法学法学理论毕业论文 分析哲学与叙事哲学 41页

湖南师范大学本科毕业论文考籍号：XXXXXXXXX姓名：XXX专业：法学法学理论论文题目：分析哲学与叙事哲学指导老师：XXX二〇一一年十二月十日\n理查德·罗蒂著李小科节译　　哲学已经在很大程度上游离出许多知识分子所能触及的范围。当今哲学家们在争论的问题，与柏拉图－尼采的对立联系在一起。这种争论的结果将决定哲学作为一门学科的发展前景。其中之一就是，对哲学的研究在将来否会独立于思想史去进行。这一争论通常发生在“分析”与“非分析”哲学分裂的讨论过程之中。　　1，当今哲学争论的两个主要议题：　　第一、分析哲学与非分析哲学之争（有时被称作“大陆哲学”）；第二、发生于存在于分析哲学（心灵与语言哲学）内部的争论，即原子论与整体论之争。原子论者认为，哲学与认知科学的结盟对自身会大有好处；整体论者则不这样认为。\n　　当代哲学系里对哲学的划分1）伦理、社会政治哲学；2）心灵和语言哲学。从事前者的哲学家很少读后者写的书，他们更多地阅读政治学教授和法理学教授所写的书，而不是读那些在研究身心关系、语言与实在关系的同事们所写的书。人们可以这样说，这两类人同处一个系，不是由于有什么共同的兴趣，而是由于机构划分的原因。　　“分析”哲学与“非分析哲学”的分野与道德和政治学作品关系不是很大。它们也与罗尔斯、哈贝马斯、NobertoBobbio,詹托尔·默菲(ChantalMouffe)、伊赛亚·柏林以及加斯托等没有多大的牵连。所有这些思想家与非哲学家（如米契尔·沃尔泽、波斯纳、伊格纳提夫（MichaelIgnatieff）、贝克等讨论着同样的问题――我们何以能改变我们的社会政治制度，以便更好地将秩序与正义结合在一起。　　人们一旦将道德政治哲学框起来存而不论，便发现分析哲学与大陆哲学的分裂就凸现出来了。这种分裂就如同人们对罗素哲学的评价一样。有的哲学家将罗素的幕状词理论视为哲学的一种范式；而另外一些哲学家则认为，罗素所做的工作没有哪一点能与黑格尔的《精神现象学》或海德格尔的《人道主义书信》相比。　　自认为是心灵和语言分析哲学的人们，肯定对罗素的幕状词理论极其熟悉。但她有可能从来就没有读过黑格尔和海德格尔的东西。如果一个人在非英语国家教哲学，她肯定读过《精神现象学》和《书信》，或要装出读过的样子来；但她完全可以理直气壮地跳过幕状词理论。巴西、土耳其、波兰的哲学家们不太理解，英语国家的同行们为什么将罗素看成一个重要人物。\n　　崇拜罗素的人可精确地讲清楚他们在回答一些什么样的问题。黑格尔和海德格尔则对不大关注常识或日常语言。他们告诉你有关精神本质或存在意义的内容，而且通常是在非常特殊或不为人所熟悉的意义上使用“精神”与“存在”（being）。弗莱格和罗素希望使事物变得清晰明白；而黑格尔和海德格则希望事情出现差异。　　读黑格尔和海德格尔书，读时有收益，有思考；但在放下书以后，你会感觉什么事都没有发生。你可能会得出结论，认为他们二人的思想有毛病。实际上，分析哲学家就是这么看他们二人的。　　哲学家之间的相互攻伐：分析哲学家有时认为黑格尔和海德格尔描述“不是在真正意义上搞哲学”。非分析哲学则认为，这些分析哲学的同行们是知识懦夫（intellectualcowards），因为后者对他们自己所熟悉的职业以外的环境没有安全感。这种相互攻伐已经持续了近50年。　　在我看来，弗莱格、罗素、黑格尔、海德格尔，他们四人可以被有效地归于一类。原因在于，他们都在以自己的方式回答着最先由柏拉图明确提出的问题：何以使得人类独特？其它动物为何缺少人类之特性？我们所独有的为什么如此重要？人以什么样的姿态（self-image-自我形象）出现时相对于这一独特性来说不失为正义？　　柏拉图的回答是，我们不象动物，我们可以认识事物（包括我们自己）是什么样的。在他看来，实在－现象的区分对智慧的获得极为重要，人之为人在于把握事实（truth）。\n弗雷格与罗素认为柏拉图的回答在总体没有什么错。他们的工作就是帮助人们回答柏拉图的问题：我们的信念（beliefs）之间有一种什么样的关系？　　弗罗二人认为，以前对这些问题的回答不充分，原因在于从柏拉图到康德的哲学家们没有关注作为中介的语言；在这些中介中，人类将实在展现给自己。从这个意义上讲，以前的答案没有能充分反映语言与实在之间的关系。　　尼采对以上问题的回答不同于柏拉图的回答。　　尼采嘲讽柏拉图对现象－实在的二分。而这一划分至今被许多分析哲学家看成是理所当然的东西。他要求人们“从艺术的视角看科学，从生活的角度看艺术”。　　（对黑格尔的尼采式阅读）　　当今认真对待黑格尔和海德格尔的哲学家们，同意尼采对现象－实在二分所做的怀疑，从而代之以对世界精神发展所做的过去与现在、早期与晚期的划分。在这些哲学家眼里，黑格尔和浪漫派诗人被看作尼采反叛柏拉图主义的先驱。黑格尔强调我们在历史进程中发展和改变着我们自身。黑格尔的这一观点，为尼采“人类的指向就是通过对自我重新描述来进行自我创造”这一论断铺平了道路。　　（对海德格尔的尼采式阅读）\n　　海德格尔是第一个试图调停柏－尼冲突（关于什么东西使得人类如此特殊）的思想家。海氏的晚期著作告诉人们，西方知识分子始于对获得自我知识的渴望，终于对实现自我创造的期盼。因此，黑格尔和海德格尔的成熟之作，均力图去解释我们现代人怎样变成了我们现在这个样子这一问题。所有这些讨论与对知识的范围与界限、事物如何使得句子为真等问题的回答没有任何关系。　　2.分析哲学的任务：探寻心智与语言是如何起作用的。　　在这个题目下有原子论与整体论（atomistsandtheholists）之争。原子论旨在解释心灵与语言是如何发挥作用的。这也是原子论者的一贯追求。整体论者则认为，（1）原子论者所做的工作不会有成果；（2）原子论将语言与心灵看成实体，这种作法是一种错误；（3）意义与信念不是一种事物。但二者都同意，（1）人之特殊性体现在人拥有心灵和语言；（2）当代哲学面临的一个大问题就是用与现代科学相一致的方法去解释心灵和语言的存在，而不用求助于柏拉图、奥古斯汀、笛卡尔等提出的非物理的实体；因此，（3）它们都是物理主义者。但原子论与整体论的相似到此为止。　　原子论者把心灵与语言分解成许多部分，将其与大脑紧密地联系在一起；心灵即大脑。他们花大量时间分析类似“信念”和“意义”这样的概念，以此企图说明信念与意义如何居于人类的中枢神经之内。\n　　在整体论者看来，将心灵与大脑视为同一这种作法明显是一种误导。即使是理想的神经生理学也不可能告诉我们有关心灵与语言的东西。整体论者虽然同意在探索大脑何以运作方面有许多事情要做，但同时又怀疑，即便是理想的神经生理学可能不会告诉我们更多有关心灵和语言的东西。他们坚持，心灵不是电脑硬件意义上的大脑；心灵与大脑、文化与生物学，其相互之间的自由度如同硬件之于软件。　　整体论认为，认识心灵与语言实际上是对我们所身处其中的社会行为（实践）变迁的认识；当然，我们不能缺少神经学方面的手段与工具。但从神经学或进行生物学方面解释人的行为，并不能将人与猩猩区分开来。猩猩是不会绘制出洞穴里的壁画，更不会建造出驶往特洛尹城的巨船。　　整体论者认为，提出批判性的意见这一社会行为与智力和语言不可分。原子论者认为，我们在没有语言之前就已经有心灵；人以外的动物也有心灵。要想解释人类为何能够获得有关存在于物理世界之中的那些事物的事实，我们就必须联系到语言表现。这就将我们的科学理论引向原始语言表现，最终至知觉性的表现。　　希望认知科学帮助我们理解人类的殊性，这是洛克留给后人的做法。他将心灵看成是简单观念和观念的仓库，最后引出休谟的“动物理性”、十九世纪的联想心理学、被艾耶尔语言学化了的休谟版，以及被麦克道尔语言学化了的康德版。整体论者遗憾洛克将我们引向此途，也因此谴责笛卡尔对洛克的误导。\n　　在整体论者看来，在神经元与社会行为（实践）之间并不存在认知科学要去研究的中介。要研究人何以具有不同于大猩猩的特殊属性，就要去研究那些实践，去研究文化。在神经元与实践之间，没有（也不需要有）什么桥梁，这就像软件与硬件之间关系一样。正如软件只是一种让硬件运行的方法，文化只是一种使我们的神经装置投入使用的方法。原子论者同意并引用了StevenPinker话，“计算心灵理论是知识史上的伟大思想之一，因为它解决了构成身心问题的谜团之一”。　　当今语言哲学中的整体论者有：戴维森（随奎茵），布兰德姆（随塞拉斯），以及追随赖尔和维坦根斯坦的其他哲学家。原子论者有：乔姆斯基、Pinker,JerryFodor,以及那些试图创立一种心智表现的语义理论。　　3、分析的明晰性与对话的明晰性　　罗蒂认为，他的以上论述能帮助读者理解以下三方面的问题：为什么　　（1）许多原子论者怀疑，整体论将分析哲学的核心思想置于危险的境地；　　（2）像内格尔这样的哲学家，他们认为维特根斯坦、戴维森等向黑格尔、海德格尔所从事的那类坏哲学敞开了大门;　　（3）布兰顿将自己称为一个新黑格尔主义者。　　原子论与整体论之争最后似乎落到了对两个问题的争论：（1）哲学家们应该做的事情类型；（2）哲学的自我形象。\n　　这体现在罗素与维特根斯坦两人对概念的不同看法上。罗素主张，概念或意义可以被分离并当作信念的元素来对待，应该承认它们的存在。然而在维特根斯坦看来，概念只是对一个词的使用。　　大多数分析哲学家同意，罗素及其追随者将我们的学科（哲学）引入可靠的科学途径。分析哲学家认为，分析哲学的训练可以锻炼和提高心灵的明晰性。他们之所以抵制整体主义是出于一种担心，担心如果他们偏离自然科学，他们将为蒙昧主义敞开大门。哲学将回归到罗素以前的岁月，即Jowett（乔伊特）andT.H.格林的时代，或二十世纪的法国。正是因为这个原因，分析哲学非常厌恶“哲学是一种人文学科”这一观点，而坚持哲学是一种科学。　　整体论者认为，要想研究心灵和语言是如何运作这一问题，最好是讲故事，那种由塞拉斯、布莱顿所讲的故事：元语言学的词汇与心灵主义的词汇同时产生；文化如何超越生物的进化。　　4.确定的存在和非确定的存在（Determinateandindeterminatebeing）\n　　很明显，我赞同整体者，赞同那些讲述故事的哲学家，而非那些提供分析的哲学家。“在物理世界中，心灵表现、意义、价值处于什么位置？”我认为，人们应该放弃这样的问题。他们应该把对物体（粒子）、信念、理应被做的事情等所做讨论描述成文化活动。这些活动所实现的目的都很明确。……哲学家们遵循卡斯托里阿迪的建议，即放弃他所说的“只有确定的存在才是真实可信的存在这一假说”。　　确定的存在是那种可以断然确定为真的存在。数学所研究的对象之间的关系就是这样。同样的还有：诺曼征服以来英国国王的名称、尹拉克战争中死亡的大体人数、二十世纪牛津的年平均降雨量。不确定的存在事例有：《哈姆莱特》的意义、邱吉尔的性格特征、人类存在的时间点等。　　我对确定存在与不确定的存在之间的划分是从社会学意义上做出。确定性只是一种程度。只将确定的存在视为真实可信的，这种作法是用一种无用的形而上学的区分代替一种有用的社会学意义上的程度区分。接受前一种区分，就是承认有关于某些话题的“事实”的存在，就是在认真地对待有关实在论与反实在论之间的争论。只有在分析哲学家们眼里，这种争论有实际的意义。只有你相信所有的存在都像拼图玩具的每一个碎片一样可以拼贴到一块，认为那些不能被拼到一块的存在就不真实可靠，就不是拼图的碎片，这个时候你就将加入到这种争论之中。　　拼拼图的类比从整体上看适合于许多领域的研究，如古生物学、粒子物理学和文献学等。在有些文化领域中，可以说我们能够最终得到正确的东西（getthingsright）。通过引入可靠的科学方法使得哲学成为上述文化领域之一的思想，以及曾经催动罗素和其他分析哲学家的观点，它们只有在概念和意义被看成能够孤立于社会实践、孤立于历史的情况下，才有可能站得住脚。\n　　一旦放弃原子论，人们就不再使用获得确切事实的比喻和追寻核心骨架的比喻了，并像维特根斯坦一样怀疑以往被视为神圣的逻辑。这将导致以下三种结果：（1）人们认真地对待发生于社会准则方面的变化；（2）用水平的知识发展比喻去替代垂直的知识发展比喻；（3）放弃心灵和语言可以像其他许多事物一样被彻底搞清楚这一观念。　　那些善待黑格尔的哲学家们，他们大都用我们如何与我们的祖先不同，如何可能与我们后代不同等这样一些问题，代替人类何以在普遍意义上具有特殊性这一问题。换言之，历史主义使得我们认为，非确定的存在比确定的存在更有魅力。它使得我们把对过去（历史）的解释和重新语境化（recontextualize）视为最为重要的人类活动，而不是把最为重要的人类活动视为对拼图的组合。　　对什么东西最值得思考这一问题存在着不同的回答。这种分歧也说明了为什么被我一直称之为“叙事哲学”（narrativephilosophy）的东西常常被叫做“解释哲学”。“解释”这一术语标志着研究兴趣的转移：从讨论什么东西绝对可靠（正确）转向没有止境的解释与语境再造。　　人何以具有其人之为人所具有的特殊性？如果人们接受柏拉图（而非尼采）对此问题的回答，那么对心灵本质或语言本质的研究就似乎显得格外必要和紧迫。分析哲学家所从事的工作显然值得受过教育的公众的注意。人们也就更有理由指出洛克和康德在西方文化史上的重要地位，指出当代分析哲学家正在追问洛克和康德　曾问过的问题。\n　　然而黑格尔指出，尽管洛克和康德两人为人类自由的原因做出了不可估量的贡献，但他们所问的问题并不怎么好，因为他们没有认识到，历史是具有自然意识的人类的历史，而非自然的历史。布莱顿将心灵主义的词汇看作使得某种社会规范变得清楚明白的一种方式，而不是像洛克那样将其看作对位于两耳间的实体的描述。就像萨特和海德格尔一样，对于黑格尔和布莱顿来说，人类是非确定的存在。就像那些使我们成为现在这个样子的法律和诗歌一样，我们需要的是永无止境的　解释。我们永远也不会得到绝对正确的东西。　　5.结论　　这些讲演是叙述哲学的一个例证。哲学在当代西方文化中的位置：开始于17世纪对身心问题、知识的范围、意志的自由等问题所做的清楚明白的说明。这些问题的产生要追溯很远。在西方，人们已经习惯了德谟克利特和卢克莱修对事物所做论述。这样，我们在对自身进行描述的时候总想达到和实现按其二人标准为对的层次。在寻求对这些方法进行折中的过程中，上面的三个问题产生了。洛克、斯宾诺莎、休谟、康德等对这些问题的讨论，对文化的世俗化发挥过重要的作用。\n　　随着时间的流逝，这些问题已经被研究得很透，几乎再也挤不出什么新东西了。法国大革命和浪漫运动彻底转移了世俗知识分子的视线。黑格尔第一个洞察出这些事件的意义，并试图使哲学跟上时代的步伐。到尼采和杜威的时代时，大多数知识分子，甚至许多哲学教授已经深信，确定文化纲领（大纲）的不是什么上帝（或自然），而是历史。　　然而，在有些国家，有些哲学教授们仍然死守着黑格尔以前的那些问题不放。他们试图通过将其语言化的方式来复活或拯救它。这种运动造成的结果就是比以往为严重的专业主义与边缘化现象。语言的转向最终导致后维特根斯坦对17世纪式哲学问题的摒弃，这也同样体现在塞拉斯和布兰顿的历史主义观点当中。所有这些发展有可能使得分析哲学家们去认真对待黑格尔的论断――哲学是以思想的形式反映一个时代。他们是否将利用这一机会，还有待观察。　　（李小科节译）　　April21,2003　　原文对照：　　ANALYTICPHILOSOPHYANDNARRATIVEPHILOSOPHY　　RichardRorty　　1.Twokindsofphilosophy　　Isaidinlastweek’slecturethatphilosophyhadprettymuchdriftedoffth\neradarscreensofmostintellectuals,andthatthiswasnotnecessarilyanoccasionforregret.Buttherearestillinterestingdebatesgoingonamongphilosophyprofessors.ThesedebatesthattieinwiththePlato-NietzscheoppositionIdescribedinmyfirstlecture,andtheiroutcomewilldeterminethefutureofphilosophyasanacademicdiscipline.Oneoftheseisaboutwhetherphilosophycanbestudiedindependentlyofthehistoryofideas.Thisdebateusuallytakesplaceinthecourseofdiscussionofthesplitbetween“analytic”and“non-analytic”philosophy.　　Thesecondofthesedebatesisgoingonwithinthesub-areaofanalyticphilosophyknownas“philosophyofmindandlanguage”.Thisisbetweentheatomists,whothinkthatphilosophycanprofitablyallyitselfwithcognitivescience,andtheholists,whodonot.InthislectureIwillbrieflyreviewbothofthesedebates.ThenIwilltrytoshowtherelevanceofbothtothequestionofwhetherornottoretainwhatIlastweekcalled“thejigsawpuzzleviewofthings”.　　Whenoneattemptstodescribewhatisgoingonintheworlds’philosophydepartmentsthesedays,thefirstdistinctiontodrawisbetweenmoral,socialandpoliticalphilosophyontheonehand,andphilosophyofmindandlanguageontheother.Thosewhoworkintheformerareadonothavemuchtosaytothoseworkinginthelatter,andconversely.Philosophyprofessorswhowriteonethicsandpoliticsusuallyreadmorebooksbyprofessorsofpoliticalscienceandofjurisprudencethanbooksbyfellowphilosopherswhodiscusstherelationbetweenthemindandthebody,\northatbetweenlanguageandreality.Thatbotharemembersofthesamedepartmentismoreanaccidentofinstitutionalhistorythanaresultofsharedinterests.　　Thedifferencebetweenthesetwobroadareasofconcernishighlightedbythefactthatthesplitbetween“analytic”philosophyand“non-analytic”philosophy(thekindsometimescalled“Continental”)haslittlerelevancetobooksaboutmoralsandpolitics.ThoselabelsarelargelyirrelevanttosuchfiguresasJohnRawls,JuergenHabermas,NobertoBobbio,ChantalMouffe,IsaiahBerlin,andCorneliusCastoriadis.Allthesethinkersareconcernedwiththesamequestionsasarenon-philosopherslikeMichaelWalzer,RichardPosner,MichaelIgnatieff,andUlrichBeck-questionsabouthowwemightalteroursocialandpoliticalinstitutionssoasbettertocombinefreedomwithorderandjustice.　　Oncewebracketoffmoralandpoliticalphilosophy,however,theanalyticvs.Continentalsplitbecomessalient.IthinkofthissplitasbetweenthephilosopherswhoareinclinedtoagreewithFrankRamseythatBertrandRussell’stheoryofdescriptionsisaparadigmofphilosophyandthosewhowouldarguethatnothingRusselldidcomparesinimportancewithHegel’sThePhenomenologyofSpiritorwithHeidegger’sLetteronHumanism.Itisadivisionbetweenphilosopherswhothinkthatyoucandofirst-ratephilosophywithoutknowingmuchintellectualhistoryandthosewhothinkthatphilosophyisatitsbestwhenittakestheformofadramaticnarrative,anarrativeendingwiththewords“Thusfarhastheworld-spiritadvanced.”\n　　Someonewhothinksofherselfasananalyticphilosopherofmindandlanguagewillalmostcertainlybefamiliarwith,andwillprobablyhaveviewsabout,Russell’stheory.Butshemayneverhaveread,andmayhavelittleambitiontoread,eitherHegelorHeidegger.Yetifyouteachphilosophyinmostnon-anglophonecountries,youmusthavereadandponderedbothThePhenomenologyofSpiritandLetteronHumanism,oratleastpretendtohavedoneso.Butyoucanskipthetheoryofdescriptions.Brazilian,TurkishandPolishphilosophersmanagetogetbywithonlyavagueideaofwhytheirAnglophonecolleaguesbelieveRusselltohavebeenanimportantfigure.　　Inordertoconveytheprofoundcontrastbetweentheself-imagesofthesetwokindsofphilosophers,Ishallbrieflydescribethetheoryofdescriptions.Russelldesignedittoanswersuchquestionsas“Giventhatthewordsusedtoformthesubjectofasentencerefertothings,andthatasentenceistrueifthingsareasthesentencesaystheyare,howisthatatruesentencecontainingareferringexpressioncanbecomefalseifonesubstitutesanotherexpressionthatreferstothesamething?”Russell’sexampleoftwosuchsentenceswere“GeorgeIVwishedtoknowwhetherScottwastheauthorofWaverly”,whichistrue,and“GeorgeIVwishedtoknowwhetherScottwasScott”,whichisfalse.　　Thetheoryofdescriptionsanswersthisquestionbysayingthatthewords\n“theauthorofWaverly”,unliketheword“Scott”,donotpickoutaparticularindividual.Theydonotformareferringexpression.WhatGeorgeIVreallywantedtoknow,Russellsaid,waswhethertherewasanindividualwhohadthepropertyofbeingtheauthorofWaverlyandwhowasidenticalwithScott.Puttingthematterthatway,heclaimed,revealsthetrue“logicalform”ofthesentenceinquestion.　　Thatithasthislogicalformcanberevealed,Russellsaid,bydistinguishingcarefullybetweentheuseoftheword“is”toexpressidentity,asin“ScottisScott”,andtoexpresspredication,asin“ScottistheauthorofWaverly”.ThatdistinctionwasbuiltintothenewsymboliclogicdevelopedbyRussell’smaster,GottlobFrege.AknowledgeofthislogicisstillregardedbymostAnglophonephilosophersasessentialtophilosophicalcompetence.Manyoftheirnon-Anglophonecolleaguesfinditoptional.　　IfyoususpectthatRussell’stheoryprovidesagoodanswertoabadquestion,youareingoodcompany.Youhavemanyeminentcontemporaryphilosophersonyourside.Thesephilosophersdonotthinkthateitherthegeneralquestionoftherelationbetweenlanguageandreality,orthemoreparticularquestionaboutwhenandhowthingsintheworldmakesentencestrue,isofmuchinterest.TheytakesuchquestionstobegoodexamplesofwhatBerkeleycalled“kickingupthedustandthencomplainingthatonecannotsee”.HegelandHeidegger,hadtheyreadRussell,wouldprobablyhavehadthesamereaction.\n　　OnebigdifferencebetweenthekindofphilosopherwhoadmiresRussellandthekindwhoprefersHegelandHeideggeristhattheformerspelloutexactlywhatquestionstheyaretryingtoanswer.Whetherornotyoufindtheanalyticphilosophers’problemsintriguing,atleastyouknowwhattheyare.Theonlyquestioniswhyyoushouldcareaboutthem.Analyticphilosopherstypicallyclaimthattheirquestionsshouldintrigueyoubecausecertainintuitionsthatyouyourselfhadbeforeyoueveropenedaphilosophybookareintensionwithoneanother.Itis,theysay,thejobofphilosophytoreconciletheseconvictions.Onesuchintuitionisthatbeliefsaremadetruebytheextra-linguisticentitiesthattheyareabout,andthevalueofthetheoryofdescriptionsisthatitrescuesthisintuitionfromsomeapparentcounter-examples.　　HegelandHeidegger,bycontrast,didnotcaremuchaboutmakingcontacteitherwithcommonsenseorwithordinarylanguage.TheirbooksoffertotellyousomethingaboutthenatureofSpirit,orthemeaningofBeing,buttheyusetheterms“Spirit”and“Being”inidiosyncratic,unfamiliar,ways.Theymakeupnovelmeaningsforthesewords.WhereasFregeandRussellhopedtomakethingsclearer,HegelandHeideggerhopedtomakethingsdifferent.Russell’sadmirerswanttogetthingsstraightbyfindingperspicuousrelationsbetweenyourpreviouslyexistingintuitions.Hegel,Heidegger,andtheiradmirershopetochangeyournotonlyyourintuitionsbutyoursenseofwhoyouareandyournotionofwhatitismostimportant\ntothinkabout.　　Inthehopeofgettingyoutochangeyourself-imageandyourpriorities,Hegelsayssuchthingsas“theAbsolutealoneistrue”.Heideggersaysthat“LanguageisthehouseofBeing”.Ifyoustopateachsuchsentenceandpausetoaskyourselfwhetheritistrue,youwillneverfinishtheirbooks.Togetthroughthem,youmusttemporarilysuspenddisbelief,getintotheswingofthestorythatisbeingtold,pickupthejargonasyougoalong,andthenaskyourself,afterhavinggiventheentirebookthemostsympatheticreadingyoucan,whetheryouhavebeengivenapromisingnewwayoftalkingaboutsomeofthethingsthatinterestyoumost.　　Ifyoulaydowntheirbooksfeelingthatnothingofthatsorthashappened,youmayconcludethatHegelandHeideggerarefuzzy-mindedthinkerswhosubstituterhetoricforargument.Ifthisisyourreaction,youwillbeingoodcompany.Youwillhavemanyeminentcontemporaryphilosophersonyourside.Willingnesstodefineone’sterms,listone’spremises,andargueinastraightlineisregardedbymostadmirersofRussellasessentialtodoinggoodphilosophy.Thatsortofargumentrequiresthatyoubeabletojudgethetruthofeachsentenceinaphilosophybookindependentlyofitssurroundings.ForadmirersofHegelandHeidgger,however,thatsortofargumentationis,thoughallverywellinitsplace,outofplaceinphilosophy.Theyseerequestsfordefinitionsoftermsandlistsofpremisesassymptomsofunwillingnesstoletphilosophyattemptitstransformativetask.\n　　Givenallthesedifferencesbetweenanalyticandnon-analyticphilosophy,onemightwonderwhetherthereisanypointintreatingFrege,Russell,HegelandHeideggerasallinthebusiness.Onemaywonderwhetheritismorethananhistoricalaccidentthatthebooksofallfourareshelvedinthesamesectionofthelibrary.AnalyticphilosopherssometimesdescribeHegelandHeideggeras“notreallydoingphilosophy”.Non-analyticphilosophersrejointhattheiranalyticcolleaguesareintellectualcowardswhodonotfeelsafeoutsideafamiliarprofessionalenvironment.Thissortofreciprocalexcommunicationhasbeengoingonforaboutfiftyyears,andtheinsultsexchangedhaveremainedmuchthesamethroughoutthisperiod.　　MyownviewisthatallfourofthethinkersIhavejustmentionedareusefullygroupedtogether.ThisisbecausetheywerealltryingtoanswerquestionsfirstformulatedexplicitlybyPlato:Whatmakeshumanbeingsspecial?Whydowehavethattheotheranimalslack?Whyiswhatwehavesoimportant?Whatself-imagewilldoproperjusticetothisuniqueness?”　　Plato’sresponsewasthatwearespecialbecausewe,unliketheanimals,canknowhowthings,includingourselves,reallyare.Hemadethereality-appearancedistinctioncentraltothesearchforwisdom,andurgedthatourself-imageshouldbethatofbeingscapableofgraspingtruth.FregeandRussellthoughtthatPlato’sanswerwasroughlyright.Theythoughtoftheirownworkashelpingusansweraquestion\nPlatoalsotriedtoanswer-namely,whatistherelationbetweenourbeliefssuchthatwecanhavetheknowledgewedo?　　Earlieranswerstothesequestionswereinadequate,FregeandRussellthought,becausephilosophersfromPlatotoKanthadnotzeroedinonlanguageasthemediuminwhichhumanbeingsrepresentrealitytothemselves,andthereforehadnotsufficientlyreflectedontherelationbetweenlanguageandreality.Sotheyhadnotpaidproperattentiontologicalform,nortothequestionstowhichRussell’stheoryofdescriptionsoffersanswers.YouwillnotthinkdiscussionoftherelationbetweenGeorgeIVandScottassillyasitseemsonceyouhaveunderstoodthatRussell’sandFrege’spuzzlesmustbesolvedbeforewecanunderstandhowsentencesaremadetruebyreality.　　Nietzsche,however,gaveadifferentanswerthanPlato’stothequestionaboutwhatmakeshumanbeingsspecial.Hesaiditwasourabilitytotransformourselvesintosomethingnew,ratherthanourabilitytoknowwhatweourselvesreallyareorwhattheuniverseisreallylike.HemockedPlato’sappearance-realitydistinction,adistinctionthatmostanalyticphilosophersstilltakeforgranted.Heaskedus“toviewsciencethroughtheopticofart,andartthroughthatoflife”.　　MostcontemporaryphilosopherswhotakeHegelandHeideggerseriouslyshareNietzsche’sdoubtsabouttheutilityoftheappearance-realitydistinction.They\nusuallyreplaceitwiththedistinctionbetweenthepastandthepresent-betweenearlierandlaterstagesoftheworld-spirit’sprogress.SuchphilosophersreadbothHegelandtheromanticpoetsasprecursorsofNietzsche’srevoltagainstPlatonism.Onthisreading,HegelisaJohntheBaptistfigure.HisemphasisonthewaywehavetransformedourselvesinthecourseofhistorypreparesthewayforNietzsche’sclaimthatthepointofbeinghumanistoachieveself-creationthroughself-redescription.Theautobiographyoftheworld-spiritthatHegeloffersinThePhenomenologyofSpiritisastoryabouthowSpiritcomestoconsciousnessofitselfinthecourseofhumanhistory.　　ThosewhoreadHegelinthiswaytypicallygoontoreadHeideggerasthefirstthinkertohavetriedtomediatetheconflictbetweenPlato’sandNietzsche’ssuggestionsaboutwhatmakesusspecial.Soread,Heidegger’slaterwritingstellastoryabouthowWesternintellectualsstartedoffhopingtogainself-knowledgeandwounduphopingtoachieveself-creation.HegelianandHeideggeriannarrativesofmaturationarenotattemptstosaysomethingabouthumanbeingsingeneral,butratherattemptstoexplainhowweinthemodernWestbecamethekindofpeopleweare.TellingstoriesofthesortHegelandHeideggertellhasnothingtodowithansweringquestionsaboutthescopeandlimitsofhumanknowledgeorabouthowthingsmakesentencestrue.　　2.Theanalyticproject:findingouthowmindandlanguage\nwork　　Somuch,fornow,forthesplitbetweenanalyticandnon-analyticphilosophy.Ishallcomebacktothattopiclater,butnowIturntotheseconddebatethatImentionedattheoutset-theonegoingonwithintheranksoftheanalyticphilosophersofmindandlanguagebetweentheatomistsandtheholists.Theambitionoftheatomistsistoexplain,astheyoftenliketoputit,howthemindworksandhowlanguageworks.Theholistsdoubtthatthisisafruitfulproject,becausetheythinkitamistaketotreatmindandlanguageasentitiesthathaveeitherelementaryparts,orastructure,orinnerworkings.Theydonotbelievethattherearethingscalled“beliefs”or“meanings”intowhichmindsandlanguagescanusefullybebrokenup.Atomists,theythinkfailtorealizethatrationality-thethingthatmakesusspecial--isasocialphenomenon,notonethatahumanorganismcanexhibitallbyitself.　　Bothatomistsandholistsagreethatwhatmakeshumanbeingsspecialistheirpossessionofmindandlanguage.Theyalsoagreethatthebigproblemforcontemporaryphilosophyistoexplaintheexistenceofmindandlanguageinawaythatisconsistentwithmodernscience-thatis,withoutappealingtothesortofspookynon-physicalentitiespostulatedbyPlato,AugustineandDescartes.Botharephysicalists,believingthat,asFrankJacksonhasputit,“ifyouduplicateourworldinallphysicalrespectsandstoprightthere,youduplicateitinallrespects.”(FME,p.12).\n　　Buttherethesimilaritiesend.Atomiststhinkthatbybreakingmindandlanguagedownintopartswecangetpsychologyintouchwithneurologyinroughlythesamewaythatchemistryhasbeenbroughttogetherwithphysicsandbiologywithchemistry.Theyfinditusefulandimportanttosaythatthemindis,insomeimportantsense,thebrain.Sotheyspendmuchoftheirtimeanalyzingconceptslike“belief”and“meaning”inordertoshowhowbeliefsandmeaningsmightresidewithinthecollectionofphysicalparticleswhichisthehumancentralnervoussystem.　　Theholistsfindthisidentificationofmindandbrainthoroughlymisleading.Astheyseeit,theatomistsaresimplytakingforgrantedthatwhatworkedformatter-namely,theexplanationofmacrostructuralbehaviorbyreferencetotransactionsbetweenmicrostructuralcompnents-willworkformind.Theholistsagreethatthereismuchtobediscoveredabouthowthebrainworks,buttheydoubtthatevenanidealneurophysiologywouldtellusanythinginterestingaboutmindorlanguage.For,theyinsist,themindisnomorethebrainthatthecomputeristhehardware.　　Aperfectunderstandingofitselectricalcircuits,holistspointsout,doesverylittletohelpyouunderstandhowyourcomputermanagestodoallthewonderfulthingsitdoes.Tounderstandthatyouhavetoknowalotaboutsoftware.Forthebrainwillrunafabulousvarietyofdifferentprogramswhileremainingindifferenttowhichonesitruns,andthesameprogramcanberunonmanydifferentsortsofhardware.\nAccordingtotheholists,mindandbrain,cultureandbiology,swingasfreefromoneanotherasdosoftwareandhardware.Theycanandshouldbestudiedindependently.　　Understandingmindandlanguage,theholistssay,isamatterofunderstandingtheevolutionofthesocialpracticesinwhichwepresentlyengage.Wecouldnot,theycheerfullyadmit,haveengagedinthosepracticesunlesswehadtherequisiteneurologicalequipment.Culturalevolutioncouldnotbeginuntilbiologicalevolutionhadreachedacertainpoint.ButthisfactdoesnothingtosupportclaimsofthesortmadebyStevenPinkersaying,inhisbookHowtheMindWorks.Pinkersays,forexample,that“Themindisasystemoforgansofcomputation,designedbynaturalselectiontosolvethekindsofproblemsourancestorsfacedintheirforagingwayoflife”.(p.21)　　Theholistspointoutthatexplanationsofhumanbehaviorthattieineitherwithneurologyorwithevolutionarybiology,willtellusonlyaboutwhatwesharewiththechimpanzees.Itwillnottellusaboutwhatwe,butnotthechimpanzees,sharewiththecreatureswhopaintedpicturesonthewallsofcaverns,norwiththosethatbuilttheshipsthatsailedtoTroy.Wecanlearnabouttheprocessesthatmediatedbetweenthoseorganismsandourselvesonlybyconstructinganarrative,tellingastoryabouthowtheybecameus.　　Holistphilosophersofmindandlanguagethinkthatthebestwaytoshow\nthatweneednotpostulateimmaterialentitiestoexplainouruniquenessistotellanimaginativestoryabouthowgruntsmutatedintoassertions.Thisisthestoryofhow,touseRobertBrandom’sterminology,sapiencereplacedmeresentience.Tocountasanassertion,andthusasasignofsapience,onBrandom’saccount,aseriesofnoisesmustbeexplicitlycriticizablebyreferencetosocialnorms.Suchanormisalreadyinplacewhenahominidfirstrealizedthat,havinggrunted“P”,shemightwellbebeatenwithsticksifshedoesnotgrunt“Q”onappropriateoccasions.Butthenormonlybecameexplicit,andwhatBrandomcalls“thegameofgivingandaskingforreasons”onlybegan,afewhundredsofthousandsofyearslater.Thatwastheperiodinwhichadescendantoftheoriginalgrunterrealizesthat,sinceshehasasserted“P”andalsoasserted“IfPthenQ”,shewilldeservedlybecalled“irrational”ifshecannotproduceagoodreasonforrefusingtoassert“Q”.　　Whereastheholiststakethesocialpracticeofcriticizingassertionstobeindispensableforbothmentalityandlanguage,theatomiststhinkthatwehadmindsbeforewehadlanguage,andindeedthatnon-humananimalshaveminds.Thisisbecausetheythinkthatthecrucialnotioninthisareaofphilosophyis“representation”ratherthan,asBrandomdoes,“inference”.Atomisminphilosophyofmindandlanguageiscloselytiedtotheideathatcognitivesciencewillhelpusseethemindasthecentralnervoussystembylinkingupphysiologicalrepresentationsoftheenvironment,suchasretinalpatternsandcochlearreverberations,withmentalrepresentations.Atomiststhinkthattoexplainhowhumanbeingswereabletolearn\nthetruthabouthowthingsinthephysicalworldworkwemustrelatethelinguisticrepresentationswhichmakeupourscientifictheoriestomoreprimitivelinguisticrepresentationsand,ultimately,toperceptualrepresentations.　　ThehopethatcognitivesciencewillhelpusunderstandwhywearesospecialisalegacyfromLocke.Itderivesfromhissuggestionthatthemindshouldbeviewedasastorehouseofsimpleandcomplexideas.ThissuggestionledtoHume’sdeliberatelyprovocativereferenceto“thereasonofanimals”,nineteenth-centuryassociationistpsychology,Ayer’slinguistifiedversionofHumeandMcDowell’slinguistifiedversionofKant.HoliststhinkthatitwaspitythatLockeputusonthispath,andtheyblameDescartesformisleadinghim.ForDescartesprovidedLockewiththeimageofthemindasaninnertheater-aroomequippedwithascreenonwhichimmaterialrepresentationsaredisplayedandinwhichanimmaterialspectatordecideswhattheextra-mentalworldislikeonthebasisoftheclarityorthecoherenceofthoserepresentations.　　HolistsalsoblameDescartesfortheideathatthemindisathingthathasworkingsthatmightbebetterunderstood.Tothinkofitthisway-aswhatGilbertRylemockinglycalledanon-materialmechanism-is,theyargue,afundamentalmistake.Forthemindshouldbethoughtofnotasamysteriousentitybutasaclusterofcapacitiesbroughtintoexistencebytheenforcementofsocialnorms.Holiststhinkthatcognitivesciencemayhelpusunderstandsentiencebetter,forthenotionof\n“mechanismsofperception”doeshaveause.Aslongasyousticktosentience,anddonotgoontosapience,itmakessensetoconnectphysiologicalstateswithdispositionalresponses.But,holistsinsist,tohaveverycomplexdispositionalresponses,isnotyettohavementality,aslongastheseresponsesarenotsubjecttocriticismbyreferencetoprevailingsocialnorms.Eventhechimpanzees,afterall,havecomplexdispositionalresponses.　　Asholistsseethematter,thereisnothingintermediatebetweentheneuronsandthesocialpracticesforcognitivesciencetostudy.Tostudywhatmakeshumanbeingsspecial,andsoverydifferentfromthechimpanzees,istostudythosepractices-tostudyculture.Weneitherhavenorneedabridgebetweentheneuronsandthepractices,anymorethanweneedonebetweenhardwareandsoftware.Softwareisjustawayofputtinghardwaretouse,andcultureisjustawayofputtingourphysiologicalequipmenttouse.Tounderstandhowhardwareworksisonething,buttounderstandtheusestowhichitisputissomethingquitedifferent.Understandingelectricalcircuits,inthebrainorinthechips,doesnothingtohelpusunderstandhowthesophisticatedsoftwareofthe1990’sevolvedoutoftheprimitivesoftwareofthe1950’s.　　Theatomiststhink,toquoteStevenPinkeragain,that“thecomputationaltheoryofmind...isoneofthegreatideasinintellectualhistory,foritsolvesoneofthepuzzlesthatmakeupthemind-bodyproblem”.Thisisthepuzzlefirstposedby\nDescartes:theproblemofhowbeliefs,whichdonotseemtobephysicalobjects,cancausephysicalevents.Pinkersaysthatthecomputationaltheoryresolvestheparadoxbysayingthatbeliefsare　　information,incarnatedasconfigurationsofsymbols.The　　symbolsarephysicalstatesofbitsofmatter,likechipsin　　computerorneuronsinthebrain.Theysymbolizethingsintheworldbecausetheyaretriggeredbythosethingsviaoursenseorgans...Eventuallythebitsofmatterconstitutingasymbolbumpintobitsofmatterconnectedtothemusclesandbehaviorhappens...Thecomputationaltheoryofmindthusallowsustokeepbeliefsanddesiresinourexplanationsofbehaviorwhileplantingthemsquarelyinthephysicaluniverse.Itallowsmeaningtocauseandbecaused.”(p.25)　　Fortheholists,however,thereneverwasamind-bodyproblemtobesolved,becausethereneverwerelittlementalentitiescalled“beliefs”,orlittlelinguisticentitiescalled“meanings”thatneededtobeplacedwithinthephysicaluniverse.Notallcausalexplanation,theholistssay,proceedsbypickingoutlittlethingsthatbumpintootherlittlethings.　　Atomismwentlargelyunchallengedamonganalyticphilosophersduringthe\nfirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury.Buttheholistreactionbeganaboutfiftyyearsago,withthepublicationofRyle’sTheConceptofMind,Wittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigations,Sellars’“EmpiricismandtheConceptofMind”,andQuine’s“TwoDogmasofEmpiricism”.Wittgenstein,asMichaelDummettrightlysays,castdoubtontheveryideaofasystematictheoryofmeaning.Quinethoughtthattheideathattherewereentitiescalled“meanings”associatedwithlinguisticexpressionswasarelicofAristotle’spre-Galileannotionsofscientificexplanation.RylethoughtthatPinker-likeprojectsofreplacinglittlespookyexplainerswithlittlenon-spookyexplainersresultedfromtakingseriouslyDescartes’sillyideathatwhatcouldn’tbeexplainedbyaphysicalmechanismhadtobeexplainedbyanon-physicalmechanism.SellarsfolloweduponWittgensteinbyarguingthatwhatmakeshumanbeingsspecialistheabilitytoarguewithoneanother,nottheabilitytohaveinnermentalstatesthataresomehowisomorphictostatesoftheenvironment.Foreveniftherearesuchstates,thefrogsandthechimpanzeeshavethemtoo.　　TheholistsofthepresentdayincludesuchphilosophersoflanguageasDonaldDavidson,whofollowsuponQuine,andBrandom,whofollowsuponSellars,andalsoahostofphilosophersofmindwhoarefollowinguponRyleandWittgenstein-notablyVincentDescombes,JenniferHornsby,HelenSteward,ArthurCollins,andLynnBaker.TheseholistsarelockedinbattlewithatomistssuchasNoamChomskyandhisstudentPinker,JerryFodor,andwithalltheotherphilosophersandcognitivescientistswhoaretryingtodevelopwhatFodorcalls“a\nsemantictheoryformentalrepresentations”.Holiststhinkthatthereisneitheraneedforsuchatheorynoranychanceofgettingit.　　3.Analyticclarityandconversationalclarity　　Somuchformysketchofthebattlelineswithincontemporaryanalyticphilosophyofmindandlanguage.IhopethatwhatIhavesaidhelpstoexplainwhymanyatomistssuspectthatholismputstheveryideaofanalyticphilosophyindanger,whyphilosopherslikeThomasNagelseeWittgensteinandDavidsonasopeningthegatestobadphilosophyofthesortpracticedbyHegelandHeidegger,andwhyBrandomdescribeshimselfasaneo-Hegelian.Asthebattlebetweentheholistsandtheanalystshaswornon,ithascometolookmoreandmorelikeadisagreementaboutwhatsortofthingphilosophersshouldtakethemselvestobedoing,abouttheself-imageofthediscipline.　　Thisisbecause,ifphilosophyistobeanalytic,theremustbesomelittlethingstoanalyzebiggerthingsinto.PhilosophicalanalysisofthesortRussellenvisagedrequiresthattherebesuchthingsasconceptsormeaningsthatcanbeisolatedandtreatedaselementsofbeliefs.Butif,asWittgensteinsuggested,aconceptisjusttheuseofaword,andiftheproperuseofthewordsthatinterestphilosophersisalwaysgoingtobeamatterofcontroversy,itisnotclearhowphilosophicalanalysiscouldpossiblyhelp.Foraphilosopher’sclaimtohave\ndiscoveredthecontoursofaconceptwillalwaysbejustapersuasiveredefinitionofaword.Philosophers’diagnosesof“conceptualconfusion”look,fromaWittgensteinianpointofview,asdisingenuouswaysofgoingaboutthetransformationofculture,ratherthanwaysofmakingclearerwhathaspreviouslybeengoingon.　　Atomistphilosophyofmindrequiresthatmindsbeaggregatesofmentalrepresentations.If,asDavidsonclaims,thenotionof“representation”isofnouseinfiguringoutwhatbeliefssomeonehasorwhatherassertionsmean,thentheclaimthatcognitivesciencewillhelpusbetterunderstandwhatmakeshumanbeingsspecialseemsdubious.Fortruth,onDavidson’sview,isnotthesortofthingthatbeliefsandassertionscanbebumpedintohavingbytheirencounterswithbitsofnon-linguisticreality.Iftherearenointerestingisomorphismstobediscoveredbetweentruebeliefsandwhatthosebeliefsareabout---isomorphismsthatRussellandhisfollowerstookforgranted-thenweshallhavetogiveuptheideathatphilosophycanreconcileourcommon-sensicalintuitionswithoneanother.Wemayjusthavetopickandchooseamongthoseintuitions.Inparticular,wemayhavetotreat“correspondencewithreality”asametaphorwhichcannotbepressed.ThatwouldpermitustosetasidethequestionsthatRussellinvokedthethenotionoflogicalformtoanswer.　　ThethoughtthatRussellandhisfollowersputourdisciplineonthesecurepathofascienceapathisverydeartomostanalyticphilosophers,asistheclaimthat\ntraininginanalyticphilosophymakesforincreasedclarityofmind.Sooneofthereasonstheyresistholismisthefearthatiftheywalkawayfromthenaturalsciencestheywillopenthegatestoobscurantism.Philosophy,theysuggestwillreverttobeingwhatitwasinthepre-RusselliandaysofJowettandT.H.Green,orwhattheyfearitbecameintwentiethcenturyFrance-aspeciesofedifyingbelles-lettres.Thisiswhymanyanalyticphilosophersdisliketheideathatphilosophyisoneofthehumanities,andinsistthatitisoneofthesciences.　　Holists,however,seenomorepromiseininquiryintohowmindandlanguageworkthaninquiryintohowconversationworks.Sotheythinkthatthatthebestwecandointhewayofunderstandinghowmindandlanguageworkistotellstories,ofthesorttoldbySellarsandBrandom,abouthowmetalinguisticandmentalisticvocabulariescameintoexistenceinthecourseoftime,aswellasstoriesabouthowculturaltookoverfrombiologicalevolution.Thelatterstoriesrecounthowwegotoutofthewoodsandintothepaintedcaverns,outofthecavernsandintothevillages,andthenoutofthevillagesintothelawcourtsandthetemples.Thekindofunderstandingthatnarrativesofthissortgivesusisnotthesortthatwegetfromseeingmanydisparatethingsasmanifestationsofthesameunderlyingthing,butratherthesortthatcomesfromexpandingourimaginationbycomparingthesocialpracticesofourdaywiththoseofpasttimesandpossiblefuturetimes.　　4.Determinateandindeterminate\nbeing　　Itwillhavebynowhavebecomeobviousthatmyownsympathiesarewiththeholists,andwithphilosopherswhotellstoriesratherthanofferinganalyses.Ithinkthatphilosophersshouldgiveuponthequestion“Whatistheplaceofmentalrepresentations,ormeanings,orvalues,inaworldofphysicalparticles?”Theyshoulddescribetalkaboutparticles,talkaboutbeliefs,andtalkaboutwhatoughttobedone,asculturalactivitiesthatfulfilldistinctpurposes.Theseactivitiesdonotneedtobefittedtogetherinasystematicway,anymorethanbasketballandcricketneedtobefittedtogetherwithbridgeandchess.AsIwassayinglastweek,themanypurposesthatareservedbyourvariousdiscoursesshouldnotbeviewedassubordinatetoanoverarchingprojectcalledofputtingallthepiecesofthepuzzletogether.Ifwehaveaplausiblenarrativeofhowwebecamewhatweare,andwhyweusethewordswedoaswedo,wehaveallweneedinthewayofself-understanding.　　OnewaytoepitomizethisviewistosaythatphilosophersshouldfollowCastoriadis’advicetogiveupwhathecalled“theassumptionthatonlydeterminatebeingisauthenticbeing”.Determinatebeingisthekindthatcanbegottenright,onceandforall.Therelationsbetweenmathematicalobjectsarelikethat.SoarethenamesoftheEnglishsovereignssincetheConquest,thoseofnineordersofangels,theapproximatenumberofpeoplewhodiedintheIraqWar,andthemeanannualrainfallinOxfordduringthetwentiethcentury.ExamplesofindeterminatebeingarethemeaningofHamlet,themoralcharacterofWinstonChurchill,andthepointofhuman\nexistence.　　Thedistinctionbetweendeterminateandindeterminatebeing,asIamdrawingit,issociological.Determinacyisamatterofdegree-degreeofcontroversialityfortheinhabitantsofaparticulartimeandplace.Tothinkofonlydeterminatebeingasauthenticistoreplaceausefulsociologicaldistinctionofdegreewithauselessmetaphysicaldistinctionofkind.Toadoptthelatterdistinctionistothinkthatthereisa“matteroffact”aboutsometopicsbutnotaboutothers,andtotakeseriouslythedebatesaboutrealismandanti-realismthatanalyticphilosophers,butnooneelse,findprofitable.Philosopherswhothinkthatonlydeterminatebeingisauthenticbeingaretheonlypeoplewhoareinterestedinthequestionofhowtosituatevalues,orminds,inaworldofelementaryparticles,howtomakeroomfortheinauthenticintheauthenticworld.Youwillenterintothesedebatesonlyifyoubelievethatallbeingsfittogetherlikepiecesofajigsawpuzzle,andthatbeingsthatcannotbemadetofitareinauthentic,notreallypiecesofthepuzzleatall.　　Theanalogywithfittingtogetherpiecesofapuzzleisentirelyappropriateformanyareasofinquiry-forexample,paleontology,particlephysicsandphilology.Theseareallareasofcultureinwhichitisplausibletothinkthatwemayeventuallygetthingsright.Theideathatphilosophycanbecomesuchanareabybeingputonthesecurepathofascience,theideathatmotivatedRussellandtheotherfoundersoftheanalyticmovementinphilosophy,remainsplausibleonlyaslongasconceptsand\nmeaningsareseenasisolablefromsocialpracticesandfromhistory.Foronlyifsuchisolationispossiblewouldwebeabletoidentifyatomsofthoughtoroflanguagewhoserelationswithoneanotherwouldremainconstantnomatterwhatuseismadeofthem,inthewaythattherelationsbetweenbitsofhardwareremainconstantnomatterwhatprogramisbeingrun.SuspicionofattemptsatsuchisolationbecomesexplicitinWittgenstein’sPhilosophicalInvestigations,whichiswhyRussell’sreviewofthatbookwassofurious.Russellwasappalledbythesuggestionthatwestopaskingaboutmeaningandstartaskingaboutuse.HewasrighttosuspectthatifWittengesteinweretakenseriously,philosophywouldnotbeamatterofanalysis,andth=emovementheinitiatedwouldberepudiated.　　Onceonegivesuponatomism,onewillceasetousemetaphorsofgettingdowntothehardfactsaswellasmetaphorsoflookinguptowardgrandoverarchingstructures.Onewillstarttreatinghardnessasjustnon-controversialityandwillbegintowonder,asWittgensteindid,whylogicwasoncethoughttobesomethingsublime.OnemayinsteadstartthinkingoflogicasBrandomdoes-asadeviceformakingoursocialnormsexplicit.Thiswillleadstotakingchangesinsocialnormsseriously,tosubstitutinghorizontalforverticalmetaphorsofintellectualprogress,andtoabandoningthenotionthatmindorlanguagearethingsthatcanbegottenrightonceandforall.　　AsIsuggestedlastweek,mostphilosopherswhotakeHegelseriously\nsubstitutequestionsaboutwhatmakesus,inourtimeandplace,specialforquestionsaboutwhatmakeshumanbeingsingeneralspecial.Theyreplacequestionsaboutwhatwesharewitheveryhumaneverywherewithquestionsabouthowwedifferfromourancestorsandhowourdescendantsmightdifferfromus.Anotherwaytoputthepointistosaythathistoricismmakesusthinkindeterminatebeingmoreinterestingthandeterminatebeing.Itleadsustothinkofthemostimportanthumanactivitynotasfittingtogtherpiecesofapuzzlebutasreinterpretingandrecontextualizingthepast.　　ThisdifferenceofopinionaboutwhatitisimportanttothinkaboutexplainswhywhatIhavebeencalling“narrativephilosophy”isoftencalled“hermeneuticphilosophy”.Theterm“hermeneutic”signalsashiftofinterestfromwhatcanbegottenrightonceandforalltowhatcanonlybereinterpretedandrecontextualizedoverandoveragain.ThatiswhyBrandom’sparadigmofinquiryisthecommonlawratherthanthediscoveryofphysicalmicrostructure.Amodelwhichwoulddoaswellisliterarycriticism,whosenecessaryinconclusivenessisnicelyexplainedinaremarkthatBrandomquotesfromT.S.Eliot:“whathappenswhenaworkofartiscreatedissomethingthathappenssimultaneouslytoalltheworksofartthatprecededit”.　　BrandomgeneralizesEliot’spointbysayingthatHegeltaughtushowtothinkofaconceptonthemodelofaperson-asthekindofthingthatisunderstoodonlywhenoneunderstandsitshistory.Thebestanswertoaquestionaboutwhoa\npersonreallyisastoryaboutherpastthatprovidesacontextinwhichtoplaceherrecentconduct.Themostusefulresponsetoquestionsaboutaconceptistotellastoryaboutthewaysinwhichtheusesofacertainclusterofwordshavechangedinthepast,asapreludetoadescriptionofthedifferentwaysinwhichthesewordsarebeingusednow.Theclaritythatisachievedwhenthesedifferentwaysaredistinguishedfromoneanother,andwheneachisrenderedintelligiblebybeingplacedwithinanarrativeofpastusage,isanalogoustotheincreasedsympathywebringtothesituationofapersonwhoselife-historywehavelearned.Suchnarrativesdecreasethetemptationtousesuchepithetsas“nonsense”,“unintelligible”and“confused.”　　Mostofthephilosopherswhosebooksreadmorelikenarrativesthanlikeanalyseshavenodoubtsaboutthephysicalistclaimthatthebehaviorofphysicistsandpoetsissupervenientuponthatofelectronsandprotons.Buttheythinkthatexplainingtherelationsofthemorecomplexentitiestosimplerentities,thougheminentlyusefulinthenaturalsciences,havenotdonemuchforphilosophy.Breakingdownorgansintocells,cellsintomolecules,andmoleculesintoparticles,permitsveryusefulinterventionsincausalprocesses.Butphilosophicalanalysesofconceptsusedtodescribehigherlevelentitiesintermsofthoseusedtodescribelowerlevelentitiesdonotfacilitateanysuchinterventions.Wherastechnologykeepsscientificanalyseshonest,nothingexercisesasimilarcontroloverphilosophicalanalyses.\n　　Themarginalizationofphilosophyincontemporaryintellectuallifemeansthattheonlypeoplewhotrytokeepphilosophyprofessorshonestareotherphilosophyprofessors.Thisis,ofcourse,afairlycommonstateofaffairsintheacademicworld.Classicalphilologists,forexample,arekepthonestonlybyotherclassicalphilologists.Butthephilologistsdonotclaimtobedoingsomethingthateverybodyshouldbeinterestedin,whereasphilosophersdo.Whenexplainingtobudget-cutterswhyitwouldbebettertoabolishtheclassicsdepartmentthanthephilosophydepartment,theyfrequentlyclaimthattheirdisciplinelooksintobasic,fundamentalissues-questionsthatdeservetheattentionofanyonewithanypretensionstointellectualsophistication.　　ThequestionthatIsaidwascommontoPlato,Hegel,NietzscheandRussell-whatmakeshumanbeingsspecial?-doeshaveagoodclaimonourattention.IfoneacceptsPlato’sratherthanNietzsche’sanswertoit,thenthestudyofthenatureofmind,oroflanguage,caneasilyseemnecessaryandurgent.Sothereisaprimafacieplausibilitytotheideathatthesortofthinganalyticphilosophersofmindandlanguagearedoingisworththeattentionoftheeducatedpublicasawhole.ThisclaimcanbemadetosoundevenmoreplausiblebypointingoutthattheimportanceofLockeandKanttotheculturalhistoryoftheWest,andnotingthatcontemporaryanalyticphilosophersareaskingthesamequestionsLockeandKantdid.　　Hegel,however,thoughtthatbothLockeandKant,thoughtheywereof\ninvaluableservicetothecauseofhumanfreedom,hadneverthelessaskedbadquestionsbecausetheydidnotgraspthatself-consciousbeingshavehistoriesratherthannatures.IfonefollowsBrandominthinkingofamentalisticvocabularyasawayofmakingexplicitcertainsocialnormsratherthan,asLockedid,adescriptionofentitieslocatedbetweentheears,thenonecanalsofollowHegelinsayingthathumanbeingsareinthemselveswhattheyareforthemselves.ForHegelandBrandom,asforSartreandHeidegger,humanbeingsareindeterminatebeings.Likethelawsandthepoemsthatmakeuswhatweare,werequireendlessreinterpretation.Wecanneverbegottenrightonceandforall.　　5.Conclusion　　Theselectureshavebeenanexampleofnarrativephilosophy,andIshallendthembysummarizingmystoryabouttheplaceofphilosophyinmodernWesternculture.Itbegins,intheseventeenthcentury,withtheexplicitformkulationofwhatbecamethetextbookproblemsaboutmindandbody,thescopeofhumanknowledge,andthefreedomofthewill.TheseproblemswerecreatedbythedifficultyofreconcilingthewaysinwhichwehumanbeingsintheWesthadbecomeaccustomedtodescribingourselveswiththerealizationthatDemocritusandLucretiushadbeenrightallthetimeabouthowthingswork.DiscussionoftheseproblemsbysuchwritersasLocke,Spinoza,HumeandKantplayedanimportantpartinthesecularizationofculturethatwasencouragedbythisrealization.\n　　Buttheseproblemshadbeenmilkeddrybythetimethattwoeventsdivertedtheattentionofthenowthoroughlysecularizedintellectuals.ThesetwoeventsweretheFrenchRevolutionandtheRomanticMovement.Hegelwasthefirstofthecanonicallygreatphilosopherstospotthesignificanceoftheseeventsandtotryto,eepphilosophyaucourant.Bythetimeof,NietzscheandDewey,mostintellectuals,andevenmostphilosophyprofessors,hadbeco,,meconvincedthatitwasHistoryratherthaneitherGodorNaturethatsettheculturalagenda.　　Nevertheless,insomecountriesthephilosophyprofessorstriedtohangontothepre-Hegelianproblematic.Theyreviveditbylinguistifyingit-amovethatresultedinbothgreaterprofessionalismandgreatermarginality.Thelinguisticturn,however,eventuallyproduceditsownrejectionoftheseventeenthcenturyproblematicintheworkofthelaterWittgenstein,anditsownversionofhistoricisminthatofSellarsandBrandom.ThesedevelopmentshavemadeitpossiblefortheanalyticphilosopherstotakeseriouslyHegel’sclaimthatphilosophyisitstimeheldinthought.Whethertheywilltakeadvantageofthisopportunityremainstobeseen.转自思与文网刊