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BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2AllenSpeightEditorNarrative,PhilosophyandLife\nBostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLifeVolume2SeriesEditorAllenSpeightBostonUniversity,MA,USAAssociateEditorsDanielO.DahlstromBostonUniversity,MA,USAM.DavidEckelBostonUniversity,MA,USAEditorialBoardAndrewChignellCornellUniversity,Ithaca,NY,USAPaulDaviesUniversityofSussex,UKWendyDonigerUniversityofChicagoDivinitySchool,IL,USAParimalPatilHarvardUniversity,Cambridge,MA,USAEleonoreStumpSt.LouisUniversity,MO,USAAlanWolfeBostonCollege,MA,USANicholasWolterstorffYaleUniversity(Emeritus),NewHaven,CT,USADeanZimmermanRutgersUniversity,NewBrunswick,NJ,USA\nAimsandScopeBostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLifeisaninterdisciplinaryscholarlyserieswhichpublishesseminalpapersontopicsofpressingandperennialinterestattheintersectionofphilosophy,religionandpubliclife.Theseriesisespeciallyinterestedininterdisciplinaryworkthatilluminatesquestionsofvalue,truth,realityandmeaning,aswellastopicsintherelevantfieldswhichhaveaparticularintersectionwithpubliclife(forexample,philosophicalandreligiousperspectivesoncontemporaryissuesinethicalandpoliticalphilosophy).Inaddition,theseriesservesasaprominentforumforimportantacademicworkemergingwithinthespecificsub-disciplineofthephilosophyofreligion.Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/8881\nAllenSpeightEditorNarrative,PhilosophyandLife\nEditorAllenSpeightInstituteforPhilosophyandReligionBostonUniversityBoston,MA,USAISSN2352-8206ISSN2352-8214(electronic)ISBN978-94-017-9348-3ISBN978-94-017-9349-0(eBook)DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0SpringerDordrechtHeidelbergNewYorkLondonLibraryofCongressControlNumber:2014956230©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped.Exemptedfromthislegalreservationarebriefexcerptsinconnectionwithreviewsorscholarlyanalysisormaterialsuppliedspecificallyforthepurposeofbeingenteredandexecutedonacomputersystem,forexclusiveusebythepurchaserofthework.DuplicationofthispublicationorpartsthereofispermittedonlyundertheprovisionsoftheCopyrightLawofthePublisher’slocation,initscurrentversion,andpermissionforusemustalwaysbeobtainedfromSpringer.PermissionsforusemaybeobtainedthroughRightsLinkattheCopyrightClearanceCenter.ViolationsareliabletoprosecutionundertherespectiveCopyrightLaw.Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.Whiletheadviceandinformationinthisbookarebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication,neithertheauthorsnortheeditorsnorthepublishercanacceptanylegalresponsibilityforanyerrorsoromissionsthatmaybemade.Thepublishermakesnowarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedherein.Printedonacid-freepaperSpringerispartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia(www.springer.com)\nAcknowledgmentsThisisthesecondvolumeofcollectedpaperstoappearintherenewedseriesBostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife.Itis,likethefirst(Justice,ResponsibilityandReconciliationintheWakeofConflict),theresultofasetofcollaborationsthatfirstemergedaroundaseriesintheInstituteforPhilosophyandReligionatBostonUniversity.ParticularthanksgotoBenRoth,whohelpedwiththeeditingofthisvolume,andLynnNiizawa,theinstitute’sgraduateassistant.IwouldalsoliketothanktheeditorsatSpringerwhohavehelpedwiththisvolumeandseries,especiallyAnitavanderLinden-Rachmat,ElvireVerbraak,andCristinadosSantos.v\n\nContents1Introduction.............................................................................................1AllenSpeightPartINarrative,PhilosophyandLife:TheoreticalQuestionsAboutNarrative2AgainstNarrativity.................................................................................11GalenStrawson3“TheSizeoftheSelf”:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution.....................................................................................33MaryaSchechtman4TheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectives................................49AllenSpeight5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣa’sLifeoftheBuddha........................................................61MalcolmDavidEckel6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist:NauseaandtheAdventuresoftheNarrativeSelf................................81BenRoth7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence........................................................103SilviaCarli8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike.................................................................119GarySaulMorson9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination...............................................135JohnGibsonvii\nviiiContents10“AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths”:ThePowerofNarrativeArtinSouthAsianLiteraryCultures..........151AnneMoniusPartIIPhilosophy,NarrativeandLifeWriting:PhilosophicalBiographyandBiographicalPhilosophy11Descartes’BiographyasaGuidetoHisMeditations...........................169DesmondM.Clarke12WritingtheLivesofPhilosophers:ReflectionsonSpinozaandOthers............................................................................181StevenNadler13Hume’sOwnLife....................................................................................191AaronGarrett14The(Ir)relevanceofBiography:TheCaseofFichte...........................199ManfredKuehnIndex.................................................................................................................209\nContributorsSilviaCarliDepartmentofPhilosophy,SkidmoreCollege,SaratogaSprings,NY,USADesmondM.ClarkeEmeritus,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityCollege,RoyalIrishAcademy,Dublin6,IrelandMalcolmDavidEckelDepartmentofReligion,BostonUniversity,Boston,MA,USAAaronGarrettDepartmentofPhilosophy,BostonUniversity,Boston,MA,USAJohnGibsonDepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofLouisville,Louisville,KY,USAManfredKuehnDepartmentofPhilosophy,BostonUniversity,Boston,MA,USAAnneMoniusHarvardDivinitySchool,Cambridge,MA,USAGarySaulMorsonFrancesHooperProfessoroftheArtsandHumanities,DepartmentofSlavicLanguagesandLiteratures,NorthwesternUniversity,Evanston,IL,USAStevenNadlerDepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofWisconsin–Madison,Madison,WI,USABenRothDepartmentofPhilosophy,BostonUniversity,Boston,MA,USAMaryaSchechtmanDepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofIllinois,Chicago,Chicago,IL,USAAllenSpeightInstituteforPhilosophyandReligion,BostonUniversity,Boston,MA,USAGalenStrawsonDepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofTexasatAustin,Austin,TX,USAix\nChapter1IntroductionAllenSpeight1.1Philosophy,NarrativeandLifeWhatisnarrativeand(why)doesitmatterphilosophically?Overthelastfewyearsthisquestionhasbeentakenupinanumberofnewwaysbyawiderangeofphilosophersandtheoristsaconversationthathas,byturns,provokedreactionsbothskepticalandaffirmative.Theresulthasbeensomethingofagenerationalshiftinhownarrativeisphilosophicallyappropriated.Thirtyyearsago,thetopicofnarrativehadbeenafocusforanumberofphilo-sophicalfigures.Anunusualconstellationofworkbeginningintheearlyandmid-1980s,including,amongothers,MacIntyre(1981),Taylor(1989),Ricoeur(1984)andNussbaum(1990),representedsomethingofahighpointintheassertionofnarrativesimportanceforarangeofphilosophicalquestionsmostintensely,perhaps,thoseconcerningpersonalidentity,moralpsychologyandnormativeeth-ics,aswellastopicsinaesthetics,literarytheoryandthephilosophyofhistory.Thetoneofthemorerecentphilosophicaldiscussionofnarrativeismorecharyandrigorous,suggestingthattheconstructiveambitionoftheearlierdiscussionhasmovedintoamoreanalyticandskepticalphase.Well-knownskepticalattacksbyGStrawson(2004,2007)andLamarque(2004,2007)havechallengedleadingpremisesoftheearlierdiscussionofnarrative,withStrawson(2004)inparticulartakentounderminebothempiricalandnormativeconceptionsofthenarrativeselfthathadbeendrawnoninearlierwork.Meanwhileattemptstogiveanadequatedefinitionofnarrativehavebroughtoutinherentdifficultiesintheconcept.Narrativestructurehasbeencharacterizedbothintermsofacertaincausalrelationship,asfamouslyarguedbyCarroll(2001),A.Speight(*)InstituteforPhilosophyandReligion,BostonUniversity,745CommonwealthAvenue,Room523,Boston,MA02215,USAe-mail:casp8@bu.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht20151A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_1\n2A.SpeightandintermsofsomeformofemotionalclosureorcatharsisasVelleman(2003,2009)hasclaimed.MorerecentlyGoldie(2012)hassuggestedapost-Strawsoniannotionofnarrativeandnarrativethoughtthathingesespeciallyonthecoherenceandmeaningprovidedbythe(oftenironic)perspectiveofanarratorataparticularpointintime,andCurrie(2010),withaneyeonthedifficultiesthathaveemergedinattemptstodefinenarrative,hasproposedinsteadagradationalorspectrumapproachtocharacterizingit.Atthesametime,therehasbeenaremarkableshiftinliterarytheorythatmightalsobecalledgenerationalawayfromthe(evenlonger-ago)heydayofnarratologyandformalistcriticismtocontemporaryinterestinthepossibleconnectionsbetweennarrativeandcontemporaryresearchinthefieldsofevolutionarybiologyandpsychology(Boyd2009;Flesch2009).Thisvolumeisespeciallyconcernedwithwhatnarrativeandphilosophyhavetosayaboutlife.Oftenthisisarelationshipcouchedintermsoffamiliarbinariesorgaps,themostpressingofwhichistheonethatAlsadairMacIntyreandothershaveformulatedaroundthefamousquestionofSartrescharacterRoquentininthenovelNausea,whowasdismissiveofthewaysinwhichagentsledlivesfalsifiedbystoriesofgreatadventures:youhavetochoose:liveortell.Or,reformulatedinthewordsofLouisMink:storiesarenotlivedbuttold.Canlifebeanarrative?EvenMacIntyre,whowantstoseelifeasalreadysome-howhavinganarrativeshape,isnonethelesscarefultonoticethattheremustbeadistinctionbetweenliterarynarrativeandbiography(Storiesarelivedbeforetheyaretoldexceptinfiction;MacIntyre1981,212).ThequestionofnarrativeandlifehasbeenpursuedintermsreminiscentoftheAristoteliandistinctionbetweenzoēandbios:organiclifeandlifethathasabiographyandiscenteredonacharacter.Zahavi(2007,2008,2011)andSchechtman(thisvolume)considerthedifficultiesofselfhoodandwhetherthenarrativeabilitiesthatcharacterizeadultswithhighcognitiveabilitiesareindeedrequiredforselfhoodorwhetheramoreminimalsenseofselfrunsthrougharangeofnototherwisenarrativeagents(non-humananimals,humaninfantsandthosesufferingdementia).Thequestionofbiographicalnarrativeprovokesalsoquestionsaboutgapswithinourtemporalperspectiveonlife.How,forexample,dotheprospectiveandplanningfeaturesofournarrativepersona(withtheforkingpathsofpotentialdecisionsthatinterestGoldie2012)gotogetherwiththemoreretrospectiveviewthatnarrativecanofferfortheworkofbiographyorautobiography?Kierkegaardsfamousremarkthatlifecanonlybeunderstoodbackwardsbutmustbelivedforwardsisreflectiveofthisnarrative/lifegap.Andtherearesimilardifficultiesinconsideringthenarrativerelationbetweenwhatonedoesandwhatonemustundergoinlife.Arendtquotesastheepigraphofhernarrative-richdiscussionofActioninTheHumanConditionIsakDinesensremarkthatAllsufferingscanbeborneifyouputthemintoastoryortellastoryaboutthem(Arendt1958,175),yetshealsoprovidesherowncommentaryforthatremarkinhersketchofthelifeofDinesenthatappearedinMeninDarkTimes:thatitisacrucialmistaketotrytoliveoneslifeaccordingtosomepreconceivednarrativeplan(Arendt1968).\n1Introduction3Amidstallofthesequestionsaboutthepotentialgapsbetweenlifeandstory,lowerandhigherself,prospectiveandretrospectiveviewsofnarrative,andagencyandsuffering,anothersetofquestionsarisesconcerningtheimportancethatnarrativemayormaynothaveforphilosophicallives,especially.Allphilosophersarepre-sumedtohavebiographies,ofcourse,butthequestionofwhatimportbiographicalstudyof(orautobiographicalclaimsabout)thelivesofthosephilosophersmayholdfortheunderstandingoftheirphilosophicalwritingsisonethatisopentodispute.Consideredasasub-questionofthelargerconcernwithnarrativeandlife,oneimportantdifferenceisworthnoting:asStevenNadlerpointsoutinhisessayinthisvolume,therehavebeenovertheyearsfarmorenumerousexplorationsoftheconnectionbetweenlifeandwritingforcertainliteraryartiststhink,forexample,oftheamountofbiographicalattentiongivenVirginiaWoolfthanevenofsuchfundamentalfiguresasSpinozaandSocrates.Butsince,asNadlerpointsout,thelastfewyearshaveseenanexplosionofnewphilosophicalbiographies,especiallyintherichterritoryofearlymodernphilosophy,oneoftheaimsofthisvolumeistodrawtogetherthethoughtsofanumberofleadingpractitionersofthecraftofphilosophicalbiography.AlongwithNadlersaccountofSpinoza,wehaveincludedreflectionsbyleadingbiographersandscholarsoftheworkofDescartes,Hume,KantandFichte,amongothers.Theoriginofthecollectionliesinayear-longlectureseriesandconferencehostedbytheInstituteforPhilosophyandReligionatBostonUniversityin20092010.ThebroadtopicoftheyearasawholewasNarrativeWisdomNarrativeMeaning,andthiswastakenupinawide-rangingseriesofinterdisciplinarytalks,aswellasinafocalconferenceontheissuesconcerningphilosophicalbiographyandautobiography.1.2ScopeandAimsoftheVolumeAssuggested,thevolumesinterestintheintersectionsamongnarrative,philosophyandlifehastwoprimarypointsoffocus:onebroadlytheoretical,concernedwithphilosophicalattemptstounderstandthefunctionandplaceofnarrative;onebothpracticalandhistorical,concernedwithhowthebiographicalandautobiographicalmaymatterinourspecificassessmentsofphilosophersthoughtandwritings.PartItakesupseveralkeyphilosophicalquestionsandconcernsaboutnarrativefromhowweshouldlocateitsrelationtophilosophyinthebroadestsensetothemorespecificphilosophicalconcernsthatnarrativeoftenraisesfornotionsofselfhood,personalidentity,temporality,agencyandmoralresponsibility,amongothers.SincemanyoftheessayshereandincontemporaryaccountsofnarrativehaverespondedinonewayoranothertoStrawson(2004),webeginthevolumewitharepublicationofthisessay.Strawsonscritiquecorrectlybeginstotrytosortoutwhatisatstakeinsomeofthequitedifferentclaimsmadeonbehalfofnarrative:forexample,thedifferencebetweentheempiricalclaimthatwehappentobecreatureswhounderstandourselvesthroughstoriesandtheessentiallynormativeclaimmade,\n4A.Speightforexample,byTaylor,thatitisabasicconditionofmakingsenseofourselvesthatwegraspourlivesinanarrative.Strawsonarguesthattheboldestearlierclaimsfornarrativefailedtotakeintoaccountthesortofdistinctionhedrawsbetweentheperspectivesofnarrativistsandepisodiststheformertendingtoconstrueatemporalintegritythroughnumerouslifeeventsandthelatterinevitablyunabletoseelifeasmorethanaseriesofdisconnectedepisodes.InTheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution,MaryaSchechtmanrespondstotheskepticalqueriesthatStrawsonhasdirectedagainstnarrativebyexaminingtwoviewsoftheselfincontemporaryphilosophicalliteraturewhichshethinkscanbetracedbacktotwodifferinginterpretationsofLockesaccountoftherelationbetweenpersonsandselves.Onthefirst(ornarrativeself-constitution)view,sheargues,apersistingsubjectexistsonlybyits(essentially,evenifonlyimplicitly,narrative)appropriationofdifferentexperiencesovertime.Ontheother(minimalist)view,asarticulatedbyDanZahaviandothers,selfhoodisnotsomethingactivelyaccomplished,butrathera(pre-reflective,pre-linguistic,pre-narrative)givenofsomesort,onethatissharednotmerelybyself-consciousadulthumanbeingsbutalsobyanimals,childrenandthecognitivelyimpaired;onthisview,selfhoodinthismorerestrictedsenseisanecessaryprecursorof,butnotcoextensivewith,personhood,whichrequiresinadditionsomeformofhigher-ordercognitionorreflection.InTheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectives,Ilookattwocontemporary(affirmative)responsestoStrawsonscritiqueofnarrativeintheworkofDavidVellemanandthelatePeterGoldiewithaneyetotheconnectionbetweennarrativeandagency.IargueforthereverseofGregoryCurriesrecentclaimthatnarrativeistheproductofagency:ifweexamineagencyinsteadastheproductofnarrative,itspossibletotracethroughtheuseofnarrativeexamplesacritiqueofmanyassumptionsinwhatVellemancallsthestandardaccountofagency.Responding(likeSchechtman)toStrawsonsskepticismaboutnarrativeselvesandalsotoNussbaumsclaimsthatliteraryformmaybeinseparablefromphilo-sophicalcontent,DavidEckelconsiderstheroleofselfhoodinthecontextofthesetofnarrativeculturaltraditionswhicharguablyhavepursuedthenotionofno-selftoitsgreatestextent:thevariousformsofBuddhistnarrative.Eckelbeginswithapeculiar(andtocontemporaryears,somewhatdifficult-to-appropriate)scenefromAsvaghosasLifeoftheBuddhawhich,heargues,givesinsightintohowBuddhismsfamousmiddlewayavoidsclaimsbothofpermanenceofselfthatwouldallownochangeandannihilationoftheselfthatwouldallownoresponsibility.PickinguponatermofSteveCollins,EckelsuggeststhataBuddhistresponsetoStrawsoncanbeseeninthenotionofselflesspersons,anotionwhichhethinksrequiresanarrativeperspectivetounderstandfully:whileaBuddhistcanformulateaclaimsuchasneitherselfnorno-self,anunderstandingofthelifethatliesbehindsuchformula-tionscanbeimpossibletoglimpsewithoutanappealtonarrativeforms.InhisessayHowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist:NauseaandtheAdventuresoftheNarrativeSelf,BenRothrespondstothefamouschoicebetweenliveortellposedbySartrescharacterRoquentin.Onthebasisofthisremark,\n1Introduction5Sartreisoftentakentoholdaviewthatnarrativeisalwaysafalsificationoflife,butRothholdsthatamorecarefulandholisticreadingofNauseashowsthatRoquentinspositionisnotsoeasilyattributabletoSartrehimselfandthatinfactSartresnovel(aswellasRoquentinsownnovelisticaspirations)infactmeanthatthereisagreaterSartreanaffirmationofnarrativitythanisoftenthought.ThebeginningsofphilosophicalreflectiononnarrativelieofcourseinasetofdebatesthatgobacktoPlatoandAristotle.CentralformanylaterphilosophicalaccountsofnarrativeinparticularisAristotlesPoetics,whichisconcernedaboveallwiththeconnectionbetweenourexperienceofmimeticworks(narrativehereinthebroadestsense,includingepicaswellasdramaticforms)andtheactivityoflearning.Inheressay,AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence,SilviaCarlisuggeststhatwecanunderstandnarrativeintelligenceasamodeofknowingdifferentfrombothpracticalandtheoreticalwisdombutnonethelessconnectedtoboth:itsconcern,sheargues,iswithobjectsofthesortthatarethefocusofpracticalintelligence,butitsmodeofunderstandingthoseobjectshasimportantanalogiestotheoreticallearning.Carlithusexplores,ontheonehand,possiblelinesofaffiliationbetweenAristotlesethicsandpoetics,withfictionpresenting,asJamesRedfieldhasclaimed,anunrealworldwhichnonethelessisabouttherealworldofethicalactionsandemotions.OntheotherhandasAristotlesfamouscommentaboutpoetrybeingmorephilosophicalthanhistorysheseesimportantsimilaritiesbetweenourengagementwithpoeticworksandtheactivityofphilosophy.Acentralconcernofnarrative,fromAristotleforward,hasbeenthequestionoftemporality:howtimeisexperiencedinnarrativeandwhethernarrativeoffersastructureforconstruingtemporalexperience.InDostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike,GarySaulMorsoncontraststwowaysofviewingtimethatcanbereflectedinliterature.Onthefirst(closed)viewoftime,looseendsaretiedupinsuchawaythattheworkcomesappropriatelytoanendandnocontinuationisimaginable:suchaviewoftimemaycharacterizecertainliteraryworksbutinlife,heclaims,thereisneversuchamomentofclosure.Onthesecond(open)view,whichhefindsinDostoevsky,outcomesarenotpresentedasnecessarybutthereaderisgivenasensethatmorethanoneeventcouldhavetakenplace.InNarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination,JohnGibsontakesuptwophilo-sophicalwaysofviewingtheimagination,whichhebroadlycharacterizesasfiction-makingandculture-making:onthefirst,thepowerofimaginationhelpsus(asSartreoncesuggested)toholdtherealatadistance,tofreeoneselffromit,inawordtodenyit,whileonthesecond,wearedrawntoseetheworld,whetherabsentorpresent,assignificant.Gibsonarguesthatnarrativecanatleastsometimesbringthesetwoactivitiestogether,suggestingbywayofexampletheprovocativethoughtexperimentofwhetherParadiseLostwouldberegardedasamoreimaginativeworkifMiltonhadnotreliedinitsconstructiononcertainexistingculturalnormsintheworldofWesternChristianity(heaven,hell,sin,etc.)andinsteadcreatedamorethoroughgoingfictionalworld.Crucialtoseeingthecommonalityofthetwotasksoftheimagination,Gibsonclaims,isitsessentiallynarrativeroleinmeaning-bestowalhowliteraryartistslikeDante,ShakespeareandMiltoncangrounda\n6A.Speightwayoftakingourselvestobeandhencereorderorreorganizetheculturalspaceinwhichtheimaginationisoperative.ThequestionofnarrativeimaginationanditssurroundingcultureisalsoofparticularconcernforAnneE.Monius,whoexplorestheculturalaspectsofnarrativereceptioninSouthAsianliterature.Takinghertitle(AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths)fromafourthcenturyTamilpoeticnarrative,sheexaminestherolethatnarrativetextscanplaynotonlyinconveyingspecificethicalteachingsaboutdharma,butalsoatleastforoneclassofreaderestablishingakindofaestheticstanceorrelishmentthatcontributestoitsproperphilosophicalappropriation.InPartII,theattentionturnsfromthephilosophicalquestionofhownarrativeandlifeintersecttothemorespecificfocusontherelationbetweenphilosopherslivesandtheirwork.Theessaysinthissecondsectionareallwrittenbyprominentphilosophicalbiographersorphilosopherswhohavewrestledwithquestionsraisedbythepracticeoflife-writing.Towhatextentmustweengagethebiographiesoffamousphilosophersinordertounderstandtheirwritings?WhataretheparticularchallengesofattemptingtounderstandthelifeandwritingsofphilosophersuchasDescartes,SpinozaandHume?InDescartesBiographyasaGuidetohisMeditations,DesmondClarkearguesfortheimportanceofhistoricalandbiographicalinsightintotheoriginsofclassicalphilosophicaltextssuchastheMeditations.Specifically,Clarkeclaimsthatasuffi-cientlycarefulhistoricalperspectiveonthetextthatisnowtheMeditationsshouldofferahelpfulcorrectivetofamiliarbutmisleadinginterpretationsofDescartes,forexample,asasubstancedualist.StevenNadler,inWritingtheLivesofPhilosophers:ReflectionsonSpinozaandOthers,notestheexplosionofrecentbiographiesofphilosophers,especiallyofthoseintheearlymodernperiod,andcontraststheearlierdearthofsuchbiographieswiththehugenumberofbiographicaltreatmentsofliteraryfigures.Inhisessay,NadlerdiscussestheparticularchallengefacingabiographerofSpinoza:thelackofdocumentsthatgobeyondhisownphilosophicalwritingandthefew,philosophically-specific,lettersofhisthatareextant.Nadlerssuggestionisthatinsuchcasesthephilosophicalbiographermustresorttocapturinghissubjectinsilhouette,asitwerebyfillinginthespacearoundhimfromotherhistoricalandculturalsources.InhisessayHumesOwnHistory,AaronGarrettexploresthemotivationsthatmayliebehindHumesautobiographicalessayMyOwnLife,writtenjustmonthsbeforehisdeathin1776.GarrettcomparesHumesend-of-lifeassessmentwhatGarrettcallsanextraordinaryliterarydisappearingactwithearlierautobio-graphicalremarksandplacestheessayinthelargercontextofHumesaccountofthetaskofhistory-writingingeneral,showinghowhewrestledwiththeproblemoftheinherentinterestednessinvolvedinthejudgingofonesownlife.Finally,ManfredKuehn,inThe(Ir)relevanceofBiography:TheCaseofFichte,takesupthechallengetophilosophicalbiographythrowndownbyCollingwood,Rortyandothersthatbiographyisusefulonlyforitsgossipvalueandnotforanunderstandingofaphilosophersthought.Kuehn,awell-knownbiog-rapherofbothKantandFichte,focusesinthisessayonthecaseofthelatter,con-\n1Introduction7sideringhowFichtesbiographymayoffersomeperspectiveonhisfamousclaimthatwhatkindofphilosophysomeonechoosesdependsonthekindofpersonheis.ReferencesArendtH(1958)Thehumancondition.UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoArendtH(1968)Menindarktimes.Harcourt,Brace&World,NewYorkBakhtinM(1973)ProblemsofDostoevskysPoetics(trans:RotselRW).Ardis,AnnArborBenjaminW(1968)Illuminations.Harcourt,Brace&World,NewYorkBoydB(2009)Ontheoriginofstories:evolution,cognitionandfiction.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MACarrollN(2001)Onthenarrativeconnection.In:Carroll(ed)Beyondaesthetics:philosophicalessays.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeCarroll(2007)Narrativeclosure.PhilosStud135:115CurrieG(2010)Narrativesandnarrators.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordFleschW(2009)Comeuppance:costlysignaling,altruisticpunishmentandotherbiologicalcom-ponentsoffiction.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAGibsonJ,HuemerW,PocciL(2007)Asenseoftheworld:essaysonfiction,narrativeandknowl-edge.Routledge,NewYorkGoldieP(2012)Themessinside:narrative,emotionandthemind.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordHuttoDD(2007)Narrativeandunderstandingpersons.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeJAestheticsandArtCriticism(2009)67.1:1132LamarqueP(2004)Onnotexpectingtoomuchfromnarrative.MindLang19:393407LamarqueP(2007)Onthedistancebetweenliterarynarrativesandreal-lifenarratives.In:HuttoDD(ed)Narrativeandunderstandingpersons.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,pp117132MacIntyreA(1981)Aftervirtue:astudyinmoraltheory.UniversityofNotreDamePress,SouthBendMindandLanguage(2004)19.4:359471NussbaumM(1990)Lovesknowledge:essaysonphilosophyandliterature.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordPhilosophicalPapers(2003)32.3:235361RicoeurP(1992)OneselfasAnother(trans:BlameyK).UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoRicoeurP(1984)TimeandNarrative(trans:McLaughlinK,PellauerD).UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoSartreJP(1964)Nausea(trans:AlexanderL).NewDirections,NewYork.OriginalFrenchedition:1938SchechtmanM(1996)Theconstitutionofselves.CornellUniversityPress,IthacaStrawsonG(2004)Againstnarrativity.Ratio16:423452StrawsonG(2007)Episodicethics.In:HuttoDD(ed)Narrativeandunderstandingpersons.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeTaylorC(1989)Sourcesoftheself.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAVellemanD(2003)Narrativeexplanation.PhilosRev112:125VellemanD(2009)Howwegetalong.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeZahaviD(2007)Selfandother:thelimitsofnarrativeunderstanding.In:HuttoD(ed)Narrativeandunderstandingpersons.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,pp179201ZahaviD(2008)Subjectivityandselfhood:investigatingthefirst-personperspective.BradfordBooks,CambridgeZahaviD(2011)Unityofconsciousnessandtheproblemoftheself.In:GallagherS(ed)TheOxfordhandbookoftheself.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,pp316335\nPartINarrative,PhilosophyandLife:TheoreticalQuestionsAboutNarrative\nChapter2AgainstNarrativityGalenStrawson2.1Talkofnarrativeisintenselyfashionableinawidevarietyofdisciplinesincludingphilosophy,psychology,theology,anthropology,sociology,politicaltheory,literarystudies,religiousstudies,psychotherapy,medicine,andlaw.Thereiswidespreadagree-mentthathumanbeingstypicallyexperiencetheirlivesasanarrativeorstory,oratleastassomesortofcollectionofstories.IamgoingtocallthisthepsychologicalNarrativitythesis,usingthewordNarrativewithacapitallettertodenoteaspecificallypsycho-logicalpropertyoroutlook:ifoneisNarrativethen(asafirstapproximation)[N]oneseesorlivesorexperiencesoneslifeasanarrativeorstoryofsomesort,oratleastasacollectionofstories.AsitstandsthepsychologicalNarrativitythesisisastraightforwardlydescrip-tive,empiricalpsychologicalthesisaboutthewayordinary,normalhumanbeingsexperiencetheirlives.Thisishowweare,itsays,thisisournature.Butitisoftencoupledwithanormativethesis,whichIwillcalltheethicalNarrativitythesis,accordingtowhicharichlyNarrativeoutlookononeslifeisessentialtolivingwell,totrueorfullpersonhood.Thedescriptivethesisandthenormativethesishavefourmaincombinations.Onemay,tobegin,thinkthedescriptivethesistrueandthenormativeonefalse.OnemaythinkthatweareindeeddeeplyNarrativeinourthinkingandthatitsnotFromGalenStrawson,RealMaterialismandOtherEssays(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2008)[firstpublishedinRatio,2004].G.Strawson(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofTexasatAustin,2210Speedway,WAG316,StopC3500,Austin,TX78712,USAe-mail:gstrawson@utexas.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht201511A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_2\n12G.Strawsonagoodthing.TheprotagonistofSartresnovelLaNauséeholdssomethinglikethisview.1ItisalsoattributedtotheStoics,especiallyMarcusAurelius.Second,andcontrariwise,onemaythinkthedescriptivethesisfalseandthenormativeonetrue.OnemaygrantthatwearenotallnaturallyNarrativeinourthinkingbutinsistthatweshouldbe,andneedtobe,inordertoliveagoodlife.ThereareversionsofthisviewinPlutarch2andahostofpresent-daywritings.Third,onemaythinkboththesesaretrue:onemaythinkthatallnormalnon-pathologicalhumanbeingsarenaturallyNarrativeandalsothatNarrativityiscrucialtoagoodlife.Thisisthedominantviewintheacademytoday,followedbythesecondview.Itdoesnotentailthateverythingisasitshouldbe;itleavesplentyofroomfortheideathatmanyofuswouldprofitfrombeingmoreNarrativethanweare,andtheideathatwecangetourself-narrativeswronginonewayoranother.Finally,onemaythinkthatboththesesarefalse.Thisismyview.Ithinkthecur-rentwidespreadacceptanceofthethirdviewisregrettable.Itsjustnottruethatthereisonlyonegoodwayforhumanbeingstoexperiencetheirbeingintime.Therearedeeplynon-Narrativepeopleandtherearegoodwaystolivethataredeeplynon-Narrative.Ithinkthesecondandthirdviewshinderhumanself-understanding,closedownimportantavenuesofthought,impoverishourgraspofethicalpossibilities,needlesslyandwronglydistressthosewhodonotfittheirmodel,andarepotentiallydestructiveinpsychotherapeuticcontexts.2.2ThefirstthingIwanttoputinplaceisadistinctionbetweenonesexperienceofoneselfwhenoneisconsideringoneselfprincipallyasahumanbeingtakenasawhole,andonesexperienceofoneselfwhenoneisconsideringoneselfprincipallyasaninnermentalentityorselfofsomesortIllcallthisonesself-experience.WhenHenryJamessays,ofoneofhisearlybooks,Ithinkofthemasterpieceinquestionastheworkofquiteanotherpersonthanmyselfarichrelation,say,whosuffersmestilltoclaimashyfourthcousinship,3hehasnodoubtthatheisthesamehumanbeingastheauthorofthatbook,buthedoesnotfeelheisthesameselforpersonastheauthorofthatbook.Itisthisphenomenonofexperiencingoneselfasaselfthatconcernsmehere.Oneofthemostimportantwaysinwhichpeopletendtothinkofthemselves(quiteindependentlyofreligiousbelief)isasthingswhosepersistenceconditionsarenotobviouslyorautomaticallythesameasthepersistenceconditionsofahumanbeingconsideredasawhole.Petrarch,Proust,Parfit,andthousandsofothershavegiventhisideavividexpression.ImgoingtotakeitsviabilityforgrantedandsetupanotherdistinctionbetweenEpisodicandDiachronicself-experienceintermsofit.1Sartre1938.2Seee.g.100CE:21417(473B474B).31915:5623.\n2AgainstNarrativity132.3ThebasicformofDiachronicself-experienceisthat[D]onenaturallyfiguresoneself,consideredasaself,assomethingthatwasthereinthe(further)pastandwillbethereinthe(further)futuresomethingthathasrelativelylong-termdiachroniccontinuity,somethingthatpersistsoveralongstretchoftime,perhapsforlife.ItakeitthatmanypeoplearenaturallyDiachronic,andthatmanywhoareDiachronicarealsoNarrativeintheiroutlookonlife.IfoneisEpisodic,bycontrast,[E]onedoesnotfigureoneself,consideredasaself,assomethingthatwasthereinthe(further)pastandwillbethereinthe(further)future.Onehaslittleornosensethattheselfthatoneiswasthereinthe(further)pastandwillbethereinthefuture,althoughoneisperfectlywellawarethatonehaslong-termcontinuityconsideredasawholehumanbeing.EpisodicsarelikelytohavenoparticulartendencytoseetheirlifeinNarrativeterms.4TheEpisodicandDiachronicstylesoftemporalbeingareradicallyopposed,buttheyarenotabsoluteorexceptionless.PredominantlyEpisodicindividualsmaysometimesconnecttochargedeventsintheirpastsinsuchawaythattheyfeelthatthoseeventshappenedtothemembarrassingmemoriesareagoodexampleandanticipateeventsintheirfuturesinsuchawaythattheythinkthatthoseeventsaregoingtohappentothemthoughtsoffuturedeathcanbeagoodexample.SotoopredominantlyDiachronicindividualsmaysometimesexperienceanEpisodiclackoflinkagewithwell-rememberedpartsoftheirpast.ItmaybethatthebasicEpisodicdispositionislesscommoninhumanbeingsthanthebasicDiachronicdisposition.Isuspectthatthefundamentalsoftemporaltemperamentaregeneticallydeter-mined,andthatwehaveheretodowithadeepindividualdifferencevariabletoputitinthelanguageofexperimentalpsychology.Ifthisisrightindividualvariationintime-style,EpisodicorDiachronic,Narrativeornon-Narrative,willbefoundacrossallcultures,sothatthesamegeneralspreadwillbefoundinaso-calledrevengeculture,withitsessentiallyDiachronicemphasis,asinamorehappy-go-luckyculture.5Compatiblywiththat,onesexactpositionintheEpisodic/Diachronic/Narrative/non-Narrativestate-spacemayvarysignificantlyovertimeaccordingtowhatoneisdoingorthinkingabout,onesstateofhealth,andsoon;anditmaychangemarkedlywithincreasingage.CertainlypoormemoryhasnothingtodowithEpisodicity.InhisautobiographyJohnUpdikeamanwithapowerfulmemoryandahighlyconsistentcharactersaysofhimselfIhavethepersistentsensation,inmylifeandart,thatIamjust4TheEpisodic/DiachronicdistinctionisnotthesamethingastheNarrative/non-Narrativedistinc-tion,aswillemerge;buttherearemarkedcorrelationsbetweenthem.5Althoughaculturecouldintheoryexertsignificantselectivepressureonapsychologicaltrait.FordescriptionsofrevengeculturesseeBlumenfeld2003.\n14G.Strawsonbeginning.6Ihavethesamesensation,andIthinkUpdikeaccuratelydescribeshowthingsareformanypeoplewhenitcomestotheirexperienceofbeingintimeand,inparticular,theirsenseofthemselvesasselves.Butheshowsbyhisownmemori-ouscasethatthisexperienceofalwaysbeginninghasnothingessentiallytodowithhavingapoorautobiographicalmemory,letaloneonethatalmostneverimpingesspontaneouslyononescurrentlife.7Inonerespect,Ithinkthatthesenseofbeingalwaysjustbeginningisnothingmorethananaccuratereflectionorsurfacinginconsciousnessoftheactualnatureofallconsciousbeingintime,atleastinthehumancase.Ithinkitmayalsobeanever-presentfeatureofordinaryeverydayexperiencethatisaccessibletoeveryonebutrarelyattendedto.8Butthisviewmaysimplyreflectmyownexperience.Andifthereisanyrespectinwhichtheexperienceofbeingalwaysjustbeginningisuni-versal,thenthis,atleast,cannotbepartofwhatdistinguishesEpisodicsfromDiachronics.ItmaybesaidthatthesenseofperpetualbeginningissimplymoresalientorvividforEpisodics;butitneednotbe.AnEpisodicconsideringthecharacterofherpresentexperiencemayfeelthatconsciousnessisaflowingstream,andhavenoparticularpositiveexperienceofperpetualrebeginning,whilelackinganysignifi-cantsensethatshewasthereinthe(further)pastandwillbethereinthefuture.ADiachronicmayexperienceconsciousnessassomethingthatisalwaysre-engag-ingoralwayssettingoutwithoutfeelingthatthisundercutshissensethathewasthereinthepastandwillbethereinthe(further)future.Episodicsmaywellhaveageneraltendencytoexperiencethingsmoreinonewaythantheother,andsotooDiachronics,butthereareperhapsnonecessarylinkagesbetweentheDiachronicandEpisodicdispositionsandthesesortsofphenomenologicalparticularities.Thekeydefiningdifferenceissimplyasstated:itisthedifferencebetweenthosewhodoandthosewhodonotnaturallyfigureorexperiencethemselves,consideredasselvesorsubjects,asthingsthatwerethereinthe(further)pastandwillbethereinthe(further)future.9DiachronicsandEpisodicsarelikelytomisunderstandoneanotherbadly.Diachronicsmayfeelthatthereissomethingchilling,empty,anddeficientabouttheEpisodiclife.Theymayfearit,althoughitisnolessfulloremotionallyarticulatedthantheDiachroniclife,nolessthoughtfulorsensitive,nolessopentofriendship,love,andloyalty.Certainlythetwoformsoflifediffersignificantlyintheirethical61989:239.SeealsotheremarkablePortuguesepoetFernandoPessoa(18881935)anextremeEpisodic:IalwaysfeelasifIvejustbeenborn/Intoanendlesslynewworld(1914:48).7Thesenseofperpetualbeginningisnotatallasenseofperpetualinchoateness.Thatwhichisalwayslaunchingoutmaybewellorstronglyformedandmaybefelttobe.UpdikealsotalksinaNarrativefashionofourreligiouspersistence,againstallthepowerfulpost-Copernican,post-Darwinianevidencethatweareinsignificantaccidentswithinavastuncausedchurning,infeelingthatourlifeisastory,withapatternandamoralandaninevitability(1989:216);andalthoughthishasnoresonanceforsome,itfulfilsapowerfulpsychologicalneedinmanyandiscommon.8IhopetodiscussthisinLifeinTime.Forasketch,seeStrawson1997:§9.9Asnoted,thisdifferencetendstorunalongsidethedifferencebetweenNarrativesandnon-Narratives,butiscertainlynotcoextensivewithit.\n2AgainstNarrativity15andemotionalform.ButitwouldbeagreatmistaketothinkthattheEpisodiclifeisboundtobelessvitalorinsomewaylessengaged,orlesshumane,orlesshumanlyfulfilled.IfHeideggeriansthinkthatEpisodicsarenecessarilyinauthen-ticintheirexperienceofbeingintime,somuchtheworsefortheirnotionofauthenticity.10IfEpisodicsaremovedtorespondbycastingaspersionsontheDiachroniclifefindingitsomehowmaceratedorclogged,say,orexcessivelyself-concerned,inauthenticallysecond-ordertheytoowillbemistakeniftheythinkitanessentiallyinferiorformofhumanlife.ThereisonesenseinwhichEpisodicsarebydefinitionmorelocatedinthepres-entthanDiachronics,sofarastheirself-experienceisconcerned.Butitdoesnotfollow,andisnottrue,thatDiachronicsarelesspresentinthepresentmomentthanEpisodics,anymorethanitfollows,oristrue,thatthepresentissomehowlessinformedbyorresponsibletothepastintheEpisodiclifethanitisintheDiachroniclife.Whatistrueisthattheinformingandtheresponsivenesshavedifferentcharac-teristicsanddifferentexperientialconsequencesinthetwocases.Facedwithscepti-calDiachronics,whoinsistthatEpisodicsare(essentially)dysfunctionalinthewaytheyrelatetotheirownpast,Episodicswillreplythatthepastcanbepresentoraliveinthepresentwithoutbeingpresentoraliveasthepast.Thepastcanbealivearguablymoregenuinelyaliveinthepresentsimplyinsofarasithashelpedtoshapethewayoneisinthepresent,justasmusiciansplayingcanincorporateandbodyforththeirpastpracticewithoutbeingmediatedbyanyexplicitmemoryofit.Whatgoesformusicaldevelopmentgoesequallyforethicaldevelopment,andRilkesremarksonpoetryandmemory,whichhaveanaturalapplicationtotheethi-calcase,suggestonewayinwhichtheEpisodicattitudetothepastmayhaveanadvantageovertheDiachronic:Forthesakeofasinglepoem,hewrites,youmusthavemanymemories.Andyetitisnotenoughtohavememories....Forthememoriesthemselvesarenotimportant.Theygiverisetoagoodpoemonlywhentheyhavechangedintoourveryblood,intoglanceandgesture,andarenameless,nolongertobedistinguishedfromourselves.11AmongthosewhosewritingsshowthemtobemarkedlyEpisodicIproposeMicheldeMontaigne,theEarlofShaftesbury,LaurenceSterne,Coleridge,Stendhal,Hazlitt,FordMadoxFord,VirginiaWoolf,Jorge-LuisBorges,FernandoPessoa,IrisMurdoch(astronglyEpisodicpersonwhoisanaturalstoryteller),FreddieAyer,BobDylan.Proustisanothercandidate,forallhisremembrance(whichmaybeinspiredbyhisEpisodicity);alsoEmilyDickinson.Diachronicitystandsoutlessclearly,becauseitisItakeitthenorm(theunmarkedposition),butonemaybeginwithPlato,StAugustine,Heidegger,Wordsworth,Dostoievski,GrahamGreene,EvelynWaugh,andallthechampionsofNarrativityinthecurrentethico-psychologicaldebate.Ifinditeasytoclassifymyfriends,manyofwhomareintenselyDiachronic,unlikemyparents,whoareontheEpisodicside.1210Cf.e.g.Heidegger1927.111910:91.12InanearlierpublishedversionofthispaperIclassifiedJosephConradasNarrative,andthiswascogentlyquestionedbyJohnAttridgeintheLetterscolumnoftheTimesLiterarySupplement\n16G.Strawson2.4HowdoEpisodicityandDiachronicityrelatetoNarrativity?SupposethatbeingDiachronicisatleastnecessaryforbeingNarrative.SinceitstruebydefinitionthatifyoureDiachronicyourenotEpisodicandconversely,itfollowsthatifyoureEpisodicyourenotNarrative.ButIthinkthatthestronglyEpisodiclifeisonenor-mal,non-pathologicalformoflifeforhumanbeings,andindeedonegoodformoflifeforhumanbeings,onewaytoflourish.SoifDiachronicityisnecessaryforNarrativity(seeSect.2.8below)thenIrejectboththepsychologicalNarrativitythesisandthenormative,ethicalNarrativitythesis.IneedtosaymoreabouttheEpisodiclife,andsinceIfindmyselftoberelativelyEpisodic,Illusemyselfasanexample.Ihaveapast,likeanyhumanbeing,andIknowperfectlywellthatIhaveapast.Ihavearespectableamountoffactualknowl-edgeaboutit,andIalsoremembersomeofmypastexperiencesfromtheinside,asphilosopherssay.AndyetIhaveabsolutelynosenseofmylifeasanarrativewithform,orindeedasanarrativewithoutform.Absolutelynone.NordoIhaveanygreatorspecialinterestinmypast.NordoIhaveagreatdealofconcernformyfuture.Thatsonewaytoputittospeakintermsoflimitedinterest.Anotherwayistosaythatitseemscleartome,whenIamexperiencingorapprehendingmyselfasaself,thattheremoterpastorfutureinquestionisnotmypastorfuture,althoughitiscertainlythepastorfutureofGSthehumanbeing.Thisismoredramatic,butIthinkitisequallycorrect,whenIamfiguringmyselfasaself.IhavenosignificantsensethatItheInowconsideringthisquestionwasthereinthefurtherpast.Anditseemscleartomethatthisisnotafailureoffeeling.Itis,rather,aregistrationofafactaboutwhatIamaboutwhatthethingthatiscurrentlyconsideringthisproblemis.IwilluseI∗torepresentthatwhichInowexperiencemyselftobewhenImapprehendingmyselfspecificallyasaninnermentalpresenceorself.I∗comeswithalargefamilyofcognateformsme∗,my∗,you∗oneself∗,themselves∗,andsoon.Themetaphysicalpresumptionbuiltintothesetermsisthattheysucceedinmakinggenuinereferencetoaninnermentalsomethingthatisreasonablycalledaself.Butitdoesntmatterwhetherornotthepresumptioniscorrect.13(10December2004).InhispersonalremembranceofConrad,FordMadoxFordobservesthatConradhadverystronglytheideaoftheCareer.Acareerwasforhimsomethingalittlesacred:anycareer....Aframeofmind,aconceptionoflife,accordingtowhichamandidnottakestockoftheresultsofhisactionsuponhimself,asitwereatlongrange,wassomethingthathehadnevercontemplated(1924:1305).Itseems,though,thatthiswasaneffortthatConradmade,some-thingthatdidnotflowfromanynaturalNarrativity,somethinglearnt,liketheneatnessofsailors,towhichFordcomparesit.AttridgenotesConradsyouthfulindifferencetotheoverallplotofhisexistence,andquotesConradsjudgementofhisyouthfulselfasnothavinganynotionoflifeasanenterprisethatcouldbemismanaged.13ThetermI*anditscognatescanfunctioninphenomenologicalcontextstoconveythecontentofaformofexperiencethatincorporatesthepresumptionwhetherornotthepresumptionisactuallycorrect.Illomitthe*whenitsnotnecessary.\n2AgainstNarrativity17So,itscleartomethateventsinmyremoterpastdidnthappentome∗.Butwhatdoesthisamountto?ItcertainlydoesntmeanthatIdonthaveanyautobiographi-calmemoriesofthesepastexperiences.Ido.Nordoesitmeanthatmyautobio-graphicalmemoriesdonthavewhatphilosopherscallafrom-the-insidecharacter.Someofthemdo.AndtheyarecertainlytheexperiencesofthehumanbeingthatIam.Itdoesnot,however,followfromthisthatIexperiencethemashavinghap-penedtome∗,orindeedthattheydidhappentome∗.Theycertainlydonotpresentasthingsthathappenedtome∗,andIthinkImstrictly,literallycorrectinthinkingthattheydidnothappentome∗.Thatcantberight.Ifoneofmyrememberedexperienceshasafrom-the-insidecharacteritmustbydefinitionbeexperiencedassomethingthathappenedtome∗.Thismayseemplausibleatfirst,butitsamistake:thefrom-the-insidecharacterofamemorycandetachcompletelyfromanysensethatoneisthesubjectoftherememberedexperience.Mymemoryoffallingoutofaboathasanessentiallyfrom-the-insidecharacter,visually(thewaterrushinguptomeetme),kinaestheti-cally,proprioceptively,andsoon.14Itcertainlydoesnotfollowthatitcarriesanyfeelingorbeliefthatwhatisrememberedhappenedtome∗,tothatwhichInowapprehendmyselftobewhenIamapprehendingmyselfspecificallyasaself.Thisdoesntfollowevenwhenemotionfiguresinthefrom-the-insidecharacteroftheautobiographicalmemory.Theinferencefrom(1)Thememoryhasafrom-the-insidecharacterinemotionalrespectsto(2)Thememoryisexperiencedassomethingthathappenedtome∗issimplynotvalid,althoughformanypeople(1)and(2)areoftenorusuallytruetogether.Formethisisaplainfactofexperience.ImwellawarethatmypastismineinsofarasIamahumanbeing,andIfullyacceptthattheresasenseinwhichithasspecialrelevancetome∗now,includingspecialemotionalandmoralrelevance.AtthesametimeIhavenosensethatI∗wasthereinthepast,andthinkitobviousthatI∗wasnotthere,asamatterofmetaphysicalfact.Asformypracticalconcernformyfuture,whichIbelievetobewithinthenormalhumanrange(lowend),itisbiologicallyviscerallygroundedandautonomousinsuchawaythatIcanexpe-rienceitassomethingimmediatelyfelteventhoughIhavenosignificantsensethatI∗willbethereinthefuture.2.5Somuch,briefly,fortheEpisodiclife.WhatabouttheNarrativelife?Andwhatmightitmeantosaythathumanlifeisnarrativeinnature?AndmustyoubeDiachronictobeNarrative?Therearemanyquestions.14Itdoesnothaveanysortoffrom-the-outsidecharacter(thatwouldbeabitlikemyseeingafilmofmyselffallingtakenbyathirdparty).\n18G.StrawsonOneclearstatementofthepsychologicalNarrativitythesisisgivenbyRoquentininSartresnovelLaNausée:amanisalwaysatellerofstories,helivessurroundedbyhisownstoriesandthoseofotherpeople,heseeseverythingthathappenstohimintermsofthesestoriesandhetriestolivehislifeasifhewererecountingit.15Sartreseesthenarrative,story-tellingimpulseasadefect,regrettable.HeacceptsthepsychologicalNarrativitythesiswhilerejectingtheethicalNarrativitythesis.HethinkshumanNarrativityisessentiallyamatterofbadfaith,ofradical(andtypi-callyirremediable)inauthenticity,ratherthanassomethingessentialforauthenticity.Thepro-NarrativemajoritymayconcedetoSartrethatNarrativitycangowrongwhileinsistingthatitsnotallbadandthatitisnecessaryforagoodlife.ImwithSartreontheethicalissue,butIwantnowtoconsidersomestatementsofthepsy-chologicalNarrativitythesis.ItisasIvesaidwidelybelieved.OliverSacks,forexample,holdsthateachofusconstructsandlivesanarrative.Hesaysthatthisnarrativeisus,ouridenti-ties.ThedistinguishedpsychologistJerryBrunerwritessimilarlyofthestorieswetellaboutourlives.Heclaimsthatselfisaperpetuallyrewrittenstory,andthatintheend,webecometheautobiographicalnarrativesbywhichwetellaboutourlives.16DanDennettclaimsthatweareallvirtuosonovelists,whofindourselvesengagedinallsortsofbehaviour,andwealwaystrytoputthebestfacesonitwecan.Wetrytomakeallofourmaterialcohereintoasinglegoodstory.Andthatstoryisourautobiography.Thechieffictionalcharacteratthecentreofthatautobiographyisonesself.17MaryaSchechtmangoesfurther,twistingtheethicalandthepsychologicalNarrativitythesestightlytogetherinavaluablyforthrightmanner.Aperson,shesays,createshisidentity[only]byforminganautobiographicalnarrativeastoryofhislife.Onemustbeinpossessionofafullandexplicitnarrative[ofoneslife]todevelopfullyasaperson.18CharlesTaylorpresentsitthisway:abasicconditionofmakingsenseofour-selves,hesays,isthatwegraspourlivesinanarrativeandhaveanunderstandingofourlivesasanunfoldingstory.Thisisnot,hethinks,anoptionalextra;ourlivesexistinaspaceofquestions,whichonlyacoherentnarrativecananswer.19HeisbackedupbyClaireinDougCopelandsnovelGenerationX:Clairebreaksthesilencebysayingthatitsnothealthytolivelifeasasuccessionofiso-latedlittlecoolmoments.Eitherourlivesbecomestories,ortheresnowaytoget151938:64.Sartreisasmuchconcernedwithrelativelyshort-termpassagesoflifeaswithlifeasawhole.16Sacks1985:110;Bruner1987:11,15,12;1994:53.17Dennett(1988),TimesLiterarySupplement,1622September.18Schechtman1996:93,119.191989:47,52.\n2AgainstNarrativity19throughthem;butTaylorbuildsalotmoreethicalweightintowhatsinvolvedingettingthroughlife.Itisbecausewecannotbutorientourselvestothegood,andhencedetermineourplacerelativetoitandhencedeterminethedirectionofourlives,[that]wemustinescapablyunderstandourlivesinnarrativeform,asaquest[and]mustseeourlivesinstory.20This,hesays,isaninescapablestructuralrequirementofhumanagency,21andPaulRicoeurappearstoconcur:How,indeed,couldasubjectofactiongiveanethicalcharactertohisorherownlifetakenasawholeifthislifewerenotgatheredtogetherinsomeway,andhowcouldthisoccurifnot,precisely,intheformofanarrative?22Heremymainpuzzlementisaboutwhatitmightbetogiveanethicalcharacterto[ones]ownlifetakenasawholeinsomeexplicitway,andaboutwhyonearth,inthemiddleofthebeautyofbeing,itshouldbethoughttobeimportanttodothis.Ithinkthatthosewhothinkinthiswayaremotivatedbyasenseoftheirownimpor-tanceorsignificancethatisabsentinotherhumanbeings.Manyofthem,connect-edly,havereligiouscommitments.Theyarewrappedupinformsofreligiousbeliefthatarelikealmostallreligiousbeliefreallyallaboutself.23AlasdairMacIntyreisperhapsthefoundingfigureinthemodernNarrativitycamp,andhisviewissimilartoTaylors.Theunityofanindividuallife,hesays,istheunityofanarrativeembodiedinasinglelife.ToaskWhatisthegoodforme?istoaskhowbestImightliveoutthatunityandbringittocompletionTheunityofahumanlife,hecontinues,istheunityofanarrativequest[and]theonlycriteriaforsuccessorfailureinahumanlifeasawholearethecriteriaforsuccessorfailureinanarratedorto-be-narratedquest.Aquestforwhat?aquestforthegoodthegoodlifeformanisthelifespentinseekingforthegoodlifeforman.24MacIntyresclaimseemsatfirstnon-psychological:agoodlifeisonethathasnarrativeunity.Butagoodlifeisonespentseekingthegoodlife,andthereisastrongsuggestionthatseekingthegoodliferequirestakingupaNarrativeperspec-tive;inwhichcasenarrativeunityrequiresNarrativity.Isanyofthistrue?Idontthinkso.ItseemstomethatMacIntyre,TaylorandallothersupportersoftheethicalNarrativitythesisarereallyjusttalkingaboutthem-selves.Itmaybethatwhattheyaresayingistrueforthem,bothpsychologicallyandethically.Thismaybethebestethicalprojectthatpeoplelikethemselvescanhope201989:512.Irejectthebecauseandthesecondhence.211989:52.221990:158.23Excessiveself-concernismuchmorelikelytobethecauseofreligiousbeliefinsomeonewhohascometoreligionthaninsomeonewhohasbeenbornintoit.Thatdoesnotchangethefactthatreligiousbeliefingeneral,ostensiblyself-denying,isoneofthefundamentalvehiclesofhumannarcissism.241981:2034.\n20G.Strawsontoengagein.25Butevenifitistrueforthemitisnottrueforothertypesofethicalpersonality,andmanyarelikelytobethrownrightofftheirowntruthbybeingledtobelievethatNarrativityisnecessaryforagoodlife.Myownconvictionisthatthebestlivesalmostneverinvolvethiskindofself-telling,andthatwehavehereyetanotherdeepdividerofthehumanrace.WhenaNarrativelikeJohnCampbellclaimsthatidentity[throughtime]iscen-traltowhatwecareaboutinourlives:onethingIcareaboutiswhatIhavemadeofmylife26ImasbewilderedasGoronwyReeswhenhewritesForaslongasIcanrememberithasalwayssurprisedandslightlybewilderedmethatotherpeopleshouldtakeitsomuchforgrantedthattheyeachpossesswhatisusuallycalledacharacter;thatistosay,apersonality[orpersonality-possessingself]withitsowncontinu-oushistory.Ihaveneverbeenabletofindanythingofthatsortinmyself.HowmuchIadmirethosewriterswhoareactuallyabletorecordthegrowthofwhattheycalltheirpersonality,describetheconditionswhichdetermineditsbirth,lovinglytracethecurveofitsdevelopment.Formyselfitwouldbequiteimpossibletotellsuchastory,becauseatnotimeinmylifehaveIhadthatenviablesensationofconstitutingacontinuouspersonal-ity.Asachildthisdidnotworryme,andifindeedIhadknownatthattimeofDerMannohneEigenschaften[TheManwithoutQualities,anovelbyRobertMusil],themanwithoutqualities,IwouldhavegreetedhimasmybloodbrotherandrejoicedbecauseIwasnotaloneintheworld;asitwas,IwascontentwithaprivatefantasyofmyowninwhichIfiguredasMr.Nobody.27UnlikeRees,Ihaveaperfectlygoodgraspofmyselfashavingacertainperson-ality,butImcompletelyuninterestedintheanswertothequestionWhathasGSmadeofhislife?,orWhathaveImadeofmylife?.Imlivingit,andthissortofthinkingaboutitisnopartofit.ThisdoesnotmeanthatIaminanywayirrespon-sible.ItisjustthatwhatIcareabout,insofarasIcareaboutmyselfandmylife,ishowIamnow.ThewayIamnowisprofoundlyshapedbymypast,butitisonlythepresentshapingconsequencesofthepastthatmatter,notthepastassuch.IagreewiththeEarlofShaftesbury:Themetaphysiciansaffirmthatifmemorybetakenaway,theselfislost.[But]whatmat-terformemory?WhathaveItodowiththatpart?If,whilstIam,IamasIshouldbe,whatdoIcaremore?Andthusletmeloseselfeveryhour,andbetwentysuccessiveselfs,ornewselfs,tisallonetome:so[longas]Ilosenotmyopinion[i.e.myoveralloutlook,mycharacter,mymoralidentity].IfIcarrythatwithmetisI;alliswell.Thenow;thenow.Mindthis:inthisisall.28Ithink,then,thattheethicalNarrativitythesisisfalse,andthatthepsychologicalNarrativitythesisisalsofalseinanynon-trivialversion.WhatdoImeanby25Oneproblemwithit,anditisadeepproblem,isthatoneisalmostcertaintogetonesstorywrong,insomemoreorlesssentimentalwayunless,perhaps,onehasthehelpofatrulygiftedtherapist.261994:190.271960:910.Pessoaalsoexperienceshimselfasnotreallyhavingorbeingaspecificselfatall,andthisfeature,valuedinmanyreligioustraditions,maywellbepositivelycorrelatedwithEpisodicitywhenitoccursnaturally.Pessoa,however,experienceshimselfasmultiplypersonali-tied,andthisisquiteanothermatter.28Shaftesbury16981712:1367;Epictetusisanimportantinfluence.\n2AgainstNarrativity21non-trivial?Well,ifsomeonesays,assomedo,thatmakingcoffeeisanarrativethatinvolvesNarrativity,becauseyouhavetothinkahead,dothingsintherightorder,andsoon,andthateverydaylifeinvolvesmanysuchnarratives,thenItakeittheclaimistrivial.29Istheresomeburdenonmetoexplainthepopularityofthetwotheses,giventhatIthinkthattheyrefalse?Hardly.Theorizinghumanbeingstendtofavourfalseviewsinmattersofthiskind.Ido,though,thinkthatintellectualfashionispartoftheexplanation.IalsosuspectthatthosewhoaredrawntowriteonthesubjectofnarrativitytendtohavestronglyDiachronicandNarrativeoutlooksorpersonali-ties,andgeneralizefromtheirowncasewiththatspecial,fabulouslymisplacedconfidencethatpeoplefeelwhen,consideringelementsoftheirownexperiencethatareexistentiallyfundamentalforthem,theytakeitthattheymustalsobefundamen-talforeveryoneelse.302.6Allveryinteresting,butwhatexactlyis(upper-case)Narrativity?Youstillhaventaddressedthequestiondirectly,andyourerunningoutofspace.PerhapsthefirstthingtosayisthatbeingDiachronicdoesntalreadyentailbeingNarrative.TheremustbesomethingmoretoexperiencingoneslifeasanarrativethansimplybeingDiachronic.ForonecanbeDiachronic,naturallyexperiencingoneself(∗)assomethingexistinginthepastandfuture,withoutanyparticularsenseofoneslifeasconstitutinganarrative.Fine,butyouhaventtoldmewhata(lower-case)narrativeiseither.Well,theparadigmofanarrativeisaconventionalstorytoldinwords.Itakethetermtoattributeattheveryleastacertainsortofdevelopmentalandhencetem-poralunityorcoherencetothethingstowhichitisstandardlyappliedlives,partsoflives,piecesofwriting.Soitdoesntapplytorandomorradicallyunconnectedsequencesofeventsevenwhentheyaresequentiallyandindeedcontiguouslytem-porallyordered,ortopurelypicaresqueorrandomlycut-uppiecesofwriting.31Thisdoesnttakeusveryfar,becausewestillneedtoknowwhatmakesdevel-opmentalunityorcoherenceinalifespecificallynarrativeinnature.Afterall,theresaclearsenseinwhicheveryhumanlifeisadevelopmentalunityahistorical-characteraldevelopmentalunityaswellasabiologicalonejustinbeingthelifeofasinglehumanbeing.Puttingasidecasesofextremeinsanity,29TaylorisexplicitthatitiswhenIamnotdealingwithsuchtrivialquestionsaswhereIshallgointhenextfiveminutesbutwiththeissueofmyplacerelativetothegood,thatmakingsenseofmypresentactionrequiresanarrativeunderstandingofmylife(1989:48).30Ithinkthismaybethegreatestsinglesourceofunhappinessinhumanintercourse.31Thereare,however,manyinterestingcomplications.SeeLifeinTime.\n22G.Strawsonanyhumanlife,evenahighlydisorderedone,canbethesubjectofanoutstandingbiographythatpossessesallthenarrative-unity-relatedvirtuesofthatliteraryform.Butifthissortofdevelopmentalunityissufficientfornarrativestructurethenitstriviallytruethatallhumanliveshavenarrativestructure.Actually,evendogsandhorsescanbethesubjectofexcellentbiographies.True.Andthis,Ithink,iswhythedistinctiveclaimofthedefendersofthepsycho-logicalNarrativitythesisisthatforalifetobeanarrativeintherequiredsenseitmustbelivedNarratively.Thepersonwhoselifeitismustseeorfeelitasanarra-tive,construeitasanarrative,liveitasanarrative.Onecouldputthisroughlybysayingthatlower-caseorobjectivenarrativityrequiresupper-caseorsubjectiveNarrativity.32Nowyoureusingthenotionofupper-casepsychologicalNarrativitytocharac-terizethenotionoflower-caseobjectivenarrativity,andIstilldonthaveaclearsenseofwhatupper-caseNarrativityis.Well,itsnoteasy,butperhapsonecanstartfromtheideaofaconstructioninthesenseofaconstrual.TheNarrativeoutlookclearlyinvolvesputtingsomesortofconstructionaunifyingorform-findingconstructionontheeventsofoneslife,orpartsofoneslife.Idontthinkthisconstructionneedinvolveanyclearlyinten-tionalactivity,noranydeparturefromoradditiontothefacts.ButtheNarrativeattitudemust(aswehavealreadyagreed)amounttosomethingmorethanadisposi-tiontograsponeslifeasaunitysimplyinsofarasitisthelifeofabiologicallysinglehumanbeing.Norcanitconsistjustintheabilitytogiveasequentialrecordoftheactualcourseofoneslifetheactualhistoryofoneslifeevenifoneslifedoesinfactexemplifyaclassicalpatternofnarrativedevelopmentindependentlyofanyconstructionorinterpretation.Onemustinadditionengagetorepeatinsomesortofconstrualofoneslife.Onemusthavesomesortofrelativelylarge-scalecoherence-seeking,unity-seeking,pattern-seeking,ormostgenerally[F]form-findingtendencywhenitcomestoonesapprehensionofoneslife,orrelativelylarge-scalepartsofoneslife.33ButthisdoesntevendistinguishNarrativityfromDiachronicity,fortobeDiachronicisalreadytoputacertainconstructionononeslifeonthelifeofthehumanbeingthatoneis:itistoapprehendthatlifethroughthelife-unifyingsensethatone(∗)wasthereinthepastandwillbethereinthefuture.AndyetyousaybeingDiachronicisnotenoughforbeingNarrative.32MacIntyredoesnotinthepassagesIhavequotedexplicitlysaythatthenarrativityofaliferequiresNarrativity.InAfterVirtueheisparticularlyconcernedwiththeideathattothinkofahumanlifeasanarrativeunityistothinkinawayalientothedominantindividualistandbureau-craticmodesofmodernculture(1981:211),andthisremarkwasprincipallyacriticismanexcellentoneofthesocialsciencesofthetime.33FromnowonIwillomitthequalificationaboutpartsofoneslifeandtakeitasread.\n2AgainstNarrativity23ImpreparedtoallowthattobeDiachronicisalreadytoputacertainconstructionononeslifeinthesenseyouspecify,butitsaveryweaksense.OnecanbeDiachronicwithoutactivelyconceivingofoneslife,consciouslyorunconsciously,assomesortofethical-historical-characterologicaldevelopmentalunity,orintermsofastory,aBildungorquest.OnecanbeDiachronicwithoutonessenseofwhoorwhatoneishavinganysignificantsortofnarrativestructure.AndonecanbeDiachronicwithoutonesapprehensionofoneselfassomethingthatpersistsintimehavinganygreatimportanceforone.34Youvealreadysaidthat,andthequestionremainsunanswered:whatsortofconstrualisrequiredforNarrativity?WhendoesonecrossthelinefrommereDiachronicitytoNarrativity?Thisisstillluminouslyunclear.Iagreethattheproposalthatform-findingisanecessaryconditionofNarrativityisveryunspecific,butitslackofspecificitymaybepartofitsvalue,anditseemsclearthatDiachronicity(D)andform-finding(F)areindependentofeachother.Inprac-tice,nodoubt,theyoftencometogether,butonecanimagine[−D+F]anEpisodicpersoninwhomaform-findingtendencyisstimulatedpreciselybylackofaDiachronicoutlook,and,conversely,[+D−F]aDiachronicpersonwholives,byforceofcircumstance,anintenselypicaresqueanddisjointedlife,whilehavingabsolutelynotendencytoseekunityornarrative-developmentalpatterninit.OtherDiachronicsinsimilarcircumstancesmaymovefrom[+D−F]to[+D+F],acquir-ingaform-findingtendencypreciselybecausetheybecomedistressedbytheonedamnedthingafteranother35characteroftheirlives.Thegreatandradicallynon-NarrativeStendhalmightbejudgedtobeanexampleofthis,inthelightofallhischaoticautobiographicalprojects,althoughIwouldbemoreinclinedtoclassifyhimas[−D+F].36Eitherway,thefactremainsthatonecanbeDiachronicwhilebeingveryunreflectiveaboutoneself.Onecanbeinclinedtothink,ofanyeventinonespastofwhichoneisreminded,thatithappenedtooneself∗,withoutpositivelygraspingoneslifeasaunityinanyfurthersayspecificallynarrativesense.Ithinkthatthenotionofform-findingcapturessomethingthatisessentialtobeingNarrativeandthatgoesessentiallybeyondbeingDiachronic,andoneviewmightbethatform-findingisnotonlynecessaryforNarrativity,butalsominimallysufficient.Againstthat,itmaybesaidthatifoneisgenuinelyNarrativeonemustalso(andofcourse)havesomesortofdistinctive[S]story-tellingtendencywhenitcomestoonesapprehensionofoneslifewherestory-tellingisunder-stoodinsuchawaythatitdoesnotimplyanytendencytofabrication,consciousor34Discern,apprehend,find,detectallhavenon-factivereadings.35Hubbard1909:32.36IjudgeStendhaltobestronglyEpisodicbutsubjecttoDiachronicflashes.JackKerouacisIthinkaclearcaseofanEpisodiclookingforlargerform.TherearealsoclearelementsofthisinMalcolmLowry.LaurenceSternemakescomedyoutofEpisodicity.JerryFodorcitesAnthonyPowell,whomIhavenotread,asafineexampleofanEpisodicaspiringtoNarrativity.\n24G.Strawsonotherwise,althoughitdoesnotexcludeiteither.Onthisview,onemustbedisposedtoapprehendorthinkofoneselfandoneslifeasfittingtheformofsomerecognizednarrativegenre.Story-tellingisaspeciesofform-finding,andthebasicmodelforit,perhaps,isthewayinwhichgiftedandimpartialjournalistsorhistoriansreportasequenceofevents.Obviouslytheyselectamongthefacts,buttheydonot,wesuppose,distortorfalsifythem,andtheydomorethanmerelylisttheminthecorrecttemporalorder,fortheyalsoplacetheminaconnectedaccount.Initsnon-falsifyingmodestory-tellinginvolvestheabilitytodetectnotinventdevelopmentalcoherenciesinthemanifoldofoneslife.ItisonewayinwhichonemaybeabletoapprehendthedeeppersonalconstanciesthatdoinfactexistinthelifeofeveryhumanbeingalthoughIbelievethiscanalsobedonebyform-findingwithoutstory-telling.Sostory-tellingentailsform-finding,andstory-tellinginadditiontoform-findingissurelytriviallysufficientforNarrativity.2.7AthirdandmoretroublingsuggestionisthatifoneisNarrativeonewillalsohaveatendencytoengageunconsciouslyininvention,fictionofsomesortfalsification,confabulation,revisionismwhenitcomestoonesapprehensionofonesownlife.Iwillcallthis[R]revision.AccordingtotherevisionthesisNarrativityalwayscarrieswithitsomesortoftendencytorevision,whererevisionessentiallyinvolvesmoremerelythanchang-ingonesviewofthefactsofoneslife.(Onecanchangeonesviewofthefactsofoneslifewithoutanyfalsification,simplybycomingtoseethingsmoreclearly.)Revisioninthepresentsenseisbydefinitionnon-conscious.Itmaysometimesbeginconsciously,withdeliberateliestoldtoothers,forexample,anditmayhavesemi-consciousinstars,butitisnotgenuinerevisioninthepresentsenseunlessoruntilitsproductsarefelttobetrueinawaythatexcludesawarenessoffalsifica-tion.37Theconscious/non-consciousborderisbothmurkyandporous,butIthinkthenotionofrevisionisrobustforallthat.Theparadigmcasesareclear,andextremelycommon.Iftherevisionthesisweretrue,itwouldbebadnewsfortheethicalNarrativitythesis,whosesupporterscannotwantethicalsuccesstodependessentiallyonsomesortoffalsification.IhavenodoubtthatalmostallhumanNarrativityiscompro-misedbyrevision,butIdontthinkitmustbe.Itisinanycaseavastandcomplexphenomenon,andIwillmakejustaveryfewremarks.37Itswellknownthatfullyconsciousliescanforgettheiroriginsandcometobefullybelievedbytheirperpetrators.\n2AgainstNarrativity25Itisoftensaidthatautobiographicalmemoryisanessentiallyconstructiveandreconstructivephenomenon(inthetermsofexperimentalpsychology)ratherthanamerelyreproductiveone,andthereisaclearsenseinwhichthisistrue.38Memorydeletes,abridges,edits,reorders,italicizes.Butevenifconstructionandreconstruc-tionareuniversalinautobiographicalmemory,theyneedntinvolverevisionascurrentlydefined,fortheymaybefabrication-freestory-tellingorform-finding.Manyhaveproposedthatweareallwithoutexceptionincorrigibleself-fabulists,unreliablenarratorsofourownlives,39andsomewhoholdthisviewclaimgreaterhonestyofoutlookforthemselves,andseepride,self-blindness,andsooninthosewhodenyit.Butotherresearchmakesitprettyclearthatthisisnottrue.Itsnottrueofeveryone.Wehavehereanotherdeepdimensionofhumanpsychologicaldiffer-ence.Somepeoplearefabulistsallthewaydown.Inothers,autobiographicalmem-oryisfundamentallynon-distorting,whateverautomaticprocessesofremouldingandrecastingitmayinvariablyinvolve.40Somethinkthatrevisionisalwayscharged,asIwillsayalwaysmotivatedbyaninterconnectedcoregroupofmoralemotionsincludingpride,self-love,conceit,shame,regret,remorse,andguilt.Somegofurther,claimingwithNietzschethatwealwaysreviseinourownfavour:Ihavedonethat,saysmymemory.Icannothavedonethat,saysmypride,andremainsinexorable.Eventuallymemoryyields.41Itseems,however,thatneitheroftheseclaimsistrue.Thefirst,thatallrevisionischarged,issignificantlyimprovedbytheinclusionofthingslikemodestyorlowself-esteem,gratitudeorforgiveness,inthecoregroupofmotivatingmoodsandemotions;somepeoplearejustaslikelytorevisetotheirowndetrimentandtooth-ersadvantageastheotherwayround.Buttheclaimthatrevisionisalwayschargedremainsfalseevenso.Revisionmayoccursimplybecauseoneisanaturalform-finderbutaveryforgetfuloneandinstinctivelyseekstomakeacoherentstoryoutoflimitedmaterials.42Frustratedstory-tellersmayfallintorevisionsimplybecausetheycantfindsatisfyingformintheirlivesandwithoutbeinginanywaymotivatedbyawishtopreserveorrestoreself-respect.JohnDeansrecallofhisconversationswithNixonattheWatergatehearingsisanothermuchdiscussedcaseofunchargedrevision.Whenthemissingtapeswerefound,histestimonywasrevealedtobeimpressivelyaccurateabouttheindividualsbasicpositionsalthoughitwas38Forgooddiscussions,seee.g.Brewer1988;McCauley1988.39Cf.e.g.Bruner1987,1990,1994.Thenotionofanunreliablenarratorderivesfromliterarycriticism.InTheMindsPast(1998a)Gazzanigaseemstosupportastronglyreconstructiveviewofhumanmemory,buthelatersaysonlythatpersonalmemorytendstobeabitfictional(1998b:713).40Brewer(1988)arguesthattheevidencethatsupportsthereconstructiveviewofpersonalmem-orydoesnotseemverycompelling.SeealsoWagenaar1994;Baddeley1994:239;Swann1990.Ross(1989)arguesthatrevisionthatseemstoserveself-esteemmaybemotivatedbynoth-ingmorethanaconcernforconsistency.411886:§68.42PerhapsconfabulationinpatientswithKorsakovssyndromeisanextremeandpathologicalexampleofrevision.Seee.g.Sacks1985;Gazzaniga1998a.\n26G.Strawsoninaccuratewithrespecttoexactlywhatwassaidduringagivenconversation.Hisrecallofeventsinvolvedrevisioninadditiontoroutineforgettingandmorallyneutralreconstruction,insofarasitcontainedpositivemistakes,butthereisnoreasontothinkthatitwassignificantlycharged.43Flashbulbmemories(suchasthememoryofwhatwasonedoingwhenoneheardabouttheshootingofPresidentKennedy,orabout9/11)canbesurprisinglyinaccurateastonishinglysogivenourcertaintythatwerememberaccuratelybutonceagainthereseemsnoreasontothinkthattherevisionthattheyinvolvemustbecharged.44Evenwhenrevisionischarged,thecommonviewthatwealwaysreviseinourownfavourmustyieldtoamassofeverydayevidencethatsomepeopleareaslikelytorevisetotheirowndetrimentorsimplyforgetthegoodthingstheyhavedone.45WhenLaRochefoucauldsaysthatself-loveissubtlerthanthesubtlestmanintheworld,thereistruthinwhathesays.Andrevisingtoonesowndetrimentmaybenomoreattractivethanrevisingtoonesadvantage.ButLaRochefoucauldissome-timestooclever,orratherignorant,inhiscynicism.46IsatendencytoreviseanecessarypartofbeingNarrative?No.Inourownfrailcase,substantialNarrativitymayrarelyifeveroccurwithoutrevision,butstory-tellingissufficientforNarrativity,andonecanbestory-tellingwithoutbeingrevi-sionary.SotheethicalNarrativitythesissurvivesthethreatposedbytherevisionthesis.WhenBernardMalamudclaimsthatallbiographyisultimatelyfiction,simplyonthegroundsthatthereisnolifethatcanbecapturedwholly,asitwas,thereisnoimplicationthatitmustalsobeultimatelyuntrue.472.8Ivemadeanumberofdistinctions,butnoneofthemcutverysharply,andifoneaskshowDiachronics[D],form-finders[F],story-tellers[S],andrevisers[R]relatetoeachother,theanswer,asfarasIcansee,isthatalmostanythinggoes.Story-tellingentailsform-findingbecauseitissimplyonekindofform-finding,butIseenoothernecessaryconnectionsbetweenthefourproperties.Somethinkthatallnormalhumanbeingshaveallfouroftheseproperties.Ithinkthatsomenormalhumanbeingshavenoneofthem.SomethinkthatNarrativitynecessarilyinvolvesallfour.Ithink(asjustremarked)thatthelimitingcaseofNarrativityinvolvesnoth-ingmorethanform-findingstory-telling(itdoesnotevenrequireonetobeDiachronic).If,finally,NarrativityistakensimplyasanameforwhateverkindofreflectiveattitudetooneselfandoneslifeisrightlyconsideredvaluablethenIthink43Brewer1988:27.Cf.Neisser1981.44Seee.g.Pillemer1998:ch.2.45Formoreformalevidence,cf.e.g.Wagenaar1994,Ismemoryself-serving?.46Evenifwedidalltendtoseeourlivesinafavourablelight,itwouldnotfollowthatwewereallrevisers:somewillhaveself-favouring,self-respect-preservingjustificationsoftheiractionsalreadyinplaceatthetimeofaction,andsohavenoneedforsubsequentrevision.47Malamud1979.\n2AgainstNarrativity27thelimitingcaseofNarrativityinvolvesnothingmorethanform-finding,anddoesnotinvolveanythingdistinctivelyNarrativeatall.HowdotheauthorsIvequotedclassifyunderthisscheme?Well,Dennettissomeonewhoendorsesafullblown[+D+F+S+R]viewofwhatitistobeNarrative,andheseemstoplaceconsiderableemphasisonrevision:ourfundamentaltacticofself-protection,self-control,andself-definitionisnotspinningwebsorbuildingdams[likespidersandbeavers],buttellingstories,andmoreparticularlyconcoctingandcontrollingthestorywetellothersandourselvesaboutwhoweare.48Bruner,Ithink,concurswiththisemphasis.ItakeitthatSartreendorses[+F+S+R],andisnotparticularlyconcernedwith[D]insofarasheismainlyinterestedinshort-term,in-the-presentstory-telling.SchechtmansaccountofNarrativityis[+D+F+S±R].ItassumesthatweareallDiachronicandrequiresthatwebeform-findingandstory-tellingandexplicitlysoconstitutinganidentityrequiresthatanindividualconceiveofhislifeashavingtheformandthelogicofastorymorespecifically,thestoryofapersonslifewherestoryisunderstoodasaconventional,linearnarrative49butitisimportant,onherview,thattherebenosignificantrevision,thatonesself-narrativebeessentiallyaccurate.Itakemyselftobe[−D−F−S−R].TheclaimthatIdontrevisemuchisthemostvulnerableone,becauseitisinthenatureofthecasethatonehasnosensethatonereviseswhenonedoes.SoImaybewrong,but(ofcourse)Idontthinkso.OnthestrongformofSchechtmansview,Iamnotreallyaperson.Somesentientcreatures,shesays,weavestoriesoftheirlives,anditistheirdoingsowhichmakesthempersons;tohaveanidentityasapersonistohaveanarrativeself-concep-tiontoexperiencetheeventsinoneslifeasinterpretedthroughonessenseofonesownlifestory.Thisisinfactacommontypeofclaim,andSchechtmangoesfurther,claimingatonepointthatelementsofapersonsnarrativethatfigureonlyinhisimplicitself-narrative,andthathecannotarticulateareonlypartiallyhisattributabletohimtoalesserdegreethanthoseaspectsofthenarrativehecanarticulate.50Thisseemstometoexpressanidealofcontrolandself-awarenessinhumanlifethatismistakenandpotentiallypernicious.TheaspirationtoexplicitNarrativeself-articulationisnaturalforsomeforsome,perhaps,itmayevenbehelpfulbutinothersitishighlyunnaturalandruinous.MyguessisthatitalmostalwaysdoesmoreharmthangoodthattheNarrativetendencytolookforstoryornarrativecoherenceinoneslifeis,ingeneral,agrosshindrancetoself-understanding:toajust,general,practicallyrealsense,implicitorexplicit,ofonesnature.Itswellknownthattellingandretellingonespastleadstochanges,smoothings,enhancements,shiftsaway481991:418;myemphasis.Dennetttakesthestorytobeprimarilyaboutwhoweare,andtothatextentitseemsthatthewordaccountwoulddoaswellasstory,eventhoughitwillrefertoparticulareventsinoneslife.49Schechtman1996:96.Thisisastrongexpressionofherview,whichhasusefullyweakerforms(cf.e.g.pp.117,159).501996:117.\n28G.Strawsonfromthefacts,andrecentresearchhasshownthatthisisnotjustahumanpsychologicalfoible.Itturnsouttobeaninevitableconsequenceofthemechanicsoftheneuro-physiologicalprocessoflayingdownmemoriesthateverystudiedconsciousrecallofpasteventsbringsanalteration.51Theimplicationisplain:themoreyourecall,retell,narrateyourself,thefurtheryouarelikelytomoveawayfromaccurateself-under-standing,fromthetruthofyourbeing.Someareconstantlytellingtheirdailyexperi-encestoothersinastoryingwayandwithgreatgusto.Theyaredriftingeverfurtheroffthetruth.Othersneverdothis,andwhentheyareobligedtoconveyfactsabouttheirlivestheydoitclumsily,stumblingly,anduncomfortably,andinawaythatissomehowessentiallyandpowerfullynarrative-resistant.Thereare,amongthenon-Narratives,anti-Narratives,thoseforwhomanystoryingoftheirlifesupposesome-oneisrecountinganincidentinyourlifetoagroupoffriendsinyourpresenceseemstobemissingthepoint,missingthetruth,evenifallthefactsareright.CertainlyNarrativityisnotanecessarypartoftheexaminedlife(norisDiachronicity),anditisinanycasemostunclearthattheexaminedlife,thoughtbySocratestobeessentialtohumanexistence,isalwaysagoodthing.Peoplecandevelopanddeepeninvaluablewayswithoutanysortofexplicit,specificallyNarrativereflection,justasmusicianscanimprovebypracticesessionswithoutrecallingthosesessions.Thebusinessoflivingwellis,formany,acompletelynon-Narrativeproject.Grantedthatcertainsortsofself-understandingarenecessaryforagoodhumanlife,theyneedinvolvenothingmorethanform-finding,whichcanexistintheabsenceofNarrativity;andtheymaybeosmotic,systemic,notstagedinconsciousness.Itmaybesaidthattheacquisitionofself-understandinginpsycho-therapy,atleast,isanessentiallyNarrativeproject,anditstruethattherapystan-dardlyinvolvesidentifyingkeycausalconnectionsbetweenfeaturesofonesearlylifeandthewayoneisatpresent.ButeventhoughthethingonelearnsisoftheformItisbecauseXandYhappenedtothischildthatIamnowZ,thereneednotbeanythingdistinctivelyorevenremotelyNarrativeinonespsychologicalattitudetotheacknowledgedcausalconnections,anymorethanthereneedbewhenonedis-coversasanadultthata(physical)scarwascausedbyonesfallingoutofapram.ThisisnotaconditionofeffectivetherapyandonecertainlydoesnthavetohaveanyDiachronicsensethatthechildencounteredintherapywasoneself∗.Evenmorecertainly,onedoesnothavetohaveasatisfyingnarrativeforgedforonebythetherapist,orintheprocessoftherapy,inordertolivewell.Heavenforbid.2.9Imsorry,butyoureallyhavenoideaoftheforceandreachofthepsychologicalNarrativitythesis.YoureasNarrativeasanyoneelse,andyournarrativesaboutyourselfdeterminehowyouthinkofyourselfeventhoughtheyarenotconscious.51SeeMcCrone2003;Debiecetal.2002.\n2AgainstNarrativity29Well,herewehaveastandoff.Ithinkitsjustnotso,andItakeitthatthedisagreementisnotjustterminological.Self-understandingdoesnothavetotakeanarrativeform,evenimplicitly.Imaproductofmypast,includingmyveryearlypast,inmanyprofoundlyimportantrespects,butitsimplydoesnotfollowthatself-understanding,orthebestkindofself-understanding,musttakeanarrativeform,orindeedahistoricalform.IfIamchargedtomakemyself-understandingexplicit,ImayillustratemyviewofmyselfbyreferencetothingsI(GS)havedone,butitcertainlywillnotfollowthatIhaveaDiachronicoutlook,stilllessaNarrativeone.AtthispointHeideggerinformsus,inavariationonSocrates,thatahumanbeingsexistenceDaseinsexistenceisconstitutedbythefactthatitsbeingisanissueforit.Fine,butitsnotatallclearthatbeingathingwhosebeingisanissueforitneedinvolveanysortofNarrativeoutlook.Heideggertakesitthatonesself-understandingisconstitutiveof[ones]beingwhatorwho[one]is,andthatthisself-understand-ingconsistslargelyinonesdeterminingoneselfassomeonebypressingaheadintoapossiblewaytobe.52Andhereheseems(butIdonotunderstandhisnotionoftemporality)tobeinsistingontheimportanceofbeingDiachronicandindeedNarrative.Butifthisishisclaimthenonceagainitseemstomefalse:falseasauniversalclaimabouthumanlife,falseasaclaimaboutwhatitisforhumanbeingstobewhatorwhotheyare,falseasanormativeclaimaboutwhatgoodorauthentichumanlifemustbelike,falseaboutwhatanyself-understandingmustinvolve,andfalseaboutwhatself-understandingisatitsbest.PerhapsHeideggerianauthenticityiscompatiblewiththeseeminglyrivalidealoflivinginthemomentTakethereforenothoughtforthemorrow:forthemorrowshalltakethoughtforthethingsofitself.Sufficientuntothedayistheevilthereof53butthiswillnotwinmeover.2.10Thereismuchmoretosay.SomemaystillthinkthattheEpisodiclifemustbedeprivedinsomeway.Buttrulyhappy-go-lucky,see-what-comes-alonglivesareamongthebestthereare,vivid,blessed,profound.54SomethinkthatanEpisodiccannotreallyknowtruefriendship,orevenbeloyal.TheyarerefutedbyMicheldeMontaigne,agreatEpisodic,famousforhisfriendshipwithEtiennedelaBoétie,whojudgedthathewasbetteratfriendshipthanatanythingelsealthoughthereisnobodylesssuitedthanIamtostarttalkingaboutmemory.Icanfindhardlyatraceofitinmyself;Idoubtifthereisanyothermemoryintheworldasgrotesquelyfaultyasmineis!5552Blattner1999:32,41;IsubstituteoneforDasein.Cf.Heidegger(1927:344):Inthelightofthefor-the-sake-of-whichofonesself-chosenability-to-be,resoluteDaseinfreesitselfforitsworld.53Matthewvi.34.ThiswayofbeinginthepresenthasnothingtodowiththeaestheticwayofbeinginthepresentdescribedandcondemnedbyKierkegaard.54Note,though,howTomBombadilinTheLordoftheRingscanproduceacertainanxiety.5515631592:32.\n30G.StrawsonMontaignefindsthatheisoftenmisjudgedandmisunderstood,forwhenheadmitshehasaverypoormemorypeopleassumethathemustsufferfromingrati-tude:theyjudgemyaffectionbymymemory,hecomments,andareofcoursequitewrongtodoso.56Agiftforfriendshipdoesntrequireanyabilitytorecallpastsharedexperiencesindetail,noranytendencytovaluethem.Itisshowninhowoneisinthepresent.ButcanEpisodicsbeproperlymoralbeings?Thequestiontroublesmany.KathyWilkesthinksnot.57Soalso,perhaps,doPlutarchandmanyothers.ButDiachronicityisnotanecessaryconditionofaproperlymoralexistence,norofapropersenseofresponsibility.AsforNarrativity,itisinthesphereofethicsmoreofanafflictionorabadhabitthanaprerequisiteofagoodlife.Itrisksastrangecommodificationoflifeandtimeofsoul,understoodinastrictlysecularsense.Itmissesthepoint.Welive,asthegreatshortstorywriterV.S.Pritchettobserves,beyondanytalethatwehappentoenact.58ReferencesBaddeleyA(1994)Therememberedselfandtheenactedself.In:NeisserU,FivushR(eds)Therememberingself.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeBlattnerW(1999)Heideggerstemporalidealism.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeBlumenfeldL(2003)Revenge:astoryofhope.WashingtonSquarePress,NewYorkBrewerWF(1988)Memoryforrandomlysampledautobiographicalevents.In:NeisserU,WinogradE(eds)Rememberingreconsidered:ecologicalandtraditionalapproachestothestudyofmemory.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeBrunerJ(1987)Lifeasnarrative.SocRes54:1132BrunerJ(1990)Actsofmeaning.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MABrunerJ(1994)Therememberedself.In:NeisserU,FivushR(eds)Therememberingself.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeCampbellJ(1994)Past,spaceandself.MITPress,CambridgedeMontaigneM(1991)Thecompleteessays(trans:ScreechMA).Penguin,LondonDebiecJ,LedouxJ,NaderK(2002)Cellularandsystemsreconsolidationinthehippocampus.Neuron36(3):527538DennettD(1988)Whyeveryoneisanovelist.TimesLiterarySupplement,1622SeptemberDennettD(1991)Consciousnessexplained.LittleBrown,BostonFordFM(1924/1989)JosephConrad.Apersonalremembrance.EccoPress,NewYorkGazzanigaM(1998a)Themindspast.UniversityofCaliforniaPress,BerkeleyGazzanigaM(1998b)TheneuralPlatonist.JConsciousStud5:706717HeideggerM(1927/1962)Beingandtime.In:MacquarrieJ,RobinsonE(eds).Blackwell,OxfordHubbardE(1909)ArticleinphilistineJamesH(18641915/1999)In:HorneP(ed)HenryJames:alifeinletters.Penguin,LondonMacIntyreA(1981)Aftervirtue.Duckworth,London56Op.cit.p.33.Asecondadvantageofpoormemory,hegoesontonote,isthatIrememberlessanyinsultsreceived.57Wilkes1998.58Pritchett1979:47.IamgratefultoaudiencesinOxford(1999),Rutgers(2000),andReading(2003)fortheircommentsandtoAlanJenkinsattheTimesLiterarySupplement.\n2AgainstNarrativity31MalamudB(1979)Dubinslives.FarrarStraus&Giroux,NewYorkMcCauleyRN(1988)Walkinginourownfootsteps:autobiographicalmemoryandreconstruction.In:NeisserU,WinogradE(eds)Rememberingreconsidered:ecologicalandtraditionalapproachestothestudyofmemory.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeMcCroneJ(2003)NewScientist,May3NeisserU(1981)JohnDeansmemory:acasestudy.Cognition9:122Nietzsche(1886)Beyondgoodandevil(JenseitsvonGutundBöse).Naumann,LeipzigPessoaF(1914/1998)FernandoPessoa&Co.,selectedpoems.In:ZenithR(ed).GrovePress,NewYorkPillemerD(1998)Momentousevents,vividmemories:howunforgettablemomentshelpusunder-standthemeaningofourlives.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAPlutarch(c.100CE/1939)Ontranquillityofmind.In:Plutarch,MoraliaVI(trans:HelmboldWC).HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAReesG(1960)Abundleofsensations.Chatto&Windus,LondonRicoeurP(1990/1992)Personalidentityandnarrativeidentity.In:RicoeurP(ed)Oneselfasanother(trans:BlameyK).UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoBlaRilkeRM(1910/1983)ThenotebooksofMalteLauridsBrigge(trans:MitchellS).RandomHouse,NewYorkRossM(1989)Relationofimplicittheoriestotheconstructionofpersonalhistories.PsycholRev96:341357SacksO(1985)Themanwhomistookhiswifeforahat.Duckworth,LondonSartreJ-P(1938/1996)LaNausee.Gallimard,ParisSchechtmanM(1996)Theconstitutionofselves.CornellUniversityPress,IthacaShaftesbury,Earlof(16981712/1900)Philosophicalregimen.In:RandB(ed)Thelife,unpub-lishedlettersandphilosophicalregimenofAnthony,EarlofShaftesbury.Macmillan,NewYorkStrawsonG(1997)Theself.JConsciousStud4:405428SwannWB(1990)Tobeadoredortobeknown:theinterplayofself-enhancementandself-verification.In:SorrentinoRM,HigginsET(eds)Handbookofmotivationandcognition:foundationsofsocialbehavior,vol2.Guilford,NewYorkTaylorC(1989)Sourcesoftheself.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeUpdikeJ(1989)Self-consciousness.Deutsch,LondonWagenaarW(1994)Ismemoryself-serving?In:NeisserU,FivushR(eds)Therememberingself:constructionandaccuracyintheself-narrative.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeWilkesK(1998)ΓΝΩΘΙΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ(Knowthyself).JConsciousStud5:153165\nChapter3“TheSizeoftheSelf”:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-ConstitutionMaryaSchechtmanInhisEssayConcerningHumanUnderstandingJohnLockeassertsanintimateconnectionbetweenpersonsandselves:Where-everaManfinds,whathecallshimself,Lockesays,thereIthinkanothermaysayisthesamePerson.(Locke,346)Thereare,however,twodifferentwaysofinterpretingthisassertionwithinthecontextofLockesbroaderview.Ononeinterpretationpersons(asLockeunderstandsthem)andselvesareessentiallyequivalent,thethird-personalandfirst-personalsidesofasinglecoin.Ontheother,beingaselfisanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionforbeingapersonwherethereisaperson,itslimitsmustcoincidewiththelimitsofapre-existingself,butselfhoodismorefundamentalthanpersonhood.Thesetwodifferentviewsoftheselfanditsrelationtopersonhoodhavereemergedinpresent-dayphilosophicaldiscussionoftheselfrepresented,respectively,innarrativeandminimalistviews.InthisessayIwillsuggestthatlookingatthecurrentdisputebetweennarrativeandminimalisttheoriststhroughtheframeworkprovidedbyLockewillyieldnewinsightsthatallowforakindofcompromiseposition.IbeginwithanoverviewofLockesdiscussionoftherelationbetweenselfandpersonandthetworeadingsitallows.NextIbrieflydescribethenarrativeandmini-malistpositionsonselfandthedebatebetweenthem.Lockesdiscussionoftheseissuescontainsafeaturethatthepresent-daydebatedoesnotaconceptualconnec-tionbetweenconsciousnessandegoisticconcern.Iarguethatbringingasomewhatmodifiedunderstandingofthisconnectiontobearonthecurrentdebatecanbeilluminating,especiallyifwealsoemploysomerecentworkbyJeffMcMahanwhich,althoughnotdirectlyaboutselves,reflectsonthekindofegoisticconcernthatisconnectedwithconsciousnessandplaysaroleinconstitutingpersonalidentity.M.Schechtman(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofIllinois,Chicago,601S.MorganStreet(MC228),Chicago,IL60607,USAe-mail:marya@uic.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht201533A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_3\n34M.SchechtmanAfterdescribingtherelevantfeaturesofMcMahansviewIshowhowapplyingtheinsightsgleanedfromLockeandMcMahanallowsustothinkabouttherelationbetweenpersonsandselvesinawaythatcapturesthekeyinsightsofbothnarrativeandminimalistviews,althoughnotwithoutdemandingsomeconcessionsfromeach.3.1LockeonPersonandSelfJohnLockesaccountofpersonalidentityisextremelyfamous.Lesssustainedattentionhasbeengiventohisunderstandingofselfanditsrelationtopersonhood,buthehassomeinteresting,ifnottotallydeterminate,thingstosayonthistopic.TogetasenseofwhathesayshereitwillbeusefultobeginbyremindingourselvesofLockesdefinitionsofeachofthekeyterms.Firstself:HetellsusthatSelfisthatconsciousthinkingthingwhichissensible,orconsciousofPleasureandPain,capableofHappinessofMisery,andsoisconcerndforitself,asfarasthatconsciousnessextends.(Locke,341),andthat:ThiseveryintelligentBeing,sensibleofHappinessorMisery,mustgrant,thatthereissomethingthatishimself,thatheisconcernedfor,andwouldhavehappy;thatthisselfhasexistedinacontinuedDurationmorethanoneinstant,andthereforetispossiblemayexist,asithasdone,MonthsandYearstocome,withoutanycertainboundstobesettoitsduration;andmaybethesameself,bythesameconsciousness,continuedonforthefuture.Andthus,bythisconsciousness,[aman]findshimselftobethesameselfwhichdidsuchorsuchanActionsomeYearssince,bywhichhecomestobehappyormiserablenow.(Locke,3456)Theself,forLocke,istheexperiencingsubject,theconsciousbeingthathasqualitativeexperience.Experiencebyitsnaturehasaqualityandavalence,andsoaselfisabeingwhonecessarilyexperiencespleasureandpain,andisofnecessityconcernedforthatwhichitexperiences.WhenitcomestothemeaningofpersonLocketellsus(amongotherthings)thatpersonisaForensickTermappropriatingActionsandtheirMerit;andsobelongsonlytointelligentAgentscapableofaLawandHappinessandMisery.(Locke,346)Tobeapersonistobeaunitofnormativejudgment.Lockefocusesprimarily(ashasmostofthediscussionsince)onjudgmentsofmoralresponsibilityandpracticalrationality.Aperson,itisassumed,isrightlyblamedorpraisedonlyforanactionthatshe,theverysameperson,hastaken,andthereisaspecialkindofcon-cernthatisappropriateonlyforexperiencesthatwillbeherown.Shemaypreferthatshe,ratherthanherbestfriend,experiencesomefuturepain,orthatherfriend,ratherthanshe,receivesomewonderfulbenefit.Nonetheless,apersonsfuturepainsandpleasuresimpactherinadirectandimmediatewaythatthepainsandpleasuresofothersdonot.KeepingthesedefinitionsofselfandpersoninmindweareinapositiontoseewhyLockesaysthatwhereversomeonefindsthesameselfanothershouldfindthesameperson.Therelationbetweenpersonsandselvesbecomesevidentwhenweaskourselveswhatattributesabeingrequirestobethekindofforensicbeingor\n3TheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution35unitofresponsibilityandprudentialreasoningthatis,onLockesview,aperson.Lockeholdsthatinordertobeaforensicunit,onemustbeabletoexperiencepleasureandpainandtocareaboutwhichonedoes,infact,experience.Hemakesthisargumentmostexplicitlyinanalyzingwhatpersonalidentitymustconsistinforpersonstobethesubjectsofmoraljudgment.Tobeasubjectofmoraljudgmentsistobealegitimatetargetofpraiseandblame,and,accordingtoLocke,thepracticeofassessinglegitimatepraiseandblamepresupposesthatthetargetofthesejudgmentsisrightlysubjectedtoalaw.This,inturn,requiresthatshebesusceptible(atleastinprinciple)topunishmentandreward.Forthissusceptibilitytohold,thetargetofmoraljudgmentmustpos-sesssubjectivityandcareaboutitsquality.Thosewhocannotexperiencepleasureandpainordonotcarewhichtheyexperiencecannotberewardedorpunished,andsocannotbesubjecttolawintheappropriateway.Thesearetheminimalrequirementsforbeingthekindofentitythatcanbepunishedorrewarded.Thereis,moreover,anadditionalrequirementwhichmustbemetforaspecificmoralassessmenttobelegitimatelyappliedtoaparticularperson.Ifpunishingorrewardingaparticularpersonforaspecificactionistobejust,theveryexperiencingsubjectwhoenjoysthepleasuresofbadbehaviororthepainsofrestraintmustbetheonetoexperiencethecorrespondingpainofpunishmentorpleasureofreward.Theremust,inotherwords,beasingleconsciousnessthatincludesboththeactiontakenanditsconsequence.Withoutthiskindofunitybetweentheactorandtherecipientofjudgment,Lockemakesitclear,therecanbenojustice.Heexplains,..whateverpastActions[aself]cannotreconcileorappropriatetothatpresentselfbycon-sciousness,itcanbenomoreconcernedin,thaniftheyhadneverbeendone:AndtoreceivePleasureorPain;i.e.RewardorPunishment,ontheaccountofanysuchAction,isallone,astobemadehappyormiserableinitsfirstbeing,withoutanydemeritatall.ForsupposingaManPunishdnow,forwhathedidinanotherLife,whereofhecouldbemadetohavenoconsciousnessatall,whatdifferenceistherebetweenthatPunishment,andbeingcreatedmiserable?(Locke,3467)ForLockeitisessentialtobeingaforensicentitythatoneunderstandoneselfasapersistingbeingwhosepresentstatedependsuponpastactions;otherwiseoneisnotafitrecipientofnormativejudgments.ItisthisrequirementthatunderliesanotherofLockesfamousdefinitionsofapersonasathinking,intelligentBeing,thathasreasonandreflection,andcanconsideritselfasitself,thesamethinkingthingindifferenttimesandplaces;whichitdoesonlybythatconsciousness,whichisinseparablefromthinking;sinceconsciousnessalwaysaccompaniesthinking,andtisthat,thatmakeseveryonetobe,whathecallsself(Locke,335).TheneedforanintimateconnectionbetweenpersonsandselvesinLockessystemshouldbefairlyevident,andLockemakesitexplicitwhenhetellsus:ThispersonalityextendsitselfbeyondpresentExistencetowhatispast,onlybyconscious-ness,wherebyitbecomesconcernedandaccountable,ownsandimputestoitselfpastActions,justuponthesameground,andforthesamereason,thatitdoesthepresent.AllwhichisfoundedinaconcernforHappinesstheunavoidableconcomitantofconsciousness,thatwhichisconsciousofPleasureandPain,desiring,thatthatself,thatisconscious,shouldbehappy.(Locke,346)\n36M.SchechtmanTobeaforensicunit,orperson,onemustbeanexperiencingsubject,capableofpleasureandpainandconcernedaboutwhichoneexperiences;thatis,onemustbeaself.Itseemsonthesurface,moreover,thatsamenessofselfisnecessaryforsamenessofperson.Whatislesscleariswhethertobeaselfonemustalsobeaperson.ThereisanambiguityinLockesviewthatmaynotbeimmediatelyevidentbutcomestotheforewhenweconsiderwhatrole(ifany)reasonandreflectionplayinconstitutingnotthepersonbuttheself.Ononereadingwhatunifiesdisparatemomentsofconsciousnessatdifferenttimesintoasingleunifiedsubjectisanactofappropriationthroughwhichtheyarealltakentobeonesown.Onthisview,theunityoftheselfandofthepersonareconstitutedsimultaneouslybyhigher-ordercognitiveactivitythatrecognizesandhenceexperiencesdifferentmomentsofconsciousnessasbelongingtoasinglesubject.Onthisreading,itisbyappropriatingthesedifferentexperiencesthatoneactuallyforgesaphenomenologicalconnectionwiththemandsoconstitutesapersistingsubjectofexperience.Thereis,however,anotherwayofunderstandingtheLockeanpicturewhichmakesselfhoodpriorto,andfoundationalfor,personhood.Onthisreading,theunificationofconsciousnessintoasinglesubject(andsointoaself)isnotsomethingweneedactivelytoaccom-plish,butisratheragiven.Beingaperson,onthisview,requiresthatinadditiontobeingaselfonemusthavethecognitivewherewithaltoreflectuponthefactofonesselfhoodandthustoarticulateaconcernforthequalityofpastandfutureexperiencesandconsciouslyrecognizethatthepresentisconditionedbythepastandhasimplicationsforthefuture.OnthisunderstandingofLockesviewonecanbeaperfectlygoodselfwithoutthecapacityforreasonandreflection,butonecannotyetbeaperson.IamnotcertainLockestextallowsforaconclusivejudgmentastowhichofthesereadingsheintended,buttheydorepresentquitedifferentunderstandingsofwhatitistobeaself.Theconflictbetweenthesetwounderstandingshasrecentlyreemergedinthedisputebetweennarrativeandminimalistconceptionsofself,towhichInowturn.3.2TheNarrativeSelfandtheMinimalSelfThereareseveraldifferentversionsofboththenarrativeandminimalistviewsofself,andfocusondifferentversionsoftherespectiveviewswillraisedifferentkindsofissues.HereIwilllookatonlyoneversionofeachview.WhileIbelievethattheconclusionsdrawnultimatelyapplytoall(oratleastmost)versionsoftheseapproaches,showingthiswouldtakemoredetailedargumentationthanIcanofferhere.AsarepresentativeofthenarrativeapproachIwillusemyownnarrativeself-constitutionview(developedinSchechtman1996),andfortheminimalistviewIwillconcentrateonthepicturedevelopedinmanyvenuesbyDanielZahavi(see,e.g.,2007,2008,2011).\n3TheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution37ThenarrativeviewIhavedefendedis,inthefirstinstance,anarrativeaccountofpersonalidentityanddoesnotdirectlyaddressquestionsofselfhood.Itdoes,however,buildonthefirstreadingofLockedescribedabove,seeingtheunityofconsciousnessthatconstitutesapersistingsubjectofexperience(orperson)assomethingthatisconstitutedbyself-narrationofaformIwilldescribeinamoment.Althoughthisnarrationisnotexactlyreflectionitdoesinvolvehigher-ordercogni-tivecapacities,andtothisextenttheviewseesthesecapacitiesasessentialtoourselfhoodaswellastoourpersonhood,ultimatelymakingselfhoodandpersonhoodcoextensive.Veryroughly,whatitistobeaperson(andsoaself)onthisview,istoexperienceoneslifethroughthelensofabackgroundautobiographicalnarrative.Thenarrativeisnotsomethingthatmustbearticulatedonaregularbasis,andwillalmostcertainlyneverbecompletelyarticulated.Theideaisthatweimplicitlykeeptrackofthestoriesofourlives,andthatthisimplicitnarrativeshapesthequalityaswellasthecontentofourexperience.Aspersonsweexperiencethepresentnotasanisolatedmoment,butaspartofanongoinglifestory.Eventsthatarehappeningnowtaketheirsignificancefromtheirnarrativecontextinawaythatalterstheirverycharacter,makingtheoverallnatureoftheexperiencehadbypersonsmarkedlydifferentfromthatofnon-self-narrators.Inthisway,Iargue,theexperienceofpastandfuturearebroughtintothatofthepresent,creatingaunifiedsubject.Thebasicideaisfairlystraightforward.Thegraduatestudentstrugglinginhergarretwhilesheaimstowardtheimmensepersonalandfinancialrewardsofacareerinphilosophywill,forinstance,experienceherprivationdifferentlythanwilltheunemployed,unskilledmotherofthreewhoseesonlyever-increasingpaininherfutureastheglobaleconomyfallsapart.Thepleasuresandpainsofthefutureare,throughnarrative,broughtintotheexperienceofthepresent,forgingthephenom-enalconnectionsthatmakeforasingleexperiencingsubjectofthekindthatisfittobeaforensicentity.Whilethenarrativeiswovenimplicitlyandspontaneously,itispartofthisviewthatapersonmustbeabletoarticulateherself-narrativelocallywhereappropriate,andthecognitiveskillsrequiredforcreatingandunderstandingnarrativesmustbeinplaceforsomeonetoconstituteherselfasaunifiedperson.ThenarrativeviewthusexpressesthefirstreadingofLockespictureoftherelationbetweenpersonsandselvesdescribedearlier,becauseitseesthesubjectivelyunifiedselfasconstitutedbyhigher-orderpsychologicalactivity.Narrativeapproachestotheselfhavecomeundersustainedcriticismfromavarietyofdifferentquarters.Oneimportanttypeofobjectioncomesfromthosewhoarguethattheselfdoesnotrequirethekindsofsophisticatedpsychologicalcapacitiesandconnectionsinvolvedinnarrative,urgingamorebasicconceptionofself.Zahavisviewisanexcellentexampleofthissortofobjection.1Hearguesthatthereisaselfthatispre-reflective,pre-linguisticand,therefore,pre-narrative.1GalenSrawson(e.g.2004,2009,2011),offersanotherfamousexampleofasimilarcomplaint.IbelievethattheanalysisIamofferinghercanbemodifiedtoaddressStrawsonsobjectionsaswell,butdoingsowouldrequireadditionalanalysissincethereareimportantdifferencesbetweenStrawsonandZahavi,especiallyconcerningthedurationoftheself.\n38M.SchechtmanThisself,whichhecallstheminimal,core,orexperientialself,isgivenaspartofthestructureofconsciousexperience,wellbeforeanynarrationorself-consciousappropriationtakesplace.Itistheubiquitousdimensionoffirst-personalgivennessinthemultitudeofchangingexperience,theprimitivesenseofminenessthatpervadesallofmyexperiences,theabidingdativeofmanifestationthatcanbefoundbeneaththechangingcontentsofmystreamofconsciousness(Zahavi2011,327).Theexistenceofsuchaselfis,hesays,uncoveredbytheworkofphenomenologistswhoseanalysisrevealsthenecessityofaminimalsenseofselfasakeypartofanyexperience.Itsexistenceisfurthersupported,heargues,byempiricalfindings.NeurologistAntonioDamasio,forinstance,hasprovidedananalysisofconsciousnessthatinvolvesbothacoreandanarrativeselfasdistinctneurologicalprocesses.Zahaviallowsthattheselvesweencounterandstudyourselvesareinfacthighlycomplex,andthatwewiththepossibleexceptionofcertainseverepathologieswillneverencountertheexperientialcoreselfinitspurity.Itwillalwaysalreadybeembeddedinanenvironmentalandtemporalhorizon.Itwillbeintertwinedwith,shaped,andcontextualizedbymemories,expressivebehavior,andsocialinteraction,bypassivelyacquiredhabits,inclinations,associations,etc.(Zahavi2011,3323)Heallowsthatbecauseofthisanarrowfocusontheexperientialcoreselfmightbesaidtoinvolveacertainamountofabstraction,butinsiststhatthereisnoreasontoquestionitsreality,itisnotamereabstraction(Zahavi2007,194).Zahavitellsusthatonecoulddescribethissituationbysayingtherearetwokindsofselves(coreselvesandnarrativeselves)or,asheseemstoprefer,whendealingwiththeexperientialself,onemightretainthetermselfsincewearedealingpreciselywithaprimitiveformofself-givennessandself-referentiality.Bycontrast,itmaybehelpfultospeaknotoftheself,butofthepersonasanarrativeconstruction.(Zahavi2007,193).ZahavispictureoftheselfanditsrelationtothepersonthusexpressesthesecondreadingofLockesviewinwhichselfhoodisanecessaryprecursorofperson-hood,butdoesnotitselfrequireanykindofreflectionorhigher-ordercognition.ThosewhowouldbeexplicitlyexcludedfromLockeanpersonhoodinfants,dogs,thedementedareneverthelessselves.Touseanadmittedlyimperfectanalogy,thecoreselfislikearoom,constitutedbythewallsthatencloseit.Aroommightbeleftempty,oritmighthaveafewitemsinit,oritmightbefilledwithfurniture,textiles,art,books,andmusicalinstruments.Whatyoucandoinaroomdependsuponwhatisinitaswellasonthekindofspaceitis,buttheroomitselfremainssubstantiallythesamenomatterwhatitscontents,andthecontentscancomeandgowithouttheactualspacebeingaltered.Similarly,theselfisconstitutedbythelimitsofbrutesubjectivity,andalthoughthecoreselvesofinfants,adults,dogsanddementiapatientsmayhavedifferentcontents,theircoreselfhoodisthesame.ThereisagooddealthatiscompellinginZahavisanalysis,anditraisesimpor-tantchallengesforthenarrativeapproachtoself.Inparticular,Zahavisclaimthatitisquestionabletodenythatinfants,dogsandthedementedareselves,evenifwewanttosaythattheyarenotpersons,ispowerful.Itseemsobviousthatthereissomethingitisliketobeaninfant,dog,ordementiapatientevenifallofthese\n3TheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution39individualsfailtomeetthecriteriaofforensicpersonhood.Ifweacceptthis,andIthinkwehavegoodreasonto,itwillrequiresomemodificationofthenarrativeviewofselfasoriginallypresented.Itmaynot,however,requireasmuchmodificationasitinitiallyseems.Thequestionweareconsideringwasoriginallyposedasaquestionofwhetherpersonsandselvesarenecessarilyconstitutedtogether,andarehencealwayscoex-tensive,orwhetherselvesareprior,withpersonsbeingconstitutedwithinthelimitsofanalready-existingselfthroughreflectionupon,andconsciousrecognitionof,thoselimits.Mysuggestionisthatthereisathirdalternative.Perhapstherearedifferentkindsofselvesandsomearenecessarilyalsopersonswhileothersarenot.Accordingtothispicture,forselveswhoinfactarepersons,personhoodandselfhoodareindeedcoextensive,buttherearealsoselveswhoarenotpersons,andtheyexperienceadifferentkindofselfhood.Thecontentofthissuggestionrequiressomeclarification,whichtheremainderofthisessaywillprovide.3.3Self-Awareness,Self-Concern,andTime-RelativeInterestsAfeatureofZahavisideaoftheminimalselfwhichwasnotheavilyemphasizedintheprevioussectionisthatitnecessarilyincludesanexperienceofselfasself.Anyconsciousexperience,nomatterhowbasic,yieldsaselfonZahavisview.Thisisbecausethesenseofoneselfasthesubjectofanongoingstreamofconsciousnessissomethingthatisgivenineveryexperienceandrepresentsafundamentalconditionofthepossibilityofconsciousexperience.Locke,aswesawearlier,alsosaysthatconsciousnessincludesrecognitionofselfasthesubjectofexperience.WeshouldnotassumethatZahaviandLockearepointingtothesamephenomenon.WhenLocketellsusthatitisthroughconsciousnessthateachofusisselftoselfheseemstohaveinmindakindofexplicitlyarticulatedrecognitionofoneselfasaselfwhichisavailableonlytobeingswithreflectiveself-consciousness.Zahavi,ontheotherhand,insiststhatthereisapre-linguistic,pre-reflectiveawarenessofselfthatisgiveninexperienceasaconditionofitsverypossibility.Despitethesediffer-ences,Ithinkthatfocusonthenatureofself-awarenessisthekeytoareconcili-ationofsortsbetweennarrativeandminimalistviewsofself.Toseehowthisissoweneedfirsttosaysomethingmoreaboutwhatself-awarenessentails.Thisisnotaneasymatter,butLockesviewgivesusavocabularyformakingprogresshere.WehaveseenthatacentralpartoftheLockeanpicture,andonewhichiscrucialtounderstandingtheconnectionbetweenpersonhoodandselfhood,isthecriticalrolegiventoegoisticconcern.ForLockeconsciousnessautomaticallybringswithittheexperienceofpainandpleasureanditsunavoid-ableconcomitant,aconcernforhappiness.Mysuggestionisthatwecanseethisessentialconcernastheformthatawarenessofselftakes.IamnotcertainthatthisisLockesownview,althoughthereiscertainlyagreatdealinwhathesaystosupportthisreading.Forpresentpurposeshowever,itisnotimportantwhetherthis\n40M.SchechtmanunderstandingisaccuratetoLockesintentions.Therelevantquestionishowitcanhelpustothinkabouttherelationbetweenpersonsandselves,andhencebetweennarrativeandminimalistaccountsoftheself.Aswehaveseen,Lockesnotionofself-concernseemstoinvolvehigher-ordercognitivecapacitiesandreflectiveself-consciousness.Forhim,theself-concernrequiredforpersonhoodis,atanyrate,aconcernthatonecanarticulatetooneself.Arguably,however,therearealsomoreprimitiveformsofself-concernthatcouldinprinciplebeconnectedtomorebasicformsofself-awareness.Understandingthesedifferentformsofself-concerncanhelpustounderstandbetterthenotionsofselfhoodthatcanbeassociatedwiththem,andgaininginsightintotherelationbetweendifferentformsofself-concerncouldfurtherilluminatetherelationbetweenthesedifferentnotionsofself.ItisherethatJeffMcMahansworkbecomesespeciallyuseful.McMahansfocusisonquestionsofpersonalidentity.Hesaysverylittledirectlyaboutthenatureoftheself,and,aswewillsee,healsousesthetermpersondifferentlythanwehavebeenusingitsofar.Hedoes,however,haveagreatdealtosayabouttherelationbetweenpersonalidentityandegoisticconcernandaboutdifferentkindsandlevelsofthisself-concern.IwillthusbeginbylookingatMcMahansaccountinitsowntermsbeforeapplyingwhathesaystoourquestionsaboutthenatureofself.McMahantakesitasamethodologicalprinciplethatanadequateaccountofpersonalidentitywillmakeidentitycorrespondascloselyaspossibletothelimitsofegoisticconcern.Commonsense,hesays,tellsusthatthereisaspecialkindofconcernthatwehaveforallandonlyourownexperiencesandthattherelationthatdefinesidentityshouldbemoreorlesscoextensivewiththerelationthatjustifiesorsupportsthisconcern.Hethengoesontoshowhowvariouspopularaccountsofpersonalidentityfailtomeetthisrequirement.Althoughhedoesnotaddressthenarrativeviewdirectly,hedoesofferpointedobjectionstoneo-Lockeanpsycho-logicalcontinuitytheories(whichsay,roughly,thatapersonatonetimeisidenticaltoapersonatsomeothertimejustincasethereisanoverlappingchainofsufficientnumbersofpsychologicalconnectionsbetweenthem).2ItshouldbeobviousasIproceedthattheseobjectionsapplyequallytothenarrativeapproach.McMahansaysthatpsychologicalcontinuitytheoriesviolatehismethodologicalprinciplefromtwodirections.Ontheonesidewecanhaveegoisticconcernforafutureevenifwebeartoitnoneofthesophisticatedhigher-orderpsychologicalconnectionsrequiredbypsychologicalcontinuitytheorists.HegivesAlzheimers-relateddementiaasanexampleofthisphenomenon(MacMahan,47).Ontheothersidetherearecasesinwhichwehavetherelevantsophisticatedconnectionsbutnogroundsforegoisticconcern.Asanexampleofthisphenomenonheusessciencefictionalcasesofreplicationofthesortfoundinthepersonalidentityliterature,whereapsychologicallyidenticalreplicaofahumanpersonisbuiltoutofnewmatterandtheoriginalbodydestroyed.Insuchacasethehigher-orderpsychological2Oftenthereareadditionalrequirementsaboutthecauseofthecontinuityandtheuniquenessoftherelation.ForadiscussionoftheseviewswithanexampleofafullydevelopedpsychologicalcontinuitytheoryseeParfit(1984).\n3TheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution41connectionscalledforbythepsychologicalcontinuitytheorywouldbeinplace,hesays,buttheoriginalpersonwouldnothaveanegoisticinterestinthewellbeingofthereplica(McMahan,47).UsinghismethodologicalprincipleMcMahanarrivesattheEmbodiedMindaccountwhichheoffersasanalternativetoexistingtheoriesofpersonalidentity.Ourintuitionsaboutegoisticconcern,hesays,showusthatwhatmatters,orwhatprovidesthebasisforegoisticconcernaboutthefuture,iscontinuityorsamenessofconsciousness(MacMahan,67),butherejectstheLockeanideathatcontinuityofconsciousnessnecessarilyinvolveshigher-orderconnectionsbetweenthecontentsofconsciousnessfrommomenttomoment.ThecasesofAlzheimersdiseaseandreplicationshow,respectively,thatsuchconnectionsareneithernecessarynorsufficientforegoisticconcern,hesays.ThenotionofsameconsciousnessMcMahansuggests,isequivalenttothenotionofthesamemind,andasinglemindcontinuestoexistonlyifenoughofthebraininwhichitisrealizedcontinuestoexistinafunctionalorpotentiallyfunctionalstate.(MacMahan67)Hethussaysthatthebasisforrationalegoisticconcernisthephysicalandfunctionalcontinuityofenoughofthoseareasintheindividualsbraininwhichconsciousnessisrealizedtopreservethecapacitytosupportconsciousnessormentalactivity(McMahan678).McMahanthuscriticizesneo-LockeanviewsandbyextensionmynarrativeviewformanyofthesamereasonsZahavidoes.He,too,thinksthattherearesubjectswhereverthereisbasicconsciousness,andthatsophisticatedcognitivecapacitiesarenotrequired.Thereare,ofcourse,importantandinterestingdifferencesbetweenZahaviandMcMahan.McMahaninsistsonthecontinuityofaphysicalrealizerofconsciousness,whilethereisnothinglikethisinZahavisview,andratherthandrawingadistinctionbetweenpersonsandselvesasZahavidoes,McMahanarguesforamoreminimalistunderstandingofpersonsaswell.Therearemanyinterestingquestionssuggestedbythesedifferences,butIwillnotpursuethemhere.InsteadIwillfocusonanotherdifference,namelythecentralrolegiventoegoisticconcerninMcMahansviewbutnotZahavis.IinvokeMcMahanherenotonlybecauseheassumesthefundamentalimpor-tanceofthisconcernintheconstitutionofselfhood(andpersonhood)butalsobecauseheoffersasubtleandinsightfuldiscussionabouttherelationbetweensimplerandmorecomplexformsthisrelationcantake.LikeZahavi,McMahanalsoacknowledgesthattypicalhumanperson/selvesarehighlycomplexandcontainagreatdealmorethanisrequiredtomeettheminimalthresholdforselfhood.SinceMcMahansultimateaimsareethical,thisisanimportantfeatureofhisview,andhedescribesitinsomedetailinhisinnovativetheoryofTime-RelativeInterests(TRI).ThebasicideabehindTRIisthategoisticconcerncanbeamatterofdegree,andthatpsychologicalunityofthesortpsychologicalcontinuitytheorists(andnarrativetheorists)usetodefineidentitycanprovidethebasisforahigherdegreeofconcernthanisstrictlynecessaryforpersonalcontinuation.McMahanthusarguesthattherationaldegreeofegoisticconcernaboutonesownfuturevarieswiththedegreeofpsychologicalunitybetweenoneselfnowandoneselfinthefuture,(MacMahan,74)wherepsychologicalunityisunderstoodasacomplexnotion,encompassingbothpsychologicalconnectednessandcontinuity.(MacMahan,74)\n42M.SchechtmanThedegreeofpsychologicalunitywithinalife,accordingtoMcMahan,isafunctionoftherichness,complexity,andcoherenceofthepsychologicalarchitecturethatiscarriedforwardthroughtime(MacMahan,75).Thekindofpsychologicalunityfoundinthelivesoftypicaladulthumanbeingsgroundsthestrongegoisticinterestwehaveinourowncontinuationwhichisgreateranddeeperthanthatexperiencedbymoreprimitiveminds.Consider,hesays,asentientanimalwithaverysimplepsychologicallifeandcontentsofconsciousnesslimitedtothespeciouspresentonewithnomemoryorforesightandnopsy-chologicalarchitecturetocarryforward:nostructureofbeliefs,desires,attitudes,dispositions,ortraitsofcharacter.(MacMahan,75)Allsuchacreaturehasisitsexperiences.Sincethoseexperiencesmightbepleasantorunpleasant,theanimalhasgroundsforsomeegoisticconcernforthefuture,but,McMahanaddsourintuitivesenseisthatthereasontocareforitssakeisabsolutelyminimal.(MacMahan756)Thedifferencebetweenthatcreaturecontinuinganditsbeingreplacedbyanotherwithasimilarlypleasantlifebecomesverythin.Thisreflectionleadstotheinsightthatpsychologicalunitywithinthelivesofpersonssuchasourselvesgivesourlivesaswholesamoralandprudentialsignificancethatthemeresumofourexperiencelacksortoputitdifferently,thatmakesourlivesaswholessignificantunitsformoralandprudentialevaluation(MacMahan76).McMahanspicturethusincludesdifferentkindsorlevelsordimensionsofegoisticconcernjustasZahavisincludesdifferentkindsorlevelsordimensionsofselfhood.Ontheonehandthereistheprimitiveconcernthatisfoundindogsandinfantsanddementiapatients,andontheotherthereisthedeepandsophisticatedformofconcernfoundintypicaladulthumans(andpresumablyaspectruminbetween).Ifwecombinethisnuancedpictureofegoisticconcernwiththeideathategoisticconcernistheformthatself-awarenesstakesandtheassumptionthatself-awarenessisanessentialfeatureofselfhood,wecanfindanewwayofthinkingaboutthedifferencesbetweenminimalistandnarrativeconceptionsofself.3.4AKindofCompromiseToseehowTRIcanhelptofindamiddlegroundbetweennarrativistsandminimalists,weneedfirsttoseethatMcMahanstheoryoftime-relativeinterestscan,likeLockesviewoftherelationbetweenpersonhoodandselfhood,bereadintwodifferentways.Ononereadingitistheviewthatbasicconsciousness,withthekindofinterestinfuturewellbeingitentails,isthethresholdforpersonhoodasMacMahandefinesit(selfhoodinourterminology),andthatoncethisisinplacesophisticatedpsychologicalcapacitiescanaddbellsandwhistlesthatgiveadditionalreasonsforcaringaboutthefutureinawaythatleavesthebasiclevelofconcernsubstantiallyuntouched.Thisisbasicallytheroomwithfurnishingspictureofselfhooddiscussedinthelastsectionbutdescribedhereintermsofegoisticconcern.Thereisanotherpossibility,however,andthatisthattheadditionofsophisticatedcapacitiesdoesnotmerelyaddontobasicconcern,buttransformsitintosomethingelse,\n3TheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution43sophisticatedconcern,andthisiswherethingsgetinteresting.AswiththetworeadingsofLocke,IamnotcertainwhichofthesereadingsismorefaithfultoMacMahansownview.InfactIsuspectitmaybethefirst.Hisanalysisdoes,how-ever,alsopointtothepossibilityofthesecondreading,anditisthisinterpretationoftime-relativeintereststhatIwishtodevelopintoakindofsynthesisofnarrativeandminimalistviewsofself.Toseehowthisworkswefirstneedaclearerunder-standingofwhatitmeanstosaythatsophisticatedpsychologicalcapacitiestransformratherthanmerelyaddontotheegoisticconcernexperiencedaspartofeventhemostminimalconsciousness.Wecangetasenseofwhatthismeansbywayofananalogy.MozartsAhJeVousDiraiMaman,startswiththesimplefolkthemeknown,amongotherthings,asTwinkle,TwinkleLittleStar,andgoesontopresenttwelvevariations,someofwhicharequitecomplicated.Althougheachvariationisaversionofthesimpletheme,noneisgeneratedbythesimpleadditionofothernotes,andthereisnonote-for-notereproductionoftheoriginalinthesophisticatedvariations.Themusicalsophistica-tionofthevariationsisnotachievedbyplacingsomethingelseontopoftheoriginalmelody,butratherbytransformingandcomplexifyingit.OnthefirstunderstandingofMcMahansaccountofTRI,addingsophisticatedpsychologicalcapacitiesislikeplunkingoutthesimplethemewiththerighthandandthenaddingsomesophisti-catedlefthandpyrotechnicsontopofit.OntheunderstandingIwishtodevelopitismorelikereplacingthesimpleplunkingwithoneofthevariations.Itisfarmoreplausibletothinkabouthumanpsychologicaldevelopmentasanalogoustoturningasimplethemeintoacomplexvariationthanassimplyaddingnewcapacitiesthatleaveeverythingelseaboutourconsciousnessjustexactlyasitwas.Ifweoperatewiththisunderstanding,however,andifwealsotakeegoisticconcerntobetheformourfundamentalsenseofselfasselftakes,thereareimpor-tantimplicationsforbothnarrativeandminimalistviews.Toseethis,weneedtounderstandthedeepeningandbroadeningofegoisticconcernthatMcMahandescribesasachangetosubjectivityitselfandnotjustasanalterationofreasonstojudgefromtheoutsidethataparticularbeinghasaninterestinthenatureofitsfuture.Theideaisthattheverynatureandqualityoftheconcernthatasophisticatedself-narratorhasforherfutureisdifferentfromthatwhichaninfant,dog,ordementiapatienthastowardhers,andthisisbecausetheverynatureandqualityofsubjectiveexperienceisdifferentfortheself-narrator.Inparticular,thephenomenalconnec-tionstheself-narratorhastoherfutureexperiencearestrongeranddeeperthanthoseaninfant,dog,ordementiapatienthastohers.Thispictureshouldsoundfamiliar,becauseitisjustwhatthenarrativeviewsuggests.Whenweareabletoexperienceourlivesasongoingnarratives,itclaims,weareabletobringtherememberedpastandanticipatedfutureintoourexperientialpresentinawaythatthosewhodonotself-narratecannot,andthismakesthesubjectivewholenessofourlivesofadeeplydifferentsortthanthatofnon-self-narratorsdifferentenoughtomakeourlivesaswholessignificantunitsformoralandprudentialevaluation.Thisapproachmakesroomforthekeyinsightsofbothnarrativeandminimalistviews,butalsorequiresimportantconcessionsfromeach.Theminimalistview\n44M.Schechtmanmustgiveupontheclaimthatthereisakindofself-experiencethatisfoundinallconsciousbeings,afundamentalcoreselfwhichisthesameininfantsanddogs,andfull-blownLockeanpersons.Attheriskofmixingmetaphors(oratleastanalogies)thisreadingnecessitatesgivinguponthepictureofconsciousnessasaroomwhichremainsthesamethroughoutthewaxingandwaningofourpsychologicalcapaci-ties,onlybecomingmorelavishlyfurnishedaswebecomemoresophisticated.Instead,thedevelopmentofthecapacitiesinvolvedinself-narrationmustbeseenasmorelikeagutrehabthatinvolvesknockingdownwalls,alteringweightbearingstructures,andbuildingadditions.Putlessmetaphorically,thereisnocoreselfthatisthesameininfants,dogs,dementiapatientsandforensicpersons.Thismeansthatwhatisincommonamongalloftheseconsciousbeingsis,asZahavidenies,anabstraction(althoughIwouldnotwanttocallitamereabstraction,sincemereisatreacherouswordandIhavenowishtodenythatabstractionscanbeextremelyusefulandilluminating.)ThisreadingofTRIalsorequiresconcessionsfromthenarrativeviewwhich,initsoriginalform,doesimplythatthereisnoexperienceofunityandhencenomean-ingfulselfhood,withoutnarration.Narrativistsshould,Ithink,acknowledgethattherearemanyformsorlevelsthatrecognitionofselfasselfcantake,andthatthereareindeedselveswhoarenotLockeanpersons.FocusonLockesforensicpictureofpersonhooddoesagoodjobofhighlightingwhatisdifferentinself-reflectivebeings,butsometimesdoessoatthecostofobscuringcontinuitiesandsimilaritieswithotherconsciousentities.Thereisnoreasontodenythesecontinuitiesbylinkingselfhoodonlytotheformofegoisticconcernfoundinpersons,andmuchtobelost,potentially,bydoingso.Thenarrativistinsightthatremainsinthisnewviewisthattheselfhoodofthosewhoareself-narratorscannotbeprisedapart,inanymeaningfulwayfromtheconditionsoftheirforensicpersonhood.Theseareselvesthatarebytheirverynatureforensicbeings,andtheirformofselfhoodisalsopersonhood.Ifweunderstandegoisticconcernasaformthatrecognitionofselfasselftakes,andifwerecognizethatthiskindofconcerncomesindifferentlevelsofcomplexity,eachwithitsdistinctsubjectivequalityandfeelingofmineness.Wecanallowthattherearegenuinecoreselves,asminimalistsinsist,whilestillholdingthatforselveswhoareLockeanpersonspersonandselfareindeedjustthird-andfirst-personalsidesofasinglecoin.3.5ConclusionsandConcernsWhatIhavedescribedis,sofar,moreofastrategyforbringingtogetherkeyintuitionsfromthenarrativeandminimalistviewsofselfthanafull-blownaccountofselfhood.Thereareobviouschallengesthatneedtobemettoshowthatthissuggestionisviable.WhileIwillnotbeabletoaddressthesechallengeshere,Icanatleastacknowledgethemandpointtothedirectionaresponsemighttake.\n3TheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution45First,thetransformationofegoisticconcernthatIclaimattendspsychologicaldevelopmentcannotbenearlyassmoothorcompleteasIhavesuggested.Bothempiricalworkintheneurosciencesandintrospectionsuggestthatprimitivepath-waysforpain,pleasure,andotherbasicformsofself-concerncontinuetoexistevenasmoresophisticatedcapacitiesandformsofconcernevolve.Itisnotasifallrudimentaryexperiencesofself-concernsimplyvanishfromourrepertoirewhenwebecomeself-narratorsorself-reflectors,andcommonalitieswithotherkindsofanimalsinourreactionstodangersandpleasuresbothphysiologicalandpsychologicalareeasytofind.Thisisanimportantinsight,butIdonotthinkitisterriblydifficultformyapproachtoaccommodate.WhatiscrucialfromthepointofviewofthemodelIamproposingisthatwheninstancesofvisceralandprimitiveself-concernoccurinsophisticatedself-narratorstheyaresurroundedbyanoverlayofotherformsofconcernandputintoacontextthatalterstheirphenomenalcharacter.Wecanseethatthisdoeshappeninthewaysweareabletotalkourselvesdownorpsychourselvesuporputthingsintoperspective.Thepersistenceofprimitivepathwaysdoes,however,raiseageneralquestionabouthowtothinkaboutthedurationofaself.Weprobablycanexperienceverysimpleformsofself-concernforrelativelyextendedperiodsoftimeifthecircum-stancesareright.Someoneundergoingtortureorextremepainorahorribleordeal,mightbeexercisingveryfewofthemoresophisticatedcapacitiescharacteristicofLockeanpersonsandthereforeexperiencingself-concerninmuchthesamewayaconsciousbeingwithoutself-narrationdoes.Itmightbearguedthatthisisanexpressionofthecoreselfwhichrevealsthatitisthereallalongandcanbeseeninpureforminthepropercircumstances.Thislastbitdoesnotfollow,however.Inordinarycircumstanceswhereweexperienceintenseandveryvisceralpleasureorpainorfearthisexperienceisalmostimmediatelyboundupwithandalteredbythenarrativecontext.Howeverprimitivethefearexperiencedduringabumpyflightoraterrifyingrollercoasterridemaybe,understandingthatoneisinanairplaneoronarollercoastertogetherwiththecapacitytosaytooneself:ItsjustwindorImgoingtogetanIsurvivedteeshirtassoonasIgetoffthisrollercoasterandtheywillnevercallmeacowardagainprofoundlyalterstheexperienceevenaswearehavingit.Whatapersonwithself-reflectivecapacitiesexperiencesisnotthesamefearthatadogorinfantmightexperienceinthesamesituation.Casesoftortureorextendedordeal(orintensereward,aswithcocaineaddiction)mayshowthattherearecircumstanceswhich,ifoneisinthemforasufficientlylongperiodoftime,willundotheabilitytoemploysophisticatedself-narratingcapacities.Insuchacaselifemayindeedshrinktothepresentandtheexperienceofselfmaythusbevastlydifferentfromthatofordinaryadulthumans;thisiswhywetendtotalkofsomeonebeingbrokeninsuchcircumstances.Thisdoesshowthatsomeonewhohasdevelopedanarrativeselfmayreverttoaminimalself,somethingthatweknewalreadyfromcircumstanceslikedementia.Itdoesnotnecessarilyimply,however,thatwhilesomeoneisaself-narratorthereiswithinherthefirst-personsubjectivityofaminimalselfplussomeotherexperiences,onlythatfirst-personexperiencecanchangedrasticallyovertime.\n46M.SchechtmanThisanalysisraisesanotherworry.IfwethinkthatthereisasingleselfthatispresentthroughoutapersonslifethemodelIamrecommendingwillhavetoexplainhowtheinfant,whichis,onthisview,acoreorminimalselfisthesameselfastheadulthumanwhoissupposedtobeawhollydifferentkindofself(andlater,perhaps,thesameselfasthedementiapatient,whoisonceagainacoreself).IfIwishtoallowthattheinfantadultanddementiapatientcanbeasingleself(andIdo)Iwillneedtosaysomethingabouthowthisispossible.Thestrategyfordoingsoistounderstandtheselfindevelopmentalandtemporally-extendedtermsratherthanassomethingthatcanbeunderstoodatamoment.Myselfisnotamomentarybeing,ontheviewIamproposing,butsomethingthatstartsourrelativelyprimitiveandbecomesmorecomplicated.Asitdevelopsitaltersinawayanalogoustothewayabiologicalentityaltersasitdevelopstomaturity.3Toreturntoouranalogy,theselfislikeahousethatgoesthroughextensiverevisionsoveritslonghistory;itissometimesaone-storyhouse,sometimesatwo-story.Overhundredsofyearsahousecanhavedifferentsquarefootage,numbersofrooms,andfoundationalfootprint.Somepartsmayremainuntouchedthroughoutthefaçademaybekeptbutbecomeaninteriorwall,theoriginalfoundationmayremainunperturbedasitisexpandedtoallowforadditions.Itwouldbeamistake,however,tosaythatthepartsthatremainarethetruehouse,essentialinawaytheothersarenot.Insomewaysthisanalysismayseemtosaynothingmorethanwhatthemini-malisthasalreadysaid,addingsomekindofinsistenceonthefundamentalroleofnon-coreelementsoftheself.Zahavisaysmanytimesinmanyplacesthathumanselvesaremulti-facetedandmulti-dimensional,andthattherearemanylevelsandaspectsoftheself.Hisclaim,itmightbeargued,isonlythatsubjectivitymustalwaysbepresentorthereisnoself.Soperhapsthisreconciliationisjusttheminimalistviewafterall.AsIunderstandtheminimalistapproach,however,itsclaimthatsubjectivityiscommontoallselvesismeantastheclaimthatthereissomeonethingthatissubjectivity,whichcanbedressedupordownbutisalwaysthesamewhereveritappears.IfthisissoIthinkthecompromisepositionIhaveoutlinedreallyisdifferent.Hereisawayofthinkingaboutwhatisatissue.WhileZahavisminimalismallowsthattheselfcanhavemanydifferentlevelsoraspectsIamnotsurehowtopicturethiswhileholdingalsothatthecoreselfismostfunda-mentalandavoidingreificationoftheself.Ifwethinkoftheself(orconsciousness)onthemodelofasubstance,thenofcourseitcanhaveattributesthatareinessentialtoit.Butiftheselfisnotanobject,ifitissubjectivity,thenitishardtoseehowitcouldhaveseveralfacets,someofwhichareessentialandothersofwhicharenot.ThepictureIhavedevelopedhereistryingalbeitinapreliminaryandlargelyundevelopedwaytospeaktothequestionofhowwecanthinkaboutthecomplexunityoftheselfifwedonotthinkofaselfonthemodelofasubstance.Thereisobviouslymuchworktobedonetoclarify,letalonedefend,thispicturebutitprom-isestomakeroomforsubjectivityinallofitsforms.3Thisisnotanuncontroversialclaimofcourse,andStrawson(seenote1),hasarguedextensivelyagainstit.ObviouslydevelopingthisstrategytoanswerchallengestotheaccountofselfdescribedhererequiresmoreextensivedescriptionofandargumentforthediachronicviewofselfthanIamabletogivehere.\n3TheSizeoftheSelf:MinimalistSelvesandNarrativeSelf-Constitution47ReferencesLockeJ(1975)In:NidditchPH(ed)Essayconcerninghumanunderstanding.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordMcMahanJ(2002)Theethicsofkilling:problemsatthemarginsoflife.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordParfitDA(1984)Reasonsandpersons.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordEnglandSchechtmanM(1996)Theconstitutionofselves.CornellUniversityPress,IthacaStrawsonG(2004)Againstnarrativity.Ration17(4):428452StrawsonG(2009)Selves:anessayinrevisionarymetaphysics.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordStrawsonG(2011)Theminimalsubject.In:GallaghenS(ed)TheOxfordhandbookoftheself.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,pp253278ZahaviD(2007)Selfandother:thelimitsofnarrativeunderstanding.In:HuttoD(ed)Narrativeandunderstandingpersons,vol60,Royalinstituteofphilosophysupplement.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,pp179201ZahaviD(2008)Subjectivityandselfhood:investigatingthefirst-personperspective.BradfordBooks,CambridgeMAZahaviD(2011)Unityofconsciousnessandtheproblemoftheself.In:GallaghenS(ed)TheOxfordhandbookoftheself.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,pp316335\nChapter4TheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectivesAllenSpeightThephilosophicalconnectionbetweennarrativeandagencyisofcoursenotnewasSilviaCarliargueselsewhereinthisvolume,itgoesbackatleasttoAristotle,andithasbeenatopicfornumerousphilosophersinthemeantime(see,amongothers,therecentpapersinAtkins2008).Inthispaper,Iwanttoexploresomeoftherecentwaysinwhichthisconnectionmatterstocontemporaryphilosophersinterrogatingtheconceptofnarrative,asopposedtotheearliergenerationofphilosophicalworkonnarrative,intheheydayofArendt,MacIntyreandTaylor.Theoutlinesofthisgenerationalshiftarenotalleasytoascertain,butagencyisaconcernthatrunsthroughanumberofrecentaccountsofnarrative.GregoryCurriesNarrativesandNarrators:APhilosophyofStories,forexample,beginswiththesentenceNarrativesaretheproductofagencyMythesisisactuallythereverseofCurries:itisthatagencyisaproductofnarratives.Infact,Iwillarguethatitispreciselyattentiontonarrativesrelationshiptoagencythatopensupimportantphilosophicalgroundsfromwhichconventionalnotionsofactionmightbecriticized.FollowingGalenStrawson,IwillnotbemakinggrandclaimsofthesortthatwecanfindinDanielDennettandothers(forexample,inDennettsclaimthatweareallvirtuosonovelists).Ihaveamoremodestambition,whichistouncoverwaysinwhichtheconstrualofagencymightmakeuseofnarrativemodesofdiscourse.Inwhatfollows,IwillusethetermnarrativeinwhatCurriecallsagradational(asopposedtoacategorical)sense,asembracingaverywiderangeofthingsthatwetendtocallnarrative,fromtheleastcomplextothemostexemplaryformsinwhichnarrativityisembodied.Narrativeisindeedapolyvalentnottosayelasticterm,A.Speight(*)InstituteforPhilosophyandReligion,BostonUniversity,745CommonwealthAvenue,Room523,Boston,MA02215,USAe-mail:casp8@bu.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht201549A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_4\n50A.Speightespeciallythesedaysinfact,onelargedifficultyfacingphilosophersofliteratureishowthemultidisciplinaryappealofthetermcanbesortedoutthroughthedifferentusagesinwhichitisemployed(todistinguishlongformjournalism,certainkindsofhistoricalwriting,atherapeuticformofmedicaltreatmentandevenaparticularsortoftheologicalapproach).Inthispaper,IwillfocusonasomewhatnarrowerrangeofwhatIhopewillberelativelyidentifiablesensesofthetermasItakeupthreecontemporaryaccountsofnarrative:StrawsonscritiqueofnarrativityandtwocontemporaryphilosophicalengagementswithnarrativethatacknowledgebutattempttomovebeyondStrawsonscritiquethoseofPeterGoldieandDavidVelleman.Afterlookingattherelationbetweennarrativityandagencyinthecontextofthesephilosophers,Iconcludewithanexaminationofsomeareaswherenarrativecanopenupconcernsunder-exploredbyconventionalaccountsofagency,endingwithabrieflookattwofamousbutunder-analyzedencounterswithnarrativethatareparticularlyconcernedwithdevelopinganotionofnarrativerhythm:FrankKermodesaccountofnarrativeclosureandWalterBenjaminsessayTheStoryteller.4.1AgencyandMinimalNarrative:Strawson’sChallengeAswithmanytopicsinphilosophy,theconstrualofnarrativeisonewhichisneces-sarilyframedintermsofquestionsposedbyaskeptic.Andinthiscase,theskepticaboutnarrative,GalenStrawson,haspointedhisattackatsomeofthemoreover-reachingclaimsmadeaboutnarrative(bothamongtheolderandsomeamongthecontemporarygeneration):hereheincludesDennettsclaimthatweareallvirtuosonovelistsalongwiththose,forexample,ofOliverSacks(whohasclaimedthatthethenarrativeweconstructofourlivesisus)andJeromeBruner(whosaidthatwebecomeourautobiographicalnarrativeoverthecourseofourlives).Strawsonarguesthatphilosophicalappealstonarrativehaveassumedinmanycasesanarrativestructurethatisnotessentialforidentityoragency.Strawsonscritiquebeginstotrytosortoutwhatisatstakeinsomeofthequitedifferentclaimsmadeonbehalfofnarrative:forexample,thedifferencebetweentheempiricalclaimthatwehappentobecreatureswhounderstandourselvesthroughstoriesandtheessentiallynormativeclaimmade,forexample,byTaylor,thatitisabasicconditionofmakingsenseofourselvesthatwe[oughtto]graspourlivesinanarrative.Strawsonarguesthattheboldestearlierclaimsfornarrativefailedtotakeintoaccountthesortofdistinctionhedrawsbetweentheperspectivesofnarrativistsandepisodiststheformertendingtoconstrueatemporalintegritythroughnumerouslifeeventsandthelatterinevitablyunabletoseelifeasmorethanaseriesofdisconnectedepisodes.Strawsondoesntthinkthateithernormativeorempiricalclaimsfornarrativestandupintheend,andheclaimstobesomethingofahappyepisodisthimself,onewhosefeelingoffriendshipwithsomeoneisbasedonaconnectionwiththatpersonnowandnotonsomerememberedstatusdatingbacktoearliertimes.\n4TheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectives51Strawsonscritiquedoesrequireofusmorecareintermsofwhatwecanassertabouttheimportanceofnarrative,buttherearesomelinesofcriticismthatcanbeappliedtohisapproach.Wemightask,forexample,whethertheverynotionofepisodicdoesntborrowsomethingfromnarrative(arentepisodes,evensketchyandstochasticones,nonethelessrelatedinsomeevenminimallyemplottedway?)Strawson,whenpressedonthis,saysstraightforwardlythatheusesepisodicinarathermorenarrowsensespecifically,inthesenseinwhichwecandifferentiateeventsthatmaybeinmyautobiographicalmemorybutthatIdonotregardashavinghappenedtome*,whereme*meanswhatInowexperiencemyselftobewhenImapprehendingmyselfspecificallyasaninnermentalpresenceorself.WellofcoursegrantStrawsonthisdistinction,yetthereappeartoremainsomeimportantelementsoftheappealtonarrativethatthosewhohavearguedinresponsetoStrawsonsskepticalobjectionscanreasonablymakeacasefor.Foronething,humanbeingsdoinfactemploysomestructureswhichcanbesaidtohaveanidentifiablynarrativecharacter(incomparisonwithother,non-narrativeorless-than-narrativestructures)anditremainsphilosophicallyrelevanttotrytosaywhatsuchnarrativestructureshaveincommon,eventotrytoascertainwhethertherearenormswithinsomedisciplinesandgenrestothecorrectapplicationofnarrativestructure.Secondly,withrespecttothequestionofagency,evenifwegrantthatthereisaproblemofepisodicitysuchthatnotallpersonsarecapableordesirousofconstruingactionsintheirlivesintermsofthelargerintegrityorunityoflifeasawhole,therearestillordinaryactionsfrommomenttomomentwhichmaybeviewedfromanagentsnarrativestanceorperspective,andsuchaperspec-tivemayindeed,onatleastsomeviewsofnormativity,beaphenomenonwhichphilosophersofactionhavetoexamineandexplain.SowhileStrawsonattackswhathedescribesasNarrativity,withacapitalN,definedasaparticularpsychologicalpropertyoroutlookofanarrativesort,itsimportanttonoticethat,asdistinguishedfromsuchcapitalizedsenseoftheterm,Strawsonseemstoacknowledgethattherearemanylocal(little-n)narrativesinourlivesthesort,forexample,thatmayattendourmakingbreakfastinthemorningImgoingtomakeoatmealandthentoast,followedbycoffeewithcreamandsugarbuthetakesthesetobetrivialanduninteresting.(And,interestingly,hepointsoutthatCharlesTaylor,thedefenderofnarrativeinthelargersense,alsothinkssuchnarrativesaretrivial.)ButIthinkitmightbeusefultoapproachthismoreminimalorquotidiansenseofnarrativealittlemorecharitably,sinceitmayprovideoneplacewhereacommonconversationaboutthequestionofnarrativeandourlivesmaybegin.Boringsomeoftheseeverydaynarrativesmaybe,buttheplanningandcontrolcapacitiesinvolvedinsuchaseriesofnarratively-presentedmoveswouldnotseemtobeatrivialempiricalfactaboutthesortofreasoninganimalsthatweare.ThisisanelementthathasbeenpresentinphilosophyofactionsinceatleastMichaelBratmanstreatmentofagencyinlightofthenotionofplanningtheory,anditsuggestsonewayinwhichanarrativeconceptionmightenterunderneathStrawsonsskepticalradarwithamoreminimalclaim.Myconstantinvolvementinselectingandsuppressingoptionsthatfitwithaplantodosomethingisapartofour\n52A.Speightagencythatbothseemshardtocontestandclearlytoinvolveanarrativedimension,evenifnotacapital-Nexplicitlynarrativeoutlook.SowhileImightbewillingtograntStrawsonsnotionthatthereareepisodicasopposedtonarrativeconceptionsofself,andacknowledgewaysinwhichsomeofthebroaderclaimsfornormativenarrativitymightneedcorrection,Iwanttosuggestthatwebeginouraccountwithanotionofnarrativeaspossiblyrelevantforwhatwedoasplanning,activebeings.AndthatisanimportantelementofeachofthenexttwophilosophicalapproachestonarrativethatIwillconsider,thoseofPeterGoldieandDavidVelleman,bothofwhomacceptkeypartsofStrawsonscritiquebutnonethelessattempttogiveacru-cialphilosophicalroletonarrativeagency.4.2NarrativeThinkingandtheRoleofIrony:GoldieThelatePeterGoldiemadeanumberofimportantcontributionstothecontemporarydiscussionofnarrative,inparticularbylinkingnewresearchonmemoryandtheemotionstoanaccountofwhatnarrativeis.Takingapost-Strawsonianminimalistapproachtonarrative,Goldiedefendedanarrativesenseofselfasopposedtothemetaphysicalcommitmentsinvolvedinasenseofnarrativeself(Goldie2012,x).Inthiscontext,hesuggestedtwonotionswhichIwanttoemphasizeinconnectionwiththequestionaboutnarrativeandagency.Thefirstishisdevelopmentoftheconceptofnarrativethinking:onhisview,narrativeissomethingthatcanbe,butneednotbe,toldornarratedtoothers(Goldie2012,4).Narrativeisnotsimplyaproductbutalsoaprocessonethatcharacterizesusasagentsseekingthedistinc-tivelynarrativecontextofcoherence,meaningfulnessandevaluativeoremotionalimportinouractions(Goldie2012,2).Secondly,Goldiestressedthatnarrativealwaysinvolvedtherepresentationofeventsfromacertainperspectiveorperspectives.Whenwenarrateapastevent,forexample,weareabletotakeastanceonthateventthatisexternaltotheperspectivewehadatthetime:someonewhoisinternaltoanarrative,havingaroleasacharacterinthenarrative,canalsobeexternaltoit,havingalsotheroleofexternalnarrator(Goldie2012,26).Goldieincludesanumberofexamplesinvolvingeitherdramaticironyortheliterarytechniqueknownasfreeindirectstyle,whereanironicgapisexpressedinawaythatfusesbothacharactersperspectiveandthatoftheauthors.(GoldieincludesJamesWoodsexampleTedwatchedtheorchestrathroughstupidtearswherethewordstupidisinasenseownedbothbycharacterandnarrator.)Thisstressonnarrativeironyisaparticularlyhelpfultoolinmanyoftheretro-spectivenarrativetasksinvolvedinouragencyparticularlyintheoftendifficultrealmofautobiography.AnaccountsuchasGoldieshastotakeon,ofcourse,asetofsignificantquestionsaboutmemoryrevision,includingthepossibilityoffalseordeceptivememories.Goldieacknowledgesvariousfictionalizingtendenciesinnarrativebutholdsthatthesedonotcompromisethepossibilityofobjectivityinnarrative.Narratives,includingautobiographicalnarratives,donotandshouldnotaspiretobelikecausalorscientificexplanations,dispassionateandnon-perspectival\n4TheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectives53(Goldie2012,155).Butthereis,onhisview,somerequirementtoappealtothe(essentiallyethical)categoryofnarrativeappropriateness:citingtheexampleofC.S.LewisnarrativeoflossinAGriefObserved,Goldiesuggeststhatsuchanarrativeconsideredasawhole,revealsandexpresseshisgrief,whichemotionis,ofcourseappropriate(Goldie2012,155).Narrativeappropriatenessthusgoesbeyondthetruthorotherwiseofitsconstituentpropositions,evenifdisagreementbetweennarratorandaudienceisstillpossible.TherealsoremainsaninterestingasymmetryinGoldiesaccountwhereretro-spectiveandprospectivenarrativeviewsdiffer.Hisaccountofthefutureplanningaspectofnarrativestressesthestructuralsimilaritiesbetweenmystanceonwhatwillhappenandmystanceonwhatdid.Inbothcases,narrativethinkingisdonefromthepresenttheexternalperspectiveofStrawsonsme-now(Goldie2012,97).Buthoweverfrequentlyironymaybeapartofhowweviewourownactionsinthepast,andhoweverwemayextendforwardacertainpossibleironicperspectiveonwhatweaimtodointhefuture,itiscertainlynottheonlynarrativeperspectiveortropewhichmightberelevantforcoordinatingourselvesintermsofpastandfuture.4.3ImprovisationandNarrativePracticalReasoning:VellemanLikeGoldie,VellemanacknowledgesthestrengthofStrawsonscritiqueaboutepisodicity:differentpeoplemayhavedifferentstancestowardnarrative,andsomeofusjustaremoreepisodicallyorientedthanothers.AsVellemanputsit:Somepeoplepreferlivesthatareuniformlydesirableandnarrativelyflat,liketheweatherinsouthernCalifornia;otherspreferlivesthatareliketheweatherinNewEngland,wherethestoryofdeathandrebirthisretoldonaregularbasis(Velleman2009,204).ButVellemangivesakeyroletonarrativeinhisargumentthattheself-understandingweemployinpracticalreasoninginvolvestwo(asymmetricallydependent)modes:psychological/causalexplanationontheonehandandnarrativeexplanationontheother.VellemansnotionofwhatthenarrativemodeofexplanationprovidesasenseofwhathecallsemotionalcadenceiscontrastedwithacausalistnarrativeviewheldbyNoelCarrollandothers.InCarrollsview,onehasnotyetconstructedanarrativeifallthatoneclaimsisthateventxprecededeventy;fortheretobeanarrative(asopposedtoanannalorachronicle)theremustbe,onhisview,acausalrelationthatnarrativeessentiallyrepresentsandmorespecificallyacausalconnectiononwhichearliereventsinasequenceareatleastcausallynecessaryconditionsforthecausationoflaterevents,orarecontributorsthereto.Forexample:TheAlliesandtheCentralPowershadfoughtthemselvestoastandstill,butthentheNorthAmericansenteredthewarand,asaresult,Germanywasdefeated.OnVellemansview,Carrollscausalaccountrulesoutsomelegitimatenarrativesandfailstoaccountforthedistinctiveforcethatnarrativeshaveonus.\n54A.SpeightCarrollhadargued,forexample,thatbecauseitdoesnotevincetheproperkindofcausalityanaccountsuchasAristarchushypothesizedtheheliocentricsystemandthencenturieslaterCopernicusdiscovereditagaincouldneverbeastory.YetVellemanclaimsthatonemightbeabletoconstructagenuinenarrativeinvolvingthesetwoeventswithoutinventinganon-existentorimprobablecausalconnection,andheadducesAristotlesfamousexampleaboutthestatueofMitys,whichkilledtheauthorofMitysdeathbyfallingdownonhimwhenalooker-onatapublicspectacle.Suchacausallyunrelatedpairofeventsnonethelesshasanemotionalpoweroverus:inAristotlesview,itisastorythatmayarouseourfearandpity(i.e.,astorythathassometragicpower);onVellemansview,theemotionalcadenceoremotionalresolutionprovidedbysuchastory(ormanyothersuchexamples,suchasthestoryofthedifferentlivesoftwinsseparatedatbirth)isessentialtothedistinctivepowerofnarrativestructure.Vellemansaccountgoesawaystowardshowinghowagenerallynarrativestruc-tureofeventscanconstituteanagentiveperspective.ForVelleman,narrativehelpsusassimilateeventsnottoapatternofhowthingshappenbuttoapatternofhowthingsfeelorwhattheymeananemotionalcadencethat,onhisview,connectswiththebiologicalorganismsdesirefortensionandrelease.VellemandrawsinthisconnectiononFrankKermodesexampleofourinvariablylisteningtotheundif-ferentiatedrhythmofaclockspendulumastick-tock,atensionandarelease.Whatthismeansforanagent'sperspectiveonherownactionisthat,inVellemansview,thereisasortoffragmentationofpracticalreasoningbetweeninstrumentalrationalityontheonehandandnarrativeperspectiveontheother:weaimtodothingsforwhichwehavebothanexplanation,revealingwhywecametodothem,andanarrativethathelpstoclarifyhowwefeelaboutthemorwhattheymeantous.ItispossibletoseebothanegativeandapositivesidetoVellemansengagementwithnarrative.Theformerisvisibleinhisearlierwritings(especiallyVelleman1989,2000),whereithasnotoftenbeendiscussedhowstrategically,eveninge-niously,Vellemanemploysnarrativeexamplesforthecriticismhelevelsatwhathecallsthestandardviewofagency.Onthestandardview,whichisalsooftencalledthedesire/beliefmodel,intentionisconsideredtobeaseparableitemfromtheactionthatresultsfromitandIcanunderstandanyintentionasacombinationofadesireandabelief,whichtogetherresultin,jointlycause,thataction.Thusinasimplecaseofaction:mydesiretoslakemythirstcombineswiththebeliefthatthisglassofwateristhebestmeansforalleviatingthirst,andIreachouttopickuptheglassofwater.Vellemanisdrawntocaseswherethisstandarddesire/beliefmodelofactionappearstobeinadequate.Illgivethreeshortexamplesofhisthatareillustrative.Thefirstisacaseofwhatwemightcallreflectivepuzzlement:YouarewalkingupFifthAvenue.Allofasuddenyourealizethatyoudontknowwhatyouredoing.YoucanseethatyourewalkingupFifthAvenue,ofcourse:thesurroundingsarequitefamiliar.ButthereasonwhyyourewalkingupFifthAvenueescapesyou,andsoyoustilldontknowwhatyouredoing.Areyouwalkinghomefromwork?Tryingtocatchadowntownbus?Justtakingastroll?Youstoptothink.\n4TheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectives55ThesecondisanexampleofwhatIwillcallattitudinallatency:SupposethatIhavealong-anticipatedmeetingwithanoldfriendforthepurposeofresolvingsomeminordifference;butthataswetalk,hisoffhandcommentsprovokemetoraisemyvoiceinprogressivelysharperreplies,untilwepartinanger.Laterreflectionleadsmetorealizethataccumulatedgrievanceshadcrystallizedinmymind,duringtheweeksbeforeourmeeting,intoaresolutiontoseverourfriendshipoverthematterathand,andthatthisresolutioniswhatgavethehurtfuledgetomyremarks.Inshort,Imayconcludethatdesiresofminecausedadecision,whichinturncausedthecorrespondingbehavior;andImayacknowledgethatthesementalstatesweretherebyexertingtheirnormalmotivationalforce,unabettedbyanystrangeperturbationorcompulsion.ButdoInecessarilythinkthatImadethedecisionorthatIexecutedit?Surely,Icanbelievethatthedecision,thoughgenuinelymotivatedbymydesires,wastherebyinducedinmebutnotformedbymeThethirdexample(usedbyVelleman,butoriginallysuppliedbyFreudinhisPsychopathologyofEverydayLife)iswhatwemightcallamotivatedparapraxis:Freudhasaninkpotonhisdesk,whichhissistertellshimheshouldgetridof,andwhenhecomesbacktohisofficeafterbeingoutwithherhefindshimselfclumsilyknockingsaidinkpotonthefloor.DidIperhapsconcludefrommysistersremarkthatsheintendedtomakemeapresentofanicerinkstandonthenextfestiveoccasion,anddidIsmashtheunlovelyoldonesoastoforcehertocarryouttheintentionshehadhintedat?Ifthatisso,mysweepingmovementwasonlyapparentlyclumsy;inrealityitwasexceedinglyadroitandwell-directed,andunderstoodhowtoavoiddamaginganyofthemorepreciousobjectsthatstoodaround.ForVelleman,thegoalofrecountingeachofthesecasesissomewhatdifferent,buttheyallraiseimportantquestionsthathethinkspresentgenuineproblemsforthestandardmodelofagencyand,Ithink,itcanthaveescapedyourattentionthatallinvolveafairlycarefullycraftedpieceofnarrative.Inthecaseofreflectivepuzzlement,whereanaddressedsecond-personfigurenototherwisedescribed(you)iswalkingupFifthAvenueandsuddenlystops,Vellemanisinterestedinmotivatingabroaderlookathowintentioninitsrelationtoactioninvolvesakindoffitbetweeninterpretationandbehavior.Itisoneofanumberofwhatarecalledinthepsychologicalliteraturedouble-capturecaseswherefirstanagentsattentionandthenhiscontrolofactionare,asitwere,cap-turedawayfromhim.OnVellemansview,theimportantthingtonoticeinthiscaseisthatwearenotjustconcernedherewiththefamiliardirectionofafitinthedirectionofintention-to-agencybutalsowithabackward-facingloopinwhichwemakesenseofagencyinanongoingway:sonotjustintentionbutrevisionisinvolvedinthefitthatmakesforintentionalagency.Wewantbothtounderstandwhatwedoandtodowhatweunderstand,andthebestwaytounderstandtherel-evantfitbetweenthesetwosidesofintentionandactionisintermsnotjustofaforward-lookingintention-to-actionrelationshipbutintermsofareciprocalrelationshipbetweenintentionandaction.Itspreciselythisreciprocalrelationthatfallsapartwhenweloseanintentionasinsuchacaseofreflectivepuzzlement.Andthepeculiarityofoursituationissuchthatwhenwedoloseanintentioninsuchcaseswefrequentlystop.Vellemansexplanationofthisinvolvestwointriguingclaims:(1)thatultimatelypracticalreasonshouldbeunderstoodasaformofpredictionaboutwhatwewillbedoing,and(2)thatouractioninvolveswhathe\n56A.Speightcallsasub-agentialaimofaquasi-Aristoteliannaturetobecomprehensibletoourselvesinwhatwedo.Theattitudinallatencyandmotivatedparapraxiscasesaddtothispicturebyraisingquestionsabouttherelationofintentionandpriordeliberationontheonehandandabouttheabilityofthestandardaccounttopickoutactions(whichareintentionalandforwhichweareresponsible)fromactivities(whicharemoreautomatic)ontheother.Thestandardaccountcantmarkoffactionintermsofapriordeliberateintention(ifitmakessenseatleastforeverydayagentsifnotallphilosophersofactiontothinkaboutanactionwhoseintentiononlycrystallizesinthecourseoftheactionitself)orintermsofmotivatedbehaviorinvolvingabelief(sincebrushingtheinkpotoffthedeskisbymostphilosophersnotconsideredanactionbutitiscertainlyanactivityinwhichtheagentisbothmotivatedtodowhatheknowswilldestroytheinkpot).WhileVellemanusestheseexamplesinhisearlieressays(Velleman1989,2000)inprimarilynegativewaystocritiqueelementsofthestandardaccountofagency,thelargerandmorepositivestakesforhisuseofnarrativevisibleinhislaterwork(Velleman2003andespecially2009)concerntheuseofnarrativetoshapeabroaderaccountofpracticalreasoning.InVelleman2009,hemakesanarrativeappealtothenotionofanimprovisationalactorasawayofsituatinghisconceptionofanagentspracticalreasoning.Vellemanasksthereadertoimagineawaythedifferencesbetweenanimprovisationalactorandthecharacterheportrays:anactorwhoplayshimselfwillhavetwolevelsofmotivationinhisaction,first-orderdispositionsthatbelongtohischaracterandahigher-ordermotivationtomakesensebyenactingthem.Whenanagentdoessomething,onVellemansview,heconsidersitinlightofhisparticularagentiveself-conceptionorcharacter.Anagentwhocriescanbedoingsoinvoluntarily(someonewhoisrespondingwithemotionalimmediacytoasituationwithuncontrolledweeping),deliberately(asinthecaseofachildwhoisattemptingtogethisparentssympathy)orsomethinginbetween(aswhenanadultletshimselfhaveagoodcry).Inallsuchcases,Vellemanargues,theagentconstantlymonitorshisactionsfromtheperspectiveofthesecondmotivationofmakingsenseofhimself,asking,inotherwords,whetherhistearsaresomethingwhichareconsistentwithhischaracterorself-conception.And,aswiththeexampleofreflectivepuzzlementabove,incaseswhereanagentcantmakesenseofitintermsofhischaracter,hestopstheactioninquestion.Makingsenseofouractionisthussomethingwhichweareconstantlydoinglikeanimprovactortestingouthisactionsinfrontofanaudiencebyessentiallynarrativemeans.4.4AssessingNarrativeAgency:QuestionsforFurtherPhilosophicalEngagementWhatcanwemakeofthethreecontemporaryphilosophicalengagementswithnarrativethatweveconsidered?Howshouldtheconnectionbetweennarrativeandagencyinthesecasebeassessedwithaneyetofurtherphilosophicalworkonthetopicofnarrative?\n4TheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectives57Asawayofbeginningasketchofsuchanassessment,itsstrikingtonoticethateachofthethreecontemporaryaccountsmakeuseofnarrativetocriticizeconven-tionalviewsofagency.Whilethemostskepticalofthethreeviews,Strawsons,underscoresdoubtsabouttherebeingsomekindofauthorialagency,heisnotaboveusingnarrativemeans(asanumberofhisreadershavenoticed)tomakehisargument.Strawson,oneofthemostliteratephilosopherscurrentlypracticingintheanglo/analytictradition,isindeedaverycapablenarrativisthimself.(Who,afterall,isthatIwhosoinsistentlydemandsinAgainstNarrativitythatwenotignorehisself-experienceasanepisodist?Presumablysomeonewithaclaimonusthatmaynotbecapital-Nnarrativebutisatleastengagedwithusinarecognizablynarrativewayingivingusanaccountofhischaracterasthisratherthanthat.Orsoonemightargue.)LikeStrawson,Goldiewantstoavoidtraditionalassumptionsaboutanarrativeselfandlookstonarrativeinsteadforthewaysinwhichourperspectiveonbothourpastandfutureactionsrequiresanexternalpointofview(me-now)differentfromtheinternalpointofviewatthetime(me-then).Vellemansimageoftheimprovisationalactorsuggeststhatweareconstantlyattemptingtonarrativelyfittogetherwhatwedoandtheself-conceptiononwhichweact.Ourongoingneedasagentstofitinterpretationtobehaviormaynotbeexperiencedbyusasconsciouslynarrative,butinterruptionsorsurpriseswithinourexperienceofthatfitarelargesourcesofouragentiveneedfornarrative.Ifthisisthecase,thenourconcernasagentswithnarrativefirstentersthepicturenotintermsofthebroadquestionabouttherelationbetweenlifeand(auto)biographythathaslaunchedStrawsonandothernarrativeskepticsintoanattackonnarrativity.(ThisisthedebateframedaroundAlasdairMacIntyresinfamousremarkthatstoriesarelivedbeforetheyaretoldandbythecontrastingclaimofSartrethatanylife-story-tellingmustinvolvefalseconstructiononmypart.)OnGoldiesandVellemansview,itisnotthatoneslifeisanarrativebutratherthatonesongoingendeavortoliveoneslifewithsensedependsonafitthatnarrativeisfrequentlycalledintohelpmaintain.Thiswouldgiveusanagentivebeginningforunderstandingthefunctioningofnarrativedependentnotonthebroadestofclaimsaboutpotentiallyfalsepatternsofbiographicalconstrualbutintheactivityofthesubjectorselftomaintainasenseofcoherenceandinthatagentsongoingeffortsatrevisinghisaccountofwhatheisdoing.WhileGoldieandVellemanmayhavesucceededinshiftingtheconversationinwaysthatgivenarrativealegitimatepost-Strawsonianpracticalphilosophicalfunc-tion,thereremainanumberofquestionsabouttheirattemptstogiveanarrativeaccountofagencythatareworthexamining.Asawayofthinkingaboutfurtherphilosophicalengagementwiththetopicofnarrativeagency,Iwilloutlinethreesuchquestions,concerningthescopeofnarrativeconsideration,theproblemoftheatricalityandtheelementofsufferingorpassivitythatnarrativeagentsmayencounter.First,itcanbeaskedaboutbothGoldiesandVellemansaccountswhethertheydrawonrelativelynarrowviewsofnarrative.Eachofthemdepends,infact,onasomewhatrestrictedgenrenotionofnarrative:Goldieontheironicformsofdramaandfreeindirectstyle,Vellemanonimprovisationalacting.Whilethisselectiveappropriationofnarrativeishelpfulforspecificphilosophicalpurposesgivingus\n58A.Speightawaytoarticulateanotionofourselvesaspracticalreasonerswestillseemtolackawideraccountofwhatnarrativeisandhowwemaydrawonitinpracticalcontexts.Aswehaveseen,VellemandrawsonKermodesnotionoftheallegedlymostprimitiveformofnarrativethetick-tockofthependulumtosuggestthatattherootofournarrativesenseissome(originallymuscularly-experienced)desirefortensionandreleasethatmayhavegainedparticularimportanceforuswithinthedevelopmentofourevolutionarybiology(Velleman2009,195).Butmustthenarrativeswemakeuseofinourlivesaspracticalagentsalwaysinvolvejustsuchemotionalclosure?Literaryexamplesofnarrativeswithoutsuchclosureabound,ofcourse,and,fromtheperspectiveofevolutionarybiology,presumablythereismorethatmaybeuncoveredintheinvestigationoftheevolutionarygroundsorconditionsforthedevelopmentofhumannarrativefaculties(asBoyd2009andothershaveargued).Second,bothGoldieandVellemanrunupagainstwhathasbeencalledtheproblematicoftheatricalityinaction:thesplitbetweentheperspectiveanagenttakesonhimselfbothassubjectandasobject-observed-by-others.Thisisterritoryfamiliartoawiderangeofthinkers,fromDiderotontheparadoxoftheactortoSartresdescriptionofthewaiterwhoactswithbadfaithtoGoffmansaccountofthemodernagentinternalizingtheperspectiveofhisaudience.Onewayofgettingaroundtheproblemsassociatedwiththeatricalityinvolvesamorerecognitiveaccountofnarrativeagencyasasocialphenomenon(oneoutlinedinmanywaysbyHegel,forexample)thanisonofferinGoldiesironicagentandVellemansimprovactor,butthiswouldagainrequiregoingbeyondthenarrowerframeofnarrativeemployedinbothaccounts.Thirdandfinally,theagentivemodelemployedinbothcasesisonewhichstillprivilegesanauthorialviewofagencythatdoesnottakefullyenoughintoaccountthepassivesidesofournarrativeexperienceofourselves.WhileVellemangivesusaspectrumofwaysinwhichacrymaybeconsideredtobemoreandlessvoluntary,thisexamplestillgivesusacaseinwhichwhatisatissueissomethingtheagentcanidentifywith(evenifonlyretrospectively)assomethingthatshedoes:evenifIamnotsurewhyIamcrying,Icanunderstanditasanactionthatismine.Thereisawiderrangeofinterruptionsandobstaclesconfrontedbyagentsfromphysicalandmentalillnesstovariousformsoftraumawhichareusuallyconstruedbyusassomethingundergoneorsufferedbutwhichremainimportantforanagentsnarra-tivesenseofherself,evenifallnarrativemodes(especiallyincasesofacutetrauma)canonlyregardthemasinterruptionsorobstacles.Iwillendbysuggestingonelineofthoughtaboutnarrativethatmightbeofuseinafurtherphilosophicalconsiderationthatmayofferabroader,morerecognitivepictureofagencythatalsotakesintoaccountnarrativeconstrualsofsufferingWalterBenjaminsbriefandprovocativeessay,TheStoryteller(whichVelleman2003mentionsbriefly).Benjaminsessayopensupawiderangeofpossibleconcernswithnarrativethatdeservefullertreatmenttherelationbetweenstoryandnovelintheconditionsofmodernity,therelationbetweennarrativeandtempo-rality,thestorytellersdeathaspossessingauthority,etc.butIwouldliketofocusespeciallyonBenjaminsprimalsceneofnarrative(onewhichisinteresting\n4TheNarrativeShapeofAgency:ThreeContemporaryPhilosophicalPerspectives59tocompareinmanywaystothenotionofrhythmdevelopedinKermode)asitplacesthenarrativistwithinadistinctivelysocialcontextwherewhatissuffered(inarduousorrepetitivework)andacertainkindofself-forgettingareimportant:[S]torytellingisalwaystheartofrepeatingstories,andthisartislostwhenthestoriesarenolongerretained.Itislostbecausethereisnomoreweavingandspinningtogoonwhiletheyarebeinglistenedto.Themoreself-forgetfulthelisteneris,themoredeeplyiswhathelistenstoimpresseduponhismemory.Whentherhythmofworkhasseizedhim,helistenstothetalesinsuchawaythatthegiftofretellingthemcomestohimallbyitself.This,then,isthenatureofthewebinwhichthegiftofstorytellingiscradled.Thisishowtodayitisbecomingunraveledatallitsendsafterbeingwoventhousandsofyearsagointheambienceoftheoldestformsofcraftsmanship.(Benjamin1968,91)Benjamindescribesinthisscenearelationbetweennarrativeandagencywithseveralnewanddistinctelements.Thesocialcontextofstorytellingisprimaryhere:astoryistoldandlistenedto;thestoryservesasanaccompanimenttothesocialactivityofwork,anditinvolvesadistinctsocialrhythmthatimpressesitselfbestuponthelistenerwhensheorheisinsomesenseself-forgetful.Narrativesorigin,onthisview,istobefoundnotinmyattemptatauthoringmylife-as-a-narrativebutratherinanalmostmusicalsocialinteractionwheretheactiveroleoftheagentliesnowinwhatare,bycomparison,seeminglypassiveengagementsinpickinguparhythm,intakingonamemorythatmayputotherelementsofself-awarenessoutofthepicture,etc.Theseengagementsarealsopartofourlivingalifethatweexperiencewithsomecoherenceorinterpretivefit,buttheyareperhapslesseasilyplacedintotheconversation.HowtodescribethissetofengagementsadequatelywouldtakeusmuchfurtherafieldbothintoBenjaminsowndistinctiveprojectsregardingstorytelling,artandhistory,andintoalongertraditionofaccountsofthefunctionofnarrativestorytelling.Butwhatmightbecalledtheacousticalandsocialaspectsofengagingnarrativeatitsmostprimallyrhythmicare,toputitmildly,under-representedincontemporaryphilosophicaldiscussionsoftherelationbetweennarrativeandagency.AndIveappealedtoBenjaminssceneinordertoattempttore-insertintothecontemporaryphilosophicalconversationsomethingofthismissingside.Itistobefoundatleastinsomerespectinelementsofthediscussionofnarrativeagenerationagothathavenotbeenmuchinfocusrecentlyin,forexample,theAristotelianelementscommontobothMacIntyreandRicoeursaccountsoftheculturalroleofnarrativeinshapingmeaning.Ifonesideofnarrativeagencyisthatoftheprimarilyindividualisticmeaning-shapingthatGoldieandVellemandescribe,thereisanothersideofnarra-tiveagencythatinvolvesasetofacousticandabsorptiveappropriations.Herethequestionisonenotsomuchofhowanindividualagentconstructsanarrativethatmakessenseofhisorherownlifebutratheroneofhow(andwhether)individualagentsconnectively(orcollectively)appealintheirnarrativizingtolargernarrativewholes.ThisisaprimaryconcernofMacIntyresappealtonarrativeinAfterVirtueandpartofwhatRicoeurtriestoexplicateinthethirdofhisthreesensesofmimesisinTimeandNarrativeasthewayinwhichnarrativepatternsdrawninitiallyfromanencounterwitheverydaylifereturntothebroaderworldingreatandlesser\n60A.Speightworksofculturalsignificancethathaveaninfluenceonthethoughtandactionsofindividualagents.Thequestionishowthesemoreappropriativeandacousticalelementsinvolvedinthesocialworldcanbefactoredintoadiscussionofnarrativeagencybluntlyput,howtheessentiallyironizingandhighlyself-consciousactivityofGoldiesnarrativeagentcangotogetherwiththelisteningandself-forgettinginwhichBenjaminsstory-hearersengage.Therearesomeimagesfromtheearlierphilosophicalconversationaboutnarrativethatmaybeofhelphereforexample,Ricoeursaccountoftheagentsexperienceofthethreemodesoftempo-rality(thepastthatispresent,thepresentthatispresentandthefuturethatispresent)asthereaderrecitingapsalm,alwaysawareofhertemporalplaceinsyllableandline.IfweplaceRicoeursimageofthereciterofthepoemnexttoBenjaminsimageofthelisteneratherwork,wecannoticeseveralthingsthataffirmelementsofthecontemporaryconversationaboutnarrativebutthatmaypushitfurther:ifthereisaStrawsoniansuspicioninbothcasesaboutwhetherthereisindeedanysuchathingasanauthorialself,thequestionofhowtheagentrelatestonarrativeisnotsomuchoneofhowherlifeis(orisnot)anarrativebutratheroneofhowinsocialspacerhythmsthataccommodatetheactiveandpassivesidesofourlivesaresustained.ReferencesAtkinsK(2008)Narrativeidentityandmoralidentity:apracticalperspective.Routledge,LondonAtkinsK,MackenzieC(2008)Practicalidentityandnarrativeagency.Routledge,LondonBenjaminW(1968)Illuminations.Harcourt,Brace&World,NewYorkBoydB(2009)Ontheoriginofstories:evolution,cognitionandfiction.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MACurrieG(2010)Narrativesandnarrators.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordGoldieP(2012)Themessinside:narrative,emotionandthemind.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordMacIntyreA(1981)Aftervirtue:astudyinmoraltheory.UniversityofNotreDamePress,NotreDameStrawsonG(2004)Againstnarrativity.Ratio16:423452StrawsonG(2007)Episodicethics.In:HuttoDD(ed)Narrativeandunderstandingpersons.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeTaylorC(1989)Sourcesoftheself.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAVellemanD(1989)Practicalreflection.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonVellemanD(2000)Thepossibilityofpracticalreason.Clarendon,OxfordVellemanD(2003)Narrativeexplanation.PhilosRev112:125VellemanD(2005)Theselfasnarrator.In:AndersonJ,ChristmanJ(eds)Autonomyandthechallengestoliberalism:newessays.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,pp5676VellemanD(2009)Howwegetalong.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge\nChapter5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣa’sLifeoftheBuddhaMalcolmDavidEckelIntheintroductiontoLovesKnowledge,herwidely-quotedandmuch-respectedvolumeofessaysonphilosophyandliterature,MarthaNussbaumsays:Literaryformisnotseparablefromphilosophicalcontent,butis,itself,apartofcontentanintegralpart,then,ofthesearchforandthestatementoftruth.1MarthaNussbaumspointhastwoimplicationsforthewaywereadBuddhistphilosophy.Firstofall,itexpandsthecanonofworksthatcanplausiblybeconsideredphilosophical.Inhercase,thecanonexpandedtoincludenotjusttheworksofKantorthenineteenth-centuryUtilitarianthinkers,butthenovelsofAusten,James,andProust.Inourcase,acomparableshiftwouldbetomovefromtheworksofclassicMadhyamakaorYogācāraphilosophers,likeCandrakīrtiorVasubandhu,tothevastcorpusofBuddhistnarrativeliterature.Nussbaumsclaimalsoinvolvesashiftnotjustinwhatweread,buthowwereadit.Forherthestartingpointwasthesimplequestion:Howdoesonelive.Withthisquestioncametheobservationthatlifeisframedinmanymorewaysthaninaseriesofphilosophicalpropositions.IfIwanted,andifyouwouldletme,IcouldspendtherestofmytimejustmusingonNussbaumsuseofthewordsliveandlife.Sheoftentalksaboutanovelsabilitytoconveyasenseoflife.HerwordscarryanechooftheconceptofaLebensanschauung,alife-viewthataccompaniesandisdictatedbyaWeltanschauungorworld-view.IthinkwecanalsohearechoesofthephraseformoflifethatWittgensteinusedtodescribethesettinginwhichwordsacquiretheirmeaning.InWittgensteinscase,thewordwasuseddeliberatelytoavoidtechnicallanguage,butassoonasheusedit,itwasinvestedwithpreciselythetechnicalaurathathewastryingtoavoid.Nussbaumssenseoflifeturnsdownthetechnicalvolumeinthesamewayandaddsthefurtherassociationofsenseasmeaning.Fortheessaysinthisvolume,thekeyquestionissimilartoNussbaumsquestion,butitexpressesamoreBuddhist1Nussbaum1990:3.M.D.Eckel(*)DepartmentofReligion,BostonUniversity,145BayStateRoad,Boston,MA02215,USAe-mail:mdeckel@bu.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht201561A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_5\n62M.D.Eckelpreoccupation:nothowshouldonelive(insomecaseslivingispreciselywhatoneshouldaspirenottodo)butwhoisitwholives?Iwouldliketoinvestigatethisquestioninawaythatbalances,asNussbaumdid,onthelinethatseparatestechnicalfromnon-technicallanguageandonthelinethatdistinguishesliteraturefromphilosophy.ThetextIhaveinmindtofocusthisquestionistheBuddhacarita(LifeoftheBuddha)bythesecond-centuryBuddhistpoetAśvaghoṣa.2Ihavechosenthistextnotonlybecauseitoffersthefirstfull-scalenarrativeoftheBuddhaslife,writtensomesixorsevencenturiesafterthelifeofthehistoricalBuddha,butbecauseitshowshowintricatelyaBuddhistnarrativecanbewoventogetherwithaformofargumentthatwecanlegitimatelycallphilosophy.Italsocontainsarich,complex,andinsomewaysambiguousmeditationonwhatitmeanstodevelopaBuddhistself.Letmebeginwithfiveversesthatareparticularlycontroversialforcontemporaryreadersofthetext.TheycomefromoneofthekeymomentsintheearlycareerofSiddhārtha,theyoungprincewhowouldbecometheawakenedoneorBuddha.Bythistime,asAśvaghoṣatellsthestory,Siddhārthahasmarriedandhadachild.Onaseriesoftripsoutsidehispalace,hehasseenfoursights:asickman,anoldman,acorpse,andawanderingascetic.Thefirstthreesightsimpressedhimwiththerealityofdeath,andthefigureoftheasceticsuggestedawayinwhichdeathmightpossiblybeovercome.Inresponsetothesesights,Siddhārthahasdecidedtoleavethepalaceandtakeupthelifeofanascetic.TospeedSiddhārthaonhisway,agroupofdeitieshavecastaveilofsleepovertheresidentsofpalace,includingagroupofwomenwhotriedtoshakehisresolutionbyofferingtheenticementsoflove.ToSiddhārthathesleepingwomenpresentasingularlyunappealingsight.Whenhesawthosegirlssleepinginsuchposes,theirbodiesdistorted(vikṛta),movementsunrestrained,thekingssongaveventtohisuttercontemptthoughtheirbodieswereexquisite,andthewaytheyspokewassosweet:Dirty(aśuci)anddistorted(vikṛta)lieshereexposedthetruenatureofwomeninthisworld;Deludedbytheirniceclothesandjewelry,men(puruṣa)becomeinfatuatedwiththem.Ifmen(manuṣya)reflectonwomenstruenature(prakṛti)andthismutation(vikāra)broughtaboutbysleep,Surelytheirpassionforthemwouldnotwax;yet,struckbythethoughtoftheirelegance,theybecomeinfatuatedwiththem.Whenheunderstoodthustheirdifference,theurgetodepartsurgedinhimthatnight;whenthegodsdiscernedhisintention,then,theyopenedthedoorofhisresidence.2IwillbequotingtextandtranslationfromOlivelle2008.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas63Then,hecamedownfromthepalaceroof-top,inuttercontemptofthosesleepinggirls;havingcomedown,then,resolute,hewentouttothefirstcourtyard.3Thefirstoftheseversessetsthescene,thenexttwodescribeSiddhārthasreaction,andthelasttwoshowhowheputshisresolutionintoaction.Whatistroublingaboutthispassageforusisnottheactionsthemselves.WeknowthatSiddhārthaisabouttoleavethepalace;allthathasbeenmissingistherightoccasion.Whatseemsstrangetomoderneyesistheharshimageofmisogyny.WhenIdiscussthispassagewithstudents,mostjustwanttoturnthepage.Butthelanguageofthepassageisworthasecondlook.Foracarefulreader,itgoesbeyondajudgmentaboutmenandwomentoalargerquestionaboutthenatureoftheself.4AśvaghoṣasdescriptionofSiddhārthasreactionstartswithtwowords,aśuciandvikṛta.InOlivellestranslation,theseappearasdirtyanddistorted;asimplertranslationmightbeimpureandchanged,withasuggestioninthewordvikṛtathatthischangeisnotforthebetter.JudgingfromtheclassicaccountoftheBuddhaslifeintheLalitavistara,bothwordsseemtohavetraditionalsources.IntheparallelpassageintheLalitavistara,godsshowthewomenaschangedandfallendown(vikṛta-vigalita).Siddhārthaisterrifiedbythesight,asifhewerelivinginacrema-tionground,andheturnshisvisionofthewomenintoameditationontheimpurityofhisownbody.Inotherwords,theimpurityisnotassociatedsolelywiththebod-iesofwomen,butwithbodiesingeneral,includinghisown.Aśvaghoṣadoesnotfollowthisprecisemodel,especiallyinthesecondverse,whereSiddhārthareflectsonwomenstruenatureandthemutationbroughtaboutbysleep.Herethewordtruenatureisthehighlychargedtermprakṛti,andthemutationbroughtaboutbysleep(or,moresimply,changeduetosleep)issvapna-vikāra.Byintroducingthetermsprakṛtiandvikāra,Aśvaghoṣacrossesthelinefromthelanguageofscrip-turetothetechnicallanguageofSāṃkhyaphilosophy.Siddhārthaisnotjustayoungmanrecoilingatthesightofsleepingwomen;hehassteppedintoaSāmkhyạallegoryandbeguntoenactthestagesofrecognitioninwhichthesoul(hererepresentedbythewordpuruṣainoneverseandbythewordmanuṣyaorman)separatesitselffromtheentanglementsofprakṛtiandescapesthecycleofrebirth.ThesignificanceoftheseverbalchangesbecomesclearifwecomparethispassagetoChapter12,whereSiddhārthameetsthesageArāḍa.Siddhārthahasvisitedanumberofbrahmanicalascetics,eachofwhomhasaparticulardharmatorecommendasawaytodealwiththesufferingsoflife.Healsohashadtorespond3Buddhacarita5.6367,translationquotedfromOlivelle2008.4LindaCovillhasgivenacogentdiscussionofAśvaghosasapparentmisogynyinhisothermini-̣epic,theSaundarananda(HandsomeNanda).Incanto9(TheAttackonWomen)amonklaunchesintoamisogynisticdiatribethatidentifiesthehomeasbondageandwomenasdangerous,ignoble,andduplicitous(Covilletal.2010:129).ShepointsoutthatelsewhereinthetextAśvaghoṣagivesamoresympatheticaccountofNandaswifeSundarīandinthispassageattributesthediatribetoananonymousmonk,ratherthantotheBuddhaoroneoftheBuddhasnameddisciples.Here,however,inthispassagefromtheBuddhacarita,AśvaghosaattributesthecritiqueofwomenṣnaturestoSiddhārthahimself.ThisraisesproblemsofinterpretationthatIaddressinthenextparagraph.\n64M.D.Eckeltoaseriesofemissariesandwell-meaningadvisorswhotrytopersuadehimtogiveuphisquestandreturntotheconventionalvisionofdharmaassociatedwithahouseholderandaking.Finallyheaskswhetherthereisasagewhocantellhimhowtoescapethecycleofrebirthaltogether.HeisdirectedtoArāḍa,whogiveshimoneofthemostextensiveearlyaccountsofSāṃkhyaphilosophy.WhileitmaybeearlyandmayeventuallyhavebeensupersededbytheformalstatementsoftextssuchastheSāṃkhyakārikās,itcontainsallthekeyelements,includingprakṛti,thesoul,andacategoryknownasvikāraortransformation:Primalnature(prakṛti)andTransformation(vikāra),birth,death,andoldageAllthatiscalledBeing,pleaseunderstand,youwhosebeingisfirm.Becauseitcognizesthisfield,whatisconsciousiscalledtheKnowerofthefield(kṣetrajña);Butthosewhocontemplatetheself,calltheself(ātman)Knowerofthefield.5Thesetwoversesshowhowmuchintellectualweightisinvestedinthetermsvapna-vikārainSiddhārthasvisionofthesleepingwomen.WendyDonigerhasdescribedtheMahābhārataasalongphilosophicalreflectionpunctuatedbymomentswhenthereflectioncrystallizesintonarrative.6Thesamehashappenedhere.SāṃkhyareflectionaboutthenatureofthesoulhascrystallizedintothenarrativeimageofSiddhārthasdisgustashegazesatagroupofsleepingwomen.Thisisnotthetimeorplacetodiscusstherelationshipbetweentheproto-SāṃkhyaofAśvasghoṣasLifeoftheBuddhaandtheclassicalformulationoftheSāṃkhyapositioninĪśvarakṛṣṇasSāṃkhyakārikās(fifthcentury)andelsewhere.ThecomplexityofthisproblemhasbeenamplydiscussedbyE.H.Johnston,GeraldJamesLarson,andothers.7CategoriesthataredistinctivetoSāṃkhyaappearnotonlyinthewell-knownconfrontationbetweenSiddhārthaandArāḍaincanto12,beforeSiddhārthatakesleavefromhisteachersandsetsouttofindhisownunder-standingofthetruth,butalsointheconversationbetweentheBuddhaandAnāthapiṇḍadainChapter18andtheBuddhasteachingtoSubhadraontheeveoftheparinirvāṇaincanto26.ItisenoughsimplytoobservethatAśvaghoṣastextsharesthesamedualisticvisionofrealitythatwasgivenmorepreciseandcarefulelaborationinlatertexts.AccordingtotheteachingattributedtoArāḍa,andtotheteachingoflaterSāṃkhyasources,realityisdividedintotwofundamentalcatego-ries:thesoul(puruṣa)andprakṛti(materialnature).Whileprakṛtiintheprimordialsense(mūla-prakṛti)isasingleprinciple,itcanbedistinguishedfurtherintotwodifferentmodesofmanifestation:prakṛti(creative)andvikṛti(created),hence5Buddhacarita12.17,20.6OFlaherty1984:128.7Johnston1936,1995;LarsonandBhattacharya1987.StephenA.KenthassummarizedtheissuesclearlyinKent1982.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas65thedistinctionbetweenprakṛtiandvikārainBuddhacarita12.17.8Asthecreativeaspectofprakṛtisuggests,prakṛtiisactive,whilepuruṣaisinactive.Puruṣa,ontheotherhandisconscious,whileprakṛtiisnot.Thedistinctionbetweenprakṛtiandpuruṣaalsoisgendered:thetermprakṛtiisgrammaticallyfeminine,whilepuruṣa(orman)ismasculine.AllofthesefeaturesofprakṛtiandpuruṣacontributetoaseriesofremarkableversesintheSāṃkhyakārikāswhereĪśvarakṛṣṇatellsavividbuthighlycondensedstoryofliberation:Likeadancerwhostopsdancingwhensheisseenbytheaudience,prakṛtistopswhensheshowsherselftothepuruṣa.Ithinkthatthereisnothingmoredelicatethanprakṛti:whensheknowssheisseen,shedoesnotshowherselfagaintopuruṣa.Atthetimeofdeath,whenprakṛtihasachievedherpurposeandwithdrawn,[puruṣa]attainsdefinitiveandfinalisolation(kaivalya).9Herepuruṣaispicturedasaspectatorandprakṛtiasadancer.Whenprakṛtibecomesawarethatshehasbeenseenbypuruṣa,shestopsherperformance,inpartoutofdelicacyorshyness,butalsobecauseshehasachievedherpurpose(artha)inliberatingthepuruṣa.10Simplyput,herpurposeistorevealherselftopuruṣaandthentostop(ni-vṛt),andtheroleofthepuruṣaissimplytositasaspectatorandtorecognizeprakṛtiforwhatsheis.Thisrecognitionleadstoastatethatthetextcallsdefinitiveandfinalisolation(kaivalya).InthedualisticsystemoftheSāṃkhya,itisnotabadthingtodistinguishandtoseparate.Thegoalisnottomergeintoastateofoneness,asitmightbeinsomeUpaniṣadictexts,buttorealizethedifferencebetweenthesoulandmaterialnatureandallowthesoultobecomefree.TheparallelbetweenthisstoryandAśvaghoṣasaccountofSiddhārthasvisionofthesleepingwomenishardtomiss.ItisasifAśvaghoṣawerewritingSiddhārthasstoryasaSāṃkhyaallegory.Thisisverystrange.WhywouldAśvaghoṣachoosetoaccommodateSiddhārthasjourneytoarivalphilosophicalsystem?Threereasonssuggestthemselves;perhapstherearemore.First,inthecontroversialenvironmentofthefirstfewcenturiesC.E.,SāṃkhyawasakeyBrahmanicalopponent.InconjunctionwiththeYogatradition,SāṃkhyaofferedaforcefulchallengetoBuddhistclaimsaboutthewaytoliberation.ThischallengecontinuedforseveralcenturiesafterthetimeofAśvaghoṣa.WereadinParmārthasLifeofVasubandhu,forexample,thataSāṃkhyateachernamedVindhyavāsindefeatedVasubandhusteacherindebateduringthereignofCandraguptaII(ca.fourthcentury).11SāṃkhyaistreatedasaformalopponentintheworksofDignāgaandBhāviveka(sixthcentury),amongothers,anditprovokes8InSāṃkhyakārikā3:Primordialnatureisuncreated.Theseventhegreatone(mahat),etc.arebothcreatedandcreative.The16arecreated.Puruṣaisneithercreatednorcreative.Herethetermvikṛtiisequatedtothetermvikāra.ThisquotationfromtheSāṃkhyakārikāsistakenfromLarson1979.9Sāṃkhyakārikās59,65,and68.TheSanskrittextisfoundinLarson1979.Herethetranslationismyown.10Thisactionisdonebyprakṛtifortheliberationofeachpuruṣa(SK56).11LarsonandBhattacharya1987:11.\n66M.D.EckelastrongcritiqueinthebiographyoftheChinesetravellerXuanzang.12SāṃkhyamayeventuallyhavebeensupersededbyVedāntaasaschoolthattiedliberationtoacertainviewofaneternalself,butintheirdaytheSāṃkhyaswereanactiveandthreateningalternativetothepointoftheviewoftheBuddhists.Somehavesug-gestedthatSāṃkhyaistheoldesttechnicalschoolofIndianphilosophyandmayhaveprovidedthebackgroundnotonlyforthedevelopmentofformalBuddhistphilosophybutalsoofcomparableJainandBrahmanicalschools.13Whetherthisistrueornot,theSāṃkhyacertainlyposedasignificantchallenge,especiallywhenitcametodefiningadistinctivelyBuddhistapproachtoliberation.AsecondreasonfortheprominenceofSāṃkhyainAśvaghoṣastexthastodowiththerelationshipbetweenAśvaghoṣaandtheMahābhārata.AsPatrickOlivelleandAlfHiltebeitelhaveshown,AśvaghoṣahasadeepcontroversialrelationshipwiththeMahābhārataingeneralandtheBhagavadGītāinparticular.14AsintheGītā,theessentialstruggletakesplaceonthefieldofdharma,whereSiddhārthaattemptstodefineanddefendhisowndharma(svadharma)inrelationtothetradi-tionalclaimsofhisfamilyandfriends,andhedoesthisinawaythatradicallydifferentiateshimfromthepointofviewoftheGītā.ThereisnomorestrikingexpressionofthiscontrastthanAśvaghoṣasechoofKrishnasfirstwordstoArjunainthefirstchapterofthetext.WhenArjunaseesthebattlefieldcrowdedwithfamilyandfriends,readytofight,heslumpsdowninhischariotandrefusestogoon.Krishnasresponsestartswithaninsulttohismanhood.Whythiscowardiceintimeofcrisis,Arjuna?Thecowardisignoble,shameful,foreigntothewaysofheaven.Dontyieldtoimpotence!Itisunnaturalinyou!Banishthispettyweaknessfromyourheart.Risetothefight(uttisṭhạ),Arjuna!Looktoyourownduty(svadharma);donottremblebeforeit;nothingisbetterforawarriorthanabattleofsacredduty.15Thekeyelementsintheselinesaretheconceptofsvadharma(ownduty)andthesimpleinjunctionstandup(uttisṭhạ).Krishnaargues,ineffect,thatArjunahastodowhatisrightforhimself,notwhatisexpectedbyhisdutiestofamilyandcaste.Andhehastogetupandenterthebattle.IttakesmorethanafewchaptersforKrishnaswordstoworktheireffect,buttheyareechoedbacktohiminArjunasfinalwords:Iamstandingup(sthitosmi).Iwillactaccordingtoyourwords.AśvaghosamocksthispassagebyputtingKrishnaswordsinthemouthofṂāra,theresentfulanddeludedgodofloveanddeath,ontheeveofSiddhārthasawakening:Standup(uttisṭhạ),OWarrior,afraidofdeath!Followthedharmathatsyourown(svadharma),abandonthedharmaofrelease(moksạ-dharma);bysubduingtheworldwitharrowsandrites,fromthisworldyouwillattainIndrasrealm.1612Hattori1968;Eckel2008;Li1995:133.13LarsonandBhattacharya1987:1011.14Olivelle2008;Hiltebeitel2006:22986.15BhagavadGītā2.23,31.TranslationsoftheBhagavadGītāarequotedfromMiller1986.16Buddhacarita13.9;translationquotedfromOlivelle2008.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas67Māraisstillstuckintheworldofthewarrior,whereSiddhārthassvadharmawouldbetofight.ButSiddhārthahasalreadymadeitcleartoaseriesofotheremis-sariesfromhisfathersworldthathisowndharmaispreciselythemokṣa-dharmathatMārafears,thedharmaofliberation.Andhisresponsetothedemandthathestandupisnotsthitosmi,butaperfectanticipationofthewell-knownaphorism:Dontjustdosomething;sitthere!Oncewehavelearnedtolookforthem,contrastsbetweenTheLifeoftheBuddhaandtheGītāseemthickontheground.Compare,forexample,thedescriptionofSiddhārthasreactiontothesightoffarmersplowingafieldwithArjunassightofhiskinsmenontheeveofthebattle.Clumpsofgrassdugupbytheplowlitteredtheearth,coveredwithtinydeadcreatures,insectsandworms;ashebeheldtheearthwithallthesestrewnabout,hegrievedgreatly,asifakinsmanhadbeenkilled.Seeingthemenplowingthefields,theirbodiesdiscoloredbythewind,thedust,andthescorchingraysofthesun,oxenweariedbythetoilofpullingtheplows,greatcompassion(kṛpā)overwhelmedthegreatnobleman.17---Sayingthisonthebattlefield,Arjunaslumpeddowninthechariotandthrewawayhisbowandarrows,hismindshakenbygrief(śoka).Ashesatdejected,hiseyesfilledwithpity(kṛpā)andblurredbytears,Krishnaspoketohim.18Bothpassagesringchangesontheexperienceofvisionandbothinvolveafeelingofpity(kṛpā),buttheyevaluatethesenseofpitydifferently.ForSiddhārtha,thefeelingofpityforthetinycreatureswhohavebeenwoundedbytheplowisthebeginningofanaspirationtorelievenotonlyhisownsuffering,butthesufferingofothers.(Thewordkṛpāoftenappearsinthistextasasynonymofkaruṇāorcompas-sion,asitdoesalsoinlaterMahāyānaaccountsofthebodhisattvapath.)ForKrishnathefeelingofpityisashamefulweaknessthatblightsArjunasvisionandblindshimtohisduty.AthirdandperhapsmoreimportantreasonforAśvaghoṣasappropriationoftheSāṃkhyanarrativeofliberationissuggestedbytheversethatfollowsthisaccountofSiddhārthaandtheplowmen.Gettingridofthefriendsthataccompaniedhim,wishingtoreachsomeclarity(viviktatā)inhisownmind,hereachedthefootofaroseappletreeinalonelyspotwithcharmingleavesrustlingallaround.1917Buddhacarita5.56.18BhagavadGītā1.47,2.1.19Buddhacarita5.8.\n68M.D.EckelSiddhārthasfirstimpulseistoseekclarity(viviktatā),20wherehecancontemplatethesignificanceofwhathesseen.Thisishisfirstexperienceofdhyānaormedita-tion.Hisdesireforsolitudeisconfirmedwhenheseesamanapproachinghimdressedinthegarbofamendicant.Hesaystotheman,Tellme,whoareyou?Themansaysthathehasgoneforthasamendicanttoseekliberation(śramaṇaḥpravra-jito‘smimokṣahetoḥ).Hewanderswithoutpossessionsordesiresinsearchofwhathecallsthesupremegoal(paramārtha).Withthisvisionofsolitudeinmind,Siddhārthagoesbacktothepalacetoprepareforhisowngoingforth.Solitude,separation,alonenesscouldallbetranslationsoftheSāṃkhyatermsforthestateofthesoulwhenithasachieveditsfinalseparationfrommaterialnature(prakṛti).ItisnoaccidentthatAśvaghoṣafindstheSāṃkhyavocabularycongenial.ItidentifiespreciselytheissuesthatSiddhārthafacesashetriestocuthistiestotheworldhehasleft.ItalsoisnoaccidentthatSiddhārthahastovisitaSāṃkhyasage,listentohisteaching,andleaveevenhimbehindbeforehecangoontohisown,solitaryawakening.Whatshouldwemakeofthisforourowninvestigationofstoriesoftheself?Firstofall,itshowshowdeeplynarrativecanbeintertwinedwithphilosophicalreflec-tion.WendyDonigeronceremarkedthatthestoryoftheMahābhāratacarrieditsphilosophyaroundwithitthewayaturtlecarriesitsshell.InTheLifeoftheBuddha,theconnection,ifpossible,isevencloser.Youcouldsaythatphilosophyisnotjusttheshelloftheturtle;itanimatestheturtlesbodyandflowsinitsblood.Notonlydoesitshapeandinterprettheeventsofthestory;itiswovenintothetextureofthelanguageitself.ItakethistobewhatMarthaNussbaumhadinmindwhenshesaid:Certainthoughtsandideas,acertainsenseoflife,reachtowardexpressioninwrit-ingthathasacertainshapeandform,thatusescertainstructures,certainterms.21Nussbaumgoesonfromheretomakeanevenstrongerclaimaboutthepowerofnarrative.Shesaysthatcertaintruthsabouthumanlifecanonlybefittinglyandaccuratelystatedinthelanguageandformcharacteristicofthenarrativeartist.Iwonder,then,whetherthereisanythinginTheLifeoftheBuddhathatexpands,deepens,orenrichestheexpressionofselfhoodwewouldgleanfromtextsthataremoreproperlyandexclusivelyphilosophical?Threethingscometomind.First,AśvaghoṣasaccountofSiddhārthasjourneyspeaksvividlyoftheneedtoestablishindependence,togohisownway,evenatthecostoflosingpeoplewhowereimportanttohim,fromhisfathertohiswife,hischarioteer,hisgroomthelistgoeson.Andtheseseparationsarenotwithoutcost.WhenSiddhārthasfamilyandfriendsappealtohisloyaltyorexpressgriefattheirloss,theytouchtheheart,sometimeseveninthesimplestmoments.WhocansayhowmuchemotionisdistilledintoSiddhārthasgesturestohishorseandhisgroomafterhehasescapedfromthepalaceandarrivedatthegateofthefirstforesthermitage?AśvaghoṣatellsusthatSiddhārthagotdownfromhishorse,touchedit,andsaid,inOlivellestrans-lation,youhavefulfilledyourtask(nistīrṇa).Itisplausibletoreadthisas20ThewordthatOlivelletranslatesasclarity(viviktatā)couldalsomeansolitudeorseparation.21Nussbaum1990:4.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas69suggestingthatSiddhārthaalsohasfulfilledhistask,or,asthewordnistīrnạsuggests,madehisescape.Hishorsehasmadeitpossibleforhimtocrossoverandbefree.ForanyonewhohasvisitedtheancientsiteatAngkorWat,itishardnottoberemindedoftheimageofAvalokiteśvaraatNeakPean,wherethisgreatbodhisattvaofcompassionmanifestshimselfasthehorseBalahatocarrythemerchantSiṃhalaandhiscompanionstosafetyovertheoceanofexistence.22SiddhārthaswordstohishorseendwiththeimageofSiddhārthanotjustgazingatthegroomChandakabutbathinghimwithhiseyes.Thesenseofaffectionispalpable.EventhoughSiddhārthaisisolated,heisstillcapableoffeelingdeepaffection.Butitisthethrillofisolationthatdominatesthescene.HermannHessewasnotjustengaginginamodernisttropeattheendofPartOneofthenovelSiddharthawhenhedepictedSiddharthasfeelingofisolationasamomentofawakeningandrebirth:Atthatmoment,whentheworldaroundhimmeltedaway,whenhestoodalonelikeastarintheheavens,hewasoverwhelmedbyafeelingoficydespair,buthewasmorefirmlyhimselfthanever.Thiswasthelastshudderofhisawakening,thelastpainsofbirth.23ButlikeHessesSiddhartha,theSiddhārthaofAśvaghoṣasstorystillneedstoliveouthissenseofindependence.HehastodealwithastreamofemissariesfromhisformerworldallpresentingtheirownmoralandemotionalclaimsandhehastotesthimselfagainsttheasceticswhoembodytherenunciationhesawinthefigureofthemendicantwhenhewassittingundertheRoseAppletree.Whenhequestionedtheseascetics,Siddhārtharealizedthattheydidnotoffertheliberationhewasseeking.Forliberation,theydirectedhimtoArāḍa,theSāṃkhyasage.InAśvaghoṣasaccount,SiddhārthaapproachedArāḍawithhighexpectations,aboutphilosophy(darśana)andaboutliberation:Asalightforamanlongingtosee,asaguideforamanlongingtotrek,asaboatforamanlongingtocross,sodoIregardyourphilosophy(darśana).Sodeigntoexplainittome,ifyouthinkitsrighttoexplain,sothatImaybecomefree,fromoldage,death,anddisease.24HeheardenoughobscureSāṃkhyacategoriestopuzzlealongstringofmoderninterpreters,buttheystilllefthimunsatisfied.Thereasonsareworthpayingatten-tionto.Ihavelistenedtothissubtleknowledgethatgrowsprogressivelymorepure;Butsincethefield-knower(kṣetrajña)isnotforsaken,Ithinkitisshortoftheabsolute(anaiṣṭhika).For,althoughthefield-knowerisfreed(mukta)fromPrimalNature(prakṛti)andTransformations(vikāra),YetIthinkitstillhasthequalityofgivingbirth(prasava)andservingasaseed.2522Rooney2008:249.23Hesse1971:4142.24Buddhacarita12.1314.25Onbirth(prasava)asacharacteristicofprakṛti,seeSāṃkhyakārikā11.\n70M.D.EckelThisabandonmentofegothatyouimaginetotakeplaceWhentheresasoul(ātman),theabandonmentoftheegocannottakeplace.Progressivelygreaterabandonment,traditionsays,ismoreperfect;therefore,Ithinkthatabandoningallleadstothefullattainmentofthegoal.26Itisnotenoughtorenounceprakṛti,hesays.Aslongasthereisaself(ātman),therestillisaseedofrebirth.Toremovethisseed,theselfalsohastobegivenup.Thisprogressivelygreaterabandonment(parataḥparatastyāgaḥ)iswhatSiddhārthareferstointhefirstoftheseversesasfinalorabsolute(naiṣṭhika).ThereferencetoanabsoluterenunciationrecallsthewordsofAsitathebrahmanicalsageinthefirstchapter,whenAsitasawSiddhārthaasababyandbegantoweep:Donotgrieveforme;grieveforthosewhothroughdelusionorloveofpleasureswillnothearhisabsolute(naiṣṭhika)dharma(Buddhacarita1.76).Whydoesabso-luteness(orfinality)requirecompleterenunciation?Whyisitnotenoughtofindastableplaceinthemidstofdesire,illusion,orchangewhereyoucanputyourfeetdownonsomethingperhapsaneternalselfthatdoesnotchange?Ananswerthisquestionwouldhelpidentifysomeofthecriticalenergythatdroveprogres-sivelymoreradicalformulationsoftheno-selfdoctrineindifferenttraditionsofBuddhistthought.Thequestionappliesnotjustintheasceticalpathbuttothevisionofrealityandtheself.Siddhārthasinitialinstincttorejecttheselfissharpenedandelaboratedasthestoryunfolds.Atthemomentofhisawakening,forexample,inthethirdwatchofthenight,hemeditates(Tib.bsgom)ontherealnatureoftheworldandattemptstounravelthequestionthatsethimonhisjourney:Whatisthesourceofoldageanddeath?Theansweristhattheycomefrombirth:ifnoonewereborn,therewouldbenoonetogrowoldanddie.Andwheredoesbirthcomefrom?Siddhārthaunder-standsthatitcomesfromkarma,theactionsthatfuelthecycleofdeathandrebirth:Withhisdivinesight,herealizedthat[birth]comesfromkarma;itdoesnotcomefromGod,fromNature(prakṛti),fromtheself,orwithoutanycause.27Sāṃkhyacategoriesagainplayacrucialrole.Aśvaghoṣathengivesatraditionalexplanationofthetwelve-foldchainofconditionedco-arisingthestandardBuddhistaccountofthecausesofrebirthandfinisheshisaccountoftheBuddhasawakeningwithtwokeyverses:Thegreatsagerealizedthatthecessationofcausalfactorscomesfromthecompleteabsenceofignorance;withthisheunderstoodperfectlywhatneededtobeunderstood,andhewasestablishedintheworldasBuddha.Withtheeightfoldpathofsupremevision,thebest26Buddhacarita12.6970,76,82.27Buddhacarita14.56:desnilhayispyangyisni//laslasjugparmkhyenpaste//dbangphyuglasminrangbzhinmin//bdaglasmayinrgyumedmin//.Afterverse14.31,theSanskritnolongersurvives,andweareforcedtoworkfromtheTibetantranslation.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas71ofmensawnoself,allthewaydownfromthetopofexistence,andheattainedpeace,likeafirethathasconsumedallitsfuel.28AtthemomentofhisBuddhahood,Siddhārthasurveystheuniverse(ortherealmsofrebirth)fromtoptobottomandseesnoself.Theconceptofno-selfappearsagainatanotherkeymomentinthenarrative,whentheBuddhaislyingdowntopreparefordeath.AwanderingasceticnamedSubhadraheardthattheBuddhawasabouttoachievenirvanaandaskedtomeetwithhim.AtfirsttheBuddhasdisciplestriedtosendhimaway.Theythoughtthathewasinterestedonlyinadoctrinaldispute.ButtheBuddhaaskedthemtolethiminandtaughthimtheeightfoldpath.Unsurprisingly,SubhadrainterpretsthisnewteachingasarepudiationoftheSāṃkhyaideasthathadorganizedhisownquestforliberation.Previouslyhethoughtthattheselfwasdifferentfromthebodyanddidnotchange.Nowherealizedthattherewasnopermanentselfandnothingcouldbetheresultoftheself.Armedwiththisnewrealization,hepaidhomagetotheBuddha,satdowninayogicposture,andpassedintonirvanalikeacloudscatteredbythewind.29Aśvaghosatreatsdoctrinalissueswithalighthandinthisshortpas-sage,butitispossibletodiscernatleastsomeofthekeyelementsoftheBuddhistapproachtotheself.ForSubhadratosaythatthereisnoselfisnottodenythatthereisachangeablestreamofcausesandconditionsthatgivethepersonalityasenseofcontinuityandresponsibility.SubhadraisenoughofaselftolistentotheBuddhasteaching,experienceachangeinunderstanding,andpreparefornirvana.ButheisnotapermanentselfinthesensethatwasattributedtotheSāṃkhyapuruṣa.Infact,itispreciselythislackofpermanencethatmakespossiblehisawakening.Subhadraisnotanythingbynature,andthereforecanchangeintosomethingnew,or,tobemoretruetothestory,canceasetobeanythingatall.WecanseeherewhySiddhārthawasconcernedaboutthefinalityofrenunciationinhisencounterwithArāḍa:itwasonlythiscompleterenunciationofapermanentselfthatwouldmakepossibleSiddhārthascompleteliberation,withtheunderstandingthatthetermsSiddhārthaandSubhadrainthissentencedoesnotrefertoapermanententity,buttothethoughts,feelings,modesofawareness,andbodilystatesthatarereferredtocon-ventionallyasaself.FormaldefinitionsofselfhoodinBuddhisttraditiontreadadelicatepathbetweentwoextremes:anextremeofannihilationandanextremeofpermanence.Aśvaghosaincludesthistwo-partformulainhisaccountofSubhadrasbreakthrough:Heunderstoodthatlivingbeingsarise,andsorejectedtheviewofannihilation;heunderstoodthatlivingbeingscease,andfirmlyrejectedtheviewofpermanence.3028Buddhacarita14.8384:marigpanimthadagmedlasdebzhindu//dubyedgagpardrangsrongchenposmkhyenpaste//dilasmkhyenbyadiniyangdagmkhyenmdzadnas//sangsrgyaszhesnijigrtennarabgnaspargyur//yanlagbrgyaddangldanparabtusharbayi//rtsemormyurgrodampailtabailamgyisni//sridrtseibarlasmchoggyurbdagmedrnamgzigsnas//budshingtshigpaimebzhinzhibargshegspargyur//.29Buddhacarita26.23.30Buddhacarita26.19:jiltarjigrtendagniskyebartogsnassu//desnichadpailtabarnamparspangspaste//jigrtendagginubpargrobashesnassu//rtagpailtababrtanposkyenpar\n72M.D.EckelTosaythatapersonispermanent,orcontinuesfromonemomenttothenext,underminesthepossibilityofchange;andtosaythatapersonisannihilated,orceasesateverymoment,underminesresponsibility.Themiddlewaybetweenextremeshastoallowbothpossibilitieschangeandresponsibilitywithoutopt-ingforeitherextremetotheexclusionoftheother.AsStevenCollinspointsoutinhismasterfulstudyofselflesspersons,thebalancebetweentheseextremesmirrorstheBuddhasaccountofthemiddlewayinhisfirstsermon:itavoidstheextremesofsensualindulgenceandasceticself-torture.31AnotherwaytoputthisistosaythattheBuddhateachesamiddlewaybetweenextremeself-affirmationandextremeself-denial.TheformalaspectsofthisteachingechothroughoutBuddhistdiscussionsoftheself,asinNāgārjunasRootVersesontheMiddleWay:Buddhasusedthewordself;theytaughtno-self;andtheyalsotaughtneitherselfnorno-self(MMK18.6).32Formulaslikethishaveacertainabstractclarityandsimplicity,butitisdifficulttosensethelifethatliesbehindthemwithoutplacingtheminanarrativesetting.AśvaghoṣasstoryoftheBuddhasconversationwithSubhadraishardlyatechnicalpieceofBuddhistphilosophy,butithelpsconveythesenseoflifeintheseformulaicphrases.HereIamreferringtoNussbaumssenseoflife.Aśvaghoṣabalancesontheedgeoftechnicaldiscourse,whilehealsomakesroomforthepainfulandambiguousdramaofalife-narrative.AfewyearsagotheDalaiLamawasinvitedtogivealectureatHarvardontheBuddhistideaofself.Hestartedwithapuzzlingstatement.Hesaidthatpeoplewhowantedtoknowtheirtrueselvesshouldhavecompassionfortheirneighbors.Asyouwouldexpect,hethenwentontogiveanaccountoftheno-selfdoctrineinitsmostrigorousform,asthedoctrineofemptiness,butwhydidhebeginbylinkinghisviewoftheselftotheideaofcompassion?ThisquestionbringsusbacktoanaspectofMarthaNussbaumsbookthatsofar,atleast,Ihavenotmentioned:theideaoflove.AśvaghoṣasretellingofthestoryoftheBuddhaisaboutmanythings.Itisanexplorationofvision,dharma,individualresponsibility,renunciation,andliberation,butitwouldbeuntruetothetextnottoacknowledgethatitalsoisaboutlove.ThisispartlyafunctionofitsuseoftheconventionsofcourtlySanskritpoetry,wherethemodalitiesoferoticlongingdictatemuchofthedrama.Italsoisrelatedtothediscourseaboutvarṇāśrama-dharma(theresponsibilitiesappropriatetodif-ferentcastesandstagesoflife)inwhichayoungmanlikeSiddhārthahasaright,evenaduty,toenjoythepleasuresoflove.Aśvaghoṣaevokesthesepleasureswithalushnessthatseemsstrangetomoderneyes,especiallytoeyesthatareaccustomedtoBuddhisttextsthatdenouncethepleasuresofthebody.ButtheyarenotsostrangeifwefollowtheDalaiLamassuggestionandlookatthewayloveiswoventogetherwithSiddhārthasemergingsenseofhimself.spangspao//.Thetermordinarythings(jigrtendag)isambiguous.TheTibetantranslatoroftenusesthistermtorepresenttheSanskritlokainthesenseofthehumanworldortheworldofsentientbeings.31Collins1982:104105.32ātmetyapiprajñaptitamanātmetyapideśitam/buddhairnātmācanānātmākaścidityapideśitam//.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas73WhenSiddhārthaventuredoutsidethepalaceandsawthefigureofanoldman,thefirstofthesightsthateventuallyledhimtoleavehishome,hisreactionwasfocusedpurelyonhimself:Whoisthisman,dearcharioteer...?Isitatransforma-tion(vikṛti)?Isithisnaturalstate(prakṛti)?Orisitsimplychance?(3.28)Whenheheardhischarioteersanswer,likeGilgameshreactingtothedeathofhisfriendEnkidu,hesaid:Willthisevilaffectmetoo?Withthesecondsight,apersonwhowasafflictedbydisease,hisconcernbegantoshiftintoafeelingofsympathyandcompassionforothers.33Bythetimehesawtheinsectsandwormsbrokenbytheplow,hisfeelingshadevolvedintothepity(kṛpā)thatsetsthistextsodecisivelyapartfromtheteachingoftheGītā.AfterSiddhārthasrenunciation,hisfathershouseholdpriesttriedtopersuadehimtocomebackbyappealingtolovefor(priya)fordharmaandforhimself(9.1517).ButSiddhārthahassethissightswiderthanmereloveforhisfatherorhisfamily.Hismindissetonliberation.HissituationisreminiscentofKarlPottersdescriptionofliberationasgreaterandgreaterconcerncoupledwithlessandlessattachment.34Compassion(karuṇā)returnsasaconceptinChapter13whenacertaininvisiblebeing(bhūtaṃkiṃcidadṛśyarūpam)seesMārasattempttoshakeSiddhārthasresolutionandsays:giveupyourhostilityandgohome(13.57).Why?[Siddhārtha]hascompassion(karuṇā)forthesuffer-ingworld,andheisworkingtofindthemedicineofknowledge(13.61).InthedescriptionofSiddhārthasawakeninginthenextchapter,AśvaghoṣaattributescompassiontoSiddhārthatwiceinasingleverse:Rememberingbirthanddeathinvariousmanylives,thecompassionateonefeltcompassionforsentientbeings(14.4).Withthisfeelingcametherealizationthatsaṃsārahadnosubstance,likethecoreofabananatree.Asthenightwentonandhisrealizationdeepened,hiscom-passionbecameevengreater:Ashesawthegoodandevilactionsofsentientbeingsandtheirdeathsandbirths,hiscompassionatenatureincreased(14.09).Bythispoint,therhetoricalstructureofthetextisclear:Siddhārthasrealizationofselfandno-selfinvolvesacomplextransmutationofloveinthepassionate,limitedsenseofphysicalpleasureandfamilyloyaltyintoauniversalconcernforthewelfareofallsentientbeings.ForsomeonewhoisfamiliarwiththeliteratureoftheMahāyāna,thisisnotasurprise.ButitisunusualandmovinginanaestheticsensetoseeitgivensuchvividnarrativeforminAśvaghoṣastext.AtthestartofLovesKnowledge,MarthaNussbaumsuggeststhatsomeviewsoftheworldcannotbefullyexpressedbyconventionalphilosophicalprose.35Someviewsaremorecomplexandmysterious,andarebetterexpressedinformsthataremorecomplex,allusive,andattentivetoparticulars.Thisisespeciallytrueofthedelicateandambiguousproblemofasserting,enacting,andquestioningonesownidentity.Textsthatarewritteninthephilosophicalmode,likeNāgārjunasRootVersesontheMiddleWay,maydefineaconceptualframewhereselfhood,orthelackofit,canbetestedandunderstood.Butthereisnothingquitelikethestoryofayoungmanenmeshedinacomplexworldofconflictingresponsibilitiesand33Thewordshereareanukampaandkaruṇā.34Potter1972:10.35IamparaphrasingNussbaumsobservationsonpage3ofLovesKnowledge.\n74M.D.Eckelfeelingstobringittolife.Andthequestionoflife,inallitscomplexityandmessiness,iswhatsetMarthaNussbaumsliteraryandphilosophicalinvestigationsinmotion.ItalsoisthequestionthathasbroughtBuddhistsbackagainandagaintothenarrativeoftheBuddhaslife,totellitagainindifferentwaysinresponsethedemandsofdifferentsocial,aesthetic,andideologicalconditions.AśvaghoṣamayhaveprovidedacompellingandoriginalaccountofthestoryofSiddhārtha,buthehashardlygiventhelastword.ThatbelongstothegenerationsofBuddhistwhohaveandwillcontinuetofashiontheirlivesinresponsetoSiddhārthasexample.Thevolumeinwhichthisessayappearsisconcernedwiththerelationshipbetweennarrativeandselfhood.Iwouldliketoconcludethisessaybyrespondingtooneoftheviewsdiscussedinthisvolume,theviewexpressedbyPeterStrawson,inhisessayAgainstNarrativity.Atthebeginningofhisbook,TheMessInside(Goldie2012),PeterGoldiesetsouttwocontrastingapproachestothisquestion.Ononesidearethosewhomaintainthathavingtherightkindofnarrativeofourlivesisinsomesenseintegralorcon-stitutiveofourbeingthepersonthatweare(1).Ontheothersidearethosewhosaythat[n]arratives,whatevertheymightbe,donotplayanysignificantpartinoutunderstandingofourlives,orinlivingalife.InhisessayAgainstNarrativity,PeterStrawson(2004)putshimselfinthecriticalcampandarguesagainsttwopar-ticularclaimsabouttherelationshipbetweennarrativeandselfhood.Oneoftheseclaimsisdescriptive,asintheclaimbyJerryBrunerthattheselfisaperpetuallywrittenstory.Theotherisnormative,asintheclaimbyMaryaSchechtmanthat[aperson]mustbeinpossessionofafullandexplicitnarrative[ofhislife]todevelopfullyasaperson.WhattroublesStrawsonaboutthesetwoclaimsisnotthecon-ceptofnarrativeperse,buttheideathatnarrativestandsinsomeimportantorevennecessaryrelationtowhathecallsonesself-experience.Byself-experiencehemeansconsideringoneselfprincipallyasaninnermentalentityorselfofsomesort(429).Inotherwords,hisargumentisnotagainstnarrative.Afterall,whocanreallydenythathumanbeingslovetotellstories?Hisobjectionisagainstnarrativ-ity,andnarrativityinvolvestherelationshipbetweennarrativeandself.ObviouslyAśvaghoṣa,asaBuddhistnarrativethinkerandliteraryartist.alsoisconcernedaboutstoriesoftheself.HowcouldAśvaghoṣasaccountoftheself(andthelackofself)beusedtoframearesponsetoStrawsonsargument?Strawsondevelopshispositionbydistinguishingbetweentwodifferentviewsoftheself:aDiachronicviewinwhichtheselfisconsideredtobesomethingthatwasthereinthe(further)pastandwillbethereinthe(further)futureandanEpisodicviewinwhichonedoesnotfigureoneself,consideredasaself,assomethingthatwasthereinthe(further)pastandwillbethereinthe(further)future(430).HeplaceshimselffirmlyintheEpisodiccampandgoesontosaythatapersonwhoholdsanEpisodicviewhasnoparticularneedforthenarrativeconstructionofaself.Infact,itmightevenbeperniciousandmisleading.Onthefaceofit,StrawsonspositionisverysimilartotheclassicBuddhistviewoftheself.InAśvaghoṣasLifeoftheBuddha,SiddhārthamovesbeyondtheSāṃkhyaviewofaselftobetrulyawakened:thebestofmensawnoself,allthewaydownfromthetopofexistence,\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas75andheattainedpeace,likeafirethathasconsumedallitsfuel.36ThepointreturnsatthemomentofSiddhārthasfinalnirvanaintheteachinghedeliverstoSubhadra.Inasense,thisisaclassicaffirmationofStrawsonsEpisodicposition:Siddhārthaawakenstotherealizationthatnothingcalledselfcontinuesfromonemomenttothenext.TosaythatSiddhārthahasachievedawakening(bodhi)isanotherwayofsayingthathehasachievedthefreedomorliberation(mokṣa)thatsoconcernedMārainhisencounterwithSiddhārthaashesatunderthetreeofhisawakening.LiberationinthisdefinitivesenseinvolvednotjusttherenunciationofSiddhārthaspalace,hisfamily,andallthetrappingsofworldlylife,butrenunciationofaperma-nentself.ItisfascinatingtoreadStrawsonsaccountofhisownEpisodicself-experience.SincetheEpisodicviewpresumesnoessentialconnectionwiththepastorthefuture,Strawsonnotesthat,inasense,EpisodicsarebydefinitionmorelocatedinthepresentthanDiachronics,sofarasthereself-experienceisconcerned(432).ThiscouldbeastartingpointforthepracticeofBuddhistmeditation.ButStrawsonalsoacknowledgesthatasahumanbeingheknowshehasapast,andremembersaspectsofitfromtheinsideastheexperiencesofthehumanbeingthatIam(434).ItisthisqualificationthisreferencetoahumanbeingthatisdifferentfromaselfthatmovesStrawsonevenmoredecisivelyinaBuddhistdirection.Buddhisttraditioninvolvesthedenialofapermanentself:inthatsenseitisEpisodic.Butitalsoinsiststhatthisdenialhastobeheldtogetherwithapragmatic,functionalrecognitionofpersonalcontinuity.Tothinkthattheselfispermanentrestrictsthepossibilityofchange,andtothinkthattheselfisannihilatedmakesitdifficult,perhapsevenimpossible,totakeresponsibilityforonesactionsortoenjoytheresultsofallthechoicesinvolvedintheprocessofliving.Thestructuralrela-tionshipbetweenthesetwopositionstheavoidanceoftwoextremesiswhatBuddhistsmeanbyaMiddlePath,wherethewordpath(pratipad)meansnotjustawayofactingbutawayofknowing.BuddhistshaveworkedouttheconflictingrequirementsoftheMiddlePathdif-ferentlyatdifferenttimesandindifferentBuddhistcultures.Oneobviouswayistoplotthesetwoperspectivesinnarrativeform,asinAśvaghoṣasLifeoftheBuddha.AsAśvaghoṣatellsthestory,Siddhārthahadtobeginhisquestforawakeningbyseparatinghimselfradicallyfromthepeoplethatdefinedhimasaprince.Innarra-tiveandideologicalterms,thisinvolvedtheassertionofaseparateself(picturedhereinthelanguageoftheSāṃkhyapuruṣaorsoul).Ashisknowledgeandhisexperienceofrenunciationdevelopedandmatured,hereachedastagewherethisselfalsohadtobegivenup.No-selfmayhavebeenthefinalgoalofhisquest,butithadtoberealizedthroughanassertionoftheself,or,inthewordsofJackEngler:Youhavetobesomebodybeforeyoucanbenobody(35).ButnarrativeisnottheonlywaytoexpressthebalanceofBuddhistapproachestotheself.Theno-selfdoctrinecanalsobepicturedinaseriesofcommoncomparisons.WhenAśvaghosasaysthat,inthemomentofawakening,Siddḥārthaattainedpeace,36Buddhacarita14.8384.Tibetantextinnote27.\n76M.D.Eckellikeafirethathasconsumedallitsfuel,thereisanimplicitimageofthepersonalityasafire.Moralactionsthegoodandbadkarmathatbringssomeformofmoralretributionarelikefueladdedtothefireofpersonality.Overtimetheyareburnedup.Ifonecanavoidaddingnewfueltothefire,therecomesamomentofextinctionornirvāṇa,whenthefireofthepersonalitygoesout.Aso-calledfireisconstantlychanging:eachmomentisdifferentfromthemomentsthatcomebeforeandafter.Butthefireinvolvesasenseofcausalcontinuity:eachmomentfollowsandisinsomesensedeterminedbythemomentsthatcomebefore.Asanimageofthepersonality,ithasaspectsofcontinuityandofperpetualchange.Anothercommoncomparisonistheimageofthepersonalityasahouse.StevenCollinspointsoutthattheprocessofleavinghomeinvolvesthreestages.Thefirstistheseparationofthebody,asinSiddhārthasdeparturefromthepalaceonthenightofhisgoingforth.Thesecondistheseparationofthemind,whenthemindlearnstogiveupalltheattachmentsanddistractionthattieittotheworldthathasbeenleftbehind.Thisissometimesvisualizedascleaninguparoom:Negligenceproducesalotofdustanddirt,evenawholeheapofrefuse.Itisasifinahouseonlyaverylittledirtcollectsinadayortwo;butifthisgoesonformanyyears,itwillgrowintoavastheapofrefuse(Collins173).Thethirdstageinvolvescompleteseparationofthehouseofself,asinthewell-knownversefromtheDhammapada:Ihavewanderedthroughmanybirthsinsaṃsāra,seekingbutnotfindingthehousebuilder;repeatedbirthisfullofsuffering.Housebuilder!Youareseen,youwillnotbuildahouseagain.Allyourraftersarebroken,yourridge-poleisshattered.Mymindisbeyondcondi-tioning,andhasreachedtheendofdesire.37Herethewordseparation(viveka)isthesameonethatwasusedforthesolitudeSiddhārthasoughtwhenhewascon-templatinghisseparationfromthepalaceandtheworldofmaterialnature.Foramorediscursiveaccountoftheno-selfdoctrine,oneofthemostcitedsourcesistheconversationbetweenthemonkNāgasenaandtheGreekKingMilindainTheQuestionsofKingMilinda.Thekingbeginswithaquestion:Bywhatname,ReverendSir,areyouknown?38Nāgasenareplies:IamknownasNāgasena,andmyco-practitionersaddressmeassuch.But,yourmajesty,thereisnoPerson(puggala)tobefoundhere.Herethewordpuggalareferstoanaspectofthepersonalitythatcontinuesfromonemomenttothenext.ThekingthenquestionNāgasenainmoredetail:Whoisitwhoacceptsthegiftsofferedtoamonk,practicesthepath,keepstheprecepts,andattainsnirvana?Istherenothinginallthewell-knownconstituentsofthepersonality,fromthebodyallthewaytoconsciousness,thatcanconsideredNāgasena?Whentheanswertoallthesequestionsisno,thekingconcludesthatthereisnothingcalledNāgasena.Nāgasenarespondsbyaskinghowthekinggottotheirmeeting:Didhecomeonfootorinachariot?Thekingexplainsthathecameinachariot.Nāgasenathenshiftstheconversationandasks37Dhammapada14344.Thecommentaryexplainsthatthehouseistheattabhāvaorthetotalityofthepersonality(Collins292).38TranslatedbyJohnS.Strong,inTheExperienceofBuddhism:SourcesandInterpretations,secondedition(Belmont,Calif.:Wadsworth,2002):9395.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas77aboutthepartofthechariot:Isthereanythinginanyofthesepartsthatcanbecalledchariot?Thekingrespondsthatthewordchariotisjustatermoraconventionaldesignationusedtorefertothesevariousparts.Nāgasenathenturnsthekingslan-guagearoundandappliesittotheperson:Itisadesignation,adescription,anappellation,nothingbutaname.Butinthefinalanalysis,theultimatesense,thereisnoPersontobefoundherein.ThekeytothisconversationliesintheformulationofNāgasenasresponse.Inthefinalanalysis,fromtheultimatepointofview,thereisnothingtobecalledNāgasena,butinanominalorpracticalsense,thenamecanbeusedtodesignateaseriesofchangeableparts.OnecanimaginethekingpuzzlingoverthedistinctionbetweenthesetwopointsofviewwhilethenominalNāgasenagetsinthenominalchariotanddriveshappilyaway.Sometimestherelationshipbetweenthesetwopointsofview,knownmoreconventionallyasthetwotruths,takestheformofanimplicitphilosophicalnar-rative.Onebegins,astheDalaiLamadidinhislectureontheselfatHarvard,withthenominalorconventionalperspective:Ifyouwanttoknowyourself,havecompassionforyourneighbor.Thenoneanalyzestheselffromtheultimatepointofviewanddoesnotfind(touseNāgasenaslanguage)anythingtowhichthewordselforpersonrefers.HoldingthesetwoperspectivestogetheristheMiddlePath;itisabalancedmodeofunderstandingthatmakesspaceforboththeDiachronicandtheEpisodicexperienceofself.Botharenecessarytomakesenseofthecomplexityofhumanexperience.MyresponsetoStrawsonwouldnotbetoquarrelwithhisviewofEpisodicself-experience.Ifanything,BuddhistviewsofselfareevenmoreradicallyEpisodicthanhis.MypointwouldbethatheneedstomakemoreofthedistinctionbetweentheDiachronicviewoftheselfandhisownsenseofhimselfasahumanbeing(Strawson434).Tobeahumanbeingforwhommemoryhasspecialemotionalandmoralrelevance,butwhohasnocon-tinuousself,strikesmeaspreciselythepointBuddhistsaremakingwhentheyinsistonaMiddleWayintheirapproachtotheself.ToconveyasenseofhisEpisodicself-experience,Strawsonmentionedacom-mentbyHenryJamesinaletterwrittenin1915toJamessindomitable,sharp-tonguedoldfriendRhodaBroughton:Ithinkofit,themasterpieceinquestion,astheworkofquiteanotherpersonthanmyself,atthisdatethatofarich(somuchratherthanapoor)relation,say,whohasntcastmeoffinmytrouble,butsuffersmestilltoclaimashyfourthcousinship.39Jamesswordsareembeddedinaseriesofremarksabouthishealth(whichseemstohavebeenunusuallybad),novelshehasbeenreading,andhopesthattheywouldsoonmeetinLondonfortea.Youmightexpectacommentlikethisfromsomeonewhowasjustnotfeelinghimself.ButitreflectsJamessdeepfascinationwiththeironiesofself-experienceandchoice.ShortlyafterJamespublishedThePortraitofaLady,withitsinnovativeandsensi-tiveexplorationoftheconsciousnessofIsabelArcher,hisbrotherWilliampublishedanarticlethatlaunchedthetermstreamofconsciousnessintoAnglo-Americanphilosophicaldiscourse(1884).Henrywrotethathisbrothersessayhaddefeatedhim,butitcouldbereadasacribsheetforthetreatmentofconsciousnessin39Strawson42930,quotedfromHorne1999:56263.\n78M.D.EckelHenryJamessownnovels.40Whatbothbrothersmakeclearisthecomplexityofconsciousness.Consciousnesspoolsanditflows,spreadswideandrunsdeep,butitsactivityneverceasesandthereisnopartofourmentallifethatdoesnotbelongtoit.41Thesamecanbesaidofonessenseofself.Toreduceittoasimpleopposi-tionbetweenDiachronicandEpisodicdoesnotdojusticetoitscomplexity.Ithasaspectsofboth.Anditispreciselythisambiguityandcomplexitythatmakeitsoamenabletoexpressioninnarrative,whetheritisthestoryofJamessslimshadeofayoungwomanaffrontingherdestiny42onthelawnofaEuropeancountryhouseorayoungprinceconfrontinghisdharmainthechambersofanIndianpalace.Forbothofthem,thechallengeoffashioningaselfinvolveslosingaself,atleasttheselfthattheyoncehadimaginedatthestartoftheirjourney.SourcesBareauA(1982)Unpersonnagebienmystérieux:lépouseduBuddha.In:HercusLAetal(eds)IndologicalandBuddhiststudies:volumeinhonourofProf.J.W.deJongonhissixtiethbirth-day.FacultyofAsianStudies,CanberraBaysG(1983)ThevoiceoftheBuddha,thebeautyofcompassion.DharmaPublishing,Berkeley.(translationofFoucaux1883)BronkhorstJ(1999)WhyistherephilosophyinIndia?RoyalNetherlandsAcademyofArtsandSciences,AmsterdamCarrithersM,CollinsS,LukesS(1985)Thecategoryoftheperson:anthropology,philosophy,history.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeCollinsS(1982)Selflessperson:imageryandthoughtinTheravādaBuddhism.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeCovillL,RoelserU,ShawS(2010)Liveslived,livesimagined:biographyintheBuddhisttradi-tions.WisdomPublications,BostonEckelMD(2008)BhāvivekaandhisBuddhistopponents,Harvardorientalseries70.DepartmentofSanskritandIndianStudiesHarvardUniversity,Cambridge,MAEnglerJ(2003)Beingsomebodyandbeingnobody:areexaminationoftheunderstandingofselfinpsychoanalysisandBuddhism.In:SafranJD(ed)PsychoanalysisandBuddhism:anunfold-ingdialogue.WisdomPublications,Boston,pp35100FoucauxPhEd.(trans)(1884)LeLalitaVistara.AnnalesduMuséeGuimet.ErnestLeroux,ParisFoucherA(1963)ThelifeoftheBuddha:accordingtotheancienttextsandmonumentsofIndia.WesleyanUniversityPress,MiddletownGnoliR(19771978)TheGilgitmanuscriptoftheSaṅghabhedavastu.2vols.SerieOrientaleRoma49.IstitutoperilMedioedEstremoOriente,RomeGoldieP(2012)Themessinside:narrative,emotion,andthemind.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordGorraM(2012)Portraitofanovel:HenryJamesandthemakingofanAmericanmasterpiece.Liveright,NewYorkHattoriM(1968)Dignāga,onperception,Harvardorientalseries47.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAHesseH(1971)Siddhartha(trans:RosnerH).Bantam,NewYork40ThedescriptionbelongstoMichaelGorra2012:235.41Gorra2012:235.42Fromtheprefacetothe1906editionofThePortraitofaLady,inHenryJames1984:1076.\n5AStoryofNoSelf:LiteraryandPhilosophicalObservationsonAśvaghoṣas79HiltebeitelA(2006)AśvaghoṣasBuddhacarita:thefirstknowncloseandcriticalreadingoftheBrahmanicalSanskritepics.JIndianPhilos34:229286HorneP(ed)(1999)HenryJames:alifeinletters.Viking,NewYorkJamesW(1884)Onsomeomissionsinintrospectivepsychology.Mind33:126JamesH(1984)HenryJames:literarycriticism.LibraryofAmerica,NewYorkJamesH(1985)Theportraitofalady.In:HenryJamesNovels18811886.LibraryofAmerica,NewYorkJohnstonEH(1936)EarlySāṃkhya:anessayonitshistoricaldevelopmentaccordingtothetexts.RoyalAsiaticSociety,LondonJohnstonEH(1995)AśvaghoṣasBuddhacaritaorActsoftheBuddha.Lahore,1935.Reprinted.MunshiramManoharlal,NewDelhiKentSA(1982)SāṃkhyaintheBuddhacarita.PhilosEastWest32:259278LarsonGJ(1979)ClassicalSāṃkhya:aninterpretationofitshistoryandmeaning.MotilalBanarsidass,DelhiLarsonGJ,BhattacharyaRS(1987)Sāṃkhya:adualisttraditionofIndianphilosophy,EncyclopediaofIndianphilosophies.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonLiRongxi(trans)(1995)AbiographyoftheTripiṭakamasterofthegreatCienMonasteryoftheGreatTangDynasty.BDKEnglishTripiṭaka77.NumataCenterforBuddhistTranslationandResearch,BerkeleyMillerBS(trans)(1986)TheBhagavad-Gita:Krishnascounselintimeofwar.Bantam,NewYorkNussbaumMC(1990)Lovesknowledge:essaysonphilosophyandliterature.OxfordUniversityPress,NewYorkOFlaherty,DonigerW(1984)Dreams,illusions,andotherrealities.UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoOlivelleP(trans)(2008)LifeoftheBuddhabyAśvaghoṣa,ClaySanskritseries.NewYorkUniversityPress,NewYorkPotter,KH(1972)PresuppositionsofIndiasPhilosophies.PrenticeHall,EnglewoodCliffs,1963.Reprinted.GreenwoodPress,WestportRooneyD(2008)Angkor:CambodiaswondrousKhmertemples.Odyssey,HongKongSchoberJ(ed)(1997)SacredbiographyintheBuddhisttraditionsofSouthandSoutheastAsia.UniversityofHawaiiPress,HonoluluStrawsonG(2004)Againstnarrativity.Ratio(newseries)17:428452StrongJS(1997)Afamilyquest:theBuddha,Yaśodharā,andRāhulaintheMūlasarvāstivādaVinaya.In:SchoberJ(ed)SacredbiographyintheBuddhisttraditionsofSouthandSoutheastAsia.UniversityofHawaiiPress,Honolulu,pp113128StrongJS(2001)TheBuddha:ashortbiography.Oneworld,OxfordStrongJS(2002)TheexperienceofBuddhism:sourcesandinterpretations,2ndedn.Wadsworth,Belmont\nChapter6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist:NauseaandtheAdventuresoftheNarrativeSelfBenRothBesides,artisfunandforfun,ithasinnumerableintentionsandcharms.Literatureinterestsusondifferentlevelsindifferentfashions.Itisfulloftricksandmagicanddeliberatemystification.Literatureentertains,itdoesmanythings,andphilosophydoesonething.(IrisMurdoch1997,p.4)Ifthereissomethingcomforting—religious,ifyouwant—aboutparanoia,thereisstillalsoanti-paranoia,wherenothingisconnectedtoanything,aconditionnotmanyofuscanbearforlong.(ThomasPynchon1973,p.434)BoththosewhowriteinfavorofandagainstthenotionofthenarrativeselfciteSartreandhisnovelNauseaasexemplaryopponentsofit.AlasdairMacIntyre,acentralproponentofthenarrativeself,writes:SartremakesAntoineRoquentinarguenotjust[]thatnarrativeisverydifferentfromlife,butthattopresenthumanlifeintheformofanarrativeisalwaystofalsifyit(1984,p.214).GalenStrawson,acriticofnarrativity,writesthatSartreseesthenarrative,story-tellingimpulseasadefect,regrettable.[]HethinkshumanNarrativityisessentiallyamatterofbadfaith,ofradical(andtypicallyirremediable)inauthenticity(2004,p.435).IthinkthatthistypeofinterpretationofNauseaisblinderedandbadandreliesonanimpoverishedapproachtoreadingfictiontypicalofphilosophers:oftakingonecharacteratonemomentasmouthpieceforbothanovelasawholeandauthorbehindit.Beginningasitdoesindescription,thenovelchallengestheseconceptualordersratherthantakingonesideortheother;itthusinvitesustorethinktheterrainofnarrativity.Here,IsketchamoreholisticreadingofNauseaanditsnotionofadventures,onewhichundercutstheclaimthatitopposesanarrativeconceptionB.Roth(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,BostonUniversity,745CommonwealthAvenue,Boston,MA02215,USAe-mail:benroth@bu.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht201581A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_6\n82B.Rothoftheself.Isuggestaswellthatthisleavesuswitharobustnotionofwhythenovelasaformhasacertainkindofphilosophicalimportance,animportanceexactlypassedoverbythesortofapproachesthatallow,forexample,Nauseatobereducedtoanargument.6.1MacIntyreandStrawsononSartre/RoquentinMacIntyre,inhiscommentsonNausea,makesnodistinctionbetweenthestand-pointofRoquentin,ascharacter,andSartre,asauthorofthenovelspecificallyorphilosopherandliteraryfigureingeneral.Rather,hedistinguishesbetweenSartre/Roquentin,Sartre/Heidegger,andSartre/MarxandclaimsthatSartre/Roquentinbelievesthatlivingandstorytellingaremutuallyexclusive:Therearenotandtherecannotbeanytruestories.Humanlifeiscomposedofdiscreteactionswhichleadnowhere,whichhavenoorder;thestory-tellerimposesonhumaneventsretrospec-tivelyanorderwhichtheydidnothavewhiletheywerelived(p.214).StrawsonisinitiallymorecarefulindistinguishingSartreandRoquentin,ascribingsuchaviewtothecharacteralone(p.429),buthequicklyconflatesthemaswell,thusdoingawaywiththeinterpretativeproblemswithwhichSartreforbetterorworseburdensuswhenhechoosesaformotherthanthetreatiseanddoesntspeakinhisownvoice.StrawsonascribestoSartreandRoquentintheviewthatweimposenarrativeformonourlives,butdoingsoisfalsifyingandsoweshouldnt:thestorytellingimpulseisregrettableandinauthentic,thoughnaturalandnearlyunavoidable(p.435).Thisis,Ithinkitissafetosay,theorthodoxreadingofNausea,amongphilosophersandmostespeciallywithrespecttonarrativity.1Thekeymomenttosupportthisreadingoccursearlyinthenovel.Roquentinmusesonthepossibilityofwhathecallsadventures:forthemostbanaleventobecomeanadventure,youmust(andthisisenough)begintorecountit.Thisiswhatfoolspeople:amanisalwaysatelleroftales,helivessurroundedbyhisstoriesandthestoriesofothers,heseeseverythingthathappenstohimthroughthem;andhetriestolivehisownlifeasifheweretellingastory.(1964,p.39)AllthisfallsunderStrawsonsdescriptivepsychologicalNarrativitythesis,whichhedifferentiatesfromthenormativeethicalNarrativitythesis(p.428).Roquentincontinues,however,makinghisownnormativeclaim:Butyouhavetochoose:liveortell.[]Nothinghappenswhileyoulive.[]Butevery-thingchangeswhenyoutellpeopleaboutlife;itsachangenoonenotices:theproofisthatpeopletalkabouttruestories.Asiftherecouldpossiblybetruestories.[]Iwantedthemomentsofmylifetofollowandorderthemselveslikethoseofaliferemembered.Youmightaswelltryandcatchtimebythetail.(pp.3940)Afullerreadingofthenovelalongtheselineswouldsuggestthathere,earlyon,Roquentinrealizestheinauthenticityofnarrativity.Whatfollowsisthenadramati-1SeetooAbbott2008,pp.22,1356;Brooks1984,p.22.\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist83zationofhisstruggletogiveupviewinghislifeasastoryandtarryinsteadwithraw,unstructuredexistence,nauseatingasitisabravedecisionphilosophically,afoolishonepractically,withintheframeofthenovel.Andifthiswereallthenovelhadtosayonthematter,thenMacIntyreandStrawsonmightberighttoidentifyRoquentinasanopponentofthenarrativeself(thougheventhenextendingsuchaclaimtothenovelandSartrewouldrequirefurthermoves).Formally,Nauseabecomesaratheroddnovelbythisreading,withitskeymomentoccurringsoclosetoitsbeginning,lessthanafourthofthewayintothenovel.Indeed,thismomentbegstobeconsideredinconjunctionwithatleasttwootherscenes:whenRoquentingoestoseeAnnyinParisandthecloseofthenovel.DoingsoundercutstheclaimthatRoquentin,thenovelasawhole,andSartrefinallysanctionthechoice:liveortell.Despiteitsfracturedbeginningsanddiaryform,Nauseaevolvesintoafairlytraditionalnovel.Itbeginswithsuchformalcontrivancesasaneditorsnote,which,inaKierkegaardianmanner,describeswhatfollowsasfoundamongthepapersofAntoineRoquentinandpublishedwithoutalteration(p.1),aswellasanumberofundatedpageswhosegapsandillegiblesectionsarehighlightedbysupposedlyeditorialfootnotes(pp.13).Onlytwomorefootnotesfollow(pp.4,12),andthenthedeviceisabandoned.Roquentinsentriesbecomelongerandmorestraightforward,lengthystretchesofactionrelatednaturalisticallywithlessandlesscommentary.Theylosetheirdiary-likecharacter,becominginsteadatypicalfirst-personnarrative.AsFrankKermodewrites,SartrebeganLaNauséeasanepisodicwork,andRoquentinspracticereflectsthis;buttheneedforstructuregrewimperi-ous(2000,p.146).AllthisistosaythatNauseagraduallybecomesjustthesortofstorythatMacIntyreandStrawsonclaimSartre/Roquentinopposes,withacleararcfromamotivatingcrisis,throughvariousrejectedpossibilitiesforrestoration,toafinalepiphany.Roquentinhasbeenbesetbythetitularnausea,afeelingofunknowncauseandmeaningthatcomesoverhimrepeatedlyduringthecourseofthenovelwhenheisincloseobservationofvariousobjectsaroundhim.Simultaneously,hehasbeenthrownintowhatwefamiliarlycall(inlargepartduetoNausea)anexis-tentialcrisis.Hegivesuphiswritingandisplaguedbythethoughtthathehadnttherighttoexist(p.84).Figuringouthowexactlythesetwoproblemsarerelatedorwhethertheyarereallyjustoneproblemrequiresinterpretivework,buttheymotivateeverythingthatfollows.Inthemiddleofthenovel,Roquentinispresentedwithtraditionalsolutionstoatleasthisexistentialpurposelessness:theself-taughtmanoffershimhumanismandsocialismasreasonsforliving(pp.103ff),andBouvilleoffershimimagesofthelifeofsociety.2Rejectingalloftheseoptions,Roquentinisleftfullyabject:thereisabsolutelynomorereasonforliving,alltheonesIhavetriedhavegivenwayandIcantimagineanymoreofthem.[]Mylifeisending(pp.1567).AbouttoleaveforParistoretirefromlifeathisyoungage,Roquentincomes,inthenovelsfinalscene,tohisgreatrealizationwhilelisteningtothejazzrecord.Thistraditionalepiphanicstructureisobscuredbecausethenovel2ThislatterisrepresentedbyRoquentinsSundaywalkdowntheRueTournebride(pp.40ff)andvisittotheBouvilleMuseumtolookattheportraitsofthecityspastluminaries(pp.82ff).HaydenCarruthmakesasimilarpointinhisintroductiontothenovel(pp.xixii).\n84B.RothcutsoffjustafterRoquentinsrealizationwithoutdramatizingitsconsequences.ItistherenonethelessandsetupbyRoquentinsmusingsaboutadventures.Beforemovingforwardwithmyreadingofthenovel,IwanttocompareitsnotionofadventurestoGeorgSimmelsconceptofthesamename.6.2SimmelandSartreonAdventuresSimmelsessayPhilosophiedesAbenteuersappearedinthenewspaperDerTaginBerlininJuneof1910.ItwasreprintedasDasAbenteuerinSimmelsPhilosophischeKulturin1911,withasecondeditionfollowingin1919.Itbeginsfromtheclaimthateveryexperienceistwofold:itcanbetakenimmediately,byitself,oritcanbetakenasasegmentofacourseofalife(1959,p.243).Thedifferenceisnotinthecontentoftheeventsthemselves,butratherinhowtheyaretaken,theformofexperiencing(p.253).Thefirstmanneroftakinganexperienceasimmediate,detachedfromthecourseoflifeSimmelnamesadventure.Giventwoexperiencesthatarenotparticularlydifferentinsubstance,itcouldbethatonlyoneisperceivedasanadventureandtheothernot,becauseeverythinghangsonus,nottheevents(p.243).ThislineofthoughtismirroredinRoquentinsfirst,fumblingattemptstoexplainthenauseaandthechangethathascomeoverhim.IthinkImtheonewhohaschanged,hewrites(p.4).Andlater:Thisfeelingofadventuredefinitelydoesnotcomefromevents:Ihaveprovedit.Itsratherthewayinwhichthemomentsarelinkedtogether(p.56).[T]hemostgeneralformofadventure,Simmelwrites,isitsdroppingoutofthecontinuityoflife(p.243).Itseventsareactuallycontinuouswithwhatcomesbeforeandaftertheminthecourseofalife,butanadventurestandsincontrasttothatinterlockingoflife-links,andinitsdeepermeaning,itoccursoutsidetheusualcontinuityoflife(p.243).Inwhatwouldseemtobeaparadox,anadventure,whilemarginaltothecourseoflife,isdistinctfromallthatisaccidentalandalien;itisultimatelyconnectedwiththecenter(p.243).Itshouldthusnotbeconfusedwiththemerelyaccidentalepisode(p.252).Inanearlyencounter,Roquentinisastonishedwhentheself-taughtmanintroducestheconceptofadventures,onwhichRoquentinhimselfhasbeenprivatelymusing,intotheirconversation.Andtheself-taughtmansdefinitionechosSimmels:aneventoutoftheordinarywithoutbeingnecessarilyextraordinary(p.36).Afterward,inmemory,anadventuretakesonadreamlikequality,Simmelclaims.AndWhatwedesignateasdreamlikeisnothingbutamemorywhichisboundtotheunified,consistentlife-processbyfewerthreadsthanareordinaryexperiences(p.244).Indeed,anadventurecanappearsodetachedfromthenormalcourseofoneslifeastobethoughtofassomeoneelsesexperience:wemightwellfeelthatwecouldappropriatelyassigntotheadventureasubjectotherthantheego(p.244).RoquentinmovedtoBouvilleaftertravelingforanumberofyears,anditistheseexperiencesabroadthatprovidetheinitialtemplateforadventuresinthenovel:intheolddays,inLondon,Meknes,Tokyo,Ihaveknowngreatmoments,Ihavehad\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist85adventures(p.37).Hedescribestheendofthisstretchofhislifeaslikewakingfromasix-yearslumber(p.5;seetoop.98).ThinkingabouthistimeinMeknes,hebecomesunsurewhethertheyarememoriesorjustfiction(p.32).And,againrecallingSimmel,hewritesthatTheresapersonwhodoesthis,doesthat,butitisntI,Ihavenothingincommonwithhim.3Hetakesthisbackmerepageslater,writingwithdoubleemphasisWellyoucancallthatbyanynameyoulike,inanycase,itwasaneventwhichhappenedtoME(p.37).Yetheisunsure,atleastatthispoint,whattheword[adventure]means(p.36),leaningmomentarilytowardtheconclusionthat,infact,hehasneverhadadventuresandItisntaquestionofwords(p.37).SimmelwritesfurtherthatWeascribetoanadventureabeginningandanendmuchsharperthanthosetobediscoveredintheotherformsofourexperiences(p.244).Beingdisconnectedfromthelargercourseoflife,anadventuresbegin-ningisnotdependentonprioreventsendings,anditsownendingdoesnotneces-sarilygivewaytosubsequenteventsbeginnings.4RoquentinseemsagaintotakeupSimmelslanguage.Sittinginacafe,hethinks:Imarvelattheseyoungpeople:drinkingtheircoffee,theytellclear,plausiblestories.[]IfIwereintheirplace,Idfallovermyself(p.7).Why?Becauseheseesnowthatyouplungeintostorieswithoutbeginningorend(p.7).Butthisistrueofnon-adventurousexperienceinthenormalcourseoflife.Ofhisadventuresabroad,RoquentinclaimsIcouldtellstories,tellthemtoowell(asfarasanecdotesareconcerned,Icanstanduptoany-oneexceptshipsofficersandprofessionalpeople)(p.33).Evenashecomestodoubtwhetherthesereallywereadventuresandwhethertherecanbeadventuresatall,RoquentinstillappearstoemploySimmelsvocabulary:Thebeginningswouldhavehadtoberealbeginnings.Alas!NowIseesoclearlywhatIwanted.Realbeginningsarelikeafanfareoftrumpets,likethefirstnotesofajazztune,cuttingshorttedium,makingforcontinuity(p.37).Inturn,endingsareemphasizedaswell:Somethingisbeginninginordertoend:anadventuredoesnotletitselfbedrawnout.(p.37).Anadventureformsaself-standingwhole.Simmeldrawsaconnectionbetweentheadventurerandtheartist:Fortheessenceofaworkofartis,afterall,thatitcutsoutapieceoftheendlesslycontinu-oussequencesofperceivedexperience,detachingitfromallconnectionswithonesideortheother,givingitaself-sufficientformasthoughdefinedandheldtogetherbyaninnercore(p.245).RoquentinputsthestorytellerintheplaceofSimmelsartist.Comingbacknowtothekeypassage,onehastochoose,liveortell,becausenothinghappenswhenyoulive.Thescenerychanges,peoplecomeinandgoout,thatsall.Therearenobeginnings.Daysaretackedontodayswithoutrhymeorreason,aninterminable,monotonousaddition(p.39).Tellingorganizesanexperience3p.33.Alinethat,givenalongertreatment,Strawsonwouldsurelyemphasize.4ComparethisclaimtoAristotlesinthePoetics:BybeginningImeanthatwhichdoesnothaveanecessaryconnectionwithaprecedingevent,butwhichcanitselfgiverisenaturallytosomefurtherfactoroccurrence.Anend,bycontrast,issomethingwhichnaturallyoccursafterapre-cedingevent,whetherbynecessityorasageneralrule,butneednotbefollowedbyanythingelse(1987,p.39).\n86B.Rothbywayofabeginningandanending,makingitakintoanadventure.Everythingchangeswhenyoutellaboutlife[.]Youseemtostartatthebeginning[,but]inrealityyouhavestartedattheend,becausetheendisthere,transformingeverything(p.40).Suchisimpossibleoflivedratherthanrecalledexperience,thoughwealltooeasilyforgetthatthefuture[is]notyetthere(p.40).Thisemphasisonbeginningsandendings,whicharesaidtobeabsentfromthenormalcourseoflife,leadsRoquentintoafurthercommentonadventures:whereaslifeismerelyonethingafteranother,inanadventuretheexactchronologymatters.Thereisarigoroussuccessionofcircumstances(p.23).Hethusequatesthefeel-ingofadventurewiththeirreversibilityoftime(p.57).Recallinghisadventuresabroad,RoquentinwritesthatneverwasIabletoturnback,anymorethanarecordcanbereversed.5Suchafeelingisincontrasttotherandom,happenstancequalityofRoquentinseverydaylifeinBouville,wherehecantakeawalk,visitacafe,workinthelibrary,andsoforthinanyorderhepleases.Whileexperiencingthefeelingofadventure,Roquentinsayshecannotevenconceiveofanythingaround[him]beingotherthatwhatitis(p.54).Everythingisdeterminedandhasitsexactplace.Incontrast,normallyeverythingiscontingent:Anythingcanhappen,anything(p.77).Roquentinslargerfateseemstohangnotonwhetheradventuresassucharepos-sibleornot,despitehissometimesputtingitthisway.Evenafterdeclaringitimpos-sibletohaveanadventureandexperienceitassuchinthemomentinsteadofjusttellingitthatwayafterthefacthestillhasmomentaryfeelingsofadventure.6Rather,Roquentinsproblemisperhapsthatsuchmomentsarenotenough:hewantshisentirelifetobeanadventure.Iwantedthemomentsofmylifetofollowandorderthemselveslikethoseofaliferemembered,hewrites(p.40).Simmelarguesthatthisisinfactpossible:Lifeasawholemaybeperceivedasanadven-ture(p.247).Asnoted,theseemingparadoxofadventuresisthat,whiledetachedfromthewidercourseofalife,theyseemtobearon,orrepresentmoreforcefully,themeaningofanentirelife.[I]tconnectswiththemostreconditeinstinctsandsomeultimateintentionoflifeasawhole,Simmelwrites(p.252).Andagain:anactioniscompletelytornoutoftheinclusivecontextoflifeand[]simultaneouslythewholestrengthandintensityoflifestreamintoit(p.254).Butifanadventuresomehowdistillsorcompactsalifeslargermeaningintooneepisode,howcanlifeasawholebeexperiencedasanadventure?Tohavesucharemarkableattitudetowardlife,Simmelwrites,onemustsenseaboveitstotalityahigherunity,asuper-lifeasitwere,whoserelationtolifeparallelstherelationoftheimmediate5p.23.Thenovelfrequentlydrawsananalogybetweenlifeandmelody.Itneverremarksexplicitlythatamelody,likeanarrative,canonlybeexperiencedintime,thoughitcomescloseinRoquentinsdescriptionofthejazzsingersvoice:itistheeventforwhichsomanynoteshavebeenpreparing,fromsofaraway,dyingthatitmightbeborn(p.22).6Inonemoment,herecallsIfeltmyheartswellwithagreatfeelingofadventure,butthereisnosensethattheretrospectivenarrationiscreatingthisfeeling.Hegoesontoreporthisreal-timefeelingswhilewritinginthediary:Iamashappytheheroofanovel(p.54).Inanotherentryhewritesagaininthepresenttense(p.135).\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist87lifeitselftothoseparticularexperienceswhichwecalladventures(p.247).Hegoeson:Perhapswebelongtoametaphysicalorder,perhapsthesoullivesatranscendentexistence,suchthatourearthly,consciouslifeisonlyanisolatedfragmentcomparedtotheunnamablecontextofanexistencerunningitscourseinit.[]Whoeversensesthroughallactuallifeasecret,timelessexistenceofthesoul,whichisconnectedwiththerealitiesoflifeonlyfromadistance,willperceivelifeinitsgivenandlimitedwholenessasanadventurewhencomparedtothattranscendentandself-consistentfate.(pp.2478)Ashislengthyconversationwiththeself-taughtmandemonstrates,however,Roquentinrejectsanyprincipleoforderormeaningbeyondhimselfsuchashuman-ismorsocialism,tosaynothingofreligion(pp.112ff).Atthesametime,herejectstheideathathehimselfcanbequeathameaningtohislife.Theself-taughtmanofferssuchanalternativeaswell:Lifehasameaningifwechoosetogiveitone.Onemustfirstact,throwonesselfintosomeenterprise.Then,ifonereflects,thedieisalreadycast,oneispledged(p.112).Sartreisfrequentlytakentosanctionsomethinglikethisviewinhisdoctrinesofradicalfreedomandalifeproject.Here,however,Roquentinatleastrejectsit:Ithinkthatthatispreciselythesortofliethat[theothersinthecafe]tellthemselves(p.112).AtleastonewayofreadingthenovelisthatRoquentinusedtohavesuchagoalorprincipleguidinghislifeandthatitisitslossthatinitiateshiscrisis.Havinglostanysenseofwhathesdoingwithhimself,Roquentincannolongerexperienceadventureswhichspeaktoalargermeaning.Atbesthecanexperiencebriefflashesofdramatic,heightenedfeeling.Butthesearenowtakenasmerefeelings,anillusiontobeseenthrough.Ifthenormalcourseoflifeiscontinuousandwhole,accordingtoSimmel,withaconsistentprocessrun[ning]throughtheindividualcomponents(p.243),butitisonlyadventuresthathaverealbeginningsandendingsorderingandshapingtheirmeanings,whereisnarrativitytobefound?AsIbeganbynoting,Nauseaisfrequentlytakenasavenuefordisputingnarrativity,orevenanargumentagainstit.Butisarejectionofadventuresarejectionofnarrativity,oristheiridentificationtooquick?Roquentinwrites,inonemoment,atlastanadventurehappenstomeandwhenIquestionmyselfIseethatithappensthatIammyselfandthatIamhere;Iamtheonewhosplitsthenight(p.54).Totheextentthatadventuresareassociatedwithsuchabsolutepresentness(Simmel,p.254),itwouldseemthatarejectionoftheirpossibilityisexactlynotarejectionofnarrativity.Ratheritisthenormalcourseofalifewhichissaidtoconsistofonethinglinkedtoandfollowinganother,seeminglyaqualityofnarrative.AgreatstrengthofNauseaasanovelisthatitsdescriptionseludedidacticsubjectiontoourmorestraightforwardconceptualorders.Itdoesntdramatizepreexistingphilosophicalthesesitdescribesthe(ora)world.Againstthethoughtthatitismerelyorattheveryleastfirstandforemostapieceofpedanticphilosophicalpedagogy,itseemstomethatNauseabeginsfromasetoffamiliarexperiencesinalltheirinarticulatenessandapparentcontradictionsandhonestlydescribesthecrisistheybringforth.AnarrativistreadingofNauseashouldtakeitnotasanargument,butaninvitationtonewandfurtherdistinctions,aninvitationtothethoughtthatthecurrentvocabularyofnarrativityfailstogetatexperienceasweactuallyhaveit.\n88B.RothIsnarrativebestcharacterizedbytemporalsuccession,bybeginningsandendings,bymeaningfulness,byunity?Ivearguedelsewhere7foraparticularcharacteriza-tion,andonecantextractanattackordefenseofnarrativityfromNauseaabsentsuchtouchstones.Mybaselinecharacterizationofnarrativefocusesontwocorefeatures.First,narrativeconcernstemporalobjects.Alldiscourseistemporalinaformalsense,aswordsaresaidinacertainorder,notallatonce.Narrativediscourseisdistinctiveinthatitscontent,theobjectswhichitisabout,aretemporal.Aland-scapeisntnarratable.Putsomeoneinthatlandscape,doingthingsintime,andeverythingchanges.Thusthesecondcorefeature:narrativeconcernshumansoratleastanthropomorphizableagents.Adescriptionofachemicalreaction,thoughtemporal,isntyetanarrative.Describedinapeculiarway,suchthatthereactantsare(falsely)imaginedtohaveperspectivesandexperiences,aresufficientlyhuman-likethatwecanprojectourselvesintothem,andagaineverythingchanges.Followingmycharacterization,inwhichunity,retrospection,andactualbeginningsandendingsarelessimportantthantemporalsuccession,thereisnoclearlinkbetweenadventuresandnarrativity.ThenotionofadventuresinvokedinNauseaissosimilartothatinSimmelsessaythatitishardformetothinkotherthanthatSartreknewofit.SofarasIcantell,noscholarhasmadethisconnectionbefore,andthereisperhapsnowayofprovingit,asSartrehardlyeverreferstoSimmelinhiswork,andnevertoDasAbenteuer.86.3AMoreHolisticReadingofNauseaLetusreturnnowtomylargerreadingofNausea.Visitinghisex-girlfriendAnny,Roquentinrealizesthatshetooappearstohavecometotherealizationthatadven-turesareimpossible,onlyshehasadifferentvocabulary.Shesaysshehasrealizedthattherearenomoreperfectmoments(p.144).Asachildseeingthefewpic-turesincludedinahistorybook(threepicturesforthewholesixteenthcentury)shecametobelievethattherewereprivilegedsituations,whichhadarareandpreciousquality,style.9Itislefttopeoplewhofindthemselvesinprivilegedsitu-ationstomakethemintoperfectmoments.Roquentin,carriedaway,fillsintheexplanationforher:Ineachoneoftheseprivilegedsituationstherearecertainactswhichhavetobedone,certainattitudestobetaken,wordswhichmustbesaidandotherattitudes,otherwordsarestrictlyprohibited.[]Infact,then,thesituationis7The(Re)PresentationofTemporalHumanMeanings,Chapter3inRoth2014.8InadiaryentryfromMarch7,1940,hereferstohistoricalrelativismoftheSimmeltype(1999,pp.298,300).9p.147.Thenovelhighlightsthesimilarity:Roquentinusesthephrasearareandpreciousqual-ity(unequalitérareetprécieuse)earlyontodescribeadventures(p.37).Anny,unprompted,usesthesamephrase(unequalitétoutàfaitrareetprécieuse)heretodescribeprivilegedsituations(p.147).\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist89thematerial:itdemandsexploitation(p.148,seetoop.62).Noticethat,despitethesimilarity,theresatleastonedecisivedifferencebetweenadventuresandprivilegedsituations.Anadventureisonlyanadventureafterthefact,intelling.Butoneisaware,inthemoment,thatoneisinaprivilegedsituationthustheabilityandresponsibilityonehastomakeuseofit,torealizeaperfectmoment.Roquentinsug-geststhataperfectmomentislikeanartworkandthus,perhaps,thatthenormativeweighthereisaesthetic,butAnnycutshimoffandsaysthisiswrong,thatmakingaperfectmomentofaprivilegedsituationwasratheraduty,evenamoralduty.AndAnnydisagreesfurtherwhenRoquentinexplainstoherhisrealizationaboutadventures.Shesays:Well,yourenotthinkinglikemeatall.Youcomplainbecausethingsdontarrangethemselvesaroundyoulikeabouquetofflowers,withoutyourtakingtheslightesttroubletodoanything.ButIhaveneveraskedasmuch:Iwantedaction.Youknow,whenweplayedadventurerandadventuress:youweretheonewhohadadventures,Iwastheonewhomadethemhappen.Isaid:Iamamanofaction.Remember?Well,nowIsimplysay:onecantbeamanofaction.(pp.1501)ItsnotatallclearthatRoquentinagreeswiththisandevenlessclearthatthenovelasawholecouldbesaidtoendorseit.Roquentinhas,asAnnysuggests,beenaskingthequestionofwhetherlifeisanadventure.Buttheirconversationholdsothertensions.Roquentinusedtothinkthatadventuresnaturallybefellhim.HereAnnyrevealsthatshemadethemhappen,bothforherselfandhim.Hesneveraskedwhetheronecanmakeoneslifeanadventure.WevewitnessedhimwanderaroundBouville,thinkingandtellinghimselfstories,butneverevenattempttoreallydoanything.Thuswehavethebeginningsofadistinctionbetweenoneslifeasanar-rativeandthenarrativizingimpulsetheactionofmakingoneslifeanarrativeoroftakingitassuch.Andinthemovefromthevocabularyofadventurestothatofprivilegedsituationsandperfectmoments,themannerofthistakingisnolongerlimitedtoretrospectivestorytellingitisavailableinthepresent.Illcomebacktothis,buthereweshouldnoticethatRoquentinhasntclearlyrejectedthepossibilityofaction,asAnnyhas.Infact,immediatelyfollowinghermonologue,Roquentinreports:Icouldnthavelookedconvinced(p.151).Theconversationturnstothequestionofwhattodo,givenallthis.Annysayssheoutlivesherself.Sheseemstomeanthatherlifeisalreadyoverandshesnowjustfillingtimemeaninglesslyuntildeath.Outlivingoneselfiscontrastedtoacting:describingapainter,Annysaysthatheisntlikeusnotyet.Heacts,hespendshimself(p.153).Bycontrast,weretoldthatshetravelswidelyandlivesoffamanwhokeepsher(p.151).ButnowRoquentinislostinthoughtaboutthepossibilitiesofart.Fromtheimpetusofthestrangehappinessthejazzrecordgiveshimeachtimehehearsit,hesays:Iwaswonderingif,inthatdirectiononecouldntfindorlookforandtrailsoffbeforemakingexplicitthethoughtthatartmightoffersomesortofhappiness,consolation,orsalvation(pp.1512).Herejectsthepossibilitiesofpaintingandsculpture,sayingthattheycantbeusedbecause\n90B.Roththeyrelovelyfacinghim.10Heneedssomethinghecanembody,notsomethinggiventohimfromoutside,againsuggestingthedistinctionbetweenobservingonespastlifeasanarrativeandlivingorexperiencingitassuchinthepresent.ElsewhereSartrewrites:Anevent:thatstosay,atemporalflowthathappenedtome—thatwasntinfrontofme,likeapictureorpieceofmusic,butthatwasmadearoundmylifeandinmylife,withmytime(1999,p.283).Roquentinrejectstheaterastootiedtoitsaudience.Finallyhesaysthathetriedtowriteabookbutisinterrupted(p.152).Thescenequicklymovestoanend,butithasnowsetupthenovelsfinale.MacIntyrenotesasevidenceforhisinterpretationthatRoquentingivesupwritinghishistoricalbiographyofRollebon:eitherhewillwritewhatistrueorhewillwriteanintelligiblehistory,buttheonepossibilityexcludestheother(p.214).Astonishingly,though,MacIntyresaysnothingaboutthefactthatNauseaendswithRoquentindecidingtowriteanovel.11ThisdespitethefactthatheholdsitagainstSartrethatinordertoshowthattherearenonarratives,hehimselfwritesanarra-tive(p.214).SoMacIntyrewouldseemtohaveusbelievethatSartresuseofnar-rativeisevidenceofitsimportance,butRoquentinsuseofnarrativedoesntsuggestanythingparallelinhis(fictional)orSartres(real)thinking.HowdoesRoquentingettothispoint?Atthebeginningofthenovelhesaysyouplungeintostorieswith-outbeginningorend(p.7).Now,though,heviewshispreviouslifeasendedanddecidestomakeanewbeginning:Iamstillfairlyyoung.Istillhaveenoughstrengthtostartagain.ButdoIhavetostartagain?12Herehehasntquiteyetresolvedtodoso,insteadtakingupAnnysnotionofoutlivingoneself:Mywholelifeisbehindme[.]Iamgoingtooutlivemyself.Eat,sleep,sleep,eat.Existslowly,softly,likethesetrees,likeapuddleofwater,liketheredbenchinthestreetcar(p.157).Bytheclosingsceneofthenovel,however,Roquentinhasgatherednewresolve.HegoesbacktotheRailwaymensRendezvousonelasttime,andthewaitressputsthejazzsongonforhim.Inthelengthoftwoplays(heaskshertorepeatit)heisagaincaptivated,transportedfromthedismissivethoughtthatthereareidiotswhogetconsolationfromthefineartstotheresolutionthathewillbecomeanartisthimself(p.174).Hethinksaboutthesingerandsongwriter:Theyarealittlelikedeadpeopleforme,alittleliketheheroesofanovel;theyhavewashedthemselvesofthesinofexisting(p.177).Andhethinkshecoulddothesame:Canyoujustifyyourexistencethen?Justalittle?[]CouldntItry....Naturally,itwouldntbeaquestionofatunebutcouldntI,inanothermedium?Itwouldhavetobeabook:Idontknowhowtodoanythingelse.Butnotahistorybook:historytalksaboutwhathasexistedanexistantcanneverjustifytheexistenceofanotherexistant.[]Anothertype10p.152.Earlier,herejectsceramicsaswell,sayingbakedobjects[]donotamuse[him](p.82).11Thismoveisforeshadowedearlier,whenRoquentinletshisimaginationofRollebonssituationrunrampantonlytoconcludethat,takingthistack,hedbebetteroffwritinganovelabouthiminsteadofabiography(p.58).Evenearlier,hewritesIhavethefeelingofdoingaworkofpureimagination(p.13).12p.156.Interestingly,heseemstotakethislanguageoverfromtheyoungcouplewhomheover-heard(andmockedinhisthoughts)inthecafewhiletalkingtotheself-taughtman(p.110).\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist91ofbook.Idontquiteknowwhichkindbutyouwouldhavetoguess,behindtheprintedwords,behindthepages,atsomethingwhichwouldnotexist,whichwouldbeaboveexistence.Astory,forexample,somethingthatwouldneverhappen,anadventure.Itwouldhavetobebeautifulandashardassteelandmakepeopleashamedoftheirexistence.(p.178)Theresmuchtoremarkuponhere.Onecantjustifytheexistenceofanotherpersonorthingbutcan,atleastinpart,justifyonesown.AndRoquentinproposestodothisexactlybyproducingastory.13Thatstoryitselfcouldnthappeninlife,butthetellingofitwilljustifyhislife.Anditseemsimportanttohimthathebeunder-stoodasanovelist,thathelivesthatstory,inwhichheisidentifiedwithatypicalroleandcharacter.Anovel,hewrites,Andtherewouldbepeoplewhowouldreadthisbookandsay:AntoineRoquentinwroteit,ared-headedmanwhohungaroundcafes,andtheywouldthinkaboutmylifeasIthinkabouttheNegresss[thejazzsinger]:assomethingpreciousandalmostlegendary.14ThereseemstomenoironyinanyofthiseitheronRoquentinsorthenovelspart.15Thatis,thiswayofrevitalizinghimselfreallyisproposedasasolutiontohiscrisis.Thenovel,againstthestandardreadingofit,doesntfinallydismissthenotionofthenarrativeself,Ithink.MacIntyreandStrawsonhavetoholdthatRoquentinfallsbackintoinauthenticityattheendofthenovel.Bythisreading,thefullarcofthestoryisthis:thenovelopenswithRoquentinsfirstexperiencesofthenauseaandhisinitialfailurestoarticulateitsmeaning.Bythetimeheposesthechoiceliveortell,aquarterofthewayintothenovel,hehasgraspeditscore,thoughhewillnuancehisexplanationinlaterscenes.ThemainpartofthenovelthendramatizesRoquentinsattempts,withvariousbackslidings,tolivewithouttheconsolationsofnarrativity.Itsclimaxisthenhisfailure,hisreturntoinauthenticity,buttressednowwithfalserationalizationsofnarrativeintheguiseofnarrativeart.IamskepticalofsuchareadingmostofallbecauseIseenothinginthefinalpagestoundercutRoquentinsepiphanyandturntoart.Theideathatoneslifeespeciallyonesentirelifeliterallyisanarrativeremainsdubious,butRoquentinwillaimtojustifyhisexistencethroughproducingnarrative,andexactlydoingsowillallowhimtounderstandhimself(andhaveothersunderstandhim)withinacertainnarra-tive,thatofthecafe-frequentingnovelist.Narrativeisnotinherentlyfalsifying,either,sanctionedbyamerelypracticalrubric:itisbothjustifyingandalegitimateformofunderstanding.Roquentinsliveortellmotivatestheeventsofthenovel;itisnotasolutiontothem.OncewediagnosethenatureofRoquentinscrisis,wehavetoseethisandeverythingelsehesaysnotasepigraphsorphilosophicaltheses,13HazelBarnesclaimsthatthenovelRoquentinwillproduceisNauseaitself(1959,p.203).Thisispossible,butsheoffersnoargumentforthisclaim,andIseenoevidenceforit.14p.178.Again,thisissetupearlyinthenovel.HewritesIamsohappywhenaNegresssings:whatsummitswouldInotreachifmyownlifemadethesubjectofthemelody(p.38).15AgainstFredricJameson,forexample,whowritesthatitischaracteristicofSartreswayofdealingwithsuchliteraryproblemsthatheshouldtellananecdotetodemonstratetheimpossibilityofanecdotes,thatheshouldpossessthemeanstomakethislivedtimespringdrearilyfromthepageatthesametimethatheisdemonstratinghowirreducibleitistolanguage(1961,p.25).IllreturntothispointinmydiscussionofKermodesreadingofthenovelbelow.\n92B.Rothbutinsteadclaimsmadefrominsideaparticularandlikelyproblematicmoodandmindset.ThusletmesketchhowIinterpretboththenauseaandRoquentinslargerexistentialcrisis,aswellastherelationbetweenthem.First,then,Roquentinsexistentialcrisis.Thoughitisthematizedonlyinthelaterportionsofthenovel,aftervariousepisodesofthenausea,itseemstomethatRoquentinscrisisofpurposeisactuallymoreimportant,andindeedatleastacon-ditionofthepossibility,ifnotthecause,ofthenausea.Roquentinhasisolatedhim-selfinBouvilletowriteabiographyofRollebon.Hehasnofamily,nofriends,andhisonlypersonalinteractionsarewiththeproprietressoftheRailwaymensRendezvous,withwhomheoccasionallyhassex(p.6),andwiththeself-taughtman,whomhemocksmercilesslyinhisdiary.Indeedhisisolationisperhapsbestexemplifiedbyhisagreeingtospendtimewiththeself-taughtman,despiteloathinghim,apparentlyinordertohavesomething,anything,todooutsideofhiswriting.RoquentindeclaresthatRollebonnowrepresentstheonlyjustificationformyexis-tence(p.70).Midwaythroughthenovel,though,heabandonswritingthebiogra-phy,leavinghimselfwithnosuchjustification.This,inandofitself,isunremarkable,however.Roquentinseemstothinkthatpracticallynooneelsesexistenceisjustifiedeither.Hespeaksoftheyoungcoupleinthecafe,forexample,asneedingtofindsomethingelsetoveiltheenormousabsurdityoftheirexistence(p.111).WhatisremarkableisonlythatRoquentin,unlikeeveryoneelse,noticesthislackofjustifi-cation.Attimes,notnoticingseemsequated(thoughperhapsonlysardonically)withhavingajustificationreducingittoasubjectivepsychologicalfact(itwaspsychology,thekindtheywriteaboutinbooks;p.84).Roquentinlooks,foralongtime,ataportraitofoneofthecityspastluminaries,sayingoftheman:Theslight-estdoubthadnevercrossedthosemagnificentgreyeyes,andHehadneverlookedanyfurtherintohimself:hewasaleader,andthushe,liketheotherleaderspor-trayed,hadarighttoeverything:tolife,towork,towealth,tocommand,torespect,and,finally,toimmortality.16Itmightseem,then,thatRoquentinsexistentialcrisisisreallyasubjectivematter:itsnotthatvariouspeoplesexistencesareorarentobjectivelyjustified,butratherthatheslosthisabilitytointerprethislife,as,havinggivenupwritingthebiographyofRollebon,henolongerhasanygoalorpurpose.Thisistosuggest,despiteMacIntyresseeingSartreasanopponent,thatthenovelisactuallyinlinewiththewideranalysisinAfterVirtue:Whensomeonecomplainsasdosomeofthosewhoattemptorcommitsuicidethathisorherlifeismeaningless,heorsheisoftenandperhapscharacteristicallycomplainingthatthenarrativeoftheirlifehasbecomeunintelligibletothem,thatitlacksanypoint,anymovementtowardsaclimaxoratelos.Hencethepointofdoinganyonethingratherthananotheratcrucialjuncturesintheirlivesseemstosuchpersonstohavebeenlost.(p.217)Nausea,asnovelsdo,arrivesatthispointbywayofplotandpsychologicaldescription,notargumentandanalysis,however.Infact,theargumentnestedwithinthenovelliveortellisaredherring,seenasinadequatewhenunderstoodwithinthelargerdramaticframingofthestory.Roquentindenieshisproblemhasanythingtodowithpurpose,however.Hetellstheself-taughtmanthatthereisnothing,nothing,absolutelynoreasonforexisting.16pp.834.SeetooSartresstoryTheChildhoodofaLeader(1975,pp.84144).\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist93Theself-taughtmaninterpretsthisclaimasonemight:youundoubtedlymean,Monsieur,thatlifeiswithoutagoal?ButRoquentinthinkstohimselfthatthisiswrong:Certainlynot,thatisnotthequestionIamaskingmyself(p.112).Instead,hecomestoequatetherealizationthatoneisnotjustifiedinonesexistencewiththeveryrealizationthatoneexists.Otherpeople,theydontknowtheyexist(p.122).Theycan,byRoquentinswayofseeingthings,thereforedeludethemselvesintothinkingtheirliveshavemeaning.Previously,hehadthoughtthiswayaswell:Never,untiltheselastfewdays,hadIunderstoodthemeaningofexistence.Iwasliketheothers[.]Isaid,likethem,Theoceanisgreen;thatwhitespeckupthereisaseagull,butIdidntfeelthatitexistedorthattheseagullwasanexistingseagull;usuallyexistencehidesitself(p.127,seetoop.124).Now,though,herealizes:Ihadnttherighttoexist.Ihadappearedbychance,Iexistedlikeastone,aplantoramicrobe(p.84).Everyexistingthingisbornwithoutreason,prolongsitselfoutofweaknessanddiesbychance,hedeclares(p.133).Thenauseaisequatedwiththisrealization.SothisisNausea,heconcludes,IexisttheworldexistsandIknowthattheworldexists.Thatsall(p.122).FromRoquentinsownperspective,then,thenauseacomesfirst.Herealizes,duetotheheightenedexperiencesofthepebbleattheshore,thewaiterssuspenders,andsoforth,thatobjectsexistthatis,thattheyexistcontingentlyandwithoutpurpose.Hethenextendsthisthinkingtohimself,bringingaboutanexistentialcrisis.Fromourperspectiveasreaders,however,itseemstomeweshouldthinktheorderisinfacttheopposite:hehaslosttheabilitytointerprettheongoingcourseofhislife,whichleaveshimincrisis.Roquentinisanunreliablenarratorinthebanalsensethatweallareinasmuchaswearenotnecessarilybestlocatedtointerpretthemeaningofourownexperiences.WhileRoquentinsownstatedreasonforstartinghisdiaryistounderstandthechangesthatfirstbefellhimwhileholdingthepebbleontheshore,andonlylaterdoeshethinkhehaslosthislifespurpose,anyoneelsecanseethatalreadyatthebeginningofthenovelhisennuiisbeingdisplacedontoinnocentobjects.ItisfromwithinthisparticularmoodthatRoquentinmakesthestrangemistakeofextendingthecategoryofjustificationtomaterialobjects.Thisallowshimtoreinterprethisowncrisisasaweightyphilosophicaldiscovery.Butaskingafterthejustificationofmaterialobjectsisjustacategorymistake.AndwhenRoquentinhasarealepiphanyinthenovelsfinalsceneofthevalueofart,heregainsthepossibilityofassigninghimselfgoalsandinterpretinghisactionsinrelationtothem.ToreadthenovelinthismanneristosuggestthatmanyofRoquentinsphilo-sophicalrealizationsarentthatbecausetheyarefalse.Itisthusperhapstodown-playacertainkindofphilosophicalworththenovelissometimesthoughttohaveandtoplayupitspsychologicalinsightintotheratherordinaryphenomenonofahermeneuticcrisis.Thatsnottosaythatitlacksphilosophicalinsightitsjusttosuggestthatitsinsightisnotofthemostabstract,metaphysicalsort,intothearbitrarinessofbeing,butanchoredinsteadalwaysinourparticularlyhumanwayofbeing-in-the-world.1717Elsewhere,IusethisinterpretationofNauseaasaspringboardtoaHeideggerianconceptionofthenarrativeself,andinfactIthinkthenovelowesmoretoHeideggersBeingandTimethantoSartreslaterBeingandNothingness.SeeANarrativistInterpretationofHeideggerianEverydayness,PartIIinRoth2014.\n94B.Roth6.4ReframingtheNarrativeSelfNausea,intheparticularwaysthatitevadesthecontemporaryconceptualapparatusofnarrativity,shouldleadustorethinkthecommonconceptionofthenarrativeself.Philosophicaldebateshaveoftenbeenpreoccupiedwiththequestionofwhetherourlivesandselves,treatedasobjects,arenarrativeinform.AndsoweseeMacIntyrefacetheobjection,forexample,thatreallivesdonthavebeginningsandends,andhisoverlyglibresponse:oneistemptedtoreply,Buthaveyouneverheardofdeath?18MacIntyreandStrawsonarerightthatRoquentin,Sartre,andNauseaallrejectthisnotionofthenarrativeself.HeretheycanmartialtheirevidenceofRoquentinmusingonthelackofobjectivebeginningsandends,thepervertingshapingoftelling,andsoforth.Andthiscriticismofthenotionthatourlivesjustarestoriesisright,Ithink.Theideathatmostofourlivesliterallyenactaplotdiagram,say,ofexposition,risingaction,complication,climax,andresolutionisalmostfarcical.MacIntyresrelianceonthenearlyarchaicwordquestistelling(pp.219ff).Someofourlivesmayindeedinvolveafairlyreliablesearchforhappi-nessorwealthorknowledge,butmostofouractivitiesarentasdramaticasthat,butinsteadusuallybanal,repetitive,andirrelevanttothelargercourseormeaningofourlives.19Anyepochdefinedbypeopleonquestshaslongsincepassed.Probablythenotionthatthereeverreallywassuchanepochisemptilynostalgic.Itakeitasevidencethatallofthisseemstomissthepoint,however.Areourlivesnarratives?Thisseemsthewrongquestion.Rather:dowetakethemasnarratives?Doweinterpretourlivesinthesamewayweinterpretnarratives?Suchwouldbetheideanotthatourlivesare,divorcedfromanyviewpoint,narrativeinform,butthatwenecessarilyunderstandortakethemthatway,thatourmannerofbeingsortstheworldoutaccordingtonarrativethreads.Thiswouldallowustoadmitthatunderone(vaguelyscientific)descriptionourlivesarecontingent,formless,andusuallyundramatic,whileatthesametimeadmitting,whenwerenotabstractingtoamoredistancedandobjectiveperspectiveonourselves,thatourlivesseemtohaveshapeandintelligibility.Ifitiswewhoarenarrativizingratherthanourlivesthatarenarratives,thenourattentionandconcernsactasthefilterwhichemphasizesmomentsofimportancewhilepassingovertheroutineandbanal.DavidCarr,inhisTime,Narrative,andHistory(whichiswoefullyignoredintherecentliterature),reframesthequestionsofnarrativityexceptionallywellalongtheselines.Therelationbetweennarrativeandtherealworldismiscastand18p.212.MacIntyresrhetoricalframe(thatthisresponseismerelytempting)herecoversoverthefactthathedoesrespondthiswayanddoesntobviouslyhaveanymoresubstantialresponse.19Iwouldsuggest,asabetteralternativetoquest,theconceptofthesearchfromWalkerPercysnovelTheMoviegoer(1998).MacIntyremightrespondthatsearchisnotopen-endedenough.Wequestaftertheholygrail,somethingwhoseappearanceandperhapsevenexistencewereunsureof(p.219).Wesearchforourcarkeysoramissinghiker.Invokingthe,ratherthanasearch,asPercysnoveldoes,perhapsovercomesthisobjection;thedefinitearticleinflatesthetermsimportanceandabstraction.\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist95misunderstood,hewrites,Bystressingthediscontinuitybetweenartandlifeandtakingnarrativeasaformofrepresentation(1986,p.16):Indiscussingtherepresentationalcharacterofnarrative,theoristssuchas[Louis]MinkandHaydenWhitearesometimesunclearonexactlywhatitisintheirviewthatnarrativetries,butisconstitutionallyunable,torepresent.Theworld,realeventsaretermstheyoftenuse.Butthiswayofspeakingintroducesaverymisleadingequivocation.Narratives,whetherhistoricalorfictional,aretypicallyabout,andthuspurporttorepresent,nottheworldassuch,realityasawhole,butspecificallyhumanreality.Butwhenthetermrealityisleftunqualified,wearetemptedbythestrongnaturalistprejudicethatwhatcountsasrealitymustbephysicalreality.Whatthissuggestsiseithertherandomactivityandcolli-sionofblindforces,devoidoforderandsignificance,or,alternatively,arealitytotallyorderedalongrigorouscausallineswithoutaflaworgapinitsmechanism.Thesetwonotionsareofcourseincompatiblewitheachother,butwhattheyhaveincommonistheideathatineithercaserealityisutterlyindifferenttohumanconcerns.Thingssimplyhappen,oneaftertheother,randomlyoraccordingtotheirownlaws.Anysignificance,meaning,orvalueascribedtoeventsisprojectedontothembyourconcerns,prejudices,andinterests,andinnowayattachestotheeventsthemselves.[]Allthisconfusestheissuebecause,asthesetheoristsverywellknow,whatstoriesandhistoriesrepresentordepictisnotpurelyphysicaleventsbuthumanexperiences,actions,andsufferings,includingthehumanactivityofprojectingmeaningontoorfindingmeaninginphysicalandotherevents.(pp.1920)Therightquestiontoaskisnotwhethertheeventsofourlives,underanobjecti-fyingdescription,havetheshapeofartisticallywroughtstories.Therightquestiontoaskiswhether,fromtheperspectiveoflivedexperience,weseeandorganizeourlivesinsuchamanner.Whether,toputitevenmorestrongly,ournotionofwhatweareaspeople,andhowpeopledifferfromotherentitiesintheworld,isultimatelygroundedinsuchawayoforganizingexperience.Above,Imadetheinitialdistinc-tionbetweenthenotionthatourlivesarenarrativesandthenotionthatwemakeortakethemassuch.Carrwrites:thenarrativecharacterorstructureofourexperi-enceandactionisnotsomethingthatsimplyvadesoi.Lifecanberegardedasaconstanteffort,evenastruggle,tomaintainorrestorenarrativecoherenceinthefaceofanever-threatening,impendingchaosatalllevels(p.91).WorkingfromHusserlsaccountoftemporalityandtime-consciousness,Carrcriticizesthetempt-inganalogybetweenisolatedeventsandsensedataor,better,criticizesthenotionofisolatedeventsinthesamewaythatothershavecriticizedthenotionofsensedata.Theyareabstractions,notbuildingblocks(pp.24,66).Heidegger,followingHusserl,offersawellknownsetofexamples:Weneverreallyfirstperceiveathrongofsensations,e.g.,tonesandnoises,intheappear-anceofthingsasthisthing-conceptalleges;ratherwehearthestormwhistlinginthechimney,wehearthethree-motoredplane,weheartheMercedesinimmediatedistinctionfromtheVolkswagen.Muchclosertousthanallsensationsarethethingsthemselves.Wehearthedoorshutinthehouseandneverhearacousticalsensationsorevenmeresounds.Inordertohearabaresoundwehavetolistenawayfromthings,divertourearfromthem,i.e.,listenabstractly.(1971,pp.256)ThenovelistDonDeLillooffersanevenricherexample:Shewasintown,drivingdownahillystreetofframehouses,andsawamansittingonhisporch,aheadofher,throughtreesandshrubs,armsspread,abroad-facedblondishman,lounging.Shefeltinthatsmallpointintime,aflyspeckquartersecondorso,thatshesaw\n96B.Rothhimcomplete.Hislifeflewopentoherpassingglance.Alazyandmanipulativeman,inrealestate,infairviewcondosbyamosquitolake.Sheknewhim.Shesawintohim.Hewasthere,divorcedanddrink-haunted,emotionallydistantfromhiskids,hissons,twosons,inschoolblazers,inthebarestblink.Avoicerecitedthenewsontheradio.Whenthecarmovedpastthehouse,inthepullofthefullsecond,sheunderstoodthatshewasnotlookingataseatedmanbutatapaintcanplacedonaboardthatwasbalancedbetweentwochairs.Thewhiteandyellowcanwashisface,theboardhisarmsandthemindandheartofthemanwereintheairsomewhere,alreadylostinthevoiceofthenewsreaderontheradio.(2001,p.72)Wedontmerelyhearacarratherthanasetofsounds;Heideggersexampleisstillabstractedfromanywidercontextinwhichwemightactuallyhearacar.Nordowemerelymistakeapileofjunkforaperson.Rather,weascribecharacterandstorytothatgestalt,experienceitmostimmediatelyinarichlymeaningfulform.Inordinaryexperience,wedontwitnessisolatedevents,oneafteranother,thenputthemtogether:Thebedrockofhumanevents,then,isnotsequencebutconfiguredsequence(Carr,p.44).Reframedinthisway,itsnotclearthatnarrativizingisfalsifying.Badfaith,inSartresterminology,occursmostoftenwhenbeing-for-itselftakesitselfasbeing-in-itself.Thiscanhappen,asinhisfamousscenarios,whenweslipentirelyintosocialroles,behavinginacertainwaybecausethatishowoneinthatsituationoneplayingthatroletypicallyacts.Therebyweavoidtakingresponsibilityforourbehavior(1969,pp.5567).Butsimplytounderstandonesselfandonessituationinnarrativetermsisntnecessarilytofallintobadfaith.Thishappensonlyifitrei-fiesonesselfintoathingathingrigidlydefined,athingthatis—insteadofunder-standing,muchmoreprovisionally,thatoneisalwaysprojectinganunderstandingofoneselfandwhereoneisgoing.Thissuggests,then,thattheappropriatemasterequationoranalogyisnotthatalifeisorislikeastory,butthatlivingisorislikereading.Narrativeisofphilosophi-calandphenomenologicalinterestnotbecausewethinkbackonourpastslikewethinkbackonanovelthatwevejustfinishedreading.MacIntyrewrites:Storiesarelivedbeforetheyaretoldexceptinfiction(p.212).Butisntitpartofourcharacterasself-consciousbeingsthatwedontlive,thentell,andkeeptheseactsisolatedfromoneanother,butseethelarger,emergingstructureofourlivesevenaswelivethem?Dontwesometimesactfornarrativereasons?20Consideringthesweepandarchitectureofanovelasawholeexactlydoesn’tseemtosayanythingaboutthemeaningofourlives.Insteaditleadsusintomoreformalconcernsunre-latedtothestructureofliving.Buttheprocessofactuallyreadinganovel(readingratherthanhavingread),offindingoneselfinthemidstofahermeneuticsituation,projectingthefutureplot,receivingnewinformation,enteringintoandabstractingbeyondcharactersperspectivesthistellsusmuchaboutourownsituationsandthefactthatourself-understandingisalwayslocated,projecting,fragmented,andprogressive,notretrospectiveandwhole.Perhaps,then,weneedtoshiftawayfromtalkoflivesaswholestoaconsiderationofourgraspofthenarrativecontoursof20SeeVelleman2005.IdevelopthisclaimthroughareadingofRousseausConfessionsinRoth2012.\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist97particularmoments.Onlyinexceptionalcircumstances(near-deathexperiences,thewritingofautobiography,trulyoff-puttingself-indulgence)domostofusprobablycastaneyeovertheshapeofourentirelives.Butourunderstandingofindividualsituationsandourmotivationsforactingwithinthemareriddenthroughbynarra-tiveandintertextualconcerns.6.5AgainstDidacticismIhaveyettosaymuchabouthowSartrehimselfunderstoodNausea,despitethetitleoftheessay.IadmitthatIdontmuchcareabouttheanswertothisquestion,andImnotsurethatonecansubstantiatetheclaimthatSartreviewedallnarrativeasamanifestationofbadfaith.Instead,IthinkSartresmisreadingofhisownworkismorecategorical,thathistheoryofliteraryinterpretationisflawed.Itsclear,though,thatSartrehimselfdidcareaboutthissortofquestion.InhisautobiographyTheWords,heidentifiesRoquentinwithhimselfcompletelyandsuggestshowheunderstoodthenovelslargermeaning,whileironicallysuggestingsomeembarrass-ment21lookingback:Attheageofthirty,IexecutedthemasterstrokeofwritinginNausea—quitesincerely,believemeaboutthebitterunjustifiedexistenceofmyfellowmenandofexoneratingmyown.IwasRoquentin.Iusedhimtoshow,withoutcomplacency,thetextureofmylife.IwasI,theelect,chroniclerofHell[.]Iwasimpossiblemyselfanddifferedfromtheothersonlybythemandatetogiveexpressiontothatimpossibility[.]Iwasaprisonerofthatobviouscontradiction,butIdidnotseeit,Isawtheworldthroughit.22InhisWarDiaries,SartrediscussesNauseaasifitwereatreatise:InLaNausée,Iassertthatthepastisnot;Iappearedtobesaying,inLaNausée,that[adventure]didntexist.Butthatswrong;IdalreadyexplainedallthatinLaNausée(1999,pp.209,198,283).Moreimportantly,inhisWhatIsLiterature?,writtensometwodecadesbefore,say,RolandBarthessDeathoftheAuthor,Sartreemphaticallyendorsesauthorialintentionality.Hebeginsbymakingastrongdistinctionbetweenpoetryandprose.Poetstreatwordsasthingsinthemselves,notassigns,andsotheydonttrafficinmeaningatall,sincetheirwordsdontrefertoanythingbeyondthemselves.Poetsrefusetoutilizelanguage,Sartrewrites(1998,p.29).Proseisthenjustautilizationoflanguageandonlyaboutsomethingbeyonditself.ThisleadsSartretotheconclu-sionthataprosewriterisalwayscommunicatingsomethingandhisaffirmationofauthorialintentionalityasthelocusofmeaningforatext:Andifproseisneveranythingbuttheprivilegedinstrumentofacertainundertaking,ifitisonlythepoetsbusinesstocontemplatewordsinadisinterestedfashion,thenonehastherighttoasktheprose-writerfromtheverystart,Whatisyouraiminwriting?(p.36)21ThatshowItaketheinterjectioninthefirstsentence.Elsewhere,however,Sartrenamesthenovelfirstwhenaskedhowhewantedpeopletorememberhim(Charlesworth1976,p.154).221981,pp.2512.InhisWarDiariesaswell,SartreidentifiesRoquentin(aswellasMathieufromtheTheAgeofReason)withhimself(1999,p.338).\n98B.RothEvenmorestrongly,hegoesontoarguethataprosewriteralwaysknowsthemeaningofhisorhertextsinadvanceandneverdiscoversanythinginthem:heknowsthem[hiswords]beforewritingthemdown[.]Thusthewritermeetseverywhereonlyhisknowledge,hiswill,hisplans,inshort,himself(pp.5051).Hereisthephilosopherswayofreadingfictionatitsworst:anovelhasameaningthatexistsbehindit,perhapsevenbeforeit,anditspurposeismerelytodramatizethatmeaning.Onceitisextracted,itsunclearthatthenovelhasanyremainingvalue.Ofteneventhecomplexitiesofdramatizationareignored,asinMacIntyresandStrawsonsreadingsofNauseawhenacharacterisunderstoodtosimplyspeakthemeaningofthenovel.23Onemightcallthisthedisquotationaltheoryofliterarymean-ing:findthemostepigraphiclineofdialogueinthenovelandremovethequotationmarks.Indeeditmaybeworsethanthis.Thenovelmayonlybeabad,imperfectinstantiationofthemeaningitpointsbackto,ameaningwhichmightbebettermorepurelypresentedintreatiseform.Cynically,then,thenovelmighthavevalueonlyinasmuchasonecanfindmorereadersfornovelsthantreatises.Affirmingthesebasichermeneuticpractices,KermodetakesareadingofNauseaasfarasonecaninhisTheSenseofanEnding.HetoostartsfromtheclaimthatSartredistrustsfictions.Theabsurddishonestyofallprefabricatedpatternsiscar-dinaltohisbeliefs,Kermodewrites(2000,p.133).AndsohearguesthatNausearepresentsthestrugglebetweentheidealandreal,fictionandcontingency.ButsincehestartsfromSartresphilosophy,hecantbutconcludethatphilosophyistrueandfictiononlyusefulinasmuchasitgetsthephilosophyright,out-and-outwronginasmuchasitmisrepresentsit:Insofarasit[Nausea]givesstructureandformtothemetaphysicalbeliefsexpressedinthetreatise[BeingandNothingness],itbothrepresentsandbeliesthem.24Theinterpretivepathremainsone-way:Inalltheseways,then,thenovelfalsifiesthephilosophy(p.139).Neveristhereanytalkofthetreatisefalsifyingthenovel,andindeedthatseemsastrangethought,butperhapsitisathoughtweshouldhave.25Kermodesreadingremainspenetratinginthatitsees23ThiswayofreadingmightbetracedbacktoAristotlesclaiminchaptersixofThePoeticsthatthethoughtofatragedyconsistsintheactualstatementsandargumentsutteredbythecharac-ters.StephenHalliwellinsiststhatoneshouldntconfusethethoughtinternaltoatragedywiththepoetsownguidingthought,however,andthinksAristotlemightnotembraceanyconceptatallofthelatter(Aristotle,pp.38,96,1713).Bycontrast,PaulRicoeurwritesthatThought,inthisnarrativecontext,mayassumevariousmeanings.Itmaycharacterize,forinstance,followingAristotlesPoetics,thetheme(dianoia)thataccompaniesthefableorplot(mythos)ofatrag-edy(p.175inMitchell1981).WemightevenreachallthewaybacktoPlatohere.RecalltheopeningofBookIIIoftheRepublic,forexample,whereSocratesreadsoffcountlesslinesofpoetryasthesortsofthingsthatneedtobebarredfromthecity,seeminglytakingmereinclusionofastatementinapoeticworktosuggestsanction.OfcoursePlatosowndramaticmaneuveringscomplicatethissituation.24p.137.Kermode(andMurdoch,whomIlldiscussmomentarily)straightforwardlytakesthenoveltopresentthephilosophicalthinkingofBeingandNothingness,despitethefacttheywerewrittenintheoppositeorder,withsometimeinbetween.25MilanKunderawrites,inadiscussionofSartre,Thisisstilltheoldineradicableerror,thebeliefthattherelationbetweenphilosophyandliteraturegoesonlyoneway,thatinsofarasprofessionalsofnarrationareobligedtohaveideas,theycanonlyborrowthemfromprofessionalsofthought(2006,p.63).\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist99theseinterpretiveissuesasthemselvesintegralpartsoftheworkingsofthenovel.TheyarenotamerefailureonSartresorthenovelspart,then,butstructural:it[Nausea]reflectsaphilosophyitmust,insofarasitpossessesnovelform,belie(pp.1445).Finallyhisreadingisunnecessarilylimitedbytheassumptionsofauthorialintentionalityandunidirectionalityintherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandliterature.Thenovel,then,providesareductionoftheworlddifferentfromthatofthetreatise.Ithastolie.Words,thoughts,patternsofwordandthought,areenemiesoftruth,hewrites(p.140).AndsoheagreeswithStrawsonthatSartreviewsfictionasdistrustedyethumanlyindispensable(Kermode,p.150).Playingtheroleofacriticofhisownnovels,itsclearthatSartreagrees.Imperfectlywellawarethatinanovelitsnecessarytolieinordertobetrue,hewrites(1999,p.158).Givingupauthorialintentionality,itseemstomethatSartresnovelsdontdistrustthemselvesintheseways,however.Asmentioned,Nauseabecomesamoretraditionalnovelasitprogresses,itsdiaryformquicklybecomingaforgetta-blebitofartificeasitgetscaughtupinlongerandlongerstretchesofnaturalisticnarration.MostofSartresotherfictionsdisplaynoironiesatallabouttheirstatus.TotheextentthatSartresphilosophyandfictionareintension,Idsuggestwecon-cludenotthatthefictionisfalsifying,butinsteadthathesabetternovelistthanhisowntheoriesandmostspecificallyhistheoryofproseallow.Onceonemakessuchamove,hisownstatedinterpretationofthenovelandidentificationofRoquentinwithhimselfbecomemereanecdotesfromliteraryhistory,curiositiesthatwedbebetteroffignoring.Nauseaseemstomeasomewhatembarrassingnovelifaboutthehorrorofcontingency,butaverygoodoneifaboutamaninhermeneuticcrisis.Havinglosthissenseofwherehisownlifeisgoing,Roquentinstartstoviewthejustificationofeverythingsexistenceasunmooredevenmerephysicalobjects,towhichapplyingtheconceptofjustificationseemsinfactmerelyconfused.Similarly,CamussTheStrangerseemstomesomewhattediousiftakenasapolemicabouttheabsurdityofexistencebutverygoodiftakenasablackcomedyaboutaninar-ticulateman.Onlyifweviewcharactersstrictlyaspuppetsmanipulatedbyauthorsforpolemicalpurposes(asSartrehimselfseemsto)needweconcludethatexistentialistnovelsareaboutexistentialism,oranynovelaboutitsnovelistsbeliefs.26Instead,wemightviewcharactersnotasobjects,butinsteadstructuresofsensibilityindeedwaysofbeing,ofexistingthatwecanworktoinhabit.27AndsoevenifoneisfinallyunsympathetictoSartresorCamussphilosophicalprogram,onemightthinkthattheyhadrealtalentsasfictionwriters,andexactlypartofwhatconstitutes26ImremindedhereofCurtisWhiteslamentthathisfriends,whenaskedaboutSavingPrivateRyan,seemedunabletothinkofthecharactersasanythingbutrealpeople,thatis,toalsothinkofthemaspartofastructureofmeaningmanipulatedbybyStephenSpielberg(2003,p.42),White(2003,p.42).Onethinksthatwereinratherbadshapeif,attheotherextreme,wecanonlythinkaboutcharactersassuchpuppets.27AndsowhatImdefendinghereisacertainkindofpsychologicallyrealistnovel,thoughpsychologyisnotabroadenoughcategory.Better:whatMurdoch(followingFrenchcritics,shesays)callsthephenomenologicalnovel(1997,p.101).SeetooFarrellinGibsonetal.2007,pp.2546.Thereareotherargumentstobemadeforthephilosophicalimportanceofotherversionsofthenovel.\n100B.Rothsuchtalentisputtingmoreorotheronthepagethanoneconceptuallyintends.Indeed,SartredramatizesamomentinNauseawhichspeaksexactlyagainsthisownlatertheory,inwhichRoquentinwritesasentenceonlytohaveitsmeaningescapehim:Ihadthoughtoutthissentence,atfirstithadbeenasmallpartofmyself.Nowitwasinscribedonthepaper,ittooksidesagainstme.Ididntrecognizeitanymore.Icouldntconceiveitagain.Itwasthere,infrontofme;invainformetotracesomesignofitsorigin.Anyonecouldhavewrittenit.ButIIwasntsureIwroteit.(p.95)AccordingtoSartrestheoryofprose,themeaningofasentencecanttakessidesagainstitsauthoritjustmeanswhattheauthorwantsitto.Elsewhere,Sartredescribesthewriterwhodoesnotwanttoberesponsibleforwhatheorshewritesasaschizophrenicdreamer,andthatsuchistheinvertedandinauthenticdreamoffreedom.28Butwhenheactuallywritesfictionalprose,hedramatizeshisalter-egosrealizationthatthingsaremorecomplicated.Theoverarchingideathatphilosophystruthsaretruerthanfictionstruthsiswrongheaded,Iwouldsuggest.Oneofthegreatattractionsoftheexistentialistphi-losopher/novelistswastheapparentthoughtthatthenovelmightbeabettervenueforthinkingthanthestraightforwardtreatiseifourthinking(andliving)infactisntitselfstraightforward.IrisMurdoch,herselfaphilosopher/novelistandagreatpro-moterforexistentialism,seemedtogiveintotheseparochialnotionsinherearlyencounterswithexistentialism,writingthatSartresnovelsandplayshaveastrictlydidacticpurpose.29Adecadelater,however,MurdochcriticizedSartrestheoryofproseandarguedthatliteraturemighthelpusrecoverfromthereductionsmodernthoughthasperformedonourlives.Wehavebeenleftwithfartooshallowandflimsyanideaofhumanpersonality,shewritesinAgainstDryness.30AndsonowWeneedmoreconceptsthanourphilosophieshavefurnisheduswith[.]Weneedmoreconceptsintermsofwhichtopicturethesubstanceofourbeing(p.293).Butifitisacategorical,formaldifferenceinapproachbetweenphilosophyandlit-eraturethathasallowedtheformertoimpoverishusandthatgivesthelatterhope,surelyitisnotfurtherconceptsthatweneedatall.Better:Itisherethatliteratureissoimportant,especiallysinceithastakenoversomeofthetasksformerlyper-formedbyphilosophy.Throughliteraturewecanre-discoverasenseofthedensityofourlives(p.294).Sense,notconcepts:thatis,literaturehasanabilityphiloso-phylacks,toimplyorperformorproducethoughtsratherthanliterallyinscribingthemontothepage.Toshowratherthantell.ThemistakethatMacIntyreandStrawsonmakeinreadingNausea,andthatphilosophersalltoofrequentlymakein281992,notep.46.Seetoop.53.29IrisMurdoch,TheNovelistasMetaphysician,in1997,p.103.IstealencountersfromeditorPeterConradissectionheading.Thelatersectionheadingistellingaswell:CanLiteratureHelpCuretheIllsofPhilosophy?301997,p.287.SeetooKunderasTheDepreciatedLegacyofCervantes:Ifitistruethatphilosophyandsciencehaveforgottenaboutmansbeing,itemergesallthemoreplainlythatwithCervantesagreatEuropeanarttookshapethatisnothingotherthantheinvestigationofthisforgottenbeing(1990,pp.45).\n6HowSartre,Philosopher,MisreadsSartre,Novelist101readingfictiongenerally,istothinkthatthemeaningofafictionmustberightthereonthepageandnotrequireanycriticalworkgreaterthanquotationforextraction.Philosophersarewellaccustomednow,bothpersonallyandprofessionally,tothechargethattheyhavenorealexpertiseorthattheirfieldhasnouseatall.Inturn,though,theyhaveabadhabitoflevelingthesamechargeagainstcriticismandthestudyofliterature.BrianLeiter,forexample,inaninfluentialifcontroversialstate-ment,writeswithhubris:Whateverthelimitationsofanalyticphilosophy,itisclearlyfarpreferabletowhathasbefallenhumanisticfieldslikeEnglish,whichhavelargelycollapsedasseriousdisciplineswhilebecomingtherepositoryforalltheworldsbadphilosophy,badsocialscience,andbadhistory(2011).Itspossi-bletothinkthatwecandowithoutthetalentsofliterarycriticsandthatonecanreadthemeaningofanovelrightoffthepageonlyifonethinksthatliteraturesfunction-ingisnomorecomplicatedrhetoricallythanphilosophys.Suchaviewoftenseemstotakethephenomenologyofreadingtoconsistofnothingbutthereceptionofactsofcommunicationandinnoneedofcloserformalandcriticalattention.Ifwereinterestednotintheselfasanobjectwithanarrativeshape,butinsteadthemannerofourbeinginasmuchasweunderstandourselvesthroughnarrativizing,thenitisperhapsliteraturewithitsrhetoricalcomplicationsandnotphilosophywhichwillallowustoexplorethisphenomenology.AndsothequotationfromMurdochIveplacedatopthisessay:Literatureentertains,itdoesmanythings,andphilosophydoesonething(1997,p.4).AcknowledgmentsMythankstoRobChodat,CharlesGriswold,AllenSpeight,andaudiencesatBostonUniversityandtheAmericanComparativeLiteratureAssociationsAnnualMeetingfortheircommentsonearlierversions.ReferencesAbbottHP(2008)TheCambridgeintroductiontonarrative,2ndedn.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge.Firsteditionpublishedin2002Aristotle(1987)Poetics(trans.andcommentaryStephenHalliwell).UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,ChapelHillBarnesHE(1959)Humanisticexistentialism:theliteratureofpossibility.UniversityofNebraskaPress,LincolnBrooksP(1984)Readingfortheplot.HarvardUniversityPress,CambridgeCarrD(1986)Time,narrative,andhistory.IndianaUniversityPress,BloomingtonCharlesworthMJ(1976)TheexistentialistsandJean-PaulSartre.GeorgePrior,LondonDeLilloD(2001)Thebodyartist.Scribner,NewYorkGibsonJ,HuemerW,PocciL(eds)(2007)Asenseoftheworld:essaysonfiction,narrative,andknowledge.Routledge,NewYorkHeideggerM(1971)Poetry,language,thought(trans:HofstadterA).HarperCollinsPublishers,NewYorkJamesonF(1961)Sartre:theoriginsofastyle.YaleUniversityPress,NewHavenKermodeF(2000)Thesenseofanending.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford.Firstpublishedin1966KunderaM(1990)Theartofthenovel.FaberandFaber,London.FirstpublishedinFrenchin1986\n102B.RothKunderaM(2006)Thecurtain(trans:AsherL).HarperCollinsPublishers,NewYork.Firstpub-lishedinFrenchin2005LeiterB(2011)Analyticandcontinentalphilosophy.Thephilosophicalgourmetreport.http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp.RetrievedDecember2013MacIntyreA(1984)Aftervirtue,2ndedn.UniversityofNotreDamePress,SouthBend.Firstedi-tionpublishedin1981MitchellWJT(ed)(1981)Onnarrative.UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoMurdochI(1997)Existentialistsandmystics.Penguin,NewYorkPercyW(1998)Themoviegoer.Vintage,NewYork.Firstpublishedin1961PynchonT(1973)Gravitysrainbow.Penguin,NewYorkRothB(2012)Confessions,excuses,andthestorytellingself:rereadingRousseauwithPauldeMan.In:PasiekaA,PetruccelliD,RothB(eds)Re-thinkingEuropeanpoliticsandhistory:IWMJuniorvisitingfellowsconferences,vol32,Vienna,IWMPublicationsRothB(2014)Narrative,understanding,andtheself:Heideggerandtheinterpretationoflivedexperience.Doctoraldissertation.BostonUniversitySartreJ-P(1964)Nausea(trans:AlexanderL).NewDirections,NewYork.FirstpublishedinFrenchin1938SartreJ-P(1969)Beingandnothingness(trans:BarnesHE).Routledge,London.FirstpublishedinFrenchin1943SartreJ-P(1975)Thewall(trans:AlexanderL).NewDirections,NewYorkSartreJ-P(1981)Thewords(trans:FrechtmanB).VintageBooks,NewYork.FirstpublishedinFrenchin1964SartreJ-P(1992)Truthandexistence(trans:AdrienvandenHoven).UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoSartreJ-P(1998)Whatisliterature?In:Whatisliterature?andotheressays(trans:FrechtmanB).HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MA,pp21245.FirstpublishedinFrenchin1948SartreJ-P(1999)Wardiaries(trans:HoareQ).VersoBooks,London.FirstpublishedinFrenchin1983SimmelG(1959)Theadventure.In:KHWolff(ed)Essaysonsociology,philosophyandaesthetics(trans:KettlerD).Harper&Row,NewYork,pp243258.FirstpublishedinGermanin1910StrawsonG(2004)Againstnarrativity.Ratio17(4):428452VellemanJD(2005)Theselfasnarrator.In:Selftoself:selectedessays.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,pp203223WhiteC(2003)Themiddlemind.HarperCollins,NewYork\nChapter7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligenceSilviaCarliInAristotlesview,thenatureofcognitionisdeterminedbytheobjectsofknowl-edge.1Ourdiscussionwillbeadequate,hewritesintheEthics,ifithasasmuchprecisionasthesubjectmatteradmitsof;exactnessisnottobesoughtalikeinalldiscussions(logoi),anymorethaninalltheproductsofthearts(NE1.3.1094b11-14).2Differentfieldsofinquiryadmitofdifferentdegreesofprecisionanddictatethekindofunderstandingthatisappropriatetothem.Accordingly,theanalysisofthenatureoftheobjectsthatpoetryimitates(mimemata)isthefirststeptodiscover3thephilosophersconceptionofthekindofunderstandingthatcanbeattainedthroughliteraryworks.Tragedy,4hewritesinthePoetics,representstheworldofhumanaffairs,sinceitisamimesisofactionandlife(Poet.6.1450a1517).Itdepictsthemostfamiliarandmostuniversalhumanexperience,i.e.,individualsplacedincircumstancesthatarenotoftheirmaking,andconnectedbyawebofrelationstootheragents,whostrivetoattainhappiness.Specifically,itshowsaseriesofeventsthatmarkthedramaticcharacterspassagefromgoodtobadfortune1Thisessayfocusesonwhatwelearnfromliteratureratherthanonthecognitivepowersthatmakethisformofunderstandingpossible.Itisgenerallyagreedthatimagination(phantasia)isprimarilyinvolvedintheexperienceofart.ForarecenttreatmentofthistopicseeM.Heath,CognitioninAristotlesPoeticsMnemosyne62no.1(2009):5175.2SeealsoNE2.2.1104a1-9;NE6.Unlessotherwisenoted,translationsfromtheGreekaremyown.3Aristotledoesnotexplicitlythematizesthenatureofnarrativeintelligence,although,asRicoeurnotes,hemakesclearthatitreallyisaquestionofakindofintelligence,beginninginChapter4,whereheestablisheshisleadingconceptsbywayoftheirgenesis.SeePaulRicoeur,TimeandNarrativeVol.1,trans.KathleenMcLaughlinandDavidPellauer(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1984),40.4FollowingAristotlesapproachinthetreatiseonpoetry,thisarticlefocusesprimarilyontragedy.S.Carli(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,SkidmoreCollege,815NorthBroadway,SaratogaSprings,NY12866,USAe-mail:scarli@skidmore.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015103A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_7\n104S.Carliorviceversa.5Thepremisesandthesettingsofthestoriesthatthepoetscomposecanbe,andoftenare,outoftheordinaryandoutlandish.Muthoiarenotmeanttobefactuallytruesincetheydonotrepresenteventsthathaveactuallyhappened(tagenomena),buteventsastheymighthappen(hoiaangenoito)orarepossibleaccordingtoprobabilityornecessity(Poet.9.1451a368).Theyhave,however,anessentialconnectiontoreallifehappenings,byvirtueofwhichtheycanberecog-nizedastheirimitations.6Themenandwomenwhoenactdramaticactions(prax-eis),forinstance,embodyrealethicaltypes:Sincetheimitators(oimimoumenoi)imitatemeninaction(prattontas),anditisnecessarythatthelatterareeitherseriousoroflittleworth(forcharactersalmostalwaysconformtothesetypes,asitisthroughviceandvirtuethatthecharactersofallmenvary),theywillimitatepeoplewhoarebetterthanus,worsethanusorlikeus(Poet.2.1448a1-5).7Boththereferencetous,i.e.,thespectatorsorreaders,andtheclaimthatcharactersalmostalwaysconformtothesetypes,makeclearthatthepersonsbeingimitatedarerealpersons.Forthisreason,nomatterhowuniquetheirpredica-mentandsocialstandingmaybe,theiractionsandreactionsdisplaypatternsthatarecharacteristicofliving,historicalindividualsoftheirkind.8Thenotionsofmoralcharacter(ēthos),thought(dianoia)andmoraldeeds(praxeis)9atworkinthePoetics,aswellastheirrelations,are,forthemostpart,thosewithwhichwearealreadyfamiliarbothfromlifeandfromAristotlesethicalandrhetoricaltreatises.10Character,forinstance,isthatinvirtueofwhichagentsareofacertainkindorqual-ity11;itisbestrevealedbychoice(proairesis),12andtogetherwiththoughtitisthecauseoftheirdeeds.13Aristotlesemphasisontheprimacyofactionoverēthos5Poet.7.1451a11-15.Seealso9.1452a22ff;1452a31ff;18.1455b28.6Onthemimeticrelationbetweenartandtheworldsee,e.g.,JohnJones,OnAristotleandGreekTragedy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1962),2129;Redfield,NatureandCultureintheIliad:TheTragedyofHector,expandeded.(Durham:DukeUniversityPress,1994),5567;Halliwell,TheAestheticsofMimesis(PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2002),15176,18693;SilviaCarli,PoetryismorePhilosophicalthanHistory:AristotleonMimêsisandForm,TheReviewofMetaphysics64,no.2(2010):30336.7SeealsoPoet.4.1448b24-28;5.1449a33;5.1449b10-11.8Aristotleholdsthatconformitytotypeisthemajorsourceoftheuniversalityofplots.Hewritesthatuniversalmeansthekindsofthingsitfitsacertainsortofpersontosayordoaccordingtoprobabilityornecessity(Poet.9.1451b8-9).9Iamreferringheretothecharactersindividualethicaldeeds,ratherthantothepoeticactionasawhole.10Poet.6.1450b5-12;19.1456a33-b811Poet.6.1450a6;1450a19;4.1448b24-28.12Poet.6.1450b8-9;15.1454a18-19.13It[tragedy]ismimesisofanaction,andtheactionisconductedbysomeagents(upotinōnprattontōn),whonecessarilyareofacertainqualityofcharacterandthought(andbecauseofthesefactorswealsosaythattheiractionsareofacertainquality).Thereare,bynature,twocausesofactions,namely,thought(dianoia)andcharacter(ēthos)(Poet.6.1449b36-1450a2;emphasisadded).HereAristotlebringscharacterandthoughttogetherasthedeterminantsofthenatureofethicaldeeds,ashedoesintheEthics.SeeNE3.2.1112a15ff;6.2.1139a33ff;6.13.Bothinchapter6and19,however,hedefinesdianoiainawaythatvirtuallyassimilatesittorhetoricalargument,\n7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence105andthought,14moreover,doesnotsimplyexpresshisunderstandingofpoeticworks,accordingtowhichtheplot,thatis,theelementthatimitatespraxis,isthefirstprincipleand,asitwere,thesouloftragedy15sothatadramawithoutactionwouldbe,likeasoullessorganism,atragedyonlyinname.16Italsoreflectshiswiderphilosophicalevaluationoftherelativeimportanceofactionandcharacterinlife.17AsisthecaseforeveryentityintheAristotelianworld,mansnatureisfullyactual-izedintheactiveexerciseofhisfunctions.Characterisadispositiontoactandfeelinacertainwaywhich,ifnotexercised,doesnotenablehimtoattainhisdistinctivegood,i.e.,eudaimonia.IndeedasintheOlympicgamesitisnotthemostbeautifulandstrongestthatarecrowned[iftheyremaininactive]butthosewhocompete(foritissomeofthesethatarevictorious),soinlifethosewhoactrightlywinnobleandgoodthings(NE1.8.1099a4-6;emphasisadded).18Similarconsiderationsholdforthepassions(pathemata)arousedbydramas,which,withoutbeingidenticaltothosethatwesufferinreallife,19bearacloseresem-blancetothem.Inbothcases,forinstance,pityisforthosewhodonotdeservetofallintomisfortune,20andaresimilartous.21Ontheotherhand,whileinreallifewefearprimarilyevilsthatmaybefallus,spectatorsfearwhatmighthappentotheheroes.22Thepassionthattheyexperience,however,preservestheself-regardingnatureofactualfearbecauseitisfeltfordramatispersonaethatarelikeus(Poet.13.1453a5).Finally,andmostimportantly,thephilosophersinsistenceontherequirementthattheepisodesofapoembeorderedaccordingtorelationsofnecessityorprobability23findsitsexplanationinthefactthatthesearetherelationsthatgoverntheeventsofthehumanworld.Although,asarule,actualhappeningsinclude,ini.e.,toverbaldemonstration,refutationetc.SeePoet.6.1450b5-12;19.1456a33-b8.OntherelationbetweenthesetwocharacterizationsofdianoiainthePoetics,seeStephenHalliwell,AristotlesPoetics,withaNewIntroduction(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1986,1998),154158.14Poet.6.1450a14-15;1450a24-25;1450a36-1450b5.15Poet.6.1450a37.16Poet.6.1450a24-25;DA2.1.412b19-22.17Halliwell,AristotlesPoetics,157.18Itshouldbenoted,however,thatinthePoeticsexternalgoodshaveamoreprominentroleindeterminingthequalityofapersonslifethantheydointheEthics.IndeedAristotleusesthetermeudaimoniaonlyonceinthistreatise(Poet.6.1450a17);typicallyheuseseutuchia(goodfortune,prosperity).SeePoet.7.1451a.1115;11.1452a32;1452b2;13.1452b35-1453a17;13.1453a26;18.1455b28.19Seebelowfortheexplanationofthispoint.20Poet.13.1453a6;Rhet.2.8.OnthelegitimacyofusingthediscussionoftheemotionsintheRhetorictoilluminateAristotlesbriefremarksinthePoetics,withoutdisregardingthedifferencebetweenthetwotreatises,seeHalliwell,AristotlesPoetics,168184.21OnthesimilaritybetweenthesubjectandtheobjectofthisemotionintheRhetoricseeRhet.2.8;forthePoeticsseebelow.22Rhet.2.5.1382a28-30;Poet.13.1452b31-1453a13.23Poet.7.1450b26-34;7.1451a13;11.1452a23ff;8.1451a27;9.1451a37-8;9.1451b33-1452a1;10.1452a18-21;15.1454a35-b2;23.1459a17-30.Thereare,however,significantexceptionstothisrule.Onthispointseen.67below.\n106S.Carliadditiontocausallyconnectedevents,24eventswhoselinksarepurelytemporal,andarethuslessorderlythanfictionalpragmata,25theworlddepictedbythepoetisstillrecognizableasasimplifiedversionofthefamiliardomainofhumanaffairs.26AsRedfieldputsit:Thepoetcreateshisworld,buthedoesnotcreateitjustashewishes.Thebeginningsareinvented,buttheconsequencesfollowastheyreallywould.Inthissense,fictionpresentsanunrealworldwhichisabouttherealworld.27Forthisreason,mimeticworkscanbesaidtoofferaformofvicariousexperiencewhich,assuch,mobilizesintheaudiencepowersandresourcesthatneighboronthoseatworkinpracticallife.Makingsenseofeventsintherealworldrequiresmasteryofagroupofinterre-latedconceptsthatdefinethedomainofaction(praxis)anddistinguishitfromphysicalmovement.28Tounderstandanactioninagivencontext,oneneedstograspwhoisacting,whattheagentisdoing,forwhatreasonsandforthesakeofwhathesacting,towardsoragainstwhomtheactionisdirected,whetheritisperformedattheappropriatetimeetc.Thecapacitytofollowaplotinfactseemstopresupposethiscompetenceinthegrammarofaction,andtobuilduponit.Thespectatorisexpected,forinstance,toattributemotivesandintentionstocharactersevenintheabsenceofanyclearindicationofthem,toappreciatethediscrepancybetweentheintendedandtheactualconsequencesoftheirdeeds,toimaginethecomplexfeel-ingsthatahero(ine)mayharbortowardsanother,toappreciatewhethertheirchoicesandreactionsaretruetotheirnature,andsoon.Thisisaformofintelligencethat,unlikethewisdomofthephilosopher,doesnotrequiretheapprehensionofgeneralprinciplesandcauses.Rather,itisanimplicitunderstandingthatoriginatesfromexperienceandremainswithinthehorizonofparticulareventsandsituations.Anindividualwhopossessesitmayknowperfectlywellwhatmattersinlife,whatinsubstanceholdsmentogether,whatmovesthem,whatpowerdominatesthemwithouthavinggraspedthisknowledgeingeneralrulesnorexpoundedittoothersingeneralreflections.29Hemaymakecleartohimselfandothershisideasinparticularcases...realorinvented,inadequateexamplesdeterminedintimeandspacewithoutallowingtheuniversaltoemergeonitsownaccount.30Thusnarrativeintelligenceresemblesphronēsiswhich,althoughinvolvesmasteryofgen-eralprinciples,31mustalsorecognizetheparticulars,foritispractical,andpraxis24OnthenatureoftherelationamonghistoricaleventsseeSilviaCarli,AristotleonthePhilosophicalElementsofHistoriaReviewofMetaphysics65(2),2011:321349.25Inlimitcases,however,eventsintherealworldcandisplayflawlesspatternsofprobabilityornecessitythatareindistinguishablefromfictionalhappenings.SeePoet.9.1451b3033.26Onthedifferencebetweenrealandpoeticworldseebelow.27JamesRedfield,NatureandCultureintheIliad,59.28SeeNE3.1.1111a3-6,aswellasthedefinitionsofthevariousvirtuesNE3.6-5;Poet.25.1461a4-9.OnthispointseePaulRicoeur,TimeandNarrative,5455.29G.F.W.Hegel,Aesthetics:LecturesonFineArt,Vol.1trans.T.M.Knox(Oxford:Clarendon,1975),40.30Ibid.31NE6.7.1141b15.\n7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence107isconcernedwithparticulars(NE6.7.1141b15-16).Thedistinctivegiftoftheprudentmanishissensitivitytothenuancesofconcretepracticalsettingsthatenableshimtoseethingscorrectly32andtochooseineachcasewhatisappropriatetotheoccasion.33Justasheacquiresthiscapacitybybecomingexpe-riencedinthehumanworld,34thespectatorsabilitytomakesenseoffictionalplotsdrawsontheirfamiliaritywithpracticalevents.35Bothkindsofintelligence,moreover,areamanifestationofourdistinctivelyhumannature.Theoreticalreason,whichapprehendsobjectswhoseprinciplescannotbeotherwise,36is,accordingtoAristotle,thebestandmostauthoritativepartofourbeingwhichconnectsustothedivine.37Practicalintelligence,ontheotherhand,istheexcellenceofhumanbeingsquahuman,notonlybecauseitisexercisedonthecontingentworldoftheanthrōpina,38butalsobecauseitbelongstoournatureascompositesofmatterandform.39Apersoncannotbepracticallywiseifshedoesnotpossessthevirtuesofcharacter,whichinvolveessentiallytheemo-tions,andthusthebody.40Virtuesofcharacter,inturn,requiretheexerciseofrightreason.41Thephronimosfeelstherightpassions,towardstherightobject,withtherightintensity,fortherightamountoftimeetc.,42andtheircontributiontohisexcel-lenceisnotonlythattheyhelptoprovidehimwiththepropermotivationtoact.43Theyalsoenhancehisunderstandingandassessmentoftheethicalworld,since,forAristotle,emotionsareselectiveresponsestodeterminateobjectsandsituations,which,therefore,involvethecapacitytodiscriminateamongthem.44Anger,forinstance,isadesire,accompaniedbypain,foropenrevengeforanapparentslighttowardsourselvesoroneofourfriends,whensuchaslightisundeserved.45Theveryexperienceofthispassionthusinvolvesaninterpretationofthenatureofthedeeds,aswellasthepersons,thatarouseit,whichisfarmoreimmediatethanour32NE6.11.1143b13.33NE2.2.1104a8;emphasisadded.34See,e.g.,NE6.7.1141b14-22;6.11.1143b11-14;1.3.1095a2-3;2.2.1104a1-9.35SeePoet.4.1448b18-20.36NE.6.1.1139a837NE10.7.1177b26-1178a7;1178b8-23.38NE3.3;6.1.1139a8.39NE10.8.1178a15-21.40See,e.g.,NE2.3.1104b13-15;2.6.1106b15-27.41NE6.13.1144b1-16;10.8.1178a17-19.Thetwokindsofaretaiaresointertwined,accordingtoAristotle,thatitisnotsufficienttoclaimthatoneisinaccordancewith(kata)theother;rather,itshouldbesaidoneisconjoinedwith(meta)theother(estigaroumononēkatatonorthonlogon,all’ēmetatouorthoulogouhexisaretēestin)(NE6.13.1144b25-27).42SeeNE2.7;4.43Experiencingtheproperemotions,andthusharmonybetweentherationalandtheappetitivepartsofthesoul,isalsoamanifestationoftheexcellenceofonesnature.SeeNE1.13.1102b14-1103a3.44See,e.g.,Rhet.2.1.1378a220-28.45Rhet.2.2.1378a31-33.\n108S.Carlireasonedevaluations.Ouremotions,then,makeusawareofwhatishappeninginourinteractionswithothers.Moreover,theyaddadimensionoffeltsignificancetotheeventswewitnessthatwouldnotbeavailabletoadetachedagent.46Angerforaslightdirectedtowardafriend,forinstance,notonlysignalswhatisgoingon;italsomakesusperceivewhatitfeelsliketobeunjustlytargetedandtorebelagainstthissortoftreatment.Asaresult,thepassionsmakeusmorealerttothehumansignifi-canceofpracticalsituationsandimproveourethicalperceptions.Narrativeintelligence,broughttolifebyemotionallychargeddramaticevents,exhibitsasimilarinterplayofpassionsandunderstanding.Theidealspectator/readerissomeonewho,withoutidentifyingfullywithtragicheroes,feelsanaffinitywiththem.Asnotedabove,pityandfearareemotionsthatarerootedinarealorapparentsimilaritybetweenthesubjectandtheobjectofthepassion.Whilethetypicaltragiccharactersareamongthosewhoenjoygreatrenownandprosperity,suchasOedipus,Thyestesandeminentmenofsuchlineages(Poet.13.1453a11-12)andareinthisrespectdifferentfromtheaveragespectatortheyare,likemostpeople,neithersupremelyvirtuousnorviciousbutfallinbetweenthesetwoextremes(Poet.13.1453a8-10).Aristotlestheorythuscontainspreciseindicationsabouttheintendedrecipientsofmimeticworks.Theyshouldbedecentcitizenswhohavereceivedagoodupbringingandarecapableofsharingthevaluesandgoalsoftheplotsprotagonists.47Thispartialidentificationwiththedramaticcharactersallowstheaudiencetomakesenseofthestorynotonlyfromthepointofviewofexternalviewers,butalsofromthatofthedramaticcharactersthemselves,andthustoparticipateintheirvicissitudesfromwithin,sotospeak.Moreover,thetragicpassionscomplementtheintellectualunderstandingofthedrama.Fearcompletestheexpectation,generatedbytheplot,ofimminentevilsbefallingtheheroes,andpityaddstointellectualcomprehensiontheemotionalunderstandingoftheundeservedcharacterofthedramatispersonaessufferings48or,atleast,ofthedis-proportionbetweentheirerrorsandtheconsequencesthattheypayforit.49Indeedoneofthemarksofthemasterfultragedianishiscapacitytoappealbothtothe46OnthispointseeNancySherman,TheFabricofCharacter:AristotlesTheoryofVirtue(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1989),4450,165171.47ThisisalsotheintendedaudienceofthelecturesonEthics(NE1.4.1095b4-6).48Ifweassumethattheheroescannotbeblamedfortheerror(hamartia)thatleadstotheirdown-fall(Poet.13.1453a10).Forthisreadingofhamartia,see,e.g.,NancySherman,HamartiaandVirtue,inEssaysonAristotlesPoetics,ed.AmélieO.Rorty(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992),177196,esp.18690;P.Donini,Latragediaelavita(Alessandria:EdizionidellOrso,2004)87106,esp.1013;M.Heath,TheUniversalityofPoetryinAristotlesPoetics,TheClassicalQuarterly(NewSeries)41No.2(1991),391398,esp.393,395;RichardSorabji,Necessity,ChanceandBlame,(Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress,1980),2958;StephenHalliwell,AristotlesPoetics,215237,esp.220,229.49Ifweunderstandhamartiaasculpableerror.Forthisinterpretationofhamartia,see,e.g.,DorotheaFredeNecessity,ChanceandWhatHappensfortheMostPartinAristotlesPoetics,inEssaysonAristotlesPoetics,ed.A.O.Rorty,21213,219n.39;CarnesLord,EducationandCultureinthePoliticalThoughtofAristotle(IthacaandLondon:CornellUniversityPress,1982),168ff.\n7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence109audiencesemotionsandtoitscapacityfordiscernmentinsuchawayastorealizeafullintegrationofthetwo.50Itwouldseem,however,thatthereisamajordifferencebetweenthewayinwhichthemanofactionapprehendseventsandthewayinwhichthespectatordoes.Theformeriscompletelyimmersedinthesituationinwhichhefindshimselfandhasaforward-lookingperspectivethatgoesbeyondwhatis,andanticipateswhatwillbe.Moreoverevenifheisexcellentandmakesthebestuseoftheinformationavailabletohiminhisdeliberations,theknowledgeathisdisposalisalwaysatriskofbeinglimitedandincomplete,asAristotlesdiscussionofinvoluntaryactionsmakesclear(NE3.1.1110b32-1111a21).Forthisreason,thepracticalmansstand-pointseemstoberatherthatoftheheroes,whoactonthebasisoftheirimperfectknowledgeofthecircumstances,thanthatofthespectator.51InancientGreecethelatterwaspresumablyalreadyfamiliarwithmosttragicstoriesbased,asarule,ontraditionalmyths52andknewmoreaboutthecharacterslivesandcareersthantheythemselvesdid.Itmaybethought,therefore,thatthismadehimanomniscientobserver.IfadefiningcharacteristicofSophoclesOedipus,forinstance,ishislackofself-knowledge,wouldntthespectator,whoknowsOedipusidentityallalong,experienceandunderstandthestoryquitedifferentlythantheKingofThebes?ThePoeticssuggeststhattheanswertothisquestioncannotbeanunqualifiedyes,andthatforAristotlethespectatorsandtheherosperspectivesareinthisrespectmoresimilarthanonemightsuppose.Hewritesthat,inthebesttragediesatleast,thechangeoffortune,whichistheturningpointoftragicmuthoi,53isunexpectednotonlyfortheheroesbutalsofortheaudience.54Inthesestoriestheeventshappencontrarytoexpectationbecauseofoneanother(paratēndoxan,diallela)(Poet.9.1452a3),andforthisreasonmakeonewonder.Giventhatwhatisknowncanhardlybeunexpected,histheoryseemstoassumethatthespectatorsexperienceoftheperformanceisnotexclusively,orevenprimarily,shapedbyhispre-existingknowledgeofthestory.Presumably,thedirectexperienceoftheplaymakesthisknowledgerecedeinthebackground,sothatheisguidedby,andrespondsto,whatisimmediatelygiventohimonstage.Inotherwords,Aristotleseemstodistinguishbetweenexternalknowledgeoftheplot,ontheonehand,andthebeliefsandemo-tionsgeneratedbytheinternaldevelopmentofthedramaticaction,ontheother.55Withoutbeingerased,theformerisweakenedandthelattertakeholdofhimand50Ontheintegrationofdiscernmentandpassionssee,e.g.,StephenHalliwellPleasure,Understanding,andEmotioninAristotlesPoetics,inEssaysonAristotlesPoetics,ed.A.O.Rorty,241260;Ricoeur,TimeandNarrative,4245.51IndeedThosewhoimitate,imitatemenwhoact(mimountaioimimoumenoiprattontas)(Poet.2.1448a1).52Aristotleconfirmsthatmanytragedieswerebasedontraditionalstories(Poet.13.53a8-12;1453a17-22;14.1454a9-13),andevenrecommendsthatpoetsdonotdeviatesignificantlyfromthem(Poet.14.1453b23-26).Atthesametime,henotesthattheplotscouldalsobebasedonhis-toricalevents(Poet.9.1451b3033),ortheycouldbeinvented(Poet.9.1451b19-23).53Seee.g.Poet.7.1451a13-16;18.1456a24-29.54Poet.9.1452a3-5.55OnthispointseeRicoeur,TimeandNarrative,240n.26.\n110S.Carlicommandhisattention.Thisprocess,promotedbytheaudiencesnaturalabilitytoidentifywiththeheroes,enablesthetheōrostoadopttheforward-lookingtakeontheaction,whichdefinesthedramaticcharactersstandpoint,andtodevelopexpec-tationswhosecontentisdeterminedbythelogicofthepragmataasconstructedbythepoet.Forthisreasonhecanbesurprisedbywhathappens.Similarly,itallowshimtoexperiencetheheroespassagefromignorancetoknowledge,56throughwhichtheycometoknowthetruthaboutthemselves,atthesametimeashisowndiscoveryofthattruthor,perhapsmoreprecisely,asare-discoveryofitcompre-hendedinlightoftheelementsprovidedbytheplot.57AlthoughweknowwhoOedipusis,forinstance,wediscoveritagain,andcomprehendthedevastatingsig-nificanceoftherevelationofhisidentityanew,throughthekingsgradualandpain-fulprocessofcomingtoseeit.If,then,thespectatorsperspectiveonthedramaticactionisuniqueanddoesnotexactlycoincideeitherwiththatofthepracticalmanorofthedramatispersonae,itisnotentirelyseveredfromthatofmenandwomeninactionbecauseitpartakes,inadistinctiveway,ofthelimitationsoftheirhorizons.Theyaredistinguished,however,bythenatureoftheirrelationtothepragmata.Themanofaction(prattōn)considersthesituationinwhichhefindshimselffromthepointofviewofitspotentialofbeingtransformedbyhischoicesanddeeds.Heregardshisenvironmentasadmittingofbeingotherwiseandofbeingimprovedbyhisownefforts,thatistosay,asanobjectofdeliberation(NE3.3).Bycontrast,althoughthespectator(theōros)partakesemotionallyintheadventuresoftheheroes,theyaretohimanobjectofcontemplation(theōria),58tothedevelopmentofwhichhedoesnotanddoesnotfeelcalledtocontributeanything.Inthisrespectheresemblesthephilosopherforwhomtheworldisnottobechangedbutunder-stoodand,thus,enjoyed.Forboth,moreover,cognitiveprogressdependsonprevi-ousacquaintancewiththeobjectstheylearnabout.59Thephilosophersdistinctivework,i.e.,bringingtolighttheintelligibilityofthings,presupposesfamiliaritywiththephenomena.Indeedtherecanbenomeaningfulinvestigationofthewhy(todioti)withoutpreviousapprehensionofthethat(tohoti),orofthefactswhosereasonsoneseeks.60Aristotlemakesasimilarpointabouttheobserversofimita-tionsinPoetics4,whereheconnectsmimesisandlearning.Afternotingthatallhumanbeings,althoughindifferentdegrees,derivefromimitationsthepleasurethatlearningproducesinthemembersofourspecies(Poet.4.1448b8-17),Aristotlewritesthatifonehappensnottohaveseenthe[original]objectbefore,theimagewillnotgivepleasurequamimesisbutbecauseofitsexecutionorcolor,orforsomeothersuchreason(Poet.4.1448b17-20).Thepre-conditiontodelightinimitationsquaimitations,becausetheymakepossibletolearnandinferwhateachobjectis56Anagnōrisis(Poet.11.1452a31-32).57OnthispointseeRicoeur,TimeandNarrative,240n.27.58Intheordinarysenseoftheoreinastolookat,toobserve.59ThisisageneralprincipleofAristotlestheoryofcognition.SeePost.An.1.1.60See,forinstance,HistoriaAnimalium,1.6.491a714;Post.An.2.1.89b213;Met.1.1.981a1-981b9.\n7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence111(Poet.4.1448b18-20),isthus,alsointhiscase,previousexperiencewiththesubjectmatterrepresentedbythemaker.61Thenatureoftheobjectsthespectatorlooksataccountsforfurtherconnec-tionsbetweennarrativeintelligenceandtheoreticalreason.Despitethesimilaritiesoutlinedabove,poeticeventsarenotthesameasactualethicaldoings.62Themostrelevantdistinctionbetweenthetwoisnotthatmimeticactionsarefictionalbutthat,eveniftheywerebasedonhistoricalhappenings,theirorganizationwoulddistinguishthemfromrealevents.63Aristotleholdsthatthepoetisfirstandforemostanimitatorbecausehemakes(poiein)plots(Poet.9.1451b28-29),whichhedefinespreciselyastheorganizationorarrangementofevents.64Themuthosoffersahighlyselectivedepictionofthehumanworld.Inactualexperiencemultipleseriesofeventswithnodiscernibleconnectiontooneanothertakeplacesimultaneously,andwithineachseriestheyhappennotonlybecauseofoneanotherbutalsosimplyoneaftertheother.65Anindividual,moreover,isinvolvedinanumberofpragmata,someofwhichareconnectedonlybecausetheyareperformed,orsuffered,bythesameperson,withoutformingaunitaryaction.66Thetragedian,bycontrast,imitatesasinglechainofeventsinwhicheachepisodecontributestothedevelopmentofthestory.Thatistosay,herepresentsanactionthatisoneandcompleteandwhoseparts,consistingofevents,mustbesoputtogetherthatifoneofthemistransposedorremovedthewholeisdislocatedanddestroyed.67Thisorganizationoftheepisodesintoaself-containedwhole(holon)68guidesandfacilitatestheviewersdiscoveryoftheactionsintelligibility.Infact,itcanbesuggestedthatthepoetsartfularrangementsoftheepisodesplaysforthereader/spectatoroftragediesarolecomparabletothatoftheworkinghypothesesthatthephilosopherformulates61TheexamplethatAristotlepresentsinPoet.4concernstherecognitionofapreviouslyknownparticularindividualfromtheobservationofhisimageorportrait.ForacarefulanalysisofthispassageseeStavrosTsitsiridis,Mimesisandunderstanding:aninterpretationofAristotlesPoetics4.1448B4-19,ClassicalQuarterly55No.2(2005):435446.Asseveralcommentatorshaveargued,however,Aristotlesthesiscanbeextendedtootherformsofmimesis,includingpoetry.See,e.g.,Halliwell,AristotlesPoetics,7081;Halliwell,TheAestheticsofMimesis,157171;P.Donini,IntroduzioneinAristotle,Poetica:traduzioneecuradiPierluigiDonini(Torino:GiulioEinaudi,2008),LXIII-LXVII.62OnthispointseeRicoeur,TimeandNarrative,40.63Aristotle,however,recognizesthattherecanbelimit-casesinwhichachainofhistoricaleventsdisplaythesameorganizationasmimeticpragmata(andcanforthisreasonbetheproperobjectofartisticplots).SeePoet.9.1451b3033.64Legō…muthon..tēnsunthesintōnpragmatōn(Poet.6.1450a5);ētōnpragmatōnsustasis(Poet.1450a14-15).65Poet.23.1459a22-29.66Poet.8.1451a17-19.67Poet.8.1451a32-34.Itmustbenoted,however,thatAristotleisquiteflexibleintheapplicationofhisprincipleoftheorganizationoftheeventsaccordingtoprobabilityornecessity,andadmitsconnectionsthataresimplyplausibleorbelievable.SeePoet.24.1460a26-7;25.1461b1112;1460a35-b5,1460b23-6,1461b11ff.FortheexplanationoftheinclusionoftheplausibleintheconstructionoftheplotseeFrede,Necessity,ChanceandWhatHappensfortheMostPartinAristotlesPoetics,esp.20812;Donini,Introduzione,XLVIII-LVI.68Poet.7.1450b24-31.\n112S.Carlitodiscoverthecausesandprinciplesofthephenomena.Bothallowthesoultofocusonlyonrelevantfactors69andtoidentifymeaningfulpatternsintheobservedmaterial.Mostimportantly,theplotpromptsthetheōrostoengageinaprocessthatmir-rorsthephilosophicalpatternofinquiryfromaporiatoresolution.Thephenomena,whicharethestartingpointofgenuinephilosophicalinvestigations,includenotonlyobservabledatabutalsothereputableviews(endoxa)heldaboutthemaswellasthedifficultiesandproblemsthattheygenerate.70Becomingfamiliarwiththeaporiaithatsurroundagivensubjectofstudyisanessentialstepinthesearchfortruth,inthefirstplace,becauseitdeepensthewonderthatanimatesthephiloso-phersdesiretounderstand.Second,awarenessofthecomplexityoftheissuesandtheproblemsthatawaitresolutionallowstheonewhoinquirestoformulatedefiniteexplanatoryhypothesisratherthanproceedingatrandom.InAristotleswords:thosewhoinquirewithoutfirstconsideringthedifficultiesarelikepeoplewhodonotknowwheretheyhavetogo;71forthesubsequentsolution(lusis)isareleasefromthepreviousdifficulties,anditisnotpossibletountieaknot(desmos)ofwhichonedoesnotknow.72Tyingaknot(desis)anduntyingit(lusis)are,similarly,thetwostagesofplotconstruction,accordingtoAristotlesanalysis(Poet.18.1455b24-32).Thepoetfirstpresentsaproblematicoreveninextricablesitu-ationfromwhichtheredoesnotseemtobeanyexit,justasanaporiaappearstofrustrateeveryattempttofindasolution.Thenheprovidestheelementstounravelthepuzzle.SophoclesOedipus,forinstance,firstoffersconflictingindicationscon-cerningtheidentityofLaiusmurderer(s),whichleavetheaudience,aswellasthechorus,73disoriented.Then,startingwiththenewsthattheCorinthianmessengerbringstoThebesroyalfamily,itweavesthoseapparentlydiscordantelementsintoacoherentpattern.Theopacityoftheinitialpartofthedramaticactionthecomplicationmakesusuneasyandchallengesourintelligence,whilethesecondparttheresolutionoffersawayoutandallowsustosee,retrospectively,theinnernecessityofthestory.Thebestkindsoftragedies,moreover,arethoselikeOedipustheKinginwhichthecharacterschangeoffortune(metabasis)isasuddenreversal(peripeteia)andcoincideswiththeirpassagefromignorancetoknowledge69Inthecaseofscientifichypothesis,allegedlyrelevant.70ForAristotlesrichviewofthenatureoftaphainomena,whichincludeobservablefactsandendoxa,seeG.E.L.Owen,TithenaitaPhainomena,inArticlesonAristotlevol.1,eds.J.Barnes,M.SchofieldandR.Sorabji,(NewYork:St.MartinPress,1975),113126;Nussbaum,TheFragilityofGoodness:LuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986)esp.Ch.8;JohnJ.Cleary,PhainomenainAristotlesMethodology,InternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudies2no.1(1994):6197;ChristopherP.Long,SavingTaLegomena:AristotleandtheHistoryofPhilosophy,TheReviewofMetaphysics60no.2(2006):24767.71Aristotle,Met.3.1.995a346.72Aristotle,Met.3.1.995a2630;seealsoNE7.1.1145b37.73Sophocles,OedipusTheKing,inSophoclesI:OedipusTheKing,OedipusatColonos,Antigone,2nded.,trans.DavidGreen(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1991),483486.\n7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence113(anagnōrisis).74Intheseplotsaneventthatisunpredictableandsurprising,suchasthearrivalofthemessengerfromCorinth,alsorevealstheconnectionbetweentheepisodesthateludedtheminduptothatpoint,andthusopensthewaytothediscov-eryofthestorysintelligibility.Besidesbeingmosteffectiveinarousingthetragicemotions,theunexpectedcombinedwithaninsightintotheconnectionofeventsthatdeterminedthedirectionoftheaction,makestheaudiencewonder,accordingtoAristotle(Poet.9.1452a2-6),andthusaddsanotherelementofaffinitybetweenspectatorsandloversofwisdom.Wonder(tothaumaston)istheexperiencethatsinglesoutanimalswhobynaturedesiretounderstand,andpushesthemtoseekcognitivesatisfaction.75Thus,presumably,thespectatorswonderisthebeginningofamorecomprehensiveattempttomakesenseofthestory.Ideallyatleast,theinsighthegainswhenherecognizesthateventsthatarecontrarytoexpectationsalsohappenbecauseofoneanother76makehimkeenertoidentifytherelationsbetweenallthepragmatathatledthestorytoitsprobableorinevitableconclusion.Iftheprocessissuccessful,hissoulshould,likethatofthephilosopherwhodiscov-ersthecausesofthephenomenastudied,turnfromwondertoitsoppositestate,namely,therecognitionthatthingscouldnotbedifferentthantheyare.77Whatthismeans,however,varieswiththecharacteroftheobjectsthatthetwocontemplate(theōrein).Thephilosopherabstractsfromthefortuitous78andtheparticular,andfocusesontheessentialandperseattributesoftheobjectshestudies.79Hisunder-standingofthewhyofthingsistherealizationthattheirnaturenecessarilymanifestsitselfintypicalactivitiesandcharacteristicsor,touseAristotlesexpression,thattheyarethewaytheyarealwaysorforthemostpart(aeiēhōsepitopolu).80Forinstance,oncehehasunderstoodtherelationbetweenthediagonalofasquareanditsside,thereisnothingthatwouldsurpriseageometersomuchasifthediagonalturnedouttobecommensurable(Met.1.2.983a19-21),andheknowsinadvancethattheirincommensurabilitycanbepredicatedofeverysquare.Thefactthatinawell-madeplottheeventsarelinkedbycausalrelationsofprob-abilityornecessity,ontheotherhand,doesnotmaketheconclusionforeseeable.Unlikethephilosopher,thetragediandoesnotexcludethefortuitousandtheacci-dentalfromhisstories,whichisratherthesourceoftheall-importantelementofsurprise.Theviewersunderstandingofthemuthos,thus,isnottheappreciationthat,giventheethicalcharacteroftheprotagonists,theyarepredictablydoomedtofall.81Rather,itistheacknowledgementthatwhenindividualsoftheirnatureare74Poet.11.1452a22-34.75Met.1.2.982b12-22.76SeePoet.9.1452a3andabovep.10.77SeeMet.1.2.983a13-21.78Met.6.2-3.79Post.An.1.9;DA1.1.402a7.80Allscienceiseitherofthatwhichisalwaysorforthemostpart(Met.6.2.1027a20).81Iamreferringtotragediesthat,liketheOedipus,showapassagefromgoodtobadfortune;tragicactionscanalso,however,showaverteddisasterandthusapassagefrombadtogoodfortune.SeePoet.7.1451a11-15;9.1452a22ff;1452a31ff;13.1453a8-17;14.1453b35-36,1454a4-9;18.1455b28.\n114S.Carlisituatedintheuniquecircumstancesimaginedbythepoetandaresubjecttothefortuitousturnsthatpunctuatetheirlives,theyareboundtoendupinmisery.AsRicoeurputsit:tounderstandthestoryistounderstandhowandwhythesucces-siveepisodesledtothisconclusion,which,farfrombeingforeseeable,mustfinallybeacceptableascongruentwiththeepisodesbroughttogetherbythestory.82Finally,boththephilosophersinquiryandthecognitiveexperienceofthetheōrosresultinthediscoveryofsomesortofuniversality,although,onceagain,ofakinddeterminedbythedifferentcharacteroftheirobjects.Theformer,movingfromwhatisfirstforustowhatisfirstinitselforfromthesensibletotheintelli-giblegraspsthehighestkindofuniversals,namely,thecommonfeaturesofaclassofparticularsabstractedfromtheindividualsandtheiridiosyncraticfeatures.Thespectator,ontheotherhand,witnessesdeedsandsufferingsenactedbyindi-vidualssituatedinparticularcircumstancesand,forthisreason,neverleavesthehorizonoftheexperiential.Yetwhatheapprehendsgoesbeyondsimpleexperience(empeiria)becauseitdoesnotconsistoffacts(tohoti)whoserelationsareunintel-ligible.Rather,hebecomesawareoftheinnerlogicofthechainofeventsimitated,which,thus,appearaspatternsofhumanactingandsuffering.ThesepatternsaretheuniversalsofpoetrytowhichAristotlerefersinthePoetics.83Althoughtheyareoneofakind,theyareakintotheuniversalsofphilosophyinthatwhenweappre-hendthem,notonlydoweunderstandthatcertaineventsshapedtheheroeslives,butalsowhytheydisplayedacertaintrajectoryandendedupthewaytheydid.84Bytheendoftheplay,then,theobservergainsaprivilegedperspectiveonacross-sectionofthehumanworld,whichisrarely,ifever,availableinexperience.Asnotedabove,historypresentsuswitheventsinwhichcausalandpurelytemporalconnectionsareregularlymixedtogether,therebymakingthediscoveryoftheirintelligibility,totheextentthatitispossible,arduous.85Inaddition,theopen-endedcharacteroftheconsequencesofhumanactionsandinteractionspreventsusfromfullyunderstandingtheirnatureandsignificance.86Lookingbackattheprogressionoftheplot,87bycontrast,thespectatorcanseetheclearlydemarkedoutlineofa82Ricoeur,TimeandNarrative,67.83OnAristotlesviewoftheuniversalsofpoetrysee,e.g.,Redfield,NatureandCultureintheIliad,5560;Halliwell,TheAestheticsofMimesis,193201;Ricoeur,TimeandNarrative,4041;Heath,CognitioninAristotlesPoetics,70;Heath,TheUniversalityofPoetryinAristotlesPoetics,390;Carli,PoetryismorePhilosophicalthanHistory.84Asnotedabove,however,thisunderstandingislimitedbytheinclusionoftheplausiblethatattimestakestheplaceofobjectivenecessaryconnections.Seen.67above.85Poet.8.1451a17-23;23.1459a21-30.86NE1.7.1097b1113;1.10-11.OnthispointseeRedfield,NatureandCultureintheIliad,6465;HannahArendt,TheHumanCondition,2nded.(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1998),19092.87ItisworthnotingthatinPoet.7Aristotlewritesthatthelengthoftheactionmustbesuchastoallowthespectator/readertorememberitasawhole:Inthesameway,then,asbodiesandanimalsmustbeofsomesize,butasizetobeeasilytakeninataglance(eusonopton),soastoryorplotmustbeofsomelength,butofalengtheasytoremember(eumnēmoneuton)(Poet.7.1451a4-6).\n7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence115groupofcharactersliveswithawell-definedstartingpoint,development,andend-pointwhichdelimitstheconsequencesoftheheroesoftenfailedstruggletoattainhappiness.OnthisinterpretationofAristotlesview,then,thespectatorofartfocusesontheobjectsandrelationsthatarethedistinctivedomainofpracticalintelligenceinuse,butunderstandsthemthroughaprocessthatishomologoustophilosophicallearn-ingandyieldssimilarresults.Movingfrompuzzlementtolucidityheseestheartic-ulatecompletenessofahumaneventandinvirtueoftheimitativerelationthatbindsartandlifegetsaglimpseoftheintelligibleskeletonofthehumanworldthatisoftenlostinordinaryexperience.Hethusgainsaquasi-philosophicalper-spectiveonalevelofthehumanworldthat,becauseofitsinextricablelinktopar-ticularityandthefortuitous,isoutsidethedomainofphilosophy.88Tragedyoffershimtherareopportunitytotakeastepbackfromtheactiveinvolvementinhumanaffairsandtocontemplatehumanlivesandpassions,aswellastorejoiceinthediscoveryoftheirintelligibility.89Inthiswayhecomestosharethestandpointoftheloverofwisdomwho,operatinginthecitythatmakeshisactivitypossible,dis-tanceshimselffromitsurgentpracticaldemandsandmakesitanobjectofcontem-plation(NE10.7.1177a28-1777b5).90Theextraordinarycharacteristicofnarrativeintelligence,then,isthatitisaquasi-divinegazeonthemosthumanofthedomains,castwithhumaneyes.ForthosefamiliarwithAristotlesbiastowardstheōriaandhisrationalisticapproachtoart,thisinterpretationofnarrativeintelligencemaynotbe(too)surpris-ing.TheissueofitsplausibilityasanaccountofthecognitiveexperienceofactualAthenianaudiences,however,remains.Tragicperformancestookplaceinthecon-textofreligiousfestivalswherethousandsofparticipantscelebrated,andproblema-tized,thevaluesofthepolis.Thusformanythetheater,farfromprovidinganopportunitytodetachthemselvesfromthecity,wasanoccasiontobeattheverycenterofitandtobondwithfellowcitizensprimarilythroughthesharingofpowerfulemotions.Didthephilosophersupposethattheaveragespectatorwould(easily)beinducedtogetintoaspeculativeframeofmindortodisplaythelevelofcuriosityandcognitivesophisticationthattheinterpretationsuggestedinthispaperrequiresofhim?91Hisoccasionalremarksontheincapacityoftheaudienceto88Met.6.2.1026b4-5;1027a20;1027a27-28.89Everyonedelightsinimitations.Thereasonisthatlearninggivesthegreatestpleasurenotonlytophilosophersbutequallytoothers,althoughthelatterhaveasmallershareofit(Poet.4.148b8-14).90Thisisnottosaythatpoetrydoesnotalsocontributetotherefinementofpracticalintelligence.Indeed,giventhesimilaritybetweenthedomainofpraxisandthepoeticworld,itislikelytoenhancetheaudiencescapacitytoreadreallifeevents.Seee.g.,P.Donini,Mimèsistragiqueetapprentissagedelaphronèsis,P.Destrèe(trad.)LesÉtudesphilosophique,4(2003):43650;P.Donini,LaTragediasenzalacatarsi,Phronesis43(1998):2641;M.Nussbaum,TheFragilityofGoodness,esp.Ch.2andCh.10;Redfield,NatureandCultureintheIliad,esp.6067.91M.Heatharguesthat,althoughworksofpoetrycanbeunderstoodatdifferentlevels,thecogni-tivecapacitytofollowamuthosisminimal.SeeHeath,CognitioninAristotlesPoetics.\n116S.Carliappreciatethetruevalueoftragedy92suggestthathedidnotharborthisillusion.93Butthen,onehastowonder,whoseexperiencewashistheorymeanttocapture?Theanswerliesinhisteleologicalviewofart.Heholds,characteristically,thatpoetryexhibitsanaturaldevelopmenttowardsitsproperend(telos),whichactual-izesitsnatureandperfection.94Onthisinterpretation,thevariousgenresofGreekliteratureformaprogressionthatgraduallyapproachestheirnaturaltelos,andcon-tributetoitscomingintobeing.Tragedyisthefinalgoaloftheseriouskindofpoetry,95andAristotledevotesmostofhistreatisetoitbecausethefinalcauseandendofathingis...itsnature...andthebest(Pol.1.2.1252b32-1253a1).Tragedyitself,inturn,undergoesaseriesoftransformationsuntilitreachesitsperfectform96exemplifiedbyplayssuchasSophoclesOedipustheKingorEuripidesIphigeniainTauris97whichprovidethephilosopherwiththecriteriontoassessthemeritsofexistingtragedies.Justasheoffersanormativeaccountofpoetryanddrama,then,onewouldexpecthimtopresentanequallynormativeviewofitsreception.Thatistosay,itisconsistentwithandevenrequiredbyhisapproach,thathisaccountofnarrativeintelligencedoesnotaimprimarilytoexplaintheexperienceofhistoricalspectators.They,mostlikely,werefirstandforemostaffectedbytragic92Second-bestistheplotthatitissaidbysomepeopletobebest:thekindwithadoublestructureliketheOdysseyandwithoppositeoutcomesforthebetterandtheworsecharacters.Itisthoughttobebestbecauseoftheweaknessoftheaudience;thepoetsfollowtheaudiencesleadandcom-posewhateveristotheirtaste(Poet.13.1453a33-35;emphasisadded).OnthispointseealsoPoet.13.1453a13-14.Similarly,Aristotlenotesthatthesamemistake[asmadebythosewhopreferdoubleplots]ismadebythosewhocomplainthatEuripidesdoesthisinhisplays,andmostofthemendinmisfortune.Forthis,asexplained,isthecorrectway(Poet.13.1453a24-27).Thephilosopheralsowritesthatwhilesomepoetscomposeepisodicplotstheonesinwhichthesequenceofeventsisneithernecessarynorprobablebecausetheyarebad(Poet.9.1451b33-37),goodpoetsdotooonaccountoftheactors:inwritingpiecesforcompetitivedisplaytheydrawouttheplotbeyonditspotentialandareoftenforcedtodistortthesequenceofevents(Poet.9.1451b37-1452a1).Itseemsplausibletoassumethattheactorsdisplaywasforthesakeof(atleastasignificantpartof)theaudience,whoenjoyedvirtuosoperformancesandthereforegratifiedthemaswellasthepoetswhobenttotheactorsdemands.OnthispointseeM.Heath,ShouldThereHaveBeenaPolisinAristotlesPoetics?ClassicalQuarterly59(2),478.93Inaddition,inthePoliticshewritesthatspectatorsareoftwokinds,theonefreeandeducated,andtheotheravulgarcrowdcomposedofmechanics,laborersandthelike(Pol.8.7.1342a18-20).OnemightgofurtherandaskwhetherAristotleregardedallspectatorsofthefirstkindasinclinedandcapabletoappreciatetragedyinthewaythathesuggests.94SeePoet.4.1448b20-1449a15.95Similarly,comedyisthetelosofthespeciesofpoetrythatdepictsthelaughable(togeloion).SeePoet.4.1448b28-1449a6.96SeePoet.4.1449a7-32.AtPoet.4.1149a14-15Aristotleexplicitlywritesthatafterundergoingmanytransformations,tragedycametorest,becauseithasattaineditspropernature.97ThesearethetwoplaysthatAristotleregardsasthebestspecimensoftheirkind.SeePoet.13.1453a8-13;1453a19-20;11.1452a23-27;1452a33-34;14.1453b4-8;1454a5-8.\n7AristotleonNarrativeIntelligence117performancesemotionally98and,althoughexperiencedsurprise,onlysensedtheintelligibilityofthestory,sotospeak.99Rather,itislikelythatAristotleformulatedhistheorytoexplainhowtragedywould(andoughtto)bereceivedbyanidealaudience.100Thisoptimalaudiencewouldcarefor,andwouldtrytomakesenseof,theconnectionsamongalltheeventsofthestory;itwouldappreciatedpainfulcon-clusionswhen,andbecause,theyarethelogicaloutcomeoftheirantecedentsratherthanhopingforhappyendingsfordeservingcharacters(Poet.13.1453a33)and,moreingeneral,itwouldbeenchantedbythelightthatwellcomposedmuthoishedonhumanlife.101TheideathatAristotlehadinmindsophisticatedandreflectiverecipientsofdramaiscorroboratedbyhisrepeatedobservationthattheeffect(dunamis)oftragedyisrealizedalsowithoutpublicperformanceandactors(Poet.6.1450b18),thatistosay,simplybyreadingtheplot.102Giventhat,eveninfourth-century(BCE)Athens,readersoftragedieswerefarlessnumerousthanspectatorsoftragicdramas,103hisstatementwouldseemtoconfirmthathisprimarytargetwasaratherselectgroupofcitizens.Moreimportantly,perhaps,readingappearstobemoreconducivetothekindofunderstandingthatAristotlesuggestswemaygainfromdramasthanwatchingatheatricalperformanceis.Notonlydoesthiswayofappropriatingtragedyforceonetofocusexclusivelyonwhathetakestobethelifeofdramas,i.e.,theirplot,whileexcludingspectacle,whichisquiteforeigntotheartofpoetry,and...notintegraltoit(Poet.6.1450b19).Itisalsoamorepersonalandprivatewaytoexperienceartthatmakesiteasiertoseveretheconnectiontoitscivicsignificanceinfavorofamoretheoreticalappropriationofit.Aristotlesviewsonnarrativeintelligence,then,arelessinformativeaboutthereceptionofpoetryinhistimethanabouthistakeontheroleofpoetryinthelifeofreflectiveindividuals.Forthisreason,theycanbehelpfultoarticulateourexperienceofGreekdrama,whichweenjoyprimarilythroughwrittentexts,andcanshedlightonthewayinwhichancienttragediesaffectourownunderstandingoftheworld.98SeeAristotlessoberingcommentsonthenatureofactualcitizensintheNicomacheanEthics,wherehewritesthatmostpeopleareruledbyemotionsandfollowthelawsprimarilybecausetheyfearpunishment(NE10.9.1179a33-1180a4).99Creatureslikeus,whobynaturelovetolearn,arelikelytobedrawntowhatisintelligibleeveniftheydontunderstandwhy.100ContrarytoSifakisview,whowrites:wemaybecertainthattheaudiencehe[Aristotle]hadinmindwhenhespokeoftheeffectoftragedywastherealAthenianaudienceofthefifthandfourthcentury.SeeG.M.Sifakis,AristotleontheFunctionofTragedy(Herakleion:CreteUniversityPress,2001),133.101OnthispointseeDonini,Introduzione,CXXICXXXIV.102SeealsoPoet.14.1453b4-7;26.1462a11-14;1462a17.103SeeLeonWoodbury,AristophanesFrogsandAthenianLiteracy:Ran.5253,1114.TransactionsoftheAmericanPhilologicalAssociation106(1976):34957;G.Cavallo,AlfabetismoecircolazionedellibroinM.Veggetti(acuradi),Introduzioneallecultureantiche,I:Oralità,Scrittura,spettacolo(Torino:BollatiBoringhieri,1992),166186;G.Cerri,Latrage-diainG.Cambiano,L.CanforaeD.Lanza(acuradi),LospazioletterariodellaGreciaAntica,Vol.I/:Laproduzioneelacircolazionedeltesto(Roma:Salernoeditrice,1992),301334.\n118S.CarliReferencesCarliS(2010)Poetryismorephilosophicalthanhistory:Aristotleonmimêsisandform.RevMetaphys64(2):303336CavalloG(1992)Alfabetismoecircolazionedellibro.In:VeggettiM(acuradi)Introduzioneallecultureantiche,I:Oralità,Scrittura,spettacolo.BollatiBoringhieri,Torino,pp166186CerriG(1992)Latragedia.In:CambianoG,CanforaLandLanzaD(acuradi)Lospazioletter-ariodellaGreciaAntica,volI/:Laproduzioneelacircolazionedeltesto.Salernoeditrice,Roma,pp301334ClearyJJ(1994)PhainomenainAristotlesmethodology.IntJPhilosStud2(1):6197DoniniP(1998)LaTragediasenzalacatarsi.Phronesis43:2641DoniniP(2003)Mimèsistragiqueetapprentissagedelaphronèsis.In:DestrèeP(trad.)LesÉtudesphilosophique4(2003):436450DoniniP(2004)Latragediaelavita.EdizionidellOrso,AlessandriaFredeD(1992)Necessity,chanceandwhathappensforthemostpartinAristotlesPoetics.In:RortyAO(ed)EssaysonAristotlespoetics.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonHalliwellS(1986)Aristotle’sPoetics,withanewintroduction.UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoHalliwellS(1992)Pleasure,understanding,andemotioninAristotlesPoetics.In:RortyAO(ed)EssaysonAristotlespoetics.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonHalliwellS(2002)Theaestheticsofmimesis.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonHeathM(1991)TheuniversalityofpoetryinAristotlesPoetics.ClassQ(NewSeries)41(2):391398HeathM(2009a)ShouldtherehavebeenaPolisinAristotlesPoetics.ClassQ59:468485HeathM(2009b)CognitioninAristotlespoetics.Mnemosyne62(1):5175HegelGWF(1975)Aesthetics:lecturesonfineart(trans:KnoxTM).Clarendon,OxfordJonesJ(1962)OnAristotleandGreektragedy.OxfordUniversityPress,NewYorkLongCP(2006)SavingTaLegomena:Aristotleandthehistoryofphilosophy.RevMetaphys60(2):247267LordC(1982)EducationandcultureinthepoliticalthoughtofAristotle.CornellUniversityPress,IthacaNussbaumM(1986)Thefragilityofgoodness:luckandethicsinGreektragedyandphilosophy.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeOwenGEL(1975)TithenaitaPhainomena.In:BarnesJ,SchofieldM,SorabjiR(eds)ArticlesonAristotle.St.MartinPress,NewYorkRedfieldJ(1994)NatureandcultureintheIliad:thetragedyofHector(expandededn).DukeUniversityPress,DurhamRicoeurP(1984)Timeandnarrative,vol1(trans:McLaughlinK,PellauerD).UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoShermanN(1989)Thefabricofcharacter:Aristotlestheoryofvirtue.Clarendon,OxfordShermanN(1992)Hamartiaandvirtue.In:RortyAO(ed)EssaysonAristotlespoetics.PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,pp177196SifakisGM(2001)Aristotleonthefunctionoftragedy.CreteUniversityPress,HerakleionSophocles(1991)OedipustheKing.In:GreneD(trans)SophoclesI:OedipusTheKing,OedipusatColonos,Antigone,2ndedn.UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoSorabjiR(1980)Necessity,chanceandblame.CornellUniversityPress,IthacaTsitsiridisS(2005)Mimesisandunderstanding:aninterpretationofAristotlesPoetics4.1448B4-19.ClassQ55(2):435446WoodburyL(1976)AristophanesFrogsandAthenianliteracy:Ran.5253,1114.TransAmPhilolAssoc106:349357\nChapter8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLikeGarySaulMorsonWhatIamreallyinterestediniswhetherGodcouldhavemadetheworldinadifferentway;thatis,whetherthenecessityoflogicalsimplicityleavesanyfreedomatall.(Einstein)8.1ClosistsandOpenistsIwouldliketodescribetwoimagesoftimethathavepersistedinWesternthought.Onepicturestimeasclosed;theother,asopen.Byclosedtime,Imeanthatatanygivenmomentoneandonlyonethingcanhappen.Iftheidenticalsituationwererepeated,theidenticaloutcomewouldresult.Bycontrast,timeisopenif,atleastatsomemoments,morethanoneeventcouldtakeplace.AsWilliamJamesexpressesthepoint,thenumberofpossibilitiesexceedsthenumberofactualities.1SomeeventsarecontingentinAristotlessenseoftheterm:theycouldeitherbeornotbe.Eachoftheseviewshastypicallybeenaccompaniedbyothers.Theassociationsaresofrequentthattheyfeellikelogicalentailmenteventhoughtheyarenot.Proponentsofclosedtimeletmecallthemclosiststypicallypresumethatunderlyingallthecomplexityweseearoundus,simplelawsgovern.Contemplatingthenumberofsubatomicparticlesthatseemedtofitnopattern,EnricoFermiremarkedthatifIcouldrememberthenamesofalltheseparticles,Iwouldhavebeenabotanist.2Bycontrast,openistshaveregardedcomplexityasultimatelyineliminable.Thefurtherbackonetracesthecausesofhistoricalevents,Tolstoyinsisted,themorecausesofcausesonediscovers:eventsdonotsimplify,theyramify.Thereisnoa1SeeWilliamJames,TheDilemmaofDeterminism,TheWilltoBelieveandOtherEssaysinPopularPsychologyandHumanImmortality(NewYork:Dover,1956),145183.2AsquotedinTheYaleBookofQuotations,ed.FredR.Shapiro(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2006),254.G.S.Morson(*)FrancesHooperProfessoroftheArtsandHumanities,DepartmentofSlavicLanguagesandLiteratures,NorthwesternUniversity2215PayneStreet,Evanston,IL60201-2509,USAe-mail:gsmorson@e.northwestern.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015119A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_8\n120G.S.Morsonpriorireasontopresumethatthenumberoflawsgoverningphenomenaissmallerthanthenumberofphenomenathemselves.GregoryBatesonfamouslyobservedthatifyouorderyourroom,andthenneglectit,itwillsoongrowmessy,butthereverseneverhappens.3Orderrequireswork,butmessisfundamental.Closistsalsoliketopositsomeprincipleofoptimality.Theworldiscomprehen-siblebecauseittendssomewheretothesimplest,tothebest,tothemostefficient,tothemostbeautiful(asmathematiciansandphysicistssay)ortoequilibrium,aseconomistsprefer.Foropenists,perfectefficiencyisinconceivable.Atleastinthebiologicalandsocialrealms,thereisalwayswhatClausewitzcallsfriction,bywhichhemeantthesumtotalofallthosethingsensuringthatthesimplestthingisdifficultandthemostefficientoutcomevanishinglyrare.4Theworldappearsoptimalwhenweexcludecontraryevidence.Itshouldbeobviousthatclosedtime,simplicity,andoptimalitydonotlogicallyentaileachother.Theworldcouldbedeterministicallygovernedbyunsimplelawsandtendtoasuboptimalresult.Butinpracticethesethreeassumptionshavecomeasapackage.Afterall,ifeventstendtoanoptimaloutcome,theypresumablyleadtoasingleoutcome,andthatmakespredictabilityeasier.Sodoesrulebysimplelaws.Thereasonthesethreecriteriahaveoftenseemedasiftheywereaspectsofthesamethingisthattogethertheypromisepredictability.Andforthosewhoaspiretopredict,thatisacomfort.Stillmoreimportantthanthesethreecriteriaisafourth.Closiststhinkintermsofasinglemomentofcausalityordesign,whereasopeniststendtoimaginemany.WhatImeanbythiswillbecomeclearlater.8.2SufficientRhymeandReasonThebestillustrationofclosedtimeisaperfectlymadeliterarywork.Despitetheirmanifolddifferencesonotherpoints,almostallschoolsofcriticismhaveagreedthatagoodpoemhassomesortofstructure,whichideallysubsumeseverylastdetail.Inasuccessfulwork,asAristotlefirstexplained,thestructuralunionofthepartsissuchthat,ifanyofthemisdisplacedorremoved,thewholewillbedisjointedanddisturbed.Forathingwhosepresenceorabsencemakesnovisibledifferenceisnotanorganicpartofthewhole.5Ideally,thereisasufficientreasonforeverydetail,explainingwhyitisthebestpossible.Thatassumptionliesbehindthecommoncriticalexerciseofshowingwhyanapparentlyextraneouselementdoestoofitthestructure.3GregoryBateson,StepstoanEcologyofMind(NewYork:Ballantine,1972),5.4CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,ed.andtrans.MichaelHowardandPeteParet(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),119.5Aristotle,Poetics,trans.S.H.Butcher,asreprintedinHazardAdams,ed.,CriticalTheorySincePlato(NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1971),53.\n8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike121Consequently,optimalitygoverns.Bothfitandoptimalityeliminatecontingency.Nothingneededismissing,nothingextraneousincluded.ForAristotle,theabsenceofcontingencyinpoetryiswhatdifferentiatesitfromlife.Structureresultsincausalitythatworksinbothdirections.6Foreshadowingmostreadilyexemplifiesbackwardcausation.Whenastormforeshadowsacatastrophe,itdoesnotcauseitthewayitmightcauseashipwreck.Thatwouldbeordinarycausation,withanearliereventcausingalaterone,butwithforeshadowingthedirectionisreversed.Itisthefuturecatastrophethatcausestheearliersignofitsapproach.Thesamelogicappliesinreallifeifonebelievesinomens.Theflightofbirdsortheentrailsofbeastsdonotcausetheeventtheypredict,theyarecausedbyit.Novelisticeventsmaycharacteristicallybeexplainedeitheraspushedorpulled.WhenPipgivesapietoaconvictinChapterOneofGreatExpectations,weknowitwillmeansomething;otherwise,theworkwouldlackdesign.Theplanofthewholegovernseachpart,andsoincidentsmaybeexplainedeitherastheresultofpriorincidentsorasthebestwaytocompletetheoveralldesign.Withstructurecomesclosure,thetyingupofalllooseends.Whenreadersnear-ingtheendofanovelcountuptheunmarriedmalesandfemalestoguesswhowillmarrywhom,theyareexpressingtheirfaiththattherewillbeanendingatwhichpointeverythingisresolved.Nocontinuationwouldmakesense.Inlife,thereisneversuchamoment.Thedesignofawell-madeliteraryworkissingular.MartinChuzzlewitisflawedpreciselybecause,whentheinitialinstallmentsfailedtoattractreaders,Dickensradicallychangedtheplan.Forthesamereason,agoodliteraryworkcannotrelyonadeusexmachina,atermalwaysusedpejoratively.Eventsshouldfollowfromtheoveralldesigngoverningfromthefirstwordtothelast.Thatis,itconformstoasinglecausalmomenttheplanofthewholeandtheauthorcannotintervenewithoutharmingthework.Thereasonthatadeusexmachinaconstitutesaflawisthatitintroducesasecondcausalmomenttointroduceanoutcomethattheinitialplandoesnotinsure.Theauthorofasuccessfulworkremainsoutsidetheevents.InBakhtinsvocabulary,thisoutsidenessensuresaestheticnecessity,thesensethatwhatdoeshappenhadtohappen,andinjustthatway.7Fromoutside,theauthorgraspsthepatternasawhole.Socanthereaderwhohasfinishedthework.Ineffect,idealreadingisre-reading,theunderstandingofeachdetailintermsofaknownwhole.Forthesophisticatedreaderofworkswithstructure,evenafirstreadingbecomesananticipatedrereading,anexerciseinguessingeventsbydiscerningtheemergingpattern.Fromtheoutsideperspective,thereisnosuspense.Suspensetakesplaceonlywhenthereadertemporarilyforegoestheexperiencefromoutsideandidentifieswithacharacterwithin.Sincethecharacterdoesnotknowthefuture,neitherdoes6IdiscussforeshadowingindetailinMorson,NarrativeandFreedom:TheShadowsofTime(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1994).7CarylEmersonandIdiscussoutsideness,aestheticnecessity,andrelatedconceptsinMorsonandEmerson,MikhailBakhtin:CreationofaProsaics(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1990).\n122G.S.Morsonthereader.Forthecharacter,asforpeopleinreallife,suspenseisreal,whereaswithliteratureitiseasilyshowntobeanillusion.Inpractice,readersswitchoftenbetweenaninternalperspectivewithsuspenseandanexternalonethatmakesdesignvisible.Universityliteratureclassesmayinstructthattheinternalperspectiveisnaïvewhilethelatterissophisticated,buttoenjoyaworkasitwasdesignedtobeenjoyedoneneedstoalternaterepeatedlybetweenbothperspectives.Ifoneneverassumestheinternalperspective,onecannotidentifywiththecharacterorevencareaboutherfate.Ifonesurrenderstheexternalperspective,oneforegoesthespecialpleasureandbeautyofawell-madeartifact.8.3TheGodofPopeandLeibnizYouhaveprobablysurmisedthattheologyinwhichGodistheperfectauthoralsoexemplifiesclosedtime.AllhistoryisHisnarrative,whoseendingmakessenseofitall.TheChristianBiblebeginsinthebeginningtheverybeginningandendsattheveryend:evenso,comeLordJesus.Wearecharactersinthemiddle.Inclosisttheology,Godseeshistorycompletefromoutside.Itwasamedievalcom-monplacethatthefuturewasasunchangeableasthepast.AndGiordanoBrunoobservedthatthedivinemindcontemplateseverythinginonealtogethersimpleactatonceandwithoutsuccession,thatis,withoutthedifferencebetweenthepast,presentandfuture;toHimallthingsarePresent.8Godsomnisciencemeansthathecannotbesurprised,aswealwaysare.Surpriseexistsonlyforbeingswhoexperiencetimefromwithin.Forthesamereason,Godisneverinsuspense.Leibnizmadetheimplicationsofthismodelexplicit.Asinawell-madepoem,thereisasufficientreasonwhyeverythingisexactlyasitis.Leibnizdoesallowforcontingenteventsbutonlyinaspecialsense.Sothathecansaythathedoesnoteliminatecontingency,hedefinesthetermtomeaneventsthatarelogicallypossibleinthesensethattheyinvolvenocontradictionbutnotactuallypossible.Leibnizreasonsthatifmorethanonepathwerepossibletwosetsofidenticalcircumstancescouldhavetwooutcomesthentwofundamentalprincipleswouldbeviolated.Iftwopathsarepossible,then,bydefinition,whicheverhappenslackssufficientreasoninsuringthatithadtohappen.Second,ifthetwopathsweredifferent,onewouldhavetobebetter,andsotheworseonewouldcontradictGodsabsolutegoodness.Onlyonecanbeoptimal,soonlyonecanhappen.Inthedivineeconomy,anychangewoulddamagethewhole.That,ofcourse,isthemetaphysicaloptimismparodiedbyVoltairesCandide,butendorsedbyAlexanderPope:AllnatureisbutArt,unknowntothee;AllChance,Direction,whichthoucanstnotsee;8AscitedinthearticleonTimeinTheDictionaryoftheHistoryofIdeas:StudiesinSelectedPivotalIdeas,ed.PhilipP.Weiner(NewYork:Scribners,973),4:393.\n8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike123AllDiscord,Harmonynotunderstood;AllpartialEvil,universalGood:And,spiteofPride,inerringReasonsspite,Onetruthisclear,Whateveris,isright.9PopesEssayonManpresentsitselfastheperfectpoemabouttheperfectworld.Onemoreanalogywiththeperfectpoemholds:intheworldofaperfectGodtherecanbenodeusexmachina.ThatisLeibnizskeypointinhisfamouscorre-spondencewithClarke,whorepresentedIsaacNewton.LeibnizobjectedtoNewtonssolutiontotheproblemofthestabilityofthesolarsystem,whichNewtonsequationsdidnotestablish.Andyetitwasobvioustoallthatthesolarsystemsimplyhadtobestablesinceitwasproducedbythedivinemind.NewtonhadsuggestedthatperhapsGodoccasionallyintervenedtokeepthesystemstable.Leibnizreactedinfury.WasGodaninferiorwatchmaker,hedemanded,whocouldnotgetthingsrightfromthebeginning?No,Godactedonce,andfromthebeginningeverythingfollowsHisalreadyperfectdesign.ForGodtointervenewouldmeanHewasaffectedbyeventsintheworld.ButaperfectBeingmustbeentirelyoutsidetheworld.HowelsecouldHeasLeibnizsaidseethefutureinthepresentasinamirror10?Thisview,howeverpiouslyintended,atleastseemstocontradictotherChristianbeliefs,suchasapersonalGodwholoves(whichseemstoinvolvebeingaffectedbypeople)andperformsmiracles(violatesthenaturallawsHeestablished).Itcer-tainlycontradictsallthosepassagesintheBiblewhereGodissurprised.HebringsontheFloodbecauseheregretshavingmadeMankind,andregretentailslackofperfectforeknowledge.InJudges,heisrepeatedlysurprisedbythesinfulnessoftheHebrews.InthestoryofAbrahamsnearsacrificeofIsaac,God,seeingAbrahamwouldindeedhavekilledhisson,commands:Laynotthinehanduponthelad,neitherdothouanythinguntohimfornowIknowthatthoufearestGod,seeingthouhastnotwithheldthyson(Genesis22:12).NowIknow:Goddidnotknowbefore.Hehadtoperformatest,andthenwaitandseehowitwouldcomeout.TheGodoftheHebrewBibleoftenchangeshismind.SpinozawhoidentifiedGodwithNaturecouldinterpretallsuchanthropomorphicpassagesasconces-sionstothenaïvetéofaprimitivetribe.Therecouldbenomiracles.ButLeibniz,forobviousreasons,couldnotdenymiracles.Hethereforesolvedthisproblemthewayphilosophersoftendo,andthewayhehimselftookthestingfromcontingency,byredefiningthetermsothattheproblemdisappears.ForLeibniz,amiracleisnotaneventviolatingthelawsofnaturebutanaturaleventthatrarelyhappens,likesnowintheSahara.MiraclesexistbutnotbecauseofDivineinterference.Onthecontrary,theyarepartoftheinitialdesign.Intheclosistview,we,likeliterarycharacters,experiencethefutureasuncertain,notbecauseitisuncertain,butbecauseweareintime.Uncertainty,surprise,9AlexanderPope,EssayonMan,I:289294,inAlexanderPope,SelectedPoetryandProse,ed.WilliamK.Wimsatt,Jr.(NewYork:Holt,Rinehart,1965),137.10AscitedinthearticleonTimeinTheDictionaryoftheHistoryofIdeas,IV:394.\n124G.S.Morsontheurgencyofthepresent:alltheseareillusory.NomatterhowmanytimeswereadAnnaKarenina,weseeherdoubtthefutureeventhoughweknowwhatwillhappentoher.Ourfutureisascertainashers.8.4SubtractingtheAgentApoetmakesaperfectpoem,andGodhasmadethebestofallpossibleworlds,butclosedtimeneedentailnosuchoutsideagent.Today,formostintellectuals,itusuallydoesnot.Godwitheredaway.Atfirst,thetraditionofnaturaltheologypresumedthatGodhadgivenustwobooks,theBibleandnature,andonecouldreadtheDivinemindthrougheither.Thereforethediscoveryofnaturallawswas,farfromimpious,acelebrationofGod.Godactsthroughsecondarycauses,thelawsHemade.ItshouldbeobviousthatthisvieweasilyslidesfirstintoDeismandthenintoatheism.JustsubtractGodandtheidenticalpictureoftheworldremains.RecallhowLaplaceexplainedNewtonianastronomytoNapoleon,whoatlastaskedabouttheroleofGod.Ihavenoneedforthathypothesis,Laplacefamouslyreplied.11LaplacebelievedintheworldofnaturaltheologybutwithoutGod.Hethoughthehadsolvedtheproblemofplanetarystabilityandneedednodivineinterventions.Infact,hehadnot,becausetheso-calledthree-bodyproblemtheequationsneededtoshowhowalltheplanets,moons,andsuninteractremained,andremains,unsolvable.InsteadofaDivinemind,Laplacepositedamerelyhypo-theticaldemonwhoknewallnaturallawsandthepositionofeachparticleatagivenmoment.Forsuchacalculatingdemon,Laplacewrote,nothingwouldbeuncertainandthefuture,asthepast,wouldbepresentinhiseyes.Thehumanmindoffers,intheperfectionwhichithasbeenabletogivetoastronomy,afeebleideaofthisintelligence.Nothingcouldhappendifferentlybecauseoftheevidentprinciplethatathingcannotoccurwithoutacausewhichproducesit.Thisaxiom,knownbythenameoftheprincipleofsufficientreason,extendseventoactionswhichareconsideredindifferent.12ThedevilwhohauntsIvanKaramazovalludestoLaplacesdemonheknowshisdemonologywhenhedescribessuchaworldasinsufferablytedious.13Therearenosurprises.Laplacealsocontributedtoprobabilitytheory,butheinsistedthatindescribingtheprobabilityofaneventhewasnotsayingthateventswerelessthanabsolutelycertain.Strictlyspeaking,heexplained,whatisprobableisnoteventsbutthecorrectnessofourguessesaboutevents.11AscitedinTheYaleDictionaryofQuotations,443.12PierreSimon,MarquisdeLaplace,APhilosophicalEssayonProbabilities(NewYork:Dover,1951),4.13FyodorDostoevsky,TheBrothersKaramazov,trans.ConstanceGarnett(NewYork:ModernLibrary,1950),783.\n8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike1258.5SocialPhysicsTheuniversebehavesasifaperfectGodhadmadeit.Thisvisioninspiredsocialsciences,whoseinventorshavepresumedthatwhatNewtondidforastronomycouldbedoneforthesocialworld.ThesemoralNewtonians,asElieHalévymemorablycalledthem,14includeHelvétius,Holbach,Bentham,Marx,Freud,Malinowski,Lévi-Strauss,theanthropologicalfunctionalistsandtheeconomistsrelyingonrationalchoicetheorywhichistosay,untilrecently,almostallofthem.AugusteComte,whoinventedthetermsociology,originallyproposedtocallhisnewdisciplinesocialphysics.Infoundingeconomicequilibriumtheory,LéonWalrasexplicitlyevokedtheideaofequilibriuminastronomy,thatis,thestabilityofthesolarsystemthatLaplacehadsupposedlyproven.HeevensolicitedPoincarésendorsementofhisequationofeconomicwithplanetaryequilibrium.Unfortunately,bythenPoincaréhadbecomeconvincedthatthethree-bodyprobleminvalidatedtheproofWalrasassumed.ItisthishistorythathasledStephenToulmintoconcludethateconomicswasbasedonaphysicsthatneverwas.15SocialsciencesoconceivedreliesonwhatIcallGodsubstitutes.TheworldbehavesasifitweremadebyaperfectGodbecause,withoutGod,GodsubstitutesdowhataperfectGodwoulddo.Soconceived.sociallaws,nolessthannaturalones,banishcontingencyandensuresimplicity.Godsubstitutesalsoenforceatendencytooptimality.WhensocialscientistsrefertoaprocessasDarwinian,theymeanthatsomeanalogytonaturalselec-tionsay,theinvisiblehandofcompetitiondrivesresultstoanoptimalpoint.Asweshallsee,Darwinsaidsomethingclosetotheopposite.Forthatmatter,sodidAdamSmith.PeoplewhodonotactuallyreadTheWealthofNationsaresurprisedtodiscoverthatabouthalfofittracesEnglisheconomichistory,inwhichthedrivingforceis,farfromrationality,whatSmithcallshumanfolly.ButSmith,likeDarwin,hasbeenLeibnizized.WhydoesSmithneednarrativeexplanationatall?Inthemid1990s,IspentayearasatokenhumanistattheCenterforAdvancedStudyintheBehavioralSciences,whereitwaspatientlyandrepeatedlyexplainedtomethatwhenadisci-plineachievesscientificstatus,itcandispensewithnarrative,whichcanatbestservetoillustratebutnottoexplain.Thelawsfullyexplainevents.Thinkofitthisway:althoughonecouldtellastoryabouthowMarsrecentlytraceditsorbitaroundthesun,itwouldbepointlesstodosobecauseMarssmotionateachmomentisalreadygivenbyknownphysicallaws.Themorescience,thelessnarrative.Beforethe1950s,adoctorateinEconomicsrequiredmasteryofeconomichistory,butasthedisciplinedecideditwasatrue,mathematicallybasedscience,itreducedsuchcoursestomarginality.14ElieHalévy,TheGrowthofPhilosophicRadicalism,trans.MaryMorris(Boston:BeaconPress,1955),6.15StephenToulmin,Economics,orThePhysicsThatNeverWas,ReturntoReason(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2001),4766.\n126G.S.MorsonGivenhumanexperience,what,apartfrommetaphysicalpredisposition,wouldinducesomeonetobelieveinoptimality?Howfarhavewereallydepartedfromtheancientviewthatheavenlymotionmustbecircularbecauseacircleistheperfectform?8.6AppendicitisMalinowski,thefounderofanthropologyasadiscipline,arguedthatanthropologycanclaimtobeasciencebecauseithasbanishedcontingency.Or,asheputit,hasdisproventheexistenceofadventurousandfortuitoushappenings.ThedisproofIamnotmakingthisupisthatotherwiseanthropologycouldnotbeascience!Withchanceexcludedandlawsknown,Malinowksianticipatedthatanthropologywouldsoonpermitpredictionofthefuture.Lévi-Straussalsoinsistedthatthechanciesthumaneventssuchaschangesinwomensfashionwouldsoonbepredictable.ForthefunctionalistschoolMalinowskiestablished,culturesworkwithperfectefficiency.Inthissense,theyareoptimal.Anythingdisruptingaculturefromout-sideisimmediatelyintegratedintoanew,optimallyefficientstructure.Asinapoem,everythingservesafunctionoritwouldhavebeeneliminated.Thus,therecanbenomerevestigesortousethetermtheninuse,nosurvivalsmerelypersistingfromthepast.Whateverlookslikeasurvivalmustbeanelementthathaschangeditsfunction,likehorse-drawncarriagesnowusedforromanticrides.Tomaintainotherwise,Malinowskiargued,wouldbetoyieldtotheanti-scientificconceptofdead-weightsorculturalfossilsinhumanculture.16Iwanttoask:DidMalinowskihaveanappendix?8.7TheOpenistViewImaginevisitingacitywhereallthestreetsarelaidoutinperfectgeometricalorder,likethecentersofPetersburg,Philadelphia,orBrasilia.Onewouldlikelyguessthatsomeonehaddesignedthatdowntown.Ofcourse,itislogicallypossiblethat,bysheerchance,aseriesofindependentandcontingentdecisionsjusthappenedtoleadtothesameresult.Butonlyafoolwoulddrawthatconclusion.Perfectdesignalmostcertainlyresultseitherfromadesigneroraprocessthatactsasadesignerwould.Ontheotherhand,ajury-riggedmechanism,downtownLondon,orthefederaltaxcodeprobablyrequiredinputfrommanypeopleatmanytimes.AtownhalllikethehistoriconeinGhent,Belgiumwithwingsbuiltadifferenttimesandremodeledindifferentways,withnowobsoletematerialsoverlaidbyothersinseveralincreasinglymodernstyles,couldhavebeenplanned16BronislawMalinowski,AScientificTheoryofCultureandOtherEssays(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1944),2728.\n8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike127assuchbysomewhimsicalarchitect,but,morelikely,reflectsthevaryingtastesandbudgetsofnewusers.Oneplanshowsthroughanother.Inshort,perfectionandsymmetrysuggestasingledesign,whetherconsciousornatural,whileimperfectionlayeredonimperfectiontestifiestoahistoricalprocessinwhichnoteverythingwasgivenattheoutset.ItispreciselytheseconsiderationsthatledDarwintoconcludethatorganismsarenottheproducteitherofGodoraGodsubstitute,butofacontingenthistoricalprocess.Theyresultfromaprocess,atermIuseinaspecialsensetoexcludethegradualunfoldingofaninitialplan.Ratheraprocess,asIshallhenceforthspeakofit,referstoasequencewithoutsuchaplan,asequenceofindependentcausalmomentsordecisions.Noteverythingispresentattheoutsetandnewchoicesintervene.InTheVoyageoftheBeagleandagaininTheOriginofSpecies,Darwindescribesaspeciesofmolethathaseyesbutlivesitsentirelifeunderground.Evenifthemoleshouldventureintothelight,itstillcouldnotseebecauseathickmem-branecoversitseyes.Theeyesarenotonlyuselessbutpositivelyharmful,becausetheyconsumecaloriesandgetinfected.Noperfectdesignerwouldhavecreatedtheorganismthatway.Theeyesareevidentlytherebecausesomeremoteancestorhadactuallyseenwiththem.ForDarwin,suchimperfectionsignalsthatacontingenthistoricalprocesshadbeenatwork.StephenJayGouldhascorrectlyarguedthattopresumenaturalselectioninsuresperfectionthatitisDarwinianistomissthepoint.Notoptimality,butlayersofsuboptimality,pointtoprocess.Darwinoffersanotherexample:Hewhobelievesthateachbeinghasbeencreatedaswenowseeit,mustoccasionallyhavefeltsurprisewhenhehasmetananimalhavinghabitsandstructurenotatallinagreement.Whatcanbeplainerthanthatthewebbedfeetofducksandgeeseareformedforswimming.Yetthereareuplandgeesewithwebbedfeetthatrarelygonearthewater.Insuchcases,andmanyotherscouldbegiven,habitshavechangedwithoutacorrespondingchangeinstructure.Thewebbedfeetoftheuplandgoosemaybesaidtohavebecomerudimentaryinfunction,thoughnotinstructure.17Isntitmorelikelythatthesegeesearedescendedfromotherswhodidlivenearthewaterthanthattheyareoptimallydesignedfortheirpresentenvironment?Andifhabitsandstructureneednotcoincideeveninbiology,whyshouldweassumethesortofperfectculturalalignmentpositedbyMalinowski,Lévi-Strauss,andFoucault?Thisiswhatopentimelookslike.AroundthegeometriccoreofPhiladelphia,thestreetsgooffeverywhichway,asinLondonorMoscow.Itiseasytoseewheretheinitialdesignstopped.Ofcourse,itispossiblethatsomeonedesignedPhiladelphiatohaveasymmetricalcentersurroundedbyasymmetry,butitismuchmorelikelythatafterthecenterwasdesigned,manyindependentdecisionsuncoordinatedintoanyplanproducedtherest.17CharlesDarwin,OntheOriginofSpecies:AFacsimileoftheFirstEdition(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1964),185.\n128G.S.Morson8.8RemembertheHungarians!Inhismarvelousbook,HowBuildingsLearn:WhatHappensAfterTheyreBuilt,StewartBrandarguesagainstthearchitecturalmaximthatformfollowsfunction.18Hedescribesbuildingsoldenoughtohavebeenpartlyremodeledmanytimes,asneedsandtasteschanged.Partlyremodeled,becauseitrarelypaystoredothewhole.Andsoabuildingcomestohavetheequivalentofthosemoleeyes:corridorsthatarenotneededorevenblockedoff,closetsdesignedforthesmallerwardrobesofthepast,andmanychangesduetotechnology:rewiringsmorethanonceadecade.Abuildingproperlyconceivedisseverallayersoflongevityofbuiltcomponents.Roomsarejumblesofoldandnew,andthebuildingasawholeistime-laden.Again,itispossiblethatblockedcorridorsanddisconnectedwiringsystemsweredeliberatelyputtherebysomepostmodernarchitect,butifthebuildingisacenturyold,thatexplanationseemslessthancompelling.IhavebeforemeachartoftheIndo-Europeanlanguages.Itshows13branchesfromProto-Indo-European,includingnotjustthefamiliarGermanic,Italic,andIndo-Iranian,butalsoAlbanian,Armenian,andTocharian(spokeninWesternChinaandnowextinct).Somebrancheshavenosub-branches,whileothersbranchmanytimes.Indo-IraniandividesintoDardic,Indic,andIranian,withDardicleadingtoonelanguage,andIndictoBengali,Romany,Gujaratiandeightothers.Asymmetryreignseverywhere,andasymmetrytestifiestoprocess,aseriesofseparatecausesnotalreadyimmanentinProto-Indo-European.WestSlavicwasdividedfromSouthSlavicbecauseHungariansinvadedEuropeandsettledbetweenwhatbecamethetwobranches.RussianFormalistlinguistsaspiredtoexplainlanguagechangeintermsofentirelyimmanentlawssystemicimbalanceswhosecorrectionledtomoreimbalanceselsewhere,adinfinitum.ButifoneremembersthoseHungarians,itshouldbeclearthatnolawsoflinguisticswouldsufficetoexplainhowlanguageschange.Somechangesresultfromexogenouscauses.InthehistoryofIndo-Europeanlanguages,unforeseeableextralinguisticforcesintervenedmanytimes.8.9NarrativenessThemostimportantdifferencebetweenclosedandopenmodelsisthenumberofdistinctcausalmoments.Intheclosedmodel,oneinitialdesignunfoldsovertime.Intheopenmodel,severalcausalmomentsformaprocess.Closedtimehasadirection,opentimedoesnot.18SeethemanyillustrationsinStewartBrand,HowBuildingsLearn:WhatHappensAfterTheyreBuilt(NewYork:Penguin,1995).\n8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike129Opentimeexhibitsgenuinecontingencyinthesensethatcausalmomentsareirreducibletoeachother.Whentimeisclosed,contingencyisillusory,likeappar-entlyirrelevantdetailsinDante.OpentimedisplayswhatIcallnarrativeness.19Phenomenapossessnarrativenesstotheextentthatnarrativeisrequiredtoexplainthem.NarrativenessdemandsthatsomemomentshavewhatBakhtincallseventness:theycanturnoutmorethanoneway.Thepresentmattersbecauseitisnottheauto-maticderivativeofthepast.Ithaspresentness.Wewillreallyovercomethedomi-nanttheologicaltraditionwhenweovercomethemodeloftimethatgoeswithit.8.10IntentionDostoevskyarguedthat,contrarytocommonsenseandlegaltradition,humaninten-tionsaresometimesgenuinelyprocessual.Theirtimeisopen.JohnLockeexpressesthecommonsenseview.Itisobvious,heargues,thatouractionsnecessarilyderivefromapriorcompleteintention.Ofcourse,wemaychangeourintentions,andwemayholdourwillsundetermineduntilwehaveexaminedtherelevantcircumstances.Butifwearetoactatall,thenatsomepointwemustarriveatanintention.Oncewehave,then,ifnoexternalobstaclesinter-vene,whatfollowsafterthat,followsinachainofconsequences,linkedtooneanother,alldependingonthelastdeterminationofthewill.20Theliteraryanalogyofthislastdeterminationwouldbethefinalplanofthework,asdistinguishedfromallthetrialsofthecreativeprocess.Lockesmodelisoneofunfolding.Theactionfollowsfromasingleactofwillunlessanobstacleintervenes.InDostoevskysview,somedecisionsworkthisway,butmanydonot.ConsidertheKairovatrial,aboutwhichDostoevskywroteseveralarticles.Themistressofamarriedman,Kairovadiscoveredthatherloverwassleep-ingwithhiswifeinKairovasownapartment.Shepurchasedarazor,waitedoutsidetheapartmentforawhile,thenwentinwhereshefoundthecoupleasleep.Sheattackedthewife,butthecoupleawokeandpreventedherfromcontinuingtheattack.Shewasaccusedofattemptedmurder.Specifically,thejurywasaskedwhetherKairova,havingpremeditatedheract,intendedtokillthewifebutwaspreventedfromtheultimateconsummationofherintent.21ThisistheLockeanmodelofintentionasunfolding.Dostoevskycommentsthatthequestiontothejuryisunanswerablebecauseitpresumesakindofintentionthatprobablydoesnotapplyinthiscase.19SeeGarySaulMorson,NarrativenessinNewLiteraryHistory,vol.34,no.1(Winter2003),5973.20JohnLocke,AnEssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding,ed.AlexanderCampbellFraser(NewYork:Dover,1959),vol.1,349.21FyodorDostoevsky,AWritersDiary,volume1,18731876,trans.KennethLantz(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1993),476.\n130G.S.MorsonInalllikelihood,therewasneveramomentinwhichKairovasintentionwascomplete.Rather,therewasasuccessionofintentions,or,ifoneprefers,aprocessofintentionalitywithnonecessaryoutcome.Kairovawasangry,murderouslyangry,andsheboughtarazorwiththesensethatshemightsomehowuseit.Ateverymoment,sherespondedtocontingenteventswithanotherdecision,whichledherontoyetanothermomentofdecision.Mostlikely,Dostoevskyobserves,shehadnoideawhatshewoulddoevenwhensittingonthestepswiththerazorinherhand,whilejustbehindher,onherownbed,layherloverandherrival.Moreover,eventhoughitmayseemabsurd,Icanstatethatevenwhenshehadbegunslashingherrival,shemightstillnothaveknownwhethershewantedtokillherornotandwhetherthiswasherpurposeinslashingher.22Hadshenotbeenrestrained,Kairovamighthavedonemanythings.Shemighthavepassedtherazoroverherrivalsthroatandthencriedout,shuddered,andrunoffasfastasshecould.Orshemighthaveturnedtherazoronherself.Orshemighthaveflownintoafrenzyandnotonlymurdered[thewife]butevenbeguntoabusethebody,cuttingoffthehead,thenose,thelips;andonlylater,suddenly,whensomeonetookthatheadawayfromher,realizewhatshehaddone.23Alltheseactions,Dostoevskyinsists,couldhavebeendonebytheverysamewomanandsprungfromtheverysamesoul,intheverysamemoodandundertheverysamecircumstances.24Ifidenticalconditionscanleadtodifferentresults,thentimeisbydefinitionopen.DostoevskyspointisnotthatKairovasactionswereguidedbyanunconsciousintention.TheFreudianmodel,sooftenimposedonDostoevsky,stilllocatesacom-pleteintentionatasinglemoment.NorcanitbesaidthatKairovawasunawareofwhatshewasdoing.Shewasawareofwhatshewasdoingateverymoment,butneverdecidedwhatshewoulddoatthenextmoment.TherewasneveramomentcorrespondingtoLockeslastdeterminationofthewill,neverapointafterwhichactionssimplyunfolded.Dostoevskianintentionresemblesanoldbuilding:itisintrinsicallytime-ladenandprocessual.8.11RepresentingProcessCouldawriterrepresentopentimeinasuccessfulliterarywork?Theentiretradi-tionofpoeticstellsusno,becauseeventhethemeofopentimemustconformtoanoveralldesign.Andyet,suchworksletmecallthemprocessualarenotonlypossible,buthavebeenmadebyseveralgreatwriters,includingSterne,Byron,Pushkin,Tolstoy,andDostoevsky.22Dostoevsky,AWritersDiary,volume1,476.23Dostoevsky,AWritersDiary,volume1,477.24Dostoevsky,AWritersDiary,volume1,477.\n8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike131Byaprocessualwork,Imeanoneinwhichtherearemultipleindependentmomentsofdesign.Asaresult,noteverythingfits,thereisnostructure,andclosureisunthinkable.Suchworksstop,theydonotend.Consequently,asinlife,causalitygoesonlyoneway:eventsarepushedintoanopenfuture,notpulledtoapredeter-minedoutcome.ConsiderTheIdiot.Ithascountlesslooseends,theequivalentofstaircasesthatgonowhereandofmoleseyesthatdonotpaytheirway.LikeLondonstreets,plotlinessometimeswanderofforpeterout.InPartOne,Myshkinisentirelynaïveandchildlike,butatthebeginningofPartTwo,hewarnsacheatnottotakehimforachild.TheconceptionofMyshkinchangesseveraltimes.InPartOne,Myshkinsayshecantmarrybecauseheisaninvalidwhateverthatmeansbutfortherestofthenovelheisconstantlygettingengagedwithnoreferencemadetohisimpair-ment.ThenovelsopeningchapterscenteronaconflictbetweenMyshkinandGanya,whothreetimes,ominouslyandeponymously,callshimanidiot!,andsaystheywilleitherbegreatfriendsorgreatenemies.Butthepromisedconfronta-tionneveroccurs.Ganyaturnsintoaminorcharacterplayingnoroleinthemainstories.Myshkinwonderswhyhisfatherwasoncearrested,butthemysteryisnevermentionedagain.WhenMyshkinmentionshisbenefactorPavlishchev,Lebedyevasks:whichPavlishchev,sincetherearetwowhoarecousins.WhymentionthisotherPavlishchevifwearenevertohearofhimagain?Severaltimes,notablywithVeraandRadomsky,wearetoldthatacharacterhasanimportantsecret,butthesecretisneverrevealed.25ItisasifDickensneverreturnedtoPipspie.YoumightalmostcallDostoevskysbookFrustratedExpectations.NeithercouldoneimproveTheIdiotbytextectomyomittingpassagesleadingnowherebecausesomeofthebestpartswouldhavetogo.Ippolit,whoplaysessentiallynoroleotherwise,occupies40pageswithaconfessionthatisarguablythenovelshighpoint.Onecangivebothexternalandinternalexplanationsforsuchincoherence.Theexternaloneiswelldocumented.Dostoevskywrotethenovelabroadwherehehadgonetoescapedebtorsprison.Heandhisyoungwifehadtopawntheirweddingrings,eventheirclothes,andtheylostanewborndaughterbecauseoftheirpoverty,orsoDostoevskybelieved.Theywenthungry.Dostoevskygaveintohisgamblingaddictionandalwayslost.Hesufferedepilepticseizures.Herepeatedlybeggedhispublisherforyetonemoreadvance.Inthesecircumstances,DostoevskyworkedfitfullyonanovelhecalledTheidiot,butwhichbearsalmostnorelationtotheworkweknow.ItwassupposedtotellthestoryofanevilmansconversiontoChrist,butDostoevskycouldnotmakeitpsychologicallyconvincingandrefusedtosendinsomethingmediocre.Atlast,onDecember4,1867,hediscardedeverythingandstartedwithanewidea:hewouldbeginwithaherowhowasalreadyChristlikeandtestwhether25ThesefeaturesofthenovelarediscussedinmoredetailinMorson,TempicsandTheIdiotinCelebratingCreativity:EssaysinHonourofJosteinBortnesontheOccasionofHis60thBirthday,ed.KnutAndreasGrimstad&IngunnLunde(Bergen:Univ.ofBergen,1997),108134.\n132G.S.MorsonChristiangoodness,ifunaccompaniedbysupernaturalpower,woulddomoregoodthanharm.Dostoevskywasgenuinelyunsurebecauseheunderstoodbetterthananyonethatpeopleresenttheirmoralbetters,andthatsuchresentmentcanleadthemtoworseandworsebehavior.InKaramazov,FyodorPavlovichisaskedwhyhehatesacertainpersonsomuch,andherepliedwithhisshamelessimpudence,Illtellyou.Hesneverdonemeanyharm,butIonceplayedanastytrickonhimandhaveneverforgivenhimforit.26Wearealllikethat,onlymostofusarenotself-awareenoughtoknowit.ItisthereforepossiblethataChristfigurewouldpro-vokeevilmoreoftenthanhewouldinspiregood.Ifso,thentheidealofChristianvirtuewouldberefuted.Dostoevskyhadnoideahowthestorywouldturnoutorwhatincidentsitwouldcontain.Hewrotefrominstallmenttoinstallmentwithoutaclueaboutthenextchapters.Heconfidedtoonefriend,Itookachanceasatroulette.MaybeitwilldevelopasIwriteit.27HedidnotknowwhetherhisChristfigurewouldpassthetest,andthenotebooksrecordcountlesspossibleplotlinesandendings.Theendingweknowdidnotoccurtohimuntilhewascompletingthethirdoffourparts,andevenafterthathetoyedwithmanyalternatives.AsaChristian,hewasdistressedthatChristianvirtuesintheendfailedthetest.Understandablyenough,criticshavebeenperplexedbythisnovel.Ontheonehand,theirtheoriestellthemthat,sinceasuccessfulworkrequiresstructure,TheIdiotmustbeafailure.OnecritichasindeedbeenboldenoughtodropitfromthelistofDostoevskysgreatnovels.TheproblemisthatTheIdiotismanifestlyagreatwork.Onemightsupposethatifanexampleflatlycontradictsatheory,thetheorymightbequestionedorrevised,butliterarycriticsareasunabletoimagineanalter-nativetopoeticsassocialscientiststomoralNewtonianism,perhapsmoreso.Somehavefoundadhocexplanations.MosthaveLeibnizizedthework:theyhaveimposedastructureonit.Therehaveevenbeencriticswhohavediscoveredforeshadowing,despiteknowinghowthebookwaswritten.Thebest,andtrulyilluminating,studyofthenoveltakesthisapproach.ButIthink,forallitsperspicacity,itmissesthebigpicture.TheIdiotreliesonanalternativetostructure.DostoevskywasprobablyinspiredbyTolstoysWarandPeace,whichwasbeingserializedatthesametimeandwhosemainthemewascontingency.In1868,Tolstoypublishedanessayinwhichheexplicitlystatesthatheisdeliberatelywritinghisbookfrominstallmenttoinstall-mentsoastoescapethefalsetemporalityofnovels,withtheirdenouementandneatendings.Hewritesnotknowingwhathisfictionalcharacterswilldountiltheydoit.Looseendsbedamned.OrasTolstoyputthepoint,hewouldgiveeachpartanindependentinterestwhichwouldconsistnotinthedevelopmentofevents,butindevelopmentitself.26Dostoevsky,Karamazov,99(translationmodified).27AscitedinJosephFrank,Dostoevsky:TheMiraculousYears,18651871(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1995),271.\n8DostoevskyandtheLiteratureofProcess:WhatOpenTimeLooksLike133Developmentitselfmeantaprocesswithmultiplemomentsofintentionality.TheIdiotborrowsTolstoysmethod,butwithadifference.Tolstoybeganwiththeideaofrepresentingcontingencybywritingprocessually.Dostoevskydidnotdiscoverthathisrealthemewasprocessthatis,theverywayhewaswritinguntilthenovelhadalreadybeguntoappear.Theveryideaofprocesswas,appropriatelyenough,discoveredinprocess.Tomakethisdiscoveryunmistakable,Dostoevskyhadcharactersreferandrespondtoreal-worldeventsthathappenedbetweeninstallmentsandsocouldnothavebeenpartofanyinitialdesign.Ippolitsunnecessaryconfessionexpressesthebooksthemeandmethod:Oh,youmaybesurethatColumbuswashappynotwhenhehaddiscoveredAmerica,butwhilehewasdiscoveringit.Takemywordforit,thehighestmomentofhishappinesswasjustthreedaysbeforethediscoveryoftheNewWorld,whenthemutinouscrewwereonthepointofreturningtoEuropeindespair.ItwasnttheNewWorldthatmattered,evenifithadfallentopieces.Columbusdiedalmostwithoutseeingit;andnotreallyknowingwhathehaddiscov-ered.Itslifethatmatters,nothingbutlifetheprocessofdiscovering,theeverlastingandperpetualprocess,andnotthediscoveryitself,atall.28Thatisthehumanexperienceoftime:aneverlastingandperpetualprocess.ReferencesAristotle(1971)Poetics(trans:ButcherSH),reprintedinAdamsH(ed)CriticaltheorysincePlato.HarcourtBrace,NewYorkBatesonG(1972)Stepstoanecologyofmind.Ballantine,NewYorkBrandS(1995)Howbuildingslearn:whathappensaftertheyrebuilt.Penguin,NewYorkDarwinC(1964)Ontheoriginofspecies:afacsimileofthefirstedition.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MADostoevskyF(1950)ThebrothersKaramazov(trans:GarnettC).ModernLibrary,NewYorkDostoevskyF(1962)Theidiot(trans:GarnettC).ModernLibrary,NewYorkDostoevskyF(1993)Awritersdiary,volume1,18731876(trans:LantzK).NorthwesternUniversityPress,EvanstonFrankJ(1995)Dostoevsky:themiraculousyears,18651871.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonHalévyE(1955)Thegrowthofphilosophicradicalism(trans:MorrisM).BeaconPress,BostonJamesW(1956)Thedilemmaofdeterminism.In:Thewilltobelieveandotheressaysinpopularpsychology.Dover,NewYorkLockeJ(1959)Oftheideaofpower.In:FraserAC(ed)Anessayconcerninghumanunderstand-ing.Dover,NewYorkMalinowskiB(1944)Ascientifictheoryofcultureandotheressays.UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,ChapelHillMorsonGS(1994)Narrativeandfreedom:theshadowsoftime.YaleUniversityPress,NewHavenMorsonGS(1997)TempicsandTheIdiot.In:GrimstadKA,LundeI(eds)Celebratingcreativity:essaysinhonourofJosteinBortnesontheoccasionofhis60thbirthday.UniversityofBergen,Bergen28FyodorDostoevsky,TheIdiot,trans.ConstanceGarnett(NewYork:ModernLibrary,1962),475.\n134G.S.MorsonMorsonGS(2003)Narrativeness.NewLitHist34(1):5973MorsonGS,EmersonC(1990)MikhailBakhtin:creationofaprosaics.StanfordUniversityPress,StanfordPopeA(1965)Essayonman.In:WimsattWKJr(ed)Selectedpoetryandprose.Holt,Rinehart,NewYorkSimonP,deLaplaceM(1951)Aphilosophicalessayonprobabilities.Dover,NewYorkToulminS(2001)Returntoreason.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAvonClausewitzC(1984)Onwar(edandtrans:HowardMandParetP).PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton\nChapter9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImaginationJohnGibsonThemagicofartmaybepresentintheverybonesofthestory.(VladimirNabokov)9.1WhatIwishtodiscussherearetwowaysofthinkingabouttheimaginationanditsrelationshiptoliterature.ThebasicdifferenceIamconcernedwithcanbeplayfullyputittermsofthedivergenceinsensibilityandinterestweencounterwhenreadingDavidLewisonSherlockHolmesandFriedrichNietzscheonOedipus(seeLewis1978;Nietzsche1999).Itis,atroot,thedifferencebetweenseeingtheliteraryimag-ination1asessentiallyconcernedwithfiction-makingorculture-making.Eachwayofthinkingtakesseriouslythattheimagination,bothingeneralandasitconcernsliterature,isapttoserveourworldlyexistencebypullingusoutofitsdumbimme-diacy,(Brann1991:798)buttheydifferinrespecttohowtheyunderstandwhatthispullingoutamountsto.Accordingtooneapproach,itmakespossibleafugitiveactthatallowsustocreateworldsthatareinobviousandoftenwondrousexcessoftherealclearlymuchartputssuchfreedomtogooduse.Accordingtotheother,itiswhatallowsusnottoescapetherealworldsomuchastoassertourselvesoverit:toachieve,say,sufficientcriticaldistancefromexistencesothatwecandiscoverhowtoinfuseitwithnewformsofmeaningandvalue.ThefirstwayofthinkingabouttheimaginationisembodiedinclaimssuchasJean-PaulSartresthattoimag-ineistoholdtherealatadistance,tofreeoneselffromit,inaword,todenyit.(1972:198)ThesecondisdetectablewhenaphilosophersuchasMaryWarnockThefullpassageis:Thethreefacetsofthegreatwritermagic,story,lessonarepronetoblendinoneimpressionofunifiedanduniqueradiance,sincethemagicofartmaybepresentintheverybonesofthestory,intheverymarrowofthought.(Nabokov1980:6)1ByliteraryimaginationImeannothingtechnical.Thephrasefunctionstoindicatethatapointisbeingmadenotabouttheimaginationsimpliciterbutasitisimplicatedintheproductionofnarrativeliterature.J.Gibson(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofLouisville,313BinghamHumanitiesBuilding,Louisville,KY40292,USAe-mail:gibsonjohn1@gmail.com©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015135A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_9\n136J.Gibsonarguesthattheimaginationenablesustoseetheworld,whetherabsentorpresent,assignificant.(1976:196.SeealsoLennon2010;Pillow2009)Thesavvyreaderwillwonderwhythereshouldbeatensionbetweenthesetwowaysofthinkingabouttheliteraryimagination.Isharethissenseofpuzzlement,butthetrick,asalways,istoexplainphilosophicallyhowtheymightbebroughttogether,andthisiswhatwilloccupymehere.MyargumentwillimplythatabettersourceforguidingthoughtabouttheliteraryimaginationisKantonMilton,thoughbythisnoslighttoLewisorNietzscheisintended.InMiltonKantfoundanearlyperfectartisticanswertoaprecisephilosophicalquestion.2Thequestion,inSanfordBudickswords,ishowanauthorscreativeactivitycanbecharacterizedbyinde-pendenceandspontaneitytheoriginality(Originalität)ofthepoeticgenius,preeminentlyandatthesametimeinheritonesgivenworld,onespast?(2010:1)WhileIhavenointentionhereofengaginginKantscholarship,Idohopetoshowthataskinghowcertainartworkssuccessfullynegotiateindependenceandinheritancecaninspireafreshwayofthinkingaboutthevexedrelationshipbetweentheunrealandworldlyinliterature.AsIwillpursuetheideahere,thisistowonderhowtheliteraryimaginationcancreatefreelyandoriginally,unbounded,insomesense,bythedumbimmediacyoftherealworldandits(actual)history,yetdosoinsuchawaythatsetsthestagenot,ornotjust,forabandoningtheworldbutalso,inamanner,forinheritingit:forreceivingitinordertoofferitbacktousinculturallyandcognitivelysignificantways.Itwillbenosurprisetohearthatthelaboroftheimaginationattimesissuesinnarrativesofanexemplarysort,andIalsohopemydiscussionwillcastlightonwhynarrativeissuchanaptvehiclefortheinventionsoftheliteraryimagination.Narrativeissurelynottheonlyvehicleoftheliteraryimaginationthemodernlyric,sofrequentlyhostiletothepresenceofnarrativeinpoetry,hasshownusthatthiscannotbebutitisclearlyamongitsmostfrequentandreliable.Theimagina-tiveachievementofagreatexpanseofproseliteratureisinseparablefromitsnarra-tiveachievement,andwhatneedstobeunderstoodbetterishownarrativecan,atleastonoccasion,bringintoharmonytheliteraryimaginationsinterestinboththeimaginaryandthereal.9.2Letmebeginwithanunlikelyexamplethatraisesaseriousquestion.ConsiderwhatyouwouldsaytosomeonewhoclaimedthatMiltonspowerofimaginationwouldhavebeenmoreperfectlydisplayedhadhewrittenParadiseLostwithoutstandinguponaninheritanceofEuropeanChristianity:ifthecontentofhisepicpoemhadbeenentirelyaninventionofhisimagination,Heaven,Hell,Eden,OriginalSinandall.Whydoesitfeel,asitshould,wrongheadedtothinkthatParadiseLostwouldhavebeenmoreimaginativejustifMiltonhadmademoreofitup?Ifone2SeeBudick(2010)forastrikingstudyofKantsinterestinMilton.\n9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination137thinksthatthepoweroftheliteraryimaginationisessentiallythepowertodenythereal,toliberateourselvesfromexistence,orsimplytocreateimaginaryobjectsandevents,whydoesitnotfollowasasimplepointoflogicthatParadiseLostwouldbeenmoreimaginativehadMiltonreliedlessontheworld,suchhetookittobe,forhiscontent?Theideaoftheimaginationasthepowertoabandon,tofreeoneselffrom,(etc.)existenceiscentraltomanyofthetheoriesoftheimaginationthehistoryofphiloso-phyhasgivenus,anditisforthisreasonthataphilosopherofliteraturecannowgetawaywithclaimingthatacontrastwithrealityseemstobepresentinallformsofimagining(New1999:72).Butfromtheinevitableideathattheliteraryimagina-tiondeniesorcontrastswithrealityinsomesensewesurelyarenotentitledtotheconclusionthatitisessentiallyunconcernedwithit,asthoughthecontrastmustbecategoricalandthedenialabsolute.ThisiswhytheMiltonexampleisuseful.AgoodpartofwhytheexampleseemssillyispreciselybecauseitrunsafoulofoursensethatMiltonsandhenceliteratureofalikesortsclaimtocreativity,origi-nality,andartisticaccomplishmentisboundupwithhisimaginativehandlingofhisculture:ofhislebensweltorlebensform,ascertainphilosophicaltraditionswouldhaveit.3Whatseemssonaiveaboutthequestionisthatitappearstoassumethattheliterarybusinessoftheimaginationissolelythatofunderwritingthewaysinwhichliteraturetakesflightfromtherealandworldly.SinceParadiseLostweavesafictionalnarrative,surelyagoodamountofdenialoftheworldcanbefoundinitslines.ButthedenialinMiltonscasealsoseemssointentionallyandessentiallylinkedtomodeofinheritancethattheideathathisclaimtoimaginativenesswouldhavebeenstrengthenedifhehadloosenedhispoemsbondtohisworldshouldstrikeoneasrisible.Thequestion,naturally,isjustwhatdoesitmeantosaythataliteraryworksparticularwayofdenyingrealitycanalsoconstituteitsmodeofinheritance?Whiletheideaisboundtosoundobscureatfirstmention,Ihopetoshowthatitbringstoviewanimportantprobleminliteraryaesthetics,andonethatrevealsjusthowcentraltheconceptofnarrativeshouldbe,butunfortunatelyisnot,tothisareaofphilosophicaldebate.InthissectionIattempttoisolatethepreciseproblemandtospecifywhatconfrontingitrequiresofus,andinthefollowingsectionIsuggestastrategyformeetingthisrequirement.Butbeforebeginning,Ineedtobringsomeclaritytothistalkofinheritanceanddenial.Toinsistthattheliteraryimaginationcaninheritcultureistoinsistthatitcan,onoccasionaleast,revealtoussomethingnontrivialaboutthetextureofrealhumanlivesandpractices,aboutthenonfictionalworldmost,butperhapsnotall,ofusseemtoinhabit.Therearemanywaysaliteraryworkmightsorevealthehumanworldtoreaders,andbycultureImeantocaptureinabroadgesturethevariousformsofworldlyimportandrealmatteringwemightreasonablyexpecttofindoneascribetoliterature,fromthecapacitytoengageinpreciseformsofcognitive3TheconceptofalebensweltorlifeworldmakesitswayintothephenomenologicaltraditionviatheworkofEdmundHusserl,andthenotionoflebensformorformoflifeintoordinarylanguagephilosophyviatheworkofLudwigWittgenstein.\n138J.Gibsonandepistemiclabor(thearticulationoftruthandtheproductionofknowledge,mostobviously)tothepursuitofmorediffuseformsofethical,affective,political,andpsychologicalinsight.Quiteapartfromthequestionofexactlywhatitmeanstosayofaliteraryworkthatitexploresandexposeshumanculturethepointofthisessayistocometounderstandthis,soitisprematuretodemandmoreprecisionherewhenwecannotsaythis,whatwehavebeforeusiswhateverremainswhentheimaginationdisengagesitsinterestintherealandworldly:aworkofmerefan-tasy,anexerciseinpuremake-believe,oranentertainment,intheunflatteringsenseoftheexpression.Notethattoclaimthatanauthorsworkattemptstoinherithercultureistosayinageneralwaythatthroughherliteraryactivitysheisattempt-ingreceiveandpresentbacktoreadersaworld,oraspectsofaworld,presumedtobereal.Isaypresumedbecauseauthorsandaudiencesmightfindthatwhattheytaketoberealwillunderscrutinyturnouttobeamyth,bunk,orfalse(MiltonsChristianworldview,say).ButitisthemodeofpresentationthatmostmatterswhentryingtounderstandwhatliteraturedoeswiththeworldandthisiswhatIwanttounderstandbetterwhenIspeakofinheritance;metaphysicalandepistemicconcernsaboutconditionsofsuccessareanothermatter,linkedto,butstillseparablefrom,thequestionIamexploringhere.Itiseasytobringdowntoearthphilosophysenticingbutmistytalkoftheimagi-nationsliberationfromrealityanditsabandonmentanddenialofexistence.Whateverelsethismayconsistin,inthecontextofliteratureitinlargepartisamatteroftheimaginationswaywithfictions.Surelypartoftheliteraryimagina-tionscreativeactivityjustisitscreationoffictions,andtheimaginationwouldseemtodeclareitsfreedomfromdumbimmediacymostassuredlyintheparticu-larmannerinwhichitgoesaboutgeneratingfictionalcontent.Itisthecapacitytotellastorythatneverhappened,andtodosowithoutmisleadingorbeingguiltyofalie,thatbringsintofocusthecentralimaginativefeatattheheartofmuchnarrativeart.Anditshouldcomeaslittlesurprisethataswepassfromtheheydayofphenom-enologyandexistentialismtocontemporaryphilosophyofliterature,weseethattalkoftheimaginationspowerofdenialandabandonmenthassettledintoalesspoeticandmoresystematicstudyoffiction-making.Whilethereisahealthydiver-sityinourtheoriesoffiction,inthemajorityofthosecurrentlypopulartheimagina-tionislinkedtovariousformsofpretenseormake-believe,thoughthelatterisclearlydominant.Onthemake-believemodel,whenweconsumefictions,wearesupposedtoengageimaginativelywiththem,making-believethattheeventsnarratedreallyhavetakenplace,thatthepeopledescribedreallydoexist,andsoon(Friend2003:37).Inachildsgameawaterballooncanbecomealethalbombandanolddolladazzlingdancepartner,andimaginativeliteratureisineffectahighlysophisticatedwayofusingwordsmuchaschildrenusethesemereobjects:aspropsinagameofmake-believe.4Itisgenerallygrantedthattocallatextfictionalisnot4InrecentyearsithasbecomepopulartocombineWaltonsmake-believetheorywithspeech-acttheory.Thisapproachtendstofavormakingthenotionofafictionalutteranceexplanatorilyprimary.Afictionalutteranceisgrammaticallyindistinguishablefromanassertionexceptthatitisproducedwiththerecognizedintentionthatwemake-believewhatisexpressedby[the]\n9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination139toimplythatitisacontinuousstringofsentencesnoneofwhichhaverealreferentsorthatthesemanticreachofliterarylanguagecanneverextendbeyondthefictionalandintotheworld(thoughonemightworrythatthemake-believemodelwillstrug-gletoaccountforthisinsatisfyingmanner.SeeGibson2007:157173).Nordoesanyoneseriousthinkthatimaginativeliteratureisso-calledbecauseitscontentiswhollymadeup,untrue,orfictitious.Anything,withinreason,canbecomeapropinagameofmake-believe,andtothisextenttheimaginationisperfectlyfreetoroamrealityinsearchoffictions.Theabandonment,thedenialofexistencecomesonceonedecidestomake-believe,thatis,imagineitamountstothesamethingonthismodelratherthanbelievewhatonefindsthere.Withtheseclarificationsinmind,wecanreturntotryingtounderstandexactlywhatitmeanstosaythattheliteraryimaginationswayofabandoningexistencemightalsoconstituteitsmodeofinheritance.Recastinlightoftheseclarifications,thequestionis:howcantheliteraryimaginationsconstructionoffictionsalsobeitsmannerofengagingwithandexposingaworldtakentobereal?Tomovethediscussionforward,considerthefollowingsuggestionforofferingaspeedyanswertothisquestion.Thesuggestionwillturnouttobedeeplyunsatisfying,butseeingwhywillhelpusunderstandwhatthetrueproblemis.SaythatIclaimthattheliteraryimaginationcanproducenarrativeswithtwodistinctlayersofcontent,oneprimaryandmanifesttheothersecondaryandoblique.Onthewhole,Iclaim,literaryworksexplicitly(andliterally)speakaboutfictionsandfictionalworlds:this,andtypicallyonlythis,iswhatthesemanticsurfaceofliteraryworksconnectreadersto,andthecontentitproduceshereissimplyfictionalcontent.Butonadeeperlevel,Iclaim,literaryworkscanproduceakindofseriousandoftenevenphilosophicalcontentdistinctfromitsmanifestfictionalcontent.Thisdeeperlayerofnonfictionalcontentcomesintheformofimplicitpoints,impliedpropositions,suggestedviews,hinted-atclaimsaboutrealitythatliteraryworksalludetoand,insodoing,indirectlymakeavailabletoappreciation.ItisinthisspiritthatJohnSearleclaimed,andmanyothershaveechoed,thatwhilewritersexplicitlyperformpretendedillocutionaryactswhencreatingaworkoffiction,theymayusethetextsthataretheproductsoftheseactsasvehiclesforimplyingseriousassertions:almostanyimportantworkoffictionconveysamessageormessageswhichareconveyedbythetextbutwhicharenotinthetext(Searle1975:332).AndasKendallWaltonputsit,perhapsfictionismoreoftenameansofperformingotherillocutionaryactssuggesting,asking,raisinganissue,remind-ing,encouragingtoactthanameansofmakingassertionsabouttheworld.(1990:78.Forvariationsofthisapproach,seeKivy1997:chapter5;Mikkonen2013:chapter2)utterance,ratherthanbelieveit.(Davies2006:42)Thevirtueofhavingrecoursetospeech-acttheoryhereisthatitsrelianceonspeakerintentionsallowsustoofferatidywayofexplain-ingthedifferencebetweensomethingbeingfictionalandsomethingmerelybeingtreatedasfictional,abasicdistinctionmanyworryWaltonsotherwiseacceptabletheorycannotaccom-modate(seeDavies2006:40).\n140J.GibsonPointsofthissortperhapsmarkonewayinwhichliteraturecanconnecttotherealIwilljustgrantthisbutIthinktheymissthehardproblem.BeforeIcanstatewhatItakethehardproblemtobe,notethattheemphasisonsuggestions,hid-denmessages,andthelikemakesthecultural,thereal,interestsofliteratureatbestaclandestineaffair,somethingthatisnottobeencounteredwhenwebearwitnesstowhataliterarynarrativeactuallysaysbutratheronlywhenwemovefromthemanifestcontentofaliteraryworktoconsiderapropositiontowhichitgesturesbutwhichitdoesnotcontain.MuchasIcan,ifcircumstancesarejustright,conveytoyouthatInolongerreallycarearetoseeyoubyuttering,Illseeyouaround,literature,onthisview,isrevelatoryofcultureonlywhenitmeanssomethingotherthan(orinadditionto)whatitactuallysays.Thereissomethingtothis,aswewillsee,butmyworryisthattheverytalkofimplying,suggesting,evenmakinganassertionidentifiesthewrongcurrencyofcommutationforexplainingwhatwemostneedexplained.Iamnotconcernedwithdenyingthatliteraturecaneverimplyorsuggestpropositions;itwouldbeplainlysillytoarguesuchathing.ButIdothinkweshouldbeveryskepticalofanytheorywhichclaimsthataworkofliteraryfictionitselfcannotstraightforwardlycontainthatwhichgivesitapurchaseontheworld,thattellsusitcannotreallybeinaliterarywork.Thisisbecausethewaysinwhichweexpectliteraturetoexposecultureareoftentoodirect,tooenmeshedinitsmanifestcontent,tobecapturedfullybytalkofimpliedorindirectassertionsandthelike.Letmeexplain.ImaginethatIambeholdentothisdouble-contentviewandyouaskmetodemonstratehowthismightfashionanattempttomakesenseofanactualliterarywork.Takingupyourchallenge,andperhapsrevealingmyinnocence,IoffertotrytoisolatethebasicmessagesItaketobeimpliedbyMiltonstellingofthestoryofthefallinParadiseLost.Thepoem,Isay,hintsatsomethingbasicaboutthehumanpre-dicament:basicbecauseinAdamandEvewesee,inMiltonswords,thewholeincludedrace.(IX.4165).Theimpliedmessage,Isay,isthatwhatismosttragicaboutlifeisthathumanseparatenessisaninescapablefeatureofit;thatweareboundtofindourselvesaloneeveninthecompanyofothersandthatthisisbecausegenuinecom-munityisimpossiblehereonpostlapsarianearth.Naturallyyoutellmethatthismes-sageIhaveelicitedfromMiltonismightilyunderdeterminedbyanythingParadiseLostactuallysays.SotoputsomefleshonthepointIthinkimpliedbyMiltonspoem,Iarguethatitsuggestsavisionofhumannatureasinevitablyleadingustoundoourrelationshiptotheverythingthatmakesgenuinecommunitypossible:God,or,forthemodernreaderwhomustrendermetaphoricwhatMiltonmeantliterarily,thegood,love,orwhateverwetaketobetheprinciplethatcanbind.Tosupportthis,IdrawyourattentiontoRafaelswordstoAdam,Ifyebefoundobedientandretain/UnalterablyHisloveentire/Whoseprogenyyouare.Meanwhileenjoy/yourfillwhathappinessthishappystate/cancomprehend,incapableofmore,(V.5016)whichconcludeswiththewarning,Attend:thatthouarehappy,owetoGod/Thatthoucontinuestsuch,owetothyself/thatis,tothyobedience;thereinstand/thiswasthecautiongiventhee;beadvised.(V.5203).Intheseandsurroundingpassages,Iclaim,Miltonimplies5AllbookandlinereferencestoParadiseLostindicatedinparenthesesaretoMilton2006.\n9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination141thathumannatureissuchthatoncewediscoverthatifwejustfollowasimplerulewecanliveinparadise,weinevitablywishtobreakthatrule.Miltonspoem,Ipropose,suggeststheideathatthegreatestparadoxofhumannatureisthatwecometoexperiencewhatevermakesparadisiacalexistencepossibleasabarrier,alimitation,andsosomethingwehaveapowerfuldrivetoovercomethroughadefiantactofself-assertion.ThepointofBookIX,Iconclude,istointimatethatsomethingaltogetherbasictoourhumanityleadsustoundothebondthatmostmatterstous,thusleavingus,likeAdamandEve,distancedanddoomedtopassfruitlesshoursbickeringinmutualaccusation,(IX.11878)anactivitymostcouplessinceAdamandEvewillrecognizeasfamiliar.YoumaygrantthatIhaveprovidedprogressivelylessunreasonablegroundsformyreading,but,ifyouareclever,youwillplaytheskepticandaskmewhyIthinkthepoemimpliespreciselythesepropositionsandnotothers.Andtorelieveyourskepticism,IshallhavetosaymoreandmoreaboutthepoemtojustifytheworldlymessagesIhaveascribedtoit.ButasIdothis,IamboundtosensehowmeagertheseimpliedmessagesfeelinrespecttothesignificanceofthepiecesofthepoemIinvoke.Inotherwords,IwillbegintofeelthatwhatisdoingvirtuallyalloftheworkinmyaccountofhowMiltonrevealssomethingbasicaboutthehumanpre-dicamentisthemanifesttext,thesurface,insomesense,ofpoemitself.Again,thisisnottodenythattheremaybemessages,assertions,points,andsuggestionsimpliedbythework.ButthepointIamleadingtoisthatinvokingthemtoexplainthepoemspowerofculturalarticulationfeelsunjustsincedoingsoignoresourpowerfulsensethatitisthefictionalnarrativeofthepoemandthestoryitexplicitlythatisfunctioningastheprimarysiteofrevelation.Anyonefamiliarwithcriticism,withhowprofessionalreadersactuallytalkaboutliteraryartworks,willhavenotedthatmyreadingofMiltonwouldhavesoundedmuchmorenatural,andcertainlymoreforceful,hadallthisdouble-contenttalkbeendroppedandthecriticalpointssimplybeenassertedofthenarrative,offeredaswaysofcharacterizingitssurfaceandtheformsofaboutnessitbears.Thiswillonlysoundoddifonethinksthatthenarrativeaworkofimaginativeliteratureweavescanbearnoaboutnessotherthanmerefictionalaboutness.Butthis,ofcourse,can-notjustbeassumed:suchareductiveposition,andonesounflatteringtotheliteraryimagination,shouldbetakenwithgreatsuspicion.Weneedtoexplorethepossibil-ityoflocatingliteraturescapacitytogiveexpressiontoculturemuchmoredirectlyinthework.Considerthatinmuchrecentworkonself-expressionitisthoughtthatinstandardcasesitismorephilosophicallyaccuratetosaythatasmileafterreceiv-ingakindnessmanifests,asopposedtoimplies,gratitude,orthatashruguponhearingoptionsfordinnershows,asopposedtointimatesorindirectlyconveys,indifference.Inthesecasestherelationshipbetweenvehicleandexpressionistoodirect,toointermeshed,forthelanguageofsuggestion,indirectness,andimplicit-nesstobephilosophicallyappropriate:wearenotgivenmereevidenceforthemeaningofmygesturesbutseeit,inasignificantsense,fullydeclaredinthem.66Thatistosay,intheepistemicvernacularofthisdebate,thattheyofferknowledge,andnotmereevidence,ofthementalstatessoexpressedinthesegestures.SeeGreen2007andBar-On2004.If\n142J.GibsonPhilosophicalaestheticsisofcourselitteredwithkindredideasabouttherelationshipbetweenworkandmeaning,formandcontent.Literaryexpression,likeself-expression,inparadigmaticcasesrefusestoletmessageachievemuchindepen-dencefrommessenger.Orsoweexpect,andmypointisthatweshouldtakethisexpectationseriouslywhenwonderinghowimaginativeliteraturegivesexpressiontoitsinterestsinthereal.AndthisleadstowhatItakethehardproblemtobe:howcanweseeculture,inthesenseusedhere,revealed,contained,innarrativecontentthatisexplicitlyfictionalandisappreciatedassuch?Thedangerousassumptionisthatifwearetoconnectliteraturetocultureandtheworldly,wemustfindinaworkoffictionsomethinginadditiontoafictionalnar-rative.Outofrespectfortheliteraryimaginationweshouldattempttoseehowfictionalnarrativesmightthemselvesbeallweneedforthetaskathand.Whatisfrustratingaboutdouble-contentviewsistheirliteralismwhentheywonderhowliteraturemightsaysomethingserious,sendingthemoffasitdoesinsearchofgenuineorseriousutterancesandthatwhichtheyconveyinstandardlinguisticcontexts:propositions,chiefly,orthecontentofadiscreteidea,belief,oratti-tudewhoseexpressiontakestheformofsomethingfundamentallystatement-like.Itproceedsasthoughinsightcanineffectonlybedeliveredintheassertivemodeofspeech.Whilemakingtheproblemsoftandthuseasilysoluble,viewsofthissortignorethefactthatatthemostfundamentallevelliteraturemightengageculture,asitwere,narrativelyandnotdeclaratively,7bytellingakindofstoryandnotbypro-ducingakindofclaim.Itisnowgenerallyacceptedthatnarrativesbestowauniquekindofmeaning,import,andcohesionuponthematerialtheyrecount(seeGoldie2012:1530),andwhatseemsamissaboutanythingthatamountstoadouble-contentviewofhowliteratureismadetomatteraboutlifeisthatthispowerofnarrativeisoverlooked.Thisisunfortunate,sinceitwouldseemtoholdoutthepromiseofanovelandintuitivewayofapproachingtheissue:onewhichtreatsnarrativeandthekindsofmeaningitisapttogenerateasprovidingthefoundationforunderstandinghowfictionbindsitselftoculture(Ireturntothisinthefollowingsection).Whilethisisfrequentlyoverlooked,thehardproblemisnotwhetherwecanseerealityinworksoffictionbutwhetherwecanseerealityinfictions.Thereisanimportantdifferencehere.Recentworkinthefieldoftenstrugglestoshowthatinworksoffictionswecanfindgenuineassertions,thatis,utteranceswhichprescribebeliefratherthanmake-belief;wecanfind,inotherwords,notmerelyimpliedbutexplicit,truth-aptstatementsaboutrealityinworksoffiction(seeDavies2012;Friend2008;Gaskin2013:3862).Thisworkisimportantforallsortsofreasons,butnotethatitoffersuslittletoclarifyhowfictionalnarrativesengagewithcultureintherespectinwhichthequestionismostchallengingandmostinneedofanitisworthmentioning,mysuggestionisnotthatweshouldmodelliteraryexpressiononself-expression.Theanalogyisfruitfulbutclearlylimited.7Asgrammarians,sotosay,understandadeclarativestatement.Iamunconcernedherewiththoseareasofordinarylanguagephilosophyandlinguisticsinwhichdeclarationisatechnicalnotionforaspeech-actthatistobecontrastedwithassertion.\n9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination143answer.Aresponsethatarguesthatwecanfindinliteraturestretchesoftruth-aptorworld-representingcontentwillrepeattheproblemofthedouble-contentviewbutnowintermsoftwodistinctkindsofcontentexplicitlyfoundinworksoffiction.Wewantknowwhetherwecanvindicateoursensethatweexperiencecultureintheexplicitlyfictionalcontentofthework:whetheroneandthesamecontentcaninsomebasicsensebebothfictionalandworldly.Andweignorethisproblemmoreorlessentirelyifwearguethatinsightsintorealityaretobefoundinthoseregionsofaworkthatarenotfictional,justaswedoifweplacetheminarealmofimpliedpropositions.8Infact,sincewearetalkingaboutimaginativeart,weshouldverymuchexpectthemannerinwhichimaginativeliteratureengageswithculturetobe,well,imaginative,whichwouldseemtomean:inpartboundupwithitsfiction-making,inpartrevealedinitsfictionalnarrativeandnot,ornotjust,inanestofnonfictionalorgenuineassertionswefindutteredonthisorthatpageofawork.Weshouldattempttoseeliteraturescharacteristicmodeofinheritancenotinthosemomentswhenitsnarrativestopsabandoninganddenyingrealitybutwhenitdoessoproudly.WhatIhavedoneinthissectionisidentifytheburdenswehavetoassumeifwearetotakeseriouslytheproblemofhowtheliteraryimaginationengageswithbothfictionandculture.Evenifwestillhavenoanswers,wehavederivedasetofexpec-tationsabouthowweshouldgoaboutprovidingsuchananswer.Weexpectthemodeofinheritance,incentralandprimaryinstances,toinsomesensebemanifestinawork,partofitscontentandboundupwith,againinsomesense,itsmeaning.Andwealsoexpecttheactofinheritancetobenarrativeinnature,amatterofhowacertainstoryiscraftedandexpressedandnotanissueofhowcertainkindsofnonfictionalutterancesmightbefoundlurkinginliterary-fictivecontent.Lastly,andtosayineffectthesamething,weexpecttheliteraryimaginationsmodeofculturalexpressiontobeofapiecewith,indeedcontainedwithin,itsfictionalexpressions.9.3Sohowmightwemoveforward?Thediscussionthusfarmakesthefollowinglineofthoughtattractive.Theliteraryimaginationspowertocreatefictionsiswhatgivesititsmostobviousclaimtoautonomy,asKantmightputit:itsfreedomtoventureoutinoftenwildandspectacularexcessofreality.Andthenextstepistotrytolocatetheliteraryimaginationscomplementarypowerofculturalarticulationinthisfictionalactivity.Andwedothis,Isuggest,byarguingthattheculturalsignifi-canceofthisfiction-makingconsistsinlargepartinhowtheimaginationendows8IfoneagreeswithStacieFriendthatfictionisagenretermandfunctionsneithertocharacterizethestatusofaworkscontent(as,say,allmade-uporimaginary)nortospecifythekindofcogni-tiveattitude(belieformake-belief)tobetakenupinrespecttoit,thenitisquestionbeggingtocalltruth-aptorworld-representingstretchesofliterarylanguagenonfictional(seeFriend2007,2008).Iamsympathetictothisbutdonotrelyonthismodeloffictionalityhere.\n144J.Gibsonthesefictionalflightsfromexistencewithakindofaboutness.Itisinvirtueofitsabilitytomakethesefictionsmatterinprecisesortsofwaysthattheliteraryimagi-nationcancreateworkswhosefictionsmaybeofrealsignificance.Itisoftenthoughtthatifartistobinditselftotheworld,itwilldosobygeneratingrepresen-tationsofthereal.Thesuggestionhereisthatweshouldconceiveoftheliteraryimaginationasexpressingitsrealinterestsnotmimeticallybutbyproducingacertainkindofmeaning.9Thismaystillbeakindofrepresentation,dependingonyourtheoryofrepresentation.Butithaslittletodowithmakingfictionspictureorinsomemannergeneratelikenessesofrealstatesofaffairsandithasmuchtodowithhowseeinghowfictionsachieveakindofrelevance,amannerofmattering,infairlypreciseways.Itisimportanttorecallthattalkoftheimaginationiswelcomejustaboutwheneverwehavetodesignatetheformofthoughtthatallowsustomakepresentthatwhichisnotmateriallyavailabletothemindortothesensesthatfeedit.Wefindtheworkoftheimaginationnotonlywhenbeholdingwondrousfictionalworldsbutalsoinhumbleractssuchastakingdelightintheimageofafriendwhohasnotbeenseeninyears.Infact,wecandetectatraceoftheimaginationspowertogobeyondthemerelygiveninmanyformsofaspectperception,incomingtoseehumanbehaviorasendowedwithcomplexethicalandaestheticproperties,evenintheabilitytoseeconfusioninthefurrowofabrow,loveintheexpanseofasmile,ortheFrenchinaFrenchman.Atsomeleveltheseallgesturetowardsthelaboroftheimagination,perhapsco-optedbyacculturationandmadesecond-naturebutstillatestamenttothemindspowertomakemoreoftheworldthandumbimmediacyoffersus.Thereasonitissodifficulttodrawatidyboundaryaroundthenotionoftheimaginationisthattheimaginationisimplicatedinonewayoranotherinsuchavastarrayofcognitive,artistic,emotionalbehavior.Iamnotsurewhatunifiesallofthesecases,butintheshadowofgrandactsoffiction-makingarealltheworka-dayfeatsofmeaning-bestowalthatmakeupagoodshareofoutattempttoendowlifewithsense.Itisthroughthis,ultimately,thatwemakeexistenceamenable,perhapseventolerable,tohumanperception;toourabilitytolookuponitandseeareflectionofourinterestsandvaluesinit.Weavingnarrativesisonesuchwayinwhichwedothis.Infact,asitconcernsusheretherelevantfictionalactivityoftheliteraryimagi-nationisinseparablefromitsnarrativeactivity.Itishardlynewsthatnarrativeisamongthemostusefultoolswehaveforbestowingmeaning,import,andcohesionuponlife,fictionalorotherwise.Andthefirstphilosophicalpointtobemadeisthatnarrative,certainlyinthecaseofliterature,isatestamenttotheimaginationasapowerofreconfiguration,apowerthatpermitsustotakematerialfromthecommon9ArthurDantooftenconceivesoftherepresentationalqualityofartworksinthislight,makingitamatteroftheirembodiedmeanings(seeDanto2000).Iamreluctanttothinkofthemeaningfulnessofartworks,atleastinthesenseIgiveithere,asinanyinterestingrespectrepresentational.Regardlessofthis,whatIamdenyingistherelevanceofthetraditionalmimeticnotionofrepre-sentation:theoldideathataliteraryrepresentationoflifesomehowoffersanimage,picture,ormirrorofreality.\n9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination145worldandplaceitinevernewrelations(think,again,ofMiltonandChristianity).10Buttonarrateisalsotobestowakindoforder,andanattendantkindofmeaning,onthematerialonerecounts.Itisawayofshowingittomatterinthisorthatway,inthismannersuffusingitwithdistinctformsofaboutnessandsignificance.Thewaysinwhichtheliteraryimaginationcantakefromthecommonworldthebeliefs,desires,interests,practices,eventsandevenpersonsfoundinitandplacetheminnovelrelationshipsandcontextsrevealhowitscreativeactivitycanbe,asSartresays,akindofliberationfromtheworldbutstill,withWarnock,awayofseeingtheworldassignificant.ThisabilitytocreatefromtherawmaterialofaculturespastorpresentanarrativethatendowsitwithmeaningiswhatIamsuggestingweoughttoidentifywiththeculturalpoweroftheliteraryimagination.Theinventingoffic-tionsturnsouttobeexactlywhatmakesavailabletotheliteraryimaginationthetoolsforsteppingintoculturalspacesothatitmayreorganizeandreorderthisspaceinnovelways.Considerthedistinctionbetweenfabulaandsyuzhet.Thisisveryroughlythedistinctionbetweenstoryandnarrative,thoughfabulaimpliessomethingmoreprecisethantheEnglishtermstorydoes.TheideathatanimatedthisdistinctionfortheRussianformalistsisthatastorycanbetoldinmanyways,andthateachdifferentwayofnarratingastorywillgenerateauniquemeaning.Meaninghereidentifiesthedistinctsensethatisproducedwhenastoryisnarratedinthiswayandnotanother:thenarrativeorganizesawayofthinkingandfeelingabouttheeventsthatconstitutethestory,aframeworkthroughwhichamannerofunderstandingtheseeventsismadepossible.Whenitissaidthatthesamestorycanbenarratedvariously,samenessisclearlynotaconceptofidentityanditdoesnotsuggestthepatentlyabsurdideathatthecontentofastoryremains,literally,uniformacrossvariousnarrativearticulationsofit.Thepointistheweakerandmoreearthboundonethatthestoryofcommonculturematerialcantoldinagreatvarietyofways:thestoryofthefallwouldbeoneexample,thoughattherightlevelofgeneralityanyformofhumanexperienceanartistmightexplorecanbecomethatstorywhichcanbenarratedvariously.Storyhereidentifiestheslicesoflifearoundwhichnarra-tivegoalsrevolve:thegoaloftellingthestoryofmodernalienation,ofsmalltownEnglishlife,oftheblackexperience,ofthefoundingofthestateofIsrael,ofteen-ageangst,andsoon(seeGibson2011).Thepointisthatnarration,astheactoftellingandsogivingdeterminateshapetoastoryofcommonhumanexperience,linksthatformofexperiencetoauniquewayofconceivingitsmeaning,evenitsnature(aproperliteraryexampleisforthcoming).Ifthisisso,thennarrativemeaningisakindofmeaningwhichaccruestothenarrativeitself,anditisdetectedonlyoncewemovebeyondwhatitsvariouslinesmeanandaskwhatthenarrativemeans.Meaninghereisbetterseenasanaxio-logicalthansemanticnotion,thatis,atermthatindicatesthatacertainstretchof10Iignoreherediscussionofwhetherweshouldbenarrativistsinrespecttoactuallifeandrealselves.Iagreethatnarrativehasasmuchpotentialtodistortasitdoestoreveal,andthisadmissionimpliesexactlynothingabouttheextenttowhichliteraturemakesuseofnarrativetobearonreality.Foranexcellentdiscussionofthis,seeGoldie2012:150171.\n146J.Gibsonlanguagebearscertainkindsofvalue,inthebroadestsensepossible.Whenweaskwhatanarrativemeans,weareasking,intheprimaryinstance,whatthestoryisastoryof,notasarequesttocataloguetheeventswhichconstituteitbuttogivevoicetohowandwhytheseevents,toldinthismanner,matter:whatgeneralconcernstheyspeakto,amplify,orexplore.Whenwepassfromstandardformsoflinguisticmeaningtonarrativemeaning,wearenotconcernedwiththecontentofanexpressionbutwitharticulatingthesignificanceofaseriesofeventsorconstellationofexperiencesexpressedinaparticularmanner.Weareconcernedwithwhattheyareallabout,asthephrasehasit.Ifyouknownothingofme,oftheacademicprofession,orofalifelivedinconstantfearofnothinginparticular,awell-wroughtnarrativeofsuchasliceoflifewillimbueyourunderstandingwithaformofsuddenandrichdeterminacy.Itwillgiveyouasenseoftheshapeofakindoflifelivedinacertainway,andtheparticularshapeitisgivenwillpromptauniqueunderstandingofwhatitmeansinaperfectlyfamiliarsenseofmeaningtobeme,aprofessorinthehumanities,oracoward.Throughthenarrativeaseriesofeventsis,asitwere,mademeaningfulinthiswayorthat.Philosophersoflan-guageattimesdistinguishbetweenlinguisticmeaning,asMichaelKremerputsit,andmeaninginabroaderexistentialsenseofsignificance.(Kremer2001:56).Iftalkofexistentialmeaningfeelspurple,talkofnarrativemeaningshouldnot,anditcapturesthebasicideaverywell:meaningattimesisamatternotofsignificationbutsignificance.Itconcernstheimport,theconsequence,oftheeventsasnarratedandattemptstomakeavailableadistinctcognitiveandaffectiveorientationtowardthem.Itisinthissensethatwecanclaimthatinparadigmaticcasestheliteraryimagi-nationsvehicleofculturalcommunicationisanarrativeandnotsomepropositionorsuggestionindirectlyexpressedthroughit.Toseethisitissufficienttopointoutsomethingcrudeinthinkingaboutfictionalnarratives,anideathatinpartexplainstheallureofdouble-contentviewsofthesortexploredabove.Itis,again,thereduc-tiveideathatsincethesemanticsurfaceofafictionalnarrativedescribesfictionsandfictionsalone,itsaboutnessismerelyfictional,extendingnofurtherthanthebound-ariesoftheimaginedworldthenarrativegenerates.Wecannowseethemyopiaofthis.Oursenseofthemeaningofthecontentofanarrativeisonlyinpartdeter-minedbythemeaningoftherepresentationalcontentofthevariousdescriptionswhichconstituteit,which,letusgrant,yieldonlyfictionstoappreciation.Butfromthemomentwearefirstintroducedtothepracticeofstory-tellingaschildren,wearetrainedtoexperiencenarrativesbythelightofaconceptionofwhytheymatter,whattheirpointis,ofwhatgranderthingstheyareabout,allofwhichcanextendourexperienceofnarrativeaboutnesswellbeyondmerelyfictionalstatesofaffairsandbringittobearonculture.Andnotethatsincethisisaclaimabouthowweexperiencenarrativeaboutness,itisaclaimabouthowweexperienceastoryscon-tent,ofwhatwefindinit(seeGibson2006).Thisisacrucialpoint,forifitissounditimpliesthat,inthecaseofliterature,weexperiencenarrativemeaningaspartofitsmanifestcontent,as,thatis,boundupwith,containedin,thestorywhichunfoldsbetweenthecoversofawork.Thismeaningisnotstatedinanyliteralsenseinthelanguageofthework,butsincewearenottalkingaboutakindoflinguisticmeaning,\n9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination147thisishardlyasurprise.Weexperiencenarrativemeaninginaworknotbecausebegleanitoffthisorthatstretchoflanguagebutbecauseinourveryattempttounder-standaworkwemustformconceptionsofitsbroaderculturalandartisticprojects,andtheseareexperiencednotasreaderlyprojectionsbutaspartoftheliterarynar-rativeitself:ofwhatitisabout.Wecangetitwrong,ofcourse,aswecanwithanyactofmeaningattribution,beittosentences,gestures,artworks,andtoalmostany-thingelseunderthesun.ThepointIammakingconcernsourexperienceofnarra-tivecontent,anditsrelevanceisthatitgivesusreasontobelievethatonceweformaconceptionofnarrativemeaninginthecontextofliterature,wetreatthatmeaningashavingprimarydomicileintheworkitselfandnot,asthedouble-contentviewhadit,inarealmofimpliedorsuggestedpropositions.This,Itakeit,showshowwecanmakegoodonthepromisetotreattheproblemashard,inthesenseIgaveitabove,andstillfindawayofovercomingit.Narrativemeaningisaspeciesofimaginativemeaninginatleastthreeoverlap-pingsenses.First,itisanexpressionoftheimaginationspowerofmeaning-bestowal,inWarnockssenseofimaginationasseeing-as-significant.Secondly,itisimaginativeisthealtogetherobvioussensethatintherelevantkindofliteraturefiction-making,theimaginativeactparexcellence,iswhatunderwritesstory-tellingandgivesititsparticularcontentandsothatwhichthenarrativemakesmeaningful.And,finally,itisimaginativeinthesensethatifwearetoexperienceanarrativeanditsaboutnessandnotjustaconcatenationofsentenceseachwithdiscretemeanings,wemustmakepresentsomethingwhichisnotimmediatelygiven,anditthusdemandsanactofimaginativetranscendence.Mostofusaresufficientlycompetentreadersthatwedothiswitheaseandusuallyunawares.Butasanyonewhohasachildknows,themomentamindbecomescapableofexplainingastorywithoutrecountingeverythingthatoccursinit,themomentamindcangettothepointandsayquicklyandinsightfullywhatastoryitselfisabout,isthemomentweknowachildhasfiguredouthowtoputtheimaginationtowork.Letmenowofferabriefliteraryexample,oncethatwillbringtoearthmypointsaboutstories,narratives,andimaginativereconfiguration.Ourliteraryheritageclearlyoffersusasurplusofstoriesofwickedness.ThinkofSatan,thefictionalforminwhichsomuchliteratureoffersitsparticularimageofevil.ConsiderfirstDantesrepresentationofSatan,ofDis,whoinInfernoisrepresentedaswhollydevoidofagency,frozen,andsimplythefurthestpoleonereachesinHell.AndnotethatdepictingSatanthiswayisequalpartsbrilliantphilosophyandbrilliantpoetry,foritgivesalltheagencytous,thehumansinner,andrevealsHelltobeaplacewevoluntarilyenter,notproddedbypitchforksanddevilishpromptingsbutbyour-selves.Itthusoffersusapowerfulimageofthehumanasfreelyevil,andofDisashavinganalmosteliminableroleinexplanationsofourpropensitytosin.NextthinkofShakespearesownSatanofsorts,Iago,who,unlikeDantesSatan,ispureagencyandispresentedasentirelyhuman.Iagoisevilpackagedastheperfectlyfalsefriend.Histrapsrevealhimtobeacreaturepossessedofimmensecreativeandimprovisationalpower,akindofMilesDavisofmalicewhoplaysusoffoneanotherandindoingsocreatestheconditionsofhumanseparatenesssocharacteristicofhowmuchRenaissanceandEarlyModernliteratureimaginesHell.YetifDantes\n148J.GibsonDishasnovoiceandsonostorytotell,Iago,thoughcertainlywithastorytotell,stillrefusestorenderintelligiblethesourceofhisevil:Demandmenothing:whatyouknow,youknow:FromthistimeforthIneverwillspeakaword.(Othello,v.ii.203).Forthisreason,hisbehaviorisboundtobaffle,strikingusashumanyetinexplicable,incapableofrationalexplanation.AndsurelyonewayofgettingatMiltonsaccomplishmentinParadiseLoseistohighlighttheextraordinarymannerinwhichthevoiceandactivity,ifnotperson,ofSatanaremadetoappearfullyhumanyetnowalsofullyintelligible.SatanswordstoEvesoundterrifyinglyclosetowordsthebetterpartofhumanreasonwouldproduce,andwehearthemassuch.WhenAdamclaims,NorcanIthinkthatGod,creatorwise/Thoughthreatning,willinearnestsodestroyus,dignifiedsohigh(ix.937940),hecompletesinhisownvoiceanargumentbegunbySatanandpassedthroughEve,andwehearourselves,guidedbytemptationanddesire,butstillreasoninginanaltogetherfamiliarway.Thegroundofevilhereseemsfinallytohavecomehomeandbeengivendomicileinthehumanmind:whollyamatterofhumanagency,justasforDante,andawhollyhumanvoice,justasforShakespeare,butnowalsointelligibleandcapableofexplainingitselfintermsaltogethergraspablebycreaturessuchasourselves.11Thesepoetsallusefamiliarculturalmaterialyetbeatoutofthisinheritancenovel,distinctwaysofthinkingandfeelingaboutthismaterial,ofconceivingitsmeaning,thoughmeaningisnowusedinapurelynarratologicalsense.Ifeachofthesepoetsattemptstotellthestoryofthesourcesofhumanevil,theirtellingsmakeavailableverydifferentwaysofmakingsenseofit:ofthinkingaboutit,ofconceiv-ingitsnatureandsignificance,ofunderstandingit.Ifwesaythis,thenweareenti-tledtosaythatliteraturesrelationtotherealisperhapsbetterseenasfoundationalthanrepresentational,issuingnotinimagesoftherealbutinactsofmeaning-makingwhichopenupnewpossibilitiesforgraspingthesenseofsomefeatureofhumanexperience.InthecaseofDante,Shakespeare,andMilton,weseeworkswhichcaneachgroundawayoftakingourselvesandourworldlysituationtobe,offeringastheydonarrativeswhichorganizeapurchaseonthenatureandimportoftheregionsofhumanculturetheyaddress.Aswepassfromoneworktoanother,weareregardingworksthatareconstitutiveofasensewecanascribetotheworld.Assuch,wecansaywithoutbeingguiltyofobfuscationthataliteraryworksparticularmannerofabandoningrealitymayalsoconstituteitsmodeofinheritance.Fortherespectsinwhichtheseworksfashionadistinctsenseoffeaturesofhumancircum-stanceandpredicamentisinseparablefromtherespectsinwhichtheycreatefictions11Itistruethataculturecouldpossessthesestorieswithoutpossessingaliterarytradition,andthatmyexamplethusdoesnotsaymuchaboutthespecificallyliterarysignificanceofthesenarratives:ofhowtheliteraryandaestheticdimensionoftheseworksmattertotheirnarrativesandthevaluewefindinthem.Afullydevelopedtheoryofliterarynarrativewouldclearlyhavetoaddressthus.Here,however,Iamsimplyexploringapointabouttheimportanceofpossessingstoriesaboutwhatweacquireinvirtueofhavingaccesstonarrativesthatorganizeculturalmaterialinaparticu-larwayandIdonothavethespacetotacklethislargerissue.Ithinkitshouldbeclearthatmypointaboutnarrativesetsupanovelwayofapproachingtheseliteraryandaestheticissues,butitisanotherproject.IthankTzachiZamirforbringingtomyattentionthatIoweawordonthis.\n9NarrativeandtheLiteraryImagination149thatsufficetogeneratethissenseand,withit,asenseofthekindofworldweinhabit.Inthisrespect,theliteraryimaginationsfiction-makingcanattimesalsoessentiallybeanactofculture-making.9.4IhavenoillusionthatIhaveofferedafullydevelopedaccountofhowwecanreconciletheliteraryimaginationsinterestinthefictionalandthereal,orevenofexactlywhattheliteraryimaginationis.WhatIhavetriedtodo,atroot,ismotivateaninterestinapproachingtheimaginationinamuchmoreexpansivemannerthanwefindincontemporaryliteraryaesthetics.Wearecurrentlyoverflowingwithpow-erful,sophisticatedtheoriesoftheimaginationanditsroleincreatingfictions.AndIhopethediscussionofthisessaygivesonereasontothinkthatresulthasbeenaone-sidedviewofwhattheimaginationisandwhyitmatterstoliterature.Theaspectoftheimaginationcontemporaryphilosophersofliteraturehaveexploredissurelycrucial,butitisatbestjustonehalfofthestoryofweshouldbetelling.Theotherhalf,Ihavesuggested,willconcerntheroleofnarrativeingettingthesefictionstomatterinaparticularway,andawaythatcanvindicateoursensetheproductsoftheliteraryimaginationareoften,andessentially,culturalartifactsthatshowusasmuchaboutexistenceastheydoabouthowtoescapeit.12ReferencesBar-OnD(2004)Speakingmymind:expressionandself-knowledge.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordBrannE(1991)Theworldoftheimagination.Rowman&Littlefield,SavageBudickS(2010)KantandMilton.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MADantoA(2000)Artandmeaning.In:NoëlC(ed)Theoriesofarttoday.UniversityofWisconsinPress,Madison,pp130140DaviesD(2006)Aestheticsandliterature.Continuum,LondonDaviesD(2012)Fictionality,fictiveutterance,andtheassertiveauthor.In:GregoryC,PetrK,MartinP(eds)Mimesis:metaphysics,cognition,pragmatics.CollegePublications,London,pp6185FriendS(2003)HowIreallyfeelaboutJFK.In:MatthewK,McIverLopesD(eds)Imagination,philosophy,andthearts.Routledge,London,pp355412AnearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedataconferenceinhonourofSanfordBudickattheHebrewUniversityofJerusalem,anditisworthsayingthatthepaperitselfgrewoutofanattempttomakesenseofBudicksimmenselysuggestiveclaimthatthewayinwhichpoetry,asexempli-fiedinMilton,reconcilesoriginalityandinheritancemaybesaidtoconstitutecultureitself,per-hapsevenwhatisconsideredtobehuman(2010:1).IamgratefultoTzachiZamirandSanfordBudickfordiscussionoftheideaspresentedhereandfortheirhospitalityduringmystay.Zamirofferedextensivecriticismontheversionpublishedhere,andwhiletheargumentwillstillfallshortofconvincinghim,Ihopeitisclearthatitisatleastbetteronaccountofhim.\n150J.GibsonFriendS(2007)Fictionalcharacters.PhilosCompass2(2):141156FriendS(2008)Imaginingfactandfiction.In:StockK,Thomson-JonesK(eds)Newwavesinaesthetics.PalgraveMacmillan,NewYork,pp150169GaskinR(2013)Language,truth,andliterature:adefenceofliteraryhumanism.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordGibsonJ(2006)Interpretingwords,interpretingworlds.JAesthetArtCritic64(4):439450GibsonJ(2007)Fictionandtheweaveoflife.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordGibsonJ(2011)Thicknarratives.In:JohnG,NoëlC(eds)Narrative,emotion,andinsight.ThePennsylvaniaUniversityPress,UniversityPark,pp6991GoldieP(2012)Themessinside:narrative,emotion,andthemind.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordGreenM(2007)Self-expression.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordKivyP(1997)Philosophiesofarts:anessayindifferences.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeKremerM(2001)Thepurposeoftractariannonsense.NOÛS35(1):3973LennonK(2010)Re-enchantingtheworld:theroleofimaginationinperception.Philosophy85(3):375389LewisD(1978)Truthinfiction.AmPhilosQ15(1):3746MikkonenJ(2013)Thecognitivevalueofphilosophicalfiction.BloomsburyAcademic,NewYorkMiltonJ(2006)Paradiselost.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordNabokovV(1980)In:FredsonB(ed)Lecturesonliterature.HarcourtBraceJovanovich,NewYorkNewC(1999)Philosophyofliterature:anintroduction.Routledge,LondonNietzscheF(1999)In:GeussR,SpeirsR(eds)Thebirthoftragedyandotherwritings.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgePillowK(2009)Imagination.In:EldridgeR(ed)TheOxfordhandbookofphilosophyandlitera-ture.OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,pp349368SartreJ-P(1972)Thepsychologyofimagination.Methuen,LondonSearleJ(1975)Thelogicalstatusoffictionaldiscourse.NewLitHist6(2):319332WaltonK(1990)Mimesisasmake-believe:onthefoundationsoftherepresentationalarts.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAWarnockM(1976)Imagination.UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley\nChapter10“AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths”:ThePowerofNarrativeArtinSouthAsianLiteraryCulturesAnneMoniusOvermorethantwomillennia,premodernSouthAsianpoetsofallreligiouspersuasionsHindu,Buddhist,Jain,Sikh,andMuslimproducedanenormousquantityofnarrativeliteratureinawidevarietyoflanguages,thebulkofitdisplay-inghighlysophisticatedliteraryartistry.Mostwell-known,perhaps,aretheso-calledepics,theMahābhārataandtheRāmāyaṇa,theirSanskritformsfixedatsomepointintheearlycenturiesofthecommonera,theircombinedvolumes(inpareddown,criticaleditions)takingupseveralfeetoflibraryshelfspace.YettheMahābhārataandtheRāmāyaṇaformjustthetipofaverylargeiceberg.OftheincompletecorpusofSanskrittextsthathavesurvived,astaggeringamountisinnarrativeform:epics,Mahāyānasūtras,Hindupurāṇas,courtlypoeticnarrativeanddrama,Mughalromances,life-storiesofjinas,buddhas,andbodhisattvas,hagiog-raphies,andsoon.Othergenresalsocontainlongnarrativepassages.Premodernphilosophicaldiscourseofteninterweavestechnicalexpositionwithstories,whilesacredliteraturesuchastheVedacombinesritualmandatewithrichveinsofnarra-tive.Narrativeformssuffusevirtuallyeverygenreoftextualproductioninpremod-ernSouthAsia.Suchtremendousweightisperhapsmostobviouslygiventonarrativebecauseofitscloseassociation,intheextanttheoreticalliterature,withcultivatingdharmaorthemorallife.Indeed,Indianliterarytraditionineverylanguageisunanimousincontendingthatnarrative(and,again,thismeansmostoftenverylongandfinelywroughtpoeticnarrative)candothingshumanlyveryimportantthingsthatotherformsofdiscoursesimplycannot.Intheopeningchapterofafourth-centuryTamilpoeticnarrativefromSouthIndiaknownastheCilappatikāramorTheLayoftheAnklet(IḷaṅkōAṭikaḷ1978),forexample,agrainmerchantrushesintotellhisfriend,theprince,theawesomeeventshehasjustwitnessed:ayoungwoman,herhusbandunjustlykilledbythekingofMaturai,toreoffherbreast,flungitattheA.Monius(*)HarvardDivinitySchool,45FrancisAvenue,Cambridge,MA02138,USAe-mail:amonius@hds.harvard.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015151A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_10\n152A.Moniuscity,burnedthecitytotheground,andthenascendedintoheavenasagoddesstobereunitedwithherslainbeloved.Theastonishedbuteverwiseprincereplieswiththewordsofthisessaystitle:Weshallcomposeapoemwithsongstoestablishthesetruths(line60),suggestingthatitisonlyinpoeticnarrativeformthatsuchwondrouseventsbecomehumanlycomprehensible.Theseventh-centurySanskritliterarytheorist,Bhāmaha,inhisKāvyālaṅkāra(2008),listsfivetypesofkāvyaorpoetryatverse1.18,ofwhichthefirstfourareclearlynarrativeinform:drama(nāṭya),epicorgreatnarrative(mahākāvyaorsargabandha),biographyorhis-tory(ākhyāyikā),taleorstory(kathā),andlyricorindependentverses(anibaddha).Hefurthercontendsthatthestudyofgoodpoetryimpartsskillinthefineartsandinethics(dharma),materialwell-being(artha),love(kāma),andliberation(mokṣa);itprovidesbothpleasure(prīti)andfame(kīrti)(verse1.2).QuotingBhāmaha,thegreattenth-centuryKashmiriŚaivaliterarytheorist,Abhinavagupta,concursthatpoetry(kāvya,ornatecourtlypoeticnarrative)confersbothpleasure(prīti)andmoralinstruction(vyutpatti),withtheinstructionofpoetry(asopposedtothatofreligiousscriptureorhistory)definedbyitspleasurablequalities,withbliss(ānanda)asitschiefgoal(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,41).AnotherKashmiriandperhapsacontemporaryofAbhinavagupta,Kuntaka,maintainsthatkāvya[poeticnarrative]isbothameans(upāya)ofpracticingdharma,etc.,andadelighttotheheartsofthehigh-born(1977,verse1.3).Intheseventeenthcen-tury,Jagannātha,arguablyoneofthelastgreatliterarytheoristswritinginSanskrit,definespoetry(andparticularlypoeticnarrativeorkāvya)assound(śabda)thatgivesrisetopleasurable(ramaṇīya)meaningthepleasurable(ramaṇīyatā)beingthatwhichproducestranscendentaldelight(1903,56).Farfrommerelyentertaining,inotherwords,poeticnarrativeisquiteubiquitouslyassumedtoinstructinwhatareknownasthefouraimsofhumanlife(puruṣārtha):ethics,materialwell-being,love,andeventualliberationfrombodilyrebirthandredeath.ForthosedrawntorecentEuro-AmericantheoreticalinterestinwhatmightlooselybecallednarrativeethicsviatheworkofLevinasandBenjamin,Nussbaum,Rorty,andRicoeur,amongothers,thedetailsoftheconnectionbetweennarrativeandethics,betweenpoeticartandmoralformation,remainfrustratinglyopaqueinthepremodernSouthAsiantheoreticaluniverse,perhapspreciselybecausesuchconnectionsaresoubiquitouslyassumed,liketheworkingsofkarma,thepluralityofdivinebeings,orthefactofhumanhierarchiesofcaste.Pollock(2001),forexample,attemptstomapoutwhathecallsthesocialaestheticofSanskritliterarytheory,concludingthatliteratureinIndiawasconceivedofnotonlyasverbaliconormetaphysicalexperience,butalsoandeminentlyassocialpractice,indeed,equipmentforliving(223).HudsonoffersareadingoftheMahābhārataepicattentivetoboththepoeticsandethicsofsuffering(2013).PremodernliterarytheoristsandcommentatorswritinginSanskrittossofftantaliz-ingtidbitsregardingpleasure,moralinstruction,andliberation,butthenpro-ceedquicklytothetechnicaldetailsofhowplotstructure,scene,character,context,image,figureofspeech,sentencestructure,verbtense,andgrammaticalendingallworktoproduceacertainkindofexperientialeffectintheaudiencethatisseldomconnectedinanydirectwaytowhatwouldtodaybecalledethics.Howexactly\n10AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths:ThePower153theconsumptionofpoeticnarrativeservestoshapethemoralpersonhoodofthereaderorlistenerisneverspelledoutinanydetail.Thisessayattemptstoteaseoutanddevelopsomeoftheseconnectionsbetweenpoeticnarrativeformandthecultivationofdharma,betweenethicsandaesthetics,drawingexamplesfromasizabletheoreticalliteraturethatspacedoesnotallowonetoaddressinfullinanyway.Havingconsideredpossiblewaysthatthereadingofpoetryorthewatchingofastageddramamightcontributetowardrealizationofthefourclassicalaimsofmorallife(andbeyond)theoretically,aclosereadingofadramaticcomedyfromSouthAsiawillserveasaworkingillustration.Inconclu-sion,thepotentialrelevanceofsuchanexerciseforcontemporaryEuro-Americandiscussionsofnarrativeethicswillbebrieflyconsidered.Abitofbackgroundonthegeneralconcernsandapproachesofpre-colonialSouthAsianliterarytheoristsquestions,definitions,anddebatesthatremainsurprisinglyconsistentinformifnotincontentandconclusionforroughlyamillen-nium,fromtheseventhcenturyCEthroughtheseventeenthisfirstrequired.Ofobviousconcernisthedefinitionofpoeticnarrativeitself;howispoetry(kāyva)distinctfromordinaryorrituallanguage?IntheseventhcenturyCE,Bhāmahadefinespoeticnarrativeorkāvyaasthebeautyofbothsoundandmeaningtogether(2008,verse16),Daṇḍinasalinguisticbodywithadornmentsthebodyaseriesofwordsconveyingadesiredmeaning(1957,verse10);Daṇḍingoesoninhiswork,theKāvyādarśa(alsoknownastheKāvyalakṣaṇa),totreatquiteexhaustivelythevarietiesofpoeticadornmentsuchasmetaphor,simile,hyperbole,andsoon.Daṇḍinfurtherdefinesmahākāvyaorgreatpoeticnarrativeintermsofcharacter,theme,plot,andstyle:itmustbebasedonahistoricalincidentoratleastberealis-tic;itmusthaveroyalcharactersandvividdescriptionsoflandscapesandcourtlylife;itmustfocusonthemesofloveandwar;itmustbefullofpoeticadornmentsevokingvarioussentiments(1957,verses1419).Overtime,however,thefocusofliterarytheoryshiftsfromtheformalanalysisofalaṅkāraorpoeticadornmenttothewaysinwhichsuchadornmentsaffectthereadingorlisteningaudience;thescopeofnarrativemeaning,inotherwords,turnsfromformalanalysisofthepoetictextitselftocarefulconsiderationoftheaudienceexperiencegeneratedbythatpoetictext.ThisisthegreatinnovationoftheKashmiriliterarytheoreticaltradition,firstwithĀnandavardhanaintheninthcentury,followedbyAbhinavaguptainthelatetenth(McCrea2008).Drawingoncategoriesofaudienceexperiencedevelopedcenturiesearlierintheanalysisoftheatricalperformance,Ānandavardhana,forexample,identifiesdhvanithesuggestivepoweroflanguageuniquetopoeticutteranceasthesoulofpoetry(kāvyasyaātmā)thatdelightstheheartsofsensitivereaders(sahṛdayamanaḥprītaye)inhisfirstverse(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,8),cultivatinginthosesensitivereaders,accordingtothecommentator,Abhinavagupta,astablestateofmind(cittavṛtti)thatisaestheti-callyrelished(āsvādyatva)(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,79).Thisaestheticrelishingmadepossiblethroughthestablestatesofmindproducedinlearnedreadersbygreatpoeticnarrative,istermedrasa,awordthatrangesinmean-ingfromsaporjuicetoessencebutthatisperhapsbestleftuntranslatedinthisliterarycontext.AfterĀnanadavardhana,rasabecomesmoreorlessdefinitive\n154A.Moniusofpoeticnarrative;ifaliteraryworkdoesnotproducerasaexperienceinthelearnedaudience,itsimplydoesnotqualifyaspoeticart(McCrea2008,441442).Whatexactlyisthisrasaexperience,andhowisitproduced?Ānandavardhanareturnstotheearliestformulationofrasathathassurvived:theperhapssecond-orthird-centuryCEanalysisoftheatricalperformance(dancedrama)attributedtoBharata,theNāṭyaśāstra.HereBharatalikensrasatothewayinwhichagourmandsavorsanexcellentmeal.Justasaculinaryconnoisseurrelishesthedelicateblendofspices,tastes,aromas,andtextures,so,too,doestheliterarysavantrelishthemanyconstituentsofanydramaticperformance.Rasaintheaudienceisproducedbythevariousstimulants(vibhāvas),consequences(anubhāvas),andpsychologicalstates(vyabhicāribhāvas)onstage;altogetherthesecreatealastingmood(sthāyībhāva)thatthedramaticcriticorconnoisseurthenrelishes(1980,verses6.3237).ImagineforamomentatheatricalproductionofShakespearesRomeoandJuliet,aplaythatBharatamightwellhavelikedinpart,although(followingthetheatricalvisionofhisNāṭyaśāstra)hecertainlywouldhavestageditasamusicalandalteredtheendingtoensurethehappyreunionoftheheroandheroine.ImagineActII,SceneII:earlierinthedayRomeoandJuliethaveseeneachotherandimme-diatelyfallenheadoverheelsinlove.Laterthatevening,alovesickRomeolingersunderJulietswindow.Suddenlyspyinghisnewbeloved,hecriesout,Butsoft,whatlightthroughyonderwindowbreaks?Itistheeast,andJulietisthesun,andthewell-known,love-fraughtRomeo,Romeo,whereforeartthouRomeo?con-versationbetweenthetwoensues(Shakespeare1974,1068).IntheeyesofBharataandthelaterliterarytheoristswhowouldapplyhisstageanalysistopoetryreadonthepage,therasatoberelishedhereisclearlytheerotic(śṛṅgāra),soofteninIndiannarrativeatitsheightenedbestwhenloversarephysicallyseparated,herebyawallhardtoclimbandanever-watchfulnurse.Thevibhāvasorstimulantstotherelishingoftheerotic(heretheparticularlyfavoredmodeoflove-in-separation)mightbeginwiththeverysceneitself:abeautifulyoungmanandwomandeeplyattractedtoeachotherbutphysicallykeptapart.Amongtheanubhāvasorconse-quencesarethelovinglooksandgestures,sighsandwordsoftheactors.Thepsy-chologicalstatesorvyabhicāribhāvaswouldincludeacomplexmixofinfatuation,frustration,bashfulness,excitement,andimpatience.Allofthiswouldleadtoanoveralllastingmoodoflove(rati)thatwouldthenbesavoredbytheliteraryconnoisseursintheaudienceasanon-person-specificandnon-situation-specificrasaexperienceoftheerotic.ForBharatathereareeightmodesofrasaexperience,alldescribedintermsofemotionalstatesmadeabstract,universalorimpersonalintheirsavoring.Lastingmoodsoflovegeneratetherasaoftheerotic,whilemoodsofhumoryieldthecomic(hāsya),griefthecompassionate(karuṇa),angerthefurious(raudra),energytheheroic(vīra),fearthefrightening(bhāyanaka),disgusttheloath-some(bībhatsa),andastonishmentthewondrous(adbhuta)(Bharata1980,verse6.15).Laterliterarytheoristsaddaninthrasa,śānta,thepeacefulorthequiescent,andassignitenormouspotentialinhumanlife(seeMassonandPatwardhan1969).\n10AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths:ThePower155Beforeturningtothetopicofwhatpromisethisaestheticrelishingholdsforethicsormoraldevelopment,itisimportanttokeepinmindthatpremodernSouthAsianliterarytheoryisdecidedlyundemocratic.Rasaexperience,simplyput,isnotopentoeveryone.Bharataisthefirsttoaddressthequalitiesnecessaryinthespecta-torthatallowfortherasaexperience;interestingly,heisalsoquicktopointoutthatnarrativeartmustspeaktoalllevelsofaudience,notsimplytheeliteamongthecrowd.Thequalificationsoftheidealspectator(prekṣaka)aremanyforBharata,including:goodcharacter,highbirth,virtue,impartiality,artisticproficiency,gen-erallearningingrammarandpoetics,honesty,soundjudgment,and,perhapsmostimportantly,empathy(1980,verses27.5055).Yethegoesontorecognizethatfewpossesssuchadmirablequalitiesinfull;audiencesarealwaysamixofthesuperior,themiddling,andtheinferior,eachwithitsownuniquelevelofinteresttowhichtheeffectiveplaywright,director,andcastmustspeak(verses27.5657).Rasaisexpe-riencedbythesuperior,whilethemiddlingenjoylove-scenesandlearnedinstruc-tioninreligionordharma,andtheinferiorpreferslapstickcomedyandelaboratecostumesandmake-up(verses27.6061).CommentingonanearlierpassageintheNāṭyaśāstra,Abhinavaguptabeautifullydescribeshowadramacangivecouragetothepersonoverwhelmedbysorrow,respitetotheweary;dramaprovidesinstruc-tion,thefulleffectsofwhichperhapsmanifestonlylongafterthefinalcurtainhasfallen.Onlyforthosedetachedfromtheendlessworriesandanxietiesofquotidianlife,however,cantheplaymeaningfullyprovideinsightintothepuruṣārthaorfouraimsofhumanexistence,includingbothdharmaorethicsandmokṣaorliberation(MassonandPatwardhan1969,5657).Poeticnarrativeinpre-colonialSouthAsia,inshort,inordertomeritthetitleart,mustevokeinitsmostsophisticatedaudi-encethenon-situation-specific,impersonal,abstractexperienceofrasabutmustalsosimultaneouslyandengaginglyimpartlife-lessonstothemiddlingaudienceandentertaintheinferior.Bhāmahasummarizestheuniversalappealofgoodpoeticnarrativeintheseventhcenturybypraisingtheclarity(prasādavat)ofgoodpoetry:Thatkāvyaisclearwhosemeaningisapparenttoall,fromthelearneddowntowomenandchildren(2008,verse2.3).Again,ShakespeareinhisdayperhapsprovidesthemostaccessibleexamplefromtheEuro-Americanliterarytradition.Sword-fightsandshufflinggrave-diggersentertainedthosestandingrightinfrontoftheGlobestageintheYard.Themoreeducatedafewrowsbackcouldappreciatethelessonsonlove,loss,andvalorenactedandgivenvoicebyRomeo,Hamlet,andKingLear.Thosewealthyelitessittingincomfortinthegalleriesmightalonesavortherasasoftheerotic,thecomic,theheroic,andthecompassionate.ThisinsistencethatnarrativespeaktomultiplelevelsofaudienceawarenessandinterestveryconsistentlymaintainedthroughoutamillenniumofSouthAsiantheorizingaboutliteraryartmakestherelationshipofnarrativemeaningtonarra-tivewisdom,dharmatorasa,ethicstoaesthetics,quitecomplex.Whilethetheoreti-callyinferioraudiencecaresonlyaboutplot,costume,action,andagoodlaugh,themiddlingaudience,accordingtovirtuallyeverytheoristfromBharataonward,revelsinthevyutpattiormoralinstructionofthetext,thelessonsindharmagainedfromdialogue,wisecharactersinteachingmode,paradigmsofvalor,romance,obe-dience,humility,andcompassion.Thismiddlingaudienceiscertainlyinluck,for\n156A.Moniuspre-colonialSouthAsiandramasandpoeticnarrativesarepositivelyburstingwithethicalinstructionofthissort.Thereisnodutygreaterthantruth(nāstisatyātparodharmo)learnstheattentiveaudienceoftheepicMahābhārata(1971,verse1.69.24),althoughlatertheyalsolearnthatnon-violenceisthegreatestduty(ahiṃsāparamodharmaḥ)(1971,verse1.11.12).TheherooftheepicRāmayaṇa,theprinceofAyodhyā,ispraisedthroughoutastheparadigmaticson,husband,brother,friend,andking.AsceticsinmedievalJainSanskritliteratureinstructthelisteningaudienceinthevalueofself-restraintandmentaldiscipline(Granoff2006);Buddhistjātakas(storiesoftheBuddhaspreviousbirths)praisethebod-hisattvascompassionatesacrificeofhisownbodytofeedahungrytigressandhercubs(Āryaśūra1959,verses1.138).Kathāorstoryliteraturesuchasthewell-knownPañcatantra(perhapsasourceforAesopsfables),throughitsmesmerizingarrayofwiseanimalcharacters,regalesitsaudiencewithlessonsonfriendship,hospitality,andpityagainstabackdropofugly,bumbling,andoftenuncouthhumans(Viṣṇuśarman1997).Thereismuchethicalwisdominpre-colonialSouthAsiannarrativeliterature,inotherwords,hidinginplainsight.Amidstallthebattlesandbedroomscenes,wisecharacterssaywisethings,andthosewisesayingsoftencirculateasindependentversesinSanskritandinallofIndiasspokenlanguages(Sternbach1974;Raoetal.1998).Yetthisisnarrativeethicsforthemiddlingaudiencealone,perhapsinpartfortheunwittinglyinferior;whatofthoseeliteconnoisseurswhoserasaexperienceisthemainfocusofsomuchSouthAsianliterarytheorizing?ThatrasatransformsthosecapableofexperiencingitinhumanlyverysignificantwaysseemsaubiquitoustheoreticalassumptioninSanskrit;kāvya,afterall,yieldsnotonlydharmaorethicsbutalsomokṣa,liberation,thehighestofthefourhumanaims.Howexactlydoesitdoso?ReturningtothatmostundemocraticassumptioninSouthAsianliterarytheoriz-ing,literarynarrativecandoitsmostimportantworkonlyonthosereaders,listen-ers,orspectatorswhohavecultivatedcertaincapacitiesandqualitieswithinthemselves,qualitiesandcapacitiesthat,whenlistedeveninpart,havethatdistinctlookoftheethical.Asmentionedabove,Bharatarequiresanimpressivelistofqualificationstoserveasanidealspectatororprekṣaka,including:goodcharacter,virtue,impartiality,honesty,soundjudgment,andempathy(1980,verses27.5055).Abhinavaguptainthetenthcenturyelaboratesonthequalityofempathyindefiningtheidealreaderasapersonwithheart(sahṛdaya)whocanidentifywiththesubjectmatterandwhorespond[s]toitsympatheticallyin[his]ownheart(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,3940).HegoesontosaythatthetraditionalsourcesofBrahminicethicsthoseworksofśruti[scripture]andsmṛti[tradition]whichconsistincommands,likethoseofamaster,todothisorthatonlygosofar;princesmaybegivengenuineinstructioninthepuruṣārtha(humanaims)onlythroughtherelishingofrasaintheirhearts(368369).HowoneachievestheaudiencequalitiesrequiredbyBharata,Abhinavagupta,andothertheoristsis,ofcourse,neverstatedexplicitlyinthegenreofliterarytheoryitself.YetitrequiresnogreatstretchoftheimaginationorhistoricalleapoffaithtoimaginewhatBharataorAbhinavaguptahaveinmind.AsAbhinavaguptasbrief\n10AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths:ThePower157allusiontośruti(scripture)andsmṛti(tradition)suggests,Hindu(aswellasBuddhistandJain)ethicallifewas(andis)highlyregulatedbycomplexpracticesofritual,devotion,initiation,socialinteraction,diet,hygiene,andthelike.Inotherwords,literarytheorists,whendescribingthepromisepoeticrelishingholdsforthecon-noisseur,assumeamatureaudiencewhohaveledlivesinaccordancewiththetech-nicaltreatisesonBrahminicaldharma,thecomplexcodesofconductforbothJainlaityandascetics,ortheBuddhistmonasticrulesandpracticesofmeditation,wor-ship,andsoforth.Poeticnarrative,throughthecultivationofrasaexperience,inotherwords,doesitstransformativeworkonanethicalbody,heart,andmindalreadyhighlydisciplinedinmultipleways.Theethicsoflawandcodenecessarilyprecedetheethicsofnarrativepoetry.Whilealltheoristsinthistraditionassigntheoriginsofgreatpoetrytosomemixtureofimagination(pratibhā),knowledge,andpractice(abhyāsa)onthepartofthepoet(see,forexample,Rājaśekhara1934,49,foralistoftheeightmothersofpoeticcomposition),neithertheproductionnortheconsumptionofpoeticnarrativeishereenvisionedasawildlycreative,unfet-teredactoftherebel.Thedisciplinedcreativityassumedthroughoutimpliesagreatdealofpriorattentiontotheformationofthemoralselfthroughcommunity-specificmentalandphysicaldisciplinarypractices.Thetenth-centuryKashmiriŚaivatheorist,Abhinavagupta,revealsinhiscommentariesonBharatasNāṭyaśāstraandĀnandavardhanasDhvanyālokathepowerfultiebetweentheaestheticrelishingofpoeticnarrativeandmoraldevelop-ment,culminatingintheultimatehumangoalofliberationfromthecycleofrebirthsandredeaths.RecallthatAbhinavaguptadefinesthereaderorspectatorwiththerequisitequalificationstoexperiencerasaassahṛdaya,thepersonwithheartwhocanidentifywiththesubjectmatterandwhorespond[s]toitsympatheticallyin[his]ownheart(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,3940).Rasaexperi-encebeginswithasympatheticunderstandingofthesituationonthepageorstage;theconnoisseur'sownlife-experiencesandmemoriesallowforalevelofidentifica-tionwiththehumanscenebeforehim,anempathywhoseparticularperson-andsituation-specificcauses(memoriesofanalogoussituations,etc.)areeventuallyshedintherasa-savoringofthepoemorscene(162163).Withhisresponserootedinhisownexperienceofeverydaylife(rememberthatDaṇḍinhadstipulatedsev-eralcenturiesbeforethatgreatpoeticnarrativeormahākāvyamustberecognizablyrealistic),theconnoisseureventuallyexperiencesasthecumulativeresultofvari-ousstimulants,responses,lastingmoods,andthelikesomethingthattranscendsthathumanparticularity.Therelishingofrasa,Abhinavaguptainsists,isanother-worldlyortranscendental(alaukika)delight(162);rasaisaformofknowledgeenabledonlybytheremovalofignorance,oftheobscurationoftheblindnessthatisthecloudofdelusion(ghanamohāndhyasaṅkaṭa)(200).Ignoranceofwhat,exactly?SpacedoesnotpermitafulltreatmenthereofAbhinavaguptasparticularbrandoftantricŚaivismpeculiartomedievalKashmir;sufficetosayforthepresentpurposesthatAbhinavaguptaoperateswithinaworldviewinwhichthesoulorSelfwithacapitalS(ātman)remainsdistinctfromultimatereality(brahman,theisti-callyidentifiedbyAbhinavaguptawithŚiva)ineverydaylifeonlybecauseofourowninadequateunderstanding,ourimpositionofdistinctionbetweensubjectand\n158A.Moniusobjectthatultimatelydissolveswiththecultivationofgenuineinsightorrecognition(pratyabhijñā)(seeGerow1994).Rasaexperiencegeneratedbypoeticnarrative,Abhinavaguptasuggeststhroughouthisliterarytheory,isacrucialstepattimesinhisproseitseemsthemostcrucialstepinthecultivationofsuchinsight.Indeed,hesuggeststhattherelishing(āsvāda)ofthehighestreality(parabrahma)resemblestherelishingofrasa(rasāsvāda)(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,200).Intherelishingofgreatliterature,accordingtothisKashmiriŚaivaliterarytradi-tion,theconnoisseurloseshimselfcompletelyinimaginativedelight,adelightthatisquitesignificantlysaidtobedevoidofanythoughtofIorYou(MassonandPatwardhan1970,69).Thisexperienceofthedissolutionofordinarysubject-objectdistinction,Abhinavaguptacontinues,isbothdifferentfromandsuperiortoordinaryperception(inwhichonehopestoattaintheobjectofdesire)andyogicorasceticperception,whichhetermsdreary(paruṣa)(69)foritslackofinterestordelightintheworlditself.Poeticnarrative,inotherwords,generatesanexperiencealbeitatransientoneintothetruenatureofSelfandReality,anexperienceofdelightunsulliedbydesire,aflashofgenuineinsightthatdoesnotnegatethebeautyandjoyoftheworld.Yetnotallrasaexperiencesarecreatedequal,however,andforAbhinavaguptatherasaofśānta,thepeacefulorthequiescent,isbyfarthemostimportant,foritalonegeneratesthekindofinsightintoātmanorSelfandultimaterealitydis-cussedabove.Śāntarasaleadstomokṣaorliberation,themostimportantofthefourhumanaims(puruṣārtha)(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,434);elsewherehewritesthatthecapacitytoexperienceśāntarasaactuallyarisesfromthedesireformokṣa(MassonandPatwardhan1970,139).Arguingthatalltheothereightrasasareactuallysubsumedunderśānta(129),Abhinavaguptafurthercon-tendsthatknowledgeofthetrueSelforātmanistheactualsthāyibhāvaorlastingmoodthatallowsfortheaestheticrelishingofśānta(130131).TothisknowledgeofātmanintimatelyconnectedwiththepoeticexperienceofśāntarasaAbhinavaguptaassignsenormousmoralweight.TherelevantpassagefromhisNāṭyaśāstracommentaryishereworthquotinginfull:ForthemanwhohasdoneallthatmustbedonewithregardtohisSelf,(i.e.,whohasrealisedthetruenatureofhisSelf),hiseffortsareallforpromotingthegoodofotherpeople,andsohisenergytakestheformofaneffortthatispromptedbythewishtohelpothers.Thisisasynonymforcompassion,anditisveryintimatelyconnectedwithśānta(MassonandPatwardhan1970,133).Finelywroughtpoeticnarrative,evocativeoftherasaofthepeaceful,inotherwords,returnsitslearnedaudiencetotheworldwithahighlydevelopedsenseofempathynotthesympathywithspecificcharactersandsituationsthatallreadersorspectatorsshare,butanempathyrenderedmoreabstract,moreuniversal,moregeneralinconceptionandapplication.Abhinavaguptaspreferenceforśāntarasaandthemoralweightheassignsitsexperienceinhumanlifeis,asabove,inextricablytiedtohisownparticularŚaivaworldview,oneinwhichtheworlditself(asanemanationofsortsfromthedivine)\n10AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths:ThePower159ishighlyregarded,andknowledgeofSelfyieldseventualliberationofthesoultodwellforeveratthelordsfeet.NotallliterarytheoristswillagreewithAbhinavagupta;inthecenturiestocome,otherswilldebatethenumberofrasas,thenatureofdhvaniorsuggestion,thevalueofśānta,andavarietyofothertopics.Intheeleventhcentury,Bhoja,forexampleworkingwithinawhollydifferentphilosophicalframeworkwillcometotheoppositeconclusionaboutthenatureofrasaexperiencevis-à-visSelf-knowledge.RasaexperienceforBhojareinforcesratherthannegatestheassertionofanIandthedistinctionofsubject(self)andobject(ofdesire)(Warder2009,47;seealsoPollock1998).Yettheassumptionthataestheticrelishingorrasayieldssomesortofmoraltransformationintheconnoisseurremainsremarkablyconsistent(albeitfordifferentreasonsaccordingtoeachtheorist).Yetmuchcontemporaryscholarshiponpre-colonialSouthAsiannarrativeparticularlyonquestionsofethicsormoralformationrestsalmostentirelyonwhatBharatamightidentifyasmiddling-levelreadership,cullingthedharmicles-sonsfromtheMahābhārataandRāmāyaṇa,fromso-calledJaindidacticstoryliteratureandBuddhistjātakas,andlargelyleavingunexaminedthepossiblemoralimplicationsfortheaestheticrelishingofsuchtexts.Whatmightattentiontothetheoreticaltraditionsconnectionofaestheticexperiencetomoralformation/trans-formationaddtoourunderstandingofnarrativeethicsinpre-colonialSouthAsia?SpaceallowsonlyabriefexampleortwoofnarrativepoetrydrawnfromtheauthorscurrentresearchprojectonmedievalJainliteratureinbothSanskritandTamil,focusedinpartontheubiquitoususeofhumorinpoeticnarrativesandplaysattributedtoJainmonks.WhileJainismistodayoftenportrayedasatraditionsteepedinvaluesofasceticismanddisciplinaryrestraint(Jaini1979),itsnarrativetraditionsprimarilyaimedatinculcatinglessonsonkarmaandvirtue(Granoff2006),Jainkāvyaandnāṭaka(courtlypoetryanddramas,respectively)evokethefullrangeofemotionalaffecttheorizedfromBharataonward,oftendwellingonscenesthatmight,atfirstglance,seemsomewhatcontrarytoJainmonasticdisci-plinarypraxis.Inparticular,theillustrativeexamplesbelowaredrawnfromtheSanskritdramaticwork,thePrabuddharauhiṇeya(literallyRauhiṇeyaAwakened),attributedtothetwelfth-centuryJainmonk,Rāmabhadra,aboutwhomlittleisknown.AmongthemanyJaintheatricalworksinSanskritthatheavilyemphasizethecomic(hāsya)(Warder1999,2004,155279),fewinanylanguageareasfullofhumorasRāmabhadrasPrabuddharauhiṇeya.WhileKṛṣṇanamesRauhiṇeyaagreatprinceofthePāṇḍavalineageinthesecondbookoftheepicMahābhārata(1971,verse2.13.56),RāmabhadraclearlydrawshisstoryfromapopularnarrativeofRauhiṇeyaasalifelongthiefborntoafamilyofthieveswhoeventuallyrenouncesthefamilialoccupationtobecomeapiousJainmonkafterheinadver-tentlyhearsasentenceoftheJinasteachings.Hemacandra,thegreattwelfth-centuryscholar-monkattachedtothecourtoftheŚaivakingKumārapāla,forexample,narratesthelifeofRauhiṇeyain110versesinhisTriṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra,alengthyrenditionofJainuniversalhistorythroughthelivesof63greatbeings(Hemacandra19041908,verses10.11.1110;Johnson1924).Thefifteenth-century\n160A.MoniusRauhiṇeyacaritramattributedtoDevamūrti(Devamūrti1916;Johnson1920)elabo-ratesthemorebasicstorytoldbyHemacandra,whilethefifteenth-centuryParyuṣaṇāṣṭāhnikavyākhyānasummarizesHemacandrasversionbriefly,asdoestheUpadeśaprāsāda(Moore1924,2).ThetoneandevocativerenderingofRāmabhadrasPrabuddharauhiṇeyacouldnotbemoredifferent.WhileallJainversionsoftheRauhiṇeyastorysharethesameelementsofplottheyoungthief,sternlywarnedbyhisfathernottolistentotheJinaMahāvīra,inadvertentlyoverhearsabitofJaindharmaand,afteraseriesofadventures(includingimprisonmentbytheking),becomesaJainmonkRāmabhadrainfusesthebasicstorylinewithhumorandsarcasmateachturn.TheplaywrightsRauhiṇeya,forexample,notonlystealsmaterialgoods,butalsomakesquiteacareerforhimselfasacleverlyplayfulabductorofwomenandchildren,beginninginActOnewiththekidnappingofayounggirlnamedMadanavatīduringaspringtimefestival(Rāmabhadra1917,816).Inthesecondact,Rāmabhadrareworksastorygivenamuchmoresombercastinthefifteenth-centuryRauhiṇeyacaritramandignoredinotherversionsofthenarrative:Rauhiṇeyasabductionofayoungbridegroomfromhisownweddingparty.InDevamūrtisfifteenth-centurytelling,theunrepententthiefdisguiseshimselfasahorseandcar-riesofftheunsuspectinggroom,strippinghimofclothesandornaments;thesceneendswiththekingschiefhouseholdministeradmonishingthekingtocatchthecriminal(Devamūrti1916,verses208224;Moore1920,180181).InRāmabhadrasplay,bycontrast,RauhiṇeyaentersRājagṛhainthedisguiseofayoungBrahminboy(baṭu)inordertosurveythemansionsofthecityswealthymerchantsaspos-sibletargets;anassistanttothemerchantleaderSubhadradescribeshimaswon-derousinbody(rūpamadbhutam)(Rāmabhadra1917,23),withacrookedcrocodilemouth,atriangularhead,andfelineeyes.Rauhiṇeyasfriend,Śabara,quitehilariouslydistractstheweddingparty(whileRauhiṇeyareadieshisabductionplan)bydancingoutlandishly,slapping(literallysounding)hiships(kaṭītaṭaṃvādayannṛtyati)(23)andhumiliatingthemaidVāmanikābyclaimingtobedancingjustlikeher(26).Allofthisamountstoaruse,ofcourse,asRauhiṇeyadisguiseshimselfasthebridegroomsmother,thebridegroomhimselfbeingnoneotherthanthemerchantSubhadrassurprisinglyyoungson(Warder2004,239,suggeststhatheseemsasyoungasfive,andrightlynotesthatsuchachildmarriageseemstobeunprecedentedinIndianliterature).ThechildwailswhenherealizesthatRauhiṇeya-in-disguiseisnothistruemother.Thethiefthentossesastainedpieceofcloththattheweddingpartymistakenlytakestobeaserpent;astheassembledcrowdrushesaboutcryingSnake!Snake!(sarpaḥsarpaḥ)inconfusionandfear,Rauhiṇeyafleeswiththechild.Śabara,inturn,havingfinallymanagedtopickupthereluctantVāmanikā,throwsherdownandrunsafterhiscompanion(Rāmabhadra1917,30).ManyelementsofRāmabhadrasplayarecomedic,particularlyincomparisontothefarmoresoberrenderingofDevamūrti.FromRauhiṇeyasoddappearanceasaBrahminboyjealouslyeyeingthepersonalwealthofRājagṛhasmerchantswithcat-likeeyesandcrocodile-likefangstohisside-kicksexaggerated,heavilysexualizeddancinginthestyleofwomen,theplaywrighttransformsastraightforwardnarrativeof\n10AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths:ThePower161thief-redeemed-as-monkintoacomedyofcostumeandslapstick.Likewise,theimageofthechild-groomrunningintothearmsofhismotherafterhisownweddingamotherwhoturnsouttobethehero-thiefindisguisesuggestshumoronmultiplelevels,fromthestartlingyouthofthegroomhimself,tohisattachmenttohismotherandhissurpriseatrecognizingRauhiṇeya.ThatRauhiṇeyamakesacleanget-awaybytoss-ingafakeserpentattheassembledcrowdfollowedbyŚabarathrowingdowntheyoungwomanhehadjustbeendiligentlytryingtoseduceonlyenhancesthecomedicethosofthescene.Alsorifewithhumoraretheconcludingscenesinthesixthandfinalact,whereinRauhiṇeyarenounceshislifeofthievingandtakesrefugewiththeJina.Thebasicoutlineofthestoryremainsconsistentacrossthemanypre-colonialJaintellings.Rauhiṇeya,whohasbeencapturedbyPrinceAbhayabutwhohasnotyetconfessedtohistheft,isbrought(inadruggedstateofintoxication)toafalseheavencon-structedbytheprince,wherevariousactors(employedbytheprince)attempttotrickthethiefintoconfessinghiscrimes.SuddenlyrememberingthewordsoftheJinaMahavīrathathehadearlieroverheard(describingthenatureoftheheavenlygods),RauhiṇeyarealizesthatAbhayaisattemptingtotrickhim,astheactorsandactressesbegintoperspireandtheirflowergarlandswilt;thethieflaunchesintoalongdescriptionofhisvirtuousdeedsonearthasaJainlayman.Thisbeginshisfinaltransformationfromthieverytomonkhood,asheiseventuallyreleased(Hemacandra1908,verses10.11.53100;Rāmabhadra1917,7896;Devamūrti1916,verses304349).RāmabhadrasdramatictellingofPrinceAbhayasfutilestagingofaheavenlyparadisetoforgeaconfessionisfilledwithexaggeratedpompandluxury,continu-ingtheover-the-topexcessesofthepreviousActFive,inwhichRauhiṇeyaisuncer-emoniouslydressedforexecutionandmountedonadonkeywhentheprinceandhisfathersuddenlyintervene.Forfullyninepages,theplaywrightdwellsonthethiefsintoxicationandluxuriousgarments,whilecelestialwomen(gandharvakā),queens,attendants,dancers,andmusiciansallunderthewatchfuldirectionofadramainstructorplythebefuddledthiefwithlove-songsanddances,whiletheheavenlygate-keeper(pratīhāra)lookson(7886).Onlymid-actdoesRauhiṇeyafullyawakentorealizethathehasnobusinessinheaven,beingutterlywithoutmerit(niṣpuṇya);noticingthattheso-calleddeitiesaresweatingandwalkingontheground(contrarytotheJinasdescriptionofthegodsthatRauhiṇeyainadvertentlyoverheardinActFour),hequicklylaunchesintoalonglistofhismeritoriousactsasapiousJainlaymanincludingservingJainteachers,givingalms,buildingtem-ples,andthelikeandstaunchlydeclaresthathehasneverdoneanythingbadorevil(duścaritrammayākvāpikadācitapinokṛtam)(87).AllofthisabjectlyingearnsRauhiṇeyaanaudiencewithKingŚreṇika;beforetheking,herevealshistrueidentityandconfessesallhiscrimes(90).Inabreathtakinglyrapidseriesofscenes,thenowsuddenlyrepentantthiefpromisestorestoreallhehasplunderedandleadseveryonetoatemplededicatedtothegoddessCaṇḍikā;behindasecretdoorlietheabductedgirl,thechild-bridegroom,andallthestolenwealth.Rauhiṇeyathenpro-ceedstotakerefugewiththeJina(9096).Alonganddrawnoutyetfutileattemptatprincelyartificeandastunningstringofliesonthepartofthehero,inotherwords,suddenlyfast-trackRauhiṇeyatoJainmonkhood.\n162A.MoniusWhywouldRāmabhadrainfusetheotherwisesomberJainstoryofathief-turned-monkwithsuchabsurdity,withsuchhumorandsarcasm?Asabove,scholarlyanalysisofmuchJainnarrativetodatehaslargelyfocusedonitsdidacticqualitiesorlessons.YetRāmabhadrasPrabuddharauhiṇeyaisanelaboratelycrafteddramatictextthat,onecouldargue(followingBharataabove),hasmoreaestheticallytransformativeaimsinmindthansimplytoentertainorteach.Ontheonehand,onemightinterprettheJaindramaticpropensityforthecomicassimplyashowofpoetictalentinacourtlyworldwhereentertainingthekingandhisretinuegeneratedroyalpatronage.AgainfollowingBharata,thereisagoodstoryherefortheinferioraudiencefullofintrigue,theft,andviolenceaswellasplentyofmoralinstructioninaJainmodeforthemoremiddlingamongthecrowd.InthecaseofRāmabhadrasdramaticrenderingoftheRauhiṇeyastory,withitssophisticatedpoeticartistry,thereareatleasttwodistinctclaimsbeingmadethroughtheveryformofthenarrativeitself:(1)thatJains,too,canclaimownershipoftheaesthetictraditionsofBharata,Daṇḍin,andothers;and(2)thatJainpoeticnarrative,turningupsidedownhere,asitsooftendoes,typicalBrahminiccourtlyfascinationswithmarriage,righteouskings,andheroes,resultsinsomethingmoreimportantthanaheroandheroineineternallylovingembrace,namely:therenunciationandlibera-tionoftheherofromworldlylife,hisescapefromtheeternalmiseriesofembodiedrebirthandredeath,inthefinalscenesevocativeofnoneotherthanśāntarasathepeacefulorquiescentwhereallJainnarrativetextseventuallyend.Itisherewiththeaestheticworkofatextonitsaudience,withwhichSanskrittheoriesofrasaareconcernedthatonecanperhapsbegintoimaginewhyJainpoeticnarrativeliteratureinSanskritisoftensocomical,andwhythesarcasticrompthroughthedangersofchildbridegrooms,inadvertentrun-inswithgreatteachers,thefutilityofprincelyartifice,andthemiseriesofhumanlifewouldbecomposedspecificallybyJainmonks.Ifthecompositionandconsumptionofnarra-tivepoetryinthecomicmodeleadingtośāntarasacanbetakenasimportantdisci-plinesofasceticpracticeamongpremodernJainmonasticcommunitiesandthesheervolumeofnarrativeliteraryoutputofJainmonksinSanskrit,Prakrit,andavarietyofSouthAsianlanguagesmakesitclearthattheywerethenwhyistheevocationofthecomicsoprominent?Theproperrelationshipamongtherasas,theirproperorderingandthewaysinwhichtheycaninteractinasinglework,isasubjectmuchdebatedinclassicalSanskritliterarytheory.ThecomicislistedsecondamongtherasasintheNāṭyaśāstraaftertheerotic,śāntaaddedtoBharataslistofeightperhapsfirstbythesecond-centuryJaintheorist,Āryarakṣita,inhisAṇuogaddāraSutta(Āryarakṣita1970,90;Warder1999,343).Theorderingoftherasaelementsofapoetictext,andtheirpropermixingorinteraction,wouldseemtobesomewhatfluid,opentointer-pretationandrearrangementeitherdirectlyintheoryorinpoeticpractice,basedonparticularsectarianconcernsabouttheproperworkofpoetry(asabove,Abhinavagupta,forexample,favorsśāntaasthemostimportant).WhileJainauthorsclearlyfavorsomethingakintośāntaintheunder-cuttingoflove(theerotic)andwar(theheroic)andintheinevitablerenunciationofthehero,thecomicwouldseemtoholdaprominentplaceintherasahierarchyofvalue.CertainBrahminic\n10AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths:ThePower163theoristswritinginSanskritcontendthatdisenchantment(vairāgyaornirveda)withtheworldisthenecessarypre-condition,thebasicemotion(sthāyībhāva)forgeneratingśāntarasa(ĀnandavardhanaandAbhinavagupta1965,397);forJainmonasticauthors,thecomic,wouldseemtoplayacriticalpartingeneratingtheproperlyasceticdetachmentfromtheworldthatinturncultivatesdisenchantmentandtheurgetorenounce.Indeed,thelistingoftheninerasasintheAṇuogaddāraSuttacitedabovemightbereadintermsofageneralengagementwiththesensoryworld(withtheheroic,theerotic,thewondrous,andthefuriousasthefirstfourrasas),followedbyageneraldisengagementfromthatsamesensoryworldthroughtheshameful,thedisgusting,thecomic,thepiteous,andeventuallythetranquil(Āryarakṣita1970,90).InRāmabhadrasfinelycrafteddramaofRauhiṇeyathethief,theevocativemovementofthetextleadsfrompaternaladmonitionnevertolistentoaJinatohilariousscenesofchildabduction,thievery,inadvertentover-hearingofmerelyasnippetoftheJinasteachings,evasionfrompolice,capture,preparationforexecution,aprincelystagingoflifeinheaventoextractaconfes-sion,amouthfuloflies,andfinallyrenunciation.Thehero-thieflikeaking,withhisownside-kickjester(Śabara)encountersonenon-sensicalsceneafteranother,takingonvariousdisguises,kidnappingandstealing,evadingpolicecapture,andoutwittingtheprincesfakeheaven,leadingtheaudiencethrough,attheveryleast,theshameful,thecomic,andthetranquil.Laughter,sarcasm,andhumorassumeaninstrumentalvaluehereinaparticularlyJainpoetictelosofśāntarasa.Cleverlyanti-heroicpoetryinacomicmodeframesasetofpoeticpractices(ofbothcompo-sitionandreception)thatmight,indeed,havebeenperceivedasaestheticelementsofanasceticdiscipline.YetfewmodelsexisttounderstandthecompositionorperformanceofatextsuchasthePrabuddharauhiṇeyainthecontextofmonasticdiscipline,Jainoroth-erwise.Notonlydoesattentiontotheartofnarrativeinpre-colonialSouthAsiaopenaninterpretivewindowontopracticesofmoraldevelopment,butitalsodemandsafullerincorporationoftheliteraryartsintocontemporaryscholarlyunderstandingofreligiousdiscipline.Onestilltendstothinkofreligiousvirtuo-sosmonks,Brahmins,asceticsengaginginworship,meditation,philosophicaldebate,andthewritingofcommentaries;evidenceconcerningtheauthorshipandaudienceofpoeticnarratives,however,demandsmoresophisticatedunderstandingofthecriticalrolethatthereading,performance,andwritingofliterarytextsplayintechnologiesofself-cultivation.Doesthepre-colonialSouthAsiancase,inturn,productivelysuggestanythingforcurrentdiscussionsofnarrativeethicsintheEuro-Americancontext?Spaceonlypermitsthebriefestofgestureshere.First,asinthestudyofpremodernSouthAsianreligiouslife,theroleofaestheticexperiencethereadingandwritingofpoetry,forexamplecontinuestoremainsomewhatoutsidethefoldofreligiousstudiesproper;thestudyoftheliteraryartsandthepracticesassociatedwiththemhasyettobefullyintegratedintoscholarlyvisionofthereligiouslifealongsideritual,worship,scripturalstudy,prayer,meditation,andthelike.Second,currentapproachestotherelationshipofnarrativetoethics/moralformationpayrelativelylittleattentiontotheaestheticdimensionsofnarrativetextwhencomparedtothe\n164A.MoniusSouthAsiantheoreticalmaterialsconsideredabove.SouthAsianliterarytheorylingersatlengthoverthequalitiesofpoeticnarrativefromplotstructureandcharactertoverbtenseandgrammaticalendingthatgeneratespecifictypesofexperienceinthelearnedaudience;thiskindofattentiveformalanalysismightservetoexpandongoingdiscussionsaboutthewaysinwhichnarrativeshapesitsreaders.Third,asmuchcriticismofthereader-responseapproachtoliteraturehaspointedout,thosereadersarenotallcreatedequal.WhileincontemporaryEuro-Americancontextsonetendstothinkofdifferencesamongreadersalonggender,racial,economicclass,andeducationallines,SouthAsianliterarytraditioninvitestheoreticalattentiontoreaderlydifferencesalongethicallines,intermsofmoraldevelopmentorawarenessinthefullcontextofanindividualhumanlifethatincludesallmannerofpracticeandexperience.ReferencesĀnandavardhana,Abhinavagupta(1965)TheDhvanyālokaofŚrīĀnandavardhanāchāryawiththeLochanaSanskritcommentaryofŚrīAbhinavagupta.In:JagannāthPāthak(ed)VidhabhawanSanskritgranthamala,97.ChowkhambaVidyabhawan,VaranasiĀnandavardhana,Abhinavagupta(1990)TheDhvanyālokaofĀnandavardhanawiththeLocanaofAbhinavagupta.TranslatedbyDanielH.H.Ingalls,JeffreyMoussaieffMasson,M.V.Patwardhan.Harvardorientalseries,49.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAĀryarakṣita(1970)Aṇuogaddārāiṃ.TranslatedbyTaikenHanaki.PrakritJainInstituteResearchpublicationseries,5.ResearchInstituteofPrakrit,JainologyandAhimsa,MuzaffarpurĀryaśūra(1959)Jātakamālā.In:VaidyaPL(ed).MithilaInstituteofPost-GraduateStudiesandResearchinSanskritLearning,DarbhangaBhāmaha(2008)BhāmahasKāvyālaṅkāra:acriticalstudyandedition.In:SubhraCR(ed)CalicutUniversitySanskritseries,29.UniversityofCalicut,CalicutBharata(1980)NāṭyaśāstraofBharata.In:BaṭukaNāthaSharmā,BaladevaUpādhyāya(eds)KashiSanskritseries,60.ChaukhambhaSanskritSansthan,VaranasiDaṇḍin(1957)KāvyalakṣaṇamRatnaśrījñānakṛtayāRatnaśriyāṬīkayāSamalaṅkṛtam.In:AnantalalThakur,UpendraJha(eds).MithilaInstituteofPost-GraduateStudiesandResearchinSanskritLearning,DarbhangaDevamūrti(1916)Rauhiṇeyacaritram.ĀtmānandaSabhā,BhavnagarGerowE(1994)Abhinavaguptasaestheticsasaspeculativeparadigm.JAmOrientSoc114(2):186208GranoffP(2006)Theforestofthievesandthemagicgarden:ananthologyofmedievalJainstories.Penguin,NewYorkGuṇabhadra(1968)Uttarapurāṇa.In:PannālālJain(ed)JñānapīṭhaMūrtidevīJainaGranthamālā,14.BhāratīyaJñānapīṭh,VārāṇasīHemacandra(19041908)Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra,6vols.JainadharmaPrasārakaSabhā,BhavnagarHudsonET(2013)Disorientingdharma:ethicsandtheaestheticsofsufferingintheMahābhārata.OxfordUniversityPress,NewYorkHultzschE(1922)ThestoryofJīvandhara,TranslatedfromtheUttarapurāṇa.QJMythicSoc124:317348IḷaṅkōAṭikaḷ(1978)CilappatikārammūlamumArumpatauraiyumAṭiyārkkunallāruraiyum.In:U.Vē.Cāminātaiyar(ed).Ceṉṉai:ṬākṭarU.Vē.CāminātaiyarNūlnilaiyamJagannātha(1903)Rasagaṅgādhara.In:GaṅgādharaŚāstri(ed).Braj.B.Das,Benares\n10AndWeShallComposeaPoemtoEstablishTheseTruths:ThePower165JainiPS(1979)TheJainapathofpurification.UniversityofCaliforniaPress,BerkeleyJohnsonHM(1920)Rāuhiṇeyasadventures:theRāuhiṇeya-Caritra.In:StudiesinhonorofMauriceBloomfield.YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,pp159195JohnsonHM(1924)ThestoryofthethiefRāuhiṇeyaintheMahāvīracaritraofHemacandra.JAmOrientSoc44:110Kuntaka(1977)TheVakrokti-jīvitaofKuntaka.EditedandtranslatedbyK.Krishnamoorthy.KarnatakUniversity,DharwadMahābhārata(1971)Textasconstitutedinitscriticaledition,volume1:Ādi-Sabhā-,Āraṇyaka-,andVirāṭa-Parvans.BhandarkarOrientalResearchInstitute,PoonaMassonJL,PatwardhanMV(1969)ŚāntarasaandAbhinavaguptasphilosophyofaesthetics,vol9,Bhandarkarorientalseries.BhandarkarOrientalResearchInstitute,PoonaMassonJL,PatwardhanMV(1970)Aestheticrapture,partII:theRasādhyāyaoftheNāṭyaśāstrawithtranslatedexcerptsfromtheAbhinavabhāratī.DeccanCollegePostgraduateandResearchInstitute,PoonaMcCreaLJ(2008)TheteleologyofpoeticsinmedievalKashmir,vol71,Harvardorientalseries.HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,MAPollockS(1998)Bhoja'sŚṛṅgāraprakāśaandtheproblemofRasa:ahistoricalintroductionandtranslation.AsiatischeStudien/Étudesasiatiques70(1):117192PollockS(2001)ThesocialaestheticandSanskritliterarytheory.JIndianPhilos29:197229Rājaśekhara(1934)Kāvyamīmāṁsā.In:DalalCD,SastryRA(eds).OrientalInstitute,BarodaRāmabhadra(1917)Prabuddharauhiṇeyam.In:Puṇyavijaya(ed).Śrījaina-Ātmānandasabhā,BhāvanagaraRaoN,Velcheru,ShulmanD(1998)Apoemattherightmoment:rememberedversesfrompre-modernsouthIndia.UniversityofCalifornia,BerkeleyShakespeareW(1974)TheriversideShakespeare.In:BlakemoreEvansG.HoughtonMifflin,BostonSternbachL(1974)Mahāsubhāṣitasaṃgraha:beinganextensivecollectionofwisesayingsinSanskrit.VishveshvaranandVedicResearchInstitute,HoshiarpurViṣṇuśarman(1997)Pañcatantra:thebookofIndiasfolkwisdom.TranslatedbyPatrickOlivelle.OxfordUniversityPress,NewYorkWarderAK(1999)Jainaesthetics.In:WagleNK,QvarnströmO(eds)ApproachestoJainastudies:philosophy,logic,ritualandsymbols,vol11,SouthAsianstudiespapers.UniversityofToronto,CentreforSouthAsianStudies,Toronto,pp342347WarderAK(2004)IndianKāvyaliterature,volumeseven,partone:thewheeloftime.MotilalBanarsidass,DelhiWarderAK(2009)Indian,Kāvyaliterature,volumeone:literarycriticism.MotilalBanarsidass,Delhi\nPartIIPhilosophy,NarrativeandLifeWriting:PhilosophicalBiographyandBiographicalPhilosophy\nChapter11Descartes’BiographyasaGuidetoHisMeditationsDesmondM.ClarkeItseemsobvioustoreflectivereaderstodaythatitwouldbeafundamentalmistaketoextractsentencesfromtranslatedversionsoftextsthatwerewrittencenturiesago,andtoattributetotheoriginalauthortheapparentmeaningsthatsuchdecontextual-izedandtranslatedexcerptshaveinthereader’svernacular.Thehistoryofbiblicalinterpretationprovidedsomeofthemostvividexamplesofsuchalackofherme-neuticsophistication.WhentheCouncilofTrent(1545–1563)consideredthewordsthatthreeofthegospelsattributedtoJesusChristatthelastsupper:‘Thisismybody,thisismyblood’,itunderstoodthemliterallyandthenusedascholastictheoryofsubstancestoexplainhowwhatlookslikebreadandwinecouldbe,infact,somethingentirelydifferent.Bydoingso,theCouncilfailedtoacknowledgethehistoryofspiritualormetaphoricalinterpretationsoftheBiblethathadbeencurrentsinceatleastthefourthcentury;itendorsedatheoryofsubstancesthatwasabouttobeabandonedbyphilosophers;anditcamouflageditsmanymistakesbyacknowl-edgingthatitwasteachingamysterythat,byitsownadmission,humanmindscouldhardlyexpressinwords(Tanner1990:II,693–4).ThewritingsofphilosophersofthepastarelesslikelytogeneratethekindofheatedcontroversiesthatfollowedTrent’sinterpretationsofthisbiblicaltext.Themostobviousreasonisthatreligioustraditionsattributeadoctrinalauthoritytothemeaningofwordsorsentences,sothatmisinterpretationunderminestheonlybasisavailableforbelievingwhatisotherwisedescribedasmysteriousor,asLockeargued,unintelligible.Philosopherstodaydonotreadthewordsoftheirancientpredecessorstolearnwhattobelieve;theyconsultthemtoextractrationallydefen-sibletheoriesorproposalswhich,onceidentified,muststandorfallwhenevaluatedbycurrentepistemiccriteria.D.M.Clarke(*)Emeritus,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityCollege,RoyalIrishAcademy,4CowperHall,MountSt.Anne’s,Milltown,Dublin6,Irelande-mail:clarkedesmond@gmail.com©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015169A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_11\n170D.M.ClarkeForthatreason,itmightseemirrelevant,unnecessary,ordisproportionatelyscrupuloustodisputeaboutinterpretationsofoldphilosophicaltextsthatallegedlymisrepresenttheideasorthoughtsoftheiroriginalauthors.Onecouldevenavoidallcontroversyaboutinterpretingtextsbydistinguishing,assomedotoday,betweentheoriginalauthorandsomepossibleauthorwithasimilarname.Forexample,ifanyoneobjectsthatPlatonevermeantwhatsomeoneattributestohim,onecouldavoidthechargeofmisrepresentationbyreplying:‘Idon’tcarewhatPlatomeantand,ifyouinsist,Ishalldiscussadifferentauthorinanotherpossibleworld,namelyPlato1,whocouldhaveheldtheviewsthatIaminterestedindiscussing.’Inthiscase,thediscussantwishestotalkaboutsomephilosophicaltheoryorpositionratherthanaboutwhatthehistoricalPlatomayhavewritten,anditseemslikeaninnocentandusefulshorthandtouseavariationonPlato’snamesimplytoidentifythethesisorpositioninwhichthemoderndiscussantisinterested.OfcoursetheyareriskingmisrepresentationbyusinganeologismsuchasPlato1;however,assum-ingthelegitimacyofanahistoricaldiscussionoranalysisofphilosophicalpositionsthatarenotattributedtoanyspecificauthor,philosopherscouldcoherentlydiscusswhateverissuestheyfindinterestingtodaywithoutengagingatallwithhistoricaltextsorthecontextsinwhichtheywerewritten.SomethinganalogoustothisevasiveresolutionwasassumedbyWilliams(1978)whenheattributedtoDescartesaprojectofpureinquiryanddescribedhisownanalysisasarationalreconstructionofDescartes’writings.Nonetheless,theassumedacademiclegitimacyofahistoricaldiscussionsofphilosophicalissuesdoesnotdetractfromwhatareequallyvalidhistoricalinquiries,inthehistoryofideas,intowhatsomeauthormeantbythewordstheywroteaboutissuesthatstillconcernus.Infact,onemightarguethatthelattershouldbethedefaultpositionforthekindofinquiryonwhichwenormallyembarkinphilosophy,becausetodootherwiseistoassumeatranscendentalperspectiveforourselves—asrationalinquirers—thatisunaffectedbythepsychological,social,historical,orotherfactorsthatapurerationalreconstructionattemptstoavoid.Ourownviewstodayareashistoricallyconditionedasthoseofourpredecessors.Ifourowntheorizing,eveninthesciences,ishistoricallyconditioned(Kitcher1992),thenwehaveabetterchanceofunderstandingotherphilosophers,ancientorcontemporary,bynotignoringthelanguageinwhichtheywriteandthemultiplicityoffactorsthathelpexplainwhytheyholdorheldtheviewsthatweattributetothem.Thesealternativeapproachestoreadingoldertextsareillustratedbythecontin-uedpopularityanddivergentinterpretationsofDescartes’MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy(1641).Ontheonehand,thistextcontinuestobereadinabbreviatedtranslatededitionsbyalmosteveryundergraduatewhostudiesphilosophyintheWest,anditisamongthebestsellersinthephilosophylistofanypublisherwhohappenstohaveagoodtranslationoreditionavailable.ItisusuallyreadasifitpresentedanddefendedsomeversionofsubstancedualismorthetheorycaricaturedbyGilbertRyleas‘thedogmaoftheGhostintheMachine’(1949:17).However,unlessreadersaremotivatedbyadesiretoidentifyexamplesofpoorarguments,itisdifficulttounderstandwhyweshouldinvitestudentstostudysuchafailedprojectassubstancedualism.JohnCottinghamhasdescribedoneofthearguments\n11Descartes’BiographyasaGuidetoHisMeditations171fordualismonwhichDescartesreliedinvariouswritings—inalettertoSilhon(May1637),inPartIVoftheDiscourseonMethod,andintheMeditations—as‘oneofthemostnotoriousnonsequitursinthehistoryofphilosophy’(1992:242).Evenifsuchalapseinlogiccouldbeexcused,thedualismthatisattributedtoDescarteshasbeenrecognizedsincethetimeofhiscorrespondencewithPrincessElizabethofBohemiain1643asmerelylabellingaproblemwithoutprovidingasolution.OnefeelsthattheremustbesomeotherwayofreadingDescartessothathedoesnotappeartohavebeenasillogicalortheoreticallyunsuccessfulasrationalreconstructionsuggestshewas,andthatsuchanalternativeinterpretationshouldbesoughtbyexaminingthehistoricalcontextinwhichhewrote.11.1DescartesandNaturalPhilosophyDuringtheperiod1629–1649,whenDescartescomposedallhispublishedworks,helivedanalmosteremiticallifeintheUnitedProvincesratherthaninFrance,thecountryofhisbirthandeducation.NotonlydidheliveinwhatwasanofficiallyCalviniststate;healsomovedhisresidenceveryfrequentlytoatleast18differentaddressesindifferenttowns,anddiscouragedmostpeoplefromvisitinghimbyconcealinghisaddress.HenriReneri(1593–1639)wasoneexceptiontothisgeneralrule:DescartesfollowedhimtoLeideninMay1630,toDeventerinMay1632andtoUtrechtinApril1635,anddescribedhimas‘myintimatefriend’.TherewereafewotherswithwhomDescarteswaswillingtosharehisresidenceorinformationabouthislocationbut,forthemostpart,helivedalone(apartfromhismanservant)inaforeigncountryandfailedtomasterthevernacularlanguageofitsresidents.ItwouldhavebeenpossibleforDescartestocompensateforhisrelativeseclusion,asMersennedid,byreadingtheworksofhiscontemporariesandcommunicatingwiththembyletter,forthepostalsystemwasslowbuteffective.Onemightimaginehimasworkinginawell-stockedstudy,withshelvesfullofbooks,andengagingwiththeirauthorsbysympatheticandcriticalreading,atleastintheearlyafternoonswhenthedaylightwasadequateforreadingandhehadsummonedtheenergytogetoutofbed.However,Descarteshadalmostnobooksinhisstudyand,ofthosehehad—forexample,booksthatweregivenaspresentsorsenttohimbycorrespon-dentstowhomhewaswillingtorevealhisaddress—herarelyreadanyofthem.Itwasnotunusual,therefore,whenhewroteareplytoGassendi’sDisquisitio(1644)withouthavingreadit;amongtheotherauthorsthatherefusedtoreadwereGibieuf,Campanella,Beaugrand,Galileo,Roberval,Stevin,Hortensius,Herbert,Beaulieu,Jansen,Kircher,Fermat,Hobbes’sessayonthetides,andDigby.HehadagoodexcuseinthecaseofDigbythathecouldnotreadEnglish,buthealsodeclinedanoffertohavesomechapterstranslatedforhisbenefitintoLatin.Ofcourseonemightobjectthat,inthecaseofanyauthor,itwouldbepossibletomakealistofbooksorauthorsthattheyfailedtoread.InthecaseofDescartes,however,thesewereauthorswhomhediscussedinprintortowhomheobjected,andinsomecasesheevenhadtheirbooksinhisstudybutreadonlythetableofcontentsortheindex.\n172D.M.ClarkeHisfirstsignificantbiographer,Baillet,reportedafterhisdeath:‘Onemustacknowledge,however,thathedidnotreadverymuch,thathehadveryfewbooks,andthatmostofthosethatwerefoundbyhisinventoryafterhisdeathwerepresentsfromhisfriends’(1691:II,467).Despitehisintentionallyhiddenlifeandhisreluctancetoreadworkbyotherauthors,Descarteswasinvolvedindisputesallhislife,withalmosteveryonewithwhomhecameintocontact.ThetargetsofhisoftenacrimoniousobjectionsincludedBeeckman,Beaugrand,Roberval,Pascal[bothEtienneandhismorefamousson,Blaise],Morin,Plempius,Voetius,thetheologiansatLeiden,theFrenchJesuits,andevenoneofhisforemostadmirers,HenricusRegius.Insomecases,whenhedisputedtheviewsofothersthatwerereportedfromParisbyMersenne,hedidnotevenknowtheidentityoftheauthoragainstwhomheobjected—asinthecaseofHobbes,towhomhereferredas‘theEnglishman’andwhomhebelievedtohavebeenlivinginEnglandwhenHobbeswasactuallyinParis.Inothercases,hedidnotknowenoughaboutacorrespondenttoappreciatethattheirviewsmightbeworthexaminingindetail,asinthecaseofPierreFermat,whosemathematicalworkwasunknowntoDescartesformostofthetimeduringwhichtheyexchangedreciprocalcriticismsandpersonalinsultsbyusingMersenneasanepistolaryintermediary.Duringthisperiodofapproximately20years,whilemovinghousefrequently,engaginginbittercontroversieswithCalvinisttheologiansinUtrechtandLeiden,andcorrespondingwithnumerousothercriticsofhiswork,Descarteswasdedicatedtoasingleover-archingproject:toreplacethenaturalphilosophyofthescholastictraditionwithaconceptualframeworkthatpresupposedaradicallynewunderstandingofwhatcountsasanexplanationofanyphenomenon(Clarke2006).Thisprojectwasdevelopedinitiallyduringtheyears1629–1633,inabooktentativelyentitledLeMonde,inwhichDescartesaspiredtoprovideexplanationsofawideanddisparaterangeofnaturalphenomena—includingthosethatareassociatedwithphysiologicalprocessesinthehumanbody,andevensome(suchasmemoryorsensation)thatwereusuallyclassifiedasmentalphenomena.Thisbookwasalmostreadyforpublicationin1633,whenDescartesheardaboutthecondemnationofGalileoandhedecidednottopublishforfearofasimilarcensure.AlthoughhesubsequentlyattractedthreatsofofficialcensurefromCalvinisttheologians,hehadtowaitforanother30yearstomeritcondemnationbyRomeofsomeofhisownbooksin1663.HavingabandonedplanstopublishLeMondein1633,Descartesfoundawayofreleasingsamplesofhisnaturalphilosophy,inthreeessaysthathepublishedin1637withJanMaireinLeiden:thedioptrics,themeteorology,andthegeometry.TheseappearedinFrenchinasinglevolume,whichomittedfromthetitlepagethenameofthereluctantauthor,whowasstillafraidofincurringanofficialcensurefromRome.Whilethebookwasbeingprintedandthepublisherawaitedcompletionofthewoodcutsrequiredforillustrations,heinvitedDescartestowriteaprefacetolinktogetherwhatmightotherwisehaveappearedasthreeunrelatedanonymousessays.Descartescompliedbyminingideasfromsomeunpublishedessays,includingtheRulesforGuidingone’sIntelligenceinSearchingfortheTruth,and\n11Descartes’BiographyasaGuidetoHisMeditations173wrotetheDiscourseonthemethodforguidingone’sreasonandsearchingfortruthinthesciences.Sincethepaginationofthebookhadalreadybeensetbytheprinter,frompages1to413,thelateadditionofaprefacehadtobepaginatedseparatelyaspages5to78.Thesubsequenthistoryofhowthisbookwasreadillustrateshowmistakenonecanbeaboutanauthor’sworkorintentions:theprefaceisnowoftenidentifiedastheprincipalbook,andtheoriginalbookisdescribedas‘appendices’tothepreface!Descartescontinuedthisresearchintonaturalphilosophyafter1637bydoingexperimentsandcommunicatingtheirresults(orrequestinginformationaboutthoseofothers)inlengthyletterstoandfromMersenne,andinsimilarcorrespondencewithRegiusandothersaboutphysiology,optics,mathematics,magnetism,andallthedetailedphenomenathatcametohisnotice.ThePrinciplesofPhilosophy(1644)providedanotheropportunitytosynthesizehisscientifictheoriesinacompacttext-bookthatmightrivalthosetraditionallyadoptedinFrance,especiallyincollegesoperatedbyhisformerteachers,theJesuits.PierreBorelmayhaveexaggeratedwhenhedescribedDescartesinAlkmaar,in1645,aspointingtoadissectedcalfandsaying:‘thisismylibrary’(1670:8),butSorbièrereportedthesameincident(inadifferenttown)asfollows:OneofhisfriendswenttovisitDescartesinEgmond.Thisgentlemanaskedhim,aboutphysicsbooks:whichonedidhemostvalue,andwhichofthemdidhemostfrequentlyconsult?‘Ishallshowyou’,hereplied,‘ifyouwishtofollowme’.Heledhimintoalowercourtyardatthebackofhishouse,andshowedhimacalfthatheplannedtodissectthenextday.Itrulybelievethathenolongerreadhardlyanything.(1660:689–90)Descartescontinuedtoworkinnaturalphilosophyand,in1647,ontheoccasionofashortvisittoParis,hevisitedBlaisePascalanddiscussedalternativeexplana-tionsofthebarometricphenomenathathadbeenstudiedbyTorricelli.HesubsequentlyclaimedthathehadsuggestedtoPascalthefamousexperimentthatwasconductedonPascal’sbehalfbyhisbrother-in-lawinSeptember1648onthepuy-de-Dômeandwhich,accordingtoPascal’spublishedaccount,provedthatbarometricreadingsarecausedexclusivelybyatmosphericpressure.DescartesagreedtoconductparallelexperimentsonthesameissuewithPascalandMersenne,andtosharetheirresults.Thiscollaborationcontinueduntilthedeathofthetwooftheparticipants,ofMersennein1648andofDescartes2yearslater.ThefinalpublishedsampleofnaturalphilosophythatDescartespublishedwasThePassionsoftheSoul(1649),inwhichheofferedatheoryofhumanemotionsfromtheperspectiveofa‘physicien’,i.e.thatofanaturalphilosopher.Hehaddraftedthisessayduringthewinterof1645–1646forPrincessElizabeth,andcon-tinuedtoworkonituntilimmediatelybeforehisdeparturetoSweden.Thisrepre-sentedtheculminationofDescartes’attempttoprovideacoherentaccountofhowbodilystatesinteractsystematicallywithmentalstates,becauseemotionsweredescribedasmentalstatesthatweretriggeredandsupportedbyspecificmotionsofanimalspirits(wherethelatterwereunderstoodasveryfinebodilyfluids).Thefundamentalassumptionofthistheorywasthattherewereasmallnumberofprimitiveconnectionsbetweenmindandbodythatareinnate—althoughwelackthe\n174D.M.Clarkemeanstoexplainthem—andthatatypeofconditioningsimilartowhatisobservedinanimalsmakespossibletheestablishmentofnovelmind-bodyconnectionsbyrepeatedexperiences.Onequestionsuggestedbythesetwodecadesofdedicatedresearchandexperimentationinnaturalphilosophyis:whydidDescartesalsowriteabookaboutmetaphysics,andwhatdidheaimtoachievebyitspublication?ItisthequestionthatwasputforcefullybyRegius,inJuly1645,whenhewrotetoaveryunreceptiveDescartes:Manyhonourableandintelligentpeoplehaveoftentoldmethattheythinktoohighlyofyourintelligencenottobelievethat,inthedepthsofyoursoul,youholdopinionsthataretheoppositeofthosethatappearpubliclyunderyourname…manyofthemareconvincedthatyouhavediscreditedyourphilosophyverymuchbypublishingyourmetaphysics(AT:IV,255).RegiuswasconvincedthatDescartes’researchrecordinnaturalphilosophywasincompatiblewiththemetaphysicsthatappearedintheMeditations,andthatDescarteswasdishonestoratleastdissemblingwhenhepublishedthatbookasifheendorseditscontents.TherewasasignificanttensionbetweenCartesiannaturalphilosophyandmetaphysics:inthemethodsused,thekindsofentitytowhichtheyappealedasexplanatory,andeventhelanguages—vernacularFrenchorscholasticLatin—inwhichtheywerewritten.IfDescarteswasnotdishonest,whydidhewritethisbookin1640andwhatwerehisobjectivesindoingso?11.2TheMeditationsDescarteshadbeencommunicatingwithMersennebypostforoveradecadewhen,in1640,hedecidedtorevisitatopicthathehadpreviouslyoutlinedin1629.HewasthenlivinginSantpoort,intheUnitedProvinces,andwassoontomovetoLeiden,inApril1640,wheretherestoftheworkwascompleted.ItisdifficulttobeconfidentaboutthespecificmotivationforthisapparentchangeofdirectioninDescartes’scholarlyinterests.Descartes’reasonablefearofecclesiasticalcensurehadnotabatedsince1633,andhehadverygoodreasonsfornotdiscussingmeta-physicalquestions,becausehedefined‘metaphysics’aswhateverpertainedtothenatureofthehumansoulandtheexistenceofGod.Thedisciplinaryboundariesbetweenanydiscussionofthosequestionsandtheologywereverypermeable;generalcouncilsoftheCatholicChurchhadnotoriouslytaughtthat,whileitwaspossibletoaddressthoseissuesbyusinghumanreason,theconclusionsofsuchdeliberationscouldnotcontradictthedoctrinesoftheChurch.Inaword,itwasimpossibletowriteaboutGodandthesoulwithoutgettinginvolvedinthekindofecclesiasticaldisputesanddoctrinalsubtletiesthatledtoGalileo’scondemnation.IfastronomycouldincurRome’scensure,dabblinginquestionsaboutGod’sexistenceandthenatureofthesoulwasevenmorelikelytodoso.Whythendidacensure-averseauthor,livingintheUnitedProvinces,writeanessayabouttheexistenceofGodandthenatureofthehumansoulandpublishitinParis?\n11Descartes’BiographyasaGuidetoHisMeditations175DescarteshadacknowledgedinletterstoMersenneandtoJeanSilhon,in1637,thatthebriefmetaphysicaldiscussionsinPartIVoftheDiscoursewereinadequateandpossiblymisleading.ThedangerofbeingmisunderstoodarosefromthefactthatthebookhadbeenpublishedinthevernacularratherthaninLatin,sothatuneducatedpeoplecouldreaditandmightconcludemistakenlythatDescartesendorsedthescepticalobjectionsthathediscussedasapreludetoaddressingmeta-physicalquestions.TheoptionofamoreadequatediscussionarosewhenhewasconsideringpublishingaLatintranslationofthe1637book,withouttheGeometry;in1638heindicatedthat‘ifthereisaLatinversionofthisbook[theDiscourseandEssays],forwhichpreparationsarebeingmade,Icouldhaveit[adiscussionofmetaphysics]includedthere’(AT:I,350).Draftversionsofthattranslationwerealreadycirculatinginthelate1630sanditseemsasifDescarteswaseventuallypersuadedbyrepeatedrequestsfromMersennetorevealthefoundationsofhisnaturalphilosophyandtocontributetotheapologeticdefenceofCatholicismthathadoccupiedMersenneforalmosttwodecades.Giventhesensitivityofthesubjectmatter,Descartesadoptedtwodefensivestrategies.Onewastosummarizehisviewsinmetaphysicsbriefly,in‘fiveorsixsheetsofprint’,toprintinitiallyonly20or30copiesand,ashewrotetoMersenne,tosendthoseto‘twentyorthirtyofthemostwisetheologiansthatIcanfindtogettheiropinionofitandtofindoutfromthemwhatIshouldchange,correct,ormodifyinitbeforemakingitpublic’(AT:II,622).WiththeexceptionoftheFirstObjections,submittedby‘apriestfromAlkmaar’,hedelegatedthistasktoMersenne,althoughitisobviousinretrospectthattheMinimfriarfailedmiserably.MersennesharedthedraftcopyofthetextwithhiscorrespondentsorfriendsinParis,includingHobbes(whowascertainlynotaCatholictheologian)andPierreGassendi(whowasaCatholicbutnotatheologian).Infact,theonlycontributoramongthefivesetsofobjectionscollectedbyMersennewhomighthavesatisfiedDescartes’preferenceswasAntoineArnauld(1612–1694),whocomposedthefourthobjections.Descartes’otherstrategyforprotectinghimselfagainsttheologicalobjectionswastorequestpriorapprovalforhisbookfromtheTheologyFacultyattheSorbonne.Again,hedelegatedthistasktoMersenne,andinanticipationofafavour-ableoutcomeMersenneincludedonthetitlepageofthe1641editionthephrase‘cumapprobationeDoctorum’[withtheapprovalofdoctors].Unfortunately,heneverreceivedthisapprovaland,afterthefact,Descartesclaimedthathedidnotneedanyone’sapprovalandhadneverrequesteditinthefirstplace.Nonetheless,hedidincludeinthepublishedtexta‘LetterofDedicationtotheSorbonne’inwhichheexplicitlyassociatedhiseffortswiththeinvitationbytheLateranCouncil(1512–1517)toprovebyreasonalonetheimmortalityofthesoul.Thatcouncilhadcondemnedthewritingsofsomeneo-Aristotelians(includingPomponazzi)whoarearguedthatthehumansouldieswiththedeathofthebody.Descartes’referencetotheLateranCouncilwasanoddclaim,sincehehadwrittenanumberoftimestoMersennetoconfirmthattherewasnothingatallinhisMeditationstoprovetheimmortalityofthesoul.MersennehadbeendelegatedbyDescartestoeditthetextandtodeleteanythingthatmightattractcensure.Itwasnotsurprising,then,thatthebookwaspublishedinParisin1641withamisleadingsubtitlethatincludedthephrase\n176D.M.Clarke‘inwhichtheexistenceofGodandtheimmortalityofthesoulis[sic]demonstrated’.Inaccordancewiththeauthor’srequest,Mersennealsotookcaretodeletesomepassagesabouttransubstantiationtowhichtheologiansmightobject.ItseemsclearthatDescarteslostcontrolofthewholepublishingproject.HewaslivinginLeiden,sendingrepliesbyposttoobjectionsastheyarrivedfromParis,andallowingMersennewidediscretiontoeditandarrangeforpublication.Theresultwasadefectiveedition,withmanymisprints,andasubtitlethatmisdescribeditscontentsandtheintentionsofitsauthor.Almost10monthslater,DescarteshadnotevenseenacopyofhisownbookandquicklyarrangedtohaveaneweditionprintedinAmsterdamandLeiden.Hechangedthesubtitletoread‘inwhichGod’sexistenceandtheDistinctionbetweentheHumanSoulandtheBodyaredemon-strated’,heomittedtheclaimonthetitlepagethathehadtheapprovaloftheSorbonne,andherestoredthepassagesabouttransubstantiationthatMersennehaddeleted.Inaddition,headdedtheseventhsetofobjectionsfromFatherBourdin,aJesuit;DescarteshadbeenkeenfromtheoutsettogetobjectionsfromtheJesuits,andoneFrenchJesuiteventuallycompliedwithhisrepeatedrequests.Asusual,DescartesalsoaddedhisownrepliestoBourdin.Thefinalresultwastwoeditionswithin2yearsofthesamebook,onlythesecondofwhichrepresentedtheauthor’sintentions.What,then,dothesebriefbiographicalandcontextualitemscontributetoareadingofDescartes’Meditations?OneobviousconclusionisthatDescartesdidnotintendtowriteabookthatprovedtheimmortalityofthesoul,asMersennehadwrittenonthetitlepage.HehadrepliedtoMersenne’sdisappointmentin1640thathehadnotwrittenasinglewordabouttheimmortalityofthesoul:‘Youshouldnotbesurprisedatthat,forIcouldnotdemonstratethatGodcouldnotannihilatethesoul,butonlythatithasanentirelydifferentnaturetothatofthebody…thatisalsoallthatIintendedtoprove’(AT:III,266).So,despiteMersenne’ssubtitleandconsistentwithDescartes’subse-quentcorrection,theMeditationswasneverintendedtoprovetheimmortalityofthehumansoul.Infact,Descartesseemsnottohavebeenconvincedatalloftheimmor-talityofthesoul.WhenhewrotetoHuygensin1642tooffercondolencesonthedeathofhisbrother,heexpresseddoubtsaboutreligiousbeliefsintheafterlife:Althoughreligionteachesusmanythingsaboutthissubject[i.e.theafterlife],Imustacknowledgeaweaknessinmyselfthatseemstometobecommoninmostpeople,namely,thatalthoughwewishtobelieveandeventhinkwebelieveverystronglyeverythingthatreligionteachesus,nonethelessweareusuallynotasaffectedbythingsthatfaithaloneteachesusandthatarenotunderstoodbyourreasonasbythoseofwhichwearealsoconvincedbyverystrongnaturalreasons(AT:III,580).Secondly,thebookwasnotwrittenasacontributiontothephilosophicaldiscus-sionsofscepticismthatoccurtypicallyinepistemology.ItisundeniablethatDescartesreviewedpyrrhonistchallengestothepossibilityofknowledgeintheFirstMeditationandthathethoughtthiswasnecessaryasapreludetodoingmeta-physics.AllthescepticalobjectionsthatwererehearsedintheFirstMeditationwerefamiliarfromtheApologyforRaymondSebondinMontaigne’sEssays,and\n11Descartes’BiographyasaGuidetoHisMeditations177theywerealsodiscussedbyJeanSilhoninTwoTruths(1991).Incontrasttowhatonemightexpectorrequireinmetaphysics,Descarteshadacknowledgedforsomeyearspriorto1640thatthekindofknowledgethatitwaspossibletoacquirewhenexplainingnaturalphenomenawasnecessarilyhypotheticalanduncertain,andthatitwasamistakeinprincipletodemandanythingelse.However,heseemstohavethoughtthatmetaphysicsrequiresandiscapableofdeliveringahigherdegreeofcertainty,andthatheshoulddispelscepticalchallengestothepossibilityofmeta-physicsbeforeembarkingonhisownreflectionsonfirstphilosophy(Clarke2012).ThefactthatDescartesattributedsolittlevaliditytoscepticismperhapsexplainsthealmostcasualfacilitywithwhichhedismissedscepticalobjectionsintheSixthMeditationashyperbolicandridiculous.AlthoughDescarteshadwrittenbothofhisearlierworks—LeMondeandthe1637bookofessays—inFrench,hedecidedtowritetheMeditationsinLatin(asalreadyindicated)tolimitthereadershiptothosewhoweresufficientlyeducatedtodistinguishbetweenhypotheticalthesesandthoseendorsedbyanauthor.However,theonlyLatinavailabletohimwasthescholasticLatinthathehadlearnedinaJesuitcollegeatLaFlèche.Asaresultofthischoiceoflanguage,hehadtousetheconceptualframeworkoftheveryscholasticismthatheconsistentlyrejected.Thiswasadilemmafacedbyallthosewhowishedtocommunicatewithaninternationalreadershipinalanguagethatsuchreadersunderstood,whileinsinuatingnewmean-ingsintooldtermsoradjustingtheimplicationsoffamiliarwordstonoveltheorieswithwhichtheywereoftenincompatible.Forexample,oneofthemostfundamentalandconsistentfeaturesofCartesiannaturalphilosophysincethelate1620swasthatoneneverexplainsanyphenomenonbypostulatingasubstantialformthatisnamedafterthephenomenontobeexplained.DescarteshadintroducedthatgeneralprincipleintheopeningparagraphoftheunpublishedLeMonde,andithadinspiredhissearchforalternativeexplanatorymodels.Accordingly,itwouldhavebeenasimpossibletoexplaintheacknowledgedfactofhumanthinkingbypostulatinga‘form’ofthinkingastoexplainthepowerofsleepingpowdertoinducesleepbyreferringtoitssoporificform.Secondly,evenifathinkingformmightbetoleratedexceptionallytodescribethespecialfacultythatwasapparentlyevidentonlyinhumanbeings,PrincessElizabethhadraisedanobjectionthatgenerationsofstudentsinphilosophyhavesincerepeated:thatonehardlyexplainshumannaturebyintroducingtwosubstances(oreventhree,ifDescartesisreadasatrialist)whenonehasnoideahowthesubstancesinteract.Howcanthehumansoul,whichisonlyathinkingsubstance,determinethemovementoftheanimalspiritsinordertoperformavoluntaryaction?…Iconfessthatitwouldbeeasierformetoattributematterandextensiontothesoulthantoattributetheabilitytomoveabody,andtobemovedbyabody,toanimmaterialbeing.(Descartes1998:148,151)Finally,Descartes’useoftheLatinterm‘substantia’reflectedtheambiguitythatheinheritedfromitsconceptualhistory.Inonesense,theword‘substance’wasmerelyasynonymfora‘thing’,sothatasubstancewasanyrealityofwhichonepredicatesvariousproperties.Sincethetermalsohadconnotationsofadistinct‘something’thatseemedtounderlieproperties,asLockelaterargued,Descartesinsistedthatit\n178D.M.Clarkewasimpossibletoknowanythingaboutsubstancesexceptbyknowingtheirproperties.HewroteinreplytoArnauld’sobjectionstotheMeditations:Wedonotknowsubstancesimmediately,asindicatedelsewhere,butonlybyperceivingcertainformsorattributesthat,inordertoexist,mustinhereinsomething[alicuirei]andconsequentlywecallthething[illamrem]inwhichtheyinhereasubstance.If,however,wesubsequentlywishedtostripthatsubstanceofthoseattributesbywhichweknowit,wewoulddestroyallourknowledgeofit;andthuswemightstillbeabletoapplyvariouswordstoitbutwewouldnotperceivetheirmeaningclearlyanddistinctly(AT:VII,222)Thus,notonlydosubstancesexplainnothing,buttheyareunknowableexceptbymeansofthepropertiesthatareunderstoodasbeingpredicatedofasomething.Itwouldthereforebeimpossibletoexplainthepropertiesofanyphenomenonbyreferencetoasubstanceofwhichtheyarepredicated,sinceweknownothingaboutthelatterexceptbymeansoftheformer.AsDescartesoftenclaimed,itwouldbebothcircularanduninformativetousesuchafailedscholasticmodelofexplanation.DespitetheapparentimplicationsofthecircumstancesinwhichDescartescomposedtheMeditations,however,hewrotealengthybookinscholasticLatin(85%ofwhichcomprisedobjectionsandreplies),whichwasdedicatedtothetheologiansoftheSorbonneandpurportedtodemonstrate‘thedistinctionofthehumansoulfromthebody’.ThechallengethenishowtointerpretthatbookwithoutattributingtoitsauthorthekindofdishonestyorinconsistencyofwhichRegiusaccusedhim.Onepossiblereadingisthefollowing(Clarke2003).Descartesextrapolatedasfaraspossibletheexplanatoryresourcesofhisnaturalphilosophytoincludeasketchofhowtoexplainsensation,memory,imagination,andthepassions.Hesummarizedthisasearlyas1637,whenhereportedintheDiscourseonMethodsomeoftheconclusionsthathehadreachedintheunpub-lishedLeMonde:IhadexplainedallthesethingsinsufficientdetailinthetreatisethatIhadplannedtopub-lishearlier[i.e.LeMonde].ThenIhadshown…whatchangesmustbemadeinthebraintocausewaking,sleepanddreams;howlight,sounds,odours,tastes,warmthandalltheotherqualifiesofexternalobjectscanimpressdifferentideasonit[thebrain]throughthesenses…whatpartofthebrainshouldbetakenas‘thecommonsense’,wheretheseideasarereceived;whatshouldbetakenasthememory,whichstorestheseideas,andastheimagination,whichcanvarythemindifferentwaysandcomposenewonesand,bythesamemeans,distributetheanimalspiritstothemusclesandcausethelimbsofthebodytomoveinasmanydifferentwaysasourownbodiescanmovewithoutthewilldirectingthem,dependingontheobjectsthatarepresenttothesensesandtheinternalpassionsofthebody.(Descartes1999:39–40)Asindicatedabove,Descartescontinuedtodevotehistimeandrelativelymeagreexperimentalresourcestothisprojectinnaturalphilosophybyincorporatingmind-bodyinteractionandhumanemotionswithinthescopeofnaturalphilosophyinThePassionsoftheSoul.Despitehisunfoundedconfidenceinthepotentialexplan-atorypoweroftheelementaryconceptsthatheincludedinhisnaturalphilosophy,suchasthesize,shape,movement,andconfigurationofsmallpartsofmatter,itseemedimpossiblein1641—asitstilldoes—toexplainhumanthinkingintermsofpartsofmatterinmotion.ThelimitedconceptualresourcesofCartesiannaturalphilosophyweresimplyinadequatetothechallenge.\n11Descartes’BiographyasaGuidetoHisMeditations179Ratherthandecideapriori,asHobbeshaddone,thathumanthinkingisreducibletomatterinmotion,Descartesattemptedtodescribeaccuratelythosefeaturesofhumannaturethatrequireanexplanation.Theyincludemanypropertiesthatseemedreducible,atleastinprinciple,tomatterinmotion.Buttheyalsoincludethisonefeature(namely,thinking)thatwasnotamenabletosuchreduction.Onaninitialclassificationofproperties,then,Descarteshadtoconcludethathumanbeingsexhibittwokindsofproperty.Sincepropertiesarepredicatedofcorrespondingsubstances,theapparentirreducibilityofsomehumanpropertiestomatterinmotionwasreflectedinthesubstancesofwhichtheyarepredicated.Accordingly,DescartesrepliedtoHobbesthatweshouldprovisionallytalkabouttwosubstancesinhumannatureanddefertolaterdiscussionthequestionwhetherthetwosubstancesarereducibletoone.Since,however,wedonotknowasubstanceitselfimmediatelythroughitself,butonlybythefactthatitisthesubjectofcertainacts,itisveryreasonableandinkeepingwithcommonusagethatweapplydifferentnamestothosesubstancesthatwerecognizeasthesubjectsofcompletelydifferentactsoraccidents,soastoexaminelaterwhetherthosedifferentnamessignifydifferentthingsoroneandthesamething(AT:VII,176).Therewasnoevidencein1640tosuggesthowhumanthinkingcouldbeexplainedbywhatwasthenknownaboutthepropertiesofmatter.Theprovisionalconclusionhadtobethatmentalexperienceswere,atthattime,irreducibletotheknownpropertiesofmatter.‘Ofcourseonemaywonderwhetherthenaturethatthinksmayperhapsbethesameasthenaturethatoccupiesspace,sothatthereisonenaturethatisbothintellectualandcorporeal’(AT:II,38),butareductionofmentalpropertiestothoseofmattermustawaittheconstructionofaviable,integratedtheory.Inotherwords,substancedualism—insofarasitisproposedbyDescartesintheMeditations—wasnotatheoryofhumannatureatall,norwasitpostulatedtoexplainthosefeaturesofhumannatureofwhichweareconsciouswhenwereflectonourexperienceofthinkingorwilling.Neithersubstancesnorsubstantialformsexplainanything,anditwouldnotrepresentanyprogressinexplaininghumanthought(1)ifwepostulatedtwosubstancesofwhichnothingisknownapartfromtheverypropertiesthatweareattemptingtoexplain,and(2)ifweknewnothingabouthowthepropertiesofsuchsubstancescouldpossiblyinteractinthewayrequiredtoexplainourexperienceofmind-bodyinteraction.Instead,substancedualismrepresentsthelimitsoftheexplanatoryresourcesofCartesiannaturalphilosophywhenappliedtohumannatureandexpressedinscholasticLatin.Descartescouldbedescribedmoreaccuratelyasapropertydualist,insofarasheconsistentlyarguedthatsomefeaturesofhumanthinkingwereirreducibletothosepropertiesofmatterofwhichheclaimedtohavereliableacknowledge.Giventhelimitedpropertiesthatheattributedtomatter,itseemedtohimimpossibletofindatheoreticallinkbetweenthosepropertiesandthinking.Thisirreducibilitywasdescribedasa‘realdistinction’.Cartesiandualism,therefore,isnotatheoryofanythingbutmerelyanacknowledgementoftheexplanatorylimitationsofthenaturalphilosophythatDescartesendorsedandanindexoftheworktobedonebeforeaviabletheoryofthehumanmindbecomesavailable.\n180D.M.ClarkeDescartes’contemporarieswhowerecriticaloftheMeditationswereclosertoanaccuratereadingofhisworkthatthosewhoreaditasendorsingsubstancedualism.MartinSchoock,whoactedasaghostwriterforVoetius,concludedthatDescarteswasreallytryingtoshowhowthemindwasreducibletobodilystatesbyproposingarguments(apparentlyinsupportofdualism)thatweresoweakthattheyimpliedtheoppositeconclusion.Regius,whohadbeenoneofhismostsupportivealliesatUtrecht,rejectedDescartes’metaphysicsasincompatiblewithhisnaturalphilosophyandpublishedatextbookofhisowntoillustratewhatCartesiannaturalphilosophywithoutmetaphysicswouldlooklike.Finally,whensomeofDescartes’bookswerelistedontheCatholicChurch’sIndexofForbiddenBooksin1663,itwasnotprimarilybecausehehadsupportedheliocentrism(ashehadfearedin1633),butbecausehistheoryofmatterandespeciallyhisaccountofsubstancewasjudgedtobeincompatiblewiththeteachingoftheCouncilofTrentontheEucharist,andbecausehisaccountofmentalactivitiesdidnotpresentthemassufficientlyindependentofthebody.Asthosecriticsconcluded,Descarteswasattemptingtoapplyhisnaturalphilosophytomentalphenomena;buthisprojectwasdefeatedbyitstheoreticalandconceptuallimitations,andthosearereflectedinthelanguageofdualism.ReferencesAdamC,TanneryP(eds)(1964–1974)OeuvresdeDescartes,12vols.Vrin,Paris.IdentifiedincitationsasATBailletA(1691)LaviedeMonsieurDes-Cartes,vol2.DanielHorthemels,ParisBorelP(1670)Historiarum,&ObservationumMetaphysicarum,Centuriaiv:RenatiCartesiivita.L.S.Cornerum,FrankfurtClarkeDM(2003)Descartes’stheoryofmind.Clarendon,OxfordClarkeDM(2006)Descartes:abiography.CambridgeUniversityPress,NewYorkClarkeDM(2012)TheepistemologyofDescartes.In:HetheringtonS(ed)Epistemology:thekeythinkers.Continuum,London,pp90–110CottinghamJ(1992)Cartesiandualism:theology,metaphysics,andscience.In:CottignhamJ(ed)TheCambridgecompaniontoDescartes.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,pp236–257deSillonJ(1991)LeDeuxVérités.Fayard,Paris(firstedn.1626)DescartesR(1998)MeditationsandOtherMetaphysicalWritings(trans:ClarkeDM).Penguin,LondonDescartesR(1999)DiscourseonMethodandRelatedWritings(trans:ClarkeDM).Penguin,LondonKitcherP(1992)Thenaturalistsreturn.PhilosRev101(1992):53–114RyleG(1949)Theconceptofmind.Hutchinson,LondonSorbièreS(1660)Relations,Lettres,etDiscoursdeMr.deSorbiere.RobertdeNinville,ParisTannerNP(ed)(1990)Decreesoftheecumenicalcouncils,vol2.SheedandWard,andGeorgetownUniversityPress,LondonWilliamsB(1978)Descartes:theprojectofpureinquiry.Penguin,Harmondsworth\nChapter12WritingtheLivesofPhilosophers:ReflectionsonSpinozaandOthersStevenNadlerTherearegreatpleasuresaswellasmanypotentialpitfallsinthewritingofphilosophicalbiography.Someofthesearecommontoallkindsofbiographicalliterature,whileothersseempeculiartowritingthebiographyofaphilosopher.Inthisessay,andfocusingonthepitfalls,Iwouldliketoaddresssomeparticularprob-lemsthatIconfrontedwhilewritingabiographyoftheseventeenth-centuryphi-losopherBaruchSpinoza.ButbeforeIdoso,Iwouldlikefirsttooffersomegeneralprogrammaticthoughtsaboutthe“biographyofphilosopher”genre.Overthepastdozenorsoyears,wehavewitnessedawonderful,evenexponen-tialincreaseinthenumberofbiographieswrittenaboutphilosophers,especiallyphilosophersfromtheearlymodernperiod,theseventeenthandeighteenthcentu-ries.(Thisperiodinthehistoryofphilosophyismyownspecialty,soIwillconfinemydiscussiontoit).Therehaverecentlybeenpublished,inEnglish,scholarlyandauthoritativebiographiesofDescartes,Spinoza,Hobbes,Leibniz,Locke,Hume,andKant—withtheexceptionofBerkeley,allbutexhaustingthetraditionalteach-ingcanonofmajorearlymodernphilosophers.Indeed,inthelastdecadealone,nofewerthanfivefull-lengthbiographiesofDescarteshaveappearedinEnglish(althoughoneisatranslationfromaslightlyearlierFrenchbook),includingDesmondClarke’swonderfulvolume,whichwillnodoubtbethestandardandauthoritativeoneforsometime.1Beforethis,wewerebasicallylimitedtotheonecontemporarybiographyofDescartes—thefamoustwo-volumehagiographical1StephenGaukroger,Descartes:AnIntellectualBiography(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995);GenevièveRodis-Lewis,Descartes:HisLifeandThought(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1999;thisisatranslationofherDescartes:Biographie[Paris:Calman-Lévy,1995]);RichardA.Watson,CogitoErgoSum:TheLifeofRenéDescartes(Boston:DavidR.Godine,2002);DesmondClarke,Descartes:ABiography(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006);andA.C.Grayling,Descartes:TheLifeandTimesofaGenius(NewYork:WalkerandCo.,2005).S.Nadler(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofWisconsin–Madison,5109HelenC.WhiteHall,600NorthParkStreet,Madison,WI53706,USAe-mail:smnadler@wisc.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015181A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_12\n182S.NadlerworkbyAdrienBaillet,LaviedeMonsieurDescartes,publishedin1691—andamorerecentbiographypublishedin1970,2althoughthislatterwasnotaverythor-oughorveryreliablestudy.Similarly,mybiographyofSpinoza,3publishedin1999,wasthefirsttrulyfull-lengthbiographyofthisphilosopherevertoappearinEnglish,andthefirstinanylanguagesincetheearlytwentiethcentury;moreover,thesameyearitappeared,anotherbiographyofSpinozawaspublishedbyMargaretGullan-Wuhr.4Anduntilafewyearsago,therewasinEnglishoneold,relativelybriefbutserviceablebiographyofLeibniz;nowwehaveMariaRosaAntognazza’sbraveandmagisterialbook.5Ishouldadd—justtoincorporatetwootherinterestsofmine—thatthelast5yearshavealsoseentheappearanceofnotone,nottwo,butthreemajorbiographiesofMaimonides,aswellas,lesssuccessfully,severalbiographicalstudiesofSocrates.6Thisrecentspateofphilosophicalbiographiesis,forbothscholarsandgeneralreaders,arefreshingchangeandawelcomedevelopmentfromthefrustratingrarityofsuchworksinthepast.Ofcourse,anygeneralstudyofaphilosopherandhisorherthoughtusuallyincludedanintroductorybiographicalchapter,a“lifeandtimes”overviewasapref-acetotheexaminationofthephilosophyitself.Andtherearewell-knownexcep-tionstomygeneralpointaboutthedearthofphilosophicalbiographiesinthepast:PeterBrown’sbiographyofAugustine,RayMonk’sfabulousbiographyofWittgensteinandhistwo-volumelifeofRussell,MauriceMandelbaum’smonu-mentallifeofRousseau,andseveralexcellentbiographiesofFriedrichNietzscheandofJean-PaulSartre.Buttheseexceptionsonlyprovetherulethatsolid,thor-ough,book-lengthbiographicalstudiesofthegreatphilosophicalthinkers,espe-ciallythosewholivedbeforethetwentiethcentury,were,foraverylongtime,quiterare,especiallywhencomparedtotheabundanceofbiographiesofnon-philosophicalliteraryfigures.IamwillingtobetthatthenumberofbiographicalstudiesofVirginiaWoolfaloneoutnumbersthetotalofphilosophicalbiographies.Tomakethingsevenmorepuzzling,figureswhomwenowregardas“scientists”seemtohavefaredbetterthanphilosophersinthisregard.Again,juststickingtothe2JackR.Vrooman,RenéDescartes:ABiography(NewYork:PutnamandSons,1970).3Spinoza:ALife(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999).4WithinReason:ALifeofSpinoza(London:JonathanCape,1998).EarlierbiographicalstudiesofSpinozaincludeStanislausvonDunin-Borkowski,DerjungedeSpinoza(Münster:AschendorffscheVerlagsbuchhandlung,1910),andJacobFreudenthal,Spinoza:SeineLebenundSeinLehre(Stuttgart:Fr.FrommansVerlag,1904).However,thesewerewrittenwellbeforesomuchoftheimportantresearchonSpinoza’sbackgroundintheAmsterdamPortuguese-JewishcommunitybyI.S.Revah,RichardPopkin,JonathanIsrael,andothers.5E.J.Aiton,Leibniz:ABiography(BristolandBoston:AdamHilger,1985);MariaRosaAntognazza,Leibniz:AnIntellectualBiography(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009).6OnMaimonides,seeHerbertDavidson,MosesMaimonides:TheManandHisWork(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005);JoelL.Kraemer,Maimonides:TheLifeandWorldofOneofCivilization’sGreatestMinds(NewYork:Doubleday,2008);andSarahStroumsa,MaimonidesinHisWorld:APortraitofaMediterraneanThinker(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009).ForrecenteffortstowriteabiographyofSocrates,seeLuisE.Navia,Socrates:ALifeExamined(NewYork:PrometheusBooks,2007);andBettanyHughes,TheHemlockCup:Socrates,Athens,andtheSearchfortheGoodLife(NewYork:Knopf,2010).\n12WritingtheLivesofPhilosophers:ReflectionsonSpinozaandOthers183earlymodernperiod,GalileoandNewtonhavelongbeensubjectsofbiographicalinterest(althoughbearinmindthat,intheseventeenthcentury,thedistinctionbetweenphilosopherandscientistdidnotexist;GalileoandNewtonwere“naturalphilosophers”).Whyisthisthecase?Whyhavetherebeen,relativelyspeakinganduntilrecently,sofewbiographiesofphilosophers?Isitthatthelifeofaphilosopheristooseden-tary,toodull,towarrantabiography?Didphilosophersleadlessactive,lessinter-estinglivesthanpoetsorfictionwritersorevenscientists?(Forthepurposeofmyremarkshere,Iamgoingtobrackettheissueofbiographiesofhistoricalfigures,worldleaders,politicians,artistsandmilitaryachievers,suchasCaesar,JohnAdams,AbrahamLincoln,Stalin,PicassoandCheGuevara.Ithinkthatbiographiesoftheseindividualsareofadifferentorderintermsofinterestandpopularitythanthoseofindividualsfromtheworldoflettersandideas.)Whydidwe,foralongtime,havesomanybiographiesofVirginiaWoolforJamesJoycebutnoneofSpinoza,themostradicaland,tomymind,excitingphilosopherofhisturbulenttime?Ofcourse,partoftheanswertothisisobvious:many,many,manymorepeoplehavereadVirginiaWoolfthanhavereadSpinoza(inpartbecausemanymorepeoplereadfictionthanreadphilosophy);andWoolf’slifeandtimesarecloser,morefamiliarandmoreaccessibletoourown.Thereissimplyalotmoreinterestamongthegeneralreadingpublicinthelifeofsuchimportanttwentieth-centuryfictionwritersasWoolforJoycethanthereisinthelifeofSpinoza(despitethefactthatJoyce’sfictionis,arguably,moredifficultthanSpinoza’sphilosophicalwritings).Butischronologicalproximityandhistoricalandliteraryaccessibilitytherealexplanation?Therearealsomanymorebiographiesofwritersfromamoredistantera—Voltaire,Diderot,MaryShelly,Coleridge—thanthereareofphiloso-phersfromthesamegeneralperiodorlater.Isitbecausethereissimplymoreinter-estinthelifeofDiderotthanthereisinthelifeofSpinozaorLeibniz?Orisit,infact,theotherwayaround:Isitthecasethatthereismoreinterestinthelivesoftheseandotherliteraryfiguresjustbecausetherehasbeensomuchbiographicalactivityaroundthem?Andifthisisthecase,thenwearebacktoouroriginalques-tion:Whyhavebiographersturnedsomuchmoreoftentoliteraryfiguresthantophilosophers?Hereisonepossiblebuthighlyspeculativehypothesisthatmayanswerthequestion.Perhapsthereasonthattherehavebeen,untilrecently,sofewbiographiesofphilosophersisthattherearenoobviouscandidatestowritethelivesofphiloso-phers.Thatis,itseemsthatforalongtimephilosophers’livesfellbetweentheliter-arycracks.Lookatitthisway:Theauthorswhotendtowritebiographiesaregenerallythemselveswritersoffictionorliterarynonfiction.Theworldtheyknowistheworldoftheirsubjects,theworldoffictionandliterarynonfiction.Thus,whenturningtobiography,theyaremostlikelytowritethelivesoffiguresfromtheworldtheyinhabit,literarylivesthenatureofwhichtheyareintimatelyfamiliarwith.Ontheotherhand,theseauthorsofliterarybiographiesmaynotfeeluptothetaskoftakingonthelifeofaphilosopher,someonewhoseideastheyinalllikelihoodhavenotspentagooddealoftimestudying.WouldanyoneundertaketowritealifeofanotoriouslydifficultthinkersuchasSpinozaorKantunlesstheyfeltcomfortable\n184S.NadlerwithSpinoza’sEthicsorKant’sCritiqueofPureReason?Thus,Isurmise,thosewhowritebiographieswillnottouchphilosophers.Thephilosophicalmaterialisjusttoofaroutsidetheircomfortzone.Atthesametime,thosewhoaremostfamiliarwithhistory’sgreatphilosophers—thatis,peoplewhoarethemselvesphilosophers—donotwritebiographies.Writingbiographywouldbeconsideredadisreputabletaskintheworldofprofessionalphi-losophers.Itisnotdoingphilosophy.Itishardenough,inAnglo-Americanphiloso-phytoday,forsomeonewhodoesprimarilyhistoryofphilosophytoearnequalrespectfromotherphilosophers;butonceyoustartworkingnotevenonthephiloso-phyofahistoricalfigurebutonhisorherlifeandtimes,thenyou’vereallygonebeyondthepale.Youmightaswelltransfertoadepartmentofcomparativeliterature.Certainly,onlysomeonewithtenurewouldundertakesuchaproject,buteventhenitistoriskone’sprofessionalcredibility.So,whydidthelivesofphilosophersforsolongfallbetweentheliterarycracks?Becausethepeoplewhowritebiographiesdonottouchphilosophers;andphiloso-phersdonotwritebiographies!Fortunately,thislatterfacthaschangedinrecentyears,givingusthatspateofrecentphilosophicalbiographies,almostallofthemwrittenbyprofessionalphilosophers.Thisisthanks,inpart,totheCambridgeUniversityPressseriesofphilosophicalbiographiesbegunbythelateTerryMoore,theCambridgephilosophyeditorinNewYork.7Butitisalsothankstosomechangesinthefieldofphilosophy,andparticularlythewayinwhichscholarshiponthehis-toryofearlymodernphilosophyispursued.Inthe1960sthroughtheearly1980s,earlymodernphilosophywasstudiedinwhat,forlackofabetterterm,canbecalledahighly“analytic”manner.Theatten-tionwasallonaphilosopher’sthesesandarguments,andthesewereexamined—aswelltheyshouldbe—inamostrigorousway.AreDescartes’demonstrationsofthemind-bodydistinctionvalid?HowexactlyisBerkeley’s“masterargument”forhisidealismsupposedtowork?WhatistheargumentativestrategyinKant’stranscen-dentaldeduction?Theseare,ofcourse,extremelyinterestingandphilosophicallyimportantques-tions.Theymustbeasked.NottoaskthemwouldbenottotakeDescartesorBerkeleyorKantorotherearlymodernthinkersseriouslyasphilosophers.Infact,itwouldamounttonotdoinghistoryofphilosophy(asopposedtodoingsomethinglikeintellectualhistory).Weshouldbegratefulforthemanyfascinatingandvalu-ablestudiesofearlymodernphilosophersthathavecomeoutofthiswayofdoinghistoryofphilosophy.However,itisalsothecasethatamongthepractitionersofthisanalyticstyleofhistoryofphilosophythereseemedtobeawillfulignoringofthehistorical,intellectual,religiousandpoliticalcontextsofaphilosopher’sthought,asifthesewereirrelevanttounderstandingwhataphilosopherwassayingandwhyheorshewassayingit.Infact,letmeputthismorestrongly:thereseemedtobeanoutrighthostilitytolookingbeyondtheexplicitandpossibleargumentsofatext—whataphilosopherdidsayandwhathe,onlogicalgrounds,couldhave,wouldhave7TheseriesincludestherecentbiographiesofDescartes,Spinoza,Hobbes,Locke,Kantnotedabove,aswellasvolumesonHegel,Schopenhauer,andNietzsche.\n12WritingtheLivesofPhilosophers:ReflectionsonSpinozaandOthers185orshouldhavesaid—andconsideringwhothatphilosopherwas;whereandwhenhelived;whomhestudied;thenatureofhisaudience;thecivil,religiousandaca-demicauthoritieswithwhomhehadtodeal;andespeciallywhatwerehisotherintellectualprojects?Thisanti-historical,anti-contextualapproachreachedasome-whatlaughableapexwhenJonathanBennett,intheintroductiontohisstudyofSpinoza’sEthics,wrotethathewasnotgoingtolookatSpinoza’sTheological-PoliticalTreatise,sincehefoundthatlatterwork—oneofthemostimportantbooksinthehistoryofphilosophy—tobeofnohelpwhatsoeverinunderstandingthemetaphysicalandmoralprojectoftheEthics.Meanwhile,althoughDescarteswasprimarilyascientistandmathematician,foralongtimemostscholarlyattentionintheAnglo-AmericanphilosophicalworldwasfocusedonhisMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy,somethingthatheconsideredaone-offexercisethatisamereepiste-mologicalpreambletohismajorprojectsinnaturalphilosophy.Booksontheargu-mentsoftheMeditationsproliferated,andjournalspublishedaseeminglyendlessnumberofarticleson“theCartesiancircle”,Descartes’argumentforGod’sexis-tenceintheThirdMeditation,orhisaccountofmind-bodyunionintheSixthMeditation.Inthatkindofnarrowlyfocusedenvironment,whatphilosopherwoulddareundertakewritingabiographyofanhistoricalfigure?Fortunately,thingshaveevolvedoverthepastquartercentury,andagooddealofscholarshipinthehistoryofearlymodernphilosophynowtakesamuchmorecon-textualandhistoricallysensitiveapproach.Philosophicalwork(thatis,workbyphilosophersandnotjustintellectualhistorians)onDescartesnowlooksmorecloselyathisscientificwritings,hisphilosophyofnature,andtheAristotelianscho-lasticismofhistime;philosophicalstudiesofSpinozanowgobeyondhismeta-physicsandepistemologyandlookathismoralphilosophy,hispoliticalthought,hisviewsonreligion,andtheseventeenth-centuryDutchandEuropeancontextofhisideas.Thisnewbroaderapproachtothestudyofearlymodernphilosophybyphilosophers,Isuggest,makesforamuchmorecongenial,evensupportiveenviron-mentforphilosophicalbiography—thatis,biographiesofphilosopherswrittenbythosewhocandoitbest:philosophersthemselves.Still,Iwouldliketosuggestthat,formytasteatleast,thingscangoevenfurther.Many,ifnotmost,ofthebiographiesofphilosophersthathaveappearedsofararewhatmightbecalled“intellectualbiographies”orintellectualitineraries.Theyareprimarilyfocusedontheideasofthephilosopherandhowtheyevolvedduringthecourseofhisorhercareer,althoughtheysituateallofthisinthecontextofthephi-losopher’slife.Theresultisoftenyetanotherstudyofaphilosopher’sphilosophyratherthanatruestudyofhislifeandtimes.Iabsolutelydonotdenythatthiscon-textualizingofaphilosopher’sideasandhistoricalexaminationoftheirdevelop-mentisavaluablethingtohave.Butinmyviewitunderestimateswhatmayoftenbetheintrinsicinterestofanintellectual’slifeinaparticulartimeandplace.Ofcourse,theideascannotbeignored.Afterall,areaderwillpickupabiographyofaphilosopherattheveryleasttolearnsomethingabouthisorherphilosophy.Butwealsopickupsuchbiographiestolearnaboutthelivesthesethinkersled,thelivesofotherswithwhomtheylived,andtheinterestingtimesinwhichtheyflourished.Itisashamethattoooftentheseelementsaregivensecondplace,asmerebackground\n186S.Nadlerorscenesettingforanexaminationoftheunfoldingofaphilosopher’sthoughtovertime.Acontextualizedanddiachroniclookataphilosopher’sthoughtisnosubsti-tuteforatrueliterarybiographyofagreatintellectual.WhichbringsmetothewritingofabiographyofSpinoza.Inonerespect,Spinoza’slifewasnotaverylivelyorinterestingone.HeneverleftTheNetherlands,andlivedallhislifeintheprovinceofHolland.Hewasnotactivelyengagedinpoli-tics.Whilenottherecluseorlonerthathewaslongdepictedasbeing,hedidoftenkeeptohimselfandledafairlymundaneexistence,devotedtohiswork.LikeDescartes,hevaluedhispeaceandquietandwantedtobeleftalonetopursuehisphilosophicalinterests.AndunlikethecaseofDescartes,thereisnosex.8Andyet,thereismuchthatisofgreatinterestandrelevanceinSpinoza’slife.HespenthisyouthinwhatwasperhapsthemostcosmopolitanandliberalcityofearlymodernEurope,Amsterdam,rightinthemiddleoftheDutchGoldenAgeandatacrucialjunctureinWesternEuropeanpoliticalhistory,astheThirtyYearsWarwascomingtoaclose.HegrewupinthePortuguese-JewishcommunityofAmsterdam,foundedbyformerconversosfleeingtheInquisitionsinPortugalandSpainandthusessentiallylivingasrefugeesinagenerallytolerantbutunpredictableCalvinistsoci-ety.HisvitriolicexcommunicationorbanfromthatJewishcommunityfor“abomi-nableheresies”and“monstrousdeeds”remainsunexplained,andthusintroducesafascinatingmysteryattheheartofhisbiography.Andthenthereistheradicalnatureofhisideas:thedenialoftheprovidentialdeityofJudaismandChristianityandtheidentificationofGodwithNature;thedenialoftheimmortalityofthesoul;therejectionofthepossibilityofmiracles;hisreductionof“truereligion”toasimpleethicalprinciple,freefromceremonialobser-vanceandecclesiastichierarchy;hisclaimthattheBibleismerelyaworkofhumanliteraturethatisofvalueonlyforitsmorallessons;andhisstrongandeloquentargu-mentsfortolerationinasecular,democraticstate.Arevolutionaryandhighlyinflu-entialthinker,livinginarich,fascinatinganddynamicculture(withmulti-ethniccomponents)thatwasofimmenseimportancetomodernEuropeanhistory,Spinozacontinuestobeofgreatrelevanceforustoday.Hisargumentsforfreedomandforthetolerationoftheexpressionofideas,andhisattackonthemeddlingbyreligiousfundamentalistsinthepoliticsofthestatearenolessimportantincontemporaryAmericansocietythantheywereinthetumultuousworldofseventeenth-centuryDutchsociety.Whataprimesubjectforabiography!Spinozaisbothablessingandacurseforabiographer.Heisablessingbecause,atleastwhenitcomestowritingsbySpinoza,thereissolittleprimarysourcemate-rialyouhavetogothrough.Hiscollectedworksareinfourmedium-lengthvol-umes.Thereare89extantlettersfromhiscorrespondence(50fromSpinozatohiscorrespondents).Atonepoint,Ithoughtitwouldbeinterestingtowriteabiographyofanothermajorintellectualfigurefromtheseventeenthcentury,AntoineArnauld,theJansenistfirebrandtheologianandhighlycombativephilosopher.Buthewasa8Descarteshadachild,Francine,withHelenaFransdr,awomanwhowasaservantinoneofthehousesinwhichhelodgedduringhistimeintheNetherlands.Thegirldiedattheageoffiveofscarletfever;Descarteswasheartbroken.\n12WritingtheLivesofPhilosophers:ReflectionsonSpinozaandOthers187verboseandrepetitive(andveryirascible)man,andthereare43largevolumesinhiscollectedwritings.Itwasalljusttoomuch.Tothisday,wedonothaveafull-lengthbiographyofArnauld,asidefromtheextended(andquitevaluable)bio-graphicalsketchwritteninthelateeighteenthcenturybytheeditorofhisoeuvres.9AbiographyofSpinozaseemedamuchmoremanageableproject,onethatwasalso,inaverypersonalway,muchmoreinterestingforme—nottheleastbecauseIthinkthatSpinozagotitallright.Atthesametime,Spinozaisacurseforanybiographer,because—well,becausethereissolittlematerial.ThelifeofSpinozaisforthisveryreasonboththebiogra-pher’snightmareandhisfieldofdreams.Spinozawasbornin1632,butwehavenothingfromSpinozahimselfbeforeca.1658,themostlikelydatingforhisearliestphilosophicalwork;andnolettersfrombefore1661.Wehavehissixphilosophicalworks(twoofwhichwereabandonedbeforebeingcompleted,athirdleftunfin-ishedathisdeath),plustwootherwritings(includingtheHebrewgrammar).Andtheextantlettersthatwedohaveareallofprimarilyphilosophicalinterest;hisfriends,whentheyputtogetheraposthumouseditionofhisworks,apparentlydestroyedanylettersofapersonalorevenpoliticalnature.Thentherearethedocu-mentsaroundhisearlylife:thereishisheremorbanfromthePortuguesecongrega-tion,extantinaPortugueseversion(intherecordbookofthePortuguese-Jewishcommunity,whosearchivesarenowhousedintheAmsterdammunicipalarchives);andthereare(thankstoarchivalresearchbyscholarsthroughoutthetwentiethcen-tury)asignificantnumberofrecordsfromtheAmsterdamJewishcommunityregardinghisfamily,hiseducation,andtheenvironmentinwhichhewasraised.Therearealso,fromtheAmsterdammunicipalarchives,notarydocumentscon-cerningtheSpinozafamilybusinessandSpinoza’sownbriefcareerasanimporter/exporter(hewasapparentlyalousybusinessman).Wealsohavemanydocumentsrelated,inonewayoranother,tothematureSpinoza.Weknowwhohisfriendswere,wherehelived,whereandwhenhetraveled,andevenwhohislandlordsandneighborswere.Wehavesomeeyewitnessaccountsofhisbehavior,reportsofsomethingshemayhavesaid,andlotsofthingswrittenbycontemporariesabouthisideas,bybothalliesandfoes.WealsoknowagooddealaboutthisturbulentperiodoftheDutchRepublic,thepoliticalandreligioustensionsthatranbeneathitstranquilRuisdaelianlandscapeandwhosedangerousdevelopmentsinthelate1660ssoconcernedSpinoza.Byusingallofthisinformation,onecanmakeupforthelackofdirectpicturesofSpinozabycreatingakindofsilhouettedportraitofhim,byfillinginthespacesaroundhimandbuildingupthestructureswithinwhichheexisted.Wethuscapturehimevenifwecannotseethedetailsofthemanhimself—similar,inaway,tothemannerinwhichsomemedievalphilosophersbelievedthat,whilewecannotknowanythingpositiveaboutGod’sownessence,wecannonethelessknowmoreandmoreofGodthroughmakingnegativeattributions.AgoodexampleforthismethodistheShabbetaiZeviepisode,whichcausedagreatfrenzyinAmsterdamandothermajorcentersofJewishlifeinEuropeinthe9OeuvresdeMessireAntoineArnauld,43vols.(Paris:Sigismondd’Arnay,1775).\n188S.Nadlermid-seventeenthcentury.10WhenZviproclaimedhimselfthemessiahinJerusalemin1666,EuropeanJews,especiallySephardimbutAshkenazimaswell,wentintoastateofmessianichysteriaandbegansellingofftheirpropertyandmovingtotheHolyLand,onlytobeultimatelydisappointedwhenZevi,underthreatofdeathfromtheCaliphate,convertedtoIslam.ItisindubitablethatSpinozamusthavehadsomefinethingstosayaboutthismadness,aboutthereligiouspassionsthatunderliesuchirrationalbehavior.Unfortunately,iftherewerelettersinwhichheexpressedhisopinions—andtheresurelywere,sinceoneofhiscorrespondentsexplicitlyaskshimwhathethoughtofitall11—theyarelosttous.Butwecertainlyknow,fromhisphilosophicalwritings,whatSpinozawouldhavesaid,anditisnothardtorecon-structhistakeonthisevent.Thiskindofbiographicalwritingisarealchallenge,andthereinliesitsfascina-tion.Ittookalotofimaginativework,andIfoundittobeanextremelyrewardingandcreativeexperience.WhileIhadtohedgealotofmyclaimswithcowardlycaveats,annoyinghesitationsandthesubjunctivemood—“Spinozacouldhave…”,“Spinozawouldhave…”,“PerhapsSpinozadid…”—Ithinkwhatemergedwasarelativelyfulland(Ihope)colorfulportraitofanindividualdeeplyembeddedinhistimes,andnotmerelyanabstractionengagedinhypotheticalactions.Inaway,thedearthofconcreteevidencewasliberating,notlimiting.Ithinkareallyinterestingchallengewouldbetodothesameforaphilosophicalfigureforwhomwehaveevenlessdocumentarybiographicalmaterial:Socrates.LetmeclosewithsomeremarksthatelaborateonsomethingIsaidabove,namely,thatformethisbiographyofSpinozawaspersonallyaveryinterestingandimportantproject.Asphilosophers,wetendtowriteforanexceedinglysmallaudi-ence:ourselves.Likeallacademicdisciplines,wehaveourlingoorjargon,ourstyle,ourthemesandourprofessionalcautions.Andperhapsthisisasitshouldbe.Itisawonderfullifetodophilosophy,itisaveryrewardingandpleasurablewaytospendone’stime,regardlessofitsinstrumentalvalue.Butsometimes,justsome-times,onewantstoknowthatoneisreachingmorethanthe15otherspecialistsinone’sfield.Onewantstowritesomethingthatwillgetreadbeyondtheacademy,tomakeadifferenceandaffectpeoplewithideas.Technicalphilosophicalwriting,whetherinbooksorforjournals,isnotlikelytodothat.Abiography,ontheotherhand,hasagoodshotatit.ButIdidnotwanttostopworkinginmyareaofexper-tise,seventeenth-centuryphilosophy,sinceIremainedfascinatedbyit.IalsohadadeepinterestforalongtimeintheartandcultureoftheDutchGoldenAge.Finally,IhadadesiretoworkonsomethingthatrelatedtomyownJewishheritage.SoIconsideredwhethertherewassomeprojectthatmetallthesecriteria:aphilosophi-calsubjectfromtheseventeenthcenturywithaJewishangleintheDutchGoldenAgeandinagenreofwritingthatwouldbeaccessibletoabroaderaudience.WhenIrealizedthattherehadneverbeenabiographyofSpinoza,Ibasicallydiscovereda10Forastudyofthisepisode,seeGershomScholem,SabbataiSevi:TheMysticalMessiah(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1973).11SeeEp.33(fromHenryOldenburg),inSpinozaOpera,ed.CarlGebhardt,4vols.(Heidelberg:CarlWintersUniversitätsverlag,1972[1925]),vol.4,p.178.\n12WritingtheLivesofPhilosophers:ReflectionsonSpinozaandOthers189topicthatwouldbemyobsessionforatleastthenextdozenyearsandthatwouldresultinfivebooks.12Mylargerpointisthatitwouldbeaverygoodthingindeedforacademicphiloso-phyifphilosophers,withoutgivinguptheirspecializedphilosophicalinterests,none-thelesscouldfindawaytomakephilosophyinteresting,relevantandaccessibletonon-philosophers,ifphilosopherscouldreachouttothegeneraleducatedpublicthatwantstodomorethanwatch“realitytelevision”andwantstoextenditsreadingbeyondnovelsandMalcolmGladwell-typejournalisticruminations.Accessiblywrittenbiographiesofphilosophersisonewaytodothis,butnottheonlyway.Thegeneralabsenceofphilosophyfrompubliclifeinthiscountryisnotagoodthing,andconstitutesanimportantdifferencebetweenthecultural/intellectuallifehereandthecultural/intellectuallifeinEurope.Aftertheeventsof9/11,theAmericanmediawasfullofpoliticians,civicleaders,journalists,clergy,historians,evenpoetsandartistsreflectingonthetragedy.But,asfarasIcanrecall,notasinglephiloso-pher.AndIdaresaythatacademicphilosophyitselfbearssomeoftheblameforthis.ReferencesAitonEJ(1985)Leibniz:abiography.AdamHilger,Bristol/BostonAntognazzaMR(2009)Leibniz:anintellectualbiography.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeClarkeD(2006)Descartes:abiography.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeDavidsonH(2005)MosesMaimonides:themanandhiswork.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordFreudenthalJ(1904)Spinoza:SeineLebenundSeinLehre.Fr.FrommansVerlag,StuttgartGaukrogerS(1995)Descartes:anintellectualbiography.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordGrahamR(2006)Thegreatinfidel:alifeofDavidHume.Birlinn,LondonGraylingAC(2005)Descartes:thelifeandtimesofagenius.WalkerandCo.,NewYorkGullan-WuhrM(1998)Withinreason:alifeofSpinoza.JonathanCape,LondonHughesB(2010)Thehemlockcup:Socrates,Athens,andthesearchforthegoodlife.Knopf,NewYorkKraemerJL(2008)Maimonides:thelifeandworldofoneofcivilization’sgreatestminds.Doubleday,NewYorkKuehnM(2001)Kant:abiography.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeMartinichAP(1999)Hobbes:abiography.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeMossnerE(1954)ThelifeofDavidHume.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordNadlerS(1999)Spinoza:alife.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeNadlerS(2002)Spinoza’sheresy:immortalityandtheJewishmind.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordNadlerS(2003)Rembrandt’sJews.UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoNadlerS(2008)Spinoza’sethics:anintroduction.CambridgeUniversityPress,CambridgeNadlerS(2011)Abookforgedinhell:Spinoza’sscandaloustreatiseandthebirthofthesecularage.PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton12Spinoza:ALife(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999);Spinoza’sHeresy:ImmortalityandtheJewishMind(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002);Rembrandt’sJews(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2003);Spinoza’sEthics:AnIntroduction(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008);andABookForgedinHell:Spinoza’sScandalousTreatiseandtheBirthoftheSecularAge(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011).\n190S.NadlerNaviaLE(2007)Socrates:alifeexamined.PrometheusBooks,NewYorkRodis-LewisG(1999)Descartes:hislifeandthought.CornellUniversityPress,IthacaScholemG(1973)SabbataiSevi:themysticalMessiah.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonStroumsaS(2009)Maimonidesinhisworld:aportraitofaMediterraneanthinker.PrincetonUniversityPress,PrincetonvonDunin-BorkowskiS(1910)DerjungedeSpinoza.AschendorffscheVerlagsbuchhandlung,MünsterVroomanJR(1970)RenéDescartes:abiography.PutnamandSons,NewYorkWatsonRA(2002)CogitoErgoSum:thelifeofRenéDescartes.DavidR.Godine,BostonWoolhouseRS(2007)Locke:abiography.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge\nChapter13Hume’sOwnLifeAaronGarrettInthisessayIwillarguethatHumesautobiographicalMyOwnLifewasintendedtoofferahistoryofHume-the-writerandinsodoingtobothexhibitHumescreden-tialsasahistorianandhisskillatprovidingahistoryofaparticularlydifficultsubjecthimself.Thereisanobviousproblemofbiasorpartialityinprovidingahistoryofoneself.Humewasquiteawareofthis.FromtheopeningparagraphofMyOwnLifeheunderscoredthatwritingaboutonesselfseemedterriblyvain,andIwillarguethatHumeseekstocountertheclaimofbiasinhiswritingsforposteritybyofferingarela-tivelyunbiasedaccountofhimself.MyOwnLifeisdatedApril18,1776,3daysafterHumeattachedacodiciltohiswillwitharrangementsforhisburialplotandhisstipulationthathistomboughthaveaninscriptioncontainingonlymyname,withtheyearofmybirthanddeath,leavingittoposteritytoaddtherest.ClearlyHumehadsecondthoughtsaboutleavingtherestwhollytoposterity!IwillbeginbycomparingMyOwnLifewithHumesotherbestknownpieceofautobiographicalwriting,awell-knownlettercommonlyreferredtoastheLettertoaPhysician(henceforthLetter).TheLetterwaswritteninearly1734fivemonthsbeforeHumeleftforLaFlechewherehewroteATreatiseandover40yearsbeforeMyOwnLife.Thesetwopiecesofautobiographicalwritingareverydifferentwhichisnotsurprisinggiventhe40yearsbetweenthem.TheLetterisaprivate,anonymouslet-terwrittenbytheyoungHumetoalearneddoctorinwhichHumedescribedhisrecentpastandpresentmentalstate.Wedonotknowwhethertheletterwasactuallysent,norarewesuretowhomitwasmeanttobesent,althoughGeorgeCheyneA.Garrett(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,BostonUniversity,745CommonwealthAvenue,Boston,MA02215,USAe-mail:garrett@bu.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015191A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_13\n192A.Garrettseemsthemostlikelycandidate.1MyOwnLife,ontheotherhand,waswrittenforHumespresentandfuturereadersandtobereadagainstthebackgroundofhisliteraryaccomplishments.HumerequestedinacodiciltohiswillthatWilliamStrahanhispublisherattachMyOwnLifeandasketchtobewrittenbyAdamSmithtothenexteditionofhisWorks.2IntheinterimbetweenHumesdeathinlate1776andtheappearancein1778oftheneweditionofHumesHistoryofEnglandandEssaysandTreatisesonSeveralSubjects,MyOwnLifewasprintedintheScotsMagazinein1777andthen,asapamphlet,alongwithAdamSmithscontroversiallettertoStrahandescribingHumesdeath:TheLifeofDavidHume,Esq.WrittenByHimself.3ThepamphletwasimmediatelytranslatedintoFrenchandlatertranslatedintoLatin.WhentheneweditionoftheHistorywasadvertised,oneofitsmainsellingpointswasInthecourseofpublicationwillbegivenanAccountoftheLifeoftheAuthorwrittenbyHimself.MyOwnLife,alongwithSmithsdescription,wasaffixedtothebeginningoftheadvertisedneweditionaswellassubsequenteditions.Furthernotabledifferences.MyOwnLifefocusesalmostexclusivelyonHumesliterarycareer,wereastheLetterwaswrittenbeforetheliterarycareerstartedanddirectlybeforetheworkthatinitiatedthecareerratherdisappointinglyasitturnedoutwasbegun.Afterwritingtheletter,HumewenttoBristol,withsomerecommendationstoeminentmerchants,butinafewmonthsfoundthatscenetotallyunsuitableandsoproceededtoPariswherehehunkereddownandwrotetheTreatise.Furthermore,theLetterdescribesindetailamentalandphysicalmaladyakindofnervousexhaustionwhichHumethoughttobetheimpedimenttohimundertakingaphilosophicalorliterarycareer.Afterinitiallyplunginghimselfintophilosophyandcriticism,HumefoundthereseemdtobeopendupanewSceneofThought,whichtransportedmebeyondMeasure,&mademe,withanArdornaturaltoyoungmen,throwupeveryotherPleasureorBusinesstoapplyentirelytoit.IwasinfinitelyhappyinthisCourseofLifeforsomeMonths;tillatlast,aboutthebeginningofSeptr1729,allmyArdorseemedinamomenttobeextinguisht,&IcoudnolongerraisemyMindtothatpitch,whichformerlygavemesuchexcessivePleasure.4ThismentalexhaustionleftHumeunabletoputhisnotesintoanoverallform,toturnthetreesintoawell-workedforest,andsohesoughttheadviceofaphysicianwhowasalsoamanoflettersandwhomightrecognizethespecificsymptomsthatHumedescribedinorderthentoseewhetherhestillmighthopeforaliterarycareerevenwhiletakingupforthemomentthelifeofamerchanttohopefullycombattheexhaustionwithworldlyactivity.1SeeJohnP.Wright(2003)Dr.GeorgeCheyne,ChevalierRamsay,andHumesLettertoaPhysician.HumeStudies.29:1,125141.2RichardSher(2006)TheEnlightenmentandtheBook:ScottishAuthorsandTheirPublishersinEighteenth-CenturyBritain,Ireland,andAmerica.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,55.3Ibid.See5559foradiscussionoftheroleofStrahansviolationofHumesinstructionsintheconstructionoftheimageofHumeasauthor.4J.Y.T.Greig(ed.)(1932)TheLettersofDavidHume.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,v.I,13.\n13HumesOwnLife193Theseextraordinaryeventsstretchingover5yearsandcataloguedindetailintheLetteralongwithmentalandbodilysymptomsandattemptsatcureisdescribedasfol-lowsinMyOwnLifeandmyhealthbeingalittlebrokenbymyardentapplication,Iwastempted,orratherforced,tomakeaveryfeebletrialforenteringintoamoreactivesceneoflife.5AspresentedinMyOwnLifethecontentssocarefullydetailedintheLetterareamomentarylapsereportedbeforetheliteraryplanoflifebegins.Nowatfirstthismightnotbesurprising.Therewere40moreyearsofincidentsinHumeslife,manyasworthrecountingastheepisodedetailedintheLettertheintriguessurroundingHumesfailuretogetauniversitypost,thecontroversyovertheFourDissertationsandthefirstvolumeoftheHistoryofEngland,hismanyfriendshipsandhisfamousfallingoutwithRousseau,aswellashisresponsestomanyoftheimportanteventsofthedaysuchasthe45.WhatisstrikinginMyOwnLifeisthatthesedetailsenterintoHumesaccountofhislifeonlywhendirectlyrelevanttohisliterarycareer,aswiththebriefrepresentationoftheexperienceofmentalexhaustioncarefullyillustratedintheLetter.Indeed,afterHumesdeathavolumeappearedentitledSupplementtotheLifeofDavidHume,Esq.(1777)whichsupplementedMyOwnLifewithfunnyanecdotesandargued,sympatheti-cally,thatHumeslifewasnotquiteassereneashehadmadeitouttobe.ManyreadersknewofaspectsofHumeslifetheymighthavewishedHumetodiscuss,nottheleasthisreligionorlackthereofwhichmadehimacontroversialfigureinScotland.AdamSmithsletterdescribingHumesdeath,whichwaspub-lishedalongsideMyOwnLifeandwaspresumablyaddedtogiveadditionallustertoit,wasmuchmorecontroversialthantheworkitfollowed.NotthatHumehidfromallposthumouscontroversy,hearrangedtohaveSmithpublishtheDialoguesonNaturalReligion.ButMyOwnLife,thehistoryofhiswritings,isnotableforabsenceofcontroversialclaimsandforitsirenicleanness.Why?ToanswerthiswehavetoturntoHumequahistorian.Aspreviouslynoted,HumereferstoMyOwnLifeasprovidingaHistoryofhiswritings.HeuseshistorytodescribethemaincontentsoftheLetteraswell.Thetermhistoryhadwidescopeanddidnotsolelyrefertowhathistoriansdo.AswouldbeexpectedHumeusedhistoryinanumberofsensesbuttwoareparticu-larlyrelevant.First,Humesometimesusedhistorytomeanarecountingoforastorymadeupoffacts,events,andincidentsthatcouldthenbeusedasthebasisfordeduction,induction,etc.Wemightcallthisanatomicalhistory.TheLetterisastorymeantbyHumetoprovidefactsabouthismentalandphysicalstatetoaphysi-cianinhopethatthephysicianwillrecognizethedetailsandofferhimhope.Itismorethanthat,obviously,butitseemsclearthatitisnotmeantasahistoryinthesenseoftheworkofahistorian,muchthelessinthespecialsensethatHumewoulddevelopfromthe1740sonward,andinparticularinwritingtheHistoryofEngland.HumesHistoryofEnglandwasahistoryinamorerobustandtechnicalsense.Historyinthissensealsoconcernedclearlysettingoutpastevents,butwithcausalexplanationswhenpossible.IntheNaturalHistoryofReligionHumeusedpsychology5DavidHume,MyOwnLifeinEssaysMoral,Political,andLiterary.E.F.Miller(ed.).Indianapolis:LibertyPress,1985,xxxiii.HenceEMPL.\n194A.Garretttoprovideacoherent,causalexplanationofapparentlydisunifiedreportsandhistoricalrecordsofreligiouspractices.IntheHistoryofEnglandHumesoughttoprovidecoher-entcausalexplanationsaswell,forexampletheanalysisinVolumeIofhowtheemer-genceofstablelaw,theindependenceofthebaronyandofLondon,andtheluckoftheEnglishpeopleinhavingmonarchslikeKingAlfredwholaidthegroundforimportantinstitutionsallgaverisetoEnglandsdistinctiveliberty.Thegoalofrobusthistoryinprovidingrelevantcausalexplanationsandcontextwastounderminefactionalmisuseofstoriesaboutthepast.HumewroteinMyOwnLifethathebegantheHistoryofEnglandwiththeaccessionoftheHouseofStuartbecausethatwastheepochwhenthemisrepresentationsoffactionbeganchieflytotakeplace(EMPLxxxvi),andsoimpliedthathisgoalwastoclarifypastmisconceptionsinordertodefangpres-entconflict.Humehopedmisconceptionsaboutthereign,whichfueledpresentdestruc-tivepartyfactionandwouldcontinuetodosoifnotcounteredwouldbedissolvedbyexplainingthegroundsforcontentiousclaimsandcontroversialeventsandcharactersandofferingeven-handedjudgments.Thetwomainobjectsofrobusthistorywereparticularpastcharactersandevents.Thatahistorianwouldbeinterestedineventsisunsurprising,butcharactersisper-hapsabitmoresurprising.HumesawrightlythatthecharactersofrulerswereusedforfactionalpurposesCharlesIandCromwellandhewishedtoprovidecarefulreflectionsoncharactersasderivedfromasurveyofactionsandeventsinordertominimizetheirfactionalizingforce.TheHistoryofEnglandisalmostentirelydividedbyreigns,andmostofHumesaccountsofreignsconsistofannalsofeventsduringthereignandthenasummaryviewofthecharacteroftherulerasarisingfromthesurveyoftheeventsandoftenanidentificationofoneormorerulingpassions.Soforoneofmanyexamples,HumeconcludeshistreatmentofRichardIwith:Themostshiningpartofthisprincescharacterarehismilitarytalents.Noman,eveninthatromanticage,carriedpersonalcourageandintrepiditytoagreaterheight;andthisqualitygainedhimtheappellationofthelion-hearted,coeurdelion.Hepassionatelylovedglory,chieflymilitaryglory;andashisconductinthefieldwasnotinferiortohisvalour,heseemstohavepossessedeverytalentnecessaryforacquiringit.Hisresentmentsalsowerehigh;hisprideunconquerable;andhissubjects,aswellashisneighbours,hadthereforereasontoapprehend,fromthecontinuanceofhisreign,aperpetualsceneofbloodandviolence.Ofanimpetuousandvehementspirit,hewasdistinguishedbyallthegood,aswellasthebadqualities,incidenttothatcharacter:Hewasopen,frank,generous,sincere,andbrave;hewasrevengeful,domineering,ambitious,haughty,andcruel.6InsomecasesHumeisfarlessadmiring,andinthecasesofsomeoftheearlierkings,ofHenryVIIIandofCromwellHumeadmitshecannotreallyarriveatasynopticcharacterjudgmentfromtheeventsofthemonarchslifeduetolackofevidenceintheearlykings,todrasticandevenconflictingactionsindifferentperi-odsoflifeinthecaseofHenryVIII,andtoextremeinconsistencyofactionswithCromwell.6D.Hume(1778)TheHistoryofEngland.LibertyFund:LibertyClassics,1983.v.I,403.\n13HumesOwnLife195FollowingHumesmentionofhisimpendingdeathheconcludeshistoricallywithhisowncharacter:Iwas,Isay,amanofmilddispositions,ofcommandoftemper,ofanopen,social,andcheer-fulhumour,capableofattachment,butlittlesusceptibleofenmity,andofgreatmoderationinallmypassions.Evenmyloveofliteraryfame,myrulingpassion,neversouredmytemper,notwithstandingmyfrequentdisappointments.Mycompanywasnotunacceptabletotheyoungandcareless,aswellastothestudiousandliterary;andasItookaparticularpleasureinthecompanyofmodestwomen,IhadnoreasontobedispleasedwiththereceptionImetwithfromthem.Inaword,thoughmostmenanywiseeminent,havefoundreasontocom-plainofcalumny,Ineverwastouched,orevenattackedbyherbalefultooth:andthoughIwantonlyexposedmyselftotherageofbothcivilandreligiousfactions,theyseemedtobedisarmedinmybehalfoftheirwontedfury.Myfriendsneverhadoccasiontovindicateanyonecircumstanceofmycharacterandconduct:notbutthatthezealots,wemaywellsuppose,wouldhavebeengladtoinventandpropagateanystorytomydisadvantage,buttheycouldneverfindanywhichtheythoughtwouldwearthefaceofprobability.(EMPLxl)Theparallelisobvious,andwouldhavebeenallthemoreobviouswhenMyOwnLifewasaffixedtothefirstvolumeoftheHistoryofEngland.Humeispro-vidingageneralevaluationofnotablequalitiesofhisowncharacterasconsistentwithorderivedfromtheeventsofhislifedetailedpreviouslyandarulingpassionnotloveofglorybutloveofliteraryfame.AndtheparallelimplieshemeansustotakeMyOwnLifeasabriefbutrobusthistory.Butthereisanobviousproblem.Thefocusonparticularpastcharactersandeventsmadetheobjectofhistorydistinctivelydifferentbothfromtheobjectoftheo-reticalorabstractphilosophy(whichconsideredcharactersingeneral)andtheobjectofcommonlife(whichconsidersproximateparticularcharactersinrelationtoonesowninterests):Whenamanofbusinessentersintolifeandaction,heismoreapttoconsiderthecharactersofmen,astheyhaverelationtohisinterest,thanastheystandinthemselvesWhenaphilosophercontemplatescharactersandmannersinhiscloset,thegeneralabstractviewoftheobjectsleavesthemindsocoldandunmoved,thatthesentimentsofnaturehavenoroomtoplay,andhescarcefeelsthedifferencebetweenviceandvirtue.Historykeepsinajustmediumbetwixttheseextremes,andplacestheobjectsintheirtruepointofview.Thewritersofhistory,aswellasthereaders,aresufficientlyinterestedinthecharactersandevents,tohavealivelysentimentofblameorpraise;and,atthesametime,havenoparticu-larinterestorconcerntoperverttheirjudgment.(OftheStudyofHistory,EMPL5678)Inotherwords,historiansevaluateparticularhumancharactersandeventsinamannerintermediatebetweentheinterestedembeddedstanceofcommonlifeandthedisinterestedgeneralviewofthephilosopher.Themoreremotethehistoryintimeandplacetheeasieritistomaintainthisintermediateposition,butthemoredifficultitistofindreliableinformation.Theclosertheeventsthemorereliabletheinformationbutthegreaterdifficultymaintainingneutrality.WhentheHistoryofEnglandappeared,itwasverycontroversial(oneofthefewcontroversiesthatHumeunderscoresinMyOwnLife)becauseasnotedmuchofthereadershiphadinterestsandallegiancesinthepresentwithrespecttothesubjectmatter.WhenthediscussionofthehistoryoftheancientSaxonsappearedtherewasconsiderablylesscontroversybutalsoconsiderablylessevidence.\n196A.GarrettHumewasacontroversialfigureandhewrotecontroversialworks.TheparallelbetweentheobjectofrobusthistoryandtheobjectofMyOwnLifepointstoapar-allelbetweenagoalofrobusthistoryandacentralgoalofMyOwnLifetodecou-pleHumethepagan,theconfrereandthenenemyofRousseauandsoforth,fromthecharacterofHumethehistorianinsuchawaythatreaderswouldfinditdifficulttodismisshisworkormisrepresentitscontentsbyassociationinthesamewaythatheattemptedtodecouplethecontroversiesoftheStuartregimeandthecharactersofCharlesIandCromwellfrompresentWhigandToryfactionalpolitics.Butnowtheobviousproblem.Whatcharacteroreventscouldonebemoreinter-estedin,andthusmorelikelytomisrepresent,thanonesownparticularlifeandworks?Thiswouldseemtobe,indeedis,theparticularcharacterwithwhichwearemostconcernedincommonlife.Toimpartiallyextricateonesownlifefromcom-monlifeisnonetooeasy.Listingsymptomsinastoryinhopeofacure,asHumedidintheLetter,seemsfarlessproblematic.AndwhatphilosopherwouldseethisproblemforHumeHistorianmoreclearlythanHumeSceptic?Humedid,though,providesomesupportthathisevaluationofhisownlifemightbereasonablydisinterestedhereareafewexamples.First,heintroducedthesur-veyofhischaracterjustmentionedwith:ItisdifficulttobemoredetachedfromlifethanIamatpresentToconcludehistoricallywithmyowncharacter.Iam,orratherwas(forthatisthestyleImustnowuseinspeakingofmyself,whichembold-ensmethemoretospeakmysentiments)(EMPLxl).ThismirrorstheopeningpassageofMyOwnLife,Itisdifficultforamantospeaklongofhimselfwithoutvanity;therefore,Ishallbeshort(EMPLxxxi).Werealizeasweareconcludingthattheworkwasindeedshort,andHumebolstersthelackofvanitybyclaimingthatbecausehewasneardeathhewaslesssusceptibletoselfinterestandconse-quentlybetterabletoappraisehisownactionsdisinterestedlyinsofarashehadlittleselfishinterestinthefutureconsequencesofhisactions.Therewasnothinghe,thelivingHume,couldgetfromabiasedpresentationsincehewassoonnottobe.Next,HumestressedhisfinancialindependenceinMyOwnLifeandthatunlikemanyofhiscontemporariesheneverneededtorelyonapatron.AgainHumeinvitedthereadertoseehimasdisinterested,reinforcinghimasadisinterestedjudgeingeneral.Also,inthedescriptionofhischaracter,Humeoffersverifiableevidencethathehasdrawnhispictureroughlyright:myfriendsneverhadocca-siontovindicateanyonecircumstanceofmycharacterandconduct:notbutthatthezealots,wemaywellsuppose,wouldhavebeengladtoinventandpropagateanystorytomydisadvantage,buttheycouldneverfindanywhichtheythoughtwouldwearthefaceofprobability(EMPLxli).Butmostimportantly,Humeistryingtoshowhissuitabilitytotheeventsofhislifeasameansofunderscoringtheneutralityofhiswritingsbywhathedoesntsay.Asnoted,Humedescribestheeventsofhisliferelevanttohisliterarycareer,i.e.,primarilyeventssurroundinghispublishedwritings.HedoestreatanumberofthecontroversiesaroundhisworkovertheStuartandTudorvolumesoftheHistory,theNaturalHistoryofReligionandhisEssays.Butinportrayingtheevents,Humeiscarefultopresentthecontroversiesasunimportant,althoughinthecaseoftheStuartvolumeoftheHistoryheadmitstherewasmuchadobutsinceitwasfromall\n13HumesOwnLife197sidesitdidnotshowHumetobebiasedinhispresentation.Andasnotedtherewerenumerouscontroversiesthatwentunmentioned.IndoingsoHumeshowshisequa-nimityandthedisinterestedtempersuitabletothehistorian.SoMyOwnLifeisbestunderstoodasaself-applicationofthegoalsandobjectofHumesHistorywithsomejustificationwerethatHumewasuptothedifficultyoftheenterprise.Allrightthen.ButIhopeyouarethinkingisthatHumeyouvepresented?Itsoundslikeanhair-shirtedascetic!IhavedownplayedthedryhumorinMyOwnLife,mainlyhumorathisownexpenseabouthisowninabilitytostircontroversy.ButIwillconcludebynotingaplayfulpointthatHumeseemstobemaking.Asmentioned,Humestatesthatloveofliteraryfamewashisguidingpassion.Thiswouldseemtosuggestatendencytoinflatehisownworks.FurthermoreHumegoesoutofhiswaytounderscorehisvanity;theworkopenswiththreementionsofvanityandconcludeswithonemorevanitybookendsthework.Thiswouldfurthersuggestunreliability.Loveoffame,though,hasaspecificmeaningforHume:prideorvanityderivedfromtheopinionsofothersviasympathyand,morespecifically,theopinionsofdiscerningotherswhoextolusforthequalitiesinwhichwechieflyexcel.MyOwnLifedetailsthesuccessesandfailuresofthatatwhichHumechieflyexcelledwriting.Insayinghewasdrivenbyloveoffameheissayingthathewasdriventobeadmiredforthequalityofhiswritingbycriticscapableofappreciatingthem.ThismotivationisnotatalldubiousforHume,infactitdrivesmuchofwhatisworthwhileinartsandletters.SimilarlyvanityisnotstrictlypejorativeforHumeHumeoftenusesprideandvanityinterchangeablyandprideisthefundamentalpassionbehindtheloveoffameandmanypositivesocialaccomplishments.Thatsaidintheintroductorypara-graphvanityisclearlypejorativeMyOwnLifeisshortinordertopreventvan-ityandfurthermorethefailuresofHumesearlywritingswerenotmuchtobevainabout.Butintheconcludingparagraphvanityisusedinadifferentsense,ofjusti-fiedpride.TheextraordinaryconcludingsentenceIcannotsaythereisnovanityinmakingthisfuneralorationofmyself,butIhopeitisnotamisplacedone;andthisisamatteroffactwhichiseasilyclearedandascertainedmakesmycaseinanut-shell.Vanityisnotbadifjustifiedandiftheobjectofvanityisonescharacterasawritertheonlywaytoconfirmitisthroughthewriting.HumeaskedthatMyOwnLifebeplacedatthebeginningofhisworksandthereasonisnowapparent.Thebestwaytodismissscepticismaboutanauthorscapacitytopresentanaccuratehistoryofhimself,evenwhenpresentedwithvarioussupports,isconsultingtheobjectofthehistoryitself.LookpastHumetothewritings.AndinthiscasetheobjectisreadilyavailabletothesortofdiscerningandjudiciousreaderwhosepraiseHumemightcareforitdirectlyfollowsafterMyOwnLife.AsInotedatthebeginning,Humehadsecondthoughtsaboutthenaïveteofleav-ingonlyaninscriptioncontainingonlymyname,withtheyearofmybirthanddeath,leavingittoposteritytoaddtherest.HumetheHistorian,theadmirerofTacitus,knewalltoowellhowwritingscouldbemisconstruedandmisusedcoun-teringthiswasacentralgoalofhisownHistory.BecauseHumetheSkeptichad\n198A.Garrettbecomealiabilitytohiswritingsbyassociation,heneededtoassociateadifferentmoreminimalandjudiciousHumewithhiswritingssothattheycouldbereadwithaclearmindandnotjustdismissedbysillybigots.InthissenseMyOwnLifeisanextraordinaryliterarydisappearingact,allowingoneHumetorecedesothatposteritymightreadhiswritingswithoutBias.ReferencesGreigJYT(ed)(1932)ThelettersofDavidHume.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordHumeD(1778)ThehistoryofEngland.LibertyFund:LibertyClassics,1983.v.IHumeD(1985)Myownlife.In:MillerEF(ed)Essaysmoral,political,andliterary.LibertyPress,IndianapolisSherR(2006)Theenlightenmentandthebook:Scottishauthorsandtheirpublishersineighteenth-centuryBritain,Ireland,andAmerica.UniversityofChicagoPress,ChicagoWrightJP(2003)Dr.GeorgeCheyne,ChevalierRamsay,andHumeslettertoaphysician.HumeStud29(1):125141\nChapter14The(Ir)relevanceofBiography:TheCaseofFichteManfredKuehn14.1ThethemeofthissectionofthevolumeisIntellectualandPhilosophicalBiography.IfIunderstandcorrectlythedemandsplaceduponmebythisthemeandthefactthatIamalsoaskedtodirectsomeofmycommentsspecificallyatthecaseJohannGottliebFichte,thenIshouldsaysomethingabouttheconditionsofthepossibilityofphilo-sophicalbiographyingeneralandalsodiscusssomeofthespecialproblemspresentedbyFichte.It’scleartomethatIverywellmightnothaveunderstoodmytaskcorrectly,andthatitismyKantianperversionthatmakesmetakethequestioninthisway.Butbethatasitmay,thatiswhatyouaregoingtoget.Accordingly,Ishallfirstdiscusssomewidelyheldviewsaboutthephilosophicalrelevanceandeventheverypossibilityofphilosophicalbiography.Secondly,IshalltrytorepresentFichte’sviewsconcerningthissubject,andthirdlyshowthat,inspiteofFichte’sattemptstodownplaytheimpor-tanceofbiography,hisownbiographyisnotatallunimportantforunderstandinghisthought.Indoingso,IshallpayparticularattentiontowhatIcall“theSiegfriedmotive,”apologizinginadvancefortheWagnerianovertones.Ifthereistime,Iwill,bywayofaconclusion,makesomecommentsonwhatItaketobethesignificanceofallthis.14.2Insomeways,therelationbetweenthelivesandthetheoriesofphilosophershasbeenaproblemfromtheverybeginningsofWesternphilosophy.ThestoryofThales,whostudiedthestarsandfellintoawellbecause,totheamusementofaM.Kuehn(*)DepartmentofPhilosophy,BostonUniversity,745CommonwealthAvenue,Boston,MA02215,USAe-mail:kuehnm@bu.edu©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015199A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0_14\n200M.KuehnThracianmaid,hedidnotpayattentiontothethingsnearesttohim,isaswellknownastheSocraticclaimintheMenothat,whilehemayneverbesurewhetherhisstoryaboutthenatureofrealitywasright,wewould“bebetter,braver,andmoreactivemenifwebelieveitrighttolookforwhatwedon’tknowthanifwebelievethereisnopointinlookingbecausewhatwedon’tknowwenevercandiscover”(86b).Andtheancientcriticsofskepticismdidbelievethatthequestionwhetheraskeptic“canlive”hisskepticismwashighlyrelevanttoadiscussionofskepticism.Noneofthismeant,ofcourse,thatthebiographyofaparticularphilosopherwasnecessarilyrelevantforunderstandingthephilosopher’stheory.Philosophyandlifemightbeintimatelyconnected,andthephilosophershouldlivehisphilosophyratherthanmerelyteachorprofessit,butitwasthephilosophicalidealtowhichweshouldaspirethatwasmuchmoreimportantthananyparticularcharacteristicsofthepeoplewhoweretryingtoachieveit.The“self”wasnotasrelevanthereaswasthetotalityoftherealitywithwhichonewastoidentify.AsHeraclitusalreadyfound:“Humannaturehasnorealunderstanding;onlydivinenaturehasit”(fragment61),and“aman’scharacterishisguardiandivinity”(fragment69).PierreHadotcertainlygotthismuchright,andMichelFoucaultgotthisverywrong.Biography,accordingly,islargelyunphilosophicalandthereforeuninterestingfromaphilosophicalpointofview.Whiletheworksofotherwriters,likethoseofDiogenesLaaertiuswhoseLivesandOpinionsofthosewhoHaveDistinguishedThemselvesinPhilosophy,pointinadifferentdirection,thedoxographictraditiontowhichhebelongedisdismissedbymanyastoounphilosophical.ItwasmainlyHegel,who,forbetterorworse,madeasharpdistinctionbetweentheindividualpersonalityandtheparticularcharacterofaphilosopherand“freethoughtandtheuniversalcharacterofhumanbeingsquahumanbeings[whose]impersonal[eigntümlichkeitslose]thoughtisitselfthepro-ductivesubject”ofthetruehistoryofphilosophy.Whatmakesforthespecialchar-acterofaphilosopherbelongsinpoliticalhistory,notinthehistoryofphilosophy.Philosophicalbiography,onthisview,isanoxymoron.ThemostconsistentfollowerofHegelinthisregardwasperhapsR.G.Collingwood.ThushedifferentiatedsharplyinhisposthumouslypublishedPrinciplesofHistorybetweentruehistoryandbiography.1Whileheconsideredhistoryandespeciallythehistoryofthoughtaneminentlyrespectableoccupation,hediscountedbiographyaltogether.Hissloganwent:“allhistoryisthehistoryofthought”(67).Thehistorian’saim“istotracethethoughtembodiedinaction”(70).Onemightthinkthatthisisalsowhatthebiographerdoes,butCollingwoodwillhavenothingofthis,claimingthatthe“biographer…includesinhissubjectagooddealwhichdoesnotbelongintheobjectofanyhistoricalstudywhatever”(70).Inotherwords,thebiographerislikelytoincludeinhissubjecteventswhich“embodynothoughtwhatsoever,”andevenwhenanactionisdescribedthatembodiesathought,itisnotincludedbecauseitembodiesathought,butratherforits“gossipvalue”(70).Inotherwords,forCollingwood,allbiographydevolvesultimatelyintogossip.1CollingwoodR.G.(2001)ThePrinciplesofHistoryandOtherWritingsinPhilosophyofHistory.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.\n14The(Ir)relevanceofBiography:TheCaseofFichte201Collingwoodclaimedthathedidnotchoose“gossipvalue”inaderogatoryspirit,butitshouldbeclearthathedidnotchoose“gossipvalue”becauseitisentirelyfreefromcondescensioneither.Thatthisissoisabundantlyclearfromhisinabilitytoresisttheclaimthatbiographyalsohas“snobberyvalue,”andthenformulatetheprinciple:“gossipvalueplussnobbery-value,bothofthemfraudulent”(75).Gossiphasforhimtodowithsympathyandmalice,withemotionsthatcharacterizehumanbeingsasmereanimals.“Theindividualitywhich…arousesoursympathyisnottheindividualityofananimalrationale,itistheindividualityofananimalpureandsimple”(71).It’sthesamekindofsympathywemayhavefor“anydog”wesee“runoverinthestreet”(71).Andthesearethestringsthebiographerplays.Inotherwords,“thepurposeofbiographyistostimulateemotion”(72)withoutany“scien-tificvalue”(73).The“animalvicissitudes”ofourlives(birth,death,etc.)arejustnotthatinterestingfromthepointofviewofthehistoryofthought.Furthermore,biographycanforCollingwoodbenothingbuta“scissorsandpasteaffair”,thoughheismuchlessclearonwhythatmustbeso.Butthisisnotsomuchtothepointinthiscontext.WhatisimportanthereisthatforCollingwood,asforHegel,biographyquabiographyisofnecessityunphilosophical.ThisattitudeisnotrestrictedtomoderateidealistslikeCollingwood.TakeRichardRorty,forinstance,wholateinhislifeseemedtohaveshedmostofhisanalyticconvictionsandinsteadendorsedmanypost-modernistcommonplaces.Healsotook“aperson’smoralcharacter—hisorherselectivesensitivity…tobeshapedbychanceeventsinhisorherlife.”2Healsoarguedthatthesechanceeventshavelittleornothingtodowith“thetools”thataphilosophermayhave“inventedatvarioustimestoaccomplishoneoranotherobject.”3Indeed,RortythoughtthatintheparticularcaseofHeidegger,wemighteasilyimagineother“chanceevents”and“independentvariations,”another“slightlydifferentworld,”inwhichHeideggerdivorcedhiswife,marriedaJewishwoman,emigratedtotheU.S.A.,taughtattheUniversityofChicago,hadason,wasdivorcedbyhiswife,whobecameapassion-ateZionistandtooktheirsontoPalestine,whereheultimatelydiesontheGolanHeights,whileHeideggerhimselfreturnstoFreiburgin1948,receives,amongotherhonors,membershipintheorderPourleMerite.Atthesametime,RortyasksustoimaginethatthebooksHeideggerwroteinthispossibleworldwouldbeonlyslightlydifferentfromtheonesheactuallywrote.4WhileRortydoesnotgosofar2RichardRorty(1994),“AnotherPossibleWorld,”inMartinHeidegger.Politics,ArtandTechnology.Ed.byKarstenHarriesandChristophJamme.(NewYork/London:HolmesandMeier),p.37.3Rorty,“AnotherPossibleWorld,”p.35.4Perhapsabiographer’staskismainlyofnegativerelevanceinthephilosophicalcontext,i.e.toshowhow“thephilosophicaltools”ofathinkershouldnotbeapplied(iftheyaretobeappliedforthetaskthethinkerdevelopedthemfor.EversincethetimeofDescartesandthebeginningofmodernphilosophy,ithasbeen,touseLocke’sphrase,“ambitionenough[forphilosophers]tobeemployedasanUnder-LabourerinclearingtheGroundalittle,andremovingsomeoftheRubbish,thatliesinthewaytoKnowledge.”(Essay10).Perhapsabiographerinphilosophyshouldbeviewedasanunder-Labourerofotherunder-laborers(whomayindeedbetruephilosophers),andbeengagedinapreliminaryclearingof“theGround…removingsomeoftheRubbish,thatliesin\n202M.Kuehnastoclaimthatphilosophicalbiographyisimpossible,hedoessuggestthatitisoflimitedornovalueforunderstandingthephilosophicaltheoriesofanyone.Itisprettymuchirrelevantforphilosophicalconcerns.Itappearstomethatanyonewhoisengagedinwritingabiographyofaphiloso-pherneeds,insomewayorother,toaddresssuchviews.Theresponsemightbeindirectordirect.Likemostbiographers,IhavetriedtheindirectrouteinmyKantbiographyandalsofollowthisapproachintheFichtebiography.Inotherwords,biographerstypicallytrytoshowthatthelifeoftheirsubjectisphilosophicallyinterestingwithoutexplicitlytellingthereaderthatitisordevelopingargumentstotheeffectthattheopposingviewiswrong.ThispaperisinsomewaysmyfirstattemptatmakingexplicittomyselfwhatsuchadirectresponsewithinthecontextoftheFichtebiographymightormightnotinvolve.Ihopeitisnotjustofinteresttomyself.14.3ImmanuelHermannFichte,JohannGottliebFichte’sonlychildandtheauthorofthefirstsignificantbiographiesofhisfather(1830and1862),feltthatJohannGottliebFichtewasauniquesubjectforabiography,justbecausehewas“differentfromotherthinkers,histeachingwasmostgenuinelyandexclusivelytheimprintofhispersonality”(vii).“Hisdoctrineinitsentiretyisunderstandableonlythroughhispersonalcharacter,foritistheperfectexpressionandconsequenceofthischarac-ter”(viii).Andjustbecausehewasconvincedofit,heconceivedhistaskasoneofshowinghowFichte’sentiredevelopmenthadtobeunderstoodasanautonomousdevelopmentandnotasdeterminedbythemerelyexternalinfluenceofotherphiloso-phers,suchasKant,Reinhold,orSchelling.Hisfatherwas,hethought,“agenuinelyGermanthinker”whogaveexpressionto“thedeeplymoralcoreofournation(Volk),ofitshonesty,conscientiousnessandsimpleincorruptibilityofitsessence.”Inotherwords,hewas“thestrongestexpressionofthesimpleandunadorned,buthonorablecharacteristicsoftheGermanicessence”(x).KunoFischer,tonamejustoneotherexampleforthisapproach,claimed:“Fichteisamongthemodernphiloso-phersaphenomenalcharactersingularinkind,justbecausehischaractercombinestwoqualitieswhichotherwiserepeleachother:theintrovertedloveofspeculationandafieryextrovertedloveofactiononthestageoftheworld”(I,125).HealsoviewsFichte’sthoughtas“inextricablyinterwoven”withhispersonality(I,133).Inotherwords,Fichte’scharacterandlifearekeytounderstandinghisphilosophy.theway”ofthosewhoreallywanttounderstandwhatathinkerissaying.Theeffectsofthisworkwillnotalwaysbepredictable.Itmaymaketheworkofsomephilosopherseasier,itmayremovesomuchoftherubblethatthereisnothinglefttodoforsomeonewhothoughttherewasatleastsomepaperinthematter,itmayunderminesomeapparentlysolidphilosophicalheapsofrubble,anditmayevenopenupentirelynewprospectsforothersbyshowinghowimplausibleandinco-herentsomeofthe“slightlydifferentworlds”imaginedbyphilosophersreallyare.\n14The(Ir)relevanceofBiography:TheCaseofFichte203OnemightthinkthatthisapproachisverymuchinkeepingwithFichte’sownviewsofthematter.Afterall,hefamouslysaidin1797:Whatkindofphilosophysomeonechoosesdependsonthekindofpersonheis,foraphilo-sophicalsystemdoesnotconsistofdeadfurnishingsonemightdiscardoracquireatwill,butitisenlivenedbythesoulofthemanwhohasit.Acharacterthatisflaccidbynatureoronethathasbeenmadeflaccidandcrookedbyspiritualservility,scholarlyluxuryandcon-ceit,willneverelevatehimselftoidealism.(I,434)Hethenwentontoclaimthat“onemustbebornasaphilosopher,onemustbeeducatedasphilosopher,andonemusteducateoneselfasaphilosopher,butonecannot,byanyhumanart,bemadeintoone”(I,434).Inotherwords,eitheroneisbornasaphilosopher,andthusreceivesone’seducationasaphilosopher,and(then)alsoeducatesoneselfphilosophically,oronewillneverunderstand,atleastifwearetobelieveFichte.TounderstandFichte,however,wemustseethattheseclaimsarepolemicallymotivated.Hedoesnotmeantosuggestthattherearemanydifferentkindsofphilo-sophicalsystemsthatsomeonemayadoptonthebasisofhisorhercharacter.Therearereallyonlytwosystems,namely,theonehecalls“dogmatism”andtheotherwhichheidentifiesas“idealism,”butwhichisinfactnothingbuthisownsystem.Yet,thissimpleoppositionofdogmatismandidealismdoesnotquitecapturethespiritofhisclaim,ifonlybecausedogmatismisnottrulyphilosophyatall.Itismerepseudo-philosophy,andthe“onlytruephilosophy”isidealism.Thedogmaticthinkerisalsomorallydefective,sincewhencriticized,he“becomeszealous,twiststhings,andwouldpersecute,ifhehadthepowertodoso.”Theideal-istphilosopher,ontheotherhand,“remainscool,andalwaysindangerofridiculingthedogmatist”(I,435).Ifthatwerenotenough,thedogmatististypicallyanoldpersonand“fullyformed”(schongemacht).Idealism,bycontrast,iswhatmaybehopedforintheyoung.Evenwithoutfurtheranalysisofthetextinwhichtheseclaimsarefound,itshouldbeclearthat“idealism”representsFichte’sownview,while“dogmatism”referstotheviewsofthosewhowoulddisagreewithhim.Thepassagerepresentsnothingbutanargumentumadhominemagainstthosewhodis-agreewithhim.Soonemightperhapsargueonthebasisofthistextthatthebiogra-phyof“theidealist”maywellbephilosophicallyrewarding,evenifthebiographyofthedogmatistisjustasworthlessasthepseudo-philosophytowhichitgaverise.ThatthisisnotFichte’sviewcanbeseenfromatextof1799inwhichhereflectsinamoreprincipledwayontherelationbetweenphilosophyandlife,claimingthatWecannotknow(erkennen)whatweareentangledin.Wemustgobeyonditandlookatitfromapointofviewthatisexternaltoit.Thisgettingbeyondourreallife,thispointofviewoutsideofitisspeculation.Andonlyinsofarastherearethesetwodifferentpointsofview,thehigheroneaboveandbesideslife,isitforuspossibletoknowourselves.Wemaylive—andperhapsevenliveinaccordancewithreason—withoutspeculating;forwecanlivewithoutknowinglife;butwecannotknowlifewithoutspeculating.(V,343)Wemightwonderaboutthetruthoftheseclaims.Theyseemobviouslyfalsetome.NorisFichtecorrectwhenheclaimsthatthisexpressesKant’spointofview,ashisattempttoestablishthenecessaryconditionsofthepossibilityofexperiencedoesnotonlynotpresupposeapointofviewthatwouldbeindependentofour\n204M.Kuehnexperience,butactuallyshowsthatsuchaspeculativepointofviewisnotavailabletousinprinciple.ButwecannotdoubtthatthisisFichte’sownview.Thereisthedogmatismofourlivesandthenthereistheidealismofspeculation:Allrealityoriginatesforusexplicitlyanddeterminatelythroughnon-philosophizing,i.e.eitherthroughthefailureofeverrisingtophilosophicalabstractioninthefirstplace,orthroughpermittingoneselftofallbackintothemechanismoflife;andtheotherwayaround,justasoneascendstopurespeculation,thisrealitynecessarilydisappears,becausewehavefreedourselvesfromthemechanismofthoughtonwhichitisfounded.(V,342)Fichteadmitsthatlife,andnotspeculation,isourgoal.Itisnecessary.Speculationisonlyameans,namelyameansforknowingtheworld.Thetwo,lifeandspeculation,areonlydeterminablethrougheachother.Lifeisquiteproperlynon-philosophizing;philosophizingisnothingbutnon-living;andIknownobetterdetermina-tionofthesetwoconceptsthanthis.Itisacompleteanti-thesis,andapointofunionbetweenthemisasimpossibleasthecomprehensionoftheXthatunderliestheSubject-Object-Self;excepttheconsciousnessoftherealphilosopherthatthesetwopointsofviewexistforhim.(V,343)Fichtegoesevenfurther,claimingthat“ourphilosophicalthinkingmeansnoth-ingandhasnosubstancewhatsoever;onlythethinkingthatisthoughtinthisthink-inghasmeaningandhassubstance.Ourphilosophicalthinkingismerelyaninstrumentbymeansofwhichwebuildourwork.Oncetheworkiscompleted,theinstrumentshouldbediscarded”(V,341).IfIunderstandthiscorrectly,thennoteventhetextswrittenbythespeculativephilosopherscountformuch.Theyareonlymorelife.Whatreallycountsforphilo-sophicalspeculationisthethoughtwhichphilosophicalthinkingproducesandwhichispartofarealmthathasnothingincommonwiththemechanismsoflifeandordinarythinking.Theproblemwithdogmatistsis,ofcourse,thattheydon’tevenseetheproblemtheyhave.ButwemightwanttoturnthetablesonFichte’sidealistor,ifyouwill,onFichteandaskwhetherhisownphilosophizingasexemplifiedinthesetwopassagesinspiresanyconfidenceinhisownspeculations.Ithinktheanswercanonlybethatitdoesnot.WhiletherhetoricalflourishaboutthetruephilosophicalcallingwithitsManicheanovertonesinthefirstpassagefrom1797shouldnotbetakenseriouslyasadviceabouthowaphilosophicalbiographyshouldbewritten,itdoesrevealsome-thingofsignificanceaboutFichtehimself.Thefactthathefeelsitisappropriatetoresorttothiskindofargumentumadhomineminthecontextofanarticlecalled“TheFirstIntroductiontotheDoctrineofScience”revealsakindofcharacterthatmightactuallyseemclosertothatofthedogmatistthantotheidealist.Indeed,theverywayheadvertisesforthesuperiorityofidealismbymaligningdogmatismseemstoundercutorcontradicttheverypositionitself.Nordoestheobservationthattheidealistisalwaysindangerofridiculingthedogmatistresolvethistension,for“ridicule”isnotidenticalwithscorn,andFichteheapsscornonhisopponent.Attheveryleast,thetoneisfalse.ThisdoesnotmeanthatthesubstanceofFichte’spositionisalsofalse,thoughIthinkthattheargumentof1797isratheruninspiringaswell,asitisbasedonfalse—orattheveryleastimplausible—premisses.Perhaps\n14The(Ir)relevanceofBiography:TheCaseofFichte205theargumentcanbefixed,somethingIwillnoteventryhere.Ijustwanttopointoutthatitdoesnothelphiscauseandactuallymightgetinthewayofappreciatingtheimportantthingsheactuallydidhavetosay.Fichtehimself,orperhapsbetter:Fichte’sownfeelingsofsuperiorityandself-righteousnessdoseemtogetinthewayofhisthinking.LikeSiegfried,theherooftheNibelungenSaga,hehasafatalflaw.Thisflawhastodowithhisinabilitytoseehimselfthroughtheeyesofotherhumanbeings.Andthisinabilityisnotunrelatedtothe“singularandirresistiblepracticalevidencewhich[Fichte]possessedof…the‘IndependenceoftheSelf’ascontrastedwithanythinghavingtodowithexternalcausality”(Fichte,Biography,ix).It’snotsomethingheeverachievedinlifeorinthought.Indeed,IwouldargueagainstImmanuelHermannFichtethatthemostimportantdifferencebetweenhisfatherandothermajormodernthinkerslikeDescartes,Spinoza,Leibniz,Hume,Kant,andHegelconsistedinpreciselythisinabilitytounderstandhowdependenthisphilosophicalthoughtwasontheviewsofhispredecessorsandcontemporaries.Andhowlittleitwascleartohimthatheoftenreactedwhenhethoughthewasact-ingautonomously.14.4Hereoneexamplefromhisearlylife,takenfromtheson’sbiography,whichmusthavebeenanimportantpartofthefamilyloreaboutFichte’syouth.Iquote:Once,theboywasaboutsevenyearsold,hisfather,torewardtheboy’sindustriousness,gavehimthepopularstoryofSiegfried(dergehörnteSiegfried)asapresent…Thisbook,probablythefirstheheldinhishandsapartfromScriptureandHymnbook,filledhismindandtookallhisattentionsothathetooknopleasureinanythingelse.Heevenneglectedhisschoollessonsandbecameirresponsible.Thisledtoseriouspunishment.Finally,hereal-izedthat,unlessthingswouldleadfrombadtoworse,hehadentirelytoridhimselfofthebook.Atthesametimehealsowantedtopunishthebookforallthebadthingsithaddonetohim.So,hetookthebooktothestreambehindthefathershouseinordertothrowitintothewater.Hehesitatedforalongtimetoundertakethefirstsubmissionofhimself,butthen,withreneweddecisiveness,hehurleditintothewaterfarawayfromwherehestood.Whenhesawitfloatingaway,therealizationofthelosswastoomuch.Hebrokedownandcriedveryhard.Thisishowhisfatherfoundhimandheardaboutthelossofthebook.Theboy,fromshynessorconfusion,remainedsilentaboutthetruereasonandcontextoftheloss.Accordingly,thefatherbecameangryabouttheson’sirresponsiblehandlingofthegiftandpunishedhimmuchmoreseverelythanusually.ItisclearthattheyoungFichtefeltharddoneby,andhissoncannotrefrainfrommakingthefollowingcomment:“[Thiswas]aforeshadowingofhislaterlifeinwhichhefrequentlywasmostmisunderstoodandmisinterpretedforjustthosethingshehaddonewithconvictionandearnestforethought,andoftenforasimilarreasonbasedonignoranceoftherealcontextandthetruereasons”(7).Itseemstomethatthisismissingthepoint,however.ItwasnotthattheyoungFichtewasunjustlyblamedforsomethingthatdidnothappen.Hisoffense,ifanoffenseitwas,hadtodowiththelossofabookthathadprobablycosthispoor\n206M.Kuehnfathermorethanhecouldafford—andthebookwas,asamatteroffact,gone.Furthermore,therewasgoodreasonforFichtenottorevealtherealstory.Ifthefatherhadfoundoutthathewillfullythrewitaway,hewouldinalllikelihoodhavebeenevenmoreangry.Therealcontextandthetruereasonswouldhavemademattersworseinhiseyes,andpunishmentwouldcertainlyhavebeenevenmoresevere.Furthermore,thewholeideathattheboy“wantedtopunishthebookforallthebadthingsithaddonetohim”issomewhatweird.Itmaybeexcusablefora7-yearoldboytothinkthiswayandtoblameathingforsomethingthatwasclearlyhisownfault,thoughIamfarfromsurewhetheritis.Ithinkthatmost7-yearoldshavealreadyawell-developedsenseofresponsibilityinsuchmatters.Bethatasitmay,itiscertainlyinexcusablefortheadults,thatis,forJohannGottliebandImmanuelHermann,tothinkthatthemotiveof“wantingtopunishthebook”bydrowningwouldexcusesomeoneforhavingthrownitaway.Norisitasignof“singularandirresistiblepracticalevidencewhich[Fichte]possessedof…the‘IndependenceoftheSelf’ascontrastedwithanythinghavingtodowithexternalcausality.”IamafraidthesamepointcanbemadeaboutotherthingsFichtedidwithforesightandearnestconsideration,liketheinfamous“annihilating”ofChristianErhardSchmidasaphilosophicalopponent.FichtetookgreatprideinbeingtheonlyonewhotrulyunderstoodKant.Schmidhaddaredtocriticizehim,soFichtepunishedhimbyan“actofannihilation.”AnselmFeuerbach,someonewhodidnotparticularlylikeFichte’sphilosophy,dislikedFichteevenmore,sayingin1799:“itisdangeroustogetintodisputeswithFichte.Heisawildanimalthatdoesnotacceptanycontradiction…IamconvincedthathecouldplayMuhammed,ifthesewerestillthetimesforMuhammed,andhecouldintroducetheWissenschaftslehrewiththeswordandincarceration,andifthelecternwerethethroneofaking.”(Fischer,I,168).Thisattitudealsocomesthroughinmuchofhiswriting.Notinfrequently,thereareadhominemsandinsults,wherethereshouldberationalargumentation,anditwouldhavebeenbetter,iftheseblemisheswereabsent,forIbelievethatblemishestheyare.IdonotthinkthattheygotothecoreofFichte’sphilosophy,whichisanotherwayofsayingthatIdonotaccepthisson’sclaimthatFichtewas“differentfromotherthinkers,hisdoctrinewasmostgenuinelyandexclusivelytheimprintofhispersonality.”Hewas,Ibelieve,thesameasanyotherphilosopher:somefeaturesofhisdoctrineareexplainablebyhischaracterandthetimesinwhichhelived,oth-erspointbeyondthem,butnoneofthemarecompletelyindependentoftheirhistori-calcontext.Wearerationalanimals—atleastuptoapoint—andphilosophyistheproductofrationalanimalsandnotofsomefaceless“purerationality.”Putdifferently,“thedevelopmentofidealistthoughtwasnotatalldirectedbyanabso-luteworldspirit.Itlargelydependeduponaccidentsandrevealshumanweaknessandshortcoming.”55WalterSchulz(1968),“Einleitung,”Fichte-SchellingBriefwechel(Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp),p.13.\n14The(Ir)relevanceofBiography:TheCaseofFichte20714.5ItisforthisreasonthatIreject“biographies”basedonconsiderationsofpossibleworldsemantics.Wemayimaginepossibilities,howeverimprobabletheymaybe.Wemaydivorcethethoughtofathinkerfromhismereanimalexistence.Wemayclaim,withFregeorPopperthatthereisthirdrealmofideasandtheoriesthatisdifferentfromthefirstrealmofphysicalobjectsandthesecondrealmofmerepsy-chology,andwemayarguethattounderstandtheideasofsomeonedoesnotpre-supposeanyinsightintotheirlives.Iam,however,rathermoreskepticalaboutwhethersuchanapproachisactuallypossible.Whilesuchviewspretendtoshowtheirrelevanceoftheactuallifeofathinker,theyactuallyrevealnotmuchmorethantheprejudicesofthepersonwhoimaginesthechanceevents,theindependentvariations,andtheslightlydifferentworld.ToreturntoRorty’smusings,Heideggerhad,ofcourse,thechancetomarryaJewishwoman,buthedidnottakeit.AndIfindthattherelationsbetweenHannahArendtandMartinHeideggeraremorerevealingthanwhatmightormightnothavehap-penedinsomeimaginaryworld.Inanycase,suchimaginaryworldsdonotprovethat“thephilosophicaltools”developedbyathinkercanbeunderstoodindependentlyofthecontextinwhichtheyweredeveloped.IfwetakeRorty’sanalogyofphilosophicaltheoriesandtoolsseriously,thenwemustsaythat,justaswithothertools,ourunderstandingof“philosophicaltools”dependsontheactualfunctionofthesetools;andthefunctiondependsontheactualworldinwhichthesetoolsweredeveloped.Whethersomethingisagrapefruitknifeoraspecialkindofscrewdriverpresupposessomeacquaintancewiththelife-worldinwhichthetoolwasconceived.Thatwemayimagineaworldwithoutgrapefruits,inwhichagrapefruitknifecanonlybeunderstoodasa(fairlyprimitive)screwdriver,oranotherworldinwhichtherearenoscrewsandscrewdriverscanbeunderstoodasprimitivegrapefruitknives,doesnotshowthatagrapefruitknifeisascrewdriver(orascrewdriverisagrapefruitknife).Theyaredifferenttools,andtheirdifferencedependsontheworld,inwhichtheyweredeveloped.Norishistorycompletelyirrelevantinthis,fortherewasatimeandplace,roughlythetimeinwhichJohannGottliebFichtelived,whentherewereneitherscrews,screwdrivers,norgrapefruitsorgrapefruitknives.Whilethereisindeedaworldofdifferencebetweensuchtoolsandthephilo-sophicaltheoriesdevelopedbyphilosophers,itshouldbeclearthatsimilarconstraintsholdforthem.Inthesameway,wemayperhapsbeinclinedtointerpretKant’smoralphilosophyasa(relativelyprimitiveorperhapsevenverysophisti-cated)contributiontotheproblemofnormativity.Butweshouldbeawarethat“values”and“norms”intherelevantsensewereinventedonlyinthenineteenthcentury.TheyplayednoroleineighteenthcenturyPrussianlivesandletters(nor,infact,anywhereelse).WhateverKantwastakinghimselftobeaboutmustthereforehavebeensomethingelse.\n208M.KuehnThisshould,attheveryleast,suggesttheactualworldinwhichaphilosopherlivedandfashionedhistoolsisthusnotentirelyirrelevanttoourunderstandingofaphilosopherandhistools.Ifwefindthattheydonotlendthemselvestosomeofourpurposes,wemightpausetoconsiderwhyorhowtheywereconceivedinthefirstplaceandthismightinfacthelpusinchangingthemtosomethingthatmightserveusbettertoday(oritmightleadustolookelsewhere).Itisatleastonesignificantaspectofaphilosophicalbiographytolimitthenumberofpossibleworldsthatsomemightviewasconvenientinreconstructingtheideasofaphilosopherandtointroduceatleastsomenotionofprobabilityinthisenterprise.Thequestionofhowaphilosopherlived,workedanddiedisnotphilosophicallyirrelevant.Itrevealssomethingaboutthephilosophicaltoolshe“inventedatvarioustimestoaccomplishoneoranotherobject”—orsoIwouldliketoargue.Furthermore,mybiographyofFichteaimstofindoutwhethersomeofthephilosophicaltoolsheinventedremainworthkeeping.Andlastbutnotleast,Iwouldliketosuggestthattheworriesaboutwhetheraphilosophicalbiographyispossiblearehighlyover-rated.Fichtewasaninterestingcharacterandthestoryofhislifeseemstomewellworthtellingjustbecauseitisinteresting.ReferencesCollingwoodRG(2001)Theprinciplesofhistoryandotherwritingsinphilosophyofhistory.OxfordUniversityPress,OxfordRortyR(1994)Anotherpossibleworld.In:HarriesK,JammeC(eds)MartinHeidegger.Politics,artandtechnology.HolmesandMeier,NewYork/LondonSchulzW(1968)Einleitung.In:Fichte-SchellingBriefwechel.Suhrkamp,Frankfurt/Main\nIndexAFAgency,action,19,51,55,57,58,60Fichte,3,6,7,199–208Arendt,Hannah,2,49,114,207Aristotle,5,49,54,85,98,103–117,119–121[Aristotle,]Poetics,5,85,98,103–105,G108–111,114–116,120Goldie,Peter,2,4,50,52–53,57–60,74,Asvaghosa,4,61–78142,145BHBenjamin,Walter,50,58–60,152Hume,David,3,6,181,191–198,205Biography,2,3,6,7,22,26,57,66,90,92,152,169–189,199–208Buddhism,4,76IImagination,5,6,90,103,135–149,156,157,178CCarroll,Noel,1,53,54Currie,Gregory,2,4,49KKant,Immanuel,3,6,61,136,143,181,183,184,202,203,205–207DKermode,Frank,50,54,58,59,83,Descartes,3,6,169–181,184–186,201,20591,98,99[Descartes,]Meditations,6,169–180,185Kierkegaard,2,29Dharma,6,63,64,66,67,70,72,73,78,151–153,155–157,160Dinesen,Isak,2LDostoevsky,5,119–133Locke,4,33–40,42–44,129,130,169,177,[Dostoevsky,]TheIdiot,131–133181,184,201EMEmerson,121MacIntyre,Alasdair,1,2,19,22,49,57,59,Enlightenment,Scottish,19281–84,90–92,94,96,98,100©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015209A.Speight(ed.),Narrative,PhilosophyandLife,BostonStudiesinPhilosophy,ReligionandPublicLife2,DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9349-0\n210IndexMahābhārata,64,66,68,151,152,Self,1–4,12,13,15–21,25–29,156,15933–46,51–53,56,57,59–78,Milton,5,136–138,140,141,145,148,14981–101,105,109,111,132,141,Mink,Louis,2,95142,156–159,163,191,196,197,200,204–206Selfhood,2–4,33,36–42,44,68,71,73,74NSkepticism,4,141,200Narrativists(vs.episodists),4,11–30,50Spinoza,3,6,123,181–189,205Nussbaum,Martha,1,4,61,62,68,72–74,Strawson,Galen,1,3,4,11–30,37,46,112,115,15249–53,57,74,75,77,81–85,91,94,98–100Substancedualism,170,179,180PPerson,4,7,12,15,18,22,23,27,33–42,44–46,50,51,55,72–74,T76,77,83,85,91,92,96,104,Tamilpoetry,6,151105,107,111,132,145,148,Taylor,Charles,1,4,18,19,21,49–51154–157,201,203,207Temporality,3,5,29,58,60,95,132Personhood,4,11,33,34,36–42,44,153TheoreticalWisdom(theôria),5,110Poetics,5,85,98,103–105,109,110,114,Time,2,4,5,12–15,17,18,20–23,26,30,130,132,15535,36,39–43,45,46,50,52,57,59,PracticalWisdom(phronêsis),5,10661,62,64–66,68,73,75,76,82,85–95,98,103,106,107,109–111,114,117,119–133,136,146,148,149,R153,158,171,172,175,178,179,Ramayana,151,156,159181–188,195,199,201,205–208Redfield,James,5,104,106,114,115Ricoeur,Paul,1,19,59,60,98,103,106,109–111,114,152VVelleman,David,2,4,50,52–59,96SSartre,2,4,5,12,18,27,57,58,81–101,135,W145,182Woolf,Virginia,3,15,182,183