哲学导论-版-Philosophy 145页

\nPhilosophy:AVeryShortIntroduction‘Thisisalivelyandinterestingintroductiontophilosophy.DespiteitsbrevityPhilosophy:AVeryShortIntroductionaddressesmanyofthecentralphilosophicalquestionsinanengagingandthought-provokingstyle.Atthesametimeitgivesreadersaflavourofsomeofthegreatestworksofphilosophyandprovidesexpertguidanceforthosewhowanttoreadtheoriginalworksthemselves.EdwardCraigisalreadyfamousastheeditorofthebestlongworkonphilosophy(theRoutledgeEncyclopedia);nowhedeservestobecomeevenbetterknownastheauthorofoneofthebestshortones.’NigelWarburton,TheOpenUniversity\nVeryShortIntroductionsareforanyonewantingastimulatingandaccessiblewayintoanewsubject.Theyarewrittenbyexperts,andhavebeenpublishedinmorethan25languagesworldwide.Theseriesbeganin1995,andnowrepresentsawidevarietyoftopicsinhistory,philosophy,religion,science,andthehumanities.Overthenextfewyearsitwillgrowtoalibraryofaround200volumes–aVeryShortIntroductiontoeverythingfromancientEgyptandIndianphilosophytoconceptualartandcosmology.VeryShortIntroductionsavailablenow:ANCIENTPHILOSOPHYContinentalPhilosophyJuliaAnnasSimonCritchleyTHEANGLO-SAXONAGECOSMOLOGYPeterColesJohnBlairCRYPTOGRAPHYANIMALRIGHTSDavidDeGraziaFredPiperandSeanMurphyARCHAEOLOGYPaulBahnDADAANDSURREALISMARCHITECTUREDavidHopkinsAndrewBallantyneDarwinJonathanHowardARISTOTLEJonathanBarnesDemocracyBernardCrickARTHISTORYDanaArnoldDESCARTESTomSorellARTTHEORYCynthiaFreelandDRUGSLeslieIversenTHEHISTORYOFTHEEARTHMartinRedfernASTRONOMYMichaelHoskinEGYPTIANMYTHOLOGYAtheismJulianBagginiGeraldinePinchAugustineHenryChadwickEIGHTEENTH-CENTURYBARTHESJonathanCullerBRITAINPaulLangfordTHEBIBLEJohnRichesTHEELEMENTSPhilipBallBRITISHPOLITICSEMOTIONDylanEvansAnthonyWrightEMPIREStephenHoweBuddhaMichaelCarrithersENGELSTerrellCarverBUDDHISMDamienKeownEthicsSimonBlackburnCAPITALISMJamesFulcherTheEuropeanUnionTHECELTSBarryCunliffeJohnPinderCHOICETHEORYEVOLUTIONMichaelAllinghamBrianandDeborahCharlesworthCHRISTIANARTBethWilliamsonFASCISMKevinPassmoreCLASSICSMaryBeardandTHEFRENCHREVOLUTIONJohnHendersonWilliamDoyleCLAUSEWITZMichaelHowardFreudAnthonyStorrTHECOLDWARGalileoStillmanDrakeRobertMcMahonGandhiBhikhuParekh\nGLOBALIZATIONPLATOJuliaAnnasManfredStegerPOLITICSKennethMinogueHEGELPeterSingerPOLITICALPHILOSOPHYHEIDEGGERMichaelInwoodDavidMillerHINDUISMKimKnottPOSTCOLONIALISMHISTORYJohnH.ArnoldRobertYoungHOBBESRichardTuckPOSTMODERNISMHUMEA.J.AyerChristopherButlerIDEOLOGYMichaelFreedenPOSTSTRUCTURALISMIndianPhilosophyCatherineBelseySueHamiltonPREHISTORYChrisGosdenIntelligenceIanJ.DearyPRESOCRATICPHILOSOPHYISLAMMaliseRuthvenCatherineOsborneJUDAISMNormanSolomonPsychologyGillianButlerandJungAnthonyStevensFredaMcManusKANTRogerScrutonQUANTUMTHEORYKIERKEGAARDPatrickGardinerJohnPolkinghorneTHEKORANMichaelCookROMANBRITAINPeterSalwayLINGUISTICSPeterMatthewsROUSSEAURobertWoklerLITERARYTHEORYRUSSELLA.C.GraylingJonathanCullerRUSSIANLITERATURELOCKEJohnDunnCatrionaKellyLOGICGrahamPriestTHERUSSIANREVOLUTIONMACHIAVELLIQuentinSkinnerS.A.SmithMARXPeterSingerSCHIZOPHRENIAMATHEMATICSTimothyGowersChrisFrithandEveJohnstoneMEDIEVALBRITAINSCHOPENHAUERJohnGillinghamandChristopherJanawayRalphA.GriffithsSHAKESPEAREGermaineGreerMODERNIRELANDSOCIALANDCULTURALSeniaPasˇetaANTHROPOLOGYMOLECULESPhilipBallJohnMonaghanandPeterJustMUSICNicholasCookSOCIOLOGYSteveBruceNIETZSCHEMichaelTannerSocratesC.C.W.TaylorNINETEENTH-CENTURYSPINOZARogerScrutonBRITAINChristopherHarvieandSTUARTBRITAINJohnMorrillH.C.G.MatthewTERRORISMCharlesTownshendNORTHERNIRELANDTHEOLOGYDavidF.FordMarcMulhollandTHETUDORSJohnGuypaulE.P.SandersTWENTIETH-CENTURYPhilosophyEdwardCraigBRITAINKennethO.MorganPHILOSOPHYOFSCIENCEWittgensteinA.C.GraylingSamirOkashaWORLDMUSICPhilipBohlman\nAvailablesoon:AFRICANHISTORYHIEROGLYPHSJohnParkerandRichardRathbonePenelopeWilsonANCIENTEGYPTIanShawHIROSHIMAB.R.TomlinsonTHEBRAINMichaelO’SheaHUMANEVOLUTIONBUDDHISTETHICSBernardWoodDamienKeownINTERNATIONALRELATIONSCHAOSLeonardSmithPaulWilkinsonCHRISTIANITYLindaWoodheadJAZZBrianMortonCITIZENSHIPRichardBellamyMANDELATomLodgeCLASSICALARCHITECTUREMEDICALETHICSRobertTavernorTonyHopeCLONINGArleneJudithKlotzkoTHEMINDMartinDaviesCONTEMPORARYARTMythRobertSegalJulianStallabrassNATIONALISMStevenGrosbyTHECRUSADESPERCEPTIONRichardGregoryChristopherTyermanPHILOSOPHYOFRELIGIONDerridaSimonGlendinningJackCopelandandDianeProudfootDESIGNJohnHeskettPHOTOGRAPHYDinosaursDavidNormanSteveEdwardsDREAMINGJ.AllanHobsonTHERAJDenisJuddECONOMICSParthaDasguptaTHERENAISSANCETHEENDOFTHEWORLDJerryBrottonBillMcGuireRENAISSANCEARTEXISTENTIALISMThomasFlynnGeraldineJohnsonTHEFIRSTWORLDWARSARTREChristinaHowellsMichaelHowardTHESPANISHCIVILWARFREEWILLThomasPinkHelenGrahamFUNDAMENTALISMTRAGEDYAdrianPooleMaliseRuthvenTHETWENTIETHCENTURYHabermasGordonFinlaysonMartinConwayFormoreinformationvisitourwebsitewww.oup.co.uk/vsi\nEdwardCraigPhilosophyAVeryShortIntroduction1\n3GreatClarendonStreet,Oxfordox26dpOxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,andeducationbypublishingworldwideinOxfordNewYorkAucklandBangkokBuenosAiresCapeTownChennaiDaresSalaamDelhiHongKongIstanbulKarachiKolkataKualaLumpurMadridMelbourneMexicoCityMumbaiNairobiSãoPauloShanghaiTaipeiTokyoTorontoOxfordisaregisteredtrademarkofOxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountriesPublishedintheUnitedStatesbyOxfordUniversityPressInc.,NewYork©EdwardCraig2002ThemoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenassertedDatabaserightOxfordUniversityPress(maker)FirstpublishedasanOxfordUniversityPresspaperback2002FirstpublishedasaVeryShortIntroduction2002Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthepriorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermittedbylaw,orundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographicsrightsorganizations.EnquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeoftheaboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,attheaddressaboveYoumustnotcirculatethisbookinanyotherbindingorcoverandyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirerBritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataDataavailableLibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationDataDataavailableISBN0–19–285421–65791086TypesetbyRefineCatchLtd,Bungay,SuffolkPrintedinGreatBritainbyTJInternationalLtd.,Padstow,Cornwall\nContentsListofillustrationsix1Philosophy1Averyshortintroduction2WhatshouldIdo?11Plato’sCrito3Howdoweknow?24Hume’sOfMiracles4WhatamI?35AnunknownBuddhistontheself:KingMilinda’schariot5Somethemes456Of‘isms’617Somemorehighspots74Apersonalselection8What’sinitforwhom?100Bibliography119WheretogonextIndex127\n\nListofillustrations1Boethiuslistenstothe6Theimageofthechariot:wordsoftheLadyArjunaandKrishna40Philosophy6©H.Lute/Trip©WallaceCollection/BridgemanArtLibrary7Theimageofthechariot:HerculesandAthena402Socrateswasdepicted©AncientArt&ArchitecturebyAristophanesasanCollectioneccentricinabasket138Marbleheadof©AKGLondonEpicurus473Socratestakesthehemlock©BritishMuseum/Bridgemanfromthegaoler22ArtLibrary©WolfeCollection,Metropolitan9Beyondthefamily,MuseumofArt,NewYork;photoErichLessing/AKGLondonanythinggoes53©Punch4Humewassmarterthanhelooked2510Everysubjecttalks©MaryEvansPictureLibraryitsowntalk67©www.CartoonStock.com5TheMiracleoftheLoavesandFishes3111Descartesas©DagliOrti/theartarchivephysiologist80©AKGLondon\n12Progressthrough16Hobbes’sLeviathanrisesconflict86outoftheEnglish©MaryEvansPictureLibrarycountryside106©Bypermissionofthe13Darwin’smessageBritishLibrarywasn’ttobedigestedquickly9017TheRajaconsultshis©DownHouse/Bridgemanpriests108ArtLibrary©V&APictureLibrary14Whattoblowupnext?9718Theauthorandhis©AKGLondonwares117Photograph:SimonBlackburn15Epicureanisminpractice?10219Philosophyclass118©J.King/Trip©Punch\nChapter1PhilosophyAveryshortintroductionAnyonereadingthisbookistosomeextentaphilosopheralready.Nearlyallofusare,becausewehavesomekindofvaluesbywhichweliveourlives(orliketothinkwedo,orfeeluncomfortablewhenwedon’t).Andmostofusfavoursomeverygeneralpictureofwhattheworldislike.Perhapswethinkthere’sagodwhomadeitall,includingus;or,onthecontrary,wethinkit’sallamatterofchanceandnaturalselection.Perhapswebelievethatpeoplehaveimmortal,non-materialpartscalledsoulsorspirits;or,quitetheopposite,thatwearejustcomplicatedarrangementsofmatterthatgraduallyfalltobitsafterwedie.Somostofus,eventhosewhodon’tthinkaboutitatall,havesomethinglikeanswerstothetwobasicphilosophicalquestions,namely:whatshouldwedo?and,whatisthere?Andthere’sathirdbasicquestion,towhichagainmostofushavesomekindofananswer,whichkicksinthemomentwegetself-consciousabouteitherofthefirsttwoquestions,namely:howdoweknow,orifwedon’tknowhowshouldwesetaboutfindingout–useoureyes,think,consultanoracle,askascientist?Philosophy,thoughtofasasubjectthatyoucanstudy,beignorantof,getbetterat,evenbeanexperton,simplymeansbeingrathermorereflectiveaboutsomeofthesequestionsandtheirinterrelations,learningwhathasalreadybeensaidaboutthemandwhy.Infactphilosophyisextremelyhardtoavoid,evenwithaconsciouseffort.Considersomeonewhorejectsit,tellingusthat‘Philosophyis1\nuseless’.Forastart,theyareevidentlymeasuringitagainstsomesystemofvalues.Secondly,themomenttheyarepreparedtosay,howeverbrieflyanddogmatically,whyitisuseless,theywillbetalkingabouttheineffectualityofcertaintypesofthought,orofhumanbeings’incapacitytodealwithcertaintypesofquestion.Andtheninsteadofrejectingphilosophytheywillhavebecomeanothervoicewithinit–ascepticalvoice,admittedly,butthenphilosophyhasneverbeenshortofscepticalvoices,fromtheearliesttimestothepresentday.WeshallmeetsomeoftheminChapter6.Iftheytakethesecondofthoselines,theymayalsobeimplyingthatmakingthediscoverythathumanbeingsjustcan’tcopewithcertainkindsofquestion,andmakingthatdiscoveryforyourself–andactuallymakingit,ratherthanjustlazilyassumingthatyouknowitalready–isn’tavaluableexperience,orisanexperiencewithouteffects.Surelythatcannotbetrue?Imaginehowdifferenttheworldwouldhavebeenifwewereallconvincedthathumanbeingsjustaren’tuptoansweringanyquestionsaboutthenatureorevenexistenceofagod,Philosophyinotherwords,ifallhumanbeingswerereligiousagnostics.Imaginehowdifferentitwouldhavebeenifwewereallconvincedthattherewasnoanswertothequestionofwhatlegitimatesthepoliticalauthoritythatstateshabituallyexerciseovertheirmembers,inotherwords,ifnoneofusbelievedthattherewasanygoodanswertotheanarchist.Itmaywellbecontroversialwhetherthedifferenceswouldhavebeenforthegood,orforthebad,orwhetherinfacttheywouldn’thavematteredasmuchasyoumightatfirstthink;butthattherewouldhavebeendifferences,andverybigones,issurelybeyondquestion.Thathowpeoplethinkaltersthings,andthathowlotsofpeoplethinkaltersthingsfornearlyeveryone,isundeniable.Amoresensibleobjectiontophilosophythanthatitisineffectualisprettymuchtheopposite:thatitistoodangerous.(Nietzsche,seepp.93–99,calledaphilosopher‘aterribleexplosivefromwhichnothingissafe’–thoughhedidn’tmeanthatasanobjection.)Butwhatthisusuallymeansisthatanyphilosophyisdangerousexceptthespeaker’s2\nown,andwhatitamountstoisfearofwhatmighthappenifthingschange.Itmightoccurtoyouthatperhapstherearepeoplewhodon’teventhinkitworthwhiletoenterintothisdiscussionatall,howeverbriefly,noteventosupportthescepticalstancethatIhavejustmentioned.Andyouwouldberight,butthatdoesn’tmeantosaythattheydon’thaveaphilosophy.Farfromit.Itmaymeanthattheyarenotpreparedto‘philosophize’–tostatetheirviewsandargueforthemordiscourseuponthem.Butitdoesn’tmeanthattheyhavenoabidingvalues,nothingwhichtheysystematicallyregardasworthwhile.Theymightthink,forinstance,thatrealexpertiseatdoingsomethingismoredesirablethananyamountoftheoreticalknowledge.Theiridealwouldnotsomuchbeinsightintothenatureofrealityasthecapacitytobecomeonewithitintheexecutionofsomeparticularactivity,tohavetrainedoneselftodosomethingwithoutconsciouseffortasifbyaPhilosophyperfectlyhonednaturalinstinct.Iamnotjustmakingthesepeopleup:alotofZenBuddhistthought,orperhapsIshouldsayZenBuddhistpractice,leansstronglyinthisdirection.Andthisideal,ofaimingatacertainkindofthoughtlessness,wastheoutcomeofagreatdealofpreviousthinking.Ifphilosophyissoclosetous,whydosomanypeoplethinkthatitissomethingveryabstruseandratherweird?Itisn’tthattheyaresimplywrong:somephilosophyisabstruseandweird,andalotofthebestphilosophyislikelytoseemabstruseorweirdatfirst.That’sbecausethebestphilosophydoesn’tjustcomeupwithafewnewfactsthatwecansimplyaddtoourstockofinformation,orafewnewmaximstoextendourlistofdosanddon’ts,butembodiesapictureoftheworldand/orasetofvalues;andunlessthesehappentobeyoursalready(rememberthatinavagueandunreflectivewayweallhavethem)itisboundtoseemverypeculiar–ifitdoesn’tseempeculiaryouhaven’tunderstoodit.Goodphilosophyexpandsyourimagination.Somephilosophyisclosetous,whoeverweare.Thenofcoursesomeisfurtheraway,and3\nsomeisfurtherstill,andsomeisveryalienindeed.Itwouldbedisappointingifthatwerenotso,becauseitwouldimplythathumanbeingsareintellectuallyrathermonotonous.Butthere’snoneedtostartatthedeepend;westartattheshallowend,where(asI’vesaid)weareallstandinginthewateralready.Doremember,however(heretheanalogywiththeswimming-poolleavesmeinthelurch,thewayanalogiesoftendo),thatthisdoesn’tnecessarilymeanthatweareallstandinginthesameplace:whatisshallowandfamiliar,andwhatisdeepandweird,maydependonwhereyougotin,andwhen.Wemaybestandinginthewater,butwhytrytoswim?Inotherwords,whatisphilosophyfor?Thereisfartoomuchphilosophy,composedunderfartoowidearangeofconditions,fortheretobeageneralanswertothatquestion.Butitcancertainlybesaidthatagreatdealofphilosophyhasbeenintendedas(understandingthewordsverybroadly)ameanstosalvation,thoughwhatwearetounderstandbysalvation,andsalvationfromwhat,hasvariedaswidelyasthephilosophiesthemselves.ABuddhistwilltellyouthatthepurposeofPhilosophyphilosophyisthereliefofhumansufferingandtheattainmentof‘enlightenment’;aHinduwillsaysomethingsimilar,ifinslightlydifferentterminology;bothwillspeakofescapefromasupposedcycleofdeathandrebirthinwhichone’smoraldesertsdetermineone’sfutureforms.AnEpicurean(ifyoucanfindonenowadays)willpooh-poohallthestuffaboutrebirth,butofferyouarecipeformaximizingpleasureandminimizingsufferinginthisyouroneandonlylife.Notallphilosophyhassprungoutofaneedforacomprehensivewayoflivinganddying.Butmostofthephilosophythathaslastedhasarisenfromsomepressingmotivationordeeplyfeltbelief–seekingtruthandwisdompurelyfortheirownsakesmaybeaniceidea,buthistorysuggeststhataniceideaisprettymuchallitis.ThusclassicalIndianphilosophyrepresentstheinternalstrugglebetweentheschoolsofHinduism,andbetweenthemallandtheBuddhists,forintellectualsupremacy;thebattleforthepreferredbalancebetweenhumanreason4\nandscripturalrevelationhasbeenfoughtinmanycultures,andinsomeisstillgoingon;ThomasHobbes’sfamouspoliticaltheory(weshallbeseeingmoreofitlater)triestoteachusthelessonshefelthadtobelearntintheaftermathoftheEnglishCivilWar;Descartesandmanyofhiscontemporarieswantedmedievalviews,rootednearlytwothousandyearsbackintheworkofAristotle,tomoveasideandmakeroomforamodernconceptionofscience;Kantsoughttoadvancetheautonomyoftheindividualinthefaceofilliberalandautocraticregimes,Marxtoliberatetheworkingclassesfrompovertyanddrudgery,feministsofallepochstoimprovethestatusofwomen.Noneofthesepeoplewerejustsolvinglittlepuzzles(thoughtheydidsometimeshavetosolvelittlepuzzlesontheway);theyenteredintodebateinordertochangethecourseofcivilization.ThereaderwillnoticethatIhaven’tmadeanyattempttodefinephilosophy,buthavejustimpliedthatitisanextremelybroadtermPhilosophycoveringaverywiderangeofintellectualactivities.Somethinkthatnothingistobegainedfromtryingtodefineit.Icansympathizewiththatthought,sincemostattemptsstrikemeasmuchtoorestrictive,andthereforeharmfulratherthanhelpfulinsofarastheyhaveanyeffectatall.ButIwillatleasthaveashotatsayingwhatphilosophyis;whetherwhatIhavetooffercountsasadefinitionornotissomethingaboutwhichweneedn’t,indeedpositivelyshouldn’t,bothertoomuch.Once,averylongtimeago,ourancestorswereanimals,andsimplydidwhatevercamenaturallywithoutnoticingthatthatwaswhattheyweredoing,orindeedwithoutnoticingthattheyweredoinganythingatall.Then,somehow,theyacquiredthecapacitiestoaskwhythingshappen(asopposedtojustregisteringthattheydo),andtolookatthemselvesandtheiractions.Thatisnotasbigajumpasmayatfirstsightappear.Startingtoaskwhythingshappenisinthefirstplaceonlyamatterofbecomingalittlemoreconsciousofaspectsofone’sownbehaviour.Ahuntinganimalthatfollowsascentisactingasifawarethatthescentis5\n1.InthisRenaissancepaintingBoethius(c.ad480–525)listenstothewordsoftheLadyPhilosophy.TheConsolationofPhilosophyishismostfamousbook,andconsolationwaswhatheneededasheawaitedexecution.Butphilosophyhashadmanypurposesbesidesthisone.\ntherebecauseitspreyhasrecentlypassedthatway–anditisbecausethatreallyiswhythescentistherethatitoftensucceedsinitshunt.Knowledgeofthissortofconnectioncanbeveryuseful:ittellsuswhattoexpect.Furthermore,toknowthatAhappensbecauseBhappenedmayimproveyourcontroloverthings:insomecasesBwillbesomethingthatyoucanbringabout,orprevent–whichwillbeveryusefulifAissomethingyouwant,orwanttoavoid.Manyoftheseconnectionsanimals,humansincluded,follownaturallyandunconsciously.Andthepractice,onceoneisawareofit,canvaluablybeextendedbyconsciouslyraisingsuchquestionsincaseswherewedonothaveconvenientlybuilt-inanswers.Therecouldbenoguarantee,however,thatthisgenerallyvaluabletendencywouldalwayspayoff,letalonealwayspayoffquickly.Askingwhyfruitfallsoffabranchprettysoonleadsonetoshakethetree.Askingwhyitrains,orwhyitdoesn’train,takesusintoadifferentPhilosophyleague,especiallywhentherealmotiveunderlyingthequestioniswhetherwecaninfluencewhetheritrainsornot.Oftenwecaninfluenceevents,anditmaywellpaytodevelopthehabitofasking,whenthings(ahuntingexpedition,forexample)havegonewrong,whetherthatwasbecausewefailedinourpartoftheperformance,asopposedtobeingdefeatedbymattersbeyondourcontrol.Thatsameusefulhabitmighthavegeneratedthethoughtthatadroughtistosomeextentduetoafailureofours–andnowwhatfailure,whathavewedonewrong?Andthenanideamightcropupwhichserveduswellinourinfancy:thereareparents,whodothingsforusthatwecan’tdoourselves,butonlyifwe’vebeengoodandtheyaren’tcrosswithus.Mighttherebebeingsthatdecidewhethertherainfalls,andshouldn’twebetryingtogetontherightsideofthem?Thatisallitwouldtakeforhumanbeingstobelaunchedintotheinvestigationofnatureandbeliefinthesupernatural.Soastheirmentalcapacitiesdevelopedourancestorsfoundtheirpowerincreasing;buttheyalsofoundthemselvesconfrontedbyoptionsandmysteries–life7\nraisedahostofquestions,wherepreviouslyithadsimplybeenlived,unquestioningly.Itisjustaswellthatallthishappenedgradually,butevensoitwasthebiggestshockthespecieshaseverencountered.Somepeople,thinkingmoreinintellectualthanbiologicalterms,mightliketosaythatitwaswhatmadeushumanatall.Thinkofphilosophyasthesoundofhumanitytryingtorecoverfromthiscrisis.Thinkingofitlikethatwillprotectyoufromcertaincommonmisapprehensions.Oneisthatphilosophyisarathernarrowoperationthatonlyoccursinuniversities,or(lessabsurdly)onlyinparticularepochsorparticularcultures;another,relatedtothefirst,isthatitissomethingofanintellectualgame,answeringtonoverydeepneed.Onthepositiveside,itmayleadyoutoexpectthatthehistoryofphilosophyislikelytocontainsomefascinatingepisodes,asindeeditdoes,anditcertainlyaddstotheexcitementifwebearinmindthatviewofwhatisreallygoingon.Canreelinghomosapiensthinkhiswaybacktothevertical?Wehavenogoodreasontoanswerthatquestioneitherway,YesorNo.AreweevensurethatweknowwheretheverticalPhilosophyis?That’sthekindofopen-endedadventurewearestuckwith,likeitornot.Butisn’tthatjusttoobroad?Surelyphilosophydoesn’tincludeeverythingthatthataccountofitimplies?Well,inthefirstplace,itwilldouslessharmtoerronthebroadsidethanthenarrow.Andinthesecondplace,thescopeoftheword‘philosophy’hasitselfvariedconsiderablythroughhistory,nottomentionthefactthattherehasprobablyneverbeenatimeatwhichitmeantthesamethingtoeveryone.Recentlysomethingratherstrangehashappenedtoit.Ontheonehandithasbecomesobroadastobeclosetomeaningless,aswhenalmosteverycommercialorganizationspeaksofitselfashavingaphilosophy–usuallymeaningapolicy.Ontheotherhandithasbecomeverynarrow.Amajorfactorherehasbeenthedevelopmentofthenaturalsciences.Ithasoftenbeenremarkedthatwhenanareaofinquirybeginstofinditsfeetasadiscipline,withclearlyagreed8\nmethodsandaclearlyagreedbodyofknowledge,fairlysoonitseparatesofffromwhathasuptothenbeenknownasphilosophyandgoesitsownway,asforinstancephysics,chemistry,astronomy,psychology.Sotherangeofquestionsconsideredbypeoplewhothinkofthemselvesasphilosophersshrinks;andfurthermore,philosophytendstobeleftinchargeofthosequestionswhichwearenotsurehowbesttoformulate,thoseinquirieswearenotsurehowbesttosetabout.Thismultiplicationofthrivingdisciplinesinevitablybringsanotherfactorintoplay,namelyspecializationwithinuniversities,andcreatestheopportunitytothinkofphilosophyyetmorenarrowly.Universityphilosophydepartmentsaremostlyquitesmall.Inconsequence,soistherangeoftheirexpertise,whichtendstoclusteraroundcurrent(sometimesalsolocal)academicfashion–itmustdo,sinceitisnormallytheywhomakeit.Besides,undergraduatecoursesare,forobviousreasons,quiteshort,andthereforehavetobeselectiveonpainPhilosophyofgrosssuperficiality.Sothenaturalassumptionthatphilosophyiswhatuniversityphilosophydepartmentsteach,thoughIcertainlywouldn’tcallitfalse,isrestrictiveandmisleading,andoughttobeavoided.Thisbookiscalledaveryshortintroductiontophilosophy.But,asIhopeisnowbecomingclear,Ican’texactlyintroduceyoutophilosophy,becauseyouarealreadythere.NorcanIexactlyintroduceyoutophilosophy,becausethereisfartoomuchofit.NomorecouldI‘showyouLondon’.Icouldshowyouafewbitsofit,perhapsmentionahandfulofothermainattractions,andleaveyouonyourownwithastreetmapandsomeinformationaboutotherguidedtours.That’sprettymuchwhatIproposetodoforphilosophy.AtthebeginningofthischapterIspokeofthreephilosophicalquestions,thoughtheymightbetterhavebeencalledthreetypesorclassesofquestion.Chapters2–4introduce,fromaclassictext,anexampleofeachtype.Byprogressingfromveryfamiliarwaysof9\nthinkinginthefirsttosomethingmostreaderswillfindaltogetherstrangerinthethird,theyalsoillustrate(thoughnotbyanymeansinitsfullextent)anotherthemeofthisintroduction:therangeofnoveltytobeencounteredinphilosophy.Ihavealsoharpedonsomewhataboutthedifficultyofavoidingbeingphilosophical.Ifthatisso,weshouldexpecttofindsomekindofphilosophymoreorlesswhereverwelook.Asiftoconfirmthat,ourfirstexamplecomesfromGreeceandthefourthcenturybc,oursecondfromeighteenth-centuryScotland,andourthirdfromIndia,writtenbyanunknownBuddhistatanunknowndateprobablybetween100bcandad100.Allthreeofthesetextsshouldbefairlyeasytoobtain,especiallythefirsttwo(seeBibliography).Thisbookcanperfectlywellbereadwithoutthem,buttherearegoodreasonstoreadthemyourselfalongsideitifthatispossible.Oneistobeabletoenjoythewriting.Muchphilosophyiswell-written,anditisstronglyrecommendedtoenjoythewritingaswellastheviewsandthearguments.Butthemainreasonisthatitwillenableyoutojoininifyouwantto.RememberthatthisisnotaPhilosophycompletelyforeigncountry:youaretosomeextentalreadyaphilosopher,andyourordinarynativeintelligencehasaworkpermithere–youdon’tneedtogothroughanyesoterictrainingtogetalicencetothink.Sodon’tbeafraid,asyouread,tostartaskingquestionsandformingprovisionalconclusions.Butnotice,provisional.Whateveryoudo,don’tgethookeduponthatlaziest,mostcomplacentofsayings,that‘everyonehasarighttotheirownopinion’.Acquiringrightsisn’tthatsimple.Rather,keepinmindthewrycommentofGeorgeBerkeley(1685–1753):‘Fewmenthink,yetallwillhaveopinions.’Iftrue,that’sapity;foronething,thethinkingispartofthefun.Finally,pleasereadslowly.Thisisaveryshortbookaboutaverylongsubject.Ihavetriedtopackalotin.10\nChapter2WhatshouldIdo?Plato’sCritoPlato,whowasborninoraround427bcanddiedin347,wasnotthefirstimportantphilosopherofancientGreekcivilization,butheisthefirstfromwhomasubstantialbodyofcompleteworkshascomedowntous.IntheIndiantraditiontheVedas,andmanyoftheUpanishadsareearlier;butoftheirauthors,andhowtheywerecomposed,weknownexttonothing.TheBuddhapre-datedPlato,thoughbyjusthowmuchisamatterofscholarlydisagreement;buttheearliestsurvivingaccountsofhislifeandthoughtwerewrittendownsomehundredsofyearsafterhisdeath.InChina,Confuciusalsopre-datedPlato(hewasborninthemiddleofthepreviouscentury);again,wehavenothingknowntohavebeenwrittenbyhim–thefamousAnalectsarealatercompilation.Plato’sworksalltaketheformofdialogues.Mostlytheyarequick-firedialogues,conversationalinstyle,thoughsometimestheprotagonistsareallowedtomakeextendedspeeches.TherearetwodozenorsooftheseknowntobebyPlato,andahandfulmorethatmaybe.Ofthecertainlyauthenticgrouptwoaremuchlongerthantheothers,andbetterthoughtofasbooksconsistingofsequencesofdialogues.(TheyareRepublicandLaws,bothdevotedtothesearchfortheidealpoliticalconstitution.)SothereisplentyofPlatotoread,andmostofitisfairlyeasytoobtain,intranslationinrelativelyinexpensiveeditions.Asregardsdegreeofdifficulty,therangeiswide.Atoneendwehavea11\nnumberofdialoguescomparabletotheoneweshallshortlybetakingacloselookat.AttheotherareworkslikeTheSophist,capableattimesofmakingthemostexperiencedreadersscratchtheirheadsandlookblank.AnearconstantfeatureofPlato’sdialoguesisthepresenceofSocrates,usuallythoughnotalwaysastheleaderofthediscussion.SincethedialoguecalledCritoisnotonlyconductedbySocratesbutalsoconcernswhathe,personally,shoulddoinacertainpredicamentinwhichhefindshimself,weneedtoknowalittleabouthimandhowhegotintothesituationheisinwhenthedialogueopens–namelyinprisoninAthensawaitingimminentexecution.Socrateslivedfrom469to399bc.Hewasclearlyacharismaticfigure,withasomewhateccentriclifestyle.Acceptingthepovertyitentailed,heappearstohavespentallhistimeinunpaiddiscussionwithwhomeverwouldjoinwithhim,whichincludedmanyofthebetter-off,hencemoreleisured,youngmenofAthens.TheseincludedPlato,PhilosophywhoseadmirationforSocratesmotivatedthecareerandwritingswhichimmortalizedbothofthem.NotallourevidenceaboutSocrates’thoughtcomestousthroughPlato,butbyfarthegreaterpartofitdoes,soitisnoeasymattertodistinguishclearlybetweentheirviews.LittledoubtthatPlatowassometimestryingtoportraythehistoricalSocrates;littledoubtthathewassometimesusingthefigureofSocratesasaliterarydevicetoconveyhisownphilosophy.Wheretodrawthelineisn’talwaysobvious,butscholarsseemnowbroadlyagreedthattherealSocratesconcentratedonethicalquestionsaboutjusticeandvirtue(‘HowshouldIlive?’issometimescalled‘theSocraticquestion’);andthatheconstantlyprobedwhetherhisfellowAtheniansreallyunderstoodwhatwasinvolvedinthesemattersanythinglikeaswellastheyclaimedto.Norwashealwayssurethatheunderstoodithimself–butthenhedidn’tclaimto.12\n2.NoteveryonewasasimpressedbySocratesasPlatowas.InTheClouds,byhiscontemporaryAristophanes,heappearsasaself-importanteccentricwhospendshistimedanglinginabasket(soastobeinabetterpositionforstudyingcelestialphenomena).\nThatsoundslikeaprettyreliablewayofmakingenemies,sothisaccountofSocrates’activitiesfitsinwellenoughwiththenextepisode:threecitizens,surelyactingasthepublictipofahostileiceberg,broughtaprosecutionagainsthimonachargeofcorruptingtheyouthofAthens.Byasmallmajorityhewasfoundguilty,andcondemnedtodeath.InTheApologyofSocratesyoucanreadPlato’sversionofthe(totallyunapologetic)speecheshemadeathistrial,oneinhisowndefence,oneaftertheverdict,oneafterthesentence.Socrateswasnotexecutedstraightaway.Atthetimeofhistrialaceremonialperiodwasbeginning,whichwouldendonlywhenanofficialshipreturnedtoAthensfromtheislandofDelos.Thishadreligioussignificance,andnoexecutionscouldtakeplacewhiletheshipwasaway.SoSocrateshadtospendthistimeinprison–longenoughforhisfriendstosetuparoutineofvisitinghim,gettoknowtheguards,andformaplanofaction.Withtimerunningout,itfallstoCritotoputthisplantoSocrates:theyproposetobribetheguards,SocratescanescapefromAthensandgosomewhereelse,maybetoThessaly,wherePhilosophyCritohasfriendswhowillofferhospitalityandprotection.ThedialogueCritoisPlato’saccountoftheirdiscussionandSocrates’response.Consideringthatthistextis2,400yearsold,oneofthemostsurprisingthingsaboutitisthatitisnotmoresurprising.YoumaynotagreewitheverythingSocratessays–forinstance,manyreaderswillfeelthathisviewoftheclaimsthatthestatecanproperlymakeontheindividualareexaggerated–butvirtuallyallthepointsmadewillbeperfectlyfamiliartoanyonewhohaseverhadtothinkaboutadifficultdecision.WhenPlatowritesaboutloveweareawarethathisperspectivediffersfromours;whenwereadhimoncosmologywearebackinacompletelydifferentage;butthisdiscussionofaspecificethicalquestion,‘WhatshouldIdointhiscase?’,couldalmosthaveoccurredyesterday.IsaidinChapter1thatwewerealltosomeextentphilosophers,andthatthereforesomephilosophywouldfeelverynearhome.Hereisanexample–fromancientGreece.14\nJustonewordbeforewestart.ThereisastandardmethodforreferringtopassagesinPlato’stexts,onethatworkswhichevereditionandtranslationyouareusing.ItactuallygoesbacktothepaginationofaRenaissanceeditionpublishedin1578,andisknownasStephanusnumbering(fromtheLatinnameoftheeditor,HenriEstienne).AnymoderneditionofPlatowillshowit,eitherinthemargin,oratthetopofthepage.Ishallbeusingitthroughoutthischapter.Thefirstpageorso(43a–44b)setsthescene.Critomentionsthatheiswellinwiththewarder.Socratessaysthatathisageyoushouldn’tcomplaintoomuchabouthavingtodie.ButthenCritoopenshiscampaignofpersuasion.Hestarts–asonewellmight–bytellingSocrateshowmuchhisfriendsvaluehim,andthenimpliesthatSocratesmightcaretoreturnthecompliment:hisfriends’reputationisatstake–ifhestaysinprisonanddiespeoplewillthinkthattheyweren’tWhatshouldIdo?preparedtogototheexpenseofbuyinghisescape.Nowalotofverydifferentpointsareraisedveryquickly(andlefthalfdealtwith–Critoisnotwrittenlikeawell-constructedlecture,butmuchmorelikearealconversation).Socratesrespondsbysayingthatoneshouldn’tbotheraboutwhat‘people’think;theopinionthatshouldmattertousisthatofreasonablepeoplewithaclearviewofthefacts.‘Wecan’taffordtotakethatline,’saysCrito,‘majorityopinionistoopowerful.’‘Onthecontrary,’Socratesreplies,‘asregardswhatreallymattersthemajoritydon’thavemuchpoweratall.’Andwhatreallymatters,apparently,iswhetheroneiswiseorfoolish(44d).Isuspectthatthisideawillstrikemanyreadersasaratherstrangeone.WhatdoesSocratesmeanbywisdom,thatitshouldbetheonlythingthatreallymatters?Weshouldkeepthatquestioninmind,andkeepaneyeopenforanythinglaterinthedialoguethatmightshedlightonit.Critojustletsitgo,andgoesbacktotheearlierissueoftheconsequencesforSocrates’friends.IsSocratesthinkingthathisfriendswillbeindangerofreprisalsifheescapes?Yes,itseemsthatheis(and15\nhereturnstoemphasizetherisktothemat53a/b).ThisofcoursequiteneutralizesCrito’sargument:nopointinappealingtothebadeffectsonyourfriendsifyoudon’tdosomething,whentheeffectsonthemifyoudoarelikelytobeatleastasbad.Crito,understandablyquitewoundup,nowmakesalongerspeech(45a–46a)inwhichhefiresoffallhisremainingammunitioninanemotionalandhaphazardsortofway.Socratesshouldn’tthinkoftherisktohisfriends,ortheexpense–anyway,theexpensewon’tbeallthatgreat.Norshouldhebotheraboutthefactthatescapeintoexilewouldmeangoingbackonthingshesaidathistrial.(Weshallsoonsee,at46b–46dand52c,thatthiscutsnoicewhateverwithSocrates,forwhombeingconsistent,truetohimselfandhisreasonsforacting,isaveryimportantvalue.)Next,Critogoeson,Socratesisactingwronglyingivinguphislifewhenhecouldsaveit,andsofallinginwithhisenemies’wishes.Critodoesn’ttelluswhetherhethinksthatforSocratestogiveuphislifePhilosophywhenhecouldsaveitwouldbewrongjustbecauseitmeanssuccessforhisenemies,orwhetheritisanintrinsicallywrongthingtodo–assomehavethoughtsuicideintrinsicallywrong–orforsomeotherreasonagain.Whichofthesehehasinmindactuallymakesquiteadifferencetowhatheissaying,butheisinnostateforprecisethinking.Nowseriouslyoverheating,hefirstaccusesSocratesofshowingnoconcernforhischildren,thenofshowingalackofcourage(45d).(ConsideringthecouragerequiredforwhatSocratesactuallydoesintendtodo,thelatterchargeseemsparticularlyabsurd–theoneabouthischildrenSocrateswilldealwithlater.)Runningoutofsteam,CritonowreturnstohiscomplaintaboutthedamagetoSocrates’friends’reputations,begsSocratestoagreewithhim,andcomestoastop.InhisdistressandanxietyCritohasbecomeprettyoffensiveinhislastcoupleofparagraphs.ButthisSocratesoverlooks,withakindremarkaboutCrito’swarmfeelings,andtakescontrolofthedialogue.The16\nthinkingimmediatelybecomesslowerandcalmer,andbetterorganized.HereturnstothefirstpointCritomade–theoneaboutreputation–andaskswhoseopinionweshouldrespect,thoseofthewiseorthefoolish,thoseofthemanyorthoseoftheexpert?Critotrotsalonggivingtheobviousanswers,thewayhisdiscussion-partnersusuallydowhenSocratesgetsintogear.Sointhiscaseweshouldn’tbelisteningtothemajority,buttosomeonewhounderstandswhatitistobejust,toactrightly,tolivewellorasoneshould.Otherwiseweshalldamageoursouls,aswewouldhavedamagedourbodiesbylisteningtothemajorityratherthanthedoctorinamatterofphysicalhealth.ThecrucialquestioniswhetheritisrightforSocratestotrytoescape–allthisstuffaboutmoney,reputations,andbringingupchildrenisofnorealconsequence(48c).Let’sjustpauseforamoment.OnethingweshouldnotdoisreadWhatshouldIdo?philosophyuncritically.Isn’tthereawhiffofmoralfanaticismaboutwhatSocratesisnowsaying?Whatdamagetohissoulexactly?Andwhyshoulditbesofrightful?Andifhisfriends’reputationsandhischildren’supbringingareontheline,mightn’thebepreparedtoriskalittledamagetohissoul?Afterall,hewouldn’tthinkmuchofanyonewhowasn’tpreparedtoriskphysicalinjuryforthesakeoffriendsandfamily.Admittedly,wehavebeentold(backat47e–48a)thatthesoul,ormoreaccurately‘thatpartofus,whateveritis,whichisconcernedwithjusticeandinjustice’,ismuchmorevaluablethanthebody.Butwehaven’tbeentoldwhyorhow;andtherehasbeennoexplanationofwhyitshouldbesovaluablethattheprospectofdamagetoitinstantlyoverridesanylittlematterslikefriends’reputationsorthewell-beingofone’schildren.Andbesides,ifchildrenarenotwellcaredfor,mightthatnotdamage‘thatpartofthem,whateveritis,whichisconcernedwithjusticeandinjustice’?ItlooksasifSocratesneededadifferentdiscussion-partner,someonewhomighthavestartedcallingforanswerstoafewofthesequestions.ButletushearSocratesout,andgetaviewofthefullpicture,ashe17\narguesthatitwouldbewrongforhimtoescapeintoexile.FirstheasksCritotoagreethatdoingsomeoneawrongisalwayswrong,evenwhendoneinresponsetoawrongdonetoyou(49a–49e).Revengemaybesweetbutitisnotpermissible.Thestrategicimportanceofthisiseasytosee:ifitisaccepted,thenwhetheranyonehaswrongedSocrates–theState,thejurors,hisaccusers–becomesirrelevant;theonlyquestioniswhetherhehimselfwouldbedoingawronginfollowingCrito’splan.ClearlySocratesdoesnotexpecttheretobewidespreadagreementonthispoint.Heknowsonlytoowellthattherearemanywhoholdthatretaliationispermissible,eventhatitispositivelyright.ButitisCritoheistryingtoconvince,andthetwoofthemhaveevidentlybeenhereindiscussionbefore–‘ourformeropinion’hecallsit.AndCritoagrees:‘Istandbyit.’Socratesnowputsforwardtwomuchlesscontroversialpremisses:doingharmtopeopleiswrong(49c),andbreakingafairagreementiswrong(49e).Heisnowabouttoarguethatifhetriestoescapehewillbedoingboth.TheinjuredpartieswouldbetheStateofAthensanditsPhilosophylaws;heimaginesthemcomingforward,personified,toputtheircase.Inthefirstplace,hewouldbedoingthemharm(50a–50b),indeedhewouldbe‘intendingtheirdestruction’.Thatsoundsodd–surelytheonlythingSocrateswouldbeintendingistoescapeexecution?Butthenextsentencetellsuswhatismeant:ifwhatheproposestodoweretakenasanexample,theresultwouldbethecollapseofthelawandhencealsooftheState,neitherofwhichcansurviveifprivateindividualsignorethedecisionsofthecourts.Whatwehavehereisanappealtoaveryfamiliarmoralargument:‘Whatwouldhappenifeverybodybehavedlikethat?’WhenIdosomething,itisasifIweregivingeveryoneelsemypermissiontodothesame,andIhavetoconsidertheconsequencesofthat,notjustofmyindividualaction.TheGermanImmanuelKant(1724–1804),somewouldsaythemostinfluentialphilosopherofmoderntimes,madethisthebasicprincipleofmorality(thoughhefoundarathermorecomplicatedwayofstatingit).18\nWehaveallheardofit,wehaveallhaditthrownatus,andhereitispoppingupin400bc.Inthesecondplace,theysuggest(50c),Socrateswouldbebreakinganagreement.Butfromhereto51dwhattheLawsandtheStatehavetosaydoesnotseemtobeaboutanagreementatall,inanynormalsense–novoluntaryconsenttoanythingonthepartofSocratesisinquestion.Itmightbebetterdescribedasbeingaboutobligationsofgratitude,oraboutthedeferenceowedbyacreaturetoitscreator,orboth.TheburdenofthisparagraphisthattheAthenianState,whichiscomparedtoaparent,madeSocrateswhatheis;andheisnotdissatisfiedwithhowitdidit.Soheisboundbyitswishes,anditisridiculoustosupposethathemighthavearightofretaliationagainstit.Thelastpointreallyoughttobeunnecessary,sinceSocrateshasalreadyWhatshouldIdo?saidthatretaliationiswronganyway.Buthecanbeseenascoveringhimselftwice:evenifretaliationweresometimesright,asmanythinkitis,itwouldstillnotberightinthiscase,wheretheparent-likeStateistheotherparty.AstohisbeingboundbytheState’swishes,thistotalitarianconceptionoftheState’spowersandthecorrespondingviewofparentalauthorityismorestipulatedthanjustifiedinthispassage.Thatisn’tsurprising,becauseitwouldn’tbeatalleasytojustifythedoctrinethattheState,byvirtueofitsroleinthelivesofhumanindividuals,therebyacquirestherighttodisposeofthemmuchasiftheywereinanimateartefactsmadeforitsownpurposes.AStatemaydoalotforitscitizens,butcanitconceivablydosomuchthattheycanlayclaimtonopurposesoftheirownbeyondthoseitallowsthem?AndoncewegrantthatSocratesmightbeallowedsomepurposesofhisownindependentofthewillofAthens,thenmightnotstayingalive(ifthatiswhathewants)beoneofthem?Crito,werehenottheperfectYes-man,couldhavehadrathermoretosayatthisstage.However,at51dSocrates’imaginaryantagonistsintroduceapointwhich,ifcorrect,makesaverybigdifference:Socrateshasofhisown19\nfreewillenteredintoanagreementwiththemtorespectandobeythelaws.Notthatheeversignedadocumentormadeanofficialstatement;buthisbehaviourwasasufficientindicationofhisagreement.Forthelawallowedhim,onceanadult,totakehispossessionsandleaveAthenswithoutanymaterialpenalty.Hestayed.Norhasheeverinhisseventyyearsbeenawayeventemporarily,exceptonmilitaryservice.Athistrialhemadeitclearthathehadnointerestinexileasapossiblealternativesentence.Takentogether,thisisclearvoluntaryconsenttotheinstitutionsofAthens.Doeshenow(contrarytowhatheavowedat49e)intendtobreakhisagreement?MuchofSocrates’argumenthasbeenconductedatahighlevelofprinciple,sometimesdizzilyhigh–aswhenhesaidthatcomparedwiththeimportanceofdoingwhatisright,mattersofreputation(hisfriends’aswellashisown)andtheupbringingofchildrenwereofnoaccount.ButhereintheclosingpagesofCrito,between52candtheend,therearesignsofhimcoveringhisback.Whetherhewantstobesureofconvincingthosenotconvincedofhisloftyprinciples,orPhilosophywhetherheisn’thimselfaltogetherhappytolettheentireissuerestonthem,thefactisthatreputations,theriskstohisfriends,hisprospectsinexile,andtheeducationofhischildrennowmakeareappearance.NotmanypagesbackSocrateswastellingCritonottobotherabouttheopinionofthecrowd.But‘theLawsandtheState’thinkitisatleastworthmentioningthatheisindangerofmakinghimselfalaughingstock(53a),andofhearingmanydeprecatorythingsabouthimself(53e),andofgivingthejurorsreasontothinkthattheymadetherightdecision(53b/c).(MoreimportanttooneholdingSocrates’principlesisthathehimselfwouldbeashamedifheweretogobackonwhathesoproudlysaidathistrial(52c)–hisownintegrityoughttomeanmoretohimthanthat.)Heshouldthinkofthepracticalconsequences:ifheescapeshisfriendswillbeindanger(53b),hislifeinexilewillbeunrewardinganddemeaning(53b–53e).Andfinally(54a),whatwillitbenefithischildren?IshetobringthemupinThessaly(Thessalyofall20\nplaces!),exilesthemselves?AndiftheyaretogrowupinAthens,whatdifferencetothemwhetherheisdeadormerelyabsent?Hisfriendswillseetotheireducationineithercase.TheLawshaveonelastcardtoplay,wellknownandmuchusedbymoralistsfromearliesttimesrightdowntoourown:theoldfire-and-brimstonemanœuvre.ShouldSocratesoffendagainstthem,theysay,hecanexpectanuncomfortablereceptionintheafterlife.Thelawsoftheunderworldaretheirbrothers,andwillavengethem.Finally,Socratesspeaksagaininhisownperson(54d).Hisclosingwordsbroachanotherperennialtopic:therelationshipbetweenmoralsandreligion.Somehaveheld(andmanyhavedisagreedwiththem)thatmoralityisimpossiblewithoutbeliefinagod.ThereisnoreasontoattributethatviewtoSocrates.ButhedoesappeartobedoingWhatshouldIdo?somethingjustastime-honouredasthefire-and-brimstonetrick,andagooddealmorecomforting:claimingdivinemoralinspiration.‘ThesethingsIseemtohear,Crito...andthesewordsre-echowithinme,sothatIcanhearnoothers....Letusthenactinthisway,sincethisisthewaythegodisleading.’Thedialogueisover;Ihopeyouhaveenjoyedreadingit.Moralproblemsarenotoriouslyhardtosettle,notjustwhenseveralpeoplearetryingtoreachagreement,butevenwhentheyaretryingtomakeuptheirownmindsasindividuals.Wehaveseenalittleofwhythisshouldbe:somanyfactors,ofsomanydifferenttypes,areinvolved.ShouldyoudoAornot?Well,whatwilltheconsequencesbeifyoudo?Theremaybeconsequencesforyourfriends,yourfamily,andothers,aswellasthoseforyouyourself.Andwhatifyoudon’t?Howdotheconsequencescompare?Alternatively,nevermindtheconsequencesforamoment,justaskwhetheryoucandoAconsistentlywithyourownviewofyourself–woulditinvolvebetrayingidealsthattillthenyouhadvaluedandtriedtoliveupto?Howwillyoufeelabouthavingdoneit?Oragain,howeverpleasanttheconsequencesmaybe,woulditrun21\n3.Stilldebatingwithhisfriends,Socratestakesthehemlockfromthegaoler.JacquesLouisDavid’swell-knownpaintingTheDeathofSocrates(1787).\ncontrarytosomeduty,orsomeobligationsyouhaveincurred?Obligationstowhom?–andmightyounotbeinbreachofotherobligationsifyoudon’tdoit?DoobligationstofriendsandfamilytakeprecedenceoverdutiestowardstheState,orviceversa?Andifyouhaveareligionwhatdoesitsayaboutthechoice?AllthiscomplexityisonlylatentinCrito,becauseSocratesmanagestomakealltherelevantfactorscomeouteitherneutral(itwon’tmakemuchdifferencetohischildreneitherway,nortohisfriends)orallpointinginthesamedirection.Butitdoesn’ttakemuchimaginationtoseethepotentialforagonizingmoraldilemmas.Somepeopleexpectphilosophytotellustheanswerstomoralproblems.Butunlessitcansomehowimposesimplicityonthecomplexitieswehavebeenlookingat,theprospectsforthatdon’tlookgood.Foritwouldhavetoshowus,convincingly,thattherewasjustoneWhatshouldIdo?rightwaytobalanceoutallthevariousconsiderations.Socrateswasgoingforsimplificationwhen(startingat48c)hetriedtomakethewholethingturnonjustoneissue.Kant,whomImentionedearlier(p.18)wentforsimplificationinbasingmoralityonasingleprinciplecloselyrelatedtothefamiliar‘whatwouldhappenifeveryonedidthat?’Sometrytosimplifyinanotherway,advisingusnottothinkintermsofdutiesandobligationsbutonlyoftheconsequencesofourownproposedactionsforeveryonewhomtheywillaffect.WeshallseemoreofthiskindofviewinChapter5.23\nChapter3Howdoweknow?Hume’sOfMiraclesMany–includingyourpresentguide–regardtheScotsmanDavidHume(1711–76)asthegreatestofallphilosopherswhohavewritteninEnglish.Hewasofwide-rangingintellect:hismulti-volumeHistoryofEnglandhadtheeffectthatinhislifetimehewasequallywellknownasahistorian,andhealsowroteessaysonpolitical(mainlyconstitutional)questionsandoneconomics.Allofthishesawascontributingtoasinglebroadproject,thestudyofhumannature.Hisyouthfulmasterpiece,publishedin1739/40,iscalledATreatiseofHumanNature;inthreebooksitdealswithhumanbeliefs,emotions,andmoraljudgements.Whatarethey,andwhatproducesthem?Hume’swritingsonthesequestionsareshapedbyadeeplyheldconvictionaboutwhathumanbeingsare.Equallyimportanttohimwasaconvictionaboutwhatwearen’t,aparticulardelusionwhichhadtobeovercomebeforeanythingmorepositivewouldhaveachanceoftakingholdofourminds.Rememberthatmostgreatphilosophydoesn’tjustadd/subtractoneortwofactsto/fromourpreviousbeliefs;itremovesawholewayofthinkingandreplacesitwithanother.Theremaybealotofminutedetailwithinit,butjuststandbackabitandyouwillseethatitislarge-scalestuff.TheconceptionthatHumewantedtorootouthaditsbasisinreligiousbelief.TakingveryseriouslythesayingthatGodcreatedusinhisown24\n4.Humewassmarterthanhelooked:‘Hisfaceisbynomeansanindexoftheingenuityofhismind,especiallyofhisdelicacyandvivacity’wroteonevisitor.\nimage,itsawusashybridbeings,inthisworldbutnotentirelyofit.Partofus,ourbodies,arenaturalobjects,subjecttonaturallawsandprocesses;butwealsohaveimmortalsouls,endowedwithreasonandanunderstandingofmorality–thisiswhatmakesusimagesofGod.Animalsarequitedifferent.Theyhavenosouls,butarejustverysubtleandcomplexmachines,nothingmore.Thereallysignificantlinecomesbetweenusandthem,notbetweenusandGod.Humewantedtomoveit:wearenotinferiorlittlegodsbutsomewhatsuperiormiddle-sizedanimals.GodGod(?)Humans———⇒———HumansAnimalsAnimalsPhilosophyDon’tmisstheadded‘?’,top-right.Theleft-handcolumninvitesustooverestimatehumanreason.Oncewegetitinproperperspectiveweshallseeboththatwehavedrawnthelineinthewrongplace,andthatourattemptseventothinkaboutwhatmightbeabovethelinearedoomedtofailure:wejustaren’tuptoit.Humethereforehasagreatdealtosayabouttheroleofreasoninourlives;hearguesthatitisn’tnearlyasbig,orofthesamekind,ashisopponentsthought.Itthenfollowsthatmuchofwhattheytookhumanreasontodomustinfactbedonebysomethingelse:themechanicsofhumannature,aboutwhichhedevelopedanextensivetheory,apieceofearlycognitivescienceaswewouldcallitnowadays.ButwhenHumewritesdirectlyaboutreligiousbelief(ashedoesquitealot,seeBibliography)heleavesthegrandtheoryontheshelfandapplies26\ncommonsenseandeverydayhumanobservation.SoinhisessayOfMiracleswehaveanotherclassicpieceofphilosophicalwritingthatstartsonyourdoorstep,ifnotactuallyinyourliving-room.However,wemustn’tassumethateverythinghereiscompletelyfamiliar.Humeisgoingtoarguethatifwebelievethatamiraclehasoccurred,whenourevidenceconsistsinotherpeople’sreports(asitvirtuallyalwaysdoes),thenweholdthisbeliefcontrarytoreason,sinceourreasonsforbelievingthattheallegedmiracledidnotoccurmustbeatleastasstrongasourreasonsforsupposingthatitdid;infact,hethinks,theyarealwaysstronger.Thiswasatopicthatheneededtoapproachcarefully,fortworeasons.NottwentyyearsbeforehepublishedOfMiraclesoneThomasWoolstonhadspentthelastfewyearsofhislifeinprisonforsayingthatthebiblicalreportsofChrist’sresurrectionwerenotadequateevidenceforbeliefinsounlikelyanHowdoweknow?event;whatHumewasnowabouttosaywasbynomeansunrelated.Second,Humereallywantedtochangethewayhiscontemporaries,especiallyhiscompatriots,thoughtaboutreligion.Hecouldn’tdothatiftheydidn’treadhim,sohehadtoleadthemingently.Hencethe‘Tillotsonconnection’thatHumeparadesintheopeningparagraph.Whatcouldbebetterthantobeabletosaythatyourviewsarejustadevelopmentofanargumentrecentlyproposedbyanarchbishop?Exceptperhaps,tobeabletoaddthatthearchbishop’sargumentwasadecisiverefutationofaspecificallyRomanCatholicdoctrine?Hume’spublic,mostoftheminvaryingdegreeshostiletoCatholicism,wouldfeelacomfortablewarmglow...andreadon.Beforewelookattheargumentitself,onemorequestion:whydoesHumefinditimportanttowriteabouttheevidenceformiracles?Itispartofhisplanforasystematictreatmentofthegroundsofreligiousbelief,anditwascustomarytothinkoftheseasbeingoftwokinds.Ontheonehandtherewerethosewhichhumanbeings,goingontheirownexperienceandusingtheirownreason,couldworkoutforthemselves.27\nOntheother,therewerethosethatcamefromrevelation,thatistosayfromasacredtextorsomeotherauthority.Butthesepresentafurtherproblem,becauseyoucouldhavefraudulenttextsandbogusauthorities;sohowtotellthegenuineones?Theanswerwasthatgenuinerevelationsareconnectedwiththeoccurrenceofmiracles:hencetheirimportance,ascertificatesofreligiousauthority.(Ultimately,theyareissuedbythehighestpossibleauthority;thewidelyacceptedview,whichHumeheretakesover,haditthatmiracleswereviolationsoflawsofnature,andthereforecouldonlybeperformedbyGodorthoseGodhadentrustedwithdivinepowers.)Thatwecanneverhavegoodreasontobelieveinamiraclewasthereforeaprettysubversiveclaim;itamountedtosayingthathumanreasoncannottellthebona-fiderevelationfromthebogus.SonowtoHume’sargument.Itstartsatapointweallknowwell,becauseweallfrequentlyrelyonthingsthatotherpeoplehavetoldus.Mostlytherehasbeennoproblem,butoccasionallywhatweweretoldturnedouttobefalse.OccasionallywehaveheardcontradictorythingsPhilosophyfromtwopeople,soweknewthatatleastoneofthemwaswrongevenifweneverfoundoutwhich.Andwealsoknowalittleaboutwhatleadstofalsereports:self-interest,protectionofothers,defenceofacausedeartoone’sheart,thewishtohaveagoodstorytotell,simplesinceremistake,uncriticalbeliefofearlierreports,mischief,andsoon.Mostofushavesometimeinourlivesgonewronginmostofthesewaysourselves,sothatitisn’tjustfromobservationofothers(assomeofHume’swordsmightbetakentosuggest)thatweacquirethisknowledge.Weallknowthathumantestimonyissometimestobetreatedwithcaution,andundercertaincircumstanceswithagreatdealofcaution.SupposeIweretotellyouthatlastweekIdrove,onanormalweekdaymorningjustbeforemidday,rightacrossLondonfromnorthtosouth,anddidn’tseeasinglepersonorvehicleontheway–notacar,notabicycle,notapedestrian;everyonejusthappenedtobesomewhereelse28\nasIwaspassing.Youmightwonderwhetheritwasanabsurdlyexaggeratedwayofsayingthattheroadswereunusuallyquiet,orwhetherIwastestingyourgullibility,orrecountingadream,ormaybegoingmad,butoneoptionyouwouldnotseriouslyentertainisthatwhatIhadsaidwastrue.Almostanything,youwouldtellyourself,howeverunlikely,ismorelikelythanthat.Thatwouldbeveryreasonableofyou.EvenifwhatIsaidwasinfacttrue(whichisjustaboutconceivable,sincenobodywasunderanycompulsiontobeonmyrouteatthattime,sotheymightallhavedecidedtobesomewhereelse)itstillwouldn’tbeatallreasonableofyoutobelieveit,ifyouronlyreasonforbelievingitwasthatIhadsaidso.Hadyoubeenwithmeandseentheemptystreetsyourselfthingsmightbedifferent;butwearetalkingaboutthecaseinwhichyouarereliantonmytestimony.Howdoweknow?PerhapsyoucanseetheshapeofHume’sargumentbeginningtoappear.Givenwhatitsroleistobeinunderpinningreligiousbelief,amiraculouseventmustsurelybeonewhichourexperiencetellsusishighlyimprobable.Forifitwerethesortofthingthatcanquiteeasilyhappen,thenanyoldcharlatanwithabitofluckorgoodtimingcouldseizetheopportunitytoqualifyashavingdivineauthority.Butifitishighlyimprobable,onlythemostreliabletestimonywillbestrongenoughtoestablishit.Forcedtochoosebetweentwoimprobabilitiesthewise,whoasHumetellsusproportionbelieftoevidence,willoptforthealternativetheyfindlessimprobable.Sothiswillhavetobethetestimonyofsuchwitnesses,thatitsfalsehoodwouldbemoreimprobablethantheoccurrenceoftheeventsitrelates.Andthatisatallorder,since,aswehaveseen,theeventsmustbeveryimprobableindeed.Nowthisleavesitperfectlypossiblethatwemight,intheory,havetestimonialevidencethatwasstrongenough.Butitisenoughtocreateseriousdoubtwhetherwedo,infact,haveadequateevidenceforany29\nmiracle.Weknowthateyewitnessescanbemistaken,orintentionallydeceived.Manyofushavehadtheexperienceoffindingourselvesindisagreementwithsomeoneelsewhowasalsoaneyewitnesstotheeventsreported,oftenwithinadayortwooftheeventsthemselves.Manyreportsofthemiraculouscometousfrompeoplewhowerenoteyewitnesses,andwerewritingorspeakingyearsaftertheeventsinquestion.Mostsuchreportscomefromadherentsofthereligionwhichtheseallegedmiraclesareusedtosupport.Acourtoflawwouldtakethepossibilitythatwitnessesofthiskindwereunreliableveryseriouslyindeed–insomecasessoseriouslythatitwouldn’tevenbepreparedtohearthemtestify.Arethereanyreportsofmiracleswhichescapesuchdoubts?Itsoundsasifwemighthavetotrawlthroughthewholeofrecordedhistorytoanswerthatquestion.Butthat,Humethinks,won’tbenecessary.Foritisn’tjustthatamiraclehastobeextremelyimprobable.Ithastobeinasenseimpossible–contrarytoalawofnature(‘insteadofbeingonlymarvellous,...reallymiraculous’).ThatwasHume’sdefinition,andthePhilosophyoneheexpectedhisaudiencetoaccept.Andthisenablesustostatetheargumentagaininaslightlydifferent,andmoredecisive,form–theformHumepreferred.Wereceiveareportofsomething–forconveniencecallitTheEvent–supposedtobemiraculous.SoweareaskedtobelievethatTheEventoccurred,andthatthiswascontrarytoalawofnature.Forustohavegoodreasontobelievethataneventofthatkindwouldhavebeencontrarytoalawofnature,itmustbecontrarytoallourexperience,andtoourbesttheoriesofhownatureworks.ButifthatissothenwemusthaveverystrongreasontobelievethatTheEventdidnotoccur–infactthestrongestreasonweeverdohaveforbelievinganythingofthatsort.Sowhatreasondowehaveontheotherside–tobelievethatitdidoccur?Answer:thereport–inotherwordsthefactthatitissaidtohave30\nHowdoweknow?5.TheMiracleoftheLoavesandFishes,inasixth-centuryrepresentation.Foodfor5,000?Orjustfoodforthought?occurred.CouldthatpossiblybesostrongastooverpowerthecontraryreasonsandwinthedayforTheEvent?No,saysHume,itcould(intheory)beofequalstrength,butneverofgreater.Theremightbesuchathingastestimony,givenbysufficientlywell-placedwitnesses,oftherightsortofcharacter,undertherightsortofcircumstances,thatasamatterofnatural(psychological)lawitwasboundtobetrue.ButthatwouldonlymeanthatwehadourstrongestkindofevidencebothforTheEventandagainstit,andtherationalresponsewouldbenotbeliefbutbewildermentandindecision.Notethebracketedwords‘intheory’.Humedoesn’tthinkthatweeverfindthissituationinpractice,andgivesanumberofreasonswhynot.Hadhelivedinourtimehemighthaveaddedthatpsychologicalresearchhasuncoveredanumberofsurprisingfactsabouttheunreliabilityofhumanmemoryandtestimony,butshowsnosignofhominginonanysetofconditionsunderwhichtheirreliabilityis31\ncompletelyassured.Norshouldweexpectitto,giventherangeofdisruptivefactorswhichHumelists.This,inessence,wasHume’sargument.Unsurprisingly,ithasprovokedmuchdiscussion,andstilldoes.Hereareacoupleofpoints,togivetheflavour.Theyalsonicelyillustratetwofeaturesfrequentinphilosophicaldiscussionandindeedindebategenerally,sowellworthbeingonthelookoutfor:thereisthecriticismwhich,whilstperfectlytrueinitself,missesthepoint;andthereistheobjectionthatanargument‘provestoomuch’.Hume,itmaybesaid,basedhisargumentonthethoughtthatamiraclemustbe(atleast)extremelyimprobable.Butwon’thisopponentsjustdenythat?They,afterall,arebelievers.Sowhereastheymightregardareportthat–totakeHume’sownexample–QueenElizabethIrosefromthedeadasfarbeneathseriousconsideration,justasHumehimselfwould,theymayregardtheallegedmiracleofChrist’sresurrectionasnotveryimprobableatall,givenwhotheytakeChristtoPhilosophyhavebeen.Hasn’tHumejustbeggedthequestionagainstthem–notsomuchprovedthattheyarewrongassimplyassumedit?ButweshouldreplyonhisbehalfthatthismistakeswhatHumewasdoing.Hewasaskingwhatreasonstheremaybeforformingreligiousbeliefsinthefirstplace.Thattheworldmaylookverydifferent,anddifferentargumentsappearreasonable,whenonehasalreadyformedthem,hewouldnotforonemomentdispute.Norneedhedisputeit:ithasnobearingonthecentralissue,whichiswhetheramiraclecanbeproved,‘soastobethefoundationofasystemofreligion’.Sothatobjectionissimplyofftarget.Thesecondisnot,andgivesHumemoretrouble.Doesn’thisargumentshowthatitcouldneverbereasonableforustoreviseourviewsaboutthelawsofnature?Butthatisthemainwayinwhichsciencemakesprogress;soifthatisirrational,thenanychargethatbeliefinmiraclesisirrationalbeginstolookrather32\nlessserious.‘IfI’mnoworsethanNewtonandEinsteinandcompany’,thebelieverwillsay,‘I’mnottoobothered.’WhymightitbethoughtthatHume’sargumenthasgoneoverthetopinthisway?Well,supposewehaveverygoodreasontothinkthatsomethingisalawofnature:allourexperiencetodatefitsinwithit,andourbestcurrentscientifictheorysupportsit.Nowsupposethatsomescientistsreportanexperimentalresultwhichconflictswithit.Doesn’tHume’sargumenttellusthatweoughtjusttodismisstheirreportonthespot?Ourevidencethatwhattheyreporttohavehappenedcannothappenisasgoodasanyevidenceweeverhave;ontheothersideofthequestionwehavejust–theirtestimony.Isn’tthatexactlythesituationhewastalkingaboutinregardtoreportsofmiracles?Howdoweknow?Humeappearstobetryingtopre-emptsomesuchcriticismwhenhewrites:‘ForIownthatotherwise[i.e.whenitisnotaquestionofbeingthefoundationofasystemofreligion]theremaypossiblybemiracles,orviolationsoftheusualcourseofnature,ofsuchakindastoadmitofprooffromhumantestimony...’.Andhegoesontodescribeanimaginarycase(philosophersoftenuseimaginarycasestotesttheforceofanargument)inwhichtherearefoundinallhumansocietiesreportsofaneight-daydarkness,whichagreewitheachotherexactlyastowhenthedarknessbeganandwhenitlifted.Then,hesays,itisclearthatweoughttoacceptthereport,andstartconsideringwhatthecauseofthisextraordinaryeventmighthavebeen.Buthedoesnottelluspreciselywhatitisaboutthisexamplethatmakesthedifference.Andthatwaswhatweneededtoknow.IthinkHumecouldhavemadeabetter,andcertainlyaclearer,responsetothethreat.HemighthavesaidthatincircumstancessuchasIhavejustoutlined(lastparagraphbutone)thescientificcommunityprobablywouldnotbelievethereport,andthattheywouldbeperfectlyrationalnotto,untilseveralofthemhadrepeatedtheexperimentandgot33\nexactlythesameresult.Beliefinitwouldthennolongerbeamatteroftestimonyalone,butalsoofwidespreadobservation.Wecan,anddo,demandthatscientificresultsbereplicable;wecan’tdemandarerunofamiracle.Whereforanyreasonnorerunispossiblethosemakingtheimprobableassertionhaveittooeasy,andweoughttobeascautiousinscienceasweshouldbeinmattersreligious.Itmaybe,thoughwecannotbecertain,thatthisiswhatHumewastryingtosay.Intheimaginarysituationhedescribes,thereportoftheeight-daydarknessisfoundinallcultures.Atatimewhencommunicationwasslowandcumbersome,andlikelytobepartialandinaccurate,perhapshetookhisstorytobeoneinwhichitwasbeyonddoubtthatallthesedifferentpeopleshadindependentlymadepreciselythesameobservations,sothatthesituationwastheequivalentofrunninganexperimentseveraltimeswithexactlythesameresult.AsIsay,wecannotbecertain–notevenHume,oneofthebestphilosophicalwritersinthisrespect,isclearallthetime.Butwecanbefairlycertainthatthatwasnotallhewastryingtosay.ForattheendofPhilosophytheparagraphfromwhichthequotationaboveistaken,wefindthis:‘Thedecay,corruption,anddissolutionofnature,isaneventrenderedprobablebysomanyanalogies,thatanyphenomenon,whichseemstohaveatendencytowardsthatcatastrophe,comeswithinthereachofhumantestimony,ifthattestimonybeveryextensiveanduniform.’Orinotherwords,theallegedeight-daydarknesswouldindeedbeveryunusual,butthereisnothingespeciallyunusualaboutnaturebehavingoutofthenormalpatternfromtimetotime.Sowehavenoreasontoregardsuchathingasimpossible,andthereforethereisnorealcomparisonwiththecaseofamiracleatall.WecouldspendalongtimeamongstthedetailsofHume’sessayOfMiracles.Manyhave.Butourtourmustmoveon.34\nChapter4WhatamI?AnunknownBuddhistontheself:KingMilinda’schariotItisgenerallytrueofIndianphilosophythatwedonotknowmuchaboutthepeoplewhowroteit.Ifweknowtheirnames,theregioninwhichtheylived,andtheirdateswithinfiftyyears,thatcountsasscholarlysuccess.ButinthecaseoftheMilindapañha,theQuestionsofKingMilinda,nosuch‘success’hasbeenachieved–wereallyknownexttonothing.HereaBuddhistmonk,Nagasena,debateswitharegionalkingandanswershisquestions.Nagasenaisprobablyarealfigure,grownlegendary;KingMilindaisgenerallythoughttobeMenander,oneoftheGreekrulersinnorth-westIndialeftoverfromtheconquestsofAlexandertheGreat.Eventhatisspeculative–soletusjustgostraighttothetext.Onlyafewlinesintoitashockawaitsus.Plato’sCrito,wesaw,isbuiltofelementsnearlyallofwhichmostreaderswillhavefoundquitefamiliar.Hume’sargumentinOfMiraclesaimedtostartfromeverydaycommon-senseobservationsabouttestimonyplusanunsurprisingdefinitionofamiracle,andthenarriveataremarkableconclusionbyshowingthatitisaninevitableconsequence.Butsometimesauthorswilladoptdifferenttactics,pitchingusstraightinatthedeependwithanassertionwhichseemsfranklypreposterous.Weshouldlearntorideouttheshockandreadon,seekingtodiscoverwhatthepreposterousassertionreallyamountsto(itmaybewhatitseems,oritmayjustbeanunusualwayofsayingsomethingratherlessstartling),andwhytheymadeit.Notice35\nthat‘whytheymadeit’meanstwothings,bothimportant:theirreasonsforthinkingittrue–andtheirmotivesforbeinginterestedinit,whattheyareaimingat.Allofthesepointsarehighlyrelevanttothepassageweareabouttolookat.First,theshock.Thepartygathers;thekingasksNagasena’sname,Nagasenatellshim:‘Sire,IamknownasNagasena’–butthenaddsthatthisword‘Nagasena’isonly‘amerename,becausethereisnopersonassuchthatisfound’.Whatcanhepossiblymean?OnewouldhavethoughtthatNagasenawasaperson,andhehasjusttoldMilindahisname;butimmediatelyitturnsoutthatthenameisnotthenameofaperson.SoNagasenaisn’tapersonafterall,andthiseventhoughhehasjusttoldthekinghowheisknownandhowhisfellowmonksaddresshim.Whatisgoingonhere?Theking,whoisevidentlyexperiencedinthiskindofdiscussion(andalsohasconsiderablepriorknowledgeofBuddhism),doesn’tdespairbutsetsouttogettothebottomofit.RealizingthatNagasenawasn’tPhilosophyjustspeakingofhimself,butintendedthepointhewasmaking(whateveritmayhavebeen)toapplyequallytoeveryone,hestartsdrawingwhathetakestobeabsurdconsequencesfromthemonk’sview.Ifitistrue,thennobodyeverdoesanything,rightorwrong,nobodyeverachievesanything,suffersanything.Thereisnosuchthingasamurder,forthereisnopersonwhodies.AndthenalittlejokeaboutNagasena’sstatus:therewasnoonewhotaughthim,andnoonewhoordainedhim.Thetacticiscommonindebatesofallkinds:hereareanumberofthingswhichweallunhesitatinglytaketobetrue;isNagasenareallysayingthattheyareallfalse?Orishegoingtotellusthathisview,ifproperlyunderstood,doesn’thavethatconsequence?Nagasenanevertakesthatchallengeupdirectly.Bytheendofthechapterhehasgivenahint,fromwhichwecanreconstructwhathemighthavesaidhadhedoneso.Butforthemomentthekingcontinues,fallingintoquestion-and-answerstylereminiscentofmanyofPlato’sdialogues.36\nMilinda’squestioninginthispassageisstructuredbytheBuddhistdoctrineofthe‘fiveaggregates’,accordingtowhichwhatwecallahumanbeingisacomplexoffiveelements.Milindacallsthemmaterialform,feeling(bywhichtheyseemtohaveunderstoodpleasure,pain,andindifference),perception,mentalformations(i.e.ourdispositions,ourcharacter),andconsciousness.Exactlywhattheseareweneednotbotherabout,solongaswehavesomeroughidea:thepointisthatthepersonisnottobeidentifiedwithanyofthem.Thatisprobablywhatmostofuswouldsay,onalittlereflection.Areweourfeelings?No,wearewhathasthefeelings,notthefeelingsthemselves.Areweourperceptions?No,forthesamereason.Areweourdispositions,ourcharacter?Wellagain,no–becausedispositions,charactersaretendenciestobehaveincertainways;andwearen’tthetendenciesbutratherwhathasthosetendencies.Likewise,wearen’tWhatamI?theconsciousness;wearewhateveritisthatisconscious.Thefifthitem(theonethatMilindaactuallyputfirst)mightbemorecontentious,however.Mightn’tthematerialelement,i.e.thebody,bethethingthatisconscious,hasthedispositions,theperceptions,thefeelings?Whenasked,ineffect,whetherthebodyisNagasena,whyisNagasenasoquicktosaythatitisn’t?Whensomeonepresentsapointasifitwereprettyobviouswhenitdoesn’tseemobvioustoyouatall,itisgoodtacticstolookforsomethingunspokenlyingbehindit.Perhapstheyareassumingthataself,aperson,mustbesomethingratherpureandlofty–noticethestudiouslyrepulsivedescriptionofthebodywithwhichthekingprefaceshisquestion.Orthataselfmustbeapermanent,unchangingthing,quiteunlikeabody,perhapsevencapableofsurvivingdeath.Eitherofthoseassumptionsmighthavecomefromearlierphilosophical/religiousconceptions–backtothatinamoment.Ormaybefromsomesuchthoughtasthis:matterdoesn’tmoveitself(justleavealumpofitlyingaroundandseehowmuchitmoves),whereasan37\nanimaldoes–sotheremustbesomethingnon-materialinitmovingitsmatter.Or:evenifmatterdoesmoveitdoesn’tmakecoherent,directed,intelligentmovements–soabodyneedssomethingtodirectit.ThesethoughtswerecommonplacelongbeforeQuestionsofKingMilindawaswritten.RemembertheimportanceSocratesattachestothewell-beingofhissoulinCrito;orgoontoreadPlato’sPhaedo–thefollow-uptoCrito,aboutSocrates’verylastdiscussionanddeath.‘Holditamoment’,youwillsay,‘that’sGreece,whereasthisisIndia’.True,butverysimilarideasarefound(evenearlier)intheBrahminicalwritingssacredtoHinduism.Admittedly,BuddhismquiteconsciouslybrokeawayfromtheBrahminicaltradition.Butthemainpointsofcontentionwereanimalsacrificeandthecastesystem(whichBuddhismabandonedalongwithallextremeformsofasceticism),sothatagreatdealofthattraditionremainedandformedthebackgroundtoBuddhismaswell.Theideaofcyclicalrebirthtofurtherlivesofsuffering,andthehopeofescapefromthecycleintoastateofPhilosophyliberation(theBuddhistnirvanaandtheHindumoksha),areequallypartofboth.Knowingthesethingsmayhelpusalittleinunderstandingtheprompt‘No,sire’withwhichNagasenaanswersthissequenceofquestions.Butitdoesn’thelpasmuchaswemightwish,becauseitgivesnohintastowhyheshouldmakethesameresponsetotheking’slastquestion,whetherthenNagasenaissomethingelse,somethingdifferentfromthefive‘aggregates’.Ifanything,itmightleadustoexpectthathewouldsaythatYes,itwassomethingdifferent,somethingthatcouldleavethebodyandlaterinhabitanother,thatcouldbehavingcertainfeelingsandperceptionsnow,andcouldhavequitedifferentonesinthefuture.Butagainhesays‘Nosire’–itisnotsomethingelse.Sothepuzzleremains.AndMilinda’snextremarkispuzzlingtoo:heaccusesthemonkofhavingspokenafalsehood,forapparently‘thereisnoNagasena’.ButNagasenaneversaidtherewas–quitethecontrary,itwashis38\nperplexingremarkthattherewasn’taperson‘Nagasena’whichsetthediscussiongoing.Youdomeettrafficjamslikethissometimes,anditwouldbeapoorguidewhotriedtocoveritup.Weneedsomecreativereadingatthisstage.Forinstance:arewetothinkofthekingasjustgettingconfused,andlosingtrackofwhathasbeensaid?Orisitthathesimplycan’tbelievethatthereisnosuchperson,andthereforethoughtthatNagasenawasboundtoanswer‘Yes’toatleastoneofhisquestions;sinceheanswered‘No’toallofthem,atleastoneanswermusthavebeenfalse,andthatisthefalsehoodthekingmeanswhenhesays‘You,reveredsir,...havespokenafalsehood’?Ofthosetwo(perhapsyoucanthinkofanother?)Ipreferthesecond.ItfitsbetterwiththefeelingonegetsfromthechapterasawholethatthekingissupposedtohaveamistakenviewofthenatureoftheselfaboutwhichNagasenaputshimright.WhatamI?Hedoesso(afterbrieflyteasingMilindaabouthispamperedlifestyle)byaskingaparallelseriesofquestionsabouttheking’schariot.Thistraditionmakesconstantuseofsimiles,parallels,andanalogies;listenersarebroughttofeelcomfortablewithsomethingtheyfindproblematicbycomingtoseeitassimilarto,orofthesamekindas,somethingelsewithwhichtheyarealreadyfamiliar.Herethehopeisthatoncethekinghasanswered‘No’toallthequestionsaboutthechariot,hewillseehowNagasenacouldreturnthesameanswertoallhisquestionsabouttheperson.Andhedoescometoseeit,bytheendofthechapter.Butfirstletmementionsomethingwhichnostudyofthistextbyitselfcouldreveal,butwhichwouldsurelyhavehadaneffectonanyoneofMilinda’sobviouslearningandintelligence.Inusingachariotasaparalleltoaperson,Nagasenaisdoingsomethingbothstronglyreminiscentof,andatthesametimeshockinglyatoddswith,ametaphorwell-knownwithintheircommonphilosophicalculture.39\n6.and7.Theimageofthechariot.InafamousscenefromthehugeIndianepic,theMahabharata,thewarriorArjunahasKrishnaashischarioteer–andashismoralguide,notjusthischauffeur!IntheGreekexampletheheroHerculestakesthereins,watchedoverbythegoddessAthena.\nPlatofamouslycomparedtheselftoachariot.Agooddealearlier,intheIndiantradition,theKathaUpanishaddoesthesame(seeBibliography).IsitnowNagasena’sturn?Well,notexactly.Itisasiftheauthorwerealludingtothetraditionpreciselytohighlighthisrejectionofit.InPlatowereadofacharioteertryingtocontroloneobedienthorse(reason)andonedisobedienthorse(theappetites);theKathaUpanishadcomparestheselftosomeoneridinginachariot,theintellecttothecharioteerdirectingthesenses,whicharethehorses.Nagasenadoesn’tmentionanyhorses.Moreimportantly,hedoesn’tmentionacharioteer,letaloneariderdistinctfromthecharioteer.Thatistheverypictureheisreactingagainst.Thereisnopermanentpresence,theself,directingoroverseeing.Thisauthor,inusingthehallowedsimileofthechariotbutusingitdifferently,issimultaneouslyputtinghisownviewandsignalling,tohisculturalcircle,justwhatheisrejecting.Sonowthemonk,followingexactlythesamepattern,questionstheWhatamI?king:‘Istheaxlethechariot?–arethewheelsthechariot?...’.Milindarepeatedlyanswers‘No’.Thatisn’tsurprising–butmuchasNagasena’sanswerstohisquestionswerefairlyunsurprisingexceptforthelast,sooneofMilinda’sanswerswillraisenearlyeveryreader’seyebrows.Thistime,however,itisn’tthelastbutthenexttolast.Nagasenaaskswhetherthenthechariotis‘thepole,theaxle,thewheels,...thereinsandthegoadalltogether’.Mostofuswouldsay‘Yes;solongaswearenottalkingaboutthesepartslyingaroundinaheapbutratherintheproperarrangement,that’sexactlywhatachariotis.’ButMilindajustsays‘No,reveredsir’.Weshallshortlyfindoutwhatliesbehindthisratheroddresponse.Forthemomentletusjustnoticethattheking,havinganswered‘No’toallthequestions,hasputhimselfinthesamepositionashadNagasena,whoimmediatelythrowsMilinda’sownearlierwordsbackathim:‘Wherethenisthechariotyousayyoucamein?Yousire,havespokenafalsehood...’–andgetsaroundofapplauseevenfromMilinda’ssupporters.Butthekingisnotforcavingin.That41\nwasnofalsehood,hesays,for‘itisbecauseofthepole,theaxle...andthegoadthat“chariot”existsasameredesignation’.Justso,repliesNagasena,and‘Nagasena’existsasameredesignationtoo,becausethefive‘aggregates’arepresent.AndhequotesthenunVajira:JustaswhenthepartsarerightlysetTheword‘chariot’isspoken,SowhentherearetheaggregatesItistheconventiontosay‘abeing’.Thekingisimpressed,andthechapterendshappily.Butjustwhat(youmaywellask)haveheandNagasenaagreedon?That‘chariot’,‘self’,‘person’,‘being’,and‘Nagasena’areconventionalterms?Butaren’tallwordsconventional–inEngland‘cow’,inFrance‘vache’,inPoland‘krowa’,whateverlocalconventiondictates?Surelytheyaretellingusmorethanthat?PhilosophyIndeedtheyare.Thisisnotabouttheconventionalityoflanguage;itisaboutwholesandtheirparts,andthepointisthatwholesareinasenselessreal,lessobjective,andmoreamatterofconvention,thanarethepartsthatcomposethem.Tobeginwith,thepartsareindependentinawaythatthewholeisnot:theaxlecanexistwithoutthechariotexisting,butnotthechariotwithouttheaxle.(AstheGermanphilosopherGottfriedWilhelmLeibniz(1646–1716)saidmuchlater,wholeshaveonlya‘borrowed’reality–borrowedfromtherealityoftheirparts.)Furthermore,whatcountsasawholeisnotgivenbynature,butdependstosomeextentonusandourpurposes.Iffromachariotweremovethepoleandoneofthewheels,thecollectionofpartsthatremainsisnotincompleteinitself,butonlywithregardtowhatwewantchariotsfor.Butwhydoesallthismatter?WhydidNagasenaprovokethisconversationinthefirstplace?Notjusttopassthetime,wemaybe42\nsure.Thepointisimportanttohimbecauseheholdsthatwhatwebelievehasaneffectonourattitudesandthroughthemonourbehaviour.That,surely,isperfectlyreasonable:those,forinstance,whobelievethattheword‘God’standsforsomethingrealmightbeexpectedtofeelandperhapsalsobehavedifferentlyfromthosewhothinkitisjustasociallyconstructedwayofspeaking.Tousethejargon:ourmetaphysics(whatwethinkrealityisfundamentallylike)canaffectourethics.NowontheBuddhistviewthepurposeofphilosophy(indeedthepurposeofBuddhism)istoalleviatesuffering;thereisnopointinitifitdoesn’t.Andamajorcauseofsufferingisoverestimationoftheimportanceoftheself,itsneeds,anditsgoals:‘clingingtoself’,asBuddhistssay.Soanychangeofbeliefwhichdowngradesthestatusoftheselfinoureyesishelpful.ATibetantextsays:‘Believingtheegotobepermanentandseparate,onebecomesattachedtoit;...thisbringsondefilements;thedefilementsbreedbadkarma;thebadkarmabreedsmiseries...’.ThatiswhyitWhatamI?matters.CanNagasenabesaidtohaveprovedhiscaseinthischapter?Hashereallyshownthatthereisnoabidingself,justanunstablecompositewhichitisconvenienttocallaperson?Surelynot.EvenifweaccepteverythingwhichheandMilindasayaboutthechariot,itwouldstillhavetobearguedthatthechariotanalogyisreliablewhenitcomestothinkingaboutaperson,yetonthatpointNagasenasaysnothingatall.Solikemostanalogies,thisoneisusefulasanillustrationorexplanationofwhatthedoctrineabouttheselfmeans,butnotasevidencethatitistrue.Nordowelearnwhyhegavethecrucialanswer(‘No,sire’)totheking’sfinalandcrucialquestion,theonetowhichasupporterofthepermanentselfwouldhavesaidYes:‘isNagasenaapart[distinct]frommaterialform,feeling,perception,mentalformationsandconsciousness?’Soourprovisionalverdictmustbe‘unproven’.Butwemightaskourselveswhetherthisquestion(‘HasNagasenaprovedhiscase?’)isthe43\nrightquestiontobeasking.Perhapsitis,ifwearetryingtomakeupourmindsaboutthenatureoftheself;butifwearetryingtounderstandwhatisgoingoninthechapterwehavebeenreading,perhapsnot.Rememberthatthisisabranchofthetraditionthatgaveustheguru,theauthoritativespiritualteacher.InNagasena’seyestheauthorityforwhathewassayingwouldultimatelybethewordoftheBuddha;hisownbusinessistoconveytherightdoctrineinlivelyandmemorableterms.ThedemandforcompellinglogicisbestreservedforawriterlikeHume,towhomitisappropriatebecauseheisgenuinelytryingtomeetit.Somereadersmayfeelanaggingworry.Buddhists,justasmuchasHindus,believeinrebirth–thepresentDalaiLamaishispredecessor,reborn.Butifthereisnoselfbeyondthefive‘aggregates’,whatistheretobereborn,whatisitthatmigratesfromonebodytothenext?Howdidtheyreconcilethesetwodoctrines?AllIcansayhereisthattheywerefullyawareoftheproblem.ItleadstoalotmoreBuddhistmetaphysics,whichouralltoobrieftourcan’tevenmakeastarton.ButPhilosophyifyouhaveinyourhandtheeditionofQuestionsofKingMilindarecommendedintheBibliography,turntopp.58–9andreadthesectionentitled‘TransmigrationandRebirth’–justtobegintogettheflavour.44\nChapter5SomethemesThethreeexampleswehavebeenlookingattouchonanumberofgeneralthemes,ideaswhosesignificancegoeswellbeyondthatofanysingletextorforthatmatteranysingleschoolorperiod.NowIshallpickhalfadozenofthemoutforspecialattention.Towhatextentaquestioncanlegitimatelybeconsideredinabstractionfromtheparticularhistoricalcontextsinwhichitwasraisedand(perhaps)answeredisitselfaphilosophicalquestion,andnosimpleone;Ishallsaysomethingaboutitintheclosingsectionofthechapter.EthicalconsequentialismDon’tbefrightenedbytheheading.Itisjustthetradenameofthedoctrinethathowgoodorbadsomethingishastobejudgedbylookingatitsconsequences.InCrito,aswesaw,Socrateswasweighingtheconsequencesoftheactionsopentohim,theresultsforhisfriends,hischildren,himself.Buttherewerealsoconsiderationsaboutwhathadhappenedinthepast,notwhatwouldresultinthefuture:hispastbehaviourmeantthathenowhadadutytotheState,whichrequiredhimtoacceptitsjudgementandpunishment.Isuggestedattheendofthatchapterthatifphilosophersweregoingtosolveourmoralproblemstheywerefirstgoingtohavetoconvinceusthatmoralmattersarereallylesscomplicatedthantheyappeartobe.Onesuchattemptisconsequentialism:nomoralreasonsare45\nbackward-looking;propermoralreasonsalllooktotheconsequencesofouractions.Sotheideaisthatsomethingisgoodifithasgoodconsequences,badifithasbadones.But,youwillimmediatelynotice,thatdoesn’ttellusmuch;westillneedtobetoldwhichconsequencesaregoodones,whicharebadones.Justrepeatingtheformula(saying:consequencesaregoodwhentheythemselveshavegoodconsequences)getsusnofurther.Aconsequentialistmustbewillingtorecommendcertainthings,orstatesofaffairs,asbeinggoodinthemselves.Intheircase,goodnessdoesnotconsistinhavinggoodconsequences–theyjustaregood.Otherthingsaregoodonlytotheextentthattheyleadtothem–thethingsthataregoodinthemselves.Thatmeansthatconsequentialismisn’tanysingleethicaldoctrine,butageneraltypeofdoctrinewhichcantakeverydifferentspecificformsdependingonwhatisheldtobegoodinitself.IfyouthinkthattheonlythinggoodinitselfispleasureyouwillliveverydifferentlyfromPhilosophysomeonewhothinksthattheonlythinggoodinitselfisknowledge.Soevenifwecouldallagreetobeconsequentialistinourethicalthinking,verylittlewouldhavebeensettled.Youmightnowwonderwhyweshouldbesoexclusive:whycan’tlotsofdifferentthingsbegoodinthemselves:pleasure,knowledge,beauty,love–justforstarters?Thatsoundsveryreasonable.Butifwhatwewerehopingforwasamoraltheorythatwouldmakeitfairlysimpleforustodecidewhatweoughttodo,thenitisabigstepinthewrongdirection.Onceweagreetotakemorethanonebasicvalueintoaccountwewillinevitablyfindthatourvaluessometimescomeintoconflict.Imightquiteoftenbeinapositiontopromoteonevalue(i.e.dothingswhichhavethatsortofconsequence)oranother,butnotboth.WhichshouldIchoose?IfSocrateshadhadtochoosetobetweenriskinghisfriends’livesanddamaginghischildren’seducation,whichshouldhehavechosen?Howluckyforhimthathedidn’t!Whatan46\nadvantageifwecouldsettleonjustonebasicvalue,andmeasureeverythingelsebytheextenttowhichitleadstothatonething.Nosurprise,then,thattherehavebeenethicaltheoriesofjustthatkind.Anearlyone,wellworthreadingabout,isthatofEpicurus(341–271bc).Forhimandhisfollowers,theoneandonlythingvaluableinitselfwaspleasure.Butdon’texpecthimtorecommendorgiesandbanquetsinterspersedwithperiodsofrelaxationonthebeachofyourprivateisland.BecausewhatEpicurusmeantbypleasurewasnotthatatall:itwasabsenceofpain,bothphysicalandmental.Thiscompletelyuntroubledstate,hethought,wasasgreatapleasureasany.Whatweimmediatelythinkofaspleasuresarejustdifferent,notmorepleasant.Thispoint,andhisadviceonhowtoachieveandmaintaintheidealstate,heappearstohavearguedforwithsubtletyandwisdom.Isay‘appears’,becausewehaveverylittlefromhisownhand;althoughheSomethemeswroteprolifically,ourknowledgeofhimmostlycomesfromlaterreports.8.MarbleheadofEpicurus,intheBritishMuseum.47\nAmodernandmoreaccessibletheoryofthistypewaspropoundedbyJohnStuartMill(1806–73)inhisfamousessayUtilitarianism,wherehecitedEpicurusasoneofhisphilosophicalancestors.Milldeclaredtheonethingvaluableinitselftobehappiness–definingitas‘pleasureandtheabsenceofpain’(thoughwithoutholding,asEpicurushad,thattheabsenceofallpainwasitselfthegreatestpleasure).ButthereisaverysignificantdifferencebetweenMillandEpicurus.ForwhereasEpicurusseemstohavebeenconcernedtoadviseindividualshowbesttosecuretheirownpleasure/tranquillity,Millwasasocialreformerwhoseethicalprinciplesaimedattheimprovementoflife(i.e.happiness)foreverybody.(AsimilardivisionisfoundinthehistoryofBuddhism:isthehighestidealthepersonalattainmentofnirvana,orisittobringallbeingstonirvana,oneselfincluded?)‘Leteveryoneseektobefreefrompainandanxiety’,saysEpicureanism;thoughitmaywelladd:‘Helpingthosearoundyoutodosowillprobablyhelpyouachieveittoo–andifso,helpthem.’ForMill,bycontrast,theprimarygoalis,quitegenerally,happiness;soanyoneelse’shappinessisjustasmuchyourgoalasisyourown,andanyperson’shappinessisofequalvaluewithanyonePhilosophyelse’s.Mill’saspirationswentbeyondhisownsociety–heevenwritesofimprovingtheconditionofthewholeofmankind.ThiswasVictorianBritain,andtheBritishEmpireprettymuchatitszenith(MillhimselfworkedfortheEastIndiaCompanyforoverthirtyyears).Butitwouldbeunfairtothinkofhimasaninterferingmoralimperialist.Hedidn’twanttotellanyonehowtobehappy;onlythateveryoneshouldbeprovidedwiththematerialgoods,theeducationandthepoliticalandsociallibertiestoworkouttheirownhappinessintheirownway.ManywillfindthisuniversalityofMill’sbasicethicalprincipleadmirable.Somemayalsowonderwhetheritcanberealistictoaskhumanbeingstospreadtheirmoralconcernsowidelyandsoimpartially.Arewecapableofit?Andwhatwouldlifebelikeifwereallytried?Thesequestions,especiallythesecond,haveledsomephilosophersto48\nthinkthatMill’sdoctrineconflictswithanothervaluewhichnearlyallofusregardasveryimportanttous.WehavealreadyseenitatworkintheCrito.IntegrityOnethingthatweighedwithSocrates,youremember,wasthelinehehadtakenathistrial.Howcouldhenowchooseexile,havingexplicitlyrejectedthatoptionwhengiventheopportunitytoproposeanalternativetothedeath-sentence?‘Icannot,nowthatthisfatehasbefallenme,throwawaymypreviousarguments.’Asasoldier,hetoldthecourt,hehadfaceddeathratherthandowhatwaswrong;hewillnotnowdowhatseemstohimtobewrongjusttoprolonghislife.SomethemesThesethoughtscaptureacentralaspectofthevirtueofintegrity.Integritymeanswholeness,unity;theideaofintegrityasavalueistheideaofalifelivedasawholeratherthanasaseriesofdisconnectedepisodes.Soitincludessteadfastadherencetoprinciples,andtoopinionsunlessnewreasonsorevidenceappear.Relatedly(andequallyapplicabletoSocrates’case)itincludesthevalueofconsistentpursuitofthosechosenprojectswhichgivepurposeandmeaningtoone’slife.Anditcanalsobetakentoexcludeself-deceptionandhypocrisy,statesinwhichpeopleareinonewayoranotheratoddswiththemselves.SohowcomfortablydoestheidealofintegrityfitwithMill’sutilitarianism?Notverycomfortablyatall,somethink.Forhoweversincereyourcommitmenttosomeprincipleinthepast,thatfactbyitselfdoesnotgiveyou–ifwetakeMill’spositionseriouslyandliterally–anyreasontofollowitagainnow.Ifinthepastyourcommitmenttothatprinciplehasconsistentlyledtogoodeffects(measuredintermsofhappiness),thenthatfactgivesyouatleastsomereasontothinkthatitwilldosoagain–whichisareasontofollowitnow.Butyourcommitmenttoit,howeversincere,howevermuchithas49\nbecomeapartofyourpersonality,isnot.CriticsofUtilitarianismquestionwhetherwecanreallylivewiththatwayofthinking.YoumightliketoconsiderwhetherUtilitarianscandefendthemselvesagainstthatcharge.Iftheycan’t,thingslookbadnotjustforthembutformostothertypesofconsequentialisttoo.Forinthelastparagraphitwasn’timportanttothinkofeffectsbeingassessedintermsofhappiness;Imighthavewrittenalmostanythinginsteadof‘happiness’withoutaffectingtheargument.Soreallythisisanattackonconsequentialism–ofwhichutilitarianismisonlyonevariety.Anyonewhofeelsthattheattacksucceedsmustacceptthattheconsequencesofanactionare(atmost)onlyoneaspectofitsvalue,andthatdecidingwhetheritwasrightornotmayinvolveasubjectivecompromisebetweenfactorsofcompletelydifferenttypes.Politicalauthority–thecontracttheoryStatesmakedemandsoftheirmemberswhichwouldbedeeplyPhilosophyobjectionableifcomingfromaprivateperson.Tax,forinstance.WhyisitpermissiblefortheStatetoappropriateacertainproportionofmyincomewhen,ifyouwereeventoattemptit,youwouldbeguiltyofextortionor‘demandingmoneywithmenaces’?OrisitjustthattheStategetsawaywithit–bybeingeasilythebiggestmenacearound?NowmostpoliticaltheoristsholdthattheStatedoeshavesomelegitimateauthority,thoughthereislessagreementabouthowmuch–inotherwords,abouthowfarthisauthoritycanextendwhilstremaininglegitimate.Opinionsrangefromtotalitarianconceptions,whichassigntotheStatepoweroverallaspectsofindividuals’lives,tominimalistconceptions,accordingtowhichitcandowhatisnecessarytokeepthepeaceandenforceanycontractsitsmembersmaymakewitheachother,andscarcelyanythingmore.Butexceptfortheveryfewwhojumpoffthebottomendofthisscale(‘Stateshavenolegitimate50\nauthorityatall’),everyonefacesthequestionhowStateauthorityoverindividualsarises.Ananswerwithalonghistory–wehavealreadyseenaversionofitinCrito–isthatitarisesoutofsomekindofcontractoragreementbetweenindividualsandthestateofwhichtheyarecitizens.Itisaverynaturalanswer.Apersonmightagreetoaccepttheauthorityofanother(inacertainareaofactivity)becausehesawsubstantialbenefit(forhimself)indoingso,andinreturnforthatbenefit.Mostwouldacceptthatsuchanarrangementlegitimatestheother’sauthorityoverhimasfarastheiragreementreaches,providedthatagreementwasvoluntary.Thoughnatural,itisnottheonlyanswerworthconsidering.Anotherwouldbethatthestrongerhasnaturalauthorityovertheweaker,andthisauthorityislegitimatesolongasitisusedfortheweaker’sbenefit.Thatmightbeagoodwaytothinkofparents’authorityovertheirinfantSomethemeschildren,forinstance.Butifweallowtheweakertobethejudgesofwhethertheyarebenefitingornot,thenweareveryclosetosayingthatthepowerislegitimateonlysolongastheyacceptit.Whereuponwearebackintheneighbourhoodofa‘tacitconsent’theory,liketheonethattheLawsandStateofAthensappealedtoagainstSocrates(p.20above).Unlessweallowthatsuperiorforcemakesauthoritylegitimate(‘mightisright’),orthatGodhasgrantedauthoritytocertainpersonsorinstitutions(the‘divinerightofkings’),itisn’teasytoavoidthecontracttheoryinsomeformorother.Thereareseveralformsofitbecauseofthewidevarietyofanswerstothequestion‘Whomakeswhatcontractwithwhom?’Sincewewerespeakingofeveryindividual’sobligationtotheStatewemightsupposethateveryonemustindividuallybeapartytothecontract(thatwouldappeartobethedriftofSocrates’approachinCrito);butsometheoristswriteasifitwereenoughthatone’sancestors,orthefoundersofone’ssociety,shouldhavebeenpartytoit.Andregardlessofthatquestion,isthecontractmadewiththewholeofsociety(sothatyoucontracttogoalongwiththedecisionsofthewholebody,ofwhichyouareyourselfa51\nmember)?Orwithsomedistinctsovereignpersonorpersonstowhomyouthenoweallegiance?Youcanseethattheresultingdifferenceintheconstitutionmaybeenormous:anywherefromsocialdemocracytoabsolutemonarchy.Andwhatisthecontract?Inwhatcircumstancescantheindividualproperlyregardthecontractashavinglapsed?ThefamouscontracttheoryofThomasHobbes(1588–1679),whichweshallreturntoinChapter8,hasitthatthesolebenefitthatthecontractingindividualcanrightfullydemandisthepreservationoftheirlife:thesovereignputsupastoptothemurderous,thievinglawlessnessofthepre-contractualsituation,andorganizesdefenceagainstattackfromwithout.Ifthatfails,allbetsareoff;otherwise,completeobedience.Epicurushadsomethingpertinenttosay:‘Hewhoknewbesthowtomeetthefearofexternalfoesmadeintoonefamilyallthecreatureshecould.’EvenHobbesgrantedfamiliesacertainnaturalexemptionfromthewarofallagainstall.IntroubledtimesfamiliesarethegroupsmostPhilosophylikelytoholdtogether,andarethebestmodelforco-operationandallegiance.(Somereadersmayfindthatideaoutofdate–butperhapsthatissobecause,andinplaceswhere,timesareeasier.)InPlato’sprescriptionforanidealstate(TheRepublic)heineffectabolishesthefamily–nodoubthehadseenmuchfamily-centredintrigueandcorruption.ApluralityofcohesiveunitswithinitmustbedangeroustothepoweroftheStateanditscapacitytopreservepeace.Ifthereistobeafamilyitisbestthatthereshouldonlybeone–asEpicurus’remarkimplies–andthattheState(recallCrito50eff.)bethoughtofaseveryone’sparent.EvidenceandrationalityRationalityiswhatyou’vegotifyouhavesomecapacitytoreason:toworkout,givencertaintruths,whatelseislikelytobetrueiftheyare;perhapsalso(thoughyouneedrathermorerationalityforthis)how52\nSomethemes9.Beyondthefamily,anythinggoes.Hobbes’sstateofnature?likely.ItisthequalityofmindHumewastalkingaboutwhenhesaid,inOfMiracles,thatawisemanproportionshisbelieftotheevidence.Formingtherightbeliefs,withtheappropriatedegreeofconfidence,isn’ttheonlymanifestationofrationalityhowever.Afamiliarsituationisthatinwhichyouwanttoknowwhetheracertainthingistrueornot(‘Wasitthebutlerwhodidit?’‘Haveweanybreadinthehouse?’),andhereyourrationalitywillshowatleastasmuchinwhatevidenceyouseekout,asinwhatyoubelieveonceyouhavegotit.Aswellaspowersofinvestigation,wealsohaveacapacityforrationalchoice:given53\ncertaindesires,tochooseacourseofactionlikelytoleadtotheirfulfilment.Andourreasonissometimes,thoughcontroversially,assignedafurtherfunction:notjusttotelluswhatweoughttodo,giventhatwehavecertaingoals,butinadditiontotelluswhatgoalsweoughttohave.Thereisaninfluentialheavyweightoneithersideofthistrickyquestion,withKantaffirmingthatreasondoeshavesuchapower,Humedenyingit.(TomymindHumeandhisfollowershaveslightlythebetterofit,thoughbattlecontinues.)Butherewestickwiththeissueofbeliefandevidence.Whyshouldwebeinterestedinhavingevidence,orbeingabletoofferreasons,forourbeliefs?Becauseitmakesitmorelikelythattheywillbetrue;anditmakesusmoreconfidentthattheyaretrue.Bothareimportant.Wewantourbeliefstobetrue,becauseweusethemtodirectouractions,andactionsdirectedbytruebeliefsareonthewholefarmoresuccessful.(Comparetheactions,andthesuccessrate,oftwopeoplebothwantingabeer:onebelieves–falsely–thatthebeerisinthefridge,theotherbelieves–truly–thatitisstillinthecar.)AnditPhilosophyhelpsifweholdourtruebeliefsconfidently,becausethenwegoaheadandactonthem,ratherthanditheringabout.Thosearepracticalconsiderations,influencingallofusallthetime.Theremayalsobetheoreticalones,havingtodowithourphilosophicalself-image:we(someofus,atcertainperiodsofhistory)mayliketothinkofourselvesasessentiallyrationalbeingsinwhoselivesreasonplaysanabsolutelycentralrole.Foralongtimephilosopherstookrationalitytobethecrucialfeaturedistinguishinghumansfromotheranimals.(YoucanseeHumecontestingthisviewinOftheReasonofAnimals,thesectionimmediatelybeforeOfMiracles.)Theideathatreasonisabsolutelycentraltohumanlifeisarathervagueone,soitisn’tthesortofviewonecouldeverprove,ordefinitivelyrefute,anditwouldbeabadmisjudgementtotry.Neverthelessmanythingscanbesaidthatarerelevanttoit.54\nThefirstwaswell-knowntothescepticsofancientGreece.Supposeyouholdsomebelief(callitB),andyouaskyourselfwhatreasonyouhavetoholdit.Sothenyouthinkofsomereason(callitR).ThisRcannotbesomethingyouhavejustdreamtup.Youmusthaveareasontothinkthatitistrue,ifitistogiveyouareasonforbelievingB.Thisfurtherreasoncan’tbeBitself,orRagain(thatwouldbetogiveabeliefasareasonforitself,whichseemslikenothingmorethanreassertingthebelief,andisoftencalled‘beggingthequestion’),soitmustbesomethingelse–whereuponthesameargumentrepeats.Thissuggeststhattheideathatwehavereasonsforourbeliefsisjustalocalappearance,whichdisappearsassoonaswetrytolookatthewiderpicture:‘reasons’turnouttoberelativetocertainotherbeliefsforwhichwehavenoreasons.Thesearchforasatisfactoryresponsetothisargumenthasstructuredawholeareaofphilosophicalinquiryknownasepistemologyorthetheoryofknowledge.SomethemesAddthatsomeofourmostbasicbeliefs,beliefswithoutwhichwejustcouldn’tgetonwithourlives,areveryhardtofindanydecentreasonfor.Amuchdiscussedexampleisourconfidencethatthingswillcontinuemuchastheyhaveinthepast:yournextbreathofairwon’tsuffocateyou,thefloorwon’tcollapsewhenyoutakeyournextstep–andhundredsofotherthingsofthatkind.Withwhatreasondowebelievethem?Don’tanswer:thatsortofbeliefhasnearlyalwaysworked.True,butthatisjustanotherexampleofwhathashappenedinthepast,andwhatwewantedtoknowwaswhyweexpectthefuturetogothesameway.Soiftheideawasthathumanbeliefcanbemadethroughandthroughrationallytransparent,orthathumanlifecouldrunonreasonalone,thenitfacesformidableobstacles.Butitremainsthecasethathumanpowersofreasoning,acquiringbeliefsbyinferringthemfrompreviousbeliefs,aremorethanjustimportanttous.Withoutthemtherewouldbenothingrecognizablyhumanleftexcepttheshapeofourbodies,andtheaveragechimpwouldrunringsroundus,literallyandfiguratively.55\nTheselfChapter4introducedtheBuddhist‘no-self’doctrine,accordingtowhichapersonisnotasimple,independentlyenduringthingbutacomposite,andaneasilydissolublecompositeatthat,ofthefive‘aggregates’,whicharethemselvescomplexthingsorstates.Butthatisnottheonlytraditioninwhichwefindtheviewthataselfisreallyawholelotofseparatethingsprecariouslyholdingtogether.ItappearsinthemodernWestastheso-called‘Bundletheoryofthemind’,andisalmostinvariablyattributedtoHume.(Inyourguide’spersonalopinionitisverydoubtfulwhetherHumeactuallyheldit,butI’llskirtroundthatcontroversyhere.)Sosupposethereissomesimple,independentlyenduringthing–you–whichjustcontinuesthesamesolongasyouexist.Whereisit?Lookintoyourownmindandseeifyoucanperceiveit.Whatdoyoufind?Inthefirstplace,younoticethatyouareexperiencingamotleyofperceptions:visualperceptionsofthewayyoursurroundingslook,Philosophyauditoryperceptionsofthewaytheysound,perhapsalsoafewsmells,tactualsensationsofpressure,roughness,warmth,andsuchlike,fromtouchingnearbyobjects.Thensensationsoftensionincertainmuscles,awarenessofbodilymovements.Allthesearecontinuallychangingasyourpositionchangesandsurroundingobjectsthemselveschange.Youmightalsofeelaslightacheinyourfoot,orinyourforehead;andbeawareofatrainofthought,perhapsasimagesorasilentsequenceofhalf-formedsentences.Butthereisnosign,inthisshiftingkaleidoscopiccomplex,ofthatobject‘theself’,juststeadfastlypersisting.Whythensupposethatthereissuchathing?Well,someonewillsay,it’sclearthatalltheseexperiences,myexperiences,somehowbelongtogether;andthereareotherexperiences,thosethatarenotminebutyours,whichalsobelongtogetherbutdon’tbelongwiththislot.Sotheremustbeonething,me,myself,whichishavingallmyexperiences56\nbutisn’thavinganyofyours,andanotherthing,yourself,doingthereverse.Supportersofthebundletheoryreplythatnothingofthekindfollows.Whatmakesallmyexperienceshangtogetherdoesn’thavetobearelationtheyallstandintosomethingelse;itmightbesomesystemofrelationshipsthattheyallstandintoeachother(butdon’tstandintoanyofyours).Thinkofalotofshredsofpaperwhichformonegroupbyvirtueofallbeingpinnedtothesamepincushion(themodelofthecentralself)–andacollectionofironfilingswhichformonebunchbecausetheyareallmagnetizedandthereforeclingtogether(themodelofthebundle).Youwillhavenoticedtheaffinitybetweenthesethoughts(adaptedfromHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,book1,part4,section6(1738))SomethemesandthoseoftheBuddhistauthorfromourChapter4.Buttherearealsodifferences,oneofthemostsignificantbeingthestatustheygivetothebody.TheBuddhistdidn’thesitatetoincludethebody(‘materialform’)asoneofthefiveaggregatesthatcomposetheperson,whereastheeighteenth-centuryversiondoesn’tevenbothertoexcludeit,butjustignoresitcompletely.Humewritesfirst‘self’,then‘selforperson’,then‘mind’,asifthesewereobviouslythesame,sothat‘Whatistheself(orperson)?’and‘Whatisthemind?’areforhimjusttwowaysofaskingonequestion.SuchwasthechangeofclimatebroughtaboutbycenturiesofreligiousthoughtdeeplyinfluencedbyPlatoandNeoplatonism,withtheiremphasisonthesoulandthespiritualandtheirdenigrationofthebodily.Thereisalsoanother,huge,difference.Whenpresentedwithaphilosophicaldoctrineitisalwaysagoodideatoaskwhathappensnext–thatistosay,whatitsproponentswanttodowithit.TheBuddhists,wesaw,hadanethicalpurposeinmind.The‘no-self’theorywouldhelpustolivebetter,keepclearof‘defilements’,avoidsufferingmoresuccessfully.Hume’snextmovewasutterlydifferent,having57\nnothingatalltodowithethicsbutquitealottodowithwhatwenowcallcognitivescience.Ifwedonotperceivetheenduringself,whythendowebelievethatwearethesamepersonfromdaytoday?Andheproposedapsychologicaltheorytoaccountforit.(Itwasbytoday’sstandardsaprettynaïveone,butthatisonlytobeexpected.)Wearenotsomuchcomparingtwoindividualsastwoepochs.Nagasena’swastheageofsurvival,Hume’stheageofscience.Wherethereissuchadifferenceintheplot,nowonderifasimilarthoughtturnsupplayingaverydifferentrole.Whichleadsstraightintoournexttopic.PhilosophyandhistoricalcontextCouldPlatoandHobbes,2,000yearsapart,withtheirdifferentbackgroundsandcircumstances,reallyhavebeendiscussingthesamething?CouldaphilosophernowadaysbeaskingthesamequestionsabouttheselfasHumedid,letalonetheearlyBuddhists?Doesn’tthePhilosophyideathatwecantalkaboutphilosophicalthemeswithoutreferencetowhoseandwhenmakethemsoundliketimelessobjectsthatthinkersofanyepochcanpluginto?Thatviewwouldbequitetheoppositeofpopularnowadays.Allthought,werepeatedlyhear,is‘situated’–tiedtotheparticularhistorical,social,andculturalcircumstancesinwhichthinkersfindthemselves.Icertainlydon’twishtorecommendthebeliefthatthereareeternalquestionsjusthangingaroundwaitingtobeasked.Buttheviewthatnoquestionoranswerhasanyexistencebeyondthespecificcircumstancesofwhoeverposesitispossiblyevenworse,andcertainlynobetter.Partoftheattractionofsuchextremesisthattheyareverysimple,somewhatinthepantomimestyleof‘Ohyesitis–Ohnoitisn’t’.Assooften,thetruthliesinbetween,andismuchmorecomplicated.Onecanapproachthistopicinmanyways,butI’llchoosethisway:isitlegitimatetotreatthethoughtofsomeonelongsincedeadasa58\ncontributiontoapresentdebate,asifitwerebeingputtous,hereandnow?Ithinkitis,andthatthereareevenreasonswhyweshould.Butitneedstobedonewithcareand–mostimportantly–withaneyetowhatwemaybemissing.Thereisnothingtostopusliftingasentencefromanoldtextandseeingwhatitcandoforusnow.Ifwewanttoliftthethought,notjustthesentence,wemayhavetoputsomeworkintodecidingwhatthesentencemeant.Ifwearen’tpreparedtodothatweshouldn’texpecttoomuchofit,andwecertainlyshouldn’tdisparageitsauthorifwedon’tgettoomuchfromit.Butgiventhatprecautionwewilloftenfinditrelevanttoourconcerns,becausemuchphilosophyarisesfromfactsabouthumanbeingsandhumanlifewhichareprettystable–atanyratetheyhaven’tchangedmuchoverthelast3,000years.SomethemesFindingsomethingrelevantisonething,findingitconvincingisanother.SupposewedismissPlato’sandHobbes’sargumentsasinsufficienttoestablishtheextentoftheauthoritytheyascribetothestate.Thereissomethingrightaboutthis:nodoubttheirargumentsareinsufficient.Butifwethenturnaway,takingourbusinesswiththemtobefinished,weriskmakinganumberofmistakes.Oneisthatthoughwemayhaveunderstoodwhattheyhavewrittenwehavenotunderstoodthem–theirconcernsaboutwhatpoliticalthoughtneeded,thecircumstancesthatgaverisetotheseconcernsandsomadetheirconclusionsattractivetothem.Sowemaybemissingthehumanitybehindthetext,andwithitanimportantaspectofwhatphilosophyisfor.Furthermore,wheneverthereisanyuncertaintyaboutwhattheymeant,understandingwhytheyweresayingitisoftenavaluablemeansofresolvingtheambiguity.Inshowingnointerestintheirmotivationwetakeariskwithourunderstandingoftheirwords.Asecondpointisthatourappreciationofaphilosopher’sachievement59\nwillbeseriouslybluntedifwedonotseetheintellectualandemotionalcircumstancesoutofwhichtheirworkgrew.Iproposedearlierthatwethinkofphilosophyasbewilderedmankind’sattempttothinkourwaybackstraight.Thatisnotastorythatcanbeappreciatedwithoutsomeunderstandingofthecircumstancesinwhichthinkershavefoundthemselves.So‘Isthisright?’iscertainlynottheonlyquestionweshouldbethinkingabout.Still,thereissomethingwrongwithrefusingaltogethertoaskwhetherourphilosopherwasright,orwhethertheirargumentsareconvincing,merelybecausetheylivedlongago.Afterall,Platodidnottakehimselftobewritingjustforhisowntimeandplace.Onthecontrary,heisconstantlytryingtodirectourattentionawayfromthetransientandtowardswhathebelievestobepermanent,anditseemsdeeplycondescending(orpossiblyself-protective?)todismisshisfurtherambitionswithoutmakinganyhonestattempttoassessthem.‘There,there,designedhisownidealstate,hashe?–whatacleverlittlefellow.’PhilosophyIhopethatyouarenowbeginningtonoticesomethingratherencouraging.Theliteratureofphilosophymaybeintimidatinglyvast,butthenumberofgenuinelydistinctphilosophicalthemesisnot.Itissomewhattoolargeforthecompassofthisveryshortbook,admittedly,butitisnotenormous.Wehavealreadyseenlinksacross2,000yearsbetweenEpicurusandMill,PlatoandHobbes,HumeandtheauthorofMilinda.Theproblemliesnotinbecomingfamiliarwiththerecurrentthemes,butinbeingsensitivetothevariationsasdifferentthinkersplaythemagainintheirownwayfortheirownpurposes.Andwhatthismeansisthatone’sunderstandingofphilosophyiscumulative,andaccumulatesratherquickly.Whichmustbegoodnews.60\nChapter6Of‘isms’Fromfootballtogardeningandbackviacookery,mountaineering,andpopulationgenetics,everysubjecthasitsownterminology.Philosophycertainlydoes,mostofitfortunatelynotnearlyasfrighteningasitlooks.InChapter4wesaw‘metaphysics’,meaningthestudyof(oropinionsabout)whatrealityislikeinitsmostgeneralfeatures.InChapter5weencountered‘consequentialism’,theblanketwordfortheoriesthatseethevalueofanythinginitsconsequencesratherthaninitsownnatureanditshistory;then‘epistemology’,thebranchofphilosophyconcernedwithknowledge,belief,andcloselyrelatednotionslikereasonsandjustification.Nowlet’slookatsomemorewords,allofthemendingin‘ism’.Thisisn’tamatterofswottingupvocabulary–ratheroffindingoutmoreaboutphilosophyasyoulearnmoreofthejargon.Mostphilosophical‘ism’wordsare(like‘consequentialism’)quitebroadtermsdesignatingacertaingeneraltypeofdoctrine.Theirbreadthmakesthemveryflexible,andensuresthattheyareinconstantuse,butitalsobringsdangers,principallythatoftakingthemtosaymorethantheyreallydo.Neverthinkthatyouhavegotaphilosophersortedoutjustbecauseyoucansaywhat‘ism’herepresents.ThephilosophyofGeorgeBerkeley(1685–1752)isaformofIdealism,andsoisthatofHegel(1770–1831);butIhaveneverhearditsuggestedthathavingreadeitherwouldbeanyhelpinunderstandingtheother–theirthoughtis61\nmilesapart.KarlMarx(1818–83),ontheotherhand,certainlywasn’tanIdealist(whichisactuallyatermofabuseintheMarxistvocabulary),butheisinmanyrespectsextremelyHegelian,andthatastudentshouldgettoknowsomethingofHegelbeforereadingMarxseemsthemostobviousadviceimaginable.Withthatwarningutteredandillustrated,letusbeginwithdualism.Itcanbeusedofanyviewwhichrecognizes(exactly)twocontrastingforcesorentities,sothatatheologywhichpositstwobasicpowersinconflict,onegoodandoneevil,issaidtobedualistic.Butbyfaritsmostcommonmeaningisadoctrineaccordingtowhichrealityconsistsoftwoverydifferentkindsofthingorstuff,namelymindandmatter;ahumanbeingconsistsofabitofeach.PerhapsthemostfamousexponentofdualisminthissenseistheFrenchmanRenéDescartes(someofwhoseworkweshallbelookingatinthenextchapter).Infact,someenemiesofdualism,andthereareplentyofthemnowadays,seemtowanttoblameitallonhim.(Thatishistoricallydubious,tosaytheleast–DescarteswasmerelytryingtogivecogentproofofaPhilosophydoctrinethatisverymucholder.)Dualismcertainlyhasitsproblems,especiallyifitistobecombinedwithmodernscientifictheory.Onetrickyquestionis:whatdoesthedualist’smentalstuffactuallydo?Wenaturallysupposethatwhatwethink,whatwefeel,whatweareawareof,affectsourbehaviour.IfIthinkthatthetrainleavesintenminutes,wanttocatchit,andseeasignpostsaying‘RailwayStation’,IwillgointhedirectionIbelievethesignpostpoints.Thismeansthatmy(physical)bodygoessomewhereitwouldn’totherwisehavegone.Butdoesn’tscientifictheorysuggestthatallphysicaleventshaveotherphysicaleventsastheircauses?Inwhichcasehowcanthereberoomforsomethingelse,ofanon-physicalkind,tocausemybodytomove?Dualistsmayjusthavetogrittheirteethandsaythatscienceisplainwrongaboutthat.Foriftheyagreethatscienceisrightonthatpoint,andiftheyagree(anditwouldbeweirdnotto)thatwhatwethink,feel,etc.affectswhatwedo,thentheconsequence62\nisthatthinking,feeling,awareness,andsoonmustbephysicalprocesses.Inwhichcasethequestioncomesroundagain:whatdoesthisnon-physicalstuffoftheirs,this‘mind’,actuallydo?Butdualistscan’tjustsaythatscienceiswrongaboutallphysicaleventshavingphysicalcauses.Thatwon’tconvinceanyonewhowasn’tconvincedtostartwith.Theywillneedsomereasonforsayingthatthereissomethingaboutuswhichcannotbephysical.WhenwecometoDescarteswe’llseesomethingofwhatadualistmighthavetoofferonthatscore.So,youmaybethinking,ifdualismistheviewthattherearetwoultimatesortsofstuff,mindandmatter,probablywealsofindadoctrinethatsaysthereisonlymatter,andanotherthatholdsthatthereisnothingbutmind.Andyou’requiteright.Thefirstiscalledmaterialism,thesecondidealism(notmentalism),andbothhaveplentyofhistory.Of‘isms’TheearliestmaterialismofwhichwehaveclearrecordisthatoftheIndianLoka¯yatas,oftenknownasCa¯rva¯kasafteroneoftheirmosteminentthinkers(incidentally,pronounce‘c’intheseSanskritwordsas‘ch’).RememberthemifyoufindyourselfslippingintothecommonerrorofimaginingthatallIndianphilosophyismystical,religious,andascetic.Onlyperceptionconfersknowledge,andwhatyoucan’tperceivedoesn’texist,theyreckoned.Theeternalsoulthat,astheBrahminssuppose,passesonfromlifetolife,isafiction.Youhaveonelifeandoneonly–trytoenjoyit.Themovementappearstohavesurvivedforoverathousandyears;unfortunately,justaboutallwenowknowofitcomesfromreportswrittenbyitsopponents.InGreeceDemocritus–afairlyclosecontemporaryofSocrates–propoundedatheorywhich,untiltwentieth-centuryphysicschangedthepicture,soundedverymodern:theuniverseconsistsofmyriadsofverysmallmaterialparticlesmovinginavacuumorvoid.Theselittlethingsarecalled‘atoms’(fromtheGreekforuncuttableorindivisible);63\ntheyandthevoidtheymovethroughareliterallyeverythingthereis.ThisrathergoodguesswastakenoverbyEpicurus(we’veseenhimalready)andhisschool,buttheeasiestplacetoreadaboutitisinafamousworkbyLucretius,aRomanadmirerofEpicurus,called‘OftheNatureofThings’(or‘OftheNatureoftheUniverse’–dependingonwhichtranslationyouhavegotholdof).Youmightexpectmaterialismtobecompletelyincompatiblewithanysortofreligiousbelief–asthecaseoftheLoka¯yatasappearstoconfirm.Butwatchoutforsurprises!TheEpicureansbelievedingods,butthenheld(asconsistencydemanded)thattheyhadbodiesmadeofaveryrefinedtypeofmatter.(Theylivesomewhereaverylongwayfromhereinastateofdivineblissanduntroubledhappiness–payingnotawinkofattentiontohumanlife.Opponentssaidthiswasjustawayofbeingatheistswithoutadmittingit.)Theword‘materialism’asitoccursineverydayusageisratherdifferent.A‘materialgirl’isn’tagirlwhoconsistsofmatteronly–thoughifPhilosophyphilosophicalmaterialistsarerightthatisallsheconsistsof,andsodoesthematerialworldshelivesin.Buttheeveryday‘materialism’whichsomebemoanandothersjustenjoyisn’twhollyunrelatedtothephilosophers’sort.Madonna’smaterialgirlderivesherpleasuresmostlyfrommaterialobjects–theirownershipandconsumption–inpreferencetothepleasuresofthemind.Everydaymaterialismistheattachmenttowhatis–nowinthephilosophers’sense–material,asopposedtowhatisspiritualorintellectual.ThephilosophyofMarxcametobecalleddialecticalmaterialism,notsomuchbecauseheheldthatthereisliterallynothingbutmatterasbecauseheheldthatthemostimportantunderlyingcausesinhumanlifearematerial:economicfactsaboutthewayinwhichasocietyproducesitsmaterialgoods.(What‘dialectical’meantweshallseeinChapter7whenweencounterHegel,below,p.81ff.)Idealismisalsoawordwithaneverydayaswellasatechnicalmeaning.64\nAtthetechnicalenditisappliedtoviewsthatdenytheexistenceofmatterandholdthateverythingthereisismentalorspiritual,likethatoftheIrishbishopGeorgeBerkeley,whomwementionedearlier.Someonewhotellsusthathadbetterexplain,inthenextbreath,whatthenarethesethingslikechairsandmountainsthatwekeepbumpingintoandfallingoff.WhenhehearditsaidthatBerkeleycouldnotberefuted,thecelebratedmanoflettersDrJohnsonisreputedtohaveanswered:‘Irefutehimthus’,andkickedastone.ButrefutingBerkeleyisn’tthateasy.(Iusetheword‘refute’tomeanshowingthatsomethingiswrong,notjustsayingthatitiswrong–whichofcourseisveryeasyindeedandcanbedonebyanyone,especiallysomeonelikeDrJohnson,whowasrarelyshorteitherofanopinionorofamemorablewayofexpressingit.)PerhapsBerkeleycanberefuted,butonlyifwecansomehowovercomethefollowingwell-wornlineofthought.WhatIamreallyOf‘isms’awareofwhenIlookatatableisnotthetableitselfbuthowthetablelookstome.‘Howitlookstome’describesnotthetable,butmymind–itisthestateofconsciousnesswhichtheobject,whateveritis,producesinmewhenIlookatit.Andthisgoesonbeingtruehoweverclosely,orfromhowevermanyangles,Ilookatthetable;anditgoesonbeingtrueifItouchthetable–exceptthatthentheobject(whateveritis)producesadifferentkindofstateofconsciousnessinme,tactualsensationsasopposedtovisual.IfIkickthetable(orDrJohnson’sstone)andithurts,thatisyetanotherstateofmyconsciousness.Admittedly,thesestatesofconsciousnessfittogetherverynicely;wequicklylearnfromaveryfewofthemtopredictquiteaccuratelywhattherestaregoingtobelike–oneglance,andweknowprettymuchwhattoexpect.Butthetableitself,thephysicaltable,isn’tsomuchanestablishedfactasahypothesisthatexplainsallthesestatesofperceptualconsciousness.Soitmightbewrong–someotherhypothesismightbethetruth.Berkeleyhimselfthoughtpreciselythat,thoughpartlybecausehebelievedhehadprovedthattheveryideaofanon-mentalexistentwasincoherent.(I’mnotgoing65\ntotroubleyouwithhissupposedproofhere.)Believingashedidinabenevolentandall-powerfulgod,hemadeHiswillthedirectcauseofourstatesofconsciousnessanddeclaredmatterredundant–aswellasincoherent.Hume–again–madeanicecomment.Berkeley’sarguments,hesaid‘admitofnoanswerandproducenoconviction’.HoweverimpossiblewemayfindittobelieveBerkeley’sdenialofmatter,aconvincingproofthathejustcouldn’tberighthasbeenextremelyelusive.Imyselfdon’tbelievethatthereisone–thoughneither,youwon’tbesurprisedtohear,doIbelieveBerkeley.Somephilosophicalsystems(likeHegel’s)qualifyasidealismnotbecausetheydenytheveryexistenceofmatterbutbecausetheyregarditassubordinatetothementalorspiritual,whichiswhatreallydeterminesthenatureofrealityandgivesitpurpose.Thisuseof‘idealism’parallelstheuseof‘materialism’wenoticedabove,initsapplicationtothephilosophyofKarlMarx.ButwhenwecomePhilosophytotheeverydaynotionofidealismtheparallelwith‘materialism’fails.Amaterialist’sattentionisfixedonmaterialgoodsasopposedtomental,spiritual,orintellectualones;whereasanidealistisnotsomeonealwaysfocusedonthelatterratherthantheformer,butsomeonecommittedtoideals.Andidealsareessentiallythingsofthemind,becausetheyarethethoughtsofcircumstancesnotinfactfoundinreality,butwhichwecanstrivetoapproachasnearlyastheconditionsoflifepermit.Thementalnatureofidealsmakestheconnectionbetweentheeverydayusageofthewordandthetechnicalone.Twomore‘isms’ofwhichonehearsalot,andwhichtendtooccurtogetherasapairofsupposedopposites,are‘empiricism’and‘rationalism’.Whereas‘dualism’,‘materialism’,and‘idealism’belongtometaphysics(whatsortsofthingarethere?),thispairbelongssquarelytoepistemology(howdoweknow?).66\n10.Everysubjecttalksitsowntalk.Of‘isms’Inaroughandreadywayweallmakeadistinctionbetweenperceivingandthinking.Itisonethingtoseetheobjectsonyourtable,noticethatoneisapenandoneacomputer;itisanotherthingtothinkaboutthem,wonderiftheystillwork,orwhattodoiftheydon’t.Andweareusedtotheideathatastronomersspendlonghourslookingatthesky,whereasmathematiciansjustseemtositthereworkingthingsout,feelingnoneedtolookatanythingatallexceptwhattheythemselveshavewrittendown.Sohere,onthefaceofit,aretwoquitedifferentwaysofacquiringknowledge.Somephilosophershavefavouredoneofthemattheexpenseoftheother:‘empiricism’isaverygeneralwordfordoctrinesthatfavourperceivingoverthinking,‘rationalism’fordoctrinesthatfavourthinkingoverperceiving.Theremayhavebeenphilosopherswhoheldthatonlywhatcouldbeperceivedcouldbeknown,soallowingnocognitivepowersatalltothought,inferenceandreason.SomethingofmuchthatkindisreportedoftheLoka¯yatas,whomwemetaboveinconnectionwithmaterialism.67\nAccordingtosomereportsoftheirthinkingtheywentevenfurther,sayingthatonlywhatcanbeperceivedexists.Ifso(butrememberthatallthereportswehavewerewrittenbytheiropponents!),theysurelyoverreachedthemselves.Nobodywhothinksthatknowledgeisonlyofwhatyouhaveperceivedcanclaimtoknowthatnothingimperceptibleexists,sincethatisn’tsomethingyoucouldpossiblyperceive.(Itwouldmakeasmuchsenseasclaimingtobeabletohearthatnothinginaudibleexists.)Anempiricistwhoholdsthatonlyperceptionyieldsknowledgeneednotbesayingthattheprocessofperceptionitselfinvolvesnothoughtwhatever,sothatwecanhaveasitwerepureperceptionuntaintedbyanythinking.Eventolookatmytableandseethatthereisapenonitrequiresmoreofmethanjustpassivelyregisteringthelightpatternsthatentermyeyes.Ineedtoknowalittleaboutpens,attheveryleastaboutwhattheylooklike,andthenbringthisknowledgetobear,otherwiseIshallnomoreseeapenthandoesthecamerawithwhichwephotographthepen.PhilosophyPerceptionisinterpretative,whereascamerasmerelyrecordpatternsoflight.Soalesscrudeempiricismwillallowthatclassification,thought,inference,andreasonallhavetheirlegitimaterole.Butitwilltakeitsstandonthepointthattheycannotgenerateasingleitemofknowledgeontheirown.Itmaybetruethatthereisnothought-freeperception;butitisalsotruethatthereisnoperception-freeknowledge.Allclaimstoknowledgeanswer,intheend,toperception;itmaybepossibleforthemtogobeyondperception,buttheymuststartfromit.Theempiricistcanofferapowerfulargumentforthisview;anywould-berationalistmusthaveananswerready.Inperceptionweareinsomekindofcontactwithobjectsaroundus;theyhaveaneffectonoursenses.Butifwetrytothinkincompleteindependenceofperception,whereisthelinkbetweenusandtheobjectswearetryingtothinkabout?Forifthereisnosuchlink,thenthereistheworld,and68\nherearewethinkingawaytoourselves.Thatsoundslikearecipeforpurefantasy,perhapsinterspersedwiththeveryoccasionalluckyguess.Letustakeaquicklookathowthreephilosophersofstronglyrationalisttendencies,Plato,Kant,andHegel,respondedtothischallenge.Whatreasoncantellus,accordingtoPlato,isnotdirectlyabouttheworldofthesensesatall,butabouteternal,transcendententitiescalledIdeasorForms:theGood,theJust,theEqual,theBeautiful.Thingsweperceivewiththesensesaregood,equal,andsoonjustinsofarasthey‘participate’intheseFormsorapproximatetothestandardssetbythem.ButhowdoesReasongetitsknowledgeoftheForms?Plato(asyouwillknowbynowifyoutookmyadvicetoreadhisPhaedoasafollow-uptoCrito)madeuseofabelieffarfromunknowntoancientGreekthought.Thesoulhasexistedbeforeitentereditspresentbody.Inthatexistenceitencountered–PlatohintsOf‘isms’obscurelyatsomethinganalogoustoperception–theForms,andinrationalthoughtitisnowbroughttorememberwhatitthenlearntofthem.Kant,whowashappytoconcedefarmoretoempiricismthanPlatoorHegel,metthechallengeinanovelandradicalway.Reasoncannottellusanythingaboutthingsimperceptible–itcanonlytelluswhat,ingeneralterms,ourexperienceisboundtobelike.Anditcandothisonlybecauseourexperienceisshapedbyourownminds.Reason,operatingonitsown,isreallyonlytellingushowourmindswork–whichiswhyitcandowhatitdoeswithoutneedingtodrawonourperceptionsoftherestoftheworld.Hegel’sresponseisnotunlikePlato’s,inthathebeginswithasystemofthoughtsoruniversalswhichhecollectivelycalls‘TheIdea’.Thisisthedrivingforcewhichstructuresthewholeofreality,whichincludesourmindsandthecategoriesinwhichwethink,aswellastherestofrealitywhichiswhatwearethinkingabout.Thatiswhywecanexpectour69\nreason,evenwhenusedonitsownindependentlyofperception,tobeintunewiththeworld.Thereasoningsubjectanditsobjectshareastructure,thatoftheIdea.Thesethreeexamplesshowusthattheoppositionbetweenempiricismandrationalismisnotaminorskirmish.Thosewhobeginbytakingoppositesidesatthispointcanendupworldsapart,metaphysicallyspeaking.ButIdonotmeantosuggestthatonlyrationalismfacesdifficultiesandempiricismisproblem-free.Notso,asweshallsoonfindout.Anothermuch-used‘ism’isscepticism.Onecanbesceptical,ofcourse,aboutspecificthingsliketheprobityoftheOlympicCommittee,theexistenceofUFOs,orthevalueofalow-fatdiet,butwhen‘scepticism’occursinphilosophicaltextsitusuallyreferstosomethingmuchmoregeneral:therejectionofawiderangeofclaimstoknowledge,ordoubtsaboutalargeclassofbeliefs.Itisn’tjusttheirnumber,ofcourse.AnyscepticismworthyofaplaceinthehistorybooksmustbeaimedatPhilosophybeliefsthatareactuallyheld,andareheldtobeimportant–nomedalsareawardedforshellingthedesert.Thismeansthattherecanbeplentyofthoughtwhichwasscepticalinitsowntime,butnowreadsdifferently.AgoodexamplewouldbeQuodNihilScitur(‘ThatNothingisKnown’),bythePortuguesephilosopher/medicFranciscoSanchez(1551–1623).Amoresceptical-soundingtitleitwouldbehardtofind,butwhatfollowsseemstousnotsomuchscepticismasavigorousattackonAristotelianism,thenprevalentbutnowlongsincediscredited.Whenscepticssucceedtheyceasetolooklikesceptics;theylooklikecriticswhowereright.Otherformsofscepticismhavealongershelf-life.Thesearetheoneswhosetargetsareperennialhumanbeliefs,oreverydaybeliefs,orwhatisoftencalledcommonsense.ThemostfamousexampleofmoderntimesoccursatthebeginningofDescartes’sMeditations,whereweare70\nthreatenedwiththepossibilitythatthesensescannotbereliedupontotellusanythingwhateverabouttheworld,noteventhatthereisone.ButDescartesisontheprogrammeforthenextchapter,soletusherelookbackinsteadtotheschoolofPyrrho(roughly:365–275bc),sourceofthemostdevelopedscepticalphilosophyweknow.Itcanallbefoundinasinglebook,OutlinesofPyrrhonismbySextusEmpiricus.Sextus,inhisprimearoundad200,herereportsinlovingdetailtheaims,arguments,andconclusionsofthesystem.Happythemovementthatfindsachroniclerlikehim.Theearlypyrrhonistshadworkedhard.Theyhadcataloguedten‘tropes’,orwaysofarguingfortheirscepticalconclusionthatwehavenosufficientgroundsforanyconvictionastowhatthingsarereallylike,asopposedtohowtheyappeartous.Facedwitha‘dogmatist’–oneofthepoliternamestheycalledpeoplelikeAristoteliansandStoicswhoclaimedtoknowsuchthings–theirfavouritestrategywastofindOf‘isms’someanimaltowhichthingswouldappeardifferently,orotherhumanbeingstowhomtheyappeareddifferently,orcircumstancesunderwhichtheywouldappeardifferentlytotheclaimantsthemselves,andthentoarguethattherewasnowayofresolvingthedisagreementwithoutarbitrarilyfavouringoneviewpointovertherest.InonepassageSextusarguesthatthereisnoreasontoprivilegethewaysomethingseemstoadogmatistoverthewayitseemstoadog.Readerswilloccasionallycatchhimarguingfrompremisseswhichascepticmightbeexpectedtofinduntrustworthy.Perhapshe,andthepyrrhonists,werenotalwaysspeakingtoeternity,buttotheircontemporaries–andfeltthatwhattheyacceptedcouldlegitimatelybeusedagainstthem.Nowadaysoneoftenhearsitaskedwhatthepointofacomprehensivescepticismcouldbe–askedrhetorically,withtheimplicationthatitcanhavenopointwhatever.Butthepyrrhonistscertainlythoughtthattheirscepticismhadapoint:theachievementoftranquillityofmind,untroubledness,ataraxia.Theyknewathingortwoabout71\npeaceofmind.Ifyouwanttoinsistonthetruthofyourpointofview,rememberthatthereisacost:lifeisgoingtobeaperpetualintellectualbrawl.Andifthebrawlstaysintellectual,you’llhavebeenlucky;especiallyinreligionandpolitics,thesethingshavebeenknowntoendinbombsandburnings.Ithinktheyknewsomethingelseaswell:movingfromhowthingsimmediatelyappeartooursensestowhattheyarereallylikeisamuchslower,morehazardousandlaboriousenterprisethanmanyoftheircontemporariesrealized.Thepyrrhonists’favouritescepticalmanœuvrewastoremindusthathowathingappearsdoesnotjustdependonthething:itdependsontheconditionofthepersontowhomitappears,andthemediumthroughwhichitappears.Whichushersinourfinal‘ism’:relativism.Relativismisnotaspecificdoctrine,butatypeofdoctrine–Imightadd,atypemuchinvoguewithintellectualsatthemoment.Thegeneralideaiseasytograsp.Amoralrelativistwillholdthatthereisnosuchthingasgood(pureandsimple),ratherthereisgood-in-this-Philosophysociety,good-in-that-society.Anaestheticrelativistrejectstheideathatanobjectmightsimplybebeautiful;wealwayshavetoask‘Beautifulforwhom,inwhoseeyes?’A‘gastronomicrelativist’won’tbeinterestedinthequestionwhetherpineappletastesnice–ithastobe‘tastesnicetowhom,when,andincombinationwithwhat?’Aliteraryrelativistdoesn’tbelievethattextshavemeanings–exceptatbestinthesensethattheyhaveavarietyofmeaningsforavarietyofreaders,andprobablyevenforonereaderatdifferenttimes.Arelativistaboutrationalitywillsaythatwhatisrationalisrelativetocultures,withtheconsequence(forinstance)thatitisillegitimatetoapply‘western’scientificstandardstotraditionalAfricanbeliefsaboutwitchcraftandpronouncethemirrational.Thatbunchofexamplesillustratesanumberofpointsaboutrelativism.Oneisthattheinitialplausibilityofdifferentcasesofrelativismvarieswidely.Manypeoplewillfindaestheticrelativismeasilyacceptable,and72\nsomewillthinkthatwhatIhavecalled‘gastronomicrelativism’isobviouslytrue.Thatrationalityisculture-relativeisamuchmoredifficultdoctrine,asisrelativismaboutmoralvalues.Thesedoctrinesdonotsay,remember,thatdifferentbeliefsareaccountedrationalindifferentsocieties,anddifferentmoralvaluesavowed,forthisnobodydoubts.Theysaythatwhatthesereallyarecandifferfromsocietytosociety,andthatisaboutasfarfromobviousasyoucanget.Soifyouhearsomeonegoingonaboutrelativismwithoutsayingrelativismaboutwhat,giveabadlyconcealedyawn.Theexamplesillustrateanotherimportantpoint.Itisn’tjustwhattheparticularrelativismisabout,itisalsowhatitrelativizesto:theindividual,asociety,aculture(thereareplentyofmulticulturalsocieties),ahistoricalepoch,orwhat.Thoseformsofrelativism,likethe‘gastronomic’,whichcanplausiblyfocusontheindividual,haveabigadvantage:unlikesocieties,cultures,andepochs,itisclearwhereanOf‘isms’individualbeginsandends.IfEuropeansshouldn’tbringtheirscientificstandardstobearonAfricanbeliefsinwitchcraft,maytheyproperlybringthemtobearonEuropeanbeliefsinwitchcraft?OronlyoncontemporaryEuropeanbeliefsinwitchcraft?Imagineyourselflivingintermingledwithapeoplewho,routinelyandwithoutmoralqualms,abandonunwantedbabiesandleavethemtodie.(Suchsocietieshaveexisted.)Couldyoujustsay‘Oh,fine.That’swhattheythink,that’stheirmoralculture,oursisdifferent’,asifitwerelike‘TheyspeakFrenchandwespeakEnglish’?Bitterexperiencesuggeststhatmanypeopleareunlikelytofinditthateasy.IwouldbeabadguideifIleftyouwiththeimpressionthatashortparagraphcandisposeofmoralandintellectualrelativism,justlikethat.Beaware,though,thatinseveralareasrelativismisinforaroughride.Therideisroughtheoretically,becauseofthedifficultyofstatingclearlyjustwhatrelativismdoesanddoesn’tsay;anditisroughpractically,becauseofthedifficultyofstandingbyitwhenthecrunchcomes.73\nChapter7SomemorehighspotsApersonalselectionInChapters2,3,and4welookedcloselyatthreepiecesofphilosophicalwriting.InthischapterIbrieflyintroduceafewmoreofmyfavourites.Theselectionispersonal–anotherauthorwouldverylikelyhavemadequitedifferentchoices.Anditcanonlybeafew.Butbeassuredthatthereareplentymore,indeedthathowevermuchyouread,therewillstillbeplentymore.Descartes:DiscourseontheMethodInChapter2Iremarkedthat,whereastheethicaldiscussionpresentedinPlato’sCritocouldalmosthavetakenplaceyesterday,Plato’scosmologytakesusbacktoacompletelydifferentworld.True–butweneedn’tgobackthatfar;fourcenturieswillbeenough.In1600itwas,admittedly,overfiftyyearssinceCopernicushadofferedhisreplacementfortheoldPtolemaicastronomy,movingthesuntothecentreofthesolarsystemandlettingtheEarth,nowjustoneofanumberofsimilarplanets,circleroundit.Butfewbelievedhim.Galileo(1564–1642)hadnotyetbegunpubliclytochampionhiscause,andwhenhedidsobynomeanseverybodybelievedhim.ItwasnotjustthattheEarthwasdisplacedfromitsproudpositioninthecentre.Infactitwasn’treallythatatall,sinceaccordingtowhatwewouldnowcallthephysicsofthedaythecentrewasnotavery74\ndesirableplacetobe:itwaswherethebasestmattertendedtocongregate,thecosmicrubbishtiponemightalmostsay.Otherfactorswerefarmoreimportant.PassagesintheBibleappeartomaintainthattheEarthisstationary;herewasanindividualpreparedtorejectoratleastreinterpretthosepassagesonthebasisofhisownreasoningwithoutreferenceordeferencetoproperauthority.Besides,theclaimsmadebyCopernicus,letaloneGalileo,wereinconflictwiththe(neo-Aristotelian)physicsandcosmologythatheldswayintheuniversities.ForanAristotelian,thebaserkindsofmatterareearthandwater.Unliketheothertwokinds,airandfire,theynaturallystrivetowardsthecentreoftheuniverse.Soasphericalmassofearthandwaterhasformedthere,andthisistheEarth.(Howeveroftenyouhearitsaid,itjustisn’tSomemorehighspotstruethatthemedievalsbelievedthattheEarthwasflat!)ButtheMoon,theSun,theplanetsandstarsdon’tconsistofthissortofmatteratall,notevenairandfire.TheyaremadeoftheQuintessence–thefifthelement–incorruptibleandunchanging,andalltheydoisgoroundincircles,eternally,ingodlikeserenity.Nowthenewastronomywantstoblowthisdistinctionaway:howeverthingsmaylookandfeelfromwherewearestanding,theEarthisitselfintheheavens;andtheheavenlybodiesarenotutterlysetapart,butareasmuchproperobjectsofscientificinvestigationastheEarthitself.Ontopofwhichthenewscientistswanttoreplaceexplanationscouchedintermsofnaturesandgoalswithtalkoftheparticlesofwhichthingsarecomposed,andofmechanicalcausationgovernedbymathematicallaws.Allthisrepresentedcatastrophicintellectualchangeonseverallevelsatonce.ItisoftencalledTheScientificRevolution,anamewhichcapturesitsmagnitude,butwronglysuggeststhatithappenedquickly.Nowonderthatitwasaccompaniedbyariseofscepticism.Forifthebestofreceivedwisdom,with2,000yearsoftriumphanthistory,wasnowseentobefailing,anaturalreactionwastodespairofhumanknowledgealtogetherandcalloffthehunt.75\nRenéDescartes(1596–1650)viewedAristotelianismasatime-hallowedsystemoferrors.Sodidthesceptics,butunlikethemhealsotookittobeanobstacle–anobstacletohumanknowledgeofnature,likescepticismitself.Soheconceivedanambitiousplan.(Hadheknownjusthowambitioushemighthavestoppedinhistracksthereandthen–soweshouldbegratefulthathedidn’t.)Bygoingbacktoapointatwhichnodoubtwasevenpossibleandthenrebuildinghumanknowledgebyunmistakablestepshewouldfighthiswayclearofscepticism,andpresumablyofAristotelianismaswell,sincehehadnoexpectationthathisreconstructionwouldleadbackinthatold,worn,falteringdirection.ThenhewouldillustratethevalueofthisheroicGreatEscapeofthehumanintellectbydemonstrableprogressinthesciences:optics,physics,physiology,andmeteorologywerealltopicsthathewroteabout.TheDiscourseontheMethodofrightlyusingone’sReason(1637)isnotDescartes’smostfamouswork–thattitlesurelygoestohisMeditations(1641).Butithastheadvantageofgivingthereader,inverybriefPhilosophycompass,atasteofmostofDescartes’sthought,includingveryimportantlyanautobiographicalaccountofthecircumstancesandmotivationfromwhichhiswholeprojectarose.Sosetasideacoupleofhours–easilyenough–andbeginbysympathizingwithDescartes’sfrustrationwhenformaleducationlefthimfeelingthat‘Ihadgainednothing...butincreasingrecognitionofmyignorance’andthattherewas‘nosuchknowledgeintheworldasIhadpreviouslybeenledtohopefor’.Admittedly,thereisvalueinsomeofwhathehasbeentaught,andhegivesasentenceeachtotheadvantagesoflanguages,history,mathematics,oratory,andpoetry–thoughthelattertwoare‘moregiftsofthemindthanfruitsofstudy’.Asforphilosophy,itschief‘advantage’isthatitenablesusto‘speakplausiblyaboutanysubjectandwintheadmirationofthelesslearned’–somuchforscholasticAristotelianism.Sotheminuteheisoldenoughhechucksitallinandgoestravelling,joininginthewars76\nwhichwereboilingawayinEuropeatthistime.Perhapsmenofactionwillhavemoretruthtoofferthanthescholars;afterall,theirmisjudgementsreallydoreboundonthem,whereasthoseofthescholarshavenopracticalconsequencesandcanbefalsewithimpunity.Onethinghelearnsonhistravelsishowmuchcustomsdifferfromplacetoplace,peopletopeople–ashepointedlysays,thereisasmuchvarietyasintheopinionsofthephilosophers–sohehadbetternotrelyonanythinghehaslearntonlythrough‘customandexample’.Atthisstagemanypeople(andnowadaysevenmorethanthen)mightslipintoaforlornscepticismoralazyrelativism.Butnotthisone.Descartes’sreactionisthatifheistoavoidlivingunderthemisguidanceoffalseopinionsthenonceinhislifeheshoulddismantlehisentirebelief-systemandconstructitanew.Whichheintendstotry–andonhisownSomemorehighspotswhat’smore.OnehastobeamazedattheaudacityofthisunflinchinglypositiveresponsetothecrisisthatDescartes,doubtlessalongwithmanylessarticulateorlessself-confidentcontemporaries,wasexperiencing.If,thatis,webelievethathereallymeantit–butIknownogoodreasontothinkthathedidn’t.InPart2oftheDiscourseweseehimstrivingtoreassureanyreaderswhomaytakehimforasocial,political,ortheologicalreformer:‘Nothreattoanypublicinstitution,it’sonlymyownbeliefsthatI’mgoingtooverhaul.’(Prudent,andanicetry,butnotaltogetherconvincing,isit?Asifheweren’tgoingtorecommendhisrenovatedbelief-systemtoanyoneelse!)TheninPart3hetakesstepstoensurethathislifecankeeptickingoverwhilehisbeliefsaresuspended,for‘beforestartingtorebuildyourhouseyoumustprovideyourselfwithsomewheretolivewhilebuildingisinprogress’.Sohewillsimplygoalong,non-committally,withthemostsensibleandmoderateviewsandbehaviourhefindsaroundhim.ItisamodifiedversionofwhathewouldhavefoundinSextusEmpiricus’reportoftherecommendationsoftheancientsceptics–whofacedthesameproblempermanently,sincetheyhadnointentionofrebuilding.77\nHowisdemolitiontoproceed,andwherewillDescartesfindhisfoundations?AtthestartofPart4hesuddenlyfeignstogoallshy:perhapsheshouldbypassthisbit,asbeing‘toometaphysicalanduncommonforeveryone’staste’.Butthenhetellsusanyway.WhatwegetinPart4isahigh-speedrésuméofhisbest-knownwork,theMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.First,suspendanybeliefaboutwhichyoucanthinkoftheslightestgroundsfordoubt.(Don’tbotheraboutwhetherthesegroundsactuallydomakeyoufeeldoubtful–mostlytheywon’t,butthatcouldjustbeafactaboutyou.)Sinceyoursenseshavesometimesdeceivedyou,considerthepossibilitythattheymightdeceiveyouatanytime,indeedthattheymightdeceiveyouallthetime–thattheyhavenomorestatusthanadreamoranhallucination.Butwhataboutyourbeliefthatyouarenowthinking?Heredoubtreallydoesrundry,becausedoubtingwhetheryouarethinkingisanothercaseofthinking–thedoubtdefeatsitself.AndifIamthinking,Descartesreflects,thenImustexist–wehavereachedthenotoriousCogitoergosum.PhilosophyYoumaywellwonderhowDescartesistorebuildanythingonthebasisofwhatlittlehassurvivedsofierceatest.Butheisn’tcowedbythetask.Hehasfoundthathisgraspofhisownexistenceisabsolutelysecure.Buthecanraisedoubtsabouteverythingelse,evenhisownbody.Sohe(hismind,soul,self)mustbesomethingelse,distinctfromhisbody,andcapableofexistingwithoutit.Thebodyisonething,themindanother–thisisthefamous(orinfamous)CartesiandualismthatwesawinChapter6(p.62).InthenextstepDescartesobservesthathehastheideaofaperfectbeing,God,sothequestionarises:howdidhegettheabilitytothinksuchathought?Ashepointsoutelsewhere,ifyouhadinmindtheplanofanextremelyintricatemachinewewouldthinkthateitheryouwereasuperbengineeryourselforhadgottheplanfromsomeonewhowas.AndsinceDescartesknowsthatheisfarfromperfecthimselfhe78\nreckonshisideaofaperfectbeingcan’tcomefromhim,butonlyfromabeingthatisactuallyperfect.Thatideainhismindisthesignatureleftbyhiscreator.ManyreaderswillfeelthatDescartes’sideaofaperfectbeingisfartoohazy,imprecise,andinawordimperfecttoneedanythingmorethanDescartesforitscause.ButheheldtheexistenceofGodtobeproved,andtookafurtherstep:whathebelieveswhenhehasachievedtheutmostclarityofwhichheiscapablemustbetrue.ForotherwisehisGod-givenfacultieswouldbemisleadinginprinciple,whichwouldmakeGodadeceiver,andhenceimperfect.Soifscepticismsaysthatevenourverybesteffortsmightleadustofalsehood,justdismissit.InPart5wearebackwithautobiography.DescartesturnstohisSomemorehighspotsscientificwork,thingswhichhehadearlier‘endeavouredtoexplaininatreatisewhichcertainconsiderationspreventmefrompublishing’.These‘considerations’wereinfactthecondemnationofGalileo’swritingsbytheChurch,asDescartesmakesclearer(thoughwithoutmentioningnames)inPart6.Thereheoffersreasonsforhisdecision,andforhisfurtherdecisiontopresentsomeofhisresultsintheDiscourseafterall.Thereasonsarefairlyconvoluted,anddon’twhollydispelthesuspicionthatthecaseofGalileohadjustfrightenedhimoff.Atthisstageoneofthoseunfortunatelittlethingshappens.Descarteswasanotablemathematician,andnomeanperformerinphysics.True,theworkofIsaacNewton(1642–1727)wipedhisphysicsoffthemaptowardstheendofthecentury,thoughnotbeforeNewtonhimselfhadaccepteditandattemptedtoworkwithinituntilhislatethirties.ButthemainexampleheselectsforPart5ishistheoryabouthowthehumanheartworks,andthisnowadayssoundsjustplainquaintandfanciful–hebelievesittobemuchhotterthananyotherpartofthebody,andmakesitsoundlikeadistilleryinaction.(Allitdistilsisblood,somereadersmaybedisappointedtolearn.)79\nPhilosophy11.Descartesasphysiologist–anakedCartesianunderstandablyfeelingabitchilly.Inspite(orpartlybecause)ofthisglitchtheDiscourseisarichandmemorablework.Aneminentfounderofmodernthoughtgrappleswithhimself,Aristotelianism,scepticism,academicreaction,publicandecclesiasticalopinion,physics,cosmology,andphysiology,allinaboutfiftypages.NowthatIcallarealfeast.80\nHegel:IntroductiontothePhilosophyofHistoryWeencounteredGeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel(1770–1831)inChapter6,thoughonlybriefly.Hisinfluencehasbeenmassive;weshallseetwoexamplesofitinthenextandfinalchapter,butimportantastheyaretheycangiveonlythebarestinklingoftheextentoftheHegel-phenomenon.Andtheoppositiontohimstartedtwoverysignificantmovements:existentialism,throughtheDanishthinkerSørenKierkegaard,andinBritaintheanalyticschoolthroughMoore,BertrandRussell,andtheyoungLudwigWittgenstein.Ittookheavyweightswithanalternativeonoffertotakepeople’smindsoffHegel,andthentheeffectwasonlypartial,local,andtemporary.ButthereisanotherreasonforintroducingaworkbyHegelatthisSomemorehighspotspoint.Nearlyallthephilosophywehavelookedatsofarbeginsfromwhatarerelativelyordinary,everydayconsiderations.(Socrates:whatwillhappentomychildrenifIdowhatmyfriendsaresuggesting?Hume:youcan’talwaysbelievewhatotherpeopletellyou.Descartes:whenthere’ssomuchdisagreementbetweentheauthorities,whatcanwedobutgobacktobasicsandstartagain?)Hegel’sthoughtinthePhilosophyofHistory,incontrast,arisesoutofagrandvisionofrealityandtheforcesthatmoveit–thisisheavy-dutymetaphysics.Hegelisoftensaidtobeaverydifficultphilosopher.Iwon’tdenyit–ifyouselectapageatrandomandreaditfromtoptobottomyouwillprobablyfeelthatyoumightjustaswellhavereaditfrombottomtotop.Butoneofthemostvaluableexperiencesforsomeonecomingnewtohisphilosophyisthatoffindinghowmucheasierthingsareifyouapproachthetextwiththegrandmetaphysicalvisionalreadyinmind.Thebigpictureisthekey,sowebeginbytryingtogetsomegraspofit.RememberthatIwarnedyoubackinChapter1toexpecttofindsomephilosophyweird.YouwillfindHegel’slessweird,evenifyoustilldon’tbelieveawordofit,afteryouhavereadtheIntroductiontothePhilosophyofHistory.Heregoes.81\nWestartwithsomethingcalled‘TheIdea’.ThinkofitasbeingratherliketheIdeasofPlato–asystemofabstractuniversalsfromwhichthingsandeventsintheworldtaketheirshapesandnatures.ButitdiffersfromPlatointwoimportantways.First,itisahighlystructuredsystem,anditsstructureisinacertainsensedevelopmental.Isay‘inacertainsense’becausetheIdeadoesn’thappenintime,onebitafteranother;Hegel’sdoctrineisratherthatitembodiesanaturalorderofthought,sothatthethoughtofoneelementinexorablyleadsthemindtoanother,andthethoughtofthosetwotoathird,andsoonuntilthewholesystemisrevealed.ThesecondbigdifferenceisthatwhereasPlatospeaksasifhisIdeasexistindependentlyofanythingelse,Hegel’sIdeacanexistonlyifsomethingembodiesit.Sotherehastobe‘Nature’–thefamiliarcollectionofconcreteobjectsthatsurroundus.AndNature,sinceitexistsinordertoembodytheIdea,reflectsalltheIdea’sproperties.The‘development’,whichintheIdeawasmetaphorical,makesaliteralappearanceinthechangingpatternsofNature.PhilosophySotheIdeaandNatureareverycloselyrelated:eachisaformoftheother.Butatthesametimetheyaresodifferentthatyoumightwellthinkofthemasopposites.TheIdeaisabstract,andneithertemporalnorspatial,whereasNatureisspatio-temporalandconcrete.TheIdeaiscomposedofuniversals,generalconcepts,whereasNaturecomprisesmyriadsofparticularthings.Anditismaterial,whichtheIdeaiscertainlynot.Hegelnowusesthissituation–theexistenceofoppositeswhichareneverthelessinasensethesamething–asthestarting-pointforadeeplycharacteristicmove.Supposethatyouwanttoknowsomethingaboutyourself,say,whatyoureallythinkaboutsomequestionorother.Shouldyousitdownmeditativelyandtrytointrospectyourownthoughts?No–youwilljustthinkyouseewhateveryouwantedtosee.Youshoulddosomething,makesomething,writesomething,ingeneralproducesomethingthat82\nexpressesyou,yourownwork–andlookatit.Thatiswhatwilltellyouaboutyourself.Goodadvice,andnothingespeciallynew.(‘Byourworksshallweknowourselves.’)ButHegelnowmakesaverysurprising(andratherobscure)useofit.Heholds,remember,thatNatureistheconcreteexpressionoftheIdea.SotheIdeaisconfrontedbyitsownwork,andthesituationisripeforittostarttounderstanditself.ThusisbornwhatHegelcallsGeist,usuallytranslated‘spirit’–consciousness,awareness.Humanmindsareitsvehicle,butwhatisreallyhappeninginthemisthattheIdeaisgraduallymovingtowardsfullself-understanding.(OK,Itoldyouthatthiswasmyexampleofhigh-altitudemetaphysics!)There’smoretocome:Hegelbelievesthatthewholepurposeofrealityispreciselythis,thattheIdeashouldcometofullknowledgeofitsownnature.AndSomemorehighspotsthisistohappeninus,inthemindsofthehumanrace.Nophilosopherhasevercastusinamoreprestigiousrole.Indeed,couldtherebeone?Thisisthehigh-watermarkofhumanself-assessment.Sowhatofhistory?Historybeginsonlywhenthereareconsciousbeingsandsomethingonemightcallaculture,thatistosaywhenwehavereachedHegel’sStage3–SpiritorGeist.HistoryisdrivenbyReason,theIdea:Hegelmakesnobonesofannouncingthisasestablishedfact,somethingwhichphilosophy(hisownphilosophy)hasshown.Inhistory,theIdeaisworkingoutitsrationalpurposes.Ifyoufindthisthoughtratheralien,rememberthattomostofHegel’saudienceitwouldhavesoundedquitefamiliar;itisacloserelativeofsomethingtheyhadbeenbroughtuptoaccept.Providenceisatwork.Behindallthemundanedetailoflife,Godisrealizinghisaims.Inspiteofeverything,GoodisgraduallydefeatingEvil.Allisforthebest.Thatthoughtisfamiliartoallofus,includingthoseofuswhosnortatit.WhatmakesHegel’sversionofitfeelunfamiliaris,first,hisconceptionof‘thebest’–theIdea,theforcethatdrivesitall,comestofullknowledgeofitsownnature–andsecond,hishighlyintellectualized83\naccountofwhatisdoingthedriving–notapersonalGodordeifiedSuperman,buttheIdea,somethinglikeasystemofPlatonicforms.Atheologystudentinhisyouth,HegelknowsperfectlywellhowtopresentthisasaversionoftheorthodoxChristianstory(infacthethinksheisimprovingonit);andhecanpreachwiththebestofthem,asyou’llquicklydiscoverasyouread.Buthistory,surely,isdrivenbytheactionsofhumanbeings?Andtheyhavetheirownhumanschemes,interests,andmotives–onethingtheyaren’ttryingtodoisensurethattheIdeacomestoperfectself-knowledge.(Howcouldtheybe?Mostofthemhaveneverevenheardofit.)Nowwemeetafamousdoctrine:theCunningofReason.Withouttheirknowledge,theIdea(orReason)reallyisatwork,influencinganddirectingthemtowardsitsownends.Soisthereanexternalforce,liketheancientFates,lookingdownonusandmanipulatingourlives?No,Hegel’sviewissubtlerandlesssuperstitiousthanthat.Rememberthatourminds,inHegel’sgrandPhilosophyplan,doembodytheIdea,butnotyetwithanyclearconsciousnessofit.(Thinkofthewayagene–Hegelmuchapprovedoforganicmetaphors–‘contains’theadultorganism,butwillonlyshowitgraduallyintheprocessofgrowthanddevelopment.)Becausethereisthissomethingwithinus,activethoughobscure,wecanconsciouslypursueourownlimitedandindividualendsandpurposeswhilstreallyservingtheturnofReason.TheIdea,nowasSpiritorGeist,directsthecourseofhistorythroughthewillof‘world-historicalindividuals’(thefamouspeopleyoureadaboutinhistorybooks).TheirfeelingfortherequirementsofSpiritisalittlemoreadvancedthanthatoftheircontemporaries,theirdissatisfactionwiththepresentstateofthingsslightlysharperandbetterfocused.Hegeldescribesthem(neverletanyonetellyouhecouldn’twrite!):‘Theydonotfindtheiraimsandvocationinthecalmandregularsystemofthepresent...theydrawtheirinspirationfromanothersource,that84\nhiddenspiritwhosehourisnearbutwhichstillliesbeneaththesurfaceandseekstobreakout’.Thesearetheleaderswhochangetheworld,unitenations,createempires,foundpoliticalinstitutions.Andoncethenewstateofthingsexists,thesocietyornationcomesfacetofacewithsomethingithasitselfproduced–thesituationthatadvancesself-understanding,remember–andfindsoutalittlemoreaboutitsownrealaspirations.Italsofindsoutmoreabouttheproblemstheybringwiththem.Forastart,thesetransitionsfromonestatetoanotherrarelyhappensmoothly,withoutconflictandstruggle.WhatHegelcalls‘thecalmandregularsystemofthepresent’alwayshasitsappeal,especiallyforthoseinwhomthesubliminalawarenessofSpirit’snextmoveisundeveloped.Thesebecomethereactionarieswhoresisttheworld-historicalSomemorehighspotsindividual’sstrivingforchange;theyareopposedbythoseofaslightlymoreadvancedstateofconsciousness,whogatherbehindtheleader,sensingthatthenewdirectionistherightone.Onlyrightfornow,however.Rememberthatthestrangethingfromwhichwebegan,theIdea,involvesdevelopment,inafigurativesense.EverythingthatexistsorhappensreflectstheIdea,andthatofcourseincludeshistory,whichexhibitstheIdea’s‘development’,butnowinaliteralsense.TheIdea,asyouwillfindifyoueverreadHegel’sLogic(butbewarned,itisdesperatelyhardwork),alwaysdevelopsthroughtheconflictofopposedconceptsfollowedbytheirresolution,whichitselfturnsouttoharbouranotheropposition,uponwhichafurtherresolutionfollows,andsoonuntiltheentiresystemiscomplete.Soitis,therefore,inthepoliticalsphere.Conflictissuesinaneworder,butbeforetoolongtheneworderitselfisshowingstrains;theseedsofthenextconflictwerealreadypresentinit,andoncetheymatureitissweptawayinitsturn.YoumayfindthemetaphysicswithwhichHegelunderpinsallthisextravagant,wild,andwoolly,butwhenheappliesittohumanhistorytheresultcertainlyisn’tstupid.Itisthisideaofprogressarisingoutofconflictwhichisknownas‘dialectic’.Itpervades85\n12.Progressthroughconflict:thestormingoftheBastille.Hegelwas19whentheFrenchRevolutionoccurred–itmadeanimpression.thethoughtofHegel,butequallythatofMarx,whichiswhyMarx’sphilosophyisoftencalled‘dialecticalmaterialism’(seeabovep.64,andbelowp.110).PhilosophyNoticethatthereisverylittlecomfortherefortheindividual.TheIdeaistocometoself-knowledge,andthisitmustdoinhumanminds,whicharetheonlyvehiclearound,butnoparticularhumanmindisofanyconcerntoitwhatever.Historythrowsindividualsawayoncetheyhaveservedtheirturn.Thatiseven,orespecially,trueofworld-historicalindividuals:‘theirendattainedtheyfallasidelikeemptyhusks’.JuliusCaesardidhisbit–andwasassassinated.Napoleondidhis–thenwasdefeated,captured,andsenttorotonElba.Anindividualisnomorethanadispensableinstrument.God,supposedly,loveseachoneofus,buttheIdeacouldn’tcareless,solongastherearesomeofus,andtheyaredoingitsbusiness.SoitishardtoseeHegelianismbecomingapopularmassphilosophy,forallitshugeinfluence.86\nCharlesDarwin:TheOriginofSpeciesThefirstthingwecanlearnfromthisfascinatingbookisnottobothertoomuchaboutdrawinganeatsharplinebetweenphilosophyandscience.Thepointisnotthatthelineisn’tsharp,althoughIbelievethattobetrue.Thepointisthattheline(ifitexists)isnotofmuchimportanceforphilosophy.OnanyreasonablewayofdrawingitDarwin’sOriginisscience,morespecificallybiology.Butbecauseofitssubject-matter,andtheclaimsitmakes,veryfewbookshavehadgreaterphilosophicalimpact.Foritimpliesastartlingthesisaboutusandhowwehavecometobeasweare.Itmaynotstartleustoday,butitstartledmostofhiscontemporariestothepointofshock;andtherearestillanumberofpeopletryingtoperformthedifficultbalancingactofrejectingitwithoutappearingmerelyignorantandprejudiced.SomemorehighspotsInonesenseTheOriginofSpeciesdoesmuchmorethan‘imply’thestartlingthesis:itbuildsaverycarefullyconstructedcaseforit,backedbyawealthofthoughtfullyassessedevidence.Darwinwasnotthefirstpersontoproposethetheoryofnaturalselection(hetellsyoualittleofthehistoryoftheideainhisownintroductiontothebook),buthewasthefirsttoassemblesomuchevidenceforitandsohonestlytoconfrontthedifficultiesitfaces.Ifpriorto1859youwantedtorejecttheviewthatspeciesweremutable,anddevelopedoutofotherspecies,andthatourownspecieswasnoexception,itwaseasy:justsay‘No’.Itconflictedwithyourother(deeplyheld)beliefs,manyexpertsopposedit,andthereexistednoseriousandplausiblestatementofthecaseforit.After1859itwasn’teasyatall–thoughofcoursetherewereplentyofpeoplewhodidn’tnotice.Inanothersense,however,‘imply’isexactlytherightword:Darwingavenoprominence(inthisbook)tohisopinionthatjustasmuchasanyotherspecieshumanityfallsunderthegeneraltheory.Readerswhoreachthelastchapter–orjumptoit–willtherefind,discreetlyplacedandwellapart,twoorthreeunmistakablesentences.Otherwise,87\nsilence.AcommonmistakeistocallthebookOriginoftheSpecies,presumablysupposingthatwearethespeciesinquestion.Absolutelynot:Thereisalmostnothingaboutus.Plentyaboutpigeons,infacthalfofchapter1.TheylendthemselvesperfectlytoDarwin’sstrategy:startfromacaseinwhichitistotallyuncontroversialthatabreedcanbealteredbyselection–thebreeder’sselectionofwhichbirdstoallowtomatewithwhich.(Unsurprisingly,there’salsoalotaboutcattleandsheepandracehorses;prizedahliasgetamentiontoo.)Butthatdoesn’ttakeDarwinquiteasfarashewantstogo,becauseitisperfectlypossibletoreplythathumanbreederscanonlymakequiteslightchanges,sothatallthestrikinglydifferentbreedsofpigeon,thoughmodifiedbyhumanpractice,mustinthefirstplacehavecomeeachfrombirdsofitsownparticularspecies–theyarejusttoodifferenttohavedescendedallofthemfromonetypeofbird.Surely?NowDarwin’sjudgementisatitsbest.Hedoesn’ttrytoprovehisPhilosophypoint,butjustshowsthatanyoneopposingitwillhavealotmoretalkingtodo.Iftherewasanoriginalfantailpigeon,whereisitnowfoundinthewild?Well,perhapsithasbecomeextinct,orlivessomewherefrightfullyremote.Andhowabouttheotherdistinctivebreedsthatpigeon-fanciersareinterestedin–wherearetheirwildrelatives?Andwhatofthefactthatwithinthesebreedsoneoccasionallyfindsindividualsthatcloselymatchthecomplexcolouringofatypeofpigeonthatdoesexistinthewildnowadays?Soisitthatalltoday’sdistinctivebreedshadancestorsofthesamecolouring(althoughtheyweredistinctspecies),andarenowalleitherextinctinthewildoratleasthaveneverbeenobserved?Well,well,howverysurprising...Soifitisprobablethatartificialselectioncanproducesucheffectsinarelativelyshorttime,isthereanynaturalprincipleofselectionthatmightproduceeffectsofsimilarmagnitude,andperhapsoffargreater88\nmagnitude,givenanenormouslylongertimetoworkin?Yes,becausethe‘struggleforexistence’(aboutwhichDarwinwritesaveryinterestingchapter)eliminatesmanyindividualsbeforetheyareabletoreproduce.Afantailpigeonwillprobablymateonlyifitcatchestheeyeofthebreeder;awildpigeonwillnotmateunlessitwithstandsthestruggleforexistencelongenoughtoreachmaturity.Whatisbeingselectedforisinthetwocasesutterlydifferent.Inthesecondcaseitisthecapacitytowithstandthelocalenvironmental/ecologicalconditions,andiftheseshouldbecomeharshtheselectionprocesswillbebrutallyefficient.Oncethoughtslikethesehavebroughtustoseethatverysubstantialchangeispossible,indeedpositivelylikely,andwhenwerecall(whatwasonlyjustbecomingcleartogeologistswhenDarwinwasayoungSomemorehighspotsman)thattheseprocessesmayhavebeengoingonforanalmostunthinkablelengthoftime,certainobservationsstrikeonedifferently,likethoseDarwinoffersinoneoftheveryfewsentencesinwhichhumanbeingsfigure:‘Theframeworkofbonesbeingthesameinthehandofaman,wingofabat,finoftheporpoise,andlegofthehorse–thesamenumberofvertebraeformingtheneckofthegiraffeandoftheelephant...atonceexplainthemselvesonthetheoryofdescentwithslowandslightsuccessivemodifications.’Thenineteenth-centuryenthusiasmforprogress,towhichthephilosophyofHegelgavesuchmomentum,predisposedmanytounderstandDarwinaspartofthesameprogressivistmovement.HisyoungercontemporaryHerbertSpencer(1820–1903),amanofamuchmoremetaphysical,evensomewhatHegelianturnofmind,reallywaspartofit.Hewastheinventoroftheoverworkedphrase‘thesurvivalofthefittest’,whichcaneasilybeunderstoodasimplyingthatthosewhosurviveinthestruggleforexistencearesuperiortothosewhodonot.Hehimselfseemstohavetakenitlikethat,forinthenameofprogressheopposedanythingthatwouldlessentheintensityofthestruggle,likesocialwelfarearrangements.89\n13.AnothervariationonathememuchfavouredbyVictoriancartoonists.Darwin’smessagewasn’ttobedigestedquickly.\nThiskindofthoughtsoonturnedintoamovementknownasSocialDarwinism.Thenameisinappropriatetothepointofbeingslanderous.Darwinneverdrewsuchconclusions,norwouldhehavedone,fornosuchthingfollows.Inhissystemthewords‘thefittest’simplymean:thosebestfittedtosurvive(andreproduce)undertheconditionsthenobtaining.Theyhavenothingtodowithmoral,orintellectual,oraestheticsuperiority;andtheymeannothingatallwithouttherider‘undertheconditionsthenobtaining’.Ifthoseconditionschange,yesterday’s‘fittest’maybetomorrow’sno-hopers.OneofthemanyproblemsaboutmakingsocialapplicationofnaturalselectionlikeSpenceristhatchangesinhumansocietycansoeasilyproducechangesintheconditionsunderwhichtheythemselvesarose.Istheinternalcombustionengine‘fitter’thanthehorseandcart?Inasense,yes,butonlysolongasitdoesn’truntheworldoutofoil.SomemorehighspotsThatdoesn’tmeanthatDarwinshouldn’tbeallowedtochangeanyone’sattitudestoanything–farfromit.Hereisanexample.TheliterarycriticandpopularistChristiantheologianC.S.Lewisonce(thoughI’msurenotonlyonce)foundhimselflamentingoursexualdrives.Giventheopportunity,hewrote,mostofuswouldeattoomuch,butnotenormouslytoomuch;whereasifayoungmanindulgedhissexualappetiteeverytimehefeltlikeit,andeachactledtoababy,hewouldinaveryshorttimepopulateanentirevillage.Whichshows,Lewisconcluded,justhowpervertedournaturalsexualityhasbecome.Butbeforeyoucastigateyourselfasinnerandstartbewailingthelostinnocenceofthehumanmale,reflectonthelessonofDarwin:whatweseehereisnoperversionofnature;itissimplynatureherself,whoisnotconcernedtoconstructtheworldinaccordancewithourmoralcodeoranyoneelse’s.Fewfactorswill,onaverage,haveasbiganeffectonthenumbersofaman’schildrenasthestrengthandfrequencyofhissexualurges;soifthisisitselfsomethingwhichmanyofhischildreninheritfromhim,itisclearlyacharacteristicwhichnaturalselectionwillselect91\nandenhance.Ifmostoftoday’smalespossessitthatisjustwhatweshouldexpect,andcertainlynocalltostartspeakingoftheFallofMan,perversion,andmoraldeterioration.Orperhapswhatsomecalloriginalsinisreallythefactthatwhatevolutionhasproduced–andwasboundtoproduce–isoutoflinewiththeirownconceptionofanidealhumancharacter.Incidentally:don’tworryaboutallthosevillages,eachpopulatedbyseveralhundredhalf-brothersandsisters.TheywillonlyspringupwherelifeprovidesouryoungCasanovawithaveritableproduction-linesupplyoffemales,willing,fertile,notalreadypregnant,andnotassociatedwithanyothermalessufficientlyaggressivetosendhimpacking.Naturecanbereliedupontoensurethatthisdoesnothappenveryoften,toputitmildly.C.S.Lewis’simaginationwasfloatingwellclearofthefacts.Thatexampleisspecificandrelativelytrivial,butyoucaneasilyseehowDarwinismcouldsubvertanentirephilosophy,suchasoneofthosewePhilosophyhavejustseen.ForDescarteshumanreasonwasafacultygiventousandguaranteedbyGod,noless,andthatwaswhyhecouldrelyonittotellusabouttheessentialnatureofmindandmatter,andagooddealelsebesides.Whatifinsteadhehadthoughtofitasanaturalinstrumentwhichhaddevelopedbecause,andtotheextentthat,itgaveitspossessorsacompetitiveadvantageoverthosewithoutit?Wouldhethenhavesupposedthatwhatitappearedtotellusonsuchmatterscouldwithcompleteconfidencebetakentobethetruth?Ifso,howwouldhehavejustifiedit?ItisonethingtothinkthatGodcouldnotbeadeceiver;butquiteanothertosaythatsincethefacultyofreasongivesussuchadvantageinpracticalmattersitcannotpossiblyleadushopelesslyastraywhenappliedtoaquestionlikewhetherthemindisanindependentsubstance.AmItobelievethatbecausereasonisgoodathelpingussurviveitmustalsobegoodatmetaphysics?Whyonearthshouldthatbetrue?IfDescarteshadlivedafterDarwin(pleaseforgivethehistoricalabsurdity)thefoundationsofhisphilosophywouldhave92\nhadtobeverydifferent,andiftheyweresodifferent,couldthesuperstructurehavebeenthesame?Nietzsche:TheGenealogyofMorals‘Aphilosopherisaterribleexplosivefromwhichnothingissafe’–thatistheonlycommentwehaveheardsofar(p.2)fromtheGermanphilosopherFriedrichNietzsche(1844–1900).Hehadnointentionofofferinghisreadersacomfortableexperience,andhiscontemporariesdefendedthemselvesbyjustnotreadinghim.Butsoonafterhisdeaththetidebegantoturn,andhebecameamajorinfluenceontwentieth-centurythought,especiallyontheEuropeancontinent.TheGenealogyofMorals,firstpublishedin1887,consistsofaprefaceSomemorehighspotsandthreeessays,allconvenientlydividedintonumberedsections.Don’tskipthepreface.Anddon’tmissthefirstsentence:‘howmuchweknownowadays,buthowlittleweknowaboutourselves’.AhugechangeinEuropeanthoughtisunderway.Thetendencyhadlongbeentosupposethat,howeverbewilderingandopaquetherestofrealitymaybetous,atleastwecouldtellwhatwasgoingoninourownminds;butinthenineteenthcenturythattendencyisfastlosingmomentum.WehavejustseenahintofitinHegel’sunderstandingofhistory:theforcesofGeistareatworkinus,thoughweknownothingorlittleofit(p.84above).LessthanagenerationafterNietzschecameSigmundFreud(1856–1939),founderofpsychoanalysis,withhisdoctrineoftheunconsciousmindinwhichthemostimportantcausesofourmentallivesliehiddenfromus.Acquiringself-knowledgeisnolongeramatterofaquickintrospectiveglance.Itcallsforhardandpainfulwork,andthereisnoguaranteethatyouwilllikewhatyoufind.Don’tmiss§3oftheprefaceeither.Doyouhearsomethingfamiliaraboutit?ItremindsmeofPart1ofDescartes’sDiscourseontheMethod:stillateenager,thefuturephilosopherisstruckbyscepticismandmistrusttowardstheintellectualdietthathisseniorsarefeedinghim93\n(p.76above).ForDescartesithadbeentheneo-Aristotelianismoftheuniversities.ForNietzscheitwasthemoralvaluesofnineteenth-centuryChristianity.Weretheyasself-evidentaseveryonearoundhimseemedtothink?Descarteswantedtoinquireintothetruthofthese‘truths’thathewasbeingtaught.Nietzschereckoneditwastimeforsomequestionsaboutthevalueofthese‘values’.Hismethodwastoaskabouttheirhistory,theirpedigree,whathecalledtheir‘genealogy’.Wherehadtheycomefrom,howhadpeoplecometoholdthem?Whyhadtheycometoholdthem,orinotherwords:whatwerethesevaluesdoingforthepeoplewhosevaluestheybecame?Afrequentreactionatthispointistosaythatthevalueofsomething,whatitisworth,dependsonwhatitislikenow.Howitcametobethatwayisquiteanothermatter.SoNietzscheisaskingthewrongquestion.Howeverwellheanswersit,itwon’ttellusanythingaboutthevalueofourvalues.Tothinkthatitwillistocommit(somemorephilosophers’jargonforyourgrowingcollection!)the‘genealogicalfallacy’.PhilosophyButisthatcriticismaltogetherfair?Idon’tthinkso.Therearecertainlycasesinwhichourviewofwhatsomethingisworthisverymuchboundupwithourbeliefsabouthowitbegan,andifthosebeliefschangeourevaluationofthethingitselfisthreatenedaswell.Indeedwehavejustseenaveryimportantexample,onewhichwasimportantforNietzschetoo:theeffectofDarwinismonourconceptionofourselves.ForsomanyofDarwin’scontemporariesthehumanraceoriginatedinadecisionbyGodtocreateusinHisownimage.Theideathatwehadinfactdevelopedfrominferiorthingslikemonkeysbyadistinctlychancyprocessthatmightjustaseasilynothavehappenedwasn’tjustanewfacttotakeonboard,liketheexistenceofonemorepreviouslyundiscoveredplanet;itwasaslapinthefaceforhumandignityandtheirconceptionoftheirownworth–whichwaswhyitwasdoggedlyresistedthenandisresistedbysometothisday.Nodoubtaboutit:undertherightcircumstances,genealogiescanbejustasexplosiveasNietzscheintended–sobacktothequestionaboutmoralvalues.94\nManybelieved,andsomestilldo,thatmoralvalueswereofsimilarorigin:handeddowntohumanbeingsdirectfromGod.Nietzsche,whoinspiteofhisclericalhomebackgroundoncedescribedhimselfasanatheistbyinstinct,hadnointerestwhateverinthatstory;hesoughttheoriginofhumanvaluesinhumanneedsandhumanpsychology.(Human,alltooHumanisthepregnanttitleofoneofhisearlierbooks.)Hewasn’tthefirsttodoso,asbecomesclearinpreface§4.Infact,therewasalreadyatraditionofit,andNietzschetookitscentralthesis,broadlystated,tobesomethingalongthefollowinglines:whenhumansfoundcertaintypesofbehaviour(onthepartofindividuals)advantageoustothemandthesmoothrunningoftheirsociety,theycalledthem‘good’,andstronglyencouragedthem;wheretheyfoundSomemorehighspotsthemdisadvantageous,thereverse.That,simply,ishowbehavingforthegoodofothersratherthanone’sowncametoberegardedasgood–theothersdeclaredittobegood,becauseofthebenefittheyreceived.Onthefaceofitthatsoundsquiteplausible:asocietyreinforceswhatisbeneficialtoit.ButNietzscheregardeditassentimental,unhistoricalclaptrap.Drawingonhisexpertknowledgeofancientlanguages(hehadhad,andthenabandoned,ameteoricacademiccareer)hetoldaverydifferenttale.Farfromitsbeingthosewhoreceivedbenefitsfromthebehaviourofotherswhothencalledthoseothers(andtheirbehaviour)‘good’,itwastheupperclasses,thearistocracy,thenobility,therulersofancientsocietieswhofirstcalledthemselves(andtheirwayoflife)goodandtheordinarypeople,theslaves,thesubjectpopulation,bad.Earlygood/baddistinctionsareperhapsbetterunderstoodasdistinctionsbetween‘noble’andbase’,freeandenslaved,leadersandled,thewashedandtheunwashed.Theywerethewordsinwhichthetopdogscelebratedthemselves,theirstrength,andtheirownwayoflife,andexpressedtheextentofthegapthattheyfeltbetweenthemselvesandtheweak,impoverished,servilemasses.95\nThat’salsoprettyplausible–youcanjustimaginethemthinkingandtalkingthatway.(Youcanstillhearitgoingonnowadaysifyougetintotherightcompany.)Butitwasthenextstepwhich,accordingtoNietzsche,wasthedecisiveoneforthenext2,000yearsandmoreofEuropeanmorality:thewormturned,themassesrevolted.Heisn’ttalkingaboutviolentrevolution,armedstruggle,forwhichtheunderclassesweregenerallytooweak,bothmateriallyandspiritually,butaboutsomethingmuchsubtlerandmuchmoreinsidious.Theyrelievedtheirfrustrationandresentmentinoneoftheveryfewwaysthatwereopentothem,namelybydevelopingtheirownsystemofvaluesinwhicheverythingabouttheiroppressorswas‘bad’andtheythemselves,whoselivescontrastedwiththeirsinsomanyways,were‘good’.Sothisvalue-systemwasnotGod-given,anditwasnottheoutcomeofsomeintuitiveperceptionofitstruth,orintrinsic‘rightness’.Itwasavengeful,retaliatorydevice,bornoftheweak’sresentmentofthestrong.Allthatcommitmenttocharity,compassion,andlovewasPhilosophyactuallyfuelledbyhate.ThiskindofthoughtisentirelytypicalofNietzsche,wholovedtostandpopularconceptionsontheirhead.Justwhenyouthoughtyourhousewasingoodorder,alongcomesaNietzschean‘explosion’andsuddenlyyourroofhaschangedplaceswithyourcellar.Thisisphilosophyatitsmostchallenging.Naturaliconoclastswilljustloveit,butanyonecanadmirethefireworks.Justthesefacts(ashebelieved)abouttheoriginsofthemoralityofloveandcompassionwouldn’thavemadeNietzschesoprofoundlymistrustfulofitasheactuallywas.Afterall,inadoptingandpromotingitthemassesweretrying,intheonlywayopentothem,togainpoweroverthestrong,andhehasnothingagainstthat–alllife,inhisview,isamanifestationofthewilltopower,andnotinylittlehumanmoralisthasanybusinesspronouncingonlifeingeneral.Whathemostdislikesabout‘herdmorality’isthatitarosenotthroughaffirmationoftheirownwayoflife(likethecodesofthehigherclasses)butthroughthe96\nSomemorehighspots14.Whattoblowupnext?Gazingfiercelyattheworldovertheamazingmoustache,Nietzschealwayslooksasifheisabouttolightsomefuseorother.negationofsomeoneelse’s:theylookedatthevigorous,free,proud,self-assured,self-assertivepeoplewhoruledthem,resentfullydeclaredtheirqualitiestobebadandhencetheoppositequalities,suchaspassivity,servitude,humility,unselfishness,tobegood.Herdmoralityislife-denying,inNietzsche’sestimation.Thosewhoespousedthismoralitywerenowinaverystrainedposition.Aslivingbeingstheyembodiedthesameinstinctivewilltopowerasdidtherulingclass,butunlikethemtheyhadnonaturaloutletforit.Sowhentheirinstinctsledthemtoseekadifferentkindofpowerbypronouncingtheirmasters’masterfulinstinctstobevicestheywereinfactturningagainsttheirowninstinctsaswell.So,toaddtothefact97\nthattheywereneedyandoppressed,thesepeoplewerepsychologicallysick,inwardlydivided.Andtheyfeltprettywretched.Buthelp–ofasort–isathand,intheformofafigureknowntoeverycultureandepochandofintenseinteresttoNietzsche:theasceticpriest,committedtopoverty,humility,andchastity,andinsomecasespractisingquiteextremeformsofself-torture.Thisfigure,whorepresentsatitsmostexplicitthewishtoberidofthebodilyconditionsoflifeandtoescapeintosomethingotherworldlyand‘beyond’,denieslifemoreemphaticallythananyoneelse.So,liketheherd,heissick,butmuchstrongerthantheyare–astrengthwhichmanifestsitselfinhisabilitytoadoptandsustainhiswayoflife.Thisstrengthgiveshimpower,thepowertoleadanddirecttheflockofweakersouls.Itarisespartlyfromtheirperceptionofhisinwardstrength,partlyfromtheairofmysteryandesotericknowledgewithwhichtheasceticsurroundshimself.Butitalsoarisesinpartfromthefactthathedoesthemaservice:healleviatestheirsuffering.RememberPhilosophythattheysufferbecausetheyhavesetthemselvesagainsttheirownvitalinstincts;sohecanhardlybeexpectedtocuretheirsuffering,becausehetoosetshimselfagainsthisvitalinstincts,onlymoreopenly,withgreaterdeterminationandsinglenessofpurpose.Animportantfactabouthumansufferingisthatpeoplewillputupwithagreatdealifonlytheyunderstandthereasonforit–evengloryinit,iftheyfindthereasongoodenough.Anotheristhatthosewhoaresufferingwanttofindsomeonetoblameforit–thatactsasakindofanaesthetic,blockingthepainoutwithanoverlayofanger.Thepriestinstinctivelyknowsthis,andgiveshisflockbothareasonfortheirsufferingandanauthorofit.Theyaresufferingtomaketheirsoulsfitforheaven,orforthevictoryofjustice,orforthesakeoftruth,orsothatGod’skingdomshouldcomeonearth–allfinethingstosufferfor.Whoistoblameforthesuffering?Answer:theythemselves.Withthis98\nstroketheseethingresentmentofthemassesisdirectedawayfromtherulers,itsoriginalobjects,conflictwithwhomwillmostlikelyonlyleadthemintomoresuffering,perhapspartialannihilation.Redirectedontothemselvesitmayatleastprovidestrengthandmotivationforalittleself-disciplineandself-improvement–underpriestlyinstruction.Andtheyarereadytoacceptit,foraswesawtheyhavealreadyturnedagainsttheirowninstinctsandsoinonesenseagainstthemselves.Theyknowwhathastoberootedout:anyhintinthemselvesoftheattitudesandbehaviourcharacteristicofthestrong.Theyhavebeenrenderedharmless.SuchisNietzsche’sanalysis.Whateverelsewemaythinkofit,itiscertainlyunflinching.Thesearenomorethanafewofthemainthoughts,crudelycompressed.Nietzsche’sstyle,itsmusicality,itsSomemorehighspotsenergy,itsvariety,itsbitingwit,issomethingonecanonlyexperienceforoneself.Andthetextisfullofdelightfuldetail,liketheaccountoftherealphilosopherin§7ofthethirdessay.Ortakethefirstessay,§§7–9.Doyoufindthisanti-Semiticintone?Thenreaditagain,andyouwillseethatitisreallyaimedatanti-Semitismitself.WhatitsaysisthatitwasonlythemoralhistoryoftheJewswhichcreatedthepsychologicalclimateinwhichChristianitycouldarise–NietzscheisfiringanironicsalvoatthoseChristiananti-Semiteswhogroundedtheiranti-SemitismonthepremissthatitwasJewswhowereresponsibleforthecrucifixionofChrist.Onceagainhehasturnedapopularwayofthinkingupsidedown:ChristiansshouldrevereJews,becausetheyhavetheJewstothankforthesuccessofChristianity.Deliciousstuff!99\nChapter8What’sinitforwhom?Thinkingaboutphilosophyishardwork–youmayhavenoticed,thoughifyou’vegotthisfaratleastithasn’tputyouoff.Writingthestuffisevenharder.(Takeitfromme.)Sowhyhavepeopledoneeither?Well,foroneormoreofawholecatalogueofreasons.Inthehopeoflearningtocontrolnature,oroflearningtocontrolthemselves,togettoheaven,toavoidgoingtohell;toenableustobearlifeasitis,tomakelifebearablebychangingit;toshoreupinstitutionspolitical,moral,orintellectual,ortotearthemdown;topromotethewriter’sinterests,topromoteotherpeople’sinterests(yes,thathappenstoo),eventopromoteeverybody’sinterests;becausetheycan’tstandcertainotherphilosophers;becausetheirjobdemandsit.Perhapsjustoccasionallyoutofpurecuriosity.Thereisawidespreadideathatphilosophersareunworldlypeople,remotefromreality.Ifthatreferstotheirlifestyle,itmayfrequentlyhavebeentrue,thoughnotalways.Ifitreferstotheirwork,then(Iamspeakingnowofphilosophythatendures)itisusuallyfalse–atleastinthesensethattheyarealmostalwaysaddressingsomerealconcernandclaimingtooffersomerealimprovement.Rightbackatthebeginning(p.1)Ispokeofthreebigquestions:whatshouldIdo?whatisthere?(i.e.whatisrealitylike?)andhowdoweknow?Itmightsoundasifanyphilosophyofferinghumanbeingssomerealimprovementmustbeconcernedprimarilywiththefirstofthose.Butthatwouldn’tberight.Beliefsabouthowthingsarecanserveto100\ngiveameaningtolifeorbolsterourfeelingsofself-worth,asforexamplethebeliefthatwearemadeintheimageofGod;theycangivearationaleto(orserveasanexcusefor)certaintypesofbehaviour,likethebeliefthathumanshaverationalsoulsandanimalsdon’t.Answerstothequestion‘howdoweknow?’canstrengthen,orloosen,theholdthatvariousanswerstothefirsttwotypesofquestionhaveonus;andveryimportantly,theycanimplybeliefsaboutwhohasknowledge,withobviousconsequencesfortheprestigeandpowerofmembersofthatgroup.Mostphilosophyattempts,then,todosomethingforsomebody.Tofinish,let’slookatsomephilosophyfromthisperspective.Ifitistoendure,aphilosophyneedsaconstituency,agroupofinterestedparties.Itschancesarebestiftheconstituencyisalargeone.First,aWhat’sinitforwhom?coupleofphilosophiesdevotedtotheindividual.That’sabigconstituency–we’reallindividuals.TheindividualThephilosophyofEpicurus(seeChapter5)isaddressedtotheindividual;itoffersarecipe,backedbyargument,forlivingahappylife.Socialandpoliticalarrangementsareunjustiftheyinterferewithindividuals’attemptstoapplytherecipe;otherwise,hisonlypoliticalrecommendationisnottoengageinpolitics.Youcantosomedegreehelpotherstolivetherightsortoflife,butonlythoseclosetoyou(Epicureanismstronglyadvocatesfriendship);everyonemustfollowtherecipeforthemselves.Forsuccessdependsnotonmaterialconditions,thesortofthingonepersoncanarrangeforanother,butonyourattitudetowardsthem.Andthatispreciselythepoint,sincehappinesscomesofknowingthatyourstateofmindislargelyindependentofwhateverlifemaytiponyounext.ItmaythensurpriseyoutohearthatinEpicurus’opiniontheonlygoodispleasure.Surelyhowmuchpleasurewecangetdependsheavilyon101\nPhilosophy15.Epicureanisminpractice?NotaccordingtoEpicurus.ourmaterialconditionsoflife?Butthere’sasecondsurprise:hethinksthatthehighestpossiblepleasureisfreedomfromphysicalpainandmentalanxiety.Simple,easilyattainablepleasuresarenolesspleasantthanextravagantandexoticones;andrelianceonthelatterinducesanxiety:themeanstoobtainthemmaybetakenawayfromyou.(TheideathatEpicureanismisaconstantdinnerpartywithmusiciansanddancing-girlsiscompletelymisleading–itmusthavecomedowntousfromEpicurus’opponents,whowerenumerous.)Acauseofmuchmentalturmoilissuperstitiousfear.Banishit.Realizethatintheirperfectblissthegodshaveneitherneednorwishtointerfereinhumanaffairs.Learnenoughaboutphysics,astronomy,andmeteorologytofeelconfidentthatallphenomenahavenaturalexplanations–theyarenotportents,omens,orsignsofdivinewrath.102\nAnddonotfeardeath,fordeathissimplynon-existence,inwhichtherecanbenothingtofear.That,onathumbnail,isEpicurus’advicetoeachoneofus.Youcoulddoalotworsethanfollowit.Ofcoursetherewouldn’tbeanypoliticiansifwealldid;butperhapswecouldputupwiththat.Epicurustaughttheindividualtobeinwardlyarmedagainstwhatevermaybefall.Over2,000yearslaterJohnStuartMillwroteastirringdefenceofeveryindividual’srighttoshapetheirownlife.InhisfamousessayOnLiberty(1859)hearguedforwhathasbecomeknownastheHarmPrinciple:‘theonlypurposeforwhichpowercanberightfullyexercisedoveranymemberofacivilizedcommunity...istopreventharmtoothers’.AsdemocraticsystemsofgovernmentbecamebetterentrenchedinEuropeandAmericatheyalsobecamebetterunderstood,What’sinitforwhom?andMillhadspottedalatentdanger:thetyrannyofthemajorityovertheindividualandoverminoritygroups.AsbefitstheauthorofUtilitarianism(seeChapter5)hemakesnoappealtohumanrights,butrathertothedamagedone,thevaluelost,ifhisprincipleisnotobserved.Tobemasterofone’sownlifeisagoodforhumanbeings,apartofourhappiness,sotheindividuallosesevenifwhatthelawforbidsthemtodoissomethingtheywouldn’thavedoneanyway.Butthewholesocietylosestoo.ForthepeoplewhomtheHarmPrincipleprotectsareanextremelyvaluableresource,preciselybecausetheyhaveunconventionalopinionsandunusuallifestyles.Iftheiropinionsareinfacttruethevaluetothecommunityisobvious.Iftheyarefalseitislessobviousbutequallyreal:iftruthiswhollyunopposeditbecomesadeadformulaonthetongue–oppositionensuresthatitremainsliveinthemind.Asforunconventionallifestyles,theyprovidelivingexperimentaldatafromwhicheveryonecanlearn.Constrainingtheindividualdamageseverybody.103\nTheStateEarlier(Chapter2,andagainbrieflyinChapter5,p.50ff.)welookedattheso-calledcontracttheoryofpoliticalobligation.WesawitinactioninPlato’sCrito,andnoticedthatitcaninprincipletakemanyforms,arisingfromthevarietyofpossibleanswerstothequestion:whocontractswithwhomtodowhatonwhatconditions?OfallcontracttheoriesthatofThomasHobbes(1588–1679)isperhapsthemostfamous–andifsothenbecauseofhismarvellouslyunflatteringdescriptionofthe‘stateofnature’,lifebeforeanysocialarrangementshadbeenmade,inwhichnobodycanownanything,cultivateanything,ordoanythingconstructiveatallwithoutcontinualfearofbeingattackedandrobbed,withafairchanceofbeingmurderedthrownin.Aslongasthis‘war...ofeverymanagainsteveryman’lasts,lifeis‘solitary,poor,nasty,brutishandshort’.Sohowtoimprovematters?Formanassociation;agreetoaccepttheauthorityofa‘sovereign’(personorbody)withfullpowerstodoanythingtheydeemPhilosophyneedfultoprotecteachofyoufromtheothersandfromanyexternalthreat.Thissovereignbodycandonoinjustice,sinceastheiracceptedrepresentativeeverythingitdoesisdonewiththepresumedconsentofallwhoarepartytothecontractthatsetitup.Onlyifthesovereigndirectlythreatenstheirlivesmaythecitizensresist–foritwastoprotecttheirlivesthattheyenteredintothecontractinthefirstplace.The‘LawsandConstitutionofAthens’,yourecall(Crito50e–51c,p.19above),wouldn’tallowSocrateseventhatmuch,butgavelittlereasontosupportsuchextremeclaims.Mightn’tHobbes’scitizensreplythatitwasn’tjusttoprotecttheirlivesthattheyenteredintothecontract?Itwastoenjoyvariousliberties,allofwhichwerelackinginthestateofnature.Thatwouldsuggestthatthecitizens’rightofresistancekicksinratherearlierthanthepointatwhichtheirverylivesarethreatened.(Besides,havinghandedoverallthepower,howaretheytoprotecttheirlives?)LikePlato,Hobbesseems104\ntohavegonefurtherthanhisargumentswarrant.Butreallythatisn’tsurprising.Plato’syouthcoincidedwithAthens’disastrouswaragainstSparta.HobbeswasbornastheSpanishArmadaapproached,towardstheendofacenturytornbyreligiousconflictthatcostmillionsoflives,andhismaturitywitnessedEngland’sdescentintocivilwar.Nowonderthatbothmenbelievedthattheprimeneedofpoliticallifewasgovernmentstrongenoughtomaintainpeaceandorder,thevalueswithoutwhichnootherscouldevenbegin.Theirwayofsupportingtheindividualwastohandovertotalsovereigntytothestate.Nosurprisethatsomehavethoughtthattheywenttoofar.JohnLocke(1632–1704),writinglessthanfiftyyearsafterHobbesbutinsomewhatlessthreateningpoliticalcircumstances,waxedironical:Asifwhenmenquittingthestateofnatureenteredintosociety,theyWhat’sinitforwhom?agreedthatallofthembutone,shouldbeundertherestraintoflaws,butthatheshouldstillretainallthelibertyofthestateofnature,increasedbypower,andmadelicentiousbyimpunity.Thisistothinkthatmenaresofoolish,thattheytakecaretoavoidwhatmischiefsmaybedonethembypole-cats,orfoxes,butarecontent,naythinkitsafety,tobedevouredbylions.ThepriesthoodPriestsarenotgenerallypersonsofeitherwealthormilitarystrength.Sowhatevergivesthemsecurity,andnotjustsecuritybutoftenveryconsiderablepowerwithintheirsocietyorreligiousgroup,mustbesomethingelse.Itarisesfromwhattheirpeoplethinkaboutthem,whattheytakethemtobeabletodoforthem,thevaluethattheyputuponthem.Inotherwords,itarisesfromphilosophy.Thelesstangibleandimmediatethebenefitsandthedangers,themorepowerfultheapparatusneededtomaintainbeliefinthemandfaithinthosewhoconfer(oravert)them.Thisisn’tamatterofintentionaldeception–thoughitwouldbeabsurd105\n16.Dwarfingeverything,Hobbes’sLeviathanrisesoutofthebillowinghillsoftheEnglishcountryside.Canthisreallybesafety?NowonderLockewasworried.\ntosuggestthatnosuchthingeveroccurs.Itisn’tevenaquestionofwhetherwhatthepriestlyclasswouldhavethelaitybelieveaboutthemistrueorfalse.Thepointisthatitshouldbebelieved:otherwise,nopriests.Soplentyofwritingexistswhichpromotestheirstatus.Illustrationsexisteverywhere,sosincewehaven’tsetfootoutsideWesternEuropeforthelastfewchapterslet’sreturntoIndiaandlookattheopeningchapterofoneofthemajorUpanishads.BythetimeTheQuestionsofKingMilindawaswritten,theBr¸hada¯ranyakaUpanishad(BU,seeBibliography)maywellhavebeenasoldasChaucer’sCanterburyTalestoday.ItbelongstotheworldoftheHinduVedas,aworldofritual,sacrifices,andchantsthatarehighlybeneficial,thoughonlyifcorrectlyperformed.Toensurecorrectperformance,youneedanexpertlearnedWhat’sinitforwhom?inVedicmatters;foramajorritualyouevenneedasuper-expertwhomakessurethattheotherexpertsareperformingcorrectly.Suchexpertiseneedstobeaccordedduerespect,andnodoubtaduefee.(‘IwishIhadwealthsoIcouldperformrites’issaidtobeeveryone’sdesire(1.4.17)).Thisexpertise–andtheperksattachingtoit–isthe(hereditary)privilegeofaparticularsocialclassorcaste,theBrahmins.Nomeresocialconvention,thiscastesystem,as1.4.11tellsus–apparentlyitarisesoutofthewaythegodsthemselveswerecreated.Read1.4.11verycarefully:noticehowitascribesacertainsuperioritytotheKs¸atriya,therulingaristocraticwarriorclass,whilstmaintainingacertainpriorityfortheBrahmins.Theirpoweris‘thewomb’ofthepoweroftherulers–thatfromwhichitissues.Soit’sabadideaforawarriortoinjureapriest,forheharmsthesourceofhisownpower.Thisisphilosophyandtheology,butclearlyitisgoodpracticalpoliticsaswell.Areadernewtothistraditionofthoughtwillfindmuchthatisstrikinglyalien.Thereisthedoctrineofthecorrespondencesbetweenthepartsofthesacrificialhorse(thiswasthemostprestigiousoftheVedicsacrifices)andpartsoraspectsoftheworld:theyear,thesky,theearth.107\n17.TheRajaconsultshispriests.\nThereisthefaithinetymology,aswhenalongerwordisshowntobemadeup–approximately–oftwoshorterwords,andthisfactistakenasindicatingthegenesisorinnernatureofwhateveritisthatthelongerworddescribes.Theknowledgeofthisstrangelore,thetextrepeatedlyinsists,ishighlyadvantageous:‘Amanwhoknowsthiswillstandfirmwhereverhemaygo’;and‘Whoeverknowsthis,...deathisunabletoseizehim...andhebecomesoneofthesedeities’.Soweshouldvaluethisknowledge,andthereforeweshouldvaluethepeoplewhoguardit–thepriests.Itisn’tnecessarilywhatthepriestcandoforyou–itmaybewhathecandotoyou.Don’tgomessingaboutwithaBrahmin’swife.AsBU6.4.12makesabundantlyclear,hewillknowjusttheritualforgettingbackatyou.And‘AmancursedbyaBrahminhavingthisknowledgeissuretoWhat’sinitforwhom?departfromthisworldbereftofhisvirilityandstrippedofhisgoodworks....NevertrytoflirtwiththewifeofalearnedBrahminwhoknowsthis,lestonemakeanenemyofamanwiththisknowledge.’Youhavebeenwarned.Ofcourseitisn’tjustpriestswhoneedtobeneeded.It’salsodoctorsanddustbinmenandgameshowpresentersandadvertisingconsultants.And–Ialmostforgot–philosophyprofessors.Theyallexistbecauseofpeople’sbeliefsandvalues,hopesandfears.TheworkingclassesTheindustrializationofWesternEuropebroughtwealthtoafewandthemostdeplorableconditionsoflifetomany.ThemanyquicklyfoundachampioninKarlMarx(1818–83),whosework,itisnoexaggerationtosay,changedthepoliticalfaceofallthosepartsoftheglobewheretherewassuchathingaspoliticsatall.Onlyinthelastdecadehasitsinfluencebeguntowane.Itmayhavebeenavictimofitsownsuccess–afterall,thereisnotestofatheorylikeactuallytryingitout.(That’stheprinciplewhichunderliestheenormouspoweroftheexperimental109\nmethodinthesciences.)Andnopoliticaltheoryevergetsapropertrialunlessalotofpeoplearealreadyconvincedofit.Herewehaveanopportunitytospotsomeofthoseconnectionswhicharetobefoundalloverthehistoryofphilosophy.MarxwasnodiscipleofHegel–insomerespectshewasviolentlyopposedtohim.ButnobodyofthattimewasuntouchedbyHegelianism.LikeHegel,Marxheldthathistoryexhibitsanecessaryprogression;unlikeHegel,heheldthedrivingforcetobeeconomic:thematerialconditionsoflife.LikeHegel,heheldthatprogresswasessentiallytheresolutionofconflict;buttheconflictwasbetweentheeconomicinterestsofdifferentsectionsofsociety–hencethefamous‘classstruggle’oftheMarxists.AndheheldaversionofthedoctrinewesawtobesoimportanttoHegel:thevalueofbeingintouchwithyour‘Other’,somethingthat‘hassomethingofyourselfinit’,asweoftensay.Marxmadefulluseofthisideainhisanalysisofthecontemporaryeconomicsystem,characterizedbytheconflictofinterestbetweenthePhilosophyworkingclassesandthecapitalists,theownersofthe‘meansofproduction’(i.e.thefactories).Hissympathieslayfirmlywiththecurrentunderdogs,theworkers.Thecrucialthingwasthatthey,needingtomakealivingandhavingnothingelsetosell,weresellingtheirlabour–workinginreturnforawage.Notmuchofawage,becausethosebuyingtheirlabourhadnointerestinpayingthemanymorethanwasnecessarytokeepthemworking.Thisensuredforthemandtheirfamiliesalifeofacuteanddegradingpoverty.Butanother,morespiritual,featureofthesituationwaspressingheavilyonthemtoo–thefactthattheworktheyweredoingwasnotreallytheirwork:‘theworkisexternaltotheworker,itisnotapartofhisnature...notthesatisfactionofaneed,merelyameanstosatisfyingotherneeds....inworkhedoesnotbelongtohimselfbuttosomeoneelse’.Theunsatisfiedneedistheneedtoexpressoneselfinwhatonedoes.110\nDiagnosisisonething,acureisanother.Itturnsouttobejustaspossibletoexperiencealienationwhentheworkoneisdoingisnotone’sownbuttheState’saswhenitisnotone’sownbutthecompany’s.Thatmuchidentificationwiththeinterestsofthecommunity,whenthecommunityisalargeandcomplexone,isnoteasilyachievedormaintained.Andevenifitwere,thatwouldjusthelptomakeworkendurable.IfwhatyoudoisstandbyaconveyorbelttighteningthelidsonjarsofmarmaladeitmaymakethingslessintolerabletobedoingitforMotherRussiathanfortheGlobalMarmaladeCorporation.Butthatdoesnothingwhatevertomakeitsomethingpositive,anexpressionofyourpersonalityorskillsorameanstothedevelopmentofyourpotential.Nowadayswespeakof‘jobsatisfaction’.Notallofusgetit–theproblemhasn’tgoneaway.What’sinitforwhom?WomenWehavebeenboundingfromtopictotopic,persontoperson,acrosstheglobeandthreemillennialikeapackagetourgonemad.Butnobodyhasbeenintroducedtophilosophyuntiltheyhaveseen,inatleastonecase,alittlemoredeeplyintosomeonephilosopher’smind.WehavehadaglimpseoftwofamousworksbyJohnStuartMill,UtilitarianismandOnLiberty.ThefirsttoldusthattheGoodwashappiness,thesecondthathappinessrequiresindividualfreedom.HisalmostequallyfamousessayTheSubjectionofWomen(1869)tellsusthatthatmeanseveryone,notjustadultmales.ThepracticalpoliticianinMilltakesaimataquitespecificand(intheoryatleast)easilyremediedabuse:‘thelegalsubordinationofonesextotheotheriswronginitself,andnowoneofthechiefhindrancestohumanimprovement;...itoughttobereplacedbyaprincipleofperfectequality’.Presentfamilylaw,heargued,amountedtotheenslavementofwives.Hemeantthewordquiteliterally,ashisaccountofthelegalpositioninChapter2shows.Whathewantschanged,however,istheentirepackageofpracticesandopinionswhichdeny111\nwomenequaleducationalopportunitiesandthenequalaccess,onmerit,toalloccupationsandpositionsofinfluence.Anymajorphilosophyneedspotentialbeneficiaries,evenincaseswherethebenefitmaybeimaginary.InseekingtoimprovethelotofwomenMillhasplentyofbeneficiariestoappealto.Buthebelievesthattheconstituencyforhisviewsis100percentofmankind,notjust50.Hewritesabouttheinjusticetowomenandthedamagedonetotheirlivesbyexistingconditions,buthewritesalmostasmuchaboutthelosstoeverybody.Thesuppressionofwomen’stalentsis‘atyrannytothemandadetrimenttosociety’.Historytellsusagooddealaboutwhatwomencando,becausewomenhavedoneit.Ittellsusnothingaboutwhattheycan’tdo,anditneverwilluntiltheyareroutinelygiventheopportunity.(AsIwrite,130-somethingyearslater,ayoungwomanisintheleadintheclosingstagesofasingle-handedround-the-worldsailingrace,aneventthatmustmakedemandsonmentalandphysicalstaminabeyondanythingIcanimagine.)PhilosophyMillalsobelievesthatmenaredamagedasindividuals,ofteninwaystheyarenotlikelytonotice(whichisitselfpartofthedamage).Foritisnotgoodforanyonetobebroughtuptobelievethemselvessuperiortoothers,especiallywhenithappens,asitfrequentlydoes,tobeotherswhosefacultiesareinfactsuperiortotheirs.Ontheotherhand,harshthoughitmaysound,livingone’slifearoundacloserelationshipwithsomeoneofinferior‘abilityandcultivation’isdetrimentaltothesuperiorparty.Yetmanymenfindthemselvesinjustthissituation,marriedtowomenwhoselimitationsarenolessrealjustbecausetheyareanenforcedartificialproductofathoroughlypernicioussystem.Thosemenmaythinktheyarewinning,butthetruthisthateveryone’saloser.Thankgoodnessthingshaveimprovedsince1869.Abit.Insomepartsoftheworld.Forthetimebeing.Givenourtopicitwouldbestrangetodrawattentiononlytosomething112\nwrittenbyaman.Butthereisanobvious,indeedalmostobligatory,placetoturn.SimonedeBeauvoir’smassiveTheSecondSex(1949)hasbeentheinspirationofsomuchfeministwritingeversince.WereIallowedabriefreturntolifeinabout200years’timeIwouldnotbesurprisedtofinditratedoneofthemostinfluentialbooksofthetwentiethcentury.LikeMill,Beauvoirisconcernedwiththelibertyofwomen;unlikeMill,sheisnotparticularlyconcernedwiththeconnectionbetweenlibertyandhappiness.Shedeniesthatthereareanyinterestinggeneralstatementsaboutwhatwomenarelike,forwhattheyarelikeisaresponsetotheircircumstances,someofwhicharesocialandthereforehighlyvariable.(Millappearedtothinkthattheremightbesomesuchgeneralizations,butdeniedthatanywereknown.)Besides,BeauvoirWhat’sinitforwhom?standsintheexistentialisttraditionandholdsthathowwereacttoourcircumstancesisafreedecisionforeachofus–topretendthatwearewhollydeterminedbyourcircumstancesisinauthenticity,abdicationofresponsibility.Ihavespaceenoughonlytotouchoneofthethemesofthislongandconstantlylivelybook.InChapter7IspokeoftheenormousinfluenceofHegel,andmentionedhisdoctrineofself-knowledge:itariseswhenonemeetsaspectsofoneselfinsomethingelse,orone’s‘Other’.Seizingonthepsychologicaltruthinthis,whilstcompletelyignoringHegel’sgrandmetaphysics,Beauvoirdevelopshermostcharacteristicdoctrine:womanisman’sOther,andtheself-understandingofbothdependsonit.WhentheOtherisitselfasubject,aperson,thesituationbecomesmorecomplicatedandpotentiallyverydamaging.I’mwatchingyouwatchingmewatchingyou...HowAseesBaffectsB,soitalterswhatAfindsinB.Andthis(recallthedoctrineaboutself-knowledge)altersA’sperceptionofA,whichthenaffectsA,bothofwhichaffecthowAseesB...Justoncegetsomethingbadlywrong,aswhenmanenslavedwoman,thinkingthatthatwasgoodforhim,andwomanaccepted113\nenslavement,thinkingthatwastheonlychoiceforher,andallrelationsbetweenthesexesaregoingtogetentangledinanetoferrorandartificiality.Now‘whateverhedoes...hefeelstrickedandshefeelswronged’.Thereciprocityoftherelationshipmeansthatneitherpartyalonecanputitright:Beauvoirappealssimultaneouslytomentorecognizetheindependenceandequalityofwomen,andtowomentobecomejustthat,byrealizingthatitisindeedthetruthaboutthemselves.Soontheverylastpagecomesasentencewhich,whilstcompletelycharacteristicofBeauvoir,couldalmosthavebeenwrittenbyMill:‘whenweabolishtheslaveryofhalfofhumanity,togetherwiththewholesystemofhypocrisythatitimplies,thenthe“division”ofhumanitywillrevealitsgenuinesignificanceandthehumancouplewillfinditstrueform’.He,comingfromtheempiricistandutilitarianismtradition,andshe,againstthetotallydifferentbackgroundofHegelplusexistentialism,endupremarkablyclosetogether.Italmostmakesyouthinktheymightberight...PhilosophyAnimalsAnyonepromotingtheinterestsofanimals–non-humananimals–facesaninitialproblem:animalscan’tread.Sothewriterwillhavetoconvinceanaudiencedistinctfromthegroupheseekstobenefit,whichcallsforoneorbothoftwostrategies:eitherappealtotheirbetternature,orarguethattheywillbenefittoo.Wesawthesecondofthoseatworkinattemptstoengagethesupportofthelaityforthepriesthood;MillandBeauvoirusedbothintryingtorallymentothecauseofwomen’semancipation.Thesituationisevenlesspromisingwhenmostofthosetowhomyouareappealingbenefit,orthinktheybenefit,fromtheverypracticesyouaretryingtohaveabolished.Lotsofpeopleliketoeatmeat,lotsofpeoplebelievethathumansbenefitenormouslyfrommedicalresearch114\nconductedbymeansofexperimentsonanimals.Feministwritershadsomethingofthesameproblemwhentheytriedtowinmenovertotheirviews,butatleasttheyhadadirectconstituencyinwomen;‘animalists’havenodirectconstituencyatall.Buddhism,withoutgoingtoextremes,isnaturallyprotectivetowardsanimals.Isay‘naturally’,becauseBuddhismretainstheHindubeliefthatsoulsreturnagainandagaintolife,andthatwhatisinoneincarnationahumanmayinanotherbeananimal.TheBuddhaoncelivedasahare.Christianityhadnosuchmetaphysics,northeattachedscruples–askanIndiancowwhethermetaphysicsmatters!AdamwascreatedLordovertheanimals,andtheywerecreatedfortheuseofmankind.Wehaverationalsouls,buttheydon’t,whichleavesthemoutsidethemoralsphere.(StThomasAquinas(1225–74)saidso,amongWhat’sinitforwhom?others.)Thatoneranandran.Humetookapopatit(seep.26above),butstillitwentonrunning.AsthefounderoftheutilitarianismthatMillespousedanddeveloped,JeremyBentham(1748–1832)tookpainandpleasuretobethemorallydecisivecategories,andfamouslydeclaredofanimals:‘Thequestionisnot,Cantheyreason?nor,Cantheytalk?but,Cantheysuffer?’(Theycan,ofcourse,sotheyenterintotheutilitarianequationandwehavemoralresponsibilitiestowardsthem.)Butthatwasanincidentalpassagefromabookdevotedtohumanwelfare.Itwasonlyveryrecentlythatwebegantogetwholebooksexplicitlyaboutthemoralityofourtreatmentofanimals(seeBibliography),afactwhichmayreflectthetrickytacticalsituationwhichtheirauthorshavetoaddress.Theirdoctrineshavemadeenormousprogressoverthelasttwentyorthirtyyears–thetacticalproblemwasn’tinsoluble.Theywereabletoappealtothesentimentalityofthosewholiketoascribehumancharacteristicstoanimals.Theywereabletoappealtothemuchharderfactsofmodernbiology,whichshow,farmoreconvincinglythanHumecouldhavedone,thatourrelationshiptoanimalsisalotcloserthan115\nAquinaseverimagined.Theyappealedpowerfullytopeople’sconsciences,askingBentham’squestionwhetherthesufferingofanimalscouldbejustifiedbyresultinggoodforhumans,andifso,thenwhen?Foryoumightfeeladifferencebetweenthedeathofexperimentalmiceinreturnforasubstantialadvanceinthetreatmentofcancer,andthedeathofdogsandbearsinabear-pitforthesakeofafewminutesofsport.Someaspectsofanimalwelfaretieinwithanotherpressingconcern–thewholebusinessofdamageto,andcarefor,thenaturalenvironment.Onesuchaspect,vegetarianism,issometimestreatedinthatway.Usingvegetablematerialstofeedcattle,andtheneatingthemeat,issaidtobeaveryinefficientwayofusingtheEarth’sresources,comparedwitheatingthevegetablesstraightoffandcuttingoutthecowinbetween.Sovegetarianismispresentedasbeing,long-term,ineveryone’sself-interest.Goodmove–themorepeoplearelistening,themorepointintalking.PhilosophyProfessionalphilosophersYouwillhavenoticed,perhapswithsomesurprise,thatIhavesaidnothingaboutphilosophyasitisbeingwrittennow.Thatsomeofitisofvalue,andwilllast,Ihavelittledoubt,andevenlessdoubtthatwhatlastswillbeatinyfractionofwhatisnowbeingpublished.Icouldguessatoneortwotitles,butaguessisexactlywhatitwouldbe;soIhavepreferredtosticktoworkwhichwealreadyknowtohavesurvivedasubstantialtestoftime.Partofthereasonwhyithassurvivedthetestisthatitwaswrittenoutofarealfeelingthatitsmessagewasneededforthebenefitofhumanity,andwecanrecognizethepassioninitaswellastheintelligence.Thereisnoreasonwhytoday’sphilosophicalwritingshouldn’tbelikethis,andsomeofitis.Butoneshouldbeawarethatmostofitiswrittenbyprofessionals,peoplewhoselivelihoodandcareerprospectsrequire116\nWhat’sinitforwhom?18.Aprofessionalphilosopher–bejustalittlewaryofthisman.themtowriteandpublishonphilosophy.Nothingfollowsfromthat–afterall,KantandHegelwereprofessionalphilosopherstoo.Anditcertainlydoesn’tfollowthattheirinterestinphilosophyisn’tgenuine.Butitdoesmeanthatamongstthevariousreasonsforthemtobeinterested,somearewhatImightcallartificial.BackinChapter1Ispokeofphilosophersasenteringdebatetochangethecourseofcivilization,nottosolvelittlepuzzles.Butintoday’sworldofprofessionalizedphilosophythemostbrilliantsolutionofapuzzlecangetitsauthoraverylongwayindeed;thetemptationsandpressuresaretheretowriteonpuzzles,forotherprofessionalphilosophers,andletcivilizationtakeitsowncourse.Thatisnot–please!–tobereadasablanketcondemnationofeverythingnowemergingfromuniversityphilosophydepartments.ItismeantasadvicetosomeonemakingtheirfirstapproachtophilosophywiththehelpofthisVeryShortIntroduction.Ifyouareleafingthroughthelatestphilosophybookfromsomeacademicpress,orarecentissue117\nofatopprofessionaljournal,andfindyourselfunabletoseewhatisgoingonorwhatclaimitcouldpossiblyhaveonyourattention,don’ttransferyourreactiontothewholeofphilosophyenbloc.Itmaybethatyouarelookingatadetailfromsomemuchlargerpicturethatyoudon’tyethavetheexperiencetorecognize.Ortheworstmaybetrue,andyoureallyarereadingthephilosopher’sequivalentofachessproblem,somethinghighlyingeniousbutwithnowidersignificance.Whilstdevelopingyourownpowersofdiscrimination,sticktothegoodoldclassics.FornosuchdoubtsneedariseaboutanyofthephilosophersIhavetriedtointroduceyouto.Weknowthattheywerewritingfromtheheartaswellasfromthehead.Alongsidetheirenormousmeritstheymayhavetheirfaults,tobesure:unsuspectedignorance,prejudice,over-confidence,obscurity–justtogettheliststarted.ButasIhopetohaveindicated,philosophyisaswideaslife,andinitshugeliteratureareexemplifiedmostintellectualvicesaswellasmostintellectualvirtues.Wishingitwereotherwisewouldbeclosetowishingthathumanbeingsdidn’thaveminds.Philosophy118\nBibliographyWheretogonext?Mytimeisup.ButIpromisedtoleaveyouwiththenamesandaddresses,sotospeak,ofsomeguideswithwhomyoucanbegintogofurtheranddeeper.Itisworthnoticingthatsomeveryprominentphilosophershavedevotedtimeandcaretowritingintroductions.Thisisnomatterofchurningoutastandardtextbook:everyrouteintophilosophyistosomeextentpersonal.IntroductionsT.Nagel,WhatDoesitAllMean?(NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1987)InthisveryshortbookTomNagel,eschewingallmentionofhistoryandaimingstraightfortheproblems,givesthereaderatasteofninedifferentareas:knowledge,otherpeople’sminds,themind–bodyrelation,languageandmeaning,freedomofthewill,rightandwrong,justice,death,andthemeaningoflife.Justrightforyourfirstpieceofreading–seewhatgrabsyou.S.W.Blackburn,Think(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999)TheperfectthingtomoveontoafterNagel.TakesonseveralofthesamethemesasNagel’sbook,plusGodandReasoning,nowatgreaterlengthanddepth;frequentquotationofhistoricalsources,sobeginning119\ntocommunicateasenseofthe(Western)philosophicaltradition.Veryentertaininglywritten.B.Russell,TheProblemsofPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1912)Aclassicintroductorybook,stillgoingafternearlyninetyyears.Don’tmissthelastchapter–Russell’sclaimsforthevalueofphilosophy–eventhoughsomeofitmaynowadaysseemjustalittlegrandioseandoptimistic.HistoriesofphilosophyB.Russell,HistoryofWesternPhilosophy(London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1946)Aremarkablebooksynthesizingamountainofmaterialinamostengagingway.Enjoyit,butdon’tbesurprisedifyoulaterhearthePhilosophyopinionthatRussell’saccountofsomeparticularthinkerislimited,ormissesthemainpoint,orisdistortedbyhisintensedislikeofChristianity.F.Copleston,AHistoryofPhilosophy(8vols.London:Burns&Oates,1946–66)NothinglikesomuchfunasRussell,butcomprehensiveandreliableandsuitableforseriousstudy.Withadifferentpublisher(SearchPress),CoplestonlateraddedavolumeonFrenchphilosophyfromtheRevolutiononwards,andanotheronphilosophyinRussia.S.Radhakrishnan,IndianPhilosophy(2vols.Delhi:OxfordUniversityPress,1996;1stpubl.1929)SarvepalliRadhakrishnan,PresidentofIndia1962–7,earlierheldprofessorshipsinCalcuttaandOxford.TheIndianphilosophical120\ntraditionisdeepandsophisticated;theWesternreaderwilloftencomeacrossfamiliarthoughtsandarguments,fascinatinglytransformedbytheunfamiliarbackground.Don’tpanicifyouseeafewwordsofSanskrit.ReferenceworksTherearenowseveralgoodone-volumeworksofthiskind:TheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,bySimonBlackburn;TheOxfordCompaniontoPhilosophy,ed.TedHonderich;TheCambridgeDictionaryofPhilosophy,ed.RobertAudi(firsttwoOxfordUniversityPress,thelastCambridgeUniversityPress).Thebestmulti–volumeworkinEnglishis(thoughIsayitmyself–tounderstandwhyIsaythat,takeacloselookatthephotoonp.117)TheBibliographyRoutledgeEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.Not,inmostcases,fortheindividualpocket!Thisisonetoreadinabigpubliclibraryorauniversitylibrary,orviasomesuchinstitutionwhichsubscribestotheinternetversion.WorksreferredtointhetextChapter2Plato,Crito.HandyandaccessibleisTheLastDaysofSocrates(PenguinBooks)whichcontainsTheApology,Crito,andPhaedoinatranslationbyHughTredennick.MyonlycomplaintisthattheStephanusnumberingisindicatedatthetopofthepage,insteadofbeinggivenfullyinthemargin.ShouldyoufeelyourselfgettingkeenonPlatoagoodbuyisPlato:CompleteWorks,ed.J.CooperandD.S.Hutchinson(HackettPublishingCo.).Chapter3DavidHume,OfMiracles,sectionXofAnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding.Manyeditions.TrythatbyL.A.Selby-Bigge(Oxford121\nUniversityPress),whichincludesHume’sEnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals.OtherwritingsonreligionbyHume,alsoeasilyavailable,arehisDialoguesConcerningNaturalReligionandTheNaturalHistoryofReligion.Chapter4Anon.,TheQuestionsofKingMilindaisavailableinaninexpensiveabridgedversioneditedbyN.K.G.Mendis(Kandy,SriLanka:BuddhistPublicationSociety,1993).Plato,Phaedrus246aff.and253dff.Platocomparesthesoultoachariot.Anon.,KathaUpanishad,3.3–7,9:thesouliscomparedtoachariotintheearlyIndiantradition.AneasilyavailableeditionofthemainUpanishadsisintheOxfordUniversityPressWorldClassicsseriesinatranslationbyPatrickOlivelle.Chapter5Epicurus:TheearlyhistorianofphilosophyDiogenesLaertiuswroteaworkcalledLivesoftheEminentPhilosophers,publishedintheLoebPhilosophyClassicalLibrarybyHarvardUniversityPress(2vols.)Thelastsectionofvol.2isdevotedentirelytoEpicurus,andreproducessomeofhiswritings.(Apartfromtheseonlyafewfragmentshavecomedowntous.)JohnStuartMill,Utilitarianism.Thisshortwork,andMill’sOnLiberty(seebelowunderCh.8)canbothbefoundinavolumeintheEveryman’sLibraryseriespublishedinLondonbyJ.M.Dent&SonsandinNewYorkbyE.P.Dutton&Co.ThomasHobbes,Leviathan.OnegoodoptionistheeditionbyRichardTuckpublishedbyCambridgeUniversityPress.Thefamouschapteraboutthestateofnatureispart1,chapter13.Plato,Republic453–66.Plato’sabolitionofthefamily–orshouldonerathersayhisintroductionofanew,non-biologicalconceptofthefamily?–andhisreasonsforit.122\nChapter6Lucretius,OftheNatureofThings,translatedbyR.E.Latham,introductionbyJohnGodwin,PenguinBooks.Lucretius,aRomanofthefirstcenturybc,putthedoctrinesofEpicurusintoLatinversewiththeclearintentionofconvertinghiscompatriotsifhecould.Godwin’sintroductionbegins:‘Thisbookshouldcarryawarningtothereader:itisintendedtochangeyourlife’.TheoriginaltitleisDeRerumNatura.Berkeley,ThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasandPhilonous.Numerouseditions:agoodbetisRogerWoolhouse’sedition,publishedbyPenguinBooks,whichalsocontainsBerkeley’sPrinciplesofHumanKnowledge.Kant,CritiqueofPureReason.StillthebesttranslationisthatbyNormanKempSmith,publishedbyMacmillan.Butbeginnersbeware:thisisveryhardreading.Sanchez,QuodNihilScitur.Thisishighlyspecializedstuff,butsinceIBibliographymentioneditinthetextIgivethedetailshere:editedandtranslatedbyElaineLimbrickandDouglasThomson,publishedbyCambridgeUniversityPress.Descartes,Meditations.Manyeditionsavailable.ButjustincaseyoufindyourselfgettinginterestedinDescartestry(initspaperbackversion)ThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,translatedbyJ.Cottingham,R.Stoothoff,andD.Murdoch,publishedbyCambridgeUniversityPress(2vols.)TheMeditationsareinii.3–62.SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism.Again,thisisspecializedmaterial.Butitwouldbeapitynevertohavereadatleastthefirsttwelvesectionsofbook1,asfarasthepointwhereSextusexplainswhattheScepticalphilosophyisfor.R.G.Bury’stranslationispublishedintheLoebClassicalLibrarybyHarvardUniversityPress.Chapter7Descartes,DiscourseontheMethod.Numerouseditions:seetherecommendationforDescartes’sMeditationsjustabove.TheDiscourseontheMethodisini.111–51.PartsofDescartes’TreatiseonMan,123\nfromwhichtheillustrationonp.80ofthisbookwastaken,areonpp.99–108Hegel,IntroductiontothePhilosophyofHistory.AnexcellenttranslationisthatbyH.B.NisbetandpublishedbyCambridgeUniversityPressunderthetitleHegel,LecturesonthePhilosophyofWorldHistory:Introduction.Pp.25–151giveyouallyouneed.CharlesDarwin,TheOriginofSpecies.ToberecommendedistheeditionbyJ.W.BurrowpublishedbyPenguinBooks.Ifyouhaven’ttimeforthewholeofit,atleastreadchapters1–4and14(theclosingchapter).Nietzsche,TheGenealogyofMorals.TranslatingNietzsche’sresonantandinventiveGermanisatrickybusiness;thatmaybewhysomanyEnglishtranslationsarepresentlyavailable.ThetwoIcanrecommendarethosebyW.KaufmannandR.J.Hollingdale,publishedbyVintageBooks,andbyDouglasSmith,publishedbyOxfordUniversityPressintheirWorldClassicsseries.(ButifyoucancomfortablyreadNietzscheinGermandon’teventhinkaboutreadinghiminanyotherlanguage.)Thecentralpassageabouttheactivitiesofthe‘asceticpriest’is3.10–22–butdon’tlimityourselftothat.PhilosophyChapter8JohnStuartMill,OnLiberty.ThisandMill’sessayUtilitarianism(seeaboveunderChapter5)areinavolumeintheEveryman’sLibraryseriespublishedinLondonbyJ.M.Dent&SonsandinNewYorkbyE.P.Dutton&Co.JohnStuartMill,TheSubjectionofWomen.AvailableinavolumecalledJohnStuartMill:ThreeEssays,introductionbyRichardWollheim,publishedbyOxfordUniversityPress;orbyitselfinaveryinexpensiveversionfromDoverPublications.Anon.,Br¸hada¯ranyakaUpanishad.AswiththeKathaUpanishad(seeabove),anaccessibleeditionisPatrickOlivelle’stranslationofthemainUpanishadsintheOxfordUniversityPressWorldClassicsseries.SimonedeBeauvoir,TheSecondSex.ThetranslationbyH.M.ParshleyisoneofthemosthandsomevolumesintheEveryman’sLibraryseries,publishedbyDavidCampbellPublishersLtd.124\nKarlMarx,EconomicandPhilosophicalManuscripts.Thisiswherethequotationinthetextcomesfrom.SomeonehavingtheirfirstgoatMarxshouldlooktosomeanthologyofhiswritings,perhapsTheMarx–EngelsReader,ed.R.Tucker,publishedbyNortonandCo.Butbeware:Marx,especiallyearlyMarx,oftenisn’teasytoread–aconsequenceofhabitsofthoughtandstylehegotfromHegel.PeterSinger,AnimalLiberation,isanotableexampleofabookdevotedtothemoralityofhumanrelationshipswithanimals,publishedbyNewYorkReviewBooksin1975.TomRegan’sTheCaseforAnimalRights(UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1983)isanother.Bibliography125\n\nIndexBible75body,statusof57Boethius6Brahmins107ABuddhism4,11,35–45absolutism52animals115aestheticrelativism72body,statusof57afterlife21fiveaggregatesof37,38,42,agnosticism243,44,56,57agreementbreaking18,19,20nirvana38,48analyticphilosophy81self35–45animals26,38,54,114–16bundletheoryofthemind56,57anthropomorphism115anti-Semitism99CAquinas,StThomas115capitalists110Aristophanes13Cartesian,seeDescartes,RenéAristotelianism70,71,76castesystem38Aristotle5Catholicism27Arjuna40chariotanalogy39–42,43artificialselection88choice53–4asceticpriests98–9Christianity27,94,98–9,115astronomy74–5,102citizens50–2,104ataraxia(peaceofmind)71–2civicduty18,20,45Athena,goddess40classstruggle110atomism63–4cognitivescience58Cogitoergosum(Descartes)78Bcommonsense70Beauvoir,Simonede113–14compassion96beer54Confucius11beliefs53–5,94consciousness37,43,65,83–5religious26–34,64,87consequentialism45–8,49–50,scepticism7061Bentham,Jeremy115,116contracttheory50–2,104–5Berkeley,GeorgeCopernicus74,75idealism61,65–6corporatephilosophy8opinions10cosmology14,74–5127\nCritodialogue(Plato)12,14–21,experimentalanimals11638,45,46,51,74,104eyewitnessaccounts30–1cyclicalrebirth38,44,63,115FDfalsehoods28,39,41–2Darwin,Charles87–93families52,111Darwinism94Fates84death102–3feelings37,43democracy103feminism5,113–14,115Democritus63–4fiveaggregatesofBuddhistDescartes,René5,92–3,93–4doctrine37,38,42,43,44,DiscourseontheMethod56,5776–80Forms(Plato)69dualism62,78Freud,Sigmund93scepticism70–1,76friendship15–18,20,101dialectic85–6dialecticalmaterialism64,86Gdispositions37Galileo74,79dualism62,66Philosophy‘gastronomic’relativism72,73Descartes78Geist(Spirit)83–5scientifictheoryand62–3GenealogyofMorals(Nietzsche)E93–9God26,28,43,78–9,83–4,education48,76,11292ego43good/goodnessempiricism66–70consequentialism45–9Epicureanism4,47–8,64happiness49,103,111atomism64Nietzsche95individualand101–3relative72socialcontract52Greekphilosophy11–23,55,epistemology55,61,66–7063–4,71–2Estienne,Henri15ethicalconsequentialism45–8ethicalquestions12,14Hexistentialism81,113happiness50experiences56–7ataraxia71–2128\nEpicureanism101Hegelon86Mill49,103,111relativismand73HarmPrinciple103industrialization109hate96integrity49–50Hegel,GeorgWilhelmFriedrich61–2,66,89JMarxand110jobsatisfaction111PhilosophyofHistory81–6Johnson,Dr65reason69–70justice12self-knowledge82–3,113Hercules40K‘herdmorality,’96–7Kant,Immanuel5Hinduism4,38,115morality18,23history83–5powerofreason54HistoryofEngland(Hume)24reasonandperception69Hobbes,Thomas5,106karma43contracttheory52,104–5KathaUpanishad41humanbeings24,26IndexKierkegaard,Søren81humansuffering98knowledge,seeepistemologyHume,David115,116Krishna40onBerkeley’sarguments66bundletheoryofthemind56Lmiracles24–34lawsofnature28,30,32–3rationality53,54Leibniz,GottfriedWilhelm42self57,58Lewis,C.S.91,92Locke,John105ILoka¯yatas63,64,67–8Idealove14,96Hegel82–5Lucretius64reasonand69–70idealism61,63,64–6MIndianphilosophy4,11,63,64,Mahabharata4067–8,107majorityopinion15,17individual,theMarx,Karl5,62,64,66,86,Epicureanismand101–3109129\nmaterialgoods48opinions10,15,17materialism63–4,66,67OriginofSpecies,The(Darwin)memory31–287–93mentalformations37,43originalsin92metaphysics43,61,66Other,the(Beauvoir)113dualism62–3,66idealism63,64–6Pmaterialism63–4,66,67pain115meteorology102absenceof47–8Mill,JohnStuart48,103,111–12,parentalauthority51115perception37,43,56,63,67–8miracles27–34philosophymoksha38definitionof5–6Moore,G.E.81historicalcontextof58–60moralrelativism72historyof110moralityprofessionalized116–19Kant18,23terminology61Nietzsche94–7physics79,102religionand21physiology79,80Philosophypigeons,andartificialselection88,89NPlato60,105Nagasena(Buddhistmonk)chariotanalogy4135–45Critodialogue12,14–21,38,45,naturalsciences8–946,51,74,104naturalselection87–92emphasisonthesoul57Nature28,30,32–3,82–3,91,105onthefamily52Newton,Isaac79Forms69,82Nietzsche,Friedrich2,93–9pleasure46,47,101–2,115nirvana38,48politicalauthority50–2no-selfdoctrine,seefivepoweraggregatesofBuddhistHarmPrinciple103doctrineofpriestswithintheircommunity105Owillto96–7obligations21,23priesthood98–9,105–9130\nProvidence83scientificknowledge32–4,62–3,psychoanalysis93102pyrrhonism71–2ScientificRevolution75self37–45,56–8Qself-knowledge82–3,93,113SextusEmpiricus71Quintessence75sexualdrive91‘situated’thought58Rsocialcontracts50–2rationalism66–70SocialDarwinism91rationality52–5socialreform48reality69–70,81–3socialvaluesystems95–7Reason83Socrates45,46,104Cunningof84Critodialogue12,14–21,51Descartes92–3historicalandliterarygoalsand54character12Hume26integrityof49Ideasand69–70Indexsoul38reincarnation38,44,115trialof14relativism72–3Sophist,The(Plato)12religionsoul57,63,69belief26–34,64,87,94sovereignty104–5moralityand21specialization9Republic(Plato)11,52Spencer,Herbert89,91reputations15,16,17,20State,the104–5retaliation18,19contracttheoryand50–2revelations28Stephanusnumbering15rulingclass95,97,99,107Stoics71Russell,Bertrand81sufferingalleviationof43Sanimal115–16salvation4,38human98Sanchez,Francisco70suicide16scepticism2,3,55,70–1supernatural7Descartes70–1,76,79superstitiousfear102Nietzsche93–4survivalofthefittest89,91131\nTVedas11,107,109vegetarianism116taxation50virtue12testimonialevidence28–9totalitarianism50transmigrationofsouls115Wtropes71wholes42willtopowerconceptU96–7undergraduatecourses9wisdom15universityphilosophyWittgenstein,Ludwig81departments9,118women111–14Upanishads11,107Woolston,Thomas27utilitarianism48–50,103,115workingclass109–11VZvalue-systems95–7ZenBuddhism3Philosophy132\n\n