing,athingtheyhavearighttodo,weretheyalone,butwhich,takenincollectionwiththousandsofothersdoingthesamething,becomesaharmfulthing.Theseactionsmustberegulatedwhenaggregated.ThisisGarrettHardin’stragedyofthecommons(1968).Pursuitofindividualadvantagedestroysthecommons.Here,contrarytoAdamSmith,thereisnoinvisiblehand.Hardinfoundthatsolutionswilloftenrequire“mutualcoercion,mutuallyagreedupon.”Acommunitynearingthecarryingcapacityofitsresourcebasewillhavetocurbshort-termself-interestforthelong-termgoodofall.Long-termsustainabilityrequiressuppressingshort-termdesires.Humanscanandoftendothewrongthing—“bynature”wemightsay—andlawneedsto“civilize”theseinstincts.Ourevolutionaryhistoryshapedusforshort-rangetribalsurvival,seldomaskingustoconsiderfuturegenerationsbeyondchildrenandgrandchildren,neverfiguringinthewelfareofothersthousandsofmilesawayortheincrementalbuild-upofheavymetals.Perhapsacommonsethicscouldworkfortribes,butfornationsandglobalcommerce,weneedregulationofthecommongood.Oftenwehumansarenotsomuchevilasthoughtless.Socialpowersexternaltotheself,suchasgovernmentorbusiness,causeevenwellintendedpersonstoactagainsttheirindividualwishes.Thosepowerscanworkagainstenvironmentalethics;butwewishtoturngovernmentalpowerstowardthebuildingofanenvironmentalethics.Thecommunalgoodismutualandrequiresbroadsocialagreementonenvironmentalpolicy.Butitalsorequiresenforcement,forsomewillbetemptedtoexceedthelimitssetbypolicy.Thisistheproblemof“cheaters,”personswhowillinself-interesttakeadvantageofcooperatingothers.Noristhisalwaysconsciouslyintended;individualsmayactastheyhavebeenaccustomedtoovermanydecades,withoutwakinguptohowthesecustomaryindividualgoodsareaggregatingtobringcommunalevilstowhichweareunaccustomed.Environmentallawwillbeneededtocurbprevailingpractices.Thesocialcontractmustbepoliced.Civiclawprotectsnaturalvalue.Thisethicwillbevoluntary,anenlightenedanddemocraticallyachievedconsensus,withthewillingsupportofmillionsofcitizens(aswehopeandoutlineinthenextsection).Butthisvoluntarycompliancedependsontheexpectationthateventhosewhodonotwishtoobeywillberequiredtodoso.Nolawscanbeenforcedwithoutthewidespreadvoluntarycomplianceofcitizens;thereareneverenoughenforcementofficerstocompeleverybody.Butevenif99%ofcitizensaregladtobehaveinacertainway,providedthatallothersdo,1%ofthecitizenswillbepressedtofreeload,andthiswilltriggerbadfaith.Minorityrightsandtherighttodissenthavealsotobeconsidered—andenforced!Butno-onehastherighttoharmothers,withoutjustifiedcause.Wheresomedestroypublicgoodsentwinedwithbioticcommunity,enforcementcanbejustified.\nENFORCINGENVIRONMENTALETHICS185Onerottenapplespoilsabarrel.Thecorruptioniscontagious.Unlessasocietypolicesoutthepolluters,therotwillspread.Maybethatisnotthewayitoughttobe,hadwehumannatureideally;but,withhumannaturerealistically,thisisthewayitis.Thisisespeciallytruewhen:“Newoccasionsteachnewduties;Timemakesancientgooduncouth”(Lowell1844,1966,p.191).Environmentalgoodshavelongbeenassumedasnature’sgift.Onlyinthelastcenturydidthesegoodscomeunderjeopardyandthreat.Nowtacitgoodshavetobemadeexplicit;assumedgoodshavetobeguaranteedbylegalenforcement.Thisisgoingtorequirenudgingpeoplealong,wheretheydonotwishtogo—notyetatleast,thoughtheymay,inretrospect,bequitegladwhentheygetthere.Vestedinterests,oftenwithmuchinertia,havetobedivested.Habitshavetobede-habituated.Self-interestiseasyenoughtorationalizeundertheoldrationale.Thisisthewaywehavebeendoingitfordecades;canwhatwasrightyesterdaybewrongtomorrow?Suchestablishedself-interest,combiningwithestablishedandtacitgoods,willquicklybeassertedasindividualrights.“Mywaterrightsgobackto1890!WhatdoyoumeanIcan’tirrigatewithitlikeIusedtobecausetheseleniumfromthereturnflowisbuildingupandistoxicdownstream?That’snotfair!”Butwecannotleaveolddecisionsinplacewhennewinformationcomesonline,withoutineffectmakingnewanddifferentdecisions.Nudgingpeopleoutoftheiroldhabitsandprivileges,shiftingpatternsofrightandwrongatshiftinglevelsofscaleandscope,isgoingtorequireenforcement.Considerchangedattitudestowardsmokingandthelongefforttomixincentiveandregulation.Ourforefathersdidnotknowwhatwenowknowabouttobacco,anymorethantheyknewaboutselenium.Werequiretobaccowarningsonpackages;weprohibitthesaleoftobaccotominors.Inpublic,youmustsmokeoutsideandinthecold.Everycigarettesmokerhasfeltpushedaround.Butitwouldnothavebeenpossibletoachieveasmoke-freeenvironmentwithoutenforcement.Mutatismutandis,applythistocleanairandenvironmentalhealth.Ortocleanwater,despite1890rights.“Liberty”isavirtueword;everybodywantsit.“Enforce,”theseemingcontrast,isoftenpejorative;nobodywantstobeforced.Butthisissuperficial.Infactonecannothavethefreedomonedesireswithoutlawenforcement.UnlessthievesarerestrainedandpropertylawsenforcedIamnotfreetoownmyhome.Onehasmoreoptionsinadecentlyorderedsociety.Myrighttofreespeechandactionrequirespolicingofthosewhowouldcurtailit.Environmentalethicsneedstolearntoextrapolateandinnovatetheseclassicalargumentsintothedomainofenvironmentalgoods.Manyofthelibertiesthatweprotectarequiteprecious.Iamnotevenfreetobreatheunlesstoxicairemissionsareenforced.TheCleanAirActof1970turnsthirtyyearsofagethisyear,oneofthemostsuccessfulenvironmentallawsever.AccordingtotheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,airpollutionhasbeencutbyathirdandacidrainby25%.Carsare95%cleaner.Theozonelayerisprojectedtorecoverbymid-centuryEmissionsofthesixworstairpollutantsdropped33%from1970–97despitea31%increaseinUSpopulation,a114%riseinproductivityanda127%jumpinthenumberofmilesdrivenbyAmericansintheirautomobiles.Allthiswouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutenforcingenvironmentalethics.Asmuchcouldbesaidforcleanwater,orenvironmentalhealth.ThereareusefulanalogieswiththeUScivilrightsmovement(Ispeak,letitbenoted,asaSoutherner,whosegreatgrandparentswereslaveowners).TheUSSouth(oftenalsotheNorthandWest)didnotdesegregatevoluntarily.Typically,compliancewasforcedbycivilrightslegislation.Butneitherwastheenforcementunconstitutional,norwasitoftenviolent.ManySouthernershadadeepsensethatitwasright,althoughnotsomethingtheyparticularlywantedtodo.Today,noSouthernerswouldreturntothesegregatedSouth.Theyareproudofwhattheyhavedone.Environmentalenforcementwilloftenbesimilar.Thefluorocarbonswereremovedfromrefrigerators,mandatedbylaw.Theforestindustrymovedtoplantationsandsustainableforestry,anddecriedgovernmentinterferencelockinguptoomuchwilderness.WolveswerereturnedtoYellowstone,withsheepranchersmuttering“Shoot,shovel,andshutup.”Butrefrigeratormakers,forestersandranchers(oratleasttheirchildren)aregoingtobeproudoftheirenvironmentalsuccess.Enforcementcoversawidespectrumofoccasionswhenanagentactscontrarytothatagent’sownwishes,owingtoforcesbroughttobearfromtheoutside.Themainideaisofexternalrestraintscountertointernaldesires.Thesemayinvolveboycotts,tariffs,fines,prohibitionofaccess,impoundedequipmentandfunds,orjail.Enforcementneednotbeviolent;indeeditwillseldombe.Unfortunately,enforcementcanbeintheinterestsofinjusticeaswellasjustice,andthisisastrueenvironmentallyassocially.Enforcementisoftenusedtomaintainundesirablepracticesintheserviceofprivilegeandvestedinterests.Enforcementcansettleissuesthewrongway,anditoftenhas.Butfewsocialissueshavebeensettledtherightwaywithoutenforcement—notslavery,notchildlabor,notwomen’ssuffrage,notworkplacesafety,notminimumwage,notcivilrights.Iconcedethatanenforcedethicisincomplete.Idonotmurder,orpollute,forfearofpunishment.Ifso,myethicsisnotautonomous;itisnominal.Enforcedethicsisnecessarybutnotsufficientforenvironmentalethics.Butwithenforcement,wecanperhapschangehabits,andoncehabituated,thebehaviormaybeinternalized.Thereisenforcementinitially,whentheactorshaveasyetnowill;but,havingdoneit,afterwardtheactorscometomakeuptheformerdeficiencyofwill.Theautomobileindustrywasforcedtocleanup,buttherearenoautomakerswhonowwishtoreturntothecarsofthesixties.Iagreethat,wherethereisfrequentuse,oneoughtnotcampnearlakes,orbuildfiresinalpinecountry;andIdonotneedabackcountryrangertomakemebehavethisway.\n186HOLMESROLSTONIIIEnforcementwilltendtobeforthestatusquo,whenwhatisasoftenneededisenforcementtoproducechange.Enforcementwillbepartoftheestablishment,andenvironmentalethicsisoftenanti-establishment,thatis,reformatory.Enforcementwillhaveacertainprestige.“That’sthelaw!”withthesuppressedpremisethatit’sagoodlawandoughttobeobeyed.Thenwemustassertthatenforcementdoesnotcarryitsowncredentials,butneedsitsownauthorizationandjustification.Enforcementisnosubstituteforargument.Wedonotwantcoerciontosubstituteforintelligence,butwealsorecognizethatintelligentactionwillneedenforcementonthosenotsoenlightened.Meanwhile,therealwaysunderliessuchactionthepriorquestionofwhetherenforcementisjust.Lawyershavetoargue,evenifpolicemendonot.Philosophershavenopowersofenforcement;theycanonlyargue.Theyquestionauthority.ThatiswhyIamarguingforthelegitimateandrationaluseofenforcement.Ageneralmoralprincipleisthattheexcessiveuseofforceisunwarranted,andthatapplieshere.Therewillbedebateaboutappropriatemeansanddegreesofenforcement.Also,wewillhopeforargumentsthatwhiletheenforcedbehaviormaybecontrarytotheactor’sdesires,itisnotcontrarytothatactor’swelfare.Myconcerniswhetherenforcementismoral,comparedwithcaring,andIconcludeonlyhalfwayso.Here,aselsewhereinethics,onewantsenforcementintheserviceofdesirableends,appropriatecaring,regulatedbyconsitutionalprocesses,preferablythoseofdemocracy.3DemocraticenvironmentalethicsHardin’s“mutualcoercion,mutuallyagreedupon”leadstothequestionofhowfaranenvironmentalethiccanbedemocratic.Theansweriscomplex.Werecall,amusedandchastened,WinstonChurchill’squipthat“Democracyistheworstformofgovernment,exceptforalltheothers.”Democracy,thoughthebestalternativewehave,isnotentirelywellsuitedforenvironmentalprotection.Ifenvironmentalpolicyistobejust,andalsoenforced,suchlawoughtbeenactedandpolicedthroughdemocraticprocess.Thisrequiressomethinkingthrough.Anon-democraticgovernmentmightenforceajustenvironmentalpolicy,butitwouldbebettertohaveademocraticenvironmentalethics.Twoplaceswherehumanspursuetheirvaluesmostzealouslyareinpoliticsandeconomics.Otherdomainsofvalue,suchasschoolandchurch,arenolessimportant,forthesealsocriticallyhelpustoformaconceptofnaturalvalue.Still,inthemodernworldhumansintenselyvaluedemocracyandcapitalism.Inbusinessweareconsumers;inpoliticswearecitizens.Theseconcernsarealliesbuttheyarealsointension.Capitalismcanbeindifferenttovaluesoutsidetheeconomicdomain(political,religious,aesthetic,ecological).Capitalismhasproducedwealth,butithasdistributeditratherinequitably,whileoftenclaimingthatitallotswealthmeritoriouslytothosewhoworkhard,efficientlyandintelligently.Herewetypicallythinkthatgovernmentisneededtoregulatebusinessonmatterssuchasworkersafety,minimumwage,orminorityhiring,ortherightsoflaboranddangersofunfaircompetition.Lawisneededtopreservethosedomainsofvaluethatcannotsafelybelefttotheopenmarketplace.Thisoughttoextendtoenvironmentalconcerns—sothedemocrats(andrepublicanstoo!)nowargue.Forthissuperintendingofcommerceweturntogovernment(aidedbyschoolandchurch)toforgeacommunityboundbytiesofmutualservice,ratherthanmerecommercialexchange.Naturalresourcedecisionshavebeenlongconsideredprimarilyeconomicdecisions.Landsunderprivateownershipwereboughtandsoldinmarketsandcaredforundereconomicincentives.Evenpubliclands,inthecommons,couldbestbemanagedwithacost/benefitapproach;wewereinterestedinwhatgoodswecouldcollectivelyharvestfromthem.Shiftingconceptsofnaturalvalue,however,nowmeanthatmany,evenmost,ofthevaluescarriedbynaturalsystemscannotbesafelylefttounregulatedcapitalistmarkets.Wenolongerwantapurelyeconomicconceptionofthenaturalgood,anymorethanwewantapurelyeconomicconceptionofthesocialgood.Hencewelooktodemocracytoinsurethatthesekindsofnaturalvaluesaresufficientlyprotectedbytheregulationofeconomics,byremovingsomenaturalvaluesfromeconomicaccess,or,wherewedoconsumeresources,bycreatingincentivesorprohibitionstoobtainthebalanceofothernaturalandsocialgoodsthatwevalueascitizens.Regulationpolicestheseinterconnectionstoseethattheeconomiconesstayintheirlegitimatedomain.Environmentalregulationhasarisentoprotectbynationalwillenvironmentalvalueswhoseprotectioncannotbelefttoeconomicinterestsalone.Ademocracyplacestheconstraintofthegeneralwillonthosewhowoulddegradethecommons.Wesometimeslegislatemorality,atleastinminimumessentialorcommondenominatorareas.Inenvironmentalpolicy,theremustbeamanagementethicforthecommons—aboutsoil,air,water,pollution,environmentalquality,theozonelayer,mutagens,wildlife,theeagleasanationalsymbol,endangeredspecies,futuregenerations.Notonlyistheenvironmentapublicgood,butfurther,mostremainingwildlandsarepubliclands—nationalforests,parks,wildernessareas,seashores,grasslands,wildliferefuges,landsundertheBureauofLandManagement,stateorcountyparksandforests.Theseareasarelargelymanagedformultipleuseandonlysemiwild;stilltheyconstituteamajorcomponentofthenaturalenvironment.Theyalsocontainmostoftherelictpristinewildlands,asnearlyastheseanywhereremain.Onecannotlooktothemarkettoproduceorprotectthemultiplevaluesthatcitizensenjoyingeneralonpubliclands,muchlessin\nENFORCINGENVIRONMENTALETHICS187wildernessareas,sincemanyofthevaluessoughtherearenot,ornotsimply,economicones.Anationneedscollectivechoicesproducingapubliclandethic.Democracy,thoughmoreadmiredthaniscapitalism,isnomoreperfect.Thehumanswhogathertodobusinesstogetherarethesamehumanswhogathertoformgovernment.Theydonotleavebehindonehumannatureandtakeonanotherwhentheymovefrommarketplacetocourthouse—eventhoughthevaluesatstakediffer.Ifhumannatureissometimesflawed,theseflawswillassoonturnupingovernmentasinbusiness.Wehavelargelythoughtthatdemocracyistheformofgovernmentbestabletocombineindividualfreedomsandmutualcooperationwithchecksontheseflawsinhumannature.Withitsmorecomprehensivesenseofthepublicgood,withallthecitizenscross-checkingeachother,democracycanputchecksontheflawsinhumannaturethatwillmaketheunregulatedmarketinhumane.Butwehavealsotorealizethatdemocracycanitselfbeaflawedinstitution.Atoughquestioniswhetherdemocracycandisciplineitselfenoughtobeenvironmentallyrational.Atestofademocracyiswhetheritscitizenscanlearntopracticeenlightenedconstraint,developinganethicfortheuseoftheenvironment,andmore,developingethicalconcernforthewholecommonwealthofahumansocietysetinitsecosystems.Onethingthatdemocracycanproduceisdebate,discussionaboutvalues(though,alas,itdoesnotalwaysdoso);andwearemorelikelytouncoverandconserveallofthenaturalvaluesatstakewhenissueshavebeenwelldebated.Inthisdebate,aninitialproblemisthatordinarypeopleoftenlacktheneededexpertise.Populardesiresarenotalwaysausefulguidetoenvironmentallywiseorjustdecisions,especiallyaboutcomplicatedmattersthatinvolvejudgingrisksorbalancingtradeoffs.Seleniumisasnecessaryforhumanhealthasitistoxic.Athowmanypartspermillionofseleniuminthedrinkingwater,orintheducksshotonthemarsh,orthefishcaughtintheriver,dowepassfromthehealthytothetolerableandthentothetoxic?Oneneedstotrustexperts.Expertsmayconcedethattheirknowledgeisincomplete,andwhatthen?Applytheprecautionaryprinciple.Butthenoneneedsexpertstoknowwheretheprecautionarythresholdslie,ifsuchthereare.Oneneedstimetorealizetheresults,althoughtheactorsareimpatientfordecisions.Justhowmuchold-growthforestisrequiredforthosespottedowls?Thatisnotthekindofquestiononeputstopopularvote.Whoiscompetenttodecide?Thatisnotthekindofquestiononeputstopopularvoteeither.Tothecontrary,politicallypopularanswersareaslikelytobewrongasright.TheEndangeredSpeciesActrequiresconsultationwhenaprojectinvolvingfederalfundsislikelytoplaceanendangeredspeciesinjeopardy.Permittingdependsonwhatiscalleda“biologicalopinion.”Therehasbeenafighttokeeptheseopinionsstrictly“biological,”meaningnot“economic”or“political,”certainlynot“democratic.”Suchbiologicalopinions,renderedbybiologistsandtheirsupervisors,willbeenforced.Thelawsthatrequireandenforcesuchopinionsaredemocraticallyachieved,perhapsalsopoliticallybiased,andtheycouldbechanged,ifthereweresufficientsocialpressures.Meanwhile,thosewhocherishdemocracymustturnoversomedecisionstoexperts.Environmentalconcernteststhepopularwillforlong-termdecisions.Therearelagtimesforeffects,aswithaerosolspraysandcarbondioxideemissions.Futuregenerationsarenotheretovotetoday.Oneistemptedtodiscountthefutureenvironmentally.Althoughenvironmentalismhasincreasinglybecomepopular,itisalsotruethatwhatenvironmentalistswantisusuallyoutofstepwiththeimmediatelyprevailingmajority.Environmentalistsarefrequentlynudgingthemajoritywhereitdoesnotyetquitewanttogo.Anotherwayofputtingthisisthatenvironmentalistsmakeexplicitwhatisasyetlatentinthepublicmind.Environmentalistsuselawtodothis,becauseotherwisepeoplewakeuptoolate.“Younevermissthewateruntilthewellrunsdry.”Mostpeopleareanthropocentric.Onlypeoplevote.Butthemostseminalenvironmentallawspushfurtherthanconcernforcivicvalues.Theyrecognizehowcivicvaluesareentwinedwithnaturalvalues.Peopleneedtovotewithaconcernforendangeredspecies,forhumanehunting,formarinemammals,forwilderness.Thescaleandscopeofenvironmentalaffairsistypicallydecades,evencenturies.ThescaleandscopeofCongresscansometimesmatchthat,butthescaleisoftentwoyears,oreventheelectionthreemonthsaway.Ifcitizensinsistonshort-sighted,immediate,humanisticvalues,thenCongressionalrepresentatives,whohavetobere-electedeverytwoyears,andSenators,whohavetobeelectedeverysix,willnotbeinamuchbetterpositionthancorporateexecutiveswhosestockholdersinsistonmaximumdividendseveryquarter,withoutregardforthelong-rangehealthofthebusiness.Wecanbetemptedtovoteforthelegislatorwhopromisesrewardsnow;thosewhodonotwillbeoutofofficenextelection.Thiscanmeandecisionsthatarenotreallysustainableoverthegenerationsofourchildrenandgrandchildren.Thehalf-lifeofapoliticianisaboutfouryears;thehalf-lifeofacorporatedirectoristwicethat.Thehalf-lifeofaforestisaboutacentury.Thehalf-lifeofaspeciesisseveralmillionyears.Thehalf-lifeofaplutoniumdumpisalmostforever.Allthismeansthatdemocraciesneedtoseeklonger-termviews,andmoreappropriatesupportinglaws,thanvotingcitizensareinclinednaturallytosupply.Onewaywedothisiswithchecksandbalances.Thejudiciaryisnotthatbranchofgovernmentplacedunderimmediatedemocraticcontrol;tothecontraryitisrelativelyfreeofit.Judgesdonothaveanymoreenvironmentalexpertisethanordinarypeople,buttheyhavethepowerandlegalobligationtoconsultexpertsandtotakelonger-rangeviews.Theymustapplylawsthattheydonotmake;ourdemocraticallyelectedrepresentativesmakethem.Suchlawsmustalsobe\n188HOLMESROLSTONIIIconstitutional.Butjudgesdonotanswerdirectlytodemocraticwill.Theylistentoargument.Theyratherconsiderwhatisjust,orright,whatoptimizesthegreatestgoodforthegreatestnumber—andthatmeans,environmentally,whatcombinesciviclawwiththegreatestprotectionofenvironmentalvalue.4Humanrights,responsibilities,andcaringfornaturePerhapsonewillconcludethattheonlyenforceableenvironmentalethicsisthesortthatprotectshumansfromharms.Anthropocentriccaringforwhathumanshaveatstakeinnaturewillbethemostpersuasivepart,politicallycorrect,andreadilyenforceable,becauseitbuildsonaclassicalhumanisticlegacy,enforcingjusticewherepersonsthreatenotherpersons.Oneoughtnottoharmotherpersons,andthiscanbereadilyextrapolatedtoenvironmentalharms.Wemightcallthisarighttonormalliving,where“normal”becomes“normative”aboutthenaturalgivens—air,soil,water,livingspace—whensuchtraditionalgivensarejeopardizedbyencroachinghumanactivities.Oneoughttohave“sustainability”;thissustainabilityentersasaningredientofenvironmentalhealth.IfonehasarighttonationalsecurityandhencetheDepartmentofDefense,onehasarighttoenvironmentalsecurityandhencetheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency.Ifonehasarighttocivicsecurity,andhencethesheriffs,onehasarighttoenvironmentalsecurity,andhencethepolicelockuptheillegaldumpsterorshutdownthenonconformingindustrialplant.Protectionagainstundueharmshaslongbeentheprovinceofjudicialpower.Rights,legallyclaimedandenforced,mustbecoordinatedwithresponsibilities.Thusyourrighttocleanwaterismyresponsibilitynottopollutethestreams,andonecannotbeenforcedwithouttheother.Ifsocialsecuritycanbemandated,socanenvironmentalsecurity.Intheseenvironmentallaws,however,humansdonotalwayshavethemselvesatthefocusofeveryevaluation,asforexamplewithlawsaboutcockfighting,bullfightingorlegholdtraps.Overmostofthenation,huntersarenowrequired,manyagainsttheirwill,tousesteelshotwhenhuntingwaterfowl.Ducksfeedonspentshotthatfallsintotheirponds,needinggritfortheirgizzards,andafterwarddieslowlyfromleadpoisoning.Twoorthreemillionducksandgeeseweredyingthisway,untillawrequiredthesteelshot—againstalongstruggleofresistancebyhuntersandmunitionsmanufacturers.In1992,Coloradoansprohibitedspringbearhunting,aswellasbearhuntingbydogsoroverbait.Huntedinthespring,asowistakenandhercubsstarve.Huntedspringorfall,dogschasedabearrelentlessly,acruelandunfairhunt.Theprohibitionwasmadebystatereferendum,amajoritydecision,with70%ofvotersrejectingthehunt.Thisisafullydemocraticdecision.Itisalsoenforced,unwillingly,onthosewhowishtohuntbears.AsigninRockyMountainNationalParkurgesvisitorsnottoharassthebighornsheep:“Respecttheirrighttolife.”Parkvisitorsareprohibitedfromstoppingtheircars,orwalking,alongahalfmileofroad,soastogivethesheepfreedomtopassatwill.ThehikingtrailupSpecimenMountain,afavoriteone,isclosedduringlambingseason,severalmonthsinthespring.Thegeneralparkethicisthatifyouareinterferingwithanyanimal’sbehavior,youaretooclose.Backoff.Oneoughttogiveanimalstheirfreedom,nomatterhowmuchyouwishtogetupcloserforthatmarveloustake-homephotograph.Allsuchregulationsareenforced.AWyomingrancherbuiltawiremeshfence,twenty-eightmileslongandfivefeethigh,toprotecthiscattle-grazinglandfromantelope.Healsohopedtoscatterordestroytheherd,becausetherewasalikelihoodthatwildlifeauthoritieswoulddeclaretheareacriticalhabitat,andthiswouldmakedifficultorimpossiblestripminingtheareaforcoal.Anearly,severewinter(1983–4)followed;snowspreventedtheantelopefromforagingelsewhere;andthefenceblockedtheirmigrationtosnow-freeareas.About1,500antelopewerethreatenedwithstarvation.Thefencewasputupandtakendownoverseveralwinters,andfinally,inaseriesofappealswhichwentallthewaytotheUSSupremeCourt,thecourtsorderedthefenceremovedorrebuilt.Thecasewascomplex,turningonwildlifeasapublicgoodmorethanonanimalcruelty,butconcernforanimalwelfarewasanimportantfactor.Again,civiclawprotectednaturalvalue.Thatwecanattimesbelegallyrequiredtobe“humane”isarevealingchoiceofwords.Wearetreatinghumanelysomethingthatisnothuman.Suchanethicisoftenpersuasive,becauseweobviouslysharewithanimalsthecapacitytosuffer.Inflictingpainrequiresjustification.Iftheinfractionisseriousenough,youwillhavetoanswerforitincourt.Notice,however,thatenvironmentalregulationcanenforcewhatsomeconsidertobeinhumane,aswhenYellowstoneParkregulationsforbadetherescueofadrowningbison,insistingthat“natureshouldtakeitscourse.”Somelawsextendtospeciesandecosystems.TheUSCongresshaslamented,intheEndangeredSpeciesAct(1973),thelackof“adequateconcern(for)andconservation(of)”species,whichhave“esthetic,ecological,educational,historical,recreational,andscientificvaluetotheNationanditspeople”(Sec.2),andmandatedspeciesprotection.TheActwastougherthanfirstrealized.Ithasstoodoveraquartercentury,protectingendangeredspeciesbeyondanyreasonableexpectationofbenefits,interpretedintheusualmedical,industrial,agricultural,orevenrecreationalsenses,asforexamplewithsavingthesnaildarterorspottedowl.TheNationalForestManagementAct(1976),theFederalLandPolicyandManagementAct(1976)andtheWildernessAct(1964)areinterpretedintermsof“ecosystemmanagement,”andtheUSForestServicecanprefertosaythatitmanagesforthe“multiplevalues”onpubliclands,ratherthanforthetraditional“multipleuses.”\nENFORCINGENVIRONMENTALETHICS1895HumansversusnatureCanandoughtweenforceenvironmentalethicsifthisbenefitsnatureoveragainsthumans?Weuse“versus”provocatively,inthelegalcourt-casesense:Humansv.Nature.Somewillimmediatelyclaimthatthisneednotbe“versus”;thatistooadversarial.Whatoneseeksishumans“with”nature,“in”nature,humans“and”nature,“caringfor”nature;orsomemorecomplementaryandinclusiveconjoiningofthetwo.Thecentralproblemispreciselythisdualist“versus”;andso—criticswilllament—Iphrasetheproblemthewrongway.Lookforharmony,notopposition;andwritelawsthatway.Soletmehastentostatethatoneoughttolegislatewin-winsolutions,wherethisispossible.Cultureandnaturehaveentwineddestinies.Peoplecannotbehealthyinasickenvironment.Facedwithadilemma,wetrytofindawayoutbyshowingthatnohardchoicesneedtobemade.Makethelawssothatthereisthegreatestgoodforthegreatestnumber,andincludethefaunaandflorainthecost/benefitanalysis.Lookformultiplevalues,naturalandcultural,asdoestheForestServiceandtheEPA.Mycriticswilltwistandturntoshowthatthe“versus”canbeeliminated.Considerpovertyindevelopingnations.TheRioDeclarationinsists,“AllStatesandallpeopleshallcooperateintheessentialtaskoferadicatingpovertyasanindispensablerequirement”(UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme,RioDeclaration,Principle5),presumablyusinglegislationtodoso.Italsodeclares,ratherpiously:“Humanbeingsareatthecentreofconcernsforsustainabledevelopment”andthatthesehumans“areentitledtoahealthyandproductivelifeinharmonywithnature”(Principle1).Typically,itturnsoutthathumansarenotreallywinning,iftheyaresacrificingthenaturethatistheirlife-supportsystem.Humanswinbyconservingnature—andthesewinnersincludethepoorandthehungry.“Inordertoachievesustainabledevelopment,environmentalprotectionshallconstituteanintegralpartofthedevelopmentprocessandcannotbeconsideredinisolationfromit”(Principle4).ButIremaintoclaim,withequalinsistence,thatdailythedecisionswefaceare“versus”inthewin-losesense.Wefacedisjunctionsasoftenasconjunctions.Justastypically,natureissacrificedforhumandevelopment;mostdevelopmentisofthiskind.Conservationdilemmasareverymuchwithusindevelopingcountries.Myanalysisisnotofsomeidealbutoftherealworld.Asmuchasanyoneelse,Iwillconvertsuchsituationsintowin-winifIcan.OnlyIfacetherealitythattheydonotsoeasilyorsosoonconvert.Notalldevelopmentisjustified,butthatwhichgetspeoplefeedseemsbasicandurgent.Thennatureshouldlose.Surelythatisjust.JamesP.Sterbaformulatesthisas“aprincipleofhumanpreservation.”Actionsthatarenecessaryformeetingone’sbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeingsarepermissibleevenwhentheyrequireaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofindividualanimalsandplantsorevenofwholespeciesorecosystems.(Sterba2000,p.34;cf.Sterba1998,p.128)Onthatprinciple,anylawsprotectingspecies,ecosystems,animals,orplants,whenthisthwartsmeetingthebasicneedsofhumans,willbeunjust.Sterbadesires,heclaims,a“peacemakingmodel”forhisethic(1998,pp.1–13);butheherebecomesquite“aggressive.”Twowordsinthisprinciple,“necessary”and“basic,”willproveelasticenoughthatvariousdebaterscanshrinkandstretchthemtotheirliking.Perhapstheycantherebymaketheprincipleeffectivelycoverawiderangeofcases.ButIamnowarguingthatenvironmentalethicsandlawought,attimes,toruncountertothisprinciple.Letusmovethroughaspectrumofcasesbuildingthisargument.MembersoftheHopitribe,nativeAmericansinArizona,wishtoengageinaceremonythatrequireskillinggoldeneagles.Theeagleiscapturedasachick,keptwell,evenreverenced,formonths,thenrituallysuffocated,sendingthespiritoftheeagletoflytotheworldoftheirHopiancestors,informingtheancestorsofwhattheHopisneedintoday’sworld—nodoubtincludingtheirbasicneeds,sincemanyoftheHopisarepoor.Theancestorsengagepowersthatensurethattheseneedsaremet.TheeaglechicksaretakenfromHopisacredlands,butthesearenowofteninnationalparksandmonuments.AlthoughtheHopisreceivedpermissionfromtheUSFishandWildlifetotakeuptofortyeaglets,theywererefusedbyNationalParkServiceofficials,ongroundsofwildlifeconservation.Inparticular,theywererefusedadmissiontoWupatkiNationalMonument,outsideFlagstaff,Arizona.Thetribehasprotested(StevensandVelushi1999;Shaffer1999).BySterba’sprinciple,if,intheirculture,thisisanecessarywayofmeetingtheirbasicneeds,thisrefusalisunjustandshouldnotbeenforced.Somuchtheworsefortheeagles.IarguetothecontrarythattheHopiswerejustifiablyrefusedadmission;and,shouldtheypersist,shouldbeforciblyprevented.InourWesternview,ofcourse,thisceremonyisnot“necessary”tomeettheir“basic”needs.ToretainSterba’sprinciplewemustbecome“Eurocentric,”thoughhedislikesthis(1998,pp.116–21),andimposeourviewontheirs.Meanwhilethosewhoengageintheceremonybelievethatitis“necessary”tohavethiseaglecontacttheirancestorstosupplytheirneeds.\n190HOLMESROLSTONIIIThisview,Imaintain,isfalse.Thereisnoscientific,ethical,social,religious,orotherevidencethatthesacrificedeagletimprovestheirlives.Probablyonecouldfindpsychosomaticevidence;thatthosewhobelievesoarereinforcedintheirresolution,courage,thrift,ingenuity,andmightindeedmanagetomeettheirbasicneedsbetterinresult.Weoughttoimposeourviewontheirs,andtheimpositioncouplesourWesternworld-viewwithavaluingofwhateaglesareinthemselves.EthicistswouldcertainlyprohibittheHopisiftheyweresacrificingtheirchildren.Inthatcase,youwouldappealtohumanrights,andtotheobligationofthegovernmenttoprotecttherightsofthewould-besacrificedchild.Myargumentisbyextension.Idonotclaim,however,thattheeaglehasrights,butthattheeaglehasintrinsicvalue,intensifiedinthiscasebyconcernforathreatenedspecies,andthatsuchvalueoverridesprotectionofthefalsebeliefsoftheHopis.OneneednotwaittopersuadetheHopisofthis;oneoughtenforcethisethic.Evenif,inmulticulturaltolerance,youwishtoremainagnosticabouttheHopibelief,oneoughtnotto“agressagainst”eaglestoprotectadoubtfulhumanbeliefaboutwaystomeetbasicneeds.SurelynativeAmericans,thoughthwartedbythewhiteman’slaw,haveavenerabletraditionofrespectforanimals,andtheycanfindsomewayofrevisingtheirbeliefsystemsoastosparetheeagles.IntheUnitedKingdom,aselsewhere,OrthodoxJewshavelongpracticedkosherslaughter.Thisis“necessary”intheirviewfortheproperserviceofGod.Arenotreligiousneedsquite“basic”?Theslaughterer,orshohet,slitsthethroat;butcheringisdesignedtoremoveasmuchbloodaspossible.Jewshavebeencommandednottoeattheblood,outofrespectforlifeandinreminderthatlifebelongstoGod.Also,rabbishavelongarguedthatthisishumaneslaughter.Timeschange,andtodaythereisastungunavailablethatinstantlyparalyzestheanimalwithanelectricshock,afterwhichitiskilled.TheBritishgovernmenthasconsideredlegislationtorequiretheuseofsuchstunguns,ongroundsthatthisisnowthemosthumanemethodofslaughter.SomeOrthodoxrabbishaveobjected,sincethispreventsthemaximalremovalofblood,andthemeatisnotkosher(LinzeyandCohn-Sherbok1997,pp.54–6;FarmAnimalWelfareCouncil,1985,pp.19–20,24–5).Shouldthislawbeenactedandenforced?Iarguethatsuchenforcementisjustified.IcanconcedethatJewsworshipGodwiththeirobservances(asIcannotconcedethattheeaglecontactsHopiancestors).Iconcedethatreligiousneedsarebasic.ButIcannotbringmyselftobelievethattheJewishGodcommandscontinuingtraditionalkosherslaughter,ifthiscausestheanimalmoresuffering.Iwouldpleadthecaseonthestrengthoftheirownpremises,aswellasmine,outofreverenceforlifeandofcompassionforsentientanimals.Nevertheless,shouldtheyinsistontheirorthodoxy,Iampreparedtoresistitbyenforcingciviclaw.IntwentyyearsAfrica’sblackrhinocerospopulationdeclinedfrom65,000to2,500,alossof97%;thespeciesfacesimminentextinction.Therehasbeenlossofhabitatduetohumanpopulationgrowth;buttheprimarydirectcauseispoachingforhorns.Peoplecannoteathorns;buttheycanbuyfoodwiththemoneyfromsellingthem.Zimbabwehasahard-lineshoot-to-killpolicyforpoachers,andover150poachershavebeenkilled(BergerandCunningham1994).LestIseemcallous,letmeinsertcaveatstoguardagainstinhumanity.Oneoughttotakemuchcaretoseethatpoachershaveotheralternativesforovercomingtheirpoverty.Suchobligationsequalanyobligationswehavetoprotecttherhinos.Ifwewerezealous,wecouldmakepoachingunnecessary.Still,whenIfacefactsinthepressingcontextinwhichtheseZimbabweanpoachersaretodaycaughtup,itishighlyprobablethatsomeofthesepoachershavenofeasiblealternativeavailabletothemformeetingtheirbasicneeds.Ialsomaintainthatsuchpolicyisright.Giventhefactthatrhinoshavebeensoprecipitouslyreduced,giventhattheZimbabweanpopulationisescalating—theaveragemarriedwomantheredesirestohavesixchildren(Bongaarts1994)—oneoughttoputtheblackrhinoasaspeciesfirstandmakepoachingillegal,evenifbasichumanneedstherebygounmet.Anyonefamiliarwithsub-SaharanAfricawillrealizethat,otherwise,therewillbenorhinos,orelephants,orlions,orgorillas,Sterba’sprincipleisaggressiveindeed.Alwaysputtinghumanbasicneedsfirstguarantees,soonerorlater,theextinctionofeveryjeopardizedspeciesthatcannotbepreservedasafoodanimal.Natureco-optedtofeedpeopleisseldomwildnaturesaved.RoyalChitwanNationalParkinNepalisaprimarysanctuaryforBengaltigersandtheAsianrhinoceros,bothextremelyendangeredspecies.Otherspeciesprotectedintheareaaretheslothbear,thepygmyhog,theswampdeer,theblackbuck,theAsianrockpython,andthegharialcrocodile(themostendangeredcrocodile).Theregion,inlowlandNepal,wastoomalarioustoliveinyear-rounduntilthe1950s.Inearlieryears,whatisnowtheparkareawaskeptasahuntingpreservefortheRanarulersofNepalinthedryseason.Oddly,thetigersandrhinossurvivedbecauseofthemosquitoes.Followingamosquitoeradicationcampaigninmid-century,Nepalisbegantomoveintotheregion.Themigrantsclearedtheforestsandstartedcultivatingcrops,alsopoaching.In1973,toincreaseprotection,thehuntingpreservewasdesignatedanationalpark.Nepalisweresurroundingit.ThepopulationoftheTerai(lowland)regionwas36,000in1950;inlessthanadecadeitwasonemillion.Withoneofthehighestbirthratesintheworld,andwiththeinfluxcontinuing,thepopulationin1991was8.6million,90%ofthempoor,50%ofthemdesperatelypoor(NepalandWeber1993;Shrestha1997).No-oneisallowedtoliveinthepark.Peoplecomplainthattheycannotcutgrasses,grazecattleandbuffalo,ortimbertheparkatwill.Theyareallowedtocutthatchgrassesseveraldaysayear,and30%ofparkincomeisgiventoVillageDevelopmentCommittees.TheRoyalNepaleseArmy,with800soldiers,isresponsibleforpreventingpoaching,grazing,cuttinggrasses,pilferingtimber,andpermanenthabitationoftheland.Enforcementisquiterigorous.In1985,554violationswerefinedand\nENFORCINGENVIRONMENTALETHICS1911,306cattlewereimpounded.In1993thirty-sevenrhinopoacherswereapprehended.Thesoldiersalsodowhattheycantoimprovethelotofthepeople.Butbeinghungryisnotasufficientreasontosacrificethepark,andthisislegallyenforced,nomatterthathumanneedsgounmet.Again,mycaveats.Oneneedstofixthisproblembyattackingitsrootsocialcauses.But,alas,inarecentvisittoNepal,Ididnotfindanyanswersinsight.Youcanstretchtheword“necessary”tomakeitunnecessaryfortheNepalistosacrificethepark—hadtheyadifferentkindofsociety,hadtheymoreforeignaidthantheydo.(Evennowaboutonehalfofthegovernment’srevenuedependsonforeignaidandborrowing;onethirdofthehardcurrencyenteringthecountryisaid.)Yes,thereareotheroptionsinprinciple,andthedestructionisunnecessary—logically,ideally,eventually.Butfactofthematteragainisthat,practically,nosuchoptionsareviableformostoftheseninemillionNepalis.“Justiceforhereandnow,”Sterba’semphasis,requiresdecisionsinlawenforcementthatsavenatureandleavebasichumanneedsunmet.ButbySterba’sprinciple,thesemillionswillbejustifiedindestroyingRoyalChitwanNationalPark,thelastrefugeinNepalofthetigersandrhino,alsoofadozenotherspecies.Unlessciviclawcanprotectnaturalvalue,longbeforetheirneedsaremet,mostofthebiodiversityinNepalwillbegone.Humansoughtnotalwaysandeverywheredumptheirmistakes,mismanagementsandmisfortunesontojeopardizedwildlife;andbasicneedsunmetisnounchallengeableexception.Wemightnotmakethisargumentforeveryendangeredbeetleornematodeworm,butthelithe,supplecat,epitomeoffelinepower,joinedwiththeothercharismaticspecies,displaysrichnessinvaluethatoneoughtnottosacrificeforatemporaryandultimatelyfutilesolutiontothesedeephumanproblems.6Globalenforcement:natureandthenationsEnforcementrequiresgovernment;thereisnoworldgovernment.Butenvironmentalethicshasgoneglobalinscale:climatechangeandglobalwarming,fishinginthedeepseas,populationcontrol,developed/developingnations,inequitabledistributionofwealthdrivingenvironmentaldegradation,tradeinivory,tigerskinsandrhinohorns.Canandoughttherebeenforcementonthisscale?Orwillwestayadriftinamulticulturalandpluralistmorass?Onnationalscales,enforcementispossible,butoninternationalscales,thereisanarchy.Atleastthereisonlyincentive,nevercommandandcontrol.Internationally—atleastshortofwar—thereareonlycarrots,neversticks.Onepossibilityisthatintheburgeoningnations,whetherescalatinginnumbersorappetites,enforcementsufficienttoprovidequalityenvironmentsmaybeimpossible,becauseitistoodemandingonhumancapacities.Qualityenvironmentswouldbedesirable,ideally;butrealistically,itisalreadytoolate.In1970inonlyonenation(Chad)wastheaverageperson,onbalance,becomingpoorer,withpopulationgrowthoverwhelmingeconomicadvance.By1980,thenumberofsuchnationshadrisentothirty-five;by1990thenumberwasninety!(Westing1993,p.100).Oneshudderswhenwaitingforthe2000figure.Undersuchpressures,civiclawisunlikelytobeabletoprotectnaturalvalues—certainlynottigerhabitat,andhardlyevensoilandwaterquality.Escalatingpopulationsandconsumerismarelikelytoescalatetheneedforenforcement,atthesametimethattheyescalateitsdifficulty.Indeed,giventhehumannatureaboutwhichweearlierworried,evendecentenvironmentsarelikelytobecomeuncommon.Perhapsthemostwecanhopeforisenvironmentaljustice,moreorless,inmorefortunateregionsoftheglobe.Whenitcomestonature,thenationsareoftenasmuchpartoftheproblemaspartoftheanswer.Thedivisivetroublesthatariseamongtheworldstates,withtheircompetingnationalsovereignties,arenotwelladaptedforharmoniousrelationswiththeEarthcommons.The“rights”ofnations,and“rights”asclaimedbycitizensofthesepoliticalstatesarenotwellalignedwiththeecologyandgeographyoftheplanet.Theshapesofthecontinentsaretheresultofnaturalforces,andnaturalresourcesliewheretheyliebynature.Onthesecontinents,nationalboundariesweredrawnforpoliticalreasonsandoftenwithminimalattentiontonaturalresources—nearlyallweredrawnbeforemanyofthemodernessentialresourceswereresourcesatall:coal,electricpower,uranium,copperorironore.Peopleasserttheirneedforaproductiveandqualityenvironmentascitizensofnationsthathaveeconomicpolicies,politicalagendas,andlawsdemandingloyaltiesinsupport.Theiraccesstonaturalresourcescomesfilteredthroughpoliticalunitsthatarenotformed,orcontinued,withtheseecologiesinmind.Theywantresources,butthepoliticalalignmentscanoftenmeansuboptimalandunjustsolutionstotheproblemsofresourcedistribution.Naturalresourceshavetobecomenationalresources,and“nationalizing”naturalresourcescanbeasmuchpartoftheproblemaspartoftheanswer,especiallywhenthesovereignindependenceofnationsisassertedwithoutregardfortheecologicalandsocialinterdependenciesofthesenations.Butitisamistaketoconcludethatnothingisenforceablebecause,onthisoneEarth,thereare178sovereignnations.Althoughthereisnoworldgovernmentnationscananddoenforce,ontheirownnationalsandonotherparties,theprovisionsoftreatiesintowhichtheyhaveentered.Thenumberofinternationaltreatiesthatgenerateenvironmentallawisconsiderable(Kiss1983;Rummel-BulskaandOsafo1991;Weissetal.1992).Providingsocialsecurityisaprincipaljustificationfor\n192HOLMESROLSTONIIInation-states,aprincipleofjusticeforbothdomesticandforeignpolicy.Thetransitionnowneedstoextendtoenvironmentalsecurityandjustice,nationallyandinternationally.Considerthepossibilitythatmostofthesemyriadnationscouldenterintoatreatyguaranteeingauniversalhumanrighttoaqualityenvironment(Westing1999).TheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyhasdecreed:“Allindividualsareentitledtoliveinanenvironmentadequatefortheirhealthandwell-being”(UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly1990).AUN-relatedgroup,theInterActionCouncil,consistingofovertwodozenformerheadsofstate,preparedin1997aUniversalDeclarationofHumanResponsibilitiesontheoccasionofthefiftiethanniversaryoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948).AlthoughthatdocumenthasnotbeenofficiallyadoptedbytheUN,itdoescontainwidelyrecognizedprinciples.Ofparticularinterestisoneofitsnineteenprinciples:Article7:Everypersonisinfinitelypreciousandmustbeprotectedunconditionally.Theanimalsandtheenvironmentalsodemandprotection.Allpeoplehavearesponsibilitytoprotecttheair,waterandsoiloftheearthforthesakeofpresentinhabitantsandfuturegenerations.(InterActionCouncil1997)Suchlanguageisbroad,and,likeallinternationalconsensusdocuments,subjecttointerpretation.Still,thereistheideathathumansintheirenvironments,theirbiosphere,warrantprotection,andallpersonsmaybeheldsoresponsible.Thatdoesnotguaranteeenforcement;butagain,thesuggestionisthatenforcementatsomelevelsanddegreescouldbeappropriate.OftensuchUNresolutionsareonlyarhetoricalveiloverpowerrelations.Butnationalpowerscananddoenterintovariouskindsofinternationalrelations,whichcanbringlevelsofenforcement.Whatstartoutashortatoryidealscan,induecourse,becomeformalinternationalcommitments,ashappenedwiththeUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.Thisdeclarationwasfirstpromulgatedin1948,andittookeighteenyears,butby1966therehadbeenwidelyadoptedinternationalcovenants,towhichaboutthreequartersofthestatesonEartharenowparty.Somethinglikethiscouldbeonthehorizonforenvironmentalconcerns.Couldthiseverextendtoamorefundamentalprotectionofnature?TheWorldCharterforNature(UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly1982)isanotheraspirationaldeclarationthatmightbedeepenedintoformalinternationalcommitments,eventuallyguaranteeingappropriaterespectfornatureforwhatitisitself.Thatroutewouldprobablybebydiscoveringthat,intryingtoasserthumanrightstoandovertheenvironment,theproblemisdeeperthanwefirstthought.Assertingourrightsand“aggressingagainstanimals,plants,species,ecosystems”thatstoodinourway,demandingourhumanrightstoaqualityenvironment,wewouldbeincreasinglyconfrontedbypopulationgrowthanddesiresforeconomicadvance.Bythenthetigersandrhinoswouldlongbegone,butwemightbegintorealizethatbothofthesethwartingproblemsresultfromregardingnatureasnothingbutnaturalresources.Environmentaljustice,sowehadthought,wasamatterofsettlingconflictinghumanrightsclaims.Justiceisfor“justus”people.Afterall,onlypersonscanbejust;whoopingcranesandsequoiatreescannot.Maybewewouldrealizethatitdoesnotfollowthatpersonscannotbehaverightlyorwronglywithregardtoanimals,plants,nature.Itmightbecomeclearertousthattoseenatureanditsconservationsolelyintermsofnaturalresourcesisasmuchpartoftheproblemastheanswer.Thereisnoruleofethicsbywhichculturalvaluesautomaticallyandalwaystrumpnaturalvalues.Humansystemsandnaturalsystemshaveentwineddestinies;whatweoughttoseek,indeedwhatwemustseekforanyworkable,orenforceablesolution,isacomplementarywelfare.Wedonotseekmoreintelligentandsustainableexploitation;whenweseekthatandthatonly,weovershoot.Maximizersalwaysovershoot.Weoughttoseek,andenforce,harmony,sustainabledevelopmentbutequallyasustainablebiosphere,humancitizenshipinabioticcommunity,civiclawprotectingnaturalvalue.ReferencesBerger,JoelandCunningham,Carol(1994)“ActiveInterventionandConservation:Africa’sPachydermProblem,”Science,263,pp.1241–2.Bongaarts,John(1994)“PopulationPolicyOptionsintheDevelopingWorld,”Science,263,pp.771–6.ConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpeciesofWildFaunaandFlora(CITES)(1973)Washington:USGovernmentPrintingOffice.FarmAnimalWelfareCouncil(1985)ReportontheWelfareofLivestockwhenSlaughteredbyReligiousMethods,London:HMSO.Hardin,Garrett(1968)“TheTragedyoftheCommons,”Science,169,pp.1243–8.InterActionCouncil(IAC)(1997)UniversalDeclarationofHumanResponsibilities,Tokyo:InterActionCouncil.Kiss,A.C.(ed.)(1983)SelectedMultilateralTreatiesintheFieldoftheEnvironment,Nairobi:UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme.Linzey,AndrewandCohn-Sherbok,Dan(1997)AfterNoah:AnimalsandtheLiberationofTheology,London:Mowbray-Cassell.Lowell,J.R.(1844,1966)ThePresentCrisis,pp.185–91inThePoeticalWorksofJamesRussellLowell,vol.1,NewYork:AMSPress.\nENFORCINGENVIRONMENTALETHICS193Nepal,SanjayKumarandWeber,KarlE.(1993)StruggleforExistence:Park-PeopleConflictintheRoyalChitwanNationalPark,Nepal,Bangkok:AsianInstituteofTechnology.Rummel-Bulska,I.andOsafo,S.(eds)(1991)SelectedMultilateralTreatiesintheFieldoftheEnvironment,II,Cambridge:GrotiusPublications.Shaffer,Mark(1999)“WupatkiWon’tLetHopisGatherGoldenEagles,”ArizonaRepublic(Phoenix)31July,pp.A1-A2.Shrestha,Nabina(1997)ProtectedSpeciesofNepal,Kathmandu:IUCNNepal.Sterba,JamesP.(1998)JusticeforHereandNow,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.——(2000)ThreeChallengestoEthics,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Stevens,JanandVelusii,Lukas(1999)“HopiEagletCeremoniesThwarted,”ArizonaDailySun(Flagstaff)29July,pp.1,11.UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(1991)RegisterofInternationalTreatiesandOtherAgreementsintheFieldoftheEnvironment,UNDoc.EP/GC.16/Inf.4.——(1992)ConventiononBiologicalDiversity,UNDoc.UNEP/Bio.Div/N7-INC.54.——RioDeclarationonEnvironmentandDevelopment,Principle1,UNCEDdocumentA/CONF.151/26,vol.I.UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(1982)WorldCharterforNature,NewYork:UNGeneralAssemblyResolutionno.37/7,28October.——(1990)NeedtoEnsureaHealthyEnvironmentfortheWell-beingofIndividuals,NewYork:UNGeneralAssemblyResolutionno.45/94,14December.UnitedStatesCongress(1973)EndangeredSpeciesActof1973,87Stat.884.PublicLaw93–205.Weiss,E.B.,Magraw,D.B.andSzasz,P.C.(1992)InternationalEnvironmentalLaw:BasicInstrumentsandReferences,Ardsley-on-HudsonNY:TransnationalPublishers.Westing,ArthurH.(1989)“ComprehensiveHumanSecurityandEcologicalRealities,”EnvironmentalConservation,16,4,winter,p.295.——(1993)“HumanRightsandtheEnvironment,”EnvironmentalConservation20,2,summer,pp.99–100.——(1999)“TowardsaUniversalRecognitionofEnvironmentalResponsibilities,”EnvironmentalConservation,26,3,September,pp.157–8.\n19THEMORALSTATUSOFNONHUMANLIFEMaryAnneWarrenOneofthemostimportantdebatesinenvironmentalethicsisthatbetweenproponentsofanthropocentric(human-centered)andbiocentric(life-centered)approaches.Atoneextreme,radicallyanthropocentricethicists,suchasJohnPassmore,1holdthatwehavemoralobligationsonlytowardhumanbeings,andnevertowardnonhumanorganisms.Thisviewissometimesexpressedbysayingthatnonhumanlifehasnointrinsicvalue.Onthisviewitcannotbemorallywrongforhumanbeingstoharmorganismsofotherspeciesunlessdoingthisadverselyaffectsotherhumanbeings.Attheoppositeextreme,radicallybiocentricethicists,suchasAlbertSchweitzer2andPaulTaylor,3extendequalmoralstatustoalllivingorganisms,refusingtodistinguishbetweentherespectduetohumanbeingsandthatduetoanimals,plantsandmicrobes.Thisviewissometimesexpressedbysayingthatalllivingorganismshavethesameintrinsicvalue.InJusticeforHereandNow,JamesP.Sterbaseekstobridgethegapbetweenanthropocentricandbiocentricformsofenvironmentalethics.Hisprojectistooutlineanethicfortheadjudicationofconflictsbetweenhumanandnonhumanneedsthatisneitherradicallyanthropocentric,norsodemandingofself-sacrificethathumanbeingscouldnotreasonablybeexpectedtoadoptit.Hiscompromiseistoaccordmoralstatustoalllivingorganisms,aswellastospeciesandecosystems,buttoretainalimitedpreferenceforhumanovernonhumaninterests.Iagreewiththisstrategy,butdisagreewiththewayinwhichhisprinciplestreatallnonhumanorganismsashavingessentiallythesamemoralstatus.Iarguethatorganismsofdifferentspeciesoftendifferinmoralstatus,bothbecauseofdifferencesintheirintrinsicvalue,andbecauseoftheirdifferentrelationshipstohumanbeingsandterrestrialecosystems.IwillbeginwithanexplicationofSterba’sview,andthenexploresomeofthesourcesandimplicationsofthisdisagreement.Finally,Iwillcommentbrieflyonacommonobjectiontotheviewthatwehavemoralobligationstononhumanlife,namelytheclaimthathumanbeingsarepsychologicallyincapableofacceptingsuchobligations.Sterba’srejectionofanthropocentrismProfessorSterbabeginshischapter“Fromanthropocentrismtononanthropocentrism”byarguingthattherearenonon-question-begginggroundsforregardinghumanbeingsassuperiortomembersofotherbiologicalspecies(p.125).4Thereis,inotherwords,nononcircularargumentfortheclaimthatweareobjectivelybetter,ormoreadmirable,thanotherorganisms.Tobesure,humanbeingshavelinguistic,artistic,technological,andothercapacitiesthatappeartobeuniqueamongstterrestrialspecies.Butthisfactprovidesnoevidenceofhumansuperiority,sinceeveryspeciespossessesdistinctivetraitsandadaptations.Ouruniqueadaptationshaveservedusfairlywell;butthoseofotherspecieshavealsobeenvaluabletothem,i.e.conducivetotheirsurvival.Alllivingorganismscanbeharmedorbenefited;theyhaveagoodoftheirown,whichisindependentoftheuseswemaywishtomakeofthem.Consequently,theyaremoralsubjects,i.e.entitiesdeservingofmoralconsideration(p.148).Sterbaconcludesthat,becauseotherorganismsaremoralsubjects,andbecausetheyarenotinferiortohumanbeings,wearerequiredtotreatthemasequals(pp.126–7).Nevertheless,Sterbasays,weareentitledtogivesomedegreeofpreferencetohumanneedsovertheneedsofotherorganisms.Todothisisnottopresupposehumansuperiority,because“regardingthemembersofallspeciesasequalsstillallowsforhumanpreferenceinthesamewaythatregardingallhumansasequalsstillallowsforself-preference”(p.127).Forinstance,theprincipleofhumanmoralequalitydoesnotprohibitusfromdefendingourselvesorotherhumanbeingsagainstwrongfulhumanaggression,orfrominvestingmoreefforttopromoteourownwell-beingandthatofourfamilyandfriendsthantopromotethewell-beingofstrangers.Thequestion,then,is:Howmuchpreferenceforhumaninterestsiscompatiblewithtreatingotherorganismsasequals?Sterbaproposesthreeprincipleswhichdefineandlimittheextentofthispreference.First,thePrincipleofSelf-Defensepermitsustokillorharmplantsoranimals(andpresumablyothernonhumanorganisms)inordertodefendourselvesorotherhumanbeingsfromharmfulaggression.Second,thePrincipleofHumanPreservationpermitsustoaggressagainstthebasicneedsofplantsandanimalstomeethumanbasicneeds.Basicneedsarethosewhich,“ifnotsatisfied,leadtolacksordeficiencieswithrespecttoastandardofadecentlife”(p.128).Sterbasaysthat,althoughthisisavaguestandard,wecanatleastdistinguish\nMARYANNEWARREN195betweenneedsthatclearlyarebasicandthosethatclearlyarenot.Finally,thePrincipleofDisproportionalityprohibitsaggressionagainstthebasicneedsofplantsandanimalsinordertomeetnonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumans(p.128).Together,thesethreeprinciplesrepresentacompromisebetweenhumanandnonhumanneeds,inwhichbasichumanneedstrumpthebasicneedsofotherorganisms,butnonbasichumanneedsaretrumpedbythebasicneedsofotherorganisms.Sterbaproposesaparallelcompromisebetweenhumanneedsandtheneedsofbiologicalspecies,andecosystems.Hearguesthatifindividualorganismshaveagoodoftheirown,thensodospecies,insofaras“theyevolve,split,budoffnewspecies,becomeendangered,goextinct,andhaveinterestsdistinctfromtheinterestsoftheirmembers”(p.148).Similarly,ecosystemscanbeharmedorbenefited;theyhaveagoodoftheirownwhichisdistinctfromthegoodoftheircomponents.Thusitmakessensetogivemoralconsiderationnotonlytoindividualorganisms,butalsotospecies,ecosystemsandtheterrestrialbiosphere.Itwould,Sterbasays,beunreasonabletoaskhumanmoralagentstosacrificetheirbasicneedsforthesakeofnonhumanspeciesorecosystems.However,whenbasichumanneedsarenotimperiled,“wewouldbejustifiedinactingonholisticgroundstopreventseriousharmtononhumanindividuals,orspecies,orecosystems,orthewholebioticcommunity”(p.131).Hethereforeextendsthethreeprinciples,topermitharmstospeciesandecosystemsforthesakeofhumanself-defenseorhumanpreservation,whileprohibitingaggressionagainstthebasicneedsofspeciesandecosystemsforthesakeofnonbasichumanneeds(p.146).Thiscompromiseviewpointstowardareconciliationbetweentheindividualisticethicofanimalliberationandtheholisticenvironmentalistethic.Animalliberationistsvaluetheinterestsofindividualanimalsoverenvironmentalconsiderations,whileenvironmentalholistsvaluetheprotectionofspeciesandecosystemsovertheinterestsofindividualplantsandanimals.Nevertheless,Sterbapointsout,bothcansupportpoliciesthatbenefitbothindividualanimalsandecosystems.Forinstance,theycanagreethatalessmeat-baseddietwouldbedesirableformostFirstWorldpeople,sinceitwouldbelessecologicallydestructiveandwouldrequirethekillingoffeweranimals.However,Sterbasaysthathisviewdoesnotrequireadherencetoastrictlyvegetarianorvegandiet.Hearguesthatuniversalveganismwouldnotservetheinterestsofdomesticanimals,sincemanybreedsandspecieswouldnolongerbeworthrearing,andmightceasetoexistexceptinzoos(p.133).Itismoreintheinterestsofdomesticanimalssuchascattleandsheepthatsomeofthemberearedforfood,underhumaneconditions.Sterba’sjustificationforhumanpreferenceSterbadeniesthathumanbeingsaresuperiortootherorganisms,yetcontendsthattheyareentitledtoprotectionsthataredeniedtononhumans.Theyareentitled,forexample,tobasicmoralrightstolifeandliberty.Wemaynotaggressagainstthemexceptinself-defense,eventomeetbasicneeds.Butifhumanbeingsareinnowaysuperiortootherorganisms,thenwhyarewenotpermittedtoaggressagainstfellowhumansforthesamereasonsthatjustifyaggressionagainstnonhumanorganisms?Why,forinstance,maywenotkillotherhumanbeingsforfoodwhenwearestarving?Sterba’sansweristhathumanbeingsderiveenormousbenefitsfrom“implicitnonaggressionpactsbasedonareasonableexpectationofacomparabledegreeofaltruisticforbearancefromfellowhumans”(p.129).Itwouldbeunreasonabletorequirehumanbeingstoforegothesebenefits,whichareprobablyessentialtothesurvivalofourspecies.Moreover,itispragmaticallyimpossibletoextendthesamebenefitstoallotherlivingorganisms.Torequirethis“would,ineffect,betorequirehumanstobesaints,andsurelymoralityisnotinthebusinessofrequiringanyonetobeasaint”(p.129).Ithinkthatthisisatleastpartofareasonableanswer.Thereisnocontradictionbetweentheclaimthatalllivingorganismshaveintrinsicvalue,andtheclaimthathumanbeingsareentitledtostrongermoralandlegalprotectionsthanaremostotherorganisms.However,Iadoptadifferentstrategyforjustifyingthesecondclaim.Sterbaarguesthat,giventhebenefitsofmutualnonaggression,humanbeingshavegreaterintrinsicvaluethanotherorganisms,andthusahighermoralstatus(p.146).Iargueforasharperdistinctionbetweenintrinsicvalueandmoralstatus.Inmyview,anorganism’sintrinsicvalueisonlyoneofthefactorsthatcandetermineitsmoralstatus;socialandecosystemicrelationshipscanalsoalterwhatweoweitinthewayofprotectionandassistance.Thusitispossibletoclaimspecialmoralrightsforhumanbeings,withoutassumingthattheirintrinsicvalueisgreaterthanthatoforganismsofallotherspecies—aclaimwhichwouldappeartobeasdifficulttoproveinanon-question-beggingwayastheclaimthathumanbeingsaresuperiortoallotherorganisms.DefiningintrinsicvalueSterbadescribeshisconceptofintrinsicvalueasrecipient-centered,ratherthanagent-centered.Ontheagent-centeredconceptofintrinsicvalue,hesays,athinghasintrinsicvalueifitsgoodisanendforsomeagent,ratherthanmerelyameanstootherends.Thisformofintrinsicvaluedoesnotadmitofdegrees,sincetheconditioniseithermetornot.Ontherecipient-centeredconcept,“tosaythatXhasintrinsicvalueistosaythatthegoodofXoughttoconstrainthewaythatothersuseXinpursuingtheirowninterests”(p.146).Recipient-centeredintrinsicvalueadmitsofdegrees,providedthattherearegoodreasonsforbelievingthatthegoodofsomeentitiesshouldconstrainouractionstowardthemmorethanthegoodofothers.Thusifthe\n196MORALSTATUSOFNONHUMANLIFEgoodofhumanbeingsoughttoconstrainouractionsmorethanthegoodofotherorganisms,thenitfollowsthathumanbeingshavegreaterintrinsicvalue.Thisrecipient-centeredconceptofintrinsicvalueisverysimilartowhatIcallmoralstatus.Idefinemoralstatusintermsofhumanmoralobligations.Anentityhasmoralstatusifhumanbeingscanhavemoralobligationstowardit,whetherthoseobligationsarebaseduponitsintrinsicvalue,oronothermorallyrelevantconsiderations.Inmyview,moralstatusisdistinctfromintrinsicvalue.Iarguethatanentity’sintrinsicvaluedependsuponthepresenceorabsenceofcertainintrinsicproperties,includinglife,sentienceandmentalsophistication;whereasitsmoralstatusdependsnotonlyonitsintrinsicvalue,butalsooncertainofitsrelationalproperties,includingitsecosystemicimportance,anditssocialrelationships(ifany)tohumanbeings.TheintrinsicvalueoflifeLikeSterba,Ibelievethatbiologicallifeisasufficientconditionforhavingintrinsicvalue,inpartforthereasonsthatPaulTaylorhasgiven.5Taylorpointsoutthatlivingorganismsareideologicallyorganizedsystems,whichfunctionandbehaveinwaysthattendtopreservetheorganismandenableittoreproduceitskind.Thusallorganismshaveatelos,orgoodoftheirown.Thisfactlendsplausibilitytotheclaimthatalllivingorganismshaveintrinsicvalue.Thelifeofanorganismhasvaluetotheorganism.Evenifanorganismisunableconsciouslytodesirecontinuedlife,tokillitis(usually)toharmit,bydefeatingthegoalsthatitnaturallypursues.Deliberatelytodothisrequiressomemoraljustification.Thusevenverysimplelifeforms,suchasbacteria,havemoralstatus,basedupontheirinternalteleology.Incontrast,mostmachinesdonothavemoralstatus,becausetheydonothaveagoodoftheirown.Theirproperfunctioningmaypromotehumanends,butitdoesnotpromoteendswhicharetheirs,includingtheirownsurvivalandreproduction.Ontheotherhand,amachinemightbeproducedwhoseinternalfunctionsandbehaviorwereorganizedtopromoteitsownsurvival,andtoenableittoreproduceitself.Suchamachinecouldberegardedasanonlivingthingwithagoodofitsown,andthusaclaimtomoralstatus.Alternatively,itcouldberegardedasanartificiallifeform,whoseinternalteleologymakesitjustasaliveasanynaturallyevolvedorganism.Itdoesnotfollowfromtheclaimthatalllivingorganismshaveintrinsicvalue,thatallofthemhaveequalintrinsicvalue,orequalmoralstatus.Therearegoodreasonstobelievethatsomeorganismshavelivesthatareofgreatervalue,tothem,thanothers.Sentienceisonepropertythatcanincreasethevalueoforganiclife.SentienceandmoralstatusSentienceisthecapacitytoexperiencepleasure,painandotherconsciousmentalstates.Althoughsentienceisnotanecessaryconditionforhavingmoralstatus,itgeneratesmoralobligationsthathavenoapplicationtononsentientorganisms.WhenIpullcrabgrassplantsfrommygarden,IneednotfearthatIamcausingthempain,ordeprivingthemoflivesthattheywereconsciouslyenjoying.Thenonsentienceofcrabgrassmakesiteasiertojustifyaggressingagainstitforlessthancompellingreasons.Iwouldnotpoisonmolesorgopherstoimprovetheappearanceofthegarden,becauseIthinkitwrongtosubjectsentientbeingstoapainfuldeathwithoutamorecompellingreason.Sentientbeingsarevulnerabletocruelty,theunjustifiedinflictionofsufferingordeath.Becausetheyarecapableofconsciousness,theylosemorethatisofvaluetothemwhentheyarekilledthandononsentientorganisms,whichcannotconsciouslyenjoytheirownexistence.Iconcludethatsentientbeingsshouldnotbekilledorcausedtoexperiencepain,exceptwhenthereisnootherwaytomeetsignificanthumanorecosystemicneeds.Howgreattheneedmustbetowarrantharmtoasentientbeingdependsupon,first,howhighlysentientitis;andsecond,thestrengthoftheevidencethatitissentient.Itisaplausiblehypothesisthatsentienceissubjecttodegrees,suchthathighlysentientanimalsexperiencegreaterpleasureandpainthandominimallysentientones.Vertebrateanimals,suchasbirdsandmammals,havemorecomplexcentralnervoussystemsandbehavioralrepertoiresthandomostinvertebrates,andthusareapttobemorehighlysentient.Moreover,wecanbemoreconfidentofthesentienceofsomeanimalsthanothers.Vertebratesaresosimilartohumanbeingsintheirsensorysystems,neurophysiologyandbehavioralresponsesthattherecanbenorealdoubtoftheirsentience.Thereismoreuncertaintyaboutthesentienceofmanyinvertebrates,suchasworms,arthropodsandcrustaceans.WhileIbelievethatthesurvivalvaluewhichacapacityforpleasureandpainwouldhaveforsuchcomplexandmobileanimalsarguesfortheirpossessingsomeformofsentience,itisdifficulttobefullyconfidentthattheydo.Iconcludethatagreaterneedisrequiredtowarrantharminganimalsthatarehighlysentient,andwhosesentienceisempiricallywellestablished,thantowarrantharminganimalsthatareminimallysentient,orwhosesentienceisuncertain.\nMARYANNEWARREN197MentalcomplexityandsophisticationAbeing’smentalcomplexityandsophisticationalsomattertothestrengthofourobligationstowardit.Ifeelworseaboutaccidentallyrunningoveraskunkthanaboutaccidentallysteppingonanant,eventhoughbothareprobablysentient.Oneexplanationofthisapparentbiasisthatskunksaremorelikehumanbeingsintheirphysiologyandbehavior,andthusIfinditeasiertoempathizewiththem.However,therearemorepertinentreasonsformakingthisdistinction.Theant,whileitmaybesentient,isprobablylesshighlysentientthantheskunk.Furthermore,theantseemsnottopossessaverysophisticatedmind.Muchofitsbehaviorappearstobe“hard-wired,”ratherthantheresultoflearning,judgmentandintention.ThusitisunlikelytobewhatTomRegancallsasubject-of-a-life.Regandefinesasubject-of-a-lifeasabeingwhoisnotonlysentient,butalsocapableofbeliefs,desires,memory,anticipationofthefuture,emotion,intentionalaction,andapsychophysicalidentityovertime.6Becauseoftheseadditionalabilities,subjects-of-liveslosemorethatisofvaluetothemwhentheyarekilledorotherwiseharmedthandosentientbeingswithlesssophisticatedminds.Whenaminimallysentientbeingdies,itlosesonlythecontinuationofalifethatmighthavebeenpleasanttoit.Itdoesnothavehopesforthefuture,orconsciouscommitmentsthatwillbedefeatedbyprematuredeath.Subjects-of-lives,ontheotherhand,havelivesthatcangobetterorworseforthemfromtheirownsubjectiveperspective.Theycanbeharmed,notjustbypainorthelossofpleasure,butbythefrustrationoftheirconsciousgoals.Forthesereasons,Ithinkitappropriatetoexercisespecialcaretoavoidharmingcreaturesthatpossessthementalcapacitiesconstitutiveofthiskindofsubjecthood.WhileReganbelievesthatonlymammalsoverayearofageareclearlysubjects,7Ithinkthatagoodcasecanalsobemadeforbirds,manyyoungermammals,andpossiblysomeothervertebrates.Thedifferencebetweensubjectsandsimplersentientbeingsisnotasharpone.Subjecthoodandmentalcomplexitycomeinmanytypesanddegrees.ThusIthinkitfutiletolookforasharpboundarybetweensubjectsandnonsubjects.Rather,weshouldrecognizethatthemorementallysophisticatedabeing,thegreateritsclaim,otherthingsbeingequal,tomoralconsideration.MoralagencyandbasicmoralrightsWhileIbelievethatsubjects-of-livesdeservespecialconsideration,IdonotacceptRegan’sviewthatallnonhumansubjects-of-livesshouldhaveexactlythesamebasicmoralrightsashumanbeings.Humanbeingsareaspecialcase.Onereasonforaccordingaspecialstatustohumanbeingsisthatmost(thoughnotall)humanbeingsarecapableofmoralagency.Moralagencyisthecapacitytoregulateone’sbehaviorbymoralconcepts,principlesandideals.Moralagencyprovidesabasisfortheextensionofspecialmoralrightstohumanbeings,inpartbecauseitmakespossibletheimplicitmutualnonaggressionpactsthatSterbastresses—aswellassuchexplicitpactsaslawsandinternationalhumanrightsagreements.Italsogreatlyexpandsthepotentialforcooperationandmutualassistance.Moralagentsarenotnecessarilymoreintelligentthanothersubjects-of-lives.However,acapacityforlinguisticcommunication—thegreatproblem-solvingtool—isprobablyessentialtomoralagency.Mostanimals,eventhosethatarehighlysocial,donotappeartoactuponmoralconcepts,idealsorrules.Eveniftheydopossesssuchconcepts,weareunabletocommunicatewiththemwellenoughtoconversewiththemaboutmoralissues.Thus,whenanintractableconflictoccursbetweenourneedsandtheirs,wecannotnegotiatecompromisesthatrequireeachspeciestorespecttherightsoftheother.Thatisonereasonwhy,whenmiceoverrunourhomesorgranaries,wesometimeshavenofeasibleoptionbuttokillthem.MoralagencyistheonecapacitythatImmanuelKantconsidersintrinsicallyvaluable.Inhisviewonlyrationalmoralagentshaveintrinsicvalue,andtheyaloneareentitledtobetreatedasendsinthemselves.8Inmyview,Kantwasrighttotreatmoralagencyasasufficientconditionforhavingfullandequalbasicmoralrights,butwrongtotreatitasanecessarycondition.Thereareanumberofcasesinwhichwearejustifiedinextendingequalmoralstatustobeingswhoarenotmoralagents.First,therearecompellingreasonsforextendingthesamebasicmoralrightstohumaninfants,youngchildren,andmentallydisabledpersonsastomentallycompetentadults.Althoughtheymaynotbecapableofmoralagency,andinsomecasesneverwillbe,theyaremembersofhumansocialcommunities,andtheirwelfareisimportanttothosewhocareaboutthem.Furthermore,allofusarevulnerabletophysicalormentaldisabilitiesthatcanundermineourcapacityformoralagency,orourabilitytopersuadeothersthatwearemoralagents.Thusallofusaremoresecurebecauseoftheprotectionsextendedtosentienthumanbeingswhoaretemporarilyorpermanentlyincapableofmoralagency.9Second,therearestrongargumentsforextendingequalmoralstatustoanimalswhosementalsophisticationisexceptional.Chimpanzeesandothergreatapes,cetaceans(dolphinsandwhales)andelephantspossessmentalabilitiesthatarefarmoreimpressivethanformerlybelieved.10Itisnotcoincidentalthatthesehighlyintelligentanimalsarealsohighlyendangeredbyhumanactivities.Highlyintelligentanimalsarelikelyalsotoberelativelylargeandlong-lived,andtoproducefewoffspring.Consequently,theseanimalspeciesareespeciallyvulnerabletohuman-causedextinction.Theirpopulationscannotwithstandmuchpressurefromhumanhuntingorhabitatdestruction,andoncedecimated,theytakealongtimetorecover.AsIwill\n198MORALSTATUSOFNONHUMANLIFEargueinthenextsection,thisvulnerabilityprovidesanadditionalargumentforprovidinganunusuallyhighlevelofprotectiontoanimalsofthesespecies.RelationalpropertiesandmoralstatusIhavearguedthatfourintrinsicpropertiesoforganisms—life,sentience,mentalsophisticationandmoralagency—establishaprimafaciescaleofmoralstatus.Otherthingsbeingequal,sentientbeingsareentitledtomoreconsiderationfortheirindividualintereststhanareorganismsthatarenonsentient,suchasmicrobesorplants.Similarly,subjects-of-livesareentitledtomoreconsiderationthanaresimplersentientbeings,suchaswormsoroysters.Andmoralagents(humanorotherwise)areentitledtofullandequalbasicmoralrights,becauseofthemutualbenefitsofnonaggressionandcooperation.Butfromanenvironmentalistperspective,itisequallyimportanttorecognizethatrelationalpropertiescaninfluencemoralstatus.J.BairdCallicottisaprominentinterpreterofAldoLeopold’slandethic.Callicottarguesthatanorganism’smoralstatusdependsuponitsimportancetothesocialand/orbiologicalcommunitiesofwhichitispart.Onthisview,wehaveespeciallystrongmoralobligationstowardplantsandanimalsofspeciesthatarerareandendangeredbyhumanactivities,andthosethatareespeciallyvitaltothestability,integrityandbeautyofthenaturalecosystem.Callicottsaysthattohuntandkillawhite-taileddeerincertaindistrictsmaynotonlybeethicallypermissible,itmightactuallybeamoralrequirement,necessarytoprotectthelocalenvironment,takenasawhole,fromthedisintegratingeffectsofacervidpopulationexplosion.Ontheotherhand,rareandendangeredanimalslikethelynxshouldbeespeciallynurturedandpreserved.11Thisisanimportantinsight.Therestorationofecosystemswhichhavebeendamagedbyhumanactivitiesrequiresthatrareandendangeredplantandanimalspeciesbeprotectedwithspecialcare,whileplantoranimalpopulationsthatcauseseriousdamagetotheecosystemmayneedtobereducedorlocallyeliminated.Althoughbothdeerandlynxesaresentient,andbothareprobablysubjects-of-lives,protectinglynxesisatpresentahigherprioritybecausetheyarerareandendangered,whiledeerarethrivingtothepointofsometimesendangeringthehealthoftheecosystem.Callicottarguesthatsocialrelationshipscanalsoalterourmoralobligationstowardanimals.AsMaryMidgleypointsout,humansocialcommunitieshaveusuallybeenmixedcommunities,whichincludesomeanimalsofotherspecies.Shearguesthatanimalswhoaremembersofoursocialcommunities,suchasdogs,catsandhorses,areentitledtospecialprotections.Weowemoretothem,asindividuals,thantomostwildanimals.12Animalswhohavebeenadmittedintooursocialworld,andwithwhombondsoftrustandaffectionhavebeenestablished,areentitledtobenefitstowhichwildanimalsusuallyarenotentitled,includingfood,protectionfrompredators,andveterinarycare(whenavailableandaffordable).Iagreethatsocialandecosystemicrelationshipscanalterourobligationstowardnonhumanorganisms.However,IdonotagreewithCallicott’sstrongerclaim,thatallofourmoralobligationsarederivedfromsocialandecosystemicrelationships.Forinstance,Iarguethatsentientanimalswhichhavenopositiveecosystemicvalue,andnosocialrelationshipswithhumanbeings,stillhavemoralstatus.Foryears,elephantsinsomeSouthAfricanparkshavebeenperiodicallyculledbecausetherewere(thoughttobe)toomanyfortheavailableterritory,andtheyweredamagingacaciasandothervegetation.OnCallicott’sview,the“excess”elephantshavenomoralstatus,becausetheyarepartofnohumansocialcommunity,andtheireffectsontheecosystemarepredominantlynegative.Inmyview,thisdoesnotfollow.Elephantsareexceptionallysensitive,socialandintelligentcreatures,whovaluetheirlivesandthoseoftheircompanions.Thusitisimportanttofindnon-lethalwaysofregulatingtheirpopulations.Thereisnowanexperimentalprojecttocontrolelephantpopulationincreasesthroughannualcontraceptiveinjections.Ifthisapproachprovessuccessful,thenIwouldarguethatitrepresentsamorallybetteroption.Itisanoptionthatisworththesacrificeofsomesignificant,thoughnotbasic,humaninterests—suchastheinterestinprofitingfromthesaleofelephanthidesandmeat.Callicott’sskepticismaboutthemoralrelevanceofsentience,andotherintrinsicproperties,springsfromhisdenialthatintrinsicvalueis“objectiveandindependentofallvaluingconsciousness.”13Inhisview,thereisnosuchthingastheintrinsicvaluethatanorganismhas,andwouldhaveevenifnoone(else)actuallyvaluedit.Ifmyargumentsinthepreviousfoursectionsaresound,thenthisskepticismisunnecessary.Livingorganismshaveagoodoftheirown,whichrepresentsanintrinsicvalueforthem.Evennonsentientorganismsbenefitfromsurvival,andareharmedbyprematuredeath.Similarly,speciesbenefitfromcontinuation,andareharmedbyextinction;andecosystemsbenefitfromnaturalbiologicaldiversity,andareharmedbyitsloss.Thesebenefitsandharmsarereal,evenwhenhumansfailtotreatthemasmorallysignificant.Callicottrejectsmyapproach,whichpermitsbothintrinsicandrelationalpropertiestoinfluencemoralstatus.Heregardsthisapproachasunsatisfactory,becauseitismorecomplexandlessclearinitsimplicationsthanatheorywhichtracesallmoralobligationstosocialandecosystemicrelationships.“Ethicaleclecticismleads,”hesays,“tomoralincommensurabilityinhardcases.Sowearecompelledtogobacktothedrawingboard.”14Myresponsetothisargumentisthatatheorythatdeniesthatlife,sentience,mentalsophisticationandmoralagencyhaveanyrelevancetomoralstatusisimplausible.Itcontradictsa\nMARYANNEWARREN199principlewhichiscentraltomany(thoughnotall)moralcodes,i.e.thatwemaynotbecrueltosentientbeings,eventhosethatarecommonandecosystemicallydetrimental.Italsorendersproblematicthebasisforuniversalhumanrights,sinceitisonlyinfictionalutopiasthatallhumanbeingsconstituteasinglesocialcommunity.Ithinkthattheseproblemsareseriousenoughtooutweighthevalueofincreasedsimplicity.YetCallicottissurelyrighttoinsistthatrelationalpropertiesarerelevanttomoralstatus.Wecannotgiveequalconsiderationtotheinterestsofallsentientbeings,assomeanimalliberationtheoriesrequire,15becausesomesentientbeingsaremembersofrareandendangeredspecies,whileothersarecommon,anddangeroustothelivesandhealthofhumanbeings.Ratsareprobablyjustasintelligentasgiantpandas—perhapsmoreso—butitdoesnotfollowthattheirlivesdeserveequalprotection.Therearesofewgiantpandasthatthespecies’survivalisinquestion,despitecaptivebreedingprojectsinChinaandelsewhere,andextensiveinternationalsupport.Rats,incontrast,areextremelynumerousandpossessedofaveryhighreproductiverate.Whenratshavebeenintroducedtoecosystemstowhichtheyarenotnative,especiallyfragileislandecosystems,theyhaveoftencontributedtotheextinctionornear-extinctionofmanyindigenousbirdsandreptiles.16Moreover,theyoftencarrypathogenicorganismsthatarelethaltohumans;andtheyinevitablyconsumeasubstantialportionofourfoodsupply,unlesstheirnumbersarekeptincheck.Thesearemorallysoundreasonsfordecliningtoprotectthelivesofratsascarefullyasthoseofpandas.Whilesocialandecosystemicrelationshipscaninfluencethemoralstatusofnonhumanorganisms,itisnotclearthatsuchrelationshipscanaltertheirintrinsicvalue.Iprefertosaythattheintrinsicvalueofanorganismdependsonitsintrinsicproperties.Idoubtthattheintrinsicvalueofanorganism’slife—itsvaluetotheorganism—automaticallyrisesorfallsinproportiontoitsimportancetotheecosystem,oritssocialrelationshipstohumanbeings.Itsmoralstatus,however,mayberaisedorloweredbecauseofsuchrelationships.RevisingSterba’sprinciplesIfnonhumanorganismsdifferinmoralstatus,thentwoofSterba’sthreeprinciples,theSelf-DefensePrincipleandthePrincipleofDisproportionality,willneedrevision.TheSelf-DefensePrinciplepermitsustoharmnonhumanorganismstoprotecthumanbeingsfromharmfulaggression.Sterbasaysthatthestandardofjustifiedself-defenseishigherwhentheaggressorishuman,becausethereare“morewayseffectivelytostopaggressivehumansthantherearetostopaggressivenonhumans”(p.128).Thisisanimportantpoint,althoughthisreasondoesnotapplytoallcases.Amorebasicreasonforsettingahigherstandardforself-defenseagainsthumanbeingsisthemutualvalueofthemutualrestraintofwhichmoralagentsarecapable.However,Sterba’sSelf-DefensePrincipleneglectsanequallyimportantpoint:thatthemagnitudeoftheriskweshouldbepreparedtotolerateinordertoavoidharminganorganismdependsuponthesortoforganismitis.Forinstance,Ithinkitisoftenalegitimateformofself-defensetokillmillionsofbacteria,e.g.bywashingone’shands.Thisistrueeventhoughthethreatwhichtheseorganismsposetohumanwell-being,onagivenoccasion,maybequitemodest.Bacteriaarenonsentient,ubiquitous,andinnodangerofextinction.Consequently,thethreatneednotbesevereandimmediatetojustifydestroyingtheminlargenumbers.Thesituationisdifferentwhenthethreateningorganismisahighlysentientanimal,and/oravitalpartofthenaturalecosystem.Ithinkitwouldbewrongtokillthevolesthathaveestablishedanundergroundcolonyinmyfrontyard,eventhoughIamtoldthatvolessometimescarrytheHantavirus,whichcanbelethaltohumanbeings.Thethreatdoesnotseemsevereenoughtojustifykillinghighlysentientbeings,whoareprobablysubjects-of-lives.AndIwouldfighttoprotectthemountainlionsthatinhabitthePointReyesNationalSeashorenexttomyhome,eventhoughtheyposeasmallthreattohumanlives,andalargerthreattocats,dogsandlivestock.Mountainlionsareavitalpartoftheintegrity,stabilityandbeautyoftheecosystem.Becauseinthepasttheywerehuntedtonearextinction,thereareveryfewoftheminthispartofCalifornia.Forthehealthoftheecosystem,andforthepleasureofsharingthelandwithmountainlions,Ithinkweshouldbewillingtoendureamodestdangertohumanbeingsanddomesticanimals.Atthesametime,Idonotbelievethatmountainlionsareentitledtoexactlythesamerighttolifethathumanbeingspossess.Theyarenot(asfaraswecantell)moralagents.Wecannotnegotiatewiththem,arrivingatmutuallybindingnonaggressionpacts.ThusIthinkitappropriatetokillindividuallionsthathaverepeatedlyattackedhumanbeings,petsorlivestock.Permanentlyimprisoningthemisnotafeasibleoption,noronethatisclearlymorehumane;andtheycannotbeleftatlarge.Sterba’sPrincipleofDisproportionalityalsoneedsmodification,toreflectdifferinghumanobligationstoorganismsofdifferentspecies.Asitstands,thisprinciplesubjectsustoexcessivelystrictrestrictionsinsomecases,andinothercasestorestrictionsthatarenotstrictenough.Itpermitsustoaggressagainsttheneedsofindividualorganisms,speciesorecosystems,tomeetonlythosehumanneedsthatarebasic.Butifaspeciesiscommon,notnativetotheecosystem,unendangered,quicktoreproduce,andnonsentient,thenIdonotthinkthatthereisastrongmoralobjectiontoharmingsomeofitsmembersforlesscompellingreasons.Forinstance,Ithinkitmorallypermissibletopullcommonweedsfrommygarden,justforthepleasureofgrowingmoredecorativeplants.\n200MORALSTATUSOFNONHUMANLIFEOntheotherhand,ifaspeciesisuncommon,vitaltotheecosystem,slowtoreproduce,andgreatlyendangeredbyhumanactivities,thenitisimperativetoprotectasmanyofitsmembersaspossible.Ifsomepeopleareaccustomedtomeetingtheirbasicneedsthroughexploitingthatspecies,thentheymaybeentitledtocompensationforlostincome,andassistanceinfindingotherwork.Theyarenot,however,automaticallyentitledtocontinueexploitingthespeciesattheriskofcausingitsextinction.WeneedtostopcuttingoldgrowthforestsinthePacificNorthwest,eventhoughpreservingoldgrowthforestscancostjobsintheshortrun.Similarly,theinternationalbanoncommercialwhalingneedstoremaininplace,eventhoughtherearepeoplewhowouldliketoearnalivingbywhaling.17SixprinciplesofmoralstatusIthinkthatthesesuggestedalterationstotwoofSterba’sprinciplesareconsistentwiththespiritofhisproject.Withsuitableadjustmentsforspeciesdifferences,thethreeprinciplesmakegoodmoralsense.Nevertheless,itisoftenusefultoviewthesamephilosophicalgroundfromseveralangles.Inthisspirit,Ioffermyownprinciplesfortheadjudicationofconflictsbetweenhumanandnonhumaninterests.18TheseprinciplesrepresentasummaryofthepointsthatIhavebeenmakinginthepreviousfivesections.Thefirstthreeprinciplesestablishaprimafaciescaleofmoralstatus,baseduponmorallysignificantintrinsicproperties,whilethelastthreeappealtosocialandecosystemicrelationshipsasadditionalcriteriaofmoralstatus.1TheRespectforLifePrinciple:Livingorganismsarenottobekilledorotherwiseharmed,withoutgoodreasonsthatdonotviolateothersoundmoralprinciples.2TheAvoidanceofCrueltyPrinciple:Sentientbeingsarenottobekilledorsubjectedtopainorsuffering,unlessthereisnootherfeasiblewayoffurtheringgoalsthatare:(a)consistentwithothersoundmoralprinciples;and(b)importanttohumanbeings,orotherentitiesthathaveastrongermoralstatusthancouldbebaseduponsentiencealone.Themorecertainweareofabeing’ssentience,andthemorehighlysentientandmentallysophisticateditis,thegreatertheneedmustbetowarrantharmingit.3TheRightsofMoralAgentsPrinciple:Moralagentshavefullandequalbasicmoralrights,includingtherightstolifeandliberty.4TheHumanRightsPrinciple:Withinthelimitsoftheirowncapacities,humanbeingswhoarecapableofsentiencebutnotofmoralagencyhavethesamemoralrightsasdomoralagents.5TheInterspecificPrinciple:Withinthelimitsofprinciples1–4,nonhumanmembersofmixedsocialcommunitieshaveastrongermoralstatusthancouldbebasedupontheirintrinsicpropertiesalone.6TheEcosystemicPrinciple:Livingthingsbelongingtospeciesthatareimportanttotheecosystemsofwhichtheyarepart,andthatareendangeredbyhumanactivities,have,withinthelimitsofprinciples1–5,astrongermoralstatusthancouldbebasedupontheirintrinsicpropertiesalone.AltruismtowardnonhumanlifeBeforeclosing,Iwanttorespondtoacommonobjectiontotheclaimthathumanbeingshavemoralobligationstowardnonhumanorganisms,speciesandecosystems.AsSterbapointsout,anthropocentricandbiocentricethicistscanagreeaboutmanyspecificgoals.Becausethehumanspeciesisdependentuponthehealthoftheterrestrialbiosphereforitsownsurvival,humaninterestsandthehealthoftheearth’secosystemswilltendtocoincideinthelongrun.Thus,justasthereareegoisticreasonsforactingasthoughonecaresaboutotherhumanbeings,evenifonedoesnot,sothereareanthropocentricreasonsforactingasifwebelievethatotherlivingthingshavemoralstatus,evenifwedonot.Nevertheless,therearecompellingreasonsforrejectingthestrictlyanthropocentricview.Unlesswerecognizemoralobligationstononhumanlifeforms,wewillbetooeasilytemptedtosacrificeirreplaceablespeciesandhabitatsforthesakeofsuchshort-termgoalsasjobs,highwaysordams.Thesolutionoflocal,regional,andglobalenvironmentalproblemsrequiresaltruismtowardnonhumanlife.Butisgenuinealtruismtowardnonhumanlifepossibleforhumanbeings?Humanbeingscannotbecompelledbyphilosophicalargumentstoacceptmoralobligationstowardentitiesforwhichtheyarepsychologicallyincapableofcaring.DavidHumebelievedthat,forthisreason,wecanhavenomoralobligationstoplants,animals,speciesorecosystems.19However,hisowntheoryofthepsychologicalbasisofhumanmoralityoughttohaveledhimtoquestionthatview.InHume’sview,thehumanmoralimpulseoriginatesinempathy,andother“socialsentiments.”Hearguesthatitisnaturalforhumanbeingstocareaboutthepeoplewithwhomtheyaresociallyconnected;andthatifitwerenotforthesenatural\nMARYANNEWARREN201sentiments,noamountofrationalargumentcouldpersuadethemtoadoptagenuinelymoralattitude.Butitisequallyclearthathumanbeingsfinditnaturaltocareabouttheplants,animals,speciesandecosystemswithwhichtheyareacquainted.AsE.O.Wilsonargues,humanbeingsare“biophilic”:giventheopportunity,theystronglyprefertolivewitharichdiversityofplantandanimalspecies,andwithinhealthyecosystems.20TheworldviewsofthoseindigenouspeoplesofNorthandSouthAmerica,Africa,AustraliaandAsiawhohavemaintainedahuntingandgatheringeconomyintomoderntimesprovideanotherargumentforthepossibilityofaltruismtowardthenonhumanworld.Almostinvariablytheseworldviewsincludearecognitionofmoralobligationstoanimals,plantsandotherportionsofthenaturalworld.21Oftentheseincludeentitieswhichmostofuswouldnotregardasliving,suchasmountains,rivers,windsandstones.Althoughthenonanthropocentricelementsofindigenousworldviewsmaynotfitcomfortablywithinourownconceptualframeworks,theirubiquityispowerfulevidencethathumanaltruismiscapableofcrossingthespeciesboundary.Ifwearepsychologicallycapableofacceptingmoralobligationstothenonhumanworld,thentheburdenofproofisshiftedtothosewhodefendtheradicallyanthropocentricposition.ConclusionIagreewithSterbathatalllivingorganismshavemoralstatus,asdospeciesandecosystems.Ialsoagreethatitispragmaticallynecessarytogivesomepreferencetohumaninterestsoverthoseofmostotherorganisms.However,Ithinkthatitisamistaketoassignessentiallythesamemoralstatustoallnonhumanorganisms.Sentience,mentalsophisticationandmoralagencymakeadifferencetowhatweowetoorganismsofdiversespecies.Theseintrinsicpropertiesarethebestguidethatwehavetoanorganism’sintrinsicvalue,i.e.thevalueofitslifetoit.Anorganism’srelationshipstoitsecosystem,andtohumanbeings,canalsoinfluenceourobligationstowardit.Whatweowetoorganismsofagivenspeciesdependsnotonlyontheirintrinsicproperties,butalsoontheirimportancetotheecosystemsinwhichtheyexist.Italsodepends,insomecases,uponthesocialrelationshipsestablishedbetweenhumansandanimalsofthatspecies.Domesticdogsandcatsmaybenomorehighlysentientormentallysophisticatedthanracoons,butwehavespecialobligationstothem,baseduponthemutuallybeneficialrelationshipsoftrustandaffectionthatlinkourspeciestotheirs.TheseargumentspointtotheneedforamorenuancedtheoryofthemoralstatusofnonhumanlifethanSterbaoffers.However,thedifferencesbetweenhisapproachandmineareminorincomparisontothegulfthatseparatestheradicallyanthropocentricapproachcharacteristicofmostWesternphilosophersfromanyofthebiocentricapproachesbeingdevelopedbyenvironmentalethicists.Weneedtowelcometheproliferationofbiocentricethicaltheories,andtolook,asSterbaadvises,forbasicpointsofagreement,aswellasforinterestingdisagreements.NOTES1JohnPassmore,Man’sResponsibilityforNature(London:CharlesScribner’sSons,1974).2AlbertSchweitzer,OutofMyLifeandTime:AnAutobiography(NewYork:Holt,Rinehart&Winston,1933);andTheTeachingofReverenceforLife,trans.RichardandClaraWinston(NewYork:Holt,Rinehart&Winston,1965).3PaulTaylor,RespectforNature:ATheoryofEnvironmentalEthics(PrincetonNJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1986).4AllpagenumbersinthetextarefromJamesP.Sterba,JusticeforHereandNow(CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).5Taylor,pp.121–3.6TomRegan,TheCaseforAnimalRights(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1983)p.243.7TheCaseforAnimalRights,p.78.8ImmanuelKant,TheMoralLaw:Kant’sGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals,trans.H.J.Paton(London:Hutchinson,1948)pp.96–7.9Iarguethatpresentienthumanfetuses(thoseyoungerthanabouttwenty-fourweeks)shouldnothaveequalbasicmoralrights,bothbecausetheyarenonsentient,andbecauseaccordingthemequalrightswouldseriouslyconflictwiththebasicmoralrightsofwomen.Ialsoarguethattherightsofsentientfetuses,althoughstrong,arelimitedbywomen’smoralrightstoself-defenseandphysicalintegrity.SeeMaryAnneWarren,“TheMoralSignificanceofBirth,”Hypatia,vol.4,no.3(fall1989);andchapter9ofMoralStatus:OurObligationstoOtherLivingThings(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).10SeeMaryAnneWarren,“TheMoralStatusoftheGreatApes:EqualityorDifference?”,andotherarticlesinGreatApesandHumansatanEthicalFrontier,editedbyPeterCannell(WashingtonDC:SmithsonianInstitutionPress,2000).11J.BairdCallicott,“AnimalLiberation:ATriangularAffair,”inInDefenseoftheLandEthic:EssaysinEnvironmentalPhilosophy(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1989)p.21.12MaryMidgley,AnimalsandWhyTheyMatter(AthensGA:UniversityofGeorgiaPress,1983)pp.112–24.13J.BairdCallicott,“IntrinsicValue,QuantumTheory,andEnvironmentalEthics,”inInDefenseoftheLandEthic,p.161.14J.BairdCallicott,“AnimalLiberationandEnvironmentalEthics:BackTogetherAgain,”inInDefenseoftheLandEthic,p.50.\n202MORALSTATUSOFNONHUMANLIFE15SeePeterSinger,“AnimalLiberation,”NewYorkReviewofBooks,vol.23,1990.16SeeDavidQuammen,TheSongoftheDodo:IslandBiogeographyinanAgeofExtinctions(NewYork:Scribner,1996).17However,thereisareasonableargumentforpermittingsmall-scalenoncommercialwhalehuntingbysomeindigenouspeopleswhohavehuntedwhalestraditionallyandconsidertheactivityimportanttotheirculturalidentity—provided,thatis,thattheparticularspeciesisclearlycapableofwithstandingthispredation.18IdiscusstheseprinciplesmoreextensivelyinMoralStatus.19DavidHume,EnquiriesConcerningHumanUnderstandingandConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,editedbyL.A.Selby-BiggeandP.H.Nidditch(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1975)pp.190–1.20EdwardO.Wilson,“BiophiliaandtheConservationEthic,”inTheBiophiliaHypothesis,editedbyStephenR.KellertandEdwardO.Wilson(WashingtonDC:IslandPress,1993).21SeeJ.BairdCallicott,Earth’sInsights:AMulticulturalSurveyofEcologicalEthicsfromtheMediterraneanBasintotheAustralianOutback(BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1994).\nPartVTHEAPPLICATIONOFSOCIALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYTONONIDEALCONDITIONS\nJustwartheoryandpacifism\n20PACIFISMFORNONPACIFISTSRobertL.HolmesWithcharacteristicbalanceandfairness,JamesP.Sterbamakesacompellingcaseforabandoningaconfrontationalandcombativewayofdoingphilosophy—the“warmaking”modelashecallsit—infavorofacooperative,“peacemaking”approach.Towardthisendheundertakestoeffectareconciliationbetweenpacifism(P)andjustwartheory(JWT).Iapplaudtheefforttoencourageadoptionofapeacemakingmodelofphilosophy,andagreefurthermorethat,insomesense,itmaybepossibletoreconcilePandJWT.Istressthewords“insomesense,”however,becauseitseemstomethereareothersensesinwhichthathasn’tbeenshowntobethecase,andthereconciliationhasn’tinfactbeenachieved.SoIwelcomethisopportunitytojoinwithSterba,sotospeak,inexploringthisissuefurther.Letmesayattheoutset,however,thatIshouldn’tcountafailuretoachieveareconciliationofthetwoasafailureofthepeacemakingconceptionofphilosophy.Partoftheaimofpeacemaking,ifitisunderstoodtoincludeconflictresolution,istomakeclearwheretherearedifferencesandtoconfrontthemopenlyanddirectlyinthehopesofcooperativelyresolvingwhateverproblemstheygenerate.Indeed,intheGandhianconception,conflictisvaluedforjustthisreason.SoinsofarasIpointoutdifferencesbetweenusontheissueoftherelationshipbetweenPandJWT,Itakethattobeinthespiritofphilosophicalpeacemakingratherthanopposedtoit.ILet’sbeginbyaskingwhatitwouldbetoreconcilePandJWT.Iassumeitwouldn’tconstituteareconciliationifonesideweretoconvincetheothertogiveupitsposition.Thatmightreconcilepacifistsandjustwartheoristsaspersons,butitwouldrepresentthevictory,sotospeak,ofonetheoryovertheother,notareconciliationofthetwo.Itakereconciliationtoimplythatthetworemainintact(thoughperhapsmodified)butwiththeirdifferencesminimizedinsomesignificantway.AnotherpossibilityisthatPandJWTmightbesaidtobereconciledifonecouldshowthat,despitetheirtheoreticaldifferences,thetwoyieldthesameconclusionswhenimplemented.Thatis,onemighttrytoshowthattheyare,sotospeak,extensionallyequivalent,inthatwhenappliedcorrectlytheyshowpreciselythesamewarstobepermissibleandimpermissible(intheway,forexample,thatarealistandanti-realistinethics,despitetheirdifferentaccountsofthenatureofmoraljudgments,mightasamatteroffactagreeintheirsubstantivemoraljudgments).It’snotdifficulttoshowhowthismightinprinciplebethecase.Letustakeabsolutepacifism(AP)tobetheviewthatallwars,actualandhypothetical,arewithoutexceptionimpermissible,andabsolutewarism(AW)1tobetheviewthatallwars,actualandhypothetical,arewithoutexceptionpermissible.Taking“hypothetical”torangeoverallconceivablewars,fewifanypersonsholdAPorAWintheseforms.Inanyevent,APandAWcouldn’tbereconciledinthesenseofbeingshowntobeextensionallyequivalent.APwouldjudgeeveryconceivablewartobewrong,AWwouldjudgeeveryconceivablewartobepermissible.Butifwedistinguishconditionalpacifism(CP)andconditionalwarism(CW),wecanseethatthesetwotheoriescouldbeextensionallyequivalent.Eachwillspecifytheconditionsunderwhichwaristhoughttobeimpermissibleorpermissible.Theformofeachmightthenbe:CP:Allwars,actualandhypothetical,areimpermissibleunderconditions——.CW:Allwars,actualandhypothetical,arepermissibleunderconditions——.Sostated,CPandCWareformaltheoriesthatyieldavarietyofsubstantivetheoriesdependinguponhowtheyarecompleted.Mostofthosetheories—atleastofthesortthathavebeenmostoftendefended—haveradicallydifferentpracticalimplications(virtuallyallpacifiststhinktheGulfWarwaswrong,atleastsomejustwartheoriststhinkitwasjust,andsoon).ButwithenoughtinkeringonecouldcompletetheblanksinsuchawaythatCPandCWyieldpreciselythesameconclusions.Thatis,onecoulddesignthemsoastoshowthesamewarstobepermissibleandimpermissible.Asanexample(thoughnotaparticularlyplausibleone),CPmightbeunderstoodtosaythatallwarsthatviolatetheUNCharterareimpermissible,andCWmightbeunderstoodtosaythatallwarsthataccordwiththeUNCharterarepermissible.Ifitis\n206ROBERTL.HOLMESunderstoodineachcasethatallotherwarsarerespectivelypermissibleandimpermissible,thesetwoseeminglydifferenttheories—eveniftheywereexpressedellipticallyassayingrespectively“allwarsarewrong”and“somewarsarejust”—wouldyieldthesameevaluationsinparticularcases.Yetonthesurfacetheywouldseemradicallydifferent.Expressedelliptically,onewouldsay“allwarsarewrong”andtheotherwouldsay“somewarsarepermissible.”Sucha“reconciliation,”however,wouldn’thavemuchpracticalsignificance.Mostpacifistsandjustwartheoristswouldsimplytakeissuewiththespecificationoftheconditions.Ifthoseconditionshadtheeffectofmakingmostorallactualwarspermissible,pacifistswouldobject;iftheyhadtheeffectofmakingmostorallactualwarsimpermissible,probablyjustwartheorists(atleastmanyofthem)wouldobject.Theirdifferencesoverthepermissibilityofwarwouldsimplyshifttotheleveloftheformulationsoftheirrespectivetheories.Theywouldeitherrejectthoseformulationsordenybeingpacifistsorjustwartheoristsinthosesenses.If,however,therewereacorrectorpreferredformulationofeachtheory,andifitcouldbeshownthatPandJWTareextensionallyequivalent(orevennearlyso)onthoseformulations,thenthatwouldbeofimportance.Forthenonecouldpresenteachsidewithreasonswhyitshouldacceptthepreferredform.Itshouldthenbepossibletopointouttoboththatalthoughoneisopposedtowarandtheotherinfavorofwar,theconditionsdefiningPandJWTleadtothesamepracticalevaluationsofthejusticeorinjusticeofwar.IfIunderstandSterbacorrectly,thisisessentiallyhistack.He’ssaying,ineffect,thatwhateverpacifistsandjustwartheoristssayindefenseoftheirtheories,themorallypreferredversionsofthosetheoriesareextensionallyequivalent,orverynearlyso.Oncepacifistsandjustwartheoristsseethis,andacceptitsimplications,thereconciliationisachieved.Asitseemsuncontroversialtoassumethatanygivenwariseitherpermissibleorimpermissible,itshouldbepossibletoformulateatheorythatenablesustodecidewhichwarsarewhich,orwhichatleastexplainswhyparticularwarsareoneortheother.Thatis,itseemsuncontroversialtoassumethateitherPorJWT—whenproperlyunderstood—isthecorrecttheoryaboutthepermissibilityofwar.Butnowitwouldberemarkableifboththeorieswerecorrect,inthesenseofleadingtovirtuallythesameevaluations,evenontheirpreferredversions.SoSterba’scontentionisanimportantone.IISterbaproceedsbydistinguishingdifferentformsofpacifism,“nonviolentpacifism,”“nonlethalpacifism”and“anti-warpacifism,”singlingoutanti-warpacifism(AWP)—theviewthat“[a]nyparticipationinthemassiveuseoflethalforceinwarfareismorallyprohibited”(p.153)—asthepreferredtype.WhileI’munconvincedthatnonviolentpacifismhasbeenshowntobeincoherent,sincehedoesn’tdiscusstheissueIwon’ttakeituphere.ItshouldsimplybenotedthatAWPhasn’tbeenshowntobethepreferredformofPunlessithasbeenshowntobemorallypreferabletononviolentpacifism.2InarguingthatJWTandAWPcanbereconciled,Sterbafocussesuponintendedandforeseenharmtoinnocents.Hecontendsthatwecaninpracticedistinguishbetweenwhatisintendedandwhatisforeseen,andthatweshouldfavoradifferentialrestriction“thatismoresevereagainsttheintentionalinflictionofharmuponinnocentsbutlesssevereagainsttheinflictionofharmthatismerelyforeseen,overauniformrestrictionagainsttheinflictionofharmuponinnocentsthatignorestheintended/foreseendistinction”(p.156).WhileIagreethatwecanmakethedistinction,I’muneasywiththewayinwhichhedrawsit.Partlyforthisreason,I’munconvincedthatadifferentialrestrictionismorallypreferabletoauniformrestriction.Letusconsiderhisreasoning,HeconsiderstheCounterfactualTestfordistinguishingbetweenintendedandforeseenconsequencesandfindsitwanting.Thetestaskstwoquestionsofactsthathavebothgoodandevilconsequences:1Wouldyouhaveperformedtheactionifonlythegoodconsequenceswouldhaveresultedandnottheevilconsequences?2Wouldyouhaveperformedtheactionifonlytheevilconsequencesresultedandnotthegoodconsequences?A“yes”toquestion1anda“no”toquestion2supposedlywouldshowthatthegoodconsequencesareintendedandtheevilconsequencesmerelyforeseen.FollowingDouglasLackey,3however,SterbaconcludesthatthetestisinadequateinacaselikethebombingofHiroshima,inwhichthegoodistheshorteningofthewar,theevilthekillingofcivilians.TheCounterfactualTestwouldseemtoindicatethatthekillingofthecivilianswasmerelyforeseen,whereasinfactitwas“self-evidentlyameansforshorteningthewar”(p.155)(hence,presumably,intended).Toremedythis,SterbaaddsaNonexplanationTest:3Doesthebringingaboutoftheevilconsequenceshelpexplainwhytheagentundertooktheactionasameanstothegoodconsequences?Iftheansweris“no”,thentheevilconsequenceismerelyforeseen;ifit’s“yes”thenit’s“anintendedmeanstothegoodconsequences.”ThissupposedlygivesthecorrectresultintheHiroshimacasebyshowingthekillingofcivilianstohavebeenintended.4\nPACIFISMFORNONPACIFISTS207Butlet’snowlookattheusethat’smadeofthedistinctionbetweenintendedandforeseenconsequences.ThisbringsustoSterba’sargumentforadifferentialrestriction(recognizingandattachingmoralweighttothedistinctionbetweenintendedandforeseenconsequences)ratherthanauniformrestriction(whichpresumablyeitherdoesn’trecognizethedistinctionordoesn’tattachmoralweighttoit).Fromthestandpointofinnocentssufferingtheharm,heasks:“Don’tthosewhosufferharmhavemorereasontoprotestwhentheharmisdonetothembyagentswhoaredirectlyengagedincausingharmtothemthanwhenitisdoneincidentallybyagentswhoseendsandmeansaregood?”(p.156).Andfromtheperspectiveofthosecausingtheharm,hesaysitwouldseemthatwehavemorereasontoprotestarestrictionagainstforeseenharmthanwedotoprotestacomparablerestrictionagainstintendedharm.Thisisbecausearestrictionagainstforeseenharmlimitsouractionswhenourendsandmeansaregood,whereasarestrictionagainstintendedharmonlylimitsouractionswhenourendsormeansareevilorharmful.(p.156)Heconcludes:Consequently,becausewehavemorereasontoprotestwhenwearebeingusedbyothersthanwhenwearebeingaffectedbythemonlyincidentally,andbecausewehavemorereasontoactwhenbothourendsandmeansaregoodthanwhentheyarenot,weshouldfavortheforeseen/intendeddistinctionthatisincorporatedintojustmeans.(p.156)Sotheargumentthusfarisforplacingamoresevererestrictionupontheintentionalharmingofinnocentsthanuponthemerelyforeseeableharmingofthem.Butthemoresevererestrictionisn’tanabsoluteone.Sterbabelievesthatconsequentialistconsiderationsholdswayhere.Suchharmispermissiblewhenit’strivial(“steppingonsomeone’sfoottogetoutofacrowdedsubway”),easilyreparable(“lyingtoatemporarilydepressedfriendtokeepherfromcommittingsuicide”)orgreatlyoffsetbyconsequences,particularlytoinnocents(“shootingoneoftwohundredcivilianhostagestoprevent,intheonlywaypossible,theexecutionofalltwohundred”)(p.157).NoticethatalthoughSterbausuallyusestheterm“harm”whenspeakingofconsequencesforinnocents,it’sclearfromsomeofhisexamplesthathisconcernextendstothepermissibilityofbothharmingandkilling.Thustheanalysisoftheintended/foreseendistinction,andthedetailingofitsbearingupontherelevantmoralissues,ispresumedtoshow—inawaythatsupposedlyshouldbeacceptabletoadvocatesofbothAWPandJWT—that:1Thereisamoresevererestrictionagainstintentionallyharmingorkillinginnocentsthanagainstmerelydoingsoforeseeably.2Itissometimesmorallypermissibletoforeseeablyharmorkillinnocentswhenitwouldbewrongtodosointentionally.3Despitethemoresevererestriction,itisalsomorallypermissibletoharmorkillinnocentsintentionallywhenthatharmisgreatlyoutweighedbytheconsequences,especiallytootherinnocents.Asaminorpoint,itshouldbenotedthatitem2doesn’tfollowfromitem1.Theremightbealesssevererestrictionagainstmerelyharminginnocentsforeseeablythanagainstdoingsointentionally,butonethatisstillsufficientlyseveretoprohibittheactualharmingofinnocents.Allthatclearlyfollowsfrom1isthatit’smorallyworsetokillinnocentsintentionallythantodosoforeseeably.Andoneactioncanbemorallyworsethananothereventhoughbotharewrong(torturingsomeonetodeathisworsethanwrongfullygivinghimapainlessbutlethalinjection).Letusassume,however,thatif1istrue,then2istruealso.Thenitwillpresumablybeeasiertojustifyharmingorkillinginnocentswherethatisamerelyforeseenoutcomeofwhatonedoes.Theconsequentialistconsiderationin3issufficient(andperhapsevennecessary)tojustifyharmingorkillingthemwhenonedoessointentionally.SterbaapparentlybelievesthereisnoreasontothinkthatadvocatesofAWPwouldrejecttheseconclusions.IIIAsapacifistwhohasarguedagainstthemoralpermissibilityofwarpreciselyonthegroundsthatwarinevitablykillsinnocentpeopleandsuchkillinghasn’tbeenshowntobejustified,Iamtroubledbytheses1through3,butIshallconcentrateon1.Grantedthereisadistinctionbetweenintendedandforeseenconsequences,theproblemiswiththedifferentialasopposedtotheuniformrestriction.Thereasoningforfavoringthedifferentialrestriction,onceagain,involveslookingatthematter,first,fromthestandpointoftheinnocentstobeharmedand,second,fromthestandpointofthosedoingtheharming.Thoseharmedsupposedlyhave\n208ROBERTL.HOLMESmorereasontoprotest“whentheharmisdonetothembyagentswhoaredirectlyengagedincausingharmtothemthanwhenitisdoneincidentallybyagentswhoseendsandmeansaregood”(Itakeitthatbeing“directlyengagedincausingharm”heremeansthattheharmisintentional).Thosecausingtheharmhavemorereasontoprotesttherestrictionagainstforeseenthanagainstintendedharm,becausearestrictionagainstforeseenharmlimitsouractionswhenourendsandmeansaregood,whereasarestrictionagainstintendedharmonlylimitsouractionswhenourendsormeansareevilorharmful,anditwouldseemthatwehavestrongergroundsforactingwhenbothourendsandmeansaregoodthanwhentheyarenot.(p.156)Myfirstconcerniswiththeapparentlyequalweightattachedtothetwoallegedgroundsforprotest.Innocentsareprotestingbeingharmedorkilled.Thoseproposingtocausetheinjuryordeathareprotestingalimitationoftheirfreedomtoharmorkillinnocents.Thesedon’tseemcomparable.Surelyinnocentpersonshavefarstrongergroundstoprotestbeingharmed(forthesakeofsimplicity,I’llspeakforthemostpartofharm,takingittoincludebeingkilled)—whetherintentionallyorforeseeably—thanperpetratorsofinjuryordeathhavetoprotestbeingpreventedfromforeseeablyharminginnocentpersons.Indeed,Iwouldturnthematteraround.Knowinglykillinginnocentpersonsagainsttheirwillispresumptivelywrongifanythingis.Ifitcanbejustifiedatall—andI’mnotsurethatitcan—itrequiresacompellingjustification.Ontheotherhand,havingone’sharmfulorlethalconducttowardinnocentpersonsrestrictedinthemannerindicated(toincludeprohibitingforeseeableaswellasintendedharm),isn’tpresumptivelywrong.Infact,sucharestrictionwouldseempresumptivelyright.Intheabsenceoffurtherassumptions,no-onehasgroundstoprotestamoralrestrictionupontheirinflictionofharmuponinnocents.Butevenintheabsenceoffurtherassumptions,everyinnocentpersonhasgroundstoprotestknowinglybeingharmedbyothers(andevenforunknowinglybeingharmedwherethatisaresultofnegligence).Inotherwords,there’samoralasymmetrybetweentheconsiderationsappealedtoindecidingtheissueofhowtoassesstherelativeweightsofintendedandforeseenharmstoinnocents.Moreover,thosesufferingharmaresaidtohavemorereasontoprotestwhentheharmisdoneintentionally“thanwhenitisdoneincidentallybyagentswhoseendsandmeansaregood.”Andregardingthoseprotestinglimitationsoftheirmaleficentactionsitissaidthat“itwouldseemthatwehavestrongergroundsforactingwhenbothourendsandmeansaregoodthanwhentheyarenot.”Inbothofthesecasesthemeansaswellastheendsinquestionaredescribedasgood.Moreover,intheformercase,theresultantharm—whenmerelyforeseeable—issaidtobeonlyincidental.Thesupposedgoodnessofmeansandends,andtheincidentalcharacteroftheharm,contributestowhateverplausibilitythedifferentialrestrictionmaybethoughttohave.Leavingthepostulatedgoodnessoftheendunchallenged,Ishouldliketoquestiontheascriptionofgoodnesstothemeansandtheuseofthelabel“incidental”tocharacterizetheharmtoinnocents.Whenyouknowinglyharminnocentpersonsinpursuitofagoodend—eveniftheinflictionofsuchharmisn’tyourintention—you’readoptingmeansthatcauseharm,injury,ordeath.It’sthiswhich,byhypothesis,constitutestheevilconsequenceofactsincasesofthesortunderconsideration.Thequestion,then,concernswhatjustificationthereisforcallingthemeansinquestiongood(unlessoneassumesthatagoodendsomehowmakesthemeanstoitgoodaswell).Ifonewantedtodescribebadmeanstoagoodend,onecouldhardlydobetterthantodescribemeansthatinvolvedharminginnocentpersons.Mypointisthatthereareobviousgroundsforcallingthemeansinquestionbadandnoobviousgroundsforcallingthemgood.Ifwe’retoacceptthecharacterizationofthemasgood,thereneedstobesomecompellingargumenttothatconclusion.Letmeturnnowtothesecondelementinthecharacterization.Itholdsthattheforeseenharmordeathtoinnocentsisonlyincidental.ThisItaketobeaseparatepointfromtheprecedingone.Harmsmightbeincidentalwhetherornotthemeanswithwhichthey’reassociatedaregood.AndIthinkit’splausibletosay,asSterbadoes,thatsometimessuchharmsmightbeincidental.Butaretheyincidentalinthesortsofcaseshedescribes?Isaforeseeableoutcomeincidentalsolelybyvirtueofthefactthatitwasn’tbroughtaboutintentionally?Andifthoseharmsareincidental,doesthatsupportthejudgmentthatthoseharmedhavefewergroundsforprotestthantheywouldiftheharmswereintended(if,asSterbamaintains,theyhavemoregroundsforprotestiftheharmsareintended,thenitfollowsthattheyhavefewergroundsforprotestifthey’remerelyforeseeable)?Letustakethesequestionsinturn.AretheharmsordeathsinquestionincidentalinthesortofcaseSterbadescribes?Theycertainlyaren’tincidentalintheexampletotrytoshowthattheprohibitionagainstintentionallykillinginnocentsisn’tabsolute.Thatexample,recall,istheshootingofoneof200(presumablyinnocent)civilianhostagestoprevent,“intheonlywaypossible,”theexecutionofall200.Itlookshereasthoughkillingtheoneisthemeanstosavingtheremaining199.5Tobesure,Sterbausesthisexampletoshowthepermissibilityofsometimesintentionallykillinginnocentpersonsandnottoargueforthedifferentialrestriction.Buttheexamplelendsitselftotheothersortofcaseaswell.Iftheonlywaypossibletopreventtheexecutionofthe199istoshootabeercanoffafencepost,andthedesignatedhostageisstrappedtothefencepost,thenoneforeseeablykillsthe\nPACIFISMFORNONPACIFISTS209hostageeventhoughtheintentionisonlytosavethe199.Butitwouldstraincredibilitytocallthekillingeithergoodorincidental.Bethatasitmay,letusnowlookatsomeofthehypotheticalcasesSterbacitestowhichtheintended/foreseendistinctionisdirectlyrelevant.1“onlytheintentionedorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorwouldpreventone’sowndeath”(p.158).2“onlytheintentionedorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystanderwouldpreventone’sowndeathandthatoffiveotherinnocentpeople.”3“onlytheintentionedorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystanderwouldpreventthedeathoffiveinnocentpeople.”4“onlytheintentionedorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingoffiveinnocentpeoplewouldpreventthedeathoftwoinnocentpeople.”5“onlytheintentionedorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorwouldpreventseriousinjurytooneselfand/orfiveotherinnocentpeople”(p.159).6“onlytheintentionedorforeseeninflictionofseriousharmuponanunjustaggressorandtheforeseeninflictionofseriousharmupononeinnocentbystanderwouldpreventseriousharmtooneselfandfiveotherinnocentpeople.”7“onlytheintentionedorforeseeninflictionofseriousharmuponanunjustaggressorandtheforeseeninflictionofseriousharmupononeinnocentbystanderwouldpreventseriousharmtofiveotherinnocentpeople.”8“onlytheintentionedorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystanderwouldpreventseriousinjuriestothemembersofamuchlargergroupofinnocentpeople.”Case1isoneofpersonalself-defense,inwhichtheinflictionofharmordeathuponaninnocentpersonisn’tatissue;andtwoothers—4and8—arecasesinwhichSterbathinks,andIagree,thatthekillingofinnocentswouldn’tbejustified.Ineachoftheremainingcasesit’ssaidthatonlytheactagainsttheaggressorandtheforeseenharmingorkillingofinnocentswouldpreventtheharminquestion.Anythinglesswon’tachieveone’send.If,knowingthis,onethenharms/killstheinnocentperson(s),itwouldseemasthoughthebringingaboutofthoseconsequences“helpsexplainwhytheagentundertooktheactionasameanstothegoodconsequences.”Butthis,bytheNonexplanationTest,wouldrenderthoseconsequencespartofwhatisintended.If,totakecase3above,youknowthattheonlywaytosavefiveinnocentpeopleistokilltwopeople,oneoftheminnocent,andyoumakeityourendtosavethefive,thenkillingtheinnocentpersonispartoftheexplanationofwhyyouperformedtheactyoudid.Ifaskedtoexplainwhyyoukilledthatperson,you’dsurelyanswerthatyouthoughtyouhadtoinordertosavethefive.Hadyoudoneanythinglessyouwouldn’thaveachievedyouraim.Itwouldappear,then,thatbytheNonexplanationTest,thekillingoftheinnocentpersonisintended.Nowthatmaybeareasonforre-examiningtheNonexplanationTestasawayofsortingoutintendedfromforeseenconsequences.Onemightwanttoarguethattheinnocentdeathisstill,ashypothesized,merelyforeseen.Bethatasitmay,thedeathisn’tincidental,eventhoughitwasn’tintended.Itwasinextricablyboundupwiththeindispensablemeanstoone’sendandbyhypothesiswasknowntobesuch.Butsupposetherewereagoodargumenttoshowthattheseharmsordeathsarenonetheless,insomemeaningfulsense,incidental.Wouldthatshowthatthoseharmedorkilledhavelessreasontoprotestwhatisdonetothemthanifitwereintentional?It’shardtoseewhy.Ifwhat’satissueiswhetheryouhavelessreasontoprotestforeseenthanintendedharmtoyourself,thenitshouldn’tmakeanydifferencewhattheintentioniswhentheharmismerelyforeseen.Ifit’ssomethingaboutanoutcome’sbeingmerelyforeseenthat’srelevant,thenIshouldhavelessreasontoprotestbeingforeseeablyharmedorkilledevenwhentheaccompanyingintentionisbad.Considerthreecases,inoneofwhichtheintentionisbad,intwoofwhichit’sarguablygood.1You’reastudentabouttodetonateabombinthecarofaprofessorwhogaveyouabadgrade,whenIunexpectedlygetinthecarwiththeprofessor.Yourintentionistoavengethebadgradebutyouforeseethatinsodoingyou’llkillmeaswell.DoIhavelessreasontoprotestyourkillingmesimplybyvirtueofthefactthatyourintentionisn’ttokillmebuttokilltheotherperson?Andwouldyouhavemorereasontoprotestarestrictionagainstharmingmesimplyonthegroundsthattheharmismerelyforeseenandnotintended?Ithinknotineithercase.2You’reabouttodetonateabombinthecarofapersonabouttogostealcandyfromababy,whenIunexpectedlygetinthecarwiththeperson.Yourintentionistopreventthetheftofcandybutyouforeseethatyou’llkillmeintheprocess.\n210ROBERTL.HOLMESHeretheintentionisarguablygood,eventhoughboththechosenmeansandtheforeseeableconsequencearebad.DoIhavelessreasontoprotestyourkillingmesimplybyvirtueofthefactthatyourintentionisn’ttokillmebuttopreventatheft?Andwouldyouhavemorereasontoprotestarestrictionagainstmerelyforeseeablyharmingmethanoneagainstintendingtoharmme?It’sdoubtful.3You’reabouttodetonateabombinacarofapersonabouttoassassinatethemayor,whenIunexpectedlygetinthecarwiththeperson.Yourintentionistopreventtheassassination,butyouforeseethatyou’llkillmeintheprocess.Hereagaintheintentionisarguablygoodandofgreatermomentthanincase2.Themeansareatbestproblematic.Buttheforeseeableconsequenceofkillingmeisclearlybad.Again,IshouldmaintainthatIhaveasmuchgroundsforprotestingyourkillingmeasIwouldifitwereintentional,andthatyouhavenotonewhitmoregroundstoprotestarestrictionagainstkillingmesimplybecausemydeathismerelyforeseeable,thanyouwouldifitwereintentional.Ifwe’reaccuratelytoassesstherespectivemeritsofadifferentialrestrictionasopposedtoauniformrestriction—andifthematteristobedecidedbyabstracthypotheticalcases—thenweshouldn’tlimitourconcerntocasesinwhichtheintendedendsandmeansareaspureassnowandtheresultantharmmerelyincidental.Therearethosecases,tobesure.Butthereareasmanyothersinwhichthatisn’tthecase.Indeed,foreveryhypotheticalcaseonecandesigninwhichtheintendedmeansandendsintheforeseeableharmingofinnocentsaregood,onecandesignanotherinwhichtheyaren’t.Andifit’sour“intuitions”aboutsuchcasesthatarethoughttoberelevant,theyseemtogoinonedirectionatleastasoftenasintheother.Ifthisiscorrect,thenwhilethereiscertainlyadistinctionbetweenintendedandforeseenconsequences,themoralweightSterbaandjustwartheoristswouldattachtoithasn’tbeenestablished.Thisdoesn’tshowthatitcan’tbeestablished,thoughIdoubtthatitcan.Itshowsonlythattheconsiderationscenteringaroundgroundsforprotestonthepartofperpetratorsandvictimsofharmtoinnocentsdon’tsufficetoestablishit.Suppose,however,thatthedifferentialweightstointendedandforeseenconsequencesinthesortsofcasesSterbacharacterizescouldbeestablished?WouldthatbolsterthecaseforJWT?Iwanttosuggestreasonsforthinkingitwouldnot.IVThereasonscenteraboutthefactthatthecasesSterbacharacterizesallappeartoinvolveinterpersonalrelationsand,byimplication,todealwiththeactionsofoneagent.Case1setsthetone.It’sthecaseofpersonalself-defenseinwhich“onlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorwouldpreventone’sowndeath.”Case2likewiseisoneofpersonalself-defenseenlargedtoincludedefenseoffiveothers.Intheremainingcasespersonalself-defensedropsout,butineachcaseitsoundsasthoughwe’retalkingaboutthekillingofanindividualaggressoranddoingsotopreventdeathorinjurytovaryingnumbersofotherindividuals(fiveatmost,exceptincase8wherereferenceistoa“muchlargergroup”).Justasthereisamajorleapfromthepermissibilityofpersonalself-defensetothepermissibilityofwar,sothereisamajorleapfromtheaffirmedconclusions(assumingtheycouldbeestablished)ineachoftheothercasestothepermissibilityofwar.AsSterbacharacterizesAWP,itsoppositionisto“anyparticipationinthemassiveuseoflethalforceinwarfare.”So,thequestioniswhetherwecanmakethetransitionfromkillinginthesortsofcasesSterbahypothesizes—evenassumingsuchkillingispermissible—tokillinginthesortsofcasesofconcerntoadvocatesofAWP.It’sthistransitionthatIwanttoquestion.AsthisissueismorecomplexthanIcandealwithadequatelyhere,Ishallonlyfocusupontwoaspectsofit.IshallarguethatevenifoneweretoconcedeSterba’sanalysisregardingintendedandforeseenconsequencesinthesortsofcaseshedescribes,therewouldbecompellinggroundsforadoptingpacifism.Butthispacifismwouldbeofasortthatnonpacifistsintheothersensescouldembrace;hence,inasense,whatIshallpresentisapacifismfornonpacifists.Togiveitalabel,Ishallcallitliberal-democraticpacifism,orLiberalPacifism(LP)forshort.ThefirstaspectIwanttofocusuponissimplyaconceptualpoint.It’sonethat’sobviousoncestated,butit’srarelystateddirectlysothatit’simplicationsbecomeclear.ItisA1Warisacooperativeundertakingbetweenwarringparties.ThisItaketobetrueofanywar,actualorhypothetical.Andby“war”Imeanwarinastandardsense,astheattemptbytwoormorestatestoachievetheirobjectivesbytheuseoforganized,systematicmilitaryviolence.Onewouldthinkthatwarringpartieswouldbethelastonestocooperate,butthat’snotalwaysso.Paradoxicalasitseems,ineverywarit’sasthoughatacitagreementhasbeenmadebybothsidestotrytosettletheirconflictbyviolence.Itfollowsfromthis2Ifeithersiderefusestofight,warcannottakeplace.\nPACIFISMFORNONPACIFISTS211Thisagainisobvious,onceonethinksaboutit.Onesidecanstillassaulttheotherandinflictdeathanddestruction.That’saggression,tobesure.Butitdoesn’tconstitutewar.Bothsideshavetofightinorderforwartotakeplace.6Nowthefollowingpropositiondoesn’tapplytoallconceivablewars;onecouldimagineawarinwhichallthefightersonbothsidesareequalinauthorityandalldecision-makingisbyconsensusordemocraticvote(as,forexample,itmightbeinsomesmallguerrillabandstoday).Butitalmostcertainlyappliestowarinanystandardsense,andtovirtuallyeverywarthatiswagedinthemodernperiod.Italsoarguablyappliestovirtuallyeverywarthatislikelytobewagedinfuture.3Forbothsidestocooperateinfighting:(a)Somepersonsmustcommandotherstokill;and(b)Somepersonsmustobeythosecommands.Armiesarehierarchical,authoritarianinstitutions.Somepersonshaveauthorityandcontroloverothers.Thosepersonsissuecommandsandothersobeycommands.Indeedobedienceisessentialtotheefficientoperationofanyarmy,evenonemadeupofvolunteers.Fromthiswecanconclude:Therefore:4Ifenoughpeopleoneithersiderefusetokilloncommand,ortocommandotherstokill,warcannottakeplace.Ifthisiscorrect,thenstartingfromwhatItaketobeincontrovertibleconceptualpointsin1and2,andanempiricalclaimin3thatisalmostcertainlytrueofall—orvirtuallyall—modernwarsinanystandardsense,wereachanotherempiricalclaimin4thathasatleastasmuchcertaintyas3.NowthepointhereisthatSterba’sexamplessaynothingaboutarmies,conscription,commandstructuresandobedience,nottomentiontanks,planes,bombs,missilesandnuclearweaponsasthemeansbywhichtowagewar,andweaponsfactoriesandmilitarizedeconomiesbywhichtosupportthewholeenterprise.Yetthesemustbefactoredinifwearetomakethetransitionfromthesortsofcaseshedescribestothecaseofwarasactuallycontemplatedandwaged.Why?Becausetheyallintroduceconsiderationsthataremorallyrelevantatthemacrolevelthattypicallydon’tapplyatthemicrolevel.Soletusreturntothemoralissues,againwithanotherconceptualpoint.B1Forwartobefullyjustifiedmorally,bothsideswouldhavetobejustifiedinfighting.Ifwecomparewarwithothersortsofcontests—fromchesstobingotobasketball—wefindthattheseotheractivitiescanbeseentobefullyjustified(grantingafewrelativelyunproblematicassumptions)becauseit’sperfectlypermissibleforboth(orall)sidestobeengagedinthem.Forwartohavethatkindofjustificationitwouldhavetobethecasethatbothsidesareintheright.However,2Bothsidescannotbemorallyjustifiedinfighting.BythisImeanbothsidescan’tbeobjectivelyjustified—thatis,can’tbedoingwhatisobjectivelypermissible;notthatbothmightnotthinkthey’rejustified(whichoftenhappens)andnoteventhatbothmightnothavegoodevidencethatthey’rejustified(whichprobablydoesn’toftenhappenbutcouldhappen).Ifthisiscorrect,then:3Warcannotbefullyjustifiedmorally.StandardJWTimplicitlyrecognizesthiswhenitsaysthatawarcannotbejustonbothsides.Thismeansthatwhenwetalkabouta“justwar”wedon’tmeanawarthatisjustthroughout.Wedon’tmeanawarinwhichthewholeoftheactivitythatbothsidesareengagedinisjust.Wemeanawarthatisjustononesideonlyandunjustontheother.Thuswecannarrowourfocus:C1Forwartobejust,onesidemustbejustifiedinfighting,theothernot.Theassumptionhere,whichagainunderliesstandardJWT,isthatalthoughawarcanbeunjustonbothsides,itcan’tbejustonbothsides(thoughtherecanbedegreesofjusticeonbothsides).Theveryconsiderationsthatwouldrenderonesideintherightwouldrendertheotherinthewrong,andviceversa.\n212ROBERTL.HOLMESNowherewecanformulateasubstantivedifferencebetweenpacifistsandjustwartheorists.Usingjustwarcategories,wemaysaythatjustwartheoriststypicallythinkthattherearesomewars—perhapsmany—inwhichonesideisjustandtheotherunjust;whereasthepacifiststypicallythink(orwouldthink,ifputtingitinjustwartheoreticterms)thatvirtuallyallwars(actual,nothypothetical)areunjustonbothsides.Nowcantheseviewsbereconciled?Ithinknot.Forif,now,webringmoralcategoriestobearupontheconsiderationsbroughtoutinA,wecansay:2Foronesidetobejustifiedinfighting:(a)Somepersonsmustbejustifiedincommandingotherstokill;and(b)Somepersonsmustbejustifiedinkillingoncommand.Thatis,oncewelookattheinnerstructureofwarsystems—eveningeneraloutline,asinA—itseemsclearthatifonesideistobejustifiedinthemassiveuseofviolencetoachieveitsends,attheveryleastitmustbepossibletojustifythecommand-and-obediencestructureoftheinstitutionwhosebusinessitistodothekilling.This,again,Itaketoberelativelyunproblematic.Butthefollowingisn’tunproblematic:3Noonehasarighttocommandotherstokill,andnooneisjustifiedinkillingoncommand.Beforemakingafewpointsofclarification,letusnotethecontinuationoftheargumenttotheliberalpacifistconclusion.Therefore:4Neithersideisjustifiedinfighting.Therefore:5Nowarisjust.InthecontextofwhichI’mspeaking(thatis,ofmodernnation-stateswitharmieswagingwarinastandardsense),thosewhoarecommandedtokilltypicallyareputintothatpositioninvoluntarily.Mostnationsdraftyoungpeopleforthemilitary.EvenacountryliketheUnitedStatescannotcountonenoughvolunteersinwartimetoprovideitwiththearmythoughtnecessary.TherewasadraftduringtheCivilWar,WorldWarI,WorldWarII,theKoreanWarandtheVietnamWar.WhilethereisatpresentnodraftintheUS,theSelectiveServiceSystemisinplace,anddraftnoticesreportedlywouldgooutinamatterofdaysifitweredeemednecessaryinanemergency.Butadraftbyitsnaturerepresentsinvoluntaryservitude.AndintheUSandmost(thoughnotall)countriesit’sdiscriminatoryaswell,singlingoutyoungmalestobearadisproportionatepartoftheburdenofwagingthegovernment’swars.NowwhileIthinkthatC3iscorrect,itsdefensewouldrequiremorespacethanisavailablehere.SoIshallmerelypointoutthatifC3iscorrect,thenaliberaldemocraticsocietycannotwagewarinthemodernworld.Thesocial,political,andeconomicstructuresitmustkeepinplaceeventomaintainreadinessforwarareincompatiblewithsuchasociety.Thetollthatittakesofhumanlibertyissimplytoogreat.Anycountrythatreliesuponconscriptionisimposinginvoluntaryservitudeuponitsyoungpeople,and,inacountryliketheUS,discriminatoryservitudeaswell.Andthis,Ishouldmaintain,isincompatiblewithafreeandopendemocraticsociety.ThusIwouldsaythatevenifonehasnoprincipledobjectiontokilling,andevenifoneweretoacceptthepermissibilityofkillinginnocentsinthesortsofcasesSterbadescribes—thatis,evenifoneweren’ta“pacifist”ontheseissues—itdoesn’tfolloweitherthatoneisjustifiedincompellingotherstokillorthatoneisjustifiedinkillingatthecommandofothers.Ifthisisso,thenifoneseriouslyhonorstheprinciplesofafreeandopensociety,onehasgrounds,andIshouldsaycompellinggrounds,forbeingaliberalpacifist.AretheregroundshereforyetsayingthatthereisareconciliationofPandJWT?Notmany,perhaps.Butthere’sonethatmayprovidepromisingsoilforattemptingtoachieveareconciliation.Itinvolvesshiftingthefocusofthedebate.Ifbothhaveacommitmenttothevaluesofaliberaldemocraticsociety,thentheycanjointogetherintracingouttheimplicationsofthatcommitmentfortheissueofwhetherwarinthemodernworldcanbejustified.IftheyshouldbeledtotheconclusionofargumentC,thenthejustwartheoristcouldclingtotheirconvictionsaboutthejustifiabilityofkilling—includingkillinginnocentsinsomeofthesortsofcasesSterbaoutlines—butwouldhavetogiveupthecentralclaimabouttheextensionofsuchkillingtothelevelofwarfare;andthepacifistcouldsettleforseeingwarfadefromtherepertoireoffreesocietiesbutwithoutnecessarilyhavingconvincedanyoneofitsinherentwrongness.Ifthepacifistseemstogetthebetterofthis“reconciliation,”sobeit.What’simportantisthattheybothendupwiththecorrectposition.\nPACIFISMFORNONPACIFISTS213NOTES1Takingtheterm“warism”fromDuaneCady.SeehisFromWarismtoPacifism(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1989).2Iconcentrateonanti-warpacifisminmyOnWarandMoralitybecauseitseemstomethatwarcanbeshowntobewrongwithoutassumingacommitmenttononviolence,eventhoughacommitmenttononviolenceentailsholdingthatwariswrong.3DouglasLackey,“TheMoralIrrelevanceoftheCounterforce/CountervalueDistinction,”TheMonist,vol.70(1987)pp.255–76.4It’sworthnotingthatSterba’saccountisatvariancewithstandardformulationsoftheDoctrineofDoubleEffect,whichhasaseparateconditionpreventingonefromdoingevil,evenifmerelyforeseen,sothatgoodmaycomeofit.Theevilconsequencecan’t,inotherwords,becausallynecessarytotheproductionofthegood(whichwould,inSterba’sterms,makeitpartoftheexplanationofwhytheagentperformedtheact).WhereastraditionalDDEallowsthatmerelyforeseenconsequencescanplaythisrole,Sterba’saccountentailsthatanyconsequenceplayingthatrole(hencepartoftheexplanationofwhytheactwasperformed)becomespartofwhatwasintended,notmerelyforeseen.5Hair-splittersmaywanttonotethatkillingtheonehostagecan’tpreventall200frombeingexecutedbecausekillingtheoneitselfconstitutesanexecution.If,ontheotherhand,oneweretosaythatitdoesn’tconstituteanexecution—orifonetook“execution”tocoveronlyexecutionatthehandsofothers—thenitwouldnolongerbetruethatkillingtheoneistheonlywaypossibletopreventtheexecutionofthe200,sinceonecouldkillthemalloneself.Whilerelativelyunimportanttothiscase,thispointisofconsiderableimportanceinmanyoftheproblemscenteringaroundthedistinctionbetweenkillingandlettingdie.6I’mnottalkingaboutalegalstateofwar,whichcanexistwithoutfightingonceadeclarationofwarhasbeenmade,butwaritself.\nCivildisobedienceandrevolutionaryaction\n21THEMORALSELFINTHEFACEOFINJUSTICELaurenceThomasIfIamtodiebythebulletofamadman,Imustdososmiling.Theremustbenoangerwithinme.Godmustbeinmyheartandonmylips.(MahatmaGandhi)Thetheoreticalargumentsforequalityaremostcompelling.Ifrespectcanbe,orcouldcometobe,demandedofanindividual,thensurelythatverysameindividualcanbeaccordedrespect.Thereisnobiologicalfeatureofanyhumanbeingwhichcontravenesthisconsideration.Menandwomencannotdemandrespectofoneanotherand,withanyjustification,refusetoaccordrespecttooneanothersimplyonaccountofgenderdifferencesalone.Likewiseforblacksandwhitesor,ingeneral,anytwoethnicorracialgroups.Indeed,thesameholdsforsexualorientation,whetherornotthishasabiologicalbasis.Heterosexualscannotdemandrespectofhomosexualsandthen,withanyjustification,refusetoaccordthemrespect,andconversely,wheresexualorientationaloneisthebasisfortherefusaltoaccordrespect.JamesSterbahasperhapsmadethecaseforequality,acrossdiversity,moreforcefullyandeloquentlythananyothercontemporaryphilosopher.Attheveryleast,justicedemandsequalitywithrespecttothebasicrightsofsociety.Thereisnogettingaroundthistruth.Unfortunately,though,thistruthdoesnotaddressaverypressingquestion,towit:Whatshouldbedoneifasocietyfailstoaccordthebasicrightstoaparticulargroupofitscitizens?Sincethenon-violentprotestsagainsttheBritishbyMahatmaGandhiinIndia,andtheCivilRightsMovementthattookplaceintheUnitedStatesinthelate1950sandearly1960s,civildisobediencehasbeenwidelyrecognizedasanappropriatewayforindividualstoprotestinjusticeswhichtheymustendureintheirveryownsociety.InhisworkATheoryofJustice,JohnRawlsappearstohaveadequatelycapturedthemoralsignificanceofcivildisobediencefromaphilosophicalperspectivewhenhenotedthatcivildisobedienceisanappealtothemoralconscience(orsenseofjustice,tousehisterminology)ofthefellowcitizensofsociety.Surely,itseemsthatMartinLutherKingJrunderstoodthecivildisobediencethatheadvocatedinpreciselythisway.Butthereissomethingparadoxicalhere.Ifasocietyhassystematicallyrefusedtoaccordthefullcomplementofbasicrightstoagroupofitscitizens,whywouldprotestsofcivildisobediencebymembersofthisdeprivedgroupsufficetomovethesocietytoaccordthesecitizensthefullcomplementofrights?Andifittakesnomorethancivildisobedience,thenwhyisitneededinthefirstplace?Thatis,ifgroupXjudgesgroupYnottobeworthyofcertainbasicrights,whywouldactsofcivildisobediencebyYssufficetomoveXstoregardYsasnowbeingworthyofthebasicrightsinquestion,asopposedtoitshappening,instead,thattheiropinionofYsasmorallow-lifeismightilyreinforcedbytheveryactsofcivildisobedienceinwhichYsengage?Afterall,thesystematicviolationofbasicrightscannotbeattributedtoanoversight,butonlytoawillfulnesstotreatcertainothersasinferior.Itis,forinstance,neverasurpriseddiscoveryamongthecitizensofasocietythatcertainofitsmembersarenotallowedtovote.Itdoesnotseemthatcivildisobediencewouldsufficetochangethiswillfulnessifwhatthatmeansisthatcivildisobediencesucceedsbyappealingtothemoralconscienceofsociety-at-large.Whenmembersofsocietyaresystematicallydeniedsomeorallofthebasicrights,preciselywhatseemstobeabsent,inthefirstplace,isasufficientlydevelopedmoralconsciencetowardtheindividualsinquestionwhichtheiractsofcivildisobediencemightawaken.InTheDemandsofJustice,Sterbawritesitshouldbeclearthatacceptinganidealofjusticeasfairnessrequiresapersontomakeaconsiderablesacrificeforthesakeofthebasicwelfareofothers.WhileIfullyshareSterba’sview,Ibelievethat,barringcertainconditions,peoplearenotnaturallydisposedtomakesuchsacrifices,andthatthereasonforthishastodowithexperiencingtheotherasamoralperson;for,astheexistenceofevilbehaviormakesabundantlyclear,wedonothavetheappropriatemoralsentimentstowardotherindividualsjustbecausetheyarepersons.Thisisespeciallysowhentheotherisanindividualwhobelongstoagroupthat(seemingly)canbedefinedin\n216LAURENCETHOMASsharpcontradistinctiontoourownandwherewebelievethatourgroupissuperior(itnotbeingagiventhatwemustbelievethatourgroupissuperior).DrawinguponbothPlatoandAristotle,andthenaninsightfromKantregardingself-respect,theviewthatIshalldefendhereisthatcivildisobediencesucceedsnotsomuchbyappealingtothemoralconscienceofsociety-at-large,butbyforcingsocietytotakethecivildisobedientseriously.Thistheydobyforcingsociety-at-largetobearwitnesstotheirdignity.Ibeginwithalittlehistory.IHistory:morallynoblebehaviorInTheJewishWar,thegreathistorianFlaviusJosephusreportsthefollowing:ThusPilatedeclaredtothem[theJews]thathewouldhavethemallslaughterediftheydidnotaccepttheflagsof[Rome],andhecommandedhissoldierstoreadythemselvesbypullingtheirswords.Uponhearingthesewords,theJewsenmassethrewthemselvestotheground,asifthishadbeenplanned,andpresentedtheirthroatstoPilate,cryingbetterthatwearekilledthanthatweshouldviolateourholylaws.TheirmoralstanceandtheardentzealfortheirreligiousconvictionsoccasionedsuchadmirationonPilate’spartthatheorderedhissoldierstotaketheflagsoutofJerusalem.Ifanythingistrue,itistruethatinthissituation,theJewssucceededincommandingtherespectofPilate.Howdidtheydothat?Theanswer,quitesimply,isthattheymadeitunmistakablyclearthattheyembracedvaluesforwhichtheywerewillingtodie.Ofcourse,Pilatecouldverywellhaveregardedthemasfoolsforbeingwillingtotakesuchastance.Still,thereisnogettingaroundthefactthatbytheveryactionofofferingtheirthroatstheytherebymadeitimpossibleforPilatetoholdthethreatofdeathoverthem.Theyirrevocablydiffusedthatthreat.TheJewsdisplayedamoralpowerthatPilatecouldnotignore;though,tobesure,heneednothaverespondedinthepositivewaythathedid.Forinstance,hecouldhavebecomeabsolutelylividoverthefactthattheyhadsoeffectivelydiffusedhisthreatofdeath.Andthathedidnotissurelytohiscredit.Justso,IthinkthatitwouldbeamistaketoregardPilate’snotbecomingangrywiththemasmerelyanaccidentofhistory.Evenifitistruethatallsentientcreaturesnaturallyavoidcircumstancesthattheysensewillbringabouttheirdeath,onlyhumanbeingscanbothvaluelifeand,attheverysametime,holdthatitisworthadheringtosomevaluesevenifthisshouldmeanalossoftheirlife.AndIsubmitthatwhenapersonexhibitswithgracebehaviorwhichstarklyexemplifiesthelattervalue,asJosephusinformsusthattheseJewsdid,thenitisextremelydifficultnottoexperiencetheindividual’sbehaviorasmorallynoble—andnotmerelyquintessentiallyhuman.ItseemstomethatHitlerwaswellawareofthisandstrovehardtoreducetheJewstosuchastateofutterdespairandfearfulnessthatitwasverynearlyimpossibleforJewsinternedthereintoexhibitanymorallynoblevalues.Itcanbeunderstandablethatapersonbegsformercyorpity—aformofbehaviorthatisquintessentiallyhuman.Yetbeggingdoesnotconstitutemorallynoblebehavior,nomatterwhatthecontext.Notevenamother’sbeggingthatherchildbesparedanunjustdeath,aswithSophieinStyron’sSophie’sChoice,standsasmorallynoblebehavior.ItisinthiscontextthatonemustappreciatePilate’sreaction.Itistruethathecouldhavebecomeangry;however,itisnomereaccidentthathedidnot.Hewasstandingface-to-facewithmorallynoblebehavior;andthiscaughthimquitebysurprise,sincehesurelyexpectedthefearofdeathtogetthebetterofthem.Iwantnowtolookbrieflyatadisplayofmorallynoblebehaviorthatcomesfromanentirelydifferentdirection.OneofthegreatironiesofAmericanhistoryisthatthosewhopennedsomeofthegreatestlanguageofequalityeverwrittenwerealsoslaveholders.WhobetterillustratestheFaustiandoctrineofthedividedselfthantheslaveholderswhowrotethefollowingwords:WeholdtheseTruthstobeself-evident,thatallMenarecreatedequal,thattheyareendowedbytheirCreatorwithcertainunalienableRights,thatamongtheseareLife,Liberty,andthePursuitofHappiness.(TheDeclarationofIndependence)Myownviewisthattheobviousdiscrepancybetweenthesewordsandthedeedsofslaveryisperhapsmoreexplicablethanoneisinitiallyinclinedtosuppose.Inthesamedocument,theseauthorsalsonotedtherecomesatimewhenpeoplehavesufferedsuchegregiousinjusticesthat“itistheirRight,itistheirDuty,tothrowoffsuchGovernment,andtoprovidenewGuardsfortheirfutureSecurity.”Andthelastparagraphincludesthefollowingwords:“wesolemnlyPublishandDeclare,ThattheseUnitedColoniesare,andofRightoughttobe,FreeandIndependentStates:thattheyareabsolvedfromallAllegiancetotheBritishCrown.”WhenoneconsidersthatatthetimetheBritishEmpirewasthegreatestmilitarypoweronearth,thisstanceofthecoloniescanonly\nTHEMORALSELFINTHEFACEOFINJUSTICE217beseenassheerhubris.Italsoconstitutesmorallynoblebehavior.Whytheymighthaveeverthoughtthattheywouldhaveprevailedagainstitisamystery.Butwhenafledglingpeopleispreparedtostanduptothegreatestpoweronearth,itseemsreasonabletosupposethattheyareratherbesottedwiththeconvictionthatinsofarasapeopleisworthyoflibertytheymustbepreparedtodieforliberty.Anditisthismorallynoblebehaviorthattheblackslavesdidnotdisplay.Itgoeswithoutsaying,ofcourse,thatthereisaperfectlygoodexplanationforwhyblacksmaynothavebeenpreparedtodiefortheirfreedom.Theyarrivedentirelyemaciatedasaresultofthemostgruelingandinhumanjourneysahumanbeingcouldbeforcedtotake.Quitesimply,theMiddlePassagewasanutterlytraumatizingexperience.Andonedoesnotreasonablyexpectmorallynoblebehavioroftraumatizedindividuals.Thecolonistscouldnothaverightlyexpectedmorallynoblebehaviorofslavesarrivingofftheships;andsubsequenttreatmentofslavesmostcertainlydidnotamelioratematters.Besides,onenaturallythinks,whyshoulddisplaysofmorallynoblebehaviorbeaprerequisitefortreatingapersonjustly?Afterall,humanbeingsshouldbetreatedjustlyinvirtueoftheirhumanity,andnotinvirtueofotherthingsthattheydo.Onceagain,theHolocaustisveryilluminatinginthisregard.Forwhattheconcentrationcampsshowquitepoignantlyisthatifwecangethumanbeingstoactinso-calledsubhumanways,thensuchsubhumanbehaviorcanitselfbeapowerfulbarriertoothersbeinghumanelyresponsivetowardthemintheabsenceofpowerfulindependentconsiderationsofcommitment.Justascompassionisnotcalledforthbyanysetofcircumstanceswhatsoever,humanenessisnotaswell.Ifapersonislyingunconsciousinherownfecesandblood,thatmayrepulsememightily,althoughIampainfullyawareofthefactthatrudimentarymedicalattentioniswhattheyneedandthat,moreover,Iamaphysicianwhocanprovidethatattention.Thatis,ratherthanbeingmovedbycompassiontohelpsuchaperson,bringingmyselftohelpthemmayrequireovercomingenormousfeelingsofdisgust.Fromtheoutset,therewerenoindependentconsiderationsofcommitmentthatinclinedslavemasterstobehumanelyresponsivetoblacks.AndthetormentedconditioninwhichblacksarriveduponAmericansoildidnothingtoarrestwhitesfromtheirshamefulattitudetowardblacks.Theseremarksneitherexcuseslavemastersnorblameblacks.HadJewsacceptedtheflagsofRome,asPilatehadorderedthemtodo,theywouldnothavebeenblameworthyforhavingdoneso,astheywereinnopositiontowithstandthemightofRome.Fromthis,though,itdoesnotfollowthattherewouldnothavebeenanymorallynoblebehaviorinwhichtheycouldhaveengagedwhichwouldhavebetteredtheirsituation.Fortherewas,namelytheverybehaviorinwhichtheyinfactengaged.Likewise,hadblacksresistedslaveryinamorallynoblewaywhentheyarrived,thismighthaveverywellhavemadeadifferenceforthebetter,althoughitiseversounderstandablewhytheydidnot.Onethingisclear:Ifinthenameofjusticetheblacksbroughtoverhadinunisonrefusedtoworkasslaves,evenifthismeanttheirdeath,thenslaverywouldnothavesurvived.Anobstreperousslavedoesnotmakeforagoodslave;andthisholdsafortioriforadeadslave.Thisistruealthoughnoblamewhatsoeverneedaccruetoblacksforfailingtosobehave.Still,andperhapsthisisthemorepoignantpoint,hadblacksenmassesobehaved,thenthewhiteslaveholderswouldnothavehadaneasywayofdifferentiatingbetweenthemselvesandblacks.Blacknessandwhitenesswouldnothavecometobetheasymmetricalmoralmarkersthattheycametobe,withwhitenessbeingregardedasmorallysuperiortoblackness.Wemustbearinmindthatequality,aswenowunderstandit,isinfactaverymodernideapromotedbytheEnlightenmentthinkers,RousseauandKantinparticular.ItwasthegeniusofRousseauandKantthatremovedthechainsofnaturalinequalitythatAristotleforged.Againstthisbackdrop,theabsenceofadramaticdisplayofdignitymayhavebeenmoreofanimpedimenttoappreciatingthehumanityofblacksarrivinguponthesoiloftheUnitedStatesthanwewouldsurelyliketosupposeor,givenourpresentvantagepoint,canevenappreciate.Tosupposethatrationalityalonecouldhavedeliveredthedesiredresults,istoattachfarmoreweighttorationalityaloneyieldingtherightmoralresultsthanthehistoryofideaswarrants.IIThemoralsentimentsInthespiritofKantianmoralphilosophy,Ibelievethatallhumanbeingsareowedjusticeinvirtueoftheirhumanity.However,theunvarnishedtruthisthatindividualsdonotalwaysgetwhattheyareowedandthat,insomeinstances,theywillgetwhattheyareowedonlyiftheythemselvesseizetheinitiativetoobtainit.Unfortunately,justiceisnotanexceptiontothistruth.Morespecificallyinthisregard,Idonotbelievethatratiocinationwillalwaysdelivertherightmoralattitudetowardthosewhomwedonotregardasbeingworthyofthebasicmoralrights.Forhavingtherightmoralattitudetowardothersisitselfoftenareflectionofthekindsoffeelingsthattheycanengageinourlife.Andthehistoryofideaswouldseemtosupporttheseremarks.Thoughsurelytheremustbesuchacase,Iamnotawareofanyinstancewheremajorinjusticesagainstapeople,whichhadbeeninplaceovertheyears,werevoluntarilycorrectedbythoseinpowersimplybecausetheycametoseetheerroroftheirwaysaftermuchreflection.If,forexample,compassionandshamearenaturalmoralsentiments,historymakesitabundantlyclearthatneitherneedbeoccasionedbywitnessingegregiousmoralwrongs,thoughnothingismoreclearthanthatthesuffererofthesewrongsisahumanbeing.Indeed,onecanbetheactivemoralagentinbringingaboutthesufferingwithoutexperiencinganycompassion\n218LAURENCETHOMASorshame.Afterall,asInotedinVesselsofEvil,thereisnorecordedcasewherehumanbeingsthoughtthattheywereroundingupanimalsonlytohaveitturnout,uponcloserinspection,thatthesupposedanimalswerehumanbeings,northeotherwayaround.Theslavemasterswantedblackwomentoserveasnanniesfortheirchildren—notchimpanzees.Andtheslavemastersdidnotcometothisconclusionviatrialanderror.Again,theNaziswantedtomakeitthecasethatcertainhumanbeings,namelyJews,wouldexhibitsubhumanbehavior.They(theNazis)werenotatallinterestedinmaking(non-human)animalsevenmoreunrulyintheirbehavior.AndasIhavealreadyindicated,insubjectingJewstosuchsubhumanconditions,theveryaimoftheNaziswastoinsurethatshameandcompassionwithrespecttothehorrendoustreatmentoftheJewswasnotexperienced.Ihavenotarguedthatrationalreflectioncannotresultinpeopleabandoningtheirmorallyobjectionableways.Ihavemerelypointedoutthatrationalreflection,alone,doesnotinvariablyhavethisresult.Why?Becauseourrationalreflectionsaboutothersoftenhasmoretodowiththesortsoffeelingsthattheyengageinusthanphilosophicaltheoryisnormallyinclinedtosuppose.Thatis,contrarytophilosophicaltheory:ourreflectionsoftenpresupposethesefeelingsratherthanregulatethem.PhilosopherstypicallycommitwhatIshallcallthejustpersonfallacy.Itseemsreasonableenoughtosupposethat1ifpersonsarewhollyjust,thentheyexpressthemoralsentimentsinalltherightways.Thus,iftheyarewhollyjust,thentheyfeelcompassionwherecompassionisappropriate,shamewhereshameisappropriate,resentmentwhereresentmentisappropriate,indignationwhereappropriate,andsoon.Tothisoneaddsthat2thejustlifeisarationallife.Andfromthesetwopremises,oneinfersthat3themoralsentimentsareregulatedbyrationality.Insodoing,however,onehasmadeafallaciousinference.Itisabasictruthofelementarylogicthatanargumentisnotvalidjustbecauseitspremisesaretrue.Thus,supposethatapersonassertedthatallwomenarehumanbeingsandsupposeittobetruethatallwomenbearchildren.Itwouldnonethelessbeamistaketoinferthatbearingchildrenisanessentialfeatureofbeinghuman.ItseemstomethatpreciselythelessontobelearntfromPlatoisthatalthoughstatements1and2aretrue,3isfalse.Thisisfortworeasons.Thefirstisthatthemoralsentimentsareonlyanallyofrationality.Second,theyareanallyofrationalityonlyinsofarastheyhavebeenproperlydevelopedinthefirstplace.Asiswellknown,Platoheldthatifpersonsaretoexperiencethemoralsentimentsintherightway,thenthefoundationforthishadtobelaidlongbeforerationalityisoperativeinthelifeofpersons.Thewherewithaltolivethejustlifeasisrequiredbyrationalityisnotaresultofthesentimentsbeingregulatedbyrationality;rather,itisaresultoftheproperlydevelopedsentimentsbeingestablishedinthefirstplace.Ofcourse,humanbeingscanchange.Butthis,Ihaveclaimed,israrelyifeveraresultofmereratiocination.PeoplewhoweremovedbythemoraleloquenceandlackofbitternessonthepartofNelsonMandelachangedasaresultofaprofoundmoralexperience,andnotsimplyasaresultofasustainedactofratiocination.Oncemore,historyisquiteinstructivehere.ThoughWesterncultureishardlyfreeofsexismatthispointintime,itisfairtosaythatmaleattitudestowardsfemalesarequitesomedistancefromthesexistattitudesofmerelyfiftyyearsago.Manymenhavechanged.Butthischangetooklotsofproddingandpain,andlotsofre-habituation.Mendidnotsimplycometotheirsenses,andinsistuponchangeonbehalfofwomen.Amalebornfiftyyearsagodidnot,inhis20s,expectawomantobeanairlinepilotoramantobeaflightattendant.Sothatmalehashadtoadjusttothesechanges.Bycontrast,foramalebornjusttwentyyearsago,nosuchre-habituationhasbeennecessarybecausehavingawomanasanairlinepilotoramanasaflightattendanthasbeenapartofthatmale’sworldfromtheveryoutset.Thus,forallthesubtleformsofsexismthatcontinuetoexist,themoralsentimentsofamaleborntwentyyearsagovis-à-viswomenwillinmanywaysbesuperiortothoseofthemalebornfiftyyearsago,althoughthelattermayverywellbeabletoproducefarmoresophisticatedargumentsforgenderequalitythantheformer.InJusticeforHereandNow,Sterbaspeaksofarighttoequalself-development.Andtheideahereisthatminimallyajustsocietyisonethatprovidesasocialenvironmentthatisconducivetotheself-developmentofallpersons,regardlessoftheircategorizationwithrespecttogender,racial,sexualorientationorphysicalabilities.Myownviewisthatinasocietythat,indeed,isbasicallyjust,theappropriatemoralsentimentsforcarryingoutsuchaprojectarealreadyinplace,butthatinasocietythatisblemishedwithegregiousinjustices,preciselywhatisneededistheappropriatemoralsentiments.Moresignificantly,myviewisthatrationalreflectionalonewillnotsufficetoproducethesesentiments.Mostpoignantly,myview\nTHEMORALSELFINTHEFACEOFINJUSTICE219isthatitispreciselythosewhodeservetobetheobjectoftheappropriatemoralsentimentswhooftenenoughmustactsoastoengagethemoralsentimentsofthosewhotreatthemunjustly.Itis,onmyview,anaspectofthefragilityofhumanbeingsthat,intheabsenceofindependentmoralcommitmentstowardothers,weneedtoexperiencethehumanityofothersfromtimetotime,especiallyacrossseeminglywelldefinedphenotypicaldifferences,inorderforourmoralsentimentstowardotherstobeastheyshouldbe.Itiseasytolosesightofthistruthifwelimitoursightstonomorethanwhatpeopleknowtobetruerationally.IIIAmoralburdenOneoftheobviousdifficultieswithmyviewisthatitplacesanobviousburdenuponthevictimsofinjustice.Andthatseemstobe:well,yetanotherinjustice.Thisconcernconfusestherealitywiththeideal.Theideal,tobesure,isthatthosewhoareguiltyofperpetratingtheinjusticeofegregioussocialinequalityshoulddowhatisnecessarytoraisetheirvictimstothelevelofsocialequality.Idonotdenythatthisshouldbetheideal.Myclaimisthatunfortunatelythisidealisjustthat—anideal.Therealityisthatvictimsofegregioussocialinequalitymustthemselvesbeinstrumentalineffectingchangeamongthosewhoareperpetratingthisinequality.Thisisbecauseitisanaspectofthefragilityofhumanbeingsthatiftheyhavebeensocializedtobelievethatagroupofpeopleismorallyinferior,thentheydonotcometohavetheappropriatemoralsentimentstowardmembersofthatgroupsimplyinvirtueofwitnessingsuchindividualsbeingtheobjectofegregiousinequality.RecallhereAristotle’sclaimthatnooneisjustorunjustbynature,butonlyasaresultofhowtheyhavebeentrained.IamsuggestinghowwemightunderstandAristotle’sclaiminamoderncontext.Justiceisnotanall-or-nothingmatter;andmembersofanysocietymayverywellbetrainedtobejusttowardsomegroupsofpersonsinsocietyandnotothers.InthisregarditwillbeusefultolookatalovelyexampleintroducedbyBernardBoxillinhisessay“Dignity,Slavery,andtheThirteenthAmendment.”Heargueswithgreatingenuitythatwhentheslavemasteraskedtheslavetomakethecasethathe(theslave)isindeedahumanbeing,therereallyisnothingthattheslavecouldhavedonetosatisfythisdemandoftheslavemaster—noactiontheslavecouldhavetakenorwordshecouldhaveuttered.Moreimportantly,Boxill’spointisthatthereisnothingthattheslaveshould,morallyspeaking,havetodo.Whilerightinthesecondinstance,Boxillis,Ibelieve,mistakeninthefirst.Theslavecouldhaveengagedinmorallynoblebehavior.Moreover,theburdentodosofelluponhim.Nodoubtonereasonwhymanyaremightilyinclinedtoresisttheideathatthisburdenfellupontheslaveisthatthiswouldseemtoentailthattheslavemasterwasnotmorallyobligatedtotreattheslavejustly.Butnotso.Theobligationtotreatapersonjustlyisnotconditionaluponwhetherapersonisinthepositiontoinsistuponbeingtreatedjustly.Thefact,though,thatthisobligationisunconditionaldoesnotsettleatallwhatapersonshoulddoifitturnsoutthatotherswillnotfulfilltheirobligationtotreatherjustly.SupposeJohntreatsRachelratherunjustly;andRachelknowsthatbyperformingacertainseriesofactionsshecouldbringitaboutthatJohnwillcometohavetheappropriatemoralsentimentstowardher,andsobemovedtotreatherjustly.Suppose,further,thatRachelrealizesthatJohnisratherintransigentinhismoralattitudetowardher.ShouldJohntreatRacheljustly?Absolutely!ButgiventhatJohnisnotabouttobehaveinthiswayofhisownaccord,whatshouldRacheldo?Surely,theanswerisnotthatRachelshouldjustwaituntilsomeoneelsecomesalonganddeliverherfromJohn’sunjustbehavior.Surely,itisincumbentuponhertoperformtheseriesofactionsinquestion,asaresultofwhichJohnwillbemovedtotreatherjustly.Andifshedoesnot,thenshemayverywellbeopentomoralcriticismforfailingtodoso.Tobesure,shewillnotbeopentothesameseverityofmoralcriticismthatcanbeleveledagainstJohn.Afterall,itisJohn—andnotshe—whoisguiltyoftreatingsomeoneunjustly.Butfromthistruth,itdoesnotfollowthatsheisnotopentoanymoralcriticismatall.Arguably,preciselywhattheKantianideaofself-respectdemandsofheristhatsheactsoastoinviteJohntotreatherjustly.ThisitdemandsofherwithoutatallrelievingJohnofhismoralobligationtotreatherjustly.Toavoidanymisunderstanding,letmestateexplicitlythatthecaseofJohnandRachelisnotstrictlyparalleltothecaseofslavery.InRachel’scase,Ihaveclaimedthat,onpainofbeingopentomoralcriticism,thereissomethingthatsheshoulddotobringitaboutthatsheistreatedjustlybyJohn.However,Idonotholdthatinallcasesapersonisopentomoralcriticismforfailingtodowhat,atleastinprinciple,shecouldhavedonetobringitaboutthatsheistreatedjustlybyanother.Therecanbeexcusingconditions,surely.WhatIwanttomakeveryclear,though,isthatwedistortthemorallandscapeifwesupposethatwheneverapersonisthevictimofinjusticethereisnothingthattheycandotobringitaboutthattheyaretreated(more)justly.Underconditionsofegregiousinjustice,actinginaccordancewithself-respectisverylikelytoacquiremorallynoblebehavior—behaviorwhichpoignantlyengagesthemoralsentimentsoftheperpetratorofinjustice,andsorendersmanifestlyevidentaperson’sdignity.Andoneconsequenceofthefailureofapeopletohaveself-respectisthattheirveryownbehavior—thatis,theirlackofnoblebehavior—maybeafactorinitsbeingthecasethattheyarecontinuallytreatedinanegregiouslyunjustway.OntheviewthatIhold,howweacttowardanotherismuchmorelikelytobeafunctionofthesentimentsthatwe\n220LAURENCETHOMASfeeltowardthatpersonthananyconsiderationswhichrationalreflectionyields.Infact,asInotedearlier,thesentimentsthatwefeeloftenfunctionasapartofthejustificatoryargumentthatwegiveunlesswealreadyembraceindependentreasonsforreachingadifferentconclusion.Accordingly,ifagroupofpeopledisplaysconsiderableservilebehavior,thenfarfrominspiringotherstotakethemseriouslyasfull-fledgedmoralagents,andsotreatthemjustly,theirveryownbehaviorinvitesothersnottodoso.Bycontrast,ifagroupofpeopledisplaysnoblemoralbehaviorinthefaceofegregiousinjusticesasrequiredbyself-respect,thentheirbehaviormostcertainlydoesnotinviteothersnottotakethemseriouslyasfull-fledgedmoralagents,evenifitfailstomoveotherstotakethemseriously,andsototreatthemjustly.Itisgenerallyrecognizedthatourownbehaviorcanhaveanimpactuponhowothersbehavetowardus.Itwouldbeamistaketothinkthatmattersofjusticearetheexceptiontothistruth.IVThedemandsofjustice:bearingwitnesstodignityOneoftheverynotablefeaturesofSterba’sworkishisinsistencethatjusticeisverydemanding.ThisisverymuchinkeepingwithAnnetteBaier’sextraordinaryessay“WhyHonestyIsaHardVirtue.”Doingtherightthingbyothersisnoteasypreciselybecausewhatconstitutestherightactioninaparticularcasecanbesoverymuchtiedtothecircumstancesofaperson’slife.Likewise,justicewithoutsacrificeseemstoamounttonomorethanpayinglipservicetoanideal.Arguingforasomethingofawelfarestate,muchoftheimpetusofSterba’swritingsistiedtoarticulatingtheclaimsthatasociety’sdisadvantaged,variouslydescribed,canmakeagainsttheadvantagedmembersofsociety.Thisamostimportantmoralexercise.Still,theviewthatIholdisthatuniversaljusticeisnotpossibleuntilpeopleareabletomakewithforcetheirowndemands.Foritisnotenoughthatpeople,theadvantagedinthiscase,wantequalityforthedisadvantaged,itisabsolutelynecessarythattheadvantagedexperiencethedisadvantagedasequals,lesttheformershouldunwittinglycometothinkittheirproperplacetospeakonbehalfofthelatter.Inthisrespect,interestingly,justiceisquiteunlikelove.Itisperhapspossible,anduseful,tothinkofloveasagiftfromonepersontoanother.Bycontrast,itisamistaketothinkofjusticeinthisway.Oneadultmayormaynothaveaclaimtobeinglovedbyanotheradult;whereasoneadultalwayshasaclaimtobeingtreatedjustlybyanotheradult.Becausejusticeshouldnotbeunderstoodasamoralgift,itis,onmyview,oftheutmostimportancethattheadvantagedinsocietyexperiencethedisadvantagedasequals;andthis,needlesstosay,issomethingthatintheendonlythedisadvantagedcanmakehappen.Otherwise,theresultiswhatwemayrefertoasmoralisticpaternalism.Ithasbeenbecomefashionabletonotethatwecannotspeakonbehalfofothersbecausewehardlyknowtheirpointofview.TheconsiderationsIhaveadvancedintheprecedingparagraphs,whilecompatiblewiththatclaim,makeadifferentpoint,namelythatinspeakingonbehalfofothersbeingtreatedasequalwecandepriveourselvesoftheopportunitytoexperiencethemfullyasequals.Thereisamoraldeferencethatwehavetowardothersonlywhenweexperiencethemasequals.Theaimofcivildisobedienceinthefaceofegregiousinjusticeisnottoappealtoanextantmoralconscience;forwithrespecttotheegregiousinjusticeinquestionnoneexists.Rather,itsaimistobetakenseriouslybytheperpetratorsoftheinjustices—tobeexperiencedfullyasequals—engaginginbehaviorthatengagestheirmoralsentimentsandcausingthemtobearwitness,ifyouwill,toone’sdignity.Iwouldimaginethatonereasonwhymanyhaveassumedthattheaimofcivildisobedienceistoappealtotheconscienceofsocietyisthattheyhavetakenthistobethebestwaytoaccountfortheemphasisuponnon-violenceinactionsofcivildisobedience.Notso,however.Ifitsaimistocauseotherstobearwitnesstoone’sdignity,thenwecanaccountfortheemphasisuponnon-violencejustaswell.Indeed,thisapproachhasevengreaterexplanatorypower.Iftheaimofcivildisobedienceistoobtainjusticebyappealingtothemoralconscienceofothers,thenhistoryshowsthatcivildisobediencemostcertainlyturnsouttobeafailureinmany,manyinstances.Ifthepoliceforceofthestateshouldforcetheparticipantsinamarchofcivildisobediencetoretreatorotherwisedisband,thenwhathavetheparticipantsgained?Havetheiractionsbeenfornaught,sincethemarchhadnoimpactuponthemoralconscienceoftheperpetratorsofinjustice?Ifwefocussimplyuponchangingthebehavioroftheunjust,itlooksasifthisiswhatmustbesaid.If,ontheotherhand,wefocusupontheimportanceofbringingotherstobearwitnesstoone’sdignity,thenwegetanentirelydifferentpicture.Thisisbecauseitisoftenthecasethateitheradversityordefeatprovidesthegreatestopportunityforshowcasingdignity,andnotlettingone’sspiritbebroken.Eveninthefaceofdefeat,therecanbeadefiancethatremindstheotherofone’shumanity.Asaresponsetodefeat,viciousnessandhostilitytendonlytobegetmoreviciousnessandhostility,andsotoblindone’soppressorstoone’shumanity,oftenenablingthemtoexcusetheirhorrificbehaviorinthenameofself-defense.Violenceinevitablygivesrisetoanexcusetobeviolent.This,Ibelieve,istheinsightthatGandhirecognized,andKingafterhim.Bycontrast,inforcingotherstobearwitnesstoone’sdignity,oneconfrontsthemwiththerealityofone’smoralpersonhood;fordignity,unlikehappinessorfearorangerorevenanxiousness,issomethingthatonlyahumanbeingcanhave.\nTHEMORALSELFINTHEFACEOFINJUSTICE221AsIhavejustsaid,ananimalcanshowfear.However,onlyahumanbeingcanshowfearlessnessinthefaceofwrongdoing,andmakeitunquestionablycleartothewrongdoerthatthisispreciselywhatisbeingdone.Thisisadisplayofdignity.Itcanbedisarming.HannahArendt,forinstance,wasalarmedbythenumberofJewswhowentsilentlyandwithoutdisturbancetotheirdeaths.Shesawthisascowardice.Nodoubtthiswastrueofsufficientlymany.Yetweneednotholdthistohavebeentrueofeveryone.Certainly,someJewscouldhavethoughttothemselvesthattheywouldprefertowalkquietlytotheirdeath,whichwasinevitableinonewayortheother,ratherthandisplayanyfearorbegfortheirlife,therebygivingtheNazispleasureintheirpowerovertheJews.Insodoing,suchJewsdisplayeddignity.Butonemightverywellask:Towhatend,sincetheydiedanyway?InVesselsofEvil,Inotedthatnovoice,howevermellifluous,constitutesachoir;likewisenoconviction,nomatterhowfirmlyheld,constitutesaconsensus.Inbothcases,thewholeismorethanjustthesumofitsparts.WhileitmayverywellbetruethattherelativelyfewJewswhomarchedtotheirdeathswithdignityfailedtomovetheNazistorespecttheJews,itdoesnotfollowfromthisthathadallJewssobehavedtheNaziswouldnonethelessnothavebeensomoved.ItwillberememberedthattheNazisdidnotjustslaughterJews,butthattheywenttogreatlengthstofirstdoallthattheycouldtostriptheJewsoftheirhumanity.Dignityinthefaceofinevitabledeathisperhapsthemostprofoundformofdefiancepossible,invariablytouchingthosewhobearwitnesstoitinspiteofthemselves.Thetrulyevilrejoiceintheexerciseofpowerthattheymanifestoverothers,generallysupposingthatthecapriciousthreatofdeathistheultimateexerciseofpoweroverothers.Thus,asaresponsetoevil,dignityisdisarmingpreciselybecauseitdisempowerstheevilagentbymakingitcleartotheagentthathisthreatisinefficacious,regardlessoftheamountofcoerciveforcethathecanbringtobear.This,forexample,ispreciselywhatmadetheearlyChristianssoextraordinarilyinfluential.Inmanycases,thethreatofdeath,farfromterrorizingtheearlyChristians,waswelcomedbythemasliberating.Thus,inhisessay“MartyrsetFiersdel’être,”Jean-MarcPrieurreportsthatBishopIgnaceofAntiochinsistedthatno-oneinterveneonhisbehalfashewasbeingcarriedtohisexecutionbyaRomanconvoy.Thethreatofdeathwasdiffusedbytheverydignitywhichthemartyrsdisplayedinthefaceofeveryconceivablethreat.ItwasnotbymightbutbymasterfuldisplaysofdignitythattheearlyChristiansconqueredmightyRome.Understoodasadisplayofdignity,then,thecivillydisobedientviolatethelawinordertobringattentiontoagraveinjustice.This,however,isnottoappealtoamoralconsciencethathasalreadyprovenitselftobeindifferenttothewrongthatisbeingperpetrated.Rather,itisanawakeningofthatmoralconsciencebydisplayingdignityintheiractsofcivildisobedience,andsomakingitmanifestlyclearthatthethreatofevilisinefficacious.VThemoralselfInthefaceofinjustice,themostpreciousmoralgoodthatthemorallywrongedhaveistheirdignity.Fromthisitdoesnotfollowthatviolencecanneverbejustified.Rather,whatdoesfollowisthatviolencecannotreplacedignity.Ifwelosesightofthis,wemayyetgainpower,butpowerintheabsenceofdignityisamostPyrrhicvictory.Anditisasublimemoraltruththatintermsofbringingaboutchangeforthebetter,amanifestdisplayofdignitycanachievewhatbruteforcecannot.If,inthestruggleforequality,weshouldlosesightofthismoraltruth,thenweunwittinglydisempowerthosewholiveinthehopesofbeingtreatedequallybyothers.Rousseauthoughtitclearthatitwasnottheabilityofhumanbeingstoprovideforthemselvesthatdistinguishedthemfromotheranimals.Indeed,whilemanyhavesupposedthathiscontractariandoctrineisbaseduponthestruggleamonghumanbeingstomeettheirbasicneeds,thisreadingisnotsupportedbyRousseau’sobservationthatIhavejustnoted,norhisclaimthatitisinthefamilythatwehavetheveryfirstsociety.Rousseauthoughtthathumanbeingshaveanobilityinlivinginconcertwithoneanotherthattheycouldnothavelivinginisolationfromoneanother.Inthisregard,hesaidnothingaboutdignityinthefaceofevil.Yetitistheverypowerofdignitydisplayedenmasseinthefaceofevilthatprovidessuchaprofoundmoralechotohiswords;fordignityenmasseprovidesamoralresonanceagainstevilthatnotevendeathcanextinguish.ReferencesBoxill,Bernard(1992)“Dignity,Slavery,andtheThirteenthAmendment,”inMichaelJ.MeyerandW.A.Parent(eds)TheConstitutionofRights(IthacaNY:CornellUniversityPress,1992).Harris,GeorgeW.(1999)Agent-CenteredMorality:AristotelianAlternativetoKantianInternalism(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress).HillJr,Thomas(1973)“ServilityandSelf-Respect,”TheMonist,57.\n222LAURENCETHOMASPrieur,Jean-Marc(2000)“MartyrsetFiersdel’être,”Historia,no.64(Mars-Avril).Themeofthisissue:TheimpactofthefirstChristiansupontheworld(PremiersChrétians:cesaventuriersquiontchangélemonde).Sterba,JamesP.(1980)TheDemandsofJustice(NotreDameIN:TheUniversityofNotreDamePress).——(1998)JusticeforHereandNow(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress).Thomas,Laurence(1989)LivingMorally:APsychologyofMoralCharacter(PhiladelphiaPA:TempleUniversityPress).——(1993)VesselsofEvil:AmericanSlaveryandtheHolocaust(PhiladelphiaPA:TempleUniversityPress).\nPartVICONCLUSION\nTOWARDRECONCILIATIONINSOCIALANDPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYJamesP.SterbaTohaveajustifiedsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,onemustattendcarefullytotheviewsofothers,andparticularlytotheobjectionstheymightraisetoone’sownviews.Byattendingtothephilosophicalviewsofothers,andespeciallytotheobjectionstheymightraisetoone’sownview,onecancometoseetheneedtomodifyone’sownview,ortodevelopitinnewways,oratleasthowtopresentitinabetterfashionsoastobebetterunderstood.MoralmethodologyInhercontributiontothisvolume,EveBrowningColesignificantlyaddstomydiscussionofwarmakingphilosophybycommentingonitshistory,natureanddisadvantages,aswellasitsattractions.Unfortunately,thewarmaking,whichColelaments,dominatesnotonlyphilosophyandacademiagenerally,butalsothemedia,politics,andthepracticeoflaw.TherewasajokegoingaroundduringBillClinton’sfirstterminoffice.Thepresidentwentonafishingtripwithmembersofthepress.Aftertheirboatleftthedock,thepresidentrealizedhedidn’thavehistacklesohesteppedofftheboatandwalkedtoshore,pickeduphistackle,andwalkedbackoverthesurfaceofthewatertotheboat.Thenextday’sheadlineread“CLINTONCAN’TSWIM.”Thisjokepokesfunatthetendencyofthepresstogiveeverythinganegativeslant,toignoreaccomplishmentsandtofocusonfailures.Butthetendencyisthere.Ifweturnfromthemediatopolitics,wefind,atleastintheUS,asimilaremphasisonnegativityandconflictratherthanoncompromiseandgovernance.Forexample,SpeakerNewtGingrichopposedClinton’shealthcareplan,reasoningthatiftheDemocratssucceededinreformingthehealthcaresystem,theywouldthenbeunbeatable.Notsurprisingly,asimilarlymotivatedoppositiondefeatedGingrich’sownplanforrestructuringMedicareandMedicaid.Inthelaw,thereisthequestionofhowfaroneshouldgoindefenseofone’sclientortobuildorprosecuteacaseagainstsomeone.InalawsuitinCalifornia,onesiderequestedtaxreturnsfromtheotherside,whichobjectedongroundsofprivacy.TherefollowedayearandahalfofcostlylitigationgoingallthewayuptotheCaliforniaSupremeCourtandback.Intheend,thelawyerwascompelledtoproducethereturns,atwhichtimeherevealedwhathehadknownallalong—hisclienthadnoreturnsforthatyear.1Thelawyerhadjudgedthatthisdelayingactionwasintheinterestofhisclient.Ontheprosecutorialside,surelytheexcessesthatKennethStarrwenttoinordertobuildacaseagainstPresidentClinton,farremovedfromhisinitiallymandatedWhitewaterinvestigation,didnotservewelltheinterestsofAmericanpeopleinhavingagovernmentfocussedonsolvingtheirimportantpolitical,economicandsocialproblems.Whatthisshowsisthattheneedforpeacemakingextendsfarbeyondthesocialandpoliticalphilosophywithwhichweareprimarilyconcerned,butitsneedthereisclearlyevident.RationalityMyargumentfromrationalitytomoralityisacentralpartofmysocialandpoliticalphilosophy.IwasmotivatedtodeveloptheargumentbecauseIperceiveddifficultiesinearlierargumentsadvancedbyAlanGewirthandKurtBaier.Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,however,Gewirthclaimsthatmyfailuretorecognizethestrengthofhisparticularargumentisrootedinourdifferentaccountsofprudentialandmoralrights.ForGewirth,prudentialrightsaimtosupporttheinterestsoftheagentorspeaker,whereasmoralrightsaimtosupportortakefavorableaccountoftheinterestsofatleastsomepersonsotherthanthespeakerortheagent.Forme,prudentialrightsareasymmetricallyaction-guidinginthattheyareaction-guidingfortherightholderonlyandnotforothers,andsotheydonotimplythatothersoughtnottointerferewiththeexerciseofthoserights.Ialsothinkthattheserightsareanalogoustotheasymmetrical“oughts”foundinmostordinarycasesofcompetitivegames.Thusinfootballadefensiveplayermaythinkthattheopposingteam’squarterbackoughttopassonathirddownwithfiveyardstogo,whilenotwantingthequarterbacktodosoandindeedhopingtofoilanysuchattemptthequarterbackmakes.Bycontrast,moralrights,Iclaim,aresymmeticallyaction-guiding.ThusifIhaveamoralrighttomylife\nCONCLUSION225thenthatrightshouldguidebothmyactionsandtheactionsofothers,inparticular,itshouldleadothersnottounreasonablyinterferewithmylife.Gewirththinksthatthesetwoaccountsofmoralandprudentialrightsdonotcoincidebecause,onhisaccount,a(moral)rightmayguideaperson’sactionswiththeaimofsupportingbothhisowninterestsandtheinterestsofothers.Butthisistrueonmyaccountaswell.Thisisbecauseinclaimingthatmoralrightsaresymmeticallyaction-guiding,guidingbothoneselfandothers,Ineverheldthatthereasonswhytheyareaction-guidingforoneselfarealwaysjustself-interested.Forexample,Icanexercisemyrighttolife,andtypicallydo,forthebenefitofothersaswellasmyself.Nevertheless,itstillholdsthatmyrighttolife,unlikeprudentialrightsandtheoughtsofcompetitivegames,isaction-guidingforothersaswellasmyselfbecauseothershaveatleastaprimafaciedutynottointerferewithmylife.SocontrarytowhatGewirthclaims,ouraccountsofmoralandprudentialrightsdocoincideafterall.Now,Gewirththinkshisargumentfromrationalitytomoralityworksbecausewhenanagentuniversalizesaprudentialclaimthatsheought(prudentially)tohave—or(prudentially)hasarightto—freedomandwellbeing,andthusassertsthateveryoneoughttohave(orhasarightto)freedomandwell-being,theagentistherebycommittedto“upholdingtheinterestsofotherpersonsaswellasherself.”Butwhileanagent,throughuniversalization,doescertainlymakeaclaimaboutothersaswellasherself(theclaimclearlyreferstoeveryone),theclaimstilldoesnotcommittheagentto“upholdingtheinterestsofotherpersonsaswellasherself,”aslongastheoughtorrightintheuniversalizedclaimisinterpretedasasymmeticallyaction-guiding,inamanneranalogoustotheoughtsofcompetitivegames.Whatthisshowsisthatwhileconsistencyanduniversalizabilitydorequireanegoisttoadmit,atleasttoherself,thateveryoneelsehasthesamejustificationasshehasforbehavingegoistically,theydonotrequireher,inmyterms,toendorsesymmeticallyaction-guidingoughtsorrightsor,inGewirth’sterms,to“upholdtheinterestsofotherpersonsaswellasherself.”Butwhileconsistencyanduniversalizabilityalonecannotlogicallyrequiretheegoisttoendorsemorality,myargumentshowsthatwecanachievethatresultbyfullyutilizingastandardofnon-question-beggingness.2Withrespecttomyownargumentfromrationalitytomorality,Gewirthcorrectlyperceivesthatitrequiresanon-question-beggingwayofdeterminingbothwhatisinaperson’sself-interestandwhatisintheinterestsofothers,andanon-question-beggingwayofrankingtheseinterestsontheirrespectivescales,fromthemostimportanttotheleastimportantineachcase.Yetthepossibilityofdeterminingandrankingsuchinterestsontheirrespectivescalesinanon-question-beggingway,issomethingthatistakenforgrantedbythosewhothinkthategoismisthemostrationallydefensibleview—themainopponentsofmorality.Inaddition,Gewirthhimselfmustthinkthatthereisanon-question-beggingwaytodetermineandranksuchinterests,otherwisehecouldnotholdthatthereisanon-question-beggingwayofdefendingmoralityoveregoism,ashedoes.Sotheassumptionthatinanon-question-beggingwaywecandeterminewhatisinaperson’sself-interestandwhatisintheinterestsofothers,andranktheseinterestsontheirrespectivescales,isactuallysharedbybothGewirthandmyselfandbyotherdefendersofmorality,aswellasbyourmainopponents,thosewhothinkthategoismisrationallyrequired.Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,BernardGertconcedesthatmyargumentfromrationalitytomoralitymaywellsucceedasanargumentoftheoreticalreason,whichisconcernedwithtruebeliefs,validargumentsandacceptablemodesofargumentation,butheclaimsitfailsasanargumentofpracticalreason,whichisconcernedwithharmsandbenefits.ButitisunclearherehowwearesupposedtounderstandthisdistinctionthatGertmakesbetweentheoreticalandpracticalreason.Can’tthedefenderoftheoreticalreasonbeconcernedwiththosetruebeliefs,validargumentsandacceptablemodesofargumentationthatarealsoaboutharmsandbenefits?Andisn’tthedefenderofpracticalreasonconcernedwiththesame?Surely,thedefenderofpracticalreasondoesnotthinkthatfalsebeliefsaboutharmsandbenefitswillalwaysdojustaswellastrueones.Surely,ifoneisconcernedaboutharmsandbenefits,oneshouldbegenerallyconcernedtoascertainwhatistrueorfalseaboutthoseharmsandbenefits.Ofcourse,asGertpointsout,therearecaseswherewedon’twanttoknowcertaintruthsorcaseswhereknowingcertaintruthswillnotbegoodforustoknow,asinthecaseofOedipus.Butsurelythisdoesnotshowthattruebeliefs,validarguments,andacceptablemodesofargumentationarenotrelevanttoaconcernforharmsandbenefits.Itonlyshowsthatcertaintruebeliefs,validarguments,andacceptablemodesofargumentationmaygetinthewayofsecuringparticularbenefitsandavoidingparticularharms.Butwhichparticularharmsandbenefitsispracticalreason,asopposedtotheoreticalreason,primarilyconcernedwithaccordingtoGert?Theywouldseemtobethoseharmsandbenefitsthatallnormalpersonswouldeitherwanttoavoidortopursue.Theharmswouldbethoseofuncompensated-fordeath,non-trivialpain,lossofability,lossoffreedomorlossofpleasure,andthebenefitswouldbethenecessarymeansofavoidingtheseharms.Clearly,Gertwantstoemployanotionofrationalitysuchthatitwouldn’tmakesensetoask:WhyshouldIavoidactingirrationally?Accordingly,hedefinesirrationalactionintermsoffailingtoavoidthesebasicharms.Sounderstood,theirrationalpersonissimplycrazy,andsoitdoesn’tmakemuchsenseforanyoneofustoask:WhyshouldIavoidactinginacrazyfashion?Surely,actinginacrazyfashionisawayIshouldn’twanttoact.\n226JAMESP.STERBAOfcourse,wecanexplainwhysomepeopledo,infact,actinacrazyfashion.Wecan,forexample,provideabiologicalexplanationorpostulateachemicalimbalance.Yet,asGertrightlymaintains,heisconcernedwithjustificationnotexplanation,andsurelycrazypeoplecannotreallyjustifytheircrazyactions:thatis,inpart,whytheyarecrazy.Butcanegoistsjustifytheiregoisticbehavior?Canimmoralistsjustifytheirimmoralbehavior?Oddly,Gertseemsunconcernedwiththesefurtherquestionsofjustification.Havingestablishedthatthereisnojustificationforactinginacrazyfashion,despitethefactthatsomepeopledoactinthatway,Gertdoesnotpursuewhethertheremightalsobenojustification,ornoadequatejustification,forpeople’sactingsimplyegoisticallyoractingimmorally,althoughclearlysomepeopleactinthesewaysaswell.Ofcourse,pursuingthesebroaderquestionsofjustificationmightrequireustobemoreconcernedwithdeterminingtruebeliefsandusingvalidargumentsandacceptablemodesofargumentation,theconcernsthatGerthaslinkedtotheoreticalreasonratherthantopracticalreason.Nevertheless,ifoneisconcernedwiththequestionsofjustification,asGertclearlyis,itwouldseemthatoneshouldalsobeinterestedintheseso-calledtheoreticalconcerns,whichinthiscontextIwouldjudgetobeeminentlypracticalaswell.GertgoesontoarguethatevenifGewirthandIweresuccessfulinansweringourbroaderquestionsofjustification,thatis,evenifGewirthhadsucceededinshowingthatimmoralpeopleactinconsistentlyorIhadsucceededinshowingthattheybegthequestion,wewouldnothaveprovidedanswersoftherightsort.Now,inJusticeforHereandNowIrespondedtoasimilarobjectionraisedbyReiman.3Reimanhadobjectedthatajustificationofmorality,likemyown,doesnotsucceedeveninitsownterms,thatis,itdoesnotsucceedinjustifyingmorality.AccordingtoReiman,avoidinginconsistency(asinGewirth’sjustification)oravoidingquestion-beggingness(asinmine)areonlylogicalrequirements,whereastheoffenseofbeingimmoralissomethingmorethanalogicaloffense.Reimanclaimsthatajustificationofmorality,likemyown,onlysucceedsinshowingthattheegoistorimmoralistisguiltyofalogicalmistake,andthatisnotenough.Reimanasksustoimagineamurdererwhosays,“Yes,I’vebeeninconsistent(orbeggedthequestion)butthatisallI’vedone.”Reimanclaimsthatmoralityrequiressomethingmore,itrequiresthatwerecognizetherealityofotherpeople,andimmoralitydeniesthatreality.4ButnoticethatifReiman’sviewofmoralityweresound,egoistsandimmoralists,bydenyingtherealityofotherpeople,wouldbesolipsists,butclearlytheyarenot.5Nevertheless,thereissomethingtoReiman’sobjection.Puttingadefenseofmoralityintermsofanon-question-beggingcompromisebetweenrelevantself-interestedandaltruisticreasonsforactioncanobscurethefactthatwhatisatstakeistheprohibitionoftheinflictionofbasicharmonothersforthesakeofnonbasicbenefittooneself,giventhattheinflictionofsuchharmiswhategoismwouldrequire.Thuswhatneedstobemadeclearisthatthefailuretobemoralinvolvesbothalogicalandamaterialmistake.Thelogicalmistakeisthatofbeggingthequestionoractingcontrarytoreason.Thematerialmistakeistheinflictionofbasicharmforthesakeofnonbasicbenefit.Bothofthesemistakescharacterizeanyfailuretobemoral,andtheymutuallyentaileachother.6Theyaresimplytwodifferentaspectsofthesameact.ButdoesthisresponsetoReimansufficeasareplytoGert?Whatifpeopleclaimnottobemovedbythefactthattheirimmoralactionsinvolvedinflictingbasicharmonothersforthesakeofnonbasicbenefittothemselves?Clearly,thetaskofjustifyingmoralitytoeveryoneisnotthesameasthetaskofprovidingeveryonewithsufficientmotivationtobemoral.Accordingly,successwithrespecttotheformertaskshouldnotbejudgedbywhetherornotonehassucceededwithrespecttothelatter.Afterall,Gerthimselfclaimstohavethecorrectanswertothequestionwhyweshouldnotactirrationally,eventhoughheallowsthathisanswerwillnotsucceedinmotivatingeveryonetoactrationally.WhatIhavebeentryingtoshowisthatmoralityisjustifiedoveregoismandpurealtruism.Ididnothope,norwoulditbereasonableformetoexpect,thatIwouldsucceedinprovidingeveryonewithasufficientmotivationtobemoral.Gert,however,hasstillotherobjectionstomyjustificationformorality.Henotesthatmyargumentformoralityisdirectedattheegoistandthepurealtruist,orratherthatitisdirectedatourselvesinsofaraswearecapableofbehavingegoisticallyoraltruistically.Gerthasnoproblemwithmydirectingmyargumentformoralityattheegoist,orratheratourselvesinsofaraswearecapableofbehavingegoisticallyorself-interestedly,buthethinksthatitisinappropriateformetodirectmyargumentatthepurealtruist,orpossiblyevenatourselvesinsofaraswearecapableofbehavingaltruistically.Whydoeshethinkthis?Gertsays:“AnyonewhochooseshisowntotalruintopreventtheleastuneasinesstoanIndian,orpersonwhollyunknowntohim,contrarytoHume,isactingirrationally.”Butsurelyevenapurealtruistwouldagreethatthissortofbehaviorwasirrationalbecauseitiscertainlyapooruseofone’spersonalresourcesintheserviceofothers.Ofcourse,purealtruistswouldbewillingtosacrificethemselvesforothersfarbeyondwhatmanyofusthinkisappropriate.Yetsotoowouldegoistsbewillingtosacrificeothersforthesakeofsomesmallbenefittothemselvesfarbeyondwhatmanyofusthinkisappropriate.Egoismandpurealtruismare,afterall,mirrorimagesofeachother,andforthatreasontheegoistcannotdisregardthepurealtruist’sperspectivewithoutbeggingthequestion.Furthermore,Ihavearguedthatonceegoismandpurealtruismarelookedatfromanon-question-beggingstandpoint,itturnsoutthatitisneitherofthesetwoperspectives,butrathertheperspectiveofmorality,understoodasanonarbitrarycompromisebetweenegoismandpurealtruism,thatemergesastherationallypreferablealternative.7\nCONCLUSION227Apartfrommyargumentforthejustificationofmorality,Gertalsohassomedifficultieswithmyaccountofmoralityasacompromisebetweenegoismandaltruism,requiringhigh-rankingself-interestedreasonsoverlow-rankingaltruisticreasons,andhigh-rankingaltruisticreasonsoverlow-rankingself-interestedreasons.Inparticular,Gertfindsitdifficulttoreadofffromthisaccountofmoralitywhatwewouldberequiredtodoincertaintroublesomecases.Yetanaccountofmoralitythatisusefulforsomepurposesmaynotbeusefulforothers,andtheaccountofmoralityIhavedefendedwasnotintendedtobeusefulasadecision-procedureforchurningouttheparticularrequirementsofmorality.IfIhadthoughtthatmyaccountwasusefulasadecision-procedure,Iwouldnothavegoneon,insubsequentchaptersofthebook,toevaluateparticularmoralandpoliticalidealssuchaslibertarianism,welfareliberalism,socialism,feminismandmulticulturalism,inordertoarriveatparticularmoralrequirements.Rather,Iwouldhavesimplyusedmyaccountofmoralityasacompromisebetweenself-interestedandaltruisticreasonstochurnoutthoserequirements.Instead,insubsequentchaptersofJusticeforHereandNow,Ihavearguednotfrom“moralityascompromise”butfromaminimallibertarianmorality,claimingthatthismoralityrequiresrightstowelfareandequalopportunitythatleadtosocialistequalityandfeministandrogyny,andIhavefurtherarguedthatthisconceptionofmoralityrequiresracialjustice,homosexualjusticeandmulticulturaljustice,andisconstrainedbyspecificprinciplesofenvironmentaljusticeandjustwarpacifism.AsIseeit,moralityascompromiseis,forthemostpart,ausefulwayofthinkingaboutmoralityforthepurposesofshowingthatmoralityisrationallypreferabletobothegoismandpurealtruism.Idon’tthinktheaccountisusefulforotherpurposessuchasderivingparticularmoralrequirements,especiallyfortroublesomecases.Ofcourse,oncewehavereachedaresolutionconcerningwhatismorallyrequiredinatroublesomecase,itshouldnormallybepossibletoreadthatresolutionbackintomyaccountofmoralitybyshowingthattheresolutionimpliesthatsomeparticularaltruisticreasonrankshigherthansomeparticularself-interestedreason,orvice-versa.AndIhavedonethisforanumberofcasesthatGerthasdiscussed.Gert’ssuggestionherethatmyaccountofmoralitymakes“nodistinctionbetweenhurtingsomeonetoavoidalesserharmtooneselfandnothelpingsomeonebecausedoingsowouldresultinharmtooneself,eventhoughitisalesserharm,”ignoresmydefenseoftheintended/foreseendistinctioninchapter7ofJusticeforHereandNow,whichinturncanbereadbackintomyaccountofmoralityascompromise.LibertarianismAccordingtoTiborMachan,libertarianjustice“consistsinestablishingandmaintainingapoliticalsysteminwhichtherespectandprotectionoftherighttolife,libertyandpropertyofthehumanindividualareofprimarylegalsignificance.”Withthis,Iaminfullagreement.WhereMachanandIdisagreeishowtheserightsaretobeinterpretedasnegativerightsofnoninterference.Ihavearguedthatwhentheserightsareinterpretedinthemostmorallydefensibleway,theyleadtoarighttowelfareandarighttoequalopportunity.Inhiscontribution,Machandeniesthatarighttowelfareandarighttoequalopportunitycanbesoderivedonthegroundsthat“thereisnojustificationforevenagoodpersontodepriveanotherfromwhatbelongstoanothermerelybecausehemayneedsustenance.”But,infact,arighttowelfareandarighttoequalopportunitydonotviolateMachan’srestriction;theydonotrequireustoregardaneedforsustenanceasoverridingpropertyrights.Rather,theserightsarebasedonthemoralsuperiorityofthenegativelibertyofthepooroverthenegativelibertyoftherichwhich,inturn,rulesoutthepossibilityoftherebeinganyconflictingpropertyrights.8Machangoesontoarguethatbydenyingthepoorarighttowelfaretherichwouldnotbedoingviolencetothem(thatis,unjustlyinterferingwiththem),becausethepoorwouldstillbeinneediftherichdidnotexist.But,ofcourse,thisisnottrueforjustanyparticulargroupofrichpeople.Aparticulargroupofrichpeople’shoardingofresourcesmaybeexactlywhyotherpeoplearepoor.Moreover,consideracasewheretheclaimholds.SupposeyouandIwouldstillbeveryneedyevenifcertainrichpeopledidnotexist.Doesthisshowthatwedonothavearightnottobeinterferedwithintakingfromthesurplusresourcesofthosesamerichpeoplewhentheydoexist?SupposeyouandIaredrowninginapond.Evenwhenothersdidnotcauseourplight,theymaystillberequirednottointerferewithourattemptstosaveourselves,evenwhentheseattemptsinvolveusingtheirsurplusresources.Machanthinksthatcaseswherethepoorareinneedthroughnofaultoftheirownarequiterareandsolawsarenotrequiredtodealwiththem.ButIhavearguedthatevenintheUS,andcertainlyintheThirdWorld,therearelargenumbersofpeople,particularlychildren,whoareneedythroughnofaultoftheirown.Machanclaimsthattheremaybeotherwaystomeettheneedsofthepoor,forexample,byobtainingwealthfromthepunishmentofrichcitizensorfromresourcesnotownedbyanyone.ItstandstoreasonthatIamallinfavorofutilizingthesemeansformeetingtheneedsofthepoor.Ijustdon’tseehowthesemeanswillsufficetomeetthebasicneedsofallthosewhoarepoorwithoutalsohavingrecoursetoarighttowelfareandarighttoequalopportunity.Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,JanNarvesonmaintainshislibertarianviewrestsonthe“generalrighttodoaswewill,providedonlywedonotinvadeorworsenothers.”Thismeans,Narvesonelaborates,“thateachindividualuponwhomourbehaviorimpingesmustbesuchthat,onbalance,shereckonsherselftobenoworseoffforourimpingement.”WhatNarvesonfailstosee,however,isthathisownview,ifitfavorsanythingatall,favorsthelibertyofthepoorovertheliberty\n228JAMESP.STERBAoftherich.Toseethis,consideratypicalconflictsituationbetweentherichandthepoor.Inthissituationtherich,ofcourse,havemorethanenoughresourcestosatisfytheirbasicneeds.Bycontrast,thepoorlacktheresourcestomeettheirmostbasicneeds,eventhoughtheyhavetriedallthemeansavailabletothemthatlibertariansregardaslegitimateforacquiringsuchresources.Now,inthissituationthereisaconflictbetweenthelibertyofthepoornottobeinterferedwithintakingfromthesurpluspossessionsoftherichwhatisnecessarytosatisfytheirbasicneeds,andthelibertyoftherichnottobeinterferedwithinusingtheirsurplusresourcesforluxurypurposes.Ifwefavoroneliberty,wemustrejecttheother.Moreover,ifwefavorthelibertyoftherichoverthelibertyofthepoor,thenthepoorwouldbeclearlyworseoffasaconsequence.Likewise,ifwefavorthelibertyofthepooroverthelibertyoftherichthentherichwouldbeclearlyworseoffasaconsequence.Consequently,Narvesonshouldadmiteitherthathisownviewhasnoresolutionatallinthesetypicalconflictsituations,orthatitfavorsthelibertyofthepooroverthelibertyoftherichbecauseonlythatresolutionprovidesforthebasicneedsofthedeservingpoor,doesnotviolatethe“Ought”Implies“Can”Principle,andisreasonableforallpartiestoaccept.NarvesonpointsoutthatpersonslivingbelowthepovertylineintheUnitedStates(astandardwhichisbasedonafoodplanthatwasdevelopedfor“temporaryoremergencyuse”andisinadequateforapermanentdiet)haveamonetaryincomethatisquitehigh—infact,manytimesthemedianincomeofpeopleinThirdWorldcountries.Ofcourse,whatNarvesonignoreshereisthatthecostsofmeetingbasicneedscanvarybetweendifferentsocietiesandwithinthesamesocietyatdifferenttimes.Thisisduetothewaythatthemeansmostreadilyavailableforsatisfyingbasicneedsareproduced.Forexample,inmoreaffluentsocieties,themostreadilyavailablemeansforsatisfyingaperson’sbasicneedsareusuallyprocessedsoastosatisfynonbasicneedsatthesametimeastheysatisfybasicneeds.Thisprocessingiscarriedouttomakethemeansmoreattractivetopersonsinhigherincomebracketswhocaneasilyaffordtheextracost.Asaresult,themostreadilyavailablemeansforsatisfyingbasicneedsaremuchmorecostlyinmoreaffluentsocietiesthaninlessaffluentsocieties,thusrequiringahigherwelfareminimuminmoreaffluentsocietiesthaninlessaffluentsocieties.Overtime,however,thiscanandshouldbechanged,asmoreandmoreefficientwaysofmeetingpeople’sbasicneedsworldwidearedeveloped.9CitingdataabouthowtheAmericanpoorfarewithrespecttothenumberofpersonsperroom(.56)andwithrespecttothenumberwholackindoorflushtoilets(1.8%),Narvesonsuggeststhat“theAmericanpoorareinfactbetteroffintheusual‘material’termsasagroupthanthecitizenryasawholein(some)other…front-linecountries,nottomentionthoseintheSecondandThirdWorlds.”Unfortunately,thereareotherdatawhichIthinksuggestalessrosypicture.10Forexample,22.4%ofchildrenlivebelowthepovertylineintheUSascomparedto4.9%inGermany,5%inSweden,and7.8%inSwitzerland,andtheUSshareswithItalythehighestinfantmortalityrateofthemajorindustrializednations.TheUSalsorankssixty-seventhamongallnationsinthepercentageofnationalincomereceivedbythepoorest20%ofitspopulation,rankingittheabsolutelowestamongindustrializednations.11Narvesonalsoclaims,citingCharlesMurray,thatthepoorintheUSandCanadawouldhavebeenbetteroffifthewelfarestatehadneverexisted.AccordingtoMurray,Basicindicatorsofwell-beingtookaturnfortheworseinthe1960s,mostconsistentlyandmostdrasticallyforthepoor….Wetriedtoprovidemoreforthepoorandproducedmorepoorinstead.Wetriedtoremovethebarrierstoescapefrompoverty,andinadvertentlybuiltatrap.12YetwhileMurray’sworkhasbeenwidelyhailedincertainquarters,criticshavearguedthattherelevantdatadonotsupporthisargument.Forexample,MichaelHarringtonpointsoutthatwhileblackmalelaborforceparticipationdiddrop7%between1969and1981(thusfittingnicelywithMurray’sthesisthatwelfareprogramsarethevillain)therewasadropof7.4%between1955and1968.13Sothedropinemploymentwasactuallygreaterbeforewelfareprogramscameonlinethanitwasafter,justtheoppositeofwhatMurray’sthesiswouldleadustoexpect.Orconsiderblackwomen.Supposedly,theyareevenmoreexposedthanmentothesupposedworkdisincentivesofwelfareprograms,sinceasmotherstheycouldhavequalifiedforAidtoFamiliesofDependentChildren.But,asHarringtonshows,theirlaborforceparticipationrateincreasedbetween1955and1981by7.5%,andmorethanhalfofthatprogressoccurredafter1968.Andonthequestionofwhetherwelfareprogramsdidanygood,ChristopherJencksclaimsthattherelevantdatatellastorythatisquitedifferentfromtheoneMurraytellsinLosingGround.Hewrites:First,contrarytowhatMurrayclaims,“net”povertydeclinedalmostasfastafter1965asithadbefore.Second,thedeclineinpovertyafter1965,unlikethedeclinebefore1965,occurreddespiteunfavorableeconomicconditions,anddependedtoagreatextentongovernmenteffortstohelpthepoor.Third,thegroupsthatbenefitedfromthis“generousrevolution,”asMurrayrightlycallsit,werepreciselythegroupsthatlegislatorshopedwouldbenefit,notablytheagedandthedisabled.Thegroupsthatdidnotbenefitweretheonesthatlegislatorsdidnotespeciallywanttohelp.Fourth,theseimprovementstookplacedespitedemographicchangesthatwouldordinarilyhavemadethingsworse.Giventhe\nCONCLUSION229difficulties,legislatorsshould,Ithink,lookbackontheireffortstoimprovethematerialconditionsofpoorpeople’sliveswithsomepride.14Somuchthenfortheclaimthatthepoor,atleastintheUS,wouldhavebeenbetteroffifthewelfarestatehadneverexisted.NarvesonalsocitesPaulKrugmanwithrespecttothebenefitsthatinternationalcapitalismhasbroughttopoorpeopleinThirdWorldcountrieslikeIndonesiaandthroughoutthePacificRim.However,Krugmanhimselfnotesthatfortwentyyearsinternationalcapitalismdidverylittleforthesecountries,keepingthemasexportersofrawmaterialsandimportersofmanufactures.Onlyrecently,throughacombinationoffactors,haveindustriesbeenwillingtotakeadvantageofverylowwagesinthesecountries(sixtycentsanhour),and,asaconsequence,theyhaveimprovedsomewhatthesituationofthepoorinthesecountries.15Nevertheless,thesituationofthepoorwouldclearlybeimprovedmuchmoreifNarvesonandothersweretorecognizethatwhatIhavearguedisthelogicalconsequenceofhisownlibertarianmoralview—abasicneedsminimumguaranteedtoallthosewhoarewillingtotakeadvantageofwhateveropportunitiesareavailabletothemtoengageinmutuallybeneficialwork.WelfareliberalismInhercontributiontothisvolume,EvaKittaydistinguishesthreedifferentkindsofwelfare:astingywelfarethatonlykeepsthepoorfromstarvingandfromotherlife-threateningills,anexpansivewelfarethatprovidesthesocialgoodsnecessaryforagoodlife,andacaringwelfarethatmakespossiblethesurvivalandthrivingofdependentpersons,frequentlybyprovidingforthosewho,inturn,provideforthedependentpersonsthemselves.Sherightlyarguesthatamorallydefensiblewelfareliberalidealwouldnotstopateitherastingywelfareorevenanexpansivewelfare,butwouldhavetoincludeacaringwelfareaswell.Shefurtherarguesthatfromthelibertarian’sidealofnegativelibertyonecanonlysucceedinderivingastingywelfare,andnottheexpansivewelfareorthecaringwelfarethatarealsoneeded.OnewaytosupportsomethinglikeKittay’sviewherebutonlibertarianpremises(obviouslynottheapproachthatKittayherselftakes)istopointoutthatnooneis,infact,interferingwithmanyofthosewhoaredependentorareseverelyinneed.Rather,peoplejustseemtobesimplyleavingthemalone,ignoringthem.Howthencouldthisbeinviolationofthelibertarianidealofnoninterference?InJusticeforHereandNow,however,Irecognizedthattherewillbecasesinwhichthepoorfailtosatisfytheirbasicneeds,notbecauseofanydirectrestrictionoflibertyonthepartoftherich,butbecausethepoorareinsuchdireneedthattheyareunableeventoattempttotakefromtherichwhattheyrequiretomeettheirbasicneeds.Insuchcases,therichwouldnotbeperforminganyactofcommissionthatwouldpreventthepoorfromtakingwhattheyrequire.Yeteveninsuchcases,Iarguedthattherichwouldnormallybeperformingactsofcommissionthatwouldpreventotherpersonsfromtakingpartoftherich’sownsurpluspossessionsandusingittoaidthepoor.Andwhenassessedfromamoralpointofview,restrictingthelibertyofthesealliesoragentsofthepoorwouldnotbemorallyjustifiedfortheverysamereasonthatrestrictingthelibertyofthepoortomeettheirownbasicneedswouldnotbemorallyjustified:itwouldnotbereasonabletorequireallofthoseaffectedtoacceptsucharestrictionofliberty.SoIthinkthatitispossibleinthiswaytoderivenotonlyastingywelfare,butalsoanexpansiveandacaringwelfarefromthelibertarian’sidealofnegativeliberty.Kittayalsothinksthatsincetherichwillbeprovidingwelfare,toothersandnotthemselves,theywilltendtobestingyindeterminingtheamountofwelfaretobeprovided.Thatiswhyshewantstopayboththerichandthepoorfordoingdependencywork,toinsurethatthestipendsforeveryonewillbesufficientlygenerous.Butinmyargumentfromlibertytoequality,thereisanotherconsiderationthathasasimilareffect.Itisthefactthattheprovisionofanadequatewelfaretoallthoseinneedleadstoequality.Kittaynotesthisfeatureofmyview,butshedoesn’tappreciateitssignificance.16Iftheprovisionofwelfareleadstoequality,however,thentherich,orshouldwesaythosewhostartoutrich,havegoodreasontowantthewelfareminimumtobeanadequateone,becausethatwelfareminimumwillbeallthattheyareallowedtokeepforthemselves.SoifIamrightthatthelibertarianidealoflibertyleadstoequality,asKittayseemstogrant,thenitshouldleadtothekindofwelfarethatKittayfavors.Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,JohnDeigh,drawingonthereformliberalismofT.H.Green,raisesaninterestingchallengetocontemporarywelfareliberalism.Contemporarywelfareliberals,likeJohnRawls,havesoughttodefendtheirpoliticalagendabyappealingtobothlibertyandequality,ineffectdefendingacompromisebetweenthetwoideals.Theproblemwiththisdefenseofwelfareliberalismisthatitcanleavethedefendersofeitheridealunsatisfied.Whyshouldonesacrificeone’sultimatepoliticalidealforthesakeofanidealthatonedoesnotrecognize,oratleastdoesnotrecognizeashavingpriorityoverone’sfavoredideal?Orincontemporaryterms,whyshouldlibertarianssacrificetheiridealoflibertywhenitcomesintoconflictwiththeidealofequalityendorsedbywelfareliberals?JohnDeighthinksthatthatreformliberalssuchasT.H.Greenhaveapersuasiveanswertothisquestionthathasbeenneglectedbycontemporarywelfareliberals.Theansweristhattheidealoflibertyitself,whencorrectlyunderstood,requires\n230JAMESP.STERBAtheequalityendorsedbywelfareliberals.Ofcourse,thatismyviewaswell,althoughmyargumentisquitedifferentfromGreen’s.Greenarguesthatthemostadequatenotionoflibertyhasbothpositiveandnegativedimensions.Onthisview,libertyisnotsimplyanidealofnoninterference;itisalsoapositiveidealwhichprovidesthecapacitytoactinpursuitofmorallyandsociallyworthyends.17AccordingtoGreen,personsarenotfreeiftheiractionsproceedfromchoicesmadeunderconditionsofpovertyorignorancewhichresultfromthenecessityofhavingtoselltheirlaborforwhateverwagesareofferedbyownersofcapital.Whentheidealoflibertyissounderstood,italonesufficestojustifytheinstitutionsofawelfarestate.Thusthereisnoneedtopittheidealoflibertyagainsttheidealofequalitytojustifythewelfarestate;libertybyitselfwilldothejob.ButwhileGreen’sidealoflibertydoesprovideasurejustificationforthewelfarestate,contemporarylibertarians,likeTiborMachanandJanNarveson,haveyettoendorseitspositivedimension,becausewhilecontemporarylibertariansgrantthatpovertyandignorancearebadthings,theystillmaintainthatlibertyasnoninterferenceistheonlyidealthatthestatecancoercivelysupport.ThisiswheremylibertytowelfareargumenthasanadvantageoverGreen’sbecauseitutilizesonlyastrictlynegativelibertyidealofnoninterference.ThewaymyargumentproceedsisbyshowingthatinvirtuallyallthosesituationswhereGreenwouldseealackofpositiveliberty,thereisalsoalackofnegativeliberty,ornoninterference,and,moreover,thelackofpositivelibertyis,infact,duetothelackofnegativeliberty.Forexample,considerwhereverpeoplearoundtheworldarelivinginconditionsofpoverty.Surely,theseconditionswouldnotobtainexceptfortheenforcementofthepropertyrightsoftherichandthepowerfulhereandelsewhere.Absentthisinterference,eitherthepoorthemselveswouldbeabletoremedytheircondition,orotherpeople,concernedaboutthewelfareofthepoor,wouldbeabletousetheresourcesoftherichandpowerfultoremedyit.Thiscouldbedoneeitherbyarrangingimmediatetransfersintheparticularsocietywherethepovertyexistsorbyarrangingtransfersfromothersocietiesworldwide.Inthisway,Iarguethatevenaccordingtoastrictlynegativeidealofliberty,thelibertyofthepoortrumpsthelibertyoftherichandpowerful,andtherebysupportstherequirementsofawelfarestate.Ofcourse,IhavenoobjectiontoDeigh’sappropriationofGreen’sidealofpositivelibertytodefendthosesamerequirements.Infact,IwelcomeDeigh’sdefense.ItisjustthatIthinkmyapproachwillbemoresuccessfulinwinningoverourlibertarianopponents.VirtueethicsandcommunityRobertC.Solomoninhiscontributiontothisvolumeprovidesanaccountofjusticeasavirtue.HewantshisaccounttobeAristotelian,butanaccountthatisstillconsiderablydifferentfromthehistoricalAristotle.Thevirtueofjusticeisforhimboth“personalandsocialinsofarastheindividualisdefinedandconstitutedbytheirroleandrelationshipsinthecommunityandwithotherpeople.”Hedefends,asaformofrelativism,theviewthatweshouldlookatdisputes,suchasthedisputeconcerninghumanrightsinChina,withoutthinkingthatonesidemustberightandtheotherwrong.Thisseemstobeaperfectlysensiblepositiontotakesinceitmaybethattherightviewrequirescombiningelementsfromperspectivesthatare,infact,opposed.Fortunately,thisisnotwhatpeopleusuallyobjecttowhentheyobjecttorelativism.Solomonalsopointsoutthatpeople’sjudgmentsofwhatisjustchangeovertime,butthisisalsosomethingwithwhichpeoplegenerallyagree.Solomonquestionsmyfocusonconflictsbetweenmoralityandself-interestbecausehethinksthatinthecasesthatcountmostindiscussionsofsocialjustice,thereisabreakdownoftheoppositionbetweenmoralityandself-interest.Asexamplesofsuchabreakdown,hecitesTedTurner’s,andhisownpresumablymixedreasons,formakingsubstantialbequeststogoodcauses.Yetaretheseexamplesreallytypicalofthecaseswherejusticemakesdemandsonus?Isn’titfarmorelikelyforjusticeormoralitytomakedemandsonusthatconflictwithourself-interestatleasttosomedegree?Inanycase,itisonlywheretherearesuchconflictsthatweneedajustificationforactingmorallyratherthanself-interestedly.AnditisforjustsuchcasesthatIhavetriedtoshowthatrationalityunderstoodasnon-question-beggingnessdoesfavormoralityoverself-interest.ItisjustherethatSolomonwantstoraiseafurtherquestion:Whyacceptastandardofnon-question-beggingness?Tothisquestion,Icould,ofcourse,replythatthestandardofnon-question-beggingnessisrequiredforgoodargumentation.ButwhatifSolomonweretopersistandask:Whydoyouwanttogivegoodargumentsforyourviews?Atthatpoint,Ithinkourdiscussionwouldhavetocometoanend.ThisisbecauseSolomonwouldthenbechallengingthebasicpresuppositionofourdiscussion,whichisthatweweretryingtoreachagreementthroughanappealtogoodarguments.Withoutthatpresupposition,wewouldjustbeplayingverbalgames.Inowturntoamorepracticalquestion.Canonebemorallyjustifiedinengagingincriminaldisobedienceagainstfellowmembersofone’scommunity?ThisisthequestiononwhichMichaelBoylanfocusesinhiscontributiontothisvolume,drawinguponanddevelopinganexamplethatIdiscussinthelastchapterofJusticeforHereandNow.\nCONCLUSION231BoylanoffersthreeinterpretationsofmyexampleofGretchen,whocommitsacriminallydisobedientacttosecurecertaingoodsthatsheisdenied.Inthefirstinterpretation,thegoodsthatGretchenisdeniedarebasicnecessitiesoflife.Inthesecondinterpretation,theyarenecessaryforhertocompeteinhersociety.Inthethirdinterpretation,theyareluxurygoodsthatshehasnotbeenabletoearn.Now,asIunderstoodtheexample,itaccordswiththefirsttwoofBoylan’sinterpretations.And,withrespecttothesetwointerpretations,BoylanandIagreethatGretchenwouldbemorallyjustifiedinengagingincriminaldisobedienceprovidedcertainconditionsaremet.18Withrespecttothethirdinterpretation,however,Boylanarguesthatifagreed-uponcommunitypracticesresultinGretchennotsecuringcertainluxurygoods,shewouldnotbemorallyjustifiedinengagingincriminaldisobediencetosecuresuchgoods.AlthoughthisisnotaninterpretationoftheexamplethatIhaveconsideredbefore,IamincompleteagreementwithBoylan’saccountofit.Inthisrespect,BoylanandIarebothcommunitarians.SocialismInhiscontributiontothisvolume,KaiNielsenprovidesaveryusefuldiscussionofvariousformsofsocialism,distinguishingtheanalyticalMarxistformofsocialismwhichhefavors.NielsenalsocommentsonthesocialistequalitywhichIclaimtoderivefromlibertarianpremises.19WhilethesocialistequalitythatIdefendaimstomeeteveryone’sbasicneeds,thesocialismthatNielsendefendsaimstomeetnotonlypeople’sbasicneeds,butalltheirneedsandalltheirwantstooinsofarasthesecanbepossiblysatisfied.ButIreallydon’tthinkthatNielsenwantstosatisfyalltheneedsthatpeoplemighthave.Forexample,hesurelywouldnotwanttosatisfyarobber’sneedforagun.Moreover,oncedistantpeopleandfuturegenerationsaretakenintoaccount,Iarguethatitisnotclearthatwecandoanythingmorethandirectlymeeteveryone’sbasicneeds,interpretedinafairlysubstantialway.Thisis,infact,howmydefenseofabasicneedsminimumleadstoequality.AccordingtoNielsen,toachieveajustworldwemustreplacecapitalismwithsocialism,butinmyearlierbook,HowtoMakePeopleJust,Iarguedthatasuitablyconstrainedcapitalismwillbepracticallyindistinguishablefromamorallydefensiblesocialism.Attheveryendofhisessay,NielsenlamentsthatIhavenotdonemoretopreparethewayforarevolutionaryfuture.ButifIhavesucceededinshowingthatrationalityleadstomoralityandthateventhemostminimalmorality,libertarianism,leadstotheequalitythatsocialistsdefend,thenIwouldhavesucceededinshowingthatarevolutionarysocialistfutureisbuiltintothenormsthatvirtuallyeveryoneendorses.Surely,thatshouldmakeitsomewhateasiertobegintorealizethatrevolutionarysocialistfutureevennowfromwithinpresent-daycapitalism.Inhercontributiontothisvolume,CarolGoulddefendsaformofsocialistequalitywhichshecallsdemocraticegalitarianism,byderivingitfromanidealofpositiveliberty.Shegoesontochallengemyownattempttodefendasimilarformofsocialistequalitybyderivingitfromanidealofnegativeliberty.ShearguesthatthebasicneedsminimumwhichIderivefromthelibertarian’sidealofnegativelibertydoesnotsupportarighttodemocraticdecision-makingorarighttoparticipateincontrollingtheproductiveprocess.ButinearlierpublishedworkwithwhichGouldisunfortunatelyunfamiliar,Iarguethattheserightsareincludedinmyunderstandingofabasicneedsminimum.20Gouldalsoclaimsthatmyargumentfromlibertytoequalitymustbe“tacitlyappealingtoaprincipleofpositiveliberty”ifitistogettosocialistequality.Thisisaplausibleclaimtomakeaboutmyview,atleastatfirstblush,butifyouthenlookattheconsiderablenumberoflibertarianresponsestomyargumentthathavebeenpublishedovertheyears,youfindthatnotonelibertarianhaseverraisedthisobjectiontomyargument,andsurelylibertarianswouldbethefirsttoraisethisobjectiontomyargumentiftherewereanygroundsfordoingso.21Attheveryendofheressay,Gouldarguesthatweneedtoconsidertheactualwaysocialandeconomicinstitutions,includingnation-statesandinternationalorganizations,functionifwearegoingtosucceedinadequatelyrealizingrightstowelfareandequalopportunity.HereGouldandIareincompleteagreement.Moreover,theneedtoexamineactualinstitutions,particularlynation-statesandinternationalorganizations,makingspecificrecommendationsforchangewillbeevenmoreappropriateifIhavesucceededinshowingthatrationalityleadstomoralityandthateventhemostminimalmorality,libertarianism,leadstotheequalitythatsocialistsdefend,becausewhenspecificrecommendationsaresogroundedinsuchaview,itwillbevirtuallyimpossibletorationallyopposethem.22FeminismInhercontributiontothisvolume,AlisonJaggarprovidesanexcellentdiscussionoftheobjectsofjusticefromafeministstandpoint.Inseveralplacesthroughoutherdiscussionshecitesmyworkapprovingly,notingthatshehasverylittletodisagreewithinrespecttothepolicyimplicationsofmyview.Whereshedoesdisagree,asdoesRosemarieTonginhercontributiontothisbook,iswithrespecttomydefenseofanidealofandrogynyasafeministideal.Theidealofandrogyny,asIdefineit,requiresthatthetraitsthataretrulydesirableinsocietybeequallyopentobothwomenandmenor,inthecaseofvirtues,beequallyexpectedofbothwomenandmen.\n232JAMESP.STERBAActually,thisdebatethatIhavebeenhavingwithJaggarandTonghasextendedovertenyears!23SoitisalittledifficulttoknowwhatIamsupposedtosayordoatthispoint.AsIhaveindicated,verylittleisatstakeinthisdebateatthepracticallevel.Weallthreearefeministswhosharemuchthesamepracticalagenda.Sowhatarewedisagreeingabout?AtthemostbasiclevelitconcernswhetherIandotherfeministsshouldendorseanidealofandrogynyasIhavecharacterizedit.SomeotherfeministswhohavesimilarlyendorsedthisidealareClaudiaCard,MarilynFriedman,CarolGould,MarthaNussbaum,andMaryAnneWarren.24Note,too,thatphilosopherswhoendorsetheidealarenotclaimingthatallotherfeministsmustalsoendorsethisideal,noraretheyclaimingthatthisistheonlywaytoconceiveoffeministjustice.Rather,whatisbeingclaimedissimplythatthiswayofconceivingoffeministjusticecanbeeasilylinkedtoothersocialandpoliticalideals,likeequalopportunity,welfareliberaljustice,andsocialistjustice.What,then,aretheobjectionstoconceivingoffeministjusticeinthisway?BothJaggarandTonghavequiteafew.Jaggarthinksthatanegativedefinitionoffeministjusticeassimplyacommitmenttoendingwomen’ssubordinationwouldbeeasierformanypeopletoaccept.Butifweweretoabidebyasimilarconsiderationelsewhereinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy,verylittlewouldgetdone.Muchofsocialandpoliticalphilosophyattemptstomovepeoplebeyondwheretheyalreadyare,withtheexpectationthatchangewillnotoccurovernight,andthatitwilltaketimeandmorediscussionbeforemanypeoplecometoaccepttheviewsthatarebeingproposed.SoIthinkthatitwouldbeamistakeinfeministphilosophyandelsewheretolimitourdiscussiontowhatmanypeoplearealreadywillingtoaccept.Moreover,traditionalconceptionsofjustice,likewelfareliberaljustice,libertarianjusticeandcommunitarianjustice,whichJaggarwantsanaccountoffeministjusticetoparallel,arealmostalwayspresentedinpositiveterms,quitedifferentfromthenegativedefinitiontowhichJaggarproposestorestrictfeministjustice.BothJaggarandTongalsoobjecttocharacterizingfeministjusticeintermsofandrogynybecausetheythinkandrogynyisacharacteridealratherthanasocialideal.OnseveraloccasionsIhaverespondedtothisobjectionbyclaimingthattheidealofandrogyny,asIdefineit,closelyresemblestheidealofequalopportunity,andsincetheidealofequalopportunityisthoughttobeasocialidealoranidealforreformingsocialstructures,thesameshouldholdoftheidealofandrogyny,asIdefineit.Butsincethisresponseofminehasyettobeaddressed,letmetryanothertack.JaggarinthisessaysaysForwomenofmygeneration…muchoftheinspirationalforceofsecond-wavefeminismderivedfromitsslogan,“Thepersonalisthepolitical.”Yetsurprisingly,whenitcomestotheidealofandrogyny,Jaggarappearstobegoingagainstthisverybasicsloganoffeminism,failingtorecognizethattheidealofandrogynyisnotjustapersonalbutalsoapoliticalideal,andthatitsgeneralrealizationwouldclearlytransformsociety,allowingbothwomenandmentobethebestthattheycanbe.Jaggarhasalsosuggestedthatifonemustgobeyondthecharacterizationoffeministjusticeassimplyacommitmenttoendingwomen’ssubordination,itispreferablytoendorsetheidealofgenderlessness.Androgyny,shethinks,willscarepeopleawayfromfeminism.Butitishardtoseehowandrogynywillbeanylessscarythangenderlessness.Infact,genderlessnessseemsabitmorescarybecauseitonlytellsuswhatweneedtogetridof,notwhatweneedtoputinitsplace.Moreover,probablythemostwellknowndefenderofagenderfreesociety,SusanOkin,hasnotroublealsoendorsingtheidealofandrogynyasIdefineit.25Finally,Jaggarhas“expressedsomeresentmentabout[my]insistenceondefiningfeminismintermsofandrogyny,eventhoughfewcontemporaryfeministsacceptedthatterm.”Thefirstthingtonotehereisthatwearetalkingaboutdefiningorcharacterizingfeministjustice,notfeminism.Thesecondthingtonotehereisthatitisnotasthoughlargenumbersofcontemporaryfeministsareflockingtoanyotherpositiveconceptionoffeministjustice.Thefieldiswideopenhere,andonlyafewcontemporaryfeminists,suchasJaggar,Tong,andKathrynMorgan,whomTongcites,haveexplicitlyrejectedit,althoughinthecaseofJaggarherrejectioniscomplicatedbythefactthatsheendorsesanidealthatatleastverballyishardtodistinguishfromandrogynyasIdefineit.Furthermore,Idon’tseetheproblemhere.Whyshouldn’tI,andotherfeministswhofeelinclinedtodoso,developanddefendacharacterizationoffeministjusticeintermsoftheidealofandrogyny?Ofcourse,weshouldbewillingtoaddressthosewhoexplicitlyrejectthatcharacterization.Butsupposeweweretoinvitethemtodeveloptheirobjectionsinconferencesandpublications,andsupposeweweretolistencarefullytotheirobjectionsandtoprovidereplieswhichwethoughtwerereasonable.Why,then,shoulditnotbeacceptableforustocontinuetodevelopourviews,andwhyshouldanyoneresentourdoingso?Tong’smainreasonforobjectingtoandrogyny,asIdefineit,isquitedifferentfromJaggar’s.ShedoesnotwanttolimithercharacterizationoffeministjusticetoanegativedefinitionasJaggardoes.Rathershewantstodefendasomewhatdifferentpositivedefinitionoffeministjustice.ShebeginsbycitingKathrynMorganasfavoringthreealternativesto“thekindofandrogynousindividualsSterbaenvisions.”ButMorganinher1983articledoesnotdiscusstheformofandrogynyIdefend,focusingherattackprimarilyontheearlypsychologicalliteratureonthistopic.AtonepointMorgancomescloseto\nCONCLUSION233discussingtheandrogynyIfavor,butthenrejectsitforareasonthatisclearlyatoddswiththinkingaboutandrogynyasanidealforachievingfeministjustice.Shewrites,Supposewe…arriveatsomethingapproximatingconsensusonasetofpositively-valuedcharacteristics,wewouldhaveveryfewleftandcertainlyveryfewrelativetothetotalsetofsex-codedcharacteristicseveninoneculture.Moreover,ifweengageinthisprocessofeliminationinhopesofreachingaccordonpositively-valuedcharacteristics,weundercutoneofthemostpowerfulclaimsmadeonbehalfofandrogyny,namely,thatitpresentsuswithamodelofthefullyhumanindividual.If,infact,beinganandrogynousindividualturnsouttomeanthatonehas,forexample,fourteenoutofpossiblesixtysex-codedcharacteristics,thentheclaimthatsuchanindividualrepresentsfullhumanityisludicrous.26Clearly,ifoneisinterestedinandrogynyasanidealforfeministjustice,asIam,thenoneisnotparticularlyconcernedthatitcaptureourfullhumanity—ourhumanvicesaswellasourhumanvirtues.Morganisnotthinkingaboutandrogynyasprovidinganidealforjustrelationsbetweenwomenandmen,nordoessheconsiderwhatanaccountofandrogynywouldlooklikeifitweredesignedforthatpurpose.Fortunately,TongdoesnotrestherrejectionofmyaccountofandrogynyonMorgan’sviewsalone.Shegoesontoobjecttothedistinctionbetweentrulydesirabletraitsandexpectedvirtuesinmyidealofandrogyny.Recallthatmyidealofandrogynyrequiresthatthetraitsthataretrulydesirableinsocietybeequallyopentobothwomenandmenor,inthecaseofvirtues,beequallyexpectedofbothwomenandmen.WhatTongspecificallyobjectstohereismyclaimthatthereisasetofvirtueswhichshouldbeequallyexpectedofbothwomenandmen.27Instead,Tongfavorsanidealoffeministjusticewhichwillsimplyprovidewomenandmenwithequalcapabilitiesforleadingafullhumanlife.WhenIindicatedtoTongthatsomevirtues(likejustice)willneedtobeenforced,andthatiswhy,puttingafeministspinonthisnecessity,Iproposedinmyidealofandrogynythatweenforcethesamevirtuesforeveryone,Tongrespondedintherevisedversionofherpaper,theoneincludedinthisvolume,asfollows:InthefeministutopiaIenvision,societywillnothavetorequirepeopletobevirtuousforpeoplewillwanttobevirtuous,havingrecognizedthatunlesstheytreateachotherwithequalrespectandconsideration,rejoicingineachother’sdifferences,theywillnotonlynotflourishbutnotsurviveasasociety.IthinkthatTong’sviewhereisfartooutopianforanaccountoffeministjusticeforhereandnow,andthatmyaccountoffeministjustice,whichrecognizestheneedtorequirecertainvirtuesofeveryone,ispreferableintheunjustworldinwhichwelive.UnlikeJaggar,TonggoesontocriticizethepracticalrequirementsIderivefrommyidealoffeministjustice.Withrespecttofamilylife,Iargueforaffordable,qualityday-care,flex-time,andmoreequalsharingofchildcareandhousekeeping.Withrespecttothedistributionofeconomicpowerinsociety,Iarguefortheendofthewagegap,affirmativeactionandcomparableworth.Withrespecttotheovertviolence,Iargueforstrongerlaws,andmoreenforcementofexistinglawsagainstrape,domesticviolenceandchildabuse;forbanninghard-corepornography,forde-emphasingviolentsportslikefootballandboxing,forteachingconflictresolution,childcareandthehistoryofpeacemakinginourschools,andforrecognizingtheinterconnectionbetweenviolenceininternationalrelationsandviolenceinpersonalrelations.Finally,afteralengthydiscussionoftheissue,Iarguefornewprogramsagainstsexualharassment.TongarguesthatthereformsIproposewillnotworkwellforworking-classfamilies,forsingle-parentfamiliesorforhomosexualhouseholds.Ithinkthatthischargecomesfromfailingtoproperlysituatemychapteronfeministjusticewithinthecontextofthechaptersthatcomebeforeandafter.Theargumentfromlibertytoequalityoftheprecedingchapterwouldbasicallyequalizetheeconomicresourcesofallfamilies,andthiswouldsurelyspeaktotheneedsofmiddle-classandsingle-parentfamilies.ThechapterthatfollowstakesupthetopicofhomosexualjusticeanddefendsasradicalaviewonthattopicasIthinkTongwouldwant.Tongalsocriticizesmefornotdiscussingfeministcriticismsoftheimplementationofcomparableworthprograms,fornotdiscussingfeministargumentsagainstthebanningofhard-corepornography,andfornotdiscussingthe“beautytrap”andreproductiveissues.Inmydefense,Ihavediscussedsomeofthesetopics(e.g.reproductiveissuesandpornography)atlengthelsewhere,anditwouldhavebeendifficulttoincludemorematerialinthischapterwhilestillmaintainingparitywithotherdiscussionsofjusticeinmybook.28Attheveryendofheressay,however,Tongmakesaveryseriouscriticismofmywork.Sheclaimsthatmyworkisnotatheoryofjusticeforhereandnow,“butforthereandthen,theUnitedStatesinthe1960sand1970s.”Attemptingtosupportthisclaim,TongstartsoutwithadiscussionofIrisYoung’sandNancyFraser’srecentwork.ButthenherdiscussionofYoung’sworkleadshertoconcludethatitisnotthatdifferentfrommyown,andsosherestsherclaimonacontrastsheperceivesbetweenNancyFraser’sworkandmyown.\n234JAMESP.STERBANow,Fraserputsforwardatheoryofsocialjusticeandatheoryofculturaljustice.Hertheoryofsocialjustice,whichshedevelopsfromMarxandHabermas,isnotunliketheegalitarianismwhichI,maybemoreusefullyinthepresentpoliticalclimate,derivefromlibertarianpremises.Incontrast,hertheoryofculturaljusticecombinesfeminism,anti-racismandanti-heterosexism.Heroverallgoalistointegratehertheoryofsocialjusticewithhertheoryofculturaljustice.ButoncewenotethecomponentsofFraser’stheoryofculturaljustice,weseetheyarejustthesamecomponentsthatIamtryingtointegrate,alongwithanaccountofeconomicjustice,intomyoveralltheoryofjustice.SoifFraser’soveralltheoryofjusticeisappropriateforhereandnow,thenso,itwouldseem,ismine.LesbianandgayperspectivesClaudiaCardinhercontributiontothisvolumeagreeswithmanyoftheconclusionsandargumentsthatIdevelopinmybook,butshealsoseekstodrawoutfurtherimplicationsoffeministjusticeforthenonidealconditionsinwhichweworkandlive.Ifindherworkhere,aselsewhere,veryhelpfulandinsightful.Feministjustice,withitsidealofgenderfreeorandrogynoussociety,appliesunderbothidealandnonidealconditions.Underidealconditions,children,irrespectiveoftheirsex,wouldbegiventhesametypeofupbringingandparentswouldhavethesameopportunitiesforeducationandemployment.Therewouldbeequalpayforcomparableworkandtheincidenceofrape,battery,sexualabuseandsexualharassmentwouldbeextremelylowornonexistent.Underthenonidealconditionsinwhichweliveandwork,noneofthishasbeenachieved,andwefacetheproblemofdeterminingwhatmeasuresandprogramsareneededtomoveustowardamorejustsociety,likethoseIdiscussinJusticeforHereandNow.Inheressay,Cardproposessomeadditionalmeasuresthatshethinksarealsoneededtomoveustowardamorejustsociety.Shesuggests,andIagree,thatanyoneguiltyofdomesticviolenceorchildabusemightbedeniedalicenseforfuturemarriagesorguardianshipofchildren.Shealsosuggeststhat“[a]bandoningheterosexualcohabitation,ratherthantryingtoreformitinthecontextofamisogynoussociety,mightbeamoreeffectiveandlessunjustwaytofurthertheandrogynousideal”(emphasisadded).HeretooIagree.29Cardthengoesontorecommendthatindividualsrejectheterosexualhouseholds“asamatterofprinciple”underexistingnonidealconditions,althoughshedoesnotfavoralegalbanonsuchhouseholds.Butanin-principlerejectionofheterosexualhouseholdswouldnotpermitindividualstoweighthestrengthsandweaknessesofthevarioushomosexualorheterosexualhouseholdsthattheymightform.Itwouldrequirethattheyautomaticallyoptforahomosexualhouseholdwhatevertheirparticularcircumstances.Itseemstomethatthiswouldhavedisastrousconsequencesforparticularindividuals.30NordoIthinkthatsuchanuncompromisingstanceisrequiredtomoveustotheandrogynousideal.Infact,thattransformationwouldbebetterachievedifhomosexualandheterosexualhouseholdswerebothconsideredopenpossibilitieswhosedesirabilitydependedontheparticularindividualswithwhomonewouldbeformingthosehouseholds.Otherthingsbeingequal,formingahouseholdwithacaringandinsightfulmanwouldbepreferabletoformingahouseholdwithaselfishandobtusewoman.OnereasonthatCardissocriticalofheterosexisthouseholdsisthatshethinksthatmendonotdoverywellasparents.Inthiscontext,sheisdisturbedbymysuggestionthatinnontraditional,betterstructuredfamilies,menwouldlearntobeopen,cooperative,andnurturantbyequallysharingchildrearingandhousekeepingresponsibilities.Shecomparesmysuggestiontoasuggestionbyoneofherstudentstotheeffectthatconvictedrapistsorbatterersshouldberequiredtoworkinsheltersforbatteredwomen.ButIdon’tthinkthiscomparisonholds,giventhatIagreewithCardthatmenwhoareguiltyofsuchoffensesmightbedeniedalicenseforfuturemarriagesorguardianshipofchildren.Moreover,thebasisforthinkingthatmenwouldlearntobeopen,cooperativeandnurturantbyshoulderingtheirchildrearingandhousekeepingresponsibilitiesisthatthisisfrequentlyhowwomenlearntheseverysametraits.Womentodayhavefrequentlygrownupinsmallerfamilies(andsohavenotbeenmuchinvolvedinraisingtheirbrothersorsisters)andhavegonethroughmanyyearsofschoolingbeforedecidingtoestablishaheterosexualhouseholdandhavechildren.Asaresult,theyareoftenasignorantofwhatisrequiredforgoodchildrearingasaretheirmalepartners.Giventhiscontext,itisnotunreasonabletoassumethatbothwomenandmencouldlearnthedesiredtraitsthattheyneedthroughanequalsharingofchildrearingandhousekeepingresponsibilities.Evenassumingthatwomenfrequentlyhaveaheadstartovermenwithrespecttocertaindesirabletraitsneededtoformagoodhousehold,andthatmenfrequentlyhaveaheadstartoverwomenwithrespecttootherdesirabletraitsneededtoformagoodhousehold,whywoulditnotbereasonableforthemtochoosetoformheterosexualhouseholds,undercertainconditions,soastolearnfromtheirpartner’sgentlecoaxingandexamplehowtoacquirethedesiredtraitstheylack?Ifwelookattoday’ssociety,manywomenhavedoneamazinglywell,giventhehindrancestheyface,inacquiringjustthosedesirabletraits,likeindependence,decisivenessandstrength,whicharestereotypicallyassociatedwithmen.Yetwhilesomeofthissuccesscanbeattributedtowomenhelpingwomen,someofitisalsoduetomenhelpingwomen,bothinsideandoutsideofhouseholds.Accordingly,Ithinkitwouldbeamistake,especiallyundertheunjustconditionsinwhichweliveandwork,tosimplyrejectthesupportforfeministjusticethatmencanprovidewithinheterosexualhouseholds.So,ratherthanendorsinganin-principlerejectionofheterosexualhouseholds,Ithinkthatweshouldtreathomosexualandheterosexualhouseholds(andotherrelationships)asopenpossibilitieswhosedesirabilitydependsontheparticularindividualswithwhomwewouldbeforming\nCONCLUSION235thosehouseholds(orrelationships).Thisalternative,Ithink,ismorelikelytobebeneficialtotheparticularindividualsinvolved,andalsomorelikelytoadvanceustowardamorejustsociety.Nevertheless,thedifferencesbetweenCard’sviewhereandwhatInowthinkwouldbemyownview(sincethisisnewterrainforme)arereallyquitesmall,and,forthemostpart,weshareacommonpoliticalagendawithrespecttofeministjusticeandwithrespecttootherissuesaswell.InJusticeforHereandNow,Iarguethatfeministjusticewhichseekstoremedytheinjusticeofsexismistheoreticallyconnectedtohomosexualjustice,whichseekstoremedytheinjusticeofheterosexism.Thetheoreticalconnectionisthateachoftheseinjusticesissupportedbyasimilarargument.Thatargumentbeginsbynotingcertaindifferencesamongeitherindividualsorgroups.Itthenclaimsthatthesedifferencesaregroundsforregardingsomeindividualsorgroupsassuperiortootherindividualsorgroups.Thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofsomeindividualsorgroupsbyotherindividualsorgroups.Ineachcase,thisargumentmovesfromaclaimofdifferencetoaclaimofsuperiorityandthentoaclaimofdomination.Inthecaseofsexism,thebiologicaldifferencesbetweenmenandwomen,orotherdifferencesclaimedtobelinkedtothesebiologicaldifferences,aresaidtobegroundsforregardingmenassuperiortowomen;thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofwomenbymen.Inthecaseofheterosexism,thebiologicaloracquireddifferencesbetweenheterosexualsandhomosexualsaresaidtobegroundsforregardingheterosexualsassuperiortohomosexuals;thissuperiorityisthenclaimedtolegitimatethedominationofhomosexualsbyheterosexuals.Itispossible,ofcourse,forsomeonetorejecttheargumentforsexismbutaccepttheargumentforheterosexism,despitetheirsimilarstructure.ThatiswhyIwasconcernedinmybooktoofferindependentreasonsforundercuttingthegeneralargumentineachcase.JohnCorvino,inhiscontributiontothisvolume,assumesthatmyargumentforfeministjusticeissuccessful,andisprimarilyconcernedtobuttressthecaseforhomosexualjustice.Hetooisconcernedwiththepossibilitythatsomeonemightgranttheneedforfeministjustice,butrejecttheneedforhomosexualjustice.Feministjustice,asIdefendit,requiresanandrogynousorgenderfreesociety,which,inturn,requiresthatthetraitsthataretrulydesirableinsocietybeequallyopentobothwomenandmenor,inthecaseofvirtues,beequallyexpectedofbothwomenandmen.Thisidealofjustice,Iargue,substitutesasocializationbasedonnaturalability,reasonableexpectationandchoiceforasocializationbasedonsexualdifference.Corvinoisparticularlyconcernedwiththosewhomightacceptthisargumentforfeministjusticebutrejectanyargumentforhomosexualjustice.Accordingly,mostofhisessayisconcernedwithdevelopingapositiveargumentforhomosexualjusticeandthenrebuttingthreepopularargumentsthathavebeenusedtosupportrestrictingtherightsofhomosexuals.Withallthis,Iaminperfectagreement.Inthecourseofdevelopinghisargumentsforhomosexualjustice,however,CorvinodoesemployadifferentnotionofgenderfromtheoneIusedinmybook,andIwouldliketoconsiderhowtheyarerelated.Asocietywhichhasrealizedfeministjustice,asIdefineit,mustbegenderfree,thatis,itmusthaveasocializationthatisbasedonnaturalability,reasonableexpectationandchoiceratherthanasocializationthatisbasedonsexualdifference.Now,Corvinothinksthatitispossibleforasocietytobegenderfreeinthissense,butalsogenderedinanothersense.Hewrites:What,then,isgender?Isubmitthatitisamistaketotrytocapturegenderintermsofnecessaryandsufficientconditions.Rather,beingawomanandbeingamanarefamilyresemblanceconcepts.Tobeawomanoramanistopossessasubstantialportionofaclusterofcharacteristics,noneofwhichisnecessarybutsomeofwhichmustbepresentinorderforthetermtoapplycorrectly.Suchcharacteristicswouldinclude,butarenotlimitedto•beingbiologicallymaleorfemale•having(orwantingtohave)acertainkindofbodilystructure(e.g.broadornarrowshouldersorhips,bodyhair,andsoon)•having(orwantingtohave)maleorfemalegenitalia•conceivingofoneselfamanorawoman•presentingoneselfasamanorawoman•exhibitingcertainmasculineorfemininecharacteristics(manyofwhichmaybeculturallybound)•relating(ordesiringtorelate)tootherpersonssexuallyinaparticularway(e.g.penetratingorbeingpenetrated)Onethingtonoteaboutthischaracterizationisthatinasocietywhichisgenderfreeinmysense,suchthatwhereequalopportunityexistsatalllevels—earlysocialization,formaleducation,sports,work,dressandbodylanguage—itisnotclearthattherewillbeany“culturallyboundmasculineandfemininecharacteristics.”Ofcourse,ifitturnsout,forexample,thatunderasystemofequalopportunityforwomenandmen,womenturnouttoconstitutemostofthefighterpilots,nowapremierroleinthemilitary,becauseoftheshorterdistance,onaverage,betweentheirheadandheart,makingthemmorecapableofwithstandingG-forces,andmenturnouttomakeupmoreofthegruntsoldiersneededprimarilyforhand-to-handcombat,becauseoftheiraveragelargerbodysize,wemaywanttorefertosuchrolesasfeminineandmasculinegenderroles,butitisnotclearthatwewould.31\n236JAMESP.STERBAYetevenifIamrightthattherewouldbefewculturallydeterminedfeminineandmasculinegenderrolesortraitsthatwouldsurvivetheequalopportunityrequirementsoffeministjustice,therewouldstillexistgenderrolesortraitsinCorvino’ssense,asheexplains:SupposePhyllis,awoman,likestodatemen….Becauseshelikestodatemen,shemightfrequentplaces(e.g.straightsinglesbars)attendedbymenwholiketodatewomen;moreover,shemightmakeherfriendsawareofthis(aswellasother)preferencessothattheymightsuggestsuitablepartnersforher.Phyllis’expressedpreferenceforandpursuitofmenstrikesmeasmorallyunproblematicofitself—especiallyinanidealsocietywheretheevilofsexismhasbeenovercome.Thuspeople’spreferencesforeitherheterosexual,homosexual,orbisexualrelationshipswillleadtogenderrolesortraitsinCorvino’ssense,andIcertainlyagreewithCorvinothatthesepreferencesarecompatiblewiththeachievementoffeministjusticeinmysense.RacialandmulticulturalperspectivesInhiscontributiontothisvolume,CharlesW.Millstakesupthetopicofracialjustice,atopicherightlyclaimshasnotbeengivensufficientconsiderationincontemporarysocialandpoliticalphilosophy.HearguesthatifcontemporarysocialandpoliticalphilosopherswouldonlyattendtothelegacyandcurrentpracticesofracismintheUS,theneventheirownnormativeperspectiveswouldrequirethemtoendorsefairlyradicalchanges.InJusticeforHereandNow,Ididcitethefollowinggeneraldatatosupportsuchchanges:InthecaseofblacksintheUnitedStates,almosthalfofallblackchildrenliveinpoverty.Blackunemploymentistwicethatofwhite.Theinfantmortalityrateinmanyblackcommunitiesistwicethatofwhites.Blacksaretwiceaslikelyaswhitestoberobbed,seventimesmorelikelytobemurderedortodieoftuberculosis.AmalelivinginNewYork’sHarlemislesslikelytoreach65thanaresidentofBangladesh.Blackscomprise50%ofthemaidsandgarbagecollectorsbutonly4%ofthemanagersand3%ofthephysiciansandlawyers.32Whileonestudyofthenation’stenlargestcitiesshowedthatblacksandwhitesrarelyinteractoutsidetheworkplace,anotherrevealedthatabout86%ofavailablejobsdonotappearinclassifiedadvertisementsandthat80%ofexecutivesfindtheirjobsthroughnetworking,thusshowingtheimportanceforemploymentofcontactsoutsidetheworkplace.33Accordingtoanotherstudy,blackchildrenadoptedbywhitemiddle-classfamiliesscoresignificantlybetterontheWechslerIntelligenceScalethanblackchildrenadoptedbyblackmiddle-classfamilies,andthescoringdifferenceisofthemagnitudetypicallyfoundbetweentheaveragescoresofblackandwhitechildren.34Ialsocitedspecificdataonenvironmentalracism:1Penaltiesunderhazardouswastelawsatsiteshavingthegreatestwhitepopulationwere500%higherthanpenaltiesatsiteswiththegreatestminoritypopulation,averaging$335,566forthewhiteareas,comparedwith$55,318forminorityareas.352Thedisparityundertoxicwastelawoccursbyraceandnotbyincome.Theaveragepenaltyinareaswiththelowestmedianincomeisonly3%differentfromtheaveragepenaltyinareaswiththehighestmedianincome.363Forallthefederalenvironmentallawsaimedatprotectingcitizensfromair,waterandwastepollution,penaltiesinwhitecommunitieswere46%higherthaninminoritycommunities.374UnderthegiantSuperfundcleanupprogram,abandonedhazardouswastesitesinminorityareastake20%longertobeplacedonthenationalpriorityactionlistthanthoseinwhiteareas.385InTacoma,Washington,wherepapermillsandotherindustrialpollutersruinedthesalmonstreamsandthewayoflifeofaNativeAmericantribe,thegovernmentneverincludedthetribeinassessingthepollution’simpactonresidents’health.396ThreeofeveryfiveblackandHispanicAmericansliveinacommunitywithuncontrolledtoxicwastesites.407Thedevelopedcountriesshipanestimated20milliontonsofwastetotheThirdWorldeachyear.In1987,dioxin-ladenindustrialashfromPhiladelphiawasdumpedinGuineaandHaiti.In1988,4,000tonsofPCB-contaminatedchemicalwastefromItalywasfoundinNigeria,leakingfromthousandsofrustingandcorrodingdrums,poisoningbothsoilandgroundwater.In1991aSwissbrokernegotiatedonbehalfofItaliancompaniesatwenty-yeardealwithonefactioninSomaliatoshiptoxicwastesintothecountry.Accordingtothecontract,theshipments—eachof100,000–150,000tons—weretoyieldaprofitof8–10milliondollarspershipment,with2–3milliondollarspershipmentgoingtotheSwissbroker.41\nCONCLUSION237Inhisessay,however,MillsprovidesamuchmoredetailedaccountthattiescurrentpracticestoahistoryofracismintheUS,andthusmoreconvincinglysupportstheradicalpracticalrequirementsthatbothofusfavor.Inowregretnothavingdonesomethingsimilar.Expandingmydiscussionsofracialjustice,homosexualjusticeandmulticulturaljusticeintoseparatechaptersoftheirownwouldhavecertainlyhelpedsupportthebook’sclaimtoconvey“thebreadthandinterconnectednessofquestionsofjustice—ararityinsocialandpoliticalphilosophy.”42AstoradicalpracticalrequirementstodealwiththehistoryandcurrentpracticeofracismintheUnitedStates,Iargueforaffirmativeaction,comparableworth,andallocatingenvironmentalrisksbyconsumption,whichwouldplacemostwastedisposalsitesinwealthyneighborhoods.Millspointsoutthattrainingprogramsforunskilledblacksarealsoneeded,asarereparationsforpastinjustices.NowalthoughIdidnotarguefortrainingprogramsforunskilledblacks,Ididassumetheirlegitimacyinmyargumentforaffirmativeaction.ReparationsforpastinjusticestoAfricanAmericans,however,issomethingIdidnotdiscuss.Nevertheless,ItakeupthesimilarquestionofreparationstoAmericanIndiansinarecentlypublishedbook,ThreeChallengestoEthics:Environmentalism,Feminism,andMulticulturalism(OxfordUniversityPress,2001),andthereIendorseafairlyspecificplanforreparationsastheappropriateresponsetowhatsomehavecalled“theAmericanHolocaust.”Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,Chung-yingChengexploresthepuzzlingrelationshipbetweenjuststatesandjustpersons,drawingoninsightsfoundinbothWesternandConfucianphilosophicalworks.43IntheConfuciantradition,thejustpersonisprimary;nordoesthejustpersonalwaysactinaccordwiththelawsofajuststate.Incontemporarysocialandpoliticalphilosophy,particularlyJohnRawls’work,itwouldseemthatthejusticeofthestateisprimary.Still,Rawlsrecognizedthatthereismoretobeingajustpersonthansimplyapersonwhoobeysthelawsofajuststate.Forexample,Rawlsrecognized,atleastinsomeofhislaterwork,thatajustpersonwouldalsobejustintheirfamilialrelationships.44NorinRawls’viewwouldajustpersonalwaysobeythelaw,eveninajuststate,because,eveninajuststate,thelawsdonotalwayssecurejustresults.45Giventhesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthesedifferentperspectives,itseemsreasonabletofollowCheng’sapproachoftryingtocombinethemintoadefensibleaccount.EnvironmentalismThereismuchthatIagreewithinHolmesRolston’scontributiontothisvolume.Heprovidesasweepingoverviewofenforcementinenvironmentalethics,relatingittoenforcementinethicsmoregenerally.Atonepoint,however,hechallengesoneofmyprinciplesofenvironmentalethics,specificallymyPrincipleofHumanPreservation.Accordingtothisprinciple,Actionsthatarenecessaryformeetingone’sbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherhumanbeingsarepermissibleevenwhentheyrequireaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofindividualanimalsandplantsorevenofwholespeciesorecosystems.Rolstonobjectstothisprincipleonthegroundsthatitbenefitshumanstoomuchattheexpenseofnonhumannature,ashetriestoshowthroughanumberofexamples.HisfirstexampleisthatoftheHopiIndiansofArizona,whoclaimthattheyneedtocaptureandkillbabygoldeneaglesinordertocommunicatewiththeirancestors.Rolstonthinksthatinourpresentcircumstances,preservinggoldeneaglesismoreimportantthansatisfyingtheHopi’sfeltreligiousneed.AlthoughhethinksthatgivenmyPrincipleofHumanPreservation,Iwoulddisagreewithhim.Iactuallyagreewithhim.Ithinkthatcapturingandkillingbabygoldeneaglesunderpresentcircumstancesisarguablynotabasicneed,evenwhenproperlyjudgedfromtheperspectiveoftheHopithemselves.Rolston’ssecondexampleinvolveswhethertousethetraditionalmethodofkosherslaughterratherthanalesspainfulcontemporarymethodwhichutilizesastungun.Rolstonthinksthattheuseofastungunispreferable,evenwhenjudgedfromanorthodoxJewishperspective.ButheretooIguessIsurpriseRolstonagainbyagreeingwithhim.SowhileneitherofthesefirsttwoexamplespresentsachallengetomyPrincipleofHumanPreservation,Rolston’sfinalexampledoesappeartodoso.Inthisexample,thousandsofNepalesehaveclearedforests,cultivatedcrops,andraisedcattleandbuffaloonthelandsurroundingtheRoyalChitwanNationalParkinNepal,buttheyhavealsomadeincursionsintotheparktomeettheirownbasicneeds.Insodoing,theyarethreateningtherhino,theBengaltiger,andotherendangeredspeciesinthepark.Nowthisclearlyisacasewherebasichumanneedsareinconflictwiththesurvivalofotherspecies.Doesthismeanthatifwewanttofavortheendangeredspeciesinthisconflict,wewouldhavetorejectmyPrincipleofHumanPreservation?Notatall.ThisisbecauseitispossibletoredescribethisexampleasaconflictbetweentwogroupsofNepalese,eachofwhomisstrivingindifferentwaystomeetbasicneeds.TheNepalesewhowanttopreservetheparkcanbeseentowanttomaintainitstouristrevenuestomeettheirownbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofotherNepalese.TheNepalesewhowanttousetheresourcesoftheparkaresimilarlytryingtomeettheirbasicneedsandthebasicneedsofotherNepalese.Accordingly,myparticularPrincipleofHumanPreservationdoesnotevenapplyinthiscase,becauseitsapplicationsarelimitedtocaseswheremeetingthebasicneedsofhumansonlyrequiresaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofindividual\n238JAMESP.STERBAanimalsandplants,orevenofentirespeciesorecosystems,butnotwhenitalsorequiresaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofotherhumans.Nevertheless,itshouldnotbethatdifficulttocomeupwithaconflictcaseofthesortthatRolstonenvisions—acasewheremeetingthebasicneedsofhumansissimplyinconflictwithprotectingtheneedsofendangeredspecies,especiallyifyouthink,asIdo,thatthebestdescriptionoftherelationshipofthehumanpopulationtotherestofthelivingworldisthatofacanceronthebiosphere,aspeciesoutofcontrol,wreakinghavocontherestofthebiosphere.Evenso,beforewecanjustifiablyuseforcetokeepotherhumansfrommeetingtheirbasicneedsinordertopreserveendangeredspecies,Ithinkthatitisbeholdenonustohavefirstdoneallthatwecan,usingwhateversurpluswehappentohave,tomeetthebasicneedsofthosepeoplewhomweproposetorestrict.Thatwouldseemtometobeadifficultconditionformostenvironmentaliststomeet.Inhercontributiontothisvolume,MaryAnneWarrendefendsanenvironmentalethicsthatisverysimilar,ifnotidentical,totheoneIdefend.Warrenthinksthatitisamistaketoassignthesamemoralstatustoallnonhumanorganisms.Forher,sentience,mentalsophistication,moralagency,theirimportancetospeciesandecosystemstowhichtheybelong,andtheirsocialrelationshipswithusall,affecttheirmoralstatus.Inmyaccount,thesefactorstoohavetobetakenintoaccount,becauseweclearlydomoreharm,otherthingsbeingequal,whenweharmsentientratherthannonsentientlivingbeings,humansratherthananimals,wholespeciesorecosystemsratherthansimplyindividualswhobelongtothosespeciesorecosystems,oranimalswithwhomwehavedevelopedmutuallybeneficialsocialrelationshipsratherthanthosewithwhichwehavenosuchrelationships.Onthisaccount,theserankingswouldhavetobetakenintoaccountinapplyingmyprinciples.46WarrenalsosuggestsoneareafortheapplicationoftheserankingsthatIdidnotexplore.MyPrincipleofHumanDefensewasfocusedonthepermissibilityofdefendingourselvesagainstaggressionfromnonhumanlivingbeings.Warrentakesupthequestionoftowhatdegreewearejustifiedindefendingourselvesagainstsimplyriskstoourwell-beingfromotherlivingbeings,andshearguesthattheaboverankingswouldaffectwhatitismorallypermissibleforustodointhisregard.Forexample,shearguesthatsheismorallyjustifiedinkillingmillionsofbacteriatodefendherselfagainstasmallrisk,asinwashingherhands,butnotmorallyjustifiedinkillinganundergroundcolonyofvolesinherfrontyard,eventhoughtheysometimescarrytheHantaviruswhichcanbelethaltohumanbeings;norisshejustifiedineliminatingmountainlionsfromtheparknearherhome,eventhoughtheyposeasmallthreattohumanlife.Whatthesecasesshowistherelevanceofwhetherlivingbeingsaresentientornot,andwhethertheyareendangeredspeciesornot.Still,Ithink,giventhepossiblethreattoherlife,shewouldbejustifiedinremovingthevolesfromherfrontyard,sincevolesareanythingbutanendangeredspecies.Thereisoneplace,however,whereWarrenclearlythinksthatheraccounthasdifferentpracticalimplicationsfrommyown.Shethinksthatonmyaccountitwouldnotbemorallypermissibletopullweedsfromone’sflowergarden.However,iftendingaflowergardenwereoneofone’smainformsofrelaxation,thenitwouldserveone’sbasicrecreationalinterests,andsowouldbepermissibleaccordingtomyPrincipleofHumanPreservation.Thesatisfactionofbasicrecreationalneedsisnecessaryforpreservation.Butsupposetendingone’sgardendoesnotservethispurpose,butonlyservestomeetone’snonbasicorluxuryinterests.Inthatcase,pullingweedsfromone’sgardencouldstillbejustifiedasameansofdefendingthebasicinterestsofotherplantsinone’sgarden,againsomethingthatispermittedtodo,butthistimeforthesakeoftheotherplantsinone’sgardenandnotforoneself.Butletusconsiderstillanothercase.Supposeonewantstoenlargeone’salreadyfairlylargeswimmingpool.Supposethisisclearlyaluxuryinterestandthatitwouldrequiretakingoutaclusterofoaktreestosatisfyit.Letusalsosuppose,probablycontrarytofact,thattheinterestsofnootherlivingbeingsareatstakehere.Appliedtothiscase,myPrincipleofDisproportionalitywouldclearlyprohibitenlargingthepool.ButwhatwouldWarren’sprincipleshavetosayaboutthiscase?Therelevantprinciplesfromheraccountareprinciples1and6.Whatiscrucialtoapplyingtheseprinciplesiswhatcountsasagoodreasonforkillingnonsentientlivingthings,aclusterofoaktreesinthiscase,thatdonotbelongtoanendangeredspecies.InherbookMoralStatus:OurObligationstoPersonsandOtherLivingThings,Warrensays:“Thatsomethingisalivingorganismisaprimafaciereasonfornotharmingit,butonethatiseasilyoverriddenwhenithasnootherclaimtomoralstatus.”47Sincethisclusterofoaktreeswouldpresumablynothaveanyotherclaimtomoralstatus,itwouldappearthatenlargingtheswimmingpoolwouldserveasagoodenoughreasontocutitdownonWarren’saccount.Onmyaccount,itwouldnot.Sowhiletherearemanysimilaritiesbetweenouraccounts,itappearstobeeasiertotakenonsentientlifeonWarren’sviewthanitisonmyown.PacifismandjustwartheoryInJusticeforHereandNow,Iarguethatpacifismandjustwartheory,intheirmostmorallydefensibleinterpretations,canbesubstantiallyreconciledinboththeoryandpractice.AsImentioninthebook,myworkinthisareadrawsupontheimportantworkofDuaneCadyandRobertL.Holmesindefenseofanti-warpacifism.48Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,RobertL.Holmessuggeststhathisargumentsinfavorofanti-warpacifismdonotprecludeacommitmenttononviolence.Iagree.Anti-\nCONCLUSION239warpacifismiscompatiblewithageneralcommitmenttononviolentstrategiesindealingwithconflict,whichIendorseaswell.Butacommitmenttononviolentpacifism(ornonlethalpacifism)requiresmorethanageneralcommitmenttononviolentstrategiesindealingwithconflictbecauseitrulesouteverusingviolence(orlethalviolence),evenifitweretheonlywaytodefendone’slifefromanunjustaggressor.ThisisaveryuncompromisingviewthatnotevenGandhiendorsed.49Moreover,Holmesalwayslimitshisobjectionstowartotheharmingorkillingofinnocents;hedoesnotarguethatitwouldbewrongorimpermissibletoharmorkillanunjustaggressorifitweretheonlywaytosaveone’sownlifeorthelivesofothers.WhatHolmesreallyobjectstointhisessay,however,ismyargumentforadifferentialrestrictiononharmthatismoresevereagainsttheintentionalinflictionofharmuponinnocentsbutlesssevereagainsttheinflictionofharmthatismerelyforeseen,leadingtotheconclusionthattheforeseenkillingofinnocentscanbemorallyjustifiedincertaincases.Inmybook,Iarguedforthisdifferentialrestrictiononharmbecausewehavemorereasontoprotestwhenwearebeingusedbyothersthanwhenwearebeingaffectedbythemonlyincidentally,andbecausewehavemorereasontoactwhenbothourendsandmeansaregoodthanwhentheyarenot.Initially,HolmesobjectsthatthesetwogroundsIofferinsupportofadifferentialrestrictiononharmarenotcomparable,thatthefirstisfarmoresignificantthanthesecond.Again,Iagree,sinceIneverclaimedthattheywerecomparable,onlythattheyweretwoconsiderationsthatfavoredadifferentialrestrictiononharm.Iclaimthatincaseswherethedeathofinnocentsismerelyforeseen,one’sendandmeanscanstillbegood.Holmesarguesthatinsuchcasesatleastone’smeansisnotgoodbecauseitcausesharmordeathtoinnocents.ButIthinkthatitwouldbeamistaketocallmeansbadwhenevertheirintendedusehassuchunintendedharmfulsideeffects.Considerapatientwhodiesfromcomplicationsfollowingnecessarysurgerythatwascompetentlyperformed.Surely,wewouldstillsaythatthesurgicalmeansusedweregoodandthattheywereusedforagoodpurpose,despitetheirunintendedlethalconsequencesforthepatient.Ofcourse,one’smeanscanbebadwhentheycauseharmfulunintendedconsequences,ifthereareothermeansavailableforattainingone’sendwhichdonotcausesuchconsequences.ButthisisnotthesortofcasethatHolmesisenvisioning.Hewantsunintendedharmfulside-effectstoinnocentstostandardlyruleoutthepursuitofendsthatwewouldotherwisethinkaremorallyjustified,evenwhentherearenoothermeansavailabletopursuethoseendsthathavelessharmfulunintendedside-effects.Holmesalsoquestionsmyuseoftheterm“incidental”todescribeforeseenbutunintendedconsequencesofouractions.Yetgiventhatthefirstmeaningof“incidental”inWebster’sNewWorldDictionaryis“happeninginconnectionwithsomethingmoreimportant,”Ithinkmyuseofthistermisjustifiedbecauseone’sendandmeansaremoreimportanttomorallyassessingone’sactionsthanaretheforeseenbutunintendedconsequencesofone’sactions.Inmybook,Iconsideranumberofhypotheticalcasesforthepurposeofassessingtheanti-warpacifistcritiqueofjustwartheory.HolmesarguesthatformanyofthesecasesmyNonexplanationTestgivestheresultthatwhatIcallforeseenconsequencesareactuallyintendedconsequences.NowIamnotentirelyhappywiththeNonexplanationTest,forreasonsIindicatedinthetext,butIdon’tthinkitisdefectiveinthewayHolmesclaimshere.AccordingtotheNonexplanationTest,therelevantquestiontoaskis:Doesthebringingaboutoftheevilconsequenceshelpexplainwhytheagentundertooktheactionasameanstothegoodconsequences?Supposeweapplythistesttothehypotheticalcasewhereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorandtheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystanderwouldpreventthedeathoffiveinnocentpeople.50Tomakethiscaseeasiertoconsider,imaginethatitinvolvesrushingaterroristjustastheterroristisbeginningtoexecuteeachofthehostageshehastaken.Theresultofthisactionisthattheterroristandonehostagearekilledbutfivehostagesaresaved.NowapplyingtheNonexplanationTest,wecanask:Doesthedeathofoneofthehostagesinthecrossfirehelpexplainwhytheterroristwasrushedtosavetheotherhostages,inthewaythattheciviliandeathsatHiroshimaandNagasakiduetotheirpresumedeffectonJapanesemoralehelpedexplainwhyTrumandroppedatomicbombsonthosetwocitiesinordertoendthewar?Ithinktheanswertothisquestionisclearlyno.Thedeathofoneofthehostagesinthecrossfireinnowayexplainswhytheterroristwasrushedinordertosavetheotherhostages.Itissimplyanunintendedbutforeseenside-effect.Arguingfurtheragainstmyuseoftheforeseen/intendeddistinction,Holmesconsidersacasewhereastudentisabouttodetonateabombinthecarofaprofessorwhogaveherabadgradewhenanotherpersonunexpectedlygetsintothecar.Giventhatthedeathoftheotherpersonwouldonlybeforeseen,Holmes,ineffect,asks:Wouldthestudent’sactionbeanyworseifthedeathoftheotherpersonwasintendedandnotsimplyforeseen?Holmesthinksnot.ButIthinkthatbadasthestudent’sactionalreadyis,itwouldbesignificantlyworseifthestudentintendedtokilltwoinnocentpersonsratherthanjustone,andthatwehavemorereasontocondemnthestudentifsheintendedtokilltwoinnocentpersonsratherthanjustone,eventhoughIagreethatwealreadywouldhaveplentyofreasontocondemnherifshejustintendsoneofthekillings.\n240JAMESP.STERBAInthelastsectionofhisessay,Holmesproposesanalternativewayofbringingpacifistsandnonpacifiststogether.Hecallsitliberalpacifism.Liberalpacifismbeginswiththeobservationthatifmodernwarsaretobefought,thosewhoarecommandedtokillmustbeputintothatpositioninvoluntarily,thatis,theymustbedraftedintothesociety’sarmedforces.Thekeythesisofliberalpacifismisthattheinvoluntaryservituderequiredbycompulsoryarmedforcesisincompatiblewiththeidealsofaliberaldemocraticsociety,evenif(quotingHolmes)“onehasnoprincipledobjectiontokilling,andevenifoneweretoacceptthepermissibilityofkillinginnocentsinthesortofcasesSterbadescribes.”Hence,Holmesthinksliberalpacifismcanestablishthatmodernwarscannotbefoughtbyliberaldemocraticsocieties.Now,muchasIwouldliketoendorseotherwaysofbringingpacifistsandjustwartheoriststogether,beyondtheapproachItookinmybook,Idon’tquiteseehowliberalpacifismcansucceedinthisendeavor.Assuming,asHolmesdoeshere,thatindividualscanlegitimatelydefendthemselvesagainstunjustaggressorsinthewaysthatIhaveargued,itwouldbeperfectlyacceptableforthesocietytowhichtheybelongtosetupanall-volunteerforcetodefenditselfinanalogousways.Holmesallowsthatthiswouldbeacceptable,eventhoughitwouldpresumablyrequireallcitizenstopaytheirfairsharefortheupkeepofsuchavolunteerforce.Butnowletusassumethatthisvolunteerforceforsomereasonprovesinsufficient.Supposeitisbecausethesocietyisflourishingeconomicallyandjobsinthevolunteerarmyarenotasdesirableasthosenowavailableintheprivatesector.Underthesecircumstances,whywouldthissociety,throughdemocraticprocedures,notbejustifiedindraftingacertainnumberofitscitizenstofulfillvacanciesinitsmilitaryforces?Underexactlywhatcircumstancestheleadersofthearmedforceswouldhave“arighttocommandotherstokill”isaseparatequestion,butassumingthatatleastsometimessuchcommandsareproperlygivenbyleadersofanall-volunteerforce,itwouldseemthat,inanalogouscircumstances,theycouldalsobeproperlygivenbyleadersofapartlyconscriptedforce.InJusticeforHereandNow,Ihavearguedthatthefewwarsandlarge-scaleconflictsthatmeetthestringentrequirementsofjustwartheoryaretheonlywarsandlarge-scaleconflictstowhichanti-warpacifistscannotjustifiablyobject.IhopetheaboveclarificationsIhavemaderegardingthewaythatIbelievethatthisreconciliationcanbeachievedwillbringusasteportwoclosertoitsrealizationinpractice.CivildisobedienceandrevolutionaryactionInthelastchapterofJusticeforHereandNow,Iconsiderwhyparticularlythehave-notsarenotresortingtocivildisobedienceorrevolutionaryactiontosecuretherightsthattheyaredeniedintheUS.Inanearlierbook,ContemporarySocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,Ispendmoretimedescribinglegalprotest,civildisobedienceandrevolutionaryaction,andinbothworksIdiscussthepossibilityofmorallyjustifiedcriminaldisobedience.51Inhiscontributiontothisvolume,LaurenceThomassetsoutanewaccountofhowcivildisobedienceworks,orshouldwork,thatfitsnicelywithmyaccountofjusticeforhereandnow.Traditionally,civildisobediencehasbeenunderstoodtobeanillegalactionwhosepurposeistodrawattentiontowhatisbelievedtobeabreachofacommonlyacceptedmoralprinciple.ButThomaspointstoaparadoxthatsurroundsthisunderstandingofcivildisobedience.Ifasocietyhasrefusedtoaccordthefullcomplementofrightstoagroupofitscitizens,whywouldprotestsofcivildisobediencebymembersofthisdeprivedgroupsufficetomovethesocietytoaccordthosecitizensthefullcomplementoftheirrights?ThisleadsThomastofavoradifferentunderstandingofcivildisobediencethatavoidstheparadox.AccordingtoThomas,civildisobediencesucceedsnotsomuchbyappealingtothemoralconscienceofsociety-at-largebutbyforcingsocietytotakethecivillydisobedientseriously.Moreover,itisthosewhoaretreatedunjustlywhohaveanobligationtoassertthemselvesanddemandthattheybetreatedasequals.ThatiswhatGandhiandKingdid;theyforcedtheiroppressorstobearwitnesstotheirdignity.Interestingly,Thomas’accountofcivildisobediencefallssomewherebetweentraditionalaccountsofcivildisobedienceandrevolutionaryaction.Onthetraditionalaccounts,thecivillydisobedientappealedtomoralstandardscommonlyacceptedinsociety,whiletherevolutionaryjustifiedtheiractionsonthebasisofmoralprinciplesnotcommonlyaccepted.OnThomas’account,civillydisobedientpersonsshocktheirfellowcitizensintoanewmoralawareness,anawarenessofthemastheirmoralequals.Thus,ifsuccessful,thecivillydisobedient,likeGandhiandKing,bringaboutatleastamoralrevolution.Workingthroughtheessaysinthisanthologywillnotalwaysbeaneasytask.Someessayswillbeclearonthefirstreading,whereasotherswillrequirecloserscrutiny.Youshouldalsomakesureyougiveeachselectionafairhearing,becausealthoughsomewillaccordwithyourcurrentviews,otherswillnot.Itisimportantthatyouevaluatetheselatterwithanopenmind,allowingforthepossibilitythataftersufficientreflectionyoumaycometoviewthemasthemostmorallydefensible.Indeed,toapproachtheselectionsofthisanthologyinanyotherwaywouldsurelyundermineyourabilitytoreasonablyresolvethosedisputesaboutjusticeinwhichourlivesareinescapablyinvolved.\nCONCLUSION241NOTES1ThiscaseisdiscussedinDeborahTannen,TheArgumentCulture(NewYork:BasicBooks,1998)pp.152–3.2Gewirthhimselfappealstoastandardofnon-question-beggingnessbut,forsomereason,hedoesn’tfullyutilizeittogetbeyondtheegoisticpresumptionsofhisdiscussionandintroduceanaltruisticperspectivewhichcanthenbeplayedoffagainstanegoisticperspective.3JeffrieReiman,“WhatOught‘“Ought”Implies“Can”’Imply?CommentsonJamesSterba’sHowToMakePeopleJust,”JournalofSocialPhilosophy(1991)pp.73–80.ThisobjectionwasactuallydirectedagainstAlanGewirth’sdefenseofmorality,butinprivatecorrespondence,Reimanhasdirecteditagainstmyownviewaswell.4JeffrieReiman,JusticeandModernMoralPhilosophy(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1990)pp.112–29.5Inprivatecorrespondence,Reimanclaimsthat,asheunderstandsthedenialoftherealityofotherpeople,itdoesnotrequiresolipsismbutonlythefailureto“recognizethefirst-personrealityofotherpeople”(2August1995).Butevengiventhisinterpretation,itstillseemsthatReimanismakingtoostrongaclaimabouttheegoist.Forexample,theegoistdoesnothavetodenythatotherhumanbeingsareinpain,aswouldseeminglybethecaseifshefailedto“recognizethefirst-personrealityofotherpeople.”6Thelogicalmistakeofbeggingthequestionentails,inthiscontext,preferringlow-rankingself-interestedreasonsoverhigh-rankingaltruisticreasonsorlow-rankingaltruisticreasonsoverhigh-rankingself-interestedreasons,which,inturn,entailsthematerialmistakeofinflictingbasicharmforthesakeofnonbasicbenefit.Likewise,thematerialmistakeofinflictingbasicharmforthesakeofnonbasicbenefitentailspreferringlow-rankingself-interestedreasonsoverhigh-rankingaltruisticreasonswhich,inturn,entailsthelogicalmistakeofbeggingthequestion.7Onthispoint,Gertinarecente-mailexchangeseemstoexpressconsiderableagreementwithmyview.HewritesIamsurprisedthatyouclaimthatMoralityasCompromiseissimplyusefultoshowthattheegoistbegsthequestionbyrulingoutaltruisticreasons.Wehavenoquarrelonthatmatter….Ihavemuchmoretroublewithyoursecondpoint:yoursuggestionthatMoralityasCompromiseis…stillusefulfor…showingthatsomethingthathastheformofmoralityispreferabletoeitheregoismoraltruismifwestartfromastandardofnon-question-beggingness.Yourconclusionseemstomecorrectinonesense,namelythatacompromisebetweenegoismandaltruismispreferabletoeitheregoismoraltruismifwestartfromastandardofnon-question-beggingness;however,thatdoesnotseemtometobeaninterestingconclusion,itseemstobesimplytautologous.ItakeGert’sdescriptionofmyargumenthereas“tautologous”asabackhandedwayofsaying:“Itworks!”8Machangoesontobuttresshisclaimwithsomeexamples.“Noonehasarighttomysecondkidney,”hesays,“eventhoughImaynotneedit,ormysecondeye,eventhoughIcouldseewellenoughwithoutit.”Buttheseexamplesareclearlynotjustgarden-varietyexamplesofthegeneralclaimthatMachanhasendorsed.Nevertheless,evenintheseunusualcases,westillneedtononarbitrarilyevaluatethecompetinglibertiesinvolved,whichincasesofthesortthatMachancitesmayleadustodenypeoplethelibertytodenyothersinneedtheuseoftheirbodilyorgansoncetheyaredead.9IdiscusstheseandotheraspectsofawelfareminimuminHowToMakePeopleJust(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1988)pp.45ff,andfootnotethisdiscussioninJusticeforHereandNow(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998)p.44.10RichardRoseandReiShiratori(eds)TheWelfareStateEastandWest(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).Infact,thelivingstandardsofpoorchildreninSwitzerland,Sweden,Finland,Denmark,Belgium,Norway,Luxembourg,Germany,theNetherlands,Austria,Canada,France,Italy,theUnitedKingdomandAustraliaareallbetterthantheyareintheUnitedStates.SeeJamesCarville,We’reRightThey’reWrong(NewYork:RandomHouse,1996)pp.31–2.11MichaelWolff,WhereWeStand(NewYork:BantamBooks,1992)pp.23,115;GeorgeKurian,TheNewBookofWorkRankings,3rdedn(NewYork:FactsonFile,1990)p.73;NewYorkTimes,17April1995.12CharlesMurray,LosingGround(NewYork:BasicBooks,1984)pp.8–9.13MichaelHarrington,“CrunchedNumbers,”TheNewRepublic,vol.193(28January1985)p.8.14ChristopherJencks,“HowPoorarethePoor?”NewYorkReviewofBooks,vol.32(9May1985)p.44.15PaulKrugman,“InPraiseofCheapLabor,”Slate,20March2000(http://slate.msn.com/Dismal/97–03–20/Dismal.asp).16AlthoughIthinkKittaydidappreciateitssignificanceinthepublicdiscussionwehadonthistopicattheConferenceonAlternativeConceptionsofJusticeheldatNotreDame,14–16April2000.17Lectureon“LiberalLegislationandFreedomofContract”inT.H.Green,LecturesonthePrinciplesofPoliticalObligation,P.HarrisandH.Murrow(eds)(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986)pp.194–212.18TheconditionsthatIarguemustbemetare,first,thatotheroptions(e.g.normalpolitics,legalprotest,civildisobedience,andrevolutionaryaction)wouldhavetobeeitherineffectiveforachievingreasonableprogresstowardajustsocietyorreasonablyjudgedtoocostlyforthosepersonstheyareintendedtobenefit;andsecond,thattherewouldonlybeminimalviolationsofthemoralrightsofothers.19AlthoughNielsenthinkstheargumentdoesnotwork,hedoesnotprovideanyspecificcriticismofit.Similarly,whilehethinksthatmyargumentfromrationality(i.e.non-question-beggingness)tomoralitydoesnotwork,heretoohedoesnotnoteanyspecificdefectsinit.\n242JAMESP.STERBA20GouldlamentsthelimitednumberofreferencestosocialisminJusticeforHereandNow,findingonlysix(actuallytherearefourteen),butunfortunatelyshefailstotakeintoaccountmybookHowtoMakePeopleJust,whichhastwochaptersdevotedtosocialistjustice.21Moreover,beyondsimplyraisingtheobjectionherself,Goulddoesnothingtoshowhowmydiscussionofthelibertarianidealofnegativelibertyillicitlysmugglesinsomenotionofpositiveliberty.Infact,Irespondedtothissameobjectionatlengthsomeyearsagoinabookco-authoredwithGouldandothers,abooktowhichGouldherselfrefersinthispaper.Unfortunately,shehasyettoaddressthatresponse.22Neartheendofheressay,GouldquestionswhethersomeoneintheTaoisttraditionwouldacceptmyaccountofrationality.Sinceasfarasmyargumentisconcerned,acommitmenttorationalityissimplyacommitmenttoastandardofnon-question-beggingness—partofthestandardofgoodargumentation—itishardformetothinkthatthoseintheTaoisttraditionwouldnotalsobecommittedtoastandardofnon-question-beggingnessinargumentation.23ThedebatebeganabitearlierthanJaggarindicates.Itactuallybeganin1991withhersandTong’scontributionstothesymposiumissueoftheJournalofSocialPhilosophyonmybookHowToMakePeopleJust.24ClaudiaCard,“RoutestoLakeWobegon”(thisvolume);MarilynFriedman,“DoesSommerslikeWomen?”,JournalofSocialPhilosophy,vol.22(1991)pp.75–90.CarolGould,“PrivacyRightsandPublicVirtues:Women,theFamilyandDemocracy,”inCarolGould,BeyondDomination(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1983)pp.3–18;CarolGould,“WomenandFreedom,”TheJournalofSocialPhilosophy,vol.15(1984)pp.20–34;MarthaNussbaum(seeherendorsementonthebackcoverofJusticeforHereandNow);MaryAnneWarren,“IsAndrogynytheAnswertoSexualStereotyping?”,in“Femininity,”“Masculinity,”and“Androgyny”,ed.MaryVetterling-Braggin(Totowa:Rowman&Littlefield,1982)pp.170–86.25InapersonalcommunicationwithOkinconcerningthefeministchaptersofHowToMakePeopleJust.26KathrynMorgan,“Androgyny:AConceptualCritique,”SocialTheoryandPractice(1982)p.268.27AsshedidinhercontributiontothesymposiumissueoftheJournalofSocialPhilosophyonmybookHowToMakePeopleJustin1991.28Moreover,noneofthematerialthatTongwouldhavewantedincludedwouldhaveaffectedtheconclusionsthatIdoendorse.Eventhecriticalmaterialoncomparableworthsimplyarguesonlyforamorerefinedprogram.29Cardsuggeststhatmydiscussionoffamiliesseemstotakeforgrantedaheterosexualhousehold,andthatmyreferencestoparentsseemtoassumethatachild’sparentswillbeonemaleandonefemale.Actually,Iwasthinkingoffamiliesasbeingeitherhomosexualorheterosexual,andwhilemyreferencetoparentsmayhaveassumedthatthereweretypicallytwoparentsineachfamily,Iwasn’tassuminganythingelse.EvenintheonereferenceImaketomothersandfathers,Iwasn’tassumingthatpersonsoccupyingthesedifferentroleshadtobeofdifferentsexes.30IprobablyshouldsaythattheconsiderationsthatIamadvancingheredrawheavilyonmyownpersonalexperiencesandobservations.Fromagedfourteentotwenty-six,IbelongedtotheChristianBrothersreligiousorder,soIhavehadsomeexperienceof,asweareusingthetermhere,alargehomosexualhousehold.Forthelasttwentyyearsorso,however,Ihavebeeninaheterosexualhousehold,wheremypartner,JanetKourany,andIhaveraisedonechild,adaughter,whohasjustgoneofftocollege.SoIactuallyhavesomepersonalknowledgeofwhatisachievable,andnotachievable,inbothhomosexualandheterosexualhouseholds.31Formoreinformationonthenaturaladvantageofwomenasfighterpilots,seeLindaBirdFranke,GroundZero(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1997)p.236.32NewYorkTimes12July1994;GeraldJaynesandRobinWilliams(eds)ACommonDestiny(WashingtonDC:NationalAcademyPress,1989)p.23;AndrewHacker,TwoNations(NewYork:BallantineBooks,1992)pp.46,231;GertrudeEzorsky,RacismandJustice(IthacaNY:CornellUniversityPress,1991)p.27.Actually,thehomiciderateinpoorblackcommunitiesis159per100,000comparedto17per100,000inmiddle-classwhitecommunities.SeeHunger1995:FifthAnnualReportontheStateofWorldHunger(SilverSpring:BreadfortheWorldInstitute,1995)p.43.33Foradiscussionofthesestudies,seeEzorsky,RacismandJustice,pp.14–18.34Ibid.,p.20.SeealsoNewYorkTimes,19October1994.ItalsoturnsoutthattheIQgapbetweenProtestantsandCatholicsinNorthernIrelandisthesameasthegapbetweenwhitesandblacksintheUS.SeeNewYorkTimes,26October1994.35NationalLawJournal,21September1992.SeealsoB.J.Goldman,NotJustProsperity:AchievingSustainabilityWithEnvironmentalJustice(WashingtonDC:NationalWildlifeFederation,1993).36NationalLawJournal.37Ibid.38Ibid.39Ibid.40MarciaCoyle,“WhenMovementsCoalesce,”NationalLawJournal,21September1992.41JohnBellamyFoster,“‘LetThemEatPollution’:CapitalismandtheWorldEnvironment,”MonthlyReview,vol.44(1993)p.14;HusseinAdam,“Somalia:EnvironmentalDegradationandEnvironmentalRacism,”inFacesofEnvironmentalRacism,edsLauraWestraandPeterWenz(LanhamMD:Rowman&Littlefield,1995)pp.195–6.42Ofcourse,asthebookstands,itisstillprobablythemostwide-rangingdiscussionofjusticetoappearindecades.43ThisisarelationshiptowhichIunfortunatelypaidlittleattentioninmywork.44JohnRawls,“TheIdeaofPublicReasonRevisited,”TheUniversityofChicagoLawReview(1997)pp.787–94.45JohnRawls,ATheoryofJustice(CambridgeMA:HarvardUniversityPress,1971)chapter6.46ThisiswhyIarguedthatmyPrincipleofHumanPreservationmustbeimplementedinawaythatcausestheleastharmpossible,whichmeansthat,otherthingsbeingequal,ourbasicneedsshouldbemetbyaggressingagainstnonsentientratherthanagainst\nCONCLUSION243sentientlivingbeings,soastoavoidthepainandsufferingthatwouldotherwisebeinflictedonsentientbeings(p.128n17),andweshouldfavorcullingelkherdsinwolf-freeranges(p.132).47MaryAnneWarren,MoralStatus:OurObligationstoPersonsandOtherLivingThings(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1997)p.178.48SeeDuaneL.Cady,FromWarismtoPacifism(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1989);RobertL.Holmes,OnWarandMorality(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1989).49Onthepoint,seeCady,p.12.50Holmes’commentshaveconvincedmethatitwouldhavebeenbetterifinthetextIhadinitiallydescribedthiscaseas“onewhereonlytheintentionalorforeseenkillingofanunjustaggressorwouldpreventthedeathoffiveinnocentpeopleandwouldresultintheforeseenkillingofoneinnocentbystander,”andsimilarlyforthesevenotherhypotheticalcasesIconsiderinthetext.MyrationalefordescribingthecasesthewayIdidwastomakeiteasiertoassessthemoralityofthehypotheticalactionineachcasebykeepingseparateeachaction’scostsandbenefits.ButInowseethismaygiverisetothemistakenimpressionthattheforeseenside-effectsoftheactionsaresomehowintentional.51JamesP.Sterba,ContemporarySocialandPoliticalPhilosophy(Belmont:WadsworthPublishingCo.,1994)chapter8.\nINDEXabilities/needs260feminism440–4;abortion277–8feministjustice251,265–7,271,440–2;Ackelsberg,Martha256feministphilosophy263–5;action:genderlessness291–2;direct256;LakeWobegon289;egoism427;same-sexcohabitation296;moralrights426–7;socialjustice266;prudentialrights427;socialism18;revolution457–8;Sterba264–5,271,290,291–2,302;voluntary155,157Tong442–4adoptionofchildren449animalliberation372AFDC(AidtoFamilieswithDependentChildren)138,141,animalrights93–4,110n5147n10,434AnimalWelfareCommittee350affirmativeaction:anthropocentricethics27–31,33,382–3;andequalityofopportunity271;environmentalethics27–8,357–8,360–5,370;race327,329–30,450,451;Sterba371–2socialjustice291;anticolonialism240women20,290anti-foundationalism113n34Afghanistan45anti-moralism335–6n3AfricanAmericansseeblackpeopleanti-pornography21Afrocentrism321–2anti-representationalism229n6agency188,190anti-slavery105aggression:anti-sodomylaws306–7defense64–5;anti-theorists208,210human/nonhuman29,54n100,54n101;APAconvention63,68n7,264–5againstneeds33–5,54n100appeasement119aidorganizations132Appiah,Anthony329alienation299Arendt,Hannah420Alinksky,Saul197aristocracy190Allen,Holly254Aristotle:altruism:inequality413;andegoism4,5,6,47n8,74–6,430–1;justice169,172,173,417,437;morality74–5,430;Metaphysics64;nonhumanlife382–3;Mill157;non-question-beggingness459n6;moralconscience410;rankings74–6,82,459n6;polemics64;andself-interest7,8Politics169;AmericanApartheid(MasseyandDenton)327positivefreedom236;analyticalMarxists208,212,214,216–17potentiality191;analyticalsocialdemocrats208,210psychology157;analyticalsocialists208virtue174,178–9anarchism151,171,208,211artificialreproduction276–7Anderson,Elizabeth257Audi,Robert86androcentrism261,328authority98–9androgynoussociety16–18,233,302–6,317n6,445autonomy154,187,190,193–8androgyny:AvoidanceofCrueltyPrinciple382alternatives272–3;APAconvention264–5;bacteria380family18;Baier,Annette:244\nINDEX245‘WhyHonestyIsaHardVirtue’418Cady,Duane454Baier,Kurt:Callicot,J.Baird377–9egoism3–4;Callinicos,N.208TheMoralPointofView83;Canada:morality3–4,5,81,219;pornography21;rationalethics193–4;poverty123–4;rationality77;socialism205;strong/weakvirtueethics170welfarestate433–4Bakunin,Mikhail208,211cannibalism30–1,101Balticrepublics43capabilities157–8,282–3Bangalorewidows’conference283capitalism:Bangladesh44,45,55–6n123consumerism355;Barry,Brian224inequalities129–30,217–18;Baudrillard,Jean208international124;bearhunting,Colorado359justice190,191–2;beautytrap275–6,444marketsocialism214–15;deBeauvoir,Simone208,239–40ownership228n1;Benhabib,Seyla256production209–10;Bentham,Jeremy103–4revolution227–8;Berger,Joel363Rorty217–18;Bergland,Bob13SovietUnion,former206;Berlin,Isaiah238wealthdistribution355Bernstein208Card,Claudia440,444–6bestiality313,314–16,318n19care:binaryoppositions63anthropocentric358;biocentrism27,370,382–3children18–19,294–5;biologicalreproduction276–7de-privatized144;biosphere383ethicsof335–6n3;bisexuality301justice173;bison360men294;Bittker,Boris332privatizedprovision137–8;blackpeople:welfare137–8,140–1,435–6civilrights21,257,353,409;caringwork259,260,274–5employment/unemployment434,449;Carmichael,Stokely327gender254,257,434;Carter,April254historyinUS326–7;chaostheory196inferiorityfeelings326;charity62,177–8,179,198n5radicalpolitics327;cheating352reparation451;Chen,Martha283trainingprograms450–1;childlabor152,207welfare434;childcare18–19,254seealsocriticalracetheory;child-rearing294,295,445,446racechildren:BlackwellCompaniontoAfrican-AmericanPhilosophy329abuseof445;Blair,Tony206adoption449;Bongaarts,John363care18–19,294–5;Bookchin,Murray27fetuses278,384–5n9;Boxill,Bernard:infantmortalityrates433,449;BlacksandSocialJustice329;inneed432;‘Dignity,SlaveryandtheThirteenthAmendment’417neglected113n31;Boylan,Michael438–9seealsochildlaborBradshaw,David314–16China:Britain:coal14;kosherslaughter362–3;humanrights176,437wealthgap215Chinesephilosophy338–44Brownv.BoardofEducation327choice:Bubeck,Dietmut142deliberative157;BureauofLandManagement356libertarianism107,108;Bush,A.148n16liberty115–18;ButternutCompany198n5Mill157;moral107–8;\n246INDEXworkfare141altruism/egoism74–6,430–1;Chomsky,Noam208,210egoism459n5,459n7;ChristianBrothers461n30feminism289–90;Christians,early421human/nonhumanneeds370–2;Christoforouv.RyderTruckRental22morality8,76,81,459n7;Chung-yingCheng451rationality7–8Churchill,Winston355conflictresolutionprinciple221–2citizenship133–4,196–7,253,457–8conflictsituations:civildisobedience409–10,419–21,457–8altruism/self-interest8;civillaw352,368cooperative137;CivilRightsAct22–3,327media425;CivilRightsMovement21,257,353,409rich/poor9–10classseesocialclassConfucianism:CleanAirAct349,353justperson339–40,342,451;CleanWaterAct350juststate342;Clinton,Bill425,426profits339–40;coal14righteousness339–40co-determination236–7Confucius:coercion:filialpiety174–5;communityvalues197;generosity179;freedom108;jen(virtue)170,174;gender260;justice169;governments155;knowledge343;libertarianism9,116;moralperson341;morality354–5;ren(humanity)342–3mutual351–2,355;consensualsex318n19violationofrights109consequencesseeforesight;cohabitation:intentionalityheterosexual292;consequentialism394–6,455–7same-sex293–9consistency74,182Cohen,G.A.208,210,211,212,217,224,225,228constitutionalessentials216Cohen,Joshua208,210,211,212consumerism355,365Cohn-Sherbok,Dan363consumption450ColdWar210contraception277Cole,EveBrowning425ConventiononBiologicalDiversity350Colorado:ConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpecies350bearhunting359;Conyers,John334wildernessprotection350–1cooperation116,137,294,402–3combatants64;co-optation282seealsomilitarydraftcorrectivejustice252commandeconomies214Corvino,John447–9commission,actof33CounterfactualTest394commonland355–6criminaldisobedience438–9commons,tragedyof113–14n41,351criticallegalstudies324–5commonsethics351–2,355–6criticalracetheory240,324–8communitarianism107–9,111n14,169–70,178,438–9criticaltheory,Young323community200n20,201n29;Cuba104autonomy187;culturalcriticism208coercion197;culturalimperialism280directaction256;culturaljustice252,261–3,444libertarianism107–9;culturalpractices283militarypolicy111n9;culture:values197;basicgoods189;virtueethics437–9;leftwing208;worldview194relativism105–6,242–3comparableworthpolicies290,329–30,450Cunningham,Carol363compassion174,175,272–3,413,415Czechoslovakia228–9n5compliance352ComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensationanddating,gender305–6,448–9LiabilityAct350Davidson,Donald175compromise:DeclarationofIndependence412–13\nINDEX247deepecology27racial327,330;deepstructuresofsociety324,325–6superiority25–6,446–7;deer378workers216defense64–5,425–6;Donne,John195seealsoself-defenseDoubleEffectDoctrine406n4Deigh,John436–7doulia(socialcooperation)139–40,143,144Delaney,Martin327DuBois,W.E.B.327delegationofauthority98–9Durkheim,Émile217democracy:duties195–7Churchill355;Dworkin,Andrea278economic231,243–4;dystopia142environmentalethics355–8;ethics356–7;eagles451–2libertarianism98–9;Eagleton,Terry208socialism212–13eatingdisorders254,255democraticegalitarianism231–2,236–8,439–40ecofeminism240Denton,Nancy330ecology27,240dependency:economicdemocracy231,243–4doulia139–40,143,144;economicdisadvantage280–1inferiority162;economicjustice19–20,190,252,257–61,329–30libertarianism145;economics,separatism298nested143;ecosphere196paid/unpaidwork142;EcosystemicPrinciple382stigma259,260;ecosystems:welfare134–6biosphere383;dependencyworkers138–40;endangeredspecies378;freedom147n11;humanneeds372;pay141,436;legislation360;self-sufficiency148n16,149n19;restoration378;status144–5;species381visibility140–1education106;Descartes,René156desegregation327,330;destruction64,65gender445;devaluationofwomen262–3race327,330;developingcountries:reformliberals152;hazardouswasteimports450;resegregation330,336n16;poverty361,434–5separatism298,330;Dewey,John208,229n9socialresponsibility141dialectics239,240–1egalitarianism:DifferencePrinciple(Rawls)116,158biocentric27;dignity419–21,420democratic231–2,236–8,439–40;dikaiosyne344distributivejustice199n9;Dipert,RandallR.113n31justice190–1;directaction256liberalism159–60;discrimination:morality117;gender306,318n24,405;neo-Kantianism199n11;race327,330rich/poor119–20;disparitiesseeinequalitiessocialism210,224–5,228DisproportionalityPrinciple31–5,54n100,371–2,380,381,454egoism:distributivejustice190;action427;egalitarianism199n9;andaltruism4,5,6,47n8,74–6,430–1;feminism279–80;compromise459n5,459n7;global243–4;ethical32,101–2,112n16;materialgoods251–2;morality3–4,6,74,180,181,430;ownership100–1;non-question-beggingness83–4,427;socialgoods165n19;seealsoself-interestSterba122ElSalvador45domesticviolence297,445electoralpolitics253,254domination:elephants378–9masculine261,323;Ellisonv.Brady24merit35;Elster,Jon208\n248INDEXembeddednesstheory(Boylan)193race409;EmergencyWetlandsResourcesAct350Rousseau163–4,413;Empedocles63self-development17–18,233,237,238,416;employment:sexuality409;gender19,267n6,434;socialism231,232;race434,449socialistjustice17–18;endangeredspecies364–5,378Sterba115,116–17;EndangeredSpeciesAct350,357,360welfareliberals32,270;enforcement351,353–5;seealsospeciesequalityseealsocoercionvonEschen,Penny326Engels,Friedrich211,213,215–16,239–40ethicofcare335–6n3Enlightenment413–14ethicalegoism101–2,112n16entitlementtowelfare133–4,136–7,259ethics:environmentalethics:Aristotle178;anthropocentrism27–8,357–8,360–5,370;commons351–2,355–6;biocentrism27,360–5,370;democracy356–7;democratic355–8;globallyjust283–4;duties195–6;human29,30,32,54n106,383;enforcement351,354;Locke101;global365–8;practices170;justice93;rational193–4;legislation349–51,358;real-world/abstract121;needs33–5,451;virtueapproach169,170,171,180,437–9;public/private351;seealsoenvironmentalethicsreconciliation372;Eurocentrism25,26,27,261,362Rolston451–3;Europe:Warren453–4socialism205–6;environmentalgoods351,352socialistegalitarianism225–6environmentaljustice256,349,365–6,367evolution311–12EnvironmentalProtectionAgency350,353,359,361exchangevalues267n5environmentalism:exclusion145–6,254anthropocentric357–8;existentialistMarxism208consumption450;expertsonenvironmentalism357experts357;exploitation280;HumanPreservationPrinciple451–4;gender260;racism449–50;Marx239–40;regulations356;poor207;relationalproperties377–9;racial331;sustainability358–60socialclass323,331–2;envy177,178wealth119–20EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission23–4expropriation97equalopportunity:affirmativeaction271;fa(lawsandnorms)342,343capabilities282–3;facts322–3feministjustice282–3,440,448;FairHousingAct327libertarianism15–16;fair-mindedness3,219,270,458moralrequirement24;family:rights431–2;androgyny18;socialism224–5;feministjustice443;welfareliberals15–16,17–18filialpiety174–5;EqualRightsAmendment316gender323;equality:heterosexuality298–9,445,461n29;Enlightenment413–14;household292–3;feminism16–25;justice191;freedom238–9;lesbians293;gender138–40,409;restructuring18–19;intrinsicvalue373;socialclass444;Kant413;Sterba273,292liberty162,163–4,436,444;FarmAnimalsWelfareCouncil363morality409–10;FederalHousingAuthority332,334propertyrights115;FederalLandPolicyandManagementAct350,360\nINDEX249femininetrait272–3,279–80gender147n11;feminism:Green153–4;androcentrism261,328;Hayek108,109;androgyny440–4;moderns/ancients151;anti-pornography21;negative/positive236;compromise289–90;political99;culturaljustice261–3;socialism231;economicjustice257–61;value241equality16–25;Friedman,Marilyn440facts322–3;Friedman,Milton179Jaggar440–2;Fuller,Margaret298justice252;liberalfeminism274;Gandhi,Arun172Marxist279;Gandhi,Mahatma409,420,454,458patriarchy325;Garvey,Marcus327philosophicalbackground239–40;Gauthier,David77,117,125n3,219,223politicaljustice253–7;gaymarriage307,308pornography275–6;gayrights302,309–10publicpolicy264;gender303–4;radicalcultural274–5;affirmativeaction20,290;second-wave254–5;androgynoussociety302–6;separatism290–9;bias267n6;sexuality254;child-rearing445,446;socialjustice251,263;coercion260;Tong441,442–4dating305–6,448–9;feministjustice:discrimination306,318n24,405;androgynoussociety16,23,445;education445;androgyny251,265–7,271,440–2;electoralpolitics253;equalityofopportunity282–3,440,448;employment19,276n6,434;family443;equality138–40,409;gender16–18;exclusion145–6;nonidealsociety444–6;exploitation260;peacemakingphilosophy263;family323;pornography443;feministjustice16–18;sexualharassment443;freedom147n11;societalreform273;inequalities253–4,260–1;Tong442–4;labordivisions258;violence443;leadershipstyles257;wagedifferentials443legislation306–7;feministphilosophy263–5militaryservice254;fetuses,human278,384–5n9moralobligations145–6;filialpiety174–5oppression18;Finnis,John310–11,317n14privilege162;Flew,Antony255production,meansof267n5;fluorocarbons353–4andrace254,257,434;Folbre,Nancy257,260self-respect267n8;food,globaldistribution13–14sex17,302–3;force115;society300–1;seealsocoercionSterba305,328–9;foresight394–401,406n4,431,454–7,462n50unemployment434;forestry,sustainable353–4violence20–1,445;Foucault,Michel208,210wagedifferentials19–20,147n8,273–4,445;France,excusabletheft113n28welfareentitlement135–6,137Fraser,Nancy252,259,280–1,444genderharassment261Frederickson,George:genderjustice277WhiteSupremacy326genderroles272,448freewill94–5genderlessness264,290,291–2,302,441,447–8freedom:GenericConsistencyPrinciple74coercion108;generosity179dependencyworker147n11;geneticallymodifiedfood215equality238–9;Genovese,Eugene226\n250INDEXGert,Bernard427–31,459n7Hampshire,Stuart208,210Getek,Barbara52n72Hampton,Jean324Gewirth,Alan:Hantavirus380–1additiverights136;happiness312–13immorality429;Hardin,Garrett351,355moral/prudentialrights4–5,47n6,426–7;Hardin,Russell180mutuality/reciprocity147n12;harm:neo-Kantianism199n11;foreseen/intended39–40,395–401;non-question-beggingness458n2;innocents40;rationalethics193–4;suffering38–9,394–5,396–7rationality77–8,79,219;harmonization340,343–4ReasonandMorality71,73;Harrington,Michael434welfare132Hartz,Louis327Gilligan,Carol275Harvard158Gingrich,Newt344n6,425HarvardCivilRightsProject327,336n16globalcorporations243–4Hayden208globaldistribution:Hayek,F.A.108,109,206,213food13–14;hazardouswastedumps449–50wealth206–7healthcare425globaljustice14,226Hegel,G.W.F.107,170,239globalpoverty122,177Hegelian-Marxistdialectics239globalization227,231,243Hegel’sDilemma146–7n6God53n86,55n109Hensonv.Dundee24Goldberg,DavidTheo329Heraclitus61,63goldeneagles362,451–2heterosexism26,27,138,445,446–7Goodin,R.145heterosexuality:goods:cohabitation292;additive136,189,198n6;family298–9,445,461n29;common160–1,170,352;morality306–16environmental351,352;Hill,Anita21,22,344n6firstorderbasic188–9,198n6;Hiroshima394,456maritalgood310–11;historicalmaterialism211,217material251–2;Hobbes,Thomas77,80–1,136,151–2,219,239public95–6,351,360;Hobhouse,L.T.162,164n11secondorderbasic189,198n6;Holmes,RobertL.454,462n50social/natural165n19,356Holmstrom,Nancy260Gordon,Lewis329Holocaust413Gordon,Linda259homosexualjustice25,27,299,446–9Gould,CarolC:homosexualrelationships:democraticegalitarianism439–40;defined304;Marx’sSocialOntology233;marriage307,308;MoralityandSocialJustice233;rights302,309–10;negativeliberty460n21;sexuality308–9;RethinkingDemocracy233society301–2governments:homosexuality:coercion155;abnormalityargument310,311–13;interference99;morality306–16,317n14;juststate342,451;naturallawargument310–11;libertarianjustice102–4;PIBargument313–16;Socrates99publicpolicy308,310Gramsci,Antonio205,215Hook,Sidney206,208,210Gray,J.Glenn64HopinativeAmericans362,451–2Greekphilosophy340–1,344Horn,W.148n16Green,T.H.152–4,157,161,436–7Hospers,John145Greenwoodbusinessdistrict332–3hostageexample456Gretchenexample187–90,192–3,197,438–9households:GulfWar392family292–3;Gutmann,Amy328–35restructuring292–9;same-sex293–9,444,461n29,461n30;Habermas,Jürgen256,283,444single-parent148n16,149n19,273,444;Haddock,Dolores267n4survey332\nINDEX251housework19,258killing41,55n120,398–401,454;Howe,Irving206,208,210police42–3;humanbeings:suffering394–5,396–7dues93,94;institutions:freewill94–5;power94,98–9;Sen158–9;privilege162;social160–1;social144;Sterba372–3welfare232HumanDefensePrinciple29,32–3,35,453integrity62,102humanethics29,30,32,54n106,383intelligence449humannature94,106–7,340–1intentionality84,394–401,406n4,431,454–7,462n50humanneeds29–30,31,364–5,370–2InterActionCouncil366–7HumanPreservationPrinciple29–31,361,451,462n46;interdependence148n18,232,235Nepaleseforests452;interests:nonhumans53n92,371–2,453–4;needs55n108;procreation53n97;other-regarding117;sacrifice35;seealsoself-interestspeciesequality32–3interference99humanrights:intergenderedpeople317n4China176,437;internationalenvironmentalagreements350,366–7culturalrelativism242–3;InternationalEnvironmentalProtectionAct350environmentaljustice367;InternationalMonetaryFund244UNDeclaration113n33;internationalorganizations440UNViennaconference104internetenvy177HumanRightsPrinciple382interpersonal-recognitionobjection73–4humanetreatment360interpersonalrelations401humanity342–3,413,417,420interracialrelationships315–16,318n22Hume,David82,169,174,175,383,430InterspecificPrinciple382intrinsicvalue370,373–4,379IgnaceofAntioch,Bishop421IPOinternetstocks177Illich,Ivan140Iraq45,56n125immorality428–9irrationality80–1,85–6incest313,318n19Israel45incomedistribution192–3;seealsowagedifferentialsJaggar,Alison273,440–2India44,55–6n123,409James,William173indigenouspeople257–8,383,385n17;Jameson,Fredric208seealsonativeAmericansjen(humanity)170,174,175individualism68n2,95,104–5Jencks,Christopher434individuals:Jews:democraticegalitarianism236–8;Holocaust413;liberty156–7,159;kosherslaughter362–3,452;rights103–4,352–3;Nazis414–15,420;self-interest352–3;Pilate411sociality235–6;Josephus,Flavius:transformative241–2;TheJewishWar411–12worldviews194junzi(superiorman)340inequalities:justperson343,415,451;Aristotle413;Confucianism339–40,342capitalism129–30,217–18;justsociety338–9,451gender253–4,260–1;juststate342,451race333–4;justwartheory35–6;socialclass253–4,263;belligerentcorrectives40–2,43;seealsowagedifferentialsjustcause36,42,56n125;infantmortalityrate433,449justmeans36;inferiority162,326,416–17morality45,403–4;informationtechnologystocks191–2non-question-beggingness36;injustice46,177,416–18pacifism45,405,454–7;innocents:reconciliation391–3anti-warpacifism44–5;justworld208harm40;justice:\n252INDEXAristotle172,173,417,437;moralagency377;capitalism190,191–2;rights72;care173;self-respect410,417–18;commongood170;sentiments173–4;communitarianism169–70;virtue174;Confucius169;virtueethics170corrective252;Keillor,Garrison289cultural252,261–3,444;Keith,Justice24demands418–21;killing:economic19–20,190,252,257–61,329–30;innocents41,55n120,398–401;egalitarianism190–1;intentional/foreseen462n50;environmentalethics93;kosher362–3,452;environmentaljustice256,349,365–6,367;lettingdie406n5;family191;permissibility401–2feminism252;King,MartinLutherJr410,420,458Fraser444;Kinsley,Michael177gender277;Kiss,A.C.366global14,226;Kittay,EvaFeder135,259–60;harmony340;Love’sLabor137,139;homosexual25,27,299,446–9;welfare435–6idealForm184;Klinkner,Philip327jen/li175;knowledge194,195,343libertarianism93,94,102–4,110n7,223,431–2;Kohlberg,Lawrence274,275liberty94–5;kosherslaughter362–3,452marketforces177;kraterism190multiculturalist27;Krauthammer,Charles334personal169,341,343;Kropotkin,Piotr259personalvirtue169,172–5,183;Krugman,Paul434–5Plato93,169;political252,253–7,338;labor,reproductive257;racist25,321–4,328–35,449–51;seealsowork,paid/unpaidrationality182–3;labordivisions210,258Rawls110n8,172–3,341;laborstandards231reconciliationist46;labortheoryofvalue211–12relativism175–8;Lackey,Douglas394Smith169,174,175;landethic378socialcontext183–4;laws342,343,345n7;socialpractice171,178;seealsolegislationsocialist15,17–18,190,192–3,232–3;Lawson,Bill:Socrates169,173,183–4;TheUnderclassQuestion329state/personal341;leadpoisoning359Sterba110n1,122,279–82;leadershipstyles257temperaments171–2;leftwingpolitics95,206,208–12;virtue169,170,181;seealsosocialismwelfare129,146;legaldefense425–6welfareliberals16;legislation:Young444;ecosystem360;seealsodistributivejustice;environmentalethics349–51,358;feministjustice;gender306–7;socialjusticehuman/natureneeds364–5;justification:racialdiscrimination327;immorality428–9;species360;morality180,429–30;seealsolawsnon-question-begging4–5,6;Lenin,V.I.216pain360Leopold,Aldo378lesbians293,307;Kalin,Jesse5seealsosame-sexhouseholdsKant,Immanuel:lettingdie/killing406n5equality413;Levin,Michael310,311–13influenceonRawls173;Levine,A.208,211,212KingdomofEnds199n11;li(ritual)170,174,175,343\nINDEX253liberalfeminists274lifeboatexamples8,30,101LiberalPartyofBritain152Lincoln,Abraham102liberalism:Linzey,Andrew363classical158;Litwack,Leon:egalitarianism159–60;TroubleinMind326Hobhouse164n11;Locke,John:liberty151;ethics101;race327–8,331–2;interdependence148n18;welfarestate158;libertarianism102,146n2;seealsoreformliberalsliberty154–5;libertarianjustice93,94,102–4,110n7,223,431–2person156;libertarianism94–5,114n43,146n2;propertyrights239,341;choice107,108;rights103,111n15;coercion9,116;understanding164n12community107–9;LockeanProviso125n3democracy98–9;Lowell,J.R.352dependence145;Luxemburg,Rosa211,213equalopportunity15–16;lynx378facts322;Lyotard,J.-F.184force115;individualism105;McGary,Howard:liberty9,12–13,32,117,239,270;RaceandSocialJustice329Lockean102,146n2;Machan,TiborR.:Narveson432–5;ethicalegoism112n16;needs54n105;IndividualsandtheirRights13;normativism110n6;libertarianjustice431–2;positivism110n6;liberty459n8;publicpolicy109;tragedyofcommons113–14n41;rich/poor12,220–1;welfarestate437rights9,48–9n23,96–7;Maclntyre,Alasdair147n14,169–70,175–6,323,340sovereignty95;McIntyre,Russell278Sterba220;MacKinnon,Catharine21,51n63,276,277–8universalism48–9n23,105–6;Mahowald,Mary277welfareliberals129–30,152,232;Malatesta,Enrico208welfareprograms9,12–13,129–32,136–7;Malcolm,Norman97welfarerights101–2,222–3,431–2MalcolmX327liberty:maledomination261,323choice115–18;malevolence75–6denied119–20;Mandela,Nelson415equality162,163–4,436,444;marginalization280Green154;MarineMammalProtectionAct350individual156–7,159;maritalgood310–11justice94–5;marketforces100,110n8,177,191–2,214liberalism151;marketsocialism214–15,226–7libertarianism9,12–13,32,117,239,270;marriage:license155;genderdifferences255;limits239;homosexual307,308;Locke154–5;maritalgood310–11;Machan459n8;restrictions297Marx151;Marshall,T.H.133–4Mill153,154;Marx,Karl:noninterference437;exploitation239–40;poor10,222;historicalmaterialism211;positive/negative239,436–7,439–40,460n21;humannature107;Rawls165n18,165n19;individualrights103–4;rich9–10,48n19;labordivisions210;rights220;liberty151;Rousseau152;naturedominated240;violations151–2;needs/abilities260;virtue353positivefreedom236;license/liberty155revolution213;\n254INDEXsocialjustice228,444;nonhumanlife370,371,384;socialism215–16;principles381–2;statelesssociety211;rankings453,454;surplus112n26relationalproperties377–80;Marxism208,213;sentience374–5,378–9anti-moralist335–6n3;morality:bourgeoistheory328;altruism74–5,430;labortheoryofvalue211–12;civildisobedience409–10;meta-narratives217;coercion354–5;poverty123–4;compromise8,76,81,459n7;Rorty216–17;Confucius341;socialclass239,323,325,331;egalitarianism117;workers209–10egoism3–4,6,74,180,181,430;Marxistfeminism279equality409–10;masculinetrait272–3,279–80facts/values322;Massey,Douglas330gender145–6;Mattapoisett276–7heterosexuality306–16;media425homosexuality306–16,317n14;men:irrationality80–1;caring294;justification180,429–30;contraception277;noblebehaviour411–12;domination261,323;non-question-beggingness4–5,81;parenting445–6;rationality3–9,28,45–6,77–8,80,219,229n7,414,426–31;same-sexhouseholds298;self-interest6–7,87,178–80,179,438;self-respect267n8;socialjustice179,438socialization295;Morgan,KathrynPauley271–2,442–3seealsogenderMorris,Christopher329Mencius178,341,342,345n7motivation85,179,181–2mentalcomplexity375–6Moulton,Janice263merit/domination35mountainlions381MeritorSavingsBankv.Vinson21–2,24multiculturalism25–7,181,240,281,450Merleau-Ponty,M.208multiculturalistjustice27meta-narratives217multinationals215,243–4Midgley,Mary378Murray,Charles433–4militarydraft405,457mutualaid118–19,147n12militarypolicy111n9Myrdal,Gunnar327militaryservice254Mill,James239Nagasaki456Mill,JohnStuart:Narveson,Jan37,68n4,224,432–5,437Aristotle157;NationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeople334choice157;NationalCoalitionofBlacksforReparationsinAmerica334equalityforwomen239;NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct350liberty153,154;NationalForestManagementAct350,360OnLiberty153,154;NationalParkService362self-development153;nativeAmericans362,450,451–2TheSubjectionofWomen299;naturallawargument155,310–11utility164n6;Nazis414–15,420virtueethics170needs:Miller,David171abilities260;Mills,CharlesW.449–51aggressionagainst33–5,54n100;Mitchell,Juliet279basic233–4,237,361,363–4,433–4,435,438–9,439–40,452;Monsanto215environmentalethics33–5,451;Moon,Donald146–7n6human29–30,31,364–5,370–2;Moore,Stanley211interests55n108;moralagency190,376–7,382libertarianism54n105;moralchoice107–8necessary361;moralconscience410,458nonbasic234;moralrights5,72–3,376–7,426–7peacemakingphilosophy361;moralsentiments169,174,410,414–16plants/animals33–5;moralstatus:poor49n31;intrinsicvalue373–4;rights100–1;\nINDEX255socialism54n105;self/others43–4;welfare133–4societal141–2,378negativity425Okin,Susan255,258,441;neighbourhoodassociation197Justice,GenderandFamily323neo-anarchists208OldLeft208,210neo-Kantianism199n11Oliver,Melvin332,333,335neo-liberalism215,227omission,actof33neo-Marxists208openness3,62,219,270,458Nepal,RoyalChitwanNationalPark364–5,452oppression18,20–1,280Nepal,SanjayKumar364Orwell,George37NewLeft208,212Osafo,S.366NewYorkTimes327Otsuka,Michael101Newsweek172‘ought’implies‘can’principle10–11,47n7,221;NGOs244excusabletheft188;Nicaragua45rich/poor11–13,222,433;Nielsen,Kai217;rights48–9n23;liberty216;socialism226rationality219,223,460n19;Outlaw,Lucius329revolution211,228;ownership:socialism224,227,439;capitalism228n1;socialistegalitarianism225distributivejustice100–1;Nietzsche,Friedrich169,170,173,175,182propertyrights97–8,120–5;noblebehaviour411–12public209nonaggression,mutual373Oxfam132nonanthropocentricethics27–9,31–3ozonelayer353NonexplanationTest394,399,455–6nonhumanlife:pacifism35–6;altruism382–3;absolute/conditional392;HumanPreservationPrinciple53n92,371–2,453–4;anti-war38,40,42,44–5,393,401,406n2,454;intrinsicvalue370;justwar45,405,454–7;moralstatus370,371,384liberal-democratic402,405,456–7;nonidealsociety290–1,444–6nonlethal37–8,53n91,393,454;noninterference431–2,437nonviolence37,53n91,393,454;non-question-beggingness:peacemakingphilosophy391;altruism459n6;reconciliation391–3;egoism83–4,427;Sterba393–4Gewirth458n2;painseesufferinghumansuperiority34–5;Pakistan44,45,55–6n123justwartheory36;Panama45justification4–5,6;pandas379morality4–5,81;parenting18–19,295–6,445–6rationality71,193,438;Parmenides63reasons78;Passmore,John27,370self-interest459n6;Pateman,Carole135,146–7n6Sterba81–2,182paternalism96,103,419non-rationalchoicetheorists208patriarchy135,323,325nonviolence409,454peacemakingapproachtophilosophy45–4218–19,223,426;normativism110n6(non)anthropocentrism27–8;Norton,Bryan52n84appropriative68n4;Nove,Alec214anddialectics239,240–1;Novello,Antonia20–1feministjustice263;Nozick,Robert158,234–5,281,323JusticeforHereandNow61–2,170–1;nursing274–5needs361;nurturance275pacifism391;Nussbaum,MarthaCraven110n8,158,176,282–4,440rationality/morality3–9;relativism176,180–1;obedience402–3,457welfarejustice129;obligations:seealsoreconciliationcharity177–8;Peirce,C.S.218moral145–6,417;personal/political255,256,441responsibility143–4;PersonalResponsibilityandWorkOpportunityAct147–8n15\n256INDEXpersonhood156alleviation133–4;perspectivism229n6Canada123–4;philosophy:developingcountries361,434–5;Chinese338–44;extreme207;Greek340–1,344;global122,177;integrity62;Marxism123–4;political322,323,328;US16,121–4,125–6n7,146,433–4;public194;welfarestate433–4race324;powerlessness280social172;precautionaryprinciple357truth129;Prieur,Jean-Marc421Utopia68;privacy277–8welfare67;privatedisobediencetheory187,189seealsopeacemakingapproach;privileges162warmakingapproachprocreation53n97,310–11;physicalappearance254,255,276seealsoreproductionPIBargument(polygamy/incest/bestiality)313–16production,meansof228n1;Piercy,Marge276–7capitalism209–10;Pilate,Pontius411gender267n5;Pincoff,Edmund171socialism234–6;pity173;socialized18seealsocompassionproductivity:Plato:paid/unpaidwork209;justice93,169;wagedifferentials192–3;moralconscience410;wealth122,124;rationality181,415;welfareentitlement135TheRepublic183–4,199n9,300–1;profits339–40Socraticdialogues63–4;proletarians209–10virtue173propertyrights:PlayboyFoundation278enforcement353;pleasure64,65,179,309equality115;Pogge,Thomas207excusabletheft101,111–12n16,136;polemics63,64Locke239,341;police42–3ownership97–8,120–5;politicalcorrectness261public/private209;politicaljustice252,253–7,338rich/poor111–12n16,130–1,432;political/personal255,256,341socialism234–5politicalphilosophy322,323,328protection94–6,377politics,relativism104prudentialrights5,47n6,72–3,426–7pollution:psychology156,157globalcontrols14;publicgood95–6,351,360hazardouswaste449–50;publicpolicy:toxicairemissions353–4feminism264;polygamy313homosexuality308,310;poor:libertarianism109;deserving132–3;metaphysicsdutyto121–2;public/privatespheres209,256,351;liberty10,222;seealsopersonal/politicalneeds49n31;organizedhelp101;Quine,W.vanO.200n24propertyrights111–12n16;rights432;Rabiduev.OsceolaRefiningCo.22,23,24welfarerights100;race325;seealsorich/pooradvantage/disadvantage332–4;Popper,Karl213affirmativeaction327,329–30,450,451;populationgrowth365deepstructure325–6;pornography21,51n63,275–6,290,443discrimination327,330;postcolonialism261domination327,330;potentiality191–2education327;poverty:equality409;absolute16,49n31;\nINDEX257exploitation331;constitutionalessentials216;andgender254,257,434;DifferencePrinciple116,158;hazardouswastedumps449–50;family/gender323;inequalities253–4;justsociety338–9,451;infantmortalityrate449;justice110n8,172–3,341;intelligencetests449;justifiedagreement47–8n13;interracialrelationships315–16,318n22;Kant173;liberalism327–8,331–2;liberty165n18,165n19;philosophy324;nonidealsociety290–1;Sterba328–9;Nozick234;unemployment434,449;politicaljustice338;violence449;public/private256;wagedifferentials332;reasonability/rationality223–4;wealthdistribution332;redistribution281;seealsoblackpeoplerights344;raceriots332–3Rousseau172,173;racialjustice25,321–4,328–35,449–51self-respect262,263;racialliberalism327–8,331–2socialcooperation140,147n13,252;racism:socialliberal224;education330;ATheoryofJustice15;environmental449–50;welfareliberalism159,436reparations334–5;Reagan,Ronald274–5stigma263;reasonability223–4,229n7US26,325–6reasons:radicalculturalfeminism274–5malevolent75–6;ranchfencingexample359–60moral3–4;Rand,Ayn110n7,111n12non-question-beggingness78;rankings:ranking74–6,81,86,193;altruism74–6,82,459n6;rationality85–6;moralstatus453,454;self-interested6–7rationality7;reciprocity139,143,147n12reasons74–6,81,86,193;reconciliation52n84;self-interest74–6,82,459n6animalliberation372;rape11,20,256,262,267n7environmentalethics372;rationalethicstheorists193–4justwartheory/pacifism391–3,405;rationality:justice46;compromise7–8;Sterba223,224,242,289Gewirth77–8,79,219;Record,Robert125–6n7Greekphilosophy181,340–1,415;redistribution146–7n6,235,281Hobbes219;reformecology27Hume430;reformliberals152–4,155,160–1,162,436–7hybridity87;reformistsocialdemocraticleftists214–15intentionality84;reformistsocialists208justice182–3;Regan,Tom375–6morality3–9,28,45–6,77–8,80,86–7,219,229n7,414,426–Reiman,J.429–30,458–9n531;relationalproperties377–80motivation181–2;relativism:Nielsen219,223,460n19;culture105–6,242;Nietzsche182;justice175–8;non-question-beggingness71,193,438;MacIntyre175–6;Plato181,415;peacemakingphilosophy176,180–1;practical/theoretical77–80,82–3,88;politics104;rankings7;rights104–5,437;reasonability223–4;Rorty175;reasons85–6;Sterba175self-interest78–9;Remick,Helen274–5Taoism460n22;ren(humanity)340,342–3,343–4truth428renzheng(benevolentgovernment)342rats379–80ReparationProposalsforAfricanAmericansAct334Rawls,John:reparationsforracism334–5,451civildisobedience409–10;reproduction276–7,278–9,444;\n258INDEXseealsoprocreationRolston,HolmesIII451–3RespectforLifePrinciple382Rorty,Richard208,210;responsibility94,143–4anti-representationalism229n6;revolution:anti-foundationalism113n34;action457–8;basicrights103–4;capitalism227–8;capitalism217–18;civildisobedience457–8;ColdWar210;class-based213;Marxism216–17;Marx213;perspectivism229n6;Nielsen211,228;relativism175;socialism208,210,227–8,439;socialism206,207–8,212–13;welfarestate281–2truth229n6rhinocerospoaching363Rousseau,JeanJacques:rich:dignity421;liberty9–10,48n19;equality163–4,413;surpluswealth432–3asinfluence172,173;rich/poor9–10,130–1;liberty152;egalitarianism119–20;andRawls172,173;global206–7;SocialContract151,163–4libertarianism12,220–1;RoyalChitwanNationalPark,Nepal364–5,452‘ought’implies‘can’principle11–13,222,433;Rummerl-Bulska,I.366rights432;Ryan,Cheyney37Sterba100,119–20,124–5,233–4,237,435–6righteousness339–40Sacks,Karen257rights:same-sexhouseholds461n29;additive136;androgyny296;citizenship457–8;ChristianBrothers461n30;equalopportunity431–2;cohabitation293–9;expropriation97;liberty/equality444;fetus278;men298gay302,309–10;Sandel,Michael107,201n29,323humannature106–7;Sartre,J.-P.208humanrights104,113n33,176,242–3,367,437;Satz,Debra217individual103–4,352–3;Schlessinger,Laura313Kant72;Schopenhauer,Arthur170,175libertarianism9,48–9n23,96–7;Schroeder,Gerhard206liberty220;Schweickart,David214Locke103,111n15;Schweitzer,Albert370Marx103–4;scienceofsociety213–14minority352;segregation,racial327,330moral5,72–3,376–7,426–7;selenium352,356–7moralagency382;self-criticalness3,65–6,219,270needs100–1;self-defense29,399,401,454‘ought’implies‘can’principle48–9n23;Self-DefensePrinciple371–2,380–1poor/rich432;self-development:protection94–5,95–6;equality17–18,233,237,238,416;prudential5,47n6,72–3,426–7;Mill153;Rawls344;socialism32,233;relativism104–5,437;welfareliberals158sovereignty94,97–8;self-governance98,100universal4–5,48–9n23,72–3,237;self-help255violation102,109;self-interest:workers’231,243–4;andaltruism7,8;seealsopropertyrights;individualrights352–3;welfarerightslimits32;RightsofMoralAgentsPrinciple382morality6–7,87,178–80,179,438;rightwingpolitics95motivation179;Robeson,Paul216,228n4non-question-beggingness459n6;Robinson,Randall334rankings74–6,82,459n6;RockyMountainNationalPark359rationality78–9;Roemer,John208,212,214reasons6–7;\nINDEX259Smith55n108;justice169,174,175;seealsoegoismandMencius178;self-managementofworkers243–4self-interest55n10self-preservation30Smith,Rogers327self-respect:smoking353gender267n8;socialcitizenship133–4Kant410,417–18;socialclass:Rawls262,263;exploitation323,331–2;socialgood262family444;self-sufficiency:inequalities253–4,263;dependencyworker148n16,149n19;intelligencetests449;wages149n19;Marxism239,323,325,331;women259–60privilege162;Sen,Amartya110n8,137,157–9socialism210;SenateArmsServicesCommittee22wealthdistribution162–3sentience:socialcontract352degreesof375–6;socialcooperation139–40,142–4,147n13,252fetuses384–5n9;socialdemocracy208,227intrinsicvalue374;socialdemocraticparties205–6,215moralstatus374–5,378–9socialdisadvantage280–1sentimentality173socialecology27,240sentiments173–4,383;socialgoods161,165n19,262seealsomoralsentimentssocialinsuranceschemes134separatism:socialjustice270–1;economics298;affirmativeaction291;education298;androgyny266;feminist290–9egalitarianism228;serviceprovision97;feminism251,263;seealsowelfareFraser444;Sessions,George27,52n84Marx228,444;sex17,302–3,316n3morality/self-interest179,438;sexism24,25–6,295–7,405,415–16,447racism333sexualassault21,256,267n7,275socialliberals224sexualharassment21–3,52n72,254,261–2;socialphilosophy172EqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission23–4;socialpractice171,178,261feministjustice443;socialism205–8,237–8;SupremeCourt24–5androgyny18;sexualintercourse97,318n19Canada205;sexuality:Cuba104;equality409;democracy212–13;feminism254;egalitarianism210,224–5,228;happiness312–13;equalopportunity224–5;homosexualrelationships308–9;equality231,232;normality311;Europe205–6;pleasure309facts322–3;shadowwork140freedom231;Shaffer,Mark362justice15,17–18,190,192–3,232–3;shan(virtues)343marketsocialism214–15,226–7;Shanley,Mary140MarxandEngels215–16;Shapiro,Thomas332,333,335needs54n105;sharedcommunityworldviewimperative194–5,196–8Nielsen224,227,439;Simon,Julian125–6n7‘ought’implies‘can’principle226;single-parenthouseholds148n16,149n19,273,444production,meansof234–6;slavery:propertyrights234–5;DeclarationofIndependence102,412–13;revolution227–8;humanity417;Rorty206,207–8,212–13;racialinjustice332,334–5;self-development32,233;universalism105,176;socialclass210;whitesupremacy326SovietUnion212;Smith,Adam:Sterba233–6;invisiblehand351;US205–6;\n260INDEXUtopia211peacemakingphilosophy61–2,67–8,129,170,176,180–1,socialistegalitarianism225–6,228218,223,239,240–1,263,361,391;socialistjustice15,17–18,190,192–3,232–3positivefreedom236;socialization295–6,447race328–9;society:racialjustice334–5;civildisobedience410;rationality/morality86–7,219;deepstructures324,325–6;reconciliation223,224,242,289;feministjustice273;redistribution235;gender300–1;relativism175;homosexualrelationships301–2;reproduction278–9;individuals324,325–6;rich/poor100,119–20,124–5,233–4,237,435–6;obligations141–2,378;sexualharassment262;scienceof213–14;socialproduction235–6;stateless211socialism233–6;Socrates:theoreticalrationality77–8;dialogues63–4;warmakingapproachtophilosophy263;government99;welfarestate226,419justice169,173,183–4;Stevens,Jan362asrecruiter66stigma:sodomylaws316dependence259,260;solidarity64,65racism263;Solinger,Rickie141welfare133Solomon,RobertC.437–8;subhumanbehaviour413,414–15TheJoyofPhilosophy182subject-of-a-life(Regan)375–6SouthernChristianLeadershipConference334subordination239–40,283,441;sovereignty112n19;seealsodominationindividualism95,104–5;subsistenceasright237,431–2libertarianism95;suffering:national365–6;harm38–9,394–5,396–7;rights94,97–8innocentlives394–5,396–7;SovietUnion43,45,206,212justification360Speamann,Robert99suffrage253species360,381suicide96speciesequality31–3,34,54n101,54n102,371,452superiority:Starr,Kenneth426domination25–6,446–7;starvation207female297–8;Sterba,JamesP.:heterosexism446–7;androgyny264–5,271,290,291–2,302;human34–5,371;anthropocentrism371–2;privileges162communitarianjustice170;SupremeCourt:compromise/morality81;sexualharassment21–3,24–5conflictresolutionprinciple221–2;surpluswealth112n26,130–1,187–8,189,432–3ContemporarySocialandPoliticalPhilosophy457;sustainability:ecology240;civiclaw368;economicjustice329–30;environmentalism358–60;equality115,116–17;forestry353–4;family273,292;short-termdesires351feministphilosophy263–4;Sweden225,226,227gender305,328–9;symbolicjustice252HowtoMakePeopleJust263,270,339,439;humanbeings372–3;TAFDC(TransitionalAidtoFamilieswithDependentChildren)HumanPreservationprinciple361;147n10justice110n1,122,279–82;TANF(TemporaryAidforNeedyFamilies)141,147n9JusticeforHereandNow61–2,65–6,71,74,77,132,170,181–Tanzania44,45,55–6n1232,187,232,263,270,271,289,302,314,321,339,370,416,Taoism460n22429,431,435–6;taxation124,143–4libertarianism220;Taylor,Charles111n14,111n15,181MoralityandSocialJustice233;Taylor,Paul27,52n84,370,374non-question-beggingness81–2,182;Teena,Brandon303‘ought’implies‘can’principle221,222,226;terrorist/hostageexample456pacifism393–4;theft,excusable101,113n28,136,187–8,438–9\nINDEX261Thomas208utilitarianism199n10,201n28,322Thomas,Clarence21,22,344n6utility164n6Thomas,Laurence329,457–8;Utopia:VesselsofEvil414,420feminist276–7,284,443;Thrasymachus99philosophy68;Thurow,Lester332socialism211deTocqueville,Alexis327Tong,Rosemarie442–4values:totalitarianism107,194–5,198n3,200n23civic357–8;totalizations184community197;toxicairemissions353exchange/use267n5;trade-offs42–3intrinsic370,373–4,379;tragedyofthecommons113–14n41,351labortheory211–12;trainingprograms450–1moraljudgments322;TransAfrica334natural357–8;transgenderedpeople292,303universalism176transsexualpeople303Velushi,Lukas362Trebilcot,Joyce17victims46,416–18trust172Vietnamwar212truth:violations:analytic/synthetic200n24;liberty151–2;philosophy129;rights102,109rationality428;violence:Rorty229n6domestic297,445;TulsaRiot332feministjustice443;Turner,Ted179,438gender20–1,445;Twain,Mark:race449;HuckleberryFinn176socialgroups280;tyranny151againstwomen20–1,254,256–7,275,290virtue184;Uganda44,45,55–6n123Aristotle174,178–9;understanding164n12Confucius170,174;unemployment207,434,449justice169,170,181;UnitedNations244;Kant174;Charter392;liberty353;DeclarationofHumanRights113n33;personal172–5,183;GeneralAssembly366;Plato173;InterActionCouncil366–7;social169RioDeclaration361;virtueethics169,170,171,180,437–9Viennaconference104visibility:UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme350,361dependencyworker140–1;UniversalDeclarationofHumanResponsibilities366–7genderinequalities260–1UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights366,367voles380–1universalism:volition156–7consistency182;voluntaryassociation99humannature340–1;voting180,253libertarianism48–9n23,105–6;VotingRightsAct327rights4–5,48–9n23,72–3,237;voyeurism261slavery105,176;vulnerability/protection377values/virtues176US:wagedifferentials:ButternutCompany198n5;economicjustice19–20;poverty16,121–4,125–6n7,146,433–4;feministjustice443;race327;gender19–20,147n8,273–4,445;racism26,325–6;productivity192–3;socialism205–6race332USConstitution111n13wages:USDeclarationofIndependence96,102,104,412–13dependencyworker141;USFishandWildlifeServices350,362self-sufficiency149n19USForestService360,361Walker,David327usevalues267n5\n262INDEXWalzer,Michael132,134,252,323coercive9;war:libertarianism9,12–13,129–32,136–7absolute/conditional392;welfarerights:cooperation402–3;internationalorganizations440;obedience402–3justice271;Waring,Marilyn257libertarianism101–2,222–3,431–2;warmakingapproachtophilosophy3,61–5,68n9,218,263,425;nations440;calistheniceffect66;poor100;pleasures64;positive/negative222–3,232;recruitmenteffect66;recognitionof14–15,234–5;winnowingeffect66universal16Warren,MaryAnne17,440,453–4;welfarestate:MoralStatus:Canada433–4;OurObligationstoPersonsandOtherLivingThings454liberalism158;wealth:Machan437;electoralpolitics254;multiculturalism281;exploitation119–20;Narveson437;productivity122,124;patriarchy135;redistribution146–7n6;poverty433–4;statistics332;Sterba226,419surplus112n26,130–1,187–8,189,432–3welfarestateliberalism152,159wealthdistribution:welfarestatism110n1,121–2,125,129–30,226Britain215;Wertheimer,Alan331capitalism355;West,Cornel329global206–7;Westing,ArthurH.365,366ideal/necessity160;whalehunting385n17race332;whitesupremacy325–6,328–35socialclass162–3Whitewaterinvestigation426Weber,KarlE.364WildandScenicRiversAct350Weber,Max217wilderness350–1,356Weiss,E.B.366WildernessAct350,360welfare:wildlife360care137–8,140–1,435–6;will156–7citizenship133–4;Will,George107,108dependency134–6;Williams,Bernard172entitlement133–4,136–7,259;Williams,Joan292Gewirth132;Wilson,E.O.383institutions232;Winch,Peter217justice129,146;Wing-sitChan175libertarianism222–3;Wittgenstein,Ludwig97needs/rights133–4;Wobegon,Lake289philosophy67;Wollstonecraft’sDilemma135,146–7n6privatizedprovision142;wolves353–4publicprovision132–3,142–3;women:race434;affirmativeaction20,290;single-parenthouseholds148n16;alienation299;socialright133;black254,257,437;stigma133civilrights21;welfarebenefits259,434devaluation262–3;welfareentitlement135–6,137,138exclusion145–6;welfareliberalstate281–2laborforce19;welfareliberals435–7;oppression20–1;equalopportunity15–16,17–18;self-sufficiency259–60;equality32,270;socialization295–6;justice16;subordination239–40,441;libertarianism129–30,152,232;violenceagainst20–1,254,256–7,275,290;needs54n105;seealsogenderpositivewelfarerights222–3;work:Rawls159,436;hours152;self-development158paid/unpaid19,142,209,257–9,292;welfareprograms434;value199n12;\nINDEX263worthpoints273–4workers:capitalism209–10;domination216;Marxism209–10;rights231,243–4;self-management243–4workfare141WorldBank244WorldTradeOrganization244worldviews194worthseecomparableworthpoliciesWright,E.G.208,211WupatkiNationalMonument362Xunzi341YellowstonePark360Young,IrisM.259,280,323,444zhi(knowledge)343–4Zimbabwe363